PALESTINE

IN Volvement of the United States in the Arab-Zionist Controversy Concerning the Future Status of Palestine;* The Issue at the United Nations

867N.01/1-647: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, January 6, 1947—2 p. m.

13. Arab League meeting yesterday, Lebanese Premier al-Sohl, Nokrashy Pasha,² Yussef Yassin,³ and representatives Iraq, Syria, and Trans-Jordan decided each state should send delegations to Palestine Conference, London.⁴ Azzam Pasha⁵ informed Ireland⁶ he does not expect to attend giving poor health as reason.

League has addressed note to British Government requesting it invite Arab Higher Committee to send Delegation to London for Conference. Note attaches importance to such representation in belief it will pave way to results desired by all concerned.⁷

Note also despatched requesting British to restore civil rights to Amin al-Husseini⁸ and to grant him permission to return to Palestine. Sent by pouch to Arab capitals. Repeated to London.

TUCK

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² The Egyptian Prime Minister.
³ The Saudi Arabian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs.
⁴ Telegram 10, January 8, from Damascus, reported that on January 6, Syrian Prime Minister Jamil Mardam issued a statement to the press in which he outlined the three principles governing Arab participation in the Palestine conference: rejection of partition; rejection of a Jewish state; and refusal to sit with the Jews at the conference table (867N.01/1–847).
⁵ Abdul Rahman Azzam, Secretary-General of the League of Arab States.
⁶ Philip W. Ireland, Attaché at the Embassy in Egypt.
⁷ According to telegrams 210, January 11, and 264, January 14, from London, the British Government invited the Arab Higher Committee to send a delegation to the Palestine conference. The invitation was accepted. (867N.01/1–1147, 1–1447)
⁸ The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem.
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] January 9, 1947.

I have spoken to the Secretary about the matters which you raised at our meeting this morning.

1. His interview with Rabbi Silver. Rabbi Silver saw the Secretary to tell him that the Basle Conference voted that the Jewish Agency was not to attend the London meetings unless there was some change in the present circumstances. Rabbi Silver believed that there would be such a change if either one of two actions was taken by the British Government. The first would be to announce that they were favorably inclined toward the idea of partition. The Secretary told Rabbi Silver that he thought there was no possibility of Mr. Bevin's making such a statement.

The second was some action by the British Government, such as releasing a substantial number of immigrants who had been taken to Cyprus. Rabbi Silver then said that he had discussed this matter with Lord Inverchapel and asked the Secretary if he would also discuss it with Lord Inverchapel. The Secretary told Rabbi Silver that he would do this, and, while I was with him, he made a note to ask Lord Inverchapel to call on him in this connection.

2. Policy on observer for the London Conferences. The Secretary confirmed the conclusion that he contemplated sending an observer only

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1 Abba Hillel Silver, President of the Zionist Organization of America and member of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, American Section. The interview took place on January 6.
2 The 22d World Zionist Congress met at Basel from December 9 to December 24; for documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. vii, pp. 727-737, passim.
3 Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
4 In telegram 83, January 6, the Embassy in London reported information from the British Foreign Office that David Ben-Gurion, Chairman of the Executive of the Jewish Agency, informed Arthur Creech Jones, British Secretary of State for the Colonies, on January 2, that the Jewish Agency "would not attend resumed Palestine Conference without major concession from British Government regarding immigration. This being refused, Ben-Gurion said that Zionist Executive was willing to meet with British Government either before, during or after resumed Palestine Conference, only condition being that meeting would not be considered as part of Palestine Conference." (867N.01/1-047) Telegram 207, January 10, from London, reported further information on the conversation of January 2 as furnished by Nahum Goldmann, member of the Executive of the Jewish Agency, London Section, namely, that Mr. Ben-Gurion informed Mr. Creech Jones that the settlement of the Palestine problem must involve free immigration, exploitation of lands not used by the Arabs, and national independence. Mr. Creech Jones was stated to have replied, "I think that we will satisfy all your demands." (867N.01/1-1047).
5 The British Ambassador.
if the Jews as well as the Arabs attended the Conference. He stated that in his opinion the observer should not undertake to be a mediator. This was the role which the British Government was playing and to have two mediators would cause confusion. He thought that the observer should observe and that his principal activity, insofar as he took any part, should be to urge moderation. However, the Secretary said that when he used the word “observer” he did this advisedly.

I went over with the Secretary the various considerations regarding who the observer should be. He thought that the suggestion of Mr. Winant was a good one since he was a man of important position and should be regarded as well disposed to all parties in the discussion. He did not know whether Mr. Winant had yet left the United States and thought that if he were still here we might have a preliminary talk with him to see whether he would be available.

DEAN ACHESON

* John Gilbert Winant, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom. He did not undertake duties as American observer because the Jewish Agency did not formally attend the Palestine Conference.

867N.01/1-947: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, January 9, 1947—7 p.m.

161. 1. British press today indicated that Ben-Gurion—Creech Jones talk yesterday dealt with steps to be taken by former while in Palestine to suppress terrorism. (Embassy’s 132, January 8) According Epstein, following actually took place.

2. Creech Jones suggested to Ben-Gurion that informal, clear, comprehensive and decisive talks between British Govt and representatives of Jewish Agency and their advisers should begin in London, January 22. Talks would be “informal” in sense that JA would be spared necessity of consulting Special Committee unless it desired to do so. Proposed talks would not be part of Palestine conference.

3. According Epstein, Ben-Gurion in his capacity as Chairman JA Executive and exercising powers as number one Zionist leader accepted “suggestion of Creech Jones” for talks beginning January 22.

4. Creech Jones mentioned but did not stress terrorism. Ben-Gurion voluntarily undertook to do his utmost to quiet conditions in Palestine

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1 Not printed.
2 Eliahu Epstein, Director of the Jewish Agency Office in Washington.
3 Telegram 132, January 8, from London, reported that, according to the decision of the Basel Congress, the Special Committee needed to be consulted only if formal participation in the Palestine Conference was envisaged (867N.01/1-847).
inasmuch as forthcoming talks would be jeopardized by continuing terror.

5. Epstein said Ben-Gurion made known his decision last night to Locker, Shertok and Goldmann who concurred. Efforts are being made today to inform Rabbi Silver by telephone since group in London agreed that either he or Neumann should take part in talks. Silver had earlier expressed his agreement in principle to such talks.

6. Ben-Gurion departed by air for Palestine today. He will return London on or before January 20 when full meeting will take place of JA delegation.

7. JA delegation has not been selected by Epstein though it would include Ben-Gurion, Kaplan, Shertok, Goldmann, Silver or Neumann, plus technical advisers on agriculture, irrigation, etc. Latter because it was anticipated that partition would be discussed and maps would be drawn.

8. Shertok and Epstein depart January 11 for Washington where Shertok will discuss forthcoming talks with Dept and Silver. He will probably raise with Dept desirability of appointing American observer.

9. Epstein said that it had been agreed between Ben-Gurion and Creech Jones that informal talks 22nd would be kept secret for present. He said less than dozen people now know that they will take place, and asked Embassy not to reveal to its British contacts that it is aware of decision.

10. Beeley, Foreign Office, telephoned Embassy a few minutes after Epstein departed and volunteered in strict confidence substantially the same story, differences being that while Epstein said that Creech Jones took initiative both conversations with Ben-Gurion, according Beeley, Colonial Secretary had "accepted" JA's proposal for informal talks. As Beeley put it Ben-Gurion had undertaken to try to convene a meeting of his colleagues in London, January 22. Foreign Office thought that to do this Ben-Gurion would have to do some persuading. Beeley again urged utmost secrecy (Embassy's 101 January 79) in handling information. He said that Colonial Secretary had promised Ben-Gurion to keep down so far as possible publicity concerning JA talks when

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* Berli Locker, member of the Executive of the Jewish Agency, London Section.
* Moshe Shertok, Chief of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency and member of its Executive, American Section.
* Emanuel Neumann, member of the Executive of the Jewish Agency, American Section.
* Eliezer Kaplan, member of the Executive of the Jewish Agency and Treasurer of the Agency.
* Harold Beeley, desk officer for Palestine in the British Foreign Office.
* Not printed.
they occur. Talks might be represented to world as a routine meeting of the JA Executive in London.

11. Embassy will seek further details from Goldmann tomorrow.

GALLMAN

867N.01/12-1646: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 13, 1947—7 p. m.

62. Deptel 2036 Dec 19.¹ Please transmit following reply to Arab League note Dec 7:²

"I have the honor to refer to my note of recent date in which I informed you that I was transmitting to the Secretary of State at your request, a declaration of the Council of the League of Arab States, dated December 2, 1946, with regard to Palestine.

My Government has requested me in reply to express its deep gratification at the firm feelings of friendship which exist between the United States and all of the Arab States, and its own hope that these friendly relations will continue to develop.

My Government has noted the Council's statement that expressions of its interest in the problem of Palestine and recent declarations and statements by the President of the United States relating to Palestine have given rise to anxiety throughout the Arab States and the Moslem World.

Since the termination of the first World War, the Government and people of the United States have given support to the concept of the Jewish National Home in Palestine. My Government is therefore acting only in keeping with the traditional policies of the United States when it advocates the taking of measures which tend to strengthen the realization of this concept.

It has also been noted that the Council has requested the Government of the United States to take measures necessary to put an end to efforts in support of Jewish immigration into Palestine from regions under American occupation in Europe.

It may be recalled that it was not until the defeat of the Axis in Europe that the world fully comprehended the tragic plight of the surviving victims of Nazi persecution, including particularly many persons of Jewish faith. It was during this and subsequent periods that the President of the United States suggested that all countries have a common responsibility for working out a solution which would permit the survivors who must leave Europe to find new homes where they may dwell in peace and security. Many of these Jewish people, after years of persecution, look to Palestine as a haven. It would appear to be contrary to the humanitarian instincts of all peoples if the survivors remaining in displaced persons centers in Europe, including

¹ Not printed.
numbers of unfortunate Jews, were denied the right to seek haven in other lands, including Palestine.

My Government shares the hope, expressed by the Council in its declaration, that an honorable and just settlement may be reached which will contribute to the establishment and maintenance of peace throughout the world.

(Complimentary close)"

Repeat to Arab capitals by airgram.  

Byrnes

867N.01/1-1447  

Memorandum by Mr. Fraser Wilkins of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs 1  

SECRET  

[WASHINGTON,] January 14, 1947.

The Palestine question is one of the most difficult problems with which the Department is faced. Our policy toward Palestine is based on seven factors:

1) Present responsibility of Great Britain for administration of Palestine under League of Nations mandate to which administration United States consented in American-British-Palestine Mandate Convention of December 8, 1924.

2) The intense desire of Jewish DP's in Europe to emigrate to Palestine.

3) Support for Jewish National Home in Palestine as expressed in Presidential statements, Congressional resolutions and party platforms.

4) The Arab population of Palestine outnumbers the Jewish population two to one. The Arabs in Palestine and neighboring countries are opposed to the partition of Palestine and to Jewish domination in any form.

5) Religious importance of Palestine to Christians, Jews and Moslems.

6) Strategic and economic importance of American oil, aviation and telecommunications facilities in Palestine and neighboring countries.

7) Practically speaking, the unsettled Palestine problem, made more difficult by the pressure for post-war migration of displaced Jews from Europe to Palestine, is an irritant in Anglo-American relations. It is also prejudicial to American-Arab relations in the fields of education, trade, petroleum and aviation. Continued agitation and uncertainty regarding the Palestine question, by weakening the Anglo-American position in the Near East, permits a more rapid extension of Soviet Russian objectives, and is distressing to Christians everywhere because the Christian interest in Palestine tends to become submerged in an Arab-Jewish controversy.

1 Mr. Wilkins was the desk officer in charge of Palestinian affairs.
American policy in Palestine, as now developed, has five principal aspects:

1) In Palestine, which now contains 1,250,000 Arabs and 600,000 Jews, neither group shall dominate the other. Palestine should be neither a Jewish State nor an Arab State, but the people of Palestine should be granted full independence as soon as practicable in one or more states in which the form of government will satisfy as nearly as possible the national aspirations of both Jews and Arabs. Accomplishment of such a solution through a workable partition of Palestine, with the exception of the Holy Places, into an Arab State, which might join a neighboring Arab State, and a Jewish State, in control of its own immigration and economic policies, could be supported by the United States. Pending full independence, Palestine would enjoy partial self-government under United Nations trusteeship.

2) Immediate transfer of 100,000 Jews from European DP camps to Palestine. Immigration laws of other countries, including United States, should be liberalized to permit admission of other DP's from Europe.

3) Continued development of Jewish National Home in Palestine through immigration and land purchase, both of which are now restricted, if partition proves impracticable.

4) Broad political, economic and cultural development of Arab population in Palestine.

5) Obtaining acquiescence of all Arab states to whatever solution gives promise of settling the Palestine question.

[Here follows a section entitled “Recent Developments”.]
President will probably make some definite recommendation to this Congress providing for admission of displaced persons to US in addition to those admissible under this year's quotas. Precise character of these recommendations has not yet been determined. In this connection refer President's State of Union address of Jan 6 relating to international relief and displaced persons. Our inclination to recommend admission of displaced persons in addition those admissible under existing legislation is not due to any "lobby" but to feeling that this Govt on humanitarian grounds should take its share of displaced persons.

Byrnes

\footnote{In telegram 220, January 14, 7 p. m., to London, the Department notified Mr. Winant that "Recommendation to admit 50,000 refugees was considered during 1946 but was never presented to Congress since Grady-Morrison plan as a whole was not acceptable to this Govt." (867N.01/1-1347)}

\footnote{For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, January 1 to December 31, 1947 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 1.}

867N.01/1-1547: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, January 15, 1947—7 p. m.

251. For Gallman from Henderson. Shertok talked to Mr. Acheson Jan 14 [15] stressing critical period had arrived in settlement Palestine problem and requesting intercession by US Govt with Brit Govt to reach solution favorable to Jews and to effect immediate transfer 100,000 Jews to Palestine.

Under Secretary agreed period was critical but stated that he was convinced, following discussion with Secretary Byrnes concerning latter's conversation with Bevin and Rabbi Silver, Brit were sincere in reaching solution at this time and that accordingly it would serve no useful purpose for US Govt approach Brit at this time.

Mr. Acheson subsequently discussed his interview with Shertok with Brit Amb who confirmed his statement reference critical period and sincerity of Brit. [Henderson.]

Byrnes

\footnote{Mr. Shertok had further discussions with Mr. Henderson on January 16, at which time the former was reported as having stated: "twelve new Jewish settlements had already been established in the northern section, known as the 'Beersheba sub-area', of the Negev, that this northern section was the most important part of the Negev in so far as future economic possibilities were concerned and that it was vital that this section be included in any proposed Jewish state in order that such state be viable." (memorandum by Fraser Wilkins 501 BD Palestine/1-1647)}
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 17, 1947.

Participants: Secretary Byrnes
Mr. Acheson, Under Secretary
Mr. Henderson, Director, NEA
Crown Prince Saud, Saudi Arabia
Ambassador Sheikh Fuad Hamza
Sheikh Asad al-Faqih, Saudi Arabian Minister to the United States

[Here follow discussions of political problems in the Near East, particularly in connection with Greater Syria, and of the extension of United States financial assistance to Saudi Arabia; for texts, see pages 738, 1329.]

PALESTINE

The Prince said that he would like to touch upon the matter of Palestine during the course of his discussions since, unfortunately, there were differences of opinion between the Government of Saudi Arabia and the Government of the United States in this regard. He pointed out that Zionism was a threat to the Arab world and opposed to the objectives of the United States in the Near East because: (1) it had certain connections with communism, (2) it was anti-democratic, aggressive and totalitarian, and (3) it was anti-God. He said that the most urgent measure to adopt with regard to Zionism was to prohibit entirely further Jewish immigration to Palestine. The Zionist demand for mass Jewish immigration to Palestine was not based on humanitarian motives, but was merely a political maneuver in order to convert the Jewish minority in Palestine into a Jewish majority against the wishes of the local population. Such a maneuver was not in accord with the principles of the United Nations.

Mr. Byrnes described his recent conversation on the subject of Palestine with Mr. Bevin. He pointed out that he had stressed to Mr. Bevin the importance that the coming conference in London be attended by representatives of the British Government and of Jews and of Arabs. Mr. Byrnes had learned from personal experience that unless parties with different views had frank discussions with each other, there was little hope that their views could be composed. On the other hand, he had found that by means of discussions it was frequently possible to find solutions for problems which on their face

\footnote{For information on the official visit of Crown Prince Saud to the United States, see footnotes 1, 4, pp. 738, 741, respectively.}
appeared insoluble. He stressed the fact that he had not asked Mr. Bevin to decide on any specific kind of solution of the Palestine problem. In fact, he had felt that it would be preferable for the British to approach the conference without having committed themselves in advance to any given solution?

The Prince said that the Arabs would not be willing to sit at a conference table with the Zionists. They had nothing to discuss with the Zionists. They merely asked that the British refuse to admit further Jewish immigration into Palestine. The Secretary replied that apparently the Zionists and the Arabs agreed in one regard, that was that they had nothing to say to one another. The Arabs took the attitude that they would not carry on conversations except on the basis of the cessation of Jewish immigration into Palestine, and the Zionists insisted that they would not participate in a conference unless it was agreed in advance that a Jewish State was to be established in Palestine. He still felt that no matter how divergent the views of the Arabs and Jews, it would be helpful to talk the matter over.

Mr. Byrnes added that he was particularly appreciative of the restrained and reasonable manner with which the Arabs were accustomed to discuss with him the problem of Palestine. Palestine represented one of the most difficult international problems in the world today and it, therefore, should be approached with moderation and in a conciliatory spirit.

[Here follows concluding paragraph; see page 741.]

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Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 21, 1947.

Lord Inverchapel called at his request. He stated that he was calling as a result of instructions contained in a somewhat lengthy telegram which he abstracted for me. He said that the telegram opened with a somewhat plaintive review of United States participation in the Palestine problem. It referred to the action of this Government regarding the Anglo-American Commission report in accepting the recommendation regarding immediate immigration of 100,000 but taking no attitude on the other recommendations. It referred then to the Grady mission and our action in being unable to support its recommendations. Finally, it referred to the statement of October 4. The telegram

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2 By President Truman; see telegram of October 3, 1946, from President Truman to British Prime Minister Attlee and footnote 76, Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. vii, pp. 701, 704.
went on to say that the British Government believed that it was essential, in entering the discussions about to open in London, to have as correct a view as possible of the probable attitude of the United States Government.

The Ambassador went on to say that it seemed probable to the British Government that the results of the discussion in London would not be an agreement upon a solution between the Jews, the Arabs, and the British Government. It was thought unlikely that any solution could be agreed to by Jewish and Arab leaders, but it was possible that a particular solution might be less objectionable to the Jews and Arabs than another and that it might be possible to find one which might be acquiesced in, however grudgingly, with the minimum of opposition. It was for such a solution that the British Government must seek.

In order to get the maximum support for such a solution, the British Government would probably report it to the United Nations General Assembly and ask for its approval. It was therefore necessary for them to know as much as possible about the probable attitude of the United States Government.

It seemed to the British Government that in all probability it would have to take one of three possible courses after the discussions terminated: first, to propose a solution based on partition; second, to propose a solution based on some form of cantonization along the lines suggested by the Grady-Morrison report; and third, to conclude that no solution which it suggested would be acceptable and to surrender the mandate to the United Nations, leaving the problem with the General Assembly.

The Ambassador was instructed to ask me what the attitude of the United States Government would be in the first case mentioned above—that is, would it support in the General Assembly, and with what vigor, a solution based on partition? From the President's statement of October 4, it seemed probable that the United States would support such a solution. Mr. Byrnes, in his discussions with Mr. Bevin, had put it forward and urged that it be considered, but Mr. Bevin could not free himself from some doubt as to our attitude.

Secondly, the Ambassador was instructed to inquire whether any of the other solutions would, from the point of view of our Government, be preferable, or whether there was some suggestion which we could make which he had not made.

I said to the Ambassador that he would of course understand that I was not authorized to speak on behalf of this Government and would have to consult with the Secretary of State, who would undoubtedly wish to consult with the President. I was willing to give to the Ambas-
sador my immediate impressions for what they were worth but would
give him the reply of our Government in a few days.

I said that I thought the solution which it would be easiest for the
American Government to support would be one based on partition.
This was based, in my judgment, both on American domestic consid-
erations and upon consideration of the inherent difficulties of the prob-
lem. In other words, I thought it more likely that the opposition to
such a solution would be vocal rather than physical than would be the
case as to any other solution. I said that in my opinion the British
Government, in the London discussions, should explore this possibility as earnestly and fully as possible both in an effort to
work it out and in an effort to convince the Jews that the British
Government had done its best for such a result. I said that I thought
the decision and the responsibility for the decision was clearly
on the British Government. Its officials could call the atmosphere of
the discussions and the possibility of compromise far better than any-
one else. In my opinion it was more important to find a solution with
the maximum possibility of being put into effect than it was to pick
out any particular solution because of the theoretical or dialectical
advantages.

Third, it seemed to me that this was about the last chance to find
a peaceful solution and that if this chance were lost I saw little hope
of avoiding the most serious results in the Middle East. I therefore
felt sure that this Government would take a most sober view of the
situation and would not approach it from any opinionated point of
view.

I said to the Ambassador that one factor seemed to me essential to
any possible solution. That was a provision opening up possibilities of
immigration. These possibilities ought to comprehend the taking, in
a comparatively short time, of approximately 100,000 Jews and some
reasonable immigration thereafter. I said that the Arab opposition to
immigration was based upon the Arab conviction that it was advocated
as the vehicle for changing the Arab majority in Palestine into an Arab
minority. This did not seem to me to be necessarily the result. The
Arabs already had a substantial majority and the Arab birth rate was
considerably higher than the Jewish. This offered possibilities for
immigration provisions which would not do great violence to the
present ratio of population and which would relieve Jewish pressures.

The Ambassador then inquired about my view as to the other two
solutions. I said that past experience led me to believe that the Mor-
rison-Grady proposals would be considerably more difficult for us
than the partition proposal, but that it might be possible to explore
a solution combining the two, with the ultimate decision as to parti-
tion being left with the General Assembly at some fixed later date, when more experience might be available as a guide to judgment.

(For the British Government to surrender the mandate to the General Assembly without proposals did not seem to me to be a solution, but almost amounted to a confession that a solution was not possible and an invitation to a great deal of confusion. I thought that this course should be adopted only as a last resort and in the default of any suggestion other than the maintenance of the status quo by force.)

The Ambassador asked whether by “acquiescence, however grudging” I meant the absence of opposition, because if I meant this he thought such a situation not likely to result as the result of any proposal. I said that I did not mean the absence of opposition because I assumed that, whatever proposal was put forward, the leaders on one side or the other, and perhaps on both, would have to make speeches against it in order to maintain their own position. I thought that there was a difference between this sort of opposition and the determined sort of violent resistance which was going on at the present time in Palestine and which had to be put down by the actual exercise of force and coercion. I felt very sure that the American Government would not participate in such an enterprise.

The Ambassador then expressed once more Mr. Bevin’s hope that some form of legislation could be proposed in this country for the reception of a substantial number of displaced persons while the discussions in London were going on. I told the Ambassador that General Hilldring \(^2\) was exploring the form of such a resolution with leaders in Congress at the present time and that we hoped by next week to be able to lay the matter before the President, get his decision, and inaugurating some legislative action.\(^3\)

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\(^2\) Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas.

\(^3\) Mr. Acheson transmitted this memorandum of conversation to the Secretary of State on the morning of January 22. Later in the day, he suggested in a separate memorandum that the latter might “wish to discuss this memorandum with the President in your meeting with him tomorrow, Thursday, at 12:30. My recommendation is that I be authorized to confirm to Lord Inverchapel the views outlined in the memorandum.” (867N.01/1-2247)

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867N.01/1-1747

President Truman to the King of Saudi Arabia

(Abdul Aziz ibn Saud)\(^1\)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 24, 1947.

YOUR MAJESTY: I deeply regret my delay in replying to the further letter regarding Palestine which Your Majesty sent me on November 2,

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\(^1\) Transmitted to Jidda in instruction 41, January 24, for delivery to the King.
1946 through the Saudi Arabian Legation in Washington. The delay arose from my desire that careful study be given to the points which Your Majesty raised in the letter.

The frank and friendly manner of your response to my message of October 25, 1946 is deeply appreciated. I am convinced that this response was prompted not only by your interest in the welfare of the Arab population of Palestine but also by your sincere desire that the bonds of friendship between the United States and Saudi Arabia be strengthened and that the United States follow a policy with regard to Palestine which would enhance its reputation throughout the Arab and Moslem world.

For my part I wish again to emphasize my earnest desire that the friendship between the United States and Saudi Arabia which this country values so highly will continue to grow stronger. It also is my sincere hope that friendship and cooperation between the United States and the Arab world, and indeed the whole Moslem world, will continue to increase as the realization becomes more widespread among the American people and among Arabs and Moslems that all of them are striving for the common objective of a peaceful and prosperous world based upon principles of justice and fairness.

Palestine is undoubtedly one of the most difficult problems faced by the world at the present time. The United States is anxious that this problem shall be solved in a manner that will be recognized by the world as just and fair. As I indicated to you in my message of October 25, the United States and other Powers, which as victors in the first World War bore a certain responsibility for the future of Palestine, took the position following the conclusion of that war that Palestine should be the site of a Jewish national home. There was a strong feeling in this country that the Jewish people who had made so many notable contributions to the world were entitled to a national home of their own, and it seemed appropriate that this national home should be established in a land which for thousands of years had been regarded by Jews as their spiritual home.

In supporting the establishment of the Jewish National Home in Palestine the United States had no thought of embarking upon a policy which would be prejudicial to the interests of the indigenous population of Palestine, and it has no such thought at the present time. The Government and the people of this country desire that the fundamental rights of both the Arab and Jewish population of Palestine shall be fully safeguarded and that in Palestine Arabs and Jews alike shall prosper and shall lead lives free of any kind of political or economic

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2 Ibid., p. 714.
oppression. We would be firmly opposed to any solution of the Palestine problem which would permit a majority of the population to discriminate against a minority on religious, racial or other grounds. It is our belief that this problem should be solved in such a manner that the various religious and ethnic groups will have similar opportunities and freedoms regardless of which group might be in the numerical majority at any given time. I am convinced, furthermore, that the responsible Jewish groups and leaders interested in developing the Jewish National Home in Palestine have no intention of expelling now or at a later date the indigenous inhabitants of that country or of using Palestine as a base for aggression against neighboring Arab States. No people has suffered more than the Jews during recent years from aggression and intolerance. No people stands more in need of world sympathy and support at the present time. It is therefore inconceivable that responsible Jewish groups or leaders could be contemplating acts of intolerance and aggression against Arabs in Palestine or elsewhere which would be sure to arouse public opinion and to provoke indignation throughout the world. I also am convinced that the terrorist acts of certain irresponsible Jewish groups in Palestine are by no means indicative of the temper of Jews in general throughout the world or symbolic of Jewish aspirations respecting Palestine. These acts in fact are deplored by the great body of Jews who fully realize that resort to terrorism merely renders the problem of Palestine more difficult of solution.

I take this occasion again to point out that I do not consider the various statements which were made by me, including those urging that at least 100,000 Jewish refugees from Europe be admitted into Palestine, are in any way inconsistent with previous assurances or statements made by the Government of the United States. This Government has repeatedly stated that in its view there should be no change in the basic situation in Palestine without consultation with both Arabs and Jews. During the last year a number of consultations with Arabs and Jews have actually taken place. Unfortunately these consultations did not lead to any agreed solution of the Palestine problem. They have served, however, to emphasize the urgency of this problem and the necessity that a solution of it be found without protracted delay. I am confident that Your Majesty will agree with me that until decisions have been reached with regard to the future of Palestine the uncertainties which at present are at least to an extent responsible for unsettled conditions in that country will continue to exert a disturbing influence in Palestine and adjacent areas.

It is my desire again to express my appreciation for the frankness of your letter of November 2, 1946, which testifies not only to your friend-
ship but also to the friendship of the people of Saudi Arabia for the United States. I can assure you that I and the people of the United States desire to maintain and strengthen our feelings of friendship toward you and the people of Saudi Arabia and toward the rulers and peoples of all Arab lands.

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

867N.01/2-1247

The Department of State to the British Embassy

SECRET

WASHINGTON, [undated].

WRITTEN ORAL STATEMENT ¹

The American Government, for domestic and other reasons, would find it easier to support in the United Nations and elsewhere the solution of the Palestine problem calling for partition and the setting up of a viable Jewish state than any other solution at present under consideration.

In case the British Government after careful study and further discussion should come to the conclusion that the partition solution would be unworkable and if it should be successful in working out in consultation with Arabs and Jews a solution, which in its opinion could successfully be put into effect, lying somewhere between the partition plan and the Morrison–Grady cantonization plan, the American Government would be disposed to give such a solution its support.

It would be somewhat difficult in view of the attitude of the American public for the American Government to give support to the cantonization plan as proposed by Morrison–Grady. It would be much more difficult for it to support any solution which does not provide for the entry in the near future into Palestine of at least 100,000 displaced European Jews and for Jewish immigration at a reasonable rate thereafter. It is assumed that the British Government understands that the American Government could not participate in the carrying out of any solution by armed force. The President is planning in the near future to recommend to Congress the enactment of legislation which would permit immigration into the United States of a substantial number of displaced persons in Europe. Such legislation, if enacted, should make it clear to both Arabs and Jews that the United States is prepared on its part to accept an appropriate share of Jewish displaced persons.

¹ According to a memorandum of conversation by Mr. Acheson, he read this statement to Lord Inverchapel on January 27 and handed a copy to him. The British Ambassador expressed understanding and satisfaction with the United States position. (867N.01/1-2747)
Since the British Government has special knowledge derived from its many years' administration of Palestine and since it is engaging in direct conversations with Arabs and Jews, it should be in a better position than any other Government to sense the kind of solution of the Palestine problem which has the best possibility of success. Furthermore, it will bear the primary responsibility for putting into actual operation any plan for Palestine which might be adopted. It would seem, therefore, that the decision as to the solution of the Palestine problem must rest with the British Government.

(Continued...)
British Government its views in October and that Arab Delegation did not wish to have further discussions before British Government has made its reply to Arab proposals. Bevin said Creech Jones would see Jews as soon as possible and that British Delegation "would make a more definite statement on British position at next meeting". Meeting adjourned for procedural discussion.

2. Palestine Arabs pointed out that when Palestine Conference opened initial statements of both British and Arab Delegations had been published. Now Palestine Arabs had made opening statement which they would like to give to press also. British Government saw no reasons to object and Palestine Arabs gave to press its statement substance of which was published London Times this morning and probably in US. Beeley explained that if and when Jews attend formal conference they too can publish their opening statement.

3. It was agreed that British Delegation would convene next meeting Palestine Conference "as early as possible this week". Arabs suggested January 29 but Britains [sic] said that they would need more time for Colonial Office talks with Jews and question was left open.

4. Beeley said date of next meeting was complicated by fact that when Colonial Office asked JA how soon informal talks could begin it was told yesterday that Ben-Gurion was ill. Colonial Office still hopes talks with Jews can begin tomorrow.

5. Bevin gave small reception last night for Arab Delegation. If and when Jews attend conference Beeley said they would be given similar hospitality.

6. Arab mood is reported to be generally gloomy. According Beeley some Arab delegates have expressed resentment at published implications (Embassy's 546, January 27) that calibre of Arab delegates has been lowered. Azzam and some of the other leaders did not come because they did not like prospect of being associated with conference which they felt was bound to fail. Beeley has not noted any evidence that Arabs have shifted to more extreme line during adjournment.

7. In private conversations Arabs have displayed keenest interest outcome Gruner case. If he is not executed, Arabs will consider it to be striking example of British appeasement policy. Arabs are reported by Beeley to be saying generally that in 1938 Britain rejected partition and in 1939 adopted an alternative policy. Now Arabs understand Britains have in mind partition as a solution. This in Arab eyes can mean only that violence and law-breaking have forced Britains to yield

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6 Not printed.

6 According to telegram 13, January 7, from Jerusalem, Dov Gruner was arrested during an armed attack on the Ramargan police station on April 23, 1946, which resulted in the death of one policeman (867N.00/1-747). He was hanged on April 16, 1947.
to Zionist demands. If Zionist terror brings such dividends Arabs say that they will know what to do. Arabs appear confident that Arab strength shown 1936–39 is not impaired. Beeley said that he did not know present status Gruner case, which along with latest kidnappings, is receiving big news play British press.

8. Beeley said that he had no knowledge of present trend of thought of JA but he understood that a number of meetings of Zionist leaders here have taken place.

GALLMAN

867N.01/1–3047: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

US URGENT

London, January 30, 1947—4 p. m.

658. Beeley, Foreign Office, supplies (Embtel 577, January 28) following information this morning:

1. Following Jewish Agency representatives met yesterday afternoon for 2½ hours at Colonial Office:
   Ben-Gurion, Shertok, Neumann, Brodetsky, Locker, Goldmann, Horowitz, Eban and Linton. British were represented by Creech Jones, who presided, Bevin and Sir Norman Brook. Colonial and Foreign Office advisers were also present.

2. Creech Jones welcomed JA Delegation [and inquired?] what they meant by partition. JA Delegation refused to set forth its views re partition saying that if it put forward a partition plan it would henceforth be committed to it. Bevin said that these talks were very exploratory and he could assure JA Delegation that it would not be committed by talking about partition. British referred to October proposals of Arab Delegation and asked JA Delegation whether it desired to file its proposals. Ben-Gurion said that JA did not wish to file proposals but that it would give British in writing its objections to Morrison plan. Ben-Gurion inquired why British Government could not return to pre-1939 régime¹ and carry out the mandate. To this Creech Jones replied “with vehemence” that British Government is no longer prepared to maintain an administration in Palestine which has no roots in people of Palestine. To do so would be contrary to democratic principles in which British Government believed and British did not think that world opinion would tolerate in Palestine an autocratic alien government. Consequently JA Delegation must start

¹This refers, presumably, to the régime in Palestine prior to the White Paper of May 1939; for text, see British Cmd. 6019, Palestine: Statement of Policy.
its thinking from the idea that British Government is "determined to set up self-governing institutions in Palestine with independence as its ultimate aim."

