ISRAEL

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONTROVERSY OVER THE FUTURE STATUS OF PALESTINE;[1] ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS; UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO ATTAIN A FINAL PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE AREA

501.BB Palestine/1–149 : Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT TEL AVIV, January 1, 1949—9 a. m.
NIACT

1. For attention President and Acting Secretary.[2] ReDeptel 281, December 30 and Mistel's 350, 351, December 31.[3] Returned from Tiberias 3 : 15 a. m. Had two hours with Ben Gurion.[4] Knox [5] present. I read Ben Gurion the same paraphrase I read Shertok.[6] After considerable deliberation he replied as follows: (paragraph references are to Department's 281).

1. "We have not invaded Egyptian territory nor do we have any intention of doing so. It is true some Israel Forces had to cross frontier into Egypt in course of tactical operations but they have already received orders to return to the Negev frontier."

2. As regards British notification to US Government he said, "in note Great Britain threatens to take action against us under 1936 Treaty with Egypt and unless we obey the decisions of the SC. In this latter connection I am confused and surprised. Great Britain is a member of the SC with which we are dealing directly and cordially. Does Great Britain plan to take independent action to enforce decisions of SC?

3. "We are very grateful for the friendship of the US and value it. I note the italics on the phrase 'peace-loving' and am distressed. We are indeed peace-loving and have consistently shown it. We are last people in the world to want to break the peace in Middle East or else-

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[1] Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, pp. 533 ff.
[2] Robert A. Lovett.
[3] For Nos. 281 and 350, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1704 and 1705; No. 351 is not printed, but see footnote 1, *ibid.*, p. 1706.
[4] David Ben-Gurion, Israeli Prime Minister.
[5] Charles F. Knox, Jr., Counselor of Mission at Tel Aviv.
[6] Moshe Shertok, Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs.

where. We are a very small people and we can survive only in peace. What we are doing is in self-defense. We have been attacked. We must reserve our right to defend ourselves even if we go down fighting. I believe the American Government and people will recognize this right. We accepted the UN request for an armistice and peace. Egypt rejected it."

4. Orders for the withdrawal of the Israel units have already been given.

5. "The reports communicated to your government about our negotiations with Transjordan are untrue and astonishing. Israel is now in the act of negotiating an armistice with Transjordan and is on the best terms with that government. There have been no threats on either side. We have met on very friendly terms and our next meeting is set for January 5."

Prime Minister then commented "I am pained by the severe tone of this communication which might have been written by Bevin [7] himself". He then stated that a formal written reply would be prepared immediately after Cabinet meeting on Sunday.

He concluded by speaking of peace negotiations with Lebanon which he said were also progressing encouragingly.

McDONALD

[7] Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

501.BB Palestine/1–149 : Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, January 1, 1949—11 a. m.

NIACT

2.[1] Attention President and Acting Secretary. At approximately 2:30 a. m. January 1, two Egyptian vessels approached off coast to attack Tel Aviv. Air alert sounded and Israel coastal batteries replied to attack fire. No hits, no casualties. Israel military spokesmen issued following warning: "up to now the various arms of the defense army of Israel have refrained from taking any action outside the immediate battle areas in the south. If the Egyptians should repeat their last night's attempt and direct attacks in whatever form against the civilian population of Israel, we shall take whatever action we deem appropriate against Egypt, and, in particular, against the Egyptian capital, Cairo."

At New Year's Day reception in our residence, President Weizmann [2] stated to mission staff that the representations I made yester-

[1] This telegram was originally received as an unnumbered message.

[2] Chaim Weizmann, President of the Provisional Government of Israel.

day and last night (reDeptel 281, Dec. 30 [3]) had had profound effect on PGI. Apparently attitude Washington, which I faithfully presented in accordance text telegram under reference, is interpreted here as indicating reversal of attitude of Washington to old British line. In this small country, despite every attempt keep secrecy, my representations apparently already widely known in governmental circles and there is much resentment. For example, Attorney General asked what is legal difference between Israel attack on El Arish and repeated bombings in Tel Aviv and elsewhere in Israel by Egyptians. Weizmann stated: "Why this terrific pressure against Israel over attack El Arish when fact is Egyptian armies attacked Israel with purpose destroy Israel." El Arish is Egyptian forward base for air attacks on Israel and latest Israel objectives were to neutralize but not to hold that base.

Weizmann stated he is writing President Truman directly as to facts in situation and sending letter by Eban [4] who is leaving for states on Tuesday.

In obedience pressure USA so threatening[ly] expressed in Deptel 281, PGI has ordered withdrawal all forces Egyptian territory. Mission uncertain as to military effect this withdrawal but USA has now most certainly incurred serious responsibility if such withdrawal again jeopardizes Israel Forces in Negev and encourages Egypt continue attacks on Israel territory.

McDONALD

[3] *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1704.
[4] Aubrey S. Eban, Israeli Representative at the United Nations.

867N.2383/1–249 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

TOP SECRET US URGENT NIACT WASHINGTON, January 2, 1949—2 p. m.

7. Dept this morning requested Brit Emb inform FonOff that in view PGI order withdraw all Israeli forces from Egyptian territory as result our representations and in view info contained Tel Aviv's unnumbered tel Jan 1, 11 a. m.[2] (being repeated London) Dept strongly believes Brit should impress on Egyptians necessity their refraining from further attacks similar that on Tel Aviv. Otherwise chain of reprisals set off may well jeopardize progress toward final settlement so far made.

LOVETT

[1] This telegram was repeated to Tel Aviv for information.
[2] See telegram 2 and footnote 1, *supra*.

867N.01/1–249 : Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

TEL AVIV, January 2, 1949—4 p. m.

3. Following verbatim text statement issued by Foreign Office on December 31:

"It is a month and a half since Egypt and Israel were ordered by the Security Council to enter into armistice negotiations. Israel accepted immediately, thus once more affirming its desire to make peace without delay. The Egyptian Government not only ignored the Security Council resolution, but renewed their military activities in the Negev. They shelled Nirim, Mivtachim and Imara, captured and occupied certain fresh heights, such as Tel-el-Jamah, Tel-el-Farah and Kirbet Kutshan, carried out widespread sabotage against roads and water installations in the area, and launched armored attacks on Israeli positions and settlements, using tanks which had newly arrived from Egypt. These were the subject repeated complaints by the Israeli authorities to UN observer to no avail. These Egyptian activities, covered by delaying tactics regarding an armistice, went on for weeks.

When Egypt finally indicated its acceptance in principle of the armistice resolution, it coupled this with conditions which the resolution did not justify. The Acting Mediator, Dr. Bunche,[1] then made certain proposals whereby the Egyptian forces at Faluja could be evacuated in stages concurrently with armistice talks. Once again the Israeli Government accepted these proposals, and its attitude was officially described by Dr. Bunche as highly satisfactory. The Egyptian commanders pretended at first that they were willing to cooperate, but when General Riley[2] went to Cairo to arrange a time and a place for an armistice meeting, and to obtain the name of the Egyptian representative, the Egyptian Government reverted to its earlier uncompromising attitude, thereby recreating the deadlock. It appears that the resolution on Palestine adopted in the meantime by the UN General Assembly, and the failure of the Security Council to approve Israel's application for membership of the UN,[3] had encouraged Egypt to revive its intransigence. The refusal of Egypt to enter into armistice negotiations could have no other meaning than that it was set on the prosecution of the war. Faced with the choice between embarking on a course leading to peace or pursuing further the line of aggressive invasion, Egypt chose the latter. Israel could not possibly acquiesce in a situation exposing its safety and territorial integrity to an ever present menace and compelling it to carry indefinitely the burdens of war readiness. The attacks perpetrated by Egyptian forces against Israeli positions at every convenient opportunity as well as the flow from Egypt of fresh men and equipment

[1] Ralph J. Bunche, United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine.

[2] Brig. Gen. William E. Riley, United Nations Chief of Staff charged with supervision of the truce in Palestine and senior United States military observer in Palestine.

[3] See footnote 3, *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. 1, Part 2, p. 1677.

left no doubt as to the intentions of the Egyptian Government. Under those circumstances, not only the release of the Egyptian brigade encircled at Faluja was inconceivable, but the Government of Israel found itself constrained to resume its freedom of action in order once and for all to put an end to the intolerable situation and stabilize Israel's security. It was Egypt's choice that determined Israel's action. In the course of that action, as in any war, only military considerations decided the fixing of the establishment of positions. The new facts created in that regard need not determine the final territorial settlement which awaits the conclusion of permanent peace between Israel and her neighbors.

For such a final and lasting peace settlement the Government of Israel is ever ready, in the firm conviction that the sooner it is achieved, the better it will be for all concerned."

McDONALD

867N.01/1–249 : Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, January 2, 1949—5 p. m.

4. For American eyes only. Shiloah[1] officially informed mission night December 31 as follows:

Secret preliminary armistice negotiations with Abdullah el Tel[2] initiated December 25 in atmosphere cordiality.

2. Meetings in complete secrecy owing (*a*) save King[3] embarrassment and possible retaliation from other Arab countries and (*b*) prevent British interfering.

3. Second meeting was held December 30 in Arab Jerusalem with Shiloah and Dayan[4] representing Israel, and Tel representing King. Conversations very satisfactory according Shiloah and one two questions on subjects were listed as agenda for further secret meeting to be held January 5 in Jewish Jerusalem. On agenda are such items as delineation frontiers, renewal operations southern potash works, operations Palestine Corporation electric plant, etc.

4. Shiloah promised keep mission secretly informed progress talks.

5. Also stated satisfactory preliminary tentative discussions on military level have been initiated with Lebanese looking toward armistice. In addition Israeli have secretly approached Lebanon Prime Minister on political level and are hopeful.

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[1] Reuven Shiloah, Political Adviser in the Israeli Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
[2] Lt. Col. Abdullah el Tel, Commander of Transjordan armed forces in Jerusalem.
[3] Abdullah, King of Transjordan.
[4] Col. Moshe Dayan, Commander of Israeli armed forces in Jerusalem.

6. Also Israel has sent secret message to new Prime Minister of Egypt offering negotiate, but Shiloah stated not certain that intermediary "has courage to present offer to Prime Minister." [5]

McDONALD

[5] Amman advised, on January 2, that the previous day Lieutenant Colonel Tel met at Jerusalem with Elias Sassoon, Colonel Dayan, and an unidentified Israeli Foreign Office representative and was said to have "informed Israelis that as personal representative of King he was prepared receive their suggestions re possible boundary settlements. It is understood Israelis endeavored ascertain for second time whether British are being kept advised of these developments. Tel is alleged to have replied he had forgotten to ask." (Telegram 1, 867N.01/-1–249) It is possible that the meeting described in this message is the same as that summarized in Tel Aviv's telegram 4.

Mr. Sassoon was Director of the Middle East Department in the Israeli Foreign Office. His surname is rendered also as Sasson; his given name as Eliahu.

501.BB Palestine/1–349

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Fraser Wilkins of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 3, 1949.

Participants: Joseph B. Keenan—American Representative, Palestine Conciliation Commission
Mr. Wilkins—NE
Mr. Halderman—UNP [1]

While discussing current matters relating to Palestine, Mr. Keenan told me that, following his selection as American Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission he had seen the President and had had an opportunity to discuss the question of Palestine with him.

Mr. Keenan said that during this conversation the President had emphasized the urgent necessity of preventing further warfare in Palestine which, if it continued, might be the spark setting ablaze a greater conflagration. Mr. Keenan said the President hoped that the action which the United Nations had already taken through the General Assembly and the Security Council would prevent further conflict and that if such action was not effective, the Conciliation Commission would immediately attempt to persuade the parties to reach an agreement.

Mr. Keenan said that the President was strongly of the opinion that the orders of the Security Council should be obeyed and that no party to the Palestine dispute should be permitted to defy the United Nations. Recent action by Israel in Egypt was mentioned in this respect. Mr. Keenan reported the President as stating that he could count on his full support and that he would back him to the limit.

[1] John W. Halderman, Assistant Chief of the Division of United Nations Political Affairs.

501.BB Palestine/1–1149

President Chaim Weizmann of the Provisional Government of Israel to President Truman[1]

TEL AVIV, January 3, 1949.

I have been informed by the Provisional Government of Israel of a communication addressed to them by your Special Envoy and of an official assurance given by them that the presence on Egyptian territory of Israeli forces which crossed the frontier in the course of hot pursuit of the Egyptian invaders signified no political or territorial claims by Israel at Egypt's expense and that these forces would be speedily withdrawn.

I feel impelled to address you personally concerning certain basic aspects of this incident. The Egyptian army invaded Palestine with a view to destroying the State of Israel. Israeli forces which accidentally crossed the Egyptian frontier had no intention of destroying the Kingdom of Egypt. The presence of our forces in the Negev conforms to the resolution of the General Assembly of November 29, 1947.[2] On the other hand, the presence of the Egyptian forces in the Negev represents a deliberate defiance of that resolution by the use of force. The Egyptian army on the 15th of May invaded Palestine, bombarded the civilian population of Tel Aviv, and destroyed Jewish villages and water installations in the Negev though the Jews had not touched a single Egyptian. Egyptian forces occupied and held positions in flagrant defiance of successive cease-fire orders of the Security Council at the end of May and in the middle of July. These indisputable facts clearly reveal which side started and consistently maintained a policy of aggression.

I feel deeply disturbed at the unequal reaction of a great power to Egyptian aggression and Jewish defense respectively. When your Government attempted to secure action by the Security Council for stopping the Egyptian and other Arab invasions, these resolutions were defeated by Great Britain which supplied practically all arms used by Egypt in its war of aggression against us. But when Jewish countermeasures repel the invaders, Great Britain comes to the aid of the aggressor in order to prevent Egyptian invaders from being ejected from territory where they had no right to be.

I deeply appreciate the great constructive contributions which you, Mr. President, made to the solution of this problem, indicating your

[1] Sent by the Israeli Mission in the United States to the White House, which transmitted the message to the Department of State by January 11 for preparation of a reply (memorandum of January 11 by Joseph C. Satterthwaite, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, to Mr. Lovett).

[2] See telegram 1271, November 29, 1947, *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, p. 1291.

refusal to follow British calculations and ill-advised policies. But I am unable to square the United States' warning that they would review their support of Israel's application for membership to the United Nations if our forces remained on Egyptian territory, with United States' sponsorship of Egyptian election to the Security Council while Egyptian forces were actually invading and attacking Israel. As a result of such sponsorship, Egypt, which defied the authority of the United Nations and broke the peace in the Middle East, is now a member of the very Council whose function it is to suppress aggression and maintain international peace.

Finally, I should point out that Egypt, in addition to defying the resolution of November, 1947, also failed to comply with the Security Council's resolution of November 16 [3] and the Assembly's resolution of December 11, 1948,[4] which ordered both parties to enter into negotiations for armistice and peaceful settlement. I trust that the above submissions may assist you in determining where the initiative, responsibilty, and guilt for the present unhappy situation properly lie.

I should reiterate that the Provisional Government of Israel is ready at any time to enter into negotiations toward the speediest possible attainment of peace.

CHAIM WEIZMANN

[3] See telegram Delga 746, November 14, 1948, from Paris; footnote 2 to Delga 746; and editorial note, *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1582, 1583, and 1597.

[4] See editorial note, *ibid.*, p. 1661.

501.BB Palestine/1–149 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Special Representative in Israel (McDonald), at Tel Aviv

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, January 3, 1949—5 p. m.

3. Re ur 1 Jan 1 and unnumbered Jan 1, 11 a. m.[1] Dept surprised at comments made by Ben Gurion, Weizmann and others on your representations based on Deptel 281 Dec 30.[2] Plse make it clear to them and others directly concerned that there should be no misconception in minds of Israelis as to purpose these representations. It was as indicated Deptel 281 to stop a move with most serious implications which Brit were contemplating. Another purpose was to avoid if possible Brit rearming of Arabs which Brit apparently determined carry out if all Israeli forces not promptly withdrawn from Egypt.

[1] Regarding the latter, see telegram 2 and footnote 1, p. 595.

[2] *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1704.

It is clear from your two reftels as well as your Weeka No. 1[3] that Israeli forces had in fact advanced into Egypt in considerable force and to considerable distance.

US has great strategic and other interests at stake in NE and PGI therefore has no just grounds on which to resent fact that US should react strongly to any action either by Israelis or Arabs containing threat of enlargement of conflict.

You should in fact state that we are making strong representations Egyptians re Egyptian acts complained of in your unnumbered Jan 1, 11 a. m. and 6 Jan 3.[4] Have also requested Brit make similar representations.

Israelis therefore should only draw simple conclusion that US representations are directed toward composing situation promptly.

Ref last sentence your Jan 1, 11 a. m. re "serious responsibility" US may have incurred through your representations Dept considers that full responsibility rests with parties who are engaging in military operations contrary to SC resolutions.[5]

LOVETT

[3] Sent as telegram 5, January 2, not printed.

[4] Latter not printed; it reported information from Foreign Minister Shertok that on the evening of January 2, an enemy plane, presumably Egyptian, dropped three bombs over Jewish Jerusalem. The message also stated that the Provisional Government of Israel expected the United States to make "very urgent and stern representations to Egypt" concerning this first bombing of Jerusalem (867N.01/1–349).

[5] A marginal notation indicates that this telegram was cleared at the White House with Clark M. Clifford, Special Counsel to President Truman. It was repeated to London as 12. On the night of January 4, Mr. McDonald handed a paraphrase to Mr. Shertok who "expressed pleasure Dept's explanation. He volunteered information that Israel troop withdrawal was ordered afternoon December 31, that officer in charge asked 24 hour leeway, that withdrawal began January 1 and by morning January 2 'not an Israeli hoof remained in Egypt'." (telegram 10, January 5, noon, from Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/1–549)

501.BB Palestine/1–349 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

TOP SECRET US URGENT NIACT WASHINGTON, January 3, 1949—5 p. m.

2. Please seek immediate audience with King[1] and make following oral representation, leaving memorandum in same sense:

1. Amer Govt has been deeply disturbed at recent renewed outbreak hostilities bet forces of Israel and Egypt in Negev, despite SC's resolutions Nov 4[2] and Nov 16 and Council's basic resolutions calling for cease-fire and truce in Palestine May 29 and July 15, 1948.[3]

[1] Farouk, King of Egypt.

[2] *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1546.

[3] See *ibid.*, pp. 1070 and 1224.

2. Because serious nature recent fighting and continued neglect countries concerned to heed SC's resolutions, Amer Govt has recently indicated to Provisional Govt of Israel its concern at course events and its belief that Israeli forces should under no circumstances invade territory of Egypt.

3. In same spirit Amer Govt because its long friendship with Egypt feels it must point out similar concern which it has lest attitude of Egypt should be stumbling block to prompt conclusion peace in Middle East. In particular we feel there should be compliance with SC resolution Nov 16, 1948 which called upon parties to Palestine conflict to negotiate armistice either directly or through good offices UN Mediator.

4. It would be most encouraging if Govt Egypt would promptly undertake negotiations looking toward armistice foreseen by SC in its resolution Nov. 16. Any word which King can give this Govt as to his intentions this respect will be appreciated.

5. In light friendly representations made to PGI which have in fact resulted in assurances of withdrawal Israeli forces from Egyptian territory, Amer Govt can expect no less than policy of wise retraint on part Egyptian Govt with respect to further hostilities against Israel. Such incidents as that Jan. 1, when two Egyptian vessels are reported to have approached Israeli coast to attack capital city of Tel Aviv, or recently reported bombing of Jerusalem, can only bring reprisal on part of Israel and will make it difficult for this or any other Govt to counsel PGI against extensive mil operations. Any assurances which King may be able to give as to Egypt's peaceful intent will be awaited with great interest by this Govt.

6. Finally, it should be urged upon King in most serious terms that Amer Govt and people feel time has come to make peace in Palestine. It is essential that hostilities should cease and that statesmanship should be employed to establish lasting peace. We trust that King Farouk as a leader of Arab world will seize this opportunity.

Repeated to London as 11, Tel Aviv as 2.

LOVETT

867N.01/12–2848 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Mr. Wells Stabler[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 3, 1949—5 p. m.

2. Dept has given careful consideration to Jerusalem tel No. 1550 Dec 23[2] rptd Amman 15 and to ur 173 Dec 28,[3] 172 Dec 28[4] and 176 Dec 29.[5] Dept's comment on points raised as follows.

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[1] Vice consul at Jerusalem; detailed to Amman.
[2] *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1687.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 1694.
[4] Not printed, but see footnote 1, *ibid.*, p. 1700.
[5] Not printed.

Dept anxious see peace restored to Palestine and believes should be accomplished by negotiations, either directly between parties or through Conciliation Commission. Dept would naturally welcome any concrete steps by Israelis or Arabs to bring about such negotiations. In this connection Dept has found reasonable attitude shown by TJ re negotiations with Jews extremely hopeful sign.

US, however, naturally desires avoid becoming involved in inter-Arab jealousies and intrigues and Dept regards question of TJ relations with Arab League as essentially one for determination by TJ. As you point out in ur 176 Dec 29, determining factor seems to be the military one.[6] Dept believes final attitude TJ re Israelis will be decided by military situation, particularly position of Arab Legion, and by stand taken by UK. Not essential, therefore, and certainly undesirable that US become involved in question TJ attitude re Arab League and other Arab States.

Dept believes that most satisfactory solution disposition greater part Arab Palestine would be incorporation in Transjordan. Therefore Dept approves principle underlying Jericho resolutions.[7]

To sum up, US would like to see TJ negotiate armistice and final peace with Israelis, and believes most of Arab Palestine could be incorporated in Transjordan as outcome such negotiations. However, US can not become involved in inter-Arab politics. If King and TJ officials seek views of US on question of Palestine settlement, you are authorized to state US approval of reasonable attitude so far shown by TJ and to express US hope that TJ, as well as other Arab States, will find way of entering armistice and peace negotiations with Israelis. You are also authorized, if queried re US views on disposition Arab Palestine, to state that US believes logical outcome negotiations between TJ and Israelis would be incorporation greater part Arab Palestine in TJ. You will know best how to do this without giving impression US supporting TJ against Arab League and without involving US in Arab politics.

LOVETT

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[6] In telegram 176, Mr. Stabler gave his opinion that the "King is now in most difficult position for he sees Jews will continue war against him or Iraqis or both unless he agrees in immediate future to peace negotiations. Also knows that if war is continued, Iraqi Army and Arab Legion can be easily defeated and he will lose everything." (867N.01/12–2948)

[7] Adopted at a meeting of Palestinian Arabs at Jericho on December 1, 1948. It called for the unity of Transjordan and Arab Palestine, with Abdullah as King; see telegram 140, December 4, 1948, from Amman, *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1645.

501.BB Palestine/1–349 : Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT TEL AVIV, January 3, 1949—7 p. m.
NIACT

7. Reference Deptel 281.[1] Attention President and Acting Secretary. I am transmitting below verbatim text of Foreign Office note received today as formal reply my representations of midnight December 31.

"Sir: 1. I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the communication from the Government of the US of America which you conveyed to me orally on the afternoon of Friday, 31 December 1948. A copy of this communication, in the form in which it was made, is appended hereto for reference.

2. You have already been informed by the Prime Minister and myself that such Israel forces as entered Egyptian territory did so in hot pursuit of an enemy driven out from a territory he had invaded in the course of a war of aggression. All such forces were recalled without delay and no Israel troops now remain on Egyptian soil. The reports received by the US Government to the effect that Israel forces had 'invaded' Egyptian territory, not as an incidental military maneuver, but as an operation deliberately planned, are devoid of all foundation. The Government of Israel never had any intention to stage an invasion of Egypt or to occupy, let alone annex, any part of Egyptian territory.

3. The Government of Israel is not surprised that charges of such utterly unfounded character should be preferred against it by the Government of the UK. It was that government which in the spring of last year encouraged the invasion of Palestine by the armies of Egypt and the Arab states. It has consistently defended this aggression in open defiance of the Charter of the UN and of the law of nations. It has throughout demonstrated and made effective its hostility to the State and Government of Israel.

4. The Government of Israel must nevertheless register its profound resentment at the attitude of the Government of the UK as transmitted without comment by the US Government. In threatening to take action under the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936, the British Government conjures up a contingency which, as will be evident from a study of the relevant provisions of that treaty, has by no means arisen. The British Government furthermore makes its abstention from a 'conflict'—which in this context can only mean an armed conflict—with the Government of Israel contingent upon the acceptance by the latter of the decisions of the United Nations

[1] *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1704.

Security Council. It is thereby setting itself up, without any warrant whatsoever, as an arbiter and mandatory, not in any actual conflict between itself and the Government of Israel, but in a hypothetical dispute between Israel and the Security Council, and is seeking to justify its arrogation of such authority by invoking a treaty which in the given context is irrelevant. The Government of Israel presumes that your communication is not to be interpreted as identifying the US Government with the attitude adopted by the British Government in this matter.

5. You will recall that on May 15 last the Egyptian Army invaded Palestine with the declared intention of preventing the establishment of the State of Israel or, if prevention were no longer possible, of encompassing its destruction. This invasion, which the Government of the US did not find itself able to halt, was an open act of war, whereby Egypt forfeited all claim to be counted among the peace-loving nations of the world. Yet, this undeniable violation by Egypt of her obligations under the Charter of the United Nations did not deter the Government of the US from sponsoring Egypt's candidature for membership in the SC, with the result that an aggressor state, which in collusion with other aggressor states has made itself responsible for a most flagrant breach of the international peace, now appears in the role of a custodian of world peace and is able to use that authority and cast its vote in furtherance of its aggressive designs. You will doubtless appreciate my government's perplexity and sorrow at finding itself—the victim of Egyptian aggression—under suspicion by the US Government of having taken an action which might 'place in jeopardy the peace of the Middle East'. I should be grateful if you would interpret to the US Government the feelings of the Government of Israel at finding itself, contrary to all rational expectations, faced with a situation which appears so fundamentally to distort the true state of affairs prevailing in the Middle East.

6. As I have already had an opportunity of informing you, the report which the US Government has received from its representative in Transjordan is wholly without foundation. Not only has the Government of Israel not told the Government of Transjordan that 'the time has passed for the negotiation of an armistice', but it is precisely an armistice which Israel is at present attempting to negotiate with Transjordan, in the hope that an armistice will soon lead to a permanent peace. I note your communication does not cite the Government of Transjordan as the source of this report.

7. I should like in conclusion to assure you, and to request you to convey this assurance to the US Government, that the Government of Israel has today in mind but one aim—peace. It nurtures no ambition to invade the territory of neighbouring states. Yet it feels bound to defend its territory and its people against aggression from whatever quarter that aggression may come and to take all legitimate measures dictated by considerations of self-defence. It will not regard that purpose as accomplished until the invading armies have withdrawn to their proper territories and peace has been established between Israel and her neighbours. It attaches the utmost importance to the retention by Israel of the friendship of the Government and people of the US and trusts that no conflict will arise between its

paramount duty of self-defence and its vital interest in the retention of the friendship. It will always be sincerely appreciative of any help that the US Government can lend in restraining aggression and hastening the restoration of peace and hopes that the US Government may find it possible, as in the past, to exercise its good offices in this direction both with the Arab states and with the Government of the UK.

Accept, sir, the renewed expression of my highest consideration." (Signed: Moshe Shertok, Minister for Foreign Affairs.)

Enclosure referred to in note is copy of the paraphrase of Deptel 281 of December 30 which I read to Shertok and Ben-Gurion as Shertok took it down in shorthand.

[Here follows enclosure.]

For American eyes only: Mission analysis of situation by the above development follows as part Two.[2]

McDONALD

[2] See telegram 9, January 5, p. 614.

501.BB Palestine/1–449: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET LONDON, January 4, 1949—1 p. m.

20. Embassy having earlier asked regarding nature counsel being given Abdullah by UK (Dept's repeat of Amman's unnumbered, December 29, 4 p. m.[1]) Burrows[2] January 3 stated that some time ago when Abdullah asked for advice UK made 3 points:

(*a*) If possible Abdullah should not finalize any agreement reached with PGI before Conciliation Commission[3] arrives (Burrows said accent is on finalize);

(*b*) There are great advantages in Abdullah and Egypt reconciling their differences and working together;

(*c*) UK made clear what it considers reasonable settlement with PGI along lines discussed earlier with Dept., i.e. Gaza–Beersheba road as southern boundary Negev; Haifa and Lydda free ports, etc.

2. Upon learning of interview in which PGI representatives threatened Transjordan (paragraph 5, Dept's 4819, December 30[4]) Foreign

[1] Presumably telegram 176, December 29, 1948, 5 p. m., not printed.

[2] Bernard A. B. Burrows, Head of the Eastern Department of the British Foreign Office.

[3] The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, hereinafter annotated as the Palestine Conciliation Commission.

[4] This was a repeat of telegram 281 to Tel Aviv, *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1704.

Office telegraphed Kirkbride [5] to tell Abdullah that it still considered its advice (paragraph 1 above) sound. In view HMG, Abdullah would be courting difficulties if he should continue to negotiate with PGI while Israeli forces still in Egypt. However, HMG aware serious responsibility involved for UK if it should advise Abdullah to refrain from any negotiations which Abdullah wished to undertake. Consequently, although HMG still hoped King would be able to "spin out" negotiations until CC arrives, Kirkbride "should not try to restrain Abdullah from any course of action upon which Abdullah decides in full knowledge facts."

3. In same instruction Kirkbride was told to make clear that if Abdullah, acting upon Jericho resolution accepts formal union between Palestine and Transjordan without limiting this to Arab areas Palestine, UK would have to make clear that it does not recognize and cannot support any claims by Abdullah to areas which may be incorporated into Jewish state.

4. Burrows said that foregoing means Abdullah is free to act as he thinks best regarding negotiations and that he is not under any UK restraint.

5. Burrows said Foreign Office has just received report of January 1 meeting Jerusalem between Abdullah Tel for Abdullah and PGI representatives. Meeting "went rather well." Israelis insisted confining "armistice" talks to Arab Legion area only and listed as points of interest to PGI access northern potash works and suggested restarting southern plant for which water would have to come from Transjordan.

Israelis suggested that boundaries should be defined between Arab Legion and Israeli forces, that prisoners should be exchanged and organization set up to handle claims. Israelis favored dividing Jerusalem and Tel replied this might be acceptable if Arab part Jerusalem included Arab quarters outside old city. Tel mentioned among Arab points of interest return Arabs of Lydda, Ramallah and Jaffa, and suggested he would like to discuss future of Galilee. Israelis made no comment.

6. Burrows asked classification should be observed regarding paragraph 5 above "since Abdullah is negotiating without knowledge Transjordan government" and should be protected from leaks.

7. Burrows commented that UK is pleased talks are continuing and that there have been "no more ultimata." He thought it obvious that while talks are technically concerned with armistice, they have already

[5] Sir Alec S. Kirkbride, British Minister in Transjordan.

gone well beyond this limit into field peace settlement. Burrows opined limiting talks to Arab Legion area "might be sinister," since there is school of Arab thought (including Samir Pasha) which believes that as soon as some progress is made with Transjordan, Israeli forces will drive south from Baisan along Jordan valley thus cutting off Iraqis who at present show no signs of either negotiating or going home. Arab Legion is aleady spread thin and could not take over Iraqi front unless assured it would not have to meet Israeli attacks.

8. Asked regarding British ideas for road ahead, Burrows said Foreign Office still believes, and apparently Ambassador Griffis agrees, next move should be US and UK reaching understanding regarding territorial objectives (Embassy's top secret despatch 2497 December 21 [6] and A–2377 [7] December 22). He said British Embassy Washington was instructed January 3 to suggest to Dept. that these talks should begin at once. Foreign Office was encouraged by British Embassy report December 28 that Department willing discuss with UK policy regarding Conciliation Commission which according Foreign Office logically should embrace territorial thinking.

9. Please keep Embassy fully informed.

HOLMES

[6] Not printed (867N.01/12–2148); it transmitted a memorandum of December 17, 1948, prepared by the British War Office, which dealt "with the strategic significance of Palestine and in particular with the importance which the British War Office attaches to the location of Israel's southern frontier." This memorandum was a followup to the Douglas–Bevin meeting of December 14, as described in telegram 5244 from London of the same day, *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1670.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 1680.

501.BB Palestine/1–449 : Telegram

Mr. John C. Ross [1] *to the Secretary of State*

SECRET NEW YORK, January 4, 1949—11:25 p. m.

3. For Rusk [2] and Satterthwaite.[3] Bunche informs that Azcarate [4] phoned from Cairo this evening that Egyptians have confidentially notified him that they are ready to enter into talks with Israel on all outstanding questions under UN auspices provided Israelis will obey SC cease-fire order by 1400 GMT January 5.

[1] Deputy to Senator Warren R. Austin, U.S. Representative at the United Nations.

[2] Dean Rusk, Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs.

[3] Joseph C. Satterthwaite, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

[4] Pablo Azcarate, Acting Mediator Bunche's Representative at Cairo.

Bunche describes this development as most encouraging in long time for there apparently are no strings attached. He has instructed Vigier [5] to take up matter urgently in Tel Aviv pressing strongly in Bunche's name for acceptance. Bunche has received no word from Tel Aviv regarding observance of SC cease-fire order to date. He has instructed Vigier to sound out Israelis on holding a high level conference on Rhodes with civil and military authorities of both Israel and Egypt under UN chairmanship. He thinks Transjordan could relatively easily be persuaded to join such a conference.

Bunche feels strongly that Israel should grab this opportunity at once if they want a peaceful settlement. He feels certain that it is a bona fide offer.

Bunche requests us to find opportunities tomorrow to impress on Israelis urgent importance of accepting this offer by deadline. He feels that advice from appropriate US officials would tip the scales at this critical juncture. However, he emphasized that matter should be treated with the utmost secrecy during next twenty-four hours.[6]

Bunche commented in same conversation this evening that until above development he was seriously contemplating requesting withdrawal of UN observers on Israeli side of lines at SC Negev committee [7] meeting Friday, January 7, since observers are bottled up in Haifa and Tel Aviv. He feels that unless the SC can make its cease-fire order stick with the Israelis he will have no course but to pull out the military observers which now give only a false sense of security.

Ross

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[5] Henri Vigier, Mr. Bunche's representative at Tel Aviv.

[6] After consulting with Messrs. Rusk and Satterthwaite, Robert M. McClintock, Special Assistant to Mr. Rusk, telephoned Mr. Ross at 10 a. m., January 5 regarding telegram 3. He observed to Mr. Ross that "the Egyptian deadline for entering into talks with Israel on all outstanding questions, provided the Israelis would obey the Security Council cease fire order by 1400 GMT today, had already passed, since this hour was 9 a. m., EST. Since the suggested representations which Dr. Bunche thought would be useful if made by the United States to the Provisional Government of Israel would have to be cleared with the President and the deadline was already expired, it seemed impossible for us to act on Dr. Bunche's suggestion. I said, however, that I thought it would be entirely appropriate for the Acting Mediator to telephone Mr. Shertok in Tel Aviv and give him the information which Mr. Azcarate had telephoned from Cairo, together with Dr. Bunche's own estimate of the situation." (memorandum of conversation by Mr. McClintock, 501.BB Palestine/1–549)

[7] A loose usage for the Committee on the Palestinian Question of the Security Council. Messrs. Rusk and Satterthwaite, in a joint memorandum of January 5 to Mr. Lovett, began preparation of instructions to the United States representative on the Committee. The memorandum noted that the Committee "was appointed pursuant to the Security Council's resolution of November 4, which required Israel and Egypt to stop fighting in the Negev and to withdraw their forces to the positions occupied as of October 14. The purpose of the Committee was to study the situation in the light of this resolution and to determine whether it should recommend to the Security Council possible action under Chapter VII in the event that the resolution had not been complied with." (501.BB Palestine/1–549)

501.BB Palestine/1–549

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 5, 1949.

Participants: The Acting Secretary, Mr. Lovett
The British Ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks
Mr. Bromley, First Secretary of the British Embassy
Mr. Satterthwaite—NEA
Mr. Wilkins—NE
Mr. McClintock—UNA

Sir Oliver Franks said that he had been instructed personally to thank the Acting Secretary of State for the prompt and effective intervention which this Government had made with the Provisional Government of Israel and which had resulted in instructions being given by the Israeli Government for the withdrawal of its forces from Egypt.

The British Ambassador said that Mr. Bevin, in view of the very great strategic interests of both the United States and Great Britain in the Near East and in the light of the necessity for an adequate defense in depth of the Suez Canal, very much hoped that the American Government might find its way clear to exert pressure on the Israeli Government to withdraw to the lines in the Negev established by the Acting Mediator after the adoption by the Security Council of its resolution of November 4, 1948.

I told the British Ambassador that for a variety of reasons I did not feel that we could accede to Mr. Bevin's request. While, in an exceptional case such as that when the incursion by Israeli forces into Egypt threatened a much more grave conflict outside the boundaries of Palestine, we had been willing to make strong representations, our general line of policy was to operate through the United Nations. It did not seem proper for the United States to take on itself the responsibilities of the Security Council and apply them unilaterally. Furthermore, we had found in practice that strong representations, to be effective, should be used sparingly; otherwise notes often were merely interesting documents for the archives but useful for no other purpose. Finally, we had our position on the Conciliation Commission to consider. The Israeli authorities already believed that two of the Members of the Commission were prejudiced in favor of the Arabs, since Turkey was a Moslem country and France not only had 25 million Mohammedans living under its jurisdiction but also had not voted for Israel in last month's sessions of the Security Council. If we were

[1] Drafted by Mr. McClintock.

to achieve anything as an impartial member of the Commission we could not jeopardize that position by taking a line which would cause the Israelis to feel that even the third Member was against them. Meanwhile, of course, we continued to share the British anxiety over the situation in Palestine and were not stinting our efforts to do the utmost to bring about a cessation of hostilities. In fact we were this afternoon addressing new representations to the Governments of Israel and Egypt, based on a report received last night from the Acting Mediator, to the effect that Egypt had said it was willing to undertake negotiations all across the board with Israel under United Nations auspices, provided Israel accepted a cease-fire by 1400 hours GMT today. The deadline was so short that we were inclined to be suspicious whether the offer was bonafide but we thought that a representation was warranted by our desire to do everything possible to facilitate a cessation of hostilities.

Sir Oliver said that the second main point which Mr. Bevin wished to make was that with the continued stress of warfare in the Near East conditions in the Arab countries would become, as he put it, deliquescent, or, to use the more graphic aphorism of the Foreign Secretary, "We should have another China on our hands". Accordingly, it was of the utmost importance that the United States and Great Britain, whose strategic interests were so involved in that area, do their utmost to compose this dangerous situation. Mr. Bevin wondered if the American Member of the Conciliation Commission might not be instructed by his Government to keep in mind the strategic interests of the United States and the United Kingdom and to use his good influence to further those interests. I said that, while naturally we would give background information to Mr. Keenan, our Representative on the Commission, we had no choice but to do our utmost to play the role of a true conciliator. Mr. Keenan and his colleagues had the task of trying to find some common ground for agreement which would be acceptable to all the parties concerned. If they could get agreement between the parties we would be bound to accept such an arrangement. However, Mr. Keenan of course would comport his action to the main lines of policy which had already been made public to the world by Dr. Jessup in his speech before Committee 1 on November 20.[2] I briefly recapitulated our main points, including the fact that if the Israeli Government desired to benefit by the territorial provisions of the resolution of November 29, 1947, it should be expected to relinquish such areas as were awarded to the Arabs

[2] See editorial note, *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1617. Philip C. Jessup was the spokesman of the United States on questions involving Palestine at the Third Session of the General Assembly at Paris.

by that resolution but were now occupied by Israel, as Jaffa and western Galilee. In other words, they could not have it both ways. As for the strategic implications of the situation, I said that Mr. Keenan would be briefed before he went. The British Ambassador seemed to to be satisfied with this answer.

Sir Oliver then said that he had received permission to tell us that shortly British reinforcements would be sent to the Gulf of Aqaba.[3] He did not, however, wish to inform us officially of this fact if we had no desire for such intelligence from his Government. In response to questioning the Ambassador intimated that the British reinforcements would be sent from outside by sea and that they numbered three companies in strength. (Mr. Bromley, however, murmured that he thought something like a battalion was being sent to Aqaba.)

I said that we had already received similar reports from other sources, including the press. I did not think that this Government wished to be officially appraised of the Ambassador's information. As a matter of friendly comment, however, we wished to raise a little red flag and point out that if the troops indeed came to Transjordan from outside the Near Eastern area their arrival would be construed in many quarters as a violation of the Security Council truce resolution of May 29, which explicitly forebade the movement of military personnel into Palestine or the neighboring countries.

The interview concluded with Sir Oliver handing me a written statement of his Government's views on the situation in China and a memorandum of its views with respect to the IRO.[4]

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[3] The British Foreign Office communiqué on this matter, issued on January 8, read as follows: "His Majesty's Government have received a request from the Transjordan Government under the terms of the Anglo-Transjordan treaty of March 1948, to send a British force to Aqaba. His Majesty's Government have acceded to this request." (telegram 91, January 8, from London, 841.2390i/1–849)

[4] Chargé Holmes, on January 5, cabled the Department concerning the instructions sent to Ambassador Franks on January 3 for his conversation with Acting Secretary Lovett. He noted that Mr. Bevin had personally drafted the instructions, which in part called for the Ambassador "to refer to identical lines of policy regarding Middle East worked out between US and UK in fall 1947, and to say that all British actions Middle East are based on this policy and nothing else. British Government understood US views general Middle East problems have not altered since 1947. . . . Franks told to urge USG to participate in resolute effort with UK to arrive at firm conclusions which US and UK can support as Palestine solution. Instruction stated three things necessary to accomplish this:

"(*a*) Fix frontiers Israel which US and UK could support;
"(*b*) UK recognition PGI;
"(*c*) Strong advice to Arabs if not to accept at least to acquiesce in agreed frontiers and to cease fighting."

The Ambassador was instructed "to urge that US and UK come to 'very firm conclusions' and fix definite boundaries and thus arrive at final settlement 'which will save Middle East'." (Telegram 47, 867N.01/1–549)

Regarding the "identical lines of policy" agreed upon at the "Pentagon Talks of 1947," see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, pp. 485 ff.

501.BB Palestine/1–549 : Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT TEL AVIV, January 5, 1949—11 a. m.

9. Attention President and Acting Secretary. Part Two.[1] Following is unanimous consensus Mission staff including Service Attachés. While Deptel 3 of January 3 is most helpful and explanatory and is being communicated Foreign Office soonest, the representations made Israel under instructions Deptel 281 of December 30[2] gave the effect of putting US in new role with relation to conflict between Israel and Egypt. Thus, irrespective of what the precise intent was in instructing me to make those representations in the form indicated, the deduction of the PGI that, by forcing Israel abandon an obviously successful military action (which would have, in mind army and public here, neutralized a forward Egyptian base from which Egypt has during six months repeatedly launched destructive air and other attacks against Israel without occasioning any recorded direct complaint by US or GB), the US is now directly involved in results of action it has taken. If Egyptian attacks should continue, or if misunderstanding our action encourages Iraqi attack in north, the US position will be compared here to Britain as power whose repeated maneuvers are having effect of letting Israel bleed to death by forcing her into position where she is neither free to end the war militarily nor obtain peace by negotiation [as called for by?] Security Council UN.

The military facts as Mission now understands them are that, owing our representations, Israel forces have abruptly retreated from Egyptian territory, abandoning control roads. The tactics of Israel Army apparently were to have raided El Arish and attack Rafah and neutralize them, then withdraw to open path for estimated 18,000 Egyptian troops to escape home to Egypt. Now situation very confused but it appears that the new position of Israeli forces has blocked escape route of Egyptians while leaving Rafah as yet untouched but completely cut off from northeast and southeast. This is what Mission meant when it ascribed "serious responsibility" arising out of US representations.

The public here has only today become aware of US representations and as implications become clearer, I anticipate unfavorable reaction. Mission troubled by possible internal political effect our move particularly as affecting January 25 elections. During last six months, I believe owing intensive efforts this Mission cultivate friendship and to the changed policy of delegation in Paris, the domestic political

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[1] For part one, see telegram 7, January 3, p. 605.

[2] *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1704.

tide was definitely swinging toward West. These latest developments have given extreme left and extreme right powerful political campaign issue to use against what now appears here to be new and definite Anglo-American alignment. If we cannot now stop Egypt's attack or persuade British to change its consistently antagonistic attitude toward Israel, these reactions will weigh against us.

All evidence here of PGI plans and Israel's self-interest negates existence any intention seize or hold Egyptian territory. Mission sees no inconsistency between US support independent strong Israel and all legitimate British interests in Egypt.

Mission hopes that US action already taken (Deptel 1, January 2 [3] and Deptel 2, January 3 [4]) will be helpful restraining Egypt. Unfortunately substance US representations Israel (Deptel 281, December 30 [5]) have come through London and are already widely publicized press here thus giving impression marked US partiality.

In view foregoing and in light of danger reaction with reference election, Mission urgently reiterates its recommendations contained Mistel 323, December 20 [6] that US immediately grant *de jure* recognition or at least ExImBank loan.

Mission has taken into account appointment Conciliation Committee and its terms of reference. Mission considers that situation now created does not permit postponement of actions suggested, and that such actions would facilitate work Conciliation Committee. (Part one sent as Mistel 7, January 3.)

McDONALD

[3] Not printed; it advised of the Department's request to the British Embassy to inform the Foreign Office that "in view PGI order withdraw all Israeli forces from Egyptian territory as result our representations . . . Dept strongly believes Brit should impress on Egyptians necessity of their refraining from further attacks similar that on Tel Aviv. Otherwise chain of reprisals set off may well jeopardize progress toward final settlement so far made." (867N.2383/1–249)

[4] This was a repeat of No. 2 to Cairo, p. 602.

[5] *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1704.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 1674.

501.BB Palestine/1–549 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

TOP SECRET US URGENT NIACT WASHINGTON, January 5, 1949—6 p. m.

14. Please call on FonMin and make following representation:

1. Acting Palestine Mediator has informed us that his Representative in Cairo telephoned Jan. 4 that Egyptian Govt had confidentially

[1] This telegram and No. 8, *infra*, were cleared with Mr. Clifford.

notified him of its readiness to enter into talks with Israel on all outstanding questions under UN auspices provided PGI obeys SC cease-fire order by 1400 GMT Jan. 5.

2. This Govt regrets that reported deadline provided little time in which to make friendly representations to both Govts of Israel and Egypt expressing hope of US Govt that cease-fire would promptly be obeyed and that negotiations between Israel and Egypt under UN auspices would be immediately undertaken to settle all outstanding questions.

4. [*sic*] American Govt profoundly hopes that Egyptian Govt will not alter its peaceful intent because reported deadline has already expired. US feels that reasonable opportunity should be given PGI in which to accept a serious and bona fide offer. You may inform FonMin that your Govt is making representations at Tel Aviv in hope that both Israel and Egypt will observe immediate cease-fire and commence negotiations for armistice and peace.

Repeated for info only to Tel Aviv as 7, London as 44.

LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/1–349 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald), at Tel Aviv

TOP SECRET US URGENT NIACT WASHINGTON, January 5, 1949—6 p. m.

8. Please call on FonMin and express your Govt's gratification on learning from FonMin's note Jan. 3 transmitted your Niact 7, Jan. 3, that no Israeli troops now remain on Egyptian territory.

2. Please add that this Govt is relieved that danger of much more serious conflict in Middle East has been averted. FonMin must realize representations of this Govt by you Dec. 31, pursuant to Deptel 281, Dec. 30,[1] were motivated by sincere friendship of US Govt for Israel and its desire to see PGI avoid course of action which might have led to grave consequences.

3. Dept has been informed by Acting Mediator that his Representative in Cairo Jan. 4 informed him that Egyptian Govt had confidentially notified UN Representative it was willing to enter into talks with Israel under UN auspices on all outstanding questions, provided PGI will obey SC cease-fire order by 1400 GMT Jan. 5. Although this info reached Dept after this deadline had expired, this Govt in friendly

[1] *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1704.

spirit desires to acquaint PGI of foregoing info with trust that it may still be possible for PGI and Egypt to enter into negotiations following a prompt and effective cease-fire.

4. Inform FonMin that similar representations are being made to Egyptian Govt, and we are informing that Govt of our belief that a reasonable opportunity should be given PGI in which to accept a serious and bona fide offer.

Repeated to London as 45 and Cairo as 15 for info only.

LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/1–349 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, January 5, 1949—6 p. m.

8. GA res 11 Dec 1948 provides *inter alia* that Conciliation Comm will undertake upon request SC functions now assigned UN Mediator or UN Truce Comm by SC resolutions. (Contel 5 Jan 3.[1]) When SC makes such request, Dept believes TC should be dissolved. Meanwhile, TC should [in] Dept's opinion, remain as now constituted. SC res 23 April 1948 [2] establishing TC made no provision addition or replacement members (ref Deptel 917 Sep 21 [3]).

LOVETT

[1] Not printed; it advised of the belief of the French Foreign Office that the Truce Commission should discontinue functioning with the arrival of the Palestine Conciliation Commission (501.BB Palestine/1–349).

[2] See editorial note, *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 852.

[3] Not printed; it stated that "SC Resolution Apr 23 establishing Truce Commission makes no provision additional members Truce Commission. Dept considers possible establishment Soviet ConGen Jerusalem would not automatically entitle USSR become member Truce Commission. UK has not thus far raised question its participation as result establishment Brit ConGen Jerusalem." (501.BB Palestine/9–1648)

501.BB Palestine/1–549 : Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET CAIRO, January 5, 1949—7 p. m.

12. ReDeptels 2, January 3 and 4 January 4.[1] As communicated to Department by Embtel 7, January 4,[2] I was granted audience by His Majesty at 4 p. m., Wednesday, fifth. I opened conversation by men-

[1] Latter not printed.

[2] Not printed.

tioning Ambassador Griffis[3] appreciation of his recent reception by King (Embtel 1782, January 2[4]) mentioning likewise former Ambassador Tuck's[5] presence in Cairo. His Majesty remarked that he had questioned Ambassador Griffis re somewhat anomalous situation Chargé of this Embassy which had not previously, to his knowledge, arisen in Cairo adding an expression of surprise that Ambassador Griffis had not elected to mention to him subject matter on which I was calling and of which he was ignorant. I responded stating that Mr. Griffis had not been informed prior to his departure which accounted for my soliciting an audience so soon after Ambassador meeting HM. On my mentioning that Ambassador Griffis had called to explain his plans for alleviating ravages of war and that I too came on a mission of peace, King remarked that he had guessed as much. I immediately thereafter emphasized that I had called by express instruction of my government on a matter of urgency. HM replied that he would have received me yesterday (that is, the very day of my application for audience) had that been possible. After thanking King for his helpful promptitude I orally developed points of Deptel 2 above-mentioned. King inquired very particularly as to whether American Government had already indicated its concern to Israelis (I purposely avoided reference to PGI by name) and appeared content on my assuring him to that effect.

Re content numbered paragraph four, HM stated that Egyptian Government desirous of concluding armistice recommended by Security Council November 16, but that implementation resolution November 4 must concurrently take place. On my inquiring if implementation of both SC resolutions might not be effected simultaneously, King supposed this might be the case. HM remarked em-

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[3] Stanton Griffis, Ambassador in Egypt.

[4] Not printed; it advised that Ambassador Griffis, on January 2, held a long discussion with King Farouk on the Palestine problem. The King advised him that "he must represent the will of his people and that his people want this war to go on if it takes ten years to finish it." He also stated that "in view of fact that Russian participations in Israel attack had become so obvious, he was constantly astounded at attitude of US in matter; that Palestine was rapidly becoming another Greece and that Russians, despite all American efforts in, and aid to, Turkey, were rapidly becoming entrenched in strategic positions in Palestine back of Turkish center frontier." The Ambassador noted that the King "Certainly indirectly confirmed my constantly stated belief that little progress can be made in Palestine settlement without completely approved blueprint by US and UK." He concluded that the "Department should consider possibilities even if unilateral, of bringing strong pressure on Israel to stop aggression and respect toothless UN orders. While I have in past tended to minimize Egyptian cry of 'Russian, Russian,' I am not now so confident. One thing is certain here, British are becoming extremely jittery re dangers of their own position and involvements which might ensue under their treaties with Egypt and Transjordan." (867N.01/1–249)

[5] S. Pinkney Tuck, Minister in Egypt from 1944 to 1946 and Ambassador in Egypt from 1946 to 1948.

phatically, however, that he had no faith in Jews or the slightest confidence that they would keep their word in any agreement. At same time HM pointed out that Egypt was in the current hostilities the attacked and not the attacker. Said hostilities, which he stated were now continuing, were of the utmost intensity and carried on by all weapons available to the Israelis, including tear and irritant gases. HM hesitated to describe such gases as being actually poisonous, but stated that Egyptians, who had not yet used them, would do so if the Israelis continued their employment. HM, while not as jovial as described by Ambassador Griffis in Embtel 1782, seemed in good spirits and manifested confidence in outcome of current struggle which he stated was probably the hardest fought engagement in Middle East since El Alamein. HM repeated, as in his January 2 talk with Ambassador Griffis, that the Egyptians had captured Russians. On my inquiring if these were not Russian Jews he stated that some were, but that pure Russians had been taken and likewise Poles, Hungarians, Dutch, and even South Africans. He had had this last-named fact brought to the attention of the South African Chargé d'Affaires even though he had not been able to produce the South Africans alive.

On my suggesting restraint recommended in numbered paragraph five giving reported bombing Jerusalem as example, HM quickly replied that his military informants had assured him that bombing had been effected by unmarked Jewish planes flying high over city with intent to place blame on Egyptians. On my subsequently mentioned reported attack on Tel Aviv by Egyptian vessels, HM stated that this combat had been a running naval engagement wherein Egyptian warships pursued Jewish ditto which endeavored to find refuge Tel Aviv, with resultant cannonading of coast. King remarked that Tel Aviv was not the objective adding that if Egyptians wished to bomb Tel Aviv they could do so anytime from air. He asked from what source American Government credits information, to which I replied that insofar as I was aware the reports had not necessarily been verified. On my mentioning that journalists seemed to have better access to the front from Israeli than from Egyptian side, King remarked that he and his officers did not like journalists about so that their exclusion from the Egyptian lines represented conscious policy. HM added that he believed allied military commanders during last war had found journalists uncomfortable persons.

Nevertheless I stressed the probability of reprisals should Egyptian attacks on Zionist-held territory be made, emphasizing that in such case it would be difficult for US or any other government to persuade Israelis not to attack. Again the King indicated that Israelis were the attackers. In conclusion I reiterated the influence attributed by my government to King Farouk, who is regarded as a leader in

the Arab world, pointing out that as a sovereign and statesman he had exceptional authority and opportunity to bring peace to Middle East.

To this King replied that while indeed he exercised authority his powers were not as great as my government might imagine. He appeared definitely pleased, however, with this tribute to his position but did not refrain from iterating the observation made to Ambassador Griffis on January 2 to effect that US had brought trouble to Middle East and should use its best endeavors to solve the problems it had created. To this I responded by remarking that US Government was basically interested in restoring peace as its efforts near Israeli authorities and its instruction to me evidenced.

On conclusion of audience I handed King memorandum based on Deptel of which a copy will be forwarded by despatch.[6] In so doing I remarked that while the memorandum which was designed for his convenience did not contain allusions to his person my government, as I had already informed him, had in its instruction to me repeatedly emphasized the vitally important responsibility which HM in his position as sovereign of Egypt and leader in Arab world possessed to bring about a lasting peace.

PATTERSON

[6] The memorandum was dated January 5; a copy was transmitted to the Department by Cairo on January 7 in despatch 25 (501.BB Palestine/1–749).

501.BB Palestine/1–649

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 6, 1949.

Subject: Developments concerning Palestine

Discussion:

An officer of the British Embassy informed us this afternoon that the Embassy had been instructed by Mr. Bevin to tell the State Department that on December 30 King Ibn Saud [1] had stated to the British Minister in Jidda that in view of the General Assembly resolution of December 11 calling for negotiations between the parties to the Palestine dispute, the time had come for the US and the UK to put pressure on both sides to reach a quick final settlement, under the threat of the most severe economic sanctions. The King asked that no other Arab

[1] Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, King of Saudi Arabia.

leaders be informed of this statement on his part, as he had not informed any of them that he was going to take such action. In speaking thus to the British Minister the King said that he was motivated by the fear that the present conflict would facilitate the spread of Communism in the Near East.

Mr. Bevin's comment on this was that it pointed out the necessity of a firm US–UK agreement on boundaries in Palestine and the use of the influence of the US and UK to persuade both parties to reach a final agreement.

The British Embassy officer also stated that a RAF reconnaissance on January 4 showed a party of thirty Israeli troops still occupying a strong point within Egyptian territory six miles west of El Auja. Photographs taken on this reconnaissance revealed that an anti-tank ditch had been bulldozed across the road one mile west of the strong point and five miles inside Egypt. Three anti-tank guns were observed in position at the strong point.

Editorial Note

Acting Mediator Bunche, at Lake Success on January 6, made a report to the President of the Security Council, which advised that "the Government of Egypt and the Provisional Government of Israel have notified my representatives in Cairo and Tel Aviv, respectively, of their unconditional acceptance of a proposal providing for a cease-fire to be immediately followed by direct negotiations between representatives of the two Governments under United Nations chairmanship on the implementation of the Security Council resolutions of 4 and 16 November 1948." The proposal provided that the cease-fire would be effective on January 5, but the date was postponed until the following day, "owing to unavoidable delays in cable communication with Haifa and Tel Aviv." The effective date was finally fixed at 1200 hours GMT, January 7, "Owing to further communication delays." The Security Council, on January 6, released the text of Mr. Bunche's report as S/1187.

The Acting Mediator informed the Committee on the Palestinian Question of the Security Council on January 7 that he had "transmitted a formal proposal to the parties that since it was desirable for the negotiations to be held in the best possible atmosphere, they be conducted at Rhodes. He had also suggested they get under way Jan. 11 or 12." (telegram 11, January 7, 8:22 p. m., from New York, 501.AJ Treaties/1–749)

Editorial Note

Cairo advised, on January 6 that Ibrahim Abdel Hady, the Egyptian Prime Minister, had telephoned the text of an *aide-mémoire* to Ambassador Rahim at Washington. The *aide-mémoire* was said to have expressed "appreciation for the friendly sentiments of US designed to reestablish peace in Palestine"; to have "insisted that Egypt had observed the Security Council's resolutions in regards to Palestine while Zionist adversaries had not done so and had moreover bombarded refugee camps and hospitals. Accordingly Egypt had been obliged to exercise legitimate defense against attacks"; and to have expressed astonishment at the accusation of bombarding Jerusalem, for "ever since May 15 [1948]," Egypt had "endeavored to spare Jerusalem and other holy places from the consequences of military action." (telegram 15, 501.BB Palestine/1–649)

The *aide-mémoire*, an undated message from the Egyptian Embassy to the Department of State, was handed to Mr. Satterthwaite by Ambassador Rahim on January 7. (867N.01/1–749)

501.BB Palestine/1–649 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL US URGENT NIACT WASHINGTON, January 6, 1949—3 p. m.

3. Confirming Rusk–Ross telephone conversation today, following is attitude to be adopted by USRep in SC Committee on Palestine scheduled for Fri., Jan. 7.

Principal objective is to get SC and its Committee to deal with Palestine in such way as not to impair possibility of success of Conciliation Commission. Inactivity Lebanese, Syrians, Iraqi, Saudi Arabians and negotiations now in process between Israel and Transjordan would make it unfortunate for an exaggeration of present Israeli-Egyptian difficulty to throw entire Palestine situation into fresh turmoil. US is exercising maximum influence on both Israel and Egypt to cease present hostilities.

SC Committee should give careful study to the reports of the Acting Mediator and his Chief of Staff on the actual fighting in the Negev and to the statements of PGI and Egypt before making Committee recommendations to SC as whole. If Bunche–Riley reports and statements of parties do not sufficiently clarify the picture, the Committee should, through its Chairman, request additional info from those having access to the facts.

If the facts are fully developed and lead members of the Committee to propose that Committee recommend further action under Chap. VII, USRep would have to state that he must refer such recommendation to his Govt for instructions. If, nevertheless, such proposals come to an immediate vote, USRep should abstain.[1]

In view of strength of recent US approaches to Cairo and Tel Aviv and of early departure Conciliation Commission, believe majority other members SC Committee would accept our position if approached privately.[2]

LOVETT

[1] The Chairman of the Committee on the Palestinian Question reported to the Security Council on January 7 that "the Committee was of the opinion that no further action by it was required at the moment." The Council released the report of the Committee the same day as S/1191.

[2] This telegram was cleared in substance with Mr. Clifford.

501.BB Palestine/1–749

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Samuel K. C. Kopper[1]

TOP SECRET [NEW YORK,] January 7, 1949.

Subject: Boundary Settlement in Palestine

Participants: Mahmoud Fawzi Bey, Permanent Egyptian Representative to the UN
Mr. John C. Ross, Deputy to the U.S. Representative to the UN
Mr. S. K. C. Kopper, Special Ass't. to the Director, NEA, Department of State

Fawzi Bey asked Mr. Ross and myself to lunch today to discuss further the matter he had raised, in the first instance, with the Secretary last summer, and more recently, and in more detail, with Dr. Jessup and myself in Paris (Delgas 920 and 953, Nov. 24 and 26, 1948).[2]

This matter has to do with the Egyptian views on what should be the proper boundary settlement in Palestine and the desirability for an informal understanding at the earliest possible opportunity between the United States, United Kingdom and Egypt. The principal features of our conversation today dwelt upon the question of whether such conversations should be undertaken and if so where should they be held.

[1] Mr. Kopper was Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs; at this time, he was detailed as an Adviser to the U.S. Delegation at the United Nations.

[2] Delga 920 is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1625; No. 953 is not printed, but see footnote 2 to Delga 920, *ibid.*, p. 1627.

Fawzi Bey said that while he was in Cairo at the turn of the year he had taken this subject up with the Egyptian Government. He now had authority to enter in discrete informal conversations with the American and British Governments regarding the boundary lines which should be established in southern Palestine. He said that his position was one where the Government of Egypt would have to be able to denounce him if dire necessity required it to do so, i.e. if any informal understanding he worked out could not be put over in Egypt. Accordingly, he thought any informal private negotiations should be undertaken in New York. If they were undertaken in Cairo, London or Washington it would lend an official governmental air to the negotiations from which it would be almost impossible to deviate. Besides this some of the Egyptian officials were somewhat wary of undertaking conversations in London because of the political atmosphere surrounding United Kingdom-Egyptian relations at the moment.

Mr. Ross and I pointed out that the establishment of the Palestine Conciliation Commission by the General Assembly on December 11th was a most important factor which we would have to take into consideration before deciding on whether informal conversations should be carried on behind the scene. We said that even assuming such conversations might take place they would have to be handled very carefully and could not in any way impede the work of the Conciliation Commission. Fawzi Bey seemed to understand this. He said that the objective of such informal conversations would be to facilitate the work of the Conciliation Commission.

I explained that following Fawzi Bey's approach to Dr. Jessup in Paris which we of course had reported to the Department it had been agreed informally in Paris by Mr. Rusk, Mr. Ross, Mr. Wilkins and myself that Paris would not have been a suitable place or time to undertake the negotiations envisaged by Fawzi Bey. Mr. Rusk had indicated that it was a matter we would have to take up after the conclusion of the General Assembly. I explained to Fawzi Bey that the question had not been discussed since our return and, therefore, no decision had been taken. Mr. Ross suggested that we endeavor to obtain the views of the Department at an early date.

Mr. Ross then indicated that if the discussions were to be held his first reaction was that New York would be the most suitable location.

I inquired of Fawzi Bey what the position of Egypt was now regarding the boundary settlement. He replied that it was substantially the same as it had been when he spoke to Dr. Jessup. He reiterated that the Jewish bulge in the Negev should be rectified.

Fawzi Bey then repeated what he had indicated to the Secretary last summer and to us in Paris during the fall. There were many Egyptian leaders who were anxious to get the Palestine question

settled so that they could get along with the development of the Egyptian economical and social system. He felt, however, that a prerequisite to this was the settlement of the Palestine situation. He repeated what he had told Dr. Jessup in response to the latter's question regarding the possibility of Egypt and Transjordan working out their differences. Fawzi Bey said that it would be difficult to do this but it was by no means impossible.

Mr. Ross and I informed Fawzi Bey in a personal manner and with complete candor that we thought the more constructive role which Egypt had played in the last number of months was helpful toward gaining a solution to this problem. We promised to let him know the reaction of the American Government to his proposal at an early date.

This conversation took place at Lake Success.

867N.01/1–749 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET JIDDA, January 7, 1949—noon.

21. Legtel 20, January 7.[1] British Ambassador and I received together [by] King 9 a. m. Legation Arab secretary says reception two representatives together to discuss political problems unprecedented SAG–US relations.

King began by saying he was faced by extremely critical situation. He loved Arabs above all else and his greatest enmity was directed towards Jews. He had been severely criticized other Arab states not giving greater support Arab cause. He had failed to heed Syrian pleas additional help. He had only sent originally thousand troops Palestine and would have sent no more but when Jews crossed into Egypt with which country he was bound by closest ties and when Jewish planes flew over Saudi territory (Legtel 9 [2]) he had no alternative but to send additional thousand troops as he had done in past few days in order to defend his friends and take action to insure respect his own territory. He said otherwise he would have been without honor.

King spoke use being made Jews by Russians and disorders which were bound to ensue unless effective measures taken by his friends and by him. He recalled strong ties which united him with British and US. He observed British Government had recently reaffirmed its treaty obligations Egypt, Transjordan and Iraq. This left only Leba-

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[1] Not printed; it conveyed the opinion expressed by King Ibn Saud to British Ambassador Trott that there was only one way to deal with the Palestine situation, namely for the "British and US Government[s] to propose economic sanctions against both Arabs and Jews unless they are prepared to put an end to fighting [in] Palestine." (867N.00/1–749)

[2] Dated January 4, not printed.

non, Syria and Saudi Arabia as Arab states whose friendship had not been publicly acknowledged by either Britain or US. He had repeatedly approached US Government for some assurances re US attitude toward him but had not obtained anything. He could not be left in this fashion and he had therefore taken the step to call together with him both British and US representatives in order stress his appreciation of critical situation and to request them to bring his viewpoints before their governments.

King observed that although Great Britain had committed itself re three Arab countries it had remained silent re Saudi Arabia which had been of unreserved assistance during both world wars. So far as US was concerned Americans partners in Saudi Arabia and he could not understand our silence particularly when he had been so severly attacked by other Arab states by reason of his failure to give greater assistance in Palestine while every protection had been afforded American interests in Saudi Arabia.

HM made reference during audience to request Russian Ambassador Cairo last year (presumably 1947) for resumption Soviet-SAG diplomatic relations. He said he had declined on grounds Soviet had no interests this country.

King concluded "you know my thoughts and you are at liberty state what you may choose in your message to your government expressive my point of view. It is requested viewpoints of your two governments be made known to me. Either you must say you are my friends and will support me or you must say no and then I will know what other means I must take." [3]

Sent Department 21, repeated London 4.

CHILDS

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[3] Saudi Arabian Deputy Foreign Minister Yusuf Yassin called Minister Childs to the Foreign Office on January 9 to convey a message "to be accepted as statement from King." Mr. Childs summarized the message as follows:

"1. Palestine situation was very critical and Jewish planes were repeatedly trespassing over Saudi territory. . . .

"2. Arabs will never accept Jewish Government in Palestine or Middle East.

"3. Problem is not one between Arabs and Jews but has gone much farther than that and involves much larger question, namely, one between world and Communism.

"4. Is it possible, I was asked, for US and British Governments jointly to take position of force against the two parties immediately involved in Palestine; namely Arabs and Jews. Could they bring force to separate two parties, a separation to be enforced by power?" (telegram 23, January 9, 11 p. m., from Jidda, 867N.01/1–949)

The Department replied to telegram 23 on January 28. In part, it suggested that the "King could be helpful in telling other Arab states that time has come to negotiate settlement and recommending to them that they work sincerely to achieve this end, either through direct negotiation or through Commission. . . . US Govt has appreciated King's past advice and counsels of moderation to other Arab States. It earnestly hopes that King will find it possible to exhibit same moderation in counseling Arab States in manner outlined . . . above." (telegram 30, 867N.01/1–949)

867N.01/1–749 : Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET URGENT NIACT

TEL AVIV, January 7, 1949—8 p. m.

20. In absence Shertok and Ben Gurion but with Ben Gurion's authority, Shiloah informs (6 p. m.) me of grave events today as follows:

1. At 5 local time, fighting had not ceased in south. Israeli forces were ordered to cease but, according Shiloah, something seems to have slipped on Egyptian side.
2. At 10:30 a. m. today, according incomplete data received by PGI, four British Spitfires "carrying bombs" strafed Israeli troops in Rafah 078079 area. Israel planes engaged combat and downed two, one at Imara 104081. One British pilot badly wounded and probably now dead. Other British is being brought as prisoner to Tel Aviv.
3. At 4 p. m. twelve Spitfires returned area presumably searching for previous flight. Israeli planes rose and shot down one and Spitfires apparently retired.
4. PGI considers attack by British planes as "unprovoked aggression" and declares situation extremely grave.
5. Israel Air Force has received instructions to avoid engagements with British.

[Here follows section numbered 6 dealing with the Israeli-Iraqi front.]

McDONALD

867N.01/1–849

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] January 8, 1949.

Subject: Attack on RAF Planes by IAF Planes

Participants: Julius Holmes, Chargé d'Affaires, London
J. C. Satterthwaite, NEA

Mr. Holmes telephoned at 10:30 this morning to say that the news about the shooting down by the Israeli Air Force of five Royal Air Force planes was true and that Ambassador Franks had been instructed to see Mr. Lovett this morning to give him the facts. Mr. Holmes was sent for by Mr. Bevin who, however, was in a meeting by the time Mr. Holmes arrived at the Foreign Office and these facts were therefore given him by Michael Wright.[1]

[1] Michael R. Wright, Superintending Under Secretary of the Eastern Department in the British Foreign Office.

To summarize the information given Mr. Holmes, the RAF planes were attacked over Egyptian territory, the attack was unprovoked, and the RAF planes were under orders not to cross the Palestinian frontier and to avoid combat. A total of five planes were shot down, four out of the first reconnaissance flight and one out of the second.

Much of the information which the British now have is based on a report from the leader of the first reconnaissance flight, who bailed out over Egyptian territory. Another important point that Mr. Holmes made was that the British assured him that the reconnaissance planes did not carry bombs and did not engage in any offensive action.

Mr. Holmes said that the British are on the point of issuing a rather lengthy press communiqué giving full details of the loss of these planes. The final paragraph reads as follows: "In view of these unprovoked attacks, our aircraft have now been instructed to regard as hostile any Jewish aircraft encountered over Egyptian territory."

In reply to Mr. Holmes' query whether the British expected to continue the reconnaissance flights, he was told that the commander of the Royal Air Force has been given discretion in this respect.

Mr. Holmes said that he had been shown a map based on both tactical and photographic reconnaissance which clearly shows a line of Jewish strong points well inside Egyptian territory.

He said also that all this information has been telegraphed to Sir Terence Shone [2] with a request that he pass it on immediately to the Acting UN Conciliator. Furthermore, Mr. Marriott, the British Consul General in Haifa, has been instructed to go to Tel Aviv at once and give this information to the PGI.

Mr. Wright also told Mr. Holmes that Mr. Bevin views this situation in the most serious light, and considers the situation extremely grave. Mr. Holmes said the British are jittery and worked up about this development. He hoped that he would be successful in calming them down somewhat. Mr. Bevin asked Mr. Wright also to tell Mr. Holmes that the Chiefs of Staff and the Minister of Defense had been consulted concerning the orders that were issued and that they had been approved by Mr. Attlee.[3]

Mr. Holmes said that he was calling at once in order that we should have this information and know that it was being made public.

Note: The sense of the foregoing was telephoned to Mr. Clark Clifford at the White House at 11:05 a. m. I also told him that Mr. Lovett would appreciate it if he would pass this information on to the President as soon as possible, since the situation might become very serious.

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[2] Of the British Delegation at the United Nations.
[3] Clement R. Attlee, British Prime Minister.

501.BB Palestine/1–849 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald), at Tel Aviv

SECRET US URGENT NIACT WASHINGTON, January 8, 1949—8 p. m.

13. Re USUN telegram 13 Jan 8 [1] repeated to you today call immediately on FonMin and state that this Govt profoundly hopes that reported continuance of military operations by Israeli forces after cease fire deadline has no basis in fact. You should add that this Govt was most gratified yesterday to hear PGI representative assure SC Palestine Committee of Israel's pacific intent, its willingness to abide by cease fire and to negotiate across the board with Egypt under UN auspices. Conclude by saying that your Govt hopes immediate assurances can be given by PGI reaffirming this official statement.

Repeated London as 94, Cairo as 28, USUN 12.

LOVETT

[1] Not printed; it advised of information from Mr. Bunche concerning an Egyptian protest that the Israelis had moved into Egyptian territory after the cease-fire deadline and were still there. The telegram also transmitted the Acting Mediator's request that the United States make representations to Tel Aviv to persuade the Israelis to make immediate withdrawal (501.BB Palestine/1–849).

867N.2383/1–849 : Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY TEL AVIV, January 8, 1949—11 p. m.

21. Re Deptel 12, January 7.[1] Talks with Shiloah and principal military liaison reveals UN observers left Tel Aviv for Negev on 7 January and are now able examine all positions. It was pointed out by Shiloah that area west of El Auja (El Aujar) is open desert without frontier markings. He offered investigate alleged position Israeli and report to mission.

Re Deptel 11, January 7 [2] re Egyptian protest to UN, Shiloah asserts UN has not forwarded any such protest to PGI as of 4 p. m. today

[1] Not printed; it requested comment on information from the British Embassy that Royal Air Force reconnaissance on January 4 and 5 showed that Israeli troops, armed with three antitank guns, still occupied a strong point in Egyptian territory west of El Auja and that an antitank ditch had been bulldozed across a nearby road 5 miles inside Egypt (867N.2383/1–749).

[2] Not printed; it repeated the text of the *aide-mémoire* left by the Egyptian Ambassador at 4 p. m. that afternoon stating that shortly after the ceasefire at 2 p. m., January 7, Zionist forces had advanced once more into Egyptian terri-

Footnote continued on following page.

and there is no knowledge here of such actions by Israeli forces. With UN now in field both sides all fighting believed stopped except at Rafah where Israeli claim local Egyptian commander continues artillery fire.

Mission has no way of checking RAF report or the alleged Israeli violations cease-fire and service attachés strongly suggest such technical matters be left UN observers on spot and that mission not become involved.

McDONALD

Footnote continued from preceding page.

tory, had bombarded several civilian objectives at Deir el-Balah in the Egyptian zone in Palestine as well as refugee camps, and that the Egyptian Government could not hold itself responsible for the consequences of continued Zionist violation of the ceasefire (867N.2383/1–749). The Department, on January 7, sent the text of the Egyptian *aide-mémoire* to Mr. Ross at New York and directed him to bring the matter to Mr. Bunche for comment (telegram 8, 501.BB Palestine/1–749).

Egyptian Prime Minister Hady called in Chargé Patterson at 7 p. m. on January 7 and conveyed to him the information contained in the *aide-mémoire*. The Chargé "expressed the hope that the apparent renewal of hostilities after a cease-fire . . . might be due to the short time available for notifying local commanders. I would hasten to apprise my government to [*of*] Egyptian viewpoint since I was certain from urgent instructions . . . of deep and serious concern of US Government in the importance not only of a cease-fire but also of attainment of general settlement in Palestine at earliest possible moment. . . . I urged upon Hady Pasha the importance of not allowing localized attacks to degenerate into general hostilities inimical to the reestablishment of the cease-fire." (telegram 20, January 7, 9 p. m., from Cairo, 501.BB Palestine/1–749)

867N.01/1–949 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Secretary of State

SECRET AMMAN, January 9, 1949—4 p. m.

13. Mytel 5, January 4.[1] Glubb Pasha [2] gave following account this morning of meeting held January 5 between Abdullah El-Tel representing King and Dayan and Shiloah representing Israelis:

During course of meeting Abdullah El-Tel said that Transjordan would wish return of Ramle and Lydda as they predominantly Arab areas. Israelis replied in connection this argument they claimed areas in Negev which were predominantly Jewish prior hostilities. Tel is alleged to have commented that these areas small, at which point Israelis asked him to delimit territories he had in mind. However Tel replied that he must refer this question to his government. Other points also raised but no progress made.

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[1] Not printed.

[2] Maj. Gen. John Bagot Glubb, Commander of the Transjordanian Arab Legion.

Glubb believed next meeting scheduled for January 12 or 13 in Jerusalem.

In Glubb's opinion progress of meetings too slow due mainly to fact that Prime Minister and Transjordan Government are not supposed to be informed in matter. In final analysis government would have to decide question and sign any agreement and therefore present state of affairs prevents presentation concrete suggestions. Unless both parties are able to cease fencing and come down to point by point definitive discussion of what each one wants and what each is prepared to give other in compromise possible that existing cordiality will be jeopardized and only several more meetings can be held.[3]

Re Israel's and Egypt's agreement entered direct armistice talks under United Nations auspices, Glubb thought this might give impetus

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[3] In telegram 15, January 10, Amman advised further that the meeting between the Israelis and Abdullah el-Tel on January 5 were "inconclusive with topics still being discussed in preliminary manner. Israelis presented their credentials signed by Ben Gurion and Shertok. While they seemed dubious about telegram's credentials signed by King only, they nevertheless accepted them. Kirkbride said atmosphere meeting had been described as cordial with Israelis making special effort." (867N.01/1–1049)

Tel Aviv, on January 6, reported on the same matter as follows: "At Foreign Ministry request Shiloah reported meeting last night PGI and Transjordan representatives Jewish Jerusalem on armistice went well. Transjordan representative, in reply question from Shiloah, confirmed there had been no threat of 'peace or war' in previous talks and had added 'if there had been we would not now be talking.' Shiloah added significantly that Transjordan representative stated British now cognizant negotiations." (telegram 14, 501.BB Palestine/1–649)

London, on January 12, advised of information from the British Foreign Office on the meeting of January 5 (telegram 145, 501.BB Palestine/1–1249). This message read in part as follows:

"First point discussed was possibility division Jerusalem into Arab and Jewish areas with exchange isolated pockets of Arab and Jewish populations. Jews said Old City should be international zone in Arab area but insisted that Hebrew University and Hadassah hospital, although isolated, must remain Jewish and must be linked by corridors.

"2. Next topic was Negev in which Jews said they must have access to potash works southern end Dead Sea and access to Red Sea where they propose to build port. They added PGI quite agreeable to provide means to build port for joint use Israel and Transjordan.

"3. When Tel replied Transjordan must have access to Mediterranean it was recognized that all objections to this were difficult to reconcile and left at that.

"4. Transjordan representative again referred to Jaffa and Galilee (paragraph 5 Embassy's 20, January 4) which he said must be returned to Arabs but Jews evaded this issue and repeated that any frontiers set would have to be based on present military situation.

"5. Jews offered to return six Arab Legion prisoners and all Egyptian prisoners in return for Jewish prisoners held by Transjordan and 200 Jews held by Egyptians. . . .

"6. Transjordan representatives referred to plight refugees, said they should return to their homes. Jews did not refuse to agree but argued it would be simpler for PGI to pay refugees compensation and to assist settlements refugees Transjordan. . . ."

to King's bringing out into open Transjordan's present talks with Jews. Hoped Israel would not use these talks to play one Arab state off against another.

Sent Department 13, repeated Jerusalem 9.

STABLER

501.BB Palestine/1–949 : Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT URGENT

TEL AVIV, January 9, 1949—10 p. m.

24. ReDeptel unnumbered (Usun 13) 8 January 4 [*3*] p. m.,[1] and Deptel 13, January 8, 8 p. m. Called on Foreign Minister at 3 : 30 p. m. today accompanied by Knox and Archibald.[2] Shertok replied as follows:

1. PGI fully confirms statement made [to] Palestine Committee SC by Israel representative and furthermore adds the "determination" of PGI to: (1) maintain ceasefire; (2) proceed full negotiations with Egypt.

I then stated, with reference allegations Israel units still remain Egyptian soil, that on basis information received from Ben Gurion and from Foreign Minister himself, I had positively assured my government of total withdrawal as of January 2. Shertok replied:

That as of time he made statement to me Israeli units were actually all out of Egypt but that subsequently, and before ceasefire, it may be that some Israeli units re-entered temporarily as a phase of operations covering a movement near Rafah. Foreign Minister stated that abruptness of withdrawal orders created great military confusion in area (re this assertion service attachés point out that withdrawal under combat conditions always difficult and complicated move to complete within limited time). He added categorically that orders have been issued all Israeli units that found themselves on Egyptian side frontier at time ceasefire to return to Israel side forthwith, and he is confident this being done. (*Note:* At 6 p. m. today Air Attaché personally asked ICS Dori [3] to give him facts and reply was that all Israeli units were in fact out of Egypt on January 2 but that subsequently and before ceasefire hour arranged, Israeli units entered road to Egypt in order to cut it as a phase of attack on Rafah; Dori added that since the deadline hour of ceasefire all Israeli units have

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[1] Not printed, but see footnote 1 to telegram 13, January 8, p. 629.
[2] Col. Edwin P. Archibald, Air Attaché in Israel.
[3] Maj. Gen. Yaakov Dori, Israeli Chief of Staff.

been ordered out of Egypt and are in process of coming out on direct orders ICS. This information corroborates Shertok's explanation.)

Foreign Minister then referred to Egyptian allegations Israel violations ceasefire (reDeptel 11, January 7 [4]) and stated that PGI categorically denied them. In particular he stated there was no air attack on Arab refugee camp.[5]

New subject: Foreign Minister then stated his wish inform us that PGI considerably perturbed by presence British troops Akaba. He is not aware of any Israel threat to Transjordan territory. At secret meeting 5 January between Israel representatives and Abdullah Tel in Jewish Jerusalem, Israeli asked Tel if King had invoked Anglo-Transjordan treaty. Tel alleged to have at first denied that King had asked for British troops but later was evasive on grounds "military secrecy". PGI formally asking Transjordan for what reason Anglo-Transjordan treaty was invoked. PGI feels only rational deduction is that presence British troops Akaba designed constitute threat to Israel territory in Negev.

New subject: Foreign Minister than referred to "astonishing news" that British Consul General Haifa unofficially advising British nationals leave Israel. Foreign Minister stated that several British nationals had asked PGI Foreign Office representative in Haifa what to do and that representative was urging them stay in Israel.

McDonald

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[4] Not printed; but see footnote 2, p. 629.

[5] The four consecutive paragraphs concluding at this point were quoted in a night action telegram to Cairo on January 10. The Department informed Chargé Patterson that this excerpt indicated the intention of the Provisional Government of Israel to observe the cease-fire and to withdraw its forces from Egypt; it also authorized the Chargé to informally "communicate substance this telegram to Egyptian Prime Minister and emphasize hope that Egyptian Govt for its part will do nothing to disturb present tense situation. You should add that US is gratified at present intention of both Egypt and Israel to meet in Rhodes for discussions which we trust will result in establishment of permanent peace in Palestine. Re recent shooting down of RAF planes you should tell Prime Minister that we firmly believe this should be kept to confines of an Israeli-UK incident and should not be permitted to affect negotiations between Arab Govts and Israel looking toward settlement of Palestine conflict." (telegram 33, 501.BB Palestine/1–949)

867N.01/1–1049

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[Washington,] January 10, 1949.

Participants: Mr. Eliahu Epstein, Special Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel
NEA—Mr. Satterthwaite
NE—Mr. Wilkins
Mr. Rockwell

Mr. Epstein called at his own request. During the course of the conversation he covered the following points.

1. He stated that he had just received a cable from Mr. Shertok to the effect that any Israeli soldiers who might have reentered Egyptian territory had now been withdrawn from Egypt. The Provisional Government of Israel desired to enter the negotiations with Egyptians at Rhodes with a completely clean slate.[1]

2. Although the military situation had been the primary factor inducing the Egyptians to agree to armistice negotiations, the Provisional Government of Israel realized that the representations made in Tel Aviv and Cairo by the United States had been of immense help. The representations had been made at just the right psychological moment and the Provisional Government of Israel was very grateful to the United States.

3. At a time when things seemed to be moving along so well between Egypt and Israel, it was extremely unfortunate that the British should have become involved. It was pure folly to send reconnaissance planes over a delicate military area where a battle was raging and where it was extremely difficult to determine the boundary line between Egyptian territory and Palestine. Israel sincerely hoped that the incident of the five airplanes shot down could be confined to Israel and Great Britain but foresaw that this incident had very serious implications as regards a general peace settlement. Mr. Epstein declared that he personally did not share the point of view of some Israeli pessimists that the British, by sending a force to Akaba, were preparing to invade Palestine and obtain what they had not been able to achieve through the Bernadotte report.[2] However, the British action in connection with the airplane incident and in sending troops to Akaba certainly indicated that the British intended to carry on a war of nerves against Israel. Israel had no intention whatsoever of invading any of the Arab states and had only taken action against the Egyptians because the Provisional Government of Israel could no longer tolerate the menace of a large Egyptian force only thirty five miles from Tel Aviv. Not only did the British activities threaten a final peace settlement by encouraging the Arabs to intransigence, but they also would have an unfavorable effect on the Israeli elections in that they would induce people to believe that cooperation with the west was a wrong course to follow. Mr. Epstein pointed out that while, of course, the United States was not involved in this British attitude, there would be many people in Israel who would not distinguish between the United States and Great Britain when they went to the polls. Under the circumstances,

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[1] The Department instructed Cairo on January 11 to "informally state to FonOff that Israeli Rep here yesterday officially told Dept all Israeli troops had withdrawn from Egyptian territory. Very much hope therefore that Egyptian Govt will send top level officials to Rhodes conversations." (telegram 38, repeated to Tel Aviv as 17, 501.BB Palestine/1–1049)

[2] Dated September 16, 1948; see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1401. Count Bernadotte was the United Nations Mediator on Palestine.

Mr. Epstein very much hoped that just as the United States had made representations in Egypt and Israel, so it would undertake to point out to the British that the course of action they were following could only lead to further trouble. Later on in the conversation it developed that in making this suggestion Mr. Epstein was not acting under instructions from Tel Aviv but was expressing his own personal desire which he was confident would be supported by Tel Aviv.

4. Mr. Epstein took up the question of peace negotiations with the Arab states other than Egypt. He said that if the Israelis received a guarantee from the Lebanese that they were sincerely prepared to sit down to serious armistice and peace negotiations Israel would withdraw its forces from the Lebanon. However, the Lebanese should not believe that they could get the Jewish troops out of their country by agreeing to peace negotiations but then stalling once the Israelis had left. Mr. Epstein did not appear to think there would be much difficulty in coming to an agreement with the Lebanese once the other Arab states started on the road to negotiations with Israel. As regards the Iraqi, Mr. Epstein said that Nuri es-Said Pasha [3] was a moderate man but that he probably did not represent the attitude of the Iraqi Government. He had come to power through *Force Majeure* and his moderation would probably not have much influence as far as negotiations with Israel were concerned. Mr. Epstein did not think there would be difficulties with the Iraqi troops, who were further removed from Tel Aviv than the Egyptians. As regards Transjordan, Mr. Epstein believed that it would be entirely possible to enter peace negotiations with King Abdullah if the British would allow the latter to do so. He thought that the Transjordan Government, if left to its own devices, would not have requested the British to send troops to Akaba.

Mr. Epstein said that when he saw Mr. Lovett tomorrow [4] at 2:30 he would develop the same trend of thought unless he had before that time received new instructions from Tel Aviv.

Mr. Satterthwaite told Mr. Epstein that the United States sincerely hoped that the incident of the five airplanes could be confined to the Israelis and the British and would not be permitted to hamper the course of peace negotiations. He said that naturally he understood the exuberance of military commanders, particularly when victorious, but pointed out that the Provisional Government of Israel should be careful not to permit a situation to develop which would force the United States to choose between Great Britain and Israel. Mr. Epstein said that he thoroughly agreed with Mr. Satterthwaite.

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[3] Iraqi Prime Minister.

[4] The meeting seems to have taken place on January 12; see Mr. Lovett's memorandum of conversation, p. 645.

501.BB Palestine/1–1049

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] January 10, 1949.

Subject: Interview with Ambassador of Egypt at 5 p. m.

Participants: Ambassador of Egypt
NEA—Mr. Satterthwaite
NE—Mr. W. L. Jenkins

The Ambassador said he had been informed that Israeli forces still held three posts in Egypt and that although his Government had agreed to send representatives to Rhodes to negotiate with the Acting Mediator of the UN for an Armistice, such representatives would not leave Egypt until all Israeli forces had left Egyptian Territory. His Government would also insist that the negotiations, if undertaken, should be based primarily on the UN Resolutions of November 4 and 16; that Egypt would participate in them with an open mind and a sincere desire for a permanent armistice and future peace.[2] Kamel Bey expressed great appreciation of the splendid efforts recently made by the US to persuade the Israelis to withdraw their troops from Egypt and believed that without them Egypt would not have agreed to enter the prospective negotiations. He hoped that the US would continue to take the lead in effecting an armistice. He stressed the present dangers to the internal security of Egypt and felt that the hands of his Government had been strengthened in its efforts to maintain order by the strong representations recently made by the U.S. to both his and the Israeli Governments.

Mr. Satterthwaite said that he had been informed today that Israeli troops had left Egypt and stressed the fact that the efforts of his Government to effect a peaceful solution of the Palestinian problem would continue to be in close cooperation with the United Nations. He hoped that the Conciliation Committee would get under way this week.

[Here follow two paragraphs of discussion of possible changes in the Egyptian cabinet and of the arrival in Washington of two Transjordanian officials.]

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[1] Drafted by William L. Jenkins of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

[2] New York, on January 11, reported information from Egyptian Representative at the United Nations Fawzi that "Position of Egyptian Government regarding Rhodes discussions is that said discussions comprehend resolutions of November 4 and 16 and December 29. Fawzi emphasized very strongly that these negotiations were not direct and not political although, he added, they are much more important than any previous discussions considering their extent and timing." (Telegram 21, 501.BB Palestine/1–1149) For the resolution of December 29, 1948, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v. Part 2, p. 1699.

In leaving, the Ambassador again emphasized the great importance of the role recently taken by the U.S., and offered to continue to keep the Department promptly informed of reports or instructions received from his Government.

867N.01/1–1049 : Airgram

The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL DAMASCUS, January 10, 1949.

A–8. Following almost day-long Cabinet meeting PriMin Khalid al-'Azm sent for me at seven p. m. Sunday for hour's "general exploration of situation with particular reference to Palestine." Explaining that since upon US insistence Egypt had accepted Cease Fire and agreed to open armistice talks Palestine situation had taken on new aspect calling for reexamination Syria's position, and it was therefore important to know UN and particularly US attitude toward further probable Zionist aggression such as feared along Lebanese-Syrian frontier where Zionists following Negeb attack pattern were now refusing access to UN observers. Israeli plane that had recently overflown Syrian lines had dropped tracts charging Syrian officials with misleading their people and promising independence to Druze, Circassian and other minorities if they would revolt. Everything seemed to indicate that Zionists instead of being peacefully inclined still threaten integrity Arab states by dream of empire and intend take each on in turn. As his predecessor had indicated (Legtels 666 Oct 23, 678 Oct 29 and 679 Oct 30 [1]) Syria has since beginning truce anxiously waited for UN to take effective action to curb Zionist expansion but on contrary has seen repeated aggression go unchecked while Zionists flagrantly flaunt [*flout*] truce and UN authority.

PriMin said British Minister had confirmed to him that after loss several planes through unprovoked Israeli attack in air over Egypt, UK has taken firm stand against Zionists' attempt at aggrandizement and is moving troops by sea to Akaba. What did US proposed to do?

I took occasion to stress our opposition to aggression and our support of conciliation mentioning our recent representations to PGI and Egypt in favor of peaceful negotiations (Deptel 2 Jan 4 [*3*] [2]) sense of which had already been communicated to FonOff. He said that was good as far as it went and he hoped this latest *démarche* indicated change in our former marked pro-Zionist policy, but he wondered just how far US could be counted upon in the long run effectively to aid in

[1] None printed.
[2] This was a repeat of telegram 2 to Cairo, p. 602.

checking Zionists' pretensions. Heretofore US to disadvantage of Arabs had usually appeared to favor Zionists who cynically violated truce, whereas Arabs conscientiously endeavored to observe truce while working in UN for recognition of right of Palestine inhabitants to self-determination. Even when cautioning PGI about aggression in Negeb, US had coupled its representation with protest to Egypt on shelling of Tel Aviv which he said was only normal act of war in retaliation for Zionist attacks upon Egyptian territory.

Saying Palestine conflict colored all thinking, his Govt considered its solution necessarily matter first importance particularly as Soviets are using people's disgruntlement over Palestine to undermine confidence in his Govt which Soviets label Anglo-American tool. In his opinion forthcoming Israeli elections would demonstrate strength of Commie influence in Israel and he hoped this would convince US of danger inherent in uncritical support of PGI. Although strict measures taken to prevent Commie-inspired demonstrations, failure his Govt to take firm action against Zionists, particularly if further feared aggression occurs in Lebanese-Syrian frontier area, might well precipitate widespread disorders that would play into Soviet-Zionist hands and further threaten peace.

I interjected to say that our concern was to serve cause of peace and suggested that distinguished record of our representative on the Conciliation Commission, The Honorable Joseph B. Keenan, should be an assurance to all parties in the Palestine conflict that our influence would be for peace without fear or favor. He asked me to report to my Govt his concern over Palestine developments and to keep him informed of my Govt's attitude and probable course of action, particularly if Zionists continue their militant course.

Although PriMin did not mention Syrian and other Arab military weakness and disunion and their consequent inability forcibly to bring Israeli to terms, he referred to Abdullah's aspirations and popular clamor for renewal hostilities to curb Zionist threat and indicated his hope that US would join with UK in taking firm position against further Zionist expansion and thus presumably create better atmosphere for Palestine solution that would save Arab face, implying that popular temper unlikely support peace negotiations with militant Zionists.

It is significant, I feel, that at no time during discussion did PriMin make usual Syrian assertion that they could never recognize Israel or even acknowledge its existence as would be implied by negotiations. When I suggested that any settlement seemed to me preferable to continued situation, he neither acquiesced nor objected, but I gained

the impression that he personally would favor negotiations if given sufficient prior assurance, similar to UK's recent stiffened attitude, that Israeli will be kept within reasonable bounds by western influence and force if necessary. He repeatedly said regretfully that Syrians had learned that they could not count upon UN alone whose authority the Zionists do not respect.

Dept may consider time now ripe to give informally assurances suggested in Legtel 618 Sept 24, 11 p m,[3] which I respectfully repeat at this time, as inducement to Syrians to use facilities of Conciliation Commission to extricate themselves from present impasse and thus serve cause of peace.

In conclusion PriMin said his Govt believing Syria's destiny lies in Anglo-American orbit hopes for closer collaboration with US not only in cultural and economic fields but in political and strategic which latter he considers very important in present state of world order.

KEELEY

[3] *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1421.

867N.01/1–1049 : Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY TEL AVIV, January 10, 1949—9 p. m.

27. Attention President and Acting Secretary. All political officers and service attachés of Mission are of opinion that British actions are destroying chances of peace. Official explanation RAF reconnaissance flights over battle area at moment Egypt accepted US-inspired UN order cease-fire and armistice negotiations and subsequent British troops landing Aqaba while Transjordan negotiations were proceeding satisfactorily are unconvincing. To us such provocative moves appear to be determined efforts forestall direct negotiations Israel–Egypt and Israel–Transjordan which might deprive Britain effective control Southern Negev. British policy is bitterly resented by PGI and people who regard it as direct continuation of persistent UK efforts sabotage establishment of independent and viable Israel.

We are convinced:

1. Current British press propaganda that PGI efforts in Negev are Communist-inspired in order prove vulnerability of Canal defenses is weird misconception of whole issue.

2. PGI, with support whole people, will resist no matter what cost all British attempts to deprive Israel opportunity negotiate directly

under UN auspices with Egypt and Transjordan regarding Negev and peace.

3. Egypt's and Transjordan's fruitful participation will depend finally upon radical change Great Britain's intransigent policy towards Israel and Negev.

4. US actions since December 30 and call for armistice negotiations have enhanced US prestige here and, if firmly pursued London and interested capitals in ME, hold promise of peace.

McDONALD

501.BB Palestine/1–1149

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 11, 1949.

UNA CONTRIBUTION TO POLICY PROBLEM STATEMENT: PALESTINE

United States interest in the Palestine problem as it has developed in the United Nations is a corollary not only of this Nation's role of leadership in the United Nations but also of the United States profound strategic interest in the Near East.

In the United Nations the United States has sought by three principal means to contribute to a solution of the Palestine problem and to the restoration of peace in the Middle East. Thus, in the General Assembly it has taken a leading part in endeavoring to reach a lasting political settlement. In the Security Council the United States has been active in supporting measures designed to maintain a truce in Palestine, to be superseded by an eventual armistice. Also, in the General Assembly the United States has sought to bring prompt relief to the more than half a million Arab refugees who constitute a grave social and political problem in the Near East.

The objectives of the United States regarding Palestine in the United Nations are to secure a prompt and lasting cessation of hostilities; the negotiation by means of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, of which this Government is a Member, of a permanent political settlement; and the relief and eventual rehabilitation of the Arab refugees, for which purpose the President will ask the Congress for an appropriation of $16 million.

[Here follows final paragraph setting forth the criteria which would guide the United States member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission; for the actual instruction, see page 681.]

501.BB Palestine/1–1149 : Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED BEIRUT, January 11, 1949—noon.

19. Foreign Minister informed me negotiations are now being conducted through UN mediator for evacuation of south Lebanon by Israeli troops. He believes they will be successful although on previous occasion when Lebanese and Israeli military met for consultations, Israeli officers said they were authorized to negotiate only on basis permanent armistice and Lebanese had no such authority. These negotiations therefore failed. Foreign Minister says Lebanon cannot consider negotiations for armistice so long as Israeli troops remain on Lebanese soil. After evacuation and completion Egyptian negotiations Lebanon expects to undertake similar negotiations. He expressed opinion that other Arab countries would do likewise. Lebanon is prepared to go to almost any length short of signing document formally recognizing existence of state of Israel.

PINKERTON

790E.00/1–1149 : Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET BEIRUT, January 11, 1949—3 p. m.

21. Foreign Minister informed me yesterday that Lebanon is now prepared to put Palestine episode to one side and consider its foreign policy on basis of friendship with Western Powers in possible future global war. He said Arab east would likely be one of several battle fronts and to prepare for such eventuality Lebanon would like to consider role which it would be expected to play. He added that public opinion here was not yet prepared to accept its responsibilities in this regard but it was rapidly approaching that point. He pointed out that Arab countries, except Syria and Lebanon, have arrangements either in force or temporarily in abeyance defining their positions. This policy of isolationism had been deliberately chosen by Syria and Lebanon but Lebanon had to definitely change its policy, and while Syria has not gone so far it also is changing. Use of port of Beirut and airfield at Rayak was mentioned as example of assistance Lebanon might be prepared to give. He indicated that Lebanon desired some sort of agreement regarding its role and did not exclude even defensive alliance although it was obvious he was not enthusiastic about treaty with Great Britain alone because of special privileges which would be involved. He said they would prefer multilateral treaty or some joint

agreement short of treaty basis. At no time did he indicate possibility of renewal of relations with France and dismissed it casually from conversation.

From previous conversation I am convinced Foreign Minister brought this subject up with me under direction from President and Prime Minister and that it had been discussed with President of Syria.[1]

PINKERTON

[1] The Department, on February 11, replied with an expression of warm appreciation for the "friendly attitude Leb Govt and its desire align itself with US and Western Powers in event possible future global war." The remainder of the reply was broadly along the lines of telegram 57, February 25, to Damascus, p. 770; except for the additional suggestion that the Lebanese Government give consideration to early resumption of discussions concerning a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation as a "long step forward in promoting development of US-Leb relations" (790E.00/1–1149).

501.BB Palestine/1–1149 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 11, 1949—5 p. m.

17. 1. In tel dated Jan 7[1] Griffis[2] expresses strong hope Dept will incorporate into pending legislation re US contribution Palestine relief safeguard clause giving Director UNRPR or Dept full discretionary powers re expenditure US contribution. He states it is essential that US contribution be safeguarded and if necessary withheld if relief operation emasculated due lack govt cooperation in NE.

2. Dept is studying possibility incorporating into legislation safeguard clause giving SecState discretionary powers over payment US contribution.

3. However, we have informed Griffis[3] we believe SYG, acting through Director UNRPR, has unquestioned authority control all expenditures under terms UN resolution, and that we look to SYG and Griffis to assume full discretionary powers this regard in order insure fulfillment objectives of resolution. In our opinion this applies not only to US funds but to all other contributions as well. Conversely, we believe SYG could not legitimately accord separate and special treatment to US contribution as distinguished from contributions of other govts to UN program.

[1] Telegram 12 from Beirut, not printed.
[2] Stanton Griffis, Director of United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees, while on leave from his regular position as United States Ambassador to Egypt.
[3] In telegram 22 to Beirut, January 11, not printed.

4. Without making reference to paras 1 and 2, pls take early opportunity convey to SYG informally our interpretation his powers, with view to obtaining his assurances this regard as further safeguard US contribution. You many inform him such questions may arise when Congress takes up this legislation next week.

LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/1–1149 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald), at Tel Aviv

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, January 11, 1949—6 p. m.

NIACT

20. We are disturbed at press reports that Israel is allegedly preparing official protest before SC against UK over recent developments resulting from RAF episode.

For your info following is first para niact tel sent Cairo yesterday, rptd London and all Arab capitals. This sets forth this Govt's earnest hope that RAF-Israeli clash will be confined to framework of an incident and not allowed further to embitter passions in Near East.

You are authorized impart this info to FonMin and instructed to add friendly advice that this Govt would deplore any action by either UK or Israel tending to exacerbate situation because of RAF incident.

Herewith first para Deptel 33 to Cairo.[1]

Rptd London as 131, USUN as 18.

LOVETT

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[1] Dated January 10, not printed. The bulk of the first paragraph is quoted in footnote 5, p. 633.

Mr. Eban sent a letter dated January 11 to the President of the Security Council in which he set forth his instructions "to convey to the SC the grave concern of the Government of Israel at the menacing attitude adopted by the UK towards the State of Israel. The military, naval, aerial and political measures which the UK has taken in recent days appear likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and to widen the limits of a local conflict which might otherwise respond to the processes of unprejudiced negotiations." (Telegram 23 from New York) The Security Council released the text of Mr. Eban's letter the same day as S/1201.

Mr. Ross discussed the letter with Mr. Eban on January 11, pointing out that "No action should be taken by anyone which would impair chances of successful outcome of forthcoming negotiations at Rhodes." As a result of the discussion, Mr. Eban indicated "that for the time being he would not press for an early meeting" of the Security Council. (Telegram 22 from New York) Telegrams 22 and 23 are both dated January 11 and are filed under 501.BB Palestine/1–1149.

867N.01/1–1149 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Secretary of State

SECRET AMMAN, January 11, 1949—6 p. m.

16. King indicated this morning that while Egypt–Israel talks going on at Rhodes, he does not propose make public fact that discussions now proceeding between Israeli and Transjordan representatives. Believed it preferable for Abdullah el Tel and Dayan to continue their talks in secrecy in order to determine area of agreement. King said his main points are:

(1) Jews should not occupy territory between Transjordan and Egypt;
(2) Gaza should belong to Transjordan;
(3) Right of Arab refugees to go back to homes;
(4) Return of Ramle and Lydda to Arabs;
(5) Access for Arabs to Jaffa.

Re Jerusalem if internationalization not possible, King would be willing accept formula of autonomy under Transjordan administration of Arab areas, which he indicated should include Katamon and upper Bakaa, and autonomy under Israeli administration of Jewish areas. He would be prepared make concessions to Jews in southern potash works and guarantee protection. King reiterated his desire for peace and again expressed hope that Jews understood sincerity his intentions arrive at settlement. He reaffirmed full resolve negotiate peace but said it must be done slowly and carefully in order final result will "relieve me forever of Palestine headache".

King remarked, with certain pride as if idea were original, that name of combined Transjordan and Arab Palestine would remain, "Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan" (mytel 15 January 10 [1]). He made no comment about decree but it is understood it is now before Acting Prime Minister and Cabinet. No final decision taken and certain amendments are still being made.

Repeated Jerusalem as 11.

STABLER

[1] Not printed; it reported that King Abdullah had prepared a draft decree to grant Transjordanian nationality to Palestinian Arabs living in or moving to areas controlled by the Arab Legion and desiring it. The draft decree also provided for abolition of frontier controls between Transjordan and areas under its administration. (867N.01/1–1049)

867N.00/1–1249

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 12, 1949.

Subject: Palestine Developments

Participants: Acting Secretary—Mr. Lovett
Mr. Eliahu Epstein, Special Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel
Mr. Aubrey Eban, Israeli Representative before the United Nations
NE—Mr. Rockwell

After presenting Mr. Eban, Mr. Epstein opened the conversation by expressing the thanks of the Provisional Government of Israel for the efforts recently made by the United States Government to promote armistice negotiations between Israel and Egypt and to bring calm to the tense situation in Palestine.

Mr. Epstein then stated that the diplomatic and press campaign being carried on by the British against Israel and British military activities such as the sending of troops to Aqaba and the alerting of the British Mediterranean naval forces were direct and prejudicial British intervention in the Palestine dispute which he feared would have an unfavorable effect on the Israeli elections. Furthermore, Mr. Epstein had just been informed that day by Mr. Shertok that the Provisional Government of Israel had reliable intelligence to the effect that the British were urging the Egyptians to stall during the Rhodes negotiations unless they could obtain terms which would further British objectives in the Negev. Mr. Epstein said that the Provisional Government of Israel hoped that the United States would continue to exert its good influence and would urge the British to cease their attacks on Israel and their intervention in the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Mr. Eban said that he had been instructed by Tel Aviv to present a complaint against the British to the Security Council and to request a Security Council meeting on British "intervention" in Palestine. He had done the first but as yet had not done the second. He desired my advice as to whether it would not be advisable to attempt to obtain from the Security Council a resolution calling upon all governments and authorities concerned to take no action likely to extend the scope of the conflict. He said that the Israeli public was alarmed lest the British be about to send military forces into Palestine and that the Provisional Government of Israel thought that some kind of Security Council action might be helpful in averting this possibility.

[1] Drafted by Mr. Rockwell.

At this point, I interrupted and read to Messrs. Epstein and Eban the news ticker account of my press conference that morning quoting my description of the efforts the United States Government had been making to prevent the extension of the scope of the conflict in Palestine and to encourage the parties to enter armistice negotiations, and of discussions between the United States and United Kingdom Governments on the general subject.

I then reviewed the course of United States action on this matter since the Israeli incursion across the Egyptian frontier. I said that in my opinion it had been unfortunate of the British to send aircraft over a battle zone. I said that it was equally unfortunate that the Israelis should have fired upon these planes. However, regardless of who was right and who was wrong in the question of the airplanes, the whole trouble had started when the Israelis crossed the Egyptian frontier. I said that after having been reassured by Mr. Shertok that all Israeli troops had been withdrawn from Egypt and after having informed the British in this sense, the United States Government had been embarrassed by the fact that Israeli forces had subsequently returned to Egypt.

I said that I would look into the question of the alleged British interference with the Egyptian participation in the armistice negotiations at Rhodes but that I simply did not believe that the reports which the Provisional Government of Israel had received on this matter were true. I also said that the Department had received no indication whatsoever that the British were planning aggressive action against Israel and that while of course the United States Government could give the Provisional Government of Israel no assurances in this regard, I thought that it was highly unlikely that the British had any such plans. Although the United States Government had advised the British against sending a force to Aqaba, I thought that they were doing so merely as a safeguard against possible Israeli action similar to that taken against Egypt. I pointed out that Great Britain had treaties with Transjordan and Egypt and said that the Provisional Government of Israel should remember that the British were extremely angry over what had recently happened. I said that I believed the British would take no action if the Israeli forces stayed where they were but that if the Israelis crossed any of the Arab frontiers, Israel would have to realize that it might be getting into a war which would be very different from that which they had been waging against the Arabs.

Mr. Epstein said that the Provisional Government of Israel of course realized this. He added that it would be extremely unfortunate if the Rhodes negotiations should break down, since we were rapidly approaching the point of diminishing returns in peace talks and the

Provisional Government could not much longer tolerate the menace of Arab armies so near to Tel Aviv. I said that as I believed Clemenceau one said, there are things which are too important to entrust to the generals. At this particular moment, those who had struggled all their lives for the establishment of a Jewish state were called upon to exercise the highest degree of restraint and statesmanship. In this connection, and in response to Mr. Eban's question, I believed that it would be unwise for Israel to aggravate the situation by requesting Security Council action. I said that Israel had made its point by tabling a complaint against Great Britain and that this seemed sufficient, particularly in view of the fact that it seemed hardly likely that the British were preparing to take military action against the Jewish state. I stated that it seemed to me that some good progress might be made in the Rhodes conversations if the situation in Palestine remained static, and I reiterated my conviction that the Israelis must not engage in any more aggressive action.

As Messrs. Epstein and Eban were leaving Mr. Epstein told me that the Export-Import Bank had passed favorably on a project loan to Israel and that the matter was now before the National Advisory Council. He asked me to put in a good word with the Council. I said that I hoped to be able to do so within the next day or two.

890i.01/1–1249

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 12, 1949.

Subject: Transjordan

Participants: Mr. Lovett—Acting Secretary
Samir Rifai Pasha—Former Prime Minister of Transjordan and Special Emissary of King Abdullah
Haidar Bey Shukri [1]
Mr. Satterthwaite—NEA
Mr. Wilkins—NE

Samir Pasha and Haidar Bey called on me today at their request following their recent arrival to the United States as special emissaries of King Abdullah of Transjordan.

Samir Pasha conveyed to me the greetings of King Abdullah and expressed the hope that the friendly relations which existed between Transjordan and the United States would grow stronger and stronger in the future.

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[1] Brother-in-law of the former Transjordanian Prime Minister.

I thanked Samir Pasha for the King's greetings and told him that we appreciated the hospitality and confidence which the King and his Government had extended to the American representative in Amman. I also said that we admired the dignity and restraint with which the King and his Government had conducted themselves during the troublest [*sic*] times resulting from developments in Palestine.

Samir Pasha remarked that the King and his Government had long hoped the presently existing friendly relations between Transjordan and the United States might be formalized by recognition and expressed the view that Transjordan's conduct would seem to justify American recognition.

Samir Pasha said he understood the United States might be in a position to extend recognition simultaneously or after the *de jure* recognition of Israel and argued that it would be of benefit not only to the United States but also to Transjordan if such recognition could precede action relating to Israel.

Samir Pasha pointed out that when Great Britain had stood alone in 1940 following the defeat of France, King Abdullah and his Government had stood by the British. Mr. Satterthwaite recalled that at this time King Abdullah's Arab Legion had assisted in the relief of Baghdad in 1941 following the Rashid Ali Rebellion.[2]

I replied no one could deny that the attitude of King Abdullah and his Government during the war and, more particularly, during the past year in Palestine would justify the recognition of Transjordan by the United States. I said it was logical and long overdue. Recent developments had, however, affected this situation. I pointed out on a confidential and personal basis that I had recently appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and had there been questioned on Great Britain's activities in the Near East. I said that I had been queried regarding the movement of British troops at Akaba and in Transjordan, on the incident of the RAF planes over the Palestine-Egyptian frontier and on British troop movements in the Mediterranean. I said it was unfortunate, that these activities—whatever their purpose—had cast a cloud over such favorable developments as the Transjordan-Israeli talks regarding Jerusalem and the scheduled Egyptian-Israeli talks at Rhodes. I added I hoped these peaceful developments would prevail.

Samir Pasha seemed to appreciate the problem which confronted this Government at this particular time and did not further press the question of immediate recognition.

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[2] For documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. III, pp. 486 ff.

Samir Pasha said he planned personally to deliver a letter from King Abdullah to the President when he called on him on Friday, January 14 and asked if it would be possible for him personally to carry the President's reply to King Abdullah when he returned to Amman in about a week or ten days. Mr. Satterthwaite said he would endeavor to make arrangements to this effect and that if the President's reply was not ready prior to Samir Pasha's departure from Washington he would see that it reached him in New York before he left the United States.[3]

[3] One of the subjects discussed at the conversation (but not recorded in this memorandum) was King Abdullah's aspiration for a Greater Syria; but see instruction 3, March 29, to Amman, p. 882. Previous documentation on the interest of Transjordan in a Greater Syria is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, pp. 738 ff.

IO Files[1]

Message Released by the United Nations Security Council on January 13, 1949

S/1205

CABLEGRAM DATED 12 JANUARY 1949 FROM THE ACTING MEDIATOR TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TRANSMITTING A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONCERNING THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL

For transmission to President of Security Council:

I have the honour to inform you, pursuant to my Report of 6 January [2] on the agreement of Egypt and Israel, to order a cease fire in the Negev and to undertake negotiations on the 4 and 16 November resolutions, that the first stage in the negotiations between representatives of the two Governments on the implementation of these resolutions was reached today, 12 January, with the arrival in Rhodes of both the Egyptian and Israeli delegations. The Egyptian delegation, headed by Colonel Mohamed Ibrahim Seif el Dine, arrived at Rhodes early in the afternoon and the Israeli delegation, headed by Dr. W. Eytan [3] arrived later in the afternoon. Both delegations are empowered to negotiate, conclude and initial an armistice agreement, subject to its final ratification by their respective Governments.

I have today met each delegation separately and discussed with them questions of procedure and agenda for subsequent joint discussions. I

[1] Master files of the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs.

[2] See editorial note, p. 621.

[3] Walter Eytan, Director General of the Israeli Foreign Office.

shall hold further meetings with each delegation tomorrow morning, 13 January, and the first joint meeting under United Nations chairmanship is fixed for 3:30 p. m. on the same day. These preliminary meetings have been encouraging in that both delegations have evinced a sincere desire for a successful outcome of the discussions and a readiness to reach with as little delay as possible discussion of substantive matters.

811.4611/1–1349

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President

WASHINGTON, January 13, 1949.

Subject: Your appointment with Samir Rifai Pasha.

Samir Rifai Pasha, personal envoy of King Abdullah of Transjordan and former Prime Minister of that country, has an appointment with you at 11:45 on Friday, January 14. He is bearing a personal message to you from King Abdullah.[1]

Samir Rifai Pasha has informed us that the message conveys the King's greetings to you and his wishes for the prosperity of the US, offers to you the King's congratulations on the outcome of the elections and expresses the hope that the present cordial relations existing between our two countries can be formalized in the near future.

Samir Rifai Pasha has indicated that he would like to receive from your hands a message in reply which he could carry to King Abdullah. A proposed reply to the King,[2] based on the information which Samir Rifai Pasha has given us, is attached for your consideration.

[Annex]

Draft Communication by President Truman to King Abdullah ibn Hussein, King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

YOUR MAJESTY: On behalf of the Government and people of the United States, I wish to express to Your Majesty my deep appreciation for your kind message of friendship which has been conveyed to me through your distinguished representative, His Excellency Samir Rifai Pasha. I am personally most grateful for your generous sentiments concerning the outcome of the American elections. May I also take this opportunity to express my appreciation to Your Majesty

[1] Dated December 18, 1948, not printed.
[2] Below.

for the warm hospitality which has been extended to Americans in your country, and to reciprocate the friendly sentiments which inspired Your Majesty's message.

I am confident that the relations of cordiality and friendship which prevail between the Transjordanian people and those of the United States will continue to be strengthened and extended to the mutual benefit of both our countries. The question of formalizing the present relations between our Governments is under active consideration, and it is hoped that this question can be resolved to the full satisfaction of both our Governments.

My Government and the American people share my fervent hope for the early return of conditions under which Your Majesty's land and people may develop and prosper in peace, well being, and happiness.

I take pleasure in extending to Your Majesty my personal wishes for your continued good health and prosperity.

501.BB Palestine/1–1349

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Robert M. McClintock

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 13, 1949.

Participants: Mr. Bromley, First Secretary of British Embassy
Mr. McClintock, UNA

Mr. Bromley, First Secretary of the British Embassy, telephoned me at 12:15 p. m. today to say that I might be interested in the substance of a telegram just received from the British Embassy in Cairo. The British Ambassador on January 11 had seen the Secretary General of the Egyptian Foreign Office, who said that the Israeli Foreign Minister, Mr. Shertok, on the 10th had said that he planned to go to Rhodes for the present peace conversations. The Egyptian Secretary General expressed the fear that this was a trap to entice the Egyptian Government into over-all talks for a final settlement, whereas the Egyptian Government felt that military issues should first be worked out between the two governments.

The British Ambassador reported that he told the Egyptian Secretary General that it was of the highest importance for Egypt to maintain its decision to enter into direct conversations with the Jews. Even though the latter might wish more far-reaching discussions, the Egyptian Representatives at Rhodes could always refer these points back to their Government and need not enter into commitments.

I thanked Mr. Bromley for this information and said that I was sure Mr. Lovett would be glad to see this confirmation of his statement yesterday to the Israeli Representative that there could be no basis of fact for the rumor that the British were actually dissuading the Egyptians from going to Rhodes.

Mr. Bromley made several private and personal comments. He said he hoped we understood that Mr. Bevin was under a severe domestic pressure on the Palestine issue. In particular, he was under attack from Churchill and Eden.[1]

Mr. Bromley added the personal comment in response to my expression of hope that the British Ambassador's conversations yesterday with Mr. Lovett and today with the President[2] would serve to ease Mr. Bevin's mind, that the Embassy in Washington was under a severe disadvantage vis-à-vis the Foreign Office. The British Embassy here had always been regarded in London as being "too weak" toward Zionist influences in the United States. In fact, Lord Inverchapel, when Ambassador, had been completely disregarded in his reports of the Zionist attitude. I gained the impression that Mr. Bromley was hopeful that his Chief would speak with greater authority, but that he was not entirely assured on this point.

Mr. Bromley said he wished me to know that he personally felt that the views expressed by Mr. Lovett yesterday were completely right, particularly with regard to how our real strategic advantage could be maintained in the Near East. He had in fact addressed a Minute along the same lines to his Ambassador not long ago.

Mr. Bromley said, in response to my question, that his Ambassador's interview this morning with the President had been more general in character than the conversations last evening with the Acting Secretary. The President, said Mr. Bromley, had responded in terms almost identical with those used by Mr. Lovett, although not in such detail.

Mr. Bromley told me that orders had been issued to the RAF in Egypt to discontinue further reconnaissance. He said the recommendation for this order had come from British authorities in Egypt. I commented that this seemed useful since reconnaissance of the type recently attempted appeared to have reached the point of diminishing returns.

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[1] Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden, British Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, respectively, from 1940 to 1945.

[2] The editors have been unable to find in the records of the Department of State any memoranda detailing the conversations of Ambassador Franks with Mr. Lovett and with President Truman. The conversation with Mr. Lovett is summarized in telegram 149, January 13, to London, p. 658. Mr. McDonald's version of the conversation with President Truman is presented in his book, *My Mission in Israel, 1948–1951* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1951), p. 126.

867N.01/1–1349

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] January 13, 1949.

Subject: Anglo-Israeli Difficulties

Participants: Mr. Eliahu Epstein, Special Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel
Mr. Joseph C. Satterthwaite, NEA

Mr. Epstein phoned to say that Mr. Lovett had requested him to repeat to me the message which he had just given him following the receipt of instructions to do so from Tel Aviv. He had, of course, at once telegraphed his Government the purport of Mr. Lovett's suggestion to him yesterday that it would be unwise for the PGI to press the Security Council to act on its letter to the SC complaining against British actions in the Palestine area. Mr. Epstein had apparently recommended that the PGI would be wise to follow this suggestion.

The telegram which he has received from Tel Aviv is to the effect that the PGI agrees with Mr. Lovett's proposal and will not press for the introduction of a resolution in the SC [1] unless some new British act of provocation should compel them to reconsider their present position. He added that his Government had full confidence in the course the State Department had been pursuing recently.

Mr. Epstein expressed his personal thanks for the contribution which he considered the State Department had been making during the past few days to a solution of this difficult problem.

[1] The Department of State, on January 14, advised Tel Aviv of its gratification at being informed by Mr. Epstein that the Provisional Government of Israel had decided not to press the matter before the Security Council (telegram 31, 501.BB Palestine/1–1449).

501.BB Palestine/1–1349

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk) to the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] January 13, 1949.

Subject: United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine

Discussion

On December 11, 1948, at its Third Session the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution establishing a Conciliation Commission to assist the Arabs and Jews in reaching an agreement re Palestine. It is composed of three states Members of the United Nations: France, Turkey and the United States.

The Conciliation Commission in addition will undertake upon request of the Security Council any of the functions now assigned to the U.N. Mediator on Palestine or to the U.N. Truce Commission by resolutions of the Security Council. Upon such request the office of the Mediator shall be terminated. It is also instructed to present to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area. It is further instructed to facilitate the rehabilitation of refugees, maintaining close relations with the Director of the U.N. Relief for Palestine Refugees.

The Conciliation Commission will have its headquarters in Jerusalem. It has been agreed that its preliminary meeting will be held in Geneva, Switzerland, about January 17, and that it will then proceed to Rhodes and Jerusalem. The President on December 29, 1948, appointed Mr. Joseph B. Keenan as the United States Representative. However, plans for his departure have been delayed. It is proposed that Fraser Wilkins (NEA) and John W. Halderman (UNP) be designated as Principal Adviser and Adviser respectively and that they depart immediately for Geneva. A supplemental memorandum will be submitted, setting forth the arrangements for security provisions for the delegation.

[Here follow a discussion of personnel requirements, a recommendation that the designations [1] of Messrs. Wilkins and Halderman be approved, concurrences, etc.]

[1] Mr. Lovett gave his approval to the designations in a marginal notation on a subsequent but undated memorandum to him by Mr. Rusk.

IO Files

Message Released by the United Nations Security Council on January 13, 1949

CABLEGRAM DATED 13 JANUARY 1949 FROM THE ACTING MEDIATOR ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TRANSMITTING A REPORT ON NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT AND THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL [1]

TO PRESIDENT OF SECURITY COUNCIL: Following my report of 12 January on the beginning of negotiations between representatives of the Government of Egypt and of the Provisional Government of Israel to seek agreement on the terms of an armistice I have the honour to present a further report on these negotiations.

[1] Released by the Security Council on January 13 as S/1209.

I held informal meetings each delegations separately on morning of 13th at which agreement was reached on all points of procedure and on an agenda [2] for the discussions.

This afternoon, 13 January, the first joint meeting was held. At this meeting the delegations were introduced. On the formal request of both delegations I assumed the role of Chairman of the meetings. The heads of the two delegations each made a formal declaration of his Government's desire for the establishment of an armistice and pledging his delegation to work persistently and in a spirit of conciliation toward that end.

The agenda for future discussions is sufficiently broad to cover outstanding points with regard to the implementation of the resolutions of 4th and 16th November.

Meetings will now proceed on the substantive items on three levels as follows:

1. Preliminary discussions separately with each delegation;
2. Informal meetings between heads of delegations and United Nations;
3. Joint formal meetings of the two delegations.

The conciliatory spirit of both parties and the progress made in matters of procedure continue to inspire hope for successful results.

[2] The editors have been unable to locate a copy of this document in the files of the Department of State or in those of the United States Mission at the United Nations.

Editorial Note

Acting Mediator Bunche welcomed the Israeli and Egyptian armistice negotiators in his opening statement at Rhodes on January 13. He noted that "by the terms of the proposal agreed upon, negotiations are to be confined, subject always to the will of the 2 parties, to the means of implementing the SC resolutions of 4 and 16 November 1948. We are not holding a peace conference here. We are not expecting to settle the complicated political issues which bedevil this problem and to which the Conciliation Commission will soon direct its attention."

Mr. Bunche recognzed that "there is a great and hopeful significance in your very presence here and your willingness to sit down together and attempt to find a basis of agreement for armistice in the conflict between the armed forces of the governments which you represent.

"Nor am I unware that this meeting marks the first time in this unfortunate conflict that representatives of the two sides have shown the statesmanship which enables them to sit down together in a com-

mon effort to look beyond a tenuous truce and to negotiate the armistice called for by the SC."

Near the conclusion of his statement, Mr. Bunche appealed "most urgently that every precaution be taken by all governments to avoid any incidents or acts which might jeopardize the constructive progress of your delegations toward armistice accord. I have in mind not only governments directly involved in these negotiations or in the Palestine conflict, but those whose interests impel them to keep close surveillance on developments in the area." (telegram 41, January 14, 3:30 p. m., from New York, 501 BB Palestine/1–1449)

The United Nations released the text of Mr. Bunche's statement on January 14 as press release PAL/413.

867N.01/1–1349 : Airgram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kohler) to the Secretary of State

SECRET Moscow, January 13, 1949.

A–35. In talks prior to his recent departure for home leave, Syrian Minister Farid Bey Zeineddine indicated that he had received further intimation from the Soviet authorities of a possible shift in Soviet policy toward Palestine and the Arab states, along lines reported in Embtel 2186, Sept. 29.[1] While he did not so indicate, it is possible that, on these latter occasions, he did receive something more specific, though we doubt that it went so far at this stage as "an offer to reverse Soviet Palestine policy in return for a demonstration on the part of Syria and other Arab countries that they are not 'instruments of Anglo-American policy' ", as alleged by the Acting Director-General of the Syrian Foreign Office (Damascus A–387, Dec. 13).[2]

The central element in Soviet policy toward Palestine is the question of the status therein of non-Soviet power and influence. In this region, as in all other "dependent, semi-dependent, or colonial areas", the constant first objective of the Kremlin is the removal of the authority or influence of any rival or hostile powers, which in practice means, principally, the authority or influence of the United States or the United Kingdom. Any means which serves this end is acceptable until the objective has been achieved. During this period Moscow supports and uses such disparate and ideologically inappropriate forces as the Zionists in Palestine, the feudal rulers of Egypt, or the "Trotskyites" in Indonesia, as well as real Communists, as in Indochina. Once the first objective is gained, the next objective becomes the fostering of

[1] *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1432.
[2] Not printed.

Communist control. At this stage, uncontrolled and ideologically inappropriate agencies are likely to find themselves neglected, undermined, sabotaged, infiltrated or even abruptly disowned and attacked, depending on the Kremlin's estimate of the shortest direction toward this next objective.

Moscow apparently considers the first objectives satisfactorily attained in Palestine, insofar as the territory presently or potentially under control of the Jews is concerned, and will be likely henceforth to concentrate on securing the establishment of a weak independent Arab state in the remainder of Palestine, free from non-Soviet outside influences. This suggests that the Soviet government will now:

(1) Decrease its support of the Israel government and revert to basic anti-Zionist policy it temporarily suspended but never abandoned (Embtel 1016, May 31).[3] Signs of this reversion are already apparent in Ehrenburg's [4] attack, in Pravda Sept. 21, on the bourgeois nature of the government of Israel and subsequent less friendly tone Soviet propaganda, as well as in recent suppression of Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee and Jewish press in Moscow, the only Jewish agencies possibly available to Israeli legation as point of contact with Soviet Jewish population.

(2) Extend increasing support to Communists of Israel, encouraging and aiding them to penetrate Government, at same time infiltrating Communist agents into Eastern European emigration, which Israel desires and Kremlin controls. The Embassy recently learned from usually reliable sources that some half-dozen Soviet citizens have been authorized to leave the Soviet Union for Palestine; since normal emigration from the USSR is forbidden, these persons could only be Soviet agents.

(3) Seek to limit territory of State of Israel to that foreseen by GA resolution of November 29, 1947 and generally to curb power of Israel Government. This is indicated by attitude of Soviet UN Delegation at Paris and by practical cessation of direct military aid to Israel Government via Czechoslovakia. It seems clear independent strength and ambition shown by young Israel Government was as unexpected by Soviet Government as by others and that its further rapid extension is not regarded as desirable.

(4) Oppose by every means extension of Abdullah's control or influence, i.e., in Soviet eyes, British control and influence, to Arab Palestine.

At appropriate time and occasion, foregoing measures will certainly be portrayed to Arab Governments as a change in Soviet policy favorable to them, and exploited by every means in order to lay basis for achievement in Arab countries of first objective already gained in Jewish Palestine. However, we do not believe there will be any sudden

[3] *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, page 1081.
[4] Ilya Grigoryevich Ehrenburg, a prominent Soviet author and journalist.

public shift in Kremlin's Palestine policy. We should rather expect that the new line will be implemented somewhat later and gradually, with direct approaches to the Arab Governments timed to take advantage of developments connected with UN effort to effect a Palestine settlement.

Department please pass copies to London, Paris, Prague, Cairo, Beirut, Jidda, Baghdad, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem.

KOHLER

501.BB Palestine/1–1349 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET US URGENT NIACT WASHINGTON, January 13, 1949—5 p. m.

149. Brit Amb called yesterday under personal instructions of Bevin and asked Acting Secy to read two telegrams, first of which bore obvious imprint of Foreign Secys drafting.

Gist this tel was that Bevin desired clearcut statement US views on Palestine territorial settlement in light mutual and highly important strategic interests UK and US in Middle East. He referred to UK–US understanding as to strategic objectives and joint action in this area [1] "subject to Israel". Lovett confirmed to Sir Oliver Franks that Middle East understanding so far as this Govt is concerned is still very much in effect.

Bevin's tel was couched in a series of questions. His next point was to ascertain precisely what US attitude was with respect to strategic land line of communications bet Egypt and other Arab States, specifically road from Gaza, Beersheba and Jericho, to Transjordan. Bevin referred to Douglas' luncheon in Dec. with himself and Brit Chiefs of Staff.[2]

Lovett replied that importance this particular strategic road had been mentioned very late in the day. Attitude of US Govt had been clear since autumn 1947 and had been frequently reiterated by President and other officials; namely that Israel was entitled to boundaries (including all of Negev) assigned it by GA resolution Nov 29, 1947. However if Israel insisted on retaining Arab areas of Palestine such as Jaffa and western Galilee it should be expected to relinquish other territory, such as part of Negev, in compensation. Our most recent

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[1] The understanding was attained at the "Pentagon Talks of 1947"; for documentation on these talks, see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, pp. 485 ff.

[2] The luncheon took place on December 20; see airgram 2377, December 22, 1948, from London, *ibid.*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1680.

exposition of this policy had been Jessup's speech before Committee 1 of GA Nov. 20, 1948.

Brit Amb in endeavoring explain his Govt's overall concept from which its concern for specific strategic lines derived said he thought UK did not feel that for immediate future it could regard attitude of Israel with any confidence. It was therefore vitally necessary that southern boundaries of Israel should be north of Gaza, Beersheba, Jericho Road. To this Lovett said he thought real strategic security lay in encouraging development in Israel of a westward outlook. Confining Israel in a straitjacket and surrounding this new nation with a circle of a weak Arab enemies kept in ring only by Brit armed assistance, would inevitably result in creation of a hostile state which would turn almost automatically toward USSR. Experience had proved that it was far more difficult to deal with a state after it had turned Communist or pro-Soviet than to keep it friendly to the west before the capture took place. Real security therefore lay not in any particular road in Negev but in attitude of Israel, which would be conditioned by attitude of Great Powers.

Bevin's next query was whether US backed SC resolutions and specifically those Nov. 4 and 16 and that of Dec. 29. We pointed out to Brit. Amb that apparently Foreign Secy was visualizing technical truce lines such as those provided for in Nov. 4 resolution as terms of a final political settlement. While SC resolutions certainly were valid in their limited application to momentary military situation and to problem of transferring truce into an armistice they did not seek to delineate final political settlement. This in fact had been left under GA res of Dec. 11 to Palestine Conciliation Comm. Our views on this final settlement were clear, since we had favored giving all Negev to Jewish State under res. Nov. 29, 1947 but now under formula expressed above contemplated that Israel might have to relinquish part of Negev if it desired to retain western Galilee and Jaffa. It therefore seemed difficult to comprehend why Foreign Secy displayed such excitement since Israel under this definition might get less territory in Negev than in Nov. 1947 when Brit. Govt. remained silent.

Next point in Bevin message was in effect "What is US prepared to do about Palestine situation?". Message added that two govts ought to get together and "do something". Acting Secy replied we had been doing a great deal and that perhaps UK had been doing too much in a non-constructive sense. For example, its sending of troops to Aqaba, the RAF incident, and threatening naval movements in Mediterranean certainly did not encourage Israelis at least to think UK was moving for peace. US for its part, as Brit. Govt. well knew, had worked with energy and no small degree of success in getting PGI to cease its campaign against Egypt and in influencing Egypt to offer

cease-fire and negotiations to Israel under UN auspices. At this juncture when Israelis and Egyptians were on point of sitting down to peace talks on Rhodes, and when we had word of favorable conversations bet Israel and Lebanon and bet Israel and Transjordan looking toward permanent settlement, it would be in highest degree unfortunate if any action should prevent these developments from coming to fruition. Lovett added parenthetically that Israeli Rep had called that same afternoon and stated his Govt believed Brit. agents were seeking to dissuade Egyptian Govt from participating in Rhodes peace talks. Acting Secy told Israeli Rep. he thought there was no basis for this report. However, if Israel should bring its charges against UK before SC it could present eloquent case which would do neither US nor UK any good. Lovett told Brit. Amb he had used utmost endeavor with Israeli Rep. to persuade his Govt. not to bring its differences with Brit before SC.

Bevin's tel was emotional in tone. It concluded with a challenge for US to choose bet supporting SC resolutions or Sov Union. Both Sir Oliver and Lovett disregarded this dramatic peroration.

Second Brit. note resumed threat to regain UK liberty of action (despite SC res. of May 29) to send arms and war material to Arab states. Lovett told Brit. Amb this would have instantaneous results of further exciting popular feeling in Israel, of placing Britain in position of violating SC res (despite Bevin's protestation that these resolutions must be complied with) and also immediately raise question of causing this Govt to lift its scrupulous arms embargo. This would in turn result in sorry spectacle of Britain arming one side in Palestine conflict and US the other, with Russians sole permanent beneficiaries.

Basic difference in point of view UK and US Govts is that Brit are demanding rigid compliance with SC resolutions Nov. 4 and 16 because they wish to use these resolutions as means of enforcing a political settlement. Brit. Amb admitted as much when he said that lines of truce or armistice would undoubtedly foreshadow final territorial dispositions. We already know from McNeil's [3] blunt comment to Rep. of PGI in Paris last autumn that UK is frankly seeking to use SC action to oust Israelis from Negev. This Govt however has repeatedly been on record as stating that neither SC nor GA has constitutional power under UN Charter to enforce a political settlement. Efforts of SC are restricted to maintaining international peace and security. We feel that proper means for achievement of final political settlement in Palestine is by negotiations bet the parties either directly or through UN auspices. These negotiations are now in progress and Conciliation Comm is on point of undertaking its responsibilities

[3] Hector McNeil, British Minister of State.

under GA res. Dec. 11. We feel it would be useful in your conversations with high FonOff officials to make clear this basic difference in approach and to emphasize our view that Brit will be starting along path whose end is far from being in sight if they seek to use SC resolutions designed solely to meet specific threats to international security as a means of accomplishing political advantage. In fact Bevin's heated admonition to this Govt to back up SC resolutions sounds queer in light his simultaneous willingness to violate SC res. May 29 by proceeding forthwith to arm Arab allies.[4]

Rptd USUN, eyes only, for Jessup.

LOVETT

[4] A marginal notation indicates that this telegram was cleared with the White House.

867N.01/1–1349 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT JERUSALEM, January 13, 1949—6 p. m.

35. On instructions from PGI Colonel Dayan yesterday called on French Consul General in latter's capacity as representative of "country most interested in future of Jerusalem" to urge strongly immediate settlement in Jerusalem by negotiations between Israel and Transjordan. Prefaced remarks by stating current talks with Abdullah Tel making no progress and offered no chance success. Asserted UK preventing King Abdullah from reaching agreement and credentials given Abdullah Tel to negotiate worthless. Dayan requested French Government exert pressure on UK induce latter encourage or allow Transjordan reach immediate settlement re Jerusalem. Requested French Consul General communicate his statements to me with request US also attempt influence UK. Maintained PGI considers agreement in immediate future more important than possibility obtaining better terms in future.

Dayan proposed settlement Jerusalem question apart from question Palestine as whole. Stated because drain on PGI resources and continued deterioration economy Jewish Jerusalem, PGI could not afford indefinite continuation present mobilization particularly in Jerusalem. Asserted PGI not willing wait for arrival Conciliation Commission and inevitably long delays involved until it became familiar with problem and eventually made recommendations to next GA. PGI anxious to settle question by peaceful means, but capable if this not possible of solving problem by force.

Dayan next offered negotiate on basis following extraordinary concessions made, he stated, in interest quick agreement:

(1) Partition city into homogeneous Jewish and Arab sections. To achieve this, Jews willing relinquish former Arab quarters of Qatamon, German colony, upper and lower Bakka and Maliha which they now hold with boundary line to run west of Maliha. In addition would give up strong military positions of Mount Zion and Der Abu Tor together with Jewish fortified settlements of Ramat Rahel and Talpiyot and Jewish quarter of Mequor Haiyim. Division city on above lines would give Arabs far more than Consul General thought possible.

(2) In return and because of insistence of orthodox Jews, Mount of Ophel, Jewish cemetery on Mount of Olives and Jewish quarter Old City would be excluded from Arab sovereignty and placed under some type international control. Stated PGI might not insist on exclusive [*exclusion*] Jewish quarter Old City from Arab sovereignty.

(3) Hadassah hospital and Hebrew University on Mount Scopus would remain Jewish and be connected with Jewish Jerusalem by new road bypassing Arab residential quarters.

(4) Recognized above would place railroad station and electric power plant in Arab area but their uses would be supervised by international agency. Jewish use railroad would be discussed later in connection with final Palestine settlement and possible Jewish corridor.

French Consul General cabled above to Paris to London for Schuman [1] in hopes latter could discuss with Bevin on current visit.

Consul General comments:

(1) Settlement Jerusalem question would go far towards restoring peace and stability in Middle East which Consul General understands is primary objective US.

(2) Regardless whether UK discouraging Egypt and Transjordan from reaching agreement with PGI for strategic reasons related to Negev, UK would have no valid reasons for opposing settlement confined to city Jerusalem.

(3) Settlement above basis might involve renunciation principle international city as called for by GA resolution but both French Consul General and I believe clause could be included in agreement between PGI and Transjordan to effect agreement would not prejudice any action by UN to internationalize entire area. Even if not acceptable consider establishment peace by agreement more important than internationalization Jerusalem.

(4) Although PGI action may be motivated by hidden tactical reasons and wish to use troops elsewhere, both French Consul General and I believe reflects genuine PGI desire establish permanent peace Jerusalem (Contel 1550, December 23 [2]) avoiding further military action this area.

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[1] Robert Schuman, French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[2] *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1687.

(5) Despite Jewish desire for peace, believe PGI will solve question by force if prospects immediate peaceful settlement fade.

(6) Proposed division city extremely favorable to Arabs and would meet their current demands as to demarcation line.

(7) Proposals made by Dayan would fit very well into suggestions for future Jerusalem contained in Contel 1530, December 13.[3]

Consul General therefore urges most strongly US seize present opportunity and press for settlement Jerusalem problem immediately. Conditions change very rapidly in Palestine and present opportunity should not be allowed escape by delay. Department may wish discuss question with UK with object obtaining full UK approval for settlement Jerusalem immediately and apart from Palestine problem as whole. Kirkbride in Amman could communicate UK views to King Abdullah and upon PGI receiving assurances through US of UK attitude Dayan and Abdullah El Tel could meet and work out details. Contribution to general stabilization in Middle East and contagious effect throughout Palestine of immediate Jerusalem settlement far outweigh probable advantages delaying in hope sustaining international city in future.[4]

Sent Department 35, repeated London, pouched Amman.

BURDETT

[3] *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1665.

[4] The Department, on January 14, informed Jerusalem that the subject matter of telegram 35 was discussed by officers at the working level with representatives of the British Embassy and it was agreed that the "matter presented possibilities which merited further urgent and very careful consideration." (telegram 24, 867N.01/1–1349)

On January 14, Jerusalem reported the thinking of the French Consul General that the "opportunity obtain real international city past and United Nations will prove unwilling furnish troops and other essentials for effective United Nations control. France's primary objective should, therefore, shift to obtaining peace on terms acceptable to both sides. Consulate General agrees entirely with this reasoning. Extent Jewish concessions should be emphasized. PGI offering give up positions essential to defense Jewish Jerusalem thus indicating clearly is move for permanent peace. Areas involved such that considerable political opposition must be anticipated within Israel." (telegram 36, 867N.01/1–1449)

501.MA Palestine/1–1449

The Acting Secretary of State to the President

WASHINGTON, January 14, 1949.

THE PRESIDENT: There is enclosed for your consideration and for transmission to the Congress, if you approve, a joint resolution[1] to authorize an appropriation for a special contribution by the United States to the United Nations for the relief of Palestine refugees.

[1] For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 6, 1949, p. 204.

The purpose of this legislation is to give effect to a resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations of November 19, 1948,[2] a copy of which is enclosed. The action of the General Assembly was based primarily upon the report of the Acting United Nations Mediator for Palestine of October 18, 1948,[3] which described the situation of the 500,000 Palestinian refugees as extremely critical and urged immediate assistance for them to avert a great human catastrophe. The General Assembly, taking this situation into account, declared in its resolution, "that the alleviation of conditions of starvation and distress among the Palestine refugees is one of the minimum conditions for the success of the effort of the United Nations to bring peace to that land". The resolution further states that a sum of approximately $29,500,000 will be required to provide relief for 500,000 refugees for a period of nine months from December 1, 1948, to August 31, 1949, and that an additional amount of approximately $2,500,000 will be required for administrative and local operational expenses. To finance these requirements, the resolution "urges all States Members of the United Nations to make as soon as possible voluntary contributions in kind or in funds sufficient to insure that the amount of supplies and funds required" is obtained.

To provide immediate assistance pending the receipt of contributions, the General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to advance $5,000,000 from the United Nations Working Capital Fund, this advance to be repaid from the voluntary contributions of governments.

The proposed legislation provides for a special contribution of $16,000,000 to the United Nations for the refugee relief program. This amount is deemed to be a fair share for the United States to contribute in order to support the efforts of the United Nations in restoring peace in Palestine and in view of the deep interest of the United States in restoring conditions of stability in that area. To date, fifteen countries have indicated that they will make contributions pursuant to the General Assembly resolution. Among these, the United Kingdom has announced a contribution of one million pounds sterling (approximately $4,000,000) and France, a contribution of 500,000,000 French francs (approximately $1,600,000).

The program will be administered by Mr. Stanton Griffis who is taking leave from his post as United States Ambassador to Egypt

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[2] For information on this resolution, see circular telegram of November 19, 1948, *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1614.

[3] The text of this report is printed in United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Supplement No. 11A*. The report is cited in an American draft resolution sent to the Department from Paris on October 20, 1948, in Delga 411, *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1497.

to serve as Director of United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees. With a view to utilizing personnel and organizations experienced in disaster relief, arrangements are being made with the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies, and the American Friends Service Committee to handle the distribution of supplies in the field as agents of the United Nations.

The provision for an advance of $8,000,000 from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation is designed to make a part of the United States contribution immediately available. Without this extraordinary provision, the normal delays in the appropriation process would make it impossible to meet the heaviest requirements of the relief program during the winter months.

Section 3 of the draft legislation is for the purpose of enabling the United Nations to procure material, supplies or services for the purposes of the resolution through the facilities of the United States Government agencies and to simplify the procedures for such procurement.

In view of the urgency of extending relief to these unfortunate peoples, and of the importance of the United States contribution to the United Nations program, I sincerely hope that the proposed legislation may be presented to the Congress for its consideration at the earliest opportunity.[4]

ROBERT A. LOVETT

[4] President Truman transmitted Mr. Lovett's letter to the Congress for its "favorable consideration" on January 29; the text of the President's message is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, February 6, 1949, p. 202.

867N.01/1–1449 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Secretary of State

SECRET AMMAN, January 14, 1949—4 p. m.

19. While it is understood that another of regular Abdullah el Tel–Dayan meetings is now scheduled for Saturday, January 15,[1] doubtful whether Tel yet authorized discuss in definitive manner any of eleven points on agenda presented Jews at second meeting in series.

Repeated Jerusalem 14.

STABLER

[1] Mr. Stabler, on January 17, advised he had learned "that due to absence in Rhodes of Shiloah no meeting between Tel and Dayan was held on January 15. As it appears likely that Transjordan will participate in Rhodes talks if present Egypt–Israel negotiations successful, probable that current series Tel–Dayan meetings will no longer be held." (telegram 24 from Amman, 867N.01/1–1749)

867N.01/1–1249 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 14, 1949—7 p. m.

134. Benard of French Emb informed Dept Jan 12 that Syrian FonOff had expressed to Fr Minister Damascus its fears impending attempt by Abdullah carry out Greater Syria scheme.[1] Benard said matter discussed with Maurice Fischer PGI spokesman Paris who stated PGI opposed formation Greater Syria and would be willing withdraw Israeli forces from Syrian front if Syrian forces menaced by Abdullah. Benard stated Fr Govt strongly opposed formation Greater Syria, was disturbed over Syrian fears this regard, and expressed hope US did not favor Abdullah's project. (Embtel 146 Jan 12)[2]

Dept assured Benard US did not favor Greater Syria plan of Abdullah involving other Arab States but was not opposed to incorporation greater part Arab Palestine in Transjordan.

Dept has no info indicating any substance for Syrian concern impending move by Abdullah and it seems hardly likely latter would make move at this time which would cause further dissension among Arab States when they already hard pressed by Israelis. Dept would appreciate any info from field clarifying current situation.[3]

LOVETT

[1] For earlier documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, pp. 738 ff.

[2] Not printed.

[3] This telegram was repeated to Arab capitals, London, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv. Mr. Stabler, in reply on January 16, advised that "There are no indications at present that King has, or is even thinking of, any plans to take positive action at this stage toward realization greater Syria. His principal preoccupation now is settlement with Israelis and incorporation as much Arab Palestine as can be obtained in Transjordan. Little doubt exists however that he regards successful achievement these as first and important step in creation greater Syria." (telegram 21, 867N.01/1–1649)

501.BB Palestine/1–1449 : Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED CAIRO, January 14, 1949—7 p. m.

59. ReEmbtels Rhodes conversations. Press morning 14th re Rhodes conversations describes them as having strictly military character and that in Egyptian view SC decisions November 4 and 16 must be made effective before studying decision December 29.

Text stresses conversations began 13th with Ralph Bunche, interim UN Mediator, and mentions influence of US in bringing about Rhodes talks as supplement to prior representations by Mediator's Cairo representative Azcarate, with Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.

Further stressed that Rhodes conversations would not possess a political character and that the sole civilian member delegation Mohamed Saleh Foreign Office official who, however, has been detached to serve in office of Mediator.

Press item further states that conversations do not envisage recognition of "pseudo state of Israel" and that there will be neither direct talks with Zionists [n]or round-table conversations. These will be conducted in same manner as those held by late Count Bernadotte,[1] likewise at Rhodes.

PATTERSON

[1] The United Nations Mediator on Palestine was assassinated in September 1948.

867N.01/1–1549 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT URGENT

AMMAN, January 15, 1949—8 a. m.

20. Israeli peace offer re Jerusalem as contained in Jerusalem's 35, January 13 and 36, January 14 [1] appears to coincide in general terms with King's views as outlined in mytel 16, January 11 and feel he would be willing discuss Jerusalem question with Jews in near future apart from more general problem of Transjordan–Israel peace, particularly since Jews seem ready grant number concessions.

Believe King would insist on complete sovereignty and control of Jewish quarter Old City and also of Katamon, upper and lower Bakaa, Mt. Zion, Deir Abu Tor, Maliha, Talpioth, Ramatrahel and Mekorhaim. He would probably also desire exchange of populations between Arab and Jewish pockets. However it is thought that he would be open to reasonable suggestions and negotiations on any or all of these points provided he could be sure of good faith of Israelis.

King's present dilemma is due in large measure to lack of active and functioning government. Prime Minister is still ill and Acting Prime Minister appears unwilling take any responsibility on matters which he prefers should be handled by Prime Minister. Therefore King is impatiently awaiting return of Samir Rifai Pasha from US to appoint him as Prime Minister.

[1] Latter not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 663.

While preliminary discussions re Jerusalem could be held before formation new government, no definitive talks could take place now nor could Abdullah El Tel be issued with credentials more valid than ones he now holds. Unsatisfactory progress of Tel–Dayan talks resulting from absurd situation re government has been pointed out to King by certain advisers but he apparently feels himself unable remedy matters at moment.

As have regular weekly dinner engagement with King at Shuneh Sunday evening would Department consider it useful for plan in Jerusalem's 35 and 36 to be outlined to King, as personal thoughts and without revealing source, in order obtain his reactions. While French Consulate General may have obtained some reaction through Abdullah El Tel and Musa Husseini (reports of whose interview will probably shortly reach British Foreign Office), it might be desirable to explore matter directly with King.[2]

Sent Department 20, repeated London 1, Jerusalem 15.

STABLER

[2] The Department, in reply on January 15, authorized Mr. Stabler to outline to the King the plan set forth in telegrams 35 and 36 from Jerusalem to obtain his reactions. It also cautioned him to "make absolutely clear you not acting in any way as mediator or extending good offices. You will of course recall that US remains on record as favoring internationalization of Jerusalem." (telegram 9 to Amman, 867N.01/1–1449)

Mr. Stabler replied, on January 17, that he had seen King Abdullah and the Transjordanian Defense Minister the previous evening and had advised them of the substance of telegram 9. The King stated that "if it did not seem possible to obtain internationalization of all Jerusalem, then autonomy of Arab and Jewish areas would be best solution to problem." He also advanced the view that a "separate settlement Jerusalem 'not a bad idea'" and that "he wanted to reach settlement with Jews which would be firm and durable and which would be based on mutual interests. Toward that end he always prepared adopt reasonable attitude on specific points under discussion. He hoped Jews would do same." (telegram 22 from Amman, 867N.01/1–1749)

501.BB Palestine/1–1549 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland

SECRET US URGENT NIACT WASHINGTON, January 15, 1949—12 noon.

65. For Vincent.[1] Deptel 54, Jan. 13,[2] Keenan will not be able, for personal reasons, undertake duties as US Rep Pal Con Comm. His successor, however, has not yet been appointed. In this situation please be guided by following instructions:

1. You shld say to Fr and Turk Members Comm and to UN Secr that pending arrival US Commissioner Dept has requested you ex

[1] John Carter Vincent, Minister in Switzerland.
[2] Not printed.

officio to represent this Govt and accordingly we hope Commission's first meetings can be informal in character.

2. If foregoing acceptable to Fr and Turk members you may participate fully with them in discussing precedures to be adopted by Comm. Such wld include:

a. Selection of Comm Chairmen. We wld suggest that Chairmanship rotate on monthly basis between three commissioners, following English alphabet. In this case France would be chairman first month, followed by Turkey, then US.

b. Itinerary of Comm. We wld have no objection if Fr propose that Comm proceed first Jerusalem to make *acte de presence*, later possibly going Rhodes if this is suggested by Mediator or if Comm shld feel such move necessary. We do not favor Comm meeting in Turkey since certain parties to Palestine dispute might not regard this as neutral ground.

3. If, contrary our expectation, Fr and Turk members insist on more formal treatment you must explain you will have to abstain from vote and that US to its regret will not be able participate in Commission's formal deliberations pending arrival its Representative.

4. Since US Rep on Con Comm will be White House appointee we do not contemplate that you should undertake substantive discussions on Palestine problem.[3]

Repeat Geneva 37 Unpal 1.

Repeated USUN 26, Paris 136, Ankara 25.

LOVETT

[3] This message was cleared by the White House. The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine held its first meeting at Geneva on January 17 with Mr. Vincent acting ex officio. The Commission "rendered homage memory Bernadotte; decided presidency would be exercised in rotation with Turkey as first president; decided establish headquarters Jerusalem beginning January 24; decided issue communiqués on committee work as occasion demanded; discussed with Azcarate practical questions including details establishment Jerusalem." (telegram Palun 2, January 18, noon, from Bern, 501.BB Palestine/1–1849) Mr. Azcarate was Principal Secretary of the Commission.

501.BB Palestine/1–1549 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, January 15, 1949—1 p. m.

42. Following comments made on 12th by British Consul Jerusalem:

Talks between Dayan and Tel not making satisfactory progress. Both sides merely presented demands which realized other could not accept and no attempt made to reconcile differences. UK advised King Abdullah obtain agreement Transjordan Government to talks. Main demands Transjordan included outlet to sea at Gaza, return of Ramle and Lydda, return of refugees and consideration future western Galilee at later date. Jews in general claimed right retain territory now held and specifically partition Jerusalem, mutual compensation

for damages, resumption operation potash works at southern end Dead Sea, together with right use potash works at northern end, and rectification lines at Latrun. No mention made by Jews of refugees.

Regarding shooting down RAF planes, asserted careful interrogation personnel involved proved conclusively Jewish attacks occurred over Egyptian territory. Stated Egyptian Defense Minister approached UK Ambassador Cairo with request UK supply arms and munitions without Egypt's invoking 1936 treaty. On instructions from E. Bevin Ambassador replied UK would not furnish assistance until Egypt invoked treaty and presence Jewish troops in Egypt definitely proved. Reconnaissance flights undertaken in effort obtain definite proof.

Consul emphasized importance to UK of overland communications between Egypt and Jordan and Iraq so that defense treaties with latter two countries could be implemented if necessary.

Considered at least corridor linking Transjordan and Egypt or Transjordan and Gaza vital for British defense needs. Expressed personal opinion UK would use force if necessary obtain route.

Sent Department 42, pouched Amman.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/1–1749

Draft Message by President Truman to President Chaim Weizmann of Israel, at Tel Aviv [1]

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

MY DEAR DR. WEIZMANN: Your message of January 3 is in my hands. I deeply appreciate your courtesy in personally conveying to me the assurances which have been given to the United States Government by the Provisional Government of Israel concerning the circumstances surrounding the crossing of the Egyptian frontier by Israeli forces. I was gratified to learn that on January 11 [*10*] Mr. Eliahu Epstein officially notified the United States Government that all Israeli forces had been withdrawn from Egypt.[2]

I am happy to assure you personally, as the United States Government has assured the Provisional Government of Israel, that the representation which I directed Mr. McDonald to make in connection with this incident was made in the most friendly interest. I so instructed Mr. McDonald because I was convinced that a situation had arisen which threatened to extend the scope of the conflict. As you

[1] Transmitted to the White House by Mr. Lovett with his memorandum of January 17. Presumably it was sent to the Israeli President as drafted.

[2] See Mr. Rockwell's memorandum of conversation, January 10, p. 633.

know, the United States Government also made strong representations in Cairo.

I am encouraged by recent developments looking toward armistice negotiations between Israel and Egypt. It is my earnest hope that these negotiations can be expanded from the military to the political field and that they can be broadened to include all the parties to the dispute.

It is essential that both Israel and the Arab states leave no stone unturned in their efforts to reach a final settlement. Neither party must permit side issues to distract it from the difficult task of attaining this goal, which will bring to Palestine the lasting peace so essential to the stabilization of the Near East and to the larger objective of international security.

With kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

867N.01/1–1849

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 18, 1949.

Subject: Palestine

Participants: The Acting Secretary, Mr. Lovett
The British Ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks
First Secretary of British Embassy, Mr. Bromley
NEA—Mr. Hare [2]
UNA—Mr. McClintock

Sir Oliver Franks called at his request to leave an *Aide-Mémoire* [3] under instructions of the Foreign Secretary. He prefaced his official remarks with the personal comment that he felt the conversations with Mr. Lovett over the past several weeks had had a material effect on the British Government. For his own part, he had tried carefully to present not only a fair picture of the American point of view, but the arguments which supported that point of view. This he had done not only in official reports of his interviews (he asked Mr. Lovett to read the telegrams recounting his conversation with the Acting Secretary on January 12 and his subsequent talk with the President),[4] but also

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[1] Drafted by Mr. McClintock.

[2] Raymond A. Hare, Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

[3] *Infra.*

[4] For information on these conversations, see Mr. McClintock's memorandum of conversation of January 13 and telegram 149 to London of the same date, pp. 651 and 658.

in a personal letter to the Foreign Secretary in which he stressed the basic reasons for the Department's attitude. Summing up, the Ambassador indicated that the Americans were looking to what to do about the future of Palestine while the British had perhaps been regarding the problem too much in the light of their unhappy experiences in the past. He was relieved to feel that the United States by its recent actions in restraining the Israeli attack on Egypt had shown clearly that it did not feel that Israel could act outside the territorial limits of the former Palestine mandate, although within those limits the American Government thought that final dispositions should be made by negotiation between the parties.

Sir Oliver said that, no doubt, the request of the British Cabinet for a statement from the United States in the sense that the United States Government and the British Government have a common policy relating to the Middle East was conditioned at least in part by considerations of domestic politics. Mr. Bevin had been under considerable attack and Mr. Eden had based his principal argument on the assertion that Palestine was forcing the two Anglo-Saxon Governments apart. However, Sir Oliver pointed out that the Cabinet telegram which he had received, and on which the *Aide-Mémoire* was based, made no reference to the domestic political situation or to the impending debate in the House of Commons on British Palestine policy. All his Government asked was that if possible the attitude of this Government toward making a statement be ascertained prior to the Cabinet meeting on Thursday, January 20.

I replied that there were two reasons why it would be difficult for this Government to make an across-the-board statement with respect to our unanimity of policy with the British Government in the Middle East. The first was a domestic problem—that of security in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I had already seen how top secret information had been leaked from that committee. Certainly, if a sweeping official statement were made, the Senate Committee would wish inside information and would probe into the basis of our current understanding on policy in the Middle East. I could offer no assurances that our top secret testimony before the Committee would not soon become public. The second consideration was that a statement along the lines which seemed to be contemplated, if it were very broad in scope, would arouse an instant Soviet reaction. The USSR saw the United States and the United Kingdom active in current conversations on the Atlantic Pact. There was a danger that a far-reaching statement on the Middle East would lead the USSR to the conclusion that a similar arrangement was being contemplated for that area. How-

ever, I did think it might be possible, if we could limit the statement strictly to the Palestine problem, for us to meet most of the requirements set forth in the Ambassador's telegram.

On other points Sir Oliver said that his Government intended to announce on Friday, January 21, that the Jewish internees on Cyprus would be released. As for his Government's contemplated *de facto* recognition of Israel, he was gratified to know that this Government planned to extend *de jure* recognition to Transjordan as well as Israel immediately after the Israeli elections provided, as was hoped, the Israeli Government returned by those elections was a moderate Government worthy of *de jure* recognition.

Although the *Aide-Mémoire* which Sir Oliver left offically embodied most of the points covered in his telegram of instructions which he said bore the earmaks of having been drafted by the Cabinet itself, it contained one paragraph for my own private information which was not paraphrased in the *Aide-Mémoire*. This referred to the recent conversations between the French Foreign Minister and the British Foreign Secretary. M. Schuman was represented as saying that France had a population which included 25 million Moslems and therefore had to be very careful in the attitude it adopted on Palestine. Nevertheless, the French Government had been on the point of extending *de facto* recognition to Israel when it stayed its hand because of Israeli defiance of Security Council resolutions.

On the main point—the desired United States statement of mutuality of view with the United Kingdom on Middle Eastern policy—it was pointed out to Sir Oliver that much would depend upon the attitude Mr. Bevin would take in the forthcoming debate in Commons. If he backed up the line which he had instructed Sir Oliver to present at our last interview, it would be difficult for this Government to make a statement in support of British policy. The Ambassador said that, as he construed his telegram just received, it indicated that the British Government was not going to harp on the old issues but was looking, as did the Department, toward what to do about the future.

I said that I thought it might be possible, provided that Mr. Bevin's statements in the House of Commons did not seek to re-establish the line which he had taken last week with us, for either the new Secretary of State or possibly the President to make a statement which would indicate that both Governments were in complete agreement in pursuing a policy designed to restore peace in the Near East as quickly as possible. I thought that it might be possible to hang such a statement

on a peg like the announcement of the British decision to release the Jews on Cyprus.

Another possibility, which I advanced merely as an off-the-cuff suggestion, was that perhaps the two Governments could extend recognition to Israel almost simultaneously. This would be convincing evidence of a concerted policy between Washington and London.

It was agreed that Mr. McClintock, in consultation with Mr. Hare and Mr. Rusk, would prepare a tentative draft of a possible statement and discuss it later today with Mr. Bromley of the British Embassy. If some draft could be developed on the working level, Sir Oliver might then send it to his Government with the caution that this was a purely tentative draft and without top level clearance. At the same time Sir Oliver would point out the difficulty which this Government would face in making a statement prior to the debate in Parliament unless it was assured that Mr. Bevin would not rake up old embers.[5]

I told the British Ambassador that Mr. Bevin seemed to have come an encouraging distance from his last position and that the decision to return the Jews from Cyprus and the intent of the British Government to extend *de facto* recognition to Israel would have an immense and beneficial effect on the Israeli elections, particularly if recognition should be given immediately before the elections.

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[5] The Department informed London on January 19 that "Such statement was worked out yesterday and telegraphed by Brit. Emb to FonOff. It has not been cleared at White House." (telegram 219, 501.BB Palestine/1–1949) The editors are unable to identify in the Department of State files the proposed statement passed to the British Embassy. London, on January 21, reported information from Mr. Burrows that the Foreign Office had accepted the draft statement, suggesting solely some rewording of paragraph 2 "designed to lay more emphasis on Middle Eastern aspects [of] Palestine [problem]." (telegram 247, 501.BB Palestine/1–2149)

There is in the files of the Department of State a draft statement dated January 21 (867N.01/1–2149). The wording of the latter portion of its second paragraph suggests to the editors, in the absence of the original draft, that the Department of State accepted the suggestion of the British Foreign Office. The draft of January 24, approved by President Truman, is printed on p. 691.

In telegram 247 (see first paragraph of this footnote), Mr. Burrows was said to have expressed Mr. Bevin's hope that the statement would be made before the meeting of the British Cabinet scheduled for the morning of January 24. In its next numbered telegram, of the same date, London observed that "Foreign Office desire for some statement re US–UK agreement on long-term objectives in Middle East springs in part from internal political exigencies since one phase of most attacks on Bevin's Palestine policy is that by his blundering he has managed to do harm to US–UK relations. There is belief here that such US statement in some form would go far to lessen difficulties British Government." (867N.01/1–2149)

867N.01/1–1849

The British Embassy to the Department of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, undated.[1]]

PALESTINE

Mr. Bevin has asked the British Ambassador to inform Mr. Lovett that, as the United States Government knows, the British Government attaches the highest importance to Anglo-American agreement over Palestine. The British Government have worked unremittingly to this end.

2. The British Government particularly appreciates Mr. Lovett's assurance that the United States Government stands firmly by its general views on the Middle East, as already explained to the British Government. Since the two Governments are in solid agreement on their long-range objectives affecting the Middle East, would it not be possible for a statement now to be made after this lapse of time in the sense that the United States Government and the British Government have a common policy relating to this area? Mr. Bevin has no desire to publish details now, but there is a view in the United Kingdom that there is no understanding between the two Governments on the Middle East and Mr. Bevin is most anxious to correct this misconception.

3. Mr. Bevin asks the British Ambassador to assure Mr. Lovett and the United States Government that the British Government has an equally earnest desire for peace and an accepted settlement of the Palestine problem, and that the British Government has been striving to that end. The British Government has now again urged the Arab Governments concerned both to settle their differences between themselves and to undertake negotiations, both at Rhodes and on a wider basis through the Conciliation Commission. It is hoped that the Conciliation Commission will soon be able to set to work. The British Government has studied, so far as reports allow, the talks at Rhodes, and is glad to note that progress is being made. The British Government believes that this is due to United States pressure on both sides and to British advice to the Arab Governments, coupled with the evidence of firmness combined with restraint which the British Government has recently shown. The British Government is however, up against a very great difficulty when Security Council decisions are

[1] This communication was handed to Mr. Lovett by Ambassador Franks on January 18.

not acted upon, and this seems to involve both Governments in an important point of principle. At the same time, the British Government is anxious that all parties in the Middle East shall look to the West and not to Russia, but it believes that the danger in the Arab States from Russia will grow very rapidly as they feel that they are deserted by the West.

4. Mr. Bevin is encouraged by the fact that the fighting appears to have stopped. The British Government is considering what other steps it could take to facilitate agreement and to encourage negotiations and to further the objectives which both Governments have. One thing which troubles the British Government is that the Transjordan Government, whom it wants to take a good deal of responsibility in the matter, and whose application to the United Nations has been vetoed by the Soviet Union, is not recognised by the United States Government. If the United States Government could immediately recognise Transjordan, even *de facto*, this would make it possible for the British Government to give simultaneous *de facto* recognition to Israel. *De facto* recognition of Transjordan is suggested as the appropriate step in view of possible changes of boundary.

5. Mr. Bevin feels that Mr. Lovett would appreciate that on many occasions the British Government have made concessions about Palestine in an attempt to be helpful and to avoid causing the State Department embarrassment. As will be seen from the above, the British Government wants to make yet another attempt to concert action and to make it clear that in the Middle East, as well as elsewhere in the world, the British and the Americans are working together. In the general setting of world affairs Mr. Bevin believes this to be all-important.

6. In short, Mr. Bevin suggests—

(*a*) That some agreed statement should be released, to the effect that there is understanding between the two Governments regarding the Middle East.

(*b*) That Transjordan should be recognised by the United States Government, perhaps *de facto*, and

(*c*) That the British Government should simultaneously recognise *de facto* the Government of Israel.

Mr. Bevin hopes that these steps would be helpful in an attempt to clear up this disturbed area.

501.BB Palestine/1–1849 : Circular telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions in the American Republics [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 18, 1949—2 p. m.

As you aware from wireless bulletin, President has publicly stated interest this country in plight Palestine refugees and is asking Congress for $16 million appropriation to be this Govt's share of $32 million relief program voted by UNGA Nov. 19. For your secret info Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secy National Defense concerned over grave threat to stability Middle East represented by more than half million Arab refugees living in conditions utmost destitution and squalor, whose fate if not promptly relieved will lead to further deterioration our strategic position in this important area.

Thus far US has been outstanding in its efforts to contribute to UN relief program, whose Director is Stanton Griffis, now on leave from post as Amb Cairo. Response of other Amer Republics has been distinctly disappointing and on whole can be classed as completely negative.

We understand Amb Griffis would like to send personal rep to explore possibilities securing contributions in kind from Brazil, Arg and possibly Chile. Although this is strictly UN enterprise, because US strategic interests involved you are requested tele your private estimate whether Govts concerned would be disposed make contribution and if accordingly it would be worthwhile for UN Director Relief Program send special rep.

Repeated to Cairo for Griffis, USUN.

LOVETT

[1] Sent to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, and Santiago.

501.BB Palestine/1–1849 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET LONDON, January 18, 1949—5 p. m.

214. 1. I am most grateful to Department for its 149, January 13 reporting conversation between Acting Secretary and British Ambassador. I believe that this frank, firm and friendly talk followed by talk of same character with President constitute genuine contribution to US–UK understanding which already have gone far to put

US thinking before British Cabinet in a light clearer than ever before. Fact that US has reasoned point of view on Middle East problems as whole has begun to make its appearance in thoughtful British publications and conversations for first time without the overworked, and tendentious implication that US views re Palestine slavishly follow dictates of American Zionist pressure groups. It is source of surprise to some that underlying US policy there is hardboiled appraisal of elements of Middle East power and prospects for making best use of them in US–UK defense planning.

2. Impact of Franks' reports of his conversations has derived more from fact spokesmen were President and Acting Secretary than from nature views they expressed. This Embassy at every opportunity has consistently made clear to Foreign Office officials, members of Parliament, military, etc., the trend of US thought on all major points made by Acting Secretary. However, British officials have been obsessed with rightness of their own views and this tempted them to hope wishfully that US attitude as expressed by US Representative SC during US political campaign would change in calmer atmosphere following elections. Bevin and his officials wanted to know on a government to government basis, apart from speeches made in charged Paris atmosphere, what US views really were. Now Bevin has received from both President and Acting Secretary restatement US policy tied up in a single unequivocable and comprehensible package and UK "knows where it stands" vis-à-vis US re Palestine. Embassy is inclined to believe that Bevin has now made his final attempt to sell US on UK Palestine policy. He now can go to no higher US authority and his hopes for UK–US cooperation on UK terms re Palestine have now vanished.

3. Embassy Officer has been shown texts of Franks' telegrams reporting conversations with both Acting Secretary and President. While Franks did not deal in same order or with exactly same emphasis re points made by Acting Secretary in Department's reference telegram he did present US views in clear light and in a context revealing a measure of personal agreement with their substance. Franks stressed friendliness of his reception on both occasions and US concept that Israel is the "most dynamic, efficient and vigorous state in Middle East". Re President's remarks Franks reported that former spoke of good and friendly relations existing between US and UK and expressed regret that in this matter US and UK "are not quite in agreement". Franks reported that President was most friendly throughout interview but that he was also very positive and definite in expression of his views. Since these reports were undoubtedly discussed in detail

at yesterday's meetings British Cabinet attended by defence chiefs, not only their content but friendly tenor of Franks' presentation may be of significance in deciding effect of US views on British Palestine policy.

4. Despite spate of comment and rumor neither British Government nor opposition appears to have decided on manner in which Palestine will be handled before Parliament. While Bevin is fully aware that he is in for rough time it would be erroneous to suppose that he will be ridden out of office on Palestine rail. Labour Party on party grounds will support him strongly and even Conservatives feel that there is point beyond which they would gain nothing by pressing Bevin re Palestine. Time is slightly in favor Bevin whose good points seem to be marshalling themselves in popular consciousness in mitigation of his lapses over Palestine.

5. British Government obviously now has choice re Palestine of going ahead, drawing back or maintaining unaggressively its present attitude and as of this moment there is no clear indication re line which will be adopted. Embassy's guess is that for immediate future UK will do as little as possible re Palestine and as events can be found to give public justification UK will progressively but quietly unbend towards PGI. An abrupt change in policy seems unlikely. It is Embassy's guess also that Bevin will attempt to play down US influence on Palestine events, but it is not unlikely that if he is hard pressed in debate he may bring US role more prominently into discussion with special reference to Bernadotte proposals.[1]

HOLMES

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[1] The Department, on January 19, replied to the last sentence of telegram 214, stating in part: "you should bear in mind in discussions with Brit fact that Bernadotte plan was rejected in GA not because of lack of support by UK and US but because both Arab and Israeli influences united to deny necessary votes. . . . In view this voting situation inside Assembly, it would be most unfortunate if Bevin or FonOff should imply that US had forsaken its agreement to support Bernadotte plan." (telegram 221, 501.BB Palestine/1–1949)

The concluding paragraph of telegram 219 to London (see footnote 5, p. 674) states that the British communication handed to the Department on January 18 "was drafted pursuant to tele which Brit. Amb said came from Cabinet itself. We believe in light your 214, Jan. 18 that Franks correctly interpreted changed situation by saying he thought Bevin has now abandoned views he expressed Jan. 12 through Amb here and that he is resolutely setting new course." Regarding the conversation of January 12, see telegram 149, January 13, to London, p. 658.

London, on January 19, reported information from Mr. Burrows that a "circular message was sent to Arab capitals January 18 telling governments that advantage should be taken of present period comparative peace to make armistice agreements with PGI on all fronts and then to enter into final negotiations either through CC or directly." (telegram 236, 867N.01/1–1949)

501.BB Palestine/1–1749 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General in Jerusalem [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 18, 1949—6 p. m.

30. Ur 47 Jan 17 [2] and previous. Dept appreciates your commendable initiative and your recommendations re proposed Jerusalem settlement. However since GA resolution Dec 11 placed upon Conciliation Commission responsibility for recommendations concerning final Jerusalem regime and since Commission soon to arrive Palestine, Dept desires ConGen not assume active role in Israel–TJ negotiations (last para reftel [3]). You should make absolutely clear to both sides US not acting as mediator in any way or extending good offices.

Dept's position on Jerusalem settlement in light developments you have reported now under urgent consideration. You will be informed.

LOVETT

[1] This telegram was repeated to London and Amman and to Geneva for the American Delegation to the Palestine Conciliation Commission.

[2] Not printed; it advised of discussions between Transjordanian and Israeli officials on proposals to settle the question of the administration of Jerusalem and of conversations by Consul Burdett and the French Consul General with those officials on the matter (867N.01/1–1749).

[3] In this paragraph, Consul Burdett proposed "drawing up outline reconciling as far as possible Jewish-Arab positions and presenting it to Abdullah Tel and Dayan for further discussion."

Editorial Note

Secretary Bevin addressed the House of Commons concerning the Palestine problem on January 18. The Embassy took special cognizance of his conciliatory mood and his announcement that the British Government was prepared to release the Jews interned on Cyprus. It also noted that "even more important may be effect in Arab capitals of Bevin's unequivocal public support direct Arab-PGI talks since such support goes somewhat beyond private British counsels to same effect through diplomatic channels. It seems likely that Bevin's direct reference to 'Government of Israel' may be another step on road to British recognition PGI." (telegram 223, January 18, 7 p. m., from London, 867N.01/1–1849)

The following day, Mr. Satterthwaite discussed with Uriel Heyd, First Secretary of the Israeli Mission in the United States, three matters concerning the British which were disturbing the Israelis. Mr. Satterthwaite suggested that "in my view Mr. Bevin's statement in Parliament yesterday indicated that the British do not have hostile

intentions toward the Israeli Government and that I hoped very much that they would before long have means of communicating with each other directly. The announcement of the release of the Jewish DP's in Cyprus would, I hoped, be helpful in clearing the atmosphere before the elections. . . . I also mentioned the U.S. loan which the Export-Import Bank has approved today." (memorandum of conversation by Mr. Satterthwaite, 501.BB Palestine/1–1949)

The Export-Import Bank, on January 19, announced authorization of a credit of $35 million to Israel to finance purchases in the United States of equipment, materials, and services in connection with agricultural projects and of a further credit of $65 million to finance projects in the fields of communications, transportation, manufacturing, housing, and public works. The latter group of credits was to be available until December 31, 1949. The text of the Bank's press release on these credits is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, February 6, 1949, page 173.

501.BB Palestine/1–2849

The Acting Secretary of State to Mr. Mark F. Ethridge

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 19, 1949.

SIR: Before you depart for Palestine to assume your duties as the American representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission, I am setting forth the following basic positions for your guidance:[1]

A) A final settlement on all questions outstanding between the parties in Palestine should be achieved by negotiation as set forth in the General Assembly resolution of December 11, 1948. You should do everything possible as a member of the Conciliation Commission to assist the parties to reach an agreement by this means. You should consult the Department periodically during the course of these negotiations.

B) If it becomes necessary during the course of the negotiations for you to express the views of this Government, you should bear in mind that American policy is based on the following premises:

1. No modifications should be made in the boundaries of the State of Israel as established by the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947, without the full consent of the State of Israel.

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[1] Mr. Lovett had sent identical instructions to Mr. Keenan in a letter of January 5. The letter is filed under 501.BB Palestine/7–1949.

2. If Israel desires additions to its territory as defined under the November 29 resolution, i.e., areas allotted by the General Assembly to the Arabs such as western Galilee and Jaffa, now under Israeli occupation, Israel should make territorial concessions elsewhere, i.e., the southern Negev. Israel is not entitled to keep both the Negev and western Galilee and Jaffa. If there is no agreement between the parties, the Israelis should relinquish western Galilee and Jaffa and the Arabs should relinquish the Israeli portion of the Negev.

3. If Israel desires to retain western Galilee and Jaffa, the southern border of Israel should not be drawn further south than the thirty-first parallel within the territory allotted to Israel under the resolution of November 29.

4. *Status of Jerusalem*—The resolution of December 11 states that the Jerusalem area should be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective United Nations control. This could be accomplished by appointing a United Nations Commissioner for Jerusalem and by establishing machinery to enable him to supervise the administration of the area, to guarantee free access to the city and the Holy Places, and to insure adequate protection of the latter. The effective administration of the area of Jerusalem should be left to Arabs and Jews, the delineation of the parts of the area to be administered by each party to be determined by agreement.

It is not unlikely that Israel may call for a land corridor to connect the State of Israel with Jerusalem. Agreement to such a demand would not be in accord with the November 29 resolution, which provided only for freedom of access to Jerusalem; moreover, since such a corridor would bisect the territory which the November 29 resolution allotted to the Arabs, it would create a geographical anomaly. In the event, however, that the creation of such a land corridor appears to be essential to a final settlement, Israel should be prepared to make territorial concessions to the Arabs elsewhere.

5. *The Port of Haifa*—The State of Israel should give assurances of free access for the interested Arab countries to the port of Haifa. The Arab countries in turn should undertake to place no obstacle in the way of oil deliveries by pipeline to the Haifa refinery. The products of the refinery should continue to be distributed on the basis of the historical pattern.

6. *Lydda airport*—The airport of Lydda should be open to international air traffic without restrictions, and the interested Arab countries should be assured of access to its facilities.

7. *Palestinian refugees*—You should be guided by the provisions of the General Assembly resolution of December 11 concerning refugees.

8. *Disposition of Arab Palestine*—US favors incorporation of greater part of Arab Palestine in Transjordan. The remainder might be divided among other Arab states as seems desirable.

C) If negotiations, either directly between the parties or through the Commission, should fail, you will be authorized to join with the other members of the Commission in an effort to persuade the parties to agree upon frontiers between Israel and Arab Palestine as set forth in paragraph (3) above. At the same time, the United States Government will concert with the British Government to attempt to induce the parties to reach agreement on this basis.

Very truly yours, ROBERT A. LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/1–1849 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General in Jerusalem [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 19, 1949—7 p. m.

35. Urtels 35 [2] and 54.[3] Herewith Dept general views re desirability direct Israeli-Transjordan negots on future administration Jerusalem:

1. Israel and Transjordan should be encouraged reach any agreement on future Arab and Jewish administrative responsibilities in Jerusalem compatible with para 8 of GA Palestine Res. of 11 Dec '48. In particular, this might include agreement on areas of Jerusalem which Arabs and Jews will separately administer, either by local population alone or with assistance of Transjordan and Israel.

2. U.S. as Member of U.N. and Conciliation Comm can give support only to such arrangements for Jerusalem as fall within GA Resolution, requiring *inter alia*, that the Jerusalem area "be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine" and that Conciliation Comm present next GA "detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area". US cannot therefore support any arrangements which would purport to authorize estab of Israeli or TJ sovereignty over parts of Jerusalem area.

3. Dept does not consider that GA reference to "permanent international regime" requires direct administration by U.N. of Jerusalem area. Res. itself states objective of "maximum local autonomy for distinctive groups consistent with the special international status of the Jerusalem area". However, while this would permit exercise of broad administrative responsibilities by Arabs and Jews in areas defined by mutual agreement, some clear representation of U.N. interest in Jerusalem area is required. Dept is considering various forms which latter might take.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London and Amman.

[2] Dated January 13, p. 661.

[3] Dated January 18; it outlined a proposed agreement on the future administration of Jerusalem which had been prepared by Consul Burdett and the French Consul General. The last paragraph of the telegram read as follows: "French ConGen and I propose present above outline including suggestions as to demarcation line and international enclaves to both Dayan and Abdullah on twenty-[here follows garbled portion]. Will act in purely personal capacity but any indication Department may be able give of its approval of proposals in general would be most helpful." (501.BB Palestine/1–1849)

4. Arrangements re Jerusalem agreed upon by Israel and Transjordan should be of provisional character and subject to approval by GA. However, GA could be expected view with much sympathy any proposal re Jerusalem mutually accepted by Arabs and Jews even though direct responsibility of U.N. thereunder might be less extensive than certain U.N. Delegations have thought necessary.

5. Conciliation Comm should be brought into any Israeli-Transjordan discussions re Jerusalem at any early stage. Suggestions advanced by Israel envisage area for direct U.N. administration and other U.N. responsibilities. Moreover, Comm has specific obligation make proposals to next GA on Jerusalem and Holy Places. Comm can advise parties on kind arrangements compatible with GA Res. and likely to be accepted by U.N.

View Deptel 30 Jan 18 Dept desires you not carry out plan outlined last para ur 54 Jan 18.

Communicate this tel to US Rep Palestine Conciliation Comm on arrival Jerusalem.

LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/1–1949 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET LONDON, January 19, 1949—7 p. m.

237. Burrows today supplied following re continuation PGI Transjordan negotiations (Embassy's 145, January 12).

1. Sassoon and Dayan on January 16 disguised as UN observers visited King Abdullah at his headquarters in Jordan Valley escorted by Abdullah Tel. PGI representatives took initiative re meeting which is not known to Transjordan Government.

2. Jews pressed for immediate settlement and Abdullah replied that he too anxious for settlement and wanted friendly relations with PGI. Abdullah said he was willing to extend cease-fire to whole front and to convert it into armistice. However, Transjordan must have exit to Mediterranean and he suggested this should be at Gaza. He remarked that if Egypt got Gaza this would mean control by Mufti.

3. Jews said they had no intention of discussing territorial adjustments with Egypt at present and would not do so without informing Transjordan beforehand.

4. Abdullah warned Jews that he would become permanent enemy PGI if Israel went Communist.

5. Jews spoke bitterly re British attitude toward Israel. To this Abdullah replied their blame UK undeserved since UK had helped

PGI by withholding arms Arab Legion. UK is still withholding arms.[1]

6. King and PGI representatives agreed to hold another meeting as soon as "military situation with Egypt cleared up". Burrows commented that Foreign Office was "very interested" in this meeting but that it was not particularly pleased that Abdullah had elected to play off PGI against the Egyptians (Embassy's 236, January 19).[2]

HOLMES

[1] Mr. Stabler, on January 24, reported information from King Abdullah about the meeting at Shuneh on January 16. The latter was said to have stated that he had received Messrs. Sassoon and Dayan "to discuss with them present developments re armistice and peace negotiations. Meeting lasted half hour. Stated he had emphasized to Israelis his desire for peace and his hope Israel would work with him in reaching lasting peace based on mutual interests. Indicated Transjordan must have outlet to sea at Gaza and that Egyptians must be obliged leave that territory. (Re this His Majesty said if he had Gaza it would not be necessary to have sovereignty over Jaffa; however, if not possible have Gaza, then Transjordan must have Jaffa.) King stated he had not gone into precise details re his terms for peace, already generally known by Israelis. He described meeting as satisfactory" (telegram 31 from Amman, 867N.01/1–2449).

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 679.

501.BB Palestine/1–1949 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, January 19, 1949—11 : 41 p. m.

70. Following is text of agreement between Israeli and Lebanese officers signed at Ras-en-Naqura 14 January, in pursuance SC Resolution November 16, as obtained from UN SYG today:

"We, the undersigned, being duly accredited military observers of the Israeli and Lebanese Armies, on this day do hereby agree to the following:

1. The Israeli authorities will evacuate their troops and relinquish control over the following villages: Deir, Siriane, Aalmne, El Qoussacr, Qantara and Yardun. This evacuation will be completed not later than 0800 hours local time Sunday, January 16, 1949.

This evacuation is to be considered as a good-will gesture and a prelude to further discussion on the matters contained in the Resolutions of the SC of 16 November 1948.

2. It is agreed that discussions involving the requirements of the November 16, 1948 Resolution of the SC will be entered into by both parties not later than Wednesday, 19 January 1949.

3. It is agreed that during the present armistice talks no military act of aggression, in the form of air operations, ground operations, patrols, firing of weapons, or destructive missiles of any sort shall be directed across the frontier by either side against the personnel or equipment of the opposing force, or against the inhabitants, including public or personal property.

4. It is further agreed that movements of civilians, particularly refugees, shall not occur from one side to the other.

5. This agreement is drawn up in the presence of the UN Military Observers whose signatures appear below."

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/1–1949 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, January 19, 1949—11 : 41 p. m.

71. Following is text of declaration approved by Israeli and Egyptian representatives at Rhodes conference January 14 on agenda item "assurances as regards military offenses and national security" declaration will become preamble of armistice agreement. Text obtained from UN SYG:

"We, the undersigned, in full authority entrusted to us by our respective governments, desirous of promoting the return of permanent peace to Palestine, and recognizing the importance in this regard of mutual reassurances as regards the future military intentions of the parties, hereby affirm the following principles which will be fully observed by both parties during the armistice:

1. The injunction of the SC against resort to military force in the Palestine dispute shall be henceforth scrupulously respected by both parties.

2. No aggressive action by the military forces—land, sea or air—of either party shall be undertaken, planned (the use of the term 'planned' in this context has no bearing on normal staff planning as generally practised in military organizations), or threatened against the people or the armed forces of the other.

3. The right of each party to its security and to freedom from fear of attack by the armed forces of the other shall be fully respected.

4. The establishment of an armistice between the armed forces of the two parties is accepted as an indispensable step towards the liquidation of armed conflict and the restoration of peace in Palestine."

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/1–1949 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, January 19, 1949—11 : 41 p. m.

72. SYG Lie through Cordier is making available USUN all important reports of Rhodes conversations submitted by Bunche in inter-

[1] This telegram was repeated to Athens.

ests of keeping US Government and especially US representative on Conciliation Commission fully informed prior to convening of Commission. Reports in daily classified summaries since January 14 have covered highlights of negotiations to date. Text of Israeli-Lebanon agreement transmitted mytel 70, January 19, and text of declaration approved at Rhodes January 14 transmitted mytel 71, January 19.

In addition to information previously reported on Faluja withdrawal, Bunche has reported that terms of agreement provide that heavy equipment to be evacuated to Egypt under UN supervision and control and held in UN custody until Chief-of-Staff satisfied anticipated armistice effective. UN staff plans for withdrawal approved by both parties with minor modifications. Bunche on January 17 noted that Israelis very conciliatory in discussing Faluja agreement.

In answer to SYG's request for reports on downed RAF planes in Negev and Aqaba landings (mytel 44, January 14 [2]), Bunche has replied that in view of prospects for significant results from Rhodes talks he desired to avoid inciting SC debates leading to recriminatory exchanges between Egyptians and Israelis which might have unfavorable repercussions in Rhodes. Bunche reported that until full information available and carefully appraised, he did not feel able to present to SC a charge of breach of truce in Aqaba landings. He reported that as of January 15 his information was incomplete and also noted that SC President had not requested reports on either downed RAF planes or Aqaba landings. While personally deploring incidents, Bunche reported he would make full reports to SC only when full information available and SC decides to take up question.

AUSTIN

[2] Not printed.

867N.01/1–2049 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL AMMAN, January 20, 1949—1 p. m.

26. Mytel 159, December 15.[1] Apparently on suggestion of King Supreme Moslem Council for Palestine in Jerusalem decided on January 18 that his Majesty should be proclaimed King in all Mosques in Palestine on Friday January 21. Religious ceremony is planned at Dome of Rock Mosque in Jerusalem to be attended by new Mufti of Palestine, President Supreme Moslem Council, Military Governor and other high civil and religious dignitaries. Short invocation will

[1] Not printed.

be read which refers to King as "Our Lord Great King Abdullah Ibn Hussein".

Sent Department, repeated Jerusalem 20.

STABLER

Editorial Note

Various posts in the Arab countries, beginning on January 21, replied to the Department's circular airgram of December 29, 1948 (see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, volume V, Part 2, page 1696), on the refugee problem. On that day, Jidda reported that "Up to the present, no Arabs from Palestine have sought refuge in Saudi Arabia" (despatch 15).

Cairo advised, on January 28, that the support given to roughly 8,000 refugees was a sizable drain on the Egyptian treasury "although percentage-wise not nearly as formidable as the expense borne by the Lebanese and Syrian Governments." It noted additionally that "If the roughly 250,000 refugees now in the Egyptian occupied area of Palestine were driven into Egypt the result would be almost catastrophic for Egypt financially." Cairo concluded that "There is ample evidence that the Egyptian Government has decided that the refugees are not in Egypt to stay. The refugees have been kept isolated in the desert on the far side of the Suez Canal where a strict guard is maintained over their camp. No new refugees have been allowed to come to Egypt since last May and the Government predicates its whole approach on forcing the refugee problem on the Jews and the United Nations to the greatest degree possible" (airgram 102).

Amman informed, on February 3, that the continued presence of 89,000 refugees in Transjordan and 302,000 in Arab Palestine would adversely affect both areas "in serious way through constant drain on almost nonexistent resources" and that the areas under Transjordanian control could only assimilate a "very small number refugees under existing conditions since money, jobs and other opportunities scarce" (telegram 46 and airgram 5).

Beirut, on February 4, stated that "The continued presence of some 90,000 Arab refugees in the Lebanon . . . would almost undoubtedly be considered unacceptable by the Government and an unbearable burden." It also gave its opinion that "Prospects of permanently settling any large number of Palestine refugees in Lebanon are very poor," inasmuch as "(1) Unemployment already exists and present economic conditions do not warrant consideration this possibility [; and] (2) Politically absorption of large number Moslems into Lebanon would upset present sensitive balance which exists between Christians and Moslems" (airgram 35 and telegram 55).

Damascus, on February 4, reported estimates of 80,000 to 100,000

refugees in Syria and that the small cash dole and foodstuffs supplied to them had resulted in "utter demoralization and impoverishment" of practically all of them. Damascus noted also that the "presence of refugees in Syria has constituted economic burden primarily on communities rather than on govt which as early as August, 1948 practically abandoned its relief expenditures as unsupportable budgetary drain" (airgram 30).

Baghdad, on February 5 and 7 noted the presence in Iraq of 5,000 refugees whose maintenance was possible despite the severe economic depression. However, the "Absence demand for labor makes impossible absorb any additional refugees now" (telegram 47 and airgram 54).

All messages cited above are filed under 501.MA Palestine, with the dates of the messages serving as dated enclosures, except for airgrams 35 from Beirut and 54 from Baghdad, which are filed under 501.BB Palestine.

501.BB Palestine/1–2349 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Grady) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT ATHENS, January 23, 1949—1 a. m.

152. Palun 7. Under Bunche's instructions, John Reedman, senior political adviser [Acting] Mediator's staff, arrived Athens from Rhodes afternoon January 22 for purpose confidentially acquainting USDel progress Egyptian-Israeli negotiations.

Egyptians and Israelis have agreed on preamble to armistice agreement and separately on Faluja pocket (Unpal 7).[1]

Differences on other points are as follows:

Israeli position: (1) Eytan informally proposed re coastal strip effective withdrawal Egyptian forces leaving such defense units as are agreed upon for administration and maintenance police control; (2) Israelis will accept principle withdrawal Israeli mobile and striking forces from area in northwest Negev as yet undefined which both sides would consider as threat to other. Bunche believes area might approximate that south of October 14 line; (3) Israelis will not agree to any armistice line which would result in advance Egyptian forces from present positions; (4) Israelis will not agree to return Egyptians in any form to Bir Asluj; (5) Israelis will not negotiate on basis of Egyptian civil governor in Beersheba; (6) Israelis hold firm position to retain El Auja but might not prevent agreement on this point alone. Israelis very probably would not permit Egyptians to return.

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[1] Also identified as telegram 92, January 21, 5 p. m., to Athens, not printed; it repeated the texts of telegrams 70, 71, and 72, all dated January 19 and printed *ante*, pp. 685 and 686 (501.BB Palestine/1–1949).

Egyptian position: (1) Egyptians expect adherence November 13 line under November 4 resolution; (2) Egyptians will accept present lines in coastal strip which coincide approximately with November 13 line; (3) Egyptians prepared withdraw (Israeli point 2) on basis agreement but are likely to press for Israeli withdrawal to November 13 line; (4) Egyptians will press for November 13 provisions re Bir Asluj and Beersheba except willing to modify claim to defense forces in Bir Asluj for civil administration and police; (5) El Auja must be held as defense outpost; (6) *status quo* requested for Egyptian forces in Hebron–Bethlehem area but will work out arrangements definitely to include [t]his group in armistice. Israelis accept this position.

Bunche believes agreement can be worked out for coastal strip and for principle of withdrawal in greater part northwest Negev but fears armistice may fail because no compromise can be reached on apparently (approximately five characters garbled) points of Bir Asluj and Beersheba and El Auja. Bunche feels it would be regrettable if armistice agreement should fail for these reasons and hopes US Government will consider what diplomatic action it could take at Tel Aviv and Cairo; had suggestion closeness agreement on major points should not be prevented by less important considerations. Bunche considers time factor important because negotiations have already lasted ten days, Israelis may modify views after January 25 election, Egyptians may modify views after January 26 meeting Arab League PolComm and present agreement re Faluja pocket might collapse if no armistice agreement.

It seems apparent Israeli military may be willing risk [the loss of?] political credit of agreement before election and possibility Bunche will report Israeli non-compliance SC November 4 resolution to UN in order to keep Egyptians out of Negev. It also seems apparent Egyptians hope to retain token positions in Bir Asluj and Beersheba and thus to score political victory in spite of military defeats. Egyptians undoubtedly consider such positions would be advantageous to Egypt at time of political and geographic settlement.

Reedman informed information re Israeli and Egyptian positions plus Bunche's views would confidentially be reported Department for consideration as to what action, if any, could be taken. It was added that it might not be appropriate for US alone to approach Tel Aviv and Cairo in view US membership Conciliation Commission.

As Bunche has not yet reported to Lake Success re present stage negotiations Reedman requests substance not be repeated elsewhere for moment.

Sent Department 152, Jerusalem 2.

GRADY

501.BB Palestine/1–2349 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, January 23, 1949—5 : 20 p. m.

85. In two cables from Rhodes dated January 22, Bunche expressed to the SYG great discouragement over Israeli-Egyptian negotiation. He did not give a detailed report of the negotiations and difficulties [1] but stated he felt that his usefulness was nearly ended and urged that the SC at once hand over his function to the Conciliation Commission as he had recently requested. It was Bunche's opinion that the current situation demands pressure i.e. governmental levels rather than persuasion by an individual.

In reply SYG Lie cabled on January 23 expressing complete confidence in Bunche, informing him that all had full confidence in his ability, and urging that he must carry on his functions through a completion of the current talks even if they became completely stalemated.

Bunche also expressed alarm to the SYG at reports which had reached him from newsmen that US was considering naming him as US representative on the Conciliation Commission.

AUSTIN

[1] In a telegram of January 24, 8 : 45 a. m., to Mr. Rusk, transmitted through the facilities of the United States Navy, Mr. Bunche advised that the previous evening he had been informed officially by the Israeli Delegation at Rhodes that the withdrawal of Egyptian forces at al-Faluja, scheduled to begin on the morning of January 25, had been postponed pending conclusion of an armistice agreement with Egypt. Mr. Bunche called this action a "flagrant breach" of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement on the subject and expressed the opinion that such "arbitrary and unilateral action," unless rectified quickly, would result in termination of the negotiations. Mr. Bunche, to save the negotiations, proposed a 48-hour extension, hoping that the Egyptians would stay on and that the Israelis would be induced to honor their agreement (501.BB Palestine/1–2449).

867N.01/1–2449

Draft of Proposed Statement by the Secretary of State on United States–United Kingdom Attitude Toward the Middle East

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 24, 1949.

Recent news about the Middle East has many encouraging aspects. The announcement today by the French Government of its *de facto* recognition of Israel is a major contribution to the settlement of the Palestine question. Similarly, the announcement by the British Government of its decision to accord *de facto* recognition of the Provisional Government of Israel at an early date is a welcome and constructive step, and follows closely upon its recent decision to release the Jewish

internees on Cyprus for entry into Israel. The Department of State has closely followed the armistice conversations on Rhodes under the auspices of the United Nations Acting Mediator for Palestine and earnestly hopes that they will come to a successful conclusion. We trust also that the news of peace conversations between Israel and Lebanon, and between Israel and Transjordan, will be borne out by a statesmanlike decision among the Governments concerned to put a permanent end to the hostilities in the Holy Land. This Government, which with France and Turkey, is a Member of the United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission, stands ready to do its utmost to assist the parties to compose their differences and to find lasting peace. I am delighted that the Honorable Mark Ethridge of Louisville, Kentucky, will serve as the United States Representative on the Conciliation Commission.[1]

There has recently been a good deal of speculation as to what were said to be differences of view as between the British Government and the American Government on the Palestine question. While at times there may have been differences of opinion in London and Washington as how best to deal with the Palestine problem, there has been no difference whatever in our main objective. This Government and the British Government have in fact long been united on the basic policy of increasing the economic well-being and sense of security of the Middle East and have sought to speed the return of lasting peace to Palestine.

Today's events show that the three Governments have reached a common attitude on an important element of a Palestine settlement and lead us to believe that the close cooperation which marked the work of our Delegations in the General Assembly will be continued.

It is my hope that the work of conciliation will continue and that early in this new year we will find our friends, both in Israel and the Arab States, using their great talents and energy in the constructive work of peace.[2]

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[1] The White House, on January 24, announced the appointment of Mark F. Ethridge as the U.S. Member on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (telegram 40, January 24, 7 p. m., to Jerusalem, 501.BB Palestine/1–2449).

[2] A marginal notation bears President Truman's "OK."

501.BB Palestine/1–2449

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] January 24, 1949.

Subject: Palestine

Participants: Mohamed Kamil Abdul Rahim, Egyptian Ambassador
NEA—Mr. Satterthwaite
NE—Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Rockwell

The Egyptian Ambassador called at his request. After discussing generalities, he mentioned the armistice negotiations going on at Rhodes between Egypt and Israel. He stated that the Israelis were maintaining an uncompromising position and refused to consider withdrawing to the October 14 military lines in accord with the Security Council resolution of November 4. The Ambassador was fearful least Israeli intransigence would cause the negotiations to break down and said that if the negotiations failed there would be very unpleasant results in Egypt. He said that no country could afford to allow the resolutions of the United Nations to be flouted and he called upon the United States to use its influence with the Israelis in order to persuade them to comply with the resolutions of November 4 and November 16. After all, he said, the Israelis have now received a loan, have practically achieved their territorial objectives, and are sure of obtaining *de jure* recognition. He thought that it was high time for the United States to do something for the other side, and to persuade the Israelis to abandon their uncompromising attitude.

Mr. Satterthwaite said that the United States Government was extremely interested in seeing a lasting peace come to Palestine and would do everything within its power and make every effort to urge upon both parties the necessity for moderation. He pointed out that the Conciliation Commission was on the point of departure for Palestine and that the impending arrival of the Commission seemed to bring the date of final peace negotiations nearer.

The Ambassador went on to say that Egypt had decided to cease paying so much attention to the Palestine dispute and "to turn its eyes" to the West. He wished every possible step to be taken to repair the damage in relations between the United States and Egypt which had been produced by the Palestine situation. He mentioned Egyptian plans for a request for technical advice and assistance from the United States. In conclusion, he once more referred to the necessity for compliance by the Israelis with the Security Council resolutions of November 4 and November 16 and emphasized the unfortunate effects which would be produced in Egypt if the Israelis failed to do so.

Mr. Satterthwaite said that the United States had always maintained that the Palestine dispute should be kept apart from United States-Arab relations and stated that he was pleased that Egypt had now decided to treat the question in this fashion.

501.BB Palestine/1–2449 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT LONDON, January 24, 1949—6 p. m.

291. According to Burrows, British Cabinet this morning considered question Palestine (paragraph two, Embassy's 247, January 21 [1]) and decided not to make any statement re British recognition Israel since Australia and New Zealand have urged UK to delay action until these dominions ready take same step simultaneously with UK. Australian cabinet meeting scheduled for January 27. Ceylon has asked UK not to recognize Israel at this stage; Pakistan has urged UK not to recognize at all and India has taken same line as Pakistan but less forcefully. Another factor leading to cabinet decision is that question should be discussed January 27–28 at London meeting Western Union consultative council. Re French recognition announced today, Burrows said Belgium and Netherlands are "furious with French".

2. When I saw Bevin on other matters this morning it was evident that he is deeply preoccupied with Palestine. He referred to Moslem resentment toward the West generated by Palestine developments and expressed belief that USSR would "switch to the Arabs". If it did so he thought this should be matter of grave concern to both US and UK. Bevin also mentioned need for Commonwealth consultation before UK can act.

HOLMES

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 5, p. 674.

501.BB Palestine/1–2449 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald), at Tel Aviv

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, January 24, 1949—7 p. m.
NIACT

42. We have today expressed to Epstein our apprehension at reports indicating Israeli Representatives have announced postponement withdrawal Egyptian force from Al Faluja, which had been scheduled begin tomorrow morning, until after conclusion armistice agreement

between Egypt and Israel. According to our info Israeli Delegation previously had agreed to unconditional release of this force. This voluntary agreement entered into by Representatives of Israel and Egypt was not made contingent upon conclusion armistice.

Epstein said he had just received instructions from Tel Aviv to call at Dept and say his Govt "in general" intended keep its forces on military lines as they now exist during period armistice in which military considerations were paramount. This armistice attitude however would not affect eventual political settlement. Epstein referred to divergent desires Egypt and Transjordan re disposition Arab coastal strip in Negev. He said Egyptians had been vanquished in war but wished return to Cairo in guise of victors, which was not easy achieve.

Epstein said however he would convey Dept's view to his Govt that PGI might find it wise be generous, realizing as it did necessity providing Egyptian Govt with some means saving face. We thought prompt implementation agreement to release Faluja garrison might afford such a means. At same time we stressed our hope neither Govt would take a position which would cause armistice negotiations break down, as this Govt, a friend of both Israel and Egypt as well as member Conciliation Commission, very much desires see these negotiations brought to a prompt and successful conclusion. We added that representations in similar vein had been given to Egyptian Ambassador this morning, ref Cairo's 93, Jan. 24.[1]

Please express similar views to Prime Minister and FonMin in your discretion. Repeated to Cairo for appropriate action as 90. Repeated for info to London as 261, Jerusalem 41 as Unpal 9.

ACHESON

[1] Not printed; it advised of information from Prime Minister Hady that the "Rhodes conversations had been virtually suspended due to refusal of Zionists to permit evacuation of positions by Faluja garrison." It also stated that the "Prime Minister who expressed gratitude for US Good Offices in bringing about Rhodes conversations voiced confident conviction that a word from US or further interposition its Good Offices was again required in aid of UN in interests of implementation of SC's resolutions which Egyptians had long ago agreed carry out." (501.BB Palestine/1–2449)

501.BB Palestine/1–2449 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET US URGENT NIACT WASHINGTON, January 24, 1949—7 p. m.

259. When Sir Oliver Franks called on Secretary this morning we went over draft of proposed statement which Secretary would have made on US–UK attitude toward Middle East, which referred to such development as hoped-for UK decision to recognize PGI, French *de*

facto recognition of Israel and appointment of Ethridge as USRep Palestine Conciliation Commission. Basic para. relating to UK–US policy in Middle East was as follows:

[Here follows second paragraph of draft statement, printed page 691.]

Premise on which statement was to be issued was announcement today of UK intention to accord *de facto* recognition to PGI at early date. However, British Ambassador following his meeting with Secretary informed us that Cabinet had decided not to make such announcement today. Accordingly Secretary's statement will not be made.

Remaining problem was remarks which Bevin plans to address to House of Commons on Jan 26. Brit Emb has shown Dept text of For Sec's proposed statement explaining this had crossed tel from Amb same subject. Dept on informal basis indicated certain deletions and alternative phraseology which would make it more acceptable from US point of view. It was stressed however that Dept had no intention "clearing" Bevin's remarks, and that they had not been seen by Sec. Our action was impelled by friendly desire assist For Sec and particularly avoid his making statements which would encourage close questioning of Pres or Sec here who would be forced in making record clear to indicate that two Govts had not always seen eye to eye on how to approach Palestine problem. We told Brit Emb that if questions should ensue prompted by debate in Commons Wed we would probably reply in terms of para quoted above from proposed Sec's statement.

Separate tel [1] provides verbatim text of Bevin's remarks as annotated on strictly informal basis in Dept after necessary elimination parts referring to Sec's proposed statement.

ACHESON

[1] *Infra.*

501.BB Palestine/1–2449 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET US URGENT NIACT WASHINGTON, January 24, 1949—7 p. m.

260. Following is text of proposed Bevin statement referred to Deptel 259 today.

"His Majesty's Government and the United States Government have long been united on the basic policy of increasing the economic wellbeing and sense of security of the Middle East and have sought to speed the return of lasting peace to Palestine. We are keeping in close touch with one another about these objectives. The fact that we and the Americans have similar interests and objectives in this

vital area is a matter of great importance. There has been the constant danger that the Middle East might become a second Balkan area, torn by internal dissensions and international rivalry. We are determined to do all in our power to prevent this happening and believe that the Americans hold similar views.

This links in with the important declaration made by President Truman in his inauguration speech in favour of a bold new programme for assisting other countries in economic and social development. This declaration is in line with many discussions I have had with Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Marshall. President Truman's aim and ours are the same. One of my first actions on taking office was to call home our representatives throughout the Middle East to discuss what contribution Britain could make in that area. The British Middle East Office has given valuable assistance, among others, in the fields of forestry, statistics and labour matters. I am glad to say that among others Iraq Government is preparing large scale plans for irrigation and flood-control which, if successfully applied, may nearly double the cultivable areas. The Persian Govt is about to embark on the first stage of their seven year development plan. In this and other projects we are willing to give all possible assistance. The Americans have also been interested in these projects and the World Bank is showing itself ready to help.

The basic policy on which we believe we and the Americans hold similar views is not merely a matter of words. I would remind the House of the common approach which we and the Americans have made to the problems of Turkey and Greece, and of the significance of this fact in the field of security. American aid and support to Turkey and Greece in close agreement with ourselves is an extremely important contribution to the stability and security of the whole area. American interest and help in Persia, also side by side with ourselves is equally important."

ACHESON

501.MA Palestine/1–2549

The Secretary of Defense (Forrestal) to the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Bloom)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, 25 January 1949.

DEAR MR. BLOOM: Your Committee has pending before it a legislative proposal recently submitted by the State Department with respect to Palestine refugees. On behalf of the National Military Establishment I should like to strongly recommended the enactment of this legislation.

Many reports from Brigadier General William Riley, U.S.M.C., who is the Senior U.S. Military Observer, as well as the Chief of Staff of the UN Mediator, Dr. Ralph Bunche, indicate that the situation of the

[1] Apparently Secretary Forrestal sent an identical letter to Tom Connally, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. He transmitted a copy of his letter to Chairman Bloom on January 25 to the Secretary of State.

refugee is a major obstacle in the path toward peace in Palestine. The presence of almost a half million refugees in various areas of the Middle East not only constitutes a serious threat to the political, economic and social stability of this important region, but seriously endangers the health and welfare of the peoples of the Arab States and Israel. This unhealthy condition also menaces American civilians and military personnel who are present in these countries.

Such a measure would be wholly consistent with the traditional humanitarian role of the United States in cases of major disaster and calamity among the peoples of other lands. Moreover, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that it is militarily important to provide timely and generous aid to these refugees in order to remove the serious threat to the stability of this area which their present plight creates.

To alleviate this dangerous situation our assistance must be prompt and generous and we have every reason to believe that it will be efficiently administered by our American Ambassador, Stanton Griffis, who has been appointed as the UN Director of Relief. I therefore urge early consideration and passage of the proposed legislation.

This office has been advised by the Bureau of the Budget that this legislation and this report are in accord with the program of the President.

Sincerely yours, JAMES FORRESTAL

IO Files

Message Released by the United Nations Security Council on January 25, 1949

S/1225

CABLEGRAM DATED 25 JANUARY 1949 FROM THE ACTING MEDIATOR TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TRANSMITTING A CEASE FIRE AGREEMENT APPROVED BY EGYPT AND THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL

TO PRESIDENT OF SECURITY COUNCIL: I have the honour to inform you that the following cease-fire agreement was formally approved by the Delegations of Egypt and Israel at Rhodes for the armistice negotiations. Text of agreement follows:

"EGYPTIAN ISRAELI GENERAL CEASE FIRE AGREEMENT

We, the undersigned, do hereby agree that:

1. The general cease-fire agreement between the two parties which became effective on 7 January 1949 at 1200 GMT is hereby formally confirmed as a complete and enduring cease-fire between all elements of our military or para-military forces—land, sea and air—wherever located.

2. No element of the ground or air forces of either party shall advance beyond or pass over the line now held by foremost elements of its ground forces, and no element of naval or air forces of either party shall enter into or pass over the waters adjacent to the coastline now held by the other party for any purpose whatsoever.

3. In pursuance of the resolution of the Security Council of 29 December 1948, complete supervision of the truce by the United Nations observers shall be allowed and facilitated.

4. Movements of civilians shall not occur from one side to the other.

Done and signed in quadruplicate at Rhodes, Island of Rhodes, Greece, on the 24 January 1949, in the presence of the United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine and the Chief of Staff of this United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. Signed for and on behalf of the Government of Egypt: Self El Dine, Colonel and M. K. El Rahmany, Colonel. For and on behalf of the Provisional Government of Israel: Walter Eytan and Yigael Yadin, Alouf.[1] Rhodes, 24 January 1949."

The negotiations on the armistice agreement made excellent progress in the early stages but severe divergencies in viewpoint have been encountered during the past few days. The negotiations are continuing, however, and it is still hoped that agreement can be reached.

I regret that I have not been in a position to keep the Security Council regularly informed as to the progress made and the difficulties encountered because of the formal agreement entered into by the two Delegations that the proceedings of the negotiations are not to be released in any way until the negotiations are concluded.

[1] Hebrew equivalent of "Colonel"; Colonel Yadin was Chief of Operations in the Israeli Army.

IO Files

Message Released by the United Nations Security Council on January 26, 1949

S/1227

CABLEGRAM DATED 25 JANUARY 1949 FROM THE ACTING MEDIATOR TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF AN UNDERTAKING ON FOOD AND MEDICAL CONVOYS FOR AL FALUJA

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL: I have the honour to report the following text of an undertaking on food and medical convoys for Al Faluja entered into at Rhodes on 24 January 1949 by the delegation of Israel.

"UNDERTAKING ON FOOD AND MEDICAL CONVOYS FOR AL FALUJA

The undersigned, on behalf of the Provisional Government of Israel, hereby undertakes that pending the evacuation of Al Faluja, and subject to review at the conclusion of the present Rhodes negotiations, food and medical supplies for the sustenance of the garrison and civilian population in Al Faluja, in such quantities as may be determined by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, shall be granted unobstructed passage from present Egyptian lines to Al Faluja in convoys exclusively under United Nations supervision and escort. The Chief of Staff shall inform the designated representative of the Government of Israel of the quantities of supplies, the number of vehicles and the times of all such projected convoys, and shall take into account such recommendations relating thereto as said designated representative may deem it necessary to make." [1]

[1] Pursuant to this agreement four separate convoys, supervised and escorted by United Nations personnel, entered al-Faluja with food and medical supplies for Egyptian military forces and civilians resident there, on January 28 and February 4, 11, and 18. These operations were carried out without incident (cablegrams by Mr. Bunche to Secretary-General Lie, dated January 29 and February 4, 11, and 18, which were released by the Security Council as S/1236, S/1243, S/1255, and S/1262, respectively).

501.BB Palestine/1–2649 : Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET URGENT TEL AVIV, January 26, 1949—10 a. m.

57. ReDeptel 42, January 24. At 9 p. m., I had conference with Shertok, Knox and Shiloah (latter returned January 25 from Rhodes) present. Shertok reviewed in detail the negotiations and contemplated procedures re Faluja evacuation as follows:

1. In discussions with Bunche and Riley it was made abundantly clear that evacuation of Faluja must be part of the whole armistice negotiation and not a separate operation; accordingly, Israeli delegation had it placed on the agenda as sub-item in "topic four". Bunche argued strongly that it would be impossible because of face for Egyptians accept a document which specified in writing that evacuation of Faluja was contingent on armistice but that he and Riley would explain to Egyptians verbally that evacuation was conditional and warn Egyptians agree or be accused in SC of non-cooperation. Israel then agreed proceed on Bunche's verbal promise which, according Shiloah, was fully understood by more than ten top UN and Israeli negotiators in round-table discussion. In effect Israelis compromised even further in agreeing that evacuation would begin on completion armistice or when armistice appeared very near to conclusion. Bunche finally countered, perhaps with undue optimism, by insistence on specific date of 24 January to start evacuation contingent, however, on armistice nego-

tiations progress before that date. When on January 22 it became apparent armistice could not be concluded, nor was very near conclusion, Israelis asked him inform Egyptians of delay in evacuation and, for window dressing, provided in agreement with Bunche the "technical reason": i.e., confusion re Egyptian request simultaneous evacuation of 2500 civilians from Faluja.

2. Shertok and Shiloah state Bunche fully admits the verbal understanding that implementation of evacuation must be contingent on, and considered in context of, whole armistice negotiations. Unfortunately, only the news of the written agreement is known to world press owing to text of operational memorandum to UN personnel in Tel Aviv which text was leaked to press.

The Egyptians have sent a note to Bunche accusing bad faith on part Israel for postponing evacuation. Israel replied January 25 in "stiff note" to Bunche, with copy for Egyptian delegates explaining exactly the verbal agreement in order avoid Egyptian accusation.

Shertok went on to say that for Israel agree evacuation Faluja with no armistice concluded or very near would be a farce; it is a misapprehension, as Bunche knows, to state that evacuation plan was unconditional.

In reply inquiry re expectations, Shertok stated he did not feel negotiations would break down over Faluja problem which is readily solvable as part of general settlement. He is most apprehensive, however, over following much more fundamental points:

1. Israel made Egypt proposal that it would guarantee stay out of Egypt if Egypt would get armies out of Israel partition area and guarantee not return. Israel furthermore guaranteed that if Egypt would take army out of Gaza–Rafah strip Israel would not move forces in, thus allowing Egyptian civil administrators to stay there along with any arrangement that could be worked out with UN supervisors. This, in Shertok viewpoint, was maximum conciliatory position possible.

2. Now it appears that Egypt, while wanting Israel guarantee not enter Egypt again, is insisting that Egyptian forces be allowed re-enter Negev and occupy El Auja. Shertok says this is serious and Israel cannot agree.

3. While disturbed over Egyptian attitude on El Auja, Shertok states that with chief negotiators still in Rhodes parley begins again Thursday and he still has hope success.

Shertok says evidence desire continue negotiations Israel signed Rhodes January 24 firm agreement with Egyptian delegates allow another food and medical convoy to Faluja brigade, and a "sincere cease-fire" arrangement similar to the Jerusalem one.

Shertok reiterated instructions sent Epstein with hope that US Government could use good offices persuade Egyptians Government

not insist (1) unconditional evacuation Faluja and (2) return Egypt forces to El Auja.[1]

Pass copy to Army CSGID.

McDONALD

[1] Mr. Rusk, on January 27, summarized telegram 57 in an unnumbered, eyes only telegram to Acting Mediator Bunche, at Rhodes. He concluded the message as follows: "We have been very much encouraged with your masterly direction of the Rhodes talks and even though auspices may not now seem bright we do hope you will stick by job until it is finished. While fully conversant your desire to return we feel that no one but yourself should shepherd these delicate negotiations at this time. Conciliation Commission can then build on foundations you have established." (501.BB Palestine/1–2749)

867N.01/2–1449

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 27, 1949.

Subject: *De jure* recognition of the Governments of Israel and Transjordan.

On August 30, 1948 you approved a policy of simultaneously extending *de jure* recognition to Israel and Transjordan, after the Israeli elections.[1] On October 24, 1948, you declared in a public statement that when a permanent government was elected in Israel it would promptly be given *de jure* recognition.[2]

The Israeli elections took place on January 25. Reports so far received are that the moderate Mapai party of David Ben Gurion, which is now in control of the Provisional Government of Israel, has won enough votes to assure that it will remain in control of the administration, with the assistance of political groups sympathetic to it. Accordingly, I believe we should plan to extend full recognition to Transjordan and Israel in the very near future.

There are attached draft telegrams to our representatives in Tel Aviv (Tab A)[3] and Amman (Tab B) instructing them to announce to representatives of the governments concerned the decision of the United States to extend full recognition, and suggested press releases to be issued here after the above notifications have been made (Tab C) and (Tab D).

Subject to your approval, it is suggested that our Mission in Tel Aviv become an Embassy and that Mr. James G. McDonald, who is your Special Representative, be named Ambassador to Israel. It is also suggested that Mr. Wells Stabler, a Foreign Service Officer who

[1] See memorandum of August 30, 1948, by the Secretary of State to President Truman, and footnote 1, *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1359.
[2] See telegram Telmar 97, October 24, 1948, to Paris, *ibid.*, p. 1512.
[3] The tabs cited in this memorandum are not printed.

is at present in Amman in the capacity of liaison officer for the American Member of the Security Council Truce Commission in Palestine, be named Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of our Mission in Amman, which should be a Legation.

I should appreciate your advice as to the timing of this recognition. It seems to me that it might come as early as the latter part of this week and that shortly thereafter we could request *agrement* for Mr. McDonald as Ambassador to Israel.[4]

DEAN ACHESON

[4] President Truman gave his approval in an undated marginal notation. Regarding the telegrams sent to Tel Aviv and to Amman on January 31, see the editorial note, p. 713.

USUN Files

Memorandum by Mr. Samuel K. C. Kopper to Mr. Mark F. Ethridge

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 27, 1949.

I. *General*—The attitude of the Arab states individually and collectively during United Nations consideration of the Palestine question has been marked by the following features:

(*a*) At the outset of the General Assembly consideration of the question in April 1947 there was unanimous agreement among the Arab states who were members of the UN as well as the Arab Higher Committee that Palestine should become a unitary Arab state. On the surface this position has been officially maintained up to the present. Their opposition to the Partition of Palestine was based on historical, legal, ethnic and other grounds. That many of their contentions had merit cannot be denied.

(*b*) Arab governmental leaders have for the most part been prodded by the populace, particularly in the cities of the Arab states to liberate Palestine from the Jewish hold. With very few exceptions these Arab leaders have not only done little publicly to try and cool the ardor of the populace, but have more often taken positions which tended to fan the flames even though the governments possessed little or no power to back up their public position with effective action.

(*c*) Strong resentment existed among Arab leaders and peoples towards the U.S. particularly during the 1947 General Assembly and immediately there afterwards, and on May 14th when the US gave *de facto* recognition to the Government of the State of Israel. During the past six months there is evidence that this anti-American sentiment has subsided slightly. There is increasing evidence that a number of the Arab leaders would like to get out of the Palestine situation as gracefully as possible. Nevertheless, there still exists considerable unrest and agitation inspired by more extreme elements which makes the situation in several of the Arab states somewhat unsettled.

(*d*) The policy of the Arab Governments regarding a Palestine settlement was frequently characterized by a stubborn unwillingness to yield on points which might have created a more suitable solution

from the Arab point of view that the situation which developed after their unwillingness to yield. Many of the points upon which they have failed to concede, have frequently seemed relatively insignificant in light of subsequent developments.

(*e*) In UN negotiations one is frequently confronted with a situation where Arab leaders are saying one thing publicly for home consumption yet at the same time privately are trying to find ways and means of settling the situation in a more moderate way.

(*f*) The unity of the Arab states in the Palestine situation was fairly well preserved until they undertook military action in Palestine. The failure of the governments to take effective action or no action at all has led to mutual recrimination and has all but shattered cooperation in the Arab League on the Palestine question. The position of Transjordan throughout the UN discussions was never exactly the same as the position taken by the other Arab states. There is increasing evidence that the Arab Governments would like to have the Palestine question settled so that they can get along with economic and social developments in their own individual countries.

(*g*) The problem of the 500,000 Arab refugees from Palestine created by the Jewish influx and Israeli military activity has placed a very heavy burden upon all of the Arab states excepting Saudi Arabia and Yemen. An adequate settlement of this potentially dangerous and electric situation is essential.

II. The attitudes of the individual Arab states may be summarized as follows:

[Here follow the attitudes of Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan, and Yemen.]

III. *Conclusion*—Most of the Arab leaders seem to realize that their cause against the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine is now hopeless. They are not, however, as yet able to take a position in public recognizing the state of Israel. Only time will permit them to take such a position. In spite of their aversion to the policy of the U.S. the great majority of the Arab leaders recognize the realities of the position of the U.S. in the world today and many of them hope that the situation in Palestine can be ended so that they can resume more normal relations toward the U.S. The position of the U.K. in the Arab world has not been enhanced by the policy pursued by that government during the past year and a half. Arab leaders are apprehensive of the intentions of the Soviet Union. They would probably prefer to get out of the present situation and into more normal relations with U.S. The tone and feeling of the Arab Delegations in the General Assembly of 1948 as compared with the previous session was much more friendly towards the U.S. in spite of all that transpired between November 1947 and September 1948. There is a feeling of some bitterness on the part of some of the Arab leaders over the willingness of the Security Council to take strong measures in July 1948 directed at the Arab states but absence of a similar willingness to do the same against the state of Israel in the fall of the same year. This

feeling, however, does not permit them to indulge in the hope that there will be a change in the American policy. In spite of insinuations a year ago that the Arab states might leave the United Nations, they have not done so although they are undoubtedly quite cynical about the role of the UN. An economic boost to that area might well alleviate some of the bitter feeling in the Arab states.

When the General Assembly was considering the establishment of the Palestine Conciliation Commission during the latter part of November and early December of 1948 there was considerable speculation as to how the Arab states would vote. If the Arab states, the Soviet Bloc and the other Asiatic states had all voted against the proposal it would not have passed. However, since the particular objective seemed to be conciliation by peaceful means and there did not appear to be any strong reaffirmation of the November 29, 1947 resolution the Arab leaders were able to indicate to their Asiatic friends their willingness to have them abstain or vote in favor of the December 11, 1948 resolution. (This required some prodding by the United States Delegation, however!)

501.BB Palestine/1–2849 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

TOP SECRET US URGENT NIACT WASHINGTON, January 28, 1949—6 p. m.

107. Epstein on instructions Shertok informed Dept Jan 28 PGI seriously disturbed by deadlock Rhodes and likelihood failure negos. Epstein said PGI sincerely desired reach agreement with Egyptians but that latter uncompromising, unwilling admit defeat, and encouraged in intransigent attitude by Bevin's speech in Commons Jan 26.

Epstein said main stumbling block appeared to be El Auja which Egyptians stated was menace to Egypt as long as in Israeli hands. They desired Israelis withdraw from El Auja but for security reasons PGI unable effect complete withdrawal as long as prospects final peace negos not immed. Israeli reps Rhodes had informed Egyptians that PGI willing withdraw main body Israeli troops back from El Auja leaving only "military outpost" under UN supervision. Such outpost would in no way be strong enough to menace Egypt and yet would afford measure of protection to Israeli settlements in area.

Epstein said he saw no reason why PGI would not agree to sign armistice with Egyptians on basis this arrangement El Auja and that he certain that if agreement concerning El Auja could be reached PGI would release Faluja brigade.

Epstein reiterated PGI position that armistice should be based on present military lines with exception above arrangement El Auja and Faluja, Egypt to remain in occupation Gaza–Rafah coastal strip.

Epstein said proposal concerning El Auja had been decided in PGI Cabinet meeting and that Cabinet had also decided formally request USG's good offices to attempt persuade Egyptians come to agreement this basis. Said despite deadlock PGI would not withdraw negotiators from Rhodes.

Pls call immed upon FonMin and give him above info. Add that USG earnestly hopes Egypt will see way clear to reaching armistice agreement with PGI. Point out that proposed UN supervision Israeli outpost El Auja seems offer assurance El Auja will not be menace Egypt nor Egyptian lines communication. Add that fact that Israeli proposal is result Cabinet decision and that PGI has formally requested US good offices seems indicate proposal sincere. State USG believes substantial progress already made toward Israeli-Egyptian armistice agreement and hopes both sides will make every effort remove final obstacles now standing in way.

Dept made representation Egypt Amb Jan 28 along same lines. Amb pointed out PGI made no mention of compliance with SC resolution Nov 4. Made personal suggestion that Egyptian observers might be stationed at proposed Israeli outpost El Auja in addition UN reps. Dept stated opinion this suggestion merited serious consideration Rhodes but pointed out proposed Israeli-Egyptian armistice comm would be in position to maintain surveillance El Auja outpost. Amb reporting Dept's representation to Cairo.

For your info only Dept this morning also recd request from SYG requesting it endeavor persuade both Govts break deadlock.[1]

ACHESON

[1] This telegram was repeated to Tel Aviv for the American Delegation to the Palestine Conciliation Commission and to Jerusalem. It was transmitted separately to Acting Mediator Bunche, at Rhodes, in an unnumbered telegram of January 28 and to London in telegram 321 the same day (501.BB Palestine/1–2849). The message to London requested the Embassy to "Pls immed convey sense above to FonOff and state USG hopes UKG will make particular effort Cairo attempt persuade Egyptians reach compromise with Israelis at Rhodes. Add USG believes Israeli proposal could serve as effective basis for armistice without reference to dispositions final peace settlement, and that fact that proposal is result PGI Cabinet decision and that PGI has formally requested US good offices this basis seems indicate proposal sincere."

Chargé Patterson called on Prime Minister Ibrahim Abdel Hadi on January 29 and gave him the substance of the Department's telegram. At the conclusion of the presentation, Hadi Pasha "expressed inability consider El Auja suggestion or other points raised by Israeli pending demonstration of Israeli good faith through prior unconditional release Faluja garrison . . ." The Prime Minister left the impression with the Chargé that the "Egyptians anxious continue Rhodes conversations but felt that token evidence of good faith by Israelis and face-saving device represented by unconditional release of Faluja garrison must be insisted upon as prerequisite to renewal of serious conversations at Rhodes." (telegram 116, January 29, 4 p. m., from Cairo, 501.BB Palestine/1–2949)

501.BB Palestine/1–2849 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT NEW YORK, January 28, 1949— 9 : 10 p. m.

107. SYG Lie handed USUN following telegram to him from Bunche dated Rhodes, 27 January. Lie stated he was giving us this confidentially and not to any other delegation although we assume he gave it to McNaughton as President SC. Lie hoped US could do something and surmised UK might be making more trouble.

Following verbatim text of telegram:

"Negotiations resumed afternoon 27th. Following separate talks with each delegation conclusion is inescapable that prospects for an armistice agreement are virtually nil. Each delegation is adamant on its previous position. Have exerted every possible effort to induce concessions from each side but to no avail.

Egyptian minimum demands are:

a. Israeli withdrawal to 14 October lines as defined in 13 November memorandum except for defence forces in settlements;

b. Egyptian civil administrators in Beersheba and Bir-Asluj; they have dropped their original demand that Egyptian forces be permitted to return to Bir-Asluj and along Rafah Bir-Asluj road;

c. They claim right to advance only at El Auja which Israelis captured in late December and advanced from there into Egypt.

Egyptians therefore taken 13 November lines as basis for armistice lines and insist advantages gained under the truce should not be confirmed by armistice agreement.

Israelis have modified their original demand that Egyptian forces withdraw altogether from Gaza–Rafah coastal strip now strongly held by them and will accept Egyptians remaining there with defence forces only on basis of a reciprocal reduction agreement. Israelis insist on retention of their forces in El Auja at minimum in defensive strength and regard as unrealistic Egyptian emphasis on 4 November resolution and demands concerning Beersheba and Bir-Asluj. They will not consider any general withdrawal to 14 October lines or evacuation of Beersheba and Bir-Asluj.

Israeli position is that any withdrawal arrangement must be on reciprocal basis and will be controlled by distance of Egyptian forces from Palestine frontier. Egyptians embittered about postponement of Al Faluja evacuation. Egyptians urge that they do not have to sign an armistice agreement with Israelis to stay where they are and hold what they have and will not sign one unless Israelis make important concessions in direction indicated. Egyptians do not wish to sign away in an armistice agreement any interests of their own in Negev or custodial claims on behalf of Palestine Arabs there. They realize that as soon as they sign most other Arab states will quickly follow.

We have been officially informed that Lebanese will sign an armistice agreement within half an hour after notification that Egyptians have signed. Abdullah has communicated to me his interest in an invitation if Egypt signs.

It has been made clear to me today that despite a complete impasse neither delegation will wish to take responsibility for walking out on the negotiations. They will wish me to take responsibility for closing the negotiations by declaring no hope for agreement exists. I will be cautious about that. At worst I will try to persuade them to adjourn indefinitely and then I will report fully to SC. Present prospect is that negotiations will be completely stalemated by Sunday if not before. Urgent Council intervention in some form might be helpful even if only a cable from President of Council.[1]

If no agreement is signed here possibility of renewed fighting will be greatly increased."

[Here follows final paragraph, dealing with a matter other than the armistice agreements.]

AUSTIN

[1] President McNaughton informed Acting Mediator Bunche that he could not "intervene officially in the Rhodes conversations unless he has a specific reason or specific point on which to comment. He advised Bunche in any event not to break off the discussions but, if necessary, adjourn them. If necessary to call adjournment, Bunche should request both parties to issue statements setting forth reasons therefor. McNaughton's thought was that the SC could use such statements as a basis for intervention." (telegram 110, January 29, 3:50 p. m. from New York, 501.BB Palestine/1–2949)

501.BB Palestine/1–2949

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Robert M. McClintock

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 29, 1949.

Subject: Palestine

Participants: Mr. Eliahu Epstein, Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel
Mr. Ethridge, U.S. Member of the U.N. Palestine Conciliation Commission
Mr. Satterthwaite, NEA
Mr. Rockwell, NE
Mr. McClintock, UNA

Mr. Epstein called on Mr. Ethridge at the Department at 11 a. m., January 29. He said that he had promptly reported to his Government the interview he had had on the preceding day with Mr. Satterthwaite but had not received any further word from Tel Aviv.

The Department's Officers laid great stress on the evacuation of the Faluja garrison and said that on the basis of their talk with the Egyptian Ambassador it seemed that this was the key point which, if removed, would cause the diplomatic log jam to break. Mr. Epstein went into a long explanation that the Faluja agreement was merely one aspect of the over-all armistice agreement. He said, "We will let them out of Faluja if they will agree to our staying at El Auja."

At this point Mr. McClintock read Mr. Epstein a private telegram from Dr. Bunche to Mr. Rusk, which made very clear that the Faluja agreement had been unconditional and was in no way dependent upon the conclusion of an over-all armistice. Mr. Epstein seemed considerably taken aback but stuck to his guns and reiterated his former thesis.

When it was suggested that possibly a token Egyptian force might also remain at El Auja, Mr. Epstein said vehemently that his Government would never agree to such terms.

(Mr. Ethridge remarked after the interview that he thought the Israelis were unduly rigid with regard to Faluja. He did not seem to have acquired a very good impression of the Israeli case from his talk with Mr. Epstein.)

Regarding the long-range aspects of the Arab refugee problem Mr. Epstein said that he was sure the Israeli Government would welcome back the Christian Arabs. He implied that such a welcome would not be accorded the Moslem Arabs but added that the Mohammedans would not wish to return in any event as they did not feel comfortable as a racial or religious minority group. He commented that it was an interesting facet of Arab character that the Mohammedan Arabs, when in the majority, treated other minorities very well but that they did not feel the same way when occupying the minority position themselves.

Mr. Epstein said that, in addition to these considerations, many of the Arab villages had been destroyed and there were no homes for the refugees to return to. He said that, from the humanitarian aspect, Israel would have to contribute something to the rehabilitation of the refugees but the problem was too vast for any single small government to handle and it could only be solved by the international community. He thought, however, that certain of the Arab States, such as Transjordan and Iraq, were in need of extra population and might be able to take a considerable portion of the refugees.

501-887—77——46

501.BB Palestine/1–2949 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT JERUSALEM, January 29, 1949—10 a. m.

78. Palun 15. It is suggested Department discuss with Ethridge Deptel 35, nineteenth and previous Contels regarding possibility early settlement Jerusalem. In order capitalize on present opportunity achieving agreement, believe question should be raised by Commission with PGI and Transjordan immediately upon arrival Ethridge who will probably become chairman February 1. Commission could then proceed planned tour capital, leaving committee here to continue by negotiations pending return. Dayan's proposals not yet discussed with Commission members. We plan informally discuss this subject with French representative shortly.

Believe agreement should follow lines Dayan suggestions, avoiding references sovereignty, and prefacing agreement with stipulation it is without prejudice international status city as provided GA resolution. Agreement would have object achieving peace and demilitarization city and would be signed directly between parties. It is recognized immediate agreement establishing demarcation line between Arab and Jewish areas and postponing question internationalization may result in intervening period being utilized to make ultimate agreement on internationalization more difficult. However, absence of any agreement now would have same result, present opportunity for peaceful settlement in city would be forfeited and permanent retention by Jews of Arab areas now held would become most likely. USDel and Consulate General, therefore, believe every effort should be exerted reach agreement now delineating Arab-Jewish area and demilitarizing city.

Department will undoubtedly realize Commission discussions regarding internationalization will probably precipitate adverse public reaction in Israel press which may stimulate dissident elements with complications security problem. For example, yesterday morning's press alleged Israeli Cabinet decided to claim full sovereign rights except in Old City where internationalization might be accepted. Nevertheless USDel and Consulate General feel risk must be taken.

French representative is of opinion that PGI should not carry out intentions reported in press to hold constituent assembly Jerusalem nor set up proposed central administrative offices in Jerusalem. He may raise question in Commission, or may make informal representations to PGI or may report to his government for action.[1]

BURDETT

[1] The Department informed Jerusalem on January 30 that Mr. Ethridge had departed for Jerusalem before telegram 78 could be discussed with him. It noted also that Mr. Ethridge was acquainted with the general lines of the proposal (telegram 54, 501.BB Palestine/1–3049).

867N.01/1–2949 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED URGENT LONDON, January 29, 1949—1 p. m.

350. Foreign Office issued following communiqué 11 a. m. London time today:

"HMG in UK have decided to accord *de facto* recognition to the Government of Israel. They hope to arrange with that government for the early exchange of representatives."

2. Final decision this connection was taken late January 28.

3. Bevin will receive Linton, Israel representative at 12:30 to inaugurate UK–Israel relations with "friendly words." Marriott [1] has been instructed to deliver same message to Shertok in Tel Aviv.

4. Fact *de facto* recognition does not in any way effect determination Israel frontiers is being made clear in Foreign Office spokesman guidance to press. Spokesman will refer to many outstanding questions arising from former British mandate which remained to be worked out with Israel and which UK hopes can be settled with Israel at early date. Re *de jure* recognition, spokesman will say that this will be considered in the light these discussions establishment of frontiers and general development of situation in Palestine.

HOLMES

[1] Cyril Marriott, British Consul General at Haifa.

867N.01/1–2949 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL JERUSALEM, January 29, 1949—3 p. m.

82. Dayan stated last night number new immigrants Jerusalem steadily increasing, now almost impossible find vacant room and Army requested vacate requisitioned houses and move into camps. First of Cyprus detainees, large number which scheduled settlement Jerusalem, expected thirtieth.

Admitted Arab quarters Jerusalem held by Jews completely settled by new immigrants and becoming thoroughly Jewish. Asserted PGI would have great difficulty forcing people move from homes now consider theirs and Army would probably be required use force with adverse political repercussions. Stated if return of certain sections to Arabs contemplated, agreement should be reached immediately.

According Dayan new immigrants now occupying Arab property throughout Israel and homes no longer exist to which Arab refugees could return. Stated PGI drawn up plans contemplating settlement Arab refugees in other Arab countries instead their return to Israel. Was vague as to details but said PGI estimated cost resettlement refugees at 150,000,000 pounds and prepared contribute considerable portion this amount. Claimed sources from which funds would come already determined. Maintained PGI would pay for Arab property taken over but not at fantastic prices prevailing during mandate.

To avoid possible embarrassment to Dayan, please protect source.

Sent Department 82, repeated Beirut 10, Amman 5.

BURDETT

867N.01/1–2649 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Saudi Arabia

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, January 29, 1949—6 p. m.

37. Dept now preparing instr to you for discussion overall relations US–SAG, but feels that certain questions raised your 68 Jan 26 [1] shld be answered immediately as follows:

1) You shld unequivocally state to SAG officials that US Govt has brought no pressure whatever on UK to recognize Israel. Only representations to UK have been concerned with recent shooting down of RAF planes over Egyptian-Israeli border, and these were made to both Israel and UK in effort to avoid incident developing into major proportions. Greatest pressure on UK has been that of Brit public and parliamentary opinion.

2) US arms embargo has been rigidly maintained. While some war material has been successfully smuggled out of US, quantity has not been large, and wherever possible participants have been prosecuted and material confiscated.

3) US attitude re Israel was clearly stated in UN by Dr. Jessup on Nov. 20 to effect that US supported Israeli claims to boundaries set forth UNGA resolution Nov 29 but believed that if Israel sought retain additional territory in Palestine it shld give Arabs territorial compensation.

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[1] Not printed; it transmitted an oral communication by Yusuf Yassin on behalf of King Ibn Saud. The communication stated that the United States was continually supporting and assisting the Israeli State; that under United States pressure, the British were starting to incline toward the Israelis; that the Soviet Union was openly extending military aid to Israel; and that the United States was also doing so, openly or secretly. The communication then queried concerning the attitude of the United States toward Israeli aggression (867N.01/1–2649).

4) We would not support any attempt by Israel to occupy any Arab state and would fully support any measures taken by UN to protect territorial integrity such State.

5) With regard to allegation of incursions Israeli planes over SA territory, Dept interested know whether SAG has brought matter to attention of Acting Mediator.[2]

ACHESON

[2] Jidda, on February 1, answered in the negative concerning the Department's query in paragraph 5 (telegram 80, 867N.01/2–149).

Editorial Note

The White House, on January 31, released statements announcing as of that date the *de jure* recognition by the United States Government of the Governments of Transjordan and of Israel; for the texts of the statements, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 6, 1949, page 205.

The Department of State sent appropriate telegrams to Amman (No. 16) and to Tel Aviv (No. 55) the same day (867N.01/1–3149).

501.BB Palestine/1–2949 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 31, 1949—6 p. m.

117. Ur 116 Jan 29. On Jan 29 Dept informed Epstein of Egypt PrimMin's response concerning Israeli proposal re El Auja. Epstein communicated substance to Tel Aviv and informed Dept Jan 31 that Shertok instructing Israeli reps Rhodes make following new proposal to Egyptians.

Village of El Auja to be seat of Israeli-Egyptian armistice commission and under control UN observers. Troops neither side to be present. Main body Israeli troops to be withdrawn "well back". Israeli "strong points" to be maintained "north and south of El Auja" along Egyptian frontier for defensive purposes.

Epstein said PGI position on release Faluja brigade remains same.

According Epstein PGI considers above arrangement should remove Egyptian fears that El Auja would be menace to Egyptian lines communication. Shertok desired details be worked out in Rhodes in-

[1] This telegram was repeated to London, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv.

stead of Washington and Cairo. Epstein said PGI anxious Rhodes negotiations not be broken off.

ACHESON

501.BB Palestine/2–149 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT LONDON, February 1, 1949—7 p. m.

379. 1. Burrows today gave Embassy considered Foreign Office reply Department's 321, January 28 [1] (Embassy's 351, January 29).[2] He said British views based on two important considerations.

2. First consideration is that Rhodes talks are being conducted in extreme privacy. Bunche made this clear in January 25 telegram to SYG (Doc No. S/1225) which mentioned formal agreement between Arabs and Jews that information re progress talks should not be made available in advance of their conclusion to anyone—not even SC. As result Burrows said it is impossible for anyone to have formal official notification of what is going on. PGI has approached USG in sense Depreftel, and Egyptians a few days earlier approached British Government re Israeli intransigence on Falluja garrison withdrawal but in Foreign Office view there is no official basis upon which advice can be given to either party.

3. Burrows said parenthetically that now UK has recognized Israel, latter is at liberty to put directly to it any points and that UK would be glad to consider such points. Israel has made no such approach.

4. Second consideration according Burrows is that intervention in favor Israeli's ideas re Auja by a government would be in pursuit settlement on very different lines to that laid down by SC on November 4 and December 29. Consequently UK feels that any such action should be regarded with utmost caution because of possibility of it being taken as precedent in other cases such as Indonesia.

5. Burrows said UK has no objection to any agreement reached between parties which would help maintain cease-fire and lead to armistice and final settlement but that Foreign Office considers material difference arises if some outside power (not party to negotiation) should intervene to press one or other side to accept something quite different from SC views.

6. Burrows pointed out that UK has repeatedly told all Arab Governments (most recently on January 18) that their best course would

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[1] Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 706.
[2] Not printed.

be to conclude armistice with Israel followed by final settlement. However, Foreign Office for reasons given above does not find it possible to intervene with Egypt in favor of any particular concession re Auja as outlined by Epstein.

7. In conclusion Burrows said Foreign Office would like to make one positive suggestion: One main difficulty Rhodes is Egyptian fear of making agreement which would leave Egypt open to further Israel aggression. Consequently Foreign Office believes that anything USG can do towards removing this Egyptian fear would be most valuable contribution.

8. When Embassy pointed out Department's 321 referred only to particular effort Cairo by UK to persuade Egyptians to reach compromise, Burrows said that in context outlined by Department this could only mean compromise re Auja and that UK for reasons given above is not prepared to advocate this compromise.

