UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

PRINCIPAL ISSUES IN RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION; MAJOR APPRAISALS AND ESTIMATES OF THE SOVIET UNION; REPORTS ON DEVELOPMENTS OF SIGNIFICANCE WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION OF CONCERN TO RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

No. 491

INR files

National Intelligence Estimate

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] 8 January 1952.
NIE 48

LIKELIHOOD OF THE DELIBERATE INITIATION OF FULL-SCALE WAR BY THE USSR AGAINST THE US AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES PRIOR TO THE END OF 1952

THE PROBLEM

To estimate whether the USSR is likely deliberately to initiate general war, i.e., full-scale war against the US and its Western allies, prior to the end of 1952.

CONCLUSION

On balance we believe it unlikely that the Kremlin will deliberately initiate general war during 1952. We believe that the Kremlin

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2Files of National Intelligence Estimates, Special Estimates, and Special National Intelligence Estimates, retained by the Directorate for Regional Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
3National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) were high-level interdepartmental reports presenting authoritative appraisals of vital foreign policy problems. NIEs were drafted by officers from those agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), discussed and revised by interdepartmental groups coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), approved by the IAC, circulated under the aegis of the CIA to the President, appropriate officers of cabinet level, and the National Security Council. The Department of State provided all political and some economic sections of NIEs.

The cover sheet to this NIE bears the following note:

"The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 7 January 1952."
prefers to pursue its objectives through methods short of deliberate resort to war with the US and its allies, and moreover, probably estimates that possibilities for progress through such methods will continue to exist through 1952. We believe that in these circumstances the Kremlin is likely to be deterred from a deliberate resort to war with the US and its allies in 1952, by the certainty of extensive destruction in the USSR as well as by the risk that the Soviet system might be destroyed.

We recognize, however, the continuing grave danger of a general war in 1952 resulting from a Kremlin action or series of actions not intended to have that result, or even from actions which, in the Kremlin’s view, entailed that risk, but not the certainty thereof. We recognize also the danger that general war might arise from Soviet-initiated hostilities which the Kremlin intended to limit to a particular area.

**DISCUSSION**

**General Considerations**

**Soviet Objectives**

1. The principal immediate Soviet objectives evidently are:
   a. To divide the West;
   b. To consolidate and extend Soviet power and influence wherever possible. (During the period under consideration Asia appears to offer the best opportunities);
   c. To prevent Western, West German, and Japanese rearmament;
   d. To prevent implementation of the US overseas-bases policy.

2. We believe the USSR, in pursuit of its objectives, will throughout the following period:
   a. Seek to maintain an advanced state of war-readiness and offset any increase in the capabilities of the US and its allies;
   b. Seek to prevent the development of any threat to the vital interests of the USSR or to Soviet control of the Satellites;
   c. Seek to expand the territorial limits of the Soviet orbit;
   d. Seek to undermine and secure control of governments not yet under Soviet domination;
   e. Seek to force countries of the free world to adopt a policy of neutrality in the East-West struggle and to deny their resources, including strategic sites, to the US and its allies.

**The Place of War in Soviet Strategy**

3. The basic strategy under which the Kremlin appears to have acted in the past employs the follow concepts:

   a. The preservation of the established communist state, the USSR, is essential to provide a secure base and strong support for revolution in other states. In turn, revolution in other countries is
necessary for the preservation and completion of the revolution in the USSR.

b. No permanent accommodation is possible between this State and the capitalist world. The doctrine of the impossibility of peaceful co-existence between communism and capitalism and the inevitability of ultimate frightful collision before one side or the other prevails remains valid.

c. Capitalism, in that it is subject to irreconcilable contradictions, bears within itself the seeds of its own destruction. Depressions, class conflict, economic rivalry, colonial awakening, etc., will weaken the capitalist world and create revolutionary situations. The USSR must provoke and exploit such situations through political warfare\(^4\) and, if appropriate, through the use of Soviet military force.

d. A grave danger exists and always will exist that the capitalist world, alarmed by the rising revolutionary tide, will unite to attack and destroy the USSR.

e. The USSR must seek to avoid the final world struggle until capitalist power has been sufficiently undermined, but must be ready at all times to assume the offensive if the situation should warrant it.

f. Recent Soviet pronouncements suggest that the Soviet rulers believe that the struggle between capitalism and Communism has reached an advanced stage in which the world is divided into two camps, and that the Western camp is now seeking not only to prevent the spread of the revolution, but also to destroy the Soviet-dominated camp.

4. It would be unsafe to take these Soviet concepts as an infallible guide to Soviet courses of action in the future. The USSR is a totalitarian state and experience suggests that totalitarian states are subject to internal pressures and compulsions which may result, without warning, in the use of foreign war as an instrument of national policy. However, Soviet use of war for this purpose can probably be better controlled than has been the case with respect to other totalitarian states in modern history. Therefore, Soviet courses of action can never be predicted with confidence. In particular the possibility of deliberate initiation of general war cannot be excluded at any time merely because such initiation would contradict past Soviet political strategy. Further, the possibility of deliberate initiation of general war cannot be excluded even if, judged from the outside, it seemed certain that the interests of the USSR would be better served by other courses of action.

\(^4\)Political warfare as here used includes all manner of political and economic pressure, diplomatic action in the UN and elsewhere, propaganda and front activities, Communist Party and Communist-controlled trade union activities, support of all kinds of revolutionary movements, and psychological warfare. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. While Soviet theory and practice offer no sure guide as to when and under what circumstances the USSR would deliberately resort to war against the US and its allies, they leave no doubt that the USSR is the implacable enemy of the non-Communist world. While in Soviet theory and practice war is an acceptable, and on occasion necessary, instrument for attaining Communist objectives, the Kremlin presumably prefers if possible to attain its objectives by courses of action short of resort to general war. However, Soviet theory and practice suggest that it would probably resort to armed attack at any time when:

a. Conditions are such that the USSR regarded the situation as highly favorable, or

b. No other method appeared available to counter what the Kremlin considered a threat to the preservation of the USSR.

Factors Which Might Deter the Kremlin From Deliberately Initiating War Against the US and Its Allies in 1952

Risks Involved and Uncertainty of Outcome

6. The Kremlin probably estimates that in the initial phase of a general war begun in 1952 Soviet and Soviet-controlled forces could seize and hold extensive and important areas of Europe and Asia and thereby enhance the USSR’s power position. It might also estimate that it could, at the very outset, deliver an atomic attack on the continental US of sufficient strength to reduce materially the US capability for countering Soviet operations. However, the Kremlin would probably not expect a Soviet atomic attack on the continental US to eliminate the threat of atomic counterattack and prevent the mobilization of the US industrial and military potential.

7. It is impossible to estimate the Kremlin’s conclusion with regard to the relative effectiveness of Soviet and US atomic warfare capabilities or with regard to the relative importance of atomic and conventional weapons in determining the issue of a war. The Kremlin would undoubtedly expect the West to react to Soviet initiation of a general war by launching an immediate atomic attack on the Soviet orbit, with consequent widespread destruction. We believe, however, that the Kremlin probably estimates that the USSR could survive this attack and maintain sufficient relative strength to carry on the war.

8. The Kremlin might believe that after the USSR had extended the areas under its control and survived the initial allied retaliation, it could fortify its newly-won positions and mobilize its newly-acquired resources. It might calculate that the economic and other losses suffered from continuing US attacks would be offset by the industrial and manpower resources it had acquired in Europe and
Asia. While the Kremlin would doubtless anticipate difficulties in establishing and maintaining firm control over the defeated populations and would also anticipate internal difficulties, its whole concept of state power suggests that it would expect to cope successfully with these problems.

9. In these circumstances the Kremlin might estimate that the resulting Soviet power position would deter the West from attempting to recover the areas overrun by the USSR. Furthermore, the Kremlin might believe that the loss of European and Asiatic resources, including manpower, might make it impossible for the US to carry the war through to a successful conclusion. The Kremlin would undoubtedly expect the US Government to be extremely tenacious and resourceful in its attempt to prosecute the war, even if denied support from Europe and Asia and subjected to increasing domestic pressure for peace. However, it might estimate that as the war dragged on opposition in the US to the war might rise to the point where the people would refuse to make the sacrifices necessary for the continuance of the conflict and thereby oblige the government to accept a compromise settlement.

10. On the other hand, the Kremlin would have to recognize that, despite initial Soviet successes at least a substantial portion of the power potential of the US would remain, and probably would in time be mobilized and brought to bear in a continuation of the struggle. In these circumstances the Kremlin would expect to be faced with operations of such magnitude as, at the least, to make the war long and costly to the USSR. The Kremlin would have to consider, in this event, whether or not it could survive the political, economic, psychological and military strains of a prolonged war of attrition.6

11. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be assumed that the Kremlin would necessarily expect to suffer defeat in a war with the US initiated in 1952. Nevertheless, the Kremlin would probably estimate that such a war would be a hazardous gamble on its part, in-

6The Director of Naval Intelligence would add at this point the following paragraph:

"In weighing this question, the Kremlin would have to recognize the grave danger that in a prolonged war of attrition the USSR would be subjected to persistent and growing air attacks, including atomic attacks, possibly resulting in serious economic breakdowns and the disruption of Soviet administrative and police machinery. With regard to newly-overrun areas the Kremlin would have to weigh the logistical and security problems of maintaining, across broad expanses of conquered territory, adequate support and control of extended Soviet forces; the danger of the ideological contamination of Soviet occupation forces; the possibility of widespread guerrilla resistance, probably supported and directed by the Allies; and perhaps most important, the possibility that Allied bridgeheads on the Continent might be held throughout the initial phase of the war, and might in time be built up sufficiently to permit a major counteroffensive." [Footnote in the source text.]
volving at a minimum the certainty of widespread destruction in the USSR and at the same time carrying with it the risk that the Soviet system itself would be destroyed. This uncertainty would probably make the Kremlin reluctant deliberately to initiate a general war in 1952.

Prospects for Achieving Soviet Aims By Methods Short of Deliberate Initiation of General War

12. The Kremlin probably estimates that opportunities will continue to exist, at least during the period of this estimate, for furthering both its immediate and long-run objectives by methods short of the deliberate initiation of full-scale war against the US and its allies.

13. Communist doctrine stresses the strategic importance of the so-called “colonial areas,” especially in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, which are regarded as having a vital bearing on the world power balance. Bringing these areas under Soviet control, or at least denying their assets to the West, is regarded as one of the most important steps in preparing for the final phase of the world struggle. At present the Kremlin probably sees in the instability of these areas favorable opportunities for early Communist gains.

14. Although probably recognizing that it has little chance in 1952 of making territorial gains in Europe without deliberate resort to general war, the Kremlin probably believes that current and future economic difficulties, particularly in the UK and France, and divergent interests and attitudes among the Western Powers may prevent the establishment of a position of strength in the West. Furthermore these difficulties may make Western Europe increasingly susceptible to various possible Soviet maneuvers, such as the “peace” campaign, the relaxation of tension, trade overtures, exploitation of the fear of war, and intimidation by the display of military force, and may make possible the growth of the Communist movement in the West.

Factors Which Might Induce the Kremlin Deliberately To Initiate General War

15. In view of the above considerations we believe it unlikely that the Kremlin would deliberately initiate general war during 1952 solely for the purpose of expanding the area under its control. With respect to China we believe that the USSR would react to the progressive expansion of the present conflict in Korea by giving increased aid to the Chinese Communists, even to the extent of committing Soviet forces and thereby creating a de facto war between the US and the USSR in the Far East, but would probably not deliberately initiate general war.
16. If, however, the Kremlin concluded that a Western attack on the USSR were imminent and unavoidable, and that Soviet chances of surviving such attack would be improved by seizing the initiative and attacking first, it would almost certainly do so. We have no way of knowing what interpretation the Soviet leaders may be placing upon the information available to them concerning Western plans and preparations. But in view of apparent longstanding Kremlin concern over any real or imagined threat to Soviet security, of Marxist warnings over the ever-present danger of capitalist attack on the Communist world, of expressed Soviet suspicion of various recent Western military measures, and of various recent statements by Western public figures and of articles in the Western press, we believe that the Kremlin is probably disturbed over Western intentions.

17. There are, however, cogent considerations which probably lead the Kremlin to believe that a deliberate Western attack during 1952 is unlikely. The West will still be far from that degree of mobilization which the Kremlin probably considers necessary for a successful attack on the USSR. Western forces on the Eurasian continent will still be far from achieving effective offensive capabilities against the present military power of the USSR and the growing military forces of the Satellites.

18. Even if the Kremlin did not anticipate an imminent attack by the West, it would probably deliberately initiate general war if it came to the conclusion that an irreversible adverse shift in the balance of military power were developing, that it could not otherwise be checked or countered, and that it constituted a grave threat to Soviet security.

19. The Kremlin may estimate that already the balance of military power is shifting to its disadvantage because of: (a) progressive integration of the West; (b) the increase in Western defense production; (c) recent Western mobilization measures and the prospect of German and Japanese rearmament; and (d) the increasing atomic capabilities of the US.

20. However, we believe it unlikely that the Kremlin will, during 1952, conclude that the foregoing developments will necessarily result in a major shift in the balance of military power. The Kremlin probably foresees many difficulties in the implementation of a vigorous, united and lasting Western program for building military strength and corresponding opportunities for exploiting these difficulties. It may estimate that sooner or later such a program will fail because of political and economic difficulties among and within the nations of the free world, and that meanwhile the Soviet bloc, firmly under Kremlin control, can continue to improve its relative power position.
21. On balance we believe it unlikely that the Kremlin will deliberately initiate general war during 1952. We believe that the Kremlin prefers to pursue its objectives through methods short of deliberate resort to war with the US and its allies, and, moreover, probably estimates that possibilities for progress through such methods will continue to exist through 1952. We believe that in these circumstances the Kremlin is likely to be deterred from a deliberate resort to war with the US and its allies in 1952 by the certainty of extensive destruction in the USSR as well as by the risk that the Soviet system might be destroyed.

22. We recognize, however, the continuing grave danger of a general war in 1952 resulting from a Kremlin action or series of actions not intended to have that result, or even from actions which, in the Kremlin's view, entailed that risk, but not the certainty thereof. We recognize also the danger that general war might arise from Soviet-initiated hostilities which the Kremlin intended to limit to a particular area.

No. 492

700.00(S)/1-2452: Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 24, 1952—8:05 a. m.

US-UK DISCUSSIONS ON USSR

In recent top-level US-UK discussions on the USSR, we expressed the view that the primary objective of the regime is to maintain itself in power first in the USSR and then to maintain its influence in the satellite areas. We said we did not think that our greatest danger lay in the possibility of a mass attack on western Europe but rather in creeping actions taken through satellites in parts of the world which would exhaust the western powers, such as is now taking place in Indochina. We therefore concluded that the main lines of military policy, as laid down in the report of the NATO Wise Men Committee, for 1952 and 1953 were correct—i.e., not to attempt to create forces beyond the capacity of ourselves and our Allies to maintain but to create sufficient force to make any action by the USSR in Europe too dangerous to be attempted.

Prime Minister Churchill expressed the opinion that the central factor in Soviet policy is fear and that the Soviets fear our friendship more than our enmity. He hoped that the growing strength of the West would reverse this, so that the Soviets would fear our enmity more than our friendship and would thus be led to seek our friendship.

ACHESON

No. 493

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Kirk)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] February 4, 1952.

Subject: Meeting with the President
Participants: Harry S. Truman
Ambassador Alan G. Kirk

The President received me at 12:05 this date and we talked until 12:30.

He expressed regret at my leaving Moscow but recalled his own agreement that a third winter there would not be practicable. He is pleased with the selection of George Kennan, and I endorsed this nomination heartily.¹

The President said the dates of acceptance of my resignation and the nomination of Mr. Kennan would be worked out by the Department and referred to him.²

We discussed the proceedings in the General Assembly, wherein I pointed out the efforts of Vishinsky to sway Committee No. 1 and the General Assembly into voting for the immediate and unconditional prohibition of the atomic bomb, thus by majority vote and before any safeguards have been established, the Soviets would

¹President Truman announced on Dec. 26, 1951, that he had acceded to the wish of Ambassador Alan G. Kirk to resign in the near future. The President also announced his intention to nominate George F. Kennan, then on leave from the Foreign Service of the United States, as Kirk’s successor as Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Regarding the Kennan appointment, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. iv, Part 2, pp. 1663 and 1673.

Ambassador Kirk left Moscow on Oct. 6, 1951, in order to serve as an adviser to the U.S. Delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly, held in Paris, Nov. 6, 1951–Feb. 5, 1952.

²Ambassador Kirk’s letter of resignation to the President dated Feb. 5 and the President’s letter of acceptance of Feb. 7 were announced by the White House on the latter date. Kennan’s nomination to be Ambassador to the Soviet Union was also presented to the Senate on Feb. 7.
gain tremendous advantage over the free world. The President
fully understood this point. 3

Then I mentioned the attempts of the Soviet Delegation to sow
dissension among the various Powers or groups of Powers in the
free world, pointing out that happily in this regard little or no suc-
cess had been achieved. The President was cognizant of these ef-
forts and expressed pleasure at their failure.

We talked a little bit about Mr. Stalin's health. I said that our
Embassy in Moscow at the time of my departure had no concrete
evidence of failing health on the part of Mr. Stalin. It was recalled
that Stalin had been present in the Bolshoi Theatre on the anni-
versary of Lenin's death on January 21, 1952. We then touched
upon the matter of Stalin giving "agreement in principle", but
finding the other members of the Politburo or the bureaucrats fail-
ing to implement these general principles.

I referred to the progress made in education among the people of
the Soviet Union, and we speculated on the possibility that with in-
creased knowledge the capacity to read and to think for themselves
would increase and the people of the Soviet Union might—at some
distant date—begin to pass their own judgment on the system of
government under which they now live.

On taking leave of the President I thanked him for his trust and
confidence, and he said very pleasantly that he had been pleased
with what had been done.

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3For documentation on these events, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. 1, pp. 616 ff.

No. 494

601.6111/2-752

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European
Affairs (Perkins) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] February 7, 1952.

Subject: Regulation of Travel of Soviet Officials in the United
States

In accordance with the discussion concerning the imposition of
tavel regulations on Soviet officials held at your Staff Meeting on
January 31, this matter was referred for inter-departmental consid-
eration by the Intelligence Advisory Committee. The IAC met Feb-
uary 7 and all interested agencies concurred in the proposal as
submitted to them based on the results of the discussion at your

1Drafted by Davis (EUR/EE) and approved by Barbour (EE).
Staff Meeting.² Attached is a paper explaining the proposal with Annex I containing a brief history of travel restrictions placed on United States and other foreign officials in the USSR and Annex II which contains the text of the note to be sent to the Soviet Embassy in Washington.³

Only one change has been made in the note as submitted to the IAC which has been done at the suggestion of the Department of Defense. This will require that in the case of Soviet military personnel, notification should be sent to the Department of Army, Navy or Air, as appropriate. Previously the note had stated that notification in the case of Soviet military personnel should be sent to the Department of Defense.

In accordance with your expressed desire at your Staff Meeting on January 31, the proposed action is now submitted to you for final approval.

If you approve this proposed action,⁴ we recommend that 48 hours in advance of the delivery of the note to the Soviet Embassy, we inform the House Foreign Affairs Committee in Executive Session of our intended action. Mr. Fisher with Mr. Barbour testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 6 and found great interest on the part of the members of the Committee on the subject of travel restrictions.

We also recommend that simultaneously we inform the NATO Council of Deputies of our intended action. After the Staff meeting on January 31 our Deputy on the Council was instructed to inform his colleagues of our contemplated action. He was informed that our final action would not be dependent upon discussion or decision of the Council of Deputies. However, we believe it advisable to give the Deputies and thus to their governments at least 48 hours advance notice of our intended action.

²In a memorandum of Feb. 13 to Assistant Secretary Perkins, Special Assistant W. Park Armstrong quoted from the minutes of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) meeting of Feb. 7 dealing with the question of the regulation of travel of Soviet officials. According to the quoted material, the IAC action-decision reads as follows:

“...The IAC concurred in the proposal for the regulation of travel of Soviet officials in the U.S. as proposed by the Department of State, it being understood that the Department of State is going to make arrangements with the FBI for notification of every proposed trip by Soviet officials.” (601.6111/2-1352)

³Annexes I and II are not printed here. For texts of the note ultimately presented to the Soviet Embassy in Washington on Mar. 10 and the paper (Annex I) released to the press by the Department of State on the same day, see Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 24, 1952, p. 451.

⁴Secretary Acheson took up the question of the regulation of travel of Soviet officials at his meeting with President Truman on Feb. 11; see the memorandum of conversation, infra.
Recommendations:

It is recommended that (1) you approve the imposition of travel regulations on Soviet officials in the United States in accordance with the proposal approved by IAC, and (2) you approve informing of our intended action members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in Executive Session as well as the Council of Deputies 48 hours in advance of the delivery of our note to the Soviet Embassy.

[Attachment]

Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Regulation of Travel of Soviet Officials in the United States

On January 15 the Soviet Government greatly increased its previous travel restrictions on American officials in the USSR. The history and nature of these restrictions, which have existed since 1941, are described in Annex I.  

The Department of State considers that the time has now come to regulate the travel of Soviet officials in the United States not on a security basis but solely on the basis of reciprocity in the treatment accorded to official representatives of each government by the receiving state. The suggested method of application of this regulation is set forth in a draft note to the Soviet Ambassador at Washington, which forms Annex II of this memorandum.  

Our regulation will apply only to Soviet official personnel assigned to the Embassy in Washington, to Soviet newspaper correspondents whose place of work is Washington and to Soviet personnel of Amtorg in New York.

Although the proposed regulation of the travel of Soviet personnel in the United States is less onerous than the restrictions applied to American officials in the USSR, the Department has drafted the proposed note with the purpose of maintaining a flexible position which would enable us to forbid a proposed journey by a Soviet official, if such were thought expedient in the light of Soviet restrictive practices on our official personnel in Moscow. Ambassador-designate Kennan has approved this proposed procedure and has expressed the desire to be given the authority, if the occasion

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6Documentation in Department of State files indicates that an earlier draft of this paper was prepared in the Office of Eastern European Affairs and served as the basis for discussion at the Secretary of State's daily staff meeting on Jan. 31, 1952, as requested by the Secretary.

6Annex I is not printed here, but see footnote 3, above.

7Annex II is not printed here, but see footnote 3, above.
arises after his arrival in the Soviet Union, to inform Soviet authorities that a relaxation in Soviet travel restrictions will be met by a relaxation in the regulation of travel placed by this Government on Soviet official personnel in Washington.

The Department has informed the United States Deputy on the NATO Council of Deputies in London of this proposed action and has instructed him to inform his colleagues of the measure being contemplated. He has been instructed to say that while a final United States Government position has not yet been reached, we would like to obtain from the other Deputies an expression of the views of their governments whether they intend to regulate the travel of Soviet official personnel in their respective countries. However, our final action will not be dependent upon any discussion or decision by the NATO Council of Deputies.

Secretary Acheson has approved of the procedure for regulating the travel of Soviet official personnel in the United States as outlined above. It is desired, however, to have the comments of other interested government agencies and their concurrence in the action finally taken.

No. 495

601.6111/2-1152

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] February 11, 1952.

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT

Item 2. Travel Regulations on Soviet Personnel

I went over this matter with the President, explaining to him what the Government had done to foreign diplomats, the nature of our proposed regulations, the fact that they were based on reciprocity and not security, and why similar restrictions were not at this time proposed for Soviet personnel in the United States.

The President approved. He asked that I address a memorandum to him for his files, stating that pursuant to his authorization of this morning we would send the attached note regarding regulation for travel of personnel to the Soviet Ambassador. We should then attach a copy of the note. We should also in the memorandum tell

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1For the antecedents to this issue, see Perkins' memorandum, supra.
him when we would send the note and release the matter to the press.  

In a memorandum of Feb. 14 to the President, Acting Secretary James C. Webb explained that the Department would send the note to the Soviet Embassy on Feb. 16 and would announce the action to the press on Feb. 18. Responding to requests for delay from several NATO nations, the Department postponed delivery of the note pending further discussion of the matter at the North Atlantic Council session in Lisbon, Feb. 20–25. The note was delivered on Mar. 10.

No. 496

Editorial Note

The United States Senate confirmed the nomination of George F. Kennan as Ambassador to the Soviet Union on March 13 and President Truman announced the appointment the following day. Regarding Kennan’s nomination, see footnotes 1 and 2, Document 493. For Kennan’s brief account of Senate consideration of his nomination, see Kennan, Memoirs, 1950–1963, pages 106–107.

Kennan paid an official call on President Truman at the White House on April 1. No official record of the meeting has been found. In his own recollection of the meeting (ibid., page 107), Kennan indicates that the President gave him “no instructions of any kind”.

Kennan took the oath of office as Ambassador to the Soviet Union on April 20. In a statement issued to the press on the occasion of the oath-taking, Kennan said the following:

“My job in Moscow, as I see it, will be to implement the policies of the U.S. Government within the area of responsibility given to me. The Embassy at Moscow is only one small part of the machinery for the implementation of our foreign policy and its effectiveness is always going to depend on the extent to which the Ambassador there bears this in mind and contrives to function as a member of a team. The opportunities for service must be determined, as in the case of any other diplomatic mission, largely by circumstances, and I cannot foresee them at this time. I will be happy if the work at Moscow gives me a chance to make a contribution to the reduction of existing tensions and the improvement of the international atmosphere. Those are objectives which seem to me urgently desirable and I see no reason why they should not be within the realm of possibility, if the desire is reciprocated.” (Department of State Bulletin, April 21, 1952, page 643)

According to his account (Memoirs, 1950–1963, page 107), Kennan luncheoned with Secretary Acheson on April 2. Acheson was “cordial but very reserved” and gave no instructions to Kennan on his mission. No official record of this luncheon meeting has been found in Department of State files.
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador-designate to the Soviet Union (Kennan)\(^1\)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] April 3, 1952.

Subject: Luncheon Conversation at the Soviet Embassy

Participants: Ambassador Panyushkin
Mr. Boris I. Karavaev, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy
Ambassador-designate George F. Kennan
Richard H. Davis, EE

I telephoned Ambassador Panyushkin on April 2 to invite him to have luncheon with me and one other officer of the Department and was met by his counter-invitation that I have luncheon with him today at 1 p. m. at the Soviet Embassy, which I accepted.

We were met at the door of the Embassy by Mr. Myshkov and escorted upstairs to the large reception room facing 16th Street where Ambassador Panyushkin and Mr. Karavaev were waiting to greet us. During the five minute conversation before luncheon over a cocktail seated in the reception room, our conversation was devoted to climate and meteorological conditions.

At the luncheon table at which there were only the four of us, served by a single maid, the conversation took a more natural, practical turn. I had the impression during the course of our conversation at the table and afterwards over coffee that the Soviet Ambassador and his Counselor were pleased at the opportunity to receive us in this informal fashion and to talk in general about things without undue emphasis on political differences. I purposely avoided contradicting or entering into a debate with them upon some of the ideas they expressed.

Possibly the chief points of interest in our two hours’ conversation, conducted entirely in Russian, were these:

1) The Ambassador spoke of the shallowness of understanding in this country which was prevalent not only among average Americans but even among those intellectually above average with relation to the Soviet Union and its purposes. Both he and Mr. Karavaev told stories of how their countrymen when identifying themselves as Russians had encountered on the part of Americans incredulity and expressions of “Impossible, where is your beard?” or

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\(^1\)Drafted by Davis and read, corrected, and approved by Kennan. Kennan’s diary (Memoirs, 1950–1963, pp. 107–108) contains a brief description of this luncheon meeting.
“Why aren’t you black?” The Ambassador stated with obvious feeling that he had heard intelligent Americans refer to his countrymen as “barbarians.”

This line of thought among other things which the Ambassador said revealed that they have become aware and sensitive to those reflections of present tensions in the relations between our two countries, which they have personally encountered.

2) The Ambassador talked at some length about “correspondents” and “journalists”, the former being defined as those who wrote down without understanding that which they heard and saw and the “journalists” being described as those who observed well and understood the implications behind facts and events which they were able to interpret for their readers. He then went on to refer to Walter Lippman, Arthur Krock and James Reston, about whom he seemed to have a respectful opinion. Lippman, he thought, was experienced and an independent thinker. He was particularly curious about Reston, whose position and qualifications apparently baffled him.

3) The Soviet Ambassador then brought up the recent replies made by J. V. Stalin to the questions of certain U.S. newspaper editors and complained that Stalin’s statements were so often brushed aside as mere propaganda in this country. He referred in a serious tone to Stalin’s statements as “most authoritative—more so than those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”

It may be that, in view of Lippman’s recent articles criticizing our reply to the Soviet note on Germany and Stalin’s reply to the effect that he considered this an opportune time for the unification of Germany, the Ambassador was attempting indirectly to draw me out on our attitude toward the German question. He did not press the matter when he failed to obtain any reaction.

4) At about this time, Mr. Karavaev broke in to remark that there were not any questions which the Soviet Government was not willing to discuss with us, that the Soviet Government, as it had made clear by repeated statements, was willing at any time to enter upon discussions leading to a settlement of any existing problems.

5) The Ambassador spoke of his service in China with evident nostalgia and with warm feeling for the great qualities of the Chinese people. He revealed that his twenty year old son had always had an inclination toward the study of the Chinese and other Sibepian languages and was now studying at the Oriental Institute in Moscow. His other son, fifteen years old, had always had, on the other hand, a penchant for mechanical things although still in the 8th year class.

In our conversation I tried and, I think, succeeded in conveying the impression that I had no special proposals to make after my

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2On Mar. 31, Stalin replied to four questions submitted to him by a group of American editors. In his answers, Stalin indicated that he thought war was no closer than it had been two or three years earlier and that a meeting of the heads of the great powers might be helpful. For text of the questions and answers, see New York Times, Apr. 2, 1952; Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1952, p. 109; or Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1952, p. 224.
arrival in Moscow; that the problems between our countries were not easy nor quick of solution and that I saw only a long road ahead if we were to improve the present atmosphere.

The Soviet Ambassador obviously had had no time to receive instructions from Moscow as to the conduct of his conversation at our luncheon, and it is perhaps for this reason that he himself did not attempt to turn it into a political debate. Nevertheless, I thought there was a note of relief and even genuine cordiality on the part of our Soviet hosts that they could talk with us in this free and informal way. Perhaps it was also noteworthy that our hosts, while pleasant and hospitable, made no effort to ploy us with drinks or turn the occasion into one of false conviviality.

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No. 498

Editorial Note

Ambassador-designate George F. Kennan arrived by aircraft in Moscow on May 6. He called on Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky on May 9 to present copies of his letters of credence and to request an audience with Nikolay Mikhailovich Shvernik, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. Chargé Hugh Cummings’ two-sentence report on the meeting concluded as follows: “Brief non-official conversation of few minutes concluded meeting which held in congenial atmosphere.” (Telegram 1803 from Moscow, May 10; 123 Kennan, George F.)

Ambassador Kennan presented his credentials to Chairman Shvernik in a formal ceremony on May 14. The text of Ambassador Kennan’s formal remarks to Shvernik was a revision by Kennan of a text which had been drafted earlier in the Department of State and transmitted to the Embassy in Moscow in airgram 165, April 23. (123 Kennan, George F.) As reported by Kennan in telegram 1812, May 13, the remarks read as follows:

“I have the honor to present to you the letters of recall of my predecessor and the letters accrediting me as Ambassador of the United States of America to the Government of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

“The principal purpose of the Government of the United States in its relations with the Soviet Government is the peaceful adjustment of all those specific questions the solution of which requires agreement between the two governments. Furthermore, my government wishes to see the removal of the conditions which up to this time have impeded normal associations between the citizens of our countries.

“In entering upon my duties as Ambassador of the United States of America in Moscow, I am in a position to assure you, and
through you other responsible leaders of the Soviet State, that my activity as Ambassador will be devoted to the promotion of these aims. I hope that this activity will meet with the understanding and collaboration of the Soviet Government."

Kennan telegraphed the following brief description of his meeting with Shvernik:

"Presented letters of recall and credence to Shvernik today at brief and correct ceremony in pleasant atmosphere. Altho I have not yet received written text his reply, it seemed to me to be patterned closely on my remarks; except that in response my expression hope for Sov Govt’s ‘understanding and collaboration’ Shvernik assured me of Presidium’s and Sov Govt’s ‘collaboration’ without reference to ‘understanding’.” (Telegram 1822 from Moscow, May 14; 123 Kennan George F.)

For Kennan’s own account of the formal presentation ceremony, the circumstances and considerations attending the preparation of his letter of presentation, and his account of his private conversation with Shvernik following the formal ceremony, see Kennan, Memoirs, 1950–1963, pages 119–121.

No. 499

611.61/5-2252: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Department of State

SECRET  PRIORITY

Moscow, May 22, 1952—noon.

1861. I wish to invite attention to scope and significance of present violent anti-American campaign being waged by Sov propaganda machine and to share with Dept certain considerations that occur to me in this connection.

1. In the fortnight since I arrived in Moscow, Sov internal propaganda outlets have been intensively employed, as Dept is aware, in an anti-Amer campaign of extreme violence, centering around bacteriological warfare and prisoners of war issues. The quantitative figures on space and time given to the subjects are impressive enough. We estimate that on an average well over half entire foreign news sections of major papers have been devoted to these subjects, not to mention domestic radio programs and other outlets. But mere statistics on volume give no adequate idea of violence of

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1 Copies of this telegram were transmitted by Deputy Under Secretary Matthews to Secretary of Defense Lovett, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Bradley, and CIA Director Smith on May 22.
this effort. I have had many years of direct exposure to Sov propaganda, and for nearly three years during the recent war was obliged to observe at first-hand workings of the Nazi propaganda machine at the peak of its offensiveness, but I must say that I have never seen anything to equal in viciousness, shamelessness, mendacity and intensity what is now being done in this country to arouse hatred, revulsion and indignation with regard to Americans in general and our armed forces in particular.

As Dept knows, campaign began nearly two months before my arrival. (Embtl 1475, March 15 and others) Prior to middle of April the accent was almost exclusively on the bacteriological warfare issue. To my mind it is significant though not to be over-rated, that propaganda action on this issue went into high gear immediately after the acute Sov reaction to revival of the Katyn issue. With the virtual breakdown of Korean armistice negotiations on prisoners of war issue, and with what must have been for Commies the almost incredible success of the provocations carried out in Kojedo prisoner of war camp, the issue of atrocities against POW's was eagerly added, and woven in with, existing bacteriological warfare propaganda.

Although there has never been a time since the revolution when Sov propaganda failed to distort Amer realities, I do not recall any propaganda line in the past so clearly calculated as this one to stir

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3Telegram 1475 reported that there was reason to believe that bacteriological warfare charges, which had received full attention in the Soviet press and in subsequent Moscow mass meetings of protest, were convincing to a considerable portion of the Soviet population. It suggested that a VOA effort to counter the germ warfare charges should be a matter of prime concern because the campaign in the USSR was a major one. (Microfilm telegram files, Moscow, Fy 53)

4On Sept. 18, 1951, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution establishing a select committee to conduct a full and complete investigation of the deaths of as many as 15,000 Polish army officers and other leaders in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk in the Soviet Union in the spring of 1940. Between October 1951 and early June 1952, the Select Committee to Conduct an Investigation and Study of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre took testimony in the United States and Europe from 81 witnesses and examined hundreds of depositions and exhibits. In its findings the Committee concluded unanimously that "the Soviet People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs committed the mass murders of the Polish officers and intellectual leaders in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk, Russia." The committee also recommended the establishment of an international tribunal to investigate mass executions wherever they might occur. The committee observed similarities between the fate of Polish officers at Katyn and the possible fate of U.N. soldiers captured in Korea. The account of the committee's hearings as set forth in seven volumes and the Interim Report of the committee (Report of July 2, 1952; H. Rept. No. 2430, 82d Cong., 2d sess.) which contained the findings and conclusions of the inquiry, were transmitted to the U.N. Secretary-General on Feb. 10, 1953, by the U.S. Representative; for text of the note transmitting the documents, see American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950-1955, pp. 2143-2144.

4For documentation on the disturbances occurring at U.N. prisoner of war camps in Korea, see vol. xv, Part 1, pp. 449 ff.
up hatred and fear of Amers generally. Lip service is still paid to social distinctions by vigorous attention to the iniquities of Wall Street; but emphasis of this campaign is plainly on Amer armed forces, with implication that they represent the habits and proclivities of Amer people at large; and reckless violence of the slander directed against them can best be realized if it be considered that it is probably no less in intensity and offensiveness than that directed against Ger army at peak of recent war.

While Sov propagandists in many of their past campaigns have shown caution by putting the more violent items in other mouths, quoting from theoretically irresponsible press sources, and avoiding direct statements by authoritative Sov organs, in present instance these restraints seem to have been dropped. Izvestiya ran a front-page editorial yesterday morning flatly accusing the Amer command of "mass destruction of innocent women, old people and children" of "utilizing the most fantastic and revolting methods for achieving their criminal purposes," of torturing prisoners of war with red hot irons, hanging them upside down, pouring water into their noses, forcibly tattooing them, forcing them to sign treasonable statements in blood, etc. There is, I reiterate, no attempt in any way to soften or disguise responsibility for these charges which are made editorially by a paper the stated publisher of which is the Presidium of the Supreme Sov of the USSR. To this we must add Malik's savage statements in the UN, plus such things as Konev's insults in his speech in Praha on Victory Day. I think it important to note that before launching this campaign Sov Govt made no attempt to discuss with us matters at issue or to develop true facts.

2. So much for the picture. What does it mean? It is not hard to find reasons why the Sov leaders, being what they are, conduct anti-Amer propaganda. But we must distinguish between routine motives which are generally operative and the special considerations which lead them to undertake a campaign of this violence and ruthlessness at this particular time. Major Sov moves rarely stem from a single motive. They are rather apt to be result of the coincidental focus of a number of considerations on a given action at a given time. In the present instance it is not hard to see what some of these motives might be. The Katyn massacre is evidently a point of pathological sensitivity in Moscow, so much so that one suspects it must involve embarrassments of an extremely delicate domestic political nature. Revival of this issue by a Congressional committee in our country this winter plainly stung the Kremlin where it hurt. It is standard Commie tactics when in danger of being exposed in one's own misdoings to go over to the attack with great violence and confuse the issue by deluging the opponent with every possible sort of counter-charge and accusation, and this
would be a normal reaction to revival of Katyn. Again the grotesque success of the provocation on Kojedo must have aroused in the Sov mind eager hopes of persuading large masses of people here and abroad, particularly in Asiatic countries, that our military authorities had really been guilty of inflicting a regime of terror and intimidation on helpless prisoners, and thus of dealing an important blow to Amer prestige generally.

Furthermore, although dipls residing here in the thirties and early forties wd have been reluctant to believe that there was room for any marked deterioration in atmosphere of Sov-Amer relations, it must be acknowledged that room did exist and such deterioration has now taken place. In contrast to robust but relatively good-humored attitude of ideological and political competition which seemed to mark Sov postures in those days, I sometimes think now sense a deep and burning embitterment of which we Amers are the main objects. Altho Sov leaders are not normally given to emotion, I cannot rule out possibility that such things as Grew diary\(^5\) and other developments capable of giving personal offense or alarm have had a greater effect than we realized, and that we have succeeded in touching deep sources of genuine fury and resentment in people whose pathological habits of mind render them only too quick to suspicion and false conclusions of every kind, and whose system of govt makes them vulnerable to any degree of malicious distortion of information by underlings.

Yet even these reflections do not to my mind constitute adequate explanation for what is here in progress. The prodding about Katyn wd normally have led to an angry spluttering of countercharges but hardly anything of this duration and intensity. Hopes for a good propaganda effect in Asia by capitalizing on the mass destruction weapon issue and on our misfortunes with the POWs would justify a steady and vigorous pounding of the drums such as we have seen on many occasions, but nothing of this suddenness and violence. In addition to this we have puzzling fact that campaign is being waged with great intensity internally among the Sov population as well as abroad. Finally, as far as personal bitterness and emotion are concerned, it wd not be in character for the Sov leaders to let such feelings drastically affect their action in propaganda field unless they had in mind some specific program of retribution to which the propaganda was subsidiary.

For all these reasons, I think there must be some special motives here involved which we here cannot see as of this moment and which go beyond the normal springs of Soviet propaganda and be-

behavior. This is view of all senior officers of this mission and of all dipl colleagues with whom I have spoken thus far. I wd not like to speculate at this time on what their motive cld be. But likelihood of their existence seems to mean that we shld observe utmost caution and vigilance and shld submit manifestations of Sov policy to most searching and concentrated analysis in the coming period.

3. Finally, the question as to how we handle existing manifestations;

First, altho I have no doubt that much attention and effort have been given to this, I wd plead that we re-examine all aspects of our governmental behavior and see whether we cannot contrive to present fewer openings and possibilities to the Sov propaganda machine just at this time. So long as we do not make clearer than we have to date our general disapproval of the use of all mass destruction and inhuman weapons, this gap in our armour is going to be exploited by Commie propagandists. I know military experts will point out that all these questions are ones of degree, that necessity compels us to perfect these weapons, that others are doing the same, that many of the weapons have legitimate milit uses, etc. This is not what I am talking about. There is a plane of reality and a plane of propaganda. The two have little connection; and as long as we permit literal and practical reflections about weapons to prevent us from assuming a clear external posture of abhorrence of mass destruction weapons and of determination not use them unless they are used against us, we are going to continue to be vulnerable propagandistically on this point.

Beyond this general consideration there must be things we can do in detail and in point of timing to decrease the number of opportunities we give to the Sovs. Alleged recent public statements by Gen Bullene about our progress in chemical warfare have been gleefully seized on here, and it is hard for us to believe that a better time cld not have been found for such statements. Unless we wish to play into the hands of Sov propagandists I feel we shld be extremely careful in official public statements generally about our progress in development of chemical and bacteriological weapons, and should invariably couple such statements with disclaimers of desire to bring suffering to helpless people. The same applies to statements about our milit purpose being "to kill" as many of our adversaries as possible, about our units being efficient "killing" machines, etc. Aside from fact that our primary milit purpose is surely to cause our adversaries to submit rather than to kill them for the sake of killing, mere use of such words plays directly into the hands of Commie propaganda machine and will continue to be ably exploited by them. With regard to bacteriological warfare, our general statements have been excellent, but we here have not seen
point-by-point refutations of statements allegedly made by captive US fliers or of other detailed fabricated evidence which has made considerable impression on many people here and presumably elsewhere. As for POW issue, provocation is lesson number one in the primer of Commie strategy, and as long as Commie factions within these camps are permitted to intrigue, agitate and disturb, and word of these happenings continues to reach outside world, we must expect Commie propaganda machine to make extremely effective use of this issue.

It wld seem to me that only most vigorous discipline, segregation of trouble makers, and isolation of camps generally wld prevent our being taken advantage of in this way.

4. This leaves us with the question of our direct governmental reaction to this Sov propaganda effort. We have all become accustomed to the excesses of Sov propaganda machine and to extensive violations of normal courtesy and good form by Sov authorities. The question at issue here is whether there is any point beyond which we wld not be prepared to let this sort of thing proceed without protest, and if so where that point lies.

It is my feeling that differences of degree are important here as everywhere, and that we shld not permit Commie leaders to conclude that there are no limits on extent to which they may go in abusing our country, spreading falsehoods about us, slandering our armed forces, and creating hatred of us here and abroad, without reaction on our part. We must remember that the charge of bacteriological warfare is of itself an extremely serious one for them to raise in any manner, to say nothing of making it subject of a propaganda campaign of unprecedented scope and nastiness. Whether we shld or can afford to ignore this is a real question. There is a certain question of dignity involved in residing and going through the motions of representation in a capital where your people, your armed forces, and in effect your flag are being subjected daily to a deliberate effort of vilification and degradation by the local govt on a scale hardly excelled in human history. I realize that it has generally been the policy of our govt that our representatives behind the iron curtain shld treat this sort of thing with deaf ears and bland indifference, and as far as our personal situations are concerned, we can do this. But we must realize that we are now up against about the worst the boys can produce in the propaganda field; and I think we must be careful, precisely in this semi-oriental country, not to permit our presence and silence to be exploited as an exhibit to others of our weakness, our lack of pride and dignity, and our helplessness in face of insult.

However, implications of this present campaign go far beyond the mere position of a mission in this city and shld be judged ac-
cordingly. I do not see how Sov Govt can deny responsibility for editorial articles in Izvestiya and it is difficult to think of allegations more offensive than those which have now been raised without scruple or inhibition in this sheet. There can be no question but that, measured against anything approaching normal standards, these charges wld be considered gravely offensive, as wld some of the recent statements made by leading Sov figures.

For the moment I can only recommend these reflections for Dept's consideration. If campaign does not begin to wane at early date, I may wish to recommend sharp public statement to Sov Govt, for terms of which I wld submit suggestions at appropriate time.

KENNAN

No. 500

611.61/5-2252. Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT

Moscow, May 22, 1952—noon.

1862. Eyes only Secretary distribution S/S only. My 1861, May 22 which went forward today, was designed to bear normal distribution within govt with attendant risk of leaks. For info of yourself and top officials Dept I wish to add following:

In view situation described in message under reference I propose to seek private and confidential interview with Vyshinsky at which I would orally and informally describe situation as outlined in early part this message; remind him my govt attaches importance to my mission here and is awaiting with interest my first comments and views on Soviet American relations; and endeavor to impress upon him that this business cannot, if continued, be allowed read off as just another routine propaganda blast but will have to be signalled to Washington as a new and important departure in Soviet policy, a departure of serious and menacing importance, of which we should have to take most careful account in shaping of our own policy. This is not an exaggeration of my view, for the implications of a continuance of this campaign appear to me both drastic and ugly, and I am frank to say that such continuance wld force me to conclusions I have heretofore been reluctant to accept.

1Copies were transmitted by Matthews to Lovett, Bradley, and Smith on May 22.

2Supra.
Vyshinsky is not likely to give me any satisfactory answer, and the payoff will be visible only from the propaganda output in ensuing days. If there is no change, and campaign continues undiminished, I wld propose to approach Department again, not referring to this present message, and suggest text of formal communication to be addressed to Soviet Govt and made public. This would be a protest note, pointing out unprecedented violence of campaign and disturbing conclusions which must be drawn from it and fixing responsibility on Soviet Govt for deliberate poisoning of international atmosphere.

I feel, for several reasons, that I should ask for this appointment with Vyshinsky during present week. Unless I hear to contrary from Department, therefore, I shall put in request before close of business Friday. Would much welcome any views or suggestions Department may have.

KENNAN

No. 501

611.61/5-2252: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1952—8:09 p.m.

PRIORITY

815. For the Amb. We agree desirability ur seeing Vyshinsky as proposed urtels 1861 and 1862 May 22. We presume that you have considered advisability postponing approach to early next week in view possibility misinterpretation or Sov exploitation of mtg this weekend so close in advance scheduled signature ceremonies in Eur. However we will leave timing to your discretion.

We presume you do not intend use exact language contained ur 1861 with Vyshinsky. We feel important avoid giving him impression that we wld be committed to any action by developments which are subject of ur démarche or by fact of ur representations. Obviously we wld avoid implications of any threat or ultimatum which could be exploited.

1Drafted by Barbour (EUR/EE); cleared in substance with Secretary Acheson, Matthews (G), Bohlen (C), and Bonbright (EUR); and signed by Barbour for the Secretary. Copies were transmitted by Matthews to Lovett, Bradley, and Smith on May 23.

2Telegram 1862, supra; telegram 1861 is Document 499.

3Reference is presumably to formal signature ceremonies in Bonn on May 26 by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany of the Contractual Agreements with the Federal Republic. See vol. vii, Part 1, pp. 109 ff.
Pls report niact paraphrase substance conversation. If press reports fact ur mtg we will say visit first substantive talk with Vyshinsky since presentation ur credentials and conversation in line purposes you expressed in statement to Shvernik.  

ACHESON

4See Document 498.

No. 502

611.61/5-2452: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

Moscow, May 24, 1952—2 p. m.

1872. Kentel. No distribution, eyes only S/S. ReDeptel 815, May 22. 1 I had not realized when I sent my 1862 2 that signature of contractuals was so close upon us. In general I had hoped to call on Vyshinsky at least two or three times a month, whether or not I had instructions, in order that I could be in a position to say that I was in regular contact with him and that no single visit would be interpreted as “news”. I would have liked to have made first of these visits at this time and to have spoken to him along lines outlined in my telegram under reference. But in view of delicate situation in connection with German position, I shall hold off for the moment and not ask for appointment until it is clearer when signing of contractuals will take place and when Soviet reaction may be expected. I have worked out a line to take with Vyshinsky on first suitable occasion which I think fully meets points raised in ref tel and will use it when and if such occasion presents itself. 3

KENNAN

1 Supra.
2 Document 500.
3 In telegram 1905, May 30, Kennan further defined his attitude on a possible meeting with Vyshinsky. The telegram reads:

“I have not wanted to ask for appointment with Vyshinsky these past days, partly because of German developments, partly because Brit Amb was asking for one and I did not want to confuse my purposes with his.

“I fear time has now passed for visit and statement to Vyshinsky along lines outlined my 1862. Whatever observations I might have made in role of shocked newcomer would now begin to have hollow ring, and in view present violence of anti-Amer campaign am inclined to feel it would not be dignified to speak to Sov authorities unless initiative came from them or I had something specific to communicate.” (611.61/5-9052)
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1952—10:47 a. m.

829. Points raised in ur 1861 May 20 [22] receiving most careful consideration in Dept. We have for some time been exploring various courses of action re BW campaign which wld help meet needs of situation and perhaps in some degree serve purpose of public statement suggested last para urtet. One approach which we think has some promise wld be to counter Commie charges BW in Kor through initiative in UN. This cld be done in SC, where we cld almost certainly force Sovs to veto res proposing impartial Comm of inquiry (possibly composed of India and Swed) to investigate charges with aid of scientists of internatl reputation and other experts, Comm to be granted freedom of movement in areas concerned. Fol expected veto, we may offer another res condemning Commies for blocking impartial investigations and undermining UN efforts maintain internatl peace and security by continuing spread false charges. Sovs wld undoubtedly veto second res as well.

Opportunity for such action will arise when Malik assumes SC presidency June and when first report Disarmament Comm comes before SC. As you know, in Disarmament Comm Malik has made long speeches on BW question. If as we expect, Malik repeats Commie charges in SC when it considers Disarmament Comm Report, we cld counter these charges by introducing separate agenda item leading to formulation above res.

Alternative possibility wld be to take initiative in advance SC debate on Disarmament Comm Report, submitting our proposal for SC inquiry without delay.

Decision on foregoing wld depend inter alia on fol factors:

1. Is Commie campaign tapering off and will our initiative serve revive it? Our estimate is that campaign will not die down and on contrary may increase in intensity in June. Sov veto wld therefore be helpful to us from propaganda standpoint.

2. Are we prepared face SC debate which might range over all aspects of Korean problem and perhaps other Far Eastern issues as well? We must assume Malik will attempt broaden discussion this way, bringing in PW issue, withdrawal of troops, charges of atroc-

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1Drafted by David H. Popper and Eric Stein (UNA/UNP) and cleared by Ward P. Allen (EUR), Barbour (EUR/EE), Matthews (G), John M. Allison (FE), Nitze (S/P), and Howland H. Sargent (P). Matthews signed for the Acting Secretary of State.

2Document 499.
ities, continuation of armis negots, etc. We do not believe we wld find such a discussion unduly harmful at present.

(3) Wld our friends in SC and other states with forces in Kor support an initiative of this kind? Answer to this question wld have to be obtained by consultation. We are informally consulting British here.

Before making decision on foregoing, we wld appreciate ur urgent comment.

BRUCE

No. 504

761.00/5-3052: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY MOSCOW, May 30, 1952—8 p. m.

1906. Department has by now received detailed accounts of Soviet releases on hate-America meeting held last night in Hall of Columns, most solemn of Sov settings for public events, only one block from Embassy. At this meeting anti-American campaign reached a new crescendo. Its tenor and violence can be judged from my 1902 May 30,¹ and require no further comment from me. This meeting will presumably be followed by corresponding meetings in communities thruout Sov Un, which means that we are in for some days and weeks more, at minimum, of this intense abuse.

This raises again the question of whether, and if so how, our govt should react to this development. I have reviewed this situation again today with senior officers of the Emb and in looking at it we have tried to leave aside the personal feelings with which no American can fail to be affected who has to live under immediate impact of this incredible torrent of abuse and falsehood. Even then, I cannot be sure that our opinions are wholly unaffected by this experience.

We are aware that there is probably strong element of provocation in this campaign and that it is vitally important for our govt at this stage to remain utterly calm and not play in any way into hands of people who would love to provoke us into an angry or defensive posture. There is much to be said for thesis that it would be best to ignore situation in belief that these acts will operate to condemn their authors more strongly than their objects. However, campaign is surely beginning to have real effect and this revelation

¹Not printed.
of the incredible lengths to which the Kremlin is prepared to go in poisoning minds of Sov populations is an important factor, new in degree if not in character, which I feel we will have to weigh carefully in all our calculations about the Sov Un. This being the case, it seems to me we must say something to indicate this, if our policy is to be wholly understandable to other people. In whatever we say it is important that we manage to elevate both the tone of our utterance and the platform of its delivery to a plane which will wholly distinguish if from what is being said on other side, also that we allow it to appear not in nature of an answer to Sov propagandists on charges they have raised, but rather as a reminder to the world of the significance this slanderous campaign must assume in the mind of any thoughtful person. My own preference, therefore, would be for a public statement to be made by the President on specially arranged occasion and surrounded with maximum solemnity, in order that it may carry as far as possible. Its force should not be diminished by too much interpretive fill-in at lower levels in our govt, but we should see to it that all mass media are well provided at time of statement with texts of Sov statements illustrating nature of campaign, which speaks for itself.

As for content, I have in mind something along following line:

“In past three months leaders and govt of Sov Un have seen fit to direct against people, armed forces and Govt of US a propaganda campaign of a violence, scurrilousness and shamelessness without precedent even among the numerous sorry examples that the world has had in recent years of deliberate and unscrupulous governmental propaganda. They have done this not only thru propaganda outlets for which they might attempt to disclaim formal responsibility, but also thru statements of prominent Sov figures and thru organs of press and radio for which their responsibility cannot possibly be denied. They have taken no steps to check truth of their charges before advancing them. On the contrary, they have advanced them in the full knowledge that they were false, misleading and unjust. Finally, they have chosen to do all this at a moment of great seriousness and delicacy in world affairs, altho they cannot but have been aware of the unfortunate affect their action would be bound to have on world situation.

The Govt of the US has taken most careful note of all these circumstances, and has not failed to draw from them the only conclusions of which they admit: namely, that the Sov leaders are not only contemptuous of the national feelings of the US people, but have taken a deliberate decision to do all in their power to create maximum confusion, hatred, and nervousness among Sov populace and in world opinion generally at just this present time.

US Govt must leave it to peoples of world to imagine what reasons could bring men to such a decision in present state of world affairs. It will be evident to everyone that whatever these reasons are, they could not possibly be ones compatible with any real con-
cern for world peace or with any desire to improve the international situation generally.

For its own part, the US Govt cannot ignore the significance of these actions on the part of the Sov leaders. On the other hand, it will not permit itself to be provoked by feeling of irritation or disgust into departing one jot from the path it has been successfully following in its resolve to see that peace is preserved and that the free world remains free."

If a public statement should be made, a copy of it should be officially communicated in some manner or other to Sov Govt, possibly thru Sov Amb Washington, with appropriate oral comments.

We feel that in view of high level Sov propaganda which will presumably follow this Moscow mass meeting any statement by us should be made promptly if it is to strike while iron is hot. Therefore, unless step could be promptly taken, this recommendation would lose its validity.²

KENNAN

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²In telegram 1909 from Moscow, May 31, Ambassador Kennan observed that Department telegram 829, May 30, had been partially answered by the message printed here. Telegram 1909 continued as follows:

"Our initiative unlikely increase intensity and extent new version 'hate-America' campaign which would seem to have achieved unsurpassed heights virulence. It would be difficult to imagine campaign being stepped up further unless Politburo or some of its members should join in personally giving it authority their voices which thus far they have not done (except by their uncomplaining presence at Marshal Govorov' May Day tirade). Our estimate is that campaign will continue much along lines March BW campaign for at least a couple of weeks. This morning's press, as expected, reports meetings Leningrad, Minsk yesterday. This follows BW campaign pattern. Mass mtgs will probably spread throughout country and be duly reported in central press. If BW routine followed, USSR mass mtgs will provide starting point for spate of articles in all types of journals with radio repeats and probably extension mass mtgs to satellites with consequent reporting here.

"I do not see any incompatibility between suggestion made my refel and that of Dept refel. This, it would seem, would not in any way be detrimental Security Council approach." (611.61/5-1652)
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1952—6:13 p. m.

846. Re Embtel 1906. We have been deeply impressed by ur series of press releases about Sov propaganda attacks on US. Ur suggestion of Presidential statement on subj has been given careful consideration with full realization weight ur opinion in matter.

However, as we see it, Sov campaign among other things designed (1) by maximum provocativeness to intimidate Free World opinion through general increase in tensions and war of nerves at this particular time, and (2) by singling out US as target to separate US from its Free World Allies and polarize issues toward bilateral US-USSR conflict. If such is case, special statement at Presidential level might play into Sov hands by (1) increasing apprehensions in certain quarters of opinion where fear already exists of excessive US combativeness and (2) tending to accept and accentuate, by its unilateral nature, Sov contention that lines are drawn directly between Moscow and Wash.

In circumstances, on balance, we are inclined to prefer action in UN along line Deptel 829 on which now awaiting reaction UK before exploring with other friendly SC members. As you indicate final para of ur 1909 this will not be incompatible ur suggestion and will not preclude later Presidential statement if that course shld subsequently appear desirable.

Acheson

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1Drafted by Barbour and Henry (EUR/EE) and cleared by Bohlen (C), Matthews (G), Nitze (S/P), Hickerson (UNA), Jessup (S/A), and Phillips (P). Secretary Acheson signed the telegram.
2Supra.
3Document 503.
4See footnote 2, supra.
5In telegram 1971, June 9, Ambassador Kennan observed: "Fully appreciate force of considerations invoked in Dept's 846 re possible US statement about Sov propaganda campaign and gladly concede best course may be to remain silent." (611.61/6-952)
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 6, 1952.

Subject: Visit of Soviet Ambassador Panyushkin

Participants: The Secretary
Mr. Alexander S. Panyushkin, Soviet Ambassador
Mr. Walworth Barbour, Office of Eastern European Affairs
Mr. Alexander Logofet, TC
Mr. Anatoli G. Myshkov, Soviet interpreter

Ambassador Panyushkin called, by appointment made at his request, at 12:30 p.m., June 6. He stated that he is being recalled to take up another assignment and in leaving Washington wished to pay his farewell courtesy visit.1 I expressed my appreciation for his call and wished him well in his future appointments. I added that the President had just given his agreement to the appointment of Mr. Zarubin, the Ambassador’s successor, and that Ambassador Kennan in Moscow was being instructed appropriately to notify the Soviet Foreign Office.2 I inquired whether the Ambassador intended to inform the press that he was departing permanently or merely on leave. He thanked me for the expeditious action on Mr. Zarubin’s agreement and suggested that in the circumstances he should inform the press that his departure is permanent. I said that we would probably confirm Mr. Zarubin’s appointment to the press shortly after Ambassador Kennan had had time to notify the Soviet Government.

1Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin called Ambassador Kennan to the Foreign Ministry on the afternoon of June 4 and informed him that Ambassador Panyushkin was being withdrawn as Soviet Ambassador and that the Soviet Government requested agrément for Georgiy Nikolayevich Zarubin, then Soviet Ambassador to the United Kingdom. (Telegram 1931 from Moscow, June 4; 601.6111/6-452)

2Ambassador Kennan was so informed in telegram 847, June 6. (601.6111/6-452).

At his news conference on June 13, President Truman was asked why the appointment of Zarubin had been accepted before it was clear whether he had been involved in the Katyn massacre of Polish officers. The President explained in reply as follows:

“It is customary, though, when a country asks the acceptance of any ambassador, he is accepted. There is never a question of any we send to them. It’s a matter of courtesy. The country has a right to pick its own representatives. We don’t pick them for them.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1952, p. 418)
I then said I had one further word.³ While we desire that a friendly atmosphere prevail between our two countries, unfortunately the situation at present is not what we could wish. In particular, I would appreciate it if he would inform his government that we are deeply concerned at the virulence of the present anti-American campaign now being waged by the Soviet Government. The campaign is of such unprecedented violence as to indicate unusual significance and, while we are unaware of what lies behind it, its significance seems clearly to have serious implications. At any rate, it is inconsistent with the various Soviet statements to the effect that the Soviet Government desires to improve relations between our two countries. Rather it clearly has the effect which it appears designed to have of increasing tensions.

The Ambassador asked whether I could specify exactly what I had in mind. I noted the charges in the Soviet press and other propaganda media that the US is employing bacteriological and chemical warfare in Korea.

The Ambassador said he would inform his government but if I wished an expression of his views he could say that the Soviet press is a free press and confines itself to factual reporting; that various commissions had examined the charges under reference and that on its part the American press, as well as other Americans holding official positions, was equally critical of the Soviet Government. He expanded his remarks, mentioning especially the efforts in which certain Congressmen are engaged to place the blame for the “Hitlerite Katyn massacre” on the Soviets. He added, however, that it is the policy of the Soviet Government to foster friendly relations with the US and, with reference to some of my recent speeches, stated that the Soviet Government believes differences could be settled by negotiation.

I said that I would like to be able to accept his statement as to the attitude of the Soviet Government but that unfortunately I was unable to do so. I said, however, that I also favor the negotiation of issues but reiterated my request that the specific matter I had raised with him be brought to his government’s attention together with my view that we could not but regard it as of serious significance.⁴

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³The points that follow were raised first at the Secretary’s daily staff meeting on the morning of June 6 and were refined in a memorandum by Barbour (EUR/EE) for the Secretary. (611.61/6–652)

⁴A summary of the last paragraphs of this memorandum was transmitted to the Embassy in Moscow for Kennan in telegram 858, June 10. (611.61/6–1052)
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)\(^1\)

SECRET

Moscow, June 6, 1952.

Dear Doc: In my recent telegram about the present Soviet anti-American campaign (May 22)\(^2\) I stated that I was not prepared to speculate at that time on the special motives that might have given rise to the peculiar violence and timing of this recent manifestation of Soviet policy. Since sending that telegram I have naturally continued to give the subject study and thought. While I do not yet feel in a position to put down in telegraphic form any conclusions for general distribution in the Government, I thought it might be useful for yourself and others in the Department if I were to try to review for you in this letter the present stage of my own thoughts about this matter.

Please bear in mind that in what I am about to say I am not dealing with those well-known and routine impulses which have caused the Soviet Communists as a matter of general policy to distort and degrade the image of America before the eyes of their own people over the entire thirty-five years of their exercise of power. What I am speaking of here is specifically the present campaign, and I am trying to get at the reasons for its extraordinary violence and its timing.

I might also stress, by way of preface, that it is no easy thing to take this outrageous and provocative propaganda material, permeated as it is with the smell of a vicious and shameless mentality, and subject it to a calm and dispassionate analysis. In doing so, I feel as I think the medical scientist must feel when setting out to examine some of the less savory manifestations of illness in the human body: it is unpleasant, but the interests of scientific truth

\(^1\)In a letter of June 7 to Matthews, Kennan suggested that distribution of this letter be limited to the following: Acheson, Bruce, Bohlen, Nitze, the Office of Eastern European Affairs, and Smith. Kennan was concerned about the security of this letter and observed: "I would not be worried about accurate leaks from it, but inaccurate ones could do a great deal of harm." (611.61/6-752)

In a letter of July 1, Matthews briefly responded to the letter printed here. The operative portion of Matthew’s letter reads:

"I want to write briefly to acknowledge belatedly the receipt of your extremely interesting letter of June 6 regarding the Soviet anti-American campaign. I followed your request with regard to its distribution quite literally and have confined it pretty much to those listed in your letter of June 7, with the addition of Jimmy Dunn and two or three others in the Department. Chip is, I believe, working up some comments on the substance of the letter." (611.61/6-652)

\(^2\)Document 499.
demand it. I can only hope that I have been able to put revulsion and indignation far enough aside, and to have arrived at something like a detached judgment.

Of the various hypotheses that have been advanced among foreign observers here with respect to the motivation of this campaign, the following seem to me to be the ones that warrant our most careful attention:

(1) That the Kremlin considers that the general state of popular morale throughout the Communist-controlled area, as marked by such things as the attitudes of the Communist war prisoners in Korea, the continued defections of individuals in the satellite area, the difficulty of raising reliable military forces in Eastern Germany, and the general apathy of the Soviet population itself toward international problems, is simply not adequate for the strains of the situation in which Soviet policy is now proceeding, and has concluded that something drastic must be done to stir people up to a greater enthusiasm for the severe tensions which this policy involves.

(2) That the Kremlin foresees some more severe test of political morale in the Soviet and satellite areas looming up in the near future, and is setting about to steel the population for these anticipated eventualities, whatever they may be.

(3) That there has been some internal disagreement in influential circles here over problems of policy toward the United States and that the violence of this present campaign represents the characteristically crude and ruthless expression of the victory of one group over another; and

(4) That the campaign stands in some connection with my appointment and arrival here, and with the possibility that a time might be approaching when confidential discussions between our two governments on what would be considered here the "real" plane, as opposed to the plane of propaganda exchanges aimed at the grandstand, would be in order, or would at least be suggested by our side.

Before commenting on these hypotheses individually, let me point out that they are not in any sense mutually exclusive. More than one of them might actually have some reality.

I.

With respect to the first of these hypotheses, namely that there is a generally unsatisfactory state of popular morale in this country and in the Communist areas and that the campaign is designed to combat this situation, I can only say that I think there is much evidence which points in this direction. The Soviet leaders can obviously not be really satisfied with the state of political morale at the present time in any of the satellite areas or in the Soviet Union. This situation in the satellite areas requires no comment. But even in the Soviet Union itself there is evidence of a continu-
ation of the widespread political apathy and skepticism that have marked the state of mind of the predominant part of the Soviet public ever since the purges (except at that time when national feelings were touched by the German invasion and the subsequent elation of victory). The continued prevalence of this state of mind cannot be agreeable to the Kremlin.

It is interesting to note that the domestic anti-American propaganda, to judge by its content, is not aimed in any sense at influential and responsible party circles. Marxist concepts, or even thoughts remotely connected with Marxist theory, seem to have only the most unimportant and peripheral place in this campaign. The emphasis has been on stirring up a sheet physical loathing of Americans per se, as people, and above all as soldiers. Pravda, possibly itself somewhat shocked at the realization of the ideological emptiness that has characterized the campaign, ran an editorial on June 4 the purpose of which was evidently to instill into it a more pronounced ideological tinge; but even this was not very impressive. The campaign, Pravda cautioned, is really against American ideology—by implication, therefore, not against America as a nation. The American ideology, it seems, now consists of Fascist racial prejudice (racism), the cult of brute force, and the hatred of other peoples. It represents, Pravda explains, weakness and loss of faith on the part of the American imperialists in themselves and in the capitalist system. Such an ideology, we are allowed to infer, calls for an ideological response. But the response which Pravda continues to try to evoke on the part of the Soviet citizen, and this is the point I wish to emphasize, is not an ideological one—it is not one of serene and contemptuous contemplation of the inevitable evil workings of capitalism as seen from the infallible vantage point of a proper Marxist understanding of the laws of human society—it is rather, to use Pravda’s own words, one of “hatred”, “resistance” and “enraged protest”. Plainly what Pravda has in mind here is mass feeling. The campaign is not addressed to the views of responsible and sophisticated party circles.

It is true that in this campaign particular use is made of those media that reach the Soviet intelligentsia. This may be partly simply to convert people not yet converted and thought to be in particular need of conversion; but it may also be to invoke the authority of these circles to support a thesis aimed at a wider audience. There is evidence of severe pressure being brought to bear on the artistic and literary community to join in the campaign and to lend it the support of their voices—the theory apparently being that if gentle and sophisticated people of this sort can also be made to appear full of flaming indignation, ordinary folk will conclude that “there must be something in it”. I would not wish to imply
that there is not a serious concern for the state of mind of the cultural and intellectual figures themselves, per se: I am sure there is. But underlying it is always an appreciation of the high respect in which the cultural circles are held by the broader Soviet public, and a recognition that greater effect can often be produced these days on the popular mind here by the relatively subtle impulses of propaganda masked as art and literature than by the flat appeals of governmental propaganda, to which so many people have become inured and indifferent. The marked attention now paid to the cultural world by the Kremlin propagandists may well be a tribute to the degree of influence this world has come to enjoy, as the more direct means of reaching and twisting public understanding have gradually been abused, and their own possibilities destroyed, by the professional propagandists.

All in all, I think we can say that there is underlying all the cacophony of this hate campaign, a note of real concern over the apathy, and sometimes latent disaffection, of large masses of people in the Communist world—not a concern connected with any fears of revolt or civil disobedience (overt obedience is no problem), but a concern lest the existence of this state of affairs be progressively exposed by events in the cold war, as it already has been in Korea, and come to affect the minds of people and the course of events further afield. The future of Asia, in particular, surely depends in the Kremlin’s view—on those who are now the wavering in the Asiatic countries not yet committed; and for Moscow it is vitally important that these latter not be astonished and estranged, and a band wagon movement set off, by signs of apathy or disaffection on the part of the peoples within the Communist orbit.

I think, therefore, that we cannot wholly reject this first hypothesis. We must, on the contrary, recognize that it certainly plays some part in the general pattern of Soviet motivation today. The question is only: what part? And is it the only motive?

I would doubt that it can be the only motive. This unsatisfactory state of morale has existed in the Communist area for several years. If the Kremlin were sure that the strains of the immediate future were not going to be greater than those of the immediate past, a campaign of this violence would hardly have been justified at the present time.

II.

This brings us to the second point: Are the Soviet leaders looking forward to something they expect to see happen in the near future which will put greater strains on popular morale in the Communist world than the events of the last two or three years? This hypothesis, plainly the most ominous of them all, is the one probably most
widely entertained among foreign observers, and it demands respectful and minute scrutiny.

We must begin, I think, by recognizing that there is no indication here that the Soviet leaders are planning to launch a major war by an overt offensive action of their own in the near future, or that they really think the outbreak of such a war might be imminent from other causes. Let me elucidate: they may feel that our policies tend inevitably toward war, and may therefore regard war as inevitable unless our "contradictions" catch up with us and weaken us in good time; but that is different from regarding war as imminent. It is true that if they thought war imminent, one of the things they might well do would be to launch a campaign of just this nature, for obvious reasons. However, this is by no means the only thing they would do. There are a number of other steps they might be expected also to take in such a contingency. Of these other steps we here have seen no evidence; and I think it unlikely, despite our isolation in Moscow, that all these steps could be taken without our receiving any inkling of them. And even in the field of psychological preparation this sort of hate campaign, useful as its effects might be from the standpoint of the regime, would hardly alone be enough to condition the population for immense changes in government policy and in the condition of their lives that another war would involve.

On the other hand, we cannot ignore the disturbing fact that the most obvious purpose of such a campaign—the one which might normally be supposed to underlie an effort of this sort—would be to instill into the minds of the Soviet and satellite peoples a degree of hatred and resentment for the United States which would be capable, so to speak, of bearing weight. And what could this "weight" be? Presumably, some sort of demands on the part of the regime for loyal support in a course which might otherwise be expected to appear to people as drastic, arbitrary, unwarranted, perhaps even excessively violent and cruel. Can we conceive of a future course answering to this description and still stopping short of war?

The pattern of Soviet intentions in Europe seems to me to be not too unclear. The trump cards of the Kremlin are: (1) use of the French Communist Party at any possible moment to disrupt unity and effectiveness of the Western coalition, and (2) eventual use of the East German Communist regime to break the Western position in Berlin, thus producing a German civil war à la Korea, in which the Atlantic Pact as well as West German forces could be exhausted and perhaps defeated while the direct military assets of the Soviet Union would be held in reserve. The Kremlin seems already, as a reaction to its failure to impede progress toward the German contractuals and EDC, to have raised the level of boldness and
recklessness with which it is willing to dispose over these European assets. But the French Communist card is one which, aside from the fact that it seems already to have been tried and failed, could hardly be expected to lead to war. The East German card, if it is not to be frivolously and prematurely sacrificed, will take some time to develop to a point where it can really be played to full effect. What could, of course, lead to war at an early date would be premature, abrupt and rash pressures against Berlin at the present time, involving direct Soviet responsibility. But Moscow surely knows this. If it expected to follow such a policy it would have to reckon with the immediacy of a major war involving its own forces—and, as indicated above, there is no broad pattern of evidence that it does. But if it does not expect to follow such a policy, why the steeling of the Soviet population through a hate campaign?

