

## POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO THE QUESTION OF RECOGNITION

### I. PRELIMINARY EXCHANGES WITH THE BRITISH; EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A "COMMONFRONT" POLICY; ANGLO-AMERICAN CON- SULTATION DURING JULY AND AUGUST; ANGLO-FRENCH-AMERI- CAN CONVERSATIONS AT WASHINGTON IN SEPTEMBER (JANUARY- SEPTEMBER)

893.01/1-349

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Chinese  
Affairs (Sprouse)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 3, 1949.

Subject: Question of Recognition in the Event of the Establishment  
of a Successor or Coalition Government in China

Mr. Ford<sup>1</sup> called by appointment today and informed me that his Embassy had received a message from the British Foreign Office setting forth the views of the British Government on the foregoing subject. Mr. Ford handed me the attached document,<sup>2</sup> which, he said, was the gist of the message: While the Foreign Office was inclined, at first thought, to think that this question might not arise if the Communists should enter a coalition government, the Foreign Office was prepared to examine the problem exhaustively as soon as a coalition should be formed. (Mr. Ford commented that the Foreign Office had indicated that it was of the opinion that both the question of recognition and the economic deficiencies of a Communist-controlled China would place bargaining weapons in the hands of the British Government in connection with protection of its interests in China.) In brief, Mr. Ford said that the British position on this question was much the same as that of the United States Government.

Referring to the position of the British Ambassador<sup>3</sup> at Nanking in the event of the withdrawal of the Chinese Government, Mr. Ford stated that the Foreign Office had now instructed him to report on the situation at the time of such withdrawal and seek instructions from the Foreign Office prior to taking any action.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> J. F. Ford, First Secretary of the British Embassy.

<sup>2</sup> *Infra.*

<sup>3</sup> Sir Ralph Stevenson.

<sup>4</sup> For correspondence in regard to the location of embassies in China, see vol. VIII, "Successive moves of the Embassy office in China in efforts to remain near the headquarters of the Chinese Government."

893.01/1-349

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*<sup>5</sup>

The Foreign Office state that, at first sight, they are inclined to think that the question of giving or withholding recognition may not arise if the Communists enter a coalition government. If His Majesty's Ambassador and staff are in Nanking, it is likely that they would do business with the new government on a *de facto* basis.

The Foreign Office say that they will examine the problem exhaustively as soon as a coalition takes place.

893.00/1-549

*The British Ambassador (Franks) to the Acting Secretary of State (Lovett)*

WASHINGTON, 5 January, 1949.

Mr. Bevin<sup>6</sup> has recently discussed the situation in China with his Cabinet colleagues and he has asked me to bring to your notice the substance of a Memorandum drawn up for Cabinet consideration. This document<sup>7</sup> is long and detailed and I have thought it better to prepare a short summary<sup>8</sup> rather than to ask you to explore the whole range of its findings. I should accordingly be grateful if you would nominate one of your advisers to confer with Mr. Graves<sup>9</sup> of my staff on the details of the Memorandum.

Mr. Bevin hopes that, as a result of our joint study of the views and comments set out in the Memorandum, it may be possible to suggest the broad basis of a plan for dealing with the rapidly developing position in the Far East.

[Enclosure]

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

CHINA

*Foreign Office appreciation of the present position*

The Government of the Republic of China under President Chiang Kai-shek has virtually lost control of the whole area north of the River Yangtze as the direct result of military failures in Manchuria. Moreover, it seems highly unlikely that the Government forces, whose fighting value is at best problematical, will be able to hold their

<sup>5</sup> Handed to the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Sproue) by the First Secretary of the British Embassy (Ford) on January 3.

<sup>6</sup> Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>7</sup> *Infra.*

<sup>8</sup> Not attached to file copy.

<sup>9</sup> Hubert A. Graves, Counselor of the British Embassy.



ground on the south bank of the river in the face of determined pressure from the Communists. The northern Communist armies now hold the initiative and are making an all-out drive on Nanking with intent to dislodge the Central Government from its capital. The consensus of expert opinion is that success is merely a matter of time.

Following on the Communist occupation of the whole area north of the Yangtze the political situation is likely to take one of two courses:—

(a) The disappearance from the scene of Chiang Kai-shek, when the Government, headed by Vice-President Li Tsung-jen and with the support of certain military leaders, may try for a military truce and a subsequent political arrangement by negotiation with the Communists. As the latter hold the whip hand it is likely to rest with them whether such proposals are accepted or not.

(b) The withdrawal of Chiang Kai-shek and a small number of his henchmen to Canton or elsewhere in China proper in a die-hard attempt to continue the war. Although this is compatible with Chiang Kai-shek's present mood and would suit those members of the Kuomintang<sup>10</sup> whose fate is linked with his, it is doubtful whether the essential quota of Government servants would be able or willing to follow. In any event he and his associates are now so completely discredited in the eyes of the people that their continued existence as a shadow Government would be entirely dependent on American support, which would have to be much more extensive than anything so far undertaken. A withdrawal by Chiang Kai-shek to Formosa would hardly affect the course of events on the mainland.

Of the above alternatives the first is likely to be the more welcome to the Communists, since it would give them control over Nanking and Shanghai without driving away the administration and financial elements, which they would find it difficult to replace from their own resources. Further, if they attach importance to the international position they would thus step overnight into the controlling position in a recognised government. To the extent that they are guided by Moscow they may be encouraged to pursue this policy with a view to strengthening the opposition to the Western Democracies in the United Nations.

Much has been written which suggests that the Chinese Communists are Communists only in name. Justification for this view lies in the fact that up to the present there has been no need for Moscow to take any overt hand in the civil war or for the Chinese Communists to make any appeal to their compatriots save that of relative honesty, relative efficiency, an ostensibly fair deal in the matter of land reform and above all peace. On the other hand, a careful study of their official pronouncements shows that their leader, General Mao Tse-tung,<sup>11</sup> pays

<sup>10</sup> Chinese Nationalist Party.

<sup>11</sup> Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

at any rate whole-hearted lip service to the Marxist-Leninist philosophy, while the Moscow press has avoided comment on his successes with such scruple over so long a period as to suggest that it is in the interests of Soviet policy not to trouble the pipe dreams of the complacent. Inasmuch as the Communist administration appears to be better disciplined and less corrupt than that of the Central Government, it may well be that if it is their policy to develop and exploit Chinese resources their initial attitude to foreign technical ability and trading interests may be encouraging. It would, however, be highly dangerous to assume that this initial honeymoon period would be likely to ripen into any enduring bond.

It is nevertheless clear that, by whichever means the Communists acquire control of the area south of the Yangtze, they must inherit the economic ills of the land. If they do so by entering a coalition Government the drain on the exchequer from civil war would cease, but it may be assumed that the Central Government has already reached such a degree of insolvency that the advantage of this is likely to be more apparent than real. In our present ignorance of Communist internal policies it is impossible to measure the degree of handicap which this state of affairs will represent, but its existence can hardly fail to induce the Kuomintang's successors to seek to maintain the country's export trade in order to pay for her essential imports, and in this connexion some initial benefit to British traders may accrue. Moreover, it is also fair to assume that General Mao Tse-tung will be hard put to it to provide the necessary administration, the more so as the number of his efficient followers is probably limited and will become somewhat thin on the ground when the whole of China falls to be administered. This factor, too, may well tend to shelter British interests for some time from the full force and fury of Communist theory and practice. But of the ultimate intentions of Mao Tse-tung, if he succeeds in surmounting local difficulties, there is little doubt.

In either event the Communists would almost certainly require a fairly lengthy period of preparation and infiltration before moving very far south of the Yangtze. Even in the absence of any coherent opposition, therefore, the eventual Communist domination of the whole of China is likely to take some little time. Whether advantage can be taken of the breathing space to create an anti-Communist bloc (for which American aid would be essential) remains to be seen, but as already indicated, the prospects are very doubtful.

#### *Conclusions*

(i) *In China* it can be assumed

(a) that there will be an immediate period of dislocation when foreign commerce generally will be at a low ebb;

(b) that there will follow a period in which the economic difficulties of the Communists may dispose them to be tolerant towards foreign trading interests;

(c) that the present nationalist tendency towards foreign investments and capital installations will thereafter be enhanced and that the intention to work rapidly towards the exclusion of the foreigner will be strengthened;

(d) that there would be a tendency to subject foreign trade, both import and export, to close government control, which would not altogether suit the types of trade United Kingdom merchants aim at doing in and with China.

British interests in China may be able to carry on at least for a time and His Majesty's Government will encourage this.

(ii) *Political effects on adjacent Areas.*

Communist activities in adjacent areas will be increased and the contacts between Communists in these countries will be facilitated. The economic effects in these areas are likely to be an increase in labour troubles and disturbances in the production of vital commodities.

*Recommendations*

(a) That His Majesty's Government should consult with the Governments of the United States, the British Commonwealth, France, Netherlands, Burma and Siam as to the best means of containing the Communist threat to our several interests.

(b) That all necessary steps should be taken to strengthen our position in colonial territories in the area.

(c) That we should consider, in consultation with friendly Powers whether the economic weakness of Communist-dominated China might not offer an opportunity to secure reasonable treatment for our interests.

WASHINGTON, 5 January, 1949.

893.01/1-349

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Sprouse)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 6, 1949.

Subject: Question of Recognition in the Event of the Establishment of a Successor or Coalition Government in China

Participants: Mr. Graves, Counselor, British Embassy  
Mr. Butterworth, Director for Far Eastern Affairs  
Mr. Sprouse, CA

In order to obtain clarification of the British Foreign Office message to the British Embassy regarding the above-mentioned subject,

the substance of which was handed to the Department by Mr. Ford of the British Embassy on January 3 (copy attached),<sup>12</sup> Mr. Sprouse asked Mr. Graves to call today.

Mr. Graves confirmed that the British Government did not view as automatic recognition of any government that might be established as successor to the present Chinese Government, whether formed in accordance with the Chinese constitution by elements of the Government following a resignation of the Generalissimo<sup>13</sup> or by a coalition including the Chinese Communists. Mr. Graves also indicated that the British Government, before extending recognition, expected to study carefully the character of any successor government in China, having particular regard to the extent of its control and the manner in which it would deal with British interests and trade.

Mr. Butterworth stated that this Government held similar views on this question and that the question of recognition was one which provided bargaining power vis-à-vis the Chinese Communists. Mr. Graves indicated that the British Government was of the same mind on this point and continued that the economic deficiencies of China gave further bargaining power to the western powers and that he would wish to discuss this and related problems early next week in connection with the British Embassy's memorandum left by the British Ambassador with the Acting Secretary on January 5.<sup>14</sup>

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893.00/1-549

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*<sup>15</sup>

CONTINUATION OF PAPER ON CHINA ATTACHED TO SIR OLIVER FRANKS'  
LETTER OF 5TH JANUARY 1949 TO MR. LOVETT

*Political Effects on Adjacent Areas.*

(a) *Japan*

The spread of Communism in China will enhance the political and strategic importance of Japan as the most important non-Communist area in East Asia, and seems certain to strengthen the determination of the United States Government that Japan shall not fall under Communist domination.

(b) *Hong Kong*

Communist domination of China down to the Yangtze is not in the first instance likely to affect Hong Kong very seriously. The

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<sup>12</sup> Printed on p. 2.

<sup>13</sup> President Chiang Kai-shek.

<sup>14</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>15</sup> Handed to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) by the Counselor of the British Embassy (Graves) on January 10.

colony's major problem is likely to be a steady stream of refugees. If, as may be expected, the Communists continue southward, they may well try to "soften up" Hong Kong by instigating strikes to coincide with their advance. Since labour in public utilities and on the waterfront in Hong Kong is mainly Communist in sympathy, such strikes might temporarily paralyse the colony. Serious clashes between Communist and Kuomintang supporters might also occur.

If all China were dominated by the Communists, the retention of Hong Kong as a British colony, in the absence of strong British naval and military forces, might depend on whether the Communists found the existence of a well-organised, well-run British port convenient for their trade with the outside world. In that event, while Hong Kong might be faced with a vast refugee problem, the colony could continue its life, but would be living on the edge of a volcano. Meanwhile the Communists would no doubt continue their infiltration tactics. If, on the other hand, the Communists were to demand the rendition of Hong Kong to China, they would use every method short of war to undermine it.

(c) *The Federation of Malaya and Singapore*

Communist control of China down to the Yangtze would not have such serious effects on Malaya as Communist domination of the whole of China, because most of the Malayan Chinese come from South China and because the Communist-controlled areas would not be contiguous to the frontier of French Indo-China. The following reactions among Malayan Chinese during such a period could, however, be expected, while some of the effects forecast below would also be felt—

- (i) an intensification of Kuomintang activity. An increase in Kuomintang activity has already been reported in recent weeks (including paper plans for an underground cell system);
- (ii) strong support for the China Democratic League and the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee, which would increase if a coalition Government were formed in China;
- (iii) increased political activity by the Chinese community, with agitation for increased representation of the Chinese in the Federal or State Councils, to which the Malays would react strongly.

Communist control of the whole of China would be a grave danger to Malaya and would mean that:—

- (i) Militant communism would be very close to Malaya's northern frontier, with Siam and French Indo-China as poor buffers;
- (ii) the morale of the Malayan Communists would be bound to improve;

(iii) there might very well be increased activity by China Communist Party agents infiltrating into Malaya. A number of China Communist Party agents are already reported to have reached Singapore;

(iv) a comparatively small increase in the successes of the Malayan Communists might have wide repercussions among the passive Chinese community, since Chinese morale as a whole in Malaya has never been good, and is very sensitive to bandit successes, intimidation, and propaganda;

(v) the Chinese population in general might well be even less ready to co-operate actively with the Malayan Government than at present. They will continue to sit firmly on the fence and hope that a Communist administration in China will turn out to be peaceful and reformist;

(vi) subversive activities by Kuomintang diehards might well continue, though admittedly without the backing of the Chinese Government, which it has hitherto enjoyed to the detriment of good government in Malaya;

(vii) there would be some increase in illegal immigration into Malaya and there might also be a demand for asylum for political refugees;

(viii) there would be repercussions among the Malays to any increase in Chinese political activity and also if militant communism were to spread in Indonesia.

*(d) Sarawak and North Borneo*

In Sarawak and North Borneo it is expected that Communist successes in North China will probably lead to an increase in Communist sympathies among the local Chinese population and reinforcement of present Communist attempts to persuade Chinese intelligentsia that national aspirations can now best be achieved through communism. At the same time a parallel increase in Kuomintang activity may be expected in the form of tightening control over registered societies, and increasing pressure on the Communists.

*(e) India and Pakistan*

The political consequences to India and Pakistan of Communist domination of China would be indirect but none the less formidable. They would be moderated or delayed to the extent that Communist domination did not spread over the whole of China. They would consist in the first instance of the great moral effect of China becoming a Communist State. India, and to a lesser extent Pakistan, are the field where Western and Asian civilisations meet, and there is always a tension between them. Hitherto, Russia has been a third factor; but the adoption of communism by a major Asiatic country would be



likely to cause it to be regarded in India and Pakistan more favourably than when it was predominantly a northern and western development. Although China has no common frontier with India, a Communist-dominated China would certainly result in a strengthening of communism in Burma, and the countries to the north of India—Tibet, Nepal and Bhutan—would gradually be penetrated by Communist influence. Thus there would at once be a threat of political and strategic encirclement of India and Pakistan's land frontiers by Communist states, which might in a relatively short time become a reality.

The political consequences of this situation may be summarised as follows:—

(i) The Indian Communists would derive enhanced prestige and greater influence. At present they are a small but vigorous minority. They would be fortified by the infiltration of Communist agents and Communist finance through Burma, Eastern Pakistan and through North-West Pakistan.

(ii) The Indian Communists would redouble their efforts to acquire influence over organised labour. They already have an influential trade union organisation under their effective domination. The agricultural population is illiterate and politically inert and therefore the urban population of India, which is small, has an influence out of all proportion to its size.

(iii) Any economic disaster, such as a famine, would give communism an opportunity to spread to rural areas.

(iv) The present attitude of neutrality on the part of India in foreign policy as between the Communist States and the Western democracies might harden as Communists rise to power in Asia. On the other hand, Hinduism is strongly opposed to communism in outlook and initially at any rate the Nehru<sup>16</sup> Government would be likely to make a determined stand against communism, their ability to maintain it depending on their ability to provide progressive improvement of the economic condition of the masses.

(v) Burmese rice might be diverted away from India if Burma went Communist and joined in any attempt to overthrow the existing regime in India. This would be a powerful factor militating against an improvement in India's economic condition.

(vi) The Government of Pakistan would be likely to be strongly anti-Communist if their disputes with India, particularly over Kashmir, were disposed of. Until that happens, however, there is a possibility that Pakistan might prefer Russian support against India, even with some knowledge of Russia's price, to absorption or conquest by India, which she still regards as India's primary objective. A

<sup>16</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian Prime Minister.

solution of the Kashmir dispute would therefore become even more essential from our point of view if the Chinese Communists succeed in controlling China.

(f) *Foreign Territories in South-East Asia*

In general, it may be expected that Communist successes in China will stimulate Communist movements throughout the area. If the Chinese Communists succeed in overrunning the whole of China, the possibilities of contacts with the Communists in Indo-China, Siam and Burma will be greatly facilitated, and it may be expected the Communist agitation in various forms will be accelerated to a marked degree.

*Burma*

The frontier between Burma and China is in part undefined, and in view of the fact that the present Burmese Government lacks effective control, it would be difficult to prevent the infiltration of Chinese Communists and a link-up between them and Burmese Communists against the Government were the whole of South-West China to come under Chinese Communist control. The general disorder in Burma might render it very difficult to cope with any considerable increase in Communist strength. There might also be the two further dangers of communism seeping over the border into India and Pakistan (East Bengal), and of the Chinese Communists pressing China's extensive frontier claims against Burma.

*Indo-China*

Direct contact between Communist-controlled China and Northern Indo-China will greatly increase the difficulties of the situation in the latter territory, where the failure of the French Government to take effective measures to seek a solution has resulted in an alliance between the Nationalist and Communist elements. The French forces in Indo-China are already stretched and if the Viet Minh were to be strongly reinforced as a result of Communist-controlled China, the situation might well become untenable for the French, at any rate in the north. There would be an increased threat to South-East Asia in general through the strengthening of the Communist position in Indo-China.

*Indonesia*

If the Dutch fail to reach a settlement in the near future there may easily be an alliance between Nationalists and Communists which might result in a long period of disorder with serious consequences not only to Indonesia but to South-East Asia as a whole.

*Siam*

There is quite a strong Chinese Communist element in Siam which so far has not caused serious trouble, but encouraged by the situation in China it might well get out of hand, and it is by no means certain



that the comparatively inefficient administration in Siam would be able to deal with it effectively. There is a considerable danger that if the Communists got out of control in southern Siam, they might combine with Communist elements in Malaya, thus rendering the suppression of the latter immeasurably more difficult.

*Sinkiang and Tibet*

Chinese Communist control in Sinkiang would facilitate increased Russian pressure, which is already apparent in that region. It is just conceivable, however, that if the Russians sought complete domination in Sinkiang, this might cause a rift with the Chinese Communists, whose nationalism would not take kindly to Russian acquisitiveness. In Tibet, it is not likely that the Tibetans would welcome Chinese Communists any more than they welcome attempts at domination by the National Government of China. But obviously the potential danger is greater as the area to the north and east of Tibet comes under Communist domination.

WASHINGTON, 10 January, 1949.

761.00/2-349: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Peiping (Clubb)*

WASHINGTON, February 3, 1949—6 p. m.

60. In connection reported intention Communists abrogate treaties with foreign powers, following comment for your use in your discretion if appropriate occasion offers. Respect for treaty obligations basis relations among modern states. UN<sup>17</sup> attaches great significance state's record treaty observance as evidence state's ability and willingness discharge Charter<sup>18</sup> obligations. One of reasons Albania failed admission UN was its refusal recognize international obligations under treaties. States desiring terminate or modify treaties obligated follow procedures prescribed in individual treaties.

ACHESON

893.01/3-2149

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*<sup>19</sup>

The following are the general views of the Foreign Office on the question of establishing relations with the Chinese Communists.

<sup>17</sup> United Nations.

<sup>18</sup> Signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945; 59 Stat. 1031.

<sup>19</sup> Handed to the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Sprouse) by the First Secretary of the British Embassy (Ford) on March 21.

The Foreign Office are aware that to refuse to accord any sort of recognition to a government which in fact effectively controls a large proportion of territory is not only objectionable on legal grounds but leads to grave practical difficulties. It would be open to His Majesty's Government to recognise the Chinese Communist Government as at any rate being a *de facto* government of that part of China which it controls, and they could of course, at the same time, continue to recognise the Central Government as being the *de jure* government of the whole of China. By so doing His Majesty's Government would be adopting an attitude similar to that which they adopted towards General Franco during the Spanish Civil War.

In spite of these arguments the Foreign Office feel that some time must still elapse before His Majesty's Government will be in a position to consider according any form of recognition to the Communists. The reasons of the Foreign Office for considering that some delay is both inevitable and desirable are:

(a) The North China Peoples Government must be regarded as an interim regime which is now in process of converting itself into something else. It is not yet known whether it will prove possible to arrange some form of coalition between the present Central Government and the Communists, nor have the Communists yet decided on their capital. The frontiers of Communist-administered territory are still fluid, and it is impossible to foresee whether there will be a period of stalemate, as in the Spanish Civil War, when the two opposing factions will each be in control of a relatively clearly defined area.

(b) On general grounds, the Foreign Office do not wish to appear unduly precipitate in recognising the Communist regime.

(c) The Foreign Office are anxious to proceed to recognition only on the basis of full consultation with the other powers concerned.

The observations of the State Department on the foregoing would be appreciated.<sup>20</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] 19 March 1949.

893.01/4-2949 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State*

NANKING, April 29, 1949—3 p. m.

[Received April 30—1:49 a. m.]

900. I venture to make suggestion re question of giving recognition to prospective new government of China. Its leaders are now in arrogant mood and already implying they will only recognize other

<sup>20</sup> On March 23, with the concurrence of the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Mr. Sprouse informed Mr. Ford of "our general agreement with British views on this subject".

countries on certain terms dictated by themselves. Worthwhile to anticipate this issue by informing them when time seems suitable that it is they who are on trial rather than other nations with well established tradition and accepted international standards. My proposal centers around two points:

(1) As many nations as possible should agree to joint action. This solidarity will be disconcerting to CCP leaders. Not only are they steeped in Marxist dogma of inevitable conflict among capitalist governments, but this is reinforced by classical Chinese dictum of playing off one barbarian horde against another. Members of North Atlantic Pact<sup>21</sup> and others in (British) Commonwealth, Latin American countries and those around Eastern Mediterranean, might be among those included. China would then find herself ranged with Soviet Union and satellites in world opinion. However blatant Communist propaganda may be in this allegiance, it will not be popular among other Chinese. Nor will it be lost upon them that America still has many friends despite incessant Sovietized abuse.

(2) United Nations might possibly be asked to scrutinize with same care as new applicants, those members states whose governments undergo radical change as result military force, for purpose assuring its intention to maintain basic freedoms and human rights. Despite employment of clichés about liberation, new democracy, truly people's government, etc., interpretation of these terms by United Nations as applied to CCP general practice and openly acknowledged doctrines might be effectively publicized on this world forum. Facts can be supplied by our Embassy and elsewhere to prove that thus far CCP is following totalitarian pattern. To have this demonstrated by those who are not intimidated by their terroristic devices nor gullible when listening to their assertions will be formidable weapon for use Asia. It can easily be shown that—while giving commendation to their genuine social reforms—CCP political outlook is in judgment of freedom loving, forward looking nations not New Democracy but last form of Fascist tyranny.

Most important feature to insist upon among human rights—and the one to which CCP would be least willing to assent—might well be freedom of press and of publication. Guarantees would have to be carefully implemented. When CCP will attempt to arouse nationalistic resentment for interference in China's internal affairs it can be urged that no nation can any longer live unto itself, least of all one that is openly advocating world-revolt plan and forcing peaceful nations to unite in self-protection. In short CCP members need to

<sup>21</sup> Signed at Washington, April 4, 1949; for text, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1964, or 63 Stat. (pt. 2) 2241.

be educated, they and their fellow-countrymen as well as other Asiatics. CCP leaders, while extremely intelligent, probably see world—especially US—largely through a murky haze of own self-indoctrination.

Sent Department, repeated OffEmb<sup>22</sup> Canton 332.

STUART

893.01/4-3049 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Shanghai (Cabot) to the Secretary of State*

SHANGHAI, April 30, 1949—9 p. m.

[Received 10:42 p. m.]

1456. News item that British Foreign Office spokesman plans establish "friendly relations" with Chinese Communist Government lends point, I believe, to mytel 1389, April 27, 11 a.m.<sup>23</sup>

CABOT

711.93/5-349 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State*

NANKING, May 3, 1949—2 p. m.

[Received 4:51 a. m.]

921. Chinese Communists have lost no opportunities in emphasizing lack of recognition and official relations between USA and themselves. This is by now hackneyed excuse given for treatment as private persons our consular officers North China. While to date they have been consistently vague in what there is for us to recognize, we may expect concrete developments in formation of government of national character as authority territory National Government diminishes. There is strong feeling arrogance manifested CCP attitude result easy military conquest which contribute to their belief that it is established nations of world which are on trial rather than Communist China in upcoming question recognition. (See my 900, April 29, repeated Canton 32 [332]). I am convinced our tactics should therefore be one of reserve, waiting for new regime to make first approach. We can afford to wait. For tactical reasons I would consider it unwise for us to initiate any move toward recognition new national regime. On this point I agree with Clark<sup>24</sup> rather than Cabot (see

<sup>22</sup> Office of the Embassy in China.

<sup>23</sup> *Post*, p. 1251.

<sup>24</sup> Lewis Clark, Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China at Canton.

Shanghai's 1389, April 27 to Department,<sup>25</sup> repeated Nanking 798, Canton 346, and Cantel 296, April 29,<sup>26</sup> repeated Shanghai 186).

To be effective we must have support of at least North Atlantic community. Governments represented therein, and particularly those of Commonwealth, should not be permitted to jump the gun for temporary apparent commercial political gains which CCP may well attempt to dangle. Chinese have long successfully employed through weakness policy of playing off one foreign power against another. It cannot be to advantage of any Western states to permit Chinese Communists succeed similar tactics against US now. I shall be glad to take whatever steps here Department may consider appropriate but I feel effective persuasion regarding advantages strict united front vis-à-vis new Chinese regime can best be made in Washington, London, Paris, Rome, etc.

Department please pass this telegram to North Atlantic community capitals in its discretion.<sup>27</sup>

Sent Department, repeated OffEmb Canton 341, Shanghai 490.

STUART

893.01/5-449 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State*

NANKING, May 4, 1949—4 p. m.

[Received May 5—2:17 a. m.]

936. When I called on British Ambassador yesterday (my first outing in one week<sup>28</sup>) he discussed desirability extending *de facto* recognition national basis to Communist Government promptly it is established. He appears to have received some policy guidance this respect from his FonOff and suggested calling meeting chiefs North Atlantic community to discuss. As Department would have seen from mytel 921, May 3 to Department, repeated Shanghai 490, Canton 341, I am strongly inclined against making any first move in establishing relations national Communist regime. I feel we should be in no hurry to extend any kind of recognition and fear premature decisions on North Atlantic community basis may prejudice flexible policy, freedom of action of us all. Furthermore I do not understand how *de facto* recognition on national basis could be extended to new regime without withdrawing recognition from Government [in

<sup>25</sup> Post, p. 1251.

<sup>26</sup> Post, p. 934.

<sup>27</sup> Repeated in a circular telegram of May 3, 5 a.m., to Embassies in the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Canada, and Australia.

<sup>28</sup> For the Embassy's situation following Nanking's occupation by Communists, see volume VIII.

Canton which I for one am not prepared to recommend for immediate future.

I would be grateful Department guidance before next meeting Little Diplomatic Corps.

Sent Department, repeated OffEmb Canton 353, Shanghai 501, passed London 5.

STUART

893.01/5-549 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State*

NANKING, May 5, 1949—5 p. m.

[Received May 6—4:34 a. m.]

943. My French and British colleagues<sup>29</sup> called on me yesterday to discuss question of “*de facto* recognition” which will arise on formation Central Government, provisional or otherwise, in Communist-occupied China. British Ambassador, who prompted meeting, presented informal memo as basis for discussion. (See Embtel 936 to Dept May 4, repeated Canton 353, Shanghai 501, London 5.) He feels that early consultation among governments of North Atlantic group desirable in order that there may be common action this problem. At same time he feels it desirable we not appear to be acting as a bloc.

Stevenson’s memo contained following considerations:

- (1) Progressive disintegration Kmt<sup>30</sup> Government.
- (2) Unless and until *de facto* recognition granted, practical difficulty of arranging satisfactory protection our interests on basis consular relations will continue.
- (3) Desirability of following Spanish Civil War precedent in appointing diplomatic agents on grant of *de facto* recognition.
- (4) Withdrawal of Ambassadors from Nanking in advance of *de facto* recognition and before appointment of diplomatic agents would leave only diplomatic representation with “crumbling Kmt” which might have adverse repercussions on nationals, interests Communist-occupied territory. I indicated general approval points 1 and 2 but said I was doubtful as to validity of 3rd and 4th considerations.

I said I did not think we should be under illusion that Communists would be influenced by fact of our having remained Nanking; that their attitude, policy toward us was already established and that they would not be satisfied with half measures. I continued that we should not sacrifice possible long range advantages for immediate and relatively minor ones; that we should not appear anxious to make first

<sup>29</sup> Jacques Meyrier and Sir Ralph Stevenson.

<sup>30</sup> Kuomintang (Nationalist Party).

move or take initiative in any kind of recognition to newcomers. Stevenson indicated agreement with my views.

I should be grateful for Department's guidance for future discussions this subject.

Sent Department, repeated Shanghai 508, OffEmb Canton 359, London 6.

STUART

893.01/5-649 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*

ROME, May 6, 1949—2 p. m.

[Received 7:58 p. m.]

1335. Depcirtel May 3, 5 a. m.<sup>31</sup> SYG<sup>32</sup> Foreign Office informs us instructions have been sent Italian Ambassador, Nanking, through British radio that he act in concert with his American, British and French colleagues. Zoppi said Italian Government wished to maintain united front with US re new Chinese regime and he expressed hope we would keep Italian Government fully advised our views.

Sent Department 1335, repeated Nanking 4.

DUNN

893.01/5-649 : Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers*<sup>33</sup>

WASHINGTON, May 6, 1949—5 p. m.

ReDepcirtel May 3 repeating Nanking's 921, May 3. Dept supports general position outlined reftel and believes question might profitably be discussed in capitals concerned Western powers. You are therefore authorized discuss this matter with FonMin of Govt to which accredited along lines suggested reftel emphasizing (1) disadvantages of initiating any moves toward recognition or giving impression through statements officials that any approach by Commies seeking recognition wld be welcomed and (2) desirability of concerned Western powers adopting common front this regard. Report FonMin's reactions.

ACHESON

<sup>31</sup> See footnote 27, p. 15.

<sup>32</sup> Secretary General, Vittorio Zoppi.

<sup>33</sup> Sent to Embassies at London, Paris, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, Ottawa, Lisbon, and Canberra; repeated to Embassy at Nanking, Embassy Office at Canton, and Consulate General at Shanghai.



893.01/5-949 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State*

THE HAGUE, May 9, 1949—3 p. m.

[Received May 9—2:55 p. m.]

390. Discussed Foreign Minister Depcirtel May 8 [6], 5 p. m. anent China and on both points 1 and 2, he expressed entire cooperation and agreement.

BARUCH

893.01/5-949 : Airgram

*The Ambassador in Canada (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State*

OTTAWA, May 9, 1949.

[Received May 11—5:03 p. m.]

A-108. Reference Department's circular telegrams dated May 3, 5:00 a. m.<sup>34</sup> and May 6, 5:00 p. m. conveying Department's attitude toward dealings with Chinese Communists.

Department of External Affairs has been informed of the gist of referenced telegrams and policy recommended therein was enthusiastically commended.

Officials here concerned with Chinese affairs feel very strongly that western states should consult together before making any decision regarding recognition or other important matters. Canadians are also anxious to maintain strictly united front regarding position towards possible new Chinese regime.

They appreciate pains taken by Department to keep Canadian Embassy in Washington informed on Chinese developments, but feel inclusion of Canadians in consultations in Washington regarding Chinese problems before decisions are reached would be mutually advantageous.

Canadian officials give the impression of feeling that they have not been informed or consulted about United States decisions regarding China in some important instances, particularly in respect to Department's authorization for Ambassador Stuart's return to Washington for consultation.<sup>35</sup>

STEINHARDT

<sup>34</sup> See footnote 27, p. 15.

<sup>35</sup> See telegram No. 510, April 22, 7 p. m., to the Ambassador in China, vol. VIII, "Successive moves of the Embassy office in China in efforts . . .".



893.01/5-1049 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, May 10, 1949—1 p. m.

[Received 5:07 p. m.]

1887. Schuman<sup>36</sup> told me last night that he agrees with Department's position with regard to recognizing Chinese Communist Government as set forth in Deptcirtel May 6, 3 a. m. [5 p. m.].

CAFFERY

893.01/5-1049 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Australia (Foster) to the Secretary of State*

CANBERRA, May 10, 1949—4 p. m.

[Received May 11—3 a. m.]

99. Saw Burton<sup>37</sup> today and urged position outlined Depcirtel May 6, 5 p. m. Burton said Australia planned continue its Embassy in Nanking and had no intention at present recognizing Communists in China. Added however that circumstances might change and that Australia could give no commitments for future.

FOSTER

893.01/5-1049 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State*

NANKING, May 10, 1949—11 p. m.

[Received May 10—4:20 a. m.]

979. My British colleague has given me copy of his most recent telegram May 5, on "*de facto* recognition" of a Communist National Government of China. He reports that he has consulted all his colleagues in North Atlantic group; that I was the only partial dissenter on two points (see Embtel 943, May 5 to Department, repeated Embassy Canton 359, Shanghai 508). He explained my position as anxiety to do nothing at this stage which might prejudice formal recognition on *de jure* basis or weaken position of democratic powers seeking to secure liberalization of Chinese Communist regime. Stevenson's telegram continued that following points emerged from discussions with his colleagues:

(1) Unanimous opinion, including Commonwealth, that we should let Communists take first step by informing Diplomatic Corps of

<sup>36</sup> Robert Schuman, French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>37</sup> John W. Burton, Secretary of the Australian Department of External Affairs.

formation of central government. Should however this fact take form of public announcements rather than communications to other powers an impasse might result.

(2) Communists may take position not satisfied anything short of formal recognition on *de jure* basis.

(3) If diplomatic agents were appointed by powers establishing relations with *de facto* regime Communists might ask for reciprocal rights of appointment.

(4) Unanimous agreement for united front but avoid publicity indicating we are "ganging-up" on new regime.

(5) In any negotiations only form of pressure would be threat to break off and withdraw Ambassadors for consultation.

According to Stevenson's telegram, French Ambassador emphasizes caution in dealings with Communists which might discourage resistance by Nationals in southwest China. Italian Ambassador warned against taking any action which would hasten disintegration of Kmt with view to keeping UN membership out of Communist hands long as possible. Netherlands Ambassador emphasizes value of continued presence Ambassadors in Nanking.

I told Stevenson I was in general agreement with his report. I shall make more specific remarks for Department's benefit in subsequent telegram.

Department pass capitals Western Powers at its discretion.

Sent Department 979, repeated OffEmb Canton 389, Shanghai 542.

STUART

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893.01/5-1149 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, May 11, 1949—6 p. m.

[Received 7:02 p.m.]

1839. Depcirtel May 6, 5 p. m., re recognition Chinese Communist Government. Holmes<sup>38</sup> presented memo based on Nanking's 921<sup>39</sup> to Bevin this morning. Bevin remarked in jocular mood "Do you want us to go as slow on this as we have in case of Israel?" Stated matter would be given full consideration.

DOUGLAS

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<sup>38</sup> Julius C. Holmes, Minister-Counselor of Embassy.

<sup>39</sup> May 3, p. 14.

893.01/5-1249 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, May 12, 1949—5 p. m.  
[Received May 12—3:43 p.m.]

1941. Mytel 1887, May 10. Foreign Office note dated May 11 just received whose pertinent paragraphs follow in translation :

“French Government believes it is indeed desirable that governments of Atlantic Community and British Commonwealth adopt common policy on this question.

“French Government intends take advantage Secretary State’s forthcoming visit Paris to study with him new situation created by collapse of National Chinese Government and to inform him of considerations to which this situation gives rise since it has special aspect for France because of common frontier between Indochina and China.”

CAFFERY

893.01/5-1249 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, May 12, 1949—7 p. m.  
[Received 9:52 p. m.]

1951. We asked Baeyens<sup>40</sup> whether Foreign Office note transmitted Embtel 1941 meant that French intend raise with Secretary whole question of defense SEA<sup>41</sup> against Chinese Communists, French military situation in Indochina, our attitude toward Bao Dai<sup>42</sup> regime, etc. After consulting Parodi,<sup>43</sup> he has replied in negative saying that present French plans are to confine discussions to eventual recognition Chinese Communist regime in China with particular reference to special French problems arising out of common frontier.

CAFFERY

893.01/5-549 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Stuart)*

WASHINGTON, May 13, 1949—8 p. m.

589. Reurtels 936, May 4, and 943, May 5 re question recognition, foll info for your guidance :

<sup>40</sup> Jacques Baeyens, Head of the Asia-Oceania Section of the French Foreign Office.

<sup>41</sup> Southeast Asia.

<sup>42</sup> Head of French Indochina, former Emperor of Annam.

<sup>43</sup> Alexandre Parodi, Secretary General of the French Foreign Office.

1. In accordance general approved position of Dept, recognition any new govt shld be based on foll three factors:

- a. *de facto* control of territory and administrative machinery of State, including maintenance public order;
- b. ability and willingness of govt to discharge its internatl obligations;
- c. general acquiescence of people of country in govt in power.

Furthermore, recognition by US shld not be withheld as political weapon except in extreme cases when US natl interest served thereby.

2. Re question recognition Commies as in *de facto* as opposed *de jure* control, foll considerations appear pertinent:

a. US Govt on recent occasion (Israel) recognized provisional govt as *de facto* authority and exchanged representatives prior to *de jure* recognition.<sup>44</sup>

b. Recognition of *de facto* authority can legally be extended without withdrawing recognition from *de jure* govt. (Oppenheim's *Internatl Law*, Vol. I, 7th Edition, pp. 145-146 par 75g)

c. Granting recognition *de facto* authority Commie regime would politically encourage Commies and discourage Natl Govt.

d. When Phibun Govt succeeded Khuang Govt in Siam, we asked and obtained assurances of intentions fulfill internatl obligations and accordingly did not withdraw recognition.<sup>45</sup> US has withheld recognition from Albania in view its refusal give similar assurances.

3. In discussing question possible recognition *de facto* authority Commie regime with diplomatic colleagues, foll questions shld be considered and Dept wld appreciate ur comments thereon:

a. Wld grant this recognition lead Commies to adopt more correct and reasonable attitude toward Amer official personnel and Amer rights and property generally? Or would they become more haughty and arbitrary?

b. Does this recognition offer best hope for protecting Amer interests?

c. Having recd recognition *de facto* authority wld Commies soon demand recognition *de jure* control which US might be unprepared grant in absence evidence of sense internatl responsibility?

4. Re Brit Amb's point 3 (urtel 943, May 5), during Span Civil War Brit made arrangements with insurgents in April 1938 for exchange of agents possessing quasi-official character while at same time retaining diplomatic relations with Span Govt. Brit Govt made it clear such concessions involved no recognition Franco administration. US with-

<sup>44</sup> See President Truman's statement on May 14, 1948, Department of State *Bulletin*, May 23, 1948, p. 673.

<sup>45</sup> See *ibid.*, March 14, 1948, p. 360; and May 23, 1948, p. 686.

held recognition Span Nationalist Govt until April 1939<sup>46</sup> by which time all semblance Loyalist Govt had disappeared.

5. Replies recd so far in response Depcirtel May 6 as follows: Paris and The Hague indicate full agreement and cooperation; Rome expresses desire maintain common front and states Ital Amb will act in concert with Amer, Brit and Fr colleagues; Ottawa enthusiastically commends policy recommended; Canberra states no intention at present recognizing Commies but adds circumstances might change and could give no commitments for future; London noncommittal but states matter will be given full consideration.

6. Reurtel 927, May 4,<sup>47</sup> Dept spokesmen have replied foll sense to questions re US relations with Commies: Commies have not as yet established "central govt" in any sense of word and are not seeking recognition. Natl Govt only Govt in China which has claim recognition. Consular establishments Commie controlled areas remain open and functioning where possible as repeatedly indicated. As functioning bodies they are on practical basis handling purely local problems with local authorities. This in no sense implies recognition or approval actions these local authorities. Facing facts it only natural expect these relationships shld be as amicable as conditions permit.

7. Dept continues of opinion we shld strongly oppose hasty recognition Commies either as *de facto* or *de jure* authority by any power and shld continue our efforts obtain full agreement concerned Fon powers (particularly Brit) to desirability presenting common front this question.

ACHESON

893.01/5-1549 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State*

NANKING, May 15, 1949—8 a. m.

[Received 11:18 p. m.]

1025. With reference paragraph 5, Embtel 1018 [1019] of May 13,<sup>48</sup> repeated Shanghai 568, Canton 411, we suggest that when time finally does come to accord *de jure* recognition to Chinese Communists, Department may wish try make such recognition contingent upon Com-

<sup>46</sup> For recognition of the Spanish Nationalist Government, see telegrams from the Secretary of State to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, April 1 and 3, 1939, *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. II, pp. 771 and 772, respectively.

<sup>47</sup> Not printed.

<sup>48</sup> Vol. VIII, "The Embassy in China after occupation of Nanking by Chinese Communists", chapter I.

munists signing detailed agreement along lines 1933 Litvinov Agreement with USSR.<sup>49</sup>

Some advantages which would accrue from this are: By pinning Communists down to certain specific minimal obligations, it would reduce their scope to misinterpret and quibble about generalities in manner characteristic of both Communists and Chinese. It would impress them that we are not intimidated by their truculence and that they and not we have most to gain by establishment of diplomatic relations. It would dovetail with Embassy recommendation (Embtel 921, May 3) that we do not take first step toward recognition. If agreement is sufficiently detailed, it would give US convenient and specific references on which to hang many protests against violations American rights which we must expect in Communist China.

Sent Department 1025, repeated Shanghai 574, OffEmb Canton 416.

STUART

893.01/5-1749 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State*

NANKING, May 17, 1949—1 p. m.

[Received May 17—7:51 a. m.]

1043. We have had several recent indications that our colleagues are, under present inactivity, ill-defined status, becoming restless and would welcome opportunity to recognize Commie central regime. Rumors reach us that Indian Govt intends to recognize Commie Govt fairly promptly after "decent interval". French, we are informed, feel that their interests in Indochina would be better protected if they recognized Commie regime promptly, rather than otherwise. My Canadian and Netherlands colleagues have both expressed to me intention or desire to remain in Nanking and become accredited to new central government as soon as that is feasible. Certainly if chiefs of mission remain Nanking, there will be every personal reason to regularize their status through early recognition. I am afraid that personal considerations are not entirely absent in recommendations which some chiefs of mission are favoring on China policy. I was gratified to see instructions contained in Dept's circular May 6 and feel I must emphasize again desirability of North Atlantic and Commonwealth group maintaining united front and forcing Commie central government, when it is established, to take initiative on recognition. I cannot but feel that it is in long-range interest of us all to require new regime to work for international recognition including recognition its international obligations and subscription to freedoms and liberties

<sup>49</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1933, vol. II, pp. 804-814.

in spirit of UN Charter. <sup>\*</sup> (Recognition will be our only lever.) Once line is broken, once we begin according recognition we will have released what little bargaining power now is in our hands. Perhaps methods of persuasion other than purely Chinese considerations will occur to Dept. It is particularly important that London and Washington, and consequently Stevenson and I, have similar instructions and act in simultaneous accord. Some of smaller countries have intimated that they would be greatly embarrassed if Stevenson and I followed different courses with respect to withdrawal from Nanking or recognition. Deptel 589, May 13, repeated Shanghai 932, Canton 174, just received and will receive comment in separate telegram.

Sent Department 1043, repeated Canton 429, Shanghai 590.

STUART

893.01/5-1749 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Portugal (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, May 17, 1949—4 p. m.  
[Received May 17—12:55 p. m.]

180. Have discussed this matter with Foreign Minister (Depcirtel May 6, 5 p. m.) who said he agrees thoroughly and emphatically with Department's views. Added he feels it still possible to halt Communist aggression Asia if Western powers take common stand but urged initiative must come from US in view British tendency to indecision and "need of being pushed." Complained his Government has informed London that it will defend Macau to maximum ability if British similarly determined re Hong Kong but no answer this connection received.

MACVEAGH

893.01/5-1949 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, May 19, 1949—4 p. m.  
[Received 5:19 p. m.]

1972. Depcirtel May 6, 5 p. m. re recognition of possible Chinese Communist Government.

1. Foreign Office has today handed to Embassy officer following *aide-mémoire* on subject:

"Note has been taken of the US Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of the 11 May.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>50</sup> See telegram No. 1839, May 11, 6 p. m., p. 20.

A study of the legal issues involved in the recognition or non-recognition of a Communist government of China was forwarded to Washington in mid-March for communication to the Department of State.<sup>51</sup> The considerations then put forward hold good at the present time.

On the practical problem the Foreign Office fully agree that the question of formally recognizing the Communists will only arise after the formation of a government claiming to be of national character. It is at present impossible to foresee when this will be, but in the meantime there would seem to be every advantage in maintaining, as State Department suggests, a reserved attitude towards the new regime and in preserving a common front among the Western and Atlantic Powers.

With this end in view full and frequent consultation will be maintained with these powers so that an urgent decision can be reached in common as soon as the Communists show their hand."

2. Dening<sup>52</sup> yesterday informed Dickover<sup>53</sup> that other Western and Atlantic Powers would be fully informed of UK position.

[DOUGLAS]

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893.01/5-1949: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Portugal (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, May 19, 1949—6 p. m.

[Received May 19—3:40 p. m.]

187. In conversation with Foreign Minister yesterday, I again referred to possibility of Western Powers taking individual decisions re Chinese Communist recognition (infotel May 18, 5 a. m.<sup>54</sup>), and while stating no approach yet reported by Portuguese envoy Nanking, Foreign Minister reiterated his concurrence with view concerted attitude imperative and stated in strongest terms that Portuguese Government will take no action without prior consideration, specifically mentioning US-UK in this connection.

MACVEAGH

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893.01/5-2049: Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, May 20, 1949—8 p. m.

[Received 11:47 p. m.]

2084. ReDepintel May 18, 5 a. m.<sup>54</sup> Baeyens tells us that Meyrier's and FonOff thinking run along following line: Western nations

<sup>51</sup> March 19, p. 11.

<sup>52</sup> Maberly E. Dening, British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Far East).

<sup>53</sup> Erle R. Dickover, Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom.

<sup>54</sup> Not printed.



should not delay recognition Chinese Communist regime once it has taken initiative obtain such recognition and has agreed assume treaty commitments its predecessor. In FonOff's view, acceptance existing Franco-Chinese treaties by CP regime would justify immediate recognition. Baeyens added that some pressure is evident from Indo-China to delay recognition out of fear of local repercussions. In addition to general effect on dissident and fence-sitting elements afforded by gesture which would undoubtedly be exploited as French abasement before rising CP tide, Baeyens said local people feared activities of Communist Chinese Consuls. Baeyens pooh-pooed these fears and intends resist this pressure.

BRUCE

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740.00119 Council/5-2349 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State*<sup>55</sup> to the Acting Secretary of State

[Extracts]

PARIS, May 23, 1949—10 p. m.

[Received May 24—1:20 p. m.]

Delsec 1782. [For] President and Acting Secretary. As appears factual report today's CFM meeting, Vishinsky's<sup>56</sup> attitude throughout was most conciliatory and pleasant. . . .

Vishinsky's emphasis on previous Soviet position that Japanese peace treaty should be dealt with through CFM seems to reveal natural interest in Far Eastern developments and confidence concerning establishment Chinese Communist Government. Vishinsky's remarks clearly imply desire to secure invitation to Chinese Govt to participate, thus involving recognition Communist regime or putting western powers on spot in refusing recognition.

ACHESON

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893.01/5-2649 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State*

NANKING, May 26, 1949—1 p. m.

[Received May 27—10:03 p. m.]

1118. I have discussed separately with my colleagues of North Atlantic community various reactions of their respective Foreign Offices to US position on recognition China Communist government

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<sup>55</sup> The Secretary was in Paris attending a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM).

<sup>56</sup> A. Ya. Vyshinsky, Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Deptel 626, May 20, repeated Canton Telcan 218<sup>58</sup>). Generally they were highly pleased with attitudes their Government. Australian Ambassador assured me his Government would keep in line with rest of us; that he was confident that his recommendations would be followed in Canberra. He added that Prime Minister<sup>59</sup> was always overcautious when Evatt<sup>60</sup> was out of country.

British Ambassador, with whom I discussed position of various members of Commonwealth, assured me categorically that Nehru would not follow independent policy but would cooperate other members Commonwealth regarding New China recognition. He was also positive in assertions that local Indian Ambassador<sup>61</sup> concurred in united front approach to problem (see Embtel 1043, to Department May 17, repeated Canton 429).

Sent Department 1118; repeated OffEmb Canton 466; repeated Canberra 1; New Delhi 4.

STUART

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S93.01/5-2649 : Telegram

*The Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China (Clark) to the Secretary of State*

CANTON, May 26, 1949—4 p. m.

[Received May 27—7:26 a. m.]

Cantel 478. Agree Hague Foreign Office [that] Ambassadors Nanking unlikely agree on common front, Depintel May 24, 1 a. m.,<sup>58</sup> regarding recognition Communist regime China, and gather from public statements Department canvassing problem other interested governments. If French Foreign Office contemplated recognition Communist acceptance French-Chinese treaties only, suggest desirability approach France and point out that more is involved than mere French-Chinese relations. With all we have been doing for France, she should be willing consider this matter from other than purely selfish motives.

Sent Department, repeated Nanking 329.

CLARK

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<sup>58</sup> Not printed.

<sup>59</sup> Joseph B. Chifley.

<sup>60</sup> Herbert V. Evatt, Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs.

<sup>61</sup> K. M. Panikkar.

740.00119 Council/5-2649 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, May 26, 1949—5 p. m.  
[Received May 26—1:29 p. m.]

Actel 13. [For] Humelsine<sup>62</sup> from Battle.<sup>63</sup> French Foreign Office indicated to Embassy last week that Schuman<sup>64</sup> would like discuss with Sec at some point question recognition Chinese Commies. In light Vishinsky proposal Monday CFM and current developments China, let us have Dept. recommendation. In case you recommend interview forward any material not in problem summary 61 or available to Embassy advisers.<sup>65</sup> [Battle.]

ACHESON

893.01/5-2649 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State*

NEW DELHI, May 26, 1949—5 p. m.  
[Received May 26—2:55 p. m.]

600. During my conversation with Bajpai<sup>66</sup> May 25 we touched on developments in China. I said that it seemed to me important that great powers, including India, should consult with one another before taking any steps which might properly be interpreted as *de facto* or *de jure* recognition Chinese Communist Government. It would be against interests of all concerned, if as result of one great power pushing ahead of others in matter of recognition, Chinese Communist regime could indulge in game of playing one power off against another.

Bajpai said he thoroughly agreed and had recently sent instruction Indian Embassy to keep in close touch on all matters affecting relations with Communist regime with US and UK Embassies.

Sent Department 600, repeated Nanking.

HENDERSON

<sup>62</sup> Carlisle H. Humelsine, Director of the Executive Secretariat of the Office of the Secretary.

<sup>63</sup> Lucius D. Battle, of the Executive Secretariat staff.

<sup>64</sup> Robert Schuman, French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>65</sup> In reply, Mr. Humelsine reported in telegram Telac No. 26, May 28, the gist of the replies to Department's circular telegram of May 6, p. 17.

<sup>66</sup> Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, Secretary General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.

893.01/5-2749: Telegram

*The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State*

NANKING, May 27, 1949—1 p. m.

[Received May 27—7:14 a. m.]

1123. Deptel 589, May 13, paragraph 1. Accords Embassy's understanding.

Paragraph 2-*b*. Embassy without access Oppenheim and unaware US precedents this point, unless perhaps in case where new state created in portion of territory formerly controlled by *de jure* government, latter retaining sovereignty over remainder. Is British action Spain example? While it may have offered political expediency, it seems to us poor precedent from legal standpoint (see *American Journal of International Law*, section 2, 1939, volume 33, page 689).

Paragraph 2-*c*. Embassy concurs. Believed *de facto* recognition if accepted would be advertised by Communist-controlled press and radio as equivalent *de jure* and consequently so regarded by public. This particularly true if *de facto* recognition "granted" or "extended" by any documented action authority US Government such as exchange representatives or joint note December 9, 1924 by Peking envoys quoted *Hackworth Digest*, volume 1, page 317.<sup>68</sup> Moreover Embassy believes extremely difficult especially for some our allies resist falling into *de jure* recognition after establishing *de facto* relations.

Paragraph 3-*a*. Such formal grant or extension recognition of *de facto* authority would probably lead to more correct Communist attitude but only if US action treated as tantamount *de jure* recognition. If on other hand we insisted on emphasizing informal aspects of recognition, we believe Communist would reject such arrangement altogether, insisting on whole loaf of [*or*] nothing.

Paragraph 3-*b*. Best hope protecting American interests lies in growth Communist recognition own needs for American goods and technical assistance. As these needs become more acute, Communist manners and policy toward Americans may be expected improve regardless degree progress toward *de jure* recognition. Despite racial, political and commercial hostility toward Americans, their property and business interests, Communist moving with caution and sins are to date chiefly omission not commission.

\* Paragraph 3-*c*. See foregoing paragraph. In Embassy's view informal relations with *de facto* authority should be permitted to develop without ceremony or formal act marking their initiation. While

<sup>68</sup> For correspondence on the recognition of the provisional government as the "*de facto*" government of China, see *Foreign Relations*, 1924, vol. I, pp. 416 ff.

Communists will undoubtedly continue to say that they do not recognize us as officials because we have no formal relations, that position will in fact be correct, so far as concerns our capacity to make formally binding representations, we not being accredited to their regime. If we can continue to talk to them as we are now doing with local government Nanking, we may accomplish as much as can be expected in light of fundamentally divergent policies of CCP and USA. Informal relations established by some mark of intent rather than developed through daily contacts will, we believe, be interpreted and used by Communists as formal recognition to our own embarrassment or rejected as derogatory to Chinese national dignity.

STUART

893.01/5-2849

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Sprouse)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 28, 1949.

Participants: Mr. B. R. Sen, Indian Minister  
Mr. Joseph S. Sparks,<sup>69</sup> SOA  
Mr. P. D. Sprouse, Chief, CA

Mr. Sen called this morning by appointment and explained that he had been instructed by the Indian Government to make inquiries regarding the recent newspaper reports that the US Government was in consultation with certain other governments with respect to the question of possible recognition of any regime the Chinese Communists might establish in China. I explained that Ambassador Stuart in Nanking had been in touch with the various chiefs of mission at Nanking on this subject and that it was generally believed desirable that a common front be maintained on the question of recognition. I added that we had been in very close consultation with the British Embassy here on the subject and that we would like to continue to keep in touch with the Indian Embassy also.

Mr. Sparks pointed out that Mr. Butterworth had sometime ago discussed this matter with Mr. Sen's predecessor and that we had noted that Ambassador Henderson at New Delhi had also discussed the matter there with the Indian Government.

Mr. Sen indicated that the Indian Government agreed that it would be desirable to maintain a common front on this question and asked that we keep in touch with them in the future on this problem.

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<sup>69</sup> Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of South Asian Affairs.

893.01/6-149 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the Secretary of State*

MANILA, June 1, 1949—3 p. m.

[Received June 1—5:43 a. m.]

1401. Information regarding adoption concerted policy concerning recognition new Chinese regime initially received Manila Embassy only through intel May 9<sup>70</sup> which stated instructions already issued our Ambassadors countries with Missions remaining Nanking. It appeared therefrom that Department inadvertently omitted from list Philippines which continue maintain Mission there. Accordingly Chargé soon after receipt intel orally discussed question with President Quirino and obtained his agreement adopt common front.

However, President apparently did not recall subject matter his informal approach when there came his attention press report originating Paris that US addressed notes this question list countries in which Philippines not included. Under Secretary Foreign Affairs Neri May 31 informed me that Elizalde<sup>71</sup> had been instructed report whether US intended Philippines participate common front and that he reported basis conversation Department that Philippines included. As Neri gave impression being piqued that Philippines had not been more formally and fully brought in on the matter, I pointed out that our approach had early been made President Quirino and expressed belief press reports of despatch notes other interested powers probably incorrect. Under Secretary agreed adding that in any case Philippine concurs adoption common approach problem.

COWEN

893.01/6-149 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Australia (Foster) to the Secretary of State*

CANBERRA, June 1, 1949—4 p. m.

[Received June 1—9:46 a. m.]

111. Burton and McIntyre of External Affairs asked me informally today whether, since my approach to them as reported Embtel 99, May 10, I had had any further word from Washington concerning US position on recognition Communist regime in China. I referred Secretary Acheson's recent public statement.<sup>72</sup> They said feeling was growing in Australian Government that regime is in China to stay, that West might as well face fact, and that continued refusal of

<sup>70</sup> Not printed.<sup>71</sup> Joaquin M. Elizalde, Philippine Ambassador in the United States.<sup>72</sup> On May 18, 1949, the Secretary of State at his press conference stated that the United States was studying the Chinese situation in consultation with other governments (Department of State Verbatim Reports of Press Conferences).

recognition would destroy any chance of cooperation, however small, from regime and would drive latter fully into arms of Moscow. They added that, while Australia appreciated US belief that Chinese Com-mies are in closest dependent relationship with Moscow, Australian Government remains to be convinced of this. They added that Australia has suggested to UK that on economic and security grounds UK should consider leading movement for recognition, failing which Hong Kong may well be lost.