Ben-Gurion said somewhat cryptically, "if you are not prepared to go back to mandate there is only one solution." Later he reverted to same point saying "if British rule out mandate absolutely not many alternatives are open to us." 3. Shertok raised question of interim position UN Palestine in event British Government should take a decision which would be referred next September to UN. He asked British Delegation to consider and advise JA Delegation how it proposed to handle immigration and land transfer regulations in interim. British Delegation promised to consider these practical questions.

4. Ben-Gurion said JA Delegation interpreted Basle resolution as leaving JA free to consider partition if it is proposed to JA Delegation.

5. It was agreed that JA Delegation and British Delegation would meet again "shortly" Colonial Office to fix date and time.

6. Beeley, who was present, received personal impression that JA Delegation was surprised to find that British Delegation was not committed to partition. He thought he noted also an undercurrent of feeling between Ben-Gurion and Neumann, who, apparently did not share former's thinking re desirability of British returning to Palestine pre-1939 régime.

7. Palestine Conference will meet again today at 3 p. m.; heads of Arab Delegation are lunching with Prime Minister beforehand. British will "make a more definite statement" re British position but Beeley indicated that this would not go very far.

8. Asked how long British thought they could hold Arab Delegation in London while they conducted informal talks with JA, Beeley said he had no idea but that Arabs were naturally a patient people and he understood from private sources that they are anxious that conference should not end in failure although they are reported to have decided to walk out in certain contingencies (e.g. partition proposal). Beeley doubted whether JA Delegation will be willing to omit stages from its negotiations.

9. Beeley said there was nothing new with regard to the principles stated by Creech Jones (paragraph 2 above); they had been British operating basis for some time.

10. Further report re yesterday meeting will be obtained from Shertok and Neumann who are calling this afternoon at Embassy.

Gallman
SECRET

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 30, 1947—7 p. m.

US URGENT

677. Neumann and Shertok gave Embassy today following report re yesterday’s talk:

1. They confirmed paragraph 1 Embtel 658, January 30.
2. Re what took place at meeting (paragraph 2 reference telegram) they confirmed outline of proceedings but emerged with strong impressions far beyond Embtel 658.
3. Ben-Gurion’s opening statement of JA objectives included:
   (a) Large scale immigration because approximately 1,200,000 Jews needed [in?] Palestine.
   (b) Full development of Palestine for benefit of whole area.
   (c) Statehood.

4. Most of talking was done on a free and easy basis by Bevin, who, together with Creech Jones, went over the various solutions which had been suggested. They say that from way Bevin emphasized difficulties of partition they gathered that British delegate had “dismissed” partition as a practicable solution although Bevin did invite JA delegate to draw a map showing their idea of partition. Among objections to partition mentioned by Bevin were:
   (a) It is [not?] possible to partition Palestine into two viable states.
   (b) Partition would never receive UN approval.
   (c) Arab states would object intensely, fearing Jewish state as beach-head for Zionist expansion.
   (d) Many Zionists schemes to increase absorptive capacity of Palestine were impractical.
   (e) Ben-Gurion’s figure of 1,200,000 Jewish immigrants is out of all reason.

5. Bevin, they say, then turned to Morrison plan which he explained except for an accident would have been known as the “Bevin plan”. He referred continually to “bi-national state”. JA delegate is said to have not understood at first what he meant by this, but it soon became unmistakably plain that Bevin wanted JA delegate to consider some variant of Morrison plan involving Jewish and Arab provincial Govts, together with a central govt including both Jews and Arabs. Above both would be superimposed the mandatory or trustee with certain powers. Bevin indicated Jews might have “a substantial measure of control over immigration” in Jewish province. Bevin asked why Jews
objection to Morrison plan (see paragraph 2, reference telegram). Would they not put their objections in writing, comment if they liked on the October Arab proposals and, if they wanted to do so, put forward a concrete plan for partition or otherwise.

6. Shertok pointed out to Bevin difficult position in which JA would be placed if it were itself to put forward partition. Bevin said that this could be done without prejudice JA's position (paragraph 2 reference telegram).

7. Creech Jones made it clear there could be no return to regime of 1922–37 for reasons stated reference telegram. They say he made additional point that Arabs regarded White Paper as undertaking to them and hence British could not return to status quo ante although British felt they were not hampered by past undertakings in working out some new régime.

8. Shertok then said that if pre-White Paper policy were restored Jews would be willing to defer their claims for statehood. If it is not restored JA must press its claim for statehood.

9. Bevin, until corrected by Neumann, kept referring to the Anglo-American committee as the "American Committee". He said that personally he would have been prepared to accept all ten recommendations but US would accept only recommendation for the 100,000. Bevin reiterated to JA delegate his statement to Parliament that his reputation is staked on finding a solution for Palestine.

10. Next meeting will take place with JA delegate at [apparent garble], date not yet fixed next week. British agreed to send JA delegate for study copies of Arab proposals and copies of the latest edition of the Morrison plan. British mentioned latter as though it were on hand ready for delivery, but up to this afternoon JA delegate had not received it.

11. Leaving subject of meeting itself, Shertok and Neumann both expressed extreme pessimism. Latter felt that his earlier doubts had been confirmed by yesterday's talks. Far from recommending that Rabbi Silver should come to London he was himself thinking seriously of returning to US from London after next meeting, leaving his JA colleagues to carry on.

12. Neumann said that although Bevin had insisted that British had no interest in remaining in Palestine it was clear to him from emphasis Bevin placed on Morrison plan that Bevin is seeking a way to justify some form British occupation and administration of Palestine. Any variant of Morrison plan, Neumann said, would mean:

(a) Restrictions re area which Jews may develop, and
(b) Restrictions on immigration, neither of which could be accepted by JA. Shertok said that any concessions re area would
have to be compensated by concessions re sovereignty. Neumann feels that talks are “likely to end ingloriously” in spite of JA goodwill.

13. Neumann and Shertok both said that since “apparently” British plan to reject both mandate and partition, time might soon arrive for US intervention. They hoped that the telegram which would be sent as a result of their interview (i.e., this telegram) would cause US Govt to consider carefully what it could do. Both expressed interest in arrival Ambassador Gardner; whom they thought would be suitable person to exercise US “good offices”. Embassy promised to report above to Dept.

14. Embassy said that British kept it informed of developments in both sets of conversations and that from British sources it had received impression that British delegate yesterday only described various possible solutions objectively without favoring any one solution. Neumann and Shertok agreed that Creech Jones had emphasized that British are not backing any one scheme against another and that everything Bevin said was within this framework. However, they said, it was abundantly clear that “Bevin was boss” and that from the emphasis he placed upon it he favored Morrison plan in some form.

GALLMAN

1 O. Max Gardner, the Appointed Ambassador to the United Kingdom, who died before he assumed the position of Ambassador.

867N.01/1-3147: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, January 31, 1946—5 p. m.

US URGENT

690. Palestine Conference met yesterday for two hours. According Beeley (Embtel 658, January 30) following took place:

1. Bevin opened meeting with prepared statement which dealt first with October Arab proposals, secondly, partition and thirdly, British obligations to UN. Bevin said that he did not propose to discuss Arab proposals in detail because they were open to great objection that they would meet with immediate Jewish armed resistance and he doubted whether Jews would ever consent to them. Bevin said that according to Jamal Huseinei’s opening statement (Embtel 577, January 28) Arabs would resist any kind of Jewish expansion and thus partition suggestion was subject to same objection as Arab proposals. British Govt is faced consequently with unwelcome prospect of imposing some solution. Bevin said that he wished to make clear to Arab Dele-
uation that present belief British Govt is that in accord with its obligations to UN its next move after talks end would have to be, if agreement is reached, to refer agreed solution to UN for approval; if no agreement is reached, matter would also have to be referred to UN, either with or without a proposed solution suggested by British Govt in absence of agreement.

2. Continuing his statement, Bevin said British Delegation was reluctant to be forced to conclusion that only possible solution is one which British must impose. He asked Arab Delegation to consider, just as he had asked JA Delegation to consider, possibility of a bi-national central government combined with a large measure of local autonomy (see paragraph 6 below) for 2 communities.

3. Jamal Husseini said any solution would be difficult so long as Jews are armed. He asked whether British Govt is sincerely endeavoring to disarm Jews. Crecch Jones expanded on difficulties of situation and said that it was almost impossible to disarm Jews. Husseini took up this point and asked whether British Govt is sincerely endeavoring to find a solution on basis of right and justice or whether it is following an appeasement policy under Jewish armed threats.

4. Arab Delegation reserved comment on Bevin’s statement and at end meeting it was agreed that Arab Delegation, when it had had time to prepare its comments on Bevin’s statement, would ask for next meeting—possibly on Monday.

5. Beeley said delegates from Syria and Iraq seemed especially depressed but all were gloomy.

6. Embassy mentioned to Beeley that it heard from outside sources (Embassy’s 677, January 30) that at January 29 meeting, Bevin had “dismissed” partition and urged Jews to consider some variant of Morrison plan. Beeley said that from what he had just told Embassy (see above) it would be clear that in carrying out Cabinet’s instructions to explore fully all possible lines of thought British Delegation was urging both sides, without in any sense having made up its mind, to consider carefully an intermediate proposal which was not strictly speaking, the Morrison plan although it had a number of features in common with Morrison plan. As an example of differences Beeley said the bi-national state British have in mind would involve two communities being actively associated with central govt from the outset, ultimate independence being goal. Purpose behind plan would be to “drive the two peoples in Palestine into a position of responsibility.” It was obviously desirable that Jews and Arabs should both have another look at possibilities inherent in a bi-national state since Cabinet is suspending final judgement until all avenues have been explored.

7. Asked whether British were sending JA Delegation latest edition
[""""Morrison plan"""" Beeley said Colonial Office is sending JA Delegation, in form of mimeographed conference papers, October Arab proposals and Morrison's speech July 31, 1946, in Commons which is also being sent to Arab Delegation. Dept has copy. British do not intend at this stage to show either Arabs or Jews detailed proposals worked out by Grady and Brook because (a) proposals are a "US-British document and not sole property of British Govt"; (b) showing map might raise storm which could be obviated by negotiation and (c) some of proposals are obviously open to negotiation. While British wanted both Arabs and Jews to think about a bi-national state they had no intention of going in writing beyond Morrison's speech as a basis for their thinking.

8. Beeley emphasized that while JA Delegation has promised to comment on Morrison's speech of July 31 and while Arabs have promised to comment on Bevin's statement of yesterday, in substance both will be commenting on bi-national state idea. It was impossible to keep two sets of negotiations exactly parallel.

9. Beeley said that British Govt's efforts to get bi-national state considered had had interesting result of making Arab Delegation feel that it was being edged toward partition by gentle stages and of making JA Delegation feel that partition has been dismissed and that it is being urged toward Morrison plan. Both sides are indignant, their differing interpretations stemming from mutual distrust.

10. Asked what move would be if both sides dismissed possibility bi-national state, Beeley said that British Delegation would have "to think again," and consider desirability of laying before Cabinet a report showing complete absence of any basis for agreement and asking Cabinet to choose one of four alternatives: (a) partition (i.e. Jewish state); (b) Arab proposals; (c) enforcement of some intermediate solution or (d) abandonment of mandate and putting problem without any suggestion to UN for solution. In this event British Delegation would be likely to put to Cabinet for decision at same time how and when Cabinet's choice should be brought before UN.

GALLMAN

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1 For extract of speech, see British Cmd. 7044, Palestine No. 1 (1947), p. 2.
Army will not be hampered in task of maintaining order. No previous intimation this order was received by this Consulate General.\(^1\) High Commissioner\(^2\) received me immediately after announcement and told me no similar action was recommended at this time for Americans because terrorist activities are directed primarily at Government and Army personnel and secondarily at British civilians. He said situation is being watched constantly and if necessary adequate protection will be accorded Americans. British officials will be accommodated in prescribed concentration centers and given protection during hours of work. Civilian Government will continue for present. High Commissioner said present action was designed to give Government free hand for any preventive measures necessary without possible embarrassment of having hostages seized.

He said Gruner had refused to proceed with appeal and intimated that further action in his case would not be taken until after evacuation measures had been completed.

My own opinion that there is no immediate danger to American nationals is similar to that of High Commissioner and I recommend that no steps toward evacuation of Americans be taken now except that all necessary space on *Marine Corp* sailing about mid-February be reserved for Americans who wish to leave.\(^3\) Estimated number 345 registered now and I believe this number will not be greatly increased unless civil strife within Jewish community develops.

PINKERTON

\(^1\) According to a memorandum of conversation of February 3 by Mr. Fraser Wilkins, the Department was not informed in advance of these measures (867N.01/2-347).

\(^2\) Lt. Gen. Alan G. Cunningham, British High Commissioner for Palestine.

\(^3\) In telegram 42, February 4, to Jerusalem, the Department concurred that no steps be taken at this time to evacuate American citizens. Mr. Pinkerton was authorized, however, to consult with the Embassies at Athens and Cairo to “fully utilize space *Marine Corp* accommodate Am citizens and dependents who may wish leave Palestine this time.” (867N.01/1-3147)

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867N.01/2-447: Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET URGENT

LONDON, February 4, 1947—4 p. m.

752. According Beeley British Delegate and JA Delegation met for two hours yesterday (Emb’s 658, January 29 [30]):

1. JA Delegation handed Creech Jones a paper which Beeley presumes contained its objections to Morrison plan (Emb’s 658 paragraph 2) but paper was not mentioned.
2. First hour meeting was largely devoted to long statement by Ben-Gurion of Zionist case in general terms. He made no definite proposals.

3. Bevin asked JA Delegation flatly what it wanted and where was its map. JA Delegation indicated that it would prefer a Jewish state embracing whole of western Palestine but this was not in form of proposal and "did not advance matters".

4. Bevin "thinking alon", (and Beeley hoped that JA Delegation understood this) then said that if London talks with both Arabs and Jews could produce no agreed solution he thought British Government would have to lay problem without recommendation before UN.

5. JA Delegation asked whether Bevin still hoped that an agreed solution could be reached.

6. In reply Bevin explained "agreed solution" to mean a solution which would involve a sufficient measure of consent by both sides not to be violently resisted. Acquiescence of both sides in a solution was the important thing. Both sides could and probably would protest before world but if they at least acquiesced it would be an important gain.

7. JA Delegation asked Bevin whether he would let it see his "intermediate" proposals in writing.

8. Bevin replied that he would prepare for study by JA Delegation an "exploratory paper" which they must not take as views of British Govt since it involved no commitment. Beeley said that this paper would be along lines of bi-national state, mentioned Emb’s 690, Jan 31.

9. Shertok asked whether JA Delegation would be permitted to submit a partition proposal. Beeley did not recall a specific reply to this question because "all along Bevin has been asking JA Delegate to say what it wanted". Beeley thought personally that Shertok’s question may have arisen from latter’s fear that JA Delegation has been maneuvered into the position of apparently itself dismissing partition.

10. Shertok said that it must be assumed that there would be long interval between now and putting any solution into effect. He inquired what would happen in interim.

11. Bevin replied that if long-term policy decided upon is not incompatible with terms of mandate, British could make interim arrangements compatible with long-term policy which of course would have to be ratified by UN.

12. Meeting ended on this somewhat inconclusive note. British Delegation worked last night and is working this morning on paper promised by Bevin (paragraph 8 above) which will be sent to Arab Delegation as well as JA Delegation. Beeley feels JA Delegation is
probably somewhat confused by events of yesterday but that British Delegation has made some progress in crystallizing its own thinking. It is increasingly being borne upon British Delegation that it cannot hope to get UN approval for a drastic solution concocted by British and that it would be wiser if a “sufficient measure of consent from both sides is lacking”, to refer matter to UN without recommendation. If, however, “sufficient measure of consent” can be found for an intermediate solution British Delegation is prepared to go ahead subject, of course, to British Cabinet approval.

13. See Emb’s 722, February 3, in connection with paragraph 12 above.

14. Neumann is calling at Embassy this afternoon.

15. British Delegation will meet with Arab Delegation this afternoon.

Gallman

*1 Not printed.

867N.61/2-547: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

US URGENT

London, February 5, 1947—2 p. m.

775. During call at Embassy yesterday Neumann confirmed Beeley’s outline of February 3 meeting (Embassy’s 752, February 4) but provided many details which follow:

1. When Jewish Agency Delegation received only Hansard report of Morrison’s speech (Embassy’s 690, January 31, paragraph 7) instead of the complete report with a map it expected, at Neumann’s suggestion, Jewish Agency Delegation handed Creech Jones, by way of comment, a copy of Ben-Gurion’s speech re Morrison plan made at Basel Congress.

2. British Delegation had abandoned term “bi-national state” as a description of what it had in mind in favor of “unitary state” which it used throughout yesterday’s meeting.

3. Ben-Gurion held forth on history Palestine problem for benefit of Bevin “who did not seem to be too well informed”. Ben-Gurion said that first partition Palestine took place in 1922; in 1937 the Peel Commission suggested partition; and in 1939 White Paper division of Palestine into zones was partition in fact since it confined Jews to narrow area. Ben-Gurion said that from point of view Jews, Britain’s “unitary state” is form of partition which Jewish Agency Delegation
could not accept. Ben-Gurion then reverted to his earlier criteria (Embassy's 677, January 30, paragraph 3).

4. Bevin attacked partition as a "counsel of desperation" and said that Britain had no intention of imposing a solution which would result in Britain taking up arms against Arabs. Britain does not need Palestine strategically and is prepared to throw the problem without recommendation into UN. On other hand, Bevin thought unitary state, although he had not checked with lawyers, would be within framework of mandate which was an advantage in his eyes. Bevin did not define area he had in mind for Jews.

5. Neumann said it was apparent to Jewish Agency that Bevin and Creech Jones did not see eye to eye because when Creech Jones referred to Jewish zone having a large measure of freedom re immigration to the extent of zones' absorptive capacity, "Bevin tried to correct him". Bevin said that there should be specified limits within which immigration might take place just as in present White Paper. Bevin wanted pre-determined maximum immigration for a number of years. Further along in discussions Creech Jones indicated that if after giving unitary state a fair trial either community desired to withdraw from Federal Union after five or ten years, this might be possible. Bevin said quickly that he did not agree with Creech Jones on this point.

6. Neumann asked Bevin whether British Delegation had received any indication from Arab Delegation that it would consent to British conception of unitary state. Bevin replied that he could not answer this question.

7. Re acquiescence on both sides instead of agreement Neumann described Bevin's reply exactly as reported in paragraph 6, Embassy's 752, February 4.

8. Bevin said that British Delegation would be willing to put its ideas re unitary state in writing. He hoped for early Jewish Agency Delegation consideration of these explanatory views because he wanted to go before Parliament next week to state position.

9. At this point Creech Jones, knowing how Jewish Agency Delegation feels about Morrison plan in any form asked whether Jewish Agency Delegation would be willing to consider the British views set down as in paragraph 8 above. Jewish Agency Delegation said that it would be willing to look at unitary state proposal. In so doing Neumann feels personally that Jewish Agency Delegation was too polite.

10. Jewish Agency Delegation expected to receive British views re unitary state within few hours on the understanding that it was a British suggestion submitted without prejudice.

11. Ben-Gurion ended talk with an appeal to Bevin as Socialist to
Socialist and Laborite to Laborite. Bevin was unmoved being concerned with “practical politics of situation”.

12. In summary Neumann felt that Jewish Agency Delegation got no new information on major points and that meeting had clearly shown divergence of views between Bevin and Creech Jones, latter obviously being more inclined to give Jews a square deal than former.

13. Neumann said that at Jewish Agency Delegation meeting today he would recommend to his colleagues that Jewish Agency Delegation terminate talks at once. He thought his colleagues would accept his recommendation which was based on fact that unitary state plan is only Morrison plan disguised, and secondly, because evacuation of British women and children from Palestine and other military measures have established a background against which Jewish Agency leaders in London can hope to do nothing. Of the two reasons latter was most important. Jewish Agency has information of the coming repressions Britain’s plan for Palestine. Such repression would play into hands of Irgun. In face of military action, which might include repression of Jewish Agency, Neumann could see no purpose in sitting quietly at conference table with Britain’s [sic]. By so doing Jewish Agency leaders would be ridiculous. He had told some of his colleagues from Palestine that they had better get ready to go back to jail.

14. Neumann said that he had talked yesterday on telephone with Rabbi Silver who was in Washington seeing Ambassador Gardner and the Secretary. He had explained to Silver that nothing could come of present talks and that Jewish Agency was being maneuvered into hopeless position.

15. Embassy seeing Neumann and possibly Shertok later today.

GALLMAN

890B.00/2-547: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, February 5, 1947—6 p. m.

US URGENT

789. Meeting Arab Delegation and British Delegation yesterday according Beeley lasted 2½ hours and was marked by “gloves off” attitude from both sides. See Embtel 771 February 5 for agreed statement issued conclusion meeting.

1. Faris el-Khoury opened meeting with formal statement Arab case in general terms and concluded with thought that October Arab Delegation proposals represent only just and equitable settlement. Dele-

1 Not printed.
gates from Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt elaborated some points made by el-Khoury but said nothing of special interest.

2. Jamal Husseini said he desired to appeal to Creech Jones and Bevin as Socialists. He said that leaving aside dispute between Arabs and Jews, Palestine constituted a serious social problem as result of congestions on land in Arab parts of Palestine where even now average Arab farmer has insufficient land to support his family. Within next twenty years high Arab fertility will still more seriously congest land even if no more immigrants are admitted. He asked whether mandatory under a Socialist government did not feel responsible for this growing social problem.

3. British Delegation "did its best" to present Zionist counter-arguments to Arab plan and discussion followed until el-Khoury interrupted to say that he wanted to cut these useless arguments short. Would British Delegation answer two questions?

(a) Do British intend to propose partition or a course which would lead to partition?

(b) Do British intend to permit continuance of Jewish immigration into Palestine?

4. Bevin said that he could not answer first question but that he would put Arab views against partition to Cab[inet]. (At this point a member of Arab Delegation evoked Arab applause by stating "partition means war"). To second question Bevin said that Arabs had better wait until they had seen British proposals. However, public opinion in Britain believed that further Jewish immigration should take place. He intended to put this question before Cab also.

5. At one point Bevin made appeal, mentioned in reference statement, for more yielding attitude on part of Arab Delegation.

6. Bevin said that he would within a few days and after consulting Cab lay before Arab Delegation British proposals in some form.

7. Beeley said that proposals Bevin had in mind were those promised Jewish Agency Delegation at February 3rd meeting (Embtel 752, paragraph 8, February 4th). At first Bevin had thought he would put in "personal paper" without commitment as a basis of discussion and this was what he had in mind when he talked to Jewish Agency Delegation. However, Bevin has changed his mind and decided that before any paper is submitted to either side, Cab must be consulted. Consequently, neither Jewish Agency Delegation nor Arab Delegation will receive proposals from British before Cab gives its clearance which may be obtained either tomorrow or Friday. Cab may decide that proposals should be submitted as Bevin originally intended, (i.e. without commitment) or it may decide that they should be submitted with full backing British Government subject only approval UN. A third
but unlikely possibility is that Cab might decide that British should give no proposals to the two Delegations.

8. Beeley said that he had been working with others night and day on British proposals which he felt represented "an honorable and reasonable attempt to avoid choosing sides". He was not free to go into details regarding them but it was clear that they envisaged a bi-national unitary state. He thought that proposals would please neither side but that they represented a fair and just approach. Beeley indicated that early increased Jewish immigration was involved "at least in the draft as it now stands."

9. One important virtue of proposals now in draft was that lawyers would possibly consider them to be within terms of mandate and thus, if Cab so decided, they could be put into effect at once.

GALLMAN

867N.01/2-547: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET

WASHINGTON, February 6, 1947—8 p.m.

628. We are glad to obtain info contained para 4 urtel 793 Feb 5 to effect Colonial Office does not believe there is any question of martial law being imposed unless "further serious terrorist outbreaks occur" and in event disturbances do take place High Commissioner may order only certain areas under military administration.  

Recent evacuation order has given rise to considerable apprehension on part of Zionists this country lest Brit Govt is considering possibility of taking drastic measures in Palestine which may lead to what amounts to open warfare between Brit troops and Jewish population of Palestine. Some of more extreme Zionists are beginning preparations to launch new anti-Brit campaign in event measures of this character should be taken. In discussing matter informally with Brit Emb today we have taken occasion to point out that it might be helpful in forestalling such campaign if Brit Govt would find it possible

1 Not printed.

2 Telegram 793 also reported information from the Colonial Office that no action was planned against the Jewish Agency or any other law-abiding organization in Palestine. The message concluded with Chargé Gallman's observation that the "Colonial Office is largely informed post facto rather than consulted re measures taken by Palestine Govt. Same is true of Foreign Office." (867N.01/2-547)
to make public announcement along lines of statements made to you by Colonial Office as contained in telegram under reference.

Sent London as Dept's 623 rptd Jerusalem as Dept's 47.

MARSHALL

867N.01/2-747 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, February 7, 1947—5 p. m.

850. Beeley gave following outline today of yesterday's meeting British Delegation and JA Delegation (Embassy's 819, February 6): ¹

1. Meeting followed "familiar pattern" of British Delegation endeavoring to persuade JA Delegation to put a partition plan on table, and of Jews steadfastly refusing to do so.

2. Beeley believes JA Delegation refusal to table plan involves following motives: (a) If JA Delegation tables partition plan, it will be sacrificing part of Palestine; (b) coalition JA Executive includes both partitionists and anti-partitionists between whom measure of agreement lies in fact that JA Delegation will consider partition plan only if someone else proposes it; (c) it is possible JA Delegation cannot agree within itself re frontiers of partition plan which should be put forward in first instance; (d) frontiers drawn to extent of more extreme Jewish demands would look absurd, and might cause case of JA Delegation to be laughed out of court.

3. Creech Jones asked JA Delegation what it wanted by way of immigration and sovereignty. Re immigration, Ben-Gurion's considered reply was that under mandate JA Delegation wanted immigration to full extent of economic absorptive capacity of Palestine; if Palestine divided Jews must be free to determine rate of immigration into Jewish area without interference or control. Re sovereignty Ben-Gurion said that when mandate is terminated Jews in Palestine must have same independence as any other state. Ben-Gurion indicated that he would prefer British to carry out mandate in accordance with Zionist interpretation of mandate.

4. Bevin said that British Govt will not be responsible for forcing a solution on either Arabs or Jews. He said that if acquiescence is not forthcoming UN must take responsibility for decision.

¹ Not printed.
5. Since British proposals were not ready, a variety of subjects were discussed including effect of Jewish immigration on Arab unemployed and land transfer regulations which Jews attacked bitterly as racial discrimination. In latter connection Beeley said Sir Douglas Harris (Embassy's 264, January 14) advised that land transfer regulations were drafted two years before White Paper and promulgated about year afterward; they were purely social and economic measures designed to protect Palestinian Arab cultivator in that they forbade anyone except Palestinian Arab cultivators from buying land. There was no racial discrimination because Syrian and Transjordan Arabs were also precluded from buying land.

6. Beeley got impression that JA Delegation had not closed door to some form of cantonization and that JA Delegation would study British proposals in light of area, freedom of control over immigration and sovereignty.

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GALLMAN

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2 In telegram 264, January 14, 6 p.m., the Embassy in London notified the Department that Sir Douglas (of the Colonial Office) had been relieved of all other duties to spend full time amassing facts and figures for use if and when partition would be discussed with the Arabs and Jews. (86T.N.01/1-1447)

News Division Files

Memorandum of the Press and Radio News Conference, of the Secretary of State, February 7, 1947

[Extract]

PALESTINE

Mr. Marshall said that the Department was being closely and fully informed on the progress of the very critical and delicate negotiations concerning Palestine which were going on in London and the difficulties which were involved. He said that we could only hope that the contending parties would get down to a specific settlement of their vexations issues. The Secretary stated that we were deeply concerned over the actual situation in Palestine itself and he said that he felt there had been some confusion there as to the purposes of the British Government in its various actions where the implication assumed was that the action taken indicated strong, military tactics. Mr. Marshall felt that this was not the case, that the trouble had been largely the character of the publicity the matter had received. Secretary Marshall concluded that he had to be very careful in what he had to say concerning Palestine because of the delicate negotiations which were going on.
SECRET

TEXT OF MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM MR. BEVIN DATED FEBRUARY 7TH 1947

Following is summary of the proposals.

The document begins by reciting our obligations under the Mandate and points out that during the last twenty-five years we have done our best to further the legitimate aspirations of the Jews without prejudicing the interests of the Arabs. We have however been able to "secure the development of self-governing institutions" in accordance with the Mandate because it has not been possible to find a basis of co-operation acceptable to both Arabs and Jews. A time has come when development in the direction of self-government can no longer be delayed. Forms of government must now be established which have their roots in the people of the country and which offer a prospect of full independence within a reasonably short period.

2. Under our present proposals the people of the country would be associated with the Central Government from the outset and would be given a large measure of responsibility for local affairs. British participation in the government would not continue for longer than necessary to effect the transition to complete independence and this period of transition would be fixed at five years.

3. The proposals would be embodied in a trusteeship agreement. We believe that they are in conformity both with the obligations already resting upon us under the Mandate and with the provisions of Article 76 of the United Nations Charter.

4. There would necessarily be an interval between the present discussions and the conclusion of a trusteeship agreement, but if it appeared that the suggested policy would command sufficient acquiescence in Palestine we could no doubt make interim arrangements in harmony with this policy before it was formally approved by the United Nations.

5. Paragraphs six to ten below outline the essential features of the proposed trusteeship agreement.

6. Areas of local administration would be delimited in such a way as to include in each a substantial majority either of Arabs or Jews. Neither the whole of the Arab territory nor the whole of the Jewish territory would necessarily be contiguous. A reasonably wide range of powers would be granted to the local administrations. There would

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1 There is no indication of the date this communication was received in the Department.
be safeguards for the rights of the Jewish minority in Arab areas and of the Arab minority in the Jewish areas.

7. "The British Delegation cannot accept the contention of the representatives of the Jewish Agency that the rate of Jewish immigration into Palestine as a whole should be determined by the Jews alone. Nor can they accept the demand of the Arab Delegation that all Jewish immigration into Palestine should cease forthwith. They do not contemplate either a settlement which would bring to an end the development of the Jewish National Home, or the admission of Jewish immigrants without reference to the effect of their entry on the rights and position of the non-Jewish population of the country. Any provisions made for future Jewish immigration must rest upon consideration for the well-being of Palestine as a whole.

"With this end in view the trusteeship agreement would provide for Jewish immigration at a rate of 4000 monthly, for a period of two years. This would guarantee the entry of approximately 100,000 additional Jewish immigrants. During the remainder of the period of trusteeship the continuance of immigration and the rate of entry would be determined with due regard to the principle of economic absorptive capacity by the High Commissioner in consultation with his Advisory Council; and in the event of disagreement the final decision would rest with an Arbitration Tribunal appointed by the United Nations."

8. "Control over transfers of land, including the power to amend the existing land transfers regulations would be conferred on the local authorities."

9. "The High Commissioner would continue to exercise supreme legislative and executive authority. He would, however, endeavor to form an advisory council so composed as to include representatives, not only of the Arab and Jewish local administrations, but also of labour, cultural and other organised interests. Despite this composition, it is probable that voting in the Advisory Council would tend first to follow communal lines. Since, however, the functions of the council would be advisory and not legislative, the High Commissioner would be required to give due attention to the views of minorities. On the conclusion of the Trusteeship Agreement the Jewish members of the Advisory Council would supersede the Jewish Agency for Palestine as the official channel of communication between the Jewish community and the High Commissioner.

"During the period of trusteeship, the High Commissioner would introduce Palestinians into his executive council, and would progressively increase the proportion of Palestinian members in that council."

10. At the end of four years, a constituent assembly would be elected.
If the majority of its Jewish members and the majority of its Arab members failed to reach agreement on the terms of a constitution, the trusteeship council would be asked to advise on the next move.

11. The object of the administering authority during the five years of trusteeship would be to prepare Palestine for independence. His Majesty's Government are not prepared to continue indefinitely to govern Palestine themselves merely because Jews and Arabs cannot agree upon the means of sharing its government between them. They have therefore devised a plan which should give the two peoples an opportunity of demonstrating their ability to work together for the good of Palestine as a whole and so providing a stable foundation for an independent state.  

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² For the text of "The Proposals submitted by the British Delegation to the Palestine Conference on 7th February, 1947, and also Communicated to Representatives of the Jewish Agency", see British Cmd. 7044, Palestine No. 1 (1947), p. 11.

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867N.01/2-847: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

Moscow, February 8, 1947—3 p. m.

344. Marking first direct Soviet comment on present Palestine crisis, Izvestia International Review February 8 indicates British evacuation of women and children is prelude to military action to enforce four-fold partition of Palestine under which British could retain control. Review states such action part of further plan for detachment of northern section of Palestine and its incorporation in Greater Syria. Such reshuffling of states to suit British strategic plan, Review claims, is in conflict with interests of peoples of Arab state.

Beirut repeat to Arab capitals.

Department please repeat to London as Moscow’s 41 and Beirut.

SMITH

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¹ For documentation on the plan for a Greater Syria, see pp. 738 ff.

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867N.01/2-947

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) to the Secretary of State

[LONDON, undated.]

I read with pleasure the newspaper account of your remarks on Palestine at your press conference on February 7th. I know how deeply

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¹ Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by Sir John Balfour, the British Minister, on February 9.
concerned you must be about the Palestine problem, and I am doing my best to keep you fully informed. You will have read the outline of our new proposals left with you by Lord Inverchapel. I am sending you this personal message in addition so that you may be aware of some of the considerations which we have had in mind when drafting this plan.

We were faced with three alternatives. We could have advanced proposals which would have satisfied one party but which we should have had to impose on the other at the point of the bayonet. I think the Arab plan could only have been imposed in this way, and the same is true of partition, especially of partition along any frontier which would have satisfied Zionist claims (incidentally one of our difficulties has been that the Jews have never given us any proposals. I have a feeling that this is due to disagreement among themselves). Or we might have concluded that the problem was insoluble by ourselves alone and referred the whole matter [to] the United Nations without making any recommendations. Even now we may be driven to adopt this course. But we thought it right first to make one more attempt to arrive at a settlement which would seem just to all reasonable people, through negotiation if possible, or at least with a fair prospect of acquiescence from the inhabitants of Palestine. I am sure you will understand my determination that the British Troops who fought for freedom in the late war shall not now be used to impose a policy by force in Palestine. And I think you will sympathise with us in exhausting our own resources of conciliation before we carry the matter to the United Nations.

We have given much thought to our obligations under the mandate. I am sincerely convinced that we have honestly carried them out hitherto, with the very important exception that we have not found it possible to develop self-governing institutions. We have now decided that a time has come when the peoples living in Palestine must be made to accept responsibility for their own fate. We cannot go on for ever maintaining an alien rule over that country. First objective of our new policy is therefore to make Palestine independent after a short period of transition, which we have fixed at five years.

I think you will find that our proposals are consistent with the present mandate. This has the great advantage that, if we find we can carry them into effect, we can begin to do so without waiting for the conclusion of a Trusteeship Agreement, but we intend to seek international approval of our policy through the negotiation of a Trusteeship Agreement as soon as possible.

During period of transition, the High Commissioner would try to
form an Advisory Council, and would be guided as far as possible by its advice. We have left composition of this body open for negotiation. It is obviously a very difficult point to decide, but we have provided that, even if we cannot give numerical parity to the Jews and Arabs, the High Commissioner should pay attention to views of the minority as well as of the majority. We have also thought it logical that, as soon as a central representative organ is established in Palestine, the Jewish population should deal with the High Commissioner through the Jewish members of that body and not through the Executive of the Jewish Agency, which represents Jews in all parts of the world. An international organisation cannot be embodied in the constitution of any country.

We have thought it right, especially as a safeguard for the development of a Jewish National Home, to provide for local areas with a large measure of autonomy. Our difficulty here is of course to de-limit Arab and Jewish areas. As you are aware it is impossible to find in all Palestine, apart from Tel Aviv and its environs, any sizable area with a Jewish majority. But we are still working on this problem and I think we shall solve it and in due course produce a reasonable map.

The vexed question of immigration has worried me more than anything else. I think that time has come to refer it, if the Arabs and Jews cannot agree, to international arbitration. This we have provided for at the end of two years. But in the immediate future we felt we should ask Palestine to make a special contribution to the relief of distress in Europe. We had also in mind President Truman's desire to see 100,000 immigrants admitted into Palestine. The proposals therefore guarantee the entry of approximately that number before international arbitration is invoked. To admit them in a shorter period than two years would probably cause an upheaval.

After four years, we hope to hold elections for a constituent assembly, and to put before the Palestinians themselves the problem of constituting their independent state. If they cannot agree on how to become independent, we shall ask the Trusteeship Council to advise us on our next move.

The initial reaction of the Arabs to our proposals is sharply hostile, and I cannot say that I hope for a better reception by the Jews. I realise that you will receive strong representations against our proposals from sections of American public opinion. But I think that if you imagine yourself in my position you will agree that this last attempt we are making to solve the problem ourselves is just and reasonable.

[Ernest Bevin]
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

SECRET

WASHINGTON,] February 10, 1947.

Attached hereto is the summary of Mr. Bevin's proposals of February 7, 1947 to the Jews and Arabs regarding Palestine.

[Here follows the proposals.]

It is interesting to note that the British Government is endeavoring gradually to reduce Palestine from a world to a local issue. Its proposals would mean that the Jews of Palestine through the Advisory Council, rather than the Jews of the world—particularly of the United States—through the Jewish Agency as at present would speak for the Jews. Furthermore, the Arabs of Palestine, rather than the representatives of Arab States, would speak for the Arabs.

The proposals, furthermore, seem to point more directly towards a binational state than did the Morrison-Grady plan. At the end of the five years, however, in case of failure of agreement between Arabs and Jews, partition, cantonization, binationalism, or any other form of state or states could apparently be recommended by the Trusteeship Council.

No reference is made in the summary to the holy places or to the rights of Palestinians who are neither Arab nor Jew. It is probable that the full proposals will have appropriate provisions of this character.

American Zionists will bitterly oppose the plan because:

1. It does not provide for an independent Jewish state.
2. It provides for local administrations which will be predominantly Arab in areas in which Arabs are at present in the majority.
3. It fails to give Jews the right to determine their own rates of immigration.
4. The rate of immigration is too low and for too short a period. American Zionists will certainly insist upon the admission of several hundred thousand Jews during any period of trusteeship.
5. It apparently does not give financial autonomy to the Jewish districts. They will lose a measure of control over the situation since the Agency in which they wield great influence will no longer act as a spokesman for the Jews. They will, nevertheless, be able through their financial power to bring much pressure on the Jews of Palestine.

The Arabs will also object because:

1. Provisions are made for further Jewish immigration. They are sure to be suspicious that the High Commissioner and the Arbitration Tribunal will admit large numbers of Jews during the last three years of the trusteeship.
2. There is no provision for the establishment of a Palestinian State based on majority rule.

In general, the plan should not be so objectionable to the Arabs as to the American Jews.

From the point of view of the American Government, one of the main defects is the slow rate of Jewish immigration. It would be preferable for the 100,000 to go to Palestine during the course of a year, beginning at once, rather than over a two-year period. The proposals are so worded that it is possible under them for immigration to begin at once if there is not too much opposition to them.

If we give our support to the proposals, even if amended so as to speed up the admission of the 100,000, American Zionists will probably charge that we have betrayed them. Nevertheless, the proposals seem to be somewhat nearer to the original Anglo-American plan than were the Morrison-Grady proposals. The British, furthermore, in preparing them were clearly endeavoring to live up to the letter of the mandate and to preserve strict impartiality as between Jews and Arabs.

We feel that it would be unwise for us to comment on the merits of the plan until the storm which its announcement will raise has subsided.

LOY W. HENDERSON

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1 For the report made on April 20, 1946, by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, see circular telegram of April 25 and footnote 22, Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. vii, pp. 585 and 588, respectively.

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867N.01/2-1047: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET

WASHINGTON, February 10, 1947—9 p. m.

680. For Gallman from Henderson. Brit Emb has furnished us summary of Bevin's proposals to Jews and Arabs and has sent Secretary courteous and enlightening personal message from Bevin. Matter (urtel 898 Feb 10 1) being studied here with deep interest.

It would be helpful to us in this connection if you would informally inquire with re following and telegraph replies:

1. Are we correct in understanding that areas of local administration are being determined on basis racial or religious complexion of population without consideration being given to economic factors or to potential economic development or settlement factors?

2. If so would Arab majority in what are now predominantly Arab areas have right to use their local administrative jurisdiction over

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1 Not printed.
land transfer so as to prevent settlement by Jews in those areas during period of trusteeship even though certain lands in those areas are particularly well suited for settlement?

3. In considering economic absorptive capacity of Palestine during final three years of trusteeship is it proposed to include capacity of areas predominantly Arab as well as those predominantly Jewish?

4. If not how would it be possible effectively to answer charges which Jews might make that it would be in keeping with the spirit of the mandate to consider absorptive capacity of Palestine as a whole and not merely of certain sections in which there are already substantial Jewish settlements?

5. Is it contemplated that virtually all areas must be considered substantially Arab or substantially Jewish or is it contemplated that some areas should be for time being under control of trusteeship government and open to settlement in accordance with absorptive capacity?

6. Is special provision being made for holy places and is any consideration being given to interests of groups who are neither Arab nor Jewish? [Henderson.]

Marshall

867N.01/2-1147 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

London, February 11, 1947—2 p. m.

926. Beeley’s report (Embassy’s 898, February 10\(^1\)) re 2½ hour meeting between JA Delegation and British Delegation yesterday afternoon follows:

1. Ben-Gurion opened with statement that JA Delegation has rejected Morrison plan and that present proposals moved away from Morrison plan in direction of White Paper.

2. Ben-Gurion argued that British proposals envisaged 100,000 immigrants in 2 years instead of in 1 year as Morrison plan suggested. Re this argument, Beeley commented that Morrison plan was contingent upon US support for plan as whole. British had given specific warning that alteration in immigration rate might be necessary if US support was not forthcoming.

3. Ben-Gurion said that under British proposals after 2 years further immigration would be dependent upon UN decision. British Delegation pointed out that this was not strictly true: it had in mind decision re immigration by an arbitration tribunal set up under UN auspices.

\(^1\) Not printed.
4. Ben-Gurion was concerned by fact Jewish areas would not be necessarily contiguous. He envisaged a series of Jewish enclaves. Beeley said discussion this point was complicated by absence of British map, and no specific reply was made by British Delegation. What British have in mind, Beeley said is "three or four" Jewish areas united administratively under one Jewish authority, total Jewish area being about the same as under Morrison plan. This will be explained to JA representatives at meeting today. (See paragraph 13.)

5. Ben-Gurion deplored fact that under proposals JA would lose its status under mandate.

6. Ben-Gurion's main objection was under proposals Palestine would be independent state with Arab majority after 5 years. Ben-Gurion said: "We do not care to have a Palestine state. This is not our business". British Delegation replied that it was not prejudging character of Palestine state which would be UN matter.

7. Ben-Gurion said that British under their proposals would continue to control immigration but settlement would be restricted to Jewish areas. Beeley said that this was an unfortunate misunderstanding which he was afraid British Delegation had not yet made clear to JA Delegation. Under proposals Jewish immigrants could go anywhere in Palestine and do anything except buy land in Arab areas. Immigrants could, for example, settle on land already owned by Jews in Arab areas.

8. Ben-Gurion argued at length that position of Arab minority in Jewish state would be far better than that of Jewish minority in Arab state because in former case Jews being surrounded by Arab countries would be forced to treat Arab minority well.

9. At this point Creech Jones said forcefully that JA Delegation was putting worst possible interpretation on every phrase of British proposals.

10. Goldmann said that there is definite risk that when matter is referred to UN, UN will establish a state with an Arab majority. He suggested to British Delegation that it should put forward to UN a partition proposal.

11. Bevin said that if neither side would acquiesce to proposals British Government would go to UN with no recommendations. Govt would, however, make available to UN all plans relating to Palestine including Arab proposals. Bevin made no mention of possibility of special UN GA meeting to consider matter. Bevin asked again for JA's partition proposals.

12. JA Delegation replied that it was prepared to accept, but not to advance, partition and pointed out that if JA Delegation had not produced map neither had British Delegation.
13. Bevin said that British Delegation would show JA Delegation a map. Bevin’s intention was that JA would in return show British Delegation its map. Here, Beeley thought JA Delegation got best of argument because while Brook, Harris and Beeley are scheduled to show Ben-Gurion, Shertok and Horowitz a British map this afternoon at 5:30, he was not sure that JA Delegation understood that it would have to produce its map. British would show British map in any case.

14. Beeley said atmosphere meeting was relatively friendly and that while there is no prospect of JA Delegation agreement to British proposals no door is yet closed.

15. Re Arab Delegation British have had no official notice of Arab reactions but are hourly expecting note from Arab Delegation commenting on proposals. British Delegation is standing by to meet this afternoon with Arab Delegation at 3 p.m. if Arab Delegation requests meeting.

GALLMAN

2 Sir Norman Brook had headed the British Delegation negotiating with the Grady Mission.

SECRET

WASHINGTON, February 11, 1947—7 p.m.

I am sending you this interim line to thank you for your most helpful explanatory message on your recent Palestine proposals. I am glad that you found my remarks to the press helpful. I was most anxious not to embarrass you in your difficult and delicate task. I am studying the proposals and if questions occur to me to which I cannot get answers here I may bother you with them.

MARSHALL

1 Sent to London as Department telegram 697, with the instruction: “Please deliver to Mr. Bevin the following message from the Secretary.”

SECRET

LONDON, February 11, 1947—7 p.m.

939. Beeley, Foreign Office, and Mathieson, Colonial Office, collaborated on following replies to questions Department’s 680, Feb 10:

Question 1. Great difficulty is that there is no area of substantial size in Palestine, apart from Tel-Aviv and its neighborhood, in which there
is a numerical majority of Jews. On other hand, it is British desire
to give Jews as nearly as possible the room for development which was
accorded them in Brook–Grady plan.¹ British think at present that
only way this can be done is to place all “Jewish” areas under a single
administration, so that population of Tel-Aviv would outweigh local
Arab majorities in rest of Jewish territory. Thus British are taking
potential economic development and settlement factors into account in
determining size of Jewish areas.

Question 2. It follows from (1) above there would be a considerable
area in which Jews would remain free to purchase land. This would
not include northern part of what Jews call the Negeb, but British
attach great importance to reserving some part of Palestine which is
capable of development to absorb surplus Arab population from the
hills, and British see no possibility of doing this except in southern
coastal plain.

Question 3. Under British proposal, central government would be
responsible for economic development involving country as a whole.
Immigration would, so far as it could be determined without reference
to arbitration, be fitted into this general economic plan, thus taking
into account absorptive capacity of country as whole.

It should be noted that Jewish immigration into Arab areas, as
distinct from purchase of land there, would not be prohibited.

Question 4. See answer to 3 above.

Question 5. British do not contemplate that any area should be left
under direct control of central govt. In present discussions, Negeb has
been divided into two parts. Northern or cultivable part carries al-
ready a substantial Arab population, and British hope to develop it
further in Arab interest (see 2 above). Jews have themselves stated
that uninhabited southern part of Negeb is useless to them. Conse-
quently, Negeb will be left in Arab area.

Question 6. During period of trusteeship, High Commission will
continue to be responsible for holy places. At end of that period, it
will be for UN to make sure that holy places are adequately safe-
guarded under the independent state. Palestine Government is at
present considering proposals for administration of Jerusalem, which
would provide for a Jewish and an Arab council in the Jewish and
Arab areas respectively, and for a mixed administration for remainder
of Jerusalem. If adopted, this proposal would fit easily into present
scheme. Beyond safeguards for minorities generally, no special pro-
vision has been made for interests of non-Arab and non-Jewish groups
which in any case are numerically insignificant in Palestine.

GALLMAN

¹ Better known as the “Grady–Morrison Plan”.
SECRET

LONDON, February 13, 1947—7 p. m.

1005. Following obtained today from Beeley and Sir Douglas Harris:

1. British showed representatives Jewish Agency Delegation February 11 British map “insofar as it has been prepared”. Beeley said map is still in draft stage. (Embassy’s 926, February 11).

2. Representatives Jewish Agency Delegation did not produce map but by moving fingers over British map showed what they had in mind. According Beeley and Harris it was clear that even if both sides should accept partition in principle there exists no hope of reaching agreement re frontiers. Gap between Jewish Agency thinking and any partition proposal which British have even contemplated is far too great to be bridged.

3. Beeley apologized for not being able to give Embassy fuller account of February 11 meeting. He said he was bound by agreement made with representatives Jewish Agency Delegation present that both sides would keep developments at meeting strictly confidential. Beeley said, however, that little of significance took place and that secrecy did not mark anything of importance.

4. Jewish Agency Delegation has not yet submitted to British Delegation its objections in writing to British proposals (Embassy’s 982, February 12) but Beeley understood that Jewish Agency is drafting them.

5. Having agreed February 10 that another meeting would be held, Jewish Agency Delegation and British Delegation meet today. Beeley could not forecast what would be said.

6. British Delegation and Arab Delegation met February 12. Bevin opened meeting by saying it was clear that agreement was not going to be reached on basis British proposals. He said that Arab objections and Jewish Agency objections to proposals have so much in common that it seemed to him it might be best for British to stand aside and let Jewish Agency Delegation and Arab Delegation work out their own solution. Bevin said he would undertake to put into effect any

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3 Not printed.

2 In telegram 931, February 11, from London, Chargé Gallman reported information from Mr. Beeley that the British had received a statement from the Arab Delegation rejecting the British proposals but not closing the door on future negotiations (867N.01/2-1147). The text of the statement, dated February 10, was transmitted in despatch 4284, March 14, from London (867N.01/3-1447).
agreement which Arabs and Jews would work out directly between themselves.

7. In absence Faris el-Khoury, Jamal Husseini for Arab Delegation made “fighting speech”. He said that so far Arab Governments have been able to restrain their populations but he did not think this was possible for much longer. In his view Middle Eastern peace was gravely threatened by Palestine situation and by strain which British role in Palestine has placed on Anglo-Arab friendship.

8. Lebanese delegate, Nadim Dimechkie, then made speech analyzing and attempting to demolish Jewish case which he said rested upon following four points:

(a) Jewish historical case: Arabs have been in Palestine so long that this can hardly be taken seriously;
(b) Distress of Jews in Europe: Arabs have not caused this and do not see why they alone should be called upon to remedy this distress;
(c) Jewish religious interests: Jews did not have an exclusive religious interest and there was no reason why such interest should have political consequences;
(d) Jews are capable of developing Palestine economically better than present inhabitants: This argument was precisely that used by Italians in Ethiopia.

10. Dimechkie said that Arabs are being asked to compromise. Arabs feel that Balfour Declaration was illegitimate and every Jewish immigrant into Palestine was for them a compromise. Arabs have compromised enough by recognizing present Jewish population Palestine and are not prepared to go further.

11. Question then arose as to what Arab Delegation would like British to do in Palestine. Palestine Arabs recommended strongly that British should pack up and get out leaving Palestine Arabs to handle resulting situation. British asked whether Palestine Arabs did not realize strength of Jews and prospect of bloodshed in such an event. Palestine Arabs said they were confident of handling situation and of Arab League support if that should be necessary.

12. Bevin said that he would make full report re proceedings Palestine Conference to Cabinet at its February 14 meeting. He asked Arab Delegation to remain in London until after this meeting. Re this request Beeley said Bevin made it clear that he might or might not have something to say after Cabinet meeting.

13. Creech Jones saw representatives Agudas Israel 3 February 10 and will see representatives Anglo-Jewish Association February 14. Beeley knew of no official reaction from either organization to pro-

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3 The “Association of Israel”, the organization of ultra-orthodox Jews in Palestine and abroad. The first part of the name is written also as “Agudat” and “Agudath”.
posals but had noted press reports that both are inclined to view British proposals with some favor.

14. Questioned re "Operation Grand National" as British press today describes transfer directly to Palestine of 300 skilled Jewish artisans from British zone Germany, Harris and Beeley said that this movement had been afoot for some time and that 600 Palestine visas had been put at disposal of displaced persons section, British Control Commission. The 300 mentioned in reports are first half such visas which they understood were being granted to Jewish DP's on a point system.

GALLMAN

867N.01/2-1447 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, February 14, 1947—5 p. m.
PRIORITY

1033. British delegate supplied this morning following information re-Palestine developments:

1. British delegate and JA Delegation met yesterday for one and one-half hours. Creech Jones opening meeting said that British Delegation had examined reactions both Arabs and Jews to British proposals and found both sides uncompromising. Consequently, British Delegation could only report their situation to Cabinet and seek its further instructions.

2. JA Delegation restated its requirements for Palestine in following order of preference:

(a) British Govt should turn western Palestine into Jewish state at once.

(b) If above not possible, British should administer mandate as they did prior 1938 until Jews secure majority, at which time Jews would be prepared to consider an independent Palestine.

(c) As last resort, Jews would be prepared to consider viable Jewish state in adequate area indicated at meeting between representatives JA Delegation and representatives British Delegation February 11 (Embassy's 1005, February 13).

3. British Delegation replied that it could not agree to any of the three alternatives outlined by JA, and with regard to last British Delegation did not believe that Palestine could be divided into two viable states.

4. Mood of JA Delegation was described as subdued and resigned. British delegate spoke soberly and with finality, and said that this meeting would be "last of present series with JA Delegation."
5. JA Delegation has not yet submitted its objections to British proposals to British Delegation in writing¹ (Embassy's 1005, February 13, paragraph 4).

6. British Delegation and Arab Delegation will meet this afternoon.

7. British Delegation anticipates next move will be statement on Palestine in Commons, possibly Monday which will be followed by Palestine debate towards end week.

8. Results Cabinet meeting today not yet available.

Gallman

¹ The text of the reply of the Jewish Agency, dated February 13, was transmitted to the Department in despatch 3943, February 21, from London (867N.01/2-2147).

867N.01/2-1447: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, February 14, 1947—7 p. m.

US URGENT

1048. British delegates advised Embassy as follows re brief meeting today between British delegates and Arab delegates (Embassy's 1033, February 14):

1. Bevin informed Arab delegates that his colleagues in Cabinet had agreed with Creech Jones and himself that, inasmuch as plan offered by British Delegation had met with no acceptance from either Arabs or Jews, question must now be referred to UN without British recommendations. Bevin said that Britain would present question before UN as impartially as possible, making available for UN use all proposals submitted, including Arab proposals.

2. Arab delegates asked British to stop all Jewish immigration in interim between now and UN decision. British replied that they would prefer to maintain status quo. This Arabs said could only mean a return to White Paper the last of whose 75,000 immigrants had entered Palestine in December 1945. Arabs said British had established 1500 as interim rate in connection with work of now defunct Anglo-American Committee, and that all Jewish immigration should now cease. Bevin replied that he would refer to Cabinet Arab delegates' request to stop immigration.

3. Re Arab request that Jewish immigration should be terminated, Mathieson, ColOff, said that immigration being crux of problem Bevin will undoubtedly ask Cabinet to decide. He thought 1500 visas monthly would be continued on grounds that this interim rate had been established by British in expectation that Anglo-American Committee
would be able to bring Palestine question to some conclusion. Conclusion has not been reached, however, and until it is, 1500 immigrants monthly is reasonable. On other hand, Mathieson thought that emphasis Arab Delegation has placed on immigration made it impossible to yield to Jewish pressure to increase rate above 1500.

4. British Delegation will spend weekend working on a statement to be made before Parliament February 18¹ (not February 17 as reported refel) and on a White Paper to be issued February 18 in preparation for Palestine debate probably February 20. No final decision has been taken re contents of White Paper.²

GALLMAN

¹ For statement made by Mr. Bevin before the House of Commons on February 18 concerning the termination of the conference with the Arabs and the consultations with the Jewish Agency and the British intention to submit the Palestine question to the United Nations, see Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 433, col. 855.
² The reference is to British Cmd. 7044, Palestine No. 1 (1947).

867N.01/2-1547

The Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, February 15, 1947.

Dear Loy: I have been reviewing the last few days' cables about Palestine, as I know you have been, with concern. The following views and questions are put forward without much confidence but in the hope of provoking some thoughts from you:

1. It looks as though the London conferences have blown up and that we have come to the end of the period begun in 1945 of trying to find a solution by inquiry and negotiation.
2. It looks as though the British were preparing to lay the whole matter before the General Assembly without recommendations.
3. It looks as though the British were prepared to maintain as an interim policy the immigration policy at present in force, that is, 1500 a month.
4. If the foregoing is true 1947 is going to be a bad year in Palestine and the Middle East, with increasing violence and grave danger to our interests in that area.
5. I see little hope that without recommendations from the British the General Assembly will be able to do very much.
6. In this situation I suppose that within a very short time we shall have to discuss the matter with the British Government and I suppose also that if the administration does not give a lead in this matter the Congress will undertake to do so with rather disastrous results.

Therefore, there are two problems that we have to consider. First is, what should the interim program be particularly about immigration? Secondly, what attitude should we take in the United Nations.
As to the first, the British view seems to be that if they make any change in present admission of Jews into Palestine it will produce Arab resistance. This may be true but it seems to me that there will be an equal amount of trouble from trying to maintain the status quo. On the other hand, if there is some relaxation of the present strict immigration policy it has the compensating advantage of perhaps making the Arabs more willing to negotiate and to compromise. Therefore, would it be possible to work for an interim policy of 3,000 per month with the idea that if this produces violence we might regard it as a threat to the peace within the jurisdiction of the Security Council and ask the Security Council to rule on that, if possible giving the interim program the strength of its endorsement.

(As to the second question—that is what position we should take in the United Nations—if the British make no proposals and take no leadership and we do not I presume that the Russians will take the ball and start off with an immense propaganda advantage. Therefore, it is hard to see how we can escape the responsibility for leadership. Furthermore whatever scheme comes out of the United Nations we shall be called upon to furnish the chief economic support for it and, therefore, we have a considerable stake in helping to formulate the best possible policy. This brings us to the question, if I am right so far, as to whether that policy should be based on partition, which we have favored thus far, or whether we will conclude that despite its domestic advantages for us that policy carries too great a weight of international difficulty to put across. One thing which we should avoid is to get committed at an early stage in any discussions with the British to a plan which will leak and cause repercussions in this country. Therefore, on the long-range plan we ought to get our own views as crystallized and as generally accepted within the Government as possible before exposing them to the British.

I am aware that this only poses but does not answer the $64.00 question but I have come to the end of my ideas for the morning.

DEAN ACHESON

S67N.01/2–1547

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 15, 1947.

I called Sir John Balfour at the British Embassy, after trying to telephone the Ambassador and finding he was away. I told Sir John that Mr. Henderson and I had been talking about the Palestine situation this morning and that it seemed to us from the cables that we had received that the London discussions had come to an impasse; that the
British intention to lay the whole thing before the United Nations without any recommendation raised the question of what to do about immigration in the meantime. The cables seemed to indicate that the British Cabinet would have the question put to them and that the British idea prevailing now was that the present arrangement of 1,500 visas monthly would be maintained.

I said that the President and the Secretary of State were both out of town and that the views I wanted to express to him were those of Mr. Henderson and myself, but I thought would be shared by the President and the Secretary.

We hoped that the British would consider the question of immigration very carefully. Our judgment was that if the rate were doubled, so that 3,000 visas a month would be available, this would not make the situation any more difficult and might make it less. I pointed out that I did not believe the Arabs would be much more excited by 3,000 visas than by 1,500. It seemed to me that the possible advantage that would arise from an increase to 3,000 would be to make the Arabs more ready to look to solutions for the problem since, as long as the situation seemed to be stalled, the Arabs were pleased and willing to maintain the status quo. Also with reference to the Jewish side of the question I thought this would be a helpful solution. I said I had had a talk with Rabbi Silver yesterday who seemed to me to be subdued and rather frightened by the impasse that has been produced. If it could be said that the British have done everything they could to negotiate a solution but without success; that they are now laying the matter before the United Nations and in the interim they are making the effort—by raising the visas to 3,000—to take care of the terrible immediate situation in Europe, this would be a very great help to us domestically. I pointed out that so far we have refused to make any statements or to send any notes to the British, pointing to Secretary Marshall’s specific statement that he did not intend to say anything that would rock the boat, but it seemed to me that if the situation has blown up we are going to be under great pressure to make a statement of some sort.

I said that I had given him these views without in any way wanting to embarrass him but simply to let him know our concern about the situation now before a final decision is made.

Sir John said that he understood completely our domestic difficulty and believed that the suggestion was a good one and would not add to their difficulties but on the other hand very probably would be helpful. He said he was most grateful for the suggestion and would pass it on immediately.
The Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

[WASHINGTON,] February 17, 1947.

Dear Dean: I am attaching hereto a summary sent over by the British Embassy of a personal message which the Secretary is to receive today from Bevin.¹

It is suggested that the Secretary answer this message today; that the reply be brief and that although expressing an understanding of the difficulties of the situation in which the British find themselves, it not go into the substance of the matter except perhaps to express the hope that if the British Government feels that it could do so without a further deterioration of the situation in Palestine it would be helpful if it could make it possible for a larger number of displaced European Jews to enter Palestine during the interim period than 1,500 a month, the rate now in effect.

We might later find it advisable to suggest that the matter be laid before the Trusteeship Council which should have its initial meeting in about a month, rather than to hold it up for the General Assembly in the autumn. It might be preferable not to advance such a suggestion, however, until we have a better idea as to what the various reactions to the British decision will be.

With regard to the line which we should take towards the Palestine problem in the light of recent events, I feel that we should move slowly in committing ourselves in any direction. There is a danger that not only would we not be able to persuade the General Assembly to approve any partition plan not recommended by the British Government, which would provide for a really workable Jewish State, but that an attempt on our part so to do would weaken our prestige and influence in the United Nations and react unfavorably in the end against the Jews. Before we engage in any international discussions regarding the matter or before we begin to make any public announcements committing ourselves to any line of action we should decide only after discussions with Congress, with the White House and with American Jews and other interested American groups what our policy is to be. We cannot afford in the forum of the United Nations to retreat from a position once taken as a result of pressure brought upon us from highly organized groups in the United States.

¹Mr. Bevin's message not found in Department files; for summary, see infra. The message as received in the Department from the British Embassy seems to have been dated February 17 but may have been sent by the British Foreign Office on February 15; see telegram 1143, February 19, from London, p. 1053.
We are reviewing all the plans for Palestine that have been advanced thus far and hope to have some concrete suggestions in the near future.

[Annex]

The British Embassy to the Department of State

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

SUMMARY OF A MESSAGE FROM MR. BEVIN TO BE DELIVERED TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON THE 17TH FEBRUARY

Since Mr. Bevin sent the Secretary of State his personal message on the 9th February the British proposals intended for a basis of negotiations have been rejected by both the Jews and the Arabs and the Palestine Conference has come to an end.

2. The Arabs have never accepted the Balfour Declaration or the Mandate but the British Government in administering this responsibility have nevertheless caused to be admitted some 535,000 Jews between 1920 and 1947. The highest figure in any one year was 62,000 in 1935 due to Hitler’s persecution, but this caused an Arab revolt and finally a figure of 75,000 was agreed on for a definite period ending December 1945. But owing to the position in Europe, the British Government extended the monthly quota of 1,500 after that date with the result that some 24,000 Jews have been admitted between January 1946 and the present time.

3. The British Government have tried hard to combine three proposals (1) immigration (2) land transfer and (3) the ultimate establishment of an independent state based on the people resident in Palestine, whether Arab or Jew. This they felt should offer a reasonable solution or at least a basis for discussion, since they consider that the country ought to reach an independent status soon and the Mandatory power yield up its responsibility. This proposed solution has however been rejected by the Jews, since it did not provide for unlimited immigration with the object not of relieving Europe alone but of establishing a Jewish state. When their own partition compromise was looked into, it became clear that the Arabs would be left only a very small and rather desolate area in the hills. The Arabs on the other hand rejected the British solution because it contemplated further Jewish immigration, to which they absolutely refused to agree. In view of the unsatisfactory working of the Mandate and of the respective claims of the two parties, the British Government could only decide to refer the Mandate back to the United Nations which seemed to be the only course open to them in the circumstances.

4. While the British Government will give the United Nations As-
semble all the information and all the documents relating to the schemes which have been put forward from time to time to solve this problem, they have decided not to make any recommendations themselves but to request the Assembly to consider the position and recommend a settlement.

5. Thus far Mr. Bevin’s message. The British Government have informed both the Arab and the Jewish Delegations of what they propose to do and they hope to put the problem to the United Nations Assembly at its next regular meeting in September. An announcement to this effect will be made in Parliament, probably on February 18th, which will be followed by a request for a debate later in the week. Before the debate it is proposed to publish a White Paper containing (1) the Provincial Autonomy Plan (known as the “Morrison-Grady” proposals), (2) The Arab proposals (3) The latest British Proposals.

2 Released as British Cmd. 7044.

867N.01/2-1947: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State
[Extracts]

SECRET

LONDON, February 19, 1947—6 p.m.

1148.

1. As result of Secretary’s suggestion in final paragraph his Feb 17 reply to Bevin’s Feb 15 communication to Secretary via British Embassy Washington, Bevin avoided committing himself regarding GA in statement he read to Parliament yesterday. Meeting of Foreign Office and Colonial Office officials considered possibility of preliminary work in Trusteeship Council but reached conclusion not yet endorsed at ministerial level that reference to Trusteeship Council might prejudice future UN decision. Beeley said that UNGA might decide that Palestine should not be trusteeship but should become an independent state or states at once. British agree that any work which can be done on problem before Sept will be most useful and Beeley said that telegram is now being processed through Foreign Office putting to Cadogan in New York for his comments certain procedural sugges-

1 The formal reply to Mr. Bevin’s communication was conveyed telegraphically to London on February 21; see infra. Presumably a copy was sent to the British Embassy on February 17, as recommended in Mr. Henderson’s communication of February 17 to Mr. Acheson, p. 1061.

2 For text, see Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 433, col. 985.

3 Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Representative at the United Nations.
tions designed to get UN started on Palestine problem in advance Sept UNGA. On basis Cadogan’s advice final reply will be sent to Secretary’s message which so far has been given only interim reply.⁴

3. Beeley said that British officials sympathized deeply with Jews in DP camps but that there is strong feeling in London that nothing should be done to tilt scales in favor of either side between now and UN decision. He thought any increase above 1500 monthly would tilt scales and pointed out that there is possibility that UN may ask British Govt to carry on in Palestine for protracted period while UN considers question. If, for example, monthly quota were doubled it would amount to 36,000 immigrants yearly, a figure only exceeded in 1934 and 1935. As things stand 18,000 Jewish immigrants annually was only exceeded in 1925 and in period 1933–36. He thought that relatively high current rate immigration was sometimes forgotten.

⁴ Not found in Department files.

867N.01/2–2147: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin)¹

SECRET
WASHINGTON, February 21, 1947.

I have just received your considerate message reporting outcome of London conversations re Palestine and regret learn that since solution acceptable both Arabs and Jews has not been found, Brit Govt feels only course open is to refer Mandate back to UN.

In endeavoring to find solution of Palestine problem which could be carried out by peaceful means, Brit Govt has been undertaking difficult and delicate task and we have refrained during course recent conversations from taking any step which might render task still more arduous. Transfer of vexations problem to UN unfortunately does not render it any less complicated or difficult. We are considering carefully what our approach to problem should be in light recent developments in order whatever move we do make will be as constructive as circumstances permit. In meantime is it possible, without bringing about any marked deterioration of situation in Palestine, to increase appreciably number of displaced European Jews who might be ad-

¹ Sent to London as Department telegram 857, February 21, 3 p. m., with the introductory comment: “In reply to Bevin’s message Feb 17 re reference Palestine question to UN See informed Brit Feb 17 substantially as follows”.
mitted into Palestine between present and final disposition of problem by UN?

Increase in number of displaced European Jews into Palestine during next few months would have beneficial effect among Jews in displaced persons centers in Europe and would meet with public approval in this country. It might make both Arabs and Jews more willing to look for compromise solution.

Since, however, Brit Govt bears onerous responsibility for maintenance of order in Palestine we must leave this decision to your judgment.

We suggest also that in your statement that matter will be referred to UN you might consider not referring to GA specifically since on further reflection preparatory work in Trusteeship Council might be helpful.2

MARSHALL

2 Telegram 857 closed with: “In reply to press queries Dept stated that foregoing note contained acknowledgment of Brit communication, request for clarification of GB intentions re certain aspects of plan to refer matter to UN and statement that problem was being carefully considered in light of developments.” According to a memorandum of February 17 from Mr. Acheson to the Secretary of State, President Truman approved the draft reply to Mr. Bevin’s message (867N.01/2-1747).

867N.01/2-2547: Telegram

The Chargé in Syria (Moose) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

DAMASCUS, February 25, 1947—9 a. m.
[Received March 5—4:33 p. m.]

59. At press conference February 20, Jamil Mardam Bey1 stated British decision submit Palestine question UN “shall not influence in any way” decision Arab League Council (taken last extraordinary session) submit question SC or UN should negotiations with British fail.

Prime Minister went on to say “Britain will present an account to UN on its work in Palestine, whereas Arab states will present complaint against British Government in their capacity as plaintiff in accordance with article 5 [sic] of UN Charter which gives Arab states the right to raise Palestine question in view of ties of neighborhood. . . .”2

MOOSE

1 Syrian Prime Minister.
2 Omission indicated in the source text.
Memorandum by Mr. William J. McWilliams of the Executive Secretariat to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] February 25, 1947.

The following report of a statement by Mr. Bevin has just come over the news ticker:

Bevin said that Britain might have been able to increase the present Jewish immigration quota of 1,500 monthly and "do more otherwise for the Jews if the bitterness of feeling which surrounds this problem of immigration had not been increased by American pressure for the immediate entry of 100,000 immigrants."

"I do not desire to create any ill feeling in the United States of America," he added, "in fact I have done all I can to promote the best possible relations with them as with other countries but I should have been happier if they had regarded to the fact that we were the mandatory power and that we were carrying the responsibility."

Bevin charged that American intervention in the Palestine problem had "set the whole thing back."

He said that "if they had only waited to ask us what we were doing then we could have informed them but instead of that a person named Earl Harrison was sent out to their zone (of Germany) and collected certain information.

"This document was issued and I must say it really destroyed the good feeling which the Colonial Secretary and I were endeavoring to produce in the Arab states."

He said that Britain realized America's interest in the problem and that "we had to take American interest into account."

"We accordingly," he said, "invited them to join us in forming an Anglo-American committee of inquiry. I must point out that I have been severely criticized by people in the United States for not accepting the committee's report. I was reminded of this when over there recently almost every day. But none of the report was accepted by the United States except one point, namely, admission of 100,000 immigrants."

Bevin revealed that he had pleaded with Secretary Byrnes in Paris at the time of the Foreign Ministers conference in an effort to get him

1 Addressed also to the Under Secretary of State.
2 Before the House of Commons on February 25; for full text, see Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 433, col. 1901.
3 On February 24, President Truman pledged his continuing efforts toward this goal; see The New York Times, February 25, 1947, p. 1, col. 2.
4 Earl G. Harrison, whose report on the condition and needs of displaced persons in the liberated areas of Western Europe and parts of Germany was released by the White House on September 29, 1945; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, September 30, 1945, p. 458.
to dissuade President Truman from issuing the demand for entry of the Jews into Palestine. His pleas, he said, were futile and the Truman declaration was issued just as Bevin believed his negotiations were on the threshold of success.

The Truman statement, he charged, "spoiled" the talks then in progress with Jewish leaders in Paris.

"I think every country in the world ought to know this," Bevin said. "I went the next morning to Secretary of State Byrnes. I told him how far I had gone the day before and that I believed we were on the road if only they would leave us alone.

"I begged that the statement should not be issued but I was told that if it was not issued by Mr. Truman a competitive statement would be issued by Mr. Dewey, (Gov. Thomas E. Dewey of New York)."

"I really must point out that in international affairs I cannot settle things if my problem is made the subject of local elections."

The House of Commons cheered Bevin's attack on Mr. Truman's tactics.

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*For President Truman's statement of October 4, 1946, see his telegram of October 3, to British Prime Minister Attlee and footnote 71, Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. vii, pp. 701.*

*For President Truman's reaction to Mr. Bevin's statement, see Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Years of Trial and Hope, vol. ii, (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Company, 1956), pp. 153-154.*

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*Statement Issued by the White House, February 26, 1947* ¹

The impression that has arisen from the debate in the British Parliament on February 25 that America's interest in Palestine and the settlement of Jews there is motivated by partisan and local politics is most unfortunate and misleading.

The President's statement of October 4, 1946, which was referred to in that debate, merely reaffirmed the attitude toward Palestine and Jewish immigration into Palestine which the United States Government has publicly expressed since the summer of 1945. This attitude was and is based upon the desire of the President to advance a just solution of the Palestine problem. Our position on this subject was communicated to the British Government by the President in his letter to Prime Minister Attlee on August 31, 1945, ² which was publicly released by the President on November 13, 1945, when he announced

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the establishment of the joint Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The statement of October 4, 1946 reiterated this Government's position, which was already fully known to all parties to the Palestine negotiations.

America's interest in Palestine is of long and continuing standing. It is a deep and abiding interest shared by our people without regard to their political affiliation.

867N.01/2-2847: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, February 26, 1947—8 p.m.

1303. Embassy today discussed informally with Beeley, Bevin's Palestine speech. Following points arose:

1. Bevin had before him comprehensive brief drafted in Foreign Office but for most part he spoke extemporaneously.

2. Full text Hansard report of speech has been telegraphed British Embassy Washington.

3. Bevin looks forward to early opportunity to discuss Palestine with Secretary at Moscow.1 Beeley doubted whether any communications on subject would be sent Washington in interim.

4. Asked what Bevin has in mind when he said that he would be willing to try again for settlement prior UN decision, Beeley said this meant that if either Arabs or Jews took the initiative British Govt would be willing to give anything they had to say most careful consideration to hopes of working out settlement prior UN. Bevin still hoped this might come to pass but prospects were not bright.2

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1 The Fourth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers met at Moscow from March 10 to April 24, 1947; for documentation, see vol. II, pp. 139 ff.

2 According to telegram 1507, March 7, from London, Mr. Goldmann informed the Embassy on March 6 that Mr. Bevin had invited him and a colleague to attend a private conversation with him and Mr. Creech Jones on February 27. "They told JA representatives that they were loath to see Palestine problem sent to UN if there was any possibility of reaching agreement outside UN. Goldmann replied that if British wanted to avoid UN they should leave larger question in suspense and work out with JA a two-year agreement permitting 100,000 immigrants and providing some form of municipal autonomy and new lands laws which would not discriminate against Jews. Bevin indicated that he thought he could persuade Arabs to admit 100,000 provided thereafter Arabs would have a say regarding future immigration. Since JA representatives could not accept 'Arab veto' conversation had no positive results." He noted also that "towards end of British-JA representative talks Ben-Gurion had sent Bevin personally a map and a memorandum dealing with partition, both of which JA in reply to Bevin's direct question on later occasion acknowledged as 'official'." (867N.01/3-747)

Telegram 1508, March 7, 5 p.m., from London, reported that Mr. Beeley subsequently gave an account of the meeting almost identical with Mr. Goldmann's. He said, however, that the Jewish Agency "memo was largely about strategic advantages of partition to British and dealt only incidentally with partition itself. JA did not send map, but B-G indicated on British map what he had in mind." (867N.01/3-747)
5. Beeley summarized speech as Bevin’s rejection of Zionist demand for Jewish state.

6. Beeley said that Bevin had recently expressed to him repeatedly his deep concern for DP’s and of his desire on humanitarian grounds to liquidate this problem. Consequently Beeley was not surprised that Bevin inserted extemporaneously a section on the subject in his speech. Beeley thought personally that Bevin is not very far from the American point of view re the 100,000 because Bevin would undoubtedly use his best efforts to get 100,000 into Palestine at earliest possible date provided this could be done either as a part of political settlement (either inside or outside of UN) or as part of general international humanitarian settlement of refugee problem as a whole. He thought that Bevin is anxious to see 100,000 Jews go to Palestine, but this must be on humanitarian grounds only and not as a step towards establishing a Jewish majority in Palestine with a Jewish state as ultimate goal.

GALLMAN

867N.01/2-2747

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 1

[WASHINGTON,] February 27, 1947.

Participants: The Secretary.

Mr. Henderson, Director, NEA.

Mr. M. Shertok, Representative in the United States of the Jewish Agency.

Mr. Shertok, a Palestinian citizen and representative in the United States of the Jewish Agency, called upon me today in order to present to me certain views of the Jewish Agency with regard to Palestine. A memorandum left by him with the Department and setting forth the substance of his statements is attached hereto. 2

After listening to Mr. Shertok’s remarks, I assured him of the deep interest of the American Government and of myself in this matter. I told him that I could, of course, make no commitments at this time with regard to Palestine, that I had not even as yet had an opportunity to talk with Mr. Bevin, that I expected to see Mr. Bevin in Moscow, and that if, during the course of our conversations in Moscow, the problem of Palestine should arise, 3 I was sure that the statements which Mr. Shertok had made to me would be helpful.

1 Drafted by Mr. Henderson.

2 Not printed.

3 No documentation has been found in Department of State files to indicate that the problem of Palestine was discussed at the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers.
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET


PRIORITY

192. SYG Lie called on me to discuss possible procedures for handling the Palestine question. Lie was concerned at the expense incurred in calling a special session of the GA and indicated that this would also be a heavy burden on the Secretariat. He put forward the following proposal:

That the British should formally request that the SYG appoint a special committee to examine the situation and make recommendations to the GA;

That the SYG would send a circular telegram to all members of the UN asking whether they would consent to the appointment by the SYG of a committee of eight members: UK, USSR, US, France, China, Sweden, Czechoslovakia and Brazil, with authority to go to Palestine to conduct an investigation on the spot, hearing all interested parties, and to report to the GA in September their substantive recommendations for the composition of the problem.

If the majority of the members of the UN indicate by telegram their assent to this proposal, Lie feels he has the authority and would be prepared to appoint such a committee.

Lie indicated that he had discussed this with the British on a tentative basis. They had preferred the Netherlands to Sweden but Lie had rejected this on the grounds that the Netherlands had oil interests.

Lie also indicated he had discussed this with Gromyko\(^1\) who seemed personally to favor this suggestion and who was telegraphing for instructions.

I raised the question as to whether Lie was authorized under the Charter and the GA rules to appoint such a committee. Lie felt that his action in postponing the GA last fall was a precedent. No commitment was made and Lie was advised he [I] would inform him as soon as possible of the US reaction to his proposals.

Austin

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\(^1\) Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, Soviet Representative at the United Nations.
The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)\textsuperscript{1}

WASHINGTON, March 6, 1947—6 p. m.

SECRET

PRIORITY

71. 1. Reurtel 192, March 3. We feel proposal regarding Palestine made by Lie is legally of doubtful validity and on the merits would not accomplish the purposes intended.

2. We find it difficult to reach any conclusion regarding procedure for dealing with the Palestine problem in UN in the absence of any formulation of the problem by the UK Government. We assume that after UK has formulated in principle if not in detail specific substantive proposals for submission to UN it will communicate its intentions to SYG.

3. After receiving such a communication SYG might find it appropriate to have an analysis of the Palestine problem prepared by his Secretariat staff for the use of the appropriate body of UN. Such a study would probably not have as its purpose the formulation of conclusions or recommendations but rather an impartial and objective analysis of the factors involved in the Palestine problem and of proposals which have been made from time to time with regard, for example, to immigration, partition, and the like.

4. To assist in making this study the SYG would presumably wish to avail himself of expert assistance which he is authorized to employ. He would probably also wish to consult with representatives in NY of various Member Governments and in this connection might even desire to establish an informal committee to advise him.

5. In your discretion you may wish to discuss this matter with Cadogan in sense of foregoing paragraphs. You will probably also wish to inform Lie of our tentative views regarding his proposal in the sense of paragraph 1 above, but you may feel that it would be desirable not to discuss the other suggestions with Lie until after you have discussed them with Cadogan.

ACHESON

\textsuperscript{1}Telegram 71 to New York was drafted by the Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Ross). It was based on discussions with Mr. Acheson on March 6 and was approved in draft by Mr. Henderson and officers of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs. In a memorandum of March 7 to Mr. Ross, the Legal Adviser (Fahy) stated that the first paragraph of the telegram "cast legal doubt upon the proposal made by Lie. I have thought that the proposal was legally permissible, though it might be impracticable." (867N.01/3–747)
SECRET

New York, March 8, 1947—4:45 p. m.

PRIORITY

217. Urteil 71, March 6, 6 p. m. Johnson \(^1\) conveyed Department’s views informally to Cadogan yesterday.

With particular reference to numbered paragraph 2, Johnson explained to Cadogan that we felt it essential that the problem of Palestine be formulated by the British Government with an analysis which would indicate how the British Government considered that it might be dealt with by the UN and what they would hope and expect the UN might accomplish toward solution of the problem. Cadogan said that he would report these views immediately to his Government and would have to await instructions before giving us his reply. He suggested that the UK Government might request an immediate meeting of the GA. He seemed skeptical, however, of the efficacy of such a proceeding.

He conceded that legality of Lie’s proposal is debatable. He was not critical of the suggestions for possible action by Lie in your numbered paragraphs 3 and 4 of telegram under reference, but did not understand what we mean by the suggestion for an “informal committee” of representatives of various member governments in New York mentioned in your paragraph 4. This suggestion was not clear to Johnson either, who suggested that no importance should be attached to the word “committee”, but that it should be taken as a suggestion that Lie might wish to consult closely with representatives of member governments in New York who had interest in the Palestine problem and were in possession of valuable information. It was felt that Lie would have no authority to set up even an informal “committee” of representatives of member nations in New York.

In full agreement with Cadogan, Johnson conveyed Department’s views also to SYG Lie. Lie said that if the British follow our suggestion, he will proceed immediately along the lines suggested by the Department. He informed Johnson that the Russians had yesterday agreed to his original suggestion. Lie accepted apparently without resentment our suggestion that his proposal might be of doubtful legal validity, and said that he did not want to take any action which did not

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\(^1\) Herschel V. Johnson, Deputy United States Representative, with the rank of Ambassador, in the United Nations Security Council. During the absence of Senator Austin, he served as Acting United States Representative at the United Nations.
have the unanimous agreement of five permanent members SC, as such
agreement was essential to any hope of success.2

2 In telegram 1241, March 19, the Department informed the Embassy in Lon-
don that "Our attitude on UN procedure re Palestine as expressed to Cadogan
and SYG arose from consideration that report of any ad hoc committee con-
stituted in manner suggested by SYG, or as result of circularization of members
as distinct from action by GA as a body, might be criticized by some of UN
and in other quarters as lacking Charter foundation. It would be unfortunate
to have any serious question arise regarding legality UN consideration Palestine
question at any stage proceedings ... Our basic attitude is that we would
like to see UN give fundamental consideration Palestine problem soon as pos-
sible. In considering question procedure in as definite manner as we can in
absence Brit formulation problem to UN, we have given some thought to idea
of special, brief session of GA restricted to single agenda item of formation of
fairly large but workable ad hoc committee to consider problem and make recom-
mendations to GA at regular Sept session. Such committee might consist dele-
gates countries represented in SC, TRUSTCO and ECOSOC. Ad hoc committee
might appoint small 'neutral' subcommittee to assemble documents, hold hearings
and visit Palestine in order to establish essential facts for consideration parent
committee." (867N.01/3-1147)

867N.01/3-2047

The British Embassy to the Department of State 1

SECRET

PALESTINE AND THE UNITED NATIONS

There are two points on which the Foreign Office have asked the
United States Embassy in London for information. These questions
have since been referred to Mr. Bevin in Moscow, who has instructed
H.M. Ambassador to raise them in Washington:

1. The Foreign Office would like to know whether the State Depart-
ment, in asking for a fuller definition of the part which H.M.G. wish
the United Nations to play, desire H.M.G. to make suggestions for pro-
cedure or for policy. H.M.G. have already made it clear that they wish
the United Nations to make recommendations concerning the future
government of Palestine. In submitting the problem to the General
Assembly (and to the suggested ad hoc Committee if set up), they had
in mind simply to provide factual and historical material dealing with
the administration of the country under the Mandate.

2. The Foreign Office would also like to obtain a fuller explanation
of the legal and other difficulties which the State Department see in the
proposal for an ad hoc Committee appointed by the Secretary General.

H.M.G. themselves are doubtful as to the efficacy in helping to solve
the problem of a study by the United Nations Secretariat, such as the
U.S. Government are understood to have favoured as an alternative
to an ad hoc Committee. They think that if nothing more than such a

1 Handed to Acting Secretary of State Acheson by the British Ambassador on
March 20.

333-774-72——68
study were done between now and September, the Assembly would be likely to appoint a Committee when it meets, and postpone the decision until next year. They consider, accordingly, that an ad hoc Committee would be much more likely to produce results. Such information as the Foreign Office have received indicates that the attitude of the Soviet, French and Chinese Governments is also favourable to this proposal. Although there is nothing in the powers of the Secretary General which positively authorises him to set up an ad hoc Committee, he does not appear to be precluded specifically from doing so, more particularly if he obtains the approval of a majority, or preferably of a two-thirds majority, of the members of the United Nations. The only question, in the view of H.M.G., is that of the precedent which would be set.

It seems therefore that the problem is to devise a way of reconciling the wish of H.M.G. to find some means of making a real step forward in the consideration of this problem before September, with the objections which the State Department see in the creation of a body such as the proposed ad hoc Committee.

WASHINGTON, 18 March, 1947.

867N.01/3-1947

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Villard)

[WASHINGTON,] March 19, 1947.

During the course of his call at the Department today, Dr. Zurayk ¹ observed that the Arab States were strongly opposed to present plans for appointing a committee of the United Nations to study the Palestine case prior to its consideration by the General Assembly next September. He said that he feared the appointment of such a committee, whether it was composed of members of the United Nations or of Secretariat personnel, would result in heavy pressure being applied in such a way as to prejudice the findings of the committee before its report was submitted to the General Assembly.

I said that our own thinking had not been crystallized on this subject, but that we were inclined to feel that some work should be done in the United Nations on the Palestine problem before it was formally aired in the General Assembly. I said that we furthermore were not sure

¹ Costi K. Zurayk, the Syrian Minister.
whether the British were going to present the problem to the General Assembly, the Security Council, or the Trusteeship Council. If nobody in the United Nations devoted any thought or study to the problem before it was considered publicly, the pressures which might be built up could be even heavier.

Dr. Zurayk said that in his opinion, and in the opinion of the other Arab representatives in the United Nations, any committee appointed should be by direction of the General Assembly, either in plenary session or in a special session called for the purpose of considering the Palestine problem. If the committee received its terms of reference direct from the General Assembly and reported back to it, the Arab States would probably be satisfied.

867N.01/3-2647 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

CAIRO, March 26, 1947—2 p. m.

368. [League of] Arab States at Council meeting Monday night: (1) pledged themselves to defend independence Palestine; (2) authorized establishment League committee to organize such defence; (3) requested member states to supply necessary funds to Higher Arab Committee [sic] to intensify Palestine propaganda and to educate Arabs abroad with view of creating Arab university in Palestine; (4) demanded complete and immediate stoppage immigration. Council also protested against inefficient British measures against illegal immigration. Criticism of America and President Truman were dropped from original resolution.¹

Council reiterated support of unity and independence of Libya and charged Secretary General of the League to exert every effort to participation of League or Arab states ² in any inquiry or plebiscite concerning Libya. Embassy advised informally that League is drafting note on this subject.

Repeated London 25.

TUCK

¹The texts of the four resolutions were transmitted to the Department in despatch 2385, March 28, from Cairo. The despatch reported that during the Council discussions, the Iraqi delegate advocated drastic action against the United States and Great Britain, amounting to a breaking-off of diplomatic relations. This view was tempered by the other member states (867N.01/3-2647).

²Seemingly garbled; despatch 2385 indicates participation of "the Arab League or some Arab countries" was intended at this point.
The Department of State to the British Embassy


MEMORANDUM

PALESTINE AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Following the conversation on March 20, 1947, at which time a memorandum dated March 18, 1947 with regard to Palestine and the United Nations was presented by the British Ambassador to the Acting Secretary, careful consideration has been given to the various points which have been raised and informal discussions have taken place between officers of the British Embassy and of the Department.

It is stated in the memorandum under reference that the British Government has already made it clear that it wishes the United Nations to make recommendations concerning the future government of Palestine and that in submitting the problem to the General Assembly the British Government had in mind simply to provide factual and historical material dealing with the administration of the country under the Mandate. The British Government, in the memorandum under reference, has raised the question whether the Department, in asking for a fuller definition of the part which the British Government wishes the United Nations to play, desires the British Government to make suggestions for procedure or for policy.

The United States Government is of the opinion that it would be extremely difficult for the United Nations to undertake to consider the problem of Palestine unless the United Nations was in receipt of some kind of a communication from the British Government containing its formulation of the problem. The position of the United States Government, in this latter respect, is that the British Government itself is in the best position to determine the nature of the formulation of the problem which it desires to present to the United Nations.

The position of the United States Government, with regard to the procedure in the United Nations, is that it is prepared to agree to any procedure for handling the problem which is clearly in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and which would appear to expedite such handling. The United States Government would, for example, be prepared to support what it has been given to understand was the original British proposal that a special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations be called for the purpose of appointing a committee to consider the Palestine question. Such committee could assemble, analyze and collate all pertinent available data; could
study the various issues which appear to be involved; and could present the various alternative solutions of the problem, together with the committee’s recommendations concerning each alternative solution, to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The Department is of the opinion, with regard to the legal and other difficulties which it sees in the proposal for an ad hoc committee appointed by the Secretary General, that the appointment of a committee in this manner is neither sanctioned nor prohibited by the Charter of the United Nations. In view of this opinion, the Department feels that, if a committee were appointed in this manner, any work which it undertook or recommendations which it made to the General Assembly of the United Nations with regard to the delicate and complex problem of Palestine might be open to question and might have the effect of rendering a complicated problem more difficult.²

¹ During conversations between officers of the Department and the British Embassy on March 21, it was informally agreed that the Department would request the U.S. Delegation at the United Nations to obtain the comments of the Secretary General regarding a special session of the General Assembly for the purpose of creating an ad hoc committee. In telegram 105, March 22, 8 p. m., to New York, the Delegation was directed to approach the Secretary General along these lines (867N.01/3-1147).

² Herschel V. Johnson had informal discussions with Mr. Lie and reported in telegram 289, March 26, from New York, that the latter “thinks the best way to proceed is for Great Britain to request a special session of the Assembly. He will then immediately send out the notice to member nations and as soon as twenty-eight affirmative notes have been received, he will call a meeting to take place within a fortnight.” Mr. Lie noted further that he would be unable to limit additional items which might be placed on the agenda after a two-thirds vote of the Assembly (867N.01/3-2347).

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The British Representative at the United Nations (Cadogan) to the Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations (Hoo)³

NEW YORK, 2 April 1947.

Sir: I have received the following message from my Government:

“His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to place the question of Palestine on the agenda of the General Assembly at its next regular annual session. They will submit to the Assembly an account of their administration of the League of Nations mandate and will ask the Assembly to make recommendations, under Article 10 of the Charter, concerning the future government of Palestine.

“In making this request, His Majesty’s Government draw the attention of the Secretary-General to the desirability of an early settlement in Palestine and to the risk that the General Assembly might not be

able to decide upon its recommendations at its next regular annual session unless some preliminary study of the question had previously been made under the auspices of the United Nations. They therefore request the Secretary-General to summon, as soon as possible, a special session of the General Assembly for the purpose of constituting and instructing a special committee to prepare for the consideration, at the regular session of the Assembly, of the question referred to in the preceding paragraph.  

I have [etc.]  

ALEXANDER CADOGAN

2The same day, Mr. Hoo sent telegrams to all members of the United Nations, except the United Kingdom, inquiring whether they concurred in the summoning of the special session for the purpose set forth in Mr. Cadogan’s letter; the text is printed in General Assembly document A/295, April 25, 1947, found in depository libraries for the United Nations.

501.BB/4-447: Circular telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain American Diplomatic Missions

SECRET  

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1947—10 p. m.  

US URGENT  

Please inform FonOff we are replying affirmatively to SYG’s request to UN Members re summoning special session GA for purpose constituting and instructing a special committee to prepare for consideration Palestine question at next regular GA session in Sept.

Please express our hope agenda can be confined to this question alone. We feel it highly desirable establish precedent that in general agenda special session be confined to speedy consideration urgent problems for which summoned and fear this would be impossible if

1Sent to 52 diplomatic missions. The Code Room was directed to preface the first sentence of the message sent to Moscow, Belgrade, Warsaw and Prague with “In your discretion”.

According to telegram 134, April 7, from Baghdad, the Ambassador in Iraq (Wadsworth) presented an aide-mémoire, based on the circular telegram, to Foreign Minister Jamali on April 6. The Foreign Minister handed him a message he had telegraphed to other Arab League states, proposing a uniform communication to the Secretary General of the United Nations. It expressed opposition to a special session but stated that if the session were summoned to declare Palestine’s independence immediately, the Iraqi Government would welcome the session. Ambassador Wadsworth suggested that the General Assembly did not possess authority to declare Palestine’s independence and that the word “immediately” was ill-chosen in view of the British communication. Thereupon, the Foreign Minister modified his language to read that his Government would welcome a General Assembly session to the end that Palestine’s independence be declared forthwith (867N.01/4-747). The Arab states finally decided to request inclusion of an additional item in the agenda, calling for termination of the mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its independence. These views were sent to the Secretary General by the diplomatic representatives in the United States of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia in communications dated April 21 and 22; for texts, see GA (S–I), Plenary, vol. 1, pp. 185–186.
agenda broadened. You might also express view it might be difficult for govs to prepare adequately for discussion other items in short time prior to special session.

In order avoid strain on UN budget, we would plan to limit our delegation to one representative and one alternate, with necessary advisers, on assumption agenda can be limited. We trust other govs planning along similar lines and would appreciate info re views FonOff.2

ACHESON

2 Telegram 2108, April 7, from London reported that the British Foreign Office informed the Embassy that restriction of the agenda to a single item was entirely in conformity with its wishes (501.BB/4-847).

501.BB/4-1747 : Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

NEW YORK, April 17, 1947—5 p.m.

359. Following memorandum sent to me today by Lie personally on organization of the special session of the General Assembly: ¹

"I. Regular versus ad hoc procedure.

"It is natural to assume that the calling of a special session of the General Assembly for the consideration of a single item would strengthen the argument for ad hoc procedures limiting organization to the strict needs of the business to be considered. Under rule 100 of the provisional rules of procedure the General Assembly 'may set up such committees ... as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.' Under this rule it would be possible, for example, to set up an ad hoc steering committee to consider important policy question, such as the role which the Jewish Agency for Palestine might play in the Assembly. A special full committee might also be set up to give actual consideration to the United Kingdom item.

"On the other hand, strong argument can be advanced for close adherence to regular procedure, especially in connection with the setting up and use of the general committee. Since a number of Jewish and Arab organizations will undoubtedly be requesting opportunity for a hearing in the General Assembly, it is of great importance that policy with regard to such requests should be worked out by a committee of the Assembly whose composition and competence have been well established and are widely understood. A move to create an ad hoc committee to deal with such delicate questions would precipitate a

¹ The U.S. Delegation at the United Nations reported in telegram 346, April 13, from New York, that it had received a telegram from the Secretary General on April 13 notifying that a majority of the members concurred in the summoning of a special session, which was to open on April 28 (501.BB/4-1347).
prolonged debate on the composition and terms of reference of the committee.

[Here follows remainder of the Secretary General's memorandum, setting forth various suggested procedures for the establishment of the General Committee and possible methods of considering the United Kingdom item on Palestine.]

AUSTIN

2 In telegram 179, April 24, the Department informed the U.S. Delegation at the United Nations it was "willing agree establishment General Committee for special session GA. Dept has serious doubts, however, re advisability of using GC to work out policy on hearings for Jewish and Arab non-governmental organizations.

"If GC is constituted and suggestion is made that it arrange for such hearings, Dept's position would be that GA must itself or on recommendation of Committee 1 decide basic preliminary political question whether such ngo's may be heard, before matter is referred to GC. In event GA agrees to reference to GC, latter would be limited to making recommendations re procedure, specific ngo's to be heard, and precise scope of hearings." (501.BB/4-1747) The First Committee of the General Assembly dealt with political and security matters.

501.BB/4-1747

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1947.

The special session of the General Assembly to consider the Palestine question is expected to meet on April 28. The present plan is that this special session will limit its agenda 2 to the appointment of a committee to report back to the regular session of the General Assembly in September. The question arises as to the composition of this committee.

1 Drafted by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rusk).
2 In telegram 130, April 7, 7 p. m., the Department notified the U.S. Delegation at the United Nations that "We are most concerned that agenda of special session be limited to one item proposed by UK and that it not become, in effect, a preliminary GA." Later in the same communication, it stated that "Department seeks at this special session to limit Palestine issue to procedural questions only; to establish the necessary machinery proposed by UK for performing preliminary spade work on the problem and then to terminate the special session promptly. Substantive policy on how to deal with Palestine can best be determined in our view after the ad hoc Committee makes its report to the next regular GA session." (501.BB/4-247)

In telegram 138, April 9, the Department informed the U.S. Delegation of its views that the "Special GA on Palestine if confined in scope to appointment special committee should be of short duration. It should not be necessary to set up committees of GA as all necessary action can be taken in Plenary Session or in GA sitting as committee of whole." (501.BB/4-447)
The State Department considers that our first choice should be a small committee of comparatively disinterested states, excluding the Big Five and the Arab States, which would ascertain the facts, narrow the issues and offer alternative practicable solutions for the consideration of the General Assembly. Such a committee would have the advantage of providing a fresh approach and a consideration not unduly influenced by public positions already taken by the more interested governments. It has the disadvantage that it might be charged that the larger powers are shirking a responsibility which is in fact theirs. The members of such a committee might include:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
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<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Norway</td>
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<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>Siam</td>
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</table>

The State Department considers that our second choice should be a small committee consisting of the Big Five and six of the smaller powers, again excluding the Arab States. Such a committee would have the advantage of placing responsibility directly upon the larger powers and also of obtaining the assistance and advice of comparatively neutral United Nations members. It would have the disadvantage of injecting into the consideration of the Palestine problem the more general problems of the world settlement and of subjecting this government to great domestic pressure between now and the September meeting of the General Assembly. There is some indication that the Arab States would strongly object to a committee containing this particular membership and without an Arab member. The membership of this second type committee might be as follows:

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<tr>
<th>China</th>
<th>Canada</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Siam</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Although the State Department does not suggest that we recommend it, the special session of the General Assembly may also have before it a proposal to name a larger committee consisting of those governments now members of the Security Council, the Economic and Social
Council and the Trusteeship Council. These would provide the following membership:

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<tr>
<th>China</th>
<th>New Zealand</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Chile</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byelorussian S.S.R.</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It will be noted that the above list contains three Arab States, to which the Jewish Agency can be expected to object strongly. If such a committee were constituted, it would undoubtedly be necessary for it to establish a subcommittee along the lines of one of the alternatives described above.

501.BB Palestine/4–1747

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] April 17, 1947.

At my meeting today with the President I discussed with him the attached memorandum, giving him the views of Senators Vandenberg and Connally.

The President agreed with our first suggestion regarding the committee, that is, the small committee of neutral nations—nations which have not been involved in the Palestine matter. He did not undertake to pass on the exact nations included in your memorandum.

The President felt that our second suggestion was probably the most desirable second choice on the assumption that for some reason the first suggestion proved not to be feasible. He discussed with me and will give me his final views later regarding the inclusion of an Arab state on this second-choice committee. The President made the very pertinent observation that if the second-choice committee was decided upon, which included nations which would be opposed by the Arabs, they might very possibly try to get an advocate on the committee and might turn to the U.S.S.R. for that purpose. With this in mind, the

1 Addressed also to Mr. Rusk.
2 Supra.
President wished to think over the desirability of giving them their own advocate and suggested for this purpose Egypt. He is fully aware that this action would be most unpalatable to the Zionists and he will give me his views on this tomorrow.

The President agreed that our third suggestion would be a most undesirable way to have the matter handled. He thought that this would be very little better than a full meeting of the General Assembly and that in order to get anywhere this large committee would be thrown back on the very considerations involved in choices one and two.

DEAN ACHESON

867N.01/4-2347

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 23, 1947.

Participants: Mr. Acheson, Acting Secretary.
Mr. Henderson, Director, NEA.
Mr. Shertok, Jewish Agency.

Mr. Shertok, the representative in Washington of the Jewish Agency and a member of the Executive Council of that Organization, called upon me today in order to discuss problems arising from the presentation of the Palestine question to the United Nations. Mr. Henderson was present.

Mr. Shertok made a long oral statement presenting the views of the Agency with regard to the attitude and the positions which in its opinion the United States should take with respect to the handling and disposition of the case before the United Nations. The following represents a summary of what Mr. Shertok had to say:

1. The Jewish Agency opposes the appointment of a neutral committee to consider the Palestine problem. The Agency feels that the question is primarily a great power question and should not be turned over to small states which would be too timid to make the type of bold decisions which the situation demands. Small states appointed to such a committee would in any event be inclined to turn towards the various great powers with the question: “What shall we do?” The great powers should therefore work on the problem themselves. The Agency would prefer that the Soviet Union be not on the committee, but feels that it would be better for it to serve on the committee than for the United States not to be a member.

2. The Agency suggests that the United States present a resolution to the Special Assembly calling upon Great Britain to administer the mandate faithfully. The expression “to administer the mandate faith-
fully" is intended to include the lifting of restrictions upon Jewish immigration and upon land ownership in Palestine.

3. The Agency also suggests that the American delegation be prepared to rebut any arguments of a substantive nature which might be advanced by the Arab delegates during the course of the Special Assembly. It hopes, for example, that the American delegation will oppose the Arab proposal that the mandate be terminated at once and a Palestinian state be established.

4. The Jewish Agency has written a letter to the Secretary-General asking that it be permitted to appear on the floor of the Assembly in order to present the Jewish case. It is hoped that the United States will support this request. The Arabs are certain to take occasion during the session not only to obtain the adoption of procedures favorable to themselves, but also to attack the Jewish side of the case. It would manifestly be unfair if there would be no spokesman for the Jews to present their side of the case.

5. He is sure that the United States will oppose Arab demands that all immigration into Palestine be stopped during the time that the Palestine question is under discussion in the United Nations, and hopes that the rejection of such demands will not be considered as a concession to the Jews. A decision sharply to increase Jewish immigration to Palestine would, of course, be a concession.

6. The element of time is of crucial importance and the great powers concerned, including the United States, cannot afford to escape their international responsibilities by postponing the making of decisions. They cannot run away from the problem. They must grapple with it courageously. At the present time there are two agencies in Palestine which are doing great harm to the country and are rendering the solution progressively more difficult. These agencies, while opposed to each other, nevertheless are working towards a common end, namely, the ruin of the country. These agencies are the British military administration and the Jewish terrorists. Unless some effort is made at once to break the vicious circle of repression breeding terror and terror leading to new repression, the situation in Palestine might well become so desperate that consideration of the problem by the United Nations would become a mere academic process. It is hoped that the United States Government will endeavor to impress upon the British Government the importance of making some move such as lifting restrictions on immigration which might tend to break this circle. In the meantime, the situation of the Jews in the detention camps in Germany is deteriorating rapidly. The anti-Semitic feeling in Germany is so intense at present that Jews cannot find a place for themselves in the economy of the country. They, therefore, are being driven into blackmarket and
other illicit activities with the result that charges are increasing that illegal trading and violation of controls on trade are racial characteristics peculiar to the Jews. The question is: “What will the United States do at this time to help solve the Palestine problem?”

7. The Agency desires to know just what is the basic policy of the United States at the present time with regard to Palestine. Has the United States a definite policy and is it prepared to back this policy? If it has not, the situation of the Jews is almost hopeless since they have no other powerful friend on whom they can depend.

The following represents a summary of my reply:

1. The American Government is preparing for the Special Session of the General Assembly with a full realization of the importance of the Palestine problem not only to the parties most immediately concerned, but to the whole world. We believe that this may be the last chance for the solving of this problem in a peaceful and fair manner. If this chance is missed, chaos and disorders might well result in Palestine of so serious a nature that that country would be ruined physically and morally. We are, furthermore, convinced that if the United Nations is to meet with success in its efforts to solve the Palestine problem, the decision which it makes not only must be fair, but must be one which has the support of world opinion. It will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to enforce any decision which does not rally the support of most of the peoples of the world. It is also the opinion of this Government that if a decision is to have the support of world opinion, it must clearly have been reached after careful study and consideration in an atmosphere free from pressures on the part of the great powers and from intrigues behind the scenes. It is our belief that we can best contribute to the reaching of a fair and enforceable decision by doing our part to maintain proceedings on the highest possible level and to limit the activities of the Special Assembly to the setting up of machinery for giving the problem the careful and impartial study which it deserves.

2. At the present time we are inclined to the opinion that perhaps the most effective type of machinery to study the problem would be a committee created by the Special Assembly composed of perhaps nine or ten so-called neutral powers; that is, countries other than the Great Powers and countries which have already taken a definite position with regard to Palestine. Such a committee would be called upon to examine during the next few months such data as are already available with regard to the Palestine question; it would assemble additional data by such means as it considered desirable, such as the holding of hearings at which representatives of governments or organizations as well as private persons could appear; it would hold its meetings in whatever
locality it might choose; and it might visit Palestine or elsewhere if it considered such visits would be helpful; it would be expected to submit to the regular session of the General Assembly in the fall such data as it has assembled in a form convenient for study, together with such recommendations as it might decide to make for the solution of the problem. We are inclined to believe that the other members of the United Nations as well as the world in general might give more weight to the findings of a committee of this character than to those of a committee in which the Great Powers are included.

3. Since we are of the opinion that the Special Session should, if possible, limit its work to matters of a procedural character, we would probably not be inclined to present or support any resolution calling upon Great Britain faithfully to administer the Mandate. In order that the Assembly should not become involved at this time in arguments relating to the substance of the problem, we would probably oppose the introduction of any resolution calling for either an immediate increase or decrease of Jewish immigration to Palestine. We have been constantly endeavoring to prevail upon the British Government, thus far without success, appreciably to increase the Jewish immigration quotas for Palestine. The British Government has consistently taken the position that increases at this time of these quotas would result in a deterioration rather than in an improvement in the situation in Palestine.

4. We are not convinced that the absence of a representative of the Jewish Agency on the floor of the Assembly during this session would necessarily be to the disadvantage of the Zionists. If, at the Special Session, various members of the Assembly, taking advantage of their right to speak, should endeavor to distort facts in their own favor or to insist upon procedures which manifestly would not permit all parties fairly and fully to present their views at the proper time, they are likely to injure their own case rather than that of the parties whom they tried to place at a disadvantage. The Agency should, of course, be given every chance to present its views with regard to the substance of the case to such a committee as the Special Session creates.

5. We fully realize the existence of the vicious circle to which Mr. Shertok referred. As already stated, we have been endeavoring to prevail upon the British to permit an increase in Jewish immigration, and we have also on a number of occasions expressed our abhorrence of the employment of terror as a political instrument in Palestine. We shall not hesitate to take advantage of any opportunity which might present itself in order to endeavor to effect a break in this circle. We are also deeply concerned with regard to the decline in morale of the
displaced Jews in the detention camps in Central Europe and shall continue to make every possible and proper effort on their behalf.

6. We have nothing to add at this time to what has already been said regarding the policy of the United States with regard to Palestine. We shall continue to make a careful study of the problem in the light of the present situation and future developments and shall strive for the attainment of a fair, equitable and enforceable solution.

867N.00/4-2447: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, April 24, 1947—2 p. m.

169. Head of Political Department 1 of JA states High Commissioner asked Ben-Gurion to call yesterday for purpose of informing him that military would very soon take over complete control of Palestine. Myerson added that Cunningham expressed regret at this move, saying he realized it would “wipe out many Jewish achievements here”. We do not understand implications of above but they will no doubt become clear within short period when will report further. 2

MACATEE

1 Golda Myerson.
2 In telegram 175, April 26, the Consul General at Jerusalem reported that the British version of these events differed considerably from that of the Jewish Agency. The Chief Secretary of the Palestine Government stated to Mr. Macatee that the “High Commissioner informed Ben-Gurion that if Agency did not get control of terrorists very soon it would be necessary for military to reestablish martial law in Jewish areas. Without mention Agency I said certain sources seemed to believe underlying implication was that entire civilian government would depart from Palestine. Chief Secretary dismissed this idea as completely unfounded as conversion to purely military government could not possibly occur so quickly.” (867N.00/4-2647)

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Editorial Note

At the opening meeting of the special session of the General Assembly on April 28, President Oswaldo Aranha requested that the General Committee consider the provisional agenda and the supplementary list of items and report on them to the General Assembly. The provisional agenda called for “Constituting and Instructing a Special Committee to prepare for the Consideration of the Question of Palestine at the Second Regular Session.” (General Assembly document A/298, April 24, 1947). The supplementary list dealt with “The termination of the mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its independence”, as proposed by Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia (GA doc. A/294, April 25, 1947). At the same meeting,
President Aranha announced that he would also submit for consideration by the General Committee pertinent communications from various organizations, if there were no objection by the General Assembly. There was no objection (GA (S-I), Plenary, volume I, pages 11-12).

The General Committee considered the first two items on April 29 and 30. The provisional agenda was adopted on the morning of April 29 (GA (S-I), Plenary, volume II: General Committee (hereafter called “GA (S-I), General Committee, volume II”), page 12.

Consideration of the supplementary list began the same afternoon and continued through both meetings on April 30. President Aranha invited Representatives of Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Saudi Arabia to come to the table (the Egyptian Representative was a member of the General Committee). The United States Representative, Herschel V. Johnson, spoke in opposition to inclusion of the item proposed by the Arab states (ibid., pages 17-19, 63-65). The proposal was defeated by an 8 to 1 vote, with 5 abstentions (ibid., page 81).

The General Committee, thereupon, recommended to the General Assembly that the British item be placed on the agenda of the Assembly and be referred for consideration to the First Committee and that the item of the Arab states not be included; for the text of its report, see GA (S-I), Plenary, volume I, page 194. The Assembly debated the British item on the morning of May 1, whereupon, President Aranha stated he considered it adopted (ibid., page 80). After extended debate on the item of the Arab states during the afternoon of the same day, the Assembly, in a roll-call vote, defeated inclusion of the item on the agenda by a vote of 24 to 15, with 10 abstentions (ibid., page 60).

The General Committee, on May 2, began consideration of the communications from various organizations. Among the four communications discussed was one from the Jewish Agency requesting authorization to participate in the meetings of the special session. A Polish resolution called for an invitation to the Jewish Agency to appear before the General Assembly for consultation (GA (S-I), General Committee, volume II, page 91). The Czechoslovak Representative proposed an amendment to the Polish resolution calling for the representatives of the Jewish Agency to appear before the plenary meeting of the Assembly to express the Agency’s views (ibid., page 99).

Senator Austin, on behalf of the United States, proposed informally that the four communications and others of similar nature should be dealt with by the Secretary General who would circulate lists of such communications and make them available to any member requesting them. He stated that “it has been and still is the position of the United States that this special session of the General Assembly should confine its activities to the procedural task of appointing a committee and
instructing it to assemble data and draw up recommendations which would enable the General Assembly to give full consideration to all aspects . . . of the Palestine problem at the next regular session.” (ibid., page 102). He considered it inappropriate for the General Assembly to invite the views of organizations other than member states. He noted that the views of the Arab states had been heard and that it would be useful to obtain the views of the Jews on the work of the special session. He would limit the appearance of Jewish organizations, however, to the Jewish Agency and advocated that its views should not be presented before the plenary meetings of the Assembly but before the First Committee. Furthermore, he proposed that the Jewish Agency should not be regarded as speaking for all the Jews of the world or even for all the Jews in Palestine (ibid., pages 105–106).

The Polish proposal, as amended by the Czechoslovak Representative, was rejected by a vote of 8 to 3, with 3 abstentions (ibid., pages 125–126). The United States resolution, as amended by the British Representative, called for the General Committee to recommend to the Assembly that it refer the communications from the Jewish Agency and the other three communications, as well as any communications of a similar character, to the First Committee for its decision. The proposal was adopted by 11 votes, with 3 abstentions (ibid., page 126). The text of the report of the General Committee, dated May 2, is printed in GA (S–I), Plenary, volume I, page 195.

The report of the General Committee on this matter was considered by the General Assembly on May 3 and 5. The Delegations of Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Chile, Argentina, and the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic submitted a joint resolution, which stated: “1. That the First Committee grant a hearing to the Jewish Agency for Palestine on the question before the Committee; 2. To send to that same Committee for its decision those other communications of a similar character from the Palestinian population which have been received by this special session of the General Assembly or may later be submitted to it.” (ibid., page 114) The Assembly on May 5 adopted the joint resolution by a vote of 44 to 7, with 3 abstentions and 1 absence (ibid., pages 114, 115).

The following day, the First Committee resolved to grant a hearing to the Jewish Agency, the Arab Higher Committee and to any other organization representative of a considerable element of the population of Palestine. The record of its deliberations on this matter is printed in GA (S–I), Plenary, volume III, Main Committees, pages 6–78.

The First Committee deliberated on constituting and instructing the special committee at successive meetings from May 7 to 13; the record of these deliberations is printed ibid., pages 78–362. Both
matters produced dissent. United States Representative Austin began the preliminary debate on May 7 by advocating designation of a small special committee of seven nations, excluding the Big Five and the Arab states (ibid., pages 80–83). Soviet Representative Gromyko proposed that the permanent members of the Security Council become members of the special committee and indicated no objection to inclusion of an Arab state (ibid., pages 147–153). The Soviet proposal was rejected on May 13 by a vote of 26 to 6, with 21 abstentions and 2 absences (ibid., pages 343–344). A broadened special committee of eleven “neutral” nations was finally decided on (ibid., pages 347–356).

On May 10, Mr. Gromyko proposed that the special committee be instructed to submit proposals “on the question of establishing without delay an independent State of Palestine.” (ibid., pages 203–204) Mr. Johnson, representing the United States, dissented, stating that the Soviet proposal would prejudice the issue and that the Committee, without specific instruction, would be in a position to make such a recommendation if it thought fit (ibid., page 205). The matter came to a vote on May 13. The Soviet proposal was defeated by a vote of 26 to 15, with 2 abstentions and 2 absences (ibid., pages 312–313).

501BB/4–2847

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, April 29, 1947.

The question arises as to the attitude of the United States toward requests of non-governmental organizations (particularly Jewish and Arab) to present their views to or to be represented in the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly.

The Department of State considers that the United States position should be based upon the following principles:

a. That the General Assembly should maintain its position that only Member governments have a right to take part in the discussions of the General Assembly, whether in plenary session or in committee of the whole; representation in the General Assembly of other than Member states is not provided in the Charter and would be contrary to the nature of the Organization.

b. That, since the task before the special session of the General Assembly is the procedural one of appointing and instructing a committee to prepare for the consideration of the question of Palestine at the next regular session, no occasion should arise for the presentation of the views of non-governmental organizations to the Assembly.

c. In general, written communications to the Secretary General should be dealt with by the Secretary General in accordance with existing practice under which lists of such communications are circulated
and the communications themselves are available to any Member requesting them. An exception has arisen because of the intention of the Secretary General to refer two letters from the Jewish Agency and the Hebrew Committee for National Liberation to the President of the General Assembly; this exception is dealt with in the Annex hereto.¹

d. National non-governmental organizations and individuals should be encouraged to transmit their views to their respective governments and not to the United Nations. Governments may, of course, present such views to the General Assembly.

e. The committee to be appointed by the special session to study the question of Palestine should be given discretion to ascertain the views of organizations or individuals.

f. If it becomes necessary, because of extended discussion of the issues before the special session by Member governments, to provide for the hearing of other views during the special session of the General Assembly, a subcommittee might be designated to hear the views of non-governmental organizations of Palestine such as the Jewish Agency and the Arab High[er] Committee. In view of b. above, the test for determining the need for such hearings during the special session should be the necessity for maintaining public confidence in the impartiality and fairness of the General Assembly in considering such questions.

To be dealt with later is the question of hearing non-governmental organizations when the General Assembly considers its recommendations on Palestine at its regular session next September.²

G. C. Marshall

¹ Not printed.
² According to telegram 109, May 1, to New York, this memorandum was approved by President Truman (501.BB/5-147).

867N.01/5-1043 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Durbrow) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Moscow, May 10, 1947—2 p.m.

1712. Recent press articles (Embtels 1636, April 30 and 1670, May 6 ¹) as well as Gromyko’s conduct in special GA meeting provide further indication that long-range Soviet policy toward Palestine is based upon:

1. Opposition to formation in all or part of Palestine of Jewish State, which USSR would regard as Zionist tool of West, inevitably hostile to Soviet Union.

¹ Neither printed.
2. Support of [Arab?] side in Palestine controversy, and specifically of independence of Palestine with present Arab majority population. Chambrin in Red Fleet article 2 was undoubtedly speaking for Soviet Union in declaring "progressive circles of entire world consider entirely just demand of Palestinian people for independence and democratic path of development."[
]

So far the Kremlin has been content to play a waiting game, accumulating good will as a result of unsuccessful British and American initiatives and the mounting hostility of the Arabs, and to a lesser extent the Jews, toward the UK and the US. It seems likely that the Soviet Government will continue to avoid any overt decision in favor of the Arabs until it is in a better position than at present to take active measures to expand its influence throughout Moslem world, unless decision should be forced upon it earlier by developments. We should accordingly expect Soviet representatives during UN handling of issue cautiously but consistently to support Arab side, while leaving enough uncertainty to avoid alienating world Jewish opinion. Soviet representatives are likely to speak in general terms of ideals of independence and democracy, to charge that Jewish-Arab hostility has been artificially engendered by British imperialists and imply that this artificial racial animosity clouds the only real conflict of interests ...3 that of the mass of the population, both Jewish and Arab, against the Zionist politicians on one side and the feudal Arab lords on the other.

Gromyko's support of the proposal to permit access to the General Assembly to "the Jewish Agency and other representative Jewish organizations" fits into this general picture, as a concession to the Jewish side which could only cause confusion and probable embarrassment to the British and ourselves. However, we believe his action in this connection was motivated primarily by other considerations. The Soviet Government has attempted, not without some success, to use the UN as a sounding board for its propaganda, and has particularly sought to extend and increase the utility of this device by securing official recognition of the WFTU. Admission of miscellaneous Jewish groups would clearly pave the way for renewed demands for recognition first of the WFTU and subsequently of a whole series of front agencies of Soviet foreign policy from the World Federation of Democratic Women to the Greek EAM.

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2 In the issue of April 27, as reported in telegram 1636.
3 As in the original.
Department please repeat London as No. 205, Paris as 198, and Jerusalem, asking latter repeat Arab capitals.

Durbrow

Report of the First Committee on a Special Committee on Palestine

[Extract]

RECOMMENDATION

The First Committee recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following resolution:

WHEREAS the General Assembly of the United Nations has been called into special session for the purpose of constituting and instructing a Special Committee to prepare for the consideration at the next regular session of the Assembly a report on the question of Palestine,

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLVES THAT:

1. A Special Committee be created for the above-mentioned purpose, consisting of the representatives of Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia;

2. The Special Committee shall have the widest powers to ascertain and record facts, and to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine;

3. The Special Committee shall determine its own procedure;

4. The Special Committee shall conduct investigations in Palestine and wherever it may deem useful, to receive and examine written or oral testimony, whichever it may consider appropriate in each case, from the mandatory Power, from representatives of the population of Palestine, from Governments and from such organizations and individuals as it may deem necessary;

5. The Special Committee shall give most careful consideration to the religious interests in Palestine of Islam, Judaism and Christianity;

6. The Special Committee shall prepare a report to the General Assembly and shall submit such proposals as it may consider appropriate for the solution of the problem of Palestine;

7. The Special Committee’s report shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not later than 1 September 1947, in order that it may be circulated to the Members of the United Nations in time

for consideration by the second regular session of the General Assembly;

Statement by the Soviet Representative at the United Nations
(Gromyko)¹

[Extracts]

Neither the historic past nor the conditions prevailing in Palestine
at present can justify any unilateral solution of the Palestine prob-
lem, either in favour of establishing an independent Arab State, with-
out consideration for the legitimate rights of the Jewish people, or
in favour of the establishment of an independent Jewish State, while
ignoring the legitimate rights of the Arab population. Neither of these
eextreme decisions would achieve an equitable solution of this compli-
cated problem, especially since neither would ensure the settlement
of relations between the Arabs and the Jews, which constitutes the
most important task.

An equitable solution can be reached only if sufficient consideration
is given to the legitimate interests of both these peoples. All this leads
the Soviet delegation to the conclusion that the legitimate interests of
both the Jewish and Arab populations of Palestine can be duly safe-
guarded only through the establishment of an independent, dual,
democratic, homogeneous Arab-Jewish State. Such a State must be
based on equality of rights for the Jewish and the Arab populations,
which might lay foundations of cooperation between these two peo-
pies to their mutual interest and advantage. It is well known that this
plan for the solution of Palestine’s future has its supporters in that
country itself:

Thus, the solution of the Palestine problem by the establishment of
a single Arab-Jewish State with equal rights for the Jews and the
Arabs may be considered as one of the possibilities and one of the more
noteworthy methods for the solution of this complicated problem. Such
a solution of the problem of Palestine’s future might be a sound
foundation for the peaceful co-existence and co-operation of the Arab
and Jewish populations of Palestine, in the interests of both these
peoples and to the advantage of the entire Palestine population and
of the peace and security of the Near East.

¹ Made before the General Assembly on May 14; reprinted from GA (S-1),
If this plan proved impossible to implement, in view of the deteriora-
tion in the relations between the Jews and the Arabs—and it will be
very important to know the special committee’s opinion on this ques-
tion—then it would be necessary to consider the second plan which,
like the first, has its supporters in Palestine, and which provides for
the partition of Palestine into two independent autonomous States,
one Jewish and one Arab. I repeat that such a solution of the Palestine
problem would be justifiable only if relations between the Jewish and
Arab populations of Palestine indeed proved to be so bad that it would
be impossible to reconcile them and to ensure the peaceful co-existence
of the Arabs and the Jews.

Of course, both these possible plans for the solution of the problem
of Palestine’s future must be studied by the committee. Its task must
be a multilateral and careful discussion of the plans for the adminis-
tration of Palestine, with a view to submitting, to the next regular
session of the General Assembly, some well-considered and reasoned
proposals, which would help the United Nations to reach a just solu-
tion of this problem in conformity with the interests of the peoples
of Palestine, the interests of the United Nations and our common
interest in the maintenance of peace and international security.

501.BB/5-1647

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1947.

Subject: Results of special session of United Nations General As-
sembly on Palestine

The special session of the United Nations General Assembly adjourned on May 15 after adopting a resolution which establishes a
Special Committee to study the Palestine problem and submit, by
September 1, such proposals as it may consider appropriate for the
solution of the problem. The report of the Special Committee will
be considered at the second regular session of the Assembly, in
September.

The General Assembly discussed the report of the First Committee on May 14
and 15 (GA (8-1), Plenary, vol. 1, pp. 122-177). On May 15, the Assembly
adopted the report by a vote of 45 to 7. Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, and Turkey were recorded in opposition; Israel abstained; and
Haiti and the Philippines were absent (ibid., pp. 176, 177).

The United Nations has published the report of the United Nations Special
Committee on Palestine as Supplement No. 11 to the Official Records of the
Second Session of the General Assembly. The report is in five volumes: vol. I
comprises the body of the report; vol. II consists of annexes, appendix and maps;
vols. III and IV contain the oral evidence presented at public and private meet-
ings, respectively; and vol. V is the index. When referred to hereafter, these
volumes will be identified as UNSCOP, with appropriate volume number.
The principal decisions reached at the special session were as follows:

1. **Composition of Committee**

The Special Committee consists of eleven relatively neutral states, not including the Great Powers or an Arab state. The members of the Committee are Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia.

2. **Terms of Reference** (See Enclosure 1)

The Committee has broad and flexible powers to investigate all relevant issues, in Palestine and elsewhere, and to receive testimony from such sources as it deems necessary. Non-governmental organizations, particularly those which represent elements of the population of Palestine, will be heard by the Special Committee in its discretion.

3. **Appeal to Avoid Prejudicial Action**

At its final meeting the Assembly passed a resolution calling upon “all governments and peoples, and particularly upon the inhabitants of Palestine, to refrain, pending action by the General Assembly on the report of the special committee on Palestine, from the threat or use of force or any other action which might create an atmosphere prejudicial to an early settlement of the question of Palestine.”

The results of the special session are very satisfactory to the United States and afford some ground for hope that a practicable solution may be presented to the General Assembly in September.

If this Government’s views should be requested by the Special Committee, the Department of State will wish to make recommendations to the President regarding the submission of such views. The Department of State will also wish to make recommendations regarding the position which the United States should take at the next session of the Assembly.

G. C. Marshall

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*The text of the General Assembly resolution, not printed.

*For the official text, see GA (S-1), Plenary, vol. 1, pp. 173, 174.

501.BB Palestine/5-2247

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET


My Dear Mr. Secretary: My general impression of this Session is encouragement. Although the Session dealt only with perhaps the most simple phase of the problem of Palestine, namely, the initial procedural question, nevertheless I feel that the approximation of unanimity in the passage of the final resolution establishing the Special
Committee of Investigation gives us reason to hope that the United Nations can work out an objective solution of this problem which will be in the true interests of the people of Palestine and the maintenance of peace and security. To expedite this happy result, active leadership by the United States will be useful.

Although the United States will not, under the resolution passed by the Special Assembly, participate actively as a member in the work of the Special Committee of Investigation, we should be prepared to state to the Special Committee at the proper time our views as to the solution of the problem of Palestine. The Committee may ask for them early, under its terms of reference. Our views could help the Special Committee in its work. This does not, of course, mean that, once having stated our views, we would bring pressure of any kind on the Committee to accept our proposal as the solution of the problem which it would recommend to the General Assembly. The forum in which our views can properly be pressed will be the regular session of the General Assembly in the Fall.

The time allowed for completion of the Special Committee's work, taking into account the time which it necessarily will have to spend in travel, is short. This means that the time available to formulate at least a tentative United States position is also short. Furthermore, for a number of other reasons I feel that the sooner we can formulate and have a tentative position the more probable will be the finding of a sound recommendation by September.

It is necessary, therefore, I feel, for us to agree among ourselves at the earliest possible moment upon a working hypothesis which could then be developed in whatever further detail might be necessary for presentation as the tentative views of the United States to the Special Committee of Investigation. Also this would make it possible for us in our discussions with other representatives to the United Nations to state our tentative views in clear and simple terms and thereby get them and their governments thinking along the lines which we consider constructive.

As a basis for a working hypothesis I should like to suggest as broad terms the following:

1. The objective should be an independent Palestinian state which would be admitted as a Member of the United Nations. This would not be a state based on racial or religious factors. It would be neither a Jewish state nor an Arab state. There would be full guarantees of the civil and religious rights and liberties of all minority groups, full account being taken of the special status of the holy places.

2. There should be authorization of a minimum of immigration per year based on the absorptive capacity of the country. This might be as high, for example, as 2½% of the present total population of Palestine for the first two years, and 1% per annum thereafter. Immigration
should be on a non-discriminatory, non-privilege basis excepting that
greater facilities would be given to relatives and members of families
already living in Palestine. The volume of immigration could, of
course, be increased by the Palestinian government above the mini-
um, depending upon the improvement of absorptive capacity.

3. Provision should be made for a period of perhaps five to ten
years of preparation for independence. During this period Palestine
should be placed under a United Nations trusteeship.

4. During at least this preparatory period provision should be made
for economic and financial assistance by the United Nations through
its Economic and Social Council and subordinate bodies and the vari-
ous specialized agencies such as the FAO, the Bank, the Fund, the
Health Organization, and UNESCO.

I realize, of course, that the foregoing suggestions involve many
controversial and difficult points but I feel that a solution worked out
along these lines would be the most objective one and should be the
most appealing one to all reasonable people. There is some indication,
for example, that the Soviet Union would go along, at least in prin-
ciple, with a solution of this kind. I refer you in this connection to
Mr. Gromyko’s statement before the General Assembly on Wednesday,
May 14. Although my optimism may be unwarranted, I feel that a
solution along these lines might be acquiesced in by the Arab states.
Furthermore, I also feel that such a solution would commend itself
to the more reasonable and better-balanced elements of the Jewish
population of the United States and other countries.

I hope that it will be possible for you to have work done in the
Department along the foregoing or possible alternate lines as a basis
for discussion of this matter at your convenience.¹

Sincerely yours,

WARREN R. AUSTIN

¹In an undated memorandum to the Secretary of State, attached to Senator
Austen’s letter, Mr. Acheson stated: “Our views, which have been discussed with
Senator Austin, are reflected in this letter.” The memorandum was initialed by
the Secretary of State.

501.BB/5-2747

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs
(Rusk) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

RESTRICTED

[WASHINGTON,] May 27, 1947.

Subject: Position Taken by the USSR on Problems Arising at
Special Session of United Nations General Assembly

The attached memorandum,¹ prepared at your request, and reviewed
in EUR and NEA, analyzes the statements on various aspects of the

¹Dated May 27, not printed; it was drafted by officers of EUR and OA.
Palestine problem made by the Soviet Delegation at the special session of the General Assembly. The voting record of the Soviet bloc, the Arab States, and the United States on the principal roll call votes taken at the special session is also appended.²

The memorandum indicates that, despite an apparent shift in the Soviet position at the final meeting of the Assembly, there is no real inconsistency in the various statements of position made by the Soviet Delegation. Throughout, the statements seem designed to straddle the fundamental issue. The Soviets supported full debate on the substantive aspects of the Palestine problem; non-voting participation in the discussions by the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee; consideration of the possibility of immediate termination of the Mandate and an independent status for Palestine; independence after partition if a bi-national state proved to be impracticable; and representation for the Great Powers on the special investigating committee.

In the opinion of a number of delegations and of most, if not all, of the United States delegation, the Soviets thus succeeded in “playing both ends against the middle” in such a way as to gain credit both with the Jews and with the Arabs. It is believed that this non-committal position was maintained to the end because the Soviets are not yet ready to come out forthrightly on the side of the Arabs, preferring to do so later at a moment when the Soviets could reap the greatest benefits in the Moslem world. Meanwhile, as might have been expected, the Soviets made every effort to direct criticism against the mandatory Power.

The efforts of the United Kingdom and United States to avoid discussion of the substance of the Palestine problem at the special session, and to create a neutral committee without Great Power participation, provided the Soviet Union with an opportunity to gain credit for a certain degree of leadership in the Palestine question. Gromyko exploited this opportunity by (1) appearing to champion the principle of full discussion; (2) generally favoring immediate independence and termination of the Mandate; and (3) arguing for Great Power participation in the Committee—with the implication that the Soviet Union was the one Great Power willing to assume its responsibilities in relation to this matter.

The course pursued by the Soviets appears to leave the USSR in an excellent tactical position for the future.³

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²Not printed.
Memorandum by the Jewish Agency for Palestine

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1947.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FINANCING OF PALESTINIAN DEVELOPMENT

1. The Jewish Agency for Palestine suggests that a constructive resolution of the Palestine problem would be facilitated if, during the next three or four months, confidential exploratory conversations on the financial implications of a Palestinian settlement were to take place between the appropriate officers of the United States Government and the representatives of the Jewish Agency. The Agency contemplates presenting its ideas, in the first instance, to the officers of the Department of State and of the Export-Import Bank. It requests guidance from the State Department on whether other Agencies of the United States Government should also be consulted at this stage.

2. In proposing confidential exploratory financial conversations at this time, the Agency's objectives are, first, to facilitate the working-out of a just settlement of the Palestine problem through the United Nations and, second, to assure that this settlement is followed by such substantial immediate economic growth as would render the settlement really definitive and firm. It is clear that an equitable settlement will be rendered much more attainable if the Government of the United States indicates its readiness to support such a settlement by participating in practical development financing. It is further clear that the political solution has its maximum chance to make a positive contribution to the peace, security and welfare of the Middle East if it begins to operate in the constructive atmosphere of large-scale development activity.

3. In the course of the next months, the Jewish Agency shall be presenting, to the special committee of the United Nations Assembly, comprehensive plans for the economic development of Palestine. In part, insofar as they deal with irrigation and agricultural development, these plans have profited from the participation of the distinguished American engineers who were responsible for designing—and, in part, constructing and operating—such projects as TVA, Boulder, and Grand Coulee. We believe that the rest of our economic planning is equally firmly based, in practical businesslike terms. We are taking steps to assure that these plans are reviewed carefully by American economists with the widest experience in economic planning and international finance.

1 Transmitted to Mr. Henderson by Eliahu Epstein, Director of the Washington Office of the Jewish Agency, on May 28, with a request for the views and decision of the Department on the subjects raised.
We would like to present all these plans also to the responsible officers of the United States Government during the next few months.

4. On June 14, 1946, the American members of the Executive of the Jewish Agency sent President Truman a letter outlining the Agency’s plans for the absorption of 100,000 immigrants. On July 6, 1946, this outline was expanded on the financial side in a memorandum to Mr. Henry F. Grady, then Chairman of the Cabinet Committee on Palestine. President Truman was so gracious as to compliment the members of the Agency on the workmanlike character of the plans submitted; the President also expressed his sympathy with the general proposals which the Agency then outlined. These plans and proposals (though they have been modified in some particulars) are substantially as relevant today as they were a year ago. (Copies of the Agency letter and memorandum and of the White House press release on the matter are attached for convenience in reference.2)

5. The financial requirements of a definitive settlement which weigh most heavily in the Jewish Agency’s plans are naturally those connected most directly with the capital needed to absorb Jewish immigrants into productive, self-sustaining livelihoods. The Agency is concerned also, however, with the capital needed to raise the productivity of our Arab neighbors in Palestine. As the Agency has repeatedly emphasized, in its submissions to the United States Government as well as to other bodies, the capital that needs to be employed productively in Palestinian development, for these purposes, far surpasses available Jewish resources.

6. Moreover, the Jewish Agency suggests that it would be advisable to present the United States Government not only its general plans but also much more particular projects in the financing of which the Export-Import Bank could appropriately participate. The Agency’s representatives will be prepared to discuss these projects in all relevant detail. We would like such projects to be subjected to searching scrutiny because we are confident that they qualify as sound investments.

7. The Agency turns first to the Export-Import Bank as a public lending body operating in the international sphere for the following reasons: (a) The Congress and Executive of the United States Government have declared their support for the objective of large-scale Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine; (b) Many of the development projects that we envisage in Palestine are specially dependent on materials, equipment and engineering talent that the United States is particularly suited to supply; and (c) We do not yet

have the status requisite for a direct approach to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Nevertheless we do intend to have a preliminary exchange of views with the International Bank. For the longer run, we look to the International Bank to play a perhaps even larger role in our development financing than that of the Export-Import Bank.

8. In a statesmanlike effort to break the deadlock over the implementation of the proposals of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, President Truman generously announced that the United States Government was prepared to meet the cost of transporting 100,000 Jews from Europe to Palestine and caring for them in transit. It would be extremely helpful if the Jewish Agency could have the State Department’s assurance that this offer still stands. Firm evidence of United States continued willingness to transport displaced Jews from Europe to Palestine would contribute to the likelihood of a constructive general settlement and would enable corresponding Jewish Agency funds to be budgeted for other urgent needs.

Jewish people the world over—and particularly in the United States—are now contributing on a most generous scale to aid in the rehabilitation of their less fortunate brethren and in their resettlement in Palestine. Reparations and UNRRA assistance were counted upon to lighten our burden in these respects, but these sources of funds have hitherto made only a minor contribution to our needs. The Jewish Agency would like to explore with the State Department the problem of funds for transitional care and maintenance—particularly the maintenance of orphaned children. The relief and rehabilitation requirements that we face far surpass the unaided resources of world Jewry.

9. Our highest hopes for the exploratory conversations which we suggest would be realized if the United States Government were prepared to make a public announcement about their progress at the time when such an announcement could be most helpful in achieving a general settlement. If the United States Government were then in a position to announce that it was prepared immediately—given a political settlement—to participate to the extent of $75 million or $100 million in the financing of the first stage of sound, businesslike development work in Palestine, a great constructive contribution will have been made to the resolution of an unnecessarily tangled and embittered situation. Our ultimate requirements of international public development financing will be very much larger than this, but such an amount loaned from the United States would aid greatly to assure a successful beginning on our large development tasks.

Eliezer Kaplan
Treasurer, Jewish Agency for Palestine
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 29, 1947.

As Mr. Shertok and Mr. Epstein of the Jewish Agency plan to see you this morning at 11:30 am, I believe it will be helpful for you to have a brief account of my conversation yesterday afternoon with Mr. Shertok and Mr. Kaplan of the Jewish Agency, accompanied by Mr. Gass and Mr. Epstein, with regard to economic developments in Palestine.

Mr. Shertok expressed the hope that the Special Committee on Palestine, which represented a new phase in the consideration of the problem, would be successful in finding a solution. Mr. Kaplan then spoke at length on Palestine's economic and financial needs. During Mr. Kaplan's talk requests, on behalf of the Jewish Agency, were made for the following:

[Here follows a summary of main points of Mr. Kaplan's memorandum, supra.]

I told Mr. Kaplan that the Department appreciated the expression of the views of the Jewish Agency with regard to the financial implications of a Palestinian settlement, that I would immediately study his memorandum and that I would communicate with him concerning it as soon as possible.

Although I have not yet had an opportunity of studying the memorandum of the Jewish Agency in detail, it is my preliminary opinion that if the United States Government engaged in "confidential exploratory conversations" with the Jewish Agency at this particular moment the most serious repercussions might ensue.

The commencement of such conversations would immediately be publicized in the press throughout the world and might be taken as an indication that the United States Government had developed its policy in advance of the report of the Special Committee on Palestine and had prejudged the case in favor of the Jews. Such conclusions might well cause such serious doubts to arise in the minds of the Arabs with regard to the sincerity and impartiality of our support of the British request for a Special Committee of the United Nations that they might refuse to cooperate with the Committee and thus nullify its work before it had even been undertaken.

It is accordingly suggested that you might wish to indicate to Mr. Shertok, during the course of your conversation with him this morning, that the United States Government would be reluctant at the present time to take any type of action which might prejudice the
work of the Special Committee. It might be added that the views of
the Jewish Agency with regard to the financial implications of a
Palestinian settlement would undoubtedly prove of interest to the
Special Committee on Palestine in its consideration of the problem.
You might also wish to add that the Department was prepared to
receive the plans of the Jewish Agency as they developed and were
presented to the special Committee but that it felt it would be un-
timely for it to enter into discussion with regard to such plans at least
before the meeting of the General Assembly in the autumn.  

[OY] W. H[ENDERSON]

1 Marginal notation by Mr. Acheson: "I agree." In reply on June 25 to the
Jewish Agency's memorandum, Mr. Henderson advised Mr. Epstein: "I am now
able to inform you that this matter has been discussed and that the Department
believes it would be unwise to engage in conversations of the character suggested
by the Jewish Agency while the Special Committee of the United Nations is
endeavoring to make constructive suggestions with regard to a solution of the
Palestine problem." (S67N.51/5-2947)

S67N.01/5-2947

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Acheson)  

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] May 29, 1947.

Participants: Mr. Moshe Shertok, Member of the Jewish Agency.
Mr. Eliahu Epstein, Washington Representative of the
Jewish Agency.
Mr. Acheson, Under Secretary.
Mr. Loy Henderson, Director, NEA.

Mr. Shertok, a member of the Executive of the Jewish Agency
charged with conducting relations on behalf of that Agency with this
Government, and Mr. Epstein, head of the office of the Jewish Agency
in Washington, called upon me this morning. Mr. Henderson was
present during the conversation.

Mr. Shertok informed me that he expected to leave for Palestine
about June 6 in order to assist the Jewish Agency in presenting its
case to the Special Committee of the United Nations. He said that
before leaving for Palestine, he desired on behalf of the Agency, to
discuss various matters with the Department of State. He said that
he would appreciate it if arrangements could be made for him to have
a talk with General Marshall and with Mr. Lovett  

1 Drafted by Mr. Henderson.
2 Robert A. Lovett, who was appointed Special Assistant to the Secretary of
State on May 29. He succeeded Mr. Acheson as Under Secretary of State on
July 1, 1947.
Mr. Shertok referred to the recent Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and said that the Jewish Agency in general was somewhat encouraged at what transpired during the course of that Session. In particular, the Jewish Agency was pleasantly surprised at the attitude displayed in the fine speech of Mr. Gromyko, the representative of the Soviet Union. It would appear from that speech that the Soviet Union, which heretofore had been considered as favorable to the Arab side of the case, had finally decided to support partition. It was, of course, impossible to judge the sincerity of the Soviet pronouncement. Nevertheless, the pronouncement was extremely helpful to the Zionists, particularly since it should assist in removing concern lest the Soviet Union would back the Arabs in case the United States and Great Britain should decide in favor of partition.

The negative feature of the Session was the fact that the United States failed to make any statement clarifying its present substantive policy with regard to Palestine. The United States, which in the past had displayed such active interest in Palestine, remained silent. On behalf of the Jewish Agency, he wished to ask whether the United States would not be willing to inform the Special Committee of the United Nations in the near future regarding its policy towards Palestine. Although it was possible to infer what the American policy was by an examination of statements made in the past, nevertheless, a complete statement regarding the American position would be helpful at this time.

The Jewish Agency in general was fairly satisfied regarding the composition of the Special Committee. It was true that Iran and India would probably support the Arab cause. On the other hand, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, in view of the Soviet attitude, as well as statements made by representatives of these countries during the Session of the United Nations, would probably favor the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine and the linking up of the displaced Jews in Europe with the problem of Palestine. The other members of the Committee could probably be considered as genuine neutrals.

It seemed clear that any solution which the Special Committee would recommend would provide for considerable Jewish immigration from Europe to Palestine. The Jewish Agency was concerned, however, at the possibilities of further delay in the inauguration of this immigration. It hoped, therefore, that the United States would find it possible to suggest to the Special Committee that in its report to the General Assembly it would recommend that steps be taken before the final solution of the Palestinian problem had been decided upon for the immediate inauguration of large-scale immigration from Europe to Palestine.
Mr. Shertok said that before departing for Palestine he would like to have the answers of the American Government to the two suggestions just made by him on behalf of the Jewish Agency. An affirmative response by the American Government to these suggestions would be of material assistance to the Agency in its efforts to obtain a fair solution of the Palestinian problem which would bring prompt relief to the persecuted Jews in Europe.

I informed Mr. Shertok that it would be impossible for me to let him know what the reaction of the American Government was to the suggestions advanced by him until after they had been carefully considered and discussed. There were a number of considerations involved, and I, myself, was puzzled as to what our answer should be. I could see the force of the suggestions; on the other hand, the American Government was extremely anxious not to take any steps which might be considered as applying pressure to the Special Committee; it was important that the impression should not be created that the United States or any of the other Great Powers was endeavoring to influence the work of a Committee which had been established on the theory that it could approach the problem in a spirit of complete neutrality.

Mr. Shertok said that perhaps when he saw General Marshall and Mr. Lovett in the course of the next week, a reply might be given to him. I repeated that it would be necessary for these suggestions to be carefully considered before a reply could be made to them.

I also informed Mr. Shertok that we would let him know early next week whether it would be possible for the Secretary and Mr. Lovett to receive him before his departure.

D[ean] A[cheson]

Records of the USUN

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

TOP SECRET


A PLAN FOR THE FUTURE GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE

I. BASIC PRINCIPLES

A. It is imperative that the General Assembly of the United Nations, at its second regular session, should recommend a definitive solution of the Palestine problem, in order that the current strife and

1 In a memorandum of June 5 to Ambassador Austin, John C. Ross, Deputy to the Ambassador, stated: "Attached is copy of the draft Working Paper on Palestine which we discussed with Loy Henderson and Dean Rusk in the Department on Tuesday. I am sending a copy to Herschel Johnson and I have a third for myself. Loy Henderson is anxious, for apparent reasons, that there be no
uncertainties may be ended and that the people of that historic land may face the future with confidence.

B. Palestine should become neither an Arab State nor a Jewish State but a single independent Palestine State in which all its people, of whatever religion or blood, may dwell together in concord. In particular, Palestine should continue to provide a Jewish National Home in its spiritual and cultural aspects, as well as a home for the Arabs and all others who live there.

C. All the inhabitants of Palestine should accept the responsibilities and share the rights and privileges of a common Palestinian citizenship.

D. The Government of Palestine should represent all Palestinian citizens and should protect their human rights and fundamental freedoms. Conversely, every effort should be made to foster the active collaboration of all Palestinian citizens in the government of their country.

E. The various Holy Places of Palestine, which are sacred to Christians, Jews and Moslems throughout the world, should be forever safeguarded.

F. Until Palestine is able to take its rightful place as a Member of the United Nations, its people should be assisted by the United Nations to create a democratic government and to prepare for their forthcoming independence.

II. PREPARATION FOR INDEPENDENCE

A. The General Assembly at its second regular session should approve a trusteeship agreement for Palestine to enter into force on January 1, 1948.

B. The administering authority for Palestine under trusteeship should be either the United Nations itself or one or more of its Members. If the United Nations were to undertake direct administration of Palestine, its responsibilities should be exercised through the Trusteeship Council; if one or more Members of the United Nations

further distribution or discussion of this plan at this time within the Mission. I assured him that we would respect this wish.

"It is also understood that this is a working paper which is not yet cleared, even within the State Department."

The origins of the memorandum of June 4 may be traced back to a preliminary draft prepared by Mr. Henderson as an initial United States position on a solution of the Palestine problem. The draft has not been found in Department of State files. According to a memorandum of May 21 by Robert R. McClintock, Special Assistant to Mr. Rusk, Mr. Merriam read the paper, however, at a meeting on May 20 attended by Mr. McClintock and three other officers of SPA (501.BB Palestine/5–2147). A subsequent undated draft, prepared by officers of NEA and SPA, was transmitted to Mr. Rusk on May 26 by James E. Green, Associate Chief of the Division of Dependent Area Affairs (501.BB Palestine/5–2647).
were to be the administering authority, their administration should be supervised by the Council.

C. The terms of the trusteeship agreement should:

1. Prepare Palestine for its ultimate establishment as a single, independent state in accordance with the basic principles set forth in Section I above;
2. Provide immediately for the maximum degree of urban and rural self-government;
3. Provide for the early inauguration of full self-government during the trusteeship period; and
4. In other ways carry out the basic objectives of the trusteeship system as specified in Article 76 of the Charter of the United Nations, namely:

[Here follow sections a through d of Article 76.]

D. The independence of Palestine should be achieved in the following manner:

1. Not later than three years after the trusteeship agreement comes into force, the administering authority should convene a Constituent Assembly of Palestine, elected on the basis of proportional representation, for the purpose of formulating a constitution.
2. The Constitution of Palestine should come into effect upon adoption by the Constituent Assembly and approval by the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations. The proposed Constitution should in the first instance be drafted by the administering authority and submitted for the approval of the Trusteeship Council. After approval by the Trusteeship Council the Constitution should be submitted to the Constituent Assembly. If changes or additions are made by the Constituent Assembly these should be ratified by the Trusteeship Council. If substantial numbers of the population of Palestine refrain from participation in the Constituent Assembly, the administering authority should resubmit the Constitution, with recommendations, to the Trusteeship Council. Upon further approval by the Trusteeship Council with such changes, if any, which it may adopt, the Constitution should be resubmitted to the Constituent Assembly. Should substantial numbers of the population of Palestine again refrain from participation in the Constituent Assembly, it would be for the Trusteeship Council to decide whether (a) the Constitution as amended should have force and effect, or (b) the trusteeship should continue.
3. With the coming into effect of this Constitution a period of self-government should follow under the general supervision of the Trusteeship Council or an agency of the Trusteeship Council. The administering authority should take immediate steps for the establishment of the legislative bodies provided for in the Constitution in order that the administration and the judiciary may be created on the basis of powers derived from the legislative branch. The administering authority should transfer the administrative and judicial functions of government to the Palestinian authority so constituted, progressively and as rapidly as circumstances permit. This period of the transfer of governmental powers should, if possible, be completed within eight
years after the adoption of the Constitution so that, by the end of that period, there would be full self-government in Palestine.

4. At the expiration of this eight-year period, Palestine should be declared an independent state by the General Assembly of the United Nations and should thereupon take its place as a Member of the United Nations, unless the General Assembly should determine that a further period of self-government under trusteeship is necessary.

5. At the time it becomes a Member of the United Nations, the independent State of Palestine should be required to give adequate international guarantees for the protection of the rights of all its inhabitants and for the safeguarding in perpetuity of all the Holy Places.

E. The Constitution of Palestine should include provisions relating to form of government, immigration, economic development and land policy, education, and the safeguarding of the Holy Places. These constitutional provisions should be consistent with the proposals set forth in Sections III to VII below, all of which are predicated upon the basic principles stated at the beginning of this memorandum. Detailed recommendations for the implementation of these proposals have been avoided as premature. The administering authority, the Constituent Assembly, and the Trusteeship Council should be free to work out a Constitution for Palestine in consonance with principles accepted by the General Assembly.

III. FORM OF GOVERNMENT

A. The form of government of the proposed independent State of Palestine must be based upon broad democratic principles and must preclude any discrimination on grounds of religion or blood.

B. The Constitution of Palestine, which should include a bill of rights, and a new legal system—equally applicable to Jew, Christian, and Moslem alike—should be in harmony with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the practices of advanced democratic countries. They should encourage the continued existence and development of the Jewish National Home in its spiritual and cultural aspects. The term "Jewish National Home", as used herein, means Jewish religious and cultural institutions established and supported by Jewish groups throughout the world which should be operated in accordance with the laws of Palestine and to which the Jews of the world should have free access in accordance with Palestine law. In view of the importance of Palestine to Judaism, Christianity and Islam, the Constitution and the legal system of Palestine should also similarly permit and encourage the establishment and maintenance of religious or cultural homes for any Moslem or Christian groups which desire to establish spiritual and cultural international centers in Palestine.
C. The Palestine State should have a federal form of Government. An appropriate number of federal divisions should be created upon the basis of economic and social considerations rather than upon considerations of religion or blood. Each federal division should enjoy considerable home rule within the framework of the Constitution.

D. The chief legislative organ of the Palestine State should be a national parliament. Whether the parliament should consist of one or two houses should be for the Constituent Assembly to decide.

E. The title and powers of the head of the State and the method of his selection, the relationship between the executive and the parliament, and the organization of the administrative departments are all matters which should be determined with the approval of the Constituent Assembly.

F. A comprehensive system of Palestinian courts, independent of the legislative and executive branches of the Government, should be established in accordance with the Constitution. The new legal codes—civil, criminal, and family status—should be of such a character that they could be applied to Moslem, Jew, and Christian alike. There should not be set up one system of law for the adherents of one religion and a different system for the adherents of another religion. Nevertheless, the laws should be so devised that they would not force a Christian, Jew, or Moslem to commit acts which would be contrary to the fundamental tenets of his religion. The modernized laws and codes of certain Near Eastern states should be examined in connection with this problem.

G. Prior to the attainment of independence by Palestine, there should be no amendment of the Constitution except with the approval of the Palestine parliament, by a two-thirds vote, and with the approval of the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations.

IV. IMMIGRATION

A. The immigration laws of Palestine should not discriminate against prospective immigrants on grounds of religion or blood.

B. For the two years beginning January 1, 1948, an immigration quota for Palestine should be established not to exceed two and one-half percent a year of the estimated population of Palestine as of January 1, 1947.

C. Beginning January 1, 1950, and until the termination of the trusteeship, the annual immigration quota shall not be in excess of one-half of one percent of the estimated population of Palestine as of January 1, 1947, unless after the inauguration of full self-government under trusteeship, the Palestine parliament should decide to increase that quota.
D. During the period of trusteeship, persons admitted to Palestine should be of two categories:

(1) persons entering on a temporary basis; and
(2) persons entering as immigrants.

[Here follow paragraphs E and F expanding on D (1) and (2) and paragraph G concerning appeals from decisions of the Palestine immigration authorities.]

V. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND LAND POLICY

A. Since the creation of a sound economy is prerequisite to the effective independence of Palestine, a program should be initiated for the over-all economic development of the country. Such a program should include plans for the fuller utilization of Jordan water power, for more extensive irrigation of the land of Palestine, for the wider use of scientific methods of agriculture, and for the progressive improvement of public health and rural welfare services.

B. In order to insure the implementation of a comprehensive welfare program, the Government of Palestine should be empowered to establish and maintain a land system appropriate to the needs of the State. The Government should accordingly be responsible for enacting equitable legislation governing the sale, purchase, lease, or use of land. Furthermore, there should be adequate legal protection for the rights of tenant cultivators in cases of land transfers.

[Here follow Sections VI and VII dealing with education and the Holy Places, respectively.]

VIII. CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS

Any plan for the future government of Palestine should be designed to provide a definitive and early solution of the problem. Neither this plan nor any alternative proposal will satisfy all of the people of Palestine and all of the governments, private organizations, and individuals who have taken a position with respect to the problem. Yet, if any solution of the Palestine problem recommended by the General Assembly is to succeed, it must be accepted in good faith by all governments and all peoples. Once a final solution is agreed upon by the General Assembly, it must be put into effect immediately by the collaborative effort of the world community.

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Editorial Note

The White House, on June 5, released a statement made by President Truman on the Palestine question, which made an appeal to "every
citizen and resident of the United States, in the interests of this country, of world peace, and of humanity, meticulously to refrain, while the United Nations is considering the problem of Palestine, from engaging in, or facilitating, any activities which tend further to inflame the passions of the inhabitants of Palestine, to undermine law and order in Palestine, or to promote violence in that country."

The text of the statement is printed in Department of State Bulletin, June 15, 1947, page 1154.

501.BB Palestine/6–1147: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

JERUSALEM, June 11, 1947—noon.

243. Local Arab reaction to decision of [Arab] Higher Committee to boycott UNSCOP 1 is thus far unfavorable. Jamal Husseini and Faris [el-] Khouri are in Jerusalem and are giving following reasons for decision to prominent Arabs:

1. Policy procrastination through investigating committees well understood by Arabs; their rights need no bargaining or confirmation.
2. Omission provision for independence from Committee's terms of reference.
3. Connection Palestine with displaced persons problem.
4. Insufficient eastern representation on Committee and membership thereon of countries "in direct relations with Jews, Americans and British whose sentiments toward Arabs well known".
5. Insertion religious matters in terms of reference for purposes justification British remaining in Palestine.
6. Handling of matter in special assembly was sufficient to create apprehension.

Jamal Husseini reliably reported to have informed Arab gathering last night that information from New York indicates Committee already decided on position. Aranha alleged to have informed Arab delegate that while he personally understood Arab rights in matter, his Government and that of US and British had already formed opinion in favor partition. Husseini also alleged that this is reason Faris [el-] Khouri favors boycott.

Strong indications Arab Communists will not boycott.

MACATEE

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1 In a letter of June 13 to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Jamal Husseini as Vice Chairman of the Arab Higher Committee announced that the Palestinian Arabs would abstain from collaborating with the Special Committee and would not appear before it; for text, see UNSCOP, vol. ii, p. 5.
PALESTINE

501.BB Palestine/6-1347: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 13, 1947—6 p. m.

Dept concerned by current tendency among certain persons and organizations interested in general Palestine problem to describe various solutions which have been suggested in recent years as, for example, “the Arab plan,” “the Jewish plan,” “the British plan for provincial autonomy,” or “the American plan for a partition of Palestine.”

Dept realizes many persons and organizations use such descriptions as labels. Dept is convinced however that others may reiterate such descriptions for propaganda reasons, thereby conveying impression that those to whom proposed solution is attributed favor one solution as opposed to another.

Dept’s attitude at recent special session UN GA was based on view that special session was called solely for procedural purpose of constituting and instructing special committee to prepare Palestine question for consideration at regular session UN GA in Sep.

Those persons and organizations who now, for example, urge US Govt to recommend some particular Palestine solution or to advocate immediate immigration into Palestine are being informed it would be inadvisable for US Govt to make specific recommendations at this time or take specific action concerning particular aspects of question while Special Committee which is preparing report has entire problem under consideration.

In any discussions which you may have concerning Palestine you should emphasize Dept’s views re UN consideration of problem. You should also make clear that this Govt has not at any time put forward or supported any plan for future of Palestine and at this stage it is not supporting any solution in preference to another.

MARSHALL


501.BB Palestine/5-2247

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 13, 1947.

Dear Austin: I have read with interest your letter of May 22, 1947 in which you refer to the recent Special Session of the General Assembly and touch upon the vexatious problem of Palestine.
In reviewing the proceedings of the Special Session, I share your general impression of encouragement. I am convinced that the success of the Session from the point of view of our Government was due in large part to your courageous and effective leadership.

The suggestions contained in your letter with regard to the kind of approach which the Department might make towards the Palestine problem are extremely helpful and are being carefully studied.

During the latter part of May, we were considering the advisability of making a public statement at an early date clarifying the substantive policies of the United States with regard to Palestine. At that time there was a possibility that the Special Committee, before departing for Palestine, might hold hearings in the United States in order to obtain the views of individuals and of various organizations maintaining headquarters in this country. It was our thought that it would be unfortunate for the United States Government to remain silent while certain American citizens or groups were making statements which might be considered as representative of the views of the Government.

It is now our understanding that the Special Committee has decided not to hold any hearings in the United States before making its investigations in Palestine and that the members of this Committee are either already en route to Palestine or are preparing to leave within the next few days.

We are inclined to believe, therefore, that it might be preferable not to make any public statement of our views with regard to the future government of Palestine in the immediate future unless unexpected developments should take place. We should of course continue to concentrate upon the task of determining the kind of government for Palestine which in our opinion would be in closest accord with the principles enunciated by us during the war and during the postwar period, including those incorporated in the Charter of the United Nations.

Although this Government has long cherished the hope that a solution of the Palestine problem might be found, an agreed settlement no longer appears possible. We are convinced that there is no solution of the Palestine problem which will not meet with strong opposition from one or several quarters. It is also possible that at least a certain degree of force may be required in implementing any solution of the Palestine problem. We therefore believe that it would be wise for us to review the whole problem in order to make certain that any kind of a solution is based upon principles which can be defended before the world, both now and in the future.

I hope that you will continue to keep us informed of the views of
the representatives of various countries to the United Nations with
regard to Palestine and that you will also communicate to us any
further ideas on the subject as may occur to you. It is hoped that in
the not distant future the Department's studies will have progressed
sufficiently far to enable us to exchange views with you on the subject
of the future of Palestine. Even though we may not make any public
announcement in the near future, it is important that we decide at the
earliest possible moment what our basic attitude should be in regard
to this serious problem.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. MARSHALL

867N.01/6-1947

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 19, 1947.

Participants: The Secretary.
Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, Jewish Agency and Zionist
Organization of America.
Mr. Loy W. Henderson, Director, NEA.

Dr. Silver called upon me this afternoon in order to present the views
of the various organizations which he represents respecting our policy
with regard to Palestine. The following represents a summary of Dr.
Silver's remarks:

1. The investigating Committee of the United Nations is now in
Palestine for the purpose of obtaining facts to be used in the prepara-
tion of a report to the United Nations regarding the problem of
Palestine and the solution of that problem. It is not believed that this
Committee will unearth any new facts. The decisions which it makes
are certain to be of a political, rather than of a juridical or fact-finding
nature. There is a danger that unless the Committee is acquainted with
the American Government's views regarding what the solution of the
Palestine problem should be, it will be working in a vacuum and its
report will be of such a character that no solution of the problem will
be found next fall and there will be again considerable delay before
the problem can be approached realistically.

2. The American Government has two alternatives before it. One
is to fail to make its views clear before the minds of the members of
the Committee are made up, with consequent confusion in the General
Assembly in September. The other is to state its views at a sufficiently
early date to permit the Committee to give careful consideration to
them before it draws up its report. The Jewish Agency and affiliated
organizations hope that the United States Government will present its
views in the near future and that before doing so, it will consult
privately with Zionist leaders so that the latter will have an oppor-

1 Drafted by Mr. Henderson.
tunity to correct any misunderstandings or misapprehensions under which the United States may be laboring and to make suggestions which will enable the United States Government and American Zionists to find common ground.

3. The American Zionists are completely in the dark as to what the present policy of the United States is with regard to Palestine. They would like to exchange views privately at once with the American Government on this subject. They are anxious that when the problem comes up before the General Assembly in the fall, they will not find themselves compelled to oppose the policies of their own Government.

4. The Zionists have the impression that in the past the Government of the United States has looked with favor upon partition. They are not sure whether the American Government still has these views. In any event, he feels that he should emphasize that partition could mean many things. A partition plan could be developed which would have the support of 95 percent of the Jews; one could also be suggested which would be unequivocably opposed by 95 percent of the Jews.

5. In about two weeks, there will be a national meeting of Zionist leaders in New York. Dr. Silver will preside. He hopes that at that time he will be in a position to bolster the morale of the Jews both in this country and abroad by making some statement with regard to the attitude of the American Government which would be encouraging. Specifically, he would like to know whether the Department of State is willing to exchange views with the Jewish Agency and if so, at what time.

I informed Dr. Silver that the question of Palestine is very much in our minds. We are devoting much time and study to it. We hope to find a definitive solution. The problem is extremely complicated. To the difficult international factors connected with it, there have been added factors of internal politics. We are anxious that a fair and equitable solution be found. There is nothing further which we can say at this time.

I added that I would give consideration to the views expressed by Dr. Silver, including his suggestion that, if possible, he would be placed in a position to make some kind of a statement at the Zionist meeting scheduled to take place in New York in two weeks.

I also told Dr. Silver that if the Zionists would like to convey to the Department any of their views which they have not already made known to it regarding what the solution of the Palestine problem should be, they might present them to Mr. Henderson either in writing or orally. Dr. Silver replied that they would be glad to do so provided the Department on its part would tell the Zionists what the views of the United States Government were. I told Dr. Silver that we were not prepared at this time to make any statement with regard to what our views are or might be.

Dr. Silver asked whether there was a possibility that some time during the summer we would be in a position to talk frankly with the
Zionist leaders. I replied that I hoped we would be able to do so. He asked if I could assure him that such a talk would precede any announcement which the Government might make regarding its Palestine policy. I replied that I hoped that it might be found possible to discuss any policy which we might contemplate adopting relating to the future of Palestine before announcing it.

Before his departure, Dr. Silver handed me the attached memorandum setting forth the views of the organizations which he represents as to the course of action which the United States Government might take.

*Undated memorandum, not printed.*

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501.BB Palestine/6-2347

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, June 23, 1947.

No. 106

Subject: UNSCOP in Palestine—The First Week.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on Monday, June 16, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine found itself settled in Jerusalem and ready to commence its efforts to find a solution for the problems which hold this country in a state of continual crisis. The Chairman of the Committee, Chief Justice Emil Sandstrom of Sweden, had arrived on the previous day to join the great majority of the membership of the Committee and Secretariat already in this country for several days.

Confronted by the large and energetic press corps of Palestine when he stepped off the plane at Lydda airport on June 15, the Chairman immediately ran into the pressmen’s request for comment on Arab accusations that the Committee was biased, and the decision of the Arab Higher Executive to boycott its proceedings. Justice Sandstrom covered those two aspects of the Arab attitude by saying simply, “It would be easier and more correct, if they were right, to come and give their opinions.”

The Committee commenced on June 16 with an informal exchange of views on its program of work. On that day an Arab general strike, called by the Arab Higher Executive, was in progress, effectively tying up all Arab-controlled commerce and transportation. On that day, too, the Chairman of UNSCOP went on the air in a broadcast which seemed directed mainly toward the Arabs, and which was, in effect, a plea for cooperation.

“I cannot put it too strongly that this Committee has come to Pales-
tine with a completely open mind.... We are impartial on this problem.... We have reached no conclusions...." he assured them.¹

During the afternoon of that first day, June 16, representatives of the Palestine Government appeared before the Committee² in private session, from which even the press was barred. UNSCOP, according to Justice Sandstrom, had agreed to this procedure as it felt that otherwise Government testimony would not have been heard. Though the Government representatives, among them Chief Secretary Sir Henry Gurney, presented little more than statistical information, the fact that they were received privately obviously irked the Jewish Agency whose English-language organ, The Palestine Post headlined the next day that "The Secret Session Was Not Needed". If for reasons of security the public was excluded, the Post went on, then the presence of the Agency's liaison officers with UNSCOP would not have endangered matters.

On the morning of June 17, members of UNSCOP met in secret session the principal item on the agenda being consideration of the Arab boycott. To the surprise of the other members, the Yugoslav alternate, M. Brilej, rose and read a long prepared statement censuring the Arab Higher Committee for its attitude. It was M. Brilej's idea to have his statement accepted by the whole committee as its reaction to the boycott. After considerable discussion, as the Department was informed in telegram no. 254 of June 17, 5 p. m., the Committee defeated this proposal by a nine-to-one vote, with Guatemala abstaining. Subsequently, the Committee decided to consider Justice Sandstrom's radio appeal mentioned above as sufficient reply to the Arab move.

While this was going on, the Secretariat was involved in technical problems with both the Government and the Jewish Agency. The Government desired to search all persons attending open hearings, or alternatively, to strike off names of persons listed to receive tickets to such hearings, UNSCOP to provide lists four days in advance. There was strong resistance in the Secretariat to these suggestions, and the Government was finally forced to capitulate. Open hearings will, in fact, be open to the public, the YMCA now being outside the barbed-wire barrier which formerly enclosed it in Zone "B".

On June 17, I also informed the Department (telegram no. 253³) of the contact established by the Irgun Zvai Leumi with the Committee through a letter delivered by a secret source to Mr. Victor Hoo, the personal representative of the Secretary-General of UNO with

¹ For full text of broadcast, see UNSCOP, vol. ii, p. 5.
² For summary record of the hearing of the representatives of the Palestine Government, see ibid., vol. iv, p. 1.
³ Not printed.
UNSCOP. The text of the letter is being forwarded to the Department. In effect, it more or less requests the Committee to bring pressure to bear upon the British Government to cease military trials and executions, with particular reference to the trials of those Irgunists apprehended after the Acre prison operations.

This attempt to involve UNSCOP in the processes of British military justice in Palestine was, from the Irgun’s point of view, most timely: At about the time the terrorists’ letter was delivered, a British military court was sentencing to death three of the five Irgunists captured at Acre. Their two comrades received life imprisonment. These sentences immediately evoked outcries in the Hebrew press that the Government was giving fresh impetus to the vicious circle of executions and more terrorism. There was nothing new in the direction Hebrew comment took. As we have pointed out to the Department in the past, the complete inability of Jewish legal organizations to cope with terrorism has been well illustrated. They choose, therefore, to emphasize the Government role in such matters.

On the afternoon of June 17, the Committee received from Mr. Moshe Shertok, Head of the Jewish Agency’s Political Department, an oral “picture of Palestine’s geography, people, industry, agriculture and potentialities”. Mr. Shertok’s hour and a quarter discourse was presented in the Committee’s first open hearing in the YMCA auditorium. At the hearing were rows of correspondents, newsreel cameramen, representatives of various Jewish bodies, consular officials—but no Arabs. Mr. Shertok took pains when commencing his speech to make it clear that he was not presenting the “Jewish case”, but was merely giving background information for the Committee’s benefit. In discussing his presentation with me later, however, he said that he went somewhat farther than that, to which I would not be disinclined to agree.

The main interest while Mr. Shertok and his colleague, Mr. Horowitz, were at the Committee table centered in the attitudes of, and questions put to him by, the various members. Seated by the Indian member, Sir Abdur Rahman, who regarded him with a somewhat unpleasant expression, Shertok answered all queries with his customary agility. The Indian, however, would not be put off on one or two matters, particularly with regard to immigration and land transfers. In connection with immigration, he asked Mr. Shertok if the latter would like to see all the immigration laws in the world disappear. Mr. Shertok replied that he would not go so far as to say that, but what had the Indian member’s question to do with the matter? The

*For the summary record of the hearing of Mr. Shertok, see UNSCOP, vol. III, p. 1.*
Indian then asked if Mr. Shertok would like to see such laws remain as they are now, to which the Jewish Agency's representative replied he had no opinion on that.

On another matter when discussing land transactions, Mr. Shertok took occasion to say that the present restrictions were on a discriminatory racial basis. He was then asked by Sir Abdur Rahman if he, Mr. Shertok, was aware that such discrimination exists in other parts of the world, that, for example, a Sikh may not buy land in the Punjab. To this Mr. Shertok said there was a distinct provision in the Mandate that the Government should encourage the close settlement of Jews on the land.

Of interest, also, during this period, was the question posed by the Iranian member, M. Entezam, who politely inquired in French if, in view of the examples of Arab-Jewish cooperation cited by M. Shertok, that was not a good indication that both peoples might collaborate, "if, as and when a Palestinian state were created". Mr. Shertok explained to the Iranian that the Jews felt they would be left in the lurch if subjected to an Arab majority with hostile leaders. Cooperation in day to day matters did not mean, Mr. Shertok added, that the Jews and Arabs are ready to compose their political differences and cooperate in one state. The Iranian member said he was satisfied with this reply for the moment, but would return to the subject at some future time.

Late in the evening of June 17 during a closed meeting, UNSCOP commenced consideration of a letter received from the parents of the three condemned terrorists. The fact that the activity of these groups was being carried on in all its deadly ferocity was revealed by the press of June 19, which gave considerable publicity to the foiling by Haganah of a tunneling operation which had been undertaken by Irgun with the intention of eventually blowing up Citrus House in Tel-Aviv, a fortress at present occupied by British officers and troops. Subsequent Irgun reaction to this Haganah activity is described in airgram no. 136.

On the morning of June 19, the Committee commenced its travels around Palestine. The first day was taken up with visits to the Haifa district, followed on the 20th by a trip to Jericho and the Dead Sea. The sub-Committee formed to determine the itinerary was believed to have decided on journeys which would take up approximately two weeks' time, during which there would be very little opportunity to hold hearings.

In the meantime, Mr. Moshe Shertok chose the morning of June 19

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\( ^6 \) For letter of June 17, see UNSCOP, vol. ii, p. 11.
\( ^4 \) Not printed.
\( ^7 \) For itinerary of the Special Committee, see UNSCOP, vol. ii, p. 4.
to call on me at the Consulate General. The Department will recall
from my telegram no. 247 of the irritation with American policy on
Palestine which he expressed to an officer of the Consulate General in
a talk on June 13. During his visit on the 19th, Mr. Shertok indicated
that in presenting its case to UN scop the JA would:

1. Put aside Ben-Gurion Statement to Vaad Leumi on May 22 (in
which JA Chairman expressed desire for Jewish state at once in part
of Palestine, remaining “small portion” to continue under mandate
for purpose facilitating Jewish immigration and settlement and rais-
ing Arab standard of living);

2. Put forward in public hearing a claim to all Palestine on historic
basis;

3. Indicate in private hearing that JA would accept partition as
settlement;

4. Present outline of Agency’s desires with respect to partition if
requested to do so by UN scop.

Questioned later by a member of my staff as to the difference between
this approach and that of Ben-Gurion, Dr. Leo Kohn of the Agency’s
Political Department stated that whereas Ben-Gurion statement im-
plied eventual absorption into Jewish state of areas not initially in-
cluded therein, the United Nations Committee would be informed in
connection with point no. 3 of the above that partition would be
considered by the JA as a final political settlement.

As the week ended, UN scop found itself deadlocked over the issue
as to whether it should bring pressure to bear on the Palestine Govern-
ment in connection with the death sentences passed on three terrorists
caught at Acre. After three long secret meetings, a majority decided
to inform the parents of the condemned men, in reply to the letter
received from them that:

“It is beyond the Committee’s instructions and function to interfere
with the judicial administration in Palestine, but having regard in the
circumstances to the task of the Committee, the matter is being brought
to the attention of the proper authorities.”

This was done through the medium of a “Resolution” to which a
majority of the members of UN scop agreed, and which was for-
warded to the Secretary General of the United Nations for transmis-
sion to the British Government. This resolution read:

“In view of the fact that the majority of the members of the Com-
mittee have expressed concern as to the possible unfavourable repercus-
sions that execution of the three death sentences pronounced by the
Military Court of Jerusalem on June 16, the day on which the Com-

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8 Not printed.
9 For full text of letter of June 22, signed by Chairman Sandstrom, see
committee held its first meeting in Jerusalem, might have upon the fulfilment of the task with which the General Assembly of the U.N. has entrusted the Committee, and considering the opinion of such members as to the scope of the resolution on the Palestine question adopted on May 15 by the General Assembly, the Committee resolved that the Chairman communicate to the Secretary General of the U.N. a copy of this resolution and of the letter received from the relatives of the condemned persons, for transmission to the Mandatory Powers."

At about the time this resolution was made public, Mr. Ben-Gurion was writing the High Commissioner that "hangings don't stop terror", and terrorists were attempting to kidnap a high British police official from a bookshop within a hundred yards or so of UNSCOP's seat of deliberations.

And so UNSCOP's first week ended. We could discern no weakening of the boycott, and the Committee's action in communicating to the Mandatory Government its fear of "possible unfavorable repercussions" will undoubtedly harden Arab opinion of its pro-Zionist bias. We shall attempt, in the weeks to come, to report on its travels, and public hearings, and to convey to the Department such indications as may become available as to its views on the situation it now finds itself in contact with.

Respectfully yours, 

ROBERT B. MACATEE

867N.01/1G-2/47

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, 27 June, 1947.

Dear Mr. Marshall: Lord Inverchapel will have told you of our grave concern at the persistent and successful attempts of Jewish organizations to send Jewish illegal immigrants to Palestine from various European countries and will have explained to you how much we regret that the funds for this illegal immigrant traffic are largely subscribed in the United States.

For this reason, His Majesty's Government have greatly valued the recent statement of President Truman calling the attention of the American people to the resolution recently adopted by the United Nations Assembly requesting all Governments and peoples to refrain, pending action by the General Assembly on the report of the Special Committee on Palestine, from the threat or use of force, or any other action which might create an atmosphere prejudicial to an early

1 This letter is numbered E 5001/48/G and is marked "confidential" and "personal".
2 Issued on June 5; see editorial note, p. 1101.
settlement of the question of Palestine. We hope also that the publicity which Trygve Lie has given to Cadogan’s note to him, asking that all Member States should take the strictest precautions to prevent the transit through their territory and the departure from their ports of Jews attempting to enter Palestine illegally, will discourage the activities of the organisers of this traffic, who are using Jewish refugees as a means of exerting political pressure on the Government of Palestine at a moment when the future of that country is under consideration by the United Nations.

May we count upon the assistance of your Government in preventing the situation from deteriorating still further? I should like to ask in particular that United States officials and representatives on charitable and refugee organizations in Europe should be requested to discourage the unauthorised movement of Jewish refugees leading to the departure of illegal immigrant ships for Palestine. My colleagues and I feel very strongly that the organisers of this traffic are not only endangering the peace and security of the Middle East but are now flouting the authority of the United Nations.

Yours sincerely,                        ERNEST BEVIN

* Dated May 23; for text, see UNSCOP, vol. II, p. 12.

501.BB Palestine/6-3047
The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to the Secretary of State
SECRET

JERUSALEM, June 30, 1947.
No. 118
Subject: UNSCOP in Palestine—the Second Week.

Sm: I have the honor to continue the chronicle begun in my despatch no. 106 of June 23, 1947, in which we commenced a weekly summary of the activities of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, together with such background information in relation thereto as we believe may be of interest to the Department and the field.

The beginning of its second week in Palestine found the Committee involved in a near-dispute with the Palestine Government and making no headway whatever toward changing the rigid line of non-cooperation adopted by the Arab Higher Committee. The Department will recall that on June 22, UNSCOP transmitted to the Secretary General of the U.N. a resolution to the effect that a majority of its members had “expressed concern as to the possible unfavourable repercussions” which might result if the Government carried out the death sentences of three convicted terrorists. The Secretary General was requested to forward the text of the resolution to the Mandatory Power.

The vote on this resolution, we are informed, was nine to one (the
Australian holding that such action exceeded the Committee’s terms of references) and the Yugoslav abstaining because he felt that the wording of the resolution was too weak.

The next day the Palestine Post, ever ready to create difficulties for the Government, announced that the Chief Secretary had “rebuked” UNSCOP for its action. In the text of Sir Henry Gurney’s message on this subject, the Chief Secretary, after observing that the Committee had in fact published such a resolution, went on to say that the Committee was, no doubt, aware “the sentences referred to above have not been confirmed . . . and the matter being sub judice it was necessary to avoid comment”. Referring to that part of the resolution which mentions that the death sentences were passed on June 16, the day on which the Committee held its first meeting in Jerusalem, the Chief Secretary said:

“It is presumably not suggested that the Court pronounced sentence on that day otherwise than in the course of judicial process. There would of course be no truth in any such suggestion.”

I was informed by the Chief Secretary on June 23 that the Committee had sought the Government’s advice as to desirability of making a statement in reply to the letter received from the condemned persons’ parents, and had been told that the Government would consider it most inadvisable to do so. Nevertheless, the Committee had proceeded to issue its resolution.

Editorializing on the Chief Secretary’s statement the same day, the Post poured out the usual compliments to the Committee which we have been reading in the Hebrew press, and announced that the Chief Secretary “had ventured to give advice to the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine”.

For once the Agency and the Irgun saw eye to eye, though the latter, in its broadcast of June 25, expressed itself somewhat more forcefully in referring to Sir Henry Gurney:

[Here follows the Irgun characterization of the Chief Secretary.]

As was to be expected, the Arabic press, led by the Mufti’s organ Al Wahda, laid down a barrage of editorial criticism of this “interference” and “additional evidence of bias” on the part of UNSCOP. Al Wahda hammered home the point that the Committee’s resolution merely confirmed the good judgment of the Arab Higher Committee in deciding on boycott from the start.

Though Monday, June 23, was supposed to be a day of rest, several members of the Committee and its secretariat, including the Chairman, journeyed to Rehovoth to lunch with Dr. Chaim Weizmann, erst-
while President of the World Zionist Congress, now cast in the role of elder-statesman in retirement.

On June 24, UNSCOP visited the Jaffa District, accompanied by the usual group of Government liaison officials and journalists. The Municipal Council of Ramle, a nearby Arab town, had stipulated on the previous day that no representatives of the Jewish press be allowed to accompany the Committee on its visit to that municipality, and UNSCOP was simultaneously informed that only the Mayor of Ramle would greet the visitors but even he would not accompany them on their tour. This attitude was typical of what they encountered in Jaffa, where despite Arab objections Jewish pressmen insisted on being present. At one textile factory where the journalists crowded in, the management stalked out in protest.

In marked contrast to this Arab reception, was that accorded the Committee the next day in Tel-Aviv, where its members were confronted with “an almost staggering volume of information”. Crowds clapped and sang for the delegates and pressed around their cars to shake their hands. Hebrew newspapers extolled the individual members and at the Great Synagogue, the Committee heard Chief Rabbi Unterman call upon the Almighty “to instill in the hearts of the United Nations Committee knowledge, wisdom and intelligence, to judge honestly and to gather the people of Israel in their Holy Land to revive and rebuild it”.

The Indian Moslem member, Sir Abdur Rahman, did not participate in the Tel-Aviv tour.

While this reception was being accorded UNSCOP in the principal Jewish city of Palestine, Jewish terrorists in Jerusalem were making their second kidnapping attempt within four days. This time, a Government liaison officer with UNSCOP, Mr. Alan Major, was involved, but through his continued struggles after being struck on the head with a hammer and because his wife’s screams attracted considerable attention, the would-be kidnappers were forced to abandon their purpose.

On the following day, June 26, the Committee set out for the Negeb to examine Jewish settlements in that wasteland of the South. At Revivim, Nir Am and Hafetz Haim, they again encountered cheers and applauding settlers, and were assured that there was room in that region for “thousands and thousands” of young men and women.

On June 26, also, the Government of Palestine presented to UNSCOP a Memorandum on the Administration of Palestine under the Mandate. The complete text has been forwarded with despatch no. 112 of June 30, 1947. In it, the Government stressed, among other

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¹ Not printed: the text of the memorandum was published by the Government of Palestine (Jerusalem, the Government Printer, 1947).
things, its role in preserving a balance between conflicting obligations imposed by the Mandate.

This paper at once aroused the ire of the Jewish Agency, which voiced its rebuttal in the shape of an editorial in the Palestine Post of June 27. Said the Post:

[Here follow quotations from the editorial and from the political correspondent of the newspaper.]

Arab journals, while not allotting as much space, also tore into the Government paper. On June 27, Al Difa editorialized:

[Here follow quotations from two Arab newspapers.]

UNSCOP remained in Jerusalem on Friday, June 27, devoting the early part of the day to visits to the Hebrew University and to Hadassah Hospital.

[Here follow accounts of UNSCOP’s visits to these two institutions and to the Arab areas of Ramallah, Nablus and Tulkarm and of the murder of three members of the British military by terrorists.]

This weekend orgy or [of?] murder, by no means unusual in this country, gave the Committee some food for thought. The Arab newspapers were still publicly proclaiming that the Committee had tried to appease the terrorists by its intervention on behalf of the convicted terrorists, described earlier in this dispatch and the preceding chapter of this chronicle. Accordingly, the Chairman called a closed meeting on Sunday, June 29, at 9 p.m. After two hours’ deliberation, the following communiqué was published at 11 p.m.:

“At this evening’s meeting the members of the Committee, taking note of the published report of acts of violence, committed in Palestine since their arrival in the country, decided by nine votes (Australia and India abstaining), to record their sense that such acts constitute a flagrant disregard of the appeal made in the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations on May 15.

“The members of the Committee unanimously charged the Chairman to express their sympathy to Mr. Alan Major, Assistant to the Palestine Government’s Liaison Officer to UNSCOP, for the act of violence to which he was subject.”

By the time it got around to the issuance of this Resolution No. 2, the Committee was presumably getting acquainted with the facts of life in Palestine. If along with such knowledge there came a certain quality of bewilderment at the maelstrom into which they had been thrust, that is understandable. For at the end of their second week, despite the appeals of the General Assembly, and of UNSCOP itself, two facts stared the Committee-members in the face:

1. Jewish terrorism is as rampant as ever.
2. The Arab boycott is as firm as ever.

Respectfully yours,

ROBERT B. MACATEE
501.BB Palestine/7-747

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

No. 118

Jerusalem, July 7, 1947.

Subject: UNSCOP in Palestine—the third week.

Sir: I have the honor to refer to my despatch no. 118 of June 30, 1947, and in continuation thereof to submit the following report of the activities of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine during its third week in this country. The Department will recall that at the end of the second week, as recorded in the despatch under reference, the Committee expressed its abhorrence of terrorists’ deeds, and conveyed its sympathy to the British official attached to UNSCOP for liaison purposes, who had been severely battered while resisting terrorist attempts to kidnap him.

Setting out again on the morning of June 30, the Committee had for reflection the fact that the immediately preceding week-end had witnessed the deaths of four more British soldiers at terrorists’ hands; it also had for reflection the fact that there was no sign of a weakening of the Arab boycott. The first three days of the week were scheduled for the last leg of the Committee’s tour of Palestine, covering the regions of Sharon, Esdraelon and Galilee.

[Here follows an account of various visits by UNSCOP.]

Meanwhile, on the previous day, the British Government had sent to the Secretary General of the United Nations a communication which constituted a reply to the Resolution which UNSCOP had forwarded to the Secretary General mentioning possible repercussions which might be expected if certain condemned terrorists were executed. The British Government’s statement was, in effect, a repetition of that of the Palestine Government. It stressed that (a) the death sentences had not been confirmed and therefore the whole matter was still sub judice; (b) if the sentences are confirmed then the High Commissioner may exercise, if he thinks fit, the royal prerogative of pardon delegated to him. At this point, the British statement added:

“It is invariably the practice of His Majesty’s Government not to interfere with the High Commissioner’s discretion, whether or not exercised by this prerogative.”

Concluding, the statement referred to the General Assembly’s Resolution on Palestine adopted on May 15. In this connection, the British Government states, it interprets the Resolution as applying

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1 For telegram of June 30 from the British Representative at the United Nations to the Secretary-General, see UNSCOP, vol. II, p. 14.
to action calculated to disturb peace in Palestine; it "cannot admit its relevance to normal processes of Justice there".

[Here follows an account of further visits by UNSCOP.]

The public hearings scheduled by the Committee in the YMCA auditorium in Jerusalem got into full swing on July 4 when David Ben-Gurion, Chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive, commenced presentation of the case, as he put it, for "establishing Palestine as a Jewish State". The two-hour statement made by Ben-Gurion has been lengthily reported in the press, but certain general trends may be recorded briefly here:

1. "The settlement of the twin problems of the Jews and Palestine was perhaps the supreme test of the United Nations . . . . Great empires had tried to assimilate and crush the Jews, but they had with an indomitable obstinacy preserved their identity."

2. "There had been 'a very sad and very painful conflict' between the Jews and the Mandatory . . . . Palestine is not part of the British Empire."

3. "The Government's memorandum abounds in 'half-truths' . . . . Palestine is the only place in the civilized world where racial discrimination still exists in law" . . . .

4. "Promises made to the Arabs have been fulfilled . . . . The Arabs have their freedom in an area 125 times the size of Palestine . . . . An Arab minority in Palestine would remain safe in national association with their race . . . . a Jewish minority in an Arab State, even with the most ideal paper guarantee, would mean the final extinction of hope for the entire Jewish people for national equality and independence" . . . .

5. "The Jews are against the continuation of the Mandate, whether of Britain or the United Nations . . . . Only by establishing Palestine as a Jewish State can the true objectives be accomplished: immigration and settlement for the Jews, economic development and social progress for the Arabs . . . . Nothing will further the Jewish Arab alliance more than the establishment of the Jewish State . . . ."

Mr. Ben-Gurion was followed by Rabbi Fishman, President of the Central Council of the World Mizrachi, who addressed the Committee in Hebrew. Rabbi Fishman outlined the central position of Palestine in Jewish religious and ritual life and emphasized that "it was only in Palestine that the orthodox Jew could fulfil himself religiously". The Rabbi added, "In our view, it is the duty of every Jew to come and live in Palestine and any regulation restricting the fulfilment of this commandment is not only devoid of legal authority, but positively sinful."

Following Rabbi Fishman, Mr. D. Horowitz, head of the Jewish Agency's Economic Department, gave the Committee a series of statistics. With his assistants displaying many charts, Mr. Horowitz
gave a running commentary for about an hour and a half, with two main objectives:

1. To prove that with the advent of the Jews, no Arab had ever been displaced, and,
2. In fact, because of the impact of Jewish economy on Palestine, the lot of the Arabs here—economically as well as hygienically—was vastly better than that of the Arabs of surrounding countries.

Mr. Horowitz, in discussing “absorptive capacity”, insisted upon the point that more and more immigration was the only answer, “that each man added to the population is not only a worker or an employer, he is also a consumer . . .”

The meeting adjourned at two o’clock in the afternoon of July 4, leaving observers somewhat exhausted. It might be safe to assume that members of the Committee also found the session exhausting, especially those members who are not fluent in English. (The public hearings have been conducted entirely in English, with the exception of the discourse by Rabbi Fishman, which, as noted above, was in Hebrew and later translated into English.)

On Sunday, July 6, the hearings resumed with Mr. E. Kaplan and Mr. F. Bernstein, the Treasurer of the Jewish Agency, and the Head of the Trade and Industry Department, pointing out in some detail the economic hardships which they contend the Government of Palestine has imposed upon the Yishuv and the country as a whole during the past twenty-seven years. In fact, condemnation of the Government of Palestine occupied an even greater portion of the speeches of these two gentlemen than it had those of their predecessors. Mr. Bernstein perhaps made his cardinal point when he told UNSCOP:

“. . . The Palestine administration, barely tolerating Jewish development—instead of assisting it—seemed chiefly concerned with what was explained as the protection of the Arab population from the dangers threatening them from Jewish colonization.

“The Arab population nevertheless derived immense advantages, but what Arab goodwill towards the Jews could have been obtained as a result of economic benefits was largely lost because those benefits were represented as the gift of a ‘protecting’ Administration which, by the very attitude of the protector, denounced Jewish colonization as harmful and dangerous to the Arabs.”

At the close of the third week, the view was widely held in Jewish circles that UNSCOP had had insufficient contact with the Yishuv. Typical of this feeling, the Palestine Post featured an article entitled,

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2 For texts of the statements made by Mr. Ben-Gurion, Rabbi Fishman and Mr. Horowitz, see UNSCOP, vol. iii, pp. 8–34.
3 The Jewish community in Palestine.
4 For texts of the statements by Messrs. Bernstein and Kaplan, see UNSCOP, vol. iii, pp. 34–47.
"They Don't Meet the People—UNSCOP REMAINS REMOTE". Probably no member of the Committee would disagree with that article, so far as the Arabs are concerned, because contact between their leaders and UNSCOP continues, apparently, to be nil. However, many a member might properly be somewhat annoyed if the Post was referring to the Jews, whose organizations, settlements and people UNSCOP had listened to and visited to the point of complete physical weariness.

The uneasiness in Jewish circles was perhaps reflected by a sentence in the same article in the Palestine Post, which made reference to the Arab boycott and the Mufi thus:

"So far as the Arabs are concerned, UNSCOP is getting only a monstrous reflection of an exile's sinister shadow over Palestine, monstrously exaggerated."

Respectfully yours,

ROBERT B. MACATEE

867N.01/7-747

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 7, 1947.

There are attached hereto the outlines of four plans for the future of Palestine which have been worked out tentatively by members of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs in cooperation with members of the Office of Special Political Affairs. These plans are in outline form and are not fully developed in detail. It would be difficult to refine them much further without the assistance of other Offices of the Department. Other Offices have as yet not been called upon in view of the necessity of maintaining the utmost secrecy in the matter.

The plans as outlined are as follows:

1. A plan for a uninational Palestinian state.
2. A plan for a binational Palestinian state; that is, a single state in which there shall be recognized Arab and Jewish communities.
3. A plan for partition in which a Jewish state shall consist of approximately 1,500 square miles of the territory in which the Jews are in the majority.
4. A variation of this plan for partition in which the Jews, in addition to the territory assigned to them in Plan no. 3, would have also the Negeb, which is composed of approximately 5,000 square miles of land in southern Palestine; most of the Negeb is desert; and it is sparsely inhabited; although there are a few villages and towns in it and nomadic Arabs wander through it from time to time.

1 None printed.
No partition plan has been prepared which would give to the Jews a state on the territory of which there are at present more Arabs than Jews since it is felt that a partition on such a basis would be extremely difficult to defend in the light of the principles of the Charter. The Jewish state outlined in Plan no. 4 would contain territory on which there are approximately 450,000 Jews and 310,000 settled Arabs.

_Suggested Procedure for Handling of Palestine Problem by the United States Government in Connection With the Coming Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations._

The suggestions set forth below are tentative and subject to revision in accordance with changes in the situation.

In considering the procedure which we should follow with regard to the Palestine problem, which is to come before the General Assembly of the United Nations in the middle of September, we should bear in mind the following:

1. It is improbable that any plan or plans for the future government of Palestine proposed by the Special Committee of Investigation will be acceptable both to Arabs and Jews. It is also possible that such plan or plans will be of such a nature that Great Britain, now the mandatory power, will be unwilling to undertake without assistance to enforce any of them.

2. It is probable that the Special Committee of Investigation will propose several plans for the future government of Palestine, a majority plan and one or more minority plans.

3. There will undoubtedly be extensive debate before the General Assembly or a Committee of that body as to the plan which should be adopted. This debate will probably be extremely heated and there may be threats on the part of various states to withdraw from the United Nations in case the General Assembly should approve a plan which in their opinion would be contrary to the principles of that organization.

4. It is probable that groups of American Zionists supported by members of Congress and other prominent Americans will do their utmost before the General Assembly meets and during the course of the debates to influence the American Government to take a public position with regard to the Palestine problem which would be agreeable to the Zionists. This pressure will become more and more intense from now on.

5. An examination of the various statements and resolutions emanating from Executive and Legislative officials during the last twenty-five years would indicate that in general this Government has taken the position that the mandate for Palestine, which incorporates the
substance of the Balfour Declaration, is recognized by us as an international commitment; that the United States Government favors mass Jewish immigration to Palestine; and that it might look with favor upon some arrangement providing for a partition of Palestine, provided such an arrangement gave promise of being workable.

6. It appears probable that it will not be possible, except through the use of force, to continue mass Jewish immigration to Palestine or to establish a workable Jewish state in the whole or in a part of Palestine. The situation today in Palestine is different from that envisaged at the time the mandate was instituted and during the early years of the mandate when it was still considered that a peaceful solution of the Palestine problem could be found. It is therefore proposed that:

1. The United States will not take any public, definite position with regard to the future government of Palestine until:

   a. The Special Committee of Investigation has presented its report to the United Nations;

   b. The British Government and the representatives of the Jews and Arabs have stated their views with regard to the various proposals contained in that report.

2. At an appropriate time during the debates following the expression of the views of the three parties mentioned in 1(b), the United States will present its views. The timing of the presentation of the views of the United States will depend upon the circumstances.

3. The plan for the future government of Palestine to be presented by the United States will depend to an extent upon the international situation and the situation in the General Assembly developed as a result of the report of the Committee and of the debates. In the light of the present situation, it is our belief that Plan no. 1 would be preferable from the point of view of the international position of this Government since that plan is based on principles of the character upon which the Charter of the United Nations is based. There might however be changes in the situation as the result of the Committee's report and of the debates which would prompt us to present one of the other plans or a variation of any one of the four plans.

4. The United States delegation should exercise special care, in presenting the view of the United States, to make it clear that our pro-

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*In a memorandum of August 27 to Mr. Lovett, Mr. Henderson stated: "It is realized that Plan I for a unational Palestine is idealistic and may not be attainable; that Plan II may likewise not be acceptable to the Jews and the Arabs. Either one or a variation thereof would, however, in our opinion be preferable to Plans III and IV. Close study invariably indicates that the seeming advantages of partition are outweighed by the real disadvantages which this type of solution would create." (867N.01/8–2747)
proposals are intended as an elaboration or an improvement upon some plan already tentatively suggested since we must not permit ourselves to be maneuvered into such a position that the plan finally adopted by the General Assembly should be considered as primarily an American plan. If the plan finally adopted should be considered as primarily an American plan or as a plan decided upon as a result of American pressure, we should probably be held primarily responsible for the administration and enforcement of such a plan.

5. We should so shape our tactics that we can retain a considerable amount of flexibility in determining our final position until the final decision with regard to the future of Palestine is made by the General Assembly. By so doing, we might be able to exert in the final stages of the discussion an ameliorating influence which would avert a breakdown in the proceedings of the General Assembly with a subsequent resort to wide scale violence as a means for the settlement of the problem.

6. Before making any proposals of our own at the Assembly regarding the future government of Palestine, we should in advance privately notify both Zionist and Arab leaders what our attitude is and what we intend to do, and endeavor to prevail upon them to go along with us.

7. We should also consider the advisability of announcing publicly our present intention not to take a position with regard to Palestine until we consider that an expression of views by us might be helpful during the course of the proceedings of the General Assembly.

8. In order to facilitate the work of our representatives to the General Assembly, it is suggested that we consider the advisability of:

a. directing one of the delegates of the United States to the General Assembly to concern himself solely with the Palestine problem and of relieving the other delegates of any responsibility for that problem.

b. arranging for the delegate selected to receive his orders direct from the President or from the Department of State, and for him to have a staff, including liaison officers, distinct from the regular staff of the United States delegation to the General Assembly.

501.BB Palestine/7-1447

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, July 14, 1947.

No. 123

Subject: UNSCOP in Palestine—the Fourth Week.

SIR: I have the honor to report that the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine continued, in a series of hearings, to probe ever more deeply into the attitude of the various Jewish and other
representatives who appeared before it during the week commencing on Monday, July 7, 1947. Following the hearing given Mr. D. Horowitz, head of the Jewish Agency’s Economics Department, on July 4 (reported in my despatch no. 118 of July 7, 1947), the Committee called David Ben-Gurion, the Executive’s Chairman, to appear for questioning. This was on the morning of July 7th.

For three and one half hours, Mr. Ben-Gurion, with Moshe Shertok of the Agency’s Political Department seated behind him, was questioned by all members of the Committee. This period was highlighted by sharp exchanges with the Indian (Moslem) member, Sir Abdur Rahman. At times, in fact, both raised their voices and showed feeling as the Indian attempted to pin Ben-Gurion down on various points. Aggressive in manner, and loud of tone, the Indian refused to pay any attention to the attitude of the audience, which was approximately 95% Jewish, and which made its sentiments known almost to the point of open ridicule. The Iranian member, unable to cope with listening jointly to Ben-Gurion, his Indian colleague, and the audience, sharply insisted to the Chairman that the audience not make its views known so audibly. The Chairman admonished the audience to that effect, with Ben-Gurion supporting him, but without notable success.

The prolonged examination of Ben-Gurion cannot be fully recorded here. We shall set forth, however, his replies to certain questions:

1. When the Chairman asked whether the Jews’ controversy with the Mandatory might be solved if the Jewish-Arab conflict were to disappear, Ben-Gurion said the Jews had no conflict with the Arabs . . . .

2. If the U.N. decides to set up a Jewish State, then the U.N. should be prepared to use force to attain that end, if necessary . . . .

3. When the Chairman asked if Arab occupancy of the country for 1000 years meant anything to him, Ben-Gurion replied that in this case it did not . . . .

4. When the Chairman said that the use of the term “National Home” in the Mandate implied reservations, Ben-Gurion stated that there were only two reservations in the Mandate, first, that the civil and religious rights of non-Jewish communities should not be prejudiced and, secondly, that the status of Jews elsewhere should not be prejudiced . . . .

5. The Czech asked if Ben-Gurion would be willing to consider a compromise, to which the latter replied they had informed the British they would consider a State in a viable part of Palestine . . . . At this point the Czech made a remark that has disturbed the Agency . . . . He said, “You know, Mr. Ben-Gurion, politics is the art of knowing what is possible” . . . .

6. In reply to the Canadian’s question, Ben-Gurion said that if the Government were to leave Jews and Arabs alone in the country, the Jews could take care of themselves . . . .

7. After telling Ben-Gurion to “be precise”, the Indian asked if the
Jews based their case on the Balfour Declaration . . . Ben-Gurion replied that the Jewish claim was 3000 [3500] years old and had merely been confirmed by that Declaration . . .

8. Asked by the Iranian how he reconciled the delay in establishing an independent state in Palestine until the Jews have a majority here with the principle of self-determination of peoples, Ben-Gurion, after long consultation with Shertok, replied that delay was justifiable in this case because whereas the Jews desire a state wherein all citizens will be equal, the Arabs have officially announced that they would continue restrictions in matters of land sales and immigration . . .

[Here follows an account of further testimony by economic experts of the Jewish Agency on July 9; for texts, see UNSCOP, volume III, pages 94–103.]

With the appearance of Dr. Chaim Weizmann on the morning of July 8, there was not a seat to be had in the auditorium. For other sessions, the hall had been from one-third to one-half empty, but all classes of Jews turned out to hear their star performer.

Dr. Weizmann spoke for approximately two hours in a well-modulated tone which contrasted pleasantly with intense pitch often attained by Mr. Ben-Gurion. The former President of the Zionist Organization reminisced at length of his experiences in the days when he was the guiding hand of the Zionist effort, and gradually shaped his discussion toward an appeal "to sweep away the White Paper" and for partition along the lines recommended by the Peel Commission "plus the Negeb". He had words of praise for the British Government and its efforts on behalf of the Zionists in the past, which was also in vivid contrast to the torrential flow of denunciation of that Government which had been poured forth by the Agency. The "High Command" of the latter organization—Ben-Gurion, Shertok, and Kaplan—occupied front row seats in the auditorium while Weizmann was speaking, and it was evident that they did not like everything they heard, particularly in the question period which followed his discourse:

1. When the Chairman asked if force should have been used to quell Arab resistance to Jewish immigration, Dr. Weizmann replied that if the Mandatory had been firm in the beginning, force would not have been needed . . .

2. The Chairman asked if Feisal, in his agreement with Dr. Weizmann, had not made a reservation to the effect that promises of Arab

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1 For the text of the hearing of Mr. Ben-Gurion, see UNSCOP, vol. III, pp. 48–71.
independence must be carried out . . . (the Agency, in mentioning the Feisal-Weizmann Agreement, had failed to mention that point) . . . When Weizmann replied that there was in fact such a reservation, the Chairman then asked if Feisal, in view of what later happened at Damascus, was not justified in considering the agreement void . . . Ben-Gurion put his head in his hands when Weizmann said, "Yes, I think he was, and we never pressed the point" . . .

3. When asked by the Indian member if Palestine was not included in Feisal's Arab States, Dr. Weizmann replied "Definitely not. He was ready to exclude Palestine." 3

While Dr. Weizmann was talking, the Secretariat of the Palestine Government issued a communiqué, the core of which follows:

". . . The findings and sentences (of terrorists Nakar, Weiss and Habib) have been confirmed by the General Officer Commanding. It will be remembered that as a result of the attack on Acre Prison on 4th May 1947, 251 convicted criminals were set free and loosed on to the community."

With one voice the entire Hebrew press proclaimed that this was a "brazen challenge" to the United Nations and its Palestine Committee, and the confirmation would probably "drag the country into a whirlpool of blood . . ." One representative of the Jewish Agency's Security Department remarked to an officer of the Consulate General that "the Government are masters of timing" . . . obviously implying that the Government had chosen that moment to goad the terrorists into deeds which would discredit the Jewish Community.

Recalled to the chair for further questioning, the first thing David Ben-Gurion did was to make it clear to UNSCOP that Dr. Weizmann spoke for nobody but himself. One further important point raised at this time was the question of the Holy Places. Mr. Ben-Gurion agreed that international supervision was needed for the sacred shrines to ensure their freedom and safety, but he warned the Committee that in the Agency's view the Holy Places were not cities nor towns, simply buildings located therein. "For example", he said, "Jerusalem is not identical with the Holy Places." 4

During the afternoon of the same date, UNSCOP decided in a closed meeting that it would not visit Cyprus to inspect the condition of Jews there. At the same meeting, it was also agreed that another approach should be made to the Arab Higher Committee with a view to arranging for it to give testimony, 5 and that invitations to testify should also be sent to the Arab States.

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3 For the text of the testimony of Dr. Weizmann, see UNSCOP, vol. iii, pp. 72-86.
4 For the text of the continuation of the hearing of Mr. Ben-Gurion, see ibid., pp. 86-94.
5 For letter of July 8 from Judge Sandstrom to the Arab Higher Committee, see UNSCOP, vol. ii, p. 6.
The vote on the decision not to visit was as follows:

Against the visit: Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, India, Peru and Sweden.
For the visit: Guatemala, Uruguay and Yugoslavia.
Abstaining: Iran and the Netherlands.

On another vote as to whether UNSCOP should hear representatives of the deportees on that island, the members found themselves in the following lineup:

Again hearing: Australia, Canada, India, Peru and Sweden.
For hearing: Guatemala, Netherlands, Uruguay and Yugoslavia.
Abstaining: Iran and Czechoslovakia.

As soon as the Committee's decision not to visit Cyprus became known, the Jewish Agency issued a statement:

"The Agency feels that this decision would be widely misunderstood, especially in view of the fact that it was taken at the same time as it was agreed to renew the appeal to the Arab Higher Committee."

[Here follow accounts of the testimony on July 9 of the Vaad Leumi (the Jewish National Council) and Rabbi Fishman; see UNSCOP, volume III, pages 103–117.]

Overshadowing the testimony of the Chief Rabbinate and representatives of the Agudath Israel on July 10, was the Arab Higher Committee's rejection of the new UNSCOP appeal for cooperation mentioned earlier in this despatch. The Department will be aware from the preceding despatches in this series of our inability to discern any weakening in the Arab attitude toward the maintenance of the boycott, so the actual rejection of UNSCOP's appeal was not unexpected.

[Here follow accounts of the testimony of the rabbinical witnesses on July 10, of the Anglican Bishop of Jerusalem, the Moderator of the Church of Scotland in Jerusalem, and representatives of Jewish Women's Organizations on July 11, and of the Communist Party of Palestine on July 13; see UNSCOP, volume III, pages 122–164.]

As the fourth week ended, it found the Committee conscientiously immersed in the intricacies of the problem, and the terrorists in their kidnapping ventures. Two British intelligence sergeants were overcome in Nathanya and carried off on the evening July 11. The Irgun and/or Stern gang were obviously preparing for the impending execution of the convicted terrorists mentioned above. Unless the very extensive search undertaken by the military—with the alleged cooperation of Haganah—proved successful, few doubted that the two sergeants would be murdered at about the time the executions are announced,

*For the Arab Higher Committee letter of July 10, see UNSCOP, vol. ii, p. 6.
presumably by what the Irgun called in a recent broadcast, its "Committee of Retribution".  
Respectfully yours,                    ROBERT B. MACATEE  

501.BB Palestine/7-2147  
The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to the Secretary of State  
SECRET  
No. 128  
Subject: UNSCOP in Palestine—the Fifth and Final Week.  

Sir: I have the honor to report that the final week in Jerusalem of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine was marked by the assiduity with which the Committee continued to apply itself to the long and arduous schedule of hearings it had laid down; by the mounting tempo of terrorist activity; and by growing anxiety and uneasiness in Jewish Agency circles.  
The Department will recall from the previous despatch in this series that the Committee's fourth week again found the terrorist element expressing its disregard for the will of the United Nations by the kidnapping of two British army sergeants at Nathanya on July 11. As thousands of troops combed the area of that township on the following two days, it was made clear by the authorities that if the two men were not released, martial law, of which this country had had a taste earlier in the year, would be imposed on the environs of that well-known summer resort.  
At 7 p. m. on Monday, July 14, the military sealed off 20 square kilometers of land, in the center of which lay the town of Nathanya. At the same time, the following communiqué was issued:  
[Here follows text of communiqué No. 123 of July 14.]  
This communiqué is presented at length to give the Department some idea of the atmosphere in Palestine at this time. Those who had hoped that terrorist activities would abate from week to week as UNSCOP got further immersed in the problem were to be disappointed.  
On July 14, the Committee listened at length to Dr. Judah L. Magnes, long-time advocate of the binational state based on political parity.  
[Here follows an account of the hearing of Dr. Magnes; see UNSCOP, volume III, pages 164–180 and 183–187, passim.]  
On Monday, July 14, it became known that the Committee would visit Beirut to hear such testimony as the Arab States might care to offer. Acceptances to give testimony had been received from the Lebanon, Egypt, and Iraq. Saudi Arabia and Syria accepted two days later.
[Here follows an account of the hearing on July 15 of the Franciscan order in Palestine; see UNSCOP, volume IV, pages 13–19.]

The leaders of the Sephardic sect of Judaism are said to have concentrated on the plight of Jews in the surrounding Arab countries and to have implored the Committee to take measures to relieve their condition either by making their migration to Palestine possible, or by setting up a Jewish state in this country.¹

[Here follow accounts of the hearings on July 15 of the Communist Party of Palestine and of the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation and of the hearings on July 17 of the Jewish Federation of Labor; see UNSCOP, volume III, pages 187–205 and 209–218.]

Following Mr. Rubashov, Mr. Shertok summed up the case of the Jewish Agency, and took occasion also to answer questions which had been previously put by Committee members to his colleagues. Among these was that concerned with 21 Arab villages about which the Indian member had inquired, as it had been alleged that they had been wiped out by Jewish land purchases and settlement. Mr. Shertok concentrated during the first part of his speech on data calculated to refute that allegation, and then moved on with considerable emphasis to deal with the present immigration and land transfer regulations. At one point, when describing the reaction of certain persons in England to the promulgation of those regulations—among them that of the present Lord Chancellor—Mr. Shertok declared that the laws were believed then to have been barbarous and savage. Mr. Shertok then passed on to give details of Jewish land acquisitions since the regulations have been in effect. The Department will note that even in the forbidden zones, there has been a considerable transfer of land from Arab to Jewish hands. Since 1940 the Jews had bought, according to Mr. Shertok,

38,000 dunums in the Prohibited Zone.
23,500 " in the Regulated Zone.
45,000 " in the Free Zone.

All acquisitions in the “Prohibited Zone”, Mr. Shertok assured the Committee, had been in accordance with the law. Persons who expected some Committee members to go into that aspect of the matter were disappointed, as no questions concerning it were put to him.

Mr. Shertok then went on to criticize the Palestine Government at length, particularly with regard to its failure to clear up the swamp-lands in the Huleh basin, and as no conclusion appeared in sight, it

¹The record of the hearings of the Sephardic sect was not published by UNSCOP.
became apparent that he would have insufficient time that day to finish his testimony. At 1:20 p.m. the Chairman intervened to ask him how much more time he wanted. Judge Sandstrom added that if Mr. Shertok needed but a minute or two longer, he could continue, but if more time than that was essential, they would adjourn and hear the rest of his testimony on the following day. Mr. Shertok indicated he needed a good deal more time, whereupon the meeting adjourned.

Mr. Shertok opened the hearing the next morning, July 18th. During the two hours he consumed in presenting the remainder of the Agency’s case “for the establishment of Palestine as a Jewish State”, Mr. Shertok went into the “impractical” character of Dr. Magnes’ bination state, and of the federal state which the Committee had heard suggested. These state forms, he insisted, would solve nothing as

“... what had to be realized was the extent of and the intense determination of Jews all over the world to achieve statehood in Palestine ... There could be no permanent stability in Palestine or in the world unless and until the elemental Jewish craving was satisfied ...”

In conclusion, Mr. Shertok urged UNSCOP not to wait until its report, which should recommend in his opinion the creation of a Jewish State, could be implemented. It was most essential that they urge, as an interim recommendation, that the White Paper be entirely eliminated so as to permit the exodus of Jewish DPs from Europe to Palestine.

It was the general expectation among the audience that many questions would be put to Mr. Shertok when he concluded his address, and it therefore came as something of a surprise when only the Guatemalan and the Uruguyan members, who have gained the local reputation as being strongly pro-Zionist, had questions for him. These were concerned with educational matters, mainly with the advisability of educating Jewish and Arab children in the same schools. Mr. Shertok did not think that would be constructive. He said, “I believe a race so educated would be culturally sterile and not creative.”

[Here follows an account of the hearings of the Palestine Communist Union; see UNSCOP, volume III, pages 234–240.]

Thus terminated the public hearings in Jerusalem. Judge Sandstrom said to reporters later that he was glad they were over and done with, “but the next stage would be harder”.

At about this time news was received that the S.S. Exodus 1947, formerly the President Warfield, was nearing Palestine with 4500 illegal immigrants aboard. She was reported as having sailed from

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*For the text of the hearing of Mr. Shertok, see UNSCOP, vol. iii, pp. 218–234.*
Philadelphia on March 29, but had been delayed in picking up her human cargo in Europe due to refusal of oil facilities in various ports. In one way or another, however, she had been fueled and finally sailed from the French port of Cette, near Marseille, a port supposedly under the control of French Communist organizations.

As UNSCOP prepared to leave, the British were transshipping the illegals. Terrorist elements were also getting into action, and the toll for Friday, July 18, was two dead and eighteen injured—all British military. The sirens were sounding with monotonous regularity in Jerusalem and elsewhere in Palestine, and prospects for the near future were somewhat grimmer than usual.\(^8\)

Respectfully yours, 

ROBERT B. MACATEE

\(^8\) For the verbatim record of UNSCOP meetings held on July 22 and 23 at Beirut, see UNSCOP, vol. iii, p. 240, and vol. iv, p. 32.

501.BB Palestine/7-2347 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

JIDDA, July 23, 1947—4 p. m.

292. Aide-mémoire re Palestine problem dated July 21 handed me yesterday by Deputy Foreign Minister and similar one handed to British representative. Following is summary:

Refers to appointment UN Palestine committee “without approval Arab nations” and establishment agenda for committee contrary to what Arab states asked for.

Political committee of Arab League met on June 5 to consider its attitude toward a committee. After arguments in favor of Arab cause in Palestine adds “if investigation committee desires to hear SAG’s opinion it will be ready to express it clearly and frankly, under the reservations of all those expressed by SAG delegation at the UN meeting concerning the investigation committee”.

Arab nations regard Great Britain as primarily responsible for Zionist aggression against tranquil Arab country.

Arab nations likewise regard US Government as next responsible for “this aggression owing to previous proposals attributed to it as well as to US Government’s pressure on Great Britain in favor of Jews or the Zionist organization against the interests of Arabs despite principles of justice, fair-play, and humanity and despite written promises King Saudi Arabia received from late President Roosevelt which were reaffirmed by present President”.

SAG together other Arab states “extremely desirous to maintain their friendly relations with two democratic states” US and Great Britain.

“They believe maintenance peace Near-East is mainly depending on maintaining this friendship. Endeavors made by His Majesty King Saudi Arabia during war and post-war are proof His Majesty’s de-
sire support democratic principles. His Majesty’s desire in future will not be less than that in past. His Majesty together with Arab States considers solution this question which may maintain peace in Middle East cannot be achieved in UN unless Arab States and the two friendly governments Britain and America will agree amongst themselves before entering the UN (session in September).

"SAG together with other Arab States has requested UN to include in its agenda September termination Palestine mandate and granting its independence.

"SAG desires to reach an agreement with the two friendly governments on this basis and to cooperate with them in deciding this situation at UN session.

"If this agreement between two friendly governments and Arab States is not concluded, reaction will have the worst results which all of us, the Arab states, America, and Britain will share in bearing the consequent difficulties, burdens and involvements. Effect of this bad result will be only of advantage those who are against peace and anxious create dissensions between Arab States and two governments, Britain and America. Mutual interest between those two governments and Arab States necessitate that they be on good terms and always in agreement with one another."

"["SAG in submitting this request as a member of Arab League trusts it will be acceptable to two friendly governments and that it will be supported and given every assistance"]"

Sent Department as 292; repeated Baghdad as 28. By pouch other Arab capitals.

Childs

867N.01/6-1847: Afrgram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iraq

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, July 24, 1947.

A-86. Suggest following reply to Iraqi note on Palestine quoted in Embtel 258 June 18: 1

"The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Royal Ministry’s note of June 14, 1947, with regard to the problem of Palestine.

In the note under acknowledgment, information is given of a decision unanimously taken by the Council of the League of Arab States at its meeting in Cairo on March 24, 1947, holding the Government of the United States of America and the British Government jointly and severally responsible for the present critical situation in Palestine and for the grave dangers that threaten security and peace in this part of the world as a result of such a situation."

"It is further stated that the Iraqi Government is at a loss to understand how the Government of the United States could justify her

1 Not printed.
encouragement of Jewish immigration into Palestine by various means, on the plea of strengthening the Jewish national home established in that country.

After a discussion of various aspects of the Palestine question, the Government of Iraq expresses the following demands:

I. That the Government of the United States should immediately stop any action of a nature to lead to the encouragement or continuation of Jewish immigration into Palestine no matter what form such immigration may assume.

II. That the Government of the United States should support before the United Nations organization in its next meeting in September 1947 the demand of the Arab States for the termination of the Palestine mandate and the proclamation of the independence of the country as a sovereign Arab state.

In concluding, the Iraqi Government states that unless the Government of the United States takes immediate steps for the realization of these two demands, it would be held responsible for the present critical situation in Palestine and for whatever developments that situation might involve, within or outside Palestine. The Government of Iraq states further that in the face of these grave dangers which actually threaten security and peace in the Near East, it cannot but resort to every possible measure, no matter of what nature, to safeguard peace and put an end once and for all to such a grave situation.

In reply, the Embassy is instructed to state that in the view of the Government of the United States it would be both inappropriate and inadvisable to enter at this time upon a formal discussion with the Government of Iraq of the merits of the problem of Palestine. The United States Government believes that the Special Committee on Palestine appointed by the recent special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations is the appropriate forum for the hearing and examination of the points of view of the individuals and organizations which desire to make known their respective attitudes on this question. In that connection it is understood that the Committee has issued an invitation to the Arab States, including Iraq, and to the Arab Higher Committee, to present testimony.

As regards the first demand of the Iraqi Government, the United States Government considers that for the time being, until immigration policy with respect to Palestine is decided upon following consideration by the United Nations of all aspects of the future of Palestine, immigration into Palestine should continue to be regulated by the Mandatory Power, which now governs Palestine. The United States Government has taken no action and contemplates no action encouraging illegal immigration into Palestine. In fact, the President of the United States, on June 5 urged ‘every citizen and resident of the United States, in the interests of this country, of world peace, and of humanity, meticulously to refrain, while the United Nations is considering the problem of Palestine, from engaging in, or facilitating, any activities which tend further to inflame the passions of the inhabitants of Palestine, to undermine law and order in Palestine, or to promote violence in that country.’
With regard to the second demand of the Iraqi Government, the United States Government intends at the proper time, after giving careful consideration to the report of the Special Committee on Palestine, to make its attitude known respecting the future of Palestine. The United States Government believes that all of the Governments represented in the United Nations will similarly desire to make known their respective attitudes at the September meeting of the General Assembly. The United States, for its part, does not intend to make any demands or exert any kind of pressure or influence on the other Governments represented in the General Assembly with regard to their respective attitudes; conversely, the United States Government will not be influenced by any kind of pressure brought to bear upon it, but will exert its best efforts to adopt a fair and constructive attitude taking all relevant factors into account.

In reference to the conclusion of the note under reply, the Government of the United States is aware of the concern with which the Government of Iraq views the Palestine situation. However, the United States Government is in no way responsible for that situation which has arisen from circumstances entirely beyond its control, and cannot accept any responsibility therefor.

The United States Government looks forward to continued work and association with the Government of Iraq, as with all of the member States of the Arab League, in efforts to resolve the Palestine problem in accordance with the principles and objectives of the United Nations, and sincerely trusts that its anticipation in this regard is shared by the Government of Iraq.”

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2 In telegram 346, August 18, the Embassy in Baghdad reported a statement made by Iraqi Prime Minister Salih Jabur to the British Chargé that the American reply to Iraq’s note on Palestine “was unsatisfactory and a deliberate evasion of American responsibility for chaotic Palestinian situation.” The Prime Minister was said to have “warned that in event of unfavorable United Nations decision, Iraq would not only sever diplomatic and economic relations with United States but would also prevent any social contact between Americans and Iraq.” (S67N.01/S-1847)

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The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, August 1, 1947—6 p. m.

310. 1. Local reaction to news of findings of bodies of two British sergeants appears (a) Palestine Government and British military awaiting developments and possible instructions from London with characteristic calm (b) Jewish community frightened with Hebrew press condemning act and (c) Arabs wondering why British not as drastic with Jews as with Arabs during earlier rebellion.

2. Myerson, Zionist executive, called on High Commissioner yesterday afternoon. Reliably informed [s]he expected hear decision imposition martial law on large part of Palestine, and was prepared to state
intention of JA continue combat terrorism “even if British action made that more difficult”.

3. JA source informs after meeting that High Commissioner reasonable and restrained and that Myerson considered atmosphere of conversation good as could be expected in circumstances. Myerson gathered imposition martial law not imminent probability.

4. High Commissioner in conversation with me two days ago mentioned concern about morale of troops but thought still pretty good. Nevertheless Tel Aviv incidents last night when British troops allegedly killed five Jews and injured many others demonstrate that hanging of two sergeants has placed great strain on ordinarily placid British troops.

5. Henry Cattan yesterday informed us of his proposed departure for New York as member Arab Higher [Committee] executive delegation. Said had recommended to executive that persons connected with Axis during war be omitted from delegation. Cattan added not worried so much about what might happen at GA as what would probably occur here afterwards. Mentioning Arab tempers running short said he and wife would be cautious about returning to Palestine this autumn.

MACATEE

\[1\] In airgram 159, August 4, the Consulate General in Jerusalem reported publication of the following resolution by Jewish leaders the day before: “The representatives of the Community, called together by the Executives of the Jewish Agency and the Vaad Leumi [Jewish National Council], expressed their horror at the foul murder of two British sergeants by unprincipled men who have cast aside every vestige of national responsibility. This outrage has already brought in its train the killing of innocent persons by rioting soldiers.

“The representatives of the Community regard the cessation of terrorism as an inexorable national necessity and they call upon the Yishuv to intensify its efforts with all its organized strength to eradicate terrorism and give full support to the security forces of the Yishuv in order to carry out this object.” (867N.00/8-447)

According to telegram 311, August 5, 6 p. m., from Jerusalem, prominent Jews were arrested by the British on the morning of August 5. The Jewish Agency thereupon informed the police authorities that the British action cancelled the Agency’s efforts to start an anti-terrorist campaign (867N.00/8-547).

501.88 Palestine/8-247: Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

URGENT

New York, August 2, 1947—2:45 p. m.

704. Following is a letter from Benjamin Cohen, Acting Secretary General, United Nations, to Herschel V. Johnson, August 1, 1947:

“The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, created by resolution of General Assembly of 15 May 1947, has decided to send
a sub-committee consisting ten members to visit Assembly centers in Germany and Austria. Seven members of Secretariat will be attached to sub-committee, and it is likely that a number of accredited journalists will accompany the sub-committee during its visit in those areas. In accordance with this decision of Special Committee and with Paragraph 8 of General Assembly Resolution which reads as follows:

'8. Requests the Secretary-General to enter into suitable arrangements with the proper authorities of any state in whose territory the Special Committee may wish to sit or to travel, to provide necessary facilities, and to assign appropriate staff to the Special Committee;'

I have honour to request that you communicate with your Government as soon as possible, in view of intended visit of sub-committee early next week, and ask that military commander of American zone in Germany and Austria be advised to afford full facilities to this sub-committee during its work in that area.

The names of members of sub-committee, of Secretariat and accompanying journalists will be communicated directly to military commander of zone.'

JOHNSON

\^1 In reply, in telegram 339, August 7, the Secretary of State advised the U.S. Mission at the United Nations that the text of Mr. Cohen's letter had been cabled to the appropriate military authorities with the instruction that necessary facilities and assistance should be provided to the Committee to the extent available. (501.BB Palestine/8-247). For the Sub-Committee's report of August 20, 1947, see UNSCOP, vol. ii, p. 14.

667N.01/6-2747

The Secretary of State to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) ^1

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 7, 1947.

DEAR MR. BEVIN: I have received your letter of June 27, 1947, in which you expressed your deep concern over the question of illegal immigration into Palestine, and asked whether you could count upon the assistance of my government in preventing the situation from deteriorating still further. You requested particularly that United States officials and representatives on charitable and refugee organizations in Europe be requested to discourage the unauthorized movement of Jewish refugees leading to their departure on illegal immigrant ships for Palestine.

You are undoubtedly aware of the complexities and difficulties involved in stopping this solicitation of funds or outfitting of vessels for use in transporting illegal immigrants. Our Treasury and Justice Departments have been requested to study the matter ^2 in order to see

\[^1\] Delivered at the British Embassy on August 7.
\[^2\] Letters of August 7 to these Departments, not printed.
whether ways exist in which to meet the requests which your Government has made in this connection. I am endeavoring to expedite their decisions in this regard.

Recently export licenses which had been issued for four LST's were revoked by this Department when evidence was received indicating that they were intended for use in the illegal immigrant traffic. We shall endeavor to see that no vessels owned by the United States Government are sold in the future to persons whose activities provide grounds for believing that the ships would be used for the purpose of transporting illegal immigrants to Palestine.

I may also add that the War Department on April 15, 1947 instructed the United States military authorities in the American Zones of Germany and Austria that admittance was to be refused to displaced persons camps after April 21, 1947 except in certain special cases. It is believed that this action in the American Zones of Germany and Austria may have the effect of restricting the general flow of refugees in Europe.

Although United States representatives in Europe are familiar with the President's statement of June 5, 1947, I am calling it to their special attention, and have directed them to comply fully with the policy therein set forth, since the movement of illegal immigrants towards Palestine at the present time tends further to complicate an already delicate situation.

I hope that these measures will prove helpful in discouraging further unauthorized movements of Jewish refugees and the departure of illegal immigrant ships for Palestine.

Faithfully yours,

[G. C. Marshall]

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501.BB Palestine/7–2347: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Saudi Arabia

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 12, 1947—2 p. m.

224. Transmit following aide-mémoire in reply to SAG aide-mémoire July 21 contained in Legtel 292 July 23:

Govt of US appreciates frank and friendly expression views SAG with regard current developments respecting Palestine as set forth in its aide-mémoire July 21. Expression of such views is further testimony of close bonds of friendship which exist between Governments of SA and US.

Govt of US was pleased to note that SAG expressed its support of consideration which UN is now giving to Palestine question through its participation in evidence which was presented to UNSCOP at Beirut July 22.
It is believed that such testimony will be of material assistance to UNSCOP and will aid it in its task of finding fair and workable solution to Palestine problem which will have support not only of Arab states but of other nations of world as well.

Govt of US has given careful consideration to suggestion of SAG that solution to Palestine question cannot be achieved in UN unless Arab states and Governments of US and GB agree among themselves before entering regular annual session in Sept.

SAG is undoubtedly aware that during Special Session of UN and since its termination Govt of US has on several occasions announced that no statement of its views with regard to future government of Palestine would be made until UNSCOP had completed its task and question was again being considered by UNGA in Sept.

Govt of US is of opinion that if its views are announced while matter is under investigation, impression might be created that this Govt is attempting to influence findings of UNSCOP. It is believed that UNSCOP's work will result in report of greater value in advancing solution of problem if such work is free from any semblance of outside governmental influence.

Govt of US believes furthermore that prestige of UN itself is involved in task of achieving solution to Palestine problem and, as member of UN, US desires strongly to support principles for which UN stands and to cooperate to full in promoting its influence in solving one of great problems presented to it.

Govt of US is of opinion that an agreement among Arab states and Govts of US and GB in advance of Sept session of UNGA would be undesirable for similar reasons. This Govt, nevertheless, appreciates and understands considerations of peace and harmony which motivated SAG to make its suggestion and feels confident that it will continue, as will Govt of US, to support UN in heavy task which it has undertaken.¹

**MARSHALL**

¹Telegram 4440, August 15, 7 p. m., from London, reported that the British Government on August 13 instructed the British Minister at Jidda to say, should the Saudi Arabian Government inquire, that "British policy regarding Palestine must be determined in reference to UNSCOP report and that British Government sees no point in conversations prior publication UNSCOP report." (501.BB Palestine/8-1547)

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108.3/8-2247

**Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)**

**TOP SECRET**

[WASHINGTON,] August 22, 1947.

**NOTES ON CABINET MEETING, FRIDAY, AUGUST 22, 10:00 A. M.**

[Here follow notes on the Cabinet meeting.]

The President asked me to remain after the meeting and asked me about the problem arising out of the British ultimatum to the Jews
aboard the *Exodus 1947*¹ to debark in France in accordance with the French invitation or to be taken to a British-controlled port in Germany and forcibly debarked there. This harsh action has caused a storm of protest in this country.

I told the President that the State Department, immediately on learning of the British ultimatum, had communicated informally with the British Embassy and asked them to notify the Foreign Office of our great concern at the action contemplated and request that it be altered to avoid the landing of these Jewish refugees in Germany. I explained that a formal note would have had an almost certain effect of freezing the British in their position because of Bevin's great sensitivity on this point and because the British could with some justice say that we were interfering in the exercise of their powers. The informal approach was felt to be far more productive and was accordingly taken by us. The President stated that he was in full accord with this and asked us to continue our best efforts to modify the British procedure. This is being done.

ROBERT A. LOVETT

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¹ In telegram 2955, July 24, the Embassy in Paris reported that "the *Exodus* 'escaped' from the French port of Sète with approximately 4,500 Jewish refugees on board, that the ship was stopped off Palestine by British war vessels and that the British authorities decided to return the passengers to France rather than intern them at Cyprus as in previous similar cases." (867N.01/7–2447)

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867N.01/5–2247 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 22, 1947—2 p. m.

US URGENT NIACT

3623. For Ambassador. We are deeply disturbed at reports which have been reaching us that Brit Govt is planning to return Jewish refugees on *Exodus* to camps in Germany. Action of this kind would profoundly shock large sections of American public opinion and would injure Brit position in US. We have informally and privately discussed matter with Balfour who had already expressed similar views to London and he has promised to bring our concern to attention Brit Govt. We hope you will find opportunity in immediate future also in personal and friendly way to endeavor to dissuade Brit from adopting such course. We have noted the views of the British Govt expressed
in para 7 Embtel 4425 Aug 15. We appreciate difficulties encountered by Brit in endeavoring to maintain status quo Palestine pending outcome of UN decision. We also realize Brit irritation with US on ground that illegal immigration to large extent planned, financed and organized in this country. Nevertheless return of Jewish refugees to Germany will serve only to arouse bitterness and to aggravate situation.

LOVETT

1 Not printed; paragraph 7 provided information from Mr. Beeley that “While British Government might have to decide eventually on some other destination for Jews now at Port de Bouc (not Cyprus or Palestine) present plans call for ships remaining indefinitely Port de Bouc.” (867N.01/8-1547)

The British Foreign Office issued a statement on August 21 that the three British transports carrying the illegal immigrants, which had been off Port de Bouc since July 22, would sail for the British zone of Germany by 6 p. m., August 22, unless the immigrants began to disembark. The text of the statement is printed in The Times (London), August 22, 1947, p. 4.

867N.01/8-2247: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom.

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 22, 1947—2 p. m.

US URGENT

NIAC

3633. For Ambassador, Deptel 3623 of Aug 22. We have just been informed informally by British Emb that Brit Govt finds itself unable to alter its plans and intends to return refugees from Exodus to Germany.1

Wide sections of the American public opinion are being aroused at reports that Brit intend to send Jewish refugees back to country in which Jews have suffered such savage persecution. Protests to White House and Dept are piling up. If Brit persist in carrying out intentions much harm will undoubtedly be done to their position in US. Please therefore take up matter at once with Brit Govt at high level in a more formal manner than that suggested in telegram under ref. More in subsequent telegram.2

LOVETT

1 In a memorandum of his conversation with the First Secretary of the British Embassy (Bromley) on August 22, the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Mattison) set forth the British position as being “literally true: that they had no other place to take them that would not take time and considerable expense to prepare.” (867N.01/8-2247)

2 Background data was provided to Ambassador Douglas in telegram 3634, August 22, 7 p. m. (867N.01/8-2247).
SECRET URGENT

LONDON, August 26, 1947—8 p. m.

4638. In absence of Bevin and Sargent,¹ I talked with Makins,² in charge of Foreign Office about contents of Deptel 3666, August 25,³ pointing out serious deterioration expected in British position and popularity in US if Jews are sent to Hamburg.

Makins said that insofar as temporary accommodation was concerned, Foreign Office and Colonial Office had thoroughly canvassed possibilities and had come to conclusion that no suitable accommodation was available in British possessions. He said that conditions in Gibraltar and Malta would be impossible if 4,000 persons were landed in these restricted communities. He added that there are good facilities at Hamburg for taking care of the Jews and in fact conditions are superior to any other that British could provide for long time in other British territory. He hoped that Jews could be persuaded to disembark quietly at Hamburg and said that all possible measures are being taken to see that they are handled as gently as possible.

Makins blamed the French for present situation, saying that although French Government had agreed that Jews could land at Port-de-Bouc, French had said that only those could be accepted who landed voluntarily, and that administratively French had broken down. He does not think that French can refuse to receive them in France from Hamburg as they are already committed to taking these people. French Cabinet decision on this point is awaited.

Makins added that Jews had been given choice of landing at Port-de-Bouc or of being sent to Hamburg “and they made their own choice”.

Makins then said that Bevin’s attitude was that he well understood opprobrium in US that would be attached to British if Jews were

¹ Sir Orme Sargent, Permanent Under-Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office.
² Roger M. Makins, Assistant Under-Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office. According to telegram 4590, August 24, 5 p. m., from London, in the absence of Messrs. Bevin and Sargent, Ambassador Douglas discussed the matter of the Exodus with Mr. Makins on August 22, after receipt of Department telegrams 3623, 3633, and 3634. He reported nothing of substance to the Department, indicating merely that a Foreign Office telegram already sent to the British Embassy would be furnished to the Department by that Embassy (867N.01/8-2447). It is possible that the message contained in telegram 3282 (see footnote 1, p. 1142), is the one referred to.
³ Not printed.
landed in Germany, but Bevin felt that there was no alternative and England would have to bear this criticism.

Makins said that he would inform Bevin of our conversation of today and that he would let us know later Bevin's reaction.

DOUGLAS

867N.01/8-3147: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 31, 1947—7 p. m.

US URGENT

3286. Brit Emb under instructions informed Dept this afternoon that FonOff has instructed Brit Emb Paris to request French Govt to renew its offer to consent to voluntary landing of Exodus refugees at some French port such as Cherbourg. Proposal contemplates that as ships bearing refugees approach English Channel offer to land on French soil be repeated to them. British believe offer would be strengthened if French official were to go aboard to confirm that French would receive them. Ships would not approach or enter French port unless substantial number refugees accepted offer.

British also pointed out that if this scheme were successful it would avoid difficulties foreseen in transfer of refugees from Germany to France. They expressed hope that American Ambassador Paris could be authorized support them in this proposal.

In discussing matter with French authorities you may reiterate as indicated in Deptel 3282, Aug 30,¹ that Dept will appreciate any action French Govt may take to ease situation and permit refugees to enter France and point out that this plan, if successful, has virtue of making it possible for refugees to avoid being landed in Germany.²

Sent Paris as 3286, repeated London as 3801.

LOVETT

¹ Not printed; it quoted the substance of a telegram from the British Foreign Office to the British Embassy which suggested the United States press the French Government to receive back the Exodus passengers without conditions via the British Zone of Germany. The Department noted that while it “does not wish enter into discussion of legal points raised [in the Foreign Office telegram], in view of humanitarian aspects of case it would appreciate any action which French Govt might take to ease situation and permit refugees enter France.”

² In telegram 3299, September 2, 7 p. m., the Department informed the Embassy in Paris that nothing in telegrams 3282 and 3286 “implies that you should support Brit request to French FonOff that French accept refugees unconditionally, i.e., compulsorily.” (867N.01/9-247)

According to telegram 3556, September 2, 6 p. m., from Paris, the Chargé in France (Bonbright) conferred with a spokesman of the French Foreign Office along the lines of the Departmental messages and was informed that “the French policy was unchanged and that they remained willing to receive such refugees as presented themselves voluntarily and saw no objection to repeating the offer.” (867N.01/9-247) Telegram 3594, September 4, 7 p. m., from Paris, noted that the time element soon mitigated against favorable action as the refugee ships were reported off Le Havre on the morning of September 4 (867N.01/9-447).
The report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine was signed at Geneva on August 31, 1947. After unanimous agreement on eleven recommendations and substantial agreement on a twelfth recommendation, the Committee suggested two plans. The majority plan, advocated by representatives of Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, and Uruguay, called for partition of Palestine into an Arab state, a Jewish state, and the City of Jerusalem. The Arab and Jewish states were to become independent following a transitional period of two years from September 1, 1947. During this period, the United Kingdom was to carry on the administration of Palestine, under the auspices of the United Nations, and to admit into the proposed Jewish state 150,000 Jewish immigrants. By treaty, the two states were to establish economic union and to provide for other matters of common interest. The City of Jerusalem was to be placed under an International Trusteeship System, with the United Nations as administering authority.

The minority plan, proposed by representatives of India, Iran, and Yugoslavia, called for creation of an independent federal state, following a transitional period not to exceed three years. During this period, responsibility for administering Palestine would be entrusted to an authority designated by the General Assembly. Jerusalem was to be the capital of the federal state.

For the text of the report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, see UNSCOP, volume I.

501.BB Palestine/9–247 : Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, September 2, 1947—7 p. m.

357. Following reactions to summary of UNSCOP report have been noted locally:

1. British expressions range from cautious desire examine full report to outright denunciation. View high ranking official recently returned from England remarked no uncertainty in UNSCOP’s determination to end mandate and added great many uninformed persons in England desire British out of Palestine. Other Secretariