INDIA

DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA CONCERNING INDIA'S ATTITUDES TOWARD THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, AND INDIAN REQUESTS FOR FINANCIAL AND MILITARY AID

711.45/1-2648

The Chargé in India (Donovan) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

New Delhi, January 26, 1948.

No. 71

Subject: India's Reaction to Financial Aid to Pakistan

Sir: I have the honor to refer to secret despatch no. 21, from the American Embassy at Karachi, dated January 13, 1948, suggesting that consideration be given to providing some financial aid to Pakistan in connection with negotiations with that country of a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation.

The difficulty of proceeding with negotiations except on such a basis is fully appreciated. The situation is somewhat similar here, except that the Government of India has not asked for a loan. India, as in the case of Pakistan, is not in a position at this time to avail itself of many of the mutual benefits to be derived from a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation with the United States and has shown no eagerness to begin discussions of such a treaty.

It is hardly necessary to point out, however, that any financial aid given by the United States to Pakistan so long as relations between India and Pakistan continue to be strained, would be regarded by India as an unfriendly act. It not only would prejudice the prospects of negotiating a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation with India, but also would have an adverse effect on all aspects of United States relations with India and possibly even more far reaching international repercussions. In this connection, attention is called to the recent dispute between India and Pakistan over the cash balances of the former undivided Government of India. India feared that if it paid to Pakistan the remaining share of the balances due to the latter under their financial agreement, the money would be used to support the raiders in Kashmir against India. Hyderabad's recent loan to

\[2\text{ Not printed.}\]
Pakistan was regarded somewhat in the light of an alliance against
India (Embassy's reports nos. 276 of January 2, 1948, 4 of January 9,
1948, and 10 of January 16, 1948; despatch no. 32 of January 9, 1948;
and telegrams nos. 39 and 41 of January 13, 1948 ①).

Financial aid to Pakistan might be viewed differently if India were
informally approached in advance and the aid were extended in such
a way that it could be directed only toward economic ends. However,
in such circumstances, India might demand similar aid.

Respectfully yours,

HOWARD DONOVAN

① Reports, despatch, and telegrams not printed.

845.24/3-1148

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, March 11, 1948.

Subject: Suspension of Export of Arms, Ammunition, and Other
Military Material to India and Pakistan

The Department has recently been approached by representatives of
India and Pakistan with a view to the purchase and export to these
countries of military material requiring export licensing. It is expected
that India and Pakistan will make further requests of this nature in
the future.

Careful consideration has been given by the appropriate officials of
the Department to the advisability of allowing military materials to be
shipped to India and Pakistan at this time, and the tentative conclusion
has been reached that in view of the tense situation prevailing in
the Indian subcontinent as a result of disputes over Kashmir and other
issues, which each party has declared to constitute threats to interna-
tional peace, licenses should not be issued for the export of military
material to either India or Pakistan until the situation becomes more
clarified. The Department further believes that a comparable policy
should be adopted with regard to the transfer, retransfer, and sales of
military items under the control of the Office of the Foreign Liquida-
tion Commissioner insofar as India and Pakistan are concerned, unless
evidence is produced to show that such materials are intended for
civilian or commercial use in India and Pakistan. It is not proposed to
establish a formal embargo with the publicity which such action would
entail.

The foregoing policy is consistent with the attitude taken by this
Government in the deliberations on the India-Pakistan question in
the Security Council of the United Nations, in that United States
representative has emphasized that the disputes between the parties
should be settled by pacific means.
The Secretary of Defense has concurred in this recommendation. It would be appreciated if you would indicate whether you agree with the foregoing policy. 

G. C. MARSHALL

1 A marginal notation on this memorandum reads: "Approved, Harry S Truman, March 12, 1948".

$43.00/3–1848: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Grady) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

NEW DELHI, March 18, 1948—4 p. m.

221. Chinese Ambassador here has had repeated to him a wire sent several days ago by Chinese Ambassador in Moscow to Nanking. He regarded it of such importance that he requested permission of Nanking to communicate to me its contents. Nanking left matter to his discretion and he has just given me what I quote in following paragraph. Source of information of Chinese Ambassador in Moscow is Indian Ambassador with whom he seems to have frequent confidential conferences. In giving me this information Chinese Ambassador here felt deeply concerned lest either Chinese or Indian Ambassador in Moscow should know that he had passed this along for information of US.

"1. Molotov 1 has expressed to Mme. Pandit 2 on several occasions that world is divided into two great camps, the democratic and the imperialistic and it is now up to India to decide which side she is going to take. Soviet Russia has been 'disappointed by the indecision of the Indian attitude'. She reports that now the Soviet press has begun to attack India.

"2. After his arrival in Delhi Soviet Ambassador did not make serious attempts to get in contact with responsible leaders of government, but directed clandestinely secret movements of Indian Communists. This aroused great indignation among the people of Congress. Some of the Congress leaders even suggested that Pandit should be recalled.

"3. There are regular meetings of the British Ambassador in Moscow with representatives there of Dominions. Recently at a meeting British Ambassador told Dominions representatives that relations between Soviet Russia and countries of western Europe have become more and more seriously strained. He hoped that Dominions would make up their minds as to their policy toward Russia at the earliest possible time and make their attitude clear to him."

Chinese Ambassador stated that he had also learned from same source that Molotov had urged Pandit to request GOT to exchange

1 Vyacheslav Mikhallovich Molotov, Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
2 Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Indian Ambassador in the Soviet Union.
diplomatic representation with Yugoslavia, Poland and other countries of eastern Europe. She replied that her government lacked personnel to do this.

All of information contained in above throws new light on Nehru’s recent foreign policy speech. It would seem that he may have been answering Russia through the medium of general policy statement. It is to be noted that he said India was not afraid of military might of any great power and the Assembly cheered him. He also stated that India did not intend to increase her representation abroad.

Am endeavoring to get information here to substantiate what has been said regarding activities of Soviet Ambassador to India and shall report promptly any information I can obtain.

Sent Department as 221, repeated Moscow as 2.

Department please repeat London as 56.

GRADY

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The reference here is presumably to a speech made on March 8 by Indian Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, before the Constituent Assembly in New Delhi. For text, entitled “India Keeps Out of Power Blocks,” see Dorothy Norman (ed.), Nehru, The First Sixty Years, vol. ii, pp. 380-386.