HOLMES

501.BB Palestine/2–149 : Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL TEL AVIV, February 1, 1949—7 p. m.

79. ReMistel 77, February 1.[1] Re broadening talks at Rhodes, Foreign Minister stated that PGI received letter 31 January from Bunche in capacity Acting UN Mediator, inviting Israel negotiate armistice with Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Yemen,[2] on basis of November 16 resolution, place of conference to be Rhodes or elsewhere within ten days. PGI replied in letter to Bunche February 1, that it readily accepted as regards Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, provided: (*a*) that Egyptian negotiations be concluded first; (*b*) and preferably that negotiations be concluded with others on bi-lateral basis in order handle problems one by one and avoid confusion. As regards Saudi Arabia and Yemen, PGI stated it had no quarrel with these states, desired to have friendly relations

[1] Not printed; it reported that Ambassador McDonald had formally conveyed United States *de jure* recognition to the Israeli Foreign Minister at 12 noon, February 1, and that in the ensuing 95-minute conversation, the latter had volunteered important information, to be made the subjects of following telegrams (867N.01/2–149).

[2] Mr. Bunche sent these invitations to the Governments of Israel and of the Arab States (except for Egypt) on January 30. The Security Council released the text of the latter group of invitations on February 3 as S/1241.

with them, and saw no reason negotiate armistice with them, because never considered itself in actual conflict with them.[3]

Foreign Minister hopeful mood re progress Rhodes Egyptian talks, especially inasmuch as on January 31 Shiloah had first direct talk with Egyptian representative and latter expressed earnest desire conclude armistice.

McDONALD

[3] According to a cablegram of February 8 from Mr. Bunche to Secretary-General Lie, the Governments of Israel, on January 31, and of Transjordan, on February 8, accepted Mr. Bunche's invitation. The Security Council released the cablegram the same day as S/1245.

Saudi Arabia, on February 8, declined the invitation, noting that the "armed Saudi Arabian troops participating in the Palestine campaign do not constitute an independent front, and there is no reason why the Saudi Arabian Government should enter into any negotiations to conclude a new truce while the truce imposed in July is still effective. At any rate, the Saudi Arabian Government accepts the decisions which have already been adopted, or which may be adopted by the Arab League, in respect of the situation in Palestine."

Iraq also declined the invitation, informing Mr. Bunche on February 13 that "the terms of armistice which will be agreed upon by the Arab States neighbours of Palestine . . . will be regarded as acceptable." The texts of the Saudi Arabian and Iraqi replies were transmitted by Mr. Bunche to Secretary-General Lie on February 24 and were released the same day by the Security Council as S/1265.

867N.01/2–149 : Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET TEL AVIV, February 1, 1949—7 p. m.

80. Re Mistel 77, February 1.[1] With repeated emphasis need absolute secrecy FonMin informed that January 31 Israel representatives went Transjordan talk with King Abdullah at latter's request. Interview was lengthy and although not yet in possession complete details conversation FonMin said his information main points were:

1. King stated he desired peace and that war was not really war but more like an unpleasant incident between "friends".
2. British knew King was conferring with Israel representatives and had no objection and gave King free hand except on certain undisclosed points.
3. That if Bunche invited Transjordan Rhodes negotiate with Israel representatives there King would send envoy immediately. If invitation permitted delay of ten days or so King would again confer with Israel representatives during interim.

FonMin stated he very pleased King's expression peaceful possibilities but somewhat baffled because King could not disclose points

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 715.

of possible disagreement. Bunche's invitation and PGI requests delay until conclusion Egyptian talks (Mistel 79, February 1) allows possibility one or more meetings with King during ten days before possible Rhodes meeting.

McDONALD

867N.01/2–149 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT URGENT JERUSALEM, February 1, 1949—9 p. m.

94. Following announcement issued by Public Information Office tonight:

At its meeting yesterday the Cabinet decided to terminate the military governorship of Jerusalem and to institute in that city governmental arrangements obtaining in other parts of the State of Israel.

"On the 2nd of August, 1948, the Government proclaimed that all laws of the State of Israel apply to the area of Jerusalem under Israeli occupation, and in view of the conditions prevailing at the time, the Government then deemed it necessary to establish the military governorship in the city."

Initial local public reaction is that announcement tantamount to annexation Jewish sections city Jerusalem to State of Israel.[1]

Sent Department 94; repeated Amman 7.

BURDETT

[1] Foreign Minister Shertok informed Mr. McDonald of this action and explained, "to avoid international misunderstanding," that it "was administrative and not annexation of Jerusalem." (telegram 78, February 1, 6 p. m., from Tel Aviv, 867N.01/2–149)

501.BB Palestine/2–249 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, February 2, 1949—7 p. m.

62. Unpal 14. [For Ethridge.] AmRep Tel Aviv, together with diplomatic and consular Corps Tel Aviv, invited attend opening Constituent Assembly Jewish Jerusalem Feb 14. Dept has serious doubts, view US position in support UNGA decision re internationalization Jerusalem, concerning advisability any American reps Palestine attending opening assembly. Dept has so informed AmRep Tel Aviv,[1]

[1] In telegram 63, February 2, 7 p. m., not printed.

stating further instructions to follow after matter fully considered here. (Ur 86 Jan 31.)[2]

Meanwhile, Dept would like receive indication views PCC re implications holding Constituent Assembly Jerusalem and Ethridge opinion re attendance US reps.

ACHESON

[2] Not printed; it reported a notice published in the local press calling upon occupants of abandoned property in Jerusalem to establish their right to hold such property. To Consul Burdett, this action "appears to be direct application in Jerusalem area of Israeli law disposing of property in manner and on grounds not permitted to military occupant under international law." The Consul cited Israeli plans to hold the Constituent Assembly in Jerusalem, to conduct municipal elections there in March, and to discontinue the military governship thereafter. He also noted the permanent establishment of the Israeli Supreme Court in Jerusalem. He then suggested that "appropriate representations soonest to PGI re these developments which seemed designed prejudice internationalization Jerusalem and are part current PGI policy treating Jerusalem as integral part Israel." (867N.00/1–3149)

Jerusalem, on February 3, reported that the first full meeting of the Conciliation Commission took place that day, with Mr. Ethridge in attendance. The Commission discussed the developments set forth in telegram 86. Mr. Ethridge asserted that the "Commission had clear mandate from UN in GA resolution December 11 and suggested Commission immediately make informal contact with Israeli Government for purpose of stating its position and ascertaining Israeli Government's views." The Commission agreed to do so and also decided "to arrange informal meeting between Commission and Israeli and Arab military commanders Jerusalem separately for purpose of expediting proposed military and administrative agreement." (telegram 107, 501.BB Palestine/2–349)

501.BB Palestine/2–249 : Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT CAIRO, February 2, 1949—9 p. m.

131. On responding at 6 p. m., February 2 to urgent request by Foreign Minister I was informed by Abaza Pasha of receipt today word from Rhodes of rejection by Israelis of a proposition devised by Dr. Bunche as Palestine Mediator with view to Egyptian-Israeli Palestine settlement (Embtel 126, February 1).

Egyptians had steadily refused Israeli efforts to change basis of Rhodes talks from SC November 4 and 16 resolutions along lines more acceptable to Israelis. However, when Bunche stating that he had been in touch with his government proposed a new basis for a Palestine settlement Egyptians although unhappy to do so assented in the interests of accelerating conclusion of an agreement.

Bunche had proposed that Bersheba (Bir Saba), El Auja and Bir Asluj should be neutralized with the Mediator or his successor, the Palestine Conciliation Commission sitting in one of the three places above-named. The Egyptians under Bunche's proposition would re-

main at Gaza.[1] (It was not clearly stated when Faluja garrison would be released.)

This proposal had been met by a refusal on the part Israelis or perhaps more precisely by counter-proposals which the Egyptians considered wholly unacceptable.

By such counter-proposals the Israelis stated:

1. Bersheba was necessary to them.
2. They required that an Israeli offensive and defensive force be stationed at Bersheba.
3. An Israeli defense force should be stationed at Bir Asluj.
4. On other hand Israeli would not occupy El Auja and would assent to the Egyptians fortifying that spot.
5. Israeli would assent to UN commission sitting at El Auja if desired.

Foreign Minister had learned that if this attitude were persisted in by the Israelis, Bunche, as acting Palestine Mediator, proposed to notify the SC of the attitude of Israeli's delegates or their government.

Foreign Minister, who indicated a continuing belief in ability of US Government to influence PGI, expressed hope that I most urgently communicate foregoing to my government in order that it might use its influence with PGI to further progress of the Rhodes talks to a conclusion having some relationship to the foundation on which the conversations were built and initiated. Abaza Pasha pointed out that Egyptians had made every conceivable concession, having even departed from their insistence on the November 4 and 16 resolutions when Bunche informed them that his proposition above mentioned had been brought to the attention of the US Government.

I trust the Department may find its way clear to extend effective good offices in order to bring parties to an agreement since Abaza Pasha rather despairingly inquired if the only alternative might be another resort to arms. The Minister, despite my categoric assurances that to the best of my knowledge and belief my government was sincerely desirous that the parties to the Rhodes conversations might reach a prompt and just settlement, was inclined to hold that the US in extending *de jure* recognition to Israel[2] at a sensitive point of the

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[1] According to a telegram of February 3, sent presumably to Secretary-General Lie, Mr. Bunche stated that his compromise draft agreement had been presented on January 31 and that the Egyptian Delegation had formally notified him on the morning of February 3 that Egypt accepted his draft, with minor modifications not affecting the substance. New York transmitted the text of Mr. Bunche's telegram to the Department in telegram 125, February 3, 1:18 p. m. (501.BB Palestine/2–349).

[2] In a note of February 4, Egyptian Ambassador Rahim expressed to the Secretary of State the very deep regret of his Government that "certain powers" had recognized the "so-called State of Israel," despite the failure to find a solution for the problems of Palestine. The Ambassador pointed out that while such recognition was not to be interpreted "as a definite stand in favor of Zionists," yet the Zionists had exploited it in this sense (501.BB Palestine/2–449).

Rhodes negotiations had rendered PGI more than ever intransigent and so had indirectly intervened in the negotiations in a sense injurious to Egypt.

Please telegraph urgently any statement which the Department may desire me to communicate to Foreign Minister or other representative Egyptian Government.

PATTERSON

867N.01/2–349 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL JIDDA, February 3, 1949—10 a.m.

87. Deputy Foreign Minister after giving message conveyed Legtel 86 [1] said if Legation's assurances in Deptel 37 [2] particularly paragraph 4 could be conveyed SAG in writing, this would very much facilitate and pave way for King use his moderating counsel with Arab States as suggested Deptel 30.[3] Replied Legation without authority give assurances in writing but would refer Department possible authorization.

Yusuf added paragraph 4 assurances were good but did not go far enough in his opinion to create sense of security Arab States. He instanced violation by Jews truce and efforts made SC to vote economic sanctions with US opposition.

I remarked neither US Government nor any other government would wish bind itself to any particular course of action against Palestine aggression and Yusuf admitted this. What SAG is asking is some assurance which we may feel it possible offer that measures recommended SC against Jewish aggression would not be opposed by US Government by reason possible Jewish pressure on US Government but only by reason doubts re their efficacy.[4]

Sent Department 87, repeated London 30.

CHILDS

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[1] Dated February 3, not printed; it conveyed the text of a message from King Ibn Saud stating that he was making every effort for peace in Palestine but that what had happened there was the result of aggression and of injustice to its local inhabitants. The King expressed the hope that the United States would instruct its representative on the Conciliation Commission to make every effort to give the Arabs their rights and to help them regain their confidence in the justice and equity of the United States Government. The Department replied on February 7, directing Minister Childs to inform the King that the United States representative on the Conciliation Commission had been "instructed make every effort assist parties reach just and equitable solution Palestine problem." (telegram 50) Both messages are filed under 867N.01/2–349.

[2] Dated January 29, p. 712.

[3] Dated January 28; not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 626.

[4] The Department's reply on February 7 instructed that if Yusuf brought up the subject again, Minister Childs was to "state with appropriate expression regret that USG not in position unilaterally give written assurances since UN seized of Palestine problem and US working in concert with other members UN to achieve solution." (telegram 49, 501.BB Palestine/2–349)

867N.01/2–349 : Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY TEL AVIV, February 3, 1949—11 a. m.

88. ReMistel 80, February 2 [*1*] and additional thereto. Morning February 2 at residence Sassoon, chief PGI negotiator with Arabs (Herlitz[1] Foreign Office also present) reported on "frank and friendly" secret conference he had with Abdullah in Amman January 31 as follows:

1. Abdullah anxious speedy peace negotiations which should follow immediately after arrangement armistice which in his opinion should involve slight difficulty. Favors public peace negotiations in Jerusalem between Transjordan and Israel, initial meeting preferably in Amman. Has notified all Arab Governments this plan and has received assent from Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. Egypt and Syria not pleased but "must follow since I (Abdullah) have decided". Has been assured by two Iraqi high officials and expects soon receive similar from Regent that Transjordan difficulties with Iraq will disappear.

2. Abdullah attributes his hurry to fear that delay will involve loss. Britain he says is using delay in Israel–Transjordan negotiations to gain concessions from other Arab states, notably Syria. King quoted this alleged British argument: "If Abdullah is blocked, what will Syria pay?"

3. Abdullah declined indicate reservations which Britain had imposed on his negotiations with Israel. Will reveal them only after armistice and during peace talks. Inferentially he permitted conclusion that Aqaba and southern Negev were involved. Transjordan he said not interested in Negev, "has enough desert land". Gaza, however, as outlet to sea now that Haifa has been lost is vital to Transjordan.

4. Abdullah is opposed to the internationalization of whole or part Jerusalem, favors partition, with old and portion of new city assigned Transjordan and rest to Israel, both portions remaining under some form United Nations supervision. No details such partition were discussed.

5. Arab refugees, Abdullah said, were now no important problem and after peace will solve itself.

6. Had accepted Bunche's invitation armistice negotiations at Rhodes because all other Arab states had agreed. He is opposed, how-

[1] Miss Esther Herlitz, Acting Director of the American Division of the Israeli Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

ever, to pooled discussions and reiterated preference direct negotiations with Israel.

7. Abdullah thinks Conciliation Commission will waste time and delay settlement. Says peace should be possible before Commission has opportunity acquaint itself with problem and before it could report assembly in September.

8. Israel's elections pleased Abdullah because disclosed such slight Communist strength. Transjordan he said does not need elections. He rules and Parliament carries out his will.

9. Interrupting his report of Abdullah's views, Sassoon emphasized that from PGI's viewpoint, armistice should suffice for many months with all the Arab states except Transjordan. With latter, peace necessary because partition of Palestine involved and many questions other than purely military ones that must be settled by formal treaty.

10. In answer my questions, Sassoon insisted that only "ultimatum" to Transjordan which might have been referred to in report to Department from Transjordan end December (Deptel 281, December 30 [2]) was his open telegram from Paris end November Transjordan Prime Minister asking that convoy be allowed, as previously agreed, to go Mount Scopus in order "to avoid incidents". Reply within 24 hours was friendly and Amman issued orders to Jerusalem to permit convoy. Subsequent exchanges all friendly.

11. According Sassoon, Abdullah denied categorically knowing in advance or having been asked about sending British troops to Aqaba early January. After their arrival he was presented with paper asking for troops, for his signature.

12. King told Sassoon he deeply appreciative recognition as sign US friendship, adding that he hoped American Government would increasingly interest itself in Transjordan–Israel relations, intimated desire lessen degree British tutelage.

McDONALD

[2] *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1704.

501.BB Palestine/2–349 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald), at Tel Aviv [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 3, 1949—2 p. m.

64. Text USRep's statement Nov 20 before Committee I of GA stated re refugees from Palestine hostilities "We believe that they

[1] This telegram was repeated to Jerusalem as No. 65 and as Unpal 15.

should be permitted to return to their homes and that adequate compensation should be arranged for the property of those who choose not to return". Pres on Jan 14 [*13?*] stated that Nov 20 speech represents US position with respect to Pal.[2]

GA Res of Dec 11, establishing PCC, calls for return of refugees so desiring, and payment compensation for property those choosing not return. USG strongly supported Dec 11 Res.

In light of this US position re refugee question, and in view fact PCC charged with facilitating disposition this problem, pls inform Dept your views re best means resolving question within framework final peaceful settlement Pal problem. Without approaching Israeli Govt, what is your estimate re its intentions permit repatriation and ability reabsorb refugees? What are your provisional recommendations for solution Arab refugee question?

Repeat reply to Jerusalem for PCC.

ACHESON

[2] Such a statement was made by President Truman at his news conference of January 13; for text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1949* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 98.

501.BB Palestine/2–449

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Secretary of State [1]

[WASHINGTON,] February 4, 1949.

THE ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

On January 31 the Acting Palestine Mediator proposed a compromise solution to the Israeli and Egyptian Governments to serve as the basis for a possible armistice between the two countries. In essence, the Israeli striking forces would be withdrawn toward the North and the Egyptian forces would remain entirely outside of Palestine with the exception of a small coastal strip from Gaza southwest to the Egyptian frontier and minor forces in the vicinity of Hebron. Beersheba, which is now held by the Israeli Government and a desert point in the Negev called Asluj, together with an important communications

[1] This memorandum was typewritten on the stationery of the Under Secretary of State. Mr. McClintock wrote, on February 7, that he had dictated the memorandum "for Mr. Webb in his office" and that it was the basis for the intervention by the Secretary, with the "President's backing," as evidenced in the telegram sent to Tel Aviv on February 5 (Mr. McClintock's letter to G. Lewis Jones, First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom, 501.BB Palestine/2–749). Regarding the telegram, see p. 730.

James E. Webb was appointed Under Secretary of State on January 27.

point near the Egyptian frontier called El Auja, would be the headquarters of the Israeli-Egyptian Armistice Commission under UN supervision.

The Israeli Government would keep defensive forces in the Jewish settlements in the Negev.

The Israeli Government has stressed to this Government that, from its point of view, the main stumbling block is who remains in force at El Auja, which is a stone's throw from the Egyptian border. Countering this, the Egyptians have complained that an unconditional written agreement was entered into on Rhodes between the Egyptian and Israeli delegations providing for the evacuation from Faluja of an encircled Egyptian garrison numbering some 3,000 people.

It appears to us that if the Israeli Government can be persuaded to the demilitarization of El Auja, Beersheba and Asluj, and at least a token withdrawal of its striking forces northward in the Negev, there is a strong possibility of concluding an armistice agreement with Egypt. This is the keystone of a rather considerable arch. If an armistice is signed with Egypt, the Government of Israel will be in a position rapidly to conclude similar agreements with its other enemies, including Lebanon, Transjordan, Syria and Iraq. In fact, the Acting Palestine Mediator has officially extended invitations to the Governments of these four countries to come to Rhodes to participate in armistice conversations.

Solution, therefore, hinges upon a successful conclusion of the present Israeli-Egyptian talks and it would seem useful if this Government would express to the Government of Israel its profound hope that the Israeli Government will find its way clear to making certain statesmanlike concessions, without which it seems inevitable that the conversations will fail.

The Egyptian Government, with considerable reluctance, has informed the Acting Mediator that it will accept his proposals and the Mediator has informally requested us to do our utmost to persuade the Israeli Government to make those concessions which are essential to a final agreement.[2]

Dr. Jessup, in New York, has suggested the advisability of your seeing Mr. Epstein, the Representative in Washington of Israel. If the armistice negotiations break down Dr. Bunche will refer the entire matter to the Security Council, where the reasons for the breakdown will be publicly aired.

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[2] Mr. Ethridge, on February 5, advised the Department that he "planned see McDonald February 6 and Shertok February 7 and would point out urgent necessity for favorable conclusion Israeli-Egyptian negotiations at early date in order make it possible for Commission to get on with its task of settling all outstanding problems re Palestine soonest." (telegram 114 (Palun 27) from Jerusalem, 501.BB Palestine/2–549)

867N.00/1–3149 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 4, 1949—7 p. m.

70. Ur 86 Jan. 31.[1] Dept's preliminary consideration legal basis abandoned property ordinance, based English summary Palestine Post since translation Hebrew text not yet available, indicates there are probably not at present time grounds for USG representation Tel Aviv on legal basis re application ordinance in New Jerusalem. Dept desires be kept informed as to manner administration ordinance in Jerusalem and be notified of circumstances in any case where Administrator moves to vest property of USG or US nationals.

However, subject concurrence Ethridge, Dept believes appropriate for PCC, view its responsibilities re Arab refugees under GA Palestine resolution, to express its concern to Israeli Govt in light of absentee property ordinance that no party take unilateral action in advance of negotiations contemplated by GA resolution which would prejudice achievement of agreed settlement on such questions as return of refugees to their homes and return of property to refugee owners. View these considerations, PCC might inquire of Israeli authorities re arrangements Govt of Israel contemplates making to return vested property belonging to refugees who later return to their homes.[2]

ACHESON

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 718.

[2] Telegram 107, February 3, to Jerusalem, was possibly not seen by Mr. Rockwell when he drafted telegram 70. No. 107 was received in the Department on February 4 at 1 : 28 p. m. It is not printed, but see *ibid.*

501.BB Palestine/2–549

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 5, 1949.

Subject: Rhodes Negotiations on Palestine

Participants: The Secretary—Mr. Acheson
Egyptian Ambassador—Mohamed Kamil Abdul Rahim
Egyptian Minister—Anis Azer
NEA—Mr. Satterthwaite

After introductions and an exchange of amenities, the Ambassador reviewed, from the Egyptian standpoint, the course of the negotiations

[1] Drafted by Mr. Satterthwaite.

at Rhodes. He said that the Egyptian Government had accepted and was willing to carry out the Security Council resolutions of November 4, November 16, and December 29. Furthermore, in an effort to break the impasse and to succeed in reaching an armistice agreement with the Israeli Government, they had accepted the last compromise suggested by Mr. Bunche, U.N. Mediator, which involved a recession on their part from the November 4 resolution. Unfortunately the "other side" had consistently refused to accept any compromise and adhered to its original position. Notwithstanding this, the Egyptian Government was very anxious to reach an agreement and had instructed him to request me to "intervene" in the hope that the negotiations might not break down. It would be most unfortunate if the Rhodes negotiations were unsuccessful and hostilities were to break out again.

I told the Ambassador that I could not agree with him more fully. I had discussed this problem with the President and knew that he was most anxious that an agreement be reached. I had also discussed the problem with the Israeli Representative here and was glad to be able to tell the Ambassador that as a result I was somewhat more optimistic and felt that there was still a good possibility of reaching an agreement under the guidance of the Mediator. I could not, of course, go into details, as that was the duty of the Mediator. It was, however, important that negotiations not be broken off and that every effort be continued toward reaching an agreement on an armistice. While my government could not "intervene", it would continue to use its good offices toward this end. At this point the Ambassador handed me an *Aide-Mémoire*[2] (copy attached) which I did not read at that time. (It sets forth the latest Bunche proposals and describes the concessions required of the Egyptians.)

After thanking me for my assurances the Ambassador said that he would like to bring up one more point. Once an armistice agreement had been signed, he felt that the time would have come to turn a new leaf in Arab-American relations. The United States has carried out all its commitments to the "other side" and perhaps it could now once more consider what assistance it could give the Arab world which, in spite of whatever might be said, does still exist and cannot be ignored. He mentioned the possibility of rendering financial, economic, cultural and technical assistance. He is, he said, in the process of preparing on his own responsibility a résumé of the possibilities in this field which he would like to discuss with me some time. He felt that if the United States could once more resume its former friendly relations with the Arab world and help to bind its wounds it would

[2] Dated February 4, not printed.

have a great moral effect and contribute toward the security of that region. He thought that the first step was already under way in the efforts being made to increase the U.S. quota on Egyptian long staple cotton.

I said that I agreed fully with the Ambassador with regard to the desirability of our getting back on closer and friendlier relations and that I would be glad to go over his résumé with him when he had completed it.

In the course of the conversation I also said that we were aware of the cooperative attitude displayed by the Egyptians at Rhodes and were most appreciative of it.

Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File [1]

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [2]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 5, 1949.

The Israeli Ambassador called at my request.

After an exchange of courtesies, I said to him that we had received yesterday messages from Mr. Ross and Mr. Jessup in New York and from the United Nations Mediator, Mr. Bunche, which caused us considerable concern. It was reported from New York that the armistice proposals put forward by the Mediator had been accepted practically in full, although with reluctance, by the Egyptians. On the other hand, however, Mr. Eban, the Israeli representative in New York, had told our representatives that the Israeli Government could not accept these proposals. We received the same information from Mr. Bunche who expressed grave fears that the negotiations would break down and that the matter would have to be reported to the Security Council by him. It appeared that in such a situation the responsibility for the collapse of the negotiations would rest on the Israeli Government.

I said that this situation caused the President a deep concern and that I was speaking to the Ambassador with the knowledge and approval of the President. The Ambassador knew that the Israeli Government had no more sympathetic friend than President Truman and that no one had done more to support them in trying days. The President believed that this was the psychological moment where an armis-

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[1] In the Harry S. Truman Library at Independence, Missouri.

[2] Sent to the White House under cover of a memorandum of February 5 by Brig. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, Special Assistant to the Secretary, addressed to Matthew J. Connelly, Secretary to President Truman, which read as follows: "The Secretary requests that the attached memorandum of conversation be delivered to the President." (Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File)

tice could be brought about without injury to the vital interests of any of the parties, if the Israeli Government would approach these discussions in a spirit of broad statesmanship and make concessions which were wholly in accord with the moral position of Israel. I hoped therefore that his Government would not reject the proposals but would accept them as a basis for further discussion and work out an armistice along the lines proposed. I did not believe that the attitude of the Egyptian Government was brittle but did believe that there was sufficient flexibility so that with a conciliatory attitude on both sides, a solution could be reached. I said that if this were not done, if the negotiations failed, and if the matter was so reported to the Security Council, the position of Israel, both morally and otherwise, would be prejudiced. I spoke of the importance of reaching an armistice with Egypt as the key decision which would produce similar arrangements with the other Arab States and launch all of them in a favorable atmosphere on the discussions of permanent peace.

The Ambassador expressed his appreciation for what I had said and the spirit in which it was said. He stated that his Government knew that it had no more sympathetic friend than President Truman and that his views would be pondered with the greatest respect. He said that I could assure the President that in the Ambassador's opinion the armistice negotiations would not break down and that as he understood it, his Government was not making a flat rejection of the Mediator's proposal but was finding difficulty on security reasons to eliminating its forces from certain places.

We both agreed that we would not go into the details of the matter and he understood that what I had said did not mean that we believed that the proposal as made in all its details ought to be the one finally accepted.

I stressed again that it should not be in our opinion rejected but made the basis for further talks in which every possible effort should be made to bring about an armistice.

The Ambassador then spoke of some of the problems which his Government had as the government of a democratic country in carrying its own people with it. He then spoke at some length about the spiritual and moral forces which had enabled the Jews to survive their hardships and which lie at the basis of the state of Israel. I said to him that I hoped they would approach the proposals for an armistice from the point of view of these considerations and that what he had said assured me that they believed that reliance upon these forces were more effective than military strong points here and there, and that as I saw it the thing that his Government would wish to avoid more than any-

thing else would be impairing in any way its moral position. He agreed that this was so and that considerations of *noblesse oblige* bore strongly upon the Jewish attitude. He told me again that I could assure the President that in his opinion the negotiations would not break down.

501.BB Palestine/2–549 : Telegram

The Consul in Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, February 5, 1949—1 p. m.

116. Palun 29. [From Ethridge.] US and French Consul Generals met with Colonel Dayan February 4 at request PCC (Congentel 107, February 3)[1] to express interest Commission in successful conclusion Israel–Transjordan agreement consistent with December 11 GA Resolution re Arab-Jewish zones Jersualem, demilitarization city, protection holy places. Dayan though this [*his?*] government would object his dealing with Commission directly but expressed no objection proposal Commission appoint informal group experts to attempt reconciliation divergent viewpoints without considering future status Jerusalem.

However he doubted anything could be accomplished because alleged Transjordan unwillingness reach separate agreement Jerusalem this time due its hope to use Jerusalem as bargaining point in overall settlement. Pointed to recent rejections at last moment of accords provisionally accepted both sides for complete or limited agreement Jerusalem and said general agreement exists as to where demarcation line should run (Congentels 35, January 13, 36 January 14,[2] 47 January 17[3]). He considers Transjordan interested only in prestige, port of Gaza and Negev. Transjordan considers Israel financial condition deteriorating and that delay will force concessions. Dayan asserts to contrary and that by delay Arabs as in past will obtain less.

Dayan said PGI must take public position Jerusalem must be integral part Israel.

If following talk Abdullah Tel PCC considers Arabs sincerely anxious to sign agreement Dayan willing continue discussions. PGI not prepared present detailed plan and thinks PCC should do so.

PCC not considering Dayan reaction pending report discussion Abdullah Tel. [Ethridge.]

BURDETT

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[1] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 718.
[2] Latter not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 663.
[3] Not printed, but see footnotes 2 and 3, p. 680.

501.BB Palestine/2–549 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald), at Tel Aviv[1]

TOP SECRET US URGENT NIACT WASHINGTON, February 5, 1949—5 p. m.

75. Pursuant to formal request of Israeli Govt Jan 28[2] for good offices this Govt in assisting Israel and Egypt to arrive at compromise in armistice negots Rhodes, this Govt approached Egyptian Govt with Israeli proposal related to El Auja.

Pls call on PriMin and leave memo in fol sense:

1) As member of UN PCC and as friendly govt which has been officially requested by Israel to use its good offices to end present impasse in armistice negots, US has approached Egypt in sense requested by Israel.

2) Although unaware of Israeli counter-proposals to Mediator's suggested compromise of Jan 31, USG informed Egypt has accepted compromise in principle, subject only to minor modifications.

3) In same spirit of friendship with which it approached Egypt at Israeli request, USG now desires state earnest hope that Israeli Govt will be able make special effort at accommodation in order accept Bunche draft as possible basis of agreement, particularly in view of action apparently taken by Egypt in this sense. *End memo.*

On Feb 5, with knowledge and approval of President, I informed Epstein that Pres was deeply concerned by possibility breakdown Rhodes negotiations. I said we had been informed that Egypt had accepted Bunche proposal, with certain reservations, but that Eban had told USUN that Israeli Govt could not accept proposal. Pres believed this was psychological moment when armistice could be achieved without injury to vital interests of parties, if Israeli Govt would approach these discussions in spirit of broad statesmanship and make concessions which were wholly in accord with moral position of Israel. I hoped, therefore, that Israeli Govt would not reject Bunche proposals but would accept them as basis for further discussion and work out armistice along lines proposed. It seemed to me that with conciliatory attitude on both sides solution could be reached but if negotiations failed and matter reported to SC, position of Israel, both morally and otherwise, would be prejudiced.

Epstein said views of Pres would be pondered with great respect. I could assure Pres that in his opinion negotiations would not break down and that as he understood it Israeli Govt was not flatly refusing

[1] This telegram was repeated to London, New York, Jerusalem (for Mr. Ethridge), and Cairo. The repeat to Jerusalem was in reply to Palun 27; see footnote 2, p. 724.

[2] See telegram 107, January 28, to Cairo, p. 705.

Mediator's proposal but was finding difficulty for security reasons in agreeing to remove its forces from certain places.

[Here follows last paragraph concerning the call later that day by the Egyptian Ambassador.]

ACHESON

501.BB Palestine/2–649 : Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET URGENT TEL AVIV, February 6, 1949—11 a. m.

101. Re Deptel 75 February 5. At 3:45 p. m. February 6 I left memo with Foreign Minister as per instructions. In conversation with Foreign Minister he stated as follows re memo:

1. Deeply appreciative US efforts vis-à-vis Egypt.
2. Deeply deplored Bunche's January 31 proposal as being far out of line Israel's position, and hopes it has not had fatal effect negotiations. Shertok had distinct impression Egypt had been willing be more conciliatory, but that Egypt now standing firm on Bunche's proposal re thorny problem of El Auja.
3. Israel has in course negotiations already compromised as follows:

(*a*) Agreed to reduce Israeli Military forces in El Auja area to a few purely defensive units.

(*b*) Agreed completely evacuate town El Auja and place it under United Nations supervision.

(*c*) Agreed to having armistice commission sit on Israeli sideline which for the "victor" is considered quite a concession.

(*d*) Agreed that if Egypt fears Israeli retention small units in neighborhood surrounding El Auja, Egypt free to build new defensives [*defenses?*] on Egypt frontier facing El Auja, this unusual concession in that while Israel binds herself not increase defenses during armistice Egypt may do so.

(*e*) While first Israeli position was insist complete Egypt evacuation Rafah-Gaza strip, Israel now has made major political and military concession allowing continuance light Egypt forces in strip area.

Bunche's proposal, while admitting in writing that area is "gateway of invasion" and that El Auja controls crossroads, nevertheless insists that whole area comprising approximately 150 square kilometers must be evacuated by Israeli. From viewpoint military defense this apparently means Israel must abandon the most vital strong points in whole area and back up to indefensible positions leaving themselves wide open if Egypt should change mind and resume war.

Shertok's viewpoint is that, while Egypt is the invader it is Israel who must, according to Bunche, withdraw her forces from wide area

and this not fair or acceptable. The area which Bunche delineates and to which the Egyptians quite understandably agree is as follows:

"From a point on the Egypt–Palestine border 5 kilometers north of the Rafah-El Auja road (MR087–047), southeast to Khashm, El Memdud (MR096–041), thence southeast to El Beha (MR108–039), thence southwest intersecting the Egypt–Palestine border at a point 5 kilometers southeast of the intersection of the old railway track and the Egypt–Palestine border (MR099.5–014.5), thence returning northwest along the Egypt–Palestine border to the border to the point of origin."

Shertok, after receiving my memo departed attend regular Cabinet meeting and I presume our representations now being considered by Cabinet. However, I am not at all sure, in view Shertok's viewpoint and concessions already made by Israel, what result will be. Shiloah told Knox after Shertok left room that Rhodes negotiations, although difficult, were by no means terminated and he still appeared hopeful.

In order appreciate Israeli position Knox, Military Attaché and I feel that consideration must be given to Israel's basic fear of Egypt's relative strength. While public feared Arab Legion, General Staff knew real threat was large Egyptian Army which moved methodically up coast within almost striking distance Tel Aviv attacking settlements en route. United Nations could not stop Egyptians and only Israeli Army, at grievous cost, managed stop and defeat them. British action and our intervention has left both armies "hanging in air" with Israel forces not in the best of defense positions owing sudden forced termination action. Egyptian forces, while defeated in field and in part disarmed, are largely intact and, according other armistice provisions, will be able return Egypt. Israeli intention destroy large arms depots at El Arish and Rafah frustrated by US-British intervention and thus Egyptian forces could, when safely across border, regroup, rearm and strike again. Israel, being unsure that UN can restrain Egypt in future any more effectively than in past, may be unwilling abandon its present defense positions in wide area demanded by Bunche.

McDONALD

867N.01/2–749 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Secretary of State

SECRET AMMAN, February 7, 1949—7 p. m.

53. During long talks this afternoon King reviewed his relations with Jews prior and subsequent to end of mandate and said his principal desire now as before was to reach understanding with them on Palestine question. Still felt it was to Jews' advantage to have only

Transjordan and Lebanon on their borders. This could be accomplished if Egyptians were kept out of Palestine and if firm and lasting peace were made with Transjordan. Talks toward that end are still continuing between Transjordan and Israel and King said that up to this time he has had no cause for not being optimistic as to their outcome. While he admitted that mutual suspicion still exists, he hoped it would be possible to reach understanding directly with Jews prior to formal armistice talks, but if not, certainly prior to formal peace negotiations. Formal talks would be mere public confirmation of agreement. With this in mind he is anxious to remove any possible point of friction between himself and Jews. He assumed Conciliation Commission would sanction agreement reached directly.

His Majesty pointed out that status of Jerusalem is giving him cause for alarm since Jews apparently insisting their part should become capital of Israel. Such insistence can only create suspicion on part of Transjordan that Jews intend expand further. King said he would not object if Jews wished construct defenses along corridor from Tel Aviv up to Jerusalem and station any number of troops there but to permit them make Jerusalem capital would be permanent threat in direction Jericho. Best solution would be autonomy for Arab and Jewish areas of city with complete demilitarization and with neutral zone between. Both parties would retain specific number police. However Jews now propose settlement which through retention Scopus area would be constant threat to Transjordan's position in city.

I inquired whether specific reference to Jerusalem problem alone suggested other points at issue agreed on or nearly so. King said no but most recent meeting with Sassoon and Dayan indicated contact closer. In view this, asked if reference to Jerusalem question suggested he was considering Jerusalem settlement apart from overall arrangement. King replied he thought Jerusalem key to whole problem and that it could not be treated separately.

His Majesty remarked his one wish was to finish Palestine question soonest and with honor and assured that if there was any break between himself and Jews, it would not be his fault. Added that in fact he had more to worry about from other Arab States than from Jews.

King finally expressed hope that United States use its influence to persuade Jews he is serious in his intent reach understanding and that they need have no fear from his side. He also hoped United States would not permit Jews to establish Jerusalem as Israel capital. Stated that in such matters he turned to United States and UK for guidance and support. Since United Nations involved others (Russia), he preferred not deal through that body of which he also not member.

Informed King that while his views would be conveyed to United States Government, must remember United States is member United

Nations and Conciliation Commission and would work through those bodies for settlement Palestine problem. Re Jerusalem said that United States still on record as supporting internationalization city but thought that if Transjordan and Israel could reach understanding on question which was sanctioned by Conciliation Commission, probable it would be confirmed by United Nations.

Sent to Department 53, pouched Jerusalem.

STABLER

501.BB Palestine/2–749 : Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET URGENT TEL AVIV, February 7, 1949—7 p. m.

109. ReEmbtel 101, February 6. Shiloah invited Knox confer this morning stating Foreign Minister and Prime Minister had studied our memo last night and he wished inform as follows:

1. Israeli delegate Rhodes had just advised that Egypt had introduced new highly disturbing conditions negotiations as follows:

a. Egypt now insists Israel withdraw forces from Negev except defense forces in settlements (where there are no settlements now Israeli forces shall be retained) while, at same time, reserving complete freedom disposal Egypt forces in area (for example, Egypt insisting seven outposts in continuous line in Gaza-Rafah strip); this attitude based on November 4 resolution.

b. Egypt now claims Israel should not be allowed have even defensive forces in southern part Negev (south of Ein Hasb MR 173025) even though area not adjacent Egypt.

In comment Shiloah stated that tone Bunche draft proposal all in favor Egypt and that Israel (despite victory) willing ignore tone to help Egypt save face but that Israel position was as follows:

1. Egypt must in practice approach armistice on basis that there is equality of status between two armies.
2. Israel cannot admit that treatment of Negev area is different than any other area of Israel.
3. Israel will agree to tone of draft Bunche proposal (even though tone and formulation make it appear that Israel is the offending party) in order help Egypt Government save face.
4. Israel will not agree to any terms which jeopardize her security during this parlous period or which attempt to create a new military balance thus setting precedent which will make negotiations with Transjordan and Syria even more difficult.

At conclusion conference Shiloah commented on intervention of US and its adverse effect of forcing Israeli withdrawal at moment when decisive military victory was within sight; Knox pointed out, however,

that Israeli position could conceivably be worse had Israel found itself in conflict with Great Britain. Shiloah then rather insistently offered mission copy Bunche draft proposal and all relevant papers so that mission could "properly advise the Department". Knox demurred and doubted that mission was in position accept this responsibility. Probably Shiloah, speaking for both Prime Minister (who is ill) and Foreign Minister (who is absent in Jerus) would welcome US as superarbitrator though he stressed that documents were for our information only.

Comment: I believe Knox acted correctly in avoiding acceptance documents because:

1. In view PGI feeling re US intervention, acceptance documents might be further step involving US in unilateral action;
2. Acceptance might give impression that US disposed bypass UN and PCC;
3. Acceptance might give PGI feeling of relieved responsibility;
4. Documents could not give mission all pertinent data and none from Egypt.

Would appreciate Department's instructions.[1]

McDONALD

[1] The Department, on February 8, expressed its agreement with the comment in No. 109 (telegram 78 to Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/2–749).

501.BB Palestine/2–849 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY JERUSALEM, February 8, 1949—5 p. m.

123. [From Ethridge.] Palun 32. On January 7, Shertok, Israeli Foreign Minister came to Jerusalem for informal meeting with Commission prior to its proposed departure on tour of near East capitals on February 12. During 4½-hour discussion following developments took place.

1. Boisanger, French delegate, opened by stating Commission wished to see Shertok to inform him of its intentions and manner in which it proposed to carry out task which UNGA had given it. Task essentially consisted of assisting parties to settle, if possible directly between them, conflict which now separates them. On other hand, Commission had received specific instructions from UNGA regarding Jerusalem, holy places, refugees, certain economic matters. Commission had decided, in order enlighten itself regarding intentions both sides, not only regarding general peace problem but also regarding specific points, to visit Near East capitals, thus permitting immediate discussion with all interested governments. Commission desired,

however, to have preliminary exchange views with Shertok to ascertain PGI views which would facilitate Commission's discussions at Arab capitals.

2. Ethridge, US delegate, continued for Commission stating Commission had decided raise question of Jerusalem in advance because of certain recent events. Commission had been informed PGI planned to open its constituent assembly in Jerusalem at which it was rumored a spontaneous resolution would be offered calling for annexation Jerusalem. Commission had also been informed PGI had extended Israeli civil law to Jerusalem and it had been reported in press PGI intends hold municipal elections in Jerusalem in March. Commission was apprehensive regarding these developments and considered them as regrettable in that they appeared to be contrary to the spirit, if not letter of GA resolution December 11. It was pointed out GA had given Commission specific task regarding Jerusalem and that it seemed both Arabs and Jews had duty to abstain from undertaking any initiative which would modify *status quo.*

3. Shertok replied that although it might seem presumptuous he would refer Commission to his statement of November 15 before first committee of 1948 GA at Paris which contained PGI views regarding various points and specifically Jerusalem. PGI had acquiesced in international status in 1947 but situation had subsequently changed because of failure of international community or any other authority to protect it except Jews themselves. PGI could not now entrust security of Jews in Jerusalem to any outside agency nor could their economic security be safeguarded except by integration in Israel. Shertok added PGI was aware international consciousness regarding Jerusalem and hoped reconciliation views would be achieved. Holding of constituent assembly would not result in *fait accompli.* On other hand, Israeli Jerusalem to all practical intent and purpose is now part of Israel. PGI does not deny its intent to keep it. PGI still maintained position it had stated on November 15. Commission was entrusted with task of presenting detailed proposals to September, 1949 GA and it was up to international community to decide.

4. Shertok continued constituent assembly signified merely expression Jewish people that Jerusalem was great national center its history. PGI did not intend to transfer its capital to Jerusalem. It was appropriate, however, first assembly should be held Jerusalem. While government could not control assembly it had decided on policy and would take no action to change *status quo.* Since government holds large majority unorthodox decisions are unlikely. Session will last only few days. Agenda consists of opening speech by Weizmann, introduction draft resolution, elections and swearing in of President. Decided not to adopt rules of procedure as it might involve protracted debate.

5. Shertok explained civil law had been extended last August and was now merely being [apparent garble] affect superseding military law. It was unreasonable expect one section Israel should be governed by different principles than another. It is only effective way deal with situation.

6. Shertok confirmed intention to sponsor municipal elections Jerusalem in March, justifying as necessary in any democratic community and based on normal evolution from military to civil status.

7. Ethridge, Boisanger and Yalcin [1] [apparent garble] found some reassurance but great deal that was disturbing in Shertok's views. It was pointed out that while each single development might be explained, all of them taken together represented trend which would appear to be contrary to intention of GA in December 11 resolution.

8. Shertok continued, in reply question from Boisanger, refugee problem can only be settled as part of peace settlement. There can be no significant return of refugees before and possibly after that event. Situation has totally changed. If refugees had stayed in Israel, PGI policy would have developed differently. Since they fled voluntarily and at British instigation PGI policy has been based on *status quo*. Exodus was primarily caused by aggression of Arab states. Return now would undermine security of Israel and would impose impossible economic burden on Israel to integrate refugees in Israeli economy. Arab refugees are essentially unassimilable in Jewish Israel. Efforts can now be made in direction radical sound solution, namely integration in neighboring Arab states, especially Iraq, Syria and Transjordan which Shertok claims are underpopulated and require more people and development to fill dangerous vacuum. Shertok recognized obligation to compensate for land left behind and suggested payment might be arranged direct to individual refugees or paid into general resettlement fund. Arab states could provide land wth assistance international financing. Shertok doubted capacity Israel to pay huge sum and at same time alleged responsibility Arab states for aggressive war and resulting loss would justify offsetting claim by Israel.

9. Shertok stated regarding general peace settlement that Israel desires to negotiate separate peace treaties and did not wish general conference. Shertok reasoned Israeli-Lebanese problems, for example, were of no concern to Egypt. Boisanger believed general problems could be handled at general conference. Specific problems could be handled separately.

10. Shertok explained, regarding territorial settlement, that Israel had accepted 1947 partition on basis Arab Palestine would become independent state. If it now became part of Transjordan situation was

[1] Hüseyin Yalçın, Turkish Representative on the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine.

radically altered and Israel's previous acceptance no longer valid and its result would be different. Israel believes there should be rectification of present lines in Palestine but did not press for an increase in total area. Israel claimed, for example, widening of 12-mile wide coastal strip between Haifa and Tel Aviv for security reasons. PGI had decided it would not consent to any foreign bases on its territory in foreseeable future. It would not agree to any foreign bases in Palestine section of an enlarged Transjordan on basis of present British treaty with Transjordan. Shertok gave no indication of any territorial concessions but indicated he would discuss Negev at later date. Shertok voluntarily disavowed intention of seizing non-Israeli Palestine unless provoked.

11. Shertok stated regarding Commission suggestion that discussions between Israeli and Arab Military Commission regarding Jerusalem should be encouraged to continue, that they were limited to demarcation of military areas and that he doubted whether Commission would be of assistance to them. Shertok, nevertheless, agreed to consider whether Commission observers would be helpful. Shertok stated demilitarization of Jerusalem was only possible if there was outside force or no need for protection. As neither condition existed demilitarization was not possible.

12. Tentative arrangements were made for further meeting between Commission and Shertok in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem on February 11. Shertok promised definite reply February 8. Ethridge spoke with Shertok privately after meeting expressing view that Middle East peace was dependent on early settlement of outstanding problems between Israel and Arab states and hoped Israel would approach in conciliatory spirit. Shertok stated PGI was working on alternative solutions to various problems. [Ethridge.] [2]

BURDETT

[2] Mr. Ethridge, the same day, expressed his view that "Shertok's presentation of PGI views regarding Jerusalem appears to me to be unyielding. It is clear that PGI does not accept world opinion regarding internationalization Jerusalem. . . . It is also clear PGI intends continue to take steps looking toward eventual incorporation of Israeli Jerusalem in Israel. . . . It may be true PGI does not intend to transfer its capital from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. On other hand facts that constituent assembly is opening here, that certain central administrative offices are operating here, that Israeli civil law applies here and that municipal elections under Israeli auspices will be held here seem to bear out my analysis. . . . It seems logical, however, present policies will continue and may only be counteracted by firmness on part of command [*sic*] governments there represented."

Mr. Ethridge also asserted that "Shertok's statement PGI views regarding refugees offended Commission. It also astonished me in view imperative necessity for friendly relations between Israel and Arab States and importance of early establishment of economic connections with Arab hinterland. . . . It is my hope PGI may be persuaded to alter these views and to adopt more humanitarian measures which would redound to benefit of Israel and Arab States. It might be wise in long run to resettle greater portion Arab refugees in neighboring Arab States; nevertheless, it appears contrary to Israel's best interests at outset to take inhuman position." (Telegram 124, from Jerusalem, 501.BB Palestine/2–849)

501.BB Palestine/2–1049

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 9, 1949.

Subject: Attendance of American Officials at Meeting of Israeli Constitutent Assembly in Jerusalem

Discussion:

The resolution of the General Assembly of November 29, 1947, which recommended the partition of Palestine, stated that the City of Jerusalem was to be established as a *corpus separatum* under a special international regime and was to be administered by the United Nations. The General Assembly resolution of December 11, 1948 on Palestine resolved that Jerusalem should be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective United Nations control. The resolution also instructed the Palestine Conciliation Commission to present to the Fourth Regular Session of the General Assembly detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area. The United States voted in favor of both of these resolutions.

During the fighting which has taken place in Palestine, the Israelis have managed to carve out by military force a land corridor connecting New Jerusalem (Jewish Jerusalem) with the State of Israel. In various public statements Israeli officials have stated their determination that New Jerusalem shall become a part of Israel.

We believe that an agreement between Israel and Transjordan looking toward the division of Jerusalem into two areas to be administered by the two countries would be an appropriate solution of the problem. We feel, however, that the United States cannot support any arrangement which would purport to authorize the establishment of Israeli or Transjordan sovereignty over parts of the Jerusalem area, in view of the above cited United Nations resolutions and our support thereof. Our belief is that the Israelis and Transjordanians, should be supervised in their administration of the city by a United Nations Commissioner, the principle of the internationalization of Jerusalem, in favor of which the world community has voted, thus being maintained.

Our representative in Tel Aviv, Mr. James G. McDonald, has informed us that the Israelis have decided to open their Constituent Assembly in Jewish Jerusalem on February 14. They are inviting members of the Diplomatic and Consular Corps in Tel Aviv to attend and Mr. McDonald requests the Department's authorization to do so. He feels that non-attendance would wound Jewish sensibilities and create an awkward situation for the United States in Israel if the

Russian Minister in Tel Aviv should attend. Mr. McDonald advocates that he accompany his acceptance of the Israeli invitation with a formal statement that his attendance at the opening of the Assembly does not imply any change in the United States position on the status of Jerusalem. (Tab A, original only.)

Mr. Mark Ethridge, the American Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission, has cabled that it is clear that the Israeli Government does not accept the world opinion concerning the internationalization of Jerusalem and intends to take steps looking toward the eventual incorporation of Jewish Jerusalem in Israel. He says that the decision to open the Constituent Assembly, with its implications of sovereignty, in Jerusalem is an indication of this intention. In Mr. Ethridge's opinion this Israeli policy can only be counter-acted by firmness on the part of the Commission and of the Governments represented on the Commission. He further states that in his opinion the decision the Department has to make is whether it will perform one more act of courtesy or whether by not doing so, the United States will dramatize its desire for peace in Palestine and its backing of General Assembly resolutions. He believes that the United States would seriously weaken the position of the Conciliation Commission by sending any United States officials to the opening of the Assembly and would strengthen the Commission's hand by not doing so. Mr. Ethridge says that he is convinced that Israeli Foreign Minister Shertok feels that the United States will not back the United Nations and that Israel can get what it wants. (Tab B, original only.)

Our Consul in Jerusalem is in agreement with Mr. Ethridge and believes that attendance of United States officials at the opening of the Assembly will prejudice the Conciliation Commission's task in drawing up a proposal for the internationalization of Jerusalem.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that our representative in Tel Aviv be instructed to point out in the most friendly fashion to the Israeli Foreign Minister the difficulties which may be caused by the plan to open the Constituent Assembly in Jerusalem. This would be done not in an effort to dissuade the Israelis from their present plan but as a matter of record should the plan have an adverse effect on the attitude of some Nations Members of the United Nations when the Israeli membership application is again considered by that body, and should the opening of the Assembly in Jerusalem, with its implications of sovereignty, prove to be a stumbling block in the course of Arab-Israeli negotiations. It is also recommended that no American official in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem attend this meeting, since for them to be present at such a ceremony, would run contrary to the position which the United States has taken in support of the internationalization of Jerusalem and, as

Mr. Ethridge states, would weaken the position of the Conciliation Commission and lead the Israelis to believe that the United States will not back up a decision of the United Nations. The French Embassy has informed us that the French Government plans to instruct its representatives in Palestine not to attend the opening of the Assembly and hopes that the United States Government will take a similar decision. We have reason to believe that the British Government would like to send the same kind of instructions. Both countries are apparently waiting to see what we will do in order to concert their policy with ours.

A suggested telegram to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem is attached for your signature if you concur.[1]

[1] Secretary Acheson reviewed this memorandum with President Truman on February 10, "giving him Mr. Ethridge's views and also Mr. McDonald's views and my own recommendation, which was that we should not attend. The President was very clear that this recommendation was correct and himself approved the telegram so stating." (Memorandum by Mr. Acheson, 501.BB Palestine/2–1049) The telegram, No. 83, was sent to Tel Aviv on February 10. It reviewed the situation as set forth in Mr. Satterthwaite's memorandum and concluded as follows: "Dept believes that in spirit of friendly counsel you should make above points to Shertok. View US position in support of UN position on Jerusalem, Dept unable authorize any Amer official from Tel Aviv or Jerusalem attend meeting Constituent Assembly if held Jerusalem. In declining invitation with appropriate expressions regret, pls inform FonOff that you understand assembly to be transferred Tel Aviv after opening Jerusalem and that you would be pleased attend first session in Tel Aviv." (501.BB Palestine/2–1049)

501.BB Palestine/2–949 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 9, 1949—3 p. m.

80. Unpal 21. For Ethridge. Re Palun 24 Feb. 4.[1] President wrote Weizmann Nov. 29, 1948, re Negev. President said "I remember well our conversation about the Negev, to which you referred in your letter. I agree fully with your estimate of the importance of that area to Israel, and I deplore any attempt to take it away from Israel." Letter then cited announcement by USDel in GA of "our firm intention to oppose any territorial changes in the November 29th Resolution which are not acceptable to the State of Israel".

No mention was made of Jerusalem. In consequence report that President informed Weizmann that US had no objection to Israeli annexation new city is completely without foundation.

[1] Identified also as telegram 108 from Jerusalem, not printed; it stated that a report was current at Jerusalem that President Truman had written to President Weizmann that "US had no objection Israeli annexation New City of Jerusalem or retention of all Negev." (501.BB Palestine/2–449) A marginal notation on No. 108 by Mr. McClintock indicates that it was read to Mr. Clifford at 9:50 a. m., February 5.

For the full text of President Truman's communication of November 29, 1948, to President Weizmann, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1633.

We do not feel that President's comments to Weizmann re Negev are inconsistent with his instructions to you or with overall basic position so clearly set forth by Jessup in his speech to Committee One Nov. 20. President's position still is that Israel is entitled to territory allotted by GA res. Nov. 29, 1947 and that no changes in frontiers set down by that res. can be made without free consent of Israel. However if Israel desires territory not allocated to it by Nov. 29 res. such as Arab areas in western Galilee and Jaffa or such as present corridor to Jerusalem, Israel must be expected to make territorial compensation elsewhere.

President's letter to Weizmann was marked personal and confidential.[2]

This telegram has been approved by the President.[3]

ACHESON

[2] A marginal notation by Mr. McClintock on an information copy of this telegram states that this sentence was added by President Truman.

[3] Telegram 80 was initialed by President Truman. The substance of the telegram was furnished to Ambassador Douglas by Mr. Rusk in a letter of February 11. The letter cited a message from G. Lewis Jones, First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom, to Mr. Satterthwaite, not identified as to date, in which it was set forth that "Dick Crossman, M.P., who recently visited Dr. Weizmann in Tel Aviv, has been spreading the rumor in London that while he was with Dr. Weizmann the latter received a personal letter from President Truman to the effect that no matter what the United States Government might say officially, Weizmann 'should not give up one inch of the Negev.' " Mr. Jones' letter also mentioned that Mr. Bevin was upset by the story. Mr. Rusk suggested that Mr. Bevin be apprised of the true facts. Ambassador Douglas replied on February 28 that Mr. Jones "has passed on in strict confidence the facts in your letter to Michael Wright and Bernard Burrows for their information and such discreet use as seems desirable." Mr. Rusk's letter and Ambassador Douglas' reply are filed under 501.BB Palestine/2–1149, /2–2849. The editors have been unable to find Mr. Jones' letter in the files of the Department of State.

890D.00/2–949 : Telegram

The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL DAMASCUS, February 9, 1949—3 p. m.

51. [On?] February 8, 5 p. m. [, ?] Prime Minister Azm, continuing conversation reported mytel 50, 8th [*9th*],[1] said Syrians recog-

[1] Not printed; it reported the Prime Minister's observations that "Syria desires facilitate Palestine Conciliation Commission's task in a very proper way and hopes this new approach to Palestine problem will result in some satisfactory settlement more in keeping with principles of right and justice than has heretofore been evident. However, before agreeing undertake armistice discussions in response Acting Mediator Bunche's invitation Syrian Government in agreement certain other Arab Governments . . . desires to have assurances Zionists will carry out UNSC resolutions, particularly those of November 4 and 16." He then noted the repeated flouting of UN authority by the Zionists without incurring UN punitive measures or censure. Syria felt that as a prerequisite to undertaking armistice talks, the Zionists must give "guarantees" to carry out Security Council resolutions faithfully. The Prime Minister was said to have "evaded" Minister Keeley's request for clarification of the guarantees sought. (501.BB Palestine/2–949)

nize their destiny is linked up with that of western democracies and feeling they have something worthwhile to contribute in providing strategic base for defense against Communism, they wish cooperate realistically and in positive sense. Believing that Turkey could not defend itself if its rear were insecure, he wished secure latter but this could be brought about only if western democracies (among whom he specifically mentioned US, UK and France) recognizing danger that threatens and useful part Syria and other Arab countries could play give timely assistance. As Syria lacks means for her own defense and thus for defense of interests of democratic powers, he could only hope situation would be accurately appraised and assistance furnished while there is still time for envisaged collaboration to be effective.

Mentioning Arabian oil which he said could play important role if defended, he said Council Ministers had approved "Tapline" agreement and would shortly place it before Parliament for ratification. He regarded this approval as symbolic desire his government to follow henceforth positive policy looking toward economic development and defense his country in which he hoped US by reason of Tapline and recognition Syria's strategic importance would take greater interest. Department pass Army.

Sent Department 51, repeated London 7, Paris 3, pouched Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, Jidda, Ankara and Moscow.

KEELEY

501.BB Palestine/2–1149 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United Nations Acting Mediator for Palestine (Bunche), at Rhodes [1]

WASHINGTON, February 11, 1949—7 p. m.

Pursuant to communication from Mediator dated August 3, 1948 US Government sent directives to Commanding Generals US Zones Germany and Austria authorizing exit of men of military age destined Palestine only after prior clearance with Mediator. In view cessation of fighting in Middle East and difficulties arising from separation of families under this policy US Government feels this restriction on departure men of military age from its zones of occupation should be removed and plans do so on February 18, 1949, subject to Acting Mediator's concurrence. No change in present policy prohibiting exit of fighting personnel is planned.

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[1] Transmitted to New York in telegram 74, with a note "Request fol message be given SYG for transmission Acting Mediator, Rhodes by cable :".

If Acting Mediator perceives any objection this action US Government will appreciate being so advised prior to date mentioned.[2]

ACHESON

[2] Mr. Bunche replied on February 15, through United Nations channels, that he perceived no objection to the proposed change in policy in view of present conditions in Palestine under the truce (telegram 182 from New York, 501.BB Palestine/2–1549).

501.BB Palestine/2–1249 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Secretary of State

SECRET AMMAN, February 12, 1949—9 a. m.

58. Mytel 54, February 8.[1] With acceptance by Transjordan of invitation to armistice talks would recommend that Department consider urgently representing to Bunche desirability holding Transjordan–Israel talks in Jerusalem. Both King and high government officials have expressed hope that Jerusalem would be site for talks and believe arguments they produce in support of this not without discernment. Transjordan has given evidence its desire for peace and it is not beyond realms possibility that armistice talks would lead to discussion peace settlement. Consequently any arrangement which would make attainment this objective more facile should, it is thought, be encouraged. Main feature change of venue is propinquity Transjordan delegation to King who must decide important points policy. Delegation as well as others concerned would have easy access to His Majesty at Shuneh or Amman.

This matter has been discussed with Ethridge who has indicated his agreement.[2]

Sent Department 58, repeated Jidda 6 for USDel Palestine Conciliation Commission, Jerusalem 32.

[STABLER]

[1] Not printed; it advised of the official acceptance by Transjordan the same morning of Mr. Bunche's invitation to armistice talks. The acceptance was said to include Iraq "which will be represented by Transjordan at talks". (867N.01/2–849)

[2] The Department, in reply on February 15, concurred in the suggestion made in telegram 58 "but feels it should be made to Bunche by Ethridge as US Rep PCC." (Telegram 21, 501.BB Palestine/2–1249)

501.BB Palestine/2–1249 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, February 12, 1949—10 a. m.

134. Palun 38. [From Ethridge.] Commission drove down to Jericho yesterday for a formal meeting and luncheon with Tawfik Pasha, Transjordan Prime Minister. After exchange greetings

Boisanger as Commission Chairman explained UN GA had given Commission its task for general purposes of bringing parties to Palestine conflict together and re-establish Palestine peace. Commission would be interested to ascertain Transjordan's general views and specifically its attitude re Jerusalem holy places, refugees and certain economic matters.

General: Prime Minister replied Transjordan had always been careful to preserve peace. Since establishment Transjordan 27 years ago its objective had been peace. It had never expressed eccentric or fanatical views and even now wanted real peace settlement. Boisanger replied Commission's goal was also peace and wondered whether Transjordan would support general peace conference between Israel and Arab states. Ethridge raised question whether general or separate peace conference would be preferable. Prime Minister believed past experience showed, based on previous cooperative meetings with Jews, separate peace conference would be more productive as to results. Yalcin inquired whether Transjordan would be free to conclude with Commission's assistance separate peace arrangements even if one or more Arab states would object and if Commission extended its assistance would Transjordan follow through. Prime Minister strongly responded Transjordan desired pursue practical policy and stated Transjordan was ready in spite of any other states policy or influence it might exert to act freely and separately. Prime Minister did not think it even necessary to have general peace conference re such questions as refugees as Transjordan itself was willing, with outside assistance, to settle problem.

Jerusalem: Prime Minister stated Jews would try to keep those areas at present under their control. Arabs, on other hand, have inhabited Jerusalem for 1300 years. If, however, Jews want to stay in Jerusalem, Arabs want to take back those Arab areas which Jews took without fighting prior to May 14. (Prime Minister as well as Colonel Abdullah Tel, Transjordan military commander Jerusalem, strongly stress this point, emphasizing Jews took wide areas Arab Jerusalem before termination British mandate without fighting.) Boisanger explained Commission has specific instructions from UN GA to prepare detailed proposals re internationalization Jerusalem, that Commission has recently established committee to study question and that it hoped Transjordan would cooperate. Prime Minister replied he had been expecting Commission express this desire re Jerusalem but wondered how internationalization would be implemented by UN. According to charter UN must send forces. If no forces, permanent members must consult and send forces but as other nations do not want Jews in Palestine no forces would be sent. Boisanger replied Commission was not persuaded international force was necessary because good

will on both sides could accomplish same purpose. Prime Minister replied he could not contest this argument but that only time would show whether Jews would agree.

Holy places: Prime Minister explained these areas have always been under Arab protection and that many difficult problems arising among different religious sects have been solved by Arabs. Arabs desire and want to keep right to protect these areas. Arabs would give full guarantees if under their control. Boisanger replied Commission could not contest Arab record in safeguarding holy places.

Refugees: Prime Minister expressed hope every refugee would be able to return to his own home and to settle on his land. Those refugees in Syria and Lebanon should for example, be permitted to return but if their property was gone they could settle in Transjordan. If Jews refuse, refugees should be repatriated and indemnified. Other Arab states are not willing to keep refugees who themselves wish to return to Palestine. Transjordan will welcome refugees in Transjordan or in Arab Palestine. Transjordan is inclined believe indemnity for Arab property in Jewish territory should be paid into general fund for resettlement rather than to individuals who may squander it. Transjordan Government may require international loan to assist resettlement as government is not strong financially.

Negev: Prime Minister voluntarily stated Transjordan wanted very much to have port on eastern Mediterranean. It specifically wanted Gaza and land access thereto. Transjordan would use every influence to accomplish this purpose. Arab Legion had not yet finished war and might have to resort to war to obtain.

Armistice negotiations: Prime Minister stated Iraq has not yet reached stage discussing peace but inclined to conclude armistice. Nuri Pasha, Iraqi Prime Minister, has delegated Transjordan to act for Iraq in armistice talks. Iraqi Army would then be able to withdraw from central Palestine. Transjordan Prime Minister considered armistice negotiations concluded in this fashion would meet problem of Iraqi public opinion re Palestine conflict.

Commission thanked Prime Minister for frank expression Transjordan attitude observing that while not all his conditions appeared acceptable, his views in general were sound and had created favorable impression. Tentative plans were made for second meeting at Amman with King Abdullah following Commission's return from Cairo and Jidda. Prime Minister hoped conclusion to Palestine question would be reached at that meeting.

Sent Department 134, repeated Amman 12. [Ethridge.]

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/2–1249 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, February 12, 1949—2 p. m.

139. Palun 41. [From Ethridge.] At request PCC US and French Consulate [*Consul*] Generals met Abdullah Tel on fifth for conversation similar that held with Dayan (Contel 116 fifth) on fourth. Tel stated willing negotiate and sign immediate agreement in Jerusalem prior to conclusion general agreement through all Palestine and would welcome appointment on PCC group advisers assist two parties. Asserted Arabs have no objections inclusion clause stating agreement without prejudice to future statute of city and would accept internationalization provided could be effective.

Expressed following views re such agreement: (1) Arab sections now held by Jews should be returned to Arab owners; (2) Arabs always willing give any guarantees desired for safety holy places and when peace restored guarantee free access; (3) willing discuss demilitarization by gradual separation two forces but believes Tel Aviv–Jerusalem corridors should be internationalized at same time since its control gives Jews great military advantage.

Stated had carried on informal exploratory talks with Dayan since conclusion cease-fire in order determine what concessions Jews willing make. [Ethridge.]

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/2–1349 : Telegram

Ambassador Stanton Griffis to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET CAIRO, February 13, 1949—4 p. m.

From Griffis for Secretary Acheson. While I have been on leave for more than two months operating UN relief program I trust that you will permit me following my long meeting with Ethridge yesterday to express to you my feeling regarding Palestine settlement based on six months careful study here and personal contacts with substantially every Arab city ruler and high minister.

Innumerable telegrams on file in Department have carried my firm feeling that no final settlement of Palestine problem can be reached prior to high level agreement between US and UK regarding the three moot questions: borders, rehabilitation of refugees and internationalization Jerusalem. I have expressed and urged this opinion in personal conversation with President, Secretary Marshall, Lovett, all

[1] Transmitted to the Department by Cairo in telegram 165.

members NE Division, members USUNDel Paris and highest level British diplomats here. Everyone has agreed in substance but apparently little result. My complete argument is that matter must be settled first in London and Washington before it can be settled here.

The Arab states have not slightest interest in feelings of France, Turkey or Peru nor indeed in feelings and opinions of UN. They are bored, confused and without confidence in mediators, commissions and UN orders. They are interested in exactly one thing. What are the intents and desires of US and UK and will US and UK make such pronunciations in conjunction with UN as will give them face-saving device of stating that partition of Palestine was forced upon them by higher powers.

This morning Turkish delegate Yalcin in Cairo newspaper statement blazoned statement "We don't wish to force our opinions on anyone". This is exactly opposite of what Egyptians want. They wish to use excuse of coercion and thereby save a critically unstable government which fully realizes that other Arab states except Transjordan have little further interest in entire problem. In other words basically [we?] are dealing only with Israel, Transjordan and Egypt. Rightly or not all Arab states believe that Israel will do exactly what US dictates and Transjordan under complete British domination.

A strong and prompt publicly stated agreement by US and UK will go a great distance towards settlement and I believe quickly solve this potentially terribly dangerous situation but it must be backed up by the strongest US and British representations both to Israel and Egypt by respective US–UK highest levels. Otherwise believe UN settlement will drag out many months or years.

Have no intention or desire bypass UN. Of course final settlements should be made formally through them.

Ethridge has read this cable and states strongly concurs. High regards.

Sent Department 165, repeated London.

[GRIFFIS]

501.BB Palestine/2–1449 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald), at Tel Aviv

SECRET NIACT
US URGENT

WASHINGTON, February 14, 1949—8 p. m.

88. Please call at once on FonMin and make following oral communication:

Eban Feb. 11 at own request called on Deputy US Rep UN NY quoting Shertok to effect that armistice negotiations on Rhodes had

narrowed down "to details" and that successful outcome could be expected. Eban told USRep re Auja that compromise being worked out to neutralize area with Jewish and Egyptian defensive forces in roughly equal strength outside area. Re Beersheba Eban understood Israel striking forces would withdraw, leaving defensive forces roughly equal to combined Egyptian-Arab Legion forces in that area.[1]

In contrast to this info officially communicated by Rep of PGI, US member PCC received memo Feb 11 from Bunche indicating that Israel Delegation was adamant in refusing withdrawal from Beersheba and in not accepting UN neutral zone arrangement for Auja.[2]

Dept today inquired of Epstein if he could reconcile these conflicting reports. Epstein said he had heard of Eban's conversation but had had no direct word from Tel Aviv.

Dept stressed earnest hope of this Govt that Eban's report cited above is correct and that PGI has wisely decided make concessions re Beersheba and Auja which seemed to be principal stumbling blocks to successful agreement.

Please telegraph report your interview with FonMin and repeat to Ethridge.

Repeated to Cairo as Unpal 27 for Ethridge. Repeated USUN as 80.

ACHESON

[1] This information was based on telegram 166, February 11, 2 p. m., from New York (501.BB Palestine/2–1149).

[2] This information was based on telegram 133 (identified also as Palun 37), February 11, 10 p. m., from Jerusalem. It quoted Mr. Bunche's memorandum to Mr. Ethridge, which stated that Colonel Yadin had informed Mr. Bunche that the reason the Israelis insisted "on complete freedom in the eastern sector of the Negev is because of the bargaining they expect to be forced to do in order to reach an agreement with Abdullah." (501.BB Palestine/2–1149)

501.BB Palestine/2–1149 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald), at Tel Aviv

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, February 15, 1949—4 p. m.

90. AP despatch datelined Jerusalem Feb 13 quotes PriMin Ben Gurion as follows:

Verbatim text. "In a brief but fiery speech he said that the commission had one direct instruction from the United Nations—the internationalization of Jerusalem. Therefore, he said, it was his duty on this occasion to tell them that 'judgment on Jerusalem would not be given by them.' "

Pls endeavor ascertain whether this report textually accurate. Appreciate comments in light urtel 120 Feb. 12.[1]

ACHESON

[1] Not printed; it reported that prior to receipt of Department's telegram 83, February 10 (not printed, but see footnote 1 to memorandum of February 9, p. 741), Mr. McDonald had called on Mr. Shertok to express his personal concern lest the Israeli Government take unilateral action affecting the status of Jerusalem at the inaugural meetings of the Constituent Assembly. Mr. Shertok, after informing him that the Provisional Government of Israel was opposed to such action, summarized "the PGI position as desire work out solution Jerusalem with UN." (501.BB Palestine/2–1249)

Tel Aviv replied, on February 18, that the Palestine *Post* of February 14 had quoted the Prime Minister as saying: "But with all respect to Conciliatory [*Conciliation*] Commission of UN decision with regard to Jerusalem was made 3,000 years ago when Bel Yishai (King David) made Jerusalem the Jewish centre." (Telegram 140, 501.BB Palestine/2–1849) Jerusalem, on February 14, cited the same issue of the Palestine *Post*, which quoted Mr. Ben-Gurion as saying additionally that "the living Jerusalem will not again accept any rule but that of its own people, Israel." (Telegram 144, 501.BB Palestine/2–1449)

501.BB Palestine/2–1549 : Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL CAIRO, February 15, 1949—6 p. m.

173. Palun 46. [From Ethridge.] During February 15 meeting between Egyptian Prime Minister accompanied by Foreign Minister and PCC. Prime Minister replied to Commission *aide-mémoire* on subjects of general negotiations, Commission assistance, Jerusalem, economic matters and refugees as set forth in GA resolution December 11 and on subject territorial questions.

Prime Minister reiterated previous view Egyptian Government as reported in Palun 43 [1] that present negotiations at Rhodes should be concluded and solution for refugee problem should be achieved before considering other matters which Commission had raised. Egypt and Israel had embarked on Rhodes negotiations as basis SC resolutions. Although Egypt agreed respect these resolutions Israelis not satisfied and does not wish implement. Even Acting Mediator's suggestions which have exceeded SC resolutions in some respects are not acceptable to Jews. Successful conclusion either at Rhodes or for Commission seems impossible as long as Jews do not feel bound respect GA or SC.

[1] Identified also as telegram 166, February 14, 10 a. m., from Cairo, not printed; it stated that the Commission arrived at Cairo on February 12 and that preliminary discussions with Egyptian officials began the next day. Egyptian Foreign Minister was said to have welcomed the Commission but to have denounced the "intransigent line" of the Israelis at Rhodes. He was also reported as saying that Egypt would not approve "historical injustice in Palestine." (501.BB Palestine/2–1449)

Refugees:[2] Principle of return to homes and respect for property and rights is fundamental and must be accepted in advance. Refugees who do not wish return should be compensated. GA considered this matter and instructed accordingly. Until appropriate measures taken UN has responsibility for refugees. Despite right Arab return as guaranteed by UN Jews may continue object. No single country, however, restricts residence on basis of religion. All countries have minorities which have full rights as citizens. If some Arab refugees return and some do not, latter category can be agreed between Israel and Arab states on basis of exchange for Jews now in Arab lands.

Jerusalem:[3] Arabs have had long and good record in Jerusalem. No reason to take from Arabs and make international. Egypt's attitude will, however, be based on GA resolution December 11.

Economic matters: Egyptian Government will be glad examine proposals at later date.

Territorial questions: Prime Minister did not discuss in reply at first but later indicated there was no use discussing pending conclusion Rhodes talks and concrete evidence of Jewish good faith and real wish live up to GA and SC resolutions.

Commission argued each of foregoing points with Prime Minister without avail. Ethridge pointed out as member Commission and as US representative interest in success at Rhodes and observed that if all Arab states had views similar those Egypt endless talk might result. If Rhodes talks should fail Commission might be requested assume responsibility for armistice negotiations. Such delays would be serious for refugees and might contribute to political unrest in Near East. It therefore seemed wise now have informal talks at least on all outstanding problems.

Prime Minister stated he had sincerely attempted give Egyptian attitude to fullest extent now possible and that he would continue cooperate with Commission. Egypt did not believe, however, it would be useful progress further at this stage until Jewish intentions were

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[2] In the discussions of February 13, Chairman Yalcin stated that the return of the refugees "was logical though difficult because conditions had changed on account Jewish immigration. If Arabs could not resettle in Egypt, perhaps other Arab states could accommodate?" The Foreign Minister retorted that the Arab States would "never admit no right to return."

[3] In the discussions of February 13, the Foreign Minister refused to commit himself on the question of the internationalization of Jerusalem, "pointing out Jerusalem had always been Arab but that this matter could be discussed after Israel had complied with SC resolutions and refugees solution had been found."

Telegram 166 also stated that Mr. Ethridge sought Egyptian views regarding "general or separate peace conferences or combination of both." The Foreign Minister expressed his belief that "direct negotiations would be preferable but stated Egypt would have to wait and see if Israel wanted peace and would abide by SC resolutions."

really known. Their reaction at Rhodes and to problem of refugees would be best demonstrations their good faith.[4] [Ethridge.]

PATTERSON

[4] Mr. Ethridge concluded that "Talks here have convinced me that unless Rhodes negotiations are quickly successful Commission's work will be greatly delayed while situation, particularly as to refugees, disintegrates and becomes more dangerous. In circumstances urge Department exert utmost pressure in addition to that already taken to make them successful and consider suggesting to very highest levels that this is time to intervene with Israel. The maul is badly needed." (Telegram 172, February 15, 5 p. m., from Cairo, 501.BB Palestine/2–1549)

501.BB Palestine/2–1549 : Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT US URGENT

TEL AVIV, February 15, 1949—6 p. m.

129. ReDeptel 88, February 14. Foreign Minister in Jerusalem. Had extended conference with Acting Foreign Minister Shiloah 12th noon. Knox, Andrus,[1] Van de Velde[2] present. Shiloah informed as follows:

Eban's comments February 11 erred on optimistic side. However, Yadin[3] and Shiloah go Rhodes February 16 resume conference with compromise formula re Auja area. On Beersheba and Auja Israeli position is:

1. PGI agreeing evacuate town El Auja and withdraw forces from a surrounding area only slightly smaller than area Bunche proposed. Also offering withdraw all but three battalions from whole area south and west of Bunche "armistice" line of November 13.

2. PGI cannot agree withdraw forces Beersheba because (1) no armistice negotiations with Transjordan as yet; (2) eastern front not politically related southern-western front; (3) presence Transjordan-Egyptian troops, plus British troops Akaba, plus irregulars, on eastern front constitute entirely different problem and must be dealt with later (presumably in negotiations between Transjordan and Israel). Shiloah opines Egypt realizes this and will concede different status Beersheba and eastern front.

3. Israel not accepting Bunche proposal put seats Armistice Commission in El Auja, Bir Asluj, Beersheba. This proposal not indicative of "equal status" both armies and PGI will insist seat Armistice Commission either on border, or in towns located equally in Egypt as well as Israel.

[1] Col. Burton C. Andrus, Military Attaché in Israel.

[2] Lt. Col. Robert W. van de Velde, predecessor of Colonel Andrus as Military Attaché in Israel.

[3] Yigal Yadin, Chief of Staff of the Israeli Army and participant for his Government at the Rhodes conference.

4. PGI will concede any reasonable formula meet Egypt half way but wherein concessions clearly involve political prejudice or military disadvantage Israel will not agree. Shiloah says he aware desirability help Egypt maintain prestige.

5. Shiloah's cited clause in Bunche proposals stating provisions of armistice do not prejudice any "political, territorial, or custodial" claims will later be considered by appropriate international authority. In Shiloah's opinion this clause should allay Egypt apprehension re PGI position re Auja or Beersheba.

6. PGI of definite opinion that negotiations Rhodes should not create new area of "international supervision" in Negev. Problem El Auja can be solved by Israel–Egypt Armistice Commission.

7. Shiloah stated that as proof sincerity PGI willing give details troops and arms to remain in western Negev and guarantee freely to facilitate inspection by Armistice Commission.

Comment: Mission believes that PGI has been withholding further compromise during last six days awaiting outcome Histadrut [4] elections 13 February and opening of Assembly in order clear political atmosphere here. Shiloah's arguments re Beersheba understandable. Mission opinion is that PGI latest proposals constitute reasonable basis compromise and will possibly elicit favorable Egyptian response. Likely these proposals are as far PGI can go.

Department pass Army, Navy, Air.

McDONALD

[4] The Israeli Federation of Labor.

501.BB Palestine/2–1749

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite)

WASHINGTON, February 17, 1949.

Subject: Israeli-Egyptian Negotiations on Rhodes.

Participants: Mohamed Kamil Abdul Rahim, Egyptian Ambassador
Mohamed El Kouny, First Secretary, Egyptian Embassy
J. C. Satterthwaite, NEA
Joseph Palmer, AF [1]

At the conclusion of a discussion on another subject, the Egyptian Ambassador expressed the hope that the United States would again use all its best influence to persuade the Israeli Government to reach an agreement at Rhodes. Upon my mentioning the fact that for the

[1] Joseph Palmer, 2d, Acting Chief of the Division of African Affairs.

first time we understood that the Acting Mediator, Mr. Bunche, was optimistic and felt that the impasse had been broken, Abdul Rahim Bey indicated that the two sides were close to agreement. He felt sure that what progress had been made had been due to the efforts of the United States. He felt sure, however, that an additional push at this time from high levels was necessary in order to bring the armistice negotiations to a successful conclusion.

I told the Ambassador that the United States was using and would continue to use its best efforts with the Israeli Government to reach a reasonable compromise. On the other hand I wished to emphasize again the great importance which we attach to continued patience and good will on the part of the Egyptian Government. That Government had shown a commendable spirit and patience for several weeks now, but it was necessary that it continue to do so and make a genuine effort toward reaching a solution. If it did so I felt that there was every hope that an agreement might be reached. We both agreed that this was necessary in order to give the Conciliation Commission a good basis on which to carry on its work.

867N.00/2–1749 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald), at Tel Aviv

SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, February 17, 1949—11 a. m.

98. Pls take earliest opportunity approach Israeli Govt re Dec. 12 absentee property ordinance along fol lines:

Dept has demonstrated its interest in protection Jewish minorities Arab lands and has taken appropriate occasions in past to remind Arab Govts their responsibilities this regard. Publication of ordinance, as shown by Syrian PriMins views (Damascus 2 to Tel Aviv Feb. 10 [1]), has already produced sharp official Arab reaction which might well lead to retaliatory measures against Jews' property Arab countries. US Govt in most friendly spirit desires suggest advisability early action by Israeli Govt such as issuance official statement in order calm fears in Arab countries that property interests of absentee owners may not be safeguarded and in order avoid precipitating retaliatory action. US Govt concerned, in light of absentee property ordinance, that no Govt take unilateral action in advance negotiations contem-

[1] This was a repeat of Damascus' telegram 55 to the Department, not printed; Prime Minister Azm was said to have expressed the hope to the Conciliation Commission that it would make the rescue of refugees a primary concern. In this connection he exhibited anxiety about the Israeli property law and intimated he wished to study its text before taking reciprocal measures against Jewish property in Syria. (501.BB Palestine/2–1049)

plated by GA resolution Dec. 11 which would prejudice achievement of agreed settlement on such questions as return of refugees to their homes and return of property to refugee owners.

For your info Dept on Feb. 4 (Deptel 70 to Jerusalem) suggested to Ethridge advisability PCC approaching Israeli Govt on last point preceding para, and inquiring Israeli authorities re arrangements Govt Israel contemplates making to return vested property belonging to refugees who later return to their homes.[2]

ACHESON

[2] Mr. McDonald replied on March 11 that he had "discussed question several times with FonOff since February 18 and government studying question. Emphasis in law is on custodial function although one regulatory provision does permit sale with proceeds blocked." (Telegram 198 from Tel Aviv, 867N.00/3–1149)

Telegram 98 was repeated to Damascus the following day as No. 48.

501.BB Palestine/2–1849 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, February 18, 1949—4 p. m.

203. Confirming telephone call to McClintock, Reedman (secretariat) telephoned to report on cable received from Bunche this morning as follows.

Bunche would deeply appreciate any possible assistance he might be given on following issue.

Only remaining issue in current Rhodes discussions is Beersheba. Egyptians are pressing for withdrawal all Israeli forces from the town. They are not however pressing for withdrawal of Israeli forces from surrounding area. Bunche describes Egyptian motive as political rather than military. Egyptians argue (*a*) there must be some recognition by Israelis of November 4 resolution, (*b*) Beersheba is an Arab town and (*c*) Beersheba is included in territory allotted to Arab state by November 29 resolution.

Israeli negotiators are adamant in refusal to enter into any formal agreement to withdraw from town. They have informed Bunche, however, that they are in fact building camps outside the town. It might be inferred from this information that Israelis plan informally to withdraw their forces.

Bunche comments that while Egyptian position is perhaps technically correct he feels they would be making great mistake to stick to their present line, particularly in view of safeguard provision in armistice agreement protecting any political rights or claims. Bunche

goes on to comment that Beersheba is more of an issue between the SC and Israel than between Egypt and Israel if it is an issue at all.

In response Reedman inquiry whether USG might take some action this point, Ross suggested (and subsequently confirmed suggestions after discussion McClintock) that best procedure at this juncture would be for SYG to see Fawzi and Eban here.

Text Bunche cable will be sent Department soon as received.

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/2–349 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General in Jerusalem [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, February 18, 1949—7 p. m.

99. Ur 107 Feb 3.[2] Dept has explored possibility converting ConGen Jerusalem to Diplomatic Agency. Dept believes step inadvisable at present time since no international administrative authority, such as UN representatives mentioned UNGA resolution Dec 11, exists Jerusalem and no international regime as yet established.

ACHESON

[1] This telegram was repeated to Ankara, London, and Paris.

[2] Not printed; Consul Burdett made the suggestion "in order to signify US attitude toward Jerusalem and to forestall further steps by Israel toward annexation." (501.BB Palestine/2–349)

501.BB Palestine/2–1949 : Telegram

The Chargé in Iraq (Dorsz) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL BAGHDAD, February 19, 1949—8 a. m.

69. Palun 49. [From Ethridge.] 1. On February 17 Ibn Saud with informality and cordiality received Commission at Riyadh three times: Following arrival, before evening prayer and for dinner. King continually emphasized Saudi Arabia's desire to cooperate in restoring peace but strongly stressed necessity for equal desire on part of Jews. At second meeting King cited three prerequisites to settlement: (1) Real guarantees by UN [and?] by larger powers making sure that settlement would be effective; (2) that immediate action would be taken by UN to make possible for Arab refugees to return to their homes; and (3) that present GA and SC resolutions re Palestine would be made effective and that those who did not comply would be made to do so or be penalized accordingly, [after?] which refugee question could be discussed first. Ibn Saud, following intervention by counsellors such as Sheikh Yussuf, and Hamza Bey, hedged somewhat on Prince Feisal's previously indicated willingness actively to partici-

pate.[1] King was ready, however, to cooperate providing other Arab states also agreeable to conference. In general, Saudi Arabia seems remote both geographically and operationally from Palestine but indicates deep and detailed interest in problem. Saudi Arabian officials manifest little faith in UN effectiveness but appear sincere and desirous of working with UN re Palestine.

2. For Department's special information Saudi Arabian officials apparently accept without question and as fact unofficial reports and rumors via press and radio re continuing military aid from US to Israel in spite SC truce. Report Israel has four American destroyers cited by Saudi Arabian officials. US Delegate suggests it would be helpful American prestige SAG could be informally told of US measures to prevent military export from US and through third countries since Nov. 1947 and particularly since June 1948.

3. On February 18 Commission left Riyadh for Baghdad via Turkish plane, putting down briefly at Dhahran for quick visit with Saudi Arabian and American officials, thereafter arriving at Baghdad at 2:30 p. m.

4. Sent Department; please repeat to Near East capitals as seems appropriate. [Ethridge.]

DORSZ

[1] The Amir Faisal, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister, had indicated in his discussions with the Palestine Conciliation Commission at Jidda on February 16 that Saudi Arabia would participate at a general conference to discuss the refugee problem, if the other Arab States would (telegram 116, February 17, 10 a. m., from Jidda, 501.BB Palestine/2–1749).

501.BB Palestine/2–2049 : Telegram

The Chargé in Iraq (Dorsz) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY BAGHDAD, February 20, 1949—noon.

71. After delivering *note verbale* (Embtel 70, February 20 [1]) which he said Prime Minister asked him hand to me, Foreign Minister made comments along following lines: (1) UNPCC wanted Iraq Govern-

[1] Not printed; it stated that Foreign Minister Hafidh had handed the note to Chargé Dorsz on the morning of February 20 (501.BB Palestine/2–2049). The two main points of the note are embodied in comments numbered 5(*a*) and (*b*) in telegram 71.

On February 23, Foreign Minister Hafidh handed a similar *note verbale* to the British Ambassador and expressed the hope that the United Kingdom, in concert with the United States, would do everything possible to force Israel to accept the return of the refugees. He noted that the Arab States had met at Cairo on February 5 and had agreed to ask for such British assurances. The point concerning Jerusalem as an Arab city was an Iraqi idea not cleared with the other Arab States. Little effort was made to "sell" this point. (telegram 72, February 24, 11 a. m., from Baghdad, 501.BB Palestine/2–2449)

ment express its views re conditions for Israel prepared go towards reaching settlement or what steps would be taken to make Israel abide by settlement; (2) before expressing its views, Iraq Government feels that some practical action designed enforce compliance by Israel of such settlement as may be reached must be worked out; (3) UN resolutions have time and again been violated by Israel. Instead taking measures to enforce resolutions, big powers and particularly US have looked aside and helped Jews through such acts as extension *de jure* recognition, sponsoring Israel admission to UN, granting of huge loan, etc; (4) in these circumstances, Arabs have lost confidence in US contention it sincerely desires create conditions in Middle East favorable to restoration of stability and security this area; (5) US could improve situation immeasurably by proving its "good faith towards Arabs" by putting pressure on Israel to accept principles re (*a*) right refugees return to Palestine and (*b*) Jerusalem remain Arab city; (6) unless US Government makes Israel accept these principles, Arab world will continue drifting towards chaos from which only Communists can profit; (7) Iraq Government therefore hopes US will give assurances desired as this would help Arab Governments in their efforts to overcome deep and intense feeling against US now prevailing Arab world and enable Arab Governments working constructively; (8) other Arab Governments are expected make similar representations to US and British Governments; and (9) identical note verbale would be delivered British Embassy.

I mentioned that UN resolution December 11 which created UNPCC contained principle that refugees who desire should have right return to their homes in Palestine. Foreign Minister said this was not good enough; Jews had previously violated other resolutions and had exhibited no intention accepting this principle in December 11 resolution. Iraq therefore wants US show good faith by giving desired assurances; otherwise Iraq must assume US trying avoid direct responsibility of seeing that Jews abide by resolutions.

Foreign Minister made it plain that any reference by US for Arabs to look to UN for enforcement of resolution would not be constructive suggestion but merely another indication of US unwillingness to assume necessary responsibility of trying rectify to some extent great injustice Arabs claim US has been chiefly instrumental in imposing upon them.[2]

Sent Department 71, repeated Amman for USDel PCC 3, Beirut 23, Damascus 13, London 28, Jerusalem 3, Tel Aviv 3, Cairo 21, Jidda 4.

DORSZ

[2] Marginal notation in the handwriting of Mr. McClintock: "what responsibility?".

501.BB Palestine/2–449

The Secretary of State to the Egyptian Ambassador (Rahim)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Egypt, and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Ambassador's note of February 4, 1949,[1] concerning the recognition of Israel.

The Government of the United States has granted full recognition to the Government of Israel since that Government, after the legislative elections of January 25, is now considered to be the legally constituted authority in the State of Israel. The Government of the United States recognized the existence of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948, when it recognized the Provisional Government of Israel as the *de facto* authority in Israel. It will therefore be seen that the existence of Israel as a state has been recognized by the United States for some time and is not a new development.

The Secretary of State desires at this time to reiterate the Department's hope that the conversations now going on may lead to the establishment of permanent peace in Palestine. It is the Department's conviction that all parties must bend every effort to remove any obstacles standing in the way of a final settlement and work to establish a normal atmosphere on questions relating to Palestine.

WASHINGTON, February 21, 1949.

[1] Not printed; it expressed the "very deep regret" of the Egyptian Government that "certain powers" had recognized "the so-called State of Israel," despite failure to find a solution for the problems of Palestine. It also stated that the Zionists had exploited the fact of recognition as a definite stand in their favor and had thereby been encouraged to persist "in their purely aggressive complicity against the Arabs." It denounced the recent recognitions as "submission to force and acceptance of the accomplished fact even at the expense of the encouragement of aggression and the violation of the Law of Nations." (501.BB Palestine/2–449) The Egyptian Ambassador handed the note to the Secretary of State on February 5.

501.BB Palestine/2–2149 : Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT TEL AVIV, February 21, 1949—1 p. m.
US URGENT

149. Today 9:45 a. m. Foreign Minister asked me his office and stated as follows:

February 20, 4 p. m. "final" meeting held Rhodes. Israel accepted "in entirety without reservations" Bunche draft complete text agreement and appendices. Egyptians make two reservations, one "purely

technical" other of "principle". First referred to definition of "what constitutes defensive units" to be allowed within armistice area. Seemingly this reservation adjustable.

In second reservation Egyptians raise question Israel evacuation Beersheba, though no mention such evacuation Bunche final draft.

According information from Eytan late February 20, Egyptian delegation returning Cairo with divided opinion. The two foreign office representatives favor acceptance Bunche draft without insistence reservations. Military member, said "represent court and King", is believed determined to urge insistence Beersheba reservation as matter Farouk prestige even if new crisis precipitated.

Foreign Minister explained that Bunche draft draws dividing line between western and eastern fronts midway between Transjordan and Egyptian-held territories. Basic idea Bunche text is that eastern front is "irrelevant" until armistice negotiations open with Transjordan. Only [1] front involved in Israel-Egyptian negotiations. Beersheba well east dividing line. Hence, its non-inclusion in Israel evacuation zone.

Foreign Minister says that word from Washington to Egypt urging unqualified acceptance latest Bunche draft might result signature armistice Wednesday or Thursday this week. He pleads urgent action by Department.

McDONALD

[1] There is an apparent garble at this point. Presumably "western" was intended.

501.BB Palestine/2–2149 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

TOP SECRET US URGENT NIACT WASHINGTON, February 21, 1949—6 p. m.

194. Pls call immediately upon FonMin and make representation following sense:

USG informed that Israeli Govt has accepted without reservations final Bunche draft complete text armistice agreement and appendices. USG further informed that Egyptian delegation Rhodes has made reservations to status proposed by Bunche for Beersheba.

USG understands that provision in Bunche draft agreement looks toward safeguarding of any political rights or claims. Status Beersheba will be determined at time of final peace settlement and USG believes question should not be permitted obstruct signing of armistice agreement.

[1] This telegram was repeated to Tel Aviv, London, and New York.

As PrimMin aware, USG worked to persuade Israeli authorities modify their former adamant position, which was holding up negotiations. Tel Aviv subsequently made several accommodations in order meet Bunche proposals such as status El Auja and Bir Asluj. USG would deplore any action likely create further obstacles at time when armistice agreement seems near, after so much hard work by both sides. In spirit of friendship for Egypt and in its desire see peace return to NE, USG urges Egyptian Govt accept Bunche draft without insistence reservations.

Above representation of course not to be made if prior receipt this tel Egyptians have accepted Bunche draft.

ACHESON

501.MA Palestine/2–2249

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET TEL AVIV, February 22, 1949.

No. 46

SIR: In answer to the Department's telegram 91 of February 15, 1949,[1] in reference to Palestine war refugees, I have the honor to submit in this communication an analysis of the elements of the problem and some factors in its possible solution.

[Here follow sections on "Summary," "Background," and "Present Obstructive Tendencies."]

The Israeli Official Position

There is no evidence that the Israeli Government through action by the Cabinet or the State Council has as yet defined an official position towards the problem of Palestine refugees. None of the few public or semipublic statements by the Foreign Minister have been comprehensive or authoritative. On several occasions, I have talked at length with Mr. Shertok (my last talk was today) and on two or three occasions with the Prime Minister, Mr. Ben Gurion, about the problem. The general impression I gather is that no one here has yet thought the matter through. Nonetheless, what is known of Israel's position at this time I summarize as follows:

1. Sole responsibility for the creation of refugees rests upon the Arab states who, in violation of the UN November 29th recommendation on partition, began and continued an offensive war against Israel. All other factors which may have played a part in the exodus are

[1] Not printed; it expressed the Department's belief that prospects for early approval of the refugee bill were favorable (501.BB Palestine/2–1349).

secondary and comparatively unimportant. Had there been no Arab attack upon Israel there would have been no Arab refugees.

2. Israel will gladly make available technical assistance and personnel in planning the resettlement of refugees outside of its territory.

3. It will consider sympathetically financial contributions towards such resettlement either in the form of compensation for Arab properties left behind by the refugees or as direct governmental grants.

4. There can be no formal consideration of Israel's role in such resettlement except as an integral part of peace negotiations and settlements with the several Arab states.

5. To allow any substantial return of refugees prior to peace would be to impose upon the Israeli military and police authorities an unbearable and wholly unacceptable responsibility.

6. Though the Israeli spokesmen do not say so, the unprecedentedly rapid influx of Jewish refugees during 1948 and the plan to admit a quarter of a million more in 1949 will, if carried out, fill all or almost all of the houses and business properties previously held by Arab refugees. Arab unoccupied farms will similarly, though not to quite the same degree, be occupied by the recent or expected Jewish refugees. Hence, there will be almost no residence or business property and only a limited number of farms to which the Arab refugees can hope to return.

Recommendations

On the basis of the above analysis of governmental attitudes in general and of those of the Israel and Arab governments in particular, I recommend:

1. The immediate supplying of Ambassador Griffis and his colleagues with the resources necessary to keep the refugees alive pending their resettlement. The appropriation by Congress of the full amount of $16,000,000 requested by President Truman as our Government's contribution will, I trust, have been passed before this despatch is received by the Department, for without this American example of generosity, Mr. Griffis' drive for essential relief funds must fail.

2. Constant and concerted pressure on both Israel and the Arab states to eschew politics in their thinking and planning about refugees and to take account of humanitarian considerations. Emphatically these governments should be told that in the long run the human approach will be the best policy.

3. Israel be urged to accept the principle that:

a. The serious and sympathetic study of plans for the return of those refugees who wish to return be not postponed until formal peace has been made or peace negotiations begun;

b. Permission to return be not tied up with such extraneous problems as permission to Jews now living in Arab countries to leave in order to enter Israel.

4. The Arab states be urged to recognize that to make the prior return of the refugees a *sine qua non* of peace negotiations would be to destroy any chance of concession by Israel and instead would tend to protract indefinitely the present twilight which is neither peace nor

war. It should be obvious to the Arab governments, if not to their peoples, that it is impracticable if not impossible for Israel to open its doors to the returning refugees before its enemies have agreed to begin peace negotiations.

5. Fundamental to any resettlement plan will be large capital funds. No estimate of the amount required can, however, be made until there has been a detailed study of the number to be resettled and where.

6. The required resettlement funds might be obtained from these sources:

a. Compensation by Israel for refugee property taken over by the state or by private individuals or corporations.

b. Lands suitable for resettlement made available by the Arab governments.

c. An international loan similar to that which under League of Nations auspices made possible the transfer of more than a million Greeks from Smyrna and vicinity to their motherland.

7. Comprehensive but general recommendations by the Palestine Conciliation Commission of an Arab refugee resettlement program is the obvious next step. Any plan to be acceptable in Tel Aviv must make provision for resettlement of the larger proportion of the refugees outside of Israeli territory.

A Definite Plan Now?

Nothing would be easier—or less useful—than for me, or any other informed person, to attempt to draw up now a detailed plan of resettlement, including adequate financing. Any such plan might appear to be sound and just, but in reality it would be so theoretical as to be almost worthless. There are still too many unknown factors to permit the preparation of a sound program.

Here are some of the unknowns:

1. The number of refugees—the estimates still vary by hundreds of thousands.

2. The real attitudes of the governments directly concerned;

a. How many refugees will be permitted to return to Israel? The sooner armistices with the neighboring states have been concluded, the sooner there can be an approximate answer to this question.

b. How many will be permitted to be resettled in the Arab states? I anticipate (despite present Arab public statements) that this number will be very large if adequate funds are made available.

3. The degree of unity of the states in UN in support of a resettlement program.

4. The degree of willingness of such states to make sacrifices toward a comprehensive solution.

This incomplete list of unknowns suggests that at most the Palestine Conciliation Commission can at the present time probably do no more than draft a very general outline of a possible program, or programs,

for the refugees. The Commission's present tour of all the capitals will have supplied it with political background against which a refugee scheme can be realistically envisaged. Perhaps the Commission might at the outset limit itself to the drawing up of a set of principles upon which basis a group of technicians could then be authorized to begin the preparation of a more definitive scheme.

Meantime—and this I regard as the essence of the matter—all possible friendly influence should be brought to bear upon all the states involved to study sympathetically ways in which each can make its maximum contribution to an agreed solution—a solution which would over the years be advantageous to all.[2]

Respectfully yours, JAMES G. MCDONALD

[2] The Department, in reply on April 1, stated that "This timely and objective report has had an important influence upon the formulation of the Department's long-range policy towards the Palestine refugee question, particularly with regard to the definition of the objectives of this Government. The Department is in accord with your recommendations . . . and would welcome your more detailed comments on means by which your recommendations number 2, 3, and 4 can be implemented." (airgram 55, 501.BB Palestine/2–2249)

501.BB Palestine/2–2249 : Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET CAIRO, February 22, 1949—2 p. m.

186. Deptel 194 February 21. Since my previous conversations concerning Rhodes negotiations were with Prime Minister I requested Abdul Hadi Pasha to receive me today which he did within the hour. I reviewed situation as understood by my government and repeatedly stressed US Government's view that Beersheba should not prove obstacle to signature armistice agreement, especially since Bunche draft safeguards political rights or claims to that town for determination during final peace settlement.

In response to my exposition Prime Minister stated that he would use his best efforts in interest of a settlement. Although I urged him to be more definite he was not disposed to bind himself by precise promise, and probably indeed could not have done so.

Prime Minister emphasized that Egyptian attitude toward Beersheba was not arbitrary, but was based on importance of town as symbol of UN November 4 resolution; as strategic point important for Egypt's defense (although such importance now diminished by Zionist fortified villages in vicinity); and as communications center on an important highway. For these reasons Egypt had been anxious to maintain a civil administration at Beersheba without troops or fortifications.

My final impression gained from our talk was that Abdul Hadi Pasha would use his influence to remove Egyptian reservation respecting Beersheba.

Thereafter possibly with view of making a Palestine settlement more palatable to Egyptian public (since Prime Minister stated that it had been difficult for Egyptians to negotiate and to make concessions) Hadi Pasha urged at considerable length importance of US support for return of Palestine refugees to their homes since temporary relief would not suffice and also US economic aid to Egypt.

If a Marshall plan for the Middle East were not practicable at least the US Government should insist that Marshall Plan dollars supplied European countries should when such countries required Egyptian cotton be used to pay for at least a portion of such cotton in dollars.

The Prime Minister in response to my question stated that he stood by the thoughts contained in his recently published responses to questions propounded by Walter Collins, Cairo United Press correspondent.

PATTERSON

Statement by the President[1]

I am immensely gratified over the news from Rhodes that the Representatives of Egypt and Israel have signed an armistice agreement. This act is a tribute to the restraint and statesmanship of the two governments. I wish, also, to congratulate the United Nations Mediator, Dr. Ralph Bunche, whose untiring efforts have so greatly contributed to the success of these negotiations.

I hope that now a formal armistice has been agreed upon between Egypt and Israel, this pattern for peace will be followed rapidly in the conclusion of similar agreements between Israel and the other Arab States. The general armistice will then, I trust, lead to the attainment of permanent peace, thus freeing the talents of these Near Eastern peoples for constructive work in the development of their respective countries. As a Member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, the United States stands ready to assist the parties to the rapid conclusion of a just and honorable peace.[2]

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[1] Released to the press by the White House on February 24; reprinted from Department of State *Bulletin*, March 6, 1949, p. 302.

[2] The Department, on February 24, sent a joint telegram to Tel Aviv (No. 113) and to Cairo (No. 202), stating that it was "greatly encouraged by Egyptian-Israeli armistice concluded at Rhodes and particularly by the public and cordial association of Egyptian and Israeli delegations in normal negotiation relationship." (501.BB Palestine/2–2449)

Editorial Note

The Governments of Israel and Egypt, at Rhodes on February 24, signed a General Armistice Agreement, the first agreement signed between Israel and an Arab neighbor. The text is published in United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year* (hereinafter identified as SC, *4th yr., Special Supplement No. 3*).

Cairo reported, on March 2, that "public reaction in Egypt hostile to the signature of the Israeli-Egyptian armistice signed at Rhodes on February 24 has been practically nil with no disturbances or demonstration[s] as originally feared by many informed persons and security officials. While criticism has been barred from the press by government directive no indirect criticism, even by the opposition press, has yet appeared. The press has, in fact, devoted itself to statements upholding the valor and honor of the Egyptian Army and calling attention to Egypt's respect and support for international organizations working for peace. The view is taken that the military experience gained in the Palestinian affair has more than compensated for sacrifices involved." (Airgram 260, 501.BB Palestine/3–249)

Editorial Note

Israeli Representative Eban, on February 24, sent a letter to Secretary-General Lie requesting the Security Council to give renewed consideration to his country's membership in the United Nations. The Council, on December 17, 1948, had failed to recommend such membership; see Mr. Lovett's memorandum of conversation of December 21, 1948, *Foreign Relations*, 1948, volume V, Part 2, page 1676.

The text of Mr. Eban's letter is printed in United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Supplement for March 1949*, page 7.

501.BB Palestine/2–2449 : Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT, February 24, 1949—11 a. m.

83. Palun 52. [From Ethridge.] Department please pass appropriate Near East Missions. On February 21 Syria Prime Minister received Commission. Ethridge as chairman explained its general and specific tasks from UNGA and requested Syrian views.

Prime Minister replied Syrian views had been stated last UNGA and questioned whether Syria should now be urged to recognize Jewish state *de facto* which established contrary to justice. Jews are even now

acting contrary to UN resolutions by importing arms, by other truce violations, by holding Constituent Assembly Jerusalem, and by other Jewish governmental action in Jerusalem.[1] Syria has presented formal protest to ministers of all countries represented Damascus re Jewish assembly and Jewish capital Jerusalem. Syria protests to commission also Prime Minister continued. Arab states are confronted by establishment of state in Palestine on racial basis. Arab population being replaced by Jews. Refugees are first and most important problem. Why cannot Arabs return if Jews can immigrate? Syria requests implementation paragraph 11 GA resolution December 11 including indemnification. Solution lies between Jews and UN and not between Jews and Arabs.

Although commission pointed out its main task was conciliation and how specific problems were intertwined, Prime Minister maintained position emphasizing Syria was abiding by UN resolutions but Jews were not. Arab states therefore required guarantees re Jewish intentions and UN implementation.

Re meeting Arab states with Commission Prime Minister agreed could take places soon at Arab capital providing other Arab States concurred.[2]

Sent Department; repeated Jerusalem 13. [Ethridge.]

PINKERTON

[1] Damascus, on February 25, reported Prime Minister Azm's fear of a Zionist *fait accompli* at Jerusalem and his request that the United States counter such move. The Prime Minister was said to have contended that "as the Conciliation Commission was specifically charged by the UN resolution with the internationalization of Jerusalem, it should limit itself in its discussion of Jerusalem to means of carrying out this specific duty. As 'Azam said nothing to me [Minister Keeley] with respect to Arab claims upon Jerusalem, the inference was that the Arabs would not object to internationalization if the UN Resolution could be used as means of defeating Israeli pretensions." Publicly, however, the Prime Minister was said to have expressed dissatisfaction with internationalization and to have insisted on the "Arabism of the city and its suburbs." (Airgram 57, 867N.01/2–2549)

[2] The Conciliation Commission saw the Lebanese Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs on February 23. Their views paralleled those of the Syrian spokesman as set forth in telegram 83. The Foreign Minister stressed the view that the "internationalization Jerusalem and solution refugee problem were test cases to determine whether Jews would abide or buck UN resolution." (Telegram 84, identified also as Palun 53, February 24, noon, from Beirut, 501.BB Palestine/2–2449)

501.BB Palestine/2–2449 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Secretary of State

SECRET AMMAN, February 24, 1949—5 p. m.

72. Defense Minister confirmed this morning delay in departure of Transjordan armistice delegation to Rhodes. Said delegation has definite instructions to consider armistice questions only and to inform

Israelis that any matter beyond scope armistice will have be referred back to Transjordan Government with view possible consideration later in connection PCC. Transjordan Government believes it would be mistake rush into peace settlement discussions at Rhodes and that more reasonable and lasting agreement could be reached by proceeding slowly toward ultimate objective under aegis PCC. Indicated again that Transjordan Government hoped PCC would soon be brought into discussions.

Re Iraqi position on armistice Defense Minister said Transjordan delegation prepared inform Israelis, if subject raised, that agreement reached by Transjordan Government will also extend to Iraqi areas but that Transjordan delegation unable commit itself in writing on this. Understanding re Iraqi areas will have to be in nature "gentleman's agreement." Fawzi Pasha believed Iraqis would abide by such agreement. Delimitation armistice lines in Iraqi area should not prove difficult as present front lines approximate desired lines of territorial settlement.[1]

Said PCC had proposed meeting of Arab states at Beirut March 21. Arab League Council also proposed hold meeting end of March at Cairo but felt this would be without practical result.

Sent Department 72; repeated Baghdad 15; pouched Jerusalem.

STABLER

[1] Mr. Stabler, on February 25, reported information that the Iraqi Defense Minister had telephoned to the Iraqi Minister at Amman to inquire whether the latter had issued a denial that the Transjordanian Delegation at Rhodes would also speak for Iraq. The Minister was alleged to have "replied such not possible in view existing relationships with King and that matter would settle itself at Rhodes where Transjordan delegation will be unable present to Israelis, if they request it, written 'power of attorney' from Iraq Government." (Telegram 73 from Amman, 501.BB Palestine/2–2549)

501.BB Palestine/2–2449 : Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED CAIRO, February 24, 1949—9 p. m.

193. Official communiqué announcing signature today at Rhodes armistice transforming cease-fire into permanent truce states "agreement has no political character. It deals exclusively with military questions and does not affect in any way the political destiny of Palestine." Communiqué also declares military delegation sent January 12 to discuss with UN Mediator the application of SC resolutions of November 4 and 16 ran into many difficulties until Bunche established project bringing together the different points of view.

Press reproduction of agreement forbidden by censor although radio heard in Egypt carries full text. Security officials warned Embassy officer violent reaction possible when agreement is published.[1]

[PATTERSON]

[1] Cairo transmitted the text of the official communiqué in airgram 239, February 26, which noted that censorship of the terms of the agreement "relented under orders, to the extent of permitting the publication of seven brief points which were ascribed to sources outside Egypt. These points as published in the local press of February 25 are as follows:

" '1. The coastal strip from the Egyptian frontier to a point 15 kilometres north of Gaza will remain under the control of the Egyptian forces.

" '2. The Egyptian forces in Faluja will start evacuating the town today.

" '3. El Auja becomes a headquarters of the United Nations observers enforcing the armistice.

" '4. Prisoners of war will be exchanged within the next ten days.

" '5. Both parties will not undertake any military operations or bring in reinforcements in arms and equipment.

" '6. Both parties will not build new airfields in Palestine.

" '7. Both parties are to reduce their main forces within four weeks in compliance with the armistice.' " (501.BB Palestine/2–2649)

Editorial Note

The Department of State announced, on February 25, that "The Government of the United States and the Government of Israel have agreed to the establishment of embassies in the respective capitals. The Government of Israel has informed the United States Government that His Excellency Eliahu Elath has been appointed first Israeli Ambassador to the United States. . . .

"The President announced on February 25 that he had nominated James Grover McDonald, of New York, to serve as the Ambassador of the United States to Israel."

The Department's *Biographic Register*, as of April 1, 1949, stated that Mr. McDonald became Ambassador on March 18, 1949.

The Department announced, on February 28, that "Pursuant to the formal recognition of the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan by the United States on January 31, 1949, the United States Government on February 28 established a Legation in Amman, the capital of Transjordan. The Government of Transjordan has notified the United States Government of its intention to establish a Legation in Washington." Mr. Stabler was designated Chargé d'Affaires of the Legation, effective March 19, pending arrival of a Minister. Dr. Yousef Haikal presented his credentials as Minister of Jordan on June 1, 1949.

The Department's press releases on these matters are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, March 6, 1949, page 302, and March 13, 1949, page 332.

501.BB Palestine/2–949 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Syria[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 25, 1949—6 p. m.

57. You may inform PriMin and FonOff as follows re ur A–8 Jan 10 and urtels 50[2] and 51 Feb 9:

(1) This Govt warmly appreciates friendly attitude Syrian Govt and its desire align itself with US and Western Powers.

(2) Dept wishes reiterate that our support estab State of Israel in no sense lessens our basic policy of friendship toward Arab countries and our earnest hope they will prosper and develop.

(3) US has not assisted Israel in violation of truce but on contrary has rigidly maintained arms embargo impartially. Quantity war material smuggled despite embargo has not been large and whenever apprehended participants have been prosecuted and material confiscated.

(4) US attitude re Israel was clearly stated in UN by Dr. Jessup on Nov 20 to effect that US supported Israeli claims to boundaries set forth UNGA resolution Nov 29 but believed that if Israel sought retain additional territory in Palestine it shld give Arabs territorial compensation.

(5) We wld not support any attempt by Israel to occupy any Arab state and wld fully support any measures taken by UN to protect territorial integrity such State.

(6) US hopes its relations with Syria and other countries NE will develop constantly. However Syrian Govt will appreciate association of US with nations outside Western Hemisphere for defense purposes, as exemplified in proposed Atlantic Security Pact, constitutes radical departure from traditional peacetime policies. It is new concept and one with which we must proceed slowly. We have not as yet envisaged broadening defensive security relationship beyond Atlantic grouping. While it wld be premature pursue subject further at present time, Dept is gratified learn of Syrian Govt's preoccupation with its basic relationship with Western Powers and its manifestation of friendship in this regard. Views of Syrian Govt will be kept well in mind.

(7) US Govt pleased that Arab states have endeavored observe truce under UN resolutions, and has urged utmost cooperation of

[1] This telegram was repeated to London and the Arab capitals.
[2] Latter not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 742.

Israeli Govt this same regard. US Govt hopes that all parties concerned will give full support General Assembly resolution of Dec 11 calling upon all parties seek agreement by negotiations either with Conciliation Commission or directly with view to final settlement of all questions outstanding between them.

ACHESON

501.BB Palestine/2–2549 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to Ambassador Stanton Griffis, at Beirut

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 25, 1949—8 p. m.

89. Eyes only for Griffis. Greatly appreciate views expressed your personal telegram Feb. 13 from Cairo. We have been following negotiations at Rhodes with closest possible attention and will pay similar attention to negotiation phase PCC. Experience thus far has not convinced us that final solution Palestine lies primarily in strong joint US–UK position which we would attempt to impose by pressure upon parties. Joint US–UK effort in last GA to support Bernadotte Plan failed completely because Arabs and Jews would have none of it and united their votes against US–UK. Arabs even rejected those elements of plan which were specifically directed to Arab advantage rather than recognize Bernadotte solution. This despite earlier assurances we had been given that Arabs would "acquiesce" in Bernadotte plan if supported by US–UK and might even vote for it. Parties have had ample opportunities in past to accept diplomatic *force majeure* as explanation to their own peoples but have shown no inclination to do so. Result has been that we have been victimized by choice between accepting rebuffs (which we have done) or exerting pressures beyond limits imposed by maintenance friendly relations as well as by obligations under Charter. Despite tortuous course of Palestine problem we have consistently maintained position that solution must be (1) by peaceful means, (2) through the UN, and (3) without acceptance of unilateral responsibilities by US. If Rhodes armistice negotiations continue to produce successful results, new possibilities for settlement through normal processes may open up. Recent news on that is encouraging. In any event, we shall keep in close touch with Ethridge and British and do everything we can to bring about settlement by peaceful processes. We do not exclude line of approach you suggest

but are inclined to view that for time being processes of conciliation should develop much more precisely the positions of the parties.[1]

ACHESON

[1] This telegram was repeated to Jerusalem for Mr. Ethridge and to London. Additionally, the Department informed Mr. Ethridge that "Our thought has been that PCC should initially endeavor to find common ground for agreement among parties without regard to preconceived ideas of our own about final settlement. Only if impasse is reached would we, as PCC member, wish to put forward terms of settlement, in which event we would consult with other members PCC as well as British. Emphasis in US position has been upon any settlement which would be agreeable to parties or in which they would at least acquiesce without further fighting. UK position is inclined to be more precise as to specific territorial arrangements.

"We note from Griffis' telegram that you concur in his suggestion. Please feel free at any time to make recommendations on such joint US–UK action as you believe required by situation. Altho we are not sanguine about such approach at this time, you are closest to the problem and we would wish to give your views very great weight." (Telegram 111, February 25, 8 p. m., to Jerusalem, also identified as Unpal 36, 501.BB Palestine/2–2549)

501.BB Palestine/2–2649 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, February 26, 1949—11 a. m.

167. Palun 54. Commission arrived Tel Aviv from Beirut February 24 via Turkish plane. Shortly following arrival Commission conferred with Israeli Foreign Minister and aides. Shertok welcomed Commission, proffered utmost assistance and heralded February 24 armistice agreement between Israel and Egypt as long step forward and first Jewish agreement with Arabs since 30-year old Feisal–Weizmann agreement.[1]

Ethridge as chairman explained Commission had just completed tour Near Eastern capitals at which it had received strong impression that Arab states were primarily concerned re Arab refugees but not necessarily as condition precedent to final peace arrangements. Arab states appeared equally concerned re Israel's general intentions. In view signature Israeli-Egyptian agreement, Commission hoped details of peace making could quickly be arranged. Under GA resolution

[1] This agreement, dated January 3, 1919, was signed at London by the Amir Faisal on behalf of the Arab Kingdom of Hejaz and Chaim Weizmann, representing the Zionist Organization. The text is available in David Hunter Miller's *My Diary at the Conference of Paris, with Documents*, vol. III, p. 188, and in George Antonius' *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement* (G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1946), p. 437. The *Diary* was printed for the author by the Appeal Printing Company, New York, presumably in 1924.

The Antonius version gives a translation in English of a stipulation to the agreement by the Amir Faisal originally in Arabic. Mr. Antonius has concluded, based on the stipulation, that the agreement was actually signed no earlier than January 4, 1919.

December 11 Commission had certain principal tasks: (1) conciliation; (2) preparation of plan re internationalization Jerusalem; (3) refugees, and (4) various economic matters. Commission had questioned Arab states re these matters and now requested frank expression Israeli views.

Foreign Minister replied recent success at Rhodes had resulted from direct negotiations between Israeli and Egyptian representatives. Direct negotiations force crystalization of governmental views. When two parties negotiate concessions are made. If Israel now indicates to Commission concessions it might make, other party may not cooperate.

Shertok continued that developments in Palestine since May 15, 1948 have taken different course than that envisaged on November 29, 1947 because of Arab aggression in Palestine and exodus of Arab refugees. Return of large mass of Arab refugees would require extensive integration and expense. Resettlement must therefore logically be considered. Israel would be unable to consider repatriation. Israel believes resettlement would eventually prove of greater benefit to both Israel and Arab states. Foreign Office had undertaken preliminary research on subject, as previously promised Commission and would submit document to Commission as working-paper about March 3.

Ethridge suggested Israel might indicate whether it accepted principles set forth in GA resolution December 11 re Jerusalem and Arab refugees after which complete range of plans for implementation could be discussed.

Shertok replied Israel could not accept abstract principles as juridical rights but added that Israel did not wish to ride roughshod over Arab rights and was ready to discuss with Arabs.

Ethridge stated Commission had found genuine desire for peace at Arab capitals but that Arabs were sincerely apprehensive re Israeli intentions. If Israel could find some way of indicating its concern and demonstrate magnanimity, Arab fears might be allayed and new spirit might prevail which would permit progress. Commission had tentatively proposed that Arab states meet with Commission to consider refugee question. Plan might or might not result. Opportunity would be provided for discussion not only of refugee problem but other problems as well. Conciliatory statement by Israel re refugees might thereby facilitate peace settlement.

Shertok seemed impressed by argument Arabs genuinely desired peace and appreciated importance of conciliatory state in view Arab psychology. Shertok added possibility of affirmative statement would be discussed with Israeli Government officials. Commission might raise at February 25 meeting with Prime Minister. Shertok would support. Shertok believed resettlement elsewhere was essential but that

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some Arabs might return depending on conditions of peace settlement.

Shertok also agreed to designate Foreign Office official to consult with committee of Commission re plans for internationalization Jerusalem.

Shertok also indicated re question of exchange of populations with specific reference to Jews in Arab states that Israel would be happy to receive latter.

Commission proceeding to Jerusalem February 26.

Sent Department 167; repeated Beirut 19; Damascus 5; Baghdad 6; Cairo 9; Amman 9; Jidda 3.

BURDETT

501.AA/2–2849

Memorandum of Conversation, Drafted by Mr. Robert M. McClintock

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] February 28, 1949.

Subject: Admission of Israel into the United Nations.

Participants: Mr. Bromley, First Secretary, British Embassy.
Mr. Raynor—EUR
Mr. Rockwell—NE
Mr. McClintock—UNA

I [1] invited Mr. Bromley of the British Embassy to call on the afternoon of February 25 to receive the Department's oral response to the memorandum which the British Embassy had left with the Department [2] on the preceding day regarding the admission of Israel into the United Nations. I explained to Mr. Bromley that we did not feel it necessary to make a written reply to his Embassy's memorandum.

The views expressed in the United Kingdom memorandum had been given careful consideration in the Department and it was generally felt that it would be wiser to let the application of Israel for admission to the United Nations be considered alone and on its own merits in the Security Council, rather than to attempt to link the Israeli application with those of Transjordan and Ceylon. We thought that Russian vetos of the latter two applications were almost a foregone conclusion. Furthermore, should the membership issue be broadened it would probably be necessary for this Government again to advance the claims of Italy. A probable result would be that the whole member-

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[1] It is not clear from the record copy of this memorandum whether the "I" refers to Mr. McClintock or to G. Hayden Raynor, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of European Affairs.

[2] Memorandum No. 412/11/49 is not printed. It was dated February 23 and was handed to Messrs. Hare and McClintock by Mr. Bromley on February 24. (501.AA/2–2349)

ship question would be reopened, with the USSR insisting on admission of Outer Mongolia, Albania, Hungary, Roumania, and Bulgaria. With respect to the last three countries, as Mr. Bromley knew, we were contemplating action with regard to their violation of treaty obligations for the maintenance of human rights. Accordingly, to go over the same acrimonious debate involving all these countries and instigate a very probable attempt by Secretary General Lie to arrange a deal whereby all applicants would be admitted, whether good, bad, or indifferent, seemed scarcely worth the qualms which the British Foreign Office expressed with regard to the admission of Israel.

Furthermore, it seemed apparent that, whether or not the United Kingdom should vote adversely on the procedural question of reconsidering the Israeli application, the Security Council would in any event vote favorably on that application. A list of probable affirmative votes indicated that perhaps nine of the Members of the Security Council would vote for the Israeli application, with only Egypt and the United Kingdom possibly abstaining.

Mr. Bromley took careful notes of the conversation and said he would report it to London.

501.BB Palestine/2–2849 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, February 28, 1949—9 a. m.

170. Palun 55. [From Ethridge?] Meeting with Ben Gurion February 25 opened by Ethridge as chairman Commission who stressed refugees were main concern Arab States and constitute such human and psychological problem to them that if Israel could make advance gesture regarding refugees, beyond concessions which might be made in negotiations, general settlement would be greatly facilitated. Ethridge also emphasized Israel needed and wanted peace.

Ben Gurion agreed but strongly stressed Israeli need for military security as well as peace. Security meant survival for Israel. Question of security more acute for its people than any other because Arab States through concerted action might be able exterminate them. Prime Minister repeated Shertok's previous statement that no one raised finger to help Jews on termination mandate. When challenged by Ethridge, Ben Gurion explained no help had been given when efforts were made to destroy Israel. Ben Gurion conceded, however, that UN had been of substantial help. Ethridge said it would be great shock to people of US to hear that Shertok and Ben Gurion had said they had not helped in creation and survival of Israel.

Regarding Prime Minister's insistence on security all three Commissioners commented Israel could not enjoy security on basis military strength. Peace and cooperation with neighbors were essential elements, Ethridge pointed out UN alone has potentiality of collective military force. Boisanger recalled Arab distrust of Israel's intentions and need for relaxation of tension as prerequisite for peace. Ben Gurion believed security would rest on steady increase in country through immigration. Second element would be peace and cooperation with Arabs. Third element would be world peace. Yalcin questioned whether immigration would not result in expulsion of Arabs. Ben Gurion replied not one single person has been or would be expelled to make place for others. Development of country would provide adequate space.

Ben Gurion emphasized belief Israel and Arab States have common destiny in Middle East. Expressed belief not only in peace but in full-sided cooperation with Arabs including help in mutual development. Promised all possible help in search for peace. If Arabs give up objective of throwing Jews into sea, peace will be easy. Israel has no claim on Arab States but for peace and friendship.

Ethridge pointed out that Arab distrust of Israeli intentions and Israeli insistence on military security might both be resolved through deposit of negotiated treaties with UN. UN represented best and only means of guarantees at present time. Ben Gurion agreed.

Commission plans remain Jerusalem week of February 28. Boisanger and Yalcin tentatively plan return Paris and Ankara respectively March 3 for consultation with their governments returning Jerusalem about March 13. Ethridge plans remain Jerusalem working out future plans and perhaps visiting various areas of Palestine such as Galilee and Negev for background.

Repeated Baghdad 7, Beirut 20, Damascus 6, Cairo 10, Jidda 4, pouched Amman. [Ethridge?]

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/2–2849 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, February 28, 1949—10 a. m.

171. Palun 56. For Acheson from Ethridge. This is summary of my impressions after tour of Arab capitals:

(1) Signing of Egyptian-Israeli armistice has greatly facilitated work of Commission. Despite Bunche's skill and patience that would not have come about except for Department's representations. Department can take satisfaction that armistice was warmly welcomed in

Israel particularly in circles below officialdom. Dozens of people have told me how happy they are about it. Government is more cautious in its approach to peace than people since government has in mind touchy nature of refugee problem, Jerusalem, upon which it has committed itself pretty far, and in making any concessions of territorial nature because of army soreness.

(2) Immediate key to peace negotiations if not to peace, is refugee problem. Arab League is not dead intellectually even if militarily ineffective. There was complete concert of approach to us with almost open request for imposed peace, for guarantees accompanying it and for beginning of solution of refugee problem as *sine qua non* of discussions on other questions. To all Arab Governments Commission pointed out utter unrealism of that position and Lebanese Foreign Minister sent word to me through Delatour DuPin of French delegation that he had been convinced it was unrealistic and wrong and was sending a letter immediately to other Arab representatives urging change of policy. I believe Lebanon and Transjordan therefore are willing to go ahead in spite of concerted policy. Commission plans to set date for meeting with Arab representatives under its chairman to explore further refugee problem. Out of that meeting, providing Arab policy has changed in meantime and providing Israel has accepted in principle GA resolution as to refugees, will come discussion of other phases and also arrangements for negotiations between Israel and Arabs.

(3) I pressed strongly upon Shertok that key to peace negotiations lies in hands of Israeli Government. There can be no fruitful negotiations until Arab psychosis as to refugees has been wiped out and Arab public opinion prepared for fact that not all refugees will return. Both sides now regard refugees as political pawn with Arab agitation constantly directed toward inhumanity of Israel's apparent indifference to them. Israeli Government strongly desirous of using refugee problem as bargaining point upon which it can give something in return perhaps for other concessions. Problem must of course be solved along with all others but generous gesture at moment on part of Israeli Government even if it be words that accept principle of GA resolution, would give Commission entry to other problems. Shertok was impressed with arguments in which I was strongly backed by French and Turkish and said he would lay it before Cabinet. He also urged that I take up with Ben Gurion with his (Shertok's) support. That was done. I am sure that Israeli Government has under consideration some action or statement as gesture to Arabs if way could be found. Department could give help by encouraging that on part of Israeli Government and by encouraging favorable response on part of Arabs if it

comes about. Will have further suggestion as to what Department can do when Commission decides formally on meeting with Arabs.

(4) Moves US has made to indicate to Israeli Government that it wants peace here have been effective. Shertok's attitude in his latest meeting with Commission and Ben Gurion's mild approach altogether different from first meeting when Shertok insulted intelligence of Commission with repetition of GA speeches. Maybe only technique but I am inclined to doubt that. I take it as part of natural process of cooling off, of feeling of greater stability on part of government as reaction to stiffened American attitude and also as Commission's reaction to Shertok's rantings in first meeting. Commission has shown no disposition to be terrorized by strong talk. [Ethridge.]

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/2–2849 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, February 28, 1949—11 a. m.

172. Palun 57. For Acheson from Ethridge. Since refugee problem is key to peace negotiations, would like Department's views on my tentative ideas of approach to question.

(1) It must be considered for some time relief problem for which money must be forthcoming, even after present commitments have run out. Would be most useful if US would quickly make available its own appropriation and indicate in some other way additional concern for 700,000 homeless people living largely in tents under most distressing circumstances in this weather. My own feeling is that the United States has accumulated an enormous moral and even financial responsibility in the situation in our justifiable zeal for creation of a state. Nevertheless these people have been displaced either by force, or terrorism or have fled because of their own fear. Even if the American public has not been told about Deir Yassin massacre,[1] all Arabs know about it and all Arabs with whom Commission has talked have either implicitly or directly blamed US and UN for displacing 700,000 persons. Personally I feel that important element in our friendly relations with Arab states is to indicate active concern with refugees as humanitarian, political and social problem in which US must be vitally interested. Not least of our concern should be political repercussions of having so many people homeless in an already politically shaky part of the world.

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[1] For information on this subject, see telegram 431, April 13, 1948, from Jerusalem, *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 817.

(2) From standpoint of work of Commission, first step in peace negotiations is to get from Israeli Government some gesture of agreement in principle [garble [2]] resolution re refugees and if possible even more specific commitment as to number Israel will take back and method of indemnification of others.

(3) Second step would be meeting with Arab states [3] to make them realize:

(*a*) That not all refugees will go back,
(*b*) That they must help find homes for those to be resettled outside Israel.

(4) Provide, through experts, plan for resettlement and proposal for financing resettlement which would involve indemnification from Israel to Arab Governments, rather than individuals, roughly on basis of number taken in by each Arab state with allowances, of course, for variations in value of property held by individual Arabs in Israel, and outside help either through loans or contributions, from UN member states or both. Commission more than two weeks ago asked UN for qualified expert who would be able to work out plan with technical help of engineers but has received no reply. Vitally needed as soon as possible particularly since refugee problem will require long time in solution.

(5) Obviously when time comes for agreement on refugee settlement, all Arab Governments and perhaps Israel will ask: How can we finance resettlement? It is question Commission must face. Has Department any views on it or is the American Government prepared to make any commitment either of sponsoring loans or of making direct loans? It would be most helpful if I could have some commitment to be used at proper time in negotiations. Abdullah, for instance, has said he is willing to take all refugees. In view of his state's bankruptcy that is fantastic financially even if it is feasible technically. But it may turn out that he will have to take most of them since all other Arab states have so far indicated unwillingness and inability to take any. Commission can press other states to absorb some refugees but Dept is aware through airgrams from Missions of reluctance of any state except Transjordan to add to its problems. I have impression beyond what has been reported in airgrams that part of reluctance is due to realization that Palestinian Arabs, having lived through 30

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[2] Presumably the word "toward" was intended.

[3] Mr. Ethridge, on February 28, advised the Department of State that "On February 27 Commission agreed to invite Arab States to send representatives to meeting at Beirut on March 21 with Commission. Invitations just going out but all states except Egypt indicated to us on our tour that they would accept." (telegram 174, identified also as Palun 60, from Jerusalem, 501.BB Palestine/2-2849)

years of political strife and having enjoyed somewhat higher standard of living than most Arabs, are more politically aware and more demanding as to living standards and would, therefore, constitute core of agitation. In view of great reluctance to absorb refugees, Arab states must be compensated with loans for projects designed to raise all living standards rather than create new problems. [Ethridge.]

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/2–2849 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET JERUSALEM, February 28, 1949—noon.

173. Palun 58. For Acheson from Ethridge. I am in agreement with principle of second paragraph of Deptel 111, February 25.[1]

Have considered that Commission has mandate only as to presentation of plan for internationalization of Jerusalem but believe that even on that Israel and Arab states should come as close to agreement as possible and Commission should take any agreement into consideration in making its own plan. Internationalization is noble ideal but Jerusalem must be made a going concern as city in which people live and need water and lights and garbage collection.

Only other rigid principle enunciated by GA is on refugees, but I do not regard it as nearly so specific as instruction on Jerusalem. Otherwise my position has been exactly that set out in first sentence of your second paragraph.

Have been at pains to talk to British. In Cairo had meeting with Sir Ronald Campbell, Chapman Andrews and Sir John Troutbeck; in Transjordan with Kirkbride and Glubb; in Baghdad with Sir Henry Mack and John Richmond. In all talks except at Cairo, British emphasized that their main desire was to liquidate bad and expensive situation. Campbell and Andrews, stressing fact they were not speaking for their governments, said, nevertheless, primary British concern had been for land access from Egypt through Transjordan up to north, presumably to Iraq [*oil?*] fields. Andrews contended that road could not be built across southern Negev without great expense and indicated British wanted to hold on to Gaza–Beersheba–Jericho–Amman road. I pointed out that Jews hold great part of road and world hardly in negotiations give it up. British conceivably might urge Arabs in negotiation to hold out either for road or for free use. However, we have not got to territorial questions.

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[1] For paragraph 2 of No. 111, see the quoted portion in the first paragraph of footnote 1 to telegram 89, February 25, p. 772.

In general, it would be most useful if Department would concert its policy with British so that they would be constructive rather than obstructionist. However, I have given no encouragement anywhere, although strongly pressed by Arabs, that there would be any unilateral guarantee by US or bilateral guarantee by US and UK of peace terms. It is true that Arabs profess to have no confidence in UN but I believe their concerted insistence upon two-power guarantee is political move to place them in position to say to their people that peace has been imposed upon them by Big Powers. Prime Minister of Egypt said almost that to me. Ben Gurion in stressing need for security did not go so far but spoke of guarantees. I strongly countered that since UN had been the mother of Israel and perhaps its savior by giving Israel time to arm after first truce, he would have to rely upon moral, sanctionable and military force of UN. He dropped argument and as set out in telegram 170, twenty-eighth, reacted affirmatively to deposit of treaties with UN.

Further along in negotiations, we will need all the help we can get. It is, however, too early for any joint action by US–UK except for conferences that make clear each government's position to each other and to me. [Ethridge.]

BURDETT

867N.48/3–149

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 1, 1949.

Subject: Necessity for early liquidation of Arab refugee problem.

Discussion:

It is the considered opinion of this office that measures for the solution of the Arab refugee problem must be well advanced prior to the termination of the United Nations relief program on August 31, 1949, if a political crisis in the Near East is to be averted. In view of the difficult economic position of the Arab states, and the impossibility of launching large-scale development projects in the near future as a means of assimilating large numbers of refugees, there are only two means of beginning to liquidate the problem during the coming months.

The first is the stimulation of "sample" development projects, limited in scope and in financing, which would provide work for some of the refugees and, in some cases, facilitate their gradual assimilation into the countries now harboring them. This approach is regarded as

an interim measure, pending the realization of larger scale development projects. NEA, in conjunction with other interested offices, is engaged in drawing up plans for such limited projects.

The second means of liquidating the refugee problem is, of course, that of repatriation. Although Israel has made it clear that it will not take back the majority of the refugees, every effort should be made to persuade Israel, in the interests of its long range relations with the Arab states, to accept the return of a substantial number. (It will be recalled that the Arab population of the Jewish state as envisaged under the partition plan of November 29, 1947 was 500,000.)

In view of the expected return of peaceful conditions in Palestine in the near future, it is felt that every effort should be made to convince Israel of the necessity of contributing to the solution of the refugee problem by initiating a gradual repatriation program now. Attempts by Israel to defer action this problem pending the achievement of a formal peace will result in a *fait accompli*, since the present accelerated Jewish immigration into Israel will have totally preempted the lands and housing on which Arab repatriation depends.

We believe that failure to commence the liquidation of the refugee problem prior to termination of the relief program will have the gravest consequences upon the political and economic structure of the Arab states. The Arab states presently represent a highly vulnerable area for Soviet exploitation, and the presence of 700,000 destitute, idle refugees provides the likeliest channel for such exploitation. In addition, their continued presence will further undermine the weakened economy of the Arab states, and may well provide the motivation for the overthrow of certain of the Arab Governments. Moreover, unless Israel demonstrates its willingness to assist by repatriation in settling the refugee question, both the possibility of a permanent settlement in Palestine and the establishment of any basis for cooperative relations between Israel and the Arabs will be adversely affected. It is felt that the relative absence of agitation and disorders up to the present arising from the refugee situation can be explained only because the majority of the refugees confidently expected to be returned to their homes.

In the opinion of this office, there is little likelihood that the Conciliation Commission will succeed in implementing its instructions with respect to refugees under the December 11 resolution unless it has the strongest support from this Government from the very outset of its negotiations. (Tab A)[1] Mr. Ethridge has expressed his concern over Israel's attitude towards the refugee problem, and has indicated

[1] Tabbed material cited in this paragraph not found attached, but, for the telegram as actually sent, see telegram 144, March 9, at Tel Aviv, p. 804.

that he would welcome this Government's support in carrying out his task. Such support will, moreover, have a favorable effect upon our relations with the Arab states, which strongly desire our assistance in this matter. (Tab B.) It is therefore recommended that you sign the attached draft telegram (Tab C), which is designed as a preliminary and exploratory approach to this question.

501.BB Palestine/3–149

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 1, 1949.

Subject: Status of Jerusalem

Participants: Mr. Tom Bromley, First Secretary, British Embassy
NEA—Mr. Satterthwaite
NE—Mr. Rockwell

Mr. Bromley called at his request to leave the attached self-explanatory memorandum concerning the status of Jerusalem.[1]

After reading the memorandum we told Mr. Bromley that it would not be possible for the Department at the present time to give the Foreign Office a definite statement of this Government's final policy regarding the status of Jerusalem. We said that the primary responsibility for recommendations concerning the future status of the Holy City has been placed upon the Palestine Conciliation Commission by the United Nations, and that the Department was awaiting with interest the Commission's recommendations in this regard. We said, however, that the Department could now assure the Foreign Office that the United States Government supported the principle of the internationalization of the whole Jerusalem area, as set forth in the General Assembly Resolution of December 11, 1948.

We informed Mr. Bromley that the present trend of thinking on the working level in the Department was that in view of the financial

[1] Undated memorandum not printed. The Department of State summarized the memorandum in telegram 127, identified also as Unpal 44, March 3, 7 p. m., to Jerusalem, as follows: "FonOff has heard that USRep PCC, reflecting US policy, taking strong line re internationalization Jerusalem. FonOff interested know how far US will seek pursue this policy even against Israeli wishes. General policy HMG support of internationalization but they do not feel it is for them to restrict Abdullah from seeking whatever arrangement he thinks best. If USG intends support internationalization firmly, above Brit attitude may lead to divergence from US-French policy. HMG also worried that view practical difficulties internationalization whole city, Israeli proposal will be adopted that new city be part Israel and old city international. This totally unfair to Transjordan and HMG could not accept. HMG could only support internationalization whole city." (501.BB Palestine/3–349)

and administrative difficulties of establishing a fullfledged international regime in Jerusalem, it might be possible to set up an arrangement whereby Israelis and Arabs (the latter presumably Transjordanians) would separately administer sections of the City, the division to be agreed upon by them, under the general supervision of some representation of the United Nations. This representation might take the form of the Office of a United Nations Commissioner, which would see to such matters as protection of and free access to the Holy Places, and unimpeded access to the whole city. We also informed Mr. Bromley that current thinking in the Department did not incline to the idea of internationalization of the Old City only and the incorporation of Jewish Jerusalem in Israel, as mentioned in paragraph 3 of the attached memorandum.

We pointed out to Mr. Bromley that should Jerusalem be internationalized in a manner similar to the Department's line of thought set forth above, there would be no question of Transjordan's "losing the Old City" which would largely remain under Transjordan administration although Transjordan sovereignty would not apply.

In conclusion, we assured Mr. Bromley once more of the United States Government's support of the principle of internationalization of the whole Jerusalem area, but reiterated our inability to make at the present time a definite statement of our own policy as regards the exact fashion in which the city might be internationalized, in view of the fact that the Palestine Conciliation Commission had not as yet made its recommendations. We stated that the Department would be pleased to receive any views that the British Foreign Office might have as to how the internationalization of Jerusalem might be achieved.

In reply to our query, Mr. Bromley said that our verbal exposition would serve as a satisfactory reply to the British memorandum.

Editorial Note

In a cablegram dated March 1, Mr. Bunche advised that the Egyptian garrison of 2,900 men at al-Faluja, with their military equipment and personal possessions, had been evacuated across the Egyptian border, pursuant to Article 3 of the Egyptian-Israeli armistice agreement. The text of his communication is printed in United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Supplement for March 1949*, page 7. Hereinafter, these official records will be identified as SC, *4th yr.*, with indication of date of supplement.

IO Files

Message Released by the United Nations Security Council on March 2, 1949

S–1272

CABLEGRAM DATED 2 MARCH 1949 FROM THE ACTING MEDIATOR TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

FOR PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL: In pursuance of resolution of Security Council of 16 November 1948, armistice negotiations under the Chairmanship of the United Nations between representatives of Israel and Transjordan, and Israel and Lebanon are being held simultaneously at Rhodes and Ras en Nakoura (on the Lebanese Palestine border) respectively. In both of these negotiations the Delegations carry credentials from their respective governments authorizing them to negotiate and conclude an armistice agreement. Both negotiations began on 1 March.[1]

[1] The Israeli Delegation, headed by Mr. Shiloah, arrived at Rhodes on March 1; the Transjordanian Delegation, headed by Col. Ahmed Sidgi el-Jundi had arrived the previous day (United Nations press releases PAL/449 and PAL/448, respectively, dated March 1 and February 28).

501.BB Palestine/3–249 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL JERUSALEM, March 2, 1949—2 p. m.

177. Palun 62. On March 1 Commission telegraphed Foreign Ministers seven Arab League states that, wishing pave way for general settlement Palestine question and reestablishment of peace, had decided to invite governments of Arab states to send representatives for purpose preliminary exchange views with Commission. Exchange views would concern refugee problem, solution of which was matter of urgency, and might eventually, if desire were expressed in course of conversation, be extended to other questions.[1] Commission con-

[1] Mr. Shiloah, in a conversation with Mr. McDonald on February 28 (reported in telegram 164, March 1, from Tel Aviv, not printed; 501.BB Palestine/3–149), had advised of his Government's warning to the Palestine Conciliation Commission about holding an all-Arab conference on refugees on the grounds that no solution for the problem would be produced; that no Arab State would dare to take a cooperative position at the conference; and that the conference would develop into a political gathering where the Arabs would harden their attitudes against an armistice and a peace settlement (telegram 167, March 1, from Tel Aviv, 867N.01/3–149). The Commission decided to go ahead with the conference, however, since "such step might facilitate progress toward peace and risk would be fully justified. In fact committee [*Commission*] feeling is that there is no other approach possible at the moment," (Telegram 1991, identified also as Palun 73, March 7, noon, from Jerusalem, 501.BB Palestine/3–749)

sidered owing ease of communications, Beirut would be particularly suited to serve as place of meeting and that March 21 would be suitable for opening. Commission requested Foreign Ministers to communicate whether agreeable and to inform names of representatives.

Commission representatives each agreed that its government would be requested inform respective missions at Arab capitals re invitation and to urge that Arab Governments accept invitation as means of cooperating with Commission and facilitating progress toward peace in Near East.

If Department approves, US Delegation suggests US Missions at Arab capitals be instructed accordingly.[2]

BURDETT

[2] The Department, in a circular telegram of March 3, 5 a. m., to Cairo, Jidda, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, and Amman, instructed the diplomatic officers at those posts to take appropriate action along the lines of the second paragraph of telegram 177 (501.BB Palestine/3–349).

501.BB Palestine/3–249 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED JERUSALEM, March 2, 1949—3 p. m.

178. Palun 63. Commission on March 1 agreed on text of first progress report to SYG of UN.[1] Text being pouched Department.

Main sections of primarily narrative account Commission activities thus far were:

1. Establishment official headquarters at Government House Jerusalem.
2. Concentration on conciliation under GA resolution December 11.
3. Commission's opinion Acting Mediator rather than Commission should conclude armistice negotiations under SC resolution November 16.
4. Quotation UNGA instructions re Jerusalem, Holy Places and refugees.
5. Establishment [garble [2]] committee re Jerusalem; meetings with Griffis re refugees and steps to obtain refugees expert; reference to Holy Places based on GA resolution December 11.
6. Brief account of official tour of Near East capitals for preliminary exchange of views.

[1] The report, dated March 1 at Jerusalem, is printed in United Nations, *Official Records of the Fourth Session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Annex to the Summary Records of Meetings, Volume II*, 1949 (hereinafter identified as GA, *4th sess., Ad Hoc Political Committee, Annex*, with the appropriate volume number), p. 1.

[2] Presumably, the word "special" was intended.

7. Commission opinion Arab states and Israel were "definitely favorable to peace." Further opinion, however, task would not be accomplished quickly or easily.

8. Commission action to invite Arab states to meet Commission Beirut March 21.

Yalcin and Yenisey of Turkish delegation departed Jerusalem for Ankara March 2; Boisanzer of French delegation plans depart for Paris March 4 or 5; both plan return Near East several days before March 21. Commission will, however, not suspend its activities but will continue work through committee[s] especially that on Jerusalem.

Sent Department 378, repeated Beirut 22, Damascus 8, Baghdad 8, Tel Aviv 15. Pouched Jidda 5, Cairo 11, Amman 10.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/3–249 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, March 2, 1949—11 : 04 p. m.

258. Telegram from Bunche received at Lake Success evening March 2, reports that Vigier [1] informs him Israeli-Lebanese negotiations are running into difficulties. Israelis unwilling evacuate Lebanese territory while Syrians remain on Lebanese front. Also object to an international frontier armistice commission, stating that the frontier will require rectification for security reasons.[2]

Bunche has received no word from Syrians regarding acceptance his invitation to armistice negotiations.

Israeli-Egyptian armistice commission initial meeting went off smoothly in cordial atmosphere.

Israeli–Trans-Jordan negotiations going slowly while Trans-Jordan delegation waiting clearance by Amman of agenda on cease-fire discussions.[3]

AUSTIN

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[1] Henri Vigier, Mr. Bunche's Deputy in connection with the armistice negotiations between Israel and Lebanon.

[2] The Lebanese Foreign Minister informed Minister Pinkerton that Lebanon "would not yield one centimeter territory and would not discuss in armistice negotiations revision of frontiers." (telegram 98, March 4, 6 p. m., from Beirut) The Department of State, on March 5, instructed Mr. McDonald to "ask ForMin whether report concerning request by Israeli repr during Israeli-Leb armistice negots for amendment Leb-Pal frontiers is correct and if so whether request reflects formal position Israeli Govt." (telegram 133 to Tel Aviv) (Both telegrams are filed under 867N.01/3–349)

[3] Amman reported, on March 2, that at the Transjordanian-Israeli negotiations on Rhodes, Mr. Bunche had proposed "that before discussing armistice, formal cease-fire agreement covering all Arab Legion fronts (not only Jerusalem) be signed. So far question Iraqi fronts not brought up." (telegram 78, 867N.01/3–249)

501.BB Palestine/3–349

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Rusk) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 3, 1949.

Subject: Assignment of Mr. George McGhee [1] as U.S. Coordinator on U.S. Palestine Refugee Matters.

1. It is becoming increasingly clear that a final settlement of the Palestine question will turn upon our ability to obtain some solution to the complicated question of Palestine refugees. There are now some 700,000 such refugees in Arab held Palestine and in neighboring Arab states. Only an insignificant fraction of these can be absorbed in the communities where they are now located. It is roughly estimated that not more than a fourth might be returned to their former homes in Israel in connection with a final peace settlement. The present United Nations program is a straight *relief* program which will terminate in September and it is not expected that the United Nations will undertake any long-range responsibility for these refugees.

The bulk of these refugees must be resettled in Arab–Palestine and in the neighboring Arab states. To do this, specific projects for their settlement must be worked out and supported by means of Ex-Im Bank loans, International Bank loans, private capital, or other resources not now committed. Such projects would include irrigation and drainage projects which will make new lands available for settlement. Construction work on such projects would itself absorb a considerable number of refugee laborers.

The national interest of the United States is so heavily involved in the solution of this problem that we should detail immediately an American of high rank, diplomatic ability and sound judgment as a Special Assistant to the Secretary of State with personal rank of Minister, to mobilize the public and private resources of the United States which might be brought to bear on this problem.

It is strongly recommended that Mr. George McGhee be named to this post. Mr. McGhee's experience and performance with regard to Greek assistance, his knowledge of the Department and of other U.S. agencies concerned, and his broad political and business experience would make him admirably suited for this assignment. I hope that you will agree and will put this assignment to Mr. McGhee in the strongest terms.[2]

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[1] Coordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey.

[2] Mr. McGhee was named to the new post.

Editorial Note

The Security Council, on March 3, resumed consideration of the application of Israel for membership in the United Nations; see the second editorial note, page 766. During the ensuing discussion, Senator Austin announced that "The United States fully supports and will vote affirmatively on the application of the State of Israel for membership in the United Nations." The text of his statement is printed in United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year* (hereinafter identified as SC, *4th yr.*), *No. 16*, page 8.

On March 4, Senator Austin submitted the following draft resolution to the Council:

"*The Security Council,*

"*Having received and considered* the application of Israel for membership in the United Nations,

"*Decides* in its judgment that Israel is a peace-loving State and is able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter, and

"*Recommends* to the General Assembly that it admit Israel to membership in the United Nations." (*ibid.*, No. 17, page 8)

The resolution came to a vote the same day and was adopted by nine votes to one (Egypt). The United Kingdom abstained (*ibid.*, page 14).

890E.00/3-449

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 4, 1949.

Subject: Proposals for strengthening Lebanese-American Relations

Participants: The Secretary—Mr. Acheson
Dr. Charles Malik, Minister of Lebanon
NE—Mr. Clark

The Minister said that on behalf of his Government and on his own behalf he wished to congratulate me on my appointment and to wish me much success. I thanked him for his kind remarks and Dr. Malik proceeded to a discussion of the points he wished to present for our consideration.

Dr. Malik stated that during the past two years he had been in frequent contact with the State Department on United Nations problems of world-wide interest. While these problems had also been of

[1] Drafted by Harlan B. Clark of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

importance to Lebanon he now wished to discuss Lebanese-American relations in a more specific sense, since it was his conviction that it was in the long-range interest of both our countries for such relations to be strengthened. He said that a draft treaty of Commerce and Friendship had been drawn up several years ago but that it had never been signed. What he wished to propose would go far beyond the terms of that treaty.

Dr. Malik said that Lebanon remembered with gratitude the active interest that the United States, under the leadership of President Roosevelt, had manifested in the achievement of Lebanon's independence, especially during the Free French crisis of 1943.[2] Moreover, it looked back upon nearly a century of friendly assistance by American philanthropic and religious organizations which have contributed much to the educational and cultural advancement of Lebanon and the entire Near East. He declared that Lebanon was unique throughout the whole of Asia and perhaps Africa as well as an oriental country which identified itself with Western Christian civilization. By virtue of this unique position, however, it was exposed to certain threats by more powerful forces stemming from the Islamic Arab hinterland to the east and the State of Israel to the south. He felt that the threat from these sources was real and dangerous and that it was not to the long-range interest of the United States to see Lebanon swallowed up by one or the other of them, whether it was from an Arab state such as Syria or Transjordan, as was sometimes heard discussed in these times, or from the Jewish State to the south. Lebanon required protection by the Western Christian states with which it had identified itself in culture and religion.

I inquired as to whether the Lebanese considered that the State of Israel constituted a genuine threat and if so in what manner and degree. Was it the pressure of continued Jewish immigration into Palestine that was feared, or was it something more? He replied that the Lebanese do in fact greatly fear Israel and that this fear was shared by all other Arab countries in the Near East. Continued Jewish immigration would, of course, increase the potential of Israel, but Israel already constituted a vast new factor in Middle Eastern affairs. For one thing, the Jews had powerful friends everywhere in the world, including the major countries. Zionism was a dynamic force and the people of Israel were energetic and possessed industrial and other potentials to a far greater degree than the Arabs now have.

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[2] For documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. IV, pp. 953 ff.

He went on to say that, since I had asked this question, he would like to state his firm conviction that until the fears of the Arab world he had just described were relieved by some positive guarantee on the part of the great powers and particularly the United States, the peace and well-being of the Near East would continue to be in doubt. He suggested that it would be most helpful if the United States Government should issue, preferably in a statement by the President, a declaration that the *status quo* in the Near East must be maintained and that no further expansion on the part of Israel would be permitted. In this regard, he would like to express further his belief that the most important prerequisite to the establishment of a firm and lasting peace in the Near East would be for the United States, Great Britain and France jointly to agree on a common policy with respect to the political settlement of outstanding problems and on plans for the economic and cultural development of the entire area. I thanked him for this suggestion regarding consultation with Great Britain and France and said that it would receive our full consideration.

Returning to his proposals for closer relations between Lebanon and the United States, Dr. Malik said that Lebanon, by virtue of its unique position of Western orientation in the Arab world, would continue to need strong support from some Western power and hoped that such support would be forthcoming from the United States. Should it be disappointed in this hope, it was Dr. Malik's personal opinion that Lebanon should in that event turn to some other source of active assistance such as, for example, France or the United Kingdom. I replied that I believed that Dr. Malik had correctly stated the interest of the United States in Lebanon and that we would continue to explore ways for strengthening our economic and other relations with both Lebanon and other countries of the Near East. I pointed out that the concept of our associating ourselves with other powers for defense purposes was a radical departure from our traditional policies and one with which I was sure the Minister would appreciate we must proceed slowly. I said that, for example, we had not yet completed our discussions with respect to the proposed North Atlantic Pact and that this question would continue to occupy our attention for some time. Nevertheless, we would be glad to explore with Dr. Malik the source of the Lebanese fears he had outlined, and the measures by which he might propose to relieve these fears. With reference to his statement that such proposals would go far beyond the provisions of our proposed treaty of Commerce and Navigation I inquired whether he envisaged taking them up in advance of the treaty or to discuss them along with preparations for concluding this treaty. Dr. Malik

replied that he envisaged following both lines of approach and in fact all possible lines. I said that I thought he might wish to discuss the specific proposals he had in mind with Mr. Satterthwaite and at an appropriate stage I would be glad to renew our personal discussion of the proposals.

Dr. Malik said there was one other matter he would also like to discuss and that was the financial assistance of which the Lebanese had great need. A request had been made some time ago by Lebanon for an International Bank loan and he hoped Lebanon could count on the support of the United States for this request. I replied that, as Dr. Malik was aware, it has been our policy to put foremost the question of reestablishing peace in the Near East. As soon as that had been done we would be in a position to consider a program of technical assistance to the entire area, as envisaged in Point IV of the President's inaugural address. In parting, Dr. Malik stated that, in accordance with my suggestion, he would get in touch with Mr. Satterthwaite and discuss the specific proposals he had in mind for strengthening Lebanese-American relations.[3]

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[3] The conversation between Messrs. Satterthwaite and Malik took place on March 8. The latter raised the question of Lebanese security, remarking that "the Arab League had proven ineffective as a means of protecting the Arab world against the dynamic force of Zionism and at least some of the Arab states and especially Lebanon believed that only one or more of the Great Powers could afford it the degree of protection it required." The Arab League, he said, "had never been effective at all in economic and cultural matters and had shown itself a failure in military affairs." He continued that "His Arab friends kept appealing for some form of public assurance by the United States which had shown itself to be so friendly to Israel that expansion of Israel at the expense of neighboring states would not be permitted."

Mr. Satterthwaite replied that "it would not be in accordance with the traddditional policy of this Government to issue a unilateral statement of the sort envisaged by Dr. Malik. In any event, the fact was that a peace settlement in Palestine had not yet been reached and that the delineation of Israel's frontiers and related questions were now terms of reference of the Conciliation Commission in which the United States was represented. It would undoubtedly prejudice the working of that Commission for the United States to intervene unilaterally at the present time in the manner suggested. More basic, however, was the United States' conviction that the Charter of the United Nations provided guarantees to meet a contingency such as feared by Lebanon, and the United States believed that its good faith in upholding the Charter had already amply been demonstrated in the Azerbaijan dispute and elsewhere. Certainly it would be premature to make an announcement concerning the frontiers of Israel prior to their determination by the peace settlement and any statement which this Government might issue would, of course, have to be carefully phrased so as not to impugn the integrity of any single state."

The Minister then suggested that "if some public announcement could not be made at this time, the United States would be prepared to reassure the various Arab Governments in confidence that the *status quo* in the Near East would be maintained." Mr. Clark's memorandum recording the conversation gives no indication of a reply by Mr. Satterthwaite (890.00/3–849).

501.BB Palestine/3–1749

Mr. John W. Halderman to the Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of Dependent Area Affairs (Cargo)

CONFIDENTIAL JERUSALEM, March 5, 1949.

DEAR BILL: The enclosed paper,[1] prepared by me in consultation with the delegation and Bill Burdett, and also the French member of the Jerusalem Committee and the French Consul General, was submitted to the Jerusalem Committee on the third. I emphasized that it was not an American proposal, but simply a working paper to serve as a basis of discussion.

The Committee has now approved the first part. The purpose of this section (under "I") was to enable the Committee to arrive at a general basic position prior to undertaking talks with the states concerned. Now that this preliminary stage has been reached, we are taking steps to get in touch with Israeli and Transjordanese representatives, and hope to be able to discuss the matter with the other Arab states in Beirut later on this month.

I envision these talks as the real beginning of the work on the Jerusalem problem. Up to now we have had nothing but general statements in which Governments have presented their positions much as they do in General Assembly debates. We hope that when we get together in more of a negotiating atmosphere, and get down to actual cases, opportunities may be presented to work out something. We also plan to urge Israel and TJ to proceed at once to a division of the city into Jewish and Arab areas, which may become administrative areas in the permanent regime of the city. We will suggest that our consuls are available as a committee of experts to assist in this. I understood from General Riley when he was here that they would not undertake this matter in the Rhodes talks, but even if they do touch upon it, the fact that we are in touch with the respective Governments here should avoid any confusion.

When I said that the Committee had approved the first part of the paper, I should have added that they did so with the amendments indicated on the copy enclosed. The deletion concerning the suggested court is rather interesting, as it resulted from a fundamental different approach on my part from that of the French and Turks. It seemed to me most natural that when there are conflicts of jurisdiction, the differences should be settled judicially. However, they are not accustomed to this idea, and would leave the decision in the hands of the U.N. authority—the executive branch, so to speak. I don't think they

[1] Below.

feel very strongly about it. The deletion was made because it did not seem essential to decide upon it right now.

Another point which may be difficult is the French desire to have an international police subject to the United Nations authority. So far they haven't been precise about it, except that they feel there should definitely be such police in those Holy Places which shelter more than one religion or sect. In particular they mention the Holy Sepulchre, and they have given me startling stories of the jealousies and actual conflicts that occur there.

I [have] already reported by telegram the point made to me by the French in our private consultation that the United Nations authority should consist of a committee consisting of representatives of the U.S., France, Turkey, an Arab and a Jew.[2] This is the reason why, in the working paper, I merely referred to a "United Nations Authority", without describing it.

The second part of this paper is also intended to serve as a basis of discussion among ourselves and so that we will have various points in mind when we undertake our consultations. We haven't yet discussed this part of the paper, except that the French member raised an objection to having the U.N. Authority report to the Trusteeship Council. In his view, the Trusteeship Council is associated with areas incapable of self-government, and not yet ready for independence. We did not debate the point, as it was really out of order, as he admitted.

Our general plan is gradually to develop a plan for Jerusalem as a result of our own work, and the consultations we will have. We hope that as a result of these consultations, the plan, when complete, will be acceptable to both sides, as well, of course, as to the U.N. This is being optimistic. We have little reason to expect, up to now, that the parties will give at all. But assuming we are successful to this extent, it would be possible to appoint the U.N. representative provided for in the resolution, and then appoint some committees of eminent experts in various fields to collaborate with him in working out detailed plans in such fields as public utilities, finance, etc. This is mostly to acquaint

[2] The telegram referred to is No. 185 (identified also as Palun 66), March 2, 6 p. m., from Jerusalem. At one point in the telegram it is stated that the "French objected to single UN representative on grounds inadequate to responsibilities, insufficient prestige, inadequate representation Christian interest . . . no certainty who representative would be, might well be Latin American, no strong objection to this, but would not have tradition of interest Jerusalem comparable, for example, to France, US. French-Turkish formula would exclude Soviet, and inclusion US should satisfy divergent Christian elements with interest in Jerusalem. . . . In defending single UN representative we did not state doubt US willingness continue official responsibility as Commission member for Jerusalem indefinitely. We considered five member commission unwieldy, and mistake to appoint representative on basis nationality. Should be person of proved ability to get along with both sides." (501.BB Palestine/3–249)

you a general line of thought, mostly my own at this point, though we have had some very general discussion along these lines in the Committee.

[Here follow personal observations and a request for comments on the letter.]

Sincerely yours, JOHN W. HALDERMAN

[Enclosure]

THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF JERUSALEM

I. BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME

A. The City of Jerusalem shall be governed by the authorities and organs hereafter denominated.

B. A United Nations Authority with power to regulate:

1. Protection for and free access to the Holy Places.
2. Protection of human rights and the rights of minority groups.
3. Common public services.
4. External relations.

C. An International Judiciary.

D. Local democratic self-government in Jewish and Arab areas respectively as to all matters not placed within the jurisdiction of the international authority.

E. Provision for financing the city.

F. Provision for the maintenance of peace and order in the city.

II. POINTS TO BE INCLUDED IN STATUTE

A. Jerusalem is constituted as an International City. Its boundaries shall be . . . (as described in the resolution).

B. A United Nations authority shall have power to make ordinances regulating:

1. Protection for and free access to the Holy Places.
2. Protection of human rights and the rights of minority groups, using as a guide, to the extent possible, the United Nations Declaration approved by the General Assembly in 1948.
3. The demilitarization of the city and the preservation of public order. Local law and order to be maintained by the respective Jewish and Arab administration.
4. Financial and budgetary matters. The local Arab and Jewish administrations shall make contributions to the international authority in amounts to be determined from time to time by the Authority.
5. Common public services.
6. Free access to and from Jerusalem and within the city for persons and goods.

7. Administration of special districts or supervision of neutralized areas as may be provided in the present statute.
8. External relations.

D. [*sic*] Local democratic self-government in Jewish and Arab areas respectively as to all matters not placed within the jurisdiction of the United Nations Administration.

E. An International Tribunal to be composed of three Judges to be selected by the President of the International Court of Justice, to decide questions relating to the competence of the organs of government herein provided, including the local Arab and Jewish administrations, and jurisdictional conflicts between courts, including religious courts.

F. The United Nations authority shall report to the Trusteeship Council, and shall also report to the Security Council on matters relating to the security and integrity of the international city.

G. The United Nations authority may, with the consent of the local Jewish and Arab administrations, provide for Jerusalem citizenship. In the absence of such provision, the right to participate in the government of the city shall not depend upon citizenship in any state.

H. Mount Scopus shall be under Jewish administration, but subject to demilitarization and supervision of the United Nations Authority.

I. Frontier inspections and other incidents of international boundaries shall be carried out on the perimeter and not on the demarcation line within the city.

J. The United Nations Authority shall cooperate with the local administrations with a view to the preservation and development of the physical aspects of Jerusalem, and the promotion of the economic, social and cultural welfare of its inhabitants.

501.BB Palestine/3–549 : Airgram

The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL DAMASCUS, March 5, 1949.

A–67. Following communication to Prime Minister (mytel 109 March 5 [1]) of Department's support of PCC invitation to Beirut meeting of Arab states (second paragraph Ethridge's Palun 62 March 2 [2] and Depcirtel March 3, 5 a. m.[3]) which Prime Minister said Syria would accept, I took occasion to express my hope that Syrian representatives would respond to Ethridge's suggestion when

[1] Not printed.
[2] See telegram 177 from Jerusalem, p. 785.
[3] Not printed, but see footnote 2 to telegram 177, p. 786.

here that they eschew generalities and give PCC the benefit of their thinking in specific terms. The Prime Minister assured me that he would be explicit. He said that heretofore two fears had stood in way of complete frankness: (1) Adverse Syrian public opinion which no politician had had courage to face and (2) Probable hostile (UN-backed Israeli coalition against Arabs. Believing firmly that no country could any longer afford isolationism, he has been endeavoring to educate Syrian public opinion in that sense and is determined resolutely to pursue a positive policy of collaboration with West. He recognizes that, as part of the price of effective western friendship, concessions must be made and settlement reached on Palestine issue. Hoping that PCC will be means of assuring Arabs fair settlement, Syria is prepared to cooperate with it in good faith. I told him that I personally was convinced of Ethridge's integrity, independence and courageous attachment to ideals of justice and felt certain that within realm of realities he would insist upon fair deal to all concerned. I warned him, however, not to expect too much, that Arab and Israeli ideas of justice were far apart as their ideas of justice were undoubtedly wide of abstract justice and that what might be within realm of attainable might well be far from Arab hopes. Yet, in my opinion, best hope of peaceful settlement lay in frank statement to PCC of Arab views and sincere collaboration with PCC in trying to reach satisfactory compromise. I knew, I said, from past statements that Syrians would prefer to throw the Israeli into the sea but continued insistence upon such extremes was unrealistic. "They are there; let them stay," replied Khalid Bey [4] but added that justice to refugees and frontiers is all important and should be realistically faced. In conclusion, the Prime Minister said they would frankly express to PCC their views and hope for justice within realizable limits.

In two-hour exchange of views with President Quwwatli March 3, His Excellency showed more moderation than heretofore and, accepting my appraisal of Ethridge, said Syrians would cooperate with PCC for solution within realm of realities. He no longer contended, as always heretofore, that Syrians would never accept Jewish state in Palestine, but he said it was unrealistic to suppose that any partition boundaries could contain millions of Jews that unlimited immigration would bring to Palestine. Hence guarantees of territorial integrity of Arab neighbors was all important but, in light of recent history, could Arabs be blamed for skepticism as regards any guarantees in sight? Who, for instance, said Shukri Bey, will make the Jews withdraw from Western Galilee, seized in violation of truce without even

[4] Prime Minister Azm.

a murmur of protest from the nations that had threatened sanctions? I replied that I believed the Israeli likewise seek peace and to get it would have to make concessions. I also recalled in this connection US position in Item 4 of Deptel 57, February 25. The President thereupon expressed his appreciation of the Department's policy statement with which he said the Prime Minister had acquainted him. I said that most of it was not new but that perhaps some of these indications of our basic policy of friendship toward the Arab countries had been overlooked by the Syrians in their chagrin over what they felt to be our partisanship for the Zionists. It was, however, a timely restatement of those things which showed our friendly feelings for the Arab peoples and our desire to serve the cause of peace and stability in the Middle East. I added that given evidence of Syrian good will, of which Palestine settlement is a necessary first step, it was my personal belief that US would increasingly give Syria evidence of its friendship, mentioning possibilities in some of President Truman's statements, including Point Four of his Inaugural Address and, for first time, message given me by the President,[5] and which I had not until now found what I considered a propitious moment to deliver, concerning his genuine friendship for the Arabs and what their peaceful cooperation might envisage. Shukri Bey said he believed in President Truman's sincerity, and he hoped that our two countries could henceforth collaborate fruitfully to their mutual advantage. Again expressing my personal views, I said much would depend upon Palestine settlement and warned him that while I felt Ethridge would stand firm for justice within bounds of attainable, and receive US backing to that end, Syria must not expect that US would abandon its friendly support of Israel; it might only expect an equivalent friendly attitude toward the Arabs, or rather equal friendship to both friends.

KEELEY

[5] The editors are unable to identify this paper.

501.BB Palestine/3–749 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, March 7, 1949—10 a. m.

192. Palun 71. [From Ethridge?] In private conversation Musa Bey Husseini said to me that representatives of Israeli Government who have been carrying on conversations with Transjordanians have suggested that Arabs and Jews get together and make a deal that will defeat internationalization of Jerusalem. Jews, he said, have told Transjordanians that they can give the Arabs a better deal than internationalization. Jews have said repeatedly that US is not interested in internationalization and only France is. In press conference in-

spired question was directed to proposition of what is Commission's attitude if private arrangement is made. I replied as chairman of Commission that if the deal is in accord with letter and spirit of GA resolution Commission would welcome it but no deal would relieve US of responsibility of reporting a plan. [Ethridge?]

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/3–549 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria

SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, March 7, 1949—6 p. m.

75. PriMin in conversation reported your 109 Mch 5 [1] seems completely to have overlooked fact that SC on Nov. 16 decided that "In

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[1] Not printed; it reported advice from the Syrian Prime Minister that "he had received another invitation from Bunche to open armistice talks with Israeli [officials] at Rhodes. . . . Might accept but did not like Rhodes as locale because of its connotations. Moreover as armistice is only formalization of cessation hostilities and as both parties already pledged to UN to observe truce during which hostilities forbidden under threat sanctions he sees no need for armistice discussions."

Minister Keeley expressed his agreement with this view, stating that "as Syrian and Israeli forces both occupying part of Galilee and presumably neither prepared short of reciprocal concessions in final peace settlement to withdraw, armistice talks between them unlikely to serve any useful purpose and might well have unfortunate repercussions. It is Legation opinion that if Syria now enters armistice negotiations with Israeli, Azm Government may be compromised if not forced out by hostile public opinion thus endangering success peace negotiations as well as ratification important measures such as French monetary accord and tapline. It would seem more in interest all concerned tacitly to accept *status quo* between Syrian and Israeli forces as virtual armistice or at least as no impediment to peace talks through PCC, with which Prime Minister is willing proceed, thus giving well disposed Azm Government more time to prepare public opinion and reinforce its position by hoped-for Parliamentary approval controversial measures important to country's economy and government's stability. Any government that may succeed present one likely to be less amenable to peaceful Palestine settlement, less disposed to ratify pending agreements and less wedded to orientation westward." (501.BB Palestine/3–549)

President Kuwatly, on March 6, expressed to Minister Keeley his opposition to armistice talks; and on March 8, Prime Minister Azm showed the Minister a draft of a "conciliatory if negative reply to Bunche" (telegram 113, March 8, noon, from Damascus). The Department, in reply on March 11, instructed the Minister to "explain to President and PriMin Dept's point of view as stated Deptel 75." It concluded by stating "we feel that Syrian Govt would be wise to undertake armistice talks and desire you make this point explicitly clear to Syrian Govt." (Telegram 85 to Damascus) Nos. 113 and 85 are both filed under 501.BB Palestine/3–849.

The formal Syrian reply to Mr. Bunche, an "evasively-worded reply amounting to negative" was handed to René F. Servoise, Mr. Bunche's political representative in Syria and Lebanon. After further discussion with Mr. Servoise, the Syrians withdrew their written reply and "instead took position Syria would only reply after conclusion current Israeli-Transjordan and Israeli-Lebanese talks." (telegram 121, March 10, 6 p. m., from Damascus, 501.BB Palestine/3–1049)

Minister Keeley delivered the sense of Department's telegrams 75 and 85 to Prime Minister Azm. The latter "patiently explained difficulties of Syrian position emphasizing that difference with Bunche seemed only one of procedure as Syria agreeable to armistice but saw too many dangers in direct negotiations with Jews." (telegram 142, March 16, from Damascus, 501.BB Palestine/3–1649)

order to eliminate the threat to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, an armistice shall be established in all sectors of Palestine.

Calls upon the parties directly involved in the conflict in Palestine as a further provisional measure under art. 40 of the charter, to seek agreement forthwith, by negotiations conducted either directly or through the Acting Mediator on Palestine, with a view to the immediate establishment of the armistice."

In our view therefore Syrian Govt is under unescapable responsibility to undertake armistice negots. Furthermore it might be useful to Azm Govt to plead *force majeure* as excuse to public opinion for entering into the inevitable agreement with Israel, pointing to SC res. Nov. 16 and making much of fact that Syria defers to UN judgment.

Rptd to Jerusalem 135 for Ethridge as Unpal 50.

ACHESON

501.BB Palestine/3–849

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal)

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 8, 1949.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: You will recall that last summer the Secretary of State requested, in his letters of June 7 and 17, and July 9 and 28,[1] that the National Military Establishment make available military observers to assist Count Bernadotte, the United Nations Mediator for Palestine, in supervising the observance of the Security Council's resolution of May 29, 1948.[2] Since that time the National Military Establishment on a rotation basis has supplied a very considerable number of officers and enlisted men for the staff of the Palestine Mediator. Similarly, the Governments of France and Belgium have furnished personnel from the armed forces for this task.

Under the provisions of the General Assembly's resolution of December 11, 1948 a Palestine Conciliation Commission was established to assume, so far as it considers necessary in existing circumstances, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator. On the request of the Security Council this Commission is authorized to undertake any of the functions now assigned to the Mediator on Palestine or to the United Nations Truce Commission by resolutions of the Security Council. To date, however, the Security Council has not relieved the

[1] None printed, but for summary of letter of July 9, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, footnote 3, p. 1196.

[2] For documentation on this subject, see *ibid.*, pp. 533 ff.

Acting Palestine Mediator of his duties, although it is anticipated that in the relatively near future, when the Acting Mediator has succeeded in arranging armistice agreements between Israel and Transjordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, the Security Council will terminate the Office of the Mediator and confer his functions on the Conciliation Commission. The Conciliation Commission is at the moment, therefore, in a transition stage between the assumption in full of the Mediator's functions and its present task, under the Assembly's resolution of December 11, of taking steps to assist the Governments and Authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them.

The American Member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, which is composed of Representatives of France, Turkey, and the United States, has already called upon the Acting Palestine Mediator for assistance with respect to air transportation and possibly also with regard to the use of certain of the military observer staff. It is anticipated that Mr. Ethridge will have increasing need for services of the military observers, although probably in much less degree than was the case with the Palestine Mediator because, as armistices are concluded, they will provide their own machinery for enforcement although there will still be a considerable measure of United Nations observation and control.

In light of this situation, the Department of State requests that the National Military Establishment furnish, in so far as compatible with the needs of the Armed Services, such personnel and assistance to the Palestine Conciliation Commission as the American Member thereof may request through channels either of the Department of State or by direct application to Commanding Officers in the Near East.

In view of the very great responsibility held by this Government as a Member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, and in light of the President's public statement of February 24, 1948, emphasizing his hope for the success of the Commission's efforts in establishing peace in Palestine, I desire to stress the belief that the national interests of the United States are involved in this question and will be well-served by the continuing and valued cooperation of the National Military Establishment in supplying personnel and other aid to the United Nations effort for the reestablishment of peace in Palestine.[3]

Sincerely yours, JAMES E. WEBB

[3] In reply, on March 15, Secretary Forrestal stated that he had instructed the Secretary of the Navy to comply with the Department's request (501.BB Palestine/3–1549). The reply is printed in airgram A–31, March 24, p. 864.

867N.01/3–849 : Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT TEL AVIV, March 8, 1949—9 a. m.

184. Re Deptel 133 March 5.[1] Conferred Foreign Minister[2] 5 p. m. March 7. Knox and Andrus[3] present. Foreign Minister stated that report received by us apparently based on two misunderstandings.

1. Israeli representatives have made no claim whatsoever for amendment or rectification of Israeli-Lebanon frontier.
2. What was said about frontiers in present preliminary discussion referred to armistice lines concerning which Israeli representatives put forth idea that certain points armistice lines might not logically conform to legal frontiers because of topographical difficulties; if such viewpoint in armistice negotiations is maintained by Israeli it will, of course, be without prejudice to frontier lines.

Foreign Minister emphasized the above misunderstood minor points were far overshadowed by (and merely a part of) two major difficulties as follows.

1. Israelis have agreed in principle to Bunche's proposal the frontier lines will be armistice lines but Israelis make condition that this proposal apply to whole frontier including Syrian and not only part thereof.
2. As regards Netulla salient, while Israelis troops are over into Lebanon on western side of salient the Syrians are occupying Israel territory on eastern side. The Lebanese demand that Israeli withdraw from Lebanon in the west while Syria refuses to withdraw in the east would, because of topography, squeeze Israeli army into a militarily unmaneuverable area if the Syrians attacked. Thus Israeli tentative viewpoint is (1) pending understanding with Syria Israel would prefer that Lebanon-Israel armistice (not frontier) line be drawn through an agreed part of the Lebanon occupied territory west of salient in order prevent withdrawing Israel forces into a salient narrowed by Syrian occupation and a possible military trap; (2) if Syria would agree evacuate Israel territory in eastern salient Israel would readily yield their position in west.

Comment: Foreign Minister's explanation involves very technical military points of involved positions and is given herein as understood by mission. Mission has impression that Israel very anxious for armistice with Lebanon (with which country Israel never felt it had a real quarrel as compared with other Arab states) but that negotiations badly complicated at moment owing interposition of Syrian

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 787.
[2] Mr. Shertok changed his name to "Sharett" as of March 6 (telegram to the Under Secretary of State from Mr. Eytan, 867N.002/3–749).
[3] Col. Burton C. Andrus, Military Attaché in Israel.

troops and unwillingness Israel yield all bargaining points to Lebanon and be left with no cards to play for Syrian evacuation of Israel territory. This obviously awkward because it places Lebanon in middle of possible impasse between Syria and Israel. Mission has hopes time and Bunche's skill will solve problem. *End comment.*

While mission believes that very cautious approach should be used at this juncture to avoid complicating individual points of negotiations we are prepared, at Department's instructions, use all influence possible vis-à-vis Israel to assist UN in any fair, militarily logical, and politically possible solution.

Department pass Army.

McDONALD

501.BB Palestine/3–849 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald), at Tel Aviv

SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, March 8, 1949—4 p. m.

140. Pls take up with Israeli auths report contained Baghdad Embtel 95 March 8 [1] rptd you as 2. If report substantiated state in strongest terms that USG as member PCC would deplore any action leading new outbreak hostilities.[2]

ACHESON

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[1] Not printed; it reported information from the Iraqi Foreign Minister that Israeli forces were concentrating at various points with the apparent intention of dislodging Iraqi troops from the Iraqi-occupied sector of Palestine. It also contained the Foreign Minister's hope that the United States "would do everything possible to restrain Israel from aggression against Iraqi troops." (867N.01/3–849)

[2] This telegram was repeated to Baghdad and to Jerusalem for Mr. Ethridge. Chargé Dorsz conveyed the substance of the message on March 8 to the Foreign Minister and Under Secretary of the Foreign Office Rawi. Both "expressed gratitude over quick US action." (Telegram 100, March 10, 9 a. m., from Baghdad, 501.BB Palestine/3–1049)

867N.01/3–949 : Airgram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, March 9, 1949.

A–299. A statement by King Abdullah that he had advised the Arab states before the outbreak of fighting to study the situation in Palestine carefully and that he had ordered his forces to enter the former Mandated territory on May 15, 1948, only when he found that other members of the Arab League insisted on intervention was printed in *Al Garida Al Misaiya*, a new evening daily newspaper, yesterday. The new paper, which will apparently be pro-Wafdist in tone, stated that the Hashemite monarch had given his views in a special interview.

King Abdullah was quoted as saying he had marched into Palestine in order to avoid accusations which might have been leveled against him. He had given the order to march in without having changed the views expressed in his warning to the other Arab states. This warning had pointed out that it would not be sufficient to rely on courage and faith to secure victory, but that it was necessary to take into account every eventuality and to be prepared for "behind the scenes" activity.

The order to enter Palestine had been given although he knew that the Transjordanian army and Kingdom lacked sufficient resources to face the situation. "We have made and still are making great sacrifices to safeguard Arab unity", continued King Abdullah, "but we are now faced with two alternatives". He defined these as being either to resume fighting with the object of annihilating the Zionists in Palestine and their supporters abroad, or to acknowledge the present status quo and to sign peace agreements. "I believe", added King Abdullah, "that Transjordan will adopt the latter course".

Explaining his opposition to an All Palestine Government, the King said that in his opinion it lacked the necessary basis and its establishment had been inspired purely by personal ambition. Also it was unreasonable for the All Palestine Government to take Gaza as its seat, as this would deprive Transjordan of a Mediterranean port.

Dealing with the Palestine conference at which he had been chosen King of Palestine, he said that the Palestine Arabs had turned to him in their plight and appealed for liberation. He had responded with more than the resources of his country. "Can I", he concluded, "turn away from them now?"

PATTERSON

501.MA Palestine/3–949 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald), at Tel Aviv

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 9, 1949—5 p. m.

144. Pls take early opportunity discuss orally problem Arab refugees with FonMin along fol lines:

1. Problem of early disposition Arab refugee question matter of friendly and growing concern to USG. Israeli Govt will recall strong US support of Dec 11 res of GA, para 11 of which established principle that refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at earliest practicable date and that compensation should be paid for property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which under principles of int law or in equity should be made good by the govts or authorities responsible.

2. Altho concern this Govt to alleviate distressed conditions among Palestine refugees has been amply demonstrated, USG has considerably broader interest this problem than temp relief. Considered opinion USG that speedy and equitable solution refugee problem is indispensable if common US-Israeli desire for stabilization and development NE is to be achieved and if exploitation refugee problem by foreign interests inimical best interests peoples NE is to be prevented. USG firmly convinced that insistence by Israeli or Arab Govts to use refugee problem to obtain concessions re final peace settlement would react to serious disadvantage such Govts before world community and US public opinion, and would seriously prejudice establishment cooperative relations among NE neighbors. Conversely, early demonstration magnanimity and humanity in dealing with this problem would contribute greatly to possibility early *modus vivendi* between Israel and Arab neighbors and would substantially increase security that area.

3. Israeli Govt will recall extent to which Israel's objectives have been furthered by USG's attitude re European DP's and has had recent proofs USG's desire cooperate thru measures to facilitate thru IRO immigration European DP's into Israel. US sincerely hopes Israel will display broad humanitarian interest in dealing with Arab refugee problem.

In view our mutual deep interest in objective establishing enduring peace in NE, USG wishes inquire as to plans of Govt of Israel to implement purposes Dec 11 res with respect Arab refugees.[1]

Pls repeat reply to US Rep, PCC.

ACHESON

[1] This telegram was repeated to Jerusalem as No. 144, identified also as Unpal 53, for Mr. Ethridge. Mr. McDonald, in reply on March 14, stated that he had stressed to the Foreign Minister on three occasions prior to receipt of telegram 144 the great concern of the United States concerning implementation of the resolution of December 11 and that he thought it preferable to delay a few days before pressing the matter (telegram 207 from Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/3–1449).

501.BB Palestine/2–2849 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 9, 1949—5 p. m.

145. Unpal 54. For Ethridge. Dept appreciates your thoughtful tel Palun 57.[1] Specific comments re your numbered paras fol:

(1) Expect completion enabling legis within few days on $16,000,000 US relief contribution, with advance payment $8,000,000 available within few weeks. Balance payable fol Congressional action, probably

[1] Identified also as telegram 172, February 28, from Jerusalem, p. 778.

not before April, on appropriation legis. In presenting case to Cong emphasis has been given to viewpoint expressed last two sentences your para 1, and general response Cong indicates concurrence this view.

As one means meeting relief rehabilitation needs after termination UN program, Dept actively considering measures to stimulate more effective drive for voluntary funds. Moreover prominent cits including Bayard Dodge [2] [and James Terry] Duce, Aramco, contemplated early formation influential group for purpose launching educational and publicity campaign. At appropriate time Dept will also consider feasibility endeavoring persuade UNICEF extend program beyond present commitment.

(2) Dept is in full agreement and is making representations Israel.

(3) Dept considers this of equal importance with your para 2. Are you in position estimate for prelim planning purposes approx number refugees who would desire return Israel and under what conditions? Have you any suggestions re desirability and practical methods determining more precisely wishes of refugees this question? [3] On assumption large number would be unwilling or unable return Israel, could Arab states be stimulated near future undertake planning on basis short term work projects utilizing refugee labor which would be of permanent benefit to countries concerned? Such projects would enable those refugees who wish remain in countries harboring them to engage in productive activity behalf Arab states. Moreover, such planning would constitute useful transition to realistic attitude by Arab states toward refugee problem as whole. Presumably experts could be made available by UN or other sources in connection such planning upon request Arab states.

(4) Your para 4 requires careful study. Direct compensation from Israel to Arab Govts without some means intermediary control and

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[2] President Emeritus of the American University at Beirut.

[3] Mr. Ethridge advised, on March 14, that he had "not been able to devise any method by which desires of Arabs could be made known. Have encouraged organization of camp committee who might communicate wishes to Commission but our thinking is that no referendum possible or valuable just now. Those who have dealt with the refugees say most of them want to be back in Palestine, whether in Israel or not. Inclined to think that is true." (telegram 221, identified also as Palun 81, 501.BB Palestine 3/1449)

In the same message, Mr. Ethridge indicated that "six weeks of effort to get the Israeli Government to commit itself on the refugee problem have resulted in not one single statement of position. That is true also of Jerusalem and all other problems with which we have to deal." Later the same day, Mr. Ethridge transmitted the text of a telegram to him from Mr. Shertok, the date of which was not supplied by Mr. Ethridge. Mr. Shertok's telegram concluded that "if pushed to the wall to say what I think at present stage all I would be able to say is that major solution is resettlement elsewhere and not in Israel" (telegram 223, identified also as Palun 84, 501.BB Palestine/3–1449).

supervision would doubtless result in dissipation funds or failure apply them for constructive resettlement purposes. Another important aspect this question is intention, publicly announced by Israeli officials, to put forth counter-claims against Arab states for war damages. Dept believes any effort by Israel relate question compensation refugees to war indemnities should be firmly resisted. Since former refers to property assets of legitimate residents Pal with incontestable right ownership to properties in question, question has no relation any claims against Arab states. For this reason may be inadvisable make Arab states custodians compensation funds.

Dept recognizes that outside financial aid through loans or contributions will be required assist Arab states in providing for refugee populations during interim phase between termination UN relief and initiation large scale development projects in Arab states. We are examining projects limited in scope and financing which might be undertaken during interim phase. Refugee expert to be assigned to PCC could be extremely useful making recommendations this question. Dept also giving urgent consideration to elaboration Point 4 of Pres inaugural address with respect unilateral and multilateral technical assistance programs in NE, but on most optimistic basis flow of capital resulting from this source unlikely for many months.

(5) We hope tentative proposals will be formulated in few weeks re work projects which would fit in with longer range development schemes while affording work for refugees in areas where now located. Some projects might be financed from private sources, including oil cos which have manifested desire contribute to econ [and] social development.

US commitment re direct grants or loans impossible at present. Until projects are more clearly defined and until Arab states show initiative in requesting aid for specific developmental projects, it will be difficult consider methods financing. Possibility ExIm and IBRD loans dependent on submission sound projects by govts concerned.

At Dept's suggestion UK is also considering question projects for assimilation refugees. Moreover we have informally raised with Brit Emb question UK intentions vis-à-vis Transjordan with respect increased financial aid in light anticipated expansion TJ's population and area.

For your info only, Dept plans appointing George McGhee as US Coordinator on Palestine refugee matters. Announcement will follow shortly.

ACHESON

501.BB Palestine/3–949 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL AMMAN, March 9, 1949—7 p. m.

91. Glubb Pasha gave following account this morning of armistice talks between Transjordan and Israel at Rhodes:

When talks commenced Israelis raised 4 points as conditions to cease-fire and armistice:

(1) Free access to Hadassah and Hebrew University;
(2) Free passage past Latrun;
(3) Opening railroad to Jerusalem;
(4) Filling in trench dug by Arabs in no man's land near Government House. In return Jews would give electricity to Arab quarters Jerusalem. (All these points previously discussed in Jerusalem between Dayan and Abdullah Tel.)

As Transjordan delegation did not consider these conditions related to military armistice, officer returned to Amman for instructions. On return officer weatherbound at Cyprus and therefore Transjordan sent message yesterday to delegation instructing it accept 4 conditions but suggesting railroad be under joint control. As cost repair electric wiring in Arab part Jerusalem excessive, delegation also instructed state that instead electricity would prefer that road from Damascus gate past new gate and Jaffa gate and thence to Bethlehem be opened and that Jews give up their positions on Mount Zion, Nebidaoud and Deirabutor.[1]

Glubb said that Abdullah Tel thought Jews would accept this arrangement in belief that lines thus agreed would represent final lines in Jerusalem and that Arabs were giving up claims to upper Bakaa, Qatamon et cetera.

Glubb thought that "with any luck" cease-fire agreement would be signed tomorrow. He indicated that for purposes this agreement clause would be added to effect that it would be applicable to Iraqi areas if and when Arab Legion took over Iraqi front-line positions (Legtel 85, March 7).[2]

He said that next phase at Rhodes would be conclusion armistice but that with turn of events near Akaba one of Transjordan's principal bargaining points disappearing. Consequently, there would seem to be little use in taking any but most reasonable attitude towards Jewish demands.

Sent Department 91, repeated Jerusalem 50.

STABLER

[1] The United Nations announced, on March 9, that the Israeli and Transjordanian Delegations held "their first joint informal meeting" that afternoon at Rhodes. The meeting lasted two and a half hours, during which an exchange of views took place on 11 points, in a "very cordial atmosphere" (press release PAL/456).

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 799.

501.BB Palestine/3–949 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, March 9, 1949—7 : 55 p. m.

293. Following "memorandum on armistice negotiations at Ras el Naqura and at Rhodes" received from Eban today:

"*Israeli-Lebanese armistice talks:*

1. The main military problems affecting northern Palestine are:

(*a*) Question of Israeli forces in occupation of Lebanese border villages.

(*b*) Presence of Syrian forces on Israeli territory at Mishmar Hayarden.

(*c*) Presence in Lebanon of Syrian forces which took part in the invasion of Israel and whose presence is related directly to the Arab-Israeli war.

2. Problem (*a*) does not in itself constitute any insuperable difficulty and could be adjusted in any general settlement of the northern frontier. Indeed, some of these villages have already been evacuated unconditionally. Problems (*b*) and (*c*), however, cannot be settled so long as the Syrian Government refuses to enter armistice negotiations.

3. It is obviously impossible for Israel to conclude agreements for the withdrawal and reduction of its forces with the Lebanese authorities, while Syrian forces are allowed to maintain themselves in full strength in positions threatening Israel's security. The principle of withdrawal and reduction laid down in the November 16 resolution must be applied to the whole area; otherwise any government can secure the prospect of military dominance simply by refusing to comply with the November 16th resolution.

4. The November 16th resolution applies to Syria just as much as to any other of the states concerned. Syrian refusal to comply with that resolution is not only inadmissible in itself, but also has a disrupting effect on the negotiations between Israel and Lebanon, who are both clearly anxious to conclude an armistice.

5. The conclusion is that all available international influence should be brought to bear to induce Syria to enter negotiations in order that the dispositions of Syrian forces, like those of Israel and the Lebanon, should be governed by the principles of the November 16th resolution. It appears from his communication to the SC this morning that the Acting Mediator is making efforts in this direction.

Negotiations at Rhodes:

6. A similar position prevails in the Israeli-Transjordan armistice negotiations. The central sector contains a large body of Iraqi troops. If Israel and Transjordan were each to accept the withdrawal and reduction required by the November 16th resolution, while Iraq[is] were not bound by any such principle, the result would be to leave Iraqi forces in a dominant position at the very heart of Israel. No

action agreed to by the Government of Transjordan could remove the threat to Israel security so long as Iraqi troops remain on Israeli territory a few miles distant from the coast and from the most densely populated centres of Jewish population.

7. There are contradictory reports of Iraq's intention to abide by any agreement signed by Transjordan. Reports of Iraq's willingness to this effect were published, later denied by General Riley, given renewed currency and later denied by the Iraqi Premier. The Transjordan delegation has now informed Dr. Bunche that they are now empowered to represent Iraq. It is obviously necessary, however, to have this undertaking from the Iraqi Government itself. Dr. Bunche has now invited the Iraqi Government to confirm officially that it will consider itself bound by any agreement signed by the Transjordan delegation. In the meantime, a discussion is proceeding on the armistice lines on other fronts.

8. The conclusion here is that unless Iraq, as well as Syria, complies directly, or through an accredited intermediary with the November 16th resolution, the prospects of an armistice with the Lebanon and Transjordan will be gravely impaired. Should it become necessary, Israel may have to ask the SC whether Syria or Iraq are justified in refusing to comply with the November 16th resolution."

AUSTIN

867N.01/3–1049

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 10, 1949.

We received two rather alarming telegrams from our Legation in Amman, the capital of Transjordan, yesterday afternoon. The first [1] indicated that Israeli forces in rather large strength had started moving into the southern Negev area which, according to the telegram, is under Arab Legion occupation. The second telegram [2] reported that King Abdullah had informed our Chargé d'Affaires that Israeli forces had been attacking an Arab Legion post at Ein Gharandal, four miles inside the Transjordan frontier.[3]

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[1] No. 88, March 9, not printed.

[2] No. 90, March 9, not printed.

[3] A third telegram of March 9, No. 89, gave Mr. Stabler's view that the Israeli advance, when negotiations for an armistice by Transjordan and Israel were proceeding, "seems ultimate in breach of good faith" and a flouting of the United Nations by Israel. The Israeli action was said to be "further evidence to Arabs that Israeli intentions, far from being peaceful, are perfidious and aggressive. . . . Cause of peace, which Israel claims earnestly to desire, is not being served through this later maneuver." Mr. Stabler then recommended urgently that the United States "make immediate representations in strongest possible terms to Israel demanding that Israeli forces return at once to and remain in positions occupied at time commencement Rhodes talks and that Israel finally accept principle that any questions relating to territorial disposition must await final peace settlement." (501.BB Palestine/3–949)

The Department called in Ambassador-designate Elath [4] and gave him the substance of the reports we had received. Elath brought with him a telegram which Dr. Bunche had sent the Israeli Government from Rhodes quoting a note which Bunche had received from the Chief of the Transjordan armistice delegation at Rhodes informing him under the instructions of the Transjordan Government that Israeli forces had crossed the Transjordan military lines in the Negev on the morning of March 7 and describing the situation as extremely delicate. The Transjordan Government requested in this note to Bunche that Israeli forces cease such operations during their armistice negotiations and withdraw to their original positions.

Elath also had with him the text of Tel Aviv's reply to Bunche which asserted that nowhere in the Negev were Israeli land or air forces operating outside the Israeli borders, and that these forces had not crossed and did not intend to cross the Transjordan frontier. The Israeli reply referred to the fact that the Transjordan note revealed the presence of Transjordan forces in the Negev and stated that this constituted a serious embarrassment to the armistice negotiations. The Israeli Government then registered a strong protest against this "invasion" and requested Bunche to transmit to the Transjordan Government the Israeli demand for the immediate withdrawal of the Transjordan forces to their own side of the frontier.

The Department expressed to Elath the gravest concern as regards the situation and strongly impressed upon him the serious consequences that would ensue should the report of the Israeli incursion into Transjordan be verified. Elath stated that his government was fully aware of and had no desire to provoke such consequences.[5]

This morning Elath has telephoned the Department to say that he has had a further telegram from Foreign Minister Sharett (Shertok) again stating categorically that no Israeli forces had crossed into Transjordan or had any intention of doing so.[6]

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[4] Eliahu Elath, who had recently changed his surname from Epstein.

[5] The information covered in Secretary Acheson's memorandum up to this point was sent to Tel Aviv in telegram 145, March 9, 7 p. m. The Department instructed Mr. McDonald to convey to the Israeli Foreign Office its expression of "gravest concern" and of "serious consequences" should the reported Israeli incursion into Transjordan be verified (867N.01/2–2849). Telegram 145 was repeated to London, Amman, New York and to Jerusalem as No. 146, identified also as Unpal 55, for Mr. Ethridge. It was sent also to Beirut, Baghdad, Damascas, Jidda, and Cairo the following day in a circular telegram of March 10 (867N.01/3–1049).

[6] Mr. Satterthwaite's memorandum of conversation states that he "thanked Mr. Elath for the prompt response to our inquiries, and took occasion to point out that our representations had not been based on press reports but on information which we had received from our representatives. I expressed the hope that there would be no further developments which might adversely affect the present delicate negotiations." (867N.01/3–1049)

Ambassador Franks has also telephoned me to inform me of telegrams about this situation which he has received. He had been instructed to see me, but thought he would not trouble me by coming down in person. He added that the information he was giving me was for you as well as for me. He said that the movement of a considerable Israeli force south into the Negev toward the Gulf of Akaba was not in line with the Security Council resolution and that the recent armistice could not override the Security Council. The British also have reports, not yet confirmed, that the Israelis have moved into Transjordan territory. He confirmed our information that Bunche is sending observers into the area to report on the situation, and said that his government hoped to hear from these observers soon.

The Ambassador further said that his government had sent instructions to the British forces in Akaba to the effect that if the Israeli forces fire on British forces, the fire is to be returned, and that if Israeli aircraft fly over British forces they will be engaged. The British Consul at Haifa has also been instructed to give the Israeli Government the exact text of the instructions.

The Ambassador then said that the only bit of more encouraging information he had is a report from Amman indicating that the Israeli forces which had made contact with the Arab Legion inside Transjordan had broken off contact at dusk yesterday and retreated westward. This later information is confirmed in a telegram which the Department received from the Legation at Amman this morning that Israeli forces have left Transjordan territory and are proceeding southward toward the Gulf of Akaba.

Sir Oliver Franks then said that he wished to express to me the anxiety of his government and to explain what they had done in the situation. The Ambassador later phoned to say that the Ambassador had forgotten to make the following statement: "We were reluctant to believe that Israeli forces had taken this action, but if the news of an aggression into Transjordan territory is confirmed, British obligations under the Anglo-Transjordan Treaty will, of course, immediately come into question."

I thinked the Ambassador for this information and said that I felt sure the British at Akaba would behave with restraint and not allow any minor incident to set off the balloon. I also told him of the reports we had received from the Israelis denying the truth of the report that they had crossed into Transjordan. I pointed out that the frontier is not marked, and that if someone should wander across it without evil intent it would be too bad to set off the whole show. The ambassador said he would use what I had told him in a message to his government. The important point was he said as I would know that "this does touch his people on a very raw nerve".

Secretary's Memoranda, Lot 53 D 444, Secretary's Memos [1]

Memorandum by Mrs. Dorothy H. Morgret in the Office of the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 10, 1949.

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR

Subject: Palestine

The Ambassador telephoned to inform the Secretary he had two or three telegrams about Palestine and he thought he should give the Secretary the important information from them. He was asked by his Government to see the Secretary, but he thought he would not trouble the Secretary by coming down at this point. He said the information was for the Secretary and the President.

The Ambassador said that considerable Israeli force is moving south in the Negeb toward the Gulf of Akaba. This is not in line with the Security Council. The recent armistice cannot override the Security Council. The British have reports, not yet confirmed, that the Israelis have moved into the Transjordan territory. They hope to hear from UN observers soon about it. What they are saying is that something which looks worrying seems about to happen. The Ambassador said they have given instructions to British forces in Akaba saying that if the Israelis behave aggressively to British forces, then the aggression will be returned. He said instructions have been sent to the British representative at Haifa asking them to inform the Israeli Government that we understand this force is moving south and if they do attack British troops, etc, the fire will be returned, or if aircraft fly over British forces they will be engaged. He said the only bit of better information comes from Amman which says the Israeli forces broke off at dusk yesterday and retreated westward. They were contacted by a force of the Arab legion. The Ambassador explained he wanted to express to the Secretary the anxiety of his Government and explain what they have done in the situation.

The Secretary thanked the Ambassador for the information. He said he knew the British at Akaba will behave with restraint and not allow any minor incident to set off the balloon.

The Ambassador said he would use this in a message to his Government.

The Secretary told the Ambassador we have had the same reports and have heard also that Bunche has sent down observers. We have

[1] Lot 53 D 444 is a comprehensive chronological collection of the Secretary of State's memoranda and memoranda of conversation for the years 1947–1953, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

also heard that the Israelis say this is not true; they have not crossed the border.

The Secretary said there is no marked frontier and if somebody wanders across it without evil intent, it would be too bad to set off the whole show.

The Ambassador said the important point is, as the Secretary will know, this does touch his people on a very raw nerve.

501.BB Palestine/3–1049 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT JERUSALEM, March 10, 1949—noon.

207. Deptel 146, Ninth.[1] Statement by Shiloah that presence Transjordan forces in Negev is "invasion" of Israel appears to be effort camouflage fact advance Israeli forces in Negev constitutes violation SC Resolution July 15 establishing permanent truce in Palestine.

Under Israeli theory all territory alloted by Nov. 29 GA Resolution to Israel is Israeli territory regardless whether occupied by Israel or Arab forces at time truce went into effect. Therefore presence Arab force on such territory is "invasion". At same time Israel maintains right of conquest to territory allotted Arabs by November 29 GA resolution and now held by its forces. ConGen unable reconcile claim Arab occupation is "invasion" while Israel occupation is not.[2]

Since truce established by SC in Palestine Transjordan forces have held southern Negev under occupation. Although exact truce lines not delineated by UN observers, territory lying roughly south of parallel 31 controlled by Transjordan through outposts and roving patrols. Thus present advance Israeli forces appears constitute as flagrant violation SC truce order as advance into Arab lines at any other point. Is equivalent to Transjordan attack towards Israeli-"invaded" Ramle or Lydda.

Israeli action apparently intended obtain occupation all Negev before permanent armistice lines drawn at Rhodes. This would face UN with still another *fait accompli* and give Israeli another political and military advantage during time of truce.

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[1] This was a repeat of No. 145 to Tel Aviv, not printed; but see footnote 5, p. 811.

[2] Mr. Shiloah, the head of the Israeli Delegation at Rhodes, sent a message of March 9 to Mr. Bunche, in which he stated that he had been instructed to inform the latter that "nowhere in the Negev are Israeli land or air forces operating outside the borders of Israel." The message continued that the crossing of Transjordanian forces into Israeli territory constituted "a serious embarrassment to the conduct of our present negotiations." The message registered the strongest protest by the Israeli Government and requested Mr. Bunche to transmit the protest and a demand for immediate withdrawal to the Transjordanian Government (telegram 298, March 10, 12:40 p. m., from New York, 501.BB Palestine/3–1049).

Consul General feels strongest representations should be made to Israel Government against any advance by Israeli forces into Negev areas occupied by Transjordan and that representations should not be limited crossing by Israel of old Transjordan frontier as indicated in penultimate paragraph Deptel 146. Advance by Israeli forces constitutes not only violation truce but jeopardized Rhodes armistice negotiations, work of PCC and will destroy slowly developing willingness Arab States negotiate settlement with Israel.[3]

Sent Department, repeated Amman 14, Beirut 27, Damascus 10, Baghdad 11, pouched Jidda, Cairo.

BURDETT

[3] Jerusalem, on March 11, advanced the view that "Because small Arab Legion strength in region Israel apparently believes can occupy area quickly, without serious fighting and with minimum world attention. Israel can then maintain publicly area never under Arab Legion control and any subsequent action by Legion to recover positions constitutes 'invasion' Israeli territory." (telegram 215, 867N.01/3–1149)

501.BB Palestine/3–1049 : Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT URGENT

TEL AVIV, March 10, 1949—3 p. m.

190.[1] ReDeptel 140, March 8 (reference Embtel Baghdad 95, March 8,[2] repeated Tel Aviv 2).

Inquired of Foreign Office as directed noon March 9. At noon today received verbal reply from Eytan who stated that Prime Minister had instructed him inform as follows:

1. While government very appreciative of US efforts facilitate armistice and peace US going "a bit too far" in asking information on how Israel disposes its troops within area of Israel.
2. Israel perfectly entitled dispose its troops as it deems necessary for own security and has a perfect sense of its obligations and sense responsibility and reality of present situation.
3. Israel does not consider itself bound to account to anyone re deployment of troops within Israel.

Eytan remarked privately that Prime Minister much upset over inquiry with its implicit questioning of motives.

Facts of situation, as reported mission by MA liaison, are:

1. Past six weeks Iraqis and Palestine Arabs from triangle been raiding nightly farms in Israel coastal strip and area south of Ara-

[1] This telegram was originally received as No. 194.
[2] Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 803.

Lajun line. Raiders apparently after cattle, food, and prisoners. Some few farmers killed.

[Here follow paragraphs numbered 2 to 8 giving details of the raids and of Israeli action to prevent the raiders from crossing Israeli lines and containing the statement that "PGI reportedly has no intentions launching offensive against Iraqis but will firmly resist and punish raiders" and comment by Mr. McDonald that "while Israelis will probably not [be] provoked into formal action it is always possible that punitive action or hot pursuit might carry over into Iraqis lines if raids continued."]

Sent Department 190, repeated Baghdad 1.

[McDonald]

IO Files

Message Released by the United Nations Security Council on March 11, 1949

S/1284

Cablegram Dated 11 March 1949 From the Acting Mediator to the Secretary-General Transmitting the Text of a General Cease-Fire Agreement Between Israel and Transjordan

For President Security Council: I have the honour to inform the Security Council that on the morning of 11 March at Rhodes the Delegations representing the Governments of Israel and Transjordan in the current Armistice negotiations signed a General Cease-Fire Agreement applying to all sectors in which forces under the Israeli and Transjordan Command are opposed. The text of this Agreement is as follows:

Israeli Transjordan General Cease-Fire Agreement

We, the undersigned on behalf of our respective Governments do hereby agree that:

1. A General Cease-Fire between the armed forces of the two parties shall be effective as of the date of the signing of this Agreement.

2. The General Cease-Fire shall be complete and enduring and shall apply to all elements of the Military or para military forces under the command of the parties signatory—land, sea and air—wherever located and shall extend to all sectors in which the armed forces of the two parties are found in proximity to each other beginning in the North at Kh Deir Azab (MR 1510 1574).

3. No element of the ground or air forces of either party shall advance beyond or pass over the lines or positions now held by the foremost elements of its ground forces and no element of air or naval forces of either party shall enter into or pass over the waters adjacent to the coastline now held by the other party for any purposes whatsoever.

4. Complete supervision of the Truce by the United Nations observers shall be allowed and facilitated.

5. Movements of civilians shall not occur from one side to the other except by mutual agreement of the parties.

This General Cease-Fire Agreement shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, interests and positions of either party signatory hereto as regards specific matters which may relate to the Armistice negotiations now in progress or to the ultimate peaceful settlement of all outstanding issues between the parties.

Done and signed in quadruplicate at Rhodes, Island of Rhodes, Greece, on the eleventh day of March nineteen forty-nine, in the presence of the United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine.

For the Government of Israel	For the Government of Transjordan
Reuven Shiloah	Col. Ashed Sudki El Jundi
Col. Moshe Dayan	Col. Mohammed Bey Mouaita

In urging the parties to undertake voluntary cease-fire at this time, I expressed the hope that its scrupulous observance by both sides would serve to dissipate the tension which has recently developed in the Southern Negev.

The negotiations on the Armistice Agreement continue.

501.BB Palestine/3–1149 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, March 11, 1949.

216. According to Palestine *Post* Ben Gurion stated in Assembly speech yesterday "Jerusalem was part of Jewish state, and there was no difference between Jerusalem and other parts of Israel. World recognition would be sought for this".

Repeated Beirut 28, Baghdad 12, Damascus 11, Amman 16, pouched Cairo, Jidda.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/3–949 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin), at New York

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, March 11, 1949—1 p. m.

154. Re memo whose text reported urtel 293 Mar 9 you may wish informally tell Eban Dept has already drawn attention US Min Damascus fact Syrian Govt obligated under SC res Nov. 16 to undertake armistice negots.

Concern of PGI for conclusion armistices with Lebanon, Transjordan, Syria and Iraq meets with sympathetic response this Govt.

This underscores our anxiety aroused by reports in Amman Legs tels 88, 89 and 90, Mar 9,[1] rptd USUN, indicating Israeli forces may have penetrated Transjordan territory. Consequences such action shld be very apparent to Eban but you shld stress our grave concern and hope that these reports may prove unfounded.

ACHESON

[1] None printed, but see footnotes 1–3, p. 810.

501.BB Palestine/3–1149 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 11, 1949—6 p. m.

153. Unpal 57. For Ethridge from Rusk. Dept contemplates concentrating activities here re Palestine refugee problem under George McGhee with title of Special Assistant to Secstate. We believe would be useful for McGhee join you for Beirut conference but that, contrary last sentence, Unpal 54 Mar. 9,[1] official appt shld not be announced until his return from Beirut since we have no desire confuse Griffis' operation or to cross wires with PCC responsibilities under Res of Dec. 11. Consequently McGhee would appear in Beirut merely as Dept Officer on special mission for Secy to gather background info on refugee problem. Upon his return he will deal not only with immed and interim phases refugee problem but, more particularly, long-range measures designed for final settlement.

McGhee tentatively plans arrive Beirut Mar 19. Wld like to see Bunche and may either during conference or afterwards call at Rhodes if Bunche himself not available Beirut or Jerusalem. Returning US, McGhee will spend few days London to concert with Brit. officials on refugee problem.

If you perceive any objections this proposal pls tele. Rptd Cairo 267 for Griffis; Beirut 110, London 817, USUN 157. [Rusk.]

ACHESON

[1] Identified also as telegram 145 from Jerusalem, p. 805.

501.BB Palestine/3–1049 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald), at Tel Aviv

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 11, 1949—7 p. m.

155. Dept considers PM comments paras 1–3 ur 194 [*190*] March 10 inappropriate. Seems indicate PM misunderstood purpose approach

you instructed make by Deptel 140 March 8. Ask Eytan inform PM USG had no intention "asking info on how Israel disposes its troops within Israel". Add USG concerned by any report indicating possibility new outbreak hostilities Pal and because of this concern desired in most friendly spirit bring Iraqi report attention Israeli auths. State US reps Baghdad being instructed take up with Iraqi auths question raids reported urtel.[1]

ACHESON

[1] This telegram was repeated to Baghdad. The Department, on March 11, requested Chargé Dorsz to inform the Iraqi Foreign Minister about the U.S. approach to the Israelis as a result of his request. At the same time, it instructed him to state to the Foreign Minister the "belief USG that in interest preservation peace Iraqi mil auths Pal should make every effort prevent such raids into Israeli areas." (Telegram 84 to Baghdad, 867N.01/3–1149)
Regarding the request of the Iraqi Foreign Minister, see footnote 1, p. 803.

501.BB Palestine/3–249 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 11, 1949—7 p. m.

156. Unpal 60. Position to be taken by Jerusalem Comite in informal consultations with reps of Israel and Transjordan (Palun 66)[1] believed sound. Dept considers that arrangements for Jerusalem shld be on principle that general administrative responsibilities will be vested in Arab and Jewish admins in respective areas of Jerusalem and that only specified functions will be carried out by whatever internatl and joint auths may be created.

Re French proposal that internatl auth shld consist reps Arabs, Jews, US, France, and Turkey, Dept agrees such auth unwieldy and otherwise undesirable. As means of bringing French to support internatl auth headed by UNRep, USRep Palestine Comm is authorized to inform French that US wld be willing support French national for first UNRep in Jerusalem provided that highly qualified person is made available.

Dept feels that concept of UNRep and one rep each from Arab and Jewish local admin constituting a Comm and acting by majority vote (last para, ref tel) is preferable to concept UNRep with advisory council. Participation of Arab rep and Jewish rep in Comm shld have result of engaging Arab and Jewish responsibility for actions taken by internatl auth in matters of common concern. Power on part of internatl auth in Jerusalem to bring important security matters to attn SC seems desirable, although precise method of such contact wld

[1] Identified also as telegram 185, March 2, from Jerusalem, not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 794.

depend on relation of internatl auth in Jerusalem to UN. Art 4 of draft Jerusalem Statute bears on this point.

Dept is not clear as to reasons for lack of Comite approval of "internatl court with power to decide jurisdictional competence government organs and local courts and questions re exercise powers internatl auth." Dept believes desirable to have some internatl tribunal competent to determine these questions, perhaps only on reference by Jerusalem internatl auth. Use of ICJ or chamber of that Court for this purpose may not be possible under UN Charter and Statute ICJ without amendment. Dept suggests provision for Jerusalem internatl tribunal to be selected, for example, by Pres ICJ.

ACHESON

501.BB Palestine/3–1149 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

NEW YORK, March 11, 1949—9 : 07 p. m.

319. Following is cablegram from Acting Mediator to SYG transmitting text of general cease-fire agreement between Israel and Transjordan:

"We, the undersigned on behalf of our respective governments do hereby agree that:

1. A general cease-fire between the armed forces of the two parties shall be effective as of the date of the signing of this agreement.

2. The general cease-fire shall be complete and enduring and shall apply to all elements of the military or para-military forces under the command of the parties signatory—land, sea and air—wherever located and shall extend to all sectors in which the armed forces of the two parties are found in proximity to each other beginning in the north at Kh Deir Azab (MR 1510 1574).

3. No element of the ground or air forces of either party shall advance beyond or pass over the lines or positions now held by the foremost elements of its ground forces and no element of air or naval forces of either party shall enter into or pass over the waters adjacent to the coastline now held by the other party for any purpose whatsoever.

4. Complete supervision of the truce by the UN observers shall be allowed and facilitated.

5. Movements of civilians shall not occur from one side to the other except by mutual agreement of the parties.

This general cease-fire agreement shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, interests and positions of either party signatory hereto as regards specific matters which may relate to the armistice nego-

tiations now in progress or to the ultimate peaceful settlement of all outstanding issues between the parties."

AUSTIN

867N.01/3–1149 : Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT
US URGENT

TEL AVIV, March 11, 1949—11 p. m.

205. ReDeptel 145, March 9, further to our 202, March 11.[1] At 4 p. m. Foreign Minister requested my [*me*] call. Knox also present. Foreign Minister categorically denied any invasion Transjordan territory or any such intention and gravely stated Israel's resentment US seeming assumption Israel's guilt and consequent warning prior inquiry of Israel regarding its intentions or actions.

Foreign Minister explained as follows:

1. At 10 p. m. last night (March 10) Israeli flag raised over Umm Reshresh police station on shore Gulf of Aqaba just west Transjordan frontier (145885) "thus completing and making effective Israel's possession of Negev".

2. For some days Israel forces moving south in Negev with difficulty owing necessity find new transit avoiding any encroachment on Transjordan frontier; had to avoid eastern road in parts because it crosses Transjordan frontier and had to find new approach to Umm Reshresh in order avoid using road that crosses Egyptian frontier. Movement successful and at no point did Israeli forces cross either Transjordan or Egyptian frontiers.

3. As Israeli units approached Naqb el Aqaba (137890) (not Rasen Naqb which is on Egyptian side 136891) approximately 7 miles NW junction Gulf Aqaba–Transjordan frontier (145885) and also Umm Reshresh they saw from distance unit of Transjordan Arab Legion entrenched there. Israeli forces stopped because under strict orders avoid clash.

4. Immediately Transjordan opened "diplomatic warfare" through three channels:

a. Message conveyed to Foreign Minister from Abdullah that latter shocked hear Israel advancing on Aqaba and that this did not accord with spirit Rhodes and that Israel forces were clashing with Transjordan. King alleged incidents at Naqb el Aqaba, Wadi

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[1] Not printed; it gave Mr. McDonald's comment that the "Mission considers highly disturbing Transjordan assertion that it has established a military 'line' across Israeli territory in Negev and now accuses Israel of crossing that line. "Feeling among Israelis here is that Transjordan and British are determined precipitate clashes on Israel territory in effort force establishment armistice lines after which Transjordan will consider itself in permanent occupation of area." (867N.01/3–1149)

Araba, and Aqaba area. To this Foreign Minister replied that if source King's anxiety was that Israel had intentions Port Aqaba or had crossed Transjordan frontier Foreign Minister could assure him neither was case, if Abdullah was in position equally assure Transjordan troops would not cross Israel frontier all would be well and that Foreign Minister assumed Abdullah aware fact Negev between Egypt and Transjordan was assigned to Israel by UN and that Israel determined exercise sovereignty over it. As regards incidents: Incident at Naqb el Aqaba was well within Israel territory: Incident Wadi Araba was when Transjordan police patrol from Ein Gharandal (170944) fired on Israel troops well within Israel Negev and then withdrew, no incident in Aqaba area.

b. Second channel was Transjordan complaint to Bunche accusing Israel of crossing a Transjordan drawn "line" in Negev. This complaint admitted very helpful existence Transjordan invasion troops in area, Shiloah replied to Bunche as indicated in Deptel under reference and requested Bunche tell Transjordan evacuate area before larger issues are raised.

c. Third channel through HMG representative Tel Aviv who left note Foreign Office callings attention Government to HMG's ally's charges that Israel had crossed frontiers and was attacking Ein Gharandal. Note outlined line of action British troops in Aqaba would take certain instances as follows:

(1) If Israeli forces crossed Transjordan frontiers and fired they would be fired upon.
(2) If Israeli forces fire from Israel side fire would be returned.
(3) If Israeli cross frontier without firing they will be warned and then fired upon.
(4) If Israeli aircraft flew over British positions they would be fired upon whether they fired or not.

Foreign Minister stated that during the night of March 9–10 the Transjordan forces at Naqb el Aqaba and at Umm Reshresh evacuated and Israel forces occupied positions without firing.

Foreign Minister then read cable received from Eilat [2] giving details of conversations in Department (reDeptel under reference) in which Eilat stated that attitude was tense and accusatory at first but more conciliatory at end. Foreign Minister said he would be less than frank if he did not state that this attitude of US based entirely on complaints from one side and without prior inquiry of Israeli Government has caused deep official resentment. (He was also probably thinking of inquiry made under instructions Deptel 140, March 8.) He stated that the Israeli move to Aqaba Gulf was undertaken with extraordinary care and great difficulty to avoid infringement Transjordan Egyptian frontiers and to avoid clashes. Conscious

[2] Alternate spelling of Elath; see footnote 4, p. 811.

that Israel aggression would involve clash British, he stated "if there is no respect for our integrity there should be some respect for our intelligence". He added that if this *ex parte* attitude on part of US were publicly known it would produce most unfortunate reaction.

Foreign Minister concluded by stating that Government had asked Bunche send observers immediately Negev check Israeli position, transit area, and alleged clashes. Also had instructed Shiloah at Rhodes March 11 sign cease-fire agreement with Transjordan in area of which most northern point is village of Budrus (149153) further line to north excluded because lack confirmation that Transjordan has power act for Iraq.

Comment: View tenseness situation and public feeling, earnestly hope that Department will not prejudge Israel's intentions or actions on basis of complaints received from Arab capitals. Information gathered independently by MA's tends confirm Foreign Minister's statement that Israel has tried avoid clashes and has scrupulously refrained from infringing on Transjordan territory. *End comment.*

Pass to Army, Air, Navy.

Sent Department, passed London 16, Amman 4, Jerusalem 19.

McDONALD

867N.01/3–1249 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Secretary of State

SECRET AMMAN, March 12, 1949—4 p. m.

100. 1. It is understood that Sassoon has sent message to King within past two days to following effect:

(*a*) Israelis advancing in Negev have no intention crossing Transjordan frontier or of attacking Akaba and King should so inform his "British allies";

(*b*) Israel hopes Arab Legion and British forces will receive orders not to attack Israeli Forces in order that present excellent relations existing between Israel and Transjordan may continue;

(*c*) Israel wishes conclude peace settlements soonest with Transjordan provided Transjordan and British will not take aggressive action in Negev. King's reply is expected to be noncommital.

2. British troops at Akaba have been ordered by British Government to use restraint and in event Israelis cross frontier, to warn them to retire before opening fire. All Israeli aircraft over Transjordan positions will be fired on immediately.

3. Glubb said this morning that in signing cease-fire agreement yesterday at Rhodes Israelis would not agree to clause re extension cease-fire to Iraqi areas if and when Legion took over (Legtel 91, March 9). Bunche consequently informed both sides in writing that

at such time as Arab Legion took over Iraqi front line it would be incumbent on both parties to discuss extension present agreement those areas.

4. Israelis are reported to have occupied in past 48 hours no man's land in Beitjibrin–Faluja area, taking over 15 Arab villages.

Sent Department 100, repeated Jerusalem 63 for PCC.

STABLER

501.BB Palestine/3–1249 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Secretary of State

SECRET AMMAN, March 12, 1949—5 p. m.

101. Government and military circles here have been badly shaken by recent Israeli actions in Negev particularly when armistice negotiations were proceeding at Rhodes. Although still hoping that US and UK as well as United Nations will find some effective method of putting halt to continued violations by Israel of SC resolutions, both in spirit and in letter, they recognize that past efforts to deal with such Israeli violations and *faits accomplis* have resulted in failure—in *de facto* acceptance of advantages gained by Israel through violations. While there are indications that Transjordan, facing realistically its present position vis-à-vis Israel, would be willing conclude peace with that country notwithstanding developments in Negev, there is considerable question as to whether Israel will cease its aggressions at this point. Evidence available at Arab Legion and Iraqi headquarters, and confirmed to certain extent by UN observers, points to intended Israeli attack on "Arab triangle".[1] (Immediately following telegram[2] quotes text of memorandum on subject provided by Arab Legion headquarters.)

Since previous Israeli violiations of SC orders have been undertaken in surprise moves, no opportunity has been offered to take any action concerning them except in nature *ex post facto* protests. Result has been that violations succeeded as *faits accomplis*. However in this instance evidence indicates that Israel plans aggressive measures toward an area which cannot even remotely be construed as "Israel territory" and may translate them into action at any time.

Would earnestly and urgently recommend that Department consider calling in Israeli Ambassador and, informing him of these reports, warn him of serious consequences affecting US–Israel relations if Israel undertakes this or any other aggressive action. Unless this is

[1] The area in Palestine bounded by the towns of Nablus, Jenin, and Tulkarm.
[2] No. 102, March 12, 7 p. m., not printed.

done and Israel is placed firmly on notice another violation and *fait accompli* will probably be chalked up in Israel's favor.[3]

Sent Department 101, repeated Jerusalem 64 for PCC, USUN 6.

STABLER

[3] The Department, in telegram 30 to Amman, March 14, suggested that "If Iraqi and TJ Govts have reliable and specific evidence indicating Israelis planning offensive against triangle, would seem logical for them bring such evidence to attention Bunche." The telegram was repeated to Baghdad and to Jerusalem for Mr. Ethridge (501.BB Palestine/3–1249).

London, on March 14, reported information from Sir Alec S. Kirkbride, British Minister to Transjordan, who was then at London for consultation, that the Transjordanian Delegation at Rhodes had suggested that the cease-fire should apply to the Iraqi front as soon as this front would be taken over by Transjordan but that the Israeli Delegation had refused, saying the matter would be discussed after the takeover. It also advised of a telegram received that morning by the Foreign Office from Amman stating that the Israeli Foreign Minister had informed the Transjordanian Delegation that Israeli forces would occupy Samaria to "maintain order" as soon as the Iraqi forces withdrew (telegram 964, 867N.01/3–1449).

501.BB Palestine/3–1449 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET URGENT JERUSALEM, March 14, 1949—11 a. m.

222. [Palun 82?] For Acheson's eyes only from Ethridge. All members of Commission remaining here have strong feeling that work of the Commission has been seriously prejudiced by:

(1). Aqaba incident because although technically no border may have been violated at least new territory has been occupied and a SC order flouted. Furthermore it appears evident purpose to take Negev without exchange in contravention US position as stated in GA.

(2). Ben Gurion's statement on Jerusalem previously reported to Department in ConGen telegram 216, March 11.

(3). Failure or refusal of Israeli Government to make any statement re refugees that would put Commission in position to find a key for peace negotiations, despite representations made by Department (see Palun 81[1]).

We are not in possession of any assurance that could be given Arabs that any settlement on any question will be respected. As previously reported, this was a major theme of Arabs during our tour of capitals.

Above situation obviously prejudices success Beirut Conference. We have informally discussed calling off conference but my own feeling is that whether it fails or not we must (*a*) make the effort, (*b*) get the situation out into the open before there is further deterioration. Consequently we are going ahead with it. If the Department can

[1] Identified also as telegram 221, March 14, from Jerusalem, not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 806.

do anything useful during Shertok's visit to induce him to make one conciliatory gesture it may save the situation. Arabs have constantly impressed upon us that they regard the refugee question as test of Israeli good faith.

The second point they have made as I have previously reported, is that they want guarantees. I have consistently replied that the only assurance in which I can encourage them is through UN. When they see it flouted and the Commission treated as unwelcome interlopers they are not likely to regard that as great assurance. Indeed unless strong action of some kind is taken now Palestine may become even holier as the burial place of the UN.

My own feeling is that if Beirut Conference fails there is little left for us to do but to call for direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab states and present a plan for the internationalization of Jerusalem that will be academic. Seems to me therefore, that Department is faced with major decision—whether it should or will try to enforce position that if Israel takes the Negev it should make exchange of territory elsewhere. If the decision is to insist upon that it will require the strongest representations at the earliest possible moment. On the other hand Stabler expressed feeling Sunday that Transjordan would be willing to negotiate peace on almost any basis.

Some of us have the feeling that one reason for Shertok's hasty departure might be desire to avoid showdown with Commission on refugee problem. Whether true or not, I hope the Department will consider the possibility that[2] exists for turning his visit to our advantage. I am sure that he considers Washington more friendly than the Commission and has not been sufficiently impressed with US interest in UN settlement. I wish he could be shown that this is not the case. [Ethridge.]

BURDETT

[2] At this point in the text appears "(Palun 82)." It is the opinion of the editors that Palun 82 is the same as telegram 222 from Jerusalem. This designation, therefore, has been deleted here and placed in brackets, with question mark, at the beginning of the message.

In the "Summary of Daily Meeting with the Secretary" of March 15, Mr. Rusk, who became Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs on February 8, is said to have "reported that the Palestine situation is getting more serious. He asked the Secretary whether he had read telegram no. 222 from Ethridge. The Secretary said that he had not but would. Mr. Rusk said we should send this along to Key West at once with an indication that the Department will have some recommendations to make to the President in regard to it but that we desired the President to have this information immediately." (Secretary's Daily Meetings, Lot 58 D 609. This lot is a chronological collection of the records of the Secretary of State's daily meetings with top Department of State officials for the year 1949–1952, as maintained by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.)

501.BB Palestine/3–1549

Memorandum by the Coordinator on Palestine Refugee Matters (McGhee)[1] to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 15, 1949.

Attached are policy recommendations with respect to Palestine refugees, together with a supporting policy paper which contains on page 20 a statement of recommended planning objectives.[2] These have been approved by Mr. Rusk, who hopes that they can be discussed at your regular staff meeting at the earliest opportunity.

Since I plan to leave for Beirut the morning of March 17, I would like to discuss this paper with you tomorrow, together with proposed plan of action and planning with respect to the refugee problem which are dealt with in papers attached.

After you have given consideration to these papers, I hope then to be able to discuss them with the Secretary, who has indicated his willingness to do so and to advise me of the President's views with respect to this matter.[3]

[Annex 1]

Memorandum by the Coordinator on Palestine Refugee Matters (McGhee) to the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 15, 1949.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

(1) It be recognized as in the national interest of the United States that an early and effective solution be found to the problem of the Palestine refugees. Such solution should make possible their repatriation or resettlement in such a manner as to minimize present and potential political and economic tensions prejudicial to United States interests in the area affected.

(2) The United States be prepared to contribute such technical and financial assistance to the solution of this problem as it considers necessary, while at the same time refusing to accept sole responsibility for solution of the problem and seeking to confine U.S. financial assistance thereto within limits consistent with its national interests.

[1] In this position, Mr. McGhee served as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

[2] These papers are printed as Annexes 1 and 2, below. The planning objectives on page 20 are the 10 recommendations in Annex 2.

[3] Filed with this memorandum is an undated memorandum, prepared presumably by Mr. McGhee and entitled "Plan of Action [regarding] Palestine Refugee Problem," not printed.

(3) A plan be developed as a matter of urgency for the implementation of this policy, including proposals for relief, rehabilitation, and long-range resettlement projects, estimated costs, and expected sources of funds, and operational procedures, including the part to be played by the U.S., the governments in the affected area, other interested governments, and the United Nations.[4]

[Annex 2]

501.MA Palestine/3–1749

Policy Paper Prepared in the Department of State[5]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 15, 1949.

PALESTINE REFUGEES

THE PROBLEM

The problem is to determine the nature and extent of United States interest in the question of some 725,000 Arab refugees from the Palestine hostilities, and in the light of the findings, to make recommendations concerning United States policy towards the long-range disposition of this question.

DISCUSSION

(1) *Background:* As a result of hostilities in Palestine preceding and following the termination of the British Mandate and establishment of the State of Israel on May 15, 1948, almost the entire Arab population of Palestine fled or was expelled from the area under Jewish occupation. These Arabs, now estimated at 725,000, took refuge in Arab-controlled areas of Palestine and in the neighboring Arab states. The present distribution of the refugees is approximately the following:

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[4] According to a memorandum of April 21, the numbered paragraphs were accepted as a "Policy Decision, March 15, 1949." The authorship of the memorandum is not indicated (867N.48/4–2249). The word "be" in each of the first two paragraphs above was changed to "is" in the memorandum of April 21 and the word "should" was added as the third word in paragraph 3.

[5] The specific authorship of this paper is not indicated. The first six sections, except for 6(*d*), and the 10 recommendations at the end of the paper were largely quoted from memoranda prepared separately by the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs and the Office of United Nations Affairs. The former was sent to Mr. McGhee in a memorandum of March 12 by Mr. Satterthwaite as provisional views on "Policy and recommendations concerning solution of the Arab refugee question" (867N.01/3–1249). The latter was in the form of a memorandum by Mr. McClintock to Mr.McGhee on March 14 and dealt with the "Attitudes of UN, individual governments, and refugees themselves toward Palestine refugee problem" (867N.48/3–1449). The Policy Paper begins with a table of contents, here omitted.

Lebanon	100,000–105,000	an addition of		10–	10.5%	to	the	normal	population
Syria	85,000–100,000	"	"	"	3.5– 4%	"	"	"	"
Transjordan	85,000	"	"	"	21%	"	"	"	"
Iraq	5,000	"	"	"	0.1%	"	"	"	"
Egypt	8,000–10,000	"	"	"	0.04– 0.05%	"	"	"	"
Palestine									
North	230,000	areas under Egyptian, Iraqi, and							
South	225,000	Transjordanian military occupation							

No accurate statistical breakdown of the refugees exists. However, the International Children's Emergency Fund considers 425,000 or 58% of the refugees eligible for assistance under its program: this group consists of infants, young children, pregnant women, and nursing mothers. Approximately 15% of the refugees are aged, sick, and infirm. It would appear that the able-bodied men and women amount to a maximum of 25 percent of the total, or 180,000.

The condition of these refugees, dependent upon their own slender resources and upon those of the neighboring states, rapidly became acute. Since the Government of Israel refused to permit repatriation of Arab refugees into Israeli territory while a state of war existed, and since relief assistance enlisted by the United Nations Mediator for Palestine in August was wholly inadequate to meet a problem of this magnitude, the Mediator referred the problem to the General Assembly in September, with a renewed appeal for assistance. This appeal was reiterated by the Acting Mediator in a report to the United Nations on October 18, 1948,[6] in which he made recommendations for the establishment of a United Nations relief program for assistance to the refugees.

(2) *Action taken up to present.*

In response to the Mediator's initial request in August for emergency supplies, the Department's only recourse, in the absence of authorized public funds, was to appeal to American voluntary agencies. As a result of this action, funds and supplies exceeding $1,500,000 have been contributed by American voluntary sources as of March 1, 1949.

On November 19, 1948, the General Assembly unanimously passed a joint US-UK-Belgian-Dutch resolution calling for a United Nations program for the relief of Palestinian refugees. This resolution declared that a sum of $32,000,000 would be required for a nine months' program, to be raised by voluntary contributions, and authorized an immediate advance of $5,000,000 from the UN working capital fund.

[6] United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session*, Supplement No. 11A. For the proposed United States draft resolution based on the needs of the refugees as set forth in this report, see telegram Delga 411, October 20, 1948, from Paris, *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1497.

This Government granted a leave of absence to Stanton Griffis, American Ambassador to Egypt, to enable him to accept the appointment as Director of United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees.

On December 7, President Truman announced his intention of recommending to the Congress that the United States contribute 50 percent of the amount called for in the United Nations resolution, or $16,000,000.[7] The authorizing legislation for this appropriation has been passed by the Senate, and is now pending in the House of Representatives.

The General Assembly resolution of December 11, 1948, establishing a Conciliation Commission for Palestine resolves "that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible". A machinery for implementing these objectives is provided by the resolution, which "instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations." We strongly supported the resolution of December 11, and have instructed the American member of the Conciliation Commission to be guided, with respect to the refugee question, by its terms.

With respect to the attitude of the Israeli Government towards the question of repatriation, we have undertaken and are undertaking action on the diplomatic level in two respects: (1) with the underlying purpose of safeguarding Arab absentee property interests in Israel against application of the Israeli ordinance of December 12, 1948 authorizing sale of such property, we are urging Israel not to take unilateral action which would prejudice achievement of an agreed settlement on the return of refugees to their homes and return of property to refugee owners; (2) we are urging Israel to implement the purposes of the December 11 resolution, as a means of facilitating political settlement of the Palestine problem and preparing the way for a *modus vivendi* with the Arab states.

If Israel indicates agreement in principle with the December 11 resolution, or expresses its willingness to cooperate in resolving the refugee question, we also contemplate making representations to the

[7] For text of statement by President Truman, see telegram Gadel 688, December 6, 1948, to Paris, *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1648.

Arab states, with a view to their adoption of a more realistic attitude towards the question of accepting a share of the refugees on a permanent basis and with a view to stimulating them to make constructive plans to this end.

(3) *Assumptions that can be made with respect to the problem.*

Failure to liquidate or materially reduce the magnitude of the Arab refugee problem would have important consequences. The Arab states presently represent a highly vulnerable area for Soviet exploitation, and the presence of over 700,000 destitute, idle refugees provides the likeliest channel for such exploitation. In addition, their continued presence will further undermine the weakened economy of the Arab states, and may well provide the motivation for the overthrow of certain of the Arab Governments. Moreover, failure to liquidate the problem would adversely affect the possibility of a permanent settlement in Palestine, and would create a permanent source of friction between Israel and the Arab states.

Conversely, speedy action looking to the equitable solution of the refugee problem would further the restoration of peace and security and contribute to the stabilization of the Near East. It would prevent the exploitation of the refugee problem by foreign interests inimical to the best interests of the peoples of the Near East.

In view of the stated position of Israel towards the question of repatriation, and the large-scale preemption of Arab lands and housing by Jewish immigrants, who are entering Israel at the rate of 25,000 monthly, it would be wholly unrealistic to expect Israel to agree to the repatriation of all those so desiring. Although the Jews originally accepted the partition resolution of November 29, 1947, under which the Arab population of the Jewish state would have numbered 500,000, it is doubtful that the State of Israel would now permit more than a small number of refugees to return to Israel. If Israel could be persuaded to accept any substantial number, it is probable that it would request financial assistance in carrying out their repatriation.

It is reasonable to assume that as many as 600,000 refugees will have to be permanently settled in the Arab states. The Arab states, however, will be unable to accomplish the resettlement of this number without adverse economic and political repercussions, unless material assistance is forthcoming.

It can also be assumed that any machinery and resources which are placed at the disposal of the Conciliation Commission to implement its task will be inadequate to deal with a resettlement problem of this magnitude. Moreover, the resources of the United Nations and its specialized agencies are presently inadequate to handle this problem and, to judge from the response of the member states to the appeal for funds to implement the November 19 resolution establishing a relief

program, the member states would not be willing to contribute the material resources required to carry out a mass resettlement program if such action were proposed in the United Nations.

Finally, it can be assumed that Great Britain is the only major foreign power whose degree of interest in the liquidation of the refugee question is sufficient to insure any significant participation in its solution. (Attention should be called in this respect to Great Britain's close treaty relations with Egypt and Iraq, and to her special position with respect to Transjordan, the latter two of which would probably be heavily involved in any mass resettlement program.)

(4) *United States interests and policy in the Near East.*

The Near Eastern area, which consists of Israel and the Arab states, is an area of vital strategic importance, a communications center, and a major source of petroleum. As such, it is an area of special concern to all the great powers and to certain lesser powers. During recent years our chief objective in the Near East was to prevent inherent rivalries and conflicting interests in that area from developing into conditions which might lead to a third world war, an objective dictated by our primary interest in safeguarding the security of the United States.

Because of the special significance of Palestine, the conflicting interests and aspirations of the Near East as a whole have had a primary focus in that country and, during the past year, found expression in open hostilities. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, this Government took a leading part in seeking a solution of the Palestine problem which would be acceptable to the interested parties. Since the failure of these attempts, we have been active in supporting measures designed to end the conflict, and to achieve a permanent settlement of the Palestine problem. These efforts, carried on within the framework of the United Nations, have been governed by our desire to support in the Near East the principles of the United Nations, and to put an end to the threat to international security and to American strategic interests in the Near East which the present situation represents.

In conjunction with our efforts to achieve the permanent settlement of Arab-Jewish differences with respect to Palestine, we are striving to promote the establishment of cooperative relationships between Israel and the Arab states, as a condition to the stabilization and peaceful development of the area.

On a regional basis, it is our policy to assist the Near Eastern countries in maintaining their independence, to strengthen their orientation towards the West, and to discourage any tendencies towards the development of authoritarian and unrepresentative forms of government. Such efforts are designed both to minimize the de-

bilitating effects of internal discontent, and to strengthen the determination of these states to resist external pressures and intervention.

(5) *Effect of the refugee problem upon United States interests and policy.*

From the political point of view, the stabilization of the Near East is a major objective of American foreign policy. The refugee problem, therefore, as a focal point for continued unrest within the Arab states, a source of continuing friction between Israel and the Arabs, and a likely channel for Soviet exploitation, is directly related to our national interests.

From the strategic point of view, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on September 22, 1948, with specific reference to the Arab refugee question, characterized the Near Eastern area as an area of critical strategic importance, and emphasized the necessity, from a military standpoint, of maintaining the Arab world oriented towards the United States and the United Kingdom. They therefore recommended that, as a measure to strengthen our military position, the United States should make provision for generous assistance to the Arab refugees from Palestine.[8] The Secretary of Defense on January 25, 1949, charterized the presence of the refugees in the Near East as a serious threat to the political, economic and social stability of this region, and a serious danger to the health and welfare of the peoples of the Arab states and Israel.[9]

Our present policy with respect to Palestinian refugees, as set forth in the Secretary's Policy Problem Book, is the following:

We should use our best efforts, through the Conciliation Commission and through diplomatic channels, to insure the implementation of the General Assembly resolution of December 11, 1948;

We should endeavor to persuade Israel to accept the return of those refugees who so desire, in the interests of justice and as an evidence of its desire to establish amicable relations with the Arab world;

We should furnish advice and guidance to the governments of the Arab states in the task of absorbing into their economic and social structures those refugees who do not wish to return to Israel.

(6) *Attitudes of UN, individual governments, and refugees themselves toward the problem.*

(*a*) *Attitude of the UN.*

Count Bernadotte, the slain Palestine Mediator, very early established the principle of UN responsibility for the Palestine refugees. In

[8] See telegram Telmar 19, September 28, 1948, to Paris, *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1427.

[9] See Secretary Forrestal's letter to Chairman Bloom, January 25, p. 697.

Conclusion (G) of his report, dated September 16, in Part Three (Assistance to Refugees), he said:

"So long as large numbers of the refugees remain in distress, I believe that responsibility for their relief should be assumed by the United Nations in conjunction with the neighbouring Arab States, the Provisional Government of Israel, the specialized agencies, and also all the voluntary bodies or organizations of a humanitarian and non-political character."

However, at the Third Session of the General Assembly in Paris, the United States Delegation was careful to insist in conversations with other Delegations that there was no *legal* responsibility for refugee relief devolving upon the United Nations. The United States Delegation succeeded in eliminating from the United Kingdom draft of the Preamble of the resolution before the Third Committee providing for an emergency relief program, a paragraph which would have established United Nations responsibility for this problem. The issue was placed before the Third Committee and the Assembly on its own merits as a question involving humanitarian as well as political elements which would have to be met on an *ad hoc* basis without establishing a precedent for similar United Nations action in other cases.

Nevertheless, in the eyes of the refugees themselves and to an even greater extent in the view of the Arab Governments, there is a United Nations responsibility for the care of the refugees only slightly less than an imagined United States responsibility, since the Arab Governments are prone to insist that Israel would not have come into existence without United States support and, had there been no Israel, there would have been no refugees.

Subsequent to the passage of the resolution, the UN in the field, under the directorship of Ambassador Stanton Griffis, has undertaken primary responsibility for the emergency phase of refugee relief. There is no doubt that the Secretary General, Mr. Trygve Lie, feels convinced that the United Nations must continue to show effective leadership in meeting this problem. However, in essence, the continuing participation of the United Nations in dealing with the interim and long-range phases of the matter will depend on the attitudes of the Governments who compose the United Nations.

(*b*) *Attitudes of Governments.*

It was significant that when the Palestine refugee problem was considered by Committee 3 in Paris last autumn, support was more verbal than valuable in tangible terms. Mr. Mayhew of the British Delegation, at the very commencement of the session, insisted that the Third Committee should immediately devise measures to meet the refugee problem. When asked, however, what measures the United Kingdom

had in mind or even if its delegation had a draft resolution, Mr. Mayhew confessed that they had neither ideas nor the embodiment of ideas in resolution form. The British attitude seemed to be one of viewing with great alarm, but most of the spade work in developing the resolution which was finally adopted by the Assembly was done by the United States Delegation. It is probable, however, that it was due to British influence that the Netherlands and Belgium associated themselves with the United Kingdom, and the United States, in jointly sponsoring a resolution. Unfortunately, however, the interest of these governments in contributing to the refugee relief in more tangible terms than sponsorship of a resolution has not proved to be very great. Although the Belgian Government has contributed approximately one-half a million dollars, the Dutch have given nothing, while the French contribution still awaits Parliamentary approval. The British contribution totals one million pounds.

The response of other governments has been even less enthusiastic. In fact, the great brunt of relief expenditures has been borne, perforce, by the Arab States, on whom these refugees are quartered. Dr. Bayard Dodge estimates that from the time the first refugees escaped from Haifa and Jaffa in the spring of 1948, to December 1 in that year, the Arab Governments contributed $11 million in cash or kind to their sustenance. This sum, in light of the very slender budgets of most of these Governments, is relatively enormous.*

The conclusion seems inescapable, therefore, that even though the United Nations should formulate a program for the interim and long-range relief periods, its constituent Governments cannot be relied upon for very effective contributions with the possible exception of the United Kingdom.

The United Kingdom has definitely indicated its mounting concern at the refugee problem, realizing as it does how the presence of 700,000 demoralized and hungry people can threaten the entire stability of the strategic Middle East in which the United Kingdom has a vital interest. Thus, the British Foreign Secretary on March 2 spoke to Ambassador Douglas in London of the depth of his concern regarding the plight of the Arab refugees. Mr. Bevin felt that this was a problem of alarming proportions which "deserves the utmost efforts of the United States and United Kingdom as well as the United Nations", to say nothing of being a political problem of the first magnitude for the reestablishment of peace in the Middle East (London telegram 787, March 3 [10]).

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* The total direct relief offered the Arab refugees by the Israeli Government to date consists of 500 cases of oranges. [Footnote in the source text.]

[10] Not printed.

Although this was the attitude of the British Foreign Secretary, his Foreign Office has as yet not formulated concrete proposals for meeting the problem. Nevertheless, British Missions in the Middle East have been circularized with a questionnaire and the Foreign Secretary, who displays a keen personal interest in the matter, in the last week of February directed that the views of the Commonwealth Governments regarding the refugee problem be ascertained, as they might be helpful not only in a material way but also in the United Nations. Mr. Bevin thought that India and Pakistan, which have wide experience in handling refugee problems, might be of particular help. He felt also that the French Government should be consulted because of its wide Moslem responsibilities. (London telegram 742, March 1 [11]).

On the basis of this evidence, therefore, there would seem to be ground for considerable spade work with the British. Through the British Middle East Office the United Kingdom has extensive economic contact with the Arab Governments and an immense reservoir of experience on which to draw. Furthermore, in very concrete terms the British should be able to tap the resources of such great engineering firms as Gibbs and Cox, who, it is understood, have prepared detailed engineering plans for river development projects and land improvement schemes in Transjordan and other areas where Palestine refugees might be settled.

Since the British and American Governments are in concert as to their strategic requirements in the Middle East, it would seem absolutely essential that any program for that area in regard to refugee relief which would be sponsored by this Government, either in the United Nations or as a separate project, should be accomplished in the closest accord with the United Kingdom Government.

(*c*) *Attitude of the Refugees Themselves.*

All reports from the field—i.e., those of Dr. Bayard Dodge and Mr. Colin Bell of the Friends Service Committee, recently returned from Gaza, and of Mr. St. Aubin, the Field Director in the Near East of the American Red Cross, plus reports from United States Missions in that area—confirm that the great bulk of the refugees wish to return to their homes and cling to the illusion that it will be possible to do so.

The danger point will come when the refugees realize that it will be impossible for the majority to return home. It is true that Mr. Stanton Griffis in Cairo's airgram A–254, March 1,[11] expresses the opinion that, once peace is restored, large numbers of refugees will infiltrate across the Israeli border and return to their former abode. Neverthe-

[11] Not printed.

less, the Representatives of the Provisional Government of Israel have very clearly indicated that Israel has no intention of taking back more than a portion of the refugees. The Israeli Representative in Washington, Mr. Eliahu Elath, told Mr. Mark Ethridge that he thought that maybe the Christian Arabs might be permitted to return but that the Moslem Arabs would be an intractable element who could not assimilate in Israel. Furthermore, Israeli authorities have followed a systematic program of destroying Arab houses in such cities as Haifa and in village communities in order to rebuild modern habitations for the influx of Jewish immigrants from DP camps in Europe. There are, thus, in many instances, literally no houses for the refugees to return to. In other cases incoming Jewish immigrants have occupied Arab dwellings and will most certainly not relinquish them in favor of the refugees. Accordingly, it seems certain that the majority of these unfortunate people will soon be confronted with the fact that they will not be able to return home. Unless some alternative is prepared and some hope offered them of an improved life in the future, it is certain that the political, to say nothing of the social, repercussions of this discovery will be very great.

If a proper program can be devised and implemented promptly, it is to be anticipated that the refugees will cooperate in carrying out the program, especially since they will in any case have no alternative. These people, for the most part, have long been inured to hardship and to life on a subsistence level. Although they have a very natural desire to return to their local fig tree and vine, to use Ambassador Griffis' phrase, it should be possible, if they had a reasonable prospect of acquiring some other fig tree and vine elsewhere, to maintain their morale and to put tools in their hands for their own salvation. The danger will be, if through lack of a proper program or adequate funds, they find themselves, on one hand, cut off from a hope of return to their former homes and, on the other hand, bereft of hope in establishing a new life for themselves elsewhere. If this should transpire it seems almost a foregone conclusion that the ensuing conditions of unrest and despair would provide a most fertile hotbed for the implantation of Communism, and we should in that moment expect to see in the vitally important strategic Middle East a reproduction of the present debacle in China.

(*d*) *Attitude of the Arab states.*

It is the present policy of the Arab states to insist upon the repatriation of all the Palestinian refugees, and none of the Arab states with the exception of Transjordan contemplates the permanent settlement of any refugees within its own territory. It can be assumed that the most virogous efforts will have to be exerted by the Conciliation Com-

mission and by interested governments if the Arab states are to be persuaded to adopt a more realistic and cooperative attitude towards this question. Moreover, it can be assumed that their active cooperation could only be obtained under the following circumstances:

(1) they would require evidence that substantial material assistance would be forthcoming from outside sources to aid in solving the refugee problem:
(2) they would require assurances that such aid would be of material benefit to their countries and populations, as well as to the refugees themselves;
(3) they would require assurances that the administration of such aid would involve no derogation of sovereignty; and
(4) they would require evidence that Israel was prepared to cooperate effectively in the liquidation of the refugee question.

(7) *United States Public Attitude Toward the Problem.*

The American public, generally is unaware of the Palestine refugee problem, since it has not been hammered away at by the press or radio. Aside from the *New York Times* and the *Herald Tribune*, which have done more faithful reporting than any other papers, there has been very little coverage of the problem. With the exception of a Sunday feature article by Max Boyd, the wire service stories, if filed, have not been used. Editorial comment is still more sparse. Freda Kirchwey in *Nation*, a few editorials in *America* (Catholic), an editorialized article in the *New Leader* and one editorial each in the *Baltimore Sun* and the *Des Moines Register* nearly exhausts the list. Most of the news articles and editorials have had a friendly slant, except for the *New York Post*, which was violently opposed to helping the Arabs. While some of the articles have addressed themselves to the question of the nature of the settlement as regards repatriation or resettlement, none of them have raised the question of continuing aid. Consequently one may conclude that, barring any dramatic developments which would arouse prejudices or create new issues, a continuing but not spectacular aid program would probably be supported by the enlightened few, and would not, in all likelihood, run into strong opposition.

Congressional Attitude.

In considering the authorizing legislation for the U.S. contribution of $16,000,000, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was chiefly concerned with the fact that the U.S. Delegation at Paris had taken action which appeared to commit the U.S. morally, if not legally, to a contribution thus placing Congress in the position of being a rubber stamp. It was also concerned about the establishment of a precedent under which the United States might undertake other programs of this character which would not be supported by all UN Members on the basis of the regular scale of contributions. There was no challenge

of the thesis that the contribution was in the national interest, an argument which, though valid, is apparently tiresome because over-worked.

The House Committee on Foreign Affairs readily accepted the Senate action on the U.S. contribution but raised questions concerning the possible application of the matching principle as a condition for the U.S. contribution. The point was not pressed in this instance but is one which should be borne in mind in connection with any further program.

Neither the Senate nor the House Committee probed the problem of continuing assistance. The Department rested its case on the need for relief over a limited period of time on the basis that aid was essential to contribute to the peace settlement and stabilization in the Near East. It also stressed the General Assembly resolution declaring that the right of refugees to return to their homes should be recognized, and the role of the Conciliation Commission in facilitating the economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees. An aside remark by one of the senators in the hearings that the program might go on for three or five years was not taken up. This was the only intimation that Congress might expect to be faced with a request for some kind of continuing program. The fact that it was not picked up is probably more significant in connection with the lack of opposition to the present program than in relation to the possibility of a continuing program. No statement has been made at any time that no further assistance would be needed.

The Senate adopted the joint resolution without objection after the presentation of the report of the Senate Committee (which was also adopted unanimously) had been presented by Senator Connally. The House Committee was unanimous in the adoption of its report to the House. The only hitch thus far has been in the House Rules Committee which postponed action on the rule to report the measure because its members had, with one exception, never heard of the Arab Refugee problem.

It is perhaps not unreasonable to conclude from the foregoing that a reasonable program for continuing aid would not meet with strong opposition in Congress. However, the form of such aid, the question of whether it is multilateral or unilateral, and its bearing upon other aid programs, are matters on which the success or failure of continuing aid may hinge.

(8) *Attitude of Individuals and Groups Interested in the Problem.*

The private groups interested in the Palestine Refugee problem consist primarily of the following: (*a*) the oil companies (ARAMCO, Standard of N.J., Socony Vacuum, Gulf Oil Company, American Independent Oil Company, Standard of California, Stand-

ard of New York, and the Texas Company, all of whom have varying degrees of interest; (*b*) Church groups, particularly the American Friends Service Committee, the Church World Service Committee, the National Catholic Welfare Conference, the Lutheran World Relief and several small denominations all of whom are associated directly or indirectly with welfare or religious projects in the Near East; (*c*) lay groups such as the Near East Foundation, the Near East College Association, Middle East Relief, Inc., Middle East Union, Committee for Holy Land Appeal (an over-all body comprising most of the aforementioned groups for the purpose of raising emergency funds) and the American Red Cross. A number of interested individuals, some of whom are closely identified with one or more of the above groups include the following: Winthrop Rockefeller, Nelson Rockefeller, Bayard Dodge, Kermit Roosevelt, Harold Hoskins, Lowell Thomas, Barclay Acheson, Dr. Patton, Edward Miller, Col. Eddy, Terry Duce, and Garland Hopkins.

All of the foregoing would probably give strong support for public assistance measures designed to stabilize the Near East and to promote the welfare of those peoples. Most of these groups are associated with or might be interested in contributing or raising funds from private sources for long-range welfare projects in the area. A campaign is to be launched shortly on the initiative of Kermit Roosevelt and Garland Hopkins to raise funds for a refugee welfare program. Present thinking is that it should extend over a five-year period. The oil companies when approached for relief funds last autumn were reluctant to support a feeding program and indicated, at that time, their greater concern and possible willingness to participate financially in longer range projects which would be of permanent value to the Near Eastern peoples. They will undoubtedly contribute through appropriate channels to private projects of this character. The possibility that some of them might also be induced to finance useful work projects in certain areas should not be excluded in the event that funds from other sources are inadequate. A $5 million figure was tossed about last autumn as a tentative indication of oil company interest in long-range welfare projects, but it would be unwise to accept this figure as even a tentative target until the programs of voluntary agencies are more fully developed.

Welfare programs are needed immediately in the refugee centers and every effort should be made to induce the voluntary agencies to develop and finance such programs. The campaign referred to above is the only major effort being undertaken. However, it is unlikely that any program financed from this source could be developed in the field for many months. Regardless of the time factor it is important

that any such program be coordinated with the planning of the continuing aid program.

The first approach to the private groups should probably be made at an early date in order to ascertain in more detail the nature of the projects envisaged. We might wish to encourage in-camp training projects as the best means to enable the refugees to adapt themselves to new conditions. We can reveal our concern about continuing aid, but indicate that it is a difficult and complex problem which cannot be quickly or easily implemented. Moreover, an initial effort on the part of private groups will be of value in urging public assistance as it becomes clear that the magnitude of the problem is too great for them to cope with. Their fund-raising activities and the attendant publicity will call attention to the continuing need and help pave the way for Congressional action.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following objectives are recommended as a basis for planning with respect to the problem, subject to change as the plan develops:

(1) To stimulate the adoption of plans to expedite the transfer of the problem from its present unproductive relief basis to a basis for a definitive settlement;

(2) To persuade Israel to accept the principle of repatriation of an agreed number or category of refugees, with provision by Israel for appropriate safeguards of civil and religious rights and on condition that those repatriated desire to live at peace within Israel and to extend full allegiance thereto;

(3) To persuade Israel to initiate the gradual repatriation of an agreed number or category as soon as possible;

(4) To urge the Israeli Government to make equitable compensation for the property and assets of those refugees who do not desire to return and of those whose property and assets have been expropriated or otherwise disposed of by the State of Israel;

(5) To provide for the permanent settlement in Arab Palestine in the near future of as large a number of the refugees as appears economically practicable;

(6) Under the assumption that Arab Palestine, or at least a large portion thereof, will be allotted to Transjordan in the final peace settlement, to undertake concerted planning with the British Government with a view to the early integration of a large portion of the refugee population into the economic and political structure of the expanded state as a whole;

(7) To examine the developmental resources common to Israel and the expanded state of Transjordan, with special reference to their water resources, with a view to stimulating cooperative economic development projects, where feasible, for the mutual benefit of both states;

(8) If the repatriation of substantial number of refugees becomes feasible, to give special consideration to those areas having the greatest

relative concentrations of refugees, particularly Lebanon, which is undergoing serious economic pressures and facing potential political pressures, and the Gaza area of southwestern Palestine, with its limited developmental potentialities;

(9) With respect to those refugees who cannot be assimilated in Israel or the expanded state of Transjordan, to examine the potentialities for permanent resettlement elsewhere in the Near East, bearing in mind the capabilities of northeastern Syria and northern Iraq, where basic manpower shortages and large cultivable areas exist;

(10) Where feasible, in the resettlement of refugees, to plan on utilization of projects which will contribute to the long-range development of the productive capacity and economic potential of the area, as contrasted with short-term projects which might be without ultimate benefit to the countries involved.[12]

[12] In a memorandum of March 23 to Mr. McClintock, James Q. Reber of the Executive Secretariat stated that the Policy Paper had been shown informally to the Secretary of State, the Under Secretary, and Mr. Rusk and that the Secretary had informally approved the "conclusions" (actually, the recommendations). The memorandum also stated that "This approval and knowledge of the specific policy issues included in the paper are sufficient to permit Mr. McGhee's operations to be initiated." Mr. McClintock quoted the memorandum in telegram 147 of March 25 to Mr. McGhee at Beirut. The memorandum and telegram are both filed under 501.MA Palestine/3–2249.

501.BB Palestine/3–1649 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, March 16, 1949—11 a. m.

230. Palun 86. [From Ethridge.] Comay [1] met with Jerusalem Committee as official representative Israel, accompanied by Lifshitz and Goulan. He proposed plan consisting internationalization Old City, division remainder area between adjacent states, and international authority over holy places in area.

Introductory statement largely devoted historical summary similar previous statements by Israel representatives on subject, but containing unusually strong condemnation UN for failure implement internationalization city or assuming responsibility for its protection. World opinion described as apathetic when Jerusalem under attack and siege. Jewish Jerusalem today in fact part of Israel and Jewish inhabitants citizens psychologically and in fact. Inconceivable they should be placed under international regime or that Israel could have part in such solution. Present day situation entirely different from 1947 when Jewish Agency reluctantly accepted internationalization.

[1] Michael Comay, Director of the British Commonwealth Division in the Israeli Foreign Office.

In presenting plan he emphasized that world interest Jerusalem largely religious and historical. This interest concentrated in Old City which only half one per cent area and 15 per cent population area. Rest of area predominantly sectarian and world interest would be fully met by international authority over holy places. He judged from past evidence UN does not want responsibility for governing entire area, and this not necessary.

Israel not willing renounce Old City to permanent Transjordan rule. This would be perpetuation unstable and explosive situation. He expressed desire that two parties in control of city proceed to permanent demarcation Arab-Jewish areas. Committee agreed to facilitate this with assistance consuls who participated in previous talks this subject. US and French Consul envisioned.

Comay said he could not commit his Government at this stage, but Committee members are uncertain whether any flexibility in position. Appears certain Israel will not agree to Jerusalem as legal entity separate from Israel. Possible it might relinquish demand re Old City, resulting international regime limited to holy places. Committee members and USDel considers internationalization Old City only basically unfair and unacceptable. Committee has previously adopted general attitude that incorporation city into adjacent states not compatible international regime. In introductory statement, chairman of committee explained its general view that regime compatible with GA resolution might consist international authority with jurisdiction holy places and matters common concern, local Arab and Jewish administrations for remaining government functions.

Committee will probably not meet with Comay before presenting progress report to PCC and talking with Arab representatives in Beirut. [Ethridge.]

BURDETT

867N.01/3–1049 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iraq[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, March 16, 1949—4 p. m.

94. Embtel 101 March 10.[2] While recognizing Iraq's needs in combatting possible subversive elements US unable consider lifting arms embargo before peace settlement achieved Palestine or SC Res May 29

[1] This telegram was repeated to Tehran, Damascus, Moscow, Ankara, and London.

[2] Not printed; it reported that a note from the Iraqi Foreign Office cited dangers that Kurdish forces led by Mustafa al-Barzani would in a few days try to enter Iraq. The forces were said to be supported by the Soviet Union and under its influence, in order to achieve Soviet political aims (867N.01/3–1049).

rescinded. Dept assumes Fonoff realizes embargo could not be lifted for Iraq alone.

Emb shld point out that speedy conclusion armistice agreements as called for by GA Res Dec 11 wld hasten final peace settlement.

ACHESON

867N.01/3–1749

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 17, 1949.

Subject: Israel–Transjordan Situation.

Discussion:

In response to your request, there are submitted hereunder pertinent excerpts from information we have received concerning the situation between Transjordan and Israel subsequent to my memorandum to you of March 14.[1]

Dr. Bunche on March 11 cabled the Security Council that he had directed United Nations observers to make a thorough and prompt investigation of all complaints, to verify military positions and their date of establishment and to apply fully the conditions of the truce. He added that at the time the cable was sent he had had no reports from observers which verified that there had been any fighting in the area.

On March 13 Dr. Bunche cabled the Security Council that United Nations observers were in the field and were making on the spot investigations, but that owing to poor transportation and communications facilities he did not yet have their detailed reports and could not therefore submit to the Council a definite report on this matter. He added that the only incident of fighting thus far reported involved an exchange of fire between Arab Legion and Israeli elements in the vicinity of Ghamr (just over the border in Transjordan) prior to the signing of the cease-fire on March 11. In this engagement one Arab Legion armored car was disabled. Dr. Bunche also stated that he had formally requested the Israeli and Transjordan delegates at Rhodes to inform their Governments that military activity of this kind, regardless of whether actual fighting eventuated, must be regarded as contrary to the conditions of the truce imposed by the Security Council.

On March 16 our Legation in Amman cabled that according to the

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[1] Not printed; it summarized reports alleging or denying Israeli incursion into Transjordan (767N.90i/3–1449).

Arab Legion Israeli soldiers are crossing the Transjordan frontier in the area of Gharandal to steal sheep. The Legion has been ordered to take no action until United Nations observers have been able to reach the area. If after that forays continue the Legion may have to open fire.

The Department has thus not yet received a definite answer as to whether the Israelis actually did cross the Transjordan frontier. The report from United Nations observers, which apparently will be as authoritative as any we shall receive, has not yet come in.[2]

Meanwhile, we have been receiving disturbing reports concerning the situation on the Israeli-Iraqi frontier. Information has come in to the effect that the Israelis are moving troops into that area, and the Iraqis, the Transjordanians, and the British are fearful that the Israelis may be about to commence hostilities against the Iraqi-held area of Arab Palestine. In response to our inquiry, the Israelis have admitted that they are moving troops into the area but have stated that they are doing so in order to afford Israeli farmers protection against cattle and food stealing raids allegedly being made from the Iraqi area. This is going on at a time when preparations are being made for the withdrawal of the 20,000 Iraqi troops in the area and their replacement by 2,000 men of the badly over-extended Arab Legion. The Israeli object to this, and state that it is a violation of the truce because the substitution of the Army of one sovereign power for another is not a normal troop replacement.

In our opinion, there is a real and disturbing possibility that Israel may be about to undertake hostilities in this area, in order to occupy more of the Palestine territory allotted to the Arabs by the November 29 General Assembly Resolution and to present the world with another *fait accompli*. Our Mission in Tel Aviv cabled today that the Israeli Chief of Staff has sent a warning to the United Nations that Israel may have to take military action to stop the Arab raids (telegram No. 211 of March 16)[3] (Tab A). The Mission adds that there is no tangible evidence that Israel contemplates military action but suggests that you may care to point out to Israeli Foreign Minister Sharett, during his call upon you tomorrow, the desirability of taking no action which would lead to hostilities. In this the Mission in Tel Aviv concurs with a conclusion which we had reached. A memorandum

[2] Mr. Stabler advised, on March 18, that General Riley the same morning had "Confirmed that Israelis did cross frontiers and that four or five Israeli jeeps were cut off in Transjordan territory at point northern Gharandal." The General also stated that he had received the assurances of the Israeli commander that his troops had been removed to the Palestine side (telegram 117, 867N.01/3–1849).

[3] Not printed.

discussing the points which might be taken up with Mr. Sharett during his call upon you tomorrow is being sent to you today.[4]

[4] Baghdad, on March 17, reported that the Iraqi Foreign Minister had requested urgently to see Ambassador Crocker to express the hope that "US either through Tel Aviv or USDel, PCC would take effective measures to guarantee that Israel will not take advantage transfer Iraqi troops by sending Jewish troops and people into vacated area [i.e., the Nablus–Jenin–Tulkarm triangle] which Transjordanians and local Arabs plan populate." The Foreign Minister also stated that "Iraq wants find peaceful solution Palestine problem and authorizes Transjordan discuss armistice with Israel for areas now in Iraqi hands." (Telegram 115, 501.BB Palestine/3–1749)

Ambassador Crocker, on March 21, informed the Department of his first conversation with newly appointed Foreign Minister Jamali, who "asked again for US assurances that Israel would not take advantage Iraq–Transjordan switch." The Ambassador "reiterated our position re inability act unilaterally and emphasized US will do everything possible to help adjust Palestine problem through UN. Further, I expressed as main hope for Arabs necessity their coming to grips with realities and taking advantage UN machinery which offers best hope for quick adjustment matter, . . . Jamali expressed keenest disappointment re our unwillingness go along with Iraqi viewpoint and pull Iraq's chestnuts out of the fire." (Telegram 128 from Baghdad, 501.BB Palestine/3–2149)

501.BB Palestine/3–1849 : Telegram

Mr. Fraser Wilkins to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL RHODES, March 17, 1949—12 noon.

[Unnumbered.] For Satterthwaite from Wilkins at Rhodes.

(1) According information from Riley and Vigier to Bunche Israeli-Lebanese armistice agreement is delayed because Israelis insist on inclusion article providing Israelis may continue occupy strategic points Lebanese territory until Syrian armistice is concluded.[1]

Lebanese delegation, on other hand, has informed Israeli delegation and Bunche disagreeable [*it is agreeable?*] clause providing "no warlike act or act of hostility shall be conducted from territory controlled by one of the parties to this agreement against the other party".

Israelis however are not satisfied believing Lebanese territory might still be used by Syria. Lebanese consider their proposal adds Lebanese guarantee to UN guarantee. Bunche considers Israeli article introduces new element into terms of reference of negotiations which was not raised at time Lebanese and Israelis agreed to negotiate under UN

[1] In a telegram received at the United Nations on March 17, Mr. Bunche stated that an Israeli-Lebanese armistice agreement was "held up solely by Israeli intransigence"; that he had informed Mr. Shiloah "in most emphatic terms that Israeli position in this regard is utterly unreasonable and that if it is not changed before end of this week, I must report to SC that Israelis are deliberately blocking Lebanese agreement in apparent attempt to bring pressure on Syria"; and that "Israeli good faith" was involved. The text of Mr. Bunche's message was transmitted to the Department by New York in telegram 356, March 17, 2 : 50 p. m., 501.BB Palestine/3–1749.

chairmanship in accordance with SC resolution November 16. Lebanese delegation and Israeli delegation agreed on March 15 to refer issue to their governments and meet again on March 23. Bunche subsequently informed Israelis at Rhodes he considers their continued insistence on Lebanese signing agreement sanctioning presence Israeli troops on Lebanese soil for indefinite period so unreasonable that he feels compelled to report matter to SC and seriously to consider withdrawing from all negotiations.[2]

It seems clear Israelis desire tie Syrian negotiations into Lebanese agreement for purpose of bringing pressure on Syria through Lebanon to negotiate and subsequently to make withdrawal Israeli troops from Lebanese territory contingent on withdrawal Syrian troops from Israeli territory. If Israelis continue block agreement Bunche's present program will be prejudiced and commission will undoubtedly be questioned at Beirut meeting by Lebanese and other Arab States regarding Israeli good faith and whether real possibility exists to negotiate regarding refugees and peace settlement.

In order avert threatened stalemate in Lebanese negotiations it is recommended Israeli Government be informed by Department that proposed Lebanese clause seems to have same effect as proposed Israeli article and that early acceptance would facilitate Bunche's task and commission's work on eve Beirut meeting.[3]

(2) According UP release, Sharett on March 10 warned of possible new outbreaks in Palestine, stated that Iraqi irregulars were raiding along central front and added Israel may be forced to take action to bring things back to normal. Israeli press, in addition, has for some time been calling attention to alleged minor incursions from Iraqi-held Samaria into Israeli coastal plain. Israeli Government has also protested to Bunche on basis of reports regarding replacement of Iraqi troops in Central Palestine by Arab Legion. Developments of this character generally precede Israeli action. It may be assumed, if Israelis are unable make satisfactory arrangements with Transjordan in reported meetings with Abdullah regarding widening of Israeli coastal strip, that Israeli political and press moves may be accelerated and may be followed by Israeli clashes with Iraqis or Arab Legion in central sector. Bunche believes such developments might be forestalled if US were able to express hope to Israeli Government that press

[2] The telegram from Mr. Bunche, cited in footnote 1 above, stated that if the Israeli position did not change in the next few days, he would "seriously consider" withdrawing from both the Lebanese and Transjordanian negotiations and return to New York.

[3] Mr. Wilkins, at Beirut, advised the Department on March 19 that "Israelis have informed Bunche they are prepared sign Lebanese agreement immediately without provision concerning Israeli troops on Lebanese soil." (telegram 121, 501.BB Palestine/3–1949)

reports of possible Israeli action do not indicate deterioration in situation.

Sent Department through Navy. Repeated to Beirut, Baghdad, Amman, Damascus and Jerusalem.

501.BB Palestine/3–1849 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT US URGENT

JERUSALEM, March 18, 1949—8 a. m.

233. Palun 88. For Acheson from Ethridge. Technical study entitled "Arab refugee problem" handed me yesterday by Israeli Government largely repeats Sharett's statement in previous conversations. Study begins with denial of responsibility, minimizes dislocation and in brief can be summed up in one sentence "when the whole matter comes up for discussion in the context of general peace talks the Israeli Government will consider whether conditions are stable enough for a certain number to come back without creating a security problem". Study emphasizes Israeli viewpoint that resettlement in Arab states is main solution and not repatriation and continues with estimate of abilities of Arab states to absorb them.

Pouching text.

Sent Department, repeated Baghdad 17, Damascus 14, Cairo 17, Jidda 8, Amman 18. [Ethridge.]

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/3–1849 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, March 18, 1949—11 a.m.

238. Palun 87. [From Ethridge.] While we intend to continue efforts to achieve substantial degree internationalization Jerusalem we consider agreement on separate legal entity practically out of question unless USG willing apply strongest pressure. Mayor New City sixteenth insisted to Jerusalem committee that Israel entitled to all Jerusalem.

USDel accordingly thinking along lines possible compromise formula and submits following for Department's consideration. Will show members Jerusalem committee as informal suggestion. If Department and PCC approve we should sound out Arab representatives in Beirut on this among other possible plans:

"1) An international regime is established for the Jerusalem area.
2) The area shall be permanently demilitarized.

3) The area is divided into Arab and Jewish zones which shall, except as hereafter provided in Article 5, be administered respectively by (adjacent Arab State) and Israel as integral parts of their territory.

4) An international authority for the Jerusalem area shall consist of a United Nations representative and (of other members?).[1]

5) The international authority shall have power to make regulations to assure protection of and free access to the holy places. It may provide guards or other personnel at such places, and may also call upon the respective local authorities for assistance and cooperation.

6) The international authority shall have the right to make representations to the appropriate local Israel and Arab authorities, or to the Foreign Ministers of those governments concerning the following matters within the Jerusalem area:

a) Protection of human rights and the rights of distinctive groups;
b) Free access to and from Jerusalem and within the city;
c) Common public services;
d) Maintenance of peace and order;
e) The demilitarization of the area.

7) Whenever the international authority decides that a dispute exists concerning any matter specified in paragraphs 5 or 6, and that such dispute concerns a matter seriously prejudicial to the welfare of the area, or of the international interest therein, it may refer the dispute to a special tribunal to be appointed by the president of the International Court of Justice.

8) If the tribunal deems that the dispute is susceptible of decision on the basis of law, it shall decide on that basis, utilizing the present statute or any of the sources set forth in Article 38, paragraph 1 of the statute of the International Court of Justice. Such decisions shall be legally binding on the parties.

9) If the tribunal deems that the dispute is not susceptible of decision on the basis of law, it shall render an opinion *ex aequo et bono*, giving special consideration, where appropriate, to the principles and purposes of the United Nations, important United Nations resolutions and declarations, and important multilateral treaties. Such opinions shall be advisory in character, but shall be regarded as embodying the judgment of the world community on the question in issue.

10) Israel and the Arab States shall deposit declarations accepting, with respect to legal disputes arising between them concerning the Jerusalem area, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice as compulsory *ipso facto* and without special agreement." [2]

Sent Department 238, repeated Amman 19. [Ethridge.]

BURDETT

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[1] As in the source text.

[2] The Department replied on March 22, stating that "Although fully sympathetic problems your most recent draft attempts to reconcile we feel paras. 1 and 3 are almost mutually exclusive; that right of representation described para. 6 in fact gives international authority very little real power; and that there are grave doubts as to efficacy legal authority described paras. 7, 8 and 9, in absence any executive authority. Accordingly we prefer you do not submit this draft to PCC or Arab Reps Beirut." (Telegram 133, identified also as Unpal 67, to Beirut, 501.BB Palestine/3–1849)

867N.113/3–1849 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, March 18, 1949—8 p. m.

945. Brit Emb Mar 17 orally informed Dept that a request for arms under Anglo-Transjordan treaty had been received from King Abdullah and that in view of recent Israeli moves in Pal and especially situation on Iraqi front "it will no longer be possible to refuse to send arms to Arab Legion". Brit Emb said Bevin informing US Amb of this move.[1] Emb officer thought main reason move was to enable Legion to defend itself if attacked by Israelis after taking over from Iraqis.

At working level Dept expressed great concern this move, pointing out adverse effect it likely to have on armistice negots and emphasizing likelihood resultant pressure to remove US embargo on arms for Israel. Dept also stated Israelis might seize upon UK decision as pretext to reopen hostilities. Dept furthermore expressed belief that sending arms to Legion would place UK in unfavorable moral position, since UK, which has stated Israel has acted contrary to UN resolutions, would be doing so itself.

Dept assumes in absence Emb report that Bevin has not raised this point or that you have handled it there on same basis as earlier discussions same subject. In connection any further discussion this point with UKG, they may be told that in our view minimum requirement prior to any such step would be notification [*consultation*] to [*with*] [2] mediator.[3]

ACHESON

[1] At a luncheon on March 16, Mr. Bevin expressed to Ambassador Douglas his concern regarding Israeli intentions, particularly over the possibility of Israeli action against Arab positions in Samaria .He said arms "have continued to flow into Israel on such a scale that it is becoming more and more 'ridiculous' for UK to refuse Arab Legion appeals for arms and ammunition." Failure to heed King Abdullah's requests "would not only adversely affect UK–Transjordan relations which are 'important to all of us', but destroy completely Arab Legion morale." (Telegram 1051, March 18, 5 p. m., 867N.01/3–1849)

[2] The two corrections were requested by the Department in telegram 1007, March 23, 9 p. m., to London (867N.113/3–2349).

[3] This telegram was repeated to Amman and to Jerusalem for Mr. Ethridge. London, in reply on March 19, advised of information from the Foreign Office that the British Government would inform Mr. Bunche as soon as a final decision was made to begin deliveries (telegram 1079, 867N.113/3–1949).

867N.01/3–1949 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel

SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, March 19, 1949—2 p. m.

173. Dept welcomes report that Israel–Lebanon armistice to be signed March 19 or 20 and that Syria will enter armistice negotiations. Principal point of concern now becomes problem of Iraqi front Samaria. Obviously prospect of peaceful settlement on entire Palestine question would be greatly set back if fighting broke out over that point. Dept believes Israel and Transjordan should proceed promptly to armistice agreement, that this armistice agreement should be extended to the Iraqi front and that Israel should interpose no objection if Iraqi troops turn over Samaria front to Transjordan. As preliminary step it would seem desirable for existing cease fire to be extended automatically to Iraqi front on assumption by Transjordan of responsibility for that area.

This matter will probably be discussed with Sharett here Tuesday. Request you follow situation closely and do everything possible to bring about rapid conclusion Israel–Transjordan armistice.[1]

ACHESON

[1] Concerning the latter point, Thomas F. Power, Deputy Secretary-General of the United States Mission at the United Nations, notified Mr. McClintock on March 18 of a telegram received by Secretary-General Lie from Mr. Bunche stating that "the Syrian Government had indicated its readiness to undertake armistice negotiations with Israel." (memorandum of telephone conversation by Mr. McClintock, 501.BB Palestine/3–1849) Minister Keeley reported similar information from Damascus on March 20, expressing his belief that Prime Minister Azm's decision to negotiate was "motivated primarily by desire to avoid giving Israeli possibility of using Syria's refusal to enter armistice negotiations as pretext for refusing to comply with refugee repatriation clause of December 11 resolution but also to leave no stone unturned to speed final solution Palestine conflict." The Prime Minister also sought the Minister's "friendly advice whether any useful purpose would be served by sending special emissary . . . to US to endeavor to enlist US support of some reasonable solution. I replied that while I felt sure my government would appreciate being kept informed of progress in Syrian thinking, it would not welcome any *démarche* that seemed to by-pass PCC" (telegram 151, 501.BB Palestine/3–2049).

501.BB Palestine/3–2049 : Telegram

The Chargé in Transjordan (Stabler) to the Secretary of State

SECRET AMMAN, March 20, 1949—9 p. m.

121. This afternoon at Shuneh King said that last night he had received Colonel Dayan, Israeli Major whom he described as Sharett's secretary, and Abdullah Tel to discuss Israeli proposals re Arab Legion

taking over Iraqi frontier (Legtel 118, March 18). He indicated meeting was friendly. Israelis said there were several territorial adjustments to be made in "Arab triangle" area but they would not insist they be made at this time. Israelis mentioned certain "high places" but did not specify. King said it was understood such adjustments would await peace settlement. According to His Majesty Dayan then drafted proposals re this matter which agreed to Legion taking over and postponed until later territorial adjustments. Dayan said he would return Tel Aviv with draft and would give King formal answer Israeli Government March 21 at 1800 hours. Meanwhile Abdullah Tel has gone to Beirut to discuss matter with Transjordan Prime Minister.

King seemed pleased by progress meeting and indicated he had told Israelis he prepared work with them for peace but that their frequent changes of heart made it difficult. Re this said that previously Israel wanted Iraqi Army leave Palestine and he had worked toward this end at H–3 meeting with Iraqi Regent and Prime Minister. Now, however, when this almost accomplished Israel appeared to be placing obstacles in the way.

Later this afternoon Glubb gave additional details these conversations as result his meeting with King and Abdullah Tel this morning at Shuneh. Dayan apparently told King Israelis would require road from coast Tafula and several high points along railroad in Tulkarm area. However, he specifically stated that Tulkarm and Qalquiliya would not be involved and would remain Arab. At this point Abdullah Tel said it would be difficult for Transjordan vis-à-vis other Arab states and Palestine Arabs to take over frontier and immediately make territorial adjustments in favor Israel. Dayan allegedly replied Israel Government understood this and therefore would only request Transjordan Government sign paper agreeing to certain territorial adjustments which would not be put into effect until several months after take over.

While it will not be known until tomorrow whether meetings will result in solution to problem, some speculation exists here that Israel, having ascertained King's attitude favorable certain adjustments, may make excessive demands.[1]

Sent Department repeated Baghdad 21, Beirut 18 for USDel.

STABLER

[1] In the afternoon of March 21, Transjordan agreed to the proposals under which Transjordan would take over the Iraqi front. Abdullah el-Tel, at 9 p. m., the same day met at Jerusalem with the Israelis who gave their approval to the proposals (telegram 122, March 22, 10 a. m., from Amman, 501.BB Palestine/3–2249).

867N.01/3–2149 : Airgram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, March 21, 1949.

A–41. Amman and Ramallah Arabic newspapers announce the termination of the military government in Arab Palestine and the establishment of a civil administration, retroactive to March 15, 1949.

According to the official announcement Omar Pasha Mater, formerly Military Governor General of Palestine has been appointed Civil Governor General of Arab Palestine and will be under the Ministry of the Interior of Transjordan. Other appointments are: Abdullah Bey el Tel as Commissioner for the Jerusalem District (seconded from the Arab Legion); Ahmad Bey el Khalil as Commissioner for Samaria District; Na'iem Bey Touqan as Commissioner for Hebron District.

The *Palestine Post* in commenting on the change in government says that it was scheduled to take place on April 1, 1949, but that the date was advanced in order to present the Arab League and the Arab States at the Beirut Conference with the established fact that Transjordan was in control of the area.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/3–2249

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [1]

[WASHINGTON,] March 22, 1949.

Participants: S—The Secretary
NEA—Mr. Satterthwaite
NE—Mr. Rockwell
Mr. Moshe Sharett, Foreign Minister of Israel
Mr. Eliahu Elath, Israeli Ambassador-Designate

[Here follow, after "an exchange of amenities," various views expressed by Mr. Sharett.]

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[1] Drafted by Mr. Rockwell. At the outset, according to a memorandum of March 16 from Mr. Satterthwaite to the Secretary, the latter was to see Mr. Sharett on March 18. The memorandum suggested that the Secretary stress to his caller recent Israeli moves in the southeastern Negev, a final territorial settlement, the Arab refugee question, the status of Jerusalem, and "Respect for United Nations Decisions." Concerning the last of these subjects. Mr. Satterthwaite wrote of the certainty of Mr. Ethridge that "Mr. Sharett considers Washington more friendly to Israel than the Conciliation Commission and that the Foreign Minister has not been sufficiently impressed with United States interest in a settlement of the Palestine question through the United Nations. It is suggested that you may wish to leave no doubt in Mr. Sharett's mind that the United States Government fully supports the authority of the United Nations and the Conciliation Commission as regards the final settlement of the Palestine dispute." (501.BB Palestine/3–1649)

Mr. Sharett said that in his opinion things were going pretty well as regards the international position of Israel. An armistice with Lebanon would be signed on March 23.[2] The situation with Iraq was not so good, since the Iraqis have decided not to be "contaminated" by any contact with the Jews and desire to be the only Arab State which has not entered into negotiations with Israel. A further complication was the fact that Transjordan planned to take over the Iraqi position. This would be a major troop replacement which would be contrary to the terms of the Palestine truce. In addition, there was the difficulty of the raids into Israeli territory from the Iraqi area. In Mr. Sharett's opinion, Israel had shown remarkable forbearance in not taking retaliatory action, with one exception.

At this point, I informed Mr. Sharett that I had discussed the situation on the Iraqi front with the President on March 21. The President had expressed to me his great concern lest by some mishap a military flareup occur in this area. He and I were of the opinion that the withdrawal of the Iraqi Army and its replacement by a lesser number of Transjordian troops was a move in favor of peace. The President was firmly convinced that a renewal of hostilities must not be allowed to occur because of the situation on the Iraqi front.

Mr. Sharett replied that he could give the President and myself his complete assurance that Israel had no intention of commencing hostilities on the Iraqi front. It was not the policy of Israel to seek further conflict in Palestine. He said that he could not, of course, assure me that there would not be military action in this area, because one could never tell what might happen when two armies opposed each other, but that I could inform the President that the policy of Israel was to seek to avoid hostilities.

I then inquired as to the progress of the armistice negotiations with Transjordan. Mr. Sharett said that things were not going too smoothly there, and that the main trouble was that Transjordan was not a free agent. He was certain that if Israel and Transjordan were left to negotiate together there would be no difficulty, but that the British were interfering. In the first place, it was not true that Israeli forces had crossed the Transjordan frontier. He could categorically assure me that, based on the border as shown on maps available in Tel Aviv, no one in the Israeli capital knew of any Israeli incursion across the frontier.

Mr. Sharett stated that Israel was very much disturbed by the report that Transjordan had requested the assistance of British troops at Aqaba in patrolling the Palestine–Transjordan frontier. In Tel

[2] The agreement was signed on that date at Ras En-Naqura; for text, see SC, *4th yr., Special Supplement No. 4.*

Aviv it was suspected that the purpose behind this request was to enable Transjordan to withdraw forces from that area to send to the Iraqi front, thus strengthening its position in that area contrary to the terms of the truce. In Mr. Sharett's opinion the British had violated the truce in the first place by sending forces to Aqaba and had done so again by reenforcing the garrison later. He stated that Israel would be "very much obliged" if the United States would seek to persuade the British to desist from patrolling the Palestine–Transjordan frontier. It was pointed out that the Department had received no information that the British had decided to accede to Transjordan's request.

I suggested that if the British did not patrol the frontier and British forces remained within the town of Aqaba area, Israel surely would not imagine that Great Britain had hostile intentions against the Negev, and the presence of British troops in Aqaba should not be allowed to affect the Israeli–Transjordan negotiations. Mr. Sharett demurred, stating that Israel would have to take into consideration, when it came time to discuss the reduction of forces, the British troops at Aqaba, since to all intents and purposes they were part of military forces of Transjordan. He added that Israel hoped to arrange demilitarized strips on both sides of the Palestine–Transjordan frontier in the same manner that similar strips had been arranged on both sides of the Palestine–Egyptian frontier through the Israeli–Egyptian armistice. The presence of the British troops at Aqaba, however, was a factor which complicated the situation considerably.

I then brought up the question of the Palestinian refugees. Mr. Ethridge had hoped it might be found possible for Israel to issue some kind of conciliatory statement concerning the refugees before the conference called by the Palestine Conciliation Commission at Beirut, but apparently it had not been possible to arrange this before Mr. Sharett's departure. The United States Government was, I said, very much interested in a solution of the refugee problem and felt that Israel had an important role to play. Mr. Sharett declared that Israel was fully cognizant of the implications of the problem as they would affect the future relations of Israel with the Arab states. The matter of a possible statement had been discussed in a Cabinet meeting and it had been decided that Israel could not possibly make such a commitment before the matter was discussed in connection with the final peace settlement. In the opinion of the Israeli Government it was out of the question to consider the possibility of repatriation of any substantial number of the refugees. The most logical solution was resettlement in the Arab countries, where so much land was available. Israel was quite prepared to make financial contributions to this resettlement, and also, if it were

desired, to give technical assistance. Mr. Sharett did not mean to say that there would be no repatriation at all. He thought that it might be possible for Israel to accept a "limited" number of refugees, such as might be necessary to reunite families which had become separated. He reiterated his conviction that the matter was one which had to be discussed at the peace conference and stated that it was impossible for Israel to make any kind of public commitment before that time.[3]

[3] In a separate memorandum of conversation by Secretary Acheson, drafted by Mr. Rockwell on March 22, it is recorded that at the close of the meeting, the Israeli Foreign Minister stated that his Government "was very much interested in obtaining American technical assistance for the organization and training of the Israeli Army." Mr. Satterthwaite informed Mr. Sharett that the United States had no legal authority to send a military mission to Israel. When Mr. Sharett stated that his Government might offer positions as advisers to retired American Army officers, the Secretary replied that the Department would look into the request (867N.20A/3–2949).

501.BB Palestine/3–2249 : Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT, March 22, 1949—3 p. m.

127. Palun 92. [From Ethridge.] Following conclusion first Commission meeting with Arab States,[1] Commissioners among themselves on March 21 again exchanged preliminary views regarding refugee problem.

Ethridge suggested that Commission might consider adoption of attitude based on following reasoning:

1. GA resolution December 11 in Paragraph 11 made provision for repatriation and compensation. Commission fully supported these instructions and desired detailed views governments and authorities concerned regarding number wishing return and method determining and paying compensation.

2. GA resolution December 11 in Paragraph 11 instructed Commission to facilitate repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of refugees, compensation payments and to maintain close relations with Griffis and with other US agencies. Commission believed for practical reasons greatest emphasis should be given in formal and informal discussions with representatives Arab States to development of program which would facilitate resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation in Arab Palestine and in Arab States of refugees who cannot be repatriated. Commission should stress to representatives Arab States it would be wiser in long run to get away from the narrow objective of rigid insistence on repatriation and concentrate on broader objective of resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation.

[1] As set forth in telegram 126 (identified also as Palun 91), March 22, 11 a. m., from Beirut, not printed; it stated that Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Transjordan were represented (501.BB Palestine/3–2249).

3. GA resolution December 11 in Paragraphs 6, 10, 11 and 12 appeared to give Commission basis for approaching problem broadly.

4. Following practical steps might be taken by Commission:

(1) It should be stressed to Arab States that it is doubtful Israel would be able absorb more than small number of refugees.

(2) Arab States should prepare themselves to continue aid thus far extended and instead of direct relief should attempt resettle refugees and initiate projects for absorbing them.

(3) Peace talks, including particularly territorial settlement in Palestine should commence soonest following Beirut meeting and current armistice talks.

(4) Commission report to April session GA that no general settlement of Palestine question nor successful conclusion to specific problem of refugees seems possible unless there is general economic development in NE and should recommend that GA call upon specialized agencies, internal organizations and member states to render technical and financial assistance upon request governments and authorities concerned in NE (see following telegram).

(5) Commission should immediately establish committee of experts to survey economic needs of area and on request of governments and authorities concerned to render technical assistance including assistance in obtaining financial aid from international and other courses (see following telegram).

Ethridge emphasized foregoing was tentative and for Commission's consideration and would submit working paper in several days. Boisanger fully supported. Yalcin agreed. Yalcin also suggested Commission should determine repatriation figure for Israel but withdrew suggestion following explanation quotas for Arab States and Israel might more logically be established in light more detailed information of various aspects of refugee problem described in Paragraph 11 GA resolution December 11. Yalcin added that during separate talks with Syrian and Transjordan representatives he had gathered impression Syria and Transjordan might vie with each other in taking refugees if greater number increased prospect financial and economic assistance, presumably from US.

Sent Department, repeated Jerusalem 26, Damascus 13, Baghdad 11, Cairo 14, Jidda and Amman unnumbered. [Ethridge.]

PINKERTON

501.BB Palestine/3–2249 : Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT BEIRUT, March 22, 1949—6 p. m.

128. Palun 93. From Ethridge and McGhee. Following proposals for PCC action on long-range aspects Palestine refugee problem which were discussed in general terms PCC meeting yesterday (see Palun

92)[1] submitted for Department's consent before definitive discussions PCC. Proposals based on Department thinking as reported by McGhee, on increasing conviction Ethridge and PCC that economic development key to long-range solution refugee problem, on desire assure due basis for outside development assistance in light US objective avoid direct responsibility and probable Arab reaction against unilateral offer, and on necessity prompt action if assistance under rehabilitation program can begin to be effective before termination present UN relief program. It is tentatively assumed relief program will not be renewed in light probable difficulty obtaining additional appropriation US Congress and in order put pressure on Arab states initiate work relief projects.

(1) PCC would report to GA in April that no general settlement Palestine question nor solution problem refugees possible without general economic development in Near East. PCC would recommend to GA that it call on specialized agencies, other appropriate international organizations and member states to render on request of governments and authorities concerned, appropriate technical and financial assistance.

(2) Meanwhile PCC, under authority Paragraph 12, GA resolution 11 December and pursuant instructions Paragraphs 6, 10 and 11, would appoint technical commission composed of representatives member states, specialized agencies and international organizations most likely be able render technical and financial assistance. Commission would survey economic development needs of area and, upon request of governments or authorities concerned, provide appropriate technical assistance including assistance in obtaining necessary financing for particular projects from international and other sources. It is envisaged that technical commission be headed by particularly well-qualified objective US citizen who could command confidence US executive, Congress and public, possibly with a UK deputy. Technical experts might be predominantly US with sprinkling of other nationalities including French to give multilateral flavor. Commission might include as members or observers representatives of International Bank, FAO, WHO and other international agencies and of private organizations in position render assistance. Commission's approach could emphasize economic development with refugee problem in background and be on area basis even though relations with governments concerned would probably be largely bilateral. Commission could organize country subcommissions on request individual governments and among other things recommend nature organization required to carry out program developed. Report of technical commission, with comment PCC and GA, would be available to all in position render assistance whose efforts could be coordinated by technical commission or successor even after termination PCC.

[1] *Supra.*

US acceptance of foregoing should be conditional assurance other members PCC that plan could be implemented along lines approved by US and assurance Arab states that requests for assistance would be forthcoming prior to appointment of commission. In addition to Department's comments on concept and timing of above proposal Department's comment requested on whether GA resolution of 11 December re PCC are considered to provide adequate basis for technical commission which could provide authoritative guidance all aspects Near East economic development, whether approval for creation of commission or for its membership need be obtained from GA prior to PCC action, and whether international nature of commission likely to affect adversely possibilities financial assistance from Export Import Bank and private US sources including oil companies. Sponsorship of technical commission by PCC might serve to allay criticism of UN and of US under President's Point 4 program for favoring one area for economic development over others with comparable needs. Assuming acceptance above proposals by Department and PCC, US would assume responsibility proposing to PCC plan of organization, US candidates and terms of reference for commission and taking initiative its activation. Final Department decision re above proposals can await full discussion following McGhee's return first week April after visit remaining Arab states and London. Department's tentative views would, however, be helpful now to Ethridge in informal discussions with PCC and Arab representatives in view close timing if proposals are to be considered in April GA session.

If Department agrees, please repeat Arab capitals, USDel, New York and London with request for views to be repeated to Beirut for Ethridge. [Ethridge and McGhee.]

PINKERTON

501.BB Palestine/3–2349 : Telegram

The Chargé in Transjordan (Stabler) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT AMMAN, March 23, 1949—4 p. m.
US URGENT

126. Legtel 123 and 124, March 22.[1] King requested me come down to Shuneh this morning in order inform me of developments of last night's meeting between Transjordan and Israeli representatives.

Meetings had taken place in Jerusalem instead of Shuneh and was attended by Fellah Pasha Medadha, Abdullah Tel and Hussein Bey

[1] Neither printed.

Sirraj (Under Secretary Foreign Office) for Transjordan and by Walter Eytan, [garble] Colonel Yigal Yadin and Moshe Dayan for Israel.

Israelis presented detailed demands for territorial adjustments on Iraqi front which in some instances represented Arab withdrawals up to 10 miles from present front lines. After many hours conference lasting to 1300 hours this morning Israelis modified demands to points beyond which further modification out of question. They informed Transjordan representatives that Transjordan must agree to these proposals and sign formal agreement within 24 hours or Israel would withdraw its agreement to Arab Legion taking over from Iraqis. Another meeting at which Israelis expect final answer is arranged for tonight at Shuneh.

In brief Israeli finalized demands are as follows:

1. Line in north front to be redrawn south of Ummelfahm (MR 165213) and Arara (MR 159211) to permit free use by Israelis of main road to Afula.

2. Line in east which now runs slightly west of Baqa (MR 155202)–Tulkarm–Qalqiliya road to be redrawn eastwards, not including Israeli possession of Tulkarm or Qalqiliya but including Taiyiba (MR 151186) and Qfarqasim (MR 148169). Line would end at Rantis (MR 152159), now junction between Iraqis and Arab Legion.

3. Line in west which now runs through Qaun (MR 194201) to be redrawn slightly west.

Israelis proposed that this agreement remain secret but that as soon as armistice agreement signed at Rhodes, secret agreement (although still remaining secret) would immediately be regarded as agreed in mutual revision of armistice terms. Implementation of secret agreement would take place in three stages:

(*a*) Within three to four weeks—adjustment eastern lines;
(*b*) Within six to eight weeks—adjustment northern lines; and
(*c*) Within three to four months from date of signature full implementation secret agreement.

Israelis also proposed that with number of days yet to be specified all Iraqi forces would be withdrawn from area of former mandated territory of Palestine.

In return Israel would agree to Legion taking over Iraqi front as soon as armistice agreement signed and would authorize Israeli delegation Rhodes sign armistice at once on basis positions held at time cease-fire agreement signed.

Transjordan representatives pointed out to Israelis adverse effect on Arab public opinion when this agreement became public unless

Transjordan received compensations. It was suggested Israelis withdraw from area close to Road Latrun to Beitsira (MR 154144) or withdraw from Ummburj (MR 147126) area and agree to Legion use of road running north from Beitjibrin. Israelis refused and said they would not agree any compensation.

Transjordan representatives at meeting, with whom I talked at Shuneh, indicated atmosphere of meeting not friendly and that Israelis had taken very strong line. They had impression that if agreement not signed Israelis might take offensive action to make adjustments demanded. (It is understood Dayan told member Consulate General Jerusalem on March 18 that if rectification not made by agreement, Israel would make them anyway.)

King indicated to me he felt that if he refused to sign agreement, Israel would recommence hostilities and whole area might be lost. It would in fact be better to sacrifice another fifteen villages with additional estimated 15,000 refugees than to lose what little left of Arab Palestine. On other hand if he did sign agreement and then armistice signed, it might be more difficult for Israelis to make further excessive demands. He not entirely decided what his attitude would be and it would depend on circumstances of tonight's meeting at Shuneh. If he could be certain that US would take action prevent Israel from reopening hostilities, he would try postpone decision for another day or two and endeavor negotiate more reasonable adjustments. However, in absence this certainty, he felt he almost forced into signing agreement tonight. We only wished it were possible to believe that Israel would present no further demands.

I offered no comment to HM beyond thanking him for keeping USG informed of developments.

Sent Department 126, repeated Baghdad 25, Beirut 22 for USDel PCC. Pouched Jerusalem.

STABLER

501.BB Palestine/3–2349 : Telegram

The Chargé in Transjordan (Stabler) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT AMMAN, March 23, 1949—7 p. m.
US URGENT

127. Legtel 126, March 23. Israeli demands and 24-hour ultimatum re Iraqi front, both in themselves and in face expressed attitude USG toward extension armistice to this area and toward Transjordan taking responsibility therein, seem totally unreasonable and in nature of blackmail. While King may feel himself forced to sign agreement

tonight, it is however possible that he will succeed in postponing final decision. In view this latter possibility would urgently recommend Department give consideration making strong representations to Israeli Government (if agreement not signed tonight) insisting that matter of territorial dispositions and adjustments be left to peace settlement and that armistice negotiations at Rhodes be concluded at once on present *status quo*.

Transjordan is willing and ready reach peace settlement but it does appear to be rank injustice for USG to stand by while Israel at point of gun in forcing Transjordan into such an agreement. This situation would seem to offer opportunity for USG to show that it intends implement its policy as expressed in UN on November 20.

Will inform Department earliest possible moment whether agreement signed or not.

Sent Department 127, repeated Beirut 23 for USDel PCC, Baghdad 26.

STABLER

Statement by the President [1]

It is with gratification that I have today signed Senate Joint Resolution 36 authorizing a special contribution by the United States of $16 million for the relief of Palestine refugees.

The United Nations General Assembly on November 19, 1948, urged all States members of the United Nations to make voluntary contributions as soon as possible to a relief fund totaling $32 million. The Secretary of State informs me that thus far fifteen other Members of the United Nations have contributed and that other Governments have signified their intention to send money or contributions in kind. There is a pressing need for this fund, for seven hundred thousand refugees are living almost on starvation level. It is the hope of the United States that very promptly the total $32 million fund will be subscribed by the members of the United Nations, or other countries, which have not yet given to the fund.

I trust that before this relief program is ended means will be devised for the permanent solution of the refugee problem, and that the efforts of the Palestine Conciliation Commission to establish a lasting peace will bring hope of a brighter future to these destitute victims of the recent hostilities in the Holy Land.

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[1] Released by the White House on March 24; reprinted from Department of State *Bulletin*, April 3, 1949, p. 419.

867N.01/12–749

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 24, 1949.

CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Conversation with Israeli Foreign Minister

I reported to the President my talk with Foreign Minister Sharett [1] which fell into two principal topics:

First, I had again impressed the Foreign Minister to make some statement which would be helpful to the Beirut Conference and would at least give some indication of the willingness of the Israeli Government, assuming conditions of peace and stability to repatriate a portion of the refugees. The Foreign Minister, however, felt that he could not make any statement on this subject except as a part of a general peace settlement.

Second, I had urged upon the Foreign Minister the desirability of a prompt conclusion of the armistice with Trans-Jordan, including arrangements for committing the Trans-Jordan troops to relieve the Iraqi troops. I had reported to the Foreign Minister the President's concern about this matter since he thought it was important for the development of both the armistice and permanent peace that as many troops as possible be withdrawn. I explained that the Foreign Minister had shown a tendency to want to use this matter of a substitution of troops to gain both territorial readjustments on the Samarian front and to try to force Iraq into discussions with Israel. I mentioned briefly the cables on this subject received this morning and our concern that the Israeli forces might attempt to bring about some adjustment of the frontier by military action.

The President was disturbed over the uncooperative attitude being taken and said that we must continue to maintain firm pressure.

[1] See memorandum of conversation that took place on March 22, p. 853.

811.22767N/3–2449

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 24, 1949.

Subject: Proposed modification of policy to permit limited number of officers from Israel and Arab States to be trained in U.S.

Discussion:

Since the imposition of the embargo on the shipment of arms to the Near East because of the Palestine conflict, the Department has fol-

lowed the policy of turning down requests from the Arab States and Israel for training of officers of their military services, in the United States. Although such a policy was not explicit in the arms embargo or the Security Council Truce resolutions of May 29 and July 15, 1948, it was felt that it was consistent with our policy of not giving military advantage to either side.

It is believed that the time has now come to reconsider this policy for the following reasons:

1) Armistice agreements have been signed between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Lebanon. Armistice talks are now in progress between Israel and Transjordan (the latter is now in the process of arranging to take over Iraqi military positions in Palestine) and will start shortly between Israel and Syria. It is hoped that these negotiations will preclude any major renewal of hostilities in Palestine.

2) The Arab States have recently shown a desire for closer relations with the West, and have renewed their requests for permission to send trainees to the United States.

3) Israel, despite her announced policy of neutrality between the East and West, has requested permission to send a certain number of officers to the United States for training. Giving such permission would be one way of encouraging Israel towards a Western orientation.

4) Great Britain and France already have student officer missions from some of the Arab States in training, and neither of these powers has seen anything inconsistent between its actions in this respect and its obligations under the various UN truce resolutions for Palestine.

Recommendations:

It is recommended that our present policy be changed to permit the sending of officer student training missions from Israel and the Arab States, in reasonable numbers, consistent with the ability of the various services to handle such missions.

[Here follow concurrences.]

501.BB Palestine/3–1549: Airgram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 24, 1949.

A–31. Unpal A–1. [For Ethridge.] Following is text of letter Mch 15 from Sec. Defense together with its accompanying memo responding affirmatively to Dept's request that NME continue to provide aid such as military observers, transportation and other facilities, to PCC similar to that already extended to UN Mediator for Palestine:

"My dear Mr. Secretary: With reference to your letter of March 8, 1949, "UNA", in which you request the continuance of the support of

[1] This airgram was repeated to New York.

the National Military Establishment in supplying personnel and other aid to the United Nations in its efforts to reestablish peace in Palestine, I wish to inform you that I have instructed the Secretary of the Navy to comply with your request, bearing in mind certain important principles regarding our participation. A copy of my memorandum to him is enclosed for your information.

It would be appreciated if you would keep me informed of the progress being made by the United Nations, estimating whenever it becomes possible to do so the duration and scope of the continued participation of the Military Establishment in support of the UN in this area. Sincerely yours, James Forrestal."

"MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

March 15, 1949.

Subj: Assistance to the United Nations in the Near East.

Attached is a letter from the Department of State dated 8 March 1949, signed by the Under Secretary of State, which contains a request for the continued assistance of the National Military Establishment in supporting the United Nations Mediator and the Palestine Conciliation Commission of the United Nations in their efforts to maintain peace in the Near East.

Inasmuch as the Chief of Naval Operations was designated Executive Agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for supporting the United Nations Mediator in Palestine, and in the light of the attached request from the Department of State and the urgent need for security in this vital area, I desire that the Department of the Navy, with the necessary collaboration of the Departments of Army and Air Force, continue to support the efforts of the United Nations to maintain peace in the Near East. I therefore request that the Department of the Navy deal directly with the Department of State in making the necessary arrangements for this support.

In providing this support, I consider it essential that certain principles be kept constantly in mind. This support by the National Military Establishment of the foreign operations of the United States and the United Nations should be limited to activities in observing and supervising the armistice in this area and should not be permitted to extend to the use of military personnel for other purposes such as guard, protective or enforcement duties or personal services. This type of support of the UN should be shared as appropriate with other members of the United Nations and should be provided on an equitable basis from among the three Services in accordance with arrangements to be worked out by you with the Departments of Army and Air Force. We should, insofar as circumstances permit, reduce the extent of our participation in this Mission as soon as and as much as practicable without jeopardizing the objective of the Mission. Finally, the Department of State should request the United Nations to provide appropriate subsistence, logistic support and reimbursement for the extraordinary expenses of our participation in this mission. James Forrestal.

CC: The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Joint Chiefs of Staff"

ACHESON

867N.01/3–2449 : Telegram

The Chargé in Transjordan (Stabler) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT
MOST IMMEDIATE

AMMAN, March 24, 1949—4 p. m.

129. Legtels 126 and 127, March 23. King informed this morning that agreement between Transjordan and Israel re Iraqi front area was signed last night at Shuneh but that final clause was inserted to effect that agreement is subject to ratification by Transjordan Prime Minister. Ratification must be communicated to Israel Government in writing not later than March 30 or agreement is null and void. (Immediately following telegram contains summary agreement.[1])

Apparently King told Transjordan representatives that if they could find suitable means to postpone final action, this course had his approval. Consequently Transjordan representatives indicated to Israelis they could not commit Transjordan Government to this agreement without approval Prime Minister. Israelis thereupon agreed to final clause.

Israelis also agreed to several other minor modifications—dates of implementation stages; manner of withdrawal Iraqi forces; insertion Articles 8 and 9. In addition they agreed to modification in adjustment of territory on western front (fourth paragraph No. 2 Legtel 126) whereby line would end at Budrus (No. 149153) which is junction between Legion and Iraqis, not Rantis. On east front (fourth paragraph No. 3, Legtel 126) line will run somewhat east of Qaun (MR 194201) instead of west.

Israelis all clearly indicated that if agreement in present form not ratified, they would advise Legion not to take over Iraqi front. If they did so, Israel would not be responsible for consequences.

While at first His Majesty seemed satisfied that final action on agreement had been postponed, he later appeared to have qualms lest postponement result in creation new difficulties, re both Israel and Iraq. He wished to settle question once and for all as decision to postpone final concurrence in agreement might prolong situation. However, he would let matter stand as now and would discuss it with Prime Minister on latter's return from Beirut Friday or Saturday.

Sent Department 129; repeated Baghdad 27, Beirut 24 for US Del PCC; pouched Jerusalem.

STABLER

[1] *Infra.*

867N.01/3–2449 : Telegram

The Chargé in Transjordan (Stabler) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT AMMAN, March 24, 1949—5 p. m.

130. Herewith summary agreement referred to in Legtel 129 March 24:

1. Israel agrees to taking over by Arab Legion on Iraqi front.
2. Demarcation lines to be as in map attached to agreement (map signed by Transjordan and Israeli representatives).
3. Agreement to be implemented in following stages: (*a*) In area west of road from Baqa to Jaljuliya (MR 145173) and from there to east of Qfarqasim—within five weeks after signature general armistice agreement; (*b*) In area of Wadiara (MR 153209) north of line from Baqa to Zububa (MR 171217)—within seven weeks after signature GAA; (*c*) All other areas—within fifteen weeks after signature GAA.
4. "Israel, for its part, has made similar changes for benefit of Transjordan" (This is clause without meaning but according to Transjordan representatives included for sake Arab public opinion. Transjordan representatives hope later to change "has made" to "will make").
5. Transjordan guarantees for all Iraqi forces in Palestine and agrees their number to be included in formula governing reduction of forces in GAA.
6. Armistice demarcation line in GAA to be based on positions held on date signature cease-fire agreement as certified by UN.
7. Agreement to be considered revision of GAA to be signed at Rhodes.
8. In case of villages affected inhabitants entitled to full rights of residence, property and freedom. If they leave may take livestock and moveable property and receive without delay full compensation for land they leave behind (Transjordan representatives believe this also empty clause).
9. Israel will pay to Transjordan cost of 20 kilos of first class road in compensation for loss of road between Tulkarm and Qalqiliya.
10. Mixed committee of two representatives from each party and chairman appointed by UN chief staff to peg out lines under this agreement.
11. Agreement not to be published without consent both parties nor "shall it in any way prejudice an ultimate political settlement between the parties."
12. Agreement subject ratification Transjordan Prime Minister, ratification to be communicated in writing to Israel not later than March 30. Failing ratification agreement null and void and without effect.

Agreement signed March 23 for "Hashemite Jordan Kingdom" by Fellah Pasha Medadha and Hussein Sirraj and for "State of Israel" by Eytan, Yadin and Dayan.

Sent Department 130, repeated Baghdad 28, Beirut 25 for USDel PCC. Pouched Jerusalem.

STABLER

867N.01/3–2449 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET LONDON, March 24, 1949—9 p. m.

1177. Latest Foreign Office info re Israeli-Transjordan (TJ) undercover negotiations Jerusalem (Paragraph 2, 3 and 6, Embassy 1153, March 23)[1] is report from Amman that Israelis have reduced demand for 15 km. belt to belt 5 km. deep and 60 km. long starting from point TJ line north of Lydda and continuing along Iraqi front to point not far from Jenin. Message sent late last night states Israelis gave TJ until 1900 hours March 23 to accept and that TJ answer was to be given at meeting later that night. Message indicated King considering acceptance even though it involved "all remaining plain land".

2. Late today Burrows said he had no further info re reply made by TJ but that above info had been communicated to Department along lines final sentence Embreftel. He described situation as "somewhat better but still extremely worrying". He was impressed by fact TJ negotiating under duress of clearest kind and was relieved that Abdullah had not put UK on spot by seeking its advice.

DOUGLAS

[1] Not printed.

501.BB Palestine/3–2549

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Robert M. McClintock

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 25, 1949.

Subject: Negotiations in and concerning Palestine.

Mr. Power telephoned this morning to say that Dr. Bunche had reported surprising progress between the Israeli and Transjordan Delegations on Rhodes in reaching the bases for an armistice agreement. He said, however, that the Israelis were complaining about alleged reinforcement of the British garrison at Aqaba and suggested to Secretary General Lie that he approach the United Kingdom Delegation with the thought that it would be helpful if the UK could reduce the number of troops at Aqaba. Bunche thought that the UK might also issue a public statement to this effect and indicate that it would not resort to military action unless Transjordan should be threatened with open aggression. As usual, Dr. Bunche added the suggestion that it would be nice if the State Department also put pressure on the British.

I told Mr. Power that the British were as well aware as we of the secret negotiations being undertaken by the Israelis and Transjordians supplementary to the armistice talks on Rhodes. The Israelis had very recently threatened King Abdullah that they might resume hostilities against the Iraqis in Samaria. Under these circumstances the British would certainly not feel disposed to reduce their garrison in Transjordan and I did not think the Department of State would be warranted in asking them to do so.

Mr. Power telephoned later this afternoon to pass on Mr. Ross' suggestion that it might be helpful to Dr. Bunche to inform him of the secret negotiations going on behind his back between Israel and Transjordan. I said it was, no doubt, a very human temptation to wish to tell our friend, the Mediator, of what was happening but that I did not think we had any warrant to do so or that we could possibly take the risk with Israel, which had not informed the US of what was going on, using our action with Bunche as a pretext to denounce the agreement now reached secretly with Abdullah. I told Mr. Power that under no circumstances should USUN divulge to the Secretariat or to Bunche its knowledge of the secret negotiations between Abdullah and the government at Tel Aviv. Mr. Power seemed somewhat unconvinced. I later confirmed my position with Mr. Rusk and have informed Mr. Power.

Messrs. Ross and Power had comments on the proposed draft SC resolution sent in Beirut's telegram 132,[1] similar on the whole to our own. We agreed that the Mediator's office, as well as his functions, should be terminated; that the Truce Commission should be liquidated; and that the court of first instance in cases of alleged violations of the armistice agreements should be the Palestine Commission and not the Security Council itself. In general, the resolution should tie up all the loose ends and supplant completely the previous resolutions of the Assembly and the Council dealing with the functions of the Mediator and the Truce Commission. We also agreed that there should be some complimentary reference to the work of Bernadotte and Bunche.

[1] Identified also as Palun 95, March 24; it gave the text of a draft of a proposed resolution to be submitted to the Security Council. In telegram 131, identified also as Palun 94, the same day, Beirut advised that "Bunche–Wilkins conversation resulted in first draft of proposed SC resolution . . . which Bunche plans to transmit to SYG about March 24 for discussion with interested SC delegates on means terminating Mediator's SC functions following conclusion armistice talks under SC resolution November 16." Telegrams 131 and 132 are filed under 501.BB Palestine/3–2449.

501.BB Palestine/3–2549 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Lebanon

SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, March 25, 1949—noon.

145. Unpal 68. [For Ethridge.] Re para 1 Beirut Tel 128 Mar 22, wld prefer not place refugee problem [1] before GA at Apr session since Comite 3 agenda already one of largest at this session and explosive character Palestine problem might cause debate to get out of hand. Seems to us paras 11, 13 and 14 GA Res Dec 11 provide sufficient authority for PCC in reporting to SYG to request him to call on specialized agencies and other govts and authorities to render appropriate assistance if necessary.

Concerning reference your para 1 to gen econ development, we wld prefer more restricted formulation along line that solution refugee problem will necessitate stimulation econ projects which would facilitate assimilation refugees and simultaneously raise econ potential of cooperating states.

Re para 2 distinction shld of course be made between planning phase of long-range operation and its execution with respect concept that proposed technical commission upon request govts or authorities concerned provide assistance in obtaining necessary financing for particular projects from internatl or other sources. In our view PCC shld appt technical comite composed of eminent personnel as you suggest, which wld have sole task of surveying entire refugee problem and of preparing detailed blueprints for solution that problem. PCC cld then recommend to GA or to Govts and authorities concerned on basis its technical comites findings *ad hoc* authority or org, such as regional development board, which would carry out plans technical comite. Such an authority or org might be able facilitate financial assistance from appropriate lending agencies.

We believe Art 12 GA Res Dec 11 provides PCC with full auth appt technical comite any time.

We do not feel necessary have formal assurance from other members PCC that plan proposed by technical comite will have to be implemented along lines approved by US, although this is in fact a necessary consideration. It seems to us that by choice leading personnel and gen position US in internatl community this objective can be achieved without undue stress in spelling it out. Also we do not feel it essential to have assurances of requests for assistance from Arab States before

[1] Mr. McClintock, in a telegram of March 24, informed Ambassador Griffis at Paris that "President today signed refugee relief bill. We hope RFC loan will be available within a week." (No. 935, 501.MA Palestine/3–2449)

technical comite is set up. To make such requests prerequisite to estab comite might imply moral obligation on PCC affirmatively to meet these requests. All that seems necessary is assurance by Arab Govts that they will give full cooperation to efforts of PCC and its technical comite in devising long-range solution problem.

Foregoing views preliminary and, as you suggest, final decision will await McGhee's return and further consultation with Ethridge.

ACHESON

501.BB Palestine/3–2349 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Transjordan [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 25, 1949—5 p. m.

37. Dept appreciates prompt and thorough fashion in which you have reported Israel–TJ talks re Iraqi front, and has given full consideration to recommendations you have made. However, view fact that TJ reps have now signed agreement, Dept does not believe that US representation Tel Aviv would be productive.

We feel that view circumstances Abdullah's instinct to sign agreement (ur 127 Mar 23) is sound and that his reasoning as to effect signing might have on possibility future Israeli demands is logical. Without seeking to give King advice, you may tell him that USG wld regard any attempt at major breach of provisions secret agreement as serious obstacle to progress being made toward peace in Pal and that USG would be prepared give strong advice against such action to any party attempting major breach.

ACHESON

[1] This telegram was repeated to London.

Editorial Note

On the afternoon of March 25, King Abdullah Ibn el-Hussein handed the Chargé in Transjordan, Wells Stabler, a message which he requested be urgently transmitted to President Truman. The message dealt with the subject of territory occupied by Iraqi forces and with the request of Israel for a modification of the present front between Iraqi and Israeli forces. The message was transmitted to the Department by Amman in telegram 132, March 25, 8 p. m. (867N.01/3–2549)

501.BB Palestine/3–2649 : Telegram

The Chargé in Transjordan (Stabler) to the Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT MOST IMMEDIATE

AMMAN, March 26, 1949—noon.

134. Deptel 37, March 25. While Transjordan representatives in fact signed secret agreement, agreement does not have any validity until it is ratified by Prime Minister who is understood to have raised objections both as to form and substance of negotiations. (It is possible that Prime Minister may resign over agreement and will have to be replaced by another who would be willing to ratify it, probably Fellah Pasha Medadh.)

Abdullah feels strongly about manner in which agreement has been forced on him but realizes implications of failure to ratify. He is convinced, as are all Transjordan representatives participating in current negotiations, that if agreement is not ratified, Israelis will take action to force out Iraqis (which would also involve Legion again) and make by force territorial adjustments which would probably far exceed what they are endeavoring to extort from Abdullah through negotiation. Abdullah also feels that Israelis would succeed in such moves without any effective action being taken by UN, US or UK to stop them.

However, he approved postponement final action on agreement in hopes some way could be urgently devised to prevent Israel from forcing him into this agreement which he also knows will not improve his position, not only re other Arab States but also re his own people and Palestine Arabs. Hence his message to the President (Legtel 132, March 25).[1]

USG informed Israel that it felt latter should interpose no objections to Transjordan assuming responsibility for Iraqi area before question of secret agreement had arisen. Moreover, Israeli Foreign Minister gave formal assurances to President through Secretary of State that Israel has no intentions whatsoever commencing hostilities on Iraqi frontier. Now, however, USG seem prepared permit Israel force Transjordan into paying excessive price without compensation for privilege of taking over Iraqi areas, while at same time threatening that if price not paid, Israel will exact it anyway.

I fear that Israel has so many times been able to violate truce without consequences that King, if he should order ratification of agree-

[1] See editorial note, *supra*.

ment, would gain little comfort or support from substance last sentence Deptel 37.

If USG does not take strong line now to stop Israel's constant, defiant and threatening attitude, I venture to suggest that before Palestine peace is concluded, Israel may well have its frontiers on the Jordan. If this does occur, I submit that it will be only because Israel found apathy and appeasement toward its defiant policy.

In view King's message to President and above, would strongly urge Department reconsider its attitude as expressed in Deptel 37 prior to March 30. Failing this and in event agreement is finally ratified, would then recommend that Department authorize me to inform King, in addition to last sentence Deptel 37, that USG still stands firmly behind its policy enunciated by Jessup in UN on November 20.[2]

Sent Department repeated Baghdad 30, London 23, Beirut 27 for USDel PCC.

STABLER

[2] Baghdad reported, on March 29, that Iraqi Foreign Minister Jamali had asked for United States assistance in restraining Israeli territorial demands in areas now held by Iraqi troops (telegram 157, 501BB Palestine/3–2949).

867N.01/3–2749 : Telegram

The Chargé in Transjordan (Stabler) to the Secretary of State

SECRET AMMAN, March 27, 1949—6 p. m.

135. Prime Minister who appeared to be in somewhat bitter frame of mind made following comments this morning:

1. While he had agreed to despatch King's message to President he thought there was little if any likelihood that either US or UK would or could come to Transjordan's assistance. Postponement final action on agreement had been due to advice received from within Transjordan Government that external assistance might be forthcoming to prevent conclusion this agreement. However, he had told King yesterday that he did not feel optimistic about nature President's reply and on this basis it had been decided to request Israeli representatives to meet with Prime Minister and other Transjordan representatives at Shuneh late afternoon Tuesday March 29. (It is understood Abdullah Tel telephoned Dayan yesterday concerning this meeting and stated that while there was no change in principle re agreement there were few points re implementation which Transjordan representatives wished discussed.) Prime Minister indicated meeting had been put off to March 29 in order await President's reply.

Prime Minister said that at meeting Tuesday he planned to propose modifications in demands and also to seek compensations (probably in Hebron area where Israelis are understood to have informed their delegates at Rhodes they are prepared give up number of villages). He also planned propose that area in triangle which Israelis demand should become no man's land under UN until such time as peace settlement is reached.

He too thought it would be preferable to consider this entire question as military one, to cancel present secret agreement and to incorporate it in terms of general armistice agreement to be signed by two delegates at Rhodes. While Israelis may not agree to suggestions on modifications, he expected they would agree to Rhodes delegates signing armistice agreement including Israeli demands in triangle.

Prime Minister said that following Tuesday's meeting matter would again be discussed in Council of Ministers with view reaching final decision (presumably prior March 30).

In general Tawfic Pasha welcomed delay in final action on secret agreement as it gave Transjordan additional time to attempt reach more suitable adjustments.

(It appears that provided he does not have to ratify agreement with his signature Prime Minister has no intention resigning.)

2. Regarding armistice negotiations at Rhodes Prime Minister said they have been more or less suspended pending outcome negotiations at Shuneh. When queried re Transjordan's position on Jerusalem he replied that Transjordan would have to accept almost any terms which Israelis demanded. Presumably Bunche would draft compromise which Transjordan would be obliged accept. Tawfic Pasha indicated that he no longer concerned about attitude Arab states or others, that his principal concern was welfare Transjordan and Arab Palestine and that he must now act, regardless of cost, to prevent complete disaster.

3. Prime Minister commented at length on future attitude of Transjordan toward UK. Said that this morning he had informed British Chargé that in future Transjordan, while remaining friend and ally of Britain and willing receive advice from British or anyone else, would act as it saw fit in its own interest. Transjordan would no longer regard it as mandatory to follow British advice.

Sent Department 135, Baghdad 31, Jerusalem 744, USDel PCC pouched London.

STABLER

Executive Secretariat Files, Lot 58 D 609

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Humelsine)

[Extract]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 28, 1949.

Participants: The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Mr. Rusk
Mr. Bohlen [1]
General Smith [2]
Mr. Humelsine

. . . . . .

Palestine

Mr. Rusk talked briefly about the Palestine situation. He told the Secretary that the Presidential policy on Palestine was outlined very carefully in Telmar 148 [3] which was sent to General Marshall at the time of the last General Assembly in Paris. Mr. Rusk said to make the position outlined in this telegram effective it would be necessary to bring Governmental pressure to bear and that such a course of action would cause the President considerable heartburn before it was over. He told Mr. Acheson that there were two papers [4] regarding this subject that he would like to have him discuss with the President at his 12:30 meeting today. Mr. Acheson indicated that he would do so and thought that he should advise the President to call in his political advisers to talk this over. Mr. Rusk went on to say that if the President exercises reasonable firmness now, we will likely get a reasonable solution to the problem.

. . . . . .

[1] Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor of the Department of State.
[2] Walter Bedell Smith, whose resignation as Ambassador to the Soviet Union was accepted by President Truman on March 25.
[3] Dated November 10, 1948, to Paris, *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1565.
[4] The editors are unable to identify the two papers.

501.BB Palestine/3–2849 : Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT URGENT

BEIRUT, March 28, 1949—5 p. m.

149. Palun 97. For the Secretary (and at his discretion for the President) from Ethridge. Talks with Arab governments over past week have only confirmed what I previously reported to Department; That if Jews would only make conciliatory gesture on refugee problem PCC could get on with its work of trying to get peace. Failure of Jews to do so has prejudiced whole cause of peaceful settlement in this part of world.

As we anticipated Commission has been confronted by insistent demand from Arabs that Jews evidence good faith and willingness to abide by GA resolution December 11 before negotiations were entered. They argued since Jews have constantly flouted UN resolution there was nothing for the Arabs to gain by entering negotiations under UN auspices. They have maintained that only when Jews show respect for UN or until other guarantees of fulfillment are forthcoming will they be willing enter peace talks.

Arab attitude toward refugee problem proceeds from two or three reasons. One is that they recognize presence of 700,000 or 800,000 homeless idle people as political weapon against Jews. They feel they can summon world opinion even if some refugees die in meantime. They frankly say, moreover, that when Israel comes up for confirmation in GA they intend to fight her and are trying to get their friends to fight her on ground she cannot pretend to be peace-loving as long as her aggression continues and on ground that, since she is defying UN resolution and directives, as in the Akaba incident and on refugee problem, it is mockery to admit her as nation willing and able undertake obligations of charter. It has been intimated to me that government "friendly to Arabs" might even suggest that GA direct SYG to send telegram to PCC asking whether the countries involved under December 11 resolution had accepted resolution in principle and were assisting in implementing it. If such move is made and not defeated in GA I might be in very embarrassing position of having to join fellow commissioners in reporting that Israeli Government has not accepted resolution in principle and refuses implement it.

Second reason for Arab position is fear of domestic repercussions on refugee problem. Since Egypt and Saudi Arabia have no refugees (Egypt has reportedly sent all of hers into Gaza strip) and Iraq has only about 4,000, figure of 800,000 constitutes about one-tenth population remaining Arab states. Since they generally more advanced

than other Arabs they constitute potential core of dangerous agitators offering a threat to existence of Arab government. They also create, so Arab leaders here have told me, core of irridentist movement that will plague all Arab states and provide basis for continual agitation to point that there will be no possibility of having anything more than armistice in Middle East.

In private conversations both Saudi Arabian and Egyptian have told me that if Israel would take token number of refugees back as preliminary gesture, peace talks could move along. Frightened Transjordanians desperately want peace talks but are also extremely sensitive to idea of "running out" on other Arab states. I am convinced they will talk peace, particularly boundary lines, when they have signed their armistice, but it is likely that on refugee problem they will continue to maintain Arab line. I am more than ever of opinion that if Jews are not deliberately stalling peace negotiations until they can consolidate their position and grab off more land as they seem to be doing in triangle, they are being most short-sighted and making it difficult for themselves ever to have peaceful relations with their neighbors.

Although Commission is making bricks without straw and with, I fear, too little support from home, it is going on with its work. We are staying in Beirut until Arab governments have agreed to further "exchange of views" with Commission in some neutral city where Jews will also be present. In their present mood the Arabs will not even talk about peace conference. We will have to try to ease them into it. In meantime, Commission intends, when it leaves Beirut, to go back to Tel Aviv for talks with [Ben-]Gurion. Jews told us they were ready for direct negotiations, but again refugee problem is not one that can be negotiated directly between Israel and another government, since all Arab governments except Yemen involved.

Although we feel we must go back to Tel Aviv it will do us little good unless Israel Government is pressured by USG to make concession which it could easily make without prejudicing its position in peace negotiations and without revealing its final hand. It is pure rubbish for Shertok to say he cannot do so; Israeli Government already knows how many it will take back and under what conditions. If it had any respect for UN and any desire to live by its ordinances it could make PCC's job easier and shorter and make its own position vis-à-vis the Arabs much more secure than it will ever be if it continues to allow refugee problem to be source agitation in every Arab country and refugees a ready prey to agitators who already working among them.

My own position is most unhappy. It is bad enough to realize UN prestige in this part world already gone, but worse than that is realiza-

tion that US prestige constantly declining and feeling toward US increasingly despairing. Since we gave Israel birth we are blamed for her belligerence and her arrogance and for cold-bloodedness of her attitude toward refugees. Of course everybody expects US to pass miracle but none is needed in this case. All that is needed is effective pressure directed toward making Israel realize that her own interests and ours also are being jeopardized in this strategic area by her intransigeance. So far as we are aware, Israel has not replied to approach made in Deptel 144 March 9.[1] Firm reiteration of policy enunciated in GA by Jessup on territorial questions and insistence that Israel abide by resolution as to refugees would, I am convinced, clear atmosphere and bring quick peace which Israel needs as badly as Arabs. If Dept intends to do anything along that line, it should be done before PCC goes Tel Aviv.

I am frankly asking for help. If we do not help out I can see no good result from the work of this Commission. What I can see is an abortion of justice and humanity to which I do not want to be midwife; complete destruction of all faith in an international organization and creation of a very dangerous flame against US in this part of world. [Ethridge.]

PINKERTON

[1] To Tel Aviv and repeated to Mr. Ethridge at Jerusalem; it is printed on p. 804.

867N.01/3–2349

President Truman to King Abdullah Ibn el-Hussein of Transjordan[1]

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, March 28, 1949—6 p. m.

HIS MAJESTY KING ABDULLAH IBN EL HUSSEIN: I have received Your Majesty's message of March 25 concerning the situation affecting the Iraqi front in Palestine. I agree with Your Majesty that the replacement of Iraqi troops by forces of Transjordan would be a move in favor of peace, and that the cease-fire and armistice between Israel and Transjordan should be extended to the Iraqi front.

With regard to the Israeli request for a modification of the present front between the Iraqi forces and those of Israel, I desire to recall to

[1] Transmitted to Amman in telegram 38, March 28, 6 p. m., with the instruction: "Pls convey following message from President to King (ur 132 March 25)."

Mr. Rusk, in a memorandum of March 28 to the Secretary, had discussed King Abdullah's message and had recommended that he discuss the matter with the President and obtain his approval for sending a proposed reply. The memorandum, which was drafted by Mr. Rockwell, noted that "Transjordan, by signing the agreement, might thus be afforded some measure of protection against further Israeli territorial demands." The Department's draft reply was cleared with Matthew J. Connelly, Secretary to the President.

Your Majesty that the policy of the United States Government as regards a final territorial settlement in Palestine and as stated in the General Assembly on Nov 30, 1948 by Dr. Philip Jessup, the American representative, is that Israel is entitled to the territory allotted to her by the General Assembly Resolution of November 29, 1947, but that of Israel desires additions, i.e., territory allotted to the Arabs by the November 29 Resolution, it should offer territorial compensation.

I understand that one of the provisions of the secret agreement which has been initialled by Your Majesty's representatives is that the agreement "shall not in any way prejudice an ultimate political settlement between the parties". Your Majesty may be assured that the United States Government, as a member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, will regard any attempt at a major breach of the provisions of the secret agreement between Transjordan and Israel as a serious obstacle to the progress being made toward peace in Palestine, and that the United States Government would be prepared to make strong representations against such action to the party attempting it.

I send Your Majesty my best and most cordial wishes.[2]

HARRY S. TRUMAN

[2] The President's message was delivered to King Abdullah at 3 p. m., March 29. The latter expressed to Chargé Stabler his "Thought that now no other course of action left open but to accept Israel's demands." (Telegram 137, March 29, 5 p. m., from Amman, 867N.01/3–2949)

501.BB Palestine/3–2849 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Lebanon

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, March 28, 1949—6 p. m.

148. Unpal 69. [For Ethridge.] Fol tel recd today from USUN:

"SYG has been informed by PCC Secretariat that French and Turkish members favor a Palestine peace conference in Geneva in immed future. He is replying that such a meeting seems premature at this time. Accordingly he will not authorize expenditure of UN funds for trip and meeting in Geneva. SYG understands this is Ethridge position."

Shld appreciate your views. Dept feels SYG shld be guided by recommendations of PCC, particularly if there is any momentum which might facilitate tangible results at a peace conference. If armistice agreements are signed near future we see certain advantages prompt peace talks and are prepared intimate these views SYG if you concur.

ACHESON

501.BB Palestine/3–2949

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Rusk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 29, 1949.

Subject: Suggested Remarks for use in Conversation with the Foreign Minister of Israel.

Discussion

It is recommended that you request Mr. Moshe Sharett, the Foreign Minister of Israel, to call upon you to discuss this Government's views with regard to an equitable settlement of the Palestine problem. Mr. Mark Ethridge, the United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission, urges again, in Beirut's top secret telegram 149, March 28, attached (Tab A), that without pressure placed by the United States on Israel there can be no good result from the work of his Commission. He says that in the Middle East, since "we gave Israel birth", we are blamed for her belligerence and her arrogance, and for the coldbloodedness of her attitude toward the refugees. He feels that a firm reiteration of the policy announced in the General Assembly by Dr. Jessup on territorial questions, and insistence that Israel abide by the Assembly's resolution of December 11, 1948 as to refugees, would clear the atmosphere and bring a quick peace which Israel needs as badly as the Arabs. If you should see Mr. Sharett before the vote is taken in the forthcoming General Assembly on Israel's admission to the United Nations, your representations would have greater effect. It is suggested that you might speak to the Israeli Foreign Minister along the following lines:

Final Territorial Settlement in Palestine

The United States Government has observed with keen and continuing interest the progress being made toward the establishment of peace in Palestine, as illustrated by the armistice agreements which have been signed between Israel and Egypt on the one hand and Israel and the Lebanon on the other, and by the progress which is being made in the negotiation of an armistice between Israel and Transjordan. The United States Government hopes that armistice agreements will soon be signed between Israel and the remaining Arab States which have participated in the Palestine conflict, and is firmly convinced that there must be no new outbreak of hostilities in Palestine.

The United States Government is deeply interested in an equitable final settlement of the Palestine problem, and looks forward to the negotiations of such a settlement by the parties concerned. The position of the United States Government as regards a final territorial settle-

ment, and as set forth by Dr. Philip Jessup in the United Nations General Assembly on November 20, 1948, is that Israel is entitled to the boundaries allotted to her by the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947, and that no changes should be made in these boundaries without the full consent of Israel. However, if Israel desires additions to this territory, i.e., areas allotted by the General Assembly resolution of November 29 to the Arabs, such as Western Galilee and Jaffa, which are now under Israeli military occupation, Israel should make territorial concessions elsewhere. The President has asked me to state to you his conviction that Israel is not entitled to keep both the areas allotted to it by the November 29 resolution and areas allotted to the Arabs by this resolution, and that Israel should make appropriate territorial compensation for any territory it seeks to retain beyond that allotted to the Jewish state by the November 29 resolution.

Status of Jerusalem

The United States Government firmly supports the principle of the internationalization of the Jerusalem area, as recommended by the General Assembly resolutions of November 29, 1947 and December 11, 1948. The General Assembly resolution of December 11, 1948, stated that an international regime for Jerusalem "should provide for maximum local autonomy for distinctive groups consistent with the special international status of the Jerusalem area". Under these circumstances, it would appear feasible that Jewish Jerusalem could be administered by Israel, perhaps as a trusteeship, and Arab Jerusalem by Transjordan on similar terms. However, in the opinion of the United States Government, it is essential that the Jerusalem area be placed under the overall supervision of some representation of the United Nations.

Palestinian Refugees

The United States Government is deeply concerned by the problem represented by the 800,000 Palestine refugees. The United States is counting heavily upon Israel to play a major role in the solution of this problem, not only in offering financial assistance in the resettlement of those refugees who do not desire to return to Israel, but also in the repatriation to Israel of a substantial number of the refugees. This Government regards such action on the part of Israel as a necessary condition to the establishment of a basis for cooperation between Israel and its neighbors.[1]

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[1] In a memorandum of March 28 to the Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk examined the problems analyzed in this memorandum, except for the question of the Palestinian refugees, and recommended that Secretary Acheson discuss them with President Truman (501.BB Palestine/3–2849).

890D.00/2–2349

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Transjordan

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 29, 1949.

No. 3

The Secretary of State refers to the Legation's despatch No. 12 of February 23, 1949,[1] reporting the counsel of Samir Rifai Pasha to King Abdullah regarding this Government's attitude toward the Greater Syria problem, and requesting the Department's guidance in the matter.

For the Legation's information, officers of the Department discussed the Greater Syria issue informally with Samir Pasha in the course of his visit to Washington in January 1949. Although the subject was discussed only briefly, occasion was taken to make it as clear as possible that the Department was concerned over the ambitions of King Abdullah to create a Greater Syria encompassing the territories of neighboring states and that this Government looked with disfavor upon such a scheme. It is apparent from the Legation's despatch under reference that Samir Pasha has either misunderstood or has distorted the Department's views in his counsel to King Abdullah.

It is true, of course, that it is a fundamental principle of our national policy to respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live. Similarly, this Government does not look with favor upon territorial changes that do not accord with the expressed wishes of the peoples concerned. From careful consideration of the Greater Syria plan as envisaged by King Abdullah, however, it would appear that there is insufficient basis to support the contention that such a plan would be "a spontaneous development springing from the will of the people." As it is the Department's opinion that under these circumstances King Abdullah's attempts to further his proposal for the creation of a Greater Syria are a disturbing factor in the Arab Near East, the Government of Transjordan would be in error to believe that the Department in any sense, tacit or otherwise, either favors or condones the scheme.

The Officer in Charge should take suitable opportunity to make the Department's views known to King Abdullah and to Samir Rifai Pasha in a manner which, while as tactful as possible, should serve to remove any further misconceptions regarding our attitude toward this issue.

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[1] Not printed.

867N.002/3–2949 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, March 29, 1949.

253. Press announces decision by Cabinet move Ministries of Health, Education, Religion and Social Welfare and War Sufferers to Jerusalem together with departments of additional ministries. Committee appointed to recommend further transfers. Estimated 1,000 government officials involved in move. Ramallah radio interprets announcement as effort influence Conciliation Commission and show Jewish determination make Jerusalem capital Israel.[1]

Sent Department: pouched Amman, repeated Beirut 48.

BURDETT

[1] The Jerusalem Committee of the Conciliation Commission considered the implications of the Israeli decision and concluded that "this constitutes *fait accompli* and part [of the] process establishing capital Jerusalem." The United States Delegation similarly concluded that "this move further prejudices prospects internationalization and confirms opinion that Israel will not relinquish new city of [*to*] international authority." (telegram 153, identified also as Palun 101, March 29, 10 p. m., from Beirut, 501.BB Palestine/3–2949)

The Conciliation Commission decided, on March 30, to send a written communication to the Israeli Prime Minister calling attention to press reports and adding that "if confirmed, PCC would be obliged to call attention of Israeli Government to incompatibility of such measure with paragraph 8 of GA resolution December 11 . . . PCC requests assurance from Ben Gurion it is not intention Israeli Government to transfer ministries to Jerusalem." (telegram 160, also identified as Palun 102, March 31, 3 p. m., from Beirut, 501.BB Palestine/3–3149)

501.BB Palestine/3–2949 : Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT, March 29, 1949—2 p. m.

152. Palun 100. [From Ethridge.] ReDeptel 148, March 28, USDel position has been that it will consider any meeting place when it becomes obvious that talks can be held or that they will be fruitful. In meantime, we expect no commitment nor have Arabs agreed to further talks. Arabs are canvassing among themselves now and will give reply to Commission within day or two. Question of meeting place will then come up as Arabs have been asked to indicate their preference.

My own feeling as stated in Commission has been that it is preferable to meet in this part of the world. Jerusalem is out because Arabs consider they would compromise themselves if they negotiated in [garble] Rhodes is distasteful to them psychologically. Tentatively most of the

Arab Delegates have said they prefer Geneva although currency difficulties there very great for most of them. Boisanger has not committed himself directly although in Commission he has frequently referred to Geneva as a possibility. Yalcin definitely is against Rhodes and favors Geneva possibly under instruction as Turks have [garble] claim on Rhodes. Jews have indicated to Boisanger preference for Geneva.

Strongest argument against Geneva to my mind is that unless Arabs send missions empowered to negotiate and sign, there will be constant shuttling back and forth to me, thus prolonging any negotiations and giving the situation time to deteriorate more. If, however, Arabs agree to talks and indicate preference for Geneva, I will have to agree and undertake to impress upon them desirability from their point of view of sending strong delegates.

We concur fully view contained and action proposed last paragraph reference telegram. [Ethridge.]

[PINKERTON]

501.BB Palestine/3–2449 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Lebanon

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, March 29, 1949—7 p. m.

156. Unpal 70. [For Ethridge.] Our preliminary reaction draft proposed SC res set forth Palun 95 Mar 24 and commented on in Palun 94 [1] is favorable. We believe however this res shld seek to tie in all loose ends and leave no doubt but that functions and Office of Mediator well as Truce Comm are terminated.

We have fol recommendations:

1. To Para 3 add fol new language: "Thanks the Truce Comm established by the SC res of 23 Apr., 1948 for its distinguished efforts in carrying out an arduous and dangerous task and declares this Comm dissolved."

2. Proposed para. 5 of draft res would be more explicit if it read as fols: "Requests the PCC to undertake the observance of the cease-fire in Palestine; *upon the assumption by the PCC of this task the remaining functions of the UN Mediator on Palestine under SC resolutions, and the office of the Mediator, shall terminate.*"

3. Para. 6 might read: "*Requests the SYG to appoint the present Chief of Staff of the Palestine Mediator to continue, under the supervision of the PCC*, such of the present truce supervision organization as the PCC may require in maintaining the cease-fire, and as may be necessary in assisting the parties to the armistice agreements in the supervision of the application of the terms of those agreements."

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[1] Regarding these two telegrams, see footnote 1, p. 869.

Believe undesirable for supervisor armistice agreements have direct access to SC. There will undoubtedly be many allegations of breach of armistice which wld impose a needless and politically embarrassing task on SC of investigating charges which can only be checked by on-the-spot observation. We feel PCC is logical body to whom chief of staff shld report alleged breaches of armistice agreements and PCC wld then be free bring grave infractions attention SC.

4. Feel also there shld be some laudatory reference in SC res to outstanding contribution Bernadotte and Bunche. Probably since latter drafted present proposed res this was omitted.[2]

Rptd USUN as 193.

ACHESON

[2] Jerusalem reported, on April 9, that the content of telegram 156 had been discussed with Mr. Bunche, who was "strongly of opinion, however, with which USDel agrees, that PCC should not become involved in armistice agreements." Mr. Bunche was said to be of the opinion that the armistice agreements did not require PCC supervision, a matter he planned to discuss with Department officers on his return to the United States (telegram 280, also identified as Palun 121, 501.BB Palestine/4–949).

501.BB Palestine/3–3049 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to Mr. Ralph J. Bunche [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, March 30, 1949—7 p. m.

For Acting UN Mediator for Palestine. US Govt refers its proposals of Sept 1948 [2] re export aircraft parts for Near East commercial airline needs, which proposals were concurred in by you Sept 18. [3]

This Govt considering desirability liberalizing policy to permit export to Israel and to Arab States, without prior approval of Mediator, aircraft, spares, other aviation items which US Govt satisfied required for establishment and maintenance civil air services and rehabilitation civil air navigation, communications and ground facilities, not limited to services in effect July 15, 1948. Request your early views this proposal.

ACHESON

[1] This telegram was sent to Cairo as No. 339 and repeated to Rhodes. Mr. Bunche, at Rhodes, replied in an undated telegram, received in the Department on April 3, that he concurred in the liberalizing policy. Henceforth, he said, "if US Government satisfied such items will be used for non-military purposes only, I see no need to obtain prior approval of Mediator for issuance of export permits." (Navy telegram NCR 3768, 501.BB Palestine/4–349)

[2] See telegram 908, September 16, 1948, to Jerusalem, *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1406.

[3] See footnote 1, *ibid.*, p. 1408.

501.BB Palestine/3–3149

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 31, 1949.

MY PROPOSED CONVERSATION WITH MR. SHARETT

I went over with the President my proposed talk with Mr. Sharett as outlined this morning with Mr. Satterthwaite.[1] The President approved it and asked that a memorandum of the conversation be sent to him after it had taken place, and said that he would say the same thing to Dr. Weizmann when he arrived in this country.

[1] This allusion is not clear to the editors. Possibly, Secretary Acheson was referring to an outline of the matters discussed in Mr. Rusk's memorandum of March 29, which was drafted in Mr. Satterthwaite's office.

867N.01/3–3149 : Telegram

The Chargé in Transjordan (Stabler) to the Secretary of State

SECRET AMMAN, March 31, 1949—2 p. m.

143. Legtel 142, March 30.[1] After meeting which lasted until 0300 hours this morning understanding had been reached on all points. It was agreed that original agreement and modifications thereto would not be kept secret and that they would form instructions to two armistice delegates at Rhodes who would include terms thereof in general armistice agreement. However, until armistice agreement signed, terms these "instructions" would not be made public. Modifications to original agreement were signed by Defense Minister and Israeli representatives and were appended to original agreement as annex.

Israelis were unwilling accept Transjordan concept that areas demanded by Israel which were not allotted to Israel under partition should be made no man's land, and stated that question of partition did not enter into discussions. While Israelis insisted they should occupy areas up to lines laid down in original agreement, it was nevertheless agreed that neither Transjordan nor Israeli forces would occupy Arab villages within areas affected and that such villages would remain "enclave". Villages would raise own police forces and would have contact with areas under Transjordan or Israeli occupa-

[1] Not printed; it advised that the King, the Prime Minister, the Chief of the Transjordanian Delegation at Rhodes, and the Defense Minister would meet with Israeli Representatives on the evening of March 30 to discuss the question of the Iraqi front. The Transjordanians anticipated proposing that "those areas in question which were allotted to Arabs under partition should become no-mans-land under UN until final settlement." (867N.01/3–3049)

tion through UN. This arrangement would preclude possibility large numbers refugees.

Israelis also agreed to change in wording paragraph 4 of original agreement so that it would read "Israel, for its part, will make certain changes for the benefit of Transjordan in area west of Hebron". Re this Israel will make ratification of lines this area which would return to Transjordan authority considerable territory. Also agreed that paragraph 3 original agreement would be entirely eliminated.

Fawzi Pasha said Israelis wished discuss last night question of Latrun for which they willing make compensation. However, Transjordan representatives replied that first step should be signature of armistice based on lines at time of cease-fire agreement and that later further talks would be held concerning Latrun, Hadassah, Potash works, railroad to Jerusalem, etc.

Fawzi Pasha indicated it now expected armistice agreement (draft of agreement concerning Arab Legion fronts has been considered and approved by Transjordan) including terms re Iraqi front would be signed at Rhodes on Monday April 4. It is understood Legion will take over from Iraqis on April 5.

In general, Defense Minister appeared glad to have matters settled and felt Transjordan had used weeks grace to good advantage.

Sent Department 143, repeated Baghdad 35, Beirut 30 for USDel PCC, Jerusalem 76.

STABLER

501.BB Palestine/3–3149 : Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT, March 31, 1949—6 p. m.

163. Palun 105. [From Ethridge.] At request French Foreign Office Boisanger has asked Ethridge to recommend that Department approach Israeli representative Washington re new Israeli requirement Jerusalem visitors have civilian visas for entry into Israel. Ethridge agreed report matter Department and suggested French representative Washington consult Department re what action desirable. We doubt wisdom constant heckling approaches but suggest this matter might be included in any general over-all approach re Jerusalem or Palestine which Department may make to Israeli Government.[1]

[1] Secretary Acheson, on April 1, informed Mr. Ethridge as follows: "I want you to know that we have given very careful consideration to Palun 97, Mar 28, which I have discussed with the President. We also have in mind Palun 99, Mar 29, and Palun 105, Mar 31. I have asked Sharett to see me Apr. 5 and shall go over these questions with him. The President says that he will cover the same points with President Weizmann when he arrives in this country." (Telegram 166, identified also as Unpal 73, to Beirut, 501.BB Palestine/4–149)

Palun 97 is identified also as telegram 149 from Beirut, p. 876; Palun 99, identified also as telegram 151 from Beirut, March 29, is not printed.

Sent Department 163, repeated Jerusalem 36, Tel Aviv 6, Amman unnumbered. [Ethridge.]

PINKERTON

Editorial Note

The Governments of Israel and Transjordan signed a General Armistice Agreement at Rhodes on April 3; for the text, see SC, *4th yr., Special Supplement No. 1.*

Editorial Note

The meaning of the expressions "Rhodes formula" and "Rhodes-type talks" in connection with the methods of negotiation between Israel and some of its Arab neighbors for armistice agreements is not entirely clear. The United Nations *Bulletin* of March 15, 1949, page 226, states that, with the convening of the Egyptian and Israeli negotiators at Rhodes, there "followed 42 days of almost continuous session. The procedure adopted was for Dr. Bunche to hold preliminary discussions separately with each delegation on each substantive item. Then informal meetings were arranged between the heads of the delegations and the Acting Mediator. And when discussion on the item had reached an advanced stage, joint formal meetings of the two delegations were held."

A press release by the United Nations, No. PAL/456 of March 9, states that the delegations of Israel and Transjordan, the same afternoon, held "their first joint informal meeting which lasted two and a half hours. In a very cordial atmosphere, an exchange of views took place on 11 points raised by both delegations in connection with the delineation of armistice lines, including the Jerusalem sector." (IO files)

The nature of these expressions became of special moment to the Department of State early in 1948. Rufus G. Smith of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs, on March 4, 1948, prepared a memorandum entitled "The Rhodes Formula," which read in part as follows:

"The 1949 armistice agreements between Israel and its four Arab neighbors were achieved pursuant to a November 1948 Security Council resolution which called on the parties to negotiate 'either directly or through the acting mediator on Palestine.'

After adoption of the resolution, Israel said that it would prefer direct negotiations but, if this was not immediately practicable, would be prepared to negotiate through UN intermediaries. Arab replies

did not deal with the procedural aspect and the meetings apparently began with no advance agreement on how they would proceed.

The account of the chief Israeli negotiator and Bunche's reports agree that the first one or two meetings were separate. According to Bunche, the first joint meeting took place on the second day. The Israeli account says that at this meeting the delegations first exchanged views through Bunche but 'it was not long before the delegations were arguing with one another directly.' Bunche's report only says that the two delegations were introduced at that first meeting and that he became chairman at their request. Thereafter, according to Bunche, there would be preliminary discussions between himself and each of the delegations separately, 'informal meetings between heads of delegations and the United Nations,' and 'joint formal meetings of the two delegations.'

Apparently, then, there were both joint meetings with Bunche in the chair and informal meetings between Bunche and each party separately. There is no indication of the frequency of each type of meeting. It is also not clear whether the substantive negotiations took place in the separate sessions, in the joint sessions, or in both. Israel would probably maintain that they took place in the joint sessions, or at least primarily in such sessions. Bunche, while referring to some Israeli descriptions of the negotiations as 'inaccurate and misleading,' has refused to expand publicly on his reports to the Security Council at the time.

Bunche's reports, however, do reflect a gradual change in terminology. By the time of the Israel–Jordan and Israel–Lebanon discussions, which began after the Israel–Egypt agreement was signed, he was talking of negotiations 'between' representatives of the parties under UN chairmanship. Also, in his summary report to the Council on all four armistice agreements, submitted after conclusion of the Israel–Syria agreement, he recommended adoption of a draft resolution referring to negotiations 'between' the parties."

The memorandum continued with a chronological account of the negotiations and their background and aftermath, which, in pertinent part, referred to Mr. Bunche's report of January 12, 13, and 25, printed on pages 649, 654, and 698, respectively; and concluded with a section entitled "An Israeli Account of the Rhodes Negotiations," which presented the views of Walter Eytan, the Chief Israeli Representative at the Rhodes negotiations, as given in his *The First Ten Years* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1958), pages 28 ff.

The Department, on March 7, 1968, informed Amman that "virtually only authoritative reports on procedures followed at Rhodes are those Bunche submitted to UNSC. . . . In any event it [is] clear that 'Rhodes formula' . . . embraced variety of methods, both formal and informal, joint and separate." (telegram 126252)

Mr. Smith's memorandum and telegram 126252 are filed under POL 27 Arab–Isr.

867N.01/4–549

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET NEW YORK, April 5, 1949.

[Subject:] Palestine Problem

Present: The Secretary
Mr. Sharett, Foreign Minister of Israel
Dean Rusk

I expressed appreciation for Mr. Sharett's visit and stated that I wanted to congratulate him upon the armistice recently concluded between Israel and Transjordan. I then expressed the hope that the negotiation of an armistice with Syria could rapidly be brought to a conclusion.

I said that I had had an opportunity to discuss with the President the matters which had been discussed between Mr. Sharett and myself in Washington, and that I now wished to discuss with Mr. Sharett the President's views on the general situation.

The President has been following the situation in the Near East with very close attention and deep personal concern.

On the question of the boundary settlement, to which attention would turn as soon as the armistice negotiations had been completed, the President wished to reaffirm his attitude which he has expressed on many occasions.

The President supports the settlement of the November 29 resolution and considers that Israel has a clear and unequivocal claim to the territories allotted to Israel in that resolution and that any changes in such territories adverse to Israel must have Israel's consent. Insofar as Israel might itself wish a rectification of the November 29 frontiers—and we can understand that some rectification will be desired—we believe that these changes must be brought about by agreement. Further, such agreement should result from negotiation and consent in the genuine meaning of those terms. The President believes that Israel must be prepared to offer territorial concessions in one part of its territory in exchange for increments of territory which it

[1] Drafted by Mr. Rusk; it is a redraft in the first person of a memorandum drafted originally in the third person, with no substantive changes. Both memoranda are filed under the same number. Secretary Acheson transmitted a copy to President Truman with his memorandum of April 7, which stated in part: "You will recall asking me to send you a copy of this memorandum so that you could use it in connection with your conversation with Dr. Weizmann when he arrives in this country." (867N.01/4–749)

The Acheson–Sharett conversation began at 11:15 a. m. on April 5 in Apartment 42–A, the Waldorf Towers (marginal notation on Mr. Acheson's memorandum of March 31, p. 886).

desires elsewhere. Actually, the President does not foresee that there should be any serious difficulty in reaching agreement on this basis.

With respect to Jerusalem, the President stands behind the concept of internationalization as set forth in the solution of the General Assembly of December 11, 1948. It is recognized that the interest of the international community is primarily in the Holy Places and in the maintenance of orderly conditions around the Holy Places. International interest is not primarily concerned with regulating the day-to-day activity of the inhabitants as such. For that reason the President believes that it should be possible to work out arrangements, perhaps under the trusteeship system, under which Israeli and Arab authorities could accept responsibilities in Jerusalem, but which recognize international interest and authority for the Holy Places.

I then stated that the most serious difficulty and the source of greatest immediate concern to the President was the question of Palestine refugees. These refugees number some 800,000. They constitute a serious political problem disturbing to the good order and well-being of the Near East. The Assembly resolution of December 11 set up the principle of repatriation. While it can be understood that repatriation of all of these refugees is not a practical solution, nevertheless we anticipate that a considerable number must be repatriated if a solution is to be found.

The President is particularly anxious that an impasse not develop on this subject, with one side refusing to negotiate for a final settlement until a solution is found for refugees, and the other side refusing to take steps to solve the refugee question until there is a final political settlement. We must avoid the argument as to which is the horse and which is the cart, because in fact the political settlement and the refugee solution are part and parcel of the same problem and both are cart and both are horse.

The President believes that now is the time for Israel to make a real contribution to a political settlement by showing that it is prepared to make a beginning on the refugee problem. The Israeli Government could state that it considers this problem a necessary part of a final political settlement, but that it is prepared to move immediately to attempt repatriation of a portion, say a fourth, of the refugees eligible for repatriation. I stated that we hoped that Israel could accept immediately the repatriation of refugees coming from areas now under Israeli occupation, but not allotted to Israel under the November 29 resolution and, in addition, a substantial number into Israel proper.

A statesmanlike move by Israel with respect to refugees would make it possible for the President to continue his strong and warm support

for Israel and efforts being made by its Government to establish its new political and economic structure on a firm basis.

In reply, Mr. Sharett stated first that he was familiar with our views on boundary questions and that he was also hopeful that an agreed solution could be reached. He stated that he realized that mutual adjustments were involved but that he did not see any insurmountable difficulty.

Regarding Jerusalem, Mr. Sharett said that he personally found the suggestions about trusteeship reasonable and worthwhile suggestions for further study, and that his own attitude was that a solution might very well be found along those lines. He stated, however, that he did not wish to exclude at this time another kind of solution which might be reached by agreement between Israel and Transjordan—an agreement which would require the imprimatur of the General Assembly and which would, of course, take into account international interest in the Holy Places. He stated that in prior discussion with Transjordan on the subject of Jerusalem they had found Abdullah insistent upon the principle of annexation rather than of internationalization.

The impression left by Mr. Sharett was that the Israeli Government had not rejected the idea of a joint trusteeship of some sort for the city of Jerusalem, but that it still had in mind the possibility of a direct agreement between Israel and Transjordan which could be agreed to internationally.

On the question of the refugees Mr. Sharett stated that he first had a question about the numbers involved. Israeli experts thought that the number of legitimate refugees was in the number of 500,000 to 550,000, but that there were many local inhabitants who described themselves as refugees in order to obtain relief.

Apart from numbers, Mr. Sharett stated that he could not agree to a distinction between territory allotted to Israel under the November 29 resolution and other territory now under Israel control. The primary reason is that security in Israel is indivisible, and he illustrated this by a detailed explanation of operations in the West Galilee area. He stated that Israel could not give up the minimum security which it had won with so much blood and expenditure by reintroducing large number of refugees into the very areas from which Israel had been seriously threatened.

Mr. Sharett then restated the Israeli position that the refugee problem can only be solved in terms of final peace settlement and that basically resettlement is the proper solution for refugees. He stated that the question arose out of war and could only be settled in a peace. He said there would never have been a refugee problem had the Arabs not initiated the war; that Israel had been willing to accept the pres-

ence of a large Arab minority within its territory, but that the situation is now completely changed and that to return refugees who had once left the country created quite a new problem. He stated that their return would disturb the homogeneity of Israeli areas; they could settle themselves in neighboring Arab states, not only to their own benefit but to the benefit of the Arab states themselves and would increase the productive capacity and capital equipment of such states.

He stated that he would report fully my remarks to his Government and, indeed, that Mr. Ben Gurion would be discussing the refugee question with the Palestine Concilliation Commission on April 7.

I then continued by stating that I thought Israel should consider the refugee question in three phases.

As a first step I thought that the Israeli Government should find a way to state that it is prepared to accept a considerable number of refugees on a repatriation basis. Since there may be some difference of opinion as to the numbers involved, it may not be possible to talk about precise figures, but some quantitative indication of what Israel could do would be an important step. Such a step would permit Mr. Ethridge and the Palestine Conciliation Commission to proceed with an orderly consideration of the entire question, would set the framework for a discussion of a political settlement and would make it easier for us to get the assistance of Congress in dealing with the later aspects of the problem.

As a second phase, I thought that, as peace discussions continued, the Israeli Government might be able to say that since discussions would be going well and there would be a prospect of a settlement, the Israeli Government could then begin actual repatriation. Initially repatriation might be to less critical areas from a security point of view and could be worked out so that it would not jeopardize the Israeli military position.

The final step would be the final political settlement which would include whatever additional contribution Israel could make in terms of repatriation.

Mr. Sharett said that he felt that the two fully understood each other's point of view and that he would report my statement fully to his Government and asked me to express his appreciation to the President for the President's interest and concern in this question.

Mr. Rusk raised with Mr. Sharett the difficulty being caused by certain administrative action by local authorities by which Israel would unnecessarily complicate and prejudice forthcoming negotiations. He cited the recent requirements that visitors to Jerusalem have civilian visas. Mr. Sharett thought that the only visas involved were those required for transit through Israel itself, but that some

question about permits may have arisen in connection with direct entry into Jerusalem from Arab-held territories. He said he would get in touch with his Government immediately and try to clarify that situation.[2]

[2] The Department sent a lengthy summary of the Acheson–Sharett conversation to Ambassador McDonald and Mr. Ethridge at Tel Aviv on April 6. The telegram noted that the Israeli Foreign Minister saw the Secretary at the latter's request. After its summary, the Department concluded as follows: "We do not feel that McDonald should associate himself with PCC in meeting with Ben Gurion, since he is not member of PCC. However, Dept desires he as Amb urgently give PriMin full account interview, stressing points made by President and Secy.

"Both McDonald and Ethridge should express to BenGurion serious concern this Govt at reports from UN Mediator of reported Israeli incursion into Syrian territory Apr. 5. Dept understands McDonald has already received direct communications from Bunche and has seen text of urgent message from Bunche to Israeli Govt Apr 5 stating that if any Israeli forces are beyond Syrian frontier he must insist this is most flagrant and dangerous violation of SC truce and that such forces must be withdrawn immediately. McDonald should state that, coming on very day when Secy has in terms of friendly interest so fully explained to Israeli FonMin President's deep concern for prompt peace in Palestine, this report if true would necessar[il]y cause most unfavorable impression here, particularly at a time when Israel membership UN on point being discussed GA." (Telegram 208, 501.BB Palestine/4–649)

The text of Mr. Bunche's message to the Israeli Government was transmitted to the Department by Beirut in telegram 177, identified also as Palun 111, April 5, 11 p. m., 501.BB Palestine/4–549.

501.BB Palestine/4–549 : Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT, April 5, 1949—1 p. m.

174. Palun 108. [From Ethridge.] During second and last joint meeting between Commission and Arab states at Beirut on April 5, representatives of Egypt, Transjordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria informed Commission their governments agreed to continuation of exchange of views at some neutral place at an early date. Iraqi representative stated his government was unable to accept and that prior to further discussion GA Resolution December 11 regarding refugees should be accepted by Israel. Iraqi representative privately stated, however, Iraq would send observer to further meetings.

Egypt, Transjordan and Syria representatives indicated Italy, Brussels, and Evian would be acceptable for meeting in that order. Lebanon preferred Evian. Saudi Arabia had no instructions. Commissioners did not discuss matter further with Arabs re Jerusalem nor among themselves. Commission plans defer decision regarding place and date pending meeting with Ben-Gurion April 7.

Arab representatives made it clear they expected Commission to present their views regarding imperative character paragraph 11 GA

Resolution December 11 and that Israel, if it desired to cooperate, might be expected now to make it possible for Arab refugees to return to their homes and to cancel other present Israeli measures re refugee land and property which are prejudicial to interests of refugees.

Commission explained it planned to visit Tel Aviv April 7 and would present Arab views regarding refugees and would ascertain Israeli attitude.[1]

Department please pass to US Mission, New York.

Sent Department 174; repeated Tel Aviv 7, Jerusalem 28, Baghdad 15, Damascus 23, Amman unnumbered, Cairo 17, Jidda unnumbered, London 3. [Ethridge.]

PINKERTON

[1] Mr. Ethridge, on April 4, had expressed his view to the Department that the Arabs had made a real concession in agreeing to go ahead with peace talks and that "If Israel would make concession now on refugees we would be on our way." (Telegram 170, identified also as Palun 107, from Beirut, 501.BB Palestine/4–499)

Editorial Note

The Second Progress Report of the Palestine Conciliation Commission was released in two parts, dated April 5 and 9. They dealt primarily with Arab and Israeli views, respectively, on the Palestine refugee question. The text of the report is printed in GA, *4th Sess.*, *Ad Hoc Political Committee*, *Annex*, volume II, page 3.

501.BB Palestine/4–549 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, April 5, 1949—3 p. m.

266. Article 8 of Israel Transjordan agreement provides for special committee which "shall have exclusive competence over such matters as may be referred to it". Questions listed for committee attention pertain mainly to Jerusalem and have direct bearing on future city.

In defending agreement before Knesset Ben-Gurion stated, according to *Palestine Post*, one of major problems in negotiations overcome when questions connected with Jerusalem left to special committee "to be settled without UN intercession". *Post* quotes Dr. Bunche as saying special committee will find means making life for people in Jerusalem easier and helping Jerusalem return to normal. Diplomatic correspondent of *Post* asserts Israel and Transjordan will negotiate directly through special committee without intervention of any third party on all questions outstanding "including those which would normally be

subject of Peace Conference and which would have been regarded as within scope of PCC". He believes establishment of special committee has seriously weakened position PCC.

Israel has long shown desire settle problem Jerusalem directly with Transjordan without "interference of third party" and Consul[ate] General has consistently maintained UN must be considered interested party in any agreement re Jerusalem. Creation this committee with apparent approval acting mediator furnishes Israel and Transjordan convenient means settling question concerning Jerusalem by mutual agreement and without taking into account UN interest in city. Difficult to perceive how functions assigned committee will not make more difficult carrying out provisions GA Resolution December 11 re internationalization.

BURDETT

501.MA Palestine/4–549 : Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT, April 5, 1949—4 p. m.

175. Palun 109. [From Ethridge.] On April 4 Eytan, Director General Israeli Foreign Office replied to PCC letter referred to in Legtel 160 March 31 [1] and stated:

Ben Gurion directs me to confirm it is intention of Government of Israel to accommodate certain of its departments in Jerusalem and government after careful study of question finds itself unable accept view this step is incompatible with Article 8 of GA resolution December 11. There is in considered opinion of government's advisers nothing in this article nor in any other article of GA resolution December 11 that could be interpreted as forbidding Government of Israel to establish any of its departments in Jerusalem.

Pending final determination of future of Jerusalem Government of Israel deems itself entitled to use accommodation available there as matter of administrative convenience.

Eytan then expressed Government of Israel's regret PCC in April 1 press release in Beirut "should have publicly criticized" government's conduct before reply could be made to PCC letter.

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[1] Identified also as Palun 102, not printed; it advised of a letter from the Palestine Conciliation Commission to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, which, in citing press reports on the transfer of Israeli ministries to Jerusalem, stated that if the reports were confirmed the "PCC would be obliged to call attention of Israeli Government to incompatibility of such measure with paragraph 8 of GA resolution December 11." The letter requested the assurance of the Prime Minister that it was not the intention of the Israeli Government to transfer the ministries to Jerusalem. (501.BB Palestine/3–3149)

Eytan concluded by confirming PCC appointment April 7 with Ben Gurion who was looking forward to exchange of views with PCC on present situation and on plans for future.

PCC decided April 5 to take two steps: (1) To write Eytan that PCC press release had not criticized government but had stated content PCC letter which expressed PCC opinion that if it were true Israel planned transfer Ministries to Jerusalem PCC considered it incompatible with GA resolution December 11; and (2) to discuss matter with Ben Gurion April 7.

PCC remains of opinion transfer of Ministries to Jerusalem is incompatible with GA resolution December 11. It is matter of Israel intent. Theory expressed in Eytan's letter that resolution is silent would presumably make it possible for Israel to announce Jerusalem as capital of Israel with impunity.

Boisanger believes US and France should discuss with Sharett in Washington. We agreed report matter to Department and suggested French representative Washington consult Department regarding desirable action.

Repeated Jerusalem 39, Tel Aviv 8, Amman unnumbered. [Ethridge.]

PINKERTON

867N.48/4–549 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 5, 1949—6 p. m.

1176. For McGhee from Satterthwaite. In general discussion with Secy Apr 2 re NEA area, FonMin Bevin [2] emphasized desirability holding Arabs "in line" and expressed view US and UK shld adopt common line for development potential resources needed for our defense. He stated that after Palestine question settled, he hoped concentrate on several major development projects, particularly Lake Victoria and Lake Tana water schemes and Euphrates. Latter he considered offers possibility establishing under good living conditions population of five to six million capable withstanding Soviet pressure.

Bevin further stated Arab refugee problem being studied. He said 40,000 could be resettled on Jordan slopes and that he was putting pressure on Syrian Govt for resettlement 200,000–300,000 Northern Syria. He hoped Transjordan could absorb remainder.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Jerusalem as No. 187 and for Mr. Ethridge as Unpal 74.

[2] Mr. Bevin was in the United States to attend the Second Part of the Third Session of the General Assembly, which began in New York on April 5.

Re general area he favors vigorous econ development drive by West, since development important for capital goods market and for food production.

Secy replied that President is greatly interest ME development as complement to Western European recovery, is extremely interested in Euphrates project, and desires concentrate on development problems rather than diffuse our energies. Secy further stated our desire proceed on internatl front and belief IBRD appropriate org for development Point IV program. [Satterthwaite.]

ACHESON

867N.20A/3–2949

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, April 6, 1949.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: During the course of a call which he paid upon the Secretary of State on March 22, the Foreign Minister of Israel, Mr. Moshe Sharett, stated that the Israeli Government was very much interested in obtaining American technical assistance for the organization and training of the Israeli Army. He said that his Government would like to offer positions as advisers to a limited number of retired United States Army officers, or Reserve officers on inactive status, who were skilled in the various branches of military organization. Mr. Sharett added that the purpose of his request was not to prepare the Israeli Army for offensive operations but to reorganize it in the most efficient manner possible to permit the reduction of the number of men now under arms.

Mr. Sharett was told that the Department would be glad to discuss his request with your office and to give it sympathetic consideration. It was also explained that in the absence of permanent legislation, it would be impossible to comply with his request on the basis of a military mission.

The Department would appreciate receiving your opinion as to whether the procedure suggested by Mr. Sharett is permissible under the law and regulations and agreeable to the National Military Establishment. It appears that it would be desirable and in the national interest to permit competent retired or reserve officers, having the confidence of the National Military Establishment, to assist the Israeli authorities in the basic organization of their army.

It appears also, however, that while we should, if possible, give agreement in principle to Mr. Sharett's request, it would be advisable to postpone the granting of permission to individual officers until such time as the armistice negotiations between Israel and the Syrian Gov-

ernments have been successfully completed, or at least until we are satisfied that the likelihood of a renewal of hostilities in Palestine has passed.

Sincerely yours, JAMES E. WEBB

501.MA Palestine/4–649

The President to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, April 6, 1949.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In accordance with Section 1 of the Joint Resolution providing for the authorization of a special contribution by the United States for the relief of Palestine refugees (Public Law 25, 81st Congress, approved March 24, 1949), I have today allocated $8,000,000 to the Department of State from funds advanced by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation under the provisions of Section 2 of the aforementioned Act, which advance has been deposited with the Treasury of the United States, and established under Appropriation Symbol No. 119/00043.

These funds are to be used by the Department of State as a special contribution to the United Nations for the purposes set forth in the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations of November 19, 1948, providing for the relief of Palestine refugees.

Sincerely yours, HARRY S. TRUMAN

501.BB Palestine/4–849: Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET TEL AVIV, April 8, 1949—noon.

268. ReDeptel 208, April 6.[1] Ethridge arrived Tel Aviv April 7 in time study Dept instructions before PCC Conference with Prime Minister. After receiving brief report from Ethridge of PCC talk with B[en-] G[urion] and Foreign Office staff I saw Prime Minister. My exchange with Prime Minister followed closely Dept's argument and complemented and reinforced presentation BG PCC.

1. Prime Minister said he had not heard of "alleged Israel violation of Syrian frontier" until morning April 7; charges might be true and if confirmed troops would be ordered back at once and commander punished. Prime Minister insisted Israel concerned only to have Syrians return their side international frontier. Hour later Shiloah (in course long explanation at residence with staff re Israel–Transjordan armistice agreement and related matters being reported airgram fully) said positively that Israeli troops already withdrawn.

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[1] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 894.

2. On question Israeli's frontiers, Prime Minister's attitude identical with that of Sharett reported Deptel 208.

3. Re Jerusalem Prime Minister said President Truman's view (Deptel 208) was encouraging and that he hoped Israel and Transjordan could reach agreement on administration of city and internationalization of holy places. Israel prepared if necessary challenge PCC's Jerusalem recommendations before GA.

4. Re refugees, Prime Minister repeated Sharett's arguments (Deptel 208) and insisted any repatriation program must be "integral part peace settlement. It must not precede nor follow peace". Israel's contribution to repatriation and resettlement must wait until Arabs no longer threaten resumption war because returning refugees now might welcome invaders. He argued GA December 11 resolve impliedly accepted this thesis and he insisted that Israel's answer on this point was unshakable.

In reply my argument that American and world public opinion was increasingly critical of Israel's position and that it should in own interest accept Dept's program of gradualism, Prime Minister replied: "I am fully aware public criticism but Israel too small make promises it cannot or does not intend to carry out. Israel right self-protection is paramount. Govt must insist irrespective criticism right defend country's existence. Not fair ask it jeopardize safety by repatriation now".

Comment: At present I see no prospect softening Israel's position refugees. Attitude Jerusalem and frontiers more promising. Hence it is fortunate PCC is pressing plans European conference. I hope Dept decides call regional conference heads of American missions (Embtel 259. April 3)[2] before Ethridge who strongly supports plan leaves this area.

McDONALD

[2] Not printed; in this message, for the attention of Mr. Satterthwaite, Ambassador McDonald suggested the "possibility regional conference preferably Rhodes while Bunche still there, of heads Missions Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Amman, Tel Aviv, Jidda, Cairo and possibly Yemen. Attendance Ethridge also obvious advantage him and us, and your or Hare's presence as chairman would be most useful." (501.BB Palestine/4–349)

501.BB Palestine/4–849 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, April 8, 1949—1 p. m.

272. In Old City yesterday encountered extreme bitterness and resentment among Palestine Arabs over signature Israel Transjordan armistice. Particularly angered over provisions in Article 6 for turning over to Jews area in triangle containing 16 villages and reportedly 35,000 inhabitants. Asserted villagers defended homes during entire period of conflict and saw no justification for surrender their lands.

Villagers reportedly begging Iraqis to stay and delegation sent Baghdad to plead case. Arabs scoffed at clause permitting villagers remain and stating Jews would not enter villages. Stated essential work surrounding lands to survive and many persons from Tulkarm and Qualqiliya also depend on lands to be given Jews. Pointed to fate villagers left in Faluja area when Egyptians withdrew alleging were terrorized by Jews and forced by physical violence to leave. Anticipated great majority Arabs in area would become refugees.

Open criticism of Transjordan and King Abdullah voiced. Stated in desire conclude immediate peace and obtain title to Arab areas in Pakistan [*Palestine*], King paid no heed to wishes or rights Palestine Arabs. Denied persons signing treaty had right to speak for Palestine Arabs or dispose their territory. US and UK assigned share of blame since failed give Abdullah concrete assurances assistance in event Jewish attack.

Abdullah Tel, Governor Old City, confirmed above feeling Palestine Arabs. Stated as adviser to King had warned him that cession territory in triangle most unwise politically and "would shake kingdom Transjordan". He refused associate himself officially with negotiations despite anger of King although did conduct Jewish officials to Shuneh. Stated that alleged compensation to Transjordan in Hebron area mere fiction since territory of no value and contained no "name" villages. Tel stated from military point of view could sympathize with demands Jews for improvement of lines in triangle. He urged they compensate by giving back villages in Ramle Ludda area (not towns) or Beitjibrin sector. This would enable King to show people concrete *quid pro quo* and offset adverse political reaction. Jews as usual refused to give anything not even village of Dawayima although this discussed for three hours.

Re Jerusalem Abdullah Tel maintained not intention Arabs exclude UN from Jerusalem discussions (Contel 266, April 5) through creation special committee. Said this undoubtedly desire of Jews but Arabs wished and realized needed assistance UN and PCC in Jerusalem settlement. Claimed would not accede to any further demands Jews in Jerusalem and was now time for Jews give something.

Re Syrian coup,[1] Abdullah Tel, who recently proceeded Damascus as emissary King Abdullah, stated revolt entirely internal against associates President Quwwatly who completely corrupt. Stated group surrounding President of Lebanon of same ilk and should watch step or might suffer similar fate. Asserted Iraq and Transjordan both supporting Zaim.

[1] The reference is to the coup by Col. Husni Zaim which overthrew the Government of Syria on March 30; see Secretary Acheson's memorandum of April 25 to President Truman, p. 1630.

From above conversations appears that Israel obtained its demands at cost further bitterness among Arab people and that in acquiescing King Abdullah also incurred public resentment. Only by risking strong popular opposition and possible upheavals can Arab leaders, regardless own wishes, agree to further Jewish demands without receiving real concessions in return. To obtain permanent peace treaties and even temporary stability in area essential find formula for forcing Israel to make concessions in accord with US policy as set forth by Jessup in speech November 20 and to comply with GA resolution December 11.

Sent Department 272, repeated Baghdad 22, Beirut 56, Damascus 19, Amman 21. Pouched Cairo, Jidda.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/4–949 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL JERUSALEM, April 9, 1949—10 a. m.

274. Palun 115. [From Ethridge.] On April 7, PCC had 2½ hour meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and his aides. Discussion revolved around (1) general and specific instructions contained in GA resolution December 11; (2) Beirut meeting with Arab states; (3) date and place of further meeting between Arab states, Israel and PCC.

Discussion revealed, in general, that (1) Prime Minister was willing to send Israeli representatives to some neutral place such as Switzerland or Italy where Arab representatives would also be present for talks either separately or jointly and either through PCC or directly beginning April 26. Prime Minister would consult his government and give definite answer before April 12; (2) Prime Minister was unable to make any commitment regarding refugees prior to peace settlement during which question would be discussed and toward solution of which Israel would contribute what it could; (3) Prime Minister was unable to accept principle of internationalization of Jerusalem area as envisaged in paragraph 8 GA resolution December 11 and intended to argue case before GA in September. International supervision of holy places was acceptable.

Yalcin as PCC chairman opened discussion emphasizing PCC task under general instructions regarding conciliation and specific instructions regarding Jerusalem and refugees. Before Beirut meeting Arabs had wished to make talks with Israel contingent on prior solution for refugee question. At Beirut PCC had been able to persuade Arabs to continue talks at early date at neutral place without advance commitment regarding refugees. PCC had already requested Israel for conciliatory statement on refugees without result. Would Israel now be

willing to accept principle of repatriation, resettlement and rehabilitation as stated in paragraph 11, GA resolution December 11?

Ben-Gurion replied it was not within Israel's competence to change GA instructions regarding Jerusalem and refugees. Instructions were matter entirely between GA and PCC. When GA considered PCC reports, Israel would be "on equal footing" to argue its case.

Ben-Gurion pointed out that paragraph 11, GA resolution December 11 specifically stated "refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors". Ben-Gurion emphasized Arab states made war on Israel and that Palestine Arabs were invited by Arab states to fight Israel. Peace has not yet been achieved and it was not yet clear Arabs wished to live at peace. Israel was willing to contribute to solution of refugee problem. Such action would be in interest of justice and self-interest of Israel. It would depend, however on whether peaceful relations were established between Israel and Arab states.

Ben-Gurion continued GA decision on November 29 to internationalize Jerusalem was based on reasons no longer valid. UN had failed to protect Jerusalem in May, 1948. Destruction in Jerusalem had been caused by Arab states which defied UN. One hundred thousand Jews had been imperiled. Israel objects to decision of December 11 regarding internationalization and wishes to argue case before GA in September. Although PCC is bound by paragraph 8, GA resolution December 11, Israel does not accept. However, Israel accepts international supervision of holy places. Israel bases its attitude on (1) presence 100,000 Jews in Jerusalem and (2) significance of Jerusalem as capital city since David. Jerusalem is to Jews what Rome and Paris are to Italians and French respectively.

Yalcin replied regarding refugees it was not question between victor and vanquished but one of human rights. If Arab states were wrong they might be punished but not Arab people. Israel has always had world sympathy which has assisted Jews in reaching promised land. If Israel denies Arab rights, world opinion would be alienated. Israel should not, like Hitler, use methods incompatible with standards western civilization.

Ben-Gurion answered that Israel had been faithful to moral principles and reiterated Israel would make its contribution but that it depended on Arab states at time of peace settlement. Ben-Gurion emphatically denied Israel expelled any Arabs from Israeli territory and, with considerable emotion, stated creation of refugee problem was organized plan by Arab states or British or both. Mandatory power should be brought before some world court or morals [*sic*]. Even now propaganda campaign magnifying refugee problem from 500,000 to

800,000 was being waged by those who had instigated Arab war against Israel. Ben-Gurion contended resettlement of Arabs in Arab states would be more humane than in Israel. Repatriation and resettlement would be discussed at peace settlement at which time Israel would not forget humanitarian side of question.

Ethridge outlined development of Arab thinking during PCC tour of Near Eastern capitals and at Beirut during which PCC had emphasized unrealistic character of Arab position of refugees and necessity of considering question within framework of peace settlement. Arabs had made great concession by agreeing. Intermediate steps were now required. Refugee question was key to solution whole Palestine problem. Israel held key. Israel might now make conciliatory gesture which would be appreciated by Arab states and world. US government and people were concerned regarding refugees. Ethridge suggested Israel might take action regarding such subjects as continued flight of refugees from Israel as reported by representatives of refugee groups, deterioration Arab orange groves, blocking of Arab accounts and similar matters. Such action might mitigate problem. At same time PCC could help by investigating refugees on relief roles and determining whether nomads and others were unjustifiably obtaining relief.

Ben-Gurion replied any Israelis expelling Arabs would be punished. Any cases brought to Israeli attention by PCC would be investigated. On subject world opinion regarding refugees Ben-Gurion stated Israel was small and serious situation would arise if world opinion turned against Israel. Self-preservation, however, was more important. If refugee problem was considered before peace settlement and Arabs were repatriated Israel might be attacked; consequently Israel could not undertake any program before such settlement. Israel feared Arab states and not Arabs but, pending peace with Arab states, Arabs readmitted to Israel might become Arab Army. Ben-Gurion appreciated importance of contradicting PCC which represented great individual states and UN but it was question Israeli self-preservation.[1]

Sent Department repeated Tel Aviv 29. [Ethridge.]

BURDETT

[1] Consul Burdett, on April 9, reported that "PCC this morning discussed Jerusalem question in light of Ben Gurion statement yesterday (re Palun 115). French delegate maintained that PCC should regard this as rejection GA resolution of December 11 and unacceptable to PCC. For this reason his delegate would not participate in further discussions this subject with Comay. PCC would proceed to draft detailed proposals in light its interpretation GA resolution. Ethridge argued that PCC should not present proposals to GA without having explored fully with parties concerned possible areas [of] agreement. Israel should not be in position to argue that proposals unacceptable because of lack consultation. Regardless position PCC he wanted Halderman consult with Comay. PCC agreed Halderman should do this and make results available for further work on detailed proposals." (Telegram 276, also identified as Palun 117, from Jerusalem, 501.BB Palestine/4–949)

501.BB Palestine/4–949 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL JERUSALEM, April 9, 1949—2 p. m.

278. Palun 119. Commission decided this morning to open further talks at Lausanne on April 26 providing adequate communication facilities available. Official decision will be taken April 12. USDel favored Rhodes but received no support from Jews, Arabs or colleagues in that viewpoint. Ethridge argued against commission leaving this part of the world and insisted upon inserting in summary record statement that it was mistake. Even those Arabs who had at first supported Rhodes withdrew support when Syrian coup came about. Arab press and radio are referring to Rhodes as island of shame. Jews flatly said they did not want to go there.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/4–1149

Mr. Mark F. Ethridge to the President

SECRET JERUSALEM, April 11, 1949.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: [Here follows one paragraph of personal observations.]

This is by far the toughest assignment you have ever given to me. The Arabs are shocked and stupefied by their defeat and have great bitterness toward the UN and the United States. The Jews are too close to the blood of their war and their narrow escape, as they regard it, from extinction, and too close to the bitterness of their fight against the British mandate to exercise any degree of statesmanship yet. They still feel too strongly that their security lies in military might instead of in good relations with their neighbors. That is fantastic, of course, for so small a country and I have tried to point out to them that by not making peace quickly they are endangering their own security by stimulating Arab irridentism, and the security of America and the Western World. In other words, the absence of peace plays into Russia's hands.

The Arabs have made what the Commission considers very great concessions; the Jews have made none so far. I appreciate greatly the help you have given along that line and will of course be grateful if you will keep the pressure up.

I am convinced that there is no sound solution to the refugee problem—that is, no solution that will not continue dangerous political agitation—short of the application of Point 4 of your inaugural message to the Middle East. I have been working with George McGhee, who was in charge for the State Department of the imple-

mentation of the Truman Doctrine. He was, as you know, sent out by the Department to look into the refugee situation. He and I are agreed on what we consider a sound approach. He returns to the United States next week and I have asked Mr. Acheson if he will not seek an appointment for him with you.

Again, thank you very much for your many evidences of kindness and confidence.

Sincerely yours, MARK ETHRIDGE

867N.48/4–2149

Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared Presumably by the First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Jones)[1]

SECRET [LONDON,] April 13, 1949.

Subject: Meeting re Arab Refugees

Participants: Mr. Michael R. Wright (Chairman), Asst Under-Secretary of State, British Foreign Office
Mr. E. A. Berthoud, Foreign Office
Mr. B. Boothby, Foreign Office
Sir John Troutbeck (B.M.E.O., Cairo)
Mr. Norman Young (British Treasury)
Mr. J. Beith (Foreign Office)
Mr. A. G. Maitland (Foreign Office)
Miss C. Waterlow (Foreign Office)
Mr. J. J. McCloy (President, International Bank)
Mr. G. C. McGhee (Department of State)
Mr. G. Lewis Jones (American Embassy, London)

The persons named above met in the Ambassadors' Waiting Room of the British Foreign Office on April 13.

Mr. Wright opened the meeting by saying that it was strictly informal and that just as he understood that everything said on the American side was subject to confirmation, so, too, everything said on the British side would have to be taken up with Mr. Bevin and was subject to his approval.

Wright said that Foreign Office information is that the total of refugees is now closer to 900,000 than to 800,000, and that we are all faced with the problem that present relief efforts will end next fall (December at the latest). He said that the UK is anxious to pass from the stage of relief to the stage of resettlement. The UK has

[1] Transmitted to the Department by London in despatch 702, April 21. The despatch noted that Mr. McGhee participated "in a series of conversations" regarding the Arab refugee problem and that the memorandum printed here recorded the most important of these conversations.

in mind a number of long-range plans for the social and economic betterment of the Middle East. He thought the necessity for these being implemented as quickly as possible is emphasized by the recent loss to the West of China. He said that the Middle Eastern countries have many problems not very different from those of China and that it would be tragic if for lack of attention from the US and the UK these countries should go the way of China.

An outstanding source of discord and infection in the Middle East, Wright said, is the presence of the 900,000 Arab refugees, who have an "unsettling" effect wherever they are located. The UK would like to marry its development plans with plans for the resettlement of the refugees.

Wright said that he would be frank: the UK is very "distressed" at the possibility that all aid to the refugees should be through United Nations channels. He did not think that the UN is a particularly efficient body for such work, and the UN approach might permit the USSR to obtain a foothold in the Middle East through participation in UN organizations. Also, in whatever form financial help was given, the major contribution would have to come from the UK and the US. Wright said that the UK fully realized, however, that the US has special problems and that in order to satisfy Congress US aid might have to take place under a UN or a PCC umbrella.

Wright said the Foreign Office has carefully examined all of the developments projects in the area and has selected three short-range schemes which they feel could be put into effect very quickly. "In order to show the way", the UK is unilaterally making a ten-year £1 million loan without interest to the TJ Government for a very simple scheme which would involve resettlement within the next year or two of between 40 and 60 thousand refugees.

The second plan favored by the Foreign Office is the Jordan Canal Plan which would cost £8 million for works and £8 for land purchase, and which would involve agreement between Israel and TJ. In four or five years the Jordan Canal Plan, it is estimated, could resettle more than 100,000 refugees.

The third plan which attracted the Foreign Office was the Gezira Scheme in Syria which, within a few years, could take care of another 100,000 refugees.

The potentialities of Iraq are great, but the works there are larger and more costly than those he had mentioned. Estimates show, however, that within six to ten years it might be possible to settle 200,000 refugees in Iraq.

Wright said that very germane to the refugee problem generally is whether Israel will permit a number of Arab refugees to return to their homes. He said UK policy is that Israel should either take the

refugees back or compensate them, but the UK realized that the chances of Israel following either course are extremely poor. How poor will depend upon the pressure which the US Government is prepared to exercise on Israel in this connection.

Wright said that the £1 million interest-free loan to Transjordan was a firm proposition. However, because of the financial position in which it finds itself, the UK will have to consider its financial participation in wider schemes very carefully.

Wright then asked for the views of Mr. McGhee.

McGhee said that the US is anxious to see the refugee problem settled and is willing to "do its part" in such a settlement. However, the US wished to avoid unilateral responsibility in this matter, and this would indicate the necessity for a UN or PCC facade.

McGhee said that he had just toured the various Arab States, had seen the refugees, and had seen the areas where they might at some future time be resettled. He had discussed the question exhaustively with Mr. Ethridge of the PCC and with a large number of officials working in the area. This had led him to adopt certain basic assumptions in working out the slow process of resettlement:

(1) Number of refugees is about 700,000;

(2) Repatriation of a certain number of refugees to Israel (he had in mind 200,000) is of the utmost importance, because such a gesture by Israel would go far to alter the attitudes of the Arab States who now flatly refuse to discuss the refugee question.

(3) Transjordan, Syria and Iraq, in that order, offer the best opportunities for refugee resettlement; only token contributions could be expected from Lebanon and Egypt.

(4) Resettlement of refugees *is* the Middle Eastern development program.

(5) Re financial aspects it must be recognized that Point Four will be of use only for technical assistance; that in addition to foreign exchange, any program will require providing the local government with local currency; and that Arab States themselves can not be relied upon to make sacrifices to help with a problem not of their making.

(6) Best approach to Arab Govts would be to stress the development aspect for their benefit and *not* to stress the refugee aspect. Nevertheless, the rise in the standard of living in each Arab country will be the index of its ability to absorb refugees. By the same token, so far as the US is concerned, emphasis on development may be a kind of Pandora's Box which might lead to a flood of demands from South American and other countries for extensive development programs.

(7) Before the US can make any moves with regard to development and resettlement in the Arab countries, the US *must* have reasonable assurances that the Administration will have funds available for this purpose. To proceed without such assurances would be to risk letting the Arabs down and lowering US prestige disastrously.

(8) The number of private and UN agencies involved in the refugee problem now and potentially are such that planning on an area basis

will be necessary in order to assure proper priorities between the various projects.

Mr. Wright then asked Mr. McCloy to speak.

McCloy said that the International Bank does not deal in relief matters; its sources of supply would immediately dry up if it tried to do so. The Bank must have reasonable prospects for repayment and "it takes a good deal of imagination to see such prospects in the Middle East."

One idea which had occurred to McCloy was exploring, as a possible factor which might tip the scales in favor of certain projects in the Middle East, the idea of a consortium of countries which would underwrite the Bank's loan. He suggested possibly the UK, US, and France. He admited that there is no precedent for this in the US, but he did not think guaranteeing such a loan without appropriating funds would be improper for Congress if it chose to do so.

McCloy explained that the UN does not interfere with the Bank's business.

McCloy said that one factor inherent in Middle Eastern countries is that large scale foreign investment would almost inevitably have such an inflationary effect that it would frustrate the investment itself.

McCloy took up McGhee's idea of planning on an area basis and said that he hoped that this planning group would not produce another report. The World had too many such reports and he understood that another one from the Middle East is "on the fire" in the UN Secretariat. It was his thought that it was much better to build one small dam at a time rather than to embark on a grandiose five-year plan for the entire area.

Mr. Norman Young said that there was no sense in the UK loaning sterling to Iraq for local expenses when Iraq has large sterling sums at its disposal in London. He pointed out that on account of the British balance of payments position it would be extremely difficult for the UK to make further loans to the Middle East involving the provision of capital equipment goods on credit. The Treasury was, moreover, opposed in principle to lending for conversion into local currency since it was considered that this must inevitably result in inflation.

Sir John Troutbeck suggested that it might be possible to use the very large oil royalties now being accrued by the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms for regional development, since very little scope for such development exists within the Sheikhdoms themselves.

McGhee then discussed attached "working paper" in detail.

At the end of McGhee's remarks, the Chairman said that he found the idea of using PCC as the UN facade very attractive. It had the advantage of being a going concern, to which UN has already given

broad responsibilities. He said that Mr. Bevin is extremely interested in the development of the Middle East and in the refugee problem and that, consequently, the Foreign Office would like to go over McGhee's working paper with Mr. Bevin. He was glad to note from a remark made earlier by McGhee that the US looked with favor upon the £1 million UK Pilot Project in Transjordan.

McCloy said that he did not like the idea of another special survey of Palestine. He said there are a number of active expert groups connected with the UN, including FAO, WHO, etc., who have funds and experts. He thought these agencies might be called upon to supply any technical advice required and that to his mind, in view of the work which has already been done on various ME projects, "a couple of engineers" would be enough.

Wright said the McGhee's idea was "selection" rather than "survey". He suggested that it amounted to a "small PCC working group".

Sir John Troutbeck said that he felt that there was a vital need for statistical information regarding all phases of the refugees. McGhee said this was a problem which he felt should be tackled at once and suggested that if the Foreign Office could name a suitable individual (such as Mr. Mills of the Colonial Office) he felt quite sure that the PCC would welcome an opportunity to avail itself of his services. He was going to look into the possibility of a similar expert being supplied from Washington.

The meeting ended with an expression of appreciation to McGhee for his lucid exposition of the problem. Wright said the Foreign Office would keep in touch with McGhee through the British Embassy in Washington and through Lewis Jones.[2]

[Here follows an account of the further telephone conversation between Mr. Jones and John Beith of the Eastern Department later the same day.]

[2] Attached to this memorandum was an undated working paper entitled "Proposed Plan of Action"; for the version of April 27, see p. 939.

501.BB Palestine/4–949 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 13, 1949—11 a. m.

195. Unpal 76. [For Ethridge.] Re Palun 103, Mar 31[1] and 117, Apr. 9,[2] you are authorized discuss with other members PCC possibility expressing internl responsibility and concern for Holy Places in

[1] Identified also as telegram 161 from Beirut, not printed.
[2] Identified also as telegram 276 from Jerusalem, not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 904.

Jerusalem by means of Arab and Israeli trusteeships along lines outlined by Secy to Sharett as reported 2nd para Deptel 208, Apr. 6 to Tel Aviv.[3]

We have impression from Palun 117 that Fr position is unrealistic and that we must seek achieve minimum of internationalization of Jerusalem which will be possible of acceptance by both sides rather than to perfect intricate and logical plan which will have no basis in reality. You are authorized in conversation with Israeli officials to indicate that Sharett told Secy he personally found suggestions for trusteeship reasonable and worth further study, although he did not exclude possibility solution by direct agreement between Israel and Transjordan.

ACHESON

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 894; the second paragraph of the telegram is virtually a direct quotation of the sixth paragraph of Secretary Acheson's memorandum of conversation of April 5, p. 890.

501.BB Palestine/4–1349 : Telegram

Mr. Mark F. Ethridge to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, April 13, 1949—1 p. m.

291. Palun 126. For the Secretary from Ethridge. Two days after Commission's talk with Ben-Gurion last week Lipschitz, one of three Israeli members of Jerusalem Committee set up in Foreign Office, called me and urgently asked to see me. Obvious his primary purpose was to arrange meetings here for Comay who seems to be second man at Foreign Office during Sharett's absence. Comay came to Jerusalem and talked with Halderman and Yenissey, Turkish member of Jerusalem Committee. Afterwards he had three-hour talk with me, during course of which he disclosed Israel's position on almost all matters under PCC consideration. Following is summary of Israeli views on primary questions:

Jerusalem: Comay said that Ben-Gurion had been angered by Yalcin's observation that Commission was bound by its terms of reference and question of full internationalization was not therefore debatable. Ben-Gurion had reacted more strongly than had been intended and had therefore over-stated Israel's position. Intent of Ben-Gurion's statement was that if Commission felt bound to propose full international regime in letter and spirit of resolution, Israel would be compelled to oppose in GA. It was not Ben-Gurion's intention to deny possibility of acceptable solution within resolution. He desired to correct PCC report which was sent to Lake Success and would write the Commission letter correcting impression left upon Commission.

Comay's main point was that Commission should strive to achieve plan acceptable to parties concerned, namely Israel, Transjordan (or other adjacent state) and UN. If Committee were to proceed without reference to states immediately concerned, product of its work would probably be unacceptable and would not contribute to solution of problem. He considered it possible to achieve plan which would be acceptable to all concerned. He was convinced that UN would accept plan containing more limited form of internationalization than might have been contemplated when resolution was adopted last December, provided plan were acceptable to parties concerned. Ben-Gurion, basis of his own extensive experience with UN here is convinced that GA would not only accept such plan, but would be extremely pleased to achieve settlement of problem.

Comay advised "month of masterly inactivity" while Transjordan and Israel try to work out through special committee agreement on Jerusalem. He thought there would be no difficulty about Jewish-Arab lines in Jerusalem since Israel would be willing to compensate for Arab expropriated property inside city. What Israel had proposed to Transjordan, in informal talks that seem to be going on now, is division of city into three zones: Jewish, Arab and international (Old City). Dayan told me later that Transjordan had shown reluctance to discuss any matters other than these strictly within armistice terms although Transjordan had previously evidenced willingness to effect opening of Bethlehem and Scopus roads and to deal with other technical matters preliminary to any peace settlement.

Comment: Ben-Gurion's strong reaction in which he virtually announced that Jerusalem would be capital of Israel did in fact create strong reaction in Commission. As reported previously, French and Turkish delegates refused to allow their members of Jerusalem Committee to meet formally with Comay for further explanations of Israeli position. For USDel I said that whether other members met or not I would instruct Halderman to do so and to explore with both sides and all parties concerned fullest possible area of agreement. Commission finally agreed that Halderman should represent Jerusalem Committee in talks with Comay and convey information to Commission. I told Comay that I did not of course consider that he had so far helped us toward a solution and I hoped he would continue his talks with Halderman and give us his full views. He promised to do so "a little later". I am sure what he has in mind is trying to work out a deal with Transjordan and present the Commission with written agreement, achieved perhaps in manner of Tulkarm agreement. Nevertheless, I am willing to consider any agreement that can be made between them although I am afraid it will give my French colleague apoplexy.

Comay has so far not even discussed anything substantive on Jerusalem. It is obvious from French plan previously reported that French will press for full internationalization including international force, special courts, distinct citizenship and special currency for Jerusalem. I consider that impossible and fantastic. I am afraid, however, that Turks will swallow it and that we may come to situation where there will be two reports to GA although I will do all I can to prevent it. Turkish attitude is not based so much upon any consuming passion for protection of holy places as upon distinct pro-Arab bias and upon, I fear, growing desire to put Israel in defensive position whenever possible perhaps a personal reaction to Israel's refusal to give at any point. My own position, I feel, accords with Department's and with my Contel 192, March 7.

It occurs to me Ankara may be giving Yalcin and Yenissey fairly free hand in this stage PCC work and that their reaction is largely personal. Yalcin, for example has consistently opposed Rhodes as meeting place and maneuvered for Geneva whereas Sarper, according to NY tel 450, April 3 [1] did not think Turkey would object to Rhodes. PCC work on Jerusalem, refugees and other matters might proceed more smoothly if Department were able to instruct our Embassy Ankara to keep Turkish Government regularly informed of developments and to suggest importance of cooperation within PCC. French, although better informed re Palestine than Turks and having understandably more rigid position re Jerusalem may also have personal bias; consequently French understanding of US position might be improved through their Embassy. Washington views such as those reported Amman telegram 85, April 11 [2] are case in point.

Refugees: Comay's position on refugees was pretty much as has been reported with few additions. He said that at low point there were about 70,000 Arabs in Israel-held territory but number has increased to about 130,000 through infiltration and through taking over of new territory, such as Tulkarm and in Beersheba area. Israel did not feel, therefore, that it could take many more. He asked if Commission had any figure in mind. I told him Commission had not discussed figure because it stuck to principle of resolution but that my own feeling was that since Israel had once accepted state with 400,000 Arabs in it she should be prepared to take back at least 250,000 refugees and compensate others. He said it was completely impossible, that Israel was deterred at moment from reducing her immigration quota of Jews only by sentiment and political dynamite. On any practical basis, he

[1] Not printed. Selim Sarper was Turkish Representative at the United Nations.
[2] This was a repeat to Jerusalem of Amman's telegram 160 to the Department, not printed.

added, immigration would certainly have to be cut because adequate employment, housing and services were not being provided for those who are coming in and Israel could not possibly double her burden in next two years. Later in conversation he said that it was probable that total number of Arabs in Israeli territory might reach 200,000 eventually through infiltration and "our taking a token number". Aside from economic burden, Israel determined not to have any fifth column inside its lines particularly if faced by stronger Arab state backed by major power.

Comment: It is obvious that Israel has not changed position on refugee problem whatever. Israeli Cabinet yesterday considered memorandum of suggestions from Commission as to steps that might be taken now to mitigate plight of refugees and also proposal of statement by Ben-Gurion clarifying Israeli position and mollifying Arab sentiment. No word has come from that meeting. Israel does not intend to take back one refugee more than she is forced to take and she does not intend to compensate any directly if she can avoid it. Ben-Gurion and Comay have both argued that refugees are inevitable result of war and no state in modern history has been expected to repatriate them. Both cite Baltic states and Turkey. They contend also that number greatly exaggerated and they can prove it. Israel refuses to accept any responsibility whatever for creation of refugees. I flatly told Ben-Gurion and Comay that while Commission was no tribunal to judge truth of contentions, I could not for moment accept that statement in face of Jaffa, Deir Yassein, Haifa and all reports that come to us from refugee organizations that new refugees are being created every day by repression and terrorism such as now being reported from Haifa. I have repeatedly pointed out political weakness and brutality of their position on refugees but it has made little impression. They are aware that world sentiment is being roused to some extent by plight of Arab refugees but they contend they are being subject to calumnies and vicious propaganda. I have answered that they are master propagandists of world and that if Arabs had tenth the genius at it they would rouse public opinion to where it would engulf Israel in wave of indignation, particularly in view of fact that world has so greatly helped Israel to come into being. They don't admit that world has helped. Comay told me that but for US intervention at wrong time (apparently with proposal for second truce) Israel would be at Jordan. "And," he added, "she needs space".

Territorial Settlements: Comay said that there will be little difficulty with Lebanon or Syria and "only minor local adjustments of border on a give-and-take basis to increase our security" will be sug-

gested. He thought either Lebanon or Egypt might be first to sign peace agreement. Israel, he said, has no territorial claims on Egypt and he did not think Egypt would make any on Israel. Settlement of Gaza strip, he thought, would be between Transjordan and Egypt rather than between Israel and Egypt.

As to Transjordan, Comay said that Abdullah had advanced idea of port on Mediterranean with corridor across Negeb but Israel had no intention of giving up Negeb or allowing it to be cut in half. He felt that something could be worked out to give Transjordan guaranteed access to some port, either Gaza or one further north. Any arrangement with Transjordan would depend upon the position of Arab Palestine. He repeated that if Arab Palestine were to fall to Transjordan, which he considers inevitable, a "new situation" would arise in which Israel would have to give greater consideration to her security. That would involve not giving up any territory in Samaria but of getting more by going to the Samarian foothills. Tulkarm, for instance, would sooner or later have to become Jewish. It would also increase security, importance of Western Galilee which Israel intended to hold in any case.

Comay did not feel that Abdullah would have any great reluctance to give up more of Arab Palestine because, he argued, "He is getting a bonus out of the war by additional territory and more population". Comay insisted that Israel would not sign any peace with Transjordan that envisioned extension of British-Transjordan treaty to Arab Palestine. He said there has been mention of federation of Transjordan and Arab Palestine.

Comay thought that in southern Arab bulge, the armistice lines would pretty well hold.

Comment: Israel's position as to Gaza strip is, I believe, that she does not want it with 330,000 Arabs in it, 230,000 of them refugees, particularly since she has back country upon which they have been living. She is probably content at the moment to let it wither. That is also true as to Tulkarm. Palestine Arabs with whom I have talked say that armistice clause not only created thousands of new refugees in that they will eventually be driven out of villages that were given up but that it was the death sentence of Tulkarm, which has lived on rich land that Abdullah surrendered. Palestine Arabs are bitter with Abdullah, Britain and US. They contend that our inactivity amounted to pressure upon Abdullah to sign.

It is obvious from Comay's statement of Israel's territorial claims that she is in direct contravention of US policy. When I told Comay that he was certainly aware that President and Secretary had only recently reaffirmed to Sharret US views on territorial settlement he replied, "yes, but we hope to change Washington's mind".

General Comment: In spite of all Department has done since January, Israel has stiffened rather than modified her position. Armistice talks emphasized Arab weakness because, as Bunche told me, Israel gave at no point and Arabs gave at every point where concession was necessary. Israel intends to exploit that weakness to the maximum.

Again it seems to me that Israeli position has brought into question whole US policy as to Palestine. One matter of concern is that unfair arrangements sponsored by UN and approved by US would have serious repercussions in Middle East and tend to discredit US, besides providing good basis for exploitation by unfriendly powers.

[ETHRIDGE]

Editorial Note

On April 13, King Abdullah handed a message to Stabler, the Chargé in Transjordan, with the request that it be transmitted to President Truman. In the message the King stated that the confiscation of Arab property in Jewish-occupied areas was against the principles of international law. Noting that a year had elapsed since the Arabs fled their lands, and that their financial condition had worsened, he requested President Truman to exercise his personal influence towards restoration of the property and assets of the Arab refugees. King Abdullah stated his belief that efforts to relieve their condition, which could be made through the International Red Cross and other channels, would be the basic step towards solving the problem of the refugees and toward facilitating the peace talks which were about to begin.

The King's message to President Truman was transmitted to the Department by Amman in telegram 162, April 13, 3 p. m. (867N.00/4–1349)

867N.01/4–1349 : Telegram

The Chargé in Transjordan (Stabler) to the Secretary of State

SECRET AMMAN, April 13, 1949—4 p. m.

163. During conversation this morning King made following comments:

1. He trusted Israel would abide by armistice agreement and would not take any further aggressive action. He believed Israelis were trying to work with him to obtain peace but hoped US, as friend both parties, would use its influence to bring about just settlement. He regarded last paragraph President's message March 28 (Deptel 38,

March 28 [1]) as guarantee against breach armistice agreement by Israel. I pointed out US Government would be prepared make strong representation to either side attempting such breach.

2. Transjordan would send delegation to PCC meeting at Lausanne composed of Transjordians and Palestine Arabs with latter in majority. However, he believed that any meeting in which all Arab states took part would not result in progress toward peace. Peace settlement between Transjordan and Israel would be reached in direct talks held in this area. He said Transjordan would be willing commence such talks irrespective attitude other Arab states, for Transjordan which had entered war with others, now left alone in Palestine. He reiterated desire for outlet to sea and thought that with six outlets on Palestine coast Mediterranean Sea [Transjordan] should be given one.

3. As British had pressed him so much regarding relations between Transjordan and Egypt, he had agreed to Prime Minister undertaking talks with Egyptian Government. But he believed Farouk remained hostile and regarded latter's message to Zaim regarding necessity for retaining Republic in Syria as directed toward Transjordan and himself. Egyptian forces in Bethlehem–Hebron still of [*are*] fomenting unrest that area and if they are [not?] withdrawn as promised upon return from Cairo of Prime Minister, they might have to be removed forcibly.

4. Situation in Samaria now quiet notwithstanding efforts junior Iraqi officers to excite disorders. Has appointed Lt. Colonel Mohammed Mayta (formerly Commander 6th Legion Regiment Old City) as Military Commander with orders take strong action to suppress further disorders. Transjordan has now assumed full responsibility for law and order that area and determined to maintain it.[2]

Pouched Arab capitals and London.

STABLER

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[1] See footnote 1, p. 878.

[2] Chargé Stabler, on April 15, advised that on the previous day Ahmad Khalil, appointed Governor of the Samaria District; Naim Touqan, appointed Governor of the Hebron District; and Ahmad Touqan, a prominent resident of Nablus, called on him at their request. "They indicated that while there was still bitterness and resentment over Transjordan–Israel armistice, it was on wane and that Palestine Arabs wished settle Palestine problems soonest. Only solution was settlement based on partition and on unification Arab Palestine and Transjordan. . . . They considered that acceptance partition principle at Lausanne might make settlement with Israel easier to achieve. . . . This group considered it was entirely possible that Transjordan and Israel could and would establish friendly relations and that at future date exchange diplomatic representatives would take place. . . . Khalil and others inquired whether US would support Arab acceptance of partition principle and would exert pressure on Israel to reach settlement on this basis. While making no specific comment I indicated that adoption reasonable and practical attitude on problem would make early settlement Palestine question more possible and stated policy of US Government on final territorial settlement." (Telegram 165 from Amman, 867N.01/4–1549) Mr. Stabler's message noted that all three of his visitors were Palestinian Arabs.

Secretary's Daily Meetings, Lot 58 D 609

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Humelsine)

[Extract]

SECRET EYES ONLY [WASHINGTON,] April 15, 1949.

Subject: Summary of Daily Meeting With the Secretary

Participants: The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Mr. Rusk
Mr. Kennan
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Humelsine

Arab Refugee Problem

Mr. Webb said that Mr. George McGhee was back from his preliminary survey of the Arab Refugee problem and that he was seeing McGhee and Rusk on this subject at 5:30 in the afternoon. In connection with this item, Mr. Acheson said that it was his opinion that we should have a more positive program in regard to our relationship with [the] Israeli[s]. Mr. Rusk said that in this connection the Department was making a study of the various steps that we could take to put positive pressure on the Israeli Government in an attempt to secure a reasonable and fair settlement of the problem.

. . . . . .

IO Files

Message Released by the United Nations Security Council on April 16, 1949

S/1308

CABLEGRAM DATED 16 APRIL 1949 FROM THE ACTING MEDIATOR TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TRANSMITTING DECLARATIONS BY ISRAEL AND SYRIA CONCERNING THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT

FOR PRESIDENT OF SECURITY COUNCIL: I have honour to report that following identical declarations addressed to M. Henri Vigier as my representative and Chairman of Israeli-Syrian armistice negotiations were signed by heads of two delegations and exchanged 13 April. These declarations developed out of Syrian proposal for a formal ceasefire agreement. As preliminary to armistice negotiations, and as indicated, both parties wish them communicated to Security Council.

Declaration made on behalf of Israel reads

"I have the honour to make to you the following declaration on behalf of Israel:

'Israel accepts and confirms the resolution of the Security Council of 15 July 1948 as a measure which forbids any recourse to military force of any form. Such a measure will remain effective so long as the Security Council has not expressly abrogated it.

It is understood that such a measure obligates the interested parties to grant every facility to United Nations observers in order to allow them to ensure a complete and effective supervision of the ceasefire.

I should be grateful if you would communicate this declaration to the interested parties and the Security Council. Alouf Makleff' "

[Here follows the declaration in French by Syria signed by Fezi Selo.]

The armistice negotiations will be formally resumed on 21 April.

867N.01/4–1649 : Telegram

The Chargé in Transjordan (Stabler) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET URGENT AMMAN, April 16, 1949—8 a. m.

166. With conclusion of Transjordan–Israel armistice agreement, next item on Transjordan–Israel agenda is presumably initiation talks through special committee (Article VIII Armistice Agreement) leading to settlement remaining differences and to peace accord between two countries. Israel for its reasons is most anxious to commence such direct talks without third party soonest and is probably pressing Transjordan through various mediums in this regard. As Department is aware, Abdullah is also anxious to settle Palestine problem soonest but at present is taking no action re special committee in view public reaction in Transjordan and Arab Palestine to armistice agreement (last paragraph Legation's 158, April 9 [1]). However, as resentment wanes, it may be expected Abdullah will appoint Transjordan delegates to special committee and instruct them meet early date with Israelis. In ensuing talks it is thought that in his desire for settlement and in belief RI [*he?*] could count on no outside assistance, he would be inclined accede somewhat too rapidly and generously to Israeli demands which include Jerusalem settlement and other points.

While it is realized that policy of US Govt is to encourage and promote steps which might lead to settlement Palestine problem, it is equally true that cardinal point of US policy is support UN. It would seem, however, that with commencement special committee talks and with probable accession by Transjordan to Israeli demands, UN, PCC

[1] Not printed.

and GA Resolution December 11 would be relegated to background position of insignificance and future of Jerusalem and other matters would be decided without taking into account world community. With this possibility in mind, it is suggested Department might wish consider instructing me advise King on friendly and personal basis that he might do well to proceed slowly re special committee talks in order await outcome Lausanne Conference and possible further negotiations under auspices PCC. Although King has often expressed his belief that UN has proven itself ineffective and impotent, it is thought he would nonetheless accept this advice, which might be coupled with reaffirmation US attitude re internationalization Jerusalem and US policy on final territorial settlement.[2]

Sent Department 166, repeated Jerusalem 89, for USDel PCC, London 27.

STABLER

[2] The Department, in its reply of April 20, stated that it had "given careful consideration suggestion advanced ur 166 Apr 16 but after review all factors involved believes it not desirable approach King this sense." (telegram 49, 867N.01/4–1649)

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, April 16, 1949—noon.

300. Palun 127. [From Ethridge.] Department's suggestion re Jerusalem conveyed French delegation along lines indicated Unpal 76.[1] Boisanger did not comment this suggestion but said he thought agreed position within PCC possible.

Secretariat has produced working draft proposals re Jerusalem as requested by Jerusalem Committee, drawing on French paper and various unofficial suggestions by USDel. This paper represents sound basis work in view USDel and we think might be adjusted to trusteeship pattern.

Paper proposes following international organs, all other powers to be in hands authorities Jewish and Arab zones.

UN administrator appointed by GA would have direct control and power make regulations re holy places to which *status quo* applies and supervision protection and access other holy places in area. Could call on authorities to grant rights passage visitors these places, and power decides disputes re holy places.

All persons in area would be entitled human rights as set forth UN December and administrator may bring questions appropriate authorities and if necessary to appropriate UN organ.

[1] Identified also as telegram 195, April 13, to Jerusalem, p. 910.

Area would be demilitarized and formal assurances given by parties re demilitarization and inviolability demarcation lines. Administrator would report violations SC.

Administrator authorized recruits small force for protection holy places and his headquarters staff.

Administrative council consisting 10 members, 4 from each zone and two neutral, would be responsible for common public services, coordination measures for maintenance peace and order, budgetary matters and other municipal matters common to area such as town planning.

International tribunal appointed by President ICJ would have jurisdiction disputes re competence organs and courts within area and also whether acts of organs compatible statute.

Mixed tribunal would have jurisdiction cases in which parties do not belong same zone.

Responsible Jewish Arab authorities would be called on to negotiate economic arrangements with view facilitating commerce between zones.

Under foregoing plan international organ would exercise actual governing power only over holy places, which point already agreed by states concerned. As to other main points such as demilitarization, peace and order, free access and human rights, USDel thinks international obligations should be proposed and might be substantially strengthened by giving international tribunal power hear complaints and render advisory opinions on motion international authority. This might be more effective means effectuating international interest than direct reference appropriate UN organ, where debates likely to be on political basis and result ineffective resolution. Reference such organs could follow, taking into account advisory opinion and subsequent attitude parties concerned. States concerned might find it difficult to reject expression international interest through such method.

Principle questions re trusteeship which occur to us at present follow:

Can main purposes trusteeship under charter be reconciled with objectives international community re Jerusalem and with public opinion in area?

In addition to direct international authority over holy places, should not international interest be afforded expression re other basic points in regard area as whole? If so, should this not be focal point of internationalization and would not creation trusteeship, with administration awarded adjacent states focus attention rather on division city between separate sovereignties?

[Ethridge]
BURDETT

867N.01/4–1649: Telegram

The Chargé in Transjordan (Stabler) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL AMMAN, April 16, 1949—5 p. m.

168. King said this morning that on April 15 he had received Eytan, Sassoon and Dayan at Shuneh to discuss various matters relative to armistice agreement and special committee talks. HM indicated that Israeli attitude much more friendly and reasonable than during previous meetings re triangle. Israelis had agreed in areas affected under Article 6 armistice terms would remain unmolested and that villagers would be given free passage back and forth to Arab lines. HM said he had told Israelis that Transjordan would be prepared accept peace agreement at Lausanne conference regardless attitude other Arab states. However, he also indicated to them that he doubted any accord could be reached at such conference and that only direct talks could result in agreement. He pointed out to them that such agreement would have to be sanctioned and guaranteed by PCC or by one or more great powers.

King informed that he would instruct government commence special committee talks immediately. (It is understood first meeting will be held at Shuneh on April 21 in presence Transjordan Prime Minister who still being in Cairo as yet uninformed. Prime Minister expected return April 18 and it is believed he may wish postpone such talks.)[1]

[Here follows final paragraph speculating on the composition of the Transjordanian delegation to the Lausanne Conference.]

Sent Department 168, repeated Jerusalem 90, London 28.

STABLER

[1] Further details of the meeting of April 15 were furnished by London on April 20, based on information reported to the Foreign Office by Minister Kirkbride. King Abdullah was said to have asked for a port on the Mediterranean, either in the vicinity of Gaza, with access via Beersheba, or at Acre; compensation for Arab refugees; and the unfreezing of Arab assets in Israel. The Israelis appeared taken aback by the first of these points, stating "such port would divide Israel. They offered full transit facilities to Transjordan to and through Haifa. King countered by offering Israel transit facilities to Aqaba if Transjordan took over Beersheba." (Telegram 1524, 867N.01/4–2049)

501.BB Palestine/4–1949 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, April 19, 1949—5 p. m.

309. Palun 130. From Ethridge for the President and Acheson. Please read this in connection with Palun 129 April 19.[1]

[Here follow first two paragraphs requesting Mr. Ethridge's relief as American member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, to return to his newspapers.]

As for the work here: We are beginning to see the beginning of the end. I assume a Jerusalem plan acceptable to the US and in major degree to countries involved can be worked out. In fact it is in the making and Halderman will present it to Department when he comes home. At any rate, it will not be presented to Assembly until September.

After nine weeks we have persuaded Arabs to sit down for peace talks with the Jews. If there is full-dress debate at Lake Success on admission of Israel, there will be a delay of several weeks in beginning those talks on any effective basis for reasons set out in Palum 129. If such a delay were inevitable, I would in any case have to ask for relief. If fight over Israel's admission is not serious, negotiations would go along quickly at Lausanne, I am convinced. Egypt and Israel apparently both anxious to sign; outstanding difficulties between Israel and Lebanon and Syria not so serious that long negotiations would be involved. Major negotiations between Transjordan and Israel, and my belief is that Israel will get pretty much what she wants and give very little, if anything.

Refugee problem, most serious of all, is one that will hang on for two or three years. Commission cannot solve it, but can set up machinery for solution providing US Government agrees to general plan.

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[1] Identified also as telegram 308 from Jerusalem, not printed; Mr. Ethridge reported that at the Israeli Prime Minister's request, he had "proceeded from Jerusalem to Tiberias April 18 for purpose of further discussions re refugees and Jerusalem prior to PCC departure for Lausanne. Ben-Gurion added nothing new of substance to his previous statements of Israeli policy to PCC but made some interesting remarks re details which are being reported separately."

Following this meeting, Mr. Ethridge saw Mr. Comay, who informed that the Israeli Foreign Office was "considerably concerned" because the question of Israeli admission to the United Nations had been referred to Committee One by the General Assembly. Mr. Comay was unsure whether this action was merely a delaying device by the "Arabs, British and others" or whether a full-dress debate would follow "during which it would be necessary for Israel substantively to state its position re such outstanding questions as refugees and Jerusalem." Mr. Ethridge concluded that "In view of Israel's intransigeance particularly on refugees and territorial questions and her unwillingness to heed advice from US which I believe would have kept her out of her jam at GA, it would probably be salutary to have world public opinion brought to bear upon her through UN." (501.BB Palestine/4–1949)

Neither French nor Turks want to take initiative on that, but are willing to work under guidance of US. I have agreed with George McGhee on a plan which he will present to Department. My colleagues on Commission have agreed that if State Department approves in consultation with British, French, and Turks, they will accept any plan American Delegate introduces. In any case, Department will no doubt shortly give an answer on general procedure and Commission can set up machinery.

Frazer Wilkins of US Delegation thoroughly familiar with everything that has gone on and could be deputized to continue in Lausanne. I would be glad of course to be at the Department's call in the States and to give all the help there that I can.

[Here follow the last two sentences of the telegram, bearing on Mr. Ethridge's return to the United States, with May 15 being the suggested date of arrival.] [Ethridge.]

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/4–2049 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET JERUSALEM, April 20, 1949—9 a. m.

311. Palun 132. From Ethridge to Acheson. Comment Amman telegram 166 [1] [, repeated] to Jerusalem as 89.

(1) From what I learn Abdullah is so anxious to make peace that it is probably too late to give him any advice that would do him any good.

(2) Reported to us yesterday unofficially that Transjordan Delegation at Lausanne would be headed by Transjordan chief but most of delegates would be Palestinian Arabs. In that case they would offer stronger resistance to Israel's further demands than Abdullah would and therefore advice probably unnecessary.

(3) Even if foregoing were not true, I believe that any assurance given him should go no further than reaffirmation of previous US position as contained in President's recent message to Abdullah and our promise that if in course of negotiations there was threat of force or duress and facts warranted it we would be prepared to make unilateral representation at Tel Aviv.

(4) As I have interpreted both US and UN policy it has been to encourage direct negotiations toward an honest and fair agreement. Therefore heavy responsibility involved in intervening in Transjordan affairs by attempting to persuade her to adopt different negotiating

[1] Dated April 16, p. 919.

tactics than she would otherwise do. Wisdom such course appears highly doubtful unless US frankly prepared to sponsor effective measures to prevent further Israeli incursions on Arab Palestine and Transjordan territory. Our understanding current Arab opinion UN and US re Palestine leads us to think any advice from US would be misinterpreted perhaps too optimistically and that its acceptance would proceed from ulterior motives.

[(5)] Territorial question appears really important on this connection. Re Jerusalem, we are not at all sure Transjordan would prefer international to bilateral division city. While they would accept international they have shown no enthusiasm for it. Furthermore parties cannot control Jerusalem solution in same way as boundaries. Even if they made agreement it would still be possible superimpose international regime of only kind that now seems possible, namely one which will recognize respective sovereignties adjacent states. In view actual situation, preliminary agreement between parties might be more helpful our objectives than otherwise. [Ethridge.]

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/4–2049 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, April 20, 1949—10 a. m.

312. Palun 133. From Ethridge. On April 18 I visited Ben-Gurion at Tiberias at his request. Prior to my departure from Jerusalem, Comay informed me Ben-Gurion would discuss such pending questions as issuance of conciliatory statement re refugees by Israel Government and Israeli views re some form of internationalization of Jerusalem. Ben-Gurion mentioned neither question and apparently had no intention of doing so. Instead Ben-Gurion analyzed at length Britain's mistaken imperialistic policy in Middle East in past and present and stressed economic and humanitarian role which position of US in world affairs ought to require US to play in this area. Ben-Gurion said that British were still attempting to operate in Middle East under policies in vogue toward end of 19th century; that Britain was attempting to rule through little kings like Abdullah; that US should declare its second independence of British Foreign Office; and that US must develop Middle East economically and raise living standard throughout area.

Jerusalem: Ben-Gurion did not seem to wish to discuss internationalization of Jerusalem as set forth in paragraph 8 General Assembly Resolution December 11 but confined himself to observation that Jerusalem could not be capital of Israel "for several years."

Jerusalem was too near "edge of Israel." If, however, Israel's eastern boundary were Jordan, Jerusalem could become capital immediately. Meanwhile, Tel Aviv was not suitable capital, apparently for security reasons but Haifa would be and might be. Israel planned to make Jerusalem center for watchmaking, diamond-cutting and other light industries. Return of tourists and pilgrims would be important to its economic existence. Demilitarization of Jerusalem could not be foreseen under existing circumstances.

Refugees: Ben-Gurion made no reference to possible conciliatory statement by Israeli Government re refugees and it was obvious from trend of his remarks that there has not been slightest change in Israeli views despite statement of American position by McDonald. Ben-Gurion emphasized role which US should play economically in Middle East and stressed that resettlement was only logical answer. Egypt was overpopulated and if Arab states were wise Egyptians would be resettled in Iraq. There was no reason why Palestinian and Israeli Arab refugees should not be resettled in Iraq and in Syria, both of which were seriously underpopulated. Israeli itself cannot and will not accept return of Arab refugees to Israeli territory for security and economic reasons. Israel will, however, contribute to assistance for refugees in three ways:

(1) Compensation for Arab land to be paid to Arab farmers through Israeli-Arab mixed claims commission. Ben-Gurion mentioned, in this connection, that Israeli could have war claims against Arab states but that these claims should be considered separately and apart.

(2) Israel would permit Arab refugees to return with object of reuniting separated families.

(3) Israel would assist in resettlement of refugees elsewhere, probably by making available its knowledge and information of Near East countries and by sending Israeli experts and technicians at no charge to assist in whatever resettlement program might be developed.

Territorial settlement: Ben-Gurion indicated Israel had no intention of relinquishing any part of Negev. If I thought its southern portion "a wilderness", which I said I did having flown over it that morning, I should "come back and see it in ten years." Israel could develop even most unpromising parts of Israel territory because "it not only loved but needed it." Transjordan would not be granted corridor to Mediterranean nor would there be corridor between Transjordan and Egypt. Israel could not be cut in two. British would not be permitted access across Israel under cover of Transjordan. Transjordan could have "free zone" in Tel Aviv or Haifa or anywhere else it chose on Mediterranean with right of passage. Present Gaza strip might become autonomous like Luxembourg. If Egypt did not want Gaza because of refugees therein Israel would accept and permit those

refugees to return to their homes. Transjordan could have [access to the Mediterranean?] without corridor but with right of free passage. Israel believed it should have all of west coast of Dead Sea as Transjordan had all of east coast, particularly if Transjordan absorbed rump of Palestine. British bases in Arab Palestine under Anglo-Transjordan treaty would not be permitted. Arab Palestine might be accorded special status in settlement through federal device in union with Transjordan.

Peace settlements: Ben-Gurion considered that Israel would be able to conclude settlements with Egypt and Lebanon first because of close affinity with each. Israel and Egypt had much in common and agreement would break ice. Immediate prospect re agreement with Lebanon was more dubious as there were rumors of another Lebanese Government crisis. Ben-Gurion hoped for quick armistice and peace settlement with Syria. Iraq would not negotiate. Transjordan would. Israel must always consider whether Arab state representatives really represent their countries. Farouk is probably Egypt but who is Zaim and does Nuri speak for Iraqi people. Ben-Gurion felt Zaim coup might not be internal and considered Nuri British agent and hated by Iraqis. Abdullah was definitely British tool. Israel, nevertheless, could endeavor to conclude settlements with as many Arab states as possible as quickly as possible. Individual problems between states could not be considered outside framework of settlement. [Ethridge.]

BURDETT

Editorial Note

Mr. McClintock, on April 20, drafted a telegram to Mr. Ethridge for the signature of Secretary Acheson. After reference to Palun 129 and 130 of April 19 (see page 923) and discussing the relief of Mr. Ethridge, the draft telegram read as follows: "This Govt is not disposed to change policy because of Israeli intransigeance as most recently manifested by Ben Gurion as reported Palun 133, April 20. We support resolution of Dec. 11 and your able effort to present logic of that resolution to Israeli and Arab Govts still has our full backing. If Israeli application for admission UN calls forth major inquiry in present GA and Israelis, as you predict, decide to stall at Lausanne, we would then be disposed to utilize your desire for relief to derive maximum diplomatic advantage. Your resignation from PCC could therefore have political significance and would serve to show Israeli Govt that US Govt is not pleased with its tactics.

"However, we are disposed to resort to fullest diplomatic pressure on Israel at present time and are prepared, if Israeli Govt pays any heed to our suggestions, to tell them that if they will go ahead on a

reasonable peace settlement, including satisfactory assurances re Jerusalem and refugees, we will do our utmost to insure that GA handle membership question with maximum of swiftness and minimum of debate. In such case, as you predict in Palun 130, talks at Lausanne might go along quickly. We should in that event wish very much that you continue as our Representative with assurance that once Lausanne conversations reached successful conclusion you would at once be relieved of your responsibilities on PCC.

"Therefore, as I see it, we should within a few weeks be able to relieve you of the PCC assignment either by reason of Israeli intransigeance and consequent stalemate, or by Israeli willingness to compromise and therefore a speedy conclusion to your efforts." (501.BB Palestine/4–2049)

The editors have been unable to find any evidence that the draft telegram was actually sent.

867N.01/4–2049 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET JERUSALEM, April 20, 1949—4 p. m.

316. Primary US objective in Palestine understood by Consulate General to be restoration peace and tranquility. Policy based on premise long-term stability, economic and political development Middle East and its affiliation with western democracies of vital interest to US. US position on refugees and boundary settlement dictated by above considerations. Support for internationalization Jerusalem apparently motivated largely by general policy supporting UN resolution and wishes Christian particularly Catholic groups rather than on consideration vital strategic interests US. Attitude Israel regarding final settlement as reported Palun 126 [1] again pointedly underlines necessity facing question what measures US will take to implement policies adopted in national interest.

Conclusion armistice agreements apparently marked important step towards achievement US objectives. However, cognizance must be taken of fact agreements acquiesced in by Arab states under varying degrees of force or threat of force on part of Israel. Arabs realized were defeated militarily, felt could count on no action by UN or great powers to curb further aggression by Israel and thus must sign armistice on any terms. Use of blackmail particularly flagrant in case of Transjordan negotiations which UN official characterized as marked by "utter perfidy on one side and utter stupidity on other". Inevitable

[1] See telegram 291, April 13, from Jerusalem, p. 911.

result has been storing up turbulent reservoir resentment against Israel, UN and US which will constantly seek favorable opportunity burst forth. In addition has created strong reaction against Arab ruling groups and repeated calls to "new generation" to free country from despotism present rumors [*rulers?*] as first step towards resumption military action against Zionism. With discrediting old leaders, blow to Arab nationalism and frustration resulting from failure anti-Zionist campaign, younger men seeking new set values which Communists only too willing provide.

Hasty conclusion peace treaties ignoring rights of one party will only breed instability and preparations for renewal of fighting contrary to interests of UN, US, Israel and Arabs. Department may, therefore, wish instruct American Legation (Amman telegram 166, April 16 to Department) to informally advise King US prepared, if warranted by facts, to make strongest representations to Israel against use of force or threats of force both during and after peace negotiations including talks in Special Committee. This would give Transjordan badly needed confidence and permit it to negotiate without duress and on equal basis with Israel and would be in accord with traditional US policy of favoring agreements openly and freely arrived at. Would prevent King from feeling must give in to such damaging demands as those in Article 6 of Armistice agreement. President's message to King could be interpreted to King in above manner and similar assurances might be given other Arab states. In adopting this position US should be prepared take requisite measures against Israel if necessary. Regarding Jerusalem now appears not likely PCC will be able obtain real UN control over Jerusalem and that international regime will take forms mentioned in Palun 127.[2] Such regime could be superimposed regardless nature agreement reached between Transjordan and Israel in direct negotiations. However, because special UN interest and obligation maintain peace and security in Holy City essential that Transjordan not accept settlement imposed by duress and that rights and interests Palestine Arabs be protected. King Abdullah has not always shown much zeal in protecting interests Palestine Arabs and their confidence in him has been considerably shaken by terms armistice agreement. If UN insists (perhaps through Jerusalem Committee of PCC) on participating in any Jerusalem settlement as third party involved could assist in reaching equitable agreement that would contribute to permanent tranquility. Such settlement should include return to Arabs of traditional Arab areas seized by Jews with demarcation line running approximately as outlined in Consulate's telegram 35, January 13. Also compensation for property remaining in Jewish

[2] Identified also as telegram 300, April 16, from Jerusalem, p. 920.

Sections, resumption of public utility services in entire city using existing facilities, free access to Mount Scopus and free use Nablus–Bethlehem road.

As means controlling Israel suggest postponement until September session Israel application for UN membership. Israeli actions including two offensive in Negev, attack in Galilee, seizure southern Negev, incursion into Syria and liberal use of big stick in armistice talks hardly support her claim to being "peace-loving state". Nor does her refusal to abide by sections GA Resolution December 11 regarding refugees and Jerusalem indicate much respect for organization she now seeking join. Postponement would enable US to continue tactics of acting through UN on Palestine question and would demonstrate to Israel that she cannot continue to ignore with impunity opinion world community.[3]

Sent Department; repeated Amman 22.

BURDETT

[3] The Department replied, on April 26, that it "appreciates reasoning ur 316 Apr 20 but after careful consideration all factors involved believes it not desirable take step suggested third para re instructions Leg Amman." (Telegram 222, 867N.01/4–2049)

501.BB Palestine/4–2049 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, April 20, 1949—11 : 05 p. m.

509. Bunche today told us he would remain as Acting Mediator only until the Syrian negotiations were completed. Is fairly optimistic that when negotiations reopened after the religious holidays on April 21 they would make good progress.

In discussing his draft proposed SC Resolution (Beirut's No. 132, Palun 95, March 24) and Department's suggested changes (Deptel 193 to New York,[1] Unpal 70, March 29), Bunche said that there was no need for PCC to share in cease-fire observation as suggested Department's paragraph 6,[2] since each armistice agreement is self-contained arrangement providing for an armistice commission chaired by chief of staff of the truce supervision organization or senior officer of organization designated by him. Commissions are to handle questions relating to terms of armistice and minor disagreements and difficulties. Outbreak of fighting must be referred to SC in any event. Bunche

[1] This was a repeat of No. 156, March 29, to Beirut, p. 884.
[2] See paragraph numbered 3 in No. 156.

pointed out that such an arrangement is a continuation of existing situation under which chief of staff handles locally minor incidents, refers basic disagreements to Mediator, while actual fighting must be referred to SC.

In connection with the armistice commissions, Bunche said it was the intention after the Syrian negotiations were completed to combine the commissions, establishing one for Northern and one for Southern areas. The UN and the Israeli personnel would remain the same, the Arabs changing as the agenda of the commissions might require.

Bunche believes that Riley or his successor, together with a force of about thirty officers and thirty enlisted men, should continue to be empowered to supervise the truce organization in maintaining the cease-fire.

Re Department's suggestion for paragraph 5,[3] Bunche does not believe it necessary specifically terminate office of Mediator in SC Resolution, pointing out that office established by GA and December 11 Resolution provided for automatic termination when functions transferred to PCC.

Bunche agrees that the Truce Commission might be dissolved, as suggested in Department's addition to paragraph 3.[4]

Resolution along foregoing lines will have to be sponsored by some SC member since Acting Mediator has no such authority.

Bunche is prepared, if asked, to make an oral statement to SC, supplementing his written report following conclusion of Syrian negotiations. He furnished USUN a rough draft of his proposed written report which is summarized in Usun 510, April 21.[5] Text being forwarded by pouch.

Bunche has refused suggestion from Lie and other sources that he should lobby for the early admission of Israel to UN. Feels this inappropriate for Acting Mediator, and that before Israel admitted should "come clean" on the following points: (1) report on Bernadotte's assassination; (2) attitude toward refugees; (3) attitude toward internationalization of Jerusalem; (4) boundary demands. He reacted favorably to informal suggestion above points might best be covered at opening Lausanne Conference.

In respect to the report on Bernadotte's assassination, Bunche stated he had been assured by Israelis that it would be ready before GA opening, although it would be largely a negative report. Eban has promised him to expedite submission.

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[3] See paragraph numbered 2 in No. 156.
[4] See paragraph numbered 1 in No. 156.
[5] *Post*, p. 933.

Bunche fully shares Ethridge's observations and recommendations on refugees, which he discussed fully in Beirut.

He was bearish on prospects for effective internationalization of Jerusalem. Said that only if USG willing put strong pressure on Israelis will Jerusalem be internationalized. Believes Jerusalem question has been pretty well settled by the probable Transjordan-Israeli deal under which Abdullah will get Arab Palestine and part of Jerusalem. He anticipates, however, that such arrangement may blow up when Abdullah realized that small Arab section of Jerusalem likely to be squeezed economically by Israelis so that in less than a year it will not be viable. Israelis fully cognizant weakness of Arab Jerusalem. Although not hostile to the concept of two trusteeships for Jerusalem, Bunche is definitely skeptical.

In respect to boundaries, Bunche observed that Israelis would never commit themselves on what their eventual goals were. It was clear that they did not intend to give up territory in Negev, or elsewhere, which had been assigned them in armistice agreements. Until some clarification of this point, however, the Arabs have legitimate grounds for hesitation and doubt about final arrangements.

Bunche expressed his great appreciation for Department's backstopping and effective intervention during numerous critical periods in his negotiations.

He emphasized repeatedly that he is most anxious to get away for a long rest as soon as possible since he is in very poor health.

AUSTIN

867N.00/4–1349

President Truman to King Abdullah Ibn el-Hussein of Transjordan[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON, undated.]

I have received Your Majesty's message of April 13, 1949, concerning the restoration of Arab refugee property in Israeli-occupied areas.

In accordance with its instructions, the Palestine Conciliation Commission, on which the United States Government is represented, is actively discussing with the Israeli Government the question of implementation of the General Assembly resolution of December 11, 1948 with respect to the return of refugees to their homes and compensation for the property of those who do not return. In addition, the United States Government has emphasized to the Israeli Government its hope

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[1] Transmitted to Amman in telegram 52, April 21, 7 p. m., with the instruction: "Pls transmit fol reply from Pres to King Abdullah (urtel 162 April 13) :" Regarding No. 162, see editorial note, p. 916.

Telegram 52 was repeated to Jerusalem for Mr. Ethridge and to Tel Aviv.

that no action will be taken prior to the negotiations called for under that resolution which would prejudice the attainment of an agreed settlement on the question of the return of refugees to their homes and the restoration of property to refugee owners. The United States Government will continue its efforts to this end.

Your Majesty is assured that the question of the Arab refugees, which is under active consideration by this Government, is a matter of deep personal concern to me.

I appreciate Your Majesty's good wishes, which I heartily reciprocate.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

501.BB Palestine/4–2149 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, April 21, 1949—12 : 30 p. m.

510. Bunche has made available to USUN rough draft of his report to SC. It briefly reviews the truce period and armistice negotiations, is couched in general and judicious terms. No specific criticism made of the parties except for sharp statement that some of the ten UK personnel killed in operation were lost under conditions which fully justifies the UN in holding the governments concerned responsible. In some instances had adequate protection been given the deaths could have been avoided.

Report draws some broad conclusions re technique of settling disputes on basis of Palestine experience. For example, concludes that an imposed truce can be applied and supervised for a period of four to five months at the most but then must be superseded by the next step toward peace. Observes that independent communication and transportation systems indispensable for success of negotiations and life of personnel.

Negotiations leading to armistice agreements described as being in each case tortuous and difficult. Demonstrate, however, that once the parties could be brought together they could, with UN assistance, be led to reasonable agreement. Asserts there is good reason to believe that peace settlement will be forthcoming in due course by virtue of efforts of PCC. He expects armistice agreements to remain in force successfully.

His conclusions point toward his suggested SC Resolution (mytel 509, April 20). Since armistice agreements provide for own machinery for supervision and call for UN assistance in this regard, unnecessary to continue impose on states concerned the onerous conditions of SC

truce. Suggests SC might consider adopting new resolution declaring unnecessary prolong truce of July 15 Resolution, but reaffirming order to desist from further military action pursuant to Article 40, and calling on authorities to continue observe unconditional cease-fire. Such action consistent with realities of situation and would fully safeguard basic objective of SC that fighting not be resumed.

Suggests that remaining Mediator's functions be transferred to PCC since there is no longer any useful function to be performed by the Mediator. Further activity by him would unfavorably impinge on PCC work. Concludes that in such situation as Palestine most effective instrument of Mediator or Conciliator is prompt and vigorous UN action.

AUSTIN

867N.48/4–2249

Memorandum by the Coordinator on Palestine Refugee Matters (McGhee) to the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 22, 1949.

Subject: Palestine Refugee Problem.

Discussion

Attached are the following papers on the Palestine Refugee Problem based on careful study by the Departmental officers concerned and observations during my recent visit to the Near East. They develop from the Policy Decision of March 15, 1949,[1] certain new Policy Recommendations and a Proposed Plan of Action.

1. Policy Decision of March 15, 1949.
2. Conclusions.
3. Policy Recommendations.
4. Proposed Plan of Action.
5. Proposed Steps to be Taken Within U.S. Government.
6. Tentative Approach to Total Cost of Program.[2]

Recommendation

It is recommended that the proposed Policy Recommendations be approved.

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[1] See Mr. McGhee's memorandum of March 15 and footnote 4 to that memorandum, p. 828.

[2] Nos. 2 to 6 are printed, below. Their specific authorship is not indicated but the presumption is that they were drafted in Mr. McGhee's office. All of these papers were dated April 27 unless otherwise indicated. The editors suggest that papers of earlier date were originally attached to the memorandum of April 22 and that these revisions, chiefly dated April 27, superseded the earlier papers and were subsequently attached to the memorandum of April 22.

[Annex 1]

PALESTINE REFUGEE PROBLEM

CONCLUSIONS

1. Although the total number of Palestine refugees and destitute persons now receiving relief is 950,000,* it is assumed that the maximum number of bonafide displaced persons who must eventually be repatriated or resettled will not exceed 700,000. The difference will be largely applicable to Arab Palestine.

2. The disposition of the refugees is now a political issue of the highest order between Israel and the Arab States, neither of which will consider it as a refugee problem. This situation will probably continue until there is some general peace settlement.

3. In the meantime, continuing and vigorous pressure will have to be exerted upon Israel and the Arab states if their agreement to repatriation and resettlement, respectively, on the scale required, is to be secured. With the exception of Transjordan, which appears to see in the refugees an opportunity to improve her political and economic position, the Arab states are reluctant to accept refugees for permanent resettlement for political as well as economic reasons. They take the position that Israel, and to a lesser extent the United Nations and the United States, created the problem and are responsible for its solution. They feel that this should be through repatriation, in accordance with Article 11 of the General Assembly Resolution of December 11, 1948. The Israelis, on the other hand, are reluctant to repatriate any large number of refugees because of economic and security considerations, and because of the need for land to carry out their planned Jewish immigration program. The Israelis take the position that the problem was created by the invasion of the Arab states, and must be solved by resettlement.

4. Agreement by Israel to repatriate at least 200,000 refugees, pursuant to the General Assembly Resolution, is considered a necessary precedent to any ultimate and satisfactory solution of the refugee

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*Distribution of refugees and destitute persons, as estimated by Palestine Conciliation Commission:

Syria	85,000
Lebanon	131,000
Iraq	5,000
Arab Palestine	630,000
Transjordan	99,000
Egypt	
Israel	
Total	950,000

[Footnote in the source text.]

problem. This is necessary to reduce the total to a number capable of assimilation on a self-supporting basis in the Arab countries within a reasonable time, and to provide a favorable atmosphere for assumption by the Arab states of the responsibilities involved in the resettlement. In view of the large-scale preemption of Arab lands, housing and employment possibilities in Israel, primary attention should be directed to securing repatriation of refugees to those formerly predominantly Arab areas now under Israeli military occupation which are outside the boundaries of the Jewish state as defined in the resolution of November 29, 1947.

5. There has been no appreciable absorption of refugees into the existing economies of the Arab states, nor can there be under present conditions without increase in unemployment, further depression of the already low standards of living and deterioration of the political stability of the Arab states, already seriously undermined by economic problems and the recent hostilities.

6. The refugees will continue to be largely dependent for their support upon assistance from outside the Arab states, after termination of the present UNRPR relief program now expected at the end of the year. The present number of refugees cannot be supported by the Arab governments nor by the voluntary relief organizations, either within or outside the Arab states.

7. At the earliest possible date and certainly at the termination of the present UNRPR program, assistance to the refugees should wherever possible be on a work rather than a relief basis, even though the initial cost per refugee is greater. A work relief program will serve to check the present serious deterioration in morale among the refugees, and will result in accomplishment of useful work directed toward their own resettlement, toward raising the economic potential of the country in which they live and toward an orderly reduction in need for further outside assistance.

8. Absorption of the refugees into the economies of the Arab states on a self-supporting basis can only be achieved through raising of the economic potentials of the countries involved through increase in amount or productivity of arable land, development of new industries, improvement in transportation, etc.

9. Apart from political considerations Syria, Iraq and Transjordan offer significant possibilities for resettlement or employment of refugees. Lebanon offers limited possibilities. Egypt and Saudi Arabia could take only token quotas. Although possibilities for immigration to other countries should be thoroughly explored, the number involved would probably not be great. Resettlement possibilities:

	2–3 Years	*5–10 Years*
Syria	Up to 200,000	Up to 750,000
Iraq	Token	Over 750,000
Transjordan (and Arab Palestine)	150–200,000	Same
Lebanon	Up to 50,000	Same
Egypt	Token	Same
Saudi Arabia	Token	Same
Other	Small	Same

10. Overall responsibility for the refugee problem should be placed squarely on Israel and the Arab states. All outside assistance should be under the auspices of the United Nations. Any plan developed to deal with the refugee problem should be formulated within this context, and should utilize all possible sources of assistance including interested and able UN member states, specialized agencies, related international organizations and private organizations. Although any United States contribution to solution of the refugee problem should be made available within the framework of UN responsibility, the US should assure that its assistance is effectively utilized through supervision of development and work relief projects undertaken wholly or largely with US funds.

11. The objective of a refugee program should be to repatriate or resettle the refugees as rapidly and economically as possible, while minimizing present and potential economic and political dislocations. For example, although on political grounds Syria and Iraq are reluctant to take refugees, their ability to provide a basis for eventual self-support is far greater than that of Transjordan, whose acceptance of the majority of the refugees would necessitate permanent subsidization of the county.

12. In order to secure the cooperation of the Arab states, any solution of the refugee problem must be formulated within the broader framework of the interests of the countries concerned. This will require full recognition of the legitimate economic development aspirations of the countries involved, in their own interest as well as in the interest of solving the refugee problem. Nationals of the countries concerned should in many cases be the immediate beneficiaries of the projects, with the refugees benefiting indirectly. Since the development projects required for solution of the refugee problem will probably absorb most of the external financing available for the Near East during the next few years, the questions of economic development and of the solution of the refugee problem are indivisible, and both must be taken fully into consideration and carefully coordinated in any overall plan which is evolved. This would also apply to United States assistance to the Near East through the "Point Four" Program.

13. Insofar as possible all outside assistance to the Arab states in connection with the refugee problem should, for internal Arab political reasons, have at least the appearance of being as a result of the request of the states concerned.

14. The present distribution of the refugees among the Arab states has an important bearing on the situation that would result if no further outside assistance were provided after termination of the UNRPR program. Only Lebanon and Transjordan would face a really difficult situation in caring for or assimilating their refugees. If Transjordan acquires all of Arab Palestine, including the Gaza strip, she will have on present figures 729,000 refugees, in comparison with an original population of 850,000. Transjordan is in reality an artificial state created by the British, and exists only by virtue of a British subsidy. The total government budget is only $5,000,000. It is itself unable to do anything for the refugees and their care, and at the termination of the UNRPR program, would remain a responsibility of the UN, the UK or whoever would be willing to assume it. In their present mood and circumstances other Arab states have neither the desire nor the resources to assume it, and would be in good position *not* to assume it.

15. No new program which gives hope of solving the refugee problem should be initiated unless financing can be assured for the achievement of certain minimum objectives. Failure of the program due to lack of financial support would further prejudice UN and US prestige and relations with the Arab states, and further aggravate the dangerous economic and political conditions created by the refugee problem. Although as much as possible of the financial assistance required should be furnished on a loan basis, grants will continue to be required, particularly for work relief and local currency costs.[3]

[Annex 2]

Palestine Refugees

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

1. As an essential condition to the solution of the Palestine refugee problem, the United States exercise continuing pressure on Israel by all appropriate means to repatriate a minimum of 200,000 Arab refugees, to Israel and Israeli-occupied areas of Palestine, from refugees now outside this area eligible for and desiring repatriation.

[3] Mr. McGhee, in letters of April 29, transmitted copies of the Conclusions and of the Proposed Plan of Action, below, to London, Beirut, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Amman, Baghdad, and Cairo.

2. The United States exercise coordinate pressure on the Arab states to accept and cooperate in the resettlement of the remaining Arab refugees (approximately 500,000).

3. It be recognized that there will be need for continuing outside assistance for the refugees after termination of the present UNRPR program (now estimated as December, 1949).

4. Such outside assistance continue to be extended under the auspices of the United Nations.

5. Such assistance place primary emphasis upon work relief rather than direct relief, and be directed toward a progressive reduction and eventual elimination of outside assistance, through reintegration of the refugees on a self-sustaining basis into the political and economic structure of the Near East, in such a manner as to create a minimum of present and potential economic and political tensions.

6. The United States cooperate actively with the Palestine Conciliation Commission in the development of a program for achieving the foregoing objectives, for presentation to the General Assembly at the September session.

7. Funds required for execution of this program be obtained to the maximum extent possible through loans to the states concerned from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the United States Export-Import Bank and from other member states, and through assistance from the United Nations and its specialized agencies and international organizations.

8. The United States be prepared to contribute as a grant, subject to Congressional appropriation, its share of such additional technical and financial assistance as it considers necessary to achieve the minimum objective of the overall program, while at the same time refusing to accept direct responsibility for the problem and confining United States assistance thereto within limits consistent with the national interest.

9. The general plan of action set forth on the attached statement be pursued in the attainment of these objectives.

[Annex 3]

PALESTINE REFUGEE PROBLEM

PROPOSED PLAN OF ACTION

1. Initiate immediately, together with the United Kingdom, a concerted program to overcome the present political stalemate preventing the Arab States and Israel from facing the refugee problem realistically and constructively. Full use should be made of direct diplomatic approach, official statements, publicity, etc., particularly as a back-

ground for the forthcoming extended talks between the Arab States and Israel in Switzerland.

2. In the meantime encourage all new public and private programs and projects, such as the UK pilot irrigation project in Transjordan and the International Bank flood control project in Iraq, which can be initiated within the present context and which will serve to alleviate the refugee problem in both its short and long range aspects.

3. Recommend to the Palestine Conciliation Commission that it establish permanent headquarters and add to its staff such administrative and technical personnel as are required for carrying out its operational responsibilities as they arise. Services should be initiated as soon as practicable to achieve coordination with the UNRPR program, to facilitate repatriation, resettlement and compensation, employment and emigration of refugees, and to represent the refugees vis-à-vis Israel and other governments.

4. Support the PCC proposal that it add to its staff other technical experts to initiate certain planning studies with respect to the refugees and the problems which will be faced in their repatriation and resettlement, which can be undertaken immediately within the present political context. Assist in the recruitment of the necessary personnel.

5. Initiate immediately planning required for the establishment of a broader economic survey group to be set up under the authority of the PCC as soon as political conditions permit, which would, in full cooperation with the states concerned and with other interested UN members, international and private organizations, examine the situation in the countries concerned in the light of existing surveys and recommend measures required to:

a. Overcome economic dislocations created by the recent hostilities;
b. Provide necessary assistance for refugees from the hostilities and for their reintegration into the political and economic life of the area on a self-sustaining basis;
c. Foster actively such economic development projects as are required to achieve the foregoing and which will, at the same time, serve to increase the economic potential of the countries concerned.

The technical group would recommend specific projects and sources of financing, as well as an integrated economic program and means of carrying it out.

6. At an appropriate stage in the work of the economic survey group, a more permanent agency would be created, pursuant to PCC recommendation, to carry out the approved program. Such agency would rely wherever possible on direct action of the states concerned, other UN members, international and private organizations. It would coordinate such activities, facilitate the furnishing of technical and

financial assistance required and exercise general supervisory functions.

[Annex 4] [4]

Palestine Refugee Problem

Proposed Steps to be Taken within U.S. Government

1. Approval of proposed Policy Recommendations and Plan of Action by the Secretary.

2. Preliminary discussion of proposed policy and plan of action with the President, particularly with respect to Recommendations 1 and 8.

3. Preliminary discussion of proposed policy and plan of action with Congressional leaders, particularly with respect to Recommendation 8.

4. Preliminary discussion of proposed policy and plan of action with the British, and determination of part UK can and will play in refugee program.

5. Initiation of action under Recommendation 1 and 2 and Proposed Plan of Action 1–5.

6. Preliminary discussion with Presidents of International Bank and Export-Import Bank to determine extent to which their institutions can participate in financing development projects which will contribute toward refugee resettlement.

7. Discussions with representatives of U.S. private organizations interested in the Palestine refugee problem to obtain their views on the proposed program and the contribution they can make to it.

8. Referral of whole question of the Palestine refugee problem to the National Security Council for decision as to action called for in the light of the national interest.

9. Final decision by the President on action to be taken in the light of the NSC decision.

10. Final discussion of President's program with Congressional leaders, with indication of possible financial assistance to be sought from Congress.

11. Assuming political conditions in Near East permit, activate economic survey group called for in Recommendation 6 and Plan of Action 5 by assisting PCC to obtain outstanding American to head up group and competent technicians for its staff.

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[4] This paper is undated.

[Annex 5] [5]

Palestine Refugee Problem

Tentative approach to total cost of program

1. Approach on basis of cost for support of refugees:

Assume that outside assistance for direct support of the refugees will be required on a decreasing scale for 3 years.

Assume that 700,000 refugees must be supported for the first year, whether resettled or repatriated, an average of 500,000 for the second year, and an average of 300,000 for the third year.

Assume that the total outside cost of supporting refugees is $30.00 per person per year on a relief basis and $60.00 per person per year on a work relief basis.

Assume that 3/4ths of refugees will be supported the first year on the basis of work payments and 1/4th on the basis of relief, and that in the next two years 7/8th will be supported through work payments and 1/8th through relief.

Total Cost for Direct Support on This Basis

	1st year	2nd year	3rd year	Total
Relief	$ 5, 250, 000	$ 1, 875, 000	$ 1, 125, 000	$ 8, 250, 000
Work	31, 500, 000	26, 250, 000	15, 750, 000	73, 500, 000
Total	$36, 750, 000	$28, 125, 000	$16, 875, 000	$81, 750, 000

2. Approach from standpoint of resettlement cost:

Assume total cost of resettlement is $350.00 per person and for repatriation $175.00 per person.

Assume 2/3rds of these sums will be paid for wages and other local currency costs which will be furnished on a grant basis, and 1/3rd for foreign exchange expenses or other items which can be set up on a loan basis.

Assume these funds will be required over a period of three years in ratio 5.3.3.

Total Cost for Resettlement

	1st year	2nd year	3rd year	Total
Loan	$32, 000, 000	$19, 000, 000	$19, 000, 000	$ 70, 000, 000
Grant	64, 000, 000	38, 000, 000	38, 000, 000	140, 000, 000
Total	$96, 000, 000	$57, 000, 000	$57, 000, 000	$210, 000, 000

3. Although there is on the basis of "2", adequate grant funds for expenditure for wages of refugees it cannot be assumed that all of

[5] This paper is undated.

these funds will be applicable to refugees. Some refugees will not be employable on resettlement projects, and some resettlement wage expenditures must be made to other local labor.

Capital outlays in addition to those required for refugee resettlement will also be required to assure a balanced program within each country and to provide some legitimate development in the countries concerned not directly connected with refugee resettlement.

4. It is tentatively estimated that total cost of an integrated program will be between 250,000,000 to 300,000,000, of which approximately 2/3rds will be on a grant basis and 1/3rd on a loan basis. Source of such funds might be as follows:

International Bank and/or Ex-Im Bank	$100,000,000
Compensation from Israel	50,000,000
Grant thru UN	100–150,000,000
U.S. share (70%) of grant†	70–105,000,000

†Near East already allocated $12,000,000 for fiscal 1950 for technical assistance under planning for Point Four Program. [Footnote in the source text.]

501.BB Palestine/5–449

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 25, 1949.

Item No. 3—President Weizmann's Visit

The President went over the four points [1] which we hoped he would stress with President Weizmann. He approved of them all.

After luncheon I got separated from the President and Mr. Weizmann and involved with other guests. The President, Mr. Weizmann, the Israeli Ambassador, and the Vice President discussed the four points.

The President told me, after the interview, that he had made all four points. He said that President Weizmann had taken a helpful attitude on all of them. He said that the internationalization of Jerusalem could be worked out. He foresaw no insoluble difficulty in the boundary matters. He said that Israel would help financially with the refugees. I am not clear as to what was said about repatriation, although I know that the President pressed him on this matter.

As we were leaving, President Weizmann asked the President again for assistance on UN membership. I said that the Israeli representa-

[1] The four points were set forth in a memorandum of April 23 from Mr. Rusk to Secretary Acheson for his conversation with President Truman concerning the latter's luncheon with President Weizmann later the same day. They dealt with the position of the United States on the internationalization of Jerusalem, boundary settlement, the refugee question and Israeli membership in the United Nations (867N.01/4–2349). The luncheon was actually held on April 25.

tives could really be of more assistance than we could if they would show a conciliatory attitude along the lines mentioned to Mr. Weizmann by the President.

As we were parting, President Weizmann said that he thought it might be a good idea for him to have a talk with me. I think that it might be worthwhile to follow this up while they are here.[2]

[2] The editors have found no documentation in the Department of State files indicating a followup conversation with President Weizmann.

501.AA/4-2649

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 26, 1949.

Subject: Israel's Desire for Admission to the U.N.

Participants: The Secretary, Mr. Acheson
Mr. Elath, Ambassador of Israel
Mr. Eban, Israeli Representative at Lake Success
Mr. Satterthwaite, Director, NEA

Ambassador Elath opened the conversation by reviewing the position of Israel's application for admission to the UN. He said that his Government attached such importance to this matter that he wished to introduce Mr. Eban, who was in charge of the problem at Lake Success and have him discuss the situation with me.

Mr. Eban then spoke at some length along the lines of a conversation he and Mr. Elath had had with Senator Austin in New York a few days ago. He emphasized the great disadvantage under which in his opinion the Israeli Government was working by not being a member of the U.N. The six Arab States, on the other hand, had the great advantage of not only being able to express their views to the GA, but they also, by virtue of their six votes, could have considerable influence on the votes of other members.

Mr. Eban remarked that the questions of Jerusalem, the Arab refugees and the boundaries seemed to be those causing the greatest difficulty. He then went on to discuss these three problems, devoting the greater part of the exposition to the Jerusalem situation.

He said that the Israelis had not only supported the plan for Jerusalem set forth in the resolution of November 29, 1947 but had participated in its drafting. Subsequently, however, the Arab States themselves had violently opposed the implementation of this plan by engaging in hostilities. He felt that insufficient importance had been attached internationally to the fact that whereas one year ago the conditions in Jerusalem had been those of utter destruction and

chaotic warfare, peace and order had subsequently been restored, thanks to the efforts of the Israeli Government, to a remarkable degree. The problem was one of integrating the necessities of the State of Israel with the desires of the other states to maintain and protect the Holy Places. In this connection he asserted that 95% of the Holy Places are controlled by the Arabs. He thought, however, that considerable progress had been made and that a solution satisfactory to the U.N. was possible. In this connection he cited the address of President Weizmann of April 23 which, he said, had the full support and authority of the Israeli Government.

With reference to the refugees Mr. Eban thought that emphasis should be on resettlement rather than repatriation, although the Israeli Government had never rejected the idea of repatriation.

He felt that there should be less difficulty in reaching a settlement regarding boundaries and hoped that by negotiation this could be worked out at Lausanne.

Toward the conclusion of his rather lengthy exposition, the intent of which was to present as strong a case as possible for Israel's early admission to the U.N., Mr. Eban said that his Government planned, at an early stage of the Lausanne talks, to make a statement of a conciliatory nature which he hoped would be of assistance in expediting Israel's admission.

When Mr. Eban had finished I said that I felt that the Israeli Government itself was in a much better position to facilitate its entrance into the U.N. than we were. I recalled that I had suggested to President Weizmann at the White House luncheon yesterday that if Israel would only make some conciliatory gesture or statement along the lines that we have suggested, we would then have some basis on which to talk to the other nations in the General Asssembly.

Frankly, I continued, I had been very disappointed in my failure to obtain any results from the two long talks I had with Mr. Sharett. Not only had my suggestions not been acted upon but in some ways it seemed that we were farther away from a solution than when I had talked with Mr. Sharett. The three questions, in order of importance, which appeared to call for some explanation by the Israeli Government were the refugees, Jerusalem and the boundaries.

With reference to the refugees, I had never suggested that Israel accept a specified number now. I had only suggested to Mr. Sharett that Israel first announce that it would accept the principle of repatriation. Next, at least half of the refugees had come from areas outside the Israeli boundaries fixed by the UN Resolution which were under Israeli military occupation. Surely it should be possible to allow a good number of such refugees to return to non-strategic areas. Then, later on, when the final peace settlement had been reached, or shortly

before, it should be possible to determine the exact number which could be repatriated. Mr. Sharett, in spite of my two talks with him, had flatly rejected this thesis and had even gone so far, when I had suggested the emotional and moral values that my proposals might have, as to suggest that such values should not be taken into consideration in international settlements. I had therefore been pleased to read President Weizmann's statements. I could only wish that he had been present when Mr. Sharett had been making his views known to me.

With reference to Jerusalem, I was glad to note that progress was apparently being made and mentioned in this connection the arrangements which were under way for Dr. Weizmann to discuss that problem with Cardinal Spellman.

As to the boundaries, I was disappointed to learn from Mr. Ethridge's telegrams that Mr. Ben-Gurion was apparently adamant in clinging to the view that Israel was entitled not only to the territory allowed it by the UNGA resolution but to all the rest of the territory it occupied militarily. Since, in writing at least, I understood the Government of Israel to accept the position that it was willing to negotiate on the basis of the November 29, 1947 resolution, it seemed to me that this was a very unwise position to take.

We were fully in accord with Israel's making the best bargain it could but did not want this bargaining to be on the basis of threats. This was particularly important in view of the fact that a bad bargain would not lead to permanent peace. As they knew, the Arab Governments were already under heavy attack from their public and press for having been too hasty in signing armistice agreements. If the final boundary settlements were such as to lead the Arab peoples to believe they had been imposed by force, Israel would, in my view, be acting contrary to its own best interests.

Again I pointed out that I was not trying to tell the Israeli Government what it should do. The U.S. had supported Israel's application for membership and would continue to do so. Unless, however, the Israeli Government were willing to make its position known on these important issues, it would be difficult for the U.S. Delegation to go to the other nations at Lake Success and endeavor to persuade them that they should also vote for Israel's admission at this session.[1]

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[1] The Department, on April 27, informed New York that the "US not in position join in sponsoring resolution for admission Israel pending further info re possibility Israeli reps Lausanne giving assurances concerning status Jerusalem, Palestine refugees, and territorial settlement which would create favorable atmosphere for admission Israel.

"Such res unnecessary for action on application and would, if presented in manner suggested, be attempt influence other dels. Our position of support for application when actually considered remains unchanged." (telegram Gadel 23, 501.AA/4–2749)

Both Ambassador Elath and Mr. Eban replied briefly to my remarks. They felt that perhaps Mr. Sharett's real views had not been fully understood. Mr. Eban expressed himself as optimistic regarding the possibility of reaching an agreement on the boundaries and Ambassador Elath felt that the question of the refugees could also be worked out, once the question of the danger to Israel's vital interests had been eliminated. They said they would, of course, make my views known to their Government and seek clarification of their Government's views on the points I had raised.[2]

[2] The Department summarized this memorandum for Tel Aviv on April 28 in telegram 250 (501.AA/4–2849). The telegram also noted that "Elath called Apr 28 once more to urge speedy action re Israeli membership UN. Expressed conviction Lausanne talks would not be real success as long as Israel not member, since Arab states would see no reason take speedy action toward final peace as long as world community apparently did not regard Israel as worthy of membership. Dept reiterated necessity Israel's making conciliatory gesture on three above points in order create atmosphere favorable admission Israel. Elath said he realized Israel would have to make some compromise re refugees, but that naturally Israeli Govt did not wish give away this valuable trump card before final peace negotiations."

Telegram 250 concluded with the instruction to Tel Aviv to "Pls seek earliest appropriate opportunity convey PrimMin and FonMin substance Secy's conversations with Eban and Elath, emphasizing in strongest terms points made by Secy."

501.BB Palestine/4–2649

The President of Israel (Weizmann) to President Truman

WASHINGTON, April 26, 1949.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Our meeting yesterday was a memorable occasion and again, on behalf of my government and myself, I thank you for your hospitality and profound understanding.

Because of the peace negotiations about to begin in Lausanne, I was especially heartened by your observations regarding the admission of Israel to the United Nations. So long as the Arab governments seek by political means to destroy the elements of stability in the present situation, neither Israel nor the Arab peoples will be free to turn their energies to peaceful development. No single act, in my judgment, will contribute so much to the pacification of the Middle East, as the speedy admission of Israel to the United Nations, and the withdrawal of this final act of recognition from the arena of political debate.

I was also extremely happy to learn that you were familiar with the position of my government on the question of Jerusalem. As I stated last Saturday, although Israel bears a direct and inescapable responsibility for Jewish Jerusalem, I am satisfied that there is no real incompatibility between the interests and concerns of Christianity, to which His Holiness the Pope has recently given eloquent expression,

and the aspirations of the people of Jerusalem to assure their government and security in conformity with their national allegiance. I firmly believe that a harmonious solution of this problem can swiftly be secured with international consent. The concern which you expressed and the considerations which you emphasized lend added force to the urgency for a speedy and broadly acceptable solution.

I stress again that we are fully mindful of the problem of the Arab refugees and of our own obligations toward them. But, except to a limited degree, the answer lies, as I stated, not in repatriation but in resettlement. As a scientist and a student of the problem, I know the possibilities of development of the Middle East. I have long felt that the underpopulated and fertile acres in the river valleys of Iraq constitute both a seductive invitation to neighboring countries and a massive opportunity for development and progress in the Middle East. Similar opportunities exist also in northern Syria and western Transjordan. In that development the government of Israel will make its contribution.

For all that you have done, Mr. President, in facilitating the establishment and recognition of my country—beginning with your plea for the admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees—I again express the profound gratitude and thanks of the people of Israel. Your leadership has been a source of inspiration and encouragement to us. And under your leadership I look forward in the long future to warm and friendly relationships between the government of the United States and the government of Israel.[1]

Yours sincerely, CH. WEIZMANN

[1] President Truman sent a brief acknowledgment on April 27, in which he expressed his appreciation of "your frank conversations in regard to things pending with regard to Israel.

"I hope everything will work out in a satisfactory manner and we can eventually get a lasting peace in the Middle East."

501.BB Palestine/4–2649

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 26, 1949.

Subject: United States Position Regarding Jerusalem

The Palestine Conciliation Commission which meets in Lausanne today will resume its consideration of some kind of international

[1] Sent also by Leonard C. Meeker of the Office of the Legal Adviser, and Durward V. Sandifer, Acting Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs.

regime for Jerusalem on the basis of the December 11 Assembly Resolution. It will be necessary to give some directives to Mr. Ethridge and for this purpose four possible alternatives are outlined at the end of this paper for your consideration.

Until now the discussions with Israel and Transjordan on this subject have led to no agreement, except that both parties reject any far-reaching scheme of internationalization. The Prime Minister of Israel flatly stated to the Commission at Tel Aviv 7th of April "that the Israeli Government accepted without reservation the international regime for the holy places, but maintained that Jerusalem outside the holy places should be a part of the State of Israel". He added that the State of Israel "would take its case on the Jerusalem question to the General Assembly".

A recent telegram from Mr. Ethridge (Palun 127)[2] outlines a proposal which combines certain elements of the French paper and various unofficial suggestions by the USDel which Mr. Ethridge thinks represents a sound basis for the Commission's recommendations to the General Assembly. This combined draft, which is the basis of Alternative 2 below, is based on a minimal international obligation for Jerusalem under which a United Nations Administrator appointed by the General Assembly would have direct control over the holy places, including power to control access to them and decide disputes regarding them. The Jewish and Arab authorities respectively would be responsible for the day-to-day administration over their respective zones. Jerusalem would be demilitarized and formal assurances given by the two parties regarding inviolability of demarcation lines. This proposal appears to follow fairly closely the line indicated by the Secretary to Mr. Sharett on April 5.

This memorandum sketches four possible approaches to the Jerusalem problem.

Alternatives

1. *International control of holy places alone.*

The PCC might recommend that it was inadvisable or impossible to give concrete expression to the international interest in Jerusalem other than by providing for United Nations control of specified holy places in the Jerusalem area. This control could be exercised by a United Nations Administrator designated by and responsible to the General Assembly. The Administrator would have power to make regulations for use of holy place guards. The expenses of the Administrator, an appropriate staff, and the guards would be met by the United Nations budget. This arrangement for United Nations control of the holy places would be subject to approval by the General Assembly and

[2] Identified also as telegram 300, April 16, from Jerusalem, p. 920.

would come into force when accepted by the Governments of Israel and Trans-Jordan; these Governments, it is presumed, would partition Jerusalem, aside from the holy places, by agreement between themselves, and such direct discussions are now actually in progress. The resolution of the General Assembly approving the above arrangements for the holy places could contain provisions regarding access to the holy places.

2. *United Nations administration of holy places, partition of Jerusalem, and international undertakings covering the area.*

In Palun 127 the United States Delegation to the Palestine Conciliation Commission has suggested a plan which goes somewhat further than the previous alternative but falls short of a true international regime for the City of Jerusalem. Under this plan the holy places in the Jerusalem area would be subject to the regime outlined in Alternative 1 above. In addition, the remainder of Jerusalem would be partitioned into Arab and Jewish zones, to be administered by Trans-Jordan and Israel, respectively. Persons living in one of the zones would have the citizenship of the state administering that zone. Jerusalem would be demilitarized. There would be international undertakings that the Declaration of Human Rights, approved by the General Assembly in December 1948, should be taken as a standard for the conduct of administration in the two zones. There would be an international administrative council, four from each zone and two neutral, to advise the two groups of zonal authorities on common services, coordination of police functions, city planning, economic arrangements, and other matters of municipal concern. There would be a right of access across the zones of Jerusalem to the holy places for all persons determined by the United Nations Administrator to be entitled to frequent these places. For the most part, local courts would perform judicial functions in their respective zones. There might be a mixed tribunal to handle civil cases in which there was zonal diversity of parties. There should be an international Court of Justice to decide questions concerning the interpretation and application of the arrangements for Jerusalem. This tribunal would give its opinion upon request by the authorities of either zone or by the United Nations Administrator. Opinions of the tribunal should be regarded as binding on the zonal authorities and the Administrator. All of the above arrangements for Jerusalem would be embodied in an instrument perhaps called a Statute. This Statute would first be approved by the General Assembly. It would come into force upon deposit with the Secretary General of acceptances by the Governments of Trans-Jordan and Israel. Finally, the Statute would provide that it could be amended

or revoked by the General Assembly in a further exercise by that body of its dispositive power over Jerusalem.

3. *United Nations trusteeship for the Old City.*

A third alternative has been suggested, in which the arrangements referred to above in Alternatives 1 and 2 would be augmented by placing the Old City of Jerusalem under the international trusteeship system of the United Nations. The Old City, about one square mile which is now occupied by the Arabs, contains important Christian, Jewish and Moslem shrines. Under such an arrangement the United Nations Organization itself could be the administering authority for the trust territory, pursuant to Article 81 of the Charter. Under this alternative, the provisions with respect to holy places in the Jerusalem area would be the same as those outlined in Alternatives 1 and 2. The actual administration of the trust territory would presumably be carried on by a United Nations Administrator and staff provided for by the Trusteeship Council, but its public utilities would be assimilated to the other parts of the city. Trusteeship over the Old City of Jerusalem alone would have serious political disadvantages from the Arab point of view.

4. *Two trusteeships for Jerusalem.*

A fourth alternative would be to institute the arrangements contemplated in Alternative 3 by means of placing the Arab zone of Jerusalem under Trans-Jordanian trusteeship and the Jewish zone under Israeli trusteeship. The provisions of Alternative 1 with respect to holy places might be retained, with a United Nations Administrator controlling them. During Secretary Acheson's talk with Foreign Minister Sharett of Israel early in April, the Secretary suggested trusteeship as a possible solution for the Jerusalem problem. Mr. Sharett, while not committing himself or purporting to express the views of his Government, indicated that he thought trusteeship might provide a solution and that the idea deserved to be looked into. If Trans-Jordan and Israel were to become administering authorities over two trust territories in Jerusalem, problems would be raised by the seating of these two countries on the Trusteeship Council when they are admitted to membership in the United Nations. Not only would Israel and Trans-Jordan be admitted to the Council, but two more nonadministering powers would have to be elected to the Council. Enlargement of the Trusteeship Council would probably impair somewhat the efficiency of that organ, More important, however, the problems of the two Jerusalem trust territories would be so different from the problems of the other trust territories that it is questionable

whether it would be appropriate to place Jerusalem under trusteeships and introduce into the Trusteeship Council two or four states having no experience with colonial problems. Naturally Israel, Trans-Jordan, and the two additional nonadministering powers would have a voice in all matters coming before the Trusteeship Council. It appears from Palun 127 that the United States Delegation to the Palestine Conciliation Commission doubts the advisability of trying to accomplish through trusteeships the objectives of the international community concerning Jerusalem.

Recommendations

The Offices which join in this memorandum believe that Alternative 2 would be preferable to any of the others. There are several reasons which point toward this conclusion:

1. The United States Delegation to the Palestine Conciliation Commission regards a plan along the lines of Alternative 2 as constituting the most realistic and desirable plan under the circumstances.
2. Such a plan would give expression to the interests of the international community in Jerusalem.
3. At the same time it would not involve the United Nations Organization in substantial expenses or administrative responsibilites.
4. This plan, perhaps with certain modifications and adjustments, would seem to be possible of acceptance by the respective parties.
5. The plan would avoid certain difficulties for the Trusteeship Council which it is believed would result from a plan comprising two trusteeships for Jerusalem.

If you concur, we think instructions in the sense of the above should be sent to Mr. Ethridge. If you feel that the Jerusalem problem requires further consultation within the Department at the present stage, it is suggested that you might wish to meet at an early date with officers of NEA, UNA and L to discuss this problem in order to reach a Departmental decision on the instructions which should be sent to Mr. Ethridge.

867N.113/5–1949

The British Embassy to the Department of State [1]

SECRET

PALESTINE ARMS EMBARGO

In view of British treaty relations with certain of the Arab states and of the British Government's concern about internal security in the Middle Eastern countries, the Foreign Office have been giving

[1] Handed to Secretary Acheson by British Ambassador Franks on April 29; see Secretary Acheson's memorandum of conversation, April 29, p. 958.

thought to the question whether the time has not come, now that armistice agreements have been signed, for the Palestine arms embargo to be lifted. Mr. Bevin thinks that, as Dr. Bunche has announced that he considers his mission complete, there will be no need to discuss the matter with him, but Mr. Bevin would like to learn the views of the United States Government on this question.

2. Mr. Bevin is convinced of the urgent need to make some immediate and favourable response to repeated Arab requests for arms. Now that armistice agreements covering the whole front in Palestine have been signed, and in view of the declaration which Mr. Bevin made at the signing of the Atlantic Pact to the effect that it did not minimise either British interest in or determination to support others not included in the Pact with whom the British Government had had long years of friendship and alliances, there appear to be no sufficient arguments to justify continued British refusal to supply the armaments requested. This is particularly so in the case of Egypt where, as the State Department know, the first steps towards technical military talks between the British and Egyptian authorities are now being taken. The British Ambassador at Cairo considers that the talks cannot succeed unless the arms embargo is raised, at least so far as Egypt is concerned. In order to secure British military requirements there, the British Government must be prepared to assist the Egyptian Government to build up their own military strength. The British Government cannot hope to persuade any Egyptian Government to agree to their requests unless they can prove conclusively that they are willing to help in the development of strong, well trained and well equipped Egyptian armed forces. Mr. Bevin believes that Mr. Acheson will agree that a military agreement with Egypt would have an important effect on the stability of the whole of the Middle East.

3. The need to fulfil British treaty obligations to Iraq and Transjordan is, in Mr. Bevin's view, hardly less pressing than in the case of Egypt. There is reason to fear trouble in Arab Palestine from the ex-Mufti's irregulars, who must now be disbanded, as well as from the Kurds in Iraq. The British Government therefore feel that the least they can do is to permit the supply of certain quantities of war material to Egypt, Iraq, and Transjordan and, if necessary, to the other Arab states for internal security and training purposes. The British Government would ask for suitable guarantees that these supplies would not be used for offensive purposes in Palestine. Such supplies would, however, in any case amount to so little that any resumption of fighting against the now well-equipped Israeli army would be out of the question.

4. Mr. Bevin is sure that Mr. Acheson will agree that it cannot have been the intention of the United Nations to make it impossible for the Arab states to keep order within their own frontiers, yet this has been the effect of the embargo, notably in Iraq. In view of the approval given by the Acting Mediator some time ago to the supply of war material by France to Syria for internal security, and of the fact that Dr. Bunche's functions have virtually come to an end, the British Government would be prepared, provided they had the support of the United States Government, to proceed on the lines suggested above without further reference to the United Nations.

5. It may be that the United States Government, if they are in general agreement with these arguments, would prefer to deal with the matter in one stage by raising the embargo altogether forthwith. The British Government would not object to this. But since it might be held necessary to obtain a United Nations resolution for that purpose, there are perhaps advantages in going no further than the proposal made in paragraph 3 above. In this connexion the British Government would see no objection to the supply of war material by the United States to Israel for internal security purposes.

6. The British Government would be grateful for the views of the United States Government on this question as soon as possible.

[WASHINGTON,] 27th April, 1949.

501.BB Palestine/4–2849

Memorandum of Conversation With the President, by the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 28, 1949.

Item No. 2—Letter from Dr. Weizmann

The President showed me a letter from Dr. Weizmann,[1] a copy of which will come to us today.

The letter referred to a request that we assist by talking with other members of the United Nations on the subject of admission of Israel to the United Nations. The President agreed that Dr. Weizmann's attitude on refugees was not satisfactory and thought that we were not in a position to bring pressure on other members of the United Nations.

I related to the President my last meeting with Ambassador Elath and Mr. Eban.[2]

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[1] Dated April 26, p. 947.

[2] See Secretary Acheson's memorandum of conversation, April 26, p. 944.

501.BB Palestine/4–2849 : Telegram

Mr. Mark F. Ethridge to the Secretary of State

SECRET LAUSANNE, April 28, 1949—11 a. m.

PCC 1. Palun 136. From Ethridge. Scheduled commencement PCC meeting with Israel and Arab states at Lausanne April 26 held up 24 hours on account delayed arrival interested delegations. On April 27 PCC met separately with Israeli Delegation consisting of Gershon Hirsch and Eliahu Sassoon, with Egyptian Delegation consisting of Abdel Chafey el Labab and Mahmud Rhmazi and with Lebanese Delegation consisting of Fuad Bey Amoun and Mohamed Ali Hamade. PCC meeting with Syrian Delegation consisting of Adnan Atassi planned April 28. PCC informed Transjordan Delegation will arrive this week. Saudi Arabia will not attend, but will accept such arrangements as other Arab states make with Israel. Iraq refused at Beirut to attend and has not yet sent expected informal observer. Yemen understood maintain same position as Saudi Arabia.

Substance of remarks by Israeli Delegation indicated Israel had not altered its position re refugees and Jerusalem as stated by Ben Gurion, Sharett and Comay. Hirsch made no allusion whatsoever to conciliatory statement re refugees nor manifested any disposition to work with PCC on possible plans for internationalization of Jerusalem. On contrary Hirsch stressed conclusion of peace with Arab states was primary objective. Refugee question and Jerusalem could not be discussed in advance, but could be considered during peace talks. Hirsch and Sassoon strongly urged PCC recommend to GA that it not debate refugees and Jerusalem at Lake Success while they were being considered at Lausanne. Hirsch believed if full debate took place at Lake Success public declarations on refugees and Jerusalem would undoubtedly be required which would have important effect on quiet negotiations at Lausanne. Hirsch stated that there was no disposition on part of Israeli Delegation now to discuss current questions at Lausanne if debate took place at Lake Success. It was made clear, nevertheless, that little progress could be expected at Lausanne in interim.

Hirsch also indicated Israeli Delegation would be unable to exchange views with Syrian Delegation before present Israeli-Syrian armistice negotiations were concluded. Peace talks with Arab States should be limited in each case to subjects of common concern. Egypt, for example, had no more right to discuss Jerusalem than Persia or Turkey. Israel hoped, therefore, that pertinent agenda would be arranged between Israel and various Arab States. PCC, on other hand, might have its own agendas with Israel and Arab States respectively.

Egyptian and Lebanese Delegations both stated their presence at Lausanne indicated cooperation with PCC and desire for peace. Both considered, however, that solution for refugee problem and Jerusalem were essential before peace talks could progress. Discussion re territorial questions was premature at this stage. Amoun indicated, however, that Lebanese Delegation was ready to discuss Jerusalem and Holy Places with Jerusalem Committee immediately.

Following meetings with Israeli, Egyptian and Lebanese Delegations, PCC considered Israeli request that PCC recommend to GA that it not debate such questions as refugees and Jerusalem while PCC was discussing at Lausanne. PCC decided it would be presumptuous on its part to make such recommendation and felt that if it were subsequently necessary to submit special or periodic report to GA such reports should be confined to statement of Israeli and Arab cooperation with PCC and degree of acceptance of provisions of GA resolution December 11.

[ETHRIDGE]

501.BB Palestine/4–2849 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, April 28, 1949—7 p. m.

544. Unpal 85. For Ethridge. Elath Apr 28 gave Dept copy cable sent by Sharett Apr 27 to Dr. Mohn [1] and you. Fol salient points.

Israeli Govt much concerned over Syrian unwillingness to withdraw forces occupying Israeli territory. Israel agreed withdraw forces from Leb during Israeli-Leb armistice negots and negot with Syria can make no progress unless Syrian Govt prepared accept same principle. Syrian delegation appears using presence Syrian troops on Israeli soil as means bringing pressure on Israel agree to what is liable become permanent alteration in frontier between two countries. Israel bound insist withdrawal Syrian troops as essential condition conclusion armistice agreement. Israeli Govt also disturbed by press reports concerning Syrian intention mobilize immed 20,000 additional men and inclined view this may be cover for new aggressive action contemplated against Israel. Under circumstances Israel sees little profit in discussing final settlement with Syrian delegation Lausanne and so long as no progress is made in Israeli-Syrian armistice negots owing Syrian Govt refusal accept polit boundary as armistice demarcation line

[1] Paul Mohn, Chief Political Adviser to Mr. Bunche.

Israeli delegation Lausanne will be instructed not enter formal or informal conversations with Syrian reps.[2]

Elath bespoke Dept's assistance persuading Syrian Govt agree withdrawal troops. Dept stated US only recognized Syria Apr 27 and Dept doubted advisability approaching Syrian Govt this matter at present. Informed Elath that believed preferable await outcome such efforts as Dr. Mohn might make this regard but would reconsider situation if no progress made Israeli-Syrian negots next few days. Dept stated belief it essential Israeli-Syrian armistice agreement be speedily concluded so that Syria could effectively participate in Lausanne talks.

ACHESON

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[2] Mr. Sharett's message of April 27 was summarized by Mr. Ethridge in his telegram from Lausanne of April 29. Mr. Ethridge also added that "PCC decided April 29 inform Foreign Minister that SC and Bunche were responsible for armistice agreements and PCC had no jurisdiction.

"My personal opinion is armistice agreement between Syria and Israel should if possible be concluded prior Lausanne but that Israel argument without validity based on understanding Syrian line in Israel established before truce whereas Israel's line in Lebanon established after truce. Furthermore past armistice agreements were concluded without prejudice political settlement." (Palun 138, 501.MA Palestine/4–2949)

This telegram was repeated to Damascus as No. 184 and to Tel Aviv and New York. Mr. Bunche informed the United States Mission at the United Nations that private military talks between the Israelis and Syrians to discuss armistice lines and reduction of forces had broken down at the first meeting on April 27 (telegram Delga 63, April 29, 5:32 p. m., from New York, 501.BB Palestine/4–2949).

501.BB Palestine/4–2949

The President to Mr. Mark F. Ethridge, at Jerusalem

[WASHINGTON,] April 29, 1949.

DEAR MARK: I appreciated very much your letter of the eleventh and I was particularly interested in the attitude of the Arabs with regard to the present situation.

I am rather disgusted with the manner in which the Jews are approaching the refugee problem. I told the President of Israel in the presence of his Ambassador just exactly what I thought about it. It may have some effect, I hope so.

Sincerely yours, [HARRY S. TRUMAN]

867N.113/4–2949

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 29, 1949.

Subject: Palestine Arms Embargo

Participants: Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador
The Secretary of State
Mr. John D. Hickerson, Director for European Affairs

Sir Oliver Franks came in to see me at 12 noon today by appointment made at his request. He handed me the attached self-explanatory memorandum dated April 27, 1949 entitled "Palestine Arms Embargo." [1] Sir Oliver summarized briefly the contents of this memorandum, stressing the British Government's concern about internal security in the Middle East countries and stating that Mr. Bevin is convinced of the urgent need to make some immediate and favorable response to repeated Arab requests for arms. Sir Oliver stated that in all cases except Egypt the arms would be entirely for the maintenance of internal security. As regards Egypt, he stated, the first steps toward technical military talks between the British and Egyptian authorities [2] are now being taken and the British Government proposes to furnish the Egyptian Government, in order to secure British military requirements there, assistance in building up Egypt's own military strength.