For these reasons, I find it difficult to believe that this propaganda campaign has been launched in particular contemplation of, and by way of preparation for, anything expected by the Kremlin to happen in Europe. It seems to me more likely that if it is pointed toward any specific expected development at all, it is one in the Asiatic area. The terms in which it is conducted seem to direct attention in this direction. But what could such a development be? Only, it would appear, some new phase of the Korean war, perhaps involving the use of new and unusually cruel tactics or devices on the Communist side, but still expected to produce consequences short of the emergence of a state of outright warfare between the Soviet Government and the United States.

I must say that I find it difficult to picture precisely what such a development could consist of—what it would look like. For this reason I am not satisfied with this second hypothesis. When one analyzes it to the end, one gets nowhere—unless one assumes that the Soviet leaders are really counting on an early outbreak of war and have successfully concealed from all of us the measures they would have to take to be ready for such a contingency. This, I think unlikely.

III.

The third hypothesis, namely that this campaign reflects the outcome of some policy struggle within the Kremlin, seems to me to be one that might conceivably account for its abruptness and violence. But there is simply no real evidence of anything of this sort. We have no grounds to believe that such differences and hesitations as might recently have existed within the Politburo with respect to policy toward the United States have been of such serious-
ness and intensity that the victory of one faction would be apt to be signalled to the country in this striking way.

All indications point to the likelihood that the central foreign policy question agitating the highest circles here in recent months has been that of the degree of stability of the Western coalition: the extent, that is, to which—in the absence of a major war—it may be expected that the strength of the non-Communist world will be sapped by internal factors such as rivalries and disagreement among its major components; colonial disaffection, economic strains resulting from excessive investment, and a possible major economic crisis in the United States springing from what Communists would consider the basic defects of the capitalist system. The indications are that to date such questions continue to be answered in the Kremlin in a generally hopeful vein. The prevailing view seems still to be that the visible or likely rifts in the capitalist world are indeed serious enough not only to assure eventual victory to the Communist camp, but to justify its leaders for the time being in continuing, and restricting themselves to, a policy of militant political attack, stopping just short of the initiation of provocation of a new general war.

Let me spell this out in a little greater detail, for it is a subject on which we cannot afford to risk any misunderstandings. I would not like to give the impression from what has just been said that the members of the Politburo have been able to trace out for themselves a clear and consistent line of thought and policy in this complicated problem of "war or no-war". Their own position today contains certain plain contradictions and dilemmas themselves. They appear (and perhaps wisely) not even to try to solve them. They allow them to emerge quite frankly in their ideological articles. On the one hand, they assert that capitalism is undergoing an internal crisis of final and mortal import from which, in the long run, it will not be able to recover through its own resources. True, they take pains to point out that this is not the same sort of crisis Marx talked about—not the same one that prevailed up to 1917—but a new phase characterized and made possible only by the development of Soviet power. This proviso is important to the Kremlin. Without it there would be no justification for the constant pressures maintained against the non-Communist world by the Stalinist political movement. Failure to insist on it would play into the hands of Titoist factions in other countries, who would say: "If the collapse of capitalism is inevitable from internal causes, then we do not require the authority and help of you Russians—either for its overthrow or its replacement". This proviso does not state that the helpful ministrations by Soviet power to the decline and death of capitalist power must always remain "short of war" or that the
Soviet armed forces should have no part in them. It admits the possibility of "wars of liberation" and of "defense against wars of aggression." It insists that the capitalists will eventually be compelled by the logic of their situation to try to resort to arms in order to wipe out Soviet power—the inner citadel of Socialism. But about the timing of all this and the order of precedence, Soviet thinking is blurred and undecided. Certainly the whole burden is not left, in the Soviet mind, to the Red Army. The factors mentioned above: the national differences within the non-Communist camp, the colonial problem, the strain of armaments, and the deeper economic instability, are all given most serious attention and are all allotted important roles in frustrating and defeating the "imperialist" design. But in what order?—and with what results? On this, Moscow is silent, and perhaps wisely so, from its own standpoint. It still allows for the possibility that the internal weaknesses may perform their task first and perform it so well that either there will be no attack on the Soviet Union or the attack, when it comes, will be a fizzle: the last ill-advised adventure—as they see it—of cornered, desperate men, hampered on every side by colonial and domestic disaffection, by disunity, by defects in their own system and by their fateful and significant failure (now heavily emphasized in Soviet thinking) to understand the way in which political action must be intermingled with military action if the latter is to produce effective results.

It is plainly on this question of timing—the question whether capitalism will try to launch its last desperate attack before or after it has been extensively weakened by internal causes—that the determination of Soviet policy today must rest. Obviously, up to the present day hope must have continued to exist in the Kremlin that capitalism would be extensively weakened by internal causes, supported by Soviet-inspired political attacks, before it could resort to general war, in which case its final effort might conceivably be absorbed and repulsed by Communist puppet forces alone.

This conclusion must have rested, and must continue to rest, on the most anxious study and analysis of the weaknesses within the non-Communist world.

On this particular subject—the assessment of the seriousness of the weaknesses in the camp of the adversary—I think it possible and even likely that there have been differing opinions at the Politburo level. These differences may even have found reflection in serious disagreements on actual questions of tactics and policy. But I see no evidence that such differences have reached the point where disagreements become identified with the political fortunes of prominent individuals; and it is only at this point that intellectual differences in the Kremlin assume the extremely savage and
bitter aspects that we have witnessed on certain occasions in the past. My feeling, therefore, is that while this present propaganda campaign is undoubtedly designed, partly if not wholly, to combat sentiments and states of mind somewhere which the Kremlin regards as disagreeable and dangerous, these sentiments and states of mind are not ones represented—so to speak—in the Politburo as such, or even in the more responsible Communist circles; they are ones having their residence in the minds of the intelligentsia and of the broad masses of the people in the Communist-controlled areas.

IV.

We come now to the last of these hypotheses, namely that this campaign might have something to do with my own appointment and arrival, with what they take to be the state of American thinking and policy today, and with the possibility (one which in this case would have to loom more prominent in the Soviet mind than it does in my own) of confidential talks looking toward the amicable adjustment of certain of the more dangerous of the issues on which the two governments are now divided.

I mention this with some hesitation, from my own standpoint as well as from the standpoint of the Department. In a conspiratorial atmosphere such as that which marks this city, and particularly when one is, one's self, the object of much attention at mysterious and anonymous hands, it is easy to overrate one's own importance in the general scene and to fall into the belief that the gentlemen in the Kremlin have nothing better to do than to pore over the reports their numerous agents obviously make and present about one's own life and movements. Nothing is more detrimental to clarity of thought than this, and I think I am experienced enough not to fall into this error.

But my appointment here may have had two connotations to the Soviet mind of a somewhat unusual order, both of which are worth noting. One lies in the fact that my name and personality are known to at least some of the prominent figures in the Soviet intellectual and artistic world, and probably known to them in a manner which would at least not tend to support the contention that Americans are without exception bloodthirsty and boorish creatures, lacking in good will, ignorant and contemptuous of Russian cultural values, obtuse to developments in the world of the Russian spirit. The second connotation is the suggestion that since I have served here before and know the language, and since I am relatively well-schooled—so to speak—in the dialectics of the Soviet-American antagonism, the United States Government might have had some thought that my appointment would facilitate
"real" discussions. The Soviet mind would not long delay in leaping from this to the assumption that the prospect of such talks might be imminent in our minds. And it is not out of the question that the Soviet leaders might themselves recognize the possibility that before very long they would find it to their own advantage to move, or to appear to move, in this direction.

You may ask: What in the world could such considerations have to do with the launching of this violent anti-American campaign? Surely, to the normal mind there could hardly be a less suitable way to react to the sort of connotation I have just suggested. But it would be making a mistake to attempt to carry out this analysis through the eyes of a normal individual. Let us remember that it has been the policy, and apparently sometimes the secret delight, of Stalin, before adopting a given course, to eliminate or force into an embarrassing position all those who might be suspected of having themselves favored such a course—all those who might be apt to claim credit for the new line or to seek in its final sponsorship by the regime a boon to their own self-esteem and prestige. It is always important, furthermore, for the Kremlin, when it seems to set out to make a concession (however insignificant or disingenuous this undertaking may be) that such a turn of policy should not appear to be the result of pressures brought to bear upon it from underneath. Specialists themselves in the art of bending foreign statesmen to their own will by building fires under them in the minds of their constituents, the Soviet leaders are abnormally sensitive to anything of this sort in their own camp.

It is not impossible that the Kremlin leaders might feel that if there were any chance that they would have need in the coming period to talk with an outward guise of reasonableness, and in a manner that could be construed as making concessions to the pressures we have brought upon them, they would want first to make it absolutely clear that they were not forced into such a position by any feelings within Russian society beneath them on which foreign statesmen could possibly play. This might have particular relation to myself if they felt that my personality and presence here tied in in any way with the neurotic uneasiness which besets a large number of Soviet artists and intellectuals in present circumstances in connection with their extreme isolation from the main cultural currents of the world.

If there is anything in this line of thought, the men in the Kremlin might then be saying two different things with this propaganda campaign. To the Soviet intelligentsia they might be saying: "We want no backtalk from you people at this stage of the game. Remember: you have no sympathies for America. You hate America. If any accommodation is to be sought with America, we leaders will
handle the matter, thank you; and we will handle it on the basis of our own authority, and against a background of violent indignation in Soviet society over American faults and iniquities. We, not you, will be the moderate ones, if we find it profitable to appear that way. And then we will be the only moderate ones. We will appear in the guise of one who takes upon himself, for the sake of peace, the onus of suppressing the righteous indignation of his own people over the outrageous behavior of his adversaries. We will be in the position of restraining Soviet public opinion, not of being restrained by it.”

To me, on the other hand, as the symbol of that portion of the Western world which has not completely lost hope for a certain improvement and stabilization of relations between the two camps, they would be saying: “You come here to us making reasonable and disarming noises and letting on as though you thought that some day we might be able to talk to one another. Very well. We are not saying that we would totally exclude the possibility. But don’t think you can push us into anything. Don’t think that just because you speak Russian and have had a few friends here and are known as a person interested in Russian culture, you are going to have any special bargaining power in your dealings with us. Don’t think that you are going to be able to play on the cosmopolitan weaknesses of our artists and writers—to break down the resentments and suspicions of America that we have been assiduously building up in their minds, and to put pressure on us in this way. This is no longer 1945, when we all played at the farce of a community of cultural values. See what these intellectuals are now being taught and what they are now saying. If you are going to deal with anyone here, it is going to be with us, their masters, and not with these neurotic intellectuals whom you may conceive of as still longing for the fleshpots and the sterile estheticism of Paris. We do all the dispensing of favors in this town. Whoever wants to talk business talks with us, and leaves our subordinates alone.”

This may sound a bit farfetched, and I am not for a moment suggesting that the minor satisfaction our friends in the Kremlin might derive from conveying such an indirect message to me could alone be an adequate motive for laying on a campaign of these dimensions. But the Soviet mind gets a peculiar pleasure, I think, out of such neatly coincidental byproducts, and I think it not out of the question that in the present instance the effect of the campaign on myself, and in connection with my arrival here, might have been just such a byproduct. The same goes for whatever implications the campaign might carry to the Soviet cultural world at this particular moment. And all of this might combine to lead the Kremlin to feel that if there were any possibility that talking of a
definite and more “real” order were soon to occur, or to be proposed, it might not be a bad thing to have the atmosphere prepared, and clarity established in all quarters, by a vigorous campaign of this sort. Perhaps there is even the hope that we would be prepared to pay a price to have it stopped.

When you try to sum up these considerations, where do you come out? You find it plausible that the Kremlin may regard the immediate future as a period marked by a new and somewhat higher intensity of the cold war, involving a bolder and more reckless exploitation of puppet forces on their side. You find it plausible that for this reason and to guard against all eventualities, the Kremlin should wish to make a vigorous attack on the apathy and skepticism with which a large proportion of the populations under its control probably views the East-West conflict. You recognize the immense significance which the successful prosecution of the cold war in the immediately coming period assumes in Soviet thinking, as the only really solid alternative to a general war which the Western powers could be expected to instigate or wander into at a time and on terms dangerous and disagreeable to Soviet power. You can see how faulty morale within the Communist areas begins, as in the Korean prisoners of war matter, to interfere with the prosecution of the cold war by the Kremlin and to present dangers for its further course. Finally, you can see that the Kremlin might also recognize a possibility that developments in this coming period might make it desirable for it to enter into “real” talks with the West, or to play at doing so, and you can understand how this might warrant a certain battening down of the hatches in the form of a rousing anti-American campaign, designed to keep Soviet opinion steady through the buffeting that might be occasioned by such unusual developments, to prevent any undesirable misunderstandings from slipping in, to prevent people from going all-out in hopes for a relaxation of relations with foreign countries such as many of them entertained during the war, and to remind a new and somewhat inscrutable American Ambassador, in the event that he should need such a reminder, that if he is going to talk to anyone around here it is going to be to Papa—that the other members of the family know their places and are well in hand.

How much of this is real, I cannot vouchsafe. I dare say a good deal of it is. To the extent that it has reality, I would not find it too worrisome in itself. But it has its worrisome sides, which I think we cannot and should not ignore. The first of these is that it is probably doing some degree of serious and lasting damage to attitudes toward the United States within the Soviet public—attitudes which have heretofore been characterized by a touching and stubborn insistence of people on the privilege of thinking well of us.
But the second thing which I find really disturbing is that even under the most charitable and soothing interpretation of the reasons for this campaign, the mere fact of its having been instituted, taken in conjunction with the really deplorable deterioration in the treatment of the diplomatic corps and foreign colony in Moscow, bears witness to an attitude on the part of the Soviet leaders which I can only characterize as one of reckless contempt for whatever values and safeguards might conceivably still lie in the maintenance of the normal diplomatic channel and of the basic amenities of international intercourse. There is something in all this of the behavior of a person who has thrown off the last inhibitions of manners and good form in his relations with other people and is prepared to behave in any way that suits his most primitive feelings, without inhibition, even—when he feels like it—with derision, insolence and impertinence, in the confidence that he has nothing to lose. I hasten to add that this is not the recklessness of a regime which does not care whether or not war comes; it is the recklessness of a regime which does not dream that questions of war or peace could ever be affected by the amenities of behavior. And to my mind this latter type of recklessness is scarcely less disturbing than the former.

People insensitive to differences of degree may say that this is nothing new in Soviet behavior—that it has always been this way. I would warn them strenuously against this assumption. I can say on the basis of personal experience that in the thirties and again during the war there was visible in the behavior of these people a certain ultimate caution about their overt relations with the capitalist West—a certain solicitude for the intactness and state of good repair of the normal and polite channel—a certain recognition that there might be times when this channel would prove useful and necessary to them—indeed perhaps the only thing they might have to fall back upon. Today, that caution seems to be gone. In its place there is a note of bravado—the excited, uncertain bravado of the parvenu who thinks his fortunes have advanced to the point where he need no longer pretend to be a man of correct behavior or even a man of respect for correct behavior. When I observe the manifestations of the conduct of the people in the Kremlin today and drink in those ineluctable touches of atmosphere in which their moods and influences are so marvelously reflected on the Moscow scene, I sometimes have the feeling that I am again witnessing the swaggering arrogance of the drunken peasant-speculator Lopakhin in the last act of Chekhov’s Cherry Orchard, when he has just purchased at auction the estate on which he grew up as a serf, and now loses control of himself in his excitement and elation and stamps around, reveling in his triumph, impervious to the
presence of the weeping family who are leaving the place forever, confident that never again will he need their respect, their help, or their solicitude.

If this is the inner emotional background of the phenomenon we are witnessing, then we have a bitter problem on our hands. It is not easy to bring back to the level of sobriety and decorum people who have fallen into this frame of mind. It should not necessarily be impossible. But it will take real thought and skillful action on our part, and probably luck as well.

Please forgive me for writing at this length. I am not generally a partisan of long documents. But when you are dealing with matters so strange and intricate as the psychology of the Bolshevik regime in the year 1952, the danger of saying too little at the cost of being cryptic and over-simplifying is sometimes greater than the danger of saying too much.

Very sincerely, 

GEORGE F. KENNAN

No. 508

511.00/6-1352: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Department of State

SECRET

Moscow, June 13, 1952—2 p.m.

1995. Before leaving Washington, I was variously requested bear in mind problems of our informational and psychological warfare authorities and give my suggestions as soon as possible on main direction our effort shld take. This msg intended as expression of my personal feeling on this subj after some weeks Moscow.

The more I become acquainted with spirit and tenor of present internal Sov ideological material, clearer it becomes to me that main basis of Sov outlook on world affairs today, underlying its entire behavior toward the Western Countries, is its persistent and despairing hope that present structure of Western World will prove unstable, unsound, and increasingly inadequate to withstand the steady polit attacks levied against it by world Commie movement. The belief is still officially accepted and entertained in Kremlin that, to use familiar Commie algebra, capitalist world is undergoing a phase of deep crisis which began with estab of Sov power in 1917, was rendered much more serious by outcome of World War II, and now actually represents the final and all-decisive crisis from which capitalism, in the face of its internal weaknesses and of
contd Commie harassments, will not be able to recover. On this thesis there seems to rest the main rationale of Sov current world policy, embracing on the one hand an unwillingness to launch and generate war against the West, this being unnecessary as well as dangerous to Sov power in many ways, but also, on the other hand, an unwillingness to have any real dealings, as distinct from "demonstrative" dealings, with Western Govts, and a refusal to treat these govt's with respect or to refrain from intensive efforts to carve the ground out from under them and destroy them. If this thesis of the unsoundness of present structure of the non-Commie world cld be shaken, bottom wld drop out of the rationale of Sov policy as we know it today.

In the present shrill exaggerations of Sov propaganda one cannot help but sense an extreme nervousness about the validity of this thesis, a feeling of desperate necessity to find substantiation for it, and accordingly a somewhat frantic casting around for any sort of straw that cld possibly be conceived to support it. Pravda yesterday morning had an editorial on the internat'l sitn which consists of nothing but this sort of whistling in the dark and gives evidence of the most anguished scrutiny of the Western World to see whether some new sources of weakness cannot somehow be discovered or plausibly claimed to exist, which wld serve to support the basic thesis. This seems to me to indicate there may be advanced degree of inner doubt here about the soundness of this thesis.

In these circumstances, I wonder whether most important and effective blow we cld deliver against Sov policy at this time might not be a psychological attack directed at the Kremlin itself, designed to shake its confidence and that of its influential followers in the soundness of above thesis and to give support to those people in high Commie circles here who may at one time or another have expressed doubt about it. It seems to me that the best way to handle this on psychological plane is by flat and vigorous challenge of the central theory on which the Sov position rests. This wld of course not replace but only supplement propaganda addressed to other major targets, such as peoples of uncommitted or threatened areas elsewhere.

In terms of hypothetical direct address to Commie leaders I wld conceive of this challenge somewhat along following lines, which is actually one I myself am taking here in Moscow whenever convenient occasions arise.

"Your people are continuing to live on the basis of a dream which is product of your own wish and your own fantasy. You still imagine that there will come a day when forces within the Western World, forces you have succeeded in influencing or bewildering will finally drag down or hamstring political regimes in the Western
Countries that oppose your policies or force those regimes to give up their recalcitrance and to dance to your tune. You have hypnotized yourselves in believing this because anything else is painful and distasteful to you. Fortifying yourselves by this self-deception, you have managed to persuade yourselves that you do not have any need to deal respectfully with Western Governments and to arrive in good faith at any serious arrangements with them. You believe that you can continue with impunity to abuse the diplomatic channel and UN by using them only ‘demonstratively’ as further means of trying to put public pressure on the Western Governments.

Actually, by following this line what you succeed in doing is only in keeping whole world in state of turmoil and uncertainty. This involves great burdens and inconveniences for everyone, but they are ones which West will be better able to bear, in long term, than you will.

This situation cannot be improved until you realize that you are indulging yourselves in an error of cosmic proportions which will sooner or later penalize you more heavily than anyone else. Your analysis of capitalism is at least 40 years out of date and wholly unsound. For a full 30 years you have been hopefully and regularly predicting catastrophe for capitalist society; yet nowhere has it occurred. Only Western Countries which have moved into Communist camp have been brought there by movement of Red Army into Eastern Europe, and by no other factor. They are held there today by sheer military intimidation and nothing else.

Western society is not suffering any final and insoluble crisis, or anything near it. It has its problems, but it admits them and faces them, instead of trying to pretend, as you do with yours, that they do not exist. They are the normal problems of change and development; and they are being successfully faced. What you know in your hearts to be true but desperately do not want to recognize is that the world is actually entering upon a period which, in the absence of major war, will be another period of relative stabilization in the relationship between socialism and capitalism. This period is going to be extremely prolonged—so prolonged that there is no use even trying to look to the end of it. The fact is that ten years hence, or twenty years hence, whatever you do, those same non-Communist Western Governments that you are trying today so desperately to undermine are still going to be there and in command of the loyalties of the peoples and of the resources of their territories. The only real question for you will be the terms by which your relationship to them is to be governed. This you will have to work out with those governments by decent and respectful negotiation. However distasteful this may be to you and however desperately you may resist it, in the end it is precisely with those same
governments themselves and not with the peoples behind them, not
with any ‘partisans of peace’ or ‘progressive circles’ or any other of
your escapist alternatives, that you are going to have to deal. But
longer you delay in realizing this and acting upon it, more unfavor-
able are going to be terms you get. It is high time, therefore, that
you ceased deluding yourselves at your own expense, woke up to a
sober appreciation of world realities. It is high time for you to
learn to take a serious attitude toward those forces and institutions
with which you are some day going to have to come to terms if you
are going to assure to yourselves any comfortable and tolerable ex-
istence in this world.”

This seems to me line of attack best designed to hit Kremlin at
point of maximum weakness and vulnerability. The essence of it is:
“You Communists are wrong in your analysis of the trend of West-
er society; you have made profound theoretical errors; capitalism
is not going to break up; your policy is therefore doomed to failure;
those who persist in believing in myth of the basic capitalist crisis
are going to have to pay the penalty of their stubborn error.”

If this central thesis be adopted, it should, in my opinion, be
thrown out against the Communist World in every conceivable var-
ation, with unremitting reiteration and persistence, and with all
possible factual support. It should be plugged by VOA. It should be
used as a talking line by all people who have occasion to deal with
or talk to Soviet officials or their stooges. It should be planted in
any places where there is reason to believe that it will get back to
the Kremlin. It shld be extensively used at the United Nations. It
shld find a place, if possible, in any serious theoretical discussions
to which the Commie World is apt to pay attn. Sov propaganda
contrary to it shld be relentlessly and vigorously exposed on a day-
by-day basis, letting nothing go unchallenged.

If this were done, I think we wld be doing best we cld to shake
Kremlin confidence and to prepare ground for eventual construc-
tive dipl effort.

Lest some of the above suggestions appear too obvious, I wld like
to point out what the above line, as I see it, does not say. It does
not say that world conflict with Communism will be decided by war
or even exclusively by predominance in armed force, although
eventual Western predominance shld be confidently predicted, and
high scale of armaments portrayed as inevitable result of errone-
ous Sov policy. It does not say that peoples of Commie area are
going to rise up and overthrow Sov regime or that inner-Sov con-
tradictions are going to bring about destruction or weakening of
Sov power at any early date, although possibility of that shld not
be excluded and may be talked about in materials addressed to
other targets. It does not say that we are going to disintegrate
Soviet machine by propaganda or indeed by any form of direct external action. It only says that Kremlin is making grave theoretical errors in its estimate of outside world and will be unable to escape eventual consequences of this stubborn and persistent blindness.¹

KENNAN

¹There is no indication in Department of State files that this message was answered. The message was commented upon in a memorandum of June 23 from Regional Planning Director for the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs John K. Emmerson to Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs John Allison. Emmerson’s memorandum begins as follows:

“It seems to me that Ambassador Kennan’s brilliant telegram analyzing the basis of the Soviet outlook on world affairs and prescribing a propaganda answer for us to use does not take sufficiently into consideration the situation in Asia. The answer suggested applies to Western Europe and the Americas, but I believe we need a different one for Asia.”

The memorandum concludes:

“In brief, I believe we should avoid discussing the world situation in terms only of Western stability or of an East-West conflict. Furthermore, to ignore the situation in Asia is to display weakness on our part and to lay ourselves open to rebuttals and charges which can only benefit the Communist side.” (511.00/6-2352)

No. 509

120.32161/6-1852

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)¹

TOP SECRET

MOSCOW, June 18, 1952.

DEAR Doc: I propose in this letter to speak about matter of such delicacy that I want you to know before you get into it that it is a

¹Attached to the source text is a memorandum of July 22 by Fisher Howe (R), which reads:

“At a meeting on July 17 with Doc Matthews, Chip Bohlen, Wally Barbour and myself, my recommendation was accepted that a message go to Kennan, suggesting that this letter be shown on a non-retention basis, to the Service chiefs. If Kennan objected he would need to write another letter which could be shown to the intelligence service chiefs. Kennan replied to the effect that he had no objection.

“At Doc Matthew’s direction, Wally Barbour and I saw separately Admiral Stout, General Samford and Generals Weckerling and Phillips, each of whom read the letter and found no serious objection. All agreed to cooperate and recognized fully the controlling interest of the Ambassador.

“I reported this to Doc and indicated to him that Wally Barbour would prepare either a message or a personal letter from Matthews to Kennan, indicating the results of our conversations with the Service chiefs.”

A handwritten notation by Howe (dated July 24) on his memorandum of July 22 indicates that Barbour cleared with Matthews a personal letter from Matthews to Kennan of the sort suggested above by Howe. Neither this personal letter nor the exchange of messages cited in the first paragraph of Howe’s memorandum have been found in Department of State files.
letter of which I am keeping no copy, and one which you will probably wish to destroy as soon as you have read it.

Since my arrival in Moscow I have become increasingly aware of a situation which not only gives me great concern but which seems to involve a very important question of principle concerning the attitude of our Government as a whole toward this mission and the functions which it is supposed to perform. I am prepared to go ahead and decide these questions on my own formal responsibility here, but in doing so I wish to make sure that the situation is clearly understood in Washington and that my decision here is in accord with the view of authoritative circles in our Government. It is for this reason that I am mentioning the matter to you.

I find upon arrival here and upon closer acquaintance with the activities of the staff that during the past two or three years this mission—and by that I mean its personnel, premises and extraterritorial status—has been intensively and somewhat recklessly exploited by the military intelligence-gathering agencies of the Government for their particular purposes. Their representatives here have, I am afraid, been encouraged by their home offices to utilize intensively such facilities as they enjoy here by virtue of their diplomatic status, for the purpose of assembling every possible shred of information on military subjects. I do not find that their instructions have called upon them to take adequate account of the effects their actions might have on the straight political and diplomatic potential of the mission, or on those very privileges and facilities from which they were profiting. So far as I can analyze the point of view which lies behind these activities, it is one which has not considered the diplomatic potential of this mission as a factor to be seriously taken into account, and which assumes the very existence of the mission as a short term provisorium, to be ruthlessly and intensively exploited while it lasts.

I would like to be able to list for you a number of the actual incidents which lead me to make these observations. Actually, I cannot bring myself to put them on paper for obvious reasons. I can only say the following about them:

1. Many of them are quite shocking and surprising, almost incredible to anyone who has had any extensive familiarity with the diplomatic profession.

2. In several instances little or no effort has been made to avoid detection by the Soviet authorities. In certain instances actions have been performed here under the very lenses of Soviet photographers appointed for the purpose of photographing them, and those actions were ones which the Soviet Government had specifically warned us were contrary to local law.

3. Many of these actions seem to me to have been of a childish and "Boy Scout" nature, which, in addition to serving as proof to
the Soviet Government of systematic misuse of our diplomatic status, must have brought smiles to the faces of higher Soviet authorities and cannot have contributed to Soviet respect for the mission.

4. Many of the targets are ones which I think could easily have been reached by other and less dangerous methods.

5. In general, these activities have been the result not of spontaneous initiative on the part of the men out here, but of pressures put upon them by their own superiors in Washington.

These activities have had and are having three effects which I think it is important for our Government to note:

1. They are self-defeating in that they lead to a steady and gradual curtailment of the very facilities which they exploit. I have no doubt whatsoever that the curtailment of travel for this mission represents a reaction of the Soviet authorities to the extensive exploitation of travel facilities by this and other missions for purposes which cannot be viewed by them as legitimate. The same is true of the drastic and total isolation of the diplomatic corps here, including even neutral missions, from contact with the Soviet people. These things have probably had a good deal to do with the extraordinary pressures put on the servant and custodial staffs of diplomatic missions. If they are continued, we must expect a steady increase in the severity of these restrictions to a point where life will become practically impossible for foreigners in this city unless they wish to sit like prisoners within their buildings and be served by imported servants. The upshot of this is that activities of this nature must be predicated upon a lack of concern for maintenance of those very facilities whose existence they assume and exploit.

2. These activities have a deleterious effect on the actual diplomatic potential of the mission, i.e., of its value as a political reporting unit and a channel of communication with the Soviet Government, and have already probably reduced its possibilities significantly in these fields.

What has been said above about the exhaustion of these channels for intelligence purposes has its application in even greater degree to the normal purposes that these facilities were supposed to serve. With the increasing isolation of the diplomatic corps, the curtailment of travel facilities, and the constant increase of Soviet vigilance vis-à-vis foreigners, you have the ruin of those last vestigial positions which made possible, even in a minor way, something resembling normal life and travel in this country. Not only that, but one cannot help feeling that the attitude of members of the Soviet Government and officials of the Foreign Office toward individual diplomatic officers of our mission must be affected by what they know of the uses to which the mission is daily being put. This applies particularly to the ambassador here, for the Soviet authorities can only conclude either that he is aware of and responsible for this employment of his mission, or that he is not aware of it or is powerless to stop it. In the first case, they must regard him as the major offender. In either of the latter cases they must regard him as a secondary figure-head who is only being put up for formal
and protocol purposes like their own ambassadors abroad. I hardly need emphasize to you how serious a factor this is. In the end, the great political judgments about the nature of Soviet power, its psychology and its intentions, are of vastly greater importance to our Government than detailed tidbits of tactical information about the Soviet armed forces, much of which can be obtained in other places or (if really well-trained people are used) by other and more desirable methods. Yet we are seriously handicapped, in our ability to arrive at these major judgments, by the retaliatory actions brought upon us by these peripheral activities of the mission. Furthermore, the maintenance of the mission as a channel of communication with the Soviet Government is something which may be rarely of practical importance but when the moment does come that it is of any value at all, then its importance can be enormous. In the burdening and reduction of the ambassadorial position by the tolerance of these activities our Government is really taking a heavy responsibility in the face of the uncertainties of the future.

3. The continuance of this type of activity actually places in jeopardy, in my opinion, the physical security of the members of the mission and their families.

Thus far the Soviet authorities have been very correct in this respect, and no American official or employee has, in recent years, suffered (to my knowledge) any physical damage or open unpleasantness. However, we know very well that the Soviet authorities are assembling a careful, and, I fear, impressive record of all of our activities. The Grew diary\(^2\) is only a small part, I am sure, of what they have in their pocket. We also know that in the more remote past there have been instances when unwise Americans met with physical violence, judicial summonses and other forms of unpleasantness. We must remember that our American employees here—and by this I mean all those persons not on the diplomatic list—are by Soviet usage completely devoid of diplomatic immunity for any violations of Soviet law. We have not seen fit to challenge seriously this position of the Soviet authorities. That means that these people are all extremely vulnerable and can in most instances very easily be framed and made subject to court action at any time. Finally, you have the several possibilities that out of the present delicate international situation there might arise either a rupture of relations between our countries or an actual state of war. In either of these events, I think it entirely possible, if not likely, that individual members of our staff, and perhaps the whole staff might suffer seriously by virtue of these activities that have been conducted in the past. Our Government must therefore realize that if it wishes such activities to be continued at this post, it cannot hold the ambassador and other officers of the mission responsible for

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\(^2\)See footnote 5, Document 499.
the maximum safety of members of the staff in the face of possible consequences that may ensue.

I am aware that this is hardly a matter on which direct written instructions can be issued to this mission, and not even one about which there can be official correspondence. I do not wish to place the Government in the position of having to give me any written instructions of an undesirable nature. I am therefore writing this letter to tell you, first of all, that I propose to issue orders to all members of this mission that they are expected to comply strictly with Soviet laws and regulations so far as they are known, and also they are to avoid every form of public behavior which might be expected to give the impression to local citizens and officials that they are engaged in improper activities. This applies particularly to the use of cameras, radio receiving sets, and other electrical and auditory devices, and to the visiting or inspection of installations or areas of a known military significance. I have already discussed these matters with the service attachés, who have taken my observations in good part. But one of them points out that this will mean important modifications in his policies and activities, and that these modifications are not apt to be agreeable to his home office.

Secondly, I would like to ask that you call to the attention of the heads of the various intelligence-gathering agencies the fact that this is my intention, and that you ascertain whether any of them is in disagreement with this position and considers that it is, on balance, detrimental to United States interests.

Thirdly, in case there is this feeling on the part of any of the responsible heads of the agencies involved, I would earnestly request that you have this matter taken to a high interdepartmental agency for thorough discussion and settlement.

Fourth, if my proposed position here meets with the full understanding and approval of the Government—so that I need not feel that any subsequent reproach will rest upon me or this mission for its conduct in this matter—then I will expect no reply of any sort to this communication, and I will understand that silence means consent.

Fifth, if, on the other hand, it is the considered view of the appropriate higher authorities of our Government that the practices I have in mind are of an importance such as to override the disadvantages to which I have pointed, and if, therefore, it is the desire of the Government that I not alter any of the existing practices, then I would appreciate it if you could find means simply to inform me that my letter of this date has been duly considered but that the Government sees no grounds for alteration of existing practices. In such case, however, I want it clearly understood, both by
the Secretary and the President, that I cannot properly be held responsible for such deterioration as may ensue in the value of this mission both as an observation post and as a channel of communication with the Soviet Government, or for any other unhappy consequences.

I am sorry to have to write this letter, but if you will put yourself in my place you will see that I have no choice but to do so. I cannot allow to proceed a progressive deterioration in the actual diplomatic potential of a mission entrusted to my care, on a vague assumption that this is what the Government wants. On the other hand, I cannot, without at least apprising the Government of what I am doing and giving it an opportunity to overrule me, take administrative measures here which might later conceivably lead to my being charged with having deprived the United States Government of valuable information, and prejudiced the military interests of the country.

Very sincerely yours,

GEORGE F. KENNAN

P.S. Two afterthoughts:

I neglected to mention above that I am afraid the situation I have described in this letter has led to a certain amount of bitterness against this mission on the part of other missions in the city, who feel that their status has also been worsened and their opportunities reduced as a result of our activities. I think there is something in this, if we take into consideration, in addition to the activities discussed in this letter, indiscretions that have been committed by individual Americans in the form of publication or leakage of information about their relations with other missions and with Soviet citizens here.

Secondly, I should make it plain that the reason I am addressing this letter to you now is that the first severe test of the policy I propose to enforce here will come in connection with the Soviet Air Force Day on June 28. I shall not be here myself, but I have given instructions through Hugh Cumming that there is to be no photographing or listening activity on the roofs of Embassy premises here which can be detected and photographed from other roofs (as has been done in the past). If the consensus of authoritative opinion in Washington wish to indicate that to Hugh by telegraphic message as suggested above, we will permit the activities; but my own feeling is that it is highly unwise and is bound to appear some day in a propaganda white book or some other disagreeable form, as proof of the systematic abuse by the American Embassy of its
diplomatic status and of its violation of local Soviet laws and regulations.

G.F.K.

No. 510

611.61/6-1852: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

TOP SECRET NIAC T WASHINGTON, June 18, 1952—6:20 p.m.

896. For the Amb. We think it desirable you take occasion ur call Vyshinski (Embtel 2027) to emphasize again to him our serious concern over apparent significance current anti-Amer campaign along lines my conversation with Panyushkin (Deptel 858, June 10). It seems to us ur taking initiative in raising matter with Vyshinski and referring to my statement to Panyushkin will give desirable emphasis in line our general assessment of Sov thinking this matter.

I will of course wish to talk with you more on this subject in London; particularly I wd like to explore desirable course of action which we might take publicly in addition to our statement in U.N. We incline now to agree that parallel to steps taken with Panyushkin and Vyshinski to impress Sov Govt confidentially with implications of this campaign some further public action is desirable to counter the appreciable effect the campaign is reported to be having in certain quarters of world opinion.

ACHESON

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¹Drafted by Barbour (EE); cleared by Perkins (EUR), Matthews (G), Sargeant (P), and Bruce (U); and signed by Secretary Acheson.

²Telegram 2027 discussed arrangements for a call by Kennan on Vyshinski. (611.61/6-1052)

³Telegram 858 transmitted the summary of the concluding portions of the record of the Secretary's conversation with Ambassador Panyushkin on June 6. For the complete memorandum of the conversation, see Document 506.
SECRET  PRIORITY

Moscow, June 19, 1952—8 p.m.

2044. I called on Vishinsky as scheduled and had conversation with him which, to my mind was extremely interesting and somewhat encouraging. It was my first discussion of any political subject with any Sov official since my arrival here, and I think my long silence and restraint lent a desirable emphasis to it in Sov eyes. He received me courteously but quite seriously, there was no banter or small talk. Since he did not bring up the question of our relations I did so myself, referred to the Secretary's talk with Pan-yushkin, said I would not repeat the Secretary's remarks but could say that they reflected such reports as I had been obliged to great regret to render about the violent anti-American propaganda with which I had been greeted on my arrival. I emphasized to him how painful this had been to me and how difficult it had been for me to discover any reasons for all this which could conceivably be compatible with a desire on the Sov inside to improve Sov-Americ relations. I said that I had worked hard up to this time and had done all in my power to bring about an improvement in the atmosphere surrounding the relations between the two governments, that I was not a pessimist and would be glad to continue to use my influence in this direction, but that what I had seen here since my arrival really caused me to question whether there was any point in such effort, since it could not be entirely one-way street.

I was less surprised by the content of Vishinsky's reply than by its terms and tone of utterance. He spoke quietly and reasonably, with no trace of vehemence or unfriendliness, and in a manner quite different from that which he uses when he is reiterating propaganda formulas designed for the public record, or when he feels under any pressure from higher authority to be aggressive and unpleasant. He referred immediately to statements made on our side of the water, some of them, he said, by high-placed persons, and also to the Grew diary,\(^1\) the press attacks, etc. He made particular reference, in what seemed to me to be really plaintive terms, to the Gubichev case.\(^2\) He did not specifically mention

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\(^1\)See footnote 5, Document 499.

\(^2\)Valentin Alekseyevich Gubichev, a Soviet citizen and former member of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations subsequently serving as an engineer with the Russian Embassy in Washington, DC.
Katyn, but I am certain that it was this he had most prominently in mind. He dwelt at some lengths on these matters and left no doubt about their being the Sov Govt's official reason for the propaganda.

I did not wish to be drawn into an argument with him about propaganda exchanges and incidents of the past, and terminated the conversation by saying to him that I deeply hoped that the anti-Amer propaganda might cease at once and that so far as such things as the Grew diary were concerned, I would ask that we be judged by the present and not by the past. In parting he took occasion, to my surprise, to indicate that the Sov Govt had high regard for my person and that none of the unpleasantness had any reference to myself.

By way of comment on the above I would say only this. The past has taught us the need for greatest wariness in dealing with the Sovs precisely in their better moments. Eager optimism is the enemy of all progress at such junctures. We know that when we run across reactions and motives on their part which are at least understandable in normal human terms, they are usually intermingled with other impulses of which this cannot be said. What Vishinsky said to me of the background of the anti-Amer campaign is only part of the story, and the misunderstandings to which his statement points are extremely serious ones, since they have roots in the stubborn Sov refusal to understand the nature of Amer public opinion and its channels of expression. Nevertheless, I have the feeling that this talk was useful and encouraging. It indicated a certain concern for my opinion, and represented at least something like an effort on his part to present an explanation for the campaign—and that in itself was not something to be taken for granted. If nothing occurs in major Amer utterances to rock the boat in these coming days, I think we may soon see a relative decline in the amount of anti-Amer material appearing here. This does not mean that I think there is possibility that the tone of the Sov press will shortly become friendly to us. I merely think it possible, as a result of the Secretary's helpful statements to Panyushkin and in

the U.N. Secretariat in New York, was arrested in New York on Mar. 5, 1949, for receiving stolen government information from Judith Coplon, an employee of the Department of Justice. Gubichev was indicted for having violated the espionage laws of the United States, tried, and convicted. A long prison sentence handed down by the trial judge on Mar. 9, 1950, was suspended on condition that Gubichev be deported from the United States, which in fact occurred on Mar. 20, 1950. For documentation on the Gubichev case, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. v, pp. 776-805.

See footnote 3, Document 499.

*Reference is presumably to the conversation between the Secretary of State and Ambassador Panyushkin on June 6; see Document 506.
the light of this talk with Vishinsky, that the abnormal pitch of anti-Americanism may now wane fairly rapidly, if no new factor appears to exacerbate the situation. Its possibilities must have been fairly well exhausted by this time, in any case.

In light of above, I hope no major statement or move will now be made by us until I have chance to discuss matter with Secretary in London next week. For what I feel to be good reason, I have not told local press about this meeting with Vishinsky and hope that news of it may be closely held in Washington.

KENNAN

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5In telegram 1910, May 31, Kennan informed the Department that he was planning to visit Berlin and Bonn in late June for consultation with authorities in Germany and to assist his family in travel to Moscow. Kennan planned to leave Moscow on June 21 and return to Moscow on June 30. (123 Kennan, George F.) In an exchange of messages with and at the suggestion of Secretary Acheson, Kennan broadened his itinerary to include a visit to London on June 27 for luncheon with Acheson. (123 Kennan, George F.)

No. 512

611.61/6-2052: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

MOSCOW, June 20, 1952—3 p. m.

2050. Reflecting further on yesterday’s talk with Vyshinsky, I think explanation of his attitude may well lie in fact that we have to deal here with the different elements within Soviet power structure, namely Foreign Office on one hand, and certain powerful party and police elements behind scenes, on other hand. (See Embtel 2044, June 19). I have distinct impression that not only did FonOff have nothing to do with initiating this campaign, which wld be only natural in the light of its relatively subordinate and executive role in Soviet power structure, but that most higher officials, probably including Vyshinsky himself, have general realization how unwise and dangerous a procedure it has been, have inwardly not approved it, but may have been told from higher up only that campaign was answer to irritating and offensive public attacks against Sov power in US and have until recently been unable to find any means to bring about its modification. Think it likely that Secretary’s statements to Panyushkin may have provided Foreign Office with evidence to demonstrate that campaign might have un-

1Supra.
desirable and unintended political implications and that this may have had real effect. Atrocity propaganda has fallen off noticeably in recent days, and Malik’s recent refusal at UN to permit discussion Korea in connection with bacteriological warfare convention, plus his own failure at this stage to bring up specific charges against us in this connection, may well be indicative of this change.

For purposes of clarity, would add that I do not conclude from Panyushkin’s and Vyshinsky’s statements that irritation over US attacks and digs is the only reason for campaign in minds of its real authors; but it may be only reason given to FonOff, and its relative importance is probably somewhat greater than my earlier reports would indicate.

KENNAN

No. 513

761.13/6-2052: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET           PRIORITY       Moscow, June 20, 1952—3 p.m.

2051. For very guarded and limited distribution. With regard to Bucharest 507 to Dept of June 181 about rumors concerning Stalin, removal of Stalin’s pictures etc., hope to submit later in summer careful study of top personnel situation here. But thought it might be useful at this time to sum up very briefly my impressions to date for benefit limited circle of top officials our govt.

There is no recent reliable evidence concerning composition of Politburo and mutual relationships between its members. Insofar as statements and behavior of Soviet power permit us to make guesses at situation, I see evidence which leads me to believe that Stalin’s personality is still making itself felt from time to time in formulation and conduct Soviet policy. Recurrence of certain phrases and extremisms in Sov propaganda appear to represent genuine Stalin touch. Sov press still cites Stalin copiously and with reverence, and his recent Victory Day messages to satellite leaders constituted official confirmation here of his continued existence and exercise of office of Prime Minister. On other hand, there

1This telegram reported that unconfirmed rumors and reports were circulating that the party organizations had been instructed to deemphasize Stalin and that Molotov and Vyshinsky would soon replace Stalin. One report indicated that party orders had been issued to remove Stalin’s pictures from public display. (Microfilm Moscow telegrams, FY 53)
seems to me to be considerable evidence that his participation in public affairs is sporadic and relatively superficial as compared with period before and during the war. There are indications in Sov actions of divided councils, indecisions and inability on part of action-taking officials to get clear directives from superiors. I do not get impression of complete one-man dominance which characterized Sov policies some years ago. Hypothesis occasionally broached in foreign circles (see Svandze’s articles in Fr magazine Réalités) that Stalin has in recent years required Politburo to take action by majority vote when he is not present or available seems to me, for numerous reasons, to be quite plausible. Such an arrangement wld account for much of the hesitation and indecision visible in Sov policy.

There are occasional evidences, but unmistakable ones, that the bets of informed members of the higher party and police bureaucracy are running toward Malenkov as most likely person to emerge in position of decisive authority as Stalin’s authority wanes or is eclipsed by death. These indications as I said, are unmistakable, but I think we wld be wrong to assume that these people really know and are necessarily placing their bets on the right horse. Kremlin politics are tricky in the extreme. My own guess would be that mere appearance of these indications, which cannot fail to have been carefully noted by all members of Politburo including Stalin, render Malenkov’s position at this moment extremely delicate and dangerous, and constitute a burden rather than a boon to his chances for succession. We shld not be surprised if we see him overtaken by catastrophe before this coming denouement is complete.

While we do not have evidence that Molotov has ever aspired to Number One position, and while it wld indeed seem somewhat contrary to his character and habits, it may be that circumstances, above all perhaps his own impeccable caution, will lead him into it.

One more thing: foreigners often assume it is only Stalin’s death that cld plunge Politburo into state of acute internal crisis. I wld warn against this. It might be precisely a death among the leading aspirants to power: Malenkov, Molotov, Beria, perhaps Bulganin, which wld have most unsettling and unexpected effects. Whims and vicissitudes of nature seem to me to have spared this body of men for abnormally long time. It is time nature began to play her usual tricks, and their effects may well be quite different from anything any of us have anticipated.

Kennan
Memorandum by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

SECRET [LONDON,] June 27, 1952.

Since I sent my last reports to the Department, and in fact since I left Moscow,\(^1\) Izvestiya—the official Government organ, has run an editorial\(^2\) listing Soviet grievances against the United States in most thorough fashion: going way back to wartime and even prewar days. I think this is a reaction to my recent talk with Vyshinski;\(^3\) and is of significance.

My recommendations are as follows:

1. That our Government issue no formal statement and make no formal communication to the Soviet Government at this time about the anti-US campaign;

2. That we take occasion in official speeches and statements as well as in the output of VOA and other propaganda media, to ridicule Soviet charges by citing and high-lighting their obvious absurdities and exaggerations, such as that we have buried alive 100,000 people in Korea, murdered 300,000 women and children, that 2,000,000 children in the United States sleep on the subway gratings, that the United States has 14,000,000 starving unemployed, etc;

3. That we go easy for the time being on anti-Soviet atrocity propaganda, for reasons I can explain on another occasion;

4. That I be authorized to discuss this late Izvestiya editorial with Mr. Vyshinski orally and informally, pointing out to him that it involves extremely serious misapprehensions concerning American policy, that these misstatements must either be believed by the Soviet leaders, in which case they have been maliciously and grievously misinformed, or they are not believed, in which case the Soviet Government is deliberately muddying the waters at a serious and delicate moment in international life. In either case the conclusions we must draw are extremely disturbing. I would then warn Mr. Vyshinski that the continued bandying about of these misstatements in editorial statements of the organ of the Presi-
um of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. cannot but reflect adversely on our relations and represents a heavy responsibility on the part of the Soviet Government.

I would explain to Mr. Vyshinskii that I was authorized to make these statements to him in the name of my Government. I would add, however, that I remained prepared to discuss with him in a friendly manner at any time the clarification of any doubts or questions the Soviet Government has to make with regard to United States policy.

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No. 515

123 Kennan, George F.: Telegram

The Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

BONN, June 29, 1952—2 p. m.

3587. From Kennan. Dept please bring to immediate attention Bohlen. Upon arriving West Eur I was bedeviled for some days by various Time-Life correspondents in Bonn and London for data to build cover story on myself, slated to appear some time in July, and avoided them or put them off as best I cld. I did not realize what was really up until late last night, when head of local Time-Life bureau, White, appeared at my hotel with 50 page telegram from NY editors, told me he had been on telephone off and on all afternoon with Luce,2 that never in his experience had he known editors to attach such importance to any single story, that Gibbs, their top Eur man, was on his way from Paris to collaborate in its preparation, etc. Intended story, as reflected by mass of questions wired from NY, which he showed me, wld be discussion of Sov-American relations built around my person, my past experience with Russ matters, my known views, and my present reactions to Moscow scene. It seems to have been provoked by recent Alsp piece3 and particularly by suggestion contained therein that I had

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1Repeated to Berlin as telegram 369 for Secretary Acheson and to Moscow as telegram 156. A copy of this message on the stationery of the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Austria indicates that it was also repeated to Vienna for Secretary Acheson as telegram 104. (CFM files, lot M 88, "Ministerial Talks in London") Acheson traveled from Berlin to Vienna on June 29 as part of his European visit.

2Henry R. Luce, publisher and editor, editor-in-chief of Time, Life, Fortune, and other national periodicals controlled by Time, Inc., of which he was Director.

3In telegram 2058, June 20, Kennan reported that he had just seen an Alsp article entitled “Contrails in Our Sky” which appeared in the Paris edition of the Herald Tribune on June 16. Kennan commented upon the article in part as follows:

"Cannot conceive any Sov intelligence agent cld ever have packed into art of this size more information of milit interest to Sov Govt. I assume this comes from circles

Continued
been caused by initial impressions in Moscow to change my views on Sov psychology and intentions and now thought Moscow might be preparing to launch World War III at early date. Questions call for my views on every possible angle Sov-American relations, including comment on Dulles recent suggestions, and many other controversial issues.

I am seeing White again this afternoon and propose to tell him that I cannot make any comments independently on an inquiry of this nature, but am reporting it promptly to Dept, in view of its far-reaching character. However, I do not think matter shld be simply left at this. Time-Life is almost surely going to write some story, whatever I say or refuse to say. I think it dangerous that they be left with impression, as conveyed in Alsop piece, that I have had to revise my basic interpretation of Sov policy and think Kremlin is about to jump us. This is problem for Dept, but seems to me something must be done to correct this misapprehension. Offhand, I would think best plan wld be for someone in senior position to see not just Luce alone but limited circle of senior editors of important major mass media (including Time-Life) and main Washington columnists, show them for background purposes my recent ltr to Matthews, which puts Alsop story in proper perspective, and appeal to their sense of public responsibility in asking them to see further publicity handled in such a way as not to blow my usefulness in Moscow or give public false impression as to tenor of my reports. Realize this has strong disadvantages but think they may be lesser of evils. As basis for such background fill-in, I wld suggest something along lines of statement I am appending at end of this msg. (refs to fon affs articles are included because I know Time-Life will refer to them whatever I say and I think it time to dispel certain stubborn misapprehensions, particularly about the first one, which have dogged its path ever since it first appeared). I cld give this statement to Time-Life bureau here (or arrange to have this done after my departure early tomorrow morning) but since it wld be story of some news value in itself believe it shld not go to Time-Life alone, and that it wld more properly come from Dept to wider circle of interested press media. Text of proposed statement fols:

within our own government and is being released on theory that Sov Govt ought to know it anyway, but I wld like to warn against release militia intelligence on our side on theory that Sov intelligence system is perfect and never misses." (Moscow microfilm telegrams, FY 53)

Joseph W. Alsop, Jr., and Stewart J.O. Alsop were journalists who co-authored the newspaper column "Matter of Fact" which was syndicated through the New York Herald Tribune.

*Reference is to Document 507.*
Verbatim

1. "X" Article\textsuperscript{6} was written end of 1945 not as expression of official policy but as personal contribution to public discussion of Sov-American relations then in progress. Kennan was at time of writing not assigned to Dept of State, and had no idea that by time article appeared he wld be occupying an important policy post in Dept.

2. Concept of "containment" was mentioned in article only as alternative to ideas of (1) appeasement or (2) despairing acceptance of inevitability of war—both of which ideas Kennan had encountered among American public upon his return from Russia in 1946, and both of which appeared to him as childish extremes.

3. In using the term "containment," Kennan had in mind resistance, to extent permitted by US capabilities, to the peculiar brand of political attack which had been conducted against the free world by the Bolshevik-Communist movement ever since the revolution, under Moscow's leadership and direction; he did not have in mind the possibility of outright military aggression by Sov forces against other countries, since he did not regard this as the main problem for the coming period. This was the source of a certain amount of misinterpretation of the article, which Kennan has always regretted.

4. Kennan's personal views were given a new expression in the winter of 1951 in a further article on foreign affairs, written at a time when the Korean war was already in progress and when the situa was substantially the same as today. At the time that article was written Kennan was again not working in govt, was engaged in private activity at Princeton, and had no idea he wld soon be returning to an official position connected with Sov-American relations. It represented solely his own views, and not govt policy.

5. Kennan is by training and instinct a professional public servant and a strong believer in the necessity of firm discipline and clear separation of responsibility in the governmental service he regards himself, in his present position, as a technical expert, available to give factual info and comment to the Secy of State and the President when they require it, and considers it unfair to them and detrimental to the public interest that he shld speak publicly about such comment or info as he may have occasion to give them. He draws a sharp distinction between his feelings as an individual and his role as a government official. In his capacity as Amb, he considers that his views on US policy and even on interpretation of Sov policy are precisely those stated by the President and other responsible policy-making officials of the govt. He does not find his personal outlook to be of primary relevance to the performance of his duties in Moscow, and he cannot understand that it shld be important or enlightening to anyone else. He feels it wld be actually confusing to the US public to have his personal feelings or background highlighted or discussed in the press at this time as anything with an important bearing on the determination of US policy with re-

\textsuperscript{6}Reference is to Kennan's article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" published in \textit{Foreign Affairs}, July 1947, under the sobriquet "X". Soon after the publication of the article, Kennan was identified as "X".
spect to USSR, since he is working entirely within framework of established US Govt policy.

6. Beyond this, he considers it obvious that his position in Moscow precludes him from entering as an individual at this time into public discussion of Sov-American relations. If he were to attempt to do so, he feels it cld not possibly fail to affect his usefulness in his Moscow post. He considers that he has no right to do anything that wld have this effect. His acceptance of the Moscow position meant, as he saw it, that he was inevitably and automatically excluding himself from any possibility of participating further in public discussion of matters affecting US policy toward Russia. He went to Moscow with this understanding and has faithfully adhered to it to date, despite heavy pressure from many other publishers and correspondents. He sees this responsibility as direct to the President, and not to the public; and feels it particularly important that this distinction be borne in mind in the case of anyone representing our gov't in Moscow. He feels that any prominent press stories that attempt to bring his views into connection with the discussion of these matters, even though based entirely on statements of persons other than himself, will not be helpful to his chances for usefulness in Moscow. He earnestly hopes this may be avoided, and that people at home will do him and the govt the favor of regarding him simply as an honest expert and observer, trying to do a quiet and effective job in an extremely difficult and delicate context. Feels Moscow Emb is already suffering from surfeit of publicity and begs it be spared at this time, in public interest, the spotlight of further press curiosity, which cannot really make comprehensible to wider public the nature of its unique problems and difficulties but can easily contribute to a further deterioration of its conditions of work and its usefulness to the country. What Emb desperately needs in coming period, in his opinion, is to be benevolently taken for granted by press and public and permitted to get ahead with its work.

No. 516

123 Kennan, George F.: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

SECRET PRIORITY
WASHINGTON, June 30, 1952—2:17 p.m.

933. For Kennan from Bohlen. We have also been much disturbed over leak your views in distorted form on Sov intentions in connection with present propaganda campaign. We have been endeavoring to bring these exaggerated versions into proper perspective. Rather than off-the-record meeting of senior editors and chief

1Drafted by Bohlen and cleared by Bonbright (EUR), Barbour (EE), and Matthews (G). Matthews signed for the Acting Secretary of State. Repeated to Bonn as telegram 3959 and to Vienna for Secretary Acheson as telegram Telac 10.
columnists which in itself might provide basis for further controversial stories, we believe preferable to continue dealing with correspondents on individual basis. We will for this purpose use material contained in your recent letter to Matthews.

We entirely approve your refusal to give interview to Time-Life Bureau concerning Sov-Amer relations and your views thereon. We will follow same line here apart from normal biographic material if despite our effort Time-Life insists on cover story. We feel that statement from Dept. such as you propose would give rise to wide speculation and comment and therefore prefer to use it as part of background treatment referred to above. Coincidence of unfortunate leak of your report on hate America campaign and mtg with Secy in London\(^2\) is certainly contributory cause to welter of speculation. We believe this will die down and our background briefing shld help.

Bruce

\(^2\)Regarding Kennan’s meeting with Acheson in London on June 27, see Document 514.

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No. 517

Behlen Papers, lot 74 D 379, “Personal Correspondence, 1952-1953”

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

RESTRICTED

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

Moscow, July 15, 1952.

DEAR Doc: I am addressing this letter to you largely because I do not know where else to address it. I will leave it to you to see that it reaches those people in Washington who ought to see it and might be interested in doing so. The good old despatch form—that of the personal address by a chief of mission to a theoretically interested Secretary of State—now seems to have passed away with many of the other older features of diplomacy, and has been replaced, I gather, by some sort of impersonal form used mostly for unimportant items. Somehow or other I find difficulty in exposing my thoughts indiscriminately to the six or seven thousand people who I understand today make up the Department of State.

The purpose of this letter is to try to sum up for you the impressions I have gathered to date of the present state of Soviet society, as compared with conditions in the times of my former periods of service here. I am looking at these matters in the present letter from the standpoint of the population. I hope soon to make a simi-
lar assessment as to how things look from the standpoint of the regime.

You will understand that these impressions rest on a very slender basis of experience. Even the average foreign diplomat, in these days of restricted travel and total isolation from Soviet citizens, sees little from his Moscow prison. An American Ambassador, surrounded by his fantastic retinue of guardians, is even more limited than others in his opportunities for observations. What I say, therefore, is merely the result of analysis and conjecture from such shreds of evidence as are available—plus the one element which perhaps does actually lend a special value to our judgments here: the fact that we are stung daily into thinking intensively about these matters and very little else, and have the requisite time and freedom from distraction to permit us to do so.

Let us begin with the mass of the people and work toward the top.

If Moscow is any criterion, the mass of the urban dwellers in this country have it materially considerably better (quite naturally) than they had it at the end of the recent war, but also probably slightly better than they ever had it at any previous time in the Soviet period. This improvement finds itself expressed principally in the availability on the market of food and clothing and minor conveniences of life. Cost is, of course now, with the abolition of rationing, a real factor; and how much the average citizen can actually afford to buy we do not know. But life must be greatly facilitated, for almost everyone, by the ability to do readily such elementary things as to buy a pair of shoestrings or a new purse or clothes for a child, to summon a taxi in any emergency, to find something nice for a birthday party, or to get a seat—sometimes—in a bus. It is the little things that the improvement has manifested itself most; and who would challenge their importance?

Altogether, however, the improvement is not really very marked if compared with the best prior period since the First Five Year Plan—namely 1938–41. In some of the larger things, notably housing and facilities for recreation, there seems to have been little or no improvement at all. It is hard to tell, furthermore, just how far these ameliorations extend, both socially and geographically. In food and clothing the improvement is probably fairly uniform throughout the industrial and urban population of the country. But some of the most striking changes in Moscow, particularly the more extensive use of private cars, the construction of private cottages on the outskirts of the city, etc., seem to represent concessions to the privileged bureaucratic caste in the capital city, and find only pale reflections, if any, further afield. The streets of Leningrad, for example, are still, except for buses, just about as devoid
of motor vehicle traffic as they must have been in the year 1914; and since the ubiquitous droschki, which then commanded the Petersburg scene, has now disappeared entirely, the streets have a very empty appearance indeed, contrasting strongly with Moscow’s busy thoroughfares.

The concessions made to the more influential Moscow public are most striking in the extent to which they have made possible the emergence of a wide-spread cultivation of private interest. I understand that in Hungary the cultivation of private garden plots is frowned on. If so, this is a very significant divergence between Soviet and satellite conditions (and, incidentally, not the only one). Garden plots exist around Moscow by the hundreds of thousands, some leased out for the summer by the suburban municipalities from public lands (roadside strips, stream-bottoms, etc.) but without accompanying buildings, others leased out as the grounds of summer dachas, others belonging to what are, in effect, private suburban properties. These areas on the edge of the city virtually hum with activity, and the activity is one having little or nothing to do with the “socialized sector” of economy. Houses are built with family labor (log houses still, but stout and warm and not bad housing); gardens and orchards are laid out; poultry and livestock (individual cows and goats) are traded and cultivated in great number, though all trading must be done in individual animals, or at the most, pairs, not in herds.

I would guess that the number of people participating in the pursuit of such part-time activities just around Moscow alone runs into the millions. And around their activities there has grown up a sort of commercial servicing establishment: people who make their living by growing seeds and hot-house plants, breeding animals, etc. All these people have to keep their operations to a small scale. They must be careful not to employ labor, or to be found owning anything so magnificent as a truck. Everything must be masked as individual, rather than highly organized commercial, activity. But there are ways and means of solving all those problems.

The result is that on the outskirts of Moscow there has grown up a veritable world of what you might call “miniature private interest,” a world in which people devote themselves to, and think about, everything under the sun except the success of Communism, and appear to be quite happy doing so. I know, in fact, of no human environment more warmly and agreeably pulsating with activity, contentment and sociability than a contemporary Moscow suburban “dacha” area on a nice spring morning, after the long, trying winter. Everything takes place in a genial intimacy and informality: hammers ring, roosters crow, goats tug at their tether, barefoot women hoe vigorously at the potato patches, small boys
play excitedly in the little streams and ponds, family parties sit at crude wooden tables in the gardens under the young fruit trees. The great good earth of Mother Russia, long ignored in favor of the childish industrial fetishes of the earlier Communist period, seems once more to exude her benevolent and maternal warmth over man and beast and growing things together; and only, perhaps, an American Ambassador, stalking through the countryside with his company of guardians to the amazement of the children and the terror of the adults, is effectively isolated, as though by an invisible barrier, from participation in the general beneficence of nature and human sociability.

It is at this point that the pursuit of private interest by the city-dweller merges with the pursuit of private interest by the country-dweller. The crisis over collectivization—the quiet, creeping, cautious but stubborn resistance of the peasant to the disguised form of state exploitation involved in the collective farm system—plainly continues unabated. The regime tries to make the peasant work the collective holdings; the peasant prefers to address himself to the tiny private plot which is left to him to work by himself and the produce of which he is free to sell as he likes. It is true that the private plot is tiny (roughly one to two acres), that he may not employ labor on it, that the amount of livestock and equipment he may have on it is limited practically to kitchen garden dimensions. All this does not matter. It is a commentary on the collective farm system that what the peasant can make from his one private cow and one private litter of pigs still seems usually to interest him more than his entire share in the collective farm herd. The collective farm system was drawn up in ignorance of the basic delicacy of the essential relationship between man and earth, man and plant, man and animal, in the agricultural process. The nature of the Soviet system has been deeply affected by the fact that the early Communists who conceived and imposed it were city people, for whom the agricultural process was only a backward and unglamorous form of industrial output, and its devotees—a reactionary, benighted caste, hovering socially between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, awkwardly resistant to classification in Marxist terms. As the years go by, the consequences of this deficiency in knowledge and experience on the part of the authors of Bolshevism become clearer and more important in their implications.

Since the average peasant house is hardly distinguishable from a great many of the city people's dachas, and since its "private" plot looks much like the summer garden of many a part-time urban farmer, it is sometimes impossible to tell from visible observation which is which. Nor is there, subjectively speaking, much difference. The peasant is condemned like the city man, to work a cer-
tain proportion of his time for what amounts to the state, at an inadequate remuneration. Like the city man, he finds relief, both spiritually and materially, by addressing himself with great intensity to the tiny plot which is left to him for his own use. Thus the partial "private sector" that is spread throughout the whole vast countryside of Russia.

The vigor and persistence of this small-scale private economy continues to be a source of concern for the regime, because it has a tendency to absorb both physical energy and emotional enthusiasm which the regime would like to harness for its own purposes. The farther one gets from Moscow the greater the problem seems to be, and the more difficult the control. The "private sector" is not without its own peculiar economic power and influence; and while these advantages are not exploited for any "counter-revolutionary" political purpose, they are exploited wherever possible for purposes of individual self-betterment, and have a tendency to lead to a good deal of connivance and corruption on the part of local officials. In consequence, the public lands and herds of the collective farms have everywhere an incurable tendency to shrink quietly and inconspicuously, the private ones to grow in similar fashion. This sort of thing seems to flourish with particular virulence in the more remote parts of the realm, where people have the feeling, to use an old Russian expression, that "the Tsar is far away." In Georgia, for example, things appear recently to have advanced to a point where the collective farm system hardly existed at all any more, except in name. The regime finally woke up to the full import of what was going on; Beria was reportedly sent down to look after things; severe measures were taken; and the collective farm structure will presumably be put back together again somehow. But this disciplinary operation cannot have been agreeable to a great many influential local figures in that part of the world; it will presumably intensify sectional discontent, and it emphasizes the way in which the growing underworld of individual economic activity operates to widen the breach between the interests and hopes of broad masses of the people and those of the regime.

This spiritual breach between the rulers and the ruled is one of the things that most strongly strikes a person returning to Russia at this juncture after a long absence. Somehow or other, the betterment of material conditions for the mass of the people seems to go hand in hand with a certain sort of withdrawal of these masses from emotional participation in the announced purposes of the regime. This is not to be confused with political discontent. On the contrary, it is attended by the steady disappearance of those age groups which have any sort of recollection of pre-revolutionary times or any ability to imagine any other sort of government than
this one. It even is attended, I think, by an increasing acceptance of Soviet power and, in general, Soviet institutions as a natural condition of life, not always agreeable or pleasant, sometimes even dangerous, but nevertheless something that is simply "there," like the weather or the soil, and not to be removed by anything the individual could possibly do—something that simply has to be accepted and put up with.

But in this very acceptance of Soviet power as a sort of an unchangeable condition of nature there is also implied the very lack of living emotional and political relationship to it, about which I am speaking. Thirty years ago people were violently for it or against it, because all of them felt Soviet power as something springing from human action, capable of alteration by human action, and affecting their own lives in ways that raised issues of great immediacy and importance with respect to their own behavior. Today most of them do not have this feeling. Their attitude toward it is one of increasing apathy and detachment, combined with acceptance—acceptance sometimes resigned, sometimes vaguely approving, sometimes unthinkingly enthusiastic. In general I think it fair to say that the enthusiasm varies in reverse relationship to the thoughtfulness of the person and to his immediate personal experience with the more terrible sides of Soviet power—such things as the experiences of collectivization, recollections of the purges, or personal unhappiness as a victim of the harshness of the bureaucracy.

It is my feeling that the regime is itself in large measure responsible for this growing emotional detachment of large masses of the people. For one thing, it has rendered itself physically and personally remote from the rest of the population to an extraordinary degree. One had a feeling 15 or 20 years ago of a much greater personal impact of the members of the Politburo on the actual running of the country, an impact which created a certain sense of intimacy between them and their subjects, and even with such of their subjects as were suffering at their hands. More was known and felt by people of the personalities, the views, and the moods of the top rulers. Today, these rulers sit in inscrutable isolation behind their Kremlin walls. For most people, they are only names, and names with a slightly mythical quality, at that. The relatively few changes in personnel in the top bodies in the past 15 years have meant that even that link with the public which is provided by the normal flow of advancement into prominent position of people who once had normal ties with friends and neighbors and co-workers, is now largely missing.

The regime, furthermore, seems now to care very little for the broad mass of the people as a possible thinking participant in the
processes of public life. The propaganda it addresses to them has an almost contemptuous overtone in the marked differences which distinguish it from the line put out for responsible and serious Communists. In the case of the masses, the appeal is to patriotic motives and the normal obligations of citizenship on the positive side, and to the most primitive and physical type of loathing for the foreigner, on the negative plane. In general, this appeal bases itself very strongly on the relationship between the Soviet—and outstandingly the Russian—population to its external environment. What the regime says to the masses of the people about internal affairs is laconic and perfunctory to a degree that seems almost de- risive. It is significant that there is no longer even any five-year plan to serve as a focal point for popular enthusiasm. There are only the so-called “grand construction projects” (velikie stroiki) such as the Volga–Don Canal and the new building of the Moscow University—enterprises which many Soviet citizens can never be expected to see with their own eyes and in which few can ever expect to participate.

These, I repeat, are the only sops thrown to such Soviet citizens as might wish to indulge in enthusiasm over the internal programs of the regime, and it seems to me that the regime does not really care terrifically whether they enthuse about these current operations or not. The proper sources of enthusiasm for the average Soviet citizen, as reflected in the nuances and implications of the positions taken by the Party, all seem to relate rather to the past than to the present, and specifically to the great deeds accomplished in past times by two men claimed to have been of Herculean and almost inhuman stature: Lenin, whose greatness is treated as a historical fact, to be taken for granted, and Stalin, the disciple who outgrew the master, whose greatness merged into divinity, and whose magic, unerring touch caused problem after problem to dissolve into the gold of “the right solution” by the peculiar alchemy of genius and infallibility.

After such great deeds, there is very little left to do, or to say, or to suggest. Challenge grows only out of conflict; but conflict is only a product of social tension. Where social tension has been overcome, where “the right solution” has long since been found, what is there left to discuss, or even to combat?

This is the question which today wracks the labors and deliberations of the Soviet literary and artistic world. It is no accident that in recent months the major debate in Soviet cultural circles has been over the question of the “conflictless” play or novel: the question, that is, as to whether it is possible for genuine conflicts to be present, and so portrayed by the fiction writer, in a society where all important social problems have theoretically been solved. The
question was raised some months ago, quite bluntly and unwisely, by a Soviet playwright apparently frustrated to the point of des-
peration in his search for a suitable conflict to form the subject of
drama. Its frightening possibilities were readily perceived by
almost everyone concerned; and the party, still pale from the
thought of the abyss into which it had been obliged to peer, hastily
announced that there were indeed genuine conflicts in Soviet life,
explaining that there were always some people more advanced and
other people less advanced in the understanding of the work and
purposes of Soviet power and that in this disparity lay tensions and
conflicts quite adequate to the purposes of any competent play-
wright or novelist.

Naturally, nobody was really fooled by this prevarication. The
fact of the matter is that the bottom has been knocked out of the
internal ideological position of the Soviet regime by the immoder-
ate and "all-out" glorification of Stalin and exaggeration of the re-
gime's own successes in the past. A vacuum has been created in
this way which it will not be easy for anyone to fill. The country
lives today, ideologically, in a species of Wagnerian twilight, char-
acterized by the rosy, ethereal reflections of great deeds once ac-
complished, breathing an atmosphere of well-deserved relaxation
and smug self-congratulation over the tremendous achievements of
the parting day. The real reason why Soviet plays are bad plays in
the year 1952 is that all have to be written on the assumption that
the happy ending has already taken place before the dramatic hap-
penings begin: witnessing them, the western observer has the im-
pression of seeing a family of actors sitting around on the stage
after the last curtain has fallen, still congratulating each other on
the fortunate outcome of all their adventures, those who were once
in error having now seen the light and started on proper paths, the
others glowing with a veritable surfeit of rectitude. There can be
no real negative characters in the Soviet drama, except agents and
dupes of the menacing outside world; for how could such people be
produced by the influences of Soviet society alone, which has been
correctly conducted for 35 years?

This question runs through all manifestations of Soviet life. It af-
facts the legal system. It causes jurists to argue about the contin-
ued causes of criminality in a system where consciousness is sup-
pposed to stem from class membership and yet classes are supposed
to be abolished. It carries into the debates of the psychologists and
the philosophers who wonder whether or not the individual is sup-
posed to be considered a moral being capable of arriving at his own
choices between right and wrong. Into every nook and cranny of
Soviet life flows the insidious paralyzing influence of this dilem-
ma—the dilemma of a group of men who have officially portrayed themselves as just one bit too successful and too infallible.