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845.00/3-2048: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Grady) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, March 20, 1948—noon.

225. Re Embdesp 237 March 6. At his request I saw last evening H. V. R. Iengar, Acting Secretary General External Affairs in Bajpai’s absence. Prime Minister wished him to discuss with me recent statement on foreign policy which Prime Minister made in Assembly. Prime Minister wanted to be sure US did not misunderstand what he was endeavoring to convey. The speech he said was primarily for home consumption and to say certain things to Russia which he felt should be said. He said that it was unthinkable that India should be on Russia’s side in event of conflict between Russia and US. American principles of democracy and those of India were identical. He wishes to maintain officially for his government a neutral position. I said that I did not see any objection to this policy but found it hard to understand the Prime Minister’s frequent reference to imperialism and that I had heard from reliable sources that Prime Minister had been critical of our government and of America. Iengar said that as one who had been intimately associated with the Prime Minister for long time he found it hard to believe this as Prime Minister never criticized America to him. Iengar stated that Prime Minister had been dis-

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^2 Not printed.
appointed in our attitude on Kashmir at UN but that there was no question about his fundamental friendliness to US. He stated further that Prime Minister is concerned about spread of Communism in India and said very confidentially measures are being taken to eliminate Communists from government.

He also stated that their military intelligence which was completely disorganized and in effect nonexistent last August is now being well organized and is giving careful attention to northern border. He stated further that resolution introduced in SC by Dr. Tsiang had been considered by Prime Minister and his advisers several days ago and met with their approval.

I learned from reliable source that Patel is not expected to recover. He has had two heart attacks and has cirrhosis of liver.

Sent Department as 225, repeated Karachi as 73. Department please repeat London and Moscow if considered desirable.

GRADY

For documentation on U.S. involvement in the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, brought before the U.N. Security Council in January 1948, see pp. 265 ff.


Vallabhbhai Patel, Indian Minister of States, Home Affairs, Information and Broadcasting.

845.60/3-2048: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

Moscow, March 20, 1948—1 p.m.

512. Can confirm information given by Chinese Ambassador New Delhi to Ambassador Grady on statements of Mrs. Pandit. She has had similar confidential conversations with me and, I believe, with heads practically all missions in Moscow except Soviet satellites.

She is obviously much concerned at Molotov's change in attitude, but there is no real reason why she should be as both British Ambassador and myself had warned her honeymoon period for her would last few months and thereafter she would have to take bitter with sweet, with emphasis on former.

She asked my advice as to whether, in event public opinion in India further aroused, it would be good move for India to discontinue present relations with USSR, and said public opinion in India so aroused it would probably be difficult to send another chief of mission when she left. I told her I thought it would be tactical disadvantage, as India
so close to USSR it should be decided advantage to maintain adequate listening post Moscow.

She emphasized her brother had been deeply affronted by actions and attitude Soviet Ambassador New Delhi. She herself now restricts her attendance at Soviet official functions to about fifteen minutes.

She informed me Nehru and most Indian leaders had long since made up their minds natural alignment was with west, but that Nehru felt at present in view Indian relative impotence and fact that nation is still in swaddling clothes it would be ridiculous to talk publicly of military participation in event of war. Her belief, which apparently reflects that of brother, is that India’s present role in family of nations should be modest and relatively humble one until nation has solved own internal difficulties.

Repeated to London as 36. Department repeat to New Delhi.

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845.60/3-2348: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Grady) to the Secretary of State.

SECRET

NEW DELHI, March 23, 1948—2 p.m.

235. Again saw Iengar last evening. He said GOI fearful Noel-Baker obstructing and adding to difficulty of arriving at agreement on Tsiang resolution. GOI does not believe he reflects attitude Cripps and Attlee. Iengar says Russians first expressed little interest Kashmir dispute other than that “interest of the people be properly safeguarded.” They are now scolding Indian delegation, evidently to carry out present USSR policy of pressuring India into USSR camp. Because of this policy and its manifestation in Molotov’s talks with Pandit (see Erble 221, March 18) plus attacks on India and Nehru in Russian press (clippings of which have reached GOI) plus now definite indications of Novikov’s activities warn Communists here, Nehru’s eyes have been opened and his attitude toward Russia has definitely stiffened. Iengar having Novikov in today to put him on carpet re some Communists entering India with irregular papers. Also GOI requesting Novikov to withdraw from Calcutta area “trade commissioner” whose activities GOI strongly suspect.

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1 Philip Noel-Baker, British Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs.
2 Sir Stafford Cripps, British Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Clement R. Attlee, British Prime Minister.
3 Kirill Vasilevich Novikov, Soviet Ambassador to India.
Nehru seriously considering accepting verbal invitation I extended him on behalf of President Truman to pay visit to US stopping for three or four days in London en route. He is thinking of going right after Legislative Assembly adjourns on April 9 and spending month. Some of his close advisers are urging him to go though he has not yet decided. The advantages of his going at this time are obvious to Department. Will Department advise me for my guidance whether time suggested would be convenient for President and would it fit into schedule of Blair House. I want to do some tentative planning in event he suddenly makes up his mind. He might decide one day and want to be off the next. Of course if he decides I will request formal invitation from President.

Sent Department as 235; Department please repeat London as 57 and Moscow as 3.

GRADY

711.45/4-248

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of South Asian Affairs (Mathews)

SECRET


Participants:  Sir Girja Shanker Bajpai, Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, GOI
Mr. Henderson ¹
Mr. Hare ²
Mr. Thurston ³
Mr. Mathews

Sir Girja called on Mr. Henderson at 2:30 at the former’s request. [Omitted here is a paragraph concerned with the feasibility of bringing a collection of Indian art to the United States for exhibition.]