I inquired whether the British Government contemplates talking to Dr. Bunche about this matter. Sir Oliver replied that his government did not contemplate approaching Dr. Bunche about this in view of his announcement that he considers his mission complete. I also inquired about the time element and Sir Oliver replied that while his government regarded the matter as urgent, he did not believe that he could mention any particular time element within which they desire to act.

I inquired whether he had any information about the type and quantity of arms involved. Sir Oliver replied that he had very limited information on this subject. He went on to say that he understood that nothing more than small arms would be involved for countries other than Egypt. For Egypt the British Government contemplates supplying not only small arms but probably some light artillery and some light tanks.

I told Sir Oliver that we would examine his memorandum carefully and sympathetically and get in touch with him later about it. I pointed out that I had inquired about timing largely for the reason that the furnishing of arms to Middle East countries by the British Govern-

[1] See p. 952.

[2] For documentation on this subject, see pp. 186 ff.

ment may introduce an element of importance in connection with the consideration in Congress of our Military Assistance Pact. Sir Oliver commented that this had probably not been considered in London and that he would call Mr. Bevin's attention to this aspect of the matter which he himself considered as one of importance.

Sir Oliver commented in passing that it was not clear whether his government contemplated formal action for lifting of the Palestine Arms Embargo by UN action or whether, if the U.S. Government agreed, his government simply contemplates assuring the Middle East governments in question that the arms will be furnished without formal action by the UN.

501.BB Palestine/4–2949 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 29, 1949—5 p. m.

Unrealistic and intransigent attitude of both Israel and Arab states re agreement to repatriation and resettlement, respectively, of Arab refugees has created problem of serious concern to USG and major obstacle to PCC's task of implementing Dec 11 res with respect to refugees. Coincidental with PCC meetings Lausanne, Dept considers it essential that strongest diplomatic approach be made to both sides in endeavor to soften their respective attitudes this question and to support PCC in its task. We are suggesting similar approach to Arabs by UK Govt.

Pls make earliest approach to PrimMin and FonMin of Govt to which you are accredited along fol lines:

USG continues support principle of repatriation of refugees so desiring in accordance GA res of Dec 11. On Apr 5 Secy made strong representations to Israeli FonMin re Pres' conviction of necessity for early Israeli agreement to repatriation; Pres on Apr 25 took occasion Weizmann's visit to press him re repatriation; Secy made similar approach to Israeli Amb Apr 26. USG will continue use best efforts vis-à-vis Israel this regard. However, USG is in full agreement with PCC's second progress report to UN, which emphasizes likelihood that not all refugees will decide return to their homes and consequent necessity obtaining agreement in principle by Arab states to resettlement those not desiring repatriation.

Earliest beginning to liquidation this question essential in view rapid depletion UNRPR funds. Since establishment UNRPR, UN members

[1] At Jidda, Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, and Amman, presumably for action; and to London and Jerusalem and to Bern for Mr. Ethridge, for information.

have contributed generously to alleviation plight of refugees, and have relieved Arab states of large measure enormous burden of relief. However, unless evidence is forthcoming that both sides are cooperating with PCC in endeavoring liquidate problem, and that concrete progress is being made therein, there is likelihood further aid would not be forthcoming from international sources, and that legislatures UN member states would be unwilling agree to further extension assistance.

Ref is made to recommendation of PCC in its progress report that Israel and Arab states might undertake program of public works which would make possible return of refugees and early absorption those not desiring return to their homes. USG notes with interest PCC's expressed willingness recommend favorable action on such a request by UN organs if Israel and Arab states should apply for technical and financial aid in preparing and executing such a program.

USG deeply hopeful Arab states will give early indication their willingness to contribute to resettlement of those not desiring return Israel. This would immeasurably facilitate ability PCC to formulate effective plans for disposition refugee question as whole, and would be important element in influencing attitude of UN member states towards possibility further assistance.

At meetings with PCC in Lausanne, USG considers both Israel and Arab states have significant responsibility for cooperating with PCC in obtaining agreed settlement to permit earliest feasible liquidation this problem, and avoid its perpetuation as threat to peace, stability and development of all Near Eastern states.[2]

ACHESON

[2] The Department additionally informed London, on April 29, that "McGhee's survey of Arab refugee situation, and reports of our diplomatic missions and PCC emphasize fact that no progress possible re liquidation problem until political atmosphere improved by Israeli agreement to principle repatriation and Arab agreement to principle resettlement. USG therefore proposes employ coordinate and continuing diplomatic pressure both sides, in order provide maximum support PCC discussions Lausanne. It would be of considerable value if FonOff would instruct diplomatic missions approach Arab Govts soonest in endeavor obtain their agreement to principle accepting for resettlement those refugees who do not desire return to Israel." (Telegram 1473, 501.BB Palestine/4–2949)

501.BB Palestine/4–3049 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, April 30, 1949—1 p. m.

342. Colonel Dayan yesterday furnished following information:

(1) Activities of special committee—at last meeting Arab delegation stated they were proceeding to Lausanne and proposed speical

committee suspend work until their return. Israeli "put pressure" on Transjordan stating would not discuss peace or other questions at Lausanne unless Transjordan conformed to armistice agreement and continued special committee talks. Transjordan agreed appoint other representatives to continue work.

[Here follows remainder of telegram primarily concerning action taken by the special committee, principally the movement of traffic on vital roads and the operation of the railroad, and on territorial settlement in Jerusalem. Concerning the latter point, the Transjordanians were said to have "refused discuss any territorial changes stating that should be considered at Lausanne. Dayan emphasized negotiations for territorial changes should be on basis what each party now holds and not on what held before war or ownership."]

BURDETT

867N.01/5–149 : Telegram

The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Secretary of State

SECRET DAMASCUS, May 1, 1949—10 a. m.

259. Transparent hypocrisy in Sharett's cable of April 27 to Dr. Mohn (Deptel 184, April 28 [1]) is doubtless already evident to all concerned but full comment is nevertheless given in hope of helping to clarify atmosphere and hasten armistice agreement so that broader aspects of problem may be realistically approached.

Israeli contention that natural boundary desired by Syria as armistice demarcation line might become permanent alteration in frontier between two countries seeks to confirm Syria's conviction that if Syria retires to old political frontier as armistice demarcation line, Israel will subsequently accept no alteration in that frontier particularly as Syria knows of no offer of Israel to withdraw from Western Galilee or other areas outside partition frontiers as earnest of willingness to have final sovereignty all such areas for determination in peace talks. Without holding any brief for Syria's "right" to frontier rectification, what is sauce for goose should be sauce for gander.

As evidence of their alleged sincerity let both parties retire simultaneously from areas not contemplated by partition resolution leaving such areas under UN supervision pending determination of sovereignty by peace conference. Otherwise let *status quo* be accepted as provisional for armistice purposes with clear understanding that armistice demarcation lines are tentative only and subject to confirma-

[1] This was a repeat of No. 544 to Bern, p. 956.

tion or rectification by peace conference. Thus latter may proceed in more hopeful atmosphere.

Re McDonald's comment in Tel Aviv Embassy telegram 314, April 29 [2] to Department re Israel's sincerity yet unwillingness to yield even to extent of leaving disputed frontier area for subsequent determination, might it not properly be asked what profit it for Syria to enter into peace negotiations with Israel if only benefits Syria can hope to obtain therefrom, slight rectification of frontier, is relinquished without any *quid pro quo* or other guarantee before peace talks begin. Considering US policy as outlined by Jessup November 20 (Deptel 57 February 25) we can scarcely in good conscience ask Syria to relinquish small salient within partition frontier while remaining silent over Israel's retention even provisionally of extensive area outside partition frontier in Western Galilee conquered by Israel during and in violation of truce. Surely if Israel's professions of desire for peace are genuine, she should be willing to make some concession as earnest thereof as Syria has already done (Mytel 256, April 28 [3]), or at least to leave all controversial issues for determination by peace conference.

Sent Department 259; repeated Bagdad 47; Tel Aviv 22; London 70; Paris 55; Bern 1 for Ethridge; New York for USDel 1. Pouched Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, Jidda, Athens, Ankara, Moscow.

KEELEY

[2] Not printed.

[3] Not printed; it reported that Syrian Prime Minister Zaim had "Intimated willingness as part general settlement including realistic frontier adjustments accept quarter million refugees if given substantial development aid in addition to compensation for refugee losses." (890D.01/4–2849)

Telegram 256 also noted that the Prime Minister "reiterated his earnest desire to liquidate Palestine debacle by pursuing henceforth policy of give and take provided he not asked to give all while other side takes all." It concluded that there was a "real opportunity for rapid settlement of Palestine problem if only US Government will exert itself to bring Israelis to face situation realistically and in spirit of fair compromise."

501.BB Palestine/5–149 : Telegram

The Chargé in Transjordan (Stabler) to the Secretary of State

SECRET AMMAN, May 1, 1949—3 p. m.

193. During call on Prime Minister this morning I conveyed to him views of US Government regarding refugee question as contained in Depcirtel April 29, 5 p. m. and left him *aide-mémoire* on subject.

Prime Minister expressed appreciation for these views and for fact

that US Govt is continuing to press Israel regarding acceptance repatriation principle in accordance GA Resolution December 11. He said Transjordan accepted in principle resettlement of refugees not desiring return their homes and was well aware of necessity for resettling such refugees. Transjordan Govt recognized that not all refugees would elect to return their homes. However, Transjordan still maintained its position of insisting that Israel accept principle of repatriation of refugees who do desire return their homes. Settlement of refugee question which he regarded as urgent factor in solution of Palestine problem would be made much easier if refugees had free choice of whether to return to their homes or to resettle in Arab states or elsewhere.

Tawfiq Pasha commented that while he had adopted common line with other Arab states regarding repatriation principle at Beirut meetings with PCC, he had in separate conversations with Ethridge and McGhee expressed willingness and awareness regarding resettlement principle. He felt such parallel approach was realistic as on one hand it did not work against common line of Arab states and on other hand it did provide positive line in assisting PCC work out overall solution to problem.

Prime Minister pointed out that one of essentials in solution refugee question was matter of boundaries. He hoped that UN and US would adhere to partition principle and that Israel would be obliged accept settlement on this basis. He stated that it was clear that solution refugee question would be simpler if Arabs should be compensated by Israel for territories over and above those allotted to Israel by November 29 Resolution. Return to Arabs of such territories would make resettlement much less difficult.

Prime Minister continued that he hoped have opportunity hold further talks with McGhee regarding possible assistance to Transjordan in technical and financial fields. He mentioned number projects and indicated Transjordan Govt might prepare certain concrete proposals. He assured that whatever assistance was received would be put to profitable use in connection Transjordan development.

In conclusion I emphasized to Prime Minister great importance which US Govt attached to acceptance by Arab states of resettlement principle and urged he use his influence with other Arab states in this regard. I also emphasized that US would, as indicated in President's message of April 21 to King, continue press Israel regarding acceptance repatriation principle. Prime Minister thought this was realistic approach and would endeavor to do what he could regarding other Arab states.

Sent Department, repeated Geneva for USDel PCC, pouched Arab Capitals, London, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv.[1]

STABLER

[1] The Department's reply, on May 16, requested Amman to "express Dept's appreciation to PriMin for his cooperative and humane attitude towards acceptance resettlement principle. However, you shld endeavor convey to him idea that, while USG deeply hopeful that TJ will be prepared receive refugees up to its absorptive capacity, in its own interests TJ shld keep in mind natural limiting factors of country and should not over-extend itself in this connection." The reply gave the Department's tentative estimates that "maximum potential absorptive capacity TJ together with area of central Pal presently under Arab mil occupation wld permit assimilation of not more than 150,000–200,000 refugees . . . Moreover, assimilation this number possible only on basis intensive development TJ and Arab Pal over two or three year period." (Telegram 60, 501.BB Palestine/5–1649)

867N.48/4–2249

Memorandum Prepared Presumably in the Office of the Coordinator on Palestine Refugee Matters (McGhee)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 2, 1949.

PALESTINE REFUGEE PROBLEM

NOTES FOR DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT

Of the attached papers the most important is *Policy Recommendations:* No's. 1 and 8 are the critical recommendations.

No. 1: The real question is how far we go in putting pressure on the Israelis to repatriate a considerable number of refugees (at least 200,000), which Ethridge feels necessary for success of the Lausanne talks and which is believed to be necessary for any ultimate solution of the refugee problem. So far the strong talks given the Israelis by the President and the Secretary on this subject have not resulted in tangible concessions. The present issue is whether we go further through such action as holding up remainder of Eximbank loan ($49,000,000) and withdrawing Eximbank Mission.

No. 8: This represents an internal decision on the part of the executive. It means that, subject to Congressional approval, reasonable assistance from other UN nations and cooperation from the states concerned, we have decided that we intend to "see through" financially a minimum refugee program, before we raise Arab hopes through assuming leadership in an economic survey group to be created by the PCC. If there are not adequate loans forthcoming from the International and Exim Banks, we intend to request our share as a grant from Congress. Final decision should, of course, be made on the basis of the best advice we can get from Congressional leaders and Bank officials. Ethridge needs such a decision in order to know how far to go in holding out hope to Israel and the Arab states for assistance in repatriation

and resettlement, as an inducement to get them to face these issues realistically and constructively. The range of grant funds that the US might be called upon to make is believed to lie between $25,000,000 and $50,000,000 a year for 3 years, depending upon ultimate cost, amount of Israeli compensation, amount available from the Banks and amount contributed by other UN states.

867N.48/5–249

Memorandum of Conversation With the President, by the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 2, 1949.

Subject: Palestine Refugee Problem

I went over the main points of Mr. McGhee's memorandum [1] with the President, directing his attention specifically to the tentative financial commitments which might be involved.

The President believed that it would probably be necessary for him to make the commitments (subject to Congressional action) but that before he did so he would like to have this matter laid before him in a memorandum which he could submit to the Bureau of the Budget and the Secretary of the Treasury, so that there could be orderly consideration of these new proposed commitments. If we can get such a memorandum to the President tomorrow, he believes that he could have the matter considered and possibly acted on at the Cabinet meeting on Friday. Until that is done he does not believe that it would be proper for me to agree, even tentatively, as this might be misleading.

[1] Presumably the memorandum of April 22, p. 934.

501.BB Palestine/5–249 : Telegram

The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Secretary of State

SECRET DAMASCUS, May 2, 1949—8 a. m.

261. Mytel 256, April 28.[1] When I orally communicated text Depcirtel April 29, 5 p. m. to Prime Minister Zaim last evening he reminded me that several days ago he had expressed his desire speed solution Palestine problem and had stated his willingness to accept as part comprehensive settlement of Palestine conflict quarter million or more Arab refugees for resettlement provided they are compensated for their losses and Syria is given adequate financial aid necessary to resettle them. He reiterated his sincere desire for prompt

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 962.

agreement with Israel and his willingness to enter direct negotiations with Israel to that end. He went on to say that as Syria, Transjordan and Egypt are Arab states most directly concerned in Palestine problem, he is willing meet with Abdullah and Farouk in effort to reach common basis for realistic approach to Israel.

While eager to give concrete proof of his sincerity already evidenced by his proffered concessions, he emphasized that unless Israel also manifests spirit of compromise stalemate will continue since Arab states cannot be expected to make all the concessions.

He laughed at Sharett's fear that mobilization 20,000 recruits could be immediate threat to Israel. Call up is internal measure to take potential trouble makers off streets. Without arms and other equipment they could be used only as labor battalions and will, he said, be so used. Israel has, he added, nothing to fear from Syria if it comes to reasonable terms. Others had created debacle; he wishes earnestly to liquidate it so as to get on with more important things: internal development and preparation against Soviet menace which he insists is real threat of moment.[2]

Sent Department 261; repeated Beirut 56; Baghdad 49; Tel Aviv 24; London 72; Paris 57; Bern 3 for Ethridge. Pouched Amman, Cairo, Jerusalem, Jidda, Athens, Ankara, Moscow.

KEELEY

[2] Chargé Patterson, on May 3, discussed the content of the circular telegram of April 29 with the Egyptian Prime Minister. The latter was reported to have stated that the "Lausanne talks were based upon UN's December 11 resolution whereby principle of repatriation established. Egypt insisted this principle should be reaffirmed by all participating Lausanne conversations, Zionists in particular. Once principle of repatriation shall have been established as basis of conversations Egypt and Arab States (Prime Minister believed) would at once get down to study of practical aspects of problem." (telegram 430, May 3, 6 p. m., from Cairo)

Minister Pinkerton discussed the circular telegram with the Lebanese Minister and received his assurances that the "Lebanese delegation Lausanne meetings with PCC has been given widest instructions to cooperate with PCC in finding answer problems. He reiterated that [Lebanon?] is already overpopulated and is organized on confessional lines so delicately balanced that acceptance permanent settlement any refugees here would be impossible." (Telegram 217, May 4, noon, from Beirut) Nos. 430 and 217 are filed under 501.BB Palestine/5–349, /5–449, respectively.

501.BB Palestine/5–249 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET TEL AVIV, May 2, 1949—1 p. m.

323. Two hours prior receipt April 29 of Deptel 250, April 28, Ford[1] and I talked at Foreign Ministry about almost identical sub-

[1] Richard Ford, Counselor of Embassy in Israel.

jects. Share distressed [2] Israel's desire to make conciliatory statement but was embarrassed by Colonel Zasuk's insistence "rectify" international frontier under guise armistice negotiations, thus endangering peace.

Later, April 29, at Kaplan [3] tea for Export-Import Bank experts, I talked with Shiloah of Foreign Office who said Israel is puzzled by Department's suggestion "conciliatory gesture about boundaries" because if there is to be no independent Arab state in Palestine and no one considers such possibility, hence Israel's yielding on boundaries could only mean parceling out Palestine territory among neighboring Arab states, a result never contemplated in November 29 GA resolution. In reply, I urged my desire prompt talk with Sharett and Ben-Gurion together.

April 30 morning, when I took General Donovan [4] to Sharett's residence, I told latter of contents of Deptel 250, April 28, and my wish confer with him and Prime Minister. Foreign Minister agreed try for early date but said absence Prime Minister Jerusalem attending Zionist action SG committee and coming May Day and Independence Day celebrations during first half this week make such conference difficult. I am continuing to press for it soonest.

I believe Israel officials because of their realization of national advantage of close US cooperation and ultimate cooperation with Arab states' desire meet President and Department's views as far as Foreign Minister and Prime Minister consider politically possible. I will continue utilize every formal and informal opportunity press US views in hope securing desired statement soon. Am hopeful on Jerusalem and refugees but pessimistic on boundaries.

McDONALD

[2] These two words should read "Sharett stressed" (copy in Tel Aviv post files, lot 56–F 31, 350 Israel).
[3] Eliezer Kaplan, Israeli Finance Minister.
[4] Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, until 1945 Director of the Office of Strategic Services; at this time on an extended tour of the Near East.

501.BB Palestine/5–249 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 2, 1949—8 p. m.

566. Unpal 88. For Lausanne. Re Palun 127 [2] Dept considers Secretariat working paper re Jerusalem constitutes sound basic approach and hopes that in due course it can be made basis future work in preference French proposals.

[1] This telegram was repeated to Jerusalem.
[2] Also identified as telegram 300, April 16, from Jerusalem, p. 920.

Dept also approves suggestion providing compulsory arbitration controversies re fulfillment by states concerned of obligations undertaken re Jerusalem area. We consider that tribunal should be given jurisdiction such controversies on motion UN Administrator or authorities either zone. Our position at this stage should be that decisions should be legally binding.

Dept understanding that UN would bear expenses of UN Administrator, his staff, guards for Holy Places, international tribunal, and other expenses appropriately chargeable. Authorities governing local zones would bear local costs, and costs their participation in mixed bodies.

ACHESON

501.BB Palestine/5–349 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Vincent) to the Secretary of State

SECRET BERN, May 3, 1949—11 a. m.

661. Palun 139. During past week PC met separately with Syrian delegation and Transjordan delegation headed by Fawzi Pasha Mulki. Both indicated desire to cooperate for Near East peace. Commissioners, advisers, and Azcarate also had numerous separate discussions with individual members of Israeli and Arab delegates. PCC's underlying impression is Israel and Arab states are sincerely desirous of making peace arrangements soonest but are maneuvering for position.

Israeli delegation is seriously concerned re question of Israeli admission to UN. It fears extensive UN debate may delay and even prevent Israeli admission at this GA session. It continues to suggest PCC recommend GA not debate such matters as refugees and Jerusalem in view Israeli and Arab talks with PCC at Lausanne. PCC has, however, maintained position stated in Palun 136.[1] Israeli delegation is also communicating with Tel Aviv re possible conciliatory statement on refugees. Partial drafts thus far seen are evasive. US delegation hopes satisfactory statement will result but fears Ben-Gurion's strong views will prevent. Israeli delegation has given no indication of working with PCC's committee on Jerusalem re plans for internationalization of Jerusalem area.

Arab delegations are keenly aware of their present tactical position. Arab delegations are not yet ready to meet with Israeli delegation for this reason and because of general reluctance to move quickly. It seems unlikely Arab delegations will engage in substantive discussion with

[1] Also identified as telegram PCC 1, April 28, from Lausanne, p. 955.

Israeli delegation either directly or through PCC until UN debate on Israeli admission is concluded. Arab delegations appear willing, however, to discuss all questions with PCC.

PCC therefore plans to continue to talk with individual delegations and will endeavor to draw up agendas of points which may eventually serve as framework for Israeli-Arab discussion either through PCC or directly. It is also hoped PCC might draw up certain preamble material on which Israel and Arab states could agree and which would serve as point of departure for further discussion as was case at Rhodes.

Eytan, now heading Israeli delegation, also approached Ethridge re Israeli-Syrian armistice negotiations expressing view that if agreement were signed with mandate frontier as armistice line Israel would be willing make border rectifications in peace talks. Syrians are already familiar with this argument and are probably unlikely to forego present bargaining advantage. In order resolve impasse US delegate suggests Syrians might withdraw to frontier while Israelis withdraw from equivalent area in Israeli territory. Area evacuated could then be considered as neutral pending and without prejudice to effect settlement.

VINCENT

501.BB Palestine/5–349 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET LONDON, May 3, 1949—5 p. m.

709. Proposal contained Deptel 1473, April 29; repeated Bern 556 discussed with Michael Wright and Beith of Foreign Office. Both agreed that UK approach Arab states re principle resettlement might have beneficial effect but felt that in making it, account should be taken differing circumstances countries concerned. Wright pointed out Transjordan has already agreed to accept refugees while there is little likelihood that appreciable numbers could be resettled in Egypt, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. He also remarked Arab states would presumably be reluctant voluntarily give up remaining bargaining weapon by subscribing to resettlement principle. We pointed out that approach did not envisage consideration number each country would be called on to absorb but merely agreement to a principle. Moreover, Arabs should be willing to do so in return for Israeli acceptance principle repatriation.

Our comments appeared to overcome Wright's objections, and he said he would immediately refer proposal to Bevin with recommendation that it be approved.[1]

Sent Department 709; repeated Bern 36.

DOUGLAS

[1] London, on May 4, advised that Mr. Bevin had given his approval and that the Foreign Office had sent instructions to British missions in Arab capitals "directing them to inform respective governments that UK fully supports representations made by US representative re agreement principles resettlement." (telegram 1740, 867N.01/5–449)

The Department informed London on May 4 that the "Views you presented to FO as reported Embtel 709 of May 3 timely and coincide Dept thinking. Irrespective great difference ability individual Arab States absorb refugees essential they as group make progress toward recognition principle which will permit states who can to take such action at appropriate time without breaking Arab line. . . . Essential that both [Arabs and Israelis] make progress toward compromise position and US and UK should assist in achieving this end with all means available." (Telegram 1515, 501.BB Palestine/5–349)

867N.48/5–449

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 4, 1949.

Subject: Repatriation of Arab Refugees from Palestine

At our meeting on Monday [1] you directed me to submit to you the estimated cost for a program of repatriation and resettlement of the Arab refugees from Palestine. This was for the purpose of having the estimated cost subjected to orderly consideration by the Budget Bureau and the Treasury Department before the matter came to you for decision.

You will recall that the matter comes up at the present time not in connection with any announcement of detailed figures, but with Mr. Ethridge's desire to lay some plan for solution of the problem before the Delegates meeting at Lausanne. Mr. Ethridge did not wish to do this unless the United States Government would agree in principle to substantial United States financial assistance in carrying out the program. He felt, and we agreed, that he was wise in this, that to make a proposal and later have it fail for lack of financial support would affect the United States interests adversely in the Middle East.[2]

DEAN ACHESON

[1] See Secretary Acheson's memorandum of May 2, p. 965.

[2] Attached to this memorandum is a second memorandum dated May 4, sent to President Truman by Secretary Acheson, which dealt with the estimated cost of the Palestine refugee problem. It is not printed; for the version of May 9, which superseded it, see p. 983.

867N.48/5–449

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, May 4, 1949.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference is made to Secretary Forrestal's letter dated September 23, 1948, in which he transmitted a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff [1] concerning the relief of the Arab refugees from the Palestine hostilities, who numbered at that time approximately 300,000.

As you will recall, on November 19, 1948, the General Assembly approved a resolution calling for a $32,000,000 program for the relief of Palestine refugees, to be raised by voluntary contributions from the member states of the United Nations. The resolution recognized that "the alleviation of conditions of starvation and distress among the Palestine refugees is one of the minimum conditions for the success of the efforts of the United Nations to bring peace to that land". The enabling legislation for a United States appropriation of $16,000,000 as our contribution to such a program was signed by the President on March 24, 1949.

The United Nations relief program is expected to terminate by the end of 1949, when the funds at its disposal will be exhausted. No provision now exists for continuing assistance to the refugees from international sources after termination of the present program. It is recognized, however, that the need for assistance will continue beyond 1949, and that the administrative and material resources of the Arab states and of voluntary relief organizations are wholly inadequate to support an assistance program of this magnitude.

For some time the Department has been studying the question of the long range disposition of the refugees, who now number at least 700,000. The consistent refusal of Israel and the Arab states to agree in principle to the repatriation and resettlement, respectively, of the refugees, has rendered it impossible for the Palestine Conciliation Commission, which is charged by the General Assembly with facilitating settlement of the problem, to initiate any measures looking towards its progressive liquidation. A concerted diplomatic approach to both Israel and the Arab states is being undertaken by the Department, in concert with the United Kingdom, in an effort to secure the agreement of both sides to repatriation and resettlement on the scale required.

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[1] A partial quotation from the letter of then Secretary of Defense Forrestal and the full text of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum of September 22, 1948, are included in telegram Telmar 19, September 28, 1948, to Paris, *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1427.

Assuming that these political obstacles can be overcome, however, there is no possibility under present conditions of any appreciable absorption of the refugees into the economies of the Arab states, already seriously weakened by internal economic difficulties, without increasing unemployment and depressing the already low standard of living. Absorption of the refugees on a self-supporting basis can only be achieved by raising the economic potential of the countries involved, through increase in the amount or productivity of arable land and creation of new employment opportunities.

In the Department's opinion, any continuing program of assistance would have to be based on three primary considerations. First, it should be formulated on a work relief basis rather than on the basis of direct relief. Such a program would raise the morale of the refugees, would result in the accomplishment of useful work directed towards their resettlement, towards raising the economic potential of the states involved and towards a progressive reduction and eventual elimination of the need for external assistance. Second, in order to secure the cooperation of the Arab states, any solution of the problem should be formulated within the broader framework of the interests of the countries concerned, with special reference to their economic development. Third, any outside assistance should be made available under the auspices of the United Nations.

On the basis of the preceding considerations, it is apparent that considerable financing from external sources, both in the form of direct grants for work relief projects and loans for economic development purposes, are required for solution of the problem. The financial requirements for such a program, which will require a minimum period of three years, are tentatively estimated at $250,000,000–$300,000,000 from all sources. These funds should be provided by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and/or the United States Export-Import Bank, in the case of projects meeting their requirements; by the United Nations, its specialized agencies and related international organizations; and the remainder by grants and loans from the governments of interested United Nations member states.

From the political point of view, the Department considers that failure to resolve the refugee problem would serve to perpetuate conditions of insecurity and unrest in the Near East, and that the refugees would serve as a focal point for the breeding of political extremism of both a leftist and a rightist character. From an economic standpoint, transfer of full responsibility for custodianship of the refugees to the Governments of the Arab states, even if they agreed to accept it, would constitute an insupportable strain upon the local economies, and thereby further aggravate political unrest and instability.

In order to formulate more precisely the nature and extent of this Government's interest in the refugee problem, and the degree to which we should participate in effecting a solution, an appreciation of the probable effects of the refugee problem upon our military and strategic interests in the Near East would be of considerable value to the Department.

It would be appreciated if you would transmit the foregoing to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the request that such an estimate be prepared for the Department's guidance.

Sincerely yours, DEAN ACHESON

501.MA Palestine/5–449

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 4, 1949.

Subject: Visit of Israeli Ambassador.

Discussion:

The Israeli Ambassador, Mr. Eliahu Elath, has an appointment with you at 4:15 this afternoon. He is under instructions from his Government to deliver to the Secretary a copy of a statement which has been prepared for Israeli representatives to make before the *ad hoc* Committee of the United Nations General Assembly when the question of the admission of Israel to the United Nations is discussed by that Committee. The background of this matter is briefly as follows:

One of the most important problems which must be cleared up before a lasting peace can be established in Palestine is the question of the disposition of the more than 700,000 Arab refugees who during the Palestine conflict fled from their homes in what is now Israeli occupied territory and are at present living as refugees in Arab Palestine and the neighboring Arab states. The December 11, 1948, resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on Palestine resolved that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date. The Israelis have consistently maintained that the solution of the Arab refugee problem lies not in repatriation but in resettlement in the Arab states. Representatives of the Arab states, on the other hand, have insisted that a prerequisite to a final peace in Palestine is the acceptance by Israel of the principle of the repatriation of those Arab refugees who desire to return to their homes.

Arab and Israeli representatives are now meeting in Lausanne, Switzerland, with the Palestine Conciliation Commission to discuss a

final peace settlement. Mr. Mark Ethridge, the American member of the Commission, believes that the question of the refugees is the key to the success of the Lausanne meeting and has been urging the Israelis to make a conciliatory statement accepting the principle of repatriation. If the Israelis do this, Mr. Ethridge believes the Arab representatives will be influenced to conclude a final peace with Israel.

The Department, through the Embassy in Tel Aviv and here in Washington, has been backing up Mr. Ethridge on this point. When Israeli Foreign Minister Sharett was in this country the Secretary emphasized to him the desirability of Israel's making a conciliatory statement concerning the refugees and the President recently spoke in the same vein to President Weizmann of Israel.

The case of the admission of Israel is now up before the United Nations and several members thereof have expressed displeasure that Israel has so far disregarded the section of the December 11 General Assembly resolution concerning the repatriation of the Arab refugees.

Under these circumstances, the Israeli Government has apparently decided to make some kind of a statement on refugees in the *ad hoc* Committee of the General Assembly. Since the Secretary urged upon Mr. Sharett the desirability of making such a statement, the Israeli Government desires that a copy of the statement be furnished the Secretary.

Recommendation:

It is probable that the statement will not be satisfactory from our point of view in that it will not be the kind of firm acceptance of the principle of repatriation which we would like to see the Israelis make. Under these circumstances, it would be most undesirable if Israeli representatives at Lausanne and in the United Nations were to seek to give the impression that the statement had been submitted to the United States Government before it was made and had been "cleared". It is therefore recommended that during the Ambassador's visit you limit yourself to listening to what he has to say, to accepting the statement without reading it in his presence, and to thanking him for the Israeli Government's courtesy in making a copy of the statement available to us. If it is impossible to avoid reading the statement in the Ambassador's presence, it is suggested that you inform him that you will wish to consider the statement thoroughly with the officers of the Department concerned with the matter.

As today is the first anniversary of the independence of Israel, it is suggested that you congratulate the Ambassador upon this event.

501.BB Palestine/5–449 : Telegram

Mr. Mark F. Ethridge to the Secretary of State

SECRET BERN, May 4, 1949—11 a. m.

676. Palun 140. On May 3, Dr. Walter Eytan as head of Israeli delegation Lausanne, made first formal appearance before PCC for purpose presenting "latest" views of Israeli Government re such outstanding matters as refugees, Jerusalem, boundaries and procedure. Substance of Eytan's remarks, particularly re refugees, again indicated Israel had not modified its position as stated by Ben Gurion (Palun 13)[1] or Comay (Palun 126).[2] Intransigence of Israeli position re refugees came as considerable surprise to PCC in view of more lenient line hinted by Eytan and other Israelis during past week (Palun 139).[3] It was indicative to me that Secretary's conversation with Sharett, McDonald's instructions (Deptel 208)[4] and Secretary's conversation with Elath and Eban (Unpal 85)[5] have apparently fallen on deaf ears. This is particularly disheartening because Arab representatives are increasingly indicating disposition to come to grips with situation. Fawzi Mulki of Transjordan delegation, for example, indicated in no uncertain terms last evening that Transjordan Government considered primary objective to be quick peace. Such matters as refugees and Jerusalem, although important, were secondary and would almost solve themselves as peace was achieved. Israelis apparently fail to appreciate importance of conciliatory approach toward outstanding problems. Arab fears re public opinion at home are deprecated. Maximum concessions from Arabs appear to be more important to Israelis than constructive conclusion to recent conflict which would represent some meetings of minds. Eytan put Israeli case as follows: (*a*) *Refugees:* In order remove any possible doubt in minds of public or individual PCC members, Israel

[1] Presumably Palun 133, identified also as telegram 312, April 20, from Jerusalem, p. 925.

[2] Identified also as telegram 291, April 13, from Jerusalem, p. 911.

[3] Identified also as telegram 661, May 3, from Bern, p. 968. In a press conference held at Lausanne on April 30, Mr. Eytan made a statement on the matter which was released by the Israeli Office of Information in New York on May 2. Mr. Eytan was said to have recognized "that the refugee problem is one of the main problems confronting this conference. The Israeli delegation has come prepared to tackle it with sincerity, and above all, in the spirit of realism. We believe it to be soluble. We are prepared to help in finding a solution and to cooperate with the UN and the Arab states in its implementation, on the assumption that cooperation with the Arab states will extend to other spheres too. The solution, however, is inseparable from the general peace settlement with the Arab states." (telegram Delga 70, May 2, 7: 25 p. m., from New York, 501.BB Palestine/5–249)

[4] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 894.

[5] Identified also as telegram 544, April 28, to Bern, p. 956.

reiterates it accepts no responsibility for fact refugees are refugees. War in Palestine is real and only cause for present situation. Israel had nothing to do with flight of Arabs and sought to avoid creation refugee problem. Eytan said he had duty to emphasize Israeli view that Arabs and Arab states were responsible for war. Israel realizes, however, situation exists in Middle East in which 550,000 people, not 800,000 or more as reported, are homeless and views with concern for humanitarian and political reasons. As Israel is part of Middle East it is interested in contributing to solution of refugee problem. Israel alone could not handle problem; nor could Transjordan. Physical return to Israel is impossible socially and practically. On November 29, 1947, Israel was prepared for large Arab minority. If there had been no war matters would have developed differently both politically and economically. Flight of Arabs has made Israel Jewish territory which returning Arabs would not recognize. Partial exchange of population which has thus resulted is healthier in long run. Experience shows large minorities are troublesome and lead to instability. To return Arabs would be backward step socially and politically and would make matters worse.

Israel would be prepared to contribute to refugee assistance in 3 ways, providing some plan for large-scale international action re refugees were undertaken: (1) Return of presently separated families; (2) Compensation; (3) Technical assistance. Eytan analyzed Israeli contribution as follows:

General: Unless resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees with international assistance were to be considered further discussion with PCC would be fruitless. Israel believes Arab refugees should be resettled under Arab rule for social, political, economic and religious reasons. Israel doubts whether returning Arabs would be content under Israeli rule. Eytan doubted Israel would issue conciliatory statement indicating possibility of repatriation and if it did that Arabs would come back. Eytan cited fact that Arabs from Arab villages transferred to Israel under Israeli-Transjordan armistice were moving out of own free will and in complete absence of force or persuasion which had been strictly enjoined. Eytan doubted whether returning Arabs would be willing to accept obligations such as service in Israeli army.

(1) *Return of Presently Separated Families:* Israelis prepared to study whether scheme can be arranged with Arab states under which Israel would take part of refugees. Time for declaration in terms of numbers has not arrived as figure depends on scheme. Large-scale international help will be required. Israeli delegation is authorized to go into question on this basis. Israelis prepared to reunite separated families based on formula of close relationship.

(2) *Compensation:* Israelis prepared to pay compensation for loss of land owned and cultivated by Arab farmers. Lands owned but not

cultivated would not be compensable. Israel believes compensation should be handled in reasonable way by payment into common fund for refugee use and to avoid squandering by individuals.

(3) *Technical Assistance:* (*a*) Israelis willing to place its experts at disposition of management of overall resettlement scheme. Arabs have few technicians and Israelis can help. Israel cannot, however, give technical assistance to isolated efforts but only to some general Near East scheme.

(*b*) *Jerusalem:* Israeli delegation will talk with Jerusalem Committee re Jerusalem and holy places. Otherwise, Israeli views were well known to PCC.

(*c*) *Territorial settlement:* Israel prepared to discuss frontiers with legitimately interested countries. Gaza strip would be of interest to Egypt and Transjordan but not Syria. Israel did not consider it necessary to settle all details or some political boundaries at Lausanne. Some boundary questions could be discussed in normal fashion between individual states later.

(*d*) *Arab declarations:* Israel feels PCC has exerted strong pressure on it as though Israel were "in dock". Israel is not responsible for situation in Palestine. Israel considers major concession is due from Arab states with whom real guilt for war lies. Arab states lack courage to state they are seeking peace. Arab states are not interested in peace but in ridding themselves of refugee problem. PCC could ask Arab delegations to issue declaration re peace aims which would clear atmosphere. Thus far Arab states have been pampered. Israel would welcome Arab statement and believes Arabs would respond to PCC request.

ETHRIDGE

867N.01/5–449 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL US URGENT TEL AVIV, May 4, 1949—2 p. m.

332. At state dinner May 3 Sharett asked me report to Department in strictest confidence that special meeting Israel-Syrian armistice negotiators to be held May 5 without presence UN officials at request Syria. Foreign Minister regards this as crucial test. He pleads for US good offices [garble] urge Colonel Zaim not insist on "rectification" of frontier. If this demand is withdrawn, Foreign Minister optimistic agreement armistice and prospect of peace negotiations.

Comment: I hope Department can act promptly.[1] *End Comment.*

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[1] The editors have found no evidence in the Department of State files that it ordered the exercise of the good offices of the United States in this matter. On May 7, the Department advised Tel Aviv of its anxiety to receive information concerning the outcome of the Israeli-Syrian meeting of May 5 (telegram 280, 867N.01/5–449). In reply, on May 10, Ambassador McDonald stated he had been advised by General Riley that the "meeting was complete failure. Neither side would budge." (telegram 347, 867N.01/5–1049)

New subject: Foreign Minister told me that Israel expects issue either New York or Lausanne new and comprehensive refugee statement. *Comment:* I hope but I cannot be sure it will be conciliatory. *End comment.*[2]

McDONALD

[2] Presumably the statement by Mr. Eytan as reported in *supra.*

867N.01/5–449 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, May 4, 1949—3 p. m.

351. Abdullah Tel, commenting on Jewish attack near Beit Safafa, characterized it clear breach armistice and SC imposed truce. Asserted King and Transjordan Government most disturbed over precipitous action Jews when Transjordan had done everything possible meet Israeli demands. Explained Colonel Dayan after consulting Tel Aviv gave Legion "ultimatum" to withdraw from area allotted Jews by specified hour. Dayan offered delay operations only if Transjordan would immediately appoint new delegates to special committee and convene committee night May 1 to complete discussion questions on agenda. Amman refused appoint delegates immediately but gave Legion orders withdraw from area assigned Jews and take every precaution avoid incidents. Villagers resisted. Tel thought Jewish attack might be warning of what would happen in triangle if delay in timetable occurred. Was strongly critical of Arab delegates on special committee for accepting line giving areas inhabited by Arab villagers to Jews. Felt relinquishment of territory immediately after Egyptian withdrawal created especially unfavorable impression on Palestine Arabs. Said understood tentative agreement reached in special committee re Latrun and free access on Scopus and Bethlehem roads but position of Transjordan Government not yet known.

Sir Hugh Dow, British Consul General, wondered whether Jews seeking pretext seize additional territory. Felt action boded ill for turnover of section in triangle since Jews might claim Legion not able maintain order and occupy large area. Reiterated his belief Israel so accustomed have its own way, concrete action as distinct from representations required before would cease efforts to expand.

Sent Department, repeated Amman.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/5–449 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland [1]

CONFIDENTIAL US URGENT WASHINGTON, May 4, 1949—6 p. m.

583. For Ethridge as Unpal 91. Israeli Amb called at Dept May 4 to deliver advance copy of statement on refugees which he said Eban would probably make before GA *Ad Hoc* Committee May 5.[2] Said statement being made result US Govt suggestion.

Statement declares Arab states responsible for creation refugee problem. Israeli Govt believes solution inseparably linked with solution issues outstanding between Israel and Arab states and can only be found within final settlement creating conditions cooperation between Israel and its neighbors.

Israel anxious contribute solution problem. Study of economic, irrigation and other possible potentialities Arab states reveals greater possibilities for stable solution by resettlement Arab states rather than Israel. Israeli Govt thus contends resettlement in neighboring areas be considered as main principle of solution. "However, Israel will be ready to make its own contribution to a solution of the problem. It is not yet ascertainable either how many wish to return under conditions that may be prescribed by the Assembly or how many Israel can receive in the light of existing political and economic considerations." Extent of Israel's contribution settlement this problem will depend entirely on formal establishment peace and relations good neighborliness between Israel and Arab states.

Israeli Govt has already announced acceptance of obligations to make compensation for lands abandoned and previously cultivated. Reaffirms its obligation protect persons and property all communities living within its borders.

While indicating its readiness to do all possible contribute solution final settlement refugee problem, Israeli Govt hopes that those states which caused problem by their initiative in proclaiming war will face up squarely to their responsibilities and undeniable opportunities available to them for settling problem in manner beneficial their own economic needs. Immediate declaration by all govts their desire for early peace settlement would create favorable atmosphere for discussion this problem.

ACHESON

[1] This telegram was repeated to USUN New York, Tel Aviv, and London.

[2] Mr. Eban addressed the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on May 5 in connection with Israel's application for membership in the United Nations. During the course of his address, he discussed various issues between Israel and its Arab neighbors, including the refugee question and the City of Jerusalem. A summary of his address is printed in United Nations, *Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part II, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Summary Records of Meetings, 6 April–10 May 1949*, p. 227.

867N.01/5–549 : Telegram

The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET DAMASCUS, May 5, 1949—10 a. m.

267. Mytel 260 May 1.[1] Zaim tells me and General Riley confirms that Counselor Tarazi of Syrian Foreign Office and Lieutenant Colonel Nasser meeting secretly on Syrian-Israeli frontier today Thursday with Shiloah and Colonel Yadin. Syrian representatives have broad powers and Zaim will also be available by telephone to instruct them if necessary to meet concessions with concessions. Moreover Zaim has reiterated to me his continued willingness personally meet Israelis representatives of equal rank (mytel 256, April 28)[1] for direct discussions all outstanding issues.

Repeated Tel Aviv 26, London 74, Paris 59, Bern 5 for Ethridge PCC, Ankara 39, USUNDel New York 3, pouched Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, Jidda.

KEELEY

[1] Not printed.

867N.01/5–749 : Telegram

The Chargé in Transjordan (Stabler) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL AMMAN, May 7, 1949—2 p. m.

199. Legtel 194, May 4.[1] King gave me following account this morning of his talk with Sharett May 5:

Meeting had taken place at Shuneh in presence of Transjordan Prime Minister. King began meeting by expressing pleasure that Sharett and Prime Minister had met and hoped agreement could be worked out.

Sharett said he gratified by appointment new Transjordan delegates to special committee as Israeli public opinion had been "shocked" to learn that committee talks suspended after meeting April 20. (Understood Transjordan representatives now Abdullah Tel and Hamad Farhan[2] with Ahmad Khalil as advisor.)

Prime Minister expressed hope that outlines for peace settlement could be reached here to be implemented by delegates at Lausanne but said it appeared that Israelis proposed that only those points of interest to Israel be discussed this stage and that all Transjordan points be deferred to Lausanne. Sharett replied that on contrary Israel wished discuss and settle all points.

[1] Not printed.
[2] Secretary in the Transjordanian Government.

Sharett then stated particular concern of Israel over resumption work at potash plant and Rutenberg.[3] Prime Minister countered by stating that Israel would have to agree to certain Transjordan demands before agreement could be reached on potash and Rutenberg.

Prime Minister then inquired whether Israel would agree to partition lines as basis for final settlement. Sharett stated that Arabs had never accepted partition and therefore it was now part of history.

At this point Prime Minister, who seemed to think Sharett had adopted somewhat "superior attitude" pointed out that he had never wanted war but that Jews through breach truce in Jerusalem, Deir Yassin and other incidents had forced him into it. Consequently Sharett had no right to talk to him as he would to Egyptians or others. Transjordan was entirely willing to agree to most of Israeli demands such as Latrun and Mt. Scopus but could only do so if Israel would agree to Transjordan demands. He said that most important thing was to arrive at peace settlement which was acceptable to people rather than to official bodies and which would guarantee future relationships. He did not want war and way to avoid it was firm and reasonable settlement. He pointed out Transjordan desire for outlet to sea and its concern re refugees. He was willing consider Latrun and Scopus situation if Israel would consider such matters as return Arab quarters Jerusalem.

Sharett replied that Israel was in agreement re peace and was also in agreement with Transjordan on other matters. Said that Israel agreed with Transjordan re undesirability internationalization Jerusalem and also agreed to Transjordan having outlet to sea. Re latter point stated Israel would give Transjordan free port at Haifa.

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[3] The Rutenberg Hydro-Electric Works were located at Naharim at the junction of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers. Chargé Stabler, on July 11, advised the Department of his recent visit to the Works, stating "It is understood that prior to the hostilities in May 1948, the Jordan Government and the Jewish Agency reached some form of agreement concerning the protection of the Hydro-Electric works. It is possible that the Jordan Government would have been able to observe this agreement if it had not been for the arrival of the Iraqi forces. When the Iraqi forces came into the area, the Israelis departed, but only after blowing up certain of the dynamos in the main dynamo building. Later the Iraqi finished the job, even removing numerous machines. . . . The area has been under the control of the Arab Legion since the departure of the Iraqi troops three months ago. All looting and damage has been stopped by the Legion and the area is under guard. . . . It is quite obvious that the Rutenberg Hydro-Electric works can only be operated again by an agreement between Jordan and Israel. Jordan, on its part, is incapable of operating such a works by itself and, moreover, the Israelis can control the flow of the Jordan. Israel, on the other hand, cannot commence operations of the works as all the buildings are in Jordan territory. In addition, Jordan can control the flow of the Yarmuk River. It would appear that it would take some time yet to reach an agreement on the operation of the Rutenberg Hydro-Electric Works as it remains, along with the Dead Sea Potash Works, an important bargaining point for Jordan." (Despatch 65 from Amman, 890i.6463/7–1149)

He indicated that Transjordan could not accept Haifa proposal and wanted outlet at Gaza through Beersheba. Sharett replied this not possible as it would cut Israeli territory. King then suggested Israelis should return Ramle and Lydda immediately so Transjordan could have outlet at Majdal or Ascalon.

King said meeting ended on friendly note but felt that no progress had been made. When I inquired whether he was hopeful that talks would lead to early and acceptable settlement he replied "I cannot answer yes or no—it depends on support I receive from US and others". He indicated he would like to meet again with Sharett or Ben-Gurion.

Sent Department 199; repeated Jerusalem 99, Geneva for USDel PCC 10, London 34, Tel Aviv 8.[4]

STABLER

[4] Tel Aviv reported, on May 10, that the Foreign Office had confirmed the meeting of Mr. Sharett with King Abdullah on May 5 and had "informally indicated no progress had resulted from discussion which was described as 'friendly but fruitless.'" (telegram 348, 867N.01/5–1049)

501.BB Palestine/4–2949 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Lebanon

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 7, 1949—4 p. m.

225. Pls take early opportunity resume conversation reported urtel 217, May 4,[1] expressing Dept's appreciation over instructions to Lebanese delegation to cooperate fully with PCC at Lausanne in solving refugee problem, and Lebanese intention use its influence with Arab states to induce reasonable attitude.

You should inform FonMin that Dept is aware of sensitive Christian–Moslem balance and would regret any disturbance to Lebanon's equilibrium. We believe, however, that Lebanon could agree to accept for permanent resettlement reasonable portion of refugees now in Lebanon, selected on basis half Christians half Moslems, in order maintain equilibrium. USG fearful that failure Lebanon indicate agreement to principle resettlement would materially lessen willingness other Arab states to share in burden which Lebanon has so generously assumed up to present, and might accordingly result in perpetuation large-scale refugee problem in Lebanon. US is therefore hopeful that in own interest Lebanon will express willingness in principle accept some refugees for permanent resettlement, as humane and constructive example to other Arab states to take similar action.

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 966.

Inform FonMin we are continuing press Israel re repatriation and we agree that compensation by Israel is necessary.[2]

ACHESON

[2] This telegram was repeated to Bern for Mr. Ethridge. Beirut replied on May 18, advising of the belief of the Foreign Minister that "it is unlikely Lebanon will be able receive many Palestine refugees for permanent settlement. For possible effect on other Arab states, however, he agreed in principle to accept as many as could be absorbed into Lebanon . . . He expressed belief that number can never exceed token or symbolic acceptance" (telegram 237, 501.BB Palestine/5–1849).

867N.48/5–949

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 9, 1949.

Subject: Estimated Cost Palestine Refugee Program

1. An expenditure of $250–275 million over the next three years is estimated to be necessary for repatriation and resettlement of 700,000 Arab refugees on a self-sustaining basis (Tab A).[1] Costs may be greater if a coordinated program cannot be carried out with full cooperation of the states concerned on the basis of sound planning and administration. The program as contemplated would involve capital development projects such as irrigation, rural industries and village development, as well as an interim relief and work program (Tab B).

2. Overall responsibility for the refugees should remain with Israel and the Arab states. Outside assistance should be under United Nations auspices. It is in the national interest of the United States, however, that the program be carried out successfully, and the United States should be prepared to aid Israel and the Arab Governments to this end through appropriate financial and technical assistance.

3. In order to assure success of the program the United States should be prepared to furnish as a grant that portion of the total cost that remains after loans from the International and Export-Import Banks, compensation by Israel and contributions by the states concerned, Great Britain and other United Nations states, and by private and commercial organizations. On the basis of estimated maximum and minimum contributions from these sources, it would be necessary to ask the United States Congress for a contribution to this program in the form of a grant of $120–150 million over the next

[1] Tabs A and B are not found attached to the Department's record copy of the memorandum of May 9 but are attached to the one of May 4 (see footnote 2, p. 970). It is the opinion of the editors that the same attachments accompanied both memoranda to the White House. Tab A is printed *infra*. Tab B, dated April 21 and entitled "Estimated Costs of Implementing Refugee Settlement," is not printed.

three years, or $40–50 million a year. No plan will be made, however, involving contributions by the United States as a grant exceeding about 50 per cent of the total cost of the program, based on best available estimates of amounts likely to be forthcoming from the other sources listed above, without seeking new authority.

4. The segment of this assistance which the International Bank and the Eximbank may choose to finance is uncertain in view of the financial risks involved. For that reason participation of the banks is assumed to the extent of only $15 million as a minimum and $50 million as a maximum.[2]

DEAN ACHESON

[Annex 1]

Memorandum on the Palestine Refugee Problem[3]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 4, 1949.

PALESTINE REFUGEE PROBLEM

FINANCING REPATRIATION AND RESETTLEMENT OF PALESTINE REFUGEES

Approximately 700,000 refugees from the Palestine hostilities, now located principally in Arab Palestine, Transjordan, Lebanon and Syria, will require repatriation to Israel or resettlement in the Arab states.

1. Total costs of repatriation and resettlement of refugees are estimated at a minimum of $267,500,000, to be expended over a three year period. This includes $30,000,000 for repatriation to Israel, $160 million for resettlement in Arab states, $27,500,000 for direct and work relief, and $50,000,000 for subsidiary development projects necessary to achieve balanced development of the economies of the Arab states.

2. If Israel will agree to and cooperate in the repatriation of 200,000 refugees, it is estimated (see Table I) that they can be returned to farms and villages in which dwellings have been rebuilt or restored,

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[2] This memorandum is identical to the one of May 4 (see footnote 2, p. 970), except for paragraph numbered 3, which reads as follows in the version of May 4: "In order to assure success of the program the United States should be prepared to finance that portion not to exceed about 50% of the total cost that remains after loans from international sources and contributions by Israel, the Arab states, Great Britain and other UN states, and private and commercial organizations. On the basis of estimated maximum and minimum contributions from these sources, it will be necessary to ask the United States Congress for contribution to this program in the form of a grant of $120–150 million over the next three years, or $40–50 million a year."

Secretary Acheson discussed the estimated cost of the Palestine refugee program with President Truman on May 12. His memorandum of the conversation records that "The President said he would speak to the Director of the Budget about the matter this afternoon, in an effort to get us a prompt reply." (Secretary's Memoranda, Lot 53 D 444, Secretary's Memos)

[3] Presumably prepared in the Office of the Coordinator on Palestine Refugee Matters.

and that they can be supplied with farm animals, tools and utensils which have been lost or destroyed, with seed for the first planting and food enough to last until the first harvest, at an average cost of $150 per person. Approximately half of the estimated $30,000,000 cost of repatriation represents capital items which would restore the net worth of the Arab properties. The other half represents for the most part wages to be paid to the refugees for work leading to their resettlement, which would go to supply food, clothing and other basic necessities to the dependents of the workers until they become self-sustaining.

3. The 500,000 remaining refugees must be resettled in Arab states. In view of the fact that Transjordan, Arab Palestine and the Lebanon do not provide an economic basis for settlement of all the refugees now within their borders, additional land must be sought elsewhere. Among the Arab states which can be considered for large scale absorption of additional refugees only Syria offers land which can be prepared for resettlement on a self-sustaining basis over the next 2–3 years. Iraq cannot be counted upon for any substantial resettlement because of political difficulties and because development will take 5–10 years.

For projects similar to the Jezirah Valley and the Ghab Swamp in Syria and for development of the Jordan Valley in Transjordan, it is estimated (see Table II) that 500,000 persons can be settled on land newly acquired and irrigated at a cost of about $320 per capita. On that basis $160,000,000 would provide for about 85,000 families of six persons. Each family would be settled on 8 acres of land, given the facilities to build houses of the type to which they are accustomed, supplied with farm animals, seeds, simple tools and household utensils, and paid enough in wages to provide food, clothing and other necessities until the first harvest. Resettlement cost for non-agricultural refugees, who will in many cases require working capital as well as homes and other facilities, is assumed to be the same. Included in the cost are such items as schools, roads, water supply, sanitation, and other minimum community facilities. There is also an allowance for limited expansion of government administration and services in the new areas. About 40% of this cost or $64,000,000 involves capital items which will increase net worth.

4. Although every effort should be made to provide for the sustenance of the refugees through work payments, on resettlement projects, relief feeding will continue to be necessary for as many as a quarter of the refugees for the first year. In addition, although there is an ample wage component in the estimated resettlement cost to employ all able-bodied refugees, many jobs must go to local citizens and it is estimated that as many as a quarter of the employable refugees cannot work directly on resettlement projects in the first year. Even though such

refugees are put to useful work it must be budgeted for separately. It is estimated that the proportion remaining on direct and work relief should be halved in the second year, and halved again in the third year. On the basis of the cost experience of the UNRPR program of approximately $30.0 per person annually for direct relief, and an estimated cost of twice this amount for persons supported through work relief, the refugees on relief and work relief would require $15,750,000 the first year, $7,875,000 the second year and $3,937,500 the third year, or a total of approximately $27,500,000.

5. Capital outlays in addition to those required for refugee resettlement must be made if balanced development programs in the countries concerned are to be assured, and some consideration given to their own development requirements apart from those associated with refugees. For additional expenditures of the magnitude of $50,000,000, allotted to the various countries in accordance with a regional plan, it should be possible to increase chances for success of the program and to accomplish considerable agricultural and other development for the benefit of the present population of the area. This is the most flexible portion of the program and may be reduced if funds are not available.

6. A relatively small amount of financial assistance is counted on through International Bank and Eximbank loans. At the present time both institutions are cautious of lending to the governments of the Near East area. Where governments have specific revenues, such as oil royalties which can be assigned directly for debt service, the banks are inclined to regard loan applications more favorably; however, none of the countries concerned have oil production. Unfortunately Syria, which is the most immediate prospect for large-scale resettlement, has in prospect only transit fees from the Trans-Arabian Pipeline which may amount to less than $500,000 annually. Syria's poor general financial condition, together with a drastic adverse trade balance, are other factors which make lending by either bank relatively difficult. Transjordan is not a member of the International Bank.

7. The minimum program capable of repatriating and resettling the refugees over the next three years will cost, as shown above, about $267,500,000. The United States will probably be called on to finance the total costs that remain after the following contributions, which are given as possible minimum and maximum figures in the light of the limited evidence available:

Loans from International and Exim Banks	$15,000,000 to $50,000,000
Compensation from Israel	30,000,000 to 50,000,000
Contributions from other states and organizations	25,000,000 to 50,000,000

Assuming maximum contributions from these sources of $150,000,000 the United States contribution would be $117,500,000. Assuming minimum contributions from these sources, or $70,000,000, the United States contribution could still be limited to $150,000,000 by reducing capital outlays under Paragraph 5 above. A portion of funds appropriated under the "Point Four" Program would be applicable against this amount. Remaining funds would have to be sought through Congressional appropriations. It is assumed that expenditures would take place in three equal installments of $40–50,000,000 per year. It should be recognized that prolonging the program over a greater number of years may reduce annual costs somewhat, but would add considerably to the total cost because of the added direct and work relief that would be required.

[Annex 2]

TABLE I

Repatriation of 200,000 refugees in Israel ($150 per capita)
(in millions of dollars)

Item	*Total Cost*	*Capital Items*
Irrigation	$5.0	$1.7
Dwellings	5.0	.2
Farm Tools and Utensils	3.3	3.3
Farm Animals	8.1	8.0
Assoc. Facilities, incl. transportation	8.6	1.8
Total	$30.0	$15.0

[Annex 3]

TABLE II

Resettlement of 500,000 refugees in Arab states
($320 per capita)
(in millions of dollars)

Item	*Total Cost*	*Capital Items*
Land	$14.2	$14.2
Irrigation	28.4	9.5
Dwellings	42.5	2.1
Farm Tools & Utensils	9.2	9.2
Farm Animals	23.1	23.1
Assoc. Facilities, such as Schools	17.0	5.1
Transportation costs, expansion of government facilities, etc.	25.6	4.2
Total	$160.0	$67.4

501.BB Palestine/5–949 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Vincent) to the Secretary of State

SECRET BERN, May 9, 1949—noon.

699. Palun 142. For the Secretary from Ethridge. Have reservation on TWA flight leaving Geneva May 24 and feel that I must make it. Hope very much that deputy will be quickly designated.

Situation here, leaving aside reaction to US sponsorship of resolution of admission, on which we have no detail yet, is roughly this:

Jerusalem: Reported in separate telegram (see Palun 143)[1] from Barco.[2] General situation is that Jerusalem Committee about in agreement and we will have no difficulty in getting agreement in committee or Commission on basis of secretariat paper with some amendments. Tactically, however, it would be mistake to advance plan now because it would only confuse other issues. My idea is that plan should be put through Commission after other matters settled and I have discouraged Barco from pushing for agreement now. Feel sure that can be attained when time is ripe.

Negotiations: Although Arab States say they want to negotiate en bloc through Commission Sassoon has already made contact with Transjordan and Egyptian delegations. Both Israelis and Arabs have to think about meetings. Eytan thinks he is making some progress with them. Arabs have assured me that nothing substantive discussed and that they are determined to negotiate en bloc. I have responded that they have a right to do that if they desire but that would presuppose agreement among themselves on such questions as the disposition of Arab Palestine, the Gaza strip, territorial compensation from Israel for territory held beyond partition plan, disposition of refugees who would not be taken back or did not want to go back, and other problems. Obviously they have not agreed among themselves and wanted time to think over what I said. They have asked for a meeting with the Commission on Tuesday and in meantime have appointed Boulas of Arab Palestine Refugee Committee as liaison man among themselves.

Arabs have been urging Commission to present plan to them. They want to be in position to say that peace was imposed by UN. In fact two of them have told me that if I will draft a peace plan they will consider it as "instruction". I have of course refused to do so both on behalf of the US and UN. I have told them that since we have pressed Israeli delegation in two public and several private meetings to reveal its position on all matters we must also press Arabs to reveal their position. The Commission would then undertake to ascertain any common ground and would have a basis for negotiation. If the viewpoints were irreconcilable and the two parties asked for it the Commission would present a working paper and agenda as basis for discussion.

[1] Identified also as telegram 698, May 9, noon, from Bern, not printed.
[2] James W. Barco, Adviser to the United States Delegation at Lausanne.

Arabs are holding meetings over week-end to undertake to get together. All of them are most anxious for peace, particularly Egypt and Transjordan.

On the basis, no doubt, of Zaim's statement to Keeley, Syria has modified her position. Zeineddine[3] until yesterday held stubbornly to position Syria would not consider anything but refugees first. He is now willing to discuss refugees and territorial settlement jointly and expressed in private conversation with me Syria's willingness to take up to 250,000 refugees providing Syria was compensated territorially. He says he has no instruction from Zaim to demand it but he regards Syria's price as panhandle of Palestine, part of eastern Galilee and western Galilee to Acre. He disclosed that Syria is holding up armistice negotiations not because of minor rectification of border but in an effort to get in one agreement, whether in armistice or at Lausanne, cession of much greater territory.

Eytan has told me that Egypt had rather hand over Gaza strip with its 80,000 population and 245,000 refugees to Israel than to Transjordan. That confirmed by Transjordan representative who feels, however, that Egypt will hold on to Gaza strip and give it to nobody. Egypt is interested primarily in shortening her line with Israel which would be accomplished by return of southern Negeb to Arab control.

It is obvious that while Arab delegation are willing to tell me and perhaps other members of Commission what they want they have not yet brought themselves to where they will tell each other, except I am sure they have agreed that what is left of presently held Arab Palestine will go to Transjordan.

Arabs have frankly admitted that they are waiting outcome at Lake Success before getting into real negotiations. Egyptians said to me, "we have weapon and we are using it." Commission feeling is that if Israel wins at Lake Success she will become hopelessly intransigeant and if she loses Israel will endeavor maintain her present position as best she can while looking forward to September session. Commission feels that if Arabs win they will feel more confidence but not intransigeance and will be more secure with public opinion at home to the point that they can go ahead with negotiations. In any case Lake Success has certainly delayed work of Commission and may further delay it after issue is settled.

When the USDel here has received detail of US sponsorship of resolution of admission will send reaction and comments. In meantime members are staying in their hotel rooms. [Ethridge.]

VINCENT

[3] Farid Zeineddine, member of the Syrian Delegation at Lausanne and Acting Secretary-General of the Syrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

501.BB Palestine/5–949 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel

SECRET US URGENT TEL AVIV, May 9, 1949—7 p. m.

282. Info reaching Dept re Syrian armistice negots indicates offer by Zaim of personal talk with Ben-Gurion re outstanding questions, but that possible offer has not reached Ben-Gurion.[1] Pls bring this offer to notice Ben-Gurion in appropriate manner, indicating interest USG in view importance armistice agreement to success Lausanne discussions.[2]

ACHESON

[1] New York, on May 8, had advised that "Zaim has offered talk personally with Ben-Gurion re armistice lines and other outstanding questions. . . . Bunche suspects that Zaim's proposal may not have been brought to Ben-Gurion's attention. Bunche suggests that it would be helpful if Department would manage to bring Zaim offer to notice of Ben-Gurion." (telegram 573, 501.BB Palestine/5–849)

[2] This telegram was repeated to New York and Damascus and to Bern for the U.S. Delegation at Lausanne. In reply on May 12, Ambassador McDonald stated he had spoken to the Israeli Prime Minister about a personal talk with the Syrian leader and was informed that he had known of this suggestion from the beginning (telegram 357 from Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/5–1249).

867N.48/5–1049

The Department of State to the British Embassy

SECRET

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Department of State wishes to express appreciation to the Government of the United Kingdom for its views [1] concerning a plan of operations which might be adopted with respect to settlement of the Palestine refugee problem. The Department of State is pleased to note the United Kingdom's general agreement with the Proposed Plan of Action [2] submitted by Mr. McGhee during his recent visit to London.

With reference to the specific comments of the United Kingdom concerning establishment of a survey group, the Department of State is of the opinion that adoption of the procedure suggested by the United Kingdom would imply the assumption of direct responsibility with respect to solution of the refugee problem by the United States

[1] The British views were expressed in the form of a telegram from the Foreign Office to the British Embassy here. The Department copy of this document is undated but was received in Mr. McGhee's office on May 2. It is filed with the *Aide-Mémoire* of May 10.

[2] See annex 3, p. 939.

in conjunction with the United Kingdom. This Government is not prepared to accept such direct responsibility for solution of the refugee problem. Moreover, it is considered that the establishment of a survey group by the Conciliation Commission is clearly within its terms of reference as set forth in the General Assembly Resolution of December 11, 1948, and that the Conciliation Commission would not be fully discharging its functions if it failed to take such action. The United States does not wish to undermine the authority of the Commission through unilateral or joint action within the range of the latter's competence.

The Department of State agrees with the United Kingdom that the proposed survey group should be small, that it should consist of the best qualified experts obtainable, and that it should be free to make its survey without supervision or interference. It is assumed, however, that these objectives could be achieved under the auspices of the Conciliation Commission if United States and United Kingdom representatives were appointed by the Commission to keep positions in the survey group, in recognition of our special interests in the refugee problem. The United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees may be cited as an example of a United Nations body which was established on sound organizational lines and has carried out its task without interference, essentially under American and British leadership.

The Department of State agrees that it would be desirable for the states concerned to associate themselves with and participate in the work of the survey group. Indeed, it is considered necessary for the success of the group that it be created as a result of the invitation of the states concerned and with their full cooperation, to assist them in carrying out developmental projects of their own choice.

In view of the urgency of the refugee problem, the Department of State agrees that first consideration should be given to projects for which basic surveys have already been made.

The Department of State recognizes that assistance to the states concerned for execution of the refugee program will be required over and above loans likely to be obtained from the International Bank and other fiscal institutions, and is gratified to note the assistance which the United Kingdom has already given Transjordan through the loan of a million pounds.

With respect to paragraph 4 of the United Kingdom statement,[3] the Department of State is giving further consideration to the type of

[3] Paragraph 4 of the Foreign Office telegram cited in footnote 1 immediately above stated that the task of maintaining the refugees and organizing their resettlement should revert "to full and overt United Nations authority" and that a specialized agency of the United Nations would best carry out the function.

organization required to carry out any program recommended by the survey group, and the proper auspices for such an organization. The views of the United Kingdom will be carefully considered in this connection; however, it is not felt that final decision need be made at the present time.

WASHINGTON, May 10, 1949.

501.BB Palestine/5–1049 : Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Troutman) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED GENEVA, May 10, 1949—11 a. m.

410. Palun 145. From Ethridge. After PCC meetings with Arabs at Beirut and with Israel in Tel Aviv, commissioners had informal meetings with Israelis in Jerusalem re preliminary measures which Israel might take without prejudice its interests for purpose creating atmosphere favorable to success of Lausanne talks. During past week Israeli delegation has informed PCC re these measures as follows:

(1) Israeli declaration re refugee problem: Recognizing refugee problem is one of main problems confronting conference. Israeli delegation prepared to tackle with sincerity and in spirit of optimism. We believe problem to be soluble and are prepared to do everything possible to help in arriving at solution. We shall cooperate with UN and with Arab States in implementing solution of problem on assumption that cooperation with Arab States will extend to other spheres as well.

(2) Israeli declaration re proprietary rights of refugees and payment of compensation: Fact that absentee property has been placed under custodian (see paragraph 5) indicates Israel's general attitude. Israel accepts principle of compensation for land abandoned and previously cultivated. Proprietary rights of refugees are recognized by Israel for purposes of such compensation but recognition does not bind government as far as concerns use or restitution of lands involved. Government reserves right to enact legislation for more rational use of absentee property and for purpose of guarding against speculation in such property without prejudice to payment of compensation or to such limited measures of repatriation as may be agreed upon.

(3) Israeli declaration re rights of minorities: Israel fully respected rights of minorities within its border and would punish anyone infringing these rights.

(4) Israeli assurance re blocked accounts: Israel has no intention of confiscating blocked Arab accounts in Israeli banks. Funds would be available to proper owners on conclusion of peace, subject to such general currency regulations as may be operative at time.

(5) A suspension of application of absentee law: Law at present in force placing of refugee property in category of "enemy property" under custodian. Custodian acts as trustee for absentee owners whose

property is administered in their interest and as far as possible preserved against deterioration after manner of similar custodianships in other countries.

(6) Undertaking re deterioration of refugee property, see paragraph 5.

(7) Employment of certain number refugee workers in Israel, e.g., port of Haifa, orange groves, et cetera: under consideration by Israeli delegation.

Re return of presently separated families (Palun 140)[1] Eytan has informed PCC following its request Israel would be willing as preliminary measure to take census by inviting Arabs resident in Israel to furnish details concerning relatives who are now refugees and who would wish and be eligible to apply for repatriation under conditions stated (genuine relatives of close degree of consanguinity and commencement of repatriation not to begin until final Israeli DPS [*sic*] Arab settlement). [Ethridge.]

TROUTMAN

[1] Identified also as telegram 676, May 4, from Bern, p. 975.

501.BB Palestine/5–1049 : Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Troutman) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA, May 10, 1949—11 a. m.

411. Palun 146. From Ethridge. PCC members and Israeli delegates recently discussed informally possibility of commencing Israeli-Arab negotiations through device of preamble of general principle in which both parties could agree. It was thought such an agreement would create favorable atmosphere and provide point of departure for further discussions and for further agreement. Bunche utilized this device to initiate discussion and agreement at Rhodes.

Eytan recently provided PCC with rough draft which might serve as basis for discussion on principles governing future relations and territorial settlement between Israel and Arab states. Israeli delegation did not consider itself bound to accept draft and presented as preliminary suggestion to facilitate negotiations. Draft agreement consists of preamble and two articles. Preamble cites pertinent paragraphs GA Resolution December 11 and PCC meeting at Lausanne. First article refers to Palestine war, Middle East peace and UN charter. Three principles affirmed:

(1) Continued observance Armistice agreements;
(2) Right to security, freedom and sovereignty;
(3) Agreement prerequisite to establishment diplomatic relations and economic cooperation.

Second article contains definition of boundaries (in blank), undertaking to respect such boundaries, reservation re subsequent boundary changes, contact between frontier authorities to prevent incidents, settlement of frontier disputes by peaceful means through negotiations and arbitration.

PCC was of opinion draft preamble beginning statement of general principles rather than detailed formulation would prove more acceptable to Arab Delegates at this stage. PCC considered Article 1, subparagraphs 1 and 3 unnecessary and unwise respectively. PCC believed it would be preferable to consider agreement along lines of Article 2 after it proved possible to bring Arabs to agreement on less controversial matters.

Present PCC thinking tends to short agreement containing preamble and one article. Preamble would cite GA Resolution December 11 and Lausanne meeting. First and only article would declare intention not to resort to threat or use of force in settlement to any dispute arising from situation in Palestine and to settle any such dispute or question by peaceful means.

PCC draft is being informally discussed with Israeli and Arab delegates. [Ethridge.]

TROUTMAN

867N.01/5–1049 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iraq (Crocker) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY BAGHDAD, May 10, 1949—1 p. m.

263. In striking contrast to meeting with Foreign Minister reported Embtel 260, May 7,[1] was my conversation with Prime Minister Nuri yesterday. Speaking dispassionately, Nuri expressed views along following lines:

1. First and foremost necessity to solution Palestine and attendant problems is determination territorial boundaries.
2. If some authorities would guarantee Israel would be made to abide by November 29, 1947 and December 11, 1948 UNGA Resolutions, real hope for liquidation Palestine problem would ensue.
3. Implementation such policy would automatically create living space in such places as Western Galilee and Lydda and Ramleh areas to permit absorption as much as 350,000 refugees.
4. Such considerable reduction in number refugees would enable Arab States examine how best they could help in solving problem of remaining refugees.

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[1] Not printed; it advised that Ambassador Crocker had communicated to Foreign Minister Jamali the substance of the circular telegram of April 29 (p. 959). The Foreign Minister was said to have "countered with number unrealistic and intransigent remarks indicating Iraq adamantly opposed taking any measure help alleviate refugee problem." (501.BB Palestine/5–749)

5. Coincidentally, fullest possible economic development would enable Iraq (*a*) settle during first four or five years bulk nomadic Iraqi tribesmen who wish make homes in fixed areas and own land and (*b*) plan on settling Palestine refugees after needs Iraqi tribesmen are met.

6. Such economic development should create conditions which would make possible five or six years hence adoption policy envisaging considerable refugee immigration into Iraq.

7. If UN fails take necessary action in time to stop Israel's constant flaunting [*flouting*] of solemn UN resolution, probably only help Iraq might extend would be to consider advisability arrange voluntary exchange on pro rata basis of Iraqi Jews for Palestine Arabs.

8. Expulsion Iraqi Jews to make room for Arab refugees not policy Iraqi Government would normally adopt as Iraq treats its Jews as Iraqi nationals entitled same rights as Iraqi Arabs. If pressed too hard, however, firebrand Iraqis might take matter into own hands and cause untold misery to thousands innocent persons.

Citing foregoing as some of reasons why he hoped UN would take effective measures to make Israel abide by earlier UN resolutions, Nuri expressed wish to help liquidate Palestine problem. His unwillingness participate Lausanne meeting springs from his sincere conviction that UN has done little to make Israel accept its decisions while at same time has done everything possible make Arabs accept *fait accomplis* created by Israeli violations UN resolutions. Now is time for UN rectify situation and enable Arabs work towards development stability and security in Middle East.

Comment: Nuri, who suffered fainting spell in Majlis[2] two days ago and appeared far from well yesterday, spoke with true ring of sincerity. If we could satisfy him that UN will make Israel accept UN decisions, he would probably be best man in Iraq to help us move ahead in trying solve Palestine and refugee problem. If, however, we persist pressing Iraq to fall in line without exacting positive commitment from Israel in advance, we fear that his attitude because fear of internal upheaval will harden and our task will to that extent become even more difficult.

Sent Department 263, repeated London 93, Jerusalem 25, Tel Aviv 20, Bern 5 for Ethridge, pouched Arab capitals.

CROCKER

[2] The Iraqi Parliament.

Editorial Note

The General Assembly, on May 11, considered the proposal to admit Israel to membership in the United Nations. Senator Austin noted that the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee of the Assembly had recom-

mended the proposal by a large majority and that the United States was cosponsor of the draft resolution to effect the admission. The text of his statement is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, May 22, 1949, page 655.

The Assembly voted 37 to 12 in favor of the draft resolution. There were 9 abstentions, including the United Kingdom and Turkey. The United States, the Soviet Union, and France were among those voting affirmatively. The President of the Assembly thereupon declared that Israel had been admitted to the United Nations. The Assembly's proceedings on May 11 are printed in United Nations, *Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part II* (hereinafter cited as GA (III)), *Plenary Meetings*, pages 330, 331. The text of resolution 273 (III) of May 11 appears in GA (III), *Resolutions, 5 April–18 May 1949*, page 18.

Hassouna Pasha, Under Secretary of the Egyptian Foreign Office, expressed to Chargé Patterson on May 12 "disillusioned acquiescence in an accomplished fact with regret that UN had found precipitate action necessary in respect of new state which had not yet shown regard for international obligations, respect for which customarily precedes recognition or acceptance into a fraternity of nations." (Telegram 466, May 12, 5 p. m., from Cairo, 501.BB Palestine/5–1249)

501.BB Palestine/5–1149

The Israeli Ambassador (Elath) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, May 11, 1949.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I should like to express the deep gratitude of my Government for the invaluable support given by the United States in the discussion of Israel's membership application in the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the United Nations. I believe that the draft resolution gained enormously in effectiveness and prestige through the formal association of the United States with it.

I should like you to know that the conversation which Mr. Eban and I were privileged to have with you on April 26th has had a deep effect on the Israeli Government. In formulating our attitudes on the various outstanding problems, we took care to keep certain principles in mind. In the first place we strongly upheld the right of the General Assembly to be regarded as the ultimate moral arbiter in issues of deadlock or difficulty. It was made clear by our representative again and again that in so far as we find difficulties in the December 11, 1948, Resolution we aspired to resolve them by agreement, not by defiance. We shall stretch ourselves to the utmost to bring our policy in conformity with United Nations resolutions, or if necessary, to seek

authority for any divergences by appeal to the General Assembly itself.

I believe that our delegation was successful in impressing upon the United Nations that the Jerusalem question required the discussion and exchange of new proposals, which, while in accord with the December 11th Resolution, take proper account of realities and of the welfare and sentiment of the population. We were gratified to understand from you on April 26th that in your view any international regime established in Jerusalem should have as its primary concern the protection and control of Holy Places and religious institutions, rather than actual administration of the City, which now enjoys the blessings of peace and orderly life, both in its Arab and Jewish sections. We have been able, with nothing but the influence of argument and discussion, to satisfy the apprehensions of most of the Catholic countries of Latin America. Seventeen out of twenty of these countries have supported our application under no kind of pressure but that of explanation and debate.

Every approach to a genuine peace discussion brings nearer the hope of a successful settlement of the refugee problem. Throughout the *Ad Hoc* Committee's discussions our representative maintained the view, upheld by the Conciliation Commission, that the "final solution of this problem will be found within the framework of the economic and social rehabilitation of all the countries of the Near East." We have endeavoured in all our recent statements to avoid any negative attitudes, and we look forward to an agreement at Lausanne defining the exact contribution of each Government concerned, as well as of the international community. We have noted the Conciliation Commission's judgment that "the refugee problem cannot be permanently solved unless other political questions, notably the question of boundaries, are also solved." Accordingly, our delegation at Lausanne has taken the initiative in asking for an immediate discussion and settlement of outstanding territorial questions. You may have observed that in the debates of the Committee our representative, mindful of our conversation with you, pledged Israel to a settlement of boundaries by agreement through the same methods of negotiation and reciprocal concessions which has had beneficial results in the armistice negotiations. All governments understand that an attitude of give and take may be necessary if an agreed settlement is to be reached at an early date.

It is our hope that the atmosphere of the peace conference at Lausanne will enable our Government to explore the paths of conciliation in more detail and with greater freedom than could possibly be done at a public forum, such as the General Assembly. The United States may have noticed that our delegation at Lake Success austerely

501-887—77——64

refused to seek any immediate tactical advantage by obscuring the real difficulties still outstanding. Despite the sharp and critical scrutiny which our policy of candour invited, we insisted on bringing our difficulties and reservations into the open light of day. It is therefore all the more significant that an impressive majority of disinterested international opinion has expressed its confidence in Israel in full and detailed knowledge of difficulties which we have neither dissembled nor concealed.

I should like to assure you in conclusion, Mr. Secretary, that the settlement of outstanding questions by agreement with the Arab States under the auspices of the United Nations remains the over-riding objective of my Government's policy.

Accept [etc.] E. ELATH

501.BB Palestine/5–1249 : Telegram

Mr. Mark F. Ethridge to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED LAUSANNE, May 12, 1949—3 p. m.

Palun 148. During past four days informal talks have taken place between PCC, Israel, Arab delegations re signature protocol which would permit Israeli Arab talks through PCC to commence. Arab delegation desired that: (1) first objective conversations be solution refugee question; (2) attached map showing [19]47 partition lines be used as base for territorial talks. Israeli delegation was willing adopt device protocol with map showing partition lines. PCC in agreement but did not wish restrict talks to refugee question only. Arab delegation after delay several days during which Syrian delegation apparently took obstructive line finally agreed PCC formulation.

On May 12 PCC Israeli Arab delegations separately signed protocol with map attached.

Protocol is as follows:

"The UN PCC anxious achieve quickly possible objectives GA resolution 11, December 1948 re refugees, respect for their rights and preservation of their property, as well as territorial and other questions, has proposed to Israeli delegation and Arab States delegation that working document attached hereto be taken as basis for talks with Commission.

The interested delegations have accepted proposal with understanding that exchanges of views which be carried on by Commission with two parties will bear upon territorial adjustments necessary to above indicated objectives."

Map consists of Palestine outline on which [19]47 partition lines for Jewish State, Arab State international area of Jerusalem are indicated. Map is not labelled "plan of partition".

Israeli delegation signed with reservations that:

(1) Israeli delegation could not be party to any exchange of views with Syrian delegation until armistice agreement was concluded;
(2) No communication re protocol was made to press and;
(3) Signing in no way prejudiced right of Israeli delegation to express itself freely on matters at issue on which it fully reserved its position.

PCC has no objection to reservations but pointed out:

(1) Protocol would be applicable to direct Israeli-Syrian talks when governments themselves wished commence;
(2) UN official press reports will probably appear in future as past re conference PCC matters (Re Palun 147).[1] PCC and its press officer would not in such circumstances be barred from replying or commenting and;
(3) Both Israeli and Arab Delegations had right to free expression their position at all times.

Arab delegations met reservation of Israeli delegation re Syria by reaffirming their right to discuss all matters re Palestine with PCC. Israeli Arab talks through PCC under protocol may thus continue.

PCC also decided to establish subcommittee for general matters including particularly territorial questions. States members of PCC will be represented by De la Tour Dupin for France, Yenisey for Turkey, Wilkins for US. Israeli Arab views re territorial questions under protocol will be sought by commission.

ETHRIDGE

[1] Identified also as telegram 412, May 10, 11 a. m., from Geneva, not printed.

867N.01/5–1249 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, May 12, 1949—4 p. m.

363. During call with Hare on French Consul General Neuville, latter expressed following views:

[Here follow two paragraphs giving these views.]

Comments:

1.—Military observers agree Israel could easily take remainder Arab Palestine by force.

2.—Legion could probably suppress any disturbances by Palestine Arabs at present unless aided from outside.

3.—Statements of Neuville confirm reports from Consulate General of widespread and growing, although partly concealed resentment against Transjordan. Press and radio statements recently more open

in their criticism and emphasize both giving up to Israel of Arab land and appointment by King Abdullah of puppets to "represent" Arabs of Palestine.

4.—Although Consul General not able agree entirely that Palestine Arabs would prefer union with Israel, following factors tend make this attractive: Failure Transjordan protect their interests versus Israel, realization great military superiority Israel, failure Abdullah provide them voice in determining own fate, consciousness of personal nature Transjordan Government and relative backwardness Transjordan as whole, more favorable economic opportunities in Israel, especially higher priced markets for agricultural products, possibility such union would permit return large numbers refugees to both Arab Palestine and areas now under Israel control.

Sent Department 363, repeated Baghdad 25, Beirut 70, Damascus 27, London 11, Geneva 10 (for USDel PCC), pouched Amman, Cairo, Jidda.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/5–1249 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL URGENT NEW YORK, May 12, 1949—4:17 p. m.

587. Bunche has sent Vigier a revised compromise proposal for settlement Israeli-Syrian discussions along the following lines:

(*a*) Truce lines to be the armistice lines;
(*b*) A demilitarized zone to be established on Auja model in Egypt agreement. Syrians to withdraw to their frontier. Israelis also to withdraw. For those points on which it is not possible to persuade Israelis to withdraw, a radical reduction of forces to effective strength should be established;
(*c*) Demilitarized zone to be under UN supervision again on Egypt armistice model. Israeli civil officers to operate in zone;
(*d*) Syrians to withdraw by stages from demilitarized zone;
(*e*) If absolutely necessary, Israelis might be allowed one or two outposts in demilitarized zone. This would be last resort, however.

Bunche says he is working on Syrians and believes that they will agree to foregoing plan. He has warned them that they cannot hope for a more favorable settlement if negotiations break down and the question goes to SC. The essential for them is that Zaim have a face-saving device such as Israeli withdrawal or drastic reduction of forces.

Bunche has talked with Eban, who indicated Israel's unwillingness to make any withdrawals or reduction of forces alleging that possibility of Syrian outpost being left in demilitarized zone should apparently be discussed in negotiations and would nullify withdrawal.

Bunche informed him and Vigier that any outposts which might be established should be in defensive force only and very few in number.

Bunche is using argument with Israelis that his plan will give them their major point which is to get the Syrians out of Palestine.

Bunche would appreciate any assistance possible from Department on foregoing proposals which will be presented at meeting tomorrow.

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/5–1249 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

PRIORITY WASHINGTON, May 12, 1949—6 p. m.

268. Following is text of memorandum on Syrian-Israeli armistice talks left in Dept by Israeli Amb May 12.

1. During the fighting in northern Palestine Israeli troops occupied fourteen villages in Lebanese territory adjoining Eastern Galilee. Syrian troops occupied Israeli territory in two sectors, the first in the Huleh Region and the second between the Sea of Galilee and the Syrio-Palestinian frontier.

2. During the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations Lebanon demanded the restoration of the international frontier. The Mediator and his staff insisted on this point with the utmost vigor. Israel accepted this position, and the Lebanese-Israeli armistice was concluded through a unilateral withdrawal by Jewish forces from Lebanese soil.

3. In the Syrio-Israeli armistice discussions Israel has asked for the application of the same principle, namely, the restoration of the international frontier. Throughout the armistice negotiations with other states, while demarcation lines within Palestine have been fluid and subject to negotiation, the utmost concern has been expressed by United Nations representatives for the preservation of established international frontiers. Thus, a temporary Jewish encroachment into Egyptian territory was most speedily corrected and the utmost concern was devoted to maintaining the integrity of the Palestine–Transjordan frontier during any troop movements or armistice delineations. It may be said that whenever a truce line has been in the vicinity of an international frontier, the armistice line has been based upon the frontier and not upon the truce positions.

4. The Syrian delegation has persistently refused to base the armistice demarcation line on the international frontier and has openly asserted that Syria has claims for frontier revision in the final political settlement.

5. This Syrian position, inadmissible in itself under Article II, paragraph 4, of the Charter and under the precedents established in

other phases of the truce and the armistice negotiations, is aggravated by the fact that the Syrian position on Israeli territory at Mishmar Hayarden is held in violation of truce. This is the only instance remaining in Palestine where any troops are in a position not authorized either under the truce or the armistice agreements.

6. Israel maintains its right to carry out the principle advocated in the Lebanese negotiations, namely, the withdrawal of Syrian troops to the frontier with Israel taking over control on its own territory previously occupied. Nevertheless in an effort to compromise, Israel has been willing to give consideration to a proposal whereby Syrian troops on withdrawing to the frontier would not be replaced by Israeli troops. The proposal is that the vacuum thus created should remain a demilitarized zone containing no forces of either side. This device has successfully solved deadlocks in other armistice discussions. For example, the disputed area at El Auja occupied by Israel troops and claimed by Egyptian forces was made a demilitarized zone. This compromise led to the successful Egyptian-Israeli armistice agreement.

7. This principle applied to the Syrian front would not prejudice the claims of either party in the final political settlement. If Syria has a territorial claim, that claim would not be prejudiced since no Israeli troops would be in occupation of the area. Similarly, Israel's claim to maintain the present frontier would not be prejudiced by the fact of Syrian occupation. The matter, therefore, becomes very grave if Syria declines to accept this compromise and insists on maintaining its present positions intact. In conversations between the Acting Mediator and the Israeli delegation at Lake Success, the former has expressed sympathy for the compromise of the demilitarized zone. This may indeed by the only method of securing the main desires of each party. This Syrians could regard the armistice line as being where it is at the moment, while Israel's main principle would be vindicated by the fact that no Syrian troops were on Israeli soil. It should be added that whereas Transjordanian, Egyptian and Israeli troops are at present in areas not allotted to them by the November 29th Resolution, none of them is on the territory of any existing state. Thus Article II, paragraph 4, of the Charter is nowhere infringed upon.

8. The new Syrian regime has recently been recognized by the United States, Great Britain, and France. These three governments should therefore be in a position to influence the Syrian government in favor of complying with the principles and precedents established before. These principles should not be applied when they redound, as in the Lebanese agreement, to Israel's disadvantage and relinquished when they require an effort on the part of an Arab state.

9. The Syrian position at the moment is so difficult to defend within the principles of the Charter and of previous armistice practice that

Israel would not hesitate to make a complaint to the Security Council. It would, however, be infinitely preferable for this matter to be settled by negotiation and agreement. It is clear, therefore, that all available international influence should be brought to bear in order to persuade the Syrian government to give the same weight to an established international frontier as has been given in all similar circumstances before.[1]

ACHESON

[1] The Department, on May 12, directed New York to bring telegram 268 to the attention of Mr. Bunche as soon as possible and to seek his attitude concerning "US approach Syrian Govt in effort persuade latter accept compromise proposal would be helpful," in view of the apparent Israeli acceptance of the main principle of that proposal (telegram 265, 501.BB Palestine/5–1249).

501.BB Palestine/5–1249 : Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Troutman) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA, May 12, 1949—6 p. m.

433. Palun 150. From PCC. On basis of assurance from Department that US would not sponsor resolution admitting Israel unless satisfactory assurance were given at Lausanne on points in question I told Arab delegation that their first reaction when announcement of sponsorship was made was renewed cynicism and intimation that I had misled them. Their more considered reaction is to feel that certainly Israel must have given more assurance to the State Department than it has given at Lausanne. I also hope very much that is true; otherwise I am afraid that what I say to Arabs in other respects will be discounted. If such assurances were received from Israel I would like most urgently to know what they are.

Am glad to report that Israeli delegates' attitude since admission has not seemed to change for the worse. Eytan seems as anxious as ever, if not more so, to go ahead with negotiations and to speed them up. [PCC.]

TROUTMAN

501.BB Palestine/5–1249 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria

CONFIDENTIAL US URGENT NIACT WASHINGTON, May 12, 1949—7 p. m.

209. USUN reports[1] that Bunche has sent Vigier revised compromise proposal for settlement Israeli-Syrian discussions. Dept considers this probably fairest possible solution impasse.

[1] In telegram 587, May 12, p. 1000.

For your info proposal is along following lines:

[Here follows a summary of points *a*, *b*, *c*, and *d* in telegram 587.]

Pls inform Syrian Govt soonest Dept sincerely hopes it can agree to foregoing plan. It is most unlikely that they could hope for more favorable settlement if negotiations should break down and question be referred to SC. Syrians stand to gain thru Israeli withdrawal and thru immeasurably improved prospects of reaching final settlement Lausanne which would result from armistice settlement.

Dept is making similar reps at Tel Aviv.[2]

ACHESON

[2] In telegram 288, May 12, 7 p. m., not printed, the last two paragraphs stated: "Pls inform Israeli Govt soonest Dept sincerely hopes they can accept this compromise since it should result in withdrawal of Syrians from Palestine which is presumably their major objective, and immeasurably increase possibilities of reaching final agreement at Lausanne.

"Also state Dept is likewise urging acceptance on Syrian Govt." (501.BB Palestine/5–1249)

Telegrams 209 and 288 were repeated to New York.

501.BB Palestine/5–1249 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 12, 1949—7 p. m.

619. Unpal 98. For USDel, Lausanne. Re US cosponsorship resolution admission Israel (re Palun 142[1]) Dept concurred view USUN that admission Israel at this session in full accord with Charter and would help settlement Palestine question. US sponsored Israeli application in SC in Paris on Dec. 17, 1948 and again in NY on Mar. 4, 1949. Participation by US among several states to provide formal basis for GA action was not under circumstances of considerable political import whereas refusal to do so would be interpreted as conspicuous shift in our policy amounting to opposition to Israeli membership. Dept believes failure of Israeli application would militate both on Arab and Israeli side against settlement at Lausanne and in later negotiations. Since beginning of Palestine question in UN Arabs have repeatedly delayed acceptance realities of situation until events have moved them far beyond their own best interests. Further, they have intimated privately on several occasions that it would assist settlement if they could be presented with decision with which they would have to comply. When such imposed solutions were arranged, Arabs bitterly opposed and failed to translate such decisions into face-saving formulas for Arab domestic opinion. On Israeli side, Israel is now

[1] Identified also as telegram 699, May 9, from Bern, p. 988.

in position of having received from us support on all questions on which they are entitled to support and time has now come for them to produce basis for settlement. Dept does not believe that transitory question of joining in cosponsoring resolution affects substantially our ability to press Israel for reasonable attitude. If pressure is required, it must necessarily be more substantial in nature. Lastly, US prestige in UN has suffered through apparent changes of attitude on our part during history of this question. Dept considered we should avoid fresh round of confusion and irritation arising from equivocal position on Israeli membership.

Asst Secy Rusk telephoned Elath in NY Fri night subject refugees and called him into Dept on Wed to press for positive action on refugee question. Rusk insisted Israeli Del Lausanne should leave no doubt in PCC that Israel accepts repatriation as substantial element in solution refugee problem. He also urged that time has come for Israel to take second step presented by Secy to Sharett, namely, to begin actual repatriation prior to final determination of numbers to be repatriated and final political settlement. Elath is expected to furnish Dept with further information on early repatriation of families of Arabs now residing in areas under Israeli control as well as other repatriation which could be accomplished without security threat. Rusk stated it necessary for us to know Israeli views on refugees in order to make our own plans on economic and other matters regarding that area. Also insisted that solution of refugee problem should not be used as bargaining point for problems of boundaries and internationalization of Jerusalem. Elath agreed these issues should be kept separate.

Austin's statement in plenary session on Israeli membership being repeated separate telegram.

ACHESON

501.BB Palestine/5–1349 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, May 13, 1949—1 : 55 a. m.

Delga 112. Deptels 265 and 268 May 12.[1] Bunche, on May 12, had very unfavorable reaction Israel memo re Syrian-Israel armistice talks because of memo's inaccuracies, half truths and Israel unwillingness withdraw or reduce forces and permit mixed Armistice Commission control demilitarized zone, especially in respect civilian return to

[1] Former not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1003.

demilitarized area. He received essentially same note from Eban today and rebutted it strongly. Rather than approach to Syrians, Bunche wishes Department would urge acceptance his compromise (mytel 587, May 12) on Israelis who are the recalcitrants. Bunche made following specific comments re memo:

Lebanese agreement not a fair comparison for Syrian agreement since Israelis agreed withdraw from Lebanon as prior condition to negotiations in talk between Ben-Gurion and Bunche December 5. Also, Israelis were definitely outside Palestine invading Lebanon. Thus is not accurate to state that Mediator during armistice negotiation insisted vigorously on this point and Israel unilaterally accepted withdrawal.

Basis for all armistice negotiations has always been truce lines. Israeli incursion into Egypt was a truce violation in October. Bunche said he did not insist on established international frontiers and never heard of alleged principle that "whenever" a truce line was in vicinity of international frontier armistice line was based upon frontier and not upon truce positions. Points out that this not true in Gaza, Auja, elsewhere in Negeb, or in Transjordan agreement. As result of other factors it happens to be true on Lebanese front.

It is absolutely not true that Mishmar Hayarden is held in violation of truce. Only Syrian violation was taking Hill 223 from which they have withdrawn.

Re statement that present dispute is only instance of nonconformity to truce or armistice agreement line, Bunche points to Western Galilee occupied by Israelis in October.

Israelis, in speaking of Syrian withdrawal, omit mention of their own withdrawal or radical reduction of forces on which Bunche has been pressing them hard. Thus it is misleading to state that at Lake Success Bunche has indicated sympathy for Israeli stand re demilitarized zone.

Last sentence paragraph 7 and general approach of memo indicate again Israeli claim that they should have all November 29 area plus what they have been able to seize. Points out this does not square with US position re necessity for compensation if adjustments to be made in November 29 lines.

Not mentioned in memo is Israeli claim that their civilians might return to any point in demilitarized zone. Bunche proposal is that Israeli civilians be allowed to return to Mishmar Hayarden, since it was a Jewish settlement, but that others return be controlled by Armistice Commission.

If Israeli-Syrian talks collapse and cannot be revived, Bunche will report to SC placing blame on Israelis. However, he does not envisage

action in immediate future, expecting May 13 talks to be unfruitful but to be continued.

New subject:

Bunche informed from Tel Aviv through Mohn that Ben-Gurion willing meet Zaim only after conclusion Israeli-Syrian Armistice Agreement. Bunche observes there is nothing in this for Zaim.

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/5–249 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 13, 1949—4 p. m.

212. Urtel 256 Apr 28 [1] and 261 May 2. Dept notes with interest marked progress you report re Zaim's attitude resettlement Arab refugees. This is first concrete evidence Syrian willingness take large number refugees and is particular importance since Syria only Arab country except already willing Transjordan which can assimilate such number within reasonable time. If this opportunity can be exploited back of refugee problem can be broken. You shld take early opportunity discuss matter further with Zaim giving appropriate emphasis his expression of willingness accept quarter million refugees, which Dept regards as humane and statesmanlike contribution to solution this problem. Express hope Zaim will use his influence with other Arab states adopt similarly constructive attitude towards problem, within limits their absorptive capacity, in order assist PCC in permanent liquidation problem. Emphasize steps USG is taking to persuade Israel make appropriate concessions re repatriation (Depcirtel Apr 29), which it is understood will help Arab Govts in accepting responsibilities for resettlement. Development program along lines discussed during McGhee's visit in Damascus well under way and Dept hopes advise you shortly details as finally approved. Meantime you shld avoid any direct offer US assistance while at same time indicating that door is open to appropriate approach through PCC, which has expressed willingness recommend favorable action re assistance requested. You shld in particular avoid any inference that USG is encouraging development projects as bribe to Arab states to accept refugees. Emphasis shld be placed on Israeli and Arab responsibility cooperate with PCC in obtaining agreed settlement refugee question in their own self interest, viz., creation condition for lasting peace in NE, elimination security threat of possible refugee dissidence or com-

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 962.

munist exploitation and contribution refugee manpower to development latent resources of recipient countries.[2]

ACHESON

[2] This telegram was repeated to Bern for Mr. Ethridge and to London. The same day, the Department sent telegram 196 to Baghdad in reply to the latter's 263 of May 10, p. 994. It noted that Baghdad's "discussions with Prim Min indicate for first time possible future change in Iraqi policy which wld permit immigration Pal refugees. Even if necessary wait 5 to 6 years as indicated in ref tel Iraq may prove of vital importance in ultimate solution refugee problem through resettlement of refugees not repatriated in Israel or assimilable in Transjordan, Syria, or Lebanon. Consequently, you shld take early opportunity discuss matter again with Prim Min giving emphasis to his statement that economic development of Iraq shld create conditions which would make possible considerable refugee immigration in future," along much the same lines as telegram 212 (867N.01/5–1049).

501.BB Palestine/5–1349 : Telegram

The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT PRIORITY

DAMASCUS, May 13, 1949—8 p. m.

281. General Riley informs me proposal set forth in Deptel 209 May 12, is no longer valid and that modification thereof already before delegations. At today's meeting Israeli delegate requested interpretation certain aspects current proposal before considering it and is presently seeking instructions Tel Aviv. In circumstances General Riley feels it would serve no useful purpose for me make representations indicated by Department; on contrary that such representations might well confuse situation.

Next meeting scheduled for Tuesday, May 17, when it is hoped modified proposal will be discussed in joint session.

General Riley suggests and I agree that I be authorized to support with Syrians, at moment we may jointly consider appropriate, whatever compromise seems fairly to safeguard interests both parties. Legation representations in support of Israeli-weighted proposal in sense penultimate paragraph Deptel 209 can only have stiffening effect.

Syria long ago became accustomed to its inability obtain justice in SC. For US to remind Syria that this situation likely to continue if she fails accept Israeli armistice terms will not. I feel sure, be persuasive, particularly in light of favor currently being shown Israel by US re Israel's acceptance as UN member despite her continued disregard of resolution of December 11 and her failure otherwise fully to live up to standards of UN Charter.

Sent Department; repeated Tel Aviv 30. Department pass USUN New York 5. Pouched Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, Paris, and Ankara.

KEELEY

S/P–NSC Files, Lot 62 D 1[1]

Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Johnson) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers)[2]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 16 May 1949.

NSC 47

Subject: United States Strategic Interests in Israel.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff position with respect to Palestine, formulated at a time when conditions therein were highly unsettled, was developed principally around the possibility of a United Nations' decision to introduce military forces into that country with consequent possible involvement of United States and/or USSR troops. This policy has been overtaken by events in that the United States recognized the provisional government as the *de facto* authority of the new State of Israel on 14 May 1948 and fully recognized the State of Israel on 29 January 1949.

In view of the foregoing developments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have prepared a brief study, from the military point of view, of United States strategic objectives in Israel in the light of the current situation, and I enclosed a copy[3] thereof herewith. It seems to me appropriate, in the light of developments over the course of the last twelve months and in view of the conclusions reached by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the National Security Council re-examine and develop an up-to-date policy on the question of the United States position with respect to Israel. If the Council agrees, I further suggest that the preparation of an initial report on this subject be requested from the Secretary of State.

By separate communication, a copy of which is attached,* I am forwarding a copy of this memorandum and its enclosure to the Secretary of State for his information.

Enclosure

STUDY OF UNITED STATES STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN ISRAEL[4]

1. Such strategic importance as Israel possesses is due to its central location in the Eastern Mediterranean–Middle East area. The

[1] Lot 62 D 1 is a serial and subject master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence for the years 1948–1961, as maintained by the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State.

[2] Submitted by Admiral Souers to the National Security Council with his note of May 17.

[3] Below.

* Not reproduced herewith. [Footnote in the source text.]

[4] This study bears no date.

direct land routes (road and rail) between Turkey and the Cairo–Suez area pass through Israeli territory. In addition, the main land routes from the Caspian area of the USSR and from Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia to Egypt and the Levant pass through or near Israel's territory, as do the pipelines from the Middle East oil areas to the Mediterranean. Israel controls the land approaches to the Cairo–Suez area from the east, the border between Israel and Egypt being about one hundred and fifty miles east of the Suez Canal.

2. There is little possibility now or in the immediate future of Israel becoming an important base area since the country lacks the facilities to accommodate large forces or installations. Furthermore, there is little reason for major base development by the Western Democracies in Israel because of the more highly developed and more accessible Cairo–Suez area some two hundred miles to the West. However, the Israeli area does contain a fine, but small, artificial harbor at Haifa, and an excellent, although limited, system of well-developed airfields and air bases. In our hands, these air installations would be most useful in the interdiction of the lines of communication from the USSR to the Middle East oil resources with medium and short-range aircraft. In the hands of the Soviets, these fields would provide bases from which the Soviets could seriously interfere with our operations in that area.

3. From the viewpoint of tactical operations, Israel's territory and its indigenous military forces, which have had some battle experience, would be of importance to either the Western Democracies or the USSR in any contest for control of the Eastern Mediterranean–Middle East area. It is estimated that in such a contest the USSR has the capability, and would probably attempt to secure or neutralize the oil facilities of the Middle East and to operate against the Cairo–Suez base area. The final line of strong defensive possibilities for the defense of the Cairo–Suez area is at the Jordan rift. Should Israel ally herself with the Western Democracies in the event of war with the USSR, full advantage could be taken of defensive positions in that country and of Israel's forces for the defense of the Cairo–Suez area and for land operations to defend or to recapture the Middle East oil facilities. The cooperation of Israel would be of considerable assistance to the Western Democracies in meeting maximum Soviet capabilities in the Palestine area. Israel, as an ally or as a friendly neutral, would enable the United States to use the Cairo–Alexandretta railway for a limited time for the shipment of supplies to Turkey. Israel as an unfriendly neutral would deny us these advantages.

4. Communist domination of Israel would permit the USSR to control the Haifa terminus of one of the oil pipelines from the Middle

East. It would interfere with our support of Turkey by land routes from the Cairo–Suez area. It would enable the USSR to infiltrate the Cairo–Suez area and would facilitate a Soviet land-offensive against that area.

5. The United States and Great Britain have practically the same strategic interests in the Middle East–Eastern Mediterranean area. However, the international reactions to the Palestine question have produced a complex, entangled political and psychological situation.

6. Israel, after a bitter conflict with the neighboring Arab states, has recently emerged as an independent Jewish nation. In general, the attitude of the of the United States in regard to this development can be considered as favorable to Israel. The United States and the USSR were the first to recognize Israel as a sovereign state. On the other hand, due primarily to her special relations with the Arab states, the United Kingdom has been slow to establish normal relations with Israel.

7. The new State of Israel has close ties with the United States because of our large and influential Jewish minority and is geographically well separated from Soviet-dominated countries. However, there is an opportunity for Communist penetration through Jewish immigration into the new nations from eastern Europe, the Balkans, and China. There are indications that significant numbers of immigrants who have passed through Communist indoctrination courses have already entered Israel. Israel's foreign policy can at present be considered pro-Western although not necessarily anti-Soviet. However, Israel's announced policy is one of neutrality in the "cold war." Israel's leaders have stated privately that their sympathies lie with the West but that for the present it is necessary for Israel publicly to assume a "neutral" position since the new state still needs Soviet support in the United Nations, and desires to facilitate the emigration to Israel of Jews now in the "Iron Curtain" countries.

8. There is considerable agitation for a Mediterranean counterpart of the North Atlantic Pact. Greece, Turkey, and the Arab states have been mentioned as possible members. In spite of Arab opposition to Israel, the strategic location and military strength of the latter make it almost mandatory that Israel be a member, providing the participation of Saudi Arabia and Iran is not precluded by such action, if the pact is aimed to resist Soviet aggression.

9. Israel is surrounded by her defeated foes who are still unfriendly. The United Kingdom has been and still is the proponent of the Arab states. As an expedient in the international field, Israel may accept friendly overtures from other great powers, including the USSR.

Thus, Israel may become a danger or an asset depending upon the nature of her future relations with the Soviets and with the Western Democracies.

10. The British have governed Palestine under mandate and have close ties with some of the neighboring Arab countries. They have military personnel, together with treaty rights, in Egypt, Transjordan, and Iraq. In the event of global war, the United States would probably wish to use facilities in the Cairo–Suez area in conjunction with the British. Hence, any negotiations or arrangements having strategic implications with regard to Israel should be coordinated with the British.

11. Certain expressions of views by the Joint Chiefs of Staff relating to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East have bearing on United States strategic interests in the new State of Israel. These views are stated below for ready reference:

a. From the point of view of the military considerations, the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East is of critical importance to the future security of the United States; and

b. The stability of the Middle East, including assurance that the peoples of this area will not turn to the USSR and against the United States, is a vital element in United States security.

CONCLUSIONS

12. *a.* In the light of the foregoing, it is concluded that United States security interests with respect to the new State of Israel are:

(1) That Israel should be oriented towards the Western Democracies and away from the USSR;

(2) That Communist infiltration should be blocked and domination of Israel by the USSR should be prevented;

(3) That the differences between the new Israeli state and the neighboring Arab states should be reconciled at least to the extent that Israel and the Arab states would act in concert to oppose Soviet aggression; and

(4) That from the United States military point of view it would be advantageous if British relations with Israel were such that a common approach could be taken by the United States and the United Kingdom in achieving mutual objectives with respect to Israel.

b. In view of the interests of the United Kingdom in the Cairo–Suez area, her over-all position in the Middle East–Eastern Mediterranean area, and the general similarity of United Kingdom and United States security interests there, and regardless of the political attitude of the United Kingdom toward Israel, any steps taken by the United States to protect our security interests in Israel should be coordinated with the British.

501.BB Palestine/5–1649 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Vincent) to the Secretary of State

SECRET BERN, May 16, 1949—3 p. m.

741. Palun 151. For the Secretary and McGhee from Ethridge. Your pouched letter of May 3 [1] and proposed plan of action dated April 27 [2] will be commented upon specifically in separate telegram and certain revisions suggested. Meantime here are what we regard as important elements of situation at moment:

(1) It is important for political reasons here that French and Turks in Washington also be approached for clearance of plan. They understood at Beirut that conversations would be held in Washington, and Frenchman this morning raised point that nothing had been heard from his government about such conversations. In addition to importance in getting plan through PCC, possibility exists that France might give material help. In discussion Thursday night with Harriman,[3] he indicated that under certain conditions ways might be found for French Government to help financially. Conversation at British Foreign Office also opened possibility that McCloy might be able to find way through consortium to underwrite help that is not now bankable. Urge quickest consultations with both French and Turkish representatives in Washington, even though such consultations produce little.

(2) It seems to me still necessary to reconcile our position with British. While they have approved general plan, they apparently still do not want to go through UN. Believe all of us agree that it is preferable that help be given that way.

(3) It is also highly desirable to provide some minor funds as soon as possible to put refugees to work. With small amount of capital new villages built by refugees could be started in Arab Palestine and light public works projects instituted with the idea that they would fit into major projects later. Commission is convinced that unrest among refugees growing and likely to explode if idleness continues. Very little money would be required to start employment and in any case, would be necessary to bridge gap between UNRPR and initiation of any large project. Could private organizations or individuals or oil companies be induced to put up some funds now? Specific projects could be recommended fairly quickly by technical committee which Commission is sending out and by refugee organizations which already have some projects in mind. Would of course need to be closely supervised.

(4) My own idea of procedure would envision skipping one step you have in mind in the plan of action. Instead of creating a survey committee in advance of major board, my feeling is that after proper com-

[1] Copy not found in Department of State files. Possibly it was similar in content to Mr. McGhee's letters of April 29; see footnote 3, p. 938.

[2] See annex 3, p. 939.

[3] W. Averell Harriman, United States Special Representative in Europe for the Economic Cooperation Administration.

mitments from Arabs and Jews, PCC should call for setting up of ME development board which could then set up its own survey committee, using such information as the PCC technical committee now in formation would have assembled in the meantime.

(5) Agree heartily with paragraph 15 of conclusions, particularly first sentence, also with statement that maximum commitments from Israel to repatriate and agreement by Arabs to accept refugees should be forthcoming before major plan is advanced. Situation here is that we have almost arrived at point where both those commitments will be forthcoming. Am convinced that Israel, because of pressure applied by US and UN debate, is willing to take more refugees then she was two months ago. We are still pressing and will press for her to take 250,000 in addition to those already in Israel or final total of 400,000 which is less than number under 1947 partition plan. It is likely that if she agrees to that figure or anything approaching it, she will herself ask for help.

Arabs have already been told and have already admitted in private conversations that they will have to take refugees. My own attitude is that Israel should first take the maximum number possible; that, secondly, as many as possible, depending upon economic factors, should be settled in Arab Palestine and that balance must be distributed between Syria and Transjordan. Am convinced that both Syria and Transjordan are prepared between them to take somewhere rising 400,000, but they naturally do not want to commit themselves until Israel has given her final figure. Even then they will not want to commit until they are assured of outside help. I am unable to give that commitment as matters stand. However, I am sure a secret commitment can be secured from them if they know that in turn help will be forthcoming from the outside. It has therefore become most urgent and imperative for me to have a commitment from the State Department and the President somewhat along this general line:

In the spirit of the President's statement of October 4, 1946,[4] in accordance with US policy re Palestine as stated at the UN, and in the spirit of point 4 of his inaugural address, the President reaffirms his position that if a final settlement can be found for the Palestine question and a peace concluded between the nations which have recently been at war, he is willing to recommend to Congress a plan for economic assistance for the development of the ME, and in the meantime to make available through UN and other sources such technical and financial assistance in the settlement of economic and refugee problems as may be possible.

If I could have that commitment, I could say to the Israelis that it is conditioned upon their absorbing at least 400,000, to the Arabs that it is conditioned upon their requesting help for resettlement of balance.

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[4] See President Truman's telegram of October 3 to British Prime Minister Attlee, *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. VII, p. 701.

Matters here have reached such a state of urgency that it is necessary for us to have some commitment as quickly as possible. It would greatly contribute to peace in the ME if we could have it. [Ethridge.]

VINCENT

867N.01/5–449

Draft Letter From the President to Francis Cardinal Spellman, Roman Catholic Archbishop of New York [1]

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

MY DEAR CARDINAL SPELLMAN: Thank you for sending me in your letter of April 29 [2] an account of your conversation with Dr. Weizmann and Mr. Eban on the status of Jerusalem.[3] As you know, this is a question which deeply interests me.

I wish to assure you that the United States Government firmly supports the principle of the internationalization of Jerusalem. The United States delegation voted for the General Assembly Palestine resolutions of November 29, 1947, and December 11, 1948. The latter resolved that the Jerusalem area should be placed under effective United Nations control and instructed the Palestine Conciliation Commission to present to the Fourth Regular Session of the General Assembly detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area which would provide for maximum local autonomy for distinctive groups consistent with the special international status of the Jerusalem area.

In view of your deep concern with the matter, a brief account of some of the basic problems connected with the establishment of an international Jerusalem enclave will be of interest to you. Competent officials of this Government have estimated that the annual cost of a 4,000-man police force to maintain order in Jerusalem would be in excess of $30,000,000. Such a police force would of necessity have to be a well-organized and efficient body, particularly in view of the

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[1] Prepared in the Department of State and transmitted to President Truman by Secretary Acheson in his memorandum of May 17. The President sent the letter to Cardinal Spellman, presumably as drafted, on May 19.

[2] Not printed.

[3] Cardinal Spellman's letter of April 29 to President Truman described his conversation with these Israeli spokesmen, who had been his dinner guests the previous evening. The guests had spoken of a type of internationalization of Jerusalem quite different from the one the President and the Cardinal had discussed at an earlier but undisclosed date. At that discussion, the letter stated, the President and the Cardinal had envisaged creation of an international enclave under United Nations rule, as decreed by the resolution of the General Assembly on November 29, 1947, and confirmed at the Paris session of the General Assembly in December 1948. The Cardinal expressed himself as being somewhat puzzled, therefore, at the information imparted to him by his guests that the Department of State had suggested to them what the Cardinal termed "a mitigated—so called 'indirect'—internationalization" under which Jerusalem would be divided into two parts as trusteeships of the United Nations, with Israel and Transjordan as administering authorities.

fact that a large segment of the inhabitants of Jerusalem is strongly opposed to the established [*establishment*] of an international regime which would [have] complete authority to regulate the daily activities of the populace. It is also of considerable importance that, under the Mandate, Jerusalem was not self-supporting but depended upon revenues from the rest of Palestine, revenues which would not be available to Jerusalem as an international enclave.

Experts of this Government who have appraised the likelihood of the contribution by the different nations of the large sums necessary annually for the administration of Jerusalem as an international enclave conclude that the countries most directly concerned would be unable or unwilling to provide the funds required. The international community is much interested in the status of Jerusalem because of concern for the free access to and protection and preservation of the Holy Places, but there are indications that the nations are not convinced of the necessity of establishing the kind of international regime which would exercise complete control over the day-to-day existence of the inhabitants of Jerusalem.

Under these circumstances, and in view of the fact that the General Assembly resolution of December 11, 1948, states that an international regime for Jerusalem "should provide for maximum local autonomy for distinctive groups consistent with the special international status of the Jerusalem area", the United States Government has come to believe that it should be possible to work out an arrangement whereby Israel and Transjordan could accept a large share of governmental responsibility in the Jerusalem area under the overall supervision of some representation of the United Nations. This representation would be placed over the entire Jerusalem area, but its primary concern would consist of controlling the Holy Places and providing for their preservation and protection, and free access thereto. The United States Government has not reached a final decision on the question, and its attitude in this regard will in large measure be determined by the proposals to be made regarding the status of the City by the Palestine Conciliation Commission, upon which the responsibility for this task has been placed by the General Assembly.

Officers of the Department of State have, in discussing the status of Jerusalem with representatives of the Government of Israel, mentioned as one possible type of international regime for Jerusalem the establishment of a joint Israeli-Transjordan trusteeship under the United Nations trusteeship system. The discussions in question were, however, general and exploratory, and, as I have stated the final position of the United States Government will not be taken until the recommendations of the Palestine Conciliation Commission on Jerusalem have been made.

I certainly agree with you that there is considerable contrast between

Dr. Weizmann's readiness to admit some degree in internationalization for Jerusalem and Mr. Ben Gurion's reported remarks concerning the City. However, I am sure you will have noted that Mr. Eban, in his statement before the *ad hoc* Political Committee of the General Assembly on May 5, admitted the possibility of an international regime applicable to the whole City of Jerusalem. In view of the attitude taken by Dr. Weizmann and Mr. Eban, it seems to me possible that Mr. Ben Gurion's words may not have reflected the final position of the Israeli Government on this question.

Dr. Weizmann's statement that any Arab refugee who so desired might return to Israel is difficult to reconcile with the position taken by Israeli representatives in discussions of the refugee problem with representatives of this Government. The former have been consistent in maintaining that the best solution of the refugee problem lies in resettlement outside of Israel. This Government believes that agreement by Israel to the repatriation of a good member of the refugees is essential to a lasting peace in Palestine. In his statement at Lake Success on May 5, Mr. Eban seemed to accept the principle of repatriation, and it is my earnest hope that when a final Palestine peace settlement is reached a sizeable number of the refugees will be repatriated.

The United States Government is profoundly indebted to Mark Ethridge for his outstanding patriotism in accepting the difficult assignment as United States Member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission. He has certainly been doing a splendid job.

I am grateful to you for giving me the benefit of your thoughts on the Palestine problem. I am fully aware of the extremely important Christian interest in Jerusalem, and I am, of course, in complete agreement with the desire of the Christian world for assured free access to the Holy Places and for their protection and preservation.

With my most sincere best wishes,

Sincerely yours

HARRY S. TRUMAN

867N.113/5–1749

The British Embassy to the Department of State

SECRET

PALESTINE ARMS EMBARGO

The British Ambassador left with the Secretary of State an informal memorandum dated 27th April setting forth Mr. Bevin's views on the Palestine Arms embargo in the light of British Treaty relationships with certain of the Arab States and of the British Government's concern about internal security in the Middle Eastern countries.

2. Mr. Bevin has now heard that the King of Egypt has told the Egyptian Prime Minister to proceed with military talks with British representatives and that three Egyptian officers have been nominated for the purpose. Simultaneously the Egyptian Prime Minister has again pressed the British Government about the resumption of the supply of arms to Egypt. It is clear that very little progress can be made with the former without the latter.

3. Mr. Bevin also understands that, following the signature of armistices between Israel and the neighbouring countries, the United States Government are informing both Israel and the Arab Governments that they are prepared to accept trainees from the Middle East for training in the United States National Defence Establishment. This might perhaps be regarded as a step in the same direction.

4. Mr. Bevin recognizes that a connection might be made between the supply of arms to the Arab States by the British Government and discussions about a military assistance programme in connection with the North Atlantic Treaty. He has verified that the military equipment which the British Government might supply to the Arab States has long been earmarked and consists of purely British-type equipment. This equipment in no way corresponds with equipment being requested from the United States as a result of the North Atlantic Treaty. The supply of the latter would not enable the British Government to release any corresponding or equivalent types for use by the Arab States, which would in fact be incapable of using such equipment.

5. Mr. Bevin is most anxious to proceed at an early date as proposed in paragraphs 3 and 5 of the British Embassy's informal memorandum of the 27th April and he would therefore be most grateful for Mr. Acheson's views as soon as possible.

[WASHINGTON,] 17th May 1949.

501.BB Palestine/5–1749 : Telegram

Mr. Mark F. Ethridge to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL LAUSANNE, May 17, 1949—noon.

Palun 155. During past few days PCC has had further meetings with Israeli and Arab delegations separately. Discussion revolved around emergency steps which Israel was willing to take on basis of PCC memo (re Palun 145 [1]) and activities of General Committee in relation to Israeli Arab PCC protocol (re Palun 148).[2]

[1] Telegram 410, May 10, from Geneva, p. 992.
[2] Dated May 12, p. 998.

Eytan restricted his remarks to general Israeli views on boundaries indicating specific details would be discussed with General Committee. Eytan said re refugees Israel was willing to do as much as it could, but that it could not handle problem alone and that its contribution would depend on extent of final settlement and on character of territorial arrangements. Eytan insisted Israeli view should be presented to Arabs by PCC. Eytan observed that admission of Israel to UN formalized its rights under charter as well as its obligations. Charter is based on premise that UN members settle disputes by peaceful means. Israel would welcome statement to this effect by Arabs and suggested PCC obtain it. Charter is also based on sovereign equality of its members. Israeli admission to UN should thus facilitate Arab problem of working and negotiating with Israel.

Eytan remarked re boundaries that partition was based on independent states in Palestine, but [he] did not mention economic union or internationalization of Jerusalem. Arabs tried to prevent but failed as Jewish state was established and Arab was not. On November 29 GA did not divide Palestine between Jews and Arab states but between Jews and Arabs of Palestine. Arab states have no claim whatsoever on Palestine. Arab states are in temporary military occupation of Palestine. First task of General Committee is to face this situation of unlawful military occupation. Israeli delegation will insist on withdrawal of all Arab states. Principle of self determination should be observed for Arab Palestine. Future of Arab Palestine should be left to its inhabitants.

PCC observed in reply that if its first task was removal of Arab troops from Arab Palestine it might also be argued removal of Israeli troops from Arab Palestine would be required. Eytan conceded logic of argument, but expressed view Israeli occupation was legitimate whereas Arab occupation was not.

PCC also observed that assuming plebiscite for Arab Palestine was necessary or desirable, essential preliminary step would undoubtedly be return of refugees to their homes. Eytan did not reply or expand his remarks re this subject.

Comment: PCC has consistently pressed Arabs to consider refugee question in context of final settlement including territorial arrangement. PCC doubts wisdom of urging Arabs at this early stage in negotiations to issue unilateral statement re settlement of disputes by peaceful means since this objective may be accomplished through their agreement to preamble (Palun 146) and is actually demonstrated by their presence in Lausanne and continuance of talks through PCC.

Re withdrawal of Arab troops and plebiscite in Arab Palestine, GA resolution December 11 is silent on both subjects. Eytan virtually

withdrew Israeli demand re withdrawal of Arab forces when faced with possibility of counter demand re withdrawal Israeli forces. Simultaneous withdrawal, although desirable, is beyond realm of practical possibility at this time. Plebiscite for Arab Palestine also seems impractical. Recent reports indicate, in any event, that Transjordan military administration is gradually being converted into Transjordan civil administration. In final analysis it seems equitable to argue that neither Israel nor Arabs have right to stipulate governmental structure of other, and thereafter to base their remarks re territorial change and other matters on such stipulation.

This morning Arabs vehemently held to their formal collective position that refugees return should be given absolute priority over other aspects of problem. PCC replied it continues press Israelis on refugee issue but, as this is unquestionably bound up with territorial settlement, PCC could not confine discussions purely to refugee matters.

Comment: PCC hopes move Arabs to more practical position when General Committee meetings begin, especially as there will then be opportunity for discussion with individual delegates. At moment Arabs are mainly occupied watching each other.

Israelis too may be induced to adopt more realistic approach when they realize UN debating tactics are of little value here where they are in reality dealing with Arabs only rather than with UN.

We also hope Israelis will realize prejudicial effect their present press tactics may have on progress of Lausanne talks (re Palun 147).[3] Following confidential statement to PCC re withdrawal of Arab troops Eytan related substance at press conference. USDel has pointed out to Israelis such tactics will not further negotiations and, if continued, might definitely prejudice them.

ETHRIDGE

[3] Identified also as telegram 412, May 10, 11 a. m., from Geneva, not printed.

501.BB Palestine/5–1549 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, May 17, 1949—7 p. m.

217. Ur 281 May 13 third para. Connection possibility US representations re Israeli-Arab armistice agreements. Dept has worked closely with Bunche and, as in case Deptel 209 May 12, has not instructed US reps make representations until so requested by Bunche. Dept appreciates ur suggestion but view fact Bunche has the responsibility for conduct negots desires that question possibility and timing US representations be handled through prior consultation with him as heretofore.

View further revision Bunche proposal Dept concurs representation to Syrian Govt present time not desirable.

ACHESON

501.BB Palestine/5–1149

The Secretary of State to the Israeli Ambassador (Elath)

WASHINGTON, May 18, 1949.

EXCELLENCY: I have received Your Excellency's letter of May 11, 1949, on the occasion of the admission of Israel to the United Nations. The sentiments which you expressed in connection with United States support of your country's application for membership are greatly appreciated. The United States Government, which has consistently advocated the admission of Israel to the United Nations, was gratified at the outcome of the vote in the General Assembly and warmly welcomes Israel to the family of nations.

The Department has noted with interest your statement concerning the effect upon the Israeli Government of the recent conversation between you, Mr. Eban and myself. I am pleased that your Government does not underestimate the importance which the United States Government attaches to the points made during that conversation, especially the questions of the refugees, the status of Jerusalem, and the final boundaries.

Now that the problem of the admission of Israel to the United Nations has been resolved, this Government is convinced that the way has been cleared for positive progress towards a final peace. The question of the refugees seems to be the principal obstacle blocking the way to a Palestine settlement. The United States Government was gratified to note that the Israeli representative's statements before the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the General Assembly gave assurances that Israel will contribute to the solution of the refugee problem and that it accepts the principle of repatriation. With the cessation of hostilities in Palestine, the security problem involved in the return of refugees to Israeli-controlled areas has greatly diminished and this Government sees no compelling reason why the repatriation of a significant number of refugees should not commence in the very near future, particularly to those areas which are outside the boundaries of Israel as defined by the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947.

The Arab states have greatly relaxed their previous position on the question of resettlement. Consequently, action by Israel along the lines of our recommendations would in all likelihood give the Arabs concrete proof of Israel's desire for a lasting settlement and provide the impetus to bring the Lausanne talks to a successful conclusion. This

Government firmly believes that a substantial measure of repatriation of refugees on the part of Israel is essential to a solidly-established peace in Palestine, and that, in the interest of the future relations between Israel and its neighbors, the wisdom of such a step is undeniable.

With regard to Jerusalem, it is felt that substantial progress has been made in bringing closer together the views of our two Governments on that problem. The responsibility, however, for formulating proposals concerning the type of international regime to be established has been placed by the General Assembly upon the Palestine Conciliation Commission, and therefore the final position of this Government on the matter will be taken in connection with the work of the Commission.

It is gratifying to note that Israel has pledged itself to a settlement of the boundary question by agreement through negotiations. This Government agrees that concessions will have to be made by both sides if an agreed territorial settlement is to be reached. You are of course well aware of the basic position of the United States on the boundary question.

This Government notes with pleasure your assurances of Israel's acceptance of the General Assembly as the surpreme arbiter on outstanding problems, and of Israel's desire to make the utmost effort to bring its policy into conformity with resolutions of the United Nations. This laudable attitude on the part of your country will be of substantial assistance in connection with the final settlement of the Palestine problem. The Israeli Government's policy of seeking the settlement of outstanding questions by agreement with the Arab states under the auspices of the United Nations is fully in accord with that of the Government of the United States.

Accept [etc.] DEAN ACHESON

501.BB Palestine/5–1649

Memorandum by the Coordinator on Palestine Refugee Matters (McGhee) to the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 18, 1949.

Subject: Palestine Refugee Problem

1. Ethridge in Palun 151 of May 16 "For the Secretary" urgently requests decision re US financial backing of Palestine refugee program along lines submitted in your Memorandum for the President. Ethridge feels that he has almost arrived at the point where commitments can be obtained from both Israel and the Arab states to take

refugees in the numbers required for satisfactory solution of the problem, if they can be assured of outside help.

2. It would greatly facilitate an agreement on this program if Ethridge could have word of the President's decision before his departure from Geneva, now scheduled for May 24. He has conducted most of the basic negotiations with the Israelis and Arabs personally in private meetings and is in best position to get agreement.

3. If you could mention this to Clark Clifford at lunch today perhaps he could facilitate a decision by the President prior to your meeting with the President tomorrow or the Cabinet meeting Friday, without your having to raise the issue with the President again.[1]

[1] In a memorandum of May 19 to the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Knapp), Wilfred Malenbaum, Chief of the Division of Investment and Economic Development, stated: "I gather the President, who has been shown the attached [telegram 741, May 16, from Bern, p. 1013] by Acheson, is about ready to buy Ethridge's formula. (He is still awaiting reaction from Treasury and the Budget Bureau on our final cost estimates, although I gather that their answer may modify the magnitudes but not alter the basic decision to proceed.) I am worried about the formula Ethridge proposes because of our old fear that it may become too much of a U.S. program. At the minimum, any cable authorizing Ethridge to proceed should make clear the political dangers in other areas of publicity that can in any way be interpreted as a special U.S. assistance program for the Middle East. . . . We are talking with the International Bank and the Eximbank to see how great are their specific interests in projects which might be considered part of this program." (501.BB Palestine/5–1949)

10 Files, A/AC.25

Report Prepared by the Committee on Jerusalem of the Palestine Conciliation Commission

RESTRICTED [LAUSANNE?,] 18 May 1949.
Com. Jer/W.18

PRELIMINARY DRAFT

INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE JERUSALEM AREA

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1. The area of Jerusalem shall include the town of Jerusalem, together with the surrounding villages and towns, the most western of which is Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa), the most northern Shu'fat; the most eastern Abu Dis, and the most southern Bethlehem.

Article 2. The area of Jerusalem shall be divided into two zones defined hereafter as the Jewish zone and the Arab zone. The demarcation line between these two zones shall be as follows: . . .[1]

[1] Omission in the source text.

Article 3. The powers of the responsible authorities of the two zones may be exercised in respect of all matters not reserved by the present Plan to the exclusive competence of the international regime.

II. ORGANS

Article 4. The United Nations shall be represented in the area of Jerusalem by an Administrator appointed for five years by the General Assembly. He shall be responsible to the General Assembly and may be dismissed by it. The headquarters of the Administrator shall be "Government House". The General Assembly shall appoint a Deputy Administrator on the proposal of the Administrator.

The Administrator and the Deputy Administrator shall not be residents of the area of Jerusalem or nationals of the State of Israel or of an Arab State.

Article 5. The Administrator and the Deputy Administrator shall be assisted by an Administrative Council. This Council shall be composed of nine members, three of whom shall be appointed by the responsible authorities of the Jewish Zone, three by the responsible authorities of the Arab zone and three by the Administrator. The latter will endeavour to ensure by his choice the representation of the principal communities other than Arab and Jewish in the area of Jerusalem.

Article 6. On behalf of the United Nations, the Administrator shall ensure:

(1) the protection of and free access to the Holy Places, in accordance with the terms of Articles 12 to 14 below;
(2) the control of the demilitarization and of the neutralization of the area, in accordance with the terms of Article 15 below;
(3) the protection of human rights and of the rights of distinctive groups, in accordance with the terms of Article 17 below.

Article 7. The Administrator, assisted by the Administrative Council, shall ensure:

(1) the coordination of measures for the maintenance of public order;
(2) the operation of the main services of common interest to the area of Jerusalem;
(3) the equitable allocation of the contributions of each zone towards expenditure in the common interests.

Article 8. The following matters shall be submitted for the approval of the Administrator, with whom the final decision shall rest: sales, exchanges and all other transactions relating to real estate and to rights connected therewith; the construction and demolition of buildings and alterations thereto; the laying-out of squares and public gardens; the opening up of new roads; public utility works.

Article 9. There shall be established in Jerusalem an International Tribunal composed of three Judges who shall not be residents of the area of Jerusalem or nationals of the State of Israel or of an Arab State. They shall be selected by the President of the International Court of Justice.

The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction with respect to:

(1) cases of jurisdictional conflicts between administrative organs and courts of the one zone and administrative organs and courts of the other zone;

(2) cases submitted either by the Administrator or the responsible authorities of the Jewish or Arab zone involving claims that laws, ordinances, regulations, administrative acts or court decisions applying to the area of Jerusalem are incompatible with the present Plan.

The decisions of the Tribunal in all cases under paragraphs (1) and (2) of the present article shall be legally binding on the Parties;

(3) cases submitted by the Administrator concerning any matter specified in Parts III, IV, VI and VII.

(*a*) If the Tribunal deems that a dispute submitted under paragraph (3) of this Article is susceptible of decision on the basis of law, it shall decide on that basis, utilizing the present Plan; or any of the sources set forth in Article 38, paragraph 1 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Such decisions shall be legally binding on the Parties.

(*b*) If the Tribunal deems that the dispute is not susceptible of decision on the basis of law, it shall render an opinion *ex aequo et bono*, giving special consideration, where appropriate, to the principles and purposes of the United Nations, to important United Nations resolutions and declarations, and to important multilateral treaties. Such opinions shall be advisory in character.

Article 10. There shall be established in Jerusalem a Mixed Tribunal composed of three Judges, two of whom shall be appointed by the responsible authorities of the Arab and Jewish zones respectively. The third Judge shall be appointed by the President of the International Tribunal and shall assume the chairmanship of the Mixed Tribunal. He shall not be a resident of the area of Jerusalem or a national of the State of Israel or of an Arab State.

The Mixed Tribunal shall have jurisdiction with respect to all civil cases in which the parties involved are not residents of the same zone or in which one or more of the parties involved are not residents of either zone. The Tribunal shall likewise have criminal jurisdiction with respect to all cases of offenses committed in one of the two zones, in which one or more of the defendants is a non-resident of such zone.

Article 11. The Administrator shall be authorised to recruit the number of guards necessary for the protection of the Holy Places,

religious buildings and sites as well as for the protection of his headquarters and his staff and of any other place under his supervision and protection. He shall further be authorised to recruit the auxiliary administrative personnel necessary for the carrying out of his functions. Such guards and personnel may be dismissed by the Administrator.

The expenses of the salaries and allowances of the Administrator, the Deputy Administrator, the members of the International Tribunal and of the Mixed Tribunal, the guards and the administrative personnel shall be borne by the United Nations.

III. HOLY PLACES, RELIGIOUS BUILDINGS AND SITES

Article 12. The Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in the area of Jerusalem and the routes giving immediate access to them, shall be placed under the exclusive control of the United Nations Administrator. The latter shall be empowered to make regulations to assure their protection and free access to them, and to station guards charged with the maintenance of order inside and outside them.

These Holy Places, buildings and sites, and their dependencies shall not be subject to any tax from which they were exempt on 29 November 1947. Their owners and occupiers shall not be subject to any tax which would place them in a less favourable fiscal situation than that which they occupied on 29 November 1947.

Article 13. The Administrator shall ensure for ministers of religion and to pilgrims free circulation throughout the area of Jerusalem. He shall have the power to negotiate and to conclude with all the interested States arrangements destined to facilitate the circulation of ministers of religion and of pilgrims who wish to enter or leave the area of Jerusalem.

Article 14. The Administrator shall decide disputes which may arise between religious communities or within a religious community in connection with Holy Places, religious buildings or sites. His decisions cannot be called in question in any court of the two zones. He shall further have the power to carry out necessary repairs to Holy Places when such repairs are urgently needed and the community or communities concerned, though having been called upon, do not carry out within a reasonable time the repair in question.

IV. DEMILITARIZATION AND NEUTRALIZATION

Article 15. The area of Jerusalem shall be permanently demilitarized and neutralized. There shall be no military or para-military forces or stocks of war material within the area.

The responsible authorities of the two zones shall give formal assurances with respect to the demilitarized character of their respec-

tive zones, and the inviolability of the demarcation line between the zones. These formal assurances shall include the following provisions:

(*a*) Both regular and irregular forces will be withdrawn;
(*b*) All entrenchments and fortifications of a military nature of any kind will be destroyed;
(*c*) All military operations, ground or aerial, within the perimeter of the area of Jerusalem are prohibited as are all military operations, ground or aerial, which originate outside the area but might be capable of affecting places within the demilitarized area;
(*d*) The importation, exportation, stockpiling of arms or munitions of any type is prohibited within the area as is the maintenance of passage through the area of military personnel either combatant or auxiliary.

Any violation of the provisions of the present Plan or any attempt to alter the international regime by force shall immediately be reported by the Administrator to the Security Council.

Nothing in this article shall affect the right of the two parties to maintain within their respective zones police forces armed with normal police weapons, for the purpose of maintaining order and security. The number of police in each zone shall not exceed 1,000.

V. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROVISIONS

Article 16. The responsible authorities of the Jewish and Arab zones shall be called upon to negotiate such arrangements of an economic and financial nature which may be appropriate in the circumstances, taking into consideration the necessity of facilitating commercial relations between the two zones.

VI. HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS

Article 17. All persons in the area of Jerusalem shall enjoy the human rights and fundamental freedoms set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.

If the United Nations Administrator considers that any such rights are being interfered with, he may bring the matter to the attention and submit the case to the Tribunal as provided in Article 9 or, if necessary, bring the matter before the competent organ of the United Nations.

VII. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

Article 18. The Administrator shall determine the conditions under which persons of any origin or of any nationality (including the citizens of the State of Israel or of an Arab State) who are not domiciled in the area of Jerusalem may be allowed to take up residence there. He shall deliver, prolong and suspend the necessary authorizations.

Article 19. The responsible authorities of the Jewish and Arab zones shall maintain in their respective zones only such agents and officials, and shall establish only such administrative organs and public services, as are normally necessary for the administration of municipal affairs.[2]

[2] There is available in the files of the Department of State a six-page memorandum sent to Mr. Barco at Lausanne by Durward V. Sandifer, the Acting Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs. It noted that the preliminary draft on Jerusalem had "been examined by officers of UNA, L, and NEA, who have collaborated in the following comments and suggestions."

The memorandum has the date "5/18/49" penned in and it is filed under 501.BB Palestine/5–1849. The editors speculate that the memorandum was actually sent later, inasmuch as the preliminary draft was dated May 18.

501.BB Palestine/5–1849 : Telegram

Mr. Mark F. Ethridge to the Secretary of State

SECRET LAUSANNE, May 18, 1949—3 p. m.

Palun 157. I understand and accept views expressed in Unpal 98 [1] but can hardly be expected to concur in view of commitment recorded in intel of April 28 [2] on which I based my statements in PCC and my talks with both Israeli and Arab delegates at Lausanne.

I agree "Israel is now in position of having received US support on all questions on which they are entitled to support and time has not [*now*] come for them to produce basis for settlement." We shall continue press them to reveal this basis re refugees, territory and Jerusalem. It must be admitted, however, that US sponsorship of admission resolution in absence of assurances at Lausanne requested by us has weakened our position and muffled my voice.

This is demonstrated by past admission instransigence of Israeli delegation forecast in Palun 142 [3] on subject of refugees and territory. Israeli delegation has not indicated acceptance in any way of US policy re refugees and territory as stated by Mr. Acheson to Mr. Sharrett (reDeptel 208, April 6 [4]). Its present approach these problems indicates concentration on resettlement rather than repatriation

[1] Identified also as telegram 619, May 12, to Bern, p. 1004.

[2] This circular telegram stated "We have informed USUN del New York US not now in position join in sponsoring res for admission Israel to UN. We first want from Israeli reps at Lausanne conference assurances re status of Jerusalem, refugees and territorial settlement, which would create favorable atmosphere for admission Israel." (800.00 Summaries/4–2849)

[3] Identified also as telegram 699, May 9, from Bern, p. 988.

[4] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 894.

and acquisition of additional territory rather than exchange. It is difficult furthermore to reconcile this approach with conciliatory responses of Elath to Rusk reported in Unpal 98. We hope, however, Department's views will prevail after further consideration by Israelis, otherwise Arabs may conclude that no solution is good solution pending September GA. Results would be impasse at Lausanne, maintenance of *status quo* of armistice lines in Palestine and irreparable delay in essential preliminary steps for resettlement of refugees.

ETHRIDGE

867N.48/5–949 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 18, 1949—7 p. m.

187. Reur 334 May 9[2] pls express Dept's appreciation FonOff's indication Arab states prepared to contribute to solution of refugee problem by resettlement. You shld seek early opportunity continue discussion this question with SAG, informing it that USG is making every effort urge Israel accept return those so desiring. In this connection USG noted with interest Israeli statements before *ad hoc* Committee GA that it is willing contribute solution of problem and that it accepts principle repatriation. We are now urging Israel give early indication that it will agree repatriate considerable number and that it will commence repatriation near future. Israel has, moreover, announced to PCC and *ad hoc* Committee GA its acceptance of obligations to pay compensation. Re SAG assurances that Arab states will arrange resettlement after refugees fully compensated, every effort will of course be made to speed process compensation. Of necessity, however, latter will be time-consuming legal process, involving detailed determination property rights and examination individual claims. USG therefore hopes that progress towards resettlement those so desiring will not be deferred pending completion this process, and that SAG will use its influence Arab League to bring about realistic and humane appreciation urgent need for commencing solution of problem.

ACHESON

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Bern for Mr. Ethridge and to London, Damascus, Beirut, Cairo, and Baghdad.

[2] Not printed; it described the Saudi Arabian Government's current thinking in the following terms: "(*a*) USG should insist return to homeland those refugees willing live Israel. (*b*) Israeli Government should give guarantee obey UN decisions. (*c*) Refugees unwilling return should be compensated by those who took possession their properties. (*d*) After refugees fully compensated, Arab states will arrange resettlement." (867N.48/5–949)

867N.113/5–1949

The Department of State to the British Embassy

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State has reviewed the memoranda left by the British Ambassador during his calls of April 27, 1949 and May 17, 1949, relative to the Palestine arms embargo, and before reaching a decision with regard to the questions raised wishes to suggest that immediate conversations be undertaken between the United Kingdom and the United States. These conversations might include the following subjects:

1) Role of the United Nations in the matter (i.e., United Nations Resolutions and Mediator, effect on Palestine Conciliation Commission negotiations, et cetera.)
2) Basic needs of each country in the area for internal security.
3) Needs above those of internal security in connection with both Anglo–United States strategic planning.
4) Political objectives which might be achieved by relaxation of the arms embargo.
5) Coordination of any programs with the Military Assistance Program proposed by the United States; possible effect on the proposed Military Assistance Program.
6) Timing, terms and conditions, including financing, of proposed shipments.
7) Possible coordination of any program with the French Government in order to insist that it does not duplicate shipments.
8) Decisions as to which country should make shipments to each State and what each country might contribute toward any plans formulated under point two above.[1]

[1] This undated memorandum was drafted on May 16 but was not handed to the British until at least 3 days later. Mr. Satterthwaite, in a memorandum of May 19 to the Secretary or the Under Secretary, submitted the memorandum for approval and suggested that when it was handed to the British Ambassador, "you orally make clear that in suggesting these conversations we are not making any commitment relative to a change in our own arms export policy, and are particularly concerned with the possible effect of such a program on current negotiations at Lausanne and the military assistance program shortly to be put before Congress." (867N.113/5–1949)

501.BB Palestine/5–1949 : Telegram

The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Secretary of State

SECRET DAMASCUS, May 19, 1949—10 a. m.

288. For George McGhee. Mytel 281 May 13. As both parties rejected modified Bunche proposal General Riley informs me negotiations adjourned indefinitely. Meanwhile Vigier and Riley hope work out another proposal that might have more prospect acceptance.

Considering Israeli intransigent attitude as exemplified by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's uncompromising refusal (Tel Aviv Embtel 342 May 9 to Department)[1] Bunche's invitation that he meet with Prime Minister Zaim (who in advance of invitation volunteered his willingness meet [Ben-]Gurion in effort cut Gordian knot), stalemate seems likely to continue indefinitely. While am convinced Zaim willing make generous concessions on other pending matters such as refugees, internationalization Jerusalem and boundaries elsewhere than slight rectification desired in Syrian-Israeli frontier in region of Lakes Hula and Tiberius, Zaim is unlikely yield everything without any *quid pro quo* as Israel seems to demand. To do so could well cost him his job and remove best hope so far of Syrian acceptance compromise settlement Palestine conflict.

General Riley's suggestion (mytel 281) that US Government's support of Mediator's efforts be communicated to Syrians only when Riley and I consider moment propitious was not intended to by-pass Mediator but rather to face realities realistically (Deptel 217 May 17). Experience has shown that Bunche being far from scene of negotiations is often as much as 48 hours behind developments and consequently his recommendations and any diplomatic support requested by him often inapplicable to situation as it exists by time they reach scene of action.

Bunche's departure before conclusion of Syrian-Israeli armistice was generally considered prematurely optimistic by those who understood Syrian internal problem and Israeli appetite. Because of ineffectiveness remote control, Legation believes Bunche should either return to scene of negotiations or relinquish initiative to those on spot. Legation favors Bunche's return believing that only he on spot is likely to be able to force some sort of *modus operandi* for armistice that will permit talks to open for settlement broader problems including delimitation permanent Syro-Israeli frontier.

Those concerned with refugee problem should understand that Zaim expressed willingness (repeatedly reiterated) to accept quarter million or more refugees for resettlement was contingent on and part of general peace settlement.

Everyone who has discussed matter with Zaim is impressed by his sincerity and broadminded attitude toward Israel (far cry from stubborn intransigence previous Syrian Government) but his ardor is cool-

[1] Not printed; it advised that Ambassador McDonald had conversed with the Israeli Prime Minister on May 8 on the subjects reported in Tel Aviv's telegram 323, May 2, p. 966. He commented that it was "Evident Israel not now prepared to go in public beyond recent statements on refugees and Jerusalem. Re boundaries it will not publicly suggest possibility yielding territory now held. This does not preclude possible concessions in bilateral talks with Transjordan at Lausanne." (868.48/5–949)

ing in face of evident Israeli insatiability. While Zaim is at least trying to measure up to Kemal Ataturk's stature (mytel 256 April 28)[2] and is susceptible to moderating influence, it is unfortunately becoming increasingly evident (Tel Aviv 342) that Ben-Gurion is no Venizelos. Yet unless Israel can be brought to understand that it cannot have all of its cake (partition boundaries) and gravy as well (areas captured in violation of truce, Jerusalem and resettlement Arab refugees elsewhere) it may find that it has won Palestine war but lost peace.

Should be evident that Israel's continued insistence upon her pound of flesh and more is driving Arab states slowly (and perhaps surely) to gird their loins (politically and economically if not yet militarily) for long-range struggle that profiting by mistakes of past could make Israel's task far harder than might be case if far seeing Israeli statesmanship were to grasp opportunities of moment to reach negotiated settlement on reasonable terms. Israel and its UN sponsors more than Arab states would stand to suffer most by indefinite prolongation current stalemate.

Sent Department 288, repeated Tel Aviv 33, USUN New York 6, Bern 8, for PCC; pouched Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, Paris, Ankara.

KEELEY

[2] Not printed.

501.BB Palestine/5–1949 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 19, 1949—1 p. m.

652. Unpal 106. For Ethridge. Fol are comments on your numbered paras Palun 151 : [2]

1. On McGhee's return neither French nor Turkish Embs had recd instrs re discussions with Dept on Pal refugee program as agreed with PCC at Beirut. Moreover, until decision made re US financial support for program Dept has desired proceed cautiously. Preliminary mtg was held May 9 with Benard of Fr Emb, which had in meantime recd instr to meet with Dept but had recd no substantive instrs. Benard raised no issues re proposed plan of action, and later exchange of technical info was agreed upon. Fol receipt Palun 151 mtg called May 18 with Turk and Fr Emb reps for gen discussion.

[1] This telegram was repeated to London.
[2] Identified also as telegram 741, May 16, from Bern, p. 1013.

2. Several mtgs have been held with Brit Emb reps and info exchanged. No reply yet recd Dept's *Aide-Mémoire* May 10 mailed you May 11, but AmEmb London in 1620 [*1920*] May 16 [3] advises UK generally willing follow Dept's lead. Dept agrees with you approach to refugee problem shld continue to be through UN and expects no difficulty with Brit assuming US and UK can play parts commensurate with their interests in problem and can be relatively free of close UN supervision.

3. Dept agrees desirability initiate limited work projects at earliest opportunity and will be glad receive recommendation PCC Technical Comm and explore all possible source funds including possibilities under UNRPR. It appears unlikely, however, that additional US grant funds can be obtained for this purpose from present session Congress, and other sources believed uncertain before new program agreed.

4. Dept agrees desirability skipping survey group phase if this cld accelerate program. However, until authoritative survey made, program approved and funds obtained there is little that proposed Development Board could do of operational nature. Head of survey group wld appear to require different capabilities than man to carry out program. Moreover, it is essential to get man of greater stature to head short survey and sell program to UN, US public and Congress than can probably be obtained for longer range administration of program. Until program developed it will be difficult ascertain type operating agency required, particularly with regard auspices and degree of centralization to be followed in execution program. Such an agency may require GA approval.

5. Dept pleased at your report that satisfactory commitments expected from Israel and Arab states shortly re repatriation and resettlement, respectively. For your info, all Dept plans call for financial assistance for repatriation as well as resettlement. Dept agrees your proposed allocation of refugees and strategy in gaining acceptance your plan. Dept aware that you need US commitment along lines given urtel before Israel and Arab states will agree accept definite number refugees. You will be advised soon as Pres has made decision.

ACHESON

[3] Not printed

501.BB Palestine/5–349 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, May 19, 1949—7 p. m.

507. During call on SecState May 17, Egyptian FonMin [1] expressed disappointment re recent events in UN, but stated Egypt nevertheless desires pursue course of friendship with US on mutually satisfactory basis. Secy stated US reciprocates these feelings and desires encourage good relations between Egypt and US.

Secy then emphasized deep concern of USG re Arab refugees, stating that we are continuing urge Israel accept principles of Dec 11 res. He said our representations had not been as successful as we wished, but that we had made some progress. We believe substantial number refugees shld return Israel but it is evident that a number could not. Latter wld have to be resettled elsewhere.

FonMin replied that Egypt was concerned with this problem, as factor which wld disturb peace entire NE. Expressed hope that all so desiring wld be permitted return. Egypt, as one of world's most densely populated regions, had no room for additional immigrants, he added.

Secy stated he was aware of this, but felt Egypt cld play constructive role in Lausanne discussions. Problem wld require agreement between parties concerned, and USG hopes for Egypt's cooperation. Khashaba Pasha stated in gen terms that Egypt prepared cooperate with US and other countries in helping achieve solution of refugee problem.

Pls take early opportunity pursue subject further with PrimMin, expressing Dept's appreciation FonMin's assurances cooperation as indicated preceding para and PrimMin's assurances (urtel 430 May 3) [2] that, once principle of repatriation was established, he was confident Arab states wld at once begin to study practical aspects of resettlement problem. USG hopes Egyptian reps Lausanne will be instructed by Egyptian Govt use their influence to bring about similarly constructive and realistic attitude on part of their colleagues.

USG fully appreciates difficulty Egypt wld have in absorbing great number refugees. However, if Egypt were to accept small number, it wld contribute to reduction of problem and make it easier for other states assume responsibility for those which they are able absorb. USG agrees with PrimMin that considerable number refugees will not wish return to Israel.

USG noted with interest Israeli Govt's acceptance of principle of repatriation, in its statements before *ad hoc* Committee GA, and its assurances that it is prepared contribute to solution of problem. USG

[1] Ahmed Mohamed Khashaba.
[2] Not printed.

will continue use its best efforts induce Israel accept return substantial number and urge early commencement repatriation activities.

USG hopes Egypt will use its great influence in Arab world to urge Arab states adopt cooperative attitude towards this urgent problem, as important means contributing to its early solution.

ACHESON

501.BB Palestine/5–1949 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, May 19, 1949—7 p. m.

655. For Ethridge. Israeli Amb Elath, discussing Arab refugees May 19 with McGhee, stated his Govt is in full agreement with USG that both repatriation and resettlement are required for solution of problem. He stated, however, that Israel not in position define number to be repatriated prior (1) formal conclusion peace and (2) assurances that plans have been made for resettlement fixed number, with necessary financing. If Israel repatriated portion and remainder were not resettled, security problem would be aggravated rather than relieved, and remainder Arabs wld insist on repatriation as well.

McGhee pointed out we consider repatriation substantial number, not merely token number, required to obtain favorable atmosphere for Arab cooperation in resettlement remainder, and to reduce problem to number capable assimilation on self-sustaining basis in Arab states within reasonable period. Only on basis agreement repatriation and resettlement adequate numbers cld PCC formulate plan for resettlement. It is obvious that USG, in responding to any request from PCC or UN, cld not agree extend assistance in support plan which it considers unworkable, and we consider resettlement number approaching 700,000 an unworkable plan.

McGhee agreed with Elath that problem was three-sided consisting agreement by Israel repatriation given number, agreement by Arabs resettlement given number, and formulation resettlement plan involving outside assistance. McGhee stated that agreement re repatriation appeared necessary first step in overcoming present impasse, but to be realistic considered it possible that agreement on all three points might be reached simultaneously at Lausanne. US considers that responsibility for problem rests with UN and PCC. *Comment:* it is believed Elath sought to convey that Israel prepared talk numbers for repatriation as soon as assurance received that Arabs wld agree resettlement remainder and outside financial assistance forthcoming. Financial assistance repatriation not discussed.

ACHESON

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London and Tel Aviv.

501.BB Palestine/5–2049 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Vincent) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY BERN, May 20, 1949—10 a. m.

769. Palun 160. From Ethridge. Israel's full territorial demands upon the Arab states were laid on the table today.[1] Back from a day with Sharett in Geneva, Eytan sought me out and in three-hour conversation, told me what Israel has in mind when she gives her position to the Commission, perhaps on Friday.[2] Far from having modified her position, Israel has stiffened her demands.

I opened the conversation by saying to Eytan that I thought the time had come for frankness and that I hoped he had new instructions from Sharett since the conference here was in a virtual stalemate. He answered that far from having new instructions, Sharett was shocked by the Commission's reaction to Israel's position and that Sharett had instructed him to come back to Lausanne so as to tell the PCC again what should be "self-evident truth" of Israel's position.

That position is this:

On Lebanon, Israel will have no demands at the moment. She is ready to accept the Polish [3] armistice lines, which coincide, with however a proviso that if in the future either state desired to open negotiations looking toward border rectification it might be done. Inquiry on my part developed that Israel wants a slice of Southeastern Lebanon which she considers necessary to her development scheme, but is willing in some way not made known to compensate her for it. For the time being, however, no demands would be made and Eytan felt a quick peace could be made.

As to Egypt, Israel's first demand would be for the political boundary between Palestine and Egypt, which would put the Gaza strip in Israel. That demand, said Eytan, would at least force Egypt to talk about the Gaza strip. I gathered that if Egypt says no, the demand will not be pressed. However, Israel is more and more in favor of having the Gaza strip and is willing to take both the refugees and normal population, with, however, the proviso that Israel would have a right to screen out and deport terrorists or Mufti followers. Eytan said he had just been authorized by Sharett to make the demand for the Gaza strip.

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[1] The date referred to as "today" may be May 19, inasmuch as telegram 769 was presumably drafted on that day. Note that the Department referred to the date as May 19 in its telegram 682 to Mr. Ethridge on May 24, p. 1051.

[2] Mr. Ethridge, on May 23, advised from Lausanne that Mr. Eytan on May 20 had informed the PCC of the Israeli position along lines similar to those expounded by him as reported in Palun 160 (telegram Palun 162, 501.BB Palestine/5–2349).

[3] An obvious garble; perhaps the words "Palestine–Lebanon frontier lines as" were intended.

As to Syria, Eytan says Israel is not willing to negotiate and will have no demands until an armistice is signed. However, Israelis willing to accept the international frontier providing a second clause makes the same provision for later reopening for the rectification of the border.

As to Transjordan, Eytan repeated legal argument previously made to Commission, that no Arab state has a right to any territory in Palestine and that any Arab state that won territorial addition would be getting a bonus out of the war.

I told him that the Commission was not deluded at all by that argument; that we recognized it as an opening move with Abdullah to divide up the rest of Arab Palestine. Eytan said that of course Israel would have more demands as to territory in Arab Palestine and the new demands would not be based upon military considerations but upon the developmental scheme.

Engineers had been discontented with the Tulkarm triangle line because it still did not put Israel in position to bring water down from the north to the south without having to tunnel under mountains at prohibitive cost. The new demand would be directed toward shortening the waterline. Israel had in mind giving Abdullah a few villages around Latrun and in the south in return for the new strip in Samaria and in return for opening the Latrun road. He said there might be a few other minor concessions here and there on a "mutual" basis.

Eytan made clear that while intending to keep occupied areas such as Western Galilee, Israel has no intention of giving up any part of the Negev. He said that also there were many reasons for that position: (1) Israel was convinced that with water she could develop it; (2) there were psychological reasons and attachments which would make it impossible for any Israeli Government to give it up; (3) public opinion in no case would stand for what would obviously be a concession to the British, not to the Arabs; (4) there was no reason why the Arabs should have it when they could not develop it and put refugees there.

I asked Eytan about Israel's intentions toward Lydda, Ramle and Jaffa. He said she had none except to keep them. Arabs in Jaffa beyond those already there were entirely out of the question and Lydda and Ramle had been filled up with immigrants and there was therefore no place for Arabs.

On the refugee question, I pointed out to Eytan that the Arabs still consider some concession on emergency measures as an evidence of Israel's good faith. He answered that Israel had made concessions already beyond what she should have because Arab Governments are not interested in refugees so much as in exploiting their own interests, which in this case takes the form of forcing Israel into a bad negotiat-

ing position. Therefore Israel would do nothing more about refugees now.

Comment: Eytan told me that he recognizes the stalemate nature of negotiations here and is ready to make his position known to the full Commission. The Arabs are meeting today to determine whether they are willing to do that also. The US Delegation anticipates that when the Arabs know Israel's position the conference is likely to break up. The Arabs feel that the Jews need peace more than they do and are willing to wait it out until September apparently.

Neither side seems to be ready for peace, despite protestations to the contrary. Certainly unless Israel modifies her demands, there is no possibility of peace on any basis heretofore envisioned by the State Department. There seems little likelihood that Israel's demands will be modified. On the contrary, Eytan told me today that Israel is basing her policy upon the knowledge that Egypt and Syria are buying arms in Europe. He professes to know from whom and in what quantity.

Department's comments will be welcome. [Ethridge.]

VINCENT

501.BB Palestine/5–2049 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 20, 1949—1 p. m.

658. Unpal 109. For Ethridge. [Re] Palun 153 [2] Dept agrees all suggested changes Proposed Plan of Action Pal Refugee problem except elimination economic survey group which has been implicit in Dept plans and discussions with British since Embtel 128 of Mar 22 from Beirut. See also Deptel 652 (Unpal 106) of May 19. Such a group appears necessary to make authoritative recommendations re distribution of refugees, selection and priority of development projects, cost of program and sources of financing, and to provide an integrated regional economic and development plan. Group would, as indicated proposed plan, have a broader focus than refugees. Members of group, particularly head, must be outstanding in their respective fields and representative proper interests UN member states and Int orgs if their recommendations are to bear proper weight with GA, US Cong and public, other UN states, Int Bank and other Int and private orgs who can contribute to program. Wherever practicable it is envisaged having appropriate Int body furnish technical man, i.e., Int Bank would furnish financial expert. It is doubted if recommendations PCC staff technical group of type now being recruited would carry sufficient

[1] This telegram was repeated to London.

[2] Identified also as telegram 742, May 16, from Bern, not printed; it suggested various changes in the wording of the proposed plan of action, p. 939.

weight with all concerned to assure acceptance of program. Agree PCC staff technical group might carry to conclusion studies re refugee aspects of problem including initial studies on organization of any permanent refugee agency, if this is decision; however, Dept feels that broader economic aspects could be better dealt with by separate body such as envisaged as survey group.

ACHESON

501.BB Palestine/5–2049 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 20, 1949—1 p. m.

Unpal 110. For Lausanne. We agree (Palun 153 [1]) ur proposal France and Turkey join US and UK in concerted program urge Israel and Arabs face refugee problem constructively through repatriation and resettlement. Pls outline to Yalcin and Boisanger genl nature our approaches Israel and Arabs (Depcirtel Apr 29, 5 p. m. and Unpal 85, Apr 28), informing them Dept concurs your view re desirability parallel approaches by French and Turkish Govts and requesting that they so inform their Govts earliest opportunity. In absence instrs this subject to French and Turk missions Washington, we believe approach by you speedier and more effective.

ACHESON

[1] See footnote 2, p. 1038.

867N.01/5–2049 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, May 20, 1949—2 p. m.

370. Dayan called last night to discuss yesterday's special committee sessions. Barco present. Committee meeting ended in complete deadlock and Dayan saw no prospects for agreement or usefulness in further negotiations. Asserted informally felt gloomier re prospects continued peace in Jerusalem than at any time since his arrival last August. Has advised Israeli Government to request UN to return Jewish sections Mt. Scopus to complete Israeli control under terms of agreement signed last July providing for UN protection on Mt. Scopus "until hostilities cease". Then proposes inform Transjordan bluntly Israel intends to have free access by agreement or otherwise. Feels Transjordan bound by Article 8 of armistice agreement to grant free access and if refuses, Israel free take appropriate measures in view breach armistice.

At committee meeting Dayan suggested agreement on following lines: Israel to receive Latrun salient in return for territory in Beit Nabala region, free access to Mt. Scopus; Arabs to receive free access to Bethlehem on main road, electricity for Old City, use Tulkarm–Qalqiliya road until new section in Arab territory constructed. Arabs demanded as essential addition point return of Arab quarters in Israel hands and stated willing allow Jews return Jewish quarter Old City. Dayan argued special committee should consider only questions specified in Article 8 of armistice agreement and territorial changes in Jerusalem should await peace treaty. However, if Arabs insisted on changes now willing consider return of Arab quarters in exchange for equivalent territory northern Jerusalem to connect Mt. Scopus with Jewish sections.[1]

Comment—Only thing Israel considers essential Jerusalem in immediate future and determined to have, is free access Mt. Scopus. At least possibility exists will use force rather than wait for peace conference decision. Dayan stated would launch propaganda campaign in US against Transjordan for failure permit free access to cultural and humanitarian institutions after agreeing to do so in principle at Rhodes. Main Arab wish is return Arab quarters and they realize principal bargaining weapon is Mt. Scopus.

During conversation I suggested to Dayan possibility general agreement covering all Jerusalem problems. He definitely preferred leave territorial matters to peace conference but agreed would consider general over-all settlement now provided Arabs make territorial adjustment in north in return for some, but not all, Arab quarters in south. Felt Arabs would maintain present adamant refusal give anything except free access to Mt. Scopus in return for Arab quarters.

Two possible solutions apparently exist, one—general settlement covering all problems affecting Jerusalem area. Might take following lines: Israel to receive Latrun salient, territory north of Jerusalem

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[1] Amman, on May 20, advised of information from Hashem Debbas, the King's Chamberlain, that at the special committee meeting at Jerusalem on May 19, which lasted for 4 hours, the Israelis wished to discuss only two points—the Latrun salient and access to Scopus. Regarding the salient, the Israelis were said to be "only willing give in return use Bethlehem road. Transjordan representatives insisted that they would agree to both points only if Israel returned Arab quarters now Jerusalem. . . . Israelis indicated they would not consider any proposal relating to Jerusalem itself." The Chamberlain informed that the next meeting would be held on May 29 but expressed doubt that progress would be made. Mr. Stabler commented that "Transjordan position re committee matters has stiffened considerably and no indication exists they propose modify stand. This due to difficulties caused by triangle agreement and by realization armistice precludes renewal hostilities by Israel to attain its ends. Moreover, government seems convinced it preferable to leave all negotiations this stage to Lausanne Conference and King apparently concurs this policy." (Telegram 212, 867N.01/5–2049)

built up area comprising land included in Hebrew University and Hadassah development plans and connecting with Jewish section of Sanhedriya, permission for Jews to return to Jewish quarter Old City with corridor through Mt. Zion assuring free access, free access to Wailing Wall and Jewish cemetery on Mt. Scopus. Arabs to receive territorial compensation in Latrun area in direction Beit Nabala, free use Nablus–Bethlehem Road, electricity for Old City and following sections southern Jerusalem: Mt. Zion, Deir Abu tor, Bakka, portion German colony, Ramat Rahel, Talpiyot, Allenby barracks, Alamein camp and section Beit Safafa now held by Jews. Exact size territory in both north and south Jerusalem subject to negotiations. Suggestion: uses as starting point areas now held, in belief neither UN nor US will force Israel start on basis areas held at end mandate. Consider above maximum Arabs can now expect receive Jerusalem and Department will note is considerably less than offered by Dayan last January. Israel building up old Arab quarters to increasing extent and populating them with new immigrants. Delay will make return Arab quarters progressively more difficult. Disadvantages proposal is that will take considerable time, involve major changes and exceed in scope task assigned special committee by armistice agreement.

Second—limited agreement to remain in effect only until permanent peace treaty signed. Israel to receive: Free access to Mt. Scopus, free use Latrun road. Arabs to receive: Free use Bethlehem road, electricity, free use Tulkarm–Qalqiliya road now in Jewish hands, free access to Arab College in Government House, neutral zone. Such agreement would meet principal Israeli demand and would conform to Article 8 Rhodes Armistice Agreement. Arabs would obtain considerable benefits but not their main desiratum. Would be simpler and easier to negotiate.

Consul General would appreciate learning which approach Department and USDel PCC consider preferable. Expect call Abdullah el Tel tomorrow with Barco and obtain his views on progress negotiations.[2]

Sent Department, repeated Amman 29, Geneva 12 (for USDel, PCC).

BURDETT

[2] Mr. Ethridge advised, on May 31, that the American Delegation at Lausanne "doubts final solution for Jerusalem can be reached while general Palestine question is under discussion at Lausanne. Pending presentation by PCC of Jerusalem plan called for in December 11 resolution, USDel perceives no objection to limited agreement mentioned urtel 370 provided agreed to by both parties and provided they understand it to be interim arrangement pending GA decision on Jerusalem area." (telegram 829, identified also as Palun 179, from Bern, 501.BB Palestine/5–3149)

867N.01/5–2349

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON, May 23, 1949.]

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT, MONDAY, MAY 23, 1949

ARAB REFUGEE COMMITMENT

The President understands that he has made a commitment in this direction and desires it implemented in a realistic manner. He understands that this problem is a long-term one and that there is no immediately available solution which will remove it from the area of consideration and action for some time to come.

JAMES E. WEBB

867N.01/5–2349 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL JERUSALEM, May 23, 1949—1 p. m.

372. Mt. Scopus discussed with Abdullah Tel during call to introduce Barco 21st. Confirmed Dayan statements negotiations in special committee deadlocked but did not appear pessimistic re possible consequences. Indicated Transjordan desired leave question for settlement in peace treaty when could use free access as bargaining weapon in effort regain Arab quarters.

Stated Israeli wished agreement in special committee limited to free movement on roads but this of no real value to Arabs. Could not really use main Bethlehem road since not possible permit Arabs pass down street past their houses occupied by Jews without right enter. Also free access to Mt. Scopus equivalent to return of large Jewish quarters since would allow reestablishment thriving community. Re overall agreement involving exchange land in Mt. Scopus area for Arab quarters said impossible for Arabs give Israel corridor to Mt. Scopus since would cut Arab sections off from north. Admitted might be able cede small area land including police training depot but not connecting Mt. Scopus with Jewish sections except by road under Arab control. Reiterated Arabs given all could in Jerusalem.

Learned Arab Legion headquarters in Jerusalem has protested to UN against new fortifications Israeli reportedly effecting Mt. Scopus.

Comment—almost insurmountable difficulties agreement re Scopus again brought out by two talks. Only possible if work on premise Jerusalem area demilitarized and eliminated from any future conflict thus making military positions of no importance. Land bridge to Scopus from Jewish Jerusalem would place Arab sections at mercy of Israel and at same time would cut off possibility of expansion Arab

quarters towards Ramallah, most logical direction. Would go a long way towards making Jerusalem entirely Jewish controlled city. Yet Israel certainly not willing give up Mt. Scopus and possesses necessary force at moment establish corridor. Also without strong outside pressure which appears most unlikely difficult believe Israel will relinquish any Arab quarters except for territorial gains north Jerusalem.

Sent Department 372, repeated Geneva 13 for USDel PCC; pouched Arab capitals.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/5–2349 : Telegram

Mr. Mark F. Ethridge to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED LAUSANNE, May 23, 1949—3 p. m.

Palun 165. Re Paluns 148 [1] and 162.[2] On May 21 Arab delegates informed PCC re May 12 protocol as follows:

1. Arab delegates reaffirms Palestine problem concerns all of them equally.

[2.] Arab delegates are confident PCC will spare no effort see certain measures (refPalun 166 [3]) are given full effect without delay.

3. Arab delegates consider refugee question most pressing of all under May 12 protocol. Delay may entail serious consequences for political, social and humanitarian reasons. Solution recommended by General Assembly resolution December 11 must be implemented in entirety soonest.

As first step Arab delegates ask refugees from areas defined May 12 protocol map (western Galilee, Jaffa area of Lydda, Ramle, Beersheba in [*and?*] area of Gaza) be enabled return their home forthwith. Also those refugees from Jewish Jerusalem.

Arab delegates, anxious personal security and free exercise their rights shall be assured refugees returning their homes until areas mentioned have been evacuated by Jewish troops and authorities request PCC consider and put into effect in name [apparent omission] refugees.

4. PCC will doubtless consider in discussions certain measures taken by Jewish authorities in Jewish Jerusalem which obstruct settlement Jerusalem question.

Particularly important depts and services installed in Jerusalem in disregard General Assembly resolution December 11 shall be transferred elsewhere without delay.

ETHRIDGE

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[1] Dated May 12, p. 998.
[2] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1036.
[3] *Infra.*

501.BB Palestine/5–2349 : Telegram

Mr. Mark F. Ethridge to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED LAUSANNE, May 23, 1949—3 p. m.

Palun 166. RefPalun 145.[1] On May 18 Arab delegates informed PCC as follows:

PCC having decided question of future measures re protection of rights and property of refugees be placed on agenda of General Comite. Arab delegates submit without prejudice to substance of question following demands:

1. Return of orange and fruit [orchards to?] growers, owners and workers.
2. Immediate unfreezing of Arab bank accounts.
3. Abrogation of absentee act and annulment of subsequent enforcing measures.
4. Suspension of all measures of requisition and occupation of Arab houses and lands.
5. Reuniting refugees belonging to same family.
6. Assurance of freedom of worship and respect of churches and mosques.
7. Repatriation of clergy.
8. Freeing of *wakf* property and free use thereof.
9. Assurance to returning refugees of security.

ETHRIDGE

[1] Identified also as telegram 410, May 10, from Geneva, p. 992.

501.BB Palestine/5–2349 : Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET CAIRO, May 23, 1949—5 p. m.

501. Deptel 507 May 19, 7 p. m. sent via Tripoli received May 22. On preceding day refugee situation touched upon in conversation with Prime Minister, requested primarily to discuss subject matter Depair 227 April 20.[1]

On mentioning to Prime Minister my understanding that authorized representative Israeli Government had at Lake Success accepted in principle right of refugee repatriation, Prime Minister rather testily replied that application of acceptances in principle could be and might easily be so long delayed as to be valueless. Acceptance in principle and implementation in practice by Israelis were two entirely different things.

[1] The editors are unable to identify this communication.

On chancing to meet Prime Minister evening 22nd, following receipt Deptel 507, I had opportunity briefly to allude to Khashaba Pasha's discussion of refugee problem with Secretary State and to voice hope that Egypt, as a leader among Arab states, might give lead toward study and solution of refugee problem which, as Prime Minister had some weeks ago informed me, would inevitably involve resettlement as well as repatriation. I trusted Egypt, despite its over-population, might accept at least token number refugees for the inspiration and guidance of other Arab states less burdened with population. Interruption prevented my pursuing subject until at hour departure I again reminded Prime Minister [apparent omission]. I shall seek another opportunity to revive subject.

British Ambassador,[2] whom I accosted same evening on subject refugees, stated he had called on Prime Minister about 10 days ago but had found him apparently little disposed to admit any responsibility for plight of refugees or for initiative in alleviating such plight.

Prime Minister had informed British Ambassador, on being pressed for statement of his thoughts on handling relief problem, that prior to action by Arab states, Israelis should start repatriating Palestine Arabs to Israel and give compensation to those preferring resettlement. British Ambassador found Egyptians inclined to blame everyone but themselves for existing situation.

Continuing, British Ambassador stated Prime Minister had added expression of his desire that relief agencies should estimate number of refugees insisting on repatriation as well as those willing to be resettled.

It will be recalled by reference mytel 430 May 3 that Prime Minister had indicated to me that as soon as Israel had accepted in principle the Arab refugee right of repatriation the Arab states would initiate plans for breaking down refugee problem into its component parts with a view to solving it. To judge from Prime Minister's remarks to Sir Ronald, Prime Minister is resorting to delaying tactics with new conditions in order stave off disagreeable necessity of spending time, energy and probably money in study of alien Arab problem which he would like to have devolve on others, presumably, UN, US and UK.

Foregoing recital not encouraging from standpoint of supplying evidence of lively Egyptian desire to cooperate in solution refugee problem but perhaps final word yet to be spoken.

PATTERSON

[2] Sir Ronald Ian Campbell.

501.BB Palestine/5–2349 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, May 23, 1949—6:35 p. m.

627. When sounded out at Department's request re his return to Near East for Syrian-Israeli negotiations (Damascus 288, May 19), Bunche said that if he entered negotiations personally it would short circuit his immediate aim of forcing a meeting between Ben-Gurion and Zaim. He thought there was little use in further discussions between present Israeli and Syrian representatives; that the question needed to be taken to higher level.

Bunche, together with Riley, who came to New York today, is drafting a new set of proposals which will be available to USUN May 24 for comment prior to their dispatch to Vigier.

His plan is to send these to the field with a suggestion that Ben-Gurion and Zaim negotiate on this basis. Bunch will inform both parties that if his proposal for such negotiation is not accepted, he will turn the matter over to the SC. He will point out to Israelis that they will be in a very weak position in that event.

Bunche reiterated that Zaim must have a *quid pro quo* from Israelis because of his domestic situation. As Bunche recently informed Sharett, Israelis cannot expect Syrian withdrawal unless they are willing to make some concessions.

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/5–2349 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, May 23, 1949—7 p. m.

673. Unpal 113. For Ethridge. Fol exploratory suggestions put forward for your comment re composition proposed PCC Survey Group. Group would consist nine men as fols:

1) *Chief:* Outstanding US businessman with top level govt experience, not connected any partisan NE movement and with great prestige with US Govt, Cong, public, financial community and private organizations.

2) *Deputy:* Outstanding Brit national, preferably with long NE, but nonpartisan experience, possibly top civil servant who has received high honors.

[Here follow the remaining seven suggestions, comprising outstanding persons in the fields of finance, industry, and trade; agriculture; construction and public works; community services; administration; refugee problems and legal problems.]

Of substantive principals at least one shld be French. Other experts can be utilized as desired on loan or consultant basis from US (some possibly under Point 4), UK (some from BMEO), UN, and other member govts and int. orgs. Group would not be created, of course, until Israelis and Arab states assume appropriate responsibilities re repatriation and resettlement, respectively, and agreed to cooperate fully with Group. In connection with comments request your suggestions as to candidates, which also under consideration by Dept. Proposed terms of reference will follow.

WEBB

501.BB Palestine/5–1649 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland

SECRET US URGENT NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 23, 1949—7 p. m.

674. Unpal 114. (For Ethridge eyes only.) Ref ur Sec 5 para 2 Palun 151 May 16, US cannot, of course, give general commitment for development program in Near East in connection with refugee problem. Following shld, however, provide you support requested. Pres has made decision to recommend Cong that this Government will within UN framework support program for repatriation and resettlement Pal refugees which is satisfactory to US with financial and technical assistance subject to following conditions:

1. Upon plan forthcoming from PCC or UN that has reasonable chance for success at reasonable cost.
2. Upon full acceptance by Arabs and Israelis of responsibilities involved and upon their active cooperation in carrying out agreed plan.
3. Upon appropriate assistance from int and other sources. In this connection you should make clear to Arabs and Israelis and other PCC members that such US financial assistance as may be forthcoming will be contingent upon satisfactory contributions by other interested parties.

New approach to Cong for funds for refugee problem not possible this session; however, executive will put request before Cong at earliest opportunity following development satisfactory overall UN program, and informal agreement with other countries as to what their financial contributions will be. You are authorized utilize foregoing in effort obtain agreements by Israel and Arab states to repatriate and resettle respectively, number of refugees specified in Palun 151. You should, however, keep US commitment in as general and informal terms as possible and make no commitment as to specific US contribution. It should be clear that program contemplated by Pres consists for most

part in relief and wage payments for refugees and cost of refugee resettlement projects, which will of course benefit countries concerned, but contains only limited development projects not associated directly with refugees. Dept desires not make any more formal undertaking or public statement at this time, but wld prefer oral commitment if possible. If, however, in your judgment written commitment becomes necessary, form of commitment shld be cleared with Dept.[1]

WEBB

[1] This telegram was repeated to London as No. 1789. It was also sent, on May 27, to Arab capitals and Tel Aviv "for background info only." (circular telegram, 501.BB Palestine/5–2749)

The Department, on May 27, authorized London to inform the Foreign Office of the substance of No. 1789 but directed the Embassy to "make clear to Brit that Pres' decision does not prejudge or predetermine respective contributions to such program by US, UK and other interested parties. Dept believes question of principles to govern contributions by UK and other sources shld form subject early discussion between US and UK, perhaps in Washington." (telegram 1846, 501.BB Palestine/5–2749)

867N.48/5–2449

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Gross) to the Acting Secretary of State[1]

[WASHINGTON,] May 24, 1949.

Subject: Discussion with Senators Connally and Vandenberg Regarding the Palestine Refugee Problem.

George McGhee and I met with Senators Connally and Vandenberg[2] on the afternoon of May 23 to outline the problem which was discussed with you on Friday. McGhee made a good presentation. The reaction of the Senators was, however, far from enthusiastic and it is quite clear that we may expect to have tough sledding with the proposition when it is ready for submission.

I told the Senators that this was simply a "reporting mission" on our part and that we were not contemplating the submission of any further Palestine refugee program for action at this session. Senator Vandenberg was somewhat more outspoken than Senator Connally in questioning the validity of the program, but both repeatedly asked how we could justify action which in effect underwrote the situation brought about by the taking of houses and land away from the Arabs by the Israelis. This line of questioning suggests the great importance of making certain that in working out any arrangements involving the granting of funds by the United States, we must insist that the Israeli

[1] Secretary Acheson was at Paris attending the Sixth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which met from May 23 to June 20.

[2] Tom Connally, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and Arthur H. Vandenberg, ranking Republican member of the same committee.

government does its full part and makes appropriate contribution to the solution of the problem.

867N.01/5–2449 : Telegram

The Chargé in Transjordan (Stabler) to the Secretary of State

SECRET AMMAN, May 24, 1949—2 p. m.

215. Situation now developing with respect to special committee talks has many of earmarks which characterized "negotiations" on Arab triangle. Israelis are presenting strong and irrevocable demands as well as insisting on what Arabs should agree to receive in return. At same time Israelis are indicating that if their demands are not satisfied, they will obtain them by other means. Thus Israelis, in hope of intimidating Transjordan into acceptance, are starting familiar pressure treatment, including veiled threat of force. It cannot be doubted that Dayan's visit to Jerusalem (Jerusalem telegram 370 to Dept [1]) was calculated attempt to have word conveyed to Transjordan that Israeli patience nearly exhausted.

It is true that at Rhodes Transjordan accepted in principle solution to matters mentioned in clause 2 Article 8 of Transjordan–Israel armistice agreement. (No mention need be made at this time of fact that Israeli refused discuss question of cease-fire until Transjordan had given agreement in principle to these points.) Such acceptance in principle still exists and Transjordan still willing to make agreements on these points provided Israel will satisfy certain Transjordan demands. It is one thing for Transjordan to state what it wishes to receive as compensation; it it another for Israel to state what Transjordan should be willing to receive. (For example, Israel seems intent on providing electricity for old city and on giving Arabs free use Bethlehem road. Israel does not appear interested in fact that Arabs have no particular desire for either.) Agreement on basis latter could hardly be defined as having been reached by negotiations, and consent in genuine meaning those terms.

Transjordan has been subjected to much criticism for giving in to Israeli demands in triangle area for it has been argued that if Transjordan resisted and Israel had resorted to force, world opinion would have been shocked and UN would have instituted measures to restrain Israel. However, it cannot be said that US response to Abdullah's plea for assistance gave any such hopeful indication. As result this storm bitter criticism by Palestine Arabs and many others, both King and Governors, have been badly frightened and all indications point to

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[1] Dated May 20, p. 1039.

fact they will refuse acquiesce in any further attempts at "blackmail". It can be said that Transjordan would prefer Israelis to make good their demands by force rather than meekly submit to threat of force. Only possibility for reaching agreement now would be for Israel to curb its voracious territorial appetite and show some signs of "negotiations and consent in genuine meaning those terms."

In adopting above policy there is no doubt Transjordan has support and encouragement from certain non-Arab quarters. I also feel that Transjordan would run grave risk, from Arab viewpoint, in submitting further to Israeli demands, notwithstanding blandishments regarding "final territorial disposition". However it would not be surprising if Transjordan were even now subjected to criticism by some quarters for not being "reasonable" and for not giving in to Israeli demands in interests of "peace".

Basically, Arab demands boil down to return of certain Arab quarters Jerusalem now held by Israelis and it is unlikely these demands can be altered. Much has been said to effect that it would be in Israel's own interests to make some conciliatory gesture toward Arabs. Discussions regarding Jerusalem would seem to offer good opportunity to make this gesture, but so far Israel has not accepted this friendly advice nor has any power shown itself disposed to press Israel in this respect. If it is still not possible for Israel to consider return certain Arab quarters Jerusalem to Arabs without making unreasonable counter demands, then it would seem preferable to bring adjournment special committee, leave *status quo* in Jerusalem and permit Lausanne conference to deal with Palestine question, including Jerusalem, as whole.

It would appear impractical to adopt courses of action suggested by Jerusalem in its telegram 370. First proposal on overall settlement could hardly be carried out without participation of UN which is precluded from special committee talks by armistice agreement. Moreover, on third party mediation there would seem little chance either side would agree on division of territories concerned. Probably Israel would request areas in northern Jerusalem far in excess what it is prepared give Arabs in southern Jerusalem. Consequently another deadlock would ensue.

Agreement on basis second proposal would appear to be difficult if not impossible to reach as Transjordan would be giving up its principal bargaining point in return for those concessions in which it is not particularly interested. Once having given up this point there would be little, if any, chance of ever obtaining satisfaction its main demand. Israel on other hand would obtain desired free access to Mt. Scopus which it would gradually turn into its own definition of "free access". Since at this time there appears to be little possibility

that special committee, which seems to be operating in vacuum, can reach any peacefully arrived-at agreement, it would in my opinion be better to adjourn it *sine die* and without prejudice and hand over matters under its jurisdiction to PCC at Lausanne. In order to achieve this, however, it will be necessary for PCC and US to put pressure on Israel, which is at all times out to achieve its ends regardless of means. It would seem unfortunate, after all work which has been done to bring about peace in Jerusalem, to permit developing situation to imperil that peace.

Sent Department, repeated Bern 6 for USDel PPC, pouched Arab capitals, London, Jerusalem.

STABLER

501.BB Palestine/5–2449 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, May 24, 1949—6 p. m.

682. Unpal 116. Eyes alone for Ethridge from Rusk. Fol is draft note developed by Dept's staff along lines to be handed Israeli Amb. in Washington. Text has not been considered by Acting Secy nor by Pres. To expedite matters, however, we would greatly appreciate your comments, to include (1) accuracy, (2) underlying policy, (3) your estimate whether note of this sort would strengthen your hand in Lausanne discussions, (4) any suggested modifications. For obvious reasons request utmost security this draft text. Dispatch of note presupposes basic decision to take specific steps, initially in the economic field, to demonstrate US determination to modify Israeli attitude.

"Excellency: I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Pres. of the US has instructed me to inform the Govt. of Israel as fols:

The Govt. of the US is seriously disturbed by the attitude of Israel with respect to a territorial settlement in Palestine and to the question of Palestinian refugees, as set forth to Mr. Mark Ethridge by Dr. Eytan on May 19, 1949 at Lausanne upon instructions of His Excellency the FonMin of Israel.[1] According to Dr. Eytan, the Israeli Govt. will do nothing further about Palestinian refugees at the present time. In connection with territorial matters, the position taken by Dr. Eytan apparently contemplates not only the retention of all territory now held under military occupation by Israel, which is clearly in excess of the partition boundaries of Nov. 29, 1947, but an additional acquisition of further territory both within and outside Palestine.

As a mem. of the UN PCC and as a nation which has consistently striven to give practical effect to the principles of the UN, the US Govt. has recently made a number of representations to the Israeli

[1] See telegram 769, May 20, from Bern, p. 1036.

Govt. concerning the repatriation of refugees who fled from the conflict in Palestine. These representations were in conformity with the principles set forth in the resolution of the GA of Dec. 11, 1948, and urged the acceptance of the principle of substantial repatriation and the immediate beginnings of repatriation on a reasonable scale which would be well within the numbers to be agreed in a final settlement. The US Govt. conceded that a final settlement of the refugee problem must await a definitive peace settlement. These representations, as well as those made concurrently to the Arab States concerning the resettlement outside of Palestine of a substantial portion of Palestine refugees, were made in the firm conviction that they pointed the way to a lasting peace in that area.

In the interests of a just and equitable solution of territorial questions the US Govt., in the UN and as a mem. of the PCC, has supported the position that Israel should be expected to offer territorial compensation for any territorial acquisition which it expects to effect beyond the boundaries set forth in the res. of the GA of Nov. 29, 1947. The Govt. of Israel has been well aware of this position and of the view of the US Govt. that it is based upon elementary principles of fairness and equity.

The US Govt. is deeply concerned to learn from Dr. Eytan's statements that the suggestions both on refugees and on territorial questions which have been made by it for the sole purpose of advancing prospects of peace have made so little impression upon the Govt. of Israel.

The US attitude of sympathy and support for Israel has arisen out of broad Amer interests and principles, particularly out of its support for the UN and its desire to achieve peace and security in the Near East on a realistic basis. The US Govt. and people have given generous support to the creation of Israel because they have been convinced of the justice of this aspiration. The US Govt does not, however, regard the present attitude of the Israeli Govt. as being consistent with the principles upon which US support has been based. The US Govt. is gravely concerned lest Israel now endanger the possibility of arriving at a solution of the Palestine problem in such a way as to contribute to the establishment of sound and friendly relations between Israel and its neighbors.

The Govt. of Israel should entertain no doubt whatever that the US Govt. relies upon it to take responsible and positive action concerning Palestine refugees and that, far from supporting excessive Israeli claims to further territory both inside and outside Palestine, the US Govt. believes that it is necessary for Israel to offer territorial compensation for territory which it expects to acquire beyond the boundaries of the Nov. 29, 1947 res. of the GA.

The Govt. of Israel must be aware that the attitude which it has thus far assumed at Lausanne must inevitably lead to a rupture in those conversations. The US Govt. must state in candor that it considers that the Govt. of Israel must provide a basis for a continuation of such talks under the auspices of the PCC and that a rupture arising out of the rigid attitude of the Govt. of Israel would place a heavy responsibility upon that Govt. and people.

If the Govt. of Israel continues to reject the basic principles set forth by the res. of the GA of Dec. 11, 1948 and the friendly advice

offered by the US Govt. for the sole purpose of facilitating a genuine peace in Palestine, the US Govt. will regretfully be forced to the conclusion that a revision of its attitude toward Israel has become unavoidable."

[Rusk]
WEBB

501.BB Palestine/5–2549 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY NEW YORK, May 25, 1949—1 p. m.

639. Following is note Bunche proposes to send Zaim on May 26 together with his draft proposal on armistice demarcation lines from Syrian-Israeli discussion. A somewhat similar note will be sent to Ben-Gurion at the same time. Bunche intends that this new compromise should be discussed by the existing delegations under Vigier's chairmanship. If, as he expects, no progress is made at this level, he will address a renewed appeal to Ben-Gurion and Zaim to negotiate the armistice agreement personally, offering UN assistance for this purpose.

Bunche would appreciate US support for his proposal. Support will be particularly needed in Tel Aviv.

"1. Following personal consultation with General Riley who has just returned to Lake Success for this purpose, cable communications with M. Vigier, and a careful study of the negotiations thus far conducted, I have the honor to submit for the consideration of your government the following suggested draft article on the armistice demarcation line in the Israeli-Syrian draft armistice agreement.

2. In submitting this draft article as a compromise proposal, I realize that it does not fully meet the desires of either party as thus far expressed in the negotiations. But you will agree, I am sure, that no agreement is possible unless each party is willing to make some concessions and accept some compromises.

3. I am confident that this draft article is consistent with the basic purpose of the SC resolutions on Palestine, and particularly the resolution of 16 November 1948. It will separate the forces, thus reducing to a minimum the possibility of friction and incident. It will require some withdrawal by the armed forces of each party. It is purely a temporary arrangement, for the duration of the armistice and pending territorial settlement. The provision for a demilitarized zone, subject to the authority of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission and the observers attached thereto, fully safeguards the territorial claims, positions and interests of both parties for the final settlement. Neither party, therefore, can validly claim to lose advantage by accepting the provisions of this draft article, unless it be argued that there is no substitute for force and armed possession in the protection of a claim. As a representative of the UN, I cannot endorse any such view,

and more particularly so since our experience with UN demilitarization of such highly strategic areas as Government House and Mount Scopus in Jerusalem, and the El Auja sector in the Negev, gives convincing proof that such arrangements work well and give full protection to the rights and claims of the interested parties.

4. I would emphasize that although vital interests of both parties are admittedly at sake in this agreement, it is an armistice and not a peace treaty we are negotiating. Neither party, therefore, is entitled to insist on final arrangements which must properly await the peace settlement, or which would clearly prejudice such settlement. The Israeli-Syrian armistice negotiations must not, in any way, impinge upon the settlement discussions now being conducted by the Conciliation Commission at Lausanne.

5. In formulating this draft, I have had in mind the stated fact that the armed forces of the Arab states entered Palestine for the sole purpose of protecting the rights and interests of the Arabs of Palestine. I can well understand that the desperate plight of the vast number of Arab refugees and the extensive territory now under the control of Israeli forces gives you grave concern and is a strong factor in determining your position as regards Palestinian territory now occupied by Syrian forces. But I submit that the provision for UN responsibility over the territory in the proposed demilitarized zone gives more than adequate protection to your interests and is much more consistent with the letter and spirit of the SC resolutions.

6. I earnestly appeal to you to give this draft your most serious and sympathetic consideration. It is my intention to call upon the delegations of the two parties to reconvene at an early date in order to continue their negotiations with this draft as a working basis."

Following is draft article on armistice demarcation lines:

"1. In view of the fact that the question of territorial settlement is one of the matters being dealt with in consultations with the UN Conciliation Commission now taking place at Lausanne, it is emphasized that the following arrangements for the armistice demarcation lines between the Israeli and Syrian Armed Forces are not to be interpreted as having any relation whatsoever to ultimate territorial arrangements affecting the two parties to this agreement.

2. The armistice demarcation line herein defined is in response to the request of the SC in its resolution of 16 November 1948, and without prejudice to the rights, positions, interests and claims of either party to this agreement. In pursuance of the spirit of the SC resolution, the armistice demarcation line has been defined with a view toward separating the armed forces of the two parties in such manner as to minimize the possibility of friction and incident.

3. The armistice demarcation line shall be delineated on the map attached to this agreement as annex (blank). Where the existing truce lines as certified by the UN truce supervision organization run along the recognized international boundary between Syria and Palestine, the armistice demarcation line shall follow the boundary line. Elsewhere, the armistice demarcation line shall follow a line midway between the certified truce lines for the Israeli and Syrian forces.

4. The armed forces of the two parties shall nowhere advance beyond the armistice demarcation line.

5. *a.* Where the armistice demarcation line does not correspond to the international boundary, the area between the armistice demarcation line and the boundary, pending final territorial settlement between the parties, shall be established as a demilitarized zone from which the armed forces of both parties shall be totally excluded, it being understood that the Ein Gev and Dadara sectors shall also be included in the demilitarized zone.

b. The purpose of the demilitarized zone shall be to safeguard the territorial claims, positions and interests of both parties pending final territorial settlement and to separate widely the armed forces, while providing for the gradual restoration of normal civilian life in the area of the zone without prejudice to the ultimate settlement.

c. Any advance by the armed forces of either party into any part of the demilitarized zone, when confirmed by the UN representatives, shall constitute a flagrant violation of this agreement.

d. The chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission established in article (blank) of this agreement and United Nations observers attached to the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring the full implementation of this article.

e. The withdrawal of such armed forces as are now found in the demilitarized zone shall be in accordance with the schedule of withdrawal annexed to this agreement and in any case shall be completed within ten weeks from the date on which this agreement is signed.

f. The chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be empowered to authorize the return of civilians to villages and settlements in the demilitarized zone and the employment of limited numbers of locally recruited civilian police in the zone for internal security purposes, and shall be guided in this regard by the schedule of withdrawal referred to in sub-paragraph (*e*) of this article." [1]

AUSTIN

[1] New York, on May 27, advised of two revisions in the draft article on armistice demarcation lines, as follows: In paragraph 5*a*, the words "between Syria and Palestine" were to be added to the first sentence after the words "international boundary"; and a new paragraph 6 was to be added, reading "On each side of the demilitarized zone there shall be areas, as defined in annex _____ to this agreement, in which defensive forces only shall be maintained, in accordance with the definition of defensive forces set forth in annex _____ to this agreement." (Telegram 652, 501.BB Palestine/5–2749)

501.BB Palestine/5–2549 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, May 25, 1949—7:05 p. m.

644. Bunche and Riley were both of opinion last evening that disclosure of Israeli territorial aspirations to PCC will result in breakdown of Israeli-Syrian armistice negotiations. They also agree that

this disclosure will probably wreck PCC talks and might also threaten armistice agreements.

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine (E)/11-2349

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON, undated.]

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT, THURSDAY, MAY 26, 1949

PALESTINE REFUGEE PROGRAM

I informed the President of the Congressional reticence about the Palestine refugee program. He instructed me to carry the program forward in spite of this and arrange for its submission.

867N.01/5-2649 : Telegram

The Chargé in Transjordan (Stabler) to the Secretary of State

SECRET AMMAN, May 26, 1949—noon.

216. British Minister informed this morning that King had received other message from Sassoon through Transjordan Minister Paris to effect that as Lausanne Conference not appear to be making progress toward peace settlement it would be desirable for Transjordan and Israel to undertake separate negotiations immediately. Prime Minister has taken line in which King apparently has acquiesced that separate negotiations while Lausanne Conference proceeding undesirable and Sassoon has been so informed. If Lausanne Conference fails, then matter of separate negotiations can be discussed again.

Kirkbride also told me that he had received personal note from King stating that postponement separate negotiations all very well but what would he do if Israelis attacked him. HM did not understand how French could supply arms and ammunition to Syria which not only did not have treaty with French but also did not have armistice, while UK refused give arms to Transjordan which had both treaty and armistice. Kirkbride commented that "Man in street" in Transjordan beginning grow restive about this situation. He has put matter up again with British Foreign Office. *Comment*—King has on numerous occasions mentioned to me possibility lifting arms embargo as result signature armistice. There is also some apprehension amongst people as to future if Israelis should choose use aggressive

means to satisfy their demands. While criticism of US and UK continues, no increase in intensity has been noticed recently. *End comment.*[1]

Sent Department 216; repeated London 40, Bern for USDel PCC 7; Jerusalem 103, Damascus 41.

STABLER

[1] Mr. Wright of the British Foreign Office discussed the question of ending or relaxing the arms embargo in the Middle East with Messrs. Hare, Kopper, and Jones at London on May 24. He noted that "Defense talks with Egyptians have begun but latter insist on early arms supply and it is abundantly clear UK cannot hope make progress with Egypt without some arms deliveries. Since Syria getting arms from France, and Israel from various sources, Foreign Office believes continuance strict US–UK observance embargo is becoming more and more futile and damaging to vital US–UK interests in Egypt. Both Transjordan and Iraq are also pressing for arms and Trevelyan of British Embassy Baghdad, coming London present Iraqi case for arms." (Telegram 2043, May 25, 8 p. m., from London, 867N.113/5–2549)

Editorial Note

On May 26, the Chargé in Transjordan, Wells Stabler, reported that after drafting telegram 216 (*supra*) he received a personal letter concerning the Palestine situation from King Abdullah, the text of which he transmitted to the Department in telegram 217, May 26, 4 p. m. from Amman (867N.01/5–2649).

King Abdullah reviewed his position vis-à-vis Palestine in a conversation with Stabler on May 28 and made a "strong plea that US should take solution Palestine problem into its hands and should bring about imposition settlement based on partition or on aid [*other?*] plan equitable to both Transjordan and Israel." (Telegram 222, May 30, 3 p. m., from Amman, 867 N.01/5–3049)

865C.01/5–2649 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET PARIS, May 26, 1949—5 p. m.

2164. From Secretary. Bevin called on me this morning.[1] [Here follow sections on Cyrenaica, printed in volume IV, page 557, and on Greece, printed in footnote 2, page 342.]

Bevin then took up question of shipment of arms to Egypt and other Arab states noting Israel gets all it wants and Arabs can buy from

[1] Messrs. Acheson and Bevin were attending the Sixth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers which met at Paris beginning May 23.

Czechs if British do not fulfill existing contracts. He said they were planning to go ahead with *de jure* recognition of Israel and then announce they would fulfill their arms contracts with Arabs. He dwelt particularly on troubled situation in Egypt, and their need to train Egyptian air force. I suggested they should take up propriety particular shipments with Bunche and informed him concerning our general thinking this problem. Bevin then took up situation of Arab refugees, hinting that Israeli intransigence might be due our encouragement. I told him about my talks with Sharett and of my and President's talks with Weizmann stating emphatically we had taken strong lines on refugees and frontiers in which we had been far from encouraging them. Bevin said that they had rumors of possible renewed Jewish aggression. He then handed me elaborate paper on possible settlement Arab refugees in various Arab states which I am forwarding air pouch. He said he would not put this forward officially but hoped their thinking could be combined with ours. I told him we also had detailed plan under consideration in Washington.

I indicated to Bevin we would communicate our views to him on these several points.

[ACHESON]

501.BB Palestine/5–2649 : Telegram

Mr. Mark F. Ethridge to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT LAUSANNE, May 26, 1949—7 p. m.

Palun 167. Consult Rusk for distribution. Reference Unpal 116.[1] I consider underlying policy accurate. Note of this character would strengthen my hand at Lausanne. It may not be as effective now as it might been at earlier date as Israeli views regarding refugees and territory have crystallized such extent, both privately and publicly, that it may be difficult for them to change. I strongly recommend its despatch nevertheless, if we are to attempt to achieve a peace in theme which will not subsequently come apart at seams. I have several suggested changes:

1. First paragraph, first sentence: Omit "as set forth to Mr. Mark Ethridge by Dr. Eytan on May 19, 1949 at Lausanne upon instruction of His Excellency, the Foreign Minister of Israel" and substitute "as set forth by the representatives of Israel at Lausanne in public and private meetings". Palun 160[2] correctly reports Eytan's views and views of his colleagues. There is no doubt they are views of Israeli

[1] Identified also as telegram 682, May 24, to Bern, p. 1051.
[2] Identified also as telegram 769, May 20, from Bern, p. 1036.

Government but to avoid technical evasion we suggest substitute phrase.

2. First paragraph, second sentence: Add at end "although it has under consideration certain urgent measures of limited character". Israeli Delegation recently informed PCC it had sent Tel Aviv for consideration urgent measures listed in Palun 166.[3] Department is doubtless aware general Israeli approach to urgent measures of this character from Palun 145.[4]

3. First paragraph, third sentence: Omit "but an additional acquisition further territory both within and out Palestine" and substitute "but possibly an additional acquisition of further territory within Palestine". Israeli Delegation May 26 revealed Israeli views regarding frontier with Transjordan which are being reported separately. In essence, Israeli Delegation proposes political boundary shall be boundary between former mandate and Transjordan; i.e. 1) southern end Lake Tiberias to junction armistice line with Transjordan border, east of Jenin and 2) middle of Dead Sea to Gulf of Aqaba. With regard to Central Palestine, present armistice lines from junction of armistice line with Transjordan border east of Jenin to middle of Dead Sea would be allowed to stand until it was determined whether Transjordan, independent government, international authority or some other form of government was in control. Modifications between Israel and that government might subsequently arise for discussion and its attitude would be determined by character of government. Meanwhile, Transjordan was in military occupation with which military changes might be discussed. Israeli Delegation stated it had not included Jerusalem area in its proposal.

Reference to Israeli acquisition outside Palestine would not strengthen note and would cause controversy. Israel desires small parts of Lebanon and Syria and possibly in Transjordan for economic reasons but will undoubtedly have to approach on exchange basis as international frontiers are involved.

4. Sixth paragraph, first sentence: Omit "both inside and outside" and substitute "within".

Undoubtedly Department has considered question of reference to Jerusalem problem in note. I agree no reference should be made because PCC plan will be considered by GA in September. I suggest, however, that Department might orally suggest to Israeli Ambassador that final settlement Palestine question would be facilitated if meanwhile, Israeli Government were able to take such conciliatory steps regarding Jerusalem as action indicating Israeli Government was temporary trustee for Arab land and property within Jerusalem area and postponment transfer Israeli Government functions to Jerusalem.

ETHRIDGE

[3] Dated May 23, from Lausanne, p. 1044.
[4] Identified also as telegram 410, May 10, from Geneva, p. 992.

867N.01/5–2749

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 27, 1949.

Subject: Representation to Israeli Government on Territorial Settlement in Palestine and Question of Palestinian Refugees.

1. *Israeli Position toward Final Settlement*

Mr. Mark Ethridge, United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission, reports in a telegram dated May 20 (Tab A)[1] that Israel has now put forth its full territorial demands upon the Arab States. Under authorization from the Israeli Foreign Minister, the Israeli representative at Lausanne has stated as follows: (1) While Israel makes no demands upon Lebanon at present, it would later like a portion of southeastern Lebanon considered necessary to Israeli development plans. The Israeli delegate said Israel would be willing to compensate Lebanon for this territory, but he did not specify in what way this would be done; (2) Israel desires to acquire from Egypt the Egyptian occupied Gaza strip, allotted to the Arabs under the partition resolution of November 29, 1947; (3) Israel makes no demands upon Syria at present, but will accept the international frontier with the proviso, also to be applied to Lebanon, that if either state desires to open negotiations in the future for border rectification, this may be done; (4) Israel will make further demands upon Transjordan for territory in Arab Palestine considered necessary to Israeli development plans. Israel has in mind giving Abdullah a few villages in return; (5) Israel will retain occupied areas such as Western Galilee and Jaffa, Lydda and Ramle allotted to the Arabs under the partition plan; (6) Israel will relinquish none of the Negev. The Israeli delegate subsequently, however, indicated to Mr. Ethridge the possibility that Israel might make some compensation in the Negev in return for the Gaza strip.

The Israeli delegate further stated that Israel will do nothing more concerning the Arab refugees at the present time.

2. *United States Position*

In the interest of achieving an equitable territorial settlement for Palestine, this Government has consistently supported the position that Israel should offer territorial compensation for any territorial acquisition which it expects to obtain beyond the boundaries allotted to Israel in the resolution of November 29, 1947. Moreover, since the General Assembly resolution of December 11, 1948 calls for the re-

[1] Not found attached; the telegram referred to is presumably No. 769 from Bern, p. 1036.

patriation of those refugees desiring to return to their homes and live at peace, and in view of the impossibility of resettling the total number of refugees in the Arab States within a reasonable period of time and at a reasonable cost, this Government has recently made representations to the Israeli Government urging its agreement to repatriation of a subtsantial number of refugees and the immediate commencement of repatriation of some portion thereof. Despite the emphasis upon repatriation in the resolution of December 11, we have urged upon the Arabs the necessity for their agreement to the resettlement in the Arab States of a substantial portion of the refugees, in view of the fact that the return to their homes of all the refugees desiring to go back would be difficult because of the continuing arrival in Israel of large numbers of European displaced persons.

Our representations on these two questions have thus far met with no success with the Israeli Government. Israeli officials have in fact informed our representatives in Palestine that they intend to bring about a change in the position of the United States Government on the above points, through means available to them in the United States. There are also indications that the Israelis are prepared to use the implied threat of force to obtain the additional territory which they desire in Palestine.

3. *Efforts of the Palestine Conciliation Commission*

The Conciliation Commission has vigorously endeavored to persuade the Israelis and the Arabs to withdraw from their extreme positions concerning a final Palestine settlement. With respect to refugees, the Commission has succeeded in persuading the Arabs to give up their previous insistence upon repatriation as a prerequisite to negotiations on other outstanding issues, and in persuading certain of the Arab States to give favorable consideration to resettlement of a portion of the refugees. The Commission has failed to obtain any concessions from the Israelis on a territorial settlement or the refugee question. It is now the considered opinion of Mr. Ethridge that the conference at Lausanne is likely to break up when the Arabs learn of the present Israeli position toward a final settlement and that there will exist no possibility of peace on any basis heretofore envisioned by the United States Government unless Israel modifies its demands. Mr. Ethridge believes that such modification is unlikely.

4. *United States Interest*

The United States interest in the security and stability of the Near East has been a principal motivation of our efforts, both in the United Nations and on the diplomatic level, to urge both parties to the Palestine dispute to take measures leading to a sound and equitable peace. The strategic interests of the United States demand early termination

501-887—77——68

of the present conditions of instability and mutual suspicion, which provide such a favorable atmosphere for Soviet penetration and exploitation of the Near East. The present instability will certainly continue if the Lausanne talks break down as a result of the new Israeli position, which is susceptible of interpretation by the Arabs as confirming their constant fears of Israeli territorial expansionism. Failure of the Israelis to modify their present demands will inevitably aggravate Arab distrust of Israel and bring about renewed Arab charges that the United States remains passive no matter how unreasonable the demands of Israel. The Department of State is firmly convinced that the Israelis as well as the Arabs must therefore be prepared to make some concessions, and that, if Israel will modify its present demands, a solution can be achieved which will be both advantageous to Israel and acceptable to the Arabs.

5. *Recommendations*

(*a*) The Department believes that the time has come to make a basic decision concerning our attitude toward Israel. The United States has given generous support to the foundation of the Jewish State, since we believed in the justice of this aspiration. We are convinced that there is no reason why the Jews and the Arabs cannot live together in peace in the Near East, providing they each adopt a reasonable attitude toward the other.

In the light of all the foregoing, the Department considers that it is now essential to inform the Israeli Government forcefully that, if it continues to reject the friendly advice which this Government has offered solely in the interest of a genuine peace in the Near East, this Government will be forced with regret to revise its attitude toward Israel. There is attached a draft note to the Israeli Government for your consideration (Tab B).[2] This note has been discussed with Mr. Ethridge, who believes that it would strengthen his hand at Lausanne and strongly recommends that it be sent.

(*b*) If the Israeli Government does not respond favorably to this proposed representation, it will be necessary to take measures designed to convince Israel of the importance to this Government of a revision of Israel's present policy. Such measures, in addition to a generally negative attitude in the future toward Israel, might include (1) refusing the request of the Israeli Government for United States technical advisers and for the training of Israeli officials in the United States; (2) withholding approval of the $49,000,000 as yet unallocated of the $100,000,000 earmarked by the Export-Import Bank for loan to Israel.

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[2] Not found attached; for note as actually sent, see telegram 322, May 28, to Tel Aviv, p. 1072.

(*c*) Although the Department of State is convinced of the necessity of carrying out this plan of action in the light of our national interest in the field of foreign policy and strongly recommends that you approve this suggested course, the matter involves other important considerations, since the proposed course of action would arouse strong opposition in American Jewish circles. It is therefore suggested that you may wish to ask your advisers to give careful consideration to the possible implications of the above procedure.

The Department hopes that it will receive your reply on a most urgent basis if this Government is to achieve a modification of the Israeli attitude in time to save the Lausanne meeting. Mr. Ethridge informed the Department by telephone on May 23 that he does not believe the meeting can last much longer than a week under the present circumstances. Dr. Bunche and General Riley concur.

[JAMES E. WEBB]

501.BB Palestine/5–2749 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 27, 1949—2 p. m.

1844. Urtel 2037, May 25.[1] You may inform FonOff substance paras 1 through six inclusive of Tab A attached to memo to Pres dated May 9, but not para 7 or covering memo. You shld make clear to FonOff that financial estimates therein were obtained through analysis best US–UK technical info available to USG; that figures do not constitute in any sense an approved US program or specific US financial commitment and that figures are susceptible of reduction or expansion in light of number of obvious variables. We hope discuss foregoing soonest with Brit Emb Washington.

Reur para 1, we are aware of urgency formulating plans continuing refugee relief. We are sending you today by separate tel our suggestions re frame of ref for proposed Economic Survey Group, for FonOff's comments. Functions of survey group would include determination number refugees unable receive direct or indirect support on wage payment basis and estimated costs direct relief for this category. Assuming political situation permits activation survey group near future, it could complete its overall recommendations to PCC, including action which wld be required by GA re continuing relief program, by Sept 1. Unless it becomes clear within few weeks that group cannot

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[1] Not printed; it advised that Messrs. Hare, Kopper, and Jones discussed the refugee question with officers of the Eastern Department of the British Foreign Office on May 24 and sought the Department's permission to advise the Foreign Office of the contents of telegram 1789, May 23, to London, and the memorandum of May 9 to the White House (501.BB Palestine/5–2549). Telegram 1789 was a repeat of 674 to Bern, p. 1047.

be activated near future, Dept wld not wish prejudge survey group's conclusions by formulating independent plan for relief program outside context of overall plan for solution refugee problem.

WEBB

501.BB Palestine/5–2749 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, May 27, 1949—4 p. m.

704. Unpal 119. For USDel, Lausanne. Herewith Dept's suggestions for terms of ref proposed Econ Survey Group (or such designation as may be decided upon) in form of draft res:

"*PCC*

Desiring to implement paras 10 and 11 of GA res Dec 11 and to obtain info which will serve as basis for recommendations for further action by GA, member states, appropriate specialized agencies, and int orgs, and

Having noted declarations of reps of Israel and Arab States with respect to repatriation, compensation, and resettlement of refugees:

1. *Hereby establishes*, pursuant to authorization granted under para 12 of foregoing res, an Econ Survey Group to examine the econ situation in countries affected by the recent hostilities, and to make recommendations which will enable govts concerned to further such measures and development programs as are required to overcome econ dislocations created by the hostilities; to reintegrate refugees from the hostilities into econ life of area on self-sustaining basis within minimum period of time; and to promote econ conditions conducive to maintenance of peace and stability in the area;

2. *Instructs* Econ Survey Group to recommend an integrated program to achieve the foregoing objectives, including an operational plan for carrying out program recommended together with estimated costs and methods of financing;

3. *Appoints* fol persons to constitute Group (Unpal 113);

4. *Requests* SYG to furnish such staff and services as Group may require;

5. *Authorizes* Group pursuant para 14 of GA res of Dec 11 to invite assistance those Govts, specialized agencies and internatl orgs which may be able facilitate its work through provision of expert personnel and technical info;

6. *Requests* Group to submit report to Comm not later than Sept 1, 1949."

For your info, Dept believes Econ Survey Group might approach its task along fol lines:

In collaboration with govts concerned

(*a*) Explore measures which can be taken by govts concerned without outside financial assistance to achieve objectives para 1 above;

(*b*) On basis existing plans and surveys, examine proposals submitted by govts concerned for econ development and settlement projects requiring outside assistance which would make possible absorption of refugees into economy of area on self-sustaining basis in minimum time and with minimum expenditure;

(*c*) Examine other econ projects which can, with outside assistance, provide temporary employment for refugees not employed on development and settlement projects para (*b*);

(*d*) Examine such other development and settlement projects requiring outside assistance which, though not associated directly with employment and settlement of refugees, would serve to achieve objectives of para 1;

(*e*) Estimate number of refugees who cannot be supported directly or indirectly through employment envisaged under paras *a–d*, together with estimated period during which direct relief will be required and cost thereof;

(*f*) Study problem of compensation to refugees for claims for property of those who do not return to their homes, and for loss of or damage to property, with special reference to relationship of such compensation to proposed settlement projects;

(*g*) Study the problem of rehabilitation of refugees including matters concerning their civil status, health, education, and social services.[1]

Dept feels Commission discussion on compensation should be postponed pending report of Group (para *f*). Analysis problem compensation being made by Dept, will be forwarded next week.

Your comments requested re foregoing, which is being discussed with Brit.[2]

WEBB

[1] The Department, on August 11, added a paragraph *h*, which read as follows: "Propose organizational structure to achieve objectives para 1 within UN framework to coordinate, supervise and facilitate measures for relief resettlement, econ development and related requirements such as community service facilities bearing in mind interests of all govts concerned and probable sources available funds from within and without area." (telegram 1097 to Bern, 501.BB Palestine/5–2749)

[2] This telegram was repeated to London as No. 1848 and to New York, the latter for information. London, on June 2, advised that the British generally agreed with the suggested terms of reference and the Department's interpretation of them (telegram 2157, 501.BB Palestine/6–249).

501.BB Palestine/5–2849 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Vincent) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED BERN, May 28, 1949—10 a. m.

818. Palun 168. From Ethridge. Eytan on May 25 wrote PCC members individually along following line:

(1). Israelis Delegate has informed PCC that two memorandums (summary of information contained in Palun 145 [1] and that contained

[1] Identified also as telegram 410, May 10, from Geneva, p. 992.

in Palun 166 [2]) were being studied Tel Aviv. Meanwhile Israelis have duty to draw PCC attention to basic misconceptions. Pity and mistake to derive conclusions from false premises and to attempt to find refugee solution on unrealistic assumptions.

(2) Important Arab Delegates understand war which their governments brought to Palestine had much of evil aftermath they must have been able to foresee. Fleeing Arabs abandoned property and homes precipitately. Whole villages fled including orange grove workers. Bank accounts were left intact. Clergy departed.

(3) Vacuum resulted. Urban and rural property destroyed. Armies moved in. War was bitter and destructive. It would be doing refugees disservice if refugees persist in belief that return would find homes, shops or fields intact. Difficult in certain cases to identify village sites.

(4) During war large numbers Jewish immigrants entered and now continues totalling over 250,000 in 1948. Intention of Israel to continue admittance as many as wish to enter.

(5) Shelter was difficult. Impossible if Arab houses were not empty. Israel took advantage of vacant houses. Jaffa, Lydda, Ramle, Beersheba, Safad, et cetera, are today almost wholly occupied by Jewish residents. War and refugee flight have changed face of country. Arab reference to suspension of requisition measures and occupation of Arab property is unrealistic. If sincere Arabs lack information re conditions in Israel. Foregoing is general but will be [made?] specific on request.

(6) Israel considers itself in no way responsible for fact refugees are refugees. Cause was war launched to kill Jewish state. Arab States are now attempting wash hands of evil created by them and to foist responsibility on intended victim. Tone of Arab memorandum referring to principles of humanity and justice ill befits representatives of only states that have ever taken up arms in attempt undo UNGA will. Tone suggests Arab Delegates perhaps unconsciously are deceiving themselves in approach Palestine problem.

(7) Important appreciate responsibility for constructive solution of refugee problem rests upon those responsible. In so far as Israel is prepared contribute within framework general peace settlement contribution can only be on lines applicable to solution elsewhere. Any Arab state offering resettlement will claim right to decide where and how, will not recognize right of individual refugee to particularize and will offer resettlement where and how consonant with domestic condition. If in eventuality envisaged Israel finds it possible to contribute toward refugee resettlement its terms will be same.

(8) No return to *status quo ante* since war and subsequent immigration have decisively and unalterably transformed aspect of country. Clock cannot be turned back. If resettlement in Israel at all, it will be on basis of existing economic and security situation. If Arab expects to return to house, trade or field, illusion should be dispelled. They no longer exist. If they exist they are probably occupied. Even if not occupied, Israel could not for security and many other reasons bind itself to restore. Resettlement in Israel would have to be on basis planned scheme devised for refugees as group and unrelated except for compensation to any proprietary rights claimed by individuals.

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[2] From Lausanne, dated May 23, p. 1044.

(9) Problem facing Arab Delegates and PCC is refugee question on basis existing situation in Israel and Arab States. Certain situation exists and only in context is any hope of workable solution. Attempt to recreate previous conditions of 1947 or 1948 is profitless and doomed failure.

(10) Frankness based on conviction success at Lausanne depends on full understanding of facts. Wishful thinking by Arab Delegates and failure realize actual situation will delay progress and ultimately lead collapse negotiations. Israeli Delegate does not suggest Arabs Delegates are deliberately blinding themselves. More likely lack of information causes misapprehension. Israeli Delegate does not suggest transmittal this letter to Arab Delegates but feels, however, it would be helpful if PCC negotiators with Arabs bear in mind possibility Arabs unaware revolutionary changes in abandoned refugee property. Israeli Delegate also feels it may be useful to explain present situation and consequences thereof.

Comment: USDel has summarized information contained this telegram to give Department indication present thinking Israeli Delegate re refugees. Eytan lectured PCC privately May 26 in same vein. With PCC agreement I told and wrote Eytan some of his assumptions and conclusions outlined this telegram at variance my views and no useful purpose in discussion. I regretted he considered it inadvisable transmit his views to Arab Delegates. Heretofore PCC endeavored assist parties to final settlement by transmittal views of each. Mutual understanding would facilitate settlement. PCC could not be expected embrace views of either for purpose of persuading other. I conceived GA resolution to assist Israel is to negotiate with Arabs rather than UN.

As result Eytan plans redraft letter for transmission to Arab Delegates. I consider important development for psychological reasons. It is hoped Israeli views drafted with Arabs rather than UN in mind will be more temperate and persuasive. [Ethridge.]

VINCENT

501.BB Palestine/5–2849 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Vincent) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED BERN, May 28, 1949—10 a. m.

819. Palun 169. From Ethridge. Reference Palun 165.[1] Eytan on May 25 wrote PCC re Arab memorandum along following line:

(1) Wide gulf separates views of Arab and Israeli delegates. Latter has taken wide view. Outstanding problems are organically linked. Piecemeal approach is impossible. Israel is willing to cooperate in solution of refugee problem if solution is seen organically as part of final settlement between Arab States and Israel.

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[1] From Lausanne, dated May 23, p. 1043.

(2) Arab Delegates have refused to talk overall settlement and have concentrated attention on one problem. This narrow view has lead to no results. Arab memorandum proposes return to homes of refugees from certain areas. Memorandum is particularist and unrealistic, characteristic of whole Arab approach and fails take account of present situation in Palestine or of aim of peace.

(3) Israeli Delegation has instructions to make every effort towards final liquidation of Palestine conflict, establishment of sincere peace and normal relations and stability of ME. Ultimate objective at Lausanne must be permanent peace. Within this context Israelis still prepared to cooperate with Arab Delegates in finding refugee solution. Arab Delegates appear, however, to have authority to discuss only one question. Their instructions seemingly disregard everything else as has been clear from start and is confirmed by Arab memorandum.

(4) Israeli Delegation suggests to PCC that determined effort should be made to persuade Arab Government to face problems at issue in spirit greater realism. Israeli Delegation is convinced peace is ultimate objective of parties and that PCC can demonstrate to Arab Delegates that present course has brought goal no nearer. Continued unrealistic demands cannot advance Arab or refugee cause. Proposals in Arab memorandum offer no sort of basis for negotiation.

(5) Israeli Delegation trusts PCC will find way to turn present talks into useful and realistic channels toward peace. [Ethridge.]

VINCENT

501.BB Palestine/5–2849 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Vincent) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED BERN, May 28, 1949—10 a. m.

820. Palun 173. From Ethridge. Israeli representatives on May 26 informed general limits of [*to?*] PCC of Israeli proposal re frontier between Israel and Transjordan. Israeli representatives considered frontier should be considered in two categories: (1) Northern and southern sections; (2) Section east of "triangle" and Hebron.

Re first category Israel suggested frontier between Israel and Transjordan should be political boundary between Transjordan and Palestine under British mandate, i.e., from junction point of Transjordan-Syrian frontier in north to El Fatur in south and from middle of Dead Sea to Gulf of Aqaba.

Re second category Israel did not propose to discuss at present time as no determination had been made as to disposition of central Palestine. Israel would, however, accept present armistice line as boundary

whether central Palestine was governed by Transjordan or independent authority. Israel had no ambitions in central Palestine. Israel planned to propose certain modifications in armistice lines but could only discuss with final established authority in central Palestine. Israeli attitude re modifications will change in accordance with character of governing authority, i.e., whether Transjordan, independent state or other authority. Israel did not wish to advance suggestions re its disposition. Israel wished give all interested including Arab states, Arab inhabitants and refugees opportunity to decide re future status of central Palestine.

Israeli proposal does not include Jerusalem area.

Meanwhile Israel regards Transjordan as occupying authority in central Palestine and will be able discuss military changes in armistice lines with Transjordan. [Ethridge.]

VINCENT

501.BB Palestine/5–2849 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Vincent) to the Secretary of State

SECRET BERN, May 28, 1949—11 a. m.

821. Palun 174. From Ethridge. Consult Rusk for distribution. In three hour closed meeting with Commission yesterday Eytan advanced idea that stalemate here could be broken to which his letter referred (reference Palun 169 [1]) only by "imaginative broad plan" for resettlement of refugees, in which international responsibility as to finance would be chief factor. He suggested Commission advance proposal to both sides which would in effect lift refugee problem out of context of Lausanne meetings. He obviously had in mind program on which Department has been working.

I pointed out to him that in effect what he was proposing was that somebody else relieve Jews and Arabs of their responsibilities and pick up the check for it. He agreed that my remark was true if crude but said there was nothing reprehensible about it as it had happened a good many times before in world history. I replied that of course there was nothing reprehensible about it but any such aid should have proper base. I told him he knew very well US had been considering such aid but we felt there must be number of conditions attached to it.

First must be that Israel must satisfy US and other nations which might participate in such scheme that she had accepted her full responsibility as to number of refugees who would return as to civil

[1] Identified also as telegram 819, May 28, from Bern, p. 1067.

rights guarantees to them, as to assurance of fair and just compensation to those who did not return and even to those who did return but in much less favorable circumstances. I pointed out President must go to Congress to ask for appropriations if he decided to make commitment (at no time indicating that any had been made) and he would certainly not make any recommendation that was not based upon what he conceived to be fair and permanent settlement in Middle East.

Second point I made was that Arab delegates must agree in principle they would accept refugees left over and that the Arabs had made it clear they would not make any such commitment until Israel herself had made some commitment on refugee problem beyond any she has made. Therefore, Arab position was in Israel's hands also.

Third condition must be that such plan would be workable and acceptable to UN. Israel could not expect member nations of UN to accept plan which they did not regard as having been based upon acceptance by Israel and Arabs of their full responsibility toward refugees and bona fide intention their part to make settlement of refugees material factor in peace settlement.

Fourth condition is that other nations must participate, including Israel. If Israel looked at that condition she must realize other nations likely to contribute would be Britain and perhaps France. Even if US brought itself to sponsoring plan without exacting from Israel fulfillment of its duty he could not expect Britain to look with favor upon it in view of her connection in Arab world. Certainly same consideration would apply to France and Turkey.

I pointed out further that whole key to peace had been in Israel's hands since January and still was and that while UN nations might be willing to buy peace in Middle East as I had suggested they wanted to be sure it was peace. Israel had primary responsibility in proving that.

Eytan said he understood US viewpoint clearly, took notes on it and indicated he wanted to communicate it to his government. He also agreed to consider document for Arabs (reference Palun 168 [2]) that would expound Israel's full position on refugee question. He contended that in making proposal for Gaza strip Israel had agreed to accept all refugees there, all normal population, other Arabs in Palestine and members of broken families. Total would be about as many as Israel agreed to accept under partition. He felt Israel would have discharged its full obligation if she did that.

I agreed that quantitatively she would have accepted her full obligation, but pointed out that he had made proposals with two conditions: international help and acquisition of Gaza strip. What was

[2] Identified also as telegram 818, May 28, from Bern, p. 1065.

now lacking was statement to Commission as to how many refugees Israel would take if she did not get Gaza strip. He agreed to consult his government on alternative proposal.

Understand next Cabinet meeting in Tel Aviv is Tuesday. That meeting will probably determine in great measure whether Lausanne conference breaks up. Press reports we get from Palestine indicate that Foreign Office thinking there is that conference might as well break up and leave Israel free to make enforced peace with Transjordan. My own feeling is that Israel prefers that to accepting any responsibility for refugees or making any territorial concessions at all. [Ethridge.]

VINCENT

501.BB Palestine/5–2849 : Telegram

Mr. Mark F. Ethridge to the Secretary of State

SECRET BERN, May 28, 1949—11 a. m.

822. Palun 175. Consult Rusk for distribution. In private meeting last night with Fawzi Mulki of Transjordan Delegation, he told me Arab Delegates will not make any further concessions here. He said their attitude was based on several factors:

1. They felt they had made concessions in signing protocol (reference Palun 148 [1]) acknowledging partition as fact and as basis for further negotiation; in being willing to accept what they regarded as minor concessions on refugee problem as set out in their 9-point memo (reference Palun 166 [2]) without demanding more substantial concession now; and in indicating in point 3 of their May 21 memo (reference Palun 165 [3]) that they were willing to go into territorial talks, even if their method was to back into such talks. On contrary, they argued that Jews have given nothing and are demanding more. No Arab politician could dare make any further concessions.

2. Neither Egypt nor Syria cared in circumstances whether they made peace, and Lebanese had taken position that it would go along with, but not ahead of, other Arab states. They want peace on basis they regard as decent, that is, one that would not overthrow their governments. He said armistice agreements had badly shaken Arab world and Arab politicians had been able to explain them away only by saying armistice lines were not peace lines. To give more now than armistice lines called for would be to wreck Arab governments, and Arab politicians could not be expected to do that.

3. Transjordan's attitude had modified and hardened considerably because of experience in Tulkarm triangle and in Jerusalem area. Fawzi Mulki felt that by their excessive gun-point demands Jews,

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[1] Dated May 12, p. 998.
[2] Dated May 23, p. 1044.
[3] Dated May 23, p. 1043.

while pretending so [*sic*] friendship with Abdullah, had actually lowered his prestige to point where he could no longer help them in peace making. He said feeling was shared by all Abdullah's advisers and even by King himself and was responsible for failure of mixed committee at Jerusalem and for King's refusal to approve separate meetings between Mulki and Sasoon at Lausanne. Mulki says Transjordan is determined that unless Jews make some concessions by which Transjordan can rescue some of her prestige he doubted whether any peace could come and he personally would not sign such peace. "All the King can do is dismiss me," he said, "I will not face wrath of people of Transjordan and Arab world by signing away more than we have already given. The Jews have been too clever." Fawzi Mulki said he would continue to try here and would discuss with Arab Delegates question of asking commission to make proposals before breaking up.

Fawzi Mulki said there would, of course, be no trouble in getting commitments from Arab Governments on accepting refugees providing Israel made satisfactory commitment. He says Arabs have already agreed among themselves they will have to accept refugees and even Iraq has given some encouragement.

ETHRIDGE

501.BB Palestine/5–2849 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel

TOP SECRET PRIORITY NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1949—11 a. m.

322. Pres desires you deliver following note classified secret immediately to Ben-Gurion.[1]

"Excellency: I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Pres of the US has instructed me to inform the Govt of Israel as fols:

The Govt of the US is seriously disturbed by the attitude of Israel with respect to a territorial settlement in Palestine and to the question of Palestinian refugees, as set forth by the representatives of Israel at Lausanne in public and private meetings. According to Dr. Eytan, the Israeli Govt will do nothing further about Palestinian refugees at the present time, although it has under consideration certain urgent measures of limited character. In connection with territorial matters, the position taken by Dr. Eytan apparently contemplates not only the retention of all territory now held under military occupation by Israel, which is clearly in excess of the partition boundaries of Nov 29, 1947, but possibly an additional acquisition of further territory within Palestine.

As a mem of the UN PCC and as a nation which has consistently striven to give practical effect to the principles of the UN, the US

[1] At 7 p. m., May 27, the Department sent a telegram to Secretary Acheson at Paris, numbered Telac 23. The editors have been unable to locate a copy in the files of the Department but presume it transmitted the text of the note to be delivered to the Israeli Prime Minister. The Secretary replied the following day, stating "Agree with text and dispatch." (Actel 20, 501.BB Palestine/5–2849) Actel 20 was received in the Department at 10 : 17 a. m., May 28.

Govt has recently made a number of representations to the Israeli Govt, concerning the repatriation of refugees who fled from the conflict in Palestine. These representations were in conformity with the principles set forth in the resolution of the GA of Dec 11, 1948, and urged the acceptance of the principle of substantial repatriation and the immediate beginnings of repatriation on a reasonable scale which would be well within the numbers to be agreed in a final settlement. The US Govt conceded that a final settlement of the refugee problem must await a definitive peace settlement. These representations, as well as those made concurrently to the Arab States concerning the resettlement outside of Palestine of a substantial portion of Palestine refugees, were made in the firm conviction that they pointed the way to a lasting peace in that area.

In the interests of a just and equitable solution of territorial questions the US Govt, in the UN and as a mem of the PCC, has supported the position that Israel should be expected to offer territorial compensation for any territorial acquisition which it expects to effect beyond the boundaries set forth in the res of the GA of Nov 29, 1947. The Govt of Israel has been well aware of this position and of the view of the US Govt that it is based upon elementary principles of fairness and equity.

The US Govt is deeply concerned to learn from Dr. Eytan's statements that the suggestions both on refugees and on territorial questions which have been made by it for the sole purpose of advancing prospects of peace have made so little impression upon the Govt of Israel.

The US attitude of sympathy and support for Israel has arisen out of broad American interest and principles, particularly out of its support for the UN and its desire to achieve peace and security in the Near East on a realistic basis. The US Govt and people have given generous support to the creation of Israel because they have been convinced of the justice of this aspiration. The US Govt does not, however, regard the present attitude of the Israeli Govt as being consistent with the principles upon which US support has been based. The US Govt is gravely concerned lest Israel now endanger the possibility of arriving at a solution of the Palestine problem in such a way as to contribute to the establishment of sound and friendly relations between Israel and its neighbors.

The Govt of Israel should entertain no doubt whatever that the US Govt relies upon it to take responsible and positive action concerning Palestine refugees and that, far from supporting excessive Israeli claims to further territory within Palestine, the US Govt believes that it is necessary for Israel to offer territorial compensation for territory which it expects to acquire beyond the boundaries of the Nov 29, 1947 res of the GA.

The Govt of Israel must be aware that the attitude which it has thus far assumed at Lausanne must inevitably lead to a rupture in those conversations. The US Govt must state in candor that it considers that the Govt of Israel must provide a basis for a continuation of such talks under the auspices of the PCC and that a rupture arising out of the rigid attitude of the Govt of Israel would place a heavy responsibility upon that Govt and people.

If the Govt of Israel continues to reject the basic principles set forth by the res of the GA of Dec 11, 1948 and the friendly advice offered by the US Govt for the sole purpose of facilitating a genuine peace in Palestine, the US Govt will regretfully be forced to the conclusion that a revision of its attitude toward Israel has become unavoidable."

Please report time of delivery niact in order that Department may furnish copy to Elath.[2]

WEBB

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[2] A marginal notation states that this telegram was "cleared with the White House 5/27/49."

Mr. Satterthwaite, on May 30, handed to the Israeli Chargé Uriel Heyd, the text of the United States note to the Israeli Government. The latter made no comment after reading the note. Mr. Satterthwaite "made no comment other than to emphasize the fact that the note had been delivered under the instructions of the President." (Memorandum of conversation by Mr. Satterthwaite, 867N.01/5–3049)

Israeli Ambassador Elath called on Acting Secretary Webb on May 31 just prior to his departure for a visit to Israel. The prime subject of their discussion was the United States note. Mr. Webb records that "With strong emotion in his voice the Ambassador said he prayed to God that the United States Government would not underestimate Israeli determination to preserve the security of Israel at all costs. It would be a tragic thing, he said, if the friendly relations between our two countries should be altered because the United States Government insisted on a course of action which would threaten Israeli security. He expressed the fervent hope that this would not come to pass.

"I said that I was sure the Israeli Government realized that the United States Government would not send such a note without prior and careful consideration of all the aspects involved. I referred to the friendly relations between our two countries, and to the United States desire to see these relations continue, and I said that it was out of the deep friendship of the United States for Israel that we had made the recommendations which we believed would lead to a lasting peace in the Near East. I reiterated that what was necessary was a sincere desire by all the parties to bring about a genuine peace." (Memorandum of conversation, 501.BB Palestine/5–3149)

501.BB Palestine/5–2949 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT TEL AVIV, May 29, 1949—6 p. m.

PRIORITY

406. ReDeptel 322, May 28. During half hour conference (Ford also present) May 29 with Prime Minister and Foreign Minister at former's home they read slowly note from President. At end of reading Foreign Minister said "this grave note calls for considered answer which we shall prepare."

Prime Minister then expressed following: US is world power which helped us much before and after state set up. US has right to "have a say." But note ignores two fundamental facts:

1. November 29 resolution never carried out by UN, US or Middle East States. It contemplated two states, Israel and independent Arab Palestine, united by customs and other ties at peace with one another and neighbors. Prime Minister unable recall any strong action by US or UN to enforce November 29 or prevent aggression by Syria, Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq. Instead embargo encouraged aggressors against Israel whose very existence was in danger. Had Jews waited on US or UN they would have been exterminated. Israel was established not on basis November 29 but on that of successful war of defence. Hence note's suggestion is today unjust and unrealistic for it ignores war and continued Arab threats which make November 29 boundaries impossible.

2. Solution refugees can be considered only as part peace settlement. Arab States refuse make peace and on May 4, Israel's independence day, threatened renewal war. So long as this attitude persists refugees are potential enemies of Israel. If war were renewed could Israel appeal to US to send arms or troops for defence against refugees fighting on side of aggressors? Upon whom does US ask Israel to rely?

In impassioned conclusion "off the record" Prime Minister said: "US is powerful and we are weak; we could be destroyed; but we do not intend to commit suicide by accepting November 29 settlement in today's fundamentally changed conditions."

Comment: Manner of Prime Minister's response and unusual reticence of Foreign Minister indicated extreme seriousness their reception of President's note. When Prime Minister opined that this was strongest representation yet sent by US to Israel I agreed but otherwise made no comment. There is no grounds however, for confidence Israel will accept without substantial reservations fundamentals of US position. I anticipate Israel's formal reply soon. *End comment.*

McDONALD

501.BB Palestine/5–3149

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, May 31, 1949.]

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT, TUESDAY, MAY 31, 1949

NOTE TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT

I indicated to the President the substance of the reports we have received as to the reaction of the reaction of the Israeli Government to our recent note, and he expressed real interest. I feel very sure that he has no doubts as to the wisdom of the course being followed.

J[AMES] E.] W[EBB]

501.BB Palestine/5–3149 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET TEL AVIV, May 31, 1949—noon.

408. Herlitz[1] of Foreign Office at residence my invitation May 30 in an hour's informal talk said:

1. "Gaza plan" had been first suggested by Ethridge to Eytan. Then Israeli Cabinet after long debate voted, with two abstentions, to accept Gaza–Rafa strip and its 250,000 to 300,000 Arabs.
2. Egypt had privately indicated its willingness relinquish strip.
3. Task of repatriating and resettling on Israeli soil this "vast number" of Arab refugees was considered as "gigantic" involving "severe personal sacrifice all Israeli people".
4. Lausanne "was not on verge failure". Ethridge was "naturally impatient for results" but Arabs "not" preparing go home. On contrary they sending for families and renting homes Lausanne.
5. Foreign Office and Prime Minister hopeful that strong representation made by US to Israel was also being made to Arab states in appropriate form.

Comment. As Herlitz talked I remained silent feeling that Deptel 322, May 28, could not be strengthened by any commentary of mine. *End comment.*

MCDONALD

[1] Esther Herlitz, Acting Director of the American Division of the Israeli Foreign Office.

867N.01/5–3149 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED JERUSALEM, May 31, 1949—2 p. m.

388. Transjordan–Israel special committee met Jerusalem 29th and will meet again June 7. No progress made on major issues but agreement reached to permit Arabs harvest crops in lands of triangle given Israel for additional week.

Talks by ConGen with both Israel and Transjordan delegates show considerable pessimism as to possibility any progress. Bergman[1] states submit specific plan for exchange territory in north for Arab quarter in south but doubts Arab proposals will form acceptable basis for discussion.

Sent Department 388; repeated Geneva 17 for USDel PCC; pouched Arab capitals.

BURDETT

[1] Presumably Abraham Bergman, District Commissioner for Israeli Jerusalem.

501.BB Palestine/5–3149 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PARIS, May 31, 1949—7 p. m.

2202. Webb from Acheson. Bevin Conv Four. Bevin discussed Palestine question with me this morning. He referred to their conversations in New York with Bunche who had agreed they could supply small arms but said he could not go further pending conclusion Syria and Israeli armistice. Bunche had prepared draft for SC but not yet ready to submit it. Bevin chiefly concerned situation arising from Israeli claims to territory both sides upper Jordan which would give them complete control of all water resources. UK hopes for four-party agreement on water development permitting settlement 100,000 refugees and leaving adequate water for Israel. He suggested we secure help of Bank and perhaps Conciliation Commission to study common use of water under joint auspices. Bevin further amplified previous arguments regarding defense arrangements with Egypt and other countries. He emphasized they must have an agreement with Egypt if trouble comes. He had settled the question of water resources and was making progress on Sudan and Ethiopia. UK has sent Slim [1] and Egyptians have appointed three of their best people to discuss plans. Bevin thinks if he now lets Egyptians have such arms for training as he can properly send under Bunche's ruling, he could stall for a couple months before supplying other arms but would need to give some assurance further action within that time. Bevin thinks much depends on settling Syrian and Israeli difficulty. He is asking Schuman [2] to use his influence with Syria. UK ready to spend considerable sterling various refugee projects.

I told Bevin in very strict confidence that we had given stiff note to Israel and were awaiting their formal reply. I stressed necessity for avoiding any reference to our note. I emphasized our belief very important British avoid raising issue by sending arms while outcome this step of ours is awaiting.

Bevin considered this very helpful and then raised Transjordan question. Wright reported Transjordan received recent note from Israel maintaining demands for Syrian withdrawal, asserting Conciliation Commission had failed and requesting direct negotiations in Jerusalem between Transjordan and Israel parallel to Lausanne discussions. Abdullah told British he was defenseless but would be accused by other Arabs of going behind their backs if he agreed to Jerusalem talks. Bevin had not previously received this information but

[1] Field Marshal Sir William J. Slim, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff.
[2] Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister.

commented UK should tell him not to enter Jerusalem talks. If Israelis attack Arab Legion it would be serious new matter for UN. In such case Bevin would feel bound to release the munitions held at Amman and expressed hope US would agree he should do so although he would not release it unless Israelis first attack. Bevin added Abdullah has also asked their advice whether they should now incorporate Palestine territories which he is administering. Bevin would like to have them do this so their treaty would apply to these territories also. Wright said their legal people believed they could argue treaty applies now without incorporation on basis *de facto* administration. Bevin specifically requested our views on question Transjordan incorporation of territories and I told him I would secure word for him as soon as possible.[3] Bevin expressed sympathetic understanding US political problem in face of domestic pressures and strong desire to avoid any break in our common front. I answered affirmatively Wright's specific question whether we agreed they could go as far as Bunche's authorization re shipment of arms.

[ACHESON]

[3] In Telac 32, May 31, 4 p. m., to Secretary Acheson at Paris, the Department had speculated that Mr. Bevin might "inquire re US attitude on disposition central part of Pal now occupied by Transjordan troops. Dept's policy on this is to favor incorporation area in Transjordan. Suggest Bevin be so informed." (740.00119 Council/5–3049) Presumably, this telegram reached Secretary Acheson too late to be used in his conversation with Mr. Bevin.

867N.01/5–2649 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Transjordan

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 31, 1949—7 p. m.

69. In replying to King's letter subject ur 217 May 26 you shld state that there is no truth whatsoever in allegation that US rep PCC interested in no other problem but that of refugees. Inform King USG, as mem PCC and nation deeply interested in peace and stability Near East, diligently working for just and equitable solution of all problems involved in Pal situation and for success Lausanne talks. In furtherance establishment peace USG has heretofore approached both sides on several factors involved and will continue do so whenever believes such approaches constructive.

You shld express appreciation for King's views concerning US role in final Pal settlement and state USG determined vigorously seek equitable settlement within framework UN.

You shld tactfully remind King that US policy re arms established as result UN arms embargo. Express hope that continued peace in

Pal and progress toward final settlement may produce circumstances which will lead to UN decision lift embargo.

In conclusion you shld express appreciation for constructive attitude shown by Jordan re final Pal settlement and particularly for King's assurances concerning his peaceful intentions.

WEBB

501.BB Palestine/5–3149 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, May 31, 1949—7 p. m.

296. In event Syrian armistice case brought before SC we are considering desirability SC recommend parties submit dispute arbitration, naming Bunche arbitrator. Procedures looking toward persuasion of parties would have been exhausted by time case brought before SC and recommendation arbitration would seem appropriate. Parties will find some difficulty in rejecting proposal since armistice would not involve permanent territorial settlement.

Would appreciate your views and unless you see objection suggest you discuss this with Bunche.

WEBB

867N.01/5–3149 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 31, 1949—11 p. m.

Unpal 124. For USDel, Lausanne. Dept appreciates reasons for concern Jerusalem expressed Jerusalem tel 370 May 20 and Amman tel 215 May 24 and also substantial contribution these tels our understanding Jerusalem situation. Dept inclined to feel present procedures will not be productive results and that new approach desirable. Following suggestion draws on both reftels.

PCC might call upon both sides to accept its appointee as chairman Special Comite but with ultimate power as arbiter. Terms of reference would need definition which shld generally include territorial delimitations and public utilities in Jerusalem to extent solutions required in final peace settlement.

Appointee would have as first function serving as chairman Special Comite and assisting parties to reach agreement.

Second function would be to arbitrate any differences on which agreement not reached within agreed period.

As third function it would be understood that agreement of parties or arbitral award on matters covered by terms of reference would form basis corresponding section of PCC detailed proposals on Jerusalem.

In prelim discussions fol names have been suggested for Arbitrator: Charles De Visscher, Belgian Judge of ICJ, and Dr. Azcarate.

Your comments and those of Jerusalem and Amman are invited but you may take this suggestion before PCC, or individual members if you see fit.[1]

WEBB

[1] This telegram was repeated to Amman as 71 and to Jerusalem as 262. Mr. Ethridge replied, on June 3, that the American Delegation doubted the practicality of the procedure suggested in Unpal 124 "because it seems unlikely procedure could be completed before September GA. Agreement of Israel and Transjordan to change constitution of special committee and terms of reference and agreement re chairman-arbitrator would involve lengthy negotiations. . . . It therefore seems preferable follow procedure suggested in Palun 179." (telegram Palun 183 from Lausanne, 501.BB Palestine/6–349) Regarding Palun 179, see footnote 2, p. 1041.

Editorial Note

The short name "Transjordan" has hitherto been used in the *Foreign Relations* series to designate the territory ruled by King (formerly Emir) Abdullah. On June 1, 1949, there appeared in the *Jordanian Official Gazette* (No. 984) a notice by Prime Minister Tewfik Abul Houda, which, as supplied to the editors by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the Department of State, read as follows:

"It is to be remembered that the decision of the Houses of Parliament which was taken on May 25, 1946, and which declared the independence of this country said that the name of this Kingdom is the 'Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan'. The Jordan Constitution, published at the beginning of February, 1947, approved this decision. However, it is noticed that the name of Transjordan is still applied to this Kingdom, and certain people and official institutions still use the old name in Arabic and foreign languages, which makes me obliged to point out to all who are concerned that the correct and official name which should be officially used in all cases is: 'Al-Mamiakeh Al-Urdunieh Al-Hashemieh' and in English 'The Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan.'

"I beg the Minister of Foreign Affairs to inform all foreign legations in Amman, the Jordan legations in foreign countries, and the Secretary of the United Nations of this official name." (890i.01/6–149)

The editors, accordingly, have decided to use hereafter the short designation "Jordan" in the annotating of documents in the Series.

Yussef Haikal, the first Jordanian Minister to the United States, presented his credentials to President Truman on June 1; see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 12, 1949, page 765.

501.BB Palestine/6–149 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, June 1, 1949—10 a. m.

Actel 30.[1] For Rusk [2] from Jessup.[3] ReEmbtel 2202, May 31, Bevin Conversation 4.

Michael Wright last night supplemented and partially corrected Bevin's statements to Secretary on Palestinian question. First essential point UK position re Syrian-Israeli frontier is desirability agreement in principle before frontier fixed that water will be used for benefit four states under joint auspices. They worried American engineer Hayes project for local use water by Israel. UK thinks if agreement reached on equitable use of water both sides of actual frontier, the line will settle itself. They do not suggest UK or US express any opinion concerning location frontier.

Re arms supplies, Wright emphasized Bevin considers essential making some definite promise to Egyptians re future deliveries presumably after two-month interval as indicated reftel 2202.

Re Transjordan, Wright made British request more specific. They must give immediate advice to Abdullah on Jerusalem negotiation and on incorporation Palestine territories. They hope US representative would convey US views to Abdullah direct or that at least we would tell UK, first, whether we believe he should stick to Lausanne talks and refuse separate negotiations Jerusalem; second, whether we would approve incorporation Palestinian territories. If we do not approve immediate incorporation, do we have objection British announcing now theory stated reftel 2202 that they consider their treaty applies to the administered territories without incorporation. Of course, what they want is something to help Abdullah's morale short of supplying arms and ammunition. Wright suggested it would also be helpful if we could tell Abdullah we would take very serious view of resumption of fighting whether started by Israelis or by Arab Legion.

Wright stated Bevin further inquires whether we think it would be useful for Wright to go to Washington at time of Secretary's return to Department with view to further discussion Near Eastern questions.

Bevin dining privately with Secretary tonight. If you can send even partial replies any UK questions on any of points raised by Bevin, Secretary would be glad communicate information to him this evening.

Your niact Telac 32 [4] just received. Anything further still welcome. [Jessup.]

ACHESON

[1] As originally received in the Department of State this telegram was numbered 2218. It was subsequently corrected to Actel 30.

[2] Dean Rusk became Deputy Under Secretary of State on May 31.

[3] Ambassador at Large Philip Jessup, Alternate Member of the United States Delegation at the Sixth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

[4] Dated May 31, not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 1078.

501.BB Palestine/5–3149 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, June 1, 1949—1 p. m.
NIACT

Telac 38. Fol replies questions ur 2202 and 2218 May 31.[1]

1. Dept agrees re desirability agreement in principle before frontier delineation that water resources will be used benefit all states concerned. Will so inform Ethridge requesting his views re feasibility obtaining such agreement at Lausanne. Economic Survey Group which PCC plans activate near future wld resurvey water resources in question with view their equitable use by all states concerned for development and refugee settlement purposes.

2. Dept believes Abdullah shld not enter into reference separate conversations with Israel parallel to Lausanne talks, and is instructing Leg Amman so to advise King. According to info from Amman King has practically made up mind take same decision.

3. View Jordan now administering Pal territory Dept believes shld be feasible proclaim incorporation near future, with proviso re final boundary settlement at later date, but believes essential consult Ethridge before making final decision view possible effect on Lausanne talks. Also consulting Ethridge re extension Brit treaty to Pal territory and will advise urgently.[2]

4. Dept believes Wright visit Washington would be helpful. Would be interested learn what specific topics he would like discuss.

WEBB

[1] The latter is dated June 1; see footnote 1, p. 1081.

[2] These matters were raised with Mr. Ethridge in telegram Unpal 125, June 1, 7 p. m., to Lausanne (501.BB Palestine/6–149); its content closely paralleled that of telegram 72 to Amman of the same date, *infra*.

867N.01/5–3049 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Jordan[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY AMMAN, June 1, 1949—7 p. m.
NIACT

72. View Sassoon communication Abdullah asserting Lausanne talks have failed and requesting direct negotiations between Jordan and Israel parallel to Lausanne discussions, Dept desires you informally advise King US Govt believes Lausanne talks have by no means

[1] The Department transmitted the substance of this message to Jerusalem in telegram 263, June 1, 7 p. m., which was repeated to Tel Aviv as No. 330 (501.BB Palestine/6–149).

failed and it essential no party take action likely undermine discussions. Accordingly, US Govt in most friendly spirit desires suggest it would not be advisable for Jordan enter reference separate negotiations.[2] US Govt approves position taken by King and reported ur 222 May 30.

Dept desires your views urgently on fol.

Bevin has informed Secy Abdullah has asked UK advice whether he should now incorporate Pal territories administered by Jordan. Bevin would like have Jordan do this so that Brit treaty would apply these territories also. UK legal advisers believe they could argue treaty applies now even without incorporation on basis *de facto* administration. If US does not approve immediate incorporation, Brits desire know whether we object their announcing they consider UK–Jordan treaty applies to administered territory without incorporation. Bevin seeking something raise Abdullah's morale short of supplying arms and ammunition and would like US reply soonest.[3]

Dept urgently investigating legal implications.

WEBB

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[2] Mr. Rockwell, on June 16, analyzed the reasoning of the Department in sending telegram 72. His memorandum stated in part:

"Although no agreement had been reached at Lausanne, largely because of the rigidity of the Israeli position, the Department felt that Sassoon was totally incorrect in stating that the talks were a complete failure. The Department also believed that it was essential to give the strongest support to the Conciliation Commission, which was attempting to reach an equitable agreement between the parties and offered all the necessary facilities to the parties for reaching such an agreement. Under the circumstances, separate talks seemed totally unnecessary, and likely to lead to circumstances similar to those under which Transjordan was forced to give up considerable territory in order to achieve an armistice with Israel. Accordingly, the Department, in the interests of a just settlement, suggested to King Abdullah that he not enter the separate talks with Israel.

"An additional motive for the Department's approach to King Abdullah was the possibility that Israel and Transjordan, by negotiating together on the question of Jerusalem without the presence of the Conciliation Commission, might reach an agreement concerning the City which would disregard the international and Christian interests in Jerusalem and in the Holy Places."

Mr. Rockwell's memorandum was transmitted to Acting Secretary Webb in a memorandum of June 16 by Messrs. Rusk and Satterthwaite, which stated that "This matter has been taken up with Mr. Connelly and Mr. Niles at the White House by Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr." (867N.01/6–1649)

[3] Chargé Stabler, in reply on June 3, gave his view that "incorporation Arab Palestine in Transjordan at this stage would have adverse effect on Lausanne talks and on Palestine Arabs and would contribute to additional difficulties between Transjordan and certain Arab states. Moreover, I believe that US and UK, whose advice and support it would soon be known had been sought and obtained, would lay themselves open to criticism for countenancing action of this nature 'out of court'." However, to show some form of support to Abdullah, he saw "no reason United States Government should interpose any objection to British announcement that they consider UK–Transjordan Treaty applies to administration territory without incorporation," should the Department be satisfied that the arguments of the British legal advisers were sound (telegram 230, June 3, noon, from Amman, 867N.01/6–349).

867N.01/6–249

Memorandum, Presumably Prepared by Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup [1]

TOP SECRET PARIS, June 2, 1949.

In answer to a number of the points raised by Mr. Bevin with the Secretary and amplified by Mr. Wright to Mr. Jessup, the following preliminary comments can be made:

1. It is agreed that it would be desirable to secure agreement in principle before delineation of Israeli's frontiers that water resources will be used for the benefit of all states concerned.
2. It is agreed that Abdullah should not enter into the suggested separate conversations in Jerusalem parallel to the Lausanne talks, and the United States Legation at Amman has been instructed so to advise the King.
3. It is agreed that it would be feasible for Transjordan to proclaim the incorporation of the administered Palestine territory in the near future with a proviso regarding the final boundary settlement at a later date. However, final decision on this point and also on the advisability of announcing the extension of the United Kingdom Treaty to cover the administered territories is reserved pending further consultations now in progress.
4. Further details will be communicated by the United States Embassy in London to Mr. Wright.

[1] Secretary Acheson sent the text of this memorandum to the Department in his telegram Actel 35, June 3, 9 a. m., from Paris, with the statement that he had handed Mr. Bevin the memorandum "Today" (740.00119 Council/6–349).

501.BB Palestine/6–249 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, June 2, 1949—4 p. m.

395. Approach to Jerusalem settlement advanced in Deptel [Unpal] 124 to Lausanne [*Bern*] [1] appears excellent in principle. Would involve direct negotiations under PCC appointed chairman and mutual agreement between parties to greatest extent possible. Questions not agreed on to be arbitrated by chairman whose decision binding. Procedure should provide maximum satisfaction to local populations, solution disputed points with maximum equity and result conforming to UN resolution re Jerusalem. Terms of reference could be so defined that settlement could form part of PCC proposals for Jerusalem now under consideration and so limited that special committee would not conflict with Jerusalem sub-committee of PCC. Believe

[1] Dated May 31, p. 1079.

essential negotiators work on premise entire area of Jerusalem will be permanently demilitarized and neutralized. In addition to territorial delimitations and public utilities, committee should consider "right of passage" to such places as Scopus and holy places and "right of residence" by Jews and Arabs in each other's zone while intimately bound up with location territorial demarcation line. Account also should be taken of fact settlement reached would become part of permanent peace treaty and must fit into overall framework of treaty.

Necessary [to] estimate reactions parties directly involved.

[Here follow the estimates that Jordan would probably welcome the proposals, especially the provision for arbitration; that the Palestinian Arabs, with objections, would probably accept the proposals; and that the Israelis would likely be opposed, anticipating greater benefits by direct negotiations. There also follow personal comments on possible arbitrators.]

Sent Department 395, repeated Geneva 19 for USDel PCC, Amman 30.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/6–249 : Telegram

Mr. Mark F. Ethridge to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET LAUSANNE, June 2, 1949—4 p. m.

Palun 181. Consult Rusk for distribution.

1. Reftel 717, May 31.[1] I regret McDonald is apparently refraining from using his influence with Israeli Government to underline President's and Department's approved position regarding Palestine as set forth in Deptel 682, May 24. We need all help we can get, particularly in Tel Aviv.[2]

2. I also regret apparent importance which McDonald attaches to Herlitz' remarks. Miss Herlitz recent graduate Eytan's civil service school, is acting chief of North American Section of Foreign Affairs; and while it may be assumed she speaks officially, I doubt if as much weight may be given her remarks as those of Ben-Gurion, Sharett, Comay (all whom must be available in Tel Aviv) and Eytan.

3. In this connection, it is clear from record Ben-Gurion first mentioned Gaza strip proposal which was subsequently officially presented by Eytan in Lausanne (reference Paluns 133 April 20, 142 May 9, 160 May 20 and 162 May 21 [*23*] [3]).

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[1] Not printed: it repeated telegram 408, May 31, p. 1076.

[2] President Truman read the first paragraph of Palun 181 on June 13; for his reaction, see footnote 2, p. 1125.

[3] Palun 162 not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1036.

4. What is date and source of information Egypt willing relinquish Gaza strip? This has always been considered possible by me and some Arabs but chief of Egyptian delegation, who has spoken to me with greatest frankness, has never even hinted at it. Any possibility of developing this project at present was torpedoed by Eytan's release to press of official proposal to PCC. Egyptians could hardly be expected acquiesce under such circumstances.

5. No comment on point 3 with which I agree. I might add same problem confronts Arabs and UN as well.

ETHRIDGE

501.BB Palestine/6–249 : Telegram

Mr. Mark F. Ethridge to the Secretary of State

SECRET LAUSANNE, June 2, 1949—5 p. m.

Palun 180. For McGhee. Agree with proposals re refugees including survey group whose functions not clearly understood here when we recommended elimination. In light explanations consider most important.

Re commitments: Arab states assured me commitments re resettlement will be forthcoming when Israel makes her commitment re repatriation. Hopeful that will come about after Tel Aviv meetings now in progress. Eytan communicated my talk (Palun 174 [1]) to Tel Aviv and left last night for consultations there.

Re approach by mission: In view Arab statements, most useful time for approach would be after Israel has made her commitment. It will be, perhaps disappointing in that Israel will say if she cannot have Gaza strip she will take only small number refugees. In that event us both here and in Washington will have to insist on greater number but it will probably still be necessary to persuade Arabs take greater number than they now contemplate.

[Here follow two paragraphs, dealing with the composition of the survey group, said to be "excellent," and "next steps."]

Reservation: I have one important reservation to all proposals re refugees. We do not think any commitment should be made until it is clear that both Arabs and Jews are in process reaching agreement re territorial settlement. In other words, if interested powers are committed to liquidating refugee problem, territorial problem itself may remain unsolved because use [2] of intransigence of parties. Both refugee

[1] Identified also as telegram 821, May 28, from Bern, p. 1069.
[2] The editors suggest that the word "use" should not appear in the text.

and territorial problem should be solved simultaneously if possible in order increase possibility of successful solution.[3]

ETHRIDGE

[3] The Department of State replied on June 7, setting forth its agreement "re desirability simultaneous solution territorial questions and refugee problem, but desires underscore necessity for positive progress towards solution refugee problem near future, in view importance time element with respect to GA and Congress. We therefore hope will be possible activate Economic Survey Group soon as Israel and Arabs firm up respective commitments re willingness accept specific numbers refugees and indicate willingness accept and cooperate with Survey Group. Survey activities cld then proceed concurrently with negots for final territorial settlement." (telegram Unpal 137, 501.BB Palestine/6–249)

867N.20A/6–349

The Secretary of Defense (Johnson) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 3 June 1949.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: This is with further reference to your letter of 6 April 1949 concerning the provision of American technical assistance in the organization and training of the Israeli Army.

You will recall that on 30 April 1949, I forwarded an interim informal reply [1] to your letter in which I set forth the conclusions of a legal study by the Secretary of the Army of the questions involved, and stated that I was seeking the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on broad policy considerations that were involved. I now have the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and have, in addition, discussed this matter, among others, with Mr. Eliahu Elath, the Israelian Ambassador.

Based upon the legal study of the Secretary of the Army, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, my discussions with Mr. Elath and consideration of this general subject in my office, I believe the following factual conclusions may be stated in response to the several questions contained in your letter of 6 April 1949.

a. It would be impossible for a retired officer of the regular Army to participate as an individual in the provision of technical assistance in the organization of the Israeli Army. This follows from the provisions of Article I, Section 9, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution which forbid any person holding any office from accepting any emolument, office or title of any kind from any foreign government, or its other agencies or instrumentalities.

b. It would be legally possible for a Reserve officer not on active duty to accept a position with, or engage himself as, a military ad-

[1] Not printed.

viser to the Government of Israel, provided he did not actually enter the military service of Israel, and provided that such action did not at the time contravene that provision of the United States Code which states that any citizen of the United States who accepts and exercises a commission to serve a foreign government in war against any state with whom the United States is at peace shall be fined not more than two thousand dollars, or imprisoned for not more than three years, or both.

c. It would be possible for a Reserve officer not on active duty to resign his commission and accept a position with, or engage himself as, a military adviser to the Government of Israel, provided that such action was not at the time in violation of the aforementioned provision of the United States Code.

d. A military mission to Israel could be established by the President under the authority of the Act of 19 May 1926, as amended. The authority to take such action exists only "during war or declared emergency", but for the purposes of the particular law, World War II has not been terminated. Thus, although as indicated in your letter of 6 April 1949, permanent authority for the establishment of such a mission is lacking, interim authority does exist. Moreover, the draft of foreign military assistance legislation prepared by the Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee provides for the deletion of the clause quoted above so that this legislation, if enacted, would permit the establishment of such a military mission in peacetime.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion, and I concur, that from the standpoint of the National Military Establishment, the only suitable method of providing the kind of technical assistance requested would be through a military mission. Although legally possible, as indicated above, we do not think it advisable that this government should, in any wise, sponsor or support the acceptance by Reserve officers, or by Reserve officers who have resigned their commissions, of positions as military advisers to the Government of Israel. Therefore, if the Israeli Government should undertake to employ such individuals, it should be made abundantly plain that such employment is in no wise under the sponsorship of the United States Government, and that such individuals cannot be supplied with assistance or support of any kind by the National Military Establishment. The reasons for this position can be concisely stated: In the first place, we could not associate ourselves with any arrangement which attempted to establish a military mission by indirection at a time when, for reasons hereinafter discussed, the official establishment of such a mission would be inadvisable. In the second place, we believe it would be anomalous to have any element of expressed or implied United States Government sponsorship of such individuals in a situation where United States military control over such individuals was completely lacking.

Similarly, we do not believe it would be advisable at this particular time to establish a United States military mission to Israel, although such action might well be desirable at a later date. From a military standpoint, and as indicated in my letter to you of 16 May 1949,[2] it would be advantageous to foster the orientation of Israel to the United States. From a military point of view, however, this should not include the initiation of any action, such as the establishment of a military mission to Israel, which might expose the United States to the possibility of overt involvement in the Jewish-Arab conflict. Our strategic interests in the Middle East would certainly suffer if Israel should become involved in a resumption of the armed conflict with her neighbors after our establishment of a military mission with the Israeli Government. Consequently, any action of this kind would be inadvisable until after conditions with respect to Israel and the Arab League have become so stabilized that risk of further conflict in that area is remote. It should be added, moreover, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the Israeli Army is not presently in any dire need of foreign technical assistance in its organization and training.

Whenever conditions in the Middle East are stabilized, we are of the opinion that, should the Government of Israel still desire a military mission, the over-all question of military missions to the nations of the Middle East should be taken up with the British Government, in view of the fact that the United States and United Kingdom have generally similar security interests in this area. In addition, if such a military mission were to be established, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the view, in which I concur, that its personnel should consist of active duty officers, rather than retired officers.

In arriving at the foregoing conclusions. we have recognized that the policy of the United States Government toward Israel is one of friendly support, and our opinions with regard to the question of technical military assistance are, therefore, offered solely from the military point of view and without specific knowledge as to what the limits of present governmental policy may be. However, within these limitations, we recommend that definitive action on the Israeli request be deferred until stability in the Middle East area has been assured, and until, at that time, the British attitude on the larger question of technical military assistance to the various nations in that area has been explored.

Sincerely yours, LOUIS JOHNSON

[2] Not printed, but see the last paragraph of the enclosure to Secretary Johnson's memorandum of May 16 to Admiral Souers, p. 1012.

501.BB Palestine/6–249 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, June 3, 1949—7 p. m.

Telac 50. Ref para 3 Telac 38 June 1. View Ethridge negative reaction immediate incorporation Pal territory now administered by Jordan or extension Brit treaty to this territory (ref Palun 182 June 2 being rptd you[1]), Dept believes desirable inform Bevin US considers advisable no action be taken above two points present time. You may wish make available to Bevin Ethridge's opinions.[2]

WEBB

[1] As Telac 52, June 3, 7 p. m., not printed.

[2] Secretary Acheson, in reply from Paris on June 6, stated: "We communicated to Bevin today point[s] made Telac 50 repeating your reftels to Holmes in London requesting inform Michael Wright. Embassy London instructed to follow up on Wright visit Washington." (telegram Actel 44, 501.BB Palestine/6–649) Julius C. Holmes was Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom.

501.BB Palestine/5–2849 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 4, 1949—2 p. m.

Unpal 133. For USDel, Lausanne. For your info only, since USG regards refugee problem as overriding factor in determining eventual disposition Gaza strip (Palun 174 May 28), USG would approve incorporation area in Israel as part final territorial settlement provided this cld be achieved by negot with and full consent Egyptian Govt and provided territorial compensation made to Egypt according Pres' formula if Egypt desires such compensation. Event transfer to Israel, USG considers fol provisions wld be essential to safeguard refugees and residents Gaza strip: (1) clear and unequivocal assurances by Israeli Govt concerning acceptance refugees and resident population Gaza strip as legitimate cits Israel with same rights and same protection accorded Jewish cits, and Israeli Govt undertaking that its civil and military authorities will respect spirit and letter of such assurances; (2) provision for UN supervision of transfer of area and of subsequent status and treatment of population for appropriate period of time.

In opinion Emb Cairo (Palun 181 June 2) without consulting Egyptian auths, Egypt might well be willing cede Gaza strip to

[1] This telegram was repeated to London and Cairo.

Israel provided latter assumes refugee burden, since area wld ultimately become administrative and financial liability to Egypt. Azzam Pasha [2] (Cairo A–565 May 16 [3] rptd you) expressed similar views. Emb considers it probable Egyptian Govt wld reserve final decision until formal peace negots and wld use as bargaining point.

WEBB

[2] Secretary-General of the Arab League.
[3] Not printed.

501.BB Palestine/6–649 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 6, 1949—3 p. m.

Unpal 134. For USDel, Lausanne. In recent conversation in Dept Bunche expressed view that Middle East arms embargo should be lifted upon conclusion Syrian armistice. His proposed res (Palun 95)[1] intended to have this effect. In formulating its position on this question Dept would be interested in your views as to whether lifting the embargo would have any serious effect prospects achieve peaceful settlement Palestine conflict.[2]

WEBB

[1] Identified also as telegram 132, March 24, from Beirut, not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 869.
[2] Mr. Ethridge, in reply on June 8, stated: "USDel believes SC should discontinue certain provisions of outstanding resolutions including arms embargo following conclusion Israeli-Syrian armistice agreement. USDel does not believe such action would have serious effect on peaceful settlement. USDel hopes it will be possible avoid prolonged debate in SC on lifting embargo and that it will be handled as discontinuance of one of several provisions." (telegram Palun 187 from Lausanne, 501.BB Palestine/6–849)
The following day, the United States Mission at the United Nations gave its view that "it would be most unwise precipitously and completely to lift ME arms embargo in near future (re Unpal 134). A dangerous armaments race might result if all controls are taken off by SC and there is no agreement among principal potential arms suppliers. Arms sales should somehow be limited not only with regard to war potential but also having in mind economic burden and need for refugee assistance and economic development. There are too many warning signals to overlook, including current tense situation at demilitarized Government House, the frequent boastful military attitude of Israelis expressed in New York, Washington, and Israel. Some Arabs also obviously champing at the bit to secure arms and assume military posture. It seems almost certain that an uneasy situation will prevail in ME for long period, even assuming reasonably successful outcome of Lausanne discussions."
The Mission also gave its opinion that limited arms for police forces might be made available, noting that Mr. Bunche had approved at least one Egyptian application to purchase sidearms for police purposes (telegram 693 from New York, 501.BB Palestine/6–949).
Regarding the difficulties at Government House, see footnote 1, p. 1098.

501.BB Palestine/6–749

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 7, 1949.

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT, JUNE 7, 1949

ISRAELI PROPAGANDA IN PALESTINE CASE

I informed the President of the activities of certain agents of the Israeli Government and he requested me to stand completely firm in the position we have taken. If necessary, he is agreeable to the Department informing the Israeli Ambassador that, unless such activities cease, our note will be immediately released and the Department will take action to clear up any possible misunderstanding that has been created.

JAMES E. WEBB

711.00111 Armament Control/6–749 : Circular telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 7, 1949—6 a. m.

View UK desire permit supply certain quantities arms and ammunition to Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan and if necessary to other Arab states for internal security and training purposes, UK Govt recently approached US Govt re possibility lifting Near East arms embargo. Dept has informed Brit Emb that it is belief of US Govt that it would be untimely for UK to deliver "military equipment" to Arab states without change in SC truce res or without agreement of Bunche.

With regard to shipment of weapons and ammunition for internal police as opposed to military purposes, Dept suggested UK might wish discuss subject with Acting Mediator. Dept understands from Brits their reps subsequently approached Bunche and obtained his approval limited shipment of arms to Arab states for internal police purposes.

WEBB

[1] At Arab capitals and Ankara.

501.BB Palestine/6–349 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 7, 1949—8 p. m.

Unpal 139. For USDel, Lausanne. Dept has fol questions and comments on Palun 179 [2] and 183,[3] Jlem 19, Jun 2,[4] and Amman 15, Jun 4.[5]

Your endorsement in Palun 170 [*179*] of "limited agreement" mentioned Jlem tel 370, May 20, appears to refer second suggestion that tel. We have two queries as to this. First, we are not clear as to procedure evnvisioned for reaching such agreement. Agreement of this scope appears to come within terms reference existing special comite which seems unable make progress. Second, as stated in Jlem tel, this proposal does not contain principal pt [*point?*] demanded by Arabs. We accordingly need further clarification as to how this solution cld be brought about.

It was existing impasse that led to Depts suggestion that parties be called upon adopt new procedure involving slightly altered terms reference explicitly including territorial adjustments. Suggestion wld be based upon need peaceful solution, failure efforts negot agreement, and offer impartial procedure which wld result solution based on equity and having backing internatl community. Admitting one or both parties might reject procedure, they wld nevertheless find this difficult in face argument just mentioned and their reaction and arguments might themselves pt way further proceedings.

A possible compromise resulting from such suggestion might be that suggested Amman reftel which basically similar except for omission arbitral function. Wld seem preferable attempt arbitration and if impossible recede this position.

Amman suggestion in Legtel 215, May 24, that special comite be adjourned and that Lausanne conference deal with Jlem as whole wld be acceptable if PCC has necessary technical info and if it desires take on negot added problem on which previous negots unsuccessful.[6]

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Jerusalem and Amman.

[2] Identified also as telegram 829, May 31, from Bern, not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1041.

[3] Dated June 3, from Lausanne, not printed.

[4] This was a repeat of telegram 395, June 2, from Jerusalem, p. 1084.

[5] This was a repeat of telegram 233, June 4, 3 p. m., not printed, but see footnotes 3 and 4, p. 1108.

[6] In reply on June 13, Mr. Hare set forth the belief of the United States Delegation that it would be "premature for PCC take on Jerusalem problem in absence of agreement on general Palestine question." (telegram Palun 200 from Lausanne, 501.BB Palestine/6–1349)

Dept appreciates considerations Palun 183 but envisions PCC wld make proposal including broadly stated terms reference and suggestion high caliber arbitrator. Parties shld indicate acceptance or rejection rather quickly or time limit cld be set. If acceptance conditioned on modification terms reference or selection arbitrator, these cld be taken up expeditiously and if not successful project cld be dropped. Time limit cld also be set for conclusion proceeding. In view reaction Jlem and Amman we withdraw suggestion Azcarate but think Judge ICJ wld be appropriate since Court in adjournment until fall. In addition De Visscher, Judge Klaestad of Norway wld seem appropriate choice.

Dept continuing maintain open position this question and invites comments.

WEBB

501.BB Palestine/6–849

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 8, 1949.

I called Mr. Ethridge at Mr. Rusk's suggestion to explain the difficulties we are encountering in finding a successor and to ask if he would be good enough to remain in Lausanne a few days longer in order to enable us to make final arrangements about a successor. This, we thought, might make it possible for him to complete the present phase of the talks.

Mr. Ethridge said first before replying he wanted to report on developments there. Mr. Eytan returned about an hour ago and immediately released a copy of an article in today's Palestine *Post* under the by-line of its diplomatic correspondent. Eytan has requested that copies of this article be circulated tonight. The gist of this article is that it can be stated authoritatively that in spite of impressions to the contrary there has been absolutely no change in the policy of the Israeli Government with respect to the questions of boundaries and refugees and that nothing has happened to alter the attitude of the Israeli Government in the slightest.

Mr. Ethridge said that he is seeing Eytan in about one hour. The Arab delegations have asked to see him tomorrow morning about the Jerusalem situation. Fawzi el Mulki has told him that unless the Israeli troops are withdrawn from the neutral zone surrounding the Government House it will be impossible for him to carry on any further conversations.

Mr. Ethridge then went on to explain that he and his staff were at the moment considering making the following suggestions to the Department. If I understood them correctly in spite of a very bad connection it was to the effect that the Commission propose an adjournment to mid August, when it would meet again at Lake Success. In the meantime a small staff would be retained which would be available to the parties if they had further suggestions. In this case Mr. Ethridge could, of course, continue as U.S. Representative.

Mr. Ethridge has already cabled the text of the Palestine *Post* article. He did not indicate that he would be cabling the foregoing suggestion to us now. Rather he requested that we phone him at 11 o'clock tomorrow morning our time (4 p. m. Lausanne time). He apparently feels that in all probability the talks will "blow up" tomorrow.

With reference to our request that he stay on a few days, he said that he would, of course, if necessary although it would be inconvenient for him. Since Hare has full information concerning all aspects of the problem, he seemed to feel that Hare could tie up the loose ends as well as he.

Mr. Ethridge also reported that Mr. Sassoon has told many people in Lausanne about our note. Cy Sulzberger [1] is about to arrive in Lausanne and will no doubt hear about the note. Mr. Ethridge does not intend, of course, to discuss the matter with Sulzberger. He does, however, intend to give him background information concerning the situation in view of the fact that Sassoon has been talking so freely. I said that we would, of course, have no objections to this.

[1] A reporter for the *New York Times*.

501.BB Palestine/6–849 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 8, 1949—11 a. m.

344. Dept gathered from conversation with Shiloah June 6 that Israeli Govt is under impression that note which Pres recently directed be delivered Tel Aviv was in large part motivated by Israeli offer at Lausanne to take Gaza strip and refugees therein. Shiloah said Govt was "astonished that it should be accused of territorial expansionism" because of this offer.

[1] This telegram was repeated to Bern for the American Delegation at Lausanne.

Pls take earliest opportunity disabuse appropriate Israeli officials this misconception, leaving no doubt in their minds that dispatch of note was occasioned by rigid Israeli position, as set forth by Eytan, on refugee question and overall territorial settlement, despite reiterated US suggestions these matters arising out of concern for peace and stability NE and based on principles fairness and equity.

With regard to Gaza strip, state that US sees no reason why area might not be incorporated Israel as part final territorial settlement provided this cld be achieved by negot with and full consent of interest Govts and providing equitable territorial compensation made to those Govts if desire such compensation.

WEBB

501.BB Palestine/6–849 : Telegram

Mr. Mark F. Ethridge to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED LAUSANNE, June 8, 1949—11 a. m.

Palun 188. Information contained Deptel 727, June 2 [1] is further evidence Israeli tactics revealed Palun 184 [2] toward objective breaking up Lausanne Conference and blaming PCC. PCC has made it clear it would welcome direct talks if parties would consent. All delegations on PCC including particularly USDel have encouraged direct talks. Thus far, however, Arabs have refused because Israel's unyielding position and because first private meetings between Israelis and Arabs were released by Israelis to press. Basic reasons for failure of either direct or indirect talks are those outlined in Palun's 174 and 175.[3]

Specific instances Israeli misrepresentations are:

1. Paragraph 2 reftel is similar attacks in Israeli press designed discredit PCC. Boisanger has been to Paris; Yalcin to London but PCC has continued to meet and delays have usually been attributable to failure either side make or answer reasonable proposals. For example Israeli Government has not yet given complete answers to Arab proposals regarding urgent measures first broached early April and again confirmed recently (Palun 166).[4]

2. Each sentence in Paragraph 3 is inaccurate even including statement Arabs and Jews have been slipping off to Paris to talk. Arabs

[1] Sent to Bern for Mr. Ethridge, not printed; it gave excerpts from telegram 668, June 1, 7 : 45 p. m., from New York, not printed, describing a conversation by John C. Ross with Messrs. Eban and Shiloah the same day. (Nos. 727 and 668 are both filed under 501.BB Palestine/6–149)

[2] Dated June 4, 11 a. m., from Lausanne, not printed.

[3] Identified also as telegrams 821 and 822, May 28, from Bern, pp. 1069 and 1071, respectively.

[4] Dated May 23, from Lausanne, p. 1044.

assure me Sassoon has undertaken to lure them away but they will not play his game as he promises nothing. He has however, been in contact with Abdullah through Paris (reference Palun 184).

3. First sentence Paragraph 4 is generally untrue. There has been no divergence views between members PCC. As to second sentence Arabs have not yet reached stage of discussing territorial compensation officially. Private conversations with them indicate, however, their eventual acceptance necessity therefor.

4. Arabs have thus far refused consider Israeli territorial proposals including Gaza strip project pending constructive action by Israelis regarding refugees. Arabs privately consider Israeli Gaza strip project unacceptable as it trades refugees for territory.

It is most unfortunate that an already difficult task should be complicated by inaccurate reports. Although Sassoon with whom have discussed these reports denies sending Shiloah such information, I have impression both Sassoon and Shiloah are deliberately muddying the waters.

ETHRIDGE

867N.01/6–849 : Telegram

The Chargé in Jordan (Stabler) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET AMMAN, May 8 [*June 8*], 1949—11 a. m.

236. Legtel 217, May 26. During call on King this morning I asked him whether there had been any further developments re Sassoon's message. HM indicated that Transjordan Minister Paris had been instructed to reply to Sassoon's message that Transjordan Government considered Israel's demand that Transjordan troops leave Palestine without prejudice to Transjordan rights in Arab Palestine and that while Transjordan interested in reaching peace agreement it not interested in direct negotiations. (Foreign Minister had earlier told me that Transjordan Government had summarily rejected Sassoon's proposal.) In reporting his talk with Sassoon as result above instructions, Transjordan Minister Paris said Sassoon had proposed that Transjordan and Israel agree on peace terms calling for following boundaries: (*a*) Northern and southern boundaries to follow old international frontiers; and (*b*) East-West boundary to follow present armistice lines with adjustments in Jerusalem and Latrun areas. Israel unwilling give up any area it now holds, but would be willing consider return certain refugees to Ramle and Lydda which would remain under Israeli sovereignty. King said this of course not acceptable.

At this point, I conveyed to HM Department's views as expressed in Deptel 72, June 1. King listened attentively and indicated his

agreement these views. However, he pointed out that there are only two courses of action to be followed in settling Palestine question—either peace or war. HM does not want war and is desirous of reaching peace settlement. But if US unable to bring about just and reasonable peace, then US must not deny him right to have arms and ammunition for self-defense. He reiterated that US could be sure that these arms and munitions would be used for self-defense only.

HM then referred to Israeli attack evening June 6 in "Hill of Evil Counsel" area Jerusalem [1] as evidence Israeli intentions not peaceful. He expressed concern re possibility Israelis planned take further aggressive action Jerusalem. Transjordan Government had requested Gen. Riley come to Jerusalem and he expected there this morning.

(King's Chamberlain later said special committee meeting scheduled for June 7 had been called off pending settlement situation growing out of Israeli attack.)

Sent Department 236, repeated Bern 16 (for USDel PCC), Jerusalem 112.

STABLER

[1] Chargé Stabler, on June 8, reported information from Jordanian sources that an Israeli detachment had moved into the Arab College and Agricultural School near Government House and had placed minefields and barbed wire along the northern and western approaches to Government House and that General Riley had referred the matter to Mr. Bunche as a violation of the Israeli-Jordanian Armistice. Similar sources also informed the Chargé that a number of shooting incidents had occurred in the triangle area. Mr. Stabler "strongly" recommended that the Department urge restraint on the Israeli Government and that the Conciliation Commission hasten implementation of the proposed plan of action regarding the Special Committee, lest peace in Jerusalem become problematical (telegram 238 from Amman, 501.BB Palestine/6–849). Regarding the proposed plan, see Unpal 133, June 4, to Bern, p. 1090.

The Department, on June 10, expressed to the U.S. Delegation at Lausanne its serious concern about the Chargé's report and "strongly" urged it to "consider possibilities PCC exerting control over this situation before recess." (Unpal 143 to Bern, 501.BB Palestine/6–1049) Mr. Hare replied, on June 13, that "USDel does not believe PCC is either in practical or official position to exert control over situation referred to in Unpal 143. . . . PCC has neither the organization at Lausanne or Jerusalem to handle such matter. Even if PCC could handle, GA resolution December 11 makes no provision for its jurisdiction of matters arising under truces or armistices pending transference such function by SC to PCC." (Palun 199 from Lausanne, 501.BB Palestine/6–1349)

Consul Burdett, on June 8, advised that Israeli seizures near Government House "now considered by Consulate General serious and carefully planned Israeli move" and that the Arabs had immediately protested to the United Nations and had stated that they would not attend further meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission until Israeli troops were withdrawn. Mr. Burdett expressed himself as being "convinced strongest measures should be taken to force withdrawal Israeli troops from Govt House area. UN now faced with complete cessation negotiations in Jerusalem and probable repercussions at Lausanne. . . . fact Israel able carry through such move with impunity will only make final settlement much more difficult by demonstrating again to Arabs unwillingness UN curb Israel and by enticing Israel to further such acts." (telegram 402 from Jerusalem, 867N.01/6–849)

501.BB Palestine/6–849 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET LONDON, June 8, 1949—1 p. m.

2205. 1. Substance Paris' 367, June 6 delivered June 7 to Michael Wright (see Telac 50 and Telac 52).[1]

2. Wright said UK will make no move for time being re extension British treaty but that it would have to watch situation from day to day. Foreign Office most anxious learn (*a*) Israeli reply US *démarche* mentioned by Secretary (paragraph two Paris' 2202, June 2 [*May 31*] to Department), and (*b*) possible steps Lausanne by Israelis (paragraph one Palun 182, June 2).

3. Re steps by Transjordan towards incorporation. Wright said he thought British Ambassador Kirkbride Amman would be able steady situation since he has been authorized tell Abdullah that UK will supply internal security arms (paragraph one Amman's 234. June 6 to Department [2]). Arms supply will begin next week along lines paragraph three, Embassy's 2177, June 3.[3] Bevin excised from list some additional "doubtful items" in order conform strictly Bunche concept.

4. Re Ethridge observation Palun 182 that UK probably considers Negev gone anyhow, Wright said Foreign Office very much in dark re developments Lausanne and very conscious deep Transjordan discouragement re Israel. Nevertheless Foreign Office continues to hope that pressure upon Israel to make territorial concessions Negev would be successful because in British eyes importance land communication between Egypt and Transjordan is in no way lessened.

5. Wright asked time formulate thoughts re visit Washington which in any case will be impractical before return Sir William Strang [4] from Middle East June 18.

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[1] These telegrams to Paris are dated June 3. The former is printed on p. 1090; the latter, not printed, repeated the text of Palun 182, June 2, from Lausanne. No. 182 contained Mr. Ethridge's view that unilateral incorporation of Arab Palestine by Jordan "would probably provoke Israelis to take same action as to all territories they occupy and freeze situation as it is. That would effectively put off any concession in Negeb or elsewhere. British probably feel Negeb is gone anyhow and they are undertaking to protect Transjordan in negotiations on Arab Palestine. But, from American point of view, we are still pressing for concession in Negeb. Until we get a yes or no on that seems to US Delegation that we should not encourage any action that would prejudice American policy." (501.BB Palestine/6-249)

[2] Not printed; in paragraph one, Mr. Stabler reported information conveyed to him on June 4 by British Ambassador Kirkbride that as a "result Anglo-American talks British Government has decided to supply 'internal security arms' to Jordan, Iraq and Egypt." (890i.24/6–649)

[3] Not printed; this paragraph stated that "Small arms and small arms ammunition only would be involved at this stage." (867N.113/6–349)

[4] Permanent Under Secretary in the British Foreign Office.

Sent Department 2205, repeated Paris 405 (for Secretary), Bern 55 (for Ethridge and Hare).

HOLMES

867N.01/6–849 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT TEL AVIV, June 8, 1949—6 p.m.

439. Personal attention of President and Acting Secretary. Current press reports from Washington, New York, and Lausanne tend confirm judgment Israeli officials (given me privately, see Embtel 429, June 7 [1]) that United States is moving towards policy which will ask of this country surrender of at least portion southern Negev as "compensation" for its retention of territories Israeli armies have conquered outside November 29 partition area.

Though Department has given no specific indication that demand for surrender of Negev tip is its policy, I can see no other territory to which this insistence could be logically applied. From point of view of American and British strategic interests it would be advantageous if Britain could be guaranteed land bridge (either through Transjordan or Egyptian occupation) from Sinai desert to Transjordan; and only such possible bridge is, of course, southern Negev.

Two considerations should, however, I think give us pause before Department and President commit themselves irretrievably to this policy.

1. I am as convinced, as I have ever been of anything, that Israeli Government will not yield any portion of southern Negev unless forced do so; and this force will have to be military force or such a degree of economic pressure as would be tantamount to war.

2. In its resistance to giving up southern Negev tip, Israel would have at least full moral support of Soviet Union.

New subject: Reply President's note (Deptel 322, May 28) promised for this afternoon.

MCDONALD

[1] Not printed.

501.BB Palestine/6–849 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY NIACT WASHINGTON, June 8, 1949—7 p. m.

347. Fol is draft article on Israeli-Syrian armistice demarcation lines which Bunche has instructed Mohn and Vigier to deliver Tel Aviv and Damascus.

"1. In view of the fact that the question of territorial settlement is one of the matters being dealt with in consultations with the UN Conciliation Commission now taking place at Lausanne, it is emphasized that the following arrangements for the armistice demarcation lines between the Israeli and Syrian Armed Forces are not to be interpreted as having any relation whatsoever to ultimate territorial arrangements affecting the two parties to this agreement.

2. The armistice demarcation line herein defined is in response to the request of the SC in its resolution of 16 November 1948, and without prejudice to the rights, positions, interests and claims of either party to this agreement. In pursuance of the spirit of the SC resolution, the armistice demarcation line has been defined with a view toward separating the armed forces of the two parties in such manner as to minimize the possibility of friction and incident.

3. The armistice demarcation line shall be delineated on the map attached to this agreement as annex (blank). Where the existing truce lines as certified by the UN truce supervision organization run along the recognized international boundary between Syria and Palestine, the armistice demarcation line shall follow the boundary line. Elsewhere, the armistice demarcation line shall follow a line midway between the certified truce lines for the Israeli and Syrian forces.

4. The armed forces of the two parties shall nowhere advance beyond the armistice demarcation line.

5. A. Where the armistice demarcation line does not correspond to the international boundary between Syria and Palestine, the area between the armistice demarcation line and the boundary, pending final territorial settlement between the parties, shall be established as a demilitarized zone from which the armed forces of both parties shall be totally excluded, it being understood that the Ein Gev and Dadara sectors shall also be included in the demilitarized zone.

B. The purpose of the demilitarized zone shall be to safeguard the territorial claims, positions and interests of both parties pending final territorial settlement and to separate widely the armed forces, while providing for the gradual restoration or normal civilian life in the area of the zone without prejudice to the ultimate settlement.

C. Any advance by the armed forces of either party into any part of the demilitarized zone, when confirmed by the UN representatives, shall constitute a flagrant violation of this agreement.

D. The chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission established in article (blank) of this agreement and United Nations observers attached to the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring the full implementation of this article.

E. The withdrawal of such armed forces as are now found in the demilitarized zone shall be in accordance with the schedule of withdrawal annexed to this agreement and in any case shall be completed within ten weeks from the date on which this agreement is signed.

F. The chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be empowered to authorize the return of civilians to villages and settlements in the demilitarized zone and the employment of limited numbers of locally recruited civilian police in the zone for internal security purposes, and shall be guided in this regard by the schedule of withdrawal referred to in sub-paragraph (E) of this article.

6. On each side of the demilitarized zone there shall be areas, as defined in annex (blank) to this agreement, in which defensive forces only shall be maintained, in accordance with the definition of defensive forces set forth in annex (blank) to this agreement." [1]

WEBB

[1] This telegram was repeated to Damascus. The Department of State, in telegram 238, June 8, 6 p. m., to Damascus, expressed its belief that the Bunche "proposal is most practical solution current difficulties and desires you take earliest opportunity strongly urge FonMin or PrimMin in your discretion to accept proposal. You shld state USG has instructed you make this approach in sincere belief proposal is real contribution to lasting peace in Pal and will remove one major obstacle in way of final settlement." (501.BB Palestine/6–849)

Telegram 238 was repeated as No. 346 to Tel Aviv for action. Minister Keeley, on June 15, conveyed the sense of telegram 238 to Prime Minister Zaim. The latter stressed "Syrian willingness continue armistice negotiations and said he had instructed Syrian delegation to show greatest possible compromising spirit since . . . he is sincerely anxious to reach satisfactory *modus vivendi* with Israeli at earliest possible date." Mr. Keeley cautioned, however, that "stalemate likely unless some means can be found to restore Syrian faith in UN ability to control Israeli without which Syrian Government will understandably be reluctant to make concessions that could have domestic repercussions embarrassing to it but which may be necessary to reach agreement with Israel." (telegram 327, June 16, 8 a.m., from Damascus, 767N.90D/6–1649)

501.BB Palestine/6–849

The Government of Israel to the Government of the United States [1]

TOP SECRET [TEL AVIV,] June 8, 1949.

The Government of Israel has given very careful and serious study to the note delivered by the American Ambassador in Tel Aviv on May 29, 1949. While deeply appreciating the keen personal interest taken by the President of the United States in the fortunes of Israel and the Middle East, the Government of Israel regrets that the terms of the note appear to be based on a misunderstanding of the position adopted by the Government of Israel and by its delegation at Lausanne.

The Government of Israel cannot possibly accept the contention that its line has been "to reject the basic principles set forth by the Resolution of the GA of December 11, 1948". The cardinal injunction of that resolution is the call made in Article 5 upon the governments concerned "to seek agreement by negotiations, conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly, with a view to the final settle-

[1] Transmitted to the Department by Tel Aviv in telegram 441, June 8, midnight, which began as follows: "ReDeptel 322 May 28. Foreign Minister handed me following reply, dated June 8, to President's note at residence at 9 p. m. today:

"Excellency, I am directed by the Prime Minister to request you to transmit the following communication to the President of the United States:"

Telegram 441 ended with: "Signed Moshe Sharett, Minister Foreign Affairs."

ment of all questions outstanding between them." This course the Government of Israel has consistently pursued. It has continually and on its own initiative made direct approaches, before and during the Lausanne Conference, to representatives of Arab states with a view to exploring the possibility of peace negotiations. It has given its full cooperation to the Conciliation Commission for the purpose of effecting a comprehensive peace settlement. The Government of Israel is satisfied that Mr. Eytan and his colleagues have actively and unswervingly followed this line.

If today the position at Lausanne is one of virtual stalemate, this is due entirely to the attitude adopted in concert by the Arab states concerned. Their delegations have persistently refused even to meet the delegation of Israel under the Commission's auspices. None of them has declared itself willing to discuss outstanding problems in the context of a lasting peace settlement. All the concrete suggestions and the offers made by the Israeli Delegation through the Commission have so far remained unanswered. In these circumstances the Government and people of Israel would deeply resent any suggestion that a rupture in the conversations, if it should occur, would be due to Israel's "rigid attitude". In the face of this contrast between Israel's continued readiness to negotiate peace and the Arab states' obstinate refusal to do so, the Government of Israel is perplexed by the expression of concern on the part of the United States Government "lest Israel now endanger the possibility" of arriving at a peaceful settlement.

As for the general attitude of the Government of Israel to the provisions of the GA Resolution of December 11, 1948, it may be pointed out that it was to elucidate this very subject that the representative of Israel was invited to appear before the *Ad Hoc* Political Commission [*Committee*] on May 5, 1949.[2] The Government of Israel had instructed Mr. Eban to set forth fully its views on all points at issue and it may be deduced from Israel's subsequent admission to the membership of the UN that his explanation—all of them strictly in relation to the December Resolution—were considered satisfactory by the GA.

The US Government is criticizing the attitude of Israel on two specific counts: (1) The final territorial settlement; (2) the solution of the Arab refugee problem.

On the first count, what appears to be a factual misconception should first be eliminated. The Government of Israel is at a loss to understand the reference in the note to the alleged contemplation by

[2] See footnote 2, p. 979.

Mr. Eytan of "an additional acquisition of further territory within Palestine". The only suggestion for any such extension of Israel territory—viz. for the incorporation within it of the Gaza–Rafa area with all its present Arab population, including the refugees—came not from the delegation of Israel but from Mr. Ethridge, the US member of the Conciliation Commission.

On the main issue of Israel's boundaries, the Government of Israel is fully aware of the view expressed by the US representatives in the UN and at Lausanne that Israel should be expected to offer territorial compensation for any areas acquired by it beyond the boundaries laid down in the GA Resolution of November 29, 1947. The Government of Israel must respectfully point out that this view does not represent a UN policy. It forms no part of the Resolution of December 11, 1948. On the contrary, a proposal to introduce into that Resolution a provision for the giving-up by Israel of an area in the Negev in return for Western Galilee was rejected by the Assembly. Paragraph 5 of the Resolution, quoted above, left the field open for a territorial settlement between the parties completely unprejudiced by any a priori principle.

The principle of territorial compensation, related to the 1947 award, is one which the Government of Israel cannot accept. That territorial award was based on a series of assumptions which failed to materialize. The hopes of peaceful implementation were erased by the Arab revolt from within and the Arab invasion from without. The Arab state of Palestine and the economic union did not come into being. The Resolution of November 1947 was indeed a source of tremendous encouragement to the Jewish people, and the part played by the US in promoting its acceptance by the Assembly will never be forgotten. Yet in the decisive struggle which preceded and followed the termination of the British mandate, the Resolution itself proved of little avail. The state of Israel evolved out of chaos and bloodshed. It had to uphold its integrity and independence alone and unaided, fighting against overwhelming odds. Nothing has occurred to invalidate the justice of the assignment to Israel of the areas included in the Jewish state by the 1947 Resolution. On the other hand, the war has proved the indispensability to the survival of Israel of certain vital areas not comprised originally in the share of the Jewish state. In his report to the GA, the late UN Mediator as long ago as last September stated: "The constant question—is not whether it may be advisable to review and revise the Resolution of November 29, 1947. It has already been outrun and irrevocably revised by the actual facts of recent Palestine history". In any case, the Government of Israel cannot agree that the act of aggres-

sion committed by the Arab states in defiance of the Charter and of the GA calls for a territorial reward.

On the question of Arab refugees, the Government of Israel feels bound to restate the basic facts of the situation. It was never part of the Jewish design to force Arabs out of the country. The Jewish authorities accepted the plan of November 29, 1947, in full knowledge that it entailed the presence within the Jewish state of a very considerable Arab population. They were ready to mold the administrative structure and economic policy of the state accordingly. What produced the Arab exodus was the war on Israel. The exodus was partly spontaneous, partly decreed from above by Arab leaders and commanders. The population which fled was that from the midst of which the first murderous attacks on the Jews were launched. The alleged menace to its future was invoked by the aggressors in justification of their invasion of Palestine from outside. The refugees are thus members of an aggressor group defeated in a war of its own making. History does not record any case of large-scale repatriation after such experience.

Moreover, the exodus has wrought a profound change in the ethnic pattern and economic structure of Israel. What was to have been started as an almost equally balanced Jewish-Arab country has become an overwhelmingly Jewish society. The Arab economy lies in ruins. All the energies of Israel are focused on the absorption of the large-scale immigration now in progress, the task which so largely motivated the UN Resolution on Palestine and in particular its support by the UN. New social and economic processes are gathering momentum in Israel, and the wheel of history cannot be turned back. It is inconceivable that the Government of Israel should find itself able to undertake in one and the same breath the absorption of mass Jewish immigration and the reintegration of returning Arab refugees. Both are problems of resettlement involving stupendous efforts on the part of the state and the double burden is far more than Israel can bear. Nor are the returning Arab refugees likely to feel, in the long run, happy and secure in the new setting.

Israel is by no means unmindful of the humanitarian aspect of the problem. It has gone much further than many other nations when faced with a similar situation. It has declared itself ready to pay compensation for land abandoned, to reunite families separated by the war, and generally to make its contribution to the solution of the problem by resettlement. Such a contribution must needs be limited by two compelling considerations; first, national security, and second, economic feasibility. Israel cannot in the name of humanitarianism be driven to commit suicide. Nor can Israel be forced to adopt methods

of rehabilitation which would be economically ruinous and self-defeating.

In its earnest desire to approximate its policy on Arab refugees as closely as possible to the terms of the Resolution of December 11, 1948, the Government of Israel has gone as far as the self-preservation of the state of Israel would permit. That trend has been given full expression in the statements of Mr. Eban to the *Ad Hoc* Political Commission [*Committee*] and of Mr. Eytan to the Conciliation Commission. May it be recalled that the December Resolution does not provide for repatriation in absolute terms. It states in paragraph 11 that "the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date". It is submitted that practicability must primarily be tested by the touchstones of security and economic realism.

Certain limited, though not negligible measures of repatriation have actually been carried through in recent months and others are under urgent consideration. Anything more substantial, if it should at all prove feasible on economic grounds, must await the restoration of peace. The security consideration is here paramount. Israel received no armed assistance from the UN when it fought for its very existence and it would be idle for it to rely on such help in the future.

The Government of Israel earnestly trusts that on further consideration of the problem the US Government will agree that the Arab states cannot have it both ways by explicitly declaring, on the one hand, that it is not part of their purpose to conclude peace with Israel, and demanding, on the other hand, an immediate solution of the refugee problem at the expense of Israel. The exodus is a direct consequence of their criminal invasion. They should not be allowed to shirk their crucial responsibility and to represent the plight of the refugees as an isolated phenomenon, artificially torn out of its real context. The Government of Israel observes with deep satisfaction that the US Government shares its view "that the final settlement of the problem of refugees must await a definitive peace settlement". But as long as the Arab states do not evince any readiness even to discuss peace, any significant measure of repatriation is clearly impracticable. The Government of Israel is conscious of no conflict between this attitude and the principles of the Charter, which seeks to guarantee a secure existence to all peace-loving nations.

The Government of Israel regards the friendship of the Government and people of the US as an asset of Israel's foreign relations than which none is higher in value. It hopes that the consideration of the present reply will restore the sympathetic understanding of the US Government for the problems and anxieties facing Israel.

501.BB Palestine/6–949

Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 9, 1949.

Subject: Israeli Reply to United States Note.

Discussion:

Telegram No. 441 of June 8 from Tel Aviv [2] conveys the reply of the Israeli Government to the note which the President directed Ambassador McDonald to deliver to Prime Minister Ben Gurion.

The reply in effect rejects the cardinal points of the United States note concerning the territorial settlement and disposition of the Arab refugee problem. It states that the United States position on the territorial question does not represent a policy of the United Nations and that the Government of Israel cannot accept the principle of territorial compensation related to the 1947 boundaries. With regard to the refugees, the note repeats the familiar arguments blaming the Arab states for the plight of these people and stating the reasons why in the opinion of the Israeli Government it is impossible for a large number of refugees to return to their homes. The note maintains that Israel has gone as far as it is possible for it to go under the present circumstances in regard to repatriation and reiterates the position that nothing more can be done until a final peace settlement is reached.

Although firmly rejecting the points made in the United States note, the Israeli note is not aggressive in tone and concludes with the hope that consideration of the Israeli reply will restore the "sympathetic understanding of the United States Government for the problems and anxieties facing Israel".

The basic positions of the United States and Israel thus remain unchanged, and there is no reason for the United States to abandon the firm position it has taken as regards Israel. You may wish to inform the President this morning that the Department will immediately consider what steps should next be taken and will shortly make recommendations to him as to a possible course of action with regard to this problem.

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[1] Sent also by Mr. Satterthwaite.

[2] See footnote 1 to Tel Aviv telegram, June 8, p. 1102.

501.BB Palestine/6–949 : Circular airgram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 9, 1949—9:10 a. m.

We transmitted to Ethridge, our rep on UN Palestine Conciliation Comm, as well as to our reps in Jerusalem and Amman,[2] our further comments on our suggestion that PCC appoint a rep to chair meetings of special comm. of Israeli-Jordanian reps, with ultimate power of arbiter. We stated our suggestion based on need for peaceful solution, failure of current efforts to negotiate agreement for Jerusalem, and offer of impartial procedure which would result in solution based on equity and having backing of international community. We feel would be difficult under this procedure for parties to reject our suggestion. With reference suggestion our rep in Amman [3] that our suggested procedure be adopted except for omission of arbitral function, we feel arbitration should be attempted and, if unfruitful, it would be possible to recede from this position. We also believe that suggestion that Lausanne conference deal with Jerusalem problem [4] as a whole would be acceptable if PCC has necessary technical info and if it desires take on these added negotiations.

WEBB

[1] This airgram, although prepared as a circular message, was sent only to the Embassy in the United Kingdom.
[2] In Unpal 139, June 7, to Bern, p. 1093.
[3] As sent in telegram 233, June 4, 3 p. m., not printed.
[4] This suggestion had been made in telegram 233 from Amman.

501.BB Palestine/6–949 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Lausanne

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, June 9, 1949—7 p. m.

Unpal 141. For Ethridge. In event definitive political discussions shld be suspended for extended period, we are deeply concerned over critical delay in activation proposed Economic Survey Group and implementation its terms of reference, since according to present plans further UN and Congressional action wld be based on Group's recommendations.

In your opinion, is there any possibility prior your departure of extracting sufficient commitment Israel and Arab states to permit immediate formation of Group, without reference remainder of political negotiations? As minimum conditions, such commitment

would appear require agreement Israel and Arabs repatriate and resettle respectively substantial number refugees prior to or at least by time of and as part of final peace settlement (without designation of specific numbers at present time if such designation cannot be obtained), and assumption both sides primary responsibility therefor subject to outside assistance; it wld also require both sides to request or accept, cooperate with and otherwise facilitate tasks of Economic Survey Group along lines set forth in Group's stated objectives (Unpal 119, Deptel 704 to Bern, May 27 numbered para 1). It shld be made clear both sides that Group's functions wld be wholly nonpolitical in character, designed solely to expedite final settlement, and that USG wld require fullest cooperation both sides with objectives and activities of Group as pre-condition to extension any US economic aid to Near East through UN or otherwise.

If you consider such commitment adequate and obtainable, how wld you propose PCC issue resolution (Unpal 119) or otherwise establish Group? It is believed that nominations for Group cld be furnished you on short notice. Pls advise Dept urgently diplomatic support which US might extend to obtain foregoing objectives.

WEBB

501.BB Palestine/6–1049

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 10, 1949.

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT, THURSDAY, JUNE 9, 1949

ISRAELI REPLY TO UNITED STATES NOTE

The President read the attached memorandum [1] with respect to the Israeli answer to our note, and expressed satisfaction that the Israelis appeared to be reacting well to the essential objectives which he and the Department are trying to achieve. He informed me that he had let it be known by a number of Jewish leaders who had called on him that unless they were prepared to play the game properly and conform to the rules they were probably going to lose one of their best friends.

[1] The memorandum of June 9, p. 1107.

867N.01/6–1049

Memorandum by the Department of State to the President [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 10, 1949.

Subject: United States Relations with Israel.

On June 8 Israel replied to the United States note which Ambassador McDonald delivered in Tel Aviv upon your instructions on May 29. The reply firmly rejected the points made in the United States note concerning a final territorial settlement and the disposition of the refugee problem. Under the circumstances, the following course of action vis-à-vis Israel is suggested.

1. *Immediate adoption of a generally negative attitude toward Israel.* This would include: refusing Israeli requests for United States assistance, such as for the training of Israeli officials in this country and the sending of United States experts to Israel; maintenance of no more than a correct attitude toward Israeli officials in this country and toward American organizations interested in promoting the cause of Israel; and failing to support the position of Israel in the various international organizations.

2. *Export-Import Bank Loan.* The Export-Import Bank should be immediately informed that it would be desirable to hold up the allocation of the $49,000,000 as yet unallocated of the $100,000,000 earmarked for loan to Israel.

3. *United States Contributions to Israel.* The time is appropriate to undertake explorations as to whether it is proper, now that a Jewish state has been established as an independent foreign country, for United States contributions to the United Jewish Appeal and to other Jewish fund-raising organizations to continue to be exempt from income tax as having been made for charitable purposes. Such contributions are now of direct benefit to a sovereign foreign state.

4. *Reply to Israel Note.* A reply to the Israeli note will be drafted, answering the points made and reiterating the United States expectation that Israel will take action along the lines suggested by the United States.

[1] Drafted by Mr. Rockwell.

501.BB Palestine/6–1049 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT TEL AVIV, June 10, 1949—10 a. m.

443. ReDeptels 344, 346,[1] 347, June 8 and further re Embtel 441, June 9 transmitting Israel's reply to President's note (Deptel 322, May 28).

[1] Telegram 346 was a repeat of 238 to Damascus, not printed, but see footnote 1 to telegram 347, June 8, p. 1102.

Ford and I June 9 conferred hour with Foreign Minister who invited me visit his office. Herlitz and Leo Kohn [2] also present.

1. Sharett noted press reports from Washington quoting Acting Secretary and said: "we here besieged for news". Nonetheless, Foreign Office has admitted merely "exchange of views". Sharett "will say no more unless US prefers and takes initiative fuller news". Israel "would not oppose publication of notes".

Comment: Publication of notes would, I think, be unfortunate because certain arouse strong public feeling. Morning June 10 Foreign Office had no explanation Israeli statement Lake Success June 9. *End comment.*

2. Sharett followed up Israel note on two points:

a. Boundaries. (Deptel 346, June 8). In conference with Secretary Acheson in New York [3] Foreign Minister had accepted former's phrase "mutual adjustments" boundaries in sense of "minor adjustments" and not "compensations or exchanges". "Could not have possibly thought of concessions to Lebanon, Syria or Egypt as rewards for their unsuccessful war of aggression". Sharett thought Secretary Acheson's words "mutual adjustments" referred primarily to boundary between Israel and Arab Palestine. Is "sorry if Secretary misunderstood".

Comment: Noteworthy that Sharett emphasized twice evident satisfaction Department's conclusion that territorial "compensation" Gaza strip would depend on "desire" other government's "such compensation". *End comment.*

b. Refugees. "Measure of repatriation actually carried out" totalled approximately 24,000 divided nearly equally between Galilee and Negev. Total Arabs now in Israel 150,000. Measures "under urgent consideration" include specific permission to "round out families" and more "general permission return of women and minor children of Arabs resident in Israel".

Comment: Sharett's manner of presenting these admittedly limited concessions was possible indication Israel's softening on refugees. *End comment.*

3. ReDeptel 344, June 8, Sharett emphatically denied Eytan had ever used any expression indicating Israel had desire further territorial expansion except in connection with Ethridge's suggestion "Gaza plan". Foreign Minister emphasized there is no justification charge Israel's position was "rigid".

Comment: No doubt Sharett feels Israel wrongly charged with "rigidity". *End comment.*

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[2] Political Adviser to Mr. Sharett.

[3] Presumably the conversation of April 5; see Mr. Acheson's memorandum of that date, p. 890.

4. ReDeptels 346, 347, June 8, Sharett said cabinet would discuss Bunche's proposal "within two hours". Israel would attend armistice meeting tenth. Major obstacle in acceptance is demilitarization of Ein Gev. I argued this minor compared with larger issues. Foreign Office telephoned June 10, 9:30 a. m. Riley reported Syrians unable attend today.

Comment: Despite Foreign Minister's protest I believe even chance Israel acceptance Bunche plan. *End comment.*

McDONALD

501.BB Palestine/6–1049 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Vincent) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY BERN, June 10, 1949—3 p. m.

909. Palun 194. From Ethridge. No progress made so far in reconciling Arab and Israeli positions and no possibility obtaining commitment of type outlined Unpal 141[1] before my departure.[2] Also practically no prospect obtaining such commitment in course subsequent PCC discussions here. However, I have some ideas on subject which hope discuss on arrival Washington June 14 and suggest Department delay action till then. [Ethridge.]

VINCENT

[1] Dated June 9, to Lausanne, p. 1108.

[2] Mr. Ethridge left Lausanne on June 10. He was succeeded on a temporary basis by Raymond A. Hare.

501.BB Palestine/6–1049 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Vincent) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED BERN, June 10, 1949—3 p. m.

912. Palun 192. From Ethridge. On June 8 Eytan returned Lausanne from Tel Aviv after week's absence during which it was common knowledge Israel was reexamining its position regarding Israeli-Arab talks through PCC. On June 9 Eytan lectured PCC at length on manner in which talks should be conducted and made general restatement of Israeli position regarding outstanding matters including refugees and territory. Eytan's remarks indicated Israel had not modified its position in any way, shape or form.

Summary of Eytan's remarks follows:

(1) Conduct of talks: Eytan believed stalemate existed at Lausanne. General dissatisfaction reflected in irresponsible talk, gossip, threats and recrimination. Difficulty must be surmounted and fresh start made. Patience and frankness were necessary.

(2) General approach: PCC members and Arabs say Israel asks unreasonable. Outstanding problems between Israel and Arabs were discussed during Israel admission debate at Lake Success. Eban made full statement. GA admitted Israel. It follows GA was satisfied with Israel's attitude on outstanding problems.[1] We are acting in conformity with Eban statements at Lausanne. If others think us unreasonable it must be in another context.

(3) Reality in Israel: Conditions in Israel have changed since November 29[2] and continuing change rapidly. Jaffa, for example, is no longer Arab and in some sections no longer exists. Automatic Arab talk regarding return of refugees is unrealistic. Such talk will not advance Lausanne discussions one inch.

(4) Middle East peace: Israeli objective at Lausanne has been restoration of Middle East peace. But other questions including refugees, territory and compensation are subsidiary. Arabs want peace also. Thus far main obstacle has been sustained refusal of Arabs to negotiate peace. Refusal is main cause for present deadlock.

(5) Refugees: Detailed Israeli position known to PCC. Israel very much concerned regarding refugee problem in Palestine and Middle East. Tendency in world since World War I has been to eliminate minority problems. Minority problems cause national and international unrest and conflict. UNSCOP did not consider exclusion of Arabs and Jews from Jewish and Arab states respectively because it assumed peaceful implementation. War resulted. Exodus occurred. Grave minority problem for Jewish state thus solved itself by events. Israel never contemplated removal of Arabs. In light of world's tragic experience during past 30 years Israel believes "recreation of minority within Israel—as Arabs insist—would be retro-step for peace of Middle East and of world". Israel will, however, contribute as much as it can in context of general peace settlement.

Eytan proposed supply PCC with summary of statements by Arab leaders calling for revenge. Eytan cited recent discussion in Egyptian Parliament regarding 72 million pound budget for arms. In such circumstances Israel considered it unreasonable to permit return of refugees. Every government which has elementary regard for its people will adopt attitude similar Israels.

(6) Territory: Israel accepted May 12 protocol as basis for discussion. Israeli principle is GA principle of mutual adjustment of borders to common advantage of each party by free negotiation. Israel cannot accept "purely arbitrary mathematical proportion of formula". Partition resolutions of November 29 are not sacrosanct. Israel is not bound to adhere. Partition was based on peaceful implementation. War results. Only Jewish state appeared. Arab state did not. Arabs

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[1] The Department, on June 15, commented on this point as follows: "Dept believes entirely unwarranted construe GA debate and decision re admission Israel as endorsement their policy before PCC." It then cited Mr. Eban's statement before the *Ad Hoc* Committee on May 5 (see footnote 2, p. 979) that only the provisions of Article 4 of the Charter were relevant in considering an application for membership and that it was "unjust withhold consent admission on grounds difference opinion on solution certain internatl problems." (telegram Unpal 151, 501.BB Palestine/6–1049)

[2] The date in 1947 that the General Assembly voted to approve the partition of Palestine.

are, however, entitled to state. Israel cannot agree that because Arabs failed to establish state [3] other Arab states are entitled to territory. It's too contrary UN principles to reward states which attempted to upset UN resolution by force. Decision along such lines would undermine UN and world peace. If there were Arab state Israel's territorial position would now be different. Israel is prepared, however, to discuss its frontiers with each of its present neighbors. Eytan considered direct talks with Arabs essential for any territorial arrangement.

(7) Israeli efforts at Lausanne: Eytan recapitulated various proposals and suggestions of Israeli delegation toward progress of Lausanne talks. Eytan recalled steps reported in Palun's 145, 146,[4] 162,[5] 173.[6] Eytan stated points outlined in Palun 146 still formed basis Israeli thinking. Failure to receive response regarding preamble was grave disappointment. Arabs had not answered territorial proposals. Israeli delegation may be prepared to put forward further suggestions if useful. To help meeting, Israel is prepared to make free zone at Haifa for import and export without Israeli duty. Israel may make other suggestions to help other Arab states. Israeli efforts are fundamentality different than Arab efforts which consist entirely of demands.

(8) Future steps: (*a*) Israel continues accept May 12 protocol; (*b*) present despondency should be overcome; (*c*) Eytan would be glad state Israeli case directly to Arab delegates.

[Ethridge]
VINCENT

[3] In Palestine.
[4] Both dated May 10; identified also as telegrams 410 and 411 from Geneva, pp. 992 and 993, respectively.
[5] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1036.
[6] Identified also as telegram 820, May 28, from Bern, p. 1068.

501.BB Palestine/6–1049 : Telegram

Mr. John C. Ross to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, June 10, 1949—3 : 04 p. m.

709. Bunche has report from Riley in Jerusalem that Dayan has informed him that there was a misunderstanding and that he will withdraw Israeli troops from demilitarized zone around Government House, replacing them with MP's. A partition of area will be arranged by Riley following NAC meeting June 11. Foregoing message from Riley followed a previous one which indicated belligerence and hostility on Dayan's part. Reason for change not apparent.

Bunche says he does not understand motives for Israeli actions Government House zone since it obviously endangered their broader objectives. He does feel, however, that it was a deliberately planned action since Dayan is not a hot-headed or impetuous person.

Ross

Editorial Note

Ambassador McDonald, on June 11, cabled to the Department, for the personal attention of the President and the Acting Secretary, that "Press and private reaction here to incomplete reports from Washington and elsewhere of contents of President's note indicate complete unanimity that: (1). US has no right moral or legal for its 'demands'; (2). Such demands must be 'resisted'." He concluded by urging that "further US views not be expressed in terms of imperatives as in concluding paragraphs President's note unless President and Department are prepared to use extreme measures ultimate effort [*effect*] of which no one could now foresee." (telegram 445 from Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/6–1149)

Later the same day Ambassador McDonald sent a followup cable to the Department for the personal attention of Clark Clifford at the White House. After referring to his telegrams 439, June 8, page 1100, and 445, he stated: "Motivated only by my grave concern Department, with best intentions of causing Israel to make what seems to Washington 'reasonable and necessary concession' on refugees and boundaries, our government so embittered Israel opinion that Ben-Gurion and Sharett would be forced despite their will and better judgement to resist US demands. Israel concessions with refugees are possible if request for these is not again put in form of demand. But under no circumstances except use of overwhelming force will Israel yield any part of Negev. . . .

"This telegram and two referred to above have been written in full remembrance of your final words to me when I was leaving White House before coming Israel." (telegram 446 from Tel Aviv, 867N.01/6–1149)

867N.01/6–1149 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 11, 1949—2 p. m.

573. Egyptian Amb called on ActSec June 10 at own request and left memo [1] re lifting arms embargo. He stated Egypt greatly desires lifting of restrictions which as result embargo it has imposed on trade navigation, pointing out no serious fighting has occurred for six months and stating Arab states have no aggressive intentions.

He said sole concern Arabs is just settlement Pal question, to which major obstacle is Israel's aggressive attitude. While Arabs originally opposed partition, they now willing accept it although cld

[1] Dated June 10, not printed.

not state fact publicly. Arab states have two major objectives, settlement refugee problem and final settlement which wld protect them against Israeli aggression. They desire all of the UN resolutions to be observed, particularly res calling for repatriation refugees. They also feel Pres' principle territorial compensation shld be observed. In response to query as to whether Amb felt independent Arab state cld be established in Pal, he stated this was matter which wld have to be settled by Arab states.

ActSec emphasized importance which USG attaches to Israeli Arab cooperation in achieving final solution. USG does not wish negots Lausanne to fail. Amb stated Egypt doing all possible to make negots succeed.

To specific query re his Govt's position on Israeli offer accept Gaza refugees in return acquisition Gaza strip,[2] Amb said Egyptian Govt regards proposal as "cheap barter". He stated first step is to permit those refugees in Gaza so desiring to return their homes, but had no suggestion re disposition remainder. He further stated Egypt wld wish make proposals re frontier rectification, which wld not involve large amount territory but wld be designed secure strategically defensible frontier for Egyptian and Israeli security. Did not state when these proposals wld be put forth.

ActSec stated question re arms embargo wld require careful study on part of Dept, pointing out it involved not only US regulation but SC truce res. Amb agreed, and indicated Egypt did not wish raise contentious argument in SC re question but desired prior discussion with SC members before raising question in SC.

Amb then took up subject training Egyptian officers in US. ActSec explained we had recently informed NME[3] we no longer have any objections to training Israeli and Arab officers. However NME has very limited quota for foreign students and therefore needs of many countries require consideration. Moreover because security considerations, many courses open only to Amcits. ActSec stated we are anxious be helpful in matter but quite possible NME cld not place all students which Egyptians might wish send to US.

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[2] Mr. Eban informed Mr. Ross during the afternoon of June 10 that "following Rhodes armistice discussions with Egypt, Abdul Munim Mustapha, head of Egyptian delegation, had first raised question of Israel taking over Gaza strip. This discussion was inconclusive. Subsequently on April 30, presumably, Eban said, because Egyptians had talked in same sense, Ethridge at Lausanne in conversation with Eytan had suggested Israel take over Gaza strip including the 250,000 refugees therein (this is figure Eban used). The idea of taking over this number of refugees shocked Eytan who, however, reported matter to his government which, after much consideration and in sincere effort to get something tangible started at Lausanne, instructed Eytan to make proposal of May 20." (telegram 712, June 10, from New York, 501.BB Palestine/6–1049)

[3] See letter of April 6, p. 898.

Pls take early opportunity discuss disposition Gaza strip with Egyptian Govt, requesting its views re Israeli offer. You shld emphasize to Egyptian Govt US concern re refugees that area, which has no economic potential for future settlement, and ask Egyptian Govt its plans re disposition those who do not wish return Israel, since latter might be considerable number. You might in this connection obtain Egyptian views with regard frontier in light Ambs reference to strategic rectification in order that we might explore possibility of exchange of Gaza strip for frontier rectification further south.

Rpt reply to USDel Lausanne.[4]

WEBB

[4] This telegram was repeated to Bern as No. 778 (Unpal 145), for the American Delegation at Lausanne. Chargé Patterson, on June 14, reported that prior to receipt of telegram 573, i.e., on June 11, he had brought up the question of the Gaza strip proposal with Foreign Minister Khashaba. The latter's views "were to effect that while Egypt contemplated retention no portion Palestine as such Egypt required most effective frontier for defensive purposes. This frontier stated to be Gaza–Beersheba–Dead Sea line. Responsive to my question Minister admitted that Egypt at present not willing cede Gaza coastal strip to Israel in return for Israel's offer assumptions charge 200,000 or more refugees in Gaza–Rafa strip." (telegram 578 from Cairo, 867N.01/6–1449)

867N.00/6–1149 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, June 11, 1949—6 p. m.

409. Present tense situation Jerusalem attributable in large part to failure reach agreement in Special Committee on questions both Jews and Arabs consider essential. Break in deadlock likely to result in quick relaxation and barring complete failure Lausanne eliminate in immediate future present danger resumption hostilities Jerusalem. Essential element is speedy solution through simplified procedure.

Consulate General considers not advisable refer question to Lausanne. Would thus become involved in whole peace treaty procedure with consequent long delays, personnel at Lausanne not familiar with details of problem and would have start all over again, extent of disagreement would not be diminished by simple reference to Lausanne. Same issues must be resolved regardless locale. Arbitration procedure would also involve delay, arbitrator would not be familiar with question, and Israel at least could be expected refuse accept principle arbitral award.

Consulate General therefore, suggests following approach combining certain features Department and Amman proposals. Settlement Government House matter necessary prerequisite. Request by Special Committee to MAC to hold series extraordinary sessions under direct

chairmanship General Riley. Section 3, Article 12 of Armistice permits changes in agreement by mutual consent. Both sides to present concrete plans for settlement along lines outlined below and under terms of reference specifically providing for territorial exchange. Riley would be able give publicity to proceedings and also use his prestige to facilitate agreement on terms he considered equitable.[1] At same time PCC and/or US Government should point out to respective governments (or if preferred to local authorities) in friendly manner necessity reaching agreement swiftly thus eliminating this great cause possible trouble. Israel again should be specifically admonished against use force or threats and ill effect present series incidents pointed out. Also could be told that because concessions made in past by Arabs and as measure of assistance in refugee problem, PCC and US hope will be able adopt generous attitude on quarters. In note to Transjordan, disadvantages of stalling should be forcibly brought out (although this may avoid causing Transjordan trouble with other states or Palestine Arabs delay certainly does not contribute towards peaceful settlement which is prime US objective). Transjordan also should be cautioned against excessive demands and inclination lure single issue of Scopus to recoup past losses of disproportionate nature. In this case Transjordan has shown tendency expand demands as Israel showed willingness make concessions. For example willing at one time trade access to Scopus for access to Arab College (Amman telegram 208, May 18 to Department) which Jews perfectly willing grant.

Consulate General believes best chances of success offered by final settlement on following basis: Israel to obtain free access to Scopus by new road from Sanhedriya in direction of "French Hill" plus territory vicinity Sanhedriya might also be given but need not constitute "land bridge." Arabs to receive in addition to Bethelehem road and electricity return certain Arab quarters and certain Jewish areas in South. Arabs must recognize not possible obtain wall their old quarters and area likely regain steadily diminishing. Baqa quarter now opened to new immigrants and once such persons settled down extremely difficult dislodge. Crucial point of course is amount area in North to be exchanged for quarters in South but Consulate General feels that with constant pressure by PCC, Riley and perhaps interested governments possible reach solution.

Above procedure advanced in interest speed, to avoid further stalling and to provide for use present UN machinery avoiding compli-

[1] Chargé Stabler, on June 17, gave his support to the suggestion regarding the Special Committee as set forth in telegram 409 (telegram 250 from Amman, 867N.01/6–1749).

cations of setting up new committee. Consulate General considers lines settlement mentioned will meet to maximum extent possible in limited agreement of nature under consideration desires of both parties.

Sent Department, repeated Amman 36, Geneva 27, Tel Aviv 52.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/6–1149 : Telegram

The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Secretary of State

SECRET DAMASCUS, June 11, 1949—7 p. m.

322. Views in Deptel 238, June 8 [1] delivered to Vice Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Arslan 1 p. m. today. He asked me to thank Department for its advice but said its interest in seeking cause of peace in Palestine might be more effective if weight its influence were brought to bear upon Israel to respect its international engagements and thus help create atmosphere favorable to armistice and peace negotiations.

Contending that as small area Palestine territory now occupied by Syria was taken in fighting against Israeli before truce whereas Israel holds unchallenged vast areas occupied during truce, suggested demilitarization on Syrian front is scarcely equitable measure. Arslan admitted current Bunche proposal nevertheless seemed to offer best basis yet suggested for discussion and he had accordingly authorized Syrian delegation to reenter negotiations. However, as experience has taught Syrians to be wary of any agreement that depends upon Israeli respect for UN guarantees he thought moment inpropitious to hope for agreement. Even Bunche must consider it unfortunate that Israeli had chosen this time to underscore their cynical disregard for their pledged word by entering and fortifying demilitarized Government House zone in Jerusalem.

This latest aggression took place, said Arslan, even while Bunche in personal message to Zaim earnestly appealed for most serious and sympathetic consideration his draft proposals assuring him that "UN responsibility over territory in proposed demilitarized zone gives adequate protection to Syrian interests" and citing Government House among others as example of UN demilitarized area which "gives convincing proof that such arrangements work well and give full protection to rights and claims of interested parties." Bunche must today be sadly disillusioned man, said Arslan.

Typical of their incomprehensible arrogance latest Israeli aggression has not only jeopardized Syrian Israeli armistice negotiations, but

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 1 to telegram 347, June 8, p. 1102.

has put wind up in all Arab circles, said Arslan. Added he has warned other Arab capitals that Government House may be first move in conquest of Jerusalem itself if not remainder of Palestine which now effectively within Israeli control.

As Prime Minister Zaim had shortly before my call on Arslan expressed similar views to Foreign Minister I feel that no useful purpose would be served by seeking to deliver Department's message to Zaim or otherwise trying further to pressurize Syrians into accepting Bunche proposal until some effective means are found and applied to guarantee Israeli respect for its engagements and for UN authority. To pressurize Syrians in face of Israeli action at Government House (Jerusalem's Contel 401, June 7 [2] and sequence to Department) would I feel sure be interpreted by Syrians only as further evidence of our alleged pro-Israeli attitude and weaken such influence as we still have with them which might better be reserved for more propitious moment such as when Israel itself can be brought to show more accommodating spirit. My French colleague, with whom I am keeping close contact, fully shares my views in this regard. Zaim told him that while inclined to accept Bunche proposal if Israeli respect for UN guaranteed pledges better assured than recent unfortunate experience has given reason to expect, he is disinclined to commit Syria before presidential referendum June 25 (mytel 315, June 8).[2] To do so might well cause disturbing repercussions which he is not prepared to risk during crucial pre-election period.

[Here follow four paragraphs dealing primarily with Mr. Arslan's denunciation of Israel's aggressive attitude.]

If despite unfavorable atmosphere indicated above Department desires me to urge upon Zaim acceptance Bunche proposal it would be helpful to have its reasons why Syria should not let Government House incident influence its acceptance of similar UN guarantee of proposed demilitarized areas on Syrian-Israeli frontier.[3]

Sent Department 322, repeated Baghdad 61, Beirut 72, Jerusalem 48, London 84, Paris 68, Tel Aviv 37, Amman 32, Ankara 44, Bern for PCC 13, Cairo 41, Jidda 26.

Department pass Army, Navy, Air.

KEELEY

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[2] Not printed.

[3] The Department, in reply on June 16, directed Damascus to "urge upon Zaim acceptance Bunche proposal" and to "point out that as result intervention such officials UN as Bunche and Riley Israeli troops have now been withdrawn" from the Government House area (telegram 248, 501.BB Palestine/6–1149).

867N.01/6–1249 : Telegram

The Chargé in Jordan (Stabler) to the Secretary of State

SECRET AMMAN, June 12, 1949—11 a. m.

243. According to reliable military source here number of incidents along entire Jordan-Israeli front have increased rapidly in past few days with ten such incidents being reported on June 10 alone. Casualties are also reported.

Legion troops at Latrun report "extraordinary" Israeli movements opposite them and believe Israelis are preparing some kind of attack on Latrun salient.

Same military source also reports greatly increased Israeli military activity "in and immediately behind" Jerusalem with two Israeli brigades—fourth and sixth—and armored cars in Jerusalem area. (According to Rhodes agreement only two battalions, but no armor, are allowed in Jerusalem.) Local authorities are seriously concerned that Israelis may be planning further operations in Jerusalem area, such as seizure Mt. Scopus or Latrun or both. Legion source stated few days ago that while Legion could cope with local incidents, it could not cope with any general outbreak of fighting.

Jordan Government has brought above (except for Latrun report) formally to attention Riley.

Comment—In view Israeli action in Government House area and above indications they are planning further aggression, I would now recommend that Department should make immediate representations Tel Aviv along lines suggested in penultimate paragraph Legtel 239 June 9 [1] without awaiting further word from Bunche. I fear that probably protracted attempts by Riley to settle situation will only give Israelis more time in which to prepare further aggression. US should therefore make it quite clear to Israel at this time that troops must be withdrawn and that any further aggressive acts will not be tolerated. *End comment.*

Sent Department 243, repeated Bern (for USDel PCC) 22, Jerusalem 119, London 46, Beirut 48, Baghdad 65, Damascus 50, Cairo 29.[2]

STABLER

[1] Not printed; that paragraph read: "In meantime I strongly urge Department to recall its telegram 37, March 25 and President's message to Abdullah (Deptel 38, March 28) and urgently consider possibility, in event Riley and Bunche should feel such step desirable, making representations in most forcible terms to Israeli Government to effect that Israeli troops must be withdrawn at once and unless Israeli will give undertaking to renounce agency of force to achieve its demands, US Government will be obliged to reconsider its attitude toward that state which has received up to this time unstinting US support." (867N.01/6–949) Regarding telegram 38, see footnote 1, p. 878.

[2] The Department, on June 14, replied that it was keeping in close touch with Mr. Bunche, "who has intervened directly, is taking strong line, and at present does not desire US assistance." (telegram 78, 501.BB Palestine/6–1349)

501.BB Palestine/6–1249 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Vincent) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED PRIORITY BERN, June 12, 1949—noon.

920. Palun 197 from Hare. On July 11 Eytan again appeared before PCC for further discussion of matters mentioned Palun 192.[1]

Boisanger opened meeting by criticizing certain of Eytan's June 8 statements including unwarranted comparison Bunche's success with that of PCC, Eytan's allegation that PCC had opposed direct negotiations as well as unjustified Jewish press attacks on PCC.

Hare put 3 questions to Eytan regarding June 8 statement:

1. Did Israelis anticipate action on Arab memos (Palun 165 and 166 [2] which might help break ice for further negotiations)?

Eytan replied memo mentioned Palun 166 under sympathetic study but sidestepped memo mentioned Palun 165;

2. How did Israelis reconcile position regarding minorities in light paragraph 11 GA resolution December 11?

Eytan replied Israel did not interpret GA resolution as "categorical imperative." GA debate November 1948 indicated "point of view close to that of Israeli Govt." Israel believed paragraph 11 linked return refugees with peace settlement. Some clauses of paragraph 11 are not "practical of implementation";

3. Did Israel distinguish regarding territory allotted Jewish state November 29 and territory subsequently occupied for purpose of final territorial adjustment and is latter subject to relinquishment or exchange?

Eytan replied evasively reiterating "mathematical approach does not commend itself to my govt."

Yalcin expressed belief these questions important and he personally not satisfied with replies.

Eytan then made 4 suggestions:

(1) Conference work retarded by limited authority of Arab delegations which appear able discuss only refugees. Could not PCC send member or high official of secretariat to Arab capitals and for appearance sake to Tel Aviv to explain situation and attempt remedy this deficiency;

(2) GA resolution December 11 clearly established authority for direct contact between parties. As 6 months have passed PCC entitled speak with vigor to Arab delegation or Arab Govts regarding direct contact;

(3) PCC should establish 5 subcommittees: general terms of peace, frontiers, refugees, Jerusalem, economic and allied matters, all of which should meet jointly with Israeli and Arabs.

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[1] Also identified as telegram 912, June 10, from Bern, p. 1112.

[2] Both dated May 23, from Lausanne, pp. 1043 and 1044, respectively.

(4) Eytan pointed out present discussions based on May 12 protocol but suggested as possible additional approach that armistice agreements conclude under November 16 resolution form common ground and might be made fruitful basis further talks.

Yalcin and Boisanger immediately replied rejecting practically all Eytan's suggestions. Regarding first suggestion Arabs had full authority to negotiate and real difficulty lay in failure of Israelis to live up to December 11 resolution.

Regarding second direct contact useless until basic groundwork laid. Also resolution did not require them negotiate directly.

Regarding third no use establish subcommittees until substantial basic agreement.

Regarding fourth Yalcin did not understand Eytan's suggestion and expressed opinion that May 12 protocol was in effect and might therefore be dangerous shift this agreed basis to armistice agreements.

Hare said his initial reaction essentially [similar?] to Yalcin's and Boisanger's. Eytan's suggestions embodied thoughts which merited careful consideration. Hare hoped Eytan would be able express further ideas of constructive nature.

Eytan disappointed but said would endeavor develop further ideas.

Repeated Paris as 56 for immediate delivery to Mark Ethridge at Hotel Crillon. [Hare.]

VINCENT

501.BB Palestine/6–1249 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Lausanne

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, June 12, 1949—1 p. m.

Unpal 146. In recent conversation with Sec, Bevin expressed concern re situation arising from Israeli claims to territory both sides upper Jordan which would give them complete control all water resources. He stated UK hopes for four-party agreement re water development to permit settlement 100,000 refugees TJ and leave adequate water for Israel. Michael Wright supplemented remarks emphasizing that first basic point UK position re Syrian-Israeli frontier is desirability prior or separate agreement in principle before frontier fixed that waters of Jordan Valley will be used benefit Israel, TJ, Syria, Lebanon under joint auspices. UK believes that if agreement reached re equitable use water, frontier line will settle itself. UK does not suggest US–UK express any opinion re location frontier.

UK pointed out that conflicting plans exist for use of waters, since TJ is studying plan for construction Jordan–Yarmuk canal to provide land for refugee settlement, and Israel has now received final plans

from Hays and associates providing for diversion most or all Jordan water for Israel before it reaches TJ.

Dept informed Sec of its concurrence re desirability agreement in principle before frontier delineation that water resources will be used benefit all states concerned.

What is USDel's opinion re possibility obtaining such agreement near future? If obtainable, such agreement might expedite territorial settlement. If Economic Survey Group cld be activated an important function cld be conduct resurvey water resources in question with view their equitable use by all states concerned for development and refugee settlement purposes.

WEBB

501.BB Palestine/6–1249 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PARIS, June 12, 1949—1 p. m.

2413. From Ethridge. USDel at Lausanne commenting separately on Israel note.

(1) If there is to be any assessment of blame for stalemate at Lausanne, Israel must accept primary responsibility. Commission members, particularly USRep, have consistently pointed out to Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Israeli delegation that key to peace is some Israeli concession on refugees. USDel prepared memo months ago of minor concessions which could be made without prejudice to Israel's final position, pointing out that such concessions would lay the basis for successful talks at Lausanne. Israel has made minor concessions with reservations, but has steadfastly refused to make important ones and has refused to indicate either publicly or privately how many refugees she is willing to take back and under what conditions. Israel's refusal to abide by the GA assembly resolution, providing those refugees who desire to return to their homes, etc., has been the primary factor in the stalemate. Israel has failed even to stipulate under what conditions refugees wishing to return might return; she has given no definition of what she regards as peaceful co-existence of Arabs and Jews in Israel and she consistently returns to the idea that her security would be endangered; that she can not bear the economic burden and that she has no responsibility for refugees because of Arab attacks upon her. I have never accepted the latter viewpoint. Aside from her general responsibility for refugees, she has particular responsibility for those who have been driven out by terrorism, repression and forcible ejection.

(2) The statement, "the Government of Israel is at a loss to understand the reference in the note to the alleged contemplation by Mr. Eytan of 'an additional acquisition of further [territory] within Palestine' " is a falsehood. Also the statement that the GA [*Gaza?*] proposal was first advanced by me. As previously reported it was first advanced by Ben Gurion and so reported to the Department at the time. In appearing before the general committee Sassoon and

Lifschitz presented Israel's claim for more of Arab Palestine and used the Hayes (TVA) project map to justify proposed new boundaries with Arab Palestine. It was made clear that the proposed canal must be all inside Israel, which would mean that further territory, including Tulkarm and the northwest corner of the Triangle, must go to Israel. In addition members of Israeli delegation have told me that their demand for withdrawal of Arab troops was designed to establish bargaining position with Abdullah so that Arab Palestine could be further divided. Comay said, "we will point out to Abdullah that he is getting a bonus out of the war." Ben Gurion told me (see telegram re Tiberias talk; [1] do not have reference here) Israel wanted the entire western shore of the Dead Sea. Sharett told the commission in his first meeting that strip from Haifa to Tel Aviv must be widened back to Samarian Hills for security reasons. Under threats Israel took over Tulkarm area villages. By force she has taken over new territory in Jerusalem.

(3) I leave to the Department whether Israel's admission to UN sanctified what she is doing. Personally, I do not see how the argument can be accepted. Israel was state created upon an ethical concept and should rest upon an ethical base. Her attitude toward refugees is morally reprehensible and politically short-sighted. She has no security that does not rest in friendliness with her neighbors. She has no security that does not rest upon the basis of peace in the Middle East. Her position as conqueror demanding more does not make for peace. It makes for more trouble.

(4) As to Gaza strip: I have felt since it was first mentioned that it could be a basis for settlement of refugee problem to extent of Israel's responsibility and also a basis for territorial settlement. I have pointed out consistently that it is a good proposal providing it is accompanied by a *quid pro quo:* some part of the Negev. I have also pointed out that a concession in the Negev is more than a satisfaction of strategic concepts; it is a major point in Arab thinking. One thing that will make for eternal friction in the Middle East is to drive the wedge into the Arab world.

There never has been a time in the life of the commission when a generous and far-sighted attitude on the part of the Jews would not have unlocked peace. Perhaps they are too close to the siege of Jerusalem to see it now. As an advocate of the new state I hope they come on it eventually. Otherwise there will be no peace in the Middle East, no security for Israel and no possibility of lifting the economic blockade with which she must remain a remittance-man nation.[2]

Repeated Bern 37 for USDel Lausanne. [Ethridge.]

BRUCE

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[1] See telegram 312, April 20, from Jerusalem, p. 925.

[2] Acting Secretary Webb met with President Truman on June 13. His memorandum of conversation stated: "The President read the enclosed telegram from Ethridge, No. 2413, with great interest, and was particularly impressed by the last paragraph.

"He also read the first paragraph of Palun 181 and indicated that he would leave it to my discretion as to whether to send a strong message to Ambassador McDonald insisting on his support." (Secretary's Memoranda, Lot 53 D 444) Palun 181 is dated June 2, p. 1085.

501.BB Palestine/6–1249 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET PRIORITY NIACT WASHINGTON, June 12, 1949— 10 p. m.

Telac 78. Fol re Pal (Actel 63 June 12 [1]).

(1) General Pal Situation. As you know from Ethridge, Lausanne talks appear completely stalemated and PCC about to recess. Israeli Govt has made non-aggressive but completely negative reply to note which Pres directed be delivered Tel Aviv. Pres convinced firm line must be maintained and Dept now considering measures which might be taken to emphasize necessity modification Israel viewpoint to open way to settlement. Reply to Israeli note will be drafted in consultation Ethridge. In view PCC stalemate, now appears necessary US play more direct role re Pal settlement. US role would continue to seek basis of settlement among parties and not on basis preconceived notions of our own. After reply to Israeli note and certain steps to underline seriousness our purpose, we have in mind making strong specific suggestions both sides, particularly re: boundaries and refugees. Since precise proposals only in formative stage and depend upon further consultations Ethridge, Bunche, Israeli and Arab reps, suggest you limit yourself to informing Bevin negative character Israeli reply, that US Govt determined to maintain firm position and keep pressure on all parties, and that we are now considering what further steps should now be taken.

(2) Jordan situation. Dept giving further study extension Anglo-Jordan treaty to Pal territories now occupied by Jordan, in light of PCC stalemate and recent Israeli move Jerusalem. Essential point is UK attitude should Israelis seize upon extension treaty as excuse for grabbing more of Arab Pal. Israeli military could probably reach Jordan river in few days, probably before UK could get into action militarily. UK problem would then be to counterattack with forces not now in that area or to fail honor extension of treaty. View limited UK mil strength Jordan and divided UK public opinion re Pal, together with sharpest possible reaction large segments US public opinion, such decision by UK has most serious and far-reaching implications. You might by questioning draw out Bevin's own view of implications and UK line of action in event Israel–Jordan hostilities.

[1] Not printed; in this telegram from Paris, Secretary Acheson stated in part: "Bevin's secretary also stated Bevin wished talk with me again Monday or Tuesday regarding general Palestine situation, Transjordan situation, and recent Jewish aggressive moves in Jerusalem. Any guidance from Department would be appreciated." (740.00119 Council/6–1249).

Bevin should not rely upon US approval or support for all consequences treaty extension nor should he overestimate US influence with Israel. Past record suggests Israel has had more influence with US than has US with Israel; this particularly true on military matters since Israeli armament has come from eastern Europe and illicit traffic over which we have had no control. Believe US as member PCC should concentrate on negotiated settlement and not become involved with explosive issue extension Anglo–Jordan treaty unless situation reaches more of crisis stage than present. These are tentative views, subject to further study and consultation here.

(3) Israeli move Jerusalem. Judging from available reports Israeli move into Govt House neutral zone was violation spirit not letter Israeli–Jordan armistice agreement. Presence Arab civilians and military in or near area gave Israelis good pretext. Situation confused and Gen. Riley attempting bring parties to agreement on withdrawal forces both sides and partition area. Meeting reps both sides under chairmanship Riley likely in day or so. We understand Israelis may agree withdrawal troops from newly-occupied area and replacement by civilian police. View fluid situation Dept has taken no action and plans not to do so unless requested to by Bunche, who kept fully informed by Riley. Suggest Bevin be informed sense above.

WEBB

Editorial Note

The Palestine Conciliation Commission sent its third progress report from Lausanne on June 13. Mr. Hare, on June 17, transmitted a summary to the Department, noting that the report covered the period from April 9 to the departure of Mr. Ethridge from Lausanne. He described the conclusions of the report as follows:

"Immediate problem facing PCC consists in linking together negotiations on refugee problem and territorial questions. Pressure exerted by Arab delegations in favor of negotiations on refugee question combined with Israeli pressure in favor of territorial negotiations threaten to create situation in which it would be difficult to arrive at agreement on solution of these fundamental problems. PCC concentrating for moment on this problem. PCC is endeavoring to arrest tendency by leading respective delegations to discuss refugee and territorial questions. Solution must relate not only to general aspect including repatriation, resettlement and rehabilitation but also to more immediate and no less important preliminary measures re safeguarding of refugee rights and property." (telegram 608, identified also as Palun 216, from Geneva, 501.BB Palestine/6–1749)

The text of the third progress report is printed in GA, *4th sess.*, *Ad Hoc Political Committee*, *Annex*, *Volume II*, page 5.

501.BB Palestine/6–1349 : Telegram

Mr. Raymond A. Hare to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET LAUSANNE, June 13, 1949—11 a. m.

Palun 198. USDel has following comment on Israeli reply to President's note (refDeptel 761) :[1]

General: Israeli reply should be read in conjunction Eytan's statement before PCC reported Palun 192.[2] Eytan put Israeli attitude re refugees and territory even more categorically. Return of refugees would be "retrograde step." Re territory, Israel cannot accept "purely arbitrary mathematical proportion or formula." USDel regrets that Israel unwilling approach refugee problem constructively through repatriation and resettlement and that Israel also unwilling consider territorial arrangement in terms fairness and equity. USDel notes with even greater regret Israel reply makes no reference whatsoever to support for UN and desire achieve peace and security on realistic basis as stated President's note. USDel reluctant conclude Israel does not share these objectives with US. USDel suggests US would be on strong ground in emphasizing these points in such further action which may be taken in matter.

Paragraph 1: Balance note proves Israeli position Lausanne has not been misunderstood as arguments advanced in Israeli reply are same those put forward Lausanne.

Paragraph 2: President's note made no reference to paragraph 5 GA resolution December 11 re conciliation although US might well have added that Israeli proposals at Lausanne were not of character to promote agreement with view final settlement all questions with Arabs. President's note confined itself to refugees and territory.

Paragraph 3: Israeli reply is not accurate. Paragraph 5 GA resolution December 11 provides for "negotiations conducted either with Conciliation Commission or directly." Arab delegates have not thus far found it possible meet officially with Israeli delegation. (approximately 20 characters garbled)[3] meeting between Sassoon of Israel and Abdul Monem of Egypt appeared in press as result Israeli leak convinced Arabs further meetings premature. Official public meetings would be still more difficult for Arabs because of Arab public opinion. Virtual stalemate at Lausanne should be laid at door of both Israelis and Arabs. Following signature of May 12 protocol (Palun 148)[4] Israelis advanced extremely [garble] proposals (Paluns 162[5] and

[1] Dated June 9, 3 p. m., not printed; it transmitted the text of telegram 441, June 8, from Tel Aviv. Regarding 441, see footnote 1 to Tel Aviv telegram, June 8, p. 1102.

[2] Identified also as telegram 912, June 10, from Bern, p. 1112.

[3] As in the source text.

[4] Dated May 12, from Lausanne, p. 998.

[5] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1036.

173 [6]) but made no proposal re refugees other than limited measures mentioned Palun 145.[7] Arabs advanced refugee proposals (Palun 166)[8] but made no proposal re territory other than suggestion advanced Palun 165.[9] Israelis have either failed take action or have not answered Arab memos re refugees and territory.

Arabs have not answered Israeli proposals re territory. USDel believes, however, that on balance Arab position more nearly in line protocol May 12 than Israeli and that at present stage negotiations next move up to Israelis and their failure act principal cause stalemate.

Paragraph 4: USDel perceives neither reason nor logic in Israeli deduction that GA considered Eban's explanations satisfactory because admission followed.

Paragraph 6: What Israelis at loss to understand in this paragraph is apparently quite clear in eighth paragraph in which it is stated "the war has proved indispensability to survival of Israel of certain vital areas not comprised originally in share of Jewish state." Israeli territory proposals advanced officially to PCC include western Galilee, Jaffa, area between Ramle Lydda Beersheba, areas north Gaza strip and south of Auja along Egyptian frontier, corridor to Jerusalem and other smaller areas throughout Palestine. Re Gaza strip Ethridge did not advance as previously indicated Palun 181.[10]

Paragraph 7: President's note did not present US position re territory as UN policy but as US policy. Rejection last fall of certain paragraphs of GA resolution December 11 might be considered in any event to be superseded by admission resolution which recalled GA resolution November 29. It may also be noted that Sharett on again being informed of US policy by Secretary on April 5 (Deptel 208 to Tel Aviv [11]) replied that "he was familiar with our views on boundary questions, was hopeful an agreed solution could be reached and did not see any insurmountable difficulty."

Paragraph 8: Please see comment on seventh paragraph. Present paragraph as worded seems tantamount to unilateral revision GA resolution November 29, judicial findings re aggressors and award. It seems also to reject US views that territorial arrangement should be based on elementary principles fairness and security. US delegation fails understand why either Israel or Arabs have anything say about government of territory controlled by other.

Paragraphs 9, 10 and 11: USDel considers one-sided overstatement of developments in Palestine. It should be added for balance that

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[6] Identified also as telegram 820, May 28, from Bern, p. 1068.
[7] Identified also as telegram 410, May 10, from Geneva, p. 992.
[8] Dated May 23, from Lausanne, p. 1044.
[9] Dated May 23, from Lausanne, p. 1043.
[10] Dated June 2, from Lausanne, p. 1085.
[11] See footnote 2, p. 894.

Israelis attacked in Haifa, Jaffa and Acre before end British mandate and that incidents such as (approximately 10 characters garbled)[12] massacre accelerated refugee flight. Former Arab economy with Israelis not entirely in ruins as small Arab farmers could certainly return to their lands. Israel knows full well that neither US nor any other state expects it to tackle unaided reintegration of Arabs who elect return. Israeli measures on humanitarian grounds have thus far proved negligible. Israel has restricted compensation for land abandoned to that previously cultivated (Palun 145). Israel has made reunion contingent on census, close relationship and final settlement (Palun 145). Israeli contribution to resettlement consists only of technical experts (Palun 140[13]).

Paragraph 12: Israeli measures consist almost entirely of those listed Palun 145. USDel believed Department will agree these measures are hardly likely endanger self-preservation Israel. USDel also believes additional measures listed Palun 166 could be considered falling within this category. Second paragraph of President's note would seem also to indicate US has not considered repatriation "in absolute terms" but has approached refugee problem on basis both repatriation and resettlement.

Paragraph 13: Please see paragraphs 9 through 12.

Paragraph 14: Arabs might submit almost similar paragraph by substituting "Arab states" for "Israel" and "territory" for "refugee" throughout.

Paragraph 15: No comment.

HARE

[12] As in the source text.
[13] Identified also as telegram 676, May 4, from Bern, p. 975.

501.BB Palestine/6–1349 : Telegram

Mr. Raymond A. Hare to the Secretary of State

SECRET LAUSANNE, June 13, 1949—4 p. m.

Palun 201. Regarding internationalization of Jerusalem. Department may wish discuss with Ethridge working paper and give USDel further instructions. In particular USDel desires Department's views on legal basis UN administration Jerusalem. Talks with Israeli representatives have elicited evidence Israel prepared oppose any provisions in derogation Israel "sovereignty" over Jewish zone of city. Specifically their greatest objection to provisions for UN administrators authority over questions of demilitarization and human rights as infringing rights of Israeli citizens by differentiating between one Israeli citizen and another on basis locus of residence. In addition they

oppose idea of administrator or municipal councils having any jurisdiction over common services except on basis *ad hoc* consultation with Israeli officials for advice only.

USDel believes that these and similar questions will be constant source trouble in future unless question of sovereignty is settled definitively in statute. We favor provision that sovereignty rests with people of Jerusalem but that UN is repository or custodian thereof and that under statute the exercise of certain attributes of sovereignty will be delegated to authorities of state adjoining the respective zones. Such provision if adoped would be consistent with continuing UN responsibility for Jerusalem and make more difficult future actions inimical to UN authority under color of right. At same time no practical difference need result in day-to-day exercise of municipal authority in respective zones by authorities of adjoining states. Difficulties in overcoming Israeli opposition to such a concept which interposes obstacle to possible plans for future expansion are apparent. Transjordan may also oppose.

HARE

501.BB Palestine/6–1349 : Telegram

Mr. John C. Ross to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, June 13, 1949—8 : 18 p. m.

720. Following is summary of information obtained from Bunche's staff on June 13.

In answer to specific question, Bunche does not request assistance from us in respect to Government House zone problem. He says that if Riley is unsuccessful, he may call for help.

Syrian-Israeli armistice negotiations postponed to June 14 or 15 since Vigier and Riley in Jerusalem, and Dayan has just been named to head armistice negotiation delegation. Israelis have already agreed to new date, which is to be finally set after situation re demilitarized zone at Government House is settled. Vigier has cabled Bunche that settlement of Jerusalem demilitarized zone affair is indispensable prior condition for Syrian-Israeli armistice agreement. He has transmitted a note from the Syrians to Bunche which states that Syria cannot ignore the new Israeli aggression in Jerusalem which constitutes a violation of the armistice agreement. It states that Syrians can have little hope for favorable issue from the armistice negotiations since Israelis infringe demilitarized zone agreements, and no guarantees appear to hold firm. Syrian note refers to Israeli promise to Riley of mutual withdrawal from demilitarized zone and its alleged subsequent violation.

In reply to foregoing, Bunche has cabled that the Syrian position is extreme and unwise. He recalled that there have been violations of

agreements by both sides in the past, and that it has been the responsibility of the UN to correct these violations. In the present instance the UN is making such correction. He further observes that if the criterion of compliance with agreements were used, neither side would qualify for participation in further negotiations. He also said he must challenge the implication that the UN is unable or not willing to carry out its commitments. He finally observed that recriminations were not helpful for the upcoming negotiations.

Bunche also cabled Israelis today that he considered incident at Government House would have harmful repercussions on the armistice negotiations at present critical stage. He termed affair a deplorable incident and urged that every step be taken urgently to rectify situation so that armistice negotiations may proceed soonest. Said it was understandable that Syrians wish efficacy of demilitarized zones and that UN could not guarantee sanctity of such zones. Cabled that there was no question but that UN had a special status at Scopus and Government House in connection with observation of demilitarization. Zones could only be altered by mutual agreement of parties. Pointed out that Rhodes armistice delegations of both parties could testify that no armistice agreement would have been possible were it not for the UN supervision of demilitarized Government House and Scopus zones. Pointed out that the lines of both zones were determined by the SC truce arrangements. Any change in these lines could be made only by mutual agreement. Unilateral change was violation of SC truce. While he had no responsibility of supervision of armistice, as acting mediator, he still had responsibility for SC truce. If lines were altered unilaterally and Israelis persisted in such truce violation, he would have no recourse except to report matter to SC.[1]

Eban informed Reedman this morning, in Bunche's absence, that he was confident that Jerusalem situation would be straightened out. However, Eban alleged that UN had no business in being in Jerusalem demilitarized zone. In effect, he said that it was UN itself which had violated the armistice agreement. Reedman informed USUN that he had pointed out to Eban that armistice agreement provided that any change in lines must be made by mutual agreement. However, even in event of mutual agreement, UN as third party present in zone must be informed even if only by courtesy. Also referred to SC truce line provisions. Eban also argued that demilitarized zone lines had been altered by Israeli-Jordan agreement. Alleged that there had been no Jordan protest until it had been stirred up by other Arab states.

[1] New York, on June 14, reported further on Mr. Bunche's views on this matter as follows: "While UN has no responsibility re the armistice supervision since agreements are self-contained entities, the SC truce and cease fire arrangements are still in effect. Bunche has responsibility for reporting to SC on these and can therefore bring present situation to attention of SC as violation of November 30 cease-fire agreement." (telegram 724, 501.BB Palestine/6–1449)

Reedman was able to cite spontaneous Jordanian protests against Israeli action.

Eban, in letter to Bunche, dated June 10, received by latter today, asked him to use his influence on Jordanians to implement Article 8 of armistice agreement relative to Scopus. Stated that no progress had been made in negotiations. He did not offer any information regarding issues at stake or course of discussions. Since there is no UN observer at special committee meetings, Bunche is almost completely uninformed re status of these discussions.[2]

Ross

[2] New York advised, on June 14, that "Bunche this noon requested US support for his urgent request to Israelis that they withdraw from Government House demilitarized zone." It also reported that "Eban agreed fully with Bunche that UN was rightfully in demilitarized zone on request of parties and could only be asked to leave if mutual agreement on disposition of zone reached between parties." (telegram 724, 501.BB Palestine/6–1449)

501.BB Palestine/6–1349 : Telegram

Mr. John C. Ross to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY NEW YORK, June 13, 1949—11 : 30 p. m.

723. Bunche informed USUN this evening that at MAC meeting Riley and Jordan voted for proposal that both sides should withdraw from demilitarized zone in Jerusalem, but Israelis voted against, therefore proposal failed.

Bunche informed us that he is calling Eban in tomorrow to tell him bluntly that Israelis must withdraw from demilitarized zone or he will immediately resign as Acting Mediator and inform SC that reason is Israeli violation of agreement. Bunche says he will state publicly that there is no point in his attempting to negotiate a Syrian-Israeli armistice agreement if the Israelis are not going to observe such agreement. Upon his return to New York this evening, he reviewed the entire situation and is thoroughly disgusted with Israeli policy re Jerusalem demilitarized zone. He terms policy as "criminally crooked", stating that there could be no doubt that whole basis of armistice agreement was that Israeli-Arab lines should remain as they were unless changed by mutual agreement.[1]

Ross

[1] Jerusalem reported, on June 14, that "At conclusion 6-hour meeting yesterday MAC passed resolution providing for simultaneous withdrawal troops of both sides by 1000 hours GMT today. . . . Resolution stated both sides violated armistice by moving troops into neutral zone. Riley cast deciding vote siding with Arab Delegation against Israel." (telegram 417, 501.BB Palestine/6–1449)

Later the same day, Jerusalem reported an unofficial statement by a United Nations officer that Israeli and Arab forces had withdrawn from the Government House zone on schedule (telegram 421, 501.BB Palestine/6–1449).

867N.48/6–1449

The Secretary of Defense (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 14 June 1949.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In reply to your letter of May 4, 1949, concerning the probable effects of the Arab refugee problem upon our military and strategic interests in the Near East, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been obtained and I wish to give you the position of the National Military Establishment on this matter.

The primary significance for the Military Establishment of the Arab refugee problem lies in the strategic importance of the Middle East to the U.S. and its security interests. This area is important not only from the point of view of actual military operations, but for its valuable petroleum resources which may be essential to the conduct of a future war. As the Joint Chiefs of Staff have frequently indicated, either unfriendly control of that area or the failure of the United States to retain the orientation of the area toward the West could, in the event of a global war, have profound effect upon the course of such a war.

It follows that all reasonable political and economic effort toward the maintenance and improvement of friendly relations with the nations of the Middle East is justified. It follows, further, that our policy logically should extend to strengthening of the Arab States so that their friendliness in war emergency may be useful.

The present refugee situation as pointed out in your letter will, unless rectified, serve to perpetuate and aggravate conditions of insecurity, unrest, and political instability, with attendant opportunity for Soviet penetration. In addition, constructive United States assistance with respect to refugees would be an asset with respect to maintenance and improvement of friendly relations with the Arab States, while the withholding of such assistance would add to the trend toward Arab embitterment.

In connection with this matter I should like to refer you to a recent intelligence estimate prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency (Intelligence Memorandum No. 180, a copy of which is attached [1]). In this memorandum, the CIA points out the serious risks inherent in the continuation of the present situations. These risks, insofar as they affect U.S. security, cause us serious concern.

The refugee problem, if unresolved, may not have specific, direct effect upon present U.S. military (as distinguished from strategic) interests in the Middle East area. The refugee problem can, however, have very serious repercussions on our strategic interests because those

[1] Not printed.

interests are bound to suffer unless the stability and friendship of the Middle East area are maintained and unless conditions there are sufficiently improved to permit Israeli and Arab reconciliation, at least to the extent that the area as a whole might reasonably be expected to resist Soviet penetration and to act in concert to oppose Soviet aggression.

We have offered no proposals for the solution of this very serious problem, but we stand ready to cooperate with you in taking appropriate steps to do so. We agree fully, however, with the tenor of your letter. We believe that a satisfactory long-term solution for security in that area and the earliest resolution of this and other major differences between Israel and the neighboring Arab States will pay important dividends in terms of our national security.[2]

Sincerely yours, LOUIS JOHNSON

[2] Secretary Acheson, in a memorandum of July 7, transmitted to President Truman a copy of Secretary Johnson's memorandum and of the intelligence estimate (867N.48/7–749).

501.BB Palestine/6–1449 : Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Troutman) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY GENEVA, June 14, 1949—4 p. m.

577. Palun 204. From Hare. On June 13 PCC held private meeting with Eytan re some of Israeli suggestions reported in Palun 197.[1] Boisanger reiterated Arabs continued find it difficult meet directly with Israelis and pointed out Arabs and Israelis had both agreed as result Beirut meeting merely come to Lausanne for exchange views.

Hare summarized Israeli and Arab proposals to PCC and observed next move up to Israeli delegates.

Eytan replied that six months had passed since adoption GA resolution December 11, and it seemed logical believe Arabs should now be able to meet directly with Israelis. Although Israel still had Arab memo outlined in Palun 166 [2] under study, Eytan did not believe immediate affirmative action would be productive as Arabs had not thus far even commented on action already taken by Israelis as reported in Palun 145.[3] Furthermore he seriously doubted efficacy of particularist approach to general settlement. Eytan then put hypothetical question whether, if Israel accepted principle of repatriation "without any strings attached," Arabs would be persuaded to conclude

[1] Identified also as telegram 920, June 12, from Bern, p. 1122.
[2] Dated May 23, from Lausanne, p. 1044.
[3] Identified also as telegram 410, May 10, from Geneva, p. 992.

peace. Eytan continued that under present circumstances in Israel and elsewhere in Near East it would be impossible for Israel actually to consider return refugees until Israel was informed of complete scientific, economic and financial plan for repatriation and resettlement of refugees. Until latter was known in detail, Israel would not even be in position to consider how many refugees could be repatriated to Israel. Meanwhile, Eytan contended that Israel's proposal re separated families (Palun 145) and its willingness to take Gaza strip and refugees therein (Palun 162 [4]) was liberal realistic approach to refugee question. Here again Eytan observed Arab delegates had not even commented on Israeli proposals.

Yalcin made moving statement re more affirmative approach by Israel pointing out Israel could accept principle of repatriation subject to such provisions as those who wished to return, those who wished to live at peace with their neighbors, special categories, international aid. Yalcin's contention was that acceptance in principle contingent on numerous provisos would provide Arabs with point of departure and thereafter permit both Israelis and Arabs to tackle refugee question constructively.

Hare observed that all were convinced that Israel and Arab states sincerely desirous of establishment lasting peace in Palestine and Middle East. If refugee question remained unsolved, such peace would hopelessly be delayed. But to approach refugee question, it would be necessary to have preliminary agreement of both sides. Unless such agreement were obtained UN, international agencies, member governments and private organizations would have considerable difficulty in developing economic and financial plans for Palestine and Middle East which would assist in solving refugee question.

Eytan listened attentively although Ethridge discussion reported Palun 174 [5] must have been familiar to him. Eytan's argument might be described as: "Tell me how much you will pay and I will tell you what, if anything, I will sell."

Eytan agreed further discussion with PCC would be helpful at some future date. At moment it is difficult to determine Eytan's motivation and intent in refugee question. Developments during next few days may make his meaning clear.

Sent Department 577, repeated Paris 73 (for Jessup). [Hare.]

TROUTMAN

[4] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1036.
[5] Identified also as telegram 821, May 28, from Bern, p. 1069.

501.BB Palestine/6–1449 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, June 14, 1949—7 p. m.

367. Deputy Under Sec Rusk June 14 called in Israeli Chargé, said Dept had received reports cancellation all Israeli Army leave June 9 and 10 and of unusual Israeli mil activity Jerusalem vicinity and Syrian border region,[2] and inquired whether Chargé could tell Dept if these reports true and if so what they meant. Chargé said had received no info.

Rusk then stated view signature armistice agreements and admission Israel UN, US now considered mil phase Pal definitely at end. Resolution problem Syrian-Israeli armistice now being worked on by Bunche and also was matter which in no way justified recourse to mil action by either side. Same thing applied to situation in Jerusalem which had been prejudiced by recent Israeli move. Peace and stability NE extremely important to US and Dept perturbed by above reports from Israel. Rusk did not presume state what these reports meant but desired Chargé inform his Govt that US, as friend of Israel, would be deeply disappointed if Israel should undertake new mil action. No one cld foresee consequences of such action, which would be completely unjustified by circumstances.

Chargé said wld immediately convey info to his Govt.

WEBB

[1] This telegram was repeated to Arab capitals and Jerusalem and to Bern for the United States Delegation at Lausanne.

[2] Tel Aviv advised, on June 17, that the resumption of Syrian-Israeli armistice talks had tended to relieve tensions in that area (telegram 467, 867N.00 (W)/6–1749).

501.BB Palestine/6–1549

Memorandum by Mr. Mark F. Ethridge to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 15, 1949.

The U.S. Delegation at Lausanne wants instruction on the following points:

(1) Recess. In the attached telegram [2] Hare points way in which a shorter recess can be achieved and still avoid danger that Arabs will not show up at New York.

[1] Mr. Ethridge, on his return to the United States, informed President Truman that "the Arab-Israeli negotiations at Lausanne under the auspices of the Conciliation Commission are 'deadlocked' and that both Israeli and Arab representatives must adopt 'entirely new approaches' if a formal peace is to be reached." (Department of State *Bulletin*, June 19, 1949, p. 780) The date of Mr. Ethridge's interview with the President is not indicated in the *Bulletin*.

[2] Not found attached.

In the light of his telegram and my own further thinking, what I would suggest is this:

That the American delegation be instructed, unless constructive proposals are forthcoming by the end of next week, to propose a recess in the talks to a date one month before the September Assembly, the Commission to meet then in New York (not at Lake Success).

The Jerusalem committee, technical committee on refugees, and the general political committee be instructed to continue their work.

The Commission to have temporary headquarters at League Palace in Geneva or in Jerusalem and members to be available to consider any new proposals or any other matter at the call of the Chairman.

Agreement to recess on the part of Israel and Arab states is not necessary. Neither side will agree because it will be an admission that they were in some way responsible. The Commission should assume the responsibility and regard it as a form of pressure on both sides.

Both sides should be warned by Commission and by the U.S. that any resort to force in any circumstance would be regarded most seriously.

Both sides should be told that the Commission, as always, welcomes any proposals that either side may make in the interim and that both parties are of course free to have any negotiations, direct or otherwise.

(2) Refugee Plan: You will remember that Eytan proposed to the Commission that the refugee problem be taken out of the context of the negotiations: that is, the United States is to pick up the check. Eytan appeared before the Commission again on Monday of this week and Hare summarizes his position in Palun 204[3] as, "Tell me how much you will pay and I will tell you what, if anything, I will sell."

Israel's position on refugees has stiffened, rather than modified, since the Tel Aviv conferences. Whereas she said at first that she would be willing to consider the return of refugees within the context of a general peace settlement, she now says (quoting Hare), "Under the circumstances in Israel and elsewhere in the Near East it would be impossible for Israel actually to consider the return of refugees until Israel was informed of a complete scientific, economic and financial plan for the resettlement of refugees. Until the latter was known in detail, Israel would not even be in a position to consider how many refugees could be repatriated to Israel." In other words, Israel is trying to force us to buy her into accepting her own obligation.

Her new position raises the question whether, having partially conditioned our promises of help on Israel's fulfillment of her obligation under the resolution to our satisfaction, it would be prudent, helpful to a peace settlement, or possible either with the White House or with Congress, to abandon that position.

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[3] Identified also as telegram 577, June 14, from Geneva, p. 1135.

Israel's great burden in accepting refugees is of course apparent, but in her Gaza proposal she admitted the possibility, with help, of absorbing the 230,000 refugees there, the 80,000 normal population and the broken families (estimated at between 35,000 and 140,000 people). In the Gaza proposal she made no such condition as she makes now. She could certainly with help absorb from 200,000 to 250,000 refugees even if she did not get the Gaza strip. If she would make a statement to that effect, hedging it with reservations as to what sort of refugees and under what conditions, we could then get a commitment from the Arab states.

I doubt very much, however, if in buying Israel into that agreement in principle we are satisfying the Arab demand for her to evidence her good faith under the resolution or that we are helping the position of the United States vis-à-vis either Israel or the Arab states. If we are going to buy peace let us make sure that it is to be peace and not disgruntlement which would arise in Arab states from further financial concessions to Israel without requiring her to fulfill the obligations of a UN member. I do not, therefore, think it is either prudent or contributory to peace to accept her conditions.

I leave to the Department the question whether the President or Congress would be willing to modify conditions under which help might be extended in resettlement and repatriation of refugees.

I would suggest, therefore, that you and George McGhee consider this course:

(1) Instruct the American delegation that in view of the fact that the President's conditions have not been met, the United States is not willing to introduce into the Commission the "McGhee plan"[4] at this juncture, although it renews the commitment that it is willing to help in the refugee situation under the conditions already outlined to the Israeli and Arab delegations and to the members of the Commission. It should be said, also, that if and when those conditions are met the United States will be willing to introduce the plan.

(2) In the meantime work on a governmental, rather than Commission level, to get acceptance of the conditions.

(3) Recognizing that time is vital, in view of the expiration of UNRPR funds and the approach of the General Assembly, establish an organization that is ready to go quickly into action once it has been approved by the UN. I think it is necessary even to go so far as to have personnel on paper, though that would have to be quietly done.

(4) Make every effort to obtain funds for interim aid, not on a basis of relief, but on a basis of employment. The morale of the refugees is deteriorating daily and becoming more dangerous. If winter comes with no help, there will be an explosive situation in the Middle East. Money will obviously have to be obtained from sources other than Congress for that interim help.

M[ARK F.] E[THRIDGE]

[4] This refers, presumably, to Mr. McGhee's memorandum of April 22 and its several annexes, p. 934.

867N.48/6–1549

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Coordinator on Palestine Refugee Matters (McGhee)

SECRET TEL AVIV, June 15, 1949.

DEAR MCGHEE: Back of my telegram of today [1] for your personal attention, copy of which is attached, lies the following reasoning.

Negatively, it is now indisputable that the PCC has shown such inherent organizational weaknesses that not even the super-energy and devotion of Mark Ethridge could galvanize it into life. Of course, its problems have been difficult and neither Arabs nor Jews have cooperated as they should; but the indictment that the PCC has shown itself "an inefficient postoffice" cannot be argued away.

Because the PCC is organically so weak, I think it a grave and unnecessary risk to contemplate using it as the base—no matter how indirectly—for the long term resettlement operations so wisely envisaged in your April 27 memorandum.[2] To tie up those difficult and technical operations with an organization as political and as weak as the PCC would be to invite failure.

On the affirmative side, I urge in the strongest possible way that the basis for the resettlement operations should be a single individual with authority to give binding directions. At every stage in the development of these plans, there will arise prickly questions which unless grasped firmly by someone who has the power and the will to override nationalist and other obstructive tactics will cause the history of the refugees resettlement program to be a repetition of the old one—too little and too late.

Could not Griffis's office have its mandate so broadened as to constitute a requisite base for the projected resettlement operations? The advantages of such a setup would be several:

1. Single-headed direction in the formulation and execution of basic policies, thus avoiding the acknowledged and unacknowledged cross purposes in the PCC which have tended to paralyze its actions.
2. The energy and devotion at the top which are essential and can be secured only through the driving leadership of an executive of the highest calibre.
3. Just recognition of the leading role which the United States through its generous contribution is making to a refugee solution. Such recognition will never be adequate through any tripartite base such as the PCC.

I recognize that it may be difficult or possibly embarrassing for the Department to reconsider its organizational plans. Nonetheless, I feel

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[1] No. 452 from Tel Aviv, not printed; it expressed the Ambassador's doubts that a "triple-headed PCC can be effective as base essential resettlement and related operations." (867N.48/6–1549)

[2] This reference is presumably to the "Proposed Plan of Action," p. 939.

impelled to make the above suggestions in the conviction that such reconsideration is essential.[3]

Cordially yours, JAMES G. McDONALD

[3] Mr. McGhee, in reply on July 1, advised Ambassador McDonald, in part, as follows:

"Let me hasten to assure you that we have never contemplated utilizing the PCC as an operating agency. We have viewed the PCC as a body which could initiate studies and pave the way for the development of a resettlement program rather than one which would implement such a program with any funds which might be made available for that purpose. We have had in mind for some time the establishment by the PCC of an Economic Survey Group to be composed of outstanding individuals whose personal authority would carry great weight. It has not yet been possible to activate this Group, the principal reason being that we have not been able to get a specific commitment from the Israeli or Arab Governments with regard to the number of refugees which they would undertake to repatriate or resettle. Under these circumstances it may be necessary to approach the problem in a somewhat different manner, but we are convinced that the PCC should have a carefully formulated program as a basis for its recommendations to the General Assembly which will need to take the necessary action to initiate the future program. . . . We fully agree with you that, whatever the form of the organization, its success will in large part depend upon the selection of a director who can give strong leadership to the program." (867N.48/6–1549)

867N.01/6–1549 : Telegram

The Chargé in Jordan (Stabler) to the Secretary of State

SECRET AMMAN, June 15, 1949—8 a. m.

247. During talk with Prime Minister June 11, following discussed:

1. Referring to present situation in Jerusalem, Prime Minister said Transjordan Government determined not to make further concessions to Israelis and would not recede from its position by Israeli threat or use of force. It would be preferable for Israel, which appears to have no end to its expansionist ambitions, to make good its demands by force and conquest than for Transjordan to make any further concessions in hope of settling problem on reasonable basis. Every effort by Transjordan to meet with Israelis in spirit of reason and compromise had ended in failure. (In earlier talks same day King made similar comments stating that although he had endeavored to be reasonable, Israel always trying to get "stranglehold" on him). Prime Minister emphasized that his remarks did not mean that Transjordan had changed its attitude re desire settle Palestine problem and that Transjordan had no thought resuming hostilities. He only wished to make clear that Transjordan had gone about as far as it could in acceding to Israeli demands.

[Here follow paragraphs numbered 2 to 5, giving the Prime Minister's views on the desire of Transjordan to establish good relations with Syria; the determination of Transjordan not to enter into separate negotiations with Israel; the need of Transjordan, Egypt, and Iraq for internal security arms "as every bit of strength gained by

Arabs meant that much less feeling of superiority and aggressiveness on part Israel"; and the "fact" that continuation by Israel of its present policy would only result in increasing the determination of the Arab peoples "to prepare themselves for final destruction of Jewish state."]

Sent Department 247, repeated Bern 25 for USDel PCC, pouched London, Tel Aviv, Arab capitals, Jerusalem.

STABLER

501.BB Palestine/6–1549 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Vincent) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET BERN, June 15, 1949—noon.

940. Palun 207 from Hare. USDel doubts possibility obtaining agreement mentioned Unpal 146 [1] in near future for following reasons:

1. Israel is unwilling negotiate with Syria at Lausanne on any question including political and economic matters under GA resolution December 11 pending conclusion Israeli-Syrian armistice.
2. Arabs unwilling meet Israelis directly at Lausanne or even to reply indirectly through PCC pending affirmative Israeli action re refugee question.
3. Resulting stalemate as Israelis unwilling talk refugee question outside context general settlement including territorial question.
4. PCC including French, Turkish and US delegates as well as Arab delegates and perhaps Israeli Delegation are not technically prepared to discuss.

USDel believes water resources question should be studied by economic survey group before it is considered by PCC or meeting of states concerned. [Hare.]

VINCENT

[1] Dated June 12, to Lausanne, p. 1123.

501.BB Palestine/6–1549 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Vincent) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL BERN, June 15, 1949—noon.

939. Palun 208. From Hare. At PCC general committee meeting June 14 Sassoon and Hirsch dispelled any hope which Eytan's statements (reference Palun 205[*204?* [1]]) might have contained.

Agenda consisted points 1 and 2 in Palun 166 and point 3 in Palun 165.[2]

[1] Identified also as telegram 577, June 14, from Geneva, p. 1135.
[2] Both dated May 23, from Lausanne, pp. 1044 and 1043 respectively.

Re point 1 Sassoon stated Israelis were unable consider refugee return separately but only in context of whole peace settlement consequently immediate return was not possible. Israelis would, on other hand, take certain limited steps to preserve Arab property in orange groves. Sassoon indicated however, Israel had general economic plan for Israel which might provide for only certain acreage in orange groves. Some Arab groves including those lacking care or destroyed by war would probably be put to other use.

Re point 2, Sassoon indicated present Israeli currency regulations would prevent unblocking of Arab accounts. Sassoon suggested International Red Cross might make use of Arab accounts within Israel which would permit use of equivalent amount International Red Cross money outside Israel for refugees.

Israeli delegation stressed answers were preliminary as both points are still "under sympathetic consideration in Tel Aviv".[3]

Re point 3, as result long involved discussion it became clear Israelis do not consider this Arab proposal on basis May 12 protocol as basis for negotiation of either refugee or territorial question (reference Palun 169 [4]). Arabs consider Israeli territorial proposals in Palun's 162 [5] and 173 [6] as violation of May 12 protocol. Result is deadlock.

Sent Department 939, repeated Paris 58 for Jessup. [Hare.]

VINCENT

[3] The Department commented, on June 20, that the use of blocked Arab accounts in the manner suggested in point two of the Sassoon statement "appears clear violation spirit of GA Res Dec 11. Even if state claims right confiscate property own citizens, applicable portions GA Res based on equity as well as law and refugees fleeing from war seem to have position equivalent aliens whose property entitled protection.

"[The question of] Blocked accounts presents more clearcut case but different only in degree from that of orange groves discussed under point 1. Shld be made clear no implication condoning any misuse Arab property contrary to principles law or equity." (Telegram Unpal 157 to Bern, repeated to Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/6–2049)

[4] Identified also as telegram 819, May 28, from Bern, p. 1067.

[5] Dated May 23, from Lausanne, not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1036.

[6] Identified also as telegram 820, May 28, from Bern, p. 1068.

501.BB Palestine/6–1549 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET PARIS, June 15, 1949—7 p. m.

Actel 74. During call on Secretary June 14 Bevin inquired as to our current thinking on Palestine situation, including Lausanne conference and problem of Transjordan. Secretary outlined to him views expressed by Ethridge during visit Paris, mentioning probable adjournment Lausanne talks and Ethridge view neither side wants to make peace. Bevin inquired whether we thought Jews would start to

fight, stating this raised urgently question of supplying arms to Transjordan. Secretary discussed recent US note to Israelis and Israeli reply, reading substance paragraph two Telac 78[1] and pointing out Department wished Bevin consider carefully problem which might be created if UK becomes involved in conflict between Israel and Transjordan. Bevin said he had not had report from British chiefs of staff. He was much concerned about abandonment of Abdullah and said trend of UK thinking was now in direction of giving Abdullah arms and *de jure* recognition of incorporation of administered territories in Palestine. Bevin said Abdullah had strong support in House of Commons, including Churchill's support. He promised to give us considered answer on this question in day or two.

Secretary then gave Bevin substance first paragraph Telac 79[2] reporting McDonald's views on current Israeli claims, adding that Ethridge agreed with general view of Bevin about desirability of concluding agreement on water rights. Jessup mentioned view expressed by both Ethridge and Cordier, who had just come from Lausanne, to effect Arabs counting on weakening of Israel in next two years. Bevin said some of his people believed civil war in Israel quite possible, and they doubted whether Ben Gurion could maintain his hold. Secretary also commented on difficulties Jewish drive for funds in US now experiencing.

ACHESON

[1] Dated June 12, to Paris, p. 1126.

[2] Dated June 13, 5 p. m., to Paris, not printed; the first paragraph of this "top secret summary for the Secretary" digested Mr. Sharett's views as set forth in telegram 443, June 10, from Tel Aviv, p. 1110, and Ambassador McDonald's views as given in his two telegrams of June 11; regarding these two latter messages, see editorial note, p. 1115.

501.BB Palestine/6–1649

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 16, 1949.

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT, THURSDAY, JUNE 16, 1949

U.S. APPROACH TO TRANSJORDAN

I delivered to the President the original of the attached memorandum with respect to the recent U.S. approach to Transjordan. The President read the pertinent sections and kept it. He indicated approval of the action taken in the Department.

J[AMES] W[EBB]

[Annex]

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Department's Message to Transjordan concerning Separate Negotiations with Israel.

The following is the pertinent section of a message sent by the Department on June 1 to the American Legation at Amman, Transjordan:

[Here follows first paragraph of telegram 72 to Amman, except that the last sentence is omitted.]

The background of this matter is as follows:

In the latter part of May, at a time when the discussions being conducted by the Palestine Conciliation Commission at Lausanne were approaching a crucial point, Elias Sassoon, a representative of the Israeli Government, sent from Paris a message to King Abdullah of Transjordan asserting that the Lausanne talks were a complete failure and requesting Transjordan to enter into separate talks, parallel to the Lausanne discussions, in Jerusalem. King Abdullah, who had placed great hopes in the Lausanne talks and had instructed his representatives to make every effort to reach agreement with the Israelis there, reacted strongly against this proposal and confided his concern to the United States Chargé d'Affaires. He was not inclined to accede to the Israeli request, since the talks were progressing at Lausanne and in view of what had happened when separate talks last took place between Israel and Transjordan without the presence of a third party.

This occurred in March, while Dr. Bunche was conducting negotiations for an armistice between Transjordan and Israel with representatives of the two countries at Rhodes. Without Dr. Bunche's knowledge Israel proposed a secret meeting with Transjordan, to take place in Jerusalem while the Rhodes talks were going on. Transjordan agreed, and during the meeting the Israeli representatives stated that Israel would not sign an armistice at Rhodes unless Transjordan agreed in Jerusalem to turn over to Israel certain areas in central Palestine then occupied by Iraqi forces. Upon the withdrawal of the Iraqi Army, Transjordan was scheduled to take over the areas occupied by Iraq, but in Jerusalem the representatives of Israel warned that if Transjordan attempted to do so without agreeing to turn over the areas in question, Israel, in addition to not signing the armistice, would not be responsible for the consequences. The Israeli representatives gave those of Transjordan 24 hours to agree. Abdullah appealed to the United States, but when no help came he signed the forced agreement on the theory that when this was done and the armistice signed at Rhodes, it might be more difficult for the Israelis to make more territorial demands. As a result, some of the richest land in Palestine

passed to Israeli control and the number of Arab refugees was considerably increased.

Although no agreement had been reached at Lausanne, largely because of the rigidity of the Israeli position, the Department felt that Sassoon was totally incorrect in stating that the talks were a complete failure. The Department also believed that it was essential to give the strongest support to the Conciliation Commission, which was attempting to reach an equitable agreement between the parties and offered all the necessary facilities to the parties for reaching such an agreement. Under the circumstances, separate talks seemed totally unnecessary, and likely to lead to circumstances similar to those under which Transjordan was forced to give up considerable territory in order to achieve an armistice with Israel. Accordingly, the Department, in the interests of a just settlement, suggested to King Abdullah that he not enter the separate talks with Israel.

An additional motive for the Department's approach to King Abdullah was the possibility that Israel and Transjordan, by negotiating together on the question of Jerusalem without the presence of the Conciliation Commission, might reach an agreement concerning the City which would disregard the international and Christian interests in Jerusalem and in the Holy Places.

501.BB Palestine/6–1649

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 16, 1949.

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT, THURSDAY, JUNE 16, 1949

MARK ETHRIDGE

The President expressed himself as being satisfied with the approach of Mr. Mark Ethridge to the Israeli problem and said he felt the proposal that the meeting be adjourned and then reconvened a month before the UN session was a good one.

The President desires to have for his information and files copies of the memoranda covering the talks between Ethridge [1] and President Ben Gurion.

J[AMES E.] W[EBB]

[1] Mr. Ethridge submitted a letter dated June 17 to President Truman confirming his resignation as a member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission. The Department of State drafted a reply for the President, dated June 24, accepting the resignation at the close of business the following day (501.BB Palestine/6–2149).

501.BB Palestine/6–1649 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, June 16, 1949—noon.

426. Dayan yesterday explained to Consulate General Israeli position on relation between Jordan armistice agreement and SC resolution on Palestine and present status UN personnel here. Armistice agreement which was signed to implement November 16 SC resolution represents one step beyond SC truce order of July 15 and previous SC resolution on Palestine. Israel and Jordan have progressed from truce stage to armistice stage on road to final peace. Armistice agreement supersedes various SC resolutions which no longer apply and powers conferred by them on UN personnel as well as restrictions imposed no longer in effect. To interpret situation otherwise would result in numerous contradictions. Terms of armistice conflict with SC resolution and interpretation of mediator. For example, SC truce resolution of July 15 and mediator's instructions prohibit any change in lines while armistice provides for various shifts. Also under SC resolution UN observers empowered to issue orders to either party in case of violation of truce; under armistice Chief of Staff can only vote as one member of PAC [*MAC*]. Under SC resolution UN officers free move anywhere, observe and enforce truce; now can only move when requested by MAC and lack enforcement powers. Bunche at Rhodes much concerned with these contradictions but urged both parties proceed on basis realities rather than technicalities.

Because only armistice now binding UN no longer possesses rights at Govt House and personnel privilege of moving as wishes. PCC never possessed special right conferred by SC resolution. UN personnel in same position as any other civilians and have no more right remain in No Man's Land than any other. Dayan denied any intention challenging entire position UN in Jerusalem.

I replied stating was expressing only personal views, that did not believe armistice supersedes and cancels out SC resolution. Latter could only be altered by SC and remains in force until SC takes specific action or peace established. Mediator and UN personnel hold same powers and rights as before but could logically refrain from exercising certain ones. Restrictions in SC resolution on both parties remain fully in force. If Israel feels situation incongruous and wishes change should as UN member apply to SC. Not proper question for consideration by MAC. However, I doubted SC willing rescind various resolutions until final peace treaties signed.

Sent Department 426, repeated Geneva 38, London 21, Baghdad 39, Beirut 86, Damascus 41, Tel Aviv 58. Pouched Amman, Cairo, Jidda.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/6–2249

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 17, 1949.

Participants: The Acting Secretary—Mr. Webb
G—Mr. Rusk
Mr. Mark Ethridge
NE—Mr. Rockwell
Mr. Aubrey Eban—Israeli Representative in United Nations
Mr. Reuven Shiloah—Special Assistant to Prime Minister Ben Gurion
Mr. Uriel Heyd—Chargé d'Affaires a.i., Embassy of Israel

The meeting, which had been arranged at the request of Messrs. Heyd, Shiloah and Eban, began at 11:45 and lasted until 1:45.

Mr. Eban opened the conversation by stating that he and Mr. Shiloah had been instructed by the Israeli Government to offer certain verbal comment in connection with the Israeli reply [1] to the note which the President directed be delivered in Tel Aviv on the basic aspects of a final settlement in Palestine.

Mr. Eban stated that he first wished to assure me of the deep feeling of friendship which Israel felt for the United States and of the profound Israeli gratitude for all that the United States had done for Israel. I said that this friendly feeling was reciprocated and that the United States desired its friendship for Israel to continue as strong in the future as in the past. It was because of friendly interest in the welfare of Israel that the President's note had been despatched.

Mr. Eban then said that the President's note dealt with two main subjects: territorial compensation and the refugees.

TERRITORIAL COMPENSATION

With regard to the first, the Israeli Government had the following objections.

Moral Objection—

Israel felt that it was immoral that anyone should think of rewarding the Arabs for the aggression which they launched against Israel. There had been extremely heavy loss of life among the population of Israel as a result, and Israel believed that rather than receiving compensation, the Arabs owed reparations to Israel.

[1] Dated June 8, p. 1102.

Territorial Compensation Rejected by the General Assembly—

Israel understood that the United States is attempting to implement the December 11 resolution of the General Assembly. However, this resolution made no mention of territorial compensation but rather called upon the parties to reach agreement among themselves without any predetermined territorial formula being involved. As a matter of fact, the General Assembly had specifically rejected such a territorial formula. In the debate in the General Assembly Mr. Dulles [2] had stated that the boundary settlement should be left entirely to the parties. The Palestine Conciliation Commission, while invoking the principle contained in the December 11 resolution concerning refugees, should also approach the territorial question in the manner envisaged by the resolution.

Effect on Armistice Agreements—

The territorial compensation formula prejudges the issues decided in the various armistice agreements which have been concluded. While, of course, these agreements are dependent upon the final settlement, no one can say that the decisions arrived at in the agreements will not have a very important effect upon the form of the final settlement. It is thus undesirable to undermine what has already been accomplished by the agreements. Eban maintained that Israel holds no territory wrongfully, since her occupation of the areas now held has been sanctioned by the armistice agreements, as has the occupation of the territory in Palestine now held by the Arab states.

Psychological Effect on Arab World—

It is most undesirable, by means of the territorial compensation formula, to raise in the Arab world hopes which are impossible of fulfillment. The Israelis have noted a definite change in the Arab attitude. Arab representatives who formerly alleged they wanted no part of Palestine are now making demands for large slices of the Negev.

Refugees

Eban maintained that Israel had not adopted a negative attitude concerning the refugees. He said Israeli representatives had made the following concrete proposals.

1. The proposal to take over the Gaza strip with all its occupants.
2. An offer to repatriate members of broken families, after a census of such members had been taken. He thought that maybe 50,000 persons might come back to Israel if this were done.
3. Israel has accepted the responsibility for refugees who have managed to filter back into Israel. All in all, Eban thought these

[2] John Foster Dulles, member of the United States Delegation at the Second Part of the Third Regular Session of the General Assembly.

Israeli proposals would mean the eventual repatriation of some 300,000 refugees. Accordingly, it could not be said that Israel had adopted a negative attitude or rejected the principle of repatriation.

In this connection, Mr. Eban said that Mr. Acheson, during a conversation with Mr. Eban and Mr. Sharett in New York,[3] had agreed that the security question was an important deterrent to the beginning of repatriation. Mr. Rusk interjected that this was not exactly so since what the Secretary had said was that Israel should begin the repatriation of refugees into areas where there was no security problem.

4. Mr. Eban maintained that Israel had agreed to unfreeze Arab bank accounts and to accept the responsibility for abandoned Arab lands in Israeli territory.

Mr. Eban then stated that the Israelis felt that their initiative at Lausanne had been unilateral and that although they were ready to make peace at Lausanne, there was no reciprocity. As further indications of the initiative taken by Israel, Mr. Eban cited the Israeli agreement to the internationalization of the Holy Places and the creation of a free-zone for Jordan at Haifa. There had been no response to any of these concessions by the Arab representatives.

Mr. Eban continued by stating that despite the provision in this sense contained in the December 11 resolution, there had been no direct meetings at Lausanne between Arabs and Israelis. This had not been the case with the negotiations conducted by Dr. Bunche. The Conciliation Commission should bring the two parties together and this was one reason why Israel had made its proposal for the creation of separate committees to discuss the various items upon which there were differences. Mr. Ethridge replied that the Conciliation Commission had always encouraged direct negotiation. Israel bore the main responsibility for the failure of such negotiations to materialize, because on the few occasions when Israeli and Arab representatives had met together the results of their meetings had immediately appeared in the *Palestine Post*. This procedure put the Arab representatives in an awkward position and discouraged further meetings.

Mr. Shiloah said that he felt the Beirut meeting between representatives of the Arab states was primarily responsible for the fact that the Arabs did not meet with the Israelis at Lausanne, because the Arabs were mutually suspicious of each other and having adopted a common attitude at Beirut they did not dare depart from this. Mr. Ethridge said that without the Beirut meeting the Arabs would never have agreed even to go to Lausanne.

Mr. Eban then stated that the duty of the United States Government and the Palestine Conciliation Commission was to call upon the Arabs

[3] See Mr. Acheson's memorandum of April 5, p. 890.

to meet in separate negotiations with the Israelis according to the terms of the December 11 resolution.

Mr. Eban then took up the Israeli territorial proposals, stating that with Lebanon Israel had proposed the political frontier as the final boundary, the same with Egypt, and the present armistice line with Jordan.

At this point I said that so far I had seen no indication that the Israeli Government had any realization of the United States attitude in this matter. As far as I could see, Mr. Eban had had nothing new to add to what had been said so many times before. How, I asked, could we reconcile the reports of Israeli troop movements [4] with the stated reasonable attitude of Israel toward a final settlement?

Mr. Eban said that Israel had no intention of undertaking military activity. If there were any troop movements, it was because of concern regarding the possible intentions of Colonel Zaim, who was known to be an ambitious militarist. All of Syria's neighbors, including Israel, were fearful of a possible Syrian attack.

At this point the United States efforts to get Syria to agree to the Bunche proposal for an armistice with Israel were outlined to Mr. Eban.[5]

I then stated that with regard to the recent note to Israel, the Department had of course scrupulously observed Ambassador Elath's special plea that the utmost secrecy be maintained. Under these circumstances, we thought it most unusual that so much of the contents of the note had been made known in various parts of the world.

I said that it seemed to me essential that both sides should subordinate their special desires to the overall necessity for a real peace, and that I had the feeling that the desire to accomplish such a peace was not yet strong enough in Israel.

Mr. Ethridge then reviewed the course of action taken by the Palestine Conciliation Commission. He explained how after considerable difficulty the Commission had succeeded in getting the Arabs to abandon their attitude that the refugee question was the only point which should be considered and to come to Lausanne for general peace talks.

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[4] Tel Aviv, on June 13, reported the cancellation on June 9 and 10 of all leave from the Israeli Army, with the apparent intention of "preparing for action if as result of Zaim's reported refusal discuss Bunche proposal Syrian armistice negotiations fail." (telegram 448) The Department replied the following day, giving its assumption that "you are doing everything possible prevent new Israeli mil venture." (telegram 365) Both telegrams are filed under 867N.20/6–1349. Tel Aviv advised, on June 17, that Miss "Herlitz categorically denied that army leaves had been cancelled" (telegram 465, 867N.20/6–1749).

[5] Tel Aviv advised, in telegram 465 cited in footnote 4 above, of further information from Miss Herlitz that Israeli-Syrian negotiations resumed on June 16 "'in spirit of friendly cordiality,' that 'some actual progress' was made, and that next meeting called for June 21. Not expected any definite conclusion will be reached for 'some weeks' as it is anticipated Syrian elections will tend slow up proceedings, but Israeli officials appear optimistic of eventual outcome."

The United States delegation had told the Arabs that their position on the refugees was totally fantastic. The United States delegation had also taken the main responsibility in drafting the proposals on Jerusalem, which were very favorable to the Israeli point of view.

The Arabs regarded the United Nations and the United States as responsible for the refugee problem and maintained that the United States must obtain evidence of the good faith of Israel concerning the refugees. Some temporary concession by Israel on this point, which could have been surrounded by provisos, would have satisfied the Arabs and provided the key to the opening of final peace negotiations. Despite all the efforts of Mr. Ethridge and the State Department, Israel made no such concession and the Conciliation Commission went to Lausanne with nothing to offer the Arabs.

Mr. Ethridge said that he noted that the Israelis were attributing the Gaza proposal to him, but the record was clear that Prime Minister Ben Gurion first broached the Gaza plan at Tiberias on April 18 in a conversation with Mr. Ethridge. Mr. Eytan later took up the subject again at Lausanne.

Mr. Ethridge said that the Arab representatives had never stated that they were not willing to talk peace at Lausanne.

Mr. Eban admitted "within these four walls" that it was true that Israel had refused to make the commitment which Mr. Ethridge had urged concerning the refugees.

He asked whether in view of the steps concerning the refugees which Israel had subsequently taken and which he had previously outlined it would still not be possible to go to the Arabs and ask them to begin serious talks. Mr. Ethridge said that if Israel would make a concrete numerical commitment concerning the refugees the stalemate at Lausanne could be resolved.

Mr. Ethridge then stated that Mr. Shiloah had been wrong in previous statements in this country that Israel had demanded no territory in central Palestine. Although Israeli representatives had not made such demands to the Palestine Conciliation Commission they had stated them in the General Committee of the Commission, and had discussed the necessity for more land in central Palestine in connection with the Israeli development scheme.

Mr. Ethridge stated his opinion that if Israel would assume the burden of taking back a portion of the Arab refugees, the world would rally to Israel for having taken such a step based on ethics and humanity.

Mr. Eban inquired whether Mr. Ethridge could refute the observation that the Arabs want to get the refugees back into Israel but do not wish to make peace. In reply, Mr. Ethridge said that at Lausanne the Egyptian representative had told him that if Israel would take

back more than a token number of refugees, Egypt would be willing to talk about a territorial settlement and to lift the economic blockade.

Mr. Shiloah said that the security question could not be disregarded. Israel had not seen the McGhee plan and was not sure that an overall scheme existed for resettlement of the refugees. All that was happening was that pressure was being put upon Israel to take back a definite number of refugees. Egypt, Syria and Jordan were rearming.[6]

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[6] The Department, the same day, summarized for the U.S. Delegation at Lausanne the meeting with the Israeli officials. The Department noted that the "Israelis reiterated at length familiar arguments why Israel unable take affirmative action re refugees and territorial settlement as set forth US note. US reps maintained firm line refuting number of allegations made by Israelis." The summary concluded as follows: "US reps reiterated belief that if Israel wld make firm commitment to PCC repatriation specific and substantial number refugees, deadlock at Lausanne wld be resolved and way to negotiations with Arab states for overall settlements would be opened. Pointed out no possibility US assistance re refugees unless Israelis and Arabs definitely accept their responsibilities re repatriation and resettlement.

"Israelis were told US believes fair final settlement cld not be achieved on basis Israel retaining all 1947 territory plus all territory under mil occupation." (Unpal 154 to Bern, 501.BB Palestine/6–1749)

867N.00/6–1149 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 17, 1949—6 p. m.

375. Dept has decided to propose Israel and TJ accept the procedure for Jlem along lines suggested in Jlem Tel 409 Jun 11 rptd to you as 52. Bunche has indicated agreement and requesting Riley act this capacity. You are accordingly requested to make presentation and leave *aide-mémoire* with Israeli Govt along fol lines:

"The US Govt is increasingly concerned that the situation in Jlem constitutes a threat to peace in Pal. It therefore is presenting the fol proposals to the govts of Israel and TJ with a view to obtaining an agreed settlement as to the questions immed in issue between them.

It is proposed that the two states agree that for this purpose the Special Comite established by the Armistice agreement shld be superseded by the Mixed Armistice Comm which shld meet under the chairmanship of Gen Riley. The terms of reference shld include such questions relating to the demarcation of Jewish and Arab zones, the use of roads and other questions of access to places in the Jlem area, and the functioning of public utilities as require agreement between the parties. Chmn shld have power to make proposals when he deems desirable. Agreed settlement these questions will be without prejudice to final decisions to be taken in collaboration with the UN regarding internatl status of Jlem area, but parties will agree to recommend inclusion agreed settlement in these decisions to extent conformable such decisions.

The Govt of TJ [*Israel*] is urged to accept this proposal in a spirit of accommodation and with determination that an agreement must be reached with all possible speed in order eliminate threat Jlem now presents to cause of peace in Pal."

We realize it may be difficult to achieve final agreement on terms reference thru separate negots Amman and Tel Aviv. However if you can achieve agreement in principle, parties cld meet in Jlem and finalize terms reference under chairmanship Riley.[1]

WEBB

[1] This telegram was repeated to Jerusalem. A virtually identical message was sent to Amman as telegram 82 the same day and time. The text of No. 375 was also sent as Unpal 153 to Bern, for the American Delegation at Lausanne, on June 17 (501.BB Palestine/6–1749).

Ambassador McDonald discussed the subject matter of telegram 375 with Miss Herlitz at the Israeli Foreign Office on June 19 and left an appropriate *aide-mémoire* the following day. He also described "Burdett's plan Jerusalem telegram to Department 409 June 11 as sound both in principles and details. It illustrates perfectly why immediate problem Jerusalem solvable only on spot." (telegram 469, June 20, from Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/6–2049)

501.BB Palestine/6–1749 : Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Troutman) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL GENEVA, June 17, 1949—7 p. m.

612. Palun 219. From Hare. On June 17 PCC met Arab delegates to discuss their memos of May 18, and 21 (Palun 166 and 165 [1]) and to elicit their further views regarding territorial matters. It was obvious Sharett statement before Knesset reported in Paris *Herald Tribune* June 16 to which Arab delegate referred at commencement of meeting served as background for Arab remarks.

Egyptian delegate made it clear that until progress is made regarding Arab memos of May 18 and 21 which dealt with both refugees and territory and, in effect, until refugee problem is settled in this manner in accord with GA resolution December 11, he could not on basis of instructions from his government take up other matters such as territorial arrangements. Recent statements have been reported from Tel Aviv regarding frontiers but nothing regarding refugees. It would not serve any purpose, therefore, in placing other matters before Arab delegates (such as Israeli proposal regarding territory).

Yalcin pointed out seriousness of Egyptian statement and asked if three other delegates had similar instructions. Lebanon, Transjordan and Syria supported Egyptian delegate.

[Here follows a detailed summary of the views of the delegates of the three Arab States, stressing Arab lack of trust in the good will and

[1] Both telegrams dated May 23, from Lausanne, pp. 1044 and 1043, respectively.

intentions of the Israelis, their violations of the decisions of the United Nations, and their expansionist tendencies. The Arabs, on the other hand, had "taken progressive steps in signing May 12 protocol and submitting on May 18 and 21 memos. Arabs unlike Jews have signed protocol May 12 without reservation."]

Lebanese concluded Arab delegates were legitimately preoccupied, that Jewish attitude was no help in common problem and that PCC should therefore act. [Hare.]

TROUTMAN

501.BB Palestine/6–1849 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland

SECRET PRIORITY NIACT

WASHINGTON, June 18, 1949—11 a. m.

Unpal 155. For US Del Lausanne. For Hare. After fullest consultation Ethridge, Dept concludes useful purpose wld be served by proposing adjourn PCC for two or three week period, during which delegations wld have fresh opportunity consult their govts with view to advancing constructive proposals upon reconvening Lausanne.

During adjournment, Jlem comite, technical comite on refugees, and genl political comite wld continue their work. Members PCC wld be subject to recall upon request either side. Both parties wld of course be entirely free to conduct direct or indirect negots. Despite adjournment, PCC and USG wld under no circumstances tolerate resort to force by either side.

Pls telegraph your comments on this proposal. If you concur in it Dept will seek Pres's agreement and thereafter approach Ankara and Paris requesting their support and suggesting they so instruct their reps Lausanne.[1]

WEBB

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[1] Mr. Hare, in reply on June 20, raised the "question of exactly what we could hope to achieve by such a step. Eytan has just returned from consultation with his government and Sharett's speech would hardly presage changed policy. Arab delegates here continue keep refugees doggedly to fore but they are split wide open on territorial issue and would be hard put to discuss territory even if refugee obstacle removed. In face these basic substantive differences it is difficult to see how short recess and reconvening here would further settlement as far as parties are concerned. Furthermore renewed contact French and Turkish PCC members with their governments could hardly be expected yield productive results. This leads to conclusion that, unless Department itself foresees possibility of using interim to advantage, probability is that negotiations would be renewed here on essentially same basis as present impasse except that by that time I hope, Ethridge successor would have been appointed. Should such be the case I find it difficult to see what would have been gained and would suggest that in that event further consideration be given to original idea of recess until August 15 in order make use of GA pressure where other expedients have failed.

Basic fact of course is that neither side actually ready for peace at this time." (telegram 974, identified also as Palun 220, from Bern, 501.BB Palestine/6–2049)

767N.90D/6–1649 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, June 18, 1949—2 p. m.

252. Referring to conversation reported in your tel No. 327 of June 16,[1] you may tell Arslan that US regards armistice agreements as very important stabilizing factors ME. The US will accordingly be prepared exercise its influence in SC to end that SC should take any necessary measures within scope Charter to deal with any threat to or violation intl peace and security arising from any threat to or breach these agreements. You may inform Arslan that Israeli Gov being informed this message with assurances impartial application.[2]

Reftel indicates possible misapprehension Arslan that Bunche proposal requires Syria withdraw several kilometers behind its own border. If necessary please make clear that proposal only requires withdrawal to intl boundary and that Syrians may station forces right up to the border, according Bunche's own interpretation.

WEBB

[1] Not printed.

[2] The Department repeated this paragraph in telegram 379 sent to Tel Aviv the same day. It concluded the message with an instruction to "inform Israeli Gov that our application foregoing policy will be impartial, depending entirely upon findings as to responsibility in event of threat or breach armistice agreement." (501.BB Palestine/6–1849)

Minister Keeley was received separately by Foreign Minister Arslan and Prime Minister Zaim on June 20 (telegrams 332, June 20, 501.BB Palestine/6–2049, and 335, June 21, 867N.01/6–2149, both from Damascus). The latter message expressed his optimism that "there is now good chance of early agreement on basis Bunche proposal of June 8 if Israeli show equal accommodating spirit. Department's expressed willingness to put weight its influence in SC behind observance any agreement reached has had marked reassuring effect."

501.MA Palestine/6–1849 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, June 18, 1949—3 p. m.

2104. Congressional action US appropriation for UN Refugee Relief nearly completed. Of $16 million appropriated, $4 million is conditional upon finding by Pres that other nations have met their obligations to UN Relief Palestine Refugees. Congressional feeling strong that total contribution should be made only if effective support forthcoming from other UN Members. To date only $6,690,000 contributed by govs other than US. Under terms of appropriation bill Dept considers it may be necessary to limit US contribution from conditional $4 million to amount total contributions from other nations exceeding $12,000,000.

Griffis informed UK considering contribution one million pounds to British Red Cross for refugee program in Trans-Jordan and plans approach UK on possibility channelling that contribution through UNRPR. Additional UK contribution in this amt combined with anticipated French contribution of 500 million francs and listing of Arab contributions in services and supplies estimated at approximately $4 million would bring total contributions from govs other than US to about $16 million. If UK contribution Red Cross does not go thru UNRPR we see little prospect obtaining US conditional contribution $4 million without which UNRPR would be obliged close down Oct. 1.

Therefore most essential for success of both present and long range programs that proposed UK contribution for British Red Cross be channeled thru UNRPR. We see no reason why under terms UN resolution of Nov. 19 conditional gift could not be made to UNRPR so that UK could obtain credit at home for supporting British Red Cross and abroad for supporting UNRPR. Dept hopes Griffis can proceed London immediately explore matter with FonOff. UNRPR Lake Success informed Dept that parliamentary questions on proposed contribution scheduled June 21.

Please bring foregoing attention FonOff and express hope satisfactory formula can be found for purposes indicated.[1]

WEBB

[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris for Ambassador Griffis and to New York. A message of similar import was sent to Paris at the same date and time. It stated that it was "Most essential for success of both present and long range programs that French contribution be effected." (telegram 2177, 501.MA Palestine/6–1849)

867N.01/6–1849 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Jordan[1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, June 19, 1949—2 p. m.

84. Ur niact 253, June 18.[2] At time sending Deptel 82[3] Dept was under impression parties had reached satisfactory interim agreement Govt House. Dept also acted under impression urgency Jerusalem negotiations be brought under effective UN chairmanship.

[1] This telegram was repeated to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

[2] Not printed; its first paragraph read: "Deptel 82, June 17 received this afternoon must have crossed mytel 250, June 15 [17]. As pointed out in my reftel am strongly of opinion that Government House question must be resolved before any action can be taken on Department's proposal. Unless that matter can be settled, there would seem little chance that Transjordan Government would be prepared to agree, even in principle, to this proposal. I believe Jerusalem would concur in this opinion and also feel Riley would agree. Therefore recommend Department authorize me and Tel Aviv delay presentation of proposal until Government House dispute is satisfactorily settled." (867N.01/6–1849) No. 250 is not printed.

[3] Dated June 17, not printed, but see footnote 1 to telegram 375, p. 1154.

Dept does not know at this time whether proposal has already been presented Tel Aviv. We therefore consider you shld proceed present proposal unless possible arrange directly with Tel Aviv more satisfactory timing.

Dept does not regard its proposal as effecting any great change in situation. Principal objective is place Riley in charge negotiations re territorial and other related matters Jerusalem area with object relieving tension. Agreement in principle both parties would permit Riley in consultation parties arrange priorities. If TJ insists prior settlement Govt House zone, this would also fall under Riley's jurisdiction and he could proceed accordingly. We feel simple fact agreement of parties to international chairmanship of negotiations on comprehensive scale may itself tend relax tension and cause parties direct their thinking toward peaceful settlement rather than seeking gain advantage by unilateral acts.

In approving presentation proposals Bunche said that since one method had failed we shld try another. Did not seem feel this marked notable change in procedures already under way.

Tel Aviv please note that in last para quoted material Deptel 375 [4] "TJ" shld read "Israel".

WEBB

[4] Dated June 17, p. 1154.

867N.01/6–2049 : Telegram

The Chargé in Jordan (Stabler) to the Secretary of State

SECRET AMMAN, June 20, 1949—4 p. m.

255. In view Deptel 84, June 19, and since it not possible communicate with Tel Aviv expeditiously I presented proposal contained in Deptel 82 June 17 [1] to Foreign Minister this morning and left him with *aide-mémoire*. Foreign Minister stated that Transjordan was anxious to settle questions at issue peacefully but felt Israeli demands excessive. If agreement could be reached on principle of returning life in Jerusalem to normal he believed there would be no difficulty in reaching understanding on present problems. Without agreement on this principle he was not hopeful. Foreign Minister promised take matter up with government urgently and give reply soonest. (It is understood Cabinet will consider proposal at Wednesday meeting, in meanwhile I will discuss matter with King and Prime Minister.)

[1] See footnote 1 to telegram 375, p. 1154.

Suggestion that presentation proposal be delayed (Legtel 253, June 18 [2]) was predicated on my belief that if Government House question finally settled to satisfaction both parties, MAC under Riley could start on other questions with clean slate and Transjordan Government would have more faith in Riley's ability to bring about agreement and in Israel's sincerity.[3]

Sent Department 255, repeated Jerusalem 124, Tel Aviv 21.

STABLER

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1157.

[3] Chargé Stabler reported, on June 22, that earlier the same day he had been handed an *aide-mémoire* by the Jordanian Foreign Minister, which welcomed the U.S. proposal but noted that any agreement must be without prejudice to the ultimate status of Jerusalem (telegram 259 from Amman, 867N.01/6–2249).

501.BB Palestine/6–1349 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 20, 1949—8 p. m.

Unpal 159. For USDel, Lausanne. Re internationalization Jerusalem. (Palun 201 [1]) In view insistent Israel refusal relinquish sovereignty New City, Dept felt this was point on which most important PCC submit proposals which cld be agreed to. Your proposal ingenious but Dept fears it wld give basis Israeli rejection entire plan. We also consider it preferable avoid reference sovereignty and merely specify respective powers exercised by authorities in area.

Dept considers that Secretariat working paper [2] wld place important attributes sovereignty in adjacent states, especially actual governing power, except UN authority will exercise direct control over Holy Places and routes giving immed access to them.

As to points 2 and 3 in Art 6, adjacent states would actually govern subject to obligations enumerated Parts IV and VI. As to these points wld appear possible to specify that administrator shall exercise powers of supervision as enumerated in Parts IV and VI.

It appears encouraging that Israel has not objected to principle demilitarization. If they accept principle it wld seem difficult for them to reject element UN supervision of character specified since this calculated only to effect supervision by impartial internatl body. As to human rights, Dept does not envisage these obligations as resulting in disparate treatment Israeli citizens inside and outside Jlem. We contemplate Decl of Human Rights serving as standard of achieve-

[1] Dated June 13, from Lausanne, p. 1130.

[2] Presumably Com. Jer/W.18, dated May 18, p. 1023.

ment for administrations having general governing responsibility in Jlem, as we assume Decl would serve in all of Israel by virtue of Israeli membership in UN. We do not contemplate attempt to enforce specifically the provisions of Decl in Jlem as such treatment not appropriate to character of Decl. Primary reliance, for giving genuine effect to principles set forth in Decl as objectives, wld be on administering authorities in Jlem. Role of UN Administrator and Internatl Tribunal wld be to take cognizance of serious departures from standards proclaimed in Decl, and through judicial procedures to secure redress in such cases and bring about necessary changes by administering authorities. Tribunal wld take into acct all relevant circumstances in determining whether an administering authority was living up to its obligation to be guided by Decl as a standard of achievement in human rights field. Suggested redraft of Art 17 in Secretariat working paper is as follows:

Art 17. The authorities responsible for govt in the two zones of Jlem shall, in administering their respective zones, be guided by the principles and standards set forth in the Universal Decl of Human Rights approved by the GA on Dec 10, 1948 "as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations". If the UN Administrator believes that zonal authorities in Jlem are failing to comply with this obligation, he shall bring the matter to the attention of the Internatl Tribunal in an appropriate proceeding, or, if necessary, bring the matter before an appropriate organ of the UN.

We feel that if basic provisions re sovereignty cannot be rejected by parties, PCC will have more latitude in making other proposals even though parties may object. Israeli and Arab spokesman in GA may propose amendments and GA wld decide. Doubtful if parties wld reject entire plan if basic outline is reasonable. These considerations wld apply to jurisdiction given municipal council over common services mentioned reftel. Such provision does not appear important from UN point of view but shld be valuable to efficient functioning of city.

Dept generally concurs opinion ConGen Jlem last para Tel 412, Jun 13,[3] rptd to you as No. 30.

Foregoing discussion is for your assistance and does not have nature instruction.

Dept expects to pouch shortly composite suggestions for changes in Secretariat draft for Jlem instrument.

WEBB

[3] Not printed; it reported that the draft proposals for an internationalized Jerusalem had been discussed with French Consul General Neuville. The last paragraph dealt with certain of the latter's suggestions (867N.01/6–1349).

501.BB Palestine/6–1449 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, June 20, 1949—8 p. m.

Unpal 160. USDel Lausanne. For Hare. Palun 204, June 14.[1] You shld inform Israeli rep US views along fol lines: USG greatly disturbed over present Israeli attitude refugee question, which represents marked departure assurances expressed by Eban May 5 [2] before *Ad Hoc* comite GA when seeking UN membership. This attitude equally difficult reconcile with Gaza strip proposal, which represents firm admission on part Israel its ability assume responsibility 230,000 refugees plus 80,000 normal residents area. By refusal come forth with constructive proposal based on quantitative acceptance without territorial acquisition (penultimate para Palun 174, May 28 [3]), Israel has effectively blocked any possibility obtaining cooperation Arabs in resolving refugee question and any justification further US approaches to Arabs this purpose.

You shld express to Israeli rep USG's disappointment re failure his Govt carry out purposes GA res Dec 11, despite Elath's formal assurances contained his letter May 11 to SecState re Israel's desire make utmost effort to bring its policy into conformity with resolutions of UN, and despite US offer technical financial assistance to Israel and Arabs in implementing program for solution of refugee problem under conditions specified and as part UN program (Unpal 114, May 23 [4]). You shld emphasize that onus of responsibility resolving refugee question lies squarely on Israelis and Arabs, and that USG is under no mandate from UN to lend its material resources to solve problem of Israeli-Arab making.[5] Therefore USG greatly regrets Eytan's implication that Israeli agreement repatriation is contingent upon assump-

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[1] Identified also as telegram 577 from Geneva, not printed.

[2] See footnote 2, p. 979.

[3] Identified also as telegram 821 from Bern, p. 1069.

[4] Identified also as telegram 674 to Bern, p. 1047.

[5] Mr. Hare, on June 23, advised the Department that prior to and after Mr. Ethridge's departure, the American Delegation had been reluctant to raise the question of general economic aid at PCC meetings, in the absence of general political agreement between the Arabs and Israelis. Its reluctance was based on the expectation of "almost certain leak" to the press and on the possibility that the PCC and the UN Secretariat might devote their entire attention to this subject. The American Delegation, however, had "privately discussed substance Unpal 114 and Palun 180 with French and Turkish members PCC but does not plan discuss question officially in PCC until commitments mentioned Palun 168 and 174 are forthcoming. We continue to attach importance to reservation in Palun 180 because of importance keeping PCC handling of refugee and territorial questions in step." (telegram Palun 226 from Lausanne, 501.BB Palestine/6–2349)

Palun 180 from Lausanne and Unpal 114 to Lausanne are printed on pp. 1086 and 1047, respectively. Palun 168 and 174 from Bern are printed on pp. 1065 and 1069, respectively.

tion financial responsibility by US, and must reiterate that agreement repatriation is obligation placed upon Israel by international community under Dec 11 res.

USG further notes with disappointment that Israeli Govt has shown no inclination meet conditions on which US offer assistance (Unpal 114) was based. In event conditions met at future date, USG wld be prepared at that time consider question of assistance to Israel and Arab states. However, you shld emphasize implications such delay, since US support of refugee settlement program conditional upon UN action and sponsorship. Such program wld necessitate time-consuming and laborious preparation by PCC prior to presentation to GA this autumn. Under present circumstances, PCC not in position initiate preparation such program in absence necessary political cooperation. Therefore any additional delay will mean increasing difficulty if not impossibility obtaining UN action this year.

You shld also inform Arabs USG attitude.[6]

WEBB

[6] Mr. Hare delivered the message contained in Unpal 160 to Mr. Eytan on January 22. The latter "made no comment on substance of message other than to say it would be duly considered and that he assumed reply in action rather than words would be preferred. I said that was exactly the case." (telegram Palun 227, June 23, 11 a. m., from Lausanne, 501.BB Palestine/6–2349)

The Department, on June 27, directed Tel Aviv to take the line set forth in Unpal 160 in discussing the refugee question with the Israeli Government (telegram 406, 501.BB Palestine/6–2749).

501.BB Palestine/6–1649 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 20, 1949—8 p. m.

275. Dept endorses your reply Dayan conversation reported Contel 426 Jun 16. We consider SC Res May 29 and July 15 in force. Some changes brought about by armistice agreements which were negotiated by parties pursuant subsequent SC Res but these do not invalidate those provisions earlier resolutions left untouched. Bunche regards these resolutions as in force and plans proposed new res superseding them when Syrian armistice concluded. He wld retain only simple cease-fire and transfer mediator function this respect to PCC. Dept's position on this proposal not yet formulated.

Dept not certain whether UN position Govt House area can be properly described as legal right or as privilege. Issue lies primarily

[1] This telegram was repeated to Tel Aviv and Amman and to Bern for the American Delegation at Lausanne.

between UN and states involved but we wld support UN contention right of free access. Neutral zone has been created by agreement parties and UN access recognized by them and confirmed by usage.

Dept wld consider it appropriate, subject your concurrence, inquire Dayan reasons for raising technical questions concerning UN rights this zone. As he says situation has progressed one step from truce to armistice. Assume all concerned hope hostilities phase concluded and moving toward final peace. Challenging existing neutral zones appears retrogressive step. UN has important work in this process. It has made financial investment in Govt House and our understanding will continue use of it so long as it has mission to perform in Jlem. If parties really desire peaceful settlement and coop with UN logical course wld be preserve existing neutral area and lend full facilities to UN. When opposite attitude is taken we can only speculate as to motives and naturally take into account strategic value of area.

WEBB

867N.48/6–2149 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET TEL AVIV, June 21, 1949—11 a. m.

471. Personal attention President and Acting Secretary of State. At my request Herlitz of Foreign Office called residence evening nineteenth remaining two hours to read portions, paraphrase others and discuss Eban's cabled report of Israeli's long meeting with Acting Secretary and other Department officials June 18 [*17*]. According to Herlitz President and Department are primarily disturbed by:

1. Israel's failure make specific pledge repatriation refugees;
2. Fear lest Israeli be planning enlarge territory by force.

Although some extremists in army and Knesset advocate expansion by use or threat of force and despite general opinion of both Israelis and foreigners that Israel is strong enough to impose its will on Arabs, I believe fear of Israel aggression is not warranted. My belief based on:

1. Present task which government dare not shirk of absorbing a quarter of a million immigrants annually requires every available economic resource;
2. Battle to reduce fantastic cost of living must be won if Ben-Gurion cabinet is to survive;
3. Outbreak war would wreck Israel's basic purpose "in gathering of exiles" and defeat government on vital economic front;
4. Israeli's repeatedly expressed confidence in General Riley and readiness accept and even on occasion to request wider scope his mediation inconsistent with aggressive intentions;

5. Aggression would alienate world opinion and risk economic or other sanctions.

Certainly Ben-Gurion, Sharett and General Staff are fully aware that further Israel expansion by force, even if war were won quickly, would be disastrously self-defeating. None of these men are reckless adventurers. On contrary their record during struggle against Britain and Arabs and now against enormous domestic problems shows Israeli leaders as highly intelligent and practical. They, knowing that aggression would lose American support and President Truman's friendship have no intention invite self-destruction.[1]

McDONALD

[1] In a Summary of Daily Meeting with the Secretary, Mr. Rusk "reported receipt of a telegram from Ambassador McDonald in which McDonald said that the Israelis will not commit any acts of aggression. Mr. Rusk emphasized that this was only McDonald's view and that we had not received any assurances from any official of Israel. It was agreed that in replying to McDonald we should ask him to attempt to get such assurances." (Executive Secretariat files, lot 58–D609)

501.BB Palestine/6–2049 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland

SECRET PRIORITY NIACT

WASHINGTON, June 21, 1949—3 p. m.

Unpal 161. For USDel Lausanne. For Hare. We have carefully considered ur views Palun 220, June 20.[1] However we still believe recess preferable to present stalemate, as means endeavoring obtain objective set forth para 1 Unpal 155.[2]

Shorter recess after which PCC wld reconvene Lausanne about July 15 wld be preferable to longer adjournment, since latter might result in producing psychological atmosphere militating against further negots through PCC and wld probably remove any possibility activating Econ Survey Group for purposes GA action autumn session.

USG will utilize recess to continue its efforts obtain more cooperative attitude both sides and to brief Ethridge's successor as soon as appointed.

Pls discuss foregoing and Unpal 155 with Boisanger and Yalcin, informing them we are approaching Paris and Ankara with view requesting them issue similar instructions their delegates PCC. Dept informing SYG its views.

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1155.
[2] Dated June 18, to Bern, *ibid.*

If agreement your colleagues obtainable, you shld seek to begin recess weekend June 25 or soonest thereafter and proceed Washington immed.[3]

WEBB

[3] The Department, on June 21, transmitted the substance of Unpal 155 and 161 to Paris, except that it altered the wording of the second paragraph of the former message to read: "Members PCC wld emphasize that resort to force by either side during or after recess wld under no circumstances be tolerated by PCC or UN." (telegram 2203, which was repeated to Ankara for action (501.BB Palestine/6–2149)). No 2203 was also sent to New York the following day as the basis for urgent discussion with Secretary-General Lie (telegram 328, 501.BB Palestine/6–2249).

Mr. Lie and the French and Turkish Foreign Offices concurred with the American proposal, except that the French Foreign Office, without withdrawing its agreement, felt that the present was not an opportune time for a recess (telegrams 761, June 22, from New York; 2595, June 22, from Paris; and 285, June 25, from Ankara, all of which are filed under 501.BB Palestine).

501.BB Palestine/6–2249 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET TEL AVIV, June 22, 1949—noon.

478. At my request Sharett received Ford and me Foreign Office June 21 for hour and quarter.

With marked show of resentment at what he termed "Rusk's peremptory fifteen minute summons" to Israel Chargé June 14[1] Sharett outlined in great detail successive steps from May 25 to June 9 to secure personal conference with Zaim or Arslan and of Syrian "endless evasions and delays". Sharett exclaimed that to be accused of imminent aggression in midst such Israeli "patient conciliatory procedure" was "shockingly unjust" and made Zaim's "intransigence a model for other Arab governments."

As to present Syrian-Israeli relations, Foreign Minister hopes MAC negotiations will succeed, but warned that Zaim could not expect indefinitely avoid withdrawal from Israel territory. "US should understand that Israel will exhaust every peaceful means through MAC, UN direct negotiations, etc., to secure mutual agreement but if Zaim persists in refusal accept Bunche proposal Israel does not intend remain quiescent."

Comment: Foreign Minister evidently under heavy strain result of bitter criticism press and Knesset that government's "pro-American policy" has resulted "national humiliation". I believe his words meant to emphasize with us that justice and expediency "require pressure on

[1] For an account of the conversation between Mr. Rusk and the Israeli Chargé, see telegram 367, June 14, to Tel Aviv, p. 1137.

Zaim to evacuate Israel territory" comparable to that exerted on Israel evacuate Lebanese territory. *End comment.*

Related subject: Regarding Department's *aide-mémoire*, Deptel 375, June 17, Sharett took strong exception to opening sentence to effect that actual situation Jerusalem threat to peace. As to substance Department proposal Israel "quite prepared to consider this important suggestion."

Foreign Minister took exception also to "undue importance" given in Acting Secretary's conference with Eban, et al, June 18[17], to report that Dayan had arrived Government House "in armored car". This was not fact: Dayan "never uses armored car". By mistake an armored car did appear at Government House but Dayan "immediately ordered it away."

New subject: Regarding reunion Arab refugees families, Sharett explained this principle being maintained and procedure "being worked out". Decisions will be in individual cases with "security considerations paramount."

Comment: I fear this foreshadows relatively few reunions near future. *End comment.*

New subject: Regarding Gaza proposal, Foreign Minister said Prime Minister "disclaims conception at Tiberias" but Israel "still willing accept strip including refugees."

Conclusion: As we were leaving, I said: "I trust nothing will happen to give grounds for fear about Israel's pacific purposes toward Syria". Foreign Minister replied: "If all peaceful means fail, we can't preclude possibility of ultimate use of force."

Comment: I believe this remark to be move in Israel's efforts to secure that US influence Zaim to accept Bunche formula. Certainly non-armistice with Syria weakens all peace efforts with other Arab states. Support therefore Bunche proposal is "key log" in present jam.

McDONALD

501.BB Palestine/6–2349

Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk) to Mr. Matthew J. Connelly, Secretary to the President [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 23, 1949.

The Secretary of State hopes to be able to speak to the President about Palestine immediately after the Cabinet meeting on Friday,

[1] At the "9:30 meeting" on the morning of June 23 in the State Department, Mr. Rusk submitted a proposed telegram and *aide-mémoire* regarding Palestine which he requested Secretary Acheson to bring to the attention of President Truman. The Secretary thereupon instructed Mr. Rusk to forward the two papers to the President (memorandum of June 23 by William J. McWilliams, of the Executive Secretariat, to the Secretary, 501.BB Palestine/6–2349).

June 24. The attached papers deal with the points which the Secretary will wish to discuss in the event the President has an opportunity to see them beforehand.

At Tab A is the text of a proposed *aide-mémoire* [2] to be handed to the Israeli Chargé d'Affaires in Washington as an informal reply to the Israeli note of June 8, 1949 (Tab B), which itself was a reply to a United States note of May 29, 1949 (Tab C).[3] It is felt that it would be desirable to reply to the Israeli note in order to correct certain misunderstandings and points of fact in the event it becomes necessary to publish the exchange at some future date. The proposed *aide-mémoire* is moderate in tone and indicates the continuation of discussions between the United States and the Government of Israel on the work of the Palestine Conciliation Commission.

At Tab D is a telegram [2] which it is proposed to send to Ambassador McDonald in reply to the latter's telegrams (Tabs E and F)[4] on the question of further military action by the Government of Israel. No new policy question is raised in the proposed telegram but it is believed that the President would be very much interested in the question of possible military action.[5]

[2] Not found attached.
[3] See telegram 322, May 28, to Tel Aviv, p. 1072.
[4] See telegrams 471 and 478, dated June 21 and 22, respectively, pp. 1163 and 1165.
[5] Secretary Acheson, on June 24, discussed the matter with the President, who approved both documents (memorandum of conversation by the Secretary, 501.BB Palestine/6–2449); for their texts, see telegrams 397 and 398 to Tel Aviv, June 24, pp. 1173 and 1174, respectively.

501.BB Palestine/6–2249 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 23, 1949—7 p. m.

331. Dept suggests reply to Eban ltr (urtel 759 Jun 22 [1]) along the fol lines:

"The US Govt has also been concerned by the lack of progress of the Special Comite. Since this Comite is strictly bilateral, composed of representatives of Israel and Hashemite Jordan Kingdom, the US has not participated in the negots directly or indirectly. For this reason my Govt does not have complete info as to the proceedings and has not been in a position where it cld appropriately undertake to advise the parties.

[1] Not printed; it gave the text of a "letter addressed to Austin by Eban, dated June 21, received today, requesting UN [*US*] good offices to urge Jordan to implement provisions of Article 8 of Israeli-Jordan armistice agreement, and containing assurances that the armistice agreements between Israel and Jordan 'are working smoothly and show all signs of continuing to do so'." (501.BB Palestine/6–2249)

My Govt has nevertheless become convinced that the Special Comite wld not be productive of results and that a new approach to the problem is desirable. It is understood that a similar view was expressed by the Israeli representative on the MAC in Jlem on Jun 13, 1949 (FYI Jerusalem Tel 419, Jun 14 [2]).

Accordingly my Govt, considering this to be its best contribution to a solution, has ventured to suggest to the Govts of Israel and the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom that the problems under consideration by the Special Comite be transferred to the MAC which wld for this purpose meet under the chairmanship of Gen Riley. It was also suggested that the terms of reference shld include questions requiring agreement between the parties relating to the demarcation of Jewish and Arab zones, the use of roads and other questions of access to places in the Jlem area and the functioning of public utilities. It was also suggested that agreed solutions of these problems shld be without prejudice to the final decisions concerning the international status of Jlem which will be decided later in collaboration with the UN, but that these solutions shld be incorporated in such final decisions to the extent that they are comformable.

My Govt is now informed that this proposal has been accepted in principle by the Govt of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom [3] and that it is receiving the consideration of the Govt of Israel.

Accordingly, responding to your inquiry, I feel that my Govt has made the most appropriate intervention within its power in the circumstances. My Govt earnestly hopes that its suggestion will be accepted by both parties and that the resulting negots will lead to a satisfactory solution of these important questions."

ACHESON

[2] Not printed; it advised that "At yesterday's MAC meeting Israel delegate admitted creation special committee in armistice agreement mistake. Despite great hopes originally held for direct negotiations talks stalemated. Expressed desire refer all pending problems to MAC." (501.BB Palestine/6–1449)

[3] The Jordanian Government on June 22 issued a press release announcing acceptance of the United States proposal on handing over the question of Jerusalem to the Mixed Armistice Commission. (telegram 260, June 23, from Amman, 501.BB Palestine/6–2349)

New York, on June 24, advised that General Riley had informed Mr. Bunche that the special committee, on June 21, had voted to transfer its functions to the Mixed Armistice Commission under the former's chairmanship (telegram 769, 501.BB Palestine/6–2249).

501.BB Palestine/7–949

President Chaim Weizmann of Israel to President Truman [1]

REHOVOTH, ISRAEL, 24 June 1949.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Government of Israel have communicated to me the text of the Note transmitted to them on your behalf on the 29th May, as well as their reply of June 8th. The matters

[1] Copy transmitted to Secretary Acheson by President Truman in a memorandum of July 9, with a request for a suggested reply.

raised in the Note are of such gravity that I feel impelled to address you personally on the subject. You have throughout taken such a warm and helpful interest in the affairs of our young State that I am most anxiously concerned that you, our great and good friend, should be under no misapprehension regarding our position and intentions concerning the issues now at stake. I wish, indeed, it were possible for me to talk matters over personally with you. That is always the best way of removing misunderstanding.

We have all been distressed at the slow progress made at Lausanne. It may be that the device of a Conciliation Commission, consisting not of officers of the U.N., but of delegates of three different countries, with different backgrounds and policies, was not the best way of promoting a speedy settlement. It certainly appears to have been less effective than the mediation of one man pursued in the name of the United Nations as a whole. But be that as it may, we are trying our best to work with this Commission and have submitted to them a number of proposals, to none of which we have so far received any reply from the other side. Indeed up till now the Arab States have altogether refused to sit with our delegates under the auspices of the Commission.

When our Delegation first arrived in Lausanne on April 30th, they immediately announced that they had come with full authorization to negotiate a comprehensive peace settlement with the delegates of the Arab States covering all the matters referred to in the U.N. Resolution of 11th December, 1948. They specifically stated that Israel was ready to contribute towards solving the Arab refugee problem in cooperation with the United Nations and the Arab States. A few days later they submitted to the Commission a draft preamble and two articles of a proposed peace treaty to serve as a basis for discussion. In this draft they proposed, among other things, the final liquidation of the war, the establishment of normal political and economic relations between Israel and the Arab States, mutual guarantees of the frontiers, abstention from the use of force for the settlement of disputes, and international arbitration in case such disputes could not be settled by agreement.

To this day we have not received any reply to these basic proposals.

Coming to the question of the Arab refugees, our delegation gave repeated assurances to the Commission that Israel was ready to cooperate with the U.N. and the Arab States for a solution of the refugee problem. We pledged ourselves to guarantee the civil rights of all minorities within our territory; we accepted the principle of compensation for land abandoned by the Arabs; we declared our readiness to unfreeze Arab accounts in our banks immediately on the conclusion of peace; we set up a Custodian of Absentee Property. Our delegation

informed the Commission that the Government of Israel was ready to readmit members of Arab families separated by the war.

In conformity with the General Assembly's Resolution of December 11th, relating to access to ports and means of communication our delegation has offered to create a free zone in the Haifa port for the benefit of Transjordan. Various proposals were made by our delegation for the delimitation of the frontiers of Israel with the Arab States. Our delegation also elaborated our attitude on the Jerusalem question.

All these constructive proposals have not elicited a single reply from the Arab delegations. It would, indeed, appear that these delegations did not come to Lausanne with authority to negotiate a peace settlement, but solely for the purpose of arranging for the repatriation of the Arab refugees to Israel.

Our delegations subsequently proposed the establishment of a number of sub-committees to deal with the general principles and conditions of peace, the territorial settlement, the refugee problem, the Jerusalem question, and the economic development of the Middle East, pursuant to Clause 10 of the U.N. Resolution of December 11th. We have not yet learnt the reaction of the Arab Delegations to these proposals. Finally, when members of the Commission suggested in a spirit of despondency that the Conference be suspended for a time, our delegation strongly opposed this course.

I feel sure you will agree, Mr. President, that in the light of these indisputable facts, we can hardly be charged with having failed to cooperate with the Commission. If so far nothing substantial has resulted from these talks, this is due essentially to the negative attitude of the Arab delegations and their persistent refusal to meet us under the auspices of the Commission. It is a great pity that the Commission failed to dislodge them from that negative attitude.

Permit me to add a few words on the two issues which are in the centre of the discussion: the territorial question and the refugee problem.

We have no aggressive designs against anyone and we are not looking for additional territory. But I think that no fair-minded man will deny us the right to retain that part of our ancient land which has become ours at a terrible cost of blood and treasure in the course of a war forced upon us by others. Most of the country which we hold beyond the boundaries set out on November 29th, 1947 was occupied by our forces during the second military campaign which was the result of the Arabs' defiant refusal to accept the Mediator's urgent plea for a continuation of the first truce. Bitter experience has shown that without that territory we are defenceless. Were we to give up the corridor to Jerusalem, that great city, whose people suffered so much and so heroically last year, would again be exposed to the danger of

having its water supply cut off and of being starved into submission. In exactly the same way, Western Galilee holds the key to the defence of Haifa and the Valley of Jezreel, while the Ramleh area assures the safety of Tel Aviv from such menacing attacks as were launched upon it last year. None of these areas was ever allotted to any of the Arab States with which we are now negotiating. All of them are occupied by Israel legally under armistice agreements.

The Palestine Arab State contemplated in the U.N. Resolution of 29th November 1947 has not come into being—not through any fault of ours—and there is no reason whatever why the neighbouring Arab States who invaded Palestine in flagrant defiance of their obligations under the Charter, should be appeased by territorial "compensation" at our expense. Incidentally, all these demands for compensation in the end boil down to the same old question on which you took so firm a stand last year—the Negev. It is the Negev, particularly the southern Negev, which appears again to be demanded from us. The reasons against it are just as potent as they were last year when you so strongly opposed our being deprived of that area which contains the country's sole mineral resources and which, in addition, is our only gateway to the East. What importance attaches to our having direct access to the Red Sea has been brought home to us strikingly by Egypt's closing of the Suez Canal to all ships—even British ships—carrying, or suspected of carrying, goods to Israel. Because of such closure we are compelled to bring vital supplies (wheat, etc.) from Australia and the Far East all the way via the Cape and Gibraltar. With the coast of Eylat in our possession and the Negev opened up by transport roads, we shall have free access to the sea routes which are vital to our existence.

Now as to the refugee problem. It is a grave issue, but it was not created by us. It was not the birth of Israel which created the Arab refugee problem, as our enemies now proclaim, but the Arab attempt to prevent that birth by armed force. These people are not refugees in the sense in which that term has been sanctified by the martyrdom of millions in Europe—they are part of an aggressor group which failed and which makes no secret of its intention to resume aggression. They left the country last year at the bidding of their leaders and military commanders and as part of the Arab strategic plan. But in spite of all this we are, for humanitarian reasons ready to contribute as far as we can towards a solution of this problem. We have, in fact, done a good deal more under this head than could, for obvious reasons, be published. Your Ambassador has been given details under this head. We have been steadily re-admitting Arab refugees during the last few months. The number of those who have returned exceeds 25,000.

We are ready to re-unite Arab families separated by the war, and we are now approaching the various Arab States through the Mixed Armistice Commissions for setting up special machinery to facilitate their return in organised form. We are prepared to re-admit more as part of a peace settlement. There are, however, two overriding considerations which limit what we can do in this sphere: we dare not again endanger our hard-won independence and security and with all the good will in the world, we cannot undertake tasks which are economically beyond our strength.

So many malicious charges have been levelled against us in connection with this Arab refugee question, that I cannot help drawing attention to the basic realities of the situation. We are a small State, nine hundred thousand Jews wedged in between forty million Arabs. We held our own last year by a terrific effort and at very heavy sacrifices, losing some of our finest youth and suffering heavy damage. The Arab States are making no secret of their intention of resuming war whenever they are ready for it. Only two days ago Faris el Khoury, the former Syrian member of the Security Council and Chairman of the Syrian Chamber, declared that the war against us "remains the corner-stone of Arab policy". Not a week passes without our being warned by authoritative Arab spokesmen of the coming "second round". The Arab States are rearming on a big scale, building up modern armament industries of their own and purchasing the most deadly modern weapons. A few weeks ago squadrons of British Vampire jet fighters were flown to the Suez Canal Zone—half an hour's air flight from our frontier—ready for instant delivery when wanted, while Egyptian pilots are being trained in their use close by. Egypt has ordered British destroyers with 4″ and 6″ guns and submarines, while there is hardly any secret about the French rearming the Syrians. This rearmament, Mr. President, constitutes a direct threat to the peace of the Middle East and thereby also to the peace of the world. With this open threat of war hanging over us, can we ignore the security aspect of the admission of a large Arab population who, whatever their individual feelings might be, are likely to turn against us if war restarts?

Apart from the security question, which to my mind is paramount, there is the economic difficulty. When the United Nations in November 1947 voted in favour of a Jewish State, it was motivated preeminently by the purpose of solving once and for all the Jewish question in Europe, to get rid of the concentration camps and of the aftermath of Hitler's holocaust. I know, Mr. President, that this purpose was uppermost in your mind when you gave us your staunch and steady support in those critical days. We are now doing exactly what

we were expected to do. We are liquidating one camp after another and have already brought over many thousands of their former inmates. Can we be expected at the same time to build up, alongside this big effort of reconstruction, a new Arab economy to absorb hundreds of thousands of Arabs? For let there be no mistake about it: the Arab economic and social structure as it was prior to last year's exodus has ceased to exist. The Arab refugee question can be solved in a big way only by a comprehensive effort of reconstruction. The crucial question is: is that effort to be undertaken in Israel, with all the political, security and economic stresses and strains arising therefrom, or in the neighbouring Arab countries where vast fertile areas are available for such resettlement and where these people can find a home in the congenial surroundings of an Arab society?

Our policy, as I stated before, is not one of absolute refusal to readmit Arabs and we may, if real peace is established, be able to do more in this respect than if the present atmosphere of latent war and hostility continues. But an all-round solution can only be found as part of a general development scheme for the benefit of the Middle East as a whole. Towards such a development scheme Israel is ready to make its contribution: I hope it will be a significant contribution. But to achieve all this there must be negotiation. agreement and peace. The most vital need at the present hour is for Arabs and Jews to enter into direct negotiations and hammer out an agreed settlement. I plead with you, Mr. President, that you may use your unique influence to induce the Arab States to face the realities of the situation and to take that decisive step.

With affectionate greetings,

Yours very sincerely, CH. WEIZMANN

501.BB Palestine/6–2249 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 24, 1949—8 p. m.

397. Dept appreciates urtel 471, June 21, which has been read by the Pres with much interest. Dept considers points you enumerate make out conclusive case against further Israeli mil adventures from realistic point of view of Israeli self-interest. Same considerations apply to threat of force during course of negots for final settlement. US hopes such considerations appear as decisive to Israeli leadership as to outside world and that assurances we have had from Eban are solidly based upon Israeli Govt decision that Israel will resolve its differences with its neighbors through the procedures of peaceful settlement.

Sharett's statement reported penultimate para urtel 478 [1] indicates necessity following situation with closest attention.

FYI ref second para urtel 478 although urgency was emphasized by Dept officer making appt Israeli Chargé was given alternative times for Rusk appt and selected time himself.

ACHESON

[1] Dated June 22, p. 1165.

501.BB Palestine/6–2449 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, June 24, 1949—8 p. m.

398. Following *Aide-Mémoire* delivered today to Israeli Chargé [1] by Deputy Under Secretary Rusk:

"The Government of the United States has received the note delivered by the Government of Israel to the United States Ambassador in Tel Aviv on June 8, 1949, in response to the note of the United States Government dated May 29, 1949. The United States Government considers that there is an identity of interest between it, the Governernment of Israel and the Governments of the Arab States in the early accomplishment of an equitable settlement of the Palestine question, an interest which is in fact shared by all of the Members of the United Nations. It is therefore regrettable that the Government of Israel did not respond more affirmatively with respect to the questions of Palestinian refugees and of boundaries discussed in the United States note. The United States Government will wish at an early date to discuss these questions further with the Government of Israel and other interested Governments, but in the meantime desires to make the following observations with respect to the note of the Government of Israel dated June 8, 1949.

The United States Government does not consider that there has been any misunderstanding on its part of the position taken by the Government of Israel, as stated by Israeli Representatives at Lausanne, on the disposition of the refugee problem and on the final terrritorial settlement in Palestine.

With regard to refugees, Israeli Representatives stated that the Israeli Government will do nothing further at the present time, although it has under consideration certain urgent measures of a limited character. This position appears to be strongly reaffirmed in the Israeli note of June 8, 1949. The Government of Israel referred in that note to its readiness to pay compensation for land abandoned, to reunite families separated by the war, and generally to make its contribution to the solution of the problem by resettlement. It does not indicate that

[1] In a memorandum of June 24, Acting Secretary Webb described his meeting of June 20 with President Truman, as follows: "I reported to the President on my talk with the Israeli representatives [on June 17] and indicated that it would be necessary for us to answer the latest Israeli note." (501.BB Palestine/6–2449)

it is ready to contribute to the problem by accepting a substantial portion of the refugees on the basis of repatriation. On the contrary, the note states, "It is inconceivable that the Government of Israel should find itself able to undertake in one and the same breath the absorption of mass Jewish immigration and the reintegration of returning Arab refugees." It is quite true that the Resolution of the General Assembly of December 11, 1948, indicated that repatriation should be permitted "at the earliest practicable date" but it can hardly be supposed that this reference to practicability was intended to subordinate repatriation to mass Jewish immigration into Israel.

With regard to the statement in the Israeli note of June 8, 1949, that the incorporation within Israel of the Gaza strip and the refugees located therein was suggested by the United States member of the Conciliation Commission, the Government of Israel will recall that Prime Minister Ben Gurion made this proposal to Mr. Mark Ethridge at Tiberias on April 18, 1949.[2] The United States Government has studied with interest a proposal along similar lines made by Israeli Representatives at Lausanne on May 20, 1949,[3] and sees no reason why the proposal might not become the basis for discussions between the Government of Israel and other interested Governments.

The United States Government regards the solution of the refugee problem as a common responsibility of Israel and the Arab States, which neither side should be permitted to shirk. It is for this reason that it has urged Israel to accept the principle of substantial repatriation and to begin immediate repatriation on a reasonable scale, and has urged the Arab States to accept the principle of substantial resettlement of refugees outside Palestine. The United States Government is convinced that unless both sides contribute fully to the solution of this problem, there is no basis for a settlement either of the refugee problem itself or of the other principal issues remaining unsettled. The United States Government is also convinced that the assumption of responsibility for the refugees by Israel and the Arab States constitutes a necessary condition to the provision of international assistance in the permanent disposition of the refugee problem.

The Government of the United States notes that the Government of Israel maintains that it cannot accept the principle of territorial compensation, related to the 1947 partition award, since that award was based on a series of assumptions which failed to materialize. It is observed, however, that the Government of Israel places considerable emphasis upon the continuing validity of the 1947 award where such emphasis supports its own position, for example, in connection with the military occupation by Israel of the southern part of the Negev during a period of truce and in connection with the presence of Syrian troops in a portion of Palestine allotted in 1947 to Israel. In any event, the partition of 1947 is the only authoritative expression of the views of the United Nations with respect to a just territorial division of Palestine between Arabs and Jews. The General Assembly has not indicated in which respects, if any, it believes the territorial basis of that award should be modified in the light of any changes in the assumptions on which that partition was based.

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[2] See telegram 312, April 20, from Jerusalem, p. 925.
[3] See telegram 769, May 20, from Bern, p. 1036.

With regard to the statement that the United States position on the territorial question does not represent a policy of the United Nations, it must be recalled that, as a member of the United Nations Conciliation Commission, a body charged by the United Nations with promoting a final solution of the Palestine problem, the United States has the right and, indeed, the duty of advancing such positions as it believes may contribute to a just and lasting settlement. The United States Government could find no basis for such a settlement in the position taken by Israeli Representatives that Israel expects to retain all areas allocated to it by the 1947 Resolution of the General Assembly, to retain areas which it has occupied outside the 1947 partition lines, and to submit further demands as to territory in Arab Palestine in connection with the Israeli development program.

The United States Government can not accept the contention of the Government of Israel that the admission of Israel to membership in the United Nations indicated that the members of the world community considered as satisfactory the attitude of Israel with respect to the provisions of the General Assembly Resolution of December 11, 1948. Mr. Eban stated before the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the General Assembly on May 5, 1949,[4] that it was his Government's understanding that nothing but the provisions of Article IV of the Charter were relevant in the consideration of an application for membership in the United Nations. He added that, while proposing to give the official views of the Government of Israel on the problem of Jerusalem and on the Arab refugees, he reserved Israel's opinion with regard to the relevance of extraneous issues to the question of admission to membership. The present effort of the Government of Israel to invoke support from the General Assembly for its position on such questions seems to be at variance with the basis on which it itself sought support for its admission to the United Nations. If there is any misunderstanding on this point which appears to impair the prospects of a settlement, the General Assembly can itself provide an authoritative interpretation of its action at its next regular session.

The United States Government has noted with appreciation the reference of the Government of Israel to the friendship for Israel of the Government and people of the United States. The suggestions which the United States Government has made in connection with a settlement of the Palestine problem have been motivated by deep and genuine concern for the peace and stability of the Near East, of which Israel is as much a part as are the Arab States, and by friendly interest in the future welfare of Israel. The United States Government continues in its resolve to do everything within its ability to assist the governments and peoples concerned to find a peaceful and lasting settlement of the Palestine question.

In conclusion, the United States Government wishes to emphasize its view that the military phases of the Palestine question must now be considered as terminated, and that any government which attempts to effect a particular settlement by the renewal of hostilities or the threat of hostilities would incur a grave responsibility before the community of nations. The United States Government welcomes the assurances it has received on this point from Representatives of the

[4] See footnote 2, p. 979.

Governments directly concerned and looks forward to an early settlement which will relieve the peoples of all communities in and around Palestine of the misery and violence which has been their lot during recent years."

Further comment will follow.[5]

ACHESON

[5] This telegram was repeated to Bern for the American Delegation at Lausanne. Thomas E. Bromley, First Secretary of the British Embassy, called on Gordon H. Mattison, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, on July 5 to inquire on behalf of the Foreign Office whether the United States had modified its recent approach to Israel regarding the refugee question and territorial compensation. Mr. Mattison informed Mr. Bromley that the second communication to the Israeli Government "did not represent any change in our approach to the subject. The reply had been designed to clear up certain Israeli misconceptions, as well as to reiterate our point of view." (memorandum of conversation, by Mr. Mattison, 867N.48/7–549)

867N.01/6–2549

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk) [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 25, 1949.

Participants: Mr. Rusk, Deputy Under Secretary of State
Mr. Uriel Heyd, Israeli Chargé d'Affairs a.i.
Mr. Mattison, NE

I handed the attached *aide-mémoire* to Mr. Heyd after orally summarizing its contents and reading verbatim the last two paragraphs for emphasis.[2]

I also mentioned that it looked to us as if the Lausanne Conference was going to recess for a few weeks. This Government was most anxious that the recess period be used to the utmost advantage towards developing a new approach towards the issues which are still outstanding.

In this connection we felt that the Gaza strip proposal was perhaps the key which would unlock the whole problem. For this reason we were most anxious that the Egyptians and Israelis get together and see what could be worked out. I inquired whether Mr. Eban would continue to remain in New York, in the event that it should prove advantageous for conversations to be held between the Israelis and Egyptians there. Mr. Heyd replied that Mr. Eban planned to remain in the United States until the return of Ambassador Elath. However, if it were a matter of urgency the Ambassador would return immediately.

[1] Drafted by Mr. Mattison.
[2] Note that telegram 398, *supra*, states that Mr. Rusk handed the *Aide-Mémoire* to the Israeli Chargé on June 24.

I stated that this would not be necessary, and explained that we had no preconceived idea as to when the conversations might take place. It was possible that the Israelis might wish to use contacts that they already had with the Egyptians. On the other hand if these were not satisfactory we were willing to help in arranging an exchange of views.

Mr. Heyd said that he would communicate with his government and inform us of its reaction.

Mr. Heyd said that there was one other matter that Mr. Sharett had asked him to take up. This was with regard to my interview with him on June 24, 1949,[3] in which I had discussed reports of impending Israeli military activity. Mr. Sharett was surprised and somewhat hurt that we had given credence to such irresponsible stories. I explained that we had received reports from a number of sources including Tel Aviv which when put together made a somewhat alarming picture. As a member of the UN and the PCC we had felt it our duty to bring these to the Israeli Government's attention. We had been most gratified to hear that the reports were not true. If the resulting exchange of views had cleared the air they had served a useful purpose.

[3] It is not clear whether Mr. Rusk conversed with the Israeli Chargé on both June 24 and June 25. The editors have been unable to find a relevant memorandum of conversation, dated June 24, in the Department of State files.

501.BB Palestine/6–2549 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY JERUSALEM, June 25, 1949—noon.

444. Riley states Israel interpreting Bunche's latest proposal re Syrian armistice to mean Israeli administration control of demilitarized area on border. All military forces to be excluded but since mixed administration not practical and area located on Israel side of border Israel authorities together with local Arab police will be responsible for administration.[1]

[1] New York, the previous day, had advised that "Regarding Israeli efforts to secure from Bunche an interpretation that Israelis should have full civil authority and sovereignty over areas of demilitarized zone assigned to them, Bunche is taking stiff line that this type of legalistic argument and delay is unwarranted. He is sending Vigier a reaffirmation that his compromise proposal should be accepted by both parties as it stands. It provides for a gradual restoration of civilian life in the demilitarized zone under the general supervision of the chairman of MAC. Policing to be done by locally recruited personnel who shall be of the nationality of the settlements concerned. All questions of sovereignty or of the law which should prevail in the areas should be left for the peace settlement. In respect to law needed for police action, Israeli law should apply to their settlements and Arab law in the Arab villages." (telegram 771, 501.BB Palestine/6–2449)

Riley feels above will be completely inacceptable to Zaim who accepted Bunche proposal on understanding demilitarized area would be completely separate from both Israel and Syria with ultimate responsibility for zone resting with UN. Riley asserts this was Bunche's intention.

In view above Israeli stand, confirmed by conversation last night with Sharett, Riley sees little chance successful conclusion armistice. Believes question must be referred to SC. Pointed out Israel rejected plan for exchange territory and now in effect rejecting proposal for demilitarized neutral zone. Only other possible suggestion before reference to SC is accord to effect that since both sides not able agree on changes present truce lines should become armistice lines pending final peace treaty. He sees no chance Israel accepting this since Israel working on premise armistice lines will in practice be final peace lines.

Sent Department, repeated Geneva 41 for USDel PCC, Damascus 45.

BURDETT

501.MA Palestine/6–2549 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, June 25, 1949—2 p. m.

2198. USG convinced that only means breaking Israeli-Arab impasse re refugees in order meet common US–UK objectives that question and carry forward contemplated procedure for solution refugee problem is through exploitation Gaza strip proposal. During period PCC recess, we propose exercise strongest diplomatic pressure effort create more cooperative attitude both sides.

We have informed Israeli Government that we regard its proposal assume responsibility refugees and residents Gaza strip in return for cession thereof as significant admission its ability accept substantial number refugees, and that we believe this proposal shld serve as basis for discussion between states concerned.

You will recall that proposal flatly rejected by Arabs when transmitted them by PCC. On June 10 UnSecy during conversation with Egyptian Amb [1] asked latter his Govt's position on Israeli proposal. Amb replied that Egyptian Govt regards offer as "cheap barter", and stated first step is to permit those refugees so desiring return their homes. He had no suggestion, however, re disposition remainder. He further stated Egypt wld wish make proposals re frontier rectification designed secure strategically defensible frontier for purposes Egyp-

[1] See telegram 573, June 11, to Cairo, p. 1115.

tian and Israeli security. Amb said such proposals wld not involve large amount territory.

On June 11 AmEmb Cairo acting on instructions requested views Egyptian auths re Israeli offer,[2] emphasizing concern USG re refugees that area, which has no econ potential for future settlement. Emb asked Egypt's plans re disposition those not wishing return Israel, since latter might be considerable number, and requested Egyptian views re frontier in light Amb's ref to strategic rectification, in order US might explore possibility exchange of Gaza strip for frontier rectification further south.

Khashaba Pasha informed Chargé he had requested military opinion from Brit Amb Cairo as to frontier line which Egypt cld most satisfactorily defend with own resources, and was advised that Gaza–Beersheba–Dead Sea line shld be adopted. In response specific query from Chargé, FonMin stated Egypt wld therefore not be willing cede Gaza strip to Israel even if Israel shld agree relieve Egypt of refugee burden that area.

While USG wld be prepared support frontier rectification favor Egypt, in accordance Pres' formula re territorial compensation, present Egyptian proposal is of course not politically feasible and wld defeat purpose providing for disposition Gaza refugees.

We propose take strong line with Egyptians, based on overriding consideration of getting constructive action re refugees. USG urgently requests firmest UK support these representations and hopes UK will make utmost effort disabuse Egypt of its unrealistic attitude towards frontier rectification of character described foregoing. Deptel to Cairo this question being repeated you separately.

Pls discuss foregoing urgently with FonOff, rpt reply to Cairo and Bern for USDel.[3]

ACHESON

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[2] See footnote 2, p. 1116.

[3] This telegram was repeated to Cairo and to Bern for the American Delegation at Lausanne. In reply, on June 28, London advised of information from Michael Wright that the "UK would instruct British Ambassador to mention to Egyptian Government US representations and to say that on territorial aspects these representations UK did not wish to give Egypt advice one way or other. However, refugees constitute problem utmost gravity and UK believes that if Egypt desires to keep Gaza strip it would be in very difficult position before world opinion if it refused keep refugees Gaza area. . . . Foreign Office inclined to think that it would be better for Egypt to keep Gaza strip and its refugees and for Israel to take another 150,000 refugees from elsewhere." (telegram 2501, 501.MA Palestine/6–2849)

867N.01/6–1449 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, June 25, 1949—2 p. m.

626. Pls seek immediate interview FonMin to resume subject discussed urtel 578, June 14 [2] and convey to him orally Dept's views along fol lines:

USG notes with profound disappointment negative attitude Egypt re cooperation refugee problem. Up to present, and despite urgency of refugees' plight, no concrete or constructive proposals for solution refugee problem have been forthcoming from any of Arab states. On its part, Egypt has consistently demanded repatriation of refugees while admitting that substantial proportion will not desire return Israel, and only proposal of Egypt re disposition latter category has been that states other than Egypt assume responsibility therefor. Consistently negative approach of Egypt typified by attitude UnSecy Hassouna Pasha (Cairo A–690, June 16 [3]), who informed AmEmb Cairo that PCC subcommittees, designed to give simultaneous study to refugees and other outstanding issues, were unacceptable to Egyptian Govt. Arab states shld give most serious attention to consequences during recent years of their steadfast refusal accept realities situation re Pal.

Fol considerations shld be of direct concern to Egyptian Govt:

(1) UNRPR program funds will run out within few months; (2) UN most unlikely take further action to extend assistance to refugees without evidence tangible progress towards solution refugee problem prior opening autumn session GA; (3) in absence such action, entire financial and admin burden relief and rehabilitation all refugees and resident population in areas under Arab military occupation will devolve upon respective occupying authorities as soon as UNRPR terminates, as well as full onus formulating and executing plans for their permanent disposition.

USG regards problem of refugees as joint responsibility of Israel and Arab states, and, as member PCC, cannot agree that either side should shirk responsibility. This fact of more than academic interest to Egypt, which as occupying power in southwest Pal, bears full responsibility for 230,000 refugees and 80,000 residents that area. USG, motivated by sincere desire find means resolving this problem, requested info re Egypt's plans for permanent disposition these people. No such info has been forthcoming.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London and to Bern for the American Delegation at Lausanne.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 1117.

[3] Not printed.

Israeli proposal re Gaza strip constitutes Israeli commitment to assume full responsibility for refugees and residents that area, and as such shld be given most serious and constructive consideration by Egyptian Govt. Proposal shld serve as basis urgent discussion between states concerned, through direct or indirect negots. USG prepared lend all possible assistance facilitate such negots. Repeat reply to Bern for USDel Lausanne.

ACHESON

501.BB Palestine/6–2549 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY JERUSALEM, June 25, 1949—4 p. m.

445. Last night together with Riley met Sharett at reception and he outlined Israel reply to Department proposal re Jerusalem. After thorough discussion with Riley following comments submitted on different points:

1. Israel not willing accept proposition threat to peace exists in Jerusalem. Both Riley and Consulate General feel definite threat to peace existed but danger diminished for moment by action of Department. Believe preferable play down this aspect now and Department might reply glad draw conclusion from Israel note that Israel has no intention disturbing peace in Jerusalem. If necessary cite evidence threat to peace could mention movement of troops by both sides into Government House zone, failure both sides reduce forces Jerusalem in accordance with armistice, flat statement by Dayan to Consulate General that if not able obtain Scopus by negotiation would take it by force (would prefer Department not quote Dayan).

2. Israel feels special committee should not be superseded. No objection perceived to special committee remaining in being to handle minor matters by direct negotiation such as harvest in triangle. Riley also plans establish subcommittee of MAC to deal with armistice questions leaving MAC free consider Jerusalem problem.

3. Sharett stated willing instruct Israel delegation at next special committee meeting propose or support if proposed by Jordan reference to MAC of questions in article 8 of armistice agreement. I inquired whether would also include elimination of Arab and Israel zones which was essential part Department proposal. He stated Israel not prepared discuss territorial changes Jerusalem until questions in article 8 successfully settled. Felt ample room for agreement existed in article 8. Argued broadening terms of reference would only enable Arabs dodge fulfilling armistice and carrying out agreement already reached in principle at Rhodes. Said armistice lines now settled and should not move on to questions of permanent lines until all armistice problems solved.

Consulate General believes discussion of territorial changes as well as other Jerusalem problems in addition to those mentioned specifically in article 8 indispensable part Department proposal. Change proposed by Sharett strikes at foundation of plan. Problems mentioned article 8 are of prime importance to Israel but of relatively little interest to Arabs. Acquiescense in Sharett views would have effect of US supporting Israel demands without Arabs receiving adequate return. Arabs could only conclude US indirectly exerting pressure for further concessions to Israel.

Consulate General has considered proposal as opening way to real and permanent settlement of many practical problems affecting Jerusalem including principally limits of two zones and freedom of access. Such agreement would not conflict with international status plans and would be based on premise of demilitarized and neutral city. Riley agrees with this conception. However, he feels also MAC might be able make progress on article 8 questions alone although this not desirable.

Strongly recommend Department insist on consideration of territorial changes. Department might reply along following lines: Since agreement apparently not possible on narrow range of problems in article 8 hoped by broadening questions for consideration possible reach accord. Because certain matters apparently not soluble under armistice conditions suggested move forward towards permanent peace. Plan will permit overall discussion of Jerusalem problem in interest of establishing lasting arrangements and permitting return of normal life to maximum extent possible for both Jews and Arabs. Department feels that working on premise Jerusalem area will be permanently demilitarized zone two parties by direct negotiation under UN chairmanship can make progress toward solution in permanent manner of many practical problems affecting Jerusalem. Such agreement could be incorporated in plan of PCC for international status of city. Both parties have stated armistice agreements including demarcation lines only temporary and changes eventually necessary affecting daily life of people will cause much less dislocation now than in future.

As previously reported Israel has approached armistice agreements with intent that they shall constitute in practice permanent arrangements especially as to boundaries. This explains attitude on Syrian armistice. Riley shares this view. Once Israel obtains satisfaction on questions in article 8 of Jordan armistice will have all it wants and be content allow armistice agreement remain in effect indefinitely. Would just sit back and refuse any territorial changes as is doing at Lausanne

despite efforts of US. Final position taken by Israel on territorial question Jerusalem will certainly indicate attitude towards territorial shifts as whole. In view Dayan statements to Consulate General that willing discuss territorial changes Jerusalem, still believe possible induce Israel negotiate on whole Jerusalem question including specifically delimitation of zones. If Israel acceptance limited to article 8, feel Department should consider reply rejection proposal.

Sent Department 445, repeated Geneva 42 for USDel PCC, Amman 42, Tel Aviv 66.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/6–2549 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET TEL AVIV, June 25, 1949—8 p. m.

489. ReDeptel 375 June 17 and Embtel 478 June 22. Formal reply to *aide-mémoire* handed Ford June 24 by Herlitz of Israel Foreign Office. Note reiterates Israeli Government's inability subscribe view of USG that present situation Jerusalem constitutes threat peace Palestine "unless State Department is in possession reliable information indicating intention on part Government Transjordan to resort to offensive military action that area." However, Government Israel "welcomes method proposed by USG for settlement certain points at issue between it and Government Transjordan" and while preferring that any items discussed under new proposal be limited to those specified in Article 8 of armistice agreement and no others, "has instructed its representatives on special committee to propose, or to support proposal that items as specified should be referred to MAC to meet under chairmanship General Riley". Note finally expresses hope that implementation new proposal will not mean final abolishment special committee which government Israel believes "should continue to exist and meet for discussion and settlement such problems as both parties may agree upon in accordance former practice".

In delivering note Herlitz stressed his [*her*] government's hope that (1) Riley "and no one else" would act as chairman all meetings MAC under new proposal, (2) That only those items named Article 8 be handled and any such item or items already acted upon by special Committee not again be revived, and (3) that special committee not be terminated.

Copies of note being airmailed.

Sent Department 489, repeated Jerusalem 54, Amman 15.

MCDONALD

501.BB Palestine/6–2749

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 27, 1949.

There are attached herewith in accordance with your request of June 16, copies of cables covering talks held between Mr. Mark Ethridge, United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission, and Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion.[1]

[1] The copies enclosed were telegrams from Jerusalem, as follows: Nos. 274, 275, and 277, April 9; 291, April 13; 308, April 19; and 312, April 20. All of these messages are printed in this compilation, except for No. 308; regarding No. 308, see footnote 1, p. 923.

501.MA Palestine/6–2749 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 27, 1949—9 a. m.

In discussing Arab refugee problem with Govt to which accredited, you shld take fol genl line:

You shld bring to Govt's attention substance Depcirtel May 27, 1 a. m.[2] (Unpal 114) which USDel PCC has discussed informally with Israeli and Arab delegations Lausanne. Conditions under which such assistance wld be forthcoming shld be carefully emphasized.

You shld then state that USG deeply disappointed re failure Israelis and Arabs to adopt constructive approach to refugees. You shld emphasize that onus of responsibility resolving refugee question lies squarely on both Israelis and Arabs, and that USG is under no mandate from UN to lend its material resources to solve problem of Israeli-Arab making. USG notes with disappointment that neither Israelis nor Arabs have shown any inclination meet conditions on which US offer assistance was based. In event conditions met at future date, USG wld be prepared at that time consider question of assistance to Israel and Arab states. However, you shld emphasize implications such delay, since US support of refugee settlement program conditional upon UN action and sponsorship. Such program wld necessitate time-consuming and laborious preparation by PCC prior to presentation to GA this autumn. Under present circumstances, PCC not in position initiate preparation such program in absence

[1] At Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, Damascus, and Beirut.

[2] Not printed; it repeated to Arab capitals the text of telegram 674, identified also as Unpal 114, May 23, to Bern, p. 1047.

necessary political cooperation. Therefore any additional delay will mean increasing difficulty if not impossibility obtaining UN action this year.

You shld stress problem of impending termination UNRPR program, and inquire what plans Arab states contemplate for continuation relief to refugees under their custodianship.

You may inform Govt that Israeli auths have received similar representations.[3]

ACHESON

[3] Chargé Stabler discussed the content of this circular telegram with King Abdullah on the morning of June 29. He pointed out that while Jordan had willingly accepted the principle of resettlement "in private conversations with US and other representatives, its attitude appeared quite different when acting in conjunction with other Arab States. Emphasized US Government is continuing exert pressure on Israel to give early indication how many refugees it will repatriate but suggested that immediate action by Arab States regarding resettlement those refugees unwilling or unable return would in no way diminish pressure on Israel or chances for repatriation. Also indicated that if some positive action not taken soon Arab States would find themselves with no outside relief assistance whatsoever and expressed belief Arab States totally unable handle problem on their own.

"King said he agreed with this analysis and suggested that steps be taken now by US and other interested countries in making survey of resettlement possibilities in Jordan and Arab Palestine with view to drawing up plans for such resettlement. He indicated he entirely prepared move forward on this basis at once if financial assistance for carrying out projects assured and felt that 'if you begin with me and others see what is being done, they will soon follow'." (telegram 267, June 29, 7 p. m., from Amman, 501.BB Palestine/6–2949)

501.BB Palestine/6–2749 : Telegram

Mr. Raymond A. Hare to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL LAUSANNE, June 27, 1949—3 p. m.

Palun 234. [Here follows the first paragraph dealing with answers to questions from Syria given by the Palestine Conciliation Commission at its meeting with Arab delegates on June 25.]

2. Essence Arab argument regarding territorial views ran as follows: Arab delegates would be willing further to discuss territorial matters if Israeli delegation returned to protocol of May 12 by basing its proposals upon it and if PCC undertook to pass judgment on Israeli and presumably Arab proposals in connection therewith.

Arabs argued Jews have done nothing to implement protocol. Paragraph 11 GA resolution December 11 reference refugees could not be subject of negotiation as it was GA imperative. Jewish territorial proposals under May 12 protocol were not "adjustments" but annexations. Arabs consider such proposals as inclusion western Galilee or Gaza as violation of protocol. Arabs also consider that Jewish agreement take Gaza refugees if Gaza strip is ceded to Israel as contrary

GA resolution December 11. Arabs will not make such rash proposals but have complied with protocol as shown by their memos of May 18 and May 21. Arabs have already approached territorial question in their May 21 memo. PCC has duty deciding whether Arab proposal is within terms of protocol.

Arabs added regarding resettlement they were prepared to examine as soon as they knew how many refugees did not wish to return on basis completely free choice. Lebanese delegate specifically stated such refugees would find Arab countries ready to take them. Foregoing represents highlights of three-hour meeting. Summary record being pouched.

HARE

501.BB Palestine/6–2749 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, June 27, 1949—7 p. m.

405. Dept concurs views expressed ConGen Jlem in Sharett interview reported Jlem Tel 445, Jun 25, rptd Tel Aviv as 66.

If official reply not yet received, or if unsatisfactory on points indicated reftel, pls reiterate views to appropriate officials. Our reference to Jlem constituting threat to peace was not an accusation but rather a statement of concern entertained by USG. Same statement concern made in presenting proposal TJ Govt. Concern seemed legitimate especially in view troop movements neutral zone. As result various consultations USG glad to have assurances such concern not warranted.

Restriction terms reference MAC to questions in Art 8 would frustrate one of main objectives in making US proposal. On basis our info previous negots re this art we feel they must be given broader base if agreement to be reached. Emphasize that Art 8 calls for negotiated agreement and this can only be done in negots between parties.

Re demarcation Arab-Jewish zones, this subject has special position in relation armistice on one hand and final peace on other. PCC given task formulating detailed proposals for Jlem at fall session GA. Most appropriate such proposals should include permanent demarcation lines and other arrangements now under discussion in Jlem. Opportunity to achieve final settlement Jlem is perhaps best prospect for progress this year and shld be seized by parties concerned. Furthermore agreement questions residence Arab-Jewish inhabitants respective zones will become more difficult the longer negots are delayed.

Pls use arguments above and those in reftel in manner to indicate strong view USG that proposal entirely fair and equitable and ur-

gently desirable shld be accepted as means settling Jlem case and definite progress toward permanent peace in Palestine.[1]

ACHESON

[1] This telegram was repeated to Jerusalem and Amman and to Bern for the American Delegation at Lausanne. Ambassador McDonald read excerpts of telegram 405 to Mr. Shiloah on July 1, "stressing USG insistence on broader base formal Jerusalem settlement." These views were reiterated to Miss Herlitz by Mr. Ford on July 5 (telegram 524, July 9, 2 p. m., from Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/7–949).

867N.48/6–2749 : Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET CAIRO, June 27, 1949—8 p. m.

628. Following receipt Deptel 626, June 25, 2 p. m. requested interview with Foreign Minister just returned from Alexandria. Khashaba Pasha received me noon 27th. I read over to him statements attributed to him mytel 578 June 14 [1] all of which he confirmed. Thereafter I orally rendered to him in French US Government's views on lack of constructive attitude by Egypt and other Arab states in cooperating towards solution refugee problem. On my mention of Egypt's "negative attitude" Khashaba Pasha interrupted and inquired with asperity if Egypt's steady insistence on positive implementation of numerous UN resolutions could be called negative. Egypt had, in accordance with UN resolutions, insisted on right of refugees desiring to return to their homes to do so. Those who did not desire to return to their homes in Palestine (and by homes he meant their houses and lands) should be compensated by Israel. Such persons should be admitted to the Arab states and the Arab states, Egypt included, would confer together as to distribution such refugees who had opted for resettlement. As for Egyptian refusal to accept proposed PCC's subcommittees Foreign Minister stated that these subcommittees were Israeli devices designed to confuse humanitarian with territorial problems and perhaps indefinitely to delay former category which would not admit of delay. The human, that is, refugee problem, must be settled first since questions relating to demarkation of frontiers might drag on for years.

Foreign Minister, who frequently interrupted me in a rather agitated fashion (due perhaps to unaccustomed fast this first day of Ramadan), listened to my exposition regarding financial difficulties which would in all probability, arise in absence of immediate constructive thinking on the Arab part during current recess of PCC.

However, on my mention that in opinion US Government the refugee problem was a joint responsibility of Arab states and Israel, min-

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 1117.

ister became annoyed and inquired if the Arabs did not have a right to defend themselves against aggression.

Israeli proposal of assuming responsibility for Gaza strip refugees and inhabitants in return for Gaza–Rafa coastal area amounted to their insistence on being paid for fulfilling a prior obligation imposed upon them by UN. Moreover, the Israelis had made no promise to permit the return of the refugees to their hearthstones, orchards and fields. For such refugees to be turned off in all probability into the desert of the Negev adjoining the Gaza strip to re-create such life as they could in that barren soil was not repatriation in the sense understood by Egypt. However, in conclusion Minister stated Egypt would not refuse to give serious consideration to any plan designed as humanitarian measure and susceptible of bringing stability to an area or situation. He desired, though, in order to enable his government to give thorough study to views presented by US Government, to receive written communication embodying such views.

Does Department authorize my summarizing its views in form of memorandum or other informal communication which I might send Minister under cover of personal letter?

Khashaba Pasha informed me of his prospective return this afternoon to Alexandria where Prime Minister has already preceded him. He will return Cairo Monday, July 4, to attend dinner which he will offer in honor Secretary Treasury Snyder.

It would be desirable to have for communication to him at that time any further views Department may desire to express.

It would seem that at least initial reaction of Foreign Minister to Department's suggestion of utilization of Israeli proposal as basis for discussion is far from favorable.

Sent Department; repeated Bern, USDel Lausanne.

PATTERSON

501.BB Palestine/6–2849 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET TEL AVIV, June 28, 1949—noon.

495. ReDeptel June 25 [*24*], number 398. Following repeated readings of text I asked Herlitz of Foreign Office to residence. Ford also present. For more than hour June 27, we informally discussed main points text.

Then Herlitz read and paraphrased portions of Israeli Chargé's report on conference with Rusk June 25.[1] Chargé stressed friendliness of Department's reply and Rusk's verbal recommendation of bilateral

[1] See Mr. Rusk's memorandum, p. 1177.

negotiations between Israel and Egypt, possibly on basis Gaza plan and later with other Arab states individually. Chargé said Rusk suggested "probable necessity territorial compensation" to Egypt. Herlitz interpreted Rusk's words as meaning "southern tip Negev". (To this I made no comment.) Egypt considered by Rusk as key to deadlock. Chargé added Rusk also suggested "territorial compensation to other Arab states" (or as singular state) in subsequent negotiations.

My questions to Department are: "Is above summary Rusk accurate and does his suggestion cancel earlier Department's discouragement of bilateral negotiations between single Arab state and Israel?" (Deptel 330, June 1).[2]

Related subject: Taking advantage of friendliness of Department's reply to Israel, Deptel 398, June 25 [*24*], I brought conversation to refugees and said to Herlitz substantially: "No amount friendship for Israel can hide fact that it has, re refugee repatriation, been poor in promise and poorer in performance. Recognizing all difficulties, there are no justifications Israel's relative inaction. Impossible exaggerate human tragedy if Israel persists failure cooperate. If Israel in good faith proposed absorb the more than 200,000 refugees Gaza strip, it must have envisioned ways to do this. Hence, no logic in Israel's argument it unable repatriate more than few tens of thousands (as also stressed to Foreign Office by Kopper [3] on his recent visit). Unacceptable everywhere except in Jewish circles, will be argument that ingathering of exiles makes repatriation Arabs impossible. Israel self-interest requires refugee cooperation asked by Department." (*Close paraphrase my refugee remarks.*)

I shall press these views with Weizmann at lunch today [4] and later with Ben Gurion and Sharett.

Meantime, please wire details US and UN emergency refugee relief financial proposals reported Leopoldville radio night June 27.

New subject: Will continue to press on Israeli officials points Deptel 397, June 24.

Sent Department 495; repeated Bern 7 (for USDel PCC).

McDONALD

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[2] Not printed, but see footnote 1 to telegram 72, June 1, p. 1082.

[3] Samuel K. C. Kopper, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

[4] Ambassador McDonald lunched with President Weizmann at Rehovoth on June 28 and urged the views of the United States on the refugee question. President Weizmann was said to have replied in substance that "your people don't understand these refugees are our enemies and potential fifth column. Don't your people read repeated threats from Arab capitals renewal war?" When asked how he reconciled his position with the Israeli offer to take the Gaza strip, he replied "That would be more than we ought to do but it certainly is utmost that is possible." (telegram 498, June 29, 1 p. m., from Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/6-2949)

867N.01/6–2849 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 28, 1949—7 p. m.

635. You are authorized present substance Deptel 626, June 25, to FonMin as *aide-mémoire*, adding fol additional considerations:

USG firmly convinced Gaza strip proposal forms basis important contribution to final settlement Palestine problem as well as constructive approach to solution grave humanitarian problem of refugees, and notes with appreciation FonMin's assurances (urtel 628, June 27) that Egypt prepared give serious consideration to any plan designed as humanitarian measure and susceptible of bringing stability to area.

USG is not unmindful of considerations prompting FonMin's concern re disposition and future well being of refugees in Gaza strip (urtel para 4) if Israel shld assume responsibility such refugees. If Egypt so desires, USG is prepared seek fullest info from Israeli Govt re specific plans underlying Israeli proposal, including future status refugees as Israeli cits. USG is also prepared advocate establishment appropriate international supervision to insure necessary guarantees welfare refugees are observed.

USG recalls with deep appreciation that Egypt, by its constructive action as first state to conclude armistice agreement, gave necessary impetus to conclusion of hostilities in NE. We are deeply hopeful that Egypt, recognizing earnest desire Near Eastern peoples and international community for restoration peace and stability Near East, is now prepared give similar stimulus to final settlement outstanding issues by entering into early discussions with Israel re Gaza proposal. USG reiterates that, if so requested, it stands ready to facilitate such discussions by all means at its disposal.

Rpt reply to London and to Bern for USDel Lausanne.

ACHESON

[1] This telegram was repeated to London as No. 2223 and to Bern for the American Delegation at Lausanne.

501.MA Palestine/6–2549 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in London

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 30, 1949—7 p. m.

2259. Pls seek early opportunity call upon Bevin and review questions outlined Deptel 2198, June 25 and 2223, June 28.[1] You shld then make representations along fol lines:

[1] This was a repeat of 635 to Cairo, *supra*.

USG disturbed by UK attitude concerning Gaza strip and refugees therein as set forth urtel 2501,[2] June 28 and puzzled re basis FonOff belief that Egypt might be prepared assume responsibility for refugees in Gaza strip, view population pressure in Egypt and steadfast refusal Egyptian authorities, in response approaches by US reps both Washington and Cairo, to consider acceptance even token number. In this connection, UK will recall that Egyptian auths recently took steps remove into Gaza strip some 10,000 refugees who were being maintained in Egyptian territory.

Egypt thus appears excluded as settlement area. Moreover, UK will recall that US–UK refugee working papers give no indication Gaza strip has economic potential for settlement any significant portion of refugees now in area. In addition resident population of 80,000, who are for most part on relief at present time, Dept estimates number refugees in Gaza strip at minimum of 230,000, not 150,000 as UK appears to believe (last para urtel).

In view of foregoing, USG finds it difficult believe Egypt has any plans involving either total or partial Egyptian responsibility for disposition Gaza refugees or that Egypt capable formulating such plans in foreseeable future.

USG recognizes that strategic considerations involved in UK thinking this question. In opinion USG, however, any strategic advantages which might be obtained from permanent retention Gaza strip plus present occupants by Egypt wld appear to be outweighed by administrative burden and enormous financial requirements involved in maintenance refugees on permanent basis, particularly since nature of area precludes execution of self-sustaining settlement projects.

US is prepared support politically feasible modification Egyptian frontier in return for cession Gaza strip with all present occupants to Israel. In interests Egyptian-Israeli security, and equally in interests US–UK security, however, USG is convinced that speedy solution of refugee problem, establishment final Palestine settlement, and encouragement of *modus vivendi* between Israel and Arab states constitute firmer basis for strategic security of all states concerned than cld be achieved through exploitation minor military advantages of Gaza strip.

US has made and continues to make strongest representations to Israel urging quantitative acceptance substantial number refugees without territorial acquisition. No result has so far been obtained, and only hopeful development presaging repatriation of large numbers of refugees has been Israeli offer concerning Gaza strip. View facts that agreement between Israel and Egypt on Gaza strip and refugees would probably pave way for Israeli-Egyptian final settle-

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 1180.

ment and thereby constitute decisive step towards overall Palestine settlement; that funds for UNRPR program are rapidly being exhausted; and that possibility getting UN action on constructive refugee program this autumn along lines contemplated by US–UK becoming increasingly remote, USG firmly convinced that Gaza proposal shld become basis for discussion between Egypt and Israel. USG hopes UK will agree that solution of grave and potentially explosive question of refugees is of overriding importance to US–UK strategic interests in NE area, and therefore reiterates its urgent request for firm UK support of US representations to Egypt.

ACHESON

501.BB Palestine/7–149 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, July 1, 1949—2 p. m.

451. US proposals for negotiations in MAC on Jerusalem problems discussed yesterday with Dayan. From his comments believe Sharett rejected plan for following reasons:

1. Would constitute admittance by Israel that agreement not possible on questions in article 8 of armistice; that Jordan no longer bound to carry out article 8 if agreement not also reached on broader questions mentioned in US proposal. Would thus nullify section of armistice which Israel feels grants it important right.
2. Known position of US on territorial settlement. Discussion of delimitation of zones would only mean Israel giving territory and receiving very little in return.
3. Might indirectly involve acquiescence in international regime for Jerusalem to which Israel firmly opposed.

Dayan suggested Sharett might consider direct talks on permanent Jerusalem agreement between Israel and Jordan under chairmanship of third party outside of terms of reference and machinery of armistice. He added such talks might consider whole question of peace treaty with Jordan since very difficult reach settlement on Jerusalem when boundary line and other points regarding remainder of Palestine not determined. In these talks permanent arrangements regarding Latrun, Scopus, and other questions mentioned in article 8 could be reached but without affecting agreement already reached in principle for duration of armistice.

Above approach might accomplish most objectives US proposals but might well conflict with work of PCC, develop into direct peace talks between Israel and Jordan and even if acceptable to Jordan encounter opposition from other Arab states.

Sent Dept 451, repeated Geneva 44, Amman 43, Tel Aviv 69.

BURDETT

867N.01/7–149 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kohler) to the Secretary of State

SECRET Moscow, July 1, 1949—3 p. m.

1661. 1. It seems to us in retrospect that Soviet support for internationalization Jerusalem under TC nothing more than formalistic gesture which had to be made in order not jeopardize adoption and implementation overall partition plan embodied GA resolution November 29, 1947 (Jerusalem's numbers 437 and 440 to Department).[1]

2. Soviet supported this resolution because it believed creation weak independent state or states in Palestine would further its basic objective of eradicating Anglo-American influence in area and substitution therefor of Soviet Communist influence. Internationalization Jerusalem under TC not entirely compatible with this objective but certainly better from Soviet viewpoint than British control.

3. While western orientation present Israeli Government not pleasing to Soviet Government, such reports as Beirut's 282 June 10[2] point toward concentration Communist Middle East effort in Israel and hence to conclusion that Soviets nevertheless consider Israel as "soft" for penetration purposes.

4. As probability establishment separate Arab state in Palestine begins recede, alternative dispositions Palestine area outside present Israel-held territory would appear to be either incorporation within Israel or within Jordan.

5. Incorporation within Israel would obviously better suit Soviet objectives: in view relative strength parties concerned it also appears more likely outcome.

6. Under these circumstances we may anticipate Soviet shift away from previous emphasis on carrying out November 29 GA resolution, including plan for internationalization Jerusalem. New line may be clothed in phraseology reminiscent of original Soviet preference for unified bi-national state in Palestine and thus have certain appeal to Palestine Arabs. (Communist propaganda line with Arab refugees reported Beirut's 282 points this direction.)

7. Fact that Soviet press has been completely silent on Palestine issue for some time may also indicate stage being set for new Soviet approach Palestine.

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[1] Both dated June 23; neither printed; the former cited an editorial in a Communist newspaper in Jerusalem, which denounced the internationalization of Jerusalem as a device "to enable US gain control over Israel" and asserted that even international control over the Holy Places "would result in complete control by American rulers over all Jerusalem." Mr. Burdett concluded that "Strong opposition by Communist paper to any form internationalization Jerusalem may indicate change in USSR attitude this question." (867N.01/6–2349)

[2] Not printed.

Sent Department 1661, repeated London 160, Jerusalem 1, Tel Aviv 7, Arab capitals unnumbered.

KOHLER

867N.01/7–149 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 1, 1949—8 p. m.

659. Deptel 626 June 25 and Deptel 635 June 28. On June 24 Dept informally advised Israeli Emb USG anxious for Israelis and Egyptians to get together and discuss Gaza strip proposal. Dept also stated USG willing to facilitate such exchange of views either in New York or elsewhere.

Israeli Chargé July 1 informed Dept he had received message from Sharett stating Israeli Govt desirous begin proposed discussions with Egypt and anxious for assistance USG in bringing about conversation. Israeli Govt would prefer discussions take place Lake Success but willing consider any other arrangement agreeable to Egypt.

Dept realizes Emb has not yet received reply to *Aide-Mémoire* submitted per Deptel 635 June 18 [*28*]. If favorable reply received Dept desires Emb immediately approach FonOff and state discussions with Israelis have resulted in suggestion that informal discussions be held Lake Success between reps Egypt and Israel. You shld inquire whether Egypt Govt agreeable foregoing and repeat US offer to facilitate such discussions by all means at its disposal.

Dept instructing Emb London [1] request Brit FonOff instruct Brit Emb Cairo concert with US Emb and strongly support US representations re Israeli-Egyptian discussions Lake Success if Egyptian Govt reply US *Aide-Mémoire* favorable.[2]

ACHESON

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[1] In telegram 2300, July 1, 8 p. m., not printed.

[2] This telegram was repeated to New York. Chargé Patterson's *Aide-Mémoire*, dated June 30, was presented to the Egyptian Foreign Minister on July 2 (telegrams 642, July 5, and 713, July 26, both from Cairo, 867N.01/7–549, 501.MA Palestine/7–2649). The Chargé conversed on the matter early in July with Under Secretary Hassouna. The latter was said to have "reacted vigorously my allegation that Israeli proposal concerning Gaza has been sole constructive measure advocated in respect of long-term aspect of refugee problem, stating that Arabs had expressed constructive views Lausanne as he intimated Ethridge and Hare both knew. He added that it was really for PCC to advance solutions to refugee problem. Hassouna was also hotly antagonistic to Israeli desire take possession additional territory as represented by Gaza-Rafa strip and expressed surprise that USG could regard such measure as constructive proposal. He evidently regarded it as an indication of Israeli predatory intent and, indeed, stated that as long as Israelis felt they could obtain American support, they would never accept any proposition from any quarter." (telegram 649, July 7, from Cairo, 867N.01/7–749)

501.BB Palestine/7–149 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 1, 1949—8 p. m.

420. Ur 495 June 28. Rusk in talk with Israeli Chargé discussed territorial compensation to interested Arab states in accordance President's formula which well known to you.

Suggestion re Israeli-Egyptian talks applied specifically to Gaza strip proposal. Rusk foresaw such talks might lead to broader discussions with Egypt and possibly conversations with other Arab states.

Dept would not discourage bilateral negotiations freely entered into by Israel and Arab states according terms GA res Dec 11 and unaccompanied by attempts coercion. Dept's suggestion Abdullah subject Deptel 330 June 1 [1] made view circumstances surrounding previous bilateral Israeli-Jordan talks resulting Israeli occupation additional area triangle, necessity give maximum support PCC at crucial moment, and possibility Israel and Jordan might reach agreement re Jerusalem which would exclude international and Christian interest that city.

Dept hopes you will not allow Israeli officials evaluation of tenor of US reply to give them impression that US Govt does not attach most grave importance to points made in US notes. What was Herlitz reply to your remarks re refugees?

Dept has no info re "US and UN emergency refugee relief financial proposals". Broadcast may have been based upon SYG Lie's urgent appeal to UN members for more contributions UNRPR.[2]

ACHESON

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 1 to telegram 72, June 1, p. 1082.

[2] Ambassador McDonald replied on July 5 that he was grateful for the clarification of the Department's position regarding bilateral negotiations. He advised further that "Government here has repeatedly insisted it has never used threats in Israel–Transjordan negotiations. Israel officials do not misinterpret Deptel 379, June 18 as weakening of USG position President's note May 28. I stress every opportunity that USG attaches 'most grave importance to points made in US note' and leave no room for doubt. Re Dept's question Deptel 420 Herlitz's reply my refugee remarks (Embtel 495, June 28), she remained silent." (telegram 513 from Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/7–549) Telegram 379 is not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1156.

867N.01/7–349 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET TEL AVIV, July 3, 1949—3 p. m.

511. Shiloah of Foreign Office, who returned Tel Aviv June 30, was at residence my request two hours July 1. Ford also present. Re Washington impressions Shiloah said:

Was gravely troubled and perplexed by "widespread and deep suspicion in USG of Israel's purposes". US and Israel have same basic purposes in Middle East—(1) stability, (2) peace, (3) prosperous and secure Israel and Arab states. Third objective impossible without achievement of first and second. USG and Israel differ only about means, yet their relations poisoned by USG's suspicion of Israel. Arab states are openly rearming, pledging renewal of war and refusing discuss terms of peace, but Israel alone is charged by USG as potential aggressor. Cause of this discrimination must be found and eradicated. Obviously prevailing suspicion not primarily matter of USG personalities. What can Israel do to end USG suspicions? (*Close Shiloah's main statement*)

In reply I admitted frankly fact and gave list reasons USG fears of Israel's purposes. I stressed that Israel's failure yield on issues refugees or frontiers and its evident superior military strength were basic causes. Ford pleaded eloquently that Israel make large and definite refugee offer.

Replying Shiloah said pressure on Israel for refugee offer was "easy way" for us and if granted would solve nothing, but only prepare way for another similar demand on Israel later. He then repeated his personal suggestion made "towards end" of conference in office Assistant Secretary June 18 that a small committee immediately draft general but comprehensive plan refugee settlement.[1]

Re Department Gaza suggestion (Deptel 399 June 24 [*25*]) Shiloah expressed warm appreciation and said Israel will press bilateral negotiations. He fears failure however "unless Cairo ceases feel that USG on theory territorial compensation, supports transfer southern tip Negev to Egypt".

Comment: Shiloah's anxiety reflects grave concern of government here and its resentment at "injustice of USG's suspicions". Department's willingness sponsor Israel-Egyptian negotiations is, I think, most helpful move in long time. Its success would loosen key log in both refugee and territorial jam. *End comment.*

MCDONALD

[1] Mr. Shiloah at this point was referring, presumably, to the meeting with Acting Secretary Webb on June 17. Mr. Webb's memorandum of that conversation did not include Mr. Shiloah's suggestion as set forth in this paragraph.

501.BB Palestine/7–549

Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Sandifer) to Mr. James W. Barco[1]

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] July 5, 1949.

The working paper of May 18, 1949 entitled "Preliminary Draft, International Regime for the Jerusalem Area" has been examined by officers of UNA, L, and NEA, who have collaborated in the following comments and suggestions which are transmitted for your assistance. Please give us your reaction to these suggestions and keep us informed as to the views of your French and Turkish colleagues on such of the points as you may take up with them.

It is suggested that the working paper might be given a title such as "Instrument Establishing an International Regime for the Jerusalem Area". This would make it possible to refer to the document as an "Instrument" rather than a "Plan" as is now done.

Article 3. Powers of government in the two zones shall be exercised by the competent local authorities in their respective zones except as otherwise provided in the present Instrument.

Comment: It is believed preferable to eliminate the phrase "exclusive competence" found in the working paper in favor of the expression "except as otherwise provided", which is a more accurate description of the division of powers set forth in the Instrument.

Article 4. It is suggested that the proposed United Nations representative be given the title of "Commissioner" instead of "Administrator".

After the first paragraph of Article 4, the following might be inserted:

> "The Commissioner shall report annually to the General Assembly. He shall also make special reports to the appropriate United Nations organ whenever he deems it necessary."

Article 5. Delete the last sentence and substitute the following phrase as the last clause of the preceding sentence: "and three by the responsible authorities of the two zones acting jointly or, in event of their failure to agree, by the Commissioner."

Comment: This suggestion is in line with the suggestion in Jerusalem telegram 412, June 13, the reasons for which are regarded as completely valid.

Article 6. On behalf of the United Nations, the Commissioner shall ensure the protection of and free access to the Holy Places, in accordance with the terms of Articles 12 to 14 of the present Instrument.

[1] Mr. Barco was formally attached to the Division of United Nations Political Affairs; at this time, he was on detail to the American Delegation at Lausanne. The memorandum of July 5 was sent to him, in care of the Consulate at Geneva, with a letter of July 14 by Mr. Sandifer, who by that time had become Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (501.BB Palestine/7–1449).

Article 6 bis. Similarly on behalf of the United Nations, the Commissioner shall supervise:

(*a*) the permanent demilitarization and neutralization of the area, in accordance with the terms of Article 15 of the present Instrument; and

(*b*) the protection of human rights and of the rights of distinctive groups, in accordance with the terms of Article 17 of the present Instrument.

Comment: We consider that the word "supervise" is a more accurate expression of the function of the Commissioner under paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 6 of the working paper.

Article 7. The Commissioner, assisted by the Administrative Council, shall promote, facilitate, and participate in:

(*a*) coordination of measures for the maintenance of public order;

(*b*) operation of the main services of common interest to the Jerusalem area;

(*c*) equitable allocation of the contributions of each zone toward expenditures in the common interest; and

(*d*) planning and execution, on an area-wide basis, of such matters of municipal concern as regional planning, the development of transport and communications, and the construction and operation of public utilities.

Comment: It is believed that the expression "promote, facilitate, and participate in" more accurately describes the role of the Commissioner than the term "ensure"—an obligation which might also be beyond his power to carry out.

Article 8. Delete.

Comment: The part of Article 8 which is desirable to retain is here moved to Article 7, resulting in the deletion of Article 8.

Article 9. There shall be established an International Tribunal for Jerusalem composed of three judges to be appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice. Each judge shall hold office for a term of _____ years from the date of his appointment and until a successor shall have been appointed, unless his post on the Tribunal shall earlier have become vacant. The President of the International Court of Justice shall determine when a vacancy has been created through resignation, disability, or death. A judge may be removed for cause by the General Assembly of the United Nations, thereby creating a vacancy. A judge may be appointed for successive terms. In the initial appointments, one judge shall be appointed for _____ years, the second for _____ years, and the third for _____ years. The judges of the International Tribunal shall not be residents of Jerusalem or nationals of the State of Israel or an Arab State. The Tribunal shall sit in Jerusalem. It shall prescribe its own rules of procedure. The Tribunal shall designate one of its number to serve as president for such period as the Tribunal may determine. The judges shall receive uniform salary, and allowances, in amounts to be determined by the General Assembly.

The International Tribunal for Jerusalem shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine cases between the responsible authorities of the Jewish and Arab zones and between the United Nations Commissioner and the responsible authorities of either zone involving claims that laws, ordinances, regulations, administrative acts or court decisions applying to the area of Jerusalem are incompatible with the present Instrument.

Alternative text for preceding paragraph:

[The International Tribunal for Jerusalem shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine cases between the responsible authorities of the Jewish and Arab zones and between the United Nations Commissioner and the responsible authorities of either zone concerning the interpretation or application of the present Instrument.] [2]

The Tribunal shall also have jurisdiction to review, in its discretion, final decisions of the Mixed Tribunal for Jerusalem provided for in Article 10 of the present Instrument.

Decisions of the Tribunal shall be binding on the parties.

The International Tribunal may issue such orders within its competence as it deems necessary to the effective exercise of its jurisdiction.

Comment: As indicated in Unpal 88, May 2, we favor making the decisions of the Tribunal legally binding in all cases. On this basis the distinctions made in paragraph 3 of Article 9 of the working paper become unnecessary. Also it seems that paragraph 2 of this Article would include paragraph 1, which may therefore be eliminated.

An alternate text is submitted above for paragraph 2 embodying the usual language used in treaties for conferring compulsory jurisdiction over the subject matter. Such language would be desirable on general principles, but there is doubt whether in this case it might give an appearance of rigidity which would be objectionable to the parties.

The paragraph concerning the review of decisions of mixed courts is suggested because it is felt that such cases, even though the parties are individuals or corporations, might involve the interpretation of the basic Instrument for Jerusalem.

Article 10. The following introductory paragraph for this article is suggested:

> "There shall be established a Mixed Tribunal for Jerusalem composed of three judges. Each Judge shall hold office for a term of ———— years from the date of his appointment and until a successor shall have been appointed, unless his post on the Tribunal shall earlier have become vacant through resignation, disability, or death. A judge may be appointed for successive terms. One judge shall be appointed by the responsible authorities of the Jewish and Arab zones respectively. The third judge, who shall serve as president of the Tribunal, shall be appointed by the President of the International Tribunal for Jerusalem; this third judge shall not be a resident of Jerusalem or a national of the State of Israel or an Arab State. The Mixed Tribunal shall sit in Jerusalem. It shall prescribe its own rules of procedure. The

[2] Brackets appear in the source text.

judges shall receive uniform salary, and allowances, in amounts to be determined by the General Assembly."

This would be followed by the present second paragraph of the working paper, with the insertion of the word "all" before "the parties" in the second line.

The following additional paragraph for Article 10 is also suggested:

"The Mixed Tribunal may issue such orders in Jerusalem as it deems necessary for the effective exercise of its jurisdiction. The decisions and orders of the Mixed Tribunal shall be executed by the appropriate authorities of the zone in which such decision or order applies."

Article 11 bis. The salaries, allowances, and administrative expenses of the United Nations Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, the International Tribunal for Jerusalem, the Mixed Tribunal for Jerusalem, and the staff of the Administrator, including guards and administrative personnel, shall be included in the annual budget adopted by the General Assembly and shall be paid by the United Nations.

Comment: This text would replace the last paragraph of present Article 11.

Article 12. As to the first paragraph, it might be desirable to specify that guards may also be stationed on the routes specified by the Administrator to give immediate access to the Holy Places.

With regard to paragraph 2 on taxation, we would consider that the corresponding clause, (Article 56, paragraph 6) of the Trusteeship Council draft Statute, would be preferable. This clause was based almost textually on the General Assembly Resolution of November 29, 1947 and had wide acceptance among United Nations members, including France.

Article 13. The Commissioner shall undertake to secure for ministers of religion and pilgrims free circulation throughout Jerusalem. He shall have power to negotiate and conclude with the States concerned arrangements to facilitate the travel of ministers of religion and pilgrims to and from Jerusalem.

Article 15. It is suggested that the second paragraph begin as follows:

"The reponsible authorities of the two zones shall make declarations to the General Assembly guaranteeing the demilitarized character of their respective zones . . ." [3]

The third paragraph might read:

"Any violation of the provisions contained in these assurances or any attempt to alter the international regime by force shall, unless settled by negotiations or pursuant to a decision of the Tribunal, be reported by the Commissioner to the Secretary General, who shall bring the matter to the attention of the Security Council."

In the fourth paragraph we suggest that "two parties" be replaced by "responsible authorities" and that the following be added to the end

[3] Omission in the source text.

of the paragraph: "unless temporarily authorized by the United Nations Commissioner."

Article 16. We suggest the deletion of the phrase "be called upon to."

Article 17. Our comments on this article have already been telegraphed to you.

Article 18. We suggest that this should be deleted.

Article 19. A possible alternative to this article would be a provision that Jerusalem shall not be the capital of either of the adjacent states.

We also have in mind the possibility of using the International Tribunal in certain matters outside the Jerusalem area. In particular we have in mind the possibility that the parties might be called upon to give undertakings that they will not impose undue restrictions on the entry and free movement of persons desiring to visit the Holy Places in Palestine. It appears possible to give the International Tribunal jurisdiction to determine whether visa regulations and other measures are unduly restrictive of such free access.

867N.01/7–549 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY TEL AVIV, July 5, 1949—noon.

512. From reliable private American, whom I trust completely but am pledged not name, I am told that President Weizmann is calling conference with Ben Gurion and Sharett July 6 to urge that Israel offer unqualified [1] non-aggression pacts to Arabs States.

I would appreciate Department's reaction this idea and its advice.[2]

McDONALD

[1] As originally received in the Department, telegram 512, at this point, read "qualified". The correction was made on July 8.

[2] The Department replied on July 5, stating that it would be "pleased see non-aggression pacts freely entered into between Arab States and Israel. However, Dept unable give to proposal ur 512 July 5 the full consideration necessary without further details. For instance, what is meant by 'qualified'? Does Weizmann envisage non-aggression pacts as forming part of overall peace settlement, or wld he plan make proposal before and separately? Difficult see how Israel cld hope Arab States wld take favorable action on proposal unless it connected with final settlement." (telegram 423, 867N.01/7–549)

867N.48/7–149

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 6, 1949.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The receipt is acknowledged of your letter dated June 14, 1949, in which you analyze the probable effects of the Arab refugee problem upon United States military and strategic

interests in the Near East, in response to the Department's request for such an appreciation. This appreciation, as well as the intelligence estimate prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency which you transmitted as an enclosure, are of considerable value to the Department. The Department is transmitting your letter together with its enclosure to the President [1] for his information.

You are doubtless aware that the President recently made a decision to recommend to the Congress that this Government, within the framework of the United Nations, support a program for the repatriation and resettlement of the Palestinian refugees with United States financial and technical assistance. Such assistance would be conditional upon (1) formulation by the Palestine Conciliation Commission or the United Nations of a plan which has a reasonable chance of implementation at a reasonable cost; (2) full acceptance by Israel and the Arab states of the responsibilities involved and their active cooperation in the execution of an agreed plan; and (3) appropriate assistance from international and other sources.

If these conditions are fulfilled, the execution of such a program of repatriation and resettlement would have important effects in meeting the objectives of the National Military Establishment in the Near East.

You are assured that the position of the National Military Establishment will be given the fullest consideration in the further development of this Government's policy toward the Arab refugee problem.

Sincerely yours, DEAN ACHESON

[1] With Secretary Acheson's memorandum of July 7, not printed.

501.BB Palestine/7–649 : Airgram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, July 6, 1949.

A–94. The following general observations, admittedly of a speculative nature, are respectfully submitted regarding the current situation in Palestine:

1—The favorable opportunity for settlement of the present phase of the Palestine problem existing at the time of the signature of the first armistice agreement has now passed. Willingness on the part of the Arabs to end, at least for the time being, the fight over Palestine has been replaced by a general hardening of attitude and reaffirmation of their early conviction that it is impossible to do business with the Jews. The turning point and one of the principal causes of this change was the harsh terms exacted by Israel in the "Triangle." Thus Israel

has missed an opportunity to start on the long and difficult road towards achieving at least a working relationship with the Arabs upon which her future depends.

2—Arab efforts are now turning to relatively long range plans for the time when it will be possible to resume the war against Israel. Recognition of their past weaknesses and readiness to actually work for that future date rather than rely on talk is growing. The Arab Legion program for training Palestinians has met with good response and recruits are now drilling at numerous villages. The Arabs have no immediate intention of resuming hostilities, but the movement is towards a day in the future when a successful war will be possible instead of a day in the future when real cooperation with Israel will be possible. Although Arab disunity is still great, each state is apparently working separately towards the same objective.

3—The immediate desire of the Arab refugees is to return to their original homes regardless of the government in control. Morale is low, they see little hope in the future, and the meagre personal possessions which were salvaged have been expended. The Palestinians consider themselves the victims not only of the UN and Israel but of the failure of the other Arab States to live up to their boasts.

4—Despondency, misery, lack of hope and faith, and destruction of former standards of values, make the refugees an ideal field for the growth of communism. Having lost everything, the rosy, although vacuous, pictures of a Communist society are a strong temptation.

5—Recent reports of US pressure on Israel have raised to a high pitch Arab expectations that Israel will be forced to conform to the often stated US policy both with respect to territories and refugees. Non-fulfillment of these hopes will bring a correspondingly bitter reaction.

6—The State of Israel has no intention of allowing the return of any appreciable number of refugees except, perhaps, in return for additional territory. By this date there is much truth in the Israel contention that their return is physically impossible. Arab houses and villages, including those in areas not given Israel by the partition decision, have been occupied to a large extent by new immigrants. Others have been deliberately destroyed. There is practically no room left. Arab quarters in Jerusalem, until recently a military zone, are now almost full and new immigrants are pouring in steadily.

7—Despite Israel's declarations, the state is financially unable to pay compensation for Arab property taken over. Great difficulty is experienced even in financing current Jewish immigration and settlement. Barring outside loans or gifts, the funds are not on hand.

8—The UN and particularly the US thus find themselves in the

position of indirectly supporting and financing Jewish immigration and settlement. By feeding and settling Arab refugees deprived of property and means of livelihood, the UN and US are enabling Israel to use the same property and means of livelihood for new immigrants.

9—Failure of the UN in the past to protect the rights and interests of the Palestinian Arabs by forcing Israel to comply with the various UN Resolutions is largely responsible for the present situation. The policies which Israel has been permitted to follow have placed her in a position where a reversal is almost impossible.

10—The State of Israel has no intention of consenting to any reduction in territory now held except for minor rectifications with full compensation. Israel conducted the armistice negotiations with the intent that the boundaries fixed should be minimum frontiers of the new state and not temporary armistice lines.

11—Israel has three additional immediate demands. If it proves impossible to satisfy them by negotiation, the employment of force is not unlikely. These are: withdrawal of Syrian forces to the former Palestine boundary; elimination of the Latrun salient; free access to, and additional territory on, Mount Scopus.

12—Israel eventually intends to obtain all of Palestine, but barring unexpected opportunities or internal crises will accomplish this objective gradually and without the use of force in the immediate future.

13—Israel is convinced of its ability to "induce" the United States to abandon its present insistence on repatriation of refugees and territorial changes. From experience in the past, officials state confidently "you will change your mind," and the press cites instances of the effectiveness of organized Jewish propaganda in the US.

14—Under the present circumstances the UN and US are confronted with two broad choices:

a—Employ the necessary punitive measures against Israel to force her to consent to a reduction in territory and repatriation of refugees. At this late stage strong measures are required which will have a severe effect on the State of Israel economically and politically.

b—Admit that the US and UN are unable or unwilling to take the required measures, and therefore that US policy on boundaries and refugees cannot be carried out. This will require plans to liquidate the Palestine problem, formed on the premise that the refugees will not return and that no territorial changes will occur.

15—Delay in making the necessary determination will only make it more difficult either to force the necessary reversal on Israel or to develop resettlement plans for the refugees and to conclude at least *de facto* peace treaties.

BURDETT

501-887—77——77

501.BB Palestine/7–649 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET TEL AVIV, July 6, 1949—3 : 46 p. m.

516. In hour talk yesterday and Foreign Office, Herlitz told Ford Israeli Government had sent July 1 request via PCC [1] to representatives of Egypt, Lebanon and Transjordan for names Arab dependents (wives, children) now those three countries of "breadwinners" now in Israel in order immediate steps may be taken reunite these divided families in Israel. She not prepared hazard number possible repatriates under this plan but felt would be "less than 25,000 persons."

Re Jerusalem proposal (Deptel 375, June 17) Herlitz said Dayan was told by Burdett July 2 that proposal transfer certain functions SP Commission to MAC "had been withdrawn by USG" and asked confirmation this report in view Israeli agreement support proposal. Please advise present status this development.[2]

Sent Department 526; repeated Jerusalem 57; Amman 17.

McDONALD

[1] The request was actually made through the Mixed Armistice Commission. The correction was requested by Tel Aviv in its despatch 178, July 8 (501.BB Palestine/7–849).

[2] The Department's reply on July 7 stated that "USG has not withdrawn proposal re MAC. Dept has assumed Riley investigating possibility setting up new arrangement view acceptance proposal by Jordan and willingness Israel go along despite reservations. Dept desires Emb press points made Deptel 405 June 27." (telegram 433, 501.BB Palestine/7–649)

867N.48/7–649 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Jordan

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, July 6, 1949—6 p. m.

93. In meeting with Haikal July 6 McGhee expressed appreciation for cooperative attitude shown by Jordan re refugees but pointed out any int. assistance in solving refugee problem depended upon agreement Israelis and Arabs accept their responsibilities re repatriation and resettlement. Said he thought public announcement by Jordan of readiness accept some refugees might be helpful in leading other Arab states agree accept own responsibilities. Inquired whether Haikal thought his Govt willing make such statement.

Haikal said wld consult Amman but believed Govt wld be agreeable make public statement accepting for resettlement a number of refugees "who did not desire return to homes in Israeli-occupied areas", with proviso re int. assistance.

In conversations this matter with auths you shld stress necessity that all parties accept responsibilities re refugees in order provide basis for any possible int. aid within framework UN. Wld be difficult, for example, establish int. refugee program on basis cooperation only one country such as Jordan. You shld inform auths that US believes public statement by Jordan wld be helpful in inducing other Arab states cooperate, but leave no doubt in their minds that while statement wld be deeply appreciated by US, it wld only be first steps and that int. refugee program can not be established without cooperation Israel and Arab states and without prior survey resettlement and repatriation possibilities in Arab states and Israel. State US continues press Israel re repatriation.

In conversations with auths you shld emphasize points made Depcirctel June 27.[1]

ACHESON

[1] The formal reply to the Chargé's representations were embodied in a Jordanian Foreign Office note of July 19. The note stated that Jordan supported the right of the refugees to return to their country in accordance with United Nations decisions and that the Government would cooperate concerning those refugees who did not wish to return, providing financial assistance were forthcoming (telegram 285, July 20, 9 a. m., from Amman, 501.BB Palestine/7–2049). Mr. Stabler concluded his telegram with the observation that "No mention is made in note of public statement. It is clear from various talks with Foreign Minister and others that Jordan Government does not feel it can make such statement at this stage."

867N.01/7–349 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 6, 1949—8 p. m.

430. Fol Dept's comments ur 411 [*511*] July 3 for your use with Shiloah and other Israeli officials who may take similar line:

US as anxious as is Israel for peace, prosperity and stability NE, but can not agree that this can be achieved on Israeli premises regarding territory and refugees.

On basis investigations its reps abroad US Govt does not believe Arab states preparing resume conflict. Any public statement to contrary designed for internal consumption within Arab states can be matched by corresponding Israeli public statements.

US Govt has pointed out to Israeli Govt on numerous occasions steps latter might take to facilitate arrival peace NE and continued full US support of Israel.

US Govt can not agree that repatriation substantial number refugees wld "solve nothing." In opinion US Govt such move wld be major step on road to peace.

US Govt also rejects apparent implication Shiloah that solution refugees problem is responsibility of US. Clear that primary responsibility lies with Israel and Arab states, which shld discharge this responsibility through repatriation and resettlement, respectively.

ACHESON

501.BB Palestine/7–749

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs (Hare)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 7, 1949.

Participants: Mr. Aubrey Eban, Israeli Representative to the U.N.
Mr. Uriel Heyd, Israeli Chargé D'Affaires a.i.
Mr. George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary, NEA[1]
Mr. Raymond Hare, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA

In the course of a luncheon conversation on July 7 Mr. Eban inquired whether the Department had heard anything from the Egyptians regarding the possibility of conversations in New York on the Gaza strip question. He said that he had intended leaving this weekend for a short trip to Tel Aviv but that he would naturally defer his departure in case there was a prospect of the holding of conversations at an early date. Mr. McGhee said that we had not heard from the Egyptians as yet but that we expected to do so any time now and that we would, of course, inform the Israeli Embassy as soon as we received word.

Discussing the substantive side of the Gaza strip proposal, Mr. Eban said that from the economic standpoint this area was of little interest to Israel; its acquisition would merely result in Israel obtaining several miles of additional coastline. The situation was quite different, however, when viewed from the standpoint of security. Gaza was only a short distance from Tel Aviv itself and as long as it remained in the hands of a country with the military potential of Egypt it could not but constitute a perpetual threat to Israel. It was true that the return of any sizeable number of Arab refugees would also constitute a threat to Israeli security but in the case of the Gaza strip it seemed abundantly clear that the risk of accepting responsibility for the refugees there was far overshadowed by the danger of that area remaining in Egyptian possession.

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[1] Messrs. McGhee and Hare become Assistant Secretary of State and Deputy Assistant Secretary on June 24 and July 6, respectively.

Mr. McGhee observed that, as Mr. Eban doubtless knew, we had seen promising possibilities in the Gaza strip idea as a step toward Palestine settlement[2] but that unfortunately the proposal had been made in such a way as to produce the effect of being a straight barter of refugees against territory. Mr. Eban said that he too felt that the presentation of this matter may have left something to be desired. In further discussion on this subject Mr. McGhee observed that although direct discussion on the Gaza proposal was favored as a practical measure he assumed that such negotiations would have to be integrated in due course into other negotiations, particularly with reference to Transjordan. Mr. Eban indicated that such would doubtless be the case.

Turning to the general question of refugees Mr. Eban said that he was concerned lest Israel should make a gesture in that direction only to have it refused by the Arabs on the basis of inadequacy and thus leave Israel "out on a limb". He expressed doubt in the circumstances whether it was advisable for Israel to make such a move. Mr. McGhee said that he viewed the matter from an entirely different point of view. Presuming that the gesture made by Israel was indeed serious, it would constitute a positive and much needed step in the direction of peace. It could, for example, be made contingent on acceptance of the remainder by the Arab States. It was, of course, obvious that Israel would not be able to take back all of the refugees but a move which would indicate that it was willing to make a real effort to contribute to a solution would create an entirely different and more promising atmosphere. Mr. McGhee went on to emphasize the gravity of the situation which would arise as a result of failure to take constructive action on the refugee question in the very near future. He said that as a result of consultations with officials of the United Nations and of his own personal knowledge of Congressional attitude he was certain that little could be done by way of obtaining further funds on a straight relief basis. Relief could only be obtained if promise were given of some constructive program for the liquidation of the problem. It would be an extremely serious matter for both Israel and the Arab States if it should become apparent that failure to take action on this important question was the direct result of a lack of their willingness to assume responsibilities which they jointly shared. Mr. Eban appeared to be particularly impressed by this argument and said that he would make a point of stressing it on his return to Tel Aviv.

[2] The Department, on July 8, instructed the American Delegation at Lausanne to inform the French and Turkish Delegations of the Gaza strip proposals made by the United States (telegram Unpal 181, 501.BB Palestine/7–849).

501.BB Palestine/5–3149

The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Connally)

WASHINGTON, July 8, 1949.

DEAR SENATOR CONNALLY: In accordance with the request of your Committee, dated May 31,[1] for the Department's comments on S.J. Res. 98 proposing to establish the Near East Survey Commission, the Department has made a careful study of the proposal and does not recommend enactment of this measure.

The Department is in full agreement with the objectives of this resolution, which are directed towards promoting the economic development and the general welfare of the Near East, and appreciates the recognition accorded by the resolution to the special importance of this area of the world.

The Department is convinced that the objectives of the resolution should be sought through a United Nations framework, and that the United States should avoid the implication of assumption of direct responsibility for development needs of the Near East. Such an implication would unquestionably be drawn out of the creation of the proposed Commission, even though the resolution directs that the work of the Commission be coordinated with UN activities. The United Nations, through the Palestine Conciliation Commission and the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees, has already assumed responsibility for and is actively seeking solution to many of the problems of the Near East which are included in the objectives of the resolution.

The Department attributes great significance to the activities of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, in which the United States is one of the three participating governments. Pursuant to its task of promoting final settlement of all problems outstanding between Israel and the Arab states, the Conciliation Commission has been charged by the United Nations with the repatriation, resettlement, and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees from the Palestine hostilities, and has been instructed to seek arrangements which will facilitate the economic development of the area.

The Conciliation Commission is undertaking, in close cooperation with the United States Government and its other participating members, to formulate plans for the accomplishment of the above purposes. Such plans, which are parallel in their objectives with those outlined in Section 6 of the Joint Resolution, are well under way, on the basis

[1] Not printed.

of previously prepared, comprehensive surveys of the Near East. It is understood, moreover, that the Conciliation Commission plans to establish an economic survey group, composed of high ranking administrators and highly competent technical specialists, who will coordinate on a regional basis the existing surveys of the Near East, with a view to accomplishing the repatriation and resettlement of refugees and contributing to the economic development of the entire area. Under its terms of reference, the economic survey group will be required to examine the economic situation in countries affected by the recent hostilities, and to make recommendations which will enable the governments concerned to further such measures and development programs as are required to overcome economic dislocations created by the hostilities; it will be required to reintegrate refugees into the economic life of the area on a self-sustaining basis within a minimum period of time, and to promote economic conditions conducive to the maintenance of peace and stability in the area.

Furthermore, the technical assistance and investment guarantee program which has been submitted to the Congress by the President would enable this Government to participate in the economic development of this area. In developing a preliminary budget for the technical assistance program particular attention was given to the Near East as an area in special need of this type of assistance as an essential element in its economic development.

Under these circumstances, the Department welcomes the interest which has inspired the Joint Resolution under reference. It believes, however, that the purposes of the resolution will be better served by cooperative action such as that contemplated through the Conciliation Commission. Such coordinated effort would insure against duplication and would bring to the problem the facilities and support of other interested governments and international organizations which is essential to solution of the economic and related problems of the area.

In view of the great interest of the United States in the establishment of a firm and lasting peace in the Near East through the efforts of the United Nations, the Department of State hopes that the Congress will give maximum support to measures recommended by the United Nations and its organs to this end.

In view of the request from your Committee for a report at this time, we have not awaited Bureau of the Budget clearance.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

ERNEST A. GROSS
Assistant Secretary

890B.00/7–849

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs (McGhee)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] July 8, 1949.

Participants: Mr. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State
Dr. Charles Malik, Lebanese Minister
NE—Mr. Mattison

[Here follows discussion of various matters, particularly the refugee question.]

Dr. Malik then developed the main theme of his call, namely that there should be an immediate "two weeks" conference between the United States, Britain and France, on a very high level. Such a conference could settle matters in a way which would insure peace in the Near East for the next twenty-five years. It could be held in secrecy, and decisions taken which were vital to the whole area. With agreement reached, the United States could then embark on a program which would mean the salvation of the area. At this point he was careful to elaborate that he felt that economic development projects should be given a relatively low priority. Of first importance was the question of firm political guidance. Citing General Sir Edward Spears[2] as an example of what a firm guiding hand could achieve, he said that the Arab states were in a stage of uncertainty where such treatment was necessary.

I interrupted to explain that there might be difficulty in American participation in such a program. We were not politically adept at this kind of action and, furthermore, we did not like the kind of responsibility which such advice necessarily entailed. As a second point, I mentioned the fact that the American public was not accustomed to seeing the country occupy such a role, and there would undoubtedly be public criticism on the grounds that we were interfering with the internal political affairs of other countries.

[Here follows further discussion of the type of program that Minister Malik advocated.]

[1] Drafted by Mr. Mattison.
[2] British Minister to Syria and Lebanon from 1942 to 1944.

Editorial Note

New York, beginning July 8, sent several reports to the Department concerning the armistice negotiations between Israel and Syria. The report of July 8 stated that there had been general agreement on the

draft of an armistice and that some demarcation of armistice lines had been achieved (telegram 811, 501.BB Palestine/7–849).

Disagreements were encountered subsequently, particularly on the location and possible modification of the "certified truce line," which had been established on July 18, 1948, after the second truce (telegrams 815, 818, and 819 from New York, all dated July 11, 501.BB Palestine/7–1149).

501.BB Palestine/7–649 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 8, 1949—6 p. m.

351. Fol Dept's comments ur 804 July 6.[1] Dept agrees visit Eban Tel Aviv wld be advantageous but desires point out no indication yet received Egypt will agree to proposed conversations. In conversation with McGhee July 7 Eban stated planned to leave for Israel this weekend but prepared delay departure if any signs received Egyptians desirous undertaking discussions.

View shortage of time before fall GA session Dept considers it desirable that PCC reconvene if possible on schedule and that it and delegations proceed take decisive action re major issues.

Role of USG re Gaza strip discussions that of friend suggesting parties talk over proposal together. US will not participate as third party in discussions or act as mediator. If third party assistance desired PCC shld provide. Other members PCC have been informed that USG considers Gaza proposal shld serve as basis discussion between Israel and Egypt and that USG willing facilitate such discussion shld parties desire undertake.

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[1] Not printed; it reported that Mr. Eban had called on Mr. Ross that morning to discuss the proposal regarding the Gaza strip. The Israeli representative had stated that he would represent his Government in conversations with Egypt and that he planned to leave for Tel Aviv on July 10 for brief consultations.

Telegram 804 stated also that Mr. Eban "raised question whether USG acting with regard to Gaza strip discussions in its capacity as member of PCC, that is with knowledge and consent of other members. . . . [He] considered it very important that UN be tied in. He thought best formula, if occasion should arise, would be that USG had been assigned by agreement among members of PCC to assist parties for this particular purpose."

Mr. Eban spoke finally concerning the arms embargo. "As he saw it, there were two alternatives: First, conclusion of Syrian armistice would be final step in creation of whole new situation in which all bets would be off; in this case something very like an arms race would be very likely to start.

"As second alternative, SC might conclude that armistice phase had been completed, but that peace had not yet been achieved; therefore, arms embargo as contained in SC resolution should be continued until achivement peace settlement. Eban expressed clear preference for second alternative as more prudent and giving less occasion to temptation of risking resumption of hostilities." (501.BB Palestine/7–649)

Agree that if discussions take place at UN headquarters it shld be understood they taking place within UN framework. UN further tied in by fact that Israeli Gaza proposal made during discussions held under auspices UNPCC. PCC cld consider any agreement reached between Israel and Egypt as having been accomplished accordance its terms of reference. Dept sees no need for formula proposed by Eban re role USG.

ACHESON

501.MA Palestine/7–949: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices[1]

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, July 9, 1949—1 a. m.

You are requested to seek an appropriate occasion to bring orally to the attention of Govt to which you are accredited details of recent Congressional action re US contribution to UNRPR program and implications thereof as fol: US has already contributed $8 million to UNRPR and a further sum of $4 million will be paid shortly under appropriation recently passed by Congress. An additional $4 million may be contributed upon a finding by Pres that other nations have met their obligations to UNRPR. Such finding cannot now be assured in view failure many nations make substantial contributions.

You shld inform Govt that, even if full $16 million forthcoming from US, UNRPR funds wld be exhausted within few months. In event that finding of Pres unfavorable, UNRPR operation will cease in August. USG can not request present Congress authorize further contributions to UNRPR beyond sum which it has already allotted, and it is doubtful whether either UN or US would be responsive to request for additional funds for continued relief program in absence constructive steps by Israel and Arab states upon which cld be based long range repatriation and resettlement program.

You shld make abundantly clear to Govt implications these factors. Upon termination UNRPR, there is no assurance that full burden both administration and financing of relief all refugees will not revert to states in which refugees now being maintained or which constitute occupying authority in respective zones of Arab Pal. Even if tragic humanitarian implications termination international relief fail to move NE states to constructive action, neither Israel nor Arab states can remain aloof to or avoid consequences of attendant security problem.

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[1] At Arab capitals and Tel Aviv and at Bern for the American Delegation at Lausanne.

USG therefore urges that most serious and urgent consideration be given to consequences of failure to take earliest action to contribute to political agreement through PCC making possible for PCC to take steps looking towards long range solution of refugee problem. In light possible early termination relief program, USG convinced that it is no longer possible for states concerned to maintain present preoccupation with doctrinaire approach to refugee problem or to pursue course dictated solely by narrow self-interest. If they persist in doing so, world community, which has borne cost of custodianship refugees during past year, will hold NE states responsible for deterioration already tragic plight of refugees.

USG therefore considers it essential that Arab states and Israel openly assume their respective responsibilities resettlement and repatriation before termination this period of grace.

ACHESON

501.BB Palestine/7–1149 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT TEL AVIV, July 11, 1949—3 p. m.

528. Acting immediately on Department's instructions its circtel unnumbered July 9 and Deptel 433, July 7,[1] Ford and I talked with Sharett at Foreign Office 35 minutes early morning July 11.

I presented with utmost earnestness USG's strong views that Israel should accept broader base MAC jurisdiction Jerusalem in order advance settlement of additional issues including permanent demarcation lines and possible agreement to be incorporated by PCC in its general Jerusalem plan for UN GA.

Replying Sharett gave "conditional" answer promising "fuller and more definitive" later after consultation. He put forcibly these objections:

1. Transjordan armistice is binding but not yet implemented. Israel insists on implementation before broadening base discussions with Transjordan. USG "instead of putting pressure on Transjordan to carry out armistice is putting pressure on Israel to agree new terms negotiations without and before implementation existing armistice".

2. USG position if accepted would be "unhealthy precedent" because any agreement "could be made null by one party insisting on new terms before carrying out original terms". Moreover, acceptance USG proposal would involve "much larger issues than Jerusalem"; e.g. Abdullah's authority over whole Arab Palestine which Sharett said would "remain Arab but not necessarily under Abdullah".

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[1] Not printed.

3. "Practically USG terms difficult acceptance because in negotiating final demarcation lines Jerusalem, Transjordan is expected make far-reaching claims including return of former Arab portions new city, which Israel will resist." Acceptance USG's present suggestion would mean that "Washington influences would be used against Israel on issue permanent lines."

4. At end, Sharett reiterated that above answer was conditional. Not final.

Comment: I anticipate that Israel's final reply will in essence be as above. Unless Department can offer to Israel more convincing reasons for acceptance than those in Deptel 405,[2] Israel will continue, I fear, to resist USG proposal and will insist on carrying out Transjordan armistice.

Personally, I cannot avoid conviction that some Burdett's arguments Jerusalem's telegram 66, June 25, repeated Department 405 [*445*] are ingenuous. For example, his contention that "problems mentioned in Article 8 are of prime importance to Israel but of relatively [little] interest to Arabs" and that if US supported Israel's demand for carrying out this armistice article "without Arabs receiving adequate return" they "could only conclude US indirectly exerting further pressure for further concessions to Israel;" this argument seems to me to demand that Israel make new concessions in order that USG consent to urge Transjordan carry out armistice terms. Tough-minded realistic Foreign Office here not likely accede unless offer tangible *quid pro quo. End comment.*

Re my suggestion (Embtel 524, July 9 [3]) I still feel Jerusalem conference with Riley and Burdett highly desirable.

New subject re refugees; I put most strongly considerations Depcirtel July 9.

Sharett's reply in summary follows:

1. "Israel is not responsible for refugee problem."

2. "We are vitally interested in problem and that something be done soonest and are anxious help. We may not have said last word re our proposals but situation extremely difficult". Then Sharett added grimly that "repeated and publicly obvious representations by USG to Israel on this subject make government's concessions more difficult. We need to be allowed to act without visible American pressure". Further reply awaits conference Foreign Office with Eban who expected July 12.

Comment: I hope but I am not sure that Sharett's words foreshadow more constructive refugee proposal by Israel than any heretofore. *End comment.*

Sent Department, repeated Jerusalem 58, Amman 18, Bern 12.

McDONALD

[2] Dated June 27, p. 1185.

[3] Not printed.

501.BB Palestine/7–649 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 11, 1949—6 p. m.

437. Fol for your background info in conversations with Israeli officials. With reference Israeli intention reunite divided families (ur 526 [*516*] July 6) USG welcomes this first tangible step toward commencement the immed repatriation long requested by USG but hopes Israeli auths will make every effort enlarge scope this process particularly view fact plan as originally presented to PCC by Israeli reps envisaged return members divided families, not merely those which have "breadwinners" in Israel. USG believes that despite current status Syrian-Israeli relations Israel shld make similar approach to Syria as evidence good intentions.

US press reported FonMin to have declared in announcement program for reunion of families that Israeli policy toward majority refugees remains unchanged. If this true you shld make clear to Israeli auths that USG considers that limited operation described urtel, which would merely implement Israeli commitment of longstanding, in no way fulfills Israel's obligation assume its responsibility to undertake substantial repatriation.

ACHESON

[1] This telegram was repeated to Arab capitals and London and to Bern for the American Delegation at Lausanne.

501.BB Palestine/7–1249 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

RESTRICTED PRIORITY WASHINGTON, July 12, 1949—7 p. m.

2528. Pls inform FonOff that USG giving urgent consideration to means strengthening PCC and improving chances fulfillment its tasks. Pursuant these objectives, USG suggests immediate approach, in which it requests Turkish and French support, to Arab states along fol lines:

"Govts of France, Turkey, and US, motivated by sincere conviction that every effort must be made to facilitate progress towards successful conclusion PCC's tasks, and to accord PCC full cooperation therein, hopes Govts concerned will instruct their delegations to enter into forthcoming discussions at Lausanne with new and constructive approach towards all issues outstanding. Up to present time, progress of PCC has been impeded by fact that certain delegations to Commission were authorized by their Govts to discuss or negotiate only with respect to limited aspects of Pal settlement, or to insist upon establishment of priorities in approaching the several questions. PCC member govts must emphasize that terms of ref under which PCC

was established by GA res of Dec 11 have application to govts and authorities concerned, as well as to members PCC. It is earnest conviction of PCC member states that all delegations to Lausanne on reconvening July 18 should be given full authority by their respective govts to enter into discussion and negotiation of all issues which fall within purview of PCC—particularly status of Jerusalem, territorial settlement, and disposition of refugees. Indeed, a primary purpose of Protocol of May 12, 1949 was to enable Arab and Israeli delegations to extend their exchanges of views to all questions covered by GA res. After talks resume, therefore, refugees and territorial questions shld be subject concurrent discussion."

Substantially similar approach wld be made Israel, taking account of fact that Israeli del has full authority discuss all outstanding questions.

At time of foregoing representations, we propose inform both sides that this bilateral approach.

If FonOff agrees re foregoing approach, USG wishes send immed tel to Arab states and hopes Turk and French Govts prepared take similar action.[1]

ACHESON

[1] This telegram was repeated to Ankara for action and to New York for information. Ankara advised, on July 15, that the Turkish Foreign Office agreed to approach the "Arab states along lines Department's draft although not in identical language. Will also approach Israeli Government through Turk Consulate General Jerusalem." (telegram 322, 501.BB Palestine/7–1549)

501.BB Palestine/7–1349

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 13, 1949.

Subject: United States Support of the Palestine Conciliation Commission and Establishment of an Economic Survey Mission.

Discussion:

It is considered essential in the national interest that the United States Government take the initiative in an effort to overcome the present impasse in the negotiations for a settlement of the Palestine question. This is necessary in order to assure formulation of an interim program under United Nations auspices for solution of the refugee problem which would create a favorable atmosphere for a final political settlement; to replace the temporary United Nations refugee

[1] Transmitted, through Messrs. Webb and Rusk, together with a summarizing memorandum of July 13, in Mr. McGhee's memorandum of the same date to Secretary Acheson. The transmitting memorandum bears the Secretary's "OK" in a marginal notation.

relief program which is rapidly drawing to a close, and to take steps to overcome economic dislocations arising out of the hostilities which are seriously handicapping economic progress in the area.

Failure to take such action would result in increased suffering and possible widespread starvation among the refugees, attended by further deterioration of present conditions of unrest which would be exploited by communist and opportunist elements and would gravely endanger the security of the Near East. Moreover, unless some progress towards solution of the Palestine problem is achieved before the opening of the General Assembly in September, the entire question will be subjected to further acrimonious and unproductive debate.

The discussions at Lausanne under the auspices of the Palestine Conciliation Commission have reached an impasse largely over the disposition of the refugees. If substantial progress can be made towards solution of this problem, a decisive step will have been taken towards a general settlement. It would have been preferable if the initiative with respect to outside assistance could, in accordance with previous plans, have awaited satisfactory agreement by Israel and the Arab States as to disposition of the refugees, and full assumption of their responsibilities toward repatriation and resettlement respectively.

It is, however, believed that outside initiative can be taken now to survey the refugee and other economic problems remaining from the hostilities, without committing the United Nations, the United States or any other government to any specific line of action, or to any action at all unless specified conditions are met. Such a survey will, it is believed, facilitate agreement on disposition of the refugees by offering hope to the countries concerned for the assistance known to be required for any successful repatriation or resettlement program, and serve to divert their preoccupation from their present short-range objectives to longer-range economic solutions to broader problems.

Recommendations:

It is recommended that the following course of action be pursued by the United States Government:

1. *Palestine Conciliation Commission.*

a. The United States Government take immediate steps to strengthen the Conciliation Commission by the nomination of a strong representative, who must be present at the next meeting of the Commission in Lausanne, scheduled for July 18.

b. The United States representative urge the Commission to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to strengthen the staff of the Commission by the appointment of a highly qualified American administrator as Chief of Staff, and supporting personnel, to carry

out its coordinating and operating functions. (Whoever is appointed could, as a collateral duty responsible directly to the Secretary-General, be appointed to succeed Mr. Stanton Griffis who is resigning effective August 1 as head of the UNRPR.)

c. The Conciliation Commission, after it reconvenes, be urged by the United States representative to devote its attention chiefly to the questions of territorial settlement, the status of Jerusalem and the political aspects of the refugee question. Any final specific allocation of the refugees on a geographical basis would take into consideration the technical analyses of this question as submitted in the report of the Economic Survey Mission.

2. *Economic Survey Mission.*

a. The Conciliation Commission be urged by the United States representative to establish an Economic Survey Mission at the earliest practicable moment, pursuant to its authority under paragraph 12 of the General Assembly resolution of December 11, 1948. The terms of reference of this Mission should be based upon the foregoing resolution with special reference to paragraph 11 thereof, which establishes the principles of repatriation and compensation for refugee property, and instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the specific tasks of repatriation, resettlement, economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees, and payment of compensation. Within this context, the Economic Survey Mission should be charged with the objectives of examining the economic situation in countries affected by the recent hostilities and making recommendations which will enable the governments concerned to further such measures and development programs as are required to: (1) overcome economic dislocations created by the hostilities; (2) reintegrate the refugees from the hostilities into the economic life of the area on a self-sustaining basis within a minimum period of time; and (3) promote economic conditions conducive to the maintenance of peace and stability in the area. Recommendations by the Survey Mission relative to political problems with which the Commission is concerned should be at the request of the Commission and confined to the economic aspects thereof. The report of the Mission would serve as a basis for further action in the General Assembly and by appropriate international organizations and interested governments, including such action as the President may wish to recommend to the Congress with respect to United States participation in the program. It will be recalled in this connection that on May 26, 1949, the President approved the principle of United States participation in such a program under certain specified conditions which can still obtain.

b. The Conciliation Commission be urged by the United States representative to request the appointment of an outstanding American

still to be designated as Chief of the Economic Survey Mission, and that the Chief appoint, in agreement with the Commission and the Secretary-General, a British and a French deputy and such expert personnel, selected on a multinational basis, as may be required to carry out the economic survey. Such personnel should be chosen on the basis of their special qualifications and in consultation with interested governments and appropriate international organizations.

c. The Department seek at the September meeting of the General Assembly an effective integration of all United Nations responsibilities remaining in connection with the Palestine hostilities, including refugee relief, rehabilitation and resettlement, and economic programs.

3. *Diplomatic Representations.*

The Department utilize the present recess in the Lausanne discussions to attempt through diplomatic representations to obtain a more realistic and constructive approach to outstanding problems on the part of both Israel and the Arab States, and, in the light of the continued refusal of Israel to agree to the principles set forth in the President's recent representations to Israel, to take concrete steps to convince the Israeli Government of the grave importance which the United States attached to these representations. (This will be made the subject of separate recommendations.)

4. *Public Statement by the President.*

Simultaneous with the announcement by the Secretary-General of the appointment of the chief of the Economic Survey Mission, the President issue a public statement, now in preparation, pledging United States support of the Palestine Conciliation Commission and the Economic Survey Mission. This statement would also include a definition of long-range United States policy towards the Near Eastern area as a whole, minimizing present issues between Israel and the Arab States.

[Here follow concurrences.]

501.BB Palestine/7–1349

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET TEL AVIV, July 13, 1949.

No. 180

Subject: Comment on the Jerusalem Consulate General A–94, July 6, of Mr. Burdett, re "Current Situation in Palestine".

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following comments on Mr. Burdett's "general observations" which I have read and reread with closest attention.

Regretfully, I must record that I can agree unqualifiedly with only four (paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 10) of Mr. Burdett's fifteen theses. From all the other eleven theses, I find myself forced by my understanding of the facts to dissent.

Here are some examples of my dissent:

1. Mr. Burdett's categoric statement that "the turning point and one of the principle [*principal*] causes" of the "hardening of the attitude" of the Arabs was the "harsh terms exacted by Israel in the Triangle" (paragraph 1) is not supported by any evidence. In fact, the attitude of the Arab states other than Trans-Jordan on the issue of peace with Israel was intransigent *before as well as after* the Israel armistice with Trans-Jordan.

2. Admittedly "the movement (among the Arabs) is towards a day in the future when a successful war will be possible." (Paragraph 2.) But Mr. Burdett's implication that these Arab plans for resumption of war are solely the fault of Israel is manifestly unjust unless the very existence of Israel be deemed justification for Arab plans to destroy the new State by war.

3. I cannot share Mr. Burdett's certainty that "Israel has no intention of allowing the return of any appreciable number of refugees except, perhaps, in return for additional territory." (Paragraph 6.) On the contrary, at the time his despatch was filed, intensive consideration was being, and continues to be, given by Israeli authorities in Tel-Aviv to the repatriation of a large number of Arab refugees without involving additional territory for Israel.

4. Mr. Burdett's charge that the UN failure "to protect the rights and interests of the Palestinian Arabs by forcing Israel to comply with the various UN resolutions" has been "largely responsible for the present situation" (paragraph 9) would be more persuasive if anywhere in his despatch he took account of the Arab states' violation of vital UN decisions, notably the basic partition decision of November 29th.

5. Mr. Burdett's related charge that Israel "eventually hopes to obtain all of Palestine" (paragraph 12) is consistent with his central thesis that this State alone is the devil of the piece, but he cites no proof of Israel's alleged expansionist program.

6. Similarly, it would be interesting to have the evidence on which Mr. Burdett bases his statement that "Israel is convinced of its ability to 'induce' the United States to abandon its present insistence on refugees and territorial changes." He gives no proof of this flat declaration. (Paragraph 13.)

7. Unsound and defeatist is Mr. Burdett's statement that "the UN and the US are confronted with only two broad choices: (1) Employ the necessary punitive measure against Israel. . . . or, (2) Admit that the US or the UN are unable or unwilling to take the required measures."

The United States is not limited to two such absolute and mutually exclusive choices.

The task of statesmanship is precisely to avoid the easy way of adopting either of two such extreme measures as Mr. Burdett contends are the only alternatives. I have no fear that the State Department or the President will be tempted to impale themselves on either horn of this destructive dilemma.

On the contrary, the United States has consistently—except when special circumstances have seemed to dictate otherwise—sought to use its influence in equal measure with both Israel and the Arab states. Why should not our Government continue to influence both sides equally in the direction of moderation and conciliation, merely varying the nature and amount of its persuasion according to its judgment on the particular issue involved?

Success in the achievement of President Truman's high ideals for the Near East require policies not based on prejudgments either pro-Arab or pro-Israel, but on a combination of extraordinary discernment, flexibility and realism.

Respectfully yours, JAMES G. MCDONALD

501.BB Palestine/7–1349 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 13, 1949—7 p. m.

2432. Reps Brit Emb July 13 furnished Dept list points suggested by FonOff as basis PCC approach solution Palestine problem. Fol substance points and informal comments reps Dept.

1) Acceptance of refugees by Arabs and Israelis for resettlement and repatriation. Dept agreed and there was further accord that view circumstances Israel latter could probably not be expected accept more than quarter million refugees for repatriation.

2) Israeli Gaza strip proposal should be accepted on condition safeguards devised re future treatment Gaza refugees Israel and territorial compensation made by Israel for strip. Dept agreed some kind international supervision treatment of refugees in Israel essential. Re second condition Dept in agreement provided Egypt desired compensation.

3) Israel should make territorial compensation for areas outside 1947 boundaries retained by her. Dept agreed but pointed out danger creating impression that US would not agree to any settlement which did not provide for territorial compensation. US did not wish attempt

[1] This telegram was repeated to Arab capitals.

force Arab states accept compensation if they did not desire, and if agreement reached between parties without duress which did not include territorial compensation US would not oppose.

4) If territorial compensation should take form of award to Jordan or to Jordan and Egypt of part or whole of Southern Negev, thus providing land bridge between Egypt and Jordan, Israel should have "guaranteed" freedom of access and communication to Red Sea. Equally Arab states should have "guaranteed" freedom of communication and access to Mediterranean through ports of Gaza and Haifa. If another solution were adopted for Southern Negev there should nonetheless be guaranteed freedom of communication and access across it between Egypt and Jordan and between Israel and Red Sea. Alternative method of providing for freedom of communication and access might be neutral zone or zones. Dept stated opinion that continuity of land communication between Arab states was most important territorial item in Palestine settlement as far as Arabs were concerned. Felt it might be possible for PCC informally make specific territorial proposal to parties and that this might well take form suggested arrangement involving transfer part of Southern Negev to Egypt and Jordan with agreement for Israeli access Red Sea. Dept inquired how much of Southern Negev UK thought would be necessary transfer to Arabs in order assure effective land communications between Jordan and Egypt. Brit reps said they would query FonOff. Dept pointed out such proposal as Gaza–Dead Sea line obviously unfeasible. Dept saw no reason for arranging access to Mediterranean for Arab states at Gaza if similar arrangement made at Haifa.

5) Free port at Haifa with arrangement by which Iraqi crude could be freely exported in return for provision by Iraq of normal supplies for Haifa refinery. Dept stated general agreement desirability establishment free zone facilities Haifa for Arab states but doubted possibility or desirability establishment free port completely free of Israeli control.

6) Partition of Jerusalem for administrative purposes with international supervision, particularly of Holy Places. Dept stated its position on Jerusalem in general agreement with this.

7) Incorporation of Arab Palestine in Jordan. Dept agreed desirable this should be done at appropriate time.

8) Israel and Arab states concerned should agree to share for their mutual benefit waters of Jordan and Yarmuk. Dept agreed.

ACHESON

501.BB Palestine/7–1349 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT WASHINGTON, July 13, 1949—7 p. m.

446. Follows message from Bunche to Sharett, Jul 13, concerning final phase Syrian-Israeli armistice negotiations:

[Here follows the text of Mr. Bunche's message to Israeli Foreign Minister Sharett. It noted that the Syrians had accepted the fundamental Israeli condition that they withdraw from their occupied positions in Palestine, subject to three conditions. Mr. Bunche requested that Mr. Sharett go as far as he reasonably could toward accepting the Syrian reservations, in order to conclude speedily the prolonged negotiations.[1]]

Dept desires you see Sharett soonest and give full support to position set out in Bunche message, emphasizing earnest hope US Govt that remaining obstacles conclusion armistice can be surmounted. You may wish first consult with Riley and Vigier in order obtain additional background remaining points at issue.

ACHESON

[1] The text of Mr. Bunche's message was sent to the Department by New York in telegram 827, July 13, 10:51 p. m., 501.BB Palestine/7–1349. Ambassador Austin, the same day, reported Mr. Bunche's observation that "he would be 'greatly obliged if Department of State could get across to Tel Aviv' support for his representations to Sharett" (telegram 824 from New York, 501.BB Palestine/7–1349).

501.BB Palestine/7–1449 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, July 14, 1949—11 a. m.

463. Comments on Tel Aviv's 528, eleventh follow:

1. Although Jordan bound abide by terms armistice, article 8 provides only for "formulation of agreed plans and arrangements". Not bound reach agreement in practice despite previous agreement in principle.

2. Since past history special committee shows not possible formulate agreed plans, logical adopt different approach, broaden terms reference and attempt progress from armistice conditions to peace conditions.

4. [*3?*] Proposal as understood by Consulate General has always possessed twofold purpose lessening tension Jerusalem by solving article 8 problem and progress towards peace through agreement on delimitation Arab Israel areas and related questions.

5. [4?] Relinquishment by Israel portion Arab quarters seized by force in Jerusalem necessary as part final peace and consistent with US policy on territorial settlement. Opposition by Sharett to Department's proposal on grounds would involve return Arab portions Jerusalem directly contrary to US policy.

5. Demarcation of zones essential part plan for international status Jerusalem PCC required present September GA. Line can be drawn either by agreement between Israel and Jordan or arbitrarily by PCC. If Israel persists in rejection US proposals suggest PCC immediately consider demarcation line and other related questions.

6. Consulate General believes US should intensify efforts secure Israel acceptance US policy on both refugees and territory since Sharett's remarks afford grounds for hope representations making themselves felt.

8. [7?] Israel acceptance broad terms reference still considered prerequisite start actual negotiations in MAC.

Sent Department; repeated Tel Aviv 75, Amman 47.

BURDETT

867N.48/7–1449 : Telegram

The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Secretary of State

SECRET DAMASCUS, July 14, 1949—5 p. m.

384. President Zaim summoned me today and in hour-long review various matters separately reported, expressed his anxiety over refugee problem, stressing his conviction that unless refugees can speedily be resettled their deteriorating situation and morale will make them increasingly amenable to Communist propaganda. Unlike most Syrians, he lost no time in recriminations or fulminations against Israel for failure to implement repatriation provisions of December 11 UN resolution but made earnest plea for US aid in resettling refugees, implying resettlement is only realistic solution distressing problem.

Recalling that as long ago as April 28 (mytel 256 [1]) he had expressed his willingness resettle quarter million or more in Syria if refugees fairly compensated for their losses and Syria given adequate aid. He begged me urge my government come forward with financial and technical assistance to help him fulfill his offer before Communists succeed in their increasing appeal to these victims of Palestine conflict. Explaining that he could not openly take initiative because powerful opposition would attack him for selling out to Jews and their backers, he pledged his wholehearted cooperation if US would take lead. "Give us needed help, show us way and we will prove our good will." Here as

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 962.

example latter, he alluded to cooperative response Syria has made to US plea for compromise in armistice talks with Israel saying he personally had directed Syrian delegation to make extreme concessions as earnest his appreciation USG's constructive promise support observance agreement and as gesture his desire speedily liquidate Palestine problems. Armistice would be reached and refugee problem must be solved.

Referring to numerous economic development projects which Syria is anxious to implement and concerning which detailed studies already made (despatch 165, July 14)[2] he pled for necessary funds and technical assistance promptly to alleviate them as means of absorbing refugee labor.

Reminding President that USG has consistently shown its concern for refugees both in making substantial contribution their relief and in urging necessity for realistic approach to resettlement, I said we have long foreseen and pointed out distressing and dangerous situation that will exist when current relief funds are exhausted as they soon will be without other provision in sight (pages two and three Legations A–134, May 11).[2] He interrupted to express his pleasure that his and our thinking should be so similar and repeated earnestly "we want to resettle them as speedily as possible, but you must help us do it". I then presented Department's views as outlined Depcirtel May 27, 1 a. m.[3] and said US felt that greater initiative should come from Arab states. Reiterating probable dire political consequences if Syria openly took initiative, Zaim said "if everyone concerned waits for someone else to move, problem will not be solved in thousand years. Recognize difficulty of our position and help us to prove our good will. It is in your interest as much as ours that this problem be speedily solved."

Believing that no useful purpose would be served by prolonging discussion pending receipt of Department's reply to Legtel 380, July 13 [2] and authority to make specific suggestions for Syrian consideration, I said I would not fail report his views to my government which I knew would be happy to learn of his awareness of serious implications of problem and of his continued willingness to approach its solution realistically.

Sincerity of Zaim's will to action is unquestionable if for no other reason than his awareness that Palestine problems stand in way realization many of his dreams. While Legation shares belief that he cannot safely go too far in advance of Syrian public opinion in what

[2] Not printed.

[3] Not printed; it repeated to Arab capitals and Tel Aviv the text of telegram 674, May 23, to Bern, p. 1047.

would here be considered unreasonable surrender to Israeli intransigence, it is evident that he is susceptible of being led by friendly US initiative not only in resettling refugees but in compromising other differences with Israel. In Legation's opinion it is in interest of peace in Middle East to capitalize on Zaim's cooperativeness by recognizing delicacy his position and by encouraging him with our support wherever possible.

If, as recommended Legtel 380, we eschew scolding tactics and take initiative in building constructively on cooperation offered us, resettlement in Syria can begin as promptly as projects can be activated with needed funds and technical assistance.

While appreciating considerations that influenced Department to condition its help of elements set forth in Depcirtel May 27, Legation believes urgency of matter calls for more direct leadership in assembling and concentrating desirable international assistance. Legation fears that unless US takes and keeps initiative in UN to evolve workable plan, cooperation on international plane will be forthcoming too slowly to solve problem before it worsens dangerously and perhaps irreparably.

Our acceptance of leadership entails danger of being blamed for shortcomings of any suggested plan of action but our successful solution this distressing problem would be great humanitarian gesture worthy our best traditions and would pay dividends in helping restore our once high prestige in Arab lands.

Sent Department 384, repeated London 98, Paris 83; pouched Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Bern, Cairo, Jerusalem, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Ankara, Moscow.

KEELEY

501.MA Palestine/7–1349 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 14, 1949—11 p. m.

701. Reurtel 669 July 13 [1] and others on same subject. Dept concerned lest Egyptians be given impression that US is insisting they agree to Gaza strip proposal. You shld make every effort to impress Egyptian officials that US position is that this is proposal which has merit, and shld not be summarily dismissed. For this reason USG believes it essential that it be discussed between parties at interest. Egyptian agreement to discuss question wld not involve commitment

[1] Not printed.

to accept proposal. It wld be concrete statesmanlike gesture. However, outright refusal to discuss wld leave Egypt open to accusation from other side that it had refused to even discuss a matter of mutual interest and wld undoubtedly be used as opportunity for propaganda campaign against Egypt.

If Egyptians shld attempt to argue that question already discussed at PCC you shld point out that immediate negative reaction of Egyptian delegate at Lausanne did not constitute in the view of this Govt "discussion" of question.

Dept cannot understand your reference in first [*last*] para reftel [2] to "USG's complaisant partiality to Israel". In interests of peace USG has on number of occasions made firm representations both sides, and has sought impartially to give advice whenever cause of peace in area cld be advanced thereby. Further comment on this and points raised in your A–746 July 1 [3] will follow.[4]

ACHESON

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[2] This paragraph gave the comment of Chargé Patterson after his conversation with Abdul Moniem Mustafa, head of the Egyptian Delegation at Lausanne, as follows: "I found Mustafa Bey's position possibly foreshadowing that of Egyptian Government not in accord with realistic appraisal of situation. If Egypt is weak in military sense Egyptian lack of confidence in Israeli good faith in UN ability to enforce its resolutions and in USG's complaisant partiality to Israeli should induce willingness to compromise and make best of bad bargain however unjust." (867N.01/7–1349)

[3] Not printed.

[4] The Department, on July 14, sent to London a telegram broadly parallel to No. 701. The telegram queried whether the British Foreign Office "now contemplates extending dipl support US representations to Egypt" concerning the Gaza strip proposal (No. 2450, 501.BB Palestine/7–1449). Its content was discussed on July 15 with Michael Wright, who in referring to the British program set forth in telegram 2432, July 13, to London, p. 1223, stated that "it was Bevin's belief that coordinated approach for whole program as embodied in British suggestions held most hope for success. Wright felt personally that to press Egyptians further on Gaza proposal, in isolation from other points, might well prejudice Egyptian acceptance proposals as whole." (telegram 2790, July 15, 6 p. m., from London, 501.BB Palestine/7–1549)

Statement Released by the Department of State [1]

The appointment of Paul A. Porter as United States Representative of the United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission was announced by the White House on July 16, 1949.[2] Mr. Porter recently served as Chief of the American Economic Mission to Greece with the personal rank of Ambassador.

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[1] Reprinted from Department of State *Bulletin*, July 25, 1949, p. 98. This source does not indicate the date of release.

[2] The American Delegation at Lausanne was notified of Mr. Porter's appointment in Unpal 186, July 16, which also informed that Mr. Porter planned to leave the United States immediately for Lausanne (501.BB Palestine/7–1649).

The Palestine Conciliation Commission is charged with the task of facilitating settlement of all issues outstanding between Israel and the Arab States under the General Assembly resolution of December 11, 1948. This government attaches great importance to a speedy solution of these issues and offers its unqualified support in the fulfillment of the Commission's task.

This government welcomes the resumption of the Lausanne meetings, which represent a further advance in the direction of peace between Israel and the Arab States. The recent discussions at Lausanne were of material benefit in clarifying the respective positions of the two parties. In the opinion of the United States as a participating member of the Commission, the groundwork has now been laid for constructive negotiations in which both parties must cooperate to the full if the area of disagreement is to be progressively narrowed and a final settlement obtained.

501.BB Palestine/7–1649 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices[1]

RESTRICTED PRIORITY WASHINGTON, July 16, 1949—1 a. m.

In order to strengthen PCC and to improve chances fulfillment its task, you are instructed immediately to approach govt to which you are accredited along fol lines:

"Govt of US, motivated by sincere conviction that every effort must be made to facilitate progress towards successful conclusion PCC's task, and to accord PCC fullest cooperation therein, hopes govts concerned will instruct their delegations to enter into forthcoming discussions at Lausanne with new and constructive approach towards all issues outstanding. Up to present time, progress of PCC has been impeded by fact that certain delegations to Commission were authorized by their govts to discuss or negotiate only with respect to limited aspects of Pal settlement, or to insist upon establishment of priorities in approaching the several questions. US Govt must emphasize that terms of ref under which PCC was established by GA res of Dec 11 have special application to govts and authorities concerned as well as to members PCC. It is earnest conviction of US Govt that all delegations to Lausanne on reconvening July 18 should be given full authority by their respective govts to enter into discussion and negotiation of all issues which fall within purview of PCC, particularly status of Jerusalem, territorial settlement and disposition of refugees. Indeed, a primary purpose of Protocol of May 12, 1949 was to enable Arab and Israeli delegations to extend their exchanges of

[1] At Cairo, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Damascus, and Amman.

view to all questions covered by GA res. After talks resume, therefore, refugees and territorial questions should be subject to concurrent discussion."

Govts of Israel and Arab States should also be informed that similar approach has been made to both sides.

Re other members of PCC, Turkish Govt has already agreed to approach Govts of Israel and Arab States as has US Govt. Dept hopes to be informed shortly that French Govt has also agreed.[2]

ACHESON

[2] Chargé Stabler discussed the content of this circular telegram with the Acting Prime Minister and King Abdullah on July 20. The King gave his views as follows: "Regarding Jerusalem said his ideas and those of Israel were close and felt there should be no difficulty reaching agreement. Regarding territorial settlement believed it should be based on partition with adjustments provided latter did not harm Jordan. Regarding refugees indicated his belief that as general principle all refugees should be resettled in Arab areas. If large numbers should return [to Israel] they would be source of constant friction between Arab States and Israel and dangerous situation would be created. However Israel should permit return those desiring become Israel citizens (which he thought would be few) and those who desire enter Israel to settle their properties. . . . Again made plea for US financial assistance in form loan and machinery." (telegram 286, July 20, 8 p. m., from Amman, 501.BB Palestine/7–2049)

On July 21, the Jordanian Foreign Minister informed the Chargé that he had instructed his delegation at Lausanne "to discuss all outstanding issues without regard to priorities on basis of UN decision Jerusalem, frontiers and refugees." (telegram 289, July 23, 10 p. m., from Amman (501.BB Palestine/7–2349))

Cairo, on July 22, advised that after discussions with high Egyptian officials, there was "no reason to believe instructions Egyptian delegation Lausanne have been amplified in sense recommended by Department." (telegram 702, 501.BB Palestine/7–2249)

501.BB Palestine/7–1649 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 16, 1949—2 p. m.

283. Dept informed Riley and Vigier feel responsible Israel Govt[1] in armistice negotiations goes long way toward meeting Syrian reservations re Samakh area and the Syrian Govt should now accept Israeli compromise offer.[2] Next meeting armistice delegations Monday, July 18, when armistice agreement might possibly be initialed for subsequent signature later in week. Dept understands Riley and Vigier have seen you and Syrian PM and request your support their views with Syrian Govt. Dept endorses their request.

ACHESON

[1] The text of the Israeli response was transmitted by New York in telegram 833, July 15, 6 : 59 p. m. (501.BB Palestine/7–1549), not printed.

[2] This information was reported by New York in telegram 832, July 15, 4 : 57 p. m. (501.BB Palestine/7–1549), not printed.

501.MA Palestine/7–1349 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 16, 1949—6 p. m.

284. Urtel 380 July 13 [1] indicates different interpretation than that intended by Dept of word responsibility in Depcirctel June 27. Dept's position that Israelis and Arabs bear primary responsibility for solution refugee problem contains no implication of blame for sequence of events leading to creation of refugees but is based squarely upon physical fact that problem intrinsic to the area by virtue of physical presence of refugees in Arab states, separated from their property, asssets and homes in Israeli or Israeli-controlled territory. Since US does not accept primary responsibility nor would support UN in acceptance, such responsibility must reside in Israel and Arab states. Concept of responsbility was dicussed openly and frankly by US rep with all Arab dels Lausanne, all of whom appeared fully to understand US position. For these reasons, Arab dialectics can do no more than perpetuate deadlock, without in any way removing refugee problem from geographical sphere of Arab states. Both sides have inescapable responsibility to take action re refugee question or suffer consequences to their own security which will inevitably result from continued inaction.

Dept fully aware of pros and cons of past history with respect to creation refugee problem. We are firmly convinced, however, of necessity both parties abandoning their preoccupation these arguments if any solution is to be achieved before major disaster is precipitated by refugee problem.

Depcirctel June 27 and Depcirctel July 9 1 a. m. in essence offer Arabs and Israelis two alternative choices: Depcirctel June 27, together with Depcirctel May 27 1 a. m.[2] on which it is based, clearly indicate basis on which USG prepared offer material assistance in solution refugee problem. Depcirctel July 9 1 a. m. cites alternative of complete inaction by Israelis and Arabs, with resultant inability of international community initiate further action and attendant repercussions upon best interests Israel and Arab states.

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[1] Not printed.

[2] Not printed; it repeated to Arab capitals the text of telegram 674, May 23, to Bern, p. 1047.

You shld therefore proceed make representations along lines Depcirctel June 27 and July 9, emphasizing considerations set forth above.[3]

ACHESON

[3] This telegram was repeated to Tel Aviv and was pouched to Arab capitals, London, Paris, Jerusalem, and Ankara and to Bern for the American Delegation at Lausanne. Minister Keeley discussed the content of telegram 284 with the Syrian Prime Minister on July 17 and reported that the latter "was visibly and volubly disappointed that no distinction was made between Syria and Israel or between Syria and certain other Arab states in assessing blame for alleged inaction. . . . In addition to making maximum contribution to refugee relief it long ago offered to accept for resettlement double or more number already parked on its territory. Acceptance responsibility for creation of refugees as implied by Department in referring to problem as one of 'Israeli-Arab' making was another matter and simple justice aside no Syrian Government could stand which accepted any part of blame for creation of Arab refugees or which thus or in any other way admitted or connived in alienating right of refugees to return to their ancestral homes in Palestine and their right to compensation for losses if in actual circumstances they are precluded by Israel from returning or do not wish to return to live under Israeli tyranny." (telegram 390, July 18, 9 a. m., from Damascus, 501.MA Palestine/7–1849)

501.BB Palestine/7–1749 : Telegram

The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY DAMASCUS, July 17, 1949—7 p. m.

387. When I discussed Israeli reply with PriMin Barazi July 15 he concluded that, irrespective qualms re details, Syrian Government would, as "of its appreciation of friendly advice of its friends" (meaning US), accept Israeli compromise offer. Following receipt today Deptel 283 July 16 I broached subject again when PriMin came to my house to review various matters separately reported and learned that true to his promise he had yesterday instructed Syrian Delegation to accept terms without further discussion.

Unless Israeli raise new issues or renig, armistice agreement will be initialled tomorrow, July 18, and signed during week he said. "I have given you my word; it is final." Have informed Riley.

Sent Department; repeated Baghdad 76, Beirut 87, London 100, Paris 85, Tel Aviv 48, Jerusalem 58, Amman 49, Cairo 52, Jidda 33, Ankara 56, Bern 24 (for USPCC).

KEELEY

501.BB Palestine/7–1849 : Telegram

The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL DAMASCUS, July 18, 1949—7 a. m.

389. Prime Minister told me yesterday that because of heavy cost (30,000 Syrian pounds monthly) and belief of Syrian delegation that nothing likely to be accomplished at Lausanne because of Israeli intransigence he proposed cut delegation to one officer and one clerk. I replied that while composition Syrian delegation matter for his decision its reduction at this time might be interpreted as weakening Syrian interest in work of PCC which would be unfortunate on eve arrival Paul Porter whose appointment I extolled.

Also took advantage of occasion to convey sense Depcirtel July 16, 1 a. m. and to urge that Syria take leadership in constructive approach at Lausanne (Bern for USPCC). In reply to Prime Minister query "tell me what you want me to do" I suggested strength Syrian delegation be maintained at least temporarily and be given full authority and instructions to discuss all outstanding problems which fall within purview of PCC, particularly status Jerusalem, territorial settlement and disposition refugees.

After some discussion he agreed and added that he would strengthen Syrian delegation by replacing Farid Zaynaldin "who is too rigid dialectician" and by adding one or more realists, perhaps bringing Edmond Homsi, Syrian Minister London to Lausanne. In addition Prime Minister said he would use his influence with other Arab states to get them to adopt more positive attitude. He would do so out of his conviction that it is in interest Syria and other Arab states to follow advice and leadership of US in solving Palestine problems. As Syria has already followed US advice in armistice [negotiations?] with Israel (mytel 387, July 17) so it is prepared to do in peace talks in belief said Prime Minister that US influence would henceforth be increasingly exerted toward ends of justice.

Pointing out again how difficult it is for Arab states to take initiative in compromising with Israel Prime Minister indicated willingness go along on any reasonable arrangements that would serve cause some peace in Middle East. He recalled statement he had made to Ambassador Griffis and me months ago in this connection (mytel 651, October 18, 1948 [1]) and reiterated hope that UN under US inspiration and leadership would speedily impose Palestine settlement based on partition plan of November 29, 1947 which Arab states would in present circumstances have to accept as *force majeure*.

[1] Not printed.

If present friendly Syrian Government remains in office and if [garble] request initiative and leadership (mytel 384, July 14 and 388, July 17 [2]) in refugee resettlement and in working out reasonable compromise in other matters before PCC Legation believes and Riley concurs that Syria now offers best Arab leadership in reaching overall peace settlement.

If we want peace and stability in Middle East we must boldly accept leadership in achieving it.[3]

Sent Department 389; repeated London 102, Paris 87, Bern 25, pouched Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Ankara.

KEELEY

[2] Latter not printed.

[3] In reply on July 20, the Department instructed Damascus to convey to the Prime Minister "US appreciation Syria's cooperative attitude reflected in his forthright action in reinforcing Syrian participation in PCC meetings and for endeavoring influence other Arab states act similarly. US confident continuation this policy will be most beneficial in speeding settlement outstanding problems." (telegram 287, 501.BB Palestine/7–1849)

Minister Keeley transmitted these sentiments to the Prime Minister on July 21. The latter urged the United States Government "keep secret his offer endeavor influence other Arab states realistically to adopt more positive policy at Lausanne and to follow US lead. Prime Minister reemphasized success his efforts this respect likely to be in proportion to how well secret kept." (telegram 400, July 22, 10 a. m., from Damascus, 501.BB Palestine/7–2249)

501.BB Palestine/7–1949

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 19, 1949.

Subject: Appointment with Paul A. Porter

Discussion:

On July 16 the President appointed Paul A. Porter to succeed Mark Ethridge as the United States representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission.

Mr. Porter plans to leave Washington July 21 by plane for Lausanne. Mr. Porter has an appointment with you at 11:45 a. m. and with the President at 3:15 p. m. on July 20.

Since Mr. Porter's appointment on July 16, officials of the Department have had an opportunity to brief Mr. Porter in detail on all aspects of the Palestine question including the instructions which Mr. Lovett, with the President's approval, issued to Mr. Keenan and Mr. Ethridge [2] (Tab A).

[1] This memorandum was transmitted to the Secretary through Mr. Rusk who initialed it.

[2] See Mr. Lovett's letter of January 19 to Mr. Ethridge and footnote 1 thereto, p. 681.

It is anticipated that Mr. Porter will inquire to what extent and in what manner the United States Government will support him in his negotiations as the United States representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission. It is accordingly suggested that you may wish, prior to your appointment with Mr. Porter, to discuss the present stage in developments regarding Palestine with the President.

It is recalled that the President directed the Department on May 29 to approach the Government of Israel in a friendly and firm manner with regard to its attitude on the subjects of Arab refugees and a territorial settlement in Palestine. It was stated at that time that "if the Government of Israel continues to reject the basic principles set forth by the resolution of the General Assembly of December 11, 1948, and the friendly advice offered by the United States Government for the sole purpose of facilitating a genuine peace in Palestine, the United States Government will regretfully be forced to the conclusion that a revision of its attitude toward Israel has become unavoidable."

The Government of Israel has continued to refuse to heed the advice of the United States Government concerning the principle of territorial compensation for areas held by Israel outside the 1947 Palestine partition lines and the repatriation of a substantial number of Palestine refugees without reference to territorial acquisition. It is hoped, however, that during future talks at Lausanne, the representatives of Israel will adopt a more conciliatory attitude.

Meanwhile, in order to strengthen Mr. Porter's authority and to increase the prospect of success at Lausanne at this critical stage, it is recommended that Mr. Porter be authorized to emphasize privately to the representatives of Israel at Lausanne two important points:

1. that the United States Government continues to stand firmly behind the principles enunciated in its note of May 29; and
2. that, pending the adoption of a more conciliatory attitude by Israel, the United States Government is finding it extremely difficult to give favorable consideration to the two following matters:

a) Further allocation of funds under the $100,000,000 loan requested by Israel in 1948. One of the principal reasons leading to favorable action by the ExImBank on this request was the belief that there were hopes of an early and final peace in Palestine and the consequent establishment of normal economic conditions in Israel which would facilitate the ultimate repayment of the loan. Israel's failure thus far to heed the friendly advice of the United States may be said to have delayed peace and normal economic relations. Pending positive action by Israel to attain these objectives a suspension of further allocation of funds is accordingly warranted on banking grounds.

b) Ways and means by which the United States, through the United Nations, might be able to participate in an overall program for the repatriation and resettlement of Palestinian refugees. In

order to plan a program which would be acceptable to the United States Congress, banking institutions and United Nations member states, some measure of agreement between the Arabs and the Jews and a definite prospect of peace in Palestine are essential; otherwise there would be no firm base on which the United States or other members of the United Nations would be able to formulate and participate in a workable program.

It is also recommended that Mr. Porter continue to emphasize to the representatives of the Arab states at Lausanne:

that the United States continues to support the principle of repatriation of those refugees who wish to return to Israel; but at the same time, hopes that the representatives of the Arab states will be able to make constructive suggestions with regard to the resettlement of those refugees who do not wish to return. Failure to do so would have the consequences indicated under 2(*b*) above.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that

1) Mr. Porter be authorized to approach the Arabs and the Israelis privately as indicated above;
2) The representative of the Department recommend to the ExIm-Bank that it temporarily postpone further allocations under the loan pending positive action by Israel at Lausanne.[3]

[Here follow concurrences by officers of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs and of the Office of United Nations Affairs.]

[3] In an attached undated memorandum, Mr. McGhee wrote: "Mr. Porter discussed this with the President yesterday and the President approved the course of action recommended in this memorandum."

501.BB Palestine/7–1949 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET TEL AVIV, July 19, 1949—noon.

549. Re Depcirtel July 16 received July 18. Department will have noted in Embtel July 18, 545[1] niact, that following my repeated representations to Foreign Office Israeli Government through Shiloah

[1] Not printed; it reported that Ambassador McDonald conversed with Mr. Shiloah on the evening of July 15. The latter made known that he would replace Mr. Eytan as head of the Israeli Delegation at Lausanne, that he would be "taking with him more 'elastic program'" and that he hoped "for progress before UNGA if PCC will bring two groups together." The Ambassador commented to the Department that "What Shiloah said and way he said it encourages me to hope that Israel's policy especially on refugees is developing favorably."
The following day, the Ambassador saw Mr. Eytan, who emphasized that Israel "intends to be 'more forthcoming' at Lausanne and hopes that 'Arabs and US delegates will also be more conciliatory'." Mr. Eytan was said to have said that it was "essential" that the "UN have success" in the negotiations. (501.BB Palestine/7–1849)

July 15 and Eytan July 16 declared that Israel delegation was returning Lausanne instructed along lines similar Department's suggestions. July 18 after dinner for Justice Douglas at residence, Ben-Gurion by implication confirmed Israeli plans for more conciliatory and broader approach at Lausanne. Despite this prior substantial Israeli assent views Depcirtel July 16 were formally urged upon Foreign Office by Ford in conference with Herlitz July 19 who is reporting immediately to Sharett.

Sent Department 549, repeated Baghdad 15, Beirut 27, Damascus 24, Amman 21, Cairo 18, Jidda 1, Lausanne.

McDONALD

501.BB Palestine/7–1949 : Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED BEIRUT, July 19, 1949—3 p. m.

369. Re Depcirtel, July 16. Lebanese Delegation to Lausanne has been impressed with need to reach agreement on outstanding issues being discussed and it has received instructions from President and Prime Minister to cooperate fully with PCC. Principal delegate has been given full authority in negotiations. In two conversations I had with him during his stay Lebanon, he indicated complete willingness to cooperate and so far as Lebanon is concerned realization of urgency for finding solution on all points. Foreign Office says Turk Chargé has made similar approach and has received similar assurances.[1]

PINKERTON

[1] The Department, on July 20, directed Beirut to "Convey to Pres and PriMin US appreciation Leb cooperative attitude re PCC negots and instru[ction]s this regard to principal Leb delegate Lausanne" (telegram 353, 501.BB Palestine/7–1949).

501.BB Palestine/7–2049 : Telegram

Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL LAUSANNE, July 20, 1949—11 a.m.

Palun 246. In conversation this afternoon Abdul Monem stoutly denied US charge regarding negative Egyptian attitude, stated Egypt anxious for just peace based on return large number refugees and partition plus compensation. Egypt in no hurry sign unjust peace which would not be lasting and rather than do this preferred await developments. Would take long time for bitterness Near East to subside enough to permit Arab states sign peace and meantime, who knew what might happen in Israel? Israel is carrying crushing economic burden and possibility civil war should not be disregarded.

Said Egypt had decided could not discuss Gaza proposal. Showed complete indifference fate Gaza refugees who were international and Jewish responsibility and maintained if international aid stopped Egypt had means support.

Negev must remain Arab and Egypt needed Gaza–Beersheba–Dead Sea line for defense.

Only sign progress Egyptian position here was information he had been authorized discuss matters other than refugees. Said he willing consider any proposal put forward by PCC but refused commit self in replies to questions regarding possibility Egyptian-Israel condominium Southern Negev or guarantee Israeli access Akaba if Southern Negev in Arab hands.

Hirsch has made it very clear that Israeli Government does not desire that Palestine question be discussed in GA this fall. Put forth "personal" suggestion that if PCC saw any hope for progress at time opening GA, it should recommend Palestine be excluded or placed at very end of GA agenda.

Have asked Arab delegates what their position will be if Shiloah brings substantial concessions from Tel Aviv. All have said would discuss concessions with great interest but obvious that during recess they have reached no common position regarding territorial issue.

ROCKWELL

767N.90D/7–2049 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria

WASHINGTON, July 20, 1949—7 p. m.

288. Express to Syrian Govt gratification USG with regard signature Israeli-Syrian armistice agreement on July 20 [1] and express hope this further step toward peace in Palestine will increase possibilities successful conclusion to meetings now taking place with PCC at Lausanne.[2]

ACHESON

[1] For text, see SC, *4th yr., Special Supplement No. 2.*

[2] This telegram was sent simultaneously, *mutatis mutandis,* to Tel Aviv as No. 461. Nos. 288 and 461 were repeated to New York.

For the statement made by Secretary Acheson on July 20 on the signing of the Israeli-Syrian armistice, see Department of State *Bulletin,* August 8, 1949, p. 180.

Editorial Note

The Department of State, on July 21, released a statement by Secretary of State Acheson on the Palestine problem. The key paragraph read as follows: "Now that the position of both parties have been fully defined in previous sessions of the [Palestine Conciliation] Com-

mission, it will materially advance the task of the Commission if both the Israeli and the Arab delegations return to Lausanne with full authority to enter into constructive and effective negotiations. It will also greatly facilitate the Commission's task if both sides will now extend their exchange of views to all problems covered by the General Assembly resolution of December 11, in order to make possible a simultaneous and balanced approach to the closely related problems of territoral settlement and disposition of the refugees from the hostilities." The full text of the Secretary's statement is published in Department of State *Bulletin*, August 1, 1949, page 148.

Editorial Note

Acting Mediator Bunche, on July 21, transmitted a report to the Security Council on the status of the armistice negotiations and the truce in Palestine. He observed that Israel had concluded armistice agreements with Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria; that the agreement with Jordan covered the front held by Iraqi forces, making unnecessary negotiations between Iraq and Israel; that the Saudi Arabian forces in the Palestine conflict had served under Egyptian command and were therefore covered by the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli armistice; and that no agreement involving Yemen was necessary since Yemen had no forces in the conflict.

As a result of these agreements, the report indicated, "an armistice now applies to all of the fighting fronts in Palestine and by the terms of the agreements the military phase of the Palestine conflict is ended."

The report contained Mr. Bunche's conclusions and his proposed draft resolution, as follows:

1. The practical application of the Security Council's truce in Palestine has now been superseded by effective armistice agreements voluntarily negotiated by the parties in the transition from truce to permanent peace. Since all of these agreements are self-enforcing and establish the necessary machinery for their supervision, with the assistance of the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization and United Nations observers at his command, it would seem unnecessary longer to impose upon the States concerned the restrictive conditions of the Security Council truce. The Security Council resolution of 15 July 1948 imposed not only a truce and the conditions relating thereto, but ordered the Governments and authorities concerned, pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, to desist from further military action.

2. In view of the existing state of affairs in Palestine, the Security Council might consider it advisable to review the situation in the light of the new conditions and to take appropriate action. Such action might declare it unnecessary to prolong the truce provided for in the

Security Council resolution of 15 July 1948. It might, at the same time, reaffirm the order in that resolution to the Governments and authorities concerned, pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, to desist from further military action, and might also call upon the parties to the dispute to continue to observe an unconditional cease-fire. Action along some such lines would be consistent with the realities of the present situation and would at the same time fully safeguard the basic objective of the Security Council that fighting in Palestine shall not be resumed.

3. In conclusion, I would respectfully call to the attention of the Security Council my communication to the Council of 17 January 1949. In my view, the action which the Council might now properly take should also provide, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, for the termination or the transfer to the United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission of such functions as now remain to the position of Mediator under Security Council resolutions. With the armistice agreements concluded, there is no longer any useful function to be performed by the Mediator. Any further activity by me would inevitably impinge upon the work of the Palestine Conciliation Commission. This could create only confusion and duplication of effort and would serve no useful purpose whatsoever. Under the terms of the several armistice agreements, I have no responsibility for their implementation or supervision, since this responsibility, by mutual agreement, is assumed by the parties themselves. With the truce obsolete, the armistice agreements concluded, and the Palestine Conciliation Commission conducting peace negotiations, the mission of the Mediator has been fulfilled. I am happy to have had this great opportunity to serve the United Nations and the cause of peace in Palestine and in this, my final report, wish to thank the Security Council for the indispensable support which it has given to me in my efforts to discharge the responsibilities entrusted to me.

4. Finally, it is clear to me that the success or failure of any mediation or conciliation effort in a situation such as that presented by Palestine must depend very largely upon the measure of support afforded by the United Nations. If the voice of the United Nations is strong and clear, it can be the decisive factor in the mediatory effort to resolve the conflict. The most effective instrument at the disposal of a mediator or conciliator is the assurance of prompt and vigorous support and action by the United Nations.

5. I have taken the liberty of attaching to this report, as an annex, a memorandum suggesting the general lines of the action which the Security Council might now consider it appropriate to take.

RALPH J. BUNCHE
Acting Mediator

Annex

The Security Council,

Having noted with satisfaction the several armistice agreements concluded by means of negotiations between the parties involved in the conflict in Palestine in pursuance of its resolution of 16 November 1948,

Expresses the hope that the Governments and authorities concerned, having undertaken by means of the negotiations now being conducted by the Palestine Conciliation Commission, to fulfil the request of the General Assembly in its resolution of 11 December 1948 to extend the scope of the armistice negotiations and to seek agreement by negotiations concluded either with the Conciliation Commission or directly, will at an early date achieve agreement on the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

Declares that the armistice agreements, as an important step in the transition from truce to permanent peace in Palestine, render unnecessary the prolongation of the truce as provided in the resolution of the Security Council of 15 July 1948;

Reaffirms the order set forth in its resolution of 15 July 1948 to the Governments and authorities concerned, pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, to desist from further military action, and calls upon them to continue to observe an unconditional cease-fire;

Requests the Conciliation Commission, with the assistance of the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, to undertake the observance of the cease-fire in Palestine, and terminates all remaining functions of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine under Security Council resolutions;

Requests the Secretary-General to continue in existence such of the present Truce Supervision Organization as the Conciliation Commission, in consultation with the Chief of Staff, may require in maintaining the cease-fire, and as may be necessary in assisting the parties to the armistice agreements in the supervision of the application and observance of the terms of those agreements.

The full text of Mr. Bunche's report is printed in SC, *4th yr., Supplement for August 1949*, page 1.

501.BB Palestine/7–2249 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 22, 1949—7 p. m.

472. Re our proposal Jlem negots under Riley, Dept has fol main points: Art 8 Armistice Agreement. does not rigidly limit subject matter negots re Jlem but includes any questions which parties may submit. In any case Art calls for formulation agreed principles these subjects and implementation obviously requires agreement in free negots between parties. Unsuccesful effort to reach such subsequent agreement shld not be regarded as violation Armistice Agreement.

Foregoing considerations admittedly technical but support our controlling motivation achieve agreement these questions which are vital to settlement Jlem question. It appears possible that sufficient bar-

[1] This telegram was repeated to Jerusalem, Amman, Bern (for the American Delegation at Lausanne), and New York.

gaining points exist both sides among these related problems to furnish basis compromise agreement. Dept hopes that parties can disregard technical aspects and undertake broadly based talks which might make possible settlement Jlem question.

Sharett's statement that Israel will resist return former Arab quarters is first official statement we have had to this effect. It appears directly contrary to provision GA res Dec 11 concerning return refugees to homes and contrary gen US policy and principles justice and equity. Question shld at least be subject negots.

Dept considers possible PCC will feel compelled include recommendations territorial and related questions in its detailed proposals for internatl regime which it must present this fall. Highly desirable such proposals have prior agreement parties but if this not possible PCC may have to make own recommendations.

ACHESON

501.MA Palestine/7–1949 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 22, 1949—7 p. m.

[Unpal] 198. For USDel Lausanne. Pls inform your colleagues PCC re fol and if they agree proceed as follows:

On basis Cairo tel 689, July 19,[1] rpted to Bern, Abdul Moneim

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[1] Not printed; it reported at length on conversations held at Alexandria by Chargé Patterson with British Ambassador Campbell, Acting Chief of the Royal Cabinet Hassan Youssef, Foreign Minister Kashaba, Secretary General of the Arab League Azzam, Mustafa Bey, and the Egyptian Finance Minister on July 15, 16, and 17. The conversations dealt with the Gaza strip proposal. The Chargé advised that all those consulted found little to approve in the proposal; while Egyptian officials "denounced it as forerunner Israel aggression against Gaza, expressing great surprise and I may add contemptuous surprise that the government of a great nation such as US should lend itself to such disreputable scheme." After describing his various conversations, the Chargé commented: "From foregoing lengthy and perhaps repetitious recital Department may find cumulative evidence not only of total lack of Egyptian faith in any proposal emanating from Israel but also a growing suspicion of inability or unwillingness of USG to view Palestine controversy impartially. This may serve to amplify and clarify reference to USG's complaisant partiality to Israel mentioned in concluding paragraph Embtel 669, July 13, which was designed to emphasize a certain lack of realism on Egypt's part. I fear that continued harping on merits of Gaza plan which are completely invisible to Arab eyes, may cause Egyptians to view USG as an accomplice of an expansionist and aggressive Israel and impair, if not destroy nascent cordiality which Egyptian officials and others have been showing toward US and its citizens and interests in interval since conclusion February 24 armistice. It is not pleasant to see practices of one's government treated with the very real intellectual and moral disdain evident in minds and indeed on lips of ranking officials of a foreign government." The Chargé concluded that "should Department be able guarantee Egypt territorial compensation sufficient provide land bridge between Egypt Jordan, Egypt I believe might adopt more conciliatory attitude toward proposed settlement." (501.MA Palestine/7–1949) Regarding 669, see footnote 2 to telegram 701, July 14, p. 1229.

Mustafa Bey expressed willingness discuss Gaza proposal in presence PCC. While obvious intent is summary rejection proposal, you and your colleagues shld take initiative privately to raise question with him on basis reftel, expressing appreciation his willingness undertake discussions and pointing out that USG, in making proposal for such discussions, held no brief for any specific locale for discussions but merely suggested Lake Success as convenient meeting place during recess. Now that PCC has reconvened, his suggestion conduct talks Lausanne quite proper. If he shld raise objection that Gaza proposal not in accord with May 12 protocol, you shld emphasize that protocol's primary intent was to create technique under which negots cld be extended to cover all issues outstanding under Dec 11 res, and that therefore any reasonable proposals put forward shld be given serious attention. Regardless of whether he intends enter into *pro forma* or substantive discussions Gaza, you shld inform him you and your colleagues prepared immediately approach Israeli del privately with view ascertaining whether it prepared make territorial compensation for Gaza strip of character which PCC cld consider equitable for presentation to Egyptians, and what guarantees it has in mind for refugees and residents along lines set forth para 1 Unpal 133, June 4.

If progress made in private discussions, it is anticipated Israeli del shld then add proposal for such equitable territorial compensation and foregoing guarantees to its May 20 Gaza strip proposal (Document AR/12, May 23 [2]) in PCC meeting and that Arabs shld then formally discuss proposal in PCC meeting.

Palun 246 July 20 just received. We assume Abdul Moneim meant Egypt cld not discuss Gaza publicly at this stage. In view his assurances to US Chargé Cairo, however, pls proceed along lines foregoing.[3]

ACHESON

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[2] AR/12 was a memorandum of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, which transmitted to the Delegations of the Arab States at Lausanne a summary of the proposals and suggestions made by the Israeli Delegation on May 20 (IO files). The Israeli proposals and suggestions are set forth in telegram 769, May 20, from Bern, p. 1036.

[3] This telegram was repeated to Cairo. The formal rejection by the Egyptian Government of the United States proposals was made in the form of an undated *aide-mémoire* handed to Chargé Patterson on July 25 (telegram 713, July 26. 9 a. m.). The Department replied on August 4, stating that "Although Dept cannot agree with contentions in Egyptian reply it is believed undesirable to continue to press Egyptian Govt re Gaza strip proposal. Proper focus of discussion this subject now appears to be Lausanne." (telegram 778, repeated to Bern for the American Delegation at Lausanne) Both telegrams are filed under 501.MA Palestine/7–2649.

501.BB Palestine/7–2249 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 22, 1949—7 p. m.

Unpal 199. For USDel, Lausanne. Re Deptel 472 Jul 22 to Tel Aviv Dept wld appreciate comments appropriate procedure in event failure parties agree demarkation lines and related subjects Jlem area. Dept considering fol alternatives:

PCC might recommend as part of proposals that agreement shld be reached by parties and that failing agreement within specified time UN authority shld delimit zones on basis *status quo* Nov 29, 1947.

Second alternative. If parties fail agree within next few weeks PCC shld make own recommendations as part of proposals after consulting expert opinion in Jlem.[2]

ACHESON

[1] This telegram was repeated to Tel Aviv as No. 471, to Jerusalem as No. 304, to Amman as No. 101, and to New York as 382.

[2] In reply to this telegram and the one *supra*, Ambassador McDonald observed that the problems of Jerusalem, refugees, and boundaries were "little if any nearer solution than when PCC was created, more than seven months ago." The Ambassador concluded that "Lack of progress not attributable personalities nor wholly to inherent difficulties of issues nor to stubborness governments concerned. Department should face fact that PCC has been inherently self-stultifying. Despite Porter's best efforts PCC will, I fear, remain incapable that series of strong affirmative united actions essential bring Arab states and Israel to move beyond present armistices.

"In light of PCC record, gravity of unsettled problems and urgent need for speedy action, I urge Department begin now campaign to have UNGA replace PCC by single man authority. This change vital even if Bunche be not available to do job." (telegram 566, July 26, 7 p. m., from Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/7–2649)

501.MA Palestine/7–1849 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 22, 1949—7 p. m.

293. Urtel 390 July 18.[1] In reply your query as to what Dept specifically desires from Syria to advance refugee solution, it wld be of considerable value if Zaim wld authorize Syrian del inform PCC officially of its willingness cooperate in facilitating solution of refugee problem by accepting substantial number refugees for permanent settlement Syria. Such undertaking by Syria wld in no way relieve Israel of its repatriation responsibilities and other Arab states of necessity cooperating in resettlement. We also hope Syrian cld be instructed use its influence induce other dels to adopt similar position simultaneously at Lausanne.

[1] Not printed.

In making foregoing suggestions, we recall, of course, that Arab dels to PCC at June 25 meeting Lausanne expressed willingness examine resettlement question as soon as they knew how many refugees did not wish return to homes on basis completely free choice, and stated that such refugees wld find Arab countries ready to take them. However we now hope it would be possible to make more practical and forthright statement along lines suggested, which wld more accurately reflect Zaim's demonstrated interest in settlement of refugees in Syria and wld materially advance progress of negots towards permanent solution of problem.

Since some progress has been made in private discussion with Arabs and since certain indications exist that Israel may now be prepared make concessions re refugees, we are concerned lest forthcoming Arab League Political Comite meeting result in hardening of Arab attitude, and thereby produce setback to PCC negots.

On suitable occasion, you shld make ref to Arab League meeting and state that Dept understands refugee question will be taken up. You shld then make fol observations:

Dept has received indications that PCC now has reasonable hopes achieving early progress towards practicable solution refugee problem. We are aware that Arab states, who bear burden of refugees, wld welcome such solution. Dept believes that all parties now appreciate fact that solution can only be achieved through effective cooperation Israelis, Arab states, UN and its member govts. For this reason Dept hopes that at forthcoming meetings Arab League, Arab reps will find it possible to adopt position in Beirut which will make it possible for Arab reps at Lausanne constructively to approach resettlement of refugees in connection with overall solution for Pal problem.

Sent Damascus, repeated to Beirut and Amman for similar action vis-à-vis Lebanese and Transjordan govts.[2]

ACHESON

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[2] This telegram was also repeated for information to Bern for the American Delegation at Lausanne. Its content was summarized and sent to Baghdad, Jidda, and Cairo as a circular telegram of July 22, 11 a. m. (501.MA Palestine/7–2249). Minister Keeley conveyed the substance of No. 293 to Prime Minister Barazi on July 25. The latter "said he would immediately send cable instructions to Syrian representatives at Lausanne to confirm to PCC formally oft-repeated offer to accept for resettlement substantial number of those refugees who not desiring return to Palestine to live under Israeli administration are compensated for their losses as foreseen in UNGA resolution December 11 and who elect to settle in Syria. Barazi implied number would depend upon Syria's absorptive capacity in light of amount of resettlement aid furnished (in past tentative figure has been 250,000 to 300,000).

"As for forthcoming meeting Palestine Political Committee Barazi said it likely to be held in Egypt (Alexandria) and he is optimistic it will support realistic and constructive attitude at Lausanne. For his part he will exert his whole influence to that end." (telegram 408, July 25, 11 a. m., from Damascus, 501.MA Palestine/7–2549)

501.BB Palestine/7–1549 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, July 23, 1949—2 p. m.

2582. Brit Emb Rep (Embtel 2790 July 15)[1] recently discussed Brit suggestions outlined Deptel 2432 July 13 with Dept. Brit stated they were prepared to approach Arab States, France and Turkey re these various points. Dept suggested, however, that it might be wise temporarily to postpone such approach (except for Gaza strip proposal which was currently being discussed by Brit Emb Cairo with Egyptian officials) until Brit and ourselves had agreed more precisely on form and substance of approach. Brit Emb seeking further views FonOff on certain points.

It may not therefore be necessary for Wright to raise proposal with Bevin for time being. Pls inform Dept re current Brit views on Gaza strip proposal.

ACHESON

[1] Not printed.

867N.01/7–2349 : Telegram

The Chargé in Jordan (Stabler) to the Secretary of State

SECRET AMMAN, July 23, 1949—midnight.

291. During talk with King this morning, he made following comments:

1. He had received no information from Fawzi Pasha re agreement Transjordan and Arab delegates that Transjordan should annex Arab Palestine (Depintel July 21, 1 a. m.[1]). However, believed annexation inevitable and desirable. During feast next week, delegation from Nablus would present to him formal request for annexation, having first held meeting in Nablus to accept partition principle. Delegation would include former followers of Mufti and he thought this action significant. HM felt such areas as might be returned to Arabs should also be annexed to Transjordan.

2. Regardless what other Arab states wished Transjordan still desired settle with Israel on permanent basis. "This is my will."

3. He had sent memo to government suggesting new ministry for resettlement (refugees) be formed, under Ragheb Bey Nasha Shibir (former mayor Jerusalem and elder statesman) if latter would accept. Ministry would be charged with formulation plan to resettle refugees in Transjordan and Arab Palestine along lines Legtel 286, July 20.[2]

[1] Not printed.

[2] Not printed; it reported information from King Abdullah that "He had given orders to his government begin resettlement in Jordan and Arab Palestine and had in mind scheme to be directed by Musa Alami for use his private and state domain lands on both sides Jordan valley." (501.BB Palestine/7–2049)

In addition each Transjordan village would be requested take 10 percent refugees living in Hebron and Samaria districts where resettlement possibilities difficult. He again expressed hope Transjordan would receive US and international aid soonest. Promised would send me copy his memo to government.

4. He doubted whether league political committee would hold meeting as planned since no agreement on site could be reached. If not held it would make no difference.

5. King has received official invitation visit Spain and would do so following visit to England. (Re visits please see Legtel 274, July 5.[3])

Pouched Madrid, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Arab capitals, London. Department summarize USDel PCC.

STABLER

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 1 to telegram 117, p. 1284.

Editorial Note

Following his return from Tel Aviv, Ambassador Elath called on Mr. McGhee to discuss his recent trip. Mr. McGhee's memorandum of conversation, dated July 25, cited the Ambassador as expressing "the opinion that our recent note to Israel regarding refugees and territory had been emotionally phrased. The Government had been somewhat hurt, possibly because it is a new state and unused to diplomatic exchange. I replied that we did not consider that our note had been emotionally phrased but had reflected the facts regarding the situation relating to Palestine under UN resolutions and established US policy." Regarding the note, see telegram 398, June 24, to Tel Aviv, page 1174.

The Ambassador was also reported to have stated that Egyptian refusal to discuss the Gaza strip proposal "showed that Egypt, and probably the other Arab states, did not sincerely desire peace. If they did they would be endeavoring to seek a way out of the present situation in the Near East.

"I pointed out that we had hoped the Egyptians would be willing during the recent recess of the PCC to adopt this proposal as a basis for discussion. Although this had not proved possible, I hoped that future developments at Lausanne might lead to this result through a simultaneous discussion of such interlinked subjects as territory and refugees. I added that I felt that the inability of the Egyptians recently to discuss the Gaza strip proposal was not indicative of a lack of desire for peace but was merely based on Arab emphasis on other matters such as repatriation under the GA Resolution of December 11. I emphasized the importance we attach to a conciliatory attitude on the part of the Israeli delegation at Lausanne in order to break the vicious circle which had thus far existed in Israeli and Arab talks with the PCC." (867N.50/7–2549)

Editorial Note

In a note of July 25, 1949 to the Secretary of State, the Egyptian Ambassador, Mohamed Kamil Bey Abdul Rahim, reiterated an earlier Egyptian request of June 10 for United States support towards bringing to an end the arms embargo imposed by the Security Council (see telegram 573, June 11, to Cairo, page 1115). The Ambassador cited the damaging effects of the embargo on trade and stated that the embargo was a hindrance to Egypt's industrial and economic development, as well as to her program of defense. He noted that United States goods needed for Egypt's development were among the articles covered by the embargo. The Ambassador requested the United States to take into account the cessation of hostilities in Palestine and the conclusion of all armistice agreements, including the Syrian Armistice signed the preceding week. (501.BB Palestine/7–2549)

501.BB Palestine/7–2549

Major General John H. Hilldring[1] *to the Secretary of State*

PHOENIX, ARIZONA, July 25, 1949.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Before I left Washington last April the President asked me to take a message from him to the appropriate officials of Israel. The message related to his deep concern about the attitude of the Israeli government as to:

1. Arab refugees, and
2. Acceptance by the Israeli government of the UN decision of November 29, 1947, for the future control of Jerusalem.

At noon last Monday I reported to the President on this mission, and on other matters regarding Palestine, and at four o'clock on Monday—a few minutes before I was to depart for Chicago and Arizona—I was informed that the President wanted me to repeat to you the report I had made to him earlier in the day.

As Mr. Battle has probably told you, I immediately called your office. In view of the fact that I do not expect to be back in Washington for some weeks, I suggested, and Mr. Battle concurred, that I send you a brief résumé of my report to the President which I can expand, if you desire more detail, when I return to Washington.

On my second day in Israel I called on the foreign minister and delivered the President's message to him. I later discussed it with the Prime Minister and several other Israeli officials. I made it clear,

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[1] Formerly a member of the United States Delegation at the United Nations and Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas.

as the President wanted, that he was personally concerned and disturbed about these matters.

Mr. Sharett stated that he was distressed to hear that the President felt as he did, and took some time to explain to me the domestic threat which any Israeli government would face if it agreed to the return of any Arab refugees. He asked me to examine the refugee and Jerusalem problems on the ground while I was in Israel, and to discuss these matters with him again before I left.

During my seventeen days in Israel I gave considerable time and thought to this project. At the end of my visit Mr. Sharett was at Lake Success. Therefore, I related my impressions and views to one of his assistants. Here in brief is what I said:

1. The President is right. The refugee problem should be separated from the other issues, and a settlement of the refugee problem effected promptly. As a beginning Israel should make a generous and bold proposal as to what it was willing to contribute to the settlement.
2. The Jerusalem problem was complicated. I wanted to give more thought to it. Anyway it could wait, in my judgment, until the refugee problem was well under way toward settlement.

The officials expressed regret that I did not agree with their proposals and attitudes about Arab refugees, but promised to communicate my views to the foreign minister.

Subsequently, two Israeli officials came to Paris to discuss this issue with me, and on a later visit to Paris Ambassador Elath conferred with me again about it. Finally, in London during my last week in Europe I had several talks with two officials from Tel Aviv. At the conclusion of each of these European discussions the Israeli officials expressed the conviction or the hope that their government would accept in some considerable part the President's proposal as to refugees.

Last Saturday the Israeli Consul General in New York came to Washington to see me. He informed me that his government was willing:

1. To discuss the Arab refugee problem separately, and
2. To agree to admit 100,000 Arab refugees, including the 20,000 who have already entered Israel illegally, but not including any that might be admitted under any future negotiation or settlement in regard to the Gaza strip.

Mr. Lurie made it quite clear:

1. That this proposal would be offered, however, only if it were satisfactory to the President and to the United States government, and
2. That this was their final figure, not a starting point from which to bargain. He based this conclusion on the judgment that the quarter of a million Arabs who would then be in Israel would be as many Arabs as his country could absorb without creating either a threat to the security of the country or an inordinately great economic problem.

I informed Mr. Lurie that I would give his message to the President. I have not, of course, given Mr. Lurie any indication of the President's reaction to this proposal.

As to Jerusalem, I informed the President that it was my judgment that the UN decision of November 29th would never be applied because:

1. Neither Israel nor Transjordan wants it.
2. After the experience of the 100,000 Jews in Jerusalem during the siege of 1948, no government in Israel which agreed to it would last five minutes, and
3. There is much difference of opinion among the so-called Christian countries as to the wisdom of insisting of the 1947 UN decision instead of some other, and perhaps better, scheme of UN control of Holy places not only in Jerusalem but also in Bethlehem, Nazareth and elsewhere.

I also gave the President several personal observations at random:

1. The Israeli government and most Israelis are disturbed and worried about recruitment and rearmament in Arab league countries, which in my opinion accounts in large measure for their super-sensitiveness in regard to security.
2. Neither the UN nor the US is ever going to bring about peace in the Near East. This will be accomplished, if it is ever accomplished, only by the Jews and the Arabs themselves with the help and guidance of the UN and the US, or both. I am certain that the indifferent results which have come out of the Lausanne Conference are traceable to the fact that the UN commissioners have been keeping the principals to the settlement apart—deliberately, instead of encouraging them to discuss the issues together.
3. One reason why America hasn't been more effective in the Palestine affair is because of the kind of Americans who are involved in it. They belong in too many cases to one of two groups:

a. Those who feel that the Jews of Palestine are always wrong, and

b. Those who feel that they are always right.

Both groups are wrong, of course, and it seems quite clear to me that a peaceful settlement of the Palestine problem cannot be expected to be brought about, or to be influenced, by people from either group. Dr. Bunche is a notable exception to the rule.

4. Another observation that worried me considerably was the difference in attitude toward Israel between British officials and our own. The British officials I talked to were without exception completely realistic and unemotional about Palestine. Their attitude can be summed up in a few words. If there is going to be a Jewish State in the Near East, then we must find a way to get along with it. Invariably I was then asked, "Do you believe we, British, will have much trouble making friends with Israel?" I never encountered in any Britisher the attitude of one U.S. official observer who said to me, "I am not anti-Jewish; I am simply pro-British. I am going along with the British."
5. I am convinced that Israel wishes to be oriented to the west. Its

officials and its people want the friendship of the United States, want to pattern Israel largely after the American way.

6. The President has great prestige and influence with Israeli officials. Once they are convinced that expressions of U.S. policy represent the views of the President, they carry great weight.

I believe that this is a complete outline of my report to the President. Of course, it is not as full a statement as I was able to give the President in nearly forty minutes. As I said in the beginning of my letter, I shall be very happy to fill in the details, if you feel that they would be useful to you, when I get back to Washington.

I am very much impressed with the splendid job you are doing, which doesn't surprise me in the least. Congratulations, and my very best wishes for your continued success and health.[2]

Sincerely, JOHN HILLDRING

[2] Messrs. Wilkins, Rusk, and Aaron S. Brown, Assistant to Mr. Humelsine, prepared a draft reply on August 11, which contained substantive informal comments. Secretary Acheson discarded the draft and prepared his own reply, which withheld "questions and comments until we have a chance to talk together." Neither the draft nor the actual reply, dated August 16, is printed. They are filed with the letter of July 25. Ambassador McDonald has given a brief account of Major General Hilldring's visit to Israel in *My Mission to Israel*, p. 170.

IO Files, A/AC.25

Preliminary Draft Declaration by the Committee on Jerusalem of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine

RESTRICTED [LAUSANNE?,] 26 July 1949.

Com.Jer./W.29

DECLARATION CONCERNING THE HOLY PLACES, RELIGIOUS BUILDINGS AND SITES IN PALESTINE OUTSIDE THE JERUSALEM AREA

In implementation of paragraph 7 of the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations of 11 December 1948, the Government of _____ formally undertakes by the following provisions to guarantee the protection of and free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Palestine situated in its territory:

1. Freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship shall be guaranteed, subject to the maintenance of public order.

2. The Holy Places, religious buildings and sites _____ shall be preserved and their sacred character protected. No act of a nature to profane that sacred character, such as the construction of buildings in an unsuitable proximity shall be permitted.

3. Rights existing on 15 May 1948 concerning the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites shall not be impaired.

4. The Government of _____ undertakes to guarantee freedom of access, of visa and of transit to ministers and pilgrims of the Chris-

tian, Jewish and Moslem religions, without distinction as to nationality, subject only to considerations of national security and to the maintenance of public order.

5. No form of taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from such taxation on 15 May 1948.

No change in the incidence of any form of taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners and occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings and sites or would place such owners and occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of that form of taxation than existed on 15 May 1948.

6. The provisions of Articles 1 to 5 shall be under the effective supervision of the administrative and judicial authorities of the United Nations in Jerusalem, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Instrument establishing a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area. The Government of _____ undertakes to cooperate actively with the United Nations Commissioner in this task and to take special account, in regard to the granting of entry and exit visas and residence permits in its territory to ministers and pilgrims of the Christian, Jewish and Moslem religions, of the recommendations addressed to it by the United Nations Commissioner. The Government of _____ furthermore undertakes to grant the latter the privileges and facilities necessary for the performance of his functions.

501.BB Palestine/7–2649 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, July 26, 1949—1 : 21 p. m.

859. Eban at his request called on Ross late yesterday afternoon and discussed the following matters of which he said he understood the only one Elath was instructed to take up with the Secretary on Wednesday is the question of continuing the arms embargo.

[Here follow sections on the discussions at Lausanne, relations with Syria, and the arms embargo.]

4. *Egyptian blockade.*

Eban referred to the Egyptian practice of stopping shipping through Suez destined for Haifa. This practice he said was a severe economic handicap to Israel with regard, for example, to importation of meat from Australia and was also a severe handicap to the UK with particular reference to the passage of tankers from the Persian Gulf through Suez destined for the Haifa refineries. This forced the UK to use dollars to buy oil from dollar areas. The Israeli Government could not understand the Egyptian position in this matter. They considered the blockade an act of war rather than an armistice. On the other hand, the Egyptians who all along have denied the existence of

war, say the armistice terms do not in any way comprehend the blockade and that the blockade is a sovereign act of the Egyptian Government, that other governments have nothing to do with.

Because of the concern which the Israeli Government feels the UK Government shares with them in regard to this matter, Israeli representatives in London have been instructed to take this matter up with the UK authorities at London this week. They will seek to determine in the first instance whether there is any truth in the rumors that the Egyptian Government has given assurances that there will be no more searches of shipping going through Suez and destined for Haifa. If there is no truth in these rumors, the Israeli representatives will seek to determine the UK view of what might be done to get the blockade lifted.[1]

AUSTIN

[1] These last two paragraphs were quoted in airgram 839, August 1, to London, with a request that the Embassy "keep Dept fully informed as possible results Israeli-UK discussions referred to." The airgram was sent also to Cairo and Tel Aviv (501.BB Palestine/8–149).

Messrs. Ross and Eban discussed the questions of the arms embargo and of the Egyptian blockade on August 1. Concerning the latter, Mr. "Eban said Israeli Minister in London had also discussed this with Bevin, pointing out the inconsistency of Egypt receiving arms from the UK on the basis that peace exists in Palestine while maintaining the blockade on the basis of war existing. Bevin was reported as having told Israeli Minister that UKG had made representations to Egyptian Government but had not yet received response. Eban expressed hope that UK representative would refer to Egyptian blockade and desirability of lifting it in SC." (telegram 875, August 1, 1:59 p. m., from New York, 501.BB Palestine/8–149)

501.BB Palestine/7–2649 : Telegram

Mr. Paul A. Porter to the Secretary of State

SECRET LAUSANNE, July 26, 1949—4 p. m.

Palun 249. Preliminary impressions leave me dubious as to prospect of important changes of attitude as result recess. Regret that holidays ending Ramadan, failure Shiloah arrive (due July 27), and unavailability Egyptian delegation make it impossible at present obtain more definitive views. Talks with colleagues on PCC and delegation members available give no grounds for optimism as to settlement by agreement here. Apparently parties willing to continue endless and aimless discussions.

At Executive session PCC morning July 25, I suggested we spend next two weeks in exploring prospects of agreement. If it should appear, as seems likely, that no agreement can be developed by mutual consent, PCC should then initiate proposals that in its view are equitable. I obtained provisional approval for this procedure.

Therefore request Department's views and instructions on (1) equitable territorial settlement; (2) provisional allocation refugees by area in light Nr. 1; (3) information re status survey group project; (4) preliminary position US re desirability placing overall Palestine question on GA agenda. Letter detailing these first reactions being prepared and subsequent telegram will convey suggestions US delegation re possible territorial settlement.

This request covers waterfront and I recognize its general character. Feel it important however that Department begin formulating a specific position on outstanding issues in view of probable contingency that impasse will continue and PCC may have obligation to initiate proposals. Failure to follow such course could make UN role in bringing about Palestine settlement meaningless and cast UN efforts into category of futile debating society. We may be forced to take initiative and I want instructions as specific as possible.

PORTER

501.BB Palestine/6–949 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 26, 1949—5 p. m.

390. Urtel 693, June 9.[1] Dept assumes in light Israeli-Syrian armistice that Bunche will raise again at early date introduction into SC of res terminating functions of mediator and revoking clause of SC res of May 28 preventing import or export of war material into area.

Dept believes before deciding its position on lifting arms embargo it would be useful to confer with Bunche so that Dept may explore with him (1) considerations underlying introduction of his proposed res at this time rather than after current phase of work of PCC concluded; (2) whether he anticipates from his conversations with other SC members that lifting arms embargo will be in issue in SC and subject of sharp debate.

Accordingly, request you arrange early meeting at mutually acceptable time for Bunche, Ross and Wilkins in NY and that you request Bunche defer presentation res until we have had opportunity to discuss with him.

ACHESON

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[1] Not printed, but see footnote 2, telegram Unpal 134, p. 1091.

501.BB Palestine/7–2649 : Telegram

Mr. Paul A. Porter to the Secretary of State

SECRET LAUSANNE, July 26, 1949—5 p. m.

Palun 250. Present thinking USDel re Unpal 199, July 24 [*22*] as follows: If failing agreement at Lausanne PCC decides to make recommendations to fourth GA re over-all Palestine territorial settlement, would be appropriate include recommendation re demarcation Jerusalem as part Jerusalem proposals if parties have by then failed agree in PCC.

If above decision not taken PCC could recommend as part of Jerusalem proposals that parties reach agreement re demarcation through mediation UN authority on basis *status quo* November 29.

USDel believes would be undesirable, so soon after establishment UN representative Jerusalem, to submit authority of latter to severe and perhaps fatal test involved in attempt to delimit zones without agreement parties. If parties failed reach agreement under mediation UN representative latter could still exercise authority on basis *status quo* and attempt strength position. In course time might bring parties to agree with him or recommend that UN call upon parties accept a specific demarcation.

PORTER

767N.90D/7–2149 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 26, 1949—7 p. m.

476. During past two years USG has consistently supported UN in its handling of Palestine. USG has also sought ways of bringing Israelis and Arabs together directly or indirectly in UN or outside UN. Para 4 of GA Res Dec 11 provides that parties seek agreement by negots conducted either with PCC or directly. Dept recently supported direct talks between Israel and Egypt for this reason and because PCC was in recess. Thus far Arabs have been unwilling, however, undertake direct talks.

Dept considers it preferable at this critical stage to place major emphasis on new phase PCC activities and strongly to support new US rep. If emphasis were shifted at this time to series of personal conferences between high Israeli and Arab officials, we wld appear to be undercutting PCC and thereby prejudice its present prospects for success and its future usefulness. Meanwhile, possible personal conferences might be protracted and lead to no result.

Dept believes Ben Gurion's desire for action, as reflected by willingness meet Zaim, might equally well be implemented by Israeli del at Lausanne. Such Israeli efforts at Lausanne to reach agreement with Syria might also have effect of promoting agreement between Israel and other Arab states at Lausanne.

It may be desirable at later date to encourage direct talks between high Israeli and Arab officials if under conditions then existing such talks should appear advisable to supplement discussions at Lausanne or otherwise to accelerate developments. Meanwhile, you are instructed informally to emphasize to Israeli officials importance we attach to current phase PCC discussions.[1]

ACHESON

[1] This telegram was repeated to Amman as No. 105 and to other Arab capitals, London, Bern (for the American Delegation at Lausanne), Jerusalem, and New York. Tel Aviv replied on August 8 that Foreign Minister Sharett the previous day had expressed his dismay at the admonition contained in telegram 476 and had stated that "Israel determined seek peace in Middle East and 'means business' in its resolve cooperate every way with PCC to this end. Nevertheless, as 'sovereign independent state here to stay' he felt Israel should be given 'free hand' in its efforts contribute toward attainment peace whether via PCC or through direct contact with Arab neighbors, and said his Government convinced such bilateral approach US would be helpful in reaching PCC's own objectives. Foreign Minister said he voiced Prime Minister's sentiments this respect and that Shiloah had conveyed same to Porter."

The Foreign Minister had also expressed the hope that the "'Arab states would be counseled and influenced' accept proposal" concerning the Arab refugees "promptly since longer Arabs delayed action, more increasingly might Israel, forced by public opinion, 'disengage itself from commitments'." (telegram 602, 501.BB Palestine/8–849)

501.BB Palestine/7–2649 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Switzerland

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 26, 1949—7 p. m.

Unpal 208. For USDel Lausanne. As soon as you consider desirable in order support current negotiations, you are authorized take steps to establish Econ Survey Mission. When decision made, pls notify Dept and inform your colleagues of Dept's view that PCC shld activate economic survey mission near future pursuant para 12 of Dec 11 res in order meet urgent need for carefully formulated program prior GA action autumn session. Dept believes terms of ref this Mission shld be based on foregoing res with special ref para 11 thereof, which establishes principles of repatriation and compensation for refugee property, and instructs PCC facilitate specific tasks of repatriation, resettlement, econ and social rehabilitation, and payment of compensation. Within foregoing context, Mission shld be charged with objectives set forth Unpal 119, May 27, numbered para 1.

In Dept's opinion, designation as mission, in which all members would be clearly responsible to chairman, wld greatly expedite completion survey and insure coordinated action. We also believe members of mission shld not serve as reps their respective govts [1] but as members international organ under auspices PCC.

Re composition, Dept believes Unpal 113, May 23 shld be modified in order include French deputy as well as UK deputy, in light France's traditional interests NE and stated desire participate actively in refugee program. In addition to chairman and deputies, mission wld include such technical personnel as required to carry out survey, selected by chairman on multinational basis and on basis their special qualifications, in consultation with interested govts and appropriate international organizations, and subject to final approval of PCC. Dept hopes Turk Govt wld be prepared make qualified personnel available on request chairman.

Dept hopes US national to serve as chairman can be chosen within few days. As soon as you consider appropriate, pls ask Boisanger obtain views FonOff re proposed French deputy and express hope French Govt will look into question availability outstanding French candidate this post.

As soon as Dept informs you re nomination of American rep, PCC cld then proceed make formal request that SYG announce establishment of survey mission and purpose thereof. White House announcement wld be made concurrently. At same time PCC members shld make formal approach to all NE govts, requesting their cooperation with mission.

Repeated to Amembassies Paris and Ankara for discussion with FonOffs upon authorization from you.[2]

ACHESON

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[1] In an explanatory note to London, the Department, on July 26, stated that "While individual members of mission wld of course advise their respective govts of proceedings of mission, Dept does not consider it feasible for members of mission to serve as reps of their respective govts. Latter wld not only raise difficult administrative and financial problems, but might make acceptability of mission to govts of NE even more difficult to overcome." (telegram 2617, 501.BB Palestine/7–2649)

[2] This telegram was repeated to Paris and Ankara with an additional note that Unpal 113 and 119 were being repeated to them separately. It was also repeated to London without the additional note.

The Department, on August 4, informed London that in conversations with British Embassy officials, it had "emphasized necessity maintaining international status of econ survey mission in order to place matter in UN context and to avoid impression that direct responsibility is being assumed by US or GB or any other state. We have pointed out that USG, which wld probably make major financial contribution to any program established, must insist upon keeping UN between itself and refugee problem." (telegram 2770, 501.BB Palestine/8–449)

501.BB Palestine/7–2749 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, July 27, 1949—4 p. m.

495. Consul General strongly favours second alternative Deptel 304, July 22.[1] Believe impossible present realistic plan providing for "effective UN control" without consideration matters listed Article 8 and in addition questions such as demarcation zones, means of access to holy places, status such sites as Jewish cemetery on Mount of Olives and permission Jews reside in Jewish quarters Old City. These points are of immediate practical concern to parties directly involved and recommendations with respect to them will vitally affect acceptability PCC proposals. Demarcation lines will also play major part in determining stability UN regime and certain Christian nations have great interest in exclusion their institutions from Jew zone. Feel decision on such fundamental and far reaching issues should be made by PCC and GA and not postponed by reference to Jerusalem authorities appointed by UN. Fear any failure at September GA reach definite decision re Jerusalem both as to nature international regime and on "practical" questions would seriously jeopardize hope for any form internationalization.

With refusal Israel to negotiate on basis Department proposal and expressed determination Sharett resist return Arab quarters, prospects agreement between parties or even start negotiations on major questions now remote. Only relatively short time remains before September GA and delay while waiting for agreement could prevent preparation PCC plan. Positions of Transjordan and Israel particularly on question delimitation zones now appear so diametrically opposed that imposed solution apparently inevitable. Also Department suggestion that zones be delimited on basis *status quo* November 29, 1947 will require imposition on Israel. Under circumstances decision by GA would have much more weight and chance of acceptance than one by UN Jerusalem authorities.

In view above Consul General suggests following procedure:

1. Continuation efforts to induce Israel negotiate with Transjordan on basis Department proposals. Agreement to maximum extent possible eminently desirable and negotiations could narrow zone within which PCC must make decision.

2. Elaboration on proposals by PCC Jerusalem subcommittee at same time and without waiting results Israel–Transjordan discussions.

[1] This was a repeat of Unpal 199 to Bern, p. 1245.

This would assure readiness plan by September and any points agreed to by Transjordan and Israel could be incorporated. Jerusalem committee might wish return to Jerusalem or request representatives of member governments on spot to advance suggestions.

Sent Department 495, repeated Tel Aviv 81, Geneva 46, Amman 53.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/7–2049 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Lausanne

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 27, 1949—7 p. m.

Unpal 211. [For Porter.] Dept notes with interest urtel Palun 246, July 20, Hirsch advised Rockwell Israeli Govt not desirous Palestine question be discussed next GA. In view Shiloah's expressed greater cooperative attitude to McDonald re refugees (Bern Tel 15, July 18, from Tel Aviv [1]) Dept believes Israeli motives warrant further exploration.[2] Dept believes discussion Palestine question in GA almost inevitable. One, continued need relief refugees makes question almost certain agenda item since UNRPR funds exhausted by October. Only quick decisive solution problem in PCC could lessen chance lengthy careful GA consideration. Two, Dept believes GA entitled consider results its Dec 11 res. Three, implementation any solution refugee problem satisfactory Israelis Arabs undoubtedly will require aid other UN Members hence should have GA authorization and assistance. FYI, you shld bear in mind USG plans for refugee resettlement, repatriation, rehabilitation contemplate continuing direct relief by UN through voluntary contributions and coordinated aid from US, UK, France and other sources under UN auspices for economic development refugee settlement areas. Estimate at your briefing July 20 re likelihood getting Congressional appropriation was request shld be made only after GA consideration entire problem.

ACHESON

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[1] This was a repeat of No. 545 from Tel Aviv, not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1237.

[2] Lausanne reported, on July 29, that "According to Hirsch, main motive for Israeli Government's desire that general Palestine question not be discussed fall GA is deleterious effect inevitable acrimonious debate would have on discussions Lausanne and on general Israeli-Arab relationships. Hirsch has suggested that if at some later date prior opening GA PCC feels there is hope of progress at Lausanne, PCC should recommend that general Palestine question not be discussed at all or be placed at end of agenda." (telegram Palun 255, 501.BB Palestine/7–2949)

501.BB Palestine/7–2849

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 28, 1949.

I told Mr. Connelly [1] that Ambassador Elath would probably bring up today the question of retaining the arms embargo on Israel and the Arab States. I said that Ralph Bunche had recommended to the Security Council that the various truce resolutions be rescinded and that the Security Council proceed on the basis of the armistice agreements. I told Mr. Connelly that the Secretary of State would wish to discuss this matter very carefully with the President and that the Secretary hopes that the President will make no commitment to Ambassador Elath prior to the Secretary's talk with the President.

Mr. Connelly said that he would take care of the matter and see to it that the President "just listens". He stated that he would need nothing in writing, that my telephone call was sufficient.

[1] Matthew J. Connelly, Secretary to President Truman.

501.BB Palestine/7–2849

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON], July 28, 1949.

Participants: Eliahu Elath, Israeli Ambassador
Uriel Heyd, Israeli First Secretary
G—Mr. Rusk
NEA—Mr. McGhee
NE—Mr. Wilkins

Problem

The extent to which Israel will be able to contribute to the Arab refugee problem in the Near East by permitting repatriation.

Action Required

To determine what reply the US Government will make to the Israeli Ambassador with regard to his remarks relating to the present attitude of Israel re repatriation.

[1] Drafted by Mr. Wilkins.

Action Assigned to

NE

On July 28 the Israeli Ambassador Eliahu Elath, accompanied by his aide, Uriel Heyd, called on me at his request for the purpose of discussing Israel's present attitude regarding the question of Arab refugees in the Near East.

The Ambassador said that his government had decided to permit the return of 100,000 Arab refugees for two reasons: (1) to demonstrate Israel's cooperation with the US; and (2) to contribute what it could to a solution of the general Arab refugee question in the Near East. Ambassador Elath added that the Israeli proposal was based on the assumption that the Arab states would be willing to conclude peace at Lausanne, and that the present Security Council arms embargo under the Security Council resolutions of May 29 and July 15 would be maintained.

Ambassador Elath stated that his government had reached its decision for these two impelling reasons in spite of the fact that Israeli security and economic experts had considered the proposed decision as disastrous.

The Ambassador explained, in reply to questions, that the 100,000 Arab refugees would include returning members of separated families and Arab infiltrees into Israel.

The Ambassador said that Israeli Foreign Minister Sharett had been scheduled to present the foregoing information to American Ambassador McDonald in Tel Aviv on July 27th, and that Israeli Delegate Shiloah planned to inform the PCC at Lausanne similarly shortly. Ambassador Elath said the Israeli delegation hoped the PCC would establish a refugee committee to which the Israeli proposal would be submitted. Reference would not be made, however, to the necessity for a formal conclusion of peace or the question of the arms embargo.

I thanked Ambassador Elath for his statement regarding the admission of 100,000 refugees into Israel and said we would study it.

Mr. McGhee inquired whether the 100,000 refugees was a rigid maximum figure, pointing out that if the Israelis and the Arabs at Lausanne attempted to tackle the question of approximately 750,000 refugees in its entirety, it would be necessary to approach the question flexibly. It was our thinking that each of the parties should accept its responsibility and absorb its share of this common problem. For example, if Israel absorbed only approximately 250,000 refugees, i.e., the 100,000 to be admitted and the Israeli estimate of 150,000 already in Israel, and if the living spaces for refugees in the Arab states totaled only 300,000, there would be a gap of 200,000 refugees. What would happen to these refugees? Israel and the Arab states should solve the whole

problem and not only a part of it. It could not be assumed that Israel and the Arab states could leave the balance to UN or some other undetermined authority.

Ambassador Elath replied that the 100,000 figure was the maximum. He appeared to be confining himself to the exact phraseology of his instructions because he was unable to reply with regard to responsibility for refugees that might not be absorbed by Israel and the Arab states.[2]

Ambassador Elath expressed his government's view that the present arms embargo should be maintained in order to avoid an arms race in the Near East. I observed that the recent conclusion of armistice agreements between Israel and Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan, and Egypt separately would seem to remove the necessity for the maintenance of an arms embargo. I inquired whether Israel would be willing to give its assurance that it would not import arms, which would thus have the effect of removing one of the chief elements in Arab fears regarding Israel. Ambassador Elath replied that the armistice agreements were a step on the road to final peace and that he could assure me of Israel's nonaggressive intentions. His government felt, however, that the arms embargo should be maintained at the present time.

Ambassador Elath remarked, during his discussion of military matters, that such groups as Palmach and Irgun, which had previously been highly autonomous, were now integrated into the Israeli Army. The Ambassador again referred to his government's hope that the US Government would soon be in a position to provide a high-ranking US Army Officer for the purpose of assisting Israel in reorganizing its military establishment. I told the Ambassador that this matter was still under consideration within the Department.

The Ambassador added that he hoped to have a further discussion with me and Mr. McGhee regarding the foregoing matters and that he also hoped to call upon the Secretary in the near future. I told him that the Department would immediately take these matters under consideration and would communicate with him further concerning them. I also told him that an appointment would be arranged with the Secretary.

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[2] The Department summarized Mr. Rusk's memorandum of conversation up to this point in Unpal 214, July 29, 8 p. m., to Lausanne, which was repeated to London, Arab capitals, and Tel Aviv (501.BB Palestine/7–2949). Unpal 214 stated, additionally, that "Elath was informed we do not consider it appropriate for Dept to advise as to adequacy or inadequacy of number of refugees permitted to return as Arab reaction and influence of Israeli proposals on Lausanne negots would determine this point. Arabs might not consider present Israeli figure as complying with GA Res Dec 11 and might not be able to resettle balance of refugees even if they so desire. It wld be difficult for US and other states to come forward with assistance plan in event all refugees not provided for under resettlement and repatriation plan."

Ambassador Elath subsequently discussed details regarding the Gaza strip proposal with Mr. Wilkins. The Ambassador explained, in reply to a question, that if this proposal proved acceptable to the Arabs it would not be possible for Israel to absorb the 230,000 Arab refugees within the area of the Gaza strip. On the other hand, if the Gaza strip proposal should now prove acceptable Israel would not be able to maintain its proposal regarding the 100,000 refugees. The Ambassador said he had not been informed by his government whether the proposal regarding 100,000 refugees and possibly 130,000 refugees from the Gaza strip would simultaneously be acceptable to his government.

Mr. Wilkins inquired whether the Israeli Government had considered the possibility of enlarging this proposal to include territorial compensation along the Egyptian frontier within the area allocated to the Arab state in Palestine and now occupied by Israel. Mr. Wilkins observed that such addition would lift the Gaza strip proposal out of the context of a bargain of "refugees for real estate" and might therefore make it acceptable to Egypt. Ambassador Elath said he did not know and that he himself had never thought of this possibility. He remarked, in this connection, that Israel would never permit the blocking of access to the Gulf of Aqaba for Israel through the relinquishment of territory in the tip of southern Palestine, for the purpose of giving Transjordan direct access to Egypt.

Ambassador Elath subsequently informed Mr. Wilkins that his government had not indicated what form peace should take at Lausanne but conceded it need not necessarily be along the lines of a peace treaty but might assume the form of unilateral declarations by the states concerned, bound together under the title of "Act of Lausanne."

501.BB Palestine/7–2849 : Telegram

Mr. Paul A. Porter to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED LAUSANNE, July 28, 1949—11 a. m.

Palun 252. As result urging by general committee, chiefs all Arab delegations have agreed cable their governments recommending that favorable reply be given to Israeli *démarche* through MACs re reuniting separated families and that steps be taken to begin reunion.

Also as result urging by general committee Israeli delegation has agreed request Israeli Government give favorable consideration Arab desires re conditions for reunion families based on oriental concept of family unit.

PORTER

501.BB Palestine/7–2849 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET TEL AVIV, July 28, 1949—noon.

571. In 40-minute talk with Foreign Minister [at] his office [at] his request late yesterday, Ford and I were informed that Israeli Government, reviewing exchange of words both oral and written which had taken place recent weeks re Arab refugee problem, had been "deeply impressed" by one argument in particular, namely that until countries involved including Israel specified actual number refugees they prepared take, no overall planning of refugee program including all important financing could be undertaken. Accordingly, while still adhering to general policy outlined by Eban at Lake Success May 5 that resettlement best solution refugee problem, Israeli Government had now decided make concrete contribution toward "overall solution" that problem and "in interest of general peace settlement" by offering take back total of 100,000 refugees. Immediate procedure in implementation this offer will be for Israeli delegation in Lausanne to inform PCC that "if Arab delegations prepared enter peace negotiations, Israel will then announce willingness go ahead with repatriation program." Foreign Minister stressed no territorial expansion strings attached to above offer. He also underlined that 100,000 was limit as this number would bring total Arab population in Israel "well over quarter million, far beyond margin of safety by all known security standards." Finally he urged fullest secrecy above proposition until Israeli Delegation Lausanne had acted.

Related subject: Foreign Minister said with some asperity that after nearly four weeks no written reply had been received regarding Israel's offer reunite Arab families. In case of Lebanon "oral acceptance" had been expressed by one official, later to be denied in Beirut, but nothing had come from Egypt or Transjordan. Foreign Minister added that immediately Syrian armistice was signed that country had also been invited participate in divided family program (reDeptel 437, July 11).

Sent Department 571; repeated Baghdad 19, Beirut 31, Damascus 28, Jerusalem 62, Amman 25, Cairo 23, Jidda 5, London 73.

MCDONALD

501.BB Palestine/7–2849 : Telegram

Mr. Paul A. Porter to the Secretary of State

SECRET LAUSANNE, July 28, 1949—2 p. m.

Palun 253. Shiloah arrived today July 27 and in private conversation stated following position of Israeli Government which he said adopted because US pressure.

1. Israel now prepared discuss refugees outside context of final Palestine settlement.
2. In discussions of refugee question Israel prepared if PCC so desires, officially commit self to accept specific number refugees for repatriation. Shiloah showed no inclination to mention number and I did not press him in this first meeting.
3. Actual repatriation of above number of refugees could not begin until:

a. Overall plan for repatriation and resettlement drawn up and means to put in operation assured. Israel could not be expected accept refugees under US pressure only to find that remainder continue in relief camps and are not resettled.

b. There must be evidence, convincing to all parties, that real progress being made toward final settlement. Israel did not insist upon formal peace treaties but could not be expected to admit large number of refugees if Arab states had no intention of making sincere efforts to reach peaceful settlement.

Shiloah emphasized necessity for international refugee repatriation and resettlement plan and urged that US hasten formulation such plan.

When question territory mentioned Shiloah said PCC would have "bitter wrangle" with Israeli delegation over any plan involving reduction Israeli occupied territory. Strongly outlined familiar position re necessity Israeli retention Negev. Maintained that "alleged" psychological desire of Arabs for continuous land connections between Arab states merely hastily erected screen to cover 19th Century ideas of military strategy. Said Israeli Government "might" consider suggestions for territorial "adjustments" which did not involve loss of Negev.

I am not encouraged by this position but shall of course attempt to make most of it and plan press for continuous sessions PCC with Arabs and Israelis in attempt discover soonest whether possibility of agreement exists.

PORTER

501.BB Palestine/7–2649 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Lausanne

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 28, 1949—9 p. m.

Unpal 213. Ref Palun 249.[1] Although Dept not yet precisely informed what attitude Israeli and Arab Dels will take Lausanne, Dept hopeful its recent diplomatic approaches to NE capitals and growing realization there of necessity for some early action re refugees will produce results Lausanne. Parties should be made to understand that if their intransigence continues next report of PCC to UN will necessarily reflect their respective positions.

Dept concurs your suggestions two weeks exploratory period and PCC initiation proposals if direct agreement not in sight. We believe anything in the nature of a PCC plan shld be avoided at least until fol stage is tried: Proposals shld be advanced by PCC on individual problems in manner which seems most effective and PCC shld be continuously prepared to withdraw, substitute or modify proposals in light reaction parties. This procedure wld keep discussions on negotiating basis with parties continually talking in terms of solutions for various problems and shld afford maximum opportunity reaching solution between now and time report must be made to GA.

Dept is presently preparing supplementary views and instructions on four points mentioned para 3 Palun 249. Meanwhile, fol comments may be helpful:

(1) This subject is under current consideration concerning which you will be informed shortly.

(2) Dept considers Israel shld absorb approx 400,000 Arab refugees and residents, of which Israel estimates 150,000 are already there. However, you should avoid US responsibility for any specific figures. Balance of refugees outside Israel will be absorbed almost entirely by Syria and Jordan including central Palestine. Allocation will necessarily depend upon disposition Gaza refugees and whether Lebanon, Egypt, and Iraq will be able retain token number. Further advice will fol this general subject;

(3) Survey group project progressing and can be ready at PCC call. Meanwhile, Dept awaits your reaction re timing of PCC action under Unpal 208.[2] Further advice will fol shortly on this matter;

(4) Dept's preliminary views re placement on GA agenda sent separately (Unpal 211 [3]).

Fol receipt your proposed letter and further tel Dept will frame specific instructions on which US initiative in PCC, if required, may be based. Meanwhile, USDel's reaction to tactics and views herein mentioned will be appreciated.

ACHESON

[1] Dated July 26, p. 1254.
[2] Dated July 26, to Bern, p. 1257.
[3] Dated July 27, to Lausanne, p. 1260.

501.BB Palestine/7–2849 : Telegram

The Chargé in Jordan (Stabler) to the Secretary of State

SECRET AMMAN, July 28, 1949—10 p. m.

294. Tel Aviv telegram [566] July 26 to Department [1] repeated Amman 24. I agree with Ambassador McDonald it would be futile attempt settle Jerusalem problem on basis first suggestion Deptel 101 July 22.[2] If proposal meant demarcation of zones without internationalization, Transjordan would probably accept. However if it meant internationalization of Jerusalem called for in GA resolution of November 29, 1947, it is believed King would oppose it notwithstanding official attitude of Transjordan as expressed at Lausanne. On Israeli side there seems little doubt proposal, with or without internationalization, would be resisted in every possible way. Consequently if UN should proceed along this line, it is believed another opportunity would present itself for flaunting [*flouting*] of such decisions.

Unless it shortly becomes clear that Israel accepts Department's proposal re MAC (Deptel 82, June 17)[3] without reservation it would appear problem will have to be dealt with by PCC along lines second alternative Deptel 101 and as originally proposed by Legation. Would suggest definite time limit now be set re Israel's final reply Department's proposal.

While agreeing with Ambassador McDonald that it would be most unfortunate if members of PCC prove unable agree amongst selves on single proposal, feel time has now come for PCC to take matters into own hands and put forward soonest definite joint proposals for settlement all outstanding issues. Further discussions with Arab and Israel delegates along lines first part Lausanne conference will, I believe, prove to no avail and will only lead to failure present session. With anticipated change Israel attitude and with continuing pressure on both Arabs and Israel it may be that sufficient leeway will exist between positions both parties to permit PCC to put forward compromise proposals.

I fear single man authority suggested by Tel Aviv would have no more chance success than PCC in settling Palestine question as he would still be obliged deal with Arab states as group and Israel. It seems certain Arab states would not agree at this stage enter into separate negotiations with Israel under UN auspices. Moreover it would not be possible for Arab states in their present frame of mind to undertake direct negotiations with Israel. This due fact that for

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1245.
[2] This was a repeat of Unpal 199, *ibid.*
[3] Not printed, but see footnote 1 to telegram 375, June 17, p. 1154.

first time since beginning Palestine conflict Arab states represented at Lausanne have reached some degree cooperation and understanding and deviation by any state from this line would be regarded as "treachery". Transjordan for one which is so sensitive to criticism at this time could not consider such direct negotiations. In addition to above it is felt any plan put forth by "single man authority" would suffer the same fate as Bernadotte plan in GA.

I concur views expressed Deptel 105 July 26 [4] that at this critical stage fullest support should be given US representatives PCC and to PCC in general. PCC should be encouraged present joint proposal, acceptable to member states and UK, to Arab and Israel delegates Lausanne. Moreover US should be prepared to give its fullest support to such proposal with assurance that its position will not change.

Department summarize USDel PCC.

Sent Department 294, repeated Tel Aviv 37, London 54, Jerusalem 138, Baghdad 73, Beirut 54, Cairo 36, Damascus 57. Pouched Jidda.

STABLER

[4] This was a repeat of 476 to Tel Aviv, p. 1256.

501.BB Palestine/7–2949

Memorandum by Mr. John C. Ross to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk) [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON?,] July 29, 1949.

As I see it there are three alternative courses concerning the arms embargo for Palestine, which was discussed at a meeting with Department officers this morning.

1. To lay the draft resolution proposed by Bunche on the Security Council table until say September, possibly later, in any event until after the PCC makes its report.
2. To propose adoption of the Bunche resolution amended to provide for retention of the arms embargo.
3. To propose adoption of the Bunche resolution (subject to minor amendments).

The *first alternative* has the possible advantage of avoiding discussion in the Council at this time of the controversial embargo question. I doubt however if this advantage is real in view of the fact that the Israelis have made public their position in favor of retaining the embargo and in view of the risk that the Russians may bring up the

[1] Addressed also to Mr. McGhee.

question. This course would have the effect legally of retaining the embargo until we know a little better how the PCC discussions at Lausanne are going to come out.

On the other hand I think this course confuses two phases of the Palestine question which we have in the past weeks and months tried to keep quite separate, namely the armistice phase and the definitive peace making phase. Also, I feel that this course would create a negative reaction psychologically [and] might thereby impair public confidence and impair the work at Lausanne. Bunche would probably oppose this course and we could probably expect fairly strong opposition from the British and the Egyptians, at least.

The *second alternative* would have the advantage of protecting us against the risk of an arms race in the Near East. To propose this alternative in the Council however would, I feel quite sure, be controversial and although strongly supported by the Israelis and probably also by the Russians and the Ukrainians, would be strongly opposed by the British and the Egyptians. I think we would have a chance of getting the Council to support us in such proposal but only as a result of very considerable effort.

The disadvantage of this course is that it would be widely interpreted as indicating a lack of confidence on the part of the United States in the relatively early achievement of peace in Palestine. As corollaries I think Arab confidence in our impartiality would be shaken and the peace effort at Lausanne impaired.

Although I orginally strongly favored retention of the embargo for the time being, I have now come to the view and so recommend personally that we should adopt the *third alternative*, namely to propose adoption of the Bunche proposed resolution subject to such minor amendments as we may think desirable.

In proposing that this course be followed I have in mind two corollaries. First, that we make a statement in the Council (and endeavor to get the British and if possible the Egyptians and the Israelis to make similar statements) of a reassuring character. In such a statement we would call attention to our own control of arms and munitions exports and make clear that we have no intention of permitting so far as we are concerned an arms race to get started.

The second corollary is that through diplomatic channels we endeavor to assure that an arms race will not get started. The diplomatic channels I have in mind are with the British, the French, the Arab States and Israel and possibly also such other states as Sweden.

I should make clear that the foregoing recommendations are personal. I discussed this matter with Ambassador Austin before leaving

New York and he at that time was inclined, as was I, to favor retention of the embargo. I will of course take up my present view of the matter with the Ambassador on my return to New York on Monday and I should like if possible to take up with him at the same time the Department's view if it has by then been determined. In view of the fact that the Council will probably meet on this subject on Wednesday next, I think it is important that a decision be reached as promptly as possible so that there will be time enough before the meeting for consultations both in Washington and in New York.

JOHN C. ROSS

Editorial Note

President Zaim of Syria informed Minister Keeley on July 30 that a formal request would be addressed to the United States Government for certain military equipment and uniforms, to be used by internal security forces. The Legation suggested that the Department would "wish examine request in light political consideration Syrian goodwill toward and cooperation in UN–US plans refugee resettlement." (telegram 420, August 1, 5 p. m., from Damascus, 890D.24/8–149)

The formal request was made on July 30 in a letter from the Chief of the Military Cabinet of the President of the Syrian Government to Minister Keeley. Damascus transmitted a copy to the Department on August 1 in despatch 187 (890D.24/8–149).

Marginal notations on telegram 420 state that a reply to Damascus and a circular telegram were drafted on August 5. They were not sent and copies have not been found in the files of the Department. A further marginal notation states that "Reply not necessary because of Aug 14 *coup d'état*". For documentation on the several coups in Syria in 1949, see pages 1630 ff.

501.BB Palestine/7–3049 : Telegram

Mr. Paul A. Porter to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED LAUSANNE, July 30, 1949—1 p. m.

Palun 256. Shiloah July 28 notified PCC Israel is prepared discuss refugees and to specify number willing repatriate subject two conditions set forth Palun 253 July 28.

July 29 Shiloah by letter submitted third condition—that discussions re refugees must be held directly between Israeli and Arab delegates in presence PCC.

PCC decided would not present third position to Arabs as condition. July 28 notified Arab delegates of Israeli position and first two conditions. Reference to third position was limited to informally expressed hope that Arab delegates would at opportune moment find it possible engage in joint discussions with Israelis.

Arabs all said only had powers talk with PCC. Joint discussions out of question. Would consider Israeli position and attendant two conditions.

I called upon Arabs accept, stating PCC felt Israeli conditions reasonable and that Israelis not attempting gain parliamentary advantages or entrap Arab delegates. Stressed humanitarian aspects refugee situation and fact UNRPR funds running out with little likelihood more to become available unless political agreement reached re repatriation and resettlement. Egyptian delegate gave impression his delegation would accept. Arabs will give answer August 2.

PORTER

501.BB Palestine/8–549

Memorandum by the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 1, 1949.

CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT—JULY 29

The President informed me that the Israeli Ambassador, who has recently returned from a visit to Israel, called on him and said that he would shortly call on me. The President thought that his attitude was more conciliatory than it had been prior to his departure. He made the following points:

(1) The Israeli Government was anxious to make progress on the refugee question and would repatriate up to 100,000 refugees.
(2) They wished the United States to oppose in the General Assembly any raising of the embargo on arms.
(3) The Israeli Government wished to retain the Negeb.
(4) The Israeli Government wished to retain the continued friendship and support of the United States Government.[2]

D[EAN] A[CHESON]

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[1] Addressed to Messrs. Rusk, Sandifer, and McGhee and to Ernest A. Gross, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, and Adrian S. Fisher, the Legal Adviser.

[2] A summary of this memorandum was sent to the American Delegation at Lausanne in Unpal 219, August 5, 8 p. m. (501.BB Palestine/8–549), repeated to New York, Arab capitals, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, and Ankara.

501.BB Palestine/8–149 : Telegram

Mr. Paul A. Porter to the Secretary of State

SECRET LAUSANNE, August 1, 1949—10 a. m.

Palun 257. Following comments Unpal 213 [1]

(1) Agree procedure second paragraph but desire stress necessity avoiding further delays insofar as possible.

(2) Agree Israel should be expected end up with approximately 400,000 Arab refugees and residents. Basis estimates Riley, believe 120,000 more accurate figure for Arabs now in Israel. Responsibility suggesting any specific figure if such action taken would rest with PCC not US.

(3) See Palun 258 [2] for action taken re survey group.

(4) On basis present situation Lausanne believe discussion general Palestine situation in GA desirable.

PORTER

[1] Dated July 28, from Lausanne, p. 1267.

[2] Dated August 1, from Lausanne, not printed; it advised that the Delegation had discussed the question of the economic survey group with the other members of the Conciliation Commission, who were in general agreement that the group be constituted as envisaged by the Department in Unpal 208, July 26, p. 1257. (501.BB Palestine/8–149)

867N.48/8–149 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL JERUSALEM, August 1, 1949—4 p. m.

499. ConGen concurs fully with opinion expressed last paragraph Palun 255.[1] Israel currently concentrating every effort consolidate holdover entire area now in its possession with particular emphasis on sections not allotted Israel by GA Resolution November 29. Ben-Gurion and Sharett personally encouraging settlement present border areas (ConGen airgram A–97, July 6)[2] while movement new Jewish immigrants into former Arab sections Jerusalem progressing steadily. Israel press indicating desire avoid general discussion Palestine at September GA.

[1] Dated July 29, from Lausanne, not printed; the last paragraph stated that the "Israelis here have stated their belief it unwise for PCC to deal with important problems involved in Palestine settlement in hurried atmosphere of working against GA deadline. I think, however, that PCC should use this deadline as pressure to induce parties take concrete steps forward and I also have growing impression that despite their assurances regarding desire for quick peace, Israelis are not sure GA might not adopt settlement plan they considered unfavorable and would not mind having further time to consolidate their situation in Palestine." (501.BB Palestine/7–2949)

[2] Not printed.

Postponement beyond September GA of decision on repatriation of refugees, boundaries and international regime for Jerusalem will further jeopardize small chance now remaining for obtaining settlement in accord with UN Resolution, US policy and principles of justice and equity. Delay will provide Israel with additional opportunity consolidate her position and reinforce her argument that "turning back clock" impossible.

Contel 495, July 27 recommended presentation definite plan covering all aspects Jerusalem problem to September GA. Suggest report by PCC on overall situation with specific recommendations re refugees and boundaries might constitute best approach entire problem. Must reiterate view often expressed that Israel will not comply in substantial manner with either GA Resolution, US policy or principles of justice and equity unless US or UN willing employ forceful measures.

Sent Department repeated Geneva 47 for USDel PCC, London 33, Baghdad 46, Tel Aviv 83, Beirut 95, Damascus 52, Cairo 23, pouched Amman, Jidda.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/8–149 : Telegram

Mr. John C. Ross to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, August 1, 1949—8 : 08 p. m.

878. Bunche, with whom I discussed question this afternoon, continues to favor lifting arms embargo and said he planned to make this position clear to Eban whom he was seeing later this afternoon. He stressed that any attempt to maintain embargo was unrealistic since it would require to be effective rebuilding truce supervision organization in order to establish observers at all airfields and ports in area and getting permission of states concerned, including Israel, to do so, which permission he was sure would not be forthcoming. He also stressed that if this subject were debated, facts of Israeli imports from eastern Europe would inevitably be brought out. In addition he anticipated whole question of immigration of fighting personnel and men of military age into Israel, contrary to truce provisions, would also be brought out.

I told Bunche Department had not yet reached decision and would want to take his views into account. As alternative to lifting embargo I asked what he thought of idea of Council deferring action on his report leaving aside his own personal inclinations. He thought it would be very bad to follow this course. SC, he said, called on the parties for prompt action in effecting armistice as transition between truce and permanent peace. Parties have in good faith and despite

serious obstacles complied with SC request for action. It would be therefore an act of bad faith of part of SC to defer action on his report at this time. Such deferment would be interpreted as expression of lack of confidence in parties, particularly in view of fact armistice agreements (see for example article 3 of Syrian agreement) contain very strong nonaggression pledges. Furthermore, leaving his personal inclinations aside, he as mediator would be supposed, if the Council deferred action, to do a lot of things which are now obsolete and impractical.

Bunche hopes very much it will be possible for Council to complete action on his report at Thursday's meeting. He hoped US would sponsor his draft resolution but agreed it would be better for Canada to do so if they are willing.

On terms of Bunche's draft resolution he agreed it would be better to eliminate language referring to Conciliation Commission in last two paragraphs and said if it were suggested in the Council to eliminate this language, he would support this suggestion and say that from the standpoint of the work of the PCC it would be better for it not to become involved in observance of the cease fire.

Ross

501.BB Palestine/8–149 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 1, 1949—8 p. m.

2710. Brit Emb reps and Dept officials have recently had further discussions re points in Deptels 2432, July 13 and 2582, July 23. Brit and ourselves now appear in substantial agreement in principle. It is of course understood that this is not a rigid position as developments at Lausanne might necessitate modification as discussions progress at Lausanne. Proposed Brit approach to Arab States, Israel, France and Turkey in support our similar views relating such matters as Palestine refugees, territorial settlement and Jerusalem area wld be most timely at this stage in view second phase of discussions at Lausanne.

For ur information, on July 25 Brit Emb rep conveyed to Dept further FonOff observations re certain details relating to points discussed in Deptel 2432, July 13. Dept plans transmit following comments to Brit Emb rep Aug 1 and suggests you also inform FonOff prior to general approach it proposes to make:

1. Re territorial settlement Dept does not believe only alternative is restoration of Western Galilee to Arabs by Israelis. Other alternatives might conceivably lie in area north of Beersheba and along Egyptian

frontier south of El Auja; or,[1] in some form of UN guarantee of access across southern Palestine and to ports in Palestine;

2. Although it proved impossible to bring Israel and Egypt together with Gaza strip proposal as basis of discussion during recent PCC recess Dept hopeful proposal might be integrated with other refugee and territorial proposals for discussion during present phase Lausanne talks;

3. Dept agrees Arab govts might prefer conclude something less formal than peace treaty in first instance but does not believe absence of formal declaration of war would be valid argument as armistice agreements have been concluded between Israel and contiguous states.

ACHESON

[1] As originally drafted, there appeared at this point the words "if territorial compensation proves impossible." They were deleted by the drafter prior to the encoding of the message.

501.BB Palestine/8–249 : Telegram

Mr. Paul A. Porter to the Secretary of State

SECRET LAUSANNE, August 2, 1949—3 p. m.

Palun 260. Reference Palun 253.[1] In meeting with PCC August 2 Arab delegates accepted conditions set by Israelis as basis for discussion refugee problem. Delegates demonstrated cooperative attitude.

PCC immediately proceeding meet Shiloah obtain for transmission Arab delegations terms Israeli proposal re refugees.

PORTER

[1] Dated July 28, from Lausanne, p. 1266.

501.MA Palestine/8–249 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, August 2, 1949—3 p. m.

500. In talk last night Kunde, US representative technical committee on refugees, made following points:

[Here follow 13 numbered points.]

Comment: Open admission by Comay [1] of Israel plans for returning Arabs confirms previously deductions that Israel has no intention

[1] Mr. Herbert Kunde's points 11 and 12 noted Mr. Comay's frank admission to the Committee that returning Arabs would be treated in the same way as new Jewish immigrants, would be integrated into the collective economy, and would be placed where their services were most needed. There was no possibility that the Arabs would return to their original homes. Mr. Comay was also cited as saying that the program for reunion of families "would in practice amount to selection by Israel of certain desirable categories of Arabs for return. Would be selected on basis security consideration and skill."

whatsoever conform with December 11 GA resolution in either letter or spirit. Section 11 resolves that refugees wishing return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at earliest practicable date. In case highly individualistic Arab, attempts to fit him as cog in Israel collective society and disregard his right return home is equivalent to exclusion Arabs from Israel. Difficult escape belief Jews loudly touted Israel projects for reunion families and return 100,000 refugees possess many earmarks of sham to evade efforts US and UN motivated by principles of humanitarianism, justice and equity to protect rights of original inhabitants Palestine in accordance UN resolutions.

Plans mentioned above and other evidence present conditions and future status Arabs may expect in Israel point up great and continuing difficulties UN will face in assuring Arabs in Israel equitable treatment and guaranteeing them basic human rights. Consulate General suggests emphasis might be shifted to rectification of temporary armistice lines to restore to Arabs area given them by GA resolution November 29 or equivalent fertile lands for use in intensive resettlement Arab refugees outside Israel. In absence willingness or feasible means for UN or US force Israel actually permit refugees return to their homes and live under acceptable conditions, this alternative might provide closest equivalent to repatriation called for by December 11 GA resolution. Would be in accord with US policy on boundaries. To forestall further consolidation by Israel of her position in all areas now held, action at September GA would be necessary.

Department summarize last five paragraphs for USDel, PCC.

Sent Department 500, repeated London 34, Amman 55, Baghdad 47, Beirut 96, Damascus 53; pouched Jidda, Cairo.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/8–349

Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 3, 1949.

Subject: Consideration of Dr. Bunche's last report to Security Council, including lifting of SC Arms Embargo NE.

During the past six months, separate armistice agreements have been concluded between Israel on the one hand, and Egypt, Lebanon, Transjordan and Syria on the other, under the guidance of Dr. Bunche as Acting UN Mediator. These agreements are of indefinite duration, incorporate "what amounts to a non-aggressive pact", provide for the withdrawal and reduction of forces and establish machinery under

General W. E. Riley, UN Chief of Staff, USMC, for the settlement of differences which may arise under the agreements.

On July 21 Dr. Bunche submitted a report (Tab A [1]) to the SC relating to the present status of the armistice negotiations and the truce in Palestine. This report concludes that Dr. Bunche's responsibilities under various SC resolutions including that of November 16, 1948 have now been discharged and suggests that such functions as remain might be terminated or transferred to the Palestine Conciliation Commission which was established under the GA resolution of December 11, paragraph 2c (Tab B). Dr. Bunche attached a suggested resolution as an annex [2] to his report. In neither the report nor in the resolution does Dr. Bunche make any specific references to the raising or the retention of the arms embargo imposed by the SC on May 29, 1948. Officers of the Department, however, have been advised of Dr. Bunche's personal view that approval of his suggested resolution by the SC would in effect lift the arms embargo.

The principal question at issue is whether the United States representative in the SC should support the Bunche proposal for transferring his functions to the PCC and rescinding the earlier truce resolutions of the SC, despite the fact that by so doing the existing SC arms embargo would be lifted. The State Department considers that there is no difficulty about transferring Bunche's functions to the Conciliation Commission and agrees that we should now proceed on the basis of armistice agreements rather than SC truce resolutions. A specific question is whether the existing UN arms embargo should be retained.

There appear to be three courses, discussed in detail in Tab E, which might be followed:

(1) The US might support postponement of consideration of Dr. Bunche's report and annex.

(2) The US might support the adoption of Dr. Bunche's report and annex, but call for the retention of the arms embargo.

(3) The US might support the adoption of Dr. Bunche's report and annex including the cancellation of the arms embargo subject to such minor amendments as may be desirable.

The following are the principal points for consideration in connection with the arms embargo question:

1. While postponement of the issue would appear to be desirable, it might be difficult to obtain because the Bunche report has been submitted and it can be assumed that one of the parties or one of the members of the Security Council would raise the question in the Council. In fact, the Security Council is scheduled to meet on Thursday morning to consider the report.

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[1] Tabbed materials cited in this memorandum are not found attached. Regarding Mr. Bunche's report of July 21, see editorial note, p. 1240.

[2] See *ibid.*

2. The theory of the armistice agreements which have now been concluded between Israel and all of its Arab neighbors is that the military phase of the problem is over and that in the progression from truce to armistice to final settlement the completion of the task of the Palestine Conciliation Commission is all that remains.

3. In practice the effect of the arms embargo has been favorable to Israel in as much as Israel has been able to obtain substantial quantities of arms despite the embargo.

4. If the lifting of the arms embargo would in practice precipitate an arms race in the area it would seriously jeopardize a settlement and would add to the already heavy economic problems of the area.

5. Great Britain and France have already begun certain deliveries to the Arab countries, with the knowledge of Bunche, on the ground that these arms were needed for internal security. It is doubtful that the Arabs would continue to comply with an arms embargo, particularly if Israel continued to buy arms abroad. The retention of the arms embargo would probably mean that both Israel and the Arab States would seek arms from iron curtain countries.

6. Israel has asked that the arms embargo be continued until a final peace settlement has been reached at Lausanne. In talks with USUN in New York, Mr. Eban indicated, however, that they were principally interested in assurances against an arms race.

7. The retention of an arms embargo, if it is to be enforced, would require revisions and additions to truce enforcement machinery which has been used up to this point. Such additional machinery would probably involve commitments both of personnel and budget from the United States.

8. Some increase in arms appears to be required for legitimate internal security purposes in the Arab States, resulting from unrest arising from the Palestine question as well as from the presence of large numbers of refugees. Mr. Bevin has strongly emphasized this point in discussing U.S.–U.K. common security interests in the Middle East.

Conclusion

From consideration of the above items it is concluded that, on balance, the United States should support the Bunche proposal to eliminate the truce resolutions despite the arms embargo feature, but should use its influence in the Security Council and diplomatically to ensure that arms going to the Middle East are within the scope of legitimate internal security requirements.

Recommendations

1. That USUN be instructed informally to ascertain the attitude of other SC members in order to determine what position they are likely to take in the SC.

2. That, unless these informal soundings indicate a strong disposition toward postponement of SC action until a later stage in the PCC talks, the US support the lifting of the arms embargo and the adoption of Dr. Bunche's resolution, and in so doing:

(*a*) Make a statement in the Council (and endeavor to get the British and if possible the Egyptians and Israelis to make similar statements) of a reassuring character to the effect that we have no intention of permitting, in so far as we are concerned, an arms race to get started;

(*b*) Through diplomatic channels, endeavor to assure that an arms race will not get started.[3]

[3] In the "Summary of Daily Meeting with the Secretary" on August 3, Mr. Rusk is recorded as having "presented a paper on Palestine to the Secretary. The main issue in the paper was whether or not we should agree to lift the arms embargo in the Middle East. Mr. Rusk pointed out that the Israelis had changed their attitude on this question. He made a point, however, that he thought there should be complete understanding on this issue with the President. The Secretary said that he would meet with the President today and get a firm decision. The urgency of this matter was brought about because the Security Council of the United Nations is meeting with Dr. Bunche on this matter starting today." (Secretary's Daily Meetings, Lot 58 D 609)

501.BB Palestine/8–349

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 3, 1949.

AUTHORIZATION OF ACTION ON BUNCHE RESOLUTION

I discussed the attached memorandum of August 3[1] and the two telegrams from Ross of August 1[2] with the President. I also told him that a telephone message from Ross this morning stated that Eban did not intend to propose amendments to the Bunche Resolution. Finally, I said that the latest information indicated that the debate on the resolution might be very short indeed and that, unless we raised objection, it would probably be passed tomorrow.

The President was clear that we should support the Bunche resolution. He has great confidence in Dr. Bunche's recommendations and is convinced that his standing in the country is such that his recommendations would not be misinterpreted. The President thought that if any action later on is necessary in regard to arms it can be dealt with as a separate matter. I suggested that, if Eban raised the matter of reassurance that there should not be an arms race, I thought that we might join with others in expressing the same desire and thereafter take such diplomatic steps as were available to prevent this from occurring. The President thought that this was a sound view.

You[3] may, therefore, proceed along the above lines.

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] Presumably Nos. 875 and 878; the former is not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1254.

[3] Copies of this memorandum were sent to Messrs. Rusk (for action), McGhee, and Sandifer.

501.BB Palestine/8–349 : Telegram

Mr. Paul A. Porter to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL LAUSANNE, August 3, 1949—4 p. m.

Palun 261. PCC (US chairman) met with Israeli Delegation August 3. Informed Israelis re Arab acceptance Israeli conditions for discussion refugee problem and requested delegation set forth its proposal.

1. Shiloah asked if Arabs could now be considered to have committed themselves to opening discussions on all issues outstanding between parties. If so, Israeli Delegation would like PCC give publicity. Chairman stated PCC did not believe that in accepting Israeli conditions Arabs had formally obligated themselves to discussion all issues, but said Arabs in informal discussions with PCC had indicated willingness do so. Shiloah could not agree that Arabs could withdraw from talks whenever did not like turn they were taking and insisted discussion on refugees must be regarded as commencement discussions on all points. Chairman stated PCC in private meeting would consider what kind of publicity might be given to present developments and exactly what form it might take. Was agreed Israeli Delegation would not discuss August 3 meeting with press representatives.

2. Shiloah after stating usual disclaimer of Israel irresponsibility for refugees and stressing security consideration, said Israel now willing see increase of Arabs in Israel above number there at end hostilities by what Israel considered large number. Could mention approximate number Israel had in mind if PCC so desired, but desired point out could be no lasting solution unless Arab states willing share responsibility.

3. Shiloah then proposed that UN immediately set up body to study economic possibilities in Arab states and propose specific projects for resettlement refugees there. Subject formulation overall plan and if international assistance furnished, Israel would make contribution mentioned paragraph two.

4. Responding to question from chairman, Shiloah said approximate figure Israeli Government had in mind was 100,000. Declared present Arab population in Israel between 165,000 and 170,000 and said Israeli Government envisaged eventual total Arab population of around 250,000. This figure based on Israel's retaining all present territory. Wished make clear would retain full authority direct returning refugees to specific localities and to specific economic activities.

5. Referring to international assistance mentioned by Shiloah, Boisanger asked whether Israel envisaged such assistance being directed at economic improvements in Israel which would enable latter

absorb refugees or to specific repatriation projects. Shiloah said would reply later.

6. Chairman asked what Israeli attitude would be if proposed UN Investigating Commission should study repatriation possibilities Israel and find latter could absorb more refugees than figure mentioned. Shiloah replied could not give definite reply at that time but desires once more stress security factor of which Israel better judge than anyone else. As result prodding by chairman Shiloah stated would give great weight to findings of such UN group.

7. Chairman then asked whether PCC could take it that approximate figure mentioned was not absolute or impossible of change. Shiloah said would agree to such interpretation but desired make statement that 100,000 represented heavy tax on Israel. Israeli Delegation had no intention of bargaining and had presented figure as honest estimate Israeli capacity absorb refugees. Refused agree that proposal represented Israeli acceptance degree responsibility for solution refugee problem. Preferred proposal be considered as indicating Israeli recognition of problem.[1]

PORTER

[1] The substance of Palun 261 was conveyed by a circular telegram of August 10, 4 a. m., to London, Paris, Arab capitals, Ankara, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem (501.BB Palestine/8–1049).

501.BB Palestine/8–449

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President

WASHINGTON, August 4, 1949.

Subject: Payment of United States Contribution to United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees

1. Public Law 25, 81st Congress, a Joint Resolution of March 24, 1949 authorized the appropriation of funds not to exceed $16,000,000 for the relief of Palestine refugees, in response to the message submitted by you to the Congress on January 27, 1949.[1]

2. Public Law 119, 81st Congress, appropriated to the President $12,000,000 for the relief of Palestine refugees, and an additional $4,000,000 for the same purpose, "to such extent as the President from time to time finds that other nations party to such United Nations agreement have met their obligations to the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees . . .".[2]

3. The amount of $12,000,000 has already been paid to the United Nations. The United Nations has presented to the Department (*a*) an

[1] Not printed.
[2] Omission indicated in the source text.

official statement to the effect that contributions in the total amount of $13,377,930, in cash, kind and services have been received or are in process of delivery from other governments as of July 31, 1949, and that there have been additional contributions, concerning which definitive information is not yet known, and (*b*) a request that the United States make a further contribution at this time. The Acting Secretary General of the United Nations states that the need for additional funds is so critical that the relief work cannot continue into September without the assurance of matching funds from the United States.

4. The Department of State believes that the request of the United Nations is reasonable and that the situation is urgent. The Department therefore recommends that the President make a finding that other nations party to the United Nations agreement have met their obligations to the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees in the form and to the extent of the contributions, totaling $13,377,930, shown in the attached schedule as having been received by the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees or in process of delivery from governments other than the United States as of July 31, 1949; and that the President authorize the payment of a contribution of $1,377,930 as an addition to the contribution of $12,000,000 previously made. Further implementations of Public Law 119 will be required later as additional statements are received from the United Nations.[3]

[3] President Truman, on August 10, made a finding "that other nations party to the agreement on United Nations Relief to Palestine Refugees have met their obligations under said agreement to the extent that an additional contribution to the United Nations in the amount of $1,377,930 is justified." (501.MA Palestine/8–1049)

Editorial Note

Ambassador Austin, on August 4, addressed the Security Council on the Palestine question. Near the end of his statement, he noted that the conclusion of the armistice agreements "justifies confidence in the early establishment of permanent peace in Palestine. As the Security Council foresaw in its resolution of 16 November 1948, progress toward peace in Palestine would involve a transition from a truce to an armistice, to be followed by a final settlement. Such a final settlement is the task of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, and, with the conclusion of these Armistice Agreements before us today, only the completion of the task of the Palestine Conciliation Commission remains.

"Therefore, the Security Council, as contemplated in its resolution of 16 November, may appropriately bring to an end the stringent

measures which were instituted to ensure more effective observance of the truce, including certain of the prohibitions of the parties included in the Security Council resolutions of 29 May 1948 and 15 July 1948. Among these was an embargo placed on the parties to the dispute and all other Governments and authorities concerned to refrain from importing or exporting war material and personnel into the affected area. These restraints, which characterized the truce period, are no longer appropriate or necessary now that we have firm commitments from the Parties in the Armistice Agreements to refrain from all hostile activity and to adjust their differences, if any, peaceably."

Ambassador Austin then stated that "An arms race would jeopardize the armistice and the settlement." He asserted that the United States "does not intend to allow the export of arms which would permit a competitive arms race in the area. Export of arms to that area of the world should be strictly limited to such arms as are within the scope of legitimate security requirements, again as recommended by Dr. Bunche. We hope that prudence will prevail not only among the parties but among all nations of the world which are in a position to supply arms and that they will pursue a policy similar to that which we intend to pursue." (SC, *4th yr., No. 36*, pages 26, 27)

New York reported that during the Council's deliberations on August 4, Mr. Bunche's draft resolution was sponsored by Canada and supported by the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Egypt, China, and Cuba. It advised also that the references to the Palestine Conciliation Commission in the Bunche draft had been replaced by references to the United Nations Chief of Staff, a change agreed to by Mr. Bunche (telegram 891, August 4, 10:55 p. m., 501.A Summaries/8–449).

890i.001/7–549 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Jordan

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 4, 1949—6 p. m.

117. Dept has given careful consideration suggestion contained urtel 274, July 5 [1] re visit Abdullah US but feels present uncertainties Lausanne negots and necessity US impartiality in exertion of pressure on both sides to reach agreement renders planning such visit difficult this stage.

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[1] Not printed; it stated that the British Government had invited King Abdullah to visit in August and queried whether the Department would consider inviting him to visit the United States following completion of that trip (890i.00/7–549). Mr. Stabler, in a letter of February 19 to Mr. Rockwell, had raised the question of a royal visit to the United States. Mr. Rockwell's response of March 16, initialed by Mr. Satterthwaite, stated "we believe the idea merits sympathetic consideration but feel that nothing whatsoever could be done about it before a settlement is reached in Palestine." Both letters are filed under 890i.001/2–1949.

Furthermore Presidential sched so crowded that visit most difficult arrange. If and when invitation extended might be desirable shld King proceed from Amman direct to US rather than via England. Therefore fact of King's visit to England not necessarily controlling as to time of visit.

ACHESON

501.BB Palestine/8–449 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET LONDON, August 4, 1949—7 p. m.

3071. 1. Points contained Deptel 2710 August 1 communicated Burrows and Beith, August 2.

2. At FonOffs suggestion, Beith and Embassy officer today went over various points and comments contained Deptel 2432 July 13 and subsequent telegrams, as well as relevant FonOff telegrams with British Embassy, Washington. Beith preparing new draft using original British document as basis and endeavoring meet points raised since then. On approval by FonOff, revised document will be telegraphed Department.

3. FonOff anxious know where it stands vis-à-vis Department in regard this matter. Earlier Department comments and reactions were characterized as "informal" and "tentative thinking." Deptel 2710 states "British and ourselves now appear in substantial agreement in principle." Can we assure FonOff of Department's "formal" agreement in principle?

4. FonOff would be glad have Department's views on timing. As Department knows British thought is to indicate to Egypt and Jordan and possibly other Arab Governments as well as French and Turks that such program would have UK support. (Beith said today they would also probably include Israel. Does Department consider it would be preferable approach French and Turks before approaching Arab Governments and Israel or approach all simultaneously? Would Department have any objection UK mentioning to French and Turks that US and UK are in substantial agreement in principle?

5. It appears to Embassy that British program holds promise as basis for negotiations in PCC. This being case, Embassy feels there would be considerable advantage if US took initiative in discussing this program with French and Turks, telling them at same time we are discussing it with British. British could then make approach in support. As second phase, PCC could present program to Arabs and Israelis, backed up by strong diplomatic support from UK, US, and,

if desirable, French and Turks. Foregoing procedure would obviate any embarrassment which might be caused by French and Turks learning we have been discussing this question with British outside PCC and presumably unbeknownst to them. Procedure would, moreover, have advantage keeping negotiations in UN organs which in final analysis will have responsibility for seeing settlement lived up to.

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/8–549 : Telegram

Mr. Paul A. Porter to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY LAUSANNE, August 5, 1949—5 p. m.

Palun 265. PCC has asked principal advisers, meeting in private and not as general committee, to draw up informal proposals concerning territory allocation of refugees and Jerusalem which PCC might consider submitting to parties as basis discussion. Jerusalem proposal will be plan drawn up by Jerusalem Committee.

First meeting revealed following re territory:

(1) French representative stated French Delegation and French Government had specific ideas concerning territorial settlement. French Government desired not to offend either Jewish minority in France or Moslem population French empire. French representative, accordingly, most reluctant participate in any discussions re territory. Was only persuaded to do so when it was pointed out that any plan drawn up would be informal personal suggestion of advisers and that it would not necessarily be accepted by PCC or by Governments of members of PCC.

Despite above statement of French representative, there have been indications here that French Delegation PCC has been encouraging Lebanese Delegation to advocate trusteeship over western Galilee.

(2) Under instructions his government, Turkish principal adviser has drawn up plan involving transfer of Negev to Egypt and Transjordan below line Deir el Balah–Asluj–31st parallel–Transjordan frontier. Turkish plan would also transfer to Lebanon and Syria eastern Galilee above horizontal line between Lebanon and Syrian borders just north Lake Hula and would return to Transjordan areas in triangle given up during Israeli-Transjordan armistice negotiations, as well as some territory in Lydda–Ramle area but not towns of Ramle and Lydda.

Turkish principal adviser and apparently Turkish Foreign Office convinced would be easier for Jews to give up Negev than all eastern or western Galilee. Yenisey states Turkish plan would maintain desired Arab territorial continuity, give Transjordan corridors to sea at Deir el Balah and create buffer between Egypt and Israel.

(3) I have authorized US principal adviser to advocate territorial distribution based upon judgment of prospects of acceptances and defensibility. This proposal is not intended to represent any appraisal of objective factors of geographic, economic, ethnic or other considera-

tions. It is simply put forward as possible basis of expedient settlement. Would appreciate soonest comments and instructions. Proposal follows:

(*a*) Area enclosed by line from Mediterranean coast at Deir el Balah to juncture thirtieth parallel and Egyptian Palestine border to be transferred to Egypt. Remainder Gaza strip to go to Israel.

(*b*) Area enclosed by line running from northern-most tip present Transjordan controlled area central Palestine to juncture Jordan River–Palestine–Transjordan frontier to be transferred to Transjordan.

(*c*) Triangle areas taken over by Israel during Israeli-Transjordan armistice negotiations to be returned to Transjordan up to point just south of juncture Hadera–Afula road and 1947 partition frontier between Israel and Arab Palestine.

(*d*) Area now held by Transjordan in south central Palestine to be extended westward to include towns of Beitjibrin and Qubeiba, and westwards outward and eastward to line running from Dead Sea to eastern boundary between Israel and Arab Palestine under 1947 partition, half-way between southern partition boundary Israel and central Arab Palestine and present southern-most penetration Transjordan forces in central Palestine.

(*e*) Israel to retain western Galilee.

Above general position does not include such points as Latrun salient, Mt. Scopus and demarcation lines Jerusalem, agreement on which might be reached separately by Transjordan and Israel.

PORTER

501.BB Palestine/8–549 : Telegram

Mr. Paul A. Porter to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY LAUSANNE, August 5, 1949—7 p. m.

Palun 266. PCC August 4 decided not transmit formally to ArabDels Israeli proposal re refugees since if did so instant rejection would result and impasse be created. Substance proposal discussed privately by PCC members with chief ArabReps. Reaction emphatic. Atassi [1] told me, for example, proposal mere propaganda scheme and "Jews either at your feet or throat". Urged US make economic arrangements with Syria and other Arab states for resettlement refugees and general development and Israel be left to condemnation world opinion. Other reactions not so violent but equally adamant in considering refugee program less than token.

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[1] Adnan el-Atassi, Head of the Syrian Delegation at Lausanne; regularly, Syrian Minister in France.

PCC August 5 held private meeting with Shiloah in which he urged reconsider position. He expressed regret discussions could not proceed on imaginative scope regional development. Stressed historic opportunity ME countries for internal development, emphasizing with exception Egypt others have area, water resources, etc. but lack population. Defended proposal as consonant with Israel's economic capacity and internal security.

Sassoon then directed attention to July 27 congress refugees in Lebanon after which spokesmen congress allegedly requested (1) no cession parts Arab Palestine to surrounding states and (2) that refugees be armed to retake Arab Palestine. Sassoon stated this known in Israel and urged as proof security conditions paramount.

PCC pressed Shiloah review proposals and ascertain if more flexible attitude could not be adopted. PCC meeting with Arab Dels August 6 to solicit informal proposals re their possible contribution solution refugee problem.

These events plus private talks convince me that although atmosphere may appear more conciliatory on surface basic positions remain unchanged. Feel obliged point out Department meeting July 28 [2] with Elath apparently promptly reported Shiloah who advised me that US policy linked to no specific refugee figure and that Israel proposal did not necessarily produce adverse reaction in Washington. Urge Department make position clear to Elath and clarify any possible misunderstanding. We cannot take firm position here if there is slightest doubt as to Department's position (reference Unpal 214).[3]

Now becoming more convinced no progress will be achieved here re refugees if problem approached in terms mathematical absolutes. Therefore ask Department's approval following procedure:

(1) Spend ensuing week attempting ascertain dimensions difference on refugees.
(2) Press PCC privately consider suggesting own solution re major outstanding points (reference Palun 265).[4]
(3) Submit privately to each del conclusions PCC as basis working draft.

Would hope reach (3) in 10 days but would not guarantee achievement any timetable here.

(1). Declaration by Arabs and Jews of responsibility solution problem.
(2). Recognition of variables in statistics.
(3). Agreement each party accept refugees in accordance capacity and availability internal economic assistance.

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[2] See Mr. Rusk's memorandum of conversation of that date, p. 1261.
[3] Dated July 29, to Lausanne, not printed; but see footnote 2, p. 1263.
[4] Dated August 5, from Lausanne, *supra*.

(4). Pledge by all parties give due weight findings survey group connection specific development projects.

(5). Statement by parties and/or PCC of targets re refugees as based on known facts and foregoing assumptions but with understanding that target number not absolutely binding on any party.

Would like Department's immediate suggestions re foregoing. Believe this or similar approach only realistic hope accord. While privately ArabDels make specific commitments all reluctant take positive public position.

Consider desirable survey group be set up soonest and am awaiting name US member in order PCC may request SYG establish.

PORTER

501.BB Palestine/8–749 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET NIACT PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, August 7, 1949—5 p. m.

2798. Dept has following comments on Embtel 3071 Aug 4 and Embtels 3099 and 3104 Aug 6 : [1]

1. Ref Para 3 Embtel 3071 and after studying Embtel 3099 Dept reiterates position stated in Deptel 2710 Aug 1, which stated "Brit and ourselves now appear in substantial agreement in principle. It is of course understood that this is not a rigid position as developments at Lausanne might necessitate modification as discussions progress at Lausanne. Proposed Brit approach to Arab states, Israel, France and Turkey in support our similar views relating such matters as Palestine refugees, territorial settlement and Jerusalem area would be most timely at this state in view second phase of discussions at Lausanne."

Dept considers Brit might approach NE govts as have French Turkish and US govts during recent months on these and other matters. Dept does not consider that supporting approaches necessitate quote formal unquote agreement. In our view Brit approach would represent voluntary indication to interested govts of general Brit thinking and of basic conformity with our general thinking. Dept considers it preferable to maintain flexibility at this stage rather than to adopt rigid position.

2. Ref Para 4 Embtel 3071. Dept considers that Brit might approach French, Turkish and NE govts simultaneously although it has no objection if Brit prefer to approach French and Turkish govts in advance. Dept has no objection if Brit inform French, Turkish and

[1] Telegram 3104 not printed.

NE govts that US–UK are in substantial agreement in principle providing it is pointed out that our position is not rigid and will take into consideration developments as discussions progress at Lausanne where USDel is following same line in private discussions with French and Turks.[2]

3. Ref Para 5 Embtel 3071. Dept considers that our substantial agreement in principle holds promise as basis for approach to interested govts and might serve as basis for informal discussions at Lausanne, but that it does not represent quote basis for negotiations in PCC unquote. US, French and Turkish Dels are already taking initiative at Lausanne as indicated in Palun 265.[3] British supporting approach to French, Turk and NE govts should therefore be helpful at this time.

4. Ref Embtel 3099. Dept is in substantial agreement in principle but suggests regarding section "g" that sentence should read quote US–UK favor incorporation central Arab Palestine in Jordan, when feasible unquote.

5. Ref Para 3 Embtel 3071 and Embtel 3104. Dept would appreciate your informing Brit FonOff foregoing views before Brit approach French, Turkish and NE govts.[4]

ACHESON

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[2] London reported, on August 9, that the Foreign Office had instructed the British Embassies at Paris and Ankara to approach the French and Turkish Foreign Offices regarding the proposals and that it had decided to await the reactions of the French and Turkish Governments before approaching the Arab Governments and Israel (telegram 3129, 501.BB Palestine/8–949).

[3] Dated August 5, from Lausanne, p. 1286.

[4] This telegram was repeated to Bern for Mr. Porter.

501.A Summaries/8–849 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

NEW YORK, August 8, 1949—7 : 54 p. m.

898.

. . . . . .

Canada and France withdrew their own texts in favor of a new joint resolution and the USSR presented a series of amendments to the original Canadian draft, as the SC resumed consideration Aug. 8 of Bunche's report on Palestine. Tsarapkin (USSR) argued that remaining negotiations should be left to the parties themselves. Lunde (Norway) supported the joint proposition.

One USSR amendment—to disband the UN Truce Supervision Organization—occasioned discussion, with Bunche warning it would nullify important provisions of the armistice agreements and representatives of the parties favoring the continued presence of the UN personnel required by the agreement. Eban (Israel), however, saw no point in requesting the SYG to arrange for the continued service of personnel "required in observing and maintaining the cease-fire." [1]

. . . . . .

AUSTIN

[1] For the further discussion of Mr. Bunche's report by the Security Council on August 8, see SC, *4th yr., No. 37*. The texts of the new joint resolution by the Canadian and French Representatives and of the Soviet amendments are printed *ibid.*, pp. 2 and 6, respectively.

501.BB Palestine/8–949 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Lausanne

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 9, 1949—7 p. m.

Unpal 223. Reference is made to Palun 263 [1] which reports info from Shiloah that Eban had been informed by reliable source close to White House that Pres recently stated to source he wld oppose any attempt to deprive Israel of Negeb and believed figure of 100,000 refugees to be repatriated by Israel very reasonable.

Policy of Pres regarding territories and refugees has been stated repeatedly by Pres, State Dept and USDel PCC. Shiloah and Eban shld be left under no illusion that such policy has been changed or that there is any difference of view between Pres, Dept, and USDel on these matters.

You are authorized to show copy this tel to Shiloah in Lausanne. USUN authorized to take similar action with Eban, and AmEmb Tel Aviv with Israeli FO. For your info this tel cleared with White House.[2]

ACHESON

[1] Dated August 3, from Lausanne, not printed.

[2] This telegram was cleared by telephone with Mr. Clifford. It was repeated to New York for action and to Arab capitals, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, and Ankara for information.

Mr. Ross, presumably on August 11, conversed with Mr. Eban about the content of Unpal 223. The latter, after checking with the Israeli Embassy, gave a "very careful statement" of his understanding of the conversation between President Truman and Ambassador Elath, as follows: "In reply to Elath's exposition regarding the Israeli position on the Negev and certain reports that Israel should give up the Negev, the President said he did not know of any such proposals.

"Elath indicated the willingness of his government to repatriate 100,000 refugees. The President said he appreciated that step and the attitude that prompted it." (telegram 915, August 11, 9:09 p. m., from New York, 501.BB Palestine/8–1149)

501.MA Palestine/8–949 : Telegram

The Chargé in Israel (Ford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET TEL AVIV, August 9, 1949—9 p. m.

607. Prior his departure yesterday for US, Ambassador read Jerusalem's telegram 505, August 3,[1] to Department and was of opinion there no grounds Burdett's belief Knesset debate and attendant press campaign "conducted in large part for foreign consumption in effort create impression Israeli offer repatriate number refugees of tremendous importance and made by government in spite fierce internal opposition".

New subject: Ambassador also read Jerusalem's telegram 500, August 2, to Department and felt whole tone telegram was highly tendentious and that concluding suggestion to shift emphasis "to rectification of temporary armistice lines to restore to Arabs area given them by GA Resolution November 29 or equivalent fertile lands to use in intensive resettlement Arab refugees outside Israel" would gravely endanger all hope progress toward peaceful agreement, and that Israel would certinly resist, if necessary by arms, any change armistice lines.

Comment: I agree both above opinions. There is no doubt about genuineness both internal opposition and resentment Israeli Government's recent offer repatriate Arab refugees, and while offer undoubtedly made as result foreign and especially US representations, its impact on local public opinion was nonetheless far-reaching and its jolt to government was softened only by ruse, whether intentional or not, of Prime Minister himself (Embassy's A–211, August 5).[2] As regards any contemplated change in present armistice lines, realities of situation are that Jews even now have so far consolidated their position in majority areas presently held, either through actual or fully planned settlements, that any action initiated now which would result dislodging them could easily prove disastrous. *End comment.*

Sent Department, repeated Baghdad 24, Beirut 36, Damascus 32, London 84, Amman 29, Cairo 30, Jidda 9, Lausanne; Tehran pass Jerusalem 67.

FORD

[1] Not printed.

[2] Not printed; it reported that the Prime Minister, in reviewing his Government's position on the return of Arab refugees before the Knesset on August 2, created an uproar on raising a question as to when the opposition had warned the people of the danger of war with the Arabs and of the need to prepare their defense. Mr. Ben-Gurion claimed for his Government "the sole responsibility" for Israeli defense preparations. There was an outcry by the opposition in the Knesset and for 2 days the opposition press devoted all of its energy to refuting the Prime Minister's allegations, deflecting them from the issue of the repatriation of the Arabs (867N.48/8–549).

867N.01/7–1349

The Secretary of State to Francis Cardinal Spellman, Roman Catholic Archbishop of New York

WASHINGTON, August 11, 1949.

MY DEAR CARDINAL SPELLMAN: The President has asked me to reply to your letter of July 13.[1] I appreciate the further evidence of your interest in the Jerusalem question and your understanding of the delicacy of the problem with which the Conciliation Commission is dealing.

It is recalled that the President's letter of June 22[2] stated that the United States Government firmly supports the principle of the internationalization of Jerusalem. It occurs to me that the subsequent remarks regarding the economic difficulties which would arise in implementing this principle may have given you the impression that only economic factors were involved.

Political factors are also of great importance. For example, it is necessary to consider such matters as the relationship between the peoples and institutions in the Jerusalem area and the adjacent states in order effectively to integrate the Jerusalem area into the political as well as the economic life of Palestine.

With regard to some of your economic points, it is recalled that the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947, provided for the partition of Palestine with economic union. This resolution also provided that a certain proportion of the surplus revenue from the Customs and other common services should be utilized to supply income for the administration of the Jerusalem area. As you know, the General Assembly resolution of November 29 was implemented only to a very limited extent. As a result, neither the original plan for the internationalization of Jerusalem nor the provision regarding revenue for Jerusalem has become effective; consequently it is necessary for the Conciliation Commission, in devising a practical plan for the internationalization of the Jerusalem area, under the General Assembly resolution of December 11, to take these factors into consideration.

It may be recalled that the General Assembly resolution of December 11, 1948, provided that the Jerusalem area should be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective United Nations control, and that the Conciliation Commission was instructed to present detailed proposals for a permanent international regime to the Fourth session of the General Assembly in September 1949.

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[1] Not printed.

[2] The President's letter was in reply to Cardinal Spellman's letter of June 10; neither printed. They are filed under 501.BB Palestine/7–549.

It may be remembered in this connection that the American representative expressed the view in Committee I of the General Assembly on November 26, 1948, that "During the course of the coming year full consideration can be given to the difficult problems of the maintenance of law and order in Jerusalem and the cost of administration . . .[3] It is our belief that the Jerusalem area should be integrated, in so far as is consistent with its special international character, with the people and institutions of the remainder of Palestine."

There seems little doubt that the General Assembly, in framing its resolution of December 11, had in mind the various economic considerations to which you refer, and that it hoped that a practical plan could be worked out during the year subsequent to December 11, 1948.

With regard to the consequences of a recognition that the adjacent states have sovereignty over the respective Arab and Jewish portions of Jerusalem, you raise the question whether, such sovereignty being recognized, the adjacent states might not be able to invoke paragraph 2 of Article 7 of the United Nations Charter in order to deny the rights of the United Nations in the area.

I believe that your apprehensions on this point will be dispelled by the assurance that we have no intention of recognizing the sovereignty of any state in the Jerusalem area. The type of international regime which we have in mind would involve the distribution of governmental powers among the three authorities concerned, namely, the two adjacent states and the United Nations authority. It will not be an application of the concept of sovereignty in the usual sense, but will rather be a matter of a precise definition of the location of respective governmental powers. In the present case, where the only rights of the adjacent states in the area will be those defined in an agreement to which they are parties, they will clearly be in no position to deny the rights of the United Nations, which will be defined in the same agreement.

It is my understanding that the Palestine Conciliation Commission is still in the process of working out a practical plan for the internationalization of the Jerusalem area which will take into account the varied and complex problems which are involved. I regret that I am not in a position to supply you with a copy of this plan at this time as the Conciliation Commission has not yet submitted its report to the Secretary General of the United Nations. Meanwhile, a copy of your letter of July 13 and related correspondence are being forwarded to the United States representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission for his consideration in relation to the plan on which the Commission is working.

Sincerely yours, DEAN ACHESON

[3] Omission indicated in the source text.

501.BB Palestine/8–1149

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Sandifer) to Mr. James W. Barco, at Lausanne

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, August 11, 1949.

Subject: Comments on Preliminary Draft of Declaration Concerning the Holy Places, Religious Buildings, and Sites in Palestine Outside the Jerusalem Area (Com.Jer./W.29, 26 July 1949).

The preliminary draft of a declaration to be made by Israel and the Arab state concerning the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Palestine outside the Jerusalem area (Com.Jer./W.29, 26 July 1949) has been examined by officers of UNA, L/P and NEA. The following comments and suggestions are the result of this joint examination and are transmitted to you for your assistance in further discussions on this subject.

Your letter of July 27, 1949[1] notes that the Jerusalem Committee intends to submit a preliminary draft of the Declaration to the Israeli Delegation for its comments. It is assumed that the views of the Arab Delegation will likewise be sought.

There follows a paragraph by paragraph comment on the draft Declaration:

Paragraph 1.

It is suggested that the reference to "freedom of conscience" be omitted from this paragraph. A guarantee of freedom of conscience is a matter which does not relate particularly to the question of the Holy Places and access to them. Accordingly it is not believed necessary for the purposes of this Declaration. It will be observed that freedom of conscience is not referred to in Paragraph 7 of the Assembly Resolution of December 11, 1948. Moreover, freedom of conscience is not susceptible of limitation and could not therefore be made "subject to the maintenance of public order", as it is in the present draft.

Paragraph 2.

It is suggested that the second sentence of this paragraph be deleted. The basic obligation is contained in the first sentence. The second sentence indicates only one of many possible forms that a derogation from this obligation might take. It is not believed desirable to emphasize in the Declaration the matter of "the construction of buildings in unsuitable proximity" and so possibly to detract from the broad character of the obligation stated in the first sentence of the paragraph.

[1] Not found in Department of State files.

Paragraph 3.

The text of this paragraph seems satisfactory. As a matter of clarification, it is the understanding of the Department that the use of the date May 15, 1948 in this paragraph and in paragraph 5 has the effect of preserving the *status quo* under the Mandate with regard to the subjects indicated, and does not have the effect of including any new provisions which may have been instituted on 15 May 1948 immediately following the termination of the Mandate.

Paragraph 4.

The following rewording is suggested for this paragraph:

"The Government of _____ undertakes to guarantee freedom of access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites within its territory and, pursuant to this undertaking, will guarantee rights of entry and of transit to ministers and pilgrims of the Christian, Jewish and Moslem religions, without distinction as to nationality, subject only to considerations of national security and to the maintenance of public order."

Paragraph 5.

No comment except for the observation made in connection with paragraph 3.

Paragraph 6.

The following revision of paragraph 6 is suggested:

"6. The Government of _____ undertakes to accept and to give effect to such recommendations as may be made by the United Nations Commissioner, provided for in the Instrument establishing a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area, with respect to the application and observance of this Declaration. The Government of _____ further undertakes to grant the United Nations Commissioner the privileges and facilities necessary for the performance of his functions."

Comment:

It was felt that the preliminary draft of paragraph 6 contained in Com.Jer./W.29 did not state with sufficient clarity the authority of United Nations Commissioner with respect to Holy Places outside Jerusalem and his relationship to the two states concerned in the implementation of the Declaration. It was felt that an undertaking by the Governments to "cooperate actively" was not sufficient and that, as regards the protection of Holy Places which is the subject of the Declaration, the two Governments should be prepared to agree to give effect to recommendations of the United Nations Commissioner.

For your information, the Department contemplates the possibility that, in the resolution approving the Declaration, the General Assem-

bly would instruct the United Nations Commissioner to report periodically on the implementation of the Declaration. This would insure that violations of the obligations assumed in the Declaration could be brought to the attention of the General Assembly by the United Nations Commissioner. It is believed that existence of such a provision would in itself promote the observance of the Declaration and that Assembly discussion of reports of the United Nations Commissioner would be an additional sanction.

501.BB Palestine/8–1149 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Lausanne [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, August 11, 1949—12 noon.

Unpal 224. Reference para four Palun 266 [2] Elath was clearly informed of Dept position on July 28 as stated Unpal 214.[3] Meanwhile, to remove any doubt which might exist in Elath's mind or in his reports to his Govt, Asst Secy McGhee on Aug 9 took advantage of Elath's presence in Dept for purpose presenting new Israeli Economic Counselor to emphasize 1) reports from USRep Lausanne indicated Arab reaction to Israeli refugee proposal was unfavorable; 2) press releases from Tel Aviv indicating that "Israel's offer . . .[4] has been recd favorably by President Truman" were not indicative of US thinking; 3) whatever merits of Israeli offer may be, it does not meet provisions of para 11 GA res Dec 11; 4) Israeli offer does not provide suitable basis for contributing to solution of Arab refugee question in view of limited extent to which Arab states are now able to absorb refugees on econ and financial grounds; 5) if Israel cld accept 230,000 Arab refugees from Gaza area, it shld be able to make more substantial offer now; and 6) on balance, US does not consider present Israeli offer to repatriate 100,000 Arab refugees satisfactory from standpoint of basis for ultimate solution of refugee problem. Although we remain unwilling to assume responsibility for naming figure, McGhee suggested to Elath that only Gaza figure or higher wld appear to offer satisfactory basis.

Elath expressed disappointment re reported Arab reaction. Present Israeli proposal to repatriate 100,000 Arab refugees was maximum for econ and security reasons, particularly latter. Elath added, how-

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London.
[2] Dated August 5, from Lausanne, p. 1287.
[3] Dated July 29, to Lausanne, not printed; but see footnote 2, p. 1263.
[4] Omission indicated in the source text.

ever that his Govt wld be informed re six points which McGhee emphasized.

Israeli reaction remains to be seen. Meanwhile, Unpal 223 [5] shld further reinforce any discussions you may have re second point.

Dept approves three-point procedure in Palun 266. Re second point, separate tel is being sent re Palun 265.[6] Re third point, Dept suggests differing views within PCC be included in conclusions as alternatives rather than as individual US, French or Turkish "plans". Procedure in Unpal 213 [7] is considered preferable at this stage.

Dept approves five-point formula for solution re refugees.

Re name US member of survey group, most promising candidate was unable to accept because of other commitments. Dept is actively working on this matter and hopes to inform you further shortly.

ACHESON

[5] Dated August 9, to Lausanne, p. 1291.
[6] Dated August 5, from Lausanne, p. 1286.
[7] Dated July 28, to Lausanne, p. 1267.

501.BB Palestine/8–1149 : Telegram

Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED LAUSANNE, August 11, 1949—3 p. m.

Palun 272. PCC has accepted general committee recommendation for establishment Lausanne mixed Arab-Israeli technical committee to study means putting into effect accord on frozen funds subject Palun 270.[1] Committee would consist 1 Arab 1 Israeli with neutral chairman to be provided by UN probably from Geneva office.

Israelis and Arabs have agreed establishment committee and Arabs have decided name Labbane [2] as their representative, pointing out this first instance they have agreed meet directly with Israelis. Azcarate now seeking chairman.

ROCKWELL

[1] Dated August 9, from Lausanne; it reported that Arab and Israeli delegates in the General Committee had "agreed to mutual unblocking, on pound for pound basis, of funds blocked in Arab states belonging to Palestine Arabs now resident in Israel and of funds blocked in Israel belonging to Palestine Arabs now resident in Arab states." (Palun 270, 501.BB Palestine/8–949)

[2] Abdel Chafi el-Labbane, member of the Egyptian Delegation at Lausanne; regularly Chief of the Political Section of the Arab Affairs department in the Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

501.BB Palestine/8–1149 : Telegram

Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell to the Secretary of State

SECRET LAUSANNE, August 11, 1949—3 p. m.

Palun 273. Following is résumé important positions developments since recess.

1. *General*—since July 18 PCC through formal and informal contacts informing self on position parties since recess. Principal advisers now preparing questions on specific points at issue which PCC could put to parties in effort get them clarify and make more specific their positions. After receiving replies intention USDel and Turk delegation that PCC draw up compromise proposal which it could present to parties. If parties reject proposal USDel and Turk delegation favor placing general Palestine question on GA agenda, with possibility PCC might present suggested compromise solution for consideration GA.

One difficulty in this is attitude Boisanger who states belief it premature to present compromise proposal to parties and that PCC must continue discussions in effort conciliate parties. Alleges PCC has made progress and that on number important questions cannot be decided so fast. Moreover opposed to PCC going to GA with proposed solution stating PCC has mandate conciliate not arbitrate and that long as either party ready continue conciliation discussions PCC has no choice but do so.

Boisanger position coincides with that of Israelis who strongly opposed going to GA and state ready continue discussions here until settlement reached. Type of settlement they have in mind indicated by Sasson in private conversation when he said Israelis thought main task PCC was persuade Arabs adopt Israeli position and that PCC was wrong if it considered that conciliation involved proposals which would deprive Israel of any territory or envisage return of much more than 100,000.

Arabs generally favor going to GA. Some desire do so in order use GA as sounding board for restatement their position. Others such as Jordan delegation in order be "forced" to acquiesce in possible decision of GA resolution problem. USDel believes no Arab chief delegate here would dare break front by reaching agreement on important points which could be considered unfavorable to Arab position, and that view this and adamant Israeli attitude, position of Boisanger re possibility reaching agreement not sound. There has been progress on minor points but basic positions remain unchanged. USDel also believes that if GA passed plan which gave something to Arabs on territory there is good chance Arab states would accept.

USDel thinks attitude Boisanger personal and not based on instructions his government. May be necessary for US and Turk governments discuss matter with French Government since there is extremely undesirable possibility parties may learn of serious divergence within PCC and also PCC can take no decisive steps unless agreement unanimous.

2. *Territory*—Israelis insist they need all territory they now hold especially Negev. Sasson has however twice indicated Israel might be able give up territory along Egyptian frontier in vicinity Auja.

Arabs are standing on 1947 partition, May 12 protocol and US territorial position. Syria and Lebanon interested in western Galilee, Jordan wants back triangle areas and Ramle Lydda and desires corridor to Mediterranean, and Egypt wants Negev up to line known to Department. Department familiar with tentative territorial suggestions USDel and Turk delegation. Work on established common territorial position in informal meetings of principal advisers has been stopped because Boisanger in line with his general position has instructed De la Tour Du Pin [1] take no effective part in discussions and no responsibility for France in any proposal which might be drawn up. USDel knows however that French delegation possesses map probably prepared by Benzihta's personal initiative, indicating suggested territorial distribution.

3. *Refugees*—Department familiar with Israeli proposition. In addition, Sasson states if several thousands of refugees are left over after Arab states have indicated how many they will accept, Israeli will accept for sake agreement.

Arabs publicly stand on December 11 resolution and state they will consider resettling those refugees who do not wish to return Israel.

Privately Syrian and Jordan representatives agree to inevitability resettlement large numbers in their countries but state view necessity maintain Arab unity and public opinion at home they cannot reach political agreement envisaging this.

Arabs about to present to PCC utterly unrealistic counterproposal on refugees in reply to Israeli proposition.

4. *Jerusalem*—Jerusalem committee has run into unexpected snag due attitude French representation. Benoist [2] now arguing that it premature for committee to agree on Jerusalem as long as other issues unsettled, that Vatican pressure makes it difficult for French government to agree to anything less than complete internationalization, that UN authority in Jerusalem must control real property transfers

[1] M. le Vicomte de La Tour du Pin Verclause, attached to the French Delegation at Lausanne.

[2] Philippe Benoist, attached to the French Delegation at Lausanne.

and immigration to city etc. Sudden tactics Benoist certainly reflect overall attitude Boisanger toward PCC initiative and probably desire French Government accommodate Vatican. Members French delegation state important French Catholics sending them personal letters urging complete internationalization.

ROCKWELL

501.BB Palestine/8–1149 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Lausanne [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, August 11, 1949—9 p. m.

Unpal 225. Ref Palun 265.[2] Dept believes discussion territorial question within PCC shld be helpful at this stage. As indicated Unpal 213,[3] Dept believes that procedure of having PCC agree on various alternative plans as basis for possible discussion between parties is preferable to having PCC itself agree on a single plan for territorial adjustment which might be unacceptable to both sides and share the fate of the Bernadotte plan.

Dept has fol comments on your numbered paras:

(1) Dept suggests procedure outlined Unpal 213 shld be emphasized to French and Turkish dels in order to stress concept of flexible proposals rather than rigid plan at this stage.

If French del has radically different proposals it is suggested they be put forward as alternatives to general PCC proposals rather than as separate and distinct French proposals. Dept believes foregoing procedure wld avoid confusion and misunderstanding which might arise from such discussions as those reported between French and Lebanese.

(2) Turkish proposal appears substantially identical with that contained Keenan instructions Jan 1949 [4] except for northern Galilee and rectifications in central Palestine.

(3) Dept is not clear re areas mentioned in (*b*) (*c*) and (*d*). Pls describe further.

Suggested US proposal appears, in general, to add territory to Israeli Gaza strip proposal, to make certain territorial rectifications in northern central Palestine and to add certain territorial changes in southern central Palestine as exchange for western Galilee.

US proposal also appears, in general, to be at considerable variance with position US has previously taken. We therefore do not believe your proposal shld be put forward within PCC as final US views or official US territorial position at this time. On other hand, it must be

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London.
[2] Dated August 5, from Lausanne, p. 1286.
[3] Dated July 28, to Lausanne, p. 1267.
[4] Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 681.

remembered that any territorial settlement which is acceptable to parties wld undoubtedly be acceptable to US.

Dept is presently working on alternative territorial position as suggestion which might be put forward in General Committee of PCC. Following consultation with Porter concerning it, you will be further informed.

ACHESON

501.A Summaries/8–1149 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

NEW YORK, August 11, 1949—9 : 15 p. m.

911.

. . . . . .

By a vote of 9–0, USSR and Ukraine abstaining, the SC Aug. 11 adopted a joint French-Canadian resolution (S/1367) in connection with the report of Acting Mediator Bunche on Palestine. Soviet amendments, reintroduced in a slightly revised version, were all rejected.

The SC also adopted, without opposition, a Canadian-Norwegian draft (S/1362) paying tribute to the work of the late Mediator, the Acting Mediator and members of their staff.[1]

. . . . . .

AUSTIN

[1] For the concluding discussion of Mr. Bunche's report by the Security Council of August 11, see SC, *4th yr., No. 38*, pp. 1–14. The text of the Canadian-French resolution is printed *infra;* that of the Canadian-Norwegian draft is printed as Resolution 72 (1949) in United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, 1949*, hereinafter identified as SC, *4th yr., Resolutions, 1949*, p. 7. Senator Austin's statement supporting the Canadian-French draft resolution and opposing the Soviet amendments is printed in SC, *4th yr., No. 38*, p. 5.

Resolution 73 (1949) Adopted by the Security Council on August 11, 1949[1]

The Security Council,

Having noted with satisfaction the several Armistice Agreements concluded by means of negotiations between the parties involved in the conflict in Palestine in pursuance of its resolution 62 (1948) of 16 November 1948,

[1] Reprinted from SC, *4th yr., Resolutions, 1949*, p. 8.

1. *Expresses the hope* that the Governments and authorities concerned, having undertaken, by means of the negotiations now being conducted by the Conciliation Commission for Palestine, to fulfil the request of the General Assembly in its resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 to extend the scope of the armistice negotiations and to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly, will at an early date achieve agreement on the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

2. *Finds* that the Armistice Agreements constitute an important step toward the establishment of permanent peace in Palestine and considers that these agreements supersede the truce provided for in Security Council resolutions 50 (1948) of 29 May and 54 (1948) of 15 July 1948;

3. *Reaffirms*, pending the final peace settlement, the order contained in its resolution 54 (1948) to the Governments and authorities concerned, pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, to observe an unconditional cease-fire and, bearing in mind that the several Armistice Agreements include firm pledges against any further acts of hostility between the parties and also provide for their supervision by the parties themselves, relies upon the parties to ensure the continued application and observance of these Agreements;

4. *Decides* that all functions assigned to the United Nations Mediator in Palestine having been discharged, the Acting Mediator is relieved of any further responsibility under Security Council resolutions;

5. *Notes* that the Armistice Agreements provide that the execution of those Agreements shall be supervised by mixed armistice commissions whose chairman in each case shall be the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine or a senior officer from the observer personnel of that organization designated by him following consultation with the parties to the Agreements;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to arrange for the continued service of such of the personnel of the present Truce Supervision Organization as may be required in observing and maintaining the cease-fire, and as may be necessary in assisting the parties to the Armistice Agreements in the supervision of the application and observance of the terms of those Agreements, with particular regard to the desires of the parties as expressed in the relevant articles of the Agreements;

7. *Requests* the Chief of Staff mentioned above to report to the Security Council on the observance of the cease-fire in Palestine in accordance with the terms of this resolution, and to keep the Conciliation Commission for Palestine informed of matters affecting the Commission's work under General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948.

501.BB Palestine/7–2549

The Secretary of State to the Egyptian Chargé (Chiati)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Egypt and refers to the Embassy's notes of June 10, 1949 [1] and July 25, 1949, in which the question of the removal of the Security Council's Arms Embargo was raised. In these notes the Egyptian Government took the position that its restrictions on the movement of air and sea transport to Israel "had been imposed for no other reason than to insure that the ships and planes enroute to Israel via Egypt did not carry armaments or war material to the Zionists as contraband in defiance of the Security Council's decisions."

As the Egyptian Government is aware, following the conclusion of the Syrian Israeli armistice the Acting Mediator submitted his final report to the Security Council [2] and that body has relieved him of his functions. At the same time the Security Council took action which in effect removed the arms embargo imposed by its resolutions of May 29 and July 15, 1948.

It is therefore evident that the obstacles which the Egyptian Government found to the removal of its restrictions no longer exist, and it is assumed that immediate steps will be taken to remove the various restrictions which have been imposed since the outbreak of hostilities in Palestine. It is felt that such action will be a constructive step towards the restoration of normal conditions in the area.[3]

WASHINGTON, August 12, 1949.

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[1] Not printed; but see telegram 573, June 11, to Cairo, p. 1115. In an attached memorandum of August 12 to Mr. McGhee, Gordon H. Mattison, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, noted that "The drafting of a reply to the notes of June 10 and July 25, 1949 from the Egyptian Embassy was delayed in order to take full advantage of Dr. Bunche's proposal to the Security Council that the truce resolutions involving the arms embargo be removed."

[2] Dated July 21; see editorial note, p. 1240.

[3] Mr. McGhee handed this note to Dr. Chiati on August 12 and stated that "the Department felt that Egypt would act in accordance with the Embassy's note of June 10, 1949 and lift the shipping restrictions which allegedly had been continued in effect because of the arms embargo. Mr. McGhee emphasized the fact that the United States had supported the removal of the Security Council's resolutions which had included the arms embargo. He pointed out that the removal of shipping restrictions by Egypt would be a constructive step toward normal relations in the Near East area." (memorandum of conversation by Stuart D. Nelson of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, 501.BB Palestine/8–1249)

The substance of the note of August 12 was conveyed to Arab capitals, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem in a circular telegram of August 16, 4 a. m., and to Bern for Mr. Porter in telegram 1144, August 18, 8 p. m. (501.BB Palestine/8–1649, 8–1849).

501.BB Palestine/8–1549

President Truman to President Weizmann, at Rehovoth, Israel[1]

PERSONAL WASHINGTON, August 13, 1949.

MY DEAR PRESIDENT WEIZMANN: Thank you for writing me personally with regard to our note of May 29, 1949, and your Government's reply of June 8. I appreciate your desire to remove any misapprehension regarding the position and intentions of your Government. I am certain a personal talk would be helpful. As this is not possible at the present time I shall endeavor to answer certain of your points.

It is true that many long months have passed since the Palestine question was first referred to the United Nations. On the other hand, it is our belief that the United Nations has made remarkable progress in view of the complexity of the problem. It may also be true that, in theory, a single individual such as Count Folke Bernadotte or Dr. Ralph Bunche would have been able to proceed more rapidly than a commission consisting of three or more members. In practice, however, experience has demonstrated that a single individual can only succeed with active assistance on the part of interested governments. We believe that the present Palestine Conciliation Commission has been able to function effectively, when one considers that it is responsible for negotiating a longer range political settlement whereas the Acting Mediator's functions were confined to the achievement of shorter range military agreements.

The proposals which the Israeli delegation at Lausanne has advanced have undoubtedly been helpful to the Palestine Conciliation Commission. Although some of these proposals have not been adopted, it may be recalled that the representatives of Israel, Lebanon, Syria,

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[1] This letter was drafted by Mr. Wilkins on August 8 and transmitted to President Truman for approval by Secretary Acheson with his memorandum of August 10. The memorandum noted that "Sending a reply [to President Weizmann's letter of June 24] at this time should be helpful in view of the discussions now taking place at Lausanne." The White House returned the proposed reply to the Department on August 15, with the President's approval.

Mr. McGhee handed the President's reply to Ambassador Elath on August 18 (see Mr. McGhee's memorandum of that date, p. 1323) for transmission to the Israeli President. The Department, on August 19, sent a summary of the reply to Tel Aviv (telegram 535, 501.BB Palestine/8–1949) and on August 31 transmitted copies of the Truman–Weizmann correspondence to Tel Aviv, Arab capitals, Paris, London, Ankara, New York, and Jerusalem for background information only and not for discussion outside these various missions (501.BB Palestine/8–1549). Copies were also sent to Geneva for the American Delegation at Lausanne on September 6 (501.BB Palestine/9–649).

Transjordan and Egypt on May 12, 1949 were signatories to a protocol of the Commission which should have the effect of facilitating further discussion of all questions, including the refugee problem, and thereby of achieving a final peace settlement. It seems reasonable to consider the Arab agreement to the protocol of May 12 as a general reply to the Israeli proposals.

With regard to the general question of the Arab refugees, you may recall that the General Assembly resolution of December 11 provided that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return. I am, therefore, glad to be reassured by your letter that Israel is ready to cooperate with the United Nations and the Arab states for a solution of the refugee problem; that Israel pledges itself to guarantee the civil rights of all minorities; that Israel accepts the principles of compensation for land abandoned by Arabs; that Israel declares its readiness to unfreeze Arab accounts under certain conditions; that Israel has set up a custodian of absentee property; and that Israel is ready to readmit members of Arab families.

It may be noted, however, that in making these proposals the Israeli delegation made them conditional, in general, on the conclusion of peace and other limiting factors, and that the representatives of the Arab states, on the other hand, considered the General Assembly resolution as imperative and mandatory.

With regard to (1) access to ports and means of communications, and (2) the delimitation of frontiers, it again seems reasonable to believe that the protocol of May 12 might be considered as a constructive basis on which these matters could be discussed. With regard to the Jerusalem question, it is my understanding that the Palestine Conciliation Commission has made excellent progress during which it consulted all interested parties and that it is presently in the process of preparing its report on this subject for the General Assembly in accordance with paragraph (8) of the General Assembly resolution of December 11.

In view of these developments at Lausanne, I believe one may conclude that the Arab representatives are prepared to enter into negotiations with the objective of achieving a peace settlement. This conclusion would appear to be reinforced by the Commission's communique of July 28, which reports that "the Arab delegations and the delegation of Israel have given express assurances regarding their intentions to collaborate with the Commission with a view to the

definitive settlement of the Palestine problem and to the establishment of a just and permanent peace in Palestine."

The Commission has already activated a number of subsidiary groups, such as the General Committee, the Jerusalem Committee, and the Technical Committee on refugees. It is my understanding that the Commission now has your project regarding additional subcommittees under consideration and that the commission might take advantage of your project to facilitate further discussions.

With regard to direct negotiations, it may be recalled that the General Assembly resolution of December 11 provides for negotiations conducted either with the Palestine Conciliation Commission or directly. Thus far the representatives of the Arab states have been unwilling to enter into direct talks. It may be hoped, however, that further progress at Lausanne might make it possible to conduct negotiations both with the Palestine Conciliation Commission and directly.

With regard to the refugee problem, we are of the opinion that primary responsibility for a solution to this problem rests with Israel and the Arab states and that, assuming all concerned are willing to approach it realistically and constructively, the United Nations, including its individual members, might be willing to assist the states concerned in reaching such solution. It is reassuring that Israel, for humanitarian reasons, is ready to contribute as far as it can toward a solution of this problem and has been readmitting Arab refugees and is ready to reunite Arab families.

During your recent visit to the United States I talked to you about my feelings regarding the refugees and the question of a final territorial settlement. These views were repeated in the recent exchange of notes between your Government and mine. I would be less than frank if I did not tell you that I was disappointed when I read the reply of your Government to our note of May 29. Even after talking with Ambassador Elath, following his recent return from Tel Aviv, I am not certain that the present proposals of your Government will affect the current conversations at Lausanne in such a way as to achieve a lasting peace between Israel and the Arab states.

Whether or not one can say that Israel has cooperated with the Commission, it seems to us that the views of the Israeli Government are in many respects at variance with the General Assembly resolution of December 11. The views of the Israeli Government may also be considered as failing to take into account the principles regarding territorial compensation advanced by the United States as indicated in our *Aide-Mémoire* of June 24.

With regard to territory, your reassurances that Israel has no aggressive designs against anyone and that it is not looking for additional territory are appreciated. We can understand that you might be somewhat apprehensive on security grounds; nevertheless, it seems reasonable to believe that the conclusion of armistice agreements with the neighboring Arab states should prove reassuring and that both Israel and the Arab states on the basis of the General Assembly resolutions of November 29, 1947, and December 11, 1948, should be able to discuss the territorial question.

I sincerely hope that both Israel and the Arab states will continue the discussions at Lausanne in a conciliatory spirit and with a greater understanding of the problems which exist between them. If both sides undertake an approach of this kind a settlement in Palestine would be greatly facilitated. Such a settlement would be an extremely important contribution to the stability of the Near East and the well-being of its peoples. It would, in addition, provide a basis on which it would be possible more constructively to plan for the future.

Very sincerely yours, HARRY S. TRUMAN

867N.01/8–1349

The Acting Representative at Vatican City (Gowen) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED VATICAN CITY, August 13, 1949.
No. 24

SIR: I have the honor to enclose a copy of an undated statement entitled "The Present Situation in Jerusalem" [1] which was handed to me on August 12, 1949 by the Acting Secretary of State of the Holy See, Monsignor Domenico Tardini. The statement which, he said, has just been prepared by the Secretariat of State of His Holiness sets forth the latest views of the Holy See on the problem of Jerusalem and is now being forwarded by the Vatican to all Apostolic Nuncios and other high ranking members of the Catholic hierarchy for their information.

Monsignor Tardini remarked that this statement is an "unofficial compendium of certain *de facto* and *de jure* considerations which according to the Holy See should be borne in mind for a proper

[1] Not printed.

appraisal of the position of the Holy See on the problem of Jerusalem and for a just, proper and permanent settlement of that vital issue". An informal English translation [2] is attached for immediate reference.

The gist of the statement is that in the opinion of the Holy See only complete internationalization of Jerusalem, its environs and all the Holy Places in Palestine can bring a true, fair, and lasting peace to the Holy Land, and that all other proposed solutions are inadequate.

After a description of the "now very critical situation in Jerusalem" the statement goes on to point out what the Vatican believes would be a satisfactory solution of the problem, viz:

[Here follow nine points said to offer a satisfactory solution of the problem of Jerusalem and a reference to the Pope's Encyclical Letters of October 24, 1948, and April 15, 1949, "in which he recommended international control for Jerusalem, its environs and all the Holy Places in Palestine."] [3]

Respectfully yours, FRANKLIN C. GOWEN

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[2] Not printed.

[3] Mr. Gowen, on August 4, had raised the question whether the Department would object to his arranging an appointment for Brigadier General Riley with the Vatican Acting Secretary of State, in order to deliver a message to the Vatican from Israeli Foreign Minister Sharett (telegram 30 from Vatican City, 501.BB Palestine/8–449). The message as summarized in the telegram stated that Mr. Sharett "was anxious to know just what Vatican wanted done with Jerusalem problem. Was Vatican interested only internationalization Jerusalem under international regime? If so, then Israel saw no solution to problem as Israel does not consider possible to place some 100,000 Jews now residing in New City under such control. It would mean these Jews would be outside Israel and subject only to protection of such administrative body against attack by Arabs. Sharett suggested (*a*) international control and/or supervision of holy places in Jerusalem area with same body supervising to lesser degree holy places in other parts Palestine. Free access to all holy places would be guaranteed; (*b*) internationalization of Old City with Israel rendering such assistance as necessary to ease economic and living conditions there. Even if Old City was returned to Arabs similar arrangements could be made; (*c*) under (*b*) free access to holy places in new Jerusalem and other parts of Israel could be arranged. Sharett was interested in knowing whether or not Vatican if interested in (*a*), (*b*) and (*c*) would be willing to arrange for meeting with Israeli representatives for purpose of explaining [*exploring?*] possibilities looking forward to possible solution."

The Department, in reply on August 9, stated that "General Riley shld not act as intermediary between Israeli FonMin and Vatican. Such action might give rise to unwarranted polit implications in view Riley's USMC rank and position as Chief of Staff of Acting Mediator. Furthermore, presentation of Israeli views to Vatican by Riley, a function which wld ordinarily be responsibility of Israeli Min Rome, might create impression US concurred in Israeli views. Position of US rep on PCC might thereby be prejudiced and work of PCC re Jerusalem might be seriously affected." (telegram 13 to Rome, 501.BB Palestine/8–949)

501.BB Palestine/8–1549

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Harlan B. Clark of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 15, 1949.

Participants: NEA—Mr. Hare
Mr. Paul A. Porter
Mr. Mark Ethridge
Mr. Fraser Wilkins, NE
Mr. Clark (in part), NE
[Mr. Faiz el-Khouri, Syrian Minister]

(*a*) *Problem:* The Syrian Minister expressed the opinion that an injustice had been done in Palestine and said that he would like to have a further opportunity to make his views known to Mr. Porter and Mr. Ethridge in this regard. It is believed he may be motivated by personal reasons of prestige in asking to consult with Mr. Porter and Mr. Ethridge.

(*b*) *Action Required:* In the present circumstances, it is recommended that any further request by the Syrian Minister for conferences with Mr. Porter be discreetly declined.

(*c*) *Action Assigned to:* NE

Discussion:

After calling on Mr. McGhee (see memorandum of today's date entitled "Views of the Syrian Minister on the Syrian *Coup d'état* of August 14")[1] the Syrian Minister asked to speak with Mr. Porter and Mr. Ethridge, who were consulting with Mr. Hare and Mr. Wilkins in an adjoining office. Upon being introduced to them, Faiz Bey began to criticize United States policy in regard to Palestine. He declared that this Government was powerless to act fairly in the matter since, like nearly every other country, the United States was completely controlled by Jews. He said that Jewish groups in England had extracted all the benefit that they could out of the British Government during the mandate period but that now Israel was an independent state they relied mainly on the United States to assist them in achieving their objectives. Mr. Ethridge and Mr. Porter asked specific questions as to how Faiz Bey believed that progress might be made in settling outstanding questions, but he turned them aside, with the remark that only by removing American support from Israel could a satisfactory settlement be made. He added that even Soviet Russia appeared to have been subject to Jewish influence and that in these

[1] Not printed, but see editorial note, p. 1632.

circumstances when all the countries of the world were under the control of the Jews, "why could I be blamed for acquiescing in their control?" This mystifying query appeared to be rhetorical and before discussion was resumed, Mr. McGhee came in to say that Mr. Porter and Mr. Ethridge were due in another conference in 2 or 3 minutes and asked that they be excused. Faiz Bey took his leave with the remark "You see, there is never any time for me to make my views known".

Mr. Clark who accompanied Faiz Bey to the elevator said he was sure that Mr. Porter and Mr. Ethridge had been pleased to have this opportunity to talk with him and would have been glad to have discussed the question with him further were it not for the fact that their presence was urgently required at an important meeting already scheduled. Faiz Bey replied that he understood that perfectly and that what he was referring to was that he had tried to see Mr. Porter before his departure for Lausanne and had been told that he was so busy making necessary preparations for his work on the Palestine Conciliation Commission that it was not possible to arrange a meeting. Mr. Clark said that he knew that Mr. Porter had indeed been very busy prior to his departure but that at Lausanne he had had full opportunity to discuss all aspects of the Palestine question with the Arab delegates to the Conciliation Commission meetings including the Syrian delegation which was in possession of pertinent instructions from its government. Faiz Bey replied, "Yes, but Lausanne is not enough. The Palestine question must be discussed everywhere". The Minister said he appreciated having the opportunity to meet Mr. Porter and Mr. Ethridge and seemed pleased at the reception he had received.

[Here follows the final paragraph giving an analysis of the personal motivations of the Syrian Minister in desiring a meeting with Messrs. Ethridge and Porter.]

811.516 Export-Import Bank/8–1549

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 15, 1949.

On August 15 the recent decision of the President temporarily to postpone further allocations under the $100,000,000 Exim Bank loan to

Israel[1] was discussed with Messrs. Rusk, Porter (US Rep. PCC), Ethridge (Former US Rep. PCC), Satterthwaite, Hare, Dort,[2] and Whitman.[3] This is not a question of cancellation of the unallocated balance of $49,000,000 on the original $100,000,000 Exim Bank loan to Israel. It is merely a question of temporary delay of further allocations against the $49,000,000 balance.

It was agreed that early peace in Palestine, which was anticipated when the Exim Bank loan to Israel was first made in the spring of 1949, has not been achieved. Even though the Palestine Conciliation Commission has been working in the Near East and in Switzerland during the past seven months, a peace settlement does not seem any closer today. In spite of limited proposals put forward by both parties regarding minor aspects of the Palestine question, no real basis for agreement under the auspices of the PCC seems to exist at the present time. In view of these factors it was agreed that the Exim Bank should suspend further allocations under the loan for the time being.

It was agreed that the Secretary of State, as a member of the Board of the Exim Bank, should inform the Board that before further allocations are made the Department of State would like to review the situation regarding any specific request for funds for the purpose of determining whether the allocation would be appropriate in the light of present circumstances. It is understood, for example, that a $5,000,000 request is pending for the Port of Haifa. It would need to be determined whether the availability of these funds for the Port of Haifa would be justified in the absence of progress towards peace in Palestine.

It was also agreed that the Secretary of State should inform the Board that the PCC plans to set up an economic survey mission for the purpose of studying the economic situation in the Near East, particularly the situation with regard to the repatriation of refugees in Israel and their resettlement in the neighboring Arab states, and for the purpose of making recommendations regarding overall economic

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[1] The Department, on August 5, advised the American Delegation at Lausanne that "Current conversations between reps Eximbank and Israeli reps Washington will shortly make it clear that further allocations under Eximbank loan have temporarily been postponed." (telegram Unpal 218, 811.516 Export-Import Bank/8–549) In reply, on August 8, Mr. Porter stated that he had "not injected ExImBank loan into discussions here. Because of Shiloah's firm position re refugees and territories do not believe any discussions in this regard would result in more than minor changes in basic position. Believe maximum effect will be obtained when Israeli Government learns from Bank officials that full economic cooperation with US not feasible under existing situation." (Palun 267, 501.BB Palestine/8–849)

[2] Dallas W. Dort, Special Assistant to Mr. Thorp.

[3] Roswell H. Whitman, Associate Chief of the Division of Investment and Economic Development.

projects for the Near Eastern area. In the absence of peace in Palestine and pending the recommendations of the Economic Survey Mission it would be wise temporarily to suspend further allocations, as such allocations might subsequently be integrated with the recommendations of the Mission itself.

It is hoped that these arguments will convince the Exim Bank of the economic grounds on which the Department's views are based and that the Bank will take a similar line in such conversations as it might have when Israeli representatives approach the Bank regarding new requests.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that you discuss this matter along the foregoing lines with appropriate officials of the Exim Bank.

501.BB Palestine/8–1549 : Telegram

Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell to the Secretary of State

LAUSANNE, August 15, 1949.

Palun 275. Following substance questions put in writing to all delegations by PCC August 15:

(1) Is delegation prepared to sign declaration according which (*a*) solution refugee problem should be sought in repatriation of refugees in Israeli-controlled territory and in resettlement of those not repatriated in Arab countries or in zone of Palestine not under Israelis.

It is understood that repatriated refugees will become *ipso facto* citizens of Israel and that no discrimination will be practiced against them both regarding civil and political rights and obligations imposed upon them by law of land.

Also understood that repatriation and resettlement will take place subject technical and financial aid to each party by international community.

(*b*) In case survey group should be charged by UN with establishment development projects in Near East of which main purpose would be to facilitate repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of refugees, all parties will undertake to facilitate task of group and take all possible measures to aid in implementation of such solutions as group might propose?

(*c*) All parties will state that above mentioned understanding concerning refugees will not prejudice rights which parties reserve in connection with final territorial settlement?

(*d*) Funds for emergency aid extended to refugees must be renewed until above-mentioned technical and financial aid shall have been allotted by international community?

(2) Without committing its government and considering that no detailed statistics exist regarding refugees, is delegation prepared present provisional estimate of approximate number refugees its government would be ready to accept?

(3) What territorial adjustments does delegation desire be made to working document annexed to Protocol of May 12? [1]

ROCKWELL

[1] Mr. Rockwell suggested to the French and Turkish Delegations that they "make concerted effort persuade all parties give affirmative answers re refugees subject Palun 275 and persuade Arab delegates make politically feasible replies to question re territory." He also urged that the Department, after consulting the Turkish and French Governments, make appropriate representations as soon as possible to the interested Arab States and Israel. (Palun 276, August 15, 5 p. m., from Lausanne, 501.BB Palestine/8–549)

501.BB Palestine/8–1549 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL JERUSALEM, August 15, 1949—3 p. m.

519. MAC meeting yesterday considered Jordan complaint re expulsion by Israel of Arabs from triangle territory taken over by Israel under terms armistice agreement (Amman's 136, July 18 [1]). According to Riley Israel took position would not permit return any Arabs expelled except as part of general solution refugee problem at Lausanne. These Arabs would be included in 100,000 Arabs. In personal conversation with Captain Ali Nuwar, Jordan representative, in presence of MAC Chairman Ballentine [2] Dayan stated Nuwar could bring question to vote in MAC and force Israel repatriate expellees but "they would regret it if they returned". Riley commented to Consul General that although Israel position direct violation armistice agreement he hesitated advise Ballentine to force vote since would not be responsible for treatment accorded returning Arabs. He considered this typical example tactic negotiating by threat and admitted UN powerless determine whether Arabs, if they returned, received fair treatment.

Believe above incident throws further light on true value proposal repatriate 100,000 Arabs.

Sent Department 519; repeated Tel Aviv 1, Baghdad 51, Beirut 101, Damascus 57, London 4, Geneva for USDel PCC 50, pouched Amman, Cairo, Jidda.

BURDETT

[1] Not printed.

[2] Col. Samuel S. Ballentine of the United States Marine Corps, who was a United States Military Observer with the Truce Supervision Organization and who was designated by General Riley as Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission for Israel and Jordan.

501.BB Palestine/8–1649

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 16, 1949.

Subject: Palestine Conciliation Commission

Discussion:

Mr. Porter, the United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission, returned to the United States from Lausanne on August 12. Since his return to the present situation at Lausanne and in Palestine has been discussed in detail in the Department and in consultation with Mark Ethridge who visited Washington for this purpose. Mr. Porter's general conclusion, with which we agree, is that no real basis for conciliation between the parties exists at the present time. The underlying reasons for this conclusion are set forth in the attached telegram (numbered paras. 1–5 of Tab A).[2]

In view of this situation, it is believed that the most effective approach to a Palestine settlement at the present time would be on economic grounds rather than on political grounds as has previously been the case. It is therefore proposed that the following procedure be followed:

1) The Palestine Conciliation Commission should as soon as possible establish the proposed Economic Survey Mission which would proceed to the Near East, study existing data, consult interested governments and authorities and on this basis prepare a report to the General Assembly through the PCC containing its recommendations for economic development and settlement of the refugee question. Before establishing the Mission interested NE governments would be requested for advance assurances they would cooperate with the Mission and would give great weight to its recommendations (last 4 paras. Tab A).

2) The PCC should submit a progress report to the UN relating its efforts at conciliation during the past seven months and its establishment of the Economic Survey Mission.

3) The PCC should then recess for the time being. Meanwhile, the PCC will leave its Principal Secretary (Dr. Pablo de Azcarate) in Jerusalem, the Commission's official headquarters, for such activities as may be necessary. The Commission may be reconvened at the request of Dr. Azcarate or any one of its three members if future developments require such action.

4) The PCC should reconvene at Lake Success when the Economic Survey Mission has completed its report (estimated at about November 1).

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[1] Sent through Mr. Rusk and initialed by him.

[2] For text of circular telegram as actually sent, see *infra*.

5) The PCC should at that time submit a further progress report to the UN incorporating the findings and recommendations of the Economic Survey Mission. This report should also include the PCC's own recommendations as to whether the Commission should continue its activities or whether it should be replaced by some new agency.

6) The Department is of the preliminary opinion it may be advisable to replace the Commission by a single individual such as an Agent General to have responsibility for conciliation, economic development, refugee resettlement and relief and possibly Jerusalem. No decision need be reached regarding the future of the PCC at this time as it is still being studied. Meanwhile, this question will be discussed with other interested governments to ascertain their views.

7) Mr. Porter tentatively plans to return to Lausanne about August 20 for the purposes described in steps 1) and 2). Mr. Porter also plans to stop off in Paris where he hopes to discuss steps 1)–5) with our Embassy, the French Foreign Office and the French representative on the PCC. This step is considered imperative to enlist French support; otherwise the French representative on the PCC might attempt to hinder the action recommended in this memorandum because of his personal inclination toward indefinite conciliation. A proposed telegram to Paris is attached (Tab B).[3]

Recommendations:

It is recommended that:

1) you approve the foregoing procedure and
2) that you approve the attached telegram (Tab B).[4]

[Here follow concurrences and a list of attachments.]

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[3] Secretary Acheson, on August 18, informed President Truman that he and Mr. Porter recommended the course outlined in Mr. McGhee's memorandum. Mr. Acheson's memorandum of the conversation states that "The President approved our taking that course." (Secretary's Memoranda, Lot 53 D 444, Secretary's Memos)

[4] The telegram was sent to Paris as No. 3068 on August 18. It read as follows: "For Bruce from the Secretary. Ambassador Paul Porter, US Rep PCC, plans arrive Paris Aug 19 enroute Lausanne. Recent developments at Lausanne re Palestine appear require new procedural approach for which we need strong French support. It would be appreciated if you would request Schuman to arrange consultation in Paris on Aug 22 between Boisanger, French Rep PCC, and French FonOff officials concerned." (501.BB Palestine/8–1849) Robert Schuman was the French Foreign Minister.

A 2-hour talk was held on the morning of August 22. Mr. Boisanger was said to have "expressed his appreciation usefulness and importance economic survey in providing basis eventual political settlement and accepted general lines policy put forward by Porter. Boisanger concerned, however, that adjournment PCC be so handled as to make entirely clear machinery for negotiation remain available to parties and not abandoned. Also desired recess should not take place until commission had received and examined Israeli and Arab replies on territorial question shortly expected. Porter stated this agreeable to him so long as matter dealt with promptly as possible preferably within one week." (telegram 3459, August 22, 5 p. m., from Paris, 501.BB Palestine/8–2249)

501.BB Palestine/8–1649 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, August 16, 1949—6 a. m.

Reference current developments relating gen Palestine question, Dept analyzes present situation as fol:

1) PCC: Hope for real progress at second phase Lausanne talks beginning July 18 has not been realized. Although both sides wld welcome peace, neither side is prepared at this time to make concessions which wld make settlement possible. Israeli offers re Gaza strip or repatriation 100,000 Arab refugees are unacceptable to Arabs. Arab position which is based on rigid adherence to para 11 of GA res Dec 11 and May 12 protocol with its map indicating 1947 partition boundaries is unacceptable to Israelis. No real basis for conciliation therefore appears possible at Lausanne.

2) GA: GA will discuss Jlem and refugee questions during forthcoming session and will probably discuss other aspects Palestine question including boundaries in connection with these items or as separate item on agenda. Israelis wish to avoid GA debate, Arabs look forward to it.

3) Israel: Israel is concerned with domestic problems and has allowed public opinion to develop within Israel to such an extent that it is almost impossible for Israeli Govt to make substantial concessions re refugees and territory which wld open way to settlement and friendly relations with Arabs. Israel prefers instead to maintain *status quo* in Palestine. Objectives seem to be (1) Absorption of almost all Palestinian refugees by Arab States and (2) *de facto* recognition of armistice lines as boundaries.

4) Arab States: Arab states are also concerned with domestic problems and are reluctant to take any forthright action for time being. Basically Arabs believe agreement with Israel at Lausanne wld require new concessions or at minimum formal acquiescence in *status quo* re refugees and territory. Arab reps consider agreement on either basis politically impossible for them because of polit repercussions which might result at home. *Status quo* is therefore preferable pending GA.

5) Refugees: Israel is willing to contribute to limited extent. Arabs privately agree that it will probably not be possible for most refugees to return to Israel and that it will be necessary to resettle them in Arab territory, primarily Syria, Jordan and Central Palestine. Arabs will not, however, take this position publicly. Although Arabs realize UNRPR funds are rapidly being depleted, necessity for early solution to overall refugee question has not resulted in constructive action on part of Arabs possibly because Arabs fatalistically anticipate UN particularly US and UK will assume responsibility at last moment.

[1] At London, Paris, Ankara, Arab capitals, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Lausanne.

6) Economic Survey Mission: Proposed mission is still under urgent consideration in Dept. Implementation has been delayed pending determination re personnel in Washington and in Lausanne pending clarification of Israeli and Arab positions. Dept expects, however, to be ready to proceed with Economic Survey Mission shortly.

