UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE UNITED NATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY: THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY; REGULATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS; EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT ARTICLE 43 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER BY PLACING ARMED FORCES AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.  

Department of State Atomic Energy Files  

Memorandum by Mr. R. Gordon Arneson to the Secretary of State  

TOP SECRET  

[WASHINGTON,] December 29, 1949.  


The attached comments on the subject paper have been prepared at the request of Mr. Kennan. These comments are directed primarily to the basic premises and the specific recommendations of the S/P paper. Inasmuch as the S/P paper was sent to you in draft form, I thought you might wish to see the comments that I have felt necessary to make on it.  

There are many points of detail both as to fact and as to interpretation which need to be corrected. I will bring these to the attention of the Policy Planning Staff in due course.  

R. GORDON ARNESON  

1 For previous documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. i, pp. 7 ff. For documentation on United States national security policy, see pp. 126 ff. For documentation on aspects of United States policy with respect to atomic energy other than international control, see pp. 403 ff. For documentation on the “Uniting for Peace” resolution adopted by the General Assembly, see vol. ii, pp. 303 ff. Additional documentation on the attitude of the Soviet Union concerning regulation of armaments and documentation on the Soviet “peace offensive” and the United States response are scheduled for publication in volume iv.  

2 Lot 57D688, a consolidated lot file in the Department of State containing documentation on atomic energy policy, 1944–1962.  

3 Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, James E. Webb, for atomic energy policy.  

4 The draft paper does not accompany the source text and has not been specifically identified. However, the paper, prepared by the Counselor, George F. Kennan, appears in its final form (January 20), on p. 22. Kennan also held the position of Director of the Policy Planning Staff until January 1, 1950.
Memorandum by Mr. R. Gordon Arneson, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 29, 1949.

COMMENTS ON POLICY PLANNING STAFF DRAFT PAPER ON INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY

The following comments are directed to the basic approach and the recommended course of action in the Policy Planning Staff paper.

In my opinion, the S/P paper is based primarily on a fundamentally incorrect assumption; namely, that it is possible to achieve prohibition of atomic weapons and international control of atomic energy that has any meaning, without a basic change in Soviet attitudes and intentions, and, in fact, in the Soviet system itself.

The history of the debates and discussions on international control in and outside the U.N. have revealed that the Soviet Union not only refuses to accept those elements which are necessary for effective control, but, far more important, it refuses to accept any system which would require it to cooperate with the rest of the world in the maintenance of peace. The very idea of a cooperative non-Communist world community is foreign to Marxism, especially as interpreted by the Soviets. It is almost axiomatic that effective international control of atomic energy is inconsistent with the Soviet system and Soviet intentions. So long as this remains true, there can be no solution to the problem of international control until we find a solution to the problem posed to the world by the Soviet Union. Any control system in the field of atomic energy, be it the United Nations plan or some other scheme, must bring about or await a fundamental change in the Soviet system. Otherwise, it would fail to accomplish its purpose, however limited.

The U.N. plan, by putting its emphasis upon effectiveness and security, meets this criterion. This, in itself, is significant. It should be noted here that the U.N. plan was never intended to provide absolute security. What it does offer is a system which would give unmistakable and adequate warning in cases of violations. This is the minimum that we can afford to accept. The suggested solution in the S/P paper does not meet the criterion of opening up the Soviet Union unless the inspection system proposed becomes so thorough that the iron curtain is effectively shattered. In this case, the control established would be more onerous than that of the U.N. plan and equally unacceptable to the Soviet Union.

*Transmitted to Kennan and to Deputy Under Secretary of State Dean Rusk on December 29, 1949, as well as to the Secretary of State.
REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS

It seems to me that before we can move in any other direction than our present one we must get an answer to the question of just what the eventual possession of significant quantities of atomic weapons by both the West and the Soviet Union adds up to. If we can get a reasonably accurate answer to this question we can then tackle the more difficult question of what we can do about it, or, in other words, what we can do about the problem of the Soviet Union. Barring some answer to the second question, we may be effectively stopped from doing anything regarding the first that would make any difference at all.

Therefore, I agree with the point made on page 12 of that if we do not wish to see atomic weapons removed from national armaments in the foreseeable future, barring such a basic change in Soviet attitude as would be implied through acceptance of the U.N. plan, then our existing position on international control is adequate. I would add, however, that this position is also adequate if we do wish to remove these weapons from national armaments. The assumption, also made on page 12 of the S/P paper, that we can have international control and prohibition of atomic weapons, even in the light of the existing Soviet attitude, is, to my mind, completely unfounded.

Until we get an answer to the question of what atomic weapons are really worth, and in the light of this answer, determine what can be done about the Soviet Union we should subject the S/P suggestions to the following criteria:

1. Do they jeopardize U.S. security?

If they do, we would be remiss in our responsibilities in putting them forward. While there may be some doubts expressed regarding the attitude of the military and the Congress regarding supporting the U.N. plan if the Soviets were to accept it, on balance, the chances of acceptance are good. That cannot be said for any alternate scheme yet advanced, including the S/P suggestions. (Mr. Osborn has testified in the past before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and that body had a man on Mr. Osborn's staff during the writing of the Second and Third Reports. This Committee indicated its approval of the work being done.)

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* See Kennan memorandum of January 20, p. 22.
2. Is there any prospect of Soviet acceptance which would involve more than a paper agreement?

If we were to suggest the idea of a moratorium on atomic energy, there is no reason to believe that the necessary safeguards would be any more acceptable to the Soviet Union than those in the U.N. plan. Neither is there any reason to believe that the Soviet Union would accept the suppression of atomic energy. Such a proposal could also lend substance to a very damaging charge, already being made, that the U.S. is trying to deny the use of atomic energy to nations deficient in power.

3. Is the procedure and solution acceptable to our closest friends, particularly the United Kingdom, Canada and France?

As the S/P paper points out, an apparent by-passing of these countries and the U.N. could be disastrous, and doubly so, should there be another such “leak” as occurred in the Smith–Molotov conversations. If we avoid these dangers and do make an approach, it should be on a much broader base than that of atomic energy. The approach should be on the general problem of the Soviet Union, and, specifically, it should not, as the S/P paper suggests, exclude the problem of conventional armaments. Although the solutions to the problem of atomic energy control and the problem of the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments are necessarily separate and different, the implementation of both systems must be coordinated. There must be some redressing of the existing imbalance between the Soviet armed forces and those of the rest of the world. The U.S. position on this point has never, to my knowledge, been thought through.

I do not believe that the suggested procedure contained in Part VII (pages 57–67) and the suggested possibilities in paragraph 6, pages 62–64 in the S/P paper meet these criteria at all adequately.

I do not believe that, much as we desire to have atomic weapons really prohibited, the U.S. should unilaterally renounce this weapon. It is difficult to see what possible effect this renunciation might have on the Soviet Union, other than being interpreted as a revelation of weakness with all its implications. Its effect on Western Europe might well be disastrous. The same considerations apply to the super-bomb, although a clear distinction must be drawn between possession and

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*See Part VIII of the Kennan memorandum of January 20, p. 40.*
use of either atomic or super-bombs. This distinction is not always made in the S/P paper.

Taking up seriatim the various possibilities for sounding out the Soviets as listed under paragraph (6), pages 62-64 of the S/P paper, I have the following comments:

"(a) A plan which would be temporary, and in the nature of a technical and political modus vivendi, rather than permanent."

There is no apparent virtue in a temporary arrangement per se. Short of an arrangement embodying the principal features of the U.N. plan, I cannot envisage any temporary scheme that would meet the criteria listed above. We could, of course, accept a temporary truce along the lines of the Romulo and Quaker proposals, which would freeze U.S. supremacy for the duration of the armistice. The Soviets would hardly accept this idea.

"(b) complete prohibition of atomic weapons of every sort."

This has been our goal in international control negotiations from the beginning. It is provided for in the U.N. plan. The Soviet Union states that this is its goal also. It is fair to say that the entire U.N. debate has hinged on this point. If we bear in mind that to all intents and purposes nuclear fuel is atomic weapons, it becomes obvious that complete prohibition of atomic weapons is inconsistent with national possession of nuclear fuel. It is this fact that the Soviet Union chooses to ignore. Control and prohibition are two sides of the same coin, or, as Sir Alexander Cadogan stated in this last General Assembly, effective control is prohibition. To talk of prohibition as distinct from control is technically meaningless.

"(c) the abandonment of large reactors for this period."

This idea is not new. It is provided for in the U.N. plan which limits the production of nuclear fuel to the quantity consistent with known beneficial uses, including research and development. For example, if

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11 For documentation on United States policy regarding the employment of nuclear weapons and on the question of developing the hydrogen bomb, see pp. 495 ff.

12 For the proposal by Carlos P. Romulo of the Philippines, President of the Fourth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, see Romulo's letter to Warren R. Austin, U.S. Representative at the United Nations, November 3, 1949, in Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. 1, p. 207. Regarding the "quaker proposal," see The United States and the Soviet Union: Some Quaker Proposals for Peace, a report prepared for the American Friends Service Committee (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), which included the following among its specific recommendations: "As an interim step we suggest that the present stockpiles of atomic bombs in the United States and in the Soviet Union be put under United Nations seal for a specified time, and that the concentration of fissionable material be halted and verified—pending the conclusion of the conventions mentioned above [which provided for comprehensive international control of armaments, the destruction of stockpiles of atomic bombs, and the outlawing of nuclear weapons]."

13 Permanent British Representative at the United Nations.
that plan were accepted now, Hanford 14 would be shut down. At one time the Soviet Union did not oppose this provision and, in fact, expressed considerable interest in its corollary, the idea of national quotas for peaceful uses. Now that it is presumably no longer a have-not nation, Vishinsky,15 in the last General Assembly stated:

"The requirements of the Soviet Union of atomic energy for peaceful purposes are tremendous, and the attainments of the Soviet Union in the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful ends are also tremendous. All this must be borne in mind when mention is made of quotas and rationing. . . ." At the same time, however, we insist that no one must prevent us from utilizing atomic energy to the maximum extent for peaceful purposes. . . ." He also stated that the U.N. plan was designed to make impossible the development of atomic energy for peaceful ends. It seems clear that the Soviet Union would accept no restriction on its development of atomic energy, i.e., manufacture of nuclear fuel with all its implications.

"(d) disposition of stocks of dangerous materials in such a way as to give reasonable assurance against any one-sided advantage by seizure."16

This, too, is not new, being an integral part of the U.N. plan. The Soviet Union has not expressed disapproval of this feature and is not expected to, so long as it is U.S. stocks that are to be redistributed. I fail to see how we can seriously put this forward except as part of the U.N. plan. In the context of the proposed temporary *modus vivendi*, it can only mean an almost immediate equalization of U.S. and Soviet atomic capabilities, with little to show in return.

"(e) non-dangerous activities to be left in national hands, but only on the condition of complete 'openness' of research and development activity."

This is provided in the U.N. plan, subject to such licensing and inspection as are deemed necessary by the nature of the research and development, and the quantities of nuclear fuel used or produced. The Soviet Union objects to this, as, in fact, they do to any requirement for real "openness"?

"(f) No international authority and no veto provisions."

This is somewhat obscure. If it means no international body, it is inconsistent with subsequent provisions for U.N. custody and supervision over large reactors, nuclear fuel and raw material sources, an inspection system, periodic observation of non-dangerous activities, etc. These activities must be carried on by some, presumably a U.N., organ. If what is intended is the denial of positive managerial, research, and development functions on the part of the international agency, it should be emphasized that such functions make control easier; would attract more competent personnel, and could mean the difference between success and failure. It might be noted that even the Soviet proposals take this factor into account and provide for research by the international agency in its own laboratories.

15 Andrei Y. Vishinsky, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union; Chairman of the Soviet Delegation to the Fourth Session of the General Assembly.
16 Omissions indicated in the source text.
I interpret the "no veto provisions" to mean that the United States modify or drop the provisions in the U.N. plan on the subject of the veto. As the S/P paper points out, this subject has not been recently debated in the United Nations. The real debate has been on effectiveness of control, which would make prohibition itself effective. I would emphasize, however, that under the U.N. plan, with international operational personnel in the large plants, the veto loses its importance because evasions, violations and seizures cannot be hidden. In such circumstances, the real question is whether the law-abiding nations, under Article 51 or some other arrangement, will take the necessary corrective measures in case of violation. Under any plan which denies the continuous physical presence of operating international personnel, the veto, which can be used to delay or to deny access, becomes very important.

"(g) Stages so arranged that termination of activity in large reactors, establishment of formal U.N. custody of large reactors and stocks of nuclear fuels, establishment of U.N. supervision over raw material sources and prohibition of the weapon, would all take place simultaneously."

Now that more than one country has something physical to give up, the problem of stages may be easier to tackle than in the past. The time and conditions under which reactors and nuclear fuel, for example, are to be given up, would be the same for all nations and none would appear to be placed in an advantageous or disadvantageous position. However, in establishing any control system, there are a certain irreducible number of steps, such as signing the treaty, establishing some international organ, recruiting, training and physically locating personnel, declaring all materials and facilities, and, finally, turning them over to the control of the international body in accordance with the terms of the treaty and as that body acquires the necessary competence to perform its duties.

I do not see how it would be physically possible to bring into being simultaneously the various points in paragraph (g) above. Moreover, the establishment of supervision over raw material sources is not a one-shot affair, but a continuous operation. I would like to point out, also, that the point on the prohibition of the weapon is technically meaningless, because the turning over of large reactors and stocks of nuclear fuel to U.N. custody would remove the essential ingredient of atomic weapons from nations and would be prohibition in fact as well as in name.

"(h) an inspection system involving:

1. a complete showdown on existing operations including full accounting and verification of raw materials utilized to date, existing reserve and pipe line stocks, nuclear fuels produced, etc.;
2. adequate U.N. observation over all known and declared raw material sources and facilities for investigation, and if necessary, observation over all alleged ones;
3. U.N. supervision of large reactors during deactivation or dismantling stage, followed by periodic observation over sites of such reactors;
4. complete openness of laboratories for serious scientific visitors on an international scale; and
5. periodic observation of non-dangerous activities."
Point (1) above is contemplated under any system of control so far advanced and needs no further comment. Point (2) does not go far enough in that it makes no provision for locating either unknown or undeclared raw materials sources. The provision in Point (3) for periodic observation over sites of dismantled or deactivated reactors is either unnecessary if the reactors are completely removed, or insufficient if the reactors can in fact be reactivated without much difficulty. Point (4) is provided for in the U.N. plan. Its requirement for complete openness of national laboratories is not acceptable to the Soviet Union. Point (5) may or may not be adequate, depending on the nature of the so-called non-dangerous activity. In certain reactors, which need not be very large, it is possible to conduct certain activities surreptitiously which are not readily detectable and could be dangerous. This is particularly true if the super-bomb becomes a real possibility.

It would be my recommendation that the United States make a complete assessment of the role of atomic weapons in the cold war and in a possible hot war. We should, at the same time, reexamine all possibilities of bringing the Soviet Union into the community of nations. If any useful course of action is indicated by the above studies, we could then make an approach to the Soviet Union on the broader basis, into which international control would fit.

Pending the results of such studies we should use the existing forum of the permanent members of the UNAEC as the point of contact with the Soviet Union. In the closed, informal sessions of that body we can, without undue risk, put forward desirable or appropriate explanations, suggestions, or even modifications on such matters as the veto and stages. This forum also provides a point of contact for the necessary consultations with our allies and for detecting or exploiting any changes in the Soviet attitude.

Policy Planning Staff Files ¹

Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk) to the Counselor (Kennan)

TOP SECRET ¹

[WASHINGTON,] January 6, 1950.

Subject: Draft Paper on International Control of Atomic Energy ²

Following are my comments on the attached atomic energy paper. I apologize for the broad degree of concurrence because I believe that you need specific criticism rather than specific concurrence at this juncture.

¹ Lot 64D563, files of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, 1947-1953.
² The draft paper does not accompany the source text and has not been specifically identified. However, the paper in its final form (January 20) appears on p. 22.
1. I agree that our present plan for the international control of atomic energy will never produce such control. I believe this because neither the Russians nor we would accept this plan. Our formal position of support and acceptance, realistically considered, is a colossal political gamble on our part.

2. One of the difficulties about the development of policy on atomic energy control is that it has fallen into the hands of experts who pretend to be talking technique when in fact they are talking politics. I have not been able to find a technical explanation of why the safeguards and controls of the present majority plan have to be what they are. When questioned, the technical people immediately wander off into politics.

3. I agree that the forum for further discussions of atomic energy control must somehow be changed and am inclined to agree that it needs treatment at a more senior governmental level. I see very serious objections to new bilateral discussions between ourselves and Russia on atomic energy control, unless such discussions resulted from consultation with and agreement by the United Kingdom, France and Canada. Otherwise, U.S.-Soviet discussions would have a most serious and demoralizing effect upon our common front. I doubt that these other countries would permit us to represent them in any way. The question may boil down, therefore, to whether we should have five or six of the Foreign Ministers discuss the question further.

4. Since our present plan has no prospect of producing international control, our present choice is between (1) no control and competition at whatever pace we can stand and (2) some other arrangement differing in important respects from our present plan. Therefore, I am inclined to urge most careful exploration of every possible modus vivendi which might give us time to go into the matter more fully.

5. I agree that the fundamental question for us is that posed at the bottom of page 21.\(^8\) I have a view on it but I do not believe that my view is relevant to the procedure by which we get a governmental decision on the question.

6. I agree that we should have an NSC clarification on the use of atomic weapons. An over-all strategic study which is now before the NSC staff may provide a vehicle for obtaining such clarification.

7. I think the "healthy instinct" of the public will probably agree that the risks of an imperfect system of international control will be smaller than the risks of no agreement at all—but I believe we should look at this one with extreme care since it is the kind of proposition on which we could easily go wrong.

\(^8\)Reference is presumably to that portion of Kennan’s argument contained in the second paragraph of Part III of the memorandum of January 20, p. 29.
8. In connection with page 38,\textsuperscript{4} it seems to me that the relation between the atom bomb and the cold war might be developed in somewhat more detail, particularly on the impact of the Russian possession of atomic weapons on the psychology of Europe.

9. By and large, I would agree with the main lines of the conclusions. These may require working out in more detail in order to see just what they need before they are accepted as a policy matter.

10. Lastly, I specifically agree with each of the "things to avoid" with which the paper concludes.

\textsuperscript{4}Reference is to Part IV of the memorandum of January 20. See bracketed note, p. 31.

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\textit{Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)}\textsuperscript{1}

\textbf{TOP SECRET} [WASHINGTON,] January 11, 1950.

\textbf{COMMENTS ON POLICY PLANNING STAFF DRAFT PAPER ON INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY }\textsuperscript{2}

1. The paper seems to me to be permeated with the assumption that the use of the atomic bomb is morally wrong; that because the atomic bomb has terrible destructive powers it is different ethically from other weapons that kill and maim, but on a smaller scale; and that the atomic bomb should be prohibited by international agreement wholly without reference to other weapons. Such an agreement would apparently rest in considerable part on the good faith of the USSR, whose record in matters of good faith is "well known". It seems to me that the better assumption would be that the only way to prevent the use of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is to prevent the outbreak of war between countries possessing such weapons.

2. The paper comes close to accepting the Soviet contention that the United Nations Plan of Prohibition and Control was not put forward in good faith. For example, the paper comments (page 12):

"It is a good position to rest on if, and as long as, international control and a prohibition of the weapon are not desired, and if it is felt that the United States must nevertheless continue to hold out for some plan for international control."\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{1}On January 24, Hickerson transmitted a copy of this memorandum to the Executive Secretariat of the Department for the attention of the Secretary of State in the event that he had not already seen it.

\textsuperscript{2}The draft paper does not accompany the source text and has not been specifically identified. For the final version, January 20, see p. 22.

\textsuperscript{3}This quotation does not appear in the text of the memorandum of January 20.
The Soviets have repeatedly charged that the United States does not wish to prohibit the use of atomic bombs. This is, of course, untrue, and the United Nations Plan clearly provides for their abolition with the establishment of an effective control system. Incidentally, Mr. Vyshinsky, during the atomic energy debate in the last General Assembly meeting made in the same speech the following charges that seem to answer one another:

a. That the "American plan" was put forward in bad faith in the firm conviction that the USSR would not accept it.

b. That the "American plan" was a diabolical Wall Street plot to obtain control of the atomic energy resources of the USSR and the rest of the world.

3. The paper damns with faint praise the United Nations Plan. Dr. Conant 4 said, in effect, during the drafting of the Plan:

"Our objective must be to produce a control plan that is not only fool proof, but as nearly as possible rascal proof."

I think the authors of the Plan succeeded in this. Internationally, the Plan is highly regarded. At Paris in 1948, 40 United Nations countries approved it. In New York last November, 49 countries voted for the Canadian-French resolution reaffirming its essential principles. The USSR and the USSR alone stands in the way of its acceptance. Isn’t this another instance, like so many others, where everyone is out of step except the USSR? Isn’t the next move up to the USSR? Why must we take the initiative in advancing new proposals all the time? The Squires and Daniels "suppression formula", which is of course the backbone of the paper’s main proposal, was published in 1947.5

The Soviet Government, therefore knows all about it, and yet the Soviet Government has made no new proposals since June, 1947; proposals which are wholly inadequate and unacceptable.

4. I assume that we can maintain a wide superiority in atomic weapons over the Soviet Union, probably for an indefinite period of time. It seems to me that we need military advice from the Joint Chiefs

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4 Dr. James B. Conant, President of Harvard University; member of the Secretary of State’s Committee which drafted the U.S. proposal for the international control of atomic energy in 1946; member of the General Advisory Committee of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission since 1947.

of Staff on the question of what the eventual possession of considerable quantities of atomic weapons by the Soviet Union will mean to us in terms of military position and strategy.

5. I have assumed all along that if the Russians accepted the U.N. Plan, before it was actually implemented, the Western Powers would insist on substantial reductions in the Soviet land army and offensive weapons. This is, of course, primarily a military question, but to me it makes absolutely no sense for the U.S. to give up what General Bradley * calls our chief offensive weapon without a fully compensatory reduction in the offensive striking power of the Soviet Union. The same situation, of course, applies in my view, to the temporary plan, based on the suppression formula, put forward in the Planning Staff paper; that is, we should agree to this only if the Soviet Union makes compensatory reductions in its offensive striking power.

6. The Soviet Union has, of course, known about the Squires and Daniels suppression formula since it was first published in 1947. As far as I am aware, they have never commented directly on it, but they have frequently charged that the ruling circles in America wish to obtain full control of all the atomic resources in the world in order to deny the benefits to workers of countries which have inadequate supplies of coal and oil. I seriously doubt whether the Soviet Union would accept these proposals. If we ever decide to make such proposals, we must be careful to see that they are presented in such a way that we do not give the Soviet Union an enormous propaganda weapon.

7. It seems to me that the inspection provisions for the temporary proposals described in the Planning Staff paper are in some particulars inadequate. In any event, I do not believe that the Soviet Union would find these inspection proposals, which are absolutely indispensable to any suspension scheme, any more palatable than they find the inspection proposals of the United Nations Plan.

8. I am in full accord with the sections of the paper which stress the importance of keeping the United Kingdom, Canada and France fully informed of what we are doing.

9. To recapitulate, I recommend that we stand on our present position until we get the military information referred to in paragraph 4 of this memorandum, after which we should re-examine our policy in the general security field.

JOHN D. HICKERSON

*Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 17, 1950.

Subject: Counselor’s Paper on International Control of Atomic Energy

Though agreeing with much of this paper, there are a number of important points where I would place a different weight on the various considerations.

As I see it, there are two important new facts dealt with in this paper and five interrelated problems on which these facts have a bearing. The two new facts are (a) the demonstrated Soviet fission bomb capability, and (b) the possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviets and of ourselves.

The five problems on which these facts have a bearing are:

(a) whether the United States should accelerate its program to determine the feasibility or non-feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon;

(b) whether our strategic plans and our related objectives and programs should be revised in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union or for other reasons;

(c) whether the present policy of the Defense Establishment with respect to the conditions under which atomic bombs would be used in the event of war should be revised;

(d) whether our present position with respect to the international control of atomic energy should be revised; and

(e) whether our public relations stance with respect to atomic energy should be revised.

With respect to these problems and the order in which it is suggested they be taken up, the following considerations appear to be pertinent:

(a) There are considerations which make it advisable to accelerate the program to determine the feasibility or non-feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon while deferring a determination as to whether to manufacture the weapon for stockpile, if it should prove feasible. Even though there may be some tendency to manufacture for stockpile if the investment has been made in testing feasibility, the major portion of the investment would be useable either for fission or thermonuclear weapons. It must be assumed that the U.S.S.R. is proceeding with a program in this field, and it would seem that the military and political advantages which would accrue to the U.S.S.R. if it possessed
even a temporary monopoly of this weapon are so great as to make
time of the essence. The possibility that an incorrect decision as to
stockpiling or use might at sometime in the future be made does not
appear to warrant a further delay in initiating an accelerated program
to test feasibility. On this subject, it is recommended that a paper
along the lines of Arneson’s draft 1 be submitted to the National
Security Council working group.

Problems (b) and (c) are closely interrelated. There are important
general policy considerations in favor of a use policy based solely on
retaliation in the event of prior use by an enemy. These include the
deep abhorrence of many of the people of the United States to the
use of weapons of mass destruction, the improvement in our public
stance toward atomic energy throughout the world if we are able to
adopt such a policy, and the greater possibility of achieving our politi-
cal objectives during and at the conclusion of a war if it is possible
to avoid the use of weapons of mass destruction during such a war.
Added to these are the strategic considerations flowing from the ex-
pected growth in the U.S.S.R.’s atomic bomb capabilities. Certain of
the military experts have estimated that within five to ten years our
present net strategic advantage in atomic weapons may be neutralized.
This equation would be materially affected by the U.S.S.R. de-
velopment of a thermonuclear weapon inasmuch as we seem to be more
vulnerable to the use of such a weapon than is the Soviet Union.

A final determination as to use policy can only be arrived at after
much fuller joint study with the Defense Establishment than has as
yet been possible. Such a study could take place under the aegis of
the National Security Council in connection with the currently
scheduled review of U.S. objectives, commitments and risks, or as the
result of a special directive to the National Security Council as sug-
gested in Arneson’s draft paper on the thermonuclear program. The
political, psychological and moral imponderables bearing on this prob-
lem as they affect our strategic plans and our related objectives and
programs would seem to fall in whole or in part within the com-
petence of the State Department.

It is recommended that the State Department representatives go
into such a study with a preliminary presumption in favor of such a
revision of our strategic plans as would permit of a use policy re-
stricted to retaliation against prior use by an enemy.

The two most difficult points to meet will be (1) what do we sub-
stitute for the present presumed deterrent effect of our atomic bomb

1Reference is presumably to a preliminary draft of Arneson’s working paper
of January 24, 1950, concerning the development of thermonuclear weapons.
Regarding that document, see footnote 1, p. 518.
policy to Soviet military aggression, and (2) in the event of Soviet military aggression, what do we substitute for our present net atomic strategic advantage.

As to (1), the following points should be taken into consideration. On the one hand, the deterrent effect of an atomic bomb capability and a willingness to use it is not necessarily eliminated by an opposing atomic bomb capability. On the other hand, the present use policy of the Defense Establishment may impede the establishment of those conditions under which a more general relaxation of tension between the U.S.S.R. and ourselves might be possible.

It is also possible that a use policy, based solely on retaliation, would not wholly eliminate the deterrent effect to Soviet military aggression of our atomic capability. They would never be quite certain that we would in fact stick to such a policy if the nature of their aggression too deeply upset the moral sense and vital interests of the people of the United States and of the world in general. This problem of the war deterrent effect of various formulations of atomic policy is one where the primary responsibility is that of the State Department. It is recommended that a more intensive study of this problem be undertaken within the State Department as part of the backstopping of our representatives in the National Security Council study.

The second problem, as to what we substitute in the event of war for our present net atomic advantage, is the most difficult problem to face up to. If it is correct that this net advantage is a declining asset in any case, this is a problem which must eventually be faced, irrespective of a decision on use policy. Certain of the problems involved are primarily of a military character, but it is recommended that the State Department require a full justification from the military as to its position. The questions are of so broad a nature that they would appear to rise above mere technical considerations to a level where it should be possible to make them clear to non-technical minds. Insofar as no strictly military substitutes are practicable, the problem becomes one of prime responsibility to the State Department.

It is recommended that no final decision on use policy be taken until the suggested review of strategic plans under (b) has been completed.

(d) As recommended in the Counselor’s paper, a final decision as to a revision of our position with respect to international control of atomic energy should not be made until the National Security Council study is completed and a decision made on use policy. It does not appear clear to me, however, that if the decision is made to adopt a policy of holding atomic weapons only for retaliatory purposes that the recommendations of the Counselor’s paper as to international con-
trol necessarily follow. It would appear to me that three sets of considerations would still have to be carefully weighed.