Sir Girja next referred to the possibility of a visit to the United States by Prime Minister Nehru. He said that he personally had urged the Prime Minister to come to this country and that, if the President issued an invitation, Nehru would of course accept. As far as time was concerned, Sir Girja felt that such a trip would not be practicable before next June. Mr. Hare said that we had had word from our Embassy in New Delhi to the effect that Nehru might be able to come to

¹ Loy W. Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.
² Raymond A. Hare, Chief of the Division of South Asian Affairs.
³ Ray L. Thurston, Assistant Chief of the Division of South Asian Affairs.
this country this month and after making inquiries of the White
House, had informed Ambassador Grady that it would be convenient
for the President to receive Nehru between April 19 and 24. Sir Girja
expressed surprise at this most recent development and indicated con-
siderable doubt that the Prime Minister would be able to come this
month owing to the pressure of affairs. Mr. Henderson pointed out
that, if it were impracticable for Nehru to come at present, we could
give further thought to working out arrangements for a visit later
this year.

Sir Girja then turned to an exposition of Indian foreign policy
which he stated was the real purpose of his visit to the United States
and his calls at the State Department. He sketched first of all the
present status of India pointing out that the Indian people were now
responsible for their own destiny, that British troops had withdrawn
from Indian territory, and that practically no British civilians re-
mained in Indian Government positions. He commented with respect
to the last point that the situation was quite different in Pakistan. He
said, however, that it had been necessary to retain British officers in
the Indian Army as there simply were not enough trained Indian per-
sonnel available to staff the upper echelons. In short, India is now its
own master.

Having expelled the British, India did not intend to take on any
other master in their stead. Sir Girja felt, however, that there was
some impression in the United States that India was tending to become
a Communist state or at least a "fellow-travelling" state. Mr. Henders-
son commented that that view was not held in U.S. Government
quarters. Although certain actions of individual Indian representa-
tives at international conferences had seemed open to various inter-
pretations, we had been confident all along that the Indian Government
itself was fully aware of the basic issues at stake. He went on to say
that he wished to make it clear that the issue was not between "Ameri-
can imperialism" and Soviet imperialism; that we had no objection to
Russia's establishing close relations with other nations provided that
this were not done by aggression, pressure, and the suppression of
freedom; and that the real issue was the maintenance and strengthen-
ing of democracy in the face of a totalitarian threat.

Sir Girja said that he appreciated the importance of Mr. Hender-
sen's remarks and was gratified that the U.S. Government was aware
of the basic democratic orientation of the Government of India. He
went on to point out that India's position had been more accurately
reflected in the 1947 UNGA than in the 1946 session, citing India's
support of our stand with respect to Korea and other issues. This
brought him to the principal point he desired to make. Should the
world once again become involved in conflict, India could only asso-
ciate itself with those nations holding the same ideals of freedom and democracy. However, his Government is not able to make an open declaration of its position as it could not now withstand the aggression from Russia or the internal difficulties which might ensue.

Mr. Thurston said that some of us had been disturbed by the anti-American tone of portions of the Indian press which had taken the position that the United States wished to assume Britain's relinquished position in India. Sir Girja replied that he was aware of the type of press comment to which Mr. Thurston referred but that he wished to make a clear distinction between the thinking of responsible Government officials and the irresponsible press. He said that the Indian press was inexperienced in the field of foreign affairs and that it was inclined to treat such matters in emotional rather than rational terms. Furthermore, there was a good bit of popular feeling in India, not shared in Government circles, that the United States was aiding the Dutch in Indonesia and the French in Indochina. This feeling was reflected in the press treatment of the United States.

Sir Girja then touched briefly on Indo-Pakistan relations emphasizing that India had no desire to eliminate Pakistan as an independent state or to reincorporate into an Indian union the territories now held by Pakistan. Mr. Henderson interjected that the State Department had been aware that such was the Indian position. Sir Girja went on to say that a political reunion of the two Dominions was most unlikely in the foreseeable future, but that he would hope for an understanding which would permit joint defense of the Indian sub-continent whose critical frontier now lay in Pakistan, and possibly a customs union. He did not feel that Indo-Pakistan relations presented any serious or insuperable problems.

Turning next to the question of India's position in South Asia, Sir Girja said that India had no desire to form or to lead a South Asian bloc. He said in strict confidence that when Thakin Nu* of Burma recently visited India, he brought with him a draft project for a "United Nations of South Asia". This was studied by Nehru and the Foreign Office, and Thakin Nu was informed that India did not consider it desirable to establish such an organization which would detract from the authority of the global United Nations and introduce into world politics a further racial and regional element. India feels that its first task is to develop itself.

Sir Girja concluded his broad sketch of Indian foreign policy with a discussion of India's relationship to the British Commonwealth. He pointed out that the draft constitution left open the question of this relationship, but added that it would clearly not be possible for India to recognize the King as titular head of the state. The exact terms

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* Prime Minister and Minister for National Planning.

429–027—75——33
of the relationship which might be worked out would depend largely on the attitude of the British but the continuance of imperial preference was definitely out of the question. Certain arrangements with respect to defense might be worked out.

Sir Girja then said that there was something of an impression in India that the United States had very little interest in that country and that he would like to know the Department's views in that respect. Mr. Henderson said that he was very grateful that Sir Girja had been so frank in his comments and that he would be equally frank. It was the considered opinion of the United States Government that in the long term close and friendly relations between India and the United States was the anchor of stability of the whole area from Africa to South East Asia. Unfortunately, at the moment the United States found it necessary to concentrate its efforts and resources on resisting aggression in certain other parts of the world. We recognized this could be only a short term policy, but we were faced with the problem of meeting an urgent and critical situation. We had every intention of giving proper and essential attention to India just as soon as circumstances permitted.

Sir Girja said that he fully understood the necessity of the United States concentrating its attention at present on certain critical areas and that he had not come to this country with any mendicant ideas. He had, in point of fact, done everything he could to quash the idea of a Marshall Plan for South Asia which had been advocated by the Indian Ambassador in Washington in despatches to New Delhi. However, in order to give immediate evidence of our real interest in India, Sir Girja urged that we urgently and seriously consider two matters in which his country needed our assistance.

He referred to India's desire to obtain American assistance in carrying out certain hydro-electric developmental projects and said that, although an approach had been made in this connection quite some time ago, no assistance had yet been forthcoming. Mr. Hare said that Ambassador Grady was keenly interested in this problem and that he had pressed it vigorously while in the US on consultation. In view of the Ambassador's wide experience in economic matters, it would be advisable for the GOI to continue to work with our Embassy in New Delhi on this question. Mr. Henderson added that the Department had been endeavoring to accomplish something along these lines but that the demands upon the American engineering profession were simply in excess of the supply. We would, however, continue our efforts to provide some assistance and it might be that the recent Smith–Mundt Act would be helpful.