In view foregoing analysis, Dept considers that most effective approach to Palestine settlement at present time wld be on basis of econ report by Economic Survey Mission rather than on polit agreement at Lausanne. Dept does not rule out possibility of further concessions by Arabs and Israelis and some measure of agreement between them under auspices of PCC but considers major emphasis shld be shifted to Economic Survey Mission. It is contemplated Economic Survey Mission might briefly visit NE, study existing data, consult interested govts and authorities and on this basis report its recommendations for econ development and settlement of refugee question to GA through PCC.

Economic Survey Mission wld report, for example, which NE countries wld be able to absorb refugees and to what extent in each case under present circumstances. Economic Survey Mission wld also report whether internatl econ and financial aid wld be required and to what extent such aid wld assist NE countries in recovering from dislocations arising from recent conflict and wld increase their ability to absorb refugees. Report and recommendations of Economic Survey Mission wld cover all possible aspects of Palestine question on econ grounds.

Dept has been contemplating instructing AmReps at Damascus, Amman and Tel Aviv to request FonOff for assurances that Govt wld cooperate with Economic Survey Mission in supplying info and wld give great weight to recommendations of Econ Survey Mission. AmReps at Beirut, Baghdad, Jidda and Cairo wld also be informed but primarily for purpose of requesting cooperation of respective govts as it is doubted resettlement of refugees wld prove feasible except for token numbers in these countries. It wld be pointed out that advance assurances were essential to justify estab of mission and to indicate serious consideration which respective govts wld be willing to give its recommendations. It wld also be pointed out that in absence of such assurances or other constructive action by Israel and Arab states long-range refugee resettlement and even short-range refugee relief wld undoubtedly be delayed.

Dept considers, however, that it wld be inappropriate to approach FonOff re Economic Survey Mission for several days in view Zaim overthrow and probable Arab preoccupation with this matter. Meanwhile your comments re analysis and shift of emphasis to Economic Survey Mission are requested.

ACHESON

501.BB Palestine/8–1649 : Telegram

Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED LAUSANNE, August 16, 1949—11 a. m.

Palun 277. Arab delegates in private meeting with PCC August 1 [*15?*] delivered informal reply re Israeli proposal concerning refugees.

Following main points:

Arab expectation Jews would advance reasonable proposals not realized. According terms December 11 resolution nearly 1,000,000 refugees must return their homes and Jews have offered accept less than 100,000. Moreover Jews in basing their proposal on all territory now under Jewish control ignore May 12 protocol.

Jews cannot oppose return large number refugees on economic ground while encouraging mass immigration of Jews. Re objections on security grounds must be recalled international security is assured by UN.

Arab delegates reiterate request in their May 23 memo for return all refugees coming from areas allotted to Arabs by partition plan such as western Galilee, Jaffa, etc. Return these refugees does not depend on will Jewish occupying authorities who do not have right interfere in affairs population occupied regions over which they do not exercise sovereignty.

After this only question to be discussed is that of refugees to be repatriated to regions allotted to Jews by partition. If Jewish proposal can be understood as applying only to this territory Arab delegations would not be opposed to its adoption as basis discussion problem refugees from this region.[1]

ROCKWELL

[1] Mr. Rockwell advised, on August 16, that in "View unrealistic and unhelpful nature Arab reply to Israeli proposal re refugees PCC has decided not to transmit to Israelis at present, but await Arab replies to questions on refugees asked by PCC August 15. PCC hopes efforts made Lausanne and by member governments in Arab capitals will result in more reasonable approach to refugee problem by Arab delegates." (Palun 280 from Lausanne, 501.BB Palestine/8–1649)

867N.48/8–1649 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, August 16, 1949—3 p. m.

522. Comments follow on Tel Aviv's 607, ninth received thirteenth.

1. Obliged reiterate opinion expressed Contel 500, August 2 and 505, August 3 [1] that Israel offer repatriate 100,000 refugees amounts mainly

[1] The latter not printed, but see paragraph one of telegram 607, p. 1292.

to "gesture". Israel figures on Arabs in Israel areas quoted Contel 504, third,[2] call for reduction of 100,000 by 25,000 "infiltrees" and families of breadwinners estimated by Arabs at 30,000, leaving total of 45,000 eligible for admittance under new offer. Conditions of return described by Comay (paragraphs 11 and 12 of Contel 500) and confirmed by Department's infotel August 10.[3] Apart from propaganda aspect (which might assist in breaking Lausanne deadlock) believe offer fails conform even to substantial part to December 11 GA resolution and US policy with respect either to numbers or conditions of repatriation of refugees.

2. Judging on basis press articles and public comments Jerusalem, reaction to refugee proposal not comparable to intense controversy generated by such questions as arms embargo and absorption of immigrants. ConGen surprised by lack of stronger outburst. Hard to conceive transparent ruse employed by Ben-Gurion (Tel Aviv's A–211)[4] would succeed more than momentarily in throwing well-informed and intelligent Israel public off scent. Consider more plausible explanation advanced by Jerusalem editor who asserted public realizes no real prospect exists of return 100,000 in immediate future.

3. Agree fully with Tel Aviv as stated Congram A–94, July 6[5] that Israel will resist effort change present temporary armistice lines. However, in addition to reaction in Israel to such change, attention should be given to effect on Arab states of acquiescence in Israel's retention of territory seized by force mainly during periods of SC imposed truce. SC resolution of August 19, 1948 states "no party is entitled to gain military or political advantage through violation of truce". Furthermore, all armistice agreements signed by Arab states on understanding demarcation lines were temporary and pacts include written provisions recognizing principle of no political gains during truce and stating agreements are without prejudice to final political settlement. ConGen believes on over-all basis more stable peace will result if territorial adjustments insisted upon.

4. Past experience of Arabs in Israel territory, regardless of statements of good faith of Israel Government instills little confidence that they will receive just treatment in future. (Contels 305, April 19, 330 April 26, 519 August 15).[5] Little real possibility is seen that UN can guarantee to Arabs human rights and fundamental freedom set forth in UN universal declaration on human rights of 1948. This reality together with conditions Israel imposing for return, led ConGen to suggest shift in emphasis to territorial changes provided in treaty.

5. Tel Aviv's 607[6] in effect recommends abandonment or emasculation of US policy on boundaries and refugees as enunciated by Jessup November 20, constantly repeated and reaffirmed in Deptel 331, August 9[7] with approval of President. ConGen submits that in lieu of

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[2] Not printed; it reported that during a foreign policy debate on June 16, Mr. Sharett placed the total number of Arabs in Israeli-held territory at 155,000 (867N.5011/8–349).

[3] Not printed.

[4] Dated August 5, not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1292.

[5] None printed.

[6] Dated August 9, p. 1292.

[7] This was a repeat of Unpal 223, p. 1291.

special pleading of inability and unwillingness of Israel to conform, attention might be directed to settlement within broad framework US policy. Solution imposed by Israel with force or threats of force on UN, US and Arab states will hardly contribute to lasting peace, or fail to strike at vitals of moral authority upon which UN and US world leadership hinges.

Department pass Lausanne.

Repeated Baghdad 52, Beirut 102, Damascus 60, London 45, Cairo 25, Jidda 10. Pouched Amman.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/8–849 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 16, 1949—7 p. m.

526. Dept is at loss to understand Israeli reaction to substance Deptel 476 July 26. Dept did not rule out direct talks between high Israeli and Arab officials if such talks shld appear advisable to supplement discussion at Lausanne or otherwise to accelerate developments (ref Embtel 602, Aug 8 [2]).

Dept also regrets to note Israeli "take it or leave it" attitude re refugees. We are firmly convinced that primary responsibility for refugees rests with Israelis and Arabs and that both parties must work together constructively to solve problem. Dept believes consideration shld also be given by Israelis to public opinion of Arabs with whom Israel must live in NE and to world public opinion with which Israel must reckon in GA as well as local Israeli opinion.

While foregoing is for your confidential info, you are authorized to make use of substance this tel in such further conversations as you may have on this subject with Israeli officials.

ACHESON

[1] This telegram was repeated to London, Arab capitals, Bern (for Mr. Porter), and New York.

[2] Not printed; but see footnote 1, p. 1257.

501.BB Palestine/8–1749 : Telegram

Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL LAUSANNE, August 17, 1949—4 p. m.

Palun 283.

[Here follow two paragraphs on discussions between the Jerusalem Committee and Israeli officials concerning the movement of additional government offices into Jerusalem, as reported to the Department in telegram 506, August 3, from Jerusalem (867N.01/8–349).]

New subject: Jerusalem Committee has now adopted text draft instrument for submission to PCC and is in process drafting accompanying report. Final text represents compromise French and US views but does not do violence to essential points US position and includes major number Department's drafting suggestions. French reluctant adopt any text at this time, and growing concern French delegation over Vatican opposition to division Jerusalem between Israel and Arab autonomy only overcome by firm US attitude re necessity submitting proposals to PCC which follow closely basic provisions May 18 draft, and willingness compromise on following points without which no French agreement likely:

(1) Immigration.
(2) Final decision disputes between religious communities over Holy Places in Jerusalem to rest with international tribunal in event a Commissioner's efforts toward settlement fail.

Re (1), provision, now so drafted as to have little meaning, reads as follows:

"Article 5. The responsible authorities of Jewish and Arab zones shall not carry out an immigration policy of a nature to change the present demographic equilibrium of the area of Jerusalem."

Re (2), French FonOff follows Vatican view that Commissioner cannot be entrusted with final decision in disputes concerning *status quo*.

US representative in agreeing above changes has emphasized final decision on draft rests with PCC. Important step will have been taken however when draft submitted to PCC with approval French representative Jerusalem Committee. This should be accomplished in few days if no further instruments from Paris. Text of draft and report will be airmailed.

ROCKWELL

501.BB Palestine/8–1749 : Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET CAIRO, August 17, 1949—6 p. m.

774. Under Secretary Hassouna Pasha in conversation sixteenth referred to SC's action in lifting arms embargo. Hassouna speaking for Prime Minister Sirry Pasha expressed earnest hope that US Government might see its way clear to implementing embargo lifting through abolition of numerous present restrictions on export of arms from US.

In reply I stated that I would bring his views to attention my government pointing out my belief that US Government while favoring arms for defence was allergic to weapons capable of use in offensive warfare.

Any positive action which the US Government may be disposed to take in above sense might possibly be made conditional on like lifting by Egyptian Government of its own restrictions dating from Palestine hostilities with especial reference to interference with ships, crews and cargoes in Egyptian ports or transiting Suez Canal.[1]

PATTERSON

[1] Cairo had advised, on August 16, that "there is no truth in rumors that the Egyptian Government will no longer search shipping passing in Suez and destined for Haifa. As previously reported, what the Egyptian Government undertook in its regulations was to confine its attention to war matériels. . . . A few days ago five American cars consigned to Tel Aviv were seized by the authorities in Alexandria. Details of this seizure are being obtained from the Consulate General at Alexandria and immediate protest will be made to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs based on the assurances which they have given regarding the nature of cargo to be interfered with." (airgram 857, 501.BB Palestine/8–1349)

Editorial Note

The Department of State, on August 18, prepared a report entitled "United States Policy Towards Israel and the Arab States"; and on August 31, Secretary Acheson transmitted a copy to Secretary of Defense Johnson, in a message which referred to the latter's communication of May 16 (890.00/8–3149). Regarding the communication of May 16, see the last paragraph of Secretary Johnson's memorandum of the same date to Admiral Souers, page 1012.

The report was submitted on September 1 for the consideration of the National Security Council; see editorial note, page 1339.

501.BB Palestine/8–1849

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs (McGhee)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1949.

Participants: Eliahu Elath, Israeli Ambassador
Uriel Heyd, First Secretary, Israeli Embassy
NEA—Mr. McGhee
NE—Mr. Wilkins

Problem:

(1) President Truman's reply[2] to President Weizmann's letter of June 24.

(2) Alleged division between White House and State Department.

(3) Developments at Lausanne re Israelis and Arabs.

[1] Drafted by Mr. Wilkins.
[2] Dated August 13, p. 1305.

Action Required:

(1) To transmit summary and full text of President Truman's reply to the American Embassy in Tel Aviv.

(2) None.

(3) To instruct the American Embassy in Tel Aviv to refute the myth that the PCC and US discouraged direct talks between Israelis and Arabs.

Action Assigned To: NE

Discussion:

The Israeli Ambassador called on me today at my request to discuss various matters relating to Israel and the Arab states. We had a most frank and friendly discussion throughout.

(1) I told the Ambassador that President Truman had replied to President Weizmann's letter of June 24 and I asked the Ambassador if he would be kind enough to transmit the President's reply to President Weizmann. As the Ambassador was willing, I handed him a sealed envelope containing the President's reply. I also handed the Ambassador a copy of the President's reply for his own informal and confidential information. I pointed out that President Truman's response should not be made known in any way and that I was providing Mr. Elath with a copy in order to keep him informed of the attitude of the US and because of our confidence in him. Mr. Elath asked me if he could inform the press, whose correspondents even then were waiting in the reception room, that President Truman had replied to President Weizmann's letter. I said that I thought this inadvisable inasmuch as President Weizmann himself had not yet received the letter and it seemed likely that the press might attach unwarranted significance to a reply at this time. It was, in fact, a coincidence and was not related in any way with Ambassador Porter's return to Lausanne, Ambassador Elath agreed.

(2) I informed Ambassador Elath of the contents of a recent exchange of messages between the Secretary of State and Ambassador Porter in Lausanne[3] with regard to certain information which Mr. Porter reported that Mr. Shiloah had received from Mr. Eban with respect to Arab refugees and territory in Palestine. The Ambassador said that he was uninformed regarding the source at the White House from whom the information reported was obtained, and suggested that the report might be based on a misunderstanding of his own recent interview with President Truman. I told the Ambassador that we were not inferring in any way that his conversation was the basis for this report. I stressed the unity of the White House and the Department regarding recent developments concerning Palestine. At the Ambassador's request I provided him with paraphrases of copies of the exchange of messages in question.

(3) Ambassador Elath questioned me with respect to Ambassador Porter's recent consultation with the Department and asked whether

[3] Palun 263, August 3, and Unpal 223, August 9. The former is not printed; but for its substance, see Unpal 223, p. 1291.

any instructions had been given Mr. Porter prior to his return to Lausanne. I replied that Mr. Porter visited Washington on routine consultation. I said that the US as a member of the Conciliation Commission was still pursuing a policy of bringing the parties together on outstanding issues and that we hoped particularly that agreement could be reached regarding refugees and territory. I added that according to reports from Lausanne there appeared to be no real basis for conciliation at the present time because of the widely divergent views held by the Israelis and the Arabs. Our main objectives in the NE are peace and stability. A refugee solution was absolutely necessary. The US as well as other members of the UN was consistently reviewing the general situation to determine whether some new approach might not be devised which would assist the Israelis and Arabs to reach agreement.

The Ambassador replied that in the opinion of his Government agreement was prevented by two important factors:

(1) Direct talks between the Israelis and the Arabs were consistently being discouraged not only by the Conciliation Commission but particularly by the US.

(2) The Arabs did not actually expect refugees to return to Israel and had no territorial demands. It could be seen, therefore, that the US position was more extreme than that of the Arabs.

I told the Ambassador that the US Government was not opposed to direct talks. I said that Mark Ethridge and Paul Porter had strongly urged the parties to negotiate directly. The Arab representatives in Lausanne and elsewhere had, on the other hand, thus far been unwilling to meet the Israelis directly. There were many reasons for this refusal, including such factors as Israeli leaks to the press concerning earlier meetings, and the Arab belief that such meetings if they resulted in concessions might lead to political repercussions in Arab capitals.

I asked the Ambassador in what respect our position in regard to Arabs and territory was more extreme. He replied that we were insisting that Israel repatriate 250,000 refugees and relinquish the Negev. He said Israel could not undertake either of these steps for economic and security reasons. I observed that the Ambassador's statement in regard to the US position was incorrect. I said we had consistently made it clear that the US was endeavoring to assist the parties and would support any fair reasonable agreement which was freely reached between them.

Regarding refugees, the US had not stated that Israel should repatriate 250,000 refugees. It had pointed out, however, that there were 750,000 refugees and that Israel and the Arab states had primary responsibility for that. Statistical and technical information which is presently available indicated that this total number might be taken

care of if the Arab states were able to absorb 500,000 and if Israel were able to repatriate a total of approximately 250,000. On the other hand, actual disposition of the refugees was a matter for determination between the parties and might be handled either directly between them or through the CC.

With respect to territory, I recalled that the US had never expressed a specific territorial proposal and referred in this connection to Dr. Jessup's statements before the UN on November 20–26, 1948. As was the case with refugees, a settlement of the territorial question was one for determination between the parties either directly or through the Conciliation Commission.[4]

[4] The Department summarized this memorandum for Tel Aviv in telegram 536, August 19, 8 p. m. (501.BB Palestine/8–949). It then concluded that "In such conversations as you may have with official and unofficial Israelis, you are authorized strongly to follow same line as McGhee re refugees and territory. Dept is particularly concerned that you refute myth re PCC and US discouragement of direct talks between Israelis and Arabs." No. 536 was repeated to London as No. 2982 and to Paris, Ankara, Arab capitals, Jerusalem, Bern (for Mr. Porter), and New York.

Editorial Note

Replies to the Department's circular telegram of August 16 (page 1317) were sent by various posts beginning August 19. Damascus (telegram 491, August 19), Baghdad (telegram 500, August 20), Beirut (telegram 432, August 20), Amman (telegram 320, August 22), and Cairo (airgram 896, August 24) agreed on the desirability of shifting emphasis from political to economic factors. Jidda (telegram 493, August 20) made no direct comment but offered no objection. Tel Aviv (telegram 640, August 19) concurred.

Jerusalem (telegram 526, August 22), on the other hand, expressed doubts on the efficacy of the shift on the grounds that an "Instinctive reaction may occur on part of both Arabs and Israelis against creation of 'yet another commission' ". Jerusalem also noted the "Problem of formulating terms of reference of economic mission consistent with UN resolutions and of such nature both Israel and Arab states will agree give great weight to its recommendations." Jerusalem's "most serious objection" centered on the fact that the "Establishment of economic survey mission and shift to economic grounds might be construed as acceptance of present political *status quo* involving achievement by Israel of objectives re refugees and boundaries."

London (telegram 3351, August 23) agreed that new tactics were required but considered "it important that in shifting to economic approach, we should not relax pressure for political settlement lest we encounter pitfall Beith points out." Mr. Beith had noted that

with the shift of emphasis from political settlement, there would be a tendency for the territorial situation to freeze.

All replies cited above are filed under 501.BB Palestine.

501.BB Palestine (E)/8–2449

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President

WASHINGTON, August 24, 1949.

Mr. Gordon R. Clapp, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Tennessee Valley Authority, today accepted appointment as Chairman of the Economic Survey Mission which was recently set up by the Palestine Conciliation Commission. In order to stress the importance which we attach to this Mission, it is proposed that you should make a statement following the announcement of Mr. Clapp's appointment by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The purposes of this Mission will be to examine the economic situation in the countries affected by the recent hostilities in Palestine, and to make recommendations which will enable the governments concerned to further such measures and development programs as are required to overcome the economic dislocations created by the hostilities; to reintegrate the refugees into the economic life of the area on a self-sustaining basis within a minimum period of time; and to promote economic conditions conducive to the maintenance of peace and stability in the area.

The attached statement [1] not only emphasizes the importance which we attach to the Survey Mission but also generally outlines United States policy towards the Near East. It is hoped that such a statement of policy will be helpful to both the Israelis and the Arabs in reaching agreement which will permit a return of normal conditions to the area.

JAMES E. WEBB

[1] For the statement as actually released by the White House on August 26, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 5, 1949, p. 333.

501.BB Palestine/8–2449 : Airgram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED CAIRO, August 24, 1949.

A–899. On calling August 21 on Under Secretary Hassouna Pasha, I raised subject Department's circular telegram, August 16, 4 a. m.,[1] respecting Departmental note of August 12 to Egyptian Chargé,

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 1304.

Washington, regarding desirability removal of trade restrictions in view removal arms embargo. In so doing, I recalled to Hassouna Pasha his own recent request that the U.S. Government, in view of arms embargo lifting by Security Council, should likewise cancel American rules and regulations in implementation of arms embargo.

Hassouna Pasha stated that he had not yet received Department's above-mentioned note August 12. However, Egyptian Government has removed restrictions on commerce through Egyptian waters and ports aside from implements of war, such as arms and ammunition. Hassouna Pasha stated that this meant manufactured weapons and ammunition and did not include raw materials or even manufactured articles, such as rubber tires acceptable for use on military vehicles. On my pointing out, in view of arms embargo lifting, even these residual restrictions should be removed by Egypt, Hassouna Pasha countered by indicating that so long as the U.S. Government had not cancelled its own regulations limiting shipment of arms to the Middle East, in respect of Egypt, Egypt should not remove its own restrictions. If arms and ammunition were being supplied to Israel but not to Egypt, and if Egyptian restrictions were removed prior to U.S. action, Egypt might find itself powerless to prevent armament of Israel. However, Hassouna did not make any categorical promise that if the U.S. cancelled its current restrictions on export of arms, Egypt would lift its own restrictions on passage of arms and ammunition destined to Israel or its ports or waters.

It would be helpful if I might be informed of the Department's thinking on the subject of this airgram.

PATTERSON

501.BB Palestine/8–2549

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs (Hare)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 25, 1949.

Subject: Status of PCC Activities and Export-Import Bank Loan.

Participants: Mr. Eliahu Elath, Ambassador of Israel
Mr. George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary
Mr. James G. McDonald, American Ambassador to Israel [1]
Mr. Raymond A. Hare, Deputy Assistant Secretary

[1] Ambassador McDonald left Israel on August 9 to return to the United States for consultation. On August 25, he saw President Truman. At various other times he spoke with Clark Clifford, Under Secretary of State Webb, George C. McGhee, and other State Department officers and with Pentagon and other Government officials. He also spoke extensively with nongovernmental persons. The Ambassador's account of his consultation is given in his *My Mission in Israel*, pp. 184–191.

Action Required:

To explain our position on the above to the Israeli Ambassador and to make similar explanation to the Israeli Government through the American Embassy in Tel Aviv.

Action Assigned to:

NEA; NE.

Discussion:

In the course of a luncheon conversation on August 25, Mr. McGhee mentioned to the Israeli Ambassador the discouragement which we had felt as the result of reports given us by Mr. Paul Porter, American Representative on the PCC, regarding failure to achieve sufficient progress by the conciliation process. However, Mr. McGhee expressed confidence in achieving an ultimate solution and was particularly hopeful that events might take a more constructive turn with the setting up of the Economic Survey Mission. He was confident that the Israeli Government would understand the significance of this measure and would afford the Mission full cooperation.

Mr. Elath replied that he did not share Mr. McGhee's pessimistic impression of the course of the conciliation talks and he was convinced of the importance of keeping such negotiation on an active basis. However, he was in agreement with Mr. McGhee as to the promising possibilities of the economic approach and felt that it might do much good provided that it were made clear that conciliation was not being put on the shelf. Mr. McGhee said that he was in entire agreement regarding the desirability of not discouraging the conciliation process in any way. He felt, however, that by putting emphasis at this stage on the economic aspect of the problem, the prospect of general settlement would be considerably brightened.

Mr. McGhee then observed that he had been informed that Mr. Souers, of the Export-Import Bank, had recently talked with Mr. Gass [2] regarding the status of the Export-Import Bank loan to Israel. From what Mr. McGhee had been able to learn, it would appear that the matter as presented to Mr. Gass might well have given rise to misunderstanding and he wished to make a few remarks by way of clarification. There was no question of suspension or cancellation of the loan, but merely of reviewing the situation in the light of recent developments, which, unfortunately, had not borne out the hopes for a peaceful settlement on which the original decision had been taken. However, this was only an act of prudence and in line with procedure normally followed in evaluating conditions for foreign financial assistance in reaching final decision on specific projects. Furthermore, it was anticipated that the situation arising out of the appointment of

[2] The names of Messrs. Souers and Gass are obviously transposed in the source text.

the Survey Mission might inject a more constructive note into the situation and make for greater clarification.

Mr. Elath responded with obvious emotion that the report which he had received from Mr. Gass had been extremely upsetting to him since it cut across the type of relationship which he felt should exist between Israel and the United States and of which he was a personal exponent. According to the information which he had received from Mr. Gass, the Export-Import Bank had stated: (1) that the decision to hold up action on the remainder of the loan had been taken very reluctantly by the Bank after long discussion in which the Bank had on several previous occasions refused to take action on economic or refugee grounds despite urging by the State Department; (2) that the Bank did not consider that there were economic grounds on which to justify the action taken; (3) that the decision reached had been as a result of a State Department "veto" for purely political reasons. Mr. Elath said that he had sent a full report on the matter to his Government and had not yet received their reply, but in the meantime his personal reactions were the following:

(1) The action taken by the Bank at the apparent behest of the State Department clearly constituted a "breach of promise". Not only was it thus a question of principle, but it would also have certain very specific repercussions in Israel, where commitments had been made on projects covered by the remainder of the loan.

(2) The decision could only be interpreted as attempted duress but it should be made clear that such tactics would not succeed. In fact, they could only be expected to have the opposite result.

(3) Action of this type, if it became known, could only serve to weaken the present government of Israel. Any such weakening would be contrary to the interests of the United States since another government could not be expected to be as friendly or cooperative.

(4) Such action would serve to render more difficult the efforts at conciliation being made at Lausanne and would be particularly unfortunate in connection with the activities of the proposed Economic Survey Mission.

Mr. McGhee thereupon reviewed and amplified the statements which he had previously made, particularly emphasizing the fact that there was no suspension of the loan as such and that any suggestion of failure to live up to a commitment was completely untenable. He added that there was no intention to exert duress, as should be evident by the timing of the discussions with the Bank and the fact that there was no specific action which this Government was currently urging the Israeli Government to take. Mr. McGhee said that as far as the Economic Survey Mission was concerned, it was entirely

by chance that these two matters had come up at the same time and that there was absolutely no connection between them. In conclusion, Mr. McGhee said that he was glad to have had this occasion for a frank exchange of views and was confident that any present doubts in this connection could be dissipated in the course of subsequent discussions.

Mr. Elath expressed regret that he had felt impelled to speak so strongly in the course of a friendly luncheon conversation, but added that, like Mr. McGhee, he was glad to have been able to discuss the matter in full sincerity and frankness.

501.BB Palestine/8–2549 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL JERUSALEM, August 25, 1949—noon.

532. Consulate General has not seen completed draft proposals (intel August 23, 10 a. m.[1]) for Jerusalem. From conversations with UN secretariat here, understands commissioner entrusted by Article 6 with ensuring protection of and free access to Holy Places and by Article 12 with exclusive control of Holy Places and routes leading to them. Because definite possibility of disturbances at Holy Places or routes leading to them, suggests Commissioner receive specific authority to call on local Arab and Jewish authorities to assist him in maintenance order should he consider this necessary. Commissioner should not be forced rely entirely on his own guards, which might well prove inadequate.[2]

ReDeptel 304, July 22:[3] Would appreciate learning what procedure PCC proposed to adopt in determining delimitation of Arab and Jewish zones.

Sent Department 532, repeated Geneva 54 (for PCC).

BURDETT

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[1] Not printed; this circular telegram summarized the substance of Palun 283, August 17, from Lausanne, p. 1321.

[2] The Department informed Lausanne on September 1 that it concurred in the suggestion made in telegram 532. (Unpal 230, 501.BB Palestine/8–2549)

[3] This was a repeat of Unpal 199, to Bern, p. 1245.

Secretary's Daily Meetings, Lot 58 D 609

Memorandum by William J. McWilliams, Assistant to the Director of the Executive Secretariat

[Extract]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 26, 1949.

Subject: Summary of Daily Meeting with the Secretary

Participants: The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Mr. Rusk
Mr. Kennan
Mr. Thorp
Mr. McWilliams
Mr. Nitze

. . . . . .

Item 3. Israeli Loan Application

Mr. Rusk reported the difficulties in which we found ourselves as a result of action by the Export Import Bank in advising the Israelis of the delay in consideration of their loan application. In accordance with the President's directive, our object had been to drag our feet. However, the Export-Import Bank had advised the Israelis that they were agreeable to going ahead with the loan application but that the State Department had ordered it held up. Mr. McGhee was to talk to Ambassador Elath this morning and the Secretary said that he would take it up with the President at the Cabinet meeting since Mr. Niles[1] had already approached the President about it.

Note: The Secretary took the matter up with the President and talked to McGhee after his return from Cabinet meeting.[2]

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[1] David K. Niles, Administrative Assistant to President Truman.

[2] The editors have been unable to find any evidence of what Secretary Acheson told Mr. McGhee after the Cabinet meeting.

501.BB Palestine (E)/8–2649

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Gross) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs (McGhee)

[WASHINGTON,] August 26, 1949.

There is a potential impact upon the Congress which may result from the proposed shift from a political to an economic emphasis in the handling of the Palestine situation (Department's circular telegram of August 16). My principal concern is related to the difficulty which we may encounter when we go to Congress next session to request further funds either for refugee relief or for economic development and resettlement in the Near East.

You will recall that when we talked last May with Senators Connally and Vandenberg they both emphasized that in working out any arrangements involving the grant of additional funds it would be essential that there be evidence that the Israeli Government is doing its full part and making appropriate contribution to the solution of the problem. While I realize that the Department has tried its best to get the Israelis and the Arabs to make some contribution to the settlement of the refugee problem, the fact is, I believe, that they have done practically nothing. Congress will require evidence that the states in the Near East are doing something for themselves before any additional United States help will be given.

My concern is that the Economic Survey Commission [*Mission*] might submit recommendations to the General Assembly (through the PCC) which will bypass the political problem, ignore the fact that the Arabs and the Israelis are doing nothing to help solve the problem themselves, and in effect commit the United States, along with a small group of other states, to make further substantial financial contributions either of an outright relief type or related to economic development of the area.

I believe we must tread very carefully on the matter of committing Congress. You will recall that the Senate Report on the Refugee Bill stated:

"The Committee believes, however, that as a matter of general policy, our delegations to the General Assembly should exercise extreme care not to take any action which commits the Congress to expenditures for such voluntary programs to which all members do not contribute under the regular United Nations budget."

501.MA Palestine/8–2449 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, August 27, 1949—3 p. m.

443. Reurtels 964[1] and 987[2] concerning second meeting UNRPR *Ad Hoc* Advisory Committee.

Dept agrees GA action for provisional continuance of UNRPR will be required before Nov. 1, but considers that relief program beyond immediate period should not be considered until report of Economic Survey Mission has been submitted. We feel that determination of relief requirements for 1950 and method of financing should be considered by GA against background of Survey Mission report which would probably not be available before Nov. 1. Consequently GA action early in the Assembly should merely provide an extension of life for UNRPR, call on members for additional contributions to meet $32 million budget, and authorize the Secretary General to advance sufficient funds from the Working Capital Fund for one or possibly two months operation in extremity, such advances to be paid from a supplement to the regular budget. Although we hope GA action on the Palestine question, including refugee relief, can be completed by Dec. 1, an advance for two mos operations would be more prudent.

While recognizing possible difficulties in obtaining favorable GA action along foregoing lines without indication of 1950 requirements, we feel that because of connection between relief requirements and estimated numbers who might be taken off relief in 1950 as a result of implementation of recommendations of Economic Survey Mission, it would be desirable to avoid submission of overall figure before Mission report. Per Capita cost figures would however be useful.

If SYG concurs in foregoing procedure we believe meeting of *Ad Hoc* Advisory Committee might be useful in preparing ground for provisional GA action.

ACHESON

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[1] Dated August 23, 5:27 p. m., not printed; it relayed information from Secretary-General Lie that the General Assembly would probably give priority to the problem of extending assistance to the Palestine refugees (501.MA Palestine/8–2349).

[2] Dated August 24, 10:33 p. m., not printed; it advised of Mr. Lie's hope that the General Assembly would complete consideration of the refugee relief problem before November 1 and of official estimates that UNRPR funds would hold out through November (501.MA Palestine/8–2449).

501.BB Palestine/8–2949

The Chargé in Israel (Ford) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL TEL AVIV, August 29, 1949.

No. 215

Subject: Israel Attitude toward Economic Survey Commission.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit as enclosures to this despatch copy of a memorandum dated August 15, 1949 from the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine regarding the formation of an Economic Survey Commission to study conditions in the Middle East with a view to facilitating the repatriation and resettlement of Arab refugees, and copy of the Israel delegate's reply to the memorandum dated August 23, 1949.[1] These communications were handed to the Embassy on August 24, 1949 by a representative of the Israel Foreign Office, and while it is appreciated that copying them [for transmittal?] to the Department may be a duplication of work, I nevertheless feel that the two communications taken together are of sufficient importance for future reference as to warrant them being made the subject of this despatch.

The enclosures are believed to be self-explanatory and to require little if any comment at this stage. Stress, however, should be placed on the nature of the Israel delegate's reply to Chapter II of the memorandum having to do with territorial settlement. The ironclad determination of the Government of Israel not to surrender any of the territory now physically occupied either by its citizens or by its Army or by both is clearly apparent in this portion of the reply, and it would be misleading and perhaps even dangerous to assume that Israel will give up any appreciable part of the territory which it now considers its own either by right of conquest or otherwise.[2]

Respectfully yours, RICHARD FORD

[1] Neither printed.

[2] The Israeli reply asserted that all areas allotted to the control and jurisdiction of Israel under the terms of the armistice agreements with its four neighbors were to be formally recognized as Israeli territory. Any changes in the final delimitations of frontiers were to be brought about only after negotiation and agreement with those neighbors. The reply also stated that the Government of Israel would facilitate the task of the economic survey mission and give full consideration to its proposals but that it considered the resettlement of refugees in Arab territories was the primary method of solving the refugee problem, although Israel would contribute by "agreeing to a measure of resettlement in Israel."

501.BB Palestine/9–249 : Telegram

Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell to the Secretary of State

SECRET LAUSANNE, August 29, 1949—7 p. m.

Palun 288. PCC took following decisions August 29:

1. Formally adopted Jerusalem statute and draft declaration re holy places outside Jerusalem area and decided forward both shortly to SYG. PCC made several amendments to Jerusalem statute as presented by Jerusalem committee of which following most important:

a. Preamble, after referring to provisions of December 11 resolution concerning Jerusalem, states that UN "hereby establishes, in the exercise of its full and permanent authority over Jerusalem area, permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area in accordance with the following provisions".

b. Article 3 "all matters not reserved by the present instrument to the competence of the UN commissioner and thereby is provided for hereinafter are delegated to the respective competence of the responsible authorities of the two zones".

PCC believed above changes would strengthen position of UN authority in Jerusalem, at least on paper, and would increase likelihood of obtaining affirmative votes for statute from Catholic nations in GA. PCC recognized changes would probably also strengthen Israeli opposition.

2. Re telegram from SYG proposing Azcarate as UN representative in Jerusalem subject Palun 286,[1] decided cable SYG that PCC preferred Azcarate remain as Principal Secretary PCC and therefore requested list other candidates be cabled soonest.[2]

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[1] Dated August 23, from Lausanne, not printed; it stated that the Palestine Conciliation Commission had decided to appoint a UN representative in Jerusalem in accordance with the GA resolution of December 11, 1948, and that this action had been taken largely on French initiative. The French were said to have been disturbed by recent Israeli moves and statements indicating intention to make Jerusalem the Israeli capital and to feel that the presence of a UN representative would have some slight deterrent effect upon the Israelis and might facilitate establishment of an eventual international regime in Jerusalem. Mr. Porter indicated that he had "no illusion of effectiveness this move" but expressed the belief that "no useful purpose would be served by opposing." (501.BB Palestine/8–2349)

[2] The Palestine Conciliation Commission appointed Alberto Gonzalez Fernandez United Nations Representative in Jerusalem on September 10 (telegram Palun 316, September 10, from Lausanne). Mr. Gonzalez, who was the Colombian Alternative Representative at the United Nations, proved unable to serve, however, "owing illness his wife." (telegram 1172, September 21, 11 p. m., from New York) Consul Burdett concluded that whether the "illness physical or diplomatic, Israeli will . . . draw conclusion hostile and even threatening tone of press and speeches responsible. Will encourage use same tactics against any other representative named and will strengthen Israel belief UN not prepared to insist on internationalization in face of determined Israel opposition." (telegram 593, September 23, 4 p. m., from Jerusalem) The three telegrams cited in this footnote are filed under 501.BB Palestine/9–1049, /9–2149, and /9–2349, respectively.

3. Decided adjourn Lausanne on or about September 15 and reconvene New York on or about October 20. During this period Azcarate will proceed Jerusalem maintain contact with parties and report to commissioners any developments or any communications or proposals parties may care to make.

ROCKWELL

501.BB Palestine/8–3049 : Telegram

Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell to the Secretary of State

SECRET LAUSANNE, August 30, 1949—11 a. m.

Palun 290. Arab delegates August 29 delivered to PCC 19 page joint reply [1] to questions put by PCC to all delegates August 15 (Palun 275).[2] Israeli reply expected August 30.

Substance Arab reply as follows, based on USDel informal translation from French.

Question (1–A)—Arab delegates cannot subscribe to any act or declaration which would prejudice provisions of December 11 resolutions concerning refugees. However Arab states desire continue aid refugees while defending their inalienable right to return to their homes. In this spirit Arab delegates welcome proposed declaration and state they are in position to study its accomplishment in framework of above principles, taking into account refugees to be settled in Arab Palestine, in Jewish territory and in international zone of Jerusalem.

Question (1–B)—if survey group is established, Arab delegates will recommend to their governments that they facilitate mission of group and take all measures which they shall judge opportune and possible to assist in carrying out solutions which group may propose.

Question (1–C)—Reply affirmative.

Question (1–D)—Reply affirmative.

Question (2)—Syrian and Jordan delegates are in position to declare that their governments are able to receive, after considering findings of survey group, those refugees who do not return to their homes, provided international assistance is furnished. For well-known reasons would be difficult for Egypt to envisage resettlement of refugees in its territory but when eastern frontier of Egypt has been rectified Egyptian delegate would be disposed to examine question in light of prevailing conditions and international assistance. Same reasons make it difficult for Lebanon to accept refugees.

Question (3)—Areas belonging to Arabs according to May 12 protocol and now under Jewish authority are of nature to make important contribution to resettlement of refugees. Compensation can

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[1] The reply was in the form of a letter dated August 29 from the Heads of the Arab Delegations to the Chairman of the Palestine Conciliation Commission (A/AC.25/AR/17, IO files).

[2] Dated August 15, from Lausanne, p. 1313.

be of two kinds—purely territorial compensation and compensation for resettlement of refugees not readmitted to Jewish territory. Jews seem determined prevent return of majority of refugees. Therefore, in addition to areas belonging to Arabs according to May 12 protocol, such as western Galilee, Ramleh, Lydda, Jaffa, Beersheba, Jed Faluja, Arab delegates believe they have right to claim, as compensation for refugees not readmitted to Jewish territory, the Negev and eastern Galilee.

Egypt must insure its security and not be separated from Arab world. Jordan must also think of its security and desires direct contact with Egypt. Moreover, central Arab Palestine will benefit by direct access to Mediterranean. For all these reasons Arab delegates consider that all of Negev must be included in Arab Palestine.

As regards eastern Galilee, it is in majority Arab in population and ownership of property. Legitimate Lebanese and Syrian security reasons, in addition to principle of compensation, militate in favor of return of eastern Galilee to the Arabs.

Arab reply concludes with statement that regarding above proposals Arab delegates ready to consider any suggestions PCC may care to make.

ROCKWELL

501.BB Palestine/8–3049 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 30, 1949—6 p. m.

3126. Embtel 3325 Aug 23.[1] Depts attitude re direct talks has not changed. Dept has always held to view that direct talks between high Israeli and Arab officials shld be encouraged, if such talks wld contribute to discussions at Lausanne and wld enhance possibility of obtaining an agreed settlement. Ethridge and Porter have made this viewpoint abundantly clear to Israeli and Arab dels at Lausanne and have continuously endeavored promote such talks. It will also be recalled USG actively supported proposal that Egypt and Israel shld hold direct talks on Gaza Strip.

In a very few instances Dept has not favored proposed negots owing to special circumstances (timing, duress, etc.) which gave reason to believe that such negots would not be constructive step toward agreed settlement. Such cases have been exception to consistent policy of encouraging direct negots whenever practical.

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[1] Not printed; it recounted a conversation with Mr. Burrows who was said to recall "several months ago US Government had taken line with Jordan of discouraging direct negotiations. Since that time, Jordan Government has on several occasions inquired of UK Government its attitude re desirability undertaking direct conversations with Israelis. UK Government, in order to concert with what it understood to be US views this subject, has discouraged Jordanians. Burrows inquired whether Department's views have now changed." (501.BB Palestine/8–2349)

Re desirability Jordan undertaking direct conversations Dept has recd no info indicating that Jordan or any other Arab state has changed attitude and is prepared at this stage to enter into such conversations either at Lausanne or elsewhere. However if any real evidence does exist that the direct talks between Jordan and Israel at this stage could commence and wld contribute to settlement of Pal problem Dept wld be far from opposed.[2]

ACHESON

[2] The Department repeated this telegram on August 31 to Paris as No. 3239 and to Ankara, Arab capitals, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem (501.BB Palestine/8–3149).

Editorial Note

In a note of September 1 to the National Security Council, Admiral Souers submitted for the consideration of the Council a draft report by the Secretary of State entitled "United States Policy Toward Israel and the Arab States." The note stated in part that the report was "prepared in light of the developments of the past year and in view of the conclusions reached by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in NSC 47 [see page 1009] . . . . The Secretary of State, in transmitting the enclosure, stated that the report was on the present position of the United States not only with respect to Israel but also to the Arab States, with particular reference to the problems arising out of the recent hostilities in Palestine, and that the Department of State is of the opinion that the situation in the Near East is of such a character as to require reference to certain aspects of policy toward the Arab States in defining the United States position toward Israel." The report is numbered NSC 47/1 (S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351).

In a memorandum of September 27 to Mr. Rusk, Max W. Bishop of Mr. Rusk's staff indicated that portions of NSC 47/1 were not acceptable to the Department of Defense (867N.48/9–2749). After considerable discussion with officers of that Department, informal agreement was reached "to rewrite certain paragraphs in that paper . . . It would be much appreciated if you could have these revised paragraphs substituted for the corresponding paragraphs in NSC 47/1." (Mr. Rusk's letter of September 29 to Admiral Souers, 867N.00/9–2949)

NSC 47/1 is not printed herein, inasmuch as NSC 47/2, which incorporates the revisions, is printed in full on page 1430. There appear below, however, the sections of the earlier paper for which substitutions were made in the later version, as follows:

"[7]*c*. The technical abilities of the Israelis, coupled with their access to Western technical and financial assistance principally from United States sources, have already resulted in much greater economic

opportunities and higher standards of living in Israel than those among the neighboring peoples. In the absence of assistance to the Arab states this disparity will tend to increase in the future and to result in further tensions between Israelis and Arabs. On the other hand, Israel's program for large-scale economic development, required to implement successfully its ambitious immigration policy, will make it dependent for the foreseeable future upon large-scale external financing through foreign capital investment, loans, and voluntary contributions.

[7]*d.* Israel's military establishment, although small by Western standards, has proved itself adequate to resist the poorly equipped, ill-trained and badly led armies of the Arab League states in the course of the recent hostilities and to occupy considerable territory beyond that awarded under the partition plan. In the future, however, the cohesiveness of the Israeli Army, like the government itself, may be affected by pressures from extremist elements. Moreover, so long as Israel continues to be isolated from her neighbors, Israel will be burdened by the high costs and accompanying psychological effect of maintaining a state of military preparedness.

[15]*a.* The political and economic stability and security of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East are of critical importance to the security of the United States.

[15]*b.* It is in the national interest of the United States to have the respect and, in so far as possible, good will of all the peoples of the Near East, Jews and Arabs alike, and their orientation toward the West and away from the Soviet Union.

[15]*d.* The foregoing can best be achieved by asserting constructive leadership in the solution of the economic, social, and political problems of the area, and on an impartial basis as between Israel and the Arab states.

City of Jerusalem:

[16]*h.* We should support the principle of the internationalization of Jerusalem. This might be accomplished along the following lines:

(1) United Nations control of the Holy Places;
(2) Division of the city into areas to be administered by the respective adjacent states; and
(3) The establishment of obligations on the part of the adjacent states to observe basic requirements with respect to demilitarization, free access and observance of human rights, and the establishment of a system of compulsory arbitration to determine whether these obligations are being fulfilled."

Finally, paragraph 21 in NSC 47/1 reads exactly the same as its counterpart in NSC 47/2, except for the substitution of new wording for the last sentence. In the earlier paper, this sentence reads as follows:

"Any US or UN assistance under such a program should be supplementary to but coordinated with such efforts as Israel and the Arab states are able and willing to make to help themselves, should be designed to promote mutually advantageous economic relations be-

tween Israel and the Arab states and to integrate their economies into a broader international economy, and should allow ample and increasing scope for private enterprise."

501.BB Palestine/9–149

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 1, 1949.

Subject: Policy with respect to Arms Shipments to the Arab States and Israel.

On November 14, 1947, the Department decided, in view of the situation in the Near East with respect to Palestine, that the issuance of licenses for the export of arms, ammunition and other war matériel intended for use in Palestine or neighboring countries should be suspended pending clarification of the situation in that area. This decision was made public in the Department's press release of December 5, 1947. Subsequently the Security Council in its resolutions of May 29 and July 15, 1948, called upon all states to refrain from shipping war matériel to the affected area.

On August 11, 1949, the Security Council, in the light of reports submitted by Dr. Bunche, and a resolution introduced by Canada and France, determined that the armistice agreements which had been signed by Israel on the one hand, and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria on the other, had superseded the truce arrangements, provided for by its resolutions, including the provisions with respect to the shipments of war matériel. The United States supported this action, and Senator Austin made a statement in the Security Council, the pertinent portion of which is quoted herewith:

"So far as the United States is concerned, it does not intend to allow the export of arms which would permit a competitive arms race in the area. Export of arms to this area of the world should be strictly limited to such arms as are within the scope of legitimate security requirements, again as recommended by Dr. Bunche. We hope that prudence will prevail not only among the parties but among all nations of the world which are in a position to supply arms and that they will pursue a policy similar to that which we intend to pursue.

It is essential that the resources of this area be used for works of peace, for economic development, for the resettlement of refugees, and for the achievement of higher standards of living for the populations of the area. It would be tragic and wholly wrong if the resources of the area were to be dissipated in an unproductive arms race."

In view of the foregoing, the groundwork has now been laid to change the existing US arms export policy with respect to the Arab states and Israel. The Department has already received inquiries on this point and it is necessary that this Government's arms export

policy be determined in order that such inquiries as are made may be answered.

Your approval is therefore requested for the following recommendations formulated with the above in view:

(1) That requests for the export of arms to the Arab states and Israel be considered and acted on in the light of the principles laid down by Senator Austin and existing US policy governing such exports generally. This would mean that arms shipments from the United States to Arab states and Israel would be limited to those which are determined necessary:

(*a*) For the purpose of maintaining internal law and order by the Government concerned in the reasonable and legitimate exercise of constituted authority.

(*b*) For the purpose of providing for reasonable requirements of self defense.

Shipments of arms to the affected areas will not be permitted by this Government if, in its opinion, such shipments would adversely affect the maintenance of peace and security in the area.[1]

(2) That informal discussions be initiated with representatives of the British and French Governments for an exchange of information and for consultations on shipments of arms to the Near Eastern area.

[1] A marginal notation states that President Truman approved Secretary Acheson's memorandum on September 1. At the same time, he directed that "no public statement be made of this and that it be treated as a routine matter, becoming known as export approvals are made. Following such approvals, it is anticipated that questions will be raised at the President's or the Secretary's press conferences. They are to be answered casually." (memorandum of September 4 to Mr. Ross by Thomas F. Power, Jr., Deputy Secretary-General of the United States Delegation at the United Nations, USUN files)

501.BB Palestine(E)/9–149

The British Embassy to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL
55/121/49

PALESTINE

1. While pursuing with the State Department plans for the Survey Group the Foreign Office have also had under consideration what policy should be adopted by the United Kingdom Delegation at the forthcoming General Assembly when the future of the present Palestine relief measures is debated. They have reached the following conclusions:

(*a*) The final solution of the[1] problem lies in resettlement, and not in relief. The emphasis should lie heavily on resettlement when further international help is considered.

[1] At this point, there appears the word "refugee" in longhand. There is no indication of the authorship of the insertion.

(*b*) The final settlement of the refugee problem can only be reached within the framework of a territorial settlement for Palestine. Moreover, Israel and the neighbouring Arab States have an inescapable responsibility in regard to the refugees which they must be made to acknowledge if they are to receive large scale financial help from outside for development projects in connection with resettlement.

(*c*) It should be represented to the Arab States concerned that whatever territorial settlement is finally reached and whatever number of refugees Israel is persuaded to accept there is bound to remain a "hard core" of refugees with which they will have to cope. They cannot escape this responsibility by postponing a political settlement, and they may well forfeit international help for resettlement by doing so.

(*d*) Development projects will not be able to absorb all the refugees for a period of years after the development projects are started. Even though the latest estimate for United Nations relief for Palestine refugees suggests that relief can be carried on until December (i.e. two months longer than previously estimated), the Survey Group will hardly be able to make its report, let alone secure the necessary finance before the present relief runs out. There will, therefore, be a gap in the provision of relief which will have to be filled.

2. The Foreign Office believe that the State Department shares their reluctance to continue relief without being certain that resettlement is on the way. Equally the Foreign Office fear that the number of refugees to be settled might drastically be reduced by illness and death if no provision, other than that of local governments, were to be made to fill the gap before resettlement. The Foreign Office therefore wish to proceed on the following lines as soon as the constitution of the Survey Group may definitely be spoken about:—

(*a*) To put to Israel and the Arab States the basis for a settlement contained in the attached paper [2] and urge them to reach final agreement within this framework as soon as possible on the lines set out in subparagraphs (*b*) and (*c*) of paragraph 1 above.

(*b*) To warn these governments that existing funds for relief are expected to run out in the autumn or early winter, and that it is at present highly problematical whether further funds for relief will be forthcoming from the United Nations. However much either side may argue that they are not themselves responsible for the refugee problem the fact remains that the refugees are in their territory and will constitute a very great burden if no settlement is reached and the provision of financial help for resettlement is thereby discouraged. (A British approach to the Jordan Government, which has done so much more than any other for the refugees in proportion to its now exhausted resources, would have to be on somewhat different lines.)

(*c*) Explain the functions of the Survey Group and hold out the [3] financial help for resettlement schemes.

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[2] See below.

[3] At this point, there appear the words "hope of" in longhand. There is no indication of the authorship of the insertion.

In the approach described above the British Government would not speak of further plans for relief but would be prepared to take the following lines at the General Assembly when the matter comes up. Provided the Survey Group is duly constituted with the task of reporting to the Conciliation Commission and makes recommendations to the appropriate bodies for the financing of development projects leading to resettlement the United Kingdom Delegate could announce at the United Nations Assembly British willingness to participate in further interim relief measures (provided contributions already promised to UNRPR are paid up) in the ratio of one to nine as against all other international contributions including that of the United States, i.e. the United Kingdom contribution would form one in ten of the total contribution. The upper limit of the British contribution would be £500,000 (in inconvertible sterling as before) and funds could not be voted until the 5th April 1950. The Foreign Office feel that the present United Nations relief scheme has relied too exclusively on American and British contributions and that every effort should be made to secure proportionate contributions from other member States.

3. The debate in the General Assembly is likely to raise the question in what proportion it is considered that refugees should be resettled as between Israel and the Arab States. The Foreign Office is aware that the United States Government have been pressing Israel on this subject and would be grateful to learn of what number in excess of 100,000 the United States Government consider Israel should take. It is clearly difficult to fix an exact figure but the Foreign Office consider it important that agreement should be reached on an approximate figure.

4. From information in possession of the Foreign Office it seems that the three delegated authorities (the International Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Society and the Quakers) at present engaged in Palestine refugee relief will be extremely unwilling to continue their work under the UNRPR unless fresh funds are in sight by October and there seems to be a real danger of the present relief measures breaking down unless something can be offered by that date.

5. The Foreign Office would much appreciate the observations of the State Department on the above proposals and would be most grateful if these observations could be received within the next week.

WASHINGTON, 1st September 1949.

[Enclosure]

PROPOSED BASIS OF SETTLEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES

(i) Acceptance of refugees by both sides in proportions to be determined.

(ii) Israel's proposal to incorporate the Gaza strip with the refugees at present in it could form part of a general settlement subject to the following conditions:

(*a*) It should be made clear that there is no question of a mere deal between territory and acceptance of responsibility for refugees. Territorial compensation for the Gaza strip should be found elsewhere by Israel for the Arabs—see (iii) below—provided the Arabs demand such compensation.

(*b*) Some safeguards should be devised in regard to the future treatment of the Gaza refugees in Israel; they should be permitted to return to any part of Israel where they had property or special interests and they should be able to earn a livelihood and presumably have full rights of citizenship.

(iii) Territorial compensation for the Gaza area (if ceded) and for other areas held by Israel but not allotted to her under the 1947 Plan should be provided if the Arabs demand it. The following areas appear politically and geographically suitable for this purpose i.e. contiguous to other Arab areas:—

(*a*) A land-bridge in the southern Negev between Egypt and Jordan.

(*b*) An area in the Negev north of Beersheba connecting with Arab central Palestine.

(*c*) An area along the Egyptian frontier south of El Auja.

(*d*) The restoration of part or all of Western Galilee.

(*e*) The Ramleh–Lydda area.

The Foreign Office see no reason to insist that any one of these areas should form the exclusive field for compensation. They could, if necessary, be combined in various proportions. This would certainly provide greater flexibility for the discussions. But the shape of the eventual territorial compensation should in any case be governed by the requirements of either side in regard to communications and outlets to the sea (see (iv) below).

(iv) Communications and outlets. If the territorial compensation to the Arabs were to be in the form of the award to Jordan, or to Jordan and Egypt, of part or whole of the Southern Negev, thus providing a land bridge between Egypt and Jordan, Israel should have guaranteed freedom of access and communication to the Red Sea.

Equally the Arab States should have guaranteed freedom of communication and access to the Mediterranean. If another solution were adopted for the Southern Negev there should nonetheless be guaranteed freedom of communication and access across it between Egypt and Jordan and between Israel and the Red Sea. An alternative method of providing for freedom of communication and access might be by a neutral zone or zones.

(v) A free port (or at least a free zone for all Arab States) should be established at Haifa with an arrangement by which Iraqi crude oil could be freely exported in return for the provision by Iraq of normal supplies for the Haifa Refinery.

(vi) There should be a partition of Jerusalem for administrative purposes with international supervision, particularly of the Holy Places.

(vii) Central Arab Palestine should be incorporated in Jordan

(viii) Israel and the Arab States concerned should agree to share for their mutual benefit the waters of the Jordan and Yarmuk.

Terms of Reference of the Economic Survey Mission[1]

TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY MISSION

The Palestine Conciliation Commission,

Desiring further to implement paragraphs 10 and 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, and to obtain information which will serve as the basis for recommendations for further action by the General Assembly, Member States, appropriate specialized agencies, and interested organizations, and

Having noted the declarations of representatives of Israel and the Arab States with respect to repatriation, resettlement and compensation of refugees,

Pursuant to the authorization granted to it under paragraph 12 of the foregoing resolution,

1. *Hereby establishes* under its auspices an Economic Survey Mission to examine the economic situation in the countries affected by the recent hostilities, and to make recommendations to the Commission for an integrated programme:

(*a*) To enable the Governments concerned to further such measures and development programmes as are required to overcome economic dislocations created by the hostilities;

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[1] Dated September 1, 1949; reprinted from GA (IV), *Ad Hoc Political Committee, Annex*, volume I, 1949, p. 29.

(*b*) To facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of paragraph eleven of the General Assembly's resolution of 11 December 1948, in order to reintegrate the refugees into the economic life of the area on a self-sustaining basis within a minimum period of time;

(*c*) To promote economic conditions conducive to the maintenance of peace and stability in the area.

2. *Instructs* the Economic Survey Mission to include in its recommendations an operational plan for carrying out the recommended programmes together with the estimated costs and methods of financing.

3. *Authorizes* the Mission, pursuant to paragraph 14 of the General Assembly's resolution of 11 December 1948, to invite the assistance of those Governments, specialized agencies and international organizations which may be able to facilitate its work.

Recommends that the Survey Mission approach its task along the following lines:

In collaboration with the Governments concerned:

(*a*) Explore the measures which can be taken by the Governments concerned without outside financial assistance to achieve the objectives of paragraph 1 above;

(*b*) On the basis of existing plans and surveys, examine proposals submitted by the Governments concerned for economic development and settlement projects requiring outside assistance which would make possible absorption of the refugees into the economy of the area on a self-sustained basis in a minimum time with a minimum expenditure;

(*c*) Examine other economic projects which can, with outside assistance, provide temporary employment for the refugees not employed on the development and settlement projects of paragraph (*b*);

(*d*) Examine such other development, and settlement projects requiring outside assistance which, though not associated directly with the employment and settlement of refugees, would serve to achieve the objective of paragraph 1;

(*e*) Estimate the number of refugees who cannot be supported directly or indirectly through the employment envisaged under paragraphs (*a*)–(*d*), together with the estimated period during which direct relief will be required and the cost thereof;

(*f*) Study the problem of compensation to refugees for claims for property of those who do not return to their homes, and for the loss of or damage to property, with special reference to the relationship of such compensation to the proposed settlement projects;

(*g*) Study the problem of rehabilitation of refugees, including matters concerning their civil status, health, education and social services;

(*h*) Propose an organizational structure to achieve the objectives of paragraph 1 within a United Nations framework, to co-

ordinate, supervise and facilitate measures for relief, resettlement, economic development and related requirements such as community service facilities, bearing in mind the interests of all Governments concerned.

1 SEPTEMBER 1949.

766A.67N/8–1249 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Representative at Vatican City (Gowen)

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 1, 1949—1 p. m.

16. Re conversation on Jerusalem reported urtel 33, Aug 12,[1] Dept desirous obtaining broadest possible support for proposals to be presented by PCC. With this in mind, suggest you seize opportune occasion to make fol points to Tardini: US Govt appreciates having Vatican's views as expressed by him and itself is strongly in favor internatl regime for Jerusalem. US Rep on PCC became convinced at early stage that essential problem confronting Comm was formulation practical proposals having good chance acceptance and which cld be placed in operation resulting in settlement this problem. Plan under consideration by Comm wld provide full UN control and protection Holy Places with provision UN guards for this purpose. Jerusalem area wld be demilitarized. Although substantial powers govt for Jewish-Arab auths deemed necessary to acceptance plan, UN Authority in Jerusalem wld possess real powers preserve character internatl regime and assure protection of and free access to Holy Places.

PCC has devoted arduous work in attempt devise plan which will satisfy essential demands of all concerned. We believe acceptance of plan outlined above will not be possible unless it receives utmost support from Christian community. We earnestly hope Vatican will agree this formula presents best possible satis and practical outcome PCC conscientious endeavor fulfill extremely delicate task assigned it by GA. FYI Cardinal Spellman understood to have transmitted to Vatican copies recent correspondence with Pres re Jerusalem (Dept's despatch No. 5, July 5 [2]), Vatican in turn transmitted to French Rep

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[1] Not printed; it reported a conversation between Mr. Gowen and Msgr. Domenico Tardini, described as the "Vatican Acting Secretary of State," in which the latter advanced the firm view that "Jerusalem and environs should be placed under international control as indicated by UN in 1947 and again in 1948. Such international control with proper guarantees would assure lasting peace, tranquility [in] Holy Land. . . . Placing Jerusalem under international control would create buffer area which neither Jews nor Arabs would violate." (766A.67N/8–1249)

[2] Not printed.

PCC. Additional correspondence between Cardinal and Dept being pouched to you.[3]

ACHESON

[3] Mr. Gowen, on October 4, reported that Monsignor Tardini had given him the major objections of the Vatican to the formula on Jerusalem proposed by the Palestine Conciliation Commission. He was said to have repeated "many times that only through true and effective international regime and not through international control would it be possible achieve what Vatican would consider fair and proper settlement of this vital problem." One of the more specific objections was the Commission's acceptance "with some limitations Arab and Israeli sovereignty over their respective zones. However, it facilitates conflicts between two neighboring groups and complicates commissioner's role who is placed without adequate powers between two sovereign groups." (telegram 41 from Vatican City, 867N.01/10–449)

501.BB Palestine/9–149 : Telegram

Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell to the Secretary of State

SECRET LAUSANNE, September 1, 1949—5 p. m.

Palun 294. Israeli delegation September 1 delivered to PCC written reply [1] to questions put by PCC to all delegations August 15 (Palun 275).[2] Substance reply as follows:

1. Israeli delegation prepared sign declaration along lines chapter 1 of PCC memo (re refugees) subject to precision on following points:

a. Israel considers solution of refugee problem to be sought primarily in resettlement in area territories but is prepared contribute by agreeing to measure of resettlement in Israel.

b. Israeli Government cannot bind itself in advance to implement such solutions as survey group may propose but will undertake to facilitate task of group and give full consideration to any proposals group may put forward.

Israeli delegation desires stress its understanding that any repatriation in Israel would take place subject to financial assistance furnished by international community and that such assistance would be extended to resettlement of Jewish refugees from Arab controlled areas Palestine.

Israel's willingness facilitate task of survey group rests within framework of numerical contribution which it has declared itself ready to make to solution of refugee problem.

Israeli delegation reiterates that Israel can agree to repatriation of refugees to Israel only as part of overall settlement of refugee problem and of Palestine conflict.

2. Re territory, Israeli delegation considers that in addition to territory indicated on map attached to protocol of May 12 all other

[1] The reply was in the form of a letter dated August 31 from Mr. Shiloah to the Chairman of the Palestine Conciliation Commission (A/AC.25/IS/36, IO files).

[2] Dated August 15, from Lausanne, p. 1313.

areas falling within control and jurisdiction of Israel under terms of the four armistice agreements should be formally recognized as Israel territory. Adjustment of frontiers so created will be subject to negotiation and agreement between Israel and Arab Government in each case concerned.

By this adjustment no territory is added to Israel which forms part of the four Arab states or was ever awarded to them by any international instrument or held by them under any agreement. No territory in which the four states exercise authority or jurisdiction under the armistice agreements is added to Israel.

If this adjustment not made, territory awarded to Israel under international instrument or held by it under an agreement (armistices) would be awarded to one or more Arab states.

Israeli delegation holds that only this adjustment falls equally in its effects on rights and positions of each party, makes no encroachment on existing sovereignties, and preserves juridicial status and stability achieved by the existing agreements.

ROCKWELL

501.BB Palestine(E)/9–249

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Harlan B. Clark of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 2, 1949.

Participants: Mr. McGhee, NEA
Mr. Hare, NEA
Mr. Gardiner, NEA
Mr. Clapp, Economic Survey Mission
Mr. Clark, NE
Dr. [Charles] Malik, Lebanese Minister
Dr. M. B. Chiati, Egyptian Chargé d'Affaires
Dr. Yusuf Haikal, Jordanian Minister
Abdullah Ibrahim Bakr, Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires
Ahmed Abdul Jabbar, First Secretary, Saudi Arabian Embassy

Problem:

The Arab diplomatic representatives made inquiry as to the objectives of the Economic Survey Mission and the scope of its activities.

Action Taken:

Mr. McGhee and Mr. Clapp outlined the projected work of the Mission, emphasizing its area-wide character and the necessity for cooperation by the Arab States with the Mission if its objectives are to be achieved.

Action Required:

It was agreed that copies of the text of the terms of reference of the ESM would be made available to the Arab diplomatic representatives.[1]

Action Assigned to: NE

Discussion:

The officers in charge of the Arab diplomatic missions in Washington called at their request to meet Mr. Gordon Clapp, Chief of Mission of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission. Mr. McGhee introduced the Arab diplomatic representatives to Mr. Clapp, and Dr. Malik opened the discussion by stating that those present would be interested in having more information about the objectives of the Economic Survey Mission and its terms of reference. Mr. McGhee said that copies of the United Nations press release in this regard would be made available to the Arab missions but that in general the terms of reference encompassed all aspects of an economic approach to the problems which confronted the Palestine Conciliation Commission. He said that in frankness it had to be admitted that the work of the Palestine Conciliation Commission on a political basis had thus far not been productive of solutions to outstanding problems. Since these problems were closely bound up with the economic situation in the area it was thought that progress could best be achieved at the present stage by determining the needs and potentialities of the area, as well as how through economic measures these potentialities could be developed and thereby contribute to a solution of the problem of the refugees and other issues with which the Palestine Conciliation Commission is faced.

Mr. Clapp said that, being an engineer and not concerned with politics, he would confine his activities to technical matters. Moreover, he proposed to study the area as a unit and not on a country-by-country or any other basis which would not permit full realization of the potentialities of the economic resources available. He referred, for example, to water resources which cut across country boundaries or were shared by adjoining states, such as were found in the TVA system. He and his staff of TVA engineers had found that unless they could plan river control schemes on an area basis, regardless of state boundaries, they could not provide for full utilization of these resources. It had also been found that the engineers could not make development plans work unless the people of the area cooperated fully in carrying out recommendations as to soil management and conserva-

[1] Mr. McGhee, in letters to the Arab diplomatic representatives on September 7, enclosed copies of the press communiqué issued by the Palestine Conciliation Commission on August 24. The communiqué outlined the objectives and functions of the Economic Survey Mission (501.BB Palestine (E)/9–749).

tion, as well as all other phases of the TVA program. The same principle would no doubt apply in the Near East where similar cooperation by the respective governments and peoples was the keynote to successful realization of any programs which the Survey Mission might recommend, and artificial barriers which might be found to exist should not stand in the way of such cooperation.

Dr. Malik inquired as to when Mr. Clapp would leave and he replied that it would be within a matter of days. Mr. McGhee said that Mr. Clapp would be accompanied by Deputies nominated by the United Kingdom, France and Turkey and that Secretary General Lie would shortly be announcing their appointment. In selecting the Deputies and other members of the mission's staff, care had been taken to obtain as wide representation as possible of interested United Nations agencies such as the FAO and WHO. Dr. Malik inquired as to whether Mr. Clapp had selected a headquarters for his Mission and Mr. McGhee replied that, while this was a matter for the United Nations to decide, some consideration had been given to Beirut as a possible headquarters. He inquired whether Dr. Malik felt that his Government would welcome the selection of Beirut as this purpose, bearing in mind that Lebanon would offer certain advantages including the presence there of buildings which had been constructed for the UNESCO meeting. Dr. Malik said that he was sure that his government would welcome the visit of the Mission but that he would like to have as much advance notice as possible in order that the necessary arrangements could be made.

Shaikh Jabbar inquired whether the Survey Mission planned to visit all the Arab countries and Mr. Clapp replied he hoped he would be able to do so but that he would have to concentrate most of his time in those countries most directly concerned. Shaikh Jabbar said that he had that in mind since he understood that it was those countries actually bordering on Israel which had been most directly concerned. Mr. McGhee recalled that the King of Saudi Arabia had already undertaken to accept certain categories of refugees and had also made contributions of petroleum products for the refugee program. It might be most useful, therefore, for Mr. Clapp to investigate the possibilities as to whether Saudi Arabia might not also be able to receive other categories of refugees. Shaikh Jabbar said that all the Arab States were willing to help out in connection with the refugees in so far as such action did not adversely affect their other "problems" in connection with Palestine.

Mr. Bakr stated that Iraq had already compiled a number of surveys which might be useful in connection with Mr. Clapp's study of Iraq's

river development projects. Mr. Clapp said that he wished to make full use of all available studies since it was not possible in the short time available to the Mission to make detailed independent surveys of each individual project.

Dr. Malik said he wished Mr. McGhee would clarify what he and Mr. Clapp had said concerning the Economic Survey Mission's terms of reference. Specifically, by approaching the economic problems of the Near East from an area basis was it envisaged that the Arab States would be called upon to cooperate with Israel and would the elimination of what had been referred to as "artificial barriers" refer to trade barriers with Israel? Mr. McGhee replied that he realized the difficulty of this problem to the Arab States but it was naturally the hope and objective of the United Nations to remove artificial barriers in the area which constituted obstacles to the resumption to normal conditions, and which thereby constituted a threat to area and world peace. At some stage trade must be resumed throughout the area; oil would again flow through its pipelines; and airplane and shipping services which have existed in the past would be restored to full operation. Mr. Clapp stated that it was obvious no useful purpose would be served by his mission if it should recommend that development schemes be implemented and if it should develop that the resultant increased production of the area could not find its way to the logical market outlets in the area. Shaikh Jabbar said that the more he learned about the scope of the Mission's activities the more limited he believed were its possibilities for success.

Mr. McGhee said that implicit in the entire undertaking of the Survey Mission was the understanding that there would have to be outside assistance to implement the recommendations which would be made. This was clear, for example, in the President's statement in announcing Mr. Clapp's appointment, the contents of which were familiar to all those present. He was sure it was understood that this government could make no commitments in this connection in advance of Congressional authorization but the desire of the United States to support the work of the Economic Survey Mission was manifest. With that in mind, it was also clear that the President could not recommend to Congress that it provide financial support for the implementation of any plans recommended by the Mission should it appear in advance that such plans were doomed to failure by virtue of artificial barriers and restrictions maintained by states in the area. Such barriers as are clearly artificial must in time be eliminated if any solution to the problems is to be successful.

Dr. Malik said that it was apparent that conditions could only be stabilized in the Near East if at some stage the State of Israel and the Arab States settled down to live together in peace. However, he felt that this government had a definite responsibility to give guarantees to the Arabs States which would enable them to do so. Mr. McGhee replied that this Government was lending the fullest possible support to the endeavors of the United Nations to facilitate the final settlement of the Palestine controversy and would continue to do so. Its function in this respect was not, however, to impose the terms of such a settlement upon the parties to the controversy. It was rather for the Arab States and Israel to work out, through the machinery which the United Nations had set up, the bases of a settlement that would provide the guarantees of peace which Dr. Malik had in mind.

501.BB Palestine/9–449 : Telegram

Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell to the Secretary of State

SECRET LAUSANNE, September 2, 1949—8 p. m.

Palun 295. Following comments USDel on Arab-Israeli replies PCC questionnaire (Palun's 290 and 294).[1]

1. *Refugee*—replies refugee questions seem fairly satisfactory in circumstances. Although Arab position on return of refugees continues be as set forth Palun 277,[2] Arabs can be considered to have accepted principle of resettlement, and Syria and Transjordan have formally stated they can receive those refugees who do not return. This seems substantial step forward, although by "those who do not return", Syria and Transjordan theoretically mean those refugees who are left over after large numbers have returned to areas Palestine allotted Arabs by partition and to areas which will remain in Israel. Israel has once more formally committed itself to measure of repatriation. Although Arab position is as stated above, and Israelis state the wish only repatriate as part overall settlement refugee problem and Palestine conflict, and both sides say they can do nothing without international assistance, Arab and Israeli replies may be considered as political agreement on sharing responsibility for solution refugee problem.

Israeli and Arab agreement on necessity for continuation relief funds pending establishment repatriation and resettlement project

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[1] Dated August 30 and September 1, respectively, from Lausanne, pp. 1337 and 1349.

[2] Dated August 16, from Lausanne, p. 1319.

should be helpful when time comes seek further relief funds from UN.

2. *Survey group*—Israelis and Arabs at Lausanne have made commitments to facilitate task survey group and give full consideration its findings. Neither side has committed self to accept findings group, and Israeli has limited its willingness facilitate groups work to framework refugee proposition it has already made.

3. *Territory*—Arabs have weakened their territorial position by demanding more than partition gave, and by basing their demands upon confused mixture of May 12 protocol, need for Arab territorial continuity, alleged desire to secure territory for refugees in compensation for their lost homes, security needs, and plain desire for more territory. Arabs were clearly unable to agree among themselves on common territorial position and so threw everything into the pot, apparently leaving it to PCC or GA to decide what pieces should be pulled out given to them. Arab representatives have privately admitted this first territorial position is unreasonable but state they made it so because they knew Israeli position would be equally unreasonable.

Israeli territorial position, although mentioning May 12 protocol cannot be considered as based on it since it contemplates no adjustments in favor Arabs. Israeli emphasizing alleged legality their position view international instrument (November 29 Resolution) and international agreements (armistice) conveniently disregarding clause in armistice agreements safeguarding territorial claims parties.

Wide divergence territorial positions parties and rigidity Israeli position once more reveal unlikelihood arriving at voluntary agreement. USDel believes that no matter how attractive proposals of survey group may be to Arabs, there is little likelihood of proceeding from present armed truce line to more stable conditions unless Israel can be persuaded to relinquish some of territory it has occupied beyond partition lines. Some measure of agreement has been achieved on refugees, but judging from attitude representatives here, Arabs will not accept any territorial solution which makes the armistice lines, perhaps with minor modifications, the final boundaries of Israel. Syria and Transjordan, however, will probably in the end agree to put into effect survey group recommendations for resettlement of refugees actually in their territories even if there has been no territorial agreement and substantial numbers of refugees have not returned to Israeli controlled areas.

ROCKWELL

501.BB Palestine/9–249 : Telegram

Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED LAUSANNE, September 2, 1949—10 p. m.

Palun 296. PCC September 1 sent Jerusalem statute to SYG.[1] September 2 submitted to parties draft declaration on holy places outside Jerusalem and sent copy to SYG. September 2 also adopted draft terms reference for survey group as submitted by USDel on basis Department's suggestions.

ROCKWELL

[1] The text of the transmitting letter of September 1 and the "Draft Instrument Establishing a Permanent International Regime for the Jerusalem Area" are printed in United Nations, *Official Records of the Fourth Session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Annex to the Summary Records of Meetings*, Annex, vol. I, p. 10. The Draft Instrument provided for four principle organs to govern the area of Jerusalem: a Commissioner to represent the United Nations in the area who would ensure the protection of and free access to the Holy Places, supervise the permanent demilitarization and neutralization of the area and ensure the protection of human rights and the rights of distinctive groups; a General Council; an International Tribunal; and a Mixed Tribunal. The area of Jerusalem was to be physically divided into a "Jewish zone" and an "Arab zone." All matters not reserved to the four principal organs were to remain within the competence of the responsible Jewish and Arab authorities in each of the zones.

The Palestine Conciliation Commission, on November 9, issued a statement in reply to critical comments on the Draft Instrument. The statement noted that the plan was "based on the present division of the City" and left "to the Governments of the adjoining States virtually all normal powers of government within the Arab and Jewish parts of Jerusalem respectively and makes it possible for them to retain or alter the present local administrations without hindrance from outside. Provision is made, however, for limited measures designed to protect the proper interests of the international community in Jerusalem and to facilitate peaceful relations and normal intercourse between the authorities and inhabitants of the Arab and Jewish parts of the divided City." The full text of the Commission's statement is printed in *ibid.*, p. 15.

Editorial Note

The Palestine Conciliation Commission, on September 2, sent a letter to the Heads of the Arab and Israeli Delegations, which transmitted the text of a draft declaration on the "Holy Places, Religious Buildings and Sites in Palestine Outside the Jerusalem Area."

The purpose of the letter was to secure acceptance of the Declaration by the Arab and Israeli Governments, thereby giving their formal guarantees to the Commission with respect to the subject matter of the declaration.

Neither the Israeli reply of November 8 nor the joint reply by the Arab Delegations on November 15 directly accepted the draft declaration. The former expressed Israeli "readiness solemnly to give formal guarantees for the free exercise in Israel of all forms of worship; for

the preservation of Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Israel, and for the associated amenities; for the granting of rights of visit, access and non-disturbance; and for appropriate measures in regard to taxation." The reply stated, however, that it would be preferable to take up the actual formulation of a declaration in the light of the forthcoming discussions at the General Assembly.

The Arab reply was in the form of a separate declaration, which repeated the language of the first five articles of the declaration of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, with minor language change, but which made no reference to the last three articles.

The texts of the letter and declaration of the Palestine Conciliation Commission and the Israeli and Arab replies are printed in GA, *4th sess.*, *Ad Hoc Political Committee*, Annex, volume I, pages 29–32.

501.BB Palestine(E)/9–349

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Gross)

[WASHINGTON,] September 3, 1949.

In your memorandum of August 26 you express concern regarding difficulty which might be encountered if we should be placed in the position of going to Congress next session to request further funds for refugee relief or economic development in the Near East without evidence that the Arabs and Israelis were making serious efforts of their own to meet their problems.

I wish to assure you that those of us who have been working on this problem have had this aspect very much in mind. Our original tactics in the Palestine Conciliation Commission were to insist that the refugee problem was a responsibility which had to be shared by both the Arabs and the Israelis and that economic assistance would only be forthcoming after a sufficient degree of political agreement had been reached and the parties had requested economic assistance on a cooperative basis. Unfortunately, despite the strenuous efforts of both Mark Ethridge and Paul Porter, progress in the PCC by the conciliation process was negligible, and it was their joint recommendation that an effort be made to break the impasse by an examination of the economic aspects of the problem through a Survey Mission in advance of substantial political agreement.

In so doing, however, it has always been clearly understood that agreement on certain basic issues in the political field will be an essential precedent to any economic assistance as a result of the recommen-

dations of the Survey. We have made no advance commitment to furnish such assistance. In other words, we hope the recommendations of the Survey Mission may solve enough of the economic aspects of the problem to make possible enough political agreement to get on with the economic program.

As you doubtless know, Gordon Clapp, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Tennessee Valley Authority, has been appointed head of the Economic Survey Mission and will be leaving for the Near East within about a week. He and his group should complete at least a preliminary report by November 1 for consideration by the forthcoming General Assembly.

501.BB Palestine/9–349 : Telegram

Mr. John C. Ross to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED NEW YORK, September 3, 1949—12 : 03 a. m.

1045. Letter from Eban received today stated that Israeli representative on Egyptian-Israeli MAC August 29 raised question embargo at Suez. By two to one vote MAC decided it was entitled request Egyptians not interfere with cargoes passing through Suez. Eban reports Egyptian stated he could not discuss matter MAC since it was outside its province. Eban states, however, that Egyptian representative indicated informally that all restrictions would be lifted except for war material.

ROSS

501.BB Palestine(E)/9–349 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices[1]

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, September 3, 1949—3 a. m.

Initial reaction Arab states to announcement of ESM for NE unenthusiastic in part and even suspicious of Mission's motivation. You are instructed bring this to early attention of appropriate FonOff officials, expressing Dept's strong hope that govt to which you are accredited, as one of sponsors of ESM, will instruct its Missions and info services in NE to make every effort elucidate objectives of and extend maximum dipl and publicity support to ESM.

Important to note emphasis on technical basis of Mission, composed of engineers, agriculturists, and other technicians, and to avoid

[1] At London, Ankara, and Paris.

at present juncture to greatest possible extent affront to Arab susceptibilities that will arise inevitably from emphasis on Israeli-Arab cooperative effort.[2]

ACHESON

[2] London, on September 7, conveyed the contents of this telegram to the Foreign Office, which stated that it would instruct its Near Eastern Missions to extend support to the work of the Economic Survey Mission (telegram 3596, September 7, 6 p. m., from London). Two days later London reported further reflection by the Foreign Office and its decision to "await Department's reactions to wider approach to Israel and Arabs on Palestine settlement, which British Embassy Washington was instructed on August 30 to discuss with Department, before instructing its missions in Near East to extend diplomatic support ESM" (telegram 3642). The two telegrams from London are filed under 501.BB Palestine(E)/9–749, /9–949.

501.BB Palestine(E)/9–349 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Lebanon

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 3, 1949—2 p. m.

476. Urtel 450, Aug 31.[1] You shld seek early appointment with FonMin and clarify Dept's position re his views along fol lines:

Establishment of ESM did not stem from action of USG, as FonMin implies. On contrary, ESM was activated by PCC as UN organ, under clear authority granted it by para 12 of Dec 11 res, and after close consultation with SYG of UN. PCC decision was made fol discussions with all dels to PCC and submission Aug 15 of written questionnaire to all dels at Lausanne, informing them re proposed functions and objectives of ESM. Written joint reply to questionnaire received by PCC Aug 29 from Arab dels (reftels being rpted separately for info) clearly indicated approval of ESM's objectives and readiness recommend that their respective govts extend full support and facilities to ESM. Dept assumes Arab dels kept their respective govts fully informed these official communications. FonMin will doubtless appreciate that, since ESM constitutes sub-body of PCC, Lausanne as seat of commission was logical and convenient place

[1] Not printed; it reported that the Lebanese Foreign Minister "made it clear that he has greatest reservation concerning survey's usefulness and considerable scepticism as to its true objectives. . . . He stated he believes the real purpose of the mission, although undisclosed, is to provide a means for relieving the increasingly grave economic conditions in Israel; that the timing of the mission could be no 'coincidence'. . . . Furthermore, he could not but regard the survey mission as an instrument designed to force the Arab states into economic cooperation with Israel . . . Foreign Minister also was disturbed by the timing of this survey as he could not but conclude that it would mean an end to any further effective negotiation for political settlement at Lausanne." (501.BB Palestine/8–3149)

through which to channel official notification this question to dels to PCC.

You shld make special effort to dissipate FonMin's fears that establishment of ESM implies abandonment by UN or US of political or other functions of PCC. USG deeply hopeful that agreed settlement offering legitimate prospects for long range stability and peace in NE can be obtained, and believes approach through ESM as well as continued efforts on political level essential to achieve such settlement. From point of view of USG, therefore, establishment of ESM constitutes reinforcement of work of conciliation; practical effort to deal on an urgent basis with economic dislocations related to hostilities, of which refugee problem in Lebanon is particularly critical instance; and means of providing PCC with technical info for incorporation into its recommendations to GA for action at autumn session.

In view Leb Govt's frequently expressed desire for external assistance in economic development, Dept is somewhat surprised over FonMin's reaction to this concrete step to obtain info on basis of which internatl assistance might be forthcoming. While Dept appreciates FonMin's candor in discussing ESM with AmLeg, we greatly regret attribution of ulterior motives to US or UN sponsorship thereof. It is Dept's understanding that "increasingly grave econ conditions" which FonMin stresses are not confined solely to Israel. It is task of ESM to examine these conditions in all countries in area with view to recommending to UN measures for their early improvement.

From point of view of USG, survey mission is by no means instrument designed to force Arab-Israeli cooperation. USG is firmly convinced that solution to econ problems of NE can derive solely from free will and initiative of nations concerned, and certainly not from imposition of any solution or program by UN or its member states. FonMin shld be aware that imposition of any such program or of material assistance required to implement it, is completely contrary to principles and traditions of US.

US rep on PCC and Dept were deeply gratified with cooperative tenor of Arab dels' reply of Aug 29 with respect to ESM, and feel confident that FonMin's preliminary reaction constitutes no invalidation of his del's statements. We appreciate FonMin's stated willingness receive ESM, but hope Leb Govt will in no way prejudge results of mission's work and will extend it same cooperation and support which have characterized all Leb's relations with UN and its organs. On part of USG, we are deeply interested in success of ESM, as means of promoting political settlement and as contribution to econ betterment of NE. As such, USG is prepared to consider carefully such aid as this Govt might properly extend under UN auspices to carry out mission's

recommendations, provided such aid is desired and effectively utilized by states directly concerned.[2]

ACHESON

[2] This telegram was repeated to Bern for the American Delegation at Lausanne and to Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Jidda, Amman, and Tel Aviv. The Department, in a circular telegram of September 3, 1 a. m., to diplomatic officers at each of these posts except Bern, authorized them at their discretion to express the views set forth in telegram 476 in discussions with governments to which they were accredited (501.BB Palestine(E)/9–349).

501.BB Palestine/9–349 : Telegram

Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL LAUSANNE, September 3, 1949—8 p. m.

Palun 299. PCC September 3 sent letter to Israeli Delegation referring to Israeli reply to PCC territorial question and stating that in opinion PCC any reference to armistice agreements in connection with final settlement territorial question should be considered in light clauses in agreements safeguarding rights and claims of parties and stating that armistice demarcation lines are not to be construed in any sense as political or territorial boundaries.

PCC felt it desirable make this formal representation for record and to avoid possible misunderstanding in future.[1]

ROCKWELL

[1] Mr. Rockwell, on September 5, informed the Secretary of State that Article 16 of the Jerusalem instrument "does not delineate line between [Arab and Israeli] zones. In letter transmitted SYG September 1, PCC explained that since demarcation line intimately connected final settlement Palestine problem, PCC does not deem advisable for present make any proposal re actual demarcation and believes instrument can be put into effect with present line as provisional without prejudice to establishment definitive line at later stage. Possibility PCC proposing specific demarcation line to GA thus left open." (Palun 300 from Lausanne, 501.BB Palestine/9–549)

501.BB Palestine/9–549 : Telegram

Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED LAUSANNE, September 5, 1949—5 p. m.

Palun 303. PCC September 5 sent letter to all delegates informing them of forthcoming arrival survey group Lausanne, stating the PCC would shortly send delegates letter containing observations and suggestions re replies to PCC questionnaire, and conveying to delegates PCC plans to adjourn Lausanne between 15 and 20 September to reconvene New York second half October. Letter explained that in

deciding upon adjournment PCC desired give interested governments time study above PCC observations and suggestions and anyway had proceed New York view presence on GA agenda of items concerning PCC. Delegates also informed commissioners at their entire disposition during recess and that Azcarate proceeding Jerusalem maintain contact with parties.

Letter also transmitted for signature parties draft declaration re refugees suggested and prepared by USDel and based upon those principles on which replies to PCC questionnaire showed parties were in general agreement. USDel proposed such declaration in order obtain more precise evidence of political agreement re refugees than devious replies to PCC questionnaire and in order that PCC might be able make public concise indication of progress during second session PCC. Although in replies to questionnaire parties said they willing sign declaration along these lines, by no means certain they will do so.

PCC observations and suggestions mentioned above will be very general in character and by no means in form of final PCC position on refugees and territory.[1]

ROCKWELL

[1] Mr. Rockwell, on September 6, advised that "neither side wished sign draft declaration subject Palun 303. View public opinion at home Arabs unwilling sign declaration which mentions concessions they have made re refugees without reference to their territorial position. Israelis object to signing declaration which would imply they agreed Egypt and Lebanon not in position accept large numbers refugees. PCC may consider press release as compromise." (Palun 305, 501.BB Palestine/9–649)

IO Files: SD/A/C.1/261

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 6, 1949.

COMPENSATION FOR PROPERTY LOSSES OF PALESTINE REFUGEES

The attached memorandum indicates the present thinking of the Department on the question of compensation for property losses sustained by Palestine Refugees.

As suggested in the memorandum it would facilitate the carrying out of the contemplated United Nations program if the Survey Mission could

1. Consult with appropriate Israeli officials with a view to obtaining as soon as possible a survey of refugee property in Israel, with an estimate of its value.
2. Consult with such private or official persons in Arab countries as might be able to assist in connection with an estimate of the value of refugee property in Israel.

3. Consult with other appropriate persons, particularly including UNRPR and its component organizations, in order to obtain recommendations for possible procedures for receiving and evaluating refugee claims for loss or damage to property.

COMPENSATION

I. *Principle of Compensation*

The General Assembly, in its resolution of December 11, 1948, laid down the following principle of compensation for the Palestine refugees:

"11. *Resolves* that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;"

The general principle of compensation thus enunciated should continue to be adhered to. However, due to developments in 1948, the principle should be made to apply to those who do not choose *or are unable* to return to their homes, including those who, although repatriated, do not have their property restored. The resolution is regarded as being equally applicable to *bona fide* refugees, whether Arab or Jewish. There were relatively few Jews resident in Palestine who fled from their homes as a result of the hostilities, but some claims in this category are to be anticipated.

In the same resolution the Palestine Conciliation Commission was instructed to facilitate the payment of compensation. No progress was made due to the lack of a basis for political negotiations between the parties. It is now felt, however, that the United Nations, through the Survey Group and such appropriate authority as may be designated by the General Assembly should carry this work forward. The refugees for the most part were not nationals of any Arab state at the time they lost their property and did not enjoy diplomatic protection of such states, and consequently no state derived any rights, legal or equitable, from loss or damage to refugee property. Consequently it seems to be a task for the United Nations, by negotiation, to take steps to protect their interests, and not that of the Arab government.

The Israeli Government has consistently accepted the principle of compensation, but has always linked with this the assertion that it has war claims against the Arab States by virtue of the alleged fact that the war was caused by Arab aggression. We consider that any war claims by Israel are in an entirely different category from compensation for refugee property and should not be treated as counterclaims or as in any way related to this obligation.

Compensation should be made on the basis of the property losses actually incurred by the refugees. It is not contemplated that more than a fraction of these losses will be actually compensated, nor that a full and complete evaluation of these properties should be attempted. However, this should be the basis in theory and as far as possible in practice.

Most of the property losses can probably be compensated by means of a lump sum payment into the fund for development projects for resettlement. This would be on the theory that most of the refugees lost no more than they would receive when resettled, *i.e.*, living quarters, land, tools, etc.

On the other hand, there should be some kind of prorata compensation to individuals who lost property in excess of the bare essentials. A possible formula would be that if it were determined for example that two-thirds of the losses were in bare essentials, two-thirds of the compensation could be paid into the resettlement fund. The other third would then be available for proration among persons whose losses were more substantial.

II. *Determination of Compensation and Distribution of Amount Paid*

According to the foregoing principles, it will be necessary, in due course, to receive and evaluate individual claims of refugees. The survey group might undertake a preliminary exploration of this problem, giving consideration to its feasibility and the type of procedure under the proposed Agent-General which would be most effective.

However, the determination of claims would not necessarily be a prerequisite to the negotiating by the appropriate United Nations Authority of a preliminary lump sum award by Israel. Such an agreement might have a proviso that if the amount paid proved less than a stipulated proportion of the finally approved claims, the matter would be reopened for adjustment.

Steps should be taken to obtain an estimate of property losses to be used as a negotiating basis. This estimate might be obtained through a survey of property held by the Israeli Custodian of Absentee Property. If the cooperation of the Israeli Government could be obtained this should make the general task easier and might make it possible for the Survey Mission to make a beginning. The question should at least be discussed with the Israeli Government with a view to obtaining its cooperation, but if such cooperation were refused, the Economic Survey Mission could so report. Of course, such a survey could not indicate all property losses. For example, most losses of personal property, aside from bank accounts, would not be shown.

Attempts should also be made to obtain such information through private and official persons in the Arab states who might be in a posi-

tion to give an estimate of the property involved. The possible source of such information might be Mr. Sami Hadawi, a former official of the Palestine Government connected with land taxation and now employed in Palestine by the Jordan Government in a similar capacity. Mr. Hadawi is understood to have saved records which he compiled while a member of the Palestine Government. He can be reached through the American Legation in Amman.

While Israel's payment will undoubtedly be less than the actual property losses, no reason is seen for her claim to limit compensation to "lands abandoned and previously cultivated." Such property appears to be in no different case from residential and business property, and personal property.

Editorial Note

The Department, on September 7, 6 a. m., sent a circular telegram to Ankara, Arab capitals, Brussels, The Hague, London, Paris, Rome, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem. The telegram gave the text of paragraph 1 and subparagraphs (*a*) and (*b*) of Secretary Acheson's memorandum of September 1, page 1341, with very slightly altered wording. It then continued as follows: "In light of foregoing, questions re US policy should be answered as follows: In pursuance of recent action of UNSC and US support thereof, US Govt now prepared receive applications for license export arms Arab States and Israel for consideration on individual merits." (711.00111 Armaments Control/9–749)

In a further circular telegram of October 24, 8:25 a. m., to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, and Tel Aviv for action and to Paris, London, and Jidda for information, the Department informed that the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 failed to provide for United States military assistance to Near Eastern countries. Inasmuch as these countries would not even be entitled to United States Government procurement assistance under that Act, the Department suggested that they might wish to have recourse to the American commercial arms market. The export of arms purchased from such sources would be permitted "within the limitations of the policies stated by the US representative in the Security Council on August 4" (711.00111 Armament Control/10–2449). Regarding the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, see Mr. McGhee's memorandum of August 16 to Mr. Berkner and footnote 2 to that memorandum, page 45; regarding Ambassador Austin's statement, see the editorial note, page 1283.

501-887—77——87

501.BB Palestine(E)/9–749 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Lausanne

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY NIACT WASHINGTON, September 7, 1949—5 p. m.

Unpal 233. Although survey mission is instrumentality of PCC, in opinion of USG it is and shld be treated as autonomous in character by virtue of its technical purpose and high rank of participants. Clapp cognizant of this view. In order that ESM will have maximum flexibility and scope to fulfill its objectives, Dept believes PCC shld not endeavor constrict or redefine broad terms of reference under which ESM activated, or otherwise instruct ESM. You are instructed present US position this question if you perceive any effort this direction on part of other members PCC.

ACHESON

867N.01/9–849

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs (Hare) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1949.

Discussion

There is attached a telegram from the U.S. delegation in Lausanne,[1] reporting on the authority of the PCC representative in Jerusalem, that the Israeli Government proposes to move its capital to Jerusalem prior to the opening of the General Assembly. Reference to the possibility of such action was also made recently by Sasson, member of the Israeli delegation to Lausanne, in conversation with the French delegate to the Conciliation Commission.

In the event that the Israelis should take such action, it would prejudice effective action by the General Assembly on the statute for Jerusalem, and thereby impede progress towards a final settlement for Palestine. Moreover, such an Israeli move would probably create a strong Arab reaction, which could result in seriously impeding the work of the Economic Survey Mission.

It is felt that this Government should make every effort to discourage such action by Israel, if it is in fact contemplated, in the interests of promoting a final settlement and of supporting UN policy towards Jerusalem.

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[1] Palun 301, September 5, not printed.

Recommendations

1. It is recommended that you sign the attached telegram.[2]

2. It is further recommended that you authorize me to call in Israeli Ambassador Elath and bring to his attention the report and this Government's position on the question.[3]

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[2] Marginal notation by Mr. Rusk: "Done." Telegram 585 was sent to Tel Aviv on September 8 and stated in part: "If report appears have substance, you shld express to appropriate FonOff officials strong view of USG that such action wld be contrary to spirit and intent of GA res of Nov 29, 1947, and res of Dec 11, 1948, and consequently to desires of international community. By obstructing PCC and GA efforts obtain practical solution for internationalization Jerusalem, such action wld constitute serious setback to UN progress towards peace in Pal." (501.BB Palestine/9–549)

In reply, on September 11, Tel Aviv conveyed the assurances of Messrs. Eytan and Comay that the "rumored removal all government ministries to Jerusalem 'either prior to or following' fall session GA was 'utterly without foundation'" (telegram 682, 501.BB Palestine/9–1149).

[3] Marginal notation by Mr. Rusk: "OK."

501.BB Palestine(E)/9–849

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edward B. McEnerney of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1949.

Subject: Economic Survey Mission, Licensing of Munitions Exports for Near East.

Participants: Mr. El Kouny, First Secretary of the Egyptian Embassy
Mrs. Hope, NE
Mr. Clark, NE
Mr. McEnerney, NE

[Here follows discussion of various aspects of the Economic Survey Mission.]

Mr. El Kouny said he wondered whether the group would take cognizance of political considerations as well as economic considerations in the course of its work. He said it had all along been the understanding of the Egyptian government that the group would take political matters within its purview. Mrs. Hope said it was not expected that the group would consider political matters which fell under the authority of the conciliation commission itself. She explained that the Mission would confine itself solely to economic questions and that it was in no sense a policy-making organ. It was expected that Mr. Clapp's recommendations would be based solely upon his technical observations.

Mr. El Kouny said he was interested in learning whether or not there had been any change in the United States attitude toward the shipment of munitions to the Near East. Mr. Clark said that a revision of our policy had been expressed in Senator Austin's comments on August 4[1] before the Security Council. As a result of this change, the Egyptian government might now submit to the United States Government any requests which it might desire to make for export licenses on munitions. Such requests would be given consideration in accordance with their individual merits. Availability of military equipment would depend in part upon the needs of the Military Aid Program countries and the conditions of supply prevailing in the United States.

Mr. Clark inquired whether the Egyptian government has taken any further steps to relax the controls which it had imposed on shipping through the Suez Canal and Mr. El Kouny said that all of these controls had been relaxed. Mr. Clark said that he was very happy to know this inasmuch as the United States Government had made its views known to the Egyptian government that the restrictions which had been imposed on shipping were not warranted or in harmony with the Suez Canal convention. Mr. El Kouny said that he felt Egypt had been justified and that they had done what any government in the same position at that time would have done. He felt that the terms of the Canal Convention could not require Egypt to permit the passage through Egyptian waters of munitions destined for an enemy nation. He said that if Egypt were ever again confronted with the same situation she would take the same action. Mr. Clark said that it was encouraging to know that the controls had been removed.

Mrs. Hope showed Mr. El Kouny a copy of Senator Austin's speech of August 4. He said he was confused by that portion of the speech which suggested that the United States licensing policy would be governed by a desire to avoid the development of an arms race in the Near East. He said this seemed to place special limitations upon the granting of licenses to Near Eastern countries. Mrs. Hope said that the United States position, as set forth by Senator Austin, was based on the assumption that the Near Eastern armistice would hold, and on a desire to pursue a course which would be consistent with the maintenance of peace in the Near East. Mr. El Kouny said that Egypt would not be applying to the United States for the types of equipment required for internal security. Material of that sort could be procured from other markets, but Egypt would wish to buy from the United States matériel with which to maintain the security of the Egyptian nation in its international relations. Mr. Clark said that

[1] See editorial note, p. 1283.

questions of the sort which Mr. El Kouny had raised could only be settled through the actual operation of the United States licensing procedure when applications were received for export of arms to Near Eastern countries. Mrs. Hope added that she felt that the whole picture would be clarified in Mr. El Kouny's mind when he had had an opportunity to read Senator Austin's statement in full.

Mr. El Kouny thanked Mrs. Hope and Mr. Clark for the clarification which they had given him on both the embargo question and the question of the Economic Survey Mission's work, and he reiterated the strong desire of the Egyptian government to cooperate to the fullest extent with Mr. Clapp's group.[2]

[2] The Department sent a copy of this memorandum of conversation to Cairo on October 5. Ambassador Caffery informed the Department, on November 1, that "It is trusted that El Kouny Bey did not create the impression that controls had been *removed* as they have not. They have, to a degree, been relaxed and there are far fewer cases arising than at any time since their imposition. Manifests are still regularly scrutinized and the fact that cargo seizures have been practically nil for the past month merely indicates that no offensive cargo has been discovered on the manifests. Added precautions of shippers and steamship companies alike are probably responsible for this.

"It is hoped that no intimation be given American shippers or shipping companies that the war-time shipping regulations imposed by the Egyptians have been removed." (airgram 1162 from Cairo, 501.BB Palestine(E)/11–149)

501.BB Palestine/9–849 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Lausanne

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 8, 1949—5 p. m.

Unpal 240. Dept discussed with Porter Sept 7 developments at Lausanne re PCC. View Clapp's arrival Lausanne and forthcoming departure of Econ Survey Mission for NE, Dept strongly believes PCC shld complete its work soonest and bring present session to close. Recessing PCC now wld give added emphasis to importance Econ Survey Mission. Prolongation might result in further hardening of position of dels which might create difficulties for Econ Survey Mission.[1]

ACHESON

[1] In a circular telegram of September 9, 6 a. m., to diplomatic and consular officers at Arab capitals, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem for action and to Bern (for Mr. Porter), London, Paris, and Ankara for information, the Department observed that "Israeli and Arab reaction to date one of suspicion of ESM and American participation therein. Israelis see ESM as a plot to force greater measure refugee repatriation than Israel desires; Arabs interpret ESM as effort force Israeli-Arab econ cooperation and/or to achieve resettlement all refugees outside Israel." The circular telegram also noted that the Dept had "requested UK, French and Turkish FonOffs instruct their missions and info services in NE render full diplomatic and publicity support to ESM." (501.BB Palestine/9–949)

501.BB Palestine/9–249

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of International Organization Affairs (Halderman)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 9, 1949.

COMMITTEE ALLOCATION OF THE PALESTINE QUESTION

PROBLEM

The problem is to determine the proper committee or committees to which the Palestine case should be allocated by the General Committee.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. All aspects of the Palestine case should be allocated to Committee 1, except for possible interim action to provide direct relief funds (see recommendation 3) and the normal function of Committee 5 on financial aspects (see recommendation 4).

2. The General Committee should recommend that Committee 1 should refer the question of direct refugee relief to Committee 3 for report back to Committee 1. The report of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees would also be referred to Committee 3 to be considered in connection with future relief programs.

3. In the event that it is necessary to make interim provision for direct relief funds, due to the exhaustion of present funds, such question should be referred to Committee 3 for action early in the session. This action should be limited to provision of stop-gap funds.

4. The foregoing allocations would be without prejudice to the normal function of Committee 5 with respect to financial provisions.

5. Except as indicated in Recommendation 3, all aspects of the Palestine case, including Jerusalem, should be deferred until the final report of the Commission, including the report of the Survey Mission, is submitted. These reports are expected about November 1.[2]

DISCUSSION

The provisional agenda includes two items on Palestine: (1) Jerusalem and the Holy Places, and (2) direct refugee relief. It is

[1] Mr. Halderman had prepared an earlier draft of this memorandum on September 2. The same day, he forwarded the draft to officers of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, the Office of the Legal Adviser, and the Division of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs for comment (501.BB Palestine/9–249). The version of September 9 printed here was prepared presumably after comments by these officers.

[2] With minor changes, including the consolidation of Nos. 3 and 4, the recommendations were sent to the United States Mission at the United Nations on September 13, for use in further consultations with the Secretariat (telegram 473 to New York, 501.BB Palestine/9–1349).

expected, however, that a later item will be placed on the agenda based on the report of the Conciliation Commission including the report of the Survey Mission. These reports are expected to be submitted about November 1.

It is the position of the United States that these reports should be considered by Committee 1 and that this item should be the basis for the principal consideration of the United Nations program in respect of Palestine for 1950.

Overall Consideration in Committee 1

Due to the interrelation of the political and economic aspects of the problem as revealed by the experience of the past year, it is felt that the United Nations should establish an integrated program for 1950 to include all political and economic aspects. In order to achieve this integration it is considered that these matters should be placed in the hands of Committee 1 for overall consideration and recommendation.

Since the problem of achieving a political solution has proved to be integrally related to that of the solution of the refugee problem (repatriation and resettlement) it is appropriate to have the consideration of these two aspects take place together in Committee 1. The question of direct relief is somewhat separate and more appropriate for consideration in Committee 3. (Recommendation 2, discussed below.) However, in order to achieve the proper integration of this program with the others, it is recommended that it be placed in the hands of Committee 1 with the recommendation that it be referred from that Committee to Committee 3 for consideration and report back to Committee 1.

Direct Relief

It is considered that Committee 1 should refer the question of direct relief to Committee 3 for consideration and report back to Committee 1. The General Committee should make a recommendation to this effect in allocating the subject matter to Committee 1. The reasons for referring the question of direct relief for consideration in Committee 3 are:

(1) Separation of the direct relief question from the large scale economic development programs will be conducive to a successful appeal for voluntary contributions for continued direct relief. If direct relief is considered in conjunction with such large-scale development programs, many delegations may consider that their voluntary contributions are unnecessary.

(2) Committee 3 will include the more "relief minded" members of delegations who should be more sympathetic to the plight of the refugees.

(3) Committee 3 has had more experience in dealing with relief matters and their judgment on this question should be of value. The program established by Committee 3 last year was highly and unexpectedly successful in bringing in the necessary contributions of $32,000,000.

(4) The subject of direct relief is normally within the terms of reference of the Third Committee which deals with social, humanitarian and cultural problems.

Timing

Since the consideration of most aspects of the Palestine case must necessarily be based on the Reports of the Conciliation Commission and the Economic Survey Mission, it is desirable that consideration be deferred until the receipt of these reports, probably about November 1. This is desirable in the interest of efficient management of the General Assembly and the conservation of time. As to Interim Relief Funds, and Jerusalem, see discussion below.

Interim Refugee Relief

Apart from the main consideration of the Palestine case there is possible need for action earlier in the session to provide interim funds to continue refugee relief until a more definitive provision can be made. This may be necessary because of the possibility that current funds will be exhausted by December 1, before General Assembly action on the overall question can be taken. The *Ad Hoc* Advisory Committee on Palestine Refugees is meeting September 29 to consider the need for such action on the basis of the financial situation of United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees at that time. If necessary this provisional action should be taken in Committee 3, early in the session, and should consist of authorization to draw on the Working Capital Fund for an amount sufficient to carry on the relief operation for a short period.

Jerusalem

The Jerusalem question is substantively somewhat distinct from the other aspects of the Palestine case. However, it will normally be in Committee 1. It should preferably be taken up at the same time as the rest of the Palestine case, but further decisions may be necessary on this point in the light of the timing of the submission of the PCC proposals and the reaction of other delegations to them.

501.BB Palestine/9–1049 : Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET CAIRO, September 10, 1949—9 a. m.

846. Re London's telegram 3505 [1] to Department September 1. In conversation with British Chargé my house September 6, Chapman-Andrews seemed surprised on my inquiry concerning the current Egyptian Government attitude toward transit through Suez Canal of military supplies destined for Israel, with especial reference to petroleum. I stated that according to information available to me, tankers were converging on Haifa from various directions and from various places of origin [2] so that a decision, if not yet taken by Egyptian Government would appear a matter for very near future. I added that quite recently, however, Hassouna Pasha had orally assured me restrictions on transportation of merchandise in the direction of Israel would henceforward be limited to munitions of war which he described as being arms and ammunition and not including raw materials susceptible of military use or even manufactured goods of like potentiality, such as rubber tires.

Although oil could perhaps not be considered a raw material in that it might be immediately utilized for military purposes, the possibility existed that Hassouna Pasha could be considered as having tacitly assented to the passage through the Suez Canal of petroleum products.

Chapman-Andrews negatived this supposition, stating that his Embassy had obtained information concerning articles regarded by Egyptian Government as absolute contraband and that "carburants" of all kinds (by which French term he understood all petroleum products) were included.

The Under Secretary had spoken to Sir Ronald Campbell (before the latter's departure) in much the same reassuring, but possibly illusory, sense as he had to me.

Accordingly, some special representations were evidently required if Persian Gulf or other oil were to be allowed through the Suez Canal to Haifa.

Continuing, Chapman-Andrews stated he proposed to request an audience of His Majesty in view of importance of the objectives and of extremely confidential nature of the negotiations. Chapman-Andrews did not hazard a surmise as to whether or not his approach to His Majesty would be successful since he believed the Egyptians fully to realize that the ultimate objective is not so much obtention of

[1] Not printed.
[2] For documentation on this subject, see pp. 91 ff.

freedom from molestation in Suez Canal as the reopening of the pipeline from Iraq to Haifa.

He explained that the recent incident involving removal of WHO meeting from Alexandria (which is regarded as result of personal intervention of His Majesty in complete disregard of apparent desires and action of his Prime Minister who is concurrently Foreign Minister and Minister of Interior) revealed lack of authority of head of Egyptian Government as contrasted with powerful position of the Chief of State. To make absolutely certain that a decision of prime political and economic importance should not run the risks of being overruled, it now seems necessary, in Chapman-Andrews view, for recourse to be had to His Majesty.

On Chapman-Andrews inquiring if the American Embassy had taken occasion to raise the subject in conversation with Egyptian officials, I replied negatively adding that such information as had reached me had seemingly been supplied solely for purposes of information.

Sent Department 846, repeated London 99.

PATTERSON

501.BB Palestine(E)/9–949 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 10, 1949—2 p. m.

3281. Urtel 3642, Sep 9.[1] UK reaction to request for dipl and publicity support of ESM difficult to reconcile with consistent UK support of ESM's objectives in all previous interchanges with US, and with very fact of Brit participation on ESM. USG believes that failure ESM to achieve its objectives wld result in deferment political settlement foreseeable future, and that ESM therefore requires maximum support from outset. USG firmly convinced that success ESM is only present means creating atmosphere in which political-territorial settlement may be possible (Depcirtel 6:00 a. m. Aug 16), and that interjection political questions at present time might prejudice work ESM. This does not of course preclude raising of political questions as soon as acceptability and progress of ESM demonstrated, and atmosphere more auspicious for continuation political discussions.

Full US reply to UK *Aide-Mémoire*[2] expected within few days.

ACHESON

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[1] Not printed, it reported that the British Foreign Office had decided to await the reactions of the Department to a wider approach to the Israelis and the Arabs on settlement of the Palestine problem before instructing its Near Eastern Missions to extend diplomatic support to the Economic Survey Mission (501.BB Palestine/9–949).

[2] Dated September 1, p. 1342.

501.BB Palestine/9–1049 : Telegram

Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY LAUSANNE, September 10, 1949—2 p. m.

Palun 317. Would appreciate urgent background information re announcement Radio Bulletin 212[1] that ExImBank has approved $2,350,000 loan to Israel for port development. This seems entirely contrary to basic decision re remainder $100,000,000 Israeli credit which Porter told me had been taken in Washington and apparently indicates radical change in US attitude toward Israel (Unpal 218).[2] There has been no alteration in position of Israeli delegation here on basic issues which would justify such change in US policy.

Announcement will place me in very awkward position vis-à-vis Israeli delegation, with members of which, on basis information brought by Porter and Unpal 218, I have been taking strong line re unlikelihood for present of large scale US-Israeli economic cooperation view Israeli attitude on main issues Palestine problem.

Agree with Clapp announcement particularly unfortunate view possible effect on cooperation Arab states with US.

ROCKWELL

[1] Dated September 8, not printed; it stated that "The newly announced loan to Israel brings the total of credits established by the Export-Import Bank in favor of that country to $53,350,000. It leaves unallocated $46,650,000 of the $100,000,000 earmarked for Israel last January." (News Division Files)

[2] Dated August 5, from Lausanne, not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1312.

501.BB Palestine/9–1249 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

SECRET LONDON, September 12, 1949—8 p. m.

3670. 1. Question UK diplomatic and publicity support for ESM discussed again today with Burrows in light Deptel 3281, September 10. Burrows emphasized FonOff anxious be all possible assistance and cooperate every way possible in work of ESM. As result Embassy's representations (Embtel 3596, September 7[1]) FonOff has already instructed British information services make every effort elucidate objectives ESM.

2. Burrows stated FonOff also willing extend diplomatic support to ESM, but wishes do so in most effective manner in order assure success. Primary objections Arab States, as expressed thus far, appear emphasize their fear that political objectives being subordinated to economic objectives and that their case consequently being prejudiced. He

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1359.

mentioned fear Syria and Iraq that if resettlement refugees in those countries is recommended, their case for resettlement in Israel or Arab Palestine have disappeared.

3. FonOff feels most effective means obtaining support Arab States for work of ESM is to reassure them on political aspects as well. This, in part, is what FonOff hopes for from wider approach. In these circumstances FonOff feels it will have greater success in selling ESM to Arabs within context wider settlement. Burrows understands our reply to UK *aide-mémoire* may be received tomorrow and hopes that it may then be possible proceed with approach.

4. It was pointed out to Burrows that replies to our approaches to Arab States and Israel had indicated suspicion of ESM. In these circumstances, time is of essence and it appears be matter of some urgency to take every possible opportunity to explain objectives of ESM in order dispel such suspicions before they harden and negate possibility ESM fulfilling its task. Both US and France are doing everything possible to assure that Arab States and Israel have proper understanding of this matter and UK cooperation this task would be helpful and perhaps crucial.

5. Burrows reiterated that FonOff hopes very much that reply its *aide-mémoire* will be received tomorrow and UK could then proceed wider approach. Meanwhile, FonOff will work out an approach on ESM alone for use in event there is any protracted delay in proceeding with wider approach.

HOLMES

867N.01/9–1349

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 13, 1949.

Subject: Conversation with Mr. Bevin on the Middle East

Participants: Mr. Bevin [1]
Mr. Dening [2]
Mr. Acheson
Mr. McGhee
Mr. Butterworth [3]
Ambassador Douglas
Ambassador Jessup
Mr. Satterthwaite [4]

[1] Mr. Bevin was in the United States to attend the Fourth Regular Session of the General Assembly, scheduled to meet at New York on September 20.

[2] Maberly E. Dening, Assistant Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office.

[3] W. Walton Butterworth, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs; on September 29, he became the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.

[4] Livingston L. Satterthwaite, Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs.

Bevin opened the discussion on the Middle East with a complaint about Palestine. He said the United Nations appoint commissions which get nowhere and which lead to more and more *faits accomplis* which cannot be changed. He said this has happened in the matters of Jerusalem, boundaries, and Arab territories. Bevin said he was in favor of Abdullah having that portion of Arab Palestine which he now occupied and if there were no boundaries there was no Palestine. He said the present situation was unsatisfactory and the British were getting nowhere with the carrying out of their Eight Point Program, although we had approved it. McGhee said it was true that we had put forward no U.S. territorial settlement but we had through our representative on the PCC attempted to get both sides to get together. The Arabs want considerable territory, the Israelis do not want to give up any and their position in both territories and refugees are too far apart for hope of settlement in the PCC in the near future. More flexible proposals are needed on both sides if there is to be hope of conciliation. Bevin asked when it would come to a head? Mr. McGhee replied that the present possibilities of the Commission through conciliation had been exhausted. The Economic Commission although somewhat suspect by the Arab States, we nevertheless hope can induce the Arabs to accept refugees for resettlement and the Israelis to accept others for repatriation with offers of economic assistance. If solution to the refugee problem can be found, perhaps normal relations can in time be resumed. We do not think that there is much hope of a territorial settlement at this time. Bevin again said that the Jews make *faits accomplis* and the Arabs get nothing.

Bevin then said that the British were making progress with Egypt toward an important treaty. The discussions were going along quite well on military, political, and economic levels. But failure to settle the Palestine problem was blocking the whole Egyptian deal. McGhee again said that he thought we had to cope with the problem for a while.

Bevin then discussed the problem of getting oil out of Iraq. He said that what was needed was "running rights" to Haifa. He had in mind a joint board to manage the port of Haifa along the lines of the Port of London Authority. It could be well and impartially run. He thought the Jews could easily grant "running rights" without in any way involving the sovereignty question. This could be done quickly and would start the port running again. Bevin said, as we knew, oil was very important to Iraq and the rights could be given outside of any territorial settlement. Mr. McGhee said the Israelis had talked only about a free zone for Haifa like that at Salonika. Mr. Bevin said a free port would be better than a free zone, which, unless the port were controlled impartially, might not result in the oil and supplies being

loaded. Bevin said he thought the Arabs would take such a deal. Mr. McGhee reminded him that the Arabs had up to now refused to cooperate or even talk with the Israelis. Bevin said that the Regent of Iraq did not reject this idea and he might be tempted to take the opportunity to share in the management of the port. This also might ease the outlet to the Red Sea Problem.

Ambassador Douglas inquired whether territorial settlement involving Abdullah might not complicate the whole Palestine situation. Bevin said that the Gaza strip was not so important. Mr. McGhee said that the other Arab States would probably oppose annexation of the occupied territory to Jordan and that the inhabitants might even oppose it or prefer the Israelis. We agree that Abdullah should eventually get it, but not until a general settlement had been reached. Before that time such action would probably create more problems than it would solve.

Bevin then reiterated his concern regarding the effectiveness of the various Commissions which had been set up. Getting to the refugee problem he said that the British had put up half a million in sterling. Mr. McGhee said we were optimistic for an ultimate solution and would be more so if it were not for the recent revolution in Syria. He said that it seemed possible to take care of nearly all of the refugees if the new Syrian Government would cooperate as Zaim had indicated he was willing to do. Some refugees might be left for a second bite.

Bevin then got another plug in for his Haifa scheme and said that if Haifa problems were settled Iraq might play ball on the refugees. I asked Bevin to explain what he meant by "running rights". He said that since the territory behind Haifa and Haifa itself are in the hands of the Jews, the Arabs have no truck, rail or pipe line rights to deep water. The Jews are always in the position of stopping the trade at any time. He thought no one would agree to a corridor. I asked him if the problem would be met if "running rights" were granted temporarily for two years. Bevin said he would prefer to do it subject to notice as he thought a fixed period would create a row before the period was ended. Bevin again said he had no faith in the economic development commission or any other commission and that Palestine was still a nightmare to him. I asked Mr. McGhee to try to do something to stir the pot and Bevin said he thought if we could only get one practical thing done, we would be better off than we are now when everything is being frustrated.[5]

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[5] For the joint statement by the United States and the United Kingdom on the Acheson–Bevin conversation, released by the Department of State on September 13, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 26, 1949, p. 467.

501.BB Palestine(E)/9–1349

The Department of State to the British Embassy

CONFIDENTIAL

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

It is believed that the United States and the United Kingdom are in substantial agreement in principle with respect to the Palestine question, and in this connection reference is made to informal conversations which took place in July and August between representatives of the United States Government and representatives of the British Government both in Washington and in London. However, it is desired to make certain specific comments on some of the points raised in the *Aide-mémoire:* [1]

1. (*a*) The Department of State assumes that when the *Aide-mémoire* refers to resettlement in general terms, as in paragraph 1, (*a*), (*b*), and (*c*), it means to include repatriation. While it is true that major emphasis will have to be placed on resettlement, it is essential that repatriation should also play an important role in the solution of this question.

(*b*) While it is clear that the final disposition of the refugee problem would be facilitated and hastened by a territorial settlement, the Department of State believes that the refugee problem can be disposed of in large measure on the basis of existing territorial delimitations. In other words, the absence of a territorial settlement should not prevent the development and implementation of plans for the repatriation and resettlement of the refugees.

(*c*) The Department of State does not believe that the question of the disposition of refugees should be approached from the point of view that after Israel has accepted a certain number of refugees for repatriation the remainder will have to be resettled by the Arab states. On the contrary, it is believed that the ability of Israel and the Arab states to absorb the refugees should be determined on the basis of an authoritative technical study. It is probable that such a study will indicate that all the refugees can only be accommodated if a certain degree of international assistance is provided. It is anticipated that the Economic Survey Mission will be able to provide this authoritative study, as well as the scale of international assistance which would be required. It is therefore considered preferable to urge Israel and the Arab states to assist the Economic Survey Mission in its work and on the basis of technical and economic considerations, to accept repatriation and resettlement on the scale required to accommodate all the refugees.

2. (*a*) The Department of State feels that it would be inadvisable to put to Israel and the Arab states any specific plan for territorial settlement. It believes that the question of territorial settlement is a matter for determination by the parties concerned either directly or

[1] Dated September 1, p. 1342.

through the Palestine Conciliation Commission. However, it considers that a discussion of the problem of territorial settlement with the Arab states and Israel in order to obtain their views might be useful at a somewhat later date.

(*b*) In view of the fact that relief requirements for the next year cannot be fully assessed until the Economic Survey Mission has made its report, the Department of State hopes that it will be possible for the Foreign Office to withhold its determination concerning the maximum amount which it might contribute to the relief program. While we are fully in accord with the view of the Foreign Office that every effort should be made to secure proportionate contributions from other member states, the Department of State believes that the efforts of our respective governments to secure a more equitable distribution of the relief burden might be jeopardized if the proposed United Kingdom contributions were determined at this stage.

3. As the Arab states have thus far shown no disposition to discuss resettlement quantitatively, and as Israel's offer to repatriate 100,000 refugees is not acceptable to the Arabs, it is clear that both will have to adopt a more flexible and compromising attitude in order that agreement can be reached. The Department of State believes that it should be stressed now and during the General Assembly, if the matter is raised, that Israel and the Arab states between them have the primary responsibility with respect to the refugee problem and should contribute to its solution in such a manner that all the refugees would be accommodated, through repatriation and resettlement. Under these circumstances, it would not be desirable to give even an approximation of the figures involved in connection with repatriation and resettlement.

4. While the Department of State does not have an analysis of the total contributions to UNRPR as of date, it understands that the anticipated contributions including a further United States contribution on the matching basis are not likely to be sufficient to finance UNRPR until the end of the current year. It is further understood that the *Ad Hoc* Advisory Committee of UNRPR which is scheduled to meet September 29, 1949, will be asked to review this situation and to make recommendations thereon. It is the view of the Department of State that if the funds received by UNRPR are not sufficient to insure continuation of operations until the end of 1949, the General Assembly should take interim action authorizing an advance from the UN Working Capital Fund to enable UNRPR to continue to that date, and pending General Assembly action on the 1950 program after receiving the report of the Economic Survey Mission.

In view of the lack of progress in the field of conciliation thus far and the subsequent decision to shift the emphasis from the political to the economic through the establishment of the Economic Survey Mission, the Department of State is of the opinion that it would be wise to defer an approach to the Arab states and Israel on political questions for the time being—at least until adequate time has been afforded for the Economic Survey Mission to demonstrate its effectiveness in creating a more favorable atmosphere.

WASHINGTON, September 13, 1949.

501.BB Palestine/9–1349 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL JERUSALEM, September 13, 1949—4 p. m.

565. Deptel 360, September 7.[1] ConGen wishes reiterate view expressed Contel 495 July 27 re importance delineating final line between Jewish and Arab zones in Jerusalem instrument to be presented to GA. Believes decision as to where line should run within international area of Jerusalem need not be affected by final boundary settlement and can be determined independently. It is supposed that in any final settlement Israel will retain corridor linking Jerusalem to Coast. Therefore same military and other factors must be considered in drawing line regardless of exact final boundaries. ConGen is obliged to differ strongly with PCC belief that present "provisional line" can be used without prejudice to establishment of definitive line later. Israel attitude towards "temporary" armistice lines indicated only too clearly its probable reaction to any future change. While under no illusion as to difficulties of imposing boundaries on Israel, ConGen firmly believes that only possibility of change lies in incorporating specific final line in Jerusalem instrument now. It is assumed PCC and US not prepared accept present line. Prospects of Arab support for international regime will be greatly increased by return of Arab quarters, while Israel opposition must be assumed in any event.

Following factors should be taken into account in drawing final line:

1. UN previously unwilling to recognize that conquest of territory by force confers legal right, particularly in Jerusalem which theoretically has been continuously under UN protection. Thus logical starting point is *status quo* November 29, 1947.

2. At same time, for practical administrative reasons, essential that Jewish and Arab zones be homogeneous entities avoiding to maximum extent possible corridors and enclaves. Therefore lines should be drawn creating compact Jewish and Arab zones which will involve retention by Jewish zone of some conquered Arab areas while surrendering large Arab quarters in southern Jerusalem and in addition certain Jewish sections which cut Arab quarters off from main Arab zone. In practice Israel would receive larger area than held on November 29.

[1] Not printed.

3. Mount Scopus should be attached to Jewish zone probably by road to San Hadriya skirting Sheikh Jerrah quarter.[2]

Sent Department, repeated Tel Aviv 108; Department pass Amman 66, Bern 61.

BURDETT

[2] The Department of State, in reply on September 19, stated that the "PCC has not yet made final decision re inclusion demarcation line in proposals prior their presentation for consideration by GA" but was studying the situation. The Department of State also indicated that it would bear the suggestions in mind and would "consult with USDel, PCC, re problem prior next PCC session." (telegram 378, 501.BB Palestine/9–1349)

501.BB Palestine(E)/9–1349: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY WASHINGTON, September 13, 1949—9 p. m.

3332. Fol tel received from New York:

(Code room: Please repeat to AmEmbassy London tel from New York no. 1113, Sept 13,[1] control no. 4569.)

Despite earlier indications given to AmEmb Baghdad that Iraq wld receive ESM, Govt's attitude has obviously hardened during past few days. Possibility such action stimulating similar attitude other NE states or even adoption common Arab League policy cannot be excluded. Latter wld of course spell deathblow to ESM.

Since ESM has already received setback, and time is of essence (urtel 3670 Sept 12), pls bring foregoing to attention FonOff soonest, together with Baghdad tel 211 to London, Sept 12,[2] and emphasize desirability urgent Brit supporting action.[3]

ACHESON

[1] Not printed; it gave the text of the reply by the Iraqi Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to Secretary-General Lie's request that facilities be made available to the Economic Survey Mission. The reply, in effect, refused permission for the Mission to visit Iraq (501.BB Palestine(E)/9–1349).

[2] This was a repeat of telegram 579 to the Department of State, not printed.

[3] Mr. McGhee, on September 16, expressed his belief to Mr. Clapp that "chances obtaining cooperative attitude improved in view apparent revision attitude Arab dipl reps here as result our discussion this week re objectives ESM. Lebanese Min Malik expressed opinion Sept 14 road ahead for ESM shld be smoother henceforth and Iraqi Chargé stated he had telegraphed his govt recommending cooperation with ESM.

"UK, Fr and Turks will extend full support in NE to ESM. UK undertaking urge Iraq revise its position as well as urge cooperation other Arab caps. We suggest you take no official cognizance Iraq's rejection and, if questioned by press, express hope that, as ESM's purposes are clarified, it will be welcomed by all members NE community." (telegram 519, identified also as Esmis 2, to Beirut, 501.BB Palestine(E)/9–1649)

IO Files, Lot 71 D 440, SD/A/C.1/273[1]

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State[2]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 14, 1949.

JERUSALEM

THE PROBLEM

The problem is to determine the position which the Delegation should take on the question of a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area pursuant to Resolution 194 (III) adopted by the General Assembly on December 11, 1948.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The United States should strongly support the proposals of the Commission. (Annex 1 contains the plan proposed by the Commission and comments for the guidance of the Delegation.[3]

2. If the PCC proposals are rejected by either the Arabs or by Israel either before or during the debate, the United States should continue to support the proposals as being the best chance of achieving an international regime and in the hope that the parties will acquiesce in a United Nations decision. This position might be changed in the light of developments.

3. Any amendments to the Statute submitted during the course of the debate should be considered by the Delegation and the Department in the light of the existing situation.

4. If the PCC proposals are defeated by vote of the General Assembly, the United States should wait and see what alternatives are advanced. At this stage the Delegation should consult the Department as to the future course of action.

DISCUSSION

[Here follow sections marked "Background of Problem"; the "Israeli Position," which stated in part that "Representatives of Israel made it clear from the outset of the Commission's work that the New City of Jerusalem was regarded as part of Israel and would not be relinquished to an international regime. The inhabitants of Jewish Jerusalem were Israeli citizens and it was, they asserted, inconceivable

[1] Lot 71 D 440 is the master file of classified records and correspondence of United States Delegations to sessions of the United Nations General Assembly for the years 1945–1965, as maintained by the Bureau of International Organization Affairs.

[2] In connection with the Fourth Regular Session of the General Assembly; the paper is marked "Subject to Final Clearance."

[3] Not found attached.

that Israel would take part in a plan which would oblige these citizens to live under another administration against their will"; and the "Arab Position," which stated in part that the Arab States "have recently indicated their acquiescence in an international regime for the City. This position is believed entirely due to their present unfavorably [*unfavorable*] military position and that it expresses a wish for an international bulwark against further Israeli expansion. . . . The Arabs have been unanimous in making their principal demand that there should be an absolute United Nations guarantee that the international character of the City shall be preserved. The Commission proposals undertake to meet this demand by means of the provisions for demilitarization. The Arabs have also insisted, as part of the demand for safeguards, that there should be no corridor linking the City with the State of Israel. The corridor nevertheless exists and there is no prospect that it will be relinquished by Israel."]

Position of the International Community.—The strongest element of interest in the Jerusalem settlement among the membership of the United Nations, apart from the Arab States and Israel, is found in the Catholic countries. While no great interest was manifested during the first half of the year, there have recently been evidences of increasing interest in the problem by the Vatican and various Catholic communities. This interest indicates a possibility of a strong demand for an international regime in the nature of a *corpus separatum.*

Basis for Recommendation 1.—The United States concurred in the opinion of its representative on the Commission that an international regime in the nature of a *corpus separatum* for Jerusalem would be rejected by Israel and that no useful purpose would be served by preparing one more plan which would share the fate of previous attempts of this kind by remaining a dead letter. The other two members of the Commission were at first inclined to favor proposals for a completely separate regime even though they agreed that such proposals could not be placed in operation. They were, however, persuaded by the United States Representative to attempt a practical approach which might be acceptable to the parties and at the same time fulfill the spirit and letter of the resolution calling for an international regime. Israel and the Arab states have both agreed to United Nations control of the Holy Places, which appears to be the focal point of international interest in the City. The proposals of the Commission call for a United Nations Authority with control over the Holy Places, including the provision of United Nations guards, and with supervisory powers over the other main subjects of international interest, namely, the observance of human rights and demilitarization. The United Nations Authority is also given power to participate with a Joint Board in the consideration

of questions which relate to the efficient functioning of the City. These include such things as common services and utilities.

Subject to the restrictions of the international regime, the powers of Government would be entrusted to the adjacent states of Israel and, presumably, the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom. The details of the international regime would be incorporated in an instrument having the force of a treaty. The United Nations Authority, as well as the states concerned, is given the power to intervene diplomatically in case of alleged violations and, in case of a dispute, to submit the question for adjudication by an international tribunal especially created for the purpose.

In supporting this plan the United States considers that it fulfills the resolution of the General Assembly and makes adequate provision for those elements of the Jerusalem situation which are of particular interest to the International Community. It is believed that the provisions for international control are strong and can, if put into operation, ensure that the world interest in Jerusalem is safeguarded.

We feel that the establishment of a Jerusalem regime in the nature of a *corpus separatum* under the United Nations is entirely impractical. This is largely because it would be unacceptable to Israel but also because, even if accepted, it would call for United Nations commitments which the United Nations might be unwilling or unable to fulfill. In addition to heavy financial requirements such commitments would also include an obligation to maintain peace and order in a City which, if legally separated from the adjacent states, might very soon be faced with serious threats either internally or from outside.

It is believed that the United Nations should be willing to accept a genuine and substantial plan which has a good possibility of being accepted by the parties concerned and of being successfully placed in operation.

Demilitarization.—If the plan is attacked on the basis of details, rather than as a whole, a likely point of attack might be that of demilitarization. Israeli representatives have often said that after their experience of a year ago they could never again leave the Jewish population of the City unprotected. This is also a likely point of attack from the Arab side, particularly since they claim that the existence of the corridor gives Israel a strong military advantage which largely nullifies the effects of demilitarization. It is believed that we should not recede from the requirement that the City be completely demilitarized. This is an essential, and one of the strongest, elements of the proposed international regime without which it is doubtful that the plan would be accepted by the Members of the United Nations. The argument on the point of military advantage

would be that both sides have direct access to the respective contiguous states and that the result is approximate equality.

The Corridor.—If the Arabs wish to reject the proposal they will undoubtedly make the existence of the corridor a basic argument. This will be linked with the question of demilitarization and the claim will be made that demilitarization is in effect non-existent on the Israeli side if there is a direct connection between Jerusalem and Israel. It is probable that the Arabs will only use this argument if they have decided to reject the plan, for there is no prospect that Israel will give up the corridor. It may, therefore, be useless to argue the matter except for the slight possibility that combined pressure may persuade the Arabs to change their position. The argument on this point would be that Jordan also has a direct link with Jerusalem and that the parties are, therefore, in a position of equality.

Basis for Recommendations 2 and 3.—In approaching the General Assembly debate on the Jerusalem question the United States has the general view that the PCC proposals represent virtually a last chance to achieve any substantial degree of internationalization going beyond international control of the Holy Places. This view may alter as a result of discussions during the Assembly period but appears well-founded in consideration of the widely divergent approaches to this question on the part of Israel, the Arabs, and the international community. The United Nations has adopted a procedure for bringing about a solution of the problem by appointing a Commission to consider all aspects and bring in proposals. The Commission has endeavored to take into account the conflicting views of the parties concerned and to present a plan calculated to reconcile their major claims. Meanwhile the conditions for achieving internationalization have been gradually deteriorating by reason of the progressive consolidation of the New City into the State of Israel, the filling up of former Arab quarters with new Israeli immigrants, the extension of Israeli civil administration and the movement of government bureaus to Jerusalem. Consequently, we feel that the United Nations should follow through strongly on the procedure it has adopted by making every effort to bring about acquiescence in the proposals of the Commission. If this fails the effort to achieve an international regime must start again from the beginning in circumstances that are even less favorable than when previous efforts were undertaken. Consequently, even if Israel or the Arab States reject the plan prior to a vote in the Assembly, we should nevertheless attempt to get a favorable Assembly vote on the chance that these parties may acquiesce in a United Nations decision.

If the proposals of the Commission fail in an Assembly vote there may reasonably be expected to be an effort on the part of the delegations of some Catholic countries to put up a plan of more far-reaching internationalization. Israel would be almost certain to oppose such proposals. The United States should cooperate in the search for a practical solution. Decisions will have to be made in the light of the proposals made, the attitude of the parties directly concerned, and possible strong developments in American Catholic and Jewish public opinion.

501.BB Palestine/9–1449 : Telegram

Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL LAUSANNE, September 14, 1949—noon.

Palun 320. 1. In final meetings with chiefs all delegations September 12 PCC delivered notes containing observations and suggestions re Arab and Israeli replies to PCC questionnaire (Palun 303).[1]

Notes to both parties, after making number minor observations on specific points raised in replies, stated PCC did not believe would be useful at present offer detailed suggestions re refugees, since desired await ESM (Economic Survey Mission) report.

Notes then referred fact both parties had accepted May 12 protocol as basis for discussion territorial question, on understanding such discussion would bear upon adjustments which would be necessary make in order achieve agreement. PCC had come to conclusion Arab and Israeli territorial proposals exceeded limits of what might be considered in broadest sense as adjustments to May 12 map. PCC consequently requested delegations and their governments to reexamine question and hoped that when work resumed in New York PCC would find new proposals a practical working basis.

Notes then stated PCC held firm view that if governments did not make substantial modifications in proposals or advance new suggestions would be very difficult or even impossible carry on constructive negotiations re territory. PCC felt would be premature for it to present to parties any proposals involving more specific indications re such modifications. PCC felt, however, modifications should bear not only on territories claimed by Israelis and Arabs which lie outside boundaries allotted to them on May 12 map, but also upon territories allotted to them on same map.

Notes informed all delegations of PCC conviction that no excessive territorial demands should be allowed impede establishment normal conditions of political and economic life in NE.

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[1] Dated September 5, from Lausanne, p. 1361.

2. Delegates orally informed PCC requesting government's members PCC make representations in Israel and interested Arab States to emphasize importance member governments and PCC attached to submission by governments concerned of new and more flexible proposals on territory in order provide practical basis for discussions New York. Therefore, hope that Department after consultation with French and Turkish Foreign Offices re coordination will be able make such representations in near future.

ROCKWELL

Editorial Note

The Fourth Progress Report of the Palestine Conciliation Commission covered its activities for the period June 9 to September 15. After reviewing its efforts involving conciliation, the refugee question and the territorial question, it concluded as follows: "The Conciliation Commission hopes that, upon the resumption of its work in New York on 19 October 1949, it will receive from the Arab and Israel delegations replies to its note of 12 September 1949, which will be of a nature to permit the successful pursuit of its efforts to conciliate the points of view of the parties. The Commission also places great hope in the assistance of the Economic Mission, whose first report is expected at the end of October, in connexion with the solution of the outstanding questions, in particular the poignant problem of the refugees."

The full text of the Fourth Progress Report is printed in GA, *4th sess.*, *Ad Hoc Political Committee*, *Annex*, 1949, volume II, page 9.

Regarding the note of September 12, see telegram Palun 320, September 14, from Lausanne, *supra*.

501.BB Palestine/8–849 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Lausanne

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 15, 1949—8 p. m.

Unpal 239. In view Palun 267, Aug 8,[1] and subsequent info from Porter [2] in Washington, Dept did not understand that ref was being made at this time to ExImBank loan in discussions with Israeli del (Unpal 218, Aug 5 [1]).

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[1] Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1312.

[2] Mr. Porter, in a telephone conversation on September 23, informed Mr. Stabler that he had received a letter from President Truman accepting his resignation as U.S. Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission as of September 15 (501.BB Palestine/9–2349).

Depts position re loan has consistently been premised on achievement of peace in Palestine. In absence of peaceful conditions Dept obliged to review each application for allocation under loan to determine whether in light existing circumstances at time it shld be approved or deferred. Cancellation or long-term suspension of loan itself has never been under consideration at any time.

Re Haifa allocation Dept desired review application in accord above policy. ExImBank had, however, already taken position with Israeli reps that while allocation justified, Bank unable authorize in absence Depts agreement. Israeli Amb was seriously concerned and at loss to understand apparent difference of view between Bank and Dept. In these circumstances Dept considered it advisable to concur in position which had already been taken by Bank.

Israeli Amb understands Dept position that it will be necessary for Depts reps on ExImBank to continue their obligation to review all future applications under loan in light of situation in Israel and its internatl relations and that Israel shld not construe such action as either direct or indirect political pressure.

ACHESON

501.BB Palestine(E)/9–749 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Lebanon

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 15, 1949—8 p. m.

512. Pls seek immediate appointment FonMin and in ur discretion PriMin, and convey fol orally:

Leb reluctance support and cooperate with ESM (urtel 460 Sept 7 [1]) and reported desire interject question into Arab League politics difficult reconcile with long record Leb cooperation with UN and US. We regret FonMin's tendency accept Amer press interpretations of ESM as authoritative statements US policy, particularly in light Dept's assurances (Deptel 476 Sept 3 and Depcirtel Sept 9, 6 a. m.[2]) that ESM not designed force Israeli-Arab econ cooperation. PCC on repeated occasions and prior activation ESM outlined to Leb and other dels Lausanne objectives ESM, and received their assurances Arab cooperation therewith.

In view repeated discussion Leb officials emphasizing econ burden of refugees, Leb reaction to ESM difficult to understand, since one of ESM's major purposes is to recommend means lifting such burden from Leb. Leb therefore stands to gain from cooperation with ESM

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[1] Not printed.

[2] Latter not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1369.

on two counts, namely, in alleviation of strain produced by excessively large refugee population and in obtaining support for Leb's econ development aspirations.

You shld point out that cooperation with ESM implies no prior commitment accept its recommendations, although we hope that sound techn basis on which they will be formulated will make them acceptable not only to NE states but to all govts in position extend financial support in their implementation.

From point of view USG, if ESM fails obtain necessary cooperation, we see no means obtaining settlement NE problems in foreseeable future. Conversely, if ESM meets with cooperation and good will from NE Govts, report will serve as basis constructive and beneficial action during coming months by GA and interested member states towards solution econ ills of NE.[3]

Inform Clapp foregoing.

You may make such additions or deletions in foregoing as you feel wld assure effective presentation.[4]

ACHESON

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[3] Minister Pinkerton, on September 19, sought authorization to delay the suggested representations to the Lebanese Government, inasmuch as Mr. Clapp had received complete cooperation from the Lebanese Government and because a reshuffling of the Lebanese Government seemed imminent (telegram 480 from Beirut). The Department gave the authorization the following day (telegram 535 to Beirut). This exchange of messages is filed under 501.BB Palestine(E)/9–1949, 9–2049.

[4] The Department simultaneously instructed Damascus to arrange an immediate meeting with the Syrian Foreign Minister and make oral, informal representations along the broad lines of telegram 512 to Beirut (telegram 413, September 15, 8 p. m., 501.BB Palestine(E)/9–1549). Minister Keeley did so on September 16. He expressed the opinion that "ESM will be received by Syria following recognition [of the Syrian regime] but am not sanguine about Syrian cooperation in implementing any ESM recommendations that relieves Israel of obligation to carry out UN resolutions." (telegram 552, September 17, noon, 501.BB Palestine(E)/9–1749)

The Department, on September 15, also instructed Cairo to "continue to emphasize importance which US attaches to its [ESM's] success, and shld recall to FonMin that PCC on number occasions prior activation ESM discussed ESM fully with Arab dels Lausanne and recd their assurances Arab cooperation therewith." (telegram 921, 501.BB Palestine(E)/9–1549)

501.BB Palestine/9–1649 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, September 16, 1949.

573. Sharett today issued following press statement:

"Instrument stands as its own condemnation. It is patently ineffectual in relation to purpose which it proposes to achieve. It bears no signs of real conviction on part of its authors as regards its real ability. It represents vain attempt to adapt theoretically conception

of international regime for Jerusalem based on principle of separate sovereignty in administration to realities of situation. In process its authors were driven to fly in face of those realities. By every test of justice and realism instrument is anachronistic and incongruous.

It is idle to disregard fact that Jewish Jerusalem is today for all practical purposes and in every political military administrative economic social and cultural sense an integral part of Israel. But for that organic connection and complete identification it would not have survived, nor would it have been able to maintain itself. While problem of Jerusalem formed subject of theoretical discussion on international scene before number of successive bodies Jerusalem itself went through death agonies, defended itself successfully against its attackers and rebuilt its life. It could achieve this only as part of state of Israel, and with its help find it is impossible to break this connection without again jeopardising its existence.

Tacit assumption of instrument that crucial problems of state sovereignty and rights of inhabitants to national allegiance and full-fledged citizenship can simply be bypassed renders the whole scheme illusory.

Equally unreal is express assertion that affairs of Jerusalem can today be effectively administered by mixed Jewish Arab council of equal composition. All such theoretical experiments in constitution making at expense of Jerusalem's vital interests are matter of past.

Idea that population of Jerusalem can be deliberately and artificially frozen either in total size or in racial composition is utterly fantastic. Provision contained in instrument with regard to immigration is not merely a denial of right of every Jew to go up and live in ancient mother city of his people; nor does it merely constitute a grave menace to Jerusalem's economic future; it is simply unenforceable in practice if Jerusalem is to be treated as living body and not as metaphysical abstraction. In providing for complete demilitarization of Jerusalem, to be applied in future to Jewish and Arab parts of the city, authors of instrument have completely disregarded another cardinal fact—that Jewish Jerusalem is today surrounded on three sides by [Arab?] territory. Formal equality of demilitarization becomes sham when gross inequality is inherent in realities of security situation. Such inequality can only be remembered by ever present capacity for effective defence. Tragic experience is there to be learned from, not to be brushed aside with sublime light-mindedness as irrelevancy.

Instrument itself is further convincing proof that application of principle of international responsibility to regime of Jerusalem cannot and need not go beyond supervision of holy places unless, indeed, principles of international administration were confined to the Old City with its shrines and religious foundations. Growing number of Christian countries and even some churches appear to be ready to accept this conclusion. In any case, insistence of international regime affecting sovereignty and administration by no means represents united will of Christian world. In forthcoming assembly delegation of Israel will do its utmost to show injustice and impracticability of proposed plan, and to prove to satisfaction of unfeasibility of solution which would fully safeguard rights and interests of all faiths and religious

institutions without encroaching upon freedom of Jewish Jerusalem and its indissoluble connection with its area Israel." [1]

BURDETT

[1] Tel Aviv reported, on September 20, that "Strong opposition to PCC Jerusalem plan continues come from all sides, with menacing tones now being heard from such extreme elements as Herut (successors to IZL) and Communists." A Herut rally at Tel Aviv on September 16 "pledged that Jewish youth would resume fighting underground in Jerusalem if government did not take lead in resisting plot against Jerusalem." Chargé Ford concluded that "public opinion being whipped up to burning and possibly fighting point on question Jerusalem's future." (telegram 699, 501.BB Palestine/9–2049)

501.BB Palestine/9–1749 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, September 17, 1949—6 p. m.

3489. USDel, PCC, reports that on Sept 12 PCC delivered notes containing observations and suggestions re Arab and Israeli replies to PCC questionnaire handed to Arab and Israeli dels on Aug 15. PCC informed dels territorial proposals exceeded limits what might be considered adjustments to May 12 protocol and annexed map. PCC requested dels and their govts to reexamine question and hoped that when PCC reconvened it wld find new proposals which cld be practical working basis.

USDel, PCC, reports that members PCC informed dels they requesting their govts make representations to Israel and Arab states concerned in order emphasize importance attached to submission by these states of more flexible and reasonable proposals on territory when PCC reconvenes about mid-Oct. Dept believes such approaches wld be desirable and that French, Turks and US shld coordinate efforts. However, as emphasis has been shifted for time being to ESM and as ESM shld be permitted proceed unencumbered by injection political questions, Dept feels that it wld be preferable to postpone suggested approaches for moment. Pls discuss foregoing with FonOff, and indicate Dept will consult further with Turk and French govts re approaches at later date.[1]

ACHESON

[1] This telegram was repeated to Ankara for similar action. Ambassador Bruce, on September 19, advised that the French Foreign Office agreed with the content of telegram 3489 and that it would "refrain from approaches and meanwhile concentrate on efforts to promote better understanding and better acceptance of ESM." (telegram 3867 from Paris, 501.BB Palestine (E)/9–1949)

The Turkish Foreign Office, on September 16, instructed its Missions to make the representations on territorial proposals requested by the Palestine Conciliation Commission (telegram 394, September 21, 5 p. m., from Ankara). Ankara, on September 22, advised that the Foreign Office had countermanded these instructions (telegram 396). The two telegrams from Ankara are filed under 501.BB Palestine/9–2149 and /9–2249, respectively.

501.BB Palestine/9–1949 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 19, 1949—1 p. m.

605. Dept concerned re reaction Israeli Govt to PCC proposals for permanent internatl regime in Jerusalem. Israelis have apparently rejected plan without even giving it thorough consideration which we believe it deserves. Discuss matter with FonOff and point out PCC has made diligent efforts reconcile position both parties and its conclusions have not been reached as result arbitrary decision. On contrary, they have been prepared only after careful thought and study of situation and represent PCC's considered views as to practical approach to internationalization of Jerusalem. We hope Israeli Govt will give proposals most serious consideration and whatever objections they may have to plan will be presented to GA in conciliatory spirit which will assist GA in putting into effect desires of world community re Jerusalem.[1]

ACHESON

[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, London, Ankara, Amman, Jerusalem, and New York. Chargé Ford discussed the subject matter of the message with Mr. Shiloah on September 23. The following day, he advised the Department that the Israeli spokesman left "no doubt either about his own disagreement with PCC plan or about his government's determination to oppose it." (telegram 710 from Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/9–2449)

501.BB Palestine(E)/9–1949 : Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

SECRET BEIRUT, September 19, 1949—5 p. m.

481. Simes 1. For McGhee from Clapp.

1. Although fully cognizant of problems we face, I am not discouraged by initial reception we have encountered (Legtel 480 19th).[1]

2. I conferred at length Saturday, 17th, with Keeley. On basis his recommendation, I will not make immediate approach to Syria, but plan instead to go to Egypt first, perhaps end this week. Visit will be largely *pro forma*. Syria visit tentatively scheduled for next week.

3. I am convinced that early discussions Arab states should be along lines work projects instead relief, with less talk of resettlement during first stages. In early talks at Tel Aviv, I intend to begin exploratory talks on compensation as well as repatriation.

4. [Here follows one sentence on the arrival of three members of Mr. Clapp's staff.]

[Clapp]
PINKERTON

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 1390.

Editorial Note

Secretary of State Acheson addressed the General Assembly on various subjects on September 21. Concerning the Palestine problem, he said that "it was a source of considerable satisfaction that the period of active hostilities in that country had been brought to a close by the conclusion of armistice agreements between Israel and the several Arab States. The efforts of the Acting Mediator and his staff in that connexion were worthy of high praise.

"Since the beginning of 1949 the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine had been carrying on its work. While no agreed settlement between the parties had so far been reached, there was nevertheless hope that progress would be made in moving beyond the armistice stage to a real and permanent peace.

"Eventual agreement between the parties was essential for the political and economic stability of the area. Later during the session the Conciliation Commission would present a report, including the recommendations of the Economic Survey Mission which was in the Near East. On the basis of that report, the General Assembly should be able to provide such machinery as might be necessary further to facilitate and encourage agreement among the parties. The United States stood ready to give its full support and assistance to that effort.

"The plight of the Palestinian refugees presented to the world a pressing humanitarian problem. It was of the highest importance that the States immediately concerned should recognize and accept their governmental responsibilities with respect to the problem. As an interim measure, the General Assembly should make the necessary provision for the maintenance of those refugees until the time when they could again become self-sustaining members of the Near Eastern communities.

"It was the hope of the peoples of all faiths that the General Assembly would be able to act successfully upon the report of the Conciliation Commission in respect to Jerusalem. In the view of the United States Government, it should adopt a practical plan for a permanent international regime in the Jerusalem area and for the protection of, and free access to, the Holy Places." (United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Session, Plenary Meetings, Summary Records of Meetings, 20 September–10 December 1949*, page 6)

501.BB Palestine(E)/9–2149 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 21, 1949—3 p. m.

3428. For your background info, Dept has for some time been disturbed by inadequate support given by Brit to ESM since its activation. For example (1) Brit failed to inform their missions to support ESM and explain its objectives to NE govts until US representations made to UK; (2) Morton, discussing ESM with USDel Lausanne, stated HMG seriously disturbed by turn of events re ESM and said he understood agreement previously reached that ESM wld consist govt reps empowered to suggest and conclude with NE states polit agreements for solution Pal problems based on repatriation resettlement projects; (3) Brit Chargé Amman informed US Chargé his scepticism re success ESM and regret over Brit involvement in ESM; (4) Bevin in Sep 13 conversation with Sec displayed negative attitude in general re Pal and said he had no faith in ESM or "any other commission"; (5) tel from Tel Aviv no. 124 to London Sep 20.[1]

UK attitude this question difficult to understand since Dept had understood all previous differences with UK re composition structure ESM fully reconciled (refer particularly to Deptel 2617, July 26,[2] urtel 2978,[3] July 28; Deptel 2770, Aug 4;[4] urtel 3093, Aug 5[5]). Dept hopes question inadequate support of ESM has now been satisfactorily resolved (urtel 3711 Sep 15[6]).

Although Brit now appear to be acting more energetically, you shld seek whenever appropriate and on continuing basis to emphasize importance which USG attaches to UK participation on ESM, UK support in field, and eventual UK contribution to implementation its recommendations. You shld inquire of FonOff re specific reaction

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[1] This was a repeat of No. 700 to the Department; it stated that "In talk with British Chargé September 19 re ESM, he stated only specific instructions yet received from his government indicated some unwillingness 'be too precipitate' in lending support ESM in Israel because of opposition which had developed certain Arab states notably Iraq. Thus he said while he was authorized 'in principle' to coordinate his approach to Israel Government with those of US and French, he must necessarily 'go slow' until results of current negotiations with recalcitrant Arab Governments became known and position ESM vis-à-vis such governments had been clarified." (501.BB Palestine(E)/9–2049)

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1258.

[3] Not printed.

[4] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1258.

[5] No. 3093 not printed; it gave the observation of a Foreign Office spokesman that except for the personnel question, there seemed to be general agreement with the United States on the establishment of the survey mission (501.BB Palestine/8–549).

[6] Not printed, it reported that the Foreign Office had sent telegrams late in the evening of September 14 to British missions at Arab capitals and Tel Aviv, requesting them to give diplomatic support to the Economic Survey Mission (501.BB Palestine (E)/9–1549).

each NE state to recent representations on ESM, explaining Dept's desire for full info in order assure continuing coordination of action this regard, and to insure concerted effort by US, UK, Fr, Turk missions in NE to support and elucidate ESM's purposes.

Pls report fully any evidence UK still reluctant extend support.

ACHESON

501.BB Palestine/9–2249

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 22, 1949.

Subject: Israeli reaction to PCC Jerusalem proposals

Since the proposals of the PCC were released to the press last week, an intensive and violent press and publicity campaign has been started in Israel condemning the proposals (Tab A).[1] Moreover, the Foreign Minister and other government officials have made public statements against the proposals[2] (Tab B). One particularly disquieting feature has been the threats of the Heruth (Freedom Party) to resume their terrorist activities if Jerusalem is internationalized. According to a recent press report, a former leader of the Irgun said in Tel Aviv on September 20 that "if the UN introduces conditions of foreign rule in the Israeli capital, then establishment of the underground would be inevitable" (Tab C).

There is also evidence that the Israelis are carrying on their campaign in this country.

According to a recent telegram from the Consulate General in Jerusalem, a New York *Herald* correspondent and a London *Times* correspondent stated that the Israeli Government is conducting the most intensive press and publicity campaign these correspondents have yet witnessed in their experience in Israel, in an effort to defeat the proposals (Tab D).

Although we have sent telegraphic instructions to the Embassy in Tel Aviv[3] to discuss the matter with the Foreign Office and express the hope that the Israeli Government would give the proposals the most serious consideration, presenting their objections to the GA in a conciliatory spirit (Tab E), I feel that it would be desirable if you would call in Ambassador Elath and inform him of the Department's views on the PCC proposals and of its deep concern regarding the

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[1] No tabbed materials in this memorandum found attached.

[2] For the Foreign Minister's statement, see telegram 573, September 16, from Jerusalem, p. 1390.

[3] See telegram 605, September 19, p. 1393.

attitude and line of action which the Israeli Government has apparently adopted. It may well be that if the Israeli Government persists in this attitude, the resultant situation will have a most unfortunate effect in connection with efforts to arrive at some peaceful solution of the Palestine problem.

Recommendations:

1. It is recommended that you call in Ambassador Elath and make the following points:

(*a*) The Department is deeply concerned regarding the reaction of the Israeli Government to the PCC proposals and notes that Israel has apparently rejected the plan without giving it the thorough consideration which we believe it deserves.

(*b*) The PCC has made diligent efforts to reconcile the position of both parties and its conclusions have not been reached as the result of any arbitrary determination. On the contrary, they have been prepared only after careful thought and study of the situation and represent the PCC's considered views.

(*c*) We believe that these proposals represent a fair and practical approach to the establishment of a permanent international regime in the Jerusalem area, and hope that whatever amendments Israel may have to the plan will be presented to the GA in a conciliatory spirit. We believe that Israel should approach this question on the basis of a desire to assist the GA in putting into effect the desires of the world community regarding Jerusalem—not on the basis of a desire to frustrate the plan.

(*d*) We believe that the continuation of what appears to be a press campaign in Palestine to defeat the proposals may have the most unfortunate effects in connection with efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Palestine problem. The threats regarding the resumption of terrorist activities are also most disquieting.

(*e*) It is possible that if present developments regarding the proposals continue, hostilities in the Jerusalem area might break out and might even spread to the rest of Palestine.

(*f*) It is recalled that Count Bernadotte's assassination last September followed closely on a press campaign against his activities. At the present time there are numerous American, French, Belgian, and Turkish officials connected with the UN in Jewish Jerusalem whose lives may well be placed in jeopardy. The Ambassador is no doubt aware of the reaction which would be caused throughout the world if any of these people should become victims of the passions which are presently being aroused.

2. It is recommended that you approve the attached telegram [5] to Tel Aviv informing our Embassy that we are calling in the Israeli Ambassador on this matter (Tab F).

[Here follow concurrences and a list of attachments.]

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[4] Ambassador Elath was called in on September 28; for the memorandum covering his discussion with Department officers on that date, see p. 1409.

[5] For a summary of the draft telegram as actually sent, see footnote 2, p. 1412.

501.BB Palestine/9–2249 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL JERUSALEM, September 22, 1949—noon.

587. Message contained Deptel 379 [1] delivered to Riley last night. He is considerably "perturbed" over Israel attitude and endeavoring to fathom motives. Feels Israel may be attempting to eliminate gradually UN participation in MAC's in belief can obtain greater advantages without restraining influence of UN. Israel particularly annoyed at chairman's developing into arbiter and at large adverse majority votes.

Developments follow: Egyptian MAC—Riley in receipt of another letter from Eytan stating Israel distressed to learn of Egypt's refusal to accept "compromise" relocation of line (Contel 575, seventeenth)[2] and expressing belief this due to Egypt's effort to obtain military and political advantage from armistice. Eytan reasserted own position on line and stated Israel would use every legal means at its disposal to obtain acceptance. Claimed any effort to force different interpretation by action of MAC would be tantamount to alteration of armistice agreement and thus beyond competence of MAC (this statement opens way to declaring any decision by MAC interpreting armistice as alteration of terms and thus outside its jurisdiction). Riley called on Sharett to discuss question and latter reiterated Israel arguments stressing that armistice stood by itself and any other agreement at Rhodes could not be used in interpreting it. Riley differed strongly and suggested Israel accept MAC views on location of line; if Egypt later raised question of military post could argue troops were based on settlement (troops based on settlements permitted in defensive zone but armistice does not specify whether new settlements may be founded in defensive zone). Sharett agreed reconsider matter and answer today.

Jordan MAC—Special committee investigating also alteration of line to permit inclusion of Wadi Fukin within Arab zone. In exchange Israel now requesting area including other Arab villages. Question of Govt House again arisen. Previous efforts agree on line dividing area between Israel and Jordan not successful.

Jordan has presented complaint to MAC that Israel constructing blockhouses within former neutral zone which not yet divided. Israel

[1] Dated September 19, not printed; it expressed the Department's serious concern about the situation developing in the Jordan, Syrian and Egyptian Mixed Armistice Commissions and its disquiet about various incidents and the "Israeli attitude in general." It also instructed Jerusalem to inform General Riley of the Department's concern and to keep the Department fully informed of developments (867N.01/9–1349). No. 379 was repeated to Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Cairo, and New York.

[2] Not printed.

claims are houses. Riley and UN officers consider edifices are constructed for use as military installations and give command of Jericho road. This is violation of article 2, paragraph 1 of armistice. Chairman raised matter informally with Biran, Israel deputy member MAC, who stated that if MAC by majority vote ordered investigation people and army would "become very excited" and shooting might occur. Riley feels best approach is to seek again agreement between Jordan and Israel on division of area and concurrently obtain Israel consent to demolish blockhouses. Hopes Israel will agree if area divided. He also considers demarcation line proposed during last negotiations as equitable.

Department may wish consider desirability pointing out to Jordan Government advantages of reaching agreement on Government House division thus perhaps eliminating this troublesome question.

Syrian MAC—during visit to Damascus, Riley persuaded Colonel Hinnawi to agree that chairman should determine what constitutes return to normal civilian life in demilitarized zones. Chairman thus can permit construction of houses Ein Gev area. Israel has taken no action on letter from MAC chairman calling for destruction of fortifications at Ein Gev.

Sent Department 587; repeated Tel Aviv 60, Beirut 114, Damascus 73; Department pass Amman 113, Cairo 30.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/9–2349

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of International Organization Affairs (Halderman)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 23, 1949.

PALESTINE POLITICAL AND REFUGEE PROBLEMS

PROBLEM

The problem is to determine the position of the United States as to action to be taken by the General Assembly with respect to the problems of achieving a political settlement of the Palestine case and the problems of direct relief, repatriation and resettlement of the Palestine refugees. The problem includes the main aspects of the Palestine case except Jerusalem and the Holy Places (see separate papers).

[1] Transmitted to Mr. Rusk by Messrs. McGhee and Sandifer in a memorandum of September 23, which stated that if Mr. Rusk approved the plan, "we propose that it be discussed with the British and French as soon as possible, both within the Clapp Mission and in Washington.

"We also propose to furnish the paper to the General Assembly Delegation with the notation that it should not be discussed with other delegations pending consultation with the French and British." (501.BB Palestine/9–2349)

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Due to the interrelationship of the problems under consideration (discussion below), it is desirable that the General Assembly should establish an integrated organization for the future conduct of the Palestine case.

2. A United Nations Palestine Commission should handle the general supervisory and policy making functions. The present terms of reference of the Conciliation Commission might be used with suitable amendments to include the additional authority and responsibilities to be conferred upon it and to define the relationship between it and the other component parts of the integrated organization. The Commission's operational director in the conduct of operations should be the Agent General referred to in the following recommendation. As regards the composition of the Commission the present states represented on the Conciliation Commission (United States, France and Turkey) might be continued. The Commission's responsibilities in respect to Jerusalem, if any, will depend upon the action of the General Assembly on that problem.

3. The executive director for the operations of the Organization should be a single individual, designated as Agent General (or some other appropriate title) who would be given broad responsibilities for the direction of (1) the negotiation of a political settlement including boundaries and refugees, (2) the administration of direct relief, (3) programs for development projects bearing relation to the economic dislocations created by the hostilities, including the resettlement and repatriation of refugees, and (4) possible duties in connection with Jersualem. The Agent General would report to and be subject to instruction by the Commission on general policy questions.

4. In respect to the political settlement, the General Assembly would grant authority to the Commission to continue to assist in the negotiations between the parties on all phases. This program would be conducted primarily through the instrumentality of the Agent General.

5. In respect to direct relief the General Assembly should make provision for the machinery necessary for its administration and provide a plan for contributions from United Nations Members (similar to UNRPR). The Agent General should have a general supervisory function in respect of direct relief.

6. In respect to the development projects the General Assembly should take note of the intention of certain governments to provide funds for settlement and development, the projects to be coordinated by an "Authority", probably consisting of the grantor states. The United States Government contemplates approaching the United Kingdom and France in this context.

7. In the fields of direct relief and development the details of what should be provided by the General Assembly concerning the structure of the component parts of the Organization and the relationship between them, cannot be precisely determined until receipt of the recommendation of the Economic Survey Mission.

8. Under the plan, therefore, there would be four components of the organization for which the Agent General would provide unified direction and coordination. United Nations funds as such would not be used except for the administrative expenses of the Commission, the Agent General and his staff. Funds for direct relief would probably come from the special contributions of United Nations Members. Funds for the development projects would probably come from those states participating in the program, from bank loans, and perhaps other sources including compensation paid for refugee property losses.

DISCUSSION

Inter-Dependence of Political and Refugee Aspects of Palestine Problem

The solution of the three problems outstanding in the Palestine case are in effect one problem with progress toward the solution of each to a large degree interdependent. A political settlement is unlikely unless arrangements are in train with respect to the resettlement and repatriation of refugees. Commitments for the resettlement of refugees are in turn dependent upon outside capital assistance for national development projects as well as upon progress toward a political settlement. Contributions toward emergency relief depend upon progress on a program for the resettlement and repatriation program so that an end to relief expenditures would be in sight.

Furthermore, the interdependence of the problems is such that in order to avoid a stalemate, a final solution of any of them must not be contingent upon action on another. On the other hand a program looking toward the solution of each is prerequisite to a program looking toward the solution of the others.

Necessity of Integrated Organization

On the basis of the foregoing assumptions, it is necessary to establish an integrated authority to provide unified direction and control of the programs looking toward the solution of each aspect of the problem. The Conciliation Commission has had broad functions relating to each phase, except relief, but it was not conceived, nor has it functioned as an operating agency. The General Assembly should therefore establish the machinery for the direction required to develop and operate an interrelated program.

COMPONENT PARTS OF THE ORGANIZATION

A. *The United Nations Palestine Commission*

The United Nations Palestine Commission would probably consist of three states, i.e., the present members of the Conciliation Commission. It would conduct the general supervisory and policy function of the United Nations. It should not be in continuous session but could arrange to meet as necessary either in New York or elsewhere. The Agent General would stand in the position of its Executive in the field for the conduct of negotiations and the conduct of its supervisory functions over the other component parts of the organization.

The principal advantage of a Commission is that it would lend substantial support to the Agent General who will be subject to strong pressures from opposing parties. Government members of the Commission are in a good position to apply pressure directly on the states involved in the dispute. Such pressures might be decisively effective in support of the Agent General.

B. *Conciliation*

For the exercise of the functions under this heading, a relatively small staff would be required primarily responsible to the Agent General. The cost of this function would be carried in the regular United Nations budget.

C. *Direct Relief*

The United Nations, in establishing the UNRPR, undertook responsibility for providing direct relief for the refugees until August 31, 1949. Direct relief on a large scale will need to be continued until permanent resettlement and repatriation of the refugees or acceptance by the governments involved of full responsibility for them. A further appeal to governments for funds would not be productive unless projected against the background of a program looking toward the definitive solution of the refugee problem. In as much as the source of funds for relief should have as wide a base as possible, and since the appeal of all governments will need to be on a humanitarian basis, it is therefore proposed that the responsibility for the present functions of UNRPR be a part of the overall organization.

Contributions for this program would be on a voluntary basis.

D. *Settlement and Development Authority*

The Economic Survey Mission is charged with making recommendations in this context. The development of a suitable agency or authority for coordinating the participation of states (primarily the US, UK and France) in the projects for the resettlement of refugees within the framework of the proposed organization will require substantial preparatory work and negotiation because of the large funds required

and because of the complex problem involved in assuring that the projects achieve the desired objectives.

The scope of the work of the "Authority" will require careful definition, particularly in respect to such matters as whether work relief, costs of the movement of refugees to their new countries, and other expenses incident to repatriation and resettlement should be borne by the states participating in this program or treated as expenses of direct relief. A second problem is the relationship between the Agent General and the Authority for purposes of coordination.

Consultations with the British and French are necessary to consider in some detail the problems involved in setting up such an authority and to reach agreement thereon including preliminary agreement on contributions. Such consultations will take place during the course of the Economic Mission, and final decisions cannot be made until at least preliminary results of this work are known.

E. *Compensation*

The problem of compensation is a distinct field which is nevertheless closely inter-related with the political and refugee aspects of the Palestine problem. In as much as the problem is one to be worked out by negotiation, the Agent General might be given authority to take steps to bring about the determination and fulfillment of obligations in respect of the payment of compensation for loss or damage to property owned by refugees, and to take appropriate measures to effectuate the equitable disposition of the proceeds of any such payments.

501.BB Palestine/9–2649

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk)[1]

[WASHINGTON,] September 26, 1949.

Subject: Long Term Organization to Continue Work of Economic Survey Mission

Problem:

The terms of reference of ESM[2] include the preparation of a long term organizational plan to operate in the field of relief and resettlement of the refugees from hostilities in Palestine. At Mr. Clapp's suggestion the outline of such a plan is to be prepared by the Department for ESM consideration. A draft to be submitted to Clapp is attached (Tab A).[3]

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[1] Sent also by Mr. Sandifer.
[2] Dated September 1, p. 1346.
[3] Not printed.

Discussion:

The enclosure outlines an organization (Near East Settlement and Development Authority) to function with the Palestine Commission (see separate paper on that subject)[4] on the assumption that the US, UK and France agree to establish it. Other members of the UN may be admitted to NESDA. NESDA's role would be advisory and coordinative; it would have a staff to continue the work of ESM, and it would be consulted by its member governments before assistance was furnished to states concerned. Funds to operate its programs would come from bank loans, compensation, grants from abroad, and other sources. It would have no veto over projects of its members, but its authority would stem from its knowledge of the area and undertakings to consult it before funds were made available for development.

NESDA's work would be coordinated with relief operations of UNRPR or its successor through the Agent General.

NESDA would call on the UN and specialized agencies for administrative and technical staff.

It is proposed to discuss the establishment of NESDA with the UK and France through the ESM deputies and simultaneously in Washington with the Embassies, in order that timely action may be taken as necessary by this session of the GA.

Recommendation:

Authorization to proceed with these discussions along the lines of the attached paper is recommended.

[Here follow concurrences.]

[4] The editors are unable to identify this paper; possibly the draft to be submitted to Mr. Clapp is intended.

883.801/9–2149 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 26, 1949—12 noon.

954. [In] Connection with representations Brit making [to] Egypts re passage Suez Canal by Haifa-bound tankers and at suggestion of Brit Chargé, Brit Emb approached Dept under instrus FonOff with request Emb Cairo be authorized lend support in form general approach Egypt Govt urging lifting restrictions on passage thru Canal in respect all shipping. (Ref London's Tel 3783, Sept 21[2] rptd Cairo as 955.) Neth Belg Nor Swed Turk and Ital being similarly

[1] This telegram was repeated to London.
[2] Not printed.

approached by Brit with request their reps consult Brit Chargé in order determine if such action in fact desirable and if so time and manner of approach.

You authorized take such action. If approach made you shld base your arguments on (1) previous US approaches re freedom of shipping thru Canal (Deptel 759 June 9 1948 [3]) (2) fact armistice agreements have been concluded between Israel and Arab states (3) removal of UN and US arms embargo (Depcirtel Aug 16 4 a. m. and Depcirtel Sept. 7 6 a. m.[4]).

This approach is not of course connected with present activities Econ Survey Mis and shld there be evidence Egypt misinterpretation you shld informally clarify.

Since drafting foregoing Brit report Chapman-Andrews [5] saw PriMin Sept 22 and outcome talk unsatisfactory. He will doubtless inform you re conversation as factor in determining desirability supporting action by US and other powers.

Dept also discussed with Brit Emb rep manner which supporting action might take and suggests you consider in detail with Chapman-Andrews. Brit Emb rep agreed with Dept solemn parade fon reps in Cairo to Egypt FonOff wld certainly become known privately and publicly in Egypt. Resulting publicity might subsequently prevent favorable Egypt action. Manner supporting action shld therefore be carefully arranged and might, in final analysis, determine whether supporting action wld be advisable at this stage.

WEBB

[3] *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1108.
[4] Neither printed.
[5] Edwin A. Chapman-Andrews, British Minister in Egypt.

867N.00/9–2649

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Wilkins) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs (McGhee)

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] September 26, 1949.

Subject: Mt. Scopus situation

We have considered Dr. Senator's request that the US Government make representations to Jordan regarding free access to Mt. Scopus [1] but we believe that we should not take any action on this matter.

[1] The request of David W. Senator, Vice President of the Hebrew University at Jerusalem, was made in a conversation with Messrs. McGhee, Wilkins, and Stabler earlier the same day (memorandum of conversation by Mr. McGhee, 867N.4212/9–2649).

During the negotiations at Rhodes between the Israelis and Jordan, the Israelis insisted that Jordan accept certain conditions before they agreed to sign even a "cease fire." Included in these conditions was free access to Mt. Scopus. Due to the fact that the Jordan Government wished to proceed to the armistice stage, it accepted free access to Mt. Scopus in principle.

Article VIII of the armistice agreement provided that a Special Committee would be organized to "direct its attention to the formulation of agreed plans and arrangements for such matters as either party may submit to it, which, in any case, shall include the following on which agreement in principle already exists: free movement of traffic on vital roads, including the Bethlehem and Latrun-Jerusalem roads; resumption of the normal functioning of the cultural and humanitarian institutions on Mt. Scopus and free access thereto; free access to the Holy Places and cultural institutions and use of the cemetery on the Mount of Olives; resumption of operation of the Latrun pumping station; provision of electricity for the Old City; and resumption of operation of the railroad to Jerusalem."

To date the only matter that has been successfully handled by the Special Committee has been the resumption of the operation of the railroad. On all other matters the Special Committee was unable to formulate any agreed plans. The Jordan delegates, while maintaining that they still agreed in principle to free access to Mt. Scopus, were unable to reach any satisfactory agreement with the Israelis on how free access could be worked out. Mt. Scopus is a very strategic location overlooking the Old City and most of the main arteries leading to Arab Jerusalem from Jordan-controlled territory. Consequently, the Jordanians did not wish to give the Israelis complete freedom of passage without any form of control. Moreover, Jordan has also raised the question of the return of certain Arab quarters in Jerusalem which, it is assumed, were presented to the Special Committee under the phrase "such matters as either party may submit to it."

The use of the Bethlehem road and the restoring of the electricity to the Old City are not very important to Jordan, as they have been getting along quite well without electricity and have built a secondary road to Bethlehem through Arab territory. What is important to them is the return of certain Arab quarters now held by the Israelis. Jordan is determined to make use of the Mt. Scopus situation as a bargaining point for their demands. There is nothing in Article VIII which requires Jordan to accept any "plans and arrangements" for free access to Mt. Scopus unless they agree to them. So far, Jordan has not agreed.

Because of this impasse the Department proposed to Jordan and Israel that both accept to refer matters on Article VIII, as well as the border questions involved in Jerusalem including demarcation lines, to the Mixed Armistice Commission under the chairmanship of General Riley. It was felt that Riley would be able to help the parties in "the formulation of agreed plans and arrangements" and might be able to produce compromise suggestions. Jordan accepted the proposal on the basis that it favored the return of normal life to Jerusalem. Israel accepted the proposal in principle but objected to the MAC dealing with the broader question of Jerusalem. In other words, Israel wished the MAC to consider only those points specifically mentioned in Article VIII of the armistice agreement.

Although we have pointed out to Israel on numerous occasions that acceptance of our proposal might enable the parties to settle their differences on the general subject of Jerusalem, without prejudicing the interest of the world community in the city, Israel has refused to go along with the proposal.

It is believed that it would be unwise for the Department to take any action on Dr. Senator's request and that the question should be left to the UN and General Riley to handle as they think best.[2]

[2] The Department summarized this memorandum in telegram 636, September 30, 6 p. m., to Tel Aviv and instructed Ambassador McDonald as follows: "In your talks with Israeli officials re PCC Jerusalem proposals, you might find it useful to point out above situation is one more reason why necessary for Israel to adopt constructive and reasonable approach to Jerusalem question. PCC plan wld seem to offer basis on which Israeli approach might now be based." (867N.01/9-3049)

501.BB Palestine(E)/9–2749

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Wilkins) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs (McGhee)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 27, 1949.

Subject: Emphasis on Work Relief by Economic Survey Mission.

Discussion:

There are attached two telegrams [2] concerning the Economic Survey Mission's intention of placing primary emphasis initially upon work relief projects "not necessarily implying permanent resettlement", in preparing its interim report. The telegrams clearly suggest that the question of permanent settlement projects would be deferred until

[1] Sent also to Mr. Gardiner.
[2] Not found attached.

the final report of the Mission, which will probably not be submitted until January 1, after the closing of the General Assembly.

Although the political considerations which motivated this tactical shift are understandable, the question of the time factor involved in the proposed schedule must be taken into account. If the preliminary report of the Mission is drafted solely or chiefly within the context of work relief projects, action in the General Assembly would presumably have to be confined to voting a large-scale relief and work relief program. Assuming that such a resolution could obtain the necessary votes in the Assembly, such a program would necessitate a greatly increased expenditure over a straight relief program, without materially advancing liquidation of the refugee problem, and would tend to further prolong the present political stalemate with respect to the refusal of both sides to get on with settlement of the refugee problem. Finally, the proposed emphasis would preclude action at the General Assembly to establish an Authority, which must be based principally on permanent settlement and development projects.

In view of the importance of the preliminary report of the Economic Survey Mission as a springboard for the establishment of the Authority, together with the advantage of obtaining concrete progress on permanent settlement projects where political conditions are favorable to their early initiation, notably in Jordan, it is believed that Mr. Clapp's preliminary report should be drafted as a total program of relief, work relief, settlement and development projects, and that his final report should constitute a more detailed elaboration of these several aspects.

Recommendations:

It is recommended that these considerations be brought to Mr. Clapp's attention in the very near future, perhaps in connection with transmittal of the working paper concerning the Authority, and that he be urged to draft his report in a manner calculated to give us a basis on which to obtain financing of long range projects as well as work relief.[3]

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[3] Attached is an undated note to Mr. Wilkins from Mrs. Hope, stating that "This is the memo with which we tried to shift Clapp's approach." The Department, on September 30, informed Beirut that the ESM intention to place its main emphasis on work relief in the early stages was causing concern, "lest ESM not include full consideration in interim report of operational plan . . . together with general approximation costs [and] methods financing.

"Action by UNGA to establish organization under which resettlement and development can move forward is essential, and to assure consideration this session UNGA to permit operations to begin in 1950, interim report shld contain adequate documentation supporting organizational plans." (telegram 574, 501.BB Palestine(E)/9–3049)

501.BB Palestine(E)/9–2749 : Circular telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, September 27, 1949—6 a. m.

Since majority NE govts now appear willing receive ESM, in future conversations with govt officials, you shld proceed on assumption govt will cooperate with ESM. Dept hopes as govts and peoples NE become accustomed presence and operations ESM, and as validity its purposes demonstrated, local criticism will abate and increasing measure genuine cooperation extended.

Continue report fully re local reaction ESM, including any significant evidence non-cooperation.

WEBB

[1] At Cairo, Tel Aviv, Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, and Jerusalem. According to an undated memorandum by Mary E. Hope to Mr. Hare attached to this telegram, the message was not sent to Jidda because the Saudi Arabian Government had informed the United Nations of its refusal to receive the Economic Survey Mission.

501.BB Palestine/9–2849

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 28, 1949.

Subject: Israeli reaction to PCC Jerusalem proposals.

Participants: Eliahu Elath, Israeli Ambassador
G—Mr. Rusk
NE—Mr. Wilkins
NE—Mr. Stabler

Problem: To inform Ambassador Elath of our concern over the Israeli reaction to the PCC proposals for the Jerusalem area.

Action Required: To inform Mr. Ross of USUN of Rusk–Elath conversation and probability Eban would approach him to discuss Jerusalem question.

Action Assigned To: NE.

Discussion:

I informed Ambassador Elath that I had asked him to come in connection with the Israeli reaction to the PCC proposals. I recalled that the GA resolution of November 29, 1947, included, *inter alia*, provisions for the full internationalization of Jerusalem. Since it was not

[1] Drafted by Mr. Stabler, assigned to the Division of Near Eastern Affairs after his return from duty in Amman.

possible to implement this resolution, consideration was then given in the spring of 1948 to the possibility of trusteeship for all of Palestine in order to provide governmental machinery for Palestine following the termination of the British Mandate. When the fighting in Jerusalem became more severe, the UN focussed its attention on the Jerusalem question and considered ways and means of solving that question alone. A special trusteeship for the Jerusalem area was among the plans proposed and I had had the occasion at that time to discuss this matter with Mr. Sharett. I told him that a practical plan should be adopted for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area which would permit the integration of Jerusalem, in so far as consistent with its special international character, with the people and institutions in the rest of Palestine. I recalled that Mr. Sharett had not seemed averse to such a plan. I indicated that we believed that the present PCC proposals represent a practical approach of this character. We were therefore surprised and puzzled by the strength and immediacy of the Israeli reaction and I had wanted to discuss the question with the Ambassador in order to clear up any misunderstanding which might have developed on their part regarding the plan. For example, I wondered whether their objections were based on the difference between annexation and something less than annexation.

The Ambassador indicated that Israel had no intention of annexing Jerusalem and believed there was no foundation for such a charge. I said that perhaps I had not made my meaning clear, as I was not speaking of previous press reports that Israel planned immediately to annex Jerusalem but was now referring to a final settlement of the Jerusalem question.

The Ambassador repeated that Israel had no intention of annexing Jerusalem but felt that the present PCC plan did not take into account several important factors in connection with Israel's interest in Jerusalem. He said that several points had annoyed them. He said the paragraph on immigration would prevent Israel from developing the economic life of Jerusalem and from increasing its growth as a cultural and religious center for the Jews. On the question of security, the demilitarization and the limitation on the number of police placed in jeopardy the security of the 100,000 Jews who are resident in Jerusalem. Israel felt that in view of the fact that Jewish Jerusalem is surrounded on three sides by Arabs that it could not afford to neglect the important question of security. Moreover, he doubted whether the UN could provide the administration necessary to carry out the plan. He wondered how the General Council as proposed in the PCC plan would be able to operate and where the funds would come from to

provide the $30,000,000 which the UN estimates is necessary for the administration of Jerusalem.

I indicated that on the matter of security it would seem unfortunate to start a competition on the size of the police forces and the quantity of armaments. I expressed the belief that these matters could be discussed in the GA and could be worked out satisfactorily in the General Council. With respect to the administration of Jerusalem, I thought his figures out of proportion, and in any event it was quite clear that the two areas would be administered and financed by the administering states. The General Council would only be called upon to consider matters which were common to both areas.

I then pointed out that the Catholic and Protestant communities in the US felt quite strongly about the problem of Jerusalem. We had tried to keep the question out of public debate, as we wished the matter considered along practical lines. We did not wish to have injected into the discussion the sentimental and emotional approach which would make it very difficult to arrive at a solution. We had considered Jerusalem as one problem in Palestine which could be settled without too much difficulty, and we had therefore been quite disappointed by the Israeli reaction. We wondered from the immediate strong press comments and statements by officials in Israel whether the Israeli Government had carefully considered the plan. We also wondered whether Israel and the US were talking about the same thing with respect to the meaning of the various provisions. I said I felt that more careful consideration of the plan by Israel and possibly talks between our people and the Israeli delegation in New York might result in dissipating some of the doubts which Israel had on various sections of the proposal. The Ambassador agreed and said he hoped it would be possible for Mr. Ross and Mr. Eban to get together.

The Ambassador said he felt it was unfortunate that the Israelis had not been consulted on the proposals prior to their submission to the UN. He felt that the Israeli objective in Jerusalem, i.e., the preservation and protection of the 100,000 Jews in Jerusalem, could have been better taken into account. Mr. Wilkins pointed out that the Jerusalem committee of the PCC, as well as others on the PCC, had discussed the proposals in detail with Israeli officials both in Tel Aviv and Lausanne during the past 8 months.

The Ambassador asked whether we had received any reaction from the Arabs with respect to the proposals. Mr. Wilkins said that Dr. Malik had made a speech in the GA which appeared to favor the proposals, and that informal talks with certain Arabs in Washington had indicated a generally favorable disposition.

The Ambassador then asked whether the US gave its support to the proposals. I replied that the US, as a member of the PCC, had participated in the drafting of the proposals, and that while final determination on the question was one for the GA, the US did give its support in general to the proposals. However, I indicated that it was quite possible that a number of amendments would be proposed during the GA discussions and that we were prepared to consider them.

I then informed the Ambassador of our concern over the reports from Jerusalem and Tel Aviv indicating that there might be a resumption of terrorist activities. I pointed out that there were a number of American as well as other foreign officials in Jerusalem, and referred to the fact that the situation in Jerusalem had been closely related to the assassination of Count Bernadotte. I expressed the hope that Israel would take the necessary measures to protect the officials in Jerusalem. The Ambassador said that the Israeli Government was aware of the situation and felt the atmosphere in Jerusalem was considerably better in this respect. However, Israel needed the help of the US in connection with the Jerusalem proposals in order to avoid the resumption of these activities.

In connection with possible discussion between our people in New York and the Israeli delegation, I suggested that Mr. Eban might also wish to talk with some of the other delegations, including Colombia, which had expressed much interest in the question of Jerusalem. Mr. Elath replied that Mr. Eban had already done this and found that the majority of the Latin American delegations were more interested in the free access to and preservation of the Holy Places than they were in the broader question of internationalization.

I requested the Ambassador to bring to the attention of the Israeli Government our concern with respect to present developments on the Jerusalem question.[2]

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[2] In telegram 637, September 30, 8 p. m., to Tel Aviv (repeated to Jerusalem, Amman, and New York), the Department stated that "During past month Dept has noted with concern continuation public statements by Israeli officials and increasing press campaign in Israel and US with apparent purpose of creating public belief proposed PCC plan provided for rigid internationalization and thereby prejudiced mutual relations between Israel and Jews resident in Jerusalem." The telegram then summarized the Rusk–Elath conversation of September 28 and concluded with an instruction "to discuss Jerusalem question with Sharett and other Israeli officials along foregoing lines in continuation of instrns contained Deptel 605, Sept 19, and conversations reported Embtels 703, Sept 23, and 710, Sept 24. You shld emphasize that our approach to Jerusalem question is based on fact that Jerusalem and area surrounding it necessary to its existence are of deep concern to three great world religions and that it is our hope that solution for Jerusalem's many intricate problems will be achieved by calm and constructive means." (501.BB Palestine/9–3049) Of the reference telegrams, Nos. 703 and 710 are not printed; but regarding the latter, see footnote 1 to telegram 605, September 19, p. 1393.

501.MA Palestine/9–2949 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, September 29, 1949—2 p. m.

3548. Dept concerned problem financing UNRPR pending GA consideration ESM Report which will furnish basis GA action future relief program. UNRPR cash expected run out about Dec. 15, after exhausting anticipated US contribution of $16 million matched by like sum from other countries, and supplies in pipeline about Jan. 15. UNRPR operating agencies seeking assurances continuation program as cannot take risks inherent in abandoning relief during winter.

Anticipated SYG will propose at UNRPR *Ad Hoc* Advisory Comite mtg Oct 4 GA be asked give early consideration this problem, prior receipt ESM Report, and seek auth advance of $3 million from Working Capital Fund to meet UNRPR requirements until Feb or possibly more to finance operations thru March. Dept most anxious avoid any GA action this question until ESM interim Report recd early Nov and until inter-related parts Palestine problem as whole can be considered by GA because any proposal to extend UNRPR operations even temporarily wld inevitably invite premature discussion future program, which can only be properly considered when ESM report recd. To meet gap in funds that will inevitably arise pending action by govs on GA res, and give assurances to agencies of continuation operations without prejudice nature and extent future program, Dept proposes recommend SYG appeal to IRO for assistance in form of supplies and funds for which no immed allocation by it to its own program expected. We believe IRO presently in position grant such assistance and wld hope favorable action cld be taken by it at Gen Council mtg Geneva beginning Oct. 11. IRO report on fin position as of March 31, 1949, showed unallocated funds equivalent to about $15 million of which substantial amount in sterling. Dept understands IRO presently unable apply large part these holdings to IRO operations and also IRO commodity inventories are high. View this situation and previous IRO assistance to UNRPR, Dept believes appeal IRO for assistance at this time shld result in favorable response.[2]

For your info Dept discussed foregoing with Brit Emb and asked for comments in hope estab identical position this subj at *Ad Hoc* Advisory Comite mtg Oct 4 and at IRO Gen Council.

WEBB

[1] This telegram was repeated to New York.

[2] London, on October 1, advised of the preliminary views of the Foreign Office, namely, that the IRO should not be depended on for financial assistance and might help in a very limited way with supplies and that the IRO would be the best agency to take over the work of UNRPR (telegram 3946, 501.MA Palestine/10–149).

501.BB Palestine(E)/9–349 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, September 29, 1949—7 p. m.

383. Dept informed [1] [that] SYG of UN received tel Sep 26 from SAG notifying UN of its refusal receive ESM because dissatisfied with "trend of treating Pal problem".

You shld call on FonOff immed or soonest pilgrimage terminated, and make fol points, using background contained Deptel 336 Sep 3 [2] and Depcirtel Sep 9, 6 a. m.[3] where relevant.

Dept disappointed SAG reaction and convinced latter based on misconstruction purposes ESM. You shld point out certain other Arab states were initially reluctant receive ESM, but when its objectives and non-polit character were clarified, this reluctance dissipated. With exception SAG, all Arab Govts to which SYG addressed communication (Egypt, Syria, Leb, Jordan, Iraq) have now expressed willingness receive ESM. SAG action difficult understand view King's humanitarian interest in contributing alleviation refugee problem, as indicated by his request Aramco provide employment opportunities for Pal refugees. Moreover, SAG action appears to be reversal previously expressed interest in development and irrigation projects frequently discussed with Emb and Dept. You shld make clear cooperation with ESM implies no prior commitment accept its recommendations, although we hope sound techn basis on which they will be formulated will make them acceptable not only to NE states but to all govts in position extend fin or techn support in their implementation.

You shld express Dept's hope Emb's clarification purposes ESM will induce SAG reconsider at least to extent of receiving ESM informally and informing ESM of SAG's techn and development needs. Foregoing has Amb Childs' concurrence.

Rpt reply Beirut for Clapp.[4]

WEBB

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[1] In telegram 1192, September 26, 11 : 57 p. m., from New York, not printed.

[2] This was a repeat of No. 476, to Beirut, p. 1359.

[3] Not printed.

[4] This telegram was repeated to Beirut. Jidda replied, on October 4, stating that "SAG is profoundly disillusioned with results achieved to date by UN insofar as benefit to themselves is concerned. . . . Now the King has expressed his disapproval of PCC or any branch of it, as well as his personal regret that none of the advice he gave in past to visiting American officials was heeded; and he will likely continue to believe that ESM is essentially a US project, however much we may explain its UN character. Embassy therefore questions whether it would be either good taste or good tactics at this time to press SAG with a new request for entry of ESM and for cooperation with it." (telegram 587, 501.BB Palestine (E)/10–449)

501.BB Palestine(E)/10–149 : Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY BEIRUT, October 1, 1949—11 a. m.

506. Simes 9. For McGhee [From Clapp].

1. Have completed first visits to Lebanon, Egypt, Transjordan and Syria, accompanied by deputies. I explained purpose of Mission emphasizing immediate task to report and recommend to UN by November 1 (now changed) a program of works for temporary employment of able-bodied refugees where they are as a basis for discontinuing or decreasing direct relief program. Asked cooperation of governments in such program without prejudice to their positions on repatriation, compensation or resettlement. Asked for their proposals re such able and useful works projects near refugee concentrations. Offered our experts for joint consultations with understanding that exploration of long-range economic development possibilities would begin after November 1 for later report. Visits arranged in atmosphere of abating suspicion that reception of Mission would indicate weakening attitude Arab States re repatriation and compensation endorsed by UN resolution and that agreement to temporary works program would lead to resettlement without agreement by NE Governments.

Egypt—three days. Brief conference with Prime Minister who was cordial and candid re Egypt's inability to accept refugees in overcrowded present population.[1] I emphasized immediate task Mission and asked cooperation on works program in Gaza area. Conference with Liaison Committee of government developed some ideas and permission was granted our experts to inspect Gaza area to see what can be done.

Dinner with Prime Minister. Trip to desert agricultural experiment station. Fairly good press. Invited to return for visit to Aswan and other developments.

Prime Minister endorsed temporary works program for refugees and is less adamant on repatriation issue than Arab League officials in his own government.

I had most profitable conversation with Ambassador Caffery.[2]

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[1] Harry C. Brown, Finance Officer and Acting Head of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees office at Cairo, informed an Embassy officer that UNRPR had taken responsibility for the 5,000 to 6,000 refugees in Egypt at Kantara at the request of the Egyptian Government and had moved them to Gaza. He also stated that subsequently the Egyptian Government had made overtures requesting UNRPR to assume responsibility for the remaining Palestinian refugees in Egypt. These too were to be sent to Gaza. (despatch 881, October 1, from Cairo, 501.MA Palestine/10–149)

[2] Jefferson Caffery, who had been designated Ambassador to Egypt on July 9.

Transjordan—two days. Temporary works program and possible resettlement schemes freely discussed. Our experts joined us and began field trip both sides of Jordan. Government is ready to go just as far on resettlement as outside funds will permit. Desmond Morton trying to arrange immediate allocation of funds available from British loan to begin works program in Transjordan by Transjordan Government without awaiting Mission report. I have encouraged him to do so.

We had thirty minutes with King Abdullah who stated Arab case forcefully. He endorsed resettlement in Transjordan and insisted upon access to Mediterranean by means of Negev not corridor and no internationalization of Jerusalem. He had strong condemnation of UN handling whole Palestine problem including Bernadotte assassination. He hoped Mission would get action on its economic recommendations.

Syria—two days. You are familiar with difficulties in getting open door for Mission. We were well-received but with extreme caution publicly by government. We had two-hour conference with Foreign Minister Qudsi first day. He stipulated and explained conditions we must accept if government was to "permit" Mission to study possibilities in Syria. Orally conceptions seemed same as reported Keeley but because of delicate political situation of government and need for finding strong program of development helpful to resettlement in Syria, I asked to have conditions in writing for later discussion. Conditions in brief precluded any economic development studies having any relation to refugees. Keeley's thorough briefing had prevented any unpleasant surprise in this respect.

I explained immediate need for temporary works program for refugees now in Syria and asked if his conditions precluded discussions or cooperation. I left him with clear understanding that we could not assign experts to long-range economic developments studies unless cooperation on temporary works program assured now.

Next day we had three hours negotiation with Qudsi on text of conditions. Some progress, and we adjourned until next week. Expect to get into Syria on workable basis. Government afraid to decide anything, but decree extending working rights to refugees is good sign. They want our help on long-range development but will not take position publicly that such developments will, or are intended to, facilitate resettlement, for fear this will weaken their position re repatriation and compensation. Qudsi knows land development will attract refugees but insists resettlement must be unstated corollary and not a subject for international discussion.[3]

[3] Damascus, on October 10, reported that Mr. Clapp and his deputies met with Foreign Minister Qudsi the previous day and agreed on a satisfactory basis "for technical discussions and field inspection in cooperation with Syrian technicians re possibility temporary work projects to employ refugees. Longer range projects will be explored later probably after elections. ESM departed for Tel Aviv yesterday" (telegram 597, 501.BB Palestine(E)/10–1049).

2. We had planned to go to Tel Aviv after Damascus and had tentative date for September 30. In meantime we received official word via British that Israel Government refused to guarantee safety of Morton, British member of ESM. I immediately called off date by cable insisting upon responsible assurance from government for Mission as whole before any date would be set. Tentative date set for October 9 at their suggestion and subject to satisfactory answer mytel re security. Prior to this interchange, Tel Aviv expressed impatience over decision to visit Arab States first. Israeli Delegation raised question with me at Lausanne and later through UN ME channels. Obvious reason for visiting Arab States first is that is where refugees are and refugees are Mission's main problem.

3. In official talks I have evaded formula for financing temporary works except to say it would require cooperation from local governments in supply materials, tools and equipment at least. At most international assistance for wages but probably less. Believe tentatively wages must come primarily from outside. Believe tentatively operating administration of works program should be in national government with supervising auditing and full inspectional functions in international agency with power to stop funds at any time (international organization to be transitional and changeable for longer program).

4. I have held full-dress conferences at each capital. Makes American press ideal by comparison.

5. American Missions at every capital indispensable our work and helped inconspicuously in many ways. Sands [4] accompanied ESM and proved indispensable.

6. Trying to arrange Baghdad visit soon.

7. Preliminary report being drafted on relief extension, temporary works and will include ideas on compensation yet to be discussed at Tel Aviv. Long-range schemes and resettlement for later report. Important to get refugees to work first.

8. Do not expect interim report before November 10.

9. PCC parentage of ESM definite handicap to Mission. Suggest you keep this in mind in considering parentage of organization to carry on economic development programs.

Sent Department, repeated Damascus 76; Department pass Cairo 52, Amman unnumbered. [Clapp.]

PINKERTON

[4] William L. Sands, Jr., Second Secretary of Embassy in Lebanon.

Editorial Note

The Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, under the direction of Assistant Secretary of State McGhee, was created effective October 3, 1949. The Division of Near Eastern Affairs ceased to exist and was replaced by the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs (ANE). Fraser Wilkins, at the same time, became Officer in Charge of Palestine–Israel–Jordan Affairs in the new Office. The Department of State, the following day, released a statement concerning these and other details of its reorganization; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 31, 1949, page 677.

800.8890/10–449 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 4, 1949— 7 p. m.

977. Since fall 1948 Amer Export Lines has been operating separate scheds Arab and Israeli ports. Company voluntarily adopted this policy because it feared NE Govts might seize cargoes or apply other restrictions vessels and passengers thereon calling both Arab and Israeli ports on same continuous voyage. As result efficiency of service has been impaired.

Because of improved NE situation company now proposes resume including Arab and Israeli ports on same scheds.

As stated previous tels, Dept is of opinion signature armistices, removal UN and US arms embargoes and peaceful conditions prevailing NE shld eliminate any possible obstacles resumption normal navigation and trade, movements passengers and cargoes etc. in eastern Med. Indicative of changed situation US has, for example, approved export license for four Beechcraft bombardier-trainers consigned Egyptian Govt and giving active consideration other applications for licenses mil equip destined NE Govts.

Discuss foregoing with FonOff stating USG trusts there will be no interference with normal operations Amer Export Lines or similar US services. Report reaction soonest together with estimate whether or not vessels likely encounter difficulties. Beirut take parallel action.

Urinfo: If response this approach not unfavorable Export lines tentatively plan inaugurate new policy by routing freighter on continuous voyage Arab and Israeli ports within the month.

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[1] This telegram was sent also to Beirut as No. 583 and was repeated to Tel Aviv, Haifa, Port Said, Alexandria, and London.

Ur further info: Rep Brit Emb Washington informs Dept Sirry Pasha in July granted permission Brit luxury cruisers *Coronia* and *Brittanic* call Alex en route Tel Aviv this winter with no restrictions except on shore movements "Zionists" or bearers passports Israel or other govts not recognized by Egypt. Leb understood to have permitted at least two Bulgarian and one Danish freighters calling Beirut en route to/from Israel unload and load cargoes unmolested. (Beirut see ltr from Heald & Co Sept 14.[2])

WEBB

[2] Ambassador Caffery spoke on varied subjects with King Farouk on October 10, including the subject of lifting Egyptian wartime shipping regulations. The Ambassador reported the conversation in telegram 943, October 12; for text, see p. 223.

Beirut reported, on December 22, that the Lebanese Foreign Office had "prepared ruling to effect ships which have entered Arab port either before or after visit to Israeli port will be allowed enter Beirut. Note must receive Cabinet approval before signature." (telegram 649, 800.8890/12–2249) This message also advised that the Lebanese Foreign Minister had informed Minister Pinkerton that "he would like to see Lebanon sign treaty with Israel and it would closely follow any Arab country other than Jordan in negotiations."

501.BB Palestine/10–549 : Telegram

The Chargé in Israel (Ford) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL TEL AVIV, October 5, 1949—1 p. m.

726. During hour's general discussion October 4 of various pending matters with Comay Israel Foreign Office, I took occasion mention pertinent substance Deptel 637, September 30,[1] stressing my government's belief that present PCC proposals re Jerusalem represent practical realistic approach permanent international regime that area, pointing out our desire avoid injection arguments based on sentiment and emotion inherent in feelings of our vast Christian communities re Jerusalem issue, and expressing earnest hope my government that Israel will cooperate calmly and constructively in early solution Jerusalem problem.

Comay (who had report before him of Rusk–Elath talk[2]) underlining that he was speaking personally and not behalf his government said feeling general in Israel Foreign Office circles that PCC proposal "does not represent common ground" on which any discussion Jerusalem issue can be undertaken. He repeated Shiloah's earlier assertion that Israel working on counterproposal of its own (Embtel 710 September 24[3]) and said that until such plan finalized and ready for

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1412.
[2] See Mr. Rusk's memorandum of conversation, September 28, p. 1409.
[3] Not printed, but see footnote 1 to telegram 605, September 19, p. 1393.

presentation GA he doubted that "any Israel official" would be prepared to discuss any phase of PCC proposal as drawn up and presented. He added in effect "at present our governments seem to be poles apart since while US obviously ready accept PCC proposal as starting point for discussions, Israel unable accept plan even in principle." Comay also said "we hope USG fully appreciates deep-seated nature Israel public resentment against any effort deprive Israel of Jerusalem".

Comment: Despite Comay's assertion he not conveying his government's thinking, I have generally found him fairly faithful echo his superiors. *End Comment.*

Sharett presently on vacation but expected back Tel Aviv October 6 at which time shall discuss with him substance Deptels 636 [4] and 637.

Sent Department 726; repeated Jerusalem 87; Department pass Amman 52, New York unnumbered for USUN.

FORD

[4] Dated September 30, not printed, but see footnote 2 to memorandum by Wilkins, September 26, p. 1407.

501.BB Palestine/10–549 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL JERUSALEM, October 5, 1949—4 p. m.

604. Riley declared today crisis has now arrived in both Syrian and Egyptian MAC's. He does not anticipate any resumption of hostilities. Following occurred:

Syrian MAC—at Damascus Col. Hinnawi flatly informed Riley Syria would not proceed with demolition of fortifications at Mishmar Ha Yarden and evacuation until Israel ceased violations of armistice in Ein Gev sector and carried out decisions of MAC. Added Syria entitled take six weeks from date Israel complied with MAC decisions to complete withdrawal from Mishmar Ha Yarden. Under terms of armistice required to evacuate by October 12. Riley hinted that instead of violating armistice herself Syria should refer Israel violations to SC. Hinnawi scoffed at this, stating Syria could never obtain just decision and if obtained UN would not enforce it. Riley showed Consulate General letter mentioned Contel 603 third [1] from Syrian Foreign Office which lists Israel violations and strongly criticizes Chief of Staff for not forcing Israel comply. Major violations are failure Israel to remove settlement in Ein Gev demilitarized zone despite MAC decision given September 5 and failure destroy fortifications at Ein

[1] Not printed.

Gev despite directive from MAC chairman dated September 9. Letter concludes with statement that Israel violations have placed armistice agreement in jeopardy. Hinnawi requested Riley return to Damascus by eighth with written answer and discuss matter with Foreign Minister.

Riley states no question exists but that Israel has violated armistice and furthermore failed to carry out decisions of MAC and directive from MAC chairman. This has prevented successful carrying out of armistice terms. He feels Syria is erring in failing to report these violations to SC and instead retaliating by refusing to carry out terms of armistice which Syria previously observed faithfully. Riley hazarded guess that for international political reasons Syria may wish postpone evacuation of Mishmar Ha Yarden until after elections, especially when faced with Israel actions. Riley will attempt to persuade Dayan to remove settlement and destroy fortifications before eighth but is not hopeful.

Egyptian MAC—Shiloah still endeavoring prevail on Riley to write interpretive letter mentioned Contel 603 [2] as prior condition to Israel acceptance this decision (not yet rendered) on location of line.

Government House—UN administrative personnel now ordered to move to Beirut. This will leave only UN armed guard at Government House. Riley does not need this building and does not wish to assume responsibility for its preservation. In talks with both sides Government House treated as headquarters for PCC, Consul General believes UN should definitely retain Government House for use in future activities here.[3]

Sent Department 604, repeated Bagdad 64, Beirut 117, Cairo 33, Damascus 77, Tel Aviv 118. Department pass Amman 74.

BURDETT

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[2] This message reported that Mr. Shiloah had requested General Riley to write a letter giving his opinion that nothing in the Israeli-Egyptian armistice agreement precluded Israel from founding new settlements in the Negev. General Riley had declined on the ground that such a letter would prejudice his neutral position. (501.BB Palestine/10–349)

[3] Jerusalem, on October 12, reported information from General Riley that (1) "Israel destroyed fortifications at Ein Gev and removed settlement as agreed. Riley flew Damascus and informed Syrians who apparently satisfied. Are evacuating troops from Mishmar Hayarden sector today, and by agreement with Israel will complete destruction of fortifications and removal of mines within three weeks"; (2) "Israel and Egypt signed map on tenth showing line extending from center of Aqaba coastal strip in accordance with Riley's and Egyptians' interpretation." (telegram 617, 501.BB Palestine/10–1249)

The last paragraph of telegram 617 reported information from Mr. Shiloah that "Israel stood ready at any time to appoint representative to discuss directly with Arab states any mutual question in effort to reach either formal or informal final settlement. Added this standing offer made with full authority of Sharett and government."

501.MA Palestine/10–149 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, October 5, 1949—6 p. m.

3625. Agreed at UNRPR *Ad Hoc* Advisory Comite yesterday that SYG shld appeal IRO, WHO, UNICEF to continue assistance Palestine refugees in view recognized need for continuation relief during winter months even tho funds for program beyond Dec. must await GA action after report ESM. Understand appeal will be made in gen terms within next day or two.

. SYG did not submit to Comite proposal for early interim action by GA for advance from Working Capt Fund as intimated in Deptel 3548 [2] since financial position UNRPR adequate for needs thru Dec. He assured operating agencies that if GA action on continuation relief has not been taken early in Dec after having benefit of ESM recommendations he would request emergency action at that time.

ASYG Price indicated uncertainty re extent use Working Capital Fund for future program because of anticipated heavy demands for other purposes. IRO assistance therefore believed needed as supplement to Working Capt Fund advance to continue operations thru March before which time receipt gov. contributions unlikely.

Dept suggests IRO adopt gen res along lines 1948 Gen Council res which cld be based on appeal of SYG leaving to DG and SYG to work out specific arrangements. Under 1948 res IRO contributed 100,000 blankets to UNRPR, detailed personnel and loaned $1 million flour on reimbursable basis. Assistance of this kind does not imply any takeover action UNRPR by IRO as indicated paras 1 and 2 of Embtel 3946.[3]

Suggest Warren [4] and Edmonds [5] explore unapplied funds and supplies available in inventories to ascertain extent to which IRO might assist without impairing its present program. Mathews UKDel indicated he wld recommend to FonOff support appeal to IRO.

WEBB

[1] This telegram was repeated to Geneva for Mr. Warren.
[2] Dated September 29, p. 1413.
[3] Dated October 1, not printed, but see footnote 2, *ibid.*
[4] George L. Warren, Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Department of State.
[5] Cecil J. Edmonds, Permanent Delegate of the United Kingdom to the General Council of the International Refugee Organization.

501.BB Palestine(E)/10–749 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY WASHINGTON, October 7, 1949—7 p. m.

400. View your observations (urtel 590 Oct 5 [2]) believe you shld defer submitting note to FonOff for present. Dept will urge Clapp call on Fuad Bey.

You shld call on Yassin to renew conversation reported urtel 585, Sep 30 [3] and endeavor informally to exploit his suggestion SA observer be appointed. You shld point out that ESM maintaining HQ in Beirut, which wld be good vantage point for SAG rep to study ESM and receive info re its objectives.

FYI we hope view Fuad's presence Beirut he might be named SAG rep.

Pls inform your Brit colleague of foregoing.

WEBB

[1] This telegram was repeated to London.

[2] Not printed; it noted that officers of the American Embassy and British diplomatic officials at Jidda were in agreement that the odds were heavily against reversal of the Saudi Arabian refusal to receive the Economic Survey Mission. It also suggested that the Mission abandon the idea of visiting Saudi Arabia and proposed in its stead that Mr. Clapp call on Fuad Hamza, an influential royal councillor, then in Beirut to solicit his good offices with the King (501.BB Palestine(E)/10–549).

[3] Not printed.

501.BB Palestine/10–1249 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices [1] *and the United States Mission at the United Nations*

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 12, 1949—10 a. m.

Dept understands PCC plans reconvene formally Lake Success Oct 18. According recent info from Clapp, preliminary report will not be ready before Nov. 10. In view this sched Dept believes first formal session shld be deferred until receipt Clapp report.

Foregoing need not interfere with present travel plans PCC reps, since latter wld doubtless find it profitable proceed Lake Success consult together and with Israeli and Arab dels informally in advance of formal session.

Consult Boisanger, Yalcin and SYG re foregoing, stating that unless they perceive objection, we plan inform Israeli and Arab dels to PCC of our views.

ACHESON

[1] At Ankara and Paris.

501.BB Palestine (E)/10–1249 : Telegram

The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Hill) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL JIDDA, October 12, 1949—3 p. m.

606. I was received at Foreign Office this morning by YY [1] after brief wait because he delayed in conference with British Chargé.

We renewed conversations on points in Embtel 585 September 30 [2] with following results:

1. Economic Survey Mission. YY said British Chargé had recently come to see him second time strongly urging that SAG reverse its stand and receive mission. However, he had been in Mecca previous night with King and discussed whole matter with him at length and wished to state that SAG position remained unchanged (Embtel 585 September 30, paragraph 6).

YY remarked that SAG is convinced real objective of ESM is to seek means disposing refugee problem by resettling them in various Arab states thus doing away with one of principal reasons for Arabs continuing their fight against Israel (this apparently a new thought but somewhat in line with YY's views as reported Embassy A–354 August 29).[2]

I said that important future benefits might be forthcoming from ESM and that USG hoped SAG would send observers ESM which has Headquarters in Beirut and remarked that I understood Fuad Bey Hamza now in Beirut. YY replied this correct and added that Fuad would make excellent representative for SAG. He inquired if ESM now holding any meetings in Beirut. I replied did not know but presumed that if not already soon would be. Then I asked if I could inform Department that Fuad will be SAG representative to ESM. YY replied I could say he is recommending him immediately and anticipates favorable decision. (This paragraph being repeated London as Embtel 88 October 12 and Beirut as 13.)[3]

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

HILL

[1] Yusuf Yassin.

[2] Not printed.

[3] Fuad Hamza, on November 22, informed Ambassador Childs that he had not been appointed observer with the Economic Survey Mission and that Mr. Clapp had not called on him. In view of his return to Beirut in a few days, the Ambassador "urged him endeavor consult with Clapp informally and frankly. I said I believed it mistake for SAG in its own best interests not to have some contact with ESM. He promised see Clapp on his return and cooperate with him in every possible way informally." (telegram 690, November 23, 10 a. m., from Jidda, 501.BB Palestine (E)/11–2349)

501.BB Palestine(E)/10–1349 : Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

SECRET BEIRUT, October 13, 1949—1 p. m.

539. Simes 17. [From Clapp.]

1. Discussions ESM with Sharett, Horowitz, Kaplan *et al* held at Tel Aviv in three long conferences. Sunday night (ninth) with Sharett and Israeli liaison committee headed by Horowitz. I explained purpose of first visit:

(*a*) To get facts about 30,000 Arab and 18,000 Jewish refugees now receiving UN relief and to learn what government doing with and for them. I explained idea of temporary works program and asked their interest leading to economic assimilation Arabs now in Israel.

(*b*) To urge them more substantial acceptance of repatriation agreement established in UNGA resolution than Israel had proposed to PCC.

(*c*) To obtain current views re compensation and to urge agreement to reconsider position making compensation part of general peace settlement and linking it with claims for indemnity.

(*d*) Appealed to Israelis to demonstrate validity of high moral professions by implementing UN resolution on repatriation and compensation.

(*e*) To lay basis for exploration long-range development after interim report completed on refugee relief and works.

Response was long lecture on Arab responsibility for Arab-Jewish war and Israeli history from Moses to date. They defended unwillingness to repatriate in accord UNGA resolution by citing Arab refusal to accept UN partition. Sharett hinted doubt that offer between PCC to repatriate 100,000 Arabs could be carried out because of strong reaction of public and military chiefs against government's offer to PCC. Position on compensation unchanged as stated to PCC.[1]

Monday morning (tenth). Again with Sharett, Horowitz *et al.* Horowitz presented at great length desirability and feasibility of resettling Arabs in Syria and Transjordan. I advised him that resettlement as solution had been made next to impossible even to discuss with Arab States, in fact because Israelis had identified it as their proposal.

[1] Mr. Clapp's reaction to his talks with the Israeli leaders was reported by the *Manchester Guardian* on October 12. In an article datelined Lydda the previous day, he was said to be "'disappointed' with Israel's attitude to Arab refugee repatriation and compensation problems. . . . In Israel my hopes have not been realised." (airgram 1871, October 14, from London, 501.BB Palestine (E)/10–1449)

Monday night. We got down to business about Arab refugees now in Israel. Arrangements made for staff to examine condition, number, work opportunities, etc. ESM will consider facts obtained as measure of practical problem of repatriation.

2. Please advise Marguerite Owen, TVA, Washington of my return Beirut.

Sent Department 539, repeated Tel Aviv 28. [Clapp.]

PINKERTON

867N.00/10–1449

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Palestine–Israel–Jordan Affairs (Wilkins)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 14, 1949.

Participants: Mr. Greenhill, First Secretary British Embassy
Mr. Wilkins

(*a*) *Problem:* The internationalization of Jerusalem and the incorporation of Arab Palestine in Jordan.[1]

(*b*) *Action Required:* Orally to inform the British Embassy in Washington and the American Embassy in London of our views.

(*c*) *Action Assigned to:* ANE

Mr. Greenhill [2] called this morning to discuss current developments regarding Palestine with particular reference to the internationalization of Jerusalem.

Mr. Greenhill reported that the Foreign Office was pleased that the United States Government had not adopted a rigid attitude regarding the present PCC proposals for the internationalization of Jerusalem and wished to make the following points with regard to present Arab and Israeli authority in Jerusalem:

1. Insofar as Israeli authority was concerned, the Israeli Government or a group owing allegiance to the Israeli Government already have authority in the Israeli area of Jerusalem. The Foreign Office did not believe equitable consideration could be given to the future of the Jerusalem area unless we knew what Arab authority there was—at least in principle;

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[1] British Minister Kirkbride, on October 4, had expressed to Mr. Fritzlan his view that Jordanian annexation of Arab Palestine was the only way to prevent Israeli seizure of the area in a series of *faits accomplis*. Mr. Fritzlan replied that "while this might be true, timing such act of union important consideration and that ill considered hasty action on part Abdullah might cause much harm." The British Minister "indicated apprehension lest failure US and UK agree soon to formal annexation might cause King take such precipitous action." (telegram 364, October 5, 10 a. m., from Amman, 867N.014/10–549)

[2] Mr. Denis A. Greenhill, First Secretary of the British Embassy.

2. Early action regarding the incorporation of Arab Palestine within Jordan would solve the question of Arab authority in Jerusalem.

The British Foreign Office had, therefore, requested the British Embassy to ascertain the Department's urgent views regarding the following possibilities:

1. The General Assembly should be asked to approve in principle the absorption of Arab Palestine into Jordan as being in principle inseparable from a disposition of Jerusalem and of the refugee question (perhaps leaving boundaries and the status of the Gaza strip for later discussion);
2. The General Assembly should be asked to direct the Palestine Conciliation Commission under paragraph 2 B of the December 11 resolution (which makes it possible for the General Assembly and the Security Council to issue new directives to the PCC) to bring about the incorporation of Arab Palestine into Jordan at the earliest possible moment and to report on action taken to the next session of the General Assembly.

I recalled Mr. Bevin had previously raised this matter with the Secretary of State and that it was our opinion the incorporation of Arab Palestine into Jordan at this particular moment was premature.

I expressed the preliminary personal view that present Arab authority in Jerusalem was as valid as present Israeli authority in Jerusalem and that if either Jordan or the General Assembly took formal action regarding the incorporation of Arab Palestine into Jordan, Israel would probably take formal action regarding the incorporation within Israel of those areas in Palestine which it now occupies beyond the 1947 partition line (Western Galilee, the region between Ramle, Lydda and Beersheba and the northern section of the Gaza strip). I added that formal action by Jordan or the General Assembly might be expected to inject political factors into UN consideration of the Palestine question which was now being handled on technical economic grounds. I also recalled that the General Assembly had refused in the fall of 1948 to take action of the character now being suggested by the Foreign Office.

I said that we would give immediate consideration to the present British views and would inform him of our reactions.[3]

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[3] Messrs. Wilkins and Greenhill met again on October 21 to discuss the Palestine situation; for the nature of their discussion, see footnote 3 to telegram 3828, October 25, p. 1452.

501.BB Palestine/10–1449 : Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 14, 1949—2 : 15 p. m.

For your background info, Dept's analysis Pal situation follows:

PCC.—Despite PCC efforts promote final settlement Pal, positions of parties concerned remain too far apart to offer hope definitive settlement foreseeable future, or even hope of producing area of agreement on which final settlement might be based. Next meeting PCC Oct 19 not expected produce any material improvement in conciliation efforts. Impasse aggravated by apparent conviction each side that time works to its advantage. In our view, reverse is true. Missions must endeavor through constant painstaking discussion with govts concerned to make them aware long range effects upon their own self interests of this impasse. Israel, while endeavoring extract full measure polit and territorial advantage during stalemate, is forced maintain high psychological and financial burden military preparedness at expense economic stabilization, and by prolonging its precarious isolation, is postponing establishment *modus operandi* with Arabs which is of highest importance to Israel's future existence. Arab states, while counting unrealistically upon econ boycott to obtain polit objectives, are sacrificing opportunity for econ development and for social reform, further weakening resistance to revolutionary and opportunist exploitation, and bearing burden costly military preparedness to detriment of economy. Continued unreasonable and intransigeant attitude both parties is in opinion USG serving to crystalize world opinion against their positions and will undoubtedly make more difficult of implementation such measures leading toward final settlement which depend upon cooperation and collaboration of international community.

ESM.—We continue support work of ESM as means of providing new base on which polit agreement between Israel and Arab states might eventually be achieved, and of reducing refugee problem to level at which it no longer constitutes major security threat to NE area and to internatl peace. Therefore we believe substantial resettlement repatriation must be carried forward on basis present territorial delimitations and without prejudice to final territorial settlement.

Missions can help to dissipate prevailing charges that ESM is device force Israeli-Arab econ cooperation or plot to benefit Israeli economy, by means critical analysis ESM terms of ref and by means elucidating self-interest states concerned in projects recommended by ESM. Implementation ESM program is dependent in final analysis on full cooperation and initiative of states concerned.

[1] At London, Paris, Ankara, Arab capitals, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and New York.

US Policy.—While USG continues regard permanent solution of Pal question as a major objective its policy towards NE, Dept considers it essential that both sides be made increasingly cognizant their responsibilities for taking initiative in advancing towards settlement. Unilateral US dipl efforts urge more tractable attitude both sides, and to obtain compromises therefrom have thus far had no appreciable effect on position either party. Since states directly concerned must live with and adjust to any settlement which may be achieved, USG has emphasized repeatedly both in PCC and through dipl means hope that both parties wld utilize PCC as medium through which to conduct negots on practical basis rather than an arena for unproductive controversies, or that both sides wld undertake direct negots, particularly when it appears such negots will lead to constructive action towards final settlement. We will continue urge adoption these procedures by parties concerned. You shld endeavor counteract current propaganda that USG or PCC has ever endeavored prevent direct talks along foregoing lines.

Re nature final settlement, USG wld support agreement between parties concerned reached on basis free negot and mutual consent. If parties are unable agree we believe PCC cld with prior consent parties draft for their consideration compromise settlement of basic issues including territory and refugees. We do not consider it advisable at this time for US unilaterally to advance specific proposals for territorial settlement or for refugee distribution.

While USG will not advance settlement proposals on natl basis, it will urge consideration by parties of all reasonable proposals which may be advanced by UN or states directly concerned and will itself give consideration to support for such proposals on basis their individual merits. We will for example extend genl support in UNGA to PCC Jlem statute as basis for discussion, including support of such amendments as are designed to enhance its acceptability to both sides and to achieve best practical plan for internatl regime Jlem area. We will also be prepared consider in UNGA recommendations of ESM, as UN organ, for long range settlement and development program and for continuation relief.

Foregoing involves increasing emphasis upon UN as instrument through which to achieve final settlement and upon necessity for initiative by parties directly concerned in reaching solution Pal problem.

In UNGA consideration Pal problem, we hope debate will emphasize procedural rather than substantive matters and will be focused on establishment future machinery for treating polit econ refugee and relief questions in order facilitate coordinated UN action re Pal in future.

501-887—77——91

Although foregoing has been policy USG for some time, its formal communication to NE Govts at this time might be subject misinterpretation. However, in any genl discussions re Pal question, foregoing shld prove useful as basis for your remarks.

ACHESON

501.MA Palestine/10–1249 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, October 14, 1949—6 p. m.

3726. Re Embtel 4104.[1] Dept deeply concerned UK intention contribute only half million pounds Palestine relief. While requirements for continued relief program won't be known until interim report ESM, Dept does not foresee any possibility cutting relief costs in half for coming year. Hopes UK will not make unilateral announcement amount its contribution prior ESM Report and opportunity US–UK consultation concerning financial implications Palestine refugee program.[2]

ACHESON

[1] Dated October 12, not printed.

[2] This telegram was repeated to Geneva for Mr. Warren. An Embassy officer discussed the message with Mr. Burrows on October 17. The latter made no offer to increase the British contribution but indicated that the British had no plans to announce a contribution prior to the report of the Economic Survey Mission (telegram 4160, October 17, 7 p. m., from London, 501.MA Palestine/10–1749).

S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351[1]

Report by the National Security Council on United States Policy Toward Israel and the Arab States[2]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, October 17, 1949.

NSC 47/2

The Problem

1. To define and assess the policy which the United States should follow toward Israel and the Arab States, with particular reference to problems arising out of the recent hostilities in Palestine.

Analysis

2. The United Nations General Assembly on November 29, 1947, recommended the partition of Palestine into a Jewish state and an

[1] This lot is a serial master file of the National Security Council documents and correspondence and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947–1961, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

[2] This paper represents a revision of NSC 47/1, dated September 1; regarding the latter, see editorial note, p. 1339.

Arab state, with provision for economic union between them. It also recommended that Jerusalem be established as a *corpus separatum* administered by the United Nations. With the termination by the British Government of its mandate over Palestine on May 15, 1948, a provisional government of a state of Israel assumed power. The proclamation creating Israel did not define its boundaries, although the concurrent Israeli request for United States recognition referred to the boundaries set forth in the General Assembly resolution of November 29.

3. The Arabs of Palestine as well as the governments of the Arab states of the Near East rejected the General Assembly partition resolution, and no government was established for the Arab portion of Palestine as recommended by the resolution. Fighting broke out between Arab and Jewish irregular forces prior to termination of the British mandate, and, concurrently with the promulgation of the State of Israel, military forces of the neighboring Arab states entered Palestine and sporadic fighting broke out, particularly in the area between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

4. *a.* The area of the Jewish State as contemplated under the General Assembly resolution was approximately 5,600 square miles, the area of the Arab state 4,400 square miles. The proposed population of the Jewish state was approximately 550,000 Jews and 500,000 Arabs; that of the Arab state, 745,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews; and that of Jerusalem, 100,000 Arabs and 100,000 Jews.

b. At the present time, the total area of Palestine under Israeli control or military occupation is estimated at 7,750 square miles. The present population of Israel consists of approximately 800,000 Jews and 70,000 to 100,000 Arabs. Jewish immigrants have been entering Israel at the rate of 25,000 monthly since May 15, 1948.

c. As a result of the hostilities, some 700,000 Palestinian Arabs fled or were expelled from Israeli-controlled territory. They took refuge in areas of Palestine under Arab military occupation and in the neighboring Arab states. The Palestinian Arabs, together with the Arab populations of the independent Arab states of the Near East, number about 35,000,000.

5. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the United States took a leading part in seeking a solution of the Palestine problem which would be acceptable to the interested parties. Since the failure of these attempts, the United States has actively supported the United Nations in its efforts to end the military conflict. The United States supported the General Assembly resolution of May 14, 1948, authorizing the appointment of a United Nations Mediator charged, among other functions, with promoting peaceful adjustment of the future situation

in Palestine. It supported the Security Council resolution of May 29, 1948, calling for a cessation of hostilities for a period of four weeks and establishing an embargo on the import of arms to the Near East. After expiration of this truce period, this Government introduced a resolution, adopted by the Security Council July 15, 1948, ordering the governments concerned to desist from further military action and deciding that the truce shall remain in force until a peaceful adjustment of the future situation in Palestine is reached. The United States assisted through diplomatic means the efforts of the Acting United Nations Mediator to negotiate armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab states; armistice agreements have now been concluded by Israel with Egypt, Transjordan, Lebanon, and Syria. This Government jointly sponsored a resolution, passed by the General Assembly on November 18, 1948, establishing a United Nations relief program for Palestine refugees supported by voluntary contributions, as a means of assisting United Nations efforts towards restoration of peace in Palestine. On December 11, 1948, the General Assembly passed a resolution establishing a Palestine Conciliation Commission, charged with facilitating settlement of all issues outstanding between Israel and the Arab states. The Commission, composed of representatives of France, Turkey, and the United States, is currently engaged in efforts to carry out its tasks of promoting a territorial settlement for Palestine, formulating an international regime for Jerusalem, and seeking a solution to the Arab refugee problem.

6. In support of the efforts of the Conciliation Commission, the United States has made a series of strong representations to both the Arabs and the Israelis. This Government's approach to the Arabs has been designed chiefly to induce them to accept the principle of substantial resettlement of refugees in the Arab states. The representations to Israel have been intended to convince it of the necessity of accepting the principle of substantial repatriation of refugees, and the principle of compensation to those states desiring such compensation for any territorial acquisition which Israel expects to effect outside the boundaries proposed in the partition resolution of November 29, 1947. The United States has warned Israel that if it continues to reject the friendly advice offered by this Government for the purpose of facilitating a general peace in Palestine, the United States Government will be forced to the conclusion that a revision of its attitude toward Israel has become unavoidable.

7. *a.* Up to the present, United States relations with Israel have been based upon our traditional support of the aspirations of the Jewish people to obtain a national home in Palestine. In support of this policy of sympathy and friendship towards the Jewish people, the United States extended immediate *de facto* recognition to the new

state; supported Israel's application for a $100,000,000 Export-Import Bank loan, of which it has up to the present time drawn $51,000,000; and supported its application for membership in the United Nations.

b. The present Government of Israel is intensely nationalistic in character, and maintains an internal policy of compromise dictated by the necessity of reconciling the demands of its extremist elements with the more moderate tendencies of the government party. The necessity of maintaining this internal balance makes it difficult for Israel's leaders to meet external demands for compromise with respect to relinquishment of territory and readmission of refugees which are essential to final settlement in Palestine. It also results in further increasing Israel's isolation among the neighboring Arab states and in reinforcing the charges of intransigence and expansionism which have been levelled against Israel. In addition Israel endeavors to pursue a neutral course in its relations with East and West. This position of neutrality is motivated by the desire to obtain further assistance from the United States, and to retain the diplomatic support of the Soviet bloc, to obtain military material therefrom, and to facilitate immigration to Israel of Jews from Eastern Europe. In view of the delicate nature of Israel's internal political equilibrium, the government will be subjected to increasing pressures from political radical and extremist groups to the extent that it makes concessions to the Arab states or otherwise follows policies contrary to the views of these groups.

c. The technical abilities of the Israelis, coupled with their access to Western technical and financial assistance principally from United States sources, have already resulted in much greater economic opportunities and higher standards of living in Israel than those among the neighboring peoples. In the absence of assistance to the Arab states this disparity will tend to increase in the future and to result in further tensions between Israelis and Arabs. However, Israel's program for large-scale economic development, required to implement successfully its ambitious immigration policy, will make it dependent for the foreseeable future upon large-scale external financing through foreign capital investment, loans, and voluntary contributions. There are forces at work which may tend to reduce the rate of immigration. These forces include improved conditions in Europe, restrictions in USSR and satellite countries on emigration, relative decrease of contributions from abroad for financing immigration, and reports of increasingly difficult conditions in Israel itself. At the same time, if immigration continues at the present rate Israel may be unable, even with large-scale external financing, to improve its economic condition sufficiently to prevent political and economic instability. This would result in Israel being faced with a pressing need intensively

to develop sub-marginal areas and to expand industrialization within Israel. If unsuccessful, the Israeli Government might be tempted to seek additional territory.

d. Israel's military establishment, although small, is a relatively modern and effective fighting machine which has proved itself adequate to resist the poorly equipped, ill-trained and badly led armies of the Arab League states in the course of recent hostilities and to occupy considerable territory beyond that awarded under the partition plan. It can be expected that the future effectiveness of the Israeli Army will increase with the implementation of current plans for training and reorganization. Arab military forces reflect the weaknesses of the Arab governments in that they have demonstrated their inability to act in concert against the Israeli Army. So long as there is the present wide discrepancy between the effective military power of the Israelis and of the Arabs, there remains, in the event of failure of non-military factors to control the situation, the danger of Israeli extremist pressure to resort to military action. Moreover, in the absence of a satisfactory *modus vivendi* between Israel and its neighbors, Israel will be burdened by the high cost and accompanying psychological effect of maintaining a state of military preparedness which in turn will detract from the effectiveness of any economic assistance given to that country.

8. *a.* United States relations with the Arab states have been traditionally based upon extensive cultural, educational, and religious interests in the Near East, which have been reinforced in recent years by growing commercial and economic ties with the area, including extensive petroleum interests. The political relations of this Government with the Arab states have suffered during the past several years because of basic differences in views on the subject of the future of Palestine. Despite this serious setback to Arab-American relations, and the deep-seated suspicion of our motives which has arisen, the Arab states for the most part still desire closer relations with this Government, and have requested from the United States economic, technical, and military assistance.

b. The intense and competing nationalisms and personal and dynastic rivalries which characterize the governments of the Arab states render them incapable of working together effectively or constructively in their own best interests. For the most part their internal policies pursue a course of inaction or of endeavoring to maintain the *status quo*. Their relations with one another are characterized by unproductive controversies and rivalries, and their principal unity lies in their implacable animosity toward and common fear of Israel. Because of the generally inferior quality of their statesmanship, and the inertia of their internal policies, the Arab states will continue to be susceptible to exploitation by extremist elements and to the imposition

of authoritarian and unrepresentative forms of government. The Arab governments will, under present conditions, endeavor to resist Soviet penetration or exploitation despite their weakness, and will continue to seek a more positive Western orientation.

c. The weakness of the Arab governments is reflected throughout the area in their retarded economic and social development, which has been further aggravated by the economic dislocations arising from the recent hostilities and by the presence of the Palestinian refugees in their territory. However, in the absence of progressive or capable leadership, the ability of the Arab governments to raise the living standards of their peoples above the level at which social revolution is a recurring threat will depend upon the provision of external technical and financial assistance.

d. The respective military forces of the Arab states also reflect the weaknesses of the Arab governments. In addition to their demonstrated failure to act in concert against the Israeli Army, their ability to maintain internal security will be seriously prejudiced as long as the arms embargo is continued. Moreover, until a firm settlement is obtained in Palestine, the disproportionate emphasis upon their respective military establishments at the expense of economic and social reforms will continue to burden the Arab states as well as Israel.

9. While the Near Eastern area has become a point of major interest to the United States only comparatively recently, the United Kingdom has had important strategic, political, and economic interests in the Near Eastern area for over a century. However, the objectives of both governments are now substantially the same although there are at times differences of opinion on methods and procedures. In addition we have had divergent views from time to time on the question of the future of Palestine. Nevertheless, the desirability for a common approach to problems and collaboration wherever possible has been clearly demonstrated by the useful results of our cooperation to date, particularly since the outbreak of World War II.

10. On August 11, 1949 the UN Security Council adopted a resolution expressing the view that the armistice agreements concluded between Israel and Egypt, Transjordan, Lebanon and Syria during the past six months supersede the Truce provided for in the Council's resolutions of May 29 and July 15, 1948. In the United States view and in the view of other members of the Council this action brought to an end the stringent measures provided for in the resolutions of May 29 and July 15, 1948. Among these measures was the embargo placed on the parties to the dispute, and all other governments and authorities concerned, to refrain from importing or exporting war material and introducing military personnel into the affected area.

The United States view with regard to the export of arms to the

area was expressed by Senator Austin in the Council on Thursday afternoon, August 4, as follows:

"So far as the United States is concerned, it does not intend to allow the export of arms which would permit a competitive arms race in the area. Export of arms to this area of the world should be strictly limited to such arms as are within the scope of the legitimate security requirements, again as recommended by Dr. Bunche. We hope that prudence will prevail not only among the parties but among all nations of the world which are in a position to supply arms and that they will pursue a policy similar to that which we intend to pursue."

11. Analysis of the estimated funds which are likely to be available during the next few years from all sources, including both grant and loan funds, reveals that the development projects required for solution of the refugee problem will probably absorb most of the external financing available from all sources for the Near East. Therefore the questions of economic development and of solution of the refugee problem are indivisible and must be considered simultaneously and carefully coordinated.

12. Our policy toward Israel and the Arab states will be an important factor in determining whether they can be stimulated to constructive action in their own behalf to provide the basis for a stable and progressive political structure and a balanced and viable economy. If either Israel or the Arab states fail to take such action, the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and Near Eastern area and United States national interests therein will be jeopardized.

13. In addition our policy toward Israel will be an important factor in determining whether Israeli policy with respect to Jerusalem, Arab Palestine, and the Arab states develops along aggressive or peaceable lines. If Israeli policy develops along expansionist and aggressive lines, the security of the area and United States national interests therein will be jeopardized.

14. In view of the strong passions which have been aroused, it will be many years before relations between Israel and neighboring countries can become sufficiently stable as to be proof against sudden and violent disruption. The situation, accordingly, requires careful implementation on our part, over a long period, of an objective, impartial but firm policy which will instill moderation in both parties to the controversy and help to ensure that the competing nationalisms do not get out of hand.

Conclusions

15. Our policy toward Israel and the Arab states should be based on the fundamental propositions that:

a. The political and economic stability of the Israel and Arab states is of critical importance to the security of the United States. In the

NSC memorandum "Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East—Basic U.S. Position", approved November 24, 1947, it is stated that: "The security of the Eastern Mediterranean and of the Middle East is vital to the security of the United States." *

b. It is in the national interest of the United States to have the respect and, in so far as possible, good will of all the peoples of the Near and Middle East, Jews and Arabs alike, and their orientation toward the West and away from the Soviet Union.

c. The differences between the new Israeli state and the neighboring Arab states should be reconciled at least to the extent that Israel and the Arab states would act in concert to oppose Soviet aggression.

d. We should provide advice and guidance in the solution of the economic, social, and political problems of the area on an impartial basis, as between Israel and the Arab states, contingent upon the willingness of these countries to apply the maximum of self help.

e. There should also be close United States–United Kingdom collaboration wherever possible to achieve the basic objectives. In addition the United States should bear in mind the desirability of collaborating with France and with Turkey and other Moslem non-Arab states in the area for the same purpose whenever it is feasible and practicable.

16. We should continue our efforts to achieve a settlement of the Palestine problem along the following lines, working principally through the United Nations, but supporting those efforts through unilateral action and through joint United States–United Kingdom influence where appropriate:

Immigration:

a. Israel should in its own interests, accept the principle of coordinating the flow of Jewish immigration with the developing capabilities of its economy.[3]

Refugees:

b. Primary responsibility should rest with Israel and the Arab states for solution of the refugee problem, aided by such outside assistance as is available.

c. In accordance with the spirit of the General Assembly resolution of December 11, 1948, Israel should accept the principle of maximum possible repatriation of refugees who so desire, should begin immediately actual repatriation on a reasonable scale within the number to be agreed in a final settlement, and should carry out such repatriation to conclusion as quickly as possible.

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*Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, "Documents Resulting from Conversations with the British in Regard to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East", dated November 19, 1947. [Footnote in the source text; for documentation on "The Pentagon Talks of 1947", see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, pp. 485 ff.]

[3] Subparagraph 16*a* did not appear in NSC 47/1. Subparagraphs *b* through *h* are identical with those appearing in NSC 47/1, except for the relettering of the subparagraphs.

d. The Arab states should accept the principle of substantial resettlement in their states of the large number of refugees who do not wish or who cannot be repatriated, and should take immediate steps to initiate such resettlement.

e. We should endeavor to obtain for the refugees adequate compensation from Israel for abandoned refugee lands and property in accordance with the General Assembly Resolution of December 11, 1948, and should resist efforts by Israel or the Arab states directly or indirectly to relate the question of payment of such compensation to the question of war indemnities.

f. We should be prepared within the framework of the United Nations, in accordance with policy already established, to support with financial and technical assistance a program for repatriation and resettlement of Palestine refugees. Our contribution is contingent upon formulation of a plan which is satisfactory to us and has a reasonable chance of success at reasonable cost, upon full acceptance by the Arabs and Israelis of such a program and the responsibilities involved, upon their active cooperation in carrying out the program, and upon satisfactory contributions by other interested governments.

Economic:

g. We should seek to promote economic arrangements between Israel and the Arab states such as the resumption of commercial intercourse within and through the area, uninterrupted flow of petroleum products, and uninhibited operation of and access to internal and international surface and air transport facilities.

Territories:

h. We should assist the Israelis and the Arabs to achieve a final settlement of the territorial question in Palestine by agreement or, failing that, by supporting a Palestine Conciliation Commission proposal for presentation to the parties and, if necessary, to the UN or by some acceptable *modus vivendi.* Although the United States would be prepared to accept a solution freely agreed to by the parties, if it is necessary for the United States to state its views, it should advance the following policy which is consistent with that approved by the President:

> If Israel wishes to retain any areas in Palestine allocated to the proposed Arab state under the UN resolution of November 29, 1947 and now occupied by Israeli forces, Israel should, if the Arab states so demand, make territorial compensation elsewhere and/or make other concessions of a non-territorial character as are required to reach an equitable agreement which could provide the basis for a lasting peace.

Jerusalem Area:

i. We should support the principle of the internationalization of the Jerusalem area as defined in the General Assembly Resolution of December 11, 1948. This might be accomplished along the following lines:

(1) United Nations control of the Holy Places;

(2) Division of the Jerusalem area into sub-areas to be administered by the respective adjacent states under the supervision of the United Nations; and

(3) The establishment of obligations on the part of the adjacent states to observe basic requirements with respect to demilitarization, free access and observance of human rights, and the establishment of a system of compulsory arbitration to determine whether these obligations are being fulfilled.

17. In the light of the Security Council Resolution of August 11, 1949 and in order to promote internal security as a basis for general security in the Near Eastern area, we should permit the export of reasonable amounts of military material to Israel and the Arab states limited to such arms as are within the scope of legitimate security requirements.

18. We should by a policy of sympathy and firm leadership encourage Israel and the Arab states to develop friendly cooperation with the Western nations, to exclude or control subversive influences, and to achieve relations of good will and trust with one another.

19. We should endeavor to prevent discrimination against Jews in the Arab states and against Arabs in Israel.

20. Any kind of regional economic or political arrangement to include Israel and the Arab states seems now unlikely because of the dissensions and suspicions which prevail in the area, and may be quite unlikely for some time to come. However, it is a possibility which should be kept under continuing review in the light of developments in the area.

21. It is desirable that the economic opportunities of the peoples of the area should be raised above the level at which social revolution is a recurring threat. The United States should encourage the economic development and expansion of economic opportunities of the people of the area. We should, therefore, in addition to supporting a program for solution of the refugee and other economic problems, which is designed solely to restore the *status quo ante*, prepare or assist in the preparation of a coordinated long-range program of economic and social development for Israel and the Arab states to be implemented by both multilateral and unilateral action through (*a*) technical assistance; (*b*) loans from the United States Export-Import Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; (*c*) grants or loans from interested UN states; (*d*) technical and financial assistance from appropriate United Nations agencies; or (*e*) a combination of the foregoing. Any U.S. or U.N. assistance under such a program should depend upon a real effort on the part of the Israel and Arab states to help themselves and each other in consonance with the principles enunciated in the above conclusions, should be coordinated with

such efforts, should be designed to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between Israel and the Arab states and to integrate their economies into a broader international economy, and should allow ample and increasing scope for private enterprise.[4]

[4] The National Security Council and the Secretary of the Treasury adopted NSC 47/2 on October 17 and submitted the paper to President Truman "with the recommendation that he approve the Conclusions contained therein and direct their implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination of the Secretary of State." (note of October 17 by Admiral Souers). The President approved the paper on October 20 and directed its implementation along the lines of the note (memorandum of October 20 by Admiral Souers to the National Security Council. S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351).

501.BB Palestine/10–1849

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 18, 1949.

Subject: Jews in Iraq; Proposed Syria–Iraq Union; Jerusalem; and Israeli attack in the Gaza Area.

Participants: Eliahu Elath—Ambassador of Israel
NEA—Mr. McGhee
ANE—Mr. Wilkins
ANE—Mr. Clark
ANE—Mr. Stabler

[Here follow introductory sections and the discussion on "Jews in Iraq."]

2. *Proposed Syria–Iraq Union:*[2] Mr. Elath said that reports his Government has received regarding the proposed Syria–Iraq union had caused considerable concerned in Tel Aviv. Israel did not, of course, wish to intervene in the internal affairs of any country and did not wish to do so in this situation, particularly if union was popularly desired. However, his Government wished to inform the United States Government of its concern over the proposed union with respect to the security of Israel and the general stability in the Near East. His Government felt that such a union might bring with it disorders which would threaten the security of Israel. It might also give rise to the belief among the peoples of Syria and Iraq that the strength of the new state was such that it could take revenge on Israel for the defeat of the Arab states. Israel believed that the union of two weak states did not mean a strong state and in any event Israel could

[1] Drafted by Mr. Stabler.
[2] For documentation on this subject, see pp. 180 ff.

defend itself. However, it was possible that all the present armistice arrangements and any prospects for peaceful settlement of the Palestine problem might be upset by the union.

Mr. Elath also said that this union could have grave internal repercusions in Israel. The extremist elements might well regard the union as justification for action by Israel to annex Eastern Palestine. The Government, which would be extremely hard pressed by the extremists, would be placed in a most difficult position.

I told the Ambassador that we had received a certain amount of information concerning the proposed union and that there were certain aspects which have caused us concern. I indicated that it was, of course, the policy of the United States not to intervene in the affairs of other states and that while we would follow developments closely, the attitude which we adopted would necessarily be within the limitation of our basic policy regarding non-intervention. We neither supported nor opposed the proposals for a union of Syria and Iraq and believed the peoples of these two countries should have an opportunity of expressing their views concerning them through their own constitutional processes. I expressed appreciation for the expression of views of his government which I said we had, in fact, anticipated.[3]

With reference to the Ambassador's remarks regarding the annexation of Eastern Palestine, I expressed the hope that Mr. Elath did not mean by this that the proposed union and the question of Eastern Palestine were in any way related. The Ambassador assured me that his remarks only meant to indicate the possible attitude of the extremists toward union.

3. *Jerusalem:* Referring to his talk with Mr. Rusk on September 28, Mr. Elath said that he had discussed the matter of the PCC Jerusalem proposals with Mr. Eban, Permanent Israeli Representative to the United Nations. Mr. Eban had informed him of his belief that most of the South American delegations to the United Nations agreed with the Israeli point of view with respect to Jerusalem. Mr. Eban, following the suggestion made by Mr. Rusk to Mr. Elath at their meeting on September 28, had also discussed the Jerusalem question with members of the United States delegation in order to clarify any misunderstanding which might exist between the two positions. From

[3] Ambassador McDonald conversed with Foreign Minister Sharett on October 17. The proposed union of Syria and Iraq was the chief subject of discussion. Mr. Sharett exhibited "considerable perturbation" and indicated it "would be idle pursue peace objectives when surrounded by an earthquake." The Ambassador gave as his "overall conviction" that "Sharett wishes distinctly to convey to me that 'all bets are off' re any previous commitment Israel may have made on territorial, refugee or any other settlement looking forward peace in NE if a fusion of Iraq and Syria is consummated." (telegram 752, October 18, noon, from Tel Aviv, 790D.90G/10–1849)

these discussions it was quite clear that basic differences existed between the United States and Israeli positions. Mr. Elath, believing that we would wish to avoid any headlong clash of views during the General Assembly consideration of the Jerusalem proposals, suggested the possibility that the United States and Israeli delegations might now work out some agreement of views. He implied that the United States should adopt a position more in line with that of Israel.