The first one is whether a control scheme such as it envisages actually gives greater assurance against the possible use of atomic weapons than the retention by the United States of an adequate retaliatory capability. In part, this requires a judgment as to the adequacy of the inspection facilities which it would provide. If inspection cannot be judged to be adequate, a scheme of this kind may give rise to continuing uncertainties and frictions which could be as disturbing to the world’s sense of security as the continued holding of atomic weapons by both sides. Furthermore, the analysis of the Counselor’s paper indicates that it is improbable that the U.S.S.R. would itself initiate the use of weapons of mass destruction. If this improbability is backed up by an adequate power of retaliation on our side, it would appear that if we adopt a use policy limited to retaliation that the chances that atomic weapons would be used against us would be small. It would appear sensible that we go into an international control scheme only if the effect thereof is clearly to improve the chances that atomic weapons will not be used against us or our allies.

The second set of considerations go to the point of whether the suggested scheme is negotiable. Even though some of the U.S.S.R. objections to the U.N. proposal have been eliminated, it is difficult to conceive of the U.S.S.R. being willing to abandon even on an interim basis its position as to peacetime uses. There is also a real question as to whether the U.K. and the Canadians would go along with the suggested scheme.

The third set of considerations go to the point of whether a successful negotiation on international control of atomic energy is practicable for us, for our allies, and for the U.S.S.R. except in the context of a broader program for the relaxation of tensions between the East and West. This leads to the question of whether further progress toward working out German and Japanese peace settlements, a mutual withdrawal of troops from the center of Europe, and a program for the limitation of conventional armaments must not be made before we can realistically expect a satisfactory agreement on atomic energy.

(e) Our present public stance toward atomic energy is undoubtedly confusing and may be detrimental to us in the light of General Bradley’s testimony that the atomic bomb would be “our principal initial weapon in any war”. This should certainly be clarified. For our public stance to be soundly based, however, it is necessary for us first to decide on our positions with respect to (a), (b), (c) and (d) above. Certainly if a modification is made in our use policy our public stance could be greatly improved, even though it should be decided that our position with respect to international control can only be modified in the event of a better and more effective plan being proposed or as
part of a more general relaxation of tensions. If it were decided that the present use policy of the Defense Establishment cannot be revised, in the absence of convincing evidence of a change in U.S.S.R. attitudes such as would be implied by an acceptance by them of approximately the present U.N. proposals for international control of atomic energy, the reasons therefor could be clarified and our public stance made less confusing.

IO Files: US/AEC/50

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles H. Russell, Adviser, United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET

[NY,] January 17, 1950.


Participants: General McNaughton, Mr. Arnold Smith, Major Pierce-Goulding, Canadian Delegation, Dr. Wei, Chinese Delegation, M. Chauvel, Baron de la Tournelle, French Delegation, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Mr. Laskey, United Kingdom Delegation, Mr. Ross, Mr. Osborn, Mr. Russell, United States Mission

1Master Files of the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State.

2On November 4, 1948, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 191(III), which approved the plan developed by the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, stating that it constituted "the necessary basis for establishing an effective system of international control of atomic energy." The resolution also requested the six sponsors of General Assembly Resolution 1(1) of January 24, 1946, establishing the U.N.A.E.C. (United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, France, China, and Canada), to consult in order to determine if, in view of their prevailing lack of unanimity (the Soviet Union was unable to accept the United Nations plan), there existed a basis for agreement on international control. For the text of Resolution 191(III), see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. 1, Part 1, p. 495. For documentation on the meetings of the six sponsors during 1949, see ibid., 1949, vol. 1, pp. 419 ff.

3General A. G. L. McNaughton, Canadian Representative to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission.

4Principal Adviser, Permanent Canadian Delegation to the United Nations.


6Dr. Hsi-ch'ien Wei, Alternate Chinese Representative to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission.

7Jean Chauvel, Permanent French Representative at the United Nations; Representative to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission.

8Baron de la Tournelle, Alternate French Representative at the United Nations; Alternate Representative to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission and to the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

9D. S. Laskey, Adviser, Permanent British Delegation to the United Nations.

10John C. Ross, Deputy United States Representative to the Security Council; Acting Deputy Representative to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission from January 31, 1950.
A short meeting was held at the United States Mission this morning, at the request of Dr. Wei who is to preside at the meeting on January 19.

It was agreed that representatives of the five delegations would attend the meeting. It would remain to be seen whether the Soviet delegation withdrew from the meeting.\footnote{At the 461st Meeting of the Security Council, January 13, the Soviet Representative, Yakov A. Malik, withdrew from the Council chamber after stating that the Soviet Union would not participate in the work of the Council until the Representative of the National Government of China was excluded and that the Soviet Union would not deem itself bound by decisions taken by the Council with the participation of the Chinese Representative. For documentation on the Soviet walkout of the Security Council and the question of Chinese representation, see \textit{vol. ii}, pp. 186 ff.} Mr. Osborn said that Mr. Hickerson would come from Washington for the meeting but would not be prepared to make the statements which had previously been discussed (US/AEC/47).\footnote{A memorandum of conversation by Russell, December 16, 1949; for text, see \textit{Foreign Relations}, 1949, vol. i, p. 246. In that conversation, Osborn indicated to McNaughton, Wei, Chauvel, and Cadogan that the United States intended to make a statement in a meeting of the six sponsors commenting on the meaning of certain aspects of the United Nations plan for international control.}

Mr. Smith said that the question of Chinese representation was not who was the representative of China, but who was the member of the Security Council. General McNaughton agreed, and said that the Six Power Consultations were not a proper place to carry on a discussion of credentials. He regarded everyone present as being there in consequence of membership in the Security Council, and, in the case of Canada, in the UNAEC.

It was also agreed that in the event that the Soviet Delegation remained at the meeting the time could usefully be employed by directing questions to the Soviet Delegation. Mr. Osborn said that the United States representative would be prepared to ask questions based upon Mr. Vyshinsky's remarks on inspection and quotas.

General McNaughton said that the Canadian government had not completed its study of General Romulo's proposals and the other proposals made in the Fourth General Assembly and that he was therefore not yet prepared to discuss them. M. Chauvel and Mr. Osborn said that this applied also to them.

There followed a general discussion of the steps to be taken in the event that the Soviet representative withdraw from the meeting. It was agreed that M. Chauvel, who will be chairman of the 15th meeting, would draft and circulate to-day or to-morrow to the five delegations a proposed letter to the Secretary-General, which could also serve as the communiqué, and which would take into account the suggestions
of Mr. Ross and others as to its contents. The draft would confirm the view that representation rested upon membership in the Security Council, would point out that the conversations could not usefully continue in the absence of the Soviet representative and would request the Secretary-General to inform the members of the United Nations that in the absence of the Soviet representative, the other Sponsoring Powers would be unable to implement the resolution of the General Assembly of November 23, 1949.

C. H. RUSSELL

IO Files: US/S/C.3/29

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles H. Russell, Adviser, United States Mission at the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL

[new york,] January 19, 1950.

Subject: Conventional Armaments

Participants: Baron de la Tournelle, General Penette,¹ French Delegation

Mr. Cole,² United Kingdom Delegation

Mr. Nash,³ Mr. Russell, United States Mission

At Mr. Nash's suggestion, a meeting was held at the French Delegation yesterday afternoon to consider the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments in view of the action taken by the Security Council on January 17, 1950 in transmitting to the C.C.A. the General Assembly Resolution of 5 December 1949, calling upon the C.C.A. to proceed with its plan of work.⁴

¹ Général de Brigade M. Penette, French Army Representative to the Military Staff Committee from January 28, 1950.
³ Frank C. Nash, Deputy United States Representative to the Commission for Conventional Armaments.
⁴ In Resolution 300(IV), December 5, 1949, adopted by a vote of 44 to 5 with 5 abstentions, the General Assembly recommended that the Security Council continue to study the regulation and reduction of armaments through the agency of the Commission for Conventional Armaments in accordance with its plan of work. For the text of Resolution 300(IV), see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. 1, p. 242.

At its 462d Meeting, January 17, 1950, the Security Council approved a French proposal that the Resolution be transmitted to the Commission for Conventional Armaments. The vote on the proposal was nine in favor, with Yugoslavia not voting and the Soviet Union absent.

Mr. Nash said that he presumed that when the Commission resumed its work, item 3 of the plan of work would be taken up. He referred to memoranda and letters on safeguards which had been prepared in 1947 and 1948, particularly a memorandum of the French Delegation of September 22, 1947. He thought that it would be desirable for any delegation to submit papers on safeguards which wished to do so. The Commission ought to be able to complete its work on safeguards before the meeting of the G.A. next autumn. Due to the inactivity of the Atomic Energy Commission, more attention would, perhaps, be paid to conventional armaments this year. He felt that conventional armaments must be regarded as part of an overall effort, together with atomic energy and Article 43 forces; they were parallel efforts which eventually would have to be integrated in an overall plan for collective security.

Mr. Cole said that the Foreign Office in a telegram of last August had approved of an examination of safeguards. He agreed that the Commission should resume its work on item 3. His delegation was not particularly anxious to have a meeting of the Commission arranged for the immediate future. He was not sure that the Foreign Office was ready for a discussion of item 4; he did not think that the C.C.A. could carry its work to a point comparable to that reached by the Atomic Energy Commission, as this raised the question of quotas, i.e. the proportions by which armaments would be reduced.

Mr. Nash agreed that it would be necessary to see what the situation was when the time to discuss item 4 arrived. In view of the U.S.S.R. opposition, there was obviously nothing to be done with the census and verification proposals at this time, but the work which had been done in 1949 would nevertheless be valuable in the consideration of safeguards.

Baron de la Tournelle said that in taking up the question of safeguards, he would like to pursue the views of the U.S.S.R. on the question of “control,” i.e., inspection and verification. He thought it would be useful to put the hypothetical inquiry to the Russians whether, in connection with their one-third disarmament proposals,²

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² During the Third Session of the General Assembly, Paris, 1948, the Soviet Union introduced a resolution proposing the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of the armaments and armed forces of the permanent members of the Security Council by one-third. For the text of the Soviet resolution (September 25, 1948), see ibid., p. 431.
they would be willing to have 1) a preliminary submission of information concerning armaments and armed forces, which would be subject to adequate verification, and 2) a continuous "control" after the plan went into effect to insure compliance therewith.

Mr. Nash agreed that if the U.S.S.R. reintroduced their one-third proposals, or renewed the discussion of them, a line of inquiry such as that proposed by Baron de la Tournelle might prove interesting and useful. He said that the Russians had never been called upon to explain their proposals in any detail, and thought that, given the opportunity, it would be well to do so provided the discussion could be kept within the area of item 3 of the C.C.A. plan of work, i.e. safeguards. He said that the Russians would likely insist that the C.C.A. get into immediate discussion of item 4, i.e. actual plans of disarmament, arguing that to consider safeguards first would be "putting the cart before the horse." Such an attempt should be resisted firmly with the argument that under existing circumstances of the world situation, there is little use in considering a plan of disarmament until it has first been determined whether it is feasible to develop real protection, i.e. adequate safeguards to insure effective compliance with any plan.

General Penette said that he could see no major obstacle to the discussion of item 3 in the Commission. It would be impossible to consider item 4 now. Before item 4 was taken up it would be necessary to know the views of the French Government, including those of the General Staff, which would want to examine the situation in the light of atomic energy and the question of Article 43 forces. Mr. Nash and Mr. Cole agreed. General Penette also agreed with Baron de la Tournelle that it would be interesting to know more about the Soviet views on "control" as suggested by the latter.

There followed a discussion of the most suitable time for the next meeting. Baron de la Tournelle thought that it would be best to wait for about six weeks by which time there might be a change in the situation relating to membership and credentials in the Security Council. China would be chairman of the Commission in February and he thought that it would be preferable to wait. It was agreed that there was no necessity for calling a meeting in the immediate future and that in the meantime the delegations represented at the meeting would continue their study of safeguards and exchange further views. The desirability of requesting the Norwegian Delegation to participate in these discussions was mentioned and appeared to meet with general agreement.
Memorandum by the Counselor (Kennan)\textsuperscript{1}

[Extracts]

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 20, 1950.

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY

The Policy Planning Staff has been asked to re-examine the present position of the United States with respect to the international control of atomic energy, and to assess the adequacy of this position in the light of present circumstances, particularly the demonstrated Soviet atomic capability. The following paper is intended to contribute to this re-examination.

[Here follows Part I, 11 pages, in which Kennan examines the existing United States position on international control.]

II

In approaching the question of the adequacy of the present U.N. majority position, I am proceeding on the assumption that no basic change in the nature of the regime in power in Russia can be brought about by a voluntary subjective act of the Soviet leaders at this juncture, or indeed by anything short of a major upheaval, which would remove the communist party entirely from power in that country, or a long process of erosion and mellowing. I cannot, therefore, look to any agreement on the international control of atomic energy to be the cause or the occasion of a change of heart on the part of the Soviet leaders which would basically alter the nature of Soviet power.

\textsuperscript{1}Preparation of this report commenced in October 1949, while Kennan was holding simultaneously the positions of Director of the Policy Planning Staff and Counselor. For documentation on consideration by the Policy Planning Staff of the question of international control, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. 1, pp. 191 ff. On January 1, 1950, Paul H. Nitze succeeded Kennan as Director of the Policy Planning Staff. Kennan transmitted the present draft to Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, on January 24 under the cover of a memorandum which read as follows: “Since Paul and the others were not entirely in agreement with the substance and since I was afraid that this report might be an embarrassing one to have on record as a formal Staff report, I have re-done this as a personal paper.

“I recommend to the Secretary’s attention Section VII, pages 63–71, which is new, and is directly along the lines of his conversation of yesterday evening.” The conversation has not been identified.

This being the case, we can reject the possibility of a wider significance of the problem of international control, and judge the adequacy of the present U.N. position to our purposes from the strict standpoint of its relation to our national security in a world where Russia is what we know it today to be.

If, in the light of this situation, it is our final judgment that the elimination of the atomic weapon from national arsenals by international agreement would confront us with a wholly unacceptable situation, and one which we would expect to remain unacceptable in the foreseeable future, then we should certainly not make any new moves at present which could have the effect of bringing us close to international agreement in the foreseeable future. Whether, in such circumstances, we should continue to support the present U.N. majority position is another question, which need not be examined at this point.

If, on the other hand, we feel that elimination of the weapon from our national arsenal by international agreement might conceivably be acceptable to us, in the sense that the risks of such an agreement might be conceived to be less than the risks of no agreement at all, then it can be questioned whether the present U.N. majority plan is entirely adequate to our purposes.

Why is this true? In the first place, the U.N. plan is based in large part on the thesis that there is a serious prospect for the early use of nuclear fuels for peaceful purposes, and that an attempt must be made to meet the problem of how to control production of such fuels. Yet this prospect as far as the Staff can learn, is by no means favorable enough today to be permitted to stand in the way of an abolition of atomic weapons by international agreement, if there were a real chance that this could be achieved.* If there were to be no production of nuclear fuels for any purpose, it might well be questioned whether all remaining atomic activities could not, under relatively moderate safeguards, be left in national hands, and whether an international operating and managing authority could not therefore be dispensed with altogether at this stage, thus removing one of the main bones of contention in the present plan.

This is, of course, the essential feature on which most of the more recent serious suggestions for departure from our present position

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*This discussion of “peaceful uses” is meant to apply only to such peaceful uses as would require large reactors, producing dangerous amounts of nuclear fuel. It is not meant to apply to reactors, like the Oak Ridge pile in our country, producing isotopes for use in research and in medicine. [Footnote in the source text.]
have been based, particularly the schemes advanced by Daniel and Squires‡ and Newman‡.§

It is interesting to note that the recommendations of the Acheson-Lilienthal report were based specifically on the belief that the possibilities for peaceful uses were great enough to justify the effort to try to control dangerous activities.

"If atomic energy had only one conceivable use—its horrible powers of mass destruction—" the report said, "then the incentive to follow the course of complete prohibition and suppression might be very great. Indeed, it has been responsibly suggested that however attractive may be the potentialities for benefit from atomic energy, they are so powerfully outweighed by the malevolent that our course should be to bury the whole idea, to bury it deep, to forget it, and to make it illegal for anyone to carry on further inquiries or developments in this field.

"We have concluded that the beneficial possibilities—some of them are more than possibilities, for they are within close reach of actuality—in the use of atomic energy should be and can be made to aid in the development of a reasonably successful system of security, and the plan we recommend is in part predicated on that idea.

"That mankind can confidently look forward to such beneficial uses is a fact that offers a clue of not inconsiderable importance to the kind of security arrangements that can be made effective. . . .""

An agreement to forego operation of large reactors at this time would not have to be taken as a permanent renunciation of the possibility of the development of large-scale atomic energy production for peaceful purposes. There is no particular reason why an arrangement would have to be of a permanent nature. On the contrary, there are good reasons why it might be better to have at this time a temporary modus vivendi. In the first place, as pointed out above, the progress made toward beneficial uses of nuclear fuels is not yet such as to make it really important that international society occupy itself now with

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‡A Road to Atomic Peace, by Cuthbert Daniel and Arthur M. Squires; the Christian Century Foundation, Chicago, 1949. [Footnote in the source text.]

‡James R. Newman, former Counsel to the McMahon Committee, whose views were set forth in a broadcast over ABC on October 26, 1949, and summed up, without attribution in the lead editorial of The New Republic, Vol. 121, No. 19, Issue 1898, November 7, 1949. [Footnote in the source text.]

§The Russians are specific in naming the question of the operation of an international authority in the Soviet Union "... a question of substance... a fundamental point..." (Vyshinsky's speech of November 10, 1949, before the United Nations Assembly). [Footnote in the source text. Reference is to the address by Soviet representative Vyshinsky at the 33rd meeting of the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the General Assembly, November 10, 1949; for the record of his remarks, see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee (hereafter cited as GA[IV], Ad Hoc Political Committee), pp. 158-189.]

the thorny problems of control which production of nuclear fuels for peaceful purposes would involve. In a few years, this situation may have a different aspect. In the second place, the international political situation could hardly be less favorable than it is today for the negotiation of any extensive international agreements of a permanent nature. Our policy must be based upon the knowledge that change is the essence of human affairs and upon the hope that change will affect this situation favorably over the course of some years. If so, the future would presumably be a better time to try to arrive at permanent arrangements for international control of atomic energy than is the present.]

I must further question whether our non-committal attitude on the matter of stages—an attitude developed during the period when we considered ourselves the sole custodians of the secrets and know-how of bomb production—is wholly justified in a period when that premise has been demonstrated no longer valid.

Surely, as things stand today, there can be little ground for concern about the particular stage at which our atomic secrets should be revealed to other nations in the establishment of any plan of control. It may be asked, therefore, whether it is really true today, as the Atomic Energy Commission stated in its Third Report to the Security Council, that “until agreement on the basic principles of control has been reached, the elaboration of proposals to cover . . .” the subject of stages “. . . would be unrealistic and would serve no useful purposes. . . .”** It does seem that there should be some way in which the Russians could be given unequivocal assurance in the preliminary phase of negotiations that effective prohibition of the weapon and closing down of nuclear fuel producing plants in all countries, including our own, would take place concurrently with, or at least not subsequent to, the establishment of a strict control over raw materials.

A question further exists as to our position on the disposal of stocks of nuclear fuel. It should be noted that if large reactors were to be abolished, strategic advantage in atomic weapons would depend largely

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† The concept of a temporary rather than a permanent agreement is not a new one. In the discussion of the control problem by W. T. R. Fox, in the volume The Atomic Weapon (Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York, 1946) which was one of the first comprehensive private treatises on this problem, contained the following passage:

“Top priority must today be given to the transitional problem of keeping the future open until men can make the fundamental adaptation necessary to civilized life in the atomic era. It cannot be too strongly reiterated that ‘permanent’ solutions which risk atomic war now in order to have permanent peace later are no solutions.” [Footnote in the source text.]

upon this factor. It seems generally to have been envisaged on our side that quotas would be so arranged as to preserve for us a clear strategic advantage in the event of seizure.†† One might, however, consider arrangements looking toward a complete destruction of all large stocks of nuclear fuel or the disposal in such a manner as would prevent any cheap and easy seizure and exploitation for military purposes by either side. In other words, one could conceive of an agreement which would eliminate the factor of strategic advantage entirely, as far as atomic weapons are concerned.

Similarly, it would seem that greater clarity could be created on the subject of the veto, in its relation to the problem of enforcement. If, as General McNaughton stated in the consultations of the “Six”; ‡‡ emphasis has shifted in the Commission “from the unattainable objective of prevention and punishment of violators by an autocratic and powerful authority to the more reasonable and reliable purpose of setting up an effective system to ensure adequate warnings”, is it still necessary to hold over the Russian head the determination that “there shall be no legal right, by ‘veto’ or otherwise, whereby a willful violator of the terms of the treaty or convention shall be protected from the consequences of violation of its terms”? §§ In other words, if we are to rely on adequate notice, rather than prevention, of violation, is there any reason why we should not go the whole hog and make it entirely clear that in any temporary modus vivendi, at any rate, there would be no question of a weakening of the veto power in the Security Council?

Finally, we could, as indicated above, make an effort to arrange for the discussion of these matters through channels where there would be better possibilities of getting the Russians to talk in a businesslike and revealing manner than in the multilateral U.N. bodies where they have heretofore been discussed.

The above suggestions are not put forward at this point as recommendations for a new “United States plan”. They are put forward

†† Note the passage from the Acheson-Lilienthal report: “... Once the plan is fully in operation it will afford a great measure of security against surprise attack; it will provide clear danger signals and give us time, if we take over the available facilities, to prepare for atomic warfare. The significant fact is that at all times during the transition period at least such facilities will continue to be located within the United States. ...” (“A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy”, op. cit., p. 50). [Footnote in the source text.]
‡‡ U.N. Document A/Permanent Members AEC/SR.9, October 24, 1949, p. 3.
§§ See footnote 17. [Footnote in the source text. Reference is to the address by Bernard M. Baruch, United States Representative at the First Meeting of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946, in New York. For text, see United Nations, Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, First Year, Plenary Meetings (hereafter cited as AEC, 1st yr., Plenary), pp. 4-14, or Department of State Bulletin, June 23, 1946, pp. 1057-1062. For documentation on United States proposals during 1946 regarding the international control of atomic energy, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. 1, pp. 712 ff.]
merely to emphasize that if it should really be our purpose to move as rapidly as possible toward the removal of this weapon from national armaments without insisting on a deep-seated change in the Soviet system, there are a number of features of our present position which do not seem to give maximum recognition to such a motive. The question of the extent to which these suggestions could be utilized in international negotiation, and of the manner in which this might be done, is a separate question, involving many important considerations of political wisdom and tactics, and will be discussed below.

It is also not intended to suggest that modification of our position along the lines indicated above would guarantee agreement with the Russians or even with our western allies. It is true that with the international authority and the veto out of the picture, and with firm U.S. assurances that staging would not operate to Soviet disadvantage, we would have met what appear to be the principal Soviet objectives [objections?] to the present U.N. majority plan. However, any new proposals along the lines suggested above would certainly raise new questions which have not heretofore had to be faced. There is no assurance that the inspection provisions we would still find it necessary to insist upon, even under a temporary agreement of this sort, would prove to be palatable to the Soviet leaders, although they would certainly be less onerous than the interference in Soviet life which would be called for by the operation in the Soviet Union of an international authority owning and managing large installations.||

The most serious question is whether the Russians would agree to forego all development of atomic energy in large-scale reactors for peaceful uses. There is every evidence that the Soviet leaders not only attach high importance to experimentation with the peaceful uses of atomic science but that they regard it as a matter of prestige that the “socialist” state keep itself entirely free to proceed with such development, unhampered by any physical interference from the capitalist side. They believe such interference to be implied by the present U.N. plan. They might well take a similar view of the obligations inherent in the sort of arrangements suggested above. In this view, there is probably a reflection of the tendency toward technological escapism which is natural to a country where economic development has been extremely uneven—a country which has highly primitive areas in its economy and which is always searching for means whereby whole stages of technological development experienced by the older industrial nations can be skipped over entirely.

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It is interesting to note that neither Squires and Daniel nor Newman considered their ideas likely of acceptance by the Russians. [Footnote in the source text.]
The assumption that Soviet views run in this direction is borne out by the tenor of Soviet propaganda in recent weeks. The Tass communiqué issued in connection with the U.S. announcement about the atomic explosion in Russia, while not specifically claiming that atomic energy was already being used for peaceful purposes, obviously aimed to leave such an implication in the mind of the reader by talking about "... construction work of great scale ... necessitating great explosive work with application newest technical means. ..."

Vyshinsky, in his speech before the United Nations on November 10, 1949, said:

"... these great inventions ought to be utilized in order to raise the economic, social and cultural level of mankind, to raise our level of progress and to expedite our progress. The role of atomic energy in economic and social development is tremendous, we cannot exaggerate it. And this makes it quite clear how evil, how sorrowful, it would be if this question were taken away from the control of sovereign, peace-loving states..."

Atomic energy, he said, "is assigned an exceptional economic, social and cultural significance" in the national economy of the Soviet Union. He criticized the present U.N. plan as one the implications of which "would make it impossible to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes at all". All these statements indicate that there will be vigorous Soviet resistance to the suggestion that large reactors be banned.

And we should expect to encounter similar resistance from the British and perhaps from other governments as well.

III

The problem whether it is desirable for this Government to move now as far as possible and as rapidly as possible toward international control is only part of a deeper problem, involving certain very far-reaching judgments and decisions of national policy, both foreign and domestic. It is not the purpose of this paper to deal exhaustively with this deeper problem or to make recommendations for its solution. But it is important, in any consideration of the international control problem, to identify the larger problem of which it is a part, to see what other things are logically involved in it, and to note certain factors bearing upon it which have particular importance from the standpoint of international control.

††Telegram 2486, September 25, 1949, from the American Embassy in Moscow to the Department of State. [Footnote in the source text. For text of telegram under reference, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. v, p. 656.]

*US/C/AC.31/238, p. 18. [Footnote in the source text. For the record of Vyshinsky's address at the 23rd Meeting of the Ad Hoc Political Committee, November 10, 1949, see GA (IV), Ad Hoc Political Committee, pp. 186-189.]
The real problem at issue, in determining what we should do at this juncture with respect to international control, is the problem of our attitude toward weapons of mass destruction in general, and the role which we allot to these weapons in our own military planning. Here, the crucial question is: Are we to rely upon weapons of mass destruction as an integral and vitally important component of our military strength, which we would expect to employ deliberately, immediately, and unhesitatingly in the event that we become involved in a military conflict with the Soviet Union? Or are we to retain such weapons in our national arsenal only as a deterrent to the use of similar weapons against ourselves or our allies and as a possible means of retaliation in case they are used? According to the way this question is answered, a whole series of decisions are influenced, of which the decision as to what to do about the international control of atomic energy and the prohibition of the weapon is only one.

We must note, by way of clarification of this question, that barring some system of international control and prohibition of atomic weapons, it is not questioned that some weapons of mass destruction must be retained in the national arsenal for purposes of deterrence and retaliation. The problem is: for what purpose, and against the background of what subjective attitude, are we to develop such weapons and to train our forces in their use?

We may regard them as something vital to our conduct of a future war—as something without which our war plans would be emasculated and ineffective—as something which we have resolved, in the face of all the moral and other factors concerned, to employ forthwith and unhesitatingly at the outset of any great military conflict. In this case, we should take the consequences of that decision now, and we should obviously keep away from any program of international dealings which would bring us closer to the possibility of agreement on international control and prohibition of the atomic weapon.

Or we may regard them as something superfluous to our basic military posture—as something which we are compelled to hold against the possibility that they might be used by our opponents. In this case, of course, we take care not to build up a reliance upon them in our military planning. Since they then represent only a burdensome expenditure of funds and effort, we hold only the minimum required for the deterrent-retaliatory purpose. And we are at liberty, if we so desire, to make it our objective to divest ourselves of this minimum at the earliest moment by achieving a scheme of international control.

We should remember that more depends on this basic decision than simply our stance toward the problems of international control. It must also have an important effect on our domestic atomic energy program, and particularly on what we do about the superbomb. If we
decide to hold weapons of mass destruction only for deterrent-retaliatory purposes, then the limit on the number and power of the weapons we should hold is governed by our estimate as to what it would take to make attack on this country or its allies by weapons of mass destruction a risky, probably unprofitable, and therefore irrational undertaking for any adversary. In these circumstances, the problem of whether to develop the superbomb and other weapons of mass destruction becomes only a question of the extent to which they would be needed to achieve this purpose. It might be, for example, that the present and prospective stockpile of conventional bombs, combined with present and prospective possibilities for delivery, would be found adequate to this purpose and that anything further in the way of mass destruction weapons would be redundant, or would fall into an area of diminishing returns.†

If, on the other hand, we are resolved to use weapons of mass destruction deliberately and prior to their use against us or our allies, in a future war, then our purpose is presumably to inflict maximum destruction on the forces, population and territory of the enemy, with the least expenditure of effort, in full acceptance of the attendant risk of retaliation against us, and in the face of all moral and political considerations. In this case, the only limitations on the number and power of mass destruction weapons which we would wish to develop would presumably be those of ordinary military economy, such as cost, efficiency, and ease of delivery.

Depending, therefore, on which of these courses is selected, our decision on the superbomb might be one of two diametrically opposite ones.