*The United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948. For text, see 62 Stat. 6.*
Sir Girja then mentioned that Colonel Kaul, former Indian Military Attaché in Washington, had reported that it was the present policy of the United States to withhold exports of military materiel to India. Mr. Thurston asked whether Kaul had pointed out that this policy applied equally to Pakistan, and Sir Girja replied that Kaul had not mentioned that aspect of our policy. Mr. Hare emphasized that, with respect to the B-25’s which Colonel Kaul had requested, the position was that, quite aside from the policy, that type of plane simply was not available, there being none in this country excess to the needs of our air force. Mr. Henderson pointed out that the decision to withhold exports of military materiel had been taken at a time when relations between India and Pakistan were quite tense and there was a possibility of serious trouble between them. He emphasized that it was not a permanent policy, and Mr. Hare added that we hoped that it would be a policy for a matter of months or preferably weeks. Sir Girja urged that the US not persist in this policy, as it was of urgent necessity that India strengthen its defenses. The Indian air force lacked bombers, and there were many other essential military needs which could be met only by imports. He would like very much to send a military mission to this country to explore the possibilities of procuring essential military equipment. Mr. Henderson said that it would be advisable for us to give some preliminary thought to this proposal before taking any definite action. In view of the indications that our own rearmament would be stepped up, it would be necessary to ascertain from our military people what the possibilities would be for sending military equipment abroad.

Sir Girja returned to Mr. Henderson’s office following his interview with the Acting Secretary.* He said that he had mentioned to Mr. Lovett India’s interest in being considered for the seat on the Security Council now held by Syria which the latter is vacating this coming fall. He pointed out that Asia had only two seats on the Security Council, one held by China, a permanent member, and the other having been passed from one Islamic nation to another. He felt that the time had come for India to be the second Asian member and hoped that the United States would be inclined to support India’s candidacy, particularly in view of our backing of India against the Ukraine last fall. Mr. Henderson said that Sir Girja had presented a good argument and that we would give very serious consideration to India’s claim.

Sir Girja indicated some resentment at the fact that Secretary Royall of the Army Department had not received him despite the pre-arranged appointment at 4:15. Secretary Royall had been tied up in an urgent press conference. Mr. Henderson expressed his regret to Sir

*Infra.
Girja and subsequently called Secretary Royall and suggested that he might wish to have some message sent to Sir Girja at the Indian Embassy.

711.45/4-243

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State (Lovett)

SECRET

Participants: Mr. Lovett

Sir Girja Shanker Bajpai, Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, GOI

E. G. Mathews, SOA

Sir Girja called at 5:30 at his request. He said that he had come to the US as a member of the Indian Special Delegation to the SC in the Kashmir case. I asked how the Kashmir situation was developing. Sir Girja replied that in Kashmir itself the Indian military position had improved and with the coming spring, Indian troops, totalling only slightly more than a division, would be able to move more vigorously against a few remaining trouble spots. According to latest Indian military reports, tribal invaders still comprised about 60% of the opposing forces, the remaining 40% being indigenous insurgents.

Turning to the SC aspect of the Kashmir situation, Sir Girja said that the fundamental differences between India and Pakistan related to the introduction of Pakistan troops into Kashmir and the composition of the interim government of the State. India could not accede to Pakistan’s demand that the latter’s troops move into Kashmir territory in order to keep the tribal invaders out. The plebiscite when held would result in a very close vote, and if India won, Pakistan forces might not withdraw and would almost certainly not effectively resist the re-entry of tribal elements. With respect to the interim government, Pakistan was insisting that Abdullah, 1 be removed as Prime Minister and that a coalition government be formed. Sir Girja felt that there was no one to replace Abdullah, and that a coalition of groups whose aims were completely divergent could only result in a paralysis of government and administration in the State.

Sir Girja then said that although he appreciated my interest, he had not intended to trouble me with the Kashmir problem. His real purpose in coming to Washington had been to explain to me and other US officials India’s position vis-à-vis the US and the USSR. He had the impression that there was a feeling in this country that India was

1 Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, Prime Minister of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
somehow "in the Russian camp". He wished to emphasize that this was not the case, as India had not rid itself of the British in order to accept domination from some other quarter. I commented, that although irresponsible newspaper columnists might have speculated on the nature of India's relations with the USSR, I was sure that there was in the US no informed opinion that India had aligned itself with the Russians. Sir Girja expressed his gratification at my statement and pointed out that two fundamental considerations prevented Indian adherence to the Soviet bloc. First, through its association with the British, unhappy as it had been in some aspects, India had acquired the ideals of democracy and individual liberty which were held by the US and other nations of the west. Second, India can expect no effective assistance from the USSR in its primary objective of developing and strengthening itself economically and militarily. In fact, the US is the only country which is in a position to aid India. I told Sir Girja that we were very grateful to receive his assurances of the friendly disposition of his Government.

Sir Girja stated that his remarks were being made with the full knowledge and authorization of Prime Minister Nehru, and that he hoped that the Prime Minister could himself visit the US in the not too distant future in order further to clarify the Indian position. I said that we would be delighted to receive Prime Minister Nehru, adding, however, that Sir Girja had himself very effectively stated his Government's views.

Sir Girja then pointed out that although India was maintaining an army of some 360,000 men and had appropriated 121 crores of rupees ($363,000,000) for defense purposes, it was in no position effectively to resist aggression from the north, and that the GOI could not risk an open declaration of its anti-USSR views. The strengthening of India's military power was of the highest importance, and he would like to send a military mission to the US at an early date to explore the possibilities of obtaining equipment, particularly as the US was about to step up its own armament program. I said that before a mission was sent it would be advisable for us to have some preliminary discussions to clarify India's wants and to examine the possibilities of supplying them from this country. I added that our production theory and practice involved a sacrifice of immediate small output for a "tooled" longer-term mass output, and cited examples from our experience in World War II. I pointed out that if an Indian military mission came to this country, it should be charged with studying American production techniques in order that some of these might be introduced in Indian ordnance factories. Sir Girja assented, but emphasized that the first objective of the mission would be procurement, and after that objective had been achieved, the mission could
turn to the matter of improving Indian techniques. I replied that in view of the importance of repair and maintenance, I would hope that the two matters could be pursued simultaneously. Sir Girja agreed that this would be desirable.