I told the Ambassador that the United States as a member of the PCC had participated in the drafting of the proposals for a permanent international regime of the Jerusalem Area and that we generally supported the plan. We recognized that amendments would probably be presented during General Assembly discussion and this Government was prepared to give careful consideration to any amendments which were advanced. Meanwhile, it was suggested that as the PCC was convening shortly in New York, the Israeli delegation might find it useful to consult with the Jerusalem Committee of the PCC in order to clarify any misunderstandings.

[Here follows an account of the discussion on Jerusalem and on the Israeli attack in the Gaza area; regarding the latter subject, see telegram 673, October 20, to Tel Aviv, page 1448.]

501.BB Palestine(E)/10–1849 : Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED PRIORITY BEIRUT, October 18, 1949—noon.

549. Simes 19. [From Clapp.] Future organizational plans:

1. To clarify background suggestions which follow, appears advisable stress points on which ESM thinking at variance with Department.

(*a*) Funds required by long-term development body for first year's operations not likely exceed $5,000,000; mostly required to bridge present gaps between preliminary general surveys and saleable engineering plans. Presently countries possess volumes of engineering reconnaissance and generalized analysis, but no specific engineering work of the nature required to make a project saleable or bankable. Governments here inexperienced in such matters, and guidance for considerable time required to bring schemes to point where positive action on complex project can be recommended. Therefore, for fiscal 1951, unnecessary and undesirable seek long-term development funds except on modest scale. When November field work completed, ESM may be prepared to recommend more funds sooner.

(*b*) ESM can report continued progress in relationships with Syrian, Lebanese, Jordan Governments, but only because has studiously avoided pressure on resettlement. Opinion in Arab states remains so violently opposed to abandonment of rights of refugees to

repatriation in Palestine that contemplation by Governments of settling them elsewhere would likely make governments more shaky. Practical advantages of local public works to prevent further deterioration morale, to cause added mobility in refugee populations, and to secure direct benefits from projects constructed, suffice to make such limited programs acceptable, and their effect will undoubtedly be to achieve in part the objective of resettlement but through choice of individual refugees. However, whatever ESM or its successors in the near future can accomplish will depend on the divorce of its activities, in Arab eyes, from any connection with political settlement of the Palestine war. ESM firmly of opinion that necessary connection between economic development activity and political conciliation should only take place at seats of government of interceding powers, and that consolidation in field, under agent general or other aegis, is unnecessary and doomed to frustrate economic approach.

2. Referring Department document suggesting NESDA [1] and September 23 paper headed Palestine Political and Refugee Problems, following are ESM views:

(*a*) Agreed consolidation of PCC political operations under agent general sound. However, for reasons above-stated and in line with planning later set forth in this cable, would delete references in September 23 draft to relief, and to development. Agent general, representative of SYG, would be co-ordinate with chairman director of EFINDI (Economic and Financial Development Institute of Near East—have other suggestions on title) whose functions outlined below.

(*b*) While ESM finds much of NESDA draft acceptable, its present thinking would involve recommending the following steps:

(1) Continuation of UNRPR only until April 1.

(2) Establishment early in 1950 at latest of new agency EFINDI by interested governments undertaking to contribute toward development plans of area. EFINDI's functions in development substantially same as NESDA's with reservations expressed Paragraph 1*a* this cable; further functions in regard to take over, under contract with SYG, of UNRPR operations as from April 1; planning and negotiation of arrangements for works projects with Governments; co-ordination of work of charitable agencies (the volume of whose direct assistance in meeting refugee needs has assumed very considerable proportions nearly equalling UNRPR assistance). Device of contract relationship with SYG avoids establishment of a third agency (or introduction of IRO, to which ESM opposed account IRO historical connection with Palestine immigration), permits close coordination of relief and work projects, and of work projects and developments. Hoped that SYG would agree support appeal for funds as for UNRPR for disbursement by EFINDI, but EFINDI would require authorization use such funds either for direct relief or wage payments.

[1] Possibly the draft to be submitted to Mr. Clapp; see Mr. McGhee's memorandum of September 26 to Mr. Rusk, p. 1403.

3. EFINDI would endeavor work out satisfactory arrangements, at as early a date as practical, with Middle East Governments to take over relief operations from agencies, and to establish work relief projects with a view to eventual full financial as well as administrative responsibility for refugees. EFINDI would call on specialized UN agencies for assistance as appropriate in technical fields. Would start specific engineering studies forthwith.

4. Calculation under study to estimate funds required by EFINDI during calendar 1950, for relief and work relief. Very preliminary calculations indicate that costs may not exceed present UNRPR budget by amounts that appear unmanageable.

5. Have given only preliminary consideration methods staffing EFINDI. Most workable proposal yet suggested is to employ director and staff through member governments, and arrange detail of technicians when required from UN or UN specialized agencies. In many of its functions, EFINDI would fit US Point 4 plans and UN plans for technical assistance.

Have discussed foregoing with Morton and Labonne, and suggest Department take up with British and French. Would appreciate Department's views on including Turkey in these considerations. While financial stake Turkey would obviously be small, there are advantages to increased interest. Consul general has been helpful colleague, and Turk's presence EFINDI could help Arab states and improve Turk's relationships Near East neighbors.

We are revising NESDA September 29 draft and Palestine September 23 draft to reflect above changes. Will telegraph or mail revision end of week. [Clapp.]

PINKERTON

501.BB Palestine/10–1849 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL TEL AVIV, October 18, 1949—1 p. m.

756. In conference lasting 90 minutes with Foreign Minister October 17, Ford and I discussed substance Deptel 636,[1] 637 [2] and 647.[3]

[1] Dated September 30, not printed, but see footnote 2 to memorandum by Wilkins, September 26, p. 1407.

[2] Dated September 30, not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1412.

[3] Not printed; it directed Tel Aviv to bring to the attention of the Israeli Foreign Office the substance of telegram 609, October 6, from Jerusalem (501.BB Palestine/10–649). No. 609 advised that the Consulate General had received a "visiting card" from the New Underground for the Freedom of Jerusalem. The reverse of the card was said to bear a handwritten inscription to "tell Truman and Acheson through your facilities we will deliver all information to them." The message also informed that General Riley had received a similar card, with the statement "withdraw your proposals and inform all your agents. Stop it. Otherwise you will go the same way as Bernadotte." (867N.00/10–649)

Foreign Minister first apologized his inability see Ford sooner explaining "press of business" had kept him otherwise occupied.

Re general question Jerusalem and particularly PCC proposals Foreign Minister did not depart materially from position heretofore laid down by lesser officials of Foreign Office (Embtels 726, October 5, and 740, October 10).[4] He called PCC proposals "provocative, anachronistic" document, saying both immigration limitation and demilitarization features particularly "unrealistic". He said Israel "fully aware" deep interest Christian world in safeguarding holy places but pointed out "fully 90 percent" these places in Arab hands and thus he was unable understand why Israel being "repeatedly importuned" in matter actually outside its control. He added Israel just as much concerned safeguarding its own holy place (specifying Wailing Wall and Rachael's Tomb) which likewise remained Arab hands. He concluded by saying Israel "fully prepared approach Jerusalem question coldly and dispassionately" and "to give all consideration outside world opinion provided such outside opinion gives similar consideration to Israel's interests".

Re violence press campaign against PCC proposals and threats physical violence implied in Jerusalem Congentel 609 and from other "mysterious" sources, Foreign Minister inclined dismiss latter as "work of irresponsible but harmless trouble makers". Press reaction showed depth of Jewish feeling re Jerusalem "which had lasted some thousands of years" and which PCC plan has merely "fanned into new flame". This connection Foreign Minister cited "violent anti-Israel campaign" recently conducted by world Catholic press, all of which he said was based on "slanderous lies and misrepresentation".

Comment: Ford concurs with me in belief that, pending discussion Jerusalem question by GA, no useful purpose would be served in further presentation subject here. I gather these people have formulated plans of their own for GA debate, and until then they appear to be stalling by plowing old ground. Moreover, rather graver subject discussed at same long conference (Embtel 752, October 18[5]) has tended distract Foreign Minister's attention from Jerusalem issue which for moment appears have more of an academic than active interest for him.

I am inclined to agree with Foreign Minister's estimate of anonymous threats of violence although in view last year's tragic happenings I propose bring each instance this nature, however far fetched, promptly to Foreign Minister's attention. *End comment.*

Sent Department 756; repeated Jerusalem 93; Department pass Amman 57.

McDonald

[4] Latter not printed.
[5] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 1441.

501.BB Palestine/10–1849 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, October 18, 1949—4 p. m.

627. Reference last paragraph Contel 617, October 12[1] reporting that Shiloah informed Riley Israel prepared designate representative for direct negotiations with Arabs at any time.

During recent talk with Riley, Glubb inquired whether Israel now ready for reasonable compromise settlement. Glubb expressed view present situation could not last and perhaps two countries could work out agreement. Riley states Glubb did not appear expect any major concessions from Israel and specifically admitted that not practical repatriate appreciable number refugees.

In entirely separate discussion Colonel Seif el Din, chief Egyptian delegate at Rhodes talks, commented to Riley on unsatisfactory nature present situation and desirability reaching some definitive agreement. Colonel Seif el Din stated its retention[2] by Egypt not essential but some provision for refugees now there necessary.

Riley has at various times voiced concern over present impermanent armistice terms and desirability considering situation which will exist when present armistice agreements lapse after one year. He is reflecting on feasibility using MACs as medium for direct discussions between parties aimed at *de facto* agreements on wide range of subjects of mutual interest. Although not so labelled, agreements might become basis for permanent settlement. Riley realizes Israel anxious to initiate direct talks separately with each Arab state and believes Transjordan and Egyptian thinking may be veering this direction.

Comments—Consulate General would appreciate guidance from Department on this subject for discussions with Riley. Does Department believe encouragement should be given to direct talks between parties at present and are MACs considered suitable medium. Consulate General cannot conceive that Israel intends to relinquish any part of territory now held (except for minor border rectifications) or to accept any appreciable number of refugees. Talks and any resulting agreements therefore would be based on existing *status quo*.[3]

BURDETT

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[1] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 1421.

[2] Presumably, retention of the Gaza strip was intended.

[3] Ambassador McDonald, on November 8, expressed his complete agreement with Mr. Burdett's conclusions as set forth in the final two sentences of telegram 627 (telegram 810 from Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/11–849).

501.BB Palestine/10–1949 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED NEW YORK, October 19, 1949—7 : 51 p. m.

1277. Palestine Conciliation Commission held first meeting of third session New York October 19. Delegations not present. Following highlights:

(1) Report of Azcarate—Principal Secretary Azcarate reported on his trip to Jerusalem and Arab States during recent recess. With regard to matters which PCC has instructed him take up in Near East, stated that Servoise was discussing question of blocked accounts with Egyptian and Israeli representatives and that there existed possibility for limited unblocking. Regarding possibility that Arabs resident vicinity armistice lines might be permitted work their land located in Israeli-held territory, Azcarate said that Israel and Jordan had reached agreement in principle that matter should be taken up in special committee created in Israeli-Jordan armistice agreement. Re reunion of separated families, representatives of Lebanon and Egypt had entered into contact with Israeli representatives and discussions were progressing satisfactorily. Efforts to persuade Israel accept PCC point of view re orange groves had produced completely negative results.

Israelis had informed Azcarate that reasons for movement government Ministries to Jerusalem were that Tel Aviv was too crowded and in order to give maximum economic and social life to Jerusalem. Israelis maintained that similar movement taking place in Old City, which had in effect become capital of Arab Palestine.

Azcarate informed PCC Jordan building new road to Bethlehem from Old City which will pass close to Government House. Israelis have constructed two block houses near Government House. These located in neutral zone according present line of demarcation in Government House area but under proposed new line demarcation, now being considered by Israel and Jordan, will lie in Israeli zone.

(2) PCC decided hold *pro forma* meetings with Arab and Israeli delegations in near future.

(3) PCC decided allow matter of appointment UN representative Jerusalem to die on vine by writing letter to SYG expressing regret SYG had been unable find candidate acceptable to PCC.

(4) View wide-spread misinterpretation draft Jerusalem statute, PCC instructed its legal adviser prepare explanatory study refuting main criticisms which PCC might consider releasing to press and members GA at later date.

Boisanger and Yalcin desire come Washington for consultations with Department. They consider it preferable such consultations take place with participation new US representative and hope he can be named by end of next week.

AUSTIN

867N.00/10–1749 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 20, 1949—8 p. m.

673. FYI Oct 18 McGhee informed Elath our concern over report in Jlem tel 625, Oct 17[2] rptd to you 127. McGhee re-emphasized our view mil phase in Pal definitely finished and no justification for further mil action any sort. McGhee said Israeli actions this type cld only serve exacerbate present situation and make settlement more difficult. Elath was requested inform Israeli Govt our views.

ACHESON

[1] This telegram was repeated to Cairo and Jerusalem.

[2] Not printed; it reported information from General Riley that Israeli armed forces had attacked Beit Hanun, a town on the northern tip of the Gaza strip which divided the Israeli and Egyptian zones. The Israeli-Egyptian armistice did not specifically permit or prohibit civilians in the area but Arab civilians had infiltrated during the summer to cultivate their orange groves and to harvest the now-ready crop. The attack drove out the civilians, Egyptian forces reporting 4 known dead and 19 wounded (867N.00/10–1749).

501.BB Palestine/10–2249 : Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NEW YORK, October 22, 1949—1 : 02 p. m.

1285. Following learned in strictest confidence October 21 from Fawzi Pasha el Mulqi.

King Abdullah and Jordan Government have decided proclaim annexation Arab Palestine by Jordan on January 1, 1950. However, if Arab states by any chance move to set up independent state in Arab Palestine in intervening period, annexation will be proclaimed before January 1. Fawzi said United Kingdom approved idea of annexation and that he certain United Kingdom would extend terms Anglo-Jordan defense treaty to new territory. Just to be on safe side Jordan would request United Kingdom give formal undertaking re extension

treaty before proclaiming annexation. If United Kingdom refused Fawzi thought Abdullah might not go ahead with plan.

Abdullah motivated by conviction Israelis will never give up any territory they now occupy and that he should take steps ensure retention that part Palestine occupied by Jordan. After annexation King plans hold elections for Jordan Parliament in which residents annexed area will participate.

Fawzi said that six months ago feeling against Abdullah in Arab Palestine was so strong, because of territory given up in Jordan-Israeli armistice agreement, that King risked being shot every time he went there. Now, however, his stock has risen to such a degree that he thinks he could even risk a plebiscite on annexation question if this were necessary. Main reason for this change, according to Fawzi, is that Arab Palestinians have come to realize that Jordan is only Arab state which can and will protect their interests.

Department please pass London as USUN 57, Amman as USUN 3, Jerusalem as USUN 6.

JESSUP

501.BB Palestine/10–1849 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 24, 1949—7 p. m.

400. Your tel 627 Oct 18. Dept has always considered direct talks shld be encouraged particularly when it appears such talks wld lead to constructive action toward final settlement (Deptel 354 Aug 31 [2] and Depcirgram Oct. 14, 2:15 p. m.). Dept sees no reason why MACs shld not be medium for direct discussions on wider range of subjects (you will recall Dept's proposal that Israel–Jordan MAC under Riley consider broader aspects Jlem question), but believes parties concerned must themselves make decision on this matter.

Dept does not agree that present armistice agreements automatically lapse after one year. Provisions are made in all agreements for revision or suspension by mutual consent any time or after one year in absence mutual consent conference may be convoked to review agreement but parties continue to be bound in all events by injunctions against resort to armed action of any sort. However, Dept does agree it most desirable efforts be made move beyond armistice stage.

ACHESON

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[1] This telegram was repeated by airgram to London, Amman, Cairo, Beirut, and Damascus.

[2] This was a repeat of telegram 3126, August 30, to London, p. 1338.

501.BB Palestine/10–2449 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, October 24, 1949—11 : 59 p. m.

Delga 138. PCC met with Arab delegates October 24 at request Egyptian delegate who had been instructed by Cairo make certain observations. Following highlights of meeting.

Abdel Moneim began by recalling that from very beginning PCC discussions Egyptian Government had insisted upon return of Palestine refugees. Egypt had acquiesced in PCC moves designed facilitate final Palestine solution, such as May 12 protocol and sending ESM to NE, but still refugees not returned.

When ESM visited Egypt Abdel Moneim made following proposals to Clapp:

1. Original inhabitants Gaza area should be permitted cultivate hinterland other side armistice lines, which not being cultivated by Israelis. Such arrangement would improve food situation Gaza area.
2. Original inhabitants that part of Gaza strip which became no man's land under Israel-Egyptian armistice agreement should be permitted return from Egyptian-occupied Gaza area.
3. The many refugees in Gaza strip who come from Beersheba region should be permitted return and cultivate lands which lying fallow.

Abdel Moneim concluded his remarks re refugees by asking PCC whether it possible consider refugee and territorial questions separately. Could Arab delegates make territorial demands without reference to disposition refugee problem? He asked for PCC guidance. PCC states that in its opinion there could be no lasting solution of one question without a solution of the other, but that progress could be made separately toward solution of each problem.

Abdel Moneim then referred to PCC letter to Arab delegates of September 2 transmitting text of draft declaration concerning Holy Places outside of Jerusalem [1] (document A/AC/25/2). He said that in opinion of Egyptian Government Arab states, which traditionally have scrupulously respected Holy Places, were not the ones to ask to sign such a declaration. When UN had decided re more important Holy Places in Jerusalem, then Egypt would abide by this decision. When PCC asked him clarify, Abdel Moneim heatedly replied that in simple terms Egyptian Government saw no reason sign declaration of this "minor aspect" Palestine problem while major issues covered in December 11 resolution remain unsolved. He thereupon orally com-

[1] See Palun 296, September 2, from Lausanne, and footnote 1, p. 1356.

mitted Egyptian Government to protect such Holy Places in Palestine as might remain under Egyptian jurisdiction and said this should be sufficient for PCC.

All other Arab delegates strongly followed same line, refusing to sign draft declaration and orally making same commitment as had Egyptian. Fawzi Pasha (Jordan) suggested that PCC submit these oral declarations to GA as commitments Arab states re Holy Places outside Jerusalem.

Comment—This new common Arab front very likely is result maneuvers Fawzi Pasha to persuade Arab delegates support King Abdullah's desire see *status quo* maintained in Jerusalem. The Department will recall that one of provisions of PCC draft declaration on Holy Places outside Jerusalem is that pending final settlement Palestine problem governments concerned would guarantee freedom of access to Holy Places in territory at present occupied under armistice agreements.

Abdel Moneim next informed PCC that upon instructions Cairo, Egyptian delegate was preparing draft declaration concerning rights of Arabs who are now or may be residents of Israeli-occupied territory. Declaration is to be based on declaration of human rights and genocide convention and will provide for formal guarantees concerning individual and property rights of Arabs in question. Egyptian delegate will submit this draft declaration to PCC with request that PCC ask Israeli delegate that arrangements be carried out for declaration to be made by Israeli Government.

PCC said would examine declaration as soon as Egyptian delegate made available.

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/10–2549 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 25, 1949—5 p. m.

3828. US continues favor incorporation Arab Pal in Jordan but Dept considers action premature this time (Deptel 3768 Oct 19 [1]). Re action after GA (Embtel 4218 Oct 20 [2]) Dept believes matter might be reconsidered then in light GA action re Pal and gen polit and econ developments in NE. We have discussed matter informally with

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[1] Not printed; it summarized the conversation of Messrs. Wilkins and Greenhill on October 14; see p. 1426.

[2] Not printed; it conveyed what was described as the impression of the British Foreign Office that the United States might be "willing agree incorporation Arab Palestine in Jordan after GA." (867N.014/10–2049)

Brit Emb rep but made clear further consideration depended on developments.[3]

ACHESON

[3] Messrs. Wilkins and Greenhill discussed the Palestine problem again on October 21. The latter stated that "Adequate arrangements should be made for the safety of the Holy Places and access to them." Later in the discussion, he said that "The United Kingdom was prepared to give general support to the Palestine Conciliation Commission's plan for the internationalization of the Jerusalem area . . . It was not anxious, however, to take the initiative or to bring pressure to bear on Israel or the Arab states with regard to the plan." He also stated that his Government would avoid discussing the incorporation of Arab Palestine into Jordan during the current session of the General Assembly but would wish such action realized at the end of the session.

Mr. Wilkins' memorandum of conversation notes that "I pointed out that the views of the Foreign Office with regard to Jerusalem were not completely clear to me. I said that if the United Kingdom Delegation confined its remarks in the General Assembly to the safety of the Holy Places and access to them, the impression might be created in the General Assembly that the United Kingdom did not generally support the internationalization of the Jerusalem area. Mr. Greenhill said this was not the British intention and that he would bring this point to London's attention."

Concerning the formal union of Arab Palestine and Jordan, Mr. Wilkins writes that "I again pointed out that it was too early to tell what action might be taken on this score as it would be necessary to await developments in the General Assembly and to consider the situation in the Near East after the end of the General Assembly before we would be in a position to determine what action could be taken" regarding the matter. (501.BB Palestine/10–2149)

501.BB Palestine(E)/10–2549 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Lebanon [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 25, 1949—7 p. m.

642. Esmis 21. [To Clapp.]

1) On Oct 24 Dept officials discussed current thinking re ESM report and UN action in relief, resettlement and polit fields with reps UK, Fr and Turkish embs (Deptel 636 Oct 21).

2) Reps were supplied with *a*) diagram chart of UN structure [2] which might result from anticipated GA action; *b*) Brief analysis this chart; [2] *c*) Draft GA res [2] which was drawn up on basis Legtel 549 [3] and Deptel 636 for purpose of clarifying our thinking (summary fols separate tel [4]) and *d*) draft proposal for long-term org (NESDA).[2]

3) Reps informed four documents were preliminary working drafts and were laid on table to coordinate joint thinking here and to keep in step with your joint thinking in Beirut.

4) Reps were requested ascertain views their govts re draft in light of reports from their reps on ESM.

[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, London, and Ankara and to New York for the American Delegation to the Palestine Conciliation Commission.

[2] Not found attached.

[3] Dated October 18, not printed.

[4] See *infra*.

5) Additional mtg planned in week or ten days. Meanwhile we propose, following receipt, to incorporate views contained in document forwarded from Damascus Oct 22 (Legtel 556 [5]) as well as your further views based on Deptel 636.

6) Dept understands Gardiner plans return US during first week Nov via Paris and London. Brit Emb considers itinerary essential for purposes coordination.

ACHESON

[5] Identified also as Simes 22 and dated October 20, not printed; it stated that a draft revision of an Economic Survey Mission paper dealing with the political and refugee problems and a draft proposal for a long-term organization would be sent to the Department from Damascus on October 22 (501.BB Palestine(E)/10–2049).

501.BB Palestine(E)/10–2549 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Lebanon [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 25, 1949—7 p. m.

643. Esmis 22. [To Clapp.] Summary important provisions preliminary working draft GA res re Pal [2] fols:

Preamble: GA recalling Dec 11 res and having examined reports of PCC, ESM and UNRPR.

1. *Organization:*

(A) Establishes UN Pal Comm consisting present PCC members to exercise gen policy supervision re Pal;

(B) Establishes UN Agent Gen Pal responsible direction UN activities re Pal;

(D) Decides continue UNRPR.

2. *Political:*

(A) Calls on Israel Arab states seek agreement by negots conducted with Agent Gen or directly with view final settlement outstanding questions;

(B) Instructs Agent Gen facilitate and expedite effective negots by Israel Arab states in task achieving final settlement and, as circumstances may require, make recommendations to foregoing or to GA thru PCC as necessary;

(C) Requests Agent Gen collaborate closely with UNRPR and NESDA develop effective coordination.

3. *Relief:*

(A) Takes note ESM report re need continue direct relief and develop short range employment projects;

[1] This telegram was repeated to London as No. 3834, Paris, and Ankara, and to New York for the American Delegation to the Palestine Conciliation Commission.

[2] Presumably the draft resolution cited in paragraph numbered two in telegram 642, *supra*.

(B) Determines on basis ESM report sum (tentatively $32 million) required;
(C) Urges UN members make voluntary contributions;
(D) Authorizes SYG to advance up to (tentatively $5 million) from UN working capital fund;
(G) Recommends UNRPR collaborate closely with Agent Gen and NESDA;
(J) Requests SYG call upon present operating groups continue services and, if subsequently unable continue, make other arrangements as required.

4. *Refugees:*

(A) Calls on Arab states Israel assume their full responsibility solution refugee problem and facilitate measures internatl assistance;
(B) Takes note ESM report recommending NESDA and declarations certain UN members re willingness participate and urges estab NESDA;
(C) Instructs Agent Gen collaborate closely with NESDA.

5. *Compensation:*

(A) Decides Pal Comm acting through Agent Gen shall have internatl status equivalent protecting state re refugee property losses;
(B) Calls on Israel Arab states to treat Comm as having this status;
(C) Requests Israel Arab states notify Agent Gen if they wish undertake protection any Pal refugees;
(D) Instructs Agent Gen take measures effect determination and fulfillment governmental obligations under internatl law or in equity re compensation payments, make appropriate releases and effectuate equitable distribution proceeds.

ACHESON

501.A Summaries/10–2549 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

NEW YORK, October 25, 1949—11:55 p. m.

1290.

. . . . . .

The Council agreed without formal vote Oct. 25 to a suggestion by President Austin that discussion of demilitarization of Jerusalem be postponed pending GA Committee 1 consideration of the PCC report. Fawzi (Egypt), at whose initiative the question was placed on the SC Agenda, registered his disagreement with this procedure but did not formally object.[1]

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AUSTIN

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[1] For the proceedings of the Security Council on the demilitarization of Jerusalem at its 453rd meeting, see SC, *4th yr., No. 49.*

501.BB Palestine/10–2049

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President

WASHINGTON, October 26, 1949.

The Palestine Conciliation Commission concluded the second phase of its work at Lausanne, Switzerland on September 16, 1949, and planned to reconvene in New York on October 19, 1949. Although it is not expected that the Commission will commence its formal sessions before November 10, 1949, on which date the report of the Economic Survey Mission is expected to be available, it is important that a United States Representative be in New York to participate in preliminary discussions. Mr. Paul A. Porter, who had been the United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission, submitted his resignation, effective September 15, 1949. The Department had hoped that Mr. Porter would be able to represent the United States again when the Commission reconvened but he has advised the Department that pending legal business makes it difficult for him to serve at this time.

I am submitting, therefore, for your approval, a request that Mr. Ely E. Palmer, a Career Minister in the Foreign Service, be given a recess appointment as United States Representative on the United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission.

This appointment is made in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 (*d*) of Public Law 341, 81st Congress. By virtue of Mr. Palmer's status in the Foreign Service as Career Minister, he will receive no additional compensation under this appointment.

There is attached herewith a recess commission for your signature if this recommendation meets with your approval.[1]

JAMES E. WEBB

[1] Marginal notation by an unidentified Department officer: "Commission returned signed by President 11/3/49." According to the Department's announcement, printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, November 21, 1949, p. 785, Mr. Palmer's appointment was made by the President on November 4.

811.516 Export-Import Bank/10–2849 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, October 28, 1949—5 p. m.

689. Board Eximbank Oct 26 authorized credit $20 million under $100 million to assist financing purchase US equipment materials services required for industrial projects designed to contribute indus-

trial development Israel, as may be approved from time to time by Board.[1] Int 3½%. Amortization 15 yrs.

Each project involving financing of more than $50,000 must be presented to Board for formal approval and projects this amount or under must be submitted from time to time for Boards administrative approval.

Israel already submitted 39 industrial projects amounting abt $11 million.

Board considered and approved financing 28 projects about $6.1 million. Eight projects about $2.7 million require further info and on three about $2.2 million Israeli not completed its study.

ACHESON

[1] The Department, on October 27, sent to Tel Aviv the text of the press release issued by the Bank concerning the $20 million credit. The release stated that this action brought to $73,350,000 the total credit extended to Israel by the Bank (telegram 687, 811.516 Export-Import Bank/10–2749).

501.BB Palestine/10–2949 : Airgram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, October 29, 1949.

A–173. The Consulate General respectfully submits the following observations, admittedly general, regarding the future of Arab Palestine and the possibility of its annexation to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as seen from Jerusalem.

1. King Abdullah has definitely set his heart on the annexation of Arab Palestine, the sooner the better. Arab Palestine would include the Arab held sections of Jerusalem. His determination probably has been strengthened by reports of negotiations for the union of Iraq and Syria, thus diminishing prospects for fulfilment of the "Greater Syria Plan." He is also getting old and would like to see his kingdom augmented before his death.

2. The United Kingdom supports this project and is inclined to favor immediate implementation. Although giving lip service to the internationalization of Jerusalem, the British apparently feel that only partition of the city is "practical" with the Arab section becoming part of Jordan. The British Consulate General in Jerusalem, at least, has held reservations regarding the possibility of internationalization for some time.

3. The United States has given its blessings to annexation but at a future date and as part and parcel of a final settlement of the Palestine problem. In addition, it continues to support internationalization of the entire Jerusalem area.

4. The other Arab states, particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are opposed to annexation both from traditional hostility to the Hashemites and the realization that such action would further diminish any remaining prospects of their obtaining territory in Palestine.

5. Israel is also strongly opposed. Her general objection to any increase in the size and therefore the potential power of an Arab state is augmented in this case by the ingrained conviction that Jordan is only Britain in disguise and annexation would mean the return of the British by the kitchen door. Furthermore, an independent Arab Palestine would be relatively easy to control and would in all probability quickly degenerate into a vassal state, if not an actual part of Israel.

6. Should incorporation take place, particularly with the open or camouflaged sanction of the United States and/or the United Kingdom, Israel might quickly seize the opportunity and formally proclaim her sovereignty over all the areas she now controls including the Jewish sections of Jerusalem.

7. The Arabs of Palestine have been the principal victims of the events since 1947. They are depressed, disillusioned and lack any strong leader to replace the discredited old ones. A uniform characteristic is their growing contempt for the United Nations at least in so far as its activities in Palestine are concerned. The refugees have been remarkably patient and have occasioned surprisingly few disturbances; it would be still more surprising if their endurance does not break into disorders on a growing scale. Indications that the breaking point may be near are the increasing numbers who attempt to infiltrate back into Israel and the up-surge of individually organized raids across the demarcation lines. Complaints against living conditions and paucity of food are also growing.

8. Better informed refugees now realize that repatriation in the sense contemplated by the December 11, 1949 resolution of the General Assembly is out of the question and they no longer think the United Nations will enforce the resolution. However, no one dares to say so openly for the great mass of the refugees has been nourished on this illusion and a frank statement of the extent of the deception might kindle an explosion. It would certainly eliminate the chances of leadership of the person making the first announcement.

9. No love for King Abdullah is expressed in private conversation or felt for Jordan despite the King's recent "triumphal parade" through Palestine. The King is commonly considered a despotic tribesman, and the Jordan Government autocratic in the extreme—the antithesis of the type of regime for which the younger intellectuals in Palestine are allegedly striving. What Palestinians fear is complete subordination to Jordan. Imbued with contempt for the "Jordanian

Bedouin", and conscious of both the small resources of Jordan itself and the scarcity of persons qualified to direct a modern state, they believe that in any joint state Palestinians should play an equal if not leading part. Particularly alarming to them is the present political and economic discrimination. Furthermore, resentment over cession of the Triangle lands is still smouldering and has permanently shaken confidence in the trustworthiness of King Abdullah as a protector against Israel.

10. Nevertheless, a growing number of the moderate, better informed elements appear resigned to the fact that there is no alternative to union with Jordan. They recognize that a viable Arab Palestine is impossible and that such a Lilliputian state would quickly be swallowed by Israel. Under specific conditions in the formulation of which they had a prior voice, incorporation with Jordan would probably be accepted.

11. Talk of union with Israel or close economic bonds between an independent Arab Palestine and Israel is heard. But, the conditions mentioned for this are the product of wishful thinking and clearly unacceptable to Israel. On the whole there does not appear to be any genuine, widely held desire to cooperate with Israel in a realistic manner.

12. Israel's treatment of its present Arab population; its security arguments against repatriation of Arab refugees; the drastic differences between the semi-socialist communal state of Israel and the Arabs' traditional mode of existence; and the chauvinistic basically anti-"goy" atmosphere in Israel; indicate that the interests of Palestinian Arabs would be served best by incorporation into Jordan.

13. Careful consideration should be given to the manner of achieving this union to minimize initial resentment and future friction. A unilateral decree of annexation without specific protection for the rights and interests of Palestinians would provoke deep, widespread bitterness difficult to heal. It might even occasion disturbances.

14. In the present circumstances union might be approached by the selection, or preferably election, of a group of Palestinian Arabs (not mere Abdullah marionettes) to represent Palestine and draw up with Jordan representatives an agreement for union under specific and acceptable conditions. The selection might be entrusted to the various mukhtars, heads of families, municipal organizations and committees from the refugees camps. The union could take the form of a kingdom under one crown but with each side of the Jordan possessing local autonomy and controlling its internal affairs. Responsibility for defense and foreign affairs could rest in a joint body. Such an arrangement would require reduction in the arbitrary power of the King in practice if not in form, and explicit provisions against discrimination

in favor of either unit of the Kingdom. Particularly important is permitting the Palestinian Arabs a prior voice in working out the arrangements which would make them responsible for the type of government organized and, therefore, give them a greater responsibility for its successful functioning.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine (E)/10–2549 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Lebanon [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 31, 1949.

663. Esmis 27. For Clapp from McGhee. We have studied your informative and detailed message (Legtel 564 Oct 25 [2]) with care and have fol further views on your numbered paras:

1. We agree agent gen with primary responsibility pol matters shld not also be charged by UN with responsibility for operations in econ field. Agent gen shld however in practice coordinate his pol activities with econ activities of UNRPR and NEDI as indicated in Deptel 636 [3] and 643.[4]

2. We cannot agree NEDI shld handle direct relief and work relief in addition to its long range econ functions. USG is not willing to assume responsibility for admin direct relief and work relief. Device of contractual arrangement with UN is unacceptable because it wld generally be considered we had assumed responsibility on national basis. UK, France and Turkey may certainly be expected react similarly. Congress wld certainly consider US involvement in NEDI as unacceptable if it included responsibility for relief even if trusted American were chairman and responsibility were limited by contract with UN. Furthermore we anticipate appeal for voluntary contributions for relief from UN members wld be prejudiced and fear such contributions wld not be forthcoming to full extent as UN members might assume NEDI had taken over.

UNRPR shld continue function through present operating agencies. We believe operating agencies can be persuaded continue participate in view gravity problem involved. In fact we see no other satisfactory answer to adm problem since any change from present system wld require organization and recruitment large staff for rela-

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, London, and Ankara and to the American Delegation of the Palestine Conciliation Commission at New York.

[2] Not printed; it gave Mr. Clapp's comments on Department's telegram 636 (501.BB Palestine (E)/10–2549); see footnote 3 immediately below.

[3] Dated October 21, not printed; it advised that the Department agreed substantially with the content of telegram 549, October 18 (p. 1442) and offered various comments (501.BB Palestine (E)/10–1849).

[4] Dated October 25, p. 1453.

tively short period. Experts tell us such staff is simply not available because of many international organizations operating in other areas of world.

3. We understand "NEDI" approximates "Social Club" in Arabic and believe it important title be included in interim report and suggest "NEDA" (Near East Development Agency).

4. Arguments shld prove as effective if UNRPR handles and coordinates its activities with NEDI.

5. We agree re US willingness and consider it essential your initial report contain specific long-range development program at least for central Palestine and Jordan as indicated in Deptel 636.

6. Although at outset UNRPR will have all funds, potentiality of NEDI shld gradually become apparent to NE govts as projects are developed.

Dept plans transmit further views re basic policy in next few days. [McGhee.]

ACHESON

501.MA Palestine/11–149

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President

WASHINGTON, November 1, 1949.

Subject: Payment of United States Contribution to United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees

1. Public Law 25, 81st Congress, a Joint Resolution of March 24, 1949, authorized the appropriation of funds not to exceed $16,000,000 for the relief of Palestine refugees, in response to the message submitted by you to the Congress on January 27, 1949. Public Law 119, 81st Congress, appropriated to the President $12,000,000 for the relief of Palestine refugees, and an additional $4,000,000 for the same purpose, "to such extent as the President from time to time finds that other nations party to such United Nations agreement have met their obligations to the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees . . . ".[1]

2. The amount of $13,377,930 has already been paid to the United Nations, $1,377,930 of which was paid as a result of your finding of August 10, 1949[2] that other nations party to the United Nations agreement had met their obligations to the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees in the form and to the extent of contributions in the amount of $13,377,930.

3. The Secretary General of the United Nations has now informed the Secretary of State[3] that "the total contributions in cash, kind or

[1] Omission in the source text.
[2] See footnote 3, p. 1283.
[3] Letter of October 13, not printed.

services donated by Governments other than that of the United States, as of September 15, 1949, amount to $15,759,745." This figure exceeds by $2,381,815 the United States contribution to date. In view of this information, he requests that the United States Government make an additional contribution of $2,000,000 at this time, and states that he will submit a final statement in respect to the balance of the authorized United States contribution within the next two months.

4. The Department of State believes that the statement of the Secretary General is justification for a favorable finding by the President. The Department, therefore, recommends that the President find that, as of September 15, 1949, other nations party to the United Nations agreement have met their obligations to the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees in a manner and to an extent warranting a further contribution of $2,000,000 at this time by the United States Government, and that the President authorize the payment of a contribution of $2,000,000 as an addition to the payments of $13,377,930 previously made. A finding in respect to the balance of the authorized United States contribution will be requested later.[4]

[4] Sent along with Mr. Webb's memorandum were "Four Contribution Charts," which are not found attached to the Department's record copy of the memorandum. Presumably the charts were copies of those transmitted with Secretary-General Lie's letter of October 13. These comprised: (1) a recapitulation of donations by governments other than the United States for relief of Palestinian refugees ($15,759,745 as of September 30); (2) donations in cash and kind to the UNRPR fund made by each of 27 countries, other than the United States, as of September 15. The British contribution of $4,032,258 was the largest in this category; (3) expenditures totaling $5,698,283 for direct care of refugees and local services by Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, as of August 31. The Egyptian contribution of $2,230,704 was the largest in this group; and (4) donations made by the United Kingdom, Eire, Denmark, and Sweden to the Red Cross and other voluntary organizations working with Near East refugees. As of September 15, these totaled $595,000, the British donation of $403,226 being the largest (501.MA Palestine/10–1549).

The Secretary of State, on November 17, authorized Ambassador Austin to inform Secretary-General Lie that "the President of the United States has considered the statement made by the Secretary General and has found that the extent to which other governments have met their obligations to the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees allows him to authorize the payment of $2,000,000 as an additional United States contribution . . . [thus] raising the total United States' contribution to $15,377,930." (instruction 358 to New York, 501.MA Palestine/10–1549)

867N.00/11–249 : Telegram

The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State

SECRET AMMAN, November 2, 1949—10 a.m.

390. In recent conversations with myself and other foreign representatives King Abdullah has openly expressed desire bring about permanent peace and conclude definitive treaty Jordan and Israel. Expressed view that without restraint UN and Arab League he could easily negotiate satisfactory treaty with Israel.

These expressions taken together with developments re future status Jerusalem, regarding which he and Israel have adopted equally intransigent positions, have doubtless been partly responsible for rumors King had undertaken secret direct negotiations with Israel looking to eventual settlement. Abdullah's Aqaba trip added fuel to fire by suggesting to minds of some that he had gone there to contact Israeli agents.

Such negotiations were officially denied two days ago. Seems improbable these rumors have substance in fact. Were Abdullah to begin negotiations would be most difficult keep them secret and by becoming known his precarious position among Palestinians, unwilling yet compromise belief UN resolutions re boundaries and refugees should be implemented, would be greatly prejudiced at time when he seeking their support constitutional annexation Arab Palestine to Jordan. Furthermore revelation such negotiations would cause cabinet crisis alienating Palestine members whose services King strongly desires retain order give government more representative complexion.

Sent Department 390; Department pass London 95, USUN 14, Tel Aviv 59. Pouch Arab capitals, Jerusalem.

FRITZLAN

501.BB Palestine(E)/11–249 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, November 2, 1949—5 p. m.

4389. Wright last evening emphasized following points in informing Embassy officers that telegram embodying preliminary Foreign Office reactions to Department's draft resolution on Palestine (Deptel 3834 October 25 [1]) had been sent British Embassy Washington for discussion Department:

1. Foreign Office doubts efficacy substituting one man agent general for present PCC. Foreign Office realizes that Department's thinking at least in part conditioned by low esteem in which PCC held by Arabs and Israelis are result past efforts. However, Foreign Office feels this element is inherent in Palestine problem and that same loss of esteem would in time attach one man agent general now attaches PCC.

2. In addition to foregoing point, Foreign Office feels it would be undesirable raise question establishing new political machinery at this session GA. Wright recalled that when British recently suggested raising question incorporate Arab Palestine into Jordan at this session GA, Department felt it would be undesirable since it would probably raise whole question of political settlement. Wright recalled Foreign Office agreed with us at that time. It now foresees same difficulty if this new question is raised.

[1] This was a repeat of telegram 643 to Beirut, p. 1453.

3. Foreign Office feels it is important that NE states themselves would take responsibility for development, which should be done through their own local development boards rather than through UN body.

4. In accordance British policy keeping Soviets out of NE, Foreign Office apprehensive creation UN body such as NEDI might open door for Soviet infiltration.

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine(E)/11–249 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Lebanon

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, November 2, 1949—7 p. m.

669. Esmis 29. [To Clapp.] Dept analyzes current situation re economic development and refugee problem NE as fol:

(1) PCC created ESM for purpose examining economic situation arising from recent NE hostilities and recommending (*a*) means of overcoming economic dislocations; (*b*) reintegrating refugees into economic life of area; and (*c*) creating economic conditions conducive to permanent peace.

(2) Dept fully appreciates practical difficulties and political complications which have confronted you and congratulates you on ESM's progress. It seems clear, however, that Israel is unwilling to consider repatriation of refugees except in limited numbers and only in context of final political settlement with Arab states. There seems no prospect of latter at present time. Arab states are unwilling, except in case of desert-poor Jordan, formally to consider extensive resettlement of refugees or to accept resettlement in return for international assistance for economic development. In other words existing impasse does not show signs of yielding to economic approach.

(3) Proof for this conclusion may be found in increasing emphasis which ESM has been forced to place on direct relief and work relief at expense of plans for long-range development.

(4) Dept does not believe present attitude Israel re repatriation, Arab states re resettlement is one on which UNGA or individual UN members including particularly US can base constructive future planning for development. ESM program drawn up principally in terms of relief and work relief with only passing reference to development will not in our view commend itself to GA, Congress, Parliament or any other legislature. GA would be confronted with necessity of voting for further voluntary contributions with no assurance of definite date of termination of relief or of integration of refugees into economic life of area. US, as one UN member, would be faced with difficult problem of requesting Congress for direct relief and work relief appropriation, possibly approximating sixteen million for 1949, without assurance of Israeli and Arab cooperation in permanent settlement

of refugee problem. Dept cannot approach Congress on this basis.

(5) Dept is accordingly of opinion ESM, subsequently backed by US, UK, France, Turkey and other like minded UN members, shld embark on course of action outlined below. Altho concessions shld be made insofar as possible to sensibilities both parties in matters of form, recommendations shld be directed to solution basic problems without being overly influenced by opposition expected; otherwise intransigence of both sides will only be encouraged.

(A) ESM shld inform GA of results of its investigations in NE and shld make complete set of recommendations to GA on basis ESM terms of reference, ESM's own experience in NE and such technical reports as are now available to ESM, particularly those relating to central Palestine, Jordan and Syria. ESM will then be in position of having outlined problem to GA on technical economic grounds only and not based on any political factor. Recommendations may well include such matters as resumption trade, flow of oil, repatriation and resettlement, which will give this Govt basis for future diplomatic approaches on these questions.

(B) It will thereafter be possible for GA to study report and to determine what action it will recommend to Israel and Arab states and other UN members on economic grounds.

(C) Individual UN members will then have full opportunity of considering Israeli and Arab reactions to ESM report and of deciding what assistance they may be able to extend. US, UK, France and Turkey wld be able more realistically to formulate their concept of NEDA and whether it shld be advanced during or after GA.

(D) US wld have before it balanced ESM report, GA debate, Israeli and Arab reactions and UN recommendations on which constructive relief and long-range development plan cld be projected for presentation to Congress.

(6) Dept believes GA might establish organizational structure along fol lines:

(*a*) UN agent to have coordinating responsibility for various UN activities relating to Palestine including conciliation, relief, and economic planning and development. Latter to be carried out by agency suggested in (*d*) below.

(*b*) PCC to continue conciliation.

(*c*) UNRPR to continue relief.

(*d*) Agency to be established for economic planning and development (NEDA).

Realize you may not wish make direct proposal concerning conciliation machinery, but your recommendation cld be based on assumption of need for continuing UN conciliation activities.

Foregoing has merit of keeping all activities within UN framework and at same time of maintaining flexibility under SYG for independent or concerted action of component agencies. ESM report wld not stress connection between political and economic activities.

(7) Cordier and Bunche, with whom McGhee has discussed current Palestine situation in general terms, agree ESM and subsequently UN shld take decisive action on basic issues at this time along lines suggested.

Dept wld appreciate ESM views soonest.[1]

ACHESON

[1] This telegram was repeated to London, Paris, Ankara, and New York, the last for the American Delegation to the Palestine Conciliation Commission.

Mr. Sheringham advised on November 7, that the Foreign Office was in substantial agreement with the Department's thinking as revealed in this telegram and that remaining differences were tactical and readily resolvable. The Foreign Office still had reservations concerning the UN Agent (see paragraph 6*a* and London's telegram 4389, November 2, p. 1462) and was of the opinion that the establishment of NEDA should be postponed until after the current session of the General Assembly in order to gauge the reactions of the General Assembly and the Middle East countries (telegram 4459, November 7, 4 p. m., from London, 501.BB Palestine(E)/11–749).

501.BB Palestine/11–349

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Wells Stabler of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] November 3, 1949.

Participants: Mr. Boisanger, French Representative, PCC
Mr. Yalcin, Turkish Representative, PCC
Dr. Azcarate, Principal Secretary, PCC
Mr. de la Tour du Pin, French Advisor
Mr. Benard, First Secretary, French Embassy
Mr. Esenbel, First Secretary, Turkish Embassy
NEA—Mr. McGhee
UNA—Mr. Sandifer
UNP—Mr. Bancroft
Mr. Halderman
ANE—Mr. Berry
Mr. Mattison
Mr. Wilkins
Mr. Rockwell
Mr. Stabler

Problem: To discuss with the French and Turkish Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission the present and future situation in connection with the Palestine problem.

Action Required: None

Action Assigned to: ANE

[1] Initialed by Mr. McGhee.

Discussion: Mr. McGhee welcomed the members of the Commission and said that he was glad to have the opportunity to exchange views with them concerning present and future developments with respect to Palestine.

Mr. Boisanger said that the principal matter of concern to the Commission was the Israeli note of October 27 and felt that the Commission should make an unequivocal reply to that note refuting the assertions made by Israel. He mentioned that the Commission had received a telegram today from the United Nations Press Representative in Jerusalem indicating that the Israeli Government had stated that the note did not mean that Israel refused further negotiations with the Commission. However, it was necessary for the Commission to make a definite reply in order that there should be no misunderstanding. Mr. McGhee said he agreed with this point of view.

Mr. McGhee then suggested it was desirable that the Commission should make continued efforts to urge the parties to undertake direct talks. He understood that the American representatives on the Commission had themselves urged these direct talks and assumed the Commission as a whole believed that such talks would be desirable. Mr. Boisanger said that he agreed that direct talks were desirable but pointed out that while the Commission should insist on direct talks, there was nothing in the December 11 Resolution which obliged the parties to undertake such talks. He felt that the Arabs because of their previous firm stand would be unwilling to enter into direct talks. He also pointed out that previous experience indicated that when the Arabs and Israelis did get together for direct talks they were not successful. Mr. Bunche and Mr. Vigier had stated that from their experience it was always necessary for a third party to be present. However, both Mr. Boisanger and Mr. Yalcin agreed that it would be most desirable to urge the parties to meet together with the Commission and the Commission intended to pursue its efforts in this connection.

Mr. McGhee said that we fully understood the difficulties involved but felt that every effort should be made along these lines.

Mr. Boisanger then referred to the statement made by the Arabs that they felt conciliation had failed and therefore wished the Commission to undertake mediation. The Commission proposed to inform the Israelis of this view and to ask whether Israel would agree to mediation. He indicated that Israel feared that the Commission might produce a new plan which might deprive them of territory which they now held. However, he believed that it was desirable to establish at least the principle of mediation and he felt that Israel, if it refused mediation in principle would be placed in a very bad moral position with respect to the United Nations. Mr. Boisanger considered that there were a number of points on which mediation could take place

without at the outset going into the more difficult questions. Mr. Yalcin wondered whether the United States Government would have the patience to bear with the mediation since this course of action would undoubtedly take a very long time.

Mr. McGhee said that he agreed that the Commission should inform the Israelis of the Arab desire for mediation and also felt that if Israel refused, it would place itself in a bad light. He suggested that there were a number of smaller matters which could be dealt with through mediation and suggested that the question of Mount Scopus might be one of them.

Mr. Sandifer indicated his belief that the Commission could undertake the mediation functions in that the Commission was empowered to conciliate which was a broader concept than mediation. It was pointed out that under the General Assembly Resolution of December 11, 1948 the Palestine Conciliation Commission had, in any event, inherited Count Bernadotte's mediation functions under the General Assembly Resolution of May 14, 1948.

Mr. McGhee then explained briefly our views on the proposed organization of United Nations functions with respect to the Palestine case and indicated our belief that it was desirable to have a United Nations coordinating agent who could ensure that the three operating groups, PCC, UNRPR, and NEDA were functioning in unison. Since all the questions involved in the Palestine problem are inter-related, it is desirable that the three groups be coordinated. Mr. McGhee emphasized that these plans are entirely tentative.

Mr. Boisanger said that he was in general agreement with the proposed organization but felt it very important that in the General Assembly no substantive questions be raised. In this connection, he felt that the PCC should remain as it is in order that its terms of reference under the December 11 Resolution would remain the same. With respect to NEDA he said that he was worried by the possibility that Russia could join the organization. Mr. Yalcin expressed the same concern. It was explained that NEDA would be formed by the participating governments and additional membership could be limited by those governments. It could be assumed, therefore, that the Governments concerned would not permit Russia to join. Mr. Yalcin pointed out that if the PCC consisted of representatives of Governments, it would not be possible for the United Nations Coordinating Agent to instruct the PCC on political matters.

Mr. McGhee said that we agreed that it was desirable to limit the debate in the General Assembly to procedural matters if possible and we felt that the proposed resolution on organization could confine the debate.

Mr. McGhee then said that we were considerably worried by the lack of security in the PCC and we had been embarrassed by the fact that everytime the United States representative made a statement, it was made available to the press. He felt that the Commission should address itself to this problem and if necessary could obtain a completely new staff. Mr. Yalcin emphasized that in any case this lack of security could not be attributed to Dr. Azcarate, Principal Secretary of the Commission. Mr. McGhee responded that he was not accusing anybody but he felt it was a matter to be dealt with.

The discussion then turned to the question of Jerusalem. Mr. McGhee informed Messrs. Boisanger and Yalcin that the United States gave its general support to the PCC proposals for an international regime in Jerusalem. However, we realized that amendments would be offered and we would be prepared to consider them in the light of their individual merits in contributing to the workability and acceptability of the plan. Mr. Boisanger and Mr. Yalcin expressed agreement with this point of view and said their delegations in New York shared the same view. Mr. Boisanger expressed the hope that it would be possible for the United States, French and Turkish delegations in New York to meet prior to the General Assembly consideration of the various Palestine problems in order to coordinate their action. Mr. McGhee said he thought this would be useful.

Mr. Boisanger hoped that it would be possible to enlist the assistance of the Chairman of Committee I in confining the discussion in Committee I to consideration of such procedural resolutions which may be presented. He expressed the view that the resolutions should not be too detailed. He said that all delegates, of course, would have to be heard but that after they made their speeches he hoped it would be possible for the Chairman of the Committee to channel further debate into consideration of the resolutions.

867N.00/11–449 : Telegram

The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State

SECRET AMMAN, November 4, 1949—1 p. m.

391. RefLegtel 390 [1] and Jerusalem Contel 639 [2] re likelihood direct negotiations between King Abdullah and Israel.

Discussed question with Kirkbride who stated categorically he did not leave King's side during recent Aqaba trip and impossible King

[1] Dated November 2, p. 1461.

[2] Dated November 2, not printed; it advised of information that King Abdullah had established direct communication with Israel and had inquired whether Israel was prepared for a "reasonable" settlement and that Mr. Sassoon was anxious to start negotiations (790D.90G/11–249).

contacted any Israeli agent. Kirkbride states emphatically he has no reason believe King has established or intends in near future establish direct contact negotiations Israelis with view to permanent settlement.

Kirkbride agrees with me however unpredictable King may be, he fully realizes such negotiations this juncture and their revelation would be grave political blunders costing support those Palestinians now backing him who have fresh in mind unpalatable results negotiations King and Israel last winter. It doubtful King yet prepared openly abandon existing solidarity with Arab states re dealings with Israel.

Comment: Rumors direct negotiations still rife here. Doubtless based on King's oft-repeated statement re desirability early settlement. However, there is often important difference between King's expression his desires and intentions and actions actually willing undertake implement them. Most improbable King would undertake such negotiations without apprising Prime Minister.

Pouched Arab capitals, Jerusalem.

Sent Department 391, Department pass London 96, USUN 15, Tel Aviv 60.

FRITZLAN

501.BB Palestine(E)/11–549 : Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT, November 5, 1949—noon.

588. Simes 28. Reference Esmis 29, November 2. Clapp conscious desirability taking firm line with Arab states and appreciated Department's full cable under reply. All concerned here hope that text interim report, which will be in your hands within a week, will go far to clarify remaining points where local appreciation of issues differs from Department's and leads to misunderstanding. ESM interim has been so drafted, in opinion of all deputies, that its recommendation regarding organization will not embarass national delegates to GA. ESM cannot, however, subscribe to organizational planning set forth in reftel. *Inter alia* Clapp cannot and will not recommend any US contributions to relief or works if UNRPR or any organization under SYG to handle program.

Reference paragraph 1 reftel, interim and final reports read together will be fully responsive to terms reference as outlined insofar as anything can be fully responsive to terms of reference at this stage.

Department is incorrect in assumption paragraph 3 reftel. Plans for long term development of scope and nature envisaged before Clapp left US, including those involving international river development,

could yet be brought to stage where funds need be sought until engineering and related inquiries requiring two years time have been completed. However, works programs now to be recommended represent beginnings of such development in locations where international issues are not involved. Term works relief as used ESM would not be confused therefore with home industries in camps etc. as proposed by UNRPR.

Reference paragraph 4, believe that approach of ESM is "pleable" to legislatures as it will recommend conclusion of relief within 18 months time. Thereafter financing of development might be considered, taking into account then political factors. ESM remains convinced that modest beginnings development under relief financing are essential prelude to such long term activity. The basic question here is whether US considers it essential to have a part in the Near East. If so, the US cannot turn its back on a situation it is judged to be partly responsible for.

Reference paragraph 5, Clapp agrees but points out importance giving full consideration to weakness and internal difficulties local governments.

Reference paragraph 5*a*, please see *supra*. Existing technical data inadequate for purposes considered by Department. Other items 5*a* and 5*b* must await final report.

Reference paragraph 6, regret unable cable all data leading Clapp to differ from Department's views on economic organization. Gardiner will be able explain on arrival in Washington next week.

Sent Department 588, Department pass London 18, Paris 22, Ankara 18.

PINKERTON

Editorial Note

In a letter of November 5 to President Truman, King Abdullah of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan stated that he had provided instructions to Fawzi el-Mulki, the Jordanian Minister of Defense who dealt with the Palestine question before the Palestine Conciliation Commission, concerning issues which threatened Jordan's existence. He asked President Truman to exercise judgment with respect to the demands of Israel and the Arabs and to put restraints on the party whose demands were beyond the range of possibility. King Abdullah noted that he continued to have confidence in and rely upon President Truman's message of March 28 (see page 878), and that he hoped for an opportunity to meet the President. (867N.01/12–149)

With respect to the presentation of King Abdullah's communication to the Department of State in December, see Mr. Hare's memorandum of December 1, p. 1515.

867N.00/11–549 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Jordan

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, November 5, 1949—5 p. m.

198. Senator, Vice President Hebrew University, accompanied by Amb Elath, again called on McGhee Nov 2 [1] to discuss Scopus situation and urge US intervention with Abdullah to carry out armistice terms and permit free access to Scopus. Elath stated Israel Govt now prepared make certain concessions to Jordan to demonstrate desire reach agreement this point and that Israeli UN Rep wld so inform SYG.

McGhee reiterated our sympathetic attitude toward Senator's objectives re resumption activities cultural and humanitarian institutions Scopus and suggested good use might be made of MAC for resolving Scopus question. MAC consists of Israeli and Jordan reps and was set up and is now functioning for questions of this kind. Furthermore submission to MAC would probably in long run be more effective than third country approach.

Pls inform FonOff re foregoing. Re Scopus, we hope Jordan Govt will be mindful of great interest in this country and elsewhere in functioning of humanitarian and cultural institutions and that it will continue approach problem in spirit of determination to resolve present impasse.[2]

ACHESON

[1] The first visit by David W. Senator had taken place on September 26; Mr. Wilkins' memorandum of conversation of that date not printed (867N.00/9–2649)

[2] This telegram was repeated to Jerusalem as No. 408 and to Tel Aviv. Simultaneously, the Department sent its first two paragraphs to Tel Aviv in telegram 705, in which it instructed Ambassador McDonald to "discuss matter with FonOff and referring Dept's proposal (Deptel 375 June 17) suggest MAC wld appear most appropriate medium through which Scopus and other question[s] this nature cld be resolved." No. 705 was repeated to Jerusalem and Amman. The Department, at the same time, directed Jerusalem, in telegram 406, to inform General Riley in confidence of the substance of Nos. 198 and 705. Telegrams 198, 705, and 406 bear identical file numbers.

501.BB Palestine(E)/11–549 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, November 5, 1949—6 : 28 p. m.

1317. For Tomlinson,[1] UNE. Cordier today received cable from Clapp saying that he was omitting from his interim report all reference to technical assistance in the Near East so that it would deal exclusively with continuing relief assistance and work relief. There

[1] John D. Tomlinson, Advisor to the Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs.

would thus be no mention of the need for, nor possible machinery and general outlines of plans for, economic development. Clapp also said that it would not be possible for him to come to Lake Success in November, stating he could answer questions by cable. He said that Gardiner was qualified to express his views on all ESM matters.

Cordier today replied to Clapp that it was most important that he come to Lake Success to discuss ESM report with PCC, Secretariat and GA delegates. Pointed out it would not be possible or appropriate for a non-UN staff member to explain to other delegates the views of the ESM. Cordier believes it most important that Clapp should be in New York to assist in holding the Palestine debate within bounds.[2]

Secretariat also objected to omission from interim report of any indication of need for long-range economic development. He told Clapp it was most important that Assembly should approve the principles and broad program for TA and development in the NE. Unless this were done, all such programs would be purely national actions and would probably lead to more political difficulties in the area. Cordier argued that it was most important that development program should have GA approval in principle. Cordier did not state to Clapp, but he and Lie believe, that unless member governments are given assurance that some long-range UN economic planning is afoot UN members will be reluctant to contribute to continued relief program.

AUSTIN

[2] Mr. Clapp, on November 11, informed Mr. McGhee that he did not plan to return for the meeting of the General Assembly (telegram 594, identified also as Simes 29, from Beirut, 501.BB Palestine(E)/11–1149).

Editorial Note

The *First Interim Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East* was signed at Beirut on November 6 by Messrs. Clapp, Gokcen, Labonne, and Morton. It was transmitted to Secretary-General Lie by Hussein C. Yalcin, Chairman of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, in a letter of November 16. The letter stated that "The Conciliation Commission considers that this report constitutes a constructive approach to the Palestine refugee problem and believes that the General Assembly will wish to give urgent consideration to it. The Commission is of the opinion that the Assembly will wish to obtain additional information concerning certain of the findings and recommendations contained in the report. In this connexion, in the light of the arrangements made by the Secretary-General with the International Red Cross organizations and the American Friends Service Committee, particular reference is made to the recommenda-

tion that the number of rations issued should be reduced by one-third as of 1 January 1950."

The Interim Report commenced with a table of contents, a foreword, and a discussion of "The Problem" and of the establishment, functions, etc., of the Mission. Then followed sections on interim findings and recommendations, which read as follows:

"INTERIM FINDINGS

As a result of the Mission's studies, discussions with Governments and investigations in the field, the Mission finds that:

1. The refugees themselves are the most serious manifestation of 'economic dislocation' created by the Arab-Israeli hostilities. The refugees represent about 7 per cent of the population in the countries in which they have sought refuge. About 65 per cent of the refugees fled to Arab Palestine and Gaza, almost doubling the population. Resolution of the demoralizing, unproductive and costly problem of the refugees is the most immediate requirement 'conducive to the maintenance of peace and stability in the area'."

2. The continuing political stalemate in the relations between the Arab countries and Israel precludes any early solution of the refugee problem by means of repatriation or large scale resettlement.

3. The relief supplied by the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPR), the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the many local and foreign voluntary agencies of charity operating in the Near East has averted a worse calamity. Were all direct relief to be cut off now, many refugees would face a winter of disease and starvation. Were charity alone to be provided for another year, it would be more difficult and costly to take constructive measures later. Nevertheless, the extent of direct relief provided through United Nations funds should be stringently cut within the next two months. There is no doubt that, however commendable it may be to extend international charity to the needy, rations greatly in excess of the number justifiable within the original intentions of the General Assembly of the United Nations have been and are being issued.

4. Work in place of relief cannot be provided immediately for all. One thing, however, is clear. Rather than remain objects of charity, the refugees who are idle must have an opportunity to go to work where they are now; work which would increase the productive capacity of the countries in which they have found refuge. Until such work has been found, those refugees who are idle must remain a burden upon others, the United Nations, charitable societies supported by voluntary contributions, or the countries in which the refugees now find themselves.

5. Useful, gainful employment can, however, be found for all the refugees able and willing to work. There are many potential opportunities for useful and productive work to improve and reclaim the land, increase the supply and use of water, strengthen and extend road systems and improve sanitation and shelter. Suitable employment for the refugees can be provided in many places, especially in Arab Pales-

tine and Jordan, where nearly half the refugees are located (see appendix C).

6. This and other similar work could begin as soon as funds can be found to finance it. But the resources of the Arab countries sheltering most of the refugees are inadequate to cope unaided with the present cost of emergency relief alone, much less to finance the cost of putting the refugees to work. Money for this purpose must be found from outside sources.

7. The inability of the refugees rapidly to find for themselves gainful employment in the Arab countries is but a symptom of the need for development of the unused resources of the Near East, where lack of available capital is responsible for much idle manpower. This is a task for the Near Eastern Governments to do in their own way, and in due course, with the help of competent counsel and substantial financial credits.

Recommendations

In the light of these findings, the Economic Survey Mission makes the following recommendations, which are explained later in the report.

1. The emergency relief for refugees made possible by voluntary contributions from Member Governments of the United Nations should be continued through the winter months, and until 1 April 1950, under the present UNRPR system; the present minimum ration should not be reduced, but the number of rations issued should be reduced by 1 January 1950 from the present rate of 940,000 to 652,000 (for an analysis of the number eligible for relief, see appendix B). This would cost 5,500,000 dollars for the three months beginning 1 January 1950. Thereafter, further reductions should take place as men become employed in gainful labour and thus become ineligible for direct relief.

2. A programme of public works, calculated to improve the productivity of the area, and such continuing relief as will be needed should be organized as an integrated operation, in co-operation with the Governments of the countries where the refugees are located. This programme should be planned and arrangements negotiated with the appropriate Near Eastern Governments to begin 1 April 1950.

No more rations should be supplied by the United Nations after 31 December 1950, unless otherwise ordered by the United Nations at the fifth session of the General Assembly, at which Near Eastern Governments concerned would have an opportunity to present appropriate proposals.

Meanwhile, the agency handling direct relief on behalf of the United Nations should be empowered to negotiate with Near Eastern Governments for the latter to take over as soon as possible, and at latest by 31 December 1950, responsibility for the maintenance of such refugees as may remain within their territories.

This programme for the nine months from April through December 1950 would require 27 million dollars, which sum would include such relief as might be needed.

The United Nations should be prepared to continue the works programme until 30 June 1951 (subject to review at the fifth session of the General Assembly).

The works programme for the six months of 1951 would require 21,200,000 dollars.

Of the total of 53,700,000 dollars for the cost of relief and works projects for the eighteen months' programme, the Mission estimates that approximately 25 percent, or 13,300,000 dollars, represents the cost of the necessary work materials, tools and equipment. The Mission considers that a considerable proportion of this sum, perhaps up to one half in certain cases, might be supplied by Governments of the countries in which the refugees are now concentrated.

This would reduce the amount required from outside sources for eighteen months from 1 January 1950 for a programme of relief and public works to approximately 48 million dollars, or an average of 2,700,000 dollars per month. This is the same as the present monthly rate of expenditure by the United Nations upon direct relief alone* (see appendix A).

3. An agency should be established to organize and, on or after 1 April 1950, direct, the programmes of relief and public works herein recommended. As a minimum requirement to the successful implementation of the relief and works programmes, the Economic Survey Mission urges that:

(*a*) Subject to rendering such reports of its activities and accounting for its expenditure to the General Assembly of the United Nations as may be required of it and within the policies established in its terms of reference, the agency should have full autonomy and authority to make decisions within the sphere of activities entrusted to it, including the selection of its subordinate staff and the administration of funds made available to it.

(*b*) The agency should be located in the Near East.

(*c*) The personnel and assets of the UNRPR should be turned over to the new agency on 1 April 1950, or as soon thereafter as possible, in order that the functions of direct relief may be directed by the new agency in appropriate relation to the works programme.

(*d*) The agency should be authorized to take counsel with such Near Eastern Governments as may so desire, concerning measures to be taken by such Governments in preparation for the time when United Nations funds for relief and works projects shall no longer be available."

The Interim Report concluded with sections entitled "Guiding Policies for Administration of Proposed Programme," "Discussion of Findings and Recommendations," and "Prospects for Employment" and four appendices entitled "Cost of Programme," "Analysis of Refugees and Relief Recipients," "Illustrative Outline of Works

*Should the United Nations decide to bring about a gradual reduction from 940,000 rations per day to 652,000 on 1 April 1950, through monthly reductions of 100,000, beginning on 1 February 1950, the cost of the alteration in schedule would amount to 1,200,000 dollars. If the United Nations should prefer to maintain the present rate of 940,000 rations per day, except as affected by work relief, throughout the calendar year 1950 and thus provide charity to many thousands who are not refugees, the cost of this alteration in schedule would amount to 7 million dollars. [Footnote in the source text.]

Projects," and "Terms of Reference of the Economic Survey Mission" (GA, *4th sess.*, *Ad Hoc Political Committee*, *Annex*, volume I, pages 16–29).

501.BB Palestine(E)/11–949

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Second Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom (Root)

SECRET [LONDON,] November 9, 1949.

Subject: The Interim Report of the Economic Survey Mission (ESM) to the Near East.

Participants: Mr. Arthur Z. Gardiner, Department of State
Mr. John F. Root, American Embassy, London
Mr. M. R. Wright, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office
Mr. Bernard Burrows, Head, Eastern Department, Foreign Office
Mr. J. G. T. Sheringham, Eastern Department, Foreign Office
Mr. Trefor Evans, Middle East Secretariat, Foreign Office
Mr. E. B. Boothby, Head, Refugee Department, Foreign Office
Mr. C. J. Edmonds, UK Representative, IRO
Hon. H. A. A. Hankey, Assistant, Personnel Department, Foreign Office
Miss Barbara Salt, Assistant, United Nations (Economic and Social) Department, Foreign Office

Note: Second conversation of two between Mr. Gardiner and Foreign Office officials.[1]

Mr. Wright said he and his colleagues were glad for the opportunity to have this preliminary discussion with Mr. Gardiner and to learn of the ESM thinking at first hand. He noted that any decisions of conclusions with respect to the ESM proposals would await his forthcoming talks in Washington.[2]

Mr. Gardiner then offered to give the group some of the background to ESM's work. He said there had been two particular sets of problems. The first was a question of engineering opinion. There had been a certain divergence between the views of the TVA engineers and the British experts. The British contemplated a series of headworks in the Jordan area which would distribute, but not increase, the supply

[1] The first conversation took place the previous day; Mr. Root's memorandum of the earlier conversation is not printed.

[2] For documentation on these talks, see pp. 186 ff.

of water. Our experts felt that it would be more advantageous both from the point of view of costs and of results to undertake works which would increase the supply of water as well as bring it to the areas where it was most needed. They were sure that for a reasonable outlay a dam could be built at Wadi Zerqa and that in an integrated irrigation and development project at Wadi Zerqa some five thousand farm families, representing twenty-five to thirty thousand people, could be employed. The TVA experts have had extensive experience in the technique of building dams on limestone foundations and are convinced that one can be built satisfactorily at Wadi Zerqa so that no leakage will result. They were thinking in terms of a dam thirty-five meters high and so constructed as to allow for later expansion if necessary. These observations, Mr. Gardiner said, represented the best professional opinion available, and the TVA experts were ready to guarantee that the project outlined could be carried out successfully. Sir Desmond Morton himself was in accord with the American view. Mr. Gardiner added that in all probability TVA technicians could be obtained to assist in carrying out the Wadi Zerqa project.

Mr. Wright said that he would like to make his own position clear, in view of the fact that there seemed to have arisen some misunderstanding. He felt that the best advice should be taken and the best work decided upon. He wanted to emphasize this point and to repeat that the Foreign Office had no axes to grind. Mr. Gardiner replied that it seemed to be merely a case of doctors disagreeing.

The second big problem to which ESM had to apply itself had to do with the question of how to organize for the future. In deference to the views of the Department and the Foreign Office, ESM had cut a great deal out of the preliminary drafts of the interim report and had left the matter of long-term development in terms as general as possible. Clapp was determined not to recommend a nickel for relief or work relief under UNRPR or for that matter under any organization of the UN secretariat. It was simply too difficult to have a business-like operation. The ESM itself had had sufficient difficulties on that score. Clapp wanted a group of thirty-five and got eighty-four, and it was difficult to keep track of just what this entire number was doing or what purpose they served. It was disconcerting to have a meeting one day and find a report on the meeting in the *Palestine Post* the next. Clapp had a phrase for the undesirables in the ESM secretariat: "incompetent saboteurs."

ESM had in mind an agency composed of the principal contributing countries, responsive to the GA but independent and autonomous in carrying out the program of relief and work relief. ESM felt it could put to work large numbers of people within eight to ten months' time. The two principal projects recommended (Wadi Zerqa and Wadi

Quilt) would account for some 8,000 man-hours of work spread over eighteen months. Altogether ESM hoped to provide employment for 60,000 to 70,000 "breadwinners" through the work-relief projects.

[Here follow two paragraphs of technical discussion on the refugee question.]

Mr. Wright remarked that the presentation in the report was first class. He thought it was extremely encouraging that the Foreign Office, the Department and ESM seemed to be in fairly close agreement on their ideas. There were, of course, certain points in connection with the report which would have to be explored at some length in Washington. It might be useful, however, at this time, to discuss one or two of these points.

Mr. Burrows expressed concern over the political impact the cut in rations might have on the refugees themselves and on the authorities in the Arab states. The interim report emphasized that the saving realized through the recommended cut in rations could be applied to the public works program. This was no doubt desirable but what consideration had ESM given to the political repercussions of the cut in rations? He felt that this was a danger point which might be seized upon by the Arabs and that the Arab leaders might be forced into a position where they were obliged to oppose the plan as a whole. Mr. Gardiner explained there were two considerations behind ESM thinking:

(1) It was incumbent on ESM to point out that a certain number of destitute persons were receiving relief. If it was the intention to provide relief for these destitute persons as well as the refugees, then this fact should be clearly recognized by the UN.

(2) The second point in ESM's thinking was that the measure would tend to put a burden on the Arab governments, leading them to come to us with more specific proposals for work relief and development. The idea was to put the Arab states in a position of wanting to start trading with us, to take the initiative in requesting ideas and funds for development. The ESM had considered the point carefully and had decided on this particular proposal with the foregoing ideas in mind.

[Here follow two paragraphs of technical discussion on the relief and work questions involving the refugees.]

Reverting to the cut in rations, Mr. Burrows asked whether the Arab governments were aware of this proposal. Mr. Gardiner replied he thought it would be news to them. Mr. Burrows asked whether it wouldn't be desirable to prepare the Arab governments in advance. There was a danger that comment following announcement of the cut might develop in such an unfavorable way as to put the governments in an extremely difficult position and prevent them from dealing rationally with the whole report. Mr. Gardiner reminded the group that

the proposals primarily concerned only three countries—Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Mr. Gardiner thought there would be no particular trouble with Jordan and the Lebanon. Syria would be a somewhat uncertain factor until after the elections. Our Embassy in Egypt was concerned about Egypt's reception of the proposals and Mr. Gardiner agreed that the report had little to offer in the Gaza strip.

There was a general discussion of the means by which the Arab countries might be forewarned of the ESM proposals, whether through the ESM, the PCC or our diplomatic missions. It was recognized that the report contained a certain amount of unpalatable medicine for all parties concerned, not only the Arabs, but that there was no way to avoid this entirely. It was agreed that the preparatory work which might be done among the Arab governments to avoid adverse reaction and insure a proper reception for the proposals should be carefully considered and that it was definitely a point to be taken up in the Washington talks. Mr. Burrows suggested that possibly our governments might refer in general terms to the fact that the report would soon be taken up by the GA, that while we were not familiar with the contents of the report, it was likely to contain certain unpalatable things for the respective countries concerned and that we hoped the governments as well as the press of these countries would weigh very carefully the ESM proposals in the light of the objectives we all desired. Mr. Sheringham brought up the threat to public security in the camps and elsewhere among the refugees that might result from the announcement of the cut in rations. He feared there might be riots and demonstrations and thought it might be only fair to warn the countries concerned in advance of these dangers. Mr. Boothby mentioned the possibility that the Arabs might marshal a move against the whole report in the GA.

In answer to a question about the future plans of Clapp and Morton, Mr. Gardiner explained that when the final touches had been put on the interim report, they planned to go to Tel Aviv. They intended subsequently to go to Syria but were postponing their visit until after the elections. Eventually they will make another complete circle of the Near East countries involved and will draw up another report, which will place the emphasis on future economic development. For this report they will draw heavily on the advice of their financial and economic experts.

Mr. Burrows noted the absence in the report of any statement on the numbers of refugees to be repatriated to Israel. Mr. Gardiner replied that ESM had purposely avoided this subject. He said there would be plenty of opportunity at the GA to refer to the December 11 Resolution. The facts seemed to be that Israel was going to take back very few refugees, but there was no point in saying so now or to give

the Arabs' hand away. It was, however, hard for him to see how Israel was going to take care of its own immigrants, let alone receive any large number of Arabs.

There was a general discussion on how the agency administering relief and work relief might be related to the UN. The British felt this point was especially important in view of the fact that the short-term agency might eventually develop into the group coordinating long-term developments. The British feeling was that the agency should be independent of the UN. It might be authorized and blessed by the UN and it might, as do other autonomous international organizations, report on its activities and submit its accounts to the GA. But it should not be controlled by the UN.

Mr. Gardiner said the State Department was determined that the agency would somehow have to be established within the "UN framework"—in other words, sponsored by and responsive to the GA. At the same time we were determined that it should be a business-like operation. He said the formula for its relationship to the UN remains to be worked out.

Mr. Gardiner remarked that the State Department will do its best to get our share of funds from Congress, but we certainly were not going to carry the burden alone. To get funds from Congress, there would have to be some assurances of substantial contributions from other countries. He did not know what these would be. Possibly if we subscribed half, we might expect a fifth or more from the UK. Mr. Burrows noted that this would mean a British contribution for the eighteen months at a yearly rate of $6,000,000. Mr. Gardiner said that we also expected to get something from the French and of course something in the way of local contributions from the countries where the projects were being carried out. There would also be certain amounts available from such international organizations as UNICEF.

Mr. Burrows noted that the view seemed to be gaining ground that the agency would not be a body possessing funds for development but a group of advisers engaged in drawing up and recommending projects and in seeking money for their implementation. Mr. Gardiner said that that was our view. We were certainly not going to turn over our check book to anybody. We had in mind that the agency would have full access to such lending organizations as the Export-Import Bank, and we expected the contributors of funds to examine the record of the agency's deliberations before advancing money for a project. He reiterated that while we were concerned with somehow working "within the framework of the UN," we certainly wanted a business-like operation. We intended to "sit across the table" from the beneficiary countries, as it were.

Mr. Boothby remarked that the agency would gain no prestige for being tied to the UN, and Mr. Wright added that from their point of view any connection with the UN did not facilitate getting funds from the British Government. Mr. Gardiner said the answer remained to be seen. He emphasized Clapp's statement that he cannot and will not recommend any US contributions to relief or public works if UNRPR or any organization under the UN secretariat is to handle the program.

Mr. Wright remarked that it was important that the UK contribution be in sterling and not in a hard currency and asked Mr. Gardiner what he thought the feeling in that respect would be. Mr. Gardiner felt that a sterling contribution would be possible, for there were relief and relief-work items, cement for example, that could be bought in the sterling area. He emphasized again that a UK contribution would help to sell the idea at home.

867N.00/11–1049 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL TEL AVIV, November 10, 1949—noon.

814. In hour's talk with Comay, Israeli Foreign Office, November 9 on general matters, Ford took occasion discuss substance Deptel 705, November 5.[1] Made specific reference June 20 *aide-mémoire* (Deptel 375, June 17) and suggested MAC seemed most appropriate medium for handling Scopus and other questions this nature. Comay was noncommittal other than to say Elath had sent similar information. He added, however, that McNeil of British Government had spoken to Eban in New York re possibility making "horse trade" on several items in Article VIII Israel–Transjordan armistice agreement. Comay said Israeli Government had authorized Eban to suggest that "if requested from right quarters" Israel would be prepared give Arabs free access to Bethlehem Road and provide electricity for Old City in exchange for free access to Scopus. Comay unwilling vouchsafe any explanation of British interest other than over-all one of "getting on with job" and also said no further steps appeared to have been taken following McNeil–Eban meeting. Comay stressed that his government, in suggesting such "deal" within Article VIII, did not intend thereby to establish precedent for handling other unsettled items that article or elsewhere in armistice agreement.

Comment: While Comay reiterated that his remarks were both "informal and unofficial", Ford gathered impression he hoped sug-

[1] See footnote 2, p. 1471.

gested "trade" would be broached by neutral source (British or US) to avoid automatic refusal should it come from either Arabs or Jews. *End Comment.*[2]

Sent Department 814; Department pass Jerusalem 94, Amman 59.

McDONALD

[2] Chargé Fritzlan, on November 10, advised that the Jordanian Foreign Minister and Acting Defense Minister were generally sympathetic to a return of cultural and humanitarian activities. The Foreign Minister indicated that, in return for access to Mt. Scopus, Israel must make a substantial concession which would contribute toward a resumption of normal living conditions in Jerusalem. Both Ministers were said to have viewed the matter as an appropriate one for consideration by the Mixed Armistice Commission (telegram 395 from Amman, 867N.00/11–1049).

890.00/11–949

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

SECRET PARIS, November 11, 1949.

Participants: Secretary Acheson
Foreign Minister Bevin
Ambassador Douglas
Mr. Barclay[1]
Mr. Battle

During a conversation with the Secretary this morning, Mr. Bevin raised several questions concerning the Near East. Mr. Bevin said that he was very worried over developments in the Near East. He mentioned the emergence of new groups and new ideas in the Arab world.

He said that it was difficult for him to continue to urge Iraq and Syria not to get together in a union, when the underlying forces in that area were so strong for Arab unity. He said that he feared that Russia might start a cry for Arab unity, which would make our position more difficult. He said that he felt that the unity movement, as it gained momentum, would spread rapidly through the area.

He expressed concern over the French insistence on the *status quo*, which the French based on the 1919 settlement. Mr. Bevin said that the British had no real hold over the people in the area. He said that the situation was quite difficult and he believed would become increasingly so.

He mentioned that he had asked Mr. Wright to discuss the problem with the Department of State in Washington. Continuing, Mr. Bevin said that if he spoke to the French regarding their insistence on *status quo*, it would be regarded as a revival of old British-French jealousies.

[1] Roderick E. Barclay, Private Secretary to Mr. Bevin.

He expressed the hope that the United States could look into the matter and see if it were possible for the United States to take it up with the French.

Mr. Bevin asked if the United States had been considering these problems. In reply Mr. Acheson assured Mr. Bevin that the United States was greatly interested in these problems and mentioned that Assistant Secretary McGhee was making every effort to evolve a new approach to the area. Mr. Acheson said that the United States would continue to study and discuss these problems with the British.

Mr. Bevin mentioned that he thought it possible that Pakistan would try to set itself up as a leader of Moslem groups in that area in an effort to strengthen Pakistan's position against Nehru.

Mr. Bevin mentioned that there appeared to be some difficulty in the proposed visit of the Prime Minister of Pakistan to Russia. Mr. Acheson mentioned the fact that the President had approved the idea of issuing an invitation to the Prime Minister of Pakistan to visit the United States, at a date to be set later. He said that the Government of Pakistan was being informed that Mr. Truman was agreeable to a visit from the Prime Minister and that if the Prime Minister indicated his willingness to accept, an invitation would subsequently be issued to him.

867N.01/11–1149

The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State

SECRET AIR PRIORITY AMMAN, November 11, 1949.

No. 140

Subject: King Abdullah's Terms for Permanent Settlement With Israelis

I have the honor to report that General Riley appeared in Amman yesterday and at his request I arranged a meeting between him and King Abdullah, at which I was present.

Through the medium of Samir Pasha Rifa'i, Minister of Court, the General and the King expressed themselves as follows on various phases of the Palestine question:

1. *Demarkation of Line in Jerusalem Area*

General Riley stated he hoped the King would appoint a Jordan member to the Special Committee of the Mixed Armistice Commission considering this problem in order that minor rectifications in the Arab-Jewish line in the Jerusalem Area could be effected. His Majesty expressed himself in favor of such a step and said he would consult Ragheb Pasha Nashishibi, Governor-General of Palestine, concerning it.

2. *Direct Negotiations With View to Permanent Settlement*

General Riley told King Abdullah that there was a strong and sincere feeling among responsible Jewish leaders (such as Ben-Gurion, Sharett and Eytan) that direct negotiations should be undertaken with the King or his representatives in order to effect permanent settlement of outstanding issues between the two countries. General Riley stated that the Israeli Government was prepared to open such negotiations on twenty-four hour notice. He added that he hoped he (the General) would be instrumental in helping bring about negotiations of this character as he believed the time was ripe for talks above the level of the Mixed Armistice Commission.

The King prefaced his reply by stating that he was beginning to feel that he had no obligation to the other Arab States in his dealings with Israel. His was the only Arab State which had any extensive border with Israel and he thought he should be free to decide when and how to negotiate with the Israelis. His Majesty continued by saying that he would begin direct negotiations with the Israelis immediately if the following points were accepted as the basis of a settlement:

a. He felt it absolutely essential that Jordan have an access to the Mediterranean and he had decided that it would be most appropriate if Jordan obtained a corridor through Beersheba to Gaza. He thought, in the interests of all, Jordan should replace Egypt at Gaza and he believed he could arrange this with the Egyptians as he had persuaded them to evacuate Bethlehem and Hebron.

b. The Arab quarters at present included in the Jewish part of Jerusalem should be returned to the Arabs. It was especially inconceivable that the Hebrew University and the Hadassah Hospital should continue to function where they did. Compensation for these two places would be considered at a time when the subject of compensation of refugees generally arose for discussion.

c. In return for Israeli concessions on the above points, the King would permit the Israelis to restore and operate the potash works at the northern end of the Dead Sea. He would guarantee free passage to and from the works via Jerusalem.

In reply to the King's statement, General Riley remarked that he thought His Majesty's demands unrealistic and excessive in view of existing circumstances. Something in the direction of the King's wishes might have been worked out eight months ago but at the present time the Israeli Government would never give serious consideration to such terms. The King replied that, in any case, such was his position and he could not enter into an agreement [*argument?*] concerning its merits. He said that if the Israelis listened to his proposals and accepted them, they would derive immeasurable benefits as he would guarantee peace for them from Gaza to Lake Tiberias.

Apropos of direct negotiations with the Israelis, the King remarked that recently the Lebanese Minister to Jordan had asked him if there was any foundation to rumors that he was negotiating directly with Israeli authorities stating that, if such were the case, Lebanon wished also to be included within the scope of the talks. General Riley laughingly observed that the Lebanese were hoping and praying that Jordan would begin such direct negotiations in order that they too could break the present deadlock. To this the King replied, "They wanted us to take the lead in war and now wish us to be the first to make peace."

3. *Entry of Christian Pilgrims into Arab Palestine from Jerusalem*

General Riley raised this question in view of the expected arrival of considerable numbers of Christian pilgrims desiring to visit Jerusalem and Bethlehem during the Holy Year, saying that he had heard the Jordan Government had decided to refuse entry of such persons coming by way of Israel. (See Legation's A–172, October 24, 1949.[1]) The General added that if pilgrims were permitted to enter Arab Palestine, there would be no question of their having to return to Israel and that Jordan would probably benefit considerably from an economic standpoint.

The King readily agreed that pilgrims coming from Israel should be allowed entry into Arab Palestine, but he thought they should be carefully screened to keep out Jewish agents and communists. He promised to give appropriate instructions to the Prime Minister. Assuming the Prime Minister is amenable to this change of policy, it is likely that a *modus operandi* on this question can be worked out. The Legation will not fail to bring to the Department's attention developments in this regard.

Comments: The King was genuinely pleased to see General Riley whom he greeted most affectionately. The discussions were conducted throughout in a cordial manner and there were no recriminations.

Of course, there is not the least likelihood that the Israelis will listen to the King's terms for a permanent Palestine settlement and there can be little doubt that His Majesty is aware of this. He would like very much to liquidate the whole affair, which is proving very burdensome as regards maintenance of occupation troops in Arab Palestine, and devote his energies to consolidating his domain and restoring the economic life of the country. However, the King seems to feel that the Israelis are more anxious than he is to come to terms and, therefore, he need not be in a hurry to reveal the irreducible minimum of his demands. He certainly displays great caution, determined, doubtless, to make no terms which will not contain real advantage for his

[1] Not printed.

country. Failure to obtain such advantages as a result of any negotiations would, of course, at the present juncture be a grave political blunder seriously jeopardizing his position.[2]

A. DAVID FRITZLAN

[2] Chargé Fritzlan, on November 11, summarized his discussion with the British Minister, Sir Alec Kirkbride, concerning the question of the annexation of Arab Palestine to Jordan. He then commented: "From my observations at this post, I am strongly of the opinion that there is a considerable body of enlightened and progressive Palestinians who see in annexation of Arab Palestine to Jordan the only salvation for their country. They are willing to give a large measure of cooperation to the Jordan Government and there is reason to believe that the presence of Palestinians in the Government is acting as a check on the arbitrary rule of King Abdullah. Such Palestinians undoubtedly expect eventually that a constitutional monarchy in the true sense will be established in this country and that, through force of population and relative advance in most of the arts, they will be able to exercise dominating influence in a united country." (Despatch 141 from Amman, 867N.01/11–1149)

867N.01/11–1449

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] November 14, 1949.

Participants: U—Mr. Webb
NEA—Mr. McGhee
The Egyptian Ambassador
The Saudi Arabian Ambassador
The Minister of Jordan
The Minister of Lebanon
The Minister of Syria
The Chargé d'Affaires of Iraq
The Delegate of Yemen to the United Nations
The Secretary of the Yemenite Delegation to the United Nations
ANE—Mr. Stabler

Problem: On the basis of the decision taken by the recent Arab League Council Meeting the diplomatic representatives of the Arab states were instructed to present a joint memorandum [1] to the United States Government requesting our intervention with Israel to implement the Protocol of May 12, 1949.

Action Required: To consider the position the Department should adopt on the joint memorandum.

Action Assigned to: ANE

Discussion: The Egyptian Ambassador, acting as spokesman for the Arab representatives, expressed appreciation at being received by the Acting Secretary. He said that at the recent Arab League Council

[1] *Infra.*

Meeting the member states had considered the Palestine situation and had instructed their diplomatic representatives in Washington to present a joint memorandum to the United States Government bearing on certain aspects of the Palestine question. The Ambassador stated that the Arabs are greatly concerned, as is the United States, about the situation in Palestine. The Arab states have cooperated both with the United States and United Nations and have accepted their advice on a number of matters. They have also acquiesced in certain other matters on which the United States and United Nations have insisted. In keeping with this policy of cooperation the Arab states represented at Lausanne had agreed to sign the Protocol of May 12, 1949.

The Arab states were much concerned by the fact that Israel had shown no signs of cooperation or good will and had in fact refused further collaboration with the Palestine Conciliation Commission. He also referred to the fact that Israel had incorporated Jaffa in Tel Aviv in violation of the United Nations. Israel had also refused to implement the May 12 Protocol. The Ambassador produced a map attached to the May 12 Protocol and pointed out that implementation of the Protocol by Israel would have solved not only the territorial but the refugee aspects of the Palestine problem. He indicated the numbers of refugees which the Arab states believed could be settled in the areas which would have been allocated to the Arabs through implementation of the Protocol. The Ambassador continued that the Arab states were entirely prepared to implement the May 12 Protocol and hoped the United States would use its influence with Israel to persuade the latter to act in a spirit of good faith and cooperation in proceeding with the implementation of the Protocol.

I thanked the Ambassador for the expression of views of the Arab Governments and for the memorandum which I said would be given careful consideration in the Department. I pointed out that it was the view of this Government that the United Nations and particularly the Palestine Conciliation Commission were the proper medium through which negotiations should be conducted. I also indicated that since this was a problem directly affecting the Arabs and Israelis, it was desirable that they should take the initiative in advancing towards a settlement. I also suggested that direct talks might also be employed. I emphasized that the United States would not advance any specific solution to either party, as the parties themselves must reach a mutually satisfactory agreement. Mr. McGhee said that this was quite true and stated that it emphasized that the United States was not in a position to urge specific proposals on either party. It was up to the parties themselves to take steps to reach an agreed settlement of the problem. I said that, of course, the United States stood entirely ready to assist the parties wherever possible in their desire to achieve peace.

The main objective of the United States, and I felt sure also that of the Arab states, was the restoration of peace.

The Egyptian Ambassador said that with reference to the question of direct talks, it was extremely difficult for the Arab states to contemplate such talks in view of the fact that Israel disregarded United Nations' decisions, had refused to work further with the Palestine Conciliation Commission and has constantly presented the world with *faits accomplis*.

The Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires then read a memorandum on instructions from his Government stating that while Iraq is in complete agreement with the other members of the Arab League, it is in a special position of not having participated in the talks of the Palestine Conciliation Commission at Lausanne. The Government of Iraq would, therefore, present in the near future a similar memorandum [2] except for amendments necessary by reason of its special position.

I again expressed appreciation for the views which had been presented and the meeting ended.

[2] Dated November 14, not printed.

501.BB Palestine/11–1449

The Diplomatic Representatives of Various Arab States in the United States to the Secretary of State

MEMORANDUM

The Diplomatic Representatives of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria, and the Head of the Delegation of Yemen to the General Assembly of the United Nations, acting under instructions of their Governments, have the honour to submit to the Honourable the Secretary of State of the United States of America the following:

The Governments of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen have been persistently opposed to any solution of the Palestine question that will not insure for the inhabitants of Palestine the exercise and enjoyment of their rights and the protection of their legitimate interests in keeping with the principles of the United Nations and the right of self-determination of peoples.

In supporting the rights of the Arabs of Palestine within the framework of these principles, the Arab Governments did not lose sight of the needs of international peace and security.

This is the reason why the Arab states were firmly opposed to the partition plan which was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on November 29, 1947, being convinced that this resolution, which contradicts the above-mentioned principles, is also likely

to trouble the peace of the Middle East. Their apprehensions did not wait long to be confirmed, since, increasing their terrorist activities in March and April 1948, the Jews had forced nearly two hundred thousands among the Arab inhabitants of Palestine to abandon their homes and seek refuge mainly in the Arab countries, obliging these countries to intervene militarily in order to prevent the complete extermination of these inhabitants.

The truce which was decided by the Security Council on May 29 and July 14, 1948 and which was accepted by the Arab Governments each time on the advice and insistence of the Government of the United States in particular, has not, any more than the general armistice, eliminated the danger.

The Arab Governments are conscious that a solution should be sought for this question and especially under the present international circumstances which call for active collaboration of all peace-loving peoples.

It is in this spirit that the Arab Governments, in response to the renewed appeal of the Government of the United States of America for reaching a realistic and peaceful solution of the problem, have agreed to collaborate to this end with the Conciliation Commission that was created by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution of 11 December last.

It is equally in this spirit that the Arab Governments signed at Lausanne on May 12, 1949 the protocol adopting the territorial provisions of the partition plan with the necessary adjustments, thereby bringing their attitude into conformity with the policy of the United States in this matter—the policy which was proclaimed by the American Delegate, Mr. Jessup, in the third session of the United Nations in Paris, was reaffirmed by the President of the United States in his message to His Majesty the King of Jordan, by the American representative in the Conciliation Commission, Mr. Ethridge, to the delegates of the Arab States, and finally by the representatives of the State Department at Lausanne.

In adhering, therefore, to the policy of the United States in this matter and in affixing their signatures side by side with that of the United States representative, the Delegations of the Arab Governments have the right to believe that some sort of gentleman's agreement, providing reciprocal obligations, was concluded.

Nevertheless, no action has been initiated to put this protocol into effect until now, owing to the lack of good faith on the part of the Jews who have equally signed it.

The Arab Governments have grounds to believe that the Government of the United States would not lack the means necessary to induce the Jews to respect their signature and carry out the obligations resulting therefrom.

Considering the great concern of the United States Government for preserving peace in this particularly sensitive part of the world and its desire not to spare any efforts in the attainment of this peace, the Arab Governments would not waver in giving it their complete cooperation towards this end. But, it is necessary that the solution which was deliberately accepted by them in order to settle in an effective manner a problem liable to paralyze their action, must be implemented.

The Arab Governments have also solemnly affirmed during the last session of the Arab League, held in Cairo in October, their firm will to form a single front to the end of defending the peace against any danger from whatever source this danger originates.

They hope that the Government of the United States of America will not deny them its support in order to solve peacefully the problem which preoccupies them, permitting them in this way to join their efforts with its own efforts in the pursuit of other ends not less urgent.

Consequently, the Arab Governments trust that the United States Government will not hesitate in giving them assurances that the peaceful solution concluded by common agreement at Lausanne in the protocol of May 12, 1949 will produce its full and complete effects, and that the United States Government will endeavor by using the effective means at its disposal and by direct action with the other interested party, to expedite this solution.

WASHINGTON, November 14, 1949.

501.BB Palestine/11–1149

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Robert N. Margrave of the Munitions Division

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] November 14, 1949.

Participants: Mr. George Ignatieff, Counselor, Canadian Embassy
Mr. G. E. Cox, Third Secretary, Canadian Embassy
BNA—Wm. L. Wight
MD—John C. Elliott
MD—R.N. Margrave

[Here follow the two introductory paragraphs dealing with United States policy concerning exports of arms to the Near East.]

Mr. Ignatieff stated that the Canadian Government had been approached by Israeli representatives with a request for quotations on various military items (for example, 500 .50 caliber Browning machine guns, 2,500,000 rounds of .50 caliber machine gun ammunition, 18,000 rounds 37 mm. AT proximity fuze ammunition, 50 105 mm. field guns, 150 artillery weapons higher than 57 mm., etc.). He queried

whether the United States Government would consider exports of this order to be of considerable military significance with respect to the Near East. Mr. Elliott pointed out that although many unofficial rumors and "feelers" concerning Near Eastern desire for U.S. arms had come to the attention of the Munitions Division, to date exports from the U.S. to the Near East have involved no significant military items (largely sporting arms and civil aircraft parts). He added that this Government would regard proposed exports to the Near East of the nature and of the order described by Mr. Ignatieff as being of considerable military significance and, therefore, would be obliged to view such shipments with great concern.

Mr. Elliott informed Mr. Ignatieff that the Department is attempting to gather together reliable information as to the relative strengths of the various Near Eastern military establishments so that, along with information derived from consultation with the United Kingdom, Canada, Belgium, France, and Italy, this Government would have an adequate basis for considering significant military shipments to the Near East. He pointed out that the proposed consultations with these Governments (of which only that with the United Kingdom had been initiated) would result not only in a pooling of information with respect to Near Eastern arms exports on a *post facto* basis but also envisaged possible prior consultation with respect to proposed exports of considerable military significance. Mr. Ignatieff expressed the view that his Government would be pleased to consult further with this Government concerning this whole problem and hoped that Mr. Elliott would keep him informed of the progress of U.S.–U.K. discussions looking to the possibility of parallel and cooperative action concerning the central problem.[1]

[1] On November 17, Mr. Elliott, who was Chief of the Munitions Division, conferred with a New York attorney, who had been asked by the Israeli Supply Mission in New York "to sound out informally the Department regarding the export to Israel of AT–6 aircraft for civil pilot training programs." Mr. Elliott suggested that "AT–6's were not the type of aircraft appropriate for a civil pilot training program" because of their high military potential and indicated that the Mission endeavor to obtain smaller aircraft (501.BB Palestine/11–1749).

711.83/10–1249 : Airgram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 14, 1949.

A–581. Department has read with great interest Embassy's telegram No. 943, October 12 [1] reporting your conversation with King Farouk and believes this frank initial exchange of views will contribute to

[1] *Ante*, p. 223.

forming the basis for a new and improved phase of United States–Egypt relations.

While it is regretted that the King continues to place such emphasis on the Palestine question vis-à-vis US–Egypt relations the theme is well-known and it is assumed that you related to the King the efforts of this Government, in cooperation with the United Nations, to bring about a settlement of the Palestine question. The main concern of this Government is that there should be political and economic stability in the Near East area and it considers an early settlement on the Palestine question as an essential condition to that stability. In further discussions with the King you should emphasize that the self-interest of Egypt as well as of the other countries of the area can best be served by a resolution of the present impasse of the Palestine question.

The following comments and information on certain of the specific points raised by the King may be useful to you:

Training of Students—Training facilities have already been provided by the Air Force for two Egyptian officers in the field of photography and it is understood that the Army now has six Egyptian officers participating in training. Moreover, the Army and the Air Force are now considering the feasibility of providing training for an additional number of Egyptian officers and it is hoped that definite commitments can soon be made. For your information, the Department of Defense is in the process of determining training requirements under the Military Assistance Program and is, therefore, not in a position to make definite commitments at this time on training facilities for countries not included in present legislation.

While you may transmit foregoing information in general way to the Egyptian authorities, Department and Defense Department prefer that any specific information in regard to numbers or other details should be channelled through the Army or the Air Force Attaché to the Egyptian Defense authorities.

[Here follow observations on the resolution by the Security Council on August 11 which provided for the superseding of the truce arrangements, including the provisions with respect to the shipment of war materials, and a partial quotation from Senator Austin's statement of August 7 that the United States did not intend to contribute to a competitive arms race in the Near East.]

Since the adoption by the Security Council of this resolution, the United States has approved several export licenses for Egypt covering such items as bombardier training planes, spare parts and a small amount of other material. In addition, the retransfer of lend-lease gun parts valued at $350,000 from Great Britain to Egypt has also been approved by the United States as is necessary in such cases.

The Department was encouraged to note that the King's attitude at the time of your conversation appeared favorable to the lifting of Egyptian wartime regulations for the Suez Canal. While it is regretted no further developments in this connection have occurred since that time, it is hoped that the Egyptian Government will find means at an early date whereby it can raise the restrictions on the Canal.

WEBB

890D.00/11–1549 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, November 15, 1949—9 p. m.

495. From McGhee for Minister Keeley. In conversation with me Nov 5 Syrian Min stated that in his judgment Syria must "line up" openly with US against Russia and requested my advice as to what Syria shld do to demonstrate this fact and promote area economic and political stability. He stated his personal conviction time has come for positive action in settling Pal controversy and proceed with economic rehabilitation in NE.

I welcomed his approach as statesman-like and said I had been disappointed by lack of progressive Arab leadership at present critical juncture. Experience indicates continued inability Israel and Arab states to reach agreement concerning outstanding Pal and econ questions does not operate to advantage of Arabs. It seemed to me that Syria, because of mature state of political development, natural leadership and great economic potential was in unique position to assert positive leadership in breaking impasse, and shld seize its opportunity to do so.

I said I believed Syria shld do two things: Cooperate to fullest degree with the UN and particularly the ESM, and commence direct talks with Israel for a peace settlement. I recalled President's statement on appointment Gordon Clapp as Chairman ESM,[1] which reflected sincere US interest take constructive part in planning practical program rehabilitation and economic development in Near East. Here was unique opportunity for Syria obtain practical benefits through cooperation with ESM on basis of whose activities US wld be more able to assist in economic planning. Syria cld express cooperation by early creation Development Board to cooperate with ESM and US. Likewise Syria cld earn gratitude Arab posterity by taking lead in achieving peaceful settlement Pal controversy. I sincerely believed it was in highest self-interest Syria find ways and means of engaging in

[1] For the statement of August 26, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 5, 1949, p. 333.

direct talks Israeli Govt, however unpalatable this might seem at outset. Results cld only be advantageous to Syria and Arab world since every month's delay brought new factors into situation none of which cld redound to ultimate benefit of Arabs.

Faiz Bey declared he wld submit these views his Govt and requested I ask you convey similar views both to present interim govt and to govt to be formed after the elections. You shld seek early favorable opportunity convey foregoing views to Syrian Govt unless you have comment which you wish to raise with Dept or at Istanbul meeting.[2] You shld particularly suggest desirability formation Syrian economic development board draw up long range development projects and cooperate with technical members ESM. [McGhee.]

WEBB

[2] For documentation on this subject, see pp. 165 ff.

867N.01/11–1649 : Telegram

The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State

SECRET AMMAN, November 16, 1949—10 p. m.

402. In hour conversation with King Abdullah this morning he gave me following exposé his attitude and recent actions re Palestine:

[Here follow four numbered paragraphs, broadly paralleling the report in despatch 140, November 11, page 1483, and stating in addition that the King expressed contempt for the "stalling and obstructive attitude" of the other Arab League members and observed that with the complete failure of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, he had no recourse other than to undertake direct negotiations with Israel. Of special note was the King's statement that "he had recently received 'high Jewish personality' and had discussed possible terms. (Presumably this occurred last Sunday night which King spent at Shuneh.) Abdullah stated both he and Israeli agent agreed early peace highly desirable as armistice soon expiring." The King's terms, in addition to those set forth in despatch 140, were said to include a rectification of the existing line to restore the Jerusalem–Bethlehem road to Jordan and mutual free port facilities at Haifa and Aqaba. The King also expressed the hope that the Israelis would make reasonable concessions because of their "desperate" economic situation.]

(5) Abdullah stated he very desirous visiting President Truman and US. He wished me to convey to President fact that he harbors no hatred for Jews. Believes he could convince US Jew leaders reasonableness his attitude, and perhaps he and Weizmann (if also in US) might reach agreement.

(6) King hoped during coming months Israelis would take no steps or permit incidents (e.g. boundary incidents) which would prejudice chances early settlement, and he desired me convey this sentiment to Israelis through US Government.

(7) Commenting on present negotiations at Lake Success, King remarked he was sorry to see that Jordan PCC delegate was expressing agreement with other Arab delegates against wishes and instructions Jordan Government. In reply to my query His Majesty stated this especially true re status Jerusalem and presentation joint memorandum to Department, step he considered ill advised.

Comment: King's desire early liquidation Palestine affair is natural. However, it is clear any settlement agreeable to His Majesty, whether achieved through UN or direct negotiations, must include substantial advantages for Jordan. Abdullah especially interested securing access to Mediterranean and replacing Egypt at Gaza.

King sincerely and strongly feels his position could be strengthened by visit to US. He feels policy US Government has served greatly strengthen Israelis and trips Weizmann to US has contributed largely to consolidating Israeli position.

Seems plausible that a visit by King to US, perhaps during coming spring, would serve focus US public attention on strategic importance Arab world to US and on urgent necessity providing solution such problems as fate Arab refugees. Possibly such a visit could contribute to adoption and success refugee aid program.[1]

Pouched Arab capitals, Jerusalem.

Sent Department 402; Department pass London 102, Tel Aviv 63, USUN 19.

FRITZLAN

[1] New York, on November 19, reported information from the Jordanian Representative at the United Nations that he had received instructions from King Abdullah adamantly opposing the internationalization of Jerusalem regardless of the position of the other Arab Delegations and the Israelis and directing him to explore the possibility of undertaking direct negotiations with the Israelis in New York. The Jordanian Representative was said to believe there was "no possibility Abdullah obtaining his territorial objectives from Israelis and that King playing with fire in contemplating direct negotiations." (Telegram Delga 232, 867N.01/11–1949)

501.BB Palestine/11–1749

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Wells Stabler of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] November 17, 1949.

Participants: Eliahu Elath, Ambassador of Israel
Aubrey Eban, Permanent Delegate of Israel to the UN
NEA—Mr. McGhee
ANE—Mr. Berry
Mr. Wilkins
Mr. Rockwell
Mr. Stabler

Problem: Mr. Eban informed Mr. McGhee that Israel proposed to submit to the United Nations a separate resolution on Jerusalem which would take into account the primary interest of the United Nations in the Holy Places.

Action Required: None

Action Assigned to: ANE

Discussion: Ambassador Elath and Mr. Eban came in at their request this afternoon to inform the Department that Israel proposed to introduce an Israeli resolution on Jerusalem in the General Assembly. This resolution would take into account the primary interest of the world community in the Holy Places and would call for Israeli control of the Holy Places under United Nations supervision. It would also call for a United Nations Commissioner to be established in Jerusalem. His functions would be limited to the matter of the Holy Places. The Israeli delegation had carefully considered the Palestine Conciliation Commission draft instrument and had come to the conclusion that the various organs of United Nations Government would seriously interfere with and cut across present jurisdiction in Jewish Jerusalem. The delegation had also studied the recent clarifying statement of the Palestine Conciliation Commission and believed that statement was more closely related to the Israeli draft resolution than to the Palestine Conciliation Commission draft instrument. Mr. Eban pointed out that the situation in Jerusalem today is entirely different from that of two years ago. The United Nations had not assumed any authority in Jerusalem and as a result fighting had broken out. It now appeared that the United Nations was endeavoring to assume for itself authority which had not existed previously.

He believed that the Jerusalem question should be presented in the United Nations on the basis of determining what the interest of the United Nations is in Jerusalem. He felt that the answer would be that the primary interest of the United Nations in Jerusalem is the Holy Places. He believed that considerable sentiment existed among the delegations to the United Nations, that the United Nations should not interfere with the daily lives of the people in that area and should concern itself only with the Holy Places. While Israel could not, of course, speak for the other side, the Israeli proposal was based on the assumption that Jordan would make a similar offer.

He indicated that while other delegations would undoubtedly be willing to offer the same type of resolution, it was felt that it would be more dramatic for Israel, one of the parties most intimately concerned with the question, to present the resolution. He emphasized that Israel was anxious to avoid the injection of religious and emotional factors into the consideration of the Jerusalem question and

he hoped that the General Assembly would take into consideration the attitude of the peoples most directly concerned.

He said that he wished to inform the department of the intention of Israel to introduce this proposal and to state that the resolution was not being introduced for tactical reasons to defeat the Palestine Conciliation Commission proposal. It was being presented on the basis of assuring to the United Nations its legitimate interests in the area. He hoped there might be United States support for this view.

Mr. McGhee expressed appreciation for Mr. Eban's presentation and said that the United States, as a member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, had participated in the drafting of the Palestine Conciliation Commission draft instrument and, therefore, gave its general support to them. We realized that there would be amendments offered and we would, of course, consider them in the light of their merits and of their contribution to achievement of agreement on a Jerusalem plan. He pointed out that our support of the Palestine Conciliation Commission draft instrument was not merely a formal one but was based on the conviction that the Palestine Conciliation Commission draft instrument offered the most reasonable basis for agreement. We had been somewhat disappointed that Israel had felt that it could not go along with the instrument but assured Mr. Eban that the views he expressed would be taken into consideration. Mr. McGhee stated that since the General Assembly had set up machinery for dealing with this question and had instructed the Palstine Conciliation Commission to submit detailed proposals for a permanent international regime in the Jerusalem area, it was up to the General Assembly to decide the question.

Mr. Rockwell pointed out that the Palestine Conciliation Commission's clarifying statement should be taken as an indication of what the drafters of the Palestine Conciliation Commission draft instrument had in mind at the time they completed their proposals. He also stated that, generally speaking, it was the Palestine Conciliation Commission's belief that the United Nations' organization of administration provided for in the draft instrument would not conflict with the jurisdiction of the administering states, except in those matters of legitimate international concern. Then, in his control over the Holy Places, the United Nations Commissioner would to a certain extent share with Israel and Jordan in administering Jerusalem.

Mr. Eban said that the Israeli view was that the Palestine Conciliation Commission draft instrument would conflict with the jurisdiction of Israel in Jewish Jerusalem and regretted that the Palestine Conciliation Commission had approached this question from the wrong starting point. By this, he meant that the Palestine Conciliation Com-

mission should have commenced with the actual situation existing in Jerusalem today taking into consideration the attitude of the people most directly affected. In this connection it was pointed out that the Palestine Conciliation Commission had, of course, followed the instructions of the General Assembly with respect to the preparation of its proposals.

501.BB Palestine/11–2149

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President

WASHINGTON, November 21, 1949.

Subject: Instructions to the United States Delegation to the General Assembly on the Jerusalem Question.

When the General Assembly takes up the Jerusalem question in a few days, it will have before it the detailed proposals for an international regime for Jerusalem prepared by the Palestine Conciliation Commission of which the United States, France and Turkey are members.

The Commission prepared these proposals pursuant to the instructions which it received from the General Assembly by the Resolution of December 11, 1948, as follows:

"*Resolved* that, in view of its association with three world religions, the Jerusalem area, including the present municipality of Jerusalem *plus* the surrounding villages and towns, . . .[1] should be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective United Nations control.

. . . . . .[1]

"*Instructs* the Conciliation Commission to present to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area which will provide for the maximum local autonomy for distinctive groups consistent with the special international status of the Jerusalem area;"

Israel has rejected the Commission's plan and has submitted an alternate proposal limited to United Nations supervision of the Holy Places. It now appears that the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom will also reject it on the ground that it does not favor an international regime for Jerusalem.

The Vatican has consistently advocated a stronger type of internationalization, under full United Nations control. You will recall that in correspondence with Cardinal Spellman you have assured him that this Government firmly supports the internationalization of Jerusalem and does not intend to recognize the sovereignty of any state

[1] Omissions indicated in the source text.

in the City. The Department of State has also written in the same sense to Cardinal Spellman and other personalities and groups.

Having discussed the foregoing considerations with the Delegation in New York, the following instructions are proposed:

1. The United States objective at this session of the General Assembly is to obtain approval of an international regime for the Jerusalem area which (*a*) will adequately recognize the status of Jerusalem as the center of three great world religions and will provide for the necessary protection of and access to the Holy Places under United Nations supervision; (*b*) will contribute to peace and stability in the area; (*c*) will be workable; and (*d*) will take into account the interests of the principal communities in Jerusalem and the views of Israel and Jordan.

2. As a member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, the United States participated in the formulation of the Palestine Conciliation Commission draft instrument and should support it, subject to clarifying amendments, as a basis for General Assembly consideration.

3. During the General Assembly discussion, the United States Delegation should state that it will examine on their merits any modifications of the Palestine Conciliation Commission Instrument and any new proposals. Such amendments or new proposals should be considered by the Delegation and the Department in the light of the possibility of reaching a general agreement.

4. For purposes of handling such amendments and proposals in the General Assembly and, if possible, reconciling them, the Department believes that the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee should create a subcommittee consisting of equal representation from members supporting Christian, Moslem and Jewish views. The Palestine Conciliation Commission might be invited to attend for advice and information.

5. If in the working out of a settlement for the Jerusalem question the Assembly should be unable to agree upon detailed and definite arrangements, the United States Delegation should, after consultation with the Department, support some other form of temporary arrangements for the Jerusalem area which, pending further consideration by the General Assembly, would provide the necessary protection of and access to the Holy Places under United Nations supervision and which would offer further opportunity for reaching an agreement which would be acceptable not only to Israel and Jordan but also to the United Nations.[2]

DEAN ACHESON

[2] In a memorandum of November 21 covering his conversation with President Truman, Secretary Acheson recorded: "I went over with the President the whole history of this matter, calling his attention to all the documents, starting with the first resolution of the General Assembly and continuing up through the present recommendation of the Conciliation Commission. After considering what I said and reading the memorandum, the President approved it." (501.BB Palestine/11–2149) The President's action is also indicated by his marginal notation "Approved Nov. 21, 1949".

The Department, later the same day, telegraphed the five numbered paragraphs to the United States Mission at the United Nations as well as the fact of Presidential approval (Gadel 110 to New York, 501.BB/11–2149).

501.BB Palestine(E)/11–2349

Working Draft Resolution Prepared in the Department of State [1]

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] November 21, 1949.

ASSISTANCE TO PALESTINE REFUGEES

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 212 (III) of November 19, 1948, and 194 (III) of December 11, 1948,

Having examined the First Interim Report of the Economic Survey Mission, A–1106,[2] and the Report of the Secretary General on Assistance to Palestine Refugees, A–1060,[3]

1. *Expresses* its appreciation to the contributing governments, to the United Nations specialized agencies, in particular UNICEF, WHO, UNESCO and IRO, to the ICRC, the League of Red Cross Societies, the American Friends Service and the numerous religious charitable and humanitarian organizations, all of which have made substantial contributions in their respective fields to the relief of the Palestine refugees;

2. *Recognizes* that continued assistance for the relief of the Palestine refugees is necessary to prevent conditions of starvation and distress among them, and that constructive measures should be undertaken at an early date to reduce the refugee problem with a view to the termination of international assistance;

3. *Considers*, on the basis of the estimate of the Economic Survey Mission, that $33,700,000 will be required for direct relief and works programs for the period January 1 to December 31, 1950, of which $20,200,000 is required for direct relief, and $13,500,000 for works programs; and that $21,200,000 will be required for works programs from January 1 to June 30, 1951, all inclusive of administrative expenses; and that direct relief should be terminated not later than December 31, 1950, unless otherwise determined by the General Assembly at its Fifth Session; [4]

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[1] A memorandum of November 22 from Messrs. Sandifer and Hare to the Secretary of State notes that this draft resolution was "the result of intensive discussions in the Department during the past week and coincides with the views of Mr. Wright and his colleagues from the British Foreign Office with whom it has been discussed. The French and Turks appear to agree in principle." (501.BB Palestine(E)/11–2349)

[2] Not printed; regarding the report, see editorial note, p. 1472.

[3] See GA, *4th sess.*, *Ad Hoc Political Committee, Annex*, vol. II, p. 14.

[4] The memorandum by Messrs. Sandifer and Hare cited in footnote 1 above also stated that "400,000 refugees would be supported by the works program when it is in full swing. It is anticipated that this program would in fact lead to the permanent absorption of a substantial number of refugees in or near the areas where they are now situated although for reasons associated with Arab sensibilities, the Economic Survey Mission has not designated it as a resettlement program.

"It is anticipated that the United States would need to contribute about 50% of the cost of the program. We indicated to Mr. Wright that it might be necessary for the United Kingdom to contribute about 25%, leaving the balance to be borne by France, the beneficiary governments, and other interested governments."

4. *Establishes* the "Near East Relief and Works Agency" (NERWA):

(*a*) to carry out in collaboration with local governments the direct relief and works program recommended by the Economic Survey Mission;

(*b*) to consult with Near Eastern governments concerning measures to be taken by them preparatory to the time when international assistance for relief and works projects is no longer available;

(*c*) subject to approval of its Advisory Commission, to assume such other functions as the ESM may recommend in accordance with its terms of reference;

5. *Establishes* an Advisory Commission consisting of representatives of France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States to advise and assist the Director of NERWA in the execution of the program;

6. [Alternative A] [5]

Appoints _____ as Director of NERWA responsible to the General Assembly for the operation of the program and, in the event of his death or disability, authorizes the Advisory Commission to appoint his successor;

[Alternative B] [5]

Requests the Secretary General to appoint the Director of NERWA on the nomination of the Advisory Commission;

The Director shall be the chief executive officer of NERWA responsible to the General Assembly for the operation of the program. He shall select and appoint his staff and shall to the extent possible utilize the facilities and assistance of the Secretary General and apply the staff rules and regulations of the United Nations. The Director shall, in consultation with the Secretary General and the Advisory Committee on Budgetary and Administrative Questions establish financial regulations for NERWA;

7. *Requests* the Director to convene the Advisory Commission at the earliest practicable date for the purpose of developing plans for the organization and administration of the program;

8. *Urges* Near Eastern countries concerned to establish local development boards to cooperate with NERWA;

9. *Continues* UNRPR as established under Resolution 212 (III) of the General Assembly until April 1, 1950, or until such date thereafter as the transfer referred to in paragraph 10 is effected, and instructs UNRPR to arrange for the gradual reduction in the number of rations from 940,000 to approximately 652,000 in accordance with the recommendation of ESM;

10. *Instructs* the Secretary General to transfer to NERWA the assets and liabilities of UNRPR by April 1, 1950, or as soon thereafter as the Director of NERWA may determine;

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[5] Brackets appear in the source text.

11. *Urges* all Members of the United Nations to make voluntary contributions in funds or in kind to insure that the amount of supplies and funds required is obtained for each period of the program as set out in paragraph 3 and states that to this end, voluntary contributions of non-Member states would also be accepted; contributions in funds may be made in currencies other than the United States dollar insofar as the program can be carried out in such currencies;

12. *Authorizes* the Secretary General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to advance immediately a sum of up to $5,000,000 from the Working Capital Fund to finance operations pursuant to this resolution, such sum to be repaid not later than December 31, 1950, from the voluntary governmental contributions requested under paragraph 11 above;

13. *Authorizes* the Secretary General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to negotiate with IRO for an interest-free loan in an amount not to exceed the equivalent of $2,800,000 to finance the program subject to mutually satisfactory conditions for repayment;

14. *Authorizes* the Secretary General to continue the Special Fund established under Resolution 212 (III) of the General Assembly, and to make withdrawals therefrom for the operations of UNRPR, and upon the request of the Director, for the operations of NERWA;

15. *Urges* UNICEF, IRO, WHO, UNESCO and FAO and other appropriate agencies and private groups and organizations, in consultation with the Director of NERWA, to participate in the program;

16. *Directs* NERWA to consult with the PCC in the best interests of their respective tasks;

17. *Requests* the Director of NERWA to submit quarterly reports, and such other reports as he deems necessary, to the Secretary General for transmission to the Members of the United Nations and to non-member governments which have contributed to the work of NERWA.

867N.00/11–2149 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL JERUSALEM, November 21, 1949—4 p. m.

655. Dayan on nineteenth gave following personal appreciation present Palestine situation. States is still in process taking over southern command; has established direct personal relations with Jordan and Egypt commanders in area; continues to follow activities of MACS and discuss them with Sharett.

1. Prospects favorable for direct negotiations with Jordan and Lebanon after termination GA which he expects will take no final action. Both have many open questions with Israel, particularly economic, whose solution would be mutually beneficial. King Abdullah long fed on belief Great Powers or PCC will force concessions from

Israel. Now realizes just wishful thinking and will have to make direct settlement through own efforts.

2. Abdullah's relations with other Arab states already very bad and he disappointed at outcome Arab League meeting. Agreement with Israel could hardly cause further deterioration and would permit King show his independence of action and defiance other Arab States. Abdullah has always dreamed of building personal kingdom during his lifetime and this furnishes strong inducement to reach agreement including incorporation Arab Palestine in Jordan. Abdullah one Arab leader who needs not fear popular reaction and overthrow his government. Assassination possible, but this danger always present.

3. Immediate agreement with Egypt and Syria more unlikely. Egypt commander stated could not act until after Egypt elections. Syria also would have to wait until next Syrian elections. However, problems with these two countries not serious.

4. Agreements need not take form of formal treaties. He personally would like to see establishment very close relations with Jordan which would give Israel Arab partner. Countries approximately same size; possesses many mutual problems that can only be solved through cooperation and joint enterprises. Mentioned potash works and development of Jordan Valley.

5. Abdullah entirely willing accept all refugees now in his territory so question of repatriation eliminated insofar as Jordan concerned.

6. Re boundaries, possible to make minor adjustments with Jordan to prevent owners from being cut off from lands. Abdullah has now abandoned hopes for return of Ramle and Lydda, and real corridor to sea naturally impossible. Lebanon needs boundary arrangement permitting labor in Lebanon to work their lands in Israel as during mandate.

7. Prospects best for economic agreements. Israel perfectly willing give Jordan free zone at Haifa and right transport any goods duty free across its territory using own transport and administering free zone. This would give Abdullah his own long desired outlet to sea. Arrangements could be made re-activate potash plants at both northern and southern ends of Dead Sea with produce shipped out as previously via Jerusalem. Under present conditions Israel cannot export but neither can Jordan. If no agreement made, Israel will execute plan already prepared to build new road for exports.

8. Jerusalem most difficult problem. GA will take no specific action and then Israel and Jordan can work out agreement. Could take form either of complete partition of city cutting each side off entirely from other or cooperative arrangement. Latter preferred and could include free access to Scopus in return for free use of Bethlehem Road (other

Israeli lately insisted on Israel-controlled corridor to Scopus and not merely free access). Solution of Jerusalem problem would also permit Israel "make peace with consular corps".

Sent Department 655; repeated Baghdad 72, Beirut 130, Damascus 91, Jidda 15, Tel Aviv 135, London 68. Department pass Cairo 47. Pouched Amman.

BURDETT

867N.014/11–2249 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET TEL AVIV, November 22, 1949—4 p. m.

839. Re Deptels 729 November 18 [1] and 672, October 20.[2] In talk November 21 at residence with Eytan and Comay Ford and I again requested clarification recent Cabinet action re fusion Tel Aviv and Jaffa. After reiterating information given Embtel 808, November 8,[3] Eytan said fusion was result of "informal Cabinet decision" and not in form of "decree," that outside minutes of Cabinet meeting as which "decision" was reached nothing in nature of written document covering fusion existed, and that his government considered move "purely municipal administrative action without political implications." He added that matter now rests with government committee appointed "to study fusion", that committee now deliberating move, and that no further step will be taken "to make permanent situation which in fact has existed for many months" until committee renders its report.

Comment: Specifically answering questions Deptel 672, (1) Israel Foreign Office officially confirms "government has decided to form single municipality of Tel Aviv and Jaffa" (Embtel 808), (2) no decree exists according to Eytan, and (3) legal aspects and implications are at present shrouded in careful double talk of which foregoing is example. *End comment.*

McDONALD

[1] Not printed.

[2] Not printed; it requested official confirmation concerning the reported issuance of a cabinet decree providing for the merger of Tel Aviv and Jaffa (867N.01/10–1849).

[3] Not printed; it furnished the text of a letter from the Israeli Foreign Office which confirmed that the Government had decided to form a single municipality out of the two cities. The letter also advised that certain fringe areas formerly in dispute had been incorporated into Tel Aviv earlier in 1949 and that "Since the rest of Jaffa is fully occupied by Israelis, and since its municipal services are in fact provided by Tel Aviv, as an extension of its own, the government's decision regularizes a situation actually existing." (867N.01/11–849)

501.BB Palestine(E)/11–2349

Memorandum by the Department of State to the President

SECRET WASHINGTON, [undated].

Subject: Palestine Refugee Program

On May 23 and 26 Mr. Webb discussed with you a proposed Palestine Refugee Program.[1] At that time you agreed that the Department should proceed with the development of a program along the general lines set forth in its memorandum of May 9, 1949. On August 26, 1949, at the time of the appointment of Mr. Clapp as Chairman of the Economic Survey Mission, you issued a statement pledging the full support of this Government to this Mission and offering to give careful consideration to such assistance as we might render, under the auspices of the United Nations, in carrying out the recommendations of this Mission.

Mr. Clapp has just submitted his first report [2] which recommends a combined direct relief and works program at a total cost of $54,900,000 for an eighteen months period from January 1, 1950, to June 30, 1951. The cost of direct relief would be $20,200,000 for the year 1950 and such relief would be terminated at the end of that year. The cost of the works program would be $13,500,000 for 1950 and $21,200,000 for the six months ending June 30, 1951.

The report further recommends that the present United Nations relief organization (United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees) be terminated in April 1950 and that a new agency be established by the General Assembly of the United Nations to carry out both the direct relief and works programs as recommended by the Economic Survey Mission.

Mr. Clapp has indicated to the Department, but not in the report, that it is premature to embark upon a more ambitious program because: (1) the Arab Governments are not yet prepared to discuss resettlement on a large scale; (2) Israel has been unwilling to undertake repatriation of a substantial number; and (3) sufficent engineering has not yet been done to warrant the initiation of large expenditures. It is contemplated that works programs will merge into plans for longer range development.

The Department has given careful consideration to Mr. Clapp's report and has prepared a draft resolution [3] which supports his recommendations (Tab A). The proposed organizational arrangement gives full recognition to the interest and concern of the United Nations in

[1] See Acting Secretary Webb's memoranda of those dates, pp. 1042 and 1056.
[2] See editorial note, p. 1472.
[3] Not found attached. Presumably, it was the draft of November 21, p. 1500.

the Palestine problem and at the same time provides a role for the United States, the United Kingdom, and France which reflects the preponderant financial responsibility which they must assume.

This draft resolution has been presented to the Bureau of the Budget, who have cleared it subject to clearance by the National Advisory Council. Time does not permit National Advisory Council clearance, and the Department desires, if you concur, to take action in the General Assembly without such clearance.

Had time permitted the Department would have preferred comprehensive consultation with Congressional leaders.

Recommendation

It is recommended:

1. That the United States Delegation to the General Assembly be authorized to introduce or support a resolution along the lines of the attached draft without, at this time, publicly indicating the amount which the United States might contribute;
2. That the Department be authorized to consult with other delegations regarding the amounts which they may be prepared to contribute on the understanding that the United States contribution to be requested from Congress would not exceed 50 percent of the cost as determined by the General Assembly;
3. That Congressional leaders be consulted to the extent possible by the Department of State [4] on the proposed course of action.[5]

[4] Marginal notation by Acting Secretary Webb: "This program approved by phone call to the President Nov. 23, 1949, 4: 05 p. m."

[5] Thus, on December 2, a group of Department officers discussed the matter with Judge John Kee, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House (memorandum of conversation, by Arthur Z. Gardiner, 501.BB Palestine(E)/12-249).

890.20/11-2349

Draft Defensive Security Pact Among the States of the Arab League, Prepared by the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs [1]

SECRET [CAIRO?, undated.]

Pursuant to the principles and objectives of the Arab League Pact and the Charter of the United Nations, and

In accordance with the sincere desire of cementing and strengthening the ties existing among the States of the Arab League, and the true wishes of those States to maintain their independence and to preserve stability and tranquility in their countries with the maintenance of their common inheritance, and

[1] Furnished to Ambassador Childs on the initiative of King Ibn Saud; translated at the Embassy and transmitted by Jidda in despatch 233, November 23.

In compliance with the desire of the Arab State nations to unite together for common defense in order to maintain peace and security,

The States who are members of this Pact have come to the following Agreement:

ARTICLE I

The contracting states guarantee hereby that in order not to expose international peace and security to danger, all these states should settle their international disputes through peaceful ways in accordance with the Charters of the Arab League and the United Nations. These states also should not, in their international relations, compel themselves to use the force or threaten to use it in any way which is inconsistent with the principles of the Arab League and the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

To realize the objectives of this Pact in a most effective way, the contracting states should, in unity or separately, take effective continuous action through their special means and through cooperation among themselves to maintain and strengthen their forces as a single state and as a whole unity to stand against any military aggression.

ARTICLE III

The contracting states should, upon request from any of them, enter into consultation when the safety, the independence or the security of any one of them is in danger.[2]

ARTICLE IV

The contracting states agree that any military aggression against any one of them or against all of them is to be considered as directed against all of them. If such aggression has taken place each of them should, in accordance with its legal right to defend itself separately or as a whole group according to the text of Article 6 of the Arab League Pact and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, help the state or states attacked. Each one of them must take immediately, separately or in cooperation with the contracting states, all necessary steps

[2] In a memorandum of November 9 to Mr. Hare, Burton Y. Berry, Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs, stated that "Egypt, in an attempt to block recent moves towards Iraqi-Syrian federation, proposed the drafting of a collective security pact which provided for the armed participation of all Arab States in the event of an attack upon any member. Agreement in principle was reached, and such a pact is now being drafted for consideration by the League Council at a subsequent meeting. It is open to question whether the pact, even if signed and ratified, will ever become more than a paper agreement." (890B.00/11–949). Mr. Berry's memorandum also gave his view that the meeting of the Arab League Council from October 22 to 29, at which the proposed pact was introduced, "appears to have been an attempt to prop up the tottering structure of the Arab League."

For documentation on the proposed Iraqi-Syrian federation, see pp. 180 ff.

including the use of armed force to establish order and peace. The Arab League and the Security Council should be notified immediately of every such military aggression, or any threat for using force and the steps which may be taken.

ARTICLE V

The contracting states should announce that their international effective commitments, either among themselves or among them and any other state are not in contradiction with the text of this Pact, and that all of them guarantee that they will not conclude any international agreement which in any way contravenes this Pact.

ARTICLE VI

The Arab League Council is in charge of all affairs relative to the execution of this Pact. The said Council has the right to appoint a special committee of the Chiefs of Staff of the contracting states and this committee will recommend the necessary defensive steps to be taken.

ARTICLE VII

Ten years after putting this Pact into effect, each one of the contracting states may have the right to withdraw from the Pact one year from the date of announcing its desire to withdraw, to the Secretary General of the Arab League. The Secretary General of the Arab League will convey such announcement to the other contracting states.

ARTICLE VIII

This Pact and its supplementary documents must be ratified by each of the contracting states in accordance with each one's constitutional procedures. Such ratification will be kept with the Secretariat General of the Arab League. This Pact is considered effective 15 days after its ratification, or after delivery to the Secretary General of at least four ratification documents of four states.

867N.00/11–2349 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET CAIRO, November 23, 1949—1 p. m.

1094. Mytel 1060 November 14.[1] Hassan Youssef told me last night that Shirine gave him Sassoon's letter which he gave to the King. The King said that he saw no object in dealing with Sassoon, for three

[1] Not printed; it advised that General Riley had brought a secret letter from Mr. Sassoon "to Ismail Shirine King's brother-in-law proposing meeting at El Auja between representatives of the two parties to explore possibility reaching general agreement between Egypt and Israel." (767N.83/11–1449)

reasons: First, he does not know with what authority Sassoon speaks; second, Sassoon is leaving soon for Ankara as Israel representative; third, it is better in any event to wait for the Department's reply to the recent Arab note.[2]

In connection with the third point I told Hassan Youssef to tell the King that in my opinion the Arab suggestions were unrealistic and anything but helpful at this juncture. He replied, "in that case what shall we do? Would it be possible to proceed on the basis of the existing demarcation lines between Israel and the Arabs?" He added quickly, "of course we could not admit to the other Arab states that we are talking of this, but if your people thought well of it I think we might get somewhere." He added also that this was only his own suggestion.

I said, "I can tell the State Department you suggested it".

Sent Department 1094, repeated Athens 33 for McGhee.

CAFFERY

[2] Of November 14, p. 1488.

Editorial Note

The General Assembly, at its Fourth Session, dealt with (1) the question of a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area and the protection of the Holy Places and (2) the question of assistance to Palestinian refugees.

The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee of the Assembly devoted 13 meetings to the first of these matters, from November 24 to 29 and from December 5 to 7. The Committee's proceedings during the earlier of these periods are printed in United Nations, *Official Records of the Fourth Session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Summary Records of Meetings, 27 September–7 December 1949* (hereinafter identified as GA, *4th sess., Ad Hoc Political Committee*), pages 246–306.

Several proposals were offered to the Committee and on November 29, general debate concluded, whereupon Subcommittee 1 was appointed to examine the proposals (*ibid.*, page 305).

867N.01/11–2449 : Telegram

The Chargé in Israel (Ford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY TEL AVIV, November 24, 1949—1 p. m.

842. Eytan called me to Foreign Office November 23 to announce in "strictest confidence" that King Abdullah had "informally invited" Government of Israel to enter into negotiations for final peace treaty

and that Israel had "formally accepted" invitation November 21. Eytan said Jordan reply expected momentarily and that while it was anticipated initial talks would be "largely exploratory" in character his government was determined enter "wholeheartedly" into discussions and hoped achieve "early favorable results." Eytan then referred to Israel Government note October 28 to PCC saying gist this note was "direct negotiations" and that present Jordan offer appeared to be "first fruits" October note and also "vindication" Israel's long-held belief in efficacy direct negotiations.

Eytan then stressed his government's hope that "we may be left alone to negotiate with Jordan in our own fashion" and that no "third party influence or interference will be brought to bear" in forthcoming negotiations. He said insofar as he knew only USG through Ambassador Elath had been apprised new development [1] and was uncertain whether King had informed British. He urged entire matter be kept secret for present.

Comment: Eytan not normally demonstrative, restrained with difficulty his elation. From his manner there would appear to be no doubt about Jordan offer. Incidentally he regretted "good news" had not been available for Ambassador McDonald prior his departure early morning November 23 for Istanbul. *End comment.*[2]

Sent Department 842, repeated Jerusalem 96, London 139, Department pass Amman 60, Istanbul for Ambassador McDonald unnumbered.

FORD

[1] Ambassador Elath had informed Mr. Hare of the new development on November 22. The Ambassador had indicated that "it might also be necessary at some stage to call upon the United States Government to facilitate the progress of the [Israeli-Jordanian] talks"; and had expressed the hope that "we would be willing to use our influence should it be required to bring about agreement."

Mr. Hare, in reply, had "thanked the Ambassador for this information and said that as he well knew the United States Government had favored direct talks and that our principal objective on this question was the restoration of peace and stability in the area. We should, of course, welcome any free negotiations which would achieve this objective." (memorandum of conversation by Mr. Stabler, 867N.01/11–2249)

[2] Chargé Ford, on November 28, reported information from a British source that Messrs. Shiloah and Sassoon had left the previous afternoon to hold the first direct peace talks with Jordanian representatives that same night. The source had also provided information from Minister Kirkbride that the initiative for the talks had come from the Israelis rather than from King Abdullah (telegram 846 from Tel Aviv, 867N.01/11–2849).

Editorial Note

A conference of American Chiefs of Mission in Near Eastern countries was held at Istanbul from November 26 to 29. The agreed conclusions (see page 168) embodied a ninth item entitled "Current

Israeli-Jordan Peace Negotiations and Annexation of Arab Palestine to Jordan."

501.BB Palestine(E)/11–2649 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Istanbul

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 26, 1949—2 p. m.

338. For McGhee.

1. Brit informed Dept USGADel late this week they support ESM report and genl lines US draft res. Brit desired, however, to re-examine (*a*) structure proposed agency (UN director and Advisory Comm) as against possibility utilizing IRO and (*b*) if IRO not considered suitable, of creation of donors commite to direct relief and public works program either in addition to or in substitution for Advisory Comm.

Brit also stated their support ESM report shld not be considered commitment to specific financial contribution as they not ready at this time to indicate extent Brit contribution.

Nov 25 Wright and Hare agreed (*a*) proposed agency preferable to IRO since latter associated by Arabs with Jewish immigration, since IRO in process winding up its affairs, and because it not constituted handle proposed ESM program; (*b*) that comite of donors wld be cumbersome and complicating either as addition to or substitute for Advisory Comm, that if changes required it wld be preferable increase membership Advisory Comm by one or two states such as Denmark. Genl question wld, however, be kept open pending further talks in NY between US, UK, Fr and Turk in light developments at UN.

Dept stated it understood Brit position re commitment at this stage re specific financial contribution and observe US similar position.

In view possibility genl *Ad Hoc* Polit Comite debate re Jlem may conclude early next week and need for coordination on ESM res in NY, further discussions will be concentrated NY. Meanwhile, Dept will continue work with UK, Fr and Turk here.

2. During early part debate *Ad Hoc* Polit Comite Nov 25 Israel rejected PCC statute grounds plan wld impose internationalization against local right self-determination. Egypt rejected statute since plan wld mean partition and ultimate annexation. Syria acceded to demands for internationalization, indicating willingness study PCC statute. UK and Canada believe statute represents desirable and practical solution. Brazil agreed support PCC plan. Nicaragua thought it might serve basis for discussion. New Zealand favors real internationalization Jlem area. View Abdullah's insistence, Jordan expected deliver statement opposing internatl regime. Chile said PCC plan rests on false juridical position and GA shld limit self to holy places. If a

subcomite unable agree on a Jlem res, Bolivia believes PCC plan shld be accepted as compromise. Netherlands, doubting agreement re Jlem possible this session believes GA shld decide on principle internationalization, and send commissioner for holy places pending final action.

3. Iran Govt reliably reported to have handed expulsion orders 36 Iraqi Jews two Iraqi Christians. To AmEmb query Iran Govt stated order not confined Iraqi Jews but apply all Iraqi subjects, in accordance decree Council Mins passed Oct 5 in Shah's presence. Govt states relations with Iraq strained owing recent Iraqi restrictions on Iranian cits in Iraq, allegedly affecting large Iran population Kerbala, and recent expulsion number Iranians. Dept's instructions Tehran being repted you separately.

WEBB

867N.01/11–2949 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Jerusalem (Roberts) to the Secretary of State

SECRET JERUSALEM, November 29, 1949—4 p. m.

666. French Consul General Neuville today intimated King Abdullah and Ben-Gurion holding secret meetings either in Jerusalem area or in South but actual location talks unknown. General Riley discounts meetings on basis King's statement that although ready to treat would wait outcome of UN Assembly.

Same source inferred Arabs and Jews negotiating exchange of Mt. Scopus and Sheik Jarrah quarter for Arab quarters in South Jerusalem. Riley believes this report may stem from his account of recent conversations with King.

Sent Department 666; repeated Tel Aviv 136; Department pass Amman 79, Istanbul unnumbered.

ROBERTS

767N.901/11–3049

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Wells Stabler of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 30, 1949.

Subject: Jordan–Israel Talks

Participants: Mr. Greenhill—British Embassy
Mr. Wilkins—ANE
Mr. Stabler—ANE

Discussion:

Mr. Greenhill read telegrams from the British Minister in Tel Aviv and the British Minister in Amman concerning the Jordan–Israel talks.

The British Minister in Tel Aviv reported a conversation with the Israeli Prime Minister. Mr. Ben Gurion indicated that Messrs. Shiloah and Sassoon met with the Jordan representatives on November 27. The talks were preliminary in nature, but Mr. Ben Gurion indicated he thought that agreement could be reached on all points except the question of the Negeb. Mr. Ben Gurion said that he was under the impression that Jordan had raised the question of the Negeb at the request of the British Government. The British Minister replied that he understood Jordan was acting under its own initiative in this case, and according to the Minister, Mr. Ben Gurion received his statement with satisfaction.

British Minister Kirkbride in Amman reported that the talks had taken place on the 27th at the King's winter quarters at Shuneh. The King had greeted the Israeli representatives but had not taken part in the discussions. Samir Rifai Pasha [1] had acted as the Jordan delegate.

It was agreed at the outset that the talks were of an exploratory nature and that it was desirable to take up the principal points or urgent matters first. Samir Pasha said that Jordan considered access to the Mediterranean of vital importance. The Israelis agreed in principle, but discussions as to how it could be implemented were left to another meeting. The Israelis then asked Samir Pasha whether Egypt would be willing to give up the Gaza Strip to Jordan. Samir Pasha replied that this is a question which would have to be taken up at the appropriate time between Jordan and Egypt and did not seem a proper subject for discussion with the Israelis.

The conversation then turned to the subject of the Negeb and Samir Pasha said that Jordan considered it should have a common frontier with Egypt and that the Arab States should be connected by land. Jordan believed that Israel should give up part of the Negeb in return for which Jordan would assure to Israel free access to Aqaba. Jordan would also request a free zone in Haifa. Sassoon pointed out that this question would raise considerable difficulties as the Negeb was the only land area in which Israel could expand.

It was decided that no decisions need be reached at the present meeting and that the questions would be left until another meeting.

The conversation then turned to Jerusalem and both Jordan and Israel agreed that they were opposed to the internationalization of Jerusalem. The Israelis pointed out that there were two matters in Jerusalem which were of secondary importance and which could be settled later if the main questions were resolved. These points were access to Scopus and the return of Arab quarters. It appeared that Israel was prepared to give up the Arab quarters.

[1] Jordanian Minister of Court.

The Israelis then said that they had one question to ask and certain information to give. The question was whether if Jordan should annex Arab Palestine, the Anglo-Jordan Treaty would extend to Arab Palestine. Samir Pasha replied that it would, whereupon the Israelis indicated that they would have further to say on that. The Israelis then informed Samir Pasha that the United States Government had been informed of the intention to proceed with these direct talks and that it had encouraged Israel to reach agreement with Jordan. The Israelis also indicated that the British were aware of these talks. They expressed the hope that even if it was impossible to keep secret the fact that the conversations were proceeding, there would be a high degree of security regarding their substance.

It was agreed that another meeting would take place on Thursday, December 1.

Kirkbride commented that the King appeared to be over-optimistic as always.

Editorial Note

The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee began general debate on the question of assistance to Palestinian refugees on November 30. France, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States had submitted a joint draft resolution on the matter on November 29; for the text, see GA, *4th sess.*, *Ad Hoc Political Committee*, *Annex*, volume I, page 53. The representatives of these same nations, on December 1, introduced a revised draft resolution, which proposed that the General Assembly establish a Near East Relief and Works Agency "(*a*) to carry out in collaboration with local Governments the direct relief and works programmes as recommended by the Economic Survey Mission; [and] (*b*) to consult with the interested Near Eastern Governments concerning measures to be taken by them preparatory to the time when international assistance for relief and works projects is no longer available." The text of this measure is printed *ibid.*, page 55. For John C. Ross' statement giving the support of the United States to the draft resolution, see GA, *4th sess.*, *Ad Hoc Political Committee*, page 308.

The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee continued general debate on the refugee question until December 2, at which time it adopted the joint draft resolution as amended, by a vote of 48 to none, with 6 abstentions. The proceedings of the Committee from November 30 to December 2 are printed *ibid.*, pages 307–330.

867N.01/12–149

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare) to the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 1, 1949.

Subject: Your Appointment With the Jordan Minister of Defense on Tuesday, December 6, 1949, at 3:00 p. m.

Discussion

The Jordan Minister of Defense, Fawzi Pasha el Mulki, now in the United States as Jordan delegate to the Palestine Conciliation Commission, is calling on you on Tuesday, December 6, 1949, at 3:00 p. m., to present a letter addressed to the President by King Abdullah of Jordan.[1] A translation of the letter is attached for your information. (Tab A).[2]

Fawzi Pasha originally requested an interview with the President, but it could not be arranged because of the President's schedule. The President suggested that you receive Fawzi Pasha in his behalf.

It is understood that Fawzi Pasha will discuss briefly his country's attitude on the Palestine question, including the problem of Jerusalem.

Recommendations

1. It is recommended that you accept the letter on behalf of the President and express appreciation for Fawzi Pasha's visit. You may wish to inform him that the letter will be brought to the President's attention at an early date.

2. It is recommended that you take the following line with respect to the matters which Fawzi Pasha proposes to discuss:

(*a*) *Jerusalem*

King Abdullah opposes the internationalization of Jerusalem on the grounds that it would prejudice the security of Jordan. He believes that if Arab Jerusalem were demilitarized a gap would be created in Jordan's defense lines and both Jordan and Arab Palestine would be exposed to possible Israel aggression. Consequently, Fawzi Pasha, acting as Jordan spokesman, has informed the United Nations that his Government considers that Arab Jerusalem should remain under Jordan control. Jordan has, however, guaranteed free access to and protection of the Holy Places.

You may wish to point out to Fawzi Pasha that the United States continues to support the principle of internationalization and express

[1] Dated November 5; see editorial note, p. 1470; a note by Mr. Brown of the Executive Secretariat indicates that King Abdullah's communication was left with the Secretary by Fawzi Pasha on December 12.

[2] Not printed.

the hope that Jordan will cooperate with the United Nations in respect to the Jerusalem question.

(*b*) *Palestine Settlement*

Fawzi Pasha will probably refer to the President's message of March 28, 1949, to the King (Tab B),[3] and outline the present views of Jordan regarding a final settlement. In this connection, direct negotiations are presently proceeding between Jordan and Israel and it may be that Fawzi Pasha will express the hope that the United States will continue to give sympathetic understanding to the desire of Jordan to reach a settlement.

You might point out that the United States believes that it is in the best interests of the parties themselves to settle this question as quickly as possible. We hope they will work either through the United Nations or directly to achieve this end. It is suggested that you also indicate that the United States Government stands ready to assist the parties, both as a member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission and in such other ways as may seem desirable, in reaching a final settlement.

[3] Not printed.

800.00 Summaries/12–149 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 1, 1949—3 a. m.

Emb Cairo reports Min War issued secret instructions in effect lifting restrictions on passage shipping through Suez Canal and on normal operating schedules US ships Medit area, except those carrying war materials, incl fuels (infotel). Emb says instr beginning be carried out all Egypt ports. Eg customs official Alexandria informed ConGen ships carrying non-mil cargo to or from Israel can pass thru Suez Canal and Eg ports without restriction molestation, provided ships bound from Eg for Israel first call at another port.

ACHESON

[1] At Tel Aviv, Arab capitals (except Cairo), London, Paris, and Jerusalem.

867N.00/12–149 : Telegram

The Chargé in Israel (Ford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET TEL AVIV, December 1, 1949—1 p. m.

850. Embtel 846, November 28.[1] Shiloah, Israeli Foreign Office, spent half-hour my home evening November 30 discussing Israeli-

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1510.

Jordan secret talks. He confirmed he and Sassoon had begun talks night November 27 at Abdullah's winter palace Shuneh; that King had spent first ten minutes with them talking "genial generalities" and that thereafter he had delegated matters to Samir Pasha Rifai with his blessings and retired. Shiloah said subsequent 45 minutes discussions conducted with "friendly cordiality," Samir and Sassoon being "old friends with much in common."

Shiloah said neither King nor Samir brought up "old Jaffa–Lydda–Ramle story" but concentrated solely on Jordan's need for outlet to Mediterranean which, in Jordan's eyes, meant "entire Negev in interests in both Jewish and Arab world contiguity." Samir felt present Jewish wedge driven into Arab world must be removed in order justify to other Arab states any concession Jordan might now make looking to final peace settlement.

Jewish delegation's reply, according Shiloah, was to effect Israel fully realized importance to Jordan of Mediterranean outlet and was prepared make "any reasonable offer" but not at cost of entire Negev. Shiloah argued that if Arabs wished avoid "inevitable Jewish expansionism" in future, they must not cramp Jewish state now. Israel delegates said some other solution short of Negev "must and could be found" and suggestion of Hebron–Gaza corridor was reportedly then put forward. Shiloah said he pointed out such an arrangement would necessitate agreement with Egypt but that this was matter for peaceful settlement between Jordan and Egypt. "We might be willing concede corridor if Egypt willing concede western terminal."

Shiloah said talk terminated more or less on this note, that he and Sassoon were then dinner guests of King who was in "jovial reminiscing mood," and that second secret meeting with same participants at same place was called for night December 1. He said he unable say yes or no to overall success first meeting but stressed its friendly atmosphere. He said he believes King wants peace "with or without Negev" and that if tonight's or any future talks break down solely because of Negev, it would indicate to him that King was not acting solely for himself but for "third party."

Comment: Shiloah rarely brings himself to utterance word "Britain" but that is of course his "third party." In several recent talks with British Minister here he has repeatedly said insofar as he knows British Government is keeping hands off present trend of events, that his government "doesn't care who holds the Negev as long as it is not the Russians," and that while so-called Gaza corridor would be no sacrifice for Israeli if Arabs prepared swallow it to save face, he believed his government would applaud if only in interests getting on with job.

I stressed to Shiloah after last night's talk keen interest my Government in progress present negotiations; pointed out he and Sassoon had assumed grave and delicate burden, the success or failure of which could have far-reaching consequences, and hoped he would keep me current on developments. *End Comment.*

Sent Department 850; repeated London 140; Jerusalem 98; Department pass Amman 62.

FORD

Editorial Note

Subcommittee 1 made its report on the Jerusalem area to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on December 2. The report included a draft resolution which called on the General Assembly to restate its intention to place the area under a permanent international regime, which would make appropriate guarantees for the protection of the Holy Places, as originally set forth by the General Assembly in its resolution of November 29, 1947 (see footnote 1 to telegram 1271, *Foreign Relations*, 1947, volume V, page 1291).

The draft resolution, accordingly, called for the establishment of the area as a *corpus separatum* and designated the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations to discharge the responsibilities of the Administering Authority. The draft resolution, moreover, called on the Trusteeship Council to complete preparation of the Statute of Jerusalem and to proceed with its implementation.

The Subcommittee's report is printed in GA, *4th sess.*, *Ad Hoc Political Committee*, *Annex*, volume I, page 57.

867N.01/12–549

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Wells Stabler of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 5, 1949.

Subject: Israel–Jordan Talks

Participants: Mr. Greenhill—British Embassy
Mr. Stabler

Discussion:

Mr. Greenhill read a telegram from the British Minister in Amman regarding the progress of the Israel–Jordan talks. The Israeli representatives, Messrs. Sassoon and Shiloah, and Samir Rifai Pasha had met for the second time at Shuneh on December 1.

The Israeli representative informed the Jordan representative that Israel had come to the conclusion that it could not cede any territory as part of a settlement with Jordan. Samir Pasha replied that this view was irreconcilable with the earlier recognition by Israel of the necessity for Jordan to have access to the sea. It was necessary for Jordan to receive this access through territory over which Jordan had sovereignty. The Israelis said that this was very difficult and there were many points involved. Samir Pasha replied that in this event there appeared to be no necessity for proceeding further with the talks. Samir Pasha commented to the British Minister that the "visitors had been taken aback" by his statement.

The Israeli representatives then asked what scheme for settlement Jordan had in mind. Samir Pasha replied by asking whether the Israeli claim to the Negeb was based solely on its need for a reserve of land capable of development. The Israel representatives replied in the affirmative. Samir Pasha then suggested that in view of this, Jordan suggested a partition of the Negeb. Israel would take the northern part which was capable of cultivation while Jordan would take the southern part which could not be cultivated in any way. Thus Jordan would not only have access to the sea but also a common frontier with Egypt. The Israelis commented that this question could not be dealt with solely on the basis of the cultivatability of the land and that other factors entered into the situation. There then ensued a long argument which led to no conclusion.

The Israelis then said that they had three points which they wanted to discuss.

With respect to Jerusalem both Israel and Jordan were opposed to internationalization and thought that partition was the best solution. The Israelis asked whether Samir Pasha could give any views on partition to which Samir Pasha replied that he could not at this time. The Israelis then said that it was necessary for them to gratify certain religious elements in Israel. Consequently it was necessary for Israel* to have free access to the Wailing Wall. Samir Pasha said that he would bear this in mind.

The Israelis said that they wished to recommence work at the Potash Works in the Dead Sea and at the Hydroelectric Station at Nahariyim. Samir Pasha replied that Jordan was not prepared to accept this except as part of a general settlement.

The Israelis brought up the question of the Anglo-Jordan Treaty and asked if it were possible for the United Kingdom to keep its bases east of Jordan. While they had no real objection to British bases West

*to reoccupy the Jewish quarters in the old city and [Footnote in the source text; presumably Mr. Stabler intended that these words be inserted in the text.]

of the Jordan, there was a psychological factor in Israel which had to be borne in mind. It would be easier for Israel to recognize greater Jordan if the British did not return to Palestine. Samir Pasha had nothing to say on this point. The Israelis then said that they assumed that Jordan insistence regarding the Negeb was the result of British strategical requirements. Samir Pasha denied this and said that to show the veracity of his denial he would offer an alternative to the Negeb. Jordan would accept a piece of territory from Hebron through Faluja to Majdal and another from Jenin through Nazareth to Acre. The latter strip would be a substitution of a common frontier with Lebanon for one with Egypt.

Samir Pasha requested the Israelis to return to Tel Aviv and obtain a straight answer on the question of access to the sea and cession of territory. The answer would show whether there was any use of meeting again. The Israelis promised that they would send a message concerning these points on or about December 4.

Samir Pasha commented to the British Minister that the Israelis appear determined not to break off the talks at that meeting and had been considerably shaken when Samir Pasha had suggested that in view of the Israel attitude on the cession of territory, no useful purpose would be served by continuing the talks. While the Israelis had been fairly adamant regarding the cession of territory, particularly in connection with the common frontier with Lebanon, there had been a number of hints that their position was not necessarily final. Samir Pasha said that the meeting had been conducted in a cordial atmosphere.

Editorial Note

The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee began consideration of the report of Subcommittee 1 (see editorial note, page 1518) on December 5. Mr. Ross stated that the United States remained convinced that the proposals of the Palestine Conciliation Commission were the best basis for a solution of the Jerusalem problem. He expressed regret that the recommendations of Subcommittee 1 did not constitute an improvement over those of the Conciliation Commission. He averred that the Trusteeship Council would have the virtually impossible task of putting into operation a new political system which failed to take into consideration the realities of the situation. The Trusteeship Council did not have at its disposal the force that might prove necessary in order to impose a regime on the population of the Jerusalem area which was obviously incompatible with its aspirations (GA, *4th sess.*, *Ad Hoc Political Committee*, page 343.

867N.00/12–549 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET TEL AVIV, December 5, 1949—1 p. m.

859. Ford and I December 4 during hour with Ben-Gurion and earlier hour and half with Eytan and Comay canvassed: (1) Istanbul conference,[1] (2) Israel position re Jerusalem, (3) re Egypt, (4) re Jordan, (5) Communism, (6) re ESM, (7) re Point IV, (8) US policy Near East.

1. Istanbul: I gave orally substance of agreed statement and also made five points McGhee and I drafted as basis my arguments here. (See my "main talk" memorandum in Department's summary of Istanbul conference.)

Prime Minister showed keenest interest throughout, interjecting observations frequently and at conclusion my résumé commented follows:

2. Jerusalem: In impassioned demand for "true reason" international community "intransigence" re Jews continued occupancy and rule of new Jerusalem, Prime Minister observed bitterly "Christianity still cannot accept nor tolerate fact that Jewish state now exists and that its traditional capital is Jerusalem". Declaring that Israel would make any desired promise re safeguarding and guaranteeing free access to "places sacred to all mankind" he added "such promises hold good today and will be observed twenty or hundred years hence". He concluded gravely "it would take an army to get Jews out of Jerusalem; and the only army I see willing to occupy Jerusalem is Russia's".

3. Egypt: Prime Minister eagerly seized on my suggestion re possible direct talks Egypt. "Peace with Egypt would mean peace and stability throughout entire Middle East" he declared and was obviously desirous such direct talks soonest. He had, however, no face-saving device to suggest. On contrary, he said "Gaza is now wanted by Abdullah and hence is not bargaining point between Egypt and Israel".

4. Jordan: Prime Minister confirmed secret talks now in progress (Embtels 846, November 28 [2] and 850 December 1) and seemed sanguine of outcome. Nonetheless, he emphatically subordinated effect Jordan peace to far more important need for Egypt peace. Eytan had previously enlarged on latest talks with Abdullah December 1, saying Negev no longer paramount issue and that talks now hinging primarily on Gaza and "free passage" or corridor. Other issues including partition Jerusalem, Latrun, Scopus–Bethlehem roads, potash concession and free port Haifa, he implied were manageable.

In answer my question re extension British treaty in event Jordan absorbs Arab Palestine, Prime Minister indicated as had younger colleagues gravity this issue. Prime Minister said "that's something we shall have to discuss with British".

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[1] For documentation on the conference of Near Eastern Chiefs of Mission held at Istanbul from November 26 to 29, see pp. 165 ff.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1510.

[5.] Communism: Aside from his Jerusalem outburst, Prime Minister emphatically decried communism's chances in Israel. "For three thousand years we Jews have refused accept regimentation and have repeatedly fought it at risk national extermination. Today we are still Jews and still fight regimentation". Re reported Vatican fear communism in Jerusalem, Prime Minister emphatically said: "Rome will be Communist before Jerusalem".

6. ESM: Prime Minister significantly made no comment on my relaying of Clapp's judgment that continued unrestricted immigration to Israel would result in economic collapse.

7. Point IV: Prime Minister interested but non-committal this program other than to grunt at my disclosure that only 5 million dollars allocated entire Near East.

8. US policy Near East: Commenting on my statement that "after Istanbul I understand more clearly full implications new policy Near East", Prime Minister said with evident conviction and pleasure: "US must in its own interests work out with or without Britain, American Near East policy; we think we can see it beginning to take shape".

Comment: Throughout the two and half hours of our two talks formalities were dispensed with and our exchanges were forthright. *End comment.*

Sent Department 859, repeated London 141, Jerusalem 99, Baghdad 52, Beirut 77, Damascus 57. Department pass Amman 63, Cairo 72, Jidda 32.[3]

McDONALD

[3] Ambassador McDonald, the following day, sent a message to Clark Clifford, suggesting that he read telegram 859 (telegram 865, 867N.00/12–649).

501.BB Palestine/12–649

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] December 6, 1949.

Subject: Voting in the UN on Jerusalem

The Secretary called Mr. Connelly at Key West this afternoon to report on the situation which would take place this afternoon in the United Nations on Jerusalem. He was doing this not to bother the President or to get any decision from him, but to explain what might seem a course by the United States delegation contrary to the President's clear instructions. The Secretary said that he did not think that the proposed course was contrary to the instructions but thought that perhaps early press reports might look as though it were.

The Secretary said that his clear basic instructions from the President on this question of Jerusalem were that the United States should stick with the Palestine Conciliation Report unless and until something better comes along. If an agreement could be worked out between

the Jews, some of the Arabs, and some of the Christian countries, the United States would be for that, but for the present, it is clear that we should not abandon the Committee Report in which we participated.

However, a subcommittee had been created which had made a report in the Committee of the whole. In this report, some of the South American countries and some of the Arab countries not involved directly, want to go back to the idea of a separate state for Jerusalem. The Secretary said that that had not been possible last year and it would not be possible now since neither the Jews nor Transjordan would accept it. However, the proposal has a majority of two. The Secretary said that we would vote against this.

The Swedes and the Dutch have brought up a proposal which may have a good deal of merit. Their proposal is to work out something along the lines of the PCC report, but less formal and less complicated. The United States position on this will be that we are not going to vote for that in the Committee but if, between the time it leaves the Committee and reaches the floor of the United Nations, the delegates could get together on this or some modification, the United States might be inclined to go along. At this point, however, if we voted for it, we would have everyone down on us; if we voted for the subcommittee report we would have the Jews down on us. The Secretary pointed out that we are now for the first time in the fairly good position when we can say to the Vatican and the Jews that they should get together and talk to each other, but that we were not going to coerce them.

811.22767N/12–649

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Wells Stabler of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 6, 1949.

Subject: Training of Israeli Officers

Participants: NEA—Mr. Hare
Mr. Greenhill—British Embassy
ANE—Mr. Wilkins
ANE—Mr. Stabler

Discussion:

Mr. Greenhill came in today on instructions from the Foreign Office to inquire regarding our attitude on the training of Israeli officers. Mr. Greenhill said that some time ago the Israeli Government had approached the British Government with the request that Israeli officers be trained in England. The British Government had replied that since

the Israeli Prime Minister had stated that Israeli officers were to be trained in the East as well as in the West, it could not agree to train any Israeli officers. Apparently this response had annoyed the Israeli Government, and it had recently again approached the British Government on the same subject, indicating that both the United States and France had agreed to train Israeli officers. The British Government was interested to know the attitude of the United States.

Mr. Hare said that while the arms embargo was in effect we accepted neither Israeli nor Arab officers for training. However, since the lifting of the arms embargo, we were prepared to consider requests. The Defense Department, in which the responsibility for these matters lies, is reviewing its training facilities in the light of the obligations of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. We assumed that when the Mutual Defense Assistance requirements have been met, the Defense Department might be able to provide limited training facilities for the Israelis and the Arabs. Mr. Hare pointed out that it was necessary for us to maintain a balance between Israeli and Arab officers, particularly if the latter desired training facilities.

Mr. Stabler indicated that the question of security also entered into this question and that the fact that Israel would send its officers both to the East and to the West would undoubtedly be taken into consideration. Mr. Stabler also mentioned that we had received requests from Israel for training facilities for a large group of officers. He referred to recent newspaper articles reporting that the Israel Government was annoyed that its requests had been ignored. The Defense Department subsequently issued a statement that Israel's request had been acknowledged and was under consideration.

Mr. Greenhill expressed appreciation for this information, which he said he would forward to London. He said that the British Government in considering this question had to bear in mind not only the question of security, but also the fact that bad blood existed between the British Army and the Israelis.

501.BB Palestine/12–749

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] December 7, 1949.

Participants: The Secretary
Deputy Under Secretary Rusk
Mr. Moshe Sharett, Israeli Foreign Minister
Mr. Eliahu Elath, Israeli Ambassador
Mr. Wilkins—ANE

[1] Drafted by Mr. Wilkins.

Problem: Current developments at the UN regarding Palestine.
Action required: None
Action assigned to: ANE

Mr. Sharett called on me this afternoon for the purpose of paying his respects during his current visit to the United States to attend the present session of the General Assembly and for the purpose of making known Israeli views on certain aspects of the Palestine problem.

Mr. Sharett informed me that it was a great relief for him to leave the present nightmare at Lake Success for the calm of Washington. He indicated that an "unholy alliance" of Arab states, Latin American states, the USSR and its satellites had brought about, in subcommittee of the *ad hoc* political committee, the adoption of an amended Australian resolution providing for rigid internationalization in the Jerusalem area. Mr. Sharett said that the ghost of November 29, 1947 [2] was "stalking the scene" and that many representatives in the United Nations were bowing down before it.

I asked Mr. Sharett if any progress had been made in recently reported conversations between representatives of Israel and representatives of the Vatican in Rome. Mr. Sharett said he could tell me confidentially that while it should be understood that the Vatican did not approve of present Israel proposals regarding Jerusalem, a message had been sent to him to the effect that he continue his present line and that conversations could be continued later. Mr. Sharett said that this message meant the Vatican was not displeased with the manner in which the Israeli Government was conducting its relations with Catholic representatives within Israel and that, as the Vatican did not expect any action at the present session of the General Assembly, representatives of Israel and the Vatican could continue their current talks thereafter. Mr. Sharett believed that the Vatican was divided regarding the question of full internationalization for the Jerusalem area, but that it would maintain its present position of support for full internationalization pending action by the GA.

I asked Mr. Sharett what the views of the Israeli Government were with respect to Jerusalem. He informed me that his Government considered an agreement between the United Nations and Israel with respect to the Holy Places through the medium of a UN commissioner appeared to be adequate and said that arrangements of this character would make it possible for Israel and Jordan to take care of the practical affairs of everyday life in Jerusalem.

I observed that when I had last seen Mr. Sharett in the spring of this year [3] I had pointed out to him that we envisaged, in the light

[2] The date of the resolution by the General Assembly which called for the partition of Palestine and the establishment of Jerusalem as a *corpus separatum*.
[3] See Secretary Acheson's memorandum of conversation of April 5, p. 890.

of the General Assembly resolution of December 11, 1948, a practical arrangement for the Jerusalem area under the general supervision of the United Nations in which the authorities of the adjoining states would have responsibility for administration. I remarked that he had previously indicated that we were in general agreement and that his present views were at some variance with his former position.

I asked Mr. Sharett what he thought of the Swedish-Netherlands proposal [4] regarding the Jerusalem area. Mr. Sharett replied that its concept appeared acceptable but that it contained a number of serious faults, including suspension of laws and regulations by the UN commissioner, the character of the Consular Court, and the prohibition on the establishment of national administrative agencies within Jerusalem. He also indicated that Israel had a number of other reservations and amendments to this proposal.

I asked Mr. Sharett what action he thought the United Nations might take regarding Jerusalem. Mr. Sharett replied that he thought the United Nations should restrict itself to a reaffirmation of its previously stated principles regarding the Holy Places, to a request to the parties concerned that they make arrangements with the United Nations regarding the Holy Places and to a call upon the parties that they cooperate with the United Nations in the reestablishment of peace in Jerusalem.

Mr. Sharett told me that, at Jordan's request, Israeli representatives had been holding a series of exploratory talks with King Abdullah and his representatives and that, while he could not report any substantial progress, his Government was hopeful of the outcome. He said that this optimism was based on the present position of both governments in Israel and Jordan and that Israel was prepared to offer agreement to the incorporation of Arab Palestine in Jordan in return for peace from Abdullah. He said that no serious question of territory existed between Israel and Jordan and that Abdullah, desiring a port in the Mediterranean, was anxious to obtain the Gaza strip from Egypt and subsequently access, by means of road or strip, from Israel. Transfer of the Gaza strip was a matter solely between Jordan and Egypt. Israel would not be in a position to offer Jordan a territorial strip which would cut Israel in two but would be in a position to offer Abdullah free access from Jordan to Gaza.

I asked Mr. Sharett if Israel and Jordan had discussed the refugee question. Mr. Sharett said their representatives had not.

Mr. Sharett concluded by informing me that Israel was seriously apprehensive regarding frequent Arab announcements of a "second

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[4] The text of the draft resolution submitted by the Netherlands and Sweden on December 5 is printed in GA, *4th sess., Ad Hoc Political Committee, Annex*, vol. I, p. 60.

round" with Israel and regarding Arab rearmament through shipments of British jets and tanks. He said that Israel would appreciate my authorizing shipments of military supplies from the United States through the granting of export licenses. I said that I was not informed on this subject and that we would study it. Ambassador Elath said he would supply us with additional details regarding this matter.[5]

[5] Mr. Hare had sent a memorandum to the Secretary of State on December 7, prior to the latter's meeting with Mr. Sharett, to brief him on the Israeli and United States positions on various important questions. The memorandum ventured into two questions which were not brought up directly during the Acheson-Sharett conversation, as follows:

"F. *Iraqi Jews*—Israel has expressed official concern to the United States Government over the alleged persecution of Iraqi Jews and has conducted a strenuous campaign, both in the United States and elsewhere, on this subject.

"It is the well-established policy of the United States Government to urge that minorities of whatever faith in Near Eastern countries be treated in a manner compatible with the objectives of the United Nations with respect to human rights and fundamental freedoms. This question has been discussed by the American Embassy in Baghdad with many members of the Jewish community in Iraq, with American and European residents of Baghdad and Basra and with Christian and Moslem Iraqis of varying shades of political opinion. Our Embassy reports that despite certain difficulties experienced by the Jewish community in Iraq, factual evidence does not support the conclusion that Iraqis of the Jewish faith are being subjected to a campaign of genocide or of general persecution. Our Embassy is continuing to discuss this matter with the Iraqi Government and we hope that Israel and Iraq will bear in mind the need for approaching such questions in a moderate manner in order to avoid aggravating the situation.

"G. *Arab Collective Security Pact and Israel's Relations with the Arab States*—Israel has expressed concern regarding the proposed Arab Collective Security Pact and has emphasized the dangers of such a Pact unless the Arab states cease to talk about preparations for a 'second round' war with Israel. Mr. Sharett has informed our Ambassador in Tel Aviv that United States or United Kingdom support for such a Pact prior to peace between Israel and the Arab States would strengthen Arab intransigeance and delay the achievement of such peace.

"We understand a committee of the Arab League is presently drafting a text of this Pact. We have not yet been informed of its full content. We have not, however, received any preliminary information, which would indicate that this Pact is preliminary to a resumption of hostilities by the Arab States against Israel." (867N.01/12–749)

Editorial Note

The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee made its report to the General Assembly on December 7; for its text, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Fourth Session of the General Assembly, Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Annex to the Summary Records of Meetings, 1949* (hereinafter identified as GA, *4th sess., Plenary, Annex*), page 35. The report included two draft resolutions adopted by the Committee for consideration by the General Assembly. One concerned the questions of an international regime for the Jerusalem area and of the protection of the Holy Places, the Committee adopting the recommendations of Subcommittee 1 by a vote of 35 to 13, with 11 abstentions.

The second draft resolution dealt with the question of assistance to the Palestine refugees, which the Committee adopted by 48 votes to none, with 6 abstentions. For the texts of the two draft resolutions, see GA, *4th Sess.*, *Plenary*, *Annex*, pages 38 and 39. For the proceedings of the Committee from December 5 to 7, see GA, *4th sess.*, *Ad Hoc Political Committee*, pages 339–368.

867N.00/12–749 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET TEL AVIV, December 7, 1949—2 p. m.

869. In 80-minute talk with Shiloah at his request Dec. 6 my house, he observed as follows:

(1) Jordan talks with Abdullah's intermittent participation are continuing in "favorable atmosphere." Central problem now is King's insistence on Gaza outlet and control of corridor. Israel agreeable "free passage" and now searching for formula to satisfy Jordan without sacrificing Israeli sovereignty or dividing country. When Israel suggested possible Egyptian objection Jordan control Gaza, King replied: "Adjustment is possible with Cairo as family affair." Shiloah said next meeting, probably December 8, is expected to be "crucial", and possibly last before opening formal negotiations.

(2) Egypt, Shiloah said, is "dear my heart". He echoed Prime Minister's eagerness for early start negotiations (Embtel 859, December 5) and said Riley was recently agent to carry letter from Sassoon to Sherine, Farouk's brother-in-law, and in confidence also of [*to?*] Egyptian Army and Foreign Office. No answer yet received this Israeli bid for negotiations. Shiloah "fears no progress unless US takes initiative bringing two countries together." In Jordan talks, Israel had "made it perfectly plain that nothing would be agreed to which might further alienate Egypt." He explained "Though Israel more intertwined with Jordan, peace with Egypt much more important."

(3) Jerusalem was discussed briefly. In passing Shiloah made disquieting statement: "We shall, of course, expect part of old city in any final partition." He anticipated no insurmountable obstacle to territorial adjustment in Jerusalem.

(4) Anglo-Jordan treaty's extension to cis-Jordan [1] would be "matter of grave concern" and Israel would "almost certainly insist that certain clauses, e.g., right to establish bases and maintain troops, be abrogated." He echoed Prime Minister's insistence this would require high level discussion with British.

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[1] Presumably, on this side of the Jordan, i.e., the West Bank.

(5) Shiloah asked if "Arab rearming and threats of second round" had caused concern at Istanbul. On my negative reply, he commented that Israel must regard seriously such rearming, especially that of Egypt with scores of tanks and some jet planes. He expressed fear that Arabs would interpret western shipment of supplies as approval of threats of second round. My assurances that US is convinced UK has no such purpose seemed not to satisfy Shiloah.

Sent Department 869; repeated London 142, Jerusalem 100, Baghdad 53, Beirut 78, Damascus 58, Jidda 33; Department pass Amman 64, Cairo 73, Karachi for McGhee.

McDONALD

Editorial Note

The General Assembly, at a brief meeting on December 8, adopted the draft resolution dealing with the question of assisting the Palestinian refugees that had been proposed by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 47–0, with 6 abstentions (United Nations, *Official Records of the Fourth Session of the General Assembly, Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Summary Records of Meetings 20 September–10 December 1949* (hereinafter identified as GA, *4th sess., Plenary*), page 571).

The resolution was based on the First Interim Report of the Economic Survey Mission. It recognized that "continued assistance for the relief of the Palestine refugees is necessary to prevent conditions of starvation and distress among them and to further conditions of peace and stability, and that constructive measures should be undertaken at an early date with a view to the termination of international assistance for relief."

The resolution also considered that "the equivalent of approximately $33,700,000 will be required for direct relief and works programmes for the period 1 January to 31 December 1950 of which the equivalent of $20,200,000 is required for direct relief and $13,500,000 for works programmes; that the equivalent of approximately $21,200,000 will be required for works programmes from 1 January to 30 June 1951, all inclusive of administrative expenses; and that direct relief should be terminated not later than 31 December 1950 unless otherwise determined by the General Assembly at its fifth regular session."

The resolution established the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to carry out the direct relief and works programs recommended by the Economic Survey Mission and to consult with Near Eastern Governments concern-

ing measures to be taken by them preparatory to the time when relief and works projects would cease.

The resolution also dealt with such matters as the Office of Director of the Agency, an Advisory Commission, and the financing of the activities of the Agency. It closed with an instruction to the Palestine Conciliation Commission to transmit the final report of the Economic Survey Mission. The full text of the resolution (No. 302 (IV)) is printed in United Nations, *Official Records of the Fourth Session of the General Assembly, Resolutions, 20 September–10 December 1949* (hereinafter identified as GA, *4th sess., Resolutions*), page 23.

Editorial Note

The General Assembly, in two meetings on December 9, considered that part of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee report concerned with establishing an international regime for the Jerusalem area and with protecting the Holy Places; the proceedings of these meetings are printed in GA, *4th sess., Plenary*, pages 572–607.

Mr. Ross expressed again the opposition of the United States to the draft resolution adopted by the Committee and reiterated support for the proposals of the Palestine Conciliation Commission (*ibid.*, page 578). British Representative Cadogan also spoke in opposition to the Committee measure, while Soviet Representative Tsarapkin spoke in favor of it (*ibid.*, pages 573 and 589).

The General Assembly, later the same day, adopted the resolution proposed by the Committee by a vote of 38–14, with 7 abstentions. The United States and the United Kingdom were recorded in opposition (*ibid.*, page 607); for the text of resolution, see *infra*.

Resolution 303 (IV) Adopted by the General Assembly on December 9, 1949 [1]

The General Assembly,

Having regard to its resolutions 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 and 194 (III) of 11 December 1948,

Having studied the reports of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine set up under the latter resolution,

I. *Decides*

In relation to Jerusalem,

[1] Reprinted from GA, *4th sess., Resolutions*, p. 25.

Believing that the principles underlying its previous resolutions concerning this matter, and in particular its resolution of 29 November 1947, represent a just and equitable settlement of the question,

1. To restate, therefore, its intention that Jerusalem should be placed under a permanent international regime, which should envisage appropriate guarantees for the protection of the Holy Places, both within and outside Jerusalem, and to confirm specifically the following provisions of General Assembly resolution 181 (II): (1) the City of Jerusalem shall be established as a *corpus separatum* under a special international regime and shall be administered by the United Nations; (2) the Trusteeship Council shall be designated to discharge the responsibilities of the Administering Authority . . . ;[2] and (3) the City of Jerusalem shall include the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern, Shu'fat, as indicated on the attached sketch-map;

2. To request for this purpose that the Trusteeship Council at its next session, whether special or regular, complete the preparation of the Statute of Jerusalem, omitting the new inapplicable provisions, such as articles 32 and 39, and, without prejudice to the fundamental principles of the international regime for Jerusalem set forth in General Assembly resolution 181 (II) introducing therein amendments in the direction of its greater democratization, approve the Statute, and proceed immediately with its implementation. The Trusteeship Council shall not allow any actions taken by any interested Government or Governments to divert it from adopting and implementing the Statute of Jerusalem;

II. *Calls upon* the States concerned to make formal undertakings, at an early date and in the light of their obligations as Members of the United Nations, that they will approach these matters with good will and be guided by the terms of the present resolution.

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[2] Omission indicated in the source text.

501.BB Palestine/12–949 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel

RESTRICTED NIACT WASHINGTON, December 9, 1949—9 p. m.

755. Reference adoption amended Australian resolution regarding Jerusalem by General Assembly. Please take all possible steps in your discretion to urge upon Israeli Govt and its officials importance of preventing any statements or action which would inflame situation in Near East, particularly in view current Israeli-Jordan talks and possible further Israeli conversations with Vatican.

Sent Tel Aviv; repeated Amman for similar action except reference conversation with Vatican; repeated Jerusalem and USUN for info.

ACHESON

501.BB Palestine/12–1149 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT TEL AVIV, December 11, 1949—1 p. m.

878. Immediately following receipt Department niact 755, December 9, Ford and I had Shiloah my residence for hour December 10 and were at office Eytan 45 minutes December 11.

In reply to Department message Eytan quoted Ben-Gurion as standing on today's statement: "Israel's position on question of Jerusalem found clear and final expression in statements by the government and all parties in Knesset on December 5. Jerusalem is an inseparable part of Israel and her eternal capital. No UN vote can alter this historic fact." Ben-Gurion feels "nothing more now need be said." There will be "special meeting government" this p. m.[1]

Eytan said Israel immediately after UN vote stopped all further transfer property to Russians under Knesset authority August 24. "Bulk of property" not transferred and "no more will be transferred."

Eytan implied Israel not required take any action re UN decision until Trusteeship Council drafted and its implementation is begun. At point implementation "Israel may refuse access Jewish Jerusalem to TC representatives or merely refuse cooperation." No decision these policies yet taken. Eytan expects and hopes that meanwhile Russia will press its advantage and make such demands in TC for participation government Jerusalem as will antagonize Western Powers and prevent agreement. He said "Moscow and Vatican each hopes cheat the other. Their alliance cannot last."

Eytan was more optimistic than Shiloah about effects UN decision on Israel–Jordan talks. Next meeting will be December 13. Shiloah was pessimistic any agreement now except possibly on Jerusalem roads to Scopus and Bethlehem. Shiloah doubts Transjordan has or can secure consent Egypt transfer to Transjordan Gaza and strip. As to transit Transjordan to Gaza, Israel now offers road under Transjordan jurisdiction on model of US agreement Panama jurisdiction

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[1] In his statement before the Knesset on December 5, the Israeli Prime Minister stated in part: "We cannot today regard the decision of November 29, 1947, as being possessed of any further moral force since the United Nations did not succeed in implementing its own decisions. In our view, the decision of November 29 about Jerusalem is null and void." The following day, the Knesset ratified unanimously the Prime Minister's statement. (Despatch 304, December 12, from Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/12–1249)

over road through Canal Zone. Eytan feels Abdullah more anxious than his advisers avoid break Israel talks.

Comment: Whole Israel shocked and pro-Russian sections stunned by success Russian-Vatican-Moslem combination. Russian cynicism is bitter pill for all, but especially for Leftists. Ben-Gurion and Cabinet now see absurdity Sharett's policy insisting on balancing Russian "friendship" with that of US. I pressed this point cruelly with Eytan and intend do same with Ben-Gurion and Weizmann urging them speak and act accordingly. In particular I called Eytan's attention to inexcusable anti-American despatches in *Palestine Post* which I believe enjoys directly or indirectly government subsidies thus putting it in different category from independent and party newspapers. *End comment.*

McDONALD

767N.90i/12–1249 : Telegram

The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State

SECRET AMMAN, December 12, 1949—7 p. m.

418. Saturday p. m. I had long audience King Abdullah at Shuneh during which following discussed.

1. Istanbul Conference: Conveyed substance recapitulation conference conclusions to King who expressed pleasure US adopted strict impartial attitude vis-à-vis Israelis and Arabs and that US approved direct talks and willing encourage both sides settle differences this manner.

2. Jerusalem: King bitterly resentful regarding GA action re Jerusalem and especially critical attitude Arab States. Asked me convey US Government appreciation US opposition amended Austrian [*Australian*] resolution, protested he had many times declared he would not leave Jerusalem and he intended abide by these declarations. Derived some comfort from his belief internationalization will not be carried out.

3. ESM report: Abdullah very pleased GA adopted ESM report without dissent and obviously expects much benefit from RWRA.

4. Jordan–Israel negotiations: King fairly hopeful success. Raised question US moral support "reasonable" Jordan claims. I replied US did not wish become involved in negotiation as we believe durable settlement obtainable only through direct negotiations two parties concerned without intervention. King replied he understood our position but hoped if opportunity arose US would support any Jordan claims it considered reasonable (particularly concerned re outlet to Mediterranean) added he had recently detected more conciliatory Israel attitude attributing this to possible suggestions made by Secretary Acheson to Sharett during recent meeting.

After audience with His Majesty I had long talk with Samir Pasha Rifai re progress negotiations with Israelis. He said crucial point was

manner arranging Jordan access to Mediterranean. Official Jordan position still demands south Negev across which road could be built connect Tafila at SE end Dead Sea with Gaza.

Samir stated Israelis proposed corridor Hebron to Gaza under Jordan "jurisdiction". To this he replied allegedly that only alternative to south Negev which could be considered would be Hebron–Gaza corridor with full Jordan sovereignty but giving Israel transit rights at specific points. In addition Jordan would demand return certain land Tulkarm area as well as Israeli relinquishment all Arab quarters Jerusalem.

Samir added Israelis put forward claim for land west of Dead Sea to permit Israeli road link between potash works both ends Dead Sea. They also expressed concern possible establishment British bases Arab Palestine as having bad psychological effect.

December 8 talks were inconclusive and it seems next discussions, date not fixed, will be decisive. I have feeling neither King nor Samir will wish continue negotiations unless basic question access to sea can be solved satisfactorily.

Re obtaining Gaza from Egyptians Samir believes this will not be difficult as Egypt would like to be rid of refugees among whom Egyptian administration has been very unpopular. He feels this question can be resolved in time without great difficulty.

Re British bases in Palestine, Samir seemed feel some satisfaction might be given Israelis as from military viewpoint present bases would afford adequate protection. However, Jordan would never consider restriction British treaty of alliance to east bank Jordan River.

Sent Department 418, Department pass London 107, USUN 23, Tel Aviv 65, Jerusalem 147. Pouched Arab capitals.

FRITZLAN

501.BB Palestine/12–1249 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT PRIORITY TEL AVIV, December 12, 1949—9 p. m.

880. Eytan called me to Foreign Office 6:30 p. m., December 12 expecting hand me advance copy Prime Minister's "policy statement" on Jerusalem, first scheduled for delivery 8 p. m. Knesset session. However, unexplained last minute cancellation and speech now set December 13 Knesset.

Eytan unable give me advance copy, but said BG had "made definite point" avoiding any "inflammatory statements" in preparing speech, while at same time stressing Israel's "rights" in Jerusalem and main-

taining position heretofore held that Jewish Jerusalem "must remain sovereignty Israel." Speech's main purpose, said Eytan, is enable government set "moderate and positive lead" for country, thereby avoiding extremist groups gaining advantage and public feeling "going astray after strange gods." Eytan said speech, broadly speaking, will announce "continuation of action" rather than suggest any new action.

Comment: I gather Israel proposes continue *status quo ante* vis-à-vis Jerusalem, e.g., town planning, maintenance certain government offices there, new construction, etc. and simply ignore existence GA resolution. *End comment.*

Sent Department 880. Department pass London 145, Jerusalem 101, Amman 65, Baghdad 55, Beirut 81, Damascus 60, Cairo 75, Jidda 35.

McDONALD

501.BB Palestine/11–1449

The Secretary of State to the Egyptian Ambassador (Rahim)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Egypt and has the honor to refer to the Joint Note of November 14, 1949, which was presented to Acting Secretary Webb by the Diplomatic Representatives of the Governments of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria and by the Head of the Delegation of Yemen to the General Assembly of the United Nations, submitting certain observations regarding the question of Palestine.

The United States Government appreciates this expression of views and considers them as indicative of the desire of the Governments of the Arab States to reach an early and peaceful settlement of the Palestine problem. The views expressed in the Joint Note have been given close consideration by this Government.

The United States Government considers that the United Nations, which has been seized with the Palestine problem since the matter was first referred to that body in 1947, is the proper medium through which a solution of the question should be sought. The General Assembly of the United Nations created the Palestine Conciliation Commission for the purpose of assisting the parties to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Commission or directly. It is the hope of this Government that the parties concerned will continue to collaborate with the United Nations in its important task of bringing about a peaceful settlement of all outstanding issues.

It is for this reason that the United States Government considers that questions relating to the Protocol of May 12, 1949, signed under the auspices of the Palestine Conciliation Commission by Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria on the one hand and by Israel on the

other, should more appropriately be discussed with the Conciliation Commission.

One of the principal objectives of the United States with respect to the Palestine problem is the restoration of peace and stability in the Near Eastern area. The United States Government is convinced that it is in the best interest of the parties themselves that they should take the initiative in advancing from the armistice stage to that of permanent peace and that they should employ all means at their disposal, including direct negotiations, to achieve this end.

The United States Government stands ready to assist the Arab States and Israel, both as a member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission and in such other ways as may seem desirable, in achieving a final settlement of the Palestine question.[1]

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1949.

[1] Separate notes were sent to the diplomatic representatives of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria on December 13. The same day the Department directed New York to convey orally to the Head of the Delegation of Yemen to the United Nations the substance of the notes. The Department explained that it was not desired to communicate in writing with the Head of the Yemeni Delegation since the United States did not maintain diplomatic relations with the present Government of Yemen. (instruction 383 to New York, 501.BB Palestine/11–1449) Mr. Ross carried out the instruction on December 20 (memorandum of conversation by Mr. Stabler, December 20, 501.BB Palestine/12–2649).

501.BB Palestine/2–1349

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] December 13, 1949.

Participants: Mr. Aubrey Eban, Israeli Representative to the UN
Dr. Moshe Keren, Counselor, Embassy of Israel
Mr. Rusk, Deputy Under Secretary
Mr. Wilkins, ANE

Problem: Implementation of the General Assembly Resolution of December 9 regarding Jerusalem.

Action Required: To consider the Israeli view.

Action Assigned to: ANE

Mr. Eban, accompanied by Dr. Keren, called on me this afternoon, at their request, for the purpose of discussing the Jerusalem question in the light of the adoption by the General Assembly on December 9 of a resolution instructing the Trusteeship Council to revise its statute for Jerusalem and to implement it.

[1] Drafted by Mr. Wilkins.

Mr. Eban said he was glad the "nightmare" of General Assembly consideration of the Palestine question was over and that he appreciated the harmony which had existed between the Israeli delegation and the US delegation in the Assembly concerning the Jerusalem question.

I interjected that I appreciated Mr. Eban's remark but observed that although we were agreed on opposition to the amended Australian resolution regarding Jerusalem, we had not been in agreement concerning the type of resolution which we felt the General Assembly should pass.

Mr. Eban said that this was correct but, now that the General Assembly had adopted the Resolution of December 9, he wished to discuss it from the point of view of immediate repercussions and future action.

Mr. Eban said that the immediate repercussions of the adoption of the General Assembly Resolution had been as expected in Israel. The people of Israel and the people of Jerusalem did not believe that Jerusalem could or should be separated from Israel. Mr. Eban anticipated that the Israeli Parliament would discuss the matter in detail and added that a resolution proclaiming Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and a motion of no confidence in the Government would probably be introduced. Mr. Eban remarked that because of the public reaction in Israel and the proposed discussions and resolutions in the Parliament the Prime Minister would probably be required to reassure the Israelis regarding the Government's intentions.

I asked Mr. Eban exactly what was the juridical status of Jerusalem. He said it was exactly the same this week as it had been last week. There was no change in the juridical status of Jerusalem, nor was one intended.

Mr. Eban continued by remarking that the General Assembly Resolution of December 9 cut across the existing patterns of authority of Israel and Jordan in Jerusalem, that it cut across the existing armistice agreement between Israel and Jordan as far as Jerusalem is concerned, and that it cut across current talks between Israel and Jordan with respect to a settlement of the Palestine question, including the particular question of Jerusalem. Mr. Eban stated that it would be Israeli policy to bring about a "reversal" of the GA's resolution of December 9.

With respect to the Israeli-Jordan conversations, Mr. Eban believed that a successful outcome might be forthcoming in a matter of hours, perhaps a few days, and that, in general, the General Assembly Resolution had probably accelerated a successful outcome to these talks, whereas it had probably made further Israeli talks with the Vatican impossible.

I asked Mr. Eban whether it would not be helpful if Israeli representatives continued to explore the Jerusalem question with the Vatican. He said that the Vatican was probably "elated" with the passage of the General Assembly Resolution of December 9, which the Vatican had not anticipated, and that he was not optimistic regarding further talks at this stage.

I pointed out that a successful settlement of the Jerusalem question involved not only agreement between Israel and Jordan but also between Israel, Jordan and other religious interests, including particularly the Vatican. I added that in order to achieve such agreement all of those interested would undoubtedly be required to compromise their official positions. I urged upon Mr. Eban the importance of endeavoring, in so far as the Israelis could, the continuation of further talks with the Vatican.

I remarked, with regard to the General Assembly Resolution of December 9, that it posed a number of legal questions and that it raised the question of implementation. I recalled that the Trusteeship Council was under instructions from the General Assembly and observed that the Assembly's action, in so far as the members of the United Nations were concerned, had the status of a recommendation as had the Assembly Resolution of November 29, 1947. I remarked, regarding implementation, that the UN had no forces at its disposal and again expressed the hope that all of the parties interested in Jerusalem, both Israel and Jordan, as well as Catholic interests, would endeavor to work out together a settlement of the question. I said that the US as a member of the UN on the Trusteeship Council would work constructively in the Council.

501.BB Palestine/12–1349 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 13, 1949—12 noon.

641. US rep on TC [1] shld be guided by fol considerations at TC mtg Dec 13 when question of Jerusalem arises.

1. Although US voted against res adopted by GA, TC is under direction of GA and shld make bona fide effort to carry out clear intention of Assembly. US as member of TC will discharge its responsibilities in attempting to carry out GA res but US member should avoid leadership in discussions. At same time because of our opposition to Jerusalem res in GA we shld be careful that our position in TC does not undermine or give appearance of undermining GA's decision.

[1] Ambassador Francis B. Sayre.

2. First task confronting TC is review and modification of statute of Jerusalem in accordance with para I (2) of GA res. This para refers to need for amendments in statute in direction of its greater democratization. Inherent in such problem is also need to consider element of workability and acceptance. Although Dept does not believe that TC shld initially take steps toward implementation of statute, Dept does believe that elements of workability and acceptance shld be taken into account in modifications of the statute.

3. In opening statement US Rep shld say that views of US on Jerusalem have been stated in Assembly but US believes that, under instructions from Assembly, TC must proceed to draw up draft statute for Jerusalem and US will cooperate to this end.

4. In light of fact that GA res was only adopted on Dec 9 Dept believes that all govts interested in question and particularly members of TC may need some time now to consider problem further and to have opportunity to study views expressed in GA. US would favor therefore adherence to present schedule of TC so that initial work on problem does not commence until latter part of Jan.

5. Although US Del shld not take any initiative on question of place of TC meeting if subject is reopened in TC, US should support holding winter meeting of TC in NY rather than Geneva.

6. If question of participation of Israel and Jordan in work of TC arises, US Del shld support invitation to them to participate without vote but US shld not at this stage initiate invitation to them since their presence might precipitate the issue of their compliance or noncompliance with GA res.

7. If move is made in TC to establish a subcommittee to work on statute US Del shld support subcommittee of the whole rather than smaller subcommittee. If despite our position smaller subcommittee is established US shld seek to avoid membership on such committee but shld not press this to point where it might appear that US is unwilling to assist TC in drafting statute.[2]

ACHESON

[2] The Department sent the text of this telegram to London on December 16 and authorized communication of its substance to the British Foreign Office (telegram 4505, 867N.01/12–1649).

Editorial Note

The Trusteeship Council, on December 13, began consideration of its responsibilities under the General Assembly's resolution of December 9. Ambassador Sayre enunciated the views of the United States the same day, guided by the considerations set forth in telegram 641, *supra*. A summary of his statement is recorded in United Nations,

Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Second Special Session, page 37.

The Council, on December 19, gave consideration to a Mexican draft resolution (*ibid.*, page 68), which proposed that the President of the Council be entrusted with the preparation of a working paper on the Statute of Jerusalem, to be submitted to the Council at the beginning of its sixth regular session on January 19, 1950. The draft resolution, as amended, was adopted by the Council by 11 votes to none, with 1 abstention (*ibid.*, page 69).

Then on December 20, the Council considered a draft resolution (*ibid.*, page 81), which expressed its concern at the removal to Jerusalem of various ministries and departments of the Government of Israel. Such action was said "likely to render more difficult the implementation of the Statute of Jerusalem." The draft resolution also called on the President of the Council "To invite the Government of Israel to submit a written statement on the matters covered by this resolution." The measure, as amended, was adopted by 5 votes to none, with 7 abstentions (*ibid.*, page 84).

The texts of the two resolutions as adopted by the Trusteeship Council, numbered 113 (S–2) and 114 (S–2), are printed in United Nations, *Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Second Special Session, 8 December–20 December 1949, Resolutions*, page 2.

767N.901/12–1349 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

SECRET LONDON, December 13, 1949—7 p. m.

4948. Furlonge, who has now replaced Burrows as head of Eastern Department, Foreign Office, said today that two recent telegrams from Kirkbride report December 8 meeting between Israel and Jordan was very stormy. Principal bone of contention continued to be Jordan's demand for access to Mediterranean. Israelis offered to give Jordan "jurisdiction" over corridor, but took strong stand could not alienate Israeli sovereignty over any territory. In presenting jurisdiction proposal, Israelis cited US-Panamanian agreement giving US right of access to Colon. Jordan turned offer down flatly. Israel reported to have argued could not give Jordan sovereignty over corridor, thereby splitting country in half, to which Jordan reported to have replied there was no question of splitting country in half, since Jordan desired southern Negev as well. Talks then adjourned *sine die*.

2. Prior to foregoing deadlock, parties discussed question of Jerusalem and there was agreement in principal regarding re-drawing

present line to meet points re access Hebrew University, Wailing Wall, et cetera. Israel also requested cession of area containing power station on Yarmuk River, to which Jordan replied it had not entered into talks to discuss disposal of Jordan territory.

3. Towards end of session, Abdullah reported to have come into room and stated that there could be no peace settlement unless Israel prepared make some concessions. He must be able show territorial concessions in order justify his action with other Arab states. If such concessions not forthcoming, he would prefer see present armistice arrangements continuing in effect.

4. Decision as to next meeting left to Israel.

5. Furlonge clearly gloomy on prospects any settlement between two parties as result these conversations.

Department pass Amman as London's 10.

Sent Department 4948, repeated Tel Aviv 79.

HOLMES

Editorial Note

The Fifth Progress Report of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, dated December 14, reviewed its operations from September 16 to December 9. The report reviewed the problem of Jerusalem and the Holy Places, the refugee question and the territorial question. It concluded, in part, that "the Commission considers that it has received from the General Assembly in explicit terms the powers and obligations to undertake in the present circumstances a procedure of mediation and in consequence, to submit compromise proposals to the parties concerned. . . . Therefore the Commission hopes to undertake this task with the interested parties and thereby bring to a successful conclusion the mission entrusted to it by the General Assembly." The full text of the Fifth Progress Report is printed in United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Annexes*, page 9.

867N.01/12–1449 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY TEL AVIV, December 14, 1949—11 a. m.

885. Comment on Embtel 882 December 13 : [1] Eytan's prognostications given me December 12 (Embtel 880 [2]) that Prime Minister's speech would contain "no inflammatory statements" hardly borne out

[1] Not printed; it gave the text of the statement made by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion to the Knesset on December 13 (867N.01/12–1349).

[2] Dated December 12, p. 1534.

in such remarks as these: "Decision is utterly incapable of implementation if only for the determined unalterable opposition of the inhabitants of Jerusalem themselves"; and "We are continuing with the transfer of the government to Jerusalem and hope to complete it as soon as possible"; and "There is nothing now to prevent Knesset from returning to Jerusalem. We propose that you take a decision to this effect".

These statements obviously made (1) to forestall more drastic demands by government's violently outspoken rightwing critics such as Herut and (2) to confound Communists and leftist Mapam elements supporting or apologizing for USSR stand on internationalization. Ben-Gurion evidently confident of instant favorable reaction of Israel to his bold directive.

Embassy observer present during speech and subsequent Knesset debate reports proceedings generally quiet and orderly with only applause coming final announcement by speaker that "after Hanukka recess" Knesset meetings will be held Jerusalem. *End comment.*

Sent Department 885, repeated Baghdad 47, Beirut 83, Damascus 62, Jerusalem 103, Jidda 37. Department pass Amman 68, Cairo 77, London 147.

McDonald

867N.00/12–1449 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET Cairo, December 14, 1949—7 p. m.

1152. Hassan Youssef Pasha said yesterday further in connection with the Sassoon–Cherine matter that in any case the approach on the Sassoon–Cherine level is not the proper level. He said "Why don't you make yourselves go-between between Israel and Egypt? Only you could persuade the Israelis to put forth items which might form basis of settlement. In effect there is really only one outstanding issue: boundary adjustment. If settlement of the refugees becomes a *fait accompli* and if agreement can be reached on territorial adjustments, peace can be made."

He said also that he doubts sincerity of Israel concerning taking care of refugees there if Israel obtains control of Gaza area. "If Egypt," he continued, "could obtain in lieu of Gaza area the section which includes Beersheba and extending to Dead Sea, Egypt might settle those refugees there."

He said conversations are under way to renew armistice but could give no details. He reaffirmed that Egypt had no desire to renew hostilities. "However, if Israel resumes hostilities Egypt will be obliged to do as well as she can."

Caffery

501.BB Palestine/12–1549

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] December 15, 1949.

Participants: Dr. Moshe Keren, Israeli Embassy
Miss Esther Herlitz, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Hare, NEA
Mr. Wilkins, ANE
Mr. Rockwell, ANE

Problem: Attitude to be adopted re Israeli desire that Trusteeship Council not take certain steps in connection with Jerusalem case.

Discussion: Dr. Keren and Miss Herlitz called at their request at the instance of Mr. Eban. They said that Mr. Eban had heard that the Trusteeship Council was considering two matters: 1) The extension of an invitation to the Israeli Government to designate representatives to take part in the discussions in the Council on the preparation of a statute setting up an international regime for Jerusalem. 2) A draft resolution proposed by the French representative on the Council condemning Israel for recently taking action concerning Jerusalem in opposition to the provisions of the General Assembly resolution of December 9, 1949.

Re 1), Dr. Keren said that the Israeli Government hoped that no such invitation would be extended since Israel would be unable to participate in discussions looking toward the establishment of a regime to which it was firmly opposed. An invitation to participate would have to be refused, with resulting embarrassment both for the Trusteeship Council and Israel. Mr. Hare said that he thought it was customary for the Council to issue invitations to the interested parties to attend sessions of the Council when matters of interest to them were being discussed and that it might be difficult for the Council to make an exception in this case. He recalled that in the Somaliland case the Council had issued an invitation to Ethiopia despite the latter's attitude on the matter. Mr. Hare could give no assurances as to what the US attitude in this instance would be, but we would keep the Israeli position in mind.

Re 2), Dr. Keren said that if the Council passed a condemnatory resolution public opinion in his country, already inflamed against the UN because of the December 9 resolution, would become even more bitter. Such a resolution would make it more difficult to obtain in a calm and dispassionate atmosphere a new and more realistic UN decision on Jerusalem. He very much hoped it would be possible to avoid bringing a resolution of this nature to vote in the Council.

Mr. Hare said that we had heard that the French representative had introduced a draft resolution, but that he had not seen the text. We did not as yet know what the attitude of our Government on this matter would be, but he wished to point out that a majority decision on Jerusalem had been taken by the United Nations and that the Trusteeship Council had been given certain specific instructions by the General Assembly. The United States was a loyal member of the United Nations and of the Trusteeship Council, and was naturally going to play its part when the Council considered the course of action to take. Dr. Keren said that of course he understood this.

Mr. Hare stated that there have recently been strong actions taken and statements made in Israel concerning Jerusalem, and that it was natural that these should provoke a reaction in the Trusteeship Council. The United States Government was concerned by moves taken in Israel likely to prejudice or complicate the work of the Trusteeship Council in the task assigned it by the General Assembly.

Both Dr. Keren and Miss Herlitz maintained that what had recently happened in Israel was merely a further development in the process of moving Government offices to Jerusalem which had been going on for some time. They said that despite strong pressure in the Cabinet to do so, the Government had refused to proclaim Jerusalem the capital of Israel. Certain statements had been made to appease public opinion, but in reality the situation was more or less the same as before.

Mr. Hare could not agree with this, and said that he thought that the recent events in Israel could not really be described as unimportant further steps in a gradual process. Much stronger things had been done and said in the past few days.

Dr. Keren then returned to the importance of public opinion in Israel, and said that no democratic government, in the face of a decision such as the one just taken by the General Assembly, could refuse to act as the people desired. We pointed out that as far as Jerusalem was concerned Israel had to reckon as well with world opinion.

When questioned as to where the capital of Israel actually was at the present moment, Dr. Keren said that Israel really would not have a capital until a constitution had been adopted. The provisional capital was at Tel Aviv, but both Tel Aviv and Jerusalem had the necessary attributes for a capital, particularly now that Government offices had been located in Jerusalem.

Dr. Keren then reiterated the hope that the Trusteeship Council would pass no resolution condemning Israel. Mr. Hare said again that he could give no assurances as to what the US attitude on the question would be, as we had not had time to study the matter thoroughly.

767N.901/12–1549 : Telegram

The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY AMMAN, December 15, 1949—10 a. m.

421. Legtel 418 December 12. Yesterday evening I had hour and half talk with Samir Pasha Rifai re results fourth meeting with Israelis held Shuneh Tuesday [1] nite presence King.

Following questions listed for discussion and trend talks as follows according Samir:

1. Territorial settlement including Jordan access Mediterranean.
2. Jerusalem.
3. Tulkarm triangle (approved for separate discussion after Israeli opposition).
4. Israeli road link along west shore Dead Sea connecting potash works.
5. Application British treaty Arab Palestine.
6. Present and future treaty obligations both parties (this inserted request Israel and aimed Jordan obligations under AL charter).

First question passed over on insistence Israelis (desiring doubtless test extent Jordan concessions before revealing their hand access to sea) but on Samir's condition it be discussed before meeting ended as it was crucial question.

Re Jerusalem, Israelis demanded change line afford them contiguity of territory with Jew quarter and Wailing Wall in old city and with Mt. Scopus institutions. Samir recognized reasonableness former and King readily assented but Samir stated Jordan could not consider latter but would be willing guarantee free access. This of course predicated on conclusion general agreement which would change line giving Jordan Nablus, St Pauls and Bethlehem roads and territory east and would provide compensation for certain Arab quarters. Such arrangement seemed in general satisfactory to Israelis.

Re Tulkarm, Samir claimed return fertile triangle area absolutely necessary. This land had been held by Jordan and had been given up at armistice negotiations result of ignorance and stupidity.

Re question Israeli road link between potash works King gave immediate assent to Israeli demand. At this point Samir insisted on returning to discussion of question Jordan access to sea rather than taking up two questions re treaties.

After some discussion between Shiloah and Sassoon latter made dramatic statement effect that as evidence good faith part Israelis, and in appreciation King's conciliatory attitude, Ben Gurion had decided in face serious opposition especially from military that Israel should

[1] December 13.

give Jordan direct corridor from Hebron to Gaza (later amended to corridor from Hebron to Gaza via Beit Jibrin) with full sovereignty subject to three reservations: (*a*) there should be no military installations or bases in corridor; (*b*) Israelis should have free passage across it at least three places; (*c*) British treaty of guarantee not to apply corridor.

When King heard this proposal he expressed much pleasure and appeared believe agreement virtually reached. However, Samir replied proposal not acceptable. He had demanded South Negev and had indicated he would consider as alternative reasonable corridor with full Jordan sovereignty over it. He stated there were two reasonable and acceptable alternatives. One was Israeli relinquishment Western Galilee and suitable corridor to it, and other was corridor from Hebron to Majdal (slightly north Gaza) via Beit Jibrin and Faluja. He added Majdal only possible area which could be considered as point access in south because: (*a*) South coast very hilly with exception Majdal area and consequently Majdal offered only feasible site for port; (*b*) there existed road connection between Hebron and Majdal while no such link with Gaza; and (*c*) while Jordan hopeful eventually taking over Gaza from Egypt, this problematical.

Israelis replied they had no authority offer corridor to Majdal but agreed confer further with government.

Re Israeli reservations offer of corridor to Gaza Samir stated: (*a*) If Jordan agreed not establish military bases or installations in corridor it would ask Israel to give similar commitment re area both sides corridor to extent corridor width; (*b*) Jordan agreed in principle Israeli free passage at certain points across corridor but could not now commit itself to number of points. Question British treaty application to corridor not discussed but Samir believes injection this factor by Israelis indicative absence complete good faith.

Two remaining treaty questions deferred to later meeting.

Israeli delegates departed with intention requesting new instructions for possible future discussions for which date not set.

Comment: Apparent Israelis attempting obtain Jordan agreement on separate [apparent omission] in hope deferring central question Jordan access to sea. To counter such tendency Samir is making clear his refusal consider any aspects settlement except as integral part overall settlement, and agreement given on any particular question presumes reaching general agreement. I have strong feeling that neither Samir nor Prime Minister would be parties to agreement which did not embrace following as minimum: (1) corridor Hebron–Majdal with Jordan sovereignty over it; (2) Jerusalem line as giving Jordan Nablus, St Pauls and Bethlehem roads and territory east; and (3) return of Jordan Tulkarm triangle.

It is extremely doubtful that any Jordan government would agree to less. In general Samir seemed hopeful talks would succeed. Question of their continuation will depend upon Israelis.[2]

Sent Department 421. Department pass London 108, USUN 24, Jerusalem 148, Tel Aviv 66.

FRITZLAN

[2] The Israeli version of the talks with the Jordanians on December 13 was conveyed to Ambassador McDonald by Mr. Shiloah the following day. The Ambassador's account, as transmitted to the Department on December 15, was a brief one, going into detail only in connection with King Abdullah's request for Majdal and Ascalon as his "sea exit" instead of Gaza. No direct mention was made in the Ambassador's account of the Israeli proposal to give Jordan a direct corridor to the Mediterranean (telegram 893 from Tel Aviv, 767N.90i/12–1549).

501.BB Palestine/12–1749

Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare) to the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 17, 1949.

Subject: Message to Israeli Government Concerning Jerusalem.

Discussion:

You will recall that we had anticipated that at your Press Conference on December 14 you would be asked concerning the attitude of this Government on the move to transfer the Israeli Government from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in opposition to the General Assembly Resolution of December 9. We had suggested that you might wish to state that in the opinion of the United States Government it would be most unfortunate if any of the parties interested in Jerusalem took action which would prejudice or complicate the settlement of the Jerusalem question. However, none of the correspondents present asked this question, and the Israeli Government has so far not received any official indication of our reaction to Prime Minister Ben Gurion's declaration in the Knesset on December 13 urging the Knesset to move to Jerusalem or to the subsequent removal of the Prime Minister's office from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

Neither the General Assembly Resolution of November 29, 1947, nor the draft statute for Jerusalem prepared by the Trusteeship Council in the Spring of 1948 specifically prohibited the establishment of the capital of Israel in Jerusalem. The General Assembly Resolution of December 9, 1949, again does not contain any such specific prohibition. Arrangements for the transfer of the capital to Jerusalem might eventually be worked out with the United Nations in the Trusteeship Council, but unilateral establishment of the capital in Jerusalem at

this particular time will undoubtedly be construed as contrary to the spirit of the Resolution of December 9 and as open opposition by Israel to the United Nations.

Following the General Assembly's adoption of its Resolution of December 9, the Department instructed its representative in Tel Aviv to urge upon the Israelis the importance of preventing any statements or action which would inflame the situation in the Near East, particularly in view of current Israeli conversations with Jordan and the Vatican[1] (Tab A). This message apparently had little effect on the Israeli Government.

Under the circumstances, it is considered desirable that the Israeli Government be informed of our attitude on the latest developments concerning Jerusalem, and the attached telegram has been drafted. (Tab B)

Recommendations:

It is recommended that you sign the attached telegram.[2]

[Here follows the concurrence of the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations.]

[1] See telegram 755, December 9, p. 1531.
[2] See telegram 768, December 20, to Tel Aviv, p. 1555.

Editorial Note

The final report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East was signed at Paris on December 18 by Chairman Clapp and the three Deputy Chairmen. The document was in two parts, the latter in the nature of a technical supplement. The two parts were released by the Palestine Conciliation Commission on December 28 under United Nations control No. AAC 25/6. The report's conclusions and proposals comprise the following:

"The approach to economic development in the Middle East proposed by the Economic Survey Mission thus includes the following elements:

1. *Recognition* by the Governments of Middle Eastern countries, by the United Nations and by the Member Governments which desire to proffer friendly assistance to the Middle East:

(i) That peace and stability cannot be achieved in the Middle East until the masses of its peoples are able to enjoy a higher standard of living than at present;

(ii) That the path to a higher standard of living for the population of the Middle East is a long one;

(iii) That, through the efforts of Middle Eastern peoples and Governments themselves, a higher standard of living can only be achieved through the development of the natural resources of

Middle Eastern countries which, to begin with, should be reflected in an improved and modernized agriculture, without which substantial industrial opportunity is denied them;

(iv) That the obstacles to economic development leave few opportunities, if any, for the immediate prosecution of large-scale schemes or the fruitful application of large long-term credits for productive, self-liquidating developments;

(v) That the proposed public works programme to provide temporary employment for Palestine refugees, as recommended in the Economic Survey Mission's Interim Report (adopted and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations, by resolution 302 (IV) dated 8 December 1949), by mobilizing a great body of man-power, now idle, will improve the productivity of the countries where the refugees now reside and can be the start of larger developments;

(vi) That several of the Governments of the countries most directly affected by the recent hostilities between Arabs and Israelis need an opportunity to learn, by doing, the art and skill of planning, organizing and carrying out a development project, conceived on a small enough scale to be within the competence of those Governments, important enough to affect the country's economy favourably, and comprising a sufficient variety of problems and technical requirements to afford overall training in a broad field, while being simple enough to assure success;

(vii) That the process by which the greater resources of the international community and the individual aid of friendly Governments are made available to the Middle Eastern countries must respect the sovereignty while strengthening the competence and independence of the country receiving assistance.

2. *Prosecution* of the programme of work relief for refugees to be inaugurated by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (established by the resolution of the General Assembly dated 8 December 1949) in such a manner as to shift more and more responsibility for the execution of the programmes on to the shoulders of the individual Governments and to ensure that these programmes for temporary employment include those projects which can add to the productivity of national and regional economies and lay the basis for subsequent larger developments offering a permanent livelihood to more people in the years to come.

3. *Establishment* by each of the Middle Eastern Governments of a national Development Board, fully contained within the sovereign jurisdiction of its governmental administration, charged with responsibility for planning balanced, overall development, defining and recommending individual projects, and providing for their execution, with the help of such technical and financial assistance from the international community or friendly Governments as each Middle Eastern Government concerned may seek.

4. (*a*) *Prosecution* by the Government of Lebanon of a pilot demonstration project to achieve a complete survey, field investigation and technical report, preparatory to the ultimate development of the Litani River as a unit;

(*b*) *Encouragement and technical assistance* by the international community, or individual friendly Governments, to the Republic of Lebanon in the definition and prosecution of the Litani investigation with an assurance that, should the Government of Lebanon find itself unable wholly to finance this investigation from internal resources, a request for external financial aid would receive careful and friendly consideration.

5. (*a*) *Prosecution* by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan of a pilot demonstration project on the watersheds and stream bed of the Wadi Zerqa, and a pilot demonstration project on the watershed and stream bed of the Wadi Qilt, which will achieve the full and unified development and use of the waters of these wadis flowing into the Jordan River from the east and west respectively; by building storage dams, to stabilize the downstream flow of the wadis and thereby increase the year-round water supply, reduce the damage of floods and add to the areas under irrigation and cultivation; by using the development of these wadis as an opportunity to employ Arab refugees and as an encouragement for them to establish themselves as permanent and productive residents on the lands they thus bring into use; and by using these pilot demonstration projects as a special opportunity to provide technical and administrative experience in the overall planning and actual execution of public works.

(*b*) *Financial and technical assistance* to the Jordan Government by the international community, through the funds to be made available by the Member Governments of the United Nations for the refugee works relief programme, in order to begin these projects; together with an assurance that later requests for credits or grants with which to complete these pilot projects will receive careful and sympathetic consideration by the United Nations or by individual friendly Governments, prior to the conclusion of the refugee works programme.

6. (*a*) *Prosecution* by the Syrian Government of a pilot demonstration project on the Orontes River in the Ghab Swamps, to reclaim, by drainage and other devices, potentially fertile lands now useless and uninhabitable, and to provide homes and other facilities needed for the people who will be required to populate and till the land thus reclaimed.

(*b*) *Encouragement and technical assistance* by the international community, or individual friendly Governments, to Syria in the planning and execution of this project by the Syrian Government, with an assurance that, should the Syrian Government find itself unable wholly to finance this development from internal resources, a request for external financial aid would receive careful and friendly consideration.

7. *Creation of a fund*, not to exceed $10 million, by the Governments which, by action of the General Assembly, are called upon to appoint their representatives to form the Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees; this fund to be available to the Advisory Commission, until expended, for allocation to Middle Eastern Governments as grants, reimbursable or otherwise as may be determined, for the purpose of facilitating research, technical studies and investigations in agriculture, engineering and other modern scientific aids to development, and assisting in the

completion of pilot demonstration projects approved by the Advisory Commission, upon application made by the Middle Eastern Government concerned.

8. *Preparation* by the Governments of the Middle Eastern countries concerned, in consultation with the Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees and in connection with the functions of that body as laid down in paragraph 7 (*b*) of the resolution of the General Assembly of 8 December 1949, of plans and recommendations for the further development of the economic and natural resources of the Middle East, with particular reference to those involving economic arrangements between two or more of the countries concerned.

This approach to the economic development of the Middle East and the policies and actions set forth herein are recommended for the early and careful consideration of the United Nations and the Governments whose active implementation of this approach will bring the Middle East into a hopeful and significant era of economic, social and political advance." (pages 12–13)

867N.002/12–1849 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, December 18, 1949.

695. Today's *Post* reports regular weekly Cabinet meeting will be held first time in Jerusalem December 20. Also reports repairs being completed on building for Ministries of Trade and Industry, Agriculture, Health, Police while Ministry of Foreign Affairs will not move for some time and Defense to remain in Tel Aviv. Claim some thousand accommodations being readied for government workers in Jerusalem.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/12–2049

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1949.

In the Fourth Session of the General Assembly, just concluded, the position of the United States in the Jerusalem question was to support the proposals for an international regime for the Jerusalem area presented by the United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission, of which the United States is a member. The Commission formulated these proposals in accordance with the instructions given to it by the General Assembly in 1948, which called for the establishment of a permanent international regime with maximum local autonomy.

With the exception of certain matters specifically reserved to the authority of the United Nations, the Commission's proposals would have delegated all normal powers of Government in the Jerusalem area to the responsible authorities of the Arab and Jewish zones, i.e., the Governments of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The principal functions reserved to the international administration were the control of the Holy Places, the supervision of the demilitarization of the area, and the protection of human rights in Jerusalem. A joint Council was provided to facilitate the operation of the City as a whole and an international tribunal to determine disputes arising under the Statute.

The proposals of the Conciliation Commission represented a middle ground between the two extreme positions, which were:

1. That Jerusalem should be a *corpus separatum* under a special international regime, separate from the surrounding area, and under full United Nations administration. This was the solution previously adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution of November 29, 1947. This solution could not be implemented due to the outbreak of fighting in Palestine and to the fact that the General Assembly recommendation of 1947 that there should be a Jewish and an Arab state in Palestine with economic union was never put into effect.
2. That the two sides of the city be under the sovereignty and authority respectively of Israel and Jordan. Israel favored an international regime limited to the Holy Places while Jordan was only prepared to give to the United Nations full guarantees for the protection of and free access to the Holy Places.

In the General Assembly this year Australia introduced a resolution incorporating the first of these extreme positions—i.e., the principle of full internationalization under complete United Nations control. This resolution immediately attracted the votes of the Catholic countries, (strongly urged by the Vatican), of the Arab States (except Jordan), and of the Soviet bloc. With minor modifications, it was adopted by 39 votes to 14, with 5 abstentions. The United States, United Kingdom and other states opposed the resolution on the grounds that it was unrealistic as it could not be implemented by the United Nations against the wishes of Israel and Jordan without the use of substantial forces. The United States delegation also pointed out that to set up a new City-State in Palestine would cost the United Nations large sums of money even on the assumption of willing cooperation by Israel and Jordan.

The United States delegation, while making clear its support of an international regime for Jerusalem, voted against the Australian resolution for reasons above stated and continued to support the proposal of the Palestine Conciliation Commission which in its view represented a sound basis for a solution, giving substantial recognition

to the legitimate desires of Israel and Jordan and of the international community. We also emphasized that, although we would consider carefully any proposed amendments to the Palestine Conciliation Commission plan, we could not see our way clear to change our position except in favor of one which represented general agreement.

It seems certain that the Arab States supported the Australian resolution out of a desire to oppose Israel and that the Soviet group did so largely in order to block the extension to Arab Palestine of the control of King Abdullah of Jordan, regarded by the Russians as a tool of Great Britain, and to curry favor with the other Arab States. The Vatican, which has important religious interests in Jerusalem, doubtless realized that the Australian resolution could not be implemented, but probably supported it in order to achieve a better bargaining position in respect of Jerusalem.

The General Assembly resolution of December 9, 1949 reaffirmed the principle of the 1947 resolution that Jerusalem should be established as a *corpus separatum* under a special international regime administered by the United Nations. The Trusteeship Council was directed at its next meeting to complete the preparation of the draft Statute for the City, which it had drawn up in compliance with the 1947 resolution, to approve the Statute, and to proceed immediately with its implementation without permitting any actions taken by any Government to divert it from this task.

Israel has reacted to the General Assembly resolution of December 9, 1949 by taking the following action in the direction of moving the Israeli capital to Jerusalem, while refraining from a formal proclamation to that effect:

1. A statement by the Prime Minister that Jerusalem always had been and always would be the capital of Israel;
2. A statement by the Prime Minister that the movement of the Government to Jerusalem was under way, and would be accelerated;
3. Decisions to move the Parliament and the Office of the Prime Minister to Jerusalem.

Jordan has made strong official statements opposing the December 9 resolution.

The United Nations Trusteeship Council has already begun to consider the task of carrying out the General Assembly resolution and will continue its work in Geneva on January 19, 1950. The United States representative, Ambassador Francis B. Sayre, has been instructed that although we opposed the resolution in the General Assembly, we believe that the Trusteeship Council should make a bona fide effort to comply with its instructions from the General Assembly, but that the United States should avoid for the present taking a position of leadership.

In connection with the Israeli action in respect of moving the Government to Jerusalem, the French and Belgian delegations have introduced a resolution expressing concern and stating that such action is likely to render more difficult the implementation of the Statute. Ambassador Sayre has been instructed to abstain unless the resolution is revised to delete the reference to "implementation" of the Statute.

Conclusions

1. Our underlying objective is to achieve a solution of the Jerusalem problem which will meet with a considerable degree of concurrence by the world community and be acceptable to the two nations which are most directly involved.

2. We do not believe that this objective can be achieved under the terms of the General Assembly resolution because neither Israel nor Jordan will ever willingly agree to the establishment of Jerusalem as a *corpus separatum* divorced from their respective control.

3. However, as a member of the Trusteeship Council the United States should not give the impression that it is obstructing the Council's work in carrying forward a General Assembly resolution adopted by a majority of the United Nations, and we should be willing to make a bona fide effort in the first phase of the Trusteeship Council's work, namely, the drafting of a statute for Jerusalem. But the United States should not support action in the Trusteeship Council looking toward the imposed implementation of the Statute for Jerusalem against the wishes of the parties.

4. When the statute is completed there will then be an opportunity available to the Trusteeship Council, in light of the comments of the interested parties, to consider whether it should take steps to implement the statute. If at that stage the Governments of Israel and Jordan express strong opposition to the Statute as drafted, the United States should make it clear that on the basis of these reactions it would be impractical to attempt to enforce such a solution on the parties, and that to impose on unwilling parties a recommendation of the General Assembly would not contribute to a viable solution of the problem.

5. To assist affirmatively in the settlement of the problem, the United States should privately encourage informal conversations between Israel and Jordan and the Vatican, but the United States should not take any part in such conversations. We might suggest that a single individual, such as Dr. Ralph Bunche, but not a representative of the United States, conduct quiet consultations with the parties and with the Vatican with a view to exploring the possibilities of an agreed solution.

The Trusteeship Council has asked its President (Garreau of France) to prepare a first draft of a new statute for consideration by the Council on January 19; he will be assisted in this task by Dr. Ralph Bunche.

6. It may be necessary in accordance with United Nations procedures for the General Assembly to consider the Jerusalem question at a special session in the spring of 1950 either as a consequence of the Trusteeship Council's inability to proceed with implementation of the statute or of agreement arrived at between the parties.

7. We continue to believe, as we did as a member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, that a reasonable solution should contain certain underlying principles, such as protection of and free access to the Holy Places under appropriate United Nations auspices, progressive demilitarization of the Jerusalem area, administration by Israel and Jordan of their respective parts of the City, and the maintenance of human rights and freedoms. However, it is our view that any solution agreed upon by the Christian world and by Israel and Jordan could be supported by us.[1]

DEAN ACHESON

[1] Mr. Rusk sent a copy of this memorandum to Senator Austin in New York with a letter of December 21. The letter noted that "The President indicated his approval of what we had done and were doing on this matter, but since he had not had an opportunity to study the memorandum carefully, we do not believe that we should conclude that he intended his approval as a specific instruction to you." Mr. Rusk stated he was sure that the memorandum "will be the basis for more specific instructions as they become necessary." (501.BB Palestine/12–2149)

501.BB Palestine/12–1749 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 20, 1949—1 p. m.

768. Pls convey fol to FonOff immed. US Govt has noted PriMin Ben Gurion's statement concerning Jerusalem in Knesset on Dec 13 and subsequent reports of removal of PriMin's office to Jerusalem.

As a friendly govt which has followed with interest and sympathy course of Israel's development, US Govt desires to inform Israeli Govt that it considers particularly unfortunate any step or course of action on part of Israel likely to prejudice or complicate settlement of Jerusalem question, especially at moment when problem of Jerusalem is being studied by Trusteeship Council in accordance with terms of Res of UNGA of Dec 9, 1949.

ACHESON

[1] This telegram was repeated to Jerusalem and New York.

867N.01/12–2249 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

SECRET LONDON, December 22, 1949—6 p. m.

5079. Embtel 5062 December 20.[1] Furlonge, Eastern Department FonOff, said today that UK study of extension UK–Jordan treaty to Arab Palestine was occasioned by recent Israeli inquiry whether treaty would automatically apply to any territory which Jordan might gain as result peace negotiations. Israelis intimated they would be less happy about reaching agreement if treaty were extended such territory.

Last evening FonOff instructed British Minister Tel Aviv to inform Israeli Government that question extension to any area acquired by Jordan is matter which concerns only UK and Jordan. He was instructed add, however, that UK has no intention establishing any bases in territory so acquired in time of peace, but that what UK might do in case of war or threat of war was another question which UK could not express its intention at present time.

British Minister Amman was instructed inform Jordan Government of foregoing message, but to add for Jordan's own confidential information that it is firm intention of UK to apply treaty to any areas acquired by Jordan as soon as they have been incorporated within their state.

Asked if foregoing applied to any corridor which Jordan might acquire, Furlonge replied affirmatively.

When we recalled that he had told us December 19 that FonOff studying certain points on which it contemplated Jordan might ask its advice, Furlonge replied treaty was principal item. He reiterated it is desire UK to maintain hands off attitude toward Jordan-Israeli talks. However FonOff has also given Kirkbride some comments "mostly of technical nature" on question of corridor for his guidance in case he is asked by Jordan. Asked if establishment of corridor would pose any particular problems for UK, Furlonge replied in negative but stated FonOff did not think corridors were ever completely satisfactory arrangements.

Sent Department 5079; repeated Tel Aviv 84, Baghdad 118, Cairo 159, Jidda 66, Beirut 46, Damascus 77.

HOLMES

[1] Not printed.

501.BB Palestine(E)/12–2349

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 23, 1949.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Department of State is preparing for presentation to the next session of Congress proposed legislation for United States participation in the United Nations program for relief, work relief and economic development among the Palestinian refugees in the Near East. This program will follow recommendations made by the Economic Survey Mission under the United Nations in its first interim report to the Palestine Conciliation Commission. On the basis of this report the General Assembly of the United Nations unanimously adopted a resolution on December 8, 1949 which provides for the implementation of the recommendations of the Mission. For your ready reference we enclose a copy of the interim report and of the General Assembly resolution.

The cost of the proposed program is $54,900,000 for an 18 months' period ending June 30, 1951 and, in view of attendant circumstances, the Department considers that a reasonable share of the total cost to be borne by the United States is 50 per cent. Therefore the Congress will be requested to appropriate $27,500,000 for contribution to the program, and for expenses incident to United States participation. The object of the program is the restoration of economic conditions conducive to the maintenance of peace and stability in the Near East area affected by the recent hostilities in Palestine. The Department is convinced that the course of action proposed by the Economic Survey Mission and approved by the General Assembly is necessary to achieve this end and that this course is prudent and wise. Strategic considerations underlying United States policy in the area were raised in a letter from Secretary Forrestal to the Department dated September 23, 1948 in which he transmitted a memorandum on the subject from the Joint Chiefs of Staff,[1] and you referred again to this subject in a letter to me dated June 14, 1949 in which you emphasized the importance, to our long range interests, of solving the problem of the refugees and of other major differences between Israel and its neighboring Arab States.

Recent discussions have been held in an interagency group regarding the proposals of the Economic Survey Mission and the General Assembly resolution, and the Department of Defense has been represented at these discussions by Captain R. F. Pryce, U.S.N., who is therefore familiar with most recent developments.

[1] Regarding these papers, see telegram Telmar 19, September 28, 1948, to Paris, *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1427.

The program must be ready for presentation to Congress early in January, and if a complete case is to be presented, it will be necessary for the Department of Defense to testify as to the strategic importance of maintaining stability in the areas affected. I hope that the Department of Defense will participate in the presentation.

Sincerely yours, DEAN ACHESON

883.00/12–2349 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

SECRET CAIRO, December 23, 1949—3 p. m.

1166. The King's principal advisers after much recent discussion among themselves have decided to propose next week to the King that Egypt propose a definite boundary solution for peace with Israel. They have decided also to propose that this step be taken in the near future without waiting for the results of the election.[1]

Repeat to McGhee. CAFFERY

[1] This telegram was made a subject of a circular telegram sent December 27, 2 a. m., to London, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Amman, and New York. (800.00 Summaries/12–2749) Ambassador McDonald, in reply on December 31, 11 p. m., stated that "It would be helpful here if Caffery could elaborate Cairo's attitude. I am sure Israel would welcome Egypt if approached directly or through US Government or otherwise. Sharett told me December 31 Israel had responded favorably to recent information Egyptian suggestions in MAC that those exchanges be broadened to include political issues. To date no Egyptian reply to Israel's willingness broaden MAC." (telegram 924, from Tel Aviv, 867N.01/12–3149)

767N.901/12–2749 : Telegram

The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State

SECRET AMMAN, December 27, 1949—10 a. m.

431. I saw Samir Pasha Sunday morning, received following re meeting between him and Shiloah and Sassoon last Friday: Outset Samir asked Israelis what formula they devised satisfy Jordan's claim access Mediterranean. Shiloah said after much consideration Israeli Government had decided could not give up [apparent garble] but would give Jordan sea front of about 3 km. just north Israel–Egypt line and possibly 3 additional km. if present no-man's land on front divided between Israelis and Egyptians. Israelis would allow Jordan full sovereignty over corridor Hebron to this coast point width to be 50 to 100 meters. However, should Jordan later obtain Gaza strip

from Egypt (Israel would support Jordan's claim) Jordan must return coastal area obtained from Israel. Shiloah admitted this point access sea consisted rough country covered with sand dunes and would be little if any economic value though satisfying Jordan's political ambitions.

To this proposal Samir replied Jordan access to sea was of importance purely from economic standpoint and Israeli offer therefore worthless. Also he could not think of corridor in terms of meters. Jordan must obtain substantial amount territory to justify peace settlement with Israelis to Arab world. Added he saw no point continuing negotiations unless Israel recognized validity these arguments. Finally he put Israelis on defensive by implying they had divulged to press such content recent talks which he thought were highly secret.

At this point King Abdullah injected conciliatory note and, Samir thinks, would likely have gone far accept Israeli proposal but for ill-considered remark by Sassoon that even if Israel made peace with Jordan they would have maintain large military forces view potential threat other Arab states. He added Israel could make substantial concessions Jordan only as part general settlement with all Arab states. Hearing this King became indignant expressing surprise that so little importance should be attached to agreement with Jordan.

Upshot of meeting was decision negotiations should continue though Samir expressed belief time had come inform Jordan Government progress talks and let Prime Minister decide if adequate basis existed for initiation formal discussions or whether matter should be dropped. Tentatively agreed after King returns from Baghdad and Samir from Tehran (proceeding Tehran tomorrow extend invitation to Shah visit Amman) Samir should discuss situation with Ben-Gurion in Jerusalem.

Comment: Samir anxious force issue access to sea and it seems clear Israelis must go much farther than they have accommodate Jordan if Samir will agree continue talks. He seemed tired and discouraged and somewhat indifferent outcome discussions. His meeting with Ben-Gurion should decide whether formal negotiations are begun or whether discussions are discontinued.

Following conversation with Samir I received substantially same account latest Jordan–Israel meeting from British Minister Kirkbride who has generally refrained from expressing his view re what Jordan should get out of peace settlement.

Sent Department 431; Department pass London 117, USUN 29, Tel Aviv 68, Jerusalem 150, Cairo 55; pouched Arab capitals.

FRITZLAN

767N.901/12–2749 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL JERUSALEM, December 27, 1949—4 p. m.

703. After stating he is following Israel–Jordan discussions closely, Colonel Dayan on twenty-fifth commented:

(1) Although agreement in principle obtained on all points raised, negotiations now reached impasse. King ready conclude peace on basis present position two parties but not able find Prime Minister willing sign agreement. Difficulty not any specific issue but fundamental question of willingness conclude treaty with Jews. No Jordanian leader except King willing incur public odium involved such action.

(2) If present opportunity to conclude agreement missed, considerable period may elapse before chance arises again. Current unstable situation Syria likely revive greater Syria and Fertile Crescent plans and cause King postpone any action re Israel. King's sudden visit Baghdad indicates his preoccupation Syrian problem. Syrian internal troubles may spread to other Arab states leading to wide area and long period turmoil. Israel–Jordan agreement now would contribute to stability whole area. Also negotiations will prove more difficult after election new Jordan parliament with large percentage Palestinians.

(3) Inquired (Dayan spoke entirely personally and informally) whether US prepared urge both sides conclude peace. I replied basic US objective is area peace and stability and US thinks direct negotitions best approach to settlement but not willing specify conditions to either party. Dayan stated was not suggesting US supporting specific terms but fundamental question concluding peace with Israel. I inquired whether he thought conclusion peace would cause internal difficulties in Jordan. He reiterated peace will produce stability not contrary.

(4) I stressed importance to Israel of peace with Arab state and asked if Israel not able advance proposals more favorable to Jordan and strengthen King's position. Dayan claimed Israel now made maximum possible concessions; gone much further than first anticipated; terms especially Jordan sovereignty over corridor certain to shape country.

(5) Made following incidental statements: Samir Pasha Rifai expected become next Jordan Prime Minister. Corridor to Mediterranean Sea as envisaged by Israel limited to road and narrow stretch on either side. Israel considered corridor exchange for Jewish quarter old city. If Jordan preferred territory other than corridor and willing accept free zone in Haifa, Israel prepared negotiate this basis. Because pressure orthodox opinion Israel must have Jewish quarter old city

and corridor linking it to Jewish sections appears only possible arrangement.

Sent Department 703, repeated Tel Aviv 140, Baghdad 76, Beirut 36, Damascus 97, Jidda 19, London 71; Department pass Amman 80, Cairo 53.

BURDETT

867N.01/12–2949 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET TEL AVIV, December 29, 1949—1 p. m.

918. At my request, Shiloah was at residence an hour December 28. Ford and Herlitz present.

Shiloah said last Israel–Jordan meeting December 23 had been "sticky" because Samir had reverted to "completely unacceptable demands for cession Negev or of corridor so wide as to divide Israel."

Shiloah guesses Samir's earlier lesser demands may have been maneuver with intention finally demand Negev. If this be explanation, Shiloah "favors suspending negotiations." He asked [*suggested?*] that Jordan's stiffening might be result Samir's desire wait on developments in Syria.

Again Shiloah discerned "no UK adverse" influence in talks unless perhaps before beginning of series talks UK had insisted on "secure land bridge from sea to Persian Gulf."

Re Syria, Shiloah reiterated with great emphasis his conviction Abdullah and Iraq are studying union moves which would "upset whole Middle East precarious balance. Egypt and Saudi Arabia would react strongly and Israel could not be expected remain quiescent." In answer my question whether Israel's objections would be less if union were won "peacefully and through will of peoples," Shiloah replied, "there is no possibility Syrian-Iraqi and Jordan peoples would be allowed express selves on union. In any case, Israel would regard union as dangerous to Israel's security and as challege to Middle East peace."

Comment: Ford and I agree that in above Shiloah is expressing firm views of his government based on sincere concern lest union jeopardize Israel's hopes move gradually towards peace through bilateral negotiations. *End comment.*

Sent Department 918, repeated Baghdad 62, Beirut 92, Damascus 67, Jerusalem 109, Jidda 42, London 156; Department pass Amman 73, Cairo 84.

MCDONALD

867N.01/12–2949 : Telegram

The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State

SECRET AMMAN, December 29, 1949—1 p. m.

434. Following are Legation's comments Jerusalem telegram 703 December 27 to Department:

1. King Abdullah's role re Jordan Israel talks has shown him extremely conciliatory, but firm in belief Jordan must obtain substantial territorial concessions before he could justify agreement his people and Arab world. Has been especially insistent over access sea. Legation's information does not indicate King willing sign agreement basis present position two parties. However desirous he was reach agreement before last meeting December 23, Sassoon's blunder (Legtel 431 December 27) seems have stiffened his attitude. Undoubtedly Samir more exacting in attitude than King and Prime Minister even more than Samir. However, case of Samir, and probably Prime Minister as well, there is little difficulty re principle concluding peace with Israelis but rather over specific content of any peace settlement and there is no reason believe Samir has modified position outlined recent Legtels. King, of course, is well aware reluctance Samir and Prime Minister conclude treaty except on favorable terms and will be guided by this knowledge.

2. Legation agrees Dayan recent events Syria serving divert King's attention to some extent from settlement with Israel and if present opportunity conclude peace not grasped chance may not soon recur. Also negotiations would undoubtedly prove more difficult after Jordan Parliament elections.

3. For some time Samir Pasha has been only serious contender for Prime Minister job and it is widely held he will be offered post before long. This possibility would be much greater if he instrumental obtaining satisfactory agreement with Israel. However, privately Samir has intimated preference retain his comfortable post as Minister of Court which gives him strong position with King and enables him engage in and keep *au courant* of Palace intrigue, rather than assume heavy responsibilities Prime Ministership.

Sent Department 434, pouched Arab capitals. Department pass London 119, Jerusalem 151, USUN 30, Tel Aviv 69.

FRITZLAN

501.BB Palestine/12–2949 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, December 29, 1949—7 p. m.

5149. At Wright's request, Evans, head NE Secretariat Foreign Office, today gave us following information re UK contribution to NERWA. Figures mentioned have been approved by Chancellor Exchequer.

1. UK prepared contribute 2,250,000 pounds, of which 1,000,000 pounds would be comprised of UK loan to Jordan.

2. Remaining 1,250,000 pounds would be subject following conditions: (*a*) up to maximum of 1,250,000 pounds, UK would match one-quarter of total contributions of other governments than US. (In other words, governments other than US would have contribute 5,000,000 pounds for UK to make maximum contribution.) (*b*) 750,000 pounds would be earmarked for expenditure on projects which will provide for resettlement.

3. Foreign Office hopes condition (*a*) will spur other governments to make maximum contributions.

4. Foreign Office feels condition (*b*) will strengthen hand of NERWA so that funds will not be wasted on hopeless areas such as Gaza.

5. Evans stated foregoing, when figured on percentage basis, compares favorably with UK contribution to UNRPR.

6. Bevin will take opportunity at Colombo conference to urge other dominion governments to make maximum possible contributions to NERWA.

We recalled that while in Wright conversations Washington, it had been recognized that either government authorized discuss specific figures, nevertheless proportions of 50 percent US, 25 percent UK and 15 percent France had been mentioned. Evans confirmed this but said he would also recall that at same time Wright had mentioned Chancellor had authorized only 500,000 pounds as UK contribution. Present figure represents increase of 750,000 over that figure and while UK wishes it could be more, he agreed that was not possible.

HOLMES

Editorial Note

The White House, on December 30, released a statement by President Truman concerning the completion by Gordon R. Clapp of his

task as Chairman of the Economic Survey Mission to the Middle East. At one point the President stated: "In accord with my previously expressed intention to give careful consideration to such assistance as we might appropriately render in carrying out the recommendations of the survey mission, legislation is now in preparation for presentation to the Congress requesting authorization for this government to assume its share in the cost of the program proposed by the United Nations for the Near East."

The full text of the President's statement is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, January 9, 1950, page 55.

867N.01/12–3049 : Telegram

President Truman to King Abdullah Ibn el Hussein of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 30, 1949—6 p. m.

YOUR MAJESTY: I have received the letter[2] which Your Majesty was good enough to send me through His Excellency Fawzi Pasha el Mulki. I very much appreciate this expression of Your Majesty's views on a problem with which the United States Government has so long been concerned.

Your Majesty may be sure that this Government will continue to give the closest attention to the Palestine question, in the constant hope that an equitable settlement may be achieved.

It is my belief that the cause of peace in the Near East would be greatly furthered if the states most directly concerned in the Palestine dispute should find it possible to agree among themselves upon the basic elements for a just settlement.

I send to Your Majesty the warm expression of my personal esteem and my best and most cordial wishes for the continued prosperity of Your Majesty and of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan in the forthcoming year.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

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[1] Sent to Amman in telegram 216, which instructed that the message be transmitted to the King. The message was drafted in the Department of State and sent to Presisdent Truman by Secretary Acheson, with his memorandum of December 29. The memorandum stated, in part, that "I believe that it is desirable to avoid any commitment in replying to King Abdullah, but that in the interests of a Palestine settlement it would be helpful to give indirect encouragement to the King to continue the secret talks now going on between Jordan and Israel. The attached reply has been drafted with these points in mind." President Truman, in a marginal notation on December 30, approved the proposed reply (867N.01/12–3049).

[2] Dated November 5; see editorial note, p. 1470.

867N.01/12–3149 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY TEL AVIV, December 31, 1949—1 p. m.

922. At his request Foreign Minister talked to me his office 45 minutes December 30 with Eytan and Shiloah present.

Summarizing his recent conversations with Secretary Acheson,[1] Sharett said he wished give Department formal statement on Jordan–Israel talks as follows:

Despite promising beginning of earlier talks impasse reached December 23 over "width of corridor." Israel prepared grant under Jordan jurisdiction or possible sovereignty width sufficient for auto and railroads but will not cede width of 40 to 50 kilometers[2] because such demand suggests purpose different from securing free access to sea. Wider corridor could be used for "intensive settlement and as possible base for military operations." Israel "went as far as it dares politically and perhaps farther than is safe strategically in offering Jordan jurisdiction or sovereignty over narrower corridor."

Sharett expressed hope that King would revert to earlier conciliatory attitude and that USG would find it possible to indicate to King its hope that "prospects of agreement not be ruined by demand beyond guaranteed freedom of access, and that meantime adventures in Syria not be permitted to inflame ME."

Comment: Sharett obviously desires conclude peace Jordan but I am sure cabinet dare not yield on wider corridor. *End comment.*

Sent Department 922, repeated Baghdad 63, Beirut 93, Damascus 68, Jerusalem 110, Jidda 43, London 157, Department pass Amman 74, Cairo 85.

MCDONALD

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[1] See memorandum of December 7 by Secretary Acheson, p. 1524.

[2] At 10 p. m. on December 31, Tel Aviv telegraphed a correction of its telegram 922, as follows: "Jordan in December 23 talks with Israel did insist corridor be 'kilometers wide' but did not specify number of kilometers. Sharett my house December 31 said 'Jordan might have meant 10 or 15 kilometers but did not name figure'." (telegram 923, 867N.01/12–3149)