It is unnecessary to dwell on the significance of this decision from the standpoint of our military planning in the field of conventional weapons. Obviously, if we make our use of weapons of mass destruction dependent on their prior use against us or our allies, we subject ourselves to the possibility that they may not be used at all, and we then have to be prepared to accept combat with conventional weapons. This affects not only the composition of our armed establishment but also the concept which we may entertain of our objectives in the event of a future war with the U.S.S.R. For what could conceivably be achieved militarily and politically without atomic weapons, whether something better or something worse, is presumably at least different

† Note that the Soviets claim that their aim in developing the bomb is only to have "enough" for purposes of retaliation. Vyshinski, in his speech before the U.N. Assembly on November 10, 1949, said: "We in the Soviet Union are utilizing atomic energy, but not in order to stockpile atomic bombs—although I am convinced that if, unfortunately and to our great regret, this were necessary, we should have as many of these as we need—no more and no less." [Footnote in the source text. GA(IV), Ad Hoc Political Committee, p. 188.]
from what could be achieved with them. On this, in turn, must depend some of the allotment of emphasis as between military and political objectives, as well as the concept of what we would be prepared to regard as a favorable issue of the conflict.

This, in turn, raises further important questions, which are more than military, about our relationship to the other countries of the Atlantic Pact group. It has a strong bearing not just on what is done by way of preparation for another war, but also on the policies which we would wish to follow in time of peace. It is part of the great question, as yet unsettled in either the official or the public mind in this country, as to whether our conflict with world communism should be regarded as one susceptible of settlement by the devastations of war alone or as one requiring at least a supporting (if not a major) victory in the field of ideas.

Plainly, then, far more than our attitude toward international control is involved in the decision as to the purposes for which we are to hold atomic weapons in the absence of such control. There is a clear warning here against any policy with respect to the international negotiations which does not flow from a basic decision on this point, and is not part of a logical pattern of overall policy in both foreign and domestic fields, likewise flowing from such a decision.

[Here follows Part IV, 17 pages, in which Kennan comments further on factors affecting the United States attitude toward atomic weapons and their function in the national arsenal from the standpoint of international control.]

V

Any discussion of the military implications of a decision not to rely on the atomic bomb as "our principal initial offensive weapon in any future war" brings up the subject of limitation of conventional armaments. Those who see a real military sacrifice in such renunciation will be inclined to say that the U.S., having thus far successfully resisted any coupling of the subjects of international control of atomic energy and disarmament in conventional weapons, should now, in the light of its atomic superiority, insist upon linking the two subjects and refuse to disarm atomically unless and until the Russians reduce their conventional armaments.

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2 For documentation on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, see vol. III, pp. 1 ff.

The subject of limitation of conventional weapons is confused and obscure, due (a) to the high degree of unreality which has marked the postures assumed by both Soviet and American Governments in the past, (b) to the tremendous disparity and lack of comparability in the armed establishments of the two powers, (c) to their respective systems of military alliances and commitments, and (d) to the staggering uncertainties surrounding the possibilities for verification and enforcement of any agreements along this line. The evolution of U.S. policy on regulation of conventional armaments, in particular, has been perfunctory and haphazard, and has left us with no clear governmental position on what we think might be possible and desirable and worth trying to achieve.

A study of the problem of international control of atomic energy is not the framework in which to develop policy recommendations about disarmament in conventional weapons. Yet there are certain appreciations on this subject which may usefully be borne in mind if the problem of atomic control is to fall into proper perspective. These are the following:

1. There are important differences in the problem of disarmament, as between atomic and conventional weapons, to wit:

   (a) Prohibition of the atomic weapons would have certain special advantages beyond those which would be obtained by disarmament in conventional weapons. These advantages correspond to the special drawbacks of the weapon: the horror which it holds for civilian populations; its capacity for causing nervousness, insecurity and a war psychosis; the difficulty of placing its development into a proper relationship to other measures of defense and foreign policy; and its tendency to influence national policy as well as intellectual life in unfortunate ways. While all distinctions in armaments, from the moral as well as the political standpoint, are ones of degree, who can say that for this reason they are less important? It cannot therefore be argued that atomic disarmament is a logical absurdity unless accompanied by conventional disarmament.

   (b) Restrictions on the atomic weapon are easier to enforce than measures of disarmament relating to conventional weapons and forces. The raw materials for atomic weapon production are few and relatively scarce. The facilities and processes necessary for its production are ones peculiar to this purpose and not needed, as things stand today, for any normal peacetime purpose. The installations are costly, cumbersome, difficult to conceal, and delicate to operate. Conventional armaments, on the other hand, involve innumerable productive processes, many of which are part and parcel of a normal peacetime economy, as well as a great multiplicity of installations and concentrations of men, weapons, facilities and materials.
2. With respect to conventional armaments, there could be, at this stage, no question of any prohibition—only of reductions. But reductions are extremely hard to arrange unless there is a fair degree of comparability between the establishments of the respective countries, in size as well as in type. In the case of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. this comparability is conspicuously lacking. The scale on which the Soviet ground force establishment is maintained is so out of proportion to that of our own that our ground forces would be substantially balanced out just by the Soviet police army alone, to which Soviet representatives never refer in international negotiations and which they obviously do not regard even as a potential object of discussion from the standpoint of reduction of armaments. Furthermore, their system of military training and of disciplinary control over the population means that demobilized soldiers could be re-mobilized with great speed and effectiveness. In the light of these facts, it is clear that even if the Soviet Government consented to demobilize unilaterally most of the Red Army, with no reduction at all on our part, it would still have both forces in existence and a capability for mobilization entirely adequate to balance all the Atlantic Pact countries could conceivably put up in this line in the foreseeable future. Since it would certainly not do anything remotely as generous as this, but would insist on heavy and significant reductions in western forces as against only such reductions on its own part as would leave at least the major part of the present Red Army intact, it is hard to conceive of any arrangement for reduction in ground forces which would be within the bounds of realistic possibility and which could yet operate to the advantage of the western powers.

3. It has been suggested that possibly the Soviet Government might be prevailed upon to go in for a mutual reduction of offensive weapons such as tanks, long-range bombers and submarines, and that in this way the total Soviet potential could be at least reduced to a point where western Europe would no longer feel threatened. It is difficult to follow this line of reasoning through to any very hopeful conclusion. Aside from the almost insuperable problem of verification and control of any such undertakings, the Russians would certainly not be interested in them if they altered the general military balance in Europe to the Soviet disfavor. Yet if they did not do so alter it, they could hardly carry any real reassurance to the peoples of western Europe. Moreover, it seems doubtful if the distinction between offensive and defensive weapons has any practical validity.

4. Any commitment on the part of any of the western powers to reduce conventional armed establishments could hardly fail to fall foul of the Atlantic Pact: i.e., of the obligations contained in that pact, and of the military planning accomplished within its framework. No Atlantic Pact power could now negotiate alone with the Russians about the reduction of conventional armaments. This is in itself enough to make any practical result highly unlikely, for nothing is harder than international negotiation by a group of sovereign powers. Moreover, proposals for any actual reduction in western strength, along lines which would be of interest to the Russians, would probably run directly counter to the purposes of the Military Assistance Program, and to obligations assumed in connection therewith.
This could hardly fail to cause great confusion, not only to people in Europe but above all to members of our Congress who are being asked to support the program.

5. In general, it must be recognized that the most important reasons why the Russians today so overshadow the west in conventional weapons lie not in the scale of Soviet armaments, formidable as this may be, but rather in the disappearance of Germany as a factor in the military balance between east and west, in the high cost of armaments to the states of western Europe and North America, and above all in the presence of Russian military forces in the very heart of Europe by virtue of the continued occupation of Germany and Austria. If the Atlantic Pact nations wish to redress the present disbalance in the power of conventional armaments, as between east and west, they must first and foremost get the Russians out of the center of Europe; a more easily verifiable, controllable and effective means of relieving the military pressure on the west than promises of reduction of armaments. They must also find ways of harnessing western German skills and energies to the building of defensive strength in the west as a whole, not in Germany alone. Finally, they must face up to the fact that a Russian military potential built on so vast a foundation of sacrifice and discipline can be effectively met only by a western effort in which sacrifice and discipline play at least a respectable, if not a comparable, part. Should the west do all these things, the day might come when the Russians would find incentive for considering a real and significant reduction in conventional armaments, although the chances of anything of this sort being brought about by formal international agreement of a multilateral nature would still be small. As things stand today, the Russians are not going to be so obliging as to relieve the west gratuitously, through some agreed reduction in conventional armaments, of a military disparity in conventional weapons which is one of Communism's most valuable political assets and an important compensating asset for the reverses suffered by Moscow to date in the European cold war.

It is impossible to say, just in the light of the above considerations, what this Government should or should not do about conventional disarmament. But it is possible to say that if the abolition of the atomic weapon must await agreement on a comprehensive program for reduction of conventional armaments, it may as well be dismissed from present consideration. And in this case, we should plainly not undertake today any new moves in the field of international control.

The same applies, of course, to a voluntary renunciation on our part of the deliberate use of the atomic weapon. Unless we are prepared to accept the situation which would ensue, from the standpoint of our resultant potential in conventional weapons, we should neither offer to give up the bomb nor resolve to forego the deliberate use of it. The possibilities for conventional disarmament are neither great

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1 Documentation on United States policy with respect to Germany and on U.S. policy with respect to Austria is scheduled for publication in volume IV.
enough nor sufficiently relevant to the problem to provide a plausible escape from this harsh choice.

[Here follows Part VI, 10 pages, which discusses the Soviet attitude toward atomic weapons, citing the Russian practice of minimizing in public statements the effectiveness of weapons of mass destruction. Kennan contends, however, that for both ideological and practical reasons, the Soviet Union does wish to avoid nuclear war.]

VII

It follows from the above discussion that if, as I understand to be the case at the present moment, we are not prepared to reorient our military planning and to envisage the renunciation, either now or with time, of our reliance on “first use” of weapons of mass destruction in a future war, then we should not move closer than we are today to international control. To do so would be doubly invidious; for not only would we be moving toward a situation which we had already found unacceptable, but we would meanwhile be making that situation even more unacceptable by increasing our reliance on plans incompatible with it.

If our military plans are to remain unchanged in this respect, then it is probably best for us to rest on the present U.N. majority proposals, not pressing them with any particular vigor, but taking care not to undermine them by any statements which would suggest a lack of readiness on our part to accept them should they find acceptance in the Soviet camp. It is true that this position is somewhat disingenuous, since if the Russians should accept what we are ostensibly urging them to accept, we might be acutely embarrassed. But the danger of their accepting it is not serious. And in the present circumstances any new departure, involving even the suggestion of a withdrawal from the U.N. proposals or of a willingness to consider other ones, would result in much confusion, as between ourselves and our friends, which would be both difficult to dispel and unnecessary.

Unless, therefore, we are prepared to alter our military concepts as indicated above, thereby placing ourselves in a position where we could afford to take these weapons or leave them as the fortunes of international negotiation might determine, I urge that we consider the question of the desirability of some new international approach to have been studied and answered in the negative, and that we bury the subject of international control as best we can for the present.

The remaining discussion in this paper accordingly relates only to what we might do if we had reviewed our military concepts, if we had come to the conclusion that we would no longer rely on mass destruction weapons in our planning for a future war, and if we had resolved to work ourselves out of our present dependence on those weapons as rapidly as possible.
The first thing we would obviously have to do would be to discuss this new state of mind with our allies in the Atlantic Pact group, with a view to obtaining their understanding for our background thinking and their agreement to the modifications of military planning which it implies. If it proved impossible to come to any meeting of the minds with our allies on these points a new situation would be created, which would have to be examined on its merits. The other members of the Atlantic Pact have no formal right, of course, to compel us to plan to wage war with weapons which we had concluded to be unacceptable to our people as weapons of "first use". On the other hand, we would have to calculate the political and psychological damage which might be done by overriding their objections too brutally. If this damage seemed exorbitant, in terms of the cold war, then we would presumably have no choice but to carry on with the present position both as respects military plans and international control. However, in this case we should be careful to bring home to the Europeans the full consciousness of the responsibility they were undertaking in asking us to defer to them on this point.

Assuming, however, that our new position with relation to the use of mass destruction weapons was finally to commend itself to the other members of the Atlantic Pact group, we would then be able to take a public position with regard to mass destruction weapons similar to that taken by the Soviet Government; namely that we deplore the existence and abhor the use of these weapons; that we have no intention of initiating their use against anyone; that we would use them only with the greatest of reluctance and only if this were forced upon us by methods of warfare used against us or our allies; and that in the absence of international agreement on the abolition of such weapons under suitable safeguards we would hold only enough to assure that it would be suicidal folly for anyone else to use them against ourselves or our allies. The President being charged with the supreme responsibility for the operations of our armed forces, including advance planning activities, this position should be taken as a matter of executive policy. To the extent that Congressional opinion might associate itself with such a position, this would be all to the good; but I see no reason why Congressional support need be a prerequisite.

Having taken such a public attitude, we would then have, for the first time since we began to amass stockpiles of atomic bombs, a clear and suitable position from which to address ourselves to the problem of international control. Our first decision would then have to be whether, even in these circumstances, we would be prepared to accept international control on terms which would yield less security against violation than the present U.N. proposals or whether we would prefer to rest our security on the maintenance of stockpiles of mass destruc-
tion weapons for such deterrent-retaliatory value as they might have. This is of course the central question in the whole international control problem; and impressive arguments can be advanced on both sides.

It is my own view that arrangements based on any or all of the suggestions contained in the second section of this report, above, while quite possibly inferior to the present U.N. proposals from the strict standpoint of theoretical atomic security, would still be preferable to a situation in which both sides would be retaining atomic weapons, and presumably other weapons of mass destruction, for purposes of retaliation, with no agreement existing concerning their control or prohibition. I base this conclusion on my conviction that it would be difficult for us, if we are to hold and develop such weapons at all, to keep them in their proper place as an instrument of national policy and to arrive at the delicate judgments which would have to be made currently about the money and effort which should be devoted to their cultivation and the role which should be allotted to them in our military planning. I believe that the peculiar psychological overtones by which these weapons will always be accompanied will tend to give them a certain top-heaviness as instruments of our national policy, and that this top-heaviness, in turn, will inevitably impart a certain eccentricity to our military planning, where there should be equilibrium.

I fear, moreover, that this tendency to eccentricity may not be limited to our military planning but may tend to affect our concept of what it is that we could achieve by the conduct of war against the Soviet Union. Whether or not war on the grand scale can achieve positive aims for an aggressive totalitarian power, it is my belief that it cannot achieve such aims for a democracy. It would be useful, in my opinion, if we were to recognize that the real purposes of the democratic society cannot be achieved by large-scale violence and destruction; that even in the most favorable circumstances war between great powers spells a dismal deterioration of world conditions from the standpoint of the liberal-democratic tradition; and that the only positive function it can fulfill for us—a function, the necessity and legitimacy of which I do not dispute—is to assure that we survive physically as an independent nation when our existence and independence might otherwise be jeopardized and that the catastrophe which we and our friends suffer, if cataclysm is unavoidable, is at least less than that suffered by our enemies. For such positive purposes as we wish to pursue, we must look to other things than war: above all, to bearing, to example, to persuasion, and to the judicious exploitation of our strength as a deterrent to world conflict. The best that war can do is to keep our nation intact, in order that we may have an oppor-
tunity to continue to function as a unified and effective society and to employ these other instruments of national policy on which real progress must rest. I feel that the absence of international agreement outlawing the weapons of mass destruction, and the retention in the national arsenals of this country and of the Soviet Union of such weapons, will have a tendency to confuse our people with regard to the realities to which I have just referred and to encourage the belief that somehow or other results decisive for the purposes of democracy can be expected to flow from the question of who obtains the ultimate superiority in the atomic weapons race. We cannot have a clear and sound national policy unless it is based on a correct appreciation by our people of the role and possibilities of the various weapons of war, and of warfare itself, as instruments of national policy. I fear that the atomic weapon, with its vague and highly dangerous promise of "decisive" results, of people "signing on dotted lines", of easy solutions to profound human problems, will impede understanding of the things that are important to a clean, clear policy and will carry us toward the misuse and dissipation of our national strength.

While both dangers are great, I would hold this latter danger to be a more serious one than that which would reside in an imperfect system of international prohibition and control, and I would therefore favor the latter.

It may be said that all weapons are cruel and destructive, if they are to serve their purpose; that many of the conventional weapons also bring death and hardship to civilian populations; that the destructive horror of the atomic weapon is only a matter of degree; and that the above concept is therefore an unsound one which, if carried to its ultimate conclusions, would lead to a Ghandian policy of unilateral demilitarization, non-resistance and appeasement.

As to the assertion that this is only a matter of degree, I think that the following words of Shakespeare are entirely relevant and applicable:

"Take but degree away—untune that string
And hark what discord follows: . . .
Then everything includes in power—
Power into will, will into appetite,
And appetite, a universal wolf,
So doubly seconded with will and power,
Must make perforce a universal prey,
And last eat up himself."§

These words would have a prophetic applicability even if there were no distinction of substance between the weapons which we know

§ From "Troilus and Cressida". [Footnote in the source text.]
as the weapons of mass destruction and the others. But I believe that there is such a distinction. It may be an inexact and imperfect one; but if we were to reject all distinctions in life on the basis of inexactness and imperfection, no civilization would be possible. The distinction lies in the way in which a weapon can be applied. By and large, the conventional weapons of warfare have admitted and recognized the possibility of surrender and submission. For that reason, they have traditionally been designed to spare the unarmed and helpless non-combatant, who was assumed already to be in a state of submission when confronted with military force, as well as the combatant prepared to lay down his arms. This general quality of the conventional weapons of warfare implied a still more profound and vital recognition: namely that warfare should be a means to an end other than warfare, an end connected with the beliefs and the feelings and the attitudes of people, an end marked by submission to a new political will and perhaps to a new regime of life, but an end which at least did not negate the principle of life itself.

The weapons of mass destruction do not have this quality. They reach backward beyond the frontiers of western civilization, to the concepts of warfare which were once familiar to the Asiatic hordes. They cannot really be reconciled with a political purpose directed to shaping, rather than destroying, the lives of the adversary. They fail to take account of the ultimate responsibility of men for one another, and even for each other's errors and mistakes. They imply the admission that man not only can be but is his own worst and most terrible enemy.

It is entirely possible that war may be waged against us again, as it has been waged against us and other nations within our time, under these concepts and by these weapons. If so, we shall doubtless have to reply in kind, for that may be the price of survival. I still think it vital to our own understanding of what it is we are about that we not fall into the error of initiating, or planning to initiate, the employment of these weapons and concepts, thus hypnotizing ourselves into the belief that they may ultimately serve some positive national purpose. I doubt our ability to hold the respective weapons in our national arsenal, to fit them into our military and political plans, to agree with our allies on the circumstances of their use, and to entertain the prospect of their continued cultivation by our adversaries, without backsliding repeatedly into this dangerous, and possibly mortal, error. In other words, even if we were to conclude today that "first use" would not be advantageous, I would not trust the steadfastness of this outlook in a situation where the shadow of uncontrolled mass destruction weapons continues to lie across the peoples of the world.
Measured against this alternative, an imperfect system of international control seems to me less dangerous, and more considerate of those things in international life which are still hopeful.

VIII

To ask that these views find general acceptance in this Government is asking a great deal; and the likelihood that this should happen at any early date seems so slight that I am not sure how useful it is to try to spell out what we should do about international control in such a contingency. A few suggestions along this line might serve, however, to show what our problem would still be in such a situation.

Our first task would be to thresh this question out with those nations who have supported our leadership in the U.N.A.E.C. We would have to inform these governments, in discussions as informal and private as they could be made, of the background of our attitude, and to explore with them what might conceivably be acceptable along the lines of the suggestions contained in Section II of this report. If we did not run into difficulty elsewhere, we would almost certainly have difficulty in persuading the British to consider the abolition of large reactors. It is probable that if they could be brought to this point at all, it would only be slowly and after repeated exchanges of views. If they still refused to consider such a possibility, we would quite possibly have to regard ourselves as having come again to the end of our rope in the question of international control. In such a case we would presumably wish to shift responsibility to the British for the failure to make headway in the international control problem. It might then be necessary for us to make some public statement indicating our own willingness to consider solutions which might vary from the present U.N. plan, and explaining why we could go no farther along this line.

If, however, the outcome of consultations with friendly powers (presumably this would be the other members of “the Six” excluding the Soviet Union) indicated a possibility of taking soundings with the Russians, we would then wish to seek some suitable quiet channel of bilateral discussion with Soviet representatives along the lines of the Malik-Jessup talks on the Berlin blockade. The exact channel need not be determined until the time comes. It would be desirable that the person conducting the discussions on our side be someone familiar with Soviet psychology and negotiating techniques, and someone whom they will recognize as probably close to the real source of authority in this Government. This person would try to arrange

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for a leisurely series of informal meetings with some suitable Soviet representative, so interspersed that there would be plenty of time for reports to governments and for the receipt of governmental guidance between encounters. It would be best, for this purpose, to avoid on both sides the personalities and channels involved in the U.N. discussions to date.

The U.S. representative in such discussions would avoid giving the impression that he was making "new proposals" or was reflecting a change of heart in this Government. He would rather take the part of one who was trying to get to the bottom of Soviet objections to the present plan and to see whether variations could be found which could obviate these objections. He would make it plain that though he was in touch with the highest circles in his government and they were interested in whatever impressions or suggestions he may gather, he was not speaking as a plenipotentiary empowered to make agreements; he could only recommend to his Government; and any consequences which might flow from the conversations would eventually have to find acceptance not only in his Government but in the competent international bodies.

It is realized that these conversations might lead into other fundamental problems of U.S.-Soviet relations, the U.S. position on which would have to be determined in the light of the conditions then prevailing.

In these discussions, the U.S. representative might sound out his Soviet counterpart along the following lines:

1. a plan which could be temporary, and in the nature of a technical and political modus vivendi, rather than permanent;
2. complete prohibition of atomic weapons of every sort;
3. the abandonment of large reactors for this period;
4. disposition of fissionable materials to be in such a way as to give reasonable assurance against any one-sided advantage by seizure, if and when agreement becomes permanent;
5. non-dangerous activities to be left in national hands, but only on the condition of complete "openness" of research and development activity;
6. no international control authority and no veto provisions;
7. stages so arranged that termination of activity in large reactors, establishment of formal U.N. custody of large reactors and stocks of nuclear fuels, establishment of U.N. supervision over raw material sources, and prohibition of the weapon would all take place simultaneously; and
8. an inspection system involving:

(a) a complete showdown on existing operations including full accounting and verification of raw materials utilized to date, existing reserve and pipeline stocks, nuclear fuels produced, etc.;
(5) adequate U.N. observation over all known and declared raw material sources and facilities for investigation, and if necessary, observation over all alleged ones;

(6) U.N. supervision of large reactors during deactivization or dismantling stage, followed by periodic observation over sites of such reactors;

(7) complete openness of laboratories for serious scientific visitors on an international scale; and

(8) Periodic observation of non-dangerous activities, plus ad hoc inspections "if there is the slightest hint of a suspicion" of "any illegal activities".

If these consultations with the Russians indicated that there was any real possibility of agreement on this basis then several steps would have to follow, the exact order and timing of which cannot be determined in advance:

(1) There would have to be threshed out, interdepartmentally and presumably also in consultations with Congressional leaders, a more detailed guiding line on exactly what this Government could afford to accept in the way of an interim agreement along the above lines;

(2) The other permanent members of the Security Council and Canada would have to be advised of the results of these soundings and their agreement obtained to a basic position to be taken in future international negotiations. This is particularly important in the cases of the U.K. and Canada.

(3) One of these other governments ought to be induced to take the lead in coming forward with proposals along these lines in the appropriate U.N. body.

(4) We would then have to take appropriate measures, based on what should be by then a public realization that we cannot in any event long adhere to the first use policy, to prepare public opinion in this country for the serious possibility of a modification of our position with respect to international control.

In addition to these suggestions as to how we might proceed, it is perhaps useful to record some things which we ought to avoid:

(1) We should avoid appointing any commission of outsiders to restudy the questions of international control prior to the time when we can be sure of some probability of Russian and British acceptance of a new approach; and even then we should not set up such a commission unless the results of its deliberations are reasonably predictable as ones which we can accept and utilize.

(2) We should avoid this time taking the lead publicly with the

[[Such a system would be along the lines recommended in the report issued in February, 1946, by the Committee on Atomic Energy of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, entitled: "A Conference Report on International Inspection of Radioactive Mineral Production". This report attached importance to an initial "complete revelation" on raw materials, which, its authors felt, would "make the following phases more or less routine". [Footnote in the source text.]

[Vyshinski's speech, November 12, 1949. [Footnote in the source text. For the record of this address, see GA (IV), Ad Hoc Political Committee, pp. 207–210.]}}
advancement of a new scheme of international control.** If there is to be a change in our position, let it come as a response to suggestions advanced by others and not as a spontaneous alteration of our existing stand. The essence of our public position should be: “We have told the world what we thought was the best way of controlling atomic energy. We still believe in that, and the U.N. majority plan stands as our preferred proposal for a permanent arrangement. However, the suggestion has now been made of a temporary arrangement, involving the complete deactivation of the large reactors and a moratorium on development of atomic power for peaceful purposes over a given period. We regret the necessity for this; but if it would contribute to world stability—if this is really what it takes to bring an increased feeling of confidence and security to the peoples of the world—we would be prepared to do our part, even though we are the ones who would have to make the greatest sacrifice in effort and investment.”

(3) We should not undertake the discussion of these matters with the Russians in any manner that puts us on the spot before our own public opinion. This rules out a Presidential meeting with Stalin and any other sensational public approach. Anything of this sort would not only create serious problems in our relations with the governments of the other members of the U.N. Commission, but it would produce a tremendous reaction of suspense and anticipation in our own public, which the Russians would know how to exploit to good advantage.

(4) We should avoid connecting publicly our action on the superbomb problem with the subject of international control of atomic energy.

IX

It may be adduced, with regard to the above discussion, that it charts out a course replete with a whole series of difficulties and obstacles and that there is extremely little likelihood, judged by present circumstances, that we would ever successfully make our way to the end of it, which would be an agreement on international control. From this, it may be argued that it could hardly be worthwhile for us to embark upon it.

This is a respectable argument; and if the progress of world events in our time were slower, simpler, and easier to foresee, it might be unanswerable. But St. Paul’s observation that, “We know in part and we prophesy in part,” was never truer than it is of the time ahead of us, particularly in respect to the development of the international situation, the meaning of war and the function of weapons. In such a time there is only one thing a nation can do which can have any

** Interesting, from the standpoint of informed outside opinion, is the following passage from a private letter addressed to the Director of the Staff by one of the most prominent of the government’s scientific consultants on atomic energy matters: “It seems to me that the time for plans, proposals and systems unilaterally offered by our Government is past, if it ever existed; and if we ever again come up with a set of proposals, it should be on the basis of some prior agreement.” [Footnote in the source text. For the letter under reference, from Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer to Kennan, November 17, 1949, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. 1, p. 222.]
really solid and dependable value: and that is to see that the initial
times of its policy are as close as possible to the principles dictated by
its traditions and its nature, and that where it is necessary to depart
from these lines, people are aware that this is a departure and under-
stand why it is necessary. For this reason, there is value in a clean and
straight beginning, even though the road ahead may be torturous
and perhaps impassable.

GEORGE F. KENNAN

230.12/1—2550: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to
the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW YORK, January 25, 1950—1:42 p. m.

74. On January 17, SC transmitted to CCA GA resolution of
5 December 1949, calling for continuance of CCA study of regulation
and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces in accord-
ance with its plan of work.

In anticipation of resumption of CCA discussions, instructions are
requested by USUN concerning the position to be taken on the next
item of CCA plan of work to be considered, viz. item III, dealing with
safeguards for a system of disarmament. Reference is made to state-
ment submitted on item III by deputy US representative in CCA in
September 1947. Reference is also made to position paper RAC D-
18/2e, approved in December 1947, and to draft position paper RAC
D–18/7, pending since 1948, each dealing with the safeguards item.
Instructions are desired concerning present status of these papers and
extent to which policy reflected therein continues to govern.

It is further recommended that a review be made of policy prevail-
ing since 1947 re resolution of questions concerning atomic energy,
Article 43 forces, and peace treaties with Germany and Japan, as con-
ditions precedent to regulation of conventional armaments.

Assimilation of the establishment of atomic energy control to the
Article 43 forces and peace treaties questions is understood as in fact

\footnote{For text of the U.S. statement, September 17, 1947, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. I, p. 660.}

\footnote{Document RAC D–18/2e, December 30, 1947, not printed, announced the
approval by Acting Secretary of State Lovett and Secretary of Defense Forrestal
of position paper RAC D–18/2d, “United States Position on Practical and Effect-
ive Safeguards Essential to the General Regulation and Reduction of Arma-
ments and Armed Forces,” November 25, 1947, prepared by the Executive Com-
mittee on Regulation of Armaments. For the text of RAC D–18/2d, see Foreign
Relations, 1947, vol. I, p. 703.}

\footnote{Not printed.}

\footnote{This position was enunciated by Secretary of State George C. Marshall in
an address at the 82nd Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, September 17,
1947; for text, see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly,
Second Session, Plenary Meetings (hereafter cited as GA (II), Plenary), vol. I,
pp. 19–27.}
requiring accomplishment of all three conditions prior to agreement on any system for regulation or reduction of armaments or armed forces. The US position, as so understood, complicates any progress in discussion of conventional armaments because of deadlock on Article 43 forces question, peace treaties, and atomic energy.

We believe that Department should consider fact that agreements on Article 43 forces and peace treaty questions are not necessarily conditions precedent to any conceivable, practical plan for regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. We recommend that these two matters be separated from question of atomic energy control. As to latter question, we think treatment, in planning stage, should be regarded as parallel to question of regulation of conventional armaments, rather than as prior thereto. Such treatment would involve concurrent coordination of plans covering the two fields and would look forward to ultimate implementation of such plans through a general system of collective security.

We would continue to affirm established point of view nothing effective can be accomplished in way of actual disarmament until problem of control of atomic energy has been solved. Proposed treatment would, however, make it possible to move up conventional armaments and armed forces to parallel and coordinated position where concept of over-all system of collective security can be strongly advanced. During fourth GA, all USUN disarmament statements disavowed piecemeal approach and emphasized point that disarmament in atomic field and in conventional armaments and armed forces field were two aspects of single problem.

Policy determinations and instructions concerning foregoing will be needed by mission in immediate future to facilitate effective consultations with friendly delegations in advance of resumption of CCA meetings.

AUSTIN

10 Files: A/1258

The Secretary-General of the United Nations (Lie) to the Members of the United Nations

[NEW YORK,] 30 January 1950.

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY

COMMUNICATION RECEIVED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF CANADA, CHINA, FRANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DATED 27 JANUARY 1950

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the Members of the United Nations the attached communication from the-
representatives of Canada, China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America dated 27 January 1950 together with the summary record of the fourteenth meeting of the Consultations of the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission (A/Permanent Members/AEC/SR.14).²

[Enclosure]

Communication From the Representatives of Canada, China, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States to the Secretary-General (Lie).

NEW YORK, 27 January 1950.

In its resolution of 4 November 1948, the General Assembly requested the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission “to meet together and consult in order to determine if there exists a basis for agreement on the international control of atomic energy to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes and for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons.”

On 23 November 1949, the General Assembly passed a resolution on the international control of atomic energy, in which the General Assembly expressed itself as follows:

“Anxious to free humanity from the dangers which will continue to exist as long as States retain under their individual control the development and operation of atomic energy facilities,

“Convinced that an international co-operative effort can avoid these dangers and can hasten the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy for the benefit of all peoples,

“1. *Urge* all nations to join in such a co-operative development and use of atomic energy for peaceful ends;

“2. *Calls* upon Governments to do everything in their power to make possible, by the acceptance of effective international control, the effective prohibition and elimination of atomic weapons;

“3. *Requests* the permanent members of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to continue their consultations, to explore all possible avenues and examine all concrete suggestions with a view to determining whether they might lead to an agreement securing the basic objectives of the General Assembly in this question, and to keep the Atomic Energy Commission and the General Assembly informed of their progress;” . . .

In accordance with the above resolution, the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission met on 20 December 1949 and again on 19 January 1950. At the beginning of the latter meeting, the representative of the Soviet Union objected to the presence of the

²Summary record not reproduced.
representative of China and submitted the following draft resolution for consideration:

"The Consultative Conference of the representatives of the six states—permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission decides:

"To exclude from its membership the representative of the Kuomintang group."

The other representatives present decided that this proposal was out of order, for the reason that representation in these Consultations was consequential on membership in the Atomic Energy Commission, and the group engaged in the Consultations had not the competence to pass on the issue raised by the representative of the Soviet Union. In this situation the representative of the Soviet Union announced that he would not participate in the Consultations so long as the present Chinese representative attended these meetings. He said he would not recognize as legal any decisions adopted by the group. After making this statement he left the meeting.

The representatives of Canada, China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States are of the opinion that the members of the General Assembly will be anxiously concerned that these important and serious Consultations have been interrupted in consequence of the position taken by the representative of the Soviet Union.

The General Assembly resolutions cited above make it clear that the primary purpose of the Consultations among the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission is to reconcile the divergent views of the Soviet Union on one side, and of the other five permanent members on the other. The representatives of these five permanent members are, therefore, of the opinion that so long as the Soviet Government refuses to participate in these Consultations, it is impossible for them to achieve the primary purpose of the mandate given by the General Assembly.

These five permanent members have undertaken to remain in close contact with one another and they will meet and consult with each other on such limited objectives as are possible of achievement under the circumstances.

The representative of France, as the next Chairman of the group, will determine in agreement with the Secretary-General the possibility of reconvening the Consultations of the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission.

In accordance with the request of the General Assembly to keep the Atomic Energy Commission and the General Assembly informed of their progress, the representatives of these five permanent members request the Secretary-General to make known to the members of the
Atomic Energy Commission and of the General Assembly, the situation created by the refusal of the representative of the Soviet Union to participate in the Consultations. To this end they request that copies of this letter, together with the summary record of the 14th Meeting of the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission, held on 19 January 1950, be transmitted to all States Members of the United Nations.

A. G. L. McNaughton  
Representative of Canada  
T. F. Tsiang  
Representative of China  
J. Chauvel  
Representative of France  
Alexander Cadogan  
Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland  
John C. Ross  
Deputy Representative of the United States of America in the Security Council

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Department of State Disarmament Files

Memoandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 6, 1950.

CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY

[Participants:]  
British Embassy—Sir Derick Hoyer Millar  
Mr. F. W. Marten

UNA—Mr. Hickerson  
UNP—Mr. Popper  
EUR—Mr. Raynor

Sir Derick said he had been instructed to ask whether there was any substance to reports appearing in the press with regard to a Soviet

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1 Lot 58D123, a consolidated lot file in the Department of State containing documentation on regulation of armaments and disarmament, 1942-1962.  
2 Minister, British Embassy.  
3 First Secretary, British Embassy.  
5 G. Hayden Raynor, Adviser for United Nations Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs.
feeler on the atomic energy problem or to press reports of a fresh approach on this subject by the United States.

Mr. Hickerson said that he knew of no feeler by the Russians; certainly Malik had not approached him. As regards a new approach by the United States, Mr. Hickerson cited the President’s press conference statement of February 2 \(^6\) and gave Sir Derick a copy of the statement made by the Secretary on January 18 on this subject [at that press conference the Secretary stated that we would continue to consider the problem “But I see no reason why we should change, and there is nothing in the works, as far as I know, which would lead us to change.”]. Sir Derick noted that the President’s statement was even more categorical than that of the Secretary, and Mr. Hickerson explained that the Secretary had spoken with the thought in mind that the President would shortly make this statement.

Mr. Hickerson said that he was seeking to nail down even more explicitly the thought contained in the Secretary’s statement. He felt that the control plan would apply to hydrogen bombs as well as to conventional atomic bombs since after all uranium was an essential component of the hydrogen bomb.

The discussion turned to Walter Lippman’s \(^*\) article of this morning. Sir Derick agreed with Mr. Hickerson that the control plan had not become obsolete simply because the Soviets now had the bomb. A control plan, Mr. Hickerson felt, was as necessary as ever; we did not think that our plan was necessarily perfect and we were willing to consider Soviet suggestions, but not to accept any which would make the plan ineffective. Sir Derick agreed that there was no possibility of progress if the Soviets would not accept an effective plan. He hoped we would keep the British informed if anything new developed.

**JOHN D. HICKERSON**

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\(^6\) The following exchange occurred at the President’s press conference of February 2:

> “Q. Mr. President, Senator Vandenberg [Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan] yesterday said that he wished that you would follow up your directive on the superbomb with a formal notification to the United Nations, first that you have ordered work to proceed on it; second, that the United States stands ready to suspend the project at the moment Soviet Russia permits adequate international control.

> “The President: I have no comment on Senator Vandenberg’s statement, but for your information we have urged constantly that international control be accepted by all the nations of the world. Hardly a week goes by that that matter is not brought up, at my suggestion, in the United Nations.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 142–143)

For the President’s statement on the hydrogen bomb, January 31, see footnote 1, p. 513.

\(^7\) Brackets appear in the source text.

\(^*\) Syndicated newspaper columnist.
Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt¹ to the Secretary of State


Dear Mr. Secretary: I want to write you just a line to tell you that I was somewhat troubled by your speech the other day,² not as to what you said about Russia because of course, we all know that is true, but it seems to me at the present time it may be more advisable to say these things face to face but not to say them to the public through the press.

My belief is that some one should go as a special representative from the President and tell Mr. Stalin, face to face, what the situation is as regards the possibility of world destruction since no one can use the H Bomb without running that danger and then emphasize the need for working out some methods together to obviate this destruction. I can not see that any harm could be done if the person went with sufficient strength behind him. It seems to me that might give some real value to Senator McMahon’s proposal,³ which seems to me unlikely to have any good results unless there is something on a higher level behind it.

I realize that you know much more than I do but I also think we have an obligation to say what policies look like to us who are in the position of the worm looking up at the sky, concerned about the foot that may descend upon it and anxious to find some way of averting disaster.

Very cordially yours,

ELEANOR ROOSEVELT

² Reference is to extended extemporaneous remarks by Secretary Acheson at his press conference of February 8 regarding relations with the Soviet Union, for the text of the statement, see Department of State Bulletin, February 20, 1950, pp. 272-274.
³ In a Senate speech of February 2, Brien McMahon of Connecticut, Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, suggested that the United States sponsor a $50 billion, five-year “global Marshall Plan” in exchange for the acceptance by other nations of international control of atomic energy.
REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS

611.001/2-1150: Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, February 11, 1950—6:23 p.m.

152. In connection with responses to Depcirtel February 3, following impression of climate of opinion at UN Headquarters re H-bomb, and press conference statements by President February 9, and Secretary February 8, may be of interest. Report represents initial reactions being expressed at Lake Success primarily by correspondents, NGO representatives, Secretariat officials and a few delegates rather than a systematic survey.

Opinions are sharply divided, both as to consequence of present atomic deadlock, and as to actual meaning of policy indicated in Secretary’s remarks. Views appear to fall into four major groups:

1. Small number of “continental realists” (largely European newspapermen and delegates) hailed American position and especially Secretary’s statement as sign Department has at last awakened to real nature of Soviet policy.


3. Substantial number express lack of conviction that US has sufficiently re-examined possibility of achieving control agreement on basis of some form of inspection, and require more than simple repetition of American position on atomic energy to be convinced.

4. Some, while agreeing with Secretary’s analysis of Soviet behavior, express view statement tactically unwise in saddling US with onus of seeming to refuse to negotiate.

Following views representative of those in group one: Sunde (Norway) declared H-bomb decision essential. De la Tournelle (France) said “Secretary’s statement excellent although might not be readily understood by those who have not had to deal with Russians.” A French correspondent referred to Secretary’s citing of Berlin, Greece, Turkey as showing understanding that only thing Stalin respects is military force, and that only negotiation possible would be on basis of “one more step and it means war”.

Most Secretariat officials and NGO’s expressing views, however, were in second group. Secretariat sources, possibly reflecting Lie’s

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1 The circular telegram under reference, not printed, requested estimates of public reaction to President Truman’s H-bomb production announcement (see footnote 1, p. 513) and associated discussion in the United States (711.5611/2-250).

2 For text of Secretary Acheson’s statement of February 8, see Department of State Bulletin, February 20, 1950, pp. 272-274. At his press conference of February 9, President Truman expressed concurrence with Acheson’s remarks; for the record of the conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950, pp. 149-153.

3 Ambassador Arne Sunde, Permanent Norwegian Representative at the United Nations.
views, inferred from Acheson statement that US had written off UN, would abandon negotiation and rely on military power. Lie, however, after encouragement from USUN, reacted February 10 with vigorous “fight-talk” to correspondents. Eichelberger* of AAUN said, “Secretary has closed door to negotiation and thrown the key away”. Another view expressed was that history of past efforts to reach agreement as recited by Secretary was “dishonest”, in that it gave one-sided picture and ignored cumulative and circular effect of our cold-war policy. Some correspondents held US political and moral position partly responsible for deterioration of relations with USSR, and among NGO's this feeling frequently heard. One NGO reported view of veteran audience here that over-all settlement with Russians necessary and that Secretary’s statement demoralizing in that it held out no hope for future. Some NGO's expressed regret that Secretary had listed Point Four among weapons in cold war, fearing context would derogate from its universal character in UN. Many urged that US strengthen its position by dramatizing its support of UN, e.g., by having Secretary appear occasionally at SC.

Among those in group three was best-informed American correspondent on atomic energy control who believed new look at control and new effort to negotiate essential on grounds that present attitude clearly devoid of possibilities for progress toward control and created public impression of inflexibility. He proposed having UN call meeting of world scientists inquire whether technical developments have altered control problem at all. In any case felt some such action even if not productive of solution to control problem would help public understand reasons for our insistence on international ownership in a way which constant repetition of US position no longer could do. A Church Peace Union representative just back from south reports considerable worry over US failure to advance new proposals. United World Federalist representative said his group may join with other organizations to petition President to appoint citizens committee to explore possible terms of over-all settlement of arms race.

In fourth group following views representative: former Canadian broadcaster now with Secretariat, while believing US analysis correct, thought would be wiser to wait for Russians to slam door. National Peace Conference representative, while reluctantly accepting US analysis of problem of negotiations, felt Secretary’s statement too cold, failed take account of US emotional need for some form of affirmative action. This group changed subject of February meeting from China to H-bomb because of deep concern.


GROSS

*Clark M. Eichelberger, National Director, American Association for the United Nations.
Memorandum by the Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)


Subject: Atomic Energy—Public Relations Aspects of International Control

On the morning of Friday, February 10, I had a long discussion with a group of newspaper editors in Chicago, and on the afternoon of the same day I addressed a luncheon meeting of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. The luncheon was attended by a large number of people of various interests from Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin. They included journalists, representatives of non-governmental organizations, university professors, and business and civic leaders. One of the main topics which they desired to hear discussed as well as to discuss themselves was the question of international control of atomic energy.

I thought that it might be of interest to you to match the impressions I received from this area of the country against the reports which you are undoubtedly obtaining concerning reactions on the same subject from other areas. There appeared to be two major lines of interest and concern.

First, a surprisingly large number of individuals of various backgrounds and lines of occupation inquired whether it was the Administration's policy to discourage, rather than encourage, public discussion of the problems which have aroused such public interest since the President's announcement concerning the hydrogen bomb. The impression appears to have become widespread that (whether for reasons of military security or other reasons) the Administration is anxious to avoid a full public debate on the implications of the problem. It appears to me that some definite indication might well be made by the Administration—or carefully selected spokesman for it—to the effect that we encourage public debate on this momentous issue. This might, for example, be done by some such device as a radio program of the scope and reach of "America's Town Meeting of the Air".

The second major question which I repeatedly encountered on the subject of international control of atomic energy was one which I think will require careful explanation. This question was (broadly stated) Why need we insist upon international ownership and management of "dangerous materials and facilities", if it were shown possible to

\(^1\) Files of the United States Mission at the United Nations.
\(^2\) Transmitted to Webb through Hickerson and Arneson.
\(^3\) For the text of the address, see Department of State Bulletin, March 6, 1950, pp. 372-377.
obtain agreement upon an "effective" inspection system under an international authority? In other words, the question frequently asked of me (and particularly by newspaper men in the area) was whether we were wise in insisting upon international ownership and management.

The explanation which I take it has been the standard exposition on this subject is that an inspection system in itself will not serve the purpose inasmuch as inspection (even assuming it were of an effective variety) would do no more than disclose the existence of stockpiles of atomic fuel or of facilities for converting it. Inasmuch as it is relatively simple to "package" atomic fuel in the form of a weapon, it would do little good by way of assuring a peaceful state to know that atomic fuel exists in established quantities without at the same time having assurance that the atomic fuel will not be secretly converted into a weapon for destructive uses.

Specifically, in terms of the question which I was repeatedly asked, our problem appears to be to give a clear public demonstration of the fact that an inspection system, in itself, no matter how "effective", cannot be sufficient to assure our national security. The confusion which appears to me to be most prevalent, and therefore most in need of clarification, is based upon an assumption that it would be of some advantage to us—as compared to the present situation of ignorance—to have some information concerning the stockpiling by the Soviet Union of dangerous materials and facilities.

In my own judgment, this point has been frequently and adequately discussed. However, it seems certain that the explanations have not received widespread public understanding and, if they ever were understood by a large number of people, these same people have long since forgotten the explanations. The questions concerning this aspect of the problem are closely related to the general desirability and necessity for a public discussion of the sort referred to in the first paragraph above.

611.61/2-1950

The Secretary of State to Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, February 23, 1950.

Dear Mrs. Roosevelt: Thank you for your letter of February 10 which deals with a problem to which I and my associates in the Department are giving the most intense and earnest consideration. We are acutely aware of the widespread apprehension created by the uncontrolled development of increasingly powerful atomic weapons and of the need for exploring whatever means offer the slightest prospect of reaching international agreement for effective control of these weapons. The despatch of a special representative of the President
to Moscow is one of the courses of action which we have constantly been examining; I hope I can make clear to you why I have not felt that I could conscientiously recommend it to the President at this time.

Should a representative of the President undertake discussions with Soviet Government officials on the subject of atomic energy without reasonable assurance that the conversations could lead to an improvement in the present situation, and there has been no indication that such conditions now exist, the probability is that he could return from Moscow with no more than the meager report that the Soviet Government had listened politely and promised to consider his views. The effect of such an outcome of the discussions on the morale of the peoples of the world can easily be imagined. Of even graver import is the fact that such disillusionment would strengthen the hands of those who see in a resort to arms the only solution of the dilemma which confronts us.

We must also bear in mind the legitimate interest of other countries in the whole question of assuring world peace. Bilateral conversations between the United States and Soviet Governments on multilateral issues could be expected to give rise to speculation and rumors leading to suspicion and mistrust and the possible disruption of the harmony and cooperation already attained through the peaceful means of the Rio Treaty, Atlantic Pact, Economic Recovery Program, and similar undertakings.

Perhaps even more important is the relationship of the United Nations to this problem of controls. I am sure you will agree that no action should be undertaken by the Government, the effect of which would be to depreciate the authority and standing of that organization.

The permanent members of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission were requested by the General Assembly resolution to “continue their consultations, to explore all possible avenues and examine all concrete suggestions with a view to determining whether they might lead to an agreement securing the basic objectives of the General Assembly in this question, and to keep the Atomic Energy Commission and the General Assembly informed of their progress”. Our representatives have more than once expressed the readiness of the United States Government to examine sincerely and earnestly any new proposals which may be put forward in amendment of the plan of control of atomic energy, approved by an overwhelming majority of the General Assembly, in order to reach an effective agreement to control atomic energy and to eliminate atomic weapons.

I find it difficult to believe that the Soviet Government is not aware of the potential danger of uncontrolled development of atomic energy. Certainly every effort has been made by the President and spokesmen for the Government to emphasize the seriousness of the problem and
the desire of the American people and their Government to attain a solution. Notwithstanding, the Soviet representative interrupted and walked out of the important consultations of the permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission for wholly irrelevant purposes connected with the Chinese representation on the Commission. These consultations are therefore temporarily at a standstill but we hope they will be renewed.

This Government will continue to stand ready to give full and sincere consideration to any proposal which will lead toward effective agreement to control atomic energy, and will welcome any indication that the Soviet Government is prepared to cooperate in such an endeavor through the established mechanism of the United Nations. We are convinced that agreement on this great issue is both vitally necessary and technically feasible and are prepared to negotiate sincerely and earnestly tomorrow or any day thereafter. We can succeed only if the Soviet Union is willing to do the same. I think this is the central issue. The Soviet Union has had and still has many avenues before it for a demonstration of its willingness to work with us toward a real, effective solution. There has unfortunately been no indication that such a willingness exists. Without any evidence of that nature I am forced to the conclusion that a special mission to Moscow would be fruitless and indeed harmful. The dangers of such an approach, as I have outlined them, seem to me to outweigh other considerations. This does not mean that a direct approach may not be advisable at a later date, but I believe we must stand firm on our present position for the time being.

I have discussed this matter with you at some length in confidence because I think it is important for you to know what we are thinking. I want you to feel free to write me further at any time on this or related issues on which you share our common concern.

With warm regards,

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 6, 1950.

Subject: Views of Chauvel on Atomic Energy Control

On Saturday, March 4, Ambassador Chauvel on his initiative, brought up this subject for the second time in two days. He said he had heard I was going to Washington on Monday¹ and wanted to give

¹ March 6.
me certain views before I left. He said he was "speaking personally", adding that on his recent trip to Paris he had discussed this matter with Parodi and the Foreign Minister.

Chauvel did not consider the present situation "satisfactory" from the point of view of the western powers. He was not sure they had a thorough understanding of each other's position.

Chauvel said French public opinion had not formerly been much disturbed by the atom bomb question. However, the hydrogen bomb announcement and, in particular, Einstein's recent statement, had created great nervousness in France. The effect had been intensified by Churchill's statements prior to the British election.

Chauvel felt that it was now necessary to consider most carefully the "political aspect of the problem", without at the same time losing sight of the scientific realities. He remarked that the French, as well as the British and Canadians, had "followed the American lead", and that this had been, and remained, necessary because only the Americans had all the information required for decisions. I asked him to illustrate what he meant. Chauvel replied that, for example, he did not really know what was involved in the application of the "stages principle". Chauvel said that he had learned, in what he described as "side conversations" with Hickerson and Osborn, that under the UN Plan "stages of disclosure would take about two years". This had not come up in meetings of the Sponsoring Powers.

Chauvel said he wished me to understand he was not being at all critical, because he realized the requirement of secrecy, but this created certain problems which were now taking on great importance. The French would, of course, continue to follow the lead of the US. But they would wish to know the "political analysis" from which we were proceeding.

For this purpose, it seemed to Chauvel desirable that we speak with him, the British and the Canadians, as soon and as frankly as possible. Chauvel would hold any such talks in the strictest confidence, reporting only by personal letters to Parodi and Schuman. Chauvel added, almost as an after-thought, "and of course Bidault would be kept informed".

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2 Alexandre Parodi, Secretary-General of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
3 Dr. Robert Schuman.
4 Speaking at a television forum on February 11, Dr. Albert Einstein, discoverer and exponent of the theory of relativity and pioneer nuclear physicist, stated that should man succeed in making the hydrogen bomb, radioactive poisoning of the atmosphere would become a possibility. See also Dr. Albert Einstein, "Arms Can Bring No Security," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1950, p. 71.
5 Reference is to the British Parliamentary elections held on February 13, 1950, in which the Conservative Party led by former Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill sharply reduced the Labour Party majority.
6 Georges Bidault, Premier of France.
I said I wished to be quite sure I understood what he meant by “political analysis”. He replied that he had in mind our discussing with him as frankly as possible our present thinking on such questions as the following: Were we convinced that no basis existed for opening up discussions with the Soviet Union and that no substantial modifications could be considered in the majority plan? What importance did we attach to the present public agitation? What did we consider the essential principles to which any effective plan must conform? Did we have any views as to procedures and next steps?

Chauvel thought it would be very valuable for the Sponsoring Powers (other than Soviet Union) to meet as soon as convenient to discuss these matters. He said he feared that there was not at the present moment “a sufficiently profound understanding” on the part of himself (he started to say “my government”) as to the indispensable conditions of a control plan. He referred again to his lack of understanding concerning the working of the stages formula.

Chauvel concluded by saying he did not see much value in the suggestion of Senator McMahon that the Council of the Atlantic Pact discuss atomic energy controls at a meeting this spring. However, if there were to be a meeting of the Council anyway, it would be convenient for the Foreign Ministers of US, UK, France and Canada to talk over the problem.

In this connection, Chauvel again mentioned Churchill’s suggestion for Three Power talks. Chauvel referred to the position Bidault took at the time of the Potsdam Conference, saying that Bidault would be consistent and object to discussions with the Soviet in which France did not participate. In any event, Chauvel hoped it would be possible for him to learn more concerning our thinking very soon, either in New York or in Washington. He was anxious to see me again when I returned from Washington.

I said I was certain a great deal of thought was being given to the whole problem in Washington. I said I was equally sure the Department would be completely frank in clarifying its views concerning any questions the French Government might wish to raise on this matter.

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7 In a Senate speech of March 1, Senator McMahon suggested a conference of Atlantic Pact nations to draft a new Western position on control of atomic energy. The new proposals would be presented to a special session of the United Nations General Assembly in Moscow.

8 Bidault was French Foreign Minister at the time of the Potsdam Conference (July 1945), in which France was not invited to participate. For documentation on the conference, including information on the French position with respect to it, see Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, two volumes (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960).
The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY WASHINGTON, March 23, 1950—1 p.m.

123. Reurtel 74, Jan 25 on conventional armaments. Your discussion on Item 3 of CCA Plan of Work shld be conducted on basis principles outlined in approved US position paper contained in RAC D–18/2e, which substitutes earlier statement submitted by Dep US Rep on CCA in Sept 1947. Additional study required of paper such as RAC D–18/7 which wld elaborate principles contained in RAC D–18/2e about which you will be kept advised.

Since resumption of CCA will mean another Sov walkout it is suggested there be close coordination with friendly Dels represented on CCA. You already have instrs Chi representation question. In connection consultations with friendly Dels fol are among reasons why resumption CCA’s activities desirable despite Sov absence:

1. Under normal conditions CCA shld already have met and resumption discussions wld simply be taking normal step. CCA’s planning activities support business as usual theme.

2. Since CCA Functions are planning in nature, ground covered in absence Sov cld be reviewed upon their return. This fact shld be made clear both to friendly Dels and in CCA itself. Temporary absence Sov wld launch Item 3 discussions without anticipated Sov obstructionism and so set stage to deal with what is likely to be Sov position, viz., that it is illogical consider Item 3 before considering Item 4 and that such consideration is device for delaying genuine disarmament including atomic weapons as well as conventional armaments. Nature of CCA’s activities in absence of Sov participation shld be made clear with friendly Dels as well as in CCA to avoid impression that something is being put over on Sov and to dispel reluctance which might develop in various quarters to any discussion of problem of regulation and reduction conventional armaments and armed forces solution of which will ultimately require Sov participation.

3. Consideration of Item 3 at this time wld re-emphasize importance and necessity of effective system of safeguard in plans for regulation and reduction conventional armaments and armed forces.

Resumption of discussions by taking up Item 3 wld also help in setting up liaison with new members of CCA and in coordinating thinking and energies of friendly Dels.

Your recommendation re modification US position of necessity for atomic energy control, Art 43 forces, and peace treaties with Germany and Japan as conditions precedent to regulation of conventional armaments under review.

ACHESON

1 Regarding this document, see footnote 2, p. 44.
2 Not printed.
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 3, 1950.

Subject: Negotiations with the U.S.S.R.

Participants: Foreign Minister Lester B. Pearson (Canada)
Ambassador Hume Wrong (Canada) ¹
Mr. R. G. Riddell (Canada) ²
Mr. Dean Rusk
Mr. Ernest Gross
Mr. Philip C. Jessup

One of the subjects which Mr. Pearson had put on the agenda for our informal discussions in New York Saturday and Sunday ³ was "The Cold War." The first aspect of the subject which he raised was the general problem of negotiations with them and the means by which this could be accomplished if it were desirable. The general Canadian attitude seemed to be that it would be desirable to keep on talking even though there were no great expectation of concrete results in the form of agreements. We pointed out that we had plenty of contacts and that again this was a case in which it was the Russians who did not take advantage of the opportunities to talk, e.g., in all of the organs of the UN. While admitting this, Pearson seemed to feel that from a public relations point of view we should frequently propose or initiate conversations and let the Russians have the onus of turning them down.

In this same context, we passed on to the question of the consideration of atomic energy and disarmament. Pearson felt it would be very desirable to resume talks on atomic energy. He said there had never really been an exploration of the points which Vishinsky raised last fall.⁴ He was not sanguine that the Russians had anything in mind, but he seemed to be reflecting Canadian Parliamentary and popular opinion in suggesting the desirability that we should not only take a fresh look at our own proposals, particularly in terms of the question of "ownership," but that we should also find ways to continue talks with the Russians on it. We discussed the possibility of getting over the procedural deadlock by having talks among Five Powers without

¹ Canadian Ambassador in the United States.
² Permanent Canadian Representative at the United Nations.
³ April 1 and 2.
⁴ In a discussion with Secretary Acheson and others in London on May 16, Pearson reiterated his concern regarding points raised by the Soviet Union at the 1949 General Assembly; for memorandum of conversation by Acheson, May 16, see p. 559.
Chinese participation. Mr. Gross expressed the opinion that the Russians would be unwilling to talk without a representative of China. Mr. Rusk suggested that, instead of starting from the idea of Six Powers and then eliminating one, we might go back to the Truman–Attlee–King base and extend Three Power talks by inviting the French and the Russians to join us. Pearson seemed to think this might be useful. It seemed to be a general view that a beginning might be made through informal talks perhaps at a dinner, but it was my impression that the Canadians would like to resume more formal conversations with the Russians, again largely from the point of view of public relations. Pearson spoke of the question of the advantages of a general prohibition on the use of atomic bombs as against the importance of the bomb as a deterrent. He felt that with the development of Russian atomic power we should have a new look at this proposition. He said that their people in re-evaluating the evidence wondered whether it was true the Russians really had the atomic bomb. Mr. Rusk pointed out that it would be quite inadvisable to proceed on the assumption that they did not.

PHILIP C. JESSUP

6 On November 15, 1945, President Truman, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, and Canadian Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King signed in Washington an Agreed Declaration proposing the establishment of a United Nations Atomic Energy Commission; for text, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1504; or 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1473. For documentation on the November tripartite meeting and other aspects of United States policy respecting atomic energy, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. 1, pp. 1–98.

IO Files: US/S/C.3/33

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy United States Representative on the Commission for Conventional Armaments (Nash)

CONFIDENTIAL

[New York,] April 6, 1950.1

Subject: Commission for Conventional Armaments

Participants: Sir Terence Shone,2 Mr. Dennis Laskey, Mr. David Cole, United Kingdom Delegation

Mr. Harry M. Shooshan, Jr., UNP

Mr. Frank Nash, Mr. Charles Russell, USUN

A meeting was held at the United Kingdom Delegation this morning to discuss the substance of a cable received from the U.K. Foreign Office concerning the desirability of an early resumption of discussions in C.C.A. (See US/S/C.3/32.)3 In effect, the Foreign Office took the

1 This memorandum, prepared on April 6, was circulated as US/S/C.3/33 on April 7.

2 Deputy to the Permanent British Representative at the United Nations.

3 Reference is to a memorandum by Russell of his conversation with Cole on April 4, not printed (IO Files).
position that it was inadvisable at this time to press ahead with the consideration of any major political issues without the participation of the Soviet, assimilating the situation in C.C.A. to that existing in the Atomic Energy Commission.

Mr. Nash commented on this position by pointing out the following: (1) In its resolution of December 5, 1949, the Fourth General Assembly called upon the C.C.A. to proceed with the consideration of its Plan of Work in order to achieve such progress “as might be possible”; (2) On January 17, 1950, after the Soviet walk-out, the Security Council transmitted the G.A. resolution to C.C.A., presumably in the expectation that the C.C.A. would proceed with appropriate action in response to it and would take such action despite anticipated Soviet non-participation; (3) In view of the foregoing, it was the opinion of the U.S. Delegation that discussions in C.C.A. should already have been reopened some time ago, and should not be delayed any longer in order to maintain the policy of “business as usual”; (4) The situation in C.C.A. was quite different from that in A.E.C. in that an actual plan had been developed in the latter field to which the U.S.S.R. was strongly opposed whereas no such plan had yet been evolved in C.C.A.; (5) The discussion in C.C.A. of the “adequate safeguards” problem covered by Item III of the Commission’s Plan of Work would involve only a “study” or “planning” exercise in which the Soviet representatives have expressed their lack of interest, professing to be interested only in getting ahead with the consideration of actual plans of disarmament (Item IV of the Plan of Work). Consideration of this item, therefore, in a wholly planning stage would hardly be regarded as any inflammatory action, and might actually go forward more smoothly than would be the case were the Soviet to be present.

Mr. Laskey responded by agreeing that it would certainly be necessary for the C.C.A. to meet before the next G.A. but he would have hoped that such a meeting might be held off until sometime later—as in June—on the possibility that the question of Chinese representation might be resolved in the meantime. He said he thought it doubtful that the principle of “business as usual” had proper application in a field like C.C.A., differentiating it from the economic and social fields where there has never been any large measure of Soviet participation.

After general discussion of the work of C.C.A., both Laskey and Cole conceded that the instructions received from their Foreign Office last August, authorizing them to proceed with the consideration of Item III of the C.C.A. Plan of Work, had not been altered except with respect to the bearing of the question of Chinese representation.

Sir Terence Shone commented on the possibility that the subjects of both atomic energy and regulation and reduction of armaments might come up for discussion in the impending meeting of the three Foreign
Ministers, and suggested that it might be desirable to abide this event before resuming discussions in C.C.A.

Mr. Cole advanced the suggestion that possibly it would be in order to have a meeting of C.C.A. at which the Commission (presumably after a Soviet walk-out) would take official note of the Security Council's transmittal of the G.A. resolution of December 5, 1949, and could then refer the matter for further consideration to the Working Committee of C.C.A.

Mr. Nash observed that in the opinion of the U.S. Delegation, it would be unwise to have a meeting of C.C.A. merely to note the transmittal of the G.A. resolution without any intention of proceeding with orderly consideration of the Commission's substantive business. He added, however, that it would require a certain amount of time for the members of the Commission to review the positions advanced in the Fall of 1947 on Item III of the Plan of Work by those who were on the Commission at that time, and to consult with their respective Foreign Offices on such current views as they might have. During this necessary interval the meeting of the Foreign Ministers would take place and the C.C.A. could have the benefit of such developments as might be forthcoming therefrom. He stated that in his view the referral of the matter to the C.C.A. Working Committee would constitute a recognition by C.C.A. that there was some useful work to be done despite the absence of the Soviet. This view was allowed to stand by the U.K. representatives although the cable from their Foreign Office had stated that if, upon an initial meeting of the C.C.A., the Soviet withdrew, there would appear to be no alternative but the temporary suspension of further activities.

In conclusion, it was agreed that steps should be taken by Mr. Nash to consult with the Delegations of France, Norway, Cuba, and Ecuador to obtain their views on the desirability of arranging for a meeting of C.C.A. before the end of April, looking toward April 18th as a suitable tentative date.

*For documentation on the meetings between Secretary Acheson, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, and French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman in London, May 11–13, see vol. III, pp. 828 ff.*

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**The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Connally)**

**WASHINGTON, April 12, 1950.**

**My Dear Senator Connally:** I refer to the Department's letter of March 8, 1950 which acknowledged receipt of your letter of the same date transmitting for the Department's comment a copy of
Senate Resolution 236 requesting "the United Nations to call an international conference with a view to achieving world disarmament".

The Department fully understands and is in complete sympathy with the objective of the resolution, namely, achieving world disarmament. However, it cannot agree with the timeliness of the method advocated for achieving the objective.

By subscribing to the Charter of the United Nations, particularly Articles 11, 26 and 47, the United States committed itself to work for and to achieve the universal regulation and reduction of armaments and it presumed that all the other signatory nations undertook the same solemn obligation. Conscientious efforts have been made in the United Nations since its establishment to fulfill these requirements of the Charter by action in the General Assembly, in the Security Council, in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (created for the formulation of specific proposals for the international control of atomic weapons and other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction), and in the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments (the field of competence of which is the formulation of proposals for the regulation and reduction of all other weapons).

As you know the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission was set up by the General Assembly Resolution of January 24, 1946. It has developed a detailed plan for the international control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons based on United States proposals submitted by Mr. Baruch to the Commission on June 14, 1946 and now endorsed by the overwhelming majority of the Member nations in the United Nations. The Commission for Conventional Armaments established by the Security Council Resolution of February 13, 1947 has directed itself to the careful preparation of proposals for the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces. In effect, therefore, it can be said that a disarmament conference has been going on since 1946 within the United Nations with the full support and active leadership of the United States.

\[1^{2}\) S. Res. 236, introduced by Senator Millard E. Tydings of Maryland on March 6 and referred to the Foreign Relations Committee, read as follows:

"Resolved, That the United Nations is hereby requested to invite the representatives of the governments of all nations to enter into an understanding and agreement to achieve world disarmament on land, on sea, and in the air, including bacteriological warfare, poison-gas warfare, and so forth, by January 1, 1954, except only for such actual occupying forces, with appropriate weapons, and for such agreed period of time, as will be necessary to police the defeated and occupied nations as a result of the recent war, and except only for such armed forces and for such weapons as are to be placed exclusively under the jurisdiction of the Security Council of the United Nations Organization, and except only for such limited forces and limited small arms as are needed to keep law and order within each country, and directly prohibiting the manufacture, storage, and possession of all other weapons, ammunition, and munitions of war, and providing further for the international inspection force authorized and instructed to see that the terms of such world disarmament are rigidly adhered to and carried out, and thereafter maintained by all the countries of the earth."
Realizing its responsibilities and desirous of seeing the objectives stated in the United Nations Charter fulfilled, this Government has guided itself along two lines. First, it has taken the position that the planning activities for the international control of atomic energy and the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces should go forward for implementation when conditions permit. Second, it has been working for measures to build up the political, economic and military strength of the non-communist nations in order to convince the Soviet Union that its best interests will be served by unqualified cooperation with other United Nations Member nations and so make agreements meaningful.

Counter to this Government's position the United Nations records reveal that in every instance of any importance, in every forum since the establishment of the two Commissions the Soviet Union has opposed and has voted against the majority's proposals relating to the possible international control of atomic energy and the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. The inescapable conclusion is that all efforts for the foreseeable future, whether within the United Nations or outside of it, toward achieving disarmament will be thwarted by the Soviet Union which by its objectives, policies, and methods is making ever clearer it does not want universal disarmament with the necessary concomitants of effective safeguards and controls to protect complying states against violations and invasions [evasions]. In the existing situation to ignore this fact would be to ignore the obvious responsibility of the Soviet Union for the lack of progress toward disarmament and would be to create a false illusion that some new method of approaching the Soviet Union would cause the reality of Soviet obstructionism to disappear. Accordingly, the Department strongly believes that the calling of an international conference by the United Nations for the purpose of attempting to reach an understanding and agreement for disarmament would suffer the same fate as the patient labors already expended in the United Nations. In fact, the calling of an international conference might have quite the opposite effect from that so earnestly desired by the resolution since it might well result in wiping out such progress as has been made in the fields of the control of atomic energy and the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments.

The United States has taken the position in both areas of negotiation that the security of this nation and of all peaceful and freedom-loving peoples requires the establishment of effective safeguards and controls which would protect complying states against violations and invasions. The Soviet Union by its actions has rejected this concept. Instead it has presented superficially attractive proposals for the prohibition and destruction of atomic weapons and the reduction of con-
ventional armaments, the implementation of which would certainly disarm the United States and the other free peoples of the world but would provide no guarantee of compliance by the Soviet Union or its satellites. As things now stand in the negotiations which have thus far transpired in the United Nations the refusal of the Soviet Union to agree to necessary controls and safeguards is manifestly clear. Accordingly, the Soviet Union probably would welcome the calling of an international conference which would provide it with a new opportunity to present glittering proposals, and all of the propaganda that would go with them, while the peace-loving nations at such a conference would have the relatively colorless but essential task of reasserting the necessity of safeguards and controls as the basic element of any agreement for universal disarmament.

In view of these facts it would not seem desirable to call a conference such as is contemplated in Senate Resolution 236. However, the Department is not unaware that, given a sufficient change in the international situation, which unfortunately does not appear near at hand, the calling of such a conference might possibly be desirable, and accordingly the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations should be assured that the suggestion contained in the resolution will be borne in mind.

The Department has been informed by the Bureau of the Budget that there is no objection to the submission of this report.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

JACK K. McFALL
Assistant Secretary

*The Foreign Relations Committee neither held hearings on the measure nor reported it to the Senate.

PM Files

The Secretary of State to the Acting Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Pike)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, April 20, 1950.

Dear Mr. Pike: As you are aware, it is United States policy to seek the establishment of effective international control of atomic energy by supporting the United Nations plan as set forth in the attached document.

*Files retained by the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State.

It would be most useful to the Department of State to obtain from
the Atomic Energy Commission a current evaluation, without regard
to political issues, of this plan to determine whether any technological
changes have occurred or are likely to occur in the United States or
abroad which would change the technical assumptions which underlie
this plan or which would invalidate it or necessitate changes in its
control features.

Since there is some urgency in this matter, I should appreciate
receiving the results of this evaluation as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles H. Russell, Adviser,
United States Mission at the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL


Subject: Conventional Armaments

Participants: Mr. David Cole, United Kingdom Delegation
               Mr. Harry M. Shoosham, Jr., UNP
               Mr. Charles H. Russell, United States Mission

1. Cole said at lunch today that he thought that the reluctance of
   the Foreign Office to renewed activity in the Commission for Con-
   ventional Armaments, and the Working Committee, was due more to
   devoting time to what he called a "futile effort" than to the absence
   of the Soviet Union over the question of Chinese representation. The
   Foreign Office had expressed and recently amplified views which were
   opposed to the resumption of the work of the Commission in the
   absence of the Soviet Delegation; he thought they were also reluctant
   to ask the British Chiefs of Staff to pass on questions in the field of
   disarmament when their minds were occupied with more pressing
   problems of an opposite nature.

2. Cole said that speaking for himself only, he could see that there
   were arguments for the Working Committee proceeding to the for-
   mulation of the general principles of a plan of safeguards (and he
   admitted that this might even be desirable from a U.N. point of view)
   provided that every effort was made to avoid bringing matters to a vote
   before the Soviets returned. There was discussion of the point which
   would be reached before any question of voting would arise. He in-
   timated that his delegation had recommended that the Working Com-
   mittee proceed with its program avoiding if possible bringing matters
to a vote in the absence of the Soviet Delegation.

3. Cole said that obviously the U.K. Delegation could not oppose
   anything being done in the Working Committee when other delega-
tions wanted to proceed. I had previously told him what we knew of the views of the French, Norwegian and Egyptian Delegations. Cole said that in so far as he knew only Mr. Menon (Indian Delegation)\(^1\) had expressed doubts.

4. In regard to preparation for the meeting of the Commission on April 27, Cole suggested

(a) that Noyes and Laskey compare notes on the Chinese representation question, and

(b) that it would be preferable to have the resolutions of the Security Council of January 17, 1950 and of the General Assembly of December 5, 1949 referred to the working Committee by action of the chairman rather than through voting on a draft resolution.

5. Cole said that it was possible that the U.K. Delegation might hear further from the Foreign Office before April 27\(^2\) and that, in that event, he would let us know. He saw no reason otherwise for a meeting between representatives of the U.K. and U.S. Delegations tomorrow. We said that Mr. Nash would be here tomorrow and that we were at their disposal.

\(^1\) M. Gopala Menon, Alternate Indian Representative to the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

\(^2\) The Commission for Conventional Armaments held its 20th Meeting on April 27, 1950, its first since August 1, 1949. His proposal for the expulsion of the Representative of the Republic of China having been rejected, Soviet Representative Yakov A. Malik withdrew from the meeting. He indicated that the Soviet Union would not regard as valid decisions taken in its absence.

At the same meeting, the Commission approved the proposal submitted by Frank C. Nash, the United States Representative, transmitting General Assembly Resolution 300(IV) (see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. 1., p. 242) to the CCA Working Committee with instructions that that body resume work on item 3 of the Commission's plan of work (safeguards). (IO Files: S/C.3/SR.20)

**USUN Files**

**Testimony by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) Before the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, Washington, April 26, 1950, 3:45 p. m.**

**SECRET**

In testifying before this Committee, I should like first of all to tell you that I am not a scientist nor an engineer. I rely upon my advisers in the Department, the Atomic Energy Commission, and in individual scientists for the best available technical opinion and advice in the field of international control of atomic energy. Through an interdepartmental committee on which the Departments of State and De-

\(^1\) This text was forwarded by Hickerson on May 10 to Deputy Representative John C. Ross at the United States Mission with instructions to transmit copies to the British and French delegations (USUN Files).
fense, and the Atomic Energy Commission, are represented, the concerted views of the three executive agencies most directly concerned are obtained on international control policy.

Since August 9, 1949, I have represented the United States in the consultations of the six permanent members of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. These were called for in the General Assembly resolution passed in Paris in 1948 in order to determine whether a basis for agreement on the international control of atomic energy could be found. As a member of the United States Delegation to the Fourth General Assembly of the United Nations last fall, I represented the United States in the General Assembly consideration and debate on atomic energy and on conventional armaments.

When I took this assignment, I needed an answer from the technical people as to whether it is or is not possible technically to control atomic energy to ensure that it is used only for peaceful purposes, so that the prohibition of all types of atomic weapons could be made really effective. Their answer was "yes".

This question has been repeatedly answered in the affirmative. It was first answered by the Board of Consultants appointed to the Department of State in early 1946, when that Board, known as the Acheson-Lilienthal Board, first reported that control of atomic energy was feasible and indicated the lines along which such control could be achieved.

It was answered again by the Scientific and Technical Committee of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission when that committee reported unanimously in September 1946 that "we do not find any basis in the available scientific facts for supposing that effective control is not technologically feasible." 2

Many times since, we have had this question looked into not only by the AEC, but by scientific and technical consultants as well, and the answer has always been the same.

The recent announcement regarding the hydrogen bomb, of course, immediately raised the question of whether the U.N.-plan of control would be fully adequate to cover the hydrogen bomb. The answer has been that it would.

While we are in constant touch with the AEC and the Department of Defense on this subject, we thought that it would be useful to get from the AEC a comprehensive current evaluation as to whether any other technical developments have occurred, or are likely to occur, in the United States or abroad which would require a change or a

modification in the United Nations plan. Present indications are that no important modification in the plan is called for.

I believe we can be assured that from the technical point of view, atomic energy can be controlled and atomic weapons of all types can be effectively prohibited. We can also be assured that the only plan that human ingenuity has been able to develop so far to do this is the plan developed in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and approved by an overwhelming vote of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948 and again in 1949. In the last General Assembly, only the Soviet bloc, now five states, voted against it.

The fundamental question is not feasibility of control, it is rather the question of the refusal of the Soviet Government to agree to the only effective control system so far devised. Realization of this fact is, in my view, essential to any sound evaluation of the situation which confronts us. If we are to get agreement on effective control and effective prohibition, we must have a willingness and a desire on the part of all concerned to reach such an agreement. If the Soviet Union has ever had in mind a willingness to negotiate such a system, it has successfully concealed it from us. This is not a conclusion that we have arrived at easily or without reluctance. It is a conclusion that is forced upon us as the only explanation for the Soviet behavior in over four years of debate and discussion of the problem of international control.

Now I am not saying that the Soviet Union does not want agreement. They do want agreement, but on their own terms. These are that nations agree to a convention providing for the prohibition and the destruction of atomic weapons without any system of safeguards that could give any promise at all that nations would abide by this agreement. The Soviet Union is always willing to agree that we destroy our atomic weapons.

When we come to the question of why the Soviet Union refuses to accept any effective system of international control, we are forced to deduce the real reasons for their refusal, not their stated reasons. In this connection, it is well to remember that never once has any Soviet representative stated that the United Nations plan would not be an effective one. This point has been made on a number of occasions by U.S. representatives and has never been challenged by the Soviet representative. One reason why the Soviet Union has refused to give serious consideration to any effective system is the fact they feel that any such system would be a breaching of the Iron Curtain. This, apparently, the Soviet Union cannot accept, whatever the consequences might be for international peace and security.

Another reason that comes to mind is the fact that the alternative to no agreement on international control is not necessarily unpleasant for the Soviet Union. It is unpleasant for the democracies for the
reason that the greatest threat that atomic weapons pose to the world is the threat of an atomic Pearl Harbor. Now, obviously, democracies do not launch such surprise attacks. Whatever the Soviet propaganda may say, they must fully realize this fact. The same does not hold true for a totalitarian state. Hitler's attacks on Poland, Norway, Denmark, Holland and the Soviet Union itself, and the Japanese attack against us, fully bear out this latter conclusion. The Soviet Union is not without guilt in this regard, as witness their actions against Poland and Finland in 1939. So long as the Soviet Union finds that the alternative to no agreement on effective control is an acceptable situation to them, there is little prospect that we can find any real basis for negotiation with them in this field. This is all the more true since they do not have to meet the pressure of any public opinion within their own country.

We are, therefore, forced to the conclusion that agreement in this field cannot pave the way for agreement in all the other areas of differences between the free world and the Soviet Union. Now this is not a new or a recent conclusion. It was reached as long ago as May, 1948 not only by the United States, but by ten of the twelve members of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, when, in its Third Report, they stated that "in the field of atomic energy, the majority of the Commission has been unable to secure the agreement of the Soviet Union to even those elements of effective control considered essential from the technical point of view, let alone their acceptance of the nature and extent of the participation in the world community required of all nations in this field by the First and Second Reports of the Atomic Energy Commission. As a result, the Commission has been forced to recognize that agreement on effective measures for the control of atomic energy is itself dependent on cooperation in broader fields of policy."

Although this conclusion was reached two years ago, we have not ceased our efforts to find some basis for agreement. At the request made on two occasions by the General Assembly of the United Nations, we have participated in a new and smaller forum composed of the six permanent members of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. These are Canada, China, France, the U.S., the U.K. and the U.S.S.R., who had originally sponsored the General Assembly resolution which created the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in January, 1946. To permit freer discussion, these meetings were held in closed session. The first meeting was on August 9, 1949. On October 25, an interim report to the General Assembly was submitted on the results of the consultations. I regret to state that absolutely no progress was made toward reaching a basis for agreement. On the same date, five of the powers submitted a statement to the General
Assembly in which, among other things, they outlined the basic obstacles to agreement, and stated certain conclusions which I believe are sufficiently important to read to you now:

"It appears from these consultations that, as in the past, the Soviet Union will not negotiate except on the basis of the principles set forth in the Soviet proposals of June 1947."

"The essential points in the Soviet control proposals, and the reasons for their rejection by the other five Powers, as brought out in the consultations, are as follows:

"The Soviet Union proposes that nations should continue to own explosive atomic materials.

"The other five Powers feel that under such conditions there would be no effective protection against the sudden use of these materials as atomic weapons.

"The Soviet Union proposes that nations continue, as at present, to own, operate, and manage facilities making or using dangerous quantities of such materials.

"The other five Powers believe that under such conditions, it would be impossible to detect or prevent the diversion of such materials for use in atomic weapons.

"The Soviet Union proposes a system of control depending on periodic inspection of facilities, the existence of which the national government concerned reports to the international agency, supplemented by special investigations on suspicion of treaty violations.

"The other five Powers believe that periodic inspection would not prevent the diversion of dangerous materials and that the special investigations envisaged would be wholly insufficient to prevent clandestine activities.

"Other points of difference, including Soviet insistence on the right to veto the recommendations of the International Control Agency, have not yet been discussed in the consultations.

"These consultations have not yet succeeded in bringing about agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the other five Powers, but they have served to clarify some of the points on which there is disagreement.

"It is apparent that there is a fundamental difference not only on methods but also on aims. All of the Sponsoring Powers other than the U.S.S.R. put world security first and are prepared to accept inno-

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vations in traditional concepts of international cooperation, national sovereignty and economic organization where these are necessary for security. The Government of the U.S.S.R. puts its sovereignty first and is unwilling to accept measures which may impinge upon or interfere with its rigid exercise of unimpeded state sovereignty.

"If this fundamental difference could be overcome, other differences which have hitherto appeared unsurmountable could be seen in true perspective, and reasonable ground might be found for their adjustment."

I wish to lay particular stress on the conclusion reached that the Soviet Union places its own narrow interpretation of sovereignty ahead of any consideration of what the impact of this interpretation might have on world peace and security.

I should like to recall also the behavior of the Soviet Union since the General Assembly in the consultations among the permanent members. The General Assembly on November 23, 1949, passed the following resolution by 49 votes to 5:

[Here follows the text of General Assembly Resolution 299 (IV), November 23, 1949, which requested the permanent members of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to continue their consultations. For the text of Resolution 299 (IV), see Foreign Relations, 1949, volume I, page 223.]

At the second meeting after the General Assembly and the fourteenth in the series of consultations on January 19, 1950, the Soviet Union, despite the solemn request of the General Assembly, walked out over the wholly extraneous and irrelevant issue of who should sit in the consultations for China. I was present at that meeting. I stated that the U.S. Government took the instructions of the General Assembly seriously and, had a different decision been made by the nations present regarding Chinese representation, I had been under instructions to proceed with the consultations. We continue to be ready to proceed with these consultations whenever the Soviet Union chooses to return to them. But I submit that unless and until the Soviet Union decides to become a cooperating member of the world community and to cooperate with the rest of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security, there is little prospect of any agreement on the question of international control of atomic energy.

The issues that separate us on this matter are fundamental ones. They cannot be solved by any tinkering with or modification of the control system. That does not mean that we are rigid in our thinking on this matter. On the contrary, we have repeatedly stated that we would give serious and sympathetic consideration to any proposals that might make the present United Nations plan either more workable or effective. We ourselves are constantly studying this problem
and if we should come up with any ideas that appear promising, we will not hesitate to put them forward.

In our consideration of this problem, we are well aware that the prohibition of atomic weapons is but one aspect of the armaments question. It cannot be finally dealt with except in the realization of the fact that the implementation of a plan for the international control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons must go hand in hand with the implementation of a plan for the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments. In the formulation of the respective control and regulation systems, it is essential, and was so recognized by the United Nations, to keep the two separate, but, as I stated before the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the General Assembly on November 19, 1949:

“At no time has any one denied that the two fields are closely interrelated—that they are two aspects of the one problem of disarmament. The Atomic Energy Commission has been endeavoring to work out a suitable and effective system for the control of atomic energy and the prohibition of the atomic weapon. The Commission for Conventional Armaments has been endeavoring to work out the preliminary steps for the development of an effective plan for the regulation and control of conventional armaments and armed forces. If and when the two Commissions succeed in developing suitable and acceptable plans in their respective fields, there will be a necessity for coordinating the two plans in an over-all system of collective security.”

This means that whenever there is agreement on the international control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons, we would not be in a position of disarming ourselves in one field without a compensatory reduction in the striking power of the Soviet land armies.

As I stated earlier, although we do not see much prospect of an early agreement in this field with the Soviet Union, we shall continue our efforts in the United Nations to reach agreement. But, as Secretary Acheson has said, we must not seek agreement for the sake of reaching agreement. We must maintain our economic health and stability in this country and increase our strength. We must, in association with the other free countries of the world, endeavor to build up our collective strength so that the Soviet Union will find itself impelled to enter into agreements in this and related fields. In my opinion, such agreements, deriving from a strong and united free world, have a good likelihood of being carried out by the Soviet Union. I must confess frankly that I would have little confidence that the Soviet Union would carry out any other kind of agreement. Their bad record in international affairs strongly supports this conclusion. Until such agreements are possible,

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*For the record of Hickerson’s address of November 19, 1949, see GA(IV), Ad Hoc Political Committee, pp. 235–236.*
we must build up our strength and that of the free world so that the Soviet Union will find aggression an unpromising and unprofitable venture.

Editorial Note


The progress report of the Working Committee (S/C.3/43), not published, including summary records of meetings and working papers considered, was transmitted to the Commission on August 9. In its report to the Security Council, S/1690, August 15, not published, the Commission transmitted the report of the Working Committee and the summary records of its own meetings. The Security Council took no action with respect to the report of the CCA during the remainder of 1950.

330.11/6-2050: Telegram

The Ambassador in Denmark (Anderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

COPENHAGEN, June 20, 1950—6 p. m.

440. In several conversations over weekend Professor Niels Bohr¹ stated that he had sent his open letter to UN² in hope of making a

¹Danish theoretical physicist and pioneer in the development of nuclear physics; adviser, Manhattan Engineer District (United States atomic bomb development program), 1943–1945.

contribution to world peace. He stressed, however, that his underlying purpose was to strengthen West's position vis-à-vis East by offering a more positive constructive moral theme. He considered concentration on theme of struggle against Communism was too negative and that world must have some higher aspiration. He believed that his idea, if appropriately developed could furnish a powerful stimulus to peace loving peoples of west and might even produce favorable effects on peoples behind the Curtain. He emphasized that if USSR also accepted, his plan would give greater advantage to West than to USSR since latter presumably is fully informed on atomic and other developments in West while we know very little what is taking place behind the Curtain. He was concerned lest Embassy and Department might not understand spirit in which he had offered suggestion and he was most apprehensive as to possible adverse repercussions on peoples of West should US dismiss or reject his proposal. He believed US had opportunity to make dramatic gesture which could electrify world.

Mrs. Roosevelt had long discussion Sunday with Bohr. She considered his proposals have some merit and plans to discuss same with President and Secretary after her arrival in US.

Embassy is of opinion that Bohr is intensely desirous of making some contribution to relieving tension between East and West; that this desire stems, not only from his own humanitarian instincts and devotion to Western democracies, but also as most Danes believe, from a keen sense of his own responsibility for present impasse as result of his contributions to development of atomic bomb.

ANDERSON

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. R. Gordon Arneson, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] June 26, 1950.


Participants: John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs
Mr. Henrik deKauffmann, Ambassador of Denmark
Benjamin M. Hulley, BNA
R. Gordon Arneson, U/A

The Danish Ambassador called at his request to set forth the views of the Danish Government on the open letter which Professor Niels Bohr had addressed to the United Nations on June 9, 1950. These views are reflected in the attached aide-mémoire which Ambassador deKauffmann left with the Department.
In elaboration of the matter, Ambassador deKauffmann made the following points. He was confident that Professor Bohr did not entertain any hope that the Soviet Union would agree to a proposal of openness. Professor Bohr felt that a great advantage would accrue to the United States if it saw fit to make such a proposal even though it would be turned down by the Soviet Union because it would help to rally the liberal and intellectual forces of the world to the support of the United States. Ambassador deKauffmann was pleased to note that there had been no expression of disapproval in the United States of Professor Bohr's proposal. He hoped very much that, at minimum, the United States would continue to refrain from adverse criticism of the proposal. He recognized that there were many practical difficulties. He recalled that Professor Bohr’s views on this matter had been known to the United States Government for some time and that a great deal of thought had been given to it. He hoped that it might be possible for the United States at least to express itself in favor of an open world as an objective to be striven for. He felt that a statement to this effect, while not very concrete, would be very helpful.

Mr. Hickerson stated that the Department was very glad to have this opportunity to discuss the Bohr proposal and very much appreciated having the views of the Danish Government as presented by the Ambassador. He went on to say that Professor Bohr’s views had been known for some period of time and that while we were of course in complete sympathy with the ideals expressed in the proposal, we foresaw many practical difficulties in handling the proposal.

Turning briefly to the Stockholm appeal, Ambassador deKauffmann pointed out that Professor Bohr had refused to sign it because he saw that it was at complete variance with his objective. The Communist press had attacked him vigorously for his unwillingness to sign while attempting to claim that his proposals and the Stockholm appeal sprang from the same motivations for world peace.

The Danish Ambassador left with the Department copies of Professor Bohr’s public reply to the request made on him to sign the Stockholm appeal as well as a copy of his statement to the press on the release of his open letter to the United Nations. Both are attached.

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1The Stockholm Appeal of the World Peace Council, March 19, 1950, read as follows:

“We demand the absolute banning of the atom weapon, arm of terror and mass extermination of populations.

“We demand the establishment of strict international control to ensure the implementation of this banning measure.

“We consider that any government which would be first to use the atom weapon against any country whatsoever would be committing a crime against humanity and should be dealt with as a war criminal.

“We call on all men of good will throughout the world to sign this Appeal.”

Documentation on the Stockholm Appeal is scheduled for publication in volume IV.

2Neither reproduced.
The Open Letter Professor Niels Bohr addressed to the United Nations on the 9th of June, 1950, was sent entirely on his own initiative and without foregoing consultation with the Danish Government.

When, however, the Danish Prime Minister became acquainted with the Open Letter, Mr. Hedtoft \(^{3}\) made the Danish point of view in regard to Professor Bohr’s letter known in a statement which he gave to the press in Copenhagen on the 13th of June.

In this statement it was said:

"Professor Bohr emphasizes the importance of cooperation among nations. He raises the demand for an open world with free access to information and exchange of ideas everywhere as a means to strengthen reciprocal confidence and to guarantee mutual safety.

We in Denmark sincerely hope that the thoughts expressed in the Open Letter may be an impulse to serious deliberations in the minds of everybody, who has a share in the responsibility for the future of our world."

The view expressed by the Prime Minister is shared by the entire Danish Cabinet.

While the Government in Copenhagen has no intention to make any further public comments to Professor Bohr’s Open Letter for the time being, the Danish Government would like to acquaint the Government of the United States of America with their views on the matter in every respect.

The Danish Government attaches very great importance to the thoughts expressed in Professor Bohr’s Open Letter and would deeply deplore it should Professor Bohr’s initiative be looked upon by the public merely as an expression of the good intentions of a purely theoretical scientific mind.

In the view of the Danish Government, an early clear American declaration to all countries in favor of an open world and a renewed American offer to place all military scientific inventions at the disposal of all countries under the safeguard of mutual appropriate international control would be of the greatest value in the effort to surmount the present international stalemate. Such a step would create all over Europe a strong and good impression of American sincerity and might possibly also be of great impact in Yugoslavia, China, India, and other countries.

\(^{3}\) Hans Hedtoft, Prime Minister of Denmark.
Even if not accepted it would possibly force the opponents of an open world to explain their reasons in public.

For these reasons the Danish Government would view with great regret any statement from the American Government indicating dissociation from the thoughts expressed by Professor Bohr.

WASHINGTON, June 21, 1950.

PM Files

The Acting Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Pike) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGOTON, June 26, 1950.

DEAR MR. ACHESON: The Commission and the General Advisory Committee to the Commission have had an opportunity to examine the question raised in your letter of April 20, 1950, concerning the United Nations plan for the international control of atomic energy.

We have examined the recommendations of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, as embodied in Department of State Publication 3646. We have also examined in particular Part IV of the United Nations report, entitled "The First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council." This deals with the scientific and technical aspects of the problem of control, and makes explicit the agreed view of the technical problems which underlay the control plan.

The Commission and the General Advisory Committee agree (1) that there have been no new scientific discoveries known to us which alter the situation; (2) that there may soon be technical developments which have some bearing on control problems; and (3) that, with the passage of time, major changes in the technical situation have occurred which profoundly alter the presuppositions under which the report appears to have been made. We may briefly summarize these points.

1. No scientific discoveries are known to us which open up sources of energy release not publicly known when the reports were written. No discoveries lend support to the view that the large-scale release of atomic energy can be based on raw materials other than uranium or thorium.

2. a. One technical development now underway in this country may, if successful, have an effect on the control plan. This is the electro-nuclear generation of neutrons. If this turns out to be practical on a large scale, it will mean that atomic energy can be released by converting thorium to U-233 without the use of natural uranium. This would mean that controls of thorium might have to be as strict as those of uranium. This development would also make it possible to produce not only U-233 but tritium and plutonium without the operation of
reactors. The success and cost of this development can not now be foretold; it is unlikely to be realized for a few years.

b. The development of thermonuclear weapons now underway in this country may also have a bearing on the control plan. If this development is successful, it will mean that tritium must be regarded as a “dangerous” material. No development of thermonuclear weapons appears possible which does not start with an atomic explosion using plutonium, U-235, or U-233, and which does not use tritium produced in nuclear reactors, or perhaps by electronuclear neutrons.

3. There are at least three important changes in the technical situation that have occurred since the first use of atomic weapons. One is the production of atomic weapons by the Soviet Union; the second is the great accumulation of stocks of U-235 and plutonium, at least in this country; the third is the fact that the hopes for a rapid development of atomic power have not so far been fulfilled. The first two of these clearly create serious problems with regard to bringing into operation the control provisions of the plan. The third indicates that the development of a large-scale atomic power industry is less certain and may proceed more slowly and on a smaller scale than envisaged in the control arrangements. This point may be relevant in assaying the relative importance of development and control functions of an international authority limited solely to atomic energy.

Sincerely yours,

Sumner T. Pike

220.11/7-2150

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. David H. Popper of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 21, 1950.

Participants: M. Henri Bonnet, Ambassador of France
Mr. John D. Hickerson, UNA
Mr. David H. Popper, UNP

Ambassador Bonnet called to discuss the problem of handling the subject of control of atomic energy at the General Assembly next fall. The Ambassador pointed out that the matter would undoubtedly arise at the Assembly, and that because Soviet “peace” propaganda had made certain inroads in Europe and elsewhere, it was important to seek a common approach to the subject. It was also necessary to consider methods of dealing with impracticable proposals for atomic energy control which might be made from the most generous motives by individuals like Romulo, but which might be extremely dangerous. We had had some experience with such proposals at the last General Assembly. The Ambassador suggested that members of the US, UK, and French Delegations in New York discuss the problem informally in the near future.
Mr. Hickerson informed Ambassador Bonnet that we would be planning to consult the French as well as the British on a number of General Assembly issues and that we would be glad to undertake separate talks on atomic energy. It was agreed that the Ambassador would so inform M. Chauvel in New York as well as his Government, and that Mr. John Ross, who is the ranking US representative for atomic energy problems at the Mission, would be authorized to participate, possibly with the assistance of an expert from the Department. The French will take the initiative in raising the matter in New York.

Mr. Hickerson suggested that in order to avoid complications with regard to Chinese participation in the informal talks, it would be better to limit the discussions to American, British and French representatives, excluding the Canadians. The Ambassador agreed.

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 14, 1950—7 p.m.

143. For Ross from Hickerson. After discussion subject urtel 257 am firmly of opinion no meeting of six permanent members of UNAEC should be called. Position majority unassailable and cannot be improved by asking Malik whether he still means what he said when he walked out in Jan. We already have Malik's refusal to participate on the record. Majority statement in letr 30 Jan to SYG, UNAEC, and all UN members is, in effect, report to GA.

A meeting might give an illusion of progress, would divert attention from important issues, and should Malik appear, would risk all the dangers arising from debating again the issue of Chinese representation without any compensating advantages. [Hickerson.]

ACHESON

1 In telegram 257 from New York, August 11, Ross reported that Jean Chauvel, French Representative to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, had raised the possibility of addressing a communication to Soviet Representative Malik concerning the possibility of his return to the forum of the six sponsoring powers (Malik had returned to the Security Council at the beginning of August) (330.11/8–1150).

2 In a conversation of August 28, Hickerson informed Chauvel and Sir Gladwyn Jebb, Permanent British Representative at the United Nations and to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, of the opposition of the United States to an approach to Malik. He indicated, however, that if the other four sponsors favored such an initiative, the United States would go along with that course of action. (IO Files: US/AEC/51) No evidence that the French proposal was pursued has been found in the files of the Department of State.
[WASHINGTON,] August 22, 1950.

Dear Mr. Chairman: International control of atomic energy is on the agenda for this fall’s session of the United Nations General Assembly. In the debates on this agenda item, it is the intention of the United States Government to continue its support of the United Nations plan of control.

In a letter dated April 20, 1950, I asked the Atomic Energy Commission for a current evaluation of the United Nations plan. In a letter dated June 26, 1950 from Sumner T. Pike, Acting Chairman, I received assurance that there have been no new scientific discoveries known to the Commission which altered the situation.

The Commission’s letter, however, identified two technical developments which might have some bearing on control problems and three major changes in the technical situation which have occurred since the plan was developed and approved.

It is important to be certain whether it would be technologically feasible to establish the type of control envisaged in the United Nations plan and, further, whether the plan, once established, would be effective.

One technical development mentioned in the letter indicates that it might be possible to produce not only plutonium from uranium and tritium from lithium, but also U-233 from thorium, without the operation of reactors. The United Nations plan makes no distinction between the controls which the international agency would exercise over uranium and thorium. Since the plan also provides that the international agency would own, operate and manage all facilities that make or produce dangerous quantities of nuclear fuel—which, by definition, includes both fusionable and fissiable materials—it would appear that the United Nations plan would meet the dangers inherent in this possible development. I should like the views of the Commission on this point.

The other technical development mentioned in the letter relates to the possible development of thermonuclear weapons. As the Commission’s letter states, an atomic explosion using plutonium, U-235, or U-233 is necessary to start a thermonuclear reaction. It follows then, if fission weapons were effectively eliminated, no thermonuclear weapon could be made. As for the point that tritium must be con-

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1 Commissioner Gordon E. Dean was appointed Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission effective July 11, 1950.
sidered a "dangerous material", the United Nations plan gives the agency the power to define "dangerous" materials. If we recall further that the United Nations plan gives to the international control agency the exclusive right to own source material, key substances, nuclear fuel and all facilities that make or produce these in dangerous quantities, it appears that the United Nations plan would effectively meet the dangers from the possible development of thermonuclear weapons. The views of the Commission on this point are also requested.

Mr. Pike’s letter of June 26, 1950, identifies three changes in the technical situation that have occurred since the first use of atomic weapons. In my opinion, the most significant one, from the viewpoint of international control, is the second; namely, the accumulation of stocks of nuclear fuel by more than one country. Apart from the problem of disposing of these stocks once the United Nations plan was accepted, there is the question as to how one can be assured that all accumulated stocks would, in fact, be turned over to international control. If there can be no adequate assurance on this point, it may well be that there is no plan of control, the United Nations or any other, which would prevent atomic weapons from appearing on the international scene without timely warning. I should appreciate the Commission’s advice as to the combination of scientific and technical methods that could be used to determine whether all significant stocks have been turned over to the agency, and the degree of certainty attaching thereto.

If the degree of certainty is very high, the first change in the technical situation mentioned in the letter, namely, the production of atomic weapons by the Soviet Union, can be coped with. Assurance that no stocks of nuclear fuel would be in the possession of any nation after the establishment of the plan could mean that atomic weapons could not get into national hands without warning.

The production of atomic weapons by the Soviet Union raises some problems concerning the establishment of any control system. However, it should be pointed out that during the development of the United Nations plan, it had always been kept in mind that not only the Soviet Union, but other nations would come into possession of atomic weapons. In the detailed spelling out of stages of transition from the present situation to one of international control, which has yet to be done, such capabilities would be taken into account.

The fact that hopes for a rapid development of atomic power have so far not been fulfilled is the third major change identified in the letter. It occurs to me that, among others, the possible development of the electro-nuclear method of generating neutrons might, by easing the uranium supply problem, have a bearing on the prospects for devel-
oping atomic power on a substantial scale. If this is so, it is perhaps difficult to improve on the provision incorporated in the United Nations plan designed to give flexibility in this matter to the international control agency, as technical developments might warrant. This provision is contained in Specific Proposal 12, Chapter 4, page 25 of the United Nations plan, which reads:

"The international agency shall keep the production of nuclear fuel, in a form suitable for ready conversion to use in atomic weapons, at the minimum required for efficient operating procedures necessitated by actual beneficial uses, including research and development. The agency shall not be authorized to increase existing stocks of nuclear fuel for any contemplated requirement, except where it is necessary to produce nuclear fuel for use in facilities whose location, design, construction and financing have been definitely decided by the agency and the nation concerned."

Early receipt of the Commission's view on the foregoing points would be helpful. The Fifth Regular Session of the General Assembly will be convened on September 19, 1950.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

10 Files: SD/A/C.1/336

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 2, 1950.

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY

THE PROBLEM

What should be the position of the United States with regard to the international control of atomic energy?

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The United States should not encourage substantive debate on this question in the General Assembly.

2. If debate develops, the United States should take the following position:

(a) Continue its support for international control by means of the United Nations plan, while making it clear that any other proposals which would be equally or more workable and effective would receive our sympathetic consideration.

(b) Support continuation of the forum of the Six Permanent Members (the Sponsoring Powers) of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission as the only appropriate one for seeking a basis for agreement, and oppose resumption of negotiations in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission itself.
(c) Press the view that, although the system for international control of atomic energy is necessarily different from the system for the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and their formulation and elaboration must be kept separate, the two must be coordinated in their implementation once agreement has been reached on the respective systems.

COMMENT

The underlying causes for the impasse in atomic energy negotiations first reported on May 17, 1948 by the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission ¹ have become increasingly obvious. The negotiations have been thwarted by an “impasse in depth”: the persistent refusal of the Soviet Union either to accept the only effective plan for control and prohibition so far devised or to put forward any effective proposals of their own stems from the fundamental of Soviet refusal to become a cooperative member of the world community. No effective prohibition is possible without an effective system of control. This is rejected by the Soviet Union because any such system would open up the Soviet Union, and therefore cannot be tolerated by the Kremlin. So long as the Kremlin maintains its present methods, policies and aims there is no hope of securing dependable agreement on effective international control.

The forum of the Six Permanent Members of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, established by the General Assembly in 1948, is the appropriate body in which to seek a basis for agreement. To it should be referred any substantive proposals that may be made in the General Assembly debate. Composed of those Members of the United Nations whose agreement is essential if any system of control and prohibition is ever to be established, it is the proper body for exploiting or exposing to the fullest any change in Soviet attitude or position. The United States is prepared to resume consultations in this forum whenever the Soviet Union chooses to return to it.

It is obvious that a system of control aimed at prohibition of atomic weapons should be put into effect in phase with the implementation of a system for regulation and reduction of conventional armaments. As appropriate in the debate, the United States should re-emphasize the view set forth by the United States Delegation on November 19, 1949 in the debate on conventional armaments as follows:

“At no time has any one denied that the two fields [atomic weapons and conventional armaments] ² are closely interrelated—that they are two aspects of the one problem of disarmament. The Atomic Energy

¹ Reference is to the Third Report of the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC, 3rd yr., Special Suppl, or Department of State Publication 3179 (July 1948)).
² Brackets appear in the source text.
Commission has been endeavoring to work out a suitable and effective system for the control of atomic energy and the prohibition of the atomic weapon. The Commission for Conventional Armaments has been endeavoring to work out the preliminary steps for the development of an effective plan for the regulation and control of conventional armaments and armed forces. If and when the two commissions succeed in developing suitable and acceptable plans in their respective fields, there will be a necessity for coordinating the two plans in an over-all system of collective security."

*For the record of the 42nd Meeting of the Ad Hoc Political Committee, November 19, 1949, during which John D. Hickerson, the United States Representative, made the statement here quoted, see GA(IV), Ad Hoc Political Committee, pp. 234-245.

IO Files: SD/A/C.1/337

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State

SECRET

Regulation and Reduction of Conventional Armaments and Armed Forces

The Problem

What should be the position of the United States with regard to the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments?

Recommendations

1. The United States should not encourage substantive debate on this question in the General Assembly.

2. If debate develops, the United States should take the following position:

(a) Continue its support of the objective of regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces.

(b) Support continuation of the planning activities of the Commission for Conventional Armaments proceeding on the basis of its approved plan of work and currently engaged in the consideration of Item 3 thereof.

(c) Insofar as there are attempts to link planning activities of international control of atomic energy with the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces, press the view that, although the system for international control of atomic energy is necessarily different from the system for the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces, and their formulation and elaboration must be kept separate, the two must be coordinated in their implementation once agreement has been reached on the respective systems.
While attempting to avoid a substantive debate on the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces in the Fifth Regular Session of the General Assembly, the United States should not hesitate to defend its record and attack the Soviet record. The underlying cause for the lack of real progress in negotiations looking toward the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces stems from Soviet policies, methods, and aims. There are no indications that the U.S.S.R. will change such policies, methods, and aims in the foreseeable future, or that it will make any effort to negotiate constructively in the field of armaments regulation and reduction. Soviet objectives include the use of the armaments field as one facet of its subversive program. The most effective means for dealing with Soviet moves in the conventional armaments field is for the United Nations to continue support of the Commission for Conventional Armaments proceeding in accordance with its approved plan of work.

The Commission for Conventional Armaments is currently engaged in discussions on Item 3 of its plan of work despite the absence of the representative of the Soviet Union. Item 3 consists of "consideration of practical and effective safeguards by means of an international system of control operating through special organs (and by other means) to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions". The United States attaches great importance to the thorough consideration of Item 3. The United States has introduced into the Commission for Conventional Armaments four papers expressing the general views of this Government with respect to the scope and nature of the "safeguards" field. These papers constitute the core of substantive consideration of this problem since the Fourth Regular Session of the General Assembly, and in fact represent the substance of the Commission's report to the Security Council for its activities since the Fourth Regular Session of the General Assembly. The four United States papers constitute general guidance on the substance of Item 3—"Safeguards".1

The general views of the United States contained in the four papers will undoubtedly serve as the basis for future discussion in the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

Any substantive proposals made during the Fifth Regular Session of the General Assembly should be referred to the Commission for Conventional Armaments for consideration within the framework of its established plan of work.

It is obvious that a system for regulation and reduction of con-

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1 For information regarding the United States papers and the report of the Commission, see editorial note, p. 75.
ventional armaments and armed forces should be put into effect in phase with the implementation of a system of international control of atomic energy aimed at prohibition of atomic weapons. As appropriate, in the debate the United States should re-emphasize the view set forth by the United States Delegation on November 19, 1949 (the Fourth Regular Session of the General Assembly) in the debate of the conventional armaments as follows:

“At no time has any one denied that the two fields [atomic weapons and conventional armaments] \(^2\) are closely interrelated—that they are two aspects of the one problem of disarmament. The Atomic Energy Commission has been endeavoring to work out a suitable and effective system for the control of atomic energy and the prohibition of the atomic weapon. The Commission for Conventional Armaments has been endeavoring to work out the preliminary steps for the development of an effective plan for the regulation and control of conventional armaments and armed forces. If and when the two Commissions succeed in developing suitable and acceptable plans in their respective fields, there will be a necessity for coordinating the two plans in an over-all system of collective security.” \(^3\)

\(^2\) Brackets appear in the source text.
\(^3\) See footnote 3, p. 86.

Minutes of the Briefing Session of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Department of State, September 8, 1950, 10 a.m.

SECRET

Representatives and Alternate Representatives

- Ambassador Austin
- Mrs. Roosevelt
- Senator Sparkman \(^1\)
- Senator Lodge \(^2\)
- Mr. Dulles \(^3\)
- Mr. Cohen \(^4\)
- Mr. Cooper \(^5\)
- Mrs. Sampson \(^6\)

Members of the Staff

\(^1\) Senator John J. Sparkman of Alabama, member of the United States Delegation.
\(^2\) Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., of Massachusetts, member of the United States Delegation.
\(^3\) John Foster Dulles, consultant to the Secretary of State; member of the United States Delegation.
\(^4\) Benjamin V. Cohen, Counselor of the Department of State, 1945–1947; alternate member of the United States Delegation.
\(^5\) John Sherman Cooper, Senator from Kentucky, 1946–1948; alternate member of the United States Delegation.
\(^6\) Mrs. Edith S. Sampson, alternate member of the United States Delegation.
[Here follows discussion of certain items to be considered by the General Assembly.]

3. Atomic Energy (SD/A/C.1/336)

Mr. Arneson began with a review of the melancholy history of negotiations on atomic energy, going back to November 1945 when through the Truman–MacKenzie-King–Attlee Declaration the United Nations was asked to work out effective control plans for atomic energy. He referred also to the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission and to the Acheson–Lilienthal report. The principle that prohibition required effective control had been accepted by the vast majority of United Nations members, but the Soviet Union had continued to maintain that prohibition could be achieved by itself, and had proposed a system of control worth absolutely nothing. Mr. Arneson described the work of the Atomic Energy Commission in working toward a system of control. Comparing the Soviet and UN plans, Mr. Arneson noted that both provided for prohibition of atomic weapons, but, while the United Nations plan prohibited nations from owning fissionable materials and operating facilities, the Soviet plan provided simply for periodic inspection of declared facilities to see whether technical rules for exploitation were being observed, and if suspicion arose, the Security Council could call for special investigations, with the obvious objection that under the proposed set-up, it would be virtually impossible for suspicion to arise.

Mr. Arneson reviewed the recommendations in the position paper. The United States should not encourage substantive debate on this question in the Assembly; this position stemmed from the view that questions such as Chinese representation, Korea, and other pressing political problems would be the center of attention. Moreover, the United States record on effective international control was clear.

Ambassador Austin asked whether there should not be some recognition of the suspicion which prevails in the Assembly among all nations that we have not been sincere in our offers, and that we have imposed a control plan which is too difficult to be carried out. He wondered whether at least we should not discuss the matter to prove that we are in dead earnest on this subject and absolutely sincere, that we are continuing to search for better plans, that we are open-minded, that we realize the danger of this terrible force and hope for a solution. Mr. Arneson concurred in this position.

Mr. Dulles, while agreeing that there was merit in Ambassador Austin’s remarks, thought that there was nothing which the United States could do which would effectively dissemble the fact that our

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\*\* Aste, p. 84.\*\*
entire strategic position was based upon the use of atomic weapons. We had not developed ground forces but had limited ourselves to one thing—the creation of a strategic air force for carrying atomic bombs. Words could not dissemble these facts. We could not deprive ourselves of atomic weapons unless a complete settlement was reached. He was rather skeptical as to whether we should encourage discussion which, however eloquent our words, ran counter to our deeds.

Senator Lodge expressed his sympathy with these views, inasmuch as our basic strategy was based upon the atomic bomb. Nevertheless, we were ready to go ahead with a plan of control but, while our record was clear on this point, it was not clear at all in the mind of the average man, judging from the Stockholm Appeal, and our position, he felt, should be advertised to offset this effect. Mr. Hickerson believed the Korean crisis had done a great deal to expose this phoney appeal for peace. He did not feel that we would have the same difficulty with it as might have been the case without Korea, which had completely discredited the Stockholm Appeal. Moreover, we stood by our plan for control, and nobody would be happier than the United States if that plan could be accepted as a part of a general disarmament plan which would make a corresponding reduction in the forces of the Soviet Union.

It seemed to Mr. Cohen that for the first few years the United States had made an excellent record and gotten tremendous good will by making people genuinely believe that we were working hard to solve the problem of the atomic weapon; since that time we had lost something, although he hoped his analysis might be wrong. He was not defending the Soviet position, but he believed many people had derived the impression that we were not now as eager as we were then to find a solution to this problem. Recalling the Soviet discovery of the bomb, he remarked that people like Barnard were writing in favor of reconsideration of our position, and while we stated that we were ready to reconsider, he did not know whether we had really thought things through. We could lose a good deal by not thinking this problem through consistently on its merits, even as to how it affects our defense program; certainly we could not afford to play the Soviet game of talking one way and acting another. He did not think we had done all that we could to meet the problem. The situation was further complicated because some of those who had dealt with the problem had written in a way that indicated needs could not be reconciled with effective control. He did not doubt that the United States had superiority through its stockpile, but what concerned him was the

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*Presumably Chester I. Barnard, President of the Rockefeller Foundation; Member of the Secretary of State's Committee on Atomic Energy, 1946.*
damage a few bombs from the other side might do in view of our
delicately organized system.

Mr. Arneson pointed out that despite our position not to foster
debate, it would undoubtedly develop. It was our position to continue
to support the United Nations control plan and at the same time to
make clear that we did not contend that we had exhausted all human
ingenuity on the subject, and would welcome any other proposals. He
indicated that the Department had not “rested on its ears” in this
matter and had tried to consider alternatives, following the great
debate on the hydrogen bomb and the news of the Soviet discovery.
The Atomic Energy Commission had been asked whether, in the light
of these developments, the plan still worked; could it be improved
upon; and did it cover the hydrogen bomb. The Commission answered
that the plan still worked and did cover the new bomb; accordingly
we were standing by the United Nations plan.

We had been unable to find any other proposals and would welcome
any. We would listen sympathetically to any ideas proposed in this
Assembly. He reviewed the background of the United Nations plan.
The continued Soviet refusal to accept the plan, in his view, con-
stituted a grave danger since it implied that the Soviets would not
cooperate in this case or elsewhere. He emphasized that the plan re-
lected not only the views of the United States but suggestions by
France and others, and had been accepted by nine of the eleven
Security Council Members in 1948. Because of the Soviet position, it
appeared that the Commission could not continue to work usefully,
and the permanent members had been requested to constitute them-
selves a forum to see whether any basis for agreement existed or could
be reached. There had been lengthy meetings during 1949 without
agreement, but these consultations had broken down with the Soviet
walk-out early in 1950. Mr. Arneson believed that this forum of the
six sponsoring powers should be continued. It had flexible rules, met
in secrecy, and as often as it wished; it could consider any proposals.
Mr. Arneson recalled that a series of suggestions had been made during
the last Assembly, but the permanent members had not been able to
begin on them before the Soviet walk-out. He did not believe reopen-
ing negotiations in the Atomic Energy Commission would be useful.

Mr. Arneson described the relationship between this problem and
conventional armaments. It was recognized that the two must be
brought “in phase” together. Neither could be worked out without a
basic agreement on the control system.

Mr. Cohen was still concerned with the fact that, although things
could not be changed over-night, we had not gone far enough to
satisfy the American people and the world of our concrete thinking
on these problems. He thought the situation required at least an
explanation of why some changes are not involved due to the Russian discovery of the bomb. He thought the idea of stages now required further study. He had not seen any official or unofficial answer to some of the problems which Barnard raised, and he believed that the Delegation should have the answers to any questions and doubts, even though those with such questions might still vote with us. We had been put at a disadvantage, insofar as public understanding was concerned, when the Russians had desired to put the two problems of conventional armaments and atomic energy together, and we had not agreed. He wondered whether we could not do something to show that we had plans for balanced armaments in the world, once current problems were settled. He thought we lost some advantage by not having our ideas in this field worked out more concretely. Perhaps a panel might be set up in this country, as was the case before, even though this time the report probably could not be made public. He felt a more constructive effort was definitely needed. So far as other countries making suggestions was concerned, he believed they were in doubt and did not wish to make any proposal which might embarrass us.

4. Conventional Armaments (SD/A/C.1/337)*

Mr. Shooshan 10 explained that the conventional armaments problem was something of a stepchild. Primary attention had been focused on atomic weapons. However, in the first Assembly the Soviet representative took occasion to attack the United States proposals on atomic energy and suggested immediate steps be taken to reduce armaments and to prohibit the manufacture and use of atomic weapons. As a result, the Commission on Conventional Armaments had been established; it had decided upon a plan of work: (1) definition of conventional armaments and field of competence; (2) general statement of principles governing armaments; (3) general system of safeguards; (4) development of actual plan for regulation and reduction of conventional armaments; (5) extension of plan to non-United Nations members; (6) actual drafting of a treaty. The Soviets had submitted a separate plan of work, but the Security Council had adopted the United States-sponsored plan, the Soviet representative abstaining. The Conventional Armaments Commission had then begun work on the first two items of its program. However, at the third Assembly the Soviet Union submitted a proposal calling for a reduction of armaments by one-third. Out of this resolution had developed a French-Belgian proposal for an arms census. The United States had supported this step. Proposals had been adopted but were vetoed by the Soviet representative in the Security Council. Last year the Commission had

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* Supra.

been instructed to continue its work, but shortly after it convened, the Soviets had walked out; nevertheless the Commission had carried on. The United States had taken the initiative and submitted four papers; a general paper laying out the field; description of the necessary organization; the field of military and para-military establishments which would have to be subject to control; other safeguards—census and verification of industries. While there had been some opposition to going ahead, it was expected that a report would go to the Assembly for its information. We would hear the views of other delegations, and while we would not push substantive debate, it could be anticipated.

Ambassador Austin suggested that the history of conventional armaments gave evidence of United States sincerity in the field. He was not quite clear as to the coordination suggested between the two fields of conventional armaments and atomic energy by the language "in phase".

Mr. Dulles agreed that the United States should not encourage substantive debate on these subjects because, at the present stage of world affairs, it was not possible to have a debate in which the United States position could be made with great sincerity. Our control of the atomic weapons and the principal reliance of our government upon them for defense had to be taken into account in considering the problems. Acceptance of the plans we had proposed would involve complete collapse of the iron curtain. When one really stated all the conditions which would have to be met, if one was honest, he simply could not help giving the impression that the conditions were so many and so difficult that this was simply a propaganda move. While Mr. Dulles favored such propaganda when it could be gotten away with, he did not believe this field should be selected for our main propaganda effort.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

S/S Files: Lot 65D238: Conversations with the President

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

SECRET

Memorandum of Conversation with the President

[WASHINGTON,] September 11, 1950.

ITEM NO. 5—UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The President asked me to consider whether either in my opening speech or in a possible speech which he might make to the General

1 Lot 65D238, memoranda of the Secretary of State's conversations 1949–1952, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.
Assembly later in October, it would not be wise for us to renew our offers made in connection with the atomic bombs and disarmament. He did not suggest going beyond present policy but merely making clear again that we are prepared at all times to discuss and work out something on these matters.

I told the President that various opinions had been made which went considerably beyond present policy, and indicated why I thought these were unwise at the present time. He agreed that anything along the lines of the suggestions made in the first draft outline speech for me would be most disastrous. However, he regards this matter as most important, and I told him that it would be given the greatest thought. I also told the President that my speech in the General Assembly would be cleared with him and would reach him in ample time so that he could give it careful thought.

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*The draft under reference has not been identified.

*For the text of Secretary Acheson’s address at the 279th Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, September 20, 1950 (during the general debate phase of proceedings), see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Plenary Meetings*, pp. 23-27 (hereafter cited as GA (V), Plenary), or Department of State *Bulletin*, October 2, 1950, pp. 523-529. During his address, Secretary Acheson presented a program for strengthening international security, consideration of which ultimately resulted in approval by the General Assembly of the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution. For documentation on that subject, see vol. II, pp. 303 ff.

PM Files

The Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Dean) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, September 20, 1950.

Dear Mr. Secretary: In reply to your letter of August 22, 1950, the effects of technical developments on the international control of atomic energy, which were referred to in our letter of June 26, 1950, are discussed in more detail below. These matters are considered under four main headings which we believe cover the points raised in your letter.

I. Accumulation of Fissionable Material

Now that the USSR has produced fissionable material, the technical question arises as to how the United States could be sure that the USSR had turned over all fissionable material to an international agency, if such an agency were established in accordance with the United Nations plan for control of atomic energy. The plan states that the international agency would own all nuclear fuel and that nations and persons would be prohibited from producing, possessing, transferring, storing, transporting, handling, or using nuclear fuel, except as author-
ized by the international agency. The plan, to the extent that it has been worked out in the various reports of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, does not specifically consider the questions of when or how stocks of fissionable material would be turned over to the international agency or what safeguards would apply to prevent or detect the withholding of fissionable material, although it does deal with safeguards against diversion of fissionable material after the plan has gone into effect. Presumably, the transfer of fissionable material to the international agency was left to be considered under the subject of "stages" of transition in putting the plan into operation.

Whether there exist safeguards against withholding of fissionable material is a crucial matter for any control plan, as indicated in your letter. One approach to this problem is to inquire whether methods are available for the determination of the total past output of facilities for the production of fissionable material.

With regard to reactors, waste material in the form of radioactive fission products must necessarily be produced in the fuel elements and must be disposed of after extraction of the fissionable material. These fission products would be subject to control by the international agency because of their possible use in radiological warfare. In this country, the fission products are stored in large underground tanks and it would be possible by sampling and analyzing their contents and estimating their volume, to get some idea of the amount of plutonium produced to date and the time when production began. Representative samples and accurate results might be difficult to obtain in this way. In the case of the USSR, if the purpose were to deceive the international agency, the liquid wastes containing fission products might be allowed to run off into the ground without regard to health hazards or, with considerable effort, might be reduced in bulk and scattered, hid, or altered in such a way that significant measurements could not be made. Some of the fission products are gases and escape into the atmosphere during chemical processing of the reactor fuel elements, . . . . Methods of sampling and analyzing the atmosphere are being investigated. . . .

In addition to the fission products, radioactive materials are formed in the moderator, shielding, and structural elements of reactors. Some of those are so short-lived that they could not be used to obtain information on the past history of the reactor, but there are others which may be suitable for that purpose. Where graphite is used as a moderator as at Hanford, carbon-14 with a half-life of 5000 years is produced by absorption of neutrons in ordinary carbon. Measurement of the specific activity of samples of graphite taken from various positions in the reactor would give an indication of the total number
of neutrons which had been released in the reactor and therefore the
total fissionable material which could have been produced from the
time operation started. Where heavy water is used as a moderator as
at Chalk River, tritium with a half-life of 12 years is produced by
absorption of neutrons in deuterium. However, it would be possible
to replace the heavy water after a certain period of operation, since
it is not a structural part of the reactor. Investigation of long-lived
activities produced in such materials as steel, concrete, and aluminum
may be required.

With regard to isotope separation plants for the production of
U-235, technical methods for determining total past production do
not appear to be nearly as promising as for reactors. The waste ma-
terial from isotope separation plants, which contains uranium de-
pleted in U-235, has very little radioactivity and could readily be
hidden or otherwise disposed of. The feed material used in the Oak
Ridge plant is uranium hexafluoride, which corrodes a number of
structural materials. However, the special materials used in the bar-
rriers, piping, and pumps and the operational procedures which have
been developed make corrosion an inadequate means of determining
the age of the plant or the time during which it has been operated. No
other specific technical means of obtaining such information from an
examination of the plant has been suggested to date, but further study
is being given to the matter.

It is assumed that reliance would not have to be placed on the
examination of reactors and isotope separation plants alone, but that
the whole range of controls and inspections given in the United Na-
tions plan would be used. This would be necessary in any case to assure
that all the facilities for the production of fissionable material had in
fact been located. In addition, it would provide cross-checks on what
the total production had been and, in particular, might give useful
clues as to the time when a particular reactor or isotope separation
plant was constructed or began operation. Investigations would have
to be made of the mines, mills, and dumps from which source ma-
terial had been obtained in the past, the facilities for processing and
purification of source material, the supply of special equipment and
materials such as mass spectrometers, diffusion barriers, pure graphite,
and heavy water, and the consumption of large quantities of electricity.
Records would have to be examined, personnel interviewed, and ground
and aerial surveys made. Considerable effort on the part of the USSR
would be necessary to falsify records, remove or alter other evidence,
and suborn witnesses in an attempt to withhold large quantities of
fissionable material from international control.

An attempt might be made by the USSR to cover up the witholding
of fissionable material by claiming that the missing material had been
consumed in atomic explosions for peaceful purposes or for tests. Methods for detecting atomic explosions would provide a check on such claims, although the quantities of fissionable material used might be difficult to determine in some cases.

With all the controls and inspections contemplated under the United Nations plan, it would appear that quantitative information could be obtained about the total amount of fissionable material produced in the past. There is still the question of whether such information could be made sufficiently accurate. The Second Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission defines dangerous activities or facilities as those “which are of military significance in the production of atomic weapons,” but does not give a quantitative meaning to “military significance,” leaving this to the international agency to decide. Volume VI of “Scientific Information Transmitted to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission by the United States Representative” includes the following statement:

“It is difficult to define the amount of activity in the illicit production of atomic weapons which is significant. The illicit construction of a single atomic bomb by means of a decade of successful evasion would not provide an overwhelming advantage, if it can be assumed that it would take another decade to produce a second bomb. But the secret production of one bomb per year would create a definite danger, and the secret production of five or more per year would be disastrous. This report assumes arbitrarily that the minimum unit of noncompliance is the secret production of one atomic bomb per year or of a total of five bombs over any period of time.”

This statement was made at a time when atomic bombs were much scarcer than they are now. As the stocks of fissionable material accumulate in various countries, the difficulties which the international agency would encounter in detecting the withholding of fissionable material for a few bombs become greater. At the same time, weapon development is increasing the energy release which can be obtained from a given quantity of fissionable material, a trend which may reach its culmination in thermonuclear weapons.

These considerations emphasize the importance of two aspects of the United Nations plan which were never worked out in detail, the stages of transition to full control and the strategic distribution of fissionable material. Before the crucial stage of turning over fissionable material to the international agency was reached, each country would have to assure itself that no other country was withholding significant quantities of fissionable material. Since there will always be the possibility of error or inaccuracy in this determination, the strategic distribution of the bulk of the fissionable material might have to be made in such a way as to override the effects of possible withholding by one or more countries.
II. Production of Fissile Material by Particle Accelerators

The possibility of producing fissile material by means of high-energy, high-current particle accelerators was of course not known at the time the United Nations plan was formulated, but seems to be covered by the general language and definitions of the plan. However, there are a number of technical aspects of the plan which may need to be made more explicit.

Thorium may increase in importance. The First Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission stated that the danger inherent in the diversion of thorium is less immediate than in the case of uranium, because thorium cannot be used by itself for the production of atomic energy. This may no longer be true, since the particle accelerator may provide a means of utilizing thorium alone in the production of U-233. The particle-accelerator development may have the same general effect as a reactor breeding program, in that it may transform U-238 and thorium into fissile material without being limited by the U-235 content of natural uranium, thus greatly increasing the potential supply of fissile material. The Specific Proposals of the Second Report made no distinction between the control measures to be applied to thorium and uranium, although it was realized that the control of thorium would be more difficult because of the extent and mode of its occurrence and its use outside of the atomic energy field.

The particle accelerator may require a smaller inventory of source material for a given rate of production of fissile material than a reactor, but may be comparable as regards size of installation, cooling and shielding requirements, and chemical processing plant. The requirements for electric power and specialized electrical equipment will be much greater than for a reactor. It would therefore appear that the problems of detection and control would be no more difficult than for a reactor. It should be emphasized that the feasibility of a particle accelerator for production of fissile material in quantity has not yet been demonstrated.

III. Prospects for Atomic Power

At the time the discussions of atomic energy began in the United Nations, there were some persons in this country and elsewhere who were sanguine of the early demonstration both of the practical generation of atomic power and of its economic feasibility. During the course of the discussions, it became apparent that numerous technical and economic problems were involved and that the time scale was a matter of years before atomic power could be demonstrated in a practical way and perhaps decades before atomic power might be utilized on a large scale.
scale, if it should prove to be economically feasible. The production of large stocks of fissionable material by the international agency in anticipation of possible future uses in atomic power plants therefore seemed to be unnecessarily dangerous. There resulted the provision which you quoted from Specific Proposal 12, Chapter 4, of the Second Report, on keeping the production of weapon-level material to a minimum. This provision as written and other provisions in the same chapter would apparently permit work to continue on the development of atomic power, including the construction of pilot plants, and would allow power reactors eventually to be constructed by arrangement between the international agency and the nation concerned. Meanwhile, in the absence of international control, there has been a large accumulation of stocks of weapon-level fissionable material, so that the limitation of Specific Proposal 12 has to some extent been nullified.

Various proposals have been made for further limitations on dangerous facilities for the production or utilization of fissionable material, such as a moratorium on atomic power. An important question raised by such proposals is the disposition of the large stocks of fissionable material now in existence, which are more dangerous in the sense of the United Nations plan than development or production facilities. This is also an important problem in connection with the United Nations plan itself, and one that has not been worked out in detail. Its seriousness continues to increase as more and more fissionable material is produced.

The possibility that particle accelerators may be developed for the production of fissionable material from U-238 and thorium without being limited by the U-235 content of natural uranium would have an effect on the prospects for atomic power by making fissionable material more readily available for this purpose. The cost of fissionable material produced in this way would be a factor in determining the economics of atomic power.

IV. Thermonuclear Weapons

Since thermonuclear weapons would be dependent on the availability of fissionable material and reactors or particle accelerators for the production of tritium, the United Nations plan in its control of fissionable material and facilities for its production would also be controlling thermonuclear weapons. This is also in accordance with the general language and the definitions of the United Nations plan. If an opportunity presented itself at some future time, there are several places where explicit reference could be made to thermonuclear weapons and to the light elements. The provisions for the control of heavy water might also be strengthened. At present, the plan only
calls for periodic reports to the international agency from nations regarding the production, shipment, location, and use of heavy water. Because of the increasing importance of heavy water in production reactors and because of the possible use of deuterium in thermonuclear weapons, it might be desirable for the international agency to own stocks of these materials and to own, operate, and manage facilities for their production.

One important feature of the increase in energy release which thermonuclear weapons may make possible is that the seriousness of the diversion or withholding of fissionable material together with tritium and deuterium might be intensified and the accuracy required in accounting for such materials might be increased.

Conclusions. After consideration of the above matters, we arrive at the following conclusions:

a. Effective international control of atomic energy on a current and continuing basis after the United Nations plan went into full operation would be technologically feasible.

b. The detection of the withholding of fissionable material produced prior to the implementation of the United Nations plan would be more difficult, and the amount of fissionable material which might be withheld without detection would increase as the accumulation of fissionable material increases. This difficulty stresses the need for (1) stages of transition to full control of such a nature as to provide opportunities for obtaining assurances against the withholding of significant quantities of fissionable material and (2) strategic distribution of fissionable material in such a way as to minimize the effects of possible withholding.

Sincerely yours,

GORDON DEAN

10 Files: US/A/2512

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large

[Extract]

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] September 21, 1950.

Subject: Various Assembly Items

Participants: Secretary Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Delegation
Mr. R. G. Riddell, Canadian Delegation
Ambassador Philip C. Jessup, United States Delegation

I lunched with Mr. Pearson at his apartment today. Mr. Jerry Riddell was also present. The following items of UN business were discussed.
1. Vishinsky Speech September 20th.¹

The Canadians thought the most interesting part of Vishinsky’s speech was his repeated emphasis on the principle of “effective international control.” Pearson said that in previous years we had had to drag out of them admissions of this principle. They suggested that we should nail the Russians upon this point. If, prior to any discussion of the Russian Resolution, a way could be found to demand that they produce their concept of what constitutes “effective international control”—with emphasis on each one of the three words—the Assembly would probably secure a basis for just refusing to talk about any of their other propositions. This of course on the assumption that the Russians are no more ready now than they ever were to talk with reality about this phrase. If the Russians really will accept effective international control, Pearson thought that in the light of such a miraculous change we could really go ahead and discuss things like disarmament. He was under no illusions that such a change had really taken place and was stressing the debating value of a suggested parliamentary procedure. He and Riddell wondered whether a separate item on the definition of “effective international control” could be put on the agenda and perhaps referred to the Sixth Committee ² for consideration before we debated the Russian Resolution. They had considered an alternative of tacking this problem onto the Russian agenda item and then in Committee vote through a proposal to take up the definition first. I told them that we would study the idea.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

¹For the text of the address by Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, Soviet Foreign Minister and Chairman of the Delegation, at the 279th Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, September 20, see GA(V), Plenary, pp. 27-31. Vyshinsky’s address included a draft resolution titled “Declaration on the removal of the threat of a new war and the strengthening of peace and security among the Nations.” For documentation on General Assembly consideration of this item, see vol. ii, pp. 371 ff.

²Legal Committee.

Confidential

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

NEW YORK, September 28, 1950.

Participants: Mr. Gustav Rasmussen, Foreign Minister of Denmark
Secretary Acheson
Lucius D. Battle
In a conversation on several matters, Mr. Rasmussen mentioned an open letter from a Mr. Niels Bohr, a distinguished Danish scientist. He said that he had not understood all of the letter but felt the main point was that if the Western world would make some declaration of the sort suggested, it would be a step in the right direction. Mr. Acheson said that he had talked to Mr. Bohr and had studied his letter. He said he was not sure whether Mr. Bohr meant that we should make the offer knowing that it would be rejected and merely hoped for a favorable public reaction or whether Mr. Bohr really thought that the offer would result in the U.S.S.R. accepting and complying with it.

Mr. Rasmussen said he thought the U.S.S.R. would refuse and could not believe they would accept.

Mr. Acheson said he thought it possible the U.S.S.R. might accept but not comply with it. In fact, he said, he was convinced that they would not really comply. Mr. Acheson said he could see merit in the proposal if the idea were purely to show the world we were making a real effort to cooperate. He assured Mr. Rasmussen that we were studying the letter and had it very much in our thoughts.

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Editorial Note

On October 24, 1950, the fifth anniversary of the coming into force of the United Nations Charter, President Truman addressed the General Assembly. The portion of the President’s remarks devoted to regulation of armaments and international control of atomic energy listed three basic principles upon which a successful plan for disarmament would have to rest: (1) the plan must include all kinds of weapons; (2) it must be based on unanimous agreement; (3) it must contain adequate safeguards.

The President’s address also included the following statement:

“Much valuable work has already been done by the two disarmament commissions on the difficult technical problems confronting them. I believe it would be useful to explore ways in which the work of these commissions could now be more closely brought together. One possibility to be considered is whether their work might be revitalized if carried forward in the future through a new and consolidated disarmament commission.”

For the full text of the address, see GA(V), Plenary, volume I, pages 245–247, or Department of State Bulletin, November 6, 1950, pages 719–722.
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Barbour) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, October 26, 1950—6 p. m.

930. Vyshinski argumentation in UN GA on control of atomic energy ¹ suggests need our part to stress thought that crux of matter is enforcement of International Control Body’s right to inspect anywhere at any time.

Body requiring unanimity for decision could be frustrated by Soviet veto. Body operating under majority decision would encounter Soviet refusal to abide by such decisions. Soviet Union over past few years has arbitrarily insisted on validity of its unilateral interpretations regardless of majority rulings and has even developed new system of vote counting (numerical sum of populations represented by participating countries) in spurious justification its attitude.

Most striking recent example of Soviet Union refusal recognize any interpretation but its own is Korea case where over 50 UN members have condemned North Koreans as aggressors whereas Soviet Union takes position that US and other UN members participating in Korean campaign are aggressors.

BARBOUR

¹ On October 23, Soviet Representative Vyshinski introduced a draft resolution in the First Committee titled “Condemnation of War Propaganda, Prohibition of the Atomic Weapon, and One-third Reduction of Great Power Forces.” For documentation on General Assembly consideration of this subject, see vol. II, pp. 371 ff.

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, November 3, 1950—1 p. m.

471. Re Delga 199 Oct 30.¹ Fol constitutes general guidance in conversations with other dels re suggestion made by Pres Oct 24 in GA re exploring ways to bring more closely together the work of AEC and CCA, one possibility being that work might be carried forward in the future through a consolidated disarmament commission. Suggestion of Pres shld be considered and discussed in context of entire speech. Underlying suggestion is fact that US has long considered necessity

¹ Delga 199 from New York, October 30, read as follows: “USDel discussions with other delegations re President’s October 24 suggestion AEC and CCA might be consolidated disclose general desire to ascertain more specifically what steps US has in mind for 5th GA. Delegation would appreciate any guidance Department can furnish this matter.” (320/10-3050)
for coordinating implementation of control systems in respective fields. Pres's suggestion foreshadowed at last year's GA in US statement to the effect that if and when suitable and acceptable plans for atomic energy and conventional armaments control are developed, there will be necessity for coordinating the two plans in an over-all system of collective security. In this connection, Delegation's attention called to paras 2e SD/A/C.1/336 and SD/A/C.1/337. Agreement on such coordination of implementation is an integral part of agreement on the two systems of control. Suggestion of Pres is to the effect that concurrent with continuing efforts to reach agreement on atomic energy and conventional armaments control systems, UN might now also prepare and plan for coordination of respective plans for joint implementation against the day that agreement can be reached. This is the only road to effective disarmament that US and UN can take if genuine disarmament is ever to come about. There is no intention of starting arms control discussions from scratch but rather of building on existing foundations. Suggestion accordingly does not stem from sudden shift in policy. Question involved is appropriate time when such consolidated and coordinated approach shld be advanced. Terms of reference of new commission, together with its membership, must be carefully worked out in consultation with other UN members so that commission is properly constituted at outset and will not be a source of grief later. US is interested in receiving best thinking of UN on this matter. US does not wish to impose its own ideas at time when it wld like to receive independent expression of views of others and accordingly US does not at this time intend to introduce resolution this GA on this subject. If others submit resolutions US will consider them on their merits. US will welcome the benefit of other Delegations' thinking on Pres's suggestion and in any event US will, at appropriate time, but not necessarily at this GA, advance its own views on how consolidation and coordination might take place and on what basis.

ACHESON

2 Ante, p. 85.
2 Ante, p. 86.

10 Files: US/A/M(Chr)/176

Minutes of the 41st Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, New York, November 16, 1950, 9:15 a.m.

[Extract]

SECRET

[Here follow a list of those present (46) and discussion of the possible establishment of an International Criminal Court.]

Mr. Nash explained that discussion of this item was attributable to the President’s speech to the Assembly on United Nations Day, October 24, in which the possibility of establishing a new commission to carry forward the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments was suggested. He noted that up until the time of the President’s address, there was no item on the agenda regarding conventional armaments, although atomic energy had been scheduled for debate directly in plenary session and was expected to come up some time early in December. That was one place where the President’s suggestion, if it came up at all, would arise. There were two other places where it might possibly be mentioned. The first was in connection with the Lie Twenty Year Peace Plan, and the second was in connection with the “Peace Through Deeds” resolution, in which there were provisions relating to disarmament.¹

Mr. Nash explained that suggestions for a single commission had several motivations. One of the primary motives was the desire of the President to bring out in sharp focus the fact that the present armaments program was no choice of our own, but a program we were compelled to adopt because the preferable course of universal disarmament under effective international control had not been followed. The speech had made it clear that we preferred disarmament. This was a psychological motive behind the President’s remarks. It was also thought that it might be possible to make some progress in the disarmament field with the new light the establishment of a single commission might bring to the problem. Another motive was to emphasize that the field of disarmament was a single unit and could not be dealt with piecemeal.

Referring to the history of the two commissions, Mr. Nash recalled that the Atomic Energy Commission was established in January, 1946, while the Commission for Conventional Armaments was not set up until February, 1947. It was our position that the best progress in the initial stages was to be made through separate consideration of the two fields, because the atomic energy problems, in particular, were so unique that there would have been no progress at all were both fields to have been considered together. Mr. Nash believed that the wisdom of this course was illustrated by the fact that a workable plan for the control of atomic energy had been developed. At the same time we had always recognized that the two fields were intimately

interrelated. For example, there was some worry that if we had a plan for the control of atomic energy approved by the General Assembly, we would have then had to come up quickly with a plan for the control of conventional armaments before we could surrender our atomic weapons.

Mr. Nash indicated that at the last General Assembly, we had started to lay the groundwork for the statement in the President’s speech by indicating that the time was coming when the two fields had to be brought together and integrated into one overall plan, even though different systems of control would be required. Since that time, the Commission on Conventional Armaments had made progress, and we were now prepared to say that a system of safeguards could be worked out so that we could carry forward on the disarmament plan. It had therefore been concluded that the time was ripe to suggest the appropriateness of bringing the two commissions together, and the President had made the suggestion in his speech. This statement recognized the fact that disarmament is a unit, that it must be universal, and that it must be surrounded by adequate safeguards. The President advanced his idea simply as a suggestion but did not make a specific proposal in order to see what the consensus among other members of the United Nations would be. His suggestion had aroused some interest. Australia had actually gone so far as to prepare a resolution. However, we had discouraged them from submitting it at once on the grounds that it was better to get general views first. Syria, India, Canada, Belgium, France and South Africa had expressed real interest in the suggestion, while the British and Norwegians had had rather a negative reaction. Our present position was more to seek the views of other members on our idea than anything more concrete. We did not now intend to submit a specific proposal in this Assembly.

Mr. Nash noted that the President’s suggestion had given rise to some confusion, including the question whether a change in United States atomic energy policy was involved. In illustration of this fact, he referred to a conversation which he had had with a Belgian delegate. This individual had asked him whether we were coming to the view that inspection alone was sufficient for atomic energy control. Mr. Nash said that he had replied in the negative, that the suggestion did not indicate any change in our position that the best plan was the plan already approved by the United Nations. The Belgian had also asked whether the President’s suggestion indicated an intention on our part to propose a swap between the two fields. He had responded that that was hardly possible. In the third place, the Belgian had inquired whether we regarded the distinction between the
two fields as entirely artificial. He had informed him that the proposal had no such significance and that we still believed it was important to maintain a distinction. Mr. Nash noted that there had been some fuzziness in this respect, particularly as regards the question of just what was a weapon of mass destruction. The distinction which needed to be kept in mind and to be discussed was the difference between atomic energy as an instrument of warfare and conventional armaments, restating the necessity for two different systems of control. He believed there would have to be subcommittees to discuss the separate problems involved in each field.

Mr. Nash observed that the political situation seemed no better as regards the possibility of general consideration of disarmament. In this connection he referred to the language in the third item of the Lie Twenty Year Peace Plan which stated the present situation as well as could be done at the present time. This had indicated that any progress at all would help to reduce the cold war tensions and adjust disputes. He observed that there were such enormous technical problems involved that it would take a long time to work out a system of controls, but there was no reason why progress could not be made on a plan as a sort of mental exercise. It might just help a little to relieve tensions to discuss this matter.

Mr. Nash explained that the problem before the Delegation was not one of action, but rather to ascertain the feelings of other members of the Assembly so that when the item was discussed, we could determine what, if anything, should be done at this session. The purpose of his comments had been to ask everybody on the delegation who should pick up any information on this subject, to pass it on so that a proper course of action could be formulated.

Ambassador Austin referred to the approval of the resolution entitled “Peace Through Deeds.” The second paragraph of that resolution, which he read, stated our policies in this field. He observed that in voting, members had wanted to vote separately on paragraph (a), but he had successfully managed to avoid such separate votes. As it turned out, except for the Soviet bloc, all of the members of the United Nations had voted with us on this expression of United Nations principles in this field. Mr. Nash said the same point might be raised in the plenary again, since the question had been asked whether paragraph 2(b) was consistent with the President’s speech. The answer to that was that it was perfectly consistent since nothing in the speech indicated a walking-away from the present plan. Ambassador Austin agreed. He noted that this was psychological warfare to meet the Stockholm Peace Petition. Here again, what we did was subservient to the Korean situation, where we should do nothing to
weaken our overall political position. Therefore, it had been determined appropriate to reaffirm the declaration of the last General Assembly.

Ambassador Austin inquired whether there was any objection to continued liaison with other delegations on this matter. There was no objection to this policy.

[Here follows consideration of other subjects.]

10 Files: US/A/2897

Memorandum of Conversations, by the Deputy United States Representative to the Commission for Conventional Armaments (Nash)

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] November 21, 1950.

Subject: President’s Suggestion Re Consolidation of AEC and CCA

Participants: Mr. Frank Nash—Conversations, separately, with:

Dr. Jacques Errera,\(^3\) Belgian Delegation
Mr. David Cole, British Delegation
Mr. J. E. Coulson,\(^2\) British Delegation
Mr. Dennis Laskey, British Delegation
Conversation with Messrs. Coulson and Laskey held jointly.

Ambassador Fawzi Bey,\(^3\) Egyptian Delegation
Dr. Jose Correa,\(^4\) Ecuadorian Delegation
Mr. Francis Lacoste,\(^5\) French Delegation
Sir Keith Officer,\(^6\) Australian Delegation

Following is the substance of recent conversations held with representatives of several Delegations concerning the President’s suggestion for the consolidation of the AEC and CCA.

Belgian Representative: Dr. Errera stated that his Delegation was very much interested in the President’s suggestion and inquired whether it indicated any possible change in the views of the US con-

\(^1\) Adviser, Permanent Belgian Delegation at the United Nations; Adviser, Belgian Delegation to the General Assembly.
\(^2\) Deputy Permanent British Representative at the United Nations; Adviser, British Delegation to the General Assembly.
\(^3\) Mahmoud Fawzi Bey, Permanent Egyptian Representative at the United Nations; Member of the Egyptian Delegation to the General Assembly.
\(^4\) Alternate Permanent Representative of Ecuador at the United Nations; Member of the Delegation of Ecuador to the General Assembly.
\(^5\) Alternate Permanent French Representative at the United Nations; Adviser, French Delegation to the General Assembly.
\(^6\) Australian Ambassador in France; Member of the Australian Delegation to the General Assembly.
cerning the possibility of relying upon a system of inspection alone for the control of atomic energy. He referred to the interview of Mr. Gordon Dean, Chairman of the US Atomic Energy Commission, appearing in the November 3 issue of *U.S. News and World Report*, where Mr. Dean discussed briefly the effectiveness of a system of inspection in the atomic energy field. He wondered whether there was any possible connection between the President's suggestion and the substance of the Gordon Dean interview. I replied that I was not aware of any connection between the two, and that I could definitely state that there was nothing in the President's suggestion of a new commission that was to be taken as implying any change in the views of the US concerning the inadequacy of a system of mere inspection for the effective control of atomic energy. Dr. Errera stated that he was relieved to hear that there was no such implication to be derived from the President's suggestion, adding that it continued to be the view of their Government that mere inspection alone could not be accepted as an effective system for the control of atomic energy. Dr. Errera also asked whether the President's suggestion might carry the implication that the US might be going to propose some "swap" in the way of a reduction in the atomic field in exchange for a reduction in the field of conventional armaments and armed forces. I replied that I could not see how such an exchange would be feasible and that in any event, there was no such implication to be derived from the President's suggestion. Dr. Errera said that in the view of his Delegation, the suggestion for the consolidation of the two present commissions into a single new commission was a good one and would receive their support. He said he thought that such a commission could carry forward much useful work with the technical phases of the problem in both the atomic and nonatomic fields, despite the inability to reach any present solution of the major political issues involved. He asked what our views might be concerning the composition of such a commission; volunteering his own opinion that probably the simplest approach would be to carry over the representation on the atomic energy commission; that is, all members of the Security Council plus Canada when not a member of the Security Council. He added, however, that some consideration might be given to countries like Belgium having an interest in the source materials of atomic energy. I replied that our thinking had not yet become firm on the point, but that we were presently inclined to agree with his view that the best approach would be to carry over the representation of the member nations serving on the atomic energy commission.