In conclusion, Sir Girja observed that Syria would be leaving the SC next fall and that he hoped India might be considered for this seat. India, the second largest nation in Asia, had not yet been a SC member, and although he appreciated the circumstances which had led the US to support Islamic states for the second Asian place on the SC, China holding the first as a permanent member, he felt that the time might have come when India’s claim could be given serious consideration, particularly in view of our support of India against the Ukraine last fall. I commented that Sir Girja made a strong case for India, and suggested that he discuss this matter with Mr. Henderson. (Sir Girja did subsequently mention India’s desire for a SC seat to Mr. Henderson).

711.45/5-1048

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Joseph S. Sparks of the Division of South Asian Affairs

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 10, 1948.

Participants: Brigadier General D. Chaudhuri, Military Attaché, Embassy of India
Mr. I. S. Chopra, First Secretary, Embassy of India
Mr. Joseph S. Sparks—SOA

Mr. Chopra initiated the discussion by saying that the Embassy of India would very much appreciate receiving informal information as to whether the U.S. Government felt as did the Indian Government that this would be an appropriate time to initiate a review of the general situation in the relations between the two nations with particular emphasis on the exchange of military information and technical training. He said that in the event such indication should prove favorable a formal approach could be made at the Department’s convenience but that in the event that the United States felt this not to be an appropriate time would it be possible for an assurance informally of maximum cooperation within limitations imposed by the situation to be given by the United States.

In discussing the question of India’s interest in the United States Chopra said that following the “unfortunate affair of the airplanes” in January (at which time a request for military planes and equipment was turned down by the Department because of the Kashmir developments) India had gone to the British with their problem. They
had been sympathetically received and certain arrangements had been worked out but the truth of the matter was that the British simply did not possess the facilities for training, information exchange, or equipment supply which the United States has.

Chopra explained that prior to August 15, 1947, and the establishment of separate Dominion status, India had not had any trouble receiving automatically all the information which could be utilized by the military. The British had received this information from the United States through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and it had been automatically passed on to, or available to, the Indian military schools and the Indian Government. Following August 15, however, this source had been completely cut off with the explanation from the British that under their understanding with the United States such information could not be made available by the British to any third country—even a Dominion.

As have various other personal, informal, official representatives of the Indian Government during recent months, Mr. Chopra stated parenthetically that, despite public statements made by Indian Government leaders for domestic consumption, there is no doubt at all as to which side India would take should there be a third world war—the United States could count absolutely on having India at its side in such a conflict.

The specific incident which had caused him to approach the Department on this occasion was explained by Mr. Chopra as being the receipt of a telegram from the Government of India to the effect that Colonel Middleton, American Military Attaché, New Delhi, had asked the Government of India for the following information, all of which is classified as “Top Secret” by India:

1. Mobilization plan of Indian Army

(a) The system and schedule of mobilization of personnel and unit.
(b) The total to be mobilized at the end of the 30 day period, the 60 day period, the 90 day period; the 120 day period and the 180 day period.
(c) A list of divisions and other units to be mobilized in each period.

2. Organization and mobilization of troops of Indian Army reserves.

(a) The number and types of reserve organizations now on active duty.
(b) Planned reserve organizations.
(c) Method of organization.
(d) Method of calling to active duty in the event of emergency.
(e) Number of trained reserves by age groups.
(f) Number of untrained reserves.”
Mr. Sparks was shown a copy of this telegram which concluded with a paragraph to the effect that Colonel Middleton had been informed that the GOI had no objection to making this information available to the U.S. should it be understood that such release would be made upon a reciprocal basis. The telegram was marked for the attention of Brigadier Chaudhuri and instructed him to approach the India Desk on the subject "with tact".

In response to a question as to what Brigadier Chaudhuri's experience so far had been in requesting information which he desired from the U.S. military, Mr. Sparks was informed that (a) few questions had been asked because of the general atmosphere following the January episode involving Colonel Kaul, (b) all questions which had been asked, with the exception of one set referred to the Air Force, had been satisfactorily answered, (c) no questions of the nature of those put by Colonel Middleton had been asked though GOI in view of its problem of reorganizing the armed forces was much interested in them, and (d) it appeared that India would lose at least one and possibly both of the two positions it had enjoyed in the past in the Fort Leavenworth training program, apparently through no fault of India's other than becoming an independent country.

Mr. Chopra reiterated that the GOI had nothing in the way of information which it wished to conceal from the United States with which it desired the closest understanding and cooperation. India was only interested in the exchange of information becoming a two way street.

In subsequent conversation on unrelated matters Mr. Chopra twice referred to a new "era of good feeling and friendly, full, understanding" which he so fervently hopes can now be inaugurated between India and the United States.

Mr. Chopra telephoned later in the afternoon to inform me that the Indian Embassy had just received a second telegram from the Government of India in which it was stated that the American Air Attaché in New Delhi had officially requested the Government of India to supply him with a complete survey of the airfields in India showing their types and classifications with maps, locations, and with detailed analysis of the disposition of facilities and the planned order of battle.
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Joseph S. Sparks of the Division of South Asian Affairs

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 17, 1948.

Participants: Brigadier D. Chaudhuri, Military Attaché
               Mr. I. S. Chopra, First Secretary, Indian Embassy
               Mr. Raymond A. Hare, SOA
               Mr. Joseph S. Sparks, SOA

Mr. Hare opened the conversation by referring to the informal talk of May 10 which Mr. Chopra and Brigadier Chaudhuri had had with Mr. Sparks on the subject of the exchange of military information between India and the United States. He expressed his appreciation and approval of the Embassy’s approach to the Department at least in the preliminary stages of the solving of specific problems at what might be termed the “operating level”. Mr. Hare pointed out that results satisfactory to both nations in the gradual growth and strengthening of bi-lateral relations were often achieved by following the procedure which had been utilized by the Indian Embassy in this case. He then asked Mr. Sparks to report on the results of the conversations which had been held with the Army.

