CYPRUS

UNITED STATES INTEREST IN AGITATION FOR ENOSIS (UNION OF CYPRUS WITH GREECE) AND IN THE QUESTION OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR CYPRUS AT THE UNITED NATIONS

No. 357

747C.00/7-1852: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece

SECRET
WASHINGTON, July 18, 1952—6:07 p. m.

236. Fol comments re Cyprus made in light recent tels from Athens and Nicosia re Cyprus problem:

Our views on Cyprus well known to parties directly concerned. Restated briefly, they are that US not party to problem but does not believe it useful for Grk Govt press matter. (Deptel 5076 to Athens May 14 rptd 172 to Nicosia). USUN has been instructed (Deptel 28 July 15) that Dept wld prefer that it not approach Brit rep at UN on this subj as recently suggested by Grk rep who stated he was actg without instructions. USUN was requested to intimate to Grk rep that as matter had in past been discussed by Grk Govt with Amer Emb Athens, Dept wld prefer Grk views be made available through that channel.

Public restatement our position at this time unlikely to alter approach of either Grks, Cypriots, or Brit to problem. On other hand, such reiteration wld probably provide additional propaganda material to those groups in ME and elsewhere which have belabored us

1For previous documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. v, pp. 523 ff.


3Telegram 5076, sent also to Cairo, Beirut, and Damascus, suggested that if the question of enosis arose in connection with Archbishop Makarios’ visit there, the Embassies indicate that enosis agitation could only widen disagreement and render more difficult a solution later, when more pacific international relations existed. (747C.00/5-1252)

4Telegram 28 instructed the U.S. Mission at the United Nations not to approach Sir Gladwyn Jebb, British Permanent Representative to the United Nations, on the Cyprus question as suggested by Kyrou, because the Department of State did not want to become involved in Greek agitation over Cyprus. (747C.00/7-952)
for our approach to other problems involving aspirations of local
groups in that area.

If Venizelos continues press for “official US reaction” to possible
Grk initiative in UN (Athens 83 July 8) we believe reply shld in-
clude statement that our attitude as previously expressed and out-
lined above remains unchanged and that we have not considered
any UN aspects. We still believe this be matter between friends
rather than one for discussion in UN.

We realize that even foregoing line may be useful to Venizelos in
his attempts shift responsibility from Grk Govt in matter. For ex-
ample, he cld use it as basis for statement that US opposing Grk
initiative or if he decides go ahead in UN, he might indicate we
have expressed no opposition. However, as he has already used US
position in his maneuvers around problem, it may be doubted that
he can obtain much more advantage from that angle. If he promul-
gates idea that we do not oppose Grks bringing matter to UN we
cld then consider statement re our non-involvement.

It may be possible for Emb Athens point out to Grks on suitable
occasions that further agitation of Cyprus issue might well endan-
ger whole structure of Grk-Turk amity, toward development of
which Govts and peoples of both countries, have devoted much care
with such outstanding results. Venizelos in particular may be im-
pressed by this line, as he claims much credit for existing cordiality
between two countries. Our own judgment is that regardless impli-
cations of Averoff version of Turk attitude toward problem (Athens
tel 5387) sharp Turk reaction can be expected shld Grks bring
matter to UN.

Emb London shld if occasion offers urge Brit avoid official public
comment on Cyprus question. We have in mind fact that info from
Athens (Embtel 5446) indicates that recent Nutting statement
gave added impetus to public and press agitation this matter.

ACHESON

5Telegram 83 reported that Venizelos was pressing Peurifoy to provide him with
official U.S. reaction to a contemplated speech by the Greek Representative in the
U.N. General Assembly, raising the issue of Cyprus. (747C.00/7-852)
6Telegram 5387, June 19, reported that Evangelos Averoff, Greek Deputy Minister
of Foreign Affairs, told Peurifoy in Athens on June 18, that in his discussions with
the Turkish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister during the Greek royal visit to
Turkey, the Turks would not discuss Cyprus enosis, stating that they themselves
had strong interests therein because of former possession of the island and the
Turkish minority there. They assured the Greeks that they would not let the British
play them off against the Greeks in discussing Cyprus. Peurifoy reported that Aver-
off said that if and when the Greeks secure Cyprus, they will make ample provision
for the Turkish minority and will grant the British whatever bases they want on a
99-year lease. (781.11/6-1952)
7Dated June 24, telegram 5446 stated that remarks by Nutting to Greek journal-
ists that the United Kingdom considered the Cyprus matter closed gave further im-
petus to Greek agitation. (747C.00/6-2452)
The Chargé in Greece (Yost) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET

ATHENS, August 26, 1953—4 p. m.

614. Foreign Minister has requested United States assistance in dissuading Archbishop Makarios from bringing Cyprus question before United Nations General Assembly.

Stephanopoulos declared that Marshal Papagos, while he has endeavored hitherto to play down Cyprus issue, is becoming more and more concerned, on basis of recent reports, over situation there which Stephanopoulos qualified as “oppression” and “slavery”. Papagos feels that only method of dealing with problem which has any possibility of success is direct and secret negotiation with British. He proposes during forthcoming Eden visit to Greece to approach British Foreign Minister on personal man-to-man basis alleging that démarche is unknown even to his own Cabinet. He intends to propose that British immediately grant to Cypriots constitution which would accord them certain rights of self-government and which would be followed in two or three years by plebiscite in which Cypriots would be given a choice between independence, incorporation into Greece or some status within commonwealth. For reasons Foreign Minister did not make completely clear he has some hope British might accept this proposal. He believes, however, that under present circumstances Cypriots would not do so.

Some time ago Kyrou approached Makarios, urged him to abandon appeal to UN on grounds that without US support it would merely invite failure and work to profit of Soviets, and confided that Greek Government contemplated high level approach to British. Makarios rejected Kyrou’s plea and has since leaked to Cypriot press intimation that high level conversations are being contemplated, thus jeopardizing prospects of their success.

Stephanopoulos fears that, if Makarios goes ahead with appeal lacking support of Greek Government, he may publicly accuse Papagos of betrayal Cypriots, which would have most serious affect upon position Papagos Government in Greece. On other hand if Greek Government should support appeal, negotiation with British would be impossible and probable failure of appeal would undermine confidence of Greek people in UN. This would be particularly unfortunate at time when government is increasing Greek forces in Korea.

1Repeated for information to London and Nicosia.
He therefore urgently requests that US endeavor to persuade Makarios to drop his appeal "for the time being" on the grounds that time is not ripe, that appeal would fail under present circumstances and that Communists in United Nations and in Cyprus would profit from this failure.

We would recommend that Department accede to Foreign Minister's request. Whether or not it is likely one of Soviet bloc might sponsor Makarios complaint, it would seem to be in interests of United States as well as of Papagos Government and British that Cyprus question not be raised in any form before United Nations at this time. While we do not share Stephanopoulos optimism about Eden's reaction to Papagos proposal, it would still seem that confidential bilateral conversations offer best prospect of progress on this problem. It appears likely that, unless Makarios can be restrained, Papagos may feel that his posture as Paladin of Greek nationalism obliges him to take over leadership of this campaign. Certainly there are few issues on which the opposition could cause more embarrassment to government than that of "betrayal of Cyprus".

Foreign Minister would appreciate prompt response so that Papagos might be informed of our position before he speaks with Eden who arrives in Greece August 30.

YOST

No. 359

747C.00/8-2653: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece

TOP SECRET  PRIORITY  WASHINGTON, August 28, 1953—6:47 p. m.  

723. Department's considered belief that US approach to Makarios (urtel 614)² would be not only undesirable but also ineffective for following reasons:

(1) US views remain same as those frequently repeated to Makarios and therefore highly unlikely to alter his intention make UN appeal; (2) in view Makarios' past performance, probable that any US approach would become public knowledge; (3) following Makarios leak to press of contemplated high-level Greek-UK conversations, US intervention with Makarios simultaneous with Eden visit to Greece would emphasize importance such talks in Cypriot mind

¹Drafted by Marjorie A. McMullen (NEA/GTI) and Baxter and cleared by Howard Meyers (UNP), Hamilton, and Richards. Repeated for information to London and Nicosia.

²Supra.
and add to Cypriot disillusionment if Papagos approach to Eden not productive, which we think likely.

We question validity Foreign Minister's reasoning concerning effect on position Greek Government if it fails support Enosis appeal to UN, since Papagos would probably be considered equally guilty of sabotaging Enosis cause by proposing constitutional solution, even with promise of plebiscite in near future. Appears be another attempt shift responsibility from Greek Government and involve US in Cyprus issue. Our views continue as previously stated, i.e., that US not party to problem but does not think useful for Greek Government press matter.

DULLES

No. 360

747C.00/9-238: Telegram

The Chargé in Greece (Yost) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET

ATHENS, September 2, 1953—noon.

679. Reference Department telegram 723, August 28. We presented Department's views to Stephanopoulos yesterday. Foreign Minister was disappointed though he conceded that further US approach to Makarios would probably be unsuccessful and that Archbishop would probably leak to press.

Stephanopoulos repeated several times that, if Papagos approach to Eden were unsuccessful and if Makarios' complaint to UN were not withdrawn, he believed Field Marshal would feel obliged to support and even sponsor this complaint. There is no other question, he said, on which Greek people are more united and in which their cause, being based on UN Charter and right of self-determination, is more just. If Greek Government does not sponsor complaint, some iron curtain or Arab state would, in Kyrou's opinion, probably do so, which would work to advantage of Communists in Cyprus, perhaps increasing their following from 30 to 50 percent of population.

Foreign Minister said he would discuss question with us again after Papagos–Eden conversation.

YOST

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1Repeated for information to London and Nicosia.

2Supra.

3No record of such a discussion with Stephanopoulos on the Papagos–Eden conversation has been found in Department of State files.
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Baxter)\(^1\)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 8, 1954.

Subject: Request of British Government for U.S. Support on the Cyprus Question

Participants: UNP—Mr. Mangano
UND—Mr. Ross
EUR—Mr. Allen
BNA—Mr. Hamilton
NEA—Dr. Howard
GTI—Mr. Baxter
GTI—Miss Crain

A preliminary meeting of Departmental officers was held in Mr. Baxter’s office to discuss a recent Aide-Mémoire from the British Embassy\(^2\) which requests: (1) assurances that the United States continues to share the British view that joint strategic interests of both countries demand the maintenance of the present status of Cyprus; (2) confirmation that the United States will continue to discourage the Greek Government from pressing its claims to Cyprus; and (3) agreement to inform the Greek Government that the United States would oppose placing the Cyprus question on the agenda of the General Assembly or its discussion by the UN.

It was pointed out that there was genuine sentiment for union of Cyprus with Greece in both places, although it was more vociferously expressed at some times than at others. It was also noted that the UK has vital military interests there (as has the US also) and has taken the position that it will not even discuss a change in the constitutional status of Cyprus through diplomatic channels.

It was agreed that before answering the Aide-Mémoire we should obtain the views of the Department of Defense on the strategic importance of Cyprus to the United States and wait for replies to the requests Mr. Baxter had sent to Athens and Nicosia for comprehensive reports on current developments in the Enosis issue.

It was the consensus of the meeting that the first point raised by the British would probably be answered in the affirmative, subject to the views of the Department of Defense. It was also tentatively agreed that we would accede to the second request of the British, to

\(^1\)Crain was coauthor of this memorandum of conversation.

\(^2\)Dated Jan. 28, not printed, but outlined here. (747C.00/1-2854)
discourage Greece from seeking consideration of the Enosis problem by the UN. With respect to the third point, it was felt that we could not at this time commit ourselves to a course of action in the UN, nor as to how we would vote if the necessity to do so should arise.

Some consideration was given to the suggestion that we need not necessarily limit ourselves to answering the specific points raised by the British, but might in addition ask what, if anything, they intended to do in the way of increased self-government for the Cypriots, and perhaps indicate our belief that such measures could usefully be taken. It was decided to explore this idea and to formulate specific measures along these lines.

The possibility was also discussed of whether the Turks might use their influence on the Greek Government to dissuade the latter from pressing its claim or from raising the issue in the next meeting of the United Nations. Although Turkey has tried to dissociate itself as much as possible from agitation on the Cyprus question, it has firmly stated its intention of being heard if the status of Cyprus should change, basing its interest on the large Turkish minority in the island. Now that close ties exist between Greece and Turkey, the Turkish Government might be able to exert a helpful influence on its neighbor.

No. 362

747C.00/2-2654: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Warren) to the Department of State

SECRET

ANKARA, February 26, 1954—8 p.m.

897. Department's CA-443 [4336], February 18,1 In conversation with Under Secretary Birgi today he raised Cyprus question on own initiative. He stated British recently approached Turks ascertain their views if Greeks should raise issue in UN. Turks replied they would consider such action by Greece most unfortunate. Turkish Government most desirous avoid involvement but if issue raised in UN will assert its interest and ask participate any Anglo-Greek discussions.

Foreign Office now informed by British Greek Government has formally advised UK its intention raise issue next UNGA. British inquired if Turks prepared support their request to US that we urge Greek Government not take this step. Turks have now decid-

1Not printed. (747C.00/2-1554)
ed do so and instructions to Embassy Washington going forward soon.

Briefly summarizing Turkish position, Birgi said, raise issue Cyprus union with Greece in UN would evoke sharply critical reaction in Turkey and jeopardize existing good relations with Greece. For this reason Turkish Government has been most careful avoid any action or statement on Cyprus which might inflame public opinion. No formal representation has ever been made to Greek Government although it has been intimated indirectly several times that Turkish Government hoped Greek Government would not officially support agitation for Enosis. Foreign Office now considering formal representations and Birgi thinks it likely they will be made. Turks would stress argument to raise issue in UN would benefit only common enemy. Furthermore, Arab-Asiatic bloc could be expected utilize it to maximum for own ends.

Birgi expressed personal view Kyrou may be personally active in pushing action by Greek Government since appointment as Secretary General Foreign Office because strong personal feelings on subject. He states Kyrou expelled from Cyprus by British some years ago for anti-British activities.2

WARREN

2Kyrou was serving as Greek Consul at Nicosia when recalled to Athens on Nov. 1, 1931, at the request of British authorities in Cyprus following Greek Cypriot violent demonstrations for enosis.

No. 363

747C.00/3-1054

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Directory of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Baxter)

SECRET


Subject: Turkish Views on Cyprus

Participants: Mr. Feridun C. Erkin, Turkish Ambassador
             Mr. Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary, NEA
             Mr. William O. Baxter, Deputy Director, GTI

Under instructions from his Government, the Turkish Ambassador called this afternoon to discuss the question of Cyprus in the light of the recent statement by the Greek Government that it intends to bring the matter up at the next UN General Assembly.1

1Reference is to a statement of Mar. 1 by Kyrou, reported in despatch 860, Mar. 17. (747C.00/3-1754)
He was not authorized to leave anything with the Department in writing, but showed Mr. Byroade a memorandum in which the Turkish views were rather fully expressed and which may be summarized as follows:

Although the question of the union of Cyprus with Greece has been a controversial one for many years, the Turkish Government has taken no note of it and has always attempted to play down any press agitation because the Enosis issue has never before been officially supported by the Greek Government. It has been the view of the Turkish Government that there was no reason for any change in the status quo, but it must now express its concern at the Greek Government's announced intention of presenting this question in the UN.

It must be noted that many of the arguments in favor of Enosis are based on the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants and on national affinities. The Turkish Government wishes to point out that it is not international custom to decide questions of sovereignty solely on the basis of majority wishes of the population, but that there are also equally important geographical considerations which must be taken into account.

The present is not an opportune time for this question to be raised; nor is it right for Greece to state that it is forced into this move because of public opinion when at the same time the Greek Government is inciting public opinion in favor of Enosis instead of trying to counteract propaganda favoring Enosis. Any public airing of this issue will have a seriously adverse effect upon relationships in NATO and among the three countries which have recently signed the Ankara Pact. Only the Soviet Union stands to profit by such action. The possession of Cyprus would be of no advantage to Greece, nor is it of vital necessity to that country. It is only a matter of "domestic policy speculation."

With regard to security, Cyprus is of far greater importance to Turkey than to Greece. The Turkish Government does not consider it a valid argument that Greece would be willing to make bases available to its allies following the annexation of Cyprus.

It is generally known that the communists and the Greek political parties are making use of this issue for their own selfish and shortsighted ends.

The Ambassador said that he wished to point out his personal opinion that the return of Mr. Kyrou to Athens is partly responsible for the more aggressive Greek policy on Cyprus. Mr. Kyrou, himself a Cypriot, was some years ago declared persona non grata by the British when he was Greek Consul in Nicosia and was forced to leave the Island. The Ambassador fears that Mr. Kyrou is using his position as Secretary General of the Greek Foreign Office to promote a personal policy that may get Greece so deeply involved that it cannot turn back.

Mr. Byroade said that we had in the past used our influence with the Greek Government in an effort to keep this question from
being brought up in the UN, believing that it was a matter between Greece and Great Britain. The Department is now in the process of reevaluating its views in the light of the announced intention of the Greek Government to seek the inclusion of the Cyprus problem on the UN agenda.

No. 364

747C.00/3-1854: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Warren) to the Department of State

SECRET

ANKARA, March 30, 1954—11 a.m.

1016. Deptel 1031, March 18. It is our view that if we agree with first two points of British aide-mémoire of January 29 [28] consistency would require that we also support third point. In light of existing strategic and political considerations, discussions this issue in UN can only serve weaken existing friendly relations and close cooperation between Greece, UK and Turkey, and thus further Soviet efforts disrupt western unity.

Following comments refer to Turkish aspect question:

1. Turks feel Enosis campaign carefully built with Archbishop Makarios as front man with secret encouragement Greek Govt. Turkish concern precisely with latter development now approaching critical stage. As noted Embtel 897, Turks appear believe Secretary General Greek Foreign Office Kyrou personally involved.

2. Union of Cyprus with Greece would place sizeable new Turkish minority under Greek control, upsetting balance effected by exchange of populations in 1920s.

3. Turkish interest based not only on Turkish minority but also to important extent on strategic (security) and historical factors. So long as Cyprus is under British control Turks feel it constitutes security support for them. In Greek hands feel opposite would be case, given long distance separating island from Greece and Communist strength in Cyprus. On historical grounds Turks point out Cyprus has never belonged to Greece whereas it was held by Turks for four centuries and then voluntarily turned over to British protection as precaution against Russian attack in 1878.

