

## PUBLICATION OF CHINA WHITE PAPER <sup>1</sup>

026 China/5-1749

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman*

WASHINGTON, [May 12, 1949.]

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The Wedemeyer Report on China <sup>2</sup>

For some time there has been a very deep interest on the part of various members of the Congress in the Wedemeyer Report on China. This has recently increased to the point where a decision should be made regarding the release of this Report.

The Report contains an independent and, in many respects, a realistic appraisal of the situation in China at the time of its preparation which might be advantageously placed before the American public. However, there are statements in the Report which, if released at this time, might have an undesirable effect abroad and others which would provide domestic critics of the Administration's policy toward China additional opportunities to attack that policy. The fact that most of the statements in the latter category are answerable probably would not prevent such attacks. Attached are (1) a copy of the Wedemeyer Report and (2) a memorandum analyzing the important portions of the Report.<sup>3</sup>

You will recall that the reason this Report was not released at the time of its submission to you was its recommendation that China request the United Nations to take immediate steps to bring about a

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<sup>1</sup> The files of the Department do not indicate the origin of the proposal to prepare a white paper on China. Work was under way in April 1949 (026 China/4-2749). A memorandum of May 21, 1951, by the then Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) stated that John F. Melby, of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in 1949, who was continuously associated with the project, "said that there was no formal directive regarding the White Paper and that the clearance as to its preparation was broached with the Secretary, who consulted with the President, who gave the green light for its compilation." The project was regarded as of first priority, to be completed in one volume within a few weeks (023 China/5-2151).

<sup>2</sup> For report dated September 19, 1947, by Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer to President Truman, see Department of State, *United States Relations With China* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 764. For General Wedemeyer's mission to China, see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. VII, pp. 635 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Memorandum not printed.

cessation of hostilities in Manchuria and request that Manchuria be placed under a Five Power Guardianship (including the USSR) or, failing that, under a Trusteeship in accordance with the United Nations Charter.<sup>4</sup> It was the opinion of General Marshall<sup>5</sup> that the assumption by the United Nations of responsibility at that time for the solution of the problem of Manchuria would probably have been fatal to that organization and that for the Chinese Government to take such action would have undermined its prestige in China, as an admission that it could not act as sovereign over one of its own most important areas. It is understood that General Marshall informed Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek,<sup>6</sup> orally through one of the Generalissimo's trusted subordinates, of these reasons and that the Generalissimo himself took no steps which would have constituted disapproval of the failure of the U.S. Government to suggest formally to the Chinese Government that it seek United Nations action regarding Manchuria.

There are set forth hereunder three possible courses of action under which the Wedemeyer Report might be released :

1. The Report could be made available on a confidential basis to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, as well as to those members of the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations who have been most insistent upon having the Report made available. This course has the disadvantage that those portions of the Report which would provide ammunition for attacks upon the Administration might well find their way into the press. The effect of the publication of such portions out of context would be most undesirable.

2. The Report could be made available to the above-named Committees and simultaneously released to the press by the Department of State. This would have the advantage of ensuring the availability of the entire Report to the public rather than only those portions which might be utilized to attack the Administration. However, the release of the Report at this time would give undue emphasis to the recommendations of the Report in its relation to the over-all problem of United States policy toward China and the Report itself would thus be taken out of the larger context of our relations with China.

3. The Report could be issued as a part of a White Paper on United States policy toward China, which is now in the process of preparation and is expected to be completed for publication sometime in June. This

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<sup>4</sup> Signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945; 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031.

<sup>5</sup> Gen. George C. Marshall, Secretary of State, January 1947-January 1949.

<sup>6</sup> In 1947 he was President of the National Government of the Republic of China.

would place the Wedemeyer Report in its proper place in the context of the over-all problem of our relations with China.

I suggest for your approval, therefore, that the Wedemeyer Report on China be released as a part of the Department of State's White Paper on United States policy toward China and that I be authorized to inform the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations, which is now pressing for the release of the Report, of the reasons why the Report was not previously published and to inform the Subcommittee also that the Department of State expects to release the Report as a part of a White Paper in the near future.

Due to the nature of the Report's comments upon the situation in Korea and upon certain aspects of the Korean leaders' activities, it is considered that the publication of those sections of the Report dealing with Korea would be harmful to the national interest and it is proposed, therefore, to release only the part of the Report relating to China.<sup>7</sup>

DEAN ACHESON

026 China/5-1749

*Mr. Clark M. Clifford, the Special Counsel to President Truman, to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, May 17, 1949.

DEAR DEAN: The President has carefully read your memorandum to him with reference to the Wedemeyer Report on China. I am returning herewith your memorandum containing the President's approval of your recommendation that the Wedemeyer Report on China be released as a part of the State Department's White Paper on United States policy toward China. You are also authorized to inform the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations of the reasons why the Report was not previously published, and to inform the Subcommittee that the State Department expects to release the Report as a part of the White Paper.

The President informs me that he agrees with you that developments in Shanghai<sup>8</sup> would control the date of the release of the White Paper. The President asks that a draft of the White Paper be submitted to him for approval prior to its release.

Very sincerely yours,

CLARK M. CLIFFORD

<sup>7</sup> Notation at end of memorandum: "Approved [.] Harry S. Truman". For section on Korea, see General Wedemeyer's report of September 19, 1947, to President Truman, *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. VI, p. 796.

<sup>8</sup> For correspondence on this subject, see vol. VIII, "Problems of United States Consulates in areas occupied by the Chinese Communists", chapter IV.

026 China/6-1349

*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State of a Conversation  
With President Truman*

[WASHINGTON,] June 13, 1949.

The President would like the White Paper on China sent to him as early as possible and has said he would like to read it all. He considers its issuance as one of our most important actions for some time to come. He asked if General Marshall had seen it and I told him he had read the chapter relating to his own activities.<sup>9</sup> The President indicated that he thought it important that General Marshall read it in its entirety prior to its issuance. He also indicated that he considered it important that Secretary Acheson have an opportunity to read it, if possible.<sup>10</sup>

JAMES E. WEBB

893.00/6-2749

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office  
of Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)*

[WASHINGTON,] June 27, 1949.

Dr. Tan <sup>11</sup> called at his request to raise under instructions from his Government two points. He first referred to the interview granted Mr. Kan Chieh-hou and the Chinese Ambassador by the President <sup>12</sup> and stated that he had been instructed to reenforce what had been said at that meeting with respect to the desire of the Chinese Government that Ambassador Stuart, upon leaving Nanking, call at Canton prior to returning to the United States.<sup>13</sup> According to Dr. Tan, the President had informed Mr. Woodward, Chief of Protocol, at the meeting referred to that this was a subject for State Department consideration and had instructed Mr. Woodward to inform the appropriate official. I told Dr. Tan that Mr. Woodward had provided Mr. Butterworth <sup>14</sup>

<sup>9</sup> General of the Army George C. Marshall was Personal Representative of President Truman in China, December 1945-January 1947. For correspondence on his mission, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VII, pp. 745 ff., and *ibid.*, 1946, vols. IX and X.

<sup>10</sup> Mr. Acheson was in Paris attending a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, May 23-June 20, 1949.

<sup>11</sup> Shao-hwa Tan, Chinese Minister.

<sup>12</sup> See memorandum of June 22, p. 708. Mr. Kan was the Personal Representative of Acting President Li Tsung-jen of China; the Ambassador was Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo.

<sup>13</sup> For Ambassador John Leighton Stuart's plans, see vol. VIII, "The Embassy in China after occupation of Nanking by Chinese Communists", chapter I.

<sup>14</sup> W. Walton Butterworth, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs.



with a full report of the conversation referred to and that this Government would naturally give consideration to the views expressed by the representatives of the Chinese Government. I stated further that no definite date had been set for Ambassador Stuart's return.

Dr. Tan then raised the question of the reported publication by this Government of a White Paper on China. He said the attention of the Chinese Government had been called to articles in the American press predicting such a publication, particularly those in the *Christian Science Monitor* of June 4, the *New Republic* of June 15, and the *Washington Post* of last week. Reference was also made to the statement by Secretary Acheson at his last press conference that the Department did have such a paper under consideration but that no decision had been made regarding its publication. Dr. Tan stated that his Government was concerned lest any document which might be made public contain sections which could be lifted out of context by either unfriendly or uninformed writers and used in a manner which would be embarrassing to the Chinese Government. He said that he had been instructed to express the hope that the United States Government would take into consideration the possible ill effects on the Nationalist Government of the publication of any such document. I informed Dr. Tan that I personally had no connection with the preparation of any such paper but that I was certain that the considerations mentioned by him were receiving adequate attention and that, in any case, I would bring his remarks to the attention of the appropriate authorities.

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026 China/6-3049

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation With  
President Truman*

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1949.

#### CHINA WHITE PAPER

I informed the President of the steps recently taken to expedite this work. He approved of them, and said that he hoped the paper could be gotten out well before the adjournment of Congress and thought that the end of July would be satisfactory. He was anxious to have the paper made as good as possible during the time at our disposal. He thought that it was important to have a short paper stressing the highlights of the Chinese White Paper.

026 China/7-649

*Memorandum for the President by Mr. Clark M. Clifford, the Special Counsel to President Truman*

[WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1949.

CONCERNING DRAFT <sup>15</sup> OF WHITE PAPER ON CHINA

I am sure the publication of a White Paper on China will be helpful to the American people in understanding the difficult and confused situation in China. However, in reading the draft, I noted some omissions which I fail to understand and which I am sure would raise a number of questions. These comments relate to Chapters I, II, III and IV. I have not seen V.

There appears to be a gap in the detailed narrative of U.S.-Chinese relations for the period December 1943 to August 1944. This was an especially critical period of the war, and very interesting politically, coming as it did after the Roosevelt-Churchill-Chiang conference in Cairo, November 1943.<sup>16</sup>

No reference is made to the Yalta conversations of President Roosevelt and Stalin on the Far East,<sup>17</sup> or the Agreement on the Far East signed by Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill.<sup>18</sup> This extraordinary omission is all the more noticeable because the conversations of subordinates like Nelson<sup>19</sup> and Hurley<sup>20</sup> with Stalin and Molotov<sup>21</sup> on the subject of China are dealt with at some length. (Too great a length for what they are worth, it seems to me.) The Yalta agreement, among other things, pledged the Soviets to conclude a "pact of friendship" with Chiang's Government. This was the direct antecedent of the Sino-Soviet treaty of August 1945.<sup>22</sup> I believe that failure to refer to Yalta in the White Paper openly and frankly would bring so much criticism that the value of the White Paper would be seriously diminished.

<sup>15</sup> Not printed.

<sup>16</sup> For communiqué issued by President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, released December 1, 1943, by the White House, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 4, 1943, p. 393. See also *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943.

<sup>17</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 894. Marshal I. V. Stalin was Chairman of the Council of Commissars of the Soviet Union.

<sup>18</sup> Signed February 11, 1945; *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 984.

<sup>19</sup> Donald M. Nelson, Chairman of the War Production Board, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in China, 1944.

<sup>20</sup> Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in China, 1944; Ambassador in China, November 1944-November 1945.

<sup>21</sup> V. M. Molotov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs in 1945.

<sup>22</sup> Signed at Moscow, August 14, 1945; United Nations Treaty Series, vol. x, p. 300, or Department of State, *United States Relations With China* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 585.

A great deal is made of the importance of Chinese-Soviet relations (especially in Chapter III) and yet the important conferences in Moscow in the summer of 1945 between T. V. Soong and Molotov<sup>23</sup> resulting in the Treaty of August 1945 are dismissed in a brief footnote. There was a close relationship between the terms of this treaty and the U.S.-British-Soviet agreement signed at Yalta.

Repeatedly it is stated or implied that the basis of American policy (of trying to bring the Nationalist Government and the Chinese Communists together) was our desire to enable China to prosecute the war against Japan more effectively. If this was truly the basis of our policy, it is all the more surprising that only the most casual notice is taken in the White Paper of the end of hostilities in August 1945, and no effort is made at all to explain what effect (if, indeed, there was any) the end of the war had on our Chinese policy.

I have a number of doubts about Chapter IV. All of them relate, I believe, to one point: the Chapter seems to lack the perspective and the point of view that a review at this date should have. It reads as though it has been compiled by paraphrasing day-to-day reports prepared in the office of General Marshall's mission. It seems rambling, repetitive and too long. Chapter IV also departs from the tone of the earlier Chapters by expressing a number of opinions and judgments on persons and events which seem out of place in a White Paper. These apparently were in contemporary documents, and have remained because of insufficient editing. It is noted that on page 53 and page 86 comments are made at the expense of the Chinese people which could well be resented by them.

Equally out of place are praise of Americans and caustic criticism of Chinese. On page 74 of Chapter IV, Ambassador Stuart is highly praised. Without in any sense wishing to detract from the credit due to Dr. Stuart, it seems improper for such praise to appear in a White Paper. It is also inconsistent for no other Ambassador of the many named in this document is praised—or condemned. It is certainly an exaggeration, if not an inaccuracy, to state that American members of field teams "accomplished miracles" in bringing about cooperation between the Nationalists and the Communists (p. 21, Ch. IV). The entire section on the Executive Headquarters (pp. 17-25, Ch. IV) bears a strong "pro-American, anti-Chinese" slant.

One final comment. I understand a White Paper to be an expression of the United States Government. Just as I do not believe the White Paper can omit Yalta on the grounds that Yalta was "White House,"

<sup>23</sup> For mission to Moscow of the President of the Chinese Executive Yuan, T. V. Soong, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VII, pp. 851 ff., *passim*.

I do not believe the Paper can avoid Stilwell <sup>24</sup> and his role in China by saying "It was an Army matter of no concern to the State Department." It would appear to be a matter of considerable concern to this Government.

I understand that a substantial re-writing job is to be done. If the later chapters can be brought up to the excellent level of Chapters I and II, the White Paper will be an important historical document of far-reaching significance and wide public interest.

Very respectfully submitted,

CLARK M. CLIFFORD

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026 China/7-849

*Memorandum by Mr. Lucius D. Battle, of the Executive Secretariat,  
to the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Humelsine)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 8, 1949.

The Secretary handed me yesterday the attached memorandum from Clark Clifford to the President <sup>25</sup> regarding the White Paper on China. The Secretary asked that this paper be returned to the President under cover of a memorandum indicating that Ambassador Jessup <sup>26</sup> has gone over this matter with Mr. Clark Clifford and that the points raised by the President with the Secretary will be met.

L[UCIUS] D. B[ATTLE]

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026 China/7-849

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman*

[WASHINGTON,] July 8, 1949.

Subject: White Paper on China

Ambassador Jessup spent three-quarters of an hour yesterday discussing with Mr. Clark Clifford the latter's memorandum to you concerning the draft of the White Paper on China. Ambassador Jessup was able to explain to Mr. Clifford that many of the points noted had already been taken care of in the redrafting which was under way, and that every effort would be made to meet the other suggestions. On certain points, Mr. Clifford agreed with Mr. Jessup that problems of

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<sup>24</sup> Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the China-Burma-India Theater and Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Commander in Chief of the China Theater, 1942-1944.

<sup>25</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>26</sup> Philip C. Jessup, who attended the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers with Secretary of State Acheson, was assigned by the latter at the end of June to assist with the preparation of the White Paper.

practicability would necessarily determine the extent to which all of the points noted could be fully covered.

DEAN ACHESON

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893.00/7-1149 : Telegram

*The Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China (Clark) to the Secretary of State*

CANTON, July 11, 1949—10 p. m.

[Received July 12—8:10 a. m.]

Cantel 717. Evidencing the increasing perturbation in Government circles over possibility release our white paper [on] China, Cantel 710, July 11,<sup>27</sup> was Vice Foreign Minister Tung Ling's comment to me today that if white paper is issued, Chinese Government would likely issue comparable document their side of picture beginning with Yalta.

CLARK

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026 China/7-1549

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] July 15, 1949.

At a White Paper meeting in Ambassador Jessup's office this forenoon, Mr. Gross' assistant Mr. Howard<sup>28</sup> stated that the bipartisan foreign policy might be importantly jeopardized by the issuance of the White Paper since Senator Vandenberg<sup>29</sup> had indicated his opposition to its publication at a time when sizable areas on the Mainland and Formosa have not fallen under Chinese Communist control. Quite apart from the validity of this view, it occurred to me that an approach might be made to Senator Vandenberg to the effect that, in the interest of preserving and possibly extending the area of bipartisan foreign policy, if his party in Congress would refrain from ex parte attacks on the Government's China policy, the issuance of the White Paper would be delayed indefinitely or at any rate until such a time as the National Government was no longer functioning in an important area in China. There is also to be said in favor of such a procedure that the issuance of the White Paper dealing as it does importantly with the Generalissimo may have unforeseeable consequences on the Formosan situation.

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<sup>27</sup> Vol. VIII, "Political and military situation in China", chapter VI.

<sup>28</sup> John H. Howard, Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Gross).

<sup>29</sup> Arthur H. Vandenberg, of Michigan, ranking Republican member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

It is, of course, a question as to whether Senator Vandenberg personally can bring his own party to accept such a procedure. If he cannot do it, or will not attempt it, you will have made a contribution vis-à-vis him in preserving the bipartisan foreign policy to which he has in the past contributed so significantly.

For my part, I do not think that the momentum for publication has gone so far that a contrary decision can not be made now if it is in the larger interest to do so. There would, of course, be a squall but not a storm through which one could not ride.

There is this further consideration that the decision to refer the White Paper for concurrence to the NME<sup>30</sup> will, I think, in all likelihood result in either a refusal of concurrence or fairly widespread recommendations for change which at the least will entail delaying the publication date. Will not this become known with unseemly results? If this be so, should not time be taken by the forelock and an immediate approach made to Senator Vandenberg?

W. W[ALTON] B[UTTERWORTH]

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026 China/7-1849

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation With  
President Truman*

[WASHINGTON,] July 18, 1949.

CHINESE WHITE PAPER

The President told me that Mr. Clifford had reported to him that the White Paper, as edited, was greatly improved and was, in Mr. Clifford's judgment, an excellent paper. The President was pleased by this.

I pointed out the difficulties which might arise through our consultation with the Military on the subject. The President does not wish to have the Paper "watered down" and will give us all possible assistance in dealing with the Military.

D[EAN] A[CHIESON]

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<sup>30</sup> National Military Establishment.

026 China/7-1949

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State  
for Congressional Relations (Gross)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 19, 1949.

Participants: Senator Tom Connally,<sup>31</sup> Secretary of State Acheson,  
Dr. Francis Wilcox,<sup>32</sup> and Ernest A. Gross.

The Secretary called on Senator Connally to advise him that the China White Paper would be issued next week, and to discuss with the Senator consultations with the Committee regarding the White Paper and the development of Far Eastern policies in the future.

The Secretary stressed to Senator Connally the desirability of assuring bipartisan consultation regarding these matters. The Secretary said that he had discussed this with the President and was authorized to take up what was in effect the offer made by Senator Vandenberg on the floor of the Senate on June 24, 1949, for close liaison between the Executive and Congress on Far Eastern policy.<sup>33</sup> Senator Connally said he thought it was a good idea "to get the Republicans in". The Senator also agreed with the Secretary that meetings with the Foreign Relations Committee would be a good method of maintaining bipartisan relations.

The Secretary offered to meet with the Committee prior to the issuance of the White Paper for the purpose of informing them about it and of discussing with the Committee procedures by which the Secretary intended to have studies made of Far Eastern policies in the future. At this meeting with the Committee the Secretary would also indicate his desire to consult with the Committee regarding recommendations which might be made to the Secretary by his advisers. Senator Connally thought it was a very good idea for the Secretary to meet with the Committee for the foregoing purposes and also the Secretary to meet with the Committee at fairly frequent times to discuss Far Eastern developments and policies on a confidential basis.

<sup>31</sup> Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

<sup>32</sup> Chief of Staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

<sup>33</sup> Following an exchange in the Senate on the subject of recognizing the Chinese Communists, Senator Vandenberg observed there "was no such liaison in respect to China policy" and "I disassociate myself . . . from the China policy which we pursued"; see *Congressional Record*, vol. 95, pt. 6, p. 8294.



Senator Connally said he thought it would be desirable to hold up action on the nomination of Walton Butterworth <sup>34</sup> until after issuance of the White Paper. The Secretary agreed.

E[RNEST] A. G[ROSS]

026 China/7-2049

*Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the  
Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] July 20, 1949.

Mr. Halaby, who has been our contact with the National Military Establishment and with Secretary Johnson <sup>35</sup> personally in regard to the White Paper, summarized over the phone the NME position.

There are two major points. The first is the security angle which they consider an extremely serious substantive matter. This is being taken up by Mr. Park Armstrong,<sup>36</sup> who is our member of the USCIB.<sup>37</sup> The second major point is that Secretary Johnson believes that as a Cabinet member and not merely as the Military Adviser of the President, he is bound to raise with you and perhaps with the President himself the basic policy question of the publication of the Paper. He raises the fundamental point that by the publication, exposing the only group in China which we could assist, we are destroying that group. Secretary Johnson has been informed by Halaby that this fundamental question was thoroughly canvassed and weighed by you and by the President but he still feels a responsibility to bring it up again. He will presumably do this directly with you.

On the time schedule, Mr. Halaby informs me the Joint Chiefs will have their final meeting tomorrow morning and that you may expect to receive Secretary Johnson's letter by noon tomorrow.

In the light of the above and of our conversation this morning, we have decided to defer our publication date. We are meeting this afternoon with the interested officers of the Department to fix a revised schedule.

PHILIP C. JESSUP

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<sup>34</sup> As Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.

<sup>35</sup> Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense.

<sup>36</sup> Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence.

<sup>37</sup> United States Communications Intelligence Board.

026 China/7-2149

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation With  
President Truman*

[WASHINGTON,] July 21, 1949.

CHINA WHITE PAPER

I informed the President of the reasons for the postponement of the date of publication for one week, and of the possible objections by the NME. The President was of the opinion that we should proceed with the publication as now planned.

I told him also of my discussion with Senator Connally and he approved the arrangements for cooperation with the Committee which we were now making.

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026 China/7-2149

*The Secretary of Defense (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, 21 July 1949.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am leaving with you a copy of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the China White Paper. They were handed to me as I was leaving the office and I am giving them to you in advance of a letter explaining my position. This letter will reach you later in the day.

Sincerely yours,

LOUIS JOHNSON

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense  
(Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, 21 July 1949.

Subject: The China White Paper.

1. This memorandum is in response to your memorandum, dated 16 July 1949,<sup>38</sup> in which the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the China White Paper, with draft letter of transmittal to the Presi-

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<sup>38</sup> Memorandum not received by the Department.

dent,<sup>39</sup> both prepared by the Department of State, were requested as a matter of urgency.

2. In view of the urgency of this matter and the voluminous nature of the State Department document, it has been impossible to determine the precision of the innumerable statements of fact and figures, contained therein. The document and its letter of transmittal, however, have been carefully read and considered, and, on this basis, the following comments are made.

3. The draft letter transmitting the China White Paper from the Secretary of State to the President summarizes very well the tenor and the general content of the China White Paper. It is recommended that it be carefully read.

4. The China White Paper is consistent with its title, "A Record of the Years 1944-49 with an Historical Introduction". It is most comprehensive and its documentation is extensive. The chapter headings of the Paper itself indicate the contents of the eight chapters. The Record includes not only a chronology of the events which took place, but also comment and opinion regarding these events, either direct or in the form of concurrent quoted statements, messages, and reports.

5. Quotation of these statements, messages, and reports raises certain possibly serious questions with respect to the security of classified documents and the security of our cryptographic systems. With respect to classification, it is noted that messages and reports originated by General Stilwell are quoted in Chapter III, that messages originated by Lieut. General Wedemeyer (in his capacity as Commanding General of United States Armed Forces in the China Theater) are quoted in Chapter V, and that messages and a final report by Major General Barr<sup>40</sup> are quoted in Chapter VII. Since the Department of the Army is the official custodian of this material, the question of declassification as necessary should be handled with that Department.

6. With respect to cryptographic security, not only military, but also Department of State communications that have been transmitted by electrical means are involved. Expert opinion is that, because of interrelationship of the various cryptographic arrangements, jeopardy to the security of our departmental system constitutes jeopardy to the security of other departmental systems. Therefore, unless appropriate steps are taken by means of effective paraphrasing where necessary and omission of unduly specific data, cryptographic compromise of serious national security consequence might result.

<sup>39</sup> For letter of transmittal, dated July 30, see Department of State, *United States Relations With China* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. iii.

<sup>40</sup> Maj. Gen. David G. Barr, Director of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) in China; for further correspondence, see pp. 472 ff.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, although they believe that this question has been considered in the compilation of the China White Paper, have been unable to assure themselves that the risk of compromise has been completely removed. Therefore, although they realize and regret that delay in preparation of the paper in its final form will, because of the great volume of material that may be in question, thereby be entailed, they must recommend, as a matter of military responsibility, that the United States Communications Intelligence Board be designated to consider the question of cryptographic security with respect to the China White Paper and to assist as necessary in insuring that the Paper meets cryptographic security requirements.

8. It should particularly be noted that the China White Paper contains nothing, either direct or by implication, in any way critical of or derogatory to the National Military Establishment or to any of its Departments or their personnel. On the contrary, the contents of the Paper place the National Military Establishment in a creditable light throughout.

9. The China White Paper, as indicated in its letter of transmittal, amounts largely to a report intended to establish, step by step, the impracticability of the United States having prevented development of the present China situation without massive overt intervention. It contains no specific consideration of future possible developments in China, nor does it make any proposals with respect to the future position or action of the United States regarding China. The letter of transmittal from the Secretary of State to the President does, however, contain in its last three paragraphs an indication of what might hereafter in general be our China policy.

10. In the light of the foregoing brief description, and subject to the action recommended in paragraphs 5 to 7 above in the interest of assuring classification and cryptographic security, the Joint Chiefs of Staff perceive no major strictly military objection to publication of the China White Paper. There are, however, as discussed below, certain indirect military implications and other points of military interest in the Paper which they feel should be covered.

11. Apart from security considerations, decision as between publication and nonpublication of the China White Paper is manifestly beyond the cognizance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nevertheless, if publication should result in materially decreasing or postponing the possibility of containing or reversing the Communist trend in China, this would have very grave national security implications in view of the enormous differential, strategically speaking, between a friendly and a Soviet-controlled or Soviet-allied China.

12. While the China White Paper is primarily factual and, on the whole, lets the record speak for itself, the cumulative effect of its many

hundreds of pages of fact, opinion, and clarifying comment is one that is highly derogatory to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek and the Chinese Nationalist Government. Regardless of whether or not the unfavorable conclusions inevitably to be drawn from the contents of the Paper as to their character and intelligence are fair, the record as compiled risks the incurrence of their deep and lasting resentment. This, because of racial and national pride, might also be the reaction of the Chinese people as a whole.

13. Unavoidably, the Paper, in recording so extensively the shortcomings of the Nationalist Government, makes it possible readily to draw the inference that the Chinese Communist Party is, by contrast, far less culpable. Although such an inference is certainly not intended, and both the Paper and its letter of transmittal make it clear that Communist domination of China is altogether unacceptable to the United States Government, their contents in many respects could prove very valuable for use as Communist propaganda.

14. It can be foreseen that the Paper in its demonstration of the relative futility to date of United States assistance to China, might cause public disinclination to support any future Chinese assistance. The point here is not one of whether or not additional assistance should be later undertaken, perhaps on different terms and in the light of unpredictable future developments. It is simply that flexibility of Governmental decision might be jeopardized.

15. Paragraphs 11 to 14 above are based solely on the conviction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the military implications of an irrevocably Communist China are very serious in terms of our national security. Admittedly, the situation there is indicative now of an almost overwhelmingly Communist trend. The Communist successes in China, however, make it all the more important that there be no avoidable obstacle to any steps that may be found practicable for containing or reversing that trend. Publication of the China White Paper might well constitute such an obstacle.

16. In connection with the foregoing possible implications of the China White Paper, the Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the over-all question of United States Asiatic policy, a matter of extreme and far-reaching importance in terms of our national security, is now under consideration by the National Security Council. They note, as previously stated, that the Paper itself does not embody any specific considerations of future possible developments in China or of future United States policy regarding China, but that the Paper's letter of transmittal contains in its last three paragraphs some general consideration of our future China policy.

17. It is the considered opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that neither the document nor the letter of transmittal should undertake

consideration of future Chinese developments or policy, since this would tend to influence and restrict in advance the National Security Council's conclusions as to our Asiatic policy. Furthermore, if consideration of our future China policy is to be retained in the letter of transmittal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are not prepared to agree that the policy generally outlined in the letter's last three paragraphs is, from the military viewpoint, necessarily best.

18. The China White Paper contains many messages and reports originated by General Marshall, General Stilwell, Major General Hurley, Lieutenant General Wedemeyer, and Major General Barr. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that it should be made clear that the opinions of these officers, as reflected in their messages and reports, are their personal and individual opinions and do not directly commit the National Military Establishment to their views, and that Lieut. General Wedemeyer and Major General Barr, who are still on active duty, have not reviewed the portions of the Paper and letter of transmittal dealing with their messages and reports. General Marshall, Major General Hurley, and Lieut. General Wedemeyer (during his special mission status) were not, in fact, functioning as representatives of the National Military Establishment when their opinions were expressed. In all cases, there would be an impression, if uncorrected, that the National Military Establishment's official views have had much greater influence than actually was the case on the course of our Governmental policy towards China to date. This might extend even to an impression that the National Military Establishment had collaborated in, rather than commented on, the Paper.

19. The Joint Chiefs of Staff object to the publication of the China White Paper until (a) there is assurance that there exists no cryptographic compromise (b) action has been taken to assure that there exists full authority for declassification of material of which the Department of the Army is the custodian. Further, they wish to emphasize that:

a. They are not committed to agreement, from the military viewpoint, with all the views expressed or implied therein;

b. They reserve their opinion regarding the question of future United States policy toward China pending consideration of this question by the National Security Council;

c. The action recommended in paragraph 7 above is essential as a precaution against possible cryptographic compromise of serious national security implications; and

d. They earnestly believe that the China White Paper should be published only after the fullest consideration of all comments and suggestions contained herein.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

LOUIS DENFELD

*Admiral, U.S. Navy*

893.00/7-2149

*The Secretary of Defense (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, 21 July 1949.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I refer to our conversation of this afternoon regarding the China White Paper. As you will recall, I left with you advance copies of the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to that Paper. These had been prepared in response to your telephone request to me on July 15, 1949.

I am very glad to have your assurance that nothing will be said or written by the Department of State which indicates that the National Military Establishment, or its officials, have participated in the preparation or publication of the Paper. We clearly understand it has been prepared from your files and will be published on your initiative and responsibility. We have acceded to your request to comment on the Paper and hope that our comments will be helpful.

We have two major questions about the China White Paper: Does its publication serve the national interests? Have adequate security precautions been taken to provide for security of documents and codes?

On the first point I concur with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that you and the President should carefully consider whether the usefulness of this Paper in clarifying recent history is greater than the risks inherent in the disclosures which are made. The responsibility for publication is yours, and I am certainly not recommending that the document be withheld from the public. I am, however, expressing to you concern as to how this publication will affect future developments in China.

On the question of security, I do not believe that the Secretary of State nor the Secretary of Defense can afford to take any risks with our codes or with classified documents, and I am certain that you will agree with me that you and the President should have the assurances of the United States Communications Intelligence Board, the top level agency concerned with these matters, that these risks have been avoided or reduced to an absolute minimum. I have instructed the military representatives on USCIB, as well as the Department of the Army, to expedite clearances of the documents involved.

Sincerely yours,

LOUIS JOHNSON



026 China/7-2549

*Memorandum by the Acting Deputy Director of the Office of German and Austrian Affairs (Byroade<sup>41</sup>) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] July 25, 1949.

At the suggestion of Mr. Humelsine, I have read the significant portions of the proposed white paper on China. It is my understanding that you desire my recommendations on the following two questions.

Question 1: *Is publication of the proposed white paper in the national interest?*

In considering this question, I believe account must be taken of the following:

(a) *Timing of the Report.*

By its very nature the white paper has a note of finality. It is an indication that the events to which it relates have reached the stage where nothing further can be accomplished and the facts can be exposed. While from a practical point of view this state of affairs may have been reached in China, nevertheless I feel the State Department is subject to justified criticism if the report is published at this time. While there can be no doubt that the National Government of China is on the way out, that government, with all of its inherent weaknesses and its present state of collapse, is still endeavoring to fight the spread of communism. Voluntary criticism of that government at this stage would undoubtedly hasten its final collapse and provide additional emotional reaction within this country. Such public criticism of a national government which this country still recognizes and which is at this time still a member of international organizations such as the UN and the FEC<sup>42</sup> would be hard to justify.

I believe, therefore, that we should await a further development in the Chinese picture which would cause the general public to realize that the National Government of China was a government in name only and that as a *de facto* situation had completely lost its power to resist. Such a development would be the fall of Canton, which has become symbolic of the last stronghold of the National Government. I am no longer closely in touch with the situation, but understand the fall of Canton may be expected during the month of August. Unless we are irrevocably committed to publishing the white paper by a

<sup>41</sup> Col. Henry A. Byroade in January-June 1946, was Director of Executive Headquarters at Peiping, in furtherance of General Marshall's Mission to China.

<sup>42</sup> United Nations and Far Eastern Commission.

certain specified date, I would strongly recommend withholding its publication until after the fall of that city.

(b) *Effect of Release of the White Paper in the Far East Generally.*

The appearance of finality of the white paper has been mentioned above. We must consider as a matter of national interest, the effect of the publication of the white paper upon countries other than China, whom we hope to bolster as effective instruments in the prevention of further spread of communism in the Far East. This applies particularly to the countries of Southeast Asia. I believe the effect of the white paper upon such countries would be one of general discouragement, that we are now in effect "washing our hands" of our Far Eastern efforts. This might be coupled with the fear that we will measure the efficiency of their government (by the American standards) as a prerequisite to any moral or material aid from the United States for the suppression of communism. With this in mind, I believe it most desirable that the white paper be accompanied by a general statement by the Secretary to the effect that this Government is keenly aware of the dangers inherent in the further spread of communism in the Far East and will take such measures as are available to support those who are willing to help themselves in the effort to stop the move of communism in the Far East. This would of necessity have to be a general statement and would have to be very carefully phrased to prevent involving us immediately in the question of support for a possible future Pacific Pact.<sup>43</sup> Nevertheless, I feel much good can be done in the Far East and a segment of public reaction in this country could be answered in advance, by some such public statement accompanying the white paper.

(c) *Fairness of the Report.*

I should like to express the fact that in my opinion this report is slanted in favor of the Chinese Communist Party. I believe this to be the case as the written record contains a greater proportion of dealings with the National Government. Consequently, a dominant portion of the white paper is dedicated to relations with the National Government. The paper leaves me with an impression of the equality of the two forces in China, whereas in reality one was an internationally recognized government while the other was an armed dissident political party. Also, in my opinion, it does not place enough stress upon the activities of the Chinese Communist representatives in their field armies and in the Truce Organization set up by General Marshall. Within the field organizations designed to carry out the truce agreements, I would estimate as much as 90 percent of the willful violations and disruptions were caused by representatives of the

<sup>43</sup> See also vol. VII, pp. 1 ff., *passim*.

Communist Party. I realize that I may be inclined to give undue weight to this factor as this was the part of the Marshall Mission with which I was connected. I know General Marshall, who saw the picture from the Chinese capital, does not agree with the large proportion of blame which I place on the Chinese Communists.

*(d) Public Criticism of the White Paper.*

I believe publication of the white paper will be followed by a storm of public criticism and recriminations. I believe this would be the case almost regardless of what was contained in the white paper as its publication will provide a focal point at which to direct the emotionally interested, as well as politically inspired opponents of our China policy. This will be balanced by the fact that the administration is willing to lay before the people such a complete and detailed record of its dealings in China. I believe the sincerity of an effort to place before the people all the facts of the case will outweigh the criticism and that it is to the long-run interest of the government to make such an attempt. I believe further that the American people are entitled to know the facts on the China question which has been the subject of so much misinformation.

In summation of the above, I believe the publication of the white paper to be in the national interest. In my opinion, however, it should be withheld until the fall of Canton or some other dramatic evidence of the final disintegration of the Chinese National Government, and should then be accompanied by a statement of our future intentions to oppose the spread of communism in the Far East.

Question 2: *Would the publication of the white paper endanger the safety of American personnel in China?*

I do not believe the contents of the white paper are such as to create conditions in China which would endanger the safety of American personnel in that country. While it undoubtedly would be preferable, for other reasons, to have Ambassador Stuart absent from the country at the time of its publication, I do not consider that either side would be incited to the point of physical violence against him.

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026 China/7-2549

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation With  
President Truman*

[WASHINGTON,] July 25, 1949.

CHINA WHITE PAPER

I informed the President of the nature of the doubts which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary Johnson had raised and as to

the policy question of publishing the White Paper. I told the President that the papers from the NME would be put before him when the final decision had to be made on publication.

The President believes that it is necessary and desirable to bring out the White Paper. We will consider the timing of it in connection with Ambassador Stuart's exit permit.

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026 China/7-2149

*The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, July 26, 1949.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have received your letter of July 21 regarding the China White Paper. I should like to reply to the various specific points which you raise.

In the first place, the Paper would be published as an official document of the Government of the United States prepared under the authority of the President. It would bear the imprint of the Department of State as the agency of the Government charged by the President with its production.

With regard to the problem of security, we have readily concurred with your recommendation based on the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that this matter should be considered by the United States Communications Intelligence Board in order to avoid entirely or reduce to an absolute minimum the risks involved. I greatly appreciate the cooperation which you are giving in expediting the work of the Board.

As to whether it serves the national interest to publish the Paper at this time, I wish to point out that over an extended period of time the President and Secretary Marshall were torn between the pressing necessity for informing the Congress and the American people concerning the facts bearing upon our relations with China and their reluctance to take any steps which would add to the difficulties of the Chinese Government. When it became my responsibility to participate in a decision concerning the choice between these two alternatives, I gave the matter the most careful consideration. As a result, I have reached the conclusion and I have recommended to the President that the time has now come when a complete survey of our entire policy in the Far East must be made and that it cannot be made and put into effect unless the Congress and the American people know the facts which unfortunately have in the general interest had to be withheld for so long a time. I recognize fully that the situation is a most difficult one, and I have weighed carefully the considerations which you and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have presented. As I am stating in my Letter of Transmittal to the President: "The inherent strength of our

system is the responsiveness of the Government to an informed and critical public opinion. It is precisely this informed and critical public opinion which totalitarian governments, whether Rightist or Communist, cannot endure and do not tolerate." I am also stating in this Letter that I have not felt that publication at this time could be withheld because a truthful record involves the revelation of a distressing situation in a country for which the people and the Government of the United States have long had a most friendly and sympathetic feeling.

I recognize, as you state in your letter, that the responsibility for publication is mine, but I shall not fail to make your views known to the President.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

893.00/7-2749

*The Secretary of Defense (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, 27 July 1949.

DEAR Mr. Secretary: In connection with my letter of July 21, 1949, and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which were enclosed on the subject of the "China White Paper", I have just received a memorandum from the United States Communications Intelligence Board which states that the Board is of the opinion that publication of the draft of the "China White Paper" which was reviewed by the Board will not compromise the cryptographic security of the United States. Information has also been received from the Departments of Army and Navy of the declassification of relevant documents under their cognizance. The recommendation contained in the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and my letter with respect to the protection of security of documents has therefore been satisfied.

With respect to the other points we raised with you concerning the advisability of publishing the Paper, I still believe that you should most carefully consider whether or not publication of the "China White Paper" at this time will do more harm than good.

Sincerely yours,

LOUIS JOHNSON

026 China/7-2849 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Taipei (Macdonald) to the Secretary of State*

TAIPEI, July 28, 1949—2 p. m.

[Received July 28—12:41 p. m.]

324. Because of past cases where Chinese Government agents have caused "popular" demonstrations against foreigners in official disfavor, request maximum advance notice release date of White Paper.

Sent Department, repeated Canton 136.

MACDONALD

-026 China/7-2949

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman*

[WASHINGTON,] July 29, 1949.

Subject: China White Paper

1. *Present Status of Preparation*

Final revisions and corrections have been made and all revised copy has gone to the Government Printing Office. Advance unbound copies of the entire book are to be delivered at noon today.

2. *Checks and clearances*

The entire document, partly in galley proof and partly in type-script, was submitted to the National Military Establishment on July 15. Secretary Johnson transmitted the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on July 21.

The question of security was referred with the entire document to the United States Communications Intelligence Board which reported to the Secretary of Defense on July 25 that they were satisfied that publication of the document would not compromise the cryptographic security of the United States.

In regard to the declassification of certain documents transmitted through military channels or secured from the National Military Establishment files, clearance was secured from General Wedemeyer.

Revised galley proofs were carefully checked by officers of the Department of State and various individual officers of the Department especially assigned to this task.

3. *Review of Basic Question of Policy in Regard to the Publication of the Paper*

In the light of various doubts and criticisms which came to the attention of the Department and in view particularly of the general considerations set forth on behalf of the National Military Establishment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary Johnson,<sup>44</sup> the basic policy question of the desirability of publication has been thoroughly considered and reviewed. In the light of these comments and this reconsideration, the final decision regarding publication is referred to you with my recommendation that the decision to publish should be reaffirmed.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff reported to the Secretary of Defense that the decision as between publication and nonpublication was beyond their cognizance but they felt it incumbent upon them to report their

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<sup>44</sup> Attached to this memorandum were the two letters dated July 21 from the Secretary of Defense and the reply dated July 26, pp. 1377, 1382, and 1386, respectively.

views to the Secretary of Defense. The points to which they called attention as requiring careful consideration are the following:

(a) The possibility that publication would decrease or postpone the possibility of containing or reversing the Communist trend in China.

(b) The risk that publication would incur the "deep and lasting resentment" of the Generalissimo and the National Government.

(c) The inference that, because of the necessarily greater emphasis on the National Government, the United States might seem to display some favor toward the Chinese Communists.

(d) The possibility that publication might cause public disinclination to support any future Chinese assistance if it subsequently should be decided that additional assistance should be undertaken. This point is stated merely in terms of the risk of jeopardizing the flexibility of the United States Government.

(e) The possibility that the statements contained in the Letter of Transmittal might restrict the flexibility of the United States Government in determining future policy in the Far East and might influence or restrict in advance the National Security Council's consideration of this question.

The foregoing considerations are all ones which were in mind when the question of the publication of the White Paper was originally considered. Nevertheless, they have again been restudied. It is impossible to deny that there are certain risks involved in the publication of such a document. On the other hand, the basic necessity of informing Congressional and public opinion regarding the facts in order that future policy may be made on the basis of realism and comprehension of the situation is believed to outweigh the risks involved. It must be anticipated that the publication of the Paper will cause a renewed storm of attack from certain quarters and that it will probably have a depressing effect on the Chinese National Government. It is not possible to estimate exactly whether in the long run it will stimulate those changes in the organization and attitude of the non-Communist Chinese which are essential to their becoming an effective ally in our struggle to contain Communist in Asia.

Consideration has also been given to the fact that both members of Congress and the public are aware that the Paper is being prepared and that a decision not to publish would be the basis for other attacks. In the hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on July 28, members of the Committee urged that the document be made available to them as soon as possible. The consideration of this element, however, has not been allowed to outweigh the more basic factors indicated by the National Military Establishment.

#### 4. *Time of Release*

If you now determine that the White Paper should be published,



the time of publication would be determined by me in accordance with the following schedule and factors:

(a) The document will not be released until Ambassador Stuart is out of China.

(b) While there are plausible arguments for timing the date of publication with the anticipated fall of Canton, it is believed that no exact correlation with events in China is necessary. On the other hand, the lapse of some additional time is likely to bring out the situation in China more clearly and to reduce the force of the possible argument that the publication has had some effect upon the defense of Canton.

(c) The volume will be ready for distribution by Monday, August 1 but can be kept secret for a period of time thereafter.

(d) From the point of view of distribution both in this country and abroad and from the point of view of briefing committees of the Congress and making the necessary statements to the press, it seems desirable to schedule release of the document either late in the week of August 1 or early in the following week. Drafts of statements which might be made to the press by you and by me in our press conferences would be submitted to you on Monday, August 1.

Preparations for the presentation of the Paper to the Committees of the Senate and House and materials for the briefing of the press are now in course of final preparation and will be available by the middle of next week.

In light of the foregoing I recommend that, subject to your decision as to publication, the exact timing of the public release be left to my discretion.

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026 China/7-2949

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation With  
President Truman*

[WASHINGTON,] July 29, 1949.

CHINESE WHITE PAPER

I left with the President the memorandum on the China White Paper,<sup>45</sup> first of all going through with him the various questions to ask whether he wished to decide them now or later.

The President decided the White Paper would be released and it should be released as soon as possible. He will be given a copy to read over the weekend. He and I thought tentatively that probably the very last part of next week would be the best time. Statements by him and

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<sup>45</sup> *Supra*.

me will be given to him on Monday, and he will tell us then the exact date, so that we can go ahead with sending out copies, etc., etc.

[DEAN ACHESON]

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026 China/8-149 : Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers* <sup>46</sup>

WASHINGTON, August 1, 1949—noon.

Dept is issuing for publication August 5 1500 hours Gmt <sup>47</sup> White Paper on China covering Sin[o]-US relations in some detail during past five years. Text Letter of Transmittal being addressed by SecState to Pres despatched to you air pouch July 30 and will be transmitted in wireless bulletin August 4. Full text White Paper being forwarded by air about August 2. Special guidance for public affairs officers also being pouched. Length Letter of Transmittal and Paper precludes sending summary by tel.

For your info Paper is very frank picture Sin-US relations during period covered. Letter Transmittal provides summary of high points and interpretation US policy during period but does not except in broadest terms deal with future policy toward Far East. Further suggestions re future steps will probably be included in press statements by Pres and Sec which will also be covered by wireless bulletin.

VOA and WB <sup>48</sup> will report fully analyses of and developments re White Paper. Request field report local reaction with suggestions re publicity.

ACHESON

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026 China/8-349

*The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, August 3, 1949.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In accordance with the statement in my letter to you of July 26, I brought to the attention of the President the views which you and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had formulated on the question of the desirability of publishing at this time the so-called China White Paper. The President, after carefully reconsidering the matter, decided that the Paper should be published, and it will accordingly be issued as of 11:00 AM Friday, August 5.

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<sup>46</sup> Sent to 51 diplomatic missions and to 12 consular posts.

<sup>47</sup> Greenwich mean time.

<sup>48</sup> Voice of America and Weekly Bulletin.

The first advanced copies are available for distribution today, and I am accordingly enclosing a copy herewith.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

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*Editorial Note*

The China White Paper was released by the Department at 12 noon, August 5, as Department of State Publication 3573, entitled *United States Relations With China, With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949*. The Letter of Transmittal dated July 30 from the Secretary of State to President Truman was reprinted as Department of State Publication 3608, entitled *A Summary of American-Chinese Relations*.

For statement by President Truman on the China White Paper, released to the press by the White House on August 4, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 15, 1949, page 237. The statement issued by the Secretary of State (Press Release No. 604, August 5) is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, August 15, 1949, page 236. (The Press Release was entitled "Statement by Secretary of State Acheson on the China White Paper"; the *Bulletin* statement was entitled "Basic Principles of U.S. Policy Toward the Far East".)

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026 China/8-849: Telegram

*The Consul General at Taipei (Macdonald) to the Secretary of State*

TAIPEI, August 8, 1949.

[Received August 12—7:27 a. m.]

360. Governor Chen Cheng<sup>49</sup> addressing agricultural meeting August 6 declared publication of White Paper should in no way dampen hearts of Chinese in resisting Communists. Instead, it should be a blessing to Chinese people. In past, people have been relying too much on support for agricultural help from US. This has created subconsciously in minds and in attitude deep spirit of dependence, which is subjecting nation to status of semi-colony. Publication of White Paper should banish from hearts forever such illusion and false hopes. From now on, we should be on our own entirely and self help is the best help.

Repeated Canton 164.

MACDONALD

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<sup>49</sup> Governor of Taiwan.

893.00/8-1049 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Clark) to the Secretary of State*

CANTON, August 10, 1949—2 p. m.

[Received August 13—6 : 12 a. m.]

Cantel 918. Li Tsung-jen<sup>50</sup> entertained me last evening at delightful informal dinner and despite White Paper he gave impression of being most friendly and cordial. He, as others with whom I have talked, seem to agree with Han Li-wu, Minister Education, who said he realized necessity publication and "the sooner we stopped talking about it and get on with our job, the better". Li was somewhat perturbed over publication his letter to President,<sup>51</sup> but admitted he had written only truth and said that in fact Generalissimo had agreed with him when he saw Generalissimo on Taiwan that present ills were due to past failures of government.

Li still desperately hopes for US military aid, yet admits that "fundamental" problem is Chinese and must be solved by Chinese. He agreed also that battle was for mind Chinese people and could not be won by bullets alone. Reform was necessary, he said, and would be carried out. Also psychological warfare would be improved.

It is firm policy of Government to harass Communists by blockade, by air raids and by continued armed resistance, even as guerrillas if necessary, in effort make their problems more difficult, hoping they will prove insoluble with result that disillusionment among Chinese people, revulsion of feeling, and eventual revolt will ensue. Li realizes we can only give aid where we are convinced that to do so has possibility being effective, yet he desperately hopes our aid will not come "too little or too late".

Sent Department Cantel 918, repeated Nanking 604, Shanghai 487, Taipei 108.

CLARK

026 China/8-1249 : Telegram

*The Consul at Shanghai (McConaughy) to the Secretary of State*

SHANGHAI, August 12, 1949—9 p. m.

[Received August 12—7 : 34 a. m.]

3208. Reference Contel 3207, August 12<sup>52</sup> re Shanghai press coverage Chinese White Paper. Believe probable local Commie authorities

<sup>50</sup> Acting President of China since January 21.

<sup>51</sup> Dated May 5, *United States Relations With China*, p. 409; see also *ante*, p. 699.

<sup>52</sup> Not printed.

may discuss Acheson's letter of transmittal and summaries of parts of White Paper at regular policy meeting today.

ConGen heard indirectly certain Commie quarters felt press releases indicated American recognition of Chinese Commie regime long way off and discouraged possibility economic help to Shanghai.

Non-Chinese observers expressed belief that Acheson reference resistance Chinese Commie aggression in neighboring countries might mean aid to British in event attack on Hong Kong.

Sent Department 3208, repeated Nanking, OffEmb Canton unnumbered.

McCONAUGHY

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026 China/8-1349 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Clark) to the Secretary of State*

CANTON, August 13, 1949.

[Received August 14—9:26 p. m.]

Cantel 935. Summary of Chinese Government official statement on White Paper due for release here probably August 14, given us today by Cheng Szu-yuan, Deputy Secretary Kmt<sup>53</sup> Supreme Policy Committee. Copy of statement in hand, Cheng gave gist as follows:

Chinese Government realizes White Paper only a record and in this record Chinese Government grateful for past US aid and support always mindful long Sino-American friendship. China's present distress due in part to 8 years' war resistance, but another large part due (1) Yalta Agreement which gave Manchuria to Russia at China's expense, and (2) US mistaken view of CCP<sup>54</sup> as agrarian reform group. US has finally come around to realizing, as China did long ago, that CCP is dictatorial party and part of international aggressive movement directed by Russia. China needs aid of US and all other democratic peace-loving countries, but, aided or not, free China will fight Communists to bitter end.

After summary, Cheng rightfully remarked statement very mild. We could say it contains nothing unexpected. Statement, which must still undergo final grammatical polish, was approved at fourth regular meeting SPC<sup>55</sup> today and is combination Foreign Office and SPC efforts.

Sent Department Cantel 934, repeated Taipei 11.

CLARK

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<sup>53</sup> Kuomintang (Nationalist Party).

<sup>54</sup> Chinese Communist Party.

<sup>55</sup> Supreme Policy Committee.

026 China/8-1549: Telegram

*The Consul General at Taipei (Macdonald) to the Secretary of State*

TAIPEI, August 15, 1949—4 p. m.

[Received 9:37 p. m.]

387. Attitude of local Chinese officials has been most cordial and friendly since release of White Paper contrary to our expectation of strong resentment followed by cool treatment on part of Chinese with whom we had friendly and close relations. Several officials called at ConGen last week and talked at length in very friendly-frank manner. K. C. Wu <sup>56</sup> spent over hour and half talking to Edgar <sup>57</sup> and me. He said we must have no secrets and I will answer any questions you ask. C. K. Yen <sup>58</sup> also spent over an hour discussing economic situation.

Yesterday at CAF <sup>59</sup> cocktail party officials were unusually gracious and friendly including Governor Chen and General Chou Chih-jou <sup>60</sup> who insisted having picture taken with him several times.

The sincerity of this present attitude is questionable in as much as the desperate hope for American aid is paramount and every effort is being made to influence US favorably. The remark of a Chinese official to the French Consul that "If we receive American aid and get strong again we won't forget the White Paper" perhaps best typifies true Chinese feeling.

Sent Department 387, repeated Canton 184.

MACDONALD.

026 China/8-1649: Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Clark) to the Secretary of State*

CANTON, August 16, 1949—3 p. m.

[Received August 16—12:57 p. m.]

Cantel 959. Chen Li-fu,<sup>61</sup> as might be expected, was vitriolic on White Paper. He complained bitterly that when Marshall was here he saw only Communists and sought only understand Communist points of view, ignoring Kmt elder statesmen. He, Chen, had had only one discussion with Marshall. Yu Yu-jen,<sup>62</sup> Yu Ta-wei <sup>63</sup> and Chu Chia-hua had fared likewise, he said. Ire from reactionary elements in Kmt

<sup>56</sup> Former Chinese Mayor of Shanghai.

<sup>57</sup> Donald D. Edgar, Consul at Taipei.

<sup>58</sup> Finance commissioner of the Taiwan provincial government.

<sup>59</sup> Chinese Air Force.

<sup>60</sup> Commander in Chief of the Chinese Air Force.

<sup>61</sup> Chinese Minister without Portfolio.

<sup>62</sup> President of the Chinese Control Yuan.

<sup>63</sup> Then Chinese Minister of Communications.

over White Paper is of course to be expected. Word comes to me from Chiang Monlin,<sup>64</sup> however, who discussed matter with Generalissimo in Taipei and quotes Generalissimo as saying lightly: "I suppose they had to get it out of their system."

CLARK

026 China/8-1649: Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Clark) to the Secretary of State*

CANTON, August 16, 1949—9 p. m.

[Received August 17—3:19 a. m.]

Cantel 966. Chu Chang-wei, Secretary-General [of] President's office, tells me Chinese response our White Paper should have been made public 2 days ago as it had received final approval by Supreme Policy Committee and by cabinet. At that time, however, Generalissimo [garble] he wanted see draft. Everything was stopped and George Yeh<sup>65</sup> took draft Taiwan for Generalissimo's perusal. Generalissimo has dictated changes which must have approval Supreme Policy Committee and cabinet before being embodied in White Paper. Chu, who participated in discussion document here, says Kmt diehards such as Chen Li-fu endeavored unsuccessfully obtain strong language in Chinese response and it was probably at their instance Generalissimo intervened. Final consideration document took place this morning, but Chu believes it will retain its original friendly approach problem.

Sent Department, repeated Taipei 129.

CLARK

501.BB/8-1749: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State*

NEW YORK, August 17, 1949—3:55 p. m.

[Received 5:16 p. m.]

938. 1. Ambassador Tsiang<sup>66</sup> called this morning at his request . . .

[Here follows report on proposed action at meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations; see section on this subject in volume I.]

6. White Paper. I repeated to Tsiang assurances I had given during his absence to member his delegation immediately prior to publication White Paper that publication should not be taken as any evidence of

<sup>64</sup> Chairman of Chinese Rehabilitation Affairs Commission.

<sup>65</sup> Chinese Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>66</sup> Tingfu F. Tsiang, Chinese representative at the United Nations.



hostility towards him or his delegation or towards China and the Chinese people. Tsiang expressed appreciation and said he had studied White Paper very carefully. He had three observations to make: First, he felt that Yalta had been a mistake. Second, he referred to statement he said President made in form of press release in March, 1948,<sup>67</sup> stating USG<sup>68</sup> opposed to coalition with Communists. This had been his Government's position for year or two previously and subject of dispute with USG. Had we taken position against coalition with Communists earlier, many of later difficulties might not have arisen. Third, Tsiang thought Secretary's transmitting letter to President was unfair and unjust complete denunciation of Nationalist Government, not warranted by White Paper itself and annexes. Commenting on last point, observed he felt he could put finger on sources of much Stuart had reported to Department and he thought these reports in many instances were based on "shady and inaccurate" information. He said he himself would not defend everything Nationalist Government had done; he had come to New York as his Government's representative to UN because he had wanted to retire from Government in China and go into active opposition to Government but was persuaded to take this UN post as not being involved in partisan politics at home. He thought it was unfair and unjust, however, to apply to Nationalist Government, as he said in effect Secretary had done in his letter of transmittal, yardstick of accomplishment which might fairly be applied to USG or Canadian Government, for example. Nationalist Government, he said, should be measured in comparison with previous Chinese governments. Judged by Chinese standards it was not nearly as bad as Secretary had indicated.

AUSTIN

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026 China/8-1749: Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Clark) to the Secretary of State*

CANTON, August 17, 1949.

[Received August 17—12:05 p. m.]

Cantel 968. Following statement by Yeh, Acting Minister Foreign Affairs, on White Paper is, we gather, only action contemplated Nationalist Government that respect:

The Chinese Government has read the White Paper on United States relations with China issued by the Department of State of the United States of America. It is a source of satisfaction to note that the American Government has come to share with the Chinese Gov-

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<sup>67</sup> See White House No. 6, March 11, 1948; *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. VIII, p. 141.

<sup>68</sup> U.S. Government.

ernment the two fundamental views which the Chinese Government has consistently maintained, namely, first, the Chinese Communists are thorough Marxists and tools of Moscow, and secondly, the Soviet Union has violated both in letter and spirit the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between China and the Soviet Union concluded in 1945. At the same time the Chinese Government must declare that it takes serious exception to the views and statements on many other important questions contained in the White Paper. It is not the intention of the Chinese Government to engage in controversy over past issues to the detriment of the traditional friendship between the Chinese and American peoples and the common cause of the democracies. However, the Chinese Government in consideration of its stand and obligations will state more fully at an appropriate time its position and the relevant facts with regard to the various complex subjects dealt with in the voluminous White Paper for the information of the Chinese and American public so as to further the mutual understanding and cordial relations between the two peoples.

Sent Department Cantel 968; repeated Nanking 636, Shanghai 503, Taipei 130.

CLARK

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026 China/8-1749: Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Clark) to the Secretary of State*

CANTON, August 17, 1949—6 p. m.  
[Received August 17—1:25 p. m.]

Cantel 972. George Yeh, Acting Foreign Minister, called me to Foreign Office to discuss White Paper. He said his announcement, Cantel 968, August 17, is only action contemplated Nationalist Government this time. He had taken position which had prevailed that Chinese response should be friendly and not such as to arouse Chinese public sentiment against US. There had been some who wished violent reaction though majority had agreed with him. He had also been able obtain restraint by Kmt and other party leaders in their public announcements.

Although he did not say so, it appears to me that obviously what has happened is that when draft that had been approved by Cabinet was taken Gimo,<sup>69</sup> many inaccuracies were discovered because Gimo retains the crucial files in his own possession and would not make them available for revision document. Yeh admitted task had been difficult because certain files were in Taipei and others in possession Gimo. He

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<sup>69</sup> Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

added that he had been surprised at mildness attitude Gimo to our White Paper even after he, Yeh, had summarized its contents.

CLARK

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026 China/8-1849 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Clark) to the Secretary of State*

CANTON, August 18, 1949—2 p. m.  
[Received August 18—12:47 p. m.]

Cantel 981. Generalissimo's sudden desire check over Chinese Government response to White Paper (Cantel 966, repeated Taipei 129, August 16) thoroughly annoyed Li Tsung-jen camp, according to Cheng Szu-yuan. Latter feels this further proof, as if any needed, that Generalissimo insists on being consulted and having his own way on everything, large and small.

Cheng says Foreign Office statement (Cantel 968, repeated Taipei 130, August 17) was written by Generalissimo and Wang-Shih-chieh<sup>70</sup> with George Yeh acting only as messenger boy. Cheng adds Generalissimo objected to original statement approved by Kmt Supreme Policy Committee (Cantel 935, repeated Taipei 118, August 13) on two grounds: (1) Lacked factual refutation charges made in White Paper; (2) Generalissimo wants to withhold lengthy statement until Congress' opinion regarding China aid crystallized, then suit statement to prevailing US official opinion.

If what Cheng says is true, and provided situation does not change too drastically in meantime, seems quite possible fuller Chinese Government statement will be made "at appropriate time".

Sent Department Cantel 981, repeated Taipei 135.

CLARK

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026 China/8-1949 : Telegram

*The Counselor of Embassy in China (Jones) to the Secretary of State*

NANKING, August 19, 1949—5 p. m.  
[Received August 19—11:25 a. m.]

1837. Vehement hostility expressed in first two official CCP commentaries on White Paper, "a confession that could not be helped" and "prepare for struggle", is not surprising. While articles are perhaps more vituperative and their tone less impersonal than usual Communist tirades against USA, it was to be expected that Communist reaction to White Paper would be violent. We detect extreme

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<sup>70</sup> Former Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

sensitivity in commentary to White Paper description of CCP as Moscow stooges. CCP is obviously also considerably on defensive in two replies, particularly second, in its appeal to forces of democratic liberalism. On this point it is interesting to note CCP admission of strong attraction which USA and American way of life continues to have for Chinese moderate and conservative intellectuals.

Sent Department 1837, repeated Canton 780, Shanghai 1170, Moscow 58.

JONES

026 China/8-2049: Telegram

*The Counselor of Embassy in China (Jones) to the Secretary of State*

NANKING, August 20, 1949—5 p. m.

[Received August 21—1:59 a. m.]

1845. Third major *Hsin Hua* commentary on White Paper released August 20 entitled "Bye Bye, Leighton Stuart" is primarily continuation of argument of second commentary (see Embtel 1837, August 19 to Department, repeated Canton 780, Shanghai 1005) for benefit of intellectuals and democratic elements still suspected being friendly USA. It differs from previous commentaries only in sinking to new low in lampooning, personal defamation great friend of China. This may reflect some degree of pique that Ambassador Stuart left Communist China without making anticipated approach to highest CCP authorities with suggestions realignment US policy. Latest comment emphasizes somewhat more than earlier articles necessity for Communist China to get along without economic goodwill of USA regardless of suffering which may result.

Sent Department, repeated OffEmb Canton 783, Shanghai 1019.

JONES

761.93/8-2349

*Statement for the Press by Dr. Kan Chieh-hou, Personal Representative of Acting President Li Tsung-jen*<sup>71</sup>

As the personal representative of Acting President Li Tsung-jen, I feel it necessary to correct a misunderstanding regarding President Li's foreign policy as related in the State Department's White Paper on U.S. Relations with China.

<sup>71</sup> Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by Dr. Kan in his letter of August 23, not printed; statement released for morning papers of August 24.

In that section of the White Paper entitled, "The Position and Policies of Acting President Li," on page 293, the following statement is made:

"On January 23 (1949), a representative of the Acting President called on Ambassador Stuart to request a public statement of support from the United States. This representative said that General Li had been in touch with the Soviet Embassy and had worked out a tentative three-point draft agreement between China and the Soviet Union which the (Soviet) Ambassador<sup>72</sup> had taken with him to Moscow a few days earlier. The three points were: (1) strict Chinese neutrality in any future international conflict; (2) the elimination of American influence to as great an extent as possible in China; (3) the establishment of a basis of real cooperation between China and Russia. General Li had agreed to these three points in principle and felt that his hand would be strengthened in negotiating on them if he had a statement of American support. . . ." <sup>73</sup>

I am compelled to point out, at the outset, that if the three conditions laid down by the Soviet Union had already been agreed to, there would have been no need to appeal to the American government for a statement of support to strengthen the Chinese hand "in negotiating on them." Furthermore, if Acting President Li had actually intended to eliminate American influence from China, he would not have kept the American Ambassador informed of such negotiations. The very fact of asking for a statement of support from the United States demonstrates his recognition of the importance of American influence in China.

In order to clarify this misunderstanding, I will herewith narrate the background data relating to all these negotiations.

Efforts aimed at an agreement under which the Soviet government would exercise its influence to halt Chinese Communists in their territorial expansion, were begun by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in 1945. At the end of that year the Generalissimo's son, who was then in Moscow, was told by Stalin that, before he could give his support to the Chinese government, a treaty of neutrality must be concluded between China and the Soviet Union, and a coalition government must be formed in China with the participation of the Chinese Communists. The Chinese government did not accept those terms.

The following year—1946—Generalissimo Chiang made it known to the Soviet Ambassador in Nanking that he was ready to reconsider the Stalin proposals and, when Stalin instructed the Soviet Ambassador to invite him to visit Moscow, he told the Soviet Ambassador that he was unable to make the trip. Stalin was so furious that he gave instructions

<sup>72</sup> N. V. Roschin.

<sup>73</sup> Omission indicated in the source text.

to all the Soviet diplomatic and consular officers in China to adopt a policy of non-cooperation in their relations with the Chinese government.

The foregoing information was laid before me by the Soviet ambassador to China when, immediately upon General Li's accession to the presidency, I was instructed to sound out the Soviet Union on prospects of exercising its influence to get the Chinese Communists to agree to a reasonable settlement under which they would halt their southward drive.

It became altogether clear from the conversations that what the Soviet Union had really wanted in the past three years was a guarantee that China would remain neutral in case Russia became involved in any way. It was equally clear that, following failure in obtaining a neutrality agreement from the Chinese government, the Russians gave a go-ahead signal to the Chinese Communists with the hope that a Communist controlled China would give them this guarantee.

Faced with the alternatives of continued Communist aggression or a neutrality treaty, Acting President Li ordered me to discuss with the American Ambassador, Dr. Leighton Stuart, the matter of offering the Soviet Union a neutrality treaty on condition that the Communist aggression be halted. I saw Dr. Leighton Stuart <sup>74</sup> and also the military and naval attachés of the American Embassy. In view of no possibility of immediate aid from the United States and the need of time for reorganizing our armed forces after our setback around Hsuechow, they had no objection to this policy of delaying the Communist offensive.

I then proceeded to take the matter up with the Soviet ambassador. With the repeated military success of the Chinese Communists, the Soviet price had been raised. He would not be satisfied with a treaty of neutrality. He insisted on the establishment of a basis of real cooperation between China and Russia. As an evidence of sincerity, he proposed that the Chinese government eliminate American influence to as great an extent as possible in China.

I protested that China could not give up her traditional friendship with the United States and that we needed such material aid and technical assistance to develop our industries and natural resources as the Soviet Union would never be able to give. He bluntly replied that further negotiation was conditioned on the acceptance of this proposal.

It was at this point that Acting President Li sent me to the American Ambassador to ask for a statement of support <sup>75</sup> to strengthen our

<sup>74</sup> See telegram No. 197, January 23, 11 a. m., from the Ambassador in China, vol. VIII, "Political and military situation in China", chapter II.

<sup>75</sup> See telegram No. 768, April 15, 11 a. m., from the Ambassador in China, vol. VIII, *ibid.*, chapter III.

hand in the negotiation with a view to obtaining Russian instruction to the Chinese Communists to come to a reasonable settlement. At no time did Acting President Li agree to the proposed establishment of a basis of real cooperation between China and Russia or the elimination of American influence to as great an extent as possible in China. Nor had the Soviet Ambassador "taken with him to Moscow" any "tentative three-point draft agreement between China and the Soviet Union", as the Soviet Ambassador did not leave China until three or four months after the negotiations had been broken off.

A few days after my conversation with Ambassador Stuart on the subject of a statement of support, the hostile attitude of the Soviet Ambassador towards the Chinese government was so evident that I did not try to see him again. The subsequent removal of the Soviet Embassy from Nanking to Canton put a complete end to this matter.

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026 China/8-2549 : Telegram

*The Consul at Shanghai (McConaughy) to the Secretary of State*

SHANGHAI, August 25, 1949.

[Received August 25—4:48 a. m.]

3440. *Liberation Daily* August 21 printed text addresses by Mayor Chen Yi at final meeting summer study course University and College Faculty Association. Address devoted almost entirely to discussion White Paper. Summary paper reveals ugly face American imperialism in its attempt attain world hegemony and self-appointed role protector of China. American imperialism gave clear-cut order to Chiang Kai-shek launch civil war for slaughter Chinese people; hopes to ferret out of victorious camp of Chinese people the so-called "democratic individualists" to organize them for task of continuing creation of chaos in China and restore American imperialist rule. The "democratic individualists" do exist in New China but not in majority. Question not whether are or are no "democratic individualists" but rather how strengthen vigilance and unite to save such wavering elements from falling victims to American imperialist inducements. Semi-colonial and feudal social structure of China created by imperialism over past hundred years cannot be smashed in few days. Years of education and reform needed. In this connection policy of CCP over years insisting on party discipline should be example to all people's organizations bring their houses in order. White Paper is political call to action, supported by and coordinated on economic front by blockade. Struggle against White Paper must be carried on ideological front but must at same time unite to break blockade. Resources of whole country may be expected come to aid Shanghai. End Summary.



Sidelights of address included criticism local Communist practice calling meetings by issuance invitations to individuals rather than through election of delegates by various groups of the public; mild criticism of groups in Shanghai for timidity in speaking their minds freely and tendency re-echo only views of Communist officials.

Sent Department 3440, repeated Nanking, by mail AmEmbassy Canton August 25.

McCONAUGHY

026 China/8-2549: Airgram

*The Consul at Taipei (Edgar) to the Secretary of State*

[Extracts]

TAIPEI, August 25, 1949.

[Received September 3—4:22 p. m.]

A-84. K. C. Wu called at this office on August 23 to return the copy of the full text of the White Paper that we had loaned him. He stated that if he was U.S. Secretary of State he would be very proud of the document, but, in his own opinion, it was unbalanced since it made almost no reference to the attitude of the Chinese toward the Mao Communists or to Chinese current reaction to Communist control. I pointed out that the period covered by the Paper ended with the Yangtze campaign and that most unfavorable reaction stories had appeared since then.

He stated that he thought it a very "cute trick" that the only reference to "agrarian reformers" was in a quote from General Hurley.

As to the Canton reply, he said that I could probably see the influence of the Gimo in the final draft and that it was along the lines that he had predicted. I inquired as to what hat the Gimo had worn when he summoned George Yeh to Taiwan with the draft for his personal consideration and revision. KC said that it was Canton that had asked for the Gimo's advice and comment, and not the reverse, that the Canton proposed draft had been querulous and contentious and that the Gimo had prepared the final text to eliminate as much of that as he could. He had objected to the statement about a "later reply at an appropriate time", but that Canton had insisted on its inclusion.

KC then stated that what he wanted to talk about was the future of Taiwan under the White Paper "policy". He said that there were four possible approaches by the American Government: 1) to walk out, 2) to try for trusteeship under UN auspices, 3) to make a forth-right takeover, and 4) to support the Government here to help keep it from Commie hands.

The first possibility he stated was out of the question for reasons of strategy and public opinion.

The second would encounter vetos by both the USSR and China in the Security Council before it could be placed with the Trusteeship Council.

The third would result in the killing of Chinese by Americans and of Americans by Chinese.

Therefore, he said, the fourth was the only alternative.

In an attempted rebuttal of my argument that it would be somewhat contradictory for the United States, after the issuance of the White Paper, to further aid the Gimo and his discredited Kmt in Taiwan, Wu replied, as he has so often of late, that the Gimo is a changed man intent on reforms and that all of the discredited followers were gradually being sloughed off. I said that some of the Gimo's recent appointments, decisions, and interferences in affairs of state gave no indication to the outside world that there had been any change whatsoever in his personal approach to problems, to which Wu replied that the West always wanted something dramatic whereas in China history was made gradually; there was no excuse for us wilfully to create a stumbling block, in the person of the Gimo, in our strategic path, and he again raised the question as to what I thought the United States would do about Taiwan. I replied that the Chinese always wanted to know what the United States was going to do, whereas I thought that right now it was more important to know what the Chinese were going to do, and that this office was as always prepared to transmit to Washington any ideas or proposals.

Wu claimed that the United States should come across with further aid to save Taiwan and that at the same time it should insist on certain specific reforms that must be taken. This we should have done at the time of the Marshall Mission and that our failure to take that stance had resulted in the present dilemma. I expressed the opinion that that would be placing us in the position of interventionists while relieving the Chinese of taking any initiative, or even responsibility for the end result. I said I doubted the acceptability of such a proposal.

As though he felt that he could gain acceptance by constant drumming, Wu closed on the theme that the Gimo was a changed man, that he would do nothing dramatic to prove it; but that a close study of developments would prove it; that he was constantly making necessary reforms and plans for more reforms; and that when Canton falls we will look at the picture as it has by then developed in an entirely new light.

In reply to my inquiry of whether there was any possibility that the Gimo might step out of the picture and retire to Baguio or Sun Moon Lake or Kweilin and leave matters in younger and more popular hands, he gave a decisive no, with the follow-up that there is no one to replace him.

EDGAR

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026 China/8-2649 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State*

PEIPING, August 26, 1949—11 a. m.

[Received August 26—4:21 a. m.]

1426. To date Chinese public has been given only violent attacks on White Paper with quotations torn from context. Even "reference material" circulated within party and in certain university circles reputedly inadequate. Desire noted some Chinese circles for complete text White Paper to read US Government story without omissions of Communist editing. Request Department mail Peiping via Hong Kong six copies separately wrapped.

CLUBB

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026 China/9-349 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 3, 1949—6 p. m.

[Received September 3—3:16 p. m.]

2221. Depcirtel August 1, noon. Only available Soviet reaction so far to White Paper on China has been *Pravda* article August 11 reported Embtel 2013, August 11 and Embdes 472, August 15.<sup>76</sup> To date Soviet comments refer only to Secretary of State's letter of transmission although White Paper is described as "1054 pages of absolute ignominy".

Embassy sees little advantage to US in publicizing White Paper in USSR through VOA. On the other hand, careful study of White Paper probably would reveal isolated items which might be plugged strongly by VOA when opportunities offer. For instance, reports of interviews between Stalin, Molotov, Hurley and Hopkins<sup>77</sup> show marked contrast between what Soviets said in 1945 and their present attitude regarding China. Such material available *inter alia* on pages 94-96, 113-126. For instance, Stalin describes Chiang as "only Chinese

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<sup>76</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>77</sup> Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt.

leader qualified undertake unification of China" (page 115). Chiang also was called by Stalin "selfless" and "a patriot" (page 95).

KIRK

026 China/9-649 : Telegram

*The Counselor of Embassy in China (Jones) to the Secretary of State*

NANKING, September 6, 1949—5 p. m.

[Received 10:06 p. m.]

2009. Chou Yu-kang (formerly co-worker [of] Carson Chang<sup>78</sup> and well-known to Ambassador Stuart) informed Embassy officer that in his opinion reference to democratic individualism in transmitting letter to White Paper had resulted in severe weakening of position of third party, non-Communist elements in Communist China. He asserted that although such groups never expected to exert decisive influence on CCP policy they had hoped to act as slightly moderating influence on extreme pro-Soviet and other tendencies within CCP. He said White Paper now being used as weapon to weaken and neutralize third party elements through charges that they may be receiving or will seek US aid. This situation, Chou asserted, had forced people like Liu Chih-wei and Chang Tung-sun to make statements condemning White Paper in order clear themselves of suspicion.

Obvious comment is that so-called democratic parties and personages now have foreign excuse for their political impotency.

Sent Department 2009, repeated Shanghai 1090.

JONES

893.00/9-1449

*The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State*

No. 129

PEIPING, September 14, 1949.

[Received November 21]

The Consul General has the honor to refer to his telegram No. 1429 of August 27<sup>79</sup> and to transmit herewith a copy (in translation) of an article as published in the *Kuang Ming Jih Pao* (Brilliant Daily, Peiping) of August 24, 1949, containing the text of a condemnatory statement issued by the China Democratic League in regard to the White Paper. The statement declares that the White Paper is merely an attempt to conceal the American Government's present plans for

<sup>78</sup> Leader of the Chinese Democratic Socialist Party.

<sup>79</sup> Not printed.

further aggression toward China and endeavors to refute the principal arguments of the White Paper.

*Summary of Article:*

The fact that the White Paper's principal aim is to conceal the Truman Government's further aggressive designs toward China can best be proved by reference to the points raised by the statement itself.

The White Paper attempts to substantiate its claim regarding the long history of Sino-American friendship by referring to such examples of American magnanimity toward China as the "Open Door Policy," "Most Favored Nation Clause," etcetera. In point of fact, these were little more than attempts on the part of the United States to compensate for its late start in the imperialistic struggle for colonies and to convert China into a colony of its own. During the past five years American encroachment upon China has become intensified. President Truman, the representative of the American capitalistic class, believes that in order to oppose the Soviet Union and Communism, he must control China in the Pacific. The White Paper's descriptions of the Hurley, Marshall and Wedemeyer missions to China themselves constitute the most convincing proof that America's sole aim has been to convert China into an anti-Soviet, anti-Communist base of attack.

Of especial note is the White Paper's passage concerning the "three roads confronting the United States when peace came." The first road, that of nonintervention in China, was obviously ill-suited to American plans; the second, that of large-scale military intervention, was not followed merely because of the American Government's certain knowledge that it would not enjoy the support of the American people; while the third road, the road leading to coalition government in China, was even more hypocritical than the second in that it would in time ensure Kuomintang control of all China. Both General Marshall's efforts to assist the Kuomintang and General Wedemeyer's recommendation regarding trusteeship for the Northeast, not to mention the vast amounts of money and military supplies afforded the Kmt Government, evince American imperialistic designs against China. The White Paper's omission of any reference to the facts that General Marshall and Ambassador Stuart in practice supported Chiang in preventing the Communist Party from joining the Government, in unilaterally convening the National Assembly and in tearing up the resolutions of the old PPC [PPC<sup>80</sup>] attest to the deceptive nature of "mediation." American imperialism now must adopt one of the three policies: to

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<sup>80</sup> Political Consultative Conference, January 1946; *United States Relations With China*, p. 610.

create internal chaos in China, to support the Kmt in its spoilage of the Chinese people, or to undertake direct action against China.

The true meaning of Secretary Acheson's letter encouraging "democratic individualists" is that America is now seeking new pawns who will carry out American imperialistic dictates in China. Genuine democratic individualists, however, will rally to the support of New China. Again, such terms as "a regime serving the interests of a foreign country", serve only to insult China's best friend and to enrage the Chinese people. As Chairman Mao has indicated, only one path lies before China, and that is to stand on the side of the Soviet Union.

The American people should recall their own revolutionary origins when criticizing revolutionary New China. They should realize that a "Pacific Union" and collaboration with Japan repeats the old fascist pattern in the Pacific. They should know that the Chinese people now have the strength with which to defeat such brutal acts as "economic blockade." We hope that progressive Americans will ally themselves with progressive Chinese in order to oppose the reactionary intrigues of President Truman and Secretary Acheson and to support world peace and progress.

*End of Summary.*

This statement contains little that is new to those who have followed recent publicity on the subject; but it categorically defines the Democratic League's political position.

E[DMUND] C[LUBB]