Mr. Sparks explained that following the meeting of May 10 he and Mr. Thurston held exploratory discussions with Army authorities and that they had been very gratified by the warmth of their reception and the extent of the genuine interest of the Army in India. He said that Mr. Thurston and he had explained the Government of India’s reaction to the requests for detailed military information which had been made by the American Military and Air Attachés in New Delhi and that the Army authorities felt this reaction to be highly reasonable and were prepared at any time to give Brigadier Chaudhuri similar information to that which had been requested of the Indian Government. The Army was not only prepared to make such information available but had already given considerable information to Mr. Vesugar, former Chief of the India Supply Mission, concerning the National Guard of the United States. In the future they would make information available only to Brigadier Chaudhuri. Mr. Chopra and Brigadier Chaudhuri agreed that Brigadier Chaudhuri would call upon Colonel Francis Graling, Chief of the Foreign Liaison Branch, in the near future and would subsequently call upon Colonel Graling’s opposite number in the Air Forces, Colonel Louis W. Proper. It was apparent that both Mr. Chopra and Brigadier Chaudhuri were fully satisfied by this portion of the conversation.

Mr. Hare said that he understood that Mr. Chopra had suggested to Mr. Sparks on May 10 the possible initiation of a review of general
Indo-American relations. He asked Mr. Chopra what the nature of the review he had had in mind might be.

Mr. Chopra responded that the Embassy of India was particularly interested in establishing a procedural approach which would be effective for the treatment of individual problems as they arose. In this connection he mentioned specifically Mr. Nehru's experience in talking with Mr. Henderson last week which he quoted Mr. Nehru 1 as describing as "the most satisfactory experience which I have had since arriving in Washington".

Mr. Hare said that in his opinion the Embassy had made an effective type of approach on the current question of the exchange of military information which had been resolved so happily. He said that both he and Mr. Sparks held themselves ready at all times for discussions of any problems which arose. He further explained that the basic endeavors of the U.S. Government in international relations today are to contribute to the creation of world wide conditions in which the Charter of the United Nations can function effectively; and added that it is particularly gratifying that India's basic endeavors are directed along the same lines.

In ensuing general discussion Mr. Hare observed that, because of the multitudinous aspects of our over-all relations, the American Government had not found it practicable in the past to conduct comprehensive over-all discussions of bilateral relations. In addition, he pointed out that, in any event, it would in all probability be undesirable to attempt to establish a formal blueprint of relations inasmuch as such a blueprint would imply detailed implementation, and possible failures of implementation in unpredictable circumstances might result in negation of the original desire to solidify relations. He cited as an example that, as close and friendly as American relations have traditionally been with the Government of Canada, we have never held comprehensive discussions of over-all policy but have dealt with each problem as it arose using as background the broad understanding and communities of interest which existed between the two countries. In this connection Mr. Hare said that in his opinion the same type of broad understanding and communities of interest existed between the people of America and the people of India and their governments, and that this had become apparent in numerous discussions such as those between Mr. Henderson, Mr. Lovett, and Sir Girja Bajpai during Sir Girja's recent visit to the United States.

The conversation terminated with an expression by Mr. Chopra of his appreciation for the frankness which had characterized it and his satisfaction with its results. He indicated that he was in complete

1 R. K. Nehru, Indian Minister in Washington.
agreement with Mr. Hare both as to the impracticability and undesirability of attempting over-all discussions and as to the bonds of broad general objectives and communities of interest between India and the United States.

845.24/7-2948

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Joseph S. Sparks of the Division of South Asian Affairs

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 29, 1948.

Participants: Mr. R. K. Nehru, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, Embassy of India
Brigadier D. Chaudhuri, Military Attaché, Embassy of India
Mr. Elbert G. Mathews, Acting Chief, SOA
Mr. Joseph S. Sparks, SOA

At our request Mr. Nehru and Brigadier Chaudhuri called to receive the Department’s answer to Mr. Chopra’s informal request of June 7 ¹ as to the probable reaction of the United States Government to a formal request from the Government of India to import arms and ammunition from the United States to be utilized exclusively in the Indian military training program.

Mr. Mathews said that he was sorry that so much time had been required to prepare an answer but explained that the Indian request had been given very careful consideration not only in the Department of State but in other interested Departments as well. He said that although we very much regretted the necessity of responding negatively to the Indian approach it had become clear in a close examination of the specific items requested by the Embassy that despite the Government of India’s willingness to provide the United States with an undertaking that the items would be used for training purposes exclusively, the export of live ammunition of any type from the United States to India at this time would result in an immediate and commensurate increase in the Government of India’s military potential. The receipt of more than 12,000,000 rounds of ammunition would release a commensurate amount for combat purposes even if the specific rounds received were not so utilized. Mr. Mathews concluded that such an increased military potential from American sources would be in violation of the current United States policy. He explained, however, that this refusal did not prejudice any future requests which the

¹A memorandum dated June 7, 1948, covering this conversation between Messrs. Chopra, Hare, and Sparks, is filed in the records of the Department of State under 845.24/6-748.
Government of India might wish to make—all of which would be given serious consideration by the Department.

Mr. Nehru and Brigadier Chaudhuri were deeply disappointed by the Department’s decision, and although they did not question the accuracy of including the items which they had requested within the framework of the over-all policy, they did attack this policy and asked whether the time had not come when the policy as a whole could be reconsidered. Mr. Mathews reviewed the history of the development of the policy and explained that it had been adopted reluctantly by the United States only as a result of the unstable situation existing between the Governments of India and Pakistan, the submission of the Kashmir problem to the Security Council, and the actual requests for assistance in military supplies received concomitantly from both Governments last January when the Kashmir developments were at their most serious peak. When Mr. Nehru objected that relations between Pakistan and India might for one cause or another be difficult for some time to come and that what he had always understood to be a temporary policy on the part of the American Government would thus in effect become a long term policy, Mr. Mathews said that he sincerely hoped, and knew that the Government of India hoped, that such would not be the case and that India and Pakistan would be able to find their way to an amicable relationship in the near future. At any rate, he explained, the Department of State could not feel justified at the present time in recommending a reconsideration of the overall policy so long as the situation which caused its original adoption continued substantially unaltered. On two different occasions during the discussion Mr. Nehru repeated his question as to whether “exactly the same policy” applied to Pakistan as to India. He was assured that it did.