By and large the major escape from this situation for the government propagandist and teacher is the “capitalist encirclement.” More and more the outside world, and above all the United States, is made to stand as scapegoat for all the genuine deficiencies and conflicts of Soviet society. But this is successful only to a limited degree. By and large, people are too perceptive to permit their emotional world to be absorbed by a thesis which tells them that this is the best of all possible worlds at home and the worst of all possible worlds lies immediately beyond the Soviet border. They shrug off this rather obvious and childish proposition—largely for the reason that it gives them no real help in meeting the genuine problems of individual life that each of them must face. They have heard it too long, it is all too remote and abstract. They need something more earthbound, something more close to home. In these circumstances it is no wonder that their emotional interests turn again to personal relationships, to the providing of greater security for individual and family. It is no wonder that there is a renewed interest in romantic love, and that bobby-soxers now storm the tenors and leading men of the Moscow stage in a manner little less violent than that of the partisans of the popular crooner at home. Above all, it is no wonder that even in the relatively sophisticated and politically-minded city of Moscow one-fourth to one-third of the population is estimated, on fairly serious evidence, to have some sort of religious faith—at least in a degree sufficient to interest them in seeing to it that their children are baptized and their dead do not go unprayed-for to the graves and crematoriums. While the ubiquity of this sort of simple faith is not to be confused with any revival of secular influence on the part of the Orthodox Church (they are two quite different things) it is nevertheless a fact of immense underlying importance.

This type of life—the combination of modest work, modest hope and modest faith—combined with an attitude of cautious detachment vis-à-vis the political power, appears to bring to those who lead it a state of mind which, if not exactly happiness, is also not unhappiness, and is actually not too different from that of working people in any country. Once the individual has detached his own inner life from the world of politics, his joys and sorrows are pretty much the normal ones of life anywhere; and the fact that there are narrow limits to the field in which his ambitions can roam, with respect to both wealth and position, is perhaps rather a source of spiritual health than otherwise.

This reasonably healthy and normal state of the popular mind contrasts quite sharply with what I fancy I see in the faces of the
intelligentsia and at least a certain sector of the more important people in the apparatus of power—with all those people, in short, who might be said to have “pretentions.” I have never seen any more subdued, morose, and obviously deeply unhappy people than many of the upper class theater audiences in Moscow. There is a deadness about them that is almost frightening. Most of these actually belong, in all probability, to the upper officialdom. One sees relatively few intellectuals any more in the Moscow theater audiences.

It requires, however, only a slight acquaintance with current artistic and critical literature to see how deeply unhappy the literary and cultural circles themselves must generally be. The long years of purges and censorship have taken their toll in two ways. They have eliminated most of the more sensitive people from the scene entirely. Relatively few of these, I think, have suffered any actual arrest or any punishment worse than a semi-exile in the years since World War II. But many have been in one way or another barred from productive work in their normal fields and from association with other people of like tastes, and many others have voluntarily barred themselves from these things. Those that remain are primarily the political careerists—people whose real profession and source of strength lies in their political collaboration with the regime but who have just sufficient talent, or did have it when they were younger, to pass plausibly as artists, authors, or what you will. Only a handful of writers of any real prestige remain, and these—instead of producing anything of great literary value—vie with each other on the overt level, in blood-thirsty propaganda speeches about bacteriological warfare, and, behind the walls of the Writers’ Union in waspish personal duels with one another, conducted in the guise of comradely literary criticism and counter-criticism, but against a background of the most savage party and police intrigue. The result is, of course, that their efforts have relatively little meaning to the wider Soviet public. They come to resemble simply a blind and confused whirling of positive and negative particles around the magnet of the central political power, with occasional minor collisions about which nobody any longer cares. When one sees these people, and indeed all of those whose lives, by virtue of their positions in life, have come to be entirely identified with the shifting shadows of favor and disfavor in the higher ranks of the regime, and when one compares their taut faces with those of the stolid but relatively healthy and happy non-party masses, one is reminded of the words of Dostoevski’s Grand Inquisitor: “And all of them will be happy, all the millions of beings, except the hundred thousand who rule them. For we alone, we who guard the secret—we alone shall be unhappy. There will be
thousands of millions of happy children and one hundred thousand superiors who have taken upon themselves the curse of the knowledge of good and evil.”

There is one more aspect of this division of the classes which is really new and of greatest potential importance for the future development of Soviet society: that is the relative stability of social relationships which has characterized the period since the war. The fact is that in the past five or six years there has been relatively little political purging. The result is that mobility throughout the apparatus of power has probably been far less than was formerly the case. Influence and position have now been retained by the same people for a relatively long time. The children of these people have begun to grow up with a distinct consciousness of caste identification. There are increasing evidences at present of a stratification of society which is attaining a certain firmness, and will not be easy to break up again. Stratification, in itself, is of course not new in Soviet society. It was frequently observed and commented on in the later thirties and during the war. But this was a relatively unstable stratification related solely to the holding of office; and since office was generally not held very long and life was full of abrupt changes and catastrophes, there was little chance for this stratification to solidify. The years since World War II, however, seem to have brought a certain change in this respect. Social distinctions are again becoming important in the relations between young people. Older people are beginning to complain of “snobishness” among the young. The behavior of different groups of people, in other words, begins to reflect not in just the jobs they happen to hold at the moment but their general estimate of themselves and of their place in the hierarchy of Soviet society.

The absence of extensive purges, which has had much to do with producing this situation, is something well worth noting for a number of reasons. Among other things, we are forced to conclude that the political concentration camp population in the Soviet Union has probably declined greatly in the last two or three years. There has been no evidence of arrests and forced labor sentences for political reasons on a scale adequate to maintain the camps at the level of populousness they reached in the late thirties and during the war. Since many of the victims are, after all, confined on limited sentences and released after varying periods of time (many of the terms should now be maturing in the case of those arrested just before and during the war) and since mortality is extremely high among the remainder, the camp population can drop very drastically and rapidly if arrests and deportations are not maintained at the levels of roughly a decade ago. We cannot even be sure that the Soviet Government is not quietly preparing a situ-
ation in which it will be possible for it to adopt a position, some fine day, that there are no political concentration camps in the Soviet Union, and to challenge some sort of international inspection to prove it. This may not be for a long time, and it may never come entirely; but the absence of evidence of extensive political arrests in recent years for offenses other than those having to do with foreign connections leads me to feel that we ought perhaps to be a bit careful in our propaganda and allegations on the forced labor question and to draw a certain distinction between the satellite areas, where concentration camps and other features of the terrorism of an early revolutionary phase are still prominent, and the Soviet Union, where terror has really done its work so well that arrest and confinement of great masses of people for purposes of intimidation are possibly no longer considered really necessary.

This relative stability in social relationships seems again to stem directly from conditions in the top ranks of the regime: particularly the congealment of personnel at the very top, the stagnation in promotions at the Central Comite level, and the general atmosphere of wary hesitation and inactivity which is no doubt a reflection of the delicacy of all personal-official relationships in the light of Stalin's increasing age and the growing problem of succession. The connection of these things with the growth of social distinctions was clearly symbolized for some of us, the other evening, by the sight of Stalin's son sitting with two other Air Force officers in solitary splendor in the government box at the ballet and ogling the prima ballerina in the best regal tradition. I cannot imagine that this young man conceives of himself as a crown prince. Despite his generals rank, he is not a person of any position on the Party, as far as any of us are aware. I should suppose that any bid for power on his part would set all sorts of fireworks in motion. But the quiet ostentation of his appearance at the ballet is eloquent testimony to the fact that distinctions other than ones of party or police position now have raised their heads and achieved recognition in the Soviet Union and find their crowning expression in the immediate vicinity of the august presence itself.

We have seen that the emotional withdrawal of the mass of the people from an identification with the life and experience of the political power was a reflection of the policies of the government itself. We see that the stratification of social groups in the country likewise has as its origin conditions at the top of the regime. These things, to my mind, warrant our most minute attention. The very essence of the domestic policies of the Stalin regime has been to attempt to abolish the factor of elemental and natural evolution in the development of Russian society—in fact, to abolish change itself except insofar as change might represent one of the deliber-
ate temporary zig-zags of party policy. We now see two changes
taking place before our eyes, neither of which was presumably de-
sired by the regime, both of which even bear in themselves consid-
erable potential danger for the regime, and yet both of which the
regime has found itself obliged to stimulate. One is the detachment
of the people from the supreme political purpose; the other is the
growing rigidity of caste stratification in Soviet society.

Both of these phenomena, in deepest essence, are reflections of
the life and works of a single man. The first is the reflections of his
infinite jealousy and avidity for political power—qualities that car-
ried him to his absurd pretensions to an earthly divinity and actu-
ally killed the ideological sense and function of the political move-
ment of which he is the head. The second is the reflection of his
increasing age and approaching death. No great country can be
identified as closely as this one with the life and fortunes of a
single man—so bent and attuned to his personality, his whims and
his neuroses, without sharing to a degree his weaknesses and his
very mortality. The Party has tried to rule out change; but the
Party is hoisted here on the petard of its own lack of genuine de-
mocracy, of the loss of organic connection with the emotional forces
of the people themselves—of its dependence on, and beholdenness
to, the life cycle of a single individual.

I see no early revolt in the Soviet Union. I see no likely dramatic
or abrupt ending to the phenomenon of Bolsheivism. Least of all do
I see in the minds of the people any new or revolutionary alterna-
tive to the present system. I cannot rule these things out, but they
are not in the cards as they appear to me today. I do see that the
Party has not succeeded in ruling out change. I see that there are
great forces operating here which are not really under the control
of the regime, because they are part of the regime’s own failings
and its own mortality. I see that the original glamour and emotion-
al meaning of the revolution have largely exhausted themselves,
and that the regime faces a dilemma in the need for filling the re-
sulting vacuum. I would warn against drawing any primitive and
over-simplified conclusions from the observations I have just made.
But I think they have sufficient force to stand also as a warning
against the assumption into which many people have drifted: that
the Soviet leaders have somehow found some mysterious secret of
infallibility in the exercise of power and that it is no problem for
them to hang on indefinitely and to mold Soviet society to their
hearts’ desire. What is coming in this immediately approaching
period may very well be a crisis of Soviet power quite comparable
in scope and seriousness to the original civil war or the death of Lenin or the purges of the 30's—but entirely different in form.

Very sincerely,

GEORGE F. KENNAN

P. S. Most of this letter was actually written a month ago, before I went to Germany. On reading it over now I have the following two after-thoughts:

1. I have probably given a somewhat exaggerated picture of the role of the private sector in agriculture. The regime claims in effect an extensive reduction in private livestock holdings in recent months as a result of the disciplinary pressures it has brought to bear.

2. I neglected to mention one or two things which support the thesis of the emotional retirement of people into "private life." One is the frequency of drunkenness and delinquency—particularly among young men—both of which are manifestations of "private life," though negative ones. The signs of this seems to me greater than at any time I have been here. Another is the regime's show of concern for what it now does not hesitate to call the "spiritual needs" of people. The very recognition that people have such needs is new in Soviet official thought, and reflects the uneasiness of the regime over the realization that they are losing access to the inner life of people.
SECRET

Moscow, August 11, 1952.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: When I called on you before coming to Moscow you were good enough to say that you would be glad if I would write you from time to time about my impressions here.

I have now been here three months and I have had a chance to pick up something of the atmosphere of the place again and to make comparisons with the times when I was here before, and I thought it might interest you to have a word from me about the main impressions I have gathered.

The thing that strikes me hardest here is the extent to which the Soviet Government has lost contact with the west. There simply is no real channel for any exchange of views; and while we maintain a big embassy here in the middle of Moscow, we are so cut off and hemmed in with restrictions and ignored by the Soviet Government that it is as though no diplomatic relations existed at all. In three months service here I have not yet had a single bit of business to take up with the Soviet Government, except minor housekeeping.

1Transmitted to the Department of State under cover of the following letter from Ambassador Kennan to Secretary Acheson, also dated Aug. 11:

"I enclose a letter to the President which I would like you to see before it goes to him.

"I would appreciate it if it might be sent on to the President if you see no objection. Should there be anything in it which you might feel had better not be said in such a communication, I would be grateful if I might be informed and given a chance to revise the letter accordingly."

A memorandum of Aug. 27 from Bonbright to Secretary Acheson, attached to the source text, reads as follows:

"EUR has no objection to the attached letter from Mr. Kennan to the President and suggests that you allow it to go forward.

"I am not particularly happy about the final paragraph, which I don't regard as particularly realistic. Nor do I believe that there is as much talk in the press about the inevitability of war as this paragraph would suggest. I don't think this point is sufficiently important however to warrant an effort to get Mr. Kennan to change it."

The memorandum is endorsed by Acheson "OK DA."

The signed copy of this letter was forwarded to the White House by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. On Sept. 3, President Truman sent the following brief acknowledgement of Kennan's letter:

"Thanks very much for your letter of August eleventh about the present condition of our relationship with the Soviet Union.

"Your letter was most interesting and informative and I appreciate your taking the time to send it to me." (Truman Library, Truman papers, PSF Subject file—Soviet Union)

2Regarding Kennan's call upon President Truman on Apr. 1, see Document 496.
matters surrounding our attempt to operate an embassy in this
city, and the Soviets have shown no inclination to discuss anything
with me or to take advantage of my presence in any way.

I attribute this state of affairs primarily to a mood of arrogance
and over-confidence which I think came over these people about
five years ago and has caused them to feel that they had no need to
pay any attention to the views or the feelings of the western gov-
ernments—a belief that the development of the international situ-
ation was going to bring them out on top and in a position to dictate
their terms to other people. What they were depending on was not
any idea of launching a great military onslaught against the west
and defeating everybody in a single military encounter, but rather
a long process of development in international life, in the course of
which they figured the western side would be weakened by various
factors, such as economic difficulties and break-up of colonial rela-
tionships. They thought there were good chances that eventually,
with the use of their enormous propaganda machine and the sharp
tactics of their disciplined parties abroad, they would be able to
sow bewilderment and anxiety throughout the western countries,
to seize power in some countries, in others to cause people to lose
faith in themselves and in us, and eventually reduce us all to a
state of relative helplessness. I do not think that they hoped for
any early rise of communist strength in the United States; but they
did think they could separate our allies from us, leave us an isolat-
ed nation with our international position and foreign trade seriously
undermined, and thus cause our people to lose faith in their own
leadership and their own political institutions and to begin to
waste their strength in domestic quarrels and disorders. This, they
figured, would mean the end of American influence and power in
the world, and would provide some muddy waters in which the
American communists might find good fishing.

Today, I think some people here are beginning to have serious
doubts as to whether this has been a good policy for the Kremlin to
follow and whether it would not have been better to have tried to
maintain some sort of polite and decent relations with ourselves
and other western governments. But these feelings are still only in
the stage of uneasy doubts, and as far as I can see they have not
yet caused the regime to alter its attitude. I do not look for any
change before our elections, and even then everything will depend
on what happens in the international situation. If, for example,
communist elements should come out on top in Iran or in Egypt
and succeed in disrupting the Middle East and shaking the position
of the Atlantic Pact group there—or if things should go badly for
us in Western Europe and the Germans and the French fight too
bitterly about the Saar,—or if the Soviet and East German authori-
ties should succeed in weakening the position of the western powers in Berlin and in causing the West Berliners to wonder whether they hadn’t been wrong in resisting communist pressures so bravely all this time—if things like this should occur in the next few months, then people here may well conclude that the attitude they have adopted in recent years has been right all along, and they only have to hold on tight and carry on and all will be well for them. But if these things do not happen, and if we can continue to demonstrate to them, as we have done in several recent situations, that we can stand up to them and that they are not going to get anywhere until they stop placing their main hopes in these attempts at sowing subversion and disunity elsewhere and begin to show a desire to treat us decently and talk to us respectfully, then I think we may begin to see changes in their attitude. Then it may become possible to do business with them, slowly and painfully, and perhaps to make some progress toward the gradual and progressive solution of some of our problems—but only one at a time, as and when conditions are favorable, not in any single package of negotiations.

When and if these people come to the point where they are willing to talk to us in a decent way, we will know it: we will see it in their behavior and many things they do. Until they come to that point I think we should leave them strictly alone and not show any signs of weakness or lack of confidence in our own position. And when we get to the point where they indicate they want to have better relations with us, then I would force them to deal with us decently at all levels where we have contact with them: that is, in the dealings between this embassy and the foreign office, between our people and the Soviet people in Berlin and Vienna, in the UN, etc. We will be playing their game if we let them insist that nothing can ever be gotten out of them unless we talk to Stalin. What we need are not rare and intermittent conversations with Stalin, interspersed with long periods in which no Soviet official will yield on anything, but orders from Stalin to his officials which will make all of them treat us with greater politeness and circumspection and respect.

I think the first things we should insist upon, as prerequisites to any improvements of our relations, are a cease-fire in Korea and a termination of the violent and dirty anti-American propaganda being put out daily here in Moscow. I have taken the liberty of telling everyone here in Moscow that I think these things are indispensable if we are to begin to reduce tensions and improve our relations with the Soviet Union, and I hope this meets with your approval.
In both of these things, it is the Soviets that must make the first move. But if they ever do make it, I think it is important then that the American press, too, show some sense of responsibility and stop the more extreme types of attack against the Kremlin. In general, I wish our press could be induced even now to lay off the subject of war and avoid publishing material that seems to indicate we regard a third world war as inevitable, since this just plays into the hands of the Soviet "peace" propaganda and frightens our friends more than it reassures them.

With best personal regards.

Very respectfully yours,

GEORGE F. KENNAN

No. 519

761.00/8-2052: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

Moscow, August 20, 1952—6 p. m.

324. Kentel eyes only Secretary (distribution S/S only). Following are reflections on this morning’s announcements re convening of party congress\(^1\) which I did not think it was wise to send by other channel. Must ask Dept to regard them as submitted only for personal knowledge and reflection of top persons in Dept and Govt. Would regard any leakage these comments on my part as extremely unfortunate.

Cannot stress too strongly importance of what may lie behind these developments, particularly coupling of convening of party congress with measures looking toward abolition of Politburo.

There is no question but that delay in holding party congress was for long delicate and painful issue within high party circles; in particular Zhdanov’s reproach to Tito, in Cominform letter, for failing to hold party congress was unquestionably meant to cut both ways and may well have been intimately connected with circumstances of Zhdanov’s demise.\(^2\) Fact that it has now proved possible

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\(^1\)On Aug. 20, Stalin announced that a recent plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had decided to convene the Nineteenth Party Congress on Oct. 5.

\(^2\)Andrey Andreyevich Zhdanov, member of the Politburo and Organizational Secretary of the CPSU, who died in Moscow on Aug. 31, 1948. Regarding his death, see telegram 1868 in Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iv, p. 916. Zhdanov’s “Cominform letter” appears to be a reference to his letter of Apr. 16, 1948, to Marshal Tito, one of the exchanges in the rupture between the CPSU and the Yugoslav Communist Party.
to convene congress means that something must have given in last few months in Sov internal situation. Coupling of convening of congress with announcement of abolition of Politburo and estab Presidium of Central Comite would tend to confirm that whatever it was that "gave" had something to do with Stalin's personal position and/or relations among top members party.

We have not slightest evidence of any recent changes in composition of existing Politburo or any substantial alteration in mutual rels of leading members. Molotov's appearance as leader of Sov del meeting Chi, plus Malenkov's designation to render Secretary's report at coming congress (which Stalin rendered at last one) would seem to indicate both these key figures are on hand, functioning normally and in good standing. There has been no sign, as yet, of any purge or major displacement among top circles of party. This seems to me to indicate that issue has been primarily one not of rivalries within top group but rather of Stalin's relationship to remainder of ruling group, altho this judgment is highly tentative and should be taken only with greatest caution.

Three hypotheses would seem to fit what is evidenced by these developments:

1. Congress may be conceived as occasion for some sort of nominal retirement on Stalin's part, but one which would leave unchanged his position of dominant influence and ascendance in party. I have never believed Stalin would voluntarily accept risk of indicating his wishes as to identity his real successor during his own lifetime, since this would represent virtual splitting of supreme power with great personal danger to himself. It is unthinkable, furthermore, that he should cease to be a member of highest party body during his lifetime, unless he were to be forced out by successful hostile group. Thus, if Stalin becomes member of new Presidium but does not take chairmanship, it may be that move, while not affecting his position of real supremacy, is conceived as means of emphasizing his retirement from position of personal operational responsibility and increasing collective responsibility of highest party body in determination of policy and conduct of affairs. This has been presaged by official language of recent months.

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3A Chinese governmental and military delegation headed by Prime Minister Chou En-lai visited Moscow, Aug. 17—Sept. 22. Negotiations between the Chinese Delegation and Soviet officials began on Aug. 20 when it was announced that discussions would proceed on the general question of Soviet-Chinese relations with particular reference to the problems of economy, defense, and international commitments. On Sept. 15, an official communiqué was issued announcing that the Soviet Union had agreed to return the Chinese Changchun railway but that Soviet troops would remain in Port Arthur until the Soviet Union and China signed a peace treaty with Japan. The communiqué also stated that "important political and economic questions were discussed."
portraying “party and govt” as directing hand of contemporary affairs and Stalin rather as revered teacher and source of inspiration. Collection responsibility of Politburo members may have rendered it difficult in absence of some institutional change to emphasize this shift of status any more than it has already been emphasized, since Stalin’s formal position has simply been that of one member of collectively organized body.

2. On other hand, these developments are so far-reaching and amazing we must not exclude possibility, inconceivable as it may sound, that this is the real turning point in Stalin’s position within party, that he is person who has been opposing convening of congress all along, knowing he could not in present conditions command majority, and that present announcement reflects final and carefully prepared victory in Central Comite over Stalin by tightly knit group of subordinated, embracing Malenkov, Beriya and Molotov together, who found it easier to get rid of Politburo as institution than to face difficulty of removing Stalin and his minor favorites from it, and have therefore, forced thru creation of new body, which will have to be elected a priori, thus providing possibility for reshuffling leading group without facing unpleasantness of making removals from Politburo. This is, in fact, hypothesis that best meets test of application to developments announced today; but it is so fantastic in its implications, and so out of accord with more basic and long term evidence, that I find it extremely hard to accept it and urge greatest caution and reservation in judgment on this point.

3. Third possibility is that presence of [in] Politburo of several persons either aging or ill-favored (such as Voroshilov, Shvernik, Andreyev) has become real problem, since honorable retirement from that body has never been regarded as a conceivable procedure; and that to avoid necessity of removing these people, which would cause fuss and present problems their future status, Stalin himself has decided to abolish body entirely and create new one to which problem children could simply fail to be elected. However, this hypothesis fails to satisfy me in several respects. In particular, I doubt Stalin would have taken step so drastic as abolition Politburo without giving most careful, and probably decisive, consideration to question his personal position in coming years, which he cannot fail to recognize as one of recreating connection with day-to-day control of affairs.

There is not evidence that any of this has any relation to foreign affairs at the moment. Mere fact that Chi del, obviously placing heavy demands upon attention Politburo members, was permitted come to Moscow at this time, would indicate foreign affairs has not been vital issue in connection with developments announced today.
In any case, would warn against any tendencies to see in these events hopeful signs from standpoint of US-Sov relations and East-West conflict. We must assume that today’s announcements represent latter phases rather than beginning of whatever internal crisis may have led to them and that whoever is in driver’s seat in this country today has been in that seat long enough to direct careful and inevitable time consuming preparations for delicate and important operations in internal polit field presaged in today’s announcements. But there is no evidence whatsoever that the hand which has guided Sov pol in recent weeks is one animated by anything other than deepest malevolence toward US.

KENNAN

No. 520

761.00/3-2152: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET

Moscow, August 21, 1952—noon.

329. Kentel. Eyes only Secretary. Distribution S/S only. In addition to hypotheses put forward mytel 324, August 20\(^1\) there is one more might be mentioned: Namely, that change will be in name only, membership of new Presidium being same as that of present Politburo and with Stalin himself taking chairmanship or with no chairman at all. This would leave open, however, question why traditional body, anchored in history and consciousness of revolutionary movement and intimately associated with Stalin himself, should be abruptly abolished at inevitable cost considerable nervousness and speculation within Communist world, for so little result. It must be borne in mind this move will cause much consternation and questioning among satellite Communists, who we may be sure had no advance notice of it. They had for most part modelled their party institutions on those of Soviet Union, and Stalin’s personal leadership has most important implications for them. They cannot fail be shaken by any mysterious and abrupt changes this nature. For these and other reasons am reluctant to believe move is solely matter of name and has no deeper reason. Seems to me delicate implications this change are borne out by failure party leaders up to this time to give any explanation or comment that could aid others

\(^1\)Supra.
in interpretation of move. If move were merely change of name, cannot see why this mystification should be necessary.  

KENNAN

No. 521

611.61/8-1552

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)¹

SECRET AND PERSONAL  

Moscow, August 25, 1952.

DEAR Doc: With respect to the recent reception of the new French Ambassador, M. Joxe, by Stalin,² I wish to tell you some things which were communicated to me in strictest confidence about the interview. M. Joxe attached such importance to the close holding of this information that he did not permit his Counselor to tell O'Shaughnessy about it and has asked that I keep it strictly for myself here in Moscow, which I am doing.

I have already wired about the circumstances of Joxe’s receiving the appointment,³ which I understood did not need to be so closely held within this Mission. It will be seen that the initiative was in reality that of the Soviet Government primarily, since Joxe’s polite reference to his being at Stalin’s disposal in no sense obligated the Soviet authorities to arrange an interview. The fact that they took this step, knowing that the British Ambassador’s request for an interview had remained without reply, surely meant that they felt they had special reasons for doing this. I think that this may have been in part intended as a reproach to me or a means of embarrassing me, by conveying the implication that had I made a similar request I also would have been received. Please note that I do not feel this is proof that such a request on my part would have been granted. But I think that the Soviet authorities saw in Joxe’s arrival, and in his perfunctory suggestion about seeing Stalin, an opportunity for placing on me the onus of not having asked.

I am quite content with this situation and only plead that everyone keep quiet and let me play it my own way here, as far as interviews with Stalin are concerned. What these people need is to be left alone for a while and taught that other people are capable of

¹The source text bears the following handwritten marginal notation: “Shown to Bruce Bonbright Barbour Aug 29, & Sec”.
²An account of the meeting is in telegram 346 from Moscow, Aug. 23. (651.61/8-2352)
³In telegram 345 from Moscow, Aug. 23. (651.61/8-2352)
doing without them, and I am quite sure that when the proper time comes for me to see Stalin (and this might be at any time for any number of reasons) my usefulness on that occasion will be enhanced, rather than otherwise, by virtue of the fact that I have refrained from bothering him until I really had something to talk to him about.

To return to the Joxe interview. Stalin began by asking him what he had seen of Moscow and when Joxe mentioned the Moscow subway, Stalin took up this subject with enthusiasm, said that he had ridden on the London subway in 1907 and found it “dirty”, and insisted (erroneously) that construction of the Paris subway had begun in 1908. Joxe had the impression that what was going on here was a deliberate attempt on Stalin’s part to show a degree of detailed knowledge on this subject that would impress and astound his visitor.

Stalin then asked Joxe whether the latter thought de Gaulle was happy, in retrospect, over his action in signing the Franco-Soviet Pact. Joxe replied that he could not speak for de Gaulle, that de Gaulle was not a friend of the present government. Talk then turned on the Atlantic Pact, which Stalin mentioned as an aggressive instrument of the United States, and, as the French understood it, Iceland. Joxe was understandably bewildered at this reference and asked whether Stalin was referring to U.S. bases on Iceland. The answer was no, he was referring to Iceland’s membership in the Pact. Joxe had the impression that Vyshinsky was himself somewhat taken aback and bewildered at this statement on Stalin’s part. When Joxe insisted that the Atlantic Pact was only for defensive purposes, Stalin turned to Vyshinsky and said to him with an air of great seriousness, “Then there is no reason why we should not belong to it.” When Joxe, however, pointed out that the U.S.S.R. was part of a world-wide security structure, namely the United Nations, Stalin merely laughed cynically and unpleasantly.

When asked what he expected to do here in Moscow, Joxe replied that he hoped to acquaint himself particularly with cultural life in the Soviet Union and trusted that he would be permitted to see various things such as the new university, etc. At this, Stalin turned to Vyshinsky and asked sharply: “Who is preventing him?” This being translated for Joxe, he hastened to say that he had had no difficulties thus far and merely wanted to express the hope that he would be permitted to see these things.

\footnote{Concerning the visit of Gen. Charles de Gaulle, then Head of the French Provisional Government, to Moscow on the occasion of the signature of the French-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance on Dec. 10, 1944, see telegram 4770 from Moscow, Dec. 11, 1944, \textit{Foreign Relations}, 1944, vol. iv, p. 987.}
Stalin terminated the conversation in a rather strange way by saying that he was the host (apparently meaning he was at M. Joxe’s disposal) but that if the Ambassador had nothing further to say to him, the interview might be considered as ended.

The French found Stalin showing his age very markedly. They said that his hair was noticeably thin compared to his pictures, his face shrunken, his stature much smaller than they had expected. They had the impression that he moved his left arm only with considerable difficulty and that his bodily movements were in general labored and jerky. They were struck by the continued brilliance and power of his eyes but felt that otherwise they were confronted by an old man.

Vyshinski, they felt, looked like a “scared rabbit.”

After the unpleasantness with the Italians, you can understand that I am extremely anxious that we do not become the source of any information about this. I think it entirely possible that the information will leak, again, through French sources and that when this occurs we will again be placed in an embarrassing position. For this reason I think you may wish to take steps to keep the record straight with regard to the day of receipt and subsequent control of this letter. My suggestion would be that since it contains no information which is needed by people in our Government for operational purposes it be shown only to two or three other people, the original can be kept by yourself and no copies made, or that some similar arrangements be made whereby we can protect ourselves in case of leaks.

I hope in the next few days to be able to write a general paper on Soviet foreign policy and intentions, the primary function of which, as I see it, would be to brief in advance of the event those gentlemen with whom I am to have the pleasure of meeting in London in the latter part of September. This would make it unnecessary for me to take up time with background considerations and to deal directly with the more immediate and detailed problems of the agenda. But this will also represent my first real report on this most important of subjects, the most important from the standpoint of my work here, and I hope that it will be of general value in the Department and throughout the Government. I shall write it with the consciousness that if it is to be widely enough distributed in Washington to do any real good as a basic document it will also probably leak at some stage or other. If I carefully allow for this possibility, then you will not have to feel so inhibited on its distribution, and I hope it will help us to get on with the important

—Reference is to the Chiefs of Mission meeting at London, Sept. 24–26; for documentation, see vol. vii, Part 1, pp. 606 ff.
decisions I feel we are going to have to make within the next six months.

Very sincerely,

GEORGE F. KENNAN

No. 522

Bohlen papers, lot 74 D 379, "Personal Correspondence 1952-1953"

The Counselor of the Department of State (Bohlen) to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kennan)¹

PERSONAL AND SECRET  [WASHINGTON,] September 19, 1952.

Dear George: Hugh Cumming who is going to London will give you this letter.

I plan to leave New York on Sunday, September 28, and arrive in Paris on Monday morning, September 29, if this will ensure my meeting you there.² If there is any change in your present plans, as I understand them, please send me a wire immediately and I can shift my schedule accordingly since the whole purpose of the trip is to meet you and Paris seems the easiest for both.

With reference to your letter on the Father Walsh business,³ I feel it would not be wise to send it to the New York Times since the subject involved is one on which mankind has argued for many centuries. As you know, all of us here have been in full agreement with your idea of sticking entirely to your business as Ambassador

¹The source text bears no signature.
²The meeting appears to have been subsequently rescheduled for Oct. 1.
³The letter by Kennan cannot be further identified. Presumably it was a response to a paragraph in a letter of Aug. 2 from Bohlen. The paragraph reads as follows: "You may have seen in the press or will when they reach you that Father Walsh [Father Edmund Walsh, Vice President of Georgetown University] at Colgate’s conference on American foreign policy took issue with some of the statements in your book [American Diplomacy, 1800-1950] concerning the use of moral judgments etc. in international affairs. I spoke at the same meeting but, unfortunately, could not wait over for Father Walsh’s talk. President [Everett] Case [of Colgate University] suggested that I send you a copy of what he actually said rather than incomplete press reports. In travelling up with Father Walsh he told me that with great regret he felt compelled to take issue with you on this moral question. I told him that I thought you were not speaking about basic moral considerations but rather at the tendency in this country to substitute moralistic slogans and inspirational literature as reasons for the behavior of states and as guides to our actions. Walsh said this was possibly true but he felt that your book was subject to the other interpretation. Of course, a good part of this is established Catholic doctrine but, as you know, that part of your book has caused considerable comment and may be subject to the interpretation Walsh puts on it. In any event, I think you would like to see exactly what he said. There is no further comment in the press so there is no public controversy over the matter." (Bohlen papers, lot 74 D 379, "Personal Correspondence 1952-1953")
to the Soviet Union and I honestly believe that a subject involving so much theology and metaphysics as that of moral law would raise considerable controversy in church and other circles here. We can discuss when I see you how is best to get this to Father Walsh. I am rather of the belief that it would be better if I delivered it personally to him but I don’t feel there is any great hurry and it can await my return. If you feel otherwise after talking to Hugh, send me a wire and I will send the letter to Father Walsh before I leave.4

My only other comment is on the Soviet reaction to NATO despatch5 which I have only just read once and will wish to study further. While, as you know, I fully share your view that a somewhat distorted picture of Soviet military intentions and possible capabilities has grown up in the Western world in recent years, I would date that from the Korean attack and not to the original concept of NATO. As I recall it, the original concept of NATO was in no case based on any belief that the Soviets were about to embark on military aggression in Europe. In fact, if my memory is correct, it was clearly seen as a political move designed to give the Europeans through association with the United States some sense of confidence and security which left to themselves they so clearly lacked. You will recall that the original impulse for the North Atlantic Treaty came from the British and French, and particularly the former after the conclusion of the Brussels Pact. The very small amount of military force envisaged and the limited degree of MDAP assistance in the period before Korea I think makes it plain that no one concerned had any exaggerated ideas of the imminence of a Russian military attack. It seems to me therefore that a truer statement of your view, which I don’t contest is applicable to the last few years, would be that the North Atlantic Pact was correctly and, if anything, too modestly conceived from the military point of view but that an erroneous interpretation of the meaning of the North Korean attack from the point of view of Soviet general policy subsequently led the Western nations, headed by ourselves, to overemphasize the purely military features and the probability of a Soviet recourse to open aggression in Europe. I believe, however, that events have done a good deal to mitigate that sentiment and possibly now the danger is over on the other side, namely, that under no circumstances need we fear Russian military action on the continent of Europe.

4No further correspondence on this matter has been found in Department of State files.
5Reference is to despatch 116 from Moscow, Sept. 8. (661.00/9–852)
One other small comment: I believe the Russian coup in Czechoslovakia was engendered equally if not more by the certain knowledge that in the planned elections in the Spring of 1948 the Communists were going to take an awful licking and that therefore the element of Soviet control in the affairs of the country were going to be watered down to a point dangerous for Soviet interests. I understand exactly what you mean because it is one of the fundamental things that we have both accepted about the Soviet Union against which these thoughts must be placed. However, to those who have not had this background and therefore don't have in mind these fundamental aspects of the Soviet system, this despatch could be misinterpreted, even though erroneously, as putting forth the view that much of Soviet aggressive action in recent years has been provoked or caused by our counter defensive measures which still in relation to the Soviet military machine, whatever its quality may be, are inferior. I mention this thought simply to point out the type of misunderstanding you might run into, particularly on the part of the military, at the London meeting.

I am looking forward very much to a chance to talk to you as the subjects are innumerable.

Yours,

No. 523

Editorial Note

The new Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Georgiy Nikolayevich Zarubin, made an initial protocol visit on Secretary Aucheson on September 18. Ambassador Zarubin, accompanied by Boris Ivanovich Karavayev, called to present copies of his credentials and to request an appointment with President Truman. The brief memorandum of conversation by Chief of Protocol John F. Simmons records the course of the meeting as follows:

“During the course of the conversation, which was of a general nature, the Ambassador said that his wife was not with him, giving no indication as to whether or when she might arrive. I told the Ambassador, before he departed, that I would be seeing him here from time to time.

“No matters of a political nature were discussed.” (Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199)

Ambassador-designate Zarubin had called upon Ambassador Kennan in Moscow on September 4, before Kennan’s departure for the United States. Kennan’s very short telegraphic report on the meeting explained that the “conversation was entirely innocuous
and non-polit.” (Telegram 431 from Moscow, September 4; 123 Kennan, George F.)

Ambassador Zarubin called upon President Truman on September 25, and presented his credentials. For texts of the formal exchange of remarks on this occasion, see Department of State Bulletin, October 6, 1952, page 515. No other official record of the Ambassador’s call has been found. The accounts of the visit reported by the news media indicate that Ambassador Zarubin took the opportunity to deny the existence of a propaganda campaign against the United States.

No. 524

123 Kennan, George F.: Telegram

The Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL N I A C T LONDON, September 26, 1952—5 p. m.

1782. I have just seen somewhat garbled but generally legible text of Pravda attack on myself\(^1\) and wish to give Dept at once following initial reactions:

\(^1\)Transmitted via the facilities of the Embassy in the United Kingdom; repeated for information to Moscow. Ambassador Kennan was in London for the Chiefs of Mission meeting.

\(^2\)Pravda, on Sept. 26, carried an article which was highly critical of Ambassador Kennan. The text of the article was transmitted in telegram 566, Sept. 26, repeated to London as 77. In telegram 567 from Moscow, Sept. 26, repeated to London as 78, Chargé McSweeney commented as follows:

“Superfluous for me to comment on long-term significance vis-a-vis Sov West relations publication attack on you today. That it is result highest level decision and probably authorship confirmed by fact the Shapiro stories which remarked that attack on Amb still accredited and active is unprecedented passed Sov censorship in fifteen seconds. This, of course, cld only happen if authoritative specific instrs had been issued in advance.” (123 Kennan, George F.)

At his press and radio news conference on Sept. 26, Secretary Acheson commented on the Pravda article. The official record of the conference reads as follows:

“A correspondent informed the Secretary that the Soviet Communist Party newspaper Pravda had devoted a column today to the denunciation of Ambassador Kennan, who was now in London. Then he asked if that had been taken into consideration in his return to Moscow. Mr. Acheson said that the article had been read to him just about five minutes ago. He stated that it seemed to him a wholly unjustified and improper attack on Ambassador Kennan. He went on to say that what Ambassador Kennan had said was a very calm description of what life was like in Moscow, a condition which the Ambassador and all other diplomats deeply regretted.” (Secretary of State—1952, Press Conferences)

An unedited version of Acheson’s comments were transmitted in telegram 2202 to London, Sept. 26, for Kennan, and repeated to Moscow as 354.
1. Press stories which were evidently immediate hinge of Soviet attack were apparently ones based on statements made by myself to reporters present at Berlin airport on Sept 19 when my plane touched there en route Moscow to London. These remarks were not volunteered but were made in reply to inquiries of reports as to whether there had been any relaxation in position of the foreign diplomats in Moscow and treatment accorded them. I replied frankly and unhesitatingly to this query because I have never considered that there was anything secret from our standpoint about details of regime of isolation applied to foreign diplomatic corps by Soviet Govt and because I feel it, in fact, essential to proper understanding of Soviet-American relations by our people and world public that they realize position in which foreign representatives in Moscow are held. I have only seen one press account based on these statements, namely that of the Paris Herald Tribune, which struck me as unfortunately worded and giving somewhat sensationalized version of what I had said, but basically not incorrect.

2. In addition to reply to questions about isolation of foreign diplomats, I told correspondents that I had seen no evidence as yet of any Soviet desire to improve our relations and felt that as long as violent anti-American campaign continues and there was no ceasefire in Korea, we had to assume that no such desire was present. This statement, I may note, was in accordance with line which I had informed the President, in recent letter to him,\(^4\) that I proposed to take. From ticker story, Pravda did not mention this statement implications of which were really of much greater importance than one they seized upon.

3. Dept can depend upon it that this sort of attack has background far deeper than particular interview in question and reflects ulterior motives. These statements are little different from ones that I and other Ambassadors have made on many occasions without any public reaction whatsoever from Soviets. Had this story not been seized upon by them, it wld have, and in fact already had, passed practically unnoticed in world opinion. On question of where real motivation this attack must be sought, suggest following reflections:

a. There is good reason to suppose, and some evidence to support supposition, that my acceptance as Ambassador was originally strongly controversial question within Soviet hierarchy, and was finally carried through over opposition of certain powerful elements.

b. It is plain that some elements in hierarchy, probably police, have never forgiven me for humiliation they suffered on V-E Day

\(^3\)For the Ambassador's personal account of the interview at Tempelhof Airport in West Berlin, see Kennan, Memoirs, 1950-1963, pp. 158-159.

\(^4\)Presumably a reference to Document 518.
1945 when US Embassy, of which I was then in charge, became subject of fourteen hour uninterrupted enthusiastic popular demonstration which police proved powerless to disperse. This is reflected in raking out Parker’s familiar story in present attack.\(^6\)

c. Incident which occurred in June, in which I was approached by obvious provocateur, made it evident that even at that early date certain circles had not reconciled themselves to my presence in Moscow, and were resorting to characteristic means in attempting to compromise me.\(^6\)

d. Soviets are resentful of what they feel to have been vigorous reaction on my part to anti-American propaganda campaign.

e. They resent position I occupy in Moscow diplomatic corps and extent to which other chiefs of mission look to me for guidance and interpretation.

f. In general, they are uncomfortable about having in their minds anyone with long background and experience in Soviet affairs whose memories and acquaintances go back farther than it is wise for even Soviet memories and acquaintances to go.

g. Most important, I am reasonably confident, on basis of series of clues and indications, that my presence in Moscow was unwelcome in some quarters precisely for the reason that my position was known to be relatively moderate and conciliatory one, against which political line now being followed by Soviet regime wld in long run prove not effective, and this was regarded with alarm by elements now dominant in party, who had committed themselves extensively to this line. These people want me out of Moscow because they feel that if time shld come when I wld have occasion to talk to Stalin the results of such discussions wld not only prove disrupting to policies they have been urging, but wld also reveal extent to which they have consistently misinformed him about outside world over course of several years. In other words, I am unfortunately convinced, and I think other observers in Moscow wld bear me out in this, that my presence in Moscow has been all along a domestic issue within Soviet hierarchy and has recently been placing strain on present policy lines which dominant group is unwilling to tolerate further.

4. I naturally regret that this has happened and feel in some measure to blame for having perhaps provided Soviet leaders with handle more convenient than they wld otherwise have had to make my position there impossible; but feel that against this background, emergence of some such story and attack wld probably have been only matter of time. Actually, pretext seized on by them was extremely thin one, for statements they cite against me will be recognized by everyone in Moscow, including Soviet citizens, as notoriously and grimly true. Present really fantastic regime of isolation of resident foreigners has evidently been encountering palatable ob-

\(^6\)Regarding this incident, including the role of the English journalist, Ralph Parker, see Kennan, Memoirs, 1925–1950, pp. 240–245.

\(^6\)Presumably reference is to an incident in July 1952, reported upon in telegram 41 from Moscow, July 6. (761.00/7-652)
jection and resistance from some internal Soviet circles as well as from foreigners themselves and I suspect its sponsors are under some strain to maintain it. They may well recognize me as focal point for this strain, and feel that if I remain there I will continue to increase their discomfort on this point.

5. In light this attack, I think I shld certainly not return to Moscow at this time but shld be ordered back, on completion of my present series of consultations in W Europe, for purposes of consultation with Dept. My absence cld then be prolonged as long as might be deemed desirable. This wld not be in any way unusual from Moscow end, since many chiefs of mission there spend extended periods away from their posts and not more than half of chiefs of mission are normally in residence at any one time. I see no reason for haste about any of this. Emb is in reasonably good shape and can be ably handled by officers now assigned there. My presence there is not required for any purpose of liaison with Sov Govt. Formal retention of my status as Amb will render unnecessary any further decisions for time being about filling post. Remaining questions can be discussed in Wash after smoke has cleared away.

6. If I am not to return on Oct 7, it will be necessary for me to have my family also leave Moscow temporarily as problems of occupying space in present circumstances are too much for them to handle over longer period without my help. Their departure will cause some press comment, but I think we can easily ride it out by saying their future plans will depend on my own. Whether I shld go back and fetch them or whether I had better not return at all even for short visit is something on which my mind is open and I wld appreciate Dept's views.

7. My own immediate plans call for me to proceed Sunday to Bonn for consultations with Donnelly and others on Berlin; Tuesday and Wednesday in Paris for consultation with Bohlen and Ridgway; latter part of next week in Geneva, where I had planned to meet Thompson to discuss Austrian situation, after which I had expected to make return journey to Moscow, Oct 6 and 7. Unless Dept desires it otherwise, I shall proceed with these plans up to and including Geneva. As to plans for return to Moscow, I shall await Dept's instructions.

8. Separate message fols on press coverage.  

KENNAN

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7 Sept. 27.

8 Telegram 1781 from London, Sept. 26, concluded that the Secretary of State's statement (see footnote 2, above) disposed of the need for any further comment on the Pravda article. (123 Kennan, George F.)
The Charge in the Soviet Union (McSweeney) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET  NIAC T  Moscow, October 3, 1952—5 p. m.
612. Emmtel 607 to Dept, Oct 3, rptd Geneva 4. After Vyshinski read to me the note, I informed him I would, of course, transmit it to my government immediately and added that it was my personal opinion that it would have been more appropriate for Soviet Government to have transmitted this communication in this way before publishing an article on same subject in Pravda. Vyshinski’s reply was that the matter had been published in West Germany and that Soviet press naturally had reacted. I remarked that I could not agree that Ambassador’s statements were either false or inimical to Soviet Union. Vyshinski replied that no one’s activities are restricted in Soviet Union and he felt that I had a very peculiar concept as to what is and is not inimical. His country had been called a fascist country and an unacceptable analogy had been drawn. He concluded that further discussion of this point was purposeless. I mentioned that the Ambassador’s family is still in Moscow; Vyshinski admitted that he was aware of this fact. I continued that I should like to know whether the Ambassador’s plane, which ordinarily is permitted entry into Soviet Union only in connection with Ambassador’s travel, would be allowed in for purpose of transporting the Ambassador’s family out of USSR. Vyshinski said that Soviet Government would have no objection to Ambassador’s return if he wished to come here to fetch his family. I pointed out that the Ambassador might not wish to return, and again repeated the question re plane. Vyshinski attempted to evade question by stating that this matter would have to be discussed separately. For third time, I reiterated my question and Vyshinski replied that he could in a “preliminary way” express Soviet Government’s consent to entry of the plane for purpose of transporting the Ambassador’s family out of Soviet Union, without the Ambassador having to be abroad.

McSweeney

1Repeated for information to Geneva for Kennan.
2Telegram 607 transmitted the text of the Soviet Foreign Ministry note of Oct. 3 described in the editorial note, infra.
3Reference is presumably to the Sept. 26 article in Pravda discussed in telegram 1782, supra.
4Regarding the transportation of the Ambassador’s family out of the Soviet Union, telegram 636, Oct. 9, reported as follows:

Continued
Editorial Note

In a note handed to Chargé John M. McSweeney on October 3 by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, the Soviet Government declared Ambassador George F. Kennan persona non grata and insisted upon his immediate recall. For text of the Soviet note of October 3 as translated into English, see Department of State Bulletin, October 13, 1952, page 557. The Soviet Government took the position that the action was necessary because of the statement to the press made by Ambassador Kennan on September 19 at Tempelhof Airport in West Berlin in which the Ambassador allegedly made "slanderous attacks hostile to the Soviet Union in a rude violation of generally recognized norms of international law". Regarding the Ambassador's interview at Tempelhof Airport, see Document 524. For an account of Chargé McSweeney's receipt of the note of October 3, see telegram 612, supra.

In a statement issued to the press on October 3, Secretary Acheson rejected the allegations made in the Soviet note of October 3 and added the following:

"Ambassador Kennan is recognized not only in this country but throughout the world as a man deeply versed in knowledge of the Soviet Union and sympathetic to the legitimate aspirations of the Russian peoples. There is no doubt that the request of the Soviet Government reflects their knowledge that the factual statement Ambassador Kennan made in Berlin on September 19 will be recognized in most parts of the world as a truthful one.

"The reasons given by the Soviet Government for requesting the recall of Ambassador Kennan are that he had violated 'generally recognized norms of international law'. This comes from a Government which has itself, over a period of years, created practices in international intercourse which violate the traditions and customs of civilized peoples developed over generations, and which adversely affect efforts to maintain good relations with the Soviet Government. The Russian peoples themselves must be shamefully aware the foreigners within the Soviet Union are customarily treated by the Soviet Government in ways which are the exact contrary of civilized international usage. The violator of accepted usage is the Soviet Government, which has created the situation accurately described in Ambassador Kennan's Berlin statement."

"Mrs. Kennan left Moscow by Air Force plane at 10 a.m. Embassy staff and quasi totality of non-satellite diplomatic corps were present at her departure. Although no reps of FonOff Protocol Section present, airport officials were helpful and courteous." (123 Kennan, George F.)

Ambassador Kennan's own account of his family's departure from Moscow appears in Kennan, Memoirs, 1950-1963, pp. 164-165.
“The Soviet Government will be informed of this conclusion. Ambassador Kennan is now in Geneva. He will remain in Western Europe temporarily and will later return to Washington for consultation.”

For text of the Secretary’s statement (issued to the press as Department of State press release 777, October 3), see Department of State Bulletin, October 13, 1952, page 557. The text of this press release was sent to Ambassador Kennan in telegram 269 to Geneva, October 3, repeated to Moscow, London, Rome, and Bonn. In telegram 231 from Geneva, October 5, addressed personally to Secretary Acheson, Kennan replied:

“Deeply appreciate your magnificent support, which is more than I personally deserved. Naturally regret that things took this turn, but feel issues at stake are ones that will sooner or later have required facing, and that ultimate effect this incident may be healthful.” (123 Kennan, George F.)

Copies of press release 777 were also sent to Senator Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin and Representative Robert B. Chiperfield of Illinois under cover of brief letters from Secretary Acheson of October 3 which included the following invitation:

“This obviously raises certain problems in our relations with the Soviet Union which I am most anxious to discuss with you. Will you please let me know when you will be in Washington next.” (123 Kennan, George F.)

The text of the press release and the same general message from Secretary Acheson were also sent via the Embassy in Rome to Representative James P. Richards of South Carolina who was traveling in Italy. (Telegram 1471 to Rome, October 3; 123 Kennan, George F.)

Secretary Acheson’s statement to the press on the Soviet action against Ambassador Kennan was made at a special press conference on October 3. In the course of that conference, the Secretary denied that Ambassador Kennan was being recalled, indicated that he had no intention of asking for the recall of Soviet Ambassador Zarubin, and stated that no consideration had been given to severing relations with the Soviet Union over the matter or to sending another Ambassador to the Soviet Union. The record of the Secretary’s Press and Radio Conference No. 28, October 3, is in Secretary of State—1952, Press Conferences. A paraphrase of the Secretary’s remarks was transmitted to Geneva in telegram 268, October 3, for Kennan and repeated to Moscow, Paris, London, Rome, and Bonn. (123 Kennan, George F.)
The Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, October 4, 1952—10 p. m.

230. Deptel 273. Bohlen and I have consulted and have arrived at fol conclusions: It would probably not be desirable for me to remain for any prolonged period of time in Bonn or even for period of some weeks. However, I shall need some days after family arrives in Ger in order to consult with Mrs. Kennan and arrange family matters. Bonn would seem most convenient center for this purpose. After lapse of few days I could then proceed Washn alone or with family or carry out any other instrs Dept may have for me. Bohlen will bring detailed considerations that have entered into this conclusion.

1Transmitted through the facilities of the Consulate General in Geneva, where Kennan was visiting.
2Dated Oct. 3, it reads:

"In order to make sure that there will be no complications in Germany, suggest you discuss with Bohlen and Donnelly proposal that you mentioned to Bruce on telephone for taking house in Bonn for a few weeks." (123 Kennan, George F.)

In telegram 227 from Geneva, Oct. 4, Kennan replied that he would discuss the matter of a temporary residence in Germany with Bohlen and Donnelly. Kennan explained that he wished to complete a certain amount of reporting on Russian matters, including the upcoming Party Congress, before turning to other work. (123 Kennan, George F.)

No. 528

Editorial Note

On October 4, Senator William F. Knowland of California addressed a telegram to Secretary Acheson strongly urging that the Soviet Ambassador be declared persona non grata and that recognition of the Soviet Union be withdrawn by the United States Government. The actions would be in retaliation for the Soviet action taken against Ambassador Kennan (see Document 526) as well as the action of the Soviet Union in providing arms and equipment to the North Korean regime. In his reply of October 7, released to the press the following day, Secretary Acheson acknowledged receipt of Senator Knowland's telegram, reiterated the substance of his statement to the press of October 3 (see Document 526), and observed that the breaking of diplomatic relations was a matter of utmost
seriousness with world-wide consequences and was a matter that would have to be carefully considered in connection with a great many factors. For texts of the exchange of messages between Senator Knowland and Secretary Acheson, see Department of State Bulletin, October 20, 1952, page 603.

No. 529

123 Kennan, George F.: Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State*

SECRET

PARIS, October 6, 1952—7 p. m.

2107. We asked De Margerie\(^2\) today about French thinking on Kennan affair. He replied French Embassy Moscow had from beginning taken view that Soviet reaction would go beyond Pravda article.\(^3\) He thought Kennan was being made victim of new Soviet effort to divide western allies, particularly US from others. Russians had recently made obvious efforts in Moscow to be pleasant to French and British while increasing their rudeness to US. French even believed diplomats in Moscow other than American might possibly expect slightly better treatment in near future.

He believes effort to divide west, particularly now that it had been highlighted by Stalin in Bolshevik article, would be Kremlin’s top priority objective for some time and would be manifested in many ways. Jettisoning of militant Marty and Tillon\(^4\) and adoption of more “bland” Communist line in France was one manifestation. Recent Wehner allegations of secret Franco-Soviet conversations,\(^5\) which Schuman categorically denied yesterday (Embtel 2090, Oct 6\(^6\)), were another. (Incidentally he commented that allegations of such conversations had come not only from Wehner but from various other ex-Communists whose abnormally acute suspicions rendered them in this and perhaps other cases vulnerable to ideas planted by their Communist sources.)

According to De Margerie, Kremlin increasingly impressed by west’s strength and unity. Notwithstanding this impression, Krem-
lin was nevertheless comforted by dogma of eventual capitalist collapse, and could therefore take very long-term view.

French believe that Kremlin has long felt best chance of breaking west would be through [garble] and Middle East rather than Red Army. It was now adding to these pressures, which were locally profitable but only comparatively long-range in their effect on west, efforts to promote confusion by steadily increasing de-emphasis on its own peaceful intentions plus more vigorous efforts to undermine western unity.⁷

Dunn

⁷Telegram 2048 from London, Oct. 8, reported that Sir Paul Mason, British Assistant Under Secretary of State in charge of the Northern Department, had expressed British Foreign Office thinking on the Kennan affair along lines closely parallel to Jacquin de Margerie’s views summarized here. (123 Kennan, George F.)

No. 530

Editorial Note

In accordance with instructions sent by the Department of State, Chargé O’Shaughnessy on October 8 delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry a note acknowledging receipt of the Ministry’s note of October 3 (see Document 526). The note of October 8 rejected the Soviet accusations against Ambassador Kennan; its substantive paragraphs read as follows:

“Ambassador Kennan’s statement accurately and in moderate language described the position of foreign diplomats accredited to the Soviet Government. It is this treatment of diplomatic representatives, systematically applied over a period of years by the Soviet Government, which grossly violates the traditions and customs in international intercourse developed over generations.

“In the light of the above, the United States Government cannot accept the charges made by the Soviet Government as constituting valid reasons for acceding to the request for the recall of Ambassador Kennan.”

The text of the note of October 8 was released to the press as press release 790, Department of State Bulletin, October 20, 1952, page 603.

On October 13, the Embassy in Moscow received a note of reply from the Soviet Foreign Ministry. As transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 662, October 13, the note reads:

“Ministry Foreign Affairs USSR in reply note of Embassy USA October 8, 1952 considers it necessary state that position of Soviet Govt set forth in note Oct 3, 1952 on question recall Mr. Kennan from post Ambassador USA in USSR remains unchanged.”
“As regards assertion contained in Embassy’s note re situation foreign diplomats in Soviet Union, this is in crude contradiction actuality and without any sort basis. This arbitrary assertion is groundless attempt justify false statement, hostile to Soviet Union, of former Ambassador USA in USSR Mr. Kennan.”

No. 531

711.5622/10-1752: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (O’Shaughnessy) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT MOSCOW, October 17, 1952—5 p. m.

688. Re urtel 426 Oct 16. I read our note to Pushkin. He replied that our note contains assertions with which the Sov Govt cannot agree. For example the assertions that Yuri Island is not Sov territory. He said that he had no intention of discussing this question now but that Yuri Island as a part of the Kurile Islands was transferred to Sov territory under Yalta agreement. With regard to the note’s assertion that the B-29 was unarmed he declared this to be in flagrant contradiction of the facts since it was determined by the Sov fighters that the B-29 opened fire on them after they had demanded that it follow them to the nearest airport.

I remarked that I could not understand how Yuri could be considered to be within the Sov frontiers and Pushkin at once replied “Yuri is Sov territory”. I said that the US Govt could not accept this proposition and that we could not regard Yuri as anything but Jap territory under Jap sovereignty and that I know of no existing agreement to the contrary. Pushkin said that he had nothing to add to this question, that it was not open to discussion. Pushkin stated that the note would be studied and that reply would be given after examination. He said that our note was based on two main points (1) that the airplane did not violate Sov territory and (2) that the plane was not armed. He said that it had been established that the Sov frontiers were violated by the plane and that the plane opened fire and “any further comments in the note

1Repeated for information to Tokyo and to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations.

2Telegram 426 transmitted instructions for the delivery of the note described in this telegram. (711.5622/10-1652) For text of the note as delivered by Chargé O’Shaughnessy, see Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 27, 1952, p. 650. The note protested the action by Soviet aircraft on Oct. 7 in downing a U.S. Air Force B-29 bomber aircraft which carried no bombs and whose guns were inoperative, in the Yuri Island area of Kurile Islands. For text of the Soviet note of Oct. 12, see ibid., p. 649.
which flow from these two untrue statements are deprived of foundation”. I said that my govt certainly cannot accept the proposition that Sov frontiers had been violated since the airplane was not anywhere near Sov territory and that since the plane was unarmed it could hardly have opened fire.

Pushkin concluded this fruitless exchange by stating that they rejected the US Govt’s protest because it is groundless. He added that he did not doubt that the Sov Govt will insist on its protest.

O’SHAUGHNESSY

No. 532

PSB files, lot 62 D 333

Document Approved by the Psychological Strategy Board¹

TOP SECRET

PSB D-24

WASHINGTON,] November 1, 1952.

PROGRAM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PREPARATION FOR STALIN’S PASSING FROM POWER

1. National policy calls for placing “maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power,” reducing Soviet power, and bringing about “a basic change in the conduct of international relations by the government in power in Russia” (NSC 20/4,² . . .).

2. One of the most favorable occasions for furthering these objectives may be Stalin’s passing from power. This event, however, has important relations to practically every aspect of the Soviet problem. It may touch off a split in the top leadership. It may also lead to the crystallization of present dissatisfactions among various groups in the Soviet population which feel themselves discriminated against.

3. This paper is also relevant to strains that may emerge before Stalin has fully passed from power. For example, since rivalries must be presumed to exist already in the top leadership and Sta-

¹Transmitted to the Secretary of State under cover of a brief letter indicating that this document had been approved by the Psychological Strategy Board at its 16th meeting, Oct. 30, 1952.

A briefing memorandum of Oct. 29 by Deputy Assistant Secretary Phillips to Acting Secretary Bruce explained that the conclusions of the paper printed here were similar to those reached by a working group studying the same problem in early 1951. Phillips further explained that the original working group was organized in 1951 by the P area of the Department of State at the request of the inter-Departmental Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee (POC). The work was subsequently turned over to PSB working group at the end of 1951. Phillips identified George Morgan as the chief architect of the paper printed here.

²For text, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. 1, Part 2, p. 662.
lin's control may be relaxing as he grows older, it is conceivable that the death of one of the principal aspirants to the succession might upset some delicate equilibrium and precipitate a crisis, arising perhaps out of Stalin's efforts to restore balance. It is also conceivable, though unlikely, that Stalin's death may be concealed, both from us and from the people, for some time after the event.

4. There is only a chance, not a certainty, that conflicts related to Stalin's passing from power will bring major changes, and if they do the changes need not be favorable to U.S. interests. The successor regime may be worse than Stalin's, and among remoter possibilities lies general war as well as general collapse. In any case, those conflicts have such weighty potentialities that they call for active preparation on our part. It may also be possible to pave the way, to a modest extent, for their eruption in desirable forms.

5. There are many uncertainties in this field, but three points stand out as landmarks: (1) Stalin must die sometime; (2) strains must be presumed to exist between individuals and groups closely connected with the problem of succession, even if the problem as such is never mentioned; (3) apart from strains now directly connected with the problem of succession, there is evidence of group dissatisfaction throughout the population of the Soviet Union.

RECOMMENDATIONS

6. In the psychological field, preparatory work should be five-fold:

b. In the light of such insight and within the context of the more probable patterns of future events in general, the principal ways in which important conflicts might develop should be analyzed and corresponding psychological courses of action sketched, as a repeated staff exercise designed to make possible prompt and judicious decisions when the time comes. Since Stalin may die any time, this task should not be delayed for the completion of further work under 6 a above.

c. To avoid uncoordinated action in case of sudden death, an agreed Government position should be prepared at once, as a basis for standby instructions for the period immediately following this contingency.

7. Each Member Agency and the Director of PSB is requested to name one staff member as principal point of contact concerning the work outlined in paragraph 6.
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Japan\textsuperscript{1}

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 4, 1952—1:52 p. m.

1158. Def has passed State copy Gen Clark's\textsuperscript{2} CX 57735 Oct 25\textsuperscript{a} re overflights Jap terr by Sov aircraft. Gen Clark states his concern over this situation and his intended courses action. Among others he intends keep you and Jap Govt informed Sov air activities this regard and to auth engagements with unfriendly Sov aircraft over Jap terr. He concludes he is sure situation receiving attn at US Govt level.

Dept has been concerned over repercussions in Jap and elsewhere both of such overflights and succession Sov attacks on US aircraft. Dept wld be inclined concur above courses action; however Jap attitudes this matter not entirely clear here.

For full consideration measures cope with continued overflights, Dept wld appreciate ur comments and suggestions re CX 57735, particularly (1) any Jap reactions to previous overflights and probable Jap reactions to future overflights if US forces make no determined effort to prevent; (2) probable Jap reactions actual engagement or shooting down Sov aircraft over Jap terr; (3) dipl steps which Jap and US Govt shld take in conjunction to protest any future violation Jap terr; and (4) polit desirability citing US-Jap Security Treaty as basis measures to handle continuous violations Jap terr by Sov mil aircraft.

Re (3) Dept assumes Jap Govt wld lodge protest against violation its terr. US Govt might serve as channel for Jap dipl protest to Sov Govt.

Re Security Treaty Dept of opinion Treaty contains no language by which US has "contracted by treaty to protect" Jap terr as stated CX 57735, and that it wld be unwise this case establish precedent or presumption Treaty contains automatic commitment. However, as matter US policy and not because of Treaty obligation US will use every means deny Jap to aggressor. In light these con-

\textsuperscript{1}Drafted by Kenneth T. Young, Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, and cleared by Charles C. Stelle of the Policy Planning Staff, Matthews, Bonbright, Walworth Barbour (EE), and Raymond T. Yingling. U. Alexis Johnson signed for Acting Secretary Bruce.

The text of this telegram was also sent to Moscow in telegram 485, Nov. 6, for information and for the comments of the Embassy.


\textsuperscript{a}Not found in Department of State files.
siderations it may be unwise refer to provisions Security Treaty in this case. Successful interception Sov aircraft cld be publicly justified basis maintenance security US forces lawfully based in Jap pursuant agreements with Jap.

In sum therefore Dept desires Emb views re (1) polit desirability auth engagements with Sov aircraft over Jap terr and (2) most effective way maximizing favorable and minimizing adverse public reaction Jap.

BRUCE

No. 534

761.5622/11-1152: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Murphy) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIAC

NIAC TOKYO, November 11, 1952—1 p. m.

1518. Urtels 11581 and 1192.2 We take serious view of position of US weakness presented to Japan and Far East generally by recent press stories reporting American failure to take strong action against Sov overflights of Jap territory. Following as it does on recent loss of B-29 which apparently was shot down by Sov aircraft, obviously questions arise in minds of thinking Japs as to the firmness of our intentions to defend Japan under Security Treaty. Naturally picture of US as weak and unreliable power is one of the chief Comminc objectives in this area.

While I concur in Gen Clark’s recommendations3 re action to be taken by FEAF, I wish to provide Dept with better analysis than we have thus far prepared re Jap reactions to previous overflights etc. Thus far as Dept is undoubtedly aware, info re these overflights has been very closely held and Jap public is not conscious of number of violations committed by Sov aircraft. There is, of course, some small sentiment that the very presence US Forces in Japan is provocative and this prevails as would be expected in left circles. It is my opinion that the bulk of Jap opinion would welcome an indication of firm action on US part. It is also my opinion that Jap reactions actual engagement or shooting down Sov aircraft would be favorable from our point of view and also would stimulate Jap support of rearmament program. I discussed this question informally with FonMin4 and he agreed.

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1 Supra.
2 In telegram 1192, Nov. 10, the Department asked for an early response to telegram 1158.
3 See telegram 1158, supra.
4 Katsuo Okazaki, Japanese Foreign Minister.
Re dipl steps which Japan and USG should take in this connection this will be treated in subsequent tel.

There is no question in my mind of the desirability of citing US-Jap Security Treaty as basis for these or similar measures.

MURPHY

No. 535

761.6622/11-1452: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (O'Shaughnessy) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET

Moscow, November 14, 1952—7 p. m.

790. Re Deptel 485 Nov 6.² We wd appreciate any background info which Dept cld make available on this subject. Pending its receipt the following thoughts have occurred to us here:

1. It would seem desirable that some form of warning against overflights of Jap territory shld be given Sov Govt before engaging Sov aircraft. It might take form of a public statement by Jap Govt or preferably, as suggested in ref tel, a formal dipl protest using US Govt as channel.

2. If violations continue Sov aircraft should be forced down by any practicable means. Our authorities in Jap should be thoroughly briefed on treatment of crews, which should be placed in custody of Jap authorities. Jap Govt could then notify Sov Govt, through US diplomatic channel that Sov aviators are interned and suggest suitable arrangements for their eventual release.

3. We believe firm action of this kind would not only be accepted by Sovs but would have a salutary effect on their behavior in that area.

Service attachés concur in the above comments.

O'SHAUGHNESSY

¹Repeated by the Department to Tokyo for comment.

²Same as telegram 1158 to Tokyo, Document 533.
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Japan

TOP SECRET  WASHINGTON, November 17, 1952—7:16 p.m.
PRIORITY

1246. Embtel 15132 re Sov overflights. JCS 923816 to CINCFE2 authorizes action to intercept, engage, and destroy combat or reconnaissance aircraft in Korea over Jap home islands and Okinawa or territorial waters three miles to seaward thereof which commit hostile acts, are manifestly hostile in intent, or which bear mil insignia of USSR or satellites and which do not immed obey signals to land unless properly cleared or obvious in distress. Unarmed transport aircraft shld be forced down if feasible but not be destroyed.

JCS 9238284 requests comments re desirability, possible contents and timing public announcement this matter. It also calls attn to State question re accuracy statement in CINCFE’s CX 577354 to effect US has contracted by treaty to protect Jap terr.

Our comments latter pt fol. Although it publicly stated US pol to protect Jap from hostile attack US in Security Treaty has not “contracted by treaty to protect” Jap terr and it undesirable estab precedent on presumption Treaty contains such automatic commitment. However interception and destruction Sov aircraft can be publicly justified on basis maintenance security US forces stationed in Jap under Security Treaty “to contribute to maintenance of intl peace and security in FE and to security Jap against armed attack from without”.

After concurrence CINCFE you are authd inform Jap Govt officially of US policy as set forth first para this tel.5

Dept also interested soonest ur and Jap Govt comments re public announcement and prior warning USSR either officially or by

1Drafted by Robert J. G. McClurkin, Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, cleared by Joseph B. Phillips and Barbour and Davis of EE, and signed by U. Alexis Johnson for Bruce. Repeated for information to Moscow as 496.
2Document 536.
3Not found in Department of State files.
4Not found in Department of State files; see Document 533.
5In telegram 1979 from Tokyo, Dec. 21, Ambassador Murphy explained that he and General Clark had agreed to postpone approaching the Japanese Government on this matter pending the arrival in Japan of F–86 fighter aircraft and the resolution of the complicated Japanese political situation. (761.5622/12–2152)
public announcement. In this connection see Moscow's 790 rptd Tokyo.\textsuperscript{8}

\textbf{BRUCE}

\textsuperscript{8}Supra. In telegram 1603, Nov. 19, Ambassador Murphy "heartily" concurred in the action authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Murphy did not believe it would be necessary or wise to notify the Soviet Government of the intended U.S. action or to make any public announcement concerning the new policy. (761.5622/11-1952) Telegram 1302 to Tokyo, Nov. 21, drafted and signed by Johnson, agreed that prior announcement of policy or notification to Soviet authorities of intended action was not desirable but that some advantage would derive from a Japanese Government protest to the Soviet Government regarding overflights which had already taken place. (761.5622/11-1952)

\underline{No. 537}

761.5622/11-2252: Telegram

\textit{The Chargé in the Soviet Union (O'Shaughnessy) to the Department of State}\textsuperscript{1}

\textbf{TOP SECRET} 

Moscow, November 22, 1952—1 p. m.

813. Tokyo's 21, November 19 sent Dept 1603.\textsuperscript{2} We see no urgency in the matter of making a public announcement.

However, we still believe it desirable to give some warning to Soviets for the following reasons:

1. Postwar Japanese Government has not to our knowledge publicly made known its position re overflights. Sovs have consistently and clearly defined their position with regard to unauthorized overflights of their territory. We do not possess full documentation on this point here, but latest exchange of notes with Swedes is a good example. Moreover, we note that a statement made by Vyshinsky to the Swedish Ambassador\textsuperscript{3} here May 24, 1952 and published in \textit{Pravda} the next day, contains following paragraph:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Begin Verbatim Text.}

"The Ministry also considers it necessary to recall the instruction, in force in the USSR as well as in all other states, by virtue of which when a state frontier is violated by a foreign aircraft and when the foreign aircraft penetrates into alien territory the airmen of the state in question are obliged to force it to land at a local aerodrome and, in the event of resistance, to open fire on it."

\textit{End Verbatim Text.}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{1}Repeated for information to Tokyo.

\textsuperscript{2}See footnote 6, supra.

\textsuperscript{3}Rolf R. Sohlman.
2. If and when the Jap Government wishes to protest a particular violation of its territory through the channels of the US Government or any other, its legal and diplomatic position will be firmer, more clear-cut and easier to handle vis-à-vis Sov Government. Also, it will strengthen our hand in the event we might some day wish to take action along the lines of Deptel 504, Nov 21.4

3. By giving prior warning, we would avoid placing ourselves in position of Soviets—who shoot and then protest—and would be more likely gain support for our position from other countries. Prior warning would be particularly desirable in this case since both we and Japs have apparently for some time permitted and ignored Soviet flights over Japan.

4. The statement which we have in mind is for purpose of record and could be couched in general terms and cover shipping as well as aircraft. It was never our thought to issue a statement to effect that we intend engage aircraft violating Jap territory.

Re B-29, we believe Soviet Government's repeated warnings re violations of their territory are considered by them as being applicable to case of B-29, in view of Pushkin's statement to me that Soviet Government considered Yuli [Yuri] Island to be Soviet territory.

O'SHAUGHNESSY

*Not printed.

No. 538

601.6111/12-2352

The Secretary of State to the Director of Central Intelligence (Smith)\(^1\)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] January 9, 1953.

MY DEAR GENERAL SMITH: I have received your letter of December 23, 1952, concerning restrictions of travel within the United States of members of the Soviet Embassy.\(^2\) I believe from your

\(^1\)Drafted by Stoessel (EUR/EE) and cleared by Barbour, Thurston, and Davis (EUR/EE), Bohlen (C), Matthews (G), Perkins and Bonbright (EUR), Trueheart (R), and the Office of the Science Adviser.

\(^2\)In his letter, Smith noted that Soviet Attachés had extended opportunities to gain important defense information by attendance at American technical conferences and meetings, that it was his understanding that one of the purposes underlying the Department of State's ruling controlling the travel of Soviet official personnel was to restrict opportunities to gather economic and technical information, and urged that technical conferences and meetings in the Washington-Baltimore area

Continued
letter that you may have been misinformed as to the reasons on which our Government’s action in imposing restrictions on the travel of members of the Soviet mission was based. The action taken by our Government in regulating the travel of Soviet officials in the United States was intended specifically as a measure of retaliation for limitations imposed upon the travel of American representatives in the Soviet Union, rather than as a measure of security control. This matter is covered fully in Intelligence Advisory Committee Document IAC-D-2/1, February 1, 1952, which paper was subsequently approved by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on February 7, 1952. (Copy attached)³

The Department is extremely concerned regarding the problem of effectively neutralizing improper activities of Soviet diplomatic personnel stationed in this country, without at the same time bringing about further restrictive practices by the Soviet Union toward the representatives of our Government resident in that country. Even though the freedom of movement of our representatives in the Soviet Union is limited, such travel as they are allowed to undertake is extremely valuable, both for intelligence purposes and for a general appraisal of the situation in that country. It was to deter the Soviets from placing further limitations on travel and hence on our ability to gain important information that travel restrictions were originally imposed on Soviet personnel in the United States. If in applying these restrictions we should cause the Soviet Union further to restrict travel of our representatives in the Soviet Union, we would not have accomplished the purpose which we originally intended. We might also develop a situation which might make it difficult to maintain our mission in the Soviet Union. In addition to the valuable intelligence which our Government derives from the maintenance of a diplomatic mission in the Soviet Union, the continuance of that Mission is based upon most important political considerations, notably upon the desirability of maintaining contact with the regime, avoiding the increased tensions which would inevitably result from the severance of relations, and for the purpose of providing a diplomatic channel to exploit any opportunity which may eventually arise to reach an accommodation with the Soviet Union on basic issues.

There is, of course, one additional factor that must be taken into account in any thorough consideration of the problem of regulating travel of Soviet official representatives—as to whether the further

³Not printed. Regarding the IAC decisions on Feb. 7, 1952, see footnote 2, Document 494.
restrictions of such travel would effectively deny the Soviet Government information available to the general public in this country.

The Department is fully appreciative of the seriousness of the problem presented by the fact that Soviet officials may have opportunity to gain data at technical meetings and through other sources as a result of their travel within the country. In this regard, the Department's communication to the Attorney General dated December 30, 1952, requested an expression of views from the Attorney General as to whether some practicable means can be devised for neutralizing espionage activities of Soviet nationals as a whole rather than concentrating on activities of individuals. (Copy of letter is attached.4)

With your permission, and because of the responsibility of the Attorney General (through the FBI) for the internal security of the United States, I would like to forward your letter to the Attorney General for his comment, and particularly as to, if it were decided by our Government that the control of travel of Soviet representatives should be based on security considerations, whether the FBI would be in a position to provide vetting procedures for the travel of Soviet nationals. The procedure would have to be extremely expeditious if we were not to go beyond the bounds of retaliation, inasmuch as the vetting procedure within the Soviet Union provides for 48 hours notice.5

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

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4Not attached to the source text and not printed. (601.6111/12-3052)

5In a letter of Jan. 22 to W. Park Armstrong, the CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence concurred in the Secretary's suggestion as presented here. (601.6111/1-2253)
The exchange of letters between Director Smith and Secretary Acheson was duly transmitted to Attorney General Herbert F. Brownell under cover of a letter of Feb. 2. (601.6111/1-2253)
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Beam) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Moscow, January 14, 1953—5 p. m.

PRIORITY

1036. Reversions to techniques of 1930's in charges of terrorist activities on part group Soviet doctors evokes several interesting considerations. It cannot be completely excluded, of course, that there was indeed some sort of conspiratorial movement. It also might be argued that the "plot" is a complete fabrication of the ruling group cold-bloodedly designed for the achievement of some political aim. It seems at any rate to corroborate belief held by many that Soviet ruling group lives in atmosphere of constant psychotic mistrust and suspicion. While it would seem unreasonable to assume that they believe the charges as made, it seems quite likely that the latter reflect the ruling circles dominant fear of uncontrolled thought and discussion. It has been often assumed that serious differences of opinion on policy matters exist in the Soviet hierarchy up to and including the Politburo. The present occurrence plus past economic controversies now being aired do not diminish such opinions. However, if this is not the case but the top leaders had reason to believe there had only been an increase in the number of small clandestine discussion circles (which have been a feature of Russian life since Czarist times), particularly among the intelligentsia the matter would probably appear serious enough to them to require the most severe repressive measures.

The patent lack of reality of the charges explainable perhaps by the following hypotheses:

1. Publicized plot must be exceedingly simple in order to be understood by the great masses of Soviet people, even though such simplicity impedes fabrication of logical chain of circumstances and/or (2) Soviets not interested in convincing their people but rather wish force down their throats obviously false allegations, particularly distasteful to intelligentsia, as overt easily recognizable further move toward thought control. (If a conspiratorial group has had within its power a half dozen leading military figures for nine years since the death of Shcherbakov in 1945, it is

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1 Repeated for information to London, Paris, Rome, and Bonn.
2 The "doctors' plot" was reported upon extensively by the Embassies in Moscow, London, Paris, and elsewhere in Europe. These reporting telegrams are included principally in file 761.00. Detailed (8 pages) comments on the "doctors' plot" and anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union is in despatch 381 from Moscow, March 3, in file 761.00/3-353.
surprising that some success had not been achieved and that after all this time plot near in fruition foiled only by means last minute intervention Security Police.)

Perhaps heavy play given Jewish bourgeoisie nationalist aspect should cause us re-evaluate Jewish element recent Czech trials. However, very identification of these groups as “Jewish Bourgeois nationalist” lessens to certain degree hypothesis which has been advanced that anti-Semitism as such is important and growing element Soviet and satellite policy.

Criticism of MGB for failure uncover plot earlier may be taken by some observers as further indication of lessened stature of Beriya. In absence further evidence of this however, it seems to Embassy MGB criticism and call for strengthened army and security forces, increased vigilance etc. may be warning to Soviet people to expect more intensive disciplinary measures plus stricter economic control mechanisms. This renewal of emphasis on discipline and threat of repressive measure quite consistent with new party statutes and subsequent comment thereon.

Re status Beriya, it should be noted he listed as being present with Stalin January 12 at Bolshoi Theater following Molotov and Malenkov. This might be considered usual position in hierarchy.

While basic motivation these charges probably arises from chronic mistrust of ruling circles, as in all similar cases, advantage is taken of opportunity gain other purposes including attack on “joint” organization (probably Joint Distribution Committee) with tie-in to US and UK, continued anti-US campaign, including bacteria warfare, atrocities, Kojedo, etc., probably had lost its momentum and present charges taken as means of providing vigorous shot in arm.

One of persons named as transmitting instruction is Dr. Schimelevich the Director of Botkin Hospital where serious ailments foreign diplomats treated. Mikhoels who died January 1948 under strange circumstances known as President Soviet Jewish anti-Fascist Committee and reputed to have complained of anti-Jewish elements Soviet policy.

Tass announcement that investigation will be concluded shortly plus recent Praha precedent may foreshadow show trials here in reasonably near future.

Beam
Memorandum by Francis B. Stevens of the Office of Eastern European Affairs to the Deputy Director of the Psychological Strategy Board (Morgan)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 21, 1953.

Attached is a paper setting forth the Department’s suggestions regarding the nature of stand-by instructions to be issued to all United States official information media for use in the period immediately following the death of Stalin. These are the instructions the preparation of which is recommended in Paragraph 6c of PSB document No. D-24, November 1, 1952.¹

I am also authorized to inform you that Mr. Edward P. Montgomery of the Office of Policy and Plans, IIA, and myself have been designated as the Department’s representatives to participate in any activities which may be undertaken to carry out recommendations 6b and 6d of the same paper.

[Attachment]

Paper Prepared in the Department of State²

PSB Paper No. D-24 of November 1, 1952 entitled “Psychological Preparation for Stalin’s Passing from Power” includes the following recommendation:

6c. To avoid uncoordinated action in case of sudden death, an agreed Government position should be prepared at once, as a basis for stand-by instructions for the period immediately following this contingency.

There is general agreement among those who have given consideration to this problem that the exact conditions which will exist at the time of Stalin’s death, be it on the international scene or within the Soviet power structure, cannot be foreseen. In the absence of such information, it is impossible to issue intelligent stand-by instructions to information media for the period immediately following Stalin’s death except in the most general terms. The aim of such instructions should be not the immediate most effective ex-

¹Document 532.
²Drafted by Stevens (EE) and apparently approved by Bohlen; Barbour, Thurston, and Davis of the Office of Eastern European Affairs; and Winthrop Sargent, Phillips, and other officers of the Public Affairs area of the Department.
ploration of the factors in the situation favorable to the advancement of United States objectives, but the avoidance of blunders which will prevent or complicate the exploitation of such factors after the situation can be thoroughly assessed. It is believed, therefore, that all information media under United States Government control, both overt and covert, should be given standing instructions that in the event of Stalin's death they should limit themselves to strictly factual reporting pending the receipt of specific guidance. Such guidance should be forthcoming with a minimum of delay in order to take maximum advantage of the situation in the United States interest.

The reaction of the Soviet people to Stalin's death is not easy to predict. Certainly there will be those who will feel that a heavy yoke has been lifted from the Russian people and that Stalin's passing affords the opportunity for beneficial change. Available evidence, however, seems to indicate that the great mass of the population has been sufficiently drugged by years of public adulation of Stalin and sufficiently impressed by the growth of Soviet power under his leadership to ensure a widespread feeling of genuine regret at his passing. It is important that in our eagerness to capitalize on the situation our information media do nothing which would do violence to this feeling if it indeed materializes. Nor is there any valid reason to believe that the security authorities will not be able to cope with the situation; premature appeals for violence or resistance are therefore also to be avoided.

One question which should be susceptible to advance determination is that of the course to be followed by this Government with respect to extending the customary official condolences. Three possible variations suggest themselves: (1) the despatch of a routine message to the Soviet Government; (2) the deliberate omission of such a message; (3) the omission of an official message while transmitting through United States information media a message to the Soviet people taking note of Stalin's death, extending to them the hand of friendship and inviting their cooperation in seeking a peaceful and secure world.

The first course is probably one which will be followed by most governments maintaining diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union unless the United States Government takes the initiative in securing advance agreement to some other proposal. Should we follow this course, strong adverse criticism of the Government may be anticipated both from anti-communist circles in the United States and from all émigré groups, Soviet and satellite. Furthermore, an opportunity would be lost to give encouragement to any potential resistance elements within the Soviet Union which might
consider Stalin’s death a favorable occasion to expand their activities.

Complete silence on the part of the United States might be exploited by Soviet propaganda in one of two ways. It might be played down, in which event it would probably go unnoticed by the mass of the population; the absence of formal messages from one or another government in the long list of published communications spread over several days requires careful reading to be detected. Or our silence might be interpreted as a deliberate affront to the Soviet people and a further example of American hostility; if the feelings of grief at Stalin’s death are genuine, this line might be not without effect.

The third alternative steers a middle course; it forestalls the criticism and resentment which would be occasioned by a formal message to the Soviet Government, while at the same time offering reassurances to the Soviet people. More importantly, it enables the United States to seize the psychological initiative and thereafter to exploit the developing situation as our interests may dictate. It is recommended that plans be developed to enable us to pursue this course. When such plans are completed they should be discussed with other governments, particularly the NATO countries, in an effort to obtain widespread adherence to this course of action.

No. 541

Microfilm telegram files, “Moscow FY 1953”

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

CONFIDENTIAL  WASHINGTON, January 26, 1953—6:54 p.m.

622. Following are Department’s views for NAC discussion doctors’ plot January 26 (Polto 1209): 2

While it is too soon to attempt to estimate the full meaning of the charges in the doctors’ plot, two most-likely hypotheses are (1) that it primarily represents a dramatic effort to increase vigilance and tighten discipline among Soviet people, or (2) that it reflects political or power problem in top Soviet hierarchy.

The alleged murder of two Politburo members and the alleged attempt on the lives of selected top Soviet military personnel would

1Drafted by Bohlen and Boster (EE) and cleared with EUR/RA and DRS. Sent to Paris as telegram Topol 761 and repeated for information to London, Moscow, Bonn, and Rome.

2Not printed. Regarding the so-called “doctors’ plot”, see footnote 2, Document 539.
seem to indicate that this affair will not be completed with the trial and execution of the nine doctors involved. The manner in which this plot is being handled, the emphasis in current Soviet propaganda on the continued existence of enemies within the Soviet state, need for vigilance, et cetera, the nature of the accusations against the state security organs "and their leaders" are reminiscent in certain respects of the techniques employed in the great purge of 1936 through 1939. There is no ground as yet, however, for believing that the new purges forecast by this doctors' plot would exceed in magnitude irrationality that of the 30's. Under the criteria of previous Stalinist purges of this nature, doctors are [illegible] of foreign intelligence intrigues plus, in this case, Zionism is too vague and indefinite to provide the chief instigating force for the doctors' actions. There is therefore a missing link which should logically in the light of past experience be supplied by a political figure who will turn out to have been the instigator of the doctors' actions. The Bukharin trial of 1938 established the precedent which may be followed in this case, that [illegible] of itself who puts doctors up to medical murders. If this is the beginning of purge process at all comparable to that of '30's present situation would appear be indication of some political or power problem involving top leadership of Soviet Union and logical consequences of Stalin's decision against one fraction or individual who, under requirements of Soviet system, must therefore be liquidated and discredited along with their or his adherents.

Whichever hypothesis is correct, following points also should be noted:

1. Most tangible result so far has been Soviet exploitation doctors' plot for drastically intensified drive for heightened security and discipline with all propaganda and notable Lenin anniversary focussed on need for vigilance and renewal class war attitudes.

2. A second positive component is anti-Semitic manifestations. While we believe it now unquestionable that anti-Semitism has become device to be used openly by Soviet rulers, we tend regard this aspect still secondary to other considerations. We also believe this not strict anti-Semitism in usual sense but rather that Jews in communist world have now begun to feel full force of Stalin's compulsion ruthlessly root out all elements with potential "international" outlook and links with outside world. Perhaps noteworthy that to date Soviet overt propaganda to Arab States has not widely exploited anti-Semitic potential of Slansky trial or doctors' plot.

3. We confidently expect further purges and show trials in satellites particularly Rumania, Poland and Hungary.

4. The problem of succession which with the passage of time is moving from the theoretical to the real undoubtedly constitutes an additional element of tension if our second hypothesis is correct.
5. We do not have sufficient information at moment to justify estimate of what relation this purge may have to Soviet foreign policy, though possibilities speculation this regard are manifest.

DULLES

No. 542

Charles E. Wilson to the President

NEW YORK, February 16, 1953.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Some months before I became Director of Defense Mobilization (December, 1950), I was invited to attend a meeting arranged by the Society of Friends—(Quakers) and Malik, who then headed the Russian Delegation of the United Nations. There were three other U.S. Industrialists present with the Quakers and Russians.

I may say we Americans did not meet with the Russians until such meeting received President Truman’s and State Department approval.2

It would be beside the point, I am here writing you on, to waste your time rehearsing the event of the meeting except to say that within a week after said meeting the Quakers, who were intermediaries, came back to us and inquired if we would go to Russia and

\[\text{Sent by President Eisenhower to Secretary Dulles on Feb. 21 under cover of a brief memorandum initialed by the President which reads as follows:} \]

"Will you please give me a study on this proposal—within the next thirty days if possible?"

In a memorandum to the President on Feb. 27, Secretary Dulles replied as follows:

"I have your memorandum of February 21 requesting that the State Department study Charlie Wilson's proposal.

"I think this idea, which the State Department considered and turned down two years ago, deserves careful reconsideration. But before going ahead with it, I think we want to have a clear idea of exactly what should be said. I would recommend that C. D. Jackson and Emmet Hughes work on this together with Chip Bohlen and Paul Nitze, from this Department, and give us, first of all, a general outline of what might be in the message, and then proceed to work up an outline draft.

"Would you let me know if you favor proceeding along these lines?" (611.61/2-2153)

No reply from the President has been found, and the matter does not appear to have been pursued further.

2Regarding the meeting between American business leaders and Ambassador Malik in the autumn of 1950 and subsequent contacts with the Department of State, see the memorandum of Mar. 13, 1961, from Kennan to Secretary Acheson and the memorandum of conversation of Apr. 20, 1951, by G. Frederick Reinhardt, in Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. iv, Part 2, pp. 1557 and 1571.
outline to Stalin our views on the relationship between U.S. and Russia as we had done to Malik, which latter effort had resulted, we thought, in provoking almost a brawl. Visas were ready for us at the Russian Embassy and Russia was to provide transportation to Moscow from a European airport. President Truman and Dean Acheson were acquainted with the proposal and various meetings ensued, but the approval of Truman was not forthcoming and then I took on the Mobilization job and the Russian Radio and Press played a tune on me as a war monger, etc. so for that, and other reasons, the whole project was abandoned.

Out of the meeting with Malik, I gained one very distinct impression. That was, that the Russians and their Satellites fear the truth reaching the masses of their people. Their lies have been so fantastic, and the truth so satisfying to the average subject of Stalin, that the Slave Masters must necessarily plot to keep the truth from them at all costs.

If the foregoing is a correct summation of the Russian position, then the proposition I desire to call to your notice may well be very difficult of accomplishment.

Briefly speaking, what I am desirous of interesting you in is a new approach to a Peace Front. I have no illusions that this is simple to conceive or carry out.

I may say, parenthetically, that your not lamented predecessor was implored to make a new approach to this problem about two years ago. He finally became intrigued with the idea sufficiently to request that the proposition be outlined to him in quite gory detail. I put in many hours doing this and he was kind enough to say, finally, that the idea had merit and he would try it out. I guess he did—on Dean Acheson. The latter had a plan too. He finally broadcast it from Europe—the one Vishinsky said he laughed at so hard, he couldn’t sleep.

The “plan” proposed two years ago and suggested for your consideration now is as follows:

1) An entirely different atmosphere has to be created, for the World’s peoples’ reception of a Peace Plan by the President of the United States.

2) The State Department must do a tremendous amount of planning and arranging months before the “Plan” is broadcast.

3) The State Department’s first job: Get Russia and Satellites’ acquiescence to reception of an hour’s broadcast message by you, on a given date—and a guarantee, in the name of humanity the world over, of freedom from “jamming”.

4) The State Department to arrange next that, following your world wide message, all the Heads of the Free Nations will immediately broadcast on a pre-arranged schedule, heartily, fervently
approving and recommending your message and its solution of the problems heretofore preventing peace.

[Page of source text missing.]
to me, there are “troubled spots” in the world that can be won over to the Free Nation standard by minor economic and wide technical and assistance plans. This conclusion is reinforced by the magnificent results attained by the Ford Foundation’s work in India and Pakistan. Giving assistance to agricultural communities that promise a doubling output of foodstuffs—all with great acclaim by Nationals of these countries for American institutions.

The first and last reaction of the last administration, was that regardless of the Peace Plan proposals, and methods of getting them across to the peoples of the world, you just can’t do business with the Russians and their Satellites. I guess there is much ground for that reaction. But, if the Peace Message were launched to the world’s masses and, if it were of a type and content I am sure it would be, given by you, who really knows if the hackneyed reaction of the last administration regarding Russia and the Satellites would hold true?

One thing I’ve become convinced of, after two years in Government and out, is that the President of the United States has, at this time, the opportunity—nay, the obligation to make a supreme effort in the interest of world peace—from what is now a platform of tremendous military strength that was lacking two years ago. A peace effort, from position of great strength, is obviously something quite different than from a position of weakness. Furthermore, I believe the world’s people or, rather, the great majority of them are tired, frustrated and fed up with wars and the threats of wars. In other words, the time—soon—is the right time.

It can be the greatest effort for World Peace, and mean more to the world’s people than any event since the Prince of Peace came 2000 years ago.

When I literally begged you to accept the nomination for the Presidency, at luncheon on Morningside Heights, I believed you were the man ordained of God to lead the effort to bring peace out of the chaos enveloping the whole civilized world. Now, I’m sure I was right.

In conclusion, suppose it is true that Russia won’t cooperate. If it is made clear that your Peace Plan is to be made known to the world’s people, whether Russia cooperates or not, I just don’t believe Russia will be able to face the consequences of refusal to cooperate in the face of the terms of your proposals that are good for all mankind.

Sincerely,

CHAS
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Beam) to the Department of State

SECRET

Moscow, February 19, 1953—3 p.m.

1196. Indian Ambassador Menon\(^2\) last night gave me account of his interview with Stalin February 17. He said he had not requested interview but was informed last Friday Stalin would like to see him in next few days. Menon thinks he was received as courtesy because Stalin desired talk with Kitchlew.\(^3\)

Menon was impressed, as was Argentine Ambassador\(^4\) at his interview some ten days ago, with Stalin’s good health and air of confidence. Fifteen minutes Menon’s half hour talk with Stalin were taken up by latter’s dissertation on the equal treatment of nationalities in USSR together with discussion of language problems in Russia and India. Passing to political affairs Menon expressed disappointment rejection POW resolution in UN, outlining Indian efforts localize and settle dispute including Indian opposition to UN forces going thirty-eighth parallel in Korea. He said he explained fully reasonableness UN POW proposal. To all this Stalin repeatedly said “yes, yes,” but seemed to show little interest and to Menon’s disappointment did not seize the opening for basic discussion or the presentation of new proposals.

Stalin brought up the question of the US Seventh Fleet and Formosa as an example of the difficulty of dealing with the Americans. Menon said that the recent US decision had likewise caused concern in his country, as expressed by Nehru, but that he regarded the Americans as a people of good will. Stalin replied that there were many good Americans but that unfortunately the US was governed by profit motives. Referring to India’s relations with

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\(^1\)Repeated for information to Paris, London, and New Delhi. At Secretary Dulles’ request, Special Assistant John W. Hanes, Jr., sent a copy of this telegram to the White House on Feb. 24 as being of possible interest to President Eisenhower.


\(^3\)Indian writer and winner of a Stalin Prize; leader of an Indian “peace delegation” which visited the USSR during the month of February 1953.

\(^4\)Luis Bravo, Argentine Ambassador in the USSR, called upon Stalin at the Kremlin on Feb. 7. Ambassador Bravo indicated to the press afterward that the meeting had been devoted mainly to discussions of Soviet-Argentine trade negotiations. Bravo also stated that Stalin appeared to be in robust health.
Japan, Stalin predicted that Japan's competition would soon undercut India's industry.

At the end of the conversation Stalin mentioned he "liked to see some of the Ambassadors in Moscow". Menon thanked him for the cooperation he had received from the Foreign Office, regarding which Stalin remarked, "even the shepherds are hospitable in Russia."

Menon told me he had a brief talk with Kitchlew yesterday regarding the latter's interview with Stalin which took place one hour after his own and lasted about 70 minutes. According to Kitchlew, Stalin expressed a personal liking for President Eisenhower but believed his hands were tied by the capitalists around him.

Menon leaving February 25 for two weeks visit Hungary where he accredited. He said he had arranged to have his letters of credence addressed to Hungarian Chief of State by title rather than by name since he "was not sure who would be there to receive him by the time he arrived."

Commonwealth representatives here, to whom Menon made substantially same report, have remarked on Stalin's apparent obsession that capitalism is blocking world peace. Both they and Menon consider that while interview does not indicate any new Soviet aggressive intention in near future, it showed no sign of yielding or conciliation.

Beam

No. 544

Editorial Note

At his press conference on February 25, President Eisenhower was asked whether anything could be accomplished by a meeting with Generalissimo Stalin "at this time" and whether the President would be willing to go out of the country to meet Stalin. The President replied in part as follows:

"I will say this: I would meet anybody anywhere, where I thought there was the slightest chance of doing any good, as long as it was in keeping with what the American people expect of their Chief Executive. In other words, I wouldn't want to just say, 'Yes, I will go anywhere.' I would go to any suitable spot, let's say halfway between, and talk with anybody, and with the full knowledge of our allies and friends as to the kind of thing I was talking about, because this business of defending freedom is a big job. It is not just one nation's job." (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, pages 69-70)
Memorandum from E. Lewis Revey of the Office of Policy and Plans, United States International Information Administration, to the Assistant Administrator of the Office (Connors)\(^1\)

CONFIDENTIAL  

[WASHINGTON,] February 25, 1953.

Subject: “The Succession”.

The history of the “Succession” issue begins with departmental consideration of US information policy with respect to the 19th Soviet Party Congress convened in Moscow, October 5, 1952.

(1) In a memorandum, dated August 24, 1952, and addressed, I believe, to P-Mr. Phillips, EE-Mr. Barbour and IPO-Mr. Connors, Mr. Kretzmann of IBS/NY set forth some of the ideas, relative to the 19th Congress, which emerged in VOA/NY staff discussions. These ideas were submitted to Washington appropriate departmental consideration.

(2) A meeting was held in Washington on September 9 to consider the IBS proposals. The following officers were present at this meeting: P-Mr. Phillips; EE-Mr. Barbour, Mr. Thurston, Mr. Davis and Mr. Pratt; EUR-Miss Kirkpatrick; IPO-Mr. Connors, Mr. Hickok and Mr. Revey; IBS-Mr. Kretzmann and Mr. Wolfe.\(^2\) The meeting ended in general agreement, reflected later, on September 24, in an IA Special Guidance entitled “Interim Guidance re 19th Soviet Party Congress”.

One of the ideas discussed at this meeting concerned preparation by IBS of a script conjuring up a “Stalin Testament” similar to the Lenin Testament. It was the sense of the meeting that IBS should proceed with preparation of such script but that it should not be broadcast before submission to and clearance by the Washington policy offices concerned.

(3) An IBS/NY script (in two parts) entitled “Stalin’s Testament” was prepared by the Russian Unit and submitted to Washington for clearance in the latter part of October.

(4) In view of the failure of the “All Union Congress of the Soviet Communist Party” to clarify the Succession problem, IBS-Mr. Kretzmann, on October 24, 1952, addressed a memo to IPO-Mr. Connors on the subject of the Succession. This memo predicated upon the assumption that Stalin had chosen Malenkov as his suc-

\(^1\)Unless otherwise indicated in appropriate annotations, the memoranda and papers referred to have not been found in Department of State files.

\(^2\)Officers mentioned in this paragraph and not previously identified include: James W. Pratt and Robert C. Hickok.
cessor, requested Washington to make decisions with respect to two questions: (a) "Is the theory" (of Malenkov's ascendancy) "plausible enough so that we would not risk our creditability [credibility] by advancing it" and (b) "Do we wish to engage in this type of psychological warfare against the Kremlin". Attached to the Kretzmann memo were two draft scripts.

(5) On October 23, before receipt of the Kretzmann memo, IPO-Mr. Revey, drafted a memorandum to IPO-Mr. Connors (copy to EE-Mr. Pratt) discussing the IBS position on the Succession and recommending conditional approval of the IBS project to handle the Succession theme. On October 28, EE-Mr. Pratt addressed a memo to EE-Mr. Barbour and Mr. Boster⁹ (copies to EUR/P-Miss Kirkpatrick and IPO-Mr. Revey) commenting on the IBS memo of October 24. A few days later DRS-Mr. Harvey addressed a memo to EE-Mr. Pratt commenting on the IBS memo and the scripts attached thereto.

(6) On the strength of the EE memo and the oral comment of DRS to EE (committed to writing November 4) IPO-Mr. Connors, on October 31, addressed a memo to IBS-Mr. Morton, setting forth interim information policy with respect to the IBS proposals relating to the Succession. The essence of this guidance was that the theme of Succession should be discussed generally, rather than in specific terms of Malenkov's ascendancy, and that each script on this complex subject should be submitted to IPO for clearance.

(7) Meanwhile, on or about November 5, EUR/P sent to IBS-Mr. Kretzmann, copy of the EE and DRS memos which commented in detail on the IBS proposal.

(8) On November 7, IPO-Mr. Connors addressed a second memo to IBS/NY—this time to Mr. Kretzmann—on the subject of the Succession. This memo, based on the judgments of EE and DRS answered the two questions advanced in the IBS memo of October 24. It stated:

(a) That the theory of Malenkov's ascendancy could be advanced with caution and in general terms but that it would be prudent to employ alternative interpretations as well.

(b) That tentatively, at least, we could engage in psychological warfare on this subject.

(c) That the complex subject of the Succession was under study in the Department and elsewhere (PSB) and we could not be sure in advance what conclusions their study would reach.

This communication also advised VOA (as suggested by EE and DRS) not to use the script "Stalin's Testament" as submitted.

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⁹David E. Boster.
(9) In a circular telegram on Soviet purges (doctors’ plot), IPO on January 30, 1953, issued further guidance relating to the Succession. This guidance (cleared by C-Mr. Bohlen, P-Mr. Phillips, EUR-Miss Kirkpatrick and IPO-Mr. Haden) pointed out that the purges may well reflect political or power problems in the highest echelons of the Soviet hierarchy, but that they do not necessarily relate to the Succession, since conceivably they might reflect taking of important policy decisions, resulting, as is customary in the Stalinist system, in the discrediting and liquidation of the losing faction and its adherents.

The important thing in all this is that IPO’s actions, in this matter, were based upon detailed consultation with other areas of the Department. The memos to IBS were based on the considered judgments of the responsible substantive and research offices of the Department, while the instructions (both 19th Congress and purges) were fully cleared by all areas of the Department concerned.

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The circular telegram is not printed. Regarding the doctors’ plot, see footnote 2, Document 539.

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No. 546

Editorial Note

The nomination of Charles E. Bohlen to become Ambassador to the Soviet Union was sent to the Senate by President Eisenhower on February 27. Transmission of the nomination followed by several days receipt of the agrément from the Soviet Government to the designation of Bohlen as Ambassador. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the Bohlen nomination were held on March 2 and March 18. The committee vote on March 18 was 15 to 0 to report favorably the nomination to the Senate. For the official record of the hearings, see Nomination of Charles E. Bohlen: Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 83d Congress 1st Session. (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1953) The text of certain exclusions made in the official record of the meeting of the committee on March 2 are included in Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, volume V, pages 203-217. For an exchange between President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles on March 16, see Document 568.

The opposition by some Senators to the nomination of Bohlen as Ambassador to the Soviet Union and the doubts raised in some quarters regarding Bohlen’s loyalty became a matter of concern
within the government and a well publicized controversy in the news media. President Eisenhower voiced his support for the nomination during his regular press conferences on March 19 and March 26; see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, pages 109 and 130. Secretary Dulles responded to a wide range of questions on the nomination at his press conference on March 20. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee considered the Bohlen nomination again on March 23 and March 25; see Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, volume V, pages 268–278. The Senate debated the nomination on March 23, 25, and 27 before confirming the nomination by a vote of 74 to 13.

The most comprehensive and authoritative account of the Bohlen nomination process is presented in Bohlen, Witness to History, pages 309–336. The President’s briefer account of the process appears in Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pages 212–213. Identifiable documentation in the files of the Department of State scarcely begins to cover all incidents attending the nomination of Bohlen described in the latter’s own published account. The single most important file in this respect is 123 Bohlen, Charles E. Secretary Dulles’ many telephone conversations between March 16 and March 27 on the nomination are included in the Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers. These records, however, only represent a small portion of the official exchanges which took place on the Bohlen nomination during this period. Only the record of one of the March 16 conversations (Document 568) has been included in this volume.

No. 547

Microfilm telegram files, “Moscow FY 53”: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Beam) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Moscow, March 4, 1953—2 p.m.
PRIORITY

1245. Immediately preceding telegram contains text communiqués regarding Stalin’s illness issued by Pravda and Moscow Radio March 4. Embassy desires call attention particularly to following points.

Original attack occurred night of March 1–2. First medical bulletin is dated 2 a.m. March 4. In other words illness has been concealed for at least two full days. Great confusion created ruling circles by sudden attack and Soviet perfectly natural tendency to secrecy could easily explain such delay. More interesting question, perhaps, is why news now released. Presume one or both of two possibilities.

(1) Stalin end approaching fast (Embassy doctor on basis medical details released considers it probable Stalin will not live long) so that it has become necessary to prepare people for news which could not be concealed indefinitely and indeed may have already started to leak in this rumor-ridden country; (2) struggle for position has already begun in high command and one or more individuals or groups feel safer with news given out (possibility Stalin already dead cannot be entirely excluded).

Seems reasonable suppose attack was actually unexpected and quite possibly unprepared for. Stalin was seen as recently as February 17 by presumably impartial observers Indian Ambassador and Saffrudin Kitchlew (Embassy does not consider feasible that any of Stalin’s long-rumored doubles, even if they actually exist, could have taken his place and concealed his death for substantial time).

Remarks in communiqué text to effect that Central Committee and Council of Ministers “recognize whole significance” Stalin’s illness and “are taking into consideration with all seriousness all circumstances” connected with it show that ruling group itself fully realized that this event will shake USSR to its foundations. Their “certainty that party and people will show greatest unity and solidarity” sounds remarkably like whistling in dark.

It is noteworthy too that Central Committee and Council of Ministers speak as group and no individual names singled out. If one man or one clique is already achieving dominance, nature of Soviet power system makes it likely that he would have attempted to show his primacy in this public record. This Embassy inclined to see picture as one of confusion, uncertainty, and temporary restraint in ruling group.

Embassy facilities for gathering reactions from Soviet citizens are extremely limited. Nevertheless all observations seem to confirm that there is little public excitement or turmoil over this event. Streets of central Moscow appear exactly as on any other day. All newspapers containing the communiqués are surrounded

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a For text of the statement by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mar. 3, and broadcast and circulated by Soviet news media on Mar. 4, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. V, No. 6, Mar. 21, 1953, p. 4. Telegram 1244 from Moscow, Mar. 4, is not printed.
by only small groups. People in the central market seemed concerned only with their usual shopping problems; two observers did not even hear the name of Stalin mentioned.

Only visible departure from normal was the longer lines which attended each newspaper sales kiosk. However, people in these lines and before bulletin boards showed themselves either unwilling or uninterested in discussing event. Among Embassy household employees, reaction has varied from tears on part of two or three women to indifferent acceptance on the part of several persons.

One final point seems worth mentioning. If this attack has been approaching for some time, it seems possible that its development has affected Stalin’s already abnormally suspicious mind and possibly have provided the underlying cause of the alleged doctors plot against the lives of the top Soviet leaders.

BEAM

No. 548

Statement by the President

WASHINGTON, March 4, 1953.

At this moment in history when multitudes of Russians are anxiously concerned because of the illness of the Soviet ruler the thoughts of America go out to all the people of the U.S.S.R.—the men and women, the boys and girls—in the villages, cities, farms and factories of their homeland.

They are the children of the same God who is the Father of all peoples everywhere. And like all peoples, Russia’s millions share our longing for a friendly and peaceful world.

Regardless of the identity of government personalities, the prayer of us Americans continues to be that the Almighty will watch over the people of that vast country and bring them, in His wisdom, opportunity to live their lives in a world where all men and women and children dwell in peace and comradeship.

1Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, p. 75. This statement was issued to the press by Press Secretary Hagerty on Mar. 4. President Eisenhower commented in a general way upon Stalin’s illness and the preparation of this statement during his news conference of Mar. 5; see ibid., pp. 76 ff. Regarding the preparation of this statement, see Document 550.

2Regarding the announcement concerning the illness of Stalin, see telegram 1245, Mar. 4, supra.
Department of State Intelligence Estimate

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 50

[WASHINGTON,] March 4, 1953.

Implications of Stalin's Collapse

Stalin's illness and imminent death removes from the Soviet scene the most important single element in the Soviet-Communist system. The remaining Soviet leaders consequently face a tremendous reallocation problem.

The Soviet system is such that solution of this problem will necessarily present grave difficulties and will almost certainly produce intra-leadership intrigues. It cannot be assumed, however, that these intrigues will lead to any serious weakening of the regime or to significant changes in Soviet foreign or domestic policies. In fact the necessity of displaying to the world a smooth transition to a new leadership would seem to require a continuance of previous policies. The 1952 Party Congress and Stalin's October Bolshevik article, together with the ideological lines laid down in the current vigilance drive, appear to have set a course which the leadership that replaces Stalin would find most difficult to alter.

Attack Appears Fatal. The nature of Moscow's announcement of Stalin's illness indicated belief on the part of Soviet leaders that there is little chance of recovery and that to all intents and purposes he has been eliminated as the controlling force in the USSR. While the communiqué spoke of the "temporary withdrawal" of Stalin and anticipated only his "more or less prolonged non-participation in leading activity," it pointedly emphasized that medical treatment so far applied has failed to bring about any improvement and described the nature of the affliction in such a way as to

\footnote{Intelligence Estimates of the Department of State were prepared in the Office of Intelligence Research. This Intelligence Estimate was circulated on stationery used for OIR "Intelligence Reports" and was sent to Secretary Dulles by W. Park Armstrong, Special Assistant for Intelligence, under cover of a short memorandum of Mar. 6 which summarized the essential conclusions of the estimate. Copies of Armstrong's memorandum were also sent to Under Secretary Smith and eight other top substantive officers of the Department.}

\footnote{The Nineteenth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union opened on Oct. 5, 1952.}

\footnote{Bolshevik (the theoretical journal of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), No. 18, September 1952, printed 50 pages of Stalin's economic theoretical writings covering the period Feb. 1-Sept. 28, 1952. The Embassy in Moscow reported on Stalin's statement in telegrams 601, Oct. 2, and 614, Oct. 4. (761.11/10-252 and 761.11/10-452, respectively)}
suggest a fatal attack. Similarly, the announcement’s concluding appeal to the Soviet people was in terms that indicated an intention to prepare the country psychologically for a new leadership.

The framers of the announcement also appeared concerned to quiet any speculation that Stalin’s illness might have been the result of any sort of “plot.” Treatment of Stalin, it was said, “is conducted under the constant supervision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Government.” It would seem, therefore, that the leaders are anxious to avoid a suggestion that Stalin’s illness is connected with the “doctors’ conspiracy” announced last January 13.4

Collapse a Surprise. Stalin’s collapse came after several months of exceptional personal activity on his part. Last autumn, in contrast to previous postwar years, he remained in Moscow for the 19th Party Congress, rather than going to Sochi in the Caucasus. He made at least two personal appearances at the Congress, delivering a public speech at the closing session, his first since 1946. He attended the November celebration of the anniversary of the Revolution, an occasion that he had frequently missed in the past. Since the beginning of the new year, he has had at least four interviews with foreigners and has attended the Bolshoi theatre. This unusual personal activity in recent months strongly suggests that his collapse came without warning.

The removal of Stalin from control presents the Soviet Union with a most serious problem of leadership. On the basis of all the evidence available it appears that he retained in his own hands and actively exercised absolute authority over the whole of the Soviet power system, including the Soviet Party, the Soviet Government, the European satellites, and the world Communist movement. Any expectation that after the war Stalin would gradually relinquish active direction of affairs and withdraw to an elder statesman status were not realized. In fact he did even revert to his prewar practice of controlling the regime from a Party post without heading the government.

Stalin apparently continued until at least a short time ago to concern himself with detailed operations of the Soviet power system to as great an extent as any time in the past. This was directly evidenced in the fields of foreign affairs, party affairs, control of the satellites, ideology, and direction of the world Communist movement. It was indirectly evidenced in the military, economic, security, and propaganda fields.

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4See footnote 2, Document 539.
Succession Unclear. So far there has been no hint who is to take over Stalin's role. The official announcement threw no light on the subject. It merely placed responsibility on the entire Central Committee of the Party and the Council of Ministers, saying that “in guiding the Party and the country, the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers with full seriousness take into account all circumstances connected with the temporary withdrawal of Comrade Stalin from leading the State's and Party activity.”

The problem of replacing Stalin is, of course, made more complex by the fact that Stalin's role was a symbolic one as well as a real one. No one can possibly assume at any early date this symbolic position, for whatever may have taken place with respect to preparations for an actual transfer of power, no preparations at all have been made for any of Stalin's associates assuming Stalin's "great father" mantle.

Even with respect to actual power, it cannot be assumed that any arrangements have been made for a changeover. Insofar as intelligence indications exist, there are none that suggest that a successor has already been chosen.

This, of course, raises two questions. Will there be a struggle for power between opposing individuals or factions? Who are the likely candidates for Stalin's mantle? It is conceivable that removal of Stalin from the controls will unleash a bitter struggle for power. This could happen if the present leadership has been split into opposing groups or if individuals jockeying for power back up their pretensions with organized support. Difficulties inside the ruling group since the end of World War II have been made evident, in the alleged murder of Zhidanov, a leading candidate for Stalin's favor, in the oblivion accorded Voznesenski, for years the principal Soviet planner, and in the variety of difficulties created for Andreyev, Khrushchev, and Kosygin.

Despite these manifestations of disharmony it appears at present that there will not be a struggle for the succession of a nature to disrupt the regime. It appears, in particular, that the inner group of the Presidium (the former Politburo) is not organized and is unlikely to become organized into hostile factions divided on policy and bent on exterminating the others. Stalin has had a long time to select, train and test his close associates, and the inner group has shown considerable stability over time. It would seem probable, however, that any lingering by Stalin, as Lenin lingered, in the wings of the stage would give more opportunity for a struggle to develop than a prompt exit.

New Head to Council Needed. Stalin built his power on the base of a position from which he could control the Party apparatus, and has built into the Soviet power structure the principle of Party su-
premacy. Nevertheless, he has since 1941 held the key post in the
government apparatus, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers.
The latter post is the only one held by Stalin that requires a more
or less immediate successor. Whoever is to be selected will be
chosen by the Central Committee and formally named by the Pre-
sidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. At the present time
Stalin holds no position in the Party which is formally unique, that
is, he shares membership with others on the Presidium of the Cen-
tral Committee and on the Secretariat. He has been described as
Secretary-General of the Party in the postwar period, but not since
the Nineteenth Party Congress. In the listings that resulted from
the Congress Stalin’s name unalphabetically led all the rest, but no
special post was assigned.

One possibility, therefore, is that a new government chieftain
would be named, without any rearrangements of Party posts. A
strong case could be made for the restoration of Molotov to the gov-
ernment post of chairman of the Council of Ministers which he
held throughout the 1930’s, when Stalin wielded power from his
Party Secretaryship. If so, it would give Molotov a definite advan-
tage. However, even if Molotov became Premier and the Central
Committee made no change in the Presidium and the Secretariat,
this would appear likely to rebound to Malenkov’s favor since with
Stalin out, Malenkov would be the only likely candidate for Stalin’s
post who held a position in both the Presidium and Secretariat.
Malenkov would be in a position, therefore, to control the Party
machinery which in the long run will probably prove supreme.

Control by a triumvirate or similar small group is possible, but
the Party chieftain under such an arrangement would almost auto-
matically come to occupy the first place, although his power and
prerogatives might not be as large and unchallenged as those of
Stalin.

No Policy Change Foreseen. Stalin’s elimination will probably
bring no early change in Soviet domestic or foreign policy. Domesti-
cally it can be expected that tight controls will continue to be
maintained over all segments of the population. Controls probably
will even be strengthened in accord with the development of the
“vigilance” campaign which was intensified after the exposure of
the “doctors’ plot” on January 13. The governmental regulations
and doctrines enunciated by Stalin or in his name will probably
become for at least a period sacrosanct with all elements vying
with each other in their professed adherence to them. For the time
being it is unlikely that any new doctrines will be enunciated. The
goals set by the new plan for 1955 will continue to serve as objec-
tives. The emphasis will remain on developing heavy and arma-
ment industry and continuing to increase the proportion of commu-

In the realm of foreign policy it would appear that Stalin and the
Party Congress laid out lines of policy to which the Soviet Govern-
ment can be expected to adhere for some time. Vis-à-vis the West,
this policy is clearly one of unremitting hostility. The official
Soviet theoretical journal Kommunist late in January backed up by
an important Pravda editorial on February 6 made clear that this
signified no “concessions not even small concessions” to the “impe-
rialists.” In practical terms, this would appear to mean a continued
“hard” Soviet policy on Korea, Germany, and all other outstanding
issues between East and West.

Stalin’s demise should have no appreciable effect in the immedi-
ate future on the Soviet Union’s relations with its satellites, with
Communist China and with the international Communist move-
ment. Operational relationship and policies have long since been
evolved, in the case of international Communism at the Soviet
Party Congress, in the case of Communist China at the 1952 talks
with top Chinese officials. In the long run, however, the problem of
replacing Stalin as the unquestioned leader of the World Commu-
nist movement may present difficulties, particularly with the Chi-
inese Party.

With respect to policy toward the West, there have been reports
of divergent opinions among Stalin’s possible successors regarding
policy but these are purely speculative. Even if any of Stalin’s asso-
ciates have privately advocated policies different from Stalin’s,
they probably would be loathe to assume the risks of opening them-
selves to charges of deviationism by publicly advocating a change,
particularly in view of the fact that Stalin has just completed draft-
ing what in effect amounts to a blue print on the direction of basic
Soviet domestic and foreign policies. In other words, the policy posi-
tions taken by Stalin will tend to be frozen for a more or less pro-
longed period with no one Soviet leader strong enough, or daring
enough, to attempt changes.
TOP SECRET  EYES ONLY

Present at the 135th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding, the Vice President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, General Vandenberg for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Administrative Assistant to the President for National Security Matters, the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Operations, the Military Liaison Officer, the Executive Secretary, NSC, and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a general account of the main positions taken and the chief points made at this meeting.

1. Stalin’s Illness (Program of Psychological Preparation for Stalin’s Passing from Power (PSB D–24), dated November 1, 1952; Appendix A to NIE–64 (Part I))

Mr. Cutler explained that the President had met early this morning with Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. C.D. Jackson, Mr. Hagerty, and himself, and had prepared a Presidential statement on Stalin’s illness which it was now desired that the Council discuss and approve.

After Mr. Cutler had read this statement and Mr. Jackson had briefly noted the reactions to the announcement of Stalin’s illness in various quarters of the globe, the President stated that the meeting earlier in the morning had been prompted by a desire to see whether and how the announcement of Stalin’s illness could best be exploited for psychological purposes. He believed that the moment was propitious for introducing the right word directly into the Soviet Union. The Russians would be so interested in the reaction of the rest of the world that it would be possible on this occasion to penetrate the Iron Curtain. The President stressed that this was a psychological and not a diplomatic move, and added that it was proposed to make the statement temperate in tone to offset

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1Drafted on Mar. 5 by Gleason.
2Document 532.
3Not printed; dated Nov. 12, 1952, and entitled “Soviet Bloc Capabilities Through Mid-1954”.
4For text of the statement as released to the press, see the editorial note, infra.
possibly intemperate comments from the Hill, though such comments had thus far been cautious.

Mr. Jackson affirmed his conviction that this was the first really big propaganda opportunity offered to our side for a long time. It enabled us to stress our devotion to peace, and it would enable us to counteract with real forcefulness the "hate America" campaign in the Soviet orbit and to calm anxieties elsewhere in the world by reassuring peoples everywhere of America's devotion to peace. Mr. Jackson further pointed out that if the President were to remain silent we would not only miss the opportunity he had outlined, but the very silence of the Chief Executive would be subject to misinterpretation by those who sought to misinterpret him. There was, in short, no option but to issue some kind of statement.

Secretary Humphrey expressed his prompt approval of the text which Mr. Cutler distributed, but Secretary Wilson evidenced anxiety lest the present statement imply that the United States Government proposed to go over the heads of the bosses of Soviet Russia and to appeal to the people of the Soviet Union to overthrow their masters. Secretary Wilson believed that efforts of this nature in the past had proved to be boomerangs, and suggested therefore that any such implication in the present text be removed.

Mr. Jackson replied that of course none of us knew all the answers, but that it seemed to him that for the moment the Russian people were punch-drunk and inert. As far as their rulers were concerned, the only one they reverenced was Stalin. The rest they only feared. Hence it had seemed unwise to have the President, so to speak, call Stalin an s.o.b., or on the other hand to send a message of condolence to the Russian people.

Secretary Dulles announced that he had no fixed opinion as to the desirability of a Presidential statement, but added that he felt there was a very great risk in whatever the President said. On balance, he felt that there was more loss than gain to be anticipated from the present text, since he agreed with Secretary Wilson that it will be interpreted as an appeal to the Soviet people to rise up against their rulers in a period of mourning, at a time when they were bound to regard Stalin more reverentially than ordinarily. It was certainly a gamble.

Thereafter the President and the other participants in the Council meeting went over the text sentence by sentence, making various changes to meet the points raised in criticism of the original text.

During the course of this exercise the President suggested that for courtesy's sake Secretary Dulles should telephone the Soviet Embassy in Washington to inquire about the situation and to express concern. Also, a message was sent to the meeting by the
Under Secretary of State, indicating that the Soviet Embassy was calling in the press at eleven o'clock, which General Smith thought indicated that "Stalin was dead as hell." In any case, said the President, it was necessary that his own statement be got out at once, since it was now a few minutes before eleven.

The statement was therefore sent in to Mr. Hagerty, and Mr. Cutler proposed various other actions for Council consideration with respect to the implications of Stalin's disappearance from power. These included an intelligence estimate by the Central Intelligence Agency, a policy estimate by the Department of State, and a psychological estimate by the Psychological Strategy Board in consultation with Mr. Jackson.

The President agreed generally with the proposed action, but suggested that one specific area in the world where Stalin's death could make a very great difference was Communist China. He doubted whether there would be any significant impact among the satellite states in Eastern Europe, and ended by suggesting that the proposed studies pinpoint China and Yugoslavia. He was also anxious that the psychological effects not be overlooked.

The Vice President observed that one of the results of Stalin's illness and death was likely to be added pressures in Congress to reduce drastically national security and defense expenditures. The Communists could be expected to exploit any such Congressional pressure, and the Vice President therefore insisted that we be prepared to meet a new Communist peace offensive in conjunction with Congressional pressure to reduce expenditures. Congress should be warned that Stalin's successor might very well prove more difficult to deal with than Stalin himself.

Mr. Dulles registered his agreement with the Vice President's opinion that the situation might very well be worse after Stalin's death.

The President also agreed with this view, and said that it was his conviction that at the end of the last war Stalin would have preferred an easing of the tension between the Soviet Union and the Western powers, but the Politburo had insisted on heightening the tempo of the cold war and Stalin had been obliged to make concessions to this view.

Mr. Dulles then sought the President's opinion with respect to a request from Senator Wiley,⁵ that Mr. Dulles appear in person before a Congressional committee to brief its members on the general situation which could be anticipated in the circumstances of Stalin's disappearance from power. Mr. Dulles added that he per-

⁵Senator Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
sonally believed that it would be a fatal mistake for the Director of Central Intelligence, who should properly give estimates only to the President and the National Security Council, to do so before Congressional committees. Quite apart from the security considerations, once the precedent had been set the Director of Central Intelligence would spend most of his time in this kind of operation.

General Vandenberg, as a former Director of Central Intelligence, emphatically confirmed Mr. Dulles’ views, and thought that it would be a great mistake to accede to Senator Wiley’s request.

At first the President felt that Mr. Dulles should try to find some way by which he might respond to Senator Wiley’s request without actually revealing secret intelligence, but he also expressed concern at the manner in which of late so many Cabinet members had been obliged to spend inordinate amounts of time on the Hill.

It was the opinion of virtually all the other members of the Council that Mr. Dulles should not agree to appear.

The President then suggested that General Smith, as a former Ambassador to Russia and as Under Secretary of State, would be the perfect substitute for Mr. Dulles on this occasion.

The other members of the Council, and particularly the Secretary of State, regarded this as the perfect solution of the problem.

The President then picked up the telephone, called Senator Wiley, and had no difficulty in persuading Senator Wiley to ask the Under Secretary of State in place of the Director of Central Intelligence.

The National Security Council.

a. Agreed upon the text of a Presidential statement on the subject subsequently released to the press.

b. Agreed that, as a matter of high urgency, the following reports should be prepared regarding the effect of Stalin’s passing from power, with particular reference to the effect on Communist China and Yugoslavia:

   (1) A new intelligence estimate by the Central Intelligence Agency.
   (2) A statement of the policy implications by the Department of State.
   (3) A plan for psychological exploitation of this event by the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Operations, assisted by the Psychological Strategy Board and its staff.

Note: The action in b–(1) above subsequently transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence; the action in b–(2) above to the Secretary of State; and the action in b–(3) above to the Special Assistant...
sistant to the President for Cold War Operations, for implementation.

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 2–4, concerning developments in Iran, review of basic national security policies, and NSC status of projects.]

S. Everett Gleason

No. 551

Editorial Note

The announcement of the death of Iosip (Joseph) Vissarionovich Stalin on the evening of March 5 was made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, and the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet that evening. For text of the announcement, circulated by the Soviet media on March 6, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, volume V, No. 6, March 21, 1953, page 5; Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1953, page 133; or Documents (R.I.A.) for 1953, page 1.

In response to the news of Stalin's death, the Secretary of State ordered the following message delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry by the United States Embassy in Moscow:


The message, transmitted by the Department of State to Moscow in telegram 702, March 5, was released to the American press by the White House on March 5. In telegram 1261 from Moscow, March 6, Chargé Beam reported that he handed the message of condolence to Acting Foreign Minister Malik for communication to Chairman Shvernik at 4 p.m. that day. (Microfilm telegram files, "Moscow FY 53")
Special Estimate¹

TOP SECRET
SE-36

[WASHINGTON,] 5 March 1953.

SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACK ON THE US THROUGH MID-1955

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the capabilities of the USSR to attack the continental US by open or clandestine means, through mid-1955.

SCOPE

This estimate is concerned solely with Soviet gross capabilities for attack on the continental US during the period mid-1953 to mid-1955. It does not attempt to assess whether the USSR intends to attack the US during that period or what courses of action the USSR would adopt before, along with, or after such an attack. Furthermore, the paper estimates Soviet gross capabilities for attack on the US without reference to any commitments of military forces which the USSR might make elsewhere and without reference to any advantages which the USSR might gain for an attack on the US by previously occupying territory that is not now within the Soviet Bloc.

PART I

Soviet Gross Capabilities


¹Special Estimates (SEs) were high-level interdepartmental reports presenting authoritative appraisals of vital foreign policy problems on an immediate or crisis basis. SEs were drafted by officers from those agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), discussed and revised by interdepartmental working groups coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), approved by the IAC, and circulated under the aegis of the CIA to the President, appropriate officers of cabinet level, and the National Security Council. The Department of State provided political portions of SEs.

According to a note on the cover sheet of this SE, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated with the CIA in the preparation of this estimate. The note further indicates that all members of the IAC concurred in this estimate on Mar. 3, 1953.
PART II

Certain Factors Affecting Soviet Employment of the Foregoing Capabilities Assuming a Soviet Decision To Attack the U.S.

33. The Soviet rulers would expect a direct attack on the United States to precipitate general war. In such a war the Soviet rulers would expect to have an initial preponderance of military power on the Eurasian continent, but in their attack upon the continental US would be concerned to prevent: (a) US retaliatory air attack on the Soviet Union with weapons of mass destruction; (b) mobilization of the superior war potential of the Western allies, particularly that of the United States; and (c) US reinforcement of anti-Soviet forces in Eurasia.

34. The Soviet rulers have demonstrated their sensitivity to the danger of US air attack with weapons of mass destruction by the high priority which they have given to the development of defenses against such an attack. Despite the substantial progress already achieved in building up their defenses, it is unlikely that they would regard their defensive capabilities as adequate to prevent substantial numbers of attacking aircraft from reaching strategic targets in the USSR. It is likely, therefore, that in initiating atomic warfare the USSR would be concerned: (a) swiftly to destroy or cripple US capabilities for retaliation in kind, with particular reference to SAC continental and overseas bases; (b) to deliver such an attack on industrial and psychological targets in the United States as would prevent, or at least hinder, the mobilization of the US war potential; and (c) to retain the means to counter any US reinforcement of Eurasia.

35. As among the available forces and weapons for attacking the continental US, the USSR's highest capability lies in open military attack with atomic bombs delivered by TU-4 type aircraft, for the following reasons:

a. The low capabilities of conventional naval forces and airborne forces.

b. The security and technical difficulties inherent in the delivery of large numbers of atomic weapons by clandestine means, particularly in inland areas.

c. Other methods of delivery of atomic weapons are insufficiently developed for large-scale use.

d. Other mass destruction weapons are insufficiently developed or subject to other handicaps in their large-scale use.

36. The Soviet rulers might, however, employ other methods of attacking the US concurrently with or immediately following an open and direct atomic attack. In the cases of guided missiles, airborne attack, submarine bombardment, and biological warfare,
Soviet capabilities at best appear to be severely limited. They have a greater capability for chemical attack in connection with, or subsequent to, atomic bombing.

37. Large-scale clandestine attack, because of the security difficulties inherent in such action and because of the obstacles to coordinating its timing with that of overt attack from the outside, is unlikely to be used immediately preceding or concurrent with an overt attack. Clandestine attack on a small scale, in the form of sabotage or biological warfare, might occur at any time, and even without an overt attack ever being launched. Subsequent to an overt attack, clandestine attack in any form could be expected to the maximum practicable extent.

38. We believe that the considerations affecting Soviet employment of their capabilities will remain throughout this period essentially the same as those outlined above.

No. 553

Editorial Note

The death of Generalissimo Stalin was one of nine topics taken up at President Eisenhower’s Cabinet meeting on the morning of March 6. The minutes of that meeting record the matter as follows:

“1. Contingency Planning: The Stalin Situation. The President told the Cabinet that no specific plan for Government action or policy had been developed in advance, despite continuous talk since 1946 about the possibility of Premier Stalin’s death. He commented that this situation indicated again the need for services such as Mr. Cutler and Mr. Jackson will perform, and he urged full cooperation with them.

“The President reported briefly on the preparation of his statement to the Russian people.” (Eisenhower Library, Cabinet Minutes)

The President’s “statement to the Russian people” is presumably the statement issued by the White House on March 4, Document 548.
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Beam) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Moscow, March 6, 1953—noon.

PRIORITY

1257. Embassy officers since early morning have covered greater Moscow area and will continue do so throughout day.

Some few people seen weeping. No conversations overheard concerning Stalin’s death. Perhaps population is somewhat more subdued than usually. Group of 400–500 people gathered around Spaski gate of Kremlin early this morning. Larger group later, but not as sizeable as might be expected, in Red Square, apparently instructed by police to stand clear of Kremlin entrance.

General impression Moscow at this point is surprising lack of response to this morning’s news of Stalin’s death and contrasts with American and British reaction to deaths President Roosevelt and King George.

Committee for organization funeral includes Khrushchev as Chairman, Kaganovich, Shvernik, Vasilevski (Minister of War) Pegov (Secretariat member and alternate member Presidium) Artemev (Commandant Moscow Military District and candidate member Central Committee) and Yasnov (Chairman Executive Committee Moscow Soviet). Latest communiqué states Stalin’s body will be placed in the Hall of Columns but no indication as to time when public will have access.

While committee for funeral arrangements not so significant as lineup of honorary pall bearers which will probably be announced shortly it may be of interest that none of popularly presumed successors is included.

Beam

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The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Beam) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Moscow, March 6, 1953—4 p.m.

PRIORITY

1259. Center of Moscow has been cleared of citizenry. Police cordons ring area from Lenin Library to beyond Bolshoi Theater. Side streets leading to Hall of Columns (where official announcement states body will rest) blocked by parked trucks. Red Square where no less than two thousand people had gathered, now cleared. Despite fact that pronouncement of committee concerned with funeral arrangements has ostentatiously not indicated when public will be permitted access Hall of Columns long line people already formed reaching to Pushkin Square.

Unusual number railroad police seen in railroad stations. Access to Leningrad station made difficult for Embassy officer despite his possession appropriate platform ticket. Inquiry of FonOff regarding access to Embassy for official personnel not resident in Mokhovaya building elicited response that arrangement of such sort not yet made and only temporary permission granted for movement Embassy personnel in automobiles via single street (Ulitsa Kalinin).

BEAM


No. 556

Bohlen files, lot 74 D 349, "PSB Meetings"

Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department of State (Bohlen)

TOP SECRET


1. There is no sign at the present of any lack of control on the part of the Kremlin.

2. It can be confidently predicted that the first reaction of the Kremlin will be to pull itself together tightly and show no sign of

1 There is no indication on the source text that this memorandum was directed to or seen by anyone. A copy appears to have been circulated to Paul Nitze and Phillip Watts of the Policy Planning Staff. (PPS files, lot 64 D 563) According to the copy of this memorandum in the PPS files, this memorandum was also attached to an otherwise unidentified memorandum of Mar. 7 regarding the proposal advanced by Charles E. Wilson in Document 542.
weakness to the outside world—which may very well mean that the Soviet Union will be harder rather than softer in its relations with other states, for a while at least.

3. At this stage at any rate the Russian people are not involved, i.e., they are playing no part in the transfer of power.

4. Although it is true, of course, that millions of Russians may be rejoicing over Stalin's death, it is also true that millions are weeping. It is a traditional Russian reaction to cry for the death of the Czar, regardless of what kind of ruler he may have been. Stalin, like his Czarist predecessors, has been given a special place in the minds of the Russian people as the all-wise and kindly "father" whose ministers are responsible for the evil deeds of the rulers.

5. If any group (the Army, for example) were planning anything, our interference at this stage would have the effect of causing their elimination more quickly than might otherwise be the case. In any event, all that any such group would want from us would be assurances of material and not moral support. If we are not prepared to give such support it is better to say nothing.

6. In China the situation may develop as the result of Stalin's death which would be to our advantage. In spite of some pretense of originality in the field of Communist theory, Mao has been willing to acknowledge Stalin as the master and to permit Stalin a special place in China's internal propaganda. It is highly doubtful if Mao would be willing to accord any successor, or successors, to Stalin such a position.

7. To a lesser extent, for obvious reasons, there is some of the above element in the internal political situation in the Eastern European satellite states.

8. All of the above are pertinent for the first phase of the post-Stalin era. This means that, with certain possible exceptions, our plans should be directed for exploiting "an emerging situation" which, of course, we must watch from day to day, e.g., helping to stir up some of the developments in China and the satellite states if and as we see them taking form but keeping in mind that we cannot instigate them in the first instance if there is not an original basis for their development in those countries themselves.

9. Perhaps later on we will find it profitable to offer to meet with the Russians on some of the subjects on which we have made no progress in the past—to test out the attitude of the new rulers if for no other reason. In this connection, however, we must keep in mind the likelihood that for some period the new group, or man, will try to carry on what they or he considered Uncle Joe's ideas were. This is something to be watched very carefully, but of course we have very few indications of what Stalin's ideas were. There is a
possibility, however, for example, that he attached some seriousness to the “Reston exchange”.2

10. Hanging over all of our plans and actions in regard to this developing situation is the question as to whether this nation has now or will find itself shortly committed to the overthrow of the Kremlin regime as contrasted with a willingness to reach even a temporary modus vivendi which would be more satisfactory than the present situation.

11. In the circumstances, a direct frontal political or psychological assault on the Soviet structure or leadership would only have the effect of consolidating their position and postponing the possibility of dissension in the top leadership. The possibility to be explored would be some suggestion or proposal of the Western Powers which would present the new leadership with a new diplomatic or political situation not before the Soviet Government during the latter phases of Stalin’s life and therefore on which his views would not be known. A suggestion of this nature might be the one for a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers for general discussion without an agenda and for a strictly limited period of time to exchange views.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

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No. 557

Microfilm telegram files, “Moscow FY 58”: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Beam) to the Department of State1

CONFIDENTIAL

Moscow, March 8, 1953—2 p. m.

1271. Atmosphere in Moscow is calm. Crowds in line (about four kilometers long) to Hall of Columns quiet but with little evidence of extreme grief.

Inner section of city heavily policed. Multiple road blocks on streets leading from center composed of trucks parked from building to building. These reinforced with militia and army. No MVD troops seen away from Hall of Columns itself. Only armed troops seen were group in lower section Metro Station near Hall of Columns.

Beyond cordoned area activity seems normal. Markets are open and business is conducted as usual. Noticeable absence of usually

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heavy traffic around “B” Circle may be occasioned by mobilization of trucks for road-block purposes.

One American who was here at time of President Roosevelt’s death notes in contrast present unemotional atmosphere active grief of citizenry at news President’s death.

Last night’s decree regarding observance of mourning for Stalin (only five minute cessation of work) certainly not designed increase population’s emotional response. Sounding of factory whistles at time funeral follows pattern Lenin obsequies.

Diplomatic Corps yesterday lined up on street next to Kremlin for over hour long wait to view body. Chinese Delegation put ahead of Corps Dean\(^2\) who protested and took lead with wreath from Corps.

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\(^2\)Swedish Ambassador Rolf Sohlin.

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No. 558

761.00/3-853: Telegram

_The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Beam) to the Department of State\(^1\)_

SECURITY   PRIORITY   Moscow, March 8, 1953—10 p. m.

1272. Following our preliminary impressions on the consequences of Stalin’s death and character new government.\(^2\)

While representing a radical departure in outward form from organization at 19th congress, present rearrangement seems attempt to mobilize forces by enhancing and concentrating functions probably performed under Stalin’s leadership.

Replacement Stalin’s authority apparently being sought in gathering for the present of recognized individual abilities and prestige. Entry of new phase seems underlined in precedence given younger men over Molotov who continues nevertheless in highest sphere and whose importance increased by elimination Stalin’s foreign affairs experience. Natural and perhaps best balance has been created in assigning government and party leadership to Malenkov, security to Beria, foreign policy to Molotov and army affairs to Bul-

\(^1\)Reiterated for information to Bonn, London, Paris, Rome, and Belgrade.

\(^2\)On Mar. 7, a joint announcement by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet described a set of sweeping changes in the Soviet Government and party leadership. The most apparently significant change was the designation of Georgiy Maksimilianovich Malenkov as Chairman of the Council of Ministers.
ganin. How long this balance will last in view traditional power rivalry Communist leaders we simply do not know, but it may be presumed government constitutes team used to working with each other.

The very speed, however, with which Malenkov was able to take over need not mean possible differences are permanently settled but may have been forced by need of filling vacuum of authority as far as possible and discouraging any tendencies toward “disorder and panic” to which revealing reference made in communiqué. In meantime any myth Stalin is indispensable seems to be counteracted by relative haste with which he is being disposed of and by government’s stated determination to proceed under the emblem of national and party unity.

Interesting to note that Malenkov, Beria and Bulganin have advanced through hierarchy as technicians and competent administrators. Molotov and Kaganovich sole remaining revolutionary Bolshevik links. Stalin’s successors not necessarily less ruthless but they may apply different methods. Whether or not reduction of party secretariat means decrease party influence, latter’s role may undergo some adjustment tending toward further fusion with state structure. Zhukov’s public reappearance as Deputy War Minister after long period relegation may be significant attempt to add weight professional army to political balance. Changes in organization of strategic industries and foreign office seem attempt to intensify control over both war potential and foreign policy.

Obvious Stalin’s death strikes blow to Soviet international Communist leadership against which Russians ill prepared. Determined steps will doubtless be taken to maintain present holdings in satellites. Early change foreign policy unlikely, particularly as new regime would find it difficult make conciliatory divergencies. Question of course is whether Mao Tse-tung will be less tractable to direction of syndicate which has yet to prove its ability to survive. While Mao Tse-tung may feel more able to treat with Soviet Union on basis ideological and political equality, he will, of course, depend on Russia for support in Korean war and on still longer term basis for assistance in carrying out basic Chinese industrialism program. His importance has been clearly recognized in precedence and special attention accorded Chinese over all other Communist associates.

BEAM
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Beam) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

1275. In accordance Secretary’s instructions Department telegram 707, I attended Stalin funeral ceremonies as special US representative. In comparison other state funerals I have witnessed, namely General Pershing’s in 1948 and that of General Von Fritsch in Berlin in 1939, arrangements were casual but ceremony could not help but be impressive against background Red Square. Chief emphasis was on satellite participation, particularly that of Chinese.

Without any active discourtesy being shown, non-Communist delegations and missions were definitely less favored. Our presence was required at Hall of Columns 8:50 when we were left standing for more than an hour at one side while last deserving Russian public servants filed past Stalin bier. At 10:00 the large satellite delegations were brought in and placed in front of us, followed by top Russian generals in front of them. Finally at 10:15 new Soviet Government leaders entered taking their place in forefront. After a few minutes further playing ceremonial music, lid was placed on Stalin’s coffin with bearers led by Malenkov and including Chou En-lai bore bright red chiffon pall and straining heavily took it from hall. After satellites we took our place in procession behind coffin on gun carriage at dead march, proceeding to Red Square within half block past our Embassy where our flag at half mast was in sight of everybody. We were flanked by two moving columns of soldiers and were courteously attended by Foreign Office and/or secret police officials in plain clothes in our ranks who showed us to places on abutments Lenin’s tomb. Latter quietly interposed themselves between us and leading Soviet and satellite groups each time they ascended and descended from top of mausoleum. Sole name of Lenin had been erased and two names Lenin and Stalin substituted in smaller letters over entrance.

After exactly one hour of speeches by Malenkov, Beria and Molotov coffin borne by same pallbearers into tomb shortly before noon.


2Dated Mar. 7, not printed. (611.61/3-753)

3In telegram 1277, Mar. 9, Beam provided a brief summary report on these three speeches. The telegram reads in part as follows:

Continued
when salutes fired and factory whistles blown. Following return of pallbearers who resumed their places on top of mausoleum striking break occurred with playing national anthem and introduction of lively martial music for military march-past which finally ended with over-flight military airplanes. Relaxation followed when top group began chatting with each other and ceremony ended with final descent into tomb by leading Communist spectators followed by diplomatic corps.

To say the least, while all proprieties observed, Stalin last rites comparatively unesthetic, considering magnificent facilities which could have been made available in Kremlin in keeping with his stature as great Soviet leader. (Under Communists Kremlin of course no longer popular property.) Peculiarly incongruous that Stalin is placed even temporarily as darkened corpse in narrow aisle on side Lenin’s lighted bier.

With gradual removal police lines groups of the curious frequent Red Square but life outwardly returning to normal indicating that whatever check was produced by first announcement Stalin’s illness is wearing off.

Beam

"Of three speeches today at Stalin rites, only Molotov’s seemed to be real funeral oration. From his voice was obvious, he was shaken, and bulk his speech was devoted to Stalin and his accomplishments.

"Malenkov and Beria on other hand were obviously in complete control of themselves and they devoted most of their attention to charting future course of Soviet State. Malenkov made general outline, indicating that same policies would be carried on. In connection with his foreign policy statement that Soviet Union would strive to avoid war and to live in peace with all countries he hedged considerably when he said that governments should serve their peoples and that people of whole world wanted peace."

The telegram continues:

"Bersia’s speech, while much in same vein as Malenkov’s had two interesting additions. First was emphasis on guarding party, vigilance of armies, et cetera, all warning that no one had better interfere with party’s policies. Second important addition of course was his statement that all government and Communist organs had decided to continue policy of country uninterruptedly and that one of decisions they took in this connection was appointment of Stalin’s comrade in arms, Malenkov, as Chairman of Council of Ministers." (Microfilm telegram files, "Moscow FY 53")
Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitzke) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 10, 1953.

Subject: Exploitation of Stalin's Death

In the event that it is decided that the next few days are not the best time to exploit the situation created by Stalin's death, it is possible that a real possibility may arise in the next few months. The following program is suggested for your consideration to exploit such a possibility:

a. That we make a settlement of the Korean armistice issue the principal immediate target. A settlement of this issue would be important (1) in improving our military strategic flexibility; (2) in removing a point of potential danger to the Western alliance and thus increasing our political flexibility; and (3) in creating a situation in which the possibilities of developing rifts between Mao and Malenkov, and possibly within the Soviet regime, would be enhanced.

b. That we make this effort in a serious, therefore covert, way rather than as part of a propaganda program.

c. That we be prepared to take substantial risks and pay substantial costs in order to achieve success.

A more detailed spelling out of the above might include the following elements:

a. Getting Bohlen to Moscow within the next week or two.

b. Dropping exploratory hints in Moscow or to Soviet or satellite diplomats at the U.N. or elsewhere that serious negotiations on non-Korean matters could be held if, but only if, the Korean armistice issue could be settled and then seeing what reaction we get.

c. Following General Clark's recommendation, release to the ROK economy the 35,000 North Korean POW non-returnees now held by us, but not the 15,000 Chinese non-returnees.

d. Bohlen to approach Molotov to initiate negotiations regarding a Korean settlement. Our position should contain an overtone of really significant military action in the event the negotiations were unsuccessful. This overtone should be no mere bluff.\(^2\)

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\(^1\)A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "Used at NSC Briefing, 3-10-53." Such a briefing, presumably held in the Department of State in advance of the NSC meeting of Mar. 11 (see Document 566), has not been further identified.

An earlier version of this memorandum, dated Mar. 9, virtually identical to the text printed here, is in Bohlen files, lot 74 D 349, "PSB Meetings."

\(^2\)The entire paragraph "d." in the source text was circled in pencil and a handwritten notation on the margin reads: "No. W. B. Smith."
e. We should be prepared to offer an all for all exchange of prisoners except for the 15,000 Chinese non-repatriates whose disposition would be the subject of the subsequent political discussion contemplated by the Armistice Agreement.

f. At an appropriate time, the President might make a speech somewhat along the lines of the Hughes’ draft, but making a high-level meeting contingent on the prior settlement of the Korean armistice issue.

PAUL H. NITZE

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3Not found in Department of State files or the Eisenhower Library.

No. 561

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “USSR”

Memorandum Prepared by the Counselor of the Department of State
(Bohlen)1

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 10, 1953.

Policy Implications of Stalin’s Death

I

The great menace to the United States and its interests has been the control exercised by a hand-full of men in the Kremlin over some 800 million people. In past circumstances, this group of men therefore could, without previous warning, involve the totality of the Soviet or Soviet-controlled empire in an attack on the United States. The death of Stalin may offer, with the progress of time, opportunities to weaken and disrupt the cohesiveness of this bloc and in particular the direct control of the Kremlin over the Eastern European satellites and its influence over Communist China. The impulses of nationalism would seem to be the chief element working against the continuance of Soviet control over the non-Soviet countries in this bloc.

The mystique and symbolism of Stalin’s name assiduously cultivated by the Soviet propaganda machine was a very important factor in the Soviet system of control. His connection with the original revolution and association with Lenin, and the continuous

1A notation on the source text reads: “Prepared by Mr. Bohlen (rec’d 3/10/53)”. The source text also indicates this memorandum was seen by Nitze and Phillip Watts of S/P. An identical copy is in Bohlen files, lot 74 D 349, “Misc Memoranda, Letters 1953.” This memorandum is in the same PPS files as Nitze’s memorandum, supra, and was presumably used in the same context as that memorandum.

2The handwritten word “unilateral” is inserted in the source text at this point.
buildup as an individual enjoying super-human qualities, not only facilitated the original imposition of Soviet control in Eastern Europe and in the establishment of primary influence in Communist China but was also a vital factor in its perpetuation. The manner in which the name of Stalin facilitated Soviet control was subtle but nonetheless real. It is doubtful if the mystique of his name had any effect on the attitude of the peoples of the countries concerned but it was, however, of considerable assistance to the local Communist leaders who could reconcile more easily whatever nationalist feeling they may have possessed with the fact of Soviet domination by reason of the international revolutionary heritage associated with the name of Stalin. It may be anticipated that the natural force of nationalism which was in part diluted by the prestige of Stalin will begin increasingly to assert itself against straight Russian domination. Neither Malenkov, nor Molotov, nor Beria enjoy any prestige comparable to that of Stalin. Our policy in all its aspects should keep this factor very much in mind.

In short, it may be stated that the death of Stalin will remove one of the elements which was able to confuse and disguise to some extent the reality of naked Soviet imperialism in the Eastern European countries. It must be recognized, however, that the element of straight Soviet control is so powerful within these Eastern European countries that the process of increased nationalism may be a very long-term process. It is doubtful if any of the present leaders in the satellite countries command sufficient following among their people on a nationalist basis to act as representatives of national sentiment in any attempt to break away from Soviet control. It is improbable moreover that the people themselves will be able to take any action or exercise any important influence until this control is weakened if not broken.

Our policy in all its aspects should be constantly alert to the possibility of the emergence of nationalism as a force in Eastern Europe and China and be prepared to encourage and support any such indications in the manner best designed to be effective in hastening the disintegration of the Soviet empire. It is doubtful, however, if at this particular period or in the immediate future direct foreign exhortation or instigation would be wise as it might assist the Soviet Union in the process of consolidation which it is our central aim to prevent and possibly diminish or at least postpone the emergence of the natural forces making for dissension within that empire.

Possibly the most effective area for exploitation will be in the field of the Soviet-Communist Chinese relationship. Since it is doubtful that Soviet control over Communist China is anywhere near as complete as it is in the case of the European satellite coun-
tries, there should logically be greater opportunity for independent Chinese action. Furthermore, in the field of ideological leadership, Mao Tse-tung may have been willing to play the part of younger brother to Stalin but will most certainly not accept willingly any subordinate role in this field to Malenkov. The proper political or psychological exploitation of this possibility will of necessity involve the consideration of our relations with the Chinese Nationalist Government. If the possibility of a rift between the Soviet Union and Communist China becomes a real possibility and not a theory, as it must remain at present, the question of the Chinese Nationalist Government and our relation to it will be immediately brought to the fore. It is, however, premature to deal with this problem at this time and it would be most unwise to do so.

II

Soviet Policy

There are no indications as yet that there are great opportunities for exploitation insofar as the Soviet Union is concerned. The USSR presents a special problem and the considerations of nationalism are not as directly visible in the case of that country.

The long-term implications of Stalin’s death will undoubtedly be extremely important in their effect upon Soviet foreign policy. At the moment, however, the following facts may be noted:

1. We have no indications that the situation is not well in the hands of the new rulers. It is true that the instructions of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers refer to the difficult situation and “the prevention of any kind of disarray and panic”. These would appear to be less expressions of concern at possible disturbances or troubles in the country as a whole than a call for unity and possibly a discreet note of warning to certain party organizations.

2. At this stage, at any rate, the Russian people are not directly involved in that they are playing no part in the transfer of power.

3. It is to be expected that the first preoccupation of the new leadership will be to close ranks and present a united front, both to the country and particularly to the outside world. There will be an increase of the normal tendency of dictators to avoid any sign of weakness vis-à-vis their external enemies, in this case primarily the United States.

4. This preoccupation against any show of weakness will probably be accompanied by great prudence and caution in regard to any new Soviet adventures or aggressive actions. Any measures on Soviet initiative which would run the serious risk of war would obviously be dangerous for the new regime. However, by the same token the new leadership will almost certainly be prepared to take great risks to avoid the physical loss of any territories or areas they have inherited from Stalin. Thus, Soviet foreign policy for a considerable period would appear to remain virtually unchanged
from the last phase in which Stalin was alive. It may become even more truculent in speech but in all probability, unless the defense of a previous position is involved, cautious in initiating new and risky adventures.

III

Policy Guides

While it is not possible to predict accurately developments, the following, at this juncture, might be accepted as sound guides to our policy:

1. We must stand resolutely and firmly on all present positions and not be deflected in any of the policies for the increase of strength and unity in the free world. Any sign of weakness on our part would be most dangerously interpreted by the new leadership.

2. Failing some sign of internal disorder or loss of control, either in the Soviet Union or over the satellites, of which up to the present there have been no signs, there would appear to be little advantage in stepping up cold war pressures, since increased expressions of hostility would probably materially assist the new leadership in the consolidation of its position and postpone the growth of dissensions and rivalries which are certainly latent in Soviet-satellite and Soviet-Chinese relationship as well as within the Soviet ruling group itself.

3. The Department of State is examining urgently the possibility of some initiative on the part of the West which might confront the new leadership with a new situation regarding decisions not previously made under Stalin.

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No. 562

Bohien files, lot 74 D 349, "PSB Meetings 1953"

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Smith) to the Acting Director of the Psychological Strategy Board (Morgan)\(^1\)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, \(]\) March 10, 1953.

Subject: Comments by Department of State on the Draft Outline of Plan for Psychological Exploitation of Stalin's Death\(^2\)

Reference: NSC Action 728, para b (3)\(^3\)

1. The following are the preliminary comments of the Department of State on the reference paper which was prepared by an ad hoc PSB Working Party.

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\(^1\)Drafted by Robert W. Tufts of the Policy Planning Staff.

\(^2\)The "Draft Outline" is not printed. The final version of the plan, reviewed and revised by the PSB on Mar. 19, was circulated as PSB D-40, Apr. 23. (PSB files, lot 62 D 333, "PSB Documents")

\(^3\)See footnote 6, Document 550.
2. With respect to the "Plan for Psychological Operations" outlined in Part II, Section 1c and 1d and Section 2, the Department understands that operations are now being carried out along these lines and believes that the agencies concerned should continue to operate along these general lines. Paragraphs 2a(3), 2a(7), and 2a(11) should be reconsidered with a view to determining whether these tasks should be undertaken covertly and might be contra-productive if undertaken overtly.

3. With respect to Part I, Assumption 3a, it should be noted that these and other relevant policy papers are now under review by the NSC and that in the course of this review changes in policy with respect to specific countries and areas may be made to which psychological operations would have to be adjusted.

4. With respect to Assumption 3b, the Department believes that the assumption is correct. It does not follow, however, that the best way to exploit Stalin's death at this time is by an aggressive heightening of cold war pressures, especially in the field of covert propaganda. Indeed, increased pressures at this time will probably tend to assist the new regime to consolidate its position and might thus prevent the later emergence of opportunities which could be exploited.

5. With respect to Assumption 3d, the Department does not believe that a major Presidential speech along the lines indicated would be an advantageous move at this time, and that indeed it might well be contra-productive. The Department has the following specific comments:

   a. There should be thorough prior consultation with our major allies, particularly the U.K. and France. Without such consultation and agreement on the purposes to be pursued in such a meeting of Foreign Ministers, the Soviet regime might be able to use the meeting to create divisive tendencies.

   b. The Department has seen a draft of the proposed speech which would commit the United States in advance to lay specific and concrete proposals before the meeting of Foreign Ministers on a wide range of subjects. The preparation of such proposals and consultation with our allies would require several months. In any event, the U.S. should not commit itself to make such proposals before it has formulated these proposals. To do otherwise might result in serious embarrassment to the President. If there are overriding reasons outside the field of foreign affairs for a Presidential speech at this time, the Department strongly recommends that the speech should not propose a meeting of Foreign Ministers or commit us to make specific proposals for the relaxation of international tensions.

   c. The Department believes that any speech of this kind will almost certainly delay progress on EDC.

6. With respect to Part I, Section 4, the Department is in general agreement with the estimate but believes that an additional point
should be added to the effect that the peoples of the Soviet Union are definitely not playing a major role in the present situation. The Department also believes that paragraph b(3) overstates the degree to which the role of the military has increased.

7. With respect to Part I, Section 5b ("Aims"), the Department believes that efforts to pursue all of these aims simultaneously would tend to be self-defeating. Once the main direction of our effort has been established, it will be possible to develop a psychological plan to support this main effort.

8. With respect to Part III, the Department believes that a sharp heightening of cold war pressures at this time would not be advantageous as a means of exploiting Stalin’s death. The Department further believes that Part III should be dropped for the time being. As decisions along the lines suggested or along other lines are taken, psychological plans can be revised and adjusted in order to take advantage of these decisions.  

*In a four-page memorandum to C. D. Jackson on Mar. 10, Tufts outlined in some detail his dissatisfaction with the “Draft Outline” printed here. Tufts circulated his memorandum to Jackson to Matthews and Nitze under cover of a memorandum of Mar. 10 that reads in part as follows:

“Over last weekend I worked at the PSB headquarters on an ad hoc PSB Working Party to develop a ‘crash’ plan for the psychological exploitation of Stalin’s death, having been directed to do so by Mr. C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President.

“In the course of this effort I had a long discussion with Mr. C. D. Jackson in which I tried to develop the reasons why, although I thought the U.S. Government should fully exploit any opportunities afforded by Stalin’s death, I did not think the plans being discussed were wise. My major point was that a psychological plan should be developed to support the main effort of the U.S. Government, whatever that might be, and that it was difficult to devise a satisfactory psychological plan until the direction and nature of this main effort were known.

“The attached memorandum is an effort to develop the underlying rationale for my position, for I did not feel sure that I had succeeded in clearly developing this in my discussion with Mr. Jackson.” (761.13/3-1053)

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No. 563

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum by the Administrative Assistant to the President (Hughes) to the President

TOP SECRET  

WASHINGTON, March 10, 1953.

Subject: Diplomatic and Propaganda Situation Created by Stalin’s Death

As you know, the opportunities and problems in this situation have been lengthily explored by all agencies concerned for the last several days.
This report briefly summarizes the division of opinion now clearly apparent and certain to be expressed in detail at tomorrow’s NSC meeting. It has been reflected in conferences with C. D. Jackson and his special task force, with Mr. Bohlen, and in a report the latter has sent me of his and General Smith’s attitude.

The debate turns on the proposition that: (1) the U.S. should propose in a message to the Soviet Union a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, France, Great Britain, and the U.S. (2) this should be made public in a short speech by you, stating the proposal and the underlying purposes in making it.

This line of political warfare is urged by Mr. Jackson, and the report prepared by his special committee—elaborating propaganda techniques to be exploited at this time—is virtually predicated entirely on this action. It is favored with the contentions that:

(1) The present offers a unique opportunity to exploit all stresses and strains within the Soviet system.

(2) A substantial speech and proposal by you is necessary to seize the political initiative, to get and keep the Soviets on the defensive.

(3) The concrete proposal for a Foreign Ministers’ meeting would (a) probably present the new Soviet leadership with a sudden problem which it is unprepared to handle (b) if rejected, give the U.S. a huge propaganda advantage and (c) if accepted, give us the opportunity to press our case on a variety of points—from Germany to Korea—against an opponent who has not had time to collect his wits.

(4) It would be political folly to allow the new Soviet leadership time to compose itself, assure domestic order and resume the foreign initiative.

This approach was quite fully explored in a meeting Mr. Jackson and I had with “Chip” Bohlen and Paul Nitze, head of State’s Policy Planning Board.

The latter have reviewed the whole scene with General Smith and the top officers of the Department of State. Mr. Bohlen has reported to me their disagreement with the above. Their reasons can be summarized:

(1) The immediate present is probably not the time of maximum opportunity in dealing with the new Soviet leadership. For the present, this leadership is bound into unity by a forced sense of urgency—a we-must-hang-together-or-we-shall-hang-separately state

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1See Document 566.
2Presumably reference is to the ad hoc PSB Working Party which prepared the “Draft Outline of Plan for Psychological Exploitation of Stalin’s Death”, not printed. Regarding the final version of the plan, see footnote 2, supra.
3Presumably reference is to a letter of Mar. 9 from Bohlen to Hughes. (Bohlen files, lot 74 D 349, “PSB Meetings”)
4No record of such a meeting has been found.
of mind. Stress and dissension will take time, some weeks or months, to manifest themselves.

(2) Any serious proposal of the nature of a Foreign Ministers meeting would demand careful prior consultation with the British and French—demanding at least some delay before it could be made.

(3) Without the content of such a proposal, a Presidential speech would have neither substance nor clearly defined purpose.

(4) The announcement of a proposed or agreed-upon Foreign Ministers meeting would tend to throw into low gear all the work on the EDC—whose acceleration has just been urged so strongly on Mr. Eden.

As you can see, all this resolves itself into a clear, simple conflict between two propositions:

a. Presented a unique opportunity to exploit the deep and inherent weaknesses of the Soviet system, we cannot afford to fail to act affirmatively and quickly.

b. Presented a situation of unknown potentialities, we can well afford to give the internal stresses of the Soviet system time to become acute—and, in the meanwhile, nothing is better calculated to increase Soviet nervous strain than studied American silence.

EMMET J. HUGHES

No. 564

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower¹

TOP SECRET [LONDON, March 11, 1953.]

I am sure that everyone will want to know whether you still contemplate a meeting with the Soviets. I remember our talk at Bernie’s² when you told me I was welcome to meet Stalin if I thought fit and that you intended to offer to do so. I understood this as meaning that you did not want us to go together, but now there is no more Stalin I wonder whether this makes any difference to your view about separate approaches to the new regime or whether there is a possibility of collective action. When I know how you feel

¹Transmitted in a letter of Mar. 11 from British Ambassador Sir Roger Makins to President Eisenhower.

²Presumably reference is to Bernard Baruch, financial expert and sometime adviser to various U.S. Presidents. Prime Minister Churchill visited the United States in January 1953. In the course of that visit, Churchill met with then President-elect Eisenhower at Baruch’s home. A general recollection of that meeting appears in Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 97. No official record of the conversation has been found.
now that the personalities are altered I can make up my own mind on what to advise the Cabinet.

I have the feeling that we might both of us together or separately be called to account if no attempt were made to turn over a leaf so that a new page would be started with something more coherent on it than a series of casual and dangerous incidents at the many points of contact between the two divisions of the world. I cannot doubt you are thinking deeply on this which holds the first place in my thoughts. I do not think I met Malenkov but Anthony and I have done a lot of business with Molotov.

I am so glad we have reached an agreement about joint negotiations in Egypt.

Kindest regards.

WINSTON

No. 565

711.11 E3/3-1158:

*President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON, March 11, 1953.]

The subject raised in your message of today² has been engaging our attention here for some days. We are convinced that a move giving to the world some promise of hope, which will have the virtues of simplicity and persuasiveness, should be made quickly. A number of ideas have been advanced, but none of them has been completely acceptable.

At our meeting in New York³ I by no means meant to reject the possibility that the leaders of the West might sometime have to make some collective move if we are to achieve progress in lessening the world’s tensions.

However, even now I tend to doubt the wisdom of a formal multilateral meeting since this would give our opponent the same kind of opportunity he has so often had to use such a meeting simultaneously to balk every reasonable effort of ourselves and to make of the whole occurrence another propaganda mill for the Soviet. It is entirely possible, however, that your government and ourselves, and probably the French, should agree upon some general purpose and program under which each would have a specific part to play.

¹Transmitted in telegram 6047 to London, Mar. 11, for immediate delivery to Prime Minister Churchill.

²Supra.

³See footnote 2, supra.
I am sure that Foster Dulles will attempt to keep in rather close touch with Anthony regarding possibilities and any tentative conclusions we may reach.

Warm regards.

IKE

No. 566

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 136th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 11, 1953

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 136th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 1 only); General Collins for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Administrative Assistant to the President for National Security Matters; the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Operations; the Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a general account of the main positions taken and the chief points made at this meeting.

[Here follows discussion of agenda item 1, “The Development of Practical Nuclear Power”]

2. The Effect of Stalin’s Death (NSC Action No. 728; SE-39)

The Director of Central Intelligence led off discussion of this item with an oral summary of the special estimate (SE-39) on the subject prepared in response to the Council’s request at the previous meeting. In commenting on the governmental changes in Russia which would follow upon Stalin’s death, Mr. Dulles noted its striking similarity to the close-knit organization for defense set up by Stalin during the second World War. The great question confronting intelligence officers was to determine whether this new set-up in Russia constituted personal dictatorship by Malenkov, or some sort of committee control. Mr. Dulles thought the latter the
more likely. Certainly, he went on to say the new regime in the Soviet Union was less sure of itself than its predecessor. It may not be more adventurous than the Stalin regime, but it may also prove less successful in handling itself and the outside world.

Mr. Dulles then discussed first the effect of Stalin’s death on the Communist Parties outside the USSR. The fringe membership of these Parties, he believed, might now be more vulnerable, but the hard core membership would be but slightly affected. It was unlikely that Kremlin control of the satellites would be seriously threatened, and he anticipated no significant change in the hostility of Yugoslavia toward the Kremlin. Similarly, no immediate change was to be anticipated in Russia’s relations with Communist China, though Moscow would have to deal with Mao with the utmost care and tact.

Thereafter, Mr. Dulles summarized the reactions of the foreign offices of the free world toward Stalin’s death, noting that in most instances these countries favored a policy of proceeding with great caution.

At the conclusion of Mr. Dulles’ estimate, the President reiterated a belief which he had stated earlier to the Council, that Stalin had never actually been undisputed ruler of the Soviet Union. Contrary to the views of many of our intelligence agencies, the President persisted in believing that the Government of the Soviet Union had always been something of a committee government. From personal experience the President believed that had Stalin, at the end of the war, been able to do what he wanted with his colleagues in the Kremlin, Russia would have sought more peaceful and normal relations with the rest of the world. The fact that the Soviet Union instead chose cold war seemed to the President an indication that, in some degree at least, Stalin had had to come to terms with other members of the Kremlin ruling circle.

Thereupon, Mr. Jackson undertook to explain to the Council the manner in which he had carried out its directive of last week regarding the plan for psychological exploitation of Stalin’s death, to be prepared by himself with the assistance of the Psychological Strategy Board and its staff. The plan which had been drawn up, he said, was based firmly on approved NSC policy recommendations beginning with NSC 20/4. It was likewise based on the assumption that the United States Government would exploit Stalin’s death to the limit of psychological usefulness, on the assumption that the United States required a unified plan to accomplish its objectives, and finally, on the assumption that Stalin’s death

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5See Document 562.
6Dated Nov. 23, 1948; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. 1, Part 2, p. 662.
had provided the United States Government with its first significant and normal opportunity to seize the initiative. It seemed to Mr. Jackson that the use of the words “disarray”, “panic”, and “lack of unity”, in Malenkov’s recent speeches, was very significant. The use of such terms either constituted a serious boner by the new Russian regime, or else it indicated genuine concern over the peaceful transition to the new authority. Furthermore, Mr. Jackson stated that the draft plan was to be considered both as a dramatic psychological move and also as a serious policy proposal not to be dismissed as merely a propaganda effort. The point of departure in the plan was an address by the President to be made as early as possible and not later, he hoped, than the first of next week. The draft of such a Presidential address had been prepared. It contained no mere pious platitudes, but a real bite. Notably, it had the President call for a Foreign Ministers Conference of the Big Four, in the course of which the United States would set forth its desire to negotiate all the major outstanding issues between the free world and the Soviet Bloc, including the unification of Germany and disarmament. However, said Mr. Jackson, everything in the plan was to flow from the initial move, the President’s address. From the moment of delivery of that speech all the arms of the United States Government, all the Embassies and missions abroad, all the other facets of American power and influence, were to be linked closely together in the pursuit of the objective. The follow-up would have to be swift, sure, and coordinated.

Mr. Jackson then noted that of course objections to his plan had been raised in the course of putting it together. Most of the objections centered in the Department of State. Mr. Jackson proposed to discuss these objections, but Secretary Dulles interposed to say that perhaps this task had best be done by him. Mr. Jackson readily agreed, but said he did wish to point out that we are, as he put it, ready to shoot. He was convinced that this was the greatest opportunity presented to the United States in many years to seize the initiative, and that that initiative ought to be seized even if this Government had to proceed unilaterally. The plan which he drafted, said Mr. Jackson, was in line with the views that President Eisenhower had set forth in the course of his campaign, as well as the views during the same period enunciated by Secretary Dulles. There was nothing in it new and strange and nothing which, it seemed to him, would not fit into the framework of this Administration’s thinking on psychological strategy.

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7The Mar. 20 draft is not printed. (PPS files, lot 65 D 563, “President’s Speech”) For an account of the preparation of the address, see Document 594. The address is printed as Document 588.
Secretary Dulles began his statement by observing that he personally did not endorse all the objections to Mr. Jackson’s plan which had been raised in the State Department. He agreed, for example, that Stalin’s death did afford the United States an opportunity to effect changes in the Communist world which might well reduce the threat which the Soviet world presented to the free world. As he saw it, the present menace of the USSR consisted in the complete control of a vast area by a handful of men who could use their power with impunity. This terrible concentration of power had largely been created, according to Secretary Dulles, by a process in which the normal urges of nationalism in the satellite states had been channelled and transformed into virtual worship of Stalin as a demi-god. As a result of this process, the Communist leaders in the satellite countries had been able to hand over to Stalin control of their countries without conscious loss of the national prestige. All this was possible while Stalin lived; but the Communist leaders in the satellites would experience far greater difficulty today in subordinating the impulse of nationalism in their respective countries to the relatively unknown individual who had taken Stalin’s place. Therefore, what we must do, continued the Secretary, was to play up this nationalism and discontent for all it was worth, to seize every opportunity by this device to break down the monolithic Soviet control over the satellite states.

We have had plenty of experience ourselves as to the difficulties of keeping a coalition together, said Secretary Dulles. It may be that the Soviets will soon experience similar or worse difficulties in their own coalition. Thus nationalism is the great theme to be developed as the means of breaking down the Stalinist structure. But Secretary Dulles warned that we have a problem of our own. We too have a coalition to manage. In our attempt to destroy the unity of the Soviet orbit we must not jeopardize the unity of our own coalition. We must draw together and not fall apart at this moment in history, and it seemed especially doubtful to the Secretary of State as to whether this was the appropriate moment to carry the offensive direct to the Soviet Union. The Soviet was now involved in a family funeral, and it might be best to wait until the corpse was buried and the mourners gone off to their homes to read the will, before we begin our campaign to create discord in the family. If we moved precipitately we might very well enhance Soviet family loyalty and disrupt the free world’s.

Furthermore, Secretary Dulles stated his belief that another consideration should be uppermost in our minds at this time. This was a moment in history when the people of the United States and of the free world generally feel that some great new effort should be made to stake out a new course. We mustn’t let this opportunity
pass or let our people down. We certainly cannot be totally negative in our reactions to what had occurred in Russia, but whatever we do decide to do must be done carefully and with equal consideration as to its effect on the USSR and on the free world. Accordingly, with regard to Mr. Jackson’s specific proposal of a meeting of the Foreign Ministers, Secretary Dulles could not but feel that such a meeting would have quite disastrous effects on our ties with our allies unless we obtained their prior consent to the agenda for such a meeting. They would believe our leadership erratic, venturesous, and arbitrary. Secretary Dulles said he felt especially concerned at the proposal in Mr. Jackson’s plan, to place discussion of German unity on the agenda for such a Foreign Ministers meeting. Discussion of German unity in such a forum at this time would ruin every prospect of ratification of the European Defense Community by the parliamentarians of the several states. It would undermine the positions of Chancellor Adenauer and of Prime Ministers Mayer and de Gasperi who had actually staked their futures on the ratification of the EDC treaties.

In addition to this, if we call the new Soviet regime to take part in a Foreign Ministers Conference, history proved that the Soviets would simply dig up all their old plans for Foreign Ministers meetings, would resort to all their devices for delay and obstruction. Nothing positive would be achieved, and meanwhile the neutralists, and all those who were hostile to a more united Europe, would take new heart. Secretary Dulles said that he was in no position to guarantee that the great EDC plan would materialize, whatever we did, but he was sure that the proposal to discuss German unity with the Soviets in a Foreign Ministers Conference was tantamount to inviting the fall of the French, German and Italian Governments, and possibly even rendering Mr. Eden’s position in the British Government untenable. Thus he felt compelled to advise against this part of Mr. Jackson’s plan.

Turning now, Secretary Dulles said, to something positive and constructive, he suggested that the President’s speech should substitute, for the proposal of a Foreign Ministers Conference, a call for the end of hostilities in Asia generally, and in Korea and Indo-China specifically, under appropriate safeguards. If the new Soviet regime could be persuaded to agree to something like this, the path would be open to further negotiations on other matters. Such an approach seemed to the Secretary of State better than to begin from the European end. But in any case enough should be done

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8 Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the German Federal Republic.
9 René Mayer, French Premier.
10 Alcide De Gasperi, Italian Prime Minister.
now to satisfy American opinion that no attempt to cause the Soviet to change its spots had been let unexplored.

When the Secretary of State had concluded his opening remarks, the President asked him in what form he would present his ideas to the world.

Secretary Dulles replied that he agreed that the opening gun should be a speech by the President. Mr. Jackson added that this could be done over television, the address to be directed, on the one hand, to the peoples of the Soviet Union and, on the other, to the peoples of the United States and the free world.

The President inquired how it would be possible, in view of the jamming, to get any such message through to the peoples of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Jackson replied that while there might indeed be jamming of any broadcast to the peoples of the Soviet Union, the President's message would certainly get through to the officials of the Soviet Government and would be widely heard in the satellite states.

The President then informed the Council that he had received some days ago, and prior to the death of Stalin, a suggestion for a speech from Mr. Sam Lubell, for whose opinions the President had considerable respect. Lubell had written the President of his belief that in our efforts to influence the Soviets as well as the people of the free world, we should give up any more appeals with regard to specific issues, such as Korea, and concentrate instead on our determination to raise the general standard of living throughout the world; to suggest, for instance, that no more than 10% of the resources of the different countries of the world should be devoted to armaments, and all the rest to the provision of food, shelter, and consumers goods. The President noted that the peoples of the Soviet Union had for years now been promised, after the completion of each successive Five-Year Plan, that their own personal needs and aspirations would be considered by their government. They had been disappointed in each case. Accordingly, what we should now do is propose that the standard of living throughout the world be raised at once, not at some indefinite time in the future. Such an appeal as this might really work. On the other hand, the President said, he could not but share Secretary Dulles' anxiety about the wisdom of a four-power meeting. We all know that the Soviets would stall indefinitely on the agenda for such a meeting. We do need something dramatic to rally the peoples of the world around some idea, some hope, of a better future. A four-power conference would not do it, but the President might say that he would be ready and willing to meet with anyone anywhere from the Soviet Union provided the basis for the meeting was honest and practical.
Secretary Dulles expressed great interest in this idea of the President’s, and said that it seemed to him to be supported by the enormous difficulty experienced by the Soviet Union in keeping their satellites from participation in the Marshall Plan.

Certainly, the President replied, the economic incentive would have terrific attraction in Russia if it could be got over to the ordinary people.

Mr. Jackson interrupted to say that there seemed to him another side to the position that Secretary Dulles had taken. It certainly seemed conceivable to Mr. Jackson that one of the main reasons for the cool attitude of many Europeans to our goal for unity in Europe stemmed from real doubts about the long-range commitment of the United States to support European unity and defense. If the full weight and majesty of American statesmanship and diplomacy could be rallied behind the objective of getting the EDC treaties signed, Mr. Jackson was convinced there would be no further worries about the overthrow of the present regimes in Western Europe. Indeed, nothing would be more effective in building them up. This, said Mr. Jackson, seemed to him to be the great opportunity presented to a great Secretary of State.

The President replied with a question as to whether Mr. Jackson assumed that such pressure has not already been brought to bear by our diplomats. It most certainly had been, in the President’s own experience. The real difficulty and the real explanation of the instability of these Western European governments came from the fact that they were afraid of their own peoples. Thus European unity had become a political issue. The governments were all in favor of it, but they were afraid of their peoples.

To this statement Secretary Dulles added again his view that if an attempt were made to create German unity by some other vehicle than the EDC, then certainly the EDC would be finished.

The President again said that emphasis in the current psychological plan, and notably in his speech, must be on the simple theme of a higher living standard for all the world, and he suggested that Mr. Jackson and his colleagues take a look at this and all the other ideas which had been advanced, and come up with a new plan for the steps that we should take. The focus, the President said, should be on the common man’s yearning for food, shelter, and a decent standard of living. This was a universal desire and we should respond to it.

Mr. Stassen stated that plainly the country’s greatest asset at this juncture was the leadership of President Eisenhower, and that every effort should be made to project the President’s leadership and personality throughout the rest of the world. In addition to emphasizing the standard of living as the goal sought by the Presi-
dent, Mr. Jackson's plan should also stress the moral values represented in the President.

The President seemed somewhat skeptical of this latter point, saying that we had stressed our moral values consistently in the past. He preferred, therefore, that the emphasis he placed on raising material standards for the common people throughout the world. This, he thought, might even result in a settlement in Korea.

Mr. Stassen then inquired what might be the effect if the President in his speech were to propose an immediate and complete cease-fire in Korea.

The President commented that the Russians had already made such a proposal.

Secretary Dulles pointed out the implication represented by the prisoner-of-war problem, and General Collins added to this by warning that if we called for a cease-fire we would have to stop the bombing of Communist communications and military targets. The Communists would thus be able to pile up supplies, and we should quickly find ourselves very vulnerable to attack.

Secretary Wilson expressed complete agreement with General Collins.

Thereafter the Council discussed for some time the question of how and when, and in what forum, the President should make his address. No firm conclusions were reached on any of these points, although the President stated his own belief that the question of when and how his speech was to be delivered was almost as important as its content.

The National Security Council: 11

a. Noted an intelligence estimate on the subject presented orally by the Director of Central Intelligence, based on a special estimate (SE-39) circulated at the meeting.

b. Noted and discussed "A Proposed Plan for a Psychological Warfare Offensive", presented orally by the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Operations, based on a written report prepared with the assistance of the Psychological Strategy Board and its staff.

c. Noted the views of the Secretary of State on the policy implications of Stalin's death, and the Secretary's reactions to the proposed psychological plan.

d. Agreed:

(1) That Stalin's death presents an opportunity for the assertion of world leadership by President Eisenhower in the interests of security, peace, and a higher standard of living for all peoples.

11Paragraphs a–d and the Note constitute NSC Action No. 734.
(2) That the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Operations should immediately draft an address by the President in the light of the discussion at the meeting, for early delivery at a time and place to be determined.

(3) That there should be a coordinated and sustained emphasis and follow-up on this address by all appropriate departments and agencies, both at home and abroad.

Note: The action in d-(2) above subsequently referred to the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Operations for implementation. The action in d-(3) above subsequently referred to the Psychological Strategy Board for implementation.

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 3-5, concerning developments in Iran, United States objectives with respect to Latin America, and the NSC status of projects.]

S. Everett Gleason

No. 567

INR-NIE files

Special Estimate

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 12, 1953.

SE-39

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEATH OF STALIN AND OF THE ELEVATION OF MALENKOV TO LEADERSHIP IN THE USSR

FOREWORD

This is a provisional estimate. The subjects herein treated will be taken into account in NIE-65, "Soviet Bloc Capabilities through 1957,"2 and treated more fully in NIE-90, "Soviet Bloc Capabilities through Mid-1955."3

1Regarding Special Estimates, see footnote 1, Document 554. According to a note on the cover sheet of this estimate, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate. The note indicates further that all members of the JAC concurred in this estimate on Mar. 10, but attention was drawn to the footnotes of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, the Joint Staff.

An advanced text of SE-39 was summarized by Allen Dulles at the 136th meeting of the National Security Council on Mar. 11; see the memorandum of discussion, supra.

2Document 599.

3Dated Aug. 18. (INR-NIE files)
The Initial Transfer of Authority

1. The problem of transfer of power is one of the most difficult which the Soviet system could face. The important initial step, the formal transfer of authority, with Malenkov as titular leader, has apparently been effected with remarkable rapidity and precision. The smoothness of the transfer of authority and the speed with which the Government and Party posts were filled, suggest an acute awareness on the part of the Soviet leaders of the dangers inherent in the situation, and that the necessary plans to bring about the change were prepared, at least in outline, well in advance of Stalin’s death.

2. Malenkov’s key position in the Soviet Communist Party throughout the past fourteen years, his conspicuous and apparently planned elevation since 1948, his prominent role at and since the 19th Party Congress, and the accolade accorded him by Beria at Stalin’s funeral suggest that there will be no immediate challenge to his position. However, we cannot estimate whether he has the qualities of leadership necessary to consolidate his position and to attain unchallenged power, since he has always operated with the backing of Stalin. Neither is it possible to estimate with confidence the capabilities or probable courses of action of his possible opponents.

3. A struggle for power could develop within the Soviet hierarchy at any time. Given the nature of the Soviet state, such a struggle would probably be carried on within the Party organization and higher echelons of the bureaucracy. In any case, the peoples of the USSR are unlikely to participate actively in the struggle. Even if a struggle should break out in the near future, we believe that the hold of the Communist Party over the USSR is not likely to be shaken quickly. We do not believe that such a struggle would in

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4In the new organization, Malenkov apparently now holds the same titular position within the Presidium and the Secretariat of the Party and in the Council of Ministers which Stalin held. In the Council of Ministers, power has been concentrated in the hands of Malenkov as Chairman and four First Deputy Chairmen: Beria, Molotov, Bulganin, and Kaganovich. These five make up the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. It may be significant that this body closely parallels in nature and membership the wartime Committee of State Defense under Stalin. The concentration of power has been increased, and the top party and government organs have been reduced in number and size. The new organization of Party and Government and the extensive reorganization and merger of several major industries under Malenkov appear to tighten and streamline the administrative system. [Footnote in the source text.]
itself lead the rulers of the USSR deliberately to initiate general war.5  

**Probable Consequences of Death of Stalin**  

**Effects upon the Bases of Soviet Power**  

4. The economic and military bases of Soviet power are unlikely to be immediately affected by Stalin’s death. However, the new leadership may prove less successful in maintaining and strengthening these bases of Soviet power.

5. The effect of Western diplomatic or psychological moves on Soviet stability and strength cannot be estimated without knowledge of the contemplated moves. However, we believe that the USSR is politically more vulnerable today than before Stalin’s death. The new leadership will have difficult policy decisions to face, and these difficulties may be increased by personal rivalries for power which would reduce Soviet strength and the cohesion of the international Communist movement.

**Effects upon Soviet Policies**

6. In the near future, the new Soviet leadership will almost certainly pursue the foreign and domestic policies established during recent years. In particular, it will probably continue to emphasize unremitting hostility to the West (including the tactic of splitting the West), the enlargement of the Bloc economic base, and the increase of Bloc military power.

7. The death of Stalin removes an autocrat who, while ruthless and determined to spread Soviet power, did not allow his ambitions to lead him into reckless courses of action in his foreign policy. It would be unsafe to assume that the new Soviet regime will have Stalin’s skill in avoiding general war. At least initially, the regime will also lack his freedom of action and his ability to manoeuvre, since it will not possess Stalin’s immense prestige and authority. Specifically, in foreign policy, the new regime will probably find it more difficult to abandon positions than did Stalin and might feel itself compelled to react more strongly if moves of the West confronted it with the need for major decisions. Conversely, the new leadership will probably exercise caution in the near future in

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5The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believes that paragraph 3 should read: “A struggle for power could develop within the Soviet hierarchy at any time. Given the nature of the Soviet state, such a struggle would probably be carried on within the Party organization. However, any serious disagreement could well have much more widespread effects, involving the Army or large sections of the population. If such a struggle should break out in the near future, we believe that the hold of the Communist Party over the USSR is not likely to be shaken quickly. So long as the struggle is confined within the Kremlin, we do not believe that it would lead the rulers of the USSR deliberately to initiate general war.” [Footnote in the source text.]
taking action which it thought would force the West to make comparable decisions. If the West should suggest re-examination of the principal issues which have divided East and West, the new Soviet government would probably adhere to established Soviet positions. However, the new government would probably show a less sure hand in dealing with new issues or in handling new Western proposals.  

8. The new Soviet regime probably fears that, while it is in the process of consolidating its power, the West may make aggressive moves against the Bloc. It would probably view with extreme suspicion any new moves made by the West, particularly those involving long-range air forces or military forces close to the Bloc frontiers. 

Effects upon the Peoples of the USSR

9. The death of Stalin removes the man who had been built up to the status of a demi-god. To many of the people of the USSR, he was the man of steel who had raised Russia to industrial and military power, who had withstood the German attack, and who had led the peoples of the USSR to the greatest military victory in Russian history. Stalin’s death will be a psychological shock to large numbers of Soviet people. However, we estimate that this shock in itself will not affect the stability of the new regime. 

Effects upon the Bloc and the International Communist Movement

10. For some time, no successor to Stalin will be able to achieve comparable status or similar significance as a symbol of the international Communist movement and as the undisputed leader of world Communism. This may have some effect upon the rank and file, at least temporarily, but the cohesion of the hard core of the Communist movement outside the Bloc is not likely to be impaired. If there should be a struggle for power within the Soviet Communist Party, the cohesion of the Communist movement outside the Bloc would almost certainly be weakened. 

The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believes that paragraph 7 should read: “The death of Stalin removes an autocrat who, while ruthless and determined to spread Soviet power, chose courses of action which although causing the Western world to rearm, did not result in general war during his lifetime. It would be unsafe to assume that the new Soviet leadership will either desire or be able to choose courses of action that will avoid precipitation of general war. At least initially, the Soviet regime may lack freedom of action and the ability to maneuver since it does not possess Stalin’s immense prestige and authority. On the other hand particularly in relation to foreign policy, the new regime may find it more difficult to abandon positions than did Stalin and might feel itself compelled to react more strongly to moves of the West. If the West should suggest re-examination of the principal issues which have divided East and West, the new Soviet government would probably outwardly adhere to established Soviet positions.” [Footnote in the source text.]
11. Kremlin control over the European Satellites is so firm that we do not believe it will be impaired merely by the death of Stalin. However, in the unlikely event that a struggle in the Soviet Communist Party should spread to the Soviet Army and the Soviet Security Forces, Soviet control over the Satellites would almost certainly be shaken.

12. Relations between Tito and Moscow are unlikely to change as a result of the death of Stalin. The antagonism was not personal, but arose from a genuine clash of Yugoslav national interests with the Soviet Communist Party. Moreover, both sides have taken actions and adopted positions which would be extremely difficult to reverse. The Kremlin could not recognize Tito as an independent Communist ally without undermining its position with the European Satellites.

13. We do not believe that Tito’s influence within the Satellites or within Communist Parties outside the Bloc will increase, unless there should be a prolonged struggle for power in the USSR.

14. We believe that Stalin’s death will have no immediate effect upon Sino-Soviet cooperation or upon Chinese Communist foreign policies. However, no successor to Stalin will have prestige and authority in Asia comparable to his. The stature of Mao as leader and theoretician of Asian Communism will inevitably increase with the disappearance of the former supreme leader. Mao will almost certainly have more influence in the determination of Bloc policy affecting Asia. He almost certainly will not seek leadership of the international Communist movement. The new Moscow leadership will probably deal cautiously with Mao; if it does not, serious strains in Sino-Soviet relations will almost certainly develop.

**Probable Western Reaction to Death of Stalin and Elevation of Malenkov**

15. We believe that in general the Western European leaders will be disposed for the time being to conduct the East-West struggle with greater hesitancy and caution. They will probably fear that any immediate Western pressure on the Bloc would increase the danger of war and facilitate the stabilization of authority in the USSR. They will also probably hope that, if Western pressure is not exerted, the problems involved in the consolidation of the authority of the new regime of the USSR will bring about at least a temporary relaxation of tensions and enable them to postpone disagreeable policy decisions.
SECRET PERSONAL AND PRIVATE

WASHINGTON, March 16, 1953.

1. *Speech on Peace.* I told the President we had worked hard over the week end and now had a draft, which was being rewritten, and which I thought deserved his study.¹ I told him that I thought it was even more essential that he make such a speech, in view of Malenkov’s speech of yesterday.² The President seemed disposed to move ahead, and said it was too bad that he had not made his speech before Malenkov.

2. *U.K. Bomber.* I mentioned that the U.K. bomber, shot down near the border, according to our information had been trespassing rather deeply into Soviet territory as a result of operating on dead reckoning under overcast conditions.³

[Here follows a brief discussion of the Egyptian situation.]

4. *Bohlen.* I spoke of the Bohlen situation⁴ and the President indicated that he had not the slightest intention of withdrawing Bohlen’s name.⁵ He asked me to speak to Sen. Taft.⁶ I told him of cer-

¹The Mar. 20 draft is not printed. (PPS files, lot 65 D 563, “President’s Speech”) For text of the address, see Document 563.

²In a brief statement on foreign affairs to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on Mar. 15, Chairman Malenkov spoke of the readiness of the Soviet Union to settle peacefully all unresolved or disputed questions with other nations, including the United States, by mutual agreement. For the translated text of Malenkov’s address, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1953, pp. 11-13.

³On Mar. 12, a British RAF bomber on a training flight in Germany was shot down by Soviet fighters for allegedly penetrating over East Germany.

⁴Regarding the nomination of Charles E. Bohlen to be Ambassador to the Soviet Union, see Document 546.

⁵Secretary Dulles telephoned Bohlen on Mar. 16. Bohlen was at home with the measles. According to Dulles the conversation proceeded as follows:

“The Secretary told him that he had talked with the President and that there was no weakening of the President’s determination to stand by his nomination. The Secretary said that he called him because he wanted to be very sure that Bohlen would not do anything to embarrass the President. Mr. Bohlen mentioned his previous testimony and said that there wasn’t any criticism of the Administration in, etc.

“The Secretary said that he wanted to be sure that no matter what happened, in the middle of the fight, or regardless of the testimony, that Bohlen would not just say he would quit, because that would leave the President in an embarrassing position.

“Mr. Bohlen said he had no intention of it, none whatever.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers)

⁶According to his memorandum of a telephone conversation with Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio on Mar. 16, Secretary Dulles explained that President Eisenhower was determined to stand behind the Bohlen nomination:

Continued
tain rumors afloat which he asked me to check with Doug MacArthur. I subsequently did and reported back to the President, who said that fitted in with his own judgment.

I told the President that if security investigations ever indicated any risk we would deal with the matter from the Executive Department in our own way. I reminded the President that the Senate had unanimously confirmed him to be Counselor in 1947 and in 1951, a high policy-making position, whereas the position to which he is being nominated now is essentially an observation post—not a policy-making position.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

"Senator Taft said he didn't think there was anything to worry about, some of them would make speeches but there wasn't much doubt of the outcome. Bridges [Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire] felt that it would help him in New Hampshire to be against Bohlen." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers)

Dulles also had telephone conversations on the Bohlen nomination on Mar. 16 with Senator Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin; with Sherman Adams, Assistant to the President; and with Maj. Gen. Wilton B. Persons, Deputy Assistant to the President. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers)

No. 569

Microfilm telegram files. "Moscow FY 55": Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Beam) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

Moscow, March 18, 1953—2 p.m.

1330. Following further impressions emerge from close scrutiny actions and words new Soviet Government.

Present leaders have a style of their own. Freed from Stalin's oppressive presence they speak in their own right and it is noticeable Malenkov's latest speeches different from manner he adopted at 19th Congress. ² Emphasis so far placed on collegual unity although is apparent Malenkov and Beria are sources real power. Police control probably dominant with support being sought from nominal association army and old time party guard. Ministerial re-

¹Repeated for information to London, Paris, Rome, and Belgrade.
²The comparison appears to be among Malenkov's address of Oct. 5, 1952, his oration at the funeral of Stalin on Mar. 9, 1953 (see footnote 3, Document 559), and his address of Mar. 15, 1953, to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. presenting the new composition of the Council of Ministers. During the last address, Malenkov spoke briefly on foreign policy matters and included the following statement:

"At present there is no disputed or unsolved question which could not be settled by peaceful means on the basis of mutual agreement of the countries concerned. This concerns our relations with all states, including the United States of America."

For full text of Malenkov's Mar. 15 address, see Documents (R.I.A.) for 1953, p. 11.
organizations probably used displace non-Malenkov-Beria men and
demotions may have aroused some bitterness. Key to stability
doubtless lies in ability Malenkov and Beria to work together and
although question is academic as long as cooperation continues, in-
teresting to speculate who is really more powerful.

During initial transition period regime has been clever in ap-
peals to internal and external public. Populace may have been
fearful that Stalin who at least kept country out of war with West
might be replaced by adventurous successors. Although credit
given to Stalin to that extent, purges, vigilance measures and anti-
US campaign seem to have created real feeling nervousness just
prior to Stalin’s death. On taking power Malenkov obviously en-
deavored quickly reassure populace by general statements peaceful
intentions. From what we can guess, Russian people relatively
immune to anti-US indoctrination and on contrary genuinely
afraid of prospect war with US which they knew Russia could not
“get at” and defeat. Paradoxically, one most popular measures
regime could adopt would probably be cessation anti-US campaign.
On the other hand regime may be faced by dilemma of being forced
continue spector external threat to evoke solidarity and also by in-
ability to make external concessions for fear being considered
weak. Close watch must be kept over propaganda line which is
temporarily more restrained.

Regimes three biggest problems are maintenance living stand-
ards and relations with US and China, assuming satellites can be
held together by police measures. Malenkov has given general as-
surances on all three accounts. Difficult to say which will have
precedence but seems likely Malenkov is endeavoring maintain
line with China before dealing with US. When examined closely his
professions of friendly intentions do not go beyond if indeed as far
as recent Peace Congress protestations. Improvement living condi-
tions which would be useful to regime during transitional period
and would assist in maintenance of order depends in large part on
relaxation tension with US. While regime may be impelled toward
this objective, difficult however to foresee any over-all settlement
with West which would not basically undermine Soviet foreign
policy position. Question is whether government will even try
piecemeal concessions to obtain advantage relaxation Western de-
defense measures and semblance peaceful coexistence. Until now, we
see no concrete evidence government has departed from Stalinist
world plans, although with the event of new men and possibly dif-
ferent conditions in relationship with China more flexible methods
may be attempted.

Beam
Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) to the Under Secretary of State (Smith)¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 18, 1953.

Subject: Agenda Item No. 1, PSB Meeting March 19, Draft Outline Plan for Psychological Exploitation of Stalin’s Death, draft of March 13, 1953.

Background

This is a revision of the paper of the same title discussed at a meeting of the National Security Council on March 11² and referred to the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Operations for revision in the light of comments made at the time.

Discussion

The present version of March 13 follows in large part the earlier version on which the Department commented in your memorandum to Mr. George A. Morgan, Acting Director of the PSB, on March 10.³ The new version does, however, contain several alternative readings and suggested revisions concerning which detailed comment at the meeting of the Board probably would not be profitable.

Recommendations

1. That with regard to Part I, which establishes the framework of the plan you express the view that, the need for taking prompt and effective psychological action is acknowledged, although the real limitations imposed upon our psychological capabilities at the time are not sufficiently taken into account. Further, you might express the view that the Department believes that the paper fails to indicate with sufficient clarity and emphasis the longer-range aspects of the situation created by the death of Stalin and the succession of Malenkov. Some time may elapse before the divisive forces inherent in the power situation in the USSR mature into a severe strain on the new regime. The initial and immediate actions called for should therefore be so taken as not to compromise successful action that may be required in the future. This view is supported by the conclusions reached in Special Estimate No. 39 of March 12 entitled "Probable Consequences of the Death of Stalin and of the Ele-

¹Phillips (P) and Nitze (S/P) concurred in this memorandum.
²See Document 566. The draft plan referred to is not printed.
³Document 562.
vation of Malenkov to Leadership in the USSR." You might add that the Department prefers version A rather than version B of the aims set forth in the section on "Strategic Concept" on page 6 of Part I. Recommendations for changes in the language of the revised paper of March 13 are being transmitted under separate cover to Mr. Morgan and members of the PSB.

2. With regard to Part II of the paper "Plans for Psychological Operations," you might recommend that discussion of overt and covert psychological operations be completely separate in order to facilitate ready handling and appropriate declassification of sections of the paper. This can readily be accomplished by a slight rearrangement of the order. The specific tasks set forth for the overt media have been refined, sharpened and elaborated on the basis of recommendations made in the document and of the views of the geographic bureaus in the Department. Proposed revisions of Part II referred to above are set forth in the paper being transmitted under separate cover to Mr. Morgan and members of the PSB.

3. As for Part III, "Recommendations for Political, Military and Economic Substantive Actions", you might say that the Department reaffirms the position taken in its memorandum to Mr. Morgan of March 10. The Department recognizes the need for coordinated political, military and economic action in taking advantage of the situation that now exists but the Department continues to believe that Part III should be dropped from the paper and decisions along the lines suggested should be considered at such time as heightened pressure is determined to be desirable.

No. 571

State-PSB files, lot 62 D 333, "PSB Meetings"

Memorandum of an Informal Meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board, Washington, March 19, 1953

TOP SECRET

Place: Office of the Under Secretary of State

Agenda Item 1. The March 13th revision of the draft plan on Stalin's death was further revised as follows:

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1Prepared by George A. Morgan, Acting Director.
2The Mar. 13 revision of the draft plan is not printed. The 28-page paper was similar to the final version circulated as PSB D-40, Apr. 23. (PSB files, lot 62 D 333, "PSB Documents") The exceptions are indicated.
a. Version B of the Aims (Part I, para. 5b) was chosen.

b. A summary was read and generally agreed to of changes for Parts I and II proposed by the State Department. The full written text of these changes is to be supplied to me for incorporation in the next draft.

c. The old Part III is to be deleted and a general paragraph substituted indicating that political, military and economic actions also are to be conducted consistently with the plan and related to it. The suggestions in the old Part III are to be filed for reference, however.

I was instructed to incorporate all changes in a new draft of the plan and circulate it to the Board for vote-slip action.

Agenda Item 2. The draft "Staff Support for PSB Implementation of NSC Action 734d(3)" (attached to my memorandum of March 17) was approved with the following changes:

a. Paragraph C2 to read: "It will do this by serving as a continuous channel by which action on the psychological exploitation of the situation is coordinated and expedited."

b. Paragraph C9a. to read: "WGS will supervise preparation and coordination of supporting psychological plans and projects for operations implementing the strategic concept set forth in Part I."

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 3 and 4 regarding East Germany and the frequency of Psychological Strategy Board meetings.]

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8Neither the original draft paper on staff support nor Morgan's memorandum of Mar. 17 is printed; for the approved version of the paper on staff support, circulated as PSB D-40/1, Mar. 19, see infra. Regarding NSC Action No. 734-d-(3), see footnote 11, Document 566.

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No. 572

State-PSB files, lot 62 D 333, "PSB Documents"

Paper Approved by the Psychological Strategy Board1

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 19, 1953.

PSB D 40/1

STAFF SUPPORT FOR PSB IMPLEMENTATION OF NSC ACTION 734 d (3)

It is recommended that the Board establish an Interdepartmental Working Group along the following lines:

A. Title: Working Group (Stalin). Symbol, WGS.

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1Approved by the PSB at its informal meeting on Mar. 19; see supra.
B. Composition: One member each will be designated by the agencies represented on the Psychological Strategy Board: State, Defense, CIA and ODM. (Each should serve as the personal representative of the Board member from his agency and enjoy ready access to his principal for policy guidance and resolution of interdepartmental differences.) The Director of the PSB Staff or one of his senior assistants will act as Mr. Jackson’s representative and will serve as chairman of the Group. *Ad hoc* participation, as needed, will be sought from the Treasury, Commerce and Justice Departments, and the Bureau of the Budget. Other agencies may be added from time to time at the discretion of the Chairman of PSB. These agencies will be requested to designate a high-level officer to serve with the WGS as appropriate.

C. Terms of Reference:

1. The basic purpose of WGS will be to assist the Board in arranging “a coordinated and sustained emphasis and follow-up on the President’s address” by all appropriate departments and agencies, both at home and abroad.”

2. It will do this by serving as a continuous channel by which action on the psychological exploitation of the situation is coordinated and expedited.

3. In addition to the President’s address, WGS will be guided by the outline plan, “Psychological Exploitation of Stalin’s Death” (if and when approved in revised form by the Board), but also will constantly review this plan in the light of the developing situation and propose changes when needed.

   a. WGS will supervise preparation and coordination of supporting psychological plans and projects for operations implementing the strategic concept set forth in Part I.

   b. WGS will recommend political, military and economic actions of psychological importance in support of the overall program.

   c. WGS will arrange for adequate intelligence support to permit timely and well-phased execution or revision of plans.

4. While WGS will not have authority to give orders to anyone, it should serve as a useful catalyst in securing action by regular agency channels. Matters of major importance will of course be referred by it to the Board.

D. Reporting: The Chairman of WGS will report formally to the Chairman of PSB, twice monthly, on the development and implementation of the whole program.

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3See Document 583.

3The plan was approved and subsequently circulated as PSB D-40, Apr. 23. (PSB files lot 62 D 333, “PSB Documents”)
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Beam) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Moscow, March 20, 1953—5 p. m.

PRIORITY

1342. Embassy has watched Soviet press carefully since first announcement Stalin illness and later announcement death, with view to ascertaining through this medium some indication future policy new regime. During illness and for days after death, papers were devoted entirely, including extra pages, to Stalin himself. More lately considerable space was given to Gottwald. Death of latter may have upset to certain extent intention Soviet Government return Soviet press to normal following confirmation by supreme Soviet of governmental changes effected by new regime.

Leading articles in recent days have been devoted largely to internal aspects Malenkov (Beriya and Molotov) pronouncement (vigilance, management improvement, etc.).

For few days beginning just before Stalin death there seemed to be cautious and slow effort build up name of Malenkov (including special references his public remarks, retouched photos, reference by Beriya as “talented pupil Lenin and comrade-at-arms Stalin”). More recently however emphasis has been almost entirely on devotion of people to a necessity of rallying around Central Committee of Party. While leading articles use material obviously suggested by Malenkov statements, no attribution is given and statements are not printed within quotes or italicized as was custom with Stalin excerpts.

Papers are now reassuming normal format with space available for reprints of foreign (usually Commie) articles and Tass despatches from abroad. These continue to label US particularly as “aggressor” and main enemy and are Headlined accordingly. Locally written pieces however, including leading articles, have shown very noticeable restraint. Subjects which previously evoked hysterical diatribes now are dealt with as dangers in such general terms as imperialism, imperialist encirclement, capitalism, etc., with only occasional specific mention of US or UK.

While “hate America campaign” has definitely been displaced for time being, it may be too early to say it is dead and further significant indications will be watched as press continues to return to normal.
Memorandum by Carlton Savage of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Staff (Nitze)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 1, 1953.

Since the death of Stalin on March 5, 1953 there have been more Soviet gestures toward the West than at any other similar period. These cover a large part of the field of tension and controversy between the East and the West. The following is a check list of Soviet gestures:

1. Agreement to exchange sick and wounded prisoners of war.
2. Proposal for the resumption of armistice talks in Korea on what appears to be a reasonable basis.
3. Proposal for British-Soviet talks in Berlin to reduce air incidents in Germany.
4. Statement by General Chuikov that a conference "called to prepare a peace treaty with Germany and the reunification of the country corresponds fully and wholly to the Soviet Union's attitude."
5. Soviet admission in propaganda that the United States and Britain had a hand in the defeat of Germany in 1945.
6. Soviet permission for a group of American correspondents to enter Russia.
7. Soviet approach to a Norwegian representative at the UN, discussing a possible meeting between President Eisenhower and Malenkov to consider subjects of tension including atomic energy control and disarmament.

In view of the possibility that these Soviet moves might lead to general negotiations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, this would seem to be an appropriate time to determine the position that U.S. should take in such negotiations.

CARLTON SAVAGE

No. 575

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of USSR Affairs (Stoessel)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 1, 1953.

Subject: Conversation at the Soviet Embassy

Participants: Ambassador Zaroubin
Ambassador Bohlen
Mr. Stoessel—EE
In accordance with previous appointment, arranged at the insistent suggestion of Ambassador Zaroubin, Ambassador Bohlen and Mr. Stoessel arrived at the Soviet Embassy at 10 a.m. and were escorted to the large Embassy reception room. Ambassador Zaroubin entered after a few minutes and greeted Ambassador Bohlen warmly. The ensuing conversation, which lasted approximately 20 minutes, was entirely in Russian.

The talk consisted largely of amenities. Ambassador Bohlen recalled the numerous occasions on which he had met Ambassador Zaroubin previously. There was some mention of the new Embassy building in Moscow, living conditions at Spaso House, and Ambassador Bohlen’s travel arrangements. Ambassador Zaroubin remarked that he considered it the duty of an ambassador to work for the betterment of relations between his own country and the country of assignment. Ambassador Bohlen agreed that this was a correct description of an ambassador’s function.

Ambassador Zaroubin noted Mr. Molotov’s statement\(^1\) that the USSR fully supported the Chinese proposals for a resolution of the Korean War. He felt that the Chinese proposals would result in ending the conflict, which he believed was “necessary for future perspectives”. Ambassador Bohlen said the proposals were being studied carefully in the Department, but would require clarification. It was obvious, he agreed, that the fighting in Korea had to end before there could be serious hope of even examining other outstanding problems.

No further matters of substance were discussed during the conversation, which ended with Ambassador Zaroubin’s expression of good wishes to Ambassador Bohlen in his new mission.

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\(^1\)Foreign Minister Molotov’s statement made on Apr. 1.

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No. 576

*Editorial Note*

Ambassador-designate Charles E. Bohlen, accompanied by Secretary Dulles, called on President Eisenhower on the afternoon of April 2. Secretary Dulles presumably came at his own request. According to the account in Bohlen, *Witness to History*, pages 335–336, Bohlen and the President had a general discussion of the Soviet Union, and Bohlen also took the opportunity to inform the President of the low morale in the Foreign Service and fear of investigations of subversion.
In reply to a question at his regular press conference on April 2, President Eisenhower stressed that Bohlen’s call was in conformity with usual practice and would only mention that the topic of the conversation was the situation in the Soviet Union of the American Ambassador. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, page 159) No official record of the meeting has been found and there appears to have been no effort on this occasion, or any other, to provide Ambassador Bohlen with any formal instructions for his new post. In a conversation in November 1953, Bohlen allegedly told New York Times foreign correspondent Cyrus L. Sulzberger that the only instructions Bohlen had from President Eisenhower were: “Watch your stomach and don’t let them get you.” (Cyrus L. Sulzberger, A Long Row of Candles: Memoirs and Diaries (1934–1954) (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1969), page 917)

No. 577

761.50/4-453: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Beam) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

Moscow, April 4, 1953—10 p. m.

1418. Soviet press and radio April 4 announce communiqué of Ministry Internal Affairs which states that those arrested in so-called plot of doctor-murderers were incorrectly accused “without any legal basis whatever”. Accused have been released and completely vindicated. Police officials of investigation section former MGB stated to have obtained confessions “by means application impermissible methods of investigation most strongly forbidden by Soviet laws” and to have been arrested.

Second brief announcement from Supreme Soviet Presidium states decree of January 20 awarding order of Lenin to Lidiya Timashuk has been repealed as incorrect.

Notable aspect announcement is increase number accused doctors from 9 to 15. Those not included original nine (and who significantly do not bear Jewish names) are: Vasiklenko, member De-

1 Repeated for information to Paris, London, Bonn and Rome.


3 Dr. Lidiya F. Timashuk, a medical worker in the Kremlin and an alleged collaborator with the Soviet security police whose letter to Generalissimo Stalin in 1952 began the investigations and arrests known as the “doctors’ plot” (see footnote 2, Document 539).

4 Dr. Vladimir Kharitonovich Vasilenko.
partment clinical medicine Academy Medical Sciences who signed medical certificates for deaths Zhdanov and Dimitrov;\(^6\) and Zelenin,\(^6\) 72 year old specialist Academy’s department clinical medicine; Preobrazhenski,\(^7\) 61 year old ear, nose, throat specialist; Zakusov,\(^8\) drug expert and member Soviet delegation UN Economic and Social Council 49 on question narcotics; Shereshevski,\(^9\) specialist Ministry Health; and Popova, about whom Embassy has no information. All but last two are members Academy Medical Sciences. Listing of doctors released at end announcement however, does not include M. B. Kogan and Ya G. Etinger of original nine. This possibly confirms Embassy’s information that Kogan died ’51 although he has always been listed with those arrested. Etinger may also have already been dead or possibly was victim illegal method reportedly used by investigatory organ.

Dropping of case also raises question future status Yegorov,\(^10\) former chief Kremlin medical administration and E. I. Smirnov, former Minister of Health. Yegorov had been replaced by I. I. Kusperin and Smirnov although not publicly involved in case was replaced by A. F. Tretyakov, the latter being confirmed at March 15 session Supreme Soviet. Release accused doctors may also affect positions doctors who replaced them as Kremlin specialists.

This startling event, perhaps more than any other, provides most concrete evidence thus far of present regime’s break with Stalinism since it must be accepted that Stalin himself either engineered the doctors plot, or gave his approval to one initiating bloc. It would be natural to assume that a bitter controversy has taken place but it is too early to say whether we are witnessing this at white heat or are viewing it in the past through reflected light. Even in the latter event it is difficult to believe that animosities are completely calmed because certainly some elements will suffer, possibly in a different kind of purge of those now judged guilty. Since Stalin died the regime seems to have assumed the form of a balance between great bureaucracies, among which the most powerful are the party, the police and the army. Beria’s mention of Malenkov in his funeral oration and also his nomination of Malenkov to be Prime Minister give the appearance that the first two are harmoniously dominant. What may be the fate of remaining purely Stalinist elements and what relationship the army bears to the balance, par-

\(^6\)Georgi Dimitrov, Bulgarian Communist Party leader until his death in 1949.
\(^6\)Dr. Vladimir Filippovich Zelenin.
\(^7\)Dr. B. S. Preobrazhenskiy.
\(^8\)Dr. V. V. Zakusov.
\(^9\)Dr. N. A. Shereshevski.
\(^10\)Dr. Boris Grigoryevich Yegorov.
particularly as one of the principal victims of the doctors “plot”, may be matters of high consequence.11

As yet the government has not had time to repair the previous “logic” of the anti-Zionist campaign, the charges against the joint distribution committee, the breaking of relations with Israel, vigilance against alleged American and British spies which are now deprived of any basis. Within the limited circles observed, the public reaction has been good, evidently in the belief that a more liberal era may ensue. On the other hand, doubts may arise concerning the stability of the power constellation and in general concerning a system of government in which such fantastic reversals can take place, including the acknowledgment that “impermissible methods” (presumably torture) have been used.

A compounding of the bizarre is provided in the March issue of the magazine Young Communist just distributed today, which carries a biting attack against bourgeois espionage, especially American, and calls for vigilance against foreign penetration in the same violent language which was used subsequent to original announcement of doctors’ plot. Article cites Timashuk as outstanding example of revolutionary vigilance. Special mention is made of old “spy”

11In telegram 1424, Apr. 6, Beam reported on the Pravda editorial criticizing former Minister of State Security Semyon Denisovich Ignatyev for “blindness and gullibility” in the “Doctors’ Plot” and former Deputy Minister of State Security and Head of the Section for Investigating Specially Important Cases of the Ministry of State Security, M. D. Ryumin, for “criminal adventurism”. On Apr. 7, it was announced that Ignatyev, who had been named a member of Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU on Mar. 15, had been removed from his position. Ignatyev was named First Secretary of Bashkir Oblast Party Committee in early 1954. Ryumin was arrested and tried in July 1954 for “careerism”, “adventurism”, and “unjustified arrests” during his service in the Ministry of State and was sentenced to death.

Beam concluded telegram 1424 with the following paragraph:

“In Embassy eyes most important above revelations is not punishment Ryumin, because there had to be scapegoat, but rather Pravda’s criticism of Ignatyev. Whether or not latter has already been arrested, a Pravda attack of this nature against a Central Communist secretary is unprecedented since earlier days Soviet regime and although Party secretariat may have declined in importance it indicates ‘counter purge’ involved in disposition doctors’ case may be reaching fairly high. Since Ignatyev was appointed to secretariat in March 7 joint decree following Stalin’s death, it now seems that interfacational problems were not resolved at that time nor may be after the mysterious meeting of the whole Central Committee on March 14 leading to Malenkov’s resignation from the secretariat. Although evidence meager, experience Ignatyev a Party worker for secretariat in post-war years might identify him as Malenkov protégé but personality alignments still too unclear to be assessed. Interesting point is that currently dominant party is giving appearance playing its hand swiftly and straight. Whatever results follow, regime apparently endeavoring foster impression that purge process is ended (excepting of course the purging of the purgers) and that Malenkov’s promise of protection individual rights in Stalin funereal oration is being carried out, together with pledges of peace and greater prosperity.” (761.00/4-653)
figures, including General Smith, Magidov, Anna Louise Strong, British General Hilton and French diplomat Charpentier.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{12}References are presumably to: Walter Bedell Smith, Ambassador to the USSR, 1946–1949; Robert Magidov, National Broadcasting Company broadcaster in Moscow in the late 1940s; Anna Louise Strong, long-time editor of the English-language \textit{Moscow Daily News}; Brig. Richard Hilton, British Military Attaché in Moscow until 1947; Pierre Charpentier, Counselor of the French Embassy in Moscow, 1944–1948.

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\textbf{No. 578}

\textit{Editorial Note}

In a message to President Eisenhower on April 6, Prime Minister Churchill indicated that he and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden detected an "apparent change for the better" in the Soviet mood. Churchill felt that no chance ought to be lost in assessing the depth of change in the attitude of the Soviet leadership. He explained that British Ambassador Sir Alvary Gascoigne was returning to Moscow with instructions to take up a number of minor points troubling British-Soviet relations. (Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Churchill–Eisenhower")

In his reply of the same date, President Eisenhower expressed the view that British and United States thinking on the subject was largely parallel. He indicated further that he was considering the delivery of a formal speech which would set forth the peaceful intentions of the United States. (711.11 EI/4-853)

In a message to President Eisenhower dated April 11, Prime Minister Churchill expressed appreciation for the advance copy of the President’s proposed April 16 address (transmitted in telegram 6665, April 8; 711.11 EI/4-853). While expressing general support for the address, Churchill expressed the hope that the delivery of the address might be postponed until the full purpose and extent of the change of attitude in the Soviet leadership was better assessed. (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file)

In his reply of the same date, President Eisenhower expressed understanding of the necessity to avoid appearing to threaten Soviet leadership, and he promised to revise certain portions of the proposed address in order not to appear belligerent. The President pointed out, nevertheless, that it was no longer possible for him to withdraw making an address of the sort he had communicated to the Prime Minister. (611.00/4-1153)

In another message of April 11, Prime Minister Churchill thanked the President for this reply and offered some specific sug-
gestions for amending the proposed address. (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file)

This exchange of messages is printed in volume VI, Part 1, pages 964 ff.

No. 579

Microfilm telegram files, "Moscow FY 53"; Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, April 7, 1953.

754. For Bohlen. In presenting credentials you should use following text of remarks:

"Your Excellency: I have the honor to present the letters accrediting me as Ambassador of the United States of America to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to hand you the letters of recall of my predecessor.

In its foreign policy the Government of the United States is consistently guided by a desire to contribute to the cause of peace in the world, to enhance respect for international obligations and to develop friendly relations between all nations. In conformity with these principles it is the sincere hope of my Government that all questions requiring adjustment between our two Governments may be settled amicably. I shall actively work for the achievement of these aims and I hope that my efforts will meet with the collaboration of the officials of the Soviet Government.

As Ambassador of the United States I shall endeavor faithfully to represent the hopes and aspirations of the American people, who entertain feelings of sincere friendship for the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

DULLES

\[1\]Drafted by Stoessel (EUR/EE) and approved for transmission by Barbour (EUR).
\[2\]Bohlen left Washington on Apr. 4 and arrived in Moscow on Apr. 11 when he assumed charge of the Embassy.
\[3\]Bohlen presented his credentials to Voroshilov on Apr. 20; see Document 584.
\[4\]In telegram 1500 from Moscow, Apr. 20, Bohlen indicated his intention to make available to American correspondents in Moscow this text of his remarks. (Microfilm telegram files, "Moscow FY 53")
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

SECRET

PARIS, April 11, 1953—1 p. m.

5433. While stating that French Government has not yet formulated definite position toward Soviet peace offensive, Margerie indicated that following represented consensus of Foreign Office views endorsed by Bidault:

1. Internal measures probably represented steps which various members of Politburo had long felt advisable but which Stalin had personally prevented in his insistence on policy of maximum repression.

2. Mao was now strong enough to obtain Soviet acquiescence in seeking Korean armistice which Peiping had for some time desired.

3. Russia might at any time cause great damage by plausible offer on German reunification, quite possibly through ostensible acceptance of western proposals of last year. Any form of four-power talks could be dragged out interminably with consequent serious effect upon EDC and western rearmament.

4. None of Soviet feelers to date represent slightest change of policy or concession in principle. Berlin air talks, return of civilians from Korea and exchange of prisoners, represented merely slight moderation in intolerable practices without concessions of substance.

5. There is no indication that long-range Soviet objectives have changed in the slightest.

6. While measures so far taken have been designed primarily to influence opinion at home, Kremlin cannot be unaware of their potential effect in disorganizing western efforts to develop strength and unity.

7. New situation could be exploited to benefit of west only if exploration of general or particular offers is accompanied by unre-laxed effort to develop western strength and unity.

Margerie said that preponderance of Soviet strength had long weighed heavily on Bidault's mind and that latter was firmly convinced that no general settlement, and probably no major particular ones, could be obtained unless and until west had material strength equal to Russia.

DILLON

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1Repeated for information to London, Moscow, and Bonn.
The Ambassador-Designate in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State

RESTRICTED NIACT

Moscow, April 14, 1953—7 p.m.

1466. Accompanied by Chargé d’Affaires I called on Molotov this afternoon and handed him the copies of the letters of credence and recall of my predecessor and requested him to arrange an appointment with the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Molotov said he expected that this could be arranged “within the next few days” and accordingly as instructed I left with him for information a copy of the remarks I would make on that occasion.

The visit was entirely protocol in nature and Molotov made no attempt to raise any matter of business nor did I. Molotov made no remarks of any particular significance but was extremely cordial in welcoming me to Moscow recalling our association during the war when he said our two countries had cooperated to their mutual benefit and to the benefit of the world as a whole. He also mentioned that my acquaintanceship with Stalin and with the members of the present Soviet Government would be an asset.

Molotov looked grayer and older than I recalled him but appeared in vigorous health and good spirits.

Bohlen

1Repeated for information to London, Paris, and Bonn.
2See Document 579.
3This is the only official report of this call upon Molotov; for Bohlen’s brief personal recollections of the meeting, see Bohlen, Witness to History, p. 343.

No. 582

Microfilm telegram files, “Moscow FY 53”: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 15, 1953—6:34 p.m.

774. Address of President before American Society Newspaper Editors April 16 1:00 pm EST,2 being transmitted to you by separate telegram, should be made occasion exceptional effort assure its importance recognized and intent correctly interpreted. You are

1Drafted by Barbour (EUR/EE).
2For text of President Eisenhower’s speech, see infra.
therefore requested seek appointment with Minister Foreign Affairs or, if he unavailable, Deputy Minister Foreign Affairs to present copy of speech to Soviet Government promptly as possible after 1:00 pm EST April 16. In presenting copy (and in discussion with your diplomatic colleagues friendly and unfriendly) you are requested to make following points as appropriate:

1. This speech represents a most serious effort on the part of the US contribute to the relaxation of tensions and to facilitate a settlement of issues that now dangerously disturb the world.

2. The principles set forth in speech embody the long-term program of the new US Administration for the attainment of international stability and order.

3. In case any implication is made that the speech is intended largely as a psychological warfare move you may dismiss it by pointing out that the text makes amply clear that the US will accord full face value to concrete actions on the part of the USSR giving assurance of its good faith, but will not be impressed by words alone.

You are requested to assure that the speech and commentary along the lines of the foregoing are also given widest possible dissemination immediately upon delivery among your colleagues and other interested persons.

Report soonest summary reaction and follow with detailed despatch covering mission handling.  

This instruction constitutes amended version circular being sent all missions, suitably altered to meet conditions Moscow.

SMITH

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3Telegram 1478 from Moscow, Apr. 17, reported that the text of President Eisenhower's message was delayed in transmission to Moscow and could not be delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry until the evening of Apr. 16. Telegram 1489 from Moscow, Apr. 18, reported that Beam called on Deputy Foreign Minister Podtserov on the evening of Apr. 17 and outlined points 1 and 2 of this telegram. The brief telegram concluded: "Podtserov seemed much impressed and said he could communicate Department's explanation 'to his Ministry.'" (Microfilm telegram files, "Moscow FY 53")

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No. 583

Address by President Eisenhower, April 16, 1953

THE CHANCE FOR PEACE

In this spring of 1953 the free world weighs one question above all others: the chance for a just peace for all peoples.

1President Eisenhower delivered this address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors. It was broadcast nationwide over combined radio and television

Continued
To weigh this chance is to summon instantly to mind another recent moment of great decision. It came with that yet more hopeful spring of 1945, bright with the promise of victory and of freedom. The hope of all just men in that moment too was a just and lasting peace.

The 8 years that have passed have seen that hope waver, grow dim, and almost die. And the shadow of fear again has darkly lengthened across the world.

Today the hope of free men remains stubborn and brave, but it is sternly disciplined by experience. It shuns not only all crude counsel of despair but also the self-deceit of easy illusion. It weighs the chance for peace with sure, clear knowledge of what happened to the vain hope of 1945.

In that spring of victory the soldiers of the Western Allies met the soldiers of Russia in the center of Europe. They were triumphant comrades in arms. Their peoples shared the joyous prospect of building, in honor of their dead, the only fitting monument—an age of just peace. All these war-weary peoples shared too this concrete, decent purpose: to guard vigilantly against the domination ever again of any part of the world by a single, unbridled aggressive power.

This common purpose lasted an instant and perished. The nations of the world divided to follow two distinct roads.

The United States and our valued friends, the other free nations, chose one road.

The leaders of the Soviet Union chose another.

**The Road Followed by the United States**

The way chosen by the United States was plainly marked by a few clear precepts, which govern its conduct in world affairs.

First: No people on earth can be held, as a people, to be an enemy, for all humanity shares the common hunger for peace and fellowship and justice.

Second: No nation’s security and well-being can be lastingly achieved in isolation but only in effective cooperation with fellow nations.

Third: Any nation’s right to a form of government and an economic system of its own choosing is inalienable.

Fourth: Any nation’s attempt to dictate to other nations their form of government is indefensible.
And fifth: A nation's hope of lasting peace cannot be firmly based upon any race in armaments but rather upon just relations and honest understanding with all other nations.

In the light of these principles the citizens of the United States defined the way they proposed to follow, through the aftermath of war, toward true peace.

This way was faithful to the spirit that inspired the United Nations: to prohibit strife, to relieve tensions, to banish fears. This way was to control and to reduce armaments. This way was to allow all nations to devote their energies and resources to the great and good tasks of healing the war's wounds, of clothing and feeding and housing the needy, of perfecting a just political life, of enjoying the fruits of their own free toil.

The Soviet Government held a vastly different vision of the future.

In the world of its design, security was to be found, not in mutual trust and mutual aid but in force: huge armies, subversion, rule of neighbor nations. The goal was power superiority at all cost. Security was to be sought by denying it to all others.

The result has been tragic for the world and, for the Soviet Union, it has been ironic.

The amassing of Soviet power alerted free nations to a new danger of aggression. It compelled them in self-defense to spend unprecedented money and energy for armaments. It forced them to develop weapons of war now capable of inflicting instant and terrible punishment upon any aggressor.

It instilled in the free nations—and let none doubt this—the unshakable conviction that, as long as there persists a threat to freedom, they must, at any cost, remain armed, strong, and ready for the risk of war.

It inspired them—and let none doubt this—to attain a unity of purpose and will beyond the power of propaganda or pressure to break, now or ever.

There remained, however, one thing essentially unchanged and unaffected by Soviet conduct: the readiness of the free nations to welcome sincerely any genuine evidence of peaceful purpose enabling all peoples again to resume their common quest of just peace.

The free nations, most solemnly and repeatedly have assured the Soviet Union that their firm association has never had any aggressive purpose whatsoever. Soviet leaders, however, have seemed to persuade themselves, or tried to persuade their people, otherwise.

And so it has come to pass that the Soviet Union itself has shared and suffered the very fears it has fostered in the rest of the world.
This has been the way of life forged by 8 years of fear and force. What can the world, or any nation in it, hope for if no turning is found on this dread road?

A Life of Fear

The worst to be feared and the best to be expected can be simply stated.

The worst is atomic war.

The best would be this: a life of perpetual fear and tension; a burden of arms draining the wealth and the labor of all peoples; a wasting of strength that defies the American system or the Soviet system or any system to achieve true abundance and happiness for the peoples of this earth.

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed.

The Costs of a World in Arms

This world in arms is not spending money alone.

It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.

The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities.

It is two electric power plants, each serving a town of 60,000 population.

It is two fine, fully equipped hospitals.

It is some 50 miles of concrete highway.

We pay for a single fighter plane with a half million bushels of wheat.

We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than 8,000 people.

This, I repeat, is the best way of life to be found on the road the world has been taking.

This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.

These plain and cruel truths define the peril and point to the hope that comes with this spring of 1958.

This is one of those times in the affairs of nations when the gravest choices must be made, if there is to be a turning toward a just and lasting peace.

It is a moment that calls upon the governments of the world to speak their intentions with simplicity and with honesty.

It calls upon them to answer the question that stirs the hearts of all sane men: is there no other way the world may live?
Beginning of a New Era

The world knows that an era ended with the death of Joseph Stalin. The extraordinary 30-year span of his rule saw the Soviet Empire expand to reach the Baltic Sea to the Sea of Japan, finally to dominate 800 million souls.

The Soviet system shaped by Stalin and his predecessors was born of one World War. It survived with stubborn and often amazing courage a second World War. It has lived to threaten a third.

Now a new leadership has assumed power in the Soviet Union. Its links to the past, however strong, cannot bind it completely. Its future is, in great part, its own to make.

This new leadership confronts a free world aroused, as rarely in its history, by the will to stay free.

This free world knows, out of the bitter wisdom of experience, that vigilance and sacrifice are the price of liberty.

It knows that the defense of Western Europe imperatively demands the unity of purpose and action made possible by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, embracing a European Defense Community.

It knows that Western Germany deserves to be a free and equal partner in this community and that this, for Germany, is the only safe way to full, final unity.

It knows that aggression in Korea and in southeast Asia are threats to the whole free community to be met by united action.

This is the kind of free world which the new Soviet leadership confronts. It is a world that demands and expects the fullest respect of its rights and interests. It is a world that will always accord the same respect to all others.

So the new Soviet leadership now has a precious opportunity to awaken, with the rest of the world, to the point of peril reached and to help turn the tide of history.

Will it do this?

We do not yet know. Recent statements and gestures of Soviet leaders give some evidence that they may recognize this critical moment.

We welcome every honest act of peace.

We care nothing for mere rhetoric.

We are only for sincerity of peaceful purpose attested by deeds. The opportunities for such deeds are many. The performance of a great number of them waits upon no complex protocol but upon the simple will to do them. Even a few such clear and specific acts, such as the Soviet Union's signature upon an Austrian treaty or its release of thousands of prisoners still held from World War II,
would be impressive signs of sincere intent. They would carry a power of persuasion not to be matched by any amount of oratory.

Working for Peace

This we do know: a world that begins to witness the rebirth of trust among nations can find its way to a peace that is neither partial nor punitive.

With all who will work in good faith toward such a peace, we are ready, with renewed resolve, to strive to redeem the near-lost hopes of our day.

The first great step along this way must be the conclusion of an honorable armistice in Korea.

This means the immediate cessation of hostilities and the prompt initiation of political discussions leading to the holding of free elections in a united Korea.

It should mean, no less importantly, an end to the direct and indirect attacks upon the security of Indochina and Malaya. For any armistice in Korea that merely released aggressive armies to attack elsewhere would be fraud.

We seek, throughout Asia as throughout the world, a peace that is true and total.

Out of this can grow a still wider task—the achieving of just political settlements for the other serious and specific issues between the free world and the Soviet Union.

None of these issues, great or small, is insoluble—given only the will to respect the rights of all nations.

Again we say: the United States is ready to assume its just part.

We have already done all within our power to speed conclusion of a treaty with Austria, which will free that country from economic exploitation and from occupation by foreign troops.

We are ready not only to press forward with the present plans for closer unity of the nations of Western Europe but also, upon that foundation, to strive to foster a broader European community, conducive to the free movement of persons, of trade, and of ideas.

This community would include a free and united Germany, with a government based upon free and secret elections.

The free community and the full independence of the East European nations could mean the end of the present unnatural division of Europe.

Reduction of Armaments

As progress in all these areas strengthens world trust, we could proceed concurrently with the next great work—the reduction of the burden of armaments now weighing upon the world. To this end we would welcome and enter into the most solemn agreements. These could properly include:
1. The limitation, by absolute numbers or by an agreed international ratio, of the sizes of the military and security forces of all nations.

2. A commitment by all nations to set an agreed limit upon that proportion of total production of certain strategic materials to be devoted to military purposes.

3. International control of atomic energy to promote its use for peaceful purposes only and to insure the prohibition of atomic weapons.

4. A limitation or prohibition of other categories of weapons of great destructiveness.

5. The enforcement of all these agreed limitations and prohibitions by adequate safeguards, including a practical system of inspection under the United Nations.

The details of such disarmament programs are manifestly critical and complex. Neither the United States nor any other nation can properly claim to possess a perfect, immutable formula. But the formula matters less than the faith—the good faith without which no formula can work justly and effectively.

A New Kind of War

The fruit of success in all these tasks would present the world with the greatest task, and the greatest opportunity, of all. It is this: the dedication of the energies, the resources, and the imaginations of all peaceful nations to a new kind of war. This would be a declared total war, not upon any human enemy but the brute forces of poverty and need.

The peace we seek, founded upon decent trust and cooperative effort among nations, can be fortified, not by weapons of war but by wheat and by cotton, by milk and by wool, by meat and by timber and by rice. These are words that translate into every language on earth. These are needs that challenge this world in arms.

This idea of a just and peaceful world is not new or strange to us. It inspired the people of the United States to initiate the European Recovery Program in 1947. That program was prepared to treat, with like and equal concern, the needs of Eastern and Western Europe.

We are prepared to reaffirm, with the most concrete evidence, our readiness to help build a world in which all peoples can be productive and prosperous.

This Government is ready to ask its people to join with all nations in devoting a substantial percentage of the savings achieved by disarmament to a fund for world aid and reconstruction. The purposes of this great work would be to help other peoples to develop the undeveloped areas of the world, to stimulate profitable and fair world trade, to assist all peoples to know the blessings of productive freedom.
The monuments to this new kind of war would be these: roads and schools, hospitals and homes, food and health.

We are ready, by these and all such actions, to make of the United Nations an institution that can effectively guard the peace and security of all peoples.

I know of nothing I can add to make plainer the sincere purpose of the United States.

I know of no course, other than that marked by these and similar actions, that can be called the highway of peace.

I know of only one question upon which progress waits. It is this:

**What Is the Soviet Union Ready To Do?**

Whatever the answer be, let it be plainly spoken.

Again we say: the hunger for peace is too great, the hour in history too late, for any government to mock men’s hope with mere words and promises and gestures.

The test of truth is simple. There can be no persuasion but by deeds.

Is the new leadership of the Soviet Union prepared to use its decisive influence in the Communist world, including control of the flow of arms, to bring not merely an expedient truce in Korea but genuine peace in Asia?

Is it prepared to allow other nations including those of Eastern Europe, the free choice of their own forms of government?

Is it prepared to act in concert with others upon serious disarmament proposals to be made firmly effective by stringent U.N. control and inspection?

If not, where then is the concrete evidence of the Soviet Union’s concern for peace?

The test is clear.

There is, before all peoples, a precious chance to turn the black tide of events. If we failed to strive to seize this chance, the judgment of future ages would be harsh and just.

If we strive but fail and the world remains armed against itself, it at least need be divided no longer in its clear knowledge of who has condemned humankind to this fate.

The purpose of the United States, in stating these proposals, is simple and clear.

These proposals spring, without ulterior purpose or political passion, from our calm conviction that the hunger for peace is in the hearts of all peoples—those of Russia and of China no less than of our own country. They conform to our firm faith that God created men to enjoy, not destroy, the fruits of the earth and of their own toil.
They aspire to this: the lifting, from the backs and from the hearts of men, of their burden of arms and of fears, so that they may find before them a golden age of freedom and of peace.

No. 584

Microfilm telegram files, "Moscow FY 53": Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State

SECRET ANI ACT

Moscow, April 20, 1953—7 p.m.

1504. Following presentation of credentials¹ as is customary Voroshilov and Pushkin, interpreter and I retired to private room. After the usual amenities including certain personal recollections, I asked Voroshilov if he had had an opportunity to read the President’s speech of last Thursday² which outlined very sincerely and clearly the position of my Government as well as the hopes and aspirations of the US Government and people for an improvement in the world situation compared to what had gone before.

Voroshilov said he had only read what had been published in the press at which point I informed him that the Embassy had sent to the Foreign Office on the evening of delivery a full and accurate text of the speech. Voroshilov then gave me the opening to bring in the points set forth in Department’s 780.³ After stating that the Soviet policy was consistently one of peace, good relations with all countries and amicable settlement of disputes, he stated that he hoped that better days lay ahead. As is characteristic of Voroshilov’s mode of expression, he stated that he hoped and expected that the rigors of winter with its immobility and ice and snow was giving way in the world to the warmer climate of spring and especially between our two countries.

I replied that I was sure that the peoples of the world shared that wish and that insofar as the people and Government of the United States were concerned, the success or failure of the truce talks in Panmunjom would be a real test of whether this was possible. I added that the Soviet Government was not a participant in

¹In a one-sentence telegram 1503, Apr. 20, Bohlen reported that he had presented credentials to Voroshilov in the customary ceremony at the Kremlin at 1 p.m. (Microfilm telegram files, “Moscow FY 1953”) A photograph of the ceremony is in Bohlen, Witness to History, p. 870.

²See supra.

³Telegram 780, Apr. 17, instructed Bohlen to take up the Korean truce negotiation problems, “ostensibly casually”, following presentation of credentials or some other early opportunity. For text, see vol. xv, Part 1, p. 914.
these negotiations but that in view of Mr. Molotov’s support of Chou En-lai’s statement that it was appropriate for me to mention this matter to him. I said that it was earnestly to be hoped that the North Korean and Chinese negotiators fully understood that [garble] key issue of the POWs under no circumstances could [garble] or be party to any agreement which would [garble] the forcible repatriation of any POW who did not [apparent omission] erring to the theme of the acid text [test?]. [Apparent omission] I told Voroshilov that in the unfortunate event that the present attempt at an armistice failed it could be taken as a sign by the American people that the hopes for a more favorable world situation which he Mr. Voroshilov had just referred to were not to be realized; that it must be apparent to all serious people that an honorable truce in Korea was an essential prerequisite to any future improvement in the world situation; and that as a [garble] he could understand how deeply people of the United States felt on this point. I did not attempt to go into any of the details of General Harrison’s letter as the moment did not seem appropriate and Voroshilov was clearly not familiar with the POW issue.

Voroshilov did not disagree with any of my remarks and Pushkin who was present expressed complete agreement with my view that a truce in Korea was essential, without however touching on the POW issue. Our talk was amicable and I found interesting the promptness and even eagerness with which Pushkin supported my statement in regard to the importance of an armistice in Korea.

Bohlen

*Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China.

No. 585

661.00/4–2453: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

Moscow, April 24, 1953—1 a.m.

448. Eyes only for Secretary. It had been our original intention to review and analyze all developments both internal and external since Stalin’s death but in the belief that they might be of some

1Repeated as telegram 1518 to the Department of State eyes only for the Acting Secretary, which is the source text. Secretary Dulles attended the North Atlantic Council Ministerial session in Paris, Apr. 23–27. For documentation on that meeting, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 368 ff.
interest and possible value to you in connection with the discussion of this subject at the present NATO meeting I am setting down certain preliminary considerations concerning the foreign policy moves of the new Soviet Government as they appear at this time.

Understandably any evaluation of the degree of change involved in present phase of Soviet conduct of its foreign affairs vary in considerable degree depending upon the estimate of what constituted previous policy under Stalin. It has long been my belief, as Department is aware, that Soviet foreign policy was in large measure determined by the nature of the Soviet state structure and the requirements for the maintenance of Soviet power rather than by any dedication to ideological considerations or sense of mission in regard to world Communism. Against this background the present softer policy of the new government appears less of a break with the past than it may appear to those who believed that the chief preoccupation of Stalin and his associates was the implementation of a previously conceived “design” or blueprint for the establishment of world Communism or world conquest.

The Soviet Union still remains a police dictatorship with total control over every aspect of its political, economic and social life still firmly lodged in the hands of a small group of men. There has been no sign that the new leadership intends to alter any of the basic elements of the Soviet State or the fundamental policy of control from the top over all its citizens and the furtherance to the maximum degree of the growth of its industrial and military power. Therefore, whatever phase we may be entering in regard to the conduct of Soviet foreign affairs, it is still conditioned by the limitations imposed by a modern totalitarian state and any descriptions of Soviet policy such as détente, relaxation et cetera must be understood as falling within the limitations imposed by the system itself. It appears to us here natural and possibly even inevitable that the new leadership of the Soviet Union, forced to deal directly with the gigantic task of the organization of a new administration and direction of the Soviet structure without the advantages and disadvantages of Stalin’s one-man rule, would seek a period of relative tranquility during this process which is still far from complete. The record of the softer and more reasonable Soviet attitude in regard to a number of questions since the death of Stalin appears to us here to be a function of the business of establishing the leadership based on a different principle rather than any evidence of a radical departure from previous Soviet policy. The chief element in this transition seems to be an attempt to shift over from the “Fuehrer Prinzip” of one-man leadership developed to such a high point by Stalin to at least the announced principle of collective leadership by committee or council rule. The great question for the
future which only time will answer is whether or not the Soviet system can be run by a committee or whether it requires the arbitrary power of final decision by one man. What has happened in foreign affairs in the direction of a détente seems a logical corollary to the efforts internally to create in the Soviet Union an atmosphere of calm and hope of better times (always within Soviet terms of reference) as contrasted with the rigors of arbitrary terror so characteristic of Stalin’s rule.

A development of interest particularly to United States in this connection is the cessation of the hate-America campaign. Although standard critical references to the United States are carried in the press, it can be stated that since the death of Stalin hate-America propaganda as an orchestrated, calculated campaign has been brought to a halt and there are at present no signs of its revival although this could of course occur at any time. (The Embassy has no information as to whether a similar halt has been called in all the satellite press.)

Since my arrival in Moscow we have not obtained any information from any source which would give any clear clue to the future course of Soviet foreign policy or the degree to which the present leadership is prepared to go in any settlement of outstanding questions on acceptable lines which could lead to a genuine rather than a fictitious lessening of the international tension. The following considerations therefore are ones which appear to us logically inherent in the situation rather than based on any information or fact and may be useful in charting our future course of action and that of our allies in relation to the Soviet Union:

1. The present leadership for reasons of its own has made a great public expression of its desire for peace. The statement of Malenkov in the Supreme Soviet has been picked up and given a prominent place in the May Day slogans and the central press continues to emphasize the theme of peace and desire of the Soviet Government for good relations with all countries. Everyone is familiar with similar statements from Soviet authorities before but there is one aspect of the present situation which in our view deserves careful consideration. It is extremely doubtful if the present leadership has the same liberty of action as Stalin and the ability to disregard as cynically as he did the contradiction between word and deed in the Soviet Union. Stalin had established for himself a position of such supreme power that he was regarded in this country as exempt from any consideration or rules other than those of his own making. It will not be as easy for the present ruling group to go back on their professions of peace as it was for Stalin.

2. It is doubtful furthermore, pre-occupied as they are with the problem of organizing their domestic rule, that the present leaders have thought through fully their future policy in the realm of foreign affairs. There are certain signs of uncertainty on the part of the new leadership. The strongest evidence to this effect is the fact
that, contrary to previous Soviet practice, one week has elapsed since the President's speech without any Soviet official reaction. In a minor key the rather nostalgic references by both Molotov and Voroshilov to me about old times may reflect on their part a certain concern before the monumental responsibilities they face in the future without the presence of Stalin.

3. There is considerable evidence in the Soviet press of a preoccupation on the part of the new leadership with their relations with China and with the European satellites.

4. It can be taken as a fact that whatever may be the real causes of the present Soviet attitude in foreign affairs that they will be quick to exploit any signs of division in the West and to attempt to frustrate adoption of the EDC and in particular German rearma-

ment.

In the circumstances I would venture to suggest that the following points might be worth considering in regard to a coordinated position with our allies in NATO.

1. As long as the Soviet Union remains a totalitarian state, concentrating on the development of its military and economic power reinforced by its ideology, the menace it represents to the free nations of the world will remain constant regardless of the particular aspect it chooses to present to the outside world.

2. More than ever the West should continue its announced policy of developing strength and unity. Any fall back in Western effort in these directions would certainly eliminate whatever opportunities there may exist to exploit the present Soviet situation to the advantage of the free world.

3. We should continue and maintain the note struck in the President's speech of calmness, confidence and receptivity to any diplomatic opportunity to settle outstanding questions along acceptable lines.

4. Attempts to force the issue for the sake of superficial and temporary propaganda gains to "put the Soviet Government on the spot" would in our opinion be counter productive and might reverse a trend which under certain circumstances we could turn to the advantage of the whole free world. We should consider every possibility of inducing or forcing the new leadership to commit itself more deeply to the line advanced since the death of Stalin.

It will of course be understood that the foregoing analysis deals exclusively with the Soviet situation and areas under its unquestioned control and does not attempt to enter into the Far Eastern situation which is complicated by the uncertainties of Soviet-Chinese relations at this particular juncture.

Bohlen
Special Estimate

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 24 April 1953.

CURRENT COMMUNIST TACTICS

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the significance of current Communist “peace” tactics.

ESTIMATE

1. Since the announcement of the death of Stalin the various gestures and statements by the Soviet and Chinese Communist Governments have followed so swiftly upon each other, and the evidence concerning relations among the men in the Kremlin has remained so obscure, that any estimate of the situation is apt to be quickly outdated. This estimate is a brief presentation of provisional conclusions on the subject as of the present date.

2. Recent statements and actions of the Soviet and Chinese Communist Governments demonstrate that the Communists have adopted, at least for the moment, a conciliatory posture in their dealings with the West.

3. There have also been developments within the USSR which may prove to be of profound significance for Soviet foreign policy. We are unable as yet to estimate the meaning of these developments. It may be that the present Soviet Government is united, securely entrenched in power, and has agreed upon tactics which will be developed with consistency and determination. It is also possible, however, that an intense struggle for power may be in progress in the Kremlin. If the latter is the case, current Soviet tactics may proceed from the regime’s instability, and Soviet foreign as well as domestic policy may fluctuate as one or another faction in the Kremlin gains temporary ascendancy. So far, however, the current Soviet tactics in foreign relations give no indication of infirm purpose in the Kremlin.

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1 Regarding Special Estimates, see footnote 1, Document 552.

According to a note on the cover sheet of this SE, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Navy, the Air Force, the Army, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate. The note further records that the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on Apr. 21.
4. In Korea, we estimate that the Communists are now prepared to make some concessions in order to reach an armistice. However, there are ambiguities in the Communist proposals on the POW issue. These ambiguities may conceal difficulties which would prevent the conclusion of an armistice. Moreover, we believe that, possibly in connection with the armistice negotiations, and almost certainly in connection with negotiations for a political settlement, the Communists will introduce proposals which the US will find extremely difficult to accept but which some members of the UN will not be disposed to reject, especially in the atmosphere of hope created by the current Communist tactics. In any case, we believe that the Communist objective to gain control of all Korea will remain unchanged.

5. With respect to Germany, we believe that the Kremlin is unlikely to implement courses of action which would jeopardize Kremlin control over East Germany. The Communists may again make dramatic proposals for free elections, for the withdrawal of occupation forces, and for the reunification of Germany. However, we believe that such proposals would contain conditions which the Kremlin would intend to be unacceptable to the West, or that, in making these proposals, the Kremlin would intend to prevent their implementation. These proposals would be designed to frustrate the EDC program and the rearmament of West Germany, capitalizing on the atmosphere created by Communist concessions in Korea and by the conciliatory Soviet behavior.2

6. Likewise, the Kremlin will probably continue to make proposals for general disarmament, but we believe that these will be made for propaganda effect, and not in the expectation that they would be accepted by the West.

7. In many other ways the Kremlin could easily win some temporary advantage and embarrass the West without real disadvantage to the Bloc. For example, the Soviet Government might accede to the Tripartite Declaration of 1948 calling for the return of Trieste to Italy. It might offer a peace treaty to Japan containing various attractive economic and even territorial clauses. It might facilitate the departure of Jews to Israel from Eastern Europe and the USSR. The Communists might propose an Austrian peace treaty,

2The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believes that with respect to Germany, the Kremlin may be willing to withdraw its troops from East Germany, if the Soviet Union considered that by doing so, it could force the Western Powers to withdraw their troops from West Germany, frustrate the EDC program, and the rearmament of Germany. The Communists may also make proposals for free elections and for the reunification of Germany, in the hope that they would be able to secure a demilitarized and neutral German state. [Footnote in the source text.]
or even offer a peaceful settlement of the war in Indo-China, on terms difficult alike to accept or to reject. The aim of such maneuvers would be to impair the political and military strength of the West, and to reap the greatest possible benefits from a decision to end the Korean War.

8. Our present view is that the purpose of current Kremlin tactics is to create an atmosphere in which resistance to Communism and to Soviet imperialism will be weakened. There is no basis for concluding that the fundamental hostility of the Kremlin toward the West has abated, that the ultimate objectives of the Soviet rulers have changed, or that the menace of Communism to the free world has diminished. ³

³The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believes the last sentence of paragraph 8 should read: "Although there is no basis for concluding that the fundamental hostility of the Kremlin toward the West has abated, that the ultimate objectives of the Soviet rulers have changed, or that the menace of Communism to the free world has diminished; it is possible that the Soviets have adopted courses of action designed for the present to reduce the threat of general war." [Footnote in the source text.]

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No. 587

Microfilm telegram files, "Moscow FY 53": Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State¹

RESTRICTED NIACI MOSCOW, April 25, 1953—5 p. m.

1526. Today's Pravda carries unprecedented full first page, six columns article entitled Regarding President Eisenhower's Speech. ² Third page carries accurate and full translation President's address.

Following main points of special interest in article:

President's speech is taken as "some kind of reply recent statements Soviet Government re possibility peaceful solution controversial international questions". Stating that President's remarks regarding absence insoluble questions contrast with other statements in his speech, article takes up particular problems.

Korea: Those seeking concrete proof can assess significance Soviet support North Korean and Chinese attempts end Korean war.

¹Repeated for information to Secretary Dulles in Paris.
²Document 583. For full text of the Pravda article of Apr. 25, translated into English, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, May 16, 1953, pp. 3 ff. For extracts from the article, see Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1953, pp. 51-57.
Germany: President’s speech does not offer basis for solution German question. It, like previous US Government fails consider existence Potsdam Agreement. “If Anglo-American bloc does not take this into account and continue on its chosen path having rendered impossible national unification Germany and having transformed its western part into military state wherein power remains in the hands of Revanchistes, it will be a fateful mistake, . . .” 3 Question is to achieve speediest conclusion peace treaty permitting German unity and consequently withdraw occupation forces.

China: President’s address failed mention China “is not this question one of urgent international problems of our times?”

East Europe: “It would be strange to expect of the Soviet Union interference aimed toward restoration of the reactionary regime overthrown by these peoples”.

Austria: “Here also no such questions as cannot be resolved on the basis of earlier concluded agreement under conditions of genuine observance of democratic rights of Austrian people.”

UN: 60 members UN subscribers to Charter did not foresee that certain governments would ignore their decisions regarding unanimity of five great powers. “Largest country in world—China—is deprived of possibility of participation . . .” “In any event impossible avoid solution this question as also series other international problems which have developed. If we are striving that there should be less words and more action then obviously it must be possible to find a way toward solution of problems of this nature.”


Article’s sharpest language is used in reference speech Secretary Dulles4 “two days after Eisenhower’s address”. Soviet policy is determined by the interests of the Soviet people, interests of peace and international security and not by toughness or softness of policy of US or other governments. “In view of such statements of official representatives of USA it is difficult judge just what is actual foreign policy position of USA at present time”, whether it wishes relieve tension or continue rearmament policy. “In opinion Soviet leaders, proposals actually directed toward peace can serve as basis for improvement international relations. This however

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3All ellipses are in the source text.
4Secretary Dulles addressed the American Society of Newspapers Editors on Apr. 18. For text of his address, see Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 27, 1953, pp. 608-608.
does not mean that Soviet leaders are prepared accept as such proposals new variations of old recipes”.

Postwar International Relations: President distorted truth in attempt show that Anglo-American bloc policies have been directed toward peace. President showed amounts expended on various war equipment “but what is said by the President is completely insufficient. Had President of USA spoken about the cost to the American people of accumulation of reserves of atom bombs and also construction of many hundreds of military bases far beyond the borders of the USA and perhaps how all this has nothing in common with any kind of defense interests of the USA then there would be revealed a picture much closer to reality and considerably more instructive.”

Disarmament: Soviet Government has no objection to five points mentioned by President “however all these proposals are too general in nature”. War fear exists in US not USSR.

US-USSR: “We have no intention of entering into a discussion with the President concerning the rather strange statement about some kind of end of an era in Soviet policy . . .” “New President USA himself for some reason unconditionally undertakes to defend the whole policy of his predecessor which at one time particularly in the period of election campaign he criticized in many respects and not without foundation . . .” In his speech the President of the USA for some reason considered it necessary to tie his proposals regarding peace to a whole series of preliminary conditions presented by him to the Soviet Union although these claims in his speech are not strengthened by appropriate obligations on the part of the USA . . .” “As is known Soviet leaders do not tie their appeal for peaceful settlement of international problems to any preliminary demands of the USA or other country, either connected with or not connected with the Anglo-American bloc. Does this mean that the Soviet side has no claims? Of course it does not mean this. Nevertheless the Soviet leaders will welcome any step on the part of the Government of the USA or the government of another country if it is directed toward amicable settlement of controversial questions. This testifies to the readiness of the Soviet side for serious, businesslike discussions of appropriate problems by means of direct negotiation as well as in necessary instances within the framework of the UN”. The President’s statement regarding US willingness to assume just part “was not strengthened in any way in Eisenhower’s speech of April 16. It (the speech) is actually lacking in this respect”.

BOHLEN
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIAC T

Moscow, April 25, 1953—6 p. m.

1527. The full page statement on President’s speech and the publication of the speech itself without deletions or any attempt to soften the vigor of the comment on Soviet policies are in themselves events of great importance and in my experience unparalleled in the Soviet Union since the institution of the Stalinist dictatorship. The article itself will require further careful study. The following preliminary comments are those which on first examination appear to us to merit special mention in addition to points mentioned in Embassy telegram 1526:

1. A great deal of thought and care have obviously gone into the preparation of this article and it is not surprising from its contents that it took a week to compose although possibly the timing of the publication may have been fixed to coincide with the end of the NATO meeting in Paris.  

2. It bears evidence of a group composition. Certain variations in style as well as the construction of some sentences appear to reflect the work of several individuals.  

3. The name of Stalin does not appear and in describing the Soviet Government the words “Soviet leaders” in the plural are most frequently used.  

4. The article is cautious and wary even to the point of indecision and may reflect either the uncertainty of the present leadership or a compromise of differing views with it.  

5. The document is not primarily designed for mass propaganda purposes. It is too long and subtle for effective and simple exploitation. Individual phrases (although these are also surprisingly few) can and probably will be selected for emphasis and exploitation by the Soviet and Communist propaganda.

In general the article appears to be designed to serve the following main purposes:

a. To avoid the appearance of throwing cold water on any prospects of peaceful solution and improved relations initiated by President.

b. An attempt to shift the onus placed on the Soviet Union by the President’s remarks for the present state of the world back on to the US and its allies. The weakness and, in Soviet terms, mild-

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1 Repeated for information to Secretary Dulles in Paris.
2 See telegram 1526, supra.
3 Reference is to the Eleventh Session of the North Atlantic Council, Apr. 23–27; for documentation, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 368 ff.
ness of the rebuttal (with the exception of the attacks on the Secretary) plus the publication in full of the President’s accurate and trenchant criticism of Soviet policies are striking in the light of past Soviet reaction to any criticism.

c. An attempt to toss the ball back to the United States by declaring that the “Soviet leaders would welcome any step from the US Government” etc., and a rather clear preference for the use of diplomatic channels over those of the United Nations.

d. As already reported, the article gives no new information or clue concerning future Soviet positions in regard to specific subjects listed by President.

It is the Embassy’s opinion and also of members of Diplomatic Corps with whom we have had an opportunity to discuss the subject that in this public exchange the United States has come out distinctly the winner. Some reaction from the US Government will of course be necessary without too long a delay. However, in our view while obviously the Soviet reply to the President’s speech is not satisfactory or sufficiently definite to give any clear indication of their future policies, we believe it desirable to avoid having this exchange degenerate except by Soviet choice into a propaganda battle, especially since as matters now stand the advantage seems to us to lie with us. We believe it would keep the present Soviet leadership more off-balance and help force them to reveal more of their real purposes if US official comment continues to follow present line inaugurated by President’s speech.

Department repeat to other posts in its discretion.

BOHLEN

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No. 589

611.00/4-2553

President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Churchill

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON, April 25, 1953.]

DEAR WMSTON: I am glad to learn from your message of April 22

that Anthony is progressing and hope he will soon be completely restored.

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1Transmitted in telegram 7047, Apr. 25, for Ambassador Aldrich with instructions that the message be delivered to Churchill. The telegram indicated that the signed original was being sent to London by diplomatic pouch.

2In this message to President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Churchill reported that the President’s address of Apr. 16 had been well-received in the United Kingdom. Churchill went on to suggest a meeting of heads of state or government with the Soviet Union. Churchill preferred to limit the meeting to the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Churchill also suggested that he might have to

Continued
Your comments about the reception of my recent speech were most welcome and I warmly appreciate the support contained in your statement in the House of Commons and Mr. Morrison’s reply.

As to the next step, I feel that we should not rush things too much and should await the Soviet reply or reaction longer than a few days. There is some feeling here also for a meeting between Heads of States and Governments, but I do not think this should be allowed to press us into precipitate initiatives. Premature action by us in that direction might have the effect of giving the Soviets an easy way out of the position in which I think they are now placed. We have so far seen no concrete Soviet actions which would indicate their willingness to perform in connection with larger issues. In the circumstances we would risk raising hopes of progress toward an accommodation which would be unjustified. This is not to say, of course, that I do not envisage the possible desirability at an appropriate time that the three Western Powers and the Soviets come together. We should by all means be alert.

My thinking concerning a personal contact at this moment runs somewhat along the same line. The situation has changed considerably since we talked in New York and I believe that we should watch developments for a while longer before determining our further course. However, if you should find it necessary for some special and local reason to seek a personal contact, we would hope for as much advance notice as you could possibly give us.

With warm regards,

As ever,

Ike

consider seriously a personal contact with the Soviet leadership if no three-power conference could be arranged. (Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, “Churchill–Eisenhower Correspondence”) The letter is printed in vol. vi, Part 1, p. 975.
Special Estimate

SECRET
[WASHINGTON,] 30 April 1953.

The Soviet Statement of 25 April 1953 in Reply to President Eisenhower's Speech on 16 April 1953

The Problem

To estimate the significance of the Soviet statement of 25 April 1953.

Estimate

1. The Soviet statement of 25 April 1953 is a defense of Soviet policy and of the world Communist movement, and a condemnation of US policy. The statement gives no indication that the rulers of the USSR will modify their stand on any of the issues outstanding between East and West.

2. The publication of the full text of President Eisenhower's speech is an unusual but not unprecedented act. The Soviet press has occasionally published the speeches and writings of "capitalist" statesmen when such action could serve as the basis for a reply. In this case, one motive for publication may have been the conviction that the speech could be represented to the Soviet people as a demand for the surrender by the USSR of the gains of World War II, and of Communist principles, as the price of peace with the US. Probably also the Soviet rulers hoped by publishing the President's speech to convince world opinion of the sincerity of current Soviet "peace" tactics.

3. While Soviet and world Communist policies and actions are consistently defended in the statement as serving peace and justice, there is an intimation that areas such as Korea, Germany, and Austria, and subjects such as East-West trade and disarmament, are open for discussion. In each case, the rectitude of past Soviet positions is affirmed, with the suggestion that it is up to the US to...

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1Regarding Special Estimates, see footnote 1, Document 552.
2According to a note on the cover sheet of this SE, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated with the CIA in the preparation of this estimate. The note further records that the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on Apr. 28.
3See Document 587.
4Document 588.
make the first step towards a settlement. However, the territories now in the Bloc, as well as the "national liberation movement" in the colonial and semi-colonial areas of Asia, are excluded from discussion.

4. The over-all impression left by the statement is that it is a skillful effort to promote dissension within the US Government, between the US Government and the American people, and above all, between the US and the rest of the non-Communist world. The statement suggests that the rulers of the USSR envisage a prolonged political warfare campaign exploiting the "peace" theme and that, whether or not there is an internal struggle for power, they are united on questions of foreign policy. The statement gives no indication that they are prepared to make substantial concessions.

No. 591

Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence"

Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

[London,] May 4, 1953.

I thought of sending something like the following to Molotov:

Begins:

I had hoped you and Eden might soon be having a talk about things as you know each other so well, but his unfortunate illness will prevent this for some time. I wonder whether you would like me to come to Moscow so that we could renew our own war-time relation and so that I could meet Monsieur Malenkov and others of your leading men. Naturally I do not imagine that we could settle any of the grave issues which overhang the immediate future of the world, but I have a feeling that it might be helpful if our intercourse proceeded with the help of friendly acquaintance and goodwill instead of impersonal diplomacy and propaganda. I do not see how this could make things worse. I should of course make it clear I was not expecting any major decisions at this informal meeting but only to restore an easy and friendly basis between us such as I have with so many other countries. Do not on any account suppose that I should be offended if you thought the time and circumstances were unsuitable or that my thought and purpose would be changed. We have both of us lived through a good lot. Let me know how you and your friends feel about my suggestion.

E nds.

The sort of date I have in mind would be three or four days in last week of May. All good wishes.

Winston
TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 5, 1953.

DEAR WINSTON: Thank you for yours of May fourth giving me the lines of a message you are thinking of sending to Molotov. Foster and I have considered it deeply and since you sought my views I must say that we would advise against it.

You will pardon me, I know, if I express a bit of astonishment that you think it appropriate to recommend Moscow to Molotov as a suitable meeting place. Uncle Joe used to plead ill health as an excuse for refusing to leave territory under the Russian flag or controlled by the Kremlin. That excuse no longer applies and while I do not for a minute suggest that progress toward peace should be balked by mere matters of protocol, I do have a suspicion that anything the Kremlin could misinterpret as weakness or overeagerness on our part would militate against success in negotiation.

In my note to you of April twenty-fifth I expressed the view that we should not rush things too much and should not permit feeling in our countries for a meeting between heads of states and governments to press us into precipitate initiatives. I feel just as strongly now as I did ten days ago that this is right, and certainly nothing that the Soviet Government has done in the meantime would tend to persuade me differently. I do not feel that the armistice negotiations are going well and this to me has been the first test of the seriousness of Communist intentions. Far from there having been any Communist actions which we could accept as indications of such seriousness of purpose the Pravda editorial repeats all the previous Soviet positions and we are now faced with new aggression in Laos.

But in my mind the most important considerations are the results which might be expected to flow from such a personal contact and the effect of such a meeting on our allies, the free world in general, and the Russians themselves. It would of course finally become known that you had consulted me, and it would be difficult for me to explain the exact purpose of the visit. Beyond this, fail-

1Attached to a memorandum from Eisenhower to Secretary Dulles requesting that this message be transmitted to Churchill. Another draft of this message was also attached to the source text.
2Supra.
3Document 589.
4Reference is presumably to the editorial in Pravda, Apr. 25, responding to Eisenhower's speech of Apr. 16; see Document 587.
ure to consult the French would probably infuriate them, especially when the situation in Indochina is hanging in the balance. If they were consulted in advance, the result would almost certainly be a proposal for a four-party conference, and this, I am convinced, we are not ready for until there is some evidence, in deeds, of a changed Soviet attitude.

Many would expect dramatic and concrete achievements from a personal visit to Moscow by the Prime Minister of Great Britain. Whatever you said publicly about the purposes of your solitary pilgrimage, I suspect that many in the Far East as well as the West would doubt that you would go all the way to Moscow merely for good will. I feel this would be true in this country, and the effects on Congress which is this week taking up consideration of our Mutual Defense Program an extension of our Reciprocal Trade Act, would be unpredictable. It seems to me that in this crucial period when the Soviet peace offensive is raising doubts in people's minds, the thing we must strive for above all other is to maintain mutual confidence among the members of NATO and other free nations and to avoid any action which could be misinterpreted. Naturally the final decision is yours, but I feel that the above factors are so important that I should in all candor and friendship lay them before you.⁸

As ever,

IKE E.

⁸In his reply of May 7, Churchill reiterated the utility of a visit to the USSR, recalling his own experience in dealing with the Soviet leadership during World War II. Churchill argued further that none of the existing Soviet leadership, except Molotov, had contacts outside the USSR. While he did express a difficulty in an "attitude of pure negation", he nevertheless indicated his intention to consider Eisenhower's "adverse advice" with the Cabinet. (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file) For complete text of Churchill's note, see vol. vi, Part 1, p. 980.

No. 593

611.61/5–653: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 6, 1953—6:32 p. m.

816. We have considered carefully how best to capitalize on recent Soviet developments to further solution many bilateral issues between US and USSR and satellites. Copy memorandum giving fur-

¹Drafted by Barbour (EUR/EE); cleared by Bonbright and Merchant (EUR), Matthews (G), and Smith; and signed by Barbour for the Secretary.
ther background information our thinking this regard being transmitted you separately. Our conclusion is that initially it would be desirable for you seek interview with Molotov (urtel 1552) and raise with him matters Soviet wives American citizens, Balashova children and American soldiers Knight and Michalowski. Leave method approach these cases your judgment. However seems to us that, aside from general humanitarian grounds, it might be effective suggest hollowness to US public Soviet professions desire improve relations in absence solution such problems. In addition foregoing desire you raise at same time with Molotov Oatis case. Do not believe it advisable you enter into details latter, but you might take line that, while Soviets not directly concerned, continued imprisonment Oatis is major deterrent in US to credibility sincerity Soviet-sponsored effort clear atmosphere and in circumstances would be Soviet interest to exert influence its friends in Czecho to obtain release. You might note Oatis is eligible under Czech law for commutation sentence to deportation, that this Government has made repeated efforts with Czechs, including transmission March 30 confidential message from President to Czech President Zapotocky, and in meantime, while substantive response Czech authorities has been awaited, Czechs have issued amnesty decree.

FYI. Language amnesty appears to exclude espionage cases such as Oatis but in absence positive statement from Czechs believe important we take position decree should apply to him.

Dulles

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2Not further identified.
3In telegram 1552, Bohlen observed that he had avoided seeking an interview with Molotov to deal purely with USSR-U.S. problems of a primarily humanitarian concern as the cases of six Soviet wives of American citizens and the children of another such wife. Bohlen felt that there was an understandable interest to take up this question with the Soviet Foreign Ministry in the hope that the new circumstances in the USSR might increase the chances of positive results. Furthermore the British Ambassador had intervened on a similar case and obtained the release of one Soviet spouse. Bohlen asked the Department if an approach by him to Molotov on this matter in the near future would conflict with other considerations. (Microfilm telegram files, "Moscow incoming FY 53")
4Regarding the imprisonment and eventual release by Czechoslovak authorities of American correspondent William Oatis, see Documents 1 ff.
Paper Prepared by Walt Whitman Rostow, Massachusetts Institute of Technology\textsuperscript{1}

[Cambridge, May 11, 1953.]

Notes on the Origin of the President’s Speech of April 16, 1953

The purpose of these notes is to supply that limited portion of the record of events known to me leading up to the delivery of the President’s speech of April 16, 1953.\textsuperscript{2} It should be borne in mind throughout that my knowledge is partial. The record can only be filled out by others, particularly by Mr. C. D. Jackson.

1. The Princeton Meeting of May 11–12, 1952.

The Princeton meeting of May 11–12, 1952, laid the foundation for the President’s speech almost a year later. That meeting was called by Mr. C. D. Jackson, then Chairman of the National Committee for a Free Europe. Professor Jerome Wiesner\textsuperscript{3} (M.I.T.) suggested to Mr. Jackson that I be invited, due to the work I was doing on the Soviet Vulnerability Project at CENIS, for which I was the responsible director. The purpose of the meeting was to explore the possibilities of solving the problem faced by Radio Free Europe in broadcasting persuasively to Eastern Europe. RFE’s problem, briefly, was this: It had developed considerable operational capabilities, but American policy offered an inadequate foundation for talking persuasively to Eastern Europeans in terms of their problems and aspirations.

Appendix 1\textsuperscript{4} lists those present at the meeting. Those representing Radio Free Europe, notably . . . , indicated the feeling that there was a fundamental lack of content in enunciated American policy on which persuasive and effective radio broadcasts could be based. Appendix 2 includes the RFE submissions to the meeting. The RFE position was supported by Mr. Rostow and others. It was opposed by representatives of the Department of State who felt that further statements of American policy would involve forward commitments we might not be prepared to honor, or which would

\textsuperscript{1}Transmitted to C. D. Jackson by Rostow with a brief letter of May 12 and a list of 18 appendices of which texts were provided for four. Rostow requested that Jackson provide the remainder. The additional 14 appendices were not found attached to the source text. None of the appendices is printed.

\textsuperscript{2}For text, see Document 583.

\textsuperscript{3}Professor of Electrical Engineering and Director of the Research Laboratory for Electronics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

\textsuperscript{4}The appendix lists 27 persons present for the May 10–11, 1952, meetings including Charles Bohlen, George Morgan, and Robert Joyce of the Department of State.
embarrass the government at home (by creating a dangerous crusade) or abroad. An important intervention was made by former Ambassador Grew, who described his profound regret that no effort was made to hold out before the Japanese people a vision of American intentions different from that projected in the Japanese press by the Japanese government in 1940-41. At the close of the afternoon of May 11 a drafting committee was appointed to see if an agreed statement of American policy might be formulated which would better meet the requirements of Radio Free Europe. Included on that drafting committee were (possibly among others) Lloyd Berkner, Cyril Black, Tom Braden, C. D. Jackson, . . . , and W. W. Rostow. Mr. Allen Dulles participated for a portion of the evening session, at which drafting was done. A draft was presented and criticized at a morning meeting on May 12 and further revised. The third draft produced by this meeting is attached as Appendix 3.

2. The papers and draft done at Princeton went both to the government through Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bohlen, and, I believe, to General Eisenhower. There was some talk that the Princeton draft might be included in a high-level speech during the Truman administration; but nothing came of it.

3. Perhaps for the record it should be stated that on leaving the group, on Saturday, May 12, Mr. Grew said that he somehow felt the meeting at Princeton had been "historic." Looking back, there is some case for his view.

May 12, 1952—March 4, 1953

4. During the campaign there were further discussions about the issues raised at the Princeton meeting, and concerning the future of psychological warfare in general, between General Eisenhower and his staff. The San Francisco speech of General Eisenhower on related to these discussions. (This section must be filled in by Mr. Jackson, with appropriate appendixes.)

5. In the months after May, Mr. Jackson was taken up with other matters, including the Eisenhower campaign, and Mr.

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*Joseph C. Grew, Ambassador to Japan, 1931-1941; Under Secretary of State, December 1944-August 1945; member of the Board of Directors of the National Committee for a Free Europe.

*Lloyd V. Berkner, President and Chairman of the Executive Committee of Associated Universities, Inc. of New York; research associate in geophysics of the atmosphere at the Carnegie Institution of Washington.

*Cyril E. Black, Associate Professor of History at Princeton University (Professor from 1954).


*The date is left blank in the source text; presumably the reference is to a campaign address in early October 1952.
Rostow was completing the Vulnerability Project. Mr. Rostow corresponded with Mr. Jackson a few times, had lunch with him in November, shortly after the election, calling to his attention the CENIS report (completed August 1952), and its possible relation to the new administration’s program of political warfare.

6. That report called for a fresh enunciation of American interests and objectives at the highest level, and sought to define them. On December 29, 1952, Mr. Rostow wrote Mr. Jackson the attached letter on an appropriate response to the Stalin replays to the Reston questions,\textsuperscript{10} published on Christmas day, 1952. Mr. Jackson replied in letters of December 31 and January 5; and Mr. Rostow replied on January 12. This sequence of letters, which in many ways forecast our shared response to the opportunities offered by Stalin’s death, are included as Appendix 4. It is to be particularly noted that Mr. Jackson had clearly in mind the central role of high-level diplomacy as an instrument in political warfare.

7. In the week before Stalin died, Mr. Rostow had arranged that Mr. Millikan\textsuperscript{11} and he call on Mr. Jackson on the afternoon of March 11, to discuss the future relations between CENIS and the various agencies of the government; and we were, at this time, arranging that CENIS make its contribution to the W. Jackson Committee.

8. The Week of March 4–12.

Early on Wednesday morning, March 4, Mr. Millikan received a telephone call from Mr. Robert Amory of the CIA asking that CENIS prepare an intelligence appreciation of the situation created by Stalin’s grave illness, which had just been announced. In particular, four questions were to be answered:

1. Is Stalin dead?
2. What are the likely dispositions of Soviet power?
3. What are the likely changes in external policy, if any?
4. What are the likely relations of the new regime to Mao?

Mr. Millikan, Mr. Hatch, Mr. Bator, Mr. Cross,\textsuperscript{12} and Mr. Rostow, at CENIS, discussed these questions from 10 AM to shortly before noon. A draft was prepared by Mr. Rostow and revised by all. It was dispatched to Washington by courier Wednesday night.

9. It was unanimously decided in CENIS that we would not only submit an intelligence appreciation but also a statement of the key vulnerability created by Stalin’s death and suggestions for prompt

\textsuperscript{10}See footnote 2, Document 556. Rostow’s letter is not printed.

\textsuperscript{11}Max F. Millikan, Professor of Economics and Director of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology from 1952; on leave during 1951 and 1952 to serve as Assistant Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

\textsuperscript{12}Hatch, Bator, and Cross are not further identified.
American action to exploit that vulnerability. In general the suggestion consisted in the opening of a political warfare offensive of the kind envisaged in the Vulnerability Report, spearheaded by an American initiated meeting of the major powers, to be offered by the President. It was also decided that, in view of the work we had done at taxpayers’ expense for a year and a half on this problem, that we had a duty to call our suggestion to the attention of Mr. C. D. Jackson. The operational suggestion was abstracted from the general intelligence appreciation and was sent to Mr. Jackson, also on Wednesday night. We informed Mr. Amory by telephone of our having done this on our own initiative. Both CENIS messages are attached as Appendix 5.

10. On Thursday, March 5, at about 3 PM, Mr. Jackson called Mr. Rostow. He indicated that he had received both the communication to him and the full appreciation sent to the CIA. He indicated that he, too, felt that now was the time to open a general political warfare offensive; and he requested that Mr. Rostow come to Washington, arriving, if possible, at about 3 o’clock on the afternoon of March 6.

11. Mr. Rostow arrived at Mr. Jackson’s office about 3:15 on March 6. He was informed:

   (a) that Mr. Charles Wilson of General Electric had recently suggested to the President that he initiate a peace move, or meeting. Mr. J. F. Dulles’ reaction to this suggestion was not unfavorable, although coming during the period of Stalin’s illness, Mr. Dulles noted that conditions had changed;

   (b) that the NSC had issued a directive instructing the CIA to prepare an intelligence appreciation of the position created by Stalin’s death by Monday, March 9; that the State Department indicated its appreciation and suggestions for action; and Mr. C. D. Jackson produced a plan to exploit Stalin’s death, also by Monday, March 9.

Mr. Jackson indicated that he had a small staff, headed by Mr. George Morgan of the PSB, helping him on the general follow-up exploitation of Stalin’s death. The Staff was drawn as a group of individuals from various parts of the government and was already at work on Friday, March 6. It was generally understood that outside help would be used by Mr. Jackson and Mr. Rostow’s presence in Washington was known to this group.

12. Mr. Jackson asked Mr. Rostow what he had to add to the message sent from Cambridge. Mr. Rostow replied that he had a reasonably clear idea as to what the President ought to say and had some suggestions as to how an initial move might be exploited.

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13See Document 542.
Mr. Jackson instructed Mr. Rostow to produce three drafts: a Presidential statement; a rationale for that statement; and any suggestions that he might have for a follow-up plan.

13. Mr. Jackson then departed for a scheduled discussion of these matters, which included Mr. Nitze and Mr. Bohlen of the Department of State and Mr. Emmett Hughes of the White House staff.\footnote{No record has been found of this meeting.}

14. Mr. Rostow was installed by 3:45 PM on March 6 in room 242 1/2 at the Old State Department Building and equipped with an excellent secretary, Mrs. Bridges. At about 11:30 PM, drafts were finished for all three items requested by Mr. Jackson. Mrs. Bridges typed for several further hours the dictated portion of the suggestions for the follow-up plan and arranged that these be available to Mr. Jackson from 8 AM on the morning of Saturday March 7.

15. On Saturday March 7 Mr. Jackson arrived and went through these three documents. He called in Mr. Emmett Hughes to read them. They found themselves in general accord with the Presidential statement and the case for it. The text of the three documents drafted by Mr. Rostow on the afternoon and evening of March 6 are attached as Appendix 6.

16. It was then decided by Mr. Hughes and Mr. Jackson that, with one exception (Morgan), the Presidential draft would be shown to no one until Monday. The reasons for this were the absence from town of certain key figures, notably Mr. John Foster Dulles, and the danger that might arise if the draft were put through the conventional bureaucratic machinery for clearance: dangers both of security and dilution. Mr. Rostow hazarded the view that if the President were to act in this matter promptly, he would have to take the decision on his own, in a rather lonely manner.

17. The three sets of papers were, however, shown to Mr. George Morgan on the afternoon of Saturday March 7 by Mr. Jackson. Mr. Morgan was told that he should assume, in the paper he and the staff were preparing, that the opening gun in the political warfare campaign would be a Presidential statement of some sort; and this was all that he was to tell his own working staff and to include in their paper. On a personal basis, however, he was shown the Presidential draft. Mr. Rostow had lunch with Mr. Morgan and gave him the third paper; that is, notes for the follow-up plan. Mr. Rostow indicated that these were meant to be simply notes for the use of Mr. Morgan's staff and that he had no desire to peddle them elsewhere. Mr. Morgan noted, however, that Mr. Rostow had felt free to include diplomacy fully in the follow-up plan, whereas his terms of reference largely excluded diplomatic policy. For that
reason he urged that the draft be "shown to others" by Mr. Rostow.

18. On Monday March 9 it became evident that there would be opposition to the Presidential statement from the Department of State. Mr. Jackson had described the meeting on March 6 to Mr. Rostow as having gone round and round in circles, but having emerged with agreement on this point: that only a proposal for a four-power conference would give adequate substance to a Presidential act at this time. And it had then appeared not impossible that Mr. Nitze and Mr. Bohlen would go along with Mr. Hughes and Mr. Jackson. Nevertheless, Bohlen and Nitze raised important objections on Monday afternoon, when the draft of the Presidential statement and the rationale for it were shown to them by Mr. Hughes.¹⁵

19. The major business for Mr. Jackson on March 9 was to cope with a long paper prepared by Mr. Morgan and his special team. (Appendix 7) This outlined a great many psychological warfare actions as follow-up for the Presidential statement. This paper was circulated on Monday to all the relevant agencies in the government represented on the PSB. In view of the length of the document and the fact that it was under review in the government, it was agreed that an extremely brief NSC directive should be drafted in the following sense: urging that a Presidential statement be given; creating a special ad hoc committee to oversee the execution of the follow-up plan; and attaching the Morgan draft plus the comments made upon it, for the ad hoc committee to consider as part of its working materials. Mr. Rostow drafted such a directive. (Appendix 8)

20. On Monday March 9 it was also decided that the issue would come to a decision on Wednesday, March 11, at an NSC meeting, Mr. Dulles being out of town until the late afternoon of March 10.

21. On Tuesday March 10 a letter from Mr. Bohlen arrived stating formally the objections of the Department of State up to the level of Under Secretary. This letter explicitly excluded Mr. Dulles, who was still in New York. (Appendix 9)

22. At Mr. Jackson's request, after extensive discussion, Mr. Rostow prepared for verbal presentation at the NSC by Mr. Jackson a brief on each of the objections raised. A copy of that brief is attached as Appendix 10.

23. In order to meet the State Department's view that the President's proposal would be a dangerous shock to our allies, it was proposed that Mr. Jackson prepare letters from the President to Mr. Churchill and Mr. Mayer to be sent two days before the

¹⁵No record has been found of this meeting.
speech, one day before the text was made available. Drafts of these letters, prepared by Mr. Rostow, are included as Appendix 11.

24. On Monday March 9 (but perhaps also on Friday March 6) Mr. Rostow had suggested to Mr. Jackson that he talk forthwith to Mr. George Kennan. Mr. Rostow heard Mr. Kennan’s views on the night of Thursday March 5 at the home of Mr. M. F. Millikan in Cambridge, and was impressed with the fact that they converged with those developed at CENIS and were sharply different from the views popularly attributed to Mr. Kennan as the author, if not the architect, of containment. Mr. Jackson immediately asked Mr. Kennan to come from his farm in Pennsylvania to Washington. Mr. Kennan saw Mr. Jackson for about an hour and a half between 2:30 and 4 o’clock on the afternoon of Tuesday, March 10. Mr. Rostow was present only for the period from about 3:15 to 4 o’clock. Mr. Kennan agreed that the kind of initiative suggested was the right course for the United States at this moment in history. He approved the draft statement in general, suggesting that it might be usefully nit-picked for detail by some of the old hands in the State Department.

He indicated his view, now several years old, that the United States must positively support efforts to unify Germany and the continent; to create effective security measures there; and to engineer Russian and American military withdrawal, leaving behind a militarily safe, predominantly democratic and unified area. Mr. Kennan warned Mr. Jackson that taking this initiative required great clarity concerning its implications for Germany on the part of two men: the President and the Secretary of State. If this condition were fulfilled, there was no need to worry excessively about other opinions in Washington or about the short period of excitement in the foreign offices of Great Britain, France, and Bonn. Mr. Kennan expressed his faith that Washington would respond with great vigor and unity to the initiative, as it had to the Marshall Plan proposal; and that our allies would come along without much difficulty. Both Mr. Jackson and Mr. Rostow were moved by the combination of dignity, force, and eloquence with which Mr. Kennan presented his views, at a time when he obviously felt acutely his enforced divorce from events, as well as a profound desire to be useful to the country in these days when an understanding of Russia was as important as it had ever been before in our history. At one point Mr. Kennan explained that the initiative proposed by Mr. Jackson was designed to reverse the direction in which the wheel of diplomacy had been spinning for some years in Washington, and, taking him by the arms, said, “You have the weight of the world on your shoulders. Good luck.” It should be noted that Mr. Jackson raised with Mr. Dulles the following day,
March 11, the future of Mr. Kennan, and was told that it was his (Mr. Dulles') understanding that Mr. Kennan had tendered his resignation and that the matter was in the hands of Mr. Bedell Smith. Mr. Dulles' assistant later reported that the Secretary was loath to bring Mr. Kennan into the Department for fear of Congressional reaction.

25. Late on the night of March 10, Mr. Rostow was called to the office of Mr. Jackson to read over a letter Mr. Jackson had drafted to Mr. Dulles. The Secretary of State had arrived in town at about 4 o'clock on March 10 and had been met, according to rumor, by an excited group of his colleagues. Mr. Dulles had already asked to see Mr. Jackson at breakfast at 7:45 on Wednesday, March 11. Mr. Jackson's letter to Mr. Dulles is attached as Appendix 12.

26. On Wednesday, March 11, Mr. Rostow saw Mr. Jackson at about 8:30 AM, after his breakfast with Mr. Dulles. Mr. Jackson reported that Mr. Dulles had found the idea "intriguing," but had several reservations which he would have to think over before the 10:30 meeting of the National Security Council.

27. Mr. Rostow saw Mr. Jackson again as he emerged from the NSC meeting at about 12:30 PM. Mr. Jackson announced that he did not know whether he was a man "carrying a shield or being carried upon it." He reported that

(a) he had had his full day in court;
(b) the President, remembering his experience with previous four-power meetings, was not enthusiastic about the Council of Foreign Ministers;
(c) Mr. Dulles took the position that our relations with France and Britain would be damaged by a unilateral initiative of this kind; that the governments of de Gasperi, Adenauer and Mayer would fall in a week; and that EDC would be postponed, if not destroyed. It was, nevertheless, agreed that a Presidential statement should be made and made soon, and that the bulk of the text as drafted was suitable.

Further, Mr. Stassen wished to see introduced into the speech a reference to the Marshall Plan and a recognition of the possibilities of drawing the East back towards the West, by economic means.

28. It may be recorded for history that the Secretary of Defense said at one point: "I agree with Mr. Jackson; don't give the bastards anything but hope."

29. It was further decided that the references to Korea would be expanded and a truce in Korea would be made even more clearly a condition for further movement towards the larger objectives of peace than the original draft had provided. Mr. Jackson was instructed to prepare a new text in the sense of the meeting.
30. While Mr. Jackson was at lunch on Wednesday, March 11, Mr. Rostow redrafted the message as instructed by Mr. Jackson. This draft as modified by Mr. Jackson after discussion is included as Appendix 13. The essential device was to hold up a vision of the specific long-range objectives of American diplomacy but to make the negotiations designed to achieve that vision contingent upon a prior Korean settlement.

31. Two tail pieces were added to the new draft, since it was envisaged that the President might deliver this statement either on television, to the American people, or to the UN Assembly on Thursday, March 19. These were drafted by Mr. Rostow, revised by Mr. Jackson (Appendix 14).

32. On Thursday, March 12, Mr. Jackson went to a luncheon meeting of the PSB. He found a warm welcome, appreciation for his effort of the previous day, and unanimity concerning the new draft. Mr. Bedell Smith, on his own initiative, said he would try to persuade Mr. Dulles to accept it.

33. On the afternoon of Thursday, March 12, Mr. Jackson drafted a letter to Mr. Dulles requesting definitive assurance that his conception of political warfare included a positive and even central role for the Department of State, calling to his attention the likelihood of a four-power meeting being forced upon the United States in the coming months, even if the proposed speech did not offer it. This letter is attached as Appendix 15.

34. Mr. Rostow returned to Cambridge on the night of March 12.

Post-March 12

35. Although I lack knowledge of the next stage in the process which led to the speech, I believe that the opening of the Soviet diplomatic peace offensive by Malenkov in his speech before the Supreme Soviet on March 16 [15] resulted in a postponement of the speech as planned on Thursday, March 12. For the record it should be noted that Mr. Jackson and Mr. Rostow urged a prompt American initiative not only to exploit the psychological possibilities available immediately after Stalin's death but with an awareness that the new Soviet regime might seize the peace initiative.

36. Drafts 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the speech are attached as Appendix 16. Mr. Jackson must fill in the history of these drafts. Mr. Rostow saw only draft (I believe) 4, with pencilled notations by Mr. Dulles, which he recalls as being much further from the content and spirit of the original two drafts than the speech presented by the President on April 16. This stirred up the attached Rostow-Jackson letter of April 1 (Appendix 17). And, on still another

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16Regarding Malenkov's address of Mar. 15, see footnote 2, Document 569.
Washington trip, Mr. Rostow saw Draft 7, which was much improved, and on the basis of which Mr. Rostow wrote the letter on April 8 (Appendix 18).

It is essential to an understanding of the conflict over this speech within the government that the relation of Mr. Jackson's initiative to EDC and Western European unity be distinguished from the view held generally in the Department of State (excepting Kennan and certain others). Both the Department of State and Mr. Jackson felt that a negotiation with the Soviet Union should take place, if at all possible, on the basis of EDC having been accomplished. In the Department of State, however, there was a deep unwillingness to contemplate such a negotiation unless it was forced upon us. In any case, it was felt in the Department that the United States should continue to use its influence directly—along familiar diplomatic lines—to bring about the completion of the EDC arrangement, as first priority, and to fend off as long as possible any four-power negotiation. It was Mr. Jackson's view that the chance of achieving EDC in the near future would be maximized if the United States were to take an initiative in the four-power negotiation and, within that framework, seek to induce our allies to go into the negotiation with the EDC arrangement behind us. It was feared by Mr. Jackson that, if the United States tried to evade a negotiation, that very fact would increase the difficulty of achieving EDC in the near future. Behind Mr. Jackson's position lay the following appreciation: that the unwillingness of many Germans to see EDC through hinged on their judgment that the United States had no serious interest in German unity, and that a negotiation with the USSR was an alternative to EDC; and, similarly, that the unwillingness of many Frenchmen to see EDC through hinged on their judgment that the United States has no serious conception of a long-run German (and continental) settlement; that the United States might, therefore, step by step, turn continental hegemony over to the Germans; and that a negotiation with the USSR was an alternative to German rearmament, or might at least postpone it. Mr. Jackson's appreciation was not that a negotiation was likely to succeed, but, rather, that it might unite the Free World around a position which would make EDC a necessary and logical step—not negatively to oppose the USSR—but positively to move towards a European settlement which would meet underlying American, German, French and other interests. At no point did the representatives of the Department of State appreciate this view or argue it; rather, they felt Mr. Jackson's initiative to be, simply, an uninformed gesture which failed to understand the key importance of EDC.
It was the fear of Mr. Jackson and Mr. Rostow that, without such a prompt U.S. initiative, that would bind up our support for EDC with a longer perspective on a European settlement, in any case EDC would be postponed until our allies had a chance to test the new Soviet regime’s intentions.

Mr. Jackson’s view on this matter was no new thing: the basic issues involved had been raised and fully discussed at the Princeton meeting of May 1952, and Mr. Jackson had obviously considered the problem posed by German and French attitudes to U.S. diplomatic objectives at an earlier time. Mr. Rostow’s similar view was also of considerable vintage, stemming back to 1946, but articulated fully in the CENIS Soviet Vulnerability Report.

W. W. Rostow

No. 595

Editorial Note

Prime Minister Churchill delivered a major foreign policy address to the House of Commons on May 11. The Embassy in the United Kingdom characterized the address as comparable in significance to President Eisenhower’s address on April 16. (Telegram 6003 from London, May 8; 741.00/5-853) Churchill discussed the situation in Korea, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Europe; recalled his relations with the Soviet Union during the war; and proposed a meeting at the highest level of the leading world powers. For full text of his speech, see H.C. Debs., 5th series, volume 515, columns 883–898; for the Embassy’s comments on the address, see telegram 6041, volume VI, Part 1, page 985.

On May 20, President Eisenhower transmitted to the Acting Secretary of State a memorandum suggesting exploration of the possibility of his meeting with Churchill and French Prime Minister René Mayer in the near future in order to demonstrate the essential friendship among their three countries regardless of appearances in the press. (711.11 EI/5-2053) Exchanges of communications at the end of May finally led to a proposed meeting of the Heads of State at Bermuda in June. For further documentation on the Bermuda Conference, see volume V, Part 2, pages 1710 ff.
Ambassador Bohlen, accompanied by Counselor of Embassy McSweeney, called on Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov on the afternoon of May 12 for the first business call of his ambassadorship. During this call Bohlen first expressed the appreciation of the United States Government for the assistance and facilities rendered by the Soviet Government to a group of United States civilian internees allowed to travel across the Soviet Union following their release by the People’s Republic of China. Then, acting with the specific authorization of the Department of State, Ambassador Bohlen explained to Molotov that one of his first duties as Ambassador was the protection of the interests and rights of American citizens, and he raised with Molotov the following cases:

1. Request for the release and repatriation of Noel;
2. Request for permission for Mrs. Balashova and her children to travel to the United States;
3. Granting of exit visas to the Soviet wives of American citizens;
4. Soviet intervention on behalf of the release from imprisonment in Czechoslovakia of the American newsman William Oatis.

The details of all these cases were well known to the Soviet authorities and had previously been the subject of many Embassy representations. Bohlen chose not to raise with Molotov the cases of American soldiers Knight and Michalowski who had fallen into the custody of Soviet forces in East Germany. Ambassador Bohlen’s presentation was received by Molotov with politeness but no commitments were made and there were no indications of subsequent decisions by the Soviet Government. During Bohlen’s call, which he reported upon in telegram 1582, May 12, Molotov raised no subjects of his own. (Microfilm telegram files, “Moscow incoming FY 53”)

On the morning of May 13, Ambassador Bohlen told correspondents in Moscow that his visit with Molotov had dealt exclusively with “certain subjects pending between the US and USSR.” The newsmen agreed to adhere to such a simple description of the meeting. (Telegram 1584, May 13; 611.61/5-1353) At the daily Department of State press briefing on May 13, the Department Press Officer was subjected to great pressure from newsmen inquiring about the Bohlen-Molotov conversation, and they were told that the question of Soviet wives of American citizens was one of the subjects discussed. (Telegram 834 to Moscow, May 14; 611.61/5-1353)

On May 15, William Oatis was released by Czechoslovak authorities; see Documents 30 ff. The American soldiers Knight and Mi-
chalowski were released to United States Army custody on May 19. During June and July 1953, exit permits were granted by Soviet authorities to several Soviet wives of American citizens and their children.

No. 597

641.61/5-2353: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET       PRIORITY       Moscow, May 23, 1953—5 p.m.

1623. British Ambassador\(^2\) accompanied Wilson on his call on Molotov Thursday (Embtel 1603, repeated London 210\(^3\)) and has given me in strict confidence following account of interview.

In agreement with Wilson Ambassador stressed the unofficial nature of his visit to Soviet Union to which Molotov said that that was the understanding of Soviet Government. Wilson then endeavored to ascertain Soviet reaction to the chief outstanding political questions but was unable to obtain from Molotov anything but non-committal answers or standard Soviet positions. Wilson told Molotov Churchill’s speech\(^4\) had solid bipartisan support in Great Britain and inquired what the reaction of Soviet Government had been to it. Molotov merely stated that the Soviet Government “and people” had found it very interesting.

On Germany Molotov said that fidelity to past agreements would greatly facilitate solutions. He gave no particular reaction to Wilson’s questions on Austria, Korea or the Far East in general except when Wilson mentioned that there were some people who felt that Soviet Union controlled and had even instigated Communist offensive in Laos. Molotov immediately stated that there were many people who believed “crazy things”.

With the exception of a reference to Labor Party views that politicians rather than generals should be conducting the Korean negotiations and that many British do not agree with US Chinese policy (to which Molotov in neither case made any reply whatsoever). In general Wilson, according to Ambassador, handled himself well in the interview.

\(^1\)Repealed for information to London.
\(^2\)Sir Alvary Gascoigne.
\(^3\)Not printed. (441.61/5–1853)
\(^4\)See Document 595.
Wilson had a five-hour dinner with Mikoyan from which nothing in particular emerged except that Mikoyan repeated in almost identical words the Soviet opposition to the release of the one Soviet wife living at British Embassy.

Ambassador told me that his government is particularly anxious that no publicity should be given to any connection between the Sanders’ case and Wilson’s visit to Hungary. But Embassy here believes that before very long Sanders will be released, possibly as result of Wilson’s discussions. Although the Ambassador faithfully carried out the instructions received to assist Wilson in every way here, he is not pleased with practice of “unofficial” visitors coming to Moscow and discussing current matters with Soviet Government as Wilson has done.

I hope the foregoing information will be kept confidential and its source carefully protected.

BOHLEN

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*Edgar Sanders, a British citizen arrested in 1949 in Hungary for alleged sabotage and espionage. Tried, convicted, and sentenced to imprisonment in February 1950, Sanders was finally released and returned to the United Kingdom in August 1953. Telegram 999 from Budapest, May 24, reported that Wilson visited Budapest on May 22 to urge Sanders’ release. (641.64/5-2458)

No. 598

761.60/6-453: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET

Moscow, June 4, 1953—1 p.m.

1671. Soviet citizen early yesterday evening entered living section of Embassy. Having entered Zook’s apartment, insisted on seeing Ambassador. In response request for assistance by occupant Apartment 2, Embassy officers McSweeney and Garvey went there, made it quite clear to visitor he was on Embassy property, that Embassy acted only in accordance with usual understanding functions diplomatic mission. He insisted again on seeing Ambassador. In order most expeditiously accomplish his departure, Embassy officers listened his story which included his Jewish background, service in Military Investigation Branch during war, employment with Office of Procurator in Krasnodar Krai and Tula Gunworks, detention for trial for violating government regulations regarding

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1Benjamin M. Zook, translator at the Embassy in the Soviet Union.
2James A. Garvey, Second Secretary of the Embassy.
travel allowances and release after two months in accordance recent general amnesty. He stated that he knew where there were many other people who felt as he did in universities, government institutions, et cetera, and when repeatedly informed that the American Embassy was not interested in this sort of thing, he only asked for the Embassy's "blessing". He appeared in highly nervous state and kept refusing to leave premises. Embassy officers therefore concerned with arranging for his departure from Embassy as soon as possible without any incident which might reflect upon Embassy. As in other cases he asked to be taken from Embassy in Embassy car. Embassy officers reminded him he had been told at beginning Embassy could accept no responsibility for him to which he agreed. Eventually after about four hours, he left Embassy on his own.

At time of his departure it was noted extra plain-clothes men were stationed around Embassy building including group in automobile at curb next to Embassy entrance.

Department will note great similarity between this incident and that which occurred approximately a year ago when Ambassador Kennan was here. Both bear strong indication of agent provocateur activity.

These cases present great difficulty in handling since while avoiding any grounds for implicating this Embassy, we would not wish on the outside chance that the individual is operating on his own to request of Foreign Office that militia guarding Embassy come in and arrest him or to expel him by force from the Embassy with the resulting scandal. These considerations account for length of time necessary before the officers of the Embassy who saw this man were able to persuade him to leave the premises.

Assuming that this was provocation, it is difficult to see exactly what the Soviet authorities had in mind at this time other than a straight police operation either to test out the Embassy and whether I would see him or to have a record in the MVD files in event of some future desire to implicate the Embassy in illegal activity.\(^3\)

This incident is known only to those directly involved and the senior officers and will be held in complete secrecy.

Bohlen

\(^3\)Telegram 1687 from Moscow, June 5, reported that a Soviet security police officer had called at the Embassy regarding a "crazy" individual missing from his family and possibly seen lurking around the Embassy. Embassy officials described in general terms the incident related here, and the Soviet police officer departed "seemingly satisfied". (761.00/6-553)
National Intelligence Estimate

TOP SECRET
NIE-65

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1953.

SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES THROUGH 1957

THE PROBLEM

To analyze the principal factors affecting Soviet Bloc capabilities and to estimate the probable development of those capabilities, through 1957.

ASSUMPTION

That there will not be general war within the period of this estimate.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Developments within the USSR resulting from the change in leadership may ultimately affect Soviet Bloc capabilities, but so far the economic and military bases of Soviet power are believed not to have been affected by Stalin's death. This estimate, therefore, is based on the trends within the Soviet Bloc since 1945, and does not attempt to estimate whether, or to what extent, these trends may be affected by changes within the ruling group.

2. The rate of growth of the Soviet economy will almost certainly remain higher than that of the US or any other major Western state. However, the output of the USSR will remain much lower

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1 Regarding National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), see footnote 2, Document 491.

2 According to a note on the cover sheet of this NIE, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated with the CIA in the preparation of this estimate. The note further indicates the IAC concurred in this estimate on June 9.

The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believe that this sentence should be replaced with the following:

It is impossible as yet to estimate with confidence whether or not a prolonged struggle for power among the new leaders will develop during the period 1953-1957. We believe, however, that if such a struggle for power should develop, it would be confined to the higher echelons of the Soviet Communist Party and Government and would probably not precipitate open conflict within or between the armed forces and security police, or involve the Soviet population. We estimate, therefore, that the stability of the regime in the USSR is unlikely to be jeopardized by differences that may develop among the Soviet leaders. [Footnote in the source text.]
than that of the US, and the output of the entire Bloc will remain much lower than that of the NATO states.

3. Bloc scientific and technical capabilities will continue to increase throughout the period of this estimate. However, the scientific assets (the number and quality of trained personnel, facilities, equipment, and financial support) of the US will remain greater than those of the USSR, and the assets of the West as a whole will remain far greater than those of the Bloc.

4. By mid-1957, the USSR may have a stockpile of from 335 to 1,000 atomic weapons (30–100 kiloton yield). We have no evidence that thermonuclear weapons are being developed by the USSR. Soviet research, development, and even field testing of thermonuclear reactions based on the disclosures of Fuchs may take place by mid-1953. However, it is very unlikely that the USSR could test a full scale thermonuclear device based on these disclosures before mid-1954. There is also a possibility that Soviet field tests based on independent research and development along other and advanced approaches to the thermonuclear weapons problem might occur by mid-1954. Testing of advanced models might be possible earlier if US developments were known through espionage or other compromise.

6. We estimate that the size of Bloc forces-in-being will not increase substantially by 1957. The emphasis in the program for increasing Bloc military strength will continue to be placed upon modernizing the armed forces and upon enlarging the atomic stockpile.

7. We estimate that the Bloc now has the capability to undertake* concurrent large-scale operations in continental Europe, the Middle East, and mainland Asia. The Bloc could reinforce with Chinese Communist and Soviet forces the Communist forces now in Korea, and at the same time undertake* an invasion of Japan by Soviet forces.

8. The USSR now has the capability to undertake* concurrent air operations against the US, the UK, continental Europe, the Middle East, Japan, and the offshore island chain of Asia. However, operations against the US would be much more difficult than those against the other areas. The USSR has the capability to reach all parts of the US and to attempt the delivery of its full

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*The estimates beyond mid-1955 are tentative projections of the estimates for the earlier years. [Footnote in the source text.]

*No estimate of the success of these operations can be made without considering the effects of the actions of opposing forces. [Footnote in the source text.]
stockpile of atomic weapons. However, even a stripped-down TU-4 could reach only the extreme northwestern corner on two-way missions without aerial refueling. Even with aerial refueling and other range extension techniques, attack upon the strategic northeastern industrial area and upon most of the principal strategic bases almost certainly would involve the expenditure of the attacking aircraft and most of the crews on one-way missions. Until it has a heavy bomber available for operational use, the USSR will not have the capability to reach most of the strategically important areas in the US on two-way missions. A heavy bomber based upon a type which has been seen in flight may begin production and may be available for operational use within the period of this estimate.  

9. We estimate that the Bloc has the capability of providing vigorous opposition against air attacks on critical targets in the interior of the USSR, under conditions of good visibility. Under clear moonlit night conditions, Bloc defense capabilities are fair against piston bombers and negligible against jet bombers. Under conditions of poor visibility, day or night, Bloc interception capabilities are negligible.

10. Currently known trends point to an increase of Bloc air defense capabilities during the period of this estimate. However, it is impossible to estimate the extent of significance of any increase, because the future development of airborne intercept (AI) equipment and of guided missiles is obscure; in any case, such an estimate would require knowledge of the characteristics of attacking aircraft through the period of this estimate.  

11. Bloc naval forces (except for ocean-going submarines, and new cruisers and destroyers) as now constituted are designed to protect Bloc coastal areas and seaward flanks of ground campaigns. We believe that, as new construction with improved characteristics

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Footnote to page 1190:

[Footnote in the source text.]  

Footnote to page 1190:

[Footnote in the source text. For text of SE-36, see Document 552.]  

Footnote to page 1190:

The Director of Naval Intelligence believes that this paragraph should read as follows:

We believe the Bloc will continue its present emphasis on air defense, and that its capabilities in this respect will increase during the period of this estimate. Operational use of improved early warning and ground intercept radar, and the extensive employment of airborne intercept equipment will contribute to this increase. The development and production of all-weather jet fighters and guided missiles, which are within Bloc capabilities, would further improve Bloc air defense. However, we cannot estimate the significance of these improvements relative to future air offensive capabilities. [Footnote in the source text.]
becomes operational, emphasis will be laid on the creation of striking forces which could operate within the limits of the range of land-based air support. Bloc minelaying capability is extensive, and in the event of war, could seriously interfere with Allied sea communications in Europe and the Far East, or with Western naval operations in waters adjacent to the USSR. The Soviet submarine force will increase its capability to undertake offensive patrols and mining operations along most of the world's strategically vital sea lanes, and possibly, if the specialized craft have been developed, simultaneously to launch guided missile attacks against targets on both the Atlantic and Pacific seabords of the US. The Soviet Navy will have no long-range amphibious capabilities within the period of this estimate, but it will remain capable of mounting short-range amphibious operations in considerable force.

12. The principal sources of strength upon which Bloc political warfare capabilities are based will remain Bloc military power, which generates fear and defeatism, and the Bloc's size, strategic position, economic power and potential, and centralized direction. Other sources of Bloc political warfare strength are the highly organized Communist international movement, and the leadership and discipline of the individual Communist Parties; Communist ideas and doctrine, which influence many non-Communists as well as Communists; and the accumulated experience and professional skill of Soviet intelligence, propaganda, and subversive organizations and of Soviet use of front organizations. Finally, the fixity of Communist purpose to impose Communism on the world and the unified direction of Communist action give the Communists a tactical political warfare advantage in determining the nature, direction, and intensity of courses of action to be used against the non-Communist world.

13. It is difficult to estimate how Bloc political warfare capabilities will develop, since they depend to a large degree not only upon the situation within the USSR but also upon the success with which the non-Communist world meets the challenges to its stability which would exist even if there were no Communist threat. It is also difficult to estimate the development of Bloc political warfare capabilities because they are dependent not only on the relative attractive power of Communist and non-Communist ideas, but on the relative military strength of the Bloc and the West. If Western military strength should increase, relative to that of the Bloc, Bloc political warfare capabilities would probably decline. On the other

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8 We believe the USSR capable of adapting submarines to this use, but we have no evidence to indicate that such modifications have been made. [Footnote in the source text.]
hand, fear of war and consequent vulnerability to Bloc political warfare would probably increase in the non-Communist world, if the Bloc's capability to deliver atomic weapons should increase relative to Western defenses, and if the Bloc should improve its air defenses relative to Western offensive capabilities.  

14. We believe that during the period of this estimate Communist capabilities to establish Communist governments by political warfare techniques will be most likely to increase in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. These capabilities will probably remain greatest in Iran and Indochina.

15. In other areas of the world, Communist capabilities to influence the attitudes of non-Communist governments and peoples will constitute the principal danger posed by Bloc political warfare. The Communists may be able to undermine support for Western programs of defense and for increased political and economic unity, and they may be able to heighten tensions among the members of the Western coalition. For these purposes, they can exploit national differences between the Western Powers, economic and trade difficulties, nationalism in colonial and dependent areas, and dread of war.

[Here follow 12 of the 16 pages of the source text presenting a detailed discussion of the points made above.]

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The Director of Naval Intelligence believes this paragraph should read as follows in order to render the military hypothesis more realistic and inclusive:

It is difficult to estimate how Bloc political warfare capabilities will develop, since they depend to a large degree upon the situation within the USSR, the success with which the non-Communist world meets the challenges to its stability which would exist even if there were no Communist threat, and the relative military strengths of the Bloc and the West. Thus, Bloc political warfare capabilities will increase if the non-Communist world fails to solve adequately the problems of economic stability, national rivalries, common defense, and aspirations for independence in the colonial areas. If Western military strength and cohesion should increase substantially relative to that of the Bloc, Bloc political warfare capabilities would probably be checked, and might decline in some areas. On the other hand, if the over-all military strength of the Bloc should substantially increase relative to that of the West, Bloc political warfare capabilities would rise, particularly with respect to the promotion of appeasement, apathy, and the fear of war. [Footnote in the source text.]
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET

Moscow, July 7, 1953—10 p.m.

36. In view of fact that I will be absent for several weeks from Soviet Union and forthcoming tripartite Foreign Ministers meetings, I feel it appropriate to set forth certain conclusions concerning significant developments in Soviet Union since Stalin's death without waiting as had been my original intention for outcome of Korean armistice talks. The events on which these conclusions are based have been reported as they occurred with appropriate comment from this mission. It is wise and, indeed, essential to exercise the utmost prudence and skepticism concerning significance Soviet moves since Stalin's death. I believe that we can no longer without detriment to our purposes continue to dismiss the present phase of Soviet policy both internal and external as simply another "peace campaign" designed solely or even primarily to bemuse and divide the West. The events that have occurred here cumulatively add up, in my opinion, to something considerably more important, offering on the one hand more opportunities and on the other considerably more dangers than the standard propaganda gestures which we have seen since the end of the war.

I am impelled, in part, in this telegram by Deptel 163 which while directed primarily to satellite countries nonetheless in second paragraph contains estimate of present Soviet actions which I feel does not realistically accord with full scope events since Stalin's death. In order to avoid misinterpretation it is necessary to repeat certain fundamental premises:

1. The Soviet Union remains a totalitarian police dictatorship, reinforced by a highly integrated ideology and consequently basically continues to regard all countries and organizations which it does not control as basically hostile and no change in this respect can be anticipated as long as basic structure of Soviet society remains unaltered.

2. Stemming from above, Soviet policy naturally will always hope for disruption of any association or alliance inevitably regarded by them as hostile. It has, however, not been characteristic of Soviet policy and in my opinion still is not, to adopt measures which

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1This telegram is quoted at length in Bohlen, Witness to History, pp. 352-353.
2Regarding the considerations involved in Ambassador Bohlen's decision to go ahead with his vacation in France, see ibid., pp. 354-355.
3Not printed.
affect their internal power structure merely for the sake of some maneuver designed to confuse their enemies.

While events set in motion by Stalin's death in regard to the Soviet Union proper and its relations with satellite areas have by no means run their course, I believe there is sufficient evidence to warrant as reasonable assumptions the following considerations: (These, of course, should be viewed in the light of the constant possibility that future events either internal or external could radically affect their future validity.)

(1) Fear of general war—even before the death of Stalin there was evidence that the Soviet Government was becoming genuinely concerned as the prospect that the intensity of the cold war resulting from their attitude and actions in postwar world was leading to a situation where events could take over with the consequent automatic progression towards general war which I believe at all times the Soviet Union has been most anxious to avoid. Subsequent events since his death have confirmed view that this was the central purpose in the political field of Stalin's Bolshevik article with its assertion that contradictions between capitalist states were de facto stronger than the contradiction between the Soviet and non-Soviet world. The logic of this position would appear to have dictated a return to diplomacy as a means of furthering Soviet interest and averting the progression towards war.

(2) The death of Stalin, requiring an important if not yet basic reorganization of the direction of the Soviet Union, offered an opportunity to put this policy into operation as something new with the employment of methods impossible under Stalin's one-man dictatorship.

(3) Although evidence is insufficient to justify a firm conclusion on this point, it is possible that the economic strain of the multiple burden of great armament expenditures, capital investment and inflated public works programs plus the political necessity of making some concession to the material well-being of the people may be a factor.

(4) The problem following Stalin's death of retaining without the possibility of recourse to Stalin's methods of rule, the hold over the Eastern European satellites and the increasing complexity of relations with Communist China presented the new leadership with the almost definite necessity of some shift in policy in these fields.

Internal measures—While we simply do not know what forms of combinations or rivalries are transpiring in the upper reaches of the Soviet Government, I can only report that the principle of collective leadership as against one-man rule has been consistently and steadily developed in this country since Stalin's death. It has
been driven home not only in the central press and given ideological underpinnings in the theoretical party journals but also has been disseminated in depth according to our information in factory and party meetings throughout the country. It would be a folly to attempt to predict that this experiment in impersonal collective leadership will last indefinitely and we can never dismiss the possibility of dissension at top level or some other event which might radically change the current line. It can only be stated now as a matter of opinion that if there is a radical reversal of present tendency back to the state of arbitrary terror characteristic of Stalin’s rule, this would come as a shock to the population of this country and would impose severe strains on the system. The present lines on which new leadership is operating internally have become sufficiently clear to be identified and they all seem to point in the direction of a less rigorous and more “liberal” regime in Soviet terms of reference. They are:

(a) Primary emphasis on the necessity of improving the standard of living of the population as the chief “duty” of the party and government (a point which has been stressed in recent developments in East Germany and Hungary).

(b) Legality in the sense of less arbitrary exercise of police power and more respect for the right of the individual citizens.

(c) Emphasis on the nationality policy of respect for the internal and other national attributes of minorities in this country and their denunciation of the policy of Russification.

(d) As an essential accompaniment the skillful but nonetheless consistent destruction of the myth of Stalin’s infallibility and his relegation as a junior member of the Communist Valhalla with obviously carefully considered selection of what part of his policies or programs can be retained and what discarded.

In its foreign relations most evidence to date would indicate that the Soviet Government desires a return to diplomacy and a lessening of world tension for an indefinite period of time. It is too soon to say in what substantive fields they would be prepared to make concessions or abandon their previous hold over areas such as Eastern Germany, Austria, etc., in Europe. It looks, however, from here as though the series of moves that it has made—such as the note to Turkey, exchange of Ambassadors with Austria and Yugoslavia—are primarily designed to jettison the more senseless and unproductive positions in which Stalin had placed them and as preparation for some serious diplomatic action in the coming period. The most important events which have occurred in the field of Soviet action as against words would appear to be in Eastern Germany and to a considerably lesser degree in the satellite area. The new policy announced in early June for Eastern Germany which so far as we can ascertain from here has not been reversed by the events in Berlin.
on June 17, I do not believe can be solely dismissed as a “tactical” maneuver designed to influence West Germany opinion. They would appear to have been motivated as previously reported by recognition of bankruptcy of policy of forced draft Sovietization of Eastern Germany and possibly likewise to place Soviet Government in a better political position for serious discussions on German unification. There is no need to argue the point that the Soviet objective remains the prevention of German rearmament and incorporation into European defense system. But as distinct from previous efforts in this direction which were confined to propaganda and threats the present developments would appear to forecast a more serious political and diplomatic effort to achieve this objective.

The foregoing current analysis attempts only to hit the high points as I do not wish to overburden this message by unnecessary details or supporting evidence. My chief purpose in this message is to emphasize my belief that events behind iron curtain and especially here, are running in our favor and primary task at present is maintenance Western unity and confidence in US leadership. I can, however, if Department desires, supplement and elaborate foregoing from Paris if necessary.  

BOHLEN

*For information on the events in East Germany, see vol. vii, Part 2, pp. 1584 ff.
*See Document 602.

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**No. 601**

INR-NIE files

*Special Estimate*¹

**TOP SECRET**

WASHINGTON, July 8, 1953.

**SE-46**

**PROBABLE LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET BLOC AND WESTERN POWER POSITIONS**

**THE PROBLEM**

To estimate the probable relative development of the Soviet Bloc and Western Power positions over the next fifteen years, with a

¹Regarding Special Estimates, see footnote 1, Document 552.

According to a note on the cover sheet of this SE, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated with the CIA in the preparation of this estimate. The note further

*Continued*
view to estimating whether or not time is on our side in the East-West conflict.

ASSUMPTIONS

1. No general war.
2. Continuation of the present general trend of policies of both the Bloc and the Western Powers.²

ESTIMATE

3. We believe it essential to state at the outset that there is no unequivocal answer to the question "is time on our side." Even assuming a "continuation of the present general trend of policies of both the Bloc and the Western Powers" (itself an assumption of doubtful validity), there are so many accidental or unpredictable factors which will materially affect the world situation as to prevent any firm estimate of the relative Soviet Bloc and Western Power positions fifteen years from now. Moreover on the side of the anti-Communist countries, taking the NATO and so-called neutralist powers together, there are so many divergent trends that it is difficult to speak of a consistent trend of policy. Even within NATO itself, the chief unifying force lies in the agreement of the members to resist aggression against any one of them. However, it is possible to appraise in general terms our likely power position vis-à-vis the Bloc if present trends continue and if various major alternative developments do or do not come to pass. Moreover, by examining the impact of some of these alternatives, we can at least establish certain significant factors which might alter present trends.

Probable Economic Growth of Soviet Bloc and the West

4. The Soviet Bloc. At the present the over-all economic strength of the Soviet Bloc is far less than that of the Western Powers; in terms of gross national product (GNP), the 1952 output of the entire Bloc is estimated to have been about one-third that of the Western states.³ However, assuming a continuation of present policies and programs, the economic strength of the Soviet Bloc will increase greatly over the next 10-15 years. For some years the rate of growth of the Soviet economy will almost certainly remain higher than that of any major Western state. However, the past

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²The Western Powers are taken to include the US and its allies. [Footnote in the source text.]
³For the purpose of these economic projections, the Western Powers include the US, the European NATO countries, West Germany, Canada, Australia, and Japan. [Footnote in the source text.]
rapid rate of growth, which we estimate averaged 7–8 percent in 1948–1952, is already leveling off and the annual rate toward the end of the period is unlikely to exceed 3–4 percent. Even so, total Soviet GNP will probably almost double within the next fifteen years, while Bloc GNP as a whole will increase around 75 percent.

5. Bloc economic capabilities to wage war are likely to increase substantially since the Bloc will probably continue to place great emphasis on the development of heavy industry, and in particular on military production. Bloc self-sufficiency, already great, will probably become more nearly complete.

6. These projections may be invalidated by other factors. A prolonged struggle for power or internal dissension in the Soviet Bloc might dissipate Soviet energies. A relaxation in the forced pace of heavy industrial development would probably reduce the rate of increase in Bloc capabilities to wage a major war. The difficulty of rapidly increasing the industrial labor force in the USSR and the probable lag in agriculture production may prove more serious limiting factors on general economic growth than we now estimate. On the other hand, the application of known scientific developments to Bloc agriculture, though this would require large-scale investments, would permit greater increases in Bloc agricultural production and the release of agricultural labor for other uses.

7. The West. It is more difficult to estimate the probable economic growth of the Western Powers. The freer and less closely integrated Western economies, particularly those of the major US allies, are more vulnerable to economic fluctuations and trends in international trade than those of the Bloc. Much will depend upon the ability of the Western Powers to establish a pattern of production and of international trade and payments which will provide such countries as the UK, Germany, and Japan with adequate markets, and in general will permit a steady economic growth, US resources and policies will be of critical importance in this field. However, assuming a continuation of present trends and no serious depressions, we estimate the probable growth in US GNP at about 56 percent over the next fifteen years, and at almost 50 percent for the Western Powers as a whole.

8. However, the Western Powers will continue to face much greater difficulties than the Soviet Bloc in allocating and directing their resources toward cold war objectives and peacetime preparations for hot war. Their ability (and desire) to impose peacetime sacrifices will be less, and the problems of agreeing on common objectives and devising effective policies among nations of different and sometimes divergent interests will remain difficult to overcome.
9. While Bloc GNP will probably increase at a higher rate than that of the Western Powers and the ratio of Western superiority will therefore decrease, the GNP of the West is already so much greater than that of the Bloc that the absolute gap between the two will widen despite the lower rate of Western growth. Thus the West will remain for the indefinite future greatly superior to the Soviet Bloc in total economic strength.

10. However, certain factors decrease the significance of over-all economic growth and resources as a factor in the world power balance. The ability of the totalitarian Soviet Bloc to devote a high percentage of its resources both to the cold war and to peacetime military preparation will probably remain greater than that of the West. Moreover, for reasons stated in paragraphs 13–18 the continuing economic superiority of the West, although important, may not be the ruling factor in determining whether time is on our side.

**Probable Scientific Capabilities of the West and the Soviet Bloc**

11. The over-all scientific assets of the West (numbers and quality of trained personnel, facilities, and equipment) are now far greater than those of the Soviet Bloc, and almost certainly will remain greater over the next fifteen years. However, the USSR is expending great efforts to reduce this disparity, and is likely to narrow the gap between it and the West, even though the Western Powers probably will produce more basic scientific advances, and will continue, in general, to be better able to translate prototypes into quantity production of high quality. Moreover, the Bloc may concentrate excessively on the solution of short-term military and economic problems, thus narrowing the range of fundamental research and diminishing the probability of basic scientific advances.

12. It is impossible to estimate whether the power relationships between the Soviet Bloc and the West will be changed during the period of this estimate by any major technological breakthrough by either side, such, for example, as the initial production of the atomic bomb by the US in 1945.

**Probable Trends in the Military Capabilities of the West and the Soviet Bloc**

13. We believe that throughout the next fifteen years the West will maintain a substantial absolute advantage in capabilities for atomic warfare, but that the Bloc will gradually reduce this advantage. Within the period of this estimate both US and USSR will

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4To project these trends to 1975, Bloc GNP is estimated to increase on the order of 125 percent while Western GNP increases only 70 percent, thus altering the ratio to roughly 2:1 in favor of the West. On the other hand, the actual disparity in favor of the West will become even greater, from around $360 billion in 1952 to some $500 billion by 1975. [Footnote in the source text.]
produce a sufficient stockpile of atomic and possibly thermonuclear weapons to cripple the other side, if delivered on targets. The US, if it has not already acquired this number of weapons, will do so before the USSR does.

14. Assuming a continuation of present general trends of policies of both the Bloc and the Western Powers, it is likely that within the period of this estimate the West and USSR will each have the means of delivery with which to cripple the other, unless developments in defensive weapons and techniques permit a substantial improvement over present defensive capabilities. At that point the world will have entered a period in which both of the great power blocs have the capacity to cripple the other, though only at equally grave risk of crippling blows in return. Unless it attained complete strategic surprise or achieved an unforeseen technological breakthrough, we believe that neither side would be able to prevent powerful retaliation in kind. In the absence of general war, however, the ruthlessness of the Soviet rulers and the fear which they inspire among many Western peoples may enable them to use the possession of atomic capabilities as an instrument of pressure in the cold war.

15. The US is losing, if it has not already lost, its longstanding invulnerability to crippling attack, and with it the immense strategic advantage of being able to conduct the traditionally deliberate and extensive post-D-Day mobilization. We cannot estimate the time at which the USSR will attain the capability to cripple US war-making capacity, but it is probably well within the period of this estimate. At that time, despite probable US retention of a sizable margin of technological superiority and superior atomic offensive capabilities, this continued disparity will become much less significant, at least in regard to bombardment of strategic targets.

16. On the other hand, the continuing superiority of the West over the Bloc in atomic capabilities will nevertheless represent a considerable advantage, because of developing tactical uses of atomic weapons. It is likely that the West will, during the period of this estimate, remain superior to the Soviet Bloc in capabilities for tactical use of atomic weapons, whether in general or in local war.

17. The development of Bloc and Western Power positions during the next fifteen years will be significantly affected by their relative conventional military capabilities, with or without the accompanying use of atomic weapons. Bloc military forces are being continuously modernized and strengthened, and will continue to pose a se-

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6For the purpose of this estimate “to cripple” means to destroy quickly a very large proportion of the resources required by the other side to wage continuing general war. [Footnote in the source text.]
rious threat to areas around the Bloc periphery. The West will probably remain superior to the Bloc in quality of weapons, in the application of technology to military uses, and in its ability to control the seas. The West will increase substantially its relative power position if it can develop local military capabilities in key areas around the Bloc periphery and can maintain forces-in-being capable of quick dispatch to such areas in case of emergency.

18. Moreover, attainment of the capability to defend Western Europe and Japan against Soviet attack would significantly improve the power position of the West. The resources of these areas, their geographical location, and their considerable technological potential, contribute substantially to Western strength. The extent to which the West will attain the capability of defending these areas will depend on Western and other policy decisions. Much will also depend, in this connection, on the degree of progress which is made in regard to the reararmament and anti-Soviet orientation of West Germany and Japan.

Probable Trends in the Political and Social Strength and Cohesion of the Soviet Bloc and the West

19. Probable Trends in the Soviet Bloc. Political and social trends will have an important, and perhaps controlling effect on the relative power positions of the Bloc and the West and are most difficult to estimate over so long a period as the next fifteen years. During this period it is possible that a struggle for control within the Kremlin might cause a retraction and decay of Soviet power. Whether such developments will take place or at what extent they would begin to have a material effect on the power position of the Soviet Bloc cannot be estimated at this time. At present, however, we see no indications that the economic and military bases of Soviet power have been affected by Stalin’s death.

20. In any case we believe it unsafe to assume that over the next 10–15 years the Soviet regime will lose its stability or the Bloc its cohesion. While the more flexible policies of the post-Stalin regime and the modest relaxation of tight Soviet controls may permit periodic overt manifestations of discontent behind the Iron Curtain, over the long run these very policies may also tend to lengthen the Kremlin’s lease on power. The possibility exists that Communist China may attempt to play an increasingly independent role. Should this potential weakness develop into a break between the two chief Communist states, it would be a major loss to Soviet power.

21. Trends in the Political and Social Strength and Cohesion of the West. Because of the greater diversity of the looser Western coalition and the variety of forces at play within it, we find it even
more difficult to project probable trends in Western strength and cohesion as they affect the global balance of power. However, at no time in the foreseeable future will the Western Powers be likely to attain or to desire to attain the centralized control to mobilize their resources characteristic of the totalitarian Soviet Bloc. In general, they will probably continue to be more subject to internal conflicts, economic fluctuations, and divisive influences than the Bloc. Much will depend on international economic developments, on future Soviet policy, on the future position of major nations like Germany, Japan, and India and, above all, on the role played by the acknowledged leader of the Western coalition, the US itself.

22. As the only single aggregation of resources outside the US itself comparable to the Soviet Bloc, Western Europe plays a major role in the world power balance. Its continued weaknesses, such as dependence on US aid, lack of a sense of urgency regarding the Communist threat, disputes between France and Germany, and French and Italian instability, constitute a major vulnerability of the Western Powers, while Western Europe’s acquisition by the Bloc would be a tremendous increment to Soviet power. The reappearance of a strong and viable Western Europe, including Germany, would substantially decrease Western vulnerability and alter the present power relationship between the Soviet Bloc and the West to the advantage of the latter.

23. On the other hand, we see many obstacles to the achievement of this objective. We believe that a primary concern of the Kremlin over the coming period will be to frustrate the development of a viable and defensible Western Europe. In this effort the Kremlin will almost certainly concentrate on the key to the European situation, the German problem. If a shift in Soviet policy on Germany, for example, led the Germans to accept a united, armed and neutral Germany, it would introduce a new factor of great significance into the world power balance. Such a development, if accepted by our NATO allies, would not necessarily weaken the Western position. A rearmed and neutral Germany would act as a buffer state, and if the Germans were subsequently to abandon neutrality, we believe that they would be more likely to align themselves with the West than with the Bloc.

24. The emergence of a rearmed, anti-Communist Japan would be a major asset in restoring the strategic balance in the Far East. However, the degree of future Japanese cooperation with the US will depend largely on the extent to which the Western alignment not only meets Japan’s needs for security and foreign markets, but also satisfies its expectations for economic and military aid and for treatment as an equal.
25. Probable Trends in the Strength and Alignment of "Gray" Areas. A major difficulty facing the West is represented by the extreme political and social instability of the underdeveloped areas of the Middle and Far East and Africa, where profound social changes are in progress, entailing in many areas disorder and consequent vulnerability to Communist influences. The anti-Western overtones of this political and social revolution create an additional obstacle to the utilization by the West of the resources of these regions. The consequent danger to the Western position is acute in some areas of Southeast Asia and the Middle East. None of these areas is likely to develop into an important center of power during the period of this estimate, but their loss would nevertheless be a serious blow to the West. For example, the loss of Indochina, which is possible, would probably result in eventual loss of most of mainland Southeast Asia. This in turn would lead to worsened prospects for stability in the Indian subcontinent, and to greatly increased difficulties in maintaining the pro-Western orientation of Japan. A Communist takeover in Iran, which is also possible, would jeopardize the already unstable Western position in the Middle East.

26. On the other hand, the trend toward greater instability and vulnerability to Communist influence in the underdeveloped areas is not irreversible. Western control of influence is still paramount in these areas. Over the next 10-15 years the US and its allies still have the opportunity to undertake actions which might arrest this trend and maintain that influence.

27. Possible Effects of a Kremlin Shift to Soft Tactics. We believe that a prolonged Kremlin shift to more moderate tactics would also present a real challenge to further growth in the military strength and the cohesion of Western Powers. To date the US has succeeded in creating and partially rearming a defensive coalition under the impetus of an acute Soviet threat. Should this threat appear to diminish, it will be difficult to maintain the support of Western peoples for continued rearmament, close integration of national policies, and vigorous anti-Communist efforts. The likelihood of divisions among the Western Powers, especially if encouraged by skillful Kremlin action, would markedly increase. It might lead, over the longer run, to some of our allies adopting more neutral positions, or even to the creation of a European "Third Force." On the other hand, a decrease of cold war tensions might allow many Western countries to concentrate on domestic needs and to devote more resources to meeting their own economic and social problems. It is possible, however, that a rearmament slow-down would instead lead to unemployment of manpower and resources.

28. A prolonged relaxation of tensions might also have an adverse effect on the cohesion and vitality of the world Communist
apparatus and hence on the Soviet power position. Soviet leaders are under some compulsion to pursue an aggressive policy in order to preserve the Communist ideology as a vital force. Any pronounced subduing of the irreconcilable hostility motif might serve to soften the rank-and-file of foreign Communist parties, and to breed restlessness in countries under Kremlin control. Moreover, without keeping active the concept of permanent conflict between Communists and non-Communists, Moscow might have difficulty in maintaining voluntary adherence of “socialist states” (e.g., Communist China and Viet Minh) and their willingness to undertake direct action in the interest of the USSR.

Is Time on Our Side?

29. We believe that the Soviet Bloc under present policies and programs will over the next 10–15 years decrease the proportion by which its economic and technological capabilities are inferior to those of the West and will acquire sufficient atomic capabilities to cripple the US. Therefore, although the West will probably retain a sizable absolute margin of superiority, we believe that in these respects time must be said to be on the Soviet side.

30. In other respects, time may be on the side of the West. The West’s military capabilities will increase during the next fifteen years if conventional rearmament programs and tactical applications of unconventional weapons enhance its present defensive capabilities in overseas areas. The extent to which these developments are likely to occur depends on Western and other policy decisions.

31. Trends can be identified within both the West and the Bloc which might undermine each side’s political stability and cohesion. We cannot predict, however, that these trends will have such effects and certainly we cannot say that they would do so within the period of this estimate.

a. Trends now seem to be running against the West in the underdeveloped areas. If these trends cannot be arrested, the consequent growth of instability and Communist influence in these areas may eventually have serious effects on the economic stability and pro-Western orientation of Western Europe and Japan.

b. While there is no reason at this time to predict the Bloc’s decay or collapse, the possibility exists of certain changes adverse to its present strength and stability. Internal rigidity may deprive the USSR of that flexibility and vitality which contribute to a political system’s survival and growth. Alternatively, the Kremlin may decide to modify and relax its previous policies, only to find that this relaxation adversely affects continuing Soviet economic growth, Satellite stability, and Sino-Soviet cohesion. It would be unsafe, however, to assume that the problems which are inherent in the Soviet system will of themselves have reached critical pro-
portions within the next fifteen years. Unless they do, the totalitarian nature of the Soviet system and the Kremlin’s pervasive control or influence over its Bloc partners will continue to provide it with many advantages over the less cohesive coalition led by the US.

32. Even under the assumption of “continuation of the present general trend of policies in both the Bloc and the Western Powers,” there are so many accidental or unpredictable factors which could alter present trends, that we are unable to conclude that time is on the side of either the Soviet Bloc or the West. Though a few of the components of power can be projected with fair confidence, the relative overall development of the power positions of the West and Soviet Bloc cannot be predicted.

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No. 602

661.00/7-955: Telegram

_The Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State^1_

TOP SECRET

PARIS, July 9, 1953—7 p. m.

133. What I had in mind in statement referred to Department’s 100^2 was that standard propaganda gestures of peace campaigns since the war exposed themselves before they had done any basic damage to Western unity and purposes, whereas recent events affecting the foreign field might forecast serious diplomatic effort on the part of Soviets to settle some outstanding questions, such as Austria and Germany, and normalization of relations with other countries while leaving intact the basic structure of Soviet Union with all its possibilities for concealing increasing military potential. Such a course of action by the Soviet Government, if it materialized, would result in making more difficult the holding together of Western alliance and maintenance leadership of the United States. If such a course of action was accompanied by serious efforts in the field of trade, judging from present indications, many European and other non-Soviet nations of the world would be inclined to neglect essential elements of national defense. In the Russian field, I believe, it has generally been felt that more flexible techniques by Soviet Government in foreign relations could, without sacrificing essential Soviet power position be more dangerous in long run than

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^1Transmitted via the facilities of the Embassy in Paris. Ambassador Bohlen arrived in Paris on July 8 with his family on holiday.

^2Telegram 100 requested an elaboration of the last sentence of Document 600.
rigid, aggressive technique of Stalin regime which had since the end of the war driven home the Soviet menace to the free world. The statement in question was in the foregoing context and would not be valid if internal and satellite events since Stalin’s death lead to a radical alteration in basic structure Soviet state and its control over satellites, which it is still much too soon to predict. The danger I had in mind, of course, could be very much mitigated if the current Soviet policy was met by unity, skillful diplomacy and calmness by the three Western powers. I have dealt only with the statements referred to, but likewise would elaborate on any other part of Moscow’s 36.³

³Document 600.

No. 603

Editorial Note

At a meeting on the morning of July 10, the Cabinet, presided over by President Eisenhower and including Nixon, Dulles, Humphrey, Wilson, Allen Dulles, and others, considered the situation in Russia. The minutes of the Cabinet meeting record the discussion as follows:

“Mr. Allen Dulles characterized the ousting of Beria as a tremendous shock to the Russian people, suggested that the army may be augmenting its power, and advised that this development does not necessarily mean that Malenkov has consolidated his position.

“(Mr. Allen Dulles left the meeting after this discussion.)

“Mr. C. D. Jackson spoke briefly on the great opportunity presented by the Beria affair for developing passive resistance in the satellite states and on the desirability of presenting the Russian Government with a series of notes concerning food, atrocities, trade unions, and slave labor. He hoped that the Foreign Ministers meeting would produce a resounding statement for German free elections.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman file, Cabinet series)
TOP SECRET

PARIS, July 10, 1953—6 p. m.

150. In attempting to assess the political significance of the announcement of Beria's arrest, I believe it important to recognize that Beria's arrest in all probability, if not certainty, occurred on June 27 or immediately prior thereto. The rumor in Moscow of his disgrace was as reported linked to his absence at the opera on the night of June 27 coupled with the sight of tanks proceeding to the center of the town at approximately 5 p.m. that day. Since, in general, rumors affecting top Soviet personnel follow and do not precede the event, I believe we can accept the fact that his arrest occurred some 12 days prior to its announcement. I would therefore suggest that the actions taken by the Soviet Government since June 27 in the political field, in particular the announcement of the new policy in Hungary, made on July 4, should be carefully examined before arriving at any hard and fast conclusion that Beria was the proponent of the line of relaxation. I can only state on this score that I have not seen any evidence since my arrival in Moscow to confirm this view.

While there is no evidence to the contrary, in the logic of things it is at least questionable whether the head of the secret police by the nature of his responsibility would be in favor of relaxation with all of its obvious consequences.

In my opinion the point to watch with particular attention is the extent and depth of the purge throughout the Soviet Union which may follow the arrest of Beria. A large scale purge of the type which would certainly have followed during Stalin's time an event of this importance would require a reversal of internal and external policies pursued by the new direction since the death of Stalin. I believe that until this element in that situation clarifies that it is not possible to assess the full political significance of his arrest.

I expect to be in Paris for at least 3 or 4 more days and am telling the press that there is no change in my plans, but will of course await Department's instructions.

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1 Repeated for information to Moscow. Bohlen was in France on holiday.

2 For a personal recollection of the development of his view on the fall of Beriya, see Bohlen, Witness to History, pp. 354-355.
Record of Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles), Washington, July 10, 1953, 12:40 p. m.  

1. The Secretary phoned his brother and asked how he came out with McCarthy? Allen Dulles read him a ticker, which was McCarthy's version of the bout. He said it was something of a draw, he wasn't making any statement, and it would be resumed on Tuesday. He said McCarthy was in an ugly mood having been slapped down pretty hard yesterday, but Mundt was helpful, Potter mum, and Dirksen absent. The general tenor of McCarthy's statement was that CIA was neither sacrosanct nor immune from investigation.

2. The Secretary said that on the Russian thing his views, and those of the Department were at variance with those expressed at Cabinet by Allen and C. D. Jackson.  

2. We think it presages a tougher policy and return to Stalinism. The Secretary said he had gone back to his bible (Problems of Leninism) and quoted extensively from it to prove his point. Allen did not think that there comparable men to replace those executed in these days, and felt that the army must have been with Malenkov. Also he thought, based on the theater party, that this had been decided about 10 days ago and there were new evidences of softness since then, the reforms in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, which sort of upset State's theory.

Jackson had made the statement that we should not accept an armistice at this time. The Secretary said that Beetle and the staff feel it is less likely that we will get one, that there is a likelihood that there will be more nationalistic policy which make our chances recede rather than advance. Allen thought armies were always more cautious than politicians, and they might want an armistice. It is his theory that it would be an awful gamble but that an armistice would remove one of the pressures—and he would like to stall for a couple of weeks, Orientals are good at that. If there is a serious breakdown it might pay off. The Secretary could not see how Korea offers us any chances right now. Allen said that he had a new cable in on the German situation which he would have Emory show to MacArthur, it predicts that the workers are planning another blowup there. The Secretary mentioned his decision

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1Prepared by Burnita O'Day, personal secretary to Secretary Dulles.
2See Document 603. The “Russian thing” presumably refers to the announced downfall of Beriya.
on Bohlen, he said he was embarrassed by his being in Paris on vacation after actually predicting that this might happen, it would appear that he knew nothing about it.

3Earlier in the afternoon (at 12:10 p.m.) Secretary Dulles called Senator William Knowland of California. The record of the conversation reads as follows:

"The Secretary telephoned the Senator and said in view of the Russian development he would like to have Bohlen come to Washington for the Foreign Ministers' meetings. He had actually cabled us that this was likely to happen, and since he is fresh from the spot it would be useful. Would it have any adverse political possibilities on the Hill? Knowland did not think so, but thought as an antidote we ought to bring in Radford or Ridgway too."

"The Secretary also spoke to the Vice President about this—who agreed with Knowland's judgment and offered the idea of planting the story that Bohlen had predicted this, in several places, to build Bohlen up and prove that it was a good appointment. The Secretary said we were doing so but to go ahead too." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers)

This same record also indicates that Assistant Secretary Merchant was instructed to telephone Bohlen in Paris.

Bohlen's recollection of his conversations with Washington at this time and the request that he return for consultation is described in Bohlen, Witness to History, pp. 355–356. This recollection, not confirmed by any documentation in Department of State files, includes a late evening conversation between Bohlen and the Secretary at the latter's home.

No. 606

700.000/S/7-1653: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions in Europe

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 16, 1953—1 a.m.

Infotel. US representative on North Atlantic Council has reported to Council on US-UK-French Foreign Ministers talks along following lines: Re USSR and satellites there was general agreement that while too early to determine exact significance Beria purge, it may mean tougher nationalistic Soviet line; recent softer internal Soviet line very possibly caused by pressure of public opinion within USSR as well as in satellites especially eastern Germany and Hungary; peace offensive destined as offensive weapon against West has boomeranged against Soviets at home; while situation still unclear, major events obviously taking place and at rhythm unprecedentedly rapid in communist world; basic policies of West have been successful, particularly in preventing consolidation Soviet world, and should be pursued without faltering; at same time tactical flexibility in application our policies should be pre-


served to take advantage of developments in USSR; West should support and develop hopes of satellite peoples for eventual freedom while avoiding inciting open revolt. Agreed on necessity reaffirm publicly and vigorously policy their governments in support European unification and EDC in particular. Ministers considered danger inherent in holding four-power talks with USSR before establishment EDC but felt proposal such talks might help Adenauer in German elections and also assist EDC ratification in France. US and UK Foreign Ministers stressed that EDC would remain firm in policy their governments and that four-power talks would not be permitted reopen question of EDC. (Additional information contained in Wireless Bulletin July 14.)

DULLES

No. 607

761.00/8-1053: Telegram

_The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State_¹

CONFIDENTIAL

MOSCOW, August 10, 1953—7 p. m.

188. Malenkov's speech before Supreme Soviet² is certainly the most important and realistic statement of current Soviet policy since Stalin’s death, especially on internal affairs and should be studied most carefully by research and analysis sections US Government. It contains considerably more statistical material and realism on future internal economic and agricultural policy than has appeared for some years. Before adding Embassy’s interpretive comments to this speech I would like to mention certain personal impressions of recent session Supreme Soviet as affecting top leadership.

It was apparent from all proceedings at Supreme Soviet and attitude of his associates that Malenkov is unquestionably dominant figure in present Soviet leadership. In addition Malenkov is by far the best Soviet orator that any foreigner present in Moscow can recall. He is extremely clear and forceful speaker and creates impression of great realism and self-confidence. Malenkov’s speech and measures adopted by Supreme Soviet make it clear that Beria removal has not brought about a reversal in any major policy lines that have been emerging since Stalin’s death.

¹Repeated for information to Paris, London, and Bonn.
²For extensive extracts from this address, delivered on Aug. 8, see _Documents (R.I.I.A.)_ for 1953, pp. 22–33.
As to speech itself, section on internal economic policy is in Embassy's opinion more interesting than that devoted to foreign affairs. It is apparent that present leadership and particularly Malenkov himself is in considerably closer touch with Soviet economic reality than in time of Stalin. His account of economic situation, deficiencies and requirements was sober and factual. It is especially significant that it lays down a new emphasis for Soviet economic development. As is well known and as Malenkov himself said, Soviet Government has, since end NEP, concentrated its attention on expansion heavy industry and largely neglected consumers' goods supply. Now Malenkov says USSR is able to and intends to devote great efforts to production and distribution consumers' goods. Heavy industry will not be neglected but Malenkov deeply committed Soviet Government to devote an increased portion its economic effort to light industry and to bring about in next two to three years radical increase in supply consumers' goods. Moreover, it is clear that government is also adopting fiscal policies and issuing directives which will provide other increased advantages, e.g., housing and hospitals to people of this country.

As an important adjunct to this plan for improving low living standards, Soviet Government is making a shift in its attitude towards peasantry. Since collectivization drive first began over 20 years ago government's efforts have been unceasingly directed toward increasing, improving and encouraging collective sector of agriculture and toward reducing and discouraging private sector. Now Malenkov says private sector will be assisted and encouraged. Although Soviet Government has no intention of changing its basic collectivization policy, past ability of private agriculture to survive even in face of official hostility makes conceivable that line announced by Malenkov may have far reaching effects in countryside and involve regime in future difficulties with the peasantry. The reduction in agricultural taxes on private sector adopted by Supreme Soviet which is published in detail today in press will be analyzed and reported by despatch.

In section on foreign affairs, aside from implied claim on hydrogen bomb, Malenkov followed with somewhat different emphasis line which has been developing since Stalin's death. While attacks on US somewhat sharper, this had been forecast by Soviet press in recent weeks. Malenkov seemed primarily to be expressing chronic fear of dictatorship against any appearance weakness before foreign pressure together with standard Soviet line that threats et cetera, do not work against Soviets. He was obviously attempting to paint picture of international scene in which all countries except US are interested in reducing international tension while US is solely interested in "cold war". In this he was shrewd enough to
pick out incidents such as chess players and statements which lend themselves to this interpretation. While maintaining Soviet adherence to principles of settlement of disputes by negotiation, including those at issue between USA and Soviet Union, Malenkov avoided any specific mention of Four-Power conference and merely stated that “negotiations between the great powers could of course play a considerable role. Naturally the appropriate premises must be created for this”. The brevity and vagueness of Malenkov’s remarks on this portion increases Embassy’s belief that USSR not particularly eager for highly publicized conference at this time but seems to favor other forms diplomatic negotiation. Reference to China’s right to UN seat has become obligatory gesture to China in present Soviet statements but on Germany Malenkov was somewhat more specific in his flat opposition to German rearmament and his attempt to establish identity Soviet-French interests on this point. In passing over relations with UK with one brief phrase Malenkov may be attempting to contrast unfavorably present British policy with that expressed by Churchill in May.³

In general, with exception noted, Malenkov’s speech in foreign section as well represents continuance and emphasis main line of Soviet policy since Stalin’s death which tend to bear out view that these changes stem from sources deeper than simple maneuver or even function of palace intrigues.⁴

BOHLEN

³Reference is presumably to Churchill’s foreign policy address to the House of Commons on May 11; see Document 595.
⁴Secretary Dulles offered his own extensive analysis of Malenkov’s address during his press and radio news conference on Aug. 12; for text of the statement, see Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 24, 1953, p. 236.

No. 608

601.6111/8-1453

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Under Secretary of State (Smith)¹

CONFIDENTIAL  [WASHINGTON,] August 14, 1953.
Subject: Relaxation of United States Travel Controls on Soviet Personnel

¹Drafted by Stoessel (EE); approved by Thurston and Bonbright (EUR); and concurred in by RA, BNA, WE, P, and SCA. The source text bears Smith’s notation: “OK”.
Discussion:

Several of the NATO countries, notably the United Kingdom and France, believe that their travel controls on Soviet representatives should be relaxed in response to the modification of travel controls in the USSR. We have opposed such relaxation pending experience with the new Soviet regulations, as well as on the grounds that controls in NATO countries are still much less onerous than those prevailing in the USSR.

The British Embassy has recently advised us that the United Kingdom believes it must make some relaxation of British controls over Soviet personnel due to public pressure. The French propose to relax their control regardless of what other NATO countries do.

Travel opportunities for our personnel at Moscow have actually increased considerably as a result of the new Soviet travel regulations. This, plus our desire to maintain NATO unity regarding travel controls, leads us to feel that we should now relax our controls to the extent of granting blanket permission Soviet representatives in Washington to travel to Chesapeake Bay without prior notification. While such permission was granted last year, it was refused this year as a means of pressuring the Soviets into granting improved facilities to our personnel at Moscow.

A telegram* was sent to Moscow asking if the Embassy perceived objection to granting blanket permission to travel to the Chesapeake Bay. Ambassador Bohlen has replied† that he sees no objection.

Recommendation:

Approve granting blanket permission for Soviet personnel to travel to the Chesapeake Bay.

*Telegram 98 to Moscow, Aug. 12, not printed. (601.6111/8-1253)
†Telegram 202 to Moscow, Aug. 13, not printed. (601.6111/8-1353)

No. 609

Editorial Note

On September 11, Under Secretary Walter Bedell Smith called in Soviet Ambassador Zarubin and presented to him an aide-mémoire, dated September 11, on the question of the Soviet lend-lease settlement negotiations and particularly the failure of the Soviet Government to return lend-lease vessels to the United States. Under Secretary Smith urged a prompt reply. For a brief review of the substance of the meeting, see the statement issued to the press by
the Department of State on September 11, in Department of State Bulletin, September 21, 1953, page 391.

On October 20, Ambassador Zarubin addressed a note to Secretary Dulles expressing the willingness of the Soviet Government to discuss technical arrangements for the transfer of 186 naval craft obtained by the Soviet Union under the Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942. Further exchanges of notes on November 24 and December 3, 24, and 26, led to the holding on December 28 of the first of a resumed series of working group meetings on the United States-USSR lend-lease settlement negotiations. Regarding these working group meetings, see Document 614. For texts of the notes cited above, see Department of State Bulletin, January 11, 1954, pages 44-47. Documentation on the exchanges of notes described and related topics is primarily in file 761.56.

No. 610

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "USSR"

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie)\(^1\)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 14, 1953.


(Reference:

Your Memorandum of September 28, 1953;\(^2\)

Mr. Knight’s Memorandum of October 2, 1953;

Mr. Beam’s Memorandum of October 6, 1953;\(^3\)

Mr. Adair’s Memorandum of October 7, 1953.\(^4\))

In your memorandum of September 28, 1953 you requested a statement of views concerning problems which might be capable of

\(^1\)Drafted by Stoessel (EE) and cleared by Barbour (EE), Ridgway B. Knight (EUR/WG), and Ben Tillman Moore, Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs.

\(^2\)Bowie’s memorandum reads:

“At a meeting Saturday morning, September 26, on the German and Austrian problems, the Secretary raised the question as to which of the problems, among those currently at issue between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., might be capable of being discussed separately with the Soviets with some degree of success and which were too interdependent for separate solution.

“In order to follow up on this question, I would appreciate a brief memo of your views concerning the interdependence or separability of the various problems outstanding between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.” (PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “USSR”)

\(^3\)Neither Knight’s nor Beam’s memorandum is printed.

\(^4\)Not printed. Charles W. Adair, Jr., of the Office of European Regional Affairs.
being discussed separately by the US with the Soviets, as opposed to those problems which are so interdependent that separate US-Soviet negotiations concerning them would not be possible.

Consideration of the possibility of separate US-Soviet negotiations regarding outstanding problems at issue involves two questions: (1) agreement between the US and the USSR as to the degree of interdependence of issues involved; and (2) the propriety of individual action on the part of the US in connection with problems which are of direct interest to our Allies.

With regard to the first question, it seems clear, as pointed out in Mr. Adair's memorandum (copy attached), that the USSR is presently endeavoring to attribute a high degree of interdependence to the major problems at issue between us. Whereas we are attempting to promote a separate solution of the Austrian question, for example, the Soviets take the position that this question is linked with a German settlement, which in turn is said to be related to general problems of international tension, including those in the Far East. This line is calculated to postpone concrete discussion of Austria and Germany, as well as insuring that, if negotiations are ever undertaken on the basis of the Soviet request for a review of the broad range of problems at issue, the USSR will stand to gain propaganda advantages through offering appealing concessions in one problem area but only in return for impossible or highly undesirable concessions from our side in another area. There is no reason to suppose that this attitude on the part of the USSR will change in the near future since, while the USSR seems disposed to seek a temporary abatement of the more extreme forms of international tension, there is no indication that the USSR finds it necessary to abandon its position of opposition to the US on basic problems at issue. Viewed in this light, it does not appear likely that the USSR would be willing to agree to negotiate seriously with the US on any separate political problems of major importance. It is possible, however, that the Soviets would be agreeable to talking with us regarding problems of relatively minor significance.

With regard to the second question raised above, that of the propriety of individual action on our part in connection with problems of direct interest to our Allies, it would appear that this consideration alone would preclude us from undertaking separate negotiations on the German and Austrian questions, regarding which our tripartite position is so well established and so far advanced. The same would hold true, we believe, with regard to Indochina, in view of the direct French interest there.

While we think that the prospects of negotiations between the US and the USSR regarding problems of major importance are not
favorable, there are discussed below certain issues which could conceivably be discussed on a separate basis:

1. Armaments Controls: Although we have emphasized in the past that this is a matter to be discussed in the forum of the UN, and have stressed that armament control is something which is, in fact, linked with problems of world tension and can only be resolved after tensions are lessened, it would be possible to justify an initiative on our part for direct talks with the USSR on the basis of the necessity for agreement between the two major atomic powers if armament control is to be successful. Such an initiative might be accepted by the Soviets as presenting an opportunity to negotiate endlessly without reaching agreement. This would offer us the possibility of at least talking with the Soviets on armament control, although it is difficult to see any other advantages accruing from it, in view of the unrealism of discussing armament control, in the absence of any change in the basic hostility of the USSR to the non-Soviet world and the virtual certainty that the Soviet state in its present form could never agree to a verification system satisfactory to the US.

2. Korea: We have represented the UN in negotiations with the Communist side in Korea and it would therefore appear appropriate, from the standpoint of our Allies, to approach the USSR directly regarding aspects of a Korean settlement. It is doubted, however, if the USSR would be prepared to involve itself directly in negotiations on Korea or to consider changes in the status quo in Korea in an exclusive context. Soviet agreement to a united, non-Communist Korea appears unlikely under any circumstances, and in any event could not be obtained without the granting of Western concessions in regard to other issues which we would consider undesirable.

3. Berlin: While there is a clear tripartite interest in Berlin, there is a precedent for direct US-Soviet negotiations regarding Berlin which was set in the Malik–Jessup talks leading to the lifting of the blockade. Since the Soviets must be presumed, especially after June 17, to be more anxious than ever to weaken the position of the Western allies in Berlin, they probably could be persuaded to discuss the problem of Berlin separately in the hope of obtaining favorable concessions. However, given the diametrical opposition of the US and Soviet objectives in Berlin, where the East-West clash is revealed in its sharpest form, the chances of success from such a discussion would appear minimal. It seems probable that the question of Berlin is not capable of negotiation in the absence of a German settlement.

4. Austrian Economic Problems: The suggestion made by Mr. Beam in his memorandum of October 6 (a somewhat similar one was made by Vienna in Embtel 844) that we take the lead in requesting a reexamination of Austrian economic problems by the Occupation Authorities should be explored. In view of the apparent disposition of the Soviets to lighten the burden of their occupation in Austria, such an approach, if made after Soviet willingness to

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*Dated Oct. 2; for text, see vol. vii, Part 2, p. 1902.*
discuss a treaty at Lugano has been tested again, might bring favorable results.

5. Danube Waterway: The possible review of the convention controlling navigation of the Danube is a question which might be discussed with the Soviets, although it is doubtful if they would consider changes in the convention in the absence of a German and Austrian settlement.

6. Cultural Exchange and East-West Trade: We have noted the suggestion made by Mr. Beam in his memorandum of October 6 that some kind of arrangement might be worked out with the USSR in view of the Soviet interest in promoting East-West Trade and our own interest in bringing about an increase in cultural exchange with the Soviet Bloc. While it appears that the USSR might well be disposed to discuss cultural exchange with us, our own position with regard to the feasibility of developing cultural exchange is unfavorable. Our present immigration laws make it very difficult for us to accept non-official visitors to the United States from Soviet Bloc countries, a fact demonstrated most clearly in the case of the proposed visit of a Soviet chess team to the United States last July. In view of our inability to encourage visits of Soviet Bloc persons to this country, it would not be advisable for us, under present immigration restrictions, to push the question of cultural exchange with the USSR.

It is possible, of course, that cultural exchange could be increased between Western Europe and the Soviet Bloc, although it may be doubted if the benefits which would be gained by such increase would warrant greater support from the US in the direction of increasing East-West trade.

7. Non-Aggression Pacts: Our present policy of linking any kind of European security arrangements with a German settlement and of discouraging consideration of such arrangements on a separate basis would seem to preclude private discussion between the US and the USSR on this subject.

8. Communist China and Formosa: The USSR would probably be pleased to discuss directly with the US the recognition of Communist China by the United States, the admission of Communist China to the UN, and a change in the status of Formosa. It is difficult to see how these questions could be unlinked from a broad discussion of Far Eastern problems, even if we desired to do so, which in turn is highly doubtful.

In summary, it would appear that the possibility of separating out current problems for direct US-Soviet discussion is not promising. It seems most likely that the Soviets will continue for the foreseeable future to insist on the interdependence of major political questions and will refuse to consider seriously the possibility of their resolution on a separate basis.

There are, of course, a number of issues of strictly bilateral interest between the US and the USSR (Lend-Lease, plane incidents, American citizens, VOA jamming, Amerika Magazine) concerning which diplomatic negotiations might offer more hope of success than the larger problems discussed above.
SECRET

Moscow, December 5, 1953—7 p. m.

659. In addition to factors discussed in Embtel 624 which caused shift in Soviet position between November 3 and November 26 following considerations which may have played part in this development are worth examining.

It is possible that Soviet Government realized far-reaching implications mentioned Embtel 624 of a continued insistence on Chinese Communist participation as price for meeting. Tripartite note November 16 must have revealed to Kremlin that issue of Chinese participation was not in itself sufficient to divide three Western powers and therefore as long as this Chinese condition was maintained there was no prospect of any important contact with chief Western powers for indefinite future. It is likely that logical consequence of absence of any communication between East and West for a long period of time with blame resting squarely on Soviet Union was viewed with genuine concern by Soviet Government. Apart from fact that such a situation would serve to enhance Western solidarity, and materially assist in adoption EDC, it would almost inevitably mean return to intensified cold war and re-emergence of element crisis in international relations with accompanying increased danger war which Soviet Government if only because of domestic programs initiated this summer in agriculture, consumer goods and trade fields would not wish to see. Incompatibility between atmosphere of enhanced crisis in its international relations and these domestic programs both in USSR and satellites would be obvious even to Soviet bloc population.

It is belief of most foreign observers in Moscow that present regime genuinely desires to avoid complications and adventures in its foreign relations while domestic program to which government deeply committed is in progress. Soviet Government thus finds

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1Repeated for information to London, Paris, and Bonn.
2In telegram 624, Ambassador Bohlen offered his analysis of the significance of the Soviet notes of Nov. 3 and Nov. 26 to France, the United Kingdom, and the United States regarding the Austrian and German problems. Bohlen said he could discern no basic shift in the Soviet attitudes toward the Austrian and German problems, but he found it important to try to identify the circumstances and considerations that forced or induced the Soviet Government to finally accept the principle of a four-power meeting on the problems. (661.62/11-2753) For full documentation on these notes and the Western communications to which they replied, see vol. vi, Part 1, pp. 658 ff.
itself, as previously reported, confronted with major contradictions in its foreign relations: On one hand, desire to avoid accentuation of tension in international relations with accompanying danger of war, and on other, determination to give up territorial acquisitions obtained as result of war, where Soviet form of society has been imposed. Soviet shift even of tactical position in space of three weeks is most unusual in Soviet practice and would not have taken place during Stalin regime. It, in all probability, was subject of considerable debate and possibly difference of opinion in hierarchy. External evidence of Soviet periodicals which went to press around November 26 and obvious surprise at Vienna peace conference indicate that this shift was not planned very far in advance since articles in these periodicals, i.e. Kommunist, New Times, continue emphasize condition of Chinese [garble] participation. This shift in position is illustrative of fact reported as far back as April (Emtbel 1518) that present direction Soviet Union is not in position to exercise same total cynical disregard contrast between Soviet word and deed possible under Stalin. Third factor of interest set off by note of November 26 which may possibly have some bearing on Soviet position and tactics at any four-power conference has been new formulation in regard to concept of Europe. Whereas previous Soviet propaganda had stressed two-world concept in ideological sense, Department will have noted that November 26 note speaks in terms of Europe as geographic concept and for first time since war does not reject out of hand idea that Eastern European nations and their relationship to European security are subjects for discussion. Heretofore Eastern European countries and in particular their relationship to rest of Europe have been regarded as outside of any discussion especially in political and security fields. Articles in Soviet press subsequent to November 26 note have stressed this new line of "Europe for the Europeans" with Anglo-Soviet and France-Soviet treaties as basis for such development without US (note difference in text November 26 note and reference Malenkov to British Ambassador that UK European country Emtbel 631). It is to be anticipated that theme will become one of chief lines Soviet propaganda prior to and at any four-power conference. Its aim, of course, is to seek to differentiate between interests of Europe including UK as against activities in Europe of "non-European countries"—the United States. It may likewise foreshadow at conference Soviet proposals for European regional security which of course would involve chief aim of present Soviet policy in Europe: i.e., European agreement for limitation and control of any German

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3Printed as telegram 448 from Moscow, Document 585.
4Not printed. (641.61/11-2853)
armament with ultimate aim of squeezing US out of Europe. Department will recall in this connection that only point on which Molotov said Hitler found themselves in enthusiastic agreement in November 1940 was on desirability exclusion US from participation European affairs.

On specific problem of Germany, inclined to doubt if Soviets yet prepared to contemplate downfall GDR which would presumably be consequence of free elections (Bonn’s 102). Believe more likely that they will continue present line of insisting that German unification, elections and other attendant factors matter for two German regimes to work out while four powers confine themselves to peace treaty and other aspects German foreign relations.

The foregoing is submitted for possible assistance in consideration of present and future lines Soviet policy.

Department pass Bermuda if desired.

BOHLEN

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Note printed.

No. 612

761.56/12-1453

Memorandum of Conversation, by George E. Truesdell of the Office of Eastern European Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] December 14, 1953.
Subject: US-USSR Lend-Lease Settlement
Participants: The Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Georgi N. Zaroubin
Mr. Nikolai K. Grigoriev, Counselor, Soviet Embassy
Mr. Anatoli G. Myshkov, Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy
The Acting Secretary, General Walter B. Smith
EE—Mr. Truesdell
TC—Mr. Logofet, Interpreter for the Acting Secretary

The Soviet Ambassador called at his own request at 3:45 p.m. today and made a statement summarizing the position of his Government on the lend-lease question, namely, that the Soviet Union had striven for a lend-lease settlement; that the Soviet Government has already returned 3 icebreakers, 27 frigates, 7 tankers and 1 dry-cargo vessel; that agreements had been reached on compensation of holders of lend-lease oil refinery patents with all those interested firms willing to negotiate on a mutually acceptable basis;
that the Soviet Government had increased its global settlement offer up to $300 million while the United States had not reduced the amount asked although stating it would do so; that thus the Soviet Government had made essential concessions; that the Soviet Government expected the United States to reach agreement on all questions, especially the amount and to fulfill previous agreements on merchant ships and naval craft; that the Soviet Government was willing to cooperate on all questions concerning lend-lease and had in fact in its note of October 20,\(^1\) proposed direct negotiations on a general lend-lease settlement; and finally that the Soviet Government hoped the United States would not limit the negotiations to technical questions, i.e. the 186 naval craft, for the Soviet side itself would also strive to settle this question.

The Acting Secretary commented that with respect to vessels, it should be noted that, if they were not returned shortly they would have lost their usefulness. He then asked if he understood correctly that the Soviet Government wished to buy some of the vessels. The Soviet Ambassador replied that his Government wished to purchase those vessels which the United States had already agreed to sell and to discuss all questions connected with lend-lease.

The Acting Secretary after obtaining confirmation that the Soviet position was to discuss all problems related to lend-lease, said that he did not reject the Ambassador’s suggestion and that he did not feel that the Ambassador would find the United States position unreasonable. He said that the United States had already shown its willingness to compromise and cited as an example the fact that no payment was asked for lend-lease ammunition which was provided to the Soviet Union for use against the common enemy. The Acting Secretary then stated his belief that item by item discussion of the topics at issue provided a sound approach and that the question of ships should be settled first. The Soviet Ambassador expressed agreement but stated that his Government did not wish to confine discussions to technical questions only. He said that the solution of the question of the 186 vessels left only two other questions, namely, the global sum and the sale of the other vessels.

The Acting Secretary emphasized that there appeared to be little advantage to making each item dependent upon conclusion of an overall settlement but said careful consideration would be given to the Ambassador’s statement and that he would consult the Secretary about it. He said that the Secretary would be back Thursday

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\(^1\)For text, see Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 11, 1954, p. 45; see also Document 609.
and he hoped to be able to give the Ambassador a reply on Friday or shortly thereafter.  

2The Department of State reply to Ambassador Zarubin's proposals was presented in an aide-mémoire of Dec. 24; for text of that document, see Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 11, 1954, p. 46.

No. 613

761.00/12-2453: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State

SECRET

Moscow, December 24, 1953—3 p. m.

764. Final disposition of Beria case brought no surprises. 1 Description of summary court proceedings according law December 1, 1934 added no new factual or other information concerning real background and cause of Beria case. It is still Embassy's view that essence of case from beginning was role of secret police in Soviet dictatorship following Stalin's death and that decision for whatever reason of Malenkov and his associates to subordinate police to party was direct cause Beria's downfall. From all accounts final liquidation Beria and his immediate associates has been greeted by complete indifference and possibly secret pleasure by Soviet population and there have been no signs of anxiety or apprehension which accompanied similar phenomena during Stalinist purges in Thirty's. Indeed, all published material in last week has emphasized that case was closed and sought to create impression that it was not a beginning but an end. However, should need arise in future undisclosed "evidence" in Beria case could be conveniently used for implicating almost anybody in Soviet regime. Presence of two leading regular army members on special panel Supreme Court (one of whom Marshal Konev) while not unusual in cases of treason is probably reflection role of army in affair. Other membership of court appears to reveal desire to involve in responsibility representatives of chief institutions Soviet Union.

The regime in this case made a definitely half-hearted attempt to construct a convincing case against Beria possibly due to extremely troublesome consequences of "proving" that Beria had been an agent of foreign imperialism while he was working hand-in-glove in Politburo with present leadership. Indeed, in reading material of

1Telegram 763 from Moscow, Dec. 24, reported that the Soviet press had announced the execution of Beria and six accomplices by shooting on Dec. 23. (761.00/12-2453)
past week it is doubtful if present leadership wished Soviet population really to believe most of these charges against Beria.

There is of course elementary justice in fate of Beria and his GPU associates but it would have been more fitting if retribution had been meted out by his victims rather than his accomplices. Apart from political significance of Beria case which is of course important, entire proceedings go to confirm obvious fact that Stalin's successors have no greater semblance of morality or regard for truth than had Stalin himself.

Bohlen

No. 614

Editorial Note

The Combined Working Group for a United States-USSR Lend-Lease Settlement held the first of a resumed series of meetings in Washington on the afternoon of December 28. During the remainder of 1953 and during January through March 1954, 28 more meetings of the Working Group were held. All meetings were held in the Department of State. Principal participants on the United States side were: Walter J. Stoeessel, George E. Truesdell, Francis T. Murphy, Captain A.C. Veasey, and Commander R.A. Markham, both of the United States Navy. Principal participants on the Soviet side were Anatoly Fyodorovich Dobrynin and Engineer Commodore Peter A. Favorov, naval expert. On March 26, 1954, the two sides reached agreement on the arrangements for the delivery of 38 naval craft to the United States; see Document 618. The United States side maintained transcripts of the proceedings of the Working Group meetings. These transcripts and other documentation relating to the negotiations are in file 761.56.

No. 615

761.00/1-2054: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State¹

TOP SECRET  PRIORITY  MOSCOW, January 20, 1954—6 p. m.

882. On eve of Berlin conference² it would appear appropriate to summarize briefly certain compulsions, inhibitions and contradic-

¹Repeated for information to London, Paris, and Bonn.
²The Four-Power Conference met at Berlin, Jan. 25-Feb. 18.
tions which appear from here to affect, if not indeed in large measure control, present Soviet foreign policy. Since these spring primarily from internal political and economic developments since death of Stalin, they have perhaps not been as visible abroad as other elements of present Soviet policy such as opposition to EDC, US bases, desire to divide Europe from US, etc.

1. The first of these factors is the attempt made by Stalin's successors to institute group rule at the top as against the total power of one individual. Whether or not this attempt succeeds or fails is of course the big open question for future. However, adoption of this principle of dictatorship as against one-man rule has already produced important changes in methods with inevitable bearing on Soviet relations and attitudes towards non-Soviet world. As already reported, by its nature, group rule does not have same monolithic precision as absolute dictatorship of one man and possibilities of serious difference of opinion at summit are greatly enhanced as a result. For that reason leadership as already demonstrated by shift on conference issue between November 3 and 26 is more vulnerable to external factors such as public opinion both at home and abroad.

2. Soviet Government has committed itself very deeply to certain new internal policies especially in economic field. They have undertaken within next two to three years to produce an appreciable rise in standard of living and the development of agriculture, consumer goods and domestic trade. It is not necessary here to examine in detail what economic consequences in field of armament and tempo of heavy industrial development these programs may entail but merely to point out that government is so deeply committed to these programs that any sharp reversal in this field would create in my opinion a very serious situation for regime.

In circumstances entire present domestic program of Soviet Government dictates necessity of avoidance of international complications of a serious nature. It is for this reason and not because of any statements made by Soviet leaders that I believe new regime needs and genuinely desires some relaxation in international tension. They have, in effect, promised their people (1) relief from threat of war, (2) an important improvement in their standard of living and well-being, and (3) an increased element of personal security for average law-abiding citizen. The chances of success in these three fields are at best problematical but they are doomed to almost certain failure in event that international situation returns to a state of crisis. In short, for this phase of its development (we are of course not dealing now with Soviet policy or attitudes several years from now), Soviet Government by its own domestic policies to say nothing of greatly complicated problem of control over satellites has made peace an imperative necessity for present regime. As against this, however, must be placed equal determination of Soviet leaders not to give up any territory which they acquired as result of World War II. This determination I believe is based not

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*For information on the Soviet notes of Nov. 3 and 26, see Document 611.*
only on obvious factors such as strategic advantage of forward positions, et cetera, but more directly upon the repercussions which abandonment of any Sovietized regime such as in East Germany would have on satellite neighbors and possibly eventually on maintenance Soviet system in Russia.

The Soviets would of course like to have benefit of both—that is, achieve some relaxation of tension especially in field of armaments without yielding any territory which they control at present time. I emphasize this contradiction (previously reported Embletal 659\(^4\)) in Soviet position since I feel its recognition and exploitation could be of considerable value to western strategy at Berlin in not allowing Soviets to escape from consequences of this basic contradiction which they face. In other words, if they can be made to recognize that a genuine reduction in tension is only possible by serious concessions on their part I believe we can present Soviet leadership with a choice which is almost certain to provoke dissension and even real division. I do not anticipate in any sense that it would be possible or even desirable to bring this contradiction to a head at Berlin.

The factors outlined above are not temporary phenomena but will continue to affect Soviet policy for at least next two or three years. These long-range considerations should be well worth keeping in mind during Berlin conference and may be helpful in resisting temptation on part of our allies to make unnecessary concessions in belief that something must be done quickly with Soviet Union.

BOHLEN

\(^4\)Document 611.

No. 616

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

The President to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Bohlen), at Berlin\(^1\)

[WASHINGTON,] February 6, 1954.

DEAR CHIP: I suppose that the rule is a good one that frowns upon the practice of the President writing directly to our Ambassadors abroad. Undoubtedly misunderstandings could arise if that kind of thing became a habit; but I still see no reason why a political post should prohibit anyone from an occasional attempt to communicate with old friends.

\(^1\)Bohlen was in Berlin serving as a special adviser to the U.S. Delegation at the Four-Power Conference at Berlin, Jan. 25-Feb. 18. The mode of delivery of this letter cannot be further determined.
Not long ago while chatting in a group, your name came up and I was reminded of the many pleasant times we have had on the golf course together. I would truly like to get together again in a foursome that included also Cy Sulzberger and Bunny Carter. The real purpose of this note, however, is to tell you every report I have on you is that no one representing America in Moscow could possibly do better than you are doing. I realize that you must live a life of continuous frustration, but obviously this is not preventing you from doing your job efficiently and well.

I would be grateful if you would convey my greetings and best wishes to the charming Mrs. Chip. My thoughts often go out to you both, and I do hope that you find compensations in your work that repay you to some extent for such disappointments as you encounter.

With warm personal regard,
Sincerely,

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3Not further identified, but see Sulzberger, A Long Row of Candles, p. 616, for an account of a golfing party at a club outside Paris in March 1951 involving then General Eisenhower, Sulzberger, Bohlen, and a "Bunny Carter".
4The source text is not signed.

No. 617

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

The Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the President

Berlin, February 12, 1954.

My Dear Mr. President: It is characteristic of you to find the time to write me so kind and thoughtful a letter. I am deeply touched and I appreciate more than I can possibly tell you not only the fact of your writing but, more particularly, the things you have to say.

I must, in simple honesty, say that I have not found the job in Moscow especially difficult, given the limitations imposed by the Soviet system and policies on any really constructive work. While life there does contain its inconveniences and frustrations, neither my wife nor I have found it unduly difficult, and in my case these have been more than compensated by my intense interest in the present phase of Soviet development. In any event, I shall return to Moscow greatly heartened by your letter.

1Supra.
As Cy Sulzberger may possibly have told you, one of the effects of life in Moscow has been a further deterioration in my already badly impaired game of golf.

My wife has asked me to thank you most sincerely for your kind message to her.

Faithfully yours,

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

No. 618

Editorial Note

Agreement was reached on March 26 between United States and Soviet representatives on the dates and procedures for the return to United States control of 38 small naval craft loaned to the Soviet Union under the World War II lend-lease program. For text of the agreement signed at Washington on March 26 and entered into force that same day, see 55 Stat. 31. For the of a brief Department of State announcement of the agreement, see Department of State Bulletin, April 12, 1954, page 563. Regarding the Working Group discussions which led to this agreement, see Document 614.

No. 619

611.61/4-1554

The Acting Secretary of State to Representative Howard S. Miller of Kansas

WASHINGTON,] April 26, 1954.

DEAR MR. MILLER: The White House has referred to me for reply your letter of April 13, 1954 proposing a conference between President Eisenhower and Premier Malenkov in the hope of reaching an understanding in the interest of world peace. 2

I share your deep concern about the unsolved problems outstanding between the Free World and the communist controlled countries, and the effect of those unsolved differences on world peace. It is our view that the best way to eliminate the sources of international tension which threaten world peace is through a step-by-step approach to the solution and settlement of individual problems.

1Drafted by Virginia H. James (EUR/EE) and cleared by Barbour (EUR/EE), Bonbright (EUR), and Morton (H).
2Not printed. The letter had been referred to the Secretary of State for reply by Gerald D. Morgan, Administrative Assistant to the President, on Apr. 15.
On April 16, 1953 President Eisenhower in an address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington outlined the steps to be taken toward the accomplishment of world peace; namely, the cessation of hostilities in Korea, Indo-China and Malaya; conclusion of an Austrian treaty; the establishment of a free and united Germany; and the reduction of armaments and agreement for the control of atomic energy. He stated that we are ready to make of the United Nations an institution that can effectively guard the peace and security of all peoples. The President made clear that the United States is ready to do its part in accomplishing these objectives. He asked what the Soviet Union is prepared to do.⁹

The road shows that a cessation of hostilities has been negotiated in Korea. Because of Soviet intransigence, however, it proved impossible at the Berlin Conference to conclude an Austrian treaty, even on terms previously acceptable to the Soviet Union; to agree on the unification of Germany on terms satisfactory to all; or to reach agreement on proposals put forward by the Western powers designed to reinforce the security of Europe on the basis of existing undertakings. Instead of showing a disposition to come to a mutual agreement on these problems, the stand of the Soviet Government made clear that it was not disposed to take any actions leading to the reconciliation of Europe, the division of which was caused by the Soviet Union.

We are now preparing to discuss the problems of Korea and Indo-China at the Geneva Conference. While the record of the Berlin Conference does not inspire optimism, we continue to hope that the Soviet Government and the communist regimes associated with it will take advantage of the Geneva meeting to solve in good faith the problems which are threatening peace in the Far East.

The Soviet Union has to date given no evidence of a change in its long-standing opposition to the establishment of an effective system of atomic energy control. The Soviet Union continues by its actions to demonstrate that it is not disposed to fulfill the spirit of the provisions of the United Nations Charter to which it is a signatory.

In the absence of evidence through deeds of a sincere disposition on the part of the Soviet Government to solve at the conference table the outstanding problems which threaten peace and security, it would not appear advisable or desirable to promote a meeting between the President and Premier Malenkov which, in the light of the Soviet attitude, could not be expected to be fruitful. Such a meeting would heighten expectations of a peaceful settlement of current problems without providing any realistic basis for arriving

⁹For text of the address, see Document 583.
at such a settlement. The failure of such a meeting would serve only to deepen present tensions.

Sincerely yours,

WALTER B. SMITH

No. 620

761.00/4-2154

Memorandum by the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Scott) to the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] April 29, 1954.

On April 2 you wrote to Alexander Kerensky\(^1\) suggesting that, prior to meeting together as he proposed, you would appreciate his putting his opinions and observations in writing.\(^2\) (Tab G)

His reply (Tab C) with attachments (Tabs D, E, F), although including some broad analyses (Tab E), concerns principally the problem of uniting Russian and non-Russian émigrés into an anti-Soviet organization. He requests the opportunity to discuss the problem with you.\(^3\)

Mr. Kerensky has been working to accomplish this under the auspices of the “Coordinating Center of Anti-Bolshevik Center” founded in October 1952. The Coordinating Center is opposed by the “Paris bloc”, the point of controversy being the Center’s insistence that self-determination of peoples in the Soviet Union take place after the overthrow of Bolshevism. (Tab D)

Mr. Kerensky is disturbed by the recent effort of the American Committee for the liberation from Bolshevism to solve this problem through creating a “Working Alliance”. (Tab F) He terms this “essentially American or at least American dominated”. (Its membership “shall be acceptable to” the Committee. Tab F, page 3, para. 4)

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\(^1\) Alexander Kerensky, a prominent Russian exile leader who served as Prime Minister of the Russian Provisional Government, June–November 1917.

\(^2\) Under Secretary Smith’s letter of Apr. 2, to Kerensky reads as follows:

“Thank you for your letter of March 29 which arrived while I was on a short vacation. I find on my return that my crowded desk and heavy schedule will not soon permit us having the long talk you suggest.

“Because I am very much interested in your opinions and observations, I should be grateful if you would put them in writing. In that way, I could gain some of the benefit of your views prior to our talking together.”

Kerensky’s letter of Mar. 29 has not been further identified.

\(^3\) Kerensky’s letter of Apr. 21 is printed below; none of the attachments to that letter is printed.
In response to Mr. Hennes’ acknowledgment [Tab B] Mr. Keren-
sky replied emphasizing the personal nature of his letter to you. [Tab A]

W.K.S.

[Tab C]

Alexander Kerensky to the Under Secretary of State (Smith)


DEAR GENERAL SMITH: Please accept my warm thanks for your
kind answer to my previous letter. I would have acknowledged it
much earlier if it were not for some unforeseen circumstances, a
reference to which you will find in the present letter.

You might recall that last November when I had the pleasure of
seeing you in Washington, 6 I informed you of the difficult situation
in which had found itself the so-called Coordinating Center, an or-
organization formed by political émigrés from Soviet Russia, both
“old” and “new”. At that time, I also left a memorandum on this
problem with Mr. Allen Dulles and Mr. C. D. Jackson. I am enclos-
ing herewith a copy of this document which might be of some inter-
est to you in case you have not seen (App. I’). In the concluding
part of this memorandum, I pointed out how important it was to
find some means of re-establishing the friendly cooperation be-
 tween the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism
and the Coordinating Center.

Almost immediately after my meeting with you, I left for Europe
where I remained until the end of March. I spent most of the time
in Munich where I worked with the Coordinating Center, and from
there I went to Paris and then to London. While watching the de-
velopment of the relations between the western world, on the one
hand, and the Communist Bloc, on the other, I could not help feel-
ing that the situation was becoming more and more critical. This
impression of mine was fully confirmed by the significant pro-
nouncements made by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles.

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4Hennes’ (Richard V. Hennes, Staff Assistant to the Under Secretary of State) brief letter indicated that Kerensky’s letter of Apr. 21 had been forwarded for reply to Walworth Barbour in view of Under Secretary Smith’s imminent absence from the country.
5Kerensky’s brief handwritten letter of Apr. 23 is not printed.
6No record has been found of this meeting between Under Secretary Smith and Kerensky.
7None of the appendices is printed.
on January 8, and January 12, respectively. In his pronouncement, Secretary Dulles gave what I believe to be an absolutely correct analysis of the strategic plan which for decades had been pursued by international Communism, under the direction of the Kremlin. Secretary Dulles also indicated that in his opinion, the continued Communist offensive could not be effectively checked by the old methods of containment.

On my part, I came to the conclusion that a moment had arrived for the Russian and non-Russian émigrés from the Soviet Union to revise their tactics of anti-Bolshevik struggle, in accordance with the new phase of international relations, as well as to devise the most effective forms of cooperation with America. I have tried to express my ideas on the present international situation and the tactical line it dictates in the memorandum—a copy of which I take the liberty of submitting to you herewith. (App. N2) As to the forms of cooperation between America and ourselves, this was precisely the problem I hoped to be able to discuss with you, remembering that at our last meeting you kindly expressed a desire to have a longer talk with me on some other occasion.

I wrote to you asking for an appointment on March 29, and a few days later, on April 1, I received a copy of the “Agreement for a Working Alliance” sent by the American Committee to the Chairman of the Coordinating Center. (I am enclosing herewith a copy of the “Agreement” in case you have not seen it—App. N.3). To me, the contents of this document was quite unexpected as it proposed a scheme of cooperation based on an entirely new principle of relationship between the two parties to the agreement. What it actually amounts to is the creation of an essentially American, or at least American-dominated, institution, with the participation of some consultant, chosen from among those more recent émigrés from the Soviet Union whose cooperation the American Committee would consider desirable.

Of course, the participation of such consultants in the work of the American Committee would be very useful, and I believe that the organized groups of the anti-Bolshevik Emigration would be glad to nominate properly qualified candidates. But the realization of this scheme by no means would solve the much broader problem of a fruitful cooperation between American agencies, on the one hand, and responsible representatives of émigré political organizations, on the other. It seems to me that in this critical moment

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8 Presumably reference is to President Eisenhower’s State of the Union Message of Jan. 7.
9 Reference is to Secretary Dulles’ address made before the Council of Foreign Relations, New York, Jan. 12; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 25, 1954, p. 107.
such a cooperation becomes an immediate necessity. I am firmly convinced that it can be achieved if one approaches the émigrés with a willingness to respect their intellectual and moral independence as well as their sense of individual and national dignity. I am equally firmly convinced that only if this cooperation is conceived as cooperation of allies in a common struggle against a common enemy, could one expect from it any positive and beneficial results.

It was this problem that I had in mind when I asked you for an appointment. I would be very happy to have a chance of presenting to you my ideas on the subject if, in view of the circumstances, you would find such a discussion both feasible and desirable.

Believe me, dear General Smith,

Sincerely yours,

ALEXANDER KERENSKY

No. 621

033.6111/5-1354: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, May 13, 1954—6:55 p. m.

716. Eyes only Ambassador from Secretary. Considerable thought has been given here to statements by Marshal Zhukov in Pravda on occasion armistice commemoration. You will recall that there was respect apparently on mutual basis between Zhukov and the President. Suggestions here have been made regarding possible communication by President to Zhukov, possibly on tenth anniversary of opening of second front in Normandy on June 6. Also suggestion has been made as to ascertaining possibility Zhukov visit. Purpose would be possibly to open up some channel of communication which might be less inflexible than Molotov appears to be. Would appreciate your reactions.

DULLES

1Drafted by Dulles, cleared by Barbour (EUR/EE), and signed for the Secretary by Jeffrey C. Kitchen. Attached to the source text is a brief typewritten note of May 13 from Robert R. Bowie (S/P) to Dulles which reads: "Here is a draft of cable to Bohlen. It was prepared by Mr. Barbour after he and I talked. He thinks it is desirable to give this much detail to Bohlen about our thinking." It cannot be determined whether the text printed is the same as that submitted with Bowie’s memorandum.

2See footnote 3, infra.


The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET  PRIORITY  Moscow, May 14, 1954—5 p. m.
1411. Eyes only for Secretary. Before dealing with specific points raised your 716, 2 believe it might be useful summarize here my views on role of Soviet military.

Since Stalin’s death professional military have been given increasing prominence but believe this to be logical result of termination overriding one-man rule of Stalin permitting professional military to assume more normal function in Soviet Government. We have not seen any reliable indication that professional military are playing independent political role or as such are in opposition to party leaders. No professional military man is on Presidium of Central Committee or Council of Ministers. Soviet and indeed Russian tradition has been that of subordination military to civilian control. While friction may of course exist there is not sufficient ground to predicate any policy or action on that supposition.

I am inclined therefore to believe that any direct communication from President as head of state to Zhukov, who retains purely military function would be unwise and would appear as transparent attempt to go behind backs of actual Soviet leaders. It would almost unquestionably be so regarded by them, especially Molotov, and might conceivably harm Zhukov’s position. However, in order to follow up remote possibility that Zhukov’s remarks in Pravda article 3 were meant to convey hint, President might consider including

1 Secretary Dulles sent a copy of this telegram to President Eisenhower on May 14 under cover of the following brief memorandum:

“I think the attached cable from Bohlen in reference to a possible invitation to Zhukov is sound, and I would be inclined to endorse his recommendations. Let me know if you wish me to do anything further in this matter.” (761.00/5–1454)

2 Supra.

3 Telegram 1389 from Moscow, May 9, reported that the Soviet celebration of the end of World War II contained “interesting differences” from the way the anniversary was marked in 1953. The telegram cited in particular an article by Marshal Zhukov appearing in Pravda on May 9. In his article Zhukov reviewed the course of the war and included the following remark:

“Soviet people will never forget the selfless struggle which was carried on against the German Fascist forces by our Allies—the peoples of France, England, the United States of America and other countries, or the sacrifices borne by them in the struggle. We give due acknowledgement to the military valor of the armies of USA and England in the period of their joint struggle with us against German Fascist armies. We also give due acknowledgement to their military leaders—to General of the Army Eisenhower and Field Marshal Montgomery—under whose direction the

Continued
in any public statement he is planning to make on anniversary Normandy landings this year appropriate reference to Soviet armed forces and Zhukov personally. We could then watch with close attention manner in which this statement was handled by Soviet press which might give us clue to real significance Zhukov’s remarks undoubtedly approved by leaders before publication. In light thereof we could examine possibility Zhukov visit.

While I am not competent judge adequately from here, believe any invitation to Zhukov to visit US would arouse excitement and concern Western European allies who would probably see in it attempt by US Government to open bilateral channel communication with Soviet Government. This might have some desirable sobering effect on our allies or on contrary might play into Soviet desire further split Western alliance.

BOHLEN

American and English armed forces more than once beat the German Fascist armies.” (Microfilm telegram files, “Moscow FY 54”)

No. 623

761.06/5-2754: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State

SECRET

MOSCOW, May 27, 1954—7 p. m.

1485. On 25th New York Times correspondent submitted to censor story dealing with Khrushchev’s rise written around thesis of growing parity or duality of party and state. Buried in story however is clear reference to encroachment by Khrushchев into government field as revealed by parity of speeches at Supreme Soviet which in story is characterized as “government occasion”. Reference also made to Kaganovich speech citing Khrushchев ahead of Malenkov as further evidence this parity. After holding 24 hours censor passed story virtually unchanged deleting only reference to fact that Council of Nationalities which Malenkov addressed as second chamber and Council of Union before which Khrushchев spoke as upper chamber as well as speculation at end of story to effect that principal address at RSFSR commemorative session would be given by Khrushchев. Fact that story was held 24 hours and deletions made makes it perfectly clear that story received top-level consideration. Possibly story was passed since its

1Repeated for information to Geneva.
chief emphasis was “parity and equality party and government” although parts referred to above making plain Khrushchev’s encroachment into government field could hardly have escaped notice sophisticated reader. The paragraph in Voroshilov’s speech before Hungarian party meeting in Budapest published in all central press today which bears down very heavily on importance of principle of collective leadership (Emtel 14842) may have some relationship to developments in top leadership.

BOHLEN

2 Not printed. (761.00/5-2754)

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No. 624

National Intelligence Estimate

TOP SECRET


NIE 11-5-54

SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND MAIN LINES OF POLICY THROUGH MID-1959

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Soviet capabilities and the main lines of Soviet strategic policy through mid-1959.2

CONCLUSIONS

1. We believe that the stability and authority of the Soviet regime will not be affected during the period of this estimate by conflicts for power or differences respecting policy within the ruling group. Soviet authority over the Satellites will almost certainly remain intact. There are potential conflicts of interest between the USSR and Communist China but we believe that during the period of this estimate the cohesive forces in the relationship will be far greater than the divisive forces.

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1 Regarding National Intelligence Estimates, see footnote 2, Document 491.

According to a note on the cover sheet of this NIE, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate. The IAC concurred in the estimate on June 1.

2 Although this paper is concerned primarily with the USSR, strengths and capabilities of the other members of the Soviet Bloc (Communist China, Eastern European Satellites, East Germany, and North Korea) are referred to where these add significantly to Soviet power. Consideration is also given to possible Chinese Communist courses of action which may have a direct bearing on the main lines of Soviet policy. [Footnote in the source text.]
2. The economic policy of the USSR will probably continue to place primary emphasis on the rapid development of heavy industry and war potential, though with more attention than in the past to development of agricultural and consumer goods production. The high rates of economic growth achieved in the immediate postwar years have been declining. We believe that the annual rate for the next two years will be about 6 or 6.5 percent and in 1956–1959 about 5 or 6 percent.

3. We believe that if current economic programs are carried on as planned Soviet defense expenditures will have to remain approximately constant in terms of purchasing power, at least through 1955. However, military procurement, even if it does not rise above the high level reached in 1952 and maintained in 1953, will be sufficient for continuous qualitative improvement of the armed forces in weapons, equipment, and training. Apart from this general qualitative improvement, the most significant changes in Soviet military strength during the period of this estimate are likely to be as follows:

   a. Increase in the nuclear weapons stockpile;
   b. Increase in the capability to deliver these weapons by various methods;
   c. Improvement in weapons systems for air defense;
   d. Increase in the long-range submarine force.

4. We believe that the Kremlin probably will continue, at least for a year or two, to avoid courses of action which in its judgment would clearly involve substantial risk of general war. Bloc leaders will try to foster and exploit political weaknesses and, as opportunity offers, armed insurrections within the non-Communist world. Soviet leaders probably believe that, by alternately easing the tension and applying the political warfare pressure dexterously, they can increase the chances that in time there will arise new opportunities for Communist strategic advances with substantial risk of general war.

5. While the Kremlin may continue to follow generally its present lines of policy throughout the period of this estimate, it should be borne in mind that the progress being made by the USSR in the development of nuclear weapons, and the increasing Soviet capability to deliver these weapons, are changing the world power situation in important respects. Under these conditions Soviet rulers will almost certainly believe that, as Soviet nuclear capabilities increase, the aversion of the US and its allies to general war will correspondingly increase, and that the Kremlin will therefore have greater freedom of action to pursue its objectives without running substantial risk of general war. Thus the Kremlin
will be increasingly ready to apply heavy pressure on the non-Communist world upon any signs of major dissension or weakness among the US and its allies. We believe, however, that the Kremlin will continue to be extremely reluctant to precipitate a contest in which the USSR would be subjected to nuclear attack. At the same time, we believe that the Kremlin would not be deterred by the risk of general war from taking counteraction against an action by the US or its allies which the Kremlin considered an imminent threat to Soviet security. We believe that the extent to which the Kremlin uses the increased freedom of action which its increased nuclear capabilities appear to give it, and the success which it achieves, will depend primarily upon the determination, strength, and cohesiveness of the non-Communist world.

6. We believe the Chinese Communist leaders in general share these Soviet views about the world situation and about opportunities and methods of advancing Communist interests. During the period of this estimate, Communist China will probably be reluctant to undertake courses of action which it considers might involve substantial risk of provoking unlimited war with a major power. The major deterrents will be: (a) China needs time to consolidate the Communist state as well as to modernize her economy; (b) China's strong ground forces are limited in service and support units, China's expanding air force has certain limitations, and China's navy has extremely limited capabilities, and China will remain militarily dependent upon the USSR for logistical, air, and naval support; (c) China's industrial centers will be vulnerable; and (d) the margin of available resources over minimum domestic requirements will be narrow. However, China will probably counter with military force, to the full extent of its capability, any action which it considers to be a military threat to its borders or to constitute an imminent threat to its vital interests, accepting the risks of war inherent in such action.

7. Both Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders probably feel that Southeast Asia offers particularly favorable opportunities for Communist expansion, not only because of the vulnerability of the states in the area, but because of the possibility of exploiting disagreements between the US and its allies. Continued Communist successes in Indochina, or the consolidation of present Communist gains in Indochina, would probably lead the Chinese Communists to expand their efforts to subvert neighboring countries by political infiltration and covert support of local insurrections, though probably not by the commitment of identifiable combat units of Chinese Communist armed forces. The aggressiveness with which such a policy would be pursued would depend on the vigor and effectiveness of non-Communist reaction.
[Here follows the “Discussion” portion of this estimate, comprising 12 of 16 pages.]

No. 625

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 206th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 15, 1954

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 206th Meeting of the Council were The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State (for Item 2 only); the Under Secretary of State (Items 1 and 3-7); Robert B. Anderson, for the Secretary of Defense; the Acting Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (Item 1); the Acting Secretary of Interior (Item 4); the Secretary of Commerce (Item 1); Under Secretary of Commerce Worthy (Item 1); Assistant Secretary of Commerce Anderson (Item 3); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (Item 1); the Administrator, Federal Facilities Corporation (Item 3); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; the NSC Representative on Internal Security (Item 1); the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

1. Restricting Diplomatic and Official Representatives of Soviet Bloc Countries in the United States in Connection With Strategic Intelligence (Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 8, 2 July 9 and 14, 4 1954; NSC Action No. 11176)

Mr. Lay opened the meeting by advising that the President would be delayed for a few moments. He suggested to the Vice

1Drafted on July 16 by Gleason.
2This memorandum circulated to the NSC a letter of June 4 to Lay from J. Edgar Hoover as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and Thomas J. Donegan as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, transmitting a joint report of the two committees to the National Security Council on “Restricting diplomatic and official representatives of Soviet bloc countries in the United States in connection with strategic intelligence,” dated June 1. Neither the memorandum nor the report is printed. (S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5427)
3This memorandum transmitted to the NSC the NSC Planning Board draft recommendations on the joint IIC-ICIS report. (S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5427)

Continued
President that the Council begin with consideration of the captioned item.

Mr. Lay outlined the following background information with respect to the subject. The Council’s Internal Security Committees (IIC and ICIS) were requested to make a joint study of the subject and to report thereon to the Council; on June 8, 1954, the resulting study was circulated to the Council.

Mr. Lay advised that coincident with the above circulation, and in accordance with the IIC-ICIS recommendations, CIA was requested to furnish an intelligence estimate in conjunction with IAC. . . .

Mr. Lay also advised that IIC had also submitted its comments on SNIE 10-5-54 and its estimate of the effect of implementing the restrictions recommended in the IIC-ICIS report; that the Justice representative on the ICIS had also submitted his comments on SNIE 10-5-54.

Mr. Lay next made reference to the Planning Board recommendations and to those contained in the IIC-ICIS report. He noted that all members of the Planning Board concurred fully in Recommendations 2, 4 and 5 of the IIC-ICIS report; that Recommendation 2 would require that all missions, establishments, etc., of Soviet bloc countries in the U.S. be plainly marked and that their representatives be required to appropriately identify themselves while functioning in the U.S.; that Recommendation 4 would provide for the establishment of programs, under the aegis of the Department of Commerce, relating to the release of governmental and non-governmental data of an unclassified strategic intelligence character; and that Recommendation 5 would provide that the military agencies and the AEC would circularize companies and facilities engaging in manufacturing or research for those agencies, advising of the practices of Soviet bloc representatives in attempting to obtain unclassified technical and strategic intelligence and suggesting that Soviet bloc officials requesting such information be referred to the appropriate Government agency.

Mr. Lay then referred to the three recommendations in the ICIS report on which there was not full agreement by all agencies concerned—namely, Recommendations 1, 3 and 6. Mr. Lay pointed out, as to Recommendation 1, that the IIC-ICIS proposed in essence that Soviet bloc missions be notified that all of their personnel in

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4This memorandum circulated to the NSC a letter from the Joint Chief of Staff supporting the draft recommendations enclosed with Lay’s memorandum of July 9. (S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5427)
5Not printed.
6SNIE 10-5-54, not printed. (S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5427)
7Neither printed; enclosed with Lay’s memorandum of July 9.
the U.S. (including those attached to international organizations) should be prohibited in the future from obtaining certain types of unclassified strategic information, and that deletions from the list of such prohibited items would be considered by the U.S. when and if comparable materials are made available to U.S. representatives in the bloc countries.

As to Recommendation 3, Mr. Lay pointed out that, with the exception of the Department of State, the Planning Board agreed with IIC and ICIS that travel restrictions on Soviet bloc representatives in the U.S. should be on a strict reciprocal basis and enforced on a basis at least comparable to the restrictions on U.S. representatives in Soviet bloc countries.

As to Recommendation 6, Mr. Lay noted that the Planning Board recommendation was a modification of that proposed in the IIC–ICIS report; that whereas the latter report recommended that when Soviet bloc representatives desire unclassified Government documents, they be requested to apply for same at a central office, the Planning Board recommended channeling of such requests through a central point, but on the basis of reciprocity, depending on the practices employed in each of the bloc countries with respect to requests made for comparable data by U.S. representatives in those countries. Mr. Lay noted that, pending the development of more detailed information regarding such practices, the Planning Board recommended approval in principle of its modified recommendation.

Mr. Lay then called upon the Attorney General, who asked the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for his comments.

Mr. Hoover pointed out at the outset that there are 309 diplomatic representatives of Soviet bloc countries in the U.S., 15 of whom are from the USSR; whereas the U.S. has only 83 of its representatives in the Soviet Union. . . .

Mr. Hoover went on to say that he believed the subject had been thoroughly considered by IIC, ICIS and the Planning Board, and that he felt that the recommendations made in the IIC–ICIS report were quite restrained. He observed that the recommendations in no instance were more than reciprocal. He expressed the opinion that it would be necessary to place the blockades between the Soviet bloc representatives in question and the information they were desirous of obtaining. It was Mr. Hoover’s personal belief that if the recommendations made by the Internal Security Committees are
adopted and implemented, additional restrictions would not be placed against our people by the Soviet bloc countries.

At this point, Mr. Hoover adverted to his earlier reference concerning the interpretation given by the employee of the Department of Commerce regarding the regulation which precludes the furnishing of certain information in the Geodetic Survey Office to Communists, and he stated that he could hardly conceive that the Secretary of Commerce would interpret that such Soviet representatives were not Communists. He attributed this interpretation to some subordinate down the line in the Department and not to the Secretary of Commerce.

Mr. Lay then called upon Secretary Smith to comment. Secretary Smith advised that the State Department's position was an extremely detached and completely objective one. He said the job of the Department of State was to collect political information, and that such collection could be done without much travel in the Soviet Union. He added, however, . . . that in considering these necessary services, his job was to point out as dispassionately as possible which of the recommendations in the IIC-ICIS report would aid the several interested agencies of the Government and which of the recommendations would impede U.S. interests.

Secretary Smith referred to the reference in the IIC-ICIS report which reflected that the Soviets relaxed their travel restrictions after the U.S. imposed additional travel restrictions on Soviet personnel here. Secretary Smith indicated that this relaxation had nothing to do with the restrictions imposed by the U.S.; rather, the modified restrictions of the USSR resulted from various changes in the Soviet Union following Stalin's death.

Secretary Smith expressed the view that the blocking off of large areas of the U.S. is infeasible, and stated that he was afraid that if the U.S. were to do that, there would be considerable adverse reaction in this country, in that people in areas where access was not denied would want such areas denied to Soviet personnel.

At this point, Secretary Smith called attention to a map which was in exhibition before the Council and which reflected the additional areas in the Soviet Union which have recently been opened to our personnel there. Secretary Smith advised that in recent months U.S. representatives have traveled 205,000 man miles in the USSR.

Secretary Smith advised that the Department of State is of the view that Recommendations 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the Planning Board should be approved, with the caveat that the Department of State
determine the exact method of implementation, in consultation with other appropriate agencies, and that they should be applied quietly and by degrees. He proposed that Planning Board Recommendations 1-a and 1-b be referred back for more realistic study. He stated that the Department of State is opposed to Planning Board Recommendation 3. It was Secretary Smith’s view that if the Council were to go beyond the proposals of the Department of State which he had just outlined, the U.S. would rapidly reach a point of diminishing returns.

... Mr. [Allen] Dulles observed that if we endeavored to restrict Soviet bloc personnel only in the acquisition of this unclassified data, they would be able to get it through other means and through various European countries.

Mr. Lay then called upon Secretary Weeks for his comments. Secretary Weeks advised that the Department of Commerce is unable fully to evaluate all of the recommendations in the report, since many of them do not relate to that Department. He stated, however, that Commerce concurs in those recommendations of the report which apply to that Department.

Secretary Weeks made reference to Mr. Hoover’s comments regarding the interpretation of the Commerce regulation which excludes furnishing certain types of information to Communists. He stated that this matter had been called to his attention by Mr. Cutler; that he had had the matter investigated; and that investigation had disclosed that an innocent mistake had been made by the employee involved.

Secretary Weeks then referred to the nautical and related types of maps which Soviet bloc representatives were obtaining from the Coast and Geodetic Office, and stated that it is possible to walk into any store in the country and buy such maps and charts. He added that he had in fact bought them himself. He stated that since this was the case, he did not know why the Soviet bloc representatives came to the Department of Commerce to obtain these maps, rather than purchase them at various stores where they are available throughout the country. Secretary Weeks added that the foregoing was not intended to modify his Department’s views on the recommendations. He again stated that the Department of Commerce favors the recommendations which relate to it.

The Vice President inquired if strict reciprocity is now in effect between the U.S. and the USSR. Secretary Smith advised that the answer is no, and went on to state that when he left Moscow, USSR regulations precluded our personnel from traveling beyond a 40-kilometer distance from Moscow. He said that at that time our personnel were permitted to go to two or three other places, but only with special permission. Secretary Smith stated that now,
however, much more extensive travel is allowed. He added that he did not believe that a great deal is actually gained from this added travel, and again emphasized that if the Council were to go beyond the proposals made by the Department of State, he felt that the U.S. would be taken past the point of diminishing returns.

At this point the President and the Secretary of State joined the meeting, and Mr. Lay briefly summarized what had transpired up to that time. Secretary Smith briefly summarized what he had said previously.

The President said he would like to ask Mr. Hoover how much we can really deny to these people. He stated that when he had seen the Smyth report in 1945, he had given up on trying to keep anything secret.

Mr. Hoover stated that one of the recommendations in the IIC-ICIS report provided that any requests made by Soviet bloc personnel be channeled through a central source. He said that this does not mean that denial of all such information could necessarily be assured by the adoption of that recommendation, but that it would certainly slow them down in the efforts to acquire it.

The President asked Secretary Smith for his views on the matter, and Secretary Smith thereupon read from a brief memorandum which he had read earlier to the Council. Secretary Smith then stated that the Department of State agreed with Planning Board Recommendations 2, 4, 5 and 6; that it recommends their approval with the caveat that State should determine, in consultation with other agencies, the exact method of accomplishing them, and that they be done quietly and on a progressive basis. He said State recommended against the adoption of Planning Board Recommendation 3, and that it proposed the referral of Planning Board Recommendations 1-a and 1-b back to the Planning Board for further consideration, while observing the effect of implementing the other recommendations proposed for approval.

The President said that in a situation of this kind we at the Council table have to shoot from the hip; we do not have detailed background data on the matter; that if we could successfully put all of these recommendations in effect he would favor doing so, but he thought the best way to handle the situation was by continuing.

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close liaison and close working relations between State, CIA, FBI, etc., meeting these problems and resolving them as they arose.

Mr. Allen Dulles stated that he had been keeping a clipping file on classified security data which had been appearing in the press, and he felt that it was this situation which we should be studying and trying to resolve. Mr. Dulles referred, by of example, to the recent article written by Retired Admiral Morreel relative to the destruction of the steel-producing capabilities of the U.S. by Soviet H-bombs.

The Vice President though that apart from the question of acquisition of intelligence, another factor which should be considered was the advisability of adopting absolute, rigid, strict reciprocity with respect to Soviet bloc diplomats. He stated that there has been a feeling in the past in the Department of State that if we were nice to the Soviet bloc diplomats they would be nice to us. Secretary Dulles and Secretary Smith observed that this feeling did not obtain at the present time in the Department of State.

Secretary Smith stated that State favors identical, rather than comparable, restrictions with respect to the bloc personnel. The Attorney General said that the Department of Justice could go for that type of arrangement.

Mr. Lay suggested, in conjunction with the foregoing, that a technical group composed of appropriate agencies should be established for the purpose of accomplishing this objective.

The President expressed the view that constant study of this problem by competent personnel in the agencies concerned was more important than trying to lay down precise and detailed regulations.

Secretary Weeks said, with respect to Planning Board Recommendation 4, that he thought the Department of Commerce, in consultation with industry, could help slow down considerably the efforts of Soviet bloc representatives to acquire unclassified strategic data from industrial sources in this country. Mr. Lay pointed out that one of the recommendations in paragraph 4 dealt specifically with this point, and with the taking of affirmative steps by the Department of Commerce to solicit the voluntary cooperation of business and industry with respect to the publication of such data.

Secretary Dulles observed that there were psychological aspects to this problem, and that he believed that it was a domestic political relations problem primarily. He observed that it would be well for us to be in a position to say that we were reciprocating in kind vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc. He observed that a far greater problem existed with respect to the safeguarding of classified security information, as contrasted to the safeguarding of unclassified data. Mr Hoover pointed out in this regard that the particular study under
consideration by the Council was limited to the problem of restricting access to unclassified, as distinguished from classified, materials. Secretary Dulles stated that he did not believe that the fate of the world would depend on how we solved this particular problem.

The President again stated that he had doubts as to the advisability of trying to lay down regulations on the subject, other than in the broadest terms.

Secretary Humphrey thought that the Council’s guide should be that we do to them precisely what they do to us. The President stated that his only objection to that point was the problem of trying to enforce any detailed regulations that were drawn. He said he disliked issuing an order unless it could be enforced fully.

Dr. Flemming asked if the Council could not accomplish what it wished to do in this situation by referring the matter to the Operations Coordinating Board. Mr. Lay pointed out that the OCB is not in the internal security field, and that this problem was primarily one of an internal security nature. The President said that the problem should be resolved by making our arrangements vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc strictly reciprocal all around.

Secretary Smith observed that it was not realistic to close out areas in the U.S. comparable to those which we are denied in the Soviet bloc countries.

The Attorney General suggested that an attempt be made to agree on areas along the lines of strict reciprocity and that if agreement could not be reached, then the problem could be brought back to the Council. Secretary Smith stated that wherever we can do it, he was in favor of restricting the activities of Soviet bloc representatives in the United States.

Secretary Weeks referred to the Planning Board recommendations which were to be implemented by the Department of Commerce, stating that he assumed that from a monetary standpoint his Department would receive a helping hand from the Bureau of the Budget when it came to implementing such recommendations.

Mr. Lay advised that a record of action on this subject would be prepared for circulation to the Council, along the lines indicated by the President.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the recommendations of the NSC Planning Board transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 9, in the light of the report by the IIIC-ICIS on the subject transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 8, the report of the Director of Central Intelligence contained in SNIE 10-5-54, and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 14.

b. Adopted Recommendations 2, 4, 5 and 6 by the Planning Board, with the understanding that they be instituted quietly and
by degrees, and that the exact method of implementing Recommendations 2 and 6 will be determined by the Department of State in consultation with other interested agencies in order to minimize the risk of Soviet bloc retaliation.

c. In lieu of Recommendations 1 and 3 by the NSC Planning Board, adopted the following:

Restrictions be placed upon diplomatic and official representatives of the Soviet bloc countries in the United States on the basis of strict reciprocity for restrictions placed upon U.S. representatives in each Soviet bloc country; as determined to be feasible by a group composed of representatives of the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and of ODM and CIA.

Note: The actions in b and c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the appropriate agencies for implementation, and circulated to the Council for information.9

[Here follows discussion of the remaining agenda items dealing with the European Defense Community and other matters.]

S. EVERETT GLEASON

9The recommendations adopted by the Council at this meeting were subsequently circulated as NSC 5427.

No. 626

661.00/8-1054

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State1

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 10, 1954.

In a recent letter2 commenting on National Intelligence Estimate 11-5-54 (Soviet Capabilities and Main Lines of Policy Through Mid-1959),3 Ambassador Bohlen states he sincerely feels that it is quite impossible to forecast even the main lines of Soviet policy for five years in advance. He says: "Capabilities of an industrial or military nature are, of course, another matter and to some extent can be very roughly estimated for a considerable period in the future. In regard to policy, intentions, etc., however, I doubt very much if even the men in the Kremlin could give you a reasonable answer."

1Drafted by Robert O. Blake of the Office of Eastern European Affairs and approved by Barbour (EUR) and Thurston (EE). The source text bears a notation indicating that Secretary Dulles saw this paper.

2Not further identified.

3Document 624.
With regard to the estimate in 11-5-54 that "the stability and authority of the Soviet regime will not be affected during the next five years by conflicts for power or differences respecting policy within the ruling group," Ambassador Bohlen feels there is clearly some confusion of thought. If there is a serious conflict for power or if there are such deep policy differences with the ruling group as to result in a split with the elimination of one faction as against another, he feels that this could not happen without seriously affecting the Soviet regime. "The serious, if not catastrophic, consequences to the Soviet regime of a fight to the death for whatever reason within the ruling group is one of the reasons why Embassy Moscow has tended to be less sanguine about such a split occurring." Ambassador Bohlen finds it difficult to believe that the men who run the Kremlin and who are aware of all its problems and difficulties would be unaware of the dangers.

He feels that present evidence does not justify any firm assumption concerning a struggle for power despite the undoubted existence of normal human rivalries and jealousies within the group. If, however, for a number of reasons such a struggle does break out, whether based on policy differences or individual rivalries, the entire Soviet regime will be affected.

Ambassador Bohlen has some reservation with regard to the NIE conclusion that "The Soviet rulers will almost certainly believe that, as Soviet nuclear capabilities increase, the aversion of the United States and its allies to general war will correspondingly increase, and that the Kremlin will therefore have greater freedom of action to pursue its objectives without running substantial risk of general war. Thus the Kremlin will be increasingly ready to apply heavy pressure on the non-Communist world." He feels that in the field of nuclear diplomacy, "there is confusion between cause and effect. That increased Soviet nuclear capability will have an effect on the Western world and particularly our allies is already painfully evident. However, it is by no means certain or even probable that the Soviet Union will be prepared to take greater risks on that account. After all, despite their capability to control the public opinion, these men themselves cannot be unaffected by the consequences of an atomic war. . . ." Malenkov's election speech, which spoke about the dangers to world civilization of nuclear warfare, probably represented much more the true thinking than the subsequent backtracking to the more familiar line of destruction of capitalism." Ambassador Bohlen feels, however, that Soviet activities in taking advantage of divisions in the Free World will be confined in large measures to the diplomatic and political as against the

*Ellipsis in the source text.*
military field. He notes that although unfortunate signs of division have been rather prevalent in the Western camp recently, the Soviet Union has not seemed to be applying heavier pressure on that account.

Ambassador Bohlen is somewhat disturbed about renewed tendencies to explain Soviet developments in terms of a struggle for power among Soviet leaders. He feels that recognition of this policy is one thing but that its acceptance as a working hypothesis in the light of which all developments are interpreted is quite another. He points out that although the Embassy in Moscow has never dismissed the possibility that collective leadership at the top will break down, nevertheless, he does not feel the evidence tends to indicate that a serious fight is in progress.

In conclusion Ambassador Bohlen states that he feels any attempt to write a five-year paper is almost doomed in advance. "The longer I am here the more I believe the inductive as against the deductive method of analysis of this country is the sounder. By this I mean conclusions drawn from an analysis of what has happened rather than the interpretation of events in the light of previously arrived at conclusions" should be the rule.

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No. 627

INR-NIE files

National Intelligence Estimate

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 14, 1954.

NIE 11–4–54

SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION THROUGH MID-1959

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Soviet capabilities and probable courses of action through mid-1959.

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1Regarding National Intelligence Estimates, see footnote 2, Document 491.

According to a note on the cover sheet of this NIE, the intelligence agencies of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this paper. The IAC concurred in this estimate on Sept. 14.
General

1. We believe that the stability and authority of the Soviet regime will not be significantly affected during the period of this estimate by conflicts for power or differences respecting policy within the ruling group. Any internal conflicts arising out of such developments would probably be resolved within the confines of the ruling group and the higher echelons of the Communist Party and would not lead to civil wars or disturbances of major proportions.

2. The appearance of new leadership in Moscow has had no apparent effect on the character of relations between the USSR and its Satellite states in Eastern Europe. We believe that Soviet authority over the Satellite regimes will remain intact during the period of this estimate.

3. Communist China is more an ally than a Satellite of the USSR. It possesses some capability for independent action, possibly even for action which the USSR might disapprove but which it would find difficult to repudiate. We believe that despite potential sources of friction between the two powers arising from occasional conflicts of national interests, the cohesive forces in the relationship will be far greater than the divisive forces throughout the period of this estimate.

Economic

4. The rate of growth of the Soviet economy has declined in the past five years from the very high rate of the immediate postwar period. We estimate that during the next two years Soviet gross national product (GNP) will increase by about 6 or 7 percent, and in 1956-1959 by about 5 or 6 percent, per year. If US GNP should increase during the period of this estimate at its long-range annual average of 3 percent, Soviet GNP would at the end of the period be about two-fifths of US, as compared with about one-third in 1953.

5. The pattern of resource allocation in the Soviet economy in 1953 showed about 14 percent devoted to defense, 28 percent to investment, and 56 percent to consumption. Current economic programs indicate that for at least the next two years the amount of expenditure on defense, instead of continuing the rapid increase that prevailed in 1950-1952, will remain about the same, while expenditure on investment and consumption will increase. We believe the chances are better than even that the Kremlin will continue its policies along these lines throughout the period of this estimate. The chief emphasis will almost certainly continue to be on further development of heavy industry.
6. The chief weakness of the Soviet economy as a whole has been in agricultural production, which has remained since 1950 at approximately the prewar level, though the population is now about 10 percent greater than in 1940. Soviet leaders appear to have recognized that continuation of the serious lag in agriculture would ultimately make it difficult to meet the food requirements of the growing urban population, the raw material requirements of the expanding industrial economy, and the export requirements of Soviet foreign trade, in which agriculture plays a major role. To remedy the situation the regime has embarked on a vigorous program, with the aim of achieving by 1956 a 50-percent increase in agricultural production over 1950. We believe that this goal will not be met, and that even in 1959 agricultural production will be no more than 15 to 20 percent higher than in 1950. Even this increase, however, would be sufficient to achieve a moderate increase in the per capita availability of foodstuffs and textiles.

Military

7. We believe that, generally speaking, the size of Soviet forces-in-being will remain approximately constant during the period of this estimate. However, the over-all effectiveness of these forces will increase, mainly because of the following factors:

a. A great increase in numbers of nuclear weapons, and in the range of yields derived from these weapons;

b. An increase in the number of all-weather fighters and jet medium bombers, and the introduction of jet heavy bombers in 1957;

c. A great increase in the number of long-range submarines;

d. An increase in combat effectiveness of Soviet ground forces, primarily due to improved weapons, equipment and organization, and to changes in doctrine and tactics designed to increase their capabilities for nuclear warfare.

8. The principal limitations of Bloc armed forces during the period of this estimate will be: deficiencies in experience, training, and equipment for long-range air operations and air defense; lack of capability to conduct long-range amphibious and naval operations; and the logistic problems, especially for operations in the Far East, arising from the size of Bloc territory and the relatively inadequate road and rail network and merchant fleet. The questionable political reliability of the Satellite armies places a significant limitation upon their military usefulness.

Probable Courses of Action

9. We believe that during the period of this estimate the Kremlin will try to avoid courses of action, and to deter Communist China from courses of action, which in its judgment would clearly involve
substantial risk of general war. However, the USSR or one of the Bloc countries might take action creating a situation in which the US or its allies, rather than yield an important position, would decide to take counteraction involving substantial risk of general war with the USSR. We believe, moreover, that the Kremlin would not be deterred by the risk of general war from taking counteraction against a Western action which it considered an imminent threat to Soviet security. Thus general war might occur during the period of this estimate as the climax of a series of actions and counteractions, initiated by either side, which neither side originally intended to lead to general war.

10. The progress being made by the USSR in the development of nuclear weapons, and the increasing Soviet capability to deliver these weapons, are changing the world power situation in important respects. Soviet leaders almost certainly believe that as Soviet nuclear capabilities increase, the unwillingness of the US, and particularly of its allies, to risk general war will correspondingly increase, and that the Kremlin will therefore have greater freedom of action to promote its objectives without running substantial risk of general war. In any case, the USSR will probably be increasingly ready to apply heavy pressure on the non-Communist world upon any signs of major dissension or weakness among the US and its allies. Nevertheless, we believe that the Kremlin will be extremely reluctant to precipitate a contest in which the USSR would expect to be subjected to nuclear attack. The extent to which the Kremlin uses its increasing freedom of action will depend primarily on the determination, strength, and cohesiveness of the non-Communist world.

11. We believe that the USSR will continue to pursue its expansionist objectives and to seek and exploit opportunities for enlarging the area of Communist control. It will be unswerving in its determination to retain the initiative in international affairs and to

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2The Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, and the Director of Intelligence, USAF, believe that the following should be substituted for the first sentence of paragraph 9: “Although the Kremlin will probably try to avoid courses of action and to deter Communist China from courses of action that entail substantial risk of involving the USSR in general war, it may be more willing to support courses of action that would involve risk of a localized war between the US and Communist China. The support given such courses of action would depend largely on Soviet judgment as to the probable outcome of the war. If the Soviet leaders believed that it would result in a severe defeat to Communism, or the fullscale participation of the USSR in general war, they would probably exert pressure on the Chinese to avoid courses of action which would precipitate hostilities. On the other hand, if they estimated that the conflict could be limited to war localized in the Far East, and that it would result in greater relative damage to US strengths than to Communist strengths, they probably would support more adventurous courses of action on the part of the Chinese Communists.” [Footnote in the source text.]
capitalize on successes in order to keep the Free World on the defensive. For the near term, however, the Kremlin will almost certainly continue to direct its external policies towards the immediate objectives of weakening and disrupting the mutual defense arrangements of non-Communist states, preventing or retarding the rearment of Germany and Japan, undermining the economic and political stability of non-Communist states, and isolating the US from its allies and associates in Europe and Asia. At the same time it will continue to expand the industrial strength of the Bloc, and to maintain large modern forces-in-being as a guarantee of the integrity of the Bloc and as an instrument of intimidation in support of its policies abroad.

12. The Communists will vary the methods used to accomplish the foregoing aims and will time their actions so as to exploit situations that in their judgment offer the most favorable opportunities. For the time being, the Kremlin seems to feel that its foreign objectives will be best served by a generally conciliatory pose in foreign relations, by gestures of “peaceful co-existence” and proposals for mutual security pacts, by tempting proffers of trade, and by playing on the themes of peace and disarmament. The purpose of these tactics is to allay fear in some parts of the non-Communist world, to create the impression that there has been a basic change in Soviet policy, and thereby to destroy the incentive for Western defense and to undermine US policies. At the same time, however, the Communists continue to support and encourage nationalist and anticolonial movements, and to maintain their efforts to subvert governments outside the Bloc. We believe that the Kremlin will revert to more aggressive and threatening conduct whenever it feels that such conduct will bring increased returns. By such varieties and combinations of tactics the Soviet leaders almost certainly consider that they can improve the chances for further Communist strategic advances. We do not believe that such tactics indicate any change in basic Communist objectives, or that they will involve any substantial concessions on the part of the Kremlin.

13. We believe that Southeast Asia offers, in the Communist view, the most favorable opportunities for expansion in the near future. The Communists will attempt to extend their gains in Indochina, and will expand their efforts to intimidate and subvert neighboring countries by political infiltration and covert support of local insurrections. We do not believe that the Communists will attempt to secure their objectives in Southeast Asia by the commitment of identifiable combat units of Chinese Communists armed forces, at least during the early period of this estimate. However, we find the situation in this area so fluid that we are unable to estimate beyond this early period.
No. 628

Memorandum by the Special Assistant for Intelligence (Armstrong) to the Acting Secretary of State

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[WASHINGTON,] September 21, 1954.

Subject: Intelligence Note: Soviet Leaders Reduce Atmosphere of Isolation

Soviet leaders for the past year have increasingly endeavored to reduce the appearance of aloofness and isolation that marked their relations with the Soviet public and foreigners in Moscow during Stalin’s later years. This development appears to be part of a program to stress collective leadership, which excludes the Stalinist build-up of any individual as a demigod, rather than part of a calculated campaign to popularize the leadership.

The new approach is evident in three trends:

(1) A marked increase in the public appearances of Presidium members and Central Committee secretaries at Soviet and Diplomatic functions within the USSR. In general, the frequency of such appearances by the Presidium as a group has increased nearly fourfold, e.g., 30 during the past year as compared with an average of 7 or 8 for the postwar period before Stalin’s death. The number of individual appearances of Presidium members and Central Committee secretaries shows an even greater increase; over 300 as compared to a previous high of 60 per year. A more personal approach to foreigners has been evident mainly in the increased attendance by Presidium members at diplomatic functions, including those in Western embassies.

(2) Standardization of dress on the part of the leaders at most public gatherings, with Malenkov’s virtual abandonment of his practice of wearing the traditional Party tunic and visored cap. Until this year Malenkov customarily attended all functions in the Party tunic, but since May 1 he has almost always appeared in a business suit. Western style business suits and fedoras now appear to be standard for all the Presidium members and Central Committee secretaries, with the exception of Bulganin who always wears a military uniform. The standardization of dress may be primarily intended to promote the appearance of collective leadership and to

1Copies of this memorandum were directed to G, C, S/P, EUR, S/MSA, U/OC, E, O, and P. A marginal notation on the source text indicates that this memorandum was not submitted to the Acting Secretary.
encourage the belief that there has been some sort of break with the Stalinist era.

(3) Frequent use of the Kremlin for public meetings, tours, and entertainment attended by ordinary citizens. Anticipated removal of the bodies of Lenin and Stalin and other foreign and Soviet individuals from Red Square and admittance of the public to the Kremlin presumably will diminish the concept of the Kremlin as a mighty walled fortress behind which the select one or few guide the destiny of the USSR. Rumors that the highest Soviet officials would move out of the Kremlin have been partly confirmed by Khrushchev’s recent statement that the Kremlin was to be opened to the public as a museum.

W. PARK ARMSTONG, JR.

601.6111/10-454: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, October 4, 1954—5:57 p. m.

Topol 394. US planning place in effect approximately October 15 certain travel restrictions on USSR, Hungarian and Rumanian diplomats and official representatives in addition those presently in force. Motivations this action are 1) concern caused by stepped up intelligence collection activities by Soviet orbit personnel in US and 2) fact that US representatives in Soviet bloc particularly in USSR have been subjected increasing harassments in recent months in connection with travel. Effect these harassments has been to significantly reduce travel opportunities made possible by ostensible relaxation travel controls in 1953.

Restrictions will be established so as not to exceed strict reciprocity. Polish and Czech representatives not subject restrictions view absence similar restrictions on US personnel stationed those countries.

In addition present requirement for prior notification travel outside 25-mile zone from center Washington, new restrictions will set up number US interior areas which will be closed except for train travel through or air travel over them and closed zone 15 miles in

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1 Repeated for information to Moscow as 234. Drafted jointly by Stoessel (EUR/EE) and Joseph J. Wolf, NATO Advisor (EUR/RA); cleared in EUR/EE, EUR, RA, and SCA; and signed for the Secretary by Stoessel.

2 The Department of State on Jan. 3, 1955, announced certain additional travel restrictions on Soviet, Hungarian, and Rumanian diplomats and officials; for text of the announcement, see Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 31, 1955, p. 193.
depth along Canadian and Mexican borders. There will be special closed cities in open areas and open cities in closed areas.

Tass correspondents in Washington and Amtorg officials in New York will also be subject new restrictions. If queried re application restrictions to Soviet bloc UN personnel you may say this question still under consideration.

In accordance with past procedures notify NAC earliest of these pending restrictions. If discussion develops re reasons for US actions believe preferable emphasize point (2) first paragraph. If queried re point (1) you may say restrictions are only one of means being developed by US authorities to cope with increased activities by Soviet orbit personnel in collecting large amounts unclassified materials of intelligence value (maps, aerial photos, industrial data etc.). Actions we will take this regard will continue to be based on reciprocity however. (FYI we do not feel advisable become involved in detailed discussion at present in NAC of this problem. We do not plan inform NAC of other actions we will take to counter Soviet activity which will include restrictions on photography and sketching and control over access to unclassified Government publications. End FYI.)

Should it be required you may state that if USSR, Hungary or Rumania should alleviate restrictions affecting our personnel US restrictions will be similarly modified.

DULLES

No. 630

611.61/11–654: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY Moscow, November 8, 1954—2 p. m.

720. Last night’s reception\(^1\) passed off without any particular incidents but developed a number of interesting features. This year Molotov repeated his performance of having a selected group of Chiefs-of-Mission sit at his table at which this time the entire Presidium with exception of Voroshilov, who did not attend reception, were seated. In addition to three Western Ambassadors, he had Burmese, Indian, Indonesian, Chinese and Pole.

After series of general toasts to guests and to peace Molotov began toasting Ambassadors individually. Toast to British Ambas-

\(^1\)An official Soviet reception held at the Kremlin as part of the celebration of the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution.
sador contained nothing special and latter in reply drank to health of city of Moscow. In proposing health of French Ambassador Molotov said that he had the pleasantest of memories of city of Paris but he could not say the same for Paris agreements. French Ambassador replied that he was here in Moscow to explain anything that bothered Molotov regarding the Paris agreements and made some reference to development of cultural relations between the two countries. When my turn came, Molotov stated that “American and Soviet diplomats had great responsibility for working towards and improvement of relations and mutual understanding between the two countries.” In reply I said that since cities had been mentioned—Moscow and Paris—I would like to mention Washington and I recalled that Mr. Molotov had visited Washington in past, particularly once during war in 1942, when he had traveled under name of Mr. Brown. I drank Molotov’s health as the most experienced diplomat in the room and, since no one could disagree with his statement concerning function of diplomats, to the next time he would visit Washington to that end.

The Soviet toasts, as might be expected, dealt again heavily with theme of peace and “friendship among the nations” to which all the neutralist Asians responded in glowing terms concerning Soviet Union, October Revolution and Soviet policy of peace. The Indonesian Ambassador even went so far as to state that the October Revolution and subsequent progress in Soviet Union had been a great inspiration for peoples of Asia.

As last year, these toasts took place before a large crowd (including all correspondents) which pressed around table. I found opportunity after leaving table to make certain that press, in general noise and confusion, had obtained an accurate account of my toast.

Congressman Wickersham, who had been successful by his own efforts in obtaining invitation from Intourist, was present and at one time or other apparently succeeded in meeting all the Soviet leaders. I was near him when he spoke to Mikoyan and he kept assuring him of desire of American people to live in peace and friendship with Soviet Union, a sentiment which I gather he repeated throughout evening.

The most interesting part of the evening came as table broke up. In going to say good-bye to Soviet officials at table, British Ambas-

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2Sir William Hayter.
3Louis Joxé.
4Reference is presumably to Nine-Power meetings at Paris, Oct. 20–23, and the agreements resulting therefrom; for documentation on those meetings, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1404 ff.
5Dr. Subandrio.
6See telegram 725, infra.
sador and I were almost literally buttonholed by Malenkov who held us in conversation for well over half-hour. While nothing startling emerged, it was nonetheless of considerable interest. I will report this conversation in detail in immediately following telegram. We were besieged by press after Malenkov left but I merely stated that no official business was transacted.

BOHLEN

No. 631

611.61/11-854: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

Moscow, November 8, 1954—7 p.m.

725. Conversation with Malenkov\(^1\) took place standing up behind table and was carried on without interpreter (Embassy telegram 720\(^2\)). Malenkov said to both British Ambassador\(^3\) and myself—although obviously directing his remarks to me—that in present state of world diplomats had very important responsibility, particularly in not permitting "small matters" to develop into big issues. He said that when there was "coolness at the top" between governments, minor questions were sure to arise and that patience and care were needed. (Although not so stated, it seemed to be clear that he was referring to Stiff-Sommerlatte incident\(^4\) although he might possibly have had in mind latest plane incident.\(^5\))

I told him that I was in complete agreement with him and that since I had been in Moscow, whenever a minor question arose, I had in every case attempted to deal with it confidentially and quietly with Soviet Foreign Office, but that I must tell him in all frankness that position taken by Soviet Government in regard to minor incidents was what sometimes caused them to be blown up into major issues. Malenkov did not dispute my statement and looked rather quizzically at Molotov who at this point joined the group. Malenkov continued, addressing both British Ambassador

\(^1\)For a subsequent, personal assessment of this conversation, see Bohlen, Witness to History, p. 870.
\(^2\)Supra.
\(^3\)Sir William Hayter.
\(^4\)On Oct. 26, the Soviet Government declared the wife of Embassy Second Secretary and Vice Consul Karl Sommerlatte to be persona non grata.
\(^5\)Reference here is to Ambassador Bohlen's Nov. 8 protest regarding the downing of a U.S. B-29 aircraft by Soviet aircraft; for text of the note, a Nov. 7 Soviet note, and a Nov. 17 U.S. note, see Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 29, 1954, p. 811.
and myself, that also diplomats had a very important function in conveying accurately to their governments the real sentiments of the government to which they were accredited and that he hoped we understood that Soviet desire for peace and normal relations was very serious and sincere; that Soviet people and Government wanted peace in order to pursue their plans of internal development; that world situation was serious and many of the outstanding questions would take time and patience before they could be settled by negotiation which Soviet Government considered to be the only proper method of resolving disputes.

At this point, strongly supported by British Ambassador, I pointed out to Malenkov that he must understand that diplomacy operated under very special and peculiar circumstances in Moscow, mentioning almost total absence of normal contact between foreign representatives and Soviet leaders. I told him I had not asked to see him because I had no special proposals from my government to make to him and did not wish to take up his time in a purely ceremonial visit. He said that lack of contacts therefore, in my case had been because I had not sought it. Both British Ambassador and I pointed out that this was not what we had in mind, but that in other capitals there were innumerable opportunities for normal informal contacts which were not present in Moscow. Malenkov then made the interesting observation that they were trying to create "conditions" which would improve the situation in this respect.

Turning specifically to United States, Malenkov said that Soviet Government had noticed that policy pursued by President Roosevelt had been reversed by United States Government and that President Roosevelt had been strongly criticized for his policy at Yalta and at other conferences. I told him that as he was undoubtedly aware, I had been Roosevelt’s interpreter and had seen with what sincerity the President had attempted to find a basis for relations with the Soviet Union. I added that my views on this subject were a matter of public record which Malenkov said he realized. I went on to say that I thought Soviet Government was making a very serious mistake if it misunderstood the reason why relations between United States and Soviet Union had deteriorated and that since he had mentioned the wartime agreements, I could tell him that the American people had been greatly disillusioned by attitude of Soviet Government towards these agreements. At this point, Malenkov interjected the standard statement that Soviet Union always abided by its agreements. I told him that I had seen President Roosevelt up to a few days before his death and that he

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6Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, Mar. 4, 1933–Apr. 12, 1945.
had been very deeply concerned at the attitude of Soviet Government concerning these agreements; that his messages in late March and April 1945 which must be in files of Soviet Government clearly reflected this concern, to which Malenkov nodded agreement. I added that Mr. Harry Hopkins directly in my presence in May 1945 had said the same thing to Marshal Stalin. This led to a discussion of United States political scene on which I told Mr. Malenkov that, judging from Soviet press, I found little evidence of knowledge, to say nothing of understanding, concerning the United States and that, with reference to his statement concerning the importance of objective reporting by diplomats, I could only say that there was vast room for improvement in regard to information concerning the United States. I said I thought the constant use of the worn out clichés concerning Wall Street, et cetera, which was the image of the United States presented to Soviet people by press here was neither serious nor realistic and I could think of nothing more dangerous or incorrect than an attempt to draw a distinction between the policy of the United States and the sentiments of its people. At this point, Kaganovich who had joined the group referred to speeches and statements appearing in United States press hostile to Soviet Union and promoting the idea of war. I repeated that I thought Soviet Government could well undertake a more serious study of United States and how it functioned other than mere collection of isolated items in US press which being free, expressed a great diversity of opinion. Malenkov listened most attentively to this and merely remarked that foreigners frequently thought that leaders of Soviet Government had nothing better to do than to dictate every item in Soviet press, to which I replied that no one seriously believed that they had time to devote to every detail in the press but I had noticed a certain consistency of treatment on any given subject. In urging Malenkov to a more realistic appraisal of US, its purposes and policies, I mentioned that our political scene was somewhat more “complicated” than his, to which he laughed and agreed.

Malenkov with appearance of great earnestness said to both British Ambassador and myself that it was frequently believed that Soviet Union in attempting to improve its relations with England was doing so “at the expense” of its relations with US. He said that this was not “solid” or serious and that Soviet Government was not so foolish as to try so stupid a game as this. He said there were apparently greater possibilities in some fields than in others but

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7Regarding the mission to Moscow in May 1945 by Harry L. Hopkins, Adviser and Assistant to President Harry S. Truman, see Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. 1, pp. 21–62.
emphasized that Soviet Government desired to have normal and
good relations with all countries. At one point the Paris agree-
ments came up and he said that they believed something should be
done "before their ratification", to which I replied that we believed
prospects for normalization of relations would be better after their
entry into force. He did not pursue the subject any further.

As indicated previously, there was nothing startling or especially
new in this conversation with Malenkov but it was singularly free,
on his side, of usual mechanical clichés which other Soviet officials
including Molotov invariably use. He seemed particularly desirous
of impressing upon us seriousness with which Soviet Union viewed
world scene and of its desire to prevent it turning into war. He
made on me an impression of a man of great determination and
ruthlessness but with a more subtle and highly developed intelli-
gence than his associates.

I mentioned to him casually during conversation that there was
possibility that I might be returning to Washington for routine con-
sultation following my trip to Sweden. I did so in order avoid any
impression when it became known that it was due to sudden emer-
gency decision on part US Government.

Although I was not present I gather that in his talk with Con-
gressman Wickersham Malenkov sent message to President Eisen-
hower concerning Soviet desire for friendship good relations et
cetera, together with an expression of his personal esteem for the
President as "a fine soldier and an honorable man." As understood
by some members of staff who were present, on departing, Malen-
kov said to Wickersham that "as situation stands now, we are
ready to turn back to US".

French Ambassador said, also that Khrushchev (who as far
as I could gather is not especially bright) said that if Paris agree-
ments went into effect, Soviet Union would have to embark on
larger defense program, to which French Ambassador replied he
doubted it since they had never let up on their military prepara-
tions since end of war.

While obviously exchanges at reception of this character are tra-
ditional and do not have any direct bearing on Soviet policy, there
is no doubt that last night Soviet officials went out of their way,
particularly in regard to US, to emphasize seriousness of their
desire for normal relations. The attitude of Malenkov and other
Soviet officials together with restrained tone of speeches over holi-
days I believe reflect the hesitancy and concern of Soviet Govern-
ment when confronted with situation, particularly in regard to

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\(^{8}\) Louis Joxe.
West German rearmament, which they realize are not in position to do much about.

Bohlen

No. 632

661.93/11-2354: Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Missions¹

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, November 23, 1954
CA-3400

Subject: Counteracting Possible Misinterpretation of Recent Sino-Soviet Accords

Some reports reaching the Department have interpreted the Sino-Soviet communiqués of October 12, 1954 as (1) a significant shift in Sino-Soviet relations in favor of China, or (2) as an indication of a struggle between the two Communist powers, out of which China has emerged victorious. The Department feels that these ideas are erroneous and that their acceptance might lead to a dangerous over-evaluation of Communist China’s strength and willingness to follow courses of independent action. The following observations are therefore made for the guidance of officers in the field in discussing the agreements with their contacts among foreign officials, subject to the discretion of the field and to the general caution that United States officials should not give these communiqués undue importance by calling special attention to them.

The communiqués must be considered from two viewpoints: (1) the impression they were calculated to give to the world, particularly Asia, (2) how they mirror Sino-Soviet relations. Without doubt the communiqués were designed to give the impression that Communist China enjoys a new degree of independence from and equality with the Soviet Union. In particular, they were designed to (a) heighten Communist China’s prestige in order to strengthen her in her drive for a leadership in Asia and for recognition as a world power (through admission to the United Nations and by diplomatic recognition by other states), and (b) to promote the current Com-

¹Drafted by Walter P. McConaughy and Edwin W. Martin, Director and Deputy Director, respectively, of the Office of Chinese Affairs (CA), and by David L. Osborne (CA) and Robert O. Blake (EE); cleared by Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson and Merchant (EUR); and approved for transmission by Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy.

²Telegram 530 from Moscow, Oct. 12, reported a description of the eight communiqués and joint declarations that constituted the Soviet-Chinese agreements of Oct. 12. The translated texts of these agreements are printed in Documents (R.I.A.) for 1954, pp. 321-327.
munist theme of peaceful coexistence by encouraging the belief that close association with the Communist bloc is compatible with sovereignty and independence and does not entail subservience to Moscow.

Further, it was probably in the interest of both powers for the purposes of the advancement of the Communist movement in Asia, to give the impression that the Soviets have now accorded a position of approximate equality to China. Thus, a liquidation of Soviet footholds in China which had been often interpreted by sensitive Asians as European extra-territoriality was dramatically announced in the communiqués. Apart from this intention to foster the impression that the Communist Chinese regime has been accorded a position of approximate equality, the agreements did not reveal anything essentially new; the scheduled withdrawal of Soviet troops merely implemented a commitment given in 1950; the level of economic aid announced continues to be niggardly; the liquidation of the joint stock companies followed a pattern already well underway in the Eastern European Communist bloc.

The new agreements although designed to have maximum propaganda usefulness, may reflect some real, though not fundamental, adjustments in the relations between the two regimes. There is no reason to believe that any readjustment put a serious strain on the partnership, which is based on strong ties of ideology, common objectives, and shared hostility to the free world. Communist China continues to accept the role of a junior partner in the coalition, because of the Soviet Union’s greater economic and diplomatic experience and its possession of the sinews of power, economic, political, and military resources. The communiqués reflect the continuing Soviet acknowledgment that Communist China occupies a more important and independent position in the Communist hierarchy than do the Soviet Union’s Eastern European satellites. It seems certain that the Soviet Union, in its own national interests and in order to maintain its supremacy in the world of Communism, attaches high importance to its paramount position in China. This influence is asserted by “advice” given through party channels, and Soviet aid programs and technical advisers.

The communiqués present the picture of a common front on foreign affairs. There are, however, at least two indications of some degree of Soviet uneasiness in this field. A special point was made, in the guise of mutually-assumed obligations, to commit the Chinese Government to consultation with the Soviet Government on all aspects of policy which might be of mutual interest. This stress on mutual consultation probably was sought as a general check on Chinese Communist foreign policy. The language used in referring to Formosa, noticeably milder than that habitually employed by
Chinese Communists, may reflect the Soviet Union's concern lest Communist China take action dangerous to Soviet security on the Formosa question. Other signs would seem to confirm the impression that the Soviet Government looks with less enthusiasm than does the Chinese Communist regime on a potentially dangerous breach of the peace in the Far East.

In summation, however, despite the above indications of differences of emphasis on policy matters, and despite Communist China's "junior partner" status, it should be emphasized that these communiqués reflect the high degree of identification which characterizes the interests and objectives of the Soviet Union and the Peiping regime. Every effort must be made to emphasize this unity of purpose, as well as the basic unchanging dedication of the two regimes to the creation of a Communist-dominated world through coordinated subversion.

Dulles