Please instruct my reply.

FOSTER

893.01/6-149 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Burma (Huddle) to the Secretary of State*

RANGOON, June 1, 1949—7 p. m.

[Received June 1—2:36 p. m.]

211. Foreign Minister spoke to me on subject Embtel 209, June 1,<sup>73</sup> and asked me to communicate request his Government to Department. I said I would gladly do so but told him I was not officially informed as to details of Department's proposals.

It would be wise I think to include Burma in any conversations on subject China, if this can consistently be done. Reuter's report lists SEA<sup>74</sup> Commonwealth States as having been consulted by Department. Burma is not in Commonwealth but probably feels a little hurt because not approached. Burma is vitally interested in China developments and having in mind significant if opportunistic change in policies now contemplated by GOB<sup>75</sup> (see mytels 210, June 1; 205, June 1<sup>76</sup>) it may be possible to associate Burma with anti-Communist nucleus by sympathetic attention and consideration at present stage. Minister Maung's request seems to indicate such an opportunity. Observe implication by Foreign Office use phrase that Burma may now wish to be considered "like minded" nation in our circle.

Pouched Bangkok, Colombo, Karachi, New Delhi.

HUDDLE

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*Editorial Note*

At his press conference on June 1 Acting Secretary of State Webb was asked by a reporter to comment on certain press association des-

<sup>73</sup> Not printed; it reported a note from the Burmese Foreign Office referring to a report that the United States had proposed that "like-minded" nations should join in common policy toward Communists in China and requesting that Burma also be consulted on this issue.

<sup>74</sup> Southeast Asia.

<sup>75</sup> Government of Burma.

<sup>76</sup> Neither printed.

patches saying that anonymous diplomatic sources in Nanking predicted recognition of "a Communist Government of China before too long." The newspaperman pointed out that the story mentioned India, Great Britain, and others, but not the United States, as leaning toward recognition.

Acting Secretary Webb replied: "I would like to say that there is no Communist Government in China; that it will apparently be some time before such a government can be established and I would prefer not to comment on what the attitude of this government would be at some future time and under conditions which we cannot foresee at this time. I would like to say that we will certainly be giving all aspects of the China situation the most careful study." (Department of State Verbatim Reports of Press Conferences.)

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893.01/6-149 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Burma (Huddle)*

WASHINGTON, June 4, 1949—1 p. m.

123. You may inform FonMin Dept welcomes GOB interest participating consultations (Embtels 209<sup>77</sup> and 211 June 1) of Govts watching Chi situation. We believe desirable for interested Govts keep in close touch. Chiefs of Missions in Nanking have been discussing matter of establishing common front toward relations with Commies and Dept will invite Burm Amb Washington to come in for exchange of views this situation. It is understood Burm Amb Nanking has already participated some of these talks, one result of which was decision Chiefs of Mission remain Nanking but move parts their respective staffs to Canton.

You may inform FonMin that common front policy consists primarily of: One, the concerned Powers will not make overtures to Commies on subj recognition but will leave question of first approach to Commies; and two, the concerned Powers will consult among themselves before taking any action toward extending any form recognition to Chi Commie Govt which may be established.

Consultations on these matters are kept on strictly informal oral basis and talks center at Nanking. Dept will appreciate knowing whether FonMin concurs this common front policy.

WEBB

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<sup>77</sup> See footnote 73, p. 33.



893.01/6-749 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kohler) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, June 7, 1949—6 p. m.

[Received June 7—2:25 p. m.]

1478. I cannot support too strongly Ambassador Stuart's convictions we should reserve recognition Chinese Communist regime as bargaining lever (Depinfotel, May 18<sup>78</sup>). Australian attitude that refusal recognition would destroy chance cooperate and drive regime to Soviets seems unrealistic to say least (Depinfotel June 2<sup>78</sup>). Liu Shao-chi article Cominform Journal appearing *Pravda* today should remove any lingering doubts CCP and Soviet and Soviet [*sic*] present solidarity.

We see no reason hurry recognition Communist regime. Soviet past behavior (North Korea) suggests they will take no recognition step until usual procedure convoking People's Assemblies, elections, etc., has taken place. Early recognition by West Powers would place latter in ridiculous position and result only in even more high-handed and arbitrary attitude on part Chinese Communists.

Embassy disturbed at anxiety for quick trade with Communists seemingly prevailing certain US and British circles. If assumption is correct China must eventually turn to West instead Soviets for economic aid, our only strength is withholding trade until concessions are made.

US-UK businessmen should realize necessity waiting policy and short-term sacrifices for long-range gain. At least on points recognition and trade should be clear that agreed US-British policy requiring Communists come to US first is only course to follow.

Sent Department 1478; repeated Nanking 64, Canton 30, London 141, Delhi 16, Canberra 10.

KOHLER

893.01/6-849 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Australia (Foster) to the Secretary of State*

CANBERRA, June 8, 1949—3 p. m.

[Received June 8—6:06 a. m.]

114. Would appreciate reply Embtel 111, June 1, especially since External Affairs might interpret my silence as indication US reconsidering policy nonrecognition Communist regime China.

FOSTER

<sup>78</sup> Not printed.

893.01/6-949: Telegram

*The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State*

NANKING, June 9, 1949—8 p. m.

[Received June 10—10:21 a. m.]

1251. Australian Ambassador here cannot believe his Govt is advocating hasty recognition Commie regime China (reDepintel June 2, 7 a. m.<sup>79</sup>). He assures me that his Govt's policy is in line with Western Powers in leaving initiative to Commie regime and in following common procedure thereafter. Officer added, however, that he would continue to emphasize desirability of such policy in his reports to Canberra.

Sent Dept 1251, repeated Canton 518, Shanghai 672, Moscow 38, Canberra 2.

STUART

893.00B/6-1049

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Wallace W. Stuart of the Division of Chinese Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] June 10, 1949.

Participants: Mr. Owen Davis, First Secretary, Australian Embassy  
Mr. Philip D. Sprouse, Chief, Division of Chinese Affairs

Mr. Wallace Stuart, Division of Chinese Affairs

Mr. Davis stated that he had called to outline informally the views of the Australian Government with respect to relations with the Chinese Communists.

The Australian Government appreciates that the Chinese Communists have as yet established no central government for China and believe that this will not occur until fall or possibly the end of the year. Nevertheless, in the opinion of the Australian Government, the Chinese Communists will establish a new government controlling substantially all of the country. This is a fact which must be faced.

The usual satellite pattern does not fit the Chinese Communists. The Australian Government is not convinced of their dependent relationship with Moscow. There are many factors in this situation which could make for Titoism.<sup>80</sup> The Australian Government believes that to close the door either with respect to recognition or to economic cooperation would drive the Chinese Communists into closer relation-

<sup>79</sup> Not printed.<sup>80</sup> Marshal Josip Broz Tito, Premier and head of the Yugoslav Communist Party and State, broke with Moscow in June 1948.

ship with Moscow whereas they would probably be responsive to evidence on the part of the Western powers of willingness to cooperate. The Australian Government accordingly favors initiative on the part of the Western powers in bringing about such cooperation rather than a policy of letting the Chinese Communists stew in their own juice.

Mr. Sprouse stated that our view of the relationship between the Chinese Communists and Moscow differs somewhat from the Australian view. The Chinese Communists have clearly shown through all their public statements and propaganda, particularly with respect to the Cominform-Tito dispute, that they follow the Kremlin line. If the Chinese Communists evidence independence from Kremlin control, this development would probably arise from factors inherent in relations between China and the USSR rather than from actions by the Western Powers, for example, respecting recognition. The US has not embarked upon economic warfare vis-à-vis the Chinese Communists, and trade channels have not been closed. We believe that recognition may provide a lever for obtaining acceptance by any new government that may be established of China's international responsibilities. We realize that mere acceptance of its international responsibilities does not guarantee fulfillment, but if acceptance is not obtained prior to recognition we fear that it would probably be impossible to obtain even this subsequently. The value of this lever depends to a considerable degree upon common approach to the matter by countries having similar interests. We consider the question of common approach very important in order to guard against Chinese Communists' following the traditional Chinese pattern of playing one country against another to the ultimate disadvantage of all.

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893.00B/6-1049

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard E. Usher of the  
Division of South Asian Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] June 10, 1949.

Participants: U So Nyun, Ambassador of Burma  
Mr. Philip D. Sprouse, Chief, Division of Chinese  
Affairs  
R. E. Usher, SOA

In response to a telegram from the Ambassador at Rangoon reporting the desire of the Burmese Government to be consulted on common front policies regarding the Chinese Communists, U So Nyun was invited to come into the Department to discuss the matter.

The Ambassador called on Mr. Sprouse at 3:30 p. m. on Friday, June 10. U So Nyun, after a few introductory comments, expressed

the view that the Chinese Communists would probably "out-Tito Tito". Mr. Sprouse said that there were no signs of "Titoism" in the Chinese Communists at the present time. He discussed in this connection the unhappy condition of a number of Chinese radicals who, while strongly socialistic, were not Stalinists but who had chosen to align themselves with the Chinese Communist party in preference to the Kuomintang. As the Communist party increases its hold on China, these marginal Communists are being disregarded in the making of Communist party policies. Mr. Sprouse did agree, however, that there are potential points of friction between the Chinese Communists and USSR which might become serious if the Chinese Communists succeed in establishing a Communist Government of China. In this connection he mentioned the fact that the Russians are exerting a good deal of control over Manchuria and outer Mongolia, and went on to say that the current Russian policy is imperialistic and that this would antagonize any Chinese Government in so far as it affected Chinese territory. Mr. Sprouse said that the U.S. is often accused of being imperialistic; but we have never had any territorial designs on China and, in fact, have never even had a concession there.

U So Nyun said that he did not think the Chinese population in Burma would sympathize with the Chinese Communists, because they were mostly businessmen and independent craftsmen. Mr. Sprouse said that, while this would appear to be the logical conclusion, the Chinese Communists are actively trying to win the favor of overseas Chinese and are having some success in doing so in many areas. The remittances from overseas Chinese back to China are very important in maintaining China's balance-of-trade position and they are useful in other ways, and consequently the Chinese Communists will go a long way to accommodate the overseas Chinese communities.

U So Nyun then went on to say that while the Government of Burma is a Socialist Government, it is certainly not communistic and that foreign observers often overlook the fact, that the United Kingdom is more socialistic in its policies than the GOB.

U So Nyun then stated that he very much desired that Burma should be included in any consultation of interested governments on the formulation of common policies for dealing with Communists in China. He said that the threat of Chinese Communism was a problem of grave concern to Burma and that since they had so much at stake, being neighbors of China, he felt it was only right that the GOB should be included in any such consultations.

Mr. Sprouse then explained the common front policy in regard to the Chinese Communists. The policy consists of two points: (1) the interested powers will not make overtures to the Communists on the

subject of recognition, but will leave the question of making the first approach up to the Communists; (2) the interested powers will consult among themselves before taking any action toward extending any form of recognition to any Chinese Communist Government which may be established.

U So Nyun said that Burma wants to do whatever the United States does with respect to recognizing or not recognizing the Chinese Communists; that Burma was certainly glad to adhere to the common front policy.

Mr. Sprouse said that we appreciate very much this expression of the view of the GOB favoring adherence to the policy.

The Ambassador seemed, however, to be disappointed that the common front policy was not broader in its scope. He produced some newspaper clippings from his pocket and read certain passages stating that consultations were taking place among interested governments on policy matters of mutual interest vis-à-vis the Chinese Communists. He said these were the consultations in which Burma would like to be included. Mr. Sprouse said that those newspaper reports were merely greatly exaggerated accounts of the common front policy consultations which he had just described to the Ambassador. He stressed the fact that these consultations had taken place almost entirely in Nanking and that he understood that the Burmese Ambassador there had taken a leading part in some phases of these consultations. Mr. Sprouse went on to explain that talks such as we were now having with the Ambassador constituted the extent of the consultations which had taken place in Washington. He went on to explain that we had talked here as often as once a week with the French and British, but that the talks with these countries were limited in content to a few mutual problems which were peculiar to these countries.

U So Nyun appeared to be satisfied with this explanation, saying he is well aware of the tendency of news reports to exaggerate matters of this kind. He said that, as a matter of fact, the Siamese Ambassador<sup>81</sup> had told him that Siam's consultations had been limited to one appointment which the Siamese Ambassador had requested. So Nyun observed that, of course, anyone is free to come in and have consultations at any time on any subject.

The Ambassador then referred to his newspaper clippings again and read further passages from which he adduced the views that the consultations mentioned were centered upon some more deeply significant question than that of recognition. He said that Burma would

<sup>81</sup> Prince Wan Waithayakon.

be vitally interested in any talks among the nations about common defense measures against possible Chinese Communist aggression.

Mr. Sprouse stated emphatically that there had been no talks whatever on that subject.

The Ambassador thanked Mr. Sprouse and stated that he would inform his Government of this conversation.

**NOTE:**

On Thursday, June 16, U So Nyun called me by telephone and stated very emphatically that he would like to remind Mr. Sprouse and me of his interest in being included in any consultations which might take place in Washington regarding common policies toward the Chinese Communists. He said that he felt that Burma was entitled to be included in any such consultations because it should be entirely clear where the GOB stands on the question of Communism. I said to the Ambassador on this occasion that I could add nothing to the assurances which Mr. Sprouse had already given him regarding the nature of the consultations which were taking place and that Burma is being included in these consultations. The Ambassador indicated that he was satisfied on that issue, but he wanted me to be sure to inform him of any additional consultations which might take place. I made no direct reply to this statement.

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893.01/6-1049 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Stuart)*

WASHINGTON, June 10, 1949—5 p. m.

685. Depcirtel May 6, 3 a. m. [5 p. m.] sent to London, Paris, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, Ottawa, Lisbon, Canberra and Depcirtel June 10, 3 a. m.<sup>82</sup> sent to Ankara, Athens, Bangkok, Bern, Cairo, Kabul, Manila, New Delhi, Rangoon, Rio de Janeiro, Stockholm, Tehran were for purpose apprising respective Fon Govts of informal discussions which have already taken place re question possible recognition Chi Commie Govt and inviting their comments to achieve maximum agreement and to avoid impression discussions limited to particular clique with others treated as outsiders. Dept has no complete list countries with dipl representatives China. Pls inform Dept omission any countries which you believe shld be included.

Rptd London for info and to pass substance in Emb discretion to FonOff.

WEBB

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<sup>82</sup> Latter not printed.

893.01/6-1149 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Burma (Huddle) to the Secretary of State*

RANGOON, June 11, 1949—1 p. m.

[Received 11:32 p. m.]

230. Foreign Office note June 9 informs Embassy [that] Union Government is in complete agreement with common front policy based on two principles set forth by Embassy (Deptel 123, June 4, second paragraph) and would be most grateful if Embassy would communicate these views to Department of State.

Foreign Office states further it has lost direct contact with Burmese Ambassador, Nanking. He has recently been instructed through British Embassy to return Rangoon for consultation and presumably will leave Nanking near future. Foreign Office, however, is anxious he should continue participate consultations Nanking while he is there and requests that he be informed through American Embassy, Nanking, that Union Government has signified acceptance common front policy.

GOB also feels that proposed exchange views between Department and Burmese Ambassador, Washington, would be highly beneficial.

If Department receives from Nanking news of Burmese Ambassador's plans and welfare, I should be glad to communicate it to Foreign Minister.

HUDDLE

893.01/6-849 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Australia (Foster)*

WASHINGTON, June 14, 1949—6 p. m.

82. Following in response ur 111 Jun 1 and 114 Jun 8 for conveying in ur discretion Burton and McIntyre.

Discussions and exchanges views re question possible recognition Chi Commie regime continuing informal basis. Views other countries so far recd indicate gen agreement desirability avoiding eagerness or haste in matter recognition and desirability countries having similar interests act along common lines. This reflects fact that Chi Commies have not as yet established govt purporting be central govt for Chi and gen view that if such govt is established, recognition may be valuable lever for obtaining new govt's acceptance China's internatl responsibilities. It is realized that mere acceptance internatl responsibilities does not guarantee fulfilment but if acceptance not obtained



prior recognition even this would probably be impossible obtain subsequently. Value of lever depends to considerable degree common approach to matter by countries having similar interests.

In our view extent Chi Commie coop[eration] with West will be determined by their need for such coop and not by promptness in extending recognition to them. We believe that on contrary over-eagerness extend recognition likely encourage Chi Commies high-handed disregard for interests which recognition would seek protect.

In discussing this matter you may wish to have in mind statement of Austral Amb at Nanking reported Nanking's 118 [1118] to Dept May 26, rptd Canberra 1.

For our further info, representative Austral Emb Washington orally outlined to Dept views his Govt substantially as reported ur 111 and was informed Dept's views along lines given above.

WEBB

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893.01/6-1449 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Philippines (Lockett) to the Secretary of State*

MANILA, June 14, 1949—7 p. m.  
[Received June 15—12:31 a. m.]

1515. Chargé today conveyed President Quirino information supplied Depcirtel June 10<sup>83</sup> regarding adopting common front on question recognition Chinese Communist regime.

Quirino emphasized his approval of such common front and stated he did not want any representative of his government to take any action which might be interpreted imply recognition. He informed Chargé that even prior Communist occupation Nanking he instructed Legation there cooperate fully with other chiefs mission regarding any action to be taken vis-à-vis Communist authorities and abide by jointly reached decisions.

President added he had prior fall Shanghai instructed his Consular Office there not participate as member proposed committee to be chosen from members Consular Corps to treat with Communist authorities after occupation that city.

Sent Department, Repeated Nanking 41, Canton 14.

LOCKETT

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<sup>83</sup> Not printed.

893.01/6-1649

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

[Extract]

MEETING AT QUAI D'ORSAY,<sup>84</sup> JUNE 16, 1949—3:00 P. M.

Participants: Mr. Acheson  
 Mr. Bohlen<sup>85</sup>  
 Mr. Schuman  
 Mr. Parodi

*China*

Mr. Schuman said he thought it was essential that our two Governments keep in contact in regard to our attitude toward the future Government of China and particularly on the question of recognition. He said they had had no contacts with the Chinese Communists but that in their opinion it would be possible if handled correctly to obtain guarantees from the Chinese Communist Government to respect the frontiers of Indochina when the question of recognition arose.

I told Mr. Schuman that I felt strongly that all the Western powers should keep in contact and should maintain a common front in regard to the developments in China and particularly any question of recognition. I told him that we had received a number of informal feelers from Chinese Communist officials but had not responded.<sup>86</sup>

393.01/6-1749: Telegram

*The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State*

NEW DELHI, June 17, 1949—1 p. m.

[Received June 18—8:45 a. m.]

682. 1. Menon, Foreign Secretary, read to me on June 16 excerpts telegram from Panikkar, Indian Ambassador to China, in which Panikkar reported US Ambassador to China had informed him that GOI<sup>87</sup> had promised USA not to recognize Chinese Communist Government without prior consultation with US. Telegram expressed

<sup>84</sup> French Foreign Office.<sup>85</sup> Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor of the Department.<sup>86</sup> See vol. VIII, "Political and military situation in China", chapter V.<sup>87</sup> Government of India.

surprise that GOI should have given such undertaking. Panikkar pointed out if India's approach towards new Communist China should be based on undertakings this kind, Chinese Communists might obtain impression that India was allying itself with Western Powers against them. Menon said that so far as he knew, GOI had given no such promise and asked if I had any idea on what American Ambassador's statements to Panikkar could be based.

I said that I was unaware such commitment and thought it possible that Panikkar might have misunderstood substance Ambassador's statement to him. I outlined to Menon substance mytel 600, May 26, as I recalled it, and Menon said statements made in mytel seemed correct to him. We agreed they did not represent any undertaking on part of GOI. He said that GOI did not intend push ahead in recognizing Chinese Communist regime but wished retain free hand.

2. Later in day in discussing another matter with Bajpai, I referred to conversation with Menon and allowed him read copy mytel 600 which he agreed was fair summary our conversation May 25. He said Panikkar in another section his telegram indicated that American Ambassador seemed to feel that there was some understanding which would permit US to work out principles which were to be observed by other powers including India in approaching problem recognition Chinese Communists. I outlined to Bajpai substance Depcirtel June 10, 3 a.m.<sup>88</sup> He made no comment other than say it seemed to him that best procedure would be for various governments represented Nanking to refrain from making public statements and from initiating discussions with Chinese Communists re recognition and to await approaches to them by Communist regime. Decisions with regard to question of recognition might be based in part on time and manner such approaches. I agreed but said it seemed rather important that there should be some kind of understanding among powers concerned not to permit themselves to be played off against one [an]other by Chinese Communists. There were probably still number diplomats in influential positions so naive as to believe that their governments might obtain some special benefit by rushing ahead of others in granting recognition. Bajpai indicated although he did not say so directly that responsible officials of India were not so naive.

3. I shall discuss problem of Chinese recognition later with Bajpai or perhaps with PriMin<sup>89</sup> himself when a favorable opportunity arises. Unwise in my opinion press India just now give any kind definite undertaking.

HENDERSON

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<sup>88</sup> Not printed.

<sup>89</sup> Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.

893.00B/6-1749 : Airgram

*The Chargé in Pakistan (Doolittle) to the Secretary of State*

KARACHI, June 17, 1949.

[Received June 25—4:30 p. m.]

A-282. ReDepintels February 4 and May 18<sup>90</sup> recognition Commie regime China. In recent informal talk with Acting Fon Secy, I suggested GOP<sup>91</sup> discount press reports US would rush recognize Commie regime since regime must first demonstrate stability and willingness assume international obligations also initiative re recognition must come from Commies. Acting Fon Secy now informs Emb GOP has carefully considered matter, is in agreement US policy not be rushed into precipitate recognition, states Pak[istan] will not recognize Commie regime without prior consultation US Govt. GOP asks in return US not recognize Commie regime without prior notice Pak which will enable GOP take simultaneous action.

DOOLITTLE

893.01/6-2049 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Stuart)*

WASHINGTON, June 20, 1949—7 p. m.

717. ReDepintel May 24, 1 a. m.,<sup>92</sup> Fr[ench] attitude toward recognition Chi Commies. Emb Paris reports Baeyens has reaffirmed principle common front re recognition Chi Commies and question acceptance existing Fr Chi treaties mentioned reftel used merely as illustration. Paris states Baeyens did not imply Fr wld take unilateral action if Commies accepted Fr-Chi treaties while refusing accept treaties betw Chi and other powers.

WEBB

893.01/6-2149 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State*

NEW DELHI, June 21, 1949—11 a. m.

[Received 12:13 p. m.]

700. During conversation Bajpai yesterday I asked if he could not further clarify GOI attitude China. I was not requesting commitments but would like have statement intentions. He replied "GOI

<sup>90</sup> Neither printed.<sup>91</sup> Government of Pakistan.<sup>92</sup> Not printed.

does not intend act unilaterally re extension recognition Communist Government China or re other aspects its relations that government. It intends keep in touch other governments and see what they decide to do". Following brief discussion Panikkar, Indian Ambassador to China, Bajpai assured me all important decisions re China made in Delhi.

HENDERSON

893.01/6-2649 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State*

NANKING, June 26, 1949—9 p. m.

[Received June 26—2 p. m.]

1379. Substance Deptel 711, June 17,<sup>93</sup> communicated to Burmese Ambassador here. Confidential message from him to Foreign Minister, Rangoon, despatched directly American Embassy there.

STUART

893.01/6-2849 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State*

NANKING, June 28, 1949—2 p. m.

[Received June 28—9:02 a. m.]

1393. Indian Ambassador must have misinterpreted my comments to him on his Government's position regarding Chinese Communists based on Delhi's telegram 600, May 26. I am so well aware of Indian representatives' sensitiveness regarding their country's new found position independence that I would hardly have consciously given impression that Indian Government was following US or any other government's lead in China policy. However I will not reopen subject with Panikkar lest further misunderstanding result.

I am grateful for Henderson's discussions in Delhi and his reports of GOI attitude toward Communist China which are useful background information for me in general discussions with my colleagues Nanking.

Repeated New Delhi 5.

STUART

<sup>93</sup> Not printed; it requested inclusion of the Burmese Ambassador in consultations on common-front policy (893.01/6-1749).

893.01/6-2849 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State*

NANKING, June 28, 1949—2 p. m.

[Received June 28—8:54 a. m.]

1395. While Embassy finds Deptel 717, June 20 (repeated Shanghai 1243, Telcan 356, Paris 2193) reporting conversation with Baeyens somewhat reassuring, attitude local French Mission one of determination recognize Communist regime earliest protect French interests Indochina. French Ambassador says he has no instructions from Paris leave China for consultation or for any other purpose. He envisages his role as one of remaining China to negotiate *de jure* recognition with Communist regime and completing all arrangements for new French Embassy to new Chinese Government before arrival his successor. French Counselor has opined his Embassy will be in Peiping (presumed new capital) by Christmas. When suggested negotiations, [on] recognition, once Communist Central Govt formed, would be long drawn out, he replied, "Perhaps for you (meaning USA) but not for us as we have no treaties with China which we care about. We are only interested in Indochina."

Similar attitude is reflected by younger secretaries. We cannot escape impression that local French Embassy, perhaps reflecting Quai d'Orsay, sees its China policy only in terms French colonial possessions Southeast Asia and quite isolated from any world policy or general international obligations French to their western allies.

Repeated Shanghai 772, Canton 589, Paris 7.

STUART

893.01/6-2949 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, June 29, 1949—5 p. m.

[Received 8:01 p. m.]

2517. Depcirtel June 10, 3 a. m.,<sup>94</sup> and previous, re united front re recognition Chinese Communist Government.

1. Foreign Office has been kept fully informed and is grateful for information.

2. Asked whether any truth in press reports, some emanating from US, to effect that strong pressure being brought by British interests

<sup>94</sup> Not printed.

China for early recognition Chinese Communist Government, Foreign Office states very little truth. Pressure from British interests China at minimum; British interests appear at present content leave matters in hands British Government and to accept consequences.

DOUGLAS

893.01/7-249 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State*

NANKING, July 2, 1949—6 p. m.

[Received July 2—8:54 a. m.]

1427. British-owned Shanghai English-language paper June 23 features AP Canberra June 21 despatch re Evatt speech to Australian House of Representatives under headline "Evatt would recognize New Regime here." Embassy wishes point out this type of statement example of sort of thing we were trying to avoid by our common-front policy which specifically emphasizes in point 1 disadvantages of initiating any moves toward recognition or giving impressions through statements officials that any approach by Communists seeking recognition would be welcomed (Depteirtel May 6, 5 p. m.).

Sent Canberra 3, repeated Department, Shanghai 792 Emboff Canton 603, Canberra.

STUART

893.01/6-2849

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (O'Shaughnessy)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 7, 1949.

Participants: M. Daridan, French Embassy <sup>95</sup>Mr. MacArthur, WE <sup>96</sup>

Mr. O'Shaughnessy, WE

Mr. Daridan called today at our request. He was informed that word had reached us from Nanking that the French Embassy there had expressed its determination to recognize the Communist regime at the earliest date in order to protect French interests in Indochina (see Nanking's 1395 of June 28). We stressed the need for following a common course of action in China and expressed our concern over the effects of premature recognition of the Chinese Communist Government on the situation in Indochina. Mr. Daridan replied that the

<sup>95</sup> Jean Daridan, Minister Counselor of the French Embassy.

<sup>96</sup> Douglas MacArthur 2d, Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs.



views set forth by the French Embassy in Nanking do not necessarily reflect the views of the Foreign Office and that it was perhaps difficult for the French in China to view the problem with sufficient objectivity in view of their proximity to Indochina. He added as an extenuating circumstance that French Ambassador Meyrier was an "able administrator" rather than a top-flight political officer and that furthermore he was surrounded by a green staff. He said that he would communicate with Baeyens personally and bring our concern to his attention.

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893.01/7-1249 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, July 12, 1949—6 p. m.  
[Received July 12—1:14 p. m.]

1733. Re reports French Mission Nanking determined "recognize Chinese Communist regime early to protect French interest Indochina" (Department's infotel June 29<sup>97</sup>). French Ambassador here has shown us French Foreign Office confidential policy paper on subject which indicates French official attitude is to delay recognition. In conversation on same topic French Counselor, after asserting his Government's attitude paralleled ours, inquired re significance report he had seen to effect Ambassador Stuart had recently made off-the-record talk in Shanghai favoring recognition.

Sent Department, repeated Nanking 77, Canton 42, Shanghai 17.

KIRK

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893.01/7-1549 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Australia (Foster) to the Secretary of State*

CANBERRA, July 15, 1949—4 p. m.  
[Received July 15—5:25 a. m.]

151. Saw Evatt and Burton today about several matters and took opportunity express hope that Australians still adhered policy non-recognition Communist regime China. Evatt said that while there was still no intention here of proposing "government to government" recognition he believed powers must develop practical working relations with regime especially through commerce and trade. He deplored what he called the economic cordon being erected by the US around North China and said he felt such measures offered no permanent solution.

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<sup>97</sup> Not printed.

Please telegraph whether as outlined Deptel 82, June 14 our position remains the same today.

Sent Department, repeated Nanking.

FOSTER

893.00B/7-2049 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Douglas)*

WASHINGTON, July 20, 1949—7 p. m.

2516. As you already know we are engaged in very thorough study and reexamination of our policy in the Far East with particular reference to what should now be done throughout the area to check the spread of Communism. In our current thinking study of problem of what if anything can be done on Chinese mainland must not be allowed to obscure various measures which can be taken throughout area. I wish you would see Bevin if possible before he leaves on vacation and tell him that I have asked you to continue for me series of frank private conversations which he and I had in Washington and Paris. You can remind him that on two occasions he spoke metaphorically of taking a "trip around the world" in order to see whether our two countries could not have a common policy. I now want to have through you a frank exchange of views with him regarding the Far East in a "matey sort of way" as he expressed it in Paris when we discussed Hong Kong, before either Govt has finally crystallized its position. Accordingly, following points can be mentioned to him as problems rather than as indicating positions already taken by this Govt. You may wish to remind him that UK has strongly urged need of firm position in case Commies attack Hong Kong and asked our support. Does this view not imply need firm common position all along line?

Among most immediate problems are attitudes to be taken toward the Chinese Communists. This problem includes question of continued recognition of National Govt through its various vicissitudes contemplating even possibility of its being a govt in exile. As a corollary there is question of non-recognition of Communist govt especially as it may spread its control and, possibly with Soviet backing, assert that it is the govt of China. This question may arise in regard to seating Chinese representatives in UN, Far Eastern Commission, and other international bodies. Next there is question of trade with Communists. On this point we already know that British are reluctant to take steps which might injure their commercial interests. We are somewhat

disturbed by reports of British business interests approaching Commie officials and suggesting cooperation. I think this subject needs to be reviewed in light of the far greater and graver issues of possible Communist domination not only of China but remainder Asia as well. Bevin stressed this broad approach in a memo on South East Asia which he handed me in April.<sup>98</sup> There is also question of protection or withdrawal of nationals from Commie areas of China.

We are further considering and I would value Bevin's views on the desirability of broadening the consideration of all these problems by exploratory consultations with other interested govts including not only the UK, Canada and France but also Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, and the Asiatic countries, such as India, Burma, Philippines, Siam, etc. The Chiang-Quirino discussions present us with obvious risk of misunderstandings in moving forward along these lines but we do not now think the possibility of consultation should be written off because of the implications of a possible Chinese-Korean-Philippine Pact. You will have noted the negative position which I took on a Pacific Pact in my press statement of May 18.<sup>99</sup> Preliminary consultations could perhaps begin with problems we shall all face in terms of recognition of Chinese Govt and dealing with Chinese Commies. As you know, we have already initiated consultations on this latter point. We would also in any such consultations avoid trying to take leadership in sponsoring any grouping of countries interested in Pacific. We think first steps along such lines should be taken by Asiatic states, preferably under Nehru's leadership. At this stage we would want to establish principle of consultation in advance rather than agreement on specific proposals. We would like to know how far the UK would support us in any such conversations. For your own info only we may begin certain talks with Canadians immediately. If Bevin raises other points including those he has raised previously such as Japan, please say we wish to explore with him all aspects Far Eastern situation.

Bevin should also be told we plan to publish the so-called China White Paper<sup>1</sup> about end of month. This will be entirely frank revelation of situation particularly since 1945 and will include texts of many documents. It will frankly reveal deficiencies of Chinese National Govt. It carefully avoids materials involving policies or actions of UK or other govts except US, China and Soviet Union.

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<sup>98</sup> Dated April 2; not printed.

<sup>99</sup> See Department of State *Bulletin*, May 29, 1949, p. 696.

<sup>1</sup> Department of State, *United States Relations With China* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949); for correspondence on the publication of the White Paper, see pp. 1365 ff.

You will of course have in mind any points of view which may have developed in Kennan's<sup>2</sup> conversations.

ACHESON

890.00/7-2249 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, July 22, 1949—11 a. m.

[Received July 22—9:30 a. m.]

2881. I called on Bevin yesterday evening and passed on to him substance Deptel 2516, July 20, 7 p. m.; Bevin noncommittal. He referred to conference on Middle East problems now under way in London and confessed preoccupation therewith. He said he hoped to initiate steps to make the Near and Middle East secure before becoming involved too deeply in the Far East. He had in mind a thorough review of the Chinese scene during his visit to Washington in September and hoped it would be possible to have Ambassadors Stuart and Stevenson present at the time. He suggested establishment of joint US-UK board which would perform much the same function for entire area from Turkey to southeast Asia as Middle East study had performed for 1947.

I agreed to forward suggestion to Department but pointed out China problems were matter of urgency and required early consideration. Bevin concurred and said he would try to give Denning benefit his views before his departure tomorrow.

With regard to Deptel 2517, July 20, 7 p. m.,<sup>3</sup> I told Bevin our very first-blush reaction was that he felt that at this juncture we could hardly go along with any such program for relief of Shanghai. This, however, was tentative.

DOUGLAS

890.00/7-2349 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, July 23, 1949—7 p. m.

[Received July 23—6:05 p. m.]

2910. Bevin has informed me that he is very willing that British and US officials should consult together on the problems dealt with in Deptel 2516, July 20 and Embtel 2881, July 22. He suggests that

<sup>2</sup> George F. Kennan, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, who was visiting in London.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

these talks be carried on while he is away and that when he comes back he will look into the question further with me. Will keep you advised. Is this what you wish?

DOUGLAS

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890.00/7-2349 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Douglas)*

WASHINGTON, July 25, 1949—8 p. m.

2602. Plan indicated your 2910 satisfactory. It establishes idea of continuing consultation and exchange of views which is what we desire.

ACHESON

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890.00/7-2649 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary  
of State*

LONDON, July 26, 1949—6 p. m.

[Received 9:46 p. m.]

2951. In conversation with Embassy official today Dening characterized as entirely off the cuff Bevin's suggestion re Stuart and Stevenson (Embtel 2881, July 22). He said suggestion not especially favored by Foreign Office as presence of Ambassadors in Washington would give too obvious an emphasis to Bevin's visit, and in all probability would not be acted upon—at least so far as UK was concerned. Dening indicated he himself would probably accompany Bevin to Washington.<sup>4</sup>

Dening stated British Government quite sympathetic with Secretary's general approach to Far East question, that interdepartment committee would meet tomorrow to discuss means of implementation, and would likely set up working committee to deal with question.

DOUGLAS

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893.00B/7-2949 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State*

NANKING, July 29, 1949—noon.

[Received 1:43 p. m.]

1641. We believe that Department should give careful consideration to issuance of statement saying in effect that, if Chinese Com-

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<sup>4</sup> In telegram No. 2683, July 30, 1 p. m., the Department replied that it was in accord with the attitude of the British Foreign Office.

munists persist in their disregard of international law and international obligations, US will in future not consider itself bound to extend, on territory subject to its jurisdiction or control, any right granted by international law or international obligations to Chinese Communist authorities or Chinese owing them allegiance. Whereas at moment American interests in China are undoubtedly greater than Chinese Communist interests in US, balance is almost certain to swing in our favor.

It occurs to us, moreover, that such declaration might pave way if we so chose to deny to Chinese Communists any rights granted China in Japan and Western Germany pursuant to agreements re those countries. This is particularly pertinent in view of recent aggressive interest shown by CCP in participating in Jap peace settlement. (See Embtel 1564, July 20.<sup>5</sup>)

STUART

890.00/7-2949 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, July 29, 1949— 5 p. m.

[Received July 29—4:06 p. m.]

2999. 1. In reply to query re outcome interdepartment committee meeting on Far East problems (Embtel 2951, July 26), Denning, Foreign Office, stated little of concrete nature had eventuated but that memo on subject would probably be forwarded British Embassy, Washington, next week. This may indicate Foreign Office desires center discussions Washington.

Present atmosphere London unfavorable discussion Chinese problems as Bevin, Cripps<sup>6</sup> and other Cabinet Ministers will be taking leave in August during which period, according to Denning, it will be practically impossible get decision on important matters.

2. British generally feel China primarily American problem and will expect US to take lead in negotiations. Little difficulty anticipated in getting British cooperation in questions raised by Secretary (Deptel 2516, July 20) with possible exception of trade with Communists. As Department is aware, British very reluctant restrict established British commercial interests in China and are obsessed with necessity of exporting wherever possible. British probably will not, except in limited degree, acquiesce in curtailing export to China of any but 1A list items and petroleum products.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

<sup>6</sup> Sir Stafford Cripps, British Chancellor of the Exchequer.

3. Reference suggestion Nehru might assume leadership Asiatic bloc, Bevin told Ambassador in confidence last week Nehru increasingly concerned spread of Communist influence India and consequently could be counted upon to pay progressively less attention to foreign affairs and to devote himself increasingly to interior problems.

DOUGLAS

893.01/8-1049: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, August 10, 1949—5 p. m.

[Received 5:19 p. m.]

3150. Following believed reasonably accurate summary Foreign Office views on Far East problems mentioned Deptel 2516, July 20. Source information primarily Dening who states British Embassy, Washington, informed substance Embassy-Foreign Office conversations.

1. Question withdrawal recognition present Chinese Government and recognition Communist government will be decided on basis participation UN. Likely question will arise before end of next meeting of UNGA,<sup>7</sup> as by then Communists will have formed all-Chinese Government and will likely have attempted force issue by sending delegation Lake Success or by other means. At such time UK and US as well as other friendly delegations will be in position consult behind the scenes and arrive at common position depending on circumstances at time.

2. UK and US have already issued withdrawal warnings to nationals, but UK warning more restrained. Further divergence noticeable in US plans to close Tihwa and probably Chungking and Kunming<sup>8</sup> (Deptintel August 5, 1 a.m.<sup>9</sup>). British do not now contemplate any such action. They believe conditions at worst will not become more stringent than in East Europe satellite areas.

3. Department already aware reluctance UK go along with US views in adapting R procedure to China (Embtel 2956, July 26<sup>10</sup>).

4. British feel SEA nations should be brought to realize there will be no Marshall Plan for Asia on European pattern and no substantial military aid program. British fed up with tendency of certain newer nations in SEA, notably Pakistan, to attempt blackmail with "unless you give us substantial military, economic and political assistance,

<sup>7</sup> United Nations General Assembly.

<sup>8</sup> For correspondence on consular posts in China, see vol. VIII, "Decision to close Consulates in Nationalist-held China . . .".

<sup>9</sup> Not printed.

<sup>10</sup> *Post*, p. 866.



we shall have no choice but to go Communist" approach. Every means should be employed to demonstrate to eastern nations implication of coming to terms with communism and to convince them of interdependence of east and west and necessity for close cooperation.

5. British economic survey of SEA area nearing completion and should be in Bevin's hands before his departure for US late this month. Survey stresses necessity for increasing food production which should have priority over all other economic aid. Methods for increasing occidental-oriental trade being studied and special attention being given to specific commodities which would figure in such trade. But inescapably there must be some reasonable solution dollar-sterling problem.

DOUGLAS

893.00/8-1749

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State*

No. 1357

LONDON, August 17, 1949.

[Received August 22.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith, with reference to the Embassy's telegram No. 3240 of August 16, 7 p. m.,<sup>11</sup> copies of the following documents:

Letter from Ambassador Douglas to Foreign Secretary Bevin dated July 22, 1949.<sup>12</sup>

Letter from Foreign Secretary Bevin to Ambassador Douglas dated July 22, 1949.<sup>13</sup>

Memorandum from the Foreign Office dated August 15, 1949, entitled "China."

The memorandum from the Foreign Office was handed to Mr. Ringwalt<sup>14</sup> and me by Mr. M. E. Dening, Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in charge of Far Eastern matters, who stated that the memorandum represented interdepartmental views on the China problem but not necessarily ministerial opinion, as some of the Ministers concerned, including Mr. Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, and Sir Stafford Cripps, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, have been on the Continent for the past several weeks. Mr. Dening stated that it is possible that Mr. Bevin, who has not yet seen the memorandum, might

<sup>11</sup> Not printed.

<sup>12</sup> Not printed; it was based on telegram No. 2516, July 20, 7 p. m., to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 50.

<sup>13</sup> Not printed; its substance was given in telegram No. 2910, July 23, 7 p. m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 52.

<sup>14</sup> Arthur R. Ringwalt, First Secretary of Embassy.

repudiate some of the views contained therein, although he doubted it, as he was well acquainted with Mr. Bevin's views in regard to the Far East.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:  
ERLE R. DICKOVER  
*Counselor of Embassy*

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum Prepared in British Foreign Office*

## CHINA

### *General*

It may be convenient to indicate briefly our assessment of the general situation in China before reviewing the particular problems raised in the United States Ambassador's letter to Mr. Bevin of the 22nd July.

2. There do not seem to be any further grounds for hope that the Communists will fail in their bid for complete power in China. Effective or prolonged resistance cannot be expected from the discredited Nationalist Government, which can no longer hope for large-scale outside assistance, nor, a fortiori, from any splinter factions into which the Nationalist Government may disintegrate. Planning must therefore be on the assumption of Communist domination of the *whole* of China in the near future.

3. There is no doubt that the present leaders of the Chinese Communist Party are orthodox Marxists-Leninists and that their present strongly pro-Soviet policy constitutes a serious threat to Western political and economic interests not only in China but also in South East Asia.

4. As regards South East Asia it would appear of cardinal importance to encourage the establishment of an effective anti-Communist front to prevent Communist encroachment beyond the borders of China. As regards China itself, it is considered that at the present stage any outside attempt to prevent the Communists from attaining complete power in China would not only be bound to fail but would rally the traditionally xenophobe Chinese behind their new rulers, and that to display a general and avowed hostility to the new régime is calculated to drive it further into the arms of Moscow.

5. It is therefore considered that the only hope of encouraging the emergence in China of a less anti-Western tendency is to give the new régime time to realize both the necessity of Western help in overcoming its economic difficulties, and the natural incompatibility of Soviet imperialism with Chinese national interests (e.g. in Manchuria).

Every opening for emphasizing that Moscow's designs are incompatible with a strong and independent China should be seized. In general we wish to avoid as far as possible head-on conflict with the Communists at present, though we have no intention of pursuing a policy of appeasement on major issues.

### *Economic*

6. For the following reasons it is considered that Western commercial and financial interests should endeavour to maintain themselves in China for as long as possible :

(a) If and when the Communists begin to realize the necessity for trade with the West in overcoming their economic difficulties, it is to be presumed that their first advances will be made not to governments but to private concerns, and it is therefore important that there should be Western concerns in China which can be approached. If at a later stage the Communists wish to make an approach to governments it is considered that their proposals should be considered on their merits. His Majesty's Government have, of course, no intention of making official advances to the Communists, but they equally do not wish to show open hostility by dissuading British commercial interests from entering into normal commercial relations with them.

(b) Although there can be no doubt about the fundamental hostility of Chinese Communism to foreign mercantile communities, it nevertheless remains possible that experience may induce a more realistic attitude in the Communist authorities, who are at present themselves to some extent prisoners of their own propaganda. There may be few grounds for optimism as to the future; but we should be unwise to abandon what remains of our position in China until it becomes abundantly clear that it is untenable. It is of course practically certain that long-established and deep-rooted commercial establishments and connections, once abandoned, could never be restored.

(c) In view of its position in Hong Kong and South East Asia the United Kingdom has, of course, every reason for being anxious to avoid mercantile transactions of a kind which might result in increasing the military strength of Communist China. It is not considered, however, that the continuance of normal trade in civilian requirements need result in any perceptible accretion to the war potential of a Communist administration in China, while any hardships resulting from the cessation of trade would fall, in the major industrial towns at any rate, on the population as a whole. These would, of course, be represented by the Chinese Communists as entirely due to the hostility of the "Imperialist" powers.

(d) It is recognized that foreign economic interests in China are likely sooner or later to be faced with the threat of expropriation. Provided that the normal channels of commerce are still open the Communist desire for trade with the West may conceivably be strong enough for some sort of trade and compensation agreement to be secured eventually.

(e) But perhaps more important than the foregoing considerations is the fact that foreign trading communities constitute a major element

in Western influence in China. We consider that it is of the first importance to maintain for as long as possible the maximum Western contact and influence behind the Asiatic Iron Curtain, particularly bearing in mind that it may conceivably prove that one of the tasks most beyond the powers of the Communist régime may be that of regimenting and controlling the deep-rooted trading propensities of the individual Chinese. So long as hope remains of exploiting the Chinese instinct to trade to the detriment of the Communist cause complete abandonment of our position in China would appear to be premature, to say the least.

(f) Finally, in the long term, the potentialities of China under a strong and efficient Government as a source of raw material and food-stuffs and as an export market should not be forgotten. It would be a misfortune should at some future time these potentialities be realized if the western world were then cut off from what might become available. It must still be our hope that opportunities will eventually arise for co-operation by the western world with an effective Chinese Government for the economic development of the country for the benefit of the Far East and the world as a whole. The severance of existing commercial links with China would run entirely counter to such an objective, however remote it may seem for the present.

7. For the above reasons, although our merchants in China may eventually have to cut their losses and leave, it is considered that it is neither in our political nor in our economic interests that they should do this if it can be avoided; and we do not share the view, which we gather to be that of the United States authorities, that foreign merchants who have stayed behind have put themselves in the position of hostages in their search for private gain and are therefore deserving of little sympathy. Moreover it must be remembered that the British firms in China are private traders. The decision whether it is worthwhile for them to continue to try to keep alive their activities must still primarily be theirs. His Majesty's Government would not in existing circumstances feel justified in seeking to prevent those who are willing and able to go on trading and would certainly not wish to be responsible by such prevention for any ensuing losses.

8. This does not, of course, mean that British mercantile communities in China would be advised to continue indefinitely to do business on humiliating and unequal terms. It is intended that British concerns in China should be encouraged to co-operate fully with each other, and with the commercial communities of other friendly Powers, so that as trade opportunities offer they will be in a position to take advantage of Communist needs to secure improvements in the conditions under which they are permitted to operate.

#### *Evacuation*

9. As indicated above, His Majesty's Government are not in favour of a premature abandonment of British interests in China, and they

consider that the longer British merchants and British missionaries (the two main elements of the British communities in China) are able to maintain a footing in China the more hope there is of maintaining British political and economic interests.

10. Broadly speaking the British communities in China are still determined to maintain themselves if they can, though of recent weeks there has been some feeling in favour of evacuation. If British nationals want to leave His Majesty's Government will certainly furnish such assistance as they can to enable them to do so, but it is not proposed, at present at least, to advise them to do so wholesale.

### *Recognition*

11. The Charter of the United Nations<sup>15</sup> (Articles 23 and 27(3)) appears to be so framed that unless there is a Chinese representative the Security Council can take decisions only on procedural matters. It therefore seems essential that *de jure* recognition should not be withdrawn from one Chinese Government until *de jure* recognition can be accorded to its successor. The questions of continuing to recognize the Nationalist Government and of according recognition to the Communists thus appear to be two facets of the same problem.

12. No question of according *de jure* or *de facto* recognition to the Communists can arise until the Communists form a Government claiming to be of national character. However, there are various indications that the Communists hope by their present offensive southwards to acquire so much territory as to be clearly the effective rulers of China. They will then probably set up a Government, to which Soviet recognition will doubtless promptly be accorded. The Communists apparently hope that this stage will be reached by mid-autumn 1949.

13. It is thus likely that the recognition question will become acute in the next few months. There are, however, still too many undetermined factors for detailed consideration of the action to be taken in all possible contingencies to be profitable at this stage. The issues therefore can be usefully discussed only in general terms.

14. At the worst, the relations of the British Commonwealth and North Atlantic Powers with a Communist Chinese Government after recognition may follow the pattern of their relations with Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe. There is however the possibility that the pattern will eventually develop along the lines of our present relationship with Jugoslavia, and it is therefore considered that the Western Powers should be careful not to prejudice future possibilities by developing an openly hostile attitude towards a Communist régime from the outset.

<sup>15</sup> 59 Stat. 1031.

15. The political objections to precipitate recognition of a Communist régime are obvious. On the other hand to withhold recognition from a government in effective control of a large part of China is legally objectionable and leads to grave practical difficulties regarding the protection of Western interests in China. It is most unlikely that the fulfilment of any special conditions can be exacted in return for recognition of the Communist régime, and it is therefore probable that after a certain stage delay in proceeding with recognition might seriously prejudice Western interests in China without any compensating advantages being obtained. The Chinese Communists themselves are unlikely to be seriously inconvenienced by the withholding of recognition. For their part they will probably decline to enter into diplomatic relations with any Power which continues to recognize the Nationalist Government.

16. Since the Nationalist Government is not considered to be any longer capable of maintaining effective resistance, the question of its continued recognition by the Powers should be considered on a basis of practical convenience rather than of sentiment. If there is Nationalist control in Formosa and/or in Western China it may be considered sufficient to regard the authority there as the *de facto* authority in control. The most important factor governing continued recognition of the Nationalist Government will however be the question of United Nations representation.

17. As regards Chinese representation in the United Nations Organization, it seems probable that, according to the Communist timetable as far as it can be estimated, the National Government will continue to represent China during the forthcoming session of the Assembly. But the possibility cannot be excluded that a change of China's representation will become a live and controversial issue even while the Assembly is in session. It is impossible to determine in advance what the attitude of the Commonwealth and North Atlantic Powers should be in such an event, but clearly it will be desirable that there should be close and continuing consultation between them.

[LONDON,] 15 August, 1949.

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S93.01/8-1949 : Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers*<sup>16</sup>

WASHINGTON, August 19, 1949—5 a. m.

As you are aware, Dept as long ago as May approached friendly govts having diplo representation in China offering exchange info re

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<sup>16</sup> Sent to Batavia, Bangkok, Hanoi, Manila, New Delhi, Rangoon, Saigon, and Singapore.



developing situation and particularly pointed out that altho Chi Commie auths had not yet organized themselves into govt or invited recognition, it was Depts view that 1) when they did so friendly powers shd consult before taking individual action; 2) no purpose wld be served or benefit derived from hasty individual acts recognition.

Indications are following fall Canton Chi Commies will hold some form Polit Consultative Conference and perhaps invite recognition mid-Autumn.

Altho there are indications some countries, as Australia for example, may promptly accord recognition, this govt has no such intention. It is in these circumstances Dept wishes your confidential estimate as to effect on opinion in country and/or govt to which you are accredited if a) recognition is withheld by the principal Western Powers, i.e. US, UK, France; b) if recognition forthcoming by principal Western Powers within reasonable length time; c) if Eng or France join with other powers in accordng recognition and US shows firm disposition not to recognize.

It is quite possible that this matter will first manifest itself in UN and therefore possibilities set forth above shd also be appreciated in light of attitudes adopted by powers concerned in discussion in UN.

ACHESON

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893.01/8-2349 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Thailand (Stanton) to the Secretary of State*

BANGKOK, August 23, 1949—1 p. m.

[Received August 24—7:11 a. m.]

739. Following are answers to questions raised Depcirtel August 19, 5 a. m.

1. (a) In minds Thai Government and people US and UK are chief opponents communism and therefore nonrecognition would be expected. Thailand almost certainly would follow US-UK lead. Nonrecognition would be welcomed by present government and majority Thailand since this would solve serious problems which would follow recognition by Thailand of Chinese Communist Government. With 3 million Chinese in Thailand occupying dominant position in economy country and with well-organized Chinese Communist group already actively engaged in attempt soften up Thailand through propaganda, it is easy foretell that arrival Chinese Communist diplomatic, consular representatives this country would force virtually all Chinese in Thailand support Communists and would almost certainly precipitate early Communist coup with Thai nationals being used as facade for Communist-dominated people's democratic government.



Nonrecognition by US and principal Western Powers would give Thailand some chance warding off Communist domination. On other hand, recognition by US and Western Powers, which Thailand would feel she must likewise accord in order avoid isolation, would intensify this country's difficulties and problems to degree where Communists would emerge triumphant and add Thailand to other subjugated countries.

(b) Whether recognition by principal Western Powers immediate or after reasonable length time would not materially alter problem for Thailand.

(c) If US were sole power not accord recognition, Thailand would be faced with serious and difficult decision. In such contingency, believe if we gave them comprehensive military and economic support they would stand with us; if not, they would recognize, fearing isolation.

2. Generally speaking, it is Phibun's<sup>17</sup> policy follow lead US-UK in these matters and adhere decisions UN. He has repeatedly told me this and I believe it represents both his thinking and desire and also desire majority Thailand. However, as previously reported, Thailand fatalistic and inclined take line least resistance unless fully assured foreign support, particularly US. Therefore US decision on question recognition Chinese Communist Government of momentous import to Thailand.

STANTON

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898.01/8-2349: Telegram

*The Consul General at Saigon (Abbott) to the Secretary of State*

SAIGON, August 23, 1949—3 p. m.  
[Received August 23—1:03 p. m.]

265. Difficult to make brief and comprehensive reply to Depcirtel August 19, 5 a. m. because of varied authorities and interests found in IC.<sup>18</sup> Common to both French, Annamites is conviction that any strong centralized Chinese Government would for geographic, historic and economic reasons regard IC as field for expansion and that super-position Communist ideology will greatly strengthen this urge. Thus all but small minority hardened Communists in Viet Minh fear Chinese aggression.

However, both French and natives split into resisters and appeasers which affects attitude toward possible recognition of Chinese Communist Government. Other factors obscuring all shades Vietnam opinion are desire for independence, hatred of French and suspicion

<sup>17</sup> Field Marshal Luang Pibul Songgram, Prime Minister of Thailand.

<sup>18</sup> Indochina.

anti-Communist campaign will be used as excuse deny or delay independence.

While both French and vernacular press have in recent months devoted much space to Chinese situation in general and various foreign rumors re recognition policy of Western Powers, there has been little indication of local opinion on merits recognition.

Thus following opinions on reaction of various elements Indochinese public are largely conjecture:

(a) *Recognition withheld.*

1. In French opinion generally favorable but with minority, chiefly among business interests critical because of desire save investments and trade, and another small group appeasers fearful withholding recognition might incite invasion IC.

2. Vietnam opinion (i.e., supporters Bao Dai government and non-Communists in general) also generally favorable because would interpret non-recognition as determination stop spread Communism and support Bao Dai against Viet Minh.

3. Viet Minh (more exactly Communist and Communist-controlled elements thereof) opinion critical but would hesitate exploit due to general anti-Chinese sentiment.

(b) *Recognition by chief powers.*

Reaction generally reverse of (a) by all elements.

French official circles are particularly fearful activities and influence Chinese Communist consuls and other officials who would flock to IC after recognition. French criticism would be directed against US for forcing unwise policy on reluctant France. Vietnam opinion would fear recognition meant abandonment of effort stop spread Communism particularly by US and initiation French negotiations with Ho Chi Minh.<sup>18a</sup> Viet Minh would rejoice and be strengthened in hope eventual victory. Large Chinese minority would rapidly climb on Communist bandwagon, movement already in progress.

(c) *Recognition withheld by US but granted by other powers including France.*

Such development would greatly confuse public opinion. French officials would defend French action in public but express doubts in private. Certain French, both far right and left, would rejoice at US diplomatic defeat. Others would hope for diplomatic and trade advantages in conjunction British. Vietnam opinion would support US due to suspicion motives French; Viet Minh would be hard-pressed to find line attacking both France and US. Local Chinese in difficult spot.

<sup>18a</sup> Indochinese Communist leader.

(d) *Recognition withheld by US and France but granted by UK and others.*

French opinion generally favorable with sharp criticism of British as interested only in profits and saving Hong Kong. Probable interruption of present extremely close relations British-French civil and military officials this area. Vietnam opinion preponderantly favorable. Viet Minh vociferously unfavorable. Local Chinese community somewhat encouraged.

Circumstances of recognition and method presentation to public might influence public opinion particularly in (b).

ABBOTT

893.01/8-2449 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the Secretary of State*

MANILA, August 24, 1949—4 p. m.

[Received August 24—8:13 a. m.]

2033. Following are principal factors which may be expected influence Philippine public and governmental opinion on question recognizing Chinese Communist regime:

1. Fear of communism has during past year been reinforced by spread of knowledge that Hukbalahaps are Communist-led and has been sharpened by recent Communist successes on Asiatic mainland (Depcirtel August 19, 5 a. m.).

2. Widespread distrust of the large Chinese colony in the Philippines and of activities in which they would engage after their home areas fall to Chinese Communists. Coupled with this is official realization that Communist-controlled Chinese Embassy at Manila might be expected to direct and protect activities Chinese Communists in Philippines.