*UK Representatives:* At a luncheon meeting with Messrs. Coulson and Laskey pessimism was registered, particularly by the latter, con-
cerning the possibility of any useful discussion going forward in the atomic energy field, either under the present set-up or under any organization which may be established. Mr. Coulson stated that although the problems were new to him, he felt that some useful discussions might continue to go forward in the CCA field, although he was not clear as to just what direction they would take. Both Mr. Coulson and Mr. Laskey stated that, in view of their Delegation, it would be unwise to attempt the establishment of a new Commission during the current General Assembly. Mr. Coulson added, however, that he felt some suggestion like that advanced by the Australian Delegation, concerning the appointment of a special committee to study the problem and report to the next General Assembly, might be in order. In a separate conversation with Mr. Cole, also of the UK Delegation, it was stated by him as his own personal view that the President’s suggestion was an “extremely sensible one.” However, Mr. Cole added that he felt some concern as to how far discussions could go ahead in CCA without encountering the very complicated problem of quotas, a problem to which he could see no present solution.

*Egyptian Representative:* Ambassador Fawzi Bey in a brief conversation stated that his Delegation thought the President’s suggestion was a good one, representing as it did a viewpoint which the Egyptian Delegation had been maintaining for some time.

*Ecuadoran Representative:* Dr. Correa stated that his Delegation was “very happy” about the President’s suggestion, and that he felt his Delegation would be willing to act as co-sponsor of any resolution which would be acceptable to the US in the way of implementing the President’s suggestion.

*French Representative:* Mr. Lacoste indicated that his Delegation would be willing to go along with whatever the US thought might be in order to implement the President’s suggestion. He added, however, that he thought the matter of a new organization should be very carefully worked out, particularly with respect to the terms of reference which would govern any new commission.

*Australian Representative:* At the outset of our conversation, Sir Keith Officer stated he was afraid that much of the momentum had been lost since the President’s suggestion was advanced, and he expressed some concern whether it would still be feasible to accomplish anything substantial during the current General Assembly. I assured Sir Keith that the only point that the US Delegation had in mind in suggesting that the Australian Delegation hold in abeyance the resolution which they had at first proposed introducing a few days
after the President's speech of October 24 was to avoid having the resolution fall within the context of the Soviet "peace proposals" which were then under debate in Committee One and also to give the other member nations time to think about the suggestion for a new commission, and time to formulate their views on the matter. I told Sir Keith that the US Delegation was most anxious to see that the President's suggestion was given careful consideration during the current General Assembly and was implemented to the maximum extent consistent with the consensus. I added that if the general reaction to the President's suggestion appeared to be one of general approval, but at the same time one of reluctance to tackle the job of working out the details during the present General Assembly, then the US Delegation would strongly favor the introduction of a resolution along the lines of the Australian draft. Sir Keith said that, in view of the foregoing, he would like to "shorten up somewhat" the earlier draft resolution of his Delegation, and transmit it to his foreign office to determine whether it might be possible for the Australian Delegation to introduce it at an appropriate stage of the GA, presumably in the course of the debate of the atomic energy question, which is scheduled to take place directly in plenary session.

PM Files

Memorandum by Mr. R. Gordon Arneson to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 27, 1950.

Subject: Views of the AEC on the Current Adequacy of the Technical Features of the United Nations Plan for the Control of Atomic Energy

During the State-Defense study which culminated in the NSC/68, considerable attention was directed toward the possibilities of, and prerequisites for, securing effective international control of atomic energy. Chapter VIII of NSC/68 concerning International Control is appended as Tab A, the most pertinent section of which states:

"The above considerations make it clear that at least a major change in the relative power positions of the United States and the Soviet Union would have to take place before an effective system of

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1 Effective November 13, Arneson, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, became Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. He continued to function as Departmental adviser on atomic energy matters.

2 For NSC 68, "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," April 14, 1950, a Report to the National Security Council by its Executive Secretary, and related documentation, see pp. 126 ff.
international control could be negotiated. The Soviet Union would have had to have moved a substantial distance down the path of accommodation and compromise before such an arrangement would be conceivable. This conclusion is supported by the Third Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, May 17, 1948, in which it is stated that ‘... the majority of the Commission has been unable to secure ... their acceptance of the nature and extent of participation in the world community required of all nations in this field. ... As a result, the Commission has been forced to recognize that agreement on effective measures for the control of atomic energy is itself dependent on cooperation in broader fields of policy.’

“In short, it is impossible to hope that an effective plan for international control can be negotiated unless and until the Kremlin design has been frustrated to a point at which a genuine and drastic change in Soviet policies has taken place.”

The narrower but important question of the current technical adequacy of the UN plan was raised during this study. On April 20, 1950, a letter, over your signature, was sent to the AEC, requesting a current evaluation, without regard to political issues, of the UN plan (see Tab B).3

The AEC replied on June 26, 1950, in a letter that was obscure and hardly responsive (see Tab C).4 An extreme conclusion that might be drawn from it was that we should no longer support the UN plan. This letter was the subject of my memorandum to you dated August 14, 1950 (see Tab D),5 accompanied by a letter to the AEC for your signature, requesting further information and a more precise expression of views. This letter was signed on August 22, 1950 (see Tab E).6

The AEC replied to this last letter on September 20, 1950 (see Tab F)7 and came to the following conclusions:

"a. Effective international control of atomic energy on a current and continuing basis after the United Nations plan went into full operation would be technologically feasible.

"b. The detection of the withholding of fissionable material produced prior to the implementation of the United Nations plan would be more difficult, and the amount of fissionable material which might be withheld without detection would increase as the accumulation of fissionable material increases. This difficulty stresses the need for (1) stages of transition to full control of such a nature as to provide opportunities for obtaining assurances against the withholding of significant quantities of fissionable material and (2) strategic distri-
bution of fissionable material in such a way as to minimize the effects of possible withholding.

Although much thinking and staff studies have been directed toward the problem of stages and strategic distribution (also called strategic balance and quotas), no specific proposals on these points have been made by the United States for reasons that are best stated in the Third Report of the UNAEC dated May 17, 1948.

"The problems which have not been elaborated in detail, i.e., organization and administration, financing, strategic balance, prohibitions, and enforcement, and the stages of transition from the present situation to one of full international control, are of a different nature. These questions do not affect the basic nature of the problem of control. Some questions, such as stages, which only concern the period of transition to full international control, will be conditional on future technological developments and the conditions of world security. The same considerations apply to the question of the strategic balance to be established in the location of nuclear materials and nuclear reactors between one part of the globe and another. Others, such as organization and administration of the agency—on which inconclusive discussions have recently taken place—and the question of the agency's finances, depend almost entirely on the existence of prior agreement on the nature and extent of the control system. Indeed, until agreement on the basic principles of control has been reached, the elaboration of proposals to cover these remaining topics would be unrealistic and would serve no useful purpose. On the other hand, given such agreement, solutions to these problems could be worked out."

The AEC also indicated that it might be desirable, if the opportunity arose, to tighten up certain parts of the plan by strengthening the controls over heavy water, and by naming the appropriate lighter elements as coming under the controls of the international agency, although the general language of the plan had been deliberately chosen to cover both fissionable and fusible materials.

In expressing these views, the AEC scrupulously limited itself only to the technical aspects of the problem. Quite properly, it did not make any analysis of broader political considerations, such as the political climate, the existing or prospective power relationships between the East and West, and the relationship between atomic energy control and the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces, which have a great bearing on whether the U.S. can afford to continue its support for the UN plan. The prime political consideration which must be kept in mind, and which is stressed in NSC/68, is that acceptance of effective international control by the Soviet Union would mean a fundamental change in the character of
the Soviet system. In fact, if the Soviet Union were to change in this
manner, they should be as insistent as we on the effectiveness of the
control system. Should this come to pass, there would be ample op-
portunities for testing their good faith—and of all other nations—
during:

(a) The negotiating out of the remainder of the UN plan, par-
ticularly on stages and on the distribution of atomic materials and
facilities,

(b) The actual implementation of the plan, and

(c) The concurrent implementation of an effective plan for the
regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces.

Conclusions

1. The United States should continue to support effective inter-
national control of atomic energy by continuing its support for the
UN plan.

2. The United States should continue to emphasize its view that
atomic energy control and the regulation and reduction of conven-
tional armaments and armed forces are integral parts of the over-all
problems of collective security and disarmament, and that an essen-
tial ingredient of agreement on both plans is agreement on their
coordinated implementation.

In connection with this latter point, the Regulation of Armaments
Committee (RAC), whose members are the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of Defense, with the Chairman of the AEC a member
when atomic energy control is involved, is responsible for United
States policy in the general field of disarmament. It has recently been
inactive because of reorganization within Defense, but it is now pre-
paring to resume its work, with particular emphasis on the inter-
relationship between atomic energy control and the regulation and
reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces. Mr. Hickerson
is your working deputy on RAC.

This memorandum has been discussed with, and concurred in by,
Mr. Matthews, Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Nitze.

R. GORDON ARNESON
Memorandum of Conversations, by Mr. G. Hayden Raynor, Adviser, 
United States Delegation to the General Assembly

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] December 1, 1950.

Subject: President’s Statement on Use of the Atomic Bomb

Participants: Various European and Commonwealth Delegations
Mr. Hayden Raynor, United States Delegation

Many European and Commonwealth delegations expressed to me yesterday great apprehension with respect to the President’s statement and the hope that it didn’t mean what it seemed to mean. The reaction was quite a serious one up until the time the clarifying statement was issued. This statement appeared to clear the atmosphere and I heard little about it in the latter part of the day.

In the earlier comment the most serious question was raised about that portion relating to the use of it being decided by the commander in the field, although there appeared to be great shock over the part which indicated that consideration was being given to its use. This latter feeling I believe still exists and I do not think that the clarifying statement removed the original impression which was created, although as indicated, it calmed down the atmosphere considerably.

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1 Reference is to a remark by President Truman during his press conference of November 30. In the course of discussion on the Korean crisis, the following exchange occurred: “The President: We will take whatever steps are necessary to meet the military situation, just as we always have. [12.] Q. Will that include the atomic bomb? The President: That includes every weapon that we have. Q. Mr. President, you said ‘every weapon that we have.’ Does that mean that there is active consideration of the use of the atomic bomb? The President: There has always been active consideration of its use. I don’t want to see it used. It is a terrible weapon, and it should not be used on innocent men, women, and children who have nothing whatever to do with this military aggression. That happens when it is used.”

Later the same day the White House issued the following press release: “The President wants to make it certain that there is no misinterpretation of his answers to questions at his press conference today about the use of the atomic bomb. Naturally, there has been consideration of this subject since the outbreak of the hostilities in Korea, just as there is consideration of the use of all military weapons whenever our forces are in combat.

“Consideration of the use of any weapon is always implicit in the very possession of that weapon.

“However, it should be emphasized, that, by law, only the President can authorize the use of the atomic bomb, and no such authorization has been given. If and when such authorization should be given, the military commander in the field would have charge of the tactical delivery of the weapon.

“In brief, the replies to the questions at today’s press conference do not represent any change in this situation.”

For the complete text of the press conference of November 30, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950, pp. 724–728. For additional documentation relating to the President’s statement, see vol. vii, pp. 1237 ff.
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Member of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly

RESTRIC TED  

[NEW YORK,] December 1, 1950.

Subject: Possible Use of the Atomic Bomb in Korea

Participants: Dr. Jamil M. Baroody,1 Delegation of Saudi Arabia  
Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, United States Delegation

After the meeting of the Third Committee2 this morning, Dr. Baroody spoke to me with deep emotion about the President's announcement of yesterday concerning the possible use of the atomic bomb in Korea. Dr. Baroody said that this matter had been discussed at great length among representatives of all the "little countries" and that he would be grateful if I would transmit their views to the President.

Dr. Baroody said that the delegations representing the Near East and Asia were profoundly distressed and disturbed over the President's announcement that he was considering the possibility of using the atomic bomb against the Chinese Communists. The word "possibility" would disappear by the time the announcement reached Asia, and people would hear only that the United States intended to use the atomic bomb against the Chinese Communists. The people of the whole Asiatic continent would never understand why the American people had decided to use the atomic bomb against them. They would regard it as an action of the white race against the colored races. They would never forget that the atomic bomb was used first against the Japanese and later against the Chinese, but never against any white peoples. This fact would have a disastrous effect upon the relations of the United States with the rest of the world for years to come. He said that everything possible should be done to prevent such a disaster.

I replied that I quite agreed that the atomic bomb was a terrible weapon but that I had to point out that other weapons were also terrible in their effect; indeed, war itself was a terrible thing. Whether the atomic bomb should be used in Korea would have to be decided entirely in terms of the military situation at a particular time; that would be true of any kind of weapon. I added that I hoped that it would not be necessary to use the atomic bomb in Korea.

1 Member of the Permanent Saudi Arabian Delegation at the United Nations; 
2 Alternate Member of the Saudi Arabian Delegation to the General Assembly. 
3 The committee of the General Assembly dealing with social, humanitarian, and cultural issues.
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ward P. Allen, Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly

CONFIDENTIAL


Subject: GA Action re Merger of CCA and AEC

Participants: Sir Keith Officer, Australian Delegation  
Mr. K. C. O. Shann, Australian Delegation  
M. Francis Lacoste, French Delegation  
Mr. Peter Hope, United Kingdom Delegation  
Mr. Frank Nash, United States Delegation  
Mr. Ward P. Allen, United States Delegation

We advised Sir Keith Officer that the US finds satisfactory the draft of resolution, based on the Australian draft, previously discussed under which the GA would establish a Committee to consider and report to the next session on coordination of the work of the AEC and CCA and on the advisability of merging their functions.

Sir Keith had recommended this favorably to his Government and, although he had not received definite word, proceeded on the assumption that he would be authorized to submit the resolution as principal sponsor in connection with plenary consideration of the atomic energy item.

After discussion, it was tentatively agreed that the Committee to be set up might be composed of the eleven members of the SC (as of January 1, 1951) plus Canada as a member of the AEC and Australia as prime mover of the resolution. It was also agreed that the sponsors of the resolution should be sought from among the same group. Sir Keith plans to discuss the matter with the Canadians, we to continue preliminary discussions with the UK and with France. Depending on Australian instructions and definite reactions from UK and France, the others of the group (except USSR and China) can then be approached.

We agreed that the time was out of joint for any more definitive action by this Assembly and that this modest proposal, if presented, would be done without fireworks or fanfare.

M. Lacoste, in response to our questions as to whether this GA should take any action on the President's suggestion, viewed with

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1 Special Assistant on United Nations Affairs, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State.

2 First Secretary, Permanent Australian Delegation to the United Nations; Adviser, Australian Delegation to the General Assembly.

3 For the text of the resolution as submitted to the General Assembly on December 12 and approved the following day, see p. 124.
sympathy the idea of some resolution along the lines of the Australian proposal. He recognized that some such action would be a good counter to the possible introduction by the USSR or some other delegation of an unacceptable proposal based on the President's suggestion. He stated that he will discuss the matter within his Delegation, seek instructions from the Foreign Office and advise us by the end of the week.

Mr. Horn seemed less unwilling to have the GA take action along the lines of the Australian proposal than he had previously indicated to Mr. Raynor and gave the impression that the UK would not be seriously averse to such action provided it is not presented as a great forward step, or as presaging abandonment of the plans and work done to date. He has discussed the matter with Messrs. Coulson and Laskey of his Delegation who will discuss it further with us.

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ward P. Allen, Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly

Confidential


Subject: General Assembly Action on Possible Merger of Commission for Conventional Armaments and Atomic Energy Commission

Participants: Mr. Peter Hope—United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. J. E. Coulson, United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. Denis S. Laskey, United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. John W. Holmes,¹ Canadian Delegation
Mr. K. C. O. Shann, Australian Delegation
Mr. Frank Nash, United States Delegation
Mr. Ward P. Allen, United States Delegation

At a luncheon conversation with the above-mentioned representatives, it was generally agreed to proceed with the introduction of a resolution in the Plenary debate on atomic energy, along the lines of the Australian draft previously discussed, establishing a committee of the members of the SC (as of January 1951) plus Canada and Australia, to report to the next session on the coordination of the work of the AEC and CCA and the advisability of merging them. Although the UK representatives stated they would have to consult their Government on the text, Mr. Coulson expressed confidence that they would receive authorization to co-sponsor. This marks a shift from

¹Alternate Canadian Representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission; Adviser, Canadian Delegation to the General Assembly.
the initial British view that action on this matter by the present GA
would be unwise.

Mr. Holmes (Canada) indicated some concern that by merely es-
establishing a Commission to report to the Sixth GA, we would open
ourselves to the charge of postponing for a whole year any possibility
of progress or continuance of the work of the two Commissions. Al-
though it was generally recognized that any real hope of progress in
these bodies now was highly unrealistic, it was agreed that a provision
should be inserted in the resolution that this study by the new Com-
mittee should be without prejudice to the continuance of the work of
the AEC and the CCA under their present terms of reference.

Mr. Coulson thought it important to avoid any implication in the
resolution that we were abandoning or scrapping any of the sub-
stantive plans for atomic energy control or to provide the USSR with
any ground to claim that previous work should be scrapped. To meet
this point more fully, it was agreed to include a preambulatory para-
graph which would recall specifically the AEC plan as approved by
the GA as well as the planning work of the CCA, and it would then
express the desire of the GA that this work be carried forward.

The Canadian and UK representatives likewise agreed with the idea
that, although Australia would act as the prime mover of the resolu-
tion, all AEC members (except the USSR and China) should be in-
vited to co-sponsor.

WARD P. ALLEN

IO Files: US/4/M(Chr)/186

Minutes of the Fifty-first Meeting of the United States Delegation to
the General Assembly, New York, December 12, 1950, 9:15 a.m.

[Extract]

SECRET

[Here follow a list of those present (44) and a review by David
H. Popper, Delegation Adviser, of work remaining before the General
Assembly.]

1. International control of atomic energy (Delga 391).¹

¹ Delga 391 from New York, December 8, not printed, contained the text of
the draft resolution to be introduced by Australia, the United States, and others.
The draft transmitted in Delga 391 was virtually identical with that adopted by
the General Assembly (p. 124), with the exception of the last paragraph which
read: "[The General Assembly] Decides to establish a committee of Australia,
Brazil, UK, China, USSR, France, US, Canada, Netherlands, Turkey, Ecuador,
India, Yugoslavia to consider and report to the next regular session of the GA
on ways and means whereby the work of the AEC and CCA may be coordinated,
and upon the advisability of their functions being merged and placed under a
new and consolidated disarmament commission." (320/12-850)
Mr. Nash recalled his previous discussion in the Delegation meeting regarding the motivation of the President's suggestion for consolidation of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission on Conventional Armaments. At that time he had pointed out that the suggestion was in part to test the climate of opinion in the General Assembly and to determine how far members might wish to go in the current session with respect to the consolidation proposal. He reported that after four weeks of testing, it appeared to be impossible to have substantive discussion regarding the possibility of merging the two commissions at this session.

Turning to the draft resolution prepared by Australia (Delga 391), he pointed out that it provided for a committee to study ways and means of bringing the two commissions closer together, even going so far as complete merger. The proposed special committee would be composed of the members of the Security Council plus Canada; co-sponsors for the Australian resolution were drawn from that group. Mr. Nash reviewed the terms of the resolution. After general hortatory preambular provisions, the resolution recognized the inability, to date, to achieve agreement among nations on the elimination of atomic weapons under a system of effective international control and the regulation of other armaments and armed forces and recalled that a plan had been developed in the Atomic Energy Commission, and approved by the Assembly, for the international control of atomic energy, and that much useful planning work had been accomplished in the Commission for Conventional Armaments. Mr. Nash pointed out that this latter provision made clear that it was not intended by this resolution in any way to junk or discredit the work of the past of both commissions. The operative provision of the resolution, as he already noted, provided for the establishment of a committee of 12 to consist of the representatives of the Security Council as of January 1, 1951, together with Canada. He explained that at first it had been expected that Australia would be included, but it had withdrawn because of the fact that its membership would open wide the possibility of including a number of other states on the special committee. Mr. Nash personally felt this limited membership was preferable.

With respect to the plans for discussion in plenary, Mr. Nash explained that Australia would be the first speaker, while the United States was inscribed to be second. We hoped this would get the discussion off on a key which we hoped could be maintained during the entire discussion. The aim was to avoid intensive substantive consideration of atomic energy. If we could get the free nations to rally around this particular resolution, Mr. Nash believed it would set a constructive note for the future.
Mr. Allen noted that other countries, now members of the Security Council, had been approached with respect to sponsoring this resolution. Brazil was without instructions; Yugoslavia had declined, and India was too much occupied with its negotiations with respect to Chinese Communist aggression in Korea to accept. He also reported that he understood the Soviets were extremely annoyed with the Secretariat for not having placed the item on control of atomic energy before the plenary at an earlier date. In answer to a question from Ambassador Austin regarding our negotiations with other countries, Mr. Nash explained that as the primary sponsor of the resolution, Australia had taken on the responsibility for obtaining co-sponsors. The only states not approached directly were China and the Soviet Union. However, he had privately undertaken to speak to the Chinese representative who was agreeable and understood why he was not being asked to co-sponsor the proposal. He noted that the membership of the special committee was not in terms of particular countries, but in terms of the membership of the Security Council. For this reason, no attempt had been made to ask whether a particular country was willing to serve. Ambassador Austin inquired how many countries had seen the draft resolution. Mr. Nash replied that all but the Soviets had been shown the resolution earlier, and that now that it had been tabled, he assumed that all members were aware of its contents.

Senator Cooper, while he thought the plan in the resolution was logical, believed the question might very well be asked as to what there was about the plan that promised any improvement over the present impasse. He wondered if the resolution were just a paper draft or actually offered hope for improvement in the present situation. It seemed to him the Soviets were likely to take this item as an opportunity to launch another propaganda attack based on various recent statements in this country regarding the use of the atomic bomb.

Mr. Nash explained that the United States would try to make it as clear as possible that this proposal was not offered as a solution to the impasse and would pick up the tenor of the President’s speech that the only hope for a solution was a fundamental change in Soviet opinion. This draft was offered as a fresh approach and with a view to going ahead with a discussion of some of the technical aspects of the problem against the day when the present difficult political situation might be resolved. In other words, this was a procedural step which at least would keep the door open. As to the possible use of the item by the Soviets for propaganda, he believed this was a real possibility. At the same time the resolution embraced a proposal which the Soviets had been contending for for five years. If they still believed the two fields of atomic energy and conventional armaments should not be split, this might make an all-out propaganda attack embarrassing. Mr.
McKeever asked whether it was anticipated that the Soviets would reintroduce their proposal for the elimination of the atomic weapon. Mr. Nash thought it was quite possible that they might bring in this proposal plus the old suggestion for a 1/3 reduction in armaments across the board. Mr. McKeever was worried about the possible vote such a proposal might pick up in this Assembly, particularly among the Asiatic states because of their reaction to the President's brief press statement.

Senator Sparkman agreed that we ought not build false hopes on this item, but he felt that perhaps one reason we might be running second in the propaganda program was our permitting Russia so often to stand out as the great advocate of peace and of a positive program to control armaments. He thought that we missed an opportunity if we did not emphasize as strongly as we could our own desire to see worked out a practical program for the reduction and control of conventional armaments and weapons of mass destruction. Mr. Nash replied that in our speech on the point of recalling the work of the Atomic Energy Commission, we would review the plan which the United Nations had approved and, at the same time, point out the speciousness of the Russian plan. This would cover both a constructive side and a rebuttal note. In other words, we did have something concrete to offer in this instance.

Senator Cooper remarked that he also thought the ideas expressed by Senator Sparkman were important to include.

Ambassador Austin inquired whether the Delegation had any objections to the proposal as explained by Mr. Nash as the policy of the Delegation. There were no objections, and he announced it to be the unanimous agreement of the Delegation to proceed along the lines described.

[Here follows discussion of the location of the sixth session of the General Assembly.]

*Porter McKeever, Public Information Adviser, United States Mission at the United Nations; Information Officer, United States Delegation to the General Assembly.

**Editorial Note**

The General Assembly considered the question of international control of atomic energy at its 321st, 322nd, and 323rd Plenary Meetings, December 12 and 13. At the 321st Meeting, Sir Keith Officer of Australia introduced a joint draft resolution sponsored by Australia, Canada, Ecuador, France, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States (for text, see Resolution GA 496(V),
The measure provided for the establishment of a committee of 12 to consider the advisability of merging the functions of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments under a consolidated disarmament commission. For the text of his presentation, see GA(V), Plenary, volume I, pages 608–609. At the same meeting, Soviet Representative Andrei Y. Vyshinsky presented a draft resolution (see telegram Delga 428, infra), according to which the Atomic Energy Commission would be instructed to prepare conventions prohibiting atomic weapons and providing for international control of atomic energy. For Vyshinsky’s address, see GA(V), Plenary, volume I, pages 609–621.

Further debate on the two draft resolutions occurred at the 321st, 322nd, and 323rd Meetings. For the statement by United States Representative John Sherman Cooper on behalf of the eight-power draft, delivered at the 321st Meeting, see ibid., pages 623–626, or Department of State Bulletin, December 25, 1950, pages 1023–1026.

At its 323rd Meeting, December 13, the General Assembly approved the eight-power joint resolution by a vote of 47 to 5 (Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Ukraine, and the Soviet Union), with 3 abstentions (Yugoslavia, Indonesia, and Pakistan). The Assembly then rejected the Soviet draft by a vote of 32 to 5 with 16 abstentions. For the record of the 323rd Meeting, see GA(V), Plenary, volume I, pages 639–652.

320/12–1250: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

NEW YORK, December 12, 1950—11:59 p.m.

Delga 428. International Control of Atomic Energy. Following is provisional text of USSR draft resolution introduced in plenary today: (A/1676)¹

"The GA:

"Considering that it is essential to begin immediately the preparation of a convention on the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the control of atomic energy decides:

"1. To instruct the UN AEC to resume its work in order to take up immediately the preparation of a draft convention for the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and a draft convention for

¹ Regarding consideration of this item by the General Assembly, see editorial note, supra."
the international control of atomic energy, with a view to both con-
ventions being concluded and carried into effect simultaneously,

"2. To instruct the said commission to prepare the draft conven-
tions referred to in the foregoing paragraph and submit them to the
SC not later than June 1, 1951."

Austin

IO Files: A/1722

Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly at its 323rd Plenary
Meeting, New York, December 13, 1950¹

[GA 496(V)]

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY

The General Assembly,

Recognizing that the effective regulation and reduction of national
armaments would substantially diminish the present danger of war,
relieve the heavy economic burden placed upon the peoples of the
world in the absence of a system of armaments control, and permit
the greater use of man's resources to projects devoted to his
betterment,

Recognizing that the regulation and reduction of armaments to
be effective must cover weapons of all kinds, must be based on unani-
mous agreement, and so must include every nation having substantial
armaments and armed forces,

Recognizing further that any plan for the regulation and reduction
of armaments and armed forces must be based upon safeguards that
will secure the compliance of all nations,

Recognizing the inability to date to achieve agreement among na-
tions on the elimination of atomic weapons under a system of effective
international control of atomic energy and on the regulation and
reduction of other armaments and armed forces,

Recalling that a plan has been developed in the United Nations
Atomic Energy Commission, and approved by the General Assembly,
for the international control of atomic energy, which would make ef-
fective the prohibition of atomic weapons; and that much useful
planning work has been accomplished in the Commission for Con-
ventional Armaments,

Desiring, however, to carry this work forward toward a com-pre-
hensive system of armaments control,

¹ Regarding the action by the General Assembly which culminated in the
adoption of this resolution, see editorial note, p. 122.
Decides to establish a committee of twelve, consisting of representatives of the members of the Security Council as of 1 January 1951, together with Canada, to consider and report to the next regular session of the General Assembly on ways and means whereby the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments may be co-ordinated and on the advisability of their functions being merged and placed under a new and consolidated disarmament commission.