S45.002/9–2048: Telegram

The Chargé in India (Donovan) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, September 20, 1948—1 p. m.

863. Bajpai during course of conversation today asked how long the Secretary would be in Paris. I told him Embassy had no definite information that point. Bajpai then said that “since the Prime Minister would not be able to visit the US for some time” the Prime Minister hoped it might be possible to see the Secretary in Paris.

Nehru plans leave Delhi October 5 for London and leave London for Paris October 25.

1 Secretary Marshall was leading the American delegation to the Third Session of the United Nations General Assembly which met in Paris between September 21 and December 12, 1948.
I did not comment on question Nehru visiting US but did say I felt sure Secretary would welcome opportunity meeting Nehru Paris.

Bajpai said no definite appointment could be made this time as many factors might affect Prime Minister’s plans but it was clear from his remarks that Prime Minister is desirous meeting Secretary in Paris.

Embassy strongly recommends possibility this meeting be kept secret as Indian press might then begin speculating upon part such meeting might play in Indo-American relations vis-à-vis Russia.

Embassy requests reply soon as possible.

DONOVAN

845.002/9-2948: Telegram

The Chargé in India (Donovan) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, September 29, 1948—noon.

890, Deptel 584, September 27. Embassy believes meeting Secretary with Nehru in Paris would afford ideal opportunity discuss widespread misconceptions among literate Indians extending even to Cabinet level regarding policy of US toward USSR, India, and Southeast Asia. Unpublicized meeting between Marshall and Nehru would enable former bring his enormous personal prestige to bear without subjecting Nehru to severe criticism in pro-Soviet circles in India.

US is criticized in India for not rendering more financial and technical assistance, yet American businessmen receive no encouragement to invest and any suggestion of American aid or investment is widely criticized as extension American imperialism. While Embassy does not consider this occasion appropriate for raising foregoing question, it is mentioned since Prime Minister might bring up this topic which would give Secretary opportunity comment on alleged “American imperialism”.

Majority position Western powers in UN is widely regarded as US majority completely subject to US control. Cabinet Minister close to Nehru remarked few days ago USSR was justified in demanding veto to protect it from US majority because minority rights must be protected. Attempt could be made convince Nehru majority position based on convictions nations concerned and not result US pressure and that will of majority should not be continuously thwarted by obstructionist minority.

Mrs. Pandit on September 25 in address to UNGA gave excellent description India’s conception its objectives and its international role.

1 Not printed.
India would like remain neutral in struggle between USSR and Western powers, which struggle it regards basically as being between USSR and US, and India is even half convinced it may be able mediate or effect workable compromise between these powers. Secretary may wish make few remarks regarding possible consequences such neutrality.

Soviet propaganda, widely accepted here, proclaims US is endangering peace of world with threat of another terrible war. Opportunity might be utilized emphasize threat comes from USSR, that it extends not only to Western powers, but to India and all Southeast Asia. Communist uprisings Southeast Asia should be mentioned.

However, US policy regarding nationalist movements in Southeast Asian colonial countries is subjected to strong criticism by Indians, who do not understand why, in view our widely proclaimed beliefs in freedom and democracy, we do not lend active support to nationalist movements rather than assisting European powers, namely, French and Dutch, by ERP aid to suppress those movements. Indians are perturbed by Communist uprisings, but believe that basically they stem from suppression and exploitation of masses by European powers and “foreign vested interests”.

Belief is widely held here US favors Pakistan over India because US wishes establish bases in Pakistan in event war with USSR. Pertinent comments this subject might be useful.

Nehru probably will wish discuss India’s most pressing problem, settlement Kashmir dispute. Belief held in some top GOI military quarters here is that India cannot support war in Kashmir for another winter. Question must be settled before normal relations with Pakistan can be established and normal relations are vital to peace this area and fulfillments objectives US policy.

Sent Department 890; Department pass Paris.

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501.6C Kashmir/10-1648: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET URGENT PARIS, October 16, 1948—10 p.m.

Delga 368. For Satterthwaite from Kopper and Parsons. Conversation between Secretary Nehru yesterday lasted over two and half hours. Also present Mme. Pandit, Bajpai.

From outset evident Nehru wished use interview obtain Secretary’s

1 Joseph C. Satterthwaite, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs; Samuel K. C. Kopper, United Nations specialist in the Department of State; and presumably James Graham Parsons, First Secretary of Embassy in India.
views world situation and Soviet motives and objectives. He made no proposals, referred only to those aspects US Indian relations mentioned by Secretary and although he made no general statement on basic position India towards USSR or US, it was clear that Nehru recognizes interaction of Soviet policy and world Communism. Tone of meeting was friendly, even cordial, but on Nehru's side, at times guarded and occasionally defensive. It unquestionably afforded three Indians present most illuminating and comprehensive recital of American thought and action on virtually all major international problems of post-war period.

Nehru appeared accept thesis rehabilitation Western Europe important Asia as well as Europe but made no comment on our stated objective preventing further spread police states. Instead he questioned Secretary rather insistently on why Soviets deliberately alienated US public opinion and what were their real objectives. He himself suggested USSR was suspicious of US and after eliciting analysis of warmongering charge, even asked Secretary what he thought of reported advocacy of preventive war by some Americans. Except for evident interest he gave no sign his reaction Secretary's outline importance of atomic bomb as deterrent Soviet action.

Nehru spoke at some length on subject Communism in India and Southeast Asia. He developed thesis that British need for popular support when they took India into war led them to support Communists in spite of paradox that Communists condemned war until Soviet entry. British support thus aided Communists to become sizeable group for first time. Then temporary community of interest between nationalists and revolutionary Communists (i.e. to rid India of Britain) aided Communist cause but in general elections Indian voters repudiated Communists because they served Moscow, not India. At present Nehru said government experiencing no difficulty in suppressing Communists in India. Seemingly also he was not deeply concerned re Communists in neighboring areas as he glossed over Burma situation lightly and hazarded view that Indonesia Republic would be able to deal with Communist threat adequately in future. There, he said, situation had been aggravated by Dutch stubbornness and referred to reports of support Dutch received from US, a remark which Secretary later referred to saying we were pressing Dutch most insistently to modify their attitude.