3. Philippine tendency to follow lead of others, and preferably lead of US, in foreign affairs.

4. Wish of persons in Philippines profiting from trade with China to ensure continuance such trade.

5. Desire given expression by leftist newsmen that Philippines maintain ties with their Asiatic neighbors on mainland.

6. Opposition's pressure on Government to follow an "independent" foreign policy.

We believe that from standpoint Philippine interests, first three considerations are the more compelling. Accordingly, we believe Philippine Government will probably desire withhold recognition for some time and that it will in the main be supported by public opinion in such stand. This would be particularly true if US, UK and France also withheld recognition. If recognition by principal Western Powers including US is forthcoming within reasonable time, Philip-

pine Government and people would probably accept the realities, albeit with some misgivings, and Philippines doubtless would likewise extend recognition. If England and France join with other powers in according recognition while the US shows firm disposition withhold it, Philippine policy of non-recognition would come under strong fire, particularly from critics of the government who might be expected allege that the American dog is wagging the tail of Philippine foreign policy. At same time influence elements desiring engage business as usual would be increasingly felt. US, nevertheless, might be able prevail upon Philippine Government withhold recognition, at least for some time, but efforts due would not necessarily prove successful. This connection Embassy desires point out element of unpredictability posed by fact that President Quirino who is his own Secretary Foreign Affairs is prone make and announce impulsive and ill-considered decisions and to stand by them stubbornly once they have been made public.

I have sounded out Ambassador Romulo<sup>19</sup> on this subject, particularly from standpoint implications for UN. He is apprehensive that question will come up there and is keenly aware difficulties likely ensue should another Communist power get seat on Security Council as well as voice in GA. He stated that he intends brief President Quirino on all aspects of the problem and that he himself will cooperate closely with US in UN.

COWEN

893.00/8-2649 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, August 26, 1949—6 p. m.

[Received 8:19 p. m.]

2155. Policy proposed paragraphs 13-16 Shanghai's 2796, July 16, from Cabot<sup>20</sup> (repeated Moscow as Department's circular airgram July 25<sup>21</sup>) impresses this Embassy Middle East [garble] as sound approach to problem Communist China. Policy of dignified aloofness (and particularly economic detachment) from affairs Communist China would not only have advantages cited in reftel and in Embtel 1620, June 27<sup>22</sup> on same subject but would enable US make more concentrated and effective effort promote political and economic stability in important Asian areas where we still have good chance stem

<sup>19</sup> Philippine representative to the United Nations.

<sup>20</sup> Vol. VIII, "Political and military situation in China", chapter VI.

<sup>21</sup> Not printed.

<sup>22</sup> Vol. VIII, "Political and military situation in China", chapter V.

Communist tide (India, Japan, southeast Asia and Moslem Middle East). Manchurian developments would seem strengthen case for taking calculated risk of letting Chinese Communists "stew in own juice" (Embtels 2025, August 13<sup>23</sup> and 2092, August 19<sup>24</sup>).

It is recognized that it may be difficult for reasons cited paragraph 11 Shanghai's 2796 to persuade British and French follow this general policy but believes maximum effort should be made in present negotiations London bring British along with US on concrete program for joint control exports to China (Department's infotel August 2 [7]<sup>25</sup>) along lines already operating vis-à-vis iron curtain countries.

I believe important [to] separate problem basic US policy re Communist China from recognition question. By viewing latter as primarily technical matter depending on existence of formally established Chinese Communist regime having effective control over country, and publicizing this as our attitude, we would have advantage following well-established historical precedents (current examples of US realistic recognition policy being ARA<sup>26</sup> area practice and established diplomatic relations Balkan satellites), and at same time would avoid expenditures disproportionate energies on what is essentially formalistic and secondary aspect of Chinese Communist problem. I have in mind present difficulties our attempt keep united front on China recognition question and prospective UN representation complications.

Foregoing is of course based on assumption (which appears justified from admittedly incomplete information available here) that Nationalist Government will continue to disintegrate territorially and otherwise at present rapid rate and that Communist regime will quickly fill void.

It may be argued that long-delayed recognition will help sustain morale non-Communist elements and also give US a better bargaining point in eventual negotiations with China Communist regime. I feel that if withholding recognition is only support we can give such elements in foreseeable future, it is better not create false hopes which can only lead to bitter disillusionment. Re second point, even should we be able use recognition as apparently effective negotiating weapon for protection US interests China (which is doubtful in view probability other non-Communist governments will not wait for US), I wonder on what basis can be assumed that understandings so reached will be implemented by Mao regime. Recognition "without illusions" at appropriate time would appear sounder course.

<sup>23</sup> *Post*, p. 961.

<sup>24</sup> Vol. VIII, "Political and military situation in China", chapter VI.

<sup>25</sup> Not printed.

<sup>26</sup> *American Republics Affairs*.

This connection believe it worth while engage in hindsight speculation on advantages which might have accrued US if we had extended recognition Soviet regime within reasonable period after success revolution. On optimistic side if US representatives had been in USSR during formative stages creation new state (before solidification of power under Stalin) they might conceivably by their presence have influenced, to at least some extent, course of events in manner more favorable to US interests than was actually possible under US non-recognition policy. (Because of our long-standing cultural and economic ties with Chinese people, more favorable circumstances for exercise such US influence could arise in Communist China than were ever present in Russia). On pessimistic side, established US-Soviet relations early twenties would certainly have enabled US Government and people obtain clearer understanding of profound dangers for Western democratic world implicit in developing Soviet regime. As to presumed benefits to US of agreements under which US eventually recognized USSR in 1933, the record certainly affords weak argument for those who would use long-delayed recognition as a bargaining device in China.

I appreciate that policy toward Communist China formulated on twin bases "dignified aloofness" and "diplomatic recognition" might present certain practical difficulties and even appear superficially contradictory. I believe, however, that long-range benefits of such policy to US and non-Communist world (as roughly depicted herein) are so strong that it would receive wide public approval and support if accompanied by a frank, carefully worked out and appropriately timed public relations program.

Sent Department 2155, repeated Nanking 93, Shanghai 19.

KIRK

711.41/8-2649 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State*

[Extracts]

LONDON, August 26, 1949—8 p. m.

[Received 8:02 p. m.]

3410. During the final round-up before my departure I discussed following subjects with Bevin:

(2) China. We went over the general position with respect to Communist China and spelled out the differences between the British

attitude and our own. I pointed out that it was our feeling that a new Communist government in China could be more forcibly convinced of its dependence on western economic assistance and normal economic and financial relationships by withholding such assistance and only granting help in consideration for specific concession. Bevin understood this, but stated as British belief that it would be wiser to remain in China, maintaining trade relations and establishments in order thus to influence the Chinese Communists in our favor. He felt that a great mistake had been made at the time of Sun Yat-sen revolution<sup>27</sup> by hanging on to the Manchu dynasty and believed that in the long-run it was better to stay in China and attempt to influence developments. He said that UKG<sup>28</sup> was seriously considering escorting merchant ships up to the limits of territorial waters in spite of Nationalist Government blockade.

DOUGLAS

893.01/8-2949 : Telegram

*The Consul at Batavia (Abbey) to the Secretary of State*

BATAVIA, August 29, 1949—1 p. m.

[Received August 29—9:14 a. m.]

710. Reference Department's circlet August 19, 5 a. m. From sampling, following believed will be local reaction.

a. If recognition withheld by US, UK, France, prestige Western Powers will rise.

b. If recognition withheld for reasonable length time, local reaction will depend upon circumstances intervening but even so would have somewhat deleterious effect.

c. If other Western Powers recognize but US shows firm disposition not to do so, US prestige will rise sharply.

If US recognizes, will be believed locally due to materialistic objectives and will adversely affect any anti-Communist program which might be set up here. Various locals think British will recognize Communists because of Hong Kong, but believe this a mistake.

If Chinese Communists recognized, it will give great spurt to Chinese Communists here. One Chinese editor in Surabaja (Chinese Communist stronghold) commented to member Consulate General staff, "When and if the Western Powers recognize the Communist

<sup>27</sup> Sun Yat-sen, founder of the Kuomintang and leader of the revolution of 1911-1912, was provisional President at Nanking, January 1, 1912.

<sup>28</sup> United Kingdom Government.



government, Chinese locally will support it and adopt the Chinese Government line.”

ABBEY

893.00/9-149 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, September 1, 1949—1 p. m.  
[Received September 1—10:02 a. m.]

3503. Embassy's despatch 1357, August 17, 1949, transmitting documents re China. Re last paragraph despatch under reference, Strang<sup>29</sup> has now informed me that policy contained in memorandum dated August 15 from FonOff<sup>30</sup> has been approved by Ministers concerned and can be considered official British policy.

HOLMES

893.00/9-149 : Telegram

*The Counselor of Embassy in China (Jones) to the Secretary of State*

NANKING, September 1, 1949—6 p. m.  
[Received September 1—7:38 a. m.]

1976. In conversation with Indian Ambassador, latter undertook explain attitude South Asian countries toward Communist revolution in China with particular reference recognition anticipated Communist central government. Panikkar said that quite aside from ideological aspects of communism or acceptability of Chinese Communist standards of democracy, successful revolution of CCP had made profound impression on Asiatic peoples and was changing face of Asia whether we liked it or not. Mao Tse-tung and Chinese Communists, he said, have tremendous prestige among people of Asia not because they are Communists but because of their success in establishing a new order and in defying West. Consequently any responsible government in southern Asia, which already and in every case (with possible exception of Philippines) is on defense in its own country for pro-western ties, must be very careful not to assume open hostile attitude toward new Chinese government born of latest phase of Chinese revolution. It is this attitude which explains tepid response to latest Philippine suggestion for South Asian Union. It is this attitude which will condition South Asian governments' policy of recognition

<sup>29</sup> Sir William Strang, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>30</sup> *Ante*, p. 57.

of Communist China regime. Panikkar pointed out that India and Southeast Asian countries have no vested interests, no prior treaties, which might obstruct path to early recognition. They are free to start from scratch with new Chinese government.

Panikkar agreed that it would be impolitic for any non-Communist government to appear anxious to recognize new regime or to make first step in that direction. He said that he had no intention of traveling to Peiping after formation of government but that he would be available in Nanking for any first approach Communists might wish to make. He added that he was sure his government did not wish to take any steps along road to recognition which would embarrass or compromise British Commonwealth. Nevertheless I received definite impression that, if Panikkar's recommendations govern, India will establish relations with Communist China shortly after Central Government established Peiping.

Sent Department; repeated EmbOff Canton 812, New Delhi 10.

JONES

893.00/9-449 : Telegram

*The Counselor of Embassy in China (Jones) to the Secretary of State*

NANKING, September 4, 1949—1 p. m.

[Received September 5—4:38 a. m.]

2000. We like Moscow's thoughtful comments<sup>81</sup> on dual China policy of "dignified aloofness" and "diplomatic recognition" and do not find them unnecessarily contradictory. On question of basic policy Embtel 1994 of September 3<sup>82</sup> concurs. On question of recognition we agree little to be gained by refusal to recognize new Communist regime on purely political grounds. Policy of reserve on question of recognition which we have consistently recommended has been more one of tactics than policy. We continue to feel that new Communist government should be given ample time to make first approach to US and other established governments to obtain formal recognition. This is more than question of protocol; it is part essential education of Chinese Communists who in their present arrogant, confident mood are themselves naming conditions on which they will extend recognition to old and established governments of world.) Out of modern Chinese history involving foreign concession areas and imposed foreign legations, there has grown false conception that establishment of diplomatic relations with China is entirely for benefit of foreign state. There is also present in CCP thinking "middle king-

<sup>81</sup> See telegram No. 2155, August 26, 6 p. m., p. 66.

<sup>82</sup> Vol. VIII, "Political and military situation in China", chapter VI.

dom" tradition which reinforces their assurance of indispensability to rest of world.)

We feel that our relations and those of our allies with China will be on much sounder basis if Chinese Communists show by their approach that they have finally recognized importance to China of formal relations abroad. Problem is to keep some of our allies from appearing too eager to recognize new government, but with almost normal complement of chiefs of mission in Nanking, bored with inactivity and anxious to regularize their own status, this will be difficult of achievement. Withdrawal of chiefs of mission would, of course, ease this problem but most of them appear to have wide latitude in their government's instructions and are disinclined to move ahead of French and/or British.

In any event US tactics should be to await Communist approach. There is ample opportunity for them to make contact with our Consuls in Peiping, Tientsin, Shanghai or with Embassy officers Nanking. If such approach is made, I assume we would not refuse to talk but would, on contrary, welcome opportunity to report new government's views and obtain authority to continue discussions informally. Whether formal recognition would result could be ascertained only through medium of such discussions at which time US conditions for recognition would be advanced. Certainly at present it is difficult to see any basis for establishment of normal diplomatic relations between US and Communist China. However, that should be left to developing events and not prejudiced in advance by negative policy decision. Sent Department; repeated Moscow 63.

JONES

893.01/9-649 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State*

NEW DELHI, September 6, 1949—midnight.

[Received September 7—11:12 a. m.]

1025. 1. In view wide differences opinion in India re developments China, and varying and frequently conflicting factors responsible for these differences, we are probably guilty of over simplification in endeavoring describe in framework [of] telegram probable effect on Indian public opinion if Western Powers should or should not recognize Communist China (Depcirtel August 19, 5 a. m.).

2. We believe, however, majority present dominating elements in India, including leaders of government and of Congress Party as well as most important government officials, would be more critical of Western Powers if latter should withhold recognition than if recog-

dition was accorded. This majority controls most of press and other media for influencing public opinion. Criticism of US would probably be even wider and more sharp if it should withhold while UK and France recognized.

Although there is some concern among members this majority lest Communist China eventually join with Russia in drive to communize Asia, this concern is dulled or offset by various factors including belief based in part on widely circulated statements emanating largely from US and UK sources to effect communism in China will prove to be incompatible with Stalinism and after first flames have subsided it will become benign constructive influence which will make China at least fairly comfortable Asian neighbor controlled neither by West or Russia. Extreme nationalists and anti-white groups, as well as those trained to believe white colonialism is world's chief evil, are inclined to rejoice at Communist victory in China even though Communist triumph may add to prestige and strengthen Communists in Asia. They would be particularly shrill in criticism if Western Powers should refuse "acknowledge their defeat and face realities of situation" by recognizing Communist China. Other members this majority enthusiastically, although vaguely pacifist, believe recognition of Communist China by Western world would strengthen cause of world peace. They would therefore be certain to criticize withholding of recognition.

3. Among dominating elements of India there is, however, minority including most high military officers and even members Congress Party which regards Communists in China, as elsewhere, irreconcilable enemies of non-Communist world; which looks to US and UK as leaders in world struggle against international Communist movement; and which would probably take attitude that Western Powers by establishing diplomatic relations with Communist group that has taken advantage of war torn and fatigued China to conquer it by force are blurring the clarity their cause, are diluting quality their leadership, and for sake trade advantages or because unwillingness frankly face disagreeable international situation are trying hide even from selves true nature of regime which they are strengthening by recognizing. Members this minority would probably also draw conclusion that by applying one yardstick to Western Europe and another to Asia, Western world was betraying fact that its avowed interest in welfare and future of Asia was not over-deep. This minority has limited means of propagating its views; therefore its voice not likely be loud.

4. Communists and fellow travellers, while limited in number, have considerable influence particularly among half-baked and maladjusted

"intellectuals". They will criticize vociferously any course taken by Western powers. Indian Socialists, most of whom have not yet learned that [*what*] European Socialists now know from bitter experience, will probably be more critical at withholding than at granting of recognition.

5. Even many members majority referred to in paragraph 2 above not likely give much credit or unqualified praise to Western Powers for according recognition. Some will accompany approval with expression hope West, particularly US, has learned it can no longer successfully intervene in Asia; others will suggest Western Powers have sold their so-called principles for trade advantages or for other opportunistic gains; others will merely gloat over "necessity Western Powers at last recognizing their eclipse in Asia."

6. Overwhelming majority people India have as yet little knowledge or interest foreign affairs. Although surface this vast human sea might be ruffled by breezes of propaganda, its depth not likely be affected by such matters as recognition Communist China by Western Powers. Although future India will eventually be decided by these at present politically illiterate masses, they will have no sentiments to voice re subject this telegram.

7. We believe GOI will be prepared recognize Chinese Communist regime as soon as latter has established firm control of China, and has eliminated all effective organized Nationalist resistance provided that regime indicates readiness to enter into relations with India. GOI will probably consult US, and almost certainly UK and other members Commonwealth, before taking formal steps to recognize. Under pressure from UK and other members Commonwealth it might, with reluctance, delay recognition for short period. GOI hopes Communist China will take more friendly attitude toward Asian powers than it has thus far displayed toward West, and it will probably desire respond fairly promptly to gesture on part Chinese regime made on basis special relationship among Asian peoples. Our impression is that Panikkar, Indian Ambassador to China, hopes obtain special position for self in China, and would like for India assume leadership in matter recognition.

Above our present impressions; developments may, of course, sharply change outlook dominating elements of country as, for example, Chinese Communist activities in Tibet and Burma, hostile attitude towards Indian Govt, or systematically discourteous treatment of Indian representatives.

HENDERSON

893.01/9-749 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Singapore (Langdon) to the Secretary of State*

SINGAPORE, September 7, 1949—5 p. m.

[Received September 9—9:43 a. m.]

254. We believe here sentiment large alien Chinese population Malaya, Hong Kong and commercial interests those colonies will figure largely in UK approach to question of recognition (Depcirer August 19), hence expect final decision will coincide those interests and have their support. We thus gauged views, wishes main elements concerned.

Governor here who was pre-war governor Hong Kong told source his Government would make representations London vs. any recognition of Chinese Commie government but in same breath said if local Chinese business interests made strong representations to him over cutting off trade with China as when Dutch cut off trade with Indonesia he would in turn make representations to London, adding, "will trade with Commie China if we can. Britain doesn't want drop Iron Curtain. After all Britain is now increasing its trade with USSR itself."

President Singapore Chamber Commerce (European) told source if British Government decided to withhold recognition for national good, British business in Malaya would go along but "you may be sure British business in Malaya and Hong Kong will wish continue trade with China under Commie Government. If trade with China ceases, trade between Malaya and Hong Kong will also scale down and present state business can hardly stand further adversity."

Alien Chinese businessmen most of whom now have local or worldwide interests have no strong views on recognition. All wish trade with China to continue but seem prepared write it off if recognition prejudices their security and well being. Imports ex-China worth about 50 million dollars comprise only 6 percent total, exports not quite 3 percent. About half alien Chinese in Malaya still have family ties in China and are anxious lest unable continue remittances to relatives but not preparing do anything if channels cut off owing physical or political causes.

Chinese Foreign Office representatives here admit wide apathy their people Malaya toward matter but believe British Government would be subjected heavy pressure by large Fukien community with its many big merchants and leaders which is under influence Tan Kah-kee (spoken of as Overseas Minister in future Commie coalition government) if it withheld recognition.

Question has not come up [apparent omission] suggesting bearing on internal security Malaya, Hong Kong unimportant. As champion

of containing communism in SEA and without any illusions re Chinese Communism, MacDonald<sup>33</sup> unlikely barter recognition cheaply. His Foreign Office deputy said, "I suppose recognition will come in fullness of time and we are thinking of risks of Commie Consuls in our midst." Chinese ConGen thinks early recognition would tend prolong terrorism because some waverers might interpret it as appeasement of Commie guerillas.

I estimate Malaya as whole will favor and urge recognition by UK but will adjust itself to non-recognition if practical grounds therefor. What France may do might not even be noticed and anyway would have little effect owing French low moral position among Asians. Non-recognition might please now liquidated Kmt but will probably not attract wide interest. One Chinese diplomat thinks non-recognition would have minor moral influence since having damned Nationalist China in White Paper we would be also damning what was left of China. Another hopes we may find way of staying behind curtain to give hope to our friends there.

LANGDON

893.01/9-949

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 9, 1949.

Participants: Mr. Dening, British Foreign Office, Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Charge of Far Eastern Matters

Mr. Meade, Counselor, British Embassy

Mr. Ford, First Secretary, British Embassy

Mr. Butterworth, FE; Mr. Merchant, FE; Mr. Freeman, CA; <sup>34</sup> Mr. Magill, CA; <sup>35</sup> Mr. Wright, CP <sup>36</sup>

With regard to the question of whether to accord recognition to any Chinese Communist government which may be established, Mr. Dening stated that there was a certain amount of internal pressure in England for recognition; that such pressure came from both the far-leftists and from certain commercial interests in London; but that the group desiring early recognition did not include Mr. Bevin. He indicated that the official U.K. position remained the same as set forth in the memorandum from the Foreign Office dated August 15, 1949, entitled

<sup>33</sup> Malcolm MacDonald, British Commissioner General in Southeast Asia at Singapore.

<sup>34</sup> Fulton Freeman, Assistant Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs.

<sup>35</sup> Robert N. Magill, of the same Division.

<sup>36</sup> Robert B. Wright, of the Division of Commercial Policy.



"China"<sup>37</sup> which subsequent to its transmission to our Embassy in London had received full ministerial approval. The important point, Mr. Dening emphasized, was that the U.K. and the U.S. should continue close and continuous consultation on the problem. He stated that, from the strictly legal aspect, the difficulties of non-recognition eventually became greater than the difficulties of recognition, but he added that this matter would seem to require a decision on a political rather than a legal basis. Mr. Dening stated that he assumed that the Soviets would recognize a Chinese Communist government as soon as one is established.

Mr. Butterworth mentioned that some months ago the Department had taken the question up with several interested foreign governments, including the U.K., on the following basis: (1) no problem of recognition had yet arisen as no central Chinese Communist government had yet been established; (2) following the establishment of such a government, the interested foreign powers should by no means be hasty in according recognition but should leave the initiative up to the new government; and (3) the interested powers should agree to consult with each other prior to taking any steps toward recognition of such a government and should bear in mind how fallacious would be an approach based on the theory that the first come would be the better served. Mr. Butterworth indicated that, of the various governments approached, only India and Australia appeared to hold divergent views.

Mr. Dening stated that, with regard to India, he felt that Ambassador Panikkar in Nanking was adopting a somewhat unrealistic view toward the question of recognition which might not necessarily be backed up by his Government. He pointed out, however, in view of India's desire to assert itself as the principal Asiatic power, that India might take an independent stand in this matter. As to Australia, Mr. Dening stated that that Government was of the opinion that there was nothing to be gained by delaying recognition of a Chinese Communist government, but that it was nevertheless in general agreement over the desirability of consulting with other powers prior to taking any action.

Mr. Butterworth stated that the Department had recently circulated its missions in Southeast Asia on the question of probable reaction in that area to recognition of a Chinese Communist government by the Western Powers, and that the replies so far received indicated without exception that early recognition by the Western Powers would cause adverse reactions in Southeast Asia. Mr. Dening commented that, whether early or late, recognition would have adverse consequences.

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<sup>37</sup> *Ante*, p. 57.

**Mr. Butterworth** said that in the Department's view early recognition would carry special disadvantages for Southeast Asia.

In reply to Mr. Dening's statement that, when the question of recognition arises, the interested powers should expect assurances with regard to their rights and interests in China, Mr. Butterworth pointed out that the Communists have already indicated publicly that they will consider certain treaties as invalid. Mr. Dening added that the U.K. would certainly not accord recognition to a government which stated in advance that it would not recognize its international commitments.

Mr. Merchant inquired whether the British Government had given full consideration to the likelihood that the Chinese Communists would demand, as a pre-condition to the establishment of relations, the withdrawal of recognition from the National Government. Mr. Dening replied that in his opinion the Communists would not accept *de facto* recognition and that the according of full *de jure* recognition would of necessity require the withdrawal of recognition from the National Government. He added, however, his opinion that when the time came to recognize the Chinese Communists the National Government would have long since ceased to be a major factor in the Chinese scene. Mr. Dening indicated that internal politics and pressures, both in the U.S. and the U.K., might have their effect on the questions of whether and when to recognize a Chinese Communist government, but that he felt there was no disagreement over the present watchful-waiting policy and the desirability of close and continuous consultation.

In adding a footnote to the conversation, Mr. Butterworth stated that he could not imagine any situation arising which would cause the U.S. to make haste in recognizing a Chinese Communist regime as that would be tantamount to acceding to blackmail. Mr. Dening replied that, for his part, he did not know whether internal pressure for recognition within the U.K. would develop to the point where the Government could no longer resist. He mentioned, for example, the situation which might arise in China with regard to British officials and other subjects should recognition be long delayed. Mr. Butterworth stated that in his opinion the U.S. would probably not give in to such blackmail tactics calculated to force us into recognizing the Chinese Communists but would undoubtedly make every effort to reduce our hostages to fortune by continuing to emphasize the evacuation of our nationals from China.

(The conversation then turned to a discussion of economic relations with Communist China.<sup>88</sup>)

<sup>88</sup> See memorandum of September 9, p. 871.

893.01/9-1049 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Burma (Huddle) to the Secretary of State*

RANGOON, September 10, 1949—noon.

[Received September 10—9:22 a. m.]

378. GOB was pleased at inclusion mutual consultations friendly powers re China before individual action taken and desires to continue arrangement as long as practicable. (Deptcirtel August 19, 5 a. m.) On question recognition Communist China government, Foreign Minister is noncommittal. He would like, I believe, to follow American and British lead but realizes difference approach between USA and UK, with joint action therefore unlikely. In absence similarity US-UK approach, Burma would, if possible, be more likely follow British lead and would, I think, be relieved if British accorded early recognition.

This problem crucial for GOB and it could scarcely be expected now to make binding commitment. Burma's action on recognition may be expected to be opportunistic, in all likelihood if CP considered, and issue may be so doubtful when it eventually arises that GOB leaders might, as has been done in past, resort to religious soothsayers for advice and counsel. This last suggestion made in all seriousness.

Public opinion in Burma on recognition question is undecided and will follow government lead. Ba Swe Socialists undoubtedly favor prompt recognition. More conservative circles clamor for policy of friendly Burmese neutrality between countries representing Communist and Western democratic ideologies, demanding policy which will always result best interests of Burma.

While Burma would, if able, probably follow British lead, GOB nevertheless might be forced by sudden impact Chinese Communism in borderland areas to take early independent action in favor Chinese Communist government. Burma could expect little or nothing by way of material aid from UK or India or any other sources in an extremity and could not successfully resist by its own unaided effort an aggressive Chinese Communist movement against it.

If Chinese Communists make no gesture toward Burma as is rather to be expected at least for a considerable period of time, Chinese Communist advance to the Burma border would nevertheless probably result in strengthening pro-Chinese elements and weak Communistic movements this country, which also would imperil government's position in attempting a non-recognition policy. (Foreign Minister told me he expects General Lu Han,<sup>39</sup> who reportedly just returned to Kunming after seeing Chiang Kai-shek, to attempt to make deal with

<sup>39</sup> Governor of Yunnan.

Communists. If this occurs, it might relieve Burma temporarily at least from immediate Chinese Communist menace and permit Burmese delay in squarely meeting recognition issue).

In substance, I expect Burma to follow a British lead in this question to the extent that the GOB finds it practicable to do so, but developments might force GOB take independent action favorable Chinese Communists. Burma would gravely consider American policy non-recognition but would not be decisively influenced by it.

HUDDLE

893.01/9-1349 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State*

SEOUL, September 13, 1949—7 p. m.

[Received September 13—11:59 a. m.]

1144. Re queries posed third substantive paragraph Deptel 755, September 8,<sup>40</sup> following is our estimate.

a. ROK<sup>41</sup> officials and public opinion will wholeheartedly welcome withholding by US and other principal Western Powers of recognition of any Communist regime or regimes which may be established in China.

b. Recognition at any time of Chinese Communist regime by chief Western Powers would be most unfavorably regarded by ROK officials and people, would further confuse Korean public opinion re Western policy toward China and might impair determination of Korean Government and people to fight Communist aggression.

c. Firm disposition on part US not to recognize in face UK or French recognition would receive utmost approbation on part ROK officialdom and public opinion.

Irrespective of UN developments, anti-Communist sentiment in ROK is so strong and pronounced, in light of persistent Communist endeavors absorb South Korea, that there is no prospect of Korean Government's according recognition to any Chinese Communist regime. Chinese Communists regarded here as scarcely different from North Korean Communists, usually part of Moscow apparatus for achieving Communist world-domination. Both Chinese and Korean Communists considered to constitute active threat to security ROK.

President Rhee<sup>42</sup> and his Cabinet, supported in large part by public opinion and press have consistently evinced sympathetic attitude toward Chinese Government in its fight against communism. Rhee's receiving of Chiang and recent dispatch Korean Ambassador to

<sup>40</sup> Not printed.

<sup>41</sup> Republic of Korea.

<sup>42</sup> Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea.

Canton clearly reflect attitude Korean Government. It is considered view this Embassy Korean Government will continue accord recognition present Chinese Government as long as it continues in existence.

MUCCIO

893.01/9-1349

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] September 13, 1949.

Subject: Conversation with Mr. Bevin on the Far East.

Participants: Mr. Bevin  
 Mr. Dening  
 Mr. Acheson  
 Mr. McGhee <sup>43</sup>  
 Mr. Butterworth  
 Ambassador Jessup  
 Ambassador Douglas  
 Mr. Satterthwaite <sup>44</sup>

[Here follows a survey of views on Southeast Asia, India, and Japan and discussion of the idea of a Pacific pact. See memorandum of September 16, volume VII, "The policies of the United States with respect to the East Asian-Pacific area . . .".]

*China.* I said that we had prepared a memorandum on the China situation which I thought expressed our views so clearly, that I would read it.

[Here follow paragraphs read from telegram No. 1994, September 3, 1949, from the Counselor of Embassy in China at Nanking, printed in volume VIII, "Political and military situation in China," chapter VI.]

To reiterate, I said that as far as recognition was concerned, there should be no hasty aid and that nobody should gain any favors from the China Communists by ready recognition or similar moves. We would insist that the Communists recognize international obligations in full as a prerequisite to recognition. We thought the United Nations might pick up the principles of the Nine Power Treaty <sup>45</sup> without mentioning it by name, but to reiterate the open door policy and the non-fragmentation of China. We did not think there was any need for recognition until the Communist Government actually does control China and there are many here who point out that they do not as yet. We strongly hope the Atlantic Pact countries will con-

<sup>43</sup> George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

<sup>44</sup> Joseph C. Satterthwaite, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

<sup>45</sup> Signed at Washington, February 6, 1922; *Foreign Relations*, 1922, vol. I, p. 276.

sult fully and carefully and concert policies on recognition of the Chinese Communist Government. We are mindful that Formosa complicates recognition. We don't feel there is any point in engaging in economic warfare but we think China should pay its way (which it has not been doing for 10 years) and that we should not extend any extra facilities to a Chinese Communist regime. We hope that controls on 1A items will be set up right away and stand-by controls on 1B items be arranged so that they can be enforced immediately. I said we were depressed on chances of doing anything about Formosa. The United Nations Commission doesn't seem practical.

Returning to China, Bevin said the British were not in a hurry to recognize but that they have big commercial interests in and trade with China and were not in the same position as we were relatively or absolutely. Bevin said the Foreign Office had told the British Community to stick and could not now tell them to leave. Also the British had to keep an eye on Hong Kong. He said that reports indicated that the fact that the British are hanging on is creating a good morale position in China for them. Bevin reported strongly that the British did not want to get out, that they have left their consuls, having in certain areas taken over representation on behalf of the United States, and intend to stay. He said that by staying he did not think it would complicate the recognition problem any further. Denning said that the only difficulty involved in staying is that the Communists can take the initiative and say to the British either recognize us or get out. Bevin said that if the Communists acted that tough the British would refuse to recognize, but he thought the Communists would be more subtle. If they avoided overt action, the British would stay on without immediately recognizing the government but continue relations with the Chinese Government as best they can anyway. Mr. Butterworth observed that the Communists have stated they intend unilaterally to abrogate the various treaties regardless of the provisions for termination and we regard this as intolerable. It was possible that denunciation of the treaties might include denunciation of those respecting Hong Kong. Mr. Bevin said he could not imagine Russia advising China to abrogate treaties. Russia had always been careful about that but if such proved to be the case, it would be intolerable. He did not think that the Communists will attack Hong Kong directly. I said they might attack Macao, which was the same kind of problem. Mr. Bevin made no effort to field this ball. Mr. Bevin said the British can defend Hong Kong from external attack, economic boycott or internal trouble. I said that who controls China is very important to us as the State Department has to prove that the Communists do control it in the face of many allegations that they do not. What does China say?



Have the Communists consulted their own people? Do the Chinese think that the Communist party controls them? Mr. Bevin said he was afraid that by being too obdurate we will drive the Chinese into Russian hands, but that by playing a careful role we can weaken Russia's grip. I said that we were between two courses, one of which was to conduct against a Communist regime hostile operations between China and the USSR, the other was to play for a split between China and the USSR. If we agree that the split is the wisest course, then how do we do it. We should be careful, but we doubt if recognition is a strong card in keeping China out of Russian hands and they will be there anyway. Also recognition would have a discouraging effect throughout Southeast Asia. Denning said that on trade if others follow, the British would impose 1A but they were not ready to extend it to 1B items or to approach other governments on 1B. The Board of Trade is reluctant to set up controls but might go along with a gentlemen's agreement, 1A items would be all right. Bevin said he thought they should do one thing at a time; that imposition of controls on 1A items had left a nasty taste in Europe. Mr. Butterworth said that the point is are we going to have China's trade under control or not. There are quasi-military items on 1B. Mr. Bevin said he would go ahead on 1A items and talk about 1B when he gets back.<sup>46</sup>

Bevin then took up Hong Kong. He said the question was whether the British should refuse to negotiate under any circumstances, or whether they should negotiate under certain conditions. Hong Kong may come up in the United Nations and at one time it had been suggested that it might become an international port. If this solution were acceptable, why would it not be equally acceptable to give Hong Kong to Communist China? Certain leases expire on the new territories in 1997. While the British might discuss the problem with a friendly China at sometime in the future, they could not do so at present. On the other hand, they would not want to make an issue or publicize the fact that they would not negotiate now. The door is not bolted for all time. If there is aggression, the British will resist and go to the United Nations. Mr. Bevin then read the following statement of British policy, "The conclusion which we reach is therefore that, while we should be prepared to discuss the future of Hong Kong with a friendly and stable Government of a unified China, the conditions under which such discussions could be undertaken do not exist at present and are unlikely to exist in the foreseeable future. Until conditions change, we intend to remain in Hong Kong, and should so inform other Commonwealth Governments and the United States, while refraining in public from pronouncements which exacer-

<sup>46</sup> For further correspondence regarding trade controls, see pp. 1002 ff.



bate our relations with China." I said that seemed sound and reasonable, and Bevin said that our agreement would be encouraging to his Government.

Bevin then reiterated that there would be close consultation with us on recognition and that they would proceed with caution. Bevin said that one difficulty was that Britain would be following one, and the United States another course. The British may follow slightly different steps with regard to their consuls and the trade position, but our differences should [not?] be with malice aforethought. I said I thought we should make a clear distinction between policy and situation. The British may hold on longer because of their situation and we less longer because of ours, but division of policy is in error. The Communists would be delighted if they could drive a wedge. We did not want that. Bevin again said that the difference was in tactics and not in objectives and I agreed.

Jessup discussed the probable presentation by the Chinese Government to the U.N. General Assembly of a resolution (1) denouncing the Soviet Government for violation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945;<sup>47</sup> (2) calling upon the members of the U.N. not to recognize the Communist regime in China; and (3) calling upon them to render support to the Nationalist Government. Jessup stated that we had indicated to the Chinese that the decision rested with them as to whether or not their case should be presented to the G.A. but that they would encounter grave disadvantages in the presentation of a resolution involving the two latter points specified above. We had, however, indicated an inclination to support in principle a resolution based on the first proposition only, but made it clear that the character and degree of our support would depend on whether or not the Chinese case were based on strong evidence. So far this evidence has not been presented to us.

If the Chinese case should be presented to the G.A., Jessup suggested that we might wish to deal with it by introducing a resolution which would reaffirm the doctrine of the "Open Door" and the maintenance of the integrity of China as set forth in the 1922 Treaties. It might also be possible, if the Chinese themselves were prepared so to request, to set up a U.N. commission to supervise developments in Formosa until the status of that territory should be finally settled. We would recognize of course that, however the case were handled, the Russians would use it as an excuse for "mud slinging". We would continue to keep in touch with the British on this matter and endeavor jointly to keep the Chinese from going too far and from handling the case in a manner which would embarrass all concerned. Bevin said the Chinese had told Strang about what they had told us

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<sup>47</sup> Signed at Moscow, August 14, 1945; United Nations Treaty Series, vol. x, p. 300.

and that Strang had expressed the same views to the Chinese as we had.<sup>48</sup> Bevin asked Dening to take up the problem with Cadogan.<sup>49</sup>

Bevin then discussed briefly the subject of propaganda. He said we should spread it far and wide that the Soviet should return the things she took from Manchuria. Mr. Butterworth said we had been trying to do this, that, for example, there had been a recent editorial in the most important paper in Shanghai which had sought to justify Russian actions in Manchuria, past and current.<sup>50</sup> It was a very ineffectual rationalization and this the Voice of America was now exploiting to the full. Bevin and Ambassador Jessup agreed that pamphlets, especially those labeled "top secret", were effective in spreading propaganda. Bevin then wound up the discussion on the Far East by reiterating that he would be careful about recognizing; would continue consultation; would put 1A list right; study the B list; that Hong Kong was adequately covered, and that he would keep Ambassador Douglas currently informed.

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893.01/9-1549 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Australia (Jarman) to the Secretary of State*

CANBERRA, September 15, 1949—3 p. m.

[Received September 15—6:09 a. m.]

198. Today's press dominated by stories Acheson-Bevin talks on Far East and London rumor British withdrawing Ambassador to China and considering recognition Communist regime there, also speculation that US will follow suit.

In view Deptel 82, June 14, which we communicated to External Affairs, please telegraph whether any changes are contemplated US policy non-recognition Communists in China.

JARMAN

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893.01/9-1549

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Reed) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 15, 1949.

There are attached two telegrams (No. 254, September 7 and No. 263, September 13<sup>51</sup>) which indicate that the large Chinese population

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<sup>48</sup> For further correspondence on Chinese appeal to the United Nations, see volume I.

<sup>49</sup> Sir Alexander M. G. Cadogan, British Representative at the United Nations.

<sup>50</sup> See telegram No. 3748, September 9, 5 p. m., from the Consul at Shanghai, vol. VIII, "Political and military situation in China", chapter VI.

<sup>51</sup> Latter not printed.

in Malaya and commercial interests will figure largely in the UK approach to the question of recognition of the Chinese Communist Government. It seems that British officials and Chinese in Malaya believe that trade with Communist China will depend upon *de jure* recognition of a Chinese Communist Government.

It seems to me that this is not necessarily so as there have been many occasions in the past when trade relations have been carried on while no formal diplomatic relations existed. In fact our own historic relations with Russia provide an excellent example of such a situation.

From the point of view of Southeast Asian countries it would in fact be preferable for some time to come to carry on trade relations with China without formal diplomatic relations. This would be especially true of Thailand and Malaya where the large Chinese elements provide a ready base of operations for Chinese Communist activities.

You doubtless recall how reluctantly Thailand established diplomatic relations with China in 1942 for the first time in modern history. Up to that time trade had been as brisk as either side could desire. Thailand would doubtless welcome now an extended interim of no diplomatic relations with China. However, if both the US and UK recognize a Chinese Communist Government, Thailand, which generally follows our lead, may feel constrained to do likewise even though endangering its national security. The longer we can delay an act of recognition, the longer we can probably defer a sharp issue over communism in Thailand and Malaya.

This thought is being put before you not because it is original but in the hope that you might keep it in mind when considering the pros and cons of recognizing a Chinese Communist Government.

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893.01/9-1649 : Telegram

*The Consul at Hanoi (Gibson) to the Secretary of State*

HANOI, September 16, 1949—3 p. m.

[Received 5:21 p. m.]

102. Deptel 42, September 7,<sup>52</sup> Depcirtel August 19, 5 a. m., received while I absent leave Hong Kong. Anderson<sup>53</sup> accordingly referred telegram Abbott<sup>54</sup> who informed him he would answer for both posts.<sup>55</sup> Although I have not seen Abbott's reply, we discussed question in past and am sure our impressions agree.

<sup>52</sup> Not printed.

<sup>53</sup> France Anderson, Jr., Vice Consul at Hanoi.

<sup>54</sup> George M. Abbott, Consul General at Saigon.

<sup>55</sup> See telegram No. 265, August 23, 3 p. m., from the Consul General at Saigon, p. 63.

Re specifically Hanoi Vietnamese political circles so concerned own problems with French their immediate interests Chinese affairs surprisingly lacking. Their reaction Department's White Paper for instance was almost complete disinterest. They follow local developments southern Chinese provinces especially Yunnan insofar as fragmentary news allows with more interest than elsewhere for they have inherent fear local war lords and bandits and do not believe Chinese Communists will be any more successful dominating bordering provinces than their predecessors. They consider Chinese threat as military rather than political and as emanating for the moment from these groups rather than from any organized Communist army.

I think consensus opinion among Vietnamese [in] Hanoi, who have any, is pending military developments and other factors recognition by Western Powers will be withheld immediate future but if Communists succeed overcoming all military opposition and establishing effective reasonably stable government these same powers will in reasonable time grant such recognition jointly if only assure continuance classic Sino-Western trade.

I do not think local opinion considers any policy recognition will be anything but joint one. Surely US and UK expected act jointly especially in view present high level Washington talks while French not considered to be in position either pioneer or fail follow in any policy adopted by their allies.

Tonkinese sentiments re Western recognition extremely difficult define. They obviously would favor indefinite non-recognition if such step might prove impediment to what they regard age-old Chinese covetousness of Vietnam. Yet threat China invasion also provided excuse presence increased number French troops and cure to them almost worse than illness. Thus they are torn by conflicting emotions complexity of which such, they cannot reconcile them into clear policy their own minds. Consequently while looking to desired end result without considering means they are apt do less address themselves and seek refuge in attitude defeatism. If Vietnamese thus affected has any hope left it is directed to Anglo-Saxon's [garbled group] looks both to oblige French grant him full independence and same time somehow forestall domination Vietnam by China as they did with Japanese.

In sum any US step re recognition will probably not actively influence opinion here one way or another providing it is not taken too hastily and is taken jointly with UK and French. Any independent action would doubtless lead to further confusion and misunderstandings.

French opinion here is simply question will be decided in present Washington talks, that no policy will be set or action taken without French and in any case it will have little effect their immediate and considerable problems Vietnam.

Considering all this it is strange no one locally at least has appeared to consider possibility Western recognition Chinese Communists might alter military picture and threat Indochina border.

GIBSON

893.01/9-1749

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] September 17, 1949.

Participants: Mr. Bevin  
 Mr. Barclay <sup>56</sup>  
 Mr. Dening  
 Mr. Schuman  
 Ambassador Bonnet <sup>57</sup>  
 Mr. Clappier <sup>58</sup>  
 Mr. Acheson  
 Mr. MacArthur  
 Mr. Merchant  
 Mr. Butterworth  
 Mr. Satterthwaite  
 Mr. O'Sullivan <sup>59</sup>

Bevin opened the conversation by saying that he had discussed policy on China with me. The main difficulty was to reconcile our policies. The British are trying to keep a foot in the door and see what happens. They intend to keep their consuls in China and as much of their business as possible. On matter of recognition of the Communist regime, the British will proceed with the greatest caution. If the British are victims of overt action, they will take their case to the Security Council and the "Big Five". To sum up, Bevin said while the United States is withdrawing, the British are holding on as long as they can.

Bevin then said that he had had a message since his previous talk with me that two American ships, *Flying Independence* and *Flying*

<sup>56</sup> Roderick E. Barclay, former Acting First Secretary of the British Embassy, Head of the Personnel Department of the British Foreign Office.

<sup>57</sup> Henri Bonnet, French Ambassador.

<sup>58</sup> Bernard Clappier, Directeur du Cabinet of the French Foreign Office.

<sup>59</sup> James L. O'Sullivan, former Vice Consul at Hanoi, on detail in the Department.

*Clipper*, were attempting to run the blockade.<sup>60</sup> Does this change the situation? Butterworth said one of these ships had requested naval support to go to Shanghai but we had advised it that it can expect no assistance from our Navy. We are trying to get the *General Gordon* into Shanghai on September 23, primarily to take out Americans who want to leave, but this will not be a regular freight and passenger trip. Bevin inquired whether the ships were going to run the blockade. Butterworth said the ships were depending on "free enterprise" and hoping to get through. I said that we had not forbidden them to make the attempt. Butterworth remarked that while we have advised the Nationalist Government of China that the form of their announcement of the blockade was not traditional and correct, we have not advised our ships to ignore it. I said we are not eager to force a test of the legality of the blockade. Schuman said the French took the same position—that the announcement of the blockade was not in proper form and they do not recognize it. Bevin inquired whether the French were sending in a relief ship and Schuman said this was not probable. There are some French students and missionaries in China. Bevin asked whether they were going to be left there and Bonnet said they were free to do as they liked. Bevin then asked how would he get the French Ambassador out, and Schuman replied on a ship, he has a reservation. I said I understood the *General Gordon* will bring out about 1,200 passengers.<sup>61</sup> Butterworth said of these more than 375 would probably be Americans. Bevin said he did not like the idea of the British Ambassador returning to London and it was suggested to him that he go as far as Hong Kong but no further. Were he to go completely out, the implication would be that the British were getting out of China. Butterworth interposed that we will leave our Consuls in China except where we can't supply them. There are probably about 800 Americans who will not leave China, who regard it as their home and settled residence.

Bevin said the Chinese Ambassador in Washington had told him the day before that Chiang Kai-shek was doing better and he was still anxious for United States support. The Chinese Ambassador said the Communists were behind their timetable, but Bevin said he thought they were ahead of the predictions made by the British Intelligence. Butterworth said that a representative of Marshal Li<sup>62</sup> said he had received so little money from Chiang that the Nationalist Government on the mainland was in serious financial straits. Bevin

<sup>60</sup> For correspondence regarding the blockade of Communist-controlled areas by the Chinese National Government, see pp. 1098 ff.

<sup>61</sup> For correspondence on the *General Gordon* evacuation, see pp. 1261 ff.

<sup>62</sup> Acting President Li Tsung-jen.

said that Chiang can't decide whether to save his reserve or his country. Bevin said he could not make up his mind whether or not China was gone. He repeated that we should consult constantly to see how things were going. The British do not intend to "skedaddle" out of there.

Butterworth said the Communists may invite recognition of their government on October 10. Bevin said in that case we will have to make up our minds. I said that we should move slowly and in any case we should not go to them, that we could not win by going to the Communist Government, that would be doing just what they wanted us to do. I said we should consult and where possible coordinate our action. The Communists must recognize their foreign obligations and actually control the country before they are entitled to recognition. I repeated what I had told Bevin previously, that it was a matter of greatest importance to us that we do not recognize the Communist Government unless it is perfectly clear that they do control all of China. We do not want to recognize them and thus acknowledge that they have won the war. We want events to dictate this. I again emphasized that constant consultation is required. Schuman said the French had an additional reason for not recognizing the Communist Government prematurely, the fact that the Nationalist territories are close to Indo-China. I said we were studying the possibilities of preventing the Communists from controlling that part of China.

Bevin said that the Portuguese Foreign Minister had come to see him about Macao. Bevin said that he could not help him. Butterworth remarked that he understood the Government of Macao does not want additional Portuguese troops there, that there may not be any trouble, and the troops are a liability. Portugal is confident that by some undisclosed method it can hold on to Macao. Bevin believed that the Portuguese feel lonely in Macao and cannot defend it. In view of the British treaty with the Portuguese, he wondered whether Britain should do something if Macao is attacked. Bevin said that in Hong Kong if anyone starts shooting, the British will shoot back and then go to the UN. The situation in Macao, however, is different. I said the Portuguese Foreign Minister had told me that the troops in Macao are very few and he did not feel there would be an attack. He had asked me about our military liaison officers in Hong Kong, and whether we were going to fight with the British in Hong Kong. In reply I had said that he was slightly confused about our military liaison officers in Hong Kong, that these are military attachés, with diplomatic status, who have had to move there from China, and that



they are getting new titles. I said that we had not been asked to help the British in Hong Kong; that we would do what we are obliged to do under the UN charter.

Bevin said he had talked with the Dutch on Indonesia. The situation there was not too bad. The Dutch were also interested in the Nationalist movement in Indo-China and Burma and thought there was some danger that the Communists might make a raid on the whole area. He said that the British were doing what they could to support the local governments; that Malaya did not want full independence yet.

[Here follows section on Indochina.]

Schuman inquired what would happen in the Security Council if the Nationalist Government of China disappears. I said we believe absence of a permanent member from the Security Council does not prevent action. It was agreed that this legal question should be discussed between the United States, Britain and France on a technical level.

Bevin said he thought Nationalist resistance in China might go on for another year, and asked what Schuman thought. Schuman said he hoped so, to which Bevin replied that he was not speaking from hope, but from belief. I said we thought the Nationalists in China could be troublesome for some time.

[Here follows section on the proposed peace treaty with Japan.]

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893.01/9-1549 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Australia  
(Jarman)*

WASHINGTON, September 21, 1949—7 p. m.

138. Reurtel 198 Sept 15. No change US policy re recog Chi Commies. During recent conversations Wash Bevin and his advisers indicated opposition hasty recog; described Brit policy one of watchful waiting with close continuous consultation among friendly powers; and added UK would certainly not accord recog Govt which stated in advance that it wld not recognize its internatl commitments. However, Brit emphasized magnitude their investments in and trade with China. Dept believes Brit Govt in general less disposed delay recog than US.

Bevin's Far Eastern adviser stated Australian Govt of opinion nothing to be gained by delaying recog but favored consultation among powers before taking any action.

WEBB

893.01/9-2349 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Tientsin (Smyth) to the Secretary of State*

TIENTSIN, September 23, 1949—4 p. m.

[Received September 24—10:43 a. m.]

779. Radio reports during past few days give much publicity to statements British Government intends recognize Communist Government as soon as set up. American business men here anxious learn whether US Government proposes similar action in order determine their course action.

SMYTH

893.01/9-2849

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Freeman)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 28, 1949.

Mr. McNichol<sup>63</sup> called this afternoon to inform me of a telegram which had just been received from Canberra with regard to the possible recognition by Australia of a Chinese Communist regime. The message stated, according to Mr. McNichol, that Dr. Evatt stated in Parliament on September 28 that the press report which had recently appeared in Australia to the effect that the UK was prepared to recognize a Chinese Communist regime shortly after its establishment had not been confirmed. Dr. Evatt also stated that Australia was in close touch with the US and the UK on this subject and that any action which might be taken with regard to recognition would follow a "common pattern". He added that, as all governments continue to recognize the Chinese National Government, the question of recognizing any new regime had not yet arisen.

893.01/9-2349 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Tientsin (Smyth)*

WASHINGTON, September 30, 1949—6 p. m.

337. Reurtel 779 September 23. Secy and Un Secy made following points re question recog:

1. Time for decision when or if recog has not yet arrived as central Chi Comm govt not yet officially established.

<sup>63</sup> David W. McNichol, Second Secretary of the Australian Embassy.

2. Dept will undertake closest consultation with Cong prior taking any action re recog Chi Comm regime.

3. Dept desires keep in close touch, and if feasible concert efforts, with all concerned friendly nations on major Chi questions, including problem recog.

For urinfo only, early recog by US highly unlikely. Likewise Dept's info indicates Brit Govt will not be hasty in according recog.

WEBB

**II. CHOU EN-LAI'S BID OF OCTOBER 1 FOR RECOGNITION; DE FACTO RECOGNITION BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT; REACTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER POWERS (OCTOBER)**

793.00/10-249 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State*

PEIPING, October 2, 1949—1 p. m.

[Received October 2—3:33 a. m.]

1665. Received 9 p. m. yesterday cover addressed me personally without title using only street address from "Foreign Office, Central People's Government of People's Republic of China". Cover delivered by two persons who requested receipt. Given. Text of letter (in official note form) in translation as follows:

"Mr. O. Edmund Clubb.

"Sir: Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, on this date issued a public statement. I am sending this public statement to you, Sir, with the hope that you will transmit it to your country's Government. I consider that it is necessary that there be established normal diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China and all countries of the world. Chou En-lai (signature and seal), Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. Peking, October 1, 1949."

Statement follows in next telegram Peiping number series.<sup>64</sup> Both letter and statement published today's *Hsin Min Pao* but not other papers.

Text letter was printed. Identical communication was received by French, Netherlands, Belgian, Italian Consuls, also late last night. British unavailable but receipt presumed. Today met with French, Netherlands, Belgian, Italian Consuls who are communicating briefly *en clair* (in absence facilities for sending coded messages) with their

<sup>64</sup> See telegram No. 1666, October 1, from the Consul General at Peiping, vol. VIII, "Political and military situation in China", chapter VII.

Governments. All four request text both letter and statement be given by Department to their Embassies Washington for transmittal their Governments. Presume Department would desire communicate also to British Embassy for their info.

CLUBB

893.01/10-249 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 2, 1949.

[Received October 2—6:57 a. m.]

2476. Soviet press coverage formation Chinese Central People's Government totals 9 columns. Full page occupied Peking Tass despatch based Hsinhua [radio] transmitting general program People's Political Consultative Council.

Mao Tse-tung's October 1 declaration announcing formation government, decision establish diplomatic relations with "any foreign government prepared observe principles equality, mutual interest, mutual respect territorial integrity, sovereignty", front-paged with following covering letter Chou En-lai to Soviet Consul General Peking, Tikhvinsky:

"Am enclosing copy today's declaration by Chairman, Central People's Government, Chinese People's Republic, Mao Tse-tung, hoping you will transmit it your country. Establishment normal diplomatic relations between Chinese People's Republic, various other states, essential."

Full translations above items being despatched.

Peking Tass, based Hsinhua, transmits September 30 declaration People's PCC announcing establishment People's Republic China.

Same sources give text announcement decision appeal UNGA<sup>65</sup> for recognition, denouncing present Chinese UN delegation as "lacking right represent Chinese people".

KIRK

761.93/10-249 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 2, 1949—midnight.

[Received October 2—8:05 p. m.]

2484. Chinese Chargé at 7 p. m. called at Foreign Office in response request and was read brief statement by Gromyko<sup>66</sup> in following sense:

<sup>65</sup> United Nations General Assembly.

<sup>66</sup> A. A. Gromyko, Soviet Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs.

In view establishment People's Central Government [at] Peking, and in view political, military and economic developments China, Canton regime under Premier Yen Hsi-shan considered local in nature and incapable representing Chinese people in foreign relations. Accordingly, Soviet Government has decided to withdraw its representatives at Canton.

Gromyko handed statement to Chargé. Chargé asked for details status himself and staff, and was told: "We have nothing to add to this statement at this time." Chargé then asked if he could call at Foreign Office tomorrow for further information, and was given to understand he was at liberty to call on Foreign Office officials. Chargé described Gromyko's attitude as formal, but not unfriendly.

Information passed Embassy by Chargé with request secret classification. Chargé believes statement will be made public immediately by Foreign Office.

Sent Department 2484, Department pass Hong Kong 3, Nanking 104, Peiping 9 from Moscow.

KIRK

761.93/10-349 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 3, 1949.

[Received October 3—11:06 a. m.]

2489. *Pravda* Oct 3 on front page prints Gromyko Oct 2 letter to Chou En-lai:

"Government USSR acknowledges receipt declaration Central People's Government China of Oct 1 proposing establishment diplomatic relations between People's Republic China and Soviet Union. Having considered Central People's Government China's proposal, Soviet Government, motivated by unchangeable desire for maintenance friendly relations with Chinese people and convinced Central People's Government China represents will overwhelming majority Chinese people, informs you it has decided establish diplomatic relations between Soviet Union and People's Republic China and to exchange ambassadors."

On back page *Pravda* carries following Tass communiqué headlined "Concerning termination diplomatic relations between Soviet Union and government of Yen Hsi-shan at Canton":

"On Oct. 2 deputy Foreign Minister USSR Gromyko on instructions Soviet Government made following statement to Chargé d'Affaires Canton Government at Moscow:

"As consequence events having taken place in China, which have led profound changes in military, political and social life country, as result of which Chinese People's Republic was formed and Central People's Government China created, Yen Hsi-shan government at Canton has ceased exercise authority in country, turned into Provincial Government of Canton and lost possibility of maintaining

diplomatic relations with foreign governments in name China. This situation has led to result diplomatic ties (*Soyazi*) China with foreign governments have proved themselves to be terminated (*Okazalis procrashchennymi*). Soviet Government, taking into account all these circumstances, considers diplomatic relations with Canton terminated and has decided recall diplomatic representatives from Canton.'["]]

Dept pass USUN 27, Hong Kong 4, telCan unnumbered, Nanking 105, Peiping 10.

KIRK

893.01/10-349

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Freeman)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 3, 1949.

Mr. Winckler<sup>67</sup> called this afternoon at his request with respect to the announcement from Peiping of the establishment of a central Chinese Communist "government". In accordance with Consul General Clubb's suggestion, I handed Mr. Winckler a copy of the text of the Communist announcement which was presented to the Consulate General in Peiping.<sup>68</sup>

Mr. Winckler stated that the French Ambassador was concerned over indications that the British Government was desirous of recognizing the Chinese Communist regime in the near future. Winckler stated that from his conversations with Mr. Dening<sup>69</sup> he had received the impression that the British had a "burning desire" to recognize the Communists and that they would undoubtedly try to persuade the French and the U.S. to do likewise. He stated that the primary concern of the French was that a solid, united front of the western democracies be maintained in this matter and that the French, the British and the U.S. Governments should maintain the closest consultations to this end. He pointed out that the USSR was likely to claim that the western democracies, in withholding recognition from the Chinese Communists, were denying representation in the United Nations to the great majority of the Chinese people, and he indicated that a united front on the question of recognition was all the more essential.

I stated in reply that, in the opinion of the Department, the announcement of the establishment of the Chinese Communist "government" would not add any urgency to the question of recognition which

<sup>67</sup> Jean-Claude Winckler, Second Secretary of the French Embassy.

<sup>68</sup> See telegram No. 1666, October 1, vol. VIII, "Political and military situation in China," chapter VII.

<sup>69</sup> Maberly E. Dening, British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Far East).

had already been discussed between Mr. Bevin,<sup>70</sup> Mr. Schuman<sup>71</sup> and Secretary Acheson. I assured Mr. Winckler, however, that we for our part would be most willing to continue our consultations on this matter with the French and would keep them currently advised of any new developments in our thinking.

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893.01/10-449 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Poland (Gallman) to the Secretary of State*

WARSAW, October 4, 1949—noon.

[Received October 4—11:05 a. m.]

1293. Department repeat China. According to AP representative Godfrey, Foreign Minister Modzelewski in first known official appearance in approximately 6 months has summoned Acting Chinese Chargé Kiang for 2 p. m. this afternoon. Chinese Chargé has been informed by Foreign Office sources Polish Government will break relations at that time and that Modzelewski has appointment at 2:30 with representatives Communist China to recognize "Chinese People's Republic."

Kiang awaiting orders from Canton re Embassy's archives and is reportedly determined not surrender them without instructions.

[GALLMAN]

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893.01/10-449 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State*

PEIPING, October 4, 1949—4 p. m.

[Received October 4—3:31 a. m.]

1674. ReContel 1665, October 2. British Consulate has acknowledged receipt Peiping Foreign Office by letter, addressed simply "General Chou En-lai", without consular title, saying note forwarded. French Consulate plans deliver unaddressed letter signed personally to Aliens Affairs Office and reporting forwarding.

Messenger indicated to me October 1 location Foreign Office would be made known in due course, informed Belgian Consulate and [any?] communication re matter could be transmitted via Aliens Affairs Office.

Refraining from addressing Chou pending receipt instruction from Department. Note that this action seems possibly open door if only slightly to contact with Communist side. Noting pending cases such

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<sup>70</sup> Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>71</sup> Robert Schuman, French Minister for Foreign Affairs.



as Mukden Consulate and Smith-Bender,<sup>72</sup> and possible future requirements, believe it advisable attempt discover what lies behind door. Will enlarge upon this belief in early message but would recommend at this time some step be taken here to inform Chou his note was forwarded, as first step to development contact. Question in that case would be whether by memo left at Aliens Affairs Office or by letter addressed Chou. In first case, I should prefer sign as Consul General, in second, presume communication would properly be addressed him personally might be signed same way. Attempt might also be made at direct contact, though success unlikely.

Please instruct.

CLUBB

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893.01/10-449 : Telegram

*The Minister in Bulgaria (Heath) to the Secretary of State*

SOFIA, October 4, 1949.

[Received October 4—12:57 p. m.]

833. *Otechestven Front* today publishes text of telegram to Chou En-lai, Minister Foreign Affairs Central People's Government Chinese People's Republic, acknowledging receipt of communication of October 1 from latter government and stating Bulgarian Government will establish diplomatic relations with People's Republic China and exchange representatives.

Also publishes article reporting establishment diplomatic relations between USSR and People's Republic China and breaking relations with Canton.

HEATH

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893.01/10-449 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Steere) to the Secretary of State*

THE HAGUE, October 4, 1949—6 p. m.

[Received October 4—4:03 p. m.]

881. We called to attention of Chief Political Section Foreign Office editorial in today's *Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant* on China. Principal points made in article were:

As matters now stand, Communist Government is a reality and Nationalist Government is "not much more than a fiction". There is, therefore, every reason for other countries besides Russia to recognize

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<sup>72</sup> For correspondence regarding these cases, see vol. VIII, "Problems of United States Consulates in areas occupied by the Chinese Communists" and footnote 31, "Political and military situation in China", chapter V.

Communist Government *de facto*. *De jure* recognition would create more difficulties for many governments other than Russia since they are bound to the "old state" by treaties. The democracies are afraid of resigning themselves to real situation China. Furthermore, *de jure* recognition would give Russia an ally in SC.<sup>73</sup> If three big Western democracies wish to avoid SC becoming paralysed, "they might feel obligated to give *de jure* recognition to the Chinese People's Republic sooner than they intended. This might not be a bad thing. It is after all no use running away from reality."

Foreign Office official said that except for sentence re treaties, he was forced to admit that there was a good deal of sense in article. He continued that he did not feel that recognition Communist Government could be postponed for a very long time, but he was careful to add that Holland would thoroughly study opinions of big powers and that Holland would not precipitate any action re recognition.

Official also informed us that extensive Netherlands Embassy property in Peking now in charge of by [a] junior official. Accordingly today telegram being sent to Nanking that, before Netherlands Ambassador leaves, Counselor should make trip to Peking ostensibly for inspection of Embassy. If necessary, added official, Counselor's stay in Peking "could be extended for some time".

Sent Department 881; repeated Moscow 5, London 97.

STEERE

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893.01/10-449

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Freeman)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 4, 1949.

In the course of a conversation today with Mr. Bounous<sup>74</sup> on other subjects relating to China, he brought up the question of possible recognition of the Chinese Communist regime. Mr. Bounous indicated some concern over press reports both in this country and in England which, in his opinion, forecast recognition of the Chinese Communists by the British Government in the not far distant future. He inquired whether formal consultations were in fact taking place between the U.S. Government and other interested powers and indicated that, if such were the case, the Italian Government would very much like to be included.

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<sup>73</sup> Security Council of the United Nations.

<sup>74</sup> Franco Bounous, First Secretary of the Italian Embassy.

I replied to Mr. Bounous along the lines of Mr. McDermott's statement to the press of yesterday,<sup>75</sup> adding that it was not the Department's intention to institute new and formal consultations with other interested powers on this subject. I pointed out that this Government some time ago recommended to all interested friendly governments that a united front be adopted toward the question of recognizing any Chinese Communist regime and that since that time we had continued an informal exchange of views on this matter with most of these governments. I also stated that the Department was not of the opinion the announcement from Peiping of the establishment of a Chinese Communist "government" added any urgency to the discussion of this subject.

In response to my question as to whether, in his opinion, a united front on this matter was feasible, Mr. Bounous replied that his government was concerned primarily over a possible split on this issue between the British and the U.S. He indicated, however, that if the British should decide to recognize the Chinese Communists independently, the Italian Government would in his opinion follow the line of the U.S. and continue to withhold recognition. Mr. Bounous added, however, that the position of the French Government was somewhat different, and he felt that in this event it would be difficult for the French to withstand the pressure for recognition which would be brought upon the government.

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893.01/10-549 : Telegram

*The Chargé in India (Donovan) to the Secretary of State*

NEW DELHI, October 5, 1949—2 p. m.

[Received October 5—11:16 a. m.]

1191. Official of Ministry External Affairs asked Embassy today what action US would take on request Chinese Communist Government for recognition. He expressed desire discuss matter with us if we should receive information US attitude. Embassy officer referred him to statements attributed by this morning's press to Department spokesman which indicated no precipitate action would be taken.

Matter difficult for Ministry External Affairs in view absence Bajpai<sup>76</sup> and next ranking officer plus preoccupation Nehru<sup>77</sup> with last minute problems prior his departure tomorrow morning. Our

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<sup>75</sup> Michael J. McDermott, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State on press relations, had underscored that aspect of the Department's approach to the recognition problem which included consultation with other powers.

<sup>76</sup> Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, Secretary General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.

<sup>77</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

informant C. S. Jha<sup>78</sup> remarked some sort of urgent action was required but indicated Ministry viewpoint had not yet crystallized.

In view slow communications between Indian Embassy [at] Washington and Ministry External Affairs, suggest if Department wishes to advise GOI<sup>79</sup> our thinking this matter Embassy be instructed appropriately.

DONOVAN

893.01/10-549 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Hungary (Cochran) to the Secretary of State*

BUDAPEST, October 5, 1949—4 p. m.

[Received October 6—5:50 a. m.]

1184. According press, granting recognition Government Chinese People's Republic as sole lawful Government China announced in cable from Foreign Minister Kallai to Foreign Minister Chou En-lai. Cable says successes Chinese people in their heroic fight for liberty under Mao Tse-tung had ensured freedom, possibility people's democratic development greatest part China. Population had created pre-conditions for formation Central Government Chinese People's Republic, a government expressing will majority Chinese people, and formation which was historic success in cause of world peace. Hungarian Government, therefore, wishing intensify friendly relations between two peoples, decided recognize new government.

Sent Department. Repeat Canton.

COCHRAN

893.01/10-549 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 5, 1949—5 p. m.

[Received October 5—1:43 p. m.]

3988. In off-record press interview with American correspondents today, Attlee<sup>80</sup> is reported to have said in response to question regarding recognition Chinese Communist Government that (a) British Government would proceed slowly, (b) there were many facets of the problem which needed mature deliberation, including the attitude of

<sup>78</sup> Joint Secretary of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs in charge of American affairs.

<sup>79</sup> Government of India.

<sup>80</sup> Clement R. Attlee, British Prime Minister.

Communists toward China's international obligations, and (c) so far as Nationalist Government is concerned all is not yet lost.

HOLMES

893.01/10-649 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Cuba (Butler) to the Secretary of State*

HABANA, October 6, 1949—3 p. m.

[Received 6:22 p. m.]

338. In reply to my question, Hevia<sup>81</sup> told me yesterday Cuba will follow lead of US in its relations with China. He said no question of Cuba's recognizing Chinese Communist government at present time.

BUTLER

893.01/10-649 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State*

PEIPING, October 6, 1949—3 p. m.

[Received October 6—6:57 a. m.]

1689. ReContel 1674, October 4; Deptel 682, October 4.<sup>82</sup> Belgian Consul acknowledged receipt and forwarding Chou En-lai letter addressing Chou as "Your Excellency" but without further title and omitting his own title. He transmitted message via Aliens Affairs Office. Netherlands Consul acknowledged similarly addressing Chou as General. Both had consulted Ambassadors, were told use own judgment and coordinate with colleagues. Understood British Consul was specifically instructed acknowledge.

Apparently AAO has been authorized act as channel for such communications but still no indications its usefulness to Consuls has been otherwise enhanced.

Reiterate belief reported Conreftel advisable I likewise make some acknowledgement receipt and report transmittal. This is especially case if it is hoped, as indicated Depreftel, establish contacts with Chou for other purposes. I am withholding action regarding Mukden temporarily in hope receipt Department's authorization regarding acknowledgement which would give something in nature springboard.

Reference White's<sup>83</sup> personal observation to press October 4<sup>84</sup> [that] Chou's letter was identic to all Consuls Peiping (except unknown what communication sent Soviets) and couched in entirely

<sup>81</sup> Carlos Hevia, Cuban Minister of State.

<sup>82</sup> For latter, see vol. VIII, "Problems of United States Consulates in areas occupied by the Chinese Communists", chapter I.

<sup>83</sup> P. Lincoln White, Executive Assistant to Michael J. McDermott.

<sup>84</sup> In a lengthy question and answer period Mr. White had read to the press the text of the Chou letter and discussed it with them.

courteous terms with reference in text to address as "Sir" or "Excellency" and use of honorific before word "country" (of addressee). No suggestion of intended discourtesy. Full probability seems be that Communists in use personal address were simply adhering their chosen line of regarding Consulates as non-existent in technical sense pending establishment regular diplomatic relations. Believe it would be desirable correct the impression given by observation in question.

CLUBB

S93.01/10-649

*Document Transmitted by the French Embassy to the Department of State*<sup>85</sup>

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are carefully studying the situation resulting from the formation of the central peoples government.

Friendly and mutually advantageous relations, both commercial and political, have existed between Britain and China for many generations. It is hoped that these will continue in the future. His Majesty's government in the United Kingdom therefore [suggest] that pending completion of their study of the situation, informal relations should be established between His Majesty's Consular offices and the appropriate authorities in the territory under the control of the Central peoples government for the greater convenience of both governments and promotion of trade between the two countries.

S93.01/10-649 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Acting Secretary of State*

NEW YORK, October 6, 1949—7:35 p. m.

[Received 8:08 p. m.]

1237. From the Secretary. At meeting with Bevin and Couve de Murville<sup>86</sup> today, former referred to our discussions of Chinese situation last month, and said he did not believe there was anything more we can do at this time. I pointed out that we had agreed to move slowly and not to take action without consulting each other. I added

<sup>85</sup> Notation by the Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Freeman) : "Handed to Mr. Butterworth by M. Daridan, French Embassy, on October 6, 1949, and purporting to be the text of the British reply to the Chinese Communist announcement establishing a 'Peoples Government' and bidding for recognition by the foreign powers."

<sup>86</sup> Director General of Political Affairs of the French Foreign Office.

that Chinese Communist government had been set up only few days ago and there seemed no reason for haste on our part.

Bevin mentioned that State Department was being kept fully informed in regard to plans of British Ambassador to China.<sup>87</sup> [Acheson.]

AUSTIN

893.01/10-449: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Peiping (Clubb)*

WASHINGTON, October 6, 1949—9 p. m.

692. Ref urtel 1674, Oct 4. Dept of opinion, unless you perceive strong objection, you shld take advantage of Chou letter to incorporate in reply reiteration our anxiety re position Mukden staff. It suggested you reply along fol lines addressing Chou in personal capacity as "Mr. Chou En-Lai" and stating simply his letter forwarded ur Govt and that you are taking advantage of informing him of this fact to bring to his personal attention deep concern of US Govt re inability ConGen Ward and his staff depart Mukden, contrary established principles of internatl civility and in spite of specific assurances from such Comm auth[oritie]s as you have been able to communicate with to effect that necessary facilities were being made available.) In light possibility ultimate publication such reply pls telegraph Dept exact text your communication to Chou after transmission.

As possibilities of developing situation permit continue ur endeavors make contact, direct or indirect, with Chou and other responsible auths in order to exert maximum pressure for early action re Mukden staff and other outstanding protection cases.

WEBB

893.01/10-649: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Cannon) to the Secretary of State*

Belgrade, October 6, 1949.

[Received October 7—12:36 a. m.]

1036. Today's *Borba*<sup>88</sup> announces FPRY<sup>89</sup> recognition yesterday of Central Government of the People's Republic of China.

CANNON

<sup>87</sup> Sir Ralph Stevenson.

<sup>88</sup> Yugoslav Communist newspaper.

<sup>89</sup> Federated People's Republic of Yugoslavia.



893.01/10-749 : Telegram

*The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State*

Tokyo, October 7, 1949.

[Received October 7—6:59 a. m.]

395. Following is gist of information supplied by Ratnam, First Secretary, Indian Mission in Japan, recently returned on *General Gordon* from 5-month stay Nanking, part time as Chargé:

British Ambassador in China, Sir Ralph Stevenson, strongly recommends immediate recognition Chinese Communist regime by British Government for economic reasons and on principle that this is only realistic approach to Chinese problem. Recognition according to Chinese Communist definition must be *de jure* or not at all and must be on a reciprocal basis. Ratnam claims in discussions with British Ambassador he advised against immediate recognition until assured that China not [now?] essential in solution of larger world problem. Ratnam also confident Indian Government will not immediately recognize Chinese Communists unless influenced by UK to follow latter's lead. He furthermore convinced precipitate recognition by UK solely on economic grounds will eventually result "in chasing rainbow" as Marxist indoctrination Chinese Communist administrators ensures eventual direct or indirect (by extortionate taxation) confiscation foreign properties. He believes that when foreigners have been utilized strengthen Communist regime, their usefulness will be at an end and foreigners thrown out. Ratnam personally thinks precipitate recognition would be mistake and that China situation should be carefully watched especially with reference possibilities continued major opposition by Chinese National Government.

From his observations and numerous conversations with Soviet Embassy friends Nanking, Ratnam convinced entire Chinese Communist effort is directed on high-level centralized basis by Soviet Russia although he unable obtain any information disclosing connection between Soviet Embassy personnel and Chinese Communists. He states entire pattern Chinese Communist regime from top to bottom closely follows Soviet Russian pattern and that in no instance could he discover any divergence from usual Soviet organization or policy line. While greatly impressed with self-discipline Chinese Communists and apparent immediate improvement in administration after take-over, Ratnam attributes these factors to utter ruthlessness with which Communist policies carried out among Chinese people.

Comment upon Ratnam: Considered an able and intelligent observer. Excuses his admitted associations with Japanese pro-Com-

munists as necessary in order find out how Communist Party operates and states followed similar associations for same reason in China. In light these proclivities, consider above remarks unusually revealing.

SEBALD

893.01/10-649

*Memorandum by Mr. Troy L. Perkins of the Office of Chinese Affairs to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 7, 1949.

With reference to that part of Peiping's 1689<sup>90</sup> which suggests that we correct the impression given by our press people regarding the Chou En-lai letter, Mr. Freeman and I feel that it would not be advisable for the Department to retrace its steps on this point of interpretation.<sup>91</sup> The balance might be righted by a remark from our spokesman that the Communists appear to have sent the same letter to all representatives of foreign countries in China, including the eastern European countries (incoming press reviews indicate that the latter countries received a similar text).

For our own purposes, we agree with Clubb that the letter, while brief, was not curt or imperious. To preserve a long-standing Communist line with regard to Chinese equality, "liberation", etc., the new regime evidently intends to avoid any possible criticism of being a suppliant in its relations with foreigners.

893.01/10-749 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 7, 1949—1 p. m.  
[Received October 7—12:01 p. m.]

2538. Receipt by Consulate General [at] Peiping [of] letter from Foreign Minister CPG (Central People's Government) indicates realistic approach new regime to problem recognition. Instead of leaving matter in air, CPG has passed ball directly to us and next move is ours. Chou's technique of addressing Clubb personally seems immaterial, as inclusion title might have implied recognition Clubb's status, a step which CPG could scarcely be expected to take now. While difficult to estimate CPG attitude toward continued residence China our consular officials in absence recognition, it appears prob-

<sup>90</sup> October 6, 3 p. m., p. 102.

<sup>91</sup> Marginal notation by Mr. Merchant: "I agree".

able to us that CPG will act to cut off their channels communication or will evict them, particularly if we slam door abruptly on recognition. Value reports from Consulate General, Peiping, this critical period need not be emphasized.

Several courses of action suggest themselves to us:

- (1) Ignore approach to Clubb:
- (2) Object to manner letter addressed;
- (3) Authorize Clubb to say we will give matter study;
- (4) Authorize Clubb informally request information CPG attitude toward existing treaties, debts, trade, US investments China, missionary activities, etc. In recommending fourth course for Department's consideration, Embassy suggests that this dickering for information might not appear unreasonable to CPG, that it could drag out Clubb's stay and freedom to utilize radio, and that it would inevitably cloak him with representative status in minds CPG officials he contacts, perhaps enhancing his chances to hang on indefinitely.

Embassy considers we hold at least two trump cards our hand: first, CPG anxiety to take China UN seat and to acquire attendant international prestige (USSR equally keen on this); second, CPG's pressing need for foreign trade to ease economic and social problems. Both requirements difficult if not impossible without US-UK recognition although British may considerably weaken second by Hong Kong trade.

In further development Embassy's views on recognition (Embtel 2155, August 26), we feel that recognition should be extended when CPG has established control over principal areas mainland, and recognition as such should be separate from basic problem policy toward China. Advantages to US in operating mission Peiping include following: on spot reporting, protection American property and citizens; some contact and inevitable influence of Embassy officers with personnel CPG, direct and indirect; dissemination, however informal, of western news not available in rigidly censored press; focal point in China for developing property and exploiting to our advantage USSR imperialism Manchuria and China, USSR responsibility for economic and social ills and restrictions on freedoms, and for encouragement and development pro-US elements. While VOA<sup>92</sup> will be useful in publicizing USSR role, and can be furnished by our Embassy Peiping with material, relative shortage shortwave sets China increases importance direct contact.

In period commencing with establishment CPG we see as principal aim US policy to prevent China from contributing to strength USSR bloc, particularly in event future war. As outlined in OIR 5012,

<sup>92</sup> Voice of America.

August 18,<sup>93</sup> we must prevent trade which will enable China to industrialize. Besides doing what we can to limit western aid for industrialization China, we must work for split between CPG and USSR and for weakening of CCP and eventual overthrow by indigenous Chinese forces whose main strength would not be US intervention. We believe total absence official relations will work against our long range aims.

Sent Department; Department pass London 278, Paris 360.

KIRK

893.01/10-649

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Freeman)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 7, 1949.

Mr. Winckler called this afternoon with reference to the text of a note<sup>94</sup> (attached) which was handed to Mr. Butterworth last night by M. Daridan, Counselor of the French Embassy. The note purported to be the text of a reply from the British Government to the Chinese Communist announcement establishing a "People's Government" and bidding for recognition by the foreign powers.

Mr. Winckler stated that the French Foreign Office in transmitting this text to the French Embassy had indicated that, according to its information, the British Consul in Peiping "had been instructed to transmit" the note at such time as he deemed opportune. Mr. Winckler added that the text of the note had apparently been received from the British Embassy in Paris, and he expressed surprise that the British Embassy in Washington had not yet communicated the text to the Department. He implied that the French Government reaction to the British note was one of astonishment that such action would be taken without consulting with the French and U.S. Governments and that the action if taken would have the effect of pulling the rug out from under the U.S. and French positions in China.

Without going into details, I informed Mr. Winckler that we were endeavoring to ascertain from the British Government whether any reply had in fact been transmitted to the Chinese Communist authorities and that I would inform him later in the premises.

In reply to my pertinent question, Mr. Winckler informed me that the French Government had instructed Consul General Breal in Peiping to call on Chou En-lai and orally acknowledge the receipt of Chou's communication announcing the establishment of the Chinese

<sup>93</sup> Not printed.

<sup>94</sup> *Ante*, p. 103.

Communist government informing him at the same time that the message had been transmitted to the French Government. Mr. Winckler assured me that, so far as he was aware, no further reply by the French Government was contemplated at this time.

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893.01/10-749 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas)*

WASHINGTON, October 7, 1949—7 p. m.

3663. Within past two days both Fr and Ital Embs have approached Dept expressing concern over possible Brit recog of Chi Commies within near future. Recent editorials in *London Times* and *Manchester Guardian* plus press reports quoting "official circles" London have no doubt contributed to increasing concern. Fr particularly alarmed over possible dissolution common front re recog as Fr Emb apparently of opinion Fr Govt wld not be able withstand pressure for recog shld other major power break common front.

Ur info only, Dept has recd from Fr Emb fol text of what purports to be Brit Govt reply which according to Fr either was delivered or is to be delivered to Chi Commie auths Peiping in answer to Chou En-lai's message announcing establishment of govt and bidding for recog by fon powers:

[Here follows text as printed on page 103.]

Dept considerably disturbed over designation in note of Chi Commie regime as "Peoples Govt", suggestion that "informal relations shld be established" and fact that note sent from govt to govt. Although question whether note does in fact amount to *de facto* recog Chi Commies by Brit one of intent and therefore cannot be determined by Dept, wld nevertheless appear to be step in direction recog and therefore one which might properly have constituted subject for consultation our two Govts in accordance understanding reached in Bevin-Acheson conversations.

Without indicating to Brit you have text purported reply, pls discuss with FonOff earliest opportunity US attitude toward Chi Commie note. You may state that US does not intend to transmit any reply to Chi Commies other than simple acknowledgment sent by ConGen Peiping to Chou (addressed to Mr. Chou En-lai) informing latter that note had been forwarded to US Govt as requested. You shld ascertain whether Brit have already or plan to transmit reply other than acknowledgment and indicate that if so question might

properly be one for consultation betw two Govts in accordance with Bevin-Acheson understanding. Pls report reaction soonest.

WEBB

893.01/10-549 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in India (Donovan)*

Washington, October 7, 1949—7 p. m.

693. Re query Min External Affairs on our attitude toward recognition Chi Commies (urtel 1191 Oct 5), you may reply that formal estab of a central Commie regime in China at this time was not unexpected development and that we believe there shld be no haste in recognition regime. US Govt has in past been in frequent consultation with GOI and other interested and friendly govts on developments in China and we have every expectation that these consultations will continue in a normal manner. In seeking agreement with friendly powers to prior consultation we have had in mind complicated aspects of this particular problem and fact that any action taken shld not be based on fallacy that the first come wld be the better served.

Dept unable envisage reasoning behind assertion of Ministry External Affairs official that "some sort of urgent action was required"; it wld assume that before giving serious consideration recognition GOI wld wish to satisfy itself that such a regime wld fulfill conditions generally recognized minimum:

- (1) Chi Commie regime has established effective control over China.
- (2) It has shown by actions it respects internatl obligations and intends honor them.
- (3) It has demonstrated satisfactorily it will conduct its internatl relations in conformity established concepts of dipl[omatic] community.
- (4) Convincing evidence obtained this recognition wld result in marked improvement GOI ability protect its interests.

Meanwhile, it is noted that the announcement of inauguration of a central Commie regime contains no assurances that regime is prepared assume internatl obligations which devolve upon a Govt of China, nor has its actions to date given basis for optimism re its intentions. It is also noted that large areas of China remain under control friendly govt with which we maintain dipl relations.

Does Emb believe decision wld be made in absence Nehru?

WEBB

93.01/10-849 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Barbour) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 8, 1949—noon.

[Received October 8—11:42 a. m.]

2543. *Pravda* and *Izvestia* devote over column to Tass articles on China. Report Chinese masses hail establishment diplomatic relations with USSR and step up production in honor founding new republic. Soviet press quotes telegram from Mongolian People's Republic to new Chinese Government which "in name whole Mongolian people" salutes heroic Chinese people and states that "expressing will of whole Mongolian people", MPR Government has decided establish diplomatic relations. Wording of telegram invites speculation whether MPR claiming speak for Mongolians of inner Mongolia, leaving door open for absorption latter into MPR.

BARBOUR

893.01/10-849 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State*

PEIPING, October 8, 1949—1 p. m.

[Received October 9—3:20 a. m.]

1704. ReDeptel 692, October 6. Forwarded letter to Chou En-lai today. Sent letter FonOff address which now known. Text by separate message.

Assuming Department in non-receipt Contel 1689, October 6, at time drafting its message, ventured use discretion to address Chou as "General" in general line with other consular colleagues.

ReContel 1674, October 4, my first impression re form use by French Consulate has now been corrected; he states he sent his letter without salutation, but at own discretion addressed both cover and letter with full title used by Chou; moreover has now been instructed to endeavor call on Chou for simple purpose informing latter of forwarding note and incidentally at discussion taking up matter of use telegraphic codes for official messages.

In my letter in usual Chinese style I quoted text Chou's communication, made no other reference Communist government or official titles. Expanded somewhat part re Mukden to give Chou essential background, and expressed hope concerned authorities would now take prompt steps rectify situation.

CLUBB



893.01/10-849 : Airgram

*The Chargé in Pakistan (Doolittle) to the Secretary of State*

KARACHI, October 8, 1949.

[Received October 20—2:15 p. m.]

A-526. In Weeka No. 40 of October 7<sup>95</sup> the remark was made that no comment was yet available on possible recognition by Pakistan of communistic Chinese Government. Last night in conversation with two or three officials of the Foreign Office the question was raised and it was stated that Pakistan would closely follow developments in the United Nations Assembly and that Zafrullah<sup>96</sup> and their Delegation had been instructed to that effect. The officials pointed out that the matter was not pressing so far as Pakistan was concerned as there is no present Chinese representation in this country nor had they any representation in China. Their policy is apt to be based on what happens in the UN.

DOOLITTLE

893.9111RR/10-849 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State*

PEIPING, October 8, 1949—1 p. m.

[Received October 11—4:47 a. m.]

1710. Re Contel 1619, September 27<sup>97</sup> re mooted recognition Communist regime, invite attention following factors.

1. Canton seems on verge collapse and in all probability authority Nationalist regime will shortly be further reduced from present bare minimum. Examples given by other militarists indicate further defections from Kmt<sup>98</sup> ranks to Communist side must be considered probable as Generalissimo's<sup>99</sup> rule crumbles. Inclusion Lung Yun<sup>1</sup> in Peiping group augur[s] well for stability Yunnan under colleague Lu Han.<sup>2</sup> Szechuan generals were ever self seekers. It is even within bounds possibility Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi<sup>3</sup> will find accommodation within bounds "People's Republic of China". Little of substance is now left besides Formosa where Kmt rule can hardly be deemed popular. In short, practically all of China proper will prob-

<sup>95</sup> Not printed.<sup>96</sup> Mohammad Zafrullah Khan, Pakistani Minister for Foreign Affairs.<sup>97</sup> Vol. VIII, "Political and military situation in China", chapter VII.<sup>98</sup> Kuomintang (Nationalist Party).<sup>99</sup> Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the Kuomintang, and President of China prior to his retirement on January 21 in favor of Vice President Li Tsung-jen as Acting President.<sup>1</sup> Governor of Yunnan, 1927-45.<sup>2</sup> Governor of Yunnan since 1945.<sup>3</sup> Military and Political Affairs Director for Central China.

ably be found inside Communist camp within visible future. And if Nationalist Government presents its case against USSR in UN on basis same evidence it has adduced previously, and with same ineptitude it has shown in other post-war political matters, its political failure will be complete in all sectors.

2. Opposition to Communist economic fighting front has been in rapid decline for full year. To endeavor to stem that ebb tide of decline runs contrary to bitter lessons experience and is demonstrably useless. Opposition to Communists must now develop within their own camp in struggles over such matters as agrarian policy, attitude toward petty *bourgeoisie*, Soviet influence in Manchuria and Sinkiang, contradiction between international political orientation and need foreign trade for program industrialization, party power. Political orientation at present is clear cut enough, but strains really only begin with achievement military aims and establishment primary controls over same 450 million Chinese who have been bitterly fighting each other for decades. Communist pretense of unanimity in those conditions must be forced. Purges of party and suppression of dissident elements to be anticipated, but basic problems will remain unsolved for years. Communist rule in sum must long be attended by serious difficulties.

3. USSR early in field where conditions favorable for its plowing. It can be expected put much political force into effort but little material investment, this at any rate in China proper. Economic conditions therefore can only be improved slowly and laboriously which (even granted dominant role played by political factors in Communist thinking) will probably force both China and USSR recognize need for leaving some room for action by other nations, for China's own salvation. Communist China's political usefulness moreover would be reduced for USSR if China unable win acceptance in international arena, so as to vote for USSR. Countries with interests here will therefore probably be permitted retain and develop them for present, within narrow limits established by xenophobic regime highly conscious of its own authority [but of no one?] else[s] interest. Nation with greatest economic stake is Britain, and difficulties it is now experiencing in many fields will presumably increase pressure for accommodation more agencies in China if such accommodation promises save something from the burning. With political channels established through recognition, Britain or other nations would have some possibility manipulating situation to own benefit. Without such channels any nation would be selectively debarred from influencing developments and its own nationals and interests in China probably subjected crippling restrictions.

4. Communists will soon be in effective power over all but periphery, where main conflict, and one which can be expected grow, is with USSR (Tibet probably safe for coming winter). Communists reputedly (see reftel) have already adjusted their position re international treaties, may be expected accept other realities as time goes on. This development should, of course, be watched. It should also be investigated by early approach to Communist side to discover their attitude re matters of interest to powers called upon to extend recognition. If Lo Lung-chi<sup>4</sup> would say "recognition without bargaining," it is still to be observed that Communists have exigent needs, and although they would surely prefer get good values for nothing it is highly probable that even as they pay to USSR for value received they would pay to others, as is fit and proper. Least effective way of influencing situation in China is by divorcing self from it; better procedure is to maintain contact, investigate possibilities as situation develops, and manipulate that situation to desired ends as far as possible. Possibilities offered by joint consultation with interested powers in UN suggest themselves naturally.

5. In circumstances would recommend following action: (a) continuation policy non-interference to benefit dying Nationalist regime; (b) maintenance for present non-committal (one way or other) position vis-à-vis new regime, but through present crack in door early endeavoring show some interest in planning, intentions and policies regime; (c) let Communists get glimpse of concrete benefits to be obtained through commerce (without slightest hint USA would give charity) and good relations with non-Soviet countries; and (d) if new government seems willing adopt more reasonable attitudes and indicates readiness follow usual standards international behavior, after presumed collapse Canton and hypothetical Chinese failure prove case in UNGA, recognize that government and maintain relations with it even as with USSR and East European countries.

Re (a), note uselessness trying prop up from outside regime unsupported by its own people; re (b), recommend particularly that we do not in fluid situation commit selves overtly as regards future policy, but instead quietly undertake exploration to discover what Communists have to offer, in meantime avoid adoption generally hostile position which would only make development contacts ultimately more difficult; re (c), believe Communists have to discover for selves that political and economic relations with USA and others on our side would promise more profit to China than dependence on USSR before they would feel urge to turn, and that in meantime USA can only view growing Soviet influence and presence Soviet

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<sup>4</sup> A leader of the Democratic League.

technicians and political workers with best grace possible, appreciating that this very development may help develop schisms in China politics in favor independence from USSR; re (d), maxim in international law finds warrant for recognition new governments when they wield effective political power and are willing and able assume international obligations, this seems in line with position American delegation Bogotá<sup>5</sup> that established diplomatic relations does not imply judgement of its domestic policies, and however unpleasant it seems that USA can hope play effective pacific role in contemporary China, and perhaps manipulate situation to its political advantage, only through establishment channel for direct dealing with present regime.

[CLUBB]

893.01/10-949 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, October 9, 1949—2 p. m.

[Received October 9—10:43 a. m.]

935. Following publication in Cairo press of tendentious notices re possible recognition by the Egyptian Government of the Chinese Communist regime, Embassy made informal inquiry of competent Foreign Office officials who indicated that while Egyptian Government is attentive to situation in China and is following developments, no action likely to take place prior to recognition of Communist regime by major powers. Accordingly not only Egyptian diplomatic representative [in] China is being asked to report but instructions have been issued to Egyptian Ambassador, Washington, and to Egyptian Embassy, London, to report on the attitude of the American and British Governments toward the problem presented. It is probable that Egyptian Ambassador to China will be soon called home on consultation.

CAFFERY

893.01/10-1049 : Telegram

*The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Bacon) to the Secretary of State*

NANKING, October 10, 1949—noon.

[Received October 11—3:34 a. m.]

2240. Asuncion, who, as clerk in charge of archives, is sole representative Philippine Legation, has informed me that neither Legation

<sup>5</sup> See Department of State, *Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogotá, Colombia, March 30—May 2, 1948, Report of the Delegation of the United States of America With Related Documents*, pp. 82-83 and Resolutions XXXV and XXXVI, p. 271.

nor Consulate General [at] Shanghai has received letter from Mao Tse-tung announcing formation People's Government. No Philippine Consul Peiping. So far as we know, only other representative omitted is Papal internuncio. Mao attempted to deliver notice to Pakistan, October 3 to Juddin but desisted when he stated he was agent only to arrange for Embassy premises and would have no diplomatic character until Pakistan Ambassador to Nationalist Government should arrive.

Filipinos concerned over snub and think Chiang-Quirino Conference<sup>6</sup> may be reason, etc. More likely is fact Soviets have no relations with Philippine Government. However, notice has been given Portuguese Minister and also Austrian.

This Embassy has received no notice of inquiry with respect Chile and other Latin American Governments.

Would appreciate summaries Department's recent instructions Consulate General, Peiping, for own information and also for information friendly missions so far as permissible, as many deeply interested US attitude but uninformed except for VOUSA<sup>6a</sup> broadcasts.

BACON

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893.01/10-1049 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Shanghai (McConaughy) to the Secretary of State<sup>7</sup>*

SHANGHAI, October 10, 1949—2 p. m.

[Received October 10—3:39 a. m.]

4232. American Catholic Bishop Walsh told officer ConGen he has been informed by Papal Nuncio Riberi, Nanking, that latter has recommended immediate recognition Communist regime by Vatican as only hope for maintenance Church in China.

McCONAUGHY

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893.01/10-1049 : Telegram

*The Chargé in India (Donovan) to the Secretary of State*

NEW DELHI, October 10, 1949—2 p. m.

[Received 3:44 p. m.]

1221. Deptel 693, October 7. I saw K.P.S. Menon, Secretary [of] Ministry External Affairs, today and communicated substance Deptel

<sup>6</sup> For Conference between Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Elpidio Quirino, President of the Philippines, see volume VII.

<sup>6a</sup> Voice of America.

<sup>7</sup> Repeated to the Special Assistant at Vatican City (Gowen) in Department telegram No. 18, October 11.

693. Menon said he was very pleased to have expression Department's view re recognition Communist Government China. He said that GOI felt recognition was something which was inevitable in light of present trend events China. He added, however, that he saw no reason for haste in recognizing Communist regime.

I asked if any decision might be made in absence Prime Minister. Menon replied that no decision would be made before return Indian Ambassador from China (Embtel 1025, September 6) which would not be before end October and that in any event he (Menon) considered decision re recognition Communist regime in absence Prime Minister "extremely unlikely" unless Prime Minister raised question during his absence which Menon considered improbable.

Menon remarked that there were probably not more than 1000 Indians in Shanghai and about 100 in Tientsin and that Indian economic interests in China were insignificant.

Decision re recognition China will be made by Prime Minister and basic factors which will determine this decision are fully set forth Embtel 1025.

Sent Department 1221; pouched Karachi. Department pass London.

DONOVAN

123 Ward, Angus I: Telegram

*The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State*

PEIPING, October 10, 1949—3 p. m.

[Received October 10—6:16 a. m.]

1707. Following text letter sent October 8:

"General Chou En-lai, Peiping:

SIR: The receipt is acknowledged your letter of October 1, 1949, stating: (Letter as given Contel 1665, October 2, from 'Mao Tze-tung' through 'all countries of the world' excepting that 'proclamation' was substituted for 'public statements' given in this office's first translation).

I promptly forwarded your letter and its enclosure to my Government as requested.

I take this opportunity to bring to your personal attention that the American Consul General at Mukden, Mr. Angus I. Ward, and his staff have been isolated in the consular compounds at that point since November 1948 for reasons unknown, resulting in the decision of my Government in May of this year to close that office and withdraw its staff; and that, in spite of specific assurances on June 21 from the Mukden authorities to the effect that necessary transportation facilities would be made available, Mr. Ward and his staff have to date been unable to depart. The US Government is deeply concerned with this situation, which is contrary to established principles of international

comity and which has been permitted to continue despite representations to the Chinese Communist Military Headquarters, and it is hoped that action will be taken by the concerned authorities promptly to rectify that situation. Respectfully yours, O. Edmund Clubb".

Letter was accompanied by unofficial Chinese language translation being forwarded Department by despatch.

Recommend no publicity at least for that part letter dealing with Mukden until Chou has been given opportunity act.

CLUBB

893.01/10-1049 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 10, 1949—6 p. m.

[Received 6:58 p. m.]

4062. Approach Foreign Office re Deptel 3663, October 7, delayed until this afternoon in hope of seeing Dening who, however, failed to appear and Embassy official received by Scarlett, head FE Department. When approached along lines final substantive paragraph Deptel, Scarlett readily admitted delivery note Central People's Government text of which identical with that given Department by French Embassy. His version substantially as follows:

Message originally drafted by Ambassador Stevenson and approved by Attlee in telegram to Nanking October 5 authorizing delivery appropriate time. At same time instructions pouched British Embassies Paris and Washington inform Quai d'Orsay<sup>8</sup> and Department respectively. In delivering message CPG October 6, British ConGen Peiping acted too precipitously. Acc[ording] French Embassy, London, letter tantamount to *de facto* recognition and Foreign Office lawyers concur informally. However, Foreign Office official position will be message not meant to imply *de facto* recognition and meant merely as device establish informal relationship Communist authorities. Foreign Office believes CPG will not regard it as *de facto* recognition having gone on record it will not deal with any nation continuing recognize Nationalist Government.

Re Department view question might properly have been one for US-UK consultation, acc[ording] Bevin-Acheson understanding, Scarlett states subsequent receipt telegram from British Embassy, Washington, October 7 re above, he has read carefully records Washington conversations and in light of such records believes although question of *de jure* recognition requires consultation, consultation not contem-

<sup>8</sup> French Foreign Office.



plated in case of *de facto* recognition. He was profusely apologetic for any misunderstanding brought about by careless handling and promised closer cooperation in future.

Embassy notes not only Foreign Office but also British authorities Nanking, Washington and Peiping failed inform American colleagues in advance of delivery of note to CPG. Difficult escape conclusion such failure deliberate. Does Department desire further representation to Strang<sup>9</sup> or Bevin on latter's return, expected October 12?

HOLMES

893.01/10-1149 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Philippines (Hester) to the Secretary of State*

MANILA, October 11, 1949—1 p. m.

[Received October 11—2:23 a. m.]

2373. Philippine Government received from People's Republic on October 10 formal request for recognition (Embtel 1515, June 14, and Embtel 2367, October 10<sup>10</sup>). In view of announcement of receipt of request following toast given at Double Ten<sup>11</sup> celebration and statements in press that Quirino was studying what reply should be given and would probably discuss question with members of his Cabinet, there was general speculation on what course of action the Government might adopt.

Embassy officer immediately contacted Neri<sup>12</sup> and stated that in view of general speculation would appreciate reaffirmation of Philippine Government's position on maintaining common front with US. Neri stated Philippine position remained unchanged and Government would keep Embassy completely informed. Embassy officer then asked [Neri] to let Embassy know immediately if there was any indication of possible change in Philippine position and whether any need consult directly with Quirino. Neri said he, of course, would do so and that he was meeting with Quirino the following morning at Cabinet meeting.

Neri phoned Embassy this morning to reconfirm that Philippine position remained unchanged and that he was meeting with Quirino later in the morning. Embassy officer will confer with Neri again afternoon following Cabinet meeting.

HESTER

<sup>9</sup> Sir William Strang, British Joint Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>10</sup> Latter not printed.

<sup>11</sup> October 10, anniversary of the Chinese revolution of 1911.

<sup>12</sup> Felino Neri, Philippine Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

841.65/10-1149

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Freeman)*<sup>13</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] October 11, 1949.

Participants: Mr. H. A. Graves, Counselor,  
British Embassy  
Mr. Merchant, FE  
Mr. Freeman, FE

Mr. Graves called this morning after having requested an appointment on an urgent basis and handed Mr. Merchant the attached text of an official communication from the British Government to the Chinese Communist authorities in Peiping which was delivered by the British Consul General on October 5.<sup>14</sup> Mr. Graves was obviously somewhat discomfited in presenting this text to us which it was apparent he was doing under urgent instructions from the British Foreign Office. The text of the communication appeared to be identical with that handed to Mr. Butterworth by Mr. Daridan of the French Embassy on October 6.

After examining the text, Mr. Merchant stated that from a layman's point of view it would appear that the sending of such a communication could be construed as constituting *de facto* recognition by the British Government of the newly established Chinese Communist regime. Mr. Freeman added that, at the very least, it would appear to be a definitive step toward recognition and as such might properly have been made the subject of consultation between our two governments, particularly in the light of the understanding reached between Mr. Bevin and Secretary Acheson that we would have "close and continuous consultations" on the subject of recognition.

Mr. Graves professed to have no personal knowledge as to the origin and development of the communication as he had been on the high seas at the time of its delivery to the Chinese Communist authorities and had only just returned to Washington. He stated, however, that the position of the Foreign Office was that the transmission of this note did in no way constitute a departure from the agreed position with respect to recognition and specifically did not, in the opinion of the Foreign Office, constitute *de facto* recognition of the Chinese Communists. He stated, furthermore, that the text had been received by the British Embassy only on Sunday, October 9, and that there had

<sup>13</sup> In his memorandum of October 11 to the Executive Secretariat the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) recommended that the Secretary of State read the "entire text" of the memorandum of conversation.

<sup>14</sup> For text of British communication, see copy received through the French Embassy on October 6, p. 103.

been no opportunity to present it to the Department's attention prior to this morning. He further stated that it was his understanding that this note was not specifically a reply to the Chou En-lai note announcing the formation of the "peoples government" and bidding for international recognition. He added that it was intended rather to establish better *de facto* relations between the British consulates in Communist-occupied China and the local authorities.

Mr. Freeman pointed out that on a cursory examination the Department's concern would be primarily with the use of the term "Central People's Government" without quotation marks and the fact that it appeared to be a note from government to government. He recalled that, during the long period of non-recognition of the Japanese puppet regime in Manchuria, this Government only referred to the term "Manchukuo" in quotation marks.

Mr. Merchant stated that the Department would wish to study the text of the communication in some detail and that he would in all probability wish to discuss it with Mr. Graves at some future date.

Bringing up another subject, Mr. Merchant informed Mr. Graves that the Department had received a report from Hong Kong to the effect that "the Royal Navy would escort any British vessels bound for Shanghai and the territorial waters in the mouth of the Yangtze". He inquired of Mr. Graves whether the latter was in a position to confirm or deny this report since it had obvious implications with regard to American shipping in that area. Mr. Graves stated in reply that as far as he was aware the Royal Navy was not in fact escorting British vessels in that area; that to do so would be a reversal of what he understood to be established British policy in that regard; but that he would inquire of the Foreign Office immediately by telegraph as to the validity of the report and would communicate with us as soon as a reply is received.<sup>15</sup>

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893.01/10-1149 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State*

PEIPING, October 11, 1949—5 p. m.  
[Received October 12—11:48 a. m.]

1724. ReContel 1710, October 8. There seems good reason believe Communist leaders truly desire American recognition and regularization relations for both political and economic reasons, which this office has previously outlined. Note that, coincident with bid, since October 1, press has carried little anti-American material (excepting few serial features). First and obvious explanation would be that even anti-American items have been temporarily crowded off pages by

<sup>15</sup> For correspondence on this matter, see pp. 1098 ff.

coverage establishment new government and state of pro-Soviet material. There may, however, also be some real shift in Communist propaganda line to aid People's Government's bid for recognition. Communists probably consider bid in itself constitutes important concession in terms political tactics (see Contel 848, July 19<sup>16</sup> for Lo Lung-chi statement that Communists would not sue for recognition), and this should be taken into consideration in estimates of Communist motives. If Communists willing make concessions, reason would, as suggested above, be rooted in political and economic exigencies: They need at least moderately good relations with USA in more ways than one. This, of course, would not *per se* indicate any change in over-all political orientation whatsoever, but willingness make concession re propaganda might signify like willingness make others more substantial; and cessation virulent anti-American propaganda would in fact constitute one of posited necessary first steps (Consulate's reftel July 19) for smoothing of relations. Matter, of course, still subject to proof, as indicated, but will bear watching. No mention yet noted in Peiping press of Yugoslav recognition. This act probably embarrassing to Chinese Communists.

ReContel 1704, October 8, British Consul Graham, acting under instructions, informed Chou in note about October 6 that British Government had matter under study, referred to long history Sino-British relations, proposed that for immediate present "informal relations" be carried on through Consulate representatives. Note unseen, am uncertain of wording. Graham confirms, however, that he was instructed address official communication Chou and says that he therefore addressed Chou with assumed title, but without himself using his own title. (Letter in Chinese only, although Graham says he has since learned his original should have been in English by post-war rule.)

UK Consulate still in nonreceipt reply re audience.

CLUBB

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893.01/10-1249 : Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers*<sup>17</sup>

WASHINGTON, October 12, 1949—11 a. m.

Announcement establishment of Chinese Communist central regime may result in renewal interest question of recognition. Dept believes

<sup>16</sup> Same as telegram No. 1195, vol. VIII, "Political and military situation in China", chapter VI.

<sup>17</sup> Sent to Ankara, Athens, Bangkok, Bern, Brussels, Cairo, Canberra, The Hague, Kabul, Lisbon, London, Manila, New Delhi, Ottawa, Paris, Rangoon, Rio de Janeiro, Rome, Seoul, Stockholm, and Tehran; repeated to Batavia, Hong Kong, Nanking, Peiping, Saigon, Singapore, and the United States delegation to the United Nations at New York.

that US Govt, having already made its views known and taken initiative in obtaining general concurrence that consultation with other interested friendly countries shld precede any action toward recog, shld in general not initiate discussion of question at this time. However, fol are present US Govt views this question for use by you in event you approached by Govt to which you accredited re US views or if you have reason to believe Govt to which you accredited contemplating independent action re recog Chi Commie regime without prior consultation :

✓ US views remain unchanged (originally set forth Depcirtel May 6 some or June 10<sup>18</sup> other addressees this Cirtel). Announcement of establishment Chi Commie "Govt" long anticipated development and does not in US view lend any special urgency to consideration question recog by non-Commie countries. Development does however point up necessity interested friendly Govts, in their own interests, maintain common attitude respecting question. To this end US Govt emphasizes need for full exchange views prior any definitive or independent steps looking toward recog by other interested friendly govts.

For urinfo only, during mid-Sept Acheson-Bevin-Schuman talks, (a) Bevin pledged caution on recog but indicated Brit commercial interests and domestic pressures might force action different from that taken by US and (b) Schuman stated premature recog out of question because of French position in Indochina.

ACHESON

745.98/10-1249 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 12, 1949—4 p. m.  
[Received October 12—12:22 p. m.]

4092. Indian High Commissioner informed American correspondent in confidence October 10 Nehru had (1) recalled Indian Ambassador China, (2) exchanged cordial messages with Mme. Sun Yat-sen<sup>18</sup> and (3) sent favorable and friendly reply Communist Foreign Minister re establishment Central People's Government.

HOLMES

<sup>18</sup> Latter not printed.

<sup>19</sup> Member of Communist-sponsored Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and a Vice Chairman of the "Central Government of the People's Republic of China".

893.01/10-1249 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State*LONDON, October 12, 1949—4 p. m.  
[Received October 12—12:30 p. m.]

4094. Moscow's 2538 to Department October 7. Embassy concurs Moscow's views, we cannot, without detriment our long-range aims, continue indefinitely ignore Central People's Government and endorses course No. 4 paragraph 1 reftel, as satisfactory method approach which would at least help establish some sort of informal basis dealing with Communist officials and supply plausible excuse continued maintenance present large and competent staff in highly strategic area.

Desirability establishment some sort of liaison near future with CPG<sup>20</sup> accentuated by action British Consulate General, Peiping, in replying officially to communication re formation CPG (Embtel 4062, October 10). If British in forwarding reply CPG have seemed crack desired UK-US united front vis-à-vis Communists, perhaps we also should take early action along lines recommended by Moscow so that appearance of UK-US difference of view would be minimized, especially in Communist's eyes.

If any such course of action adopted, believed desirable inform British and French in advance order avoid further misunderstanding.

HOLMES

893.01/10-1249

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

[Extract]

[WASHINGTON,] October 12, 1949.

*Recognition of China*

The Prime Minister<sup>21</sup> expressed the views which he repeated the next day in his conversation with the President that are outlined in that memorandum,<sup>22</sup> and I refer to it here. His talk was clearly slanted toward early recognition. I told him that that was not our view, that we thought it important in this case not to believe that any advantage could be gained for the country in according early recog-

<sup>20</sup> Central People's Government.<sup>21</sup> The Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru.<sup>22</sup> October 18, p. 127.

nition, and that our primary concern here was to indicate by our conduct our deep interest and concern for the welfare of the Chinese people. I thought that this might be done by indicating in our handling of the situation that we were concerned for instance, that the Government actually did control all of China and that by early recognition we were sacrificing the interests of some portions of the country which were still attempting to maintain its independence of Communist control. Then, too, we should show our concern that the Government should establish some form of acquiescence by the Chinese people. While this might be something which could not be done, it was important that the Chinese people should know we were thinking in these terms. Finally, the Government should be required to state its international obligations. He asked how we could bring our own attitude to the attention of the Chinese people. I thought that this might be done both through the Voice of America and by printed material which could be circulated. He doubted whether such material could be effectively circulated. His general attitude seemed to be that since recognition was doubtless inevitable, there was little purpose in postponing it by diplomatic maneuvers.

893.01/10-1249 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Steere) to the Secretary of State*

THE HAGUE, October 12, 1949—7 p. m.

[Received 8:03 p. m.]

937. Foreign Office says Netherlands representative who has been designated to proceed from Canton to Chungking<sup>23</sup> will first go to Hong Kong "for consultation with his colleagues". Official stated that Netherlands Government had not deviated from principle that it should have representative at Nationalist Government seat, but that it wanted a margin of time to see what would happen. He said, "Perhaps the Nationalist Government will collapse in the next few weeks."

Official expressed some surprise that British Government had instructed its representative in Peking to contact Communist government, which amounts to virtual *de facto* recognition. British had informed Netherlands of these instructions, but Netherlands did not regard British step as the close cooperation "with consultation" that is supposed to exist between Western Powers on this matter.

<sup>23</sup> The Chinese Government was moving to Chungking from Canton; see telegram Cantel No. 1189, October 11, 1 p. m., vol. VIII, "Successive moves of the Embassy office in China in efforts . . .".



In general, official said, Foreign Office believes eventual recognition Communist government inevitable, but timing is important. He repeated former assurances (Embtel 881, October 4) that Netherlands Government would take no precipitate action or initiative.

Sent Department 937, repeated London 99.

STEERE

893.01/10-1349 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State*

PEIPING, October 13, 1949—10 a. m.

[Received October 13—9:50 a. m.]

1733. Re Contel 1724, October 11. French Consul informs that he was received October 11 at Foreign Office on 2 hours' notice by Huang Siang (Chief EUS Division) and Wang Ping-nan (Chief General Affairs Section) on behalf Chou En-lai. He was received with all courtesy by two officials who excused Chou on grounds he was too busy with current affairs. French Consul set forth purpose his visit (unindicated in advance) as stated Reftel including matter use codes. Officials stated they would refer matter higher authority. French Consul further took up matter of getting transfer his Mukden colleague to Peiping to relieve him who is scheduled proceed him [home?] on leave and officials indicated like action would be taken.

Italian Consul confirms that he communicated with Chou asking receipt communication and reporting its transmittal.

British Consul confirms his second letter stated British Government was studying new situation created by establishment new government (not studying Chou's letter) and confirmed likewise that proposal re informal relations with Consulate officers bore implication of being interim procedure to be used pending decision with respect new situation.

CLUBB

893.01/10-1349 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Philippines (Hester) to the Secretary of State*

MANILA, October 13, 1949—2 p. m.

[Received October 13—1:52 a. m.]

2392. After Cabinet meeting Neri again assured Embassy that common-front position regarding recognition People's Republic will be adhered to by Philippine Government (Depcirtel June 10<sup>24</sup> and Embtel 2373, October 10 [11]). Neri expressed desire to be kept

<sup>24</sup> Not printed, but see circular telegram of May 6, p. 17.

informed on developments so that Philippine Government could be guided on common-front action. He asked whether US considered request for recognition should be simply ignored or should be acknowledged. He stated that he was particularly interested in learning action of India, Pakistan and Burma on receiving requests for recognition.

Department is accordingly requested to advise Embassy what position should be taken with respect to Philippine participation in common approach.

HESTER

893.01/10-1349 : Telegram

*The Chargé in India (Donovan) to the Secretary of State*

NEW DELHI, October 13, 1949.

[Received October 13—3:20 p. m.]

1239. GOI issued following press note today.

“A request has been received from the People’s Central Republic of China through the Indian Ambassador in Nanking for recognition of that government as the legal government of the people of China and for establishment of diplomatic relations. The Government of India have informed the government of the People’s Central Republic of China that they are studying the situation that has arisen and in this connection have summoned their Ambassador in Nanking for consultations. The Government of India have expressed the hope that informal contacts would continue to be maintained between the newly formed government and our consular representatives.”

DONOVAN

893.01/10-1349

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

[Extracts]

[WASHINGTON,] October 13, 1949.

Participants: The President  
Secretary Acheson  
Prime Minister Nehru  
Sir Girja Bajpai

The President received Prime Minister Nehru at 4:30 this afternoon. Sir Girja Bajpai and the Secretary of State were present. The interview lasted three-quarters of an hour.

*China.* The conversation then turned to the situation in China. The Prime Minister expressed his view that the basic situation in China was that the agrarian revolution, which had begun many years

ago but had been intensified in 1911, had been so mishandled by the Kuomintang that power had fallen by default in the hands of the Communists. He thought that they were not desired in China but were accepted in the absence of any other apparent force interested in dealing with the problem. He thought that Communism was alien to the Chinese mind and that foreign domination would be deeply resented. He believed that the course of events would restore Chinese nationalism as a governing force and would weaken the subservience to Moscow.

In regard to recognition, he thought that India's proximity to China put India in a somewhat different position from that of other countries and indicated a leaning toward early recognition. The President hoped that this was a matter in regard to which the non-Communist countries could consult and if possible concert their action. The Prime Minister agreed that there should certainly be consultation.

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893.01/10-1349 : Telegram

*The Special Assistant at Vatican City (Gowen) to the Secretary of State*

VATICAN CITY, October 13, 1949.

[Received October 15—11 :44 a. m.]

43. Deptel 18, October 11, re China.<sup>25</sup> Matter mentioned by me to Montini, Vatican Under Secretary State, today. He said case extremely serious and some days required for answer.

GOWEN

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893.01/10-1449 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas)*

WASHINGTON, October 14, 1949—4 p. m.

3722. Pls deliver fol msg from Secy to Bevin earliest opportunity :

"I was concerned by the text of msg from Brit Govt to Chi Commie auths Peiping, apparently in reply to Commie invitation for recog, copy of which furnished Dept on Oct 11 which was 6 days after delivery of msg in Peiping. The phraseology of the note, regardless of reception by Chi Commie auths, appears to imply *de facto* recog although the FonOff has assured us that such was not the intent. I feel confident that this step was not intended as a departure from the understanding previously reached between US and UK and confirmed in our own conversations in Washington and New York with respect to

<sup>25</sup> See footnote 7, p. 116.

the importance of avoiding eagerness in approaching question recog, the necessity for close and continuous consultation, and the desirability of common course of action insofar as possible. Nevertheless, there is little question that any indication of independent action by one of Western Powers having similar interests in Far East wld be exploited to full by Chi Commies and wld inevitably have adverse effect on resolution and cooperation of independent Asiatic countries.

"In giving you my frank views on this circumstance, I wish to reiterate the hope that any future actions contemplated by UK re question recog be preceded by the full consultation envisaged in our earlier discussions and to assure you that US Govt fully intends to do likewise."

ACHESON

893.01/10-1849 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Philippines (Hester)*

WASHINGTON, October 14, 1949—7 p. m.

1246. Re ur 2392 Oct 13, you may give Neri fol info:

Commie regime Peiping in letter Oct 1 sent to our ConGen, as well as other foreign reps there, invited recognition. Our ConGen in personal capacity merely replied he was forwarding message to USGovt.

Formal estab of a central Commie regime in China at this time was not unexpected development and we believe there shld be no haste in recognition regime. US Govt has in past been in frequent consultation with other interested and friendly govts on developments in China and we have every expectation that these consultations will continue in a normal manner. In seeking agreement with friendly powers to prior consultation we have had in mind complicated aspects of this particular problem and fact that any action taken shld not be based on fallacy that the first come wld be the better served.

We assume that before giving serious consideration recognition friendly govts would wish to satisfy themselves that such a regime wld fulfill conditions generally recognized minimum:

- (1) Chi Commie regime has established effective control over China.
- (2) It has shown by actions it respects interna[tiona]l obligations and intends honor them.
- (3) It has demonstrated satisfactorily it will conduct its interna[tiona]l relations in conformity established concepts of dipl[omatic] community.
- (4) Convincing evidence obtained this recognition wld result in marked improvement recognizing govt's ability protect its interests.

Meanwhile, it is noted that the announcement of inauguration of a central Commie regime contains no assurances that regime is prepared

assume internatl obligations which devolve upon a govt of China, nor has its actions to date given basis for optimism re its intentions. It is also noted that large areas of China remain under control friendly Govt with which we maintain dipl relations.

ACHESON

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893.01/10-1549 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Barbour) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 15, 1949.

[Received October 15—10:18 a. m.]

2601. In connection British note to Peiping Government (Department infotels October 14, 4 a. m., and 4 p. m.<sup>28</sup>) we feel it is impossible to avoid conclusion that British have deliberately taken strong step toward recognition or at least establishment satisfactory working relations with CPG despite very recent agreements to make no move without consultation. Fact that Department was not approached by British Embassy Washington until 4 days after delivery note to CPG suggests British well aware of unfavorable reception.

British action in sending note may indicate British determination not to be maneuvered by us into position of sharing our current unpopularity in China through participation in what British may consider to be unnecessary and undesirable pressure activities. British action seriously compromises highly desirable and previously agreed upon policy of coordinated Western action toward CPG.

We agree with London Embassy that if we are to attempt to hide schism which in fact has developed only step we can take now is to make somewhat similar approach. However, we do not recommend addressing any note to CPG as such. Nor do we believe that unilateral nature of British approach can successfully be concealed at this time.

We feel that British approach reveals anxiety to profit by trade on short term basis at expense of grave long range policy considerations, that their commercial honeymoon with CPG will be short-lived and of little or no permanent advantage to British, except that Chinese pressure on Hong Kong may be postponed until period when CPG will be obliged to handle matter through diplomatic channels. Urge we continue to exert every effort to win British cooperation with our proposed policy not to bolster CPG economy, which would assist CPG in solving its economic problems and would reduce onus on USSR to extend help to China.

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<sup>28</sup> Neither printed.

Our view USSR and CCP must be delighted with British approach to CPG, and possibility of propaganda exploitation to embarrassment of West, not to mention British relations with Chinese Nationalist Government, is obvious.

Department pass London 285, Paris for Kirk <sup>27</sup> 370.

BARBOUR

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893.01/10-1749

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Sprouse)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 17, 1949.

Mr. Reuchlin<sup>28</sup> called by appointment this morning and handed me the attached document representing a note which, he said, the Netherlands Foreign Office had instructed its consular representative at Peiping to hand to Chou En-lai "within three or four days". He explained that this probably meant that it would be delivered today or tomorrow. He said that he had been instructed by his Foreign Office to ascertain the Department's reaction to the note.

I told Mr. Reuchlin that this note seemed to go far beyond what we considered desirable under present circumstances and that it, in fact, seemed to represent a departure from the common front agreed upon in the approach of the Western Powers to the Chinese Communists. I reviewed the British action in acknowledging the bid for recognition from the Chinese Communists and explained that we had merely instructed our Consul General at Peiping to acknowledge the note from the Communists and state that he was forwarding it to his government for consideration. I said that the Netherlands note seemed to be particularly undesirable in that its reference to the promotion of mutual trade would probably further the Chinese Communist view that the Western Powers considered trade with China vital to their interests. I asked that he convey this reaction to his Foreign Office and express the Department's view that this seemed undesirable from the standpoint of the Western Powers in their relations with the Chinese Communists.

In reply to my inquiry, Mr. Reuchlin said that this note was probably sent after discussion of the matter with the British Government. He further stated that it was now probably too late to prevent the delivery of this note but that he would inform the Foreign Office of our views in this regard.

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<sup>27</sup> Alan G. Kirk, Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

<sup>28</sup> Jonkheer O. Reuchlin, Netherlands Minister.

## [Annex]

*Draft of Note From the Netherlands Consular Representative at Peiping to Mr. Chou En-lai*

The new situation resulting from the recent formation of the Central People's Government forms an object of careful study by the Netherlands Government.

With a view to continuing the friendly relations which have always existed between the Netherlands and China, the Netherlands Government suggests that, pending completing of its study, the Netherlands consular officers in the territory under the control of the Central People's Government take up informal contacts with the local authorities. In the opinion of the Netherlands Government such a provisional arrangement may contribute to the promotion of mutual trade and would be advantageous for both Governments.<sup>29</sup>

893.01/10-1749

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation With President Truman*

[WASHINGTON,] October 17, 1949.

## UK RECOGNITION OF CHINA

The President had already seen my telegram to Mr. Bevin on the China recognition matter.<sup>30</sup> He had noted that the Soviet reaction was that the British note amounted to recognition. He thought that the British had not played very squarely with us on this matter.

D[EAN] A[CHESON]

893.01/10-1749 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, October 17, 1949—7 p. m.

[Received 8:45 p. m.]

4335. Baeyens<sup>31</sup> tells us delivery British note Chinese Communists came as no surprise to Foreign Office as British here had on October 5 shown them draft of note. (According to Baeyens, this information was telegraphed French Embassy, Washington.) French consider

<sup>29</sup> On November 1 the Department was informed by the Netherlands Embassy that the last word of this draft was changed from "Governments" to "peoples".

<sup>30</sup> Telegram No. 3722, October 14, 4 p. m., p. 128.

<sup>31</sup> Jacques Baeyens, Head of Asia-Oceania Section of the French Foreign Office.



and so told British that note amounted to *de facto* recognition and was contrary to both letter and spirit of Washington conversations.

While he believes British action has strengthened position of those French circles advocating early recognition Mao government (including former French Ambassador and Military Attaché at Nanking), Baeyens' personal view, which he says is largely shared by Parodi,<sup>32</sup> is that French should not be stampeded into similar actions but should follow their previous policy of non-recognition pending assurances from Communists re observance of treaties, etc. He added that he did not think this was moment to break relations with Nationalist Government. He said decision on French position will be made next week "when I hope we will have a Foreign Minister".

Dutch Ambassador called on Baeyens today and read him note "very similar to British note". Dutchman was, however, unable to say when note had been or was going to be delivered in Peking.

Sent Department 4335, repeated London 724, Hague 52, Department pass Moscow 211.

BRUCE

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893.01/10-1849 : Telegram

*The Chargé in India (Donovan) to the Secretary of State*

NEW DELHI, October 18, 1949—3 p. m.

[Received October 19—7:51 a. m.]

1255. Percy Wood, Delhi correspondent *Chicago Tribune*, called Embassy October 17 stating Colonel McCormick<sup>33</sup> of *Chicago Tribune* had telegraphed him he had received information from Chinese source (former mayor Shanghai) that British Government was pressing GOI to recognize China promptly. I told Wood we had no information which would substantiate such statement.

Wood saw K.P.S. Menon<sup>34</sup> later same day and asked Menon if British were putting pressure on India to recognize Communist Government China. Menon replied that he could not say that British were exercising pressure; that British were keeping GOI fully informed their policy; and that he (Menon) was sure British hoped India would take action consonant with, and simultaneous to, British this question. Menon added that in view British economic position China he felt British policy tended towards early recognition and that naturally Britain would like to have as many countries as possible follow Britain.

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<sup>32</sup> Alexandre Parodi, Secretary General of the French Foreign Office.

<sup>33</sup> Col. Robert R. McCormick, editor and publisher of the *Chicago Tribune*.

<sup>34</sup> Krishna P. S. Menon, Indian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom.

Deptel 712, October 14.<sup>35</sup> Recall of Indian Ambassador from China requires no comment from Embassy as there is nothing unusual this action.

Regarding Nehru's exchange messages Mme. Sun Yat-sen, nothing known by either Embassy or UK High Commissioner. In this connection Roberts, Deputy UK High Commissioner, remarked Krishna Menon was not an especially reliable source of information but Roberts does not discount possibility that Prime Minister wrote such a letter.

Regarding "favorable and friendly reply" sent by GOI to Communist Foreign Minister, Embassy does not attach undue importance that statement (Embtel 1239 October 13). See Embassy airgram 1068, October 18.<sup>36</sup>

Roberts told me today he saw no indication precipitate action by GOI recognition China. Roberts feels regarding GOI that "they are going along". This probably means they are going along with British policy regarding recognition China before Nehru's return and Roberts has had some information from Menon. Pannikar [*Pannikkar*], Indian Ambassador to China, is due arrive India early November accompanied by British Ambassador to China. It was suggested to Pannikar that he stop off at Singapore and attend conference British Ambassadors, High Commissioners, *et al*; to which Pannikar replied that it would be useless for him to do so since he had no instructions regarding Indian policy recognition China and that he could expect no instructions until Nehru returned India. Pannikar's reply undoubtedly included instructions other subjects to be considered by Singapore conference but Pannikar specifically mentioned question recognition China.

Sent Department, Department pass London.

DONOVAN

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893.01/10-1849 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 18, 1949—4 p. m.

[Received October 18—1:36 p. m.]

4173. In compliance with Deptel 3722, October 14, I conveyed the Secretary's message to Bevin personally this morning. He was surprised that we had not been consulted before despatch of British note

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<sup>35</sup> It repeated telegram No. 4092, October 12, 4 p. m., from the Chargé in the United Kingdom, p. 123.

<sup>36</sup> Not printed.

to Chinese Communists, admitting frankly that such action is contrary to understanding reached with Secretary in Washington. Dening<sup>87</sup> was sent for and offered apologetic explanation that because of procedural error instructions to British Embassy in Washington had been sent by airgram instead of cable, which accounted for fact that we were not notified in advance.

Bevin asked that the Secretary be assured that he had given firm instructions which he repeated orally to Dening that no steps were to be taken with respect to Chinese Communist government without prior consultation with US. He pointed out that his agreement with the Secretary was for prior consultation not necessarily prior agreement.

DOUGLAS

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893.01/10-1849 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Steere) to the Secretary of State*

THE HAGUE, October 18, 1949—6 p. m.

[Received 6:26 p. m.]

968. Having read last paragraph Paris 4335, October 17 to Department, we inquired at Foreign Office concerning proposed Dutch action re Chinese Communist government which seemed to be diametrically opposed to what we had been told by Foreign Office twice recently. (See Embtels 881, October 4 and 937, October 12.) Acting chief Political Section apologized for not having informed Embassy of Netherlands' decision to follow British pattern re contact with Communist government in Peking. Official said that Netherlands Embassies Washington, Paris and Brussels (but not London) had been instructed to approach respective Foreign Offices on matter with view to consulting before taking action. Official remarked that this was more in spirit of agreed cooperation than British approach to Chinese Communists.

Official stated that Department's reaction had not been favorable and that Quai d'Orsay had been critical, but less than Department, of Netherlands' proposed action.

He said that Dutch intend to go ahead and instructions will be sent to their representative in Peking to contact Communist Foreign Minister there. Dutch representative will not present written document but only suggest orally that contact be established and maintained between Netherlands consulates in China and Communist government.

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<sup>87</sup> Maberly E. Dening, British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Official said that Netherlands had not been precipitate [and had] not taken initiative in this matter. They still think, however, that the British did not play ball by taking action and informing other powers afterwards. Dutch official concluded by stating that Netherlands was being forced to establish contact with Communists because British had already done so.

Sent Department 968, repeated London 106, Paris 72, Moscow 6.

STEERE

893.01/10-1949 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, October 19, 1949—5 p. m.  
[Received October 19—2:41 p. m.]

4367. Baeyens tells us that in preliminary consultations on future French policy re French recognition Chinese Communist government considerable attention being given to repercussions recognition would have in Indochina (Embtel 4335, October 17). Pignon<sup>38</sup> has advised Foreign Office that early recognition would constitute important moral support to Vietminh to detriment Bao Dai.<sup>39</sup> He is urging that recognition be postponed as long as possible and at least for next few months.

Sent Department 4367, repeated London 732; Department pass Saigon 138.

BRUCE

893.01/10-1949 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*

ROME, October 19, 1949—6 p. m.  
[Received October 19—2:46 p. m.]

3297. Depcirtel October 12, 11 a. m. Secretary General Foreign Office has assured me Italian Government (reference 1335, May 6) does not propose independent action re recognition Chinese Communist regime without prior consultation US. He would appreciate having as soon as possible any further views that we may have in that regard.

DUNN

<sup>38</sup> Léon M. Pignon, French High Commissioner in Indochina.

<sup>39</sup> Chief of State of Vietnam.

893.01/10-2149 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Shanghai (McConaughy) to the Secretary of State*

SHANGHAI, October 21, 1949—5 p. m.

[Received October 21—9:41 a. m.]

4466. Over-all impression I gained from casual conversations with several Nanking diplomats who came to Shanghai to embark on British evacuation ships *Shengking* and *Wing Sang* October 18 was that they are rather impatient for early recognition Communist regime and are generally disposed to recommend unreservedly to their Government that recognition be accorded in the not distant future.

I was impressed by fact that some of the diplomats seemed to consider *de facto* control of preponderance of area and population of China to be sole determining factor in deciding recognition issue with little weight accorded to other factors to which we attach importance such as ability and willingness of regime to carry out international obligations, its independence of foreign domination and extent and degree of support of Chinese people enjoyed by regime. It was disturbing to note their casual and even cavalier attitude toward indignities we have suffered at hands of Communists, particularly detention of our consular staff at Mukden. It hardly seemed to occur to some of foreign diplomats that such outrages when continued without rectification might serve as deterrent to recognition. One of them remarked jocosely that ConGen Ward was Sinophile and Sinologue and probably was able to carry on enough enjoyable researches very congenial to him during his detention.

While cogent case could be made for recognition on terms providing some reasonable degree assurance Communist respect for our more fundamental interests, there was little evidence that Nanking foreign diplomats were approaching recognition question in other than happy-go-lucky manner, with little thought as to what their countries might be "getting into" or the importance of determining and holding out for minimum *sine qua non* conditions for recognition.

Desire make clear that above represent an impression of general frame of mind gained from informal bandying "cocktail" conversation with frequently changing groups rather than summary of statement definitely identifiable as considered views of specific individuals.

McCONAUGHY

893.01/10-2149 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Shanghai (McConaughy) to the Secretary of State*

SHANGHAI, October 21, 1949—5 p. m.

[Received October 21—7:35 a. m.]

4467. Close local American friend of Indian Ambassador Panikkar quoted him as predicting in confidence shortly before he embarked for India on October 18 that all Commonwealth and most European and Asiatic countries would recognize Chinese Commie regime by December 15. He predicted US would follow suit within few weeks thereafter. Panikkar reported casting about for suitable site for Indian Embassy in Peiping. House hunting by other missions as well reportedly has stimulated Peiping real estate market.

MCCONAUGHY

893.01/10-2449

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Ringwalt)<sup>40</sup>*

[LONDON,] October 21, 1949.

Under instructions from the Chargé d'Affaires I called at the Foreign Office to discuss with Mr. Dening certain aspects of the transmission by the British Consul General at Peiping of the note to the Chinese Communist authorities there, suggesting the establishment of informal relations between the two governments. I informed him that it seemed that doubt still existed in the minds of some of our people dealing with Far Eastern problems that someone in the Foreign Office might have "pulled a fast one."

Dening replied that he had "hoped that Mr. Bevin had lain that ghost" in his conversation with Ambassador Douglas. (Embtel 4173, October 18, 1949). He denied emphatically that any skulduggery had been intended anywhere along the line, but admitted that his overworked and undermanned staff had committed two stupid errors: (1) the Foreign Office instruction to the British Embassy at Washington containing the text of the note to be shown to the Department of State had inadvertently been sent "Saving" (by air mail) instead of being telegraphed, and (2) the Far Eastern Department had blundered outrageously in not checking with its Legal Adviser who, as has already been pointed out (Embtel 4062, October 10, 1949), is of the opinion that the note as delivered amounted to *de facto* recognition. He reiterated what already had been stated by Mr. Bevin to the Am-

<sup>40</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) in his despatch No. 1688, October 24; received October 29.

bassador that the delivery of the note was in fact in violation of the Bevin-Acheson agreement to consult not only with regard to recognition of the Chinese Communist regime at Peiping but on all matters of concern to the United States and the United Kingdom in the Far East.

Dening volunteered that, although the conference to be held in Singapore in November (Embassy's telegram No. 4197, October 19<sup>41</sup>) was to have no formal agenda, one of the questions to be discussed there would be the implications of the recognition by the United Kingdom of a central Chinese Communist government on the position of the British Empire in the Far East. Certainly no recognition by the United Kingdom of the Chinese Communists would take place until the conclusion of that conference.

I mentioned that I personally was not too impressed by what seemed to me to be specious arguments, advanced by certain British officials, differentiating between *de jure* and *de facto* recognition, to the effect that whereas *de facto* [*de jure*?] recognition would under the Bevin-Acheson agreement be a matter for consultation between the two governments, *de facto* would not.<sup>42</sup> Dening replied with some asperity that if any British official in Washington or London had advanced such an argument he had done so without authority.

In conclusion, I said that, regardless of the facts of the case, what concerned me most was that the incident was indicative of what I felt to be a distressing lack of coordination, on a working level at least, between our two governments and that I hoped we could do better in the future. Mr. Dening assured me of his entire cooperation.

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893.01/10-2149 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 21, 1949—7 p. m.  
[Received October 21—2:16 p. m.]

4235. Embtel 4173, October 18. In further conversation with Dening this afternoon he stated emphatically that Bevin-Acheson understanding reached in Washington would include consultation in

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<sup>41</sup> Not printed; it described the frame of reference for the forthcoming Singapore conference as "merely another regional conference of chiefs of mission, area military commanders and colonial governors" (701.4100/10-1949).

<sup>42</sup> Marginal notation: "Scarlett of FonOff told us *de facto* recog. did not require consultation". See telegram No. 4062, October 10, 6 p. m., from the Chargé in the United Kingdom, p. 118.



advance regarding *de facto* as well *de jure* recognition Chinese Communists. Memorandum of conversation by air.<sup>43</sup>

HOLMES

893.01/10-2149 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Netherlands (Steere)*

WASHINGTON, October 21, 1949—8 p. m.

922. Nether Min on Oct 17 handed Dept copy of note which, he said, Neth FonOff had instructed its Cons rep at Peiping to hand to Chou En-lai, "FonMin" of new regime. Fol is text note:

[Here follows text of draft printed on page 132.]

Emb shld send FonOff note along fol lines:

Dept State has noted text of msg from Neth Govt to Chi Commie auths Peiping, apparently in reply to Commie invitation for recog, copy of which was furnished Dept on Oct 17 by Neth Emb at Washington. Dept feels confident that this step was not intended as a departure from the understanding previously reached between US and Neth in May last with respect to importance of avoiding eagerness in approaching question of recog, the necessity for close and continuing consultation and the adoption to the extent feasible of a common front re relationship with Commie regime.<sup>44</sup>

Emb shld then state that, in reporting this comment, it wishes to reiterate hope that any future actions contemplated by Neth re question recog be preceded by full consultation envisaged in earlier discussions between two Govts and give assurance that US Govt fully intends to do likewise. For ur info, we have raised this matter with Brit also.

ACHESON

893.01/10-2149 : Airgram

*The Ambassador in Thailand (Stanton) to the Secretary of State*

BANGKOK, October 21, 1949.

[Received November 2—11:47 a. m.]

A-490. On October 20, 1949, in a press conference Prime Minister Phibun discussed the problem of recognition of the Chinese Communist Government. He emphasized the need for great caution and indicated a desire to move slowly. According to the press report, he

<sup>43</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>44</sup> This note was transmitted on October 25 to the Netherlands Government by the American Embassy at The Hague.

stated that Thai recognition depends on two factors. They are: (1) Whether or not the Communist Government really represents the Chinese people and is governing in the interests of the majority of the Chinese people; (2) Whether the Communist Government is accorded a favorable reception in the United Nations. While it is not clear to the Embassy why or how membership in the United Nations must precede recognition by individual countries, yet the obvious implication is that Phibun intends to take no action until it is quite clear that the majority of nations and particularly the Great Powers have publicly committed themselves to recognition.

There is quoted below the text of the press report of the conference which appeared in the English-language, *Liberty* newspaper:

"The Premier stated that Thailand could not afford to make a hasty decision in regard to so important a question as this and that time and consideration should be given since it involved international understanding.

"The Premier said that the recognition of the newly established Communist government depended on,

"(1) Whether the Chinese Communist Government really represented the people, whether it was administering the country solely in the interests of the people as a whole and whether it really had the support of the majority of the people.

"(2) Another main point that would have to receive careful and lengthy consideration was whether the Chinese Communist government would receive recognition from UNO<sup>45</sup> or not.

"The Government was desirous of avoiding all political implications and was in a position unlike Soviet Russia and her satellite countries which had promptly accorded recognition to the Chinese Communist Government almost immediately after its establishment. The Premier stated that Russia's action was only natural since it had similar political ideologies and Russia wished to give the lead to other countries of the world in the matter and thus pave the way for the Chinese Communist Government to establish diplomatic relations with foreign countries.

"The Premier stressed that Thailand is a small country and must therefore be certain of her step before making any move.

"The Premier further stated that, if possible, he would like to see the Chinese Communist Government a member of UNO, or accorded recognition by UNO, before making any move in the matter. He is of opinion that as Thailand is a member-nation of UNO, it would be unseemly for Thailand to extend recognition to a government that was not recognized by UNO. He also said that as the Chinese Nationalist Government is a fellow-member, it would be most irregular and, in fact, impossible to give recognition to two governments established in the same country."

STANTON

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<sup>45</sup> United Nations Organization.

*Editorial Note*

In his telegram 224, October 24, from Canberra (not printed), Ambassador Jarman informed the Department that in accordance with the Department's circular telegram of October 12 he had seen Foreign Minister Evatt and urged upon him the importance of concerted action toward the Chinese Communist regime. Mr. Evatt in turn had given the Ambassador a note stating that Australia's views accorded very largely with those of the United States. The note went on to say that Australia saw no great need for urgency in recognizing China but felt such a step should not be unduly delayed if delay were to involve a worsening of the bargaining position of the Western Powers, who ought to use recognition as a tool for obtaining, through negotiations, undertakings from the Chinese Communists to respect the political integrity of neighboring areas, especially Hong Kong. Indeed, Australia, the note continued, would urge that such negotiations be commenced immediately with the Chinese Communists and stressed the desirability of United States-Australian consultations so that concerted action could be taken. (893.01/10-2449)

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893.01/10-2449

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Acting Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Freeman)*

WASHINGTON, October 24, 1949.

Mr. Collins<sup>46</sup> telephoned this afternoon to inform me of the nature of the Canadian Government's reply which the Department of External Affairs had instructed be made in Peiping, presumably by the British consul at that city.

The instructions sent to Peiping on October 22 provided for an oral acknowledgment of receipt of the Communist note to be made to "a responsible officer of the Foreign Affairs Bureau" of the Chinese Communist regime. It was specifically requested that the consul avoid in so far as possible the implication that the official status of the Communist regime was being recognized by the Canadian Government. Mr. Collins further stated that the consul was to inform the responsible official that the note was being studied by the Canadian Government and that, in the meantime, it was hoped that Canadian consular officers in China might be permitted to carry out their normal functions in accordance with accepted international law.

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<sup>46</sup>Ralph E. Collins, Second Secretary of the Canadian Embassy.

Mr. Collins added that this stand on the part of the Canadian Government appeared to fall somewhere between that which had been adopted by the British Government and that of the U.S. Government.

893.01/10-2549 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Peiping (Chubb) to the Secretary of State*

PEIPING, October 25, 1949—4 p. m.  
[Received October 26—6:16 a. m.]

1822. ReDeptel 710, October 14.<sup>47</sup> British Consul here apparently uninformed re Indian reply to recognition bid. Deduce general Indian position was probably indicated in Nehru's October 18 statement that Indian Government like any other government "cannot ignore realities". Note further (1) underlying Indian sympathy for another Asiatic country having many problems basically similar to India's own; (2) probable desire Government India, possessing long common frontier with China, effect early stabilization relations with latter with aim avoiding as much trouble as possible; (3) political position of India to left both USA and UK is perhaps intimated by Indian stand in UN on both Vietnam and North Korea re ECAFE.<sup>48</sup> Note finally India is without established interests China under attack except in Sinkiang, and in that relatively unencumbered state probably sees little promise profit, but instead some dangers in holding back on recognition for reasons they might judge connected with power politics. It would seem to appear urge in Indian Government is toward early recognition.

Take occasion refer Contel 1710, October 8, and respectfully note that seems against Peiping background be danger overstraining on Western recognition united front which has already shown signs weakness this regard. Believe attempt achieve impossible might lead to American diplomatic reverse, and that any effort cause non-Soviet powers generally to withhold recognition either indefinitely or for long period would fall in category impossible. Accepting our own view international law this regard, observe (1) by time Chinese stand against USSR in UN is terminated position Nationalist Government Chungking will in all probability be patently hopeless. (2) There has never before been exacted as prerequisite for recognition China's various governments the position that new rule should have consent governed, there never having been general election and therefore

<sup>47</sup> This telegram repeated telegram No. 4092, October 12, 4 p. m., from the Chargé in the United Kingdom, p. 123.

<sup>48</sup> Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.

popularly approved government in China's known history, and (3) Communist willingness to abide by international law and accept international obligations is still to be clarified. In circumstances believe that maximum coordination now assured is prior consultation without necessarily prior agreement as accorded by British (Depintel October 19, 4 a. m.<sup>50</sup>) and that logical optimum achievement would be on level joint effort by interested non-Soviet governments to get principal clarification of Communist position re international obligations. Communists would be most apt make concessions this regard if there were something in nature parallel stand by interested powers, and this I believe should be undertaken early because of manifest impatience some interested governments. Such undertaking would probably incidentally slow up recognition tendency. This seems feasible move and joint effort this respect might, depending on developments, lead in due course to increased cooperation vis-à-vis Communist China, whereas to attempt more at this stage would probably overstrain patience and endurance our natural allies.

Re Depintel October 17, 8 a. m.,<sup>50</sup> note that hypothetical recognition would not *ipso facto* lead of necessity to rendering economic aid to Peiping regime. Believe on contrary that any American recognition should basically be designed for purpose maintaining contact with situation for possible joint exploitation as indicated Conreftel October 8, that although trade with Communist China even as Eastern Europe should be made possible within framework statement outlined Depcirtel October 14, 5 a. m.<sup>50</sup> There should be no gratuitous assumption of Chinese as economic burdens, that as implied Conreftel October 17 full weight of those economic burdens should be left on back USSR for so long as China maintains present political orientation and USSR thereby enjoys special political influence this country. Believe that thus qualified recognition holds no danger political or economic loss to USA, but that without recognition our maneuverability in Asia would be more untrammled than if political contacts were maintained. *(not confirmed)*

CLUBB

893.01/10-2549 : Airgram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State*

SEOUL, October 25, 1949.

[Received November 10—2:40 p. m.]

A-336. Re: Embassy telegram No. 1144, September 13, 1949. During conversation with an Embassy officer on October 24, President

<sup>50</sup> Not printed.

Rhee expressed great concern at possible recognition of communist China by the United Kingdom or at possible attempts by Northwest Airlines to land in communist-held China.

Dr. Rhee said that if the United Kingdom should recognize communist China he thought that his Government would have to sever diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom. He said the big democratic countries could afford to temporize with the communists, but Korea could not; Korea had "burned her bridges" and intended to oppose the communists without compromise.

As regards rumors he had heard that Northwest Airlines was considering securing landing rights in Tientsin or Peiping, President Rhee said that if NWA tried to land in Chinese communist territory after using Kimpo Airport as an intermediary landing point, he would find it necessary to cancel existing landing rights of NWA in Korea.

MUCCIO

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893.01/10-2649 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Australia (Jarman) to the Secretary of State*

CANBERRA, October 26, 1949.

[Received October 27—7:25 a. m.]

229. Evatt issued public statement last night concerning request People's Republic China for recognition. Said arrangements been made that any action taken will be concerted by Australia with UK and US, referred Secretary Acheson's three points, control of area, international obligations and support majority people. Definite and convincing answers required before question recognition can be resolved. "We certainly wish maintain friendly relations with people of China but in absence firm and specific assurance that territorial integrity neighboring countries, notably Hong Kong, will be respected and that new China will carry out all its international obligations, recognition cannot be granted any more than admission to UN could be granted."

JARMAN

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893.01/10-2649

*The Ambassador in Canada (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State*

No. 637

OTTAWA, October 26, 1949.

[Received October 31.]

Secretary of State for External Affairs L. Pearson announced in the House of Commons yesterday that Canada will not extend recog-

nition to the Communist Government of China until that government can be shown to be independent of USSR control.

Mr. Pearson stated that two requirements for recognition exist. These are: (1) a government must be independent of external control by another state; (2) a government must exercise effective control over the territory which it claims. Mr. Pearson made it clear that recognition would not necessarily follow even if Communist China met the stated requirements.

Canada, Mr. Pearson added, is keeping in close touch with "like-minded" governments with respect to developments in China. He said: "Very careful consideration is being and will continue to be given to all the implications arising out of the situation there which is so important to the peace of the world."

The question of Canadian recognition of Communist China was heightened when T. C. Davis, Canadian Ambassador to China, stated a short time ago in a press interview in San Francisco that Canada could do business with Communist China. Ambassador Davis is now in Ottawa for consultation. He has been extremely chary of making further public statements along this line and has told inquiring reporters only that China wants to do business with Canada. When asked for comment on his San Francisco statement, Mr. Davis told a *Citizen* reporter: "You people have been asking me the same questions all across the country, and I'm sorry I cannot answer them before reporting to the government."

Mr. Pearson's statement in Parliament has evidently finished discussion for the time being on recognition of China. It seems not improbable, however, that Canada may give further consideration to the question upon learning the results of the Singapore meeting of Commonwealth representatives.

For the Ambassador:  
JULIAN F. HARRINGTON  
*American Minister*

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893.01/10-2749 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Strong) to the Secretary of State*

CHUNGKING, October 27, 1949—11 a. m.

[Received October 27—3:02 a. m.]

Cantel 1229. Foreign Minister<sup>51</sup> states Bevin had conversation with Chinese Ambassador, London, about October 20, in which Bevin

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<sup>51</sup> George K. C. Yeh.



reported to have assured that UK not contemplating full recognition in near future.

Yeh claimed that in this talk Bevin made remark that Britain was only country fighting Communists since it intended hold Hong Kong while "US only made gestures and did nothing" and Chinese Nationalist Forces always retreated without fighting.

Evatt speech of recent date in which stated Australia would follow joint line with US and UK in not recognizing Communists was discussed by Yeh. He thought Evatt might have based remarks on some very recent agreement between US and UK on recognition question but on other hand felt Evatt might "again have been talking through his hat". Yeh said he knew Ambassador Stevenson was urging *de jure* recognition and he felt very keenly the failure of UK to maintain diplomatic relations with Chinese Government (Cantel 1216, October 21<sup>52</sup>) after having promised at Canton to give British ConGen here concurrent diplomatic status.

STRONG

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893.01/10-2749 : Telegram

*The Chargé in China (Strong) to the Secretary of State*

CHUNGKING, October 27, 1949—noon.

[Received October 27—4:46 a. m.]

Cantel 1231. October 26, Foreign Minister Yeh said that in interview about 10 days ago between Nehru and Chinese Ambassador Koo,<sup>53</sup> Nehru declared, despite heavy pressure from British, Indian Government would not recognize Chinese Communists for 2 or 3 months at which time Nehru opined Chinese Nationalist regime would be finished. Nehru gave as reason for delay in recognition appreciation Chinese help to India in 1942 and past Kuomintang financial and other support to Congress Party.

STRONG

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893.01/10-2749 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Taipei (Macdonald) to the Secretary of State*

TAIPEI, October 27, 1949—1 p. m.

[Received October 27—1:21 a. m.]

621. Inspector General, Chinese Maritime Customs L. K. Little just returned from Hong Kong where he conferred with British Am-

<sup>52</sup> Vol. VIII, "Successive moves of the Embassy office in China in efforts . . .".

<sup>53</sup> V. K. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador in the United States.

bassador to China. In reply to direct question by Little re British recognition Chinese Communists, Ambassador stated he saw no reason for delaying recognition but that his Government would take no action until: (1) after conference of area Ministers and Ambassadors at Singapore, and (2) disposition of China's case in UN. By possible maneuvering, the disposition of China's case in UN might be prolonged by US if we desire to postpone British recognition at this time.

Prominent British businessman and close friend of Little's confided to Little that British Ambassador told him he would press for immediate recognition Communist China upon arriving London.

Governor of Hong Kong remarked to Little he did not think recognition imminent.

Sent Department, repeated Hong Kong 59.

MACDONALD

893.01/10-2749: Telegram

*The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State*

PEIPING, October 27, 1949—3 p. m.

[Received October 27—8:31 a. m.]

1836. ReContel 1822, October 25. Chinese student Tsinghua October 21 informed Carpenter<sup>54</sup> question American recognition new Chinese regime much discussed political science classes. Professors presented united front in stating recognition hoped for but could not alter basic enmity two countries. American recognition would merely constitute effort US Government ameliorate desperate domestic economic situation, not mark friendship or respect toward New China. China must accept recognition for sake concomitant economic and financial benefits only USA presently in position provide. Relative economic strength USA result insignificant American contributions made last war. In no case must Chinese people substitute friendly for opportunistic attitude toward USA.

Chinese students instructed regard all former American friends as spies. Even after recognition, American diplomatic and commercial personnel must be treated as self-confessed spies, American businessmen as informers, local American consuls, American missionaries as hypocritical, violently anti-Communist, exploiters of Chinese people, American students in Chinese universities as agents FBI from which necessary for them obtain clearance before proceeding abroad. In sum, Chinese people must utilize American recognition for own sakes, must not regard it as anything but mere economic palliative on part USA, must continue regard American people as actual enemies.

<sup>54</sup> Gardner E. Carpenter, Vice Consul at Peiping.

Informant reported students appeared convinced logic, validity above arguments.

Sent Department 1836; Department pass Shanghai 1102.

CLUBB

865.00B/10-2949 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*

ROME, October 29, 1949—6 p. m.

[Received 9:16 p. m.]

3460. Information contained Deptel 2617, October 22,<sup>55</sup> transmitted Director General, Political Affairs, Foreign Office, who states Italian position similar to ours and that US would be consulted by Italy prior to any decision on part of Italian Government re recognition Communist regime.

DUNN

III. REACTIONS TO BRITISH PROPOSAL OF NOVEMBER 1 FAVORING *DE JURE* RECOGNITION OF THE PEIPING REGIME; BRITISH DECISION OF DECEMBER 15 TO ACCORD *DE JURE* RECOGNITION IN JANUARY 1950; OPPOSITION BY THE UNITED STATES TO HASTY RECOGNITION (NOVEMBER-DECEMBER)

893.02/11-149

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Sprouse)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 1, 1949.

Participants: Mr. H. A. Graves, Counselor, British Embassy  
Mr. Butterworth, Assistant Secretary  
Mr. Sprouse, CA

Mr. Graves called by appointment this afternoon and handed Mr. Butterworth the attached secret memorandum, prepared by the British Embassy under date of November 1, 1949,<sup>56</sup> in which are set forth the views of the British Government with regard to the question of recognition of the Chinese Communist regime.<sup>57</sup> He explained that

<sup>55</sup> Not printed; it reported in regard to the Chinese Communist bid for recognition and the Department's position (893.01/10-1949).

<sup>56</sup> *Infra.*

<sup>57</sup> The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) reported in telegram No. 4353, October 31, 9 p. m. (893.01/10-21[31]49), and in despatch No. 1744, November 1 (893.01/11-149), that the British Foreign Office on the afternoon of October 31 informed the Embassy of the proposal to be made by the British Government for the recognition of the Chinese Communist regime as the Government of China.

the memorandum also set forth the British attitude toward the Chinese case in the United Nations regarding Soviet violations of the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945.<sup>58</sup> In reply to a question, Mr. Graves stated that the British Government was instructing its representatives to consult on this question with the French, Dutch, and Belgian Governments and with the governments of the British Commonwealth, as well as with the U.S. Government. (Mr. Graves subsequently telephoned Mr. Sprouse and said that a later telegram from the British Foreign Office indicated that similar instructions had been sent to Rome, Lisbon, Luxembourg, Oslo and Copenhagen.) He explained that the British Government would appreciate receiving an indication of the U.S. Government's views within two weeks. He further stated that the attached memorandum represented the preliminary conclusions of the British Government regarding the question of recognition. With respect to the Chinese case before the United Nations, he explained that the memorandum represented the present thinking of the British Government.

After some general discussion of the memorandum, Mr. Butterworth asked if the absence of reference in the memorandum to the question of obtaining assurances from the Chinese Communist regime, prior to extending recognition, of respect for international obligations indicated that the British Government would not expect to obtain any *quid pro quo*. Mr. Graves replied that it was the British Government's view that the disadvantages of nonrecognition were so great as to outweigh any possible advantages to be obtained from securing Chinese Communist assurance of respect for international obligations. He added that the British Government was under no illusions as to the advantages to be gained from any commitment obtained from the Chinese Communists with respect to international obligations. Mr. Butterworth referred to the conversations between the Secretary, Mr. Bevin<sup>59</sup> and Mr. Schuman<sup>60</sup> in September and pointed out that the question of observance by the Chinese Communists of their international obligations in accordance with international comity had been brought up during those conversations and that it was his understanding that this would be considered in connection with the problem of recognition. In reply to a direct question, Mr. Graves admitted that the British Government would expect to obtain Chinese Communist assurances regarding observance of the Kowloon lease agreement prior to extending recognition. He indicated that the question of Hong Kong did not arise since this was British territory ceded by treaty.

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<sup>58</sup> Signed at Moscow, August 14, 1945. For text, see United Nations Treaty series, vol. x, p. 300; for correspondence, see volume I.

<sup>59</sup> Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>60</sup> Robert Schuman, French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Prefacing his query with the expression that he was going to be very frank, Mr. Butterworth asked if the British had had any preliminary conversations with Chinese Communist authorities either in Hong Kong or in Shanghai through intermediaries such as Mr. John Keswick (head of Jardine-Matheson)<sup>61</sup> which would provide some common ground and make the British approach to the question of recognition seem less of a "bolt out of the blue". Mr. Graves replied that the British Embassy at Washington had no knowledge of any such exploratory discussions but that he himself suspected that such an approach may have been made through Mr. Keswick at Shanghai. He said that he would inquire of the Foreign Office in this regard.

Mr. Butterworth referred to the indication given by the Secretary to Mr. Bevin in September of the probable attitude of the countries in southeast Asia toward early recognition of the Chinese Communist regime and added that he assumed that the British representatives in their forthcoming conference at Singapore would look into this question and take into consideration the attitudes of the countries in southeast Asia, which, according to American reports, would not favor early recognition. Mr. Graves said that he felt certain that this question would be considered at Singapore by the British representatives and said that he would endeavor to obtain information in this regard for transmission to Mr. Butterworth.

Mr. Graves stated in conclusion that the British Government expected to receive the replies of the other governments being approached without any difficulty within the next two weeks and repeated the previously expressed hope that the Department of State would give him an indication of the U.S. Government's attitude within two weeks. Mr. Butterworth replied that the Department would give full consideration to the matter and that it was hoped a reply would be forthcoming as requested by the British.

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893.01/11-149

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*<sup>62</sup>

1237/34/49

#### MEMORANDUM

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, having considered the question of the recognition of the Chinese communist

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<sup>61</sup> Jardine, Matheson & Co., British shipping firm in China.

<sup>62</sup> Handed by the Counselor of the British Embassy (Graves) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) on November 1 and by the Secretary of State to President Truman on November 7.

regime, desire to consult with the Government of the United States and other governments including those of the British Commonwealth, on the basis of the general appraisal of the situation and conclusions set forth in the present memorandum. His Majesty's Government will make no decision on recognition until replies have been made and until a report has been received from Singapore, where the forthcoming conference of United Kingdom representatives will consider the implications of recognition as they affect United Kingdom interests in the Far East.

2. It is recalled that the Chinese Nationalist Government was our former ally in the war and has been a useful friend in the United Nations. Today it is unfortunately no longer representative of anything but its ruling clique, whilst its control over the remaining metropolitan territories is tenuous. The Nationalist forces in China have shown no disposition to give battle and there is no doubt that the will to resist has largely disappeared. In the United Nations Organisation the continued recognition of the Nationalist Government offers the advantage of a vote which in the past has usually been cast in our favour, whereas a communist vote is likely to be cast against us. But this is hardly an advantage which can be maintained indefinitely.

3. The communist government of the People's Republic of China is the only alternative to the Nationalist Government and the communists are now the rulers of most of China (Mr. Bevin is advised that they control at present seventy per cent of the total area of the country and seventy-five per cent of the total population of China). Moreover the fall of Canton has brought them to the frontier of Hongkong. It would be a mistake to disregard the fact that they are, on their own statements, orthodox Marxist-Leninists who openly declare their strong partiality for the Soviet Union and its methods. How long they will last, how "orthodox" their methods will be, and how strong their leadership will prove is yet to be seen.

4. The Soviet Union and the satellite states have already recognised the communist government, and a considerable number of Russian technicians have already arrived in North China. It may be expected that the Soviet Union will take full advantage of the fact that they are first in the field and that, in the absence of any representation from the West, they will seek to influence the Chinese communist government in the direction of making matters difficult for other powers. If there is a considerable influx of Russians, it is not impossible that frictions may develop with the Chinese, but we cannot expect to take advantage of such a development if we have no relations with the communist government. The communists have a need to trade with the West but, with the lapse of time, if such trade does not

develop they may come to the conclusion that they can tighten their belts and do without Western economic assistance, in which view they will be encouraged by the Soviet Union.

5. The United Kingdom has also to consider its own trading interests in China, which are considerable and of long standing. His Majesty's Government have advocated a policy of keeping a foot in the door, and if this policy is to bear fruit it can only be as a result of recognition of the Chinese communist government. On political and practical grounds His Majesty's Government are therefore in favour of *de jure* recognition. \*

6. Mr. Bevin is advised that recognition of the communist government as the *de jure* government of China in present conditions cannot be held to be contrary to the principles and practice of international law, having regard to the proportion of Chinese territory controlled by the communist government and the firmness of its control there on the one hand and, on the other, to the small proportion of Chinese territory held by the Nationalists and the tenuous nature of Nationalist control, where it exists. It can be asserted that the resistance of the Nationalist Government in China is now ostensibly hopeless and its control over any portion of Chinese territory on the mainland hardly more than nominal, and in these circumstances Mr. Bevin is advised that *de jure* recognition of the communist government is legally justifiable.

7. The above represents His Majesty's Government's political and legal appreciation of the position and their conclusion is that recognition should be accorded. A detailed examination has yet to be made of the precise implications for the United Kingdom of *de jure* recognition and these are being studied. The implications for the United Kingdom's extensive Far Eastern interests will be examined by a conference of His Majesty's representatives in the Far East which is being held from the 2nd to the 4th November. Other governments will no doubt be studying the implications for their own interests. It is Mr. Bevin's hope that the action eventually taken by governments will be concerted as far as possible, although it is accepted that every government has, in the final analysis, the right to take such action as it considers appropriate.

8. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have also been considering what their attitude should be when the Chinese Nationalist complaint against the Soviet Union comes up for debate in the political committee of the United Nations Assembly. They are unable to see that the Nationalist complaint will, at this late date, serve any useful purpose in upholding the authority of the Nationalist Government in China, which has already been described as tenuous. It is



by no means clear that a successful case can be established against the Soviet Union or that, if it is established, any desirable result will ensue. The Soviet Union for its part can be relied upon to make a violent attack upon the position of the Nationalist Government and is likely to make use of those portions of the United States White Paper on China<sup>63</sup> which are the most damaging to Chiang Kai-Shek<sup>64</sup> and the Nationalist Government. Since, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the present state of affairs in China is due to the corruption and maladministration of the National Government and that any breach of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 had in fact little bearing upon the present situation, any support of the Nationalist Government in the forthcoming debate would not, it is considered, be justified. Nor, if ultimate recognition of the Chinese communist government is contemplated, does there appear to be any purpose in criticising the Chinese communists in advance of such recognition. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are disposed to instruct their representatives in the United Nations Assembly to take no part in the debate and to abstain from voting if a vote should take place.

9. It would be of considerable convenience to Mr. Bevin if Mr. Acheson could favour him with the Department of State's observations within the next two weeks in order that His Majesty's Government may review the problem in the light of those views and the opinions expressed at the Singapore Conference.

WASHINGTON, 1 November 1949.

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893.01/11-249

*Memorandum by Mr. Gerald Stryker of the Office of Chinese Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] November 2, 1949.

Subject: Attitudes Toward Recognition of the Chinese Communist Regime

*A. Attitudes of friendly interested governments.*

In general almost all governments friendly to the U.S. and concerned with developments in China continue to support, in theory at least, the position consistently advanced by the U.S. since May of this year that (a) hasty recognition would be unwise, and (b) con-

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<sup>63</sup> Department of State, *United States Relations With China* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949); for correspondence regarding the publication of the White Paper, see pp. 1365 ff.

<sup>64</sup> President of China until his retirement on January 21, 1949, in favor of Vice President Li Tsung-jen; leader of the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party).

sultation between friendly interested governments prior to taking any action respecting recognition is desirable.

Certain governments, however, have replied to the Chinese Communist bid for recognition in a way and in terms which might be interpreted as something of a departure from the agreed policy of holding prior consultation and making no haste. Thus, the UK (whose most recent declaration on recognition policy is treated below), the Netherlands, India, and Canada have stated to the Chinese Communist regime orally or in writing that the question of recognition is under consideration and that in the meantime it is to be hoped that consular officials of the concerned governments will be allowed to perform normal functions of mutual advantage.

No government has stated categorically that it will not recognize the Chinese Communist regime. On the contrary, the general attitude is that all friendly interested states will eventually recognize the regime, but that the granting of recognition will be dependent on certain factors such as protection of trade interests, protection of the borders of neighboring states, the regime's willingness to accept its international obligations, or questions connected with the vague term "timing."

Conditions for recognition have been stated publicly only by Australia, and these conditions are the most stringent yet set by any government. The Australian Minister for External Affairs<sup>65</sup> in a remarkable statement on October 25<sup>66</sup> announced that the question of recognition cannot be solved until "definite and convincing" assurances are given that "(1) the government which was set up on 1st October is in fact in control of the area it claims; (2) it is in fact prepared to and capable of carrying out its international obligations; and (3) it is a government supported by the free will of the majority of the people it rules." (Mr. Evatt, incidentally, attributed the enumeration of these conditions to Secretary Acheson, a gross inaccuracy as far as the third condition is concerned.) Mr. Evatt noted furthermore that the UK, the US and Australia "are in complete accord in their attitude toward the new government" and concluded that "in the absence . . .<sup>67</sup> of firm and specific assurances that the territorial integrity of neighboring countries, notably Hong Kong, will be respected and that the new China will carry out all its international obligations, recognition cannot be granted any more than admission to the United Nations would be granted."

<sup>65</sup> Herbert V. Evatt.

<sup>66</sup> See telegram No. 229, October 26, from the Ambassador in Australia, p. 145.

<sup>67</sup> Omission indicated in the source text.

"On political and practical grounds, His Majesty's Government are . . .<sup>67a</sup> in favor of *de jure* recognition." So states a note delivered on November 1 by the British Embassy in Washington. The note makes it clear that this declaration is based on the belief that (a) the National Government's position is "ostensibly hopeless", (b) the UK and other western powers will be in danger of forfeiting important advantages to the USSR and its satellites in terms of both economic interest and political influence if recognition is long delayed, (c) *de jure* recognition is legally justified in view of the Chinese Communists' firm control over most of China, and (d) the UK can hope to protect its own sizeable and long-standing trading interests in China only if recognition is granted. The British communication makes no mention of any conditions for recognition; it is apparently the British view that *de jure* recognition should be extended, when the time comes, with no strings attached. The note states that a decision regarding recognition will not be made until replies are received (Secretary Acheson is requested to reply within two weeks) and until a report is forthcoming from the Singapore conference (November 2-4). At the same time the UK wants it understood that, while concerted action is desirable, "it is accepted that every government has, in the final analysis, the right to take such action as it considers appropriate."<sup>68</sup>

B. *Attitudes of Participants in Round Table Discussion of October 6, 7, and 8.*

The question of recognition was discussed at some length during the conference on US problems in the Far East sponsored by the Department's Office of Public Affairs on October 6-8. The 25 participants in this conference represented various segments of the US public and all were qualified to a greater or lesser degree as experts in the Far Eastern field.

With the exception of Mr. Stassen,<sup>69</sup> who categorically opposed recognition on the grounds described below, and of an Oregon banker who counselled a policy of "watch and wait" because of his concern over explosive reactions from the US public and the Congress, every one of the participants who expressed his views on the subject favored US recognition of the Chinese Communist regime. The supporters

<sup>67a</sup> Omission indicated in the source text.

<sup>68</sup> Foregoing part "A" of this memorandum was set up separately as CFE D-2/1 for use of the Secretary of State in the forthcoming meeting in Paris of the Council of Foreign Ministers; see memorandum CFE D-2, November 5, p. 168.

<sup>69</sup> Harold E. Stassen, former Governor of Minnesota, President of the University of Pennsylvania.

included eleven intellectuals and educators, four businessmen, and one (the only) missionary representative. The desirability of recognizing the Chinese Communist regime was so much taken for granted during the discussion that little mention was made of the positive reasons for recognition. Discussion centered, rather, on when and under what conditions recognition should be granted. Be that as it may, the following points were advanced in support of recognition:

(1) Nothing is to be lost by recognition, nothing to be gained by non-recognition.

(2) Non-recognition would hamper trade or make trade impossible.

(3) Chinese public opinion will be more favorable to the US if the US recognizes.

(4) Recognition might make possible reestablishment of the traditional US policy of the "open door."

(5) Only by recognition can relations with the Chinese be "normalized."

Some of the supporters favored immediate recognition, but most of them believed that recognition should be granted at a certain time and under certain conditions. Observations made along these lines included the following points:

(1) Recognition should be granted if and when

(a) the National Government loses control completely and the Communists establish effective "machinery of state."

(b) the Chinese Communists demonstrate their willingness to accept international obligations and to treat decently nationals of other states in territories under their control.

(2) Recognition should be used as a bargaining agent in attempts to secure certain conditions vital to the US.

(3) Recognition should be granted neither too early, in which case the US would appear to be engaging in a panicky retreat in all of Asia, nor too late, in which case the US would appear to be forced into temporizing with a situation beyond its ability to handle.

(4) The US should begin immediately to disentangle itself from the National Government. Specifically ECA<sup>70</sup> aid should be ended forthwith and the US should keep itself clear of the Chinese case before the UN. (One or two of the participants even favored positive action by the US to end the "port closure").

(5) US public opinion should not be an impediment to recognition; public opinion can be either ignored or educated to a new view of the China scene. That education has already begun with the publication of the White Paper.

(6) There is no reason for holding up recognition on account of the prospective Japanese peace treaty.

<sup>70</sup> Economic Cooperation Administration.

Mr. Stassen's opposition to recognition was based on the following considerations:

(1) Recognition would hasten the victory of the Communists in China and hasten the complete liquidation of the National Government.

(2) Recognition would mean repudiation of one of the US's greatest wartime allies.

(3) Recognition would force out of the UN the representatives of a government which still has effective jurisdiction over one-third of the area of China and one-third of its people.

(4) Recognition of the Chinese Communist regime would mean abandonment of a Government which has provided a greater measure of democracy and individual freedom than has any Communist government.

(5) Recognition would put the US in the position of being unable at some later date to support effective anti-Communist elements in China.

(6) If it is the desire of the US to encourage Titoism<sup>71</sup> in Communist China, generosity is not the means to attain that end, as shown by US experience in Yugoslavia.

Mr. Stassen concluded his statement on recognition by observing that recognition and assistance would be appropriate when indications appeared that the Chinese Communists were moving away from Moscow and in the direction of granting individual freedom to the people under their control. He also stated emphatically that the US should have a new program of economic aid to Asia in operation before recognition is accorded to the Chinese Communist regime.

### *C. Statements by Far Eastern Specialists*

Roughly two-thirds of the thirty Far Eastern specialists who were invited by Ambassador Jessup<sup>72</sup> in letters of August 18 to submit comments and recommendations on US policy in the Far East discussed the question of recognition of the Chinese Communist regime. About half of this number favored recognition, while the other half were opposed.

Those who favored recognition believed that the fact that the Communists have effective control over China calls for prompt US recognition. This group was also concerned with the problem of maintaining the maximum amount of American connections in China in order to minimize Communist control and to help bring about its eventual decline. Some of the supporters of recognition felt that the US should make it clear that any delay in recognition would be caused

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<sup>71</sup> Marshal Josip Broz Tito, head of the Yugoslav Communist Party and State, broke with Moscow, June 1948.

<sup>72</sup> Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup.

by Communist unwillingness to maintain relations and to assume the usual international obligations.

Only a small number of those who specifically opposed recognition now, looked forward to recognition in the foreseeable future. This group held generally to the line that the US should adopt a "wait and see" policy and that a "delayed decision" would be most advisable.

#### D. *US press opinion*

The US press during the past month and a half has devoted considerable attention to the question of US recognition of the Chinese Communist regime. Editorial policies range from an outright call for immediate recognition to a downright condemnation of recognition at any time, with a good many papers having discussed the question without arriving at any conclusion. A majority opinion on the subject cannot be stated to exist as yet.

Papers which support recognition now or at some indefinite time in the future make the following points:

(1) Recognition would mean only cognizance of what is already an accomplished fact.

(2) Recognition would allow the US to maintain contact with the Chinese; the US must keep offices in China as listening posts.

(3) Withholding recognition is a weapon of limited usefulness.

(4) Recognition does not imply moral approval of a regime.

(5) The US can hope to influence the Communist regime along democratic lines and keep Russian influence at a minimum only through recognition.

(6) Failure to recognize will drive China further into the arms of the USSR.

Newspapers which support recognition generally feel that recognition should be contingent upon

(1) Chinese Communist control over the mass of the people.

(2) Chinese Communist assumption of international obligations.

(3) Chinese Communist agreement to behave and to treat US officials and nationals decently.

Those newspapers which oppose recognition take the following stand:

(1) Recognition would entail moral and material aid and support to the Chinese Communists.

(2) Recognition of the Chinese Communists, while at the same time carrying on a cold war with the USSR and its satellites in Eastern Europe, would make for inconsistency in US foreign policy.

(3) Recognition would give China's seat in the UN to the Chinese Communists.

(4) The US should not recognize the Chinese Communists but rather support the National Government.

Editorial discussions of the question of recognition have contained these additional observations:

(1) Whether the Chinese Communist regime is recognized or not, it will not be easy to do business with the Communists.

(2) It is to be hoped that the US and other Western Powers will take concerted action regarding recognition, but it is generally believed that the UK will lead the way in recognizing, thereby causing a split in US-UK policy.

890.00/11-1749

*Memorandum by Mr. Charlton Ogburn, Jr., of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON, November 2, 1949.]

DECISIONS REACHED BY CONSENSUS AT THE MEETINGS WITH THE SECRETARY AND THE CONSULTANTS ON THE FAR EAST <sup>73</sup>

[Here follows summary of decisions in regard to the area from Japan to Pakistan as a whole, followed by summary of decisions in regard to individual countries in the area, Japan, Ryukyu Islands, and Korea.]

*D. China*

1. The further extension of military aid, overt or covert, by the United States to the Chinese Nationalist Government or to Chinese Nationalist armies would be futile and should be ruled out as likely to recoil to our disadvantage.

2. With regard to providing any anti-Communist elements in China with any kind of assistance, the burden of showing that such assistance would be effective in the specific case must lie with the proponents of such a program of aid.

3. With regard to Communist China, we anticipate the possibility that great strains will develop between Peiping and Moscow. These

<sup>73</sup> The Secretary of State presided over two meetings with Officers of the Department and the Consultants on the Far East. On October 26, from 2:30 to 5 p. m., the following were present: The Secretary, the Under Secretary (Webb), the Deputy Under Secretary (Rusk), the Counselor (Kennan), the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth), the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and African Affairs (McGee), Ambassador Stuart, Ambassador Jessup, Consultants Robert B. Fosdick and Everett Case, and Walter Wilds, Charles W. Yost, Raymond A. Hare, John M. Allison, Philip D. Sprouse, John Davies, Jr., Kenneth C. Krentz, Dallas W. Dort, and Charlton Ogburn, Jr. On October 27, from 4 to 5:15 p. m., the following were present: The Secretary, Mr. Rusk, Mr. Butterworth, Ambassador Stuart, Ambassador Jessup, Consultants Fosdick and Case, and Messrs. Wilds, Yost, Hare, Allison, Sprouse, Davies, Lampton Berry, Krentz, Dort, Elbert G. Mathews, James L. O'Sullivan, and Ogburn.



strains would not only work to our advantage but would contribute to the desired end of permitting China to develop its own life independently rather than as a Russian satellite. However, rather than go out of our way to create difficulties for the Chinese Communist regime, which might drive it the more firmly into the arms of the Kremlin while failing to shorten its life, we should recognize that the ingredients of the situation in China are such as to make the task of any Chinese Government exceedingly difficult and should allow these ingredients full opportunity to operate.

4. In pursuit of our aim of encouraging Chinese Communist deviation from the Moscow line, we should keep before the Chinese people the fact of our interest in their independence and welfare, and to this end should utilize the full potentialities of an expanded information program, relying upon written materials in addition to the Voice of the USA, which is of limited effectiveness.

5. At the present time, we should not consider US Government financial assistance to Chinese Communist projects of an economic-developmental nature and should discourage the enlistment of private American capital in such projects. Communist China should not be made eligible for Point IV benefits. However, we should permit American business firms already in China to continue their operations and should favor the continued functioning of American philanthropical and educational missions in China in order to maintain our contacts with the Chinese people.

6. We should acquiesce in trade with China of an innocent character while permitting no strategic items to reach Communist China and making no loans to encourage trade with China.

7. US recognition of the Chinese Communists is not to be regarded as a major instrument for showing our interest in the Chinese people or for winning concessions from the Communist regime. Our attitude on this question should not be an eager one, but should be realistic.

8. We should not seek to detach Formosa from the Communist-controlled mainland either by the application of force or by seeking jurisdiction over the island through a trusteeship arrangement on behalf of Formosan self-government, since such actions on our part would outrage all Chinese elements and as a resort to naked expediency would destroy our standing with the smaller countries of the world. However, should another nation bring the conflict involving Formosa before the United Nations as a threat to the peace, we might join with other members in supporting a cease-fire resolution and the application of the principle of self-determination.

[Here follows summary of decisions with regard to other countries in the area, the Philippines, Indochina, Thailand, British Malaya, Indonesia, Burma, India, and Pakistan.]

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893.01/11-249 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Bacon), at Nanking*

WASHINGTON, November 2, 1949—7 p. m.

1204. Shanghai states Bishop Walsh<sup>74</sup> informed by Papal Nuncio Riberi he favors immed recognition Commie regime by Vatican as only hope for maintenance of church in China. As Emb officers now in Dept were given opposite impression by Riberi, you are requested to ascertain his present attitude re recognition through informal conversations without giving any indication you are under instrs from your Govt. Report results to Dept.

ACHESON

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893.01/11-349 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Burma (Huddle) to the Secretary of State*

RANGOON, November 3, 1949—noon.

[Received November 3—7:51 a. m.]

484. Panikkar, Indian Ambassador to China, returned through Rangoon recently, worried by growing might of Red China and its threat to Asia, especially Indian Government and institutions, inclined to recommend early recognition by India. Burma Ambassador Myint Thein, also back from Nanking, is much impressed by Mao Tse-tung<sup>75</sup> government's progress, considers it aggressive and expansionist in sense that its ambitions may take it beyond Chinese borders, fears for safety of Burma, remarking that China traditionally has never considered Burma an independent political entity.

HUDDLE

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<sup>74</sup>The Most Reverend James E. Walsh, American Roman Catholic missionary in China (Maryknoll Fathers).

<sup>75</sup>"Chairman of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China"; Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

893.01/11-349

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State  
for European Affairs (Perkins)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 3, 1949.

Participants: Mr. Perkins, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs  
Sr. Lucioli, Counselor, Italian Embassy  
Mr. Unger, WE <sup>76</sup>

Mr. Lucioli said that the Italian Government has just received from the British Government a note to the effect that the British intend to give formal recognition to the Chinese Communist Government but, before taking final action, they wish to solicit the views of the North Atlantic Pact countries. Lucioli said that Italy's interests in this matter are primarily of a general nature, aside from certain commercial considerations, and relate more to Italy's relations with the other Western countries than any direct political interest in the Chinese situation itself. For this reason he was raising this question first with me to solicit my views, on instructions from his Government, although he would like subsequently to talk to some of the Far Eastern officers in the State Department. Lucioli added that the Italian Government felt that concerted action among the Pact countries was probably desirable on important issues of this nature. I replied that I was not intimately acquainted with our Chinese policy and our immediate plans in this respect but that my personal view was that the British action was somewhat hasty. I recognized, however, that sooner or later we would probably have to recognize the fact that the Communist Government was in control of China and presumably to accord it recognition. I said that the French seemed to agree with us on the advisability of a more gradual policy. Lucioli said he assumed from this that we favored reaching final recognition through a series of gradual steps, rather than final action now.

Lucioli then pointed out that Italy had a direct interest in recognition as it may relate to the possibility of Italy's securing membership in the UN. He explained that, if recognition takes place, at some point the permanent members of the Security Council, including the USSR, would undoubtedly have to take up the question of the replacement of the present Nationalist Government representative by a representative of the Communist Government and at this time the

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<sup>76</sup> Leonard Unger, of the Office of Western European Affairs.

question of Italian membership in the UN might usefully be raised. Presumably Lucioli was proposing that Soviet agreement to Italian admission to the UN might be demanded in return for our accepting Communist instead of Nationalist representation for China. I acknowledged this suggestion but gave my opinion that it was unlikely that additional countries would be admitted to the UN until it is agreed that all those which have been proposed for membership are taken in at once.

GEORGE W. PERKINS

893.01/11-449 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 4, 1949—4 p. m.

[Received November 4—1 :41 p. m.]

4598. Baeyens<sup>77</sup> informs us meeting held November 1 interested division chiefs, Foreign Office and in Overseas France, Pignon,<sup>78</sup> Meyrier (French Ambassador to Nanking) to discuss British memo regarding recognition Chinese Government (Depintel November 2, 1 a. m.<sup>79</sup> received Paris November 4, 6 a. m.).

Baeyens stated while meeting accepted inevitability of recognizing Communist Government, favored postponement as long as possible, amongst other major reasons because of effect recognition on Indochina situation. French believe if British recognize now, Belgium, Holland, India and Pakistan (but not necessarily Australia and New Zealand) will probably follow suit immediately, "leaving rest of us out on limb if we persist delaying". In belief US thinking on undesirability early recognition similar to French, and in view greater possibilities US influencing UK, meeting recommended Foreign Office request Department take parallel action French in endeavoring "to slow down British".

Said minutes meeting in hands interested Ministries since yesterday but no decision on recommendation had as yet been made.

Sent Department 4598, repeated London 792.

BRUCE

<sup>77</sup> Jacques Baeyens, Head of the Asia-Oceania Section of the French Foreign Office.

<sup>78</sup> Leon M. Pignon, French High Commissioner in Indochina.

<sup>79</sup> Not printed.

893.01/11-449

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Sprouse)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 4, 1949.

Mr. Daridan<sup>80</sup> called this afternoon and during the course of his conversation informed me that the French Embassy had this morning received a telegram from the Foreign Office giving the gist of a note from the British Embassy in Paris regarding the British views on the question of recognition of the Chinese Communist regime. (This note is identical with that presented by the British Embassy to the Department on November 1.) Mr. Daridan said that the Foreign Office would appreciate our cooperation in endeavoring to obtain a delay on the part of the British with regard to possible recognition of the Chinese Communist regime. He concluded that this was the only comment the Foreign Office had made regarding the British note.

893.01/11-449 : Telegram

*The Chargé in India (Donovan) to the Secretary of State*

NEW DELHI, November 4, 1949—5 p. m.

[Received 8:21 p. m.]

1366. Sardar Patel, Home Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, telephoned me this morning and asked me to lunch with him today. At lunch were present only Patel, his private secretary, his daughter and myself. While Patel has aged in past few months, he was alert and expressed himself in his usual blunt and concise fashion.

He said he wished to discuss problem of India's recognition of Communist Government in China which must inevitably come up soon. Following is summary our conversation:

Foreign affairs were usually left to Nehru,<sup>81</sup> but in matter of such importance as recognition Communist Government [of] China, Patel felt that he must participate. I remarked that recognition of Communist Government China by India raised internal as well as external problems, with which Patel agreed. He expressed great concern over

<sup>80</sup> Jean Daridan, Counselor of the French Embassy.<sup>81</sup> Indian Prime Minister.

state of affairs in Burma and said that Communist Government in China, with Burma collapsing, presented grave problem to India. He also expressed concern over situation Tibet, but did not elaborate. I remarked that while the position of Great Britain, the US, and India varied insofar as their interests might be affected by the recognition or nonrecognition of China, certain basic factors were common to all countries and then stressed points outlined Deptel 693, October 7. I particularly emphasized that there was no need for haste in recognizing Communist China Government and that any power which counted on obtaining genuine good will or friendship by prompt recognition would be disappointed as Communist regimes did not operate in that fashion. Patel agreed with my views.

His secretary said that Chinese colony in Calcutta had always been a problem and that it would serve as convenient link with Communist China for activities in India. Overt acts by China not feared, but Patel admitted that police left Chinese to themselves in Calcutta's Chinatown and interfered only when absolutely necessary. Chinese in other parts India no problem.

Patel remarked his attitude towards Communism was well-known both at home and abroad. Recent Russian attacks on Prime Minister have been due to Russian idea that he is veering to the right. Patel took this opportunity to say that there was [*were*] no differences between Prime Minister and himself and that it was his job to keep order in the country.

Concluding conversation, Patel said he felt there was no need for hurry in recognizing Communist Government China and asked me to keep in touch with him re problem recognition. Other than that, he made no commitments re Indian policy, but I am sure he will weigh very carefully effect recognition would have on Communist problem in India and on question Indo-Burmese relations. Patel can be powerful factor in opposing the faction which desires prompt recognition China and, in my comments, I therefore emphasized internal aspects of problem as they might affect India, should it recognize Communist regime China.

In view extreme sensitivity Nehru and Minister External Affairs re discussion foreign affairs by other members government, fact that

Patel had this talk with me should not be revealed to British or French.

Sent Department 1366; pouched Calcutta.

Department pass London, Paris from Delhi.

DONOVAN

893.01/11-449: Telegram

*The Chargé in the Philippines (Hester) to the Secretary of State*

MANILA, November 4, 1949—7 p. m.

[Received November 4—5:44 a. m.]

2538. *Manila Times* October 30 and *Evening News* November 1 carried stories to effect President Quirino October 29 revealed Chinese Government had requested Philippine Government permit entry Chinese refugees and that persons seeking haven would include ranking officials and financiers. Under Secretary Neri,<sup>82</sup> November 4, informed Embassy officer this report incorrect and result of misunderstanding of remarks made by President Quirino in October 26 speech before Cebu Chinese Chamber Commerce (Embtel 2436, October 20<sup>83</sup>). Neri added Philippine Government had received informal request permit entry some Chinese financiers who desired survey local investment possibilities but that consideration their request had been shelved.

Passing from discussion question possible admission Chinese refugees to that of recognition Chinese Communist regime, Neri reaffirmed that Philippine Government stands by policy common-front. Indeed, he said, Philippines may well decide on policy non-recognition. Incidentally, Embassy believes Papal Delegate Egidio Vagnozi is exerting his influence here against recognition; in conversation with Ambassador November 2, he voiced opinion effects present [*presence?*] Chinese Commie Embassy could be absorbed without undue danger in Washington or London but that its influence would be dangerous in country like Philippines which contains substantial Chinese population. He added he accordingly felt it important Philippines should not recognize Chinese Communist regime.

HESTER

<sup>82</sup> Felino Neri, Philippine Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>83</sup> Not printed.



893.01/11-549

*Memorandum by Mr. Troy L. Perkins, of the Office of Chinese Affairs* <sup>84</sup>

[CFE D-2]

[WASHINGTON, November 5, 1949.]

RECOGNITION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST REGIME

*Problem:*

The position which we should take during the forthcoming discussions with the British and French Foreign Ministers with respect to the question of possible recognition of a Chinese Communist regime.

*Discussion:*

1. The present position of leading governments toward recognition and their reaction to the Chou En-lai letter of October 1, inviting recognition, are summarized in Supplement A (CFE D-2/1).<sup>85</sup>

2. Recognition should not be extended before the Communist regime has concretely indicated that it is prepared to respect at least the minimum standards of international conduct and to assume the responsibilities of a government in the treatment of foreign nationals and their interests. The foregoing embodies the meagerest minimum and does not involve the usual and desirable assumption by a new regime of existing treaty obligations of the state nor does it even assume the negotiation of a new agreement, similar to the US-USSR 1933 Litvinov Agreement.<sup>86</sup> We await the observance in practice of the elementary concepts of international conduct or even (as in the Mukden case<sup>87</sup>) of simple humanitarian treatment of foreign nationals.

Chinese Communist leaders have publicly announced their intention to abrogate or not to recognize a number of the international obligations contracted by the present Chinese Government including,

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<sup>84</sup> A covering document by Bradley Patterson, of the Executive Secretariat, stated that this memorandum was drafted for guidance "on the position the U. S. should take during the forthcoming conversations with the British and French Ministers concerning possible recognition of a Chinese Communist regime. This paper has been approved by Mr. Butterworth and has been informally discussed with the Secretary."

<sup>85</sup> Not printed; but see part "A" of memorandum by Gerald Stryker, November 2, p. 154, which was adopted in its entirety to be "Supplement A (CFE D-2/1)", with the insertion of the following as the fifth paragraph:

"Among the Southeast Asian countries other than India, Thailand's Premier Phibun has stated publicly that recognition of the Chinese Communist regime will be dependent upon proof that the regime represents and is supported by a majority of the people and its acceptance by the UN. The Burmese have indicated a strong desire to engage in consultation on the question of recognition, but no definitive statement as to that country's intentions has yet been made. The Philippines apparently will follow the U.S. lead on recognition."

<sup>86</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1933, vol. II, pp. 805-814.

<sup>87</sup> See vol. VIII, "Problems of United States Consulates in areas occupied by the Chinese Communists", chapter I.

specifically, most of the recent treaties and agreements between the U.S. and China. (There is attached a list of the major treaties and agreements in force between the United States and China—Supplement B—CFE D-2/2).

It is suggested that you take up with Mr. Bevin the question of the British attitude toward Communist disregard of the obligations undertaken by China in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.<sup>88</sup> We have under consideration the suspension in so far as they apply to imports from China, of the benefits of tariff concessions made by the U.S. in that Agreement. Such suspension would require, for one thing, consultation with other contracting parties and we may find it exceedingly difficult to take the necessary action effectively or at all if the British and a number of the other contracting parties should have, in the meanwhile, recognized the Communists without clarifying their position with respect to the General Agreement.

3. Recognition of the Communist regime by leading democratic powers during the present session of the General Assembly would be unfortunate in its effect upon consideration of substantive problems of this session since, unless there were reasonably unanimous consent among them to the seating of a Chinese Communist delegation, such recognition would probably interject a procedural problem and might well invite a rancorous debate.

4. Hasty recognition by any of the leading democratic Western Powers would have immediate and far-reaching repercussions in southeast Asia because of the indication of a break in the democratic ranks and the aid and comfort given to local Communist movements. We believe that consideration should be given to the attitudes of the countries in southeast Asia which, according to American reports, do not favor early recognition. The reaction in the independent countries, such as Siam, Burma, the Philippines and the new Indonesian Republic would be most important. You may wish, in discussion with Mr. Schuman, to allude to the position which the Indochinese Government and Bao Dai<sup>89</sup> might find themselves in if there were French recognition of a neighboring regime without any assurances of its future attitudes and actions toward Indochina.

A complicating factor for the French would be the gathering of Pai Chung-hsi's<sup>90</sup> retreating armies along the Indochina border, since

<sup>88</sup> Signed at Geneva, October 30, 1947; for text, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1700, or 61 Stat. (pts. 5-6).

<sup>89</sup> Chief of State of Vietnam.

<sup>90</sup> Director of Military and Political Affairs for Central China under Acting President Li Tsung-jen.

the French would likely be unable to cope with any large-scale incursions of Pai's forces.

It would also be well for the Secretary to keep in mind the attitude of the British with respect to Hong Kong. If the British should, because of pressure from the US, withhold recognition of the Chinese Communists for a considerable period, it is possible that complications over Hong Kong would arise which might lead to a Chinese Communist attack on the Colony. In this connection, it should be noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have given their opinion that the British military position in Hong Kong would, under such circumstances, be untenable and have recommended to the President that "the United States will not provide military support to the British for the defense of Hong Kong in the event of a Communist military attack". The defeat of the British in Hong Kong by the Chinese Communists would, of course, constitute a serious loss in prestige of the democratic Western powers in the Far East.

5. It is our belief that recognition by the U.S. of a Communist regime while the Mukden case is outstanding would be a tactical impossibility. In fact, this case raises the question, as a gauge of their future performance, of the independence of action of the Chinese Communist leaders, most particularly in Manchuria. We consider that the recognition of the Chinese Communist regime by other friendly powers while this flagrant instance of treatment of foreign officials remains unsettled would have the effect of acquiescing in, if not condoning, such practice and could serve as a precedent for the Communists after recognition has been successfully achieved.

6. Finally, it is to be noted that a friendly government which we recognize still has control over considerable areas and population of China and continues to oppose the Communist drive in Asia.

*Recommendations:*

It is recommended that you endeavor to obtain the agreement of Mr. Bevin and Mr. Schuman to the following:

1. That the friendly Western Powers continue to adhere to the continuation of full prior consultation and, in so far as possible, common action with respect to recognition.

2. That recognition not be extended until at least the conditions generally recognized as a minimum are fulfilled.

3. That no support be given during the present session of the General Assembly to attempts of a Chinese Communist delegation to obtain seating in the Assembly.

## [Annex]

*Supplement B [CFE/D-2/2:] List of Major Treaties and Agreements  
in Force Between the United States and China*

## A. MULTILATERAL

Cairo statement of November, 1943

Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, San Francisco, June 26, 1945

(In addition, China is also a party to a number of agreements involving specific UN organizations, such as UNESCO, FAO, IRO, WHO, the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank, ILO, etc.)

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), signed at Geneva, October 30, 1947

Convention on International Civil Aviation, Chicago, December 7, 1944

International Telecommunications Convention, Madrid December 9, 1922 [1932]

International Sanitary Convention for Aerial Navigation, Washington, December 15, 1944

(With protocol of April 23, 1946, prolonging the convention)

Protocol amending the agreements, conventions, and protocols on narcotic drugs, concluded at The Hague on January 23, 1922 [1912], *et seq.*, New York, December 11, 1946

Convention to suppress slave trade, Geneva, September 25, 1926

Agreement for the repression of trade in white women, Paris, May 18, 1904

Convention for promoting safety of life at sea, London, May 31, 1929, with amendments

Universal Postal Convention, Cairo, March [20,] 1934

Convention for the international exchange of official documents, Brussels, March 15, 1886

Convention for the formation of an international union for the publication of customs tariffs, Brussels, July 5, 1890

Arrangement relative to the repression of the circulation of obscene publications, Paris, May 4, 1910

Conventions for the pacific settlement of international disputes and the limitation of the employment of force, The Hague, October 18 1907

Conventions regarding the rules of warfare (The most important of these conventions were those signed at The Hague, October 18, 1907.)

Nine-Power Treaty, February 6, 1922

#### B. BILATERAL

Treaty . . . Relating to the Relinquishment of Extraterritorial Rights in China and the Regulation of Related Matters, Washington, January 11, 1943

Arbitration Treaty, Washington, June 27, 1930

Air Transport Agreement, Nanking, December 20, 1946

Parcel Post Convention, Peking, May 29, 1916

Agreement relating to the exemption from duty of the effects of diplomatic and consular officers, Washington, September-December, 1930

Agreement Relating to the Presence of United States Armed Forces in China, Nanking, August 29-September 3, 1947

Agreement Relating to Claims Resulting from Activities of US Military Forces in China, effective March 17, 1948

Agreement Relating to the Establishment of the United States Educational Foundation in China (Fulbright agreement), Nanking, November 10, 1947

Agreement relating to financial aid to China (the 500 million dollar credit), Washington, March 21, 1942

Agreements regarding lend-lease

(Most important of these agreements was the Agreement Relating to the Disposition of Lend-Lease Supplies, June 14, 1946, the so-called "pipe-line" agreement.)

Agreement for the sale of certain surplus war property, Shanghai, August 30, 1946

Dollar credit arrangement for the purchase by China of American surplus property abroad (dockyard agreement), Shanghai, May 15, 1946

Agreement . . . Relating to the Transfer of U.S. Naval Vessels and Equipment to the Chinese Government, Nanking, December 8, 1947

Economic aid agreement, Nanking, July 3, 1948

Agreement . . . Providing for Relief Assistance to China, Nanking, October 27, 1947

Agreement . . . Providing for the Establishment of a Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction in China, Nanking, August 5, 1948

Treaty of Friendship, Navigation, and Commerce, November 30, 1948

893.01/11-549

*Senator H. Alexander Smith*<sup>91</sup> to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] November 5, 1949.

DEAR DEAN: I had hoped to see you before this to have a chance to talk to you personally about my experience in the Far East. I see by the papers that you are leaving at once for Paris for the conference with the British and French, and therefore there will be no opportunity for me to see you before you go. I realize the pressure you are under and want to send you my very best wishes as you undertake these important deliberations.

There are two matters I wanted particularly to emphasize in my talk with you, and I can state them in this letter, with the hope that I can elaborate my reasons at a later date.

(1) I am strongly of the conviction that we should not recognize the Chinese communist government at this time, and furthermore I hope it will be possible for you with your eloquence and diplomacy to persuade the British not to do so. From conversations with the British authorities in Hong Kong, I was convinced that they were thinking exclusively in terms of (a) defense of Hong Kong, and at any cost retaining it in British possession, and (b) the pressure of their commercial interests in Shanghai and Hong Kong to recognize the Commies, so that traditional British trade can go on as before.

I was also impressed, however, with the statements of the British representatives that they felt whatever stand was taken, should be taken with the United States and not apart from the United States. I feel, therefore, that our strong stand against recognition would have a weighty effect upon the British position. In any event, however, I urge that we do not make the mistake, as I see it, of recognizing the present Chinese communist government. Many things can happen in the next few months.

(2) The second important conviction that came to me from my trip was that under no conditions should we let Formosa fall into the hands of the Chinese communists or under the domination of Russia. This of course presents a very difficult question, and it is problematical whether the Nationalist government could defend Formosa without further aid from us. From the standpoint of our own national security, however, I was convinced from my visit on the ground and getting the feel of our strategical island bases that the occupation of Formosa by hostile forces would definitely threaten our security. I

<sup>91</sup> Of New Jersey, Republican member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who had returned from a personal trip to survey conditions in the Far East.

did not arrive at this conclusion from any strategical knowledge of my own, which I make no claim to, but from the insistence of our military and naval forces wherever I went that this was a very dangerous issue and that we could not afford to pass it up.<sup>92</sup>

There have been many suggested formulas to handle this delicate matter and I am confident that we can find one on which we can all agree, and which will be in the best interests of the Taiwans themselves. I want to have the opportunity to review these possibilities with you and with our Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees.

I am sending this line to you at this time because I feel that these matters are urgent and all of us who have responsibility for our foreign policy should be working together and in complete understanding.

With kindest personal regards and best wishes for the success of your trip, I remain

Always cordially yours,

H. ALEXANDER SMITH

893.01/11-649 : Telegram

*The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Bacon) to the Secretary of State*

NANKING, November 6, 1949—noon.

[Received November 6—2:23 a. m.]

2378. Deptel 1204, November 2. Conferred Nuncio November 5 on pretext ascertain Holy See policy re payment house and land taxes. Riberi said had attempted induce religious orders form united front without success; indicated approval Shanghai Jesuit Superiors determination go jail rather than pay. Declared protection mission property and physical safety individual priests must be for Consuls concerned whereas his responsibility primarily survival and welfare in China Catholic Church as such. Had almost succeeded getting Nationalists give legislative sanction to Church as Chinese indigenous religious body and would have to begin again with Communists.

Does not believe recognition would significantly improve temporal relations so long as Communists continue regard religious faith as "mental infirmity". Confirmed my understanding no letter received from Chou En-lai and said with hearty laugh he very glad of that since he could not be called on to reply. Advocated exercise great patience by both Church and US, citing Allied behavior during Berlin blockade as brilliant example resulting frustration Communist tactics. Is convinced domineering Soviets will eventually spoil own welcome

<sup>92</sup> For correspondence regarding Formosa, see pp. 261 ff.



even in CCP<sup>93</sup> and that within few months popular feeling against Soviets and for Western nations will become evident.

Suggested that Ward incident directed by Soviets to create deeper rift between CCP and US and not maneuver to force early recognition. In his opinion, Church troubles various localities caused by attitude local Communist authorities and could not be quickly cured by recognition. Observed with composure that (1) village Communists have just closed Kichow Cathedral (Southeast Hankow), and (2) Nanking police have asked use of local chapel and on being refused said "you will regret". Cited recent case two Peiping priests jailed 5 days for disciplining pupils and said if punishment had been 5 years as rumored would not have minded since such excesses by authorities would serve open eyes of public.

As I left he stopped me and asked with evident anxiety whether I thought British would take independent step and recognize People's Government before other powers ready do so. Said I thought this most unlikely even if sometimes British seemed willing allow impression grow they would do so except for US restraint. Seemed reassured and renewed counsels of "patience and courage".

Believe Riberi still feels no immediate or remote advantage be gained by allowing selves to be stamped into hasty action and thinks profitable course is delay recognition until time when Soviet harness begins to gall CCP authorities as well as Chinese public.

BACON

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893.01/11-749 : Telegram

*The Chargé in India (Donovan) to the Secretary of State*

NEW DELHI, November 7, 1949—10 a. m.

[Received 1:21 p. m.]

1373. UK Deputy High Commission[er] Frank Roberts, who has just returned Singapore Conference, said it was unanimous opinion officials attending conference, even die-hard colonial administrators, that recognition should be accorded Chinese Communists as soon as possible. Roberts said while majority Chinese population Singapore was not pro-Communist they admired and were susceptible to influence from "New China" and representative conference felt that inevitable contacts between Chinese Malaya and Chinese Communists should take place openly where they could be more easily observed rather than through clandestine means as would be case if Chinese Communists not recognized.

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<sup>93</sup> Chinese Communist Party

According Roberts, conference reached conclusion Indochina was key to whole Southeast Asian situation. If Indochina falls under Communist control, all Southeast Asian countries except Malaya will succumb. Belief is Siam would be first to fall followed by Burma.

Sent Department 1373, Department pass Singapore.

DONOVAN

893.01/11-749 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Thailand (Stanton) to the Secretary of State*

BANGKOK, November 7, 1949—1 p. m.

[Received November 7—11:03 a. m.]

951 Foreign Minister<sup>94</sup> informs me telegram received from Prince Wan<sup>95</sup> reporting Dept asked him ascertain view Thailand Govt re recognition Chinese Communist government. Pote said, frankly speaking, Government hoped avoid recognition long as possible. I enquired precisely what he meant by this term. He replied Government hoped delay establishment diplomatic relations until Chinese Communist government seated in UN and implied that early recognition by Britain or other countries would probably not affect Government's present position this matter. He went on to explain establishment diplomatic relations would be grave development for Thailand since it was anticipated Chinese Communist diplomats, consular representatives, would actively endeavor form Chinese minority this country into active pro-Communist unit. Evident from what he said Government rather hopes will be possible avoid exchange diplomatic representatives even in event recognition Chinese Communist govt and that with this in mind formation special Chinese affairs department under Ministry Interior being pushed.

STANTON

893.01/11-749 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Singapore (Langdon) to the Secretary of State*

SINGAPORE, November 7, 1949—1 p. m.

[Received November 7—3:42 a. m.]

360. Following is account Singapore Conference given me by Dening<sup>96</sup> impliedly in accordance with Mr. Bevin's undertaking to Secretary full consultation in question recognition Mao government.

<sup>94</sup> Pote Sarasin.

<sup>95</sup> Prince Wan Waithayakon, Thai Ambassador in the United States.

<sup>96</sup> Maberly E. Dening, British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Cabinet will make final decision upon receipt reports of UK representatives (see London's 4353, October 23 [31]<sup>97</sup>) and recommendations Singapore Conference. Latter advises soonest *de jure* recognition by year end, if possible, as desirable from viewpoint both SEA<sup>98</sup> and general positions. Further advises that no formal conditions be attached but that when according recognition UK Government make unilateral declaration. It assumes Chinese Government accepts all international obligations. Observes recognition should not involve weakening but be accompanied by strengthening resistance to spread communism in area. Notes dangers to Malaya of having Communist Consuls and discouraging effects on Bao Dai's regime but offers suggestions to offset them, including joint UK-US declaration with respect Vietnam; similar, that is, regarding attitude in case aggression Hong Kong.

Above constitutes substance of confidential decisions being cabled London; remainder likely reasons for and discussions leading to above.

Full report by pouch follows.

LANGDON

S93.01/11-749 : Telegram

*The Chargé in India (Donovan) to the Secretary of State*

NEW DELHI, November 7, 1949—2 p. m.

[Received 5:07 p. m.]

1375. Embtel 1366, November 4. Panikkar, Indian Ambassador to China, asked me to lunch with him yesterday and discussed at length question Indian recognition Communist government China. Discussion instigated by him since, accordance Department's instructions, I have refrained from raising question with GOI officials in view Depcirtel October 12, 11 p.m. [*a.m.*]

Indian Ambassador said he thoroughly disliked communism and that he did not intend press immediate recognition China by India. However, facts must be faced. India's position with a thousand-mile frontier with China was more pressing than economic interests British and US. Communism is a greatly overrated menace. It has flourished only in countries ravaged by war. If India had been occupied by Japanese troops, situation in India would be entirely different than it is today and would resemble Indochina or Indonesia. In countries other than those ravaged by war, communism has made no great headway. It may have nuisance value but nothing more; examples Ceylon, India.

<sup>97</sup> Not printed.

<sup>98</sup> Southeast Asia.

I said in endeavoring view situation from Indian standpoint we did not perceive any positive advantages from too hasty recognition and until some assurance was given new government intended live up to international obligations. Indian Ambassador replied he did not expect friendship from Communist government China through fact of recognition. However, if diplomatic relations were established countries so doing would be in better position protect their interests and might exert some modifying influence on Communist government whereas without recognition nothing could be achieved. He anticipates relations between India and China after recognition to be on basis "sound unfriendliness" such as now exists between Britain and Russia. Britain and Russia criticize each other publicly but both powers know that there is no danger of war. Communist government China will attack GOI on radio and indulge in pin pricks but both India and China know there is no danger of war.

Tibet<sup>99</sup> is not a problem with respect Communist infiltration into India other than as it affords access to Nepal which country is India's greatest danger. Nepal's "fourteenth century feudalistic" regime must eventually collapse and form of government which will replace it is definite source concern India especially since no geographical barriers separate Nepal from India. Indian Ambassador believes treaty between India [and] Nepal, with India guaranteeing Nepal's independence, would be good idea.

Tibet can be sealed off effectively. Infiltration China into India from Tibet no problem since trade routes from central Asia into India have always offered means infiltration but very little has been accomplished along that line despite fact that training school for Communist agents at Tashkent has been in operation many years.

Total number Chinese in India about 18,000 of which 10,000 in Calcutta. Chinese in India offer no problem except as connecting link with Communist China. Chinese have never been able obtain foothold in India economically as they have elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Therefore their Communist activities here will not be important.

Indian Ambassador was critical of VOA<sup>1</sup> program beamed on China and said deliberate misstatements of fact were made. He admitted Russian radio was equally distorted on subject China. Indian Ambassador believes situation Burma [and] Indochina hopeless and that they must eventually go Communist, probably dragging Siam with them. Indonesian Government has 60-40 chance of success.

<sup>99</sup> For further correspondence regarding Tibet, see pp. 1064 ff.

<sup>1</sup> Voice of America.

Britain can hold Singapore and probably Malaya. Indian population Malaya has never become involved in Communist activities except to very minor degree.

Why should US continue recognize Russia and withhold recognition Communist government China. Russia when recognized by US did not live up to obligations previous regime so why should US insist Communist government China assume obligations previous government. I think Panikkar is sincere in his statements, however fallacious they may be, and that he honestly believes India's interests would best be served by recognizing Communist government when present Nationalist Government disappears. I am inclined agree with him that Chinese population India no great threat but inclined believe he considerably overestimates seriousness problem for India which present regime Nepal represents. I feel sure his arguments as outlined here will have considerable effect on Nehru since they discount entirely any internal danger to India arising from recognition Communist regime China. I personally do not believe Chinese in India will be source of any great difficulty after recognition although as Patel<sup>2</sup> remarked if Communist government China took over Embassy here it could direct its propaganda machine more effectively and in this connection he mentioned large staff maintained Delhi by Russian Embassy.

Sent Department 1375, pouched Calcutta, Rangoon, Department pass London.

DONOVAN

893.01/11-749 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Australia (Jarman) to the Secretary of State*

CANBERRA, November 7, 1949—4 p. m.

[Received November 7—8:12 a. m.]

237. Today's press carries story Australia is preparing recognize Communist regime China in near future. With these and Depintel November 2, 1 a. m.,<sup>3</sup> in mind, Foster<sup>4</sup> asked Burton<sup>5</sup> whether there had been any change in Australian position. Burton said Australia still stood by position outlined Embtel 224, October 24, and had so informed UK in reply latter's recent approach. Added that in any

<sup>2</sup> Indian Deputy Prime Minister.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> Andrew B. Foster, Counselor of Embassy in Australia.

<sup>5</sup> John W. Burton, Secretary of the Australian Department of External Affairs.

case Government would not consider recognition before the federal elections on December 10 (the Government is being criticized by opposition for alleged failure deal vigorously with Communists in Australia). Burton dismissed press stories as lies.

Burton said his information was New Zealand strongly opposed to recognition while India would grant it ahead of everybody else.

Sent Department. Department pass London.

JARMAN

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893.01/11-849: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State*

THE HAGUE, November 8, 1949—1 p. m.

[Received 12:44 p. m.]

1077. With reference to Embassy's note of October 25<sup>6</sup> based on Deptel 922, October 21, note from FonOff received today, after preliminary remarks, says following:

"The note further states that on October 17 the Netherlands Embassy at Washington furnished the Department of State with a copy of the Royal Netherlands note addressed to the Chinese Communist authorities, apparently in reply to Communist invitation for recognition.

"From the latter statement it would appear that there exists some misunderstanding on the part of the US Government. In this connection the Ministry wishes to emphasize that no note has been addressed by the Netherlands Government to the Chinese Communist authorities, but that only an oral message was conveyed to these authorities, the text of which was communicated to the US Government and other governments concerned well in advance of the eventual date of its delivery.

"The oral communication in question was not made in reply to a Communist invitation for recognition but was prompted by the consideration that a regime, exercising the virtual power in the greater part of China, can for practical reasons not be wholly ignored.

"The Ministry shares the hope of the Embassy that the full consultation between the Western Powers concerned, which was envisaged at the time, will precede decisions on the question of recognition and gladly gives the assurance that the Netherlands Government for its part will continue to adhere to this procedure."

Sent Department; repeated Paris 76, London 113.

CHAPIN

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<sup>6</sup> Not printed.

893.01/11-849 : Telegram

*The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Bacon) to the Secretary of State*

NANKING, November 8, 1949—2 p. m.

[Received November 8—5:22 a. m.]

2389. 1. Since question recognition first arose, British business interests China have urged earliest consummation and British diplomats here have taken contagion. At present, not only do virtually all responsible personnel British Embassy constantly and publicly state their expectation of recognition "within 1 or 2 months", but some also fret at Foreign Office caution and shortsightedness which they imagine can be only conceivable obstacle to it. Communists have subtly encouraged this attitude in definite preferential treatments. For instance, *Amethyst* escape<sup>7</sup> clearly soft-pedaled after necessary initial blast movement British displeased in notable contrast impossibility most American moves, labor troubles with regard British have received less publicity and generally been settled with less fuss and there have been no direct official involvements comparable Ward and Soule cases.<sup>8</sup> (Notably fewer efforts implicate British in espionage frame-ups all over world.) (Differences when arisen have been settled quietly and usually fairly soon, especially of late since *Amethyst* and *MacFarlane* cases resolved.) When similar cases arise or are produced with Americans, they are protracted indefinitely and every drop propaganda squeezed out. This adds up to definite effort, not only to prevent rapid American recognition by producing atmosphere in which it impossible, but also to split US and British on this matter. British, in their turn, have in many respects taken less adamant stands opposing Communist actions than we have (e.g., on taxes), thus reinforcing tendency relax tension.

2. Feel discussions with British in London, Washington and Paris should emphasize Ward and Soule cases their headache as much as ours, since strike at root status foreigners and diplomats China. If happens to us today, may be their turn tomorrow. Embassy strongly feels this point on which principle should not be slighted and British should be requested in strongest terms not considered [*consider*] rec-

<sup>7</sup> The British naval sloop *Amethyst*, fired on by Communist shore batteries along the Yangtze on April 20, 1949, escaped July 31 after being stranded for months.

<sup>8</sup> For the case of Consul General Ward at Mukden, see vol. VIII, "Problems of United States Consulates in areas occupied by the Chinese Communists", chapter I; for the case of Military Attaché, Brig. Gen. Robert H. Soule, at Nanking, see *ibid.*, "The Embassy in China after occupation of Nanking by Chinese Communists", chapter II.



ognition while such cases unjustified coercion exist. Best of course if they can be persuaded make public announcement this effect as evidence solidarity. While impossible document, possibility exists that British feeling tinged with pleasant irresponsibility as white man's burden (in this case maintenance essential position Western nations on Consulate and diplomatic rights and on adherence normal procedures antecedent formal recognition) now falls on American shoulders, leaving British free to extract any political or economic profit from situation. Such attitude their part would of course be exactly what Communists trying produce.

Department pass Peiping its discretion.

Sent Department 2389. Department pass Shanghai 1223.

BACON

893.01/11-849 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Singapore (Langdon) to the Secretary of State*

SINGAPORE, November 8, 1949—5 p. m.

[Received November 8—9 :13 a. m.]

363. November 8 MacDonald<sup>9</sup> invited same representatives mytel 339, October 26,<sup>10</sup> to home last night to give account of Singapore Conference. Much same as Dening's (see mytel 360, November 7) but made no mention Indochina discussion owing presence French Consul General, also brought out following points unsaid by Dening.

(1) In case US should take different action in Mao recognition, conference recommended every effort be made to minimize difference by maximizing cooperation regional resistance to Communist expansion, economic, military and political aid to SEA countries, Point Four program,<sup>11</sup> et cetera.

(2) UK Government unlikely to disregard recommendation recognition view unanimity on it of conferees most competent to judge British interest each country.

Dening going Canberra 9th discuss conference with Foreign Minister. In Sunday talk said Bevin would ask Nehru in London to offer mediate between Karens and Dobis.

LANGDON

<sup>9</sup>Malcolm MacDonald, British Commissioner General in Southeast Asia at Singapore.

<sup>10</sup>Not printed.

<sup>11</sup>For President Truman's proposal in his inaugural address of January 20, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 30, 1949, pp. 123, 125.

893.01/11-849: Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 8, 1949—8 p. m.

[Received November 8—2:28 p. m.]

4670. From Secretary. Before getting into discussions with British and French on recognition Chinese Communists, believe it desirable have additional material re legal complications of recognition in terms of membership in UN and Security Council to supplement paper CFE/D-2.<sup>12</sup> [Acheson]

BRUCE

893.01/11-849: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 8, 1949—midnight.

[Received November 8—5:51 p. m.]

2793. View possibility Secretary will have occasion Paris discuss recognition Communist China with Bevin and Schuman, Embassy has reviewed comments it has submitted this subject in light subsequent developments with particular reference British attitude (London's telegram 4353, October 31<sup>13</sup>).

Embassy continues feel valid position taken its telegrams 2155, August 26; 2538, October 7; and 2601, October 15, that US policy China should contemplate (1) maintenance of diplomatic relations without prejudice disapproval regime, and (2) parallel economic aloofness with maximum controls of contacts contributing to enhance industrialization and thus economic-military potential Soviet bloc. Also concur desirability that establishment relations should preferably be accomplished in due course as situation develops and that it is important precipitous action that regard be avoided. Seems to us material factors pointing towards advisability postponement immediate recognition are (1) that important areas China (notably Chungking, wartime Chinese capital) not yet included Communist control, and establishment relations with government not obviously in *de facto* authority would appear premature, (2) that so long as Soviets have not formally raised issue, it would be unwise for West to take step likely upset and further complicate status Nationalist representatives current session GA with result Chinese case there, which we have supported, might not receive public airing to which

<sup>12</sup> November 5, p. 168.<sup>13</sup> Not printed, but see memorandum by the British Embassy, November 1, p. 151.

at least it would appear entitled, and (3) that in face US public statements concerning Chinese policy US recognition now could be interpreted as ensuing from British and other pressures, a conclusion that would tend be corroborated if action preceded public report findings and recommendations Chinese policy committee.

We think these considerations are impressive and firmly believe that if, as implied British circularization other governments (London's 4353), British anticipate immediate recognition, strong representations should be made to dissuade them.

We have considered possible alternative timing. Presumably indefinite delay followed by ultimate recognition would emphasize reluctance with which step finally taken and cede increasing initiative to Soviet policy China. As possibly best bet, suggest that occasion of contemplated Baguio conference or similar meeting might afford opportunity for general simultaneous Western recognition to be accomplished as logical sequence to decision such conference. Should collective representatives of free peoples Southeast Asia determine to take note situation China and, although condemning dictatorial Communist regime there, to establish diplomatic relations as practical matter, parallel US, UK, French, etc., action premised on lead Asian democracies would have merit of giving endorsement to policy of those nations most directly concerned. Manifestly participation or possibly leadership of India in such a collective determination would be important.

Sent Department 2793, Department pass Paris for the Secretary 394, London 305.

KIRK

893.01/11-849

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Sprouse)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 8, 1949.

Participants: Mr. Hubert Graves, Counselor, British Embassy  
Mr. Butterworth, Assistant Secretary  
Mr. Sprouse, CA

Mr. Graves called by appointment this afternoon and handed Mr. Butterworth the two attached memoranda, dated November 8, 1949: (1) conclusions reached by the British Conference held at Singapore November 2-4 regarding the question of recognition of the Chinese Communist regime<sup>14</sup> and (2) estimate by the Conference of the effect

<sup>14</sup> *Infra.*

of recognition of the Chinese Communist regime on certain countries and territories in Southeast Asia.<sup>15</sup> Mr. Graves pointed out that the conclusions of this Conference did not mean that the British Government had reached a final decision in the matter and added that the Foreign Office had not yet received any replies to the memoranda handed by British representatives to the various Western European countries and the Commonwealth governments.

Mr. Butterworth noted the third paragraph of the memorandum setting forth the conclusions reached regarding the question of recognition, which stated that "from the point of view of the situation in Southeast Asia and the Far East generally such recognition is desirable as early as possible and in any case by the end of the year", and said that, while he could explain the British view of this question in so far as the British position at Hong Kong and British investments in China were concerned, he could not follow this reasoning with respect to Southeast Asia and the Far East in general. He pointed out that the second of the two attached memoranda actually seemed on balance to argue against early recognition or at least to furnish no particular reason therefor, this being particularly true of the British estimate of the effect on the Bao Dai regime in Indochina.

Mr. Graves replied that he did not know the reasons for the statement made in the third paragraph referred to by Mr. Butterworth and that he could only suggest that it was believed that early recognition might lessen the likelihood of unrest and agitation stirred up by the Chinese Communists in Southeast Asia and that it might also more readily serve to keep the Chinese Communists within their own borders than if they were not recognized and not treated as a legitimate government.

During general discussion of the memoranda Mr. Butterworth and Mr. Sprouse pointed out that it had been the Department's opinion that the effect in Southeast Asia of early recognition of the Chinese Communist regime would be generally unfavorable and that the estimate of the British Conference at Singapore had not actually differed materially from the Department's estimate.

Referring to Mr. Butterworth's previous query whether the British had had any exploratory discussions regarding recognition with the Chinese Communists through intermediaries at Shanghai or Hong Kong, Mr. Graves said that he had passed this query on to the Foreign Office and that the latter had replied that no such discussions had been held.

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<sup>15</sup> Not printed.

Mr. Butterworth confirmed to Mr. Graves that the Department had received a brief telegraphic summary of the British Conference conclusions forwarded by the Consul General at Singapore but that we had not yet received the full text of the document which had been handed to him by the British representatives at Singapore and which he was forwarding by pouch. In reply to Mr. Butterworth's request, Mr. Graves agreed to make available to the Department the text of this document as soon as it should be received by the British Embassy. He concluded that the results of the Conference would, of course, have to be studied by the British Government.

S93.01/11-849

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*<sup>16</sup>

MEMORANDUM

The conference of United Kingdom representatives which was held at Singapore from 2nd to 4th November reached the following conclusions regarding the question of recognition of the communist government in China:—

The Bukit Serene Conference considers that British interests in China and in Hong Kong demand earliest possible *de jure* recognition of the communist government in China.

The conference is of the opinion that from the point of view of the situation in South East Asia and the Far East generally such recognition is desirable as early as possible and in any case by the end of the year.

It considers that no formal conditions can be attached to such recognition but that His Majesty's Government in according it should make a unilateral statement of their assumption that the new government accepts China's existing international obligations.

The conference also considers that:—

(a) recognition should not involve any weakening but should indeed be accompanied by a strengthening of our resistance to the spread of communism in the area, and

(b) an extensive propaganda campaign should be launched to explain that the recognition does not involve any inconsistency with our

<sup>16</sup> Handed by the Counselor of the British Embassy (Graves) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) on November 8; repeated in telegram No. 4327, November 9, 7 p. m., for the Secretary of State in Paris.

policy of opposition to communism in South East Asia. Hong Kong should not take any direct part in this.

WASHINGTON, 8 November, 1949.

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893.01/11-949 : Airgram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bliss) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 9, 1949.

[Received November 14—1:22 p. m.]

A-2062. [Here follows report on Singapore Conference similar in substance to report given in memorandum of conversation on November 8, printed on page 184.]

On the afternoon of November 8, Mr. Peter Scarlett, Head of Far Eastern Department, Foreign Office . . . stated that, although in general the reactions received from the interested friendly governments up to the present were only of a preliminary nature (Embtel 4353, October 31<sup>17</sup>), on the whole they were sympathetic with the British inclination toward early recognition. Two of the powers consulted had emphasized that it would be embarrassing to recognize the new government before the end of the present session of the UNGA.

BLISS

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893.01/11-1049

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Sprouse)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 10, 1949.

Participants: Senhor Pedro Theotónio Pereira, Ambassador of Portugal  
 Mr. Butterworth, Assistant Secretary  
 Mr. Dunham, WE  
 Mr. Sprouse, CA

The Portuguese Ambassador called this afternoon by appointment and explained that he would like to review with Mr. Butterworth the situation in China and its relation to the problem of Macao. He referred to the recent British approach to his government regarding the question of recognition of a Chinese Communist regime and said that it seemed to indicate that the British Government was disposed toward

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<sup>17</sup> Not printed.

early recognition. He said that if the British Government did recognize the Chinese Communist regime it would, of course, be extremely difficult for the Portuguese Government not to follow suit, particularly in view of the position of Macao. He asked if there had been any change in the Department's position in this regard since his conversation of several months ago with Mr. Butterworth.

Mr. Butterworth, after stating that there had been no change in the Department's position, stated that we still felt it desirable for the friendly interested governments to maintain a common position with regard to recognition. He further stated that of course at present the Chinese Communists had not gained control over the entire area on the mainland, sizable areas of which were still in non-communist hands. He stated that the Department did not believe that anything could be gained through hasty action on this question. He said that it was realized of course that the British position with respect to the large British investments in China and the problem of Hong Kong played a considerable part in British thinking on this question. Referring to the Communist treatment of Consul General Ward and his staff at Mukden, Mr. Butterworth pointed out that this Government could under these circumstances give no consideration to the question of recognition.

The Portuguese Ambassador then expressed an interest in the general situation in China and the Chinese Communist regime at Peiping. Mr. Sprouse gave a brief summary description of the Chinese Communist regime and the situation in China, as reported by officers in the field.

The Ambassador indicated that the Portuguese Government would probably not expect to obtain any commitment from the Chinese Communist regime regarding Macao in the event that it decided to extend recognition, since such a commitment would obviously be worthless. He added that the Governor of Macao would, however, probably seek and be able to obtain some assurances regarding Macao from Chinese Communist authorities in the Canton area. He seemed to feel that these assurances, in keeping with the traditional Chinese practices, would be worth much more than any assurances from a Chinese Communist regime at Peiping. He further indicated that the Portuguese forces at Macao represented only a "moral" force in terms of meeting a possible Chinese Communist attack and that the colony could not be defended against a determined attack. In conclusion, he reiterated that the Portuguese Government would find it extremely difficult not to recognize the Chinese Communist regime if the British Government took such action.



740.00119 Council/11-1149: Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State*<sup>18</sup>

[Extracts]

PARIS, November 11, 1949—3 a. m.

[Received 5:33 a. m.]

4716. For President and Webb<sup>19</sup> from Secretary. [Here follows section relating to European subjects discussed at the opening meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers on November 10.]

In taking up China problem Schuman outlined major questions facing France, which he felt were common to three powers, as:

(1) Attitude toward Communist regime, considered both in terms of situation in China and in UN. For French this issue hinged not on what faction controlled most of area of China, but on which faction controlled area bordering Indochina.

(2) Problem presented by approach of Nationalist troops to Indochina.

(3) Indochina problem itself, which would present grave difficulties if Communists able to establish direct contact with Ho Chi Minh. He admitted failure of French Parliament to approach [*approve?*] agreement with Bao Dai, but stated belief Bao Dai was only solution and urged some immediate gesture by US and UK to show that we supported current French policy.

In reply I stated that we had agreement for joint consultation on China, which we expected to follow. It was further our view that there is no need for haste in approaching recognition of Communist regime. We felt Communists must first satisfy certain conditions, such as release of Consul General in Mukden, respect for international agreements and assurances on US property in China. On Indochina I told Schuman we wanted to be as helpful as possible, and that we would consider any specific proposals French cared to make although basically we felt task was for French to take further action.

Bevin stated that matter of recognition was currently receiving careful attention by British, and that they had problem of coordinating with Commonwealth countries and with other interests. Sooner or later recognition step must be taken, but certainly not while China case on GA agenda, nor before Dutch transfer responsibility to Indonesians, and Australians did not want it before their elections. This would mean mid-December at earliest. On Indochina he indicated

<sup>18</sup> For changes later made in this telegram, see telegram No. 3922, November 12, 5 p. m., from the High Commissioner in Germany, *infra*.

<sup>19</sup> James E. Webb, Under Secretary of State, Acting Secretary while the Secretary was in Paris attending meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

willingness to take steps after French take action and then expressed some fears about situation in Formosa where he said Nationalists had large arms supplies which they considered not as potential against Communists, but as source which would be surrendered to Communists and possibly used against Hong Kong and Indochina.

Sent Department 4716, repeated London 813, Frankfort 130. [Acheson.]

BRUCE

893.01/11-1249 : Telegram

*The United States High Commissioner in Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State*

FRANKFORT, November 12, 1949—5 p. m.  
[Received 7:18 p. m.]

3922. From Secretary. Amend eighth paragraph Paris telegram 4716 to Department,<sup>21</sup> repeated London 813, Frankfort 130, to read as follows:

“In taking up China recognition question, Schuman touched briefly on vast and complex political problem which all three faced as major powers and members UN, and then outlined special problems facing France because of common boundary: Subparagraph *a*: Difficulty of France to recognize Chinese Government which did not control border territory; subparagraph *b*: Threat of Nationalist troops retreating into Indochina and subparagraph *c*: Indochinese problem itself involving hostilities in which France while perhaps appearing as defending her own special interests was also fighting communism and Communists. This problem would become acute when Chinese Communist forces made contact with Ho Chi Minh and France would need help, not military but political. Bao Dai was loyal partner and strengthening him offered only solution, therefore Schuman asked that US and UK approach Bao Dai directly and inform him that they approved of association between him and France and of common policies being worked out. Schuman did not ask for recognition of Vietnam, realizing that this could not be expected until after ratification Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia Agreements by French Parliament.”

Rewrite last sentence next paragraph as follows:

“On Indochina I told Schuman we felt that French were on right track with Bao Dai (although perhaps not moving as fast as desirable) and we wanted to be as helpful as possible. I said we would consider

<sup>21</sup> i.e., paragraph following bracketed note in telegram No. 4716, *supra*.

sympathetically any specific proposals French cared to make although basically we felt that primary task was French."

Sent Department 3922; repeated London 253, Paris 294. [Acheson.]  
McCLOY

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893.01/11-1449

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Sprouse)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 14, 1949.

During the course of a conversation on another subject, Mr. Graves referred to the British Embassy's note of November 1 regarding the question of recognition of the Chinese Communist regime and asked if the Department had yet prepared a reply. I pointed out that the Secretary had discussed this general question with Mr. Bevin at Paris and that I felt certain that no reply could be expected until after the Secretary's return.

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893.01/11-1449

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Sprouse)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 14, 1949.

Participants: Mr. Ralph E. Collins, Second Secretary, Canadian Embassy  
Mr. Merchant, Deputy Assistant Secretary  
Mr. Sprouse, CA

Mr. Collins called today by appointment and stated that he had been instructed by his government to inform the Department of the Canadian Government's reaction to the British note of November 1 regarding recognition of the Chinese Communist regime. He said that the Canadian reply, which had already been sent to London, expressed the opinion that recognition should come sooner rather than later. He explained that this decision had not yet received Cabinet approval. He continued that the Canadian Government had weighed the pros and cons of the question and had decided that the advantages outweighed the disadvantages. The Canadian Government was, however, of the opinion that recognition should not be extended prior to the adjournment of the General Assembly. He stated as his personal opinion that the Canadian Government contemplated recognition shortly after the first of the new year. Asked

whether the Canadian Government expected to extend recognition without any assurances of respect for international obligations or of minimum standards of conduct on the part of the Chinese Communist regime, Mr. Collins replied that the Canadian reply to the British had indicated that the criteria of control of territory and acquiescence of the people seemed to be fulfilled and that no reference had been made to the question of obtaining commitments from the Chinese Communist regime. He asked what the reaction of the U.S. Government was to this question.

Mr. Merchant stated that we appreciated being informed of the Canadian action in this regard and explained that the Department felt that the maintenance of a common front on this question by the interested Western powers was to the advantage of all concerned. He said that the U.S. Government obviously could not and would not consider the question of recognition so long as the Communists subjected Consul General Ward to the treatment now being given to him. Mr. Sprouse referred to the Smith-Bender case<sup>22</sup> and to the refusal of the Chinese Communists to issue an exit permit to General Soule and pointed out that the general treatment of U.S. officials in China by the Chinese Communists had been such as to raise serious doubts regarding the future treatment of foreign officials in China. Mr. Merchant characterized such treatment as completely uncivilized and added that, even should such "barbarisms" be removed tomorrow, there was no reason to believe that the U.S. Government would immediately give consideration to recognition. He emphasized the desirability of at least obtaining some indication from the Chinese Communists that they were prepared to live up to normal standards of international conduct. He pointed out that the treatment of Consul General Ward actually should be of concern to all the friendly Western powers even though this particular case affected only a U.S. official. Mr. Sprouse pointed out that even though any assurances that could be obtained from the Chinese Communists might be worthless, it seemed foolhardy for any power to rush into recognition in the face of present Chinese Communist actions. He pointed out that it was not to the advantage of any government to extend recognition hastily. Mr. Merchant said that obviously it would be desirable for all the friendly Western powers to take a common stand in the matter, but that, of course, it was realized that the thinking of the various concerned powers was based upon their own interests in the matter.

Mr. Collins said that he would inform the Canadian Government of the views of the Department in this regard.

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<sup>22</sup> See vol. VIII, footnote 31, "Political and military situation in China", chapter V.

893.01/11-1549 : Telegram

*The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Bacon) to the Secretary of State*

NANKING, November 15, 1949—9 a. m.

[Received November 14—11:03 p. m.]

2427. ReDepintel November 10.<sup>23</sup> Our impression is that Titoism arose in Yugoslavia not because of any action or failure to act on part of Western Powers, but as direct results of action injurious to Yugoslav political independence and economic reconstruction. We consider estrangement between China and USSR will probably arise in same way and our recognition at this time could contribute little or nothing to this development.

BACON

893.01/11-1649 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 16, 1949—6 p. m.

[Received November 16—2:57 p. m.]

4587. At invitation Bevin, HCs<sup>24</sup> [of] Commonwealth Governments called at Foreign Office in body afternoon 15th exchange views recognition Chinese Communists. View HCS about as anticipated as follows:

- a. India: Earlier the better.
- b. Canada: In favor of recognition, but timing conditioned to some extent by US opinion.
- c. Australia: Some effort should be made through informal contact with Communists to obtain prior promise of good behavior.
- d. New Zealand: No firm opinion.
- e. Pakistan: No views.
- f. General consensus that recognition should be coordinated so far as possible.

According to Scarlett, Embassy's informant in Foreign Office, Bevin specifically directed that report of conference be forwarded Department, but CRO<sup>25</sup> which handled details moves slowly and report will probably not be embodied in telegram to British Embassy, Washington, before 21st.

<sup>23</sup> Not printed; it reported on the Singapore conference (800.00 Summaries/11-1049).

<sup>24</sup> High Commissioners.

<sup>25</sup> Commonwealth Relations Office.

When Embassy officer referred to report New Zealand had emphatically gone on record as being against recognition, Scarlett intimated Fraser<sup>26</sup> was busy electioneering and had not given matter sufficient thought.

Scarlett's best estimate timing British recognition early January.

As yet no firm date Ceylon conference, although January 9 suggested.

Sent Department 4587, repeated Canberra unnumbered, Delhi 109, Wellington unnumbered.

DOUGLAS

893.01/11-1649 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 16, 1949—6 p. m.

[Received November 16—2:26 p. m.]

4790. According to Baeyens, Bevin told Massigli<sup>27</sup> yesterday that UK was not considering recognizing Chinese Communists before end of year and he would attempt to arrive at common position with US and France before taking action. Baeyens thinks British may not act before question is considered at Ceylon Commonwealth Conference in January. He said France was ready to take action in near future.

Sent Department 4790, repeated London 828.

BRUCE

893.01/11-1949 : Telegram

*The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Bacon) to the Secretary of State*

NANKING, November 19, 1949—11 a. m.

[Received November 19—12:55 a. m.]

2459. Dutch officer in charge, Devoogd, informs me he very pleased British will be unable take any step toward recognition until after Ceylon conference in January. Also states Netherlands Government has no intention taking any step until after transfer Indonesian sovereignty December 30 in order not embarrass any Indonesian Government with possibly unwanted relations with Communist China.

BACON

<sup>26</sup> Peter Fraser, New Zealand Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs.

<sup>27</sup> René Massigli, French Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

501.BB/11-2049 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to  
the Secretary of State*

NEW YORK, November 20, 1949—3:21 p. m.

[Received 5:40 p. m.]

DelGA 233. Following is copy of official text of communication received by SYG<sup>28</sup> from Communist government in China:

“Peking’s 291/290 18/11 1535.

“Mr. Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations Organization, Lake Success, New York.

“The Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China was formally formed on October 1st. On the day of its formation, Chairman Mao Tze-tung of the Central Peoples Government solemnly proclaimed to the world:

‘The Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China is the sole legal government representing all the people of the Peoples Republic of China. The Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China has now fundamentally liberated the territory and people of all China and also won the enthusiastic support of the people throughout the country, while the Kuomintang reactionary government is now in exile and dispersed and its remnant forces will soon be eliminated.’

This reactionary government has lost all *de jure* and *de facto* grounds for representing the Chinese people.

“The so-called, ‘Delegation of the Chinese National Government’ participating in the United Nations Organization and attending the present session of the United Nations General Assembly in the name of the Chinese people has therefore become the tool of a handful of exiled elements, and is absolutely unqualified to represent the Chinese people.

“On behalf of the Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China, I formally demand that the United Nations Organization immediately deprive the ‘Delegation of the Chinese National Government’ in accordance with the principles and spirit of the United Nations Charter,<sup>29</sup> of all rights to further represent the Chinese people in the United Nations, so as to conform to the wishes of the Chinese people.

“Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the Central Peoples Government of the Peoples Republic of China.”

AUSTIN

<sup>28</sup> Secretary-General of the United Nations.

<sup>29</sup> Signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945; 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031.



893.01/11-2249

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State  
(Webb)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 22, 1949.

Participants: Madame Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Ambassador of  
India

Mr. Webb, Under Secretary

Mr. Mathews,<sup>31</sup> SOA

The Indian Ambassador called at her request. She handed me a note dated November 21 transmitting a memorandum<sup>32</sup> setting forth the views of her government on the recognition of the Communist regime in China. The Ambassador explained that the message from New Delhi transmitting these views had crossed the Secretary's appeal with respect to the Ward case.<sup>33</sup>

After reading the memorandum, I said that my Government appreciated receiving the views of the Government of India. Although I indicated that we should like to study the memorandum before addressing ourselves specifically to its contents, I did say that our own approach was one of an historic interest in the welfare of the Chinese people. It seemed to us that we should be sure that the Communist regime would show a real regard for the interests of the Chinese people, both internally and in its relations with the rest of the world. The Chinese Communists' disregard of normal international practices as revealed in our experience, leads us to wonder whether they would act in the interests of the people of China. The Ambassador commented that she could appreciate our point of view.

[Here follows discussion of Indo-Pakistan matters.]

As the Ambassador was leaving I expressed my deep gratification at having had the opportunity to meet her brother, the Prime Minister, and also Sir Girja Bajpai.<sup>34</sup>

893.01/10-2549 : Airgram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Korea (Muccio)*

WASHINGTON, November 22, 1949.

A-230. Re your A-336 October 25 Department assumes President Rhee not being permitted to lose sight of serious and adverse effect

<sup>31</sup> Elbert G. Mathews, Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs.

<sup>32</sup> Not printed. It set forth the position of the Indian Government in favor of recognition of the Peoples Republic of China, preferably before the end of December 1949 (893.01/11-2149).

<sup>33</sup> See circular telegram of November 18, 10 a. m., vol. VIII, "Problems of United States Consulates in areas occupied by the Chinese Communists", chapter I.

<sup>34</sup> Secretary General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.

on international position of Republic of Korea which would result from decision of Korean Government to sever relations with British Government over issue of Chinese Communist recognition.

ACHESON

893.01/11-2349 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the Secretary of State*<sup>35</sup>

MANILA, November 23, 1949—3 p. m.  
[Received November 23—4:09 a. m.]

2652. Under Secretary Foreign Affairs Neri November 22 told Embassy officer he has been informed by Doctor Tambu, ConGen Indonesian Republic, that his Government is prepared recognize Chinese Communist regime. He added that he had been given understand Indonesian Republic motivated by desire itself obtain recognition of that regime.

INS correspondent Frank Emery quotes source which he regards as most reliable as stating Tambu explained internal situation Indonesia renders recognition Chinese Communists desirable and that Indonesian Republic accordingly will not be in position participate SEAU.<sup>36</sup>

COWEN

893.01/11-2349 : Telegram

*The Chargé in India (Donovan) to the Secretary of State*

NEW DELHI, November 23, 1949—4 p. m.  
[Received November 23—12:44 p. m.]

1453. Khoman, Thai Chargé d'Affaires who leaves Delhi for Bangkok on transfer November 25, commented as follows re China: Thai wishes follow lead of US re recognition Communist government. However, British recognition Communist government will make position Thai difficult owing proximity Malaya and large numbers Chinese both in Malaya and Thai. This connection, Bajpai told me yesterday Burma wishes recognize Communist government China "almost immediately".

<sup>35</sup> Repeated as telegrams Nos. 591 and 1059, November 23, 7 p. m., to the Embassy in the Netherlands and the Consulate General at Batavia, respectively, with instruction to inquire whether the reported remarks accurately reflected the attitude of the Indonesian Government toward recognition of the Peiping regime, the Department having understood previously that Indonesia was not eager to recognize the Chinese Communists.

<sup>36</sup> Southeast Asia Union.

Khoman said his opinion Thai Government not well equipped deal with internal disorders which might be started by Communists.

In opinion Khoman, UK and GOI recognition Chinese Communists will be followed by immediate transfer of allegiance those Chinese minority groups SEA which have not already gone over. He feels these groups may then be more, not less, difficult to deal with. He also remarked he was afraid forthcoming manifestation increased US interest SEA such as Jessup's visit Bangkok and meeting of US Ambassadors<sup>37</sup> somewhat belated as GOI likely to have recognized Communists before then.

Sent Department 1453, repeated Bangkok unnumbered, Department pass London.

DONOVAN

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893.01/11-2349

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 23, 1949.

Mr. Graves of the British Embassy came in by appointment this morning to tell me "in confidence" that the Embassy had received this morning from London a telegram stating that the High Commissioner of India in London had informed Mr. Bevin of Nehru's decision to recognize the Chinese Communist Government sometime between December 15 and December 25, but in no event prior to the end of the General Assembly.

Mr. Graves then discussed the good news of Angus Ward's release and asked what we proposed concerning the multilateral *démarche* which we had set in motion. I told him that no decision had been reached on this but that our preliminary thinking was that we should dispatch a circular telegram to the original recipients telling them that we had received word of Ward's release from prison but that we remained of the opinion that an expression of the concern with which the other governments viewed this matter was still in order, particularly in view of the fact that we had no information as to the treatment or trial of Mr. Ward, nor in fact do we have any assurance that he and his staff would in fact be permitted to depart from Mukden. I assured Mr. Graves that as soon as a decision had been reached on this matter by us we would communicate it to him.

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<sup>37</sup> For Far East tour of Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup to attend Bangkok Conference at end of January, see White House press release of November 17, Department of State *Bulletin*, November 28, 1949, p. 800.

893.01/11-2549 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State*

THE HAGUE, November 25, 1949—6 p. m.

[Received November 26—12:47 a. m.]

1171. We informed Boon<sup>38</sup> contents Manila's 2652 (Deptel 1059, November 23). In commenting, Boon first remarked that Hatta<sup>39</sup> had made statement re early recognition by RIS<sup>40</sup> of Chinese Communist government when he passed through Cairo en route Hague-Batavia. Boon then said high ranking Indonesians are generally sympathetic Nehru's attitude re Chinese Communists and that it was not unlikely that India would soon accord recognition and thus precipitate avalanche of similar recognitions. Boon feels that little can be done to stop such developments.

He added, however, that Dutch feel most strongly that Netherlands should not recognize Chinese Communists before sovereignty transferred to Indonesia. He handed us copy of *aide-mémoire* of November 21 to British Embassy here<sup>41</sup> re Netherlands attitude question recognition Chinese Communists, adding that Van Kleffens<sup>42</sup> had been furnished with copy which he had presumably given Department. We are, however, forwarding full text *aide-mémoire* air mail.

CHAPIN

893.01/11-2849

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Sprouse)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 28, 1949.

Participants: Mr. Hubert Graves, Counselor, British Embassy  
Mr. Butterworth, Assistant Secretary  
Mr. Sprouse, CA

Mr. Graves called this afternoon by appointment and presented the attached document,<sup>43</sup> which, he explained, was the summary of the results of the meeting between Mr. Bevin and the High Commissioners of the Commonwealth Governments in London on November 15 re-

<sup>38</sup> Hendrik N. Boon, Acting Secretary General of the Netherlands Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>39</sup> Mohammed Hatta, Vice President of Indonesia and concurrently Prime Minister.

<sup>40</sup> Republic of Indonesia (United States of Indonesia).

<sup>41</sup> Not printed.

<sup>42</sup> E. N. van Kleffens, Netherlands Ambassador in the United States.

<sup>43</sup> *Infra*.

garding the question of recognition of the Chinese Communist regime. He further explained that the British position was still that the problem had not yet been referred to the Cabinet for a final decision but that general thinking favored recognition by the end of the year.

Mr. Butterworth pointed out that it was the Department's understanding that the Government of India had reached a more definite decision with respect to the question of recognition than was indicated in the attached memorandum. Mr. Graves concurred and said that he had just recently communicated to Mr. Merchant later information in this regard. Mr. Butterworth said that it was his understanding that the Government of India expected to extend recognition some time between December 15 and December 25.

Mr. Graves asked that the contents of the memorandum be treated as confidential since the Commonwealth Governments would probably inform the Department of their views regarding the question of recognition.

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893.01/11-2849

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*<sup>44</sup>

1237/93/49

#### MEMORANDUM

Mr. Bevin and the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations<sup>45</sup> met the High Commissioners of the Commonwealth Governments in London on 15th November and the question of recognition of the Chinese communist government was discussed.

The views of Commonwealth Governments were briefly as follows:

*Canada.* The Canadian Government realised that recognition was inevitable, but they were in no hurry to take this step. Reasons for caution were:—

- (1) repercussion of recognition on Chinese living in Canada.
- (2) Canadian interests still remain largely in territories controlled by Nationalists in West China.
- (3) reluctance to march out of step with the United States.

*Australia and New Zealand.* Both Governments see difficulties about immediate recognition and would prefer to postpone any decision until some time after their respective elections. The Australian Government also considers that an unofficial approach should be made to the communist government to obtain assurance of respect for international obligations and territorial integrity of neighbouring coun-

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<sup>44</sup> Handed by the Counselor of the British Embassy (Graves) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) on November 28.

<sup>45</sup> Philip Noel-Baker.

tries. Dr. Evatt has publicly announced that the question should be discussed at the Colombo Conference.

*India.* The Government of India are in favour of early recognition and may act independently if general recognition is too long delayed.

*Pakistan and Ceylon.* Both Governments' views generally coincide with those of the United Kingdom.

It will be seen from the above that differences are on timing rather than on principle. While making it quite clear that he had not consulted his Cabinet colleagues, Mr. Bevin gave it as his impression on the question of timing that it would probably suit the general convenience of Commonwealth and other friendly governments if the act of recognition was delayed for some weeks.

The reasons for such timing were:—

(a) The Chinese motion in the United Nations and the present Assembly Session would be ended.

(b) The new Australian and New Zealand Governments would have been formed and elections over.

(c) The Netherlands Government wished to delay recognition until after the transfer of sovereignty in Indonesia which will be not later than December 30th.

(d) The French wished to delay recognition until after ratification of the agreements with Bao Dai, because of the discouraging effect that prior recognition of the communist government might have on his supporters.

The meeting was aware that the detention of the United States Consul-General in Mukden still remained a most serious obstacle to recognition for the United States.

WASHINGTON, 28 November, 1949.

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893.00B/11-2849

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 28, 1949.

Participants: Mr. Thomas C. Davis, Canadian Ambassador to China  
 Mr. Ralph Collins, Canadian Embassy  
 Mr. W. Walton Butterworth, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs  
 Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

Ambassador Davis, who is staying at the Canadian Embassy on a brief visit to Washington, came in by appointment this morning to

see me. He explained that he wished to renew his old acquaintance and communicate for what they might be worth the conclusions which he had reached from his two and a half years in China.

First, he said he had no doubt that the Communist leaders of China were orthodox Communists who regarded the Soviet Union as their one great friend and whose foreign policy line they would faithfully follow. Secondly, Judge Davis said he was convinced that because of the basic characteristics of the Chinese people, the present Communist leaders in China would be unable to "Communistize" the Chinese people. Thirdly, he believed that the nation which had exerted the greatest influence in China for the past century and toward whom the Chinese people were basically the most friendly is the United States. He referred to the widespread recognition that of all the great powers the U.S. was the only one that had pursued a non-predatory policy with respect to China and, in fact, had given greatly of its substance and friendship to China. Lastly, he expressed the opinion that by ultimately recognizing the Peking regime, the United States could best in future exercise its potentially great influence, which would not be easily or quickly dissipated by the Communists' propaganda. In this connection, he recognized that consideration of such a move was out of the question at the present time and he accepted as fact that the United Kingdom and certain other nations, including members of the Commonwealth, would recognize Peking before we did. As a matter of tactics, he expressed the hope that recognition by such nations would be spread over a period of time in order to avoid simultaneous recognition by all of the Western Powers except the United States, thereby leaving the United States in a position of prominent isolation.

Ambassador Davis's estimate of the future was, on the whole, optimistic. He believes that the present Communist leadership in its necessary search for administrative and technical skills will be forced to dilute itself by admission to high positions of non-Communists who will exercise an increasingly moderating influence. He intimated also that he felt the Russians by their natural arrogance would encounter difficulties of their own making. I pointed out that his appraisal seemed to omit the possibility or probability of a complete ruthlessness on the part of the Chinese Communists which would result in the liquidation of non-Communists once their usefulness had passed and, in any event, before they could become a threat to the present leadership.

It was apparent that Ambassador Davis, who always worked on the closest terms with our Embassy in Nanking, had made this visit to Washington for the purpose of informally supplementing the Cana-



dian Embassy's earlier formal notification to us of Canada's intention to recognize Peking in the not distant future.

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893.01/11-2849: Telegram

*The Consul at Tientsin (Wellborn) to the Secretary of State*

TIENTSIN, November 28, 1949—9 a. m.

[Received November 30—3:45 a. m.]

975. Following for Department's consideration re recognition Chinese Communists.

It occurs to us that if Department is contemplating recognition Chinese Communists in near future, consideration may be given sending delegation special negotiators discuss with Communists their aims and objectives toward US in general and American nationals, business, and other interests in China, in particular, and bargain for terms before granting even *de facto* recognition. Communists seem to have attached great importance to matter recognition and for US to grant it without making bargain (bargaining main essential way of getting things done with Chinese) would give Communists tremendous face and similarly loss of prestige for US with those Chinese who are not now and who may not in future be in accord with Communist policies and actions.

Further with reference ourtel 971 [972a?], November 25,<sup>46</sup> we observe gathering antipathy here toward Soviets and Department may wish hold off discussions with Chinese Communists re *de facto* recognition until possible Sino-Soviet breach becomes more noticeable. *De jure* recognition may be withheld until there is definite evidence of break away from Soviet camp. Our Government's granting *de jure* recognition at such time would strengthen stand those Chinese who still have and could be expected to retain respect for greatness of America and strength US Government.

WELLBORN

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893.01/11-2849: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 28, 1949—5 p. m.

[Received November 29—12:30 p. m.]

4731. According Scarlett, Foreign Office, French Embassy, London, has informed him that Vatican is putting considerable pressure on

<sup>46</sup> Not printed.

French Government to recognize Chinese Communists arguing that until France and other nations with influential Catholic population recognize Communists Vatican cannot do so, and until Vatican recognizes Communists it lacks means to oppose communism in China [garbled group] protection Catholic interests there.

Sent Department 4731, repeated Paris 933.

DOUGLAS

893.01/11-2849: Airgram

*The Ambassador in New Zealand (Scotten) to the Secretary of State*

WELLINGTON, November 28, 1949.

[Received December 5—10:10 a. m.]

A-252. In the course of an informal conversation on November 24th with First Secretary Elting, McIntosh<sup>47</sup> said he wished the Bangkok Conference was going to be held sooner since he believed the question of recognition Communist China would be posed before then. When Elting remarked that conference was not very distant, particularly since nothing would be done until after the elections here and in Australia, and probably not until after the Commonwealth meeting in Ceylon, McIntosh stated that the UK was eager to grant recognition at the earliest possible moment. Elting then asked him whether Prime Minister Fraser had really considered the question and was firm in his opposition to recognition. McIntosh replied that Fraser was most definitely opposed but that he might possibly change his mind after the election. McIntosh explained that there could scarcely be any objection to recognition from the legal point of view, but the Prime Minister feels that it would give aid and comfort to the Communists and discourage anti-Communist elements. Elting then inquired whether the UK might not find it desirable to "play both ends against the middle" by the UK granting recognition while some of the Commonwealth countries withheld it on moral grounds. The reply to this was an emphatic "no" and left Elting with the distinct impression that the UK is putting heavy pressure on New Zealand, and probably Australia, to go along.

To emphasize the absence of material New Zealand interest which might affect their decision, McIntosh said they are mainly concerned about the position of the Chinese Consul General here, whom they all like, adding that they would like to postpone recognition in any case for as long as he cared to remain.

SCOTTEN

<sup>47</sup> Alister D. McIntosh, Permanent Secretary of the New Zealand Department of External Affairs.

893.01/11-2949 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 29, 1949—8 p. m.

[Received 11 p. m.]

5022. Foreign Office confirms information given London's 933, November 28,<sup>48</sup> regarding Vatican's desire extend early recognition Chinese Communists. Foreign Office states Vatican reluctant to take lead, however, and is endeavoring to persuade some prominent Catholic country break the ice. French position, however, remains unchanged (Embtel 4790, November 16).

Sent Department 5022, repeated London 876.

BRUCE

893.00/11-3049

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (McFall)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 30, 1949.

Participants: Senator Alexander Smith  
The Secretary  
H — Mr. McFall

Senator Smith opened the conversation by stating that he had come to see the Secretary just to give him the benefit of some observations that he felt quite strongly about in connection with Far Eastern developments.

He first made reference to what he considered to be a "divided military authority in the Far East". It was pointed out that General MacArthur<sup>49</sup> had complete control of both the economic and military problems in Japan and the surrounding islands and that the U.S. Navy was apparently in control in China, and in his and several others' opinions this provoked a state of affairs that was most undesirable and inefficient. The Senator did not appear to be too clear in his own mind as to what he thought should be done, but the Secretary gave him to understand that we had no military control of any kind in China now (the Navy having been withdrawn) and that any military decisions affecting China rest in the Pentagon Building. The Secretary told Senator Smith that we were giving consideration to the possibility of establishing an ambassador-at-large somewhere in the general area of the Far East who might be used to tie in loose ends and

<sup>48</sup> Same as telegram No. 4731, November 28, 5 p. m., from London, p. 203.

<sup>49</sup> General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Japan.

serve as a focal point for representing our interest in that area. It was emphasized, however, that no decision had been made on this subject as yet.

The Senator next expressed his serious concern about the disadvantages that would accrue to the United States in the recognition of China. He stated that it was his considered opinion that the ground for the current Chinese development had been laid in Russia as long as twenty years ago and that the Russians had worked assiduously on the fulfillment of their aggrandizement in this direction since that time. He stated that he could see no possibility whatsoever of any Titoism developing in China and that he felt any commercial advantages that might be gained out of recognition of the Communist regime would not compensate for the psychological defeat that would be ours as a result of recognition. The Secretary then told him that he had read the Senator's letter <sup>50</sup> to him about China with interest and that he wanted to assure him that in the first place no thought would be given to recognition until *at least* three factors had been served—(1) that all or substantially all of the territory of China had actually been conquered; (2) that any government to be recognized had shown its fitness to comply with international obligations; and (3) that there was an evident will on the part of the people to accept the government that had been established. The Senator then asked him what he thought England would do regarding recognition. The Secretary replied that he believed they would certainly do nothing until after the conference in January with the Dominions, upon which occasion there was a probability that this issue would be canvassed thoroughly. What they would do thereafter the Secretary indicated he could not predict. The Senator stated that he had a talk with Chiang Kai Shek and "many other influential Chinese leaders". He stated that he had had extensive conversations with K. C. Wu <sup>50a</sup> for whom he had a very high regard. (It appeared that he had confined himself rather closely to the Chiang Kai Shek coterie in his discussions on China.) At this point in the conversation a complete difference of opinion arose between the Secretary and the Senator as regards Chiang Kai Shek "absconding" with the Chinese government funds. The Senator opined that he felt the Generalissimo took the only feasible course open to him in taking the government funds with him to Formosa. The Secretary replied that he could not share that thought in any way, that he felt the taking was absolutely wrong and that no fair view of the situation could permit of any other judgment. After a valiant but completely unsuccessful effort on the part of the

<sup>50</sup> November 5, p. 173.

<sup>50a</sup> Former Mayor of Shanghai.

Senator to convince the Secretary that he should modify his view on Chiang, the Senator concluded by stating that it was obvious they shared different feelings on the subject but the main thing now was the future, not the past, and he then repeated his fervent hope that we would not accord any recognition to the Communist Government, certainly in the immediate present. The Secretary indicated he did not feel there was any real difference of opinion on that, that while he could not say we would *never* recognize the Communist Government he wanted to repeat the assurance that he would exercise every form of caution and considered study before any move in this direction was made. The Senator seemed to be satisfied with this statement.

Next the Senator brought up the question of Formosa. He stated that he had talked to "many military authorities" in the Far East who had told him that they regarded the retention of Formosa as of the utmost strategic importance to the United States. He said that his own personal view was that it was to our compelling interest to hold on to the island by any means short of actual war, and that he felt we should pursue the possibility of adopting one of two alternatives by way of protecting our interests in that area—(1) to arrange, if possible, a trusteeship of the island by the United Nations (he conceded that this was probably not practicable) or (2) a military occupation on our part of Formosa. It was his thought that such a military occupation would protect our strategic interests in that area which he regarded as "still strictly speaking a part of Japan," even though by the Cairo Declaration<sup>51</sup> we had permitted the Chinese to take over. The Senator stated that he felt "it would be better for Communists to try to dislodge us from the island first before we would have to come in later and try to do the same thing with them". The Secretary said he felt the Senator should know that this subject is receiving constant consideration, that there had been a half dozen meetings with the National Defense on the subject, with another one arranged for this week, and that there is some difference of opinion among military authorities as to the strategic importance of the island. The Secretary said he hoped a firm decision concerning the matter would be forthcoming at an early date.

In passing, the Senator at this point told the Secretary he wanted to pay a tribute to the resourcefulness of Consul General Karl Rankin in Hong Kong, who, he stated, was a man of real ability and was doing a fine job under difficult circumstances.

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<sup>51</sup> For text of statement by President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, p. 448.

The Senator next presented a suggestion which he asked the Secretary to turn over in his mind. He proposed the setting up of a combined sub-committee of the House Foreign Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations Committees to go to the Far East with the idea of acting in an advisory capacity to Jessup, Fosdick and Case<sup>52</sup> in their investigations of the situation in the Far East. The Senator seemed to feel this would be helpful to both Committees of the Congress in working on Chinese and other related problems in the future. The Secretary reminded him that the Department feels that a matter of this kind should be brought before the full Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees for discussion and made no commitment on the Senator's recommendation for the creation of the special group.

The Senator told the Secretary that his report,<sup>53</sup> which he will give to the Committee, of his trip to the Far East, will be mailed to the Secretary and to me within the next day or so.

On departing the Senator expressed to me his firm resolve to do everything he possibly can to prevent any political considerations from being brought next Congressional session into questions concerning our foreign policy, as he felt it was of transcendent importance that we avoid any appearance of any domestic disaffection for our foreign policies in the trying times in which we find ourselves.

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893.01/12-149

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Sprouse)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 1, 1949.

Mr. Graves telephoned this morning and, speaking in guarded fashion, said that his Embassy had been directed by the Foreign Office to inform the Department that Mr. Bevin planned to present to the Cabinet for decision during the week of December 12-19 the question of the date on which the British Government would extend recognition to the Chinese Communist regime. He said that the Foreign Office would continue to keep the Department fully informed of all developments in this regard.

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<sup>52</sup> Raymond B. Fosdick and Everett Case on July 30 were appointed consultants to the Department on Far Eastern matters.

<sup>53</sup> Report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, November 29, 1949, *Congressional Record*, vol. 96, pt. 1, pp. 156-160, Exhibit A.

893.01/12-149: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*

ROME, December 1, 1949—2 p. m.  
 [Received December 1—9:05 a. m.]

3906. Embtel 3460, October 29. Director General [of] Political Affairs informed us Foreign Office has instructed Italian Embassy, Washington, to consult with Department on question recognition Communist regime in China. He states that Foreign Office is now convinced after conversations with British that latter intends to recognize without further delay and have been successful in persuading other Western European governments, such as Netherlands, to take similar action. Italians also believe that French recognition of Communist government not far away.

Guidotti stated Italian Government felt that its recognition of Chinese Communist government might not be unwelcome from US point of view in view of action now to be taken by other European governments. He pointed out that Italy, as a nation without substantial economic or political interests in China, might be useful to US if they established relations with Communist government. He also stated nonrecognition on part of Italian Government would be most difficult to defend against attack from opposition within Italy and in Parliament, since it would not be logical with policy towards Communist government of Soviet Union, nor would it have support of similar action by other Western European governments.

DUNN

893.01/12-149: Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Vincent) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, December 1, 1949—5 p. m.  
 [Received December 1—2:30 p. m.]

1822. Explaining Federal Council's communiqué re Swiss policy on recognition Red China (Legtel 1812, November 30<sup>54</sup>), Cuttat<sup>55</sup> of Foreign Office today told Hughes<sup>56</sup> that Swiss policy would undoubtedly follow pattern of Israel recognition, that is, Switzerland would wait until a substantial number of countries had already recognized Communist China. Cuttat said that Switzerland would then probably join with the majority. He added that it is Swiss policy in

<sup>54</sup> Not printed.<sup>55</sup> Jacques A. Cuttat, Chief of the Western Section of the Division of Political Affairs of the Swiss Ministry for Foreign Affairs.<sup>56</sup> Morris N. Hughes, Counselor of Legation in Switzerland.



cases of this kind not to be conspicuous among the first or among the last to recognize but that when the weight of world opinion was for recognizing Switzerland would follow along. He could not say how many nations or what type of nations would constitute prerequisite for Swiss recognition but thought that "certainly more than half" would be necessary.

VINCENT

893.01/12-249 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State*

NEW DELHI, December 2, 1949—8 a. m.

[Received December 2—4 :25 a. m.]

1489. 1. During conversation with Bajpai on December 1 he referred to telegram which GOI had sent to Madame Pandit stating its position re Chinese recognition and instructing matter be discussed with State Department (see Embtel 1439, November 21<sup>57</sup>). He said no indication as yet received of US reaction.

2. Bajpai added that similar telegrams sent simultaneously various members of Commonwealth and Burma. UK was anxious for early recognition, Pakistan agreed to early recognition in principle but planned to send more complete statement of policy, Ceylon agreed with India's position and also prepared to recognize; Australia had replied not prepared state its policy until after elections since it was only caretaker government; although New Zealand had not replied thus far, it was believed reply would be negative. Burma was so anxious to recognize that GOI had difficulty in persuading it to wait until latter part of month. He did not mention Canada.

3. I asked Bajpai re GOI's communication to Chinese Communist Government re Ward arrest. He said instructions reached Indian representative China just as Ward was released and that representative instead of delivering message asked Delhi for further instructions. He has now been instructed to deliver message regardless release in order to impress on Chinese Communists seriousness of arrest of diplomatic or consular officials. No confirmation yet received that Indian representative had delivered message. I considered it inopportune to press for details re substance of message. Plan to do so when informed that message has been delivered.

HENDERSON

<sup>57</sup> Not printed.

893.01/12-249 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the Secretary of State*

MANILA, December 2, 1949—5 p. m.

[Received December 2—5:07 a. m.]

2729. Controlled American source has learned (Embtel 2676, November 28<sup>58</sup>) from informant cited reftel that *ad hoc* Philippine Government Committee studying question Philippine Government recognition Chinese Communist regime held second meeting November 29. Informant stated committee unanimously agreed Mao Tse-tung under domination Moscow and proceeded discuss question possible economic advantages which might flow to Philippines from recognition. He said Foreign Office Counselor Constantino and Manual Adea, formerly First Secretary and Consul General Nanking, held Philippines would benefit from trade with China, volume which might be expected to be greater if recognition accorded. However, Col. Gabriel<sup>59</sup> argued their advantage would be offset by increased remittances from Chinese this country to homeland which similarly would be facilitated by conditions attending diplomatic recognition and intercourse. Informant expressed view committee would favor withholding recognition at least until accorded by US.

COWEN

893.01/12-149 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Dunn)*

WASHINGTON, December 2, 1949—7 p. m.

3082. Urtel 3906 Dec 1. You shld inform Director General Polit Affairs that US attitude toward recognition by friendly countries remains that previously expressed (see Depcirtel Oct 12, 7 p. m. [11 a. m.]<sup>60</sup>) as follows:

Announcement of establishment Chi Commie "Govt" long anticipated development and does not in US view lend any special urgency to consideration question recog by non-Commie countries. Development does however point up necessity interested friendly govts, in their own interests, maintain common attitude respecting question. To this end US Govt emphasizes need for full exchange views prior

<sup>58</sup> Not printed.<sup>59</sup> Augustin G. Gabriel, Head of the Philippine National Investigation and Coordinating Agency (NICA).<sup>60</sup> *Ante*, p. 122.

any definitive or independent steps looking toward recog by other interested friendly govts.

ACHESON

803.01/12-349 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Thailand (Stanton) to the Secretary of State*

BANGKOK, December 3, 1949—10 a. m.

[Received December 3—5:11 a. m.]

1025. 1. Confidentially informed late last night by Foreign Minister that he advised by British latter intend recognize Chinese Communist government about middle this month. He said understood Indian and Burmese Governments would extend recognition about the same time.

2. He said he thought British recognition of Chinese Communists at this time would not alter decision taken by Thailand Government withholding recognition as long as possible although such action would greatly intensify pressure on Thailand. Nevertheless he and most members Cabinet feel avoidance recognition of Communists by Thailand Government for as long as possible highly desirable since presence Communist diplomatic and consular representatives would mean intensification Communist activities in Thailand. In reply my query attitude Parliament, he said some questions asked yesterday's session to which he replied by explaining technicalities involved in recognition. He said when British recognition officially announced he would no doubt have to make more detailed statement to Parliament.

3. He inquired US Government's position regarding recognition Chinese Communists. I said on basis statements recently made by Secretary State, we not contemplating immediate recognition. Speaking personally, I did not believe we could possibly recognize Chinese Communists in the very near future for the following reasons:

(1) Absence of any definite assurance or public announcement by Communist leaders indicating respect for treaty rights and international obligations;

(2) Continuing mistreatment of American citizens and consular officers by the Communists;

(3) Continuing and openly-expressed hostility both by Communist press and leaders toward the US.

Sent Department 1025; repeated New Delhi 28, Rangoon 48. Department pass London unnumbered.

STANTON

893.01/12-349 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, December 3, 1949—1 p. m.

[Received December 3—11:18 a. m.]

5110. Baeyens has just telephoned to say Massigli has heard that British Cabinet will "pronounce itself" on principle and timing of Chinese Communist recognition week beginning December 12. French Embassy Washington instructed request our views. Baeyens feels this timing leaves narrow margin for consultation.

Sent Department 5110, repeated London 894.

BRUCE

893.01/12-549

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] December 5, 1949.

Subject: Reply to Note from Indian Embassy on Question of Recognition of Chinese Communist Regime

With reference to the attached note of November 21, 1949,<sup>61</sup> handed to the Acting Secretary by Madame Pandit on November 22, it is suggested that the reply be made to her orally when she calls at her request to see you on December 6 at 3:45 P. M.<sup>62</sup>

We suggest that the following comments would be pertinent for use in your discussion:

1. You have now given careful consideration to the points raised in the Indian note.

2. While recognizing the considerable military successes of the Communist forces, the fact is that there are portions of territory and population of China under the control of a friendly government which the United States Government recognizes and which continues to oppose the Communist drive in Asia.

✓3. We do not consider that delay in recognition would have a significant or lasting effect upon the feeling of the Chinese people generally toward foreigners; on the contrary that hasty recognition by individual powers might well prove an illusory benefit, particularly in view of the gross mistreatment of Consul General Ward and other foreign nationals in the areas which the Chinese Communists have taken over.

<sup>61</sup> Not printed, but see footnote 32, p. 196.

<sup>62</sup> No memorandum of conversation found in Department of State files.

4. While the effect on trade and commerce of recognition is indeed worthy of serious consideration, this question should be handled in the light of the total national interest, having in mind at the same time the nature of the safeguards foreign property interests will have under the new regime.

5. In our view recognition within the near future by any of the leading democratic powers would have undesirable repercussions in the internal situation of countries of Southeast Asia because of the indication given of a break in the democratic ranks and of the aid and comfort given to local Communist movements. The elements of these populations which are in sympathy with the new regime are, in our view, not likely to be made less bold by the granting of recognition by the principal powers. The attempts of these elements to foment trouble are likely to be highly aggressive regardless of the matter of recognition. The reaction in the independent countries of Southeast Asia would be most important. As to the attitude of Burma, our information is that Burma is not anxious to give immediate recognition.<sup>63</sup>

6. In considering the question of assumption of international obligations by the new regime, we have searched for some indication that it is prepared to respect at least the minimum standards of international conduct and to assume the responsibility of a government in the treatment of foreign nationals and their interests. While there have been fewer instances of indignities suffered by other foreign nationals, it may well be that the Chinese Communists may later mete out to them similar treatment and that, indeed, the present apparently dissimilar attitude toward foreign nationals is itself only a phase of Chinese Communist tactics. It is agreed that promises or commitments may not necessarily have meaning; actions are what count. Unless the regime appeared inclined to respect some standard of public decency and humanity, relations, after recognition, might prove to be intolerable.

7. Therefore, while appreciating the Indian Government's position and in the understanding that it will, of course, follow the line of action which it deems best, this Government does not believe that the time is propitious to give active consideration to recognition. We hope that the Ambassador and her Government will continue to afford this Government the opportunity for any further exchange of views upon this subject which may be deemed desirable.

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<sup>63</sup> Marginal notation on copy of memorandum in the files of the Office of Chinese Affairs: "This erroneous report came from Burmese Mission. Not used by Sec'y."

893.01/12-549 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 5, 1949—6 p. m.

[Received 8:28 p. m.]

4836. Re Bangkok's 1025 to Department,<sup>64</sup> repeated New Delhi, Rangoon, London, and Paris 5110 to Department,<sup>65</sup> repeated London.

Scarlett [of] Foreign Office states position paper on recognition Communists will be submitted formally to Cabinet December 15. Hitherto position has been British should recognize as soon as decently possible after consultation other friendly governments. Now Cabinet will be asked to decide (1) having consulted friendly governments do British recognize and (2) if so what will be appropriate timing? Any decision reached will be communicated US and other friendly governments before public announcement is made. (Bangkok please inform New Delhi, Rangoon.)

Sent Department 4836, repeated Paris 963, Department pass Bangkok 10.

HOLMES

893.01/12-649

*The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State*

NEW DELHI, December 6, 1949—10 p. m.

[Received December 7—4:31 a. m.]

1518. 1. During final talk with Bajpai today before his departure on 8th for New York, he touched briefly again on China. He said that GOI had not yet received indication of US reaction to India's statement of position regarding Chinese recognition (Embtel 1489, December 2). He hoped that US would understand that in recognizing China, GOI was not undertaking to "flirt" with Chinese Communists or, for that matter, with Soviet or any other Communists. GOI fully recognized Communist danger and had no illusion regarding present tie-up between Communist China and Communist Russia. GOI, however, would be in embarrassing position if Burma and other Asian powers should recognize Communist China while India held back. Furthermore, if GOI should wait until after UK recognition it would be charged internally with following in UK's footsteps rather than having foreign policy of its own.

<sup>64</sup> December 3, 10 a. m., p. 212.<sup>65</sup> December 3, 1 p. m., p. 213.

2. Bajpai said that although GOI was continuing formally its present policy of neutrality between two power blocs, it was in practice making more and more decisions "based on merit" in harmony with Western policy, particularly US policy, rather than with Soviet policy. Illustration of GOI's determination not to appease Chinese Communists was its decision to make representation regarding Ward regardless fact that Ward had been released (paragraph 3 Embtel 1489). In fact GOI had made representation whereas UK had failed to do so.

3. In response my query, he showed me copy of note handed to Chinese Communist government. This note recited facts relating to case of Ward and Stokes<sup>66</sup> as received from US Government and closed with following statement: "The Government of India wishes to express their concern over the facts disclosed by the Government of the US, since they constitute a departure from diplomatic usage."

HENDERSON

893.01/12-749 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Thailand (Stanton) to the Secretary of State*

BANGKOK, December 7, 1949—4 p. m.

[Received December 7—8:32 a. m.]

1038. Re Saigon's 422,<sup>67</sup> might suggest Department once again point out to British hasty recognition Chinese Communist government as apparently contemplated by them will hasten Communist domination Siam and indeed strengthen Communists' influence and increase prestige Commie government throughout SEA.

Sent Department 1038, repeated Singapore 55, airmailed Saigon.

STANTON

893.01/12-749

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Freeman)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 7, 1949.

Mr. Collins called today and referred to the Indian note to the Canadian Government, similar to that sent to this Government,<sup>68</sup> indicating an intention to extend recognition to the Chinese Communists during the latter part of December. Mr. Collins stated that the Canadian Government had now replied to the Indian Government, presumably in Ottawa, expressing appreciation to the Indian Government

<sup>66</sup> William N. Stokes, Vice Consul at Mukden.

<sup>67</sup> December 5, not printed.

<sup>68</sup> Not printed, but see footnote 32, p. 196.



for informing the Canadian Government of the former's thinking on this question. The Canadian Government in its reply stated, however, that it wished to re-examine the whole question of China in the light of the discussions among the Commonwealth countries to be held in January at Colombo, and that in all probability Canada would take no action with regard to recognition of the Chinese Communists prior to that time.

I thanked Mr. Collins for this information and indicated that the Department would appreciate receiving any further thoughts which the Canadian Government might have on this question.

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893.01/12-749 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*

ROME, December 7, 1949—8 p. m.

[Received December 7—5:46 p. m.]

3991. We informed Director General [of] Political Affairs substance Deptel 3082, December 2. He stated that Italian Government was being pressed by British Ambassador here for definitive reply to British memorandum of November 1.<sup>69</sup> He understood that Portugal had now made up its mind to join with British in recognition along with other countries and that French would not be far behind. He said Government felt it could not postpone replying to British any longer, and was considering a communication which would point out that if UK decided on recognition, Italian Government would have to review its present position. He said Foreign Office did not want Italy to be last Western European country to recognize Communist regime, thus exposing it to further attack by Communists and extreme right for subservience to wishes of US against what seemed to be recognition to protect Italian interests which, while not as important as British, were of importance and included some 1,000 missionaries. In reply to our inquiry whether Vatican was in favor of recognizing regime, he stated that Foreign Office had heard rumors to this effect, but he did not believe Vatican had actually made a decision (infotel airgram November 30, 7 a. m.<sup>70</sup>).

If UK and other Western European countries proceed with recognition, it would seem that similar action on part Italy foregone conclusion.

DUNN

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<sup>69</sup> *Ante*, p. 151.

<sup>70</sup> Not printed.

893.01/12-849: Telegram

*The Chargé in Burma (Day) to the Secretary of State*

RANGOON, December 8, 1949—11 a. m.

[Received December 8—9:27 a. m.]

537. In conversation my call on Foreign Minister Dec. 7, following his return from Lake Success and London Dec. 4, Foreign Minister said expected GOB recognize Communist China before end this month but feared early recognition would help Communist penetration from Yunnan, hoped Communist China would not soon send diplomats Rangoon, desired delay longest sending Burma Ambassador to Communist China.

Conclude GOB likely recognize Communist China immediately after, not before, Britain does despite Foreign Minister's apprehension over disadvantages acting too hastily.

I said I assumed GOB continuing consultation policy and added hoped recognition would await some definite assurance by Communist China of intent respect international obligations protect foreign nationals and property in China.

Sent Department 537, repeated Bangkok 54, London 28.

DAY

893.01/12-849: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*

ROME, December 8, 1949—1 p. m.

[Received December 8—9:49 a. m.]

4002. Re Embtel 3991, December 7. Netherlands Minister<sup>71</sup> here has informed me that he does not believe his Government prepared to recognize Chinese Communist regime. This would seem at variance with opinion of Foreign Office. If De Bylandt is correct and Dutch attitude is indicative of policy of other Western European countries, I believe we could successfully dissuade Italian Government from following UK lead in recognizing Communist regime. On other hand, if a number of other countries go along with UK I believe efforts persuade Italian Government against recognition would be futile.

DUNN

<sup>71</sup> Willem F. L. van Bylandt.

893.01/12-849

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] December 8, 1949.

Participants: Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador  
The Secretary  
Mr. W. Walton Butterworth, Assistant Secretary, FE

The British Ambassador called this morning at my request and I explained to him that I wished to discuss with him the question of recognition of the Chinese Communist regime. He said he was glad that I had sent for him because he also had two or three matters which he wished to raise, particularly, the question of Formosa and the discussions at the Ceylon Conference regarding a possible Japanese Peace Treaty.

[For section of this memorandum concerning Formosa, see page 442.]

I then brought up the question of possible recognition of the Chinese Communist regime indicating that shortly after the receipt of the British note of November 1, I had gone to Paris and met with Mr. Bevin and we had discussed the matter there. I now understood that the British Cabinet was scheduled to consider the question about mid-December and that I wished to review and reiterate the point of view which this Government held on this matter. In the first place, it seemed desirable to us to act if at all possible in concert with other concerned powers to ascertain whether the Chinese Communists intended to live up to their international obligations. It seemed to us that the inclinations of the Chinese Communists were to follow the Russian example of considering themselves not an evolutionary regime which had sprung from the previous one which, therefore, entailed that they assume both the rights and the obligations of the former regime, but a revolutionary one which would seek to assume all the rights and only those obligations they choose to undertake. It was important to know what the real situation was and, if possible, to prevent such a development. Secondly, it was important to have evidence of how they proposed to conduct themselves with respect to the outer world: whether it would be in conformity with international law and usage as a civilized power, or as an uncivilized or semi-civilized entity. Thirdly, we did not believe that hasty recognition would confer any permanent benefits on those who undertook it. Fourthly, as respects the U.S., it was important for us to bring Congress into our deliberations so that, at any rate, the problem would be fully talked out and the issues clarified. Therefore, regardless of

the action taken by other powers, we would not act hastily. I also went on to say that I appreciated that the arrangement had been to consult but that no commitment had been made necessarily to act unitedly, it being recognized that the interests of states differed and that in matters of recognition they would, in the final analysis, be governed by their views of immediate and long term self-interest. I asked Mr. Butterworth if he had anything to add and he called Sir Oliver Franks' attention to the presence in Washington of Mr. Lewisohn\* who had been for some twenty years the *London Times* representative in Peiping and had only just arrived here. Mr. Lewisohn had confirmed our own reports that the Communist regime attached great importance to being recognized by some of the Western powers though there were those among the Chinese Communists who were apparently anxious that the U.S. not recognize the regime. Given the fact that Chinese Communists do want recognition by other powers than USSR and its satellites, it would be regrettable that the powers should give up the opportunity of thus bringing pressure to bear for recognition of existing obligations. The British Ambassador said he appreciated these considerations and also the fact that if the powers were not going to act as a unit, it would be undesirable for those who were recognizing to act as a concerted body. He also wanted it understood that the British Cabinet was not merely going to consider the question in mid-December but as he understood it would probably make a decision which might well be to recognize before the year was out. I said that if this decision were taken, I hoped that we would at least be given as much advance notice as possible so as to minimize the effects that misunderstanding might well create and cause repercussions on other Anglo-American concerns. He agreed to ensure that this would happen.

[Here follows discussion of Japanese peace treaty and a military assistance agreement.]

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893.01/12-949 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 9, 1949—2 p. m.

[Received December 9—10:55 a. m.]

4898. Reference Embtel 4836, December 5, repeated Bangkok, 10. According Scarlett, Foreign Office position paper re recognition Communists submitted as planned but no final decision will be reached

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\*Mr. Lewisohn in a talk in FE had been critical of British policy and in accord with U.S. attitude towards recognition. [Footnote in the source text.]

until after return Bevin December 12. Scarlett did not reveal what action if any taken by Cabinet.

Sent Department 4898, repeated Bangkok 11.

HOLMES

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893.01/12-1049 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*

ROME, December 10, 1949—6 p. m.

[Received 6:19 p. m.]

4041. ReEmbtel 3991, December 7. Informed [that] Foreign Office has replied to British memorandum that, while they agree with British reasoning, they consider unity among Western democracies on issue of recognition more important. We have been promised text of reply and shall forward it as soon as received.

DUNN

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893.01/12-1149 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State*

NEW DELHI, December 11, 1949—9 a. m.

[Received December 11—11:13 a. m.]

1541. During conversation which I had on December 10 with K.P.S. Menon, Secretary of Ministry External Affairs, who in absence Bajpai is in charge of Ministry, told me following re recognition Communist China.

1. GOI had received message from Madame Pandit describing position of US Government re recognition Communist China. GOI appreciated views and position US but felt in view India's geographic position and Asian interests GOI must carry out its program for recognition. Recognition probably would not take place, however, before last week December or first week January.

2. Although GOI would act regardless decision other members Commonwealth, it still hoped to receive replies from all before taking action. Canada favored recognition but deferred pending decision France, Australia and other friendly powers. UK also favored early recognition but as yet had made no definite decision re time and conditions. No reply from New Zealand and no definite answer from Pakistan.

3. Burma was pressing hard for immediate recognition. Burmese Ambassador stated several days ago his Government wished to recognize on December 11 or shortly thereafter. Ambassador was informed that GOI did not wish unduly to influence GOB but hoped GOB could wait until other Asian Powers could take action with dignity and in general agreement.

4. In response my question he said GOI would not await Commonwealth conference in Ceylon since it did not wish impression to be obtained that Commonwealth was dictating political decisions of international nature.

5. GOI had promised Chinese Ambassador here that it would give him 10 days' notice before extending recognition so he would have opportunity in quiet way to wind up affairs and get out.

I told him it was to be regretted that GOI found it necessary to move ahead so fast. I was convinced from my experience in dealing with Communist-controlled governments that they did not really appreciate gracious or friendly gestures but they did understand and respect, in spite of loud protests, displays of firmness. Undoubtedly the Chinese Communists would welcome lack of unity among democratic powers in dealing with them and would endeavor to exploit this lack to their advantage and to the disadvantage of democratic world.

Menon said GOI recognized this fact. It hoped that differences in our approach to Communist China would not lead to mutual embarrassment.

Sent Department; repeated Rangoon 31.

HENDERSON

893.01/12-1249: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*

[Extract]

ROME, December 12, 1949—6 p. m.

[Received December 12—2:39 p. m.]

4056. ReEmbtel 4041, December 10. Italian Government reply December 7 to British *pro memoria* agrees with British evaluation of present political and military situation in China . . .

DUNN

893.01/12-1649: Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers*<sup>72</sup>

WASHINGTON, December 16, 1949—3 a. m.

Since survey of opinion re question recog Chi Commie regime initiated by Top Secret Depcirtel Aug. 19 5 a. m., situation has developed to point where now appears India may recog before end Dec. UK

<sup>72</sup> Sent to Batavia, Bangkok, Karachi, Manila, New Delhi, Rangoon, Saigon, and Singapore.

and Burma may recog simultaneously or shortly thereafter to be followed by majority other countries throughout world with interests in China, excepting Philippines, Republic of Korea and possibly Italy.

Under these circumstances Dept desires ur estimate of effect on opinion in country and/or Govt to which you accredited if (1) US shld join in early recog, (2) US shld delay recog until great majority other countries have recognized, (3) US shld indefinitely withhold recog.

ACHESON

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893.01/12-1649

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 16, 1949.

The First Secretary of the Burmese Embassy called on the Officer in Charge of Burma-Ceylon Affairs late yesterday afternoon under instructions to inform the Department that his Government had concluded that, in view of recent developments in Yunnan Province, it must act immediately to extend recognition to the Chinese Communist regime. The Embassy representative had no information as to the exact timing of his Government's move, but the tenor of his instructions was such that Burmese recognition will probably be forthcoming within the next few days.<sup>73</sup>

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893.01/12-1649 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 16, 1949—1 p. m.  
[Received December 16—10:58 a. m.]

4994. Embtel 4836, December 5. Although Cabinet met yesterday and assumably considered recognition Chinese Communists, informal inquiries various levels Foreign Office have so far failed to elicit any information re Cabinet decision.

Reliable American correspondent informs Embassy his inquiry Attlee's<sup>74</sup> secretary last night resulted in guarded statement Cabinet decision definitely in favor recognition and Bevin given discretion as

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<sup>73</sup> Notation by Aaron S. Brown, of the Executive Secretariat: "December 16, 1949. The Burmese Embassy informed NEA this afternoon that Burma has recognized the Chinese Communist regime."

<sup>74</sup> Clement R. Attlee, British Prime Minister.



to timing. Assumably Foreign Office would wish consult new government[s] Australia and New Zealand before announcing decision.

Information from other press sources indicates apparent imminence Communist attack on Formosa has raised new technical questions, it being realized that Formosa is still legally Japanese territory and UK has certain responsibilities that connection.

HOLMES

893.01/12-1649: Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 16, 1949—6 p. m.

[Received December 16—1:41 p. m.]

5004. Reference Embtel 4994, December 16. Scarlett, Foreign Office, has just informed Embassy [that] Cabinet yesterday reached definite decision in principle to recognize the Chinese Communists. Timing of recognition was left to discretion of Bevin who would doubtless wish consult friendly governments prior to making public announcement.

Although Scarlett not participating in drafting, he understands personal message from Bevin to Secretary somewhat to above effect will be telegraphed to British Embassy Washington this evening.

HOLMES

893.01/12-1649

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Sprouse)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 16, 1949.

Participants: Mr. Hubert Graves, Counselor, British Embassy  
Mr. Butterworth, Assistant Secretary  
Mr. Sprouse, CA

Mr. Graves called at his request this afternoon and explained that he was doing so, because of the illness of the Ambassador, in order to present a personal message<sup>76</sup> (a copy of which is attached) from Mr. Bevin to the Secretary regarding the question of recognition of the Chinese Communist regime. He pointed out the message indicated the desire of Mr. Bevin that no publicity be given to the decision of the British Cabinet in this regard until the British Government is ready to notify the Chinese Government and emphasized the desirabil-

<sup>76</sup> *Infra.*

ity of no publicity in this matter. Mr. Graves also handed Mr. Butterworth an additional brief memorandum (a copy of which is attached <sup>76</sup>) which indicated that Mr. Bevin would be grateful for a reply from the Secretary and further set forth the British Government's view regarding the position of Formosa.

893.01/12-1649

*The British Embassy to the Department of State* <sup>77</sup>

PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM MR. BEVIN TO MR. ACHESON

I want you to know that the Cabinet have now taken a decision in principle to accord *de jure* recognition to the Chinese Communist Government. The actual date of recognition has not yet been fixed, but I am thinking in terms of the 2nd January 1950, though I do not wish to be held to that date. I am anxious that no publicity should be given to our decision until we are ready to notify the Chinese Government.

I also wish you to know that we have deferred a decision on this matter as long as we felt able, but having taken into account all the circumstances and all the views expressed by other Governments, nevertheless feel we must now proceed to recognition. There are some factors which affect us specially, not only our interests but the position in Hongkong, and also in Malaya, where there are vast Chinese communities. We feel that continued non-recognition is liable to cause trouble there which we cannot afford to risk, and we have had to bear this in mind.

As you know, we also take the view that to withhold recognition indefinitely is to play straight into the hands of the Soviet Union. We feel that the only counter to Russian influence is that Communist China should have contacts with the West, and that the sooner these contacts are established the better.

Our recognition will merely acknowledge the inescapable fact that the Chinese Communist Government is in effective control in China. This does not in the least lessen our determination to resist communism in South East Asia and elsewhere. What happens in the territories for which we are responsible is very much our business, and we intend to stimulate resistance to communism with all the means at our disposal, and hope like-minded countries will do the same.

While for obvious reasons, we cannot accompany the act of recognition with a statement in public that it does not denote approval of

<sup>76</sup> Not printed.

<sup>77</sup> Handed by the Counselor of the British Embassy (Graves) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) on December 16.

the Chinese Communist Government, this is as you know the fact. All of us after all recognise the Soviet Union and Satellites. We acknowledge the existence of these Governments, though we certainly do not approve of them. And by recognising the Chinese Communist Government we shall be doing no more than acknowledging a fact, as we have done with the Soviet Union and the Satellites.

Such then is the position which I want to put to you frankly. I had hoped that we might be able to take action together in this matter, but if the United States feel unable to accord recognition I shall quite understand the position. As you know, we want to keep in close association with you, but we have to be careful not to lose our grip of the situation in Asia and to take into account the views of our Asian friends.

I am grateful for the views which you expressed to Sir Oliver Franks about this question of recognition on 8th December which I have taken into account in discussion with my colleagues. I am consulting with Commonwealth and other Governments with whom we have been in touch on this question, but it is of course for them to make up their own minds.

WASHINGTON, 16 December, 1949.

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893.01/12-1749 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, December 17, 1949—2 p. m.  
[Received December 17—9:31 a. m.]

5297. Re London's 5002 to Department.<sup>78</sup> We were shown Bevin message to Schuman re China and Indochina which was delivered Foreign Office this noon. Presumably Embassy London or British Embassy Washington will furnish text which we understand differs from Bevin's message to us. In brief: Message announces UK decision to recognize Chinese Communists, preferably on January 2, and expresses hope this will not embarrass French Government and Bao Dai, especially since UK considering *de facto* recognition latter after Colombo conference if certain conditions fulfilled. Bevin suggests Schuman send Bao Dai message explaining UK position.

[Here follows summary of British conditions for recognition of Bao Dai's government.]

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<sup>78</sup> Not printed; it reported the British Foreign Office indicated Mr. Bevin was informing M. Schuman that recognition of the Peiping regime was being retarded temporarily in hope the French would settle the Vietnam problem to permit prior recognition of Bao Dai (851G.01/12-1649).

Sent Department 5297; repeated London 937; Department pass Saigon 168.

BRUCE

893.01/12-1749: Telegram

*The Chargé in Burma (Day) to the Secretary of State*

RANGOON, December 17, 1949—7 p. m.

[Received December 17—10:49 a. m.]

f 550. Deputy Secretary Foreign Office has confirmed the Burma Government has extended recognition Communist China as reportedly revealed by Foreign Minister to press in Calcutta.

Sent Department 550, repeated New Delhi 62.

DAY

893.01/12-1949: Telegram

*The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State*

NEW DELHI, December 19, 1949—6 p. m.

[Received December 19—2:56 p. m.]

1575. 1. Menon, Secretary in charge External Affairs, sent for me this afternoon in order to inform me in confidence that GOI intends recognize Communist China on December 30. He assumed US Government is already aware UK intends extend recognition January 2.

2. Menon said Nehru had requested him express hope that US Government would not take amiss such early recognition on part GOI. In view its geographical position, GOI felt it could not wait longer to establish relations with the regime controlling so close a neighbor. GOI hoped use its relations prevent Chinese Communists from passing completely Moscow domination.

3. I said that our position re recognition had already been clarified by Secretary of State. We had no desire or intention, however, impose our views on other countries and I was sure that my Government would take position India must make its own decision re matters this kind.

HENDERSON

893.01/12-1949: Telegram

*The Consul General at Saigon (Abbott) to the Secretary of State*

SAIGON, December 19, 1949—7 p. m.

[Received December 19—8:12 a. m.]

457. Recognition Chinese Communist regime (Depcirtel December 16, 3 a. m.) has been subject endless discussions all political elements

here for many weeks and press has filled columns with editorials, agency despatches and articles from world press. Certain basic ideas are believed to have crystallized in local public opinion:

1. US is fundamentally opposed to recognition, has consistently used its influence to prevent action by UK and other countries, and will only recognize with extreme reluctance when it is clear that these efforts have failed.

2. UK extremely anxious to extend recognition in order protect its commercial interests. This "shopkeeper's["] attitude repeatedly commented on bitterly in right-wing circles and with malicious pleasure by fellow traveling press. This belief plus repeated rumors in recent weeks that UK was on point of recognition is believed to have largely discounted any important effect on public opinion when British recognition finally comes.

3. French will probably follow suit if UK recognizes, certainly if US does. This situation deplored by most although there is appeasement group among both French and Vietnam which hopes recognition will prevent Communist invasion or rather fears refusal to recognize may be used as excuse for invasion.

4. Recognition by US will have following adverse effect on local situation:

*a.* Ho Chi Minh and supporters will be greatly encouraged and Bao Dai correspondingly discouraged. Argument will be advanced and widely believed that determination to stop further spread Communism only half-hearted and that, if we have accepted Mao Tse-tung, we will eventually accept Ho Chi Minh.

*b.* French will have to accept Chinese Communist consuls who will promptly organize influential and relatively numerous local Chinese community. This would have serious effect on political and military situation since local Chinese have till now been largely passive.

Viewed from above background, following reply to numbered alternatives paragraph 2 reference telegram.

(1). Most adverse effect. General assumption that we had followed British lead to avoid losing China markets. Considerable loss of face among native elements because of wide publicity given here toward arrest and other Communist insults.

(2). Somewhat less adverse effect, particularly if combined with prior recognition Bao Dai government, firm warning against Chinese direct or indirect aggression and preliminary publicity campaign emphasizing recognition granted for technical and not political reasons and implies no endorsement of Communist regime.

(3). Best solution from Indochina point of view.

ABBOTT

893.01/12-1949: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the Secretary of State*

MANILA, December 19, 1949—11 p. m.

[Received December 20—4:03 a. m.]

2859. ReDepcirtel December 16, 3 p. m. [*a. m.*]. I saw Quirino [in] Baguio this afternoon, [and he] expressed desire fullest possible co-operation with US and hope that recognition from US would not be too immediate. Also indicated deepest concern over possibility loss Formosa to Chinese Communist regime and pressed me hard for definite information as to what, if any, aid we are now giving Formosa or propose to give Formosa, or what, if anything, we propose doing toward defense Formosa and more specifically, if any of our forces in Japan, Okinawa, or here either air or navy would be used. Also specifically pressed for information as to whether our Okinawa forces or forces based in Philippines would be used for defense Philippines in event attack on Philippines originating from Formosa or Chinese mainland. He further stated he felt that in view of vulnerable position of Philippines, he felt that it would be an imprudent thing for the Philippines to risk antagonizing Chinese Communist regime by long deferring recognition after recognition by substantial number other powers.

COWEN

893.01/12-2049: Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Beam) to the Secretary of State*

BATAVIA, December 20, 1949—10 a. m.

[Received December 20—7:32 a. m.]

1006. Reference Depcirtel December 16, in view (1) Indo[nesia] concern with local Chinese minority, (2) Indo desire maintain good relations Pacific countries and (3) reluctance antagonize Communist block pending Indo UN membership, it is likely RIS<sup>79</sup> when set up will arrange early recognition Chinese Communist regime, particularly if example furnished by India and UK, especially former. Will report further after talks with influential Indo leaders in which I will stress Soviet attitude in SC and will refer Mao's visit to Moscow. (Contel 1000, December 17<sup>80</sup>). US recognition or non-recognition Chinese would probably have little effect Indo decision. 1) In light

<sup>79</sup> Republic of Indonesia (United States of Indonesia).

<sup>80</sup> Not printed.

indignities suffered by US in China and strong US official and public reaction, early US recognition would be construed as capitulation and would be described as such by leftwing elements here. 2) Delayed US recognition awaiting example majority other countries would be better understood if some form assurances could be obtained re protection US national[s] and interests China although resulting difference between US recognition and Philippine and Korean non-recognition policies would be commented on. 3) Indefinite withholding US recognition China would probably evoke little reaction unfavorable or otherwise in foreseeable future.

Sent Department, Department pass The Hague.

BEAM

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893.01/12-2049

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Sprouse)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 20, 1949.

Mr. Taymans<sup>81</sup> called at his request this morning and explained that he was calling in accordance with the instructions of his Foreign Office to discuss the question of recognition of the Chinese Communist regime. He stated that it was still the opinion of the Belgian Government that there was no need for haste in extending recognition and that it would be desirable for the friendly Western powers to maintain a common front on this question. He said that present indications seem to point to early British recognition, possibly shortly after the first of the year, and that the Belgian Government had to give serious consideration to the action it should take in this regard. He said if the British Government alone extended recognition the Belgian Government would probably not go along and would desire to postpone such action until some unnamed future date. He added, however, that if the other Brussels Pact<sup>82</sup> Powers, including France, should extend recognition the Belgian Government would almost inevitably have to take similar action, which might be taken jointly with the other nations concerned. He asked for an indication of the Department's views on this question.

I reviewed briefly the Department's views in regard to this question, pointing out that the Department still considered that hasty and premature action toward recognition would be disadvantageous to the interests of this country and the interests of the Western nations in

<sup>81</sup> Roger Taymans, Counselor of the Belgian Embassy.

<sup>82</sup> Treaty for collaboration in economic, social, and cultural matters and for collective self-defense, signed at Brussels, March 17, 1948; United Nations Treaty Series, vol. XIX, p. 51.



general. I said that at the present time this Government could not even seriously consider the question of recognition so long as the Chinese Communist regime gave no indication of observance of normal standards of international conduct. I reviewed briefly the Ward and Smith-Bender cases, the treatment of our Consulate General at Shanghai in connection with the demands of Chinese ex-Navy employees and the matter of General Soule's exit permit.<sup>83</sup> I said that it was realized, of course, that the final decision in this regard must be made by each nation on the basis of its own interests and that we desired to continue consultation on this subject and to be informed of the views of the other friendly Western nations. In reply to Mr. Taymans' direct question whether any indication could be given of when the U.S. Government might recognize the Chinese Communist regime, I said that no such indication could be given. I expressed appreciation of his action in communicating to the Department the views of the Belgian Government and expressed the hope that he would again get in touch with the Department prior to any action which might be taken by the Belgian Government on this question. Mr. Taymans agreed to do so.

893.01/12-2049 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Thailand (Stanton) to the Secretary of State*

BANGKOK, December 20, 1949—3 p. m.

[Received December 20—12:55 p. m.]

1074. 1. Most strongly urge United States delay recognition Chinese Communist Government, making recognition contingent upon receipt definite undertakings from Communists fully protect American rights, interests in China, observe existing treaty obligations between the two countries and uphold principles international law, including those set forth in UN Charter<sup>84</sup> (Depcirctel December 16, 3 a. m.).

2. Foregoing recommendation based on following reasons:

(a) Open and reiterated hostility manifested by Communist leaders and propaganda machine against US.

(b) Callous mistreatment and calculated humiliation US officials in China.

(c) Denouncement recently concluded Sino-American commercial treaty by Communist spokesman as "traitorous" agreement.

(d) Statements of Communist leaders and spokesmen showing carefully planned aggression against Tibet and encouragement and

<sup>83</sup> For correspondence on these subjects, see volume VIII.

<sup>84</sup> Signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945; 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031.

support Communist subversive groups in countries of South and East Asia. These statements together with recent notification by Chou En-lai regarding pursuit, extermination Nationalist troops fleeing into neighboring countries indicate Communist plans for engulfment countries South and East Asia and perhaps India, fully developed. Communist troops have now reached borders Indochina and upon complete occupation Yunnan will be threatening Northern Burma and Thailand.

(e) On basis statements Mao, other Communist leaders, and Mao's present visit Stalin, clear that influence Soviet Government upon Chinese Communist government dominating, exclusive.

3. Recognition by US without even attempting obtain any safeguards will inevitably have following repercussions upon Thailand, other countries having large or influential Chinese minorities:

(a) These countries will be forced also recognize and establish diplomatic relations with Chinese Communist Government. This act will be followed by influx large Chinese Communist diplomatic, consular staffs who can confidently be expected make concentrated effort weld Chinese minorities in these countries into potent pro-Communist weapon which can and will be turned against governments in power. This internal pressure likely coordinated with massing Chinese Communist troops along borders Burma, Thailand, Indochina and threatening invasion. Estimated in case Thailand, 6 months after arrival Communist representatives, this country will be under Communist control.

(b) Thailand Government and people, and peoples of many other countries South East Asia will feel useless attempt resist Communism and therefore desirable come to terms rapidly as possible.

(c) In above contingency our counter-Communist propaganda would be meaningless to them and be largely a waste of time, effort and money. For the same reason other forms of aid would be almost valueless as attempt swing people away from Communism.

4. In view aforementioned grim realities and rapidity and gravity of developments, I very strongly urge US Government forthwith and without waiting for Bangkok Conference, issue official statement on subject recognition.

(a) Declaration to refer open hostility Chinese Communist government to US, mistreatment US officials, failure give assurances re protection American lives and property and observance of treaty, international obligations and aggressive plans Communist government against other countries Asia. Believe declaration should state in view foregoing, US unable recognize Chinese Communist government unless and until positive undertakings given observe treaty and international obligations.

(b) Second part of declaration, after referring aggressive plans enunciated by Communist leaders, should express our strong opposition to any attempt invade other Asian countries or create trouble there and in a further statement of our intention invoke provisions UN Charter against aggressive actions endangering peace.

(c) There should also be included statement indicating our determination give technical and other aid those countries who desire it and who are striving maintain, or still seeking their freedom and independence. This statement must of course be implemented by immediate extension of aid through MAP,<sup>85</sup> technical assistance and any other feasible means.

(d) I believe a third paragraph should include reference to Formosa and reiteration our commitment return Formosa to China but only when there shall have been established in China a government freely elected by the people.

I believe prior to issuance of foregoing statement that every effort should be made evacuate all American officials and personnel from China in order reduce number Americans who might be held as hostages by Communists and thus avoid grave risks which we run of Communists mistreating Americans and perhaps provoking American people to point where we would be swept into war against Communist China and probably Soviet Russia.

5. In conclusion may I reiterate my conviction that the gravity of the situation and rapid march events, calls for definition with least possible delay of our policy in Far East and South and East Asia. Although it is almost too late to take any effective measures stem Communism, I still believe fairly clear-cut statement by US Government would have heartening and reassuring effect upon free and independent countries this part of world and might at least delay Communist plans engulf rest of Asia. To say and do nothing would permit Communist expansion by default while to extend recognition along with UK and some other countries, would greatly facilitate and expedite the loss of Asia to Communists.

Senior members Embassy staff are in general agreement with foregoing.

STANTON

893.01/12-2049 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State*

THE HAGUE, December 20, 1949—5 p. m.

[Received December 20—2:03 p. m.]

1282. Foreign Office official today said following to us regarding recognition Chinese Communist government:

1. Foreign Office largely concerned with Indo[nesia] aspect recognition Peking. If Indo announces its new statehood to Peking and if Peking should acknowledge, such acknowledgement would amount

<sup>85</sup> Mutual Assistance Program.

to recognition on both sides. However, if Peking failed to acknowledge Indo's notification, recognition of Peking by Indo would not exist.

2. Foreign Office hopes that Peking will take first step and immediately recognize Indo, as this would constitute indication that Kremlin (which would be notified of Indo statehood by Dutch anyway) did not intend be difficult about Indo and might even permit its admission into UN.

3. Official with whom we talked will try to sell idea to Stikker<sup>86</sup> and Cabinet that recognition of Peking by Netherlands Government be held up until Peking has recognized Indo.

In conclusion, official remarked that Netherland Government was exploring every way to help Indo politically and obtain her admission into UN.

Sent Department 1282, repeated Batavia 142, Moscow 9, Department pass Moscow, Batavia.

CHAPIN

893.01/12-2049 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the Secretary of State*

MANILA, December 20, 1949—7 p. m.

[Received December 20—4 p. m.]

2880. As indicated (Depcirtel December 16, 3 a. m., Embtel 2859, December 19) Embassy's reftel, effect within Philippine Government might be unfortunate were US to join in early recognition Chinese Communist regime; we believe US would lose somewhat in dignity in eyes Philippine public if US recognition were apparently hurried or precipitate and that prestige of communism this area would be enhanced thereby.

Should US delay until majority other countries have extended recognition, we believe both Philippine Government and people would accept US decision also to extend recognition as natural if not inevitable.

Should US indefinitely withhold recognition after Philippines had itself extended it, we believe result would be to increase an uneasy sense on part Philippine Government and people that they were caught between two antagonists.

We would urge that after recognition may be decided upon but some time prior to its announcement Embassy be authorized inform Philippine Government of US intent. We feel Philippine Government in preserving common front with US by postponement recognition has earned right expect this courtesy from US which would

<sup>86</sup> D. U. Stikker, Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs.

enable it announce its decision regarding recognition in advance of US should it wish to do so. If Philippine Government finds itself in position where it feels impelled accord recognition at same time as US or immediately thereafter it would be put in position suggesting absence true independence and it might be less likely cooperate with us when we next feel need Philippine support.

COWEN

893.01/12-2149 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Shanghai (McConaughy) to the Secretary of State*

SHANGHAI, December 21, 1949— 3 p. m.  
[Received December 21—5:12 a. m.]

5327. Danish Minister Morch informed me that he expected his Government would recognize Communist regime early January, implying he anticipated Danish recognition would follow immediately that of British. As of possible added interest was Morch's remark that as his Government owned no property in Peiping, he was looking into prospects of acquiring some. Danish businessman recently in Peiping found it would be necessary to purchase as no suitable property for rent; furthermore, impossible buy land inside old diplomatic quarter.

MCCONAUGHY

893.01/12-2149

*The Chinese Ambassador (Koo) to the Secretary of State*

The Chinese Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and, pursuant to instructions, has the honor to transmit to the Secretary the following message from the Minister for Foreign Affairs:<sup>87</sup>

"The General Assembly of the United Nations having in its Fourth Session decided to refer China's appeal against the Soviet Union to the Interim Commission for consideration and report to the next Session of the Assembly,<sup>88</sup> any Government which chooses to extend recognition to the Communist regime recently set up in Peiping would be prejudging the case and would seriously prejudice the position of the Interim Commission in its effort to implement the Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on December 8th.

"The Communist regime in Peiping is not a free, independent political entity. It is a creation by a foreign Power. It has no spontaneous

<sup>87</sup> George K. C. Yeh.

<sup>88</sup> For correspondence on this subject, see volume I.

support of the Chinese people, whose national character and traditional culture are basically opposed to the Communist ideology.

"In international law it lacks all the attributes of a sovereign state. Any recognition accorded to it constitutes a violation of the principles of the United Nations' Charter.

"At a time when the whole democratic world is struggling to arrest the advance of totalitarianism, any such recognition would inevitably further the cause of international communism, for the consequences of which democracy will one day have to pay dearly."

WASHINGTON, December 21, 1949.

893.01/12-2149 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State*

ROME, December 21, 1949—10 p. m.

[Received 10:37 p. m.]

4181. We have been given by Foreign Office (Embtel 4056, December 12) copy letter to British Ambassador, Rome, from Secretary General Foreign Office Zoppi which reads in translation :

"Your letter 17 kindly informed me intention British Government to proceed to *de jure* recognition of popular Communist government (*sic*) adding that date selected would be January 2 if other governments agreed on that date.

Italian Government has impression that basis of mutual understanding among interested powers not yet reached. It also does not believe it possible, in such brief lapse of time, to overcome difference of views which still exist on question and arrive at common line of action hoped for in our reply to British memo of November 2.

In view foregoing, Italian Government does not for present believe it is in position to give more satisfactory reply, at same time giving assurance that will not fail keep British Government informed its decisions as soon as this will be possible."

DUNN

751.51G/12-2249 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, December 22, 1949—noon.

[Received December 22—8:14 a. m.]

5366. Baeyens read us this morning text Schuman's reply to Bevin message summarized Embtel 5297.<sup>89</sup> Message will be delivered by Massigli this afternoon. It has been repeated to Bonnet<sup>90</sup> with in-

<sup>89</sup> December 17, 2 p. m., p. 226.

<sup>90</sup> Henri Bonnet, French Ambassador in the United States.

structions enlist US support in influencing British postpone recognition Mao Tse-tung until Bao Dai can simultaneously be recognized.

Summary Schuman message to Bevin follows (Begin summary):

French Government appreciates reasons advanced by British Government for early recognition Peking regime and consideration with which UK has examined possible impact this recognition on French problem Indochina and success Bao Dai regime.

[Here follows discussion of Vietnam situation.]

Schuman then goes on urge Bevin to delay his recognition of Peking regime until after he can recognize Bao Dai. In addition, other considerations already made known British Government, he points to new element introduced by Mao Tse-tung visit Moscow and emphasizes his great apprehension that this visit with its proclamations of Sino-Soviet solidarity if immediately followed by UK recognition Mao Tse-tung regime before such recognition of Bao Dai Government would have effect of severely weakening spirit of resistance to communism throughout Southeast Asia. (End summary).

Sent Department 5366, repeated London 947. Department pass Saigon 170.

BRUCE

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893.00/12-2249: Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, December 22, 1949—1 p. m.

[Received December 22—8:14 a. m.]

5367. Re my immediately preceding telegram, Baeyens said French Government was without information re US reaction Bevin message to Secretary re Chinese recognition, delivered simultaneously message to Schuman. He expressed hope French Government would be kept informed either through us here or French Embassy Washington.

Sent Department 5367, repeated London 948.

BRUCE

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893.01/12-2249: Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 22, 1949—6 p. m.

[Received December 22—3:12 p. m.]

5080. In routine off-record conference in Prime Minister's office yesterday, Philip Jordan, advisor on Public Relations, is reliably reported to have announced that recognition of Communist China would



definitely take place on last day in December or first few days in January. He said other Commonwealth Governments had been consulted with regard to timing and that only Australia had yet to be heard from.

Regarding the Colombo Conference, Jordan stated that chief item of now firmed-up agenda was form and scope of a Japanese peace treaty, other items to include Commonwealth countries' dollar requirements for next 12 months and "question of sterling balances". (He did not elaborate on this last item.)

HOLMES

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893.01/12-2249 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 22, 1949—7 p. m.  
[Received December 22—4:11 p. m.]

5088. Counselor Chinese Embassy has confirmed press rumors he delivered this afternoon a note to Foreign Office containing caution that any nation recognizing Chinese Communists was helping to wreck the UN. Representations were apparently as described in UP story of December 20 with Taipei dateline. Counselor stated similar notes being delivered other Western European capitals. He was unable to state whether similar note being delivered Washington.

HOLMES

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893.01/12-2249

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Thailand (Stanton)*<sup>91</sup>

BANGKOK, December 22, 1949.

Mr. MacDonald,<sup>92</sup> who is on a three day visit to Bangkok, said yesterday that in the course of his conversations with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister,<sup>93</sup> they had both brought up the subject of impending recognition by the UK of the Chinese Communist Government. He said that he and the British Ambassador, Sir Godfrey Thompson, had indicated to Phibun<sup>94</sup> their personal belief that the

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<sup>91</sup> Copy received in the Department January 2, 1950.

<sup>92</sup> Malcolm MacDonald, British High Commissioner in Southeast Asia.

<sup>93</sup> Field Marshal Luang Pibul Songgram and Pote Sarasin, respectively.

<sup>94</sup> Pibul Songgram, the Prime Minister.

Thai Government should make its own decision with respect to the problem of recognition.

I had a rather lengthy discussion with Mr. MacDonald on the subject of recognition and outlined my views, emphasizing the gravity of such a step for Thailand and pointing out that the exchange of consular and diplomatic representatives would have the most serious consequences in **this country**. MacDonald agreed with the latter view and pointed out if **Thailand** and Burma were absorbed by the Communists, Malaya's source of food stuffs might well be lost. At this point I asked him whether the **British** authorities had given thought to the complications likely to grow out of a policy of killing Communists in Malaya and shaking hands with them in China in order to trade and protect British interests in that country. I said it seemed likely to me the Communist Government in China would seek to pressure them to cease the campaign against the Communists in Malaya and that if they refused, retaliatory action would be taken against British subjects and interests in China. MacDonald replied this particular point had not previously occurred to him but one could only hope the Chinese Communist Government would follow a wiser policy.

I said from my conversations with the Thai, in Government and other circles, that early UK recognition of the Chinese Communist Government would be greeted with dismay and cause many Thai to feel that it was useless to attempt to stand against the Communists and therefore it would be better to come to terms with them as soon as possible. I pointed out the UK and U.S. had tried in various ways to impress upon the Thai the necessity for "holding the line" against Communism, and that they would inevitably regard UK recognition as a serious and substantial breach in that line. MacDonald said he fully realized the seriousness of the problem for the Thai but reiterated the British view that their great interest in China necessitated recognition and furthermore that without recognition and contact with the Chinese Communists, there would be no hope of weaning them away from Moscow.

I told MacDonald that for the reasons I had outlined I was personally opposed to recognition of the Chinese Communists and felt in the case of our own Government that we should insist on definite assurances regarding protection of American rights and interests, the observance of treaty rights and international obligations. I said without some such assurances I did not see on what basis diplomatic relations could be firmly established. MacDonald replied that they would have to depend upon "world opinion".

E[DWIN] F. S[TANTON]

893.01/12-2349: Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 23, 1949—6 p. m.

[Received December 23—5:16 p. m.]

5110. At Foreign Office this afternoon Dening<sup>95</sup> stated that British formula for recognition Chinese Communists included simultaneous withdrawal *de jure* recognition National Government but expressing desire keep Consul in Formosa in *de facto* relationship with local authorities. He said Chinese Ambassador [in] London had been so informed December 19.

Dening said that during call Foreign Office yesterday evening French Ambassador had handed Bevin note from Schuman urging delay in recognition of Communists until after recognition Bao Dai. (Apparently note summarized in Paris 5366 to Department December 22.) Bevin reportedly told Massigli he would consider French request but pointed out that as British had brought urgently to French attention some six times since agreement of March 8<sup>96</sup> had been signed (he proceeded to enumerate them) necessity for early implementation this agreement, he saw no basis for French indignation at British precipitousness re China. Dening further reported Bevin this morning had decided to delay recognition until January 6 and that telegrams to this effect would be sent Washington and Paris later this evening. This decision assumably would be final due departure Bevin for Colombo December 27. Dening said Foreign Office had noted absence of reply from Secretary to Bevin's note of December 16 one [on?] recognition. He mentioned in passing that India would recognize Communists December 30, and said Canadians were "naughty" in giving to press prior to communication to Foreign Office their decision delay recognition until after conclusion Colombo Conference (Embtel 5095, December 23, penultimate paragraph<sup>97</sup>).

After Dening's departure Scott<sup>98</sup> stated that next week question will be put to Attlee whether by that time there is sufficient evidence of transfer of power to Bao Dai to warrant confidential statement to French prior to recognition Communists that British plans grant *de facto* recognition Vietnam as associated state in French union. If

<sup>95</sup> Maberly E. Dening, British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Far East).

<sup>96</sup> France and the former Emperor Bao Dai of Annam reached agreement on the future status of French Indochina.

<sup>97</sup> Not printed; it summarized British press reports on the question of recognition, with particular reference to the *Manchester Guardian*.

<sup>98</sup> Robert H. Scott, Head of the South-East Asia Department of the British Foreign Office.

so statement would be made and other Commonwealth countries would be asked at Colombo to join British in public statement to that effect. Scott had no confidence on getting other Commonwealth governments to agree, however. Formula would be for announcement of *de facto* recognition Bao Dai immediately after conference and simultaneous elevation of British Consul General [at] Saigon to rank of Minister but without actually establishing Legation there. Scott said Foreign Office would much appreciate knowing what Department has in mind.

By way of explanation British position vis-à-vis French, Scott said Pakistan has requested question recognition Vietnam be discussed at Colombo and therefore British could not make public statement before then. He feels convinced confidential statement will not satisfy French who want public declaration for internal political use in presentation law for implementation March 8 agreements.

Sent Department 5110, repeated Paris 1047.

HOLMES

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893.01/12-1649 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Douglas)*

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1949—10 p. m.

4592. Pls transmit fol personal msg from Secy to Mr. Bevin :

"I am grateful for the frank expression of your views on the question of according recognition to the Chi Commie regime as contained in ur msg to me which was transmitted by the Brit Emb on December 16, 1949. Of course, I am sorry that ur Govt has decided to recognize the Chi Commies, as I, too, had hoped that we might follow a common course of action in this matter.

"I have little to add in the nature of comment to the views which I previously expressed to you in Washington and Paris and more recently to Sir Oliver Franks. It may be that when ur Govt recognizes the Chi Commies, we may feel it desirable to make a statement stating the reasons why we for our part think it unwise to do so. But that is not decided.

"I hope that although we are adopting different courses in this instance our two Govts can follow a common course in all other important matters of mutual concern in the Far East. This will be important if we are to stimulate the free peoples of that area into adopting effective measures of resistance to the spread of Communism.

"Apart from the pros and cons of the general situation, I have been impressed with the representations which we understand the

French have just made to you regarding the effect of recognition of the Chinese Communists upon the problem of Vietnam and also by the fact that they have set themselves a timetable for Assembly ratification of the Mar 8 Agreements. I know that you attach great importance, as I do, to the situation in Indochina and in view of the proposed French course of action, I know that you will understand why I bring this aspect of the matter once more to your attention in relation to the timing of your proposed action."

ACHESON

893.01/12-2449

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Sproue)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 24, 1949.

Mr. Ford<sup>99</sup> called at the Department this afternoon to inform me of his Embassy's receipt of a telegram from Mr. Bevin, the substance of which he described as follows:

Please tell Mr. Acheson that I have decided after very careful consideration to notify the Chinese Communist Government on January 6 of our decision to accord *de jure* recognition. I intend to appoint Mr. Hutchison<sup>1</sup> (the officer now in charge of the British Embassy at Nanking) as Chargé d'Affaires pending the appointment of an Ambassador. The Chinese Ambassador in London will be informed on the same day of the withdrawal of *de jure* recognition from the National Government and he will be told that he will no longer be recognized as Ambassador. As regards Formosa, the Chinese Ambassador in London will be informed that in accordance with our practice the British Consul there will continue to maintain *de facto* relations with the local authorities.

Mr. Ford stated that the telegram indicated that no publicity would be given to this decision until the date of notification and that a proposed formula for recognition would be communicated to the Embassy in a later telegram. I told Mr. Ford that a telegram had been sent to our Embassy in London last night containing a message from the Secretary to Mr. Bevin<sup>2</sup> and asked whether the British telegram gave any indication of Mr. Bevin's receipt of this message prior to the despatch of the British telegram. Mr. Ford said that it did not give any such indication.

<sup>99</sup> J. F. Ford, First Secretary of the British Embassy.

<sup>1</sup> John C. Hutchison, British Minister (Commercial) in China.

<sup>2</sup> See *supra*.

893.01/12-2449 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State*

PEIPING, December 24, 1949—9 a. m.

[Received December 27—12:38 p. m.]

2350. Having reference particularly situation treated Contel 2341, December 23<sup>3</sup> (reContels 1710, October 8 and 1822, October 25), note particularly Burma recognition and reputedly impending recognition by British Commonwealth, Indian and Netherlands Governments of Peiping regime. Against this background would now stress desirability remaining in field to permit exploitation political situation for American benefit.

Note here particularly hypothesis contained Contel December 23 that situation may now have reached stage where greater exploitation by non-Soviet states has become possible. It is basic that we can hardly exploit situation without being on ground. It seems to me probable that if American Government takes, with or without participation Congress, position that recognition is definitely not to be extended, Communists will in due course call halt to even present limited functioning Consulates and possibly call for their closure and our departure from China. This would be, as have other Communist actions in past, without regard to international law and practice but would be effective nevertheless. Such action would leave us both without representation and power act on behalf American interests since action British channels could hardly be expected bear same fruits as possible through our own action. Italian Consul has twice argued that American interests would be best served by recognition giving us possibility contesting USSR in China or field where nonrecognition removes that possibility. It would seem axiomatic that if Communists are to turn an about-face or partially from USSR they must have somewhere to turn. Recognition British Commonwealth and other states would offer them limited but not full opportunity. This is critical period in Chinese development. It would seem best USA be present in fullest force possible in circumstances. Reiterate this would not be "support" Communist regime China in any greater degree than Communist regimes USSR and elsewhere; in fact we should avoid particularly material support for so long as Communists follow Moscow patterns, but divorce from scene seems without promise or profit.

Any contention Communists not in effective control China could hardly now be substantiated. Regarding question Communist will-

<sup>3</sup> Vol. VIII, "Political and military situation in China", chapter VIII.

ingness abide by international obligations and practice, matter is as doubtful as in cases Hungary, Poland and other satellite states but probably more so, especially in view urgent pressing needs. There remains still possibility exploring field by discussion with Communist authorities, which exploration still untried. At such time (which I should propose be no later than soon after return Ambassador Jessup to Washington) as such queries might be undertaken then would best be attempted by direct consultation with Foreign Minister Chou, without, of course, matter being given advance publicity. Interview might be possible now [that] Communists assured Ward detention could hardly be subject.<sup>4</sup> Consultation might, of course, in event prove fruitless and due note is taken fact that British think it pointless and will presumably act accordingly. But if point is to be made in respect matter recognition, believe it is only logical and even proper that some attempt be made discover Communist attitude this regard.

Van Putten<sup>5</sup> earlier had rumor that Communists had fixed end December as deadline for American recognition. Believe this, if true, reflected earlier more optimistic Communist estimate of their attractions, but hazard own estimate that if other governments extend recognition January-February, we could not prudently plan on being able continue Consular functions without recognition after about May 1 next.

CLUBB

893.01/12-2749

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Sprouse)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 27, 1949.

Mr. Helb<sup>6</sup> called by appointment this morning and said that he was instructed by his Government to inquire of the Department's attitude with respect to the question of recognition of the Chinese Communist regime. He said that the British Government had informed the Netherlands Government of its intention to extend recognition to the Chinese Communist regime about January 2 and was endeavoring to persuade the Netherlands Government to take similar action at the same time. He explained that the Netherlands Government was of the opinion that it would have to take such action within the next few weeks but that it did not consider that it could accord recognition by January 2 for several reasons. These reasons, he described, in-

<sup>4</sup> The Ward party left Mukden on December 7 and Tientsin on December 11.

<sup>5</sup> James D. Van Putten, Consul at Peiping.

<sup>6</sup> H. A. Helb, Counselor of the Netherlands Embassy.



cluded (1) the attitude of the other Brussels Pact Powers and (2) the necessity of consultation in this regard with the Indonesians subsequent to the transfer of sovereignty. In reply to my query, he said that the Netherlands Government had not yet set any definite date for recognition.

I reviewed for him briefly the Department's attitude on the question of recognition, pointing out that it remained unchanged. In brief, the Department considered that there is nothing to be gained by hasty or premature action in this regard and that hasty action would serve no advantage to the nation so acting. I said that it would, of course, be desirable to maintain a common front on this question but that it was recognized that each nation must make its own decision in the light of what it considered to be its own interest. I said that the U.S. Government obviously could not give serious consideration to the question of recognition of the Chinese Communist regime at this time in view of the failure of the Chinese Communist regime to observe even minimum standards of international conduct, as evidenced by their treatment of U.S. consular officials in China, with particular reference to the Ward case. In reply to my question, Mr. Helb said that the Netherlands Government would not seek to obtain any *quid pro quo* or any commitments from the Chinese Communists prior to extending recognition, unless it should do so in connection with the question of recognition of the United States of Indonesia. I asked Mr. Helb whether he expected the Netherlands Government and the Indonesian Republic to take joint or simultaneous action with respect to according recognition. He said that the Netherlands Government was bound to consult the Indonesians on this matter and that the Indonesians were, of course, desirous of obtaining widespread recognition of their sovereign status subsequent to the transfer of sovereignty. This, he said, would lead them probably to send a circular note to all powers making a bid for recognition. In this connection, he pointed out that membership in UN was obviously in the minds of the Indonesian authorities. When I asked whether the Indonesians would ask the Chinese Government or the Chinese Communist regime for recognition, he replied that they would undoubtedly address their request to the Chinese Communists, which would probably be transmitted by Netherlands representatives in China. He expressed the opinion that the Indonesians would probably wish to follow the lead of India in according recognition and that they felt that the Asiatic nations understood the threat of Communism in Asia better than the Western powers. When I asked Mr. Helb whether the Indonesian leaders were aware of the hostility of the Chinese Communist regime toward them and of the aims of the Chinese Commu-

nists as shown in the recent WFTU <sup>7</sup> meetings in Peiping, he said that these aspects of the situation had been brought to the attention of Hatta. He pointed out that the Indonesian leaders seem to be confident of their ability to deal with the Communist threat in Indonesia.

I thanked Mr. Helb for communicating to the Department the views of the Netherlands Government and asked that he continue to keep in touch with the Department on this question. I indicated that we would do likewise.

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893.01/12-2749 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Burma (Day) to the Secretary of State*

RANGOON, December 27, 1949—noon.

[Received 1:48 p. m.]

562. Burmese Government opinion:

Dominant Socialist group would welcome early or delayed recognition by US as strengthening their position but Conservatives would see long-range disadvantage in increasing prestige of regime that may invade or infiltrate into Burma. Action would weaken belief that US is bulwark against communism and be regarded proof US policy opportunistic.

Indefinite withholding of recognition would reinforce respect for US as upholder of law and democratic freedoms but would aggravate sense of insecurity from rivalries major powers and incline Government Burma rely even more on Commonwealth rather than US for aid.

Burmese public opinion:

Early or delayed recognition would be interpreted as evidence US not strong enough follow independent course. As public susceptible to Communist or leftwing Socialist propaganda derogatory to US, effective information program explaining reasons would be desirable.

DAY

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893.01/12-2749

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Sprouse)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 27, 1949.

Mr. Rocheta <sup>8</sup> was brought to my office today by Mr. Dunham <sup>9</sup> for the purpose of discussing the question of recognition of the Chinese

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<sup>7</sup> World Federation of Trade Unions (Communist controlled).

<sup>8</sup> Manuel Rocheta, Counselor of the Portuguese Embassy.

<sup>9</sup> William B. Dunham, of the Office of Western European Affairs.

Communist regime. He said that he had been instructed by the Portuguese Government to communicate to the Department its views on this question and to ascertain whether there had been any change in the Department's views. He said that the British Government had recently informed the Portuguese Government of its intention to extend recognition about January 2 and was endeavoring to seek similar action by the Portuguese Government. He pointed out that the Portuguese Government had, of course, to keep in mind the problem of Macao and that while it had not yet reached a decision or replied to the British Government, preferring first to seek the views of this Government, it might have to accord recognition in the near future.

I reviewed briefly the Department's position on this question, saying that the Department could not seriously consider recognition at this time, particularly in view of the failure of the Chinese Communists to observe even the minimum standards of international conduct, apart from the question of observing its international obligations in terms of treaties and agreements. I described briefly the Ward, Smith-Bender and other cases involving mistreatment of American official personnel. I said that it was the Department's view that hasty or premature action was undesirable and that the interests of the Western nations would in general not be served by hasty recognition. I continued that the maintenance of a common front was to be desired but that it was recognized that each nation must make its decision in the light of what it considered its own interests.

I thanked him for informing the Department of the views of his Government and asked that he continue to keep in touch with the Department in this regard prior to any action that might be taken by the Portuguese Government. I said that we would also keep in touch with the Portuguese Government on this question.

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893.01/12-2049 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen)*

WASHINGTON, December 27, 1949—5 p. m.

1564. Dept expects keep Phil Govt fully informed in advance any definitive step on part US to recognize Chi Commies. Dept sympathetic Phil Govt desire avoid appearance fol US lead in this matter. Reurtel 2880 Dec 20.

You may in ur discretion so inform Phil Govt.

ACHESON

893.01/12-2749

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*<sup>10</sup>

Mr. Bevin wishes Mr. Acheson to know that it has been decided, after very careful consideration, to notify the Chinese Communist Government on 6th January, 1950, of His Majesty's Government's decision to accord *de jure* recognition.

It is intended to appoint Mr. J. C. Hutchison, at present Officer in Charge of His Majesty's Embassy at Nanking, to be His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, pending the appointment of an Ambassador.

On the same day the Chinese Ambassador in London will be informed of the withdrawal of *de jure* recognition from the Nationalist Government and that he will no longer be recognized as Ambassador. As regards Formosa he will be notified that, in accordance with our practice, His Majesty's Consul there will continue to maintain *de facto* relations with the local authorities. The Ambassador and his staff will be offered asylum in the United Kingdom should they so desire.

No publicity will be given to the decision until the date of notification.

WASHINGTON, 27 December, 1949.

893.01/12-2749

*The Consul at Taipei (Edgar) to the Secretary of State*

No. 143

TAIPEI, December 27, 1949.

[Received January 4, 1950.]

According to the local press Foreign Minister George Yeh on December 18 announced the National Government's severance of diplomatic relations with Burma and issued the following statement:

"Taipeh, Dec. 18, (Reuters): Foreign Minister George Yeh announced Nationalist Government's severance of diplomatic relations with Burma who had earlier granted recognition to the Chinese people's government in Peking.

In a statement, Yeh said:

"The Chinese Government learns with regret of the recognition extended by the government of Burma to the Soviet sponsored Communist regime in Peiping. It is amazing that while fighting against the Communists in its own land, the Burmese Government should have thought expedient to recognize a Communist regime in a neighboring country where the traditional character of the people can no more accept the Communist ideology than that of the peoples of Burma. The

<sup>10</sup> Handed by the Counselor of the British Embassy (Graves) to the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Sprouse) on December 28.

Chinese Government believes that before long Burma will find herself confronted with a situation where the Soviet inspired fifth columnists in Burma join hand with those in China in an attempt to establish a totalitarian rule in all Asiatic countries. While still cherishing the friendliest feelings toward the peoples of Burma, the Chinese Government is constrained to sever diplomatic relations with Burma under the present government."

DONALD D. EDGAR

*Speaks*

893.01/12-2849 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Singapore (Langdon) to the Secretary of State*

SINGAPORE, December 28, 1949—5 p. m.

[Received December 28—4:58 a. m.]

422. Knowing people here (Depcirtel December 16) think of US recognition, not in terms of when, but whether it should be given.

British officials give impression of sympathetic understanding our reluctance to recognize, laying it to home politics, pique at total loss our China efforts, Ward case et cetera, but at same time of thinking overwrought feelings influence our rational consideration of question, e.g. Dening jestingly told me our White Paper<sup>11</sup> gave Singapore conference best case for recognition. MacDonald's abstract justification recognition is people's right to choose own govt as Chinese people have done in broad sense. Malay opinion may be passed over as unconcerned with affairs outside Malaya. Leaders domiciled China think along following general lines:

Interest in China nonpolitical, sentimental, not exceeding wish for peace in, and international respect for, land of ancestors or relatives, hence question US recognition academic interest only. Chinese people do not take Communist ideology seriously and regard Communist victory as triumph not ideology but essentially, and for time being, good over bad. Victors should have fair trial to be rejected by traditional means if misrule. If US does not recognize government Chinese people have now accepted but continues recognize government it, itself, exposed as corrupt and hopeless, Chinese people will be puzzled by US logic. Chiang has fled from fair fight and his bombing and blockades unavailing and inhuman, thus continued to him culpable.<sup>12</sup> US recognition would not be thought abject or mercenary any more "than a millionaire would be thought so toward a beggar".

<sup>11</sup> Department of State, *United States Relations With China* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949).

<sup>12</sup> This sentence is apparently garbled.

As all informed people including Chinese here recognizes ours as special case, my guess is they hardly expect our early recognition along with others, but rather after decent interval probation.

LANGDON

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893.01/12-2849 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Sweden (Matthews) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, December 28, 1949—6 p. m.

[Received 9:33 p. m.]

1298. Re Embtel 1164, November 22, 1 p. m.<sup>13</sup> Chinese Ambassador Wei-lin Hsieh told us today that on December 22 Foreign Minister Uden sent for him to say that Swedish Government had decided in principle to recognize Peiping Communist regime within a few days after British. Uden said British had informed him they would extend recognition early in January. From other remarks made by Uden, Chinese Ambassador infers British recognition will take place not later than January 9 (possibly on January 6) and that Norway and Denmark would take action similar to that of Sweden.

Hsieh said Uden was most cordial personally and said that he might remain in Sweden as long as he desired. Since his conversation FonOff has in fact extended his Swedish residence visa to May 30, 1953. Hsieh is undecided as to whether he will live in Sweden or France and requests a diplomatic 3(2) visa to visit the US for a brief period while he is making up his mind. Visa will be granted unless instructed by telegraph to contrary. I might add that there is no question in my mind of Hsieh's anti-Communist views.

He tells us that to date he has sensed no pro-Communist views amongst the members of his staff although four Chinese students now in Sweden are, he suspects, preparing to declare their adherence to the Peiping regime.

MATTHEWS

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893.01/12-2849 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Norway (Bay) to the Secretary of State*

OSLO, December 28, 1949—8 p. m.

[Received December 28—3:39 p. m.]

902. In reply to question by Embassy Counselor today, Skylstad, Secretary General Foreign Office, said Norway would recognize government of Communist China early in January. This decision had

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<sup>13</sup> Not printed.

been taken after consultation with British Government and was based on Norwegian shipping interests in China rather than political motive. Norwegian Ambassador, now on way back China, would take up residence Peiping.

When asked whether Norwegian Government had considered possible effect on UN of recognizing Communist China, Skylstad replied situation would undoubtedly be "awkward". It was pointed out that US Government had adopted policy of "hesitation" in recognizing Communists in view of doubts re their ability discharge international obligations as exemplified by Ward case. Skylstad answered he could appreciate this point, but nevertheless fact must be faced that Nationalist China was virtually finished and realities of situation must be met.

Sent Department 902, pouched London, Stockholm, Copenhagen.

BAY

893.01/12-2949

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Freeman)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 29, 1949.

Mr. Hagglof<sup>14</sup> called this morning at his request to discuss the question of recognition of the Chinese Communist regime. He stated that he had received a telegram from Stockholm indicating that the French Government and the U.S. were endeavoring to persuade the British to delay recognition until the French Government had ratified the March 8 Agreements with respect to Indochina. Mr. Hagglof informed me that he had not been requested by his Foreign Office to consult with the Department on this matter, but that he desired clarification of the connection between the ratification of the March 8 Agreements and the British recognition of the Chinese Communists.

I indicated that this was primarily a matter for discussion with the French, but for Mr. Hagglof's background information I gave him my understanding of the question as follows: The French have made urgent representations to the British requesting that recognition of the Chinese Communist regime be delayed at least until the March 8 Agreements have been ratified and the transfer of authority to Bao Dai effected; it is apparently the belief of the French Government that British recognition of the Chinese Communists prior to that time would have the effect of encouraging the forces of Ho Chi Minh and at the same time of jeopardizing the success of Bao Dai, while the ill effects of recognition subsequent to the transfer of authority would be

<sup>14</sup> Ingemar Hagglof, Counselor of the Swedish Embassy.



greatly reduced. In response to Mr. Hagglof's question whether the U.S. had made similar representations to the British, I informed him that we had simply mentioned the French interest in this matter.

I then took the opportunity to point out in some detail the position of the U.S. with respect to the question of recognition of the Chinese Communists. I mentioned the complete absence of any assurances regarding the attitude of the Chinese Communists toward China's international obligations; their unwillingness to abide by even the minimum standards of international conduct and decency; the flagrant examples of inhumane conduct such as the Olive,<sup>15</sup> Ward and Smith-Bender cases; the inadvisability of taking hasty action toward recognition; and the desirability of the interested non-Communist powers adopting a common course of action. I stated, however, that the question of whether to recognize was in the final analysis one for each individual power to decide for itself, but that the U.S. for its part could not at this time seriously consider extending recognition.

Mr. Hagglof replied that he was fully appreciative of our point of view, but indicated that the Swedish Government had some time ago decided definitely to recognize the Chinese Communists and that it was simply a question of when. He added that the Norwegian and Danish Governments were apparently prepared to extend recognition almost simultaneously with the British, and that the Swedish Government would probably follow suit before the end of January.

I thanked Mr. Hagglof for conveying this information to the Department and stated that I would be appreciative of receiving any further information on the subject which he might receive. He assured me that he would keep the Department informed of the Swedish Government's intentions in this regard and that he would surely let us know well in advance of the actual according of recognition.

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893.01/12-2949 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Burma (Day) to the Secretary of State*

RANGOON, December 29, 1949—2 p. m.

[Received December 29—10:38 a. m.]

566. Following text Foreign Minister People's Republic to GOB re recognition Communist China was released by GOB yesterday and carried most newspapers this morning.

"I have the honor to acknowledge on behalf of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China the receipt of Your

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<sup>15</sup> For correspondence on the case of William M. Olive, Vice Consul at Shanghai, see vol. VII, "Problems of United States Consulates in areas occupied by the Chinese Communists", chapter IV.

Excellency's telegram of December 16, 1949, informing me that the Government of the Union of Burma wishes to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China.

"I have further the honor to state that after Your Excellency's Government has severed relations with the remnants of the Kuomintang reactionaries my Government will be pleased to establish diplomatic relations with the Government of the Union of Burma on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty. It is hoped that your Government will appoint a representative to Peiping to begin negotiations on this matter."

Reply must be considered rebuff to GOB which in according early recognition risked widespread criticism, presumably in hope improving Burma-China relations.

Newspaper *Burman* comments reply surprisingly disappointing; fails to see point in severing relations with government no longer existing; considers Chinese Foreign Minister's reply "unmerited piece of studied cold-shouldering".

Local press 20th carried Reuter's Taipei release stating Nationalists severed relations with GOB December 18.

DAY

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893.01/12-2949: Telegram

*The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State*

NEW DELHI, December 29, 1949—3 p. m.

[Received 5:09 p. m.]

1612. We continue to adhere in general to views expressed in our telegram 1025, September 6, re probable reaction here to various courses of action we might take re recognition Communist China. As result of developments since September, however, we are inclined to believe that immediate recognition by US of Communist China, unless latter should sharply revise its attitude towards US, would be more injurious to our position in India than if these developments had not occurred. These developments include treatment by Communist China of our officials and other nationals, statements by responsible Communist Chinese leaders re international intentions, statements by US officials, et cetera.

Following are our further comments re estimate reaction India to three contingencies mentioned in Depcirtel December 16, 3 a. m.

Point 1. Our failure join in granting early recognition will undoubtedly subject US to considerable criticism by Indian political leaders and wide sections Indian press. In our opinion, however, it would be better for our position in India for US to face this criticism rather than to reverse our policies at this juncture and accord recog-

dition of a regime maintaining contemptuous attitude towards US. We would appear weak and vacillating if after treatment accorded our nationals and after we had appealed for international hesitation in recognition we should proceed at once to recognize. Certain Indian political leaders would undoubtedly be pleased if US should follow lead of GOI thereby endorsing their position and strengthening their internal and international leadership. Such action on our part, however, would undoubtedly cause GOI to give less weight in future to our views on international problems, to have less respect for our judgment of international situation, and to create doubts re our tenacity of purpose.

Point 2. If we should accord recognition at later date after it had been granted by most of other interested countries, our position in India would not be injured so severely as it would be if we recognized immediately. Much of course would depend upon attitude taken by Communist China during interim. If after delay we should recognize regime, international attitude of which has not materially improved, some critics here would gloat because great Western Power had been compelled to capitulate to new Asian regime; others would point out that when we found that other countries were unwilling to subscribe to principles advocated by US we abandoned these principles for sake of expediency. Some circles in India disillusioned with results of Indian recognition would probably regret that US had granted recognition without extracting conditions which might also improve relations between India and Communist China. GOI understands that if we adhere our avowed policy of hesitation their recognition will contribute to problems SC<sup>16</sup> in January. It assumes that countries recognizing, including India and UK, will support Communist China representative for seat while we support Nationalist China representative. It feels eventually majority SC will decide in favor Communist China. Split in SC placing India and UK on side Russia will not be entirely displeasing to formulators Indian foreign policy, particularly Nehru, since alignment in this respect can serve as further evidence GOI adherence to policy of following middle road between two power blocs. Nehru might also consider that such split means progress for his policy of endeavoring extricate UK from close associations US and to bring it over into a neutral bloc in which he hopes play major role. If during interim Communist China assumes attitude which indicates that it is possible for non-Communist countries including ourselves to have advantageous relations with it, we can accord recognition without loss of prestige in India, since we shall not have abandoned any position.

<sup>16</sup> Security Council of the United Nations.

Point 3. If we withhold recognition indefinitely and if in meantime relations between India and Communist China are fairly smooth, we can expect continuing criticism on ground that our position is unrealistic, that by our stubbornness we are causing much suffering to innocent Chinese people, and that we lack sympathy for Asian peoples. Indian press and political leaders will accuse US of hindering development of genuine Chinese nationalism and rendering more difficult termination of cold war. If relations between India and Communist China are not as friendly as GOI hopes they will be, criticism our failure recognize may gradually subside and eventually GOI leaders may hope that we do not accord recognition at least until there is change in China's attitude toward India. We do not believe that we should permit Indian criticism or press to influence too greatly such decisions as we may take with regard to Communist China. In our opinion our long-range position in India will be stronger if we refrain from recognition until it becomes more clear what Communist China plans to do re international obligations and what international policies it really pursues, particularly re countries southeast Asia, Burma, Philippines and Indonesia.

HENDERSON

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893.01/12-2949 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Ceylon (Satterthwaite) to the Secretary of State*

COLOMBO, December 29, 1949—4 p. m.  
[Received December 29—9:32 a. m.]

288. Permanent Secretary External Affairs informs me Ceylon expects follow UK lead in recognizing Communist regime in China. He expects his action be completed before Commonwealth Foreign Ministers convene on January 9.

SATTERTHWAITE

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893.01/12-2049 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Netherlands  
(Chapin)*

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1949—7 p. m.

1189. Dept concurs gen conclusions Moscow's 3157, Dec 21 to Dept<sup>17</sup> relayed to Hague, Batavia and suggest you might appropriately use background info that msg in discussions (this tel is in specific response

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<sup>17</sup> Not printed; it discussed the Soviet attitude toward nationalism in colonial areas as based on writings by Lenin and Stalin, with special regard to signs of hostility for the new United States of Indonesia (501.BC Indonesia/12-2149).

to urtel 1282, Dec 20 relayed Batavia, Moscow) with concerned officials. Believe Indos shld be encouraged not recognize Chi Commie regime before US recognizes. You might stress fol considerations:

1. USSR attitude toward admission Indo [to] UN will be determined by larger Soviet objectives not by merits of case nor Indo acts designed win over USSR. Gen lines Sov attitude Indos made clear recent Sov veto SC Indo res[olution].

2. Even if Chi Commie were to recognize Indos might lead to no change Sov attitude Indos admission to UN but result in immed estab Chi Commie mission Indo with unlimited opportunities for penetration and anti-Hatta maneuvering.

3. Unless special GA<sup>18</sup> shld be called of which no present indication Indo cannot be admitted UN until next Sep at earliest hence wisest policy proceed slowly vis-à-vis both Chi Commie regime and USSR.

ACHESON

501.A Summaries/12-2949 : Telegram

*The Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations  
(Gross) to the Secretary of State*

[Extract]

NEW YORK, December 29, 1949—10:30 p. m.

[Received December 30—1 a. m.]

1485.

SECURITY COUNCIL (458th Meeting)

NARRATIVE

*USSR not to recognize "Kuomintang Delegate"*

Malik (USSR) recalled at the outset that the USSR had at the last GA supported the declaration of the "Chinese People's Republic", in which it challenged the legitimacy of the delegation headed by Tsiang. The USSR, he declared, would not regard the "Kuomintang Delegate" as representing China. After an almost identical statement by Galagan (Ukraine), Tsiang asserted that the two statements struck a blow at the very legal and moral foundations of the UN.

Noting that the basis for the statement lay in a telegram from Chou En-lai, self-styled Foreign Minister of the "so-called People's Republic", Tsiang asked: Who made him Foreign Minister; who created that regime? He had, he recalled, placed before the last GA

<sup>18</sup> General Assembly of the United Nations.

evidence that the "People's Republic" was nothing but a puppet regime inspired by the USSR. This question had been referred to the IC,<sup>18a</sup> to which he would submit additional evidence, he stated. It was, he concluded, his "firm belief" that the SC should pay no attention to the USSR and Ukraine "groundless statements".

Stating that the opportunities to make the foregoing statements had been afforded in accordance with longstanding custom, President McNaughton<sup>19</sup> ruled "that the matter is closed". After Malik intervened again to state that he did not intend to challenge the ruling, since he did not deem it necessary to take note of the "irresponsible statements and slander" of a "man who represents nobody", the agenda was adopted without objection and the council turned to the Kashmir question. . . .

GROSS

893.01/12-3049 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 30, 1949—noon.

[Received December 30—8:26 a. m.]

5153. Following is text of letter dated December 29 addressed to me by William Strang<sup>20</sup> in response to my letter of December 24 transmitting personal message from Secretary to Mr. Bevin (Deptel 4592, December 23).

"Dear Julius, Before he left, the Foreign Secretary asked me to send you a reply to your letter to him of the 24th December about the recognition of the Chinese Communist government.

Mr. Bevin asks you to thank Mr. Acheson for his message and to express regret that our two Governments have not found it possible to keep in step on this question. For our part, we have done all we could to delay matters in the hope of being able to synchronise with the United States Government, but for reasons with which Mr. Acheson is already familiar, we have been unable to do so.

Although our two Governments are not able to agree in this instance, Mr. Bevin is very ready to keep in the closest touch with the United States Government on matters relating to China and the Far East, and he shares Mr. Acheson's views about the necessity of stimulating the free peoples of that area to resist the spread of communism.

With regard to France, Mr. Bevin is very conscious of the difficulties of the French in Indo-China, and is doing his best to assist them

<sup>18a</sup> Interim Committee (Little Assembly) of the United Nations.

<sup>19</sup> Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton, Canadian Representative at the United Nations.

<sup>20</sup> Sir William Strang, British Joint Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

in this matter. For Mr. Acheson's confidential information, he hopes to discuss the Commonwealth attitude towards Vietnam at the forthcoming conference in Colombo.

Yours sincerely, signed William Strang."

HOLMES

898.01/12-3049

*Memorandum by Miss Ruth E. Bacon, United Nations Adviser of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 30, 1949.

A meeting is to be held this afternoon at 4 o'clock in Mr. Rusk's office to discuss Departmental policy in connection with certain questions affecting the Chinese National Government representative on the Security Council. Background information on certain of these questions is given below for your possible use in connection with that meeting.

*I. Present Situation with Regard to Chinese Representation on the Security Council.*

New York's 1485, December 29 reports that the Soviet and Ukraine representatives at the Security Council meeting yesterday stated that they would not regard "the Kuomintang Delegate as representing China." After a reply by Tsiang the issue was not pressed.

It is possible that this challenge was intended to pave the way for questioning Tsiang's right to be Chairman of the Security Council during January. If so, the question will be pressed at the next meeting, the date for which has not been set by Tsiang, but which would probably be held during the first week of January.

At the end of this month Argentina, Canada and the Ukraine go off the Security Council and are replaced by India, Yugoslavia and Ecuador. The full composition of the Security Council will be as follows:

China	Norway
Cuba	USSR
Ecuador	United Kingdom
Egypt	United States
France	Yugoslavia
India	

*II. Question of Use of Veto.*

Attached is a draft position paper <sup>21</sup> which has been cleared by FE with the changes marked on it.

<sup>21</sup> Not printed.



The following main points are made in the position paper.

1. Questions relating to Yugoslavian, Chinese National Government or Chinese Communist regime representatives will be treated as procedural and as not subject to the veto. Accordingly, the affirmative vote of any seven members of the Security Council on these questions will be accepted as decisive and a negative vote on our part will not be counted as a veto. Similarly, we would vote against according the Chinese National Government the right to veto questions affecting his credentials or the credentials of Communist representatives.

2. In advance of a public statement of the US position in the Security Council the Department should inform Congressional leaders of its proposed position.

There would seem to be good reason for holding that approval of credentials, if it involves deciding which of two claimants is in fact the government of a permanent member of the UN, is larger than a procedural question. FE did not press this position, however, in view of the fact that it was prepared to concur in the conclusion reached in the position paper that the veto should not be used on such questions. If we should insist that a permanent member has the right to veto questions relating to his credentials the result might be to continue representatives of a permanent member indefinitely on the Security Council and to create a chaotic situation in that body. It is not believed also that we would wish to use our first and only veto on this issue.

### *III. Vote on Seating of Communist Regime Representative or on National Government Representative.*

It is believed that under conditions so far as now foreseeable we should vote against the seating of a Communist regime representative or the unseating of a National Government representative so long as we continue to recognize the National Government of China. If that Government should disappear before we recognize the Communist regime a different situation would, of course, be presented but does not need to be taken into consideration for present purposes.

By the time the Council meets it is possible that the following states, in addition to the Soviet satellites, will have recognized: Burma, India, the UK, Norway, Sweden and Denmark. Of the Council membership, the following states would probably favor unseating the National Government representative: India, Norway, the USSR, the UK and Yugoslavia. The following states would be likely to oppose unseating the National Government representative: China, Cuba, Ecuador and the US. It is quite possible that Egypt might vote against the National Government. France's position is some-

what uncertain. A line-up of 6 to 5 or 6 to 4 with one abstention may result unless the UK can persuade France to go along with it.

It is probable that EUR<sup>22</sup> will favor voting against the National Government as soon as the British have recognized, or at least abstaining. The argument advanced may be to avoid giving an impression of disunity between the US and UK on this issue. On the other hand, the US and the UK have differed previously, as for example, in connection with the election of Yugoslavia to the Security Council without ill effects upon the UN. The divergence of views between the US and UK on the question of the Chinese Communist regime is well known and efforts on our part to accord our policy to the British, besides being illogical would not be likely to add to our prestige.

It is understood that UNA<sup>23</sup> is prepared to go along with the FE position.

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893.01/12-3149 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Australia (Jarman) to the Secretary of State*

CANBERRA, December 31, 1949—1 p. m.

[Received December 31—5:11 a. m.]

282. External Affairs official told Foster<sup>24</sup> late Friday (Embtl December 30, 3 p. m.<sup>25</sup>) that Australian Government has taken definite decision re recognition Communists' Government China and has communicated decision to London.

Official added that External Affairs not now at liberty reveal decision to US, but would ask Spender's<sup>26</sup> permission.

Delayed sending this message hoping to receive information. Definitely refused this morning. Private and confidential information secured from Office New Zealand High Commissioner to effect Australian Government decision taken before Christmas was to note UK recognition on January 2 without approval and not to recognize now; this apparently in line with NZ action.

JARMAN

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<sup>22</sup> Bureau of European Affairs.

<sup>23</sup> Bureau of United Nations Affairs.

<sup>24</sup> Andrew B. Foster, Counselor of Embassy in Australia.

<sup>25</sup> Not printed.

<sup>26</sup> Percy C. Spender, Australian Minister for External Affairs and External Territories.