4. Re remarks of Greek Ambassador Kalergis to Embassy counselor on March 5 (copy memo conversation sent GTI) to effect

1Telegram 1031 called for an early reply to a previous telegram which requested recommendations to assist the Department of State in replying to the British aide-mémoire of Jan. 28. (747C.00/3-1854)

2Outlined in Document 361.

3Document 362.

4John D. Kalergis, Greek Minister in Turkey.

5The memorandum of conversation by Foy D. Kohler, Counselor of Embassy in Turkey, has not been found in Department of State files.
Turks would not object on official level to union Cyprus with Greece, Embassy considers this opinion incorrect. It is already disproved by fact Turks have now made formal representation to Greek Government for first time. Latter has apparently sought encourage view expressed by Kalergis and perhaps itself misled by continuing passivity Turkish Government in face mounting agitation recent months. We believe Turkish position essentially as stated to us by Birgi (Embtels 897 and 928), i.e., Turks are seriously concerned and will demand voice in any decision alter present status of Cyprus.

WARREN

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Dated Mar. 5, not printed. (747C.00/3-554)

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No. 365

747C.00/4-554: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 5, 1954—5:46 p.m.

2901. You are requested approach Papagos and/or Stephanopoulos to make clear that US remains firmly opposed raising Cyprus question at next UNGA session. Many and very grave problems of over-all international situation require fullest possible cooperation Western nations which agitation Cyprus issue would disturb. You may also wish indicate our feeling that Greek presentation enosis issue to UN would have extremely deleterious effects in Aegean area where relations have been improving. Finally it would afford USSR and communist bloc tailor-made opportunity to achieve success in what appears number one Soviet objective at this time, i.e. to create dissension among members of Western world and attempt destroy European strength by setting NATO partners against each other.

While US would regret withholding support from Greece if question should arise in UN, cannot offer Greek Government any encouragement in this respect. US has noted with gratification Marshal’s moderate approach to problem and earnestly hope he will find it possible to continue to discourage popular agitation and will also reconsider advisability UN action.

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Byroade seeing Politis today. 2 Will give him similar explanation our position and indicate you have been instructed explain our views in Athens on highest levels. 3

Dulles

2 For a memorandum of conversation by Baxter on Byroade’s conversation with Politis, Apr. 5, see infra.

3 Telegram 2463 from Athens, Apr. 10, stated that Cannon had explained the U.S. position as set forth in this telegram to Stephanopoulos and Kyprou and also would discuss it with Papagos on that day. The Greek Foreign Ministry showed no sign of modifying its attitude. (747C.00/4-1054) No record of Cannon’s conversation with Papagos on Apr. 10 has been found in Department of State files.

No. 366

747C.00/4-554

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Baxter)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 5, 1954.

Subject: Cyprus

Participants: Mr. Athanase G. Politis, Greek Ambassador
Mr. Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary, NEA
Mr. William O. Baxter, Acting Director, GTI

The Greek Ambassador called today at his request “merely to inform” the Department of the present status of the Cyprus question. He reviewed some of the developments of the past few months. Last September when Eden was convalescing in Athens, Papagos, at the personal suggestion of the British Ambassador, tried to bring up this subject with Eden on a completely informal and friendly basis. He was told brusquely that it was a closed question as far as the British were concerned and that it could not be discussed. Papagos was naturally offended by this attitude and as a result addressed a note to the British on November [October] 15 suggesting bilateral talks. 1 This note has been completely ignored. The intransigent attitude of the British in refusing even to discuss on any basis a problem so close to the hearts of the Greeks made it impossible later for Papagos to accept an invitation to visit London. As recently as March 15 Eden again made the same blunt statement with regard to Cyprus in the House of Commons as he had made on previous occasions. 2 This had dismayed the Greek Government and the Greek public, coming as it did at a time when Arch-

1Not printed. (781.00/10-2353)
bishop Makarios was seeing Government officials in Athens on this subject and when even British newspapers were suggesting that the British Government should adopt a more flexible attitude. Its only effect was to further inflame heated feelings. Mr. Byroade agreed that Eden's remark had had an unfortunate effect.

Mr. Byroade then explained that the Cyprus question had given him serious concern of late, so much, in fact, that Ambassador Cannon has been instructed to approach the Greek Government in Athens officially to transmit our strong hope that Greece will refrain from raising the Cyprus question at the next meeting of the General Assembly. This may seem a difficult request to make of one of our best friends, but it is our firm opinion that no one but our enemies could profit by the airing of this question at a time when we have so many grave international problems requiring the fullest cooperation among the Western nations. It would give the Soviet Union and its satellites a tailor-made opportunity to achieve one of their main present objectives, which is to create dissension among NATO partners in an attempt to destroy European unity. It would also reverse the trend toward closer relationships in the Aegean area which has been so encouraging to us in the past year. Although the US would regret ever being in a position of opposing Greece on any question, Mr. Byroade felt he would be less than frank if he did not point out that we cannot offer the Greek Government any encouragement in expecting our support if it brings this question before the United Nations. We have noted Marshal Papagos' moderate approach to this problem, and we earnestly hope that he will find it possible to discourage popular agitation and to reconsider the advisability of instituting any UN action.

The Greek Ambassador indicated that he agreed completely with our analysis of the results of raising the Cyprus question in the UN and that his Government felt the same way. He stated more than once that it was the firm desire of his Government not to put this question to the UN, but that the pressures were so strong that it was hard to see how Greece could resist some positive action in the absence of any modification of the intransigent British stand. The Ambassador repeated what many other Greek officials have frequently said, "If the British would only agree to talk to us in a friendly fashion and admit that there is a problem between us." As in the case of other officials, he did not indicate what would be the terms of reference of such talks but did imply that some public indication of a British willingness to discuss the matter might make

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3 These instructions were transmitted to Cannon by telegram 2901 to Athens, supra.
it possible for the Greek Government to postpone to some indefinite future time the formal raising of this question.

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No. 367

747C.00/5-1954

The Acting Secretary of Defense (Anderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 19, 1954.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference is made to a communication from the Acting Secretary of State, dated 18 February 1954,\(^1\) which forwarded a copy of an *Aide-Mémoire* from the British Embassy\(^2\) and which asked for an expression of opinion from the Department of Defense on the importance of Cyprus to the United States within the framework of overall United States strategic plans.

This communication and its accompanying *Aide-Mémoire* were referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who now express the following views:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that base facilities in Cyprus are important to United States strategic interests in the Mediterranean area. Accordingly, they would prefer those arrangements which are most likely to permit their continued use by the armed forces of the United States."

The Department of Defense is not willing to go beyond this statement of U.S. military interest, or to take a position in a dispute between two of our allies in which the U.S. interest is not clearly affected.

ROBERT B. ANDERSON

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\(^1\)Not printed. (747C.00/2-1854)

\(^2\)Dated Jan. 28; outlined in Document 361.
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Key)\(^1\)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 3, 1954.

Subject: Cyprus.

I refer to your memorandum of May 11\(^2\) regarding the possibility of referring the Cyprus question to the North Atlantic Council in order to avoid the possible disruptive effects of a discussion of the problem in the UN General Assembly next September.

We had not, prior to receipt of your memorandum, given consideration to referring this question to the NAC. No NATO member has suggested such a move, and furthermore the NAC has never before, to my knowledge, been called upon to consider problems of this nature (i.e. a territorial dispute between two of its members). In fact the major emphasis in NATO to date has been upon the military alliance and we have deliberately avoided Council discussion of certain issues (e.g. Trieste) in order to avoid any possible break in the all-important NATO solidarity. Political consultation is an important function of the NAC, but matters involved in this consultation procedure are matters of common interest to NATO raised with a view to presenting a unified front to problems facing the NATO area as a whole.

It is true Article 1 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that the parties undertake "to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered. . . ."\(^3\) This, however, we look upon as a statement of general principle, intended to reconcile this regional arrangement with obligations assumed under the UN Charter.\(^4\) It does not establish a substitute for the UN Charter and its provisions for settlements of disputes. Neither the NAT nor any subsequent agreement of the parties establish any machinery for the collective handling of disputes between NATO partners.

\(^1\)Attached to the source text is a handwritten note by Popper: "Mr. Key: We expected this kind of answer. It will be helpful to us when we get complaints about how useless or harmful GA discussion of Enosis may be."

\(^2\)Not found in Department of State files.

\(^3\)Ellipsis in the source text. For text, see TIAS No. 1964; 63 Stat. (pt. 2) 2241; or United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS), vol. 34, p. 243.

\(^4\)For text, see Department of State Treaty Series (TS) No. 993, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031.
Even if one were to assume the problem was an appropriate one for the NAC, there still remains the question of advisability. Thus far, there has been no indication that the *Enosis* problem has affected UK-Greek cooperation in NATO. We believe, on the other hand, there may be a danger that such cooperation would, in fact, be affected if the *Enosis* problem were now to be brought to the NAC. (Incidentally, I presume you are aware that Cyprus was specifically excepted from the NATO area by the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty).\(^5\)

It is pertinent, of course, to estimate the probability of accomplishing something worthwhile in the *Enosis* case in the event of its being submitted to the NAC. First of all, the matter should not be put before the NAC without the approval of both parties to the dispute. The UK has refused to discuss the matter bilaterally with Greece. It is reasonable to assume the UK would not approve consideration by the Council if the UK expected the Council to find in favor of Greece. Greece on the other hand might well oppose submission to the NAC, on the assumption that the colonial powers in NATO would side with the UK. A defeat of Greece, express or implied, on this issue in the NAC could not help but make NATO still another target for blame by the Greek people. Both BNA and GTI agree that neither side is likely to change its position in this dispute without strong pressure from some source. The NAC is not in a position to assert such pressure.

Probably the most that could be achieved by way of Council action would be a recommendation that the two countries settle the matter bilaterally (which the British would resent) or that Greece drop its claims temporarily in view of the exigencies of the present world situation (which the Greek people would resent). Even if only a statement by Greece followed by a UK statement in the NAC were considered sufficient, there would be certain difficulties. In order to have assurance that other delegations, for example Turkey, would not also speak and set off a general discussion with risks of dissension within the Council, it would be necessary to contact all delegations in advance and "rig" the discussion. RA doubts the advisability of employing this device, which is rare in the NAC, for this purpose.

In summary, EUR is unable to foresee any solution to the *Enosis* problem in the North Atlantic Council. On the other hand, we foresee possible damage to NATO solidarity if the dispute should be submitted to the NAC in an attempt to find a solution or to give

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\(^5\)At this point appears a handwritten note by Popper: "Only from the area in which the obligations of automatic defense exist—not from area about which there may be consultation."
the parties an opportunity to state their respective positions. I feel very strongly that the various strains under which NATO is already operating at the present time make it extremely inadvisable to submit a problem such as Enosis to the NAC.

I might point out in this connection that reports indicate this problem has been very recently discussed in the Council of Europe. We are waiting official reports from the Consulate at Strasbourg and will revert to this subject after these reports have been received and examined.

by WB EUR—LIVINGSTON MERCHANT

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6Telegram 7713 from Strasbourg, Sept. 18, reported that Stamatios Mercouris, a Greek Representative to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, announced in the general political debate the intention to bring up the Cyprus question in the near future. (747C.00/9-1854) No further reports on it from Strasbourg have been found in Department of State files.

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No. 369

Editorial Note

Secretary Dulles briefed President Eisenhower at the White House on June 23 for talks with Prime Minister Churchill in Washington, June 25-29. A memorandum of conversation on this briefing by Douglas MacArthur II reads as follows: “The Secretary indicated that the British would probably ask us to support them with respect to Cyprus. The President indicated general familiarity with this question. He pointed out that if Cyprus were returned to Greece, the Turks would probably raise questions and vice versa, and that a maintenance of the status quo was probably the best solution at this time.” (For text of this memorandum, see volume VI, Part 1, page 1071) Cyprus was not discussed in these talks, but Churchill stated its value as a military base after British withdrawal from Egypt. A memorandum of conversation, prepared in the Department of State, on the Eisenhower–Churchill meeting of June 27 reads in part as follows: “The Prime Minister went on to say that Cyprus and Jordan might be better than Suez for redeployment of British troops. He said that from such bases British forces might be flown to reinforce Malaya if needed.”
**Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Baxter)**

SECRET

**[WASHINGTON,] June 24, 1954.**

Subject: Cyprus

Participants: Mr. Athanase Politis, Greek Ambassador  
Mr. Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary, NEA  
Mr. William O. Baxter, Deputy Director, GTI

The Greek Ambassador called at his request to urge, as he said he had done last week in a conversation with Mr. Merchant,¹ that the US use its good offices during the forthcoming visit of Churchill and Eden² to discuss with them the Cyprus question in the hope of convincing the British to make some conciliatory move which would make it possible for the Greek Government not to raise this problem in the UN General Assembly next September.

After a recapitulation of the familiar arguments on both sides, Mr. Byroade expressed the opinion that, at this time when the British feel that we are partly responsible for their being pushed out of areas where they were once firmly established, it would be virtually impossible to approach Churchill on the basis of any idea that British sovereignty over Cyprus should be relinquished. The Greek Ambassador reiterated his belief that the solution of the problem could be postponed if the British would only agree now to recognize the existence of a question of mutual Greek-British interest and to demonstrate a willingness to discuss it. In this connection he was asked whether he thought his Government could agree to conversations which would not take up the sovereignty issue. It was suggested that perhaps the British, if they are willing to institute genuine constitutional and internal governmental reforms in Cyprus, might publicly recognize a legitimate Greek interest in the welfare of the Cypriots because of cultural, ethnic and religious ties. This might give an opportunity for British-Greek conversations, thereby meeting the Greek desideratum for bilateral discussions. The Ambassador was also asked whether, in such an event, he believed his Government would have sufficient influence with the Cypriots and the Ethnarchy to urge them to cooperate with the British and to accept a more active interest in local government as a step in the direction of their ultimate objectives. If this were pos-

¹No record of that conversation has been found in Department of State files.  
²See the editorial note, supra.
sible, it would have the advantage of isolating the Communists, who would, of course, oppose any sort of concession to "wicked British imperialism." At the present time the Ethnarchy has the embarrassing support of the Communists in its campaign for enosis.

The Ambassador stated that naturally he could not give official views on these queries without instructions from Athens, but his attitude implied that he did not consider it impossible for the Greek Government to accept something of this sort. He also expressed the opinion that his Government has considerable influence with Cypriot leaders and even more with the Ethnarchy.

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No. 371

74TC.00/7-254

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Baxter)\(^1\)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 2, 1954.

Subject: Cyprus

Participants: Mr. Athanase Politis, Greek Ambassador
Mr. Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary, NEA
Mr. William O. Baxter, Deputy Director, GTI

The Greek Ambassador called today at his request. He asked whether the Department had any information to give him on the Cyprus problem and whether recent discussions in Washington had evolved a formula which might make it possible for the Greek Government to avoid raising this subject in the UN. In a brief conversation at a social gathering a few days earlier, he had understood Mr. Dulles to say that the British had brought up the question during the Churchill–Eden visit\(^2\) and that Mr. Byroade was in full possession of the details.

Mr. Byroade explained that he thought there must be some misunderstanding. To the best of his knowledge Cyprus was not mentioned by Eden or the Secretary. Of course, the President and Churchill had discussions at which no one else was present. Cyprus might conceivably have been brought up at that time, but, if so, no decision had been reached, as there was an agreement that any policy decisions made at such private sessions would be committed to writing. However, some time ago the British Embassy had asked

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\(^1\)Drafted July 7.

\(^2\)June 25–29; regarding the question of discussion on Cyprus during that visit, see Document 369.
the Department for its views on the Cyprus problem. The day of Eden's arrival, Mr. Byroade had called in a representative of the British Embassy to talk informally along the same lines as the discussions a week ago with the Greek Ambassador—that is, a tentative exploration of the possibility that the British might recognize the interest of the Greek Government in the Cypriots because of ethnic, cultural and religious ties and be willing to talk to the Greeks about British plans for the future welfare of the Cypriot people without any reference to a change in sovereignty. It might have been this discussion with the British which the Secretary had in mind.

The Ambassador appeared disappointed that nothing concrete had emerged during the Churchill-Eden visit and said that Greek newspapers were already interpreting, as directly applicable to Cyprus, 'the section of the Churchill-Eisenhower Declaration which referred to "the principle of self-government."' He asked Mr. Byroade if he could find out definitely whether the Secretary's remark to him meant that the Secretary had knowledge of some discussion of Cyprus of which Mr. Byroade was not aware.

Later Mr. Byroade telephoned the Greek Ambassador to say that, after checking with the Secretary, he had nothing to add to what had been said in his office earlier the same afternoon.

3Reference is to the British aide-mémoire of Jan. 28, outlined in Document 361.
4A memorandum of conversation with Beeley is in file 747C.00/6-2554.
5See supra.

No. 372

747C.00/5-1954

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 7, 1954.

Subject: Cyprus

1Drafted by Wood and cleared by Barbour and Byroade, and with Baxter. Conurrences by Phillips (who attached a memorandum, not filed with the source text) and officers in BNA were also obtained. It was transmitted to Dulles through Kitchen and Murphy.
Problem

To answer a British Aide-Mémoire asking for our position on Cyprus and to attempt to persuade the Greek Government not to raise the Cyprus question at the next session of the United Nations General Assembly.²

Discussion

The British Aide-Mémoire (Tab C)³ requested our support on the grounds that British sovereignty over Cyprus was of strategic importance to the United States. Our reply (Tab A)⁴ based in part on consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense (Tab D)⁵ states that 1) although American strategic interests no longer require a continuation of British sovereignty over Cyprus, we do not desire a change at this time, 2) that we have urged and will continue to urge the Greeks not to raise the issue in the United Nations; but that if they do we will have to balance our support of the British against our interest in the principle of self-determination. The substance of this proposed reply has already been communicated orally and informally to the British Embassy.⁶

We have tried unsuccessfully to persuade the Greek Government not to raise the issue in the United Nations. Greek leaders are publicly committed to do so unless the British agree to basic talks on the future sovereignty of Cyprus. This the British will not do. If the question goes to the United Nations, the Greeks may obtain considerable support from anti-colonial powers. However, they are very unlikely to obtain Cyprus.

The British have for some time offered the Cypriots a constitution which has been refused. We have informally suggested to the British and the Greeks that British authorities and representative Cypriots should start talks on the question of a mutually acceptable constitution.

Recommendation

1. That you approve the attached Aide-Mémoire (Tab A) for delivery by appropriate Department officers to representatives of the British Embassy. When delivering the Aide-Mémoire, the Department officers would stress to the British the hope that a sincere effort could be made to evolve an acceptable constitution for Cyprus.⁷

²Dated Jan. 28, outlined in Document 361.
³Not filed with the source text.
⁴Not filed with the source text, but printed infra.
⁵Tab D, not filed with the source text, was Document 367.
⁶A memorandum of this conversation is in file 747C.00/6-2554.
⁷The source text indicates approval of this recommendation.
2. That you sign the enclosed letter (Tab B)\(^8\) to Foreign Minister Stephanopoulous which NEA will hand to Ambassador Politis.

\(^{8}\)The letter to Stephanopoulous, not filed with the source text, was signed by Dulles, July 12, but subsequently revised. For the revised text, delivered to Stephanopoulous by Cannon, July 28, see Document 375.

No. 373

747C.00/1-2854

The Department of State to the British Embassy\(^1\)

SECRET

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Secretary of State refers to the British Aide-Mémoire of January 28, 1954,\(^2\) expressing the British Government's concern at the apparent intention of the Government of Greece to raise the issue of Cypriot Enosis at the next session of the United Nations General Assembly.

The Embassy's Aide-Mémoire states that the British Government would welcome an assurance that the Government of the United States believes that the joint strategic interests of our two Governments demand there should be no change in the status of Cyprus. This Government recognizes that Cyprus is of strategic importance to the United States but is unable to confirm that United States strategic interests require that there be no change in sovereignty over Cyprus.

Nevertheless this Government is persuaded that political considerations of importance to the United States militate against such a change at this time.

The Embassy's Aide-Mémoire further requests that the United States Government continue to advise the Greek Government not to press their claim to Cyprus, particularly in the United Nations, and to make clear that the United States would oppose placing this item on the agenda of the General Assembly. Consistent with its practices of the past several years, the United States has availed itself of several recent opportunities both in Washington and Athens to impress upon the Greek Government the conviction of this Government that no useful purpose would be served, and in fact serious harm would be caused to Western interests, by the in-

\(^{1}\)Drafted by Hamilton and Baxter and cleared by Barbour and Andrew B. Foster (BNA); approved by Dulles.

\(^{2}\)See Document 361.
introduction of this controversial subject in the General Assembly. The United States will make further representations of this type.

For the present the Department only wishes to note that, should the Greek Government raise the matter in the United Nations, the United States Government would be confronted with the problem of reconciling general political considerations with the importance which it attaches to the principle of the self-determination of peoples.

WASHINGTON, July 12, 1954.

No. 374

747C.00/7-2754: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece

SECRET \textunderscore NIAC\textunderscore T

WASHINGTON, July 27, 1954—6:04 p.m.

230. British have informed Department strictest confidence UK intention announce new limited constitution for Cyprus nearest future probably tomorrow July 28 and that Greek and Turkish Governments would be informed prior public statement in Parliament.\textsuperscript{2} Although not satisfying Greek desire for direct talks with UK this can be considered constructive move to get problem off dead center. Greek Government cannot be expected welcome British proposal wholeheartedly but we hope Greek official reaction may be temperate and helpful.

In Department's view Greek Government will assume grave responsibility for disruption to free-world unity by bringing Cyprus question UN. Department seriously disturbed recent declaration Makarios urging violence as means achieving \textit{Enosis}.\textsuperscript{3} Department believes Greek Government should give most considered thought to modifying its policy on Cyprus and exerting influence to encourage Cypriot cooperation in orderly development self government along lines new UK proposals and to restrain Makarios from stepping out of his role as religious leader and inciting Cypriot population to violence.

\textsuperscript{1}Drafted by Baxter and cleared by Meyers and Jernegan; cleared in draft with Raynor.

\textsuperscript{2}The statement by Hopkinson in the House of Commons, July 28, is in \textit{H.C. Debs.}, 5th series, vol. 531, col. 504.

\textsuperscript{3}Circular airgram 766 to Athens, Ankara, London, and Nicosia, July 31, reported that Archbishop Makarios made a speech rejecting the idea of a constitution and stated that although the campaign would remain peaceful, "British supporters of imperialist dreams only understand force." (747C.00/7-3154)
Department therefore wishes you deliver earliest July 28 to Stephanopoulos and/or Papagos as personal message from Secretary text letter forwarded you by GTI July 13\textsuperscript{4} with changes suggested Embtel 196.\textsuperscript{5} In your rewording combining paragraphs 7 and 8 original letter final sentence should be changed read: “This Government has made its views on this subject known also to the UK.”

\textsuperscript{4}Reference is to a letter by Richards to Cannon, July 13, which enclosed a letter by Dulles to Stephanopoulos. (Athens Embassy files, lot 60 F 16, “350 Cyprus 1954”) For the revised text of the message by Dulles to Stephanopoulos, July 28, see infra.

\textsuperscript{5}Telegram 196 from Athens, July 24, reported that the letter by Dulles might be interpreted by the Greeks to mean U.S. full endorsement of the British position. The Embassy in Athens suggested changes in the text, which were approved by this telegram. (747C.00/7-2454)

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No. 375

Athens Embassy files, lot 60 F 16, “350 Cyprus 1954”

\textbf{Personal Message From the Secretary of State to Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos\textsuperscript{1}}

\textbf{SECRET}

I should like to set forth to you personally, confidentially, and with the friendliest motives the views of the Government of the United States on the difficult question of Cyprus. I know that Prime Minister Papagos and you desire to approach this problem in a conciliatory and constructive manner and I therefore feel that I may candidly explain why the Government of the United States is convinced that the introduction of this question in the United Nations at this time would result in serious and undesirable consequences.

This Government firmly believes that the strength of the free world’s defense in the vital eastern Mediterranean region depends in large measure on the fullest cooperation and the continuing mutual sympathy of Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey. However, as you are well aware, these are also the very countries primarily concerned with the future of Cyprus.

\textsuperscript{1}Delivered by Cannon to Stephanopoulos in Athens on July 28; see telegram 238, infra. The message printed here contains revisions suggested by Cannon in telegram 196, July 24 (747C.00/7-2454), which were approved by telegram 230 to Athens, supra. The original letter, July 12, was not delivered to Stephanopoulos. (Enclosure to letter from Richards to Cannon, July 13, in Athens Embassy files, lot 60 F 16, “350 Cyprus 1954”; copy in file 747C.00/7-1254)
As all three countries have, for different reasons, strong views on the subject, it is a question which, we both realize, requires unusual forbearance and discretion. In these matters open pressures are rarely conducive to the best results.

It appears unlikely that, if the Cyprus question is raised in the forthcoming session of the United Nations, the union of Cyprus with Greece will thereby be accomplished. On the other hand, public debate would expose and increase the differences which exist among Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom on this difficult subject. Such a development would be particularly unfortunate at a time when you are wisely seeking to strengthen your country's ties with Turkey and Yugoslavia.²

I need not point out that any differences between your country, the United Kingdom and Turkey would offer the opportunity for mischief which the Soviet Union is always seeking.

I therefore wish to express to you my profound conviction that a United Nations debate on Cyprus at this time would not achieve the goal which you desire, that it would have serious effects on Greece's friendly relations with her NATO and her two Ankara Pact partners, and that it would, by its disruptive effect on worldwide unity, militate against the best interests of your own country.

The Government of the United States believes that the question is capable of being resolved by the Cypriots and the United Kingdom and that this can be approached in gradual stages. It appears to me that present tensions would be reduced if British officials and Cypriots were to agree to undertake talks looking toward formulation of a mutually acceptable constitution. This Government has made its views on this subject known also to the United Kingdom.³

²At this point the original letter had an additional sentence deleted at the suggestion of Cannon with Department of State approval. It reads: "I believe there are deep popular feelings in Turkey on the subject of Cyprus which could not be ignored by the Turkish Government."

³This paragraph was suggested by Cannon and approved by the Department of State. In the third sentence, the words "has made" were supplied by the Department of State, replacing the words "plans to make." This paragraph replaced two paragraphs in the original, which read:

"The Government of the United States believes that the Cyprus question involves primarily the Cypriots and the United Kingdom. This Government is, nevertheless, also cognizant of the interests of Greece and Turkey.

"Is this not a question which should be approached gradually? It appears to me that a useful purpose might be served if representatives of the people of Cyprus were to agree to undertake talks with British officials looking toward the formulation of a mutually acceptable constitution. This could be a helpful step toward giving the Cypriots more voice in their own affairs while at the same time reducing

Continued
I should like to reiterate my admiration for the statesmanlike qualities which Prime Minister Papagos and Your Excellency have demonstrated on so many occasions. I am confident that you will receive this message in the amicable spirit in which it is written and that you will weigh carefully the considerations which it contains.

[WASHINGTON,] July 28, 1954.

present tensions. This Government plans to make its views on this subject known to the United Kingdom and to Turkey.

The United Kingdom was informed of U.S. views on this subject by Hamilton in a conversation with Salt of the British Embassy in Washington, July 16; the memorandum of this conversation by Wood, July 16, is in file 747C.00/7-1654.

At this point in the original letter, Cannon changed the word “letter” to “message”; see telegram 258, infra.

No. 376

747C.00/7-2854: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Cannon) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

ATHENS, July 28, 1954—7 p.m.

238. Deptel 230, July 27. Secretary’s personal message handed to Stephanopoulos at 2 p.m. Only further change in text was substitution of “message” for “letter” in last paragraph. He asks earnestly that fact of communication as well as text itself be kept on strictly secret basis for present at least.

He gave it a naturally superficial first reading and would have liked me to construe it for him. I refrained but did make pointed presentation of observations along lines second paragraph reference telegram emphasizing timeliness of opportunity for Greek Government to exert influence with Cypriots in light new situation created by Makarios threat to resort to violence.

He questioned briefly repeated references to Yugoslavia and Turkey but realizing greater import of message in its entirety did not press these points. Seventh paragraph (revised text) engaged his special attention. He hoped “gradual stages” means reasonable progress toward an inevitable evolution and not indefinite postponement. We can expect him to give microscopic examination to phrase “agree to undertake talks toward formulation of mutually acceptable constitution.” He wonders if this means we are exerting

1Repeated to London and pouch to Nicosia.
2Document 374.
3Supra.
4See footnote 3, Document 374.
our influence with the British not to “impose” a constitution. He told me British Chargé expects this afternoon to receive and to communicate to him text of announcement in Parliament with regard to constitution.\(^5\) He fears it will be sterner than US position cited. I said that whatever that declaration may be Greek Government can perform an act of high statesmanship by telling Cypriots in clearest terms they should take care not to reject any proposal out of hand but take time to consider calmly and seek any ground for getting discussions started.

CANNON

\(^5\)Reference is to Hopkinson’s statement before the House of Commons, July 28. (H.C. Debs., 5th series, vol. 581, col. 504)

No. 377

747C.00/7-2854

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Baxter)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 28, 1954.

Subject: Cyprus

Participants: Mr. Athanase Politis, Greek Ambassador

Mr. Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary, NEA

Mr. William O. Baxter, Deputy Director, GTI

The Greek Ambassador called today at his request to discuss Cyprus. He seemed disappointed that Mr. Byroade could not give him encouraging news with respect to the British attitude. Mr. Byroade told him that, on the contrary, he feared we had underestimated the firmness of the British position and the importance they attach to maintaining it. Within the last few days we have had indications that British Government feels so strongly about this matter that it may very well stage a walk-out on any discussion of Cyprus in the UN. He reiterated his belief that the Greek Government has chosen a most inopportune time to bring up a problem which, in a more dormant form, has been a source of irritation for years. Smarting under the forced evacuation from Egypt and faced with moving its Middle East headquarters from Suez to Cyprus, the British at this time will be completely inflexible on any move which threatens their sovereignty over Cyprus.

Mr. Byroade indicated that the US Government is seriously concerned about this matter, believing that an airing of this problem in the UN could profit no one but the Soviet bloc. It is not conceiv-
able that the Greek objective of enosis could be achieved in this session of the GA, and in fact any process of gradual and orderly evolution toward that end would only be retarded by emotional clashes in full view of the world between two such old friends as Greece and the UK. We are also disturbed by the recent declaration of Archbishop Makarios counseling the Cypriots to resort to violence in order to drive the British out.\(^1\) Threats of this sort are not conducive to an amicable solution of differences.

Mr. Byroade informed the Ambassador that we had learned confidentially from the British of their intention of announcing a new constitution for Cyprus, if not today in Parliament, certainly before the end of this week, a move which was to be communicated to the Greek and Turkish Governments prior to the public statement.\(^2\)

The Ambassador said that new British proposals for a constitution in Cyprus had been expected by his Government, but, of course, would not be enough to satisfy anyone. Public opinion is now running so high on this question that neither this Greek Government nor any which could be envisaged would be able to remain in power if it did not respond to the will of the people by taking this matter to the UN. He repeated what he had often said before, that the only thing which can prevent such a step on the part of the Greek Government is a willingness of the British to engage in bilateral discussions.

The Ambassador said further that his Prime Minister wished him to call to the attention of Secretary Dulles a recent exchange in the House of Commons which had “outraged” Greek sensibilities. Mr. Mallalieu\(^3\) had reminded the House that in 1897 Gladstone had said “he hoped that Cyprus would very soon become a Greek island.” Mr. Nutting had replied for the Government: “We are now living in 1954, not 1897.”\(^4\) The Ambassador did not see how such a retrogressive attitude of the British could be defended. Certainly times have changed—but in the other direction, that is, toward more recognition, whether rightly or wrongly, of the rights of peoples to self-determination. This was reaffirmed only a few weeks ago by Eisenhower and Churchill in their communiqué at the end of the Washington talks.\(^5\)

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\(^1\)Reference presumably is to the statement by Makarios quoted in footnote 3, Document 374.

\(^2\)Reference is to the statement by Hopkinson before the House of Commons, July 28. (H.C. Debs., 5th series, vol. 531, col. 504)

\(^3\)Joseph P. W. Mallalieu, Labour Member of Parliament.

\(^4\)This exchange took place July 21. (H.C. Debs., 5th series, vol. 530, col. 46)

Mr. Byroade said he would again bring the subject of Cyprus to the attention of the Secretary, after which he would get in touch with the Ambassador.⁶

⁶Records of Byroade's intended discussion of Cyprus with Dulles and a subsequent contact by Byroade with Politis have not been found in Department of State files.

No. 378

747C.00/8-454: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Cannon) to the Department of State¹

SECRET PRIORITY

ATHENS, August 4, 1954—2 p. m.

291. Reference Department telegram 230 July 27.² Foreign Minister last night handed me personal message for Secretary³ in reply Secretary's message on Cyprus question which I delivered July 28.⁴

Text is ten pages long and therefore forwarded by today's pouch. It is presentation Greek position on Cyprus issues composed at moment of bitter disappointment and resentment caused by recent British parliamentary debate and measures currently being taken by authorities in Cyprus. As could be expected in these circumstances it is negative response to Secretary's request that question not be raised in UNGA, and sets forth four considerations explaining why Greece can follow no other course. Message also reveals extreme sensitiveness, and contains angry comment about Turkey's pretensions as regards settlement of Cyprus problem.

CANNON

¹Repeated for information to London and Nicosia.
²Document 374.
³Not printed. (Athens Embassy files, lot 60 F 16, "350 Cyprus 1954")
⁴Document 375.
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey

CONFIDENTIAL  WASHINGTON, September 6, 1954—11:02 a.m.

293. Menderes' personal letter to Secretary on Cyprus Embtel 244,\(^2\) rptd London 45, Athens 29, Nicosia 3 handed to Secretary just before his departure Manila. Deliver following to Prime Minister as personal message from Acting Secretary:\(^3\)

"I wish express my sincere thanks to you for the clear and frank views of the Turkish Government on the Cyprus question contained in your recent personal message to Secretary Dulles.

"This Government regrets the action of the Greek Government in proposing that Cyprus be included on the agenda of the forthcoming General Assembly. Its discussion there can, in our opinion, lead to no early solution and will on the other hand jeopardize the close relationships existing among the NATO members concerned and particularly between Greece and Turkey and Greece and the UK.

"This Government is giving most urgent and serious consideration to this problem but has not yet reached a final decision as to its position when the Greek item is presented in the General Committee. I trust you will treat this information as confidential.

"You may be assured that this Government will weigh with fullest sympathy the views of the Turkish Government in formulating its policy."

According to Department's information Greek Government still underestimates strength of Turkish reaction. At time of presenting foregoing message you should suggest orally our belief that Turkish Government should again make its views known to Greece in order assure against any possible misunderstanding when question raised in UN. Although we appreciate strong Turkish feeling on this question, Turks should understand US view that Western unity is of paramount importance. We therefore hope Turkish Government will seek to discuss question in frank and friendly manner with Greek Government and that Turks while making their posi-

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\(^2\)Telegram 244, Sept. 1, reported that Adnan Menderes, Prime Minister of Turkey, had sent a letter to Dulles urging the United States to take a firm position against inclusion of the Cyprus question on the U.N. General Assembly's agenda and against U.N. action if the item was placed on the agenda. (747C.00/9-154) Menderes' message to Dulles, Aug. 31, is in file 747C.00/8-3154.

\(^3\)No information as to the delivery of Smith's message to Menderes has been found in Department of State files. It apparently was an interim reply, since Dulles also replied to Menderes in Document 386.
tion clear should also show desire to work for mutually satisfactory solution of problem so that it will not poison NATO relationships or jeopardize future Balkan alliance.

SMITH

No. 380

747C.00/9-1454


CONFIDENTIAL
SD/A/C.1/448

[WASHINGTON,] September 14, 1954.

THE CYPRUS PROBLEM

The Problem

The Greek Government has proposed for inclusion in the agenda of the Ninth General Assembly the item entitled "Application, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of the island of Cyprus". Submission of this item by Greece, despite the vigorous opposition of the United Kingdom and despite our repeated advice against doing so, confronts the United States with the necessity of taking a position a) on admitting the item for Assembly discussion, and b) on the substance of the case which Greece will attempt to make.

United States Position

1. The United States should abstain in any vote on inclusion of this matter in the agenda. In this connection it should be made plain that while the United States does not wish to oppose the principle of freedom of discussion in the Assembly, it does not believe that attempted action on this problem by the General Assembly would have constructive or helpful effects.

2. If the problem is included in the agenda, the United States should endeavor to keep the discussion as brief and restrained as possible.

1Reference is to the letter from Papagos to Hammarskjöld, Aug. 16. (U.N. Doc. A/2703)
2The Secretary's staff meeting notes, 9:15 a.m., Tuesday, Sept. 14, read in part as follows:
"UN Voting on the Cyprus Question
"4. Mr. Key noted that the UK no longer had any strong feelings about our vote on the Cyprus question. The Secretary said that his inclination therefore was to abstain from this vote." (Secretary's Staff Meetings, lot 63 D 75, "Notes 195-264, SM N-264")
possible, enlisting the aid of other friendly delegations to that end. Any statement of United States views should rest on the assertion that the best method for development of increased self-government in Cyprus lies in direct discussions between the British Government and representative Cypriot leaders. If necessary, in connection with particular proposals which may be advanced, the United States Delegation should warn against the danger of overstepping the limits set by Article 2/7 of the Charter.³

3. The United States should privately urge the British and Greeks to adopt as reasonable and restrained an attitude as possible, and should advise them to avoid direct attacks on or criticism of each other.

4. As to the General Assembly’s competence to deal with this matter, the United States should be guided by the following principles:

a) Mere discussion of this problem by the General Assembly does not involve the question of competence;

b) The problem of competence does come into play in connection with particular proposals or resolutions and we believe that at this point there is grave danger of overstepping the limits of Article 2/7 on “domestic jurisdiction”.

5. In line with the position stated in the preceding paragraphs, the United States should endeavor to avoid Assembly action which might make the situation more difficult.

Comment

Pressure has been building up for several years for presentation of the Cyprus issue to the General Assembly by the Greek Government. Since 1950 the publicity and the propaganda toward this end have been intensified. Greek nationalist feeling has been strongly aroused at home, while the Greek Orthodox Church hierarchy in Cyprus—and even the Cypriot Communist Camp—have raised a mounting clamor for “Enosis” (union with Greece). In 1950 the Greek Church held an unofficial “plebiscite” of the Greek Orthodox population in Cyprus, with the reported result that about 95% of group polled registered a desire for union with Greece.

In the face of this mounting campaign in Cyprus and in Greece, the United Kingdom has firmly resisted these pressures and has, from time to time, applied strong measures to discourage sedition

³It reads: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.” For the text of the Charter of the United Nations, adopted in San Francisco, June 26, 1945, see TS No. 993, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031.
or incitement to disorder in Cyprus. Early in August the British announced the intention of working out and applying a new constitution for Cyprus. Their earlier offer of a more liberal constitution in 1948 was rejected by the Cypriots; announcement of the present British plan has also aroused initial opposition among Cypriot nationalists, the Orthodox Church hierarchy in the island, and among the Communists. While the United Kingdom has undertaken limited programs of economic development and improvement for people of the island, its recent conduct of local political affairs has exposed it particularly to criticism from the anti-colonial nations, and from the Soviet bloc, as well as from the Greek Government.

Last December the Greeks made it clear in the General Assembly that, unless the British would at least discuss with them the possibility of giving the Cypriots a chance to decide their political status, Greece would feel compelled to bring this matter before the General Assembly. At intervals throughout the present year the Greeks have attempted to raise the matter privately with the British but have met with stern rebuffs.

The British position is that Greece is simply asking for a bit of British territory. With its military evacuation of the Suez Canal Zone, the United Kingdom places very great strategic importance on full and unquestioned control of the island of Cyprus which they now intend to develop as a major base for their Middle East position. Finally, they insist that the affairs of Cyprus are strictly within the "domestic jurisdiction" of the United Kingdom, and that therefore it is entirely improper to bring the matter before the United Nations. The British have informed us that they regard the Cyprus issue as the "touchstone" of the coming Assembly session and that, if the Assembly proceeds to deal with this question or attempts to interfere in any way with their administration, the United Kingdom may have to reconsider its policy of "cooperation" with the United Nations in the entire field of non-self-governing territories affairs. They have repeatedly stressed the importance they attach to obtaining full support of their position by the United States.

The United States has on several occasions this year strongly advised the Greek Government not to raise the Cyprus question in the General Assembly. The most recent step of this kind was a personal message from Secretary Dulles to the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, delivered on July 28. The Greek Foreign Minister re-

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4Reference presumably is to Hopkinson's statement before the House of Commons, July 28. (H.C. Debs., 5th series, vol. 581, col. 504)

5Document 375.
plied that Greece could not possibly back down on raising this issue.\(^6\)

Greece bases its complaint principally on Article 1, paragraph 2, as well as Articles 10 and 14 of the Charter, using as its major theme the issue of “self-determination”, a principle which the anti-colonial nations have for several years been attempting to define by United Nations pronouncement in a manner which could be used to call into question established territorial settlements and treaty rights in many parts of the world. In view of our practice of not opposing the principle of freedom of discussion in the General Assembly, it would be difficult for us to deny that the Assembly has the power under Article 10 of the Charter to discuss questions such as the Cyprus problem. At the same time we are keenly alive to the harm to Allied unity which could be caused by all but the most restrained discussion of this sensitive issue since the British regard mere discussion as interference in their internal affairs. While the United Kingdom will without question make the “domestic jurisdiction” argument at the very outset (in connection with inclusion in the agenda), the United States should use this argument sparingly and mainly in connection with the dangers of particular draft resolutions.

So far as is presently known, the Greeks would hope to obtain at least a general expression of sympathy by the General Assembly for application of the principle of “self-determination” in the political affairs of Cyprus. Because of a substantial Turkish minority in Cyprus (15-18%), and because of the proximity of Cyprus to the Turkish mainland, Turkey is strongly opposed to Assembly consideration of this problem or interference of a character likely to encourage any change in existing sovereignty. For this reason, anything but the most careful and restrained discussion of the problem in the Assembly is likely to revive and accentuate old Greek-Turkish antagonisms and damage the solidarity achieved to date in the Balkan Pact among Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia. Any untoward Assembly action on this problem could seriously worsen British-Greek relations and to that extent weaken the fabric of solidarity in the NATO system. At the same time, the Government of Marshal Papagos has staked its prestige at home and abroad on obtaining an airing of its views on Cyprus at this Assembly. A negative United States vote on the procedural matter of inclusion in the agenda might lead to a serious weakening of our influence in Greece, even though their government is fully aware that we do not agree with and cannot support their substantive demands.

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\(^6\)Reference is to the personal message from Stephanopoulos to Dulles, handed to Cannon, Aug. 3; see Document 378.
While an abstention will not please the British, they are now mainly interested in obtaining our help to defeat any harmful or unwise action by the Assembly.

While the maintenance of control over Cyprus in the hands of a stable and friendly power is of strategic importance to the United States as well as to the United Kingdom, our dislike of General Assembly involvement in the problem of Cyprus is based principally on political grounds which the British and the Greeks both understand. We do not attach the same importance as do the British, from the strategic point of view, to the retention of Cyprus under British control, but there are obvious, strong political reasons for our desire not to see British sovereignty over the island disturbed in any way under present conditions.

No. 381

747C.00/9-1554: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 15, 1954—7:15 p. m.

657. UK Embassy informed by Department today and UK delegation being informed by USUN that US will abstain inscriptions Cyprus question UNGA agenda.\(^2\) Department also informing Greek Turkish Embassies pointing out our primary policy on this question is to lessen inter-Allied tension and therefore we will seek cooperation avoiding heated debate or GA action likely worsen situation.\(^3\)

Following points to be made to British and Turkish Embassies here:

1. US will seek discourage debate on application principle self-determination.
2. Will actively oppose any resolution.
3. Department believes that even a negative US vote would not prevent item from being placed on agenda. US will retain greater freedom exert moderating influence on Greek and other interested delegations.

\(^1\)Drafted by Wood and cleared with Allen (EUR), Raynor, and Niles W. Bond (UNP) by Baxter. Also sent to Ankara and London and repeated for information to Nicosia.

\(^2\)A memorandum of conversation by Key, Sept. 15, informing Beeley of the U.S. decision to abstain in the vote on the Cyprus item is in file 747C.00/9-1554. No record of informing the British Delegation at the United Nations has been found in Department of State files.

\(^3\)No record of communicating the U.S. decision to the Greek and Turkish Embassies as of Sept. 15 has been found in Department of State files.
4. We assume UK will agree criticisms Greece be avoided for sake Western unity. Also urge UK avoid walkout which we believe would increase tension and might increase chance passage Greek resolution.

Greek Embassy will be informed US remains convinced no good can come of debate. While US is prepared not to oppose inscription Greek Government should realize it has responsibility handle question with greatest moderation and avoid criticism UK or Turkey and should not press for passage of a resolution as this would make more difficult eventual Greek-UK rapprochement.

London and Athens may at their discretion make similar démarches. Ankara should inform Prime Minister along foregoing lines as final reply his personal message to Secretary August 31.4

DULLES

4See footnote 2, Document 379.

No. 382

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower1 September 18, 1954.

TOP SECRET

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

MY DEAR FRIEND: I did not complicate my long telegram to you about Europe2 by referring to the isolated question of Cyprus about which you wrote to me on August 20.3

1This message was transmitted by Makins, Sept. 18, through the White House to Eisenhower, who was at a ranch near Fraser, Colorado. Makins also sent a copy to Smith. A handwritten notation on another copy notes that Eisenhower saw it on Sept. 20, and phoned Smith. (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file, "Dulles–Herter series")

2Transmitted Sept. 17; for text, see vol. v, Part 2, p. 1225.

3The portion of this letter on the Cyprus question reads as follows:

"Right now I am wondering how you will handle the Cyprus situation. This, of course, is strictly one of your family problems and I am not mentioning it with any thought that my own opinions should have a bearing on such a matter. My indirect concern, though, arises out of resultant effects upon American opinion. You and I have devoted a lot of time and thought to keeping relationships between our two peoples both durable and cordial, and I am anxious to be in a position to be as helpful as possible when there appears to be any chance of damage to those relationships.

"If you should like to give me a little briefing on the matter, I might be in a position to do something. Incidentally, some of our people who have been travelling recently in Greece have come back and spread stories to the effect that Greece and Cyprus are quite ready to be reasonable and conciliatory—of course I do not know how accurate are their observations and their reporting. But this kind of thing does

Continued
A factual note is being prepared which I will send by airmail, but I understand our Embassy in Washington has already supplied the State Department with information. A simple test is to compare the conditions prevailing in Cyprus with those in the Greek Islands and particularly in Rhodes since the Greeks took them over from the Italians. Cyprus has never known more rapid progress while in the others there is a grievous decline.

I feel it is my duty to tell you that the failure of the United States to support us at U.N.O. would cause deep distress over here and add greatly to my difficulties in guiding public opinion into the right channels in much larger matters.

It cannot be disputed that our claim against the inscription of this question affecting our own external affairs is justified by the Statutes and spirit of U.N.O. If any such item were discussed by the Assembly, we would of course walk out. Injury would be done to that institution of which the United States and Britain and her Commonwealth are the main pillars. Cyprus would acquire utterly disproportionate publicity and be magnified by the enemies of the English speaking world on both sides of the ocean into a marked difference between us. I do trust therefore that we shall not be confronted with American abstention.

Kindest regards,

As ever,

Winston

serve to give you some idea of why I am interested in the other side of the story.”
(Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file)

4Transmitted by Makins to Eisenhower, Sept. 20; for text, see infra.

5Reference is possibly to the fact that on Aug. 25 the British Chargé handed Dulles a memorandum requesting U.S. support in resisting inscription of the Cyprus item on the U.N. General Assembly’s agenda. On the following day, Salt gave Allen (EUR) a longer paper setting forth the British position. (747C.00/8–2654) Makins also handed to Smith the paper prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff on the “Strategic Importance of Cyprus to the United Kingdom,” Sept. 17. (747C.00/9–2054)

No. 383

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

The British Ambassador (Makins) to President Eisenhower

WASHINGTON, September 20, 1954.

Dear Mr. President: With reference to the message to you from the Prime Minister about Cyprus which I sent to you on September 18,1 I enclose the factual note referred to in that message.

Yours sincerely,

Roger Makins

1Supra.
The strategic importance of our continued sovereignty in Cyprus in relation to the stability and defence of the Middle East is described in the paper prepared by the Chiefs of Staff which has already been handed by the Ambassador to General Bedell Smith. The paper makes it quite clear why the suggestion of a leased base does not provide the answer on the strategic point. Confidence in the United Kingdom's willingness and ability to fulfill its treaty obligations in the Middle East is an essential element in the building up of any effective defence in the area. The free world cannot afford a power vacuum on N.A.T.O.'s southern flank.

2. The international airing of this question has already done enough harm to Anglo-Greek and Greek-Turkish relations. During the recent N.A.T.O. exercise, "Keystone", Greek and Turkish officers could scarcely be brought to talk to each other. A decision on Cyprus at the United Nations might well put a strain on Greek-Turkish relations which they could not bear.

3. The only people who can profit by this controversy are the Communists.

4. This is not a question of self-government in a colony but one of transferring one, indeed two, ethnic groups from one sovereignty to another. To allow the United Nations to discuss Cyprus on the pretext of self-determination would open the flood gates for the pursuit of territorial claims everywhere. If, for instance, some Communist power proposed United Nations intervention in favour of self-determination for the so-called free Thais in Siam, would the United States abstain? There are dozens of other areas all round the world about which there could be endless squabbles. China, for example, could claim large bits of Northern Burma and India on grounds of history and racial affinity.

5. It is not at all certain what the Cypriots themselves want. Unilateral clamour is no evidence of a people's will and in this connexion it is legitimate to recall that by the time that Hitler had shouted long enough, a very large number of people thought that ninety per cent of Austrians wanted to be submerged in the Third Reich.

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2Not printed. (747C.00/9-2054)
Nor can the church-run plebiscite of 1950, backed as it was by threats of the withdrawal of Baptism and other church rites, be regarded as an indication that Cypriots really want Enosis. Plebiscites anyhow are of the political armoury of dictatorships. Democracies have other means of determining a people's will.

6. Our attitude is not entirely negative. We are determined to develop normal democratic constitutional processes in Cyprus, and when the Cypriots have had experience of running their own affairs, Her Majesty's Government have little doubt about the judgment they will form in regard to where their true interests lie. Cyprus has the highest standard of living in the Middle East and the second lowest death rate in the world. We have the impression that the long-standing boycott of any constitution by Cypriot extremists both of left and right is largely due to their fear that a constitution would provide a platform for moderate opinion which at present finds no expression, except, e.g. when British troops, recently arrived in Cyprus from Egypt, were warmly welcomed by the people.

7. It is therefore very much to be hoped that even if the United States Government do not share our interpretation of Article II (7) of the United Nations Charter, and cannot accept our view that the United Nations have no jurisdiction, nevertheless they would oppose inscription on the practical merits of the case and having regard to the interests of the free world.

8. There is no doubt at all that active United States support for us would clinch matters in our favour. Even as things are our enquiries all round the world show that the votes at the United Nations are likely to be pretty evenly divided. If the United States were to vote against inscription, the matter would not be inscribed.

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*Quoted in footnote 3, Document 380.*
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, September 20, 1954—4 p. m.

PRIORITY

Delga 2. Re Cyprus Deptel 157.\(^1\) Dixon and Hopkinson (UK) called on me this morning to discuss Cyprus. Hopkinson opened the discussion by saying that he had come to New York to put the arguments in every possible way to keep Cyprus off the agenda. The British were very distressed that a rift in Anglo-Greek relations had occurred and the Greeks themselves realized that the matter had gone too far and would like to find a way to extricate themselves. The UK would like also to find such a device, but anything that might be done, short of rejecting the item on the agenda, raised the issue of British sovereignty which they could not allow to happen. The UK military staff were convinced that the only possible effective control for military installations in Cyprus came from complete sovereignty and administration in their hands. They had only to mention Suez to demonstrate that anything else was not good enough. They were, of course, prepared to give Cyprus self-government, but they could not admit the principle of self-determination in this case. Self-determination would mean that Cyprus could if it wished, not only join Greece, but establish an independent Communist island; in fact, if an election were held today, that would be the outcome. From the UN standpoint, an equally important point was that putting the Cyprus question on the agenda opened the door for any country to raise any question, even, for example, the question of a claim by Colombia to the Panama Canal Zone. It might, in fact, encourage the Turks to raise the question of the large Turkish minority in Western Thrace and Thrace’s annexation to Turkey, or for the Soviets to raise the question of the Kurds in Iran and Iraq and lay claim to those areas.

I pointed out that we had been given the impression the UK was resigned to having the matter on the agenda and that hence our abstention was not so disturbing.

\(^1\)Telegram 157, Sept. 18, authorized USUN to suggest that the United Kingdom explore with selected Latin American delegations the possibility of a vote for postponing the question of inscription of Cyprus on the agenda of the General Assembly, immediately after Greece and the United Kingdom stated their positions, with a view toward the British and the Cypriots working out matters between themselves. (747C.00/9-1554)
Hopkinson said they could not understand how such an impression had been created, that their position had been unchanged from the beginning, and Dixon pointed out that as things now looked, our vote might be the decisive factor in adopting the agenda. Very strong support had developed for the British position and even Krishna Menon had promised not to vote for inscription. Iraq, Liberia, Colombia and Pakistan had promised also, but they might be one vote shy in defeating the item. Dixon stated that frankly a lot also depended on the Scandinavian bloc, and Canada had not yet decided either.

I said that it would take a tremendous amount of education of the American public before we could vote against inscription and asked if there was anything the UK could do to save Greek face.² Hopkinson said they had racked their brains and had not been able to think of anything. I also pointed out that voting against the Greeks could have a decisive effect on our coming Congressional elections in a number of crucial districts.

Dixon suggested that if we voted against inscription we might make a balanced statement bowing somewhat to Greek sentiment but referring to the importance and complications of NATO, the use the Communists would make of the dispute, and even saying that we hoped the UK and Greece would talk together to settle the question. I asked at this point whether the UK would in fact talk, and Dixon and Hopkinson admitted they would not. They said that Churchill was sending a message to the Secretary³ and they hoped to have a further talk with the Secretary and me tomorrow,⁴ since time was of the essence before the meeting of the general committee on Wednesday. I said that we would take up the question again and keep closely in touch with them.

I have the impression that rather than see the matter go on the agenda, they would reluctantly accept a decision to postpone adoption of the agenda, as outlined in Deptel 157. I feel we should wait

²Regarding efforts to find a way “to save Greek face,” a memorandum by Key to Lodge, Sept. 16, reads:

“The Secretary was unable before his departure yesterday to reply personally to your telegram of September 18 in which you referred to a possible face-saving procedure for the Greeks in respect of Cyprus, suggested to you by Mr. [Tom-Anthony] Pappas [Greek-American businessman]. This same idea was raised privately with the Under Secretary about two weeks ago by Spyros Skouras [Motion-Picture Executive], who also was able to mention the matter directly to Churchill. The British Prime Minister flatly rejected the whole idea, and Mr. Eden sent us a personal message stating that the UK could not possibly make any public or private statement of the nature suggested since this could only be taken as yielding in the face of Greek pressure. Accordingly, that particular idea appears to offer no fruitful possibilities under present conditions.” (USUN files, Cyprus—1950–August 1955)

³Not further identified.

⁴A memorandum of this conversation by Cook is in file 747C.00/9–2154.
to sound out the LA’s however, until the Secretary has been informed of latest developments tomorrow.

Lodge

No. 385

747C.00/12-154

The Secretary of State to Prime Minister Churchill

SECRET  [WASHINGTON,] September 21, 1954.

Dear Sir Winston: The President received your message of September 18 while in the Colorado hills, and phoned me about it, particularly regarding the question of Cyprus, on which he asked me to write you at once. Let me say first that we fully share your view that, on the merits of the case, it would seem to be highly desirable to avoid discussion or action in the United Nations. We full appreciate the distress and difficulties which any such discussion would create for you in the General Assembly, and we ourselves are not unconcerned. However, the question as to how to vote on inclusion of this matter on the agenda poses an exceedingly difficult problem for us because of our traditional liberal view of the relevant charter provisions and because we have consistently and publicly adhered to the principle of the right of discussion in the General Assembly. We fought very hard for this at San Francisco in the face of Soviet opposition.

Also involved are our relations with Greece as well as our own public and political opinion.

To make things doubly difficult, I learn that our intention to abstain has been made known to the Greek Government and to others as well. In fact, it almost impossible for us now actually to vote against inscription. Even to abstain, which we shall do, stretches our principles. We have talked this over with Roger Makins. We shall quietly let it be known, particularly to the pro-

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1The source text is an enclosure to Document 401.
2Document 382.
3No memorandum of that conversation between Dulles and Makins has been found in Department of State files. A memorandum of conversation by Brig. Gen. C. Stanton Babcock, Counselor of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, to Lodge, Sept. 15, stated that Key telephoned Babcock that morning to inform him that Dulles was informing Makins that morning of the U.S. decision to abstain on the question of inscribing the Cyprus item on the agenda. (USUN files, Cyprus—1950-August 1955) A memorandum of conversation at the Secretary's staff meeting by Walter K. Scott, Director of the Executive Secretariat, Sept. 20, stated that in his talk with Acting Secretary Smith on Sept. 18, “Ambassador Makins stated that the British heard that we planned to abstain on the question of placing the Cyprus
pective members of the general committee, that we very much dislike the prospect of a discussion of the Cyprus question at this time. That may have sufficient effect on some of the members, so that the result might prevent inscription. I am about to discuss this with Dixon and Hopkinson of your delegation. Also, as far as consistent with our abstention, we shall in our statement in the general committee discourage development of the item. If the vote in the committee is adverse to inscription, which now seems possible, we shall then vote in the plenary to uphold the action of the general committee in excluding the item from the agenda. Finally, if the item is included on the agenda, we shall actively oppose the passage of any resolution and will do all possible to keep any discussion to the absolute minimum.

Faithfully yours,

Foster Dulles

matter on the UN agenda. On the Greek Cyprus petition, the British now felt that the matter was touch and go. They would like us, if we find it necessary to abstain, to at least let it be known discreetly that we hope the matter did not come up for debate. General Smith stated that he felt favorably toward this request and expected to talk to the Secretary about it upon his return.” (Secretary’s Staff Meetings, lot 63 D 75, “Minutes 1954–1955”)

*4A memorandum of this conversation is in file 747C.00/9-2154.
*5This statement has not been further identified.
*6A memorandum of conversation with Dulles by Lodge, Sept. 22, stated that Dulles “said that his statement should be interpreted as meaning that we should vote to support the full report of the General Committee en bloc but that if the issue is drawn on Cyprus by itself in the Plenary session, then we should continue to abstain”. Dulles and Lodge “agreed to take a fresh look at the whole matter if the unexpected happened and the Cyprus matter was not inscribed in the General Committee.” (747C.00/9-2254)

No. 386

747C.00/8-3154

The Secretary of State to the Turkish Ambassador (Erkin)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, September 21, 1954.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the note of August 31, 1954, from the Turkish Embassy, quoting the text of a message from His Excellency Adnan Menderes relating to the question of Cyprus. I should be appreciative if you would transmit to Mr. Menderes the following reply:

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1This message was drafted by Baxter, Sept. 23, and signed by Jernegan on the following day.
"I have been most interested in receiving Your Excellency's further views with respect to the Cyprus issue. This Government has continued to give its most serious consideration to this problem and all of the points which you have raised have been studied with great care.

"The United States remains convinced that discussion of the question in the General Assembly will lead to no solution and will serve only to intensify existing friction and thereby prejudice Western unity. This Government has concluded, therefore, that its major objective, i.e., to lessen inter-Allied tension, can best be furthered if it abstains from voting on inscription of the question on the agenda. It is believed that a negative vote by the United States would not, in any case, keep the item off of the agenda and that by abstaining this Government will retain greater freedom to exert a moderating influence on other delegations.

"If the item is placed on the agenda the United States Government intends to do all that it can to discourage its development. It will seek to avoid any debate on the application of the principle of self-determination and it will actively oppose passage of any resolution. It will, moreover, urge moderation by all parties in any discussion of the question with a view to facilitating eventual rapprochement between the interested Governments.

"I am sure you will appreciate that the above position is based on this Government's firm conviction that it is the best means of endeavoring to dispose of the issue in a manner which will do the least harm to the unity of the Western world."

Accept [etc.]

For the Secretary of State:
JOHN D. JERNEGAN

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No. 387

SECRET

LONDON, October 2, 1954—11 p. m.

1690. From Secretary.² At luncheon today Eden raised Cyprus. He said suggestion had been made that Greeks, Turks and British might sit down together. Eden said that was impossible. They could not sit down with Greeks. Upon questioning, the British had no clear plan of campaign for handling matter in General Assembly, although Eden expressed pleasure at quality, if not quantity, of

¹Repeated for information to New York.
²Dulles was in London, Sept. 26—Oct. 3, for the Nine-Power and Four-Power Conferences, Sept. 28—Oct. 3. For documentation, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1294 ff.
vote on inscription in plenary. He welcomed my suggestion that we would try to keep Cyprus at the end of the list so that perhaps it might be forgotten in the desire to get home by Christmas.  

ALDRICH

For the results of votes by the U.N. General Assembly on inscription of Cyprus on the General Assembly’s agenda, Sept. 24, see Document 410.

No. 388

USUN files, Cyprus—1950—August 1955

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Cyprus cable

Participants: Secretary Dulles  
Ambassador Lodge

Secretary Dulles said that the cable on Cyprus had been sent with “no high level clearance.”

I said that it was the only really categorical instructions which I had received since being at the United Nations and that it would have been altogether natural for me to have carried out the instructions without question. I did not do so because they seemed to

The typed notation: “For the Files” and “Not for Reports” appears in the heading of the source text. A memorandum, prepared in the Department of State, of a telephone call by Lodge in New York to Dulles in Washington earlier on the same day reads as follows:

“L. said he received instructions to deliver personally a note to the Greeks. He questions the prudence of telling them this far before elections we are going to oppose any resolution. The Sec. said he knew nothing about it. L. said the item is at the bottom of the list and they won’t get it until the end of November. The Sec. reversed the instructions. L. said the instructions were going to Athens.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, Telephone memoranda, General, Aug.—Oct. 1954)

Reference is to telegram 186 to New York, Oct. 7, which instructed Lodge to deliver a note verbale to the Greek Delegation. The last paragraph of the note verbale reads:

“The US, whose record of friendship for Greece entitles it speak frankly on matters common concern, urges Greek Government endeavor keep any discussion of Cyprus question as brief and temperate as possible. US is opposed to having Assembly adopt any resolution on this subject and furthermore would feel obliged to advise others to take similar stand if resolution is proposed. In our considered judgment any attempt press matters into lengthy discussions or toward consideration of any resolution can only work harm to structure of inter-Allied cooperation without making any constructive contribution toward easing of present tensions arising from this problem.”

Also sent as telegram 837 to Athens, Oct. 7, which instructed the Embassy to deliver the same note verbale to the Greek Foreign Ministry. (747C.00/10-754)
me so highly unwise. I said there was something wrong with the system and that whoever sent that cable should be talked to.  

We then discussed the Cyprus question and he said he wanted me to try to prevent the matter from ever coming to a head so that we would not have to take a public position on it, that if it did come to a head we would then consult and see what to do in the light of the circumstances that then existed.

I expressed my belief that we should do everything we could behind the scenes and procedurally to prevent the issue from coming to a head, but that if it did we should not go on record against the Greeks, both because of the importance of the colonial issue in the world and because of our own public opinion.

He said he wasn't prepared to agree that we should vote with the Greeks.

I said I was not asking that we should vote with the Greeks, but only that we should not vote against them.

3A memorandum for the files by Cook, Oct. 18, reads:

"On October 8 word was received in USUN that Rod O'Connor had instructed the Greek Desk to cable the Embassy in Greece to hold up delivery of the note which Ambassador Lodge discussed with the Secretary. Mr. O'Connor also said that confirmation to the effect the note had not been delivered would not be received before Saturday, October 9.

"The Secretary requested the papers with respect to the note be sent to his desk immediately.

"Mr. O'Connor requested Ambassador Lodge to hold delivery of the note here pending further word from the Secretary." (USUN files, Cyprus—1950—August 1955)

Telegram 844 to Athens, Oct. 8, instructed the Embassy not to deliver the note. (747C.00/10–854) Telegram 793 from Athens, Oct. 8, stated that the note had not been delivered. (747C.00/10–854)

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No. 389

USUN files, Cyprus—1950—August 1955

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)1

CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS, October 23, 1954.

Subject: Cyprus

Participants: The Secretary

Marshal Papagos

1Enclosure to a memorandum by Key to Lodge, Oct. 29, regarding a draft letter from Dulles to Papagos. For text of Dulles' letter to Papagos, Nov. 16, see Document 396.
Marshal Papagos told the Secretary\textsuperscript{2} privately at Ambassador Hughes' luncheon on October 23 that he hoped that at the General Assembly, with respect to the Cyprus matter, the U.S. could either in effect be strictly neutral or else seek to postpone the entire matter for this year.\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{2}Dulles was in Paris, Oct. 20-23, for the Nine-Power, Four-Power, and North Atlantic Council Ministerial meetings; for documentation, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1404 ff.

\textsuperscript{3}Telegram Topol 511 to Paris, Oct. 27, for Hughes from Merchant, reads:

"Reference your letter Oct 25 Secretary did have brief word Papagos at luncheon Saturday and made clear our distaste projected discussion Cyprus in General Assembly. Papagos asked that when matter came up US either maintain strict neutrality or seek postpone discussion this year. Secretary made no commitment."

\(747C.00/10-2753\)

\underline{No. 390}

\(747C.00/10-2654\)

\textbf{Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Greek Affairs (Wood)}

\textbf{SECRET}  

\textbf{[WASHINGTON.]} October 26, 1954.

Subject: Cyprus in the UN

Participants: Mr. Athanase G. Politis, Greek Ambassador
The Secretary
Mr. C. B. Wood, GTI

The Greek Ambassador called today at his own request to ask the Secretary to deliver a sealed personal message from Prime Minister Papagos to the President.\textsuperscript{1}

The Secretary spoke of having talked with the Prime Minister at lunch in Paris on October 23\textsuperscript{2} and said that the Prime Minister had handed him a note at that time which he had since studied.\textsuperscript{3}

The Ambassador said the Prime Minister had been perturbed by certain indications, notably a remark by Ambassador Cannon to

\textsuperscript{1}Dated Oct. 23; in it Papagos warned of an extremely unfavorable reaction by the Greek people, if U.S. policy on the Cyprus question continued along present lines. He asserted that it was possible to maintain the defense interest of the Western Alliance in Cyprus with recognition of the Cypriots' right of self-determination. (Enclosure to memorandum by Key to Lodge, Oct. 29; USUN files, Cyprus—1950–August 1955)

\textsuperscript{2}For a memorandum of that conversation, see supra.

\textsuperscript{3}This eight-page memorandum with covering note signed by Papagos at Paris, Oct. 23, claimed that the United States, rather than being neutral as promised, on the Cyprus question at the United Nations, was assisting the United Kingdom there. It emphasized that serious repercussions would ensue in Greece if the United States continued its present policy. (747C.00/10-2354)
Acting Prime Minister Kanellopoulos,\(^4\) to the effect that the United States would not maintain its neutrality on the Cyprus question in the UN. His Government hoped that the American delegation would not only remain neutral in voting, but would also avoid influencing other delegations.

The Secretary replied that the British had also criticized us, which was perhaps a pretty good indication of our neutrality. He emphasized in closing that he intended to study the entire matter.

\(^4\)No record of that conversation has been found in Department of State files. Papagos' memorandum, cited in footnote 3 above, stated that Cannon told Kanellopoulos on Oct. 15 that the United States would oppose any substantive recommendation by Committee I of the General Assembly on the Cyprus question. Turkey had also been so informed.

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**No. 391**

**Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President**\(^1\)

**SECRET**

**[WASHINGTON,] November 2, 1954.**

Subject: Letter Addressed to You by Prime Minister Papagos on Cyprus\(^2\)

There is attached a letter addressed to you by Prime Minister Papagos expressing concern that the attitude of the United States on the question of Cyprus in the UN is becoming increasingly opposed to the Greek position. The Prime Minister says that if this trend continues the sympathies of the Greek people will be estranged from the United States.

I have received a similar letter from the Prime Minister.\(^3\)

**Recommendation:**

That you avoid being personally involved in this controversy. If you agree, I will answer both letters along the following lines:\(^4\)

We continue to believe, as we have previously informed the Greek Government, that the raising of the Cyprus question in the UN is harmful to Western unity. Although we abstained on the vote to place the item on the agenda, we have never committed

\(^1\)Drafted by Wood and Baxter.

\(^2\)Dated Oct. 23; see footnote 1, supra.

\(^3\)Dated Oct. 23; see footnote 3, supra.

\(^4\)The draft reply by Dulles to Papagos was not sent. (Text attached to memorandum by O'Connor to Byroade, Nov. 2; 747C.00/11-254.) A memorandum by Phyllis D. Bernau (S) of a telephone call by Eisenhower to Dulles, Nov. 3, noted that Eisenhower "thought the draft was cold and abrupt." Dulles "said he would go over it more carefully." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, Telephone Conversations)
ourselves to remaining neutral during subsequent UN action. For reasons stated, the United States will feel obliged to oppose the passage of any resolution on the Cyprus question in the General Assembly.

We feel that the proper place for negotiations about Cyprus is on the Island and not in the UN; therefore, we hope the Greek Government will seek to influence the non-communist Cypriot leaders to start serious negotiations with the British looking toward self-government. We also plan to encourage the British to negotiate with the Cypriots.

John Foster Dulles

No. 392

747C.00/11–354: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece\(^1\)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 5, 1954—7:45 p. m.

1073. Key today discussed Cyprus in UNGA with Scott UK Embassy. Stated we recognized our commitment to UK to oppose any resolution\(^2\) but were concerned that despite our joint efforts mild resolution such as one calling on UK to carry on discussions with Cypriots looking toward self-government would receive two-thirds majority. We therefore sought UK reaction to arrangement for moderate statement by Greeks and we would hope by British, to be followed by passage of simple postponement resolution preferably sine die. Alternatively we might seek conclude moderate Cyprus debate without passage any resolution though this extremely difficult in view general UN practice concluding discussion each item by some sort resolution. If British-Cypriot talks made progress before next GA session matter might not then be placed on its agenda.

Key stated if British agreed we would explore possibility such an arrangement.

Scott said proposition would be put Foreign Office but doubted would be accepted. Stressed depth UK feeling this subject comparing it with US attitude on Guatemala. Said UK wanted item taken up and killed, so matter would be disposed of in GA once and for

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\(^1\)Drafted by Popper and cleared by Key and Baxter. Also sent to London and USUN.

\(^2\)That commitment was made in Document 385.
all. Contrary to indication London’s 2132\(^3\) repeated Athens 40, stated UK would not sit in Political Committee during consideration item. Laid great weight on effect active US lobbying on item through Key cautioned re overestimating our power combat emotional anti-colonial sentiment in Assembly even among Latins.

Dulles

\(^3\)Telegram 2132, Oct. 29, stated that the United Kingdom had indicated it would vote but not participate in the debate on Cyprus at the United Nations. (747C.00/10-2954)

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No. 393

747C.00/11-954: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Cannon) to the Department of State\(^1\)

SECRET

ATHENS, November 9, 1954—3 p. m.

1014. Pass USUN. Last paragraph Department’s telegram 1073, November 5\(^2\) in sharp contrast Foreign Office version of assurances Secretary Dulles reported to have given Prime Minister Papagos in Paris.\(^3\) According Foreign Office Prime Minister has definite impression Secretary Dulles stated US would maintain neutral position Cyprus issue, and specifically that US would not endeavor influence other countries.

Prime Minister also has further impression he received assurance from Secretary that if any member US Government has been lobbying other UN delegations against Greece on Cyprus issue it has been without approval Secretary State, that Secretary promised look into this matter immediately upon return Washington and to terminate such activities if they are continuing and further that Secretary expressed intention communicate with Prime Minister on this particular question.

Embassy also informed that this is only point on which Prime Minister expects hear from Secretary in response Marshal’s memorandum.\(^4\)

Cannon

\(^1\)Repeated to London and USUN.

\(^2\)Supra.

\(^3\)See Document 389.

\(^4\)Reference presumably is to the memorandum by Papagos to Dulles, Oct. 23; see footnote 3, Document 390.
Memorandum of Conversation, by Philip A. Mangano of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 12, 1954.

Subject: Current Aspects of the Cyprus Problem

Participants: The Secretary
Mr. Byroade, NEA
Mr. Key, IO
Mr. Elbrick, EUR
Mr. Baxter, GTI
Mr. Mangano, UNP

The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office on Friday morning, November 12.

Mr. Key began by explaining the nature of the soundings he had made with Sir Robert Scott of the UK Embassy on November 5 of British Foreign Office reactions to alternative possibilities of postponing or cutting off Assembly discussion of the Cyprus problem in order to avoid the risk that a mild resolution might be put forward and obtain two-thirds support. (See Deptel 1073, November 5 to Athens, repeated to London 2554 and USUN 245.)² In view of the Secretary’s stated desire that the Department explore ways and means of postponing or avoiding discussion of this problem at the General Assembly, it had been felt necessary to consult first of all with the British, bearing in mind the commitment made to them last September in the Secretary’s letter to Sir Winston Churchill,³ that we would “actively oppose the passage of any resolution . . .”.⁴

Mr. Key added that the immediate, personal reaction of Sir Robert Scott had not been promising, but we had not yet received the considered Foreign Office reaction. In the meantime it was felt essential that the Secretary reply to recent messages from Marshal Papagos making it clear that a) we had never undertaken to remain “neutral” on the substance of the Cyprus issue, b) we would feel obliged to oppose adoption of a resolution because of the resultant dangers to Western solidarity.

¹Drafted Nov. 16.
²Document 392.
³Document 385.
⁴Ellipsis in the source text.
Mr. Byroade produced a revised draft letter to Marshal Papagos\(^5\) which the Secretary might hand personally to the retiring Greek Ambassador. Ambassador Politis is being replaced apparently because of failure to obtain some degree of US backing for the Greek position on Cyprus. Mr. Byroade noted that, responsive to the President’s comment,\(^6\) the revised draft letter to Papagos had been made less cool and abrupt. It now included a sentence alluding in general terms to our willingness to explore possible ways and means of reducing tensions aroused by this problem. In this way the message could reflect the Secretary’s awareness of Papagos’ mention of “postponement” during their conversation in Paris,\(^7\) without committing us at this time to work for such a procedure. Mr. Byroade urged upon the Secretary the importance, in terms of our relations with Greece, of clarifying our position to them at the earliest possible moment.

The Secretary, after refreshing his memory on the background leading up to his message of September 21 to Churchill, said that his own position had always been that, in assuring the British that we would oppose “any resolution”, he obviously meant any “substantive” resolution, i.e., any resolution smacking of action or interference in the affairs of Cyprus. He pointed out that we had also assured the British that we would “do all possible to keep any discussion to the absolute minimum”. The British could not logically expect us to oppose a resolution which would result in what we both wanted, namely the adjourning or cutting off of discussion at the current GA session.

Mr. Key and Mr. Elbrick expressed concern that, in view of the rather categorical language used in the commitment to the British, the latter might nevertheless insist on holding us to a literal interpretation of the assurance offered. Mr. Key added that the UK Embassy felt that London wanted the whole issue knocked down once and for all this year. He felt that, unless the British reacted favorably to the soundings he had made on procedure, it would be necessary, perhaps for the Secretary himself, to explain his position to the British Ambassador so that there would be no misunderstanding on that score. The Secretary agreed that his position should be explained clearly to the British in the near future, unless the Foreign Office showed willingness to consider our suggestions for avoiding full-scale discussion of the problem this year.

\(^5\)Not found in Department of State files. For text of Dulles’ letter to Papagos, Nov. 16, see Document 396.
\(^6\)Regarding Eisenhower’s comment, see footnote 4, Document 391.
\(^7\)See Document 389.
Mr. Elbrick observed that a "postponement" formula would be difficult for the British because it seemed to imply that the matter could properly come before the Assembly next year. The Secretary said that, while the term "postponement" was not a good one, what we were after was a way to "adjourn discussion", or have the Assembly decide not to consider the matter further at this time. If this could be accomplished, we would have to let next year's Assembly worry about what to do with items submitted to it at that time.

The Secretary then reviewed the proposed letter to Papagos and made a few changes, inserting the word "substantive" at several points when reference was made to our opposition to an Assembly "resolution". He then agreed that the letter be prepared for his signature, so that he might give it to the retiring Greek Ambassador at the earliest practicable moment. The Secretary also noted that, while the British, in seeking our help, argued that they felt as strongly on Cyprus as we did on the Guatemalan problem, they had in fact given us no help on the latter problem and had abstained in the SC vote at the June 25 meeting.  

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No. 395

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file, "Dulles-Herter Series"

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President

WASHINGTON, November 16, 1954.

Subject: Cyprus

We are exploring with the British possible methods of avoiding formal United Nations action on the Cyprus question, such as adjournment sine die or some way of ending discussions on the issue without a resolution on the merits of the case. However, in view of our intention to oppose any substantive resolution on Cyprus, and in order to avoid any further misunderstanding by the Greeks, I felt we should not delay longer in making our position clear to Prime Minister Papagos. There is attached the text to my letter to Papagos, which also acknowledges his communication to you of

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1 Drafted by Baxter on Nov. 12. A note on the source text reads: "The President's approval phoned to Phyllis Bernau, 11/18/54."

2 Dated Nov. 16, infra.
October 23.\textsuperscript{3} It has been redrafted to take into consideration your belief that an earlier version\textsuperscript{4} was too cold and abrupt. It also indicates our willingness to explore ways, other than by formal United Nations action, of reducing tensions created by this question.

\textit{John Foster Dulles}

\footnote{See footnote 1, Document 390.}

\footnote{See footnote 4, Document 391.}

\textbf{No. 396}

\textit{The Secretary of State to Prime Minister Papagos}\textsuperscript{1}

\textbf{SECRET} \hfill \textbf{[WASHINGTON], November 16, 1954.}

\textbf{DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:} The President has asked me to reply to your letter of October 23 concerning Cyprus.\textsuperscript{2} He has told me of his deep concern in this matter and of his hope that it will be possible to avoid an open aggravation of the relations between our Greek and British friends. This letter is also an answer to the one you gave me during our conversation in Paris on October 23.\textsuperscript{3}

I sincerely regret that there has been a misunderstanding of our position in the General Assembly on this question. We refrained from opposing the inscription of the item on the agenda because of our friendship for Greece and because of our traditional support of the principle of freedom of discussion in the General Assembly. However, we are convinced that at this time a discussion of the matter in the General Assembly or the adoption of any substantive\textsuperscript{4} resolution would harm the good relations between certain of our friends and allies. This to us is the most important consideration in the entire question. Thus while we have not opposed the desire of the Greek Government to bring the Cyprus question to the attention of the General Assembly, we would be compelled to oppose the passage of any substantive\textsuperscript{4} resolution. However, we will be glad to explore otherwise methods of reducing the tensions which are being created by this question.

The climate for endeavoring to find such methods appears to be improving. Responsible opinion in the United Kingdom now seems

\footnote{This letter, drafted by Wood and Baxter and cleared by Barbour, was handed to Politis, Nov. 16, for transmittal to Papagos; see the memorandum of conversation, infra.}

\footnote{See footnote 1, Document 390.}

\footnote{See footnote 3, \textit{ibid.}}

\footnote{The word “substantive” was added to the draft text by Dulles; see Document 394.}
ready to take steps toward eventual self-government for the people of Cyprus, provided there is cooperation from the Cypriots. In Greece, I believe, there is an increased realization that the problem cannot be solved quickly, but will take time and patience. My own feeling is that lasting progress can be made only by gradual steps which will not upset allied unity and that such steps can be taken only when the British and the Cypriots are willing to meet in good faith and discuss the political problems of the island.

In seeking the best method to approach the problem, I therefore suggest that our common objective should be to encourage constructive negotiations in Cyprus. The Cypriots and the British authorities are the parties most directly concerned, and I strongly urge that your Government use its friendly influence with non-communist Cypriot leaders to encourage them to undertake serious discussions with the British authorities. We shall similarly use our own influence to encourage the British Government actively to seek such negotiations. In the future, our own feelings on the subject will be influenced by the degree of willingness with which the British authorities and the leaders of Cyprus seek to work out their common problems.

I wish to assure you that United States officials are not engaging in any lobbying activities on the Cyprus issue either in New York or Washington or other capitals.

In conclusion I would like to tell Your Excellency that the President and I sincerely admire the qualities of leadership and dedication which you have shown in serving your country and in furthering our united endeavor to give strength and stability to the free world.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

No. 397

747C.00/11-1654

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Baxter)\(^1\)

SECRET


Subject: Cyprus

Participants: Athanase Politis, Ambassador of Greece
The Secretary
William O. Baxter, GTI

\(^1\) A handwritten notation by O'Connor on the source text notes that Dulles approved it Nov. 17.
The Secretary asked the Greek Ambassador to call today to receive, for transmittal to Prime Minister Papagos, a reply to the latter’s communications of October 23 addressed to the President and the Secretary.\(^2\)

After reading the letter, the Ambassador asked whether the United States Government intended to make public at this time any of the views which it contained. He was told that it was considered a secret communication to the Prime Minister.

In reply to a query as to whether we would make a public statement at a later date, it was pointed out that, when the Cyprus item is taken up in committee, we will doubtless make clear to other interested and friendly delegations our opposition to any substantive resolution. The advance knowledge of this may be useful to the Greek Government in making a decision as to whether it should introduce a resolution at the time it presents its case in committee.

The Ambassador also asked whether he could assure his Prime Minister that United States officials had not in the past done any lobbying on the Cyprus question. The Prime Minister was particularly interested because of his belief that the United States had indicated it would maintain “complete neutrality” on this issue. The Secretary said that to the best of his knowledge there had been no activities of that sort. However, in discussions with representatives of other delegations we made no secret of the fact that we considered the Greek request for the inclusion of this item on the General Assembly agenda as both ill-timed and ill-advised.

The Secretary referred to the Prime Minister’s suggestion, made during their recent conversation in Paris,\(^4\) that discussion on this question might be postponed for this year without prejudice. He indicated that we were exploring this possibility but had not yet reached any decision as to whether such a course would be feasible. The Ambassador asked if Greece might expect the support of the United States if a motion for postponement were made. The Secretary indicated that we might be able to support such a solution.

The Ambassador stated his belief that public opinion on this question is running so high in Greece that it will be very difficult for the Greek Government to agree to a motion for postponement. The Secretary said that he could not understand what advantage the Greek Government hoped to achieve in pushing this issue that would in any way balance the tremendous harm it is doing to Greek relations with Great Britain and Turkey.

\(^2\)Reference is to the letter by Dulles to Papagos, Nov. 16, *supra*.

\(^3\)See footnotes 1 and 3, Document 390.

\(^4\)See Document 389.
The Ambassador in Greece (Cannon) to the Department of State

SECRET NIAC No. 398

ATHENS, November 17, 1954—6 p. m.

1079. Reference Deptel 1158, November 16.\(^2\) Foreign Minister just sent me message\(^3\) Greek Government greatly distressed by effect of letter to Papagos if text or even substance becomes public knowledge. What he has in mind is that in view series of current shocks to Greek Rally position such as continuing Parliamentary defections to Markezinis faction, quarrels over German contracts, complications in US aid procedures and probable gains anti-Rally elements in next Sunday’s municipal elections, this is indeed most awkward moment for set-back on Cyprus issue.

He asks that Cyprus issue letter be held in strict secrecy at least until after elections. He says Papagos fears that divulging this matter even to third government on confidential basis might well tip balance against Rally candidates in such critical areas as Athens, Salonika and Piraeus.

Please advise whether we can give Greeks any assurances on security aspect this matter.\(^4\)

CANNON

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\(^1\) Repeated for information to London.

\(^2\) Telegram 1158 summarized Document 396. (747C.00/11-1654)

\(^3\) Not found in Department of State files.

\(^4\) Telegram 1173 to Athens, Nov. 17, authorized the Embassy to give such assurances, which were then conveyed orally by Schnee to John Sossides, Secretary to Stephanopoulos, Nov. 19. (747C.00/11-1754; and handwritten notation on copy of telegram 1173 in Athens Embassy files, lot 60 F 16, “350 Cyprus 1954”)

No. 399

CONFIDENTIAL

ATHENS, December 1, 1954—2 p. m.

1166. Reference (a) Department telegram 1238 November 24, 1954;\(^2\) (b) Secretary’s letter to Prime Minister November 16, 1954;\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Repeated to London, Ankara, Nicosia, and USUN in New York.

\(^2\) Telegram 1238 reported on Key’s meeting with Beeley, Nov. 22. (747C.00/11-2454)

\(^3\) Document 396.
(c) memorandum of meeting with Secretary November 12, 1954 on current aspects Cyprus problem; \(^4\) (d) Embassy telegram 928 October 27, 1954.\(^5\)

Foreign Minister has handed me tentative draft resolution Cyprus question as variant of Kyrou text already known to Department.\(^6\) Full text in next following telegram.\(^7\)

He says Greece would be deeply grateful for US ideas and guidance in developing final text compatible with criteria set forth in Secretary’s letter (reference (b)) and most anxious make every effort, short of withdrawing resolution, to resolve UN problem in manner consistent US policy of avoiding divisive confrontation with British. He added notwithstanding Papagos’ remark to Secretary,\(^8\) Greece’s position now is against postponing issue.

While this draft apparently inadequate and I left Foreign Minister in no doubt our unwillingness have hand in drafting resolution for situation we have tried so hard to avert. I believe we might persuade Greeks accept solution meeting our objectives if term “substantive resolution”\(^9\) interpreted along lines set forth by Secretary in reference (c) which correspond Greek interpretation and Embassy understanding US policy and objectives. In such case, suggestions set forth reference (d) still appear useful. Now is time when US can exert its influence with reasonable expectancy of achieving equitable solution. This might, for example, be in form resolution proposed by some third delegation commending Greeks and British for interest in welfare Cypriots, noting official statements indicating intention British Government offer constitutional reforms expanding area self-government and concluding with expression confidence that in ensuing months British and Cypriots supported by Greeks will cooperate in seeking orderly evolution of situation. As seen from here, developments subsequent to our earlier recommendations make more attractive alternative proposal of disposing of issue without formal resolution but after controlled debate. Could not way be found to overcome procedural difficulties?

\(^4\)Document 394.
\(^5\)Telegram 928 recommended that the United States seek British and Greek agreement to a formula whereby Greece would state its case for Cypriot self-determination, without proposing a resolution by the U.N. General Assembly. The British would restate their intention to continue talks with Cypriot representatives on adoption of a constitution expanding the area of self-government. (747C.00/10-2754)
\(^6\)Telegrams Delga 255 and 311 from New York, Nov. 18 and 80, quoted similar Greek draft resolutions. (747C.00/11-1854 and 747C.00/11-3054)
\(^7\)Telegram 1167 from New York, Dec. 1, not printed. (747C.00/12-154)
\(^8\)Regarding Papagos’ remark to Dulles, see Document 889.
\(^9\)A handwritten notation on the source text defines “substantive resolution” as “any resolution smacking of action or intervention in the affairs of Cyprus.”
I have not discussed these alternatives with Greek leaders and believe some persuasion would be required, but have reason to think they would at this time accept something fairly close. Greek Government badly shaken by recent phase Markezinis affair,\textsuperscript{10} setbacks in municipal elections, and ferment in opposition groups now moving toward Popular Front concept to bring Rally down. Moreover, public morale at lowest point since Rally came to power. If Papagos government further weakened outlook for US policy objectives definitely disquieting. Leaders are showing anxiety and are badly in need positive and specific guidance.

Foreign Minister says if it will help in downgrading importance of issue he would be willing not to participate in person but leave matter in hands regular delegation even though they would give him bad time with Greek public.

Embassy recommendations obviously based on assumption Secretary’s understanding of US obligation to British (reference (c)) will prevail. If on other hand, we accept interpretation set forth reference (a) US objective would not be, as Embassy has hitherto assumed, to soften or avert divisive discussion in international forum. On contrary, it seems to us here that US objective would then become attainment of clear-cut decision without much concern for how much damage is done in process.

With the possible exception of one or two men on British Ambassador’s staff, I know of no observers in Athens who would agree that this British solution will dispose of issue. I am convinced that solution based on point 5 of reference (a)\textsuperscript{11} would substantially raise emotional content of issue, would tend encourage violence and would create more serious division among allies.

\textbf{Cannon}

\textsuperscript{10}Markezinis resigned from his position as Minister of Coordination in April 1954, reportedly over personal differences with Papagos on the extent of Markezinis’ power. In November, Markezinis withdrew from the Rally and three members of the Greek Government resigned, developments prompted by a statement of Papagos on Nov. 10 that Markezinis had made economic commitments in negotiations at Bonn in November 1953, without reporting them to Papagos. Reports on these developments were transmitted by telegram 59 from Salonika, Apr. 4 (781.00/4-454); despatch 994 from Athens, Apr. 20 (781.00/4-2054); and telegram 1028 from Athens, Nov. 12. (781.00/4-1254)

\textsuperscript{11}It reads as follows: “UK does not want its friends initiate or support any softening of terms any resolution that may be introduced by Greece.” (747C.00/11-2454)
SECRET

Athens, December 1, 1954—5 p.m.

1168. Papagos has handed me letter for Secretary\(^1\) in response Secretary’s letter of November 16\(^2\) on Cyprus question.

Am forwarding today’s pouch.

Letter stresses two arguments: First, matter is not British-Cypriot but essentially British-Greek dispute; second, solution confusing self-government with self-determination is “delusion.” Otherwise repetition familiar points though on somewhat higher plane and in more moderate language that earlier communications.

Though it appears in direct opposition to thesis presented Embtel 1166 today’s date\(^3\) we take it to be essentially formal statement Greek position for record and still believe our recommendations valid.

CANNON

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\(^1\)Dated Nov. 30, not printed. (Enclosure to despatch 497 from Athens, Dec. 1; 747C.00/12-154)

\(^2\)Document 396.

\(^3\)Supra.

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No. 401

747C.00/12-154

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Key) to the Secretary of State\(^1\)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 1, 1954.

Subject: Cyprus Problem

Discussion:

1. The British have given us an essentially negative reaction to the idea of curtailing or avoiding discussion of the Cyprus problem through a procedural resolution, thus avoiding a substantive resolution at the General Assembly. They strongly prefer coming to grips with the issue at this session, believing that any Greek resolution, if not “softened” by well-meaning friends, can be defeated.

\(^1\)Also from Byroade and Merchant; drafted by Mangano and Wood, cleared with Murphy, and transmitted through Scott to Dulles. A handwritten notation on the source text notes that Dulles saw it.
They fear any move which would imply that the Assembly would drop the matter temporarily but consider the problem next year.

2. There is danger that, having in mind your message of last September to Churchill (Tab A), the British will expect us actively to oppose any resolution, substantive or procedural, which they do not want adopted. You will recall that, in your recent message to Marshal Papagos, you informed him that we would oppose any “substantive” resolution. In that connection Greek representative Kyou has privately given Ambassador Lodge a draft resolution which, despite his comments to Lodge, clearly appears substantive to us (Tab B).

3. Ambassador Lodge has already told the UK Delegation he did not feel we could be expected to lobby actively in their behalf (Tab C). Apparently he feels, consistent with that view, we can tell others of our position without pressing them to embrace it. This point also may be misunderstood by the British.

4. The British feel that if they offer the Cypriots a liberal constitution, the communists may well take control of any self-government thus created on the island. We agree that there is some danger of this but feel that tighter restrictions by the British on the activities of the communist leaders in Cyprus would reduce that danger. We believe that the British must offer a liberal constitution providing for an assembly with an elected majority if they are to have any chance of obtaining the cooperation of the non-communist Cypriots.

Recommendations:

1. That you call in the British Ambassador and, in order to make our position perfectly clear, inform him that, while we will oppose any resolution of substance, we must remain free to consider a procedural solution on its merits. You might assure the Ambassador that, if a procedural solution seems indicated, we would endeavor to exclude any implication that the problem would be considered at a subsequent session.

2. That you confirm to Sir Roger our inability to lobby actively in support of their position, though we will make our own position plain in response to inquiries from other delegations.

3. That you mention to Sir Roger that we are interested in their plans for improving the political situation on the island. Specifical-
ly we wonder whether they plan to limit the freedom of action of the key communist leaders in order to facilitate British contacts with the non-communist leaders.

No. 402

747C.00/12-854: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State

SECRET       PRIORITY       NEW YORK, December 8, 1954—7 p. m.

Delga 357. Limit distribution. Re: Cyprus. Dixon (UK) met with me this morning to discuss working our joint position on Cyprus. He said that UK preference remained the defeat of any resolution on the question. I said that my instructions were to oppose any substantive resolution and that we would tell people this was the case. We were not able, however, to put pressure on others to defeat a substantive resolution.

Dixon said that there was a very fine balance in voting situation as they now see it. While the announcement of US opposition to a substantive resolution might be enough to bring around some uncertain votes, it remained risky. Voting situation changed from day to day. For example, Pakistan had now informed UK that they would vote against any Greek resolution and this the UK felt would bring about some change in Arab voting pattern to advantage of UK. On other hand, balance of LA vote was presently running against UK. I said that I could understand LA’s support for UK being more doubtful if the question were one of substance, but this might not be the case if a procedural motion not to discuss the Greek item were put forward. I said that I would ask Washington to authorize me to do some button-holing on a resolution not to discuss; I felt that if that were the UK preference we could be of substantial help.

Dixon said that in view of the fine balance in voting on a substantive resolution and in view of their wish to make this morning’s meeting decisive, he believed he could proceed to work out with US a procedural motion not to discuss and so advise London. He raised the question of whether US could present such a motion at the outset of debate. Since UK was under most stringent instructions not to participate in substantive debate it was important that the procedural motion should be made at outset so that they could be present and participate on that basis.
Crosthwaite suggested US might make the motion by pointing out that we were not taking a position on the merits but taking such action to avoid a divisive issue between Allies. I said that I would raise with the Department whether we could make the motion, but wondered if it would not be better if such a country as Denmark or Pakistan did so and we then went to work in support.

Dixon felt that the planning for a motion not to discuss should be like a military plan, i.e., it should not get to the Greeks that we had this in mind and hence, the work in support of it would have to begin after the motion was made. He asked if in the interim period the UK could say that US “opposes the Greek proposal”. I agreed that they could do this.

Dixon also wished to give further thought to whether a procedural motion should say “decides not to ‘discuss’ or not to ‘consider’”. The use of “not to consider” might appear more like a reversal of the GA decision to inscribe the item and therefore require a two-thirds majority. On the other hand, “not to consider” from the UK standpoint might be better as more far-reaching in substance. I pointed out that the use of “not to discuss” might gather more votes for the very reason that it did not go quite as far as “not to consider” and suggested that the main objective should be to get a very substantial vote. Dixon agreed this was the case.

I would appreciate Department’s views on “discuss” vs “consider” as well as Department’s views on whether US could make the motion. I recommend we do not make it.

I believe I should be authorized to do some lobbying in favor of a resolution not to consider or not to discuss the Cyprus question. This is because it is very much to our advantage not to have the substantive question itself come to a vote. I believe we could justify my doing this by saying that it was in the interests of all three powers concerned to compose this question and not to let them get into intransigent positions. My plan would be to do some button-holing among our friends here after the motion has been made and to do it on an apparently informal and casual basis.

Lodge

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¹P. M. Crosthwaite, British Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations.
SECRET PRIORITY  WASHINGTON, December 9, 1954—6 p. m.

Gadel 147. Appreciate success your efforts with British (Delga 357)." Hope UK Del will be present vote on procedural motion, and we should seek agreement on such motion by negotiation with other delegations, subject to UK concurrence. Agree preferable US should not take motion and suggest Scandinavian NATO member preferable to Pakistan because Commonwealth member.

Motion not to "discuss" preferable as less painful to Greeks, likely to obtain more votes while still contributing to UK objective, and not directly contradictory to GA inscriptions. You should try ward off any amendments which would expressly or impliedly indicate matter may again be considered by UN Gadel 137.3

We should justify our position during lobbying by indicating our belief public debate would only lead three parties concerned to take intransigent positions making eventual solution more difficult. Also, in event procedural motion introduced so late that there is little time for subsequent lobbying, probably desirable we make statement shortly after motion introduced supporting motion on basis best chance lessening Cyprus tension is by direct negotiations between British and Cypriots. Our statement should be phrased to reduce Soviet opportunities to berate us for being against self-determination.

DULLES

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2Supra.

3Gadel 137 to New York, Dec. 6, stated that the U.S. main objective with regard to the Cyprus item in the U.N. General Assembly was to avoid a clash between Allies, which consideration of a substantive resolution would entail. The Department of State preferred an alternative, mentioned by Dixon to James J. Wadsworth, U.S. Deputy Representative to the United Nations, in New York on Dec. 4, that a motion be made at the beginning of debate not to discuss the Cyprus item. (320/12-454)
SECRET

ATHENS, December 12, 1954.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I have just received a telegram from the Secretary of State\(^2\) urgently requesting me to deliver the following message from him to you.

"You will recall that in my letter of November 16\(^3\) I stated that, while the United States would have to oppose in the General Assembly a substantive resolution on Cyprus, we would explore otherwise methods of reducing tensions created by this question.

"Reports from our Delegation in New York\(^4\) are that a resolution of the type suggested by your Government\(^5\) could not obtain the necessary majority. We would ourselves have to vote against such a resolution because we do not believe that United Nations interposition is useful at this time.

"It seems to me, therefore, that the best outcome from the standpoint of Western unity as well as Greek prestige would be to support a resolution by this Assembly not to discuss the Cyprus question. Of course, future Assemblies would be unbound.

"I am making this suggestion in the light of your remarks to me in Paris last October 23\(^6\) which I interpreted as meaning that you would prefer this result if the United States could not be strictly neutral.

"This step would lessen the chances of a debate which could only hurt the relations between our Greek and British friends. Furthermore, it appears that a decision by the General Assembly not to discuss the question would be less unfortunate from the standpoint of Greek public opinion than the failure of a Greek resolution to obtain the necessary majority.

"You may be sure that we will do all we can to conclude the discussion as amicably as possible. With assurance of my high regard and best wishes."

Sincerely yours,

Cavendish W. Cannon

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\(^1\) This message was delivered on Dec. 12.

\(^2\) Telegram 1401 to Athens, Dec. 11. (747C.00/12-1154) A memorandum by Murphy to Dulles, Dec. 11, to which the draft telegram was attached, stated that this was done in accordance with Dulles' telephone conversation with Lodge that morning. (747C.00/12-1154)

\(^3\) Document 396.

\(^4\) The reports from New York have not been further identified.

\(^5\) Reference presumably is to a Greek draft resolution handed to an official of the Department of State, Dec. 11, which has not been found in Department of State files. See Document 399.

\(^6\) Regarding those remarks, see Document 389.

\(^7\) No reply by Papagos to this message by Dulles has been found in Department of State files.
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece

SECRET
Washington, December 14, 1954—12:37 p. m.

1418. Proposed Greek resolution (your 1263)\(^2\) not consistent with what Secretary had in mind (Deptel 1401).\(^3\) It considered substantive and USDel would oppose.

As you point out in your 1255,\(^4\) Greeks pressing issue because British refusal negotiate with Greece. Department seriously doubts therefore Greek delegate would declare in his speech that Greek objective to have matter discussed between Cypriots and British. "Expanded area of self-government" (urtel 1255) at variance with Greek objective of enosis.

Clear from UN practice motion "not to discuss" normally procedural and not substantive. Thus US support for such motion should not be misconstrued by Greeks.

Greek Ambassador last night urged Department help find "a way out"\(^5\) for Greeks. Was told Department could not go beyond solution proposed Secretary’s message to Papagos.

DULLES

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\(^1\)Drafted by S. Roger Tyler, Jr. (IO/UNP), and cleared by Wood, Baxter, Allen (EUR), Popper, Key, and with Raynor. Also sent to London and USUN in New York.

\(^2\)Telegram 1263, Dec. 13, transmitted text of a Greek draft resolution on Cyprus, approved by Papagos for submission at the United Nations. It proposed that the General Assembly invite "the parties (Great Britain-Greece) to seek a solution in conformity with paragraph 1 of Article 33 of the Charter." (747C.00/12-1354)

\(^3\)Dated Dec. 11, not printed. (747C.00/12-1154) It transmitted to the Embassy in Athens the text of Document 404.

\(^4\)Telegram 1255, Dec. 11, suggested a procedure at the United Nations whereby Greece would state it had wished the Cyprus issue to be resolved by direct negotiations between the Cypriots and the British. Then a delegate introducing the resolution for the General Assembly "not to discuss" Cyprus would point out that British sources had indicated an intention to pursue with Cypriots the question of an expanded area of self-government. (747C.00/12-1154)

\(^5\)A memorandum of the conversation with Melas, Dec. 13, is in file 747C.00/12-1354.
The Secretary of State to the Department of State

SECRET

PARIS, December 15, 1954—10 p.m.

Secto 2. Greek Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos has just seen me in condition of great excitement. He would normally preside at NATO council but says Papagos has instructed him to proceed at once to New York to take charge of Cyprus matter for Greece. He hopes get some delay. He pleads with us at least in course of debate to give some indication that the New Zealand resolution does not bury this matter for all time. I explained to him that it was perfectly clear from a legal standpoint that it did not bind a future Assembly and indeed that it did not bind this Assembly under the precedent set in the China case last year when Pearson ruled that a resolution could be considered even though it was totally inconsistent with a resolution previously adopted. Stephanopoulos pleads with us at least to accept some alteration of the New Zealand resolution which would indicate that it applied only "to this session" or failing that to make some comparable statement in the course of debate. I doubt that we can do this without seeming to invite Greek action next year. However, I do feel that if there should be a discussion limited to the legal significance of the resolution and it was appropriate for us to express an opinion that aspect alone, we could indicate that as a juridical matter we did not feel that the agenda of a future Assembly can be limited by a prior Assembly. This should, however, be purely a legal statement and probably accompanied by a disclaimer of any desire to see this particular matter brought next year before the Assembly.

DULLES

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1Repealed to Athens and passed to USUN. Dulles was in Paris, Dec. 15–19, for preliminary talks and the Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Dec. 17–18; for documentation, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 549 ff.

2New Zealand’s draft resolution “not to consider further” the Cyprus question was distributed as U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L.125. For the voting on it, see Document 410.

Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in France (Brewster) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)\(^1\)

SECRET

[PARIS,] 16 December 1954.

I conveyed your message\(^2\) orally to Ambassador Exindaris at the Greek Foreign Minister’s apartment in the Hotel Bristol. He passed the word along immediately to the Foreign Minister in the adjoining room.

The Greek NATO Ambassador expressed his gratitude for the statement and immediately raised the principal issue which concerns the Foreign Minister.

Greece has a tremendous public opinion problem on its hands. The Greek public should have some reassuring statement from a U.S. source to permit the quashing of rumors in Athens that the U.S. has been one of the principal “bad boys” on the Resolution regarding Cyprus in the UN.\(^3\) The Greek Foreign Minister also naturally wants to prove he has been active on this issue in Paris, even though he did not go to New York. In the interest of U.S.-Greek relations he feels a brief statement which he might be authorized to use promptly would help the current U.S. position and prestige in Greece, and reduce Leftist demagoguery in Athens.

Whatever language the Secretary would permit, he feels would help greatly in putting out the current Greek “political fire”.

Ambassador Exindaris will wish to raise this question with you tomorrow morning at the Council meeting,\(^4\) and hopes you may be able to obtain the Secretary’s agreement to authorize Mr. Stephanopoulos to make some statement.

I am sure the Greek NATO Delegation is also carefully weighing the possibility of having a Greek correspondent ask the Secretary a question on his views on the Cyprus action in the UN.

As a personal suggestion, possibly language along the following lines would be palatable to the Greek Foreign Minister:

\(^1\)This memorandum was transmitted through Edwin M. Martin (USRO) and Hughes.
\(^2\)Dated Dec. 16, below.
\(^3\)Regarding the draft U.N. General Assembly resolution on Cyprus, see Document 410.
“I called on the U.S. Secretary of State Wednesday\(^5\) for a friendly talk on the Cyprus issue and am now informed that he communicated with Washington and the U.S. Delegation to the UN immediately thereafter. On the basis of reports from New York he believes the resolution on Cyprus as amended meets the points raised by me. He is happy that this resolution, which reflects a spirit of moderation, was carried by such an overwhelming majority in the UN Political Committee.”

[Appendix]

The Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Greek Delegation at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council\(^6\)

[PARIS,] 16 December 1954—2:30 p. m.

Mr. Merchant regrets exceedingly that he will be unable to see Ambassador Exindaris this afternoon but he is involved in continuous meetings with the British and the French both this afternoon and this evening. He has discussed the matter with the Secretary and desired to communicate the following to Ambassador Exindaris:

“Immediately after the Greek Foreign Minister called on the Secretary yesterday the Secretary communicated with Washington and the U.S. Delegation to the U.N.\(^7\) He does not know whether his communication in fact affected the result but the Secretary, on the basis of the reports he now has, thought that the resolution on Cyprus as amended last night meets the main point that the Foreign Minister raised with him. Insofar as the matter of a statement to the Greek people is concerned, the Secretary is dubious of the propriety of his making such a statement but if an occasion offers at a press conference when he can make some helpful comment, he will take that opportunity.”\(^8\)

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\(^5\)For a report on this meeting, see Document 406.

\(^6\)This message was conveyed orally by Brewster to Exintaris, Dec. 16.

\(^7\)Reference is to the document cited in footnote 5, above.

\(^8\)For Dulles’ statement on Cyprus, issued to the press at Paris, Dec. 18, see Document 411.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF GREEK, TURKISH, AND IRANIAN AFFAIRS (BAXTER)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, December 16, 1954.

Subject: Call of the Greek Ambassador

Participants: George V. Melas, Greek Ambassador
Herbert Hoover, Jr., Acting Secretary
William O. Baxter, GTI

The new Greek Ambassador, in paying his courtesy call on Under Secretary Hoover today, opened his remarks by saying that it was his earnest intention to do his best to maintain and further the close friendly relationships between Greece and the United States. Although the two countries have the same objectives and policies, he pointed out that his arrival coincided with one question of deep concern to his Government on which the United States had taken a position less favorable to Greece than had been hoped. Mr. Hoover said he thought we were all pleased that a formula had been worked out yesterday in the United Nations which Greece had been able to subscribe to and which had passed unanimously.¹

Ambassador Melas said that, in this connection, he wished to express the profound regret of his Government, as has already been done to Ambassador Cannon by Prime Minister Papagos, for the irresponsible anti-American demonstration in Athens. Mr. Hoover mentioned press reports of further demonstrations and showed the Ambassador the ticker story of the attack on the USIE library in Salonika during the course of which a portrait of President Eisenhower had been burned. The Ambassador was visibly shaken by this news and entreated Mr. Hoover most earnestly not to believe that such actions are representative of true Greek feeling nor that the Greek Government is in any way involved. Mr. Hoover pointed out that with a free press such as ours these events in Greece would receive wide publicity and would have an unfortunate effect on American public opinion. He hoped the Greek Government would take all necessary steps to prevent further outbreaks of this nature and would also seek to place before the Greek public in their true light the recent developments concerning Cyprus in the United Nations. After all, the Greek Government had officially

¹For the voting in Committee I of the U.N. General Assembly on the Cyprus question, see Document 410.
agreed to and voted for the same motion which the United States had supported.

Ambassador Melas stated that his Government had accepted the United Nations formula not from choice but because it had no other recourse when it was announced a day or two ago that the United States would oppose the very mild Greek resolution.² This news had come as a profound shock to the Greek people, who had always looked to the United States as the leading exponent of the ideals of liberty and independence of peoples. The cause of Cyprus is a deep national conviction on which all Greeks are united and on which they all feel elementary justice is on their side. Of course, the Greek Government had known that the United States looked with disfavor upon its introducing this question in the United Nations, but the intransigent refusal of the British to discuss this matter through normal diplomatic channels and uncompromising public statements in the House of Commons had forced this course of action on the Greek Government. United States abstention at the time of voting on the inscription of the Cyprus item had been a disappointment to the Greek Government but had led it to believe that the United States would remain “neutral” throughout. Indeed the Secretary had “promised” Prime Minister Papagos when they met in Paris in October³ that the United States would maintain a position of “neutrality.” In mid-November the Secretary sent a personal message to Papagos⁴ informing him that the United States would oppose a “substantive resolution”; since that time, the Greek Government has bent every effort to working out a resolution “so mild that it could hurt no one.” In a meeting with Mr. Jernegan last Saturday⁵ the Ambassador had, without instructions from his Government, even further diluted the proposed resolution and had received no indication that the Department considered it substantive. It was not until Monday, in a meeting with Mr. Key,⁶ after the United States position had been fully divulged in the press,⁷ that he realized the United States would accept only a purely procedural motion without even any slight references to principles enunciated in the Charter and so frequently repeated in other official statements.

²Reference possibly is to Lodge’s statement in Committee I of the U.N. General Assembly, Dec. 14; see Document 410.
³See Document 389.
⁴Document 396.
⁵Dec. 11; no memorandum of that conversation has been found in Department of State files.
⁶A memorandum of that conversation by Key, Dec. 13, is in file 747C.00/12-1354.
⁷e.g., see the New York Times, Dec. 13, 1954.
The Ambassador said that, although the United States had, for reasons of its own, not been able to support Greece at this time, he would urge us, when we considered the timing more appropriate, to use our great influence with the British to bring about a settlement of this question. Even the President, whom he saw when presenting his credentials a week ago, had expressed the belief that some solution to this problem should be worked out "by the two governments." 8

As the Ambassador rose to leave, Mr. Hoover said he was sorry that the Ambassador's arrival to take over his new duties was clouded by the untoward happenings in Greece. The problem now for both of us, he said, was not to look backward but to work together to find a constructive way of getting things back into perspective so that there will be no lasting harm done to the firm friendship and close cooperation which have so long characterized relations between our two countries.

After the meeting in Mr. Hoover's office, Mr. Baxter took the occasion to state again, as he had in a previous conversation with the Ambassador, the Department's understanding of the meeting in Paris between the Secretary and Marshal Papagos. According to our reports, Papagos referred to the United States abstention when Greece sought to have the Cyprus item inscribed and urged that, if we could not support Greece when the item came up for discussion, we would at least maintain "complete neutrality." Papagos also suggested the remote possibility of postponement of the item. The Secretary gave no commitment but had tried to find some solution along the postponement line. Mr. Baxter also explained that there might be some difference of interpretation as to the term "neutrality." The United States has always said that the Cyprus question was one of primary concern to Greece and the United Kingdom, that the United States interest was only the broader one of concern that this divergence of views between two friends could adversely affect solidarity of the free world. We therefore do not wish to see discussions that would enter into the substance of the question nor did we wish to take a position against either of the two countries at interest. By supporting a motion which avoided any reference to the substance of the question and which was not directed against either Greece or Great Britain, the United States had, it seemed to Mr. Baxter, played a neutral part. We could not interpret the term "neutral" in such a narrow sense as to mean nothing but abstention on a Greek motion seeking application of the principle of self-determination to the people of Cyprus.

8Melas presented his credentials to Eisenhower on Dec. 9; no memorandum of that conversation has been found in Department of State files.
CONFIDENTIAL

ATHENS, December 17, 1954—6 p.m.

PRIORITY

1308. Reference Deptel 1453.2 Had long talk with Papagos this morning using very firm language. Ended on theme that even though internal political situation may have obliged government to let people blow off steam time has come to reduce Cyprus question to true perspective and turn to constructive business of our two governments.

Immediately thereafter he issued statement3 repeating expressions of deep regret and strong condemnation and by reference also to our discussion of subjects “currently under consideration by two friendly and allied countries” prepared way for returning to normal Greek-American collaboration. He said he also would try to devise way induce calmer attitude in press but uncertain how to go about it.

Since public bitterness is general and government itself under attack effect these efforts may be gradual. I therefore think no further protests desirable pending our reappraisal situation next week. Having borne down heavy thus far believe wiser now to try tactic of forbearance.

CANNON

1Repeate for information to Salonika.
2Telegram 1453, Dec. 16, endorsed the “strong representations” made by Cannon to the Greek Government in connection with the Cyprus demonstrations in Athens and Salonika and asked for Cannon’s views whether “further and formal protests” were “necessary or advisable.” (781.00/12-1654)
3Papagos’ statement of Dec. 15 is quoted in despatch 576 from Athens, Dec. 20. (747C.00/12-2054)

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No. 410

Editorial Note

A letter from Prime Minister Papagos to United Nations Secretary-General Hammarskjöld, August 16, requested that an item on self-determination for Cyprus be put on the agenda of the General Assembly. (United Nations Document A/2703) The General Committee of the United Nations General Assembly recommended inclusion of this item on the agenda by a vote of 9 to 3 (including the United Kingdom), with 3 abstentions (including the United States),
September 23. In the General Assembly on the following day, Iraq proposed postponement of a decision on inscription of the Cyprus item for a few days. This motion failed of adoption by a vote of 24 (including the United States) to 24 (including Greece), with 12 abstentions (including Turkey and the United Kingdom). The British Representative (John Selwyn Lloyd) opposed inscription on the ground that it interfered in a matter of British domestic jurisdiction, since the British had sovereignty over Cyprus. (United Nations Document A/PV.477, paragraphs 112–147) The Greek Representative (Stephanopoulos) argued for the right of self-determination in Cyprus. (Ibid., paragraphs 155–180) Selim R. Sarper, Turkish Permanent Representative to the United Nations, stated that the administration of Cyprus was a British domestic affair in which the United Nations was not authorized to intervene, according to Article 2, paragraph 7, of the United Nations Charter. (Ibid., paragraphs 181–190) The General Assembly placed the Cyprus item on its agenda by a vote of 30 (including Greece) to 19 (including Turkey and the United Kingdom), with 11 abstentions (including the United States), September 24.

A Greek draft resolution, which was dated December 13 and placed before Committee I of the General Assembly on the following day, expressed the “wish” that the principle of self-determination be applied to Cyprus. (United Nations Document A/C.1/L.124) New Zealand submitted a draft resolution “not to consider further” the Cyprus question and requested priority in discussion and voting on its proposal in Committee I, December 14. (United Nations Document A/C.1/L.125) Committee I granted priority to the New Zealand draft resolution by a vote of 28 to 15, with 16 abstentions. Its Chairman (Urrutia, Colombia) ruled that a two-thirds majority vote was not required on the motion for priority. (United Nations Document A/C.1/SR.749, paragraph 17)

United States Representative Lodge in Committee I supported the Chairman’s ruling and the New Zealand resolution, which, he said, would not prevent Greece from stating its case, since a decision not to consider the Cyprus question further did not preclude discussion. Lodge stated that “prolonged consideration in this forum would only increase tensions and embitter national feelings at a time when the larger interests of all concerned are best served by strengthening existing solidarity among freedom-loving nations.” (USUN press release 2084, December 14, quoted in part in U.S. Participation in the UN, 1954, page 61) Nutting (United Kingdom), Kyrou (Greece), and Sarper (Turkey) then made statements in Committee I on the Cyprus question. (United Nations Documents A/C.1/SR.749, paragraphs 28–33, and A/C.1/SR.750, paragraphs 1–39 and 40–74) The Soviet Representative (Georgiy N. Zar-
ubin, Soviet Ambassador in the United States) supported the Greek draft resolution in Committee I on December 15. (United Nations Document A/C.1/SR.752, paragraphs 19-23)

In an effort to provide a reasoned basis for the New Zealand draft resolution in Committee I on December 15, El Salvador and Colombia proposed an amendment to add a preamble which read as follows: “Considering that, for the time being, it does not appear appropriate to adopt a resolution on the question of Cyprus.” (United Nations Document A/C.1/L.126) New Zealand accepted this amendment and the preamble was adopted by a separate vote of 44 (including Greece, the United Kingdom, and the United States) to 0, with 16 abstentions (including Turkey) in Committee I. It then adopted the New Zealand draft resolution as amended by a vote of 49 to 0, with 11 abstentions. (United Nations Documents A/C.1/L.125 and L.126) The Greek draft resolution was not voted on.

The United Nations General Assembly adopted the New Zealand draft resolution as amended on December 17 by a vote of 50 (including Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States) to 0, with 8 abstentions. (United Nations Document A/Resolution/292 [Resolution 814 (IX)]; text in United Nations Document A/2890, page 5) Turkish Representative Sarper said that Turkey’s vote for the resolution did not imply recognition of the General Assembly’s competence to consider the Cyprus question. He said in the future no just and equitable settlement of the “so-called question of Cyprus” was possible without Turkish cooperation and consent. (United Nations Document A/PV.514, paragraphs 258-261) British Representative Nutting said that British support for this “procedural resolution” did “not imply acceptance of the Assembly’s right to take up the substantive consideration” of the Cyprus question. (Ibid., paragraphs 270-274) Greek Representative Kyrou stated that the resolution postponed for the time being a decision on a question which remained pending before the United Nations. (Ibid., paragraphs 281-291)
CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS, December 18, 1954—1 p.m.

PRIORITY

Secto 16. In response Greek newspapermen’s requests for comment on Cyprus UN action, Secretary today authorized reply which was handed out routinely through USRO press officer. Expect story to appear Sunday morning Athens papers.

FYI, Greek Foreign Minister had urged Secretary make statement re-affirming solidarity and warmth Greek-American relations and underlining long tradition of friendship between countries. Greek Foreign Minister was shown advance copy proposed text and concurred in language.

Begin verbatim text.

“One of the real pleasures of this North Atlantic Council meeting has been the opportunity to confer again personally with my friend, Mister Stephanopoulos, the Foreign Minister of Greece. I might say that one of the important reasons why we have had so successful a Council meeting was the effective leadership of the Greek Foreign Minister in his role of chairman of the Council of Ministers. My first action on arriving at Paris was to have a private conference with Mister Stephanopoulos. We had a long and friendly discussion of the Cyprus issue which was then under discussion in the Political Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York. Immediately following this discussion, I communicated personally with Washington and with the United States delegation to the United Nations in New York. Late that evening the resolution under consideration in the Political Committee was amended and passed in the amended form by an overwhelming majority. On the basis of the reports which I have had from New York, I believe that the resolution on Cyprus, as amended, meets in substantial degree on the points which the Foreign Minister raised in his discussion with me. I am happy that

1 Repeated to London and Athens and passed to USUN.
2 Regarding Stephanopoulos’ request for a statement by Dulles, see Document 407.
3 A memorandum by Merchant to Dulles, Dec. 21, reads:

“On Sunday [Dec. 19] at noon after Ambassador Hughes’ luncheon [in Paris] I took the opportunity of explaining to Tony Rumbold, Sir Anthony Eden’s private secretary, the circumstances under which you had seen the Greek Foreign Minister, Stefanopoulos, and later agreed to give a statement to Greek journalists. I said that we were not giving out the statement either in Paris or at home and doubted that it would be picked up from the Greek press but that you were naturally anxious that Sir Anthony be aware of the background and circumstances.” (747C.00/12-2154)

4 For a report on this meeting, Dec. 15, see Document 406.
5 For the voting in Committee I (Political Committee) of the U.N. General Assembly on the Cyprus question, Dec. 15, see the editorial note, supra.
this resolution, which reflects the spirit of moderation, found such broad support.

It is a matter of deep regret that the attitude of the United States on the Cyprus matter seems to be to some extent misunderstood in Greece. Such misunderstandings are unfortunately inevitable even as between peoples who have the deepest respect and regard for each other. I am, however, confident that the long tradition of friendship between the Greek and the American peoples will continue unimpaired.

I was particularly pleased to support at the Council meeting the proposal that the next meeting of the North Atlantic Ministers in the spring should be held in Athens.\(^6\)

*End verbatim text.*

\(^6\)A bracketed note on p. 4 of the paper, "Cyprus Background," prepared by Wood, Sept. 21, 1956, reads as follows: "At British insistence meeting was not held in Athens." (Athens Embassy files, lot 66 F 94, "Cyprus 1966, Athens (56) Cyprus (Consolidated)").

No. 412

747C.00/12-2254

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Kitchen)*\(^1\)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] December 23, 1954.

Subject: Call of Greek Ambassador re Cyprus (December 23, 1954, 5:00 p. m.)

Participants: Mr. George V. Melas, Greek Ambassador
Mr. John D. Jernegan, Acting Assistant Secretary, NEA
Mr. Jeffrey C. Kitchen, Deputy Director, GTI

The Ambassador commenced by referring to the Secretary's letters of July 28 to the Greek Foreign Minister\(^2\) and November 16 to Prime Minister Papagos.\(^3\) He said these letters showed that the United States was willing to assist in seeking a mutually acceptable solution for the Cyprus problem.

The Ambassador then became rather emotional and asked why the United States had seen fit to go along with the British as far as UN action on the Cyprus issue was concerned. He recalled the American tradition of freedom and expressed the opinion that our

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\(^1\)Drafted on Dec. 30.

\(^2\)Document 375.

\(^3\)Document 396.
action in this matter was inconsistent with that tradition. He then
adverted to recent conversations with his "Turkish colleague"
which led him to believe that the Turkish Government had not
acted as a free agent in taking a stand against the Greek resolu-
tion but had, in fact, been subjected to great pressure. Ambassador
Melas clearly implied the British Government had put such pres-
sure on the Turks.

Mr. Melas inquired rhetorically what the British wanted out of
this and what they expected the result could be. He had read in
the New York Times that the British were again considering offer-
ing the Cypriots a parliament with an appointed majority. This, of
course, was completely inadequate and unacceptable. In the House
of Commons debate, the Colonial Secretary had said the British po-
sition was strengthened by the UN vote. If the British intended
only to pursue their old course, it would be a great mistake. They
couldn't have everything their way. He stated with great emotional
emphasis that international relations were now governed by a set
of accepted standards and practices embodied in the Atlantic Char-
ter, the UN Charter, the Potomac Charter, and similar basic agree-
ments to conduct international relations on a just and legal basis.
The Greeks, he asserted, could not be treated as "colonials"—they
were neither Zulus nor Sudanese. Although he had received much
of his formal training in Britain and was an admirer of their institu-
tions, he was at a loss as to how they could realistically and
genuinely maintain the position they had assumed in connection
with Cyprus.

Mr. Jernegan stated that our position with regard to Cyprus, and
the reasons why we had pursued the course which had culminated
in our UN vote in favor of deferring consideration for the time
being, had been clearly stated in the Secretary's communications to
the Foreign Minister and Prime Minister. It had also been set forth
in discussions in Washington, and by our representatives at the
UN. There was no need to review the history of the United States
position at this juncture. In answer to the Ambassador's question,
one could presume that the strategic position of the island and the
matter of prestige had played a considerable part in the formulat-
ion of the British position. Regardless of whether prestige was a
rational or logical consideration on which to base a position it, nev-
evertheless, was a real factor which could not be discounted in inter-
national dealings.

The Ambassador interrupted, seizing on the question of prestige,
and said that in the modern world "prestige is not enough" on
which to base a course of action on a matter as important as this.
He was afraid the United States gave way to outward form. The
British could keep a few battalions of fusiliers on the island and
scatter them around the Middle East from time to time to “protect the oil lines” as occasion demanded, but their usefulness was not comparable to the devoted willingness of some 400,000 Greeks on Cyprus to defend that soil as part of their homeland. The Ambassador then suggested the military problems involved should be examined by a team of top military men in order to decide on actual base requirements on the island. There could be no doubt that Greece would make the bases available. Greece was on the allied side. They had no Bevan; sent no goods to Red China. Could they be considered less reliable? The United States apparently considered its arrangements on Crete satisfactory, and the Ambassador regarded the United States Sixth Fleet as more of a factor in area defense than “the island” as such.

Mr. Jernegan said that while much of what the Ambassador had said was logical, yet he believed one could safely assert prestige constituted approximately 90% of the British position.

The Ambassador interjected that, with all due respect, the United States should not be “entangled” with this. The Cypriots had all the prerequisites to be free—and no valid reason for not being free. He referred to the recent regrettable “riots” in Athens and Salonika. To be candid, he was distressed, but not astonished. Greece was a peninsula of eroding rocks whose economy had been resuscitated and was now kept going by United States assistance. Although Greece had been a poor country for 400 years, her one great contribution had been her love of liberty and her defense of freedom. He reiterated that in modern circumstances prestige and the British concern for “position” was insufficient in face of the overwhelming facts and reasonableness of the proposition that Cyprus should be a part of Greece. He begged the United States to consider not only its history, but the negative effect on its influence which would result from its appearing to defend colonialism. A colleague in the Greek Foreign Service, who had recently written to him after a trip to Southeast Asia, expressed great concern because in that area the United States had been successfully labeled by the communists as a defender of the colonial system and a protector of the colonial powers. The implications in connection with United States world leadership were very great indeed and should be weighed carefully by the United States Government.

Mr. Jernegan replied that all factors had been taken into account in determining the United States position. It was not true that on the Cyprus question the United States was simply defending a colonial position. As we had stated in our communications to the Greeks, our overriding concern was that there should not be an open split between our friends and allies in the UN. Such a debate at this juncture could not hope to produce a beneficial result. It
was appropriate for the Greek Government to bring to our attention its concern in relation to future developments. We intend to seek ways for a satisfactory settlement. What we can accomplish is another matter. He urged the Greeks not to draw gloomy conclusions from the speech of the Colonial Secretary. From his experience in Tunisia he was aware that parliamentary speeches were frequently intended primarily for home consumption and contrasted past statements in the French Assembly to recent favorable developments in Tunisia. With a release of pressure, the Colonial Secretary might be more forthcoming. He strongly urged an attempt at rapprochement between the British and Cypriot leaders. The latter should talk with the British even if the initial British proposal is not regarded as good enough. A refusal on the part of the Cypriots even to discuss would be regrettable. The history of other British colonies showed they were not unbending. He differed with the Ambassador in that the United States did not regard it as its responsibility to see to it that all nations lived up to all principles of all charters. It was certainly desirable that they do so, but as a practical matter the United States could not be expected to execute a universal policing responsibility. However, this Government continued to be concerned that a satisfactory solution be worked out between the parties at interest, and we would continue to seek one.

The Ambassador apologized for calling “on Christmas Eve” but said that his Government and he personally were concerned that the United States should continue to be conscious of the need for a reasonable settlement.

*Not further identified.*