Re Communism, Secretary mentioned dangerous situation Latin America with wealthy crust on top and little else but mass of poor. Nehru seemed to catch parallel with India but preferred dwell on social and economic objectives his Government.

During his initial lengthy review world situation which he said was further complicated by difficult local issues, Secretary referred to
Kashmir as one such issue which disturbed US greatly. He expressed hope twice that India and Pakistan would earnestly attempt to settle this matter as quickly as possible. Nehru averted to this later and after saying that regarding Kashmir he had legitimate grievance, launched into rather gratuitous fifteen minute ex parte review case reminiscent his telegram October 4 to Liaquat. He contrasted non-
secular [secular] Democratic Government of India with theocratic reactionary Pakistan illustrating his argument with accounts of mob action against emancipated Moslems as well as threats to march to Delhi. He asserted without qualification that India had accepted UNCIP resolution whereas Pakistan had rejected it. He insisted Indian Government could not have stayed in office week if it had not flown troops Kashmir year ago defend Indian territory. Later on in conversation he reverted to Kashmir case in more moderate vein and said hoped some solution could be worked out.

There was no reference this connection to London or British Commonwealth. We did not gain impression that Nehru contemplating solution by force but he is clearly convinced righteousness Indian position.

Hyderabad mentioned in passing by Nehru along lines Delga 315, October 13. He said significant improvement had occurred consequent upon removal of threat to communal relations. When crisis came both religious factions behaved with restraint and consequently both have regained much confidence each other.

Secretary at one time alluded to charges of American imperialism mentioned New Delhi telegram 890, September 29, and later used Latin America again as parallel to point out how under-developed area needing US capital did not offer favorable conditions because of politicians use of imperialist bogey. Secretary pointed out that government loans much more likely to form basis for charge of imperialism than private. Nehru ascribed charges of imperialism to general impression that as consequence Marshall Plan American dominance in foreign field, already very powerful, constantly growing.

During conversation Secretary alluded several times our support UN. In his reply Nehru struck fairly responsive note despite apparent dissatisfaction with UN action in cases of direct interest to India. However, Nehru said India would support UN though it had weaknesses since it was only hope of world and must be supported. Nehru also said he was in full accord in condemning use of deceit and force but that it was also necessary to be firm but generous. He did recognize that, although another war would be horrible in its consequences, a nation could not sacrifice its interest and principles simply because of

\[\text{Independence,}\]

\[\text{Indianapolis}\]
fear of the horror. If a nation did so it would simply be sacrificing without contest the honor and principles it should have tried to protect. Towards close of talk he stated he well aware of India's responsibility to develop its economy and society and that in working for itself India was working for Asia, especially in view tragic situation in China. He also dwelt on close friendly relations India enjoyed with Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia and way in which these countries sometimes solicited and accepted Indian advice. Perhaps he did this to counter Pakistan charges India was aggressive neighbor.

Despite its general character, we feel conversation was important step in evolution closer, more understanding relationship US and India and that Indians present were impressed with character, sincerity, and purpose US policy. Moreover, Secretary's frankness and time he gave to interview must have been very pleasing. Although Nehru was entertaining British delegation at 7:30, he did not take leave of Secretary till 7:45. [Kopper and Parsons.]

MARSHALL

845.24/2-1148

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 10, 1948.

Subject: Request for Approval of Policy Arms Committee's Interpretation of President's Memorandum of March 12, 1948

Discussion

Reference is made to NEA's memorandum of February 11 to the Secretary, subject: "Suspension of Export of Arms, Ammunition and Other Military Material to India and Pakistan" (Tab "A"), the letter of the Secretary dated February 25 to the Secretary of National Defense and the reply of the latter dated February 27 (Tab "B"), and the subsequent memorandum from the Secretary to the President dated March 11, 1948 (Tab "C").

The Governments of Pakistan and India have requested the approval of export licenses covering spare parts for existing military equipment of American origin. Since our policy was designed to prevent any increase in the military potential of either country, NEA and the

1 The memorandum referred to here is presumably the President's handwritten notation of March 12, 1948 in the margin of the Secretary's memorandum of March 11, p. 496.
2 Memorandum by Loy Henderson, not printed.
3 Letter transmitting to Forrestal a copy of Henderson's February 11 memorandum to Secretary Marshall, not printed.
4 Not printed.
Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments feel that spare equipment parts to maintain existing equipment of American origin clearly could be supplied within the intent of this policy. The Policy Arms Committee and NEA recommend that the policy of temporarily restricting the export of military materials to India and Pakistan in accordance with the memorandum approved by the President on March 12, 1948 be interpreted as not precluding the export to those countries of replacement parts or other items required to maintain their existing defense establishments.

Recommendation

It is recommended that you approve the foregoing interpretation.¹

¹Mr. Lovett initialed this memorandum, presumably approving it.

845.00/12-2248: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson)² to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, December 22, 1948—8 a.m.

1108. During talk with Bajpai December 21, I asked regarding GOI reaction events in China. He said that although India did not believe it would be sharply affected in immediate future by Communist victory, it was somewhat concerned at possible ultimate consequences. A Communist China might lead to establishment series of other Communist Asiatic states and to strengthening Communist forces throughout South East Asia. GOI felt that unless there should be considerable deterioration in Indian economic conditions, it could keep Indian Communist movement under control. Plans for Indian economic development were being speeded up in hope of checking inflation and improving living standards.

Both Governor General ² and Nehru, in conversations during last few days seemed even less concerned at Chinese developments. Both appeared confident of Communist victory in China but expressed view that a Communist China would not necessarily be dominated by Soviet Union. Governor General went so far as to say that China under Communist control would probably be more Asiatic and anti-Western and might therefore be more cooperative with India than Kuomintang China, which had contrived “to survive so long only because of its support from without”.

¹Loy W. Henderson assumed charge of the Embassy at New Delhi on November 19, 1948, succeeding Henry F. Grady, who had been appointed Ambassador to Greece in June.
²Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, who assumed office June 21, 1948.
In general I find a certain smugness in Indian government circles regarding China. There is apparently feeling that China is destined to disappear for some time as a world force leaving India as the foremost Asiatic power, courted on one side by capitalistic powers of the West and on the other by Communist powers of Eastern Europe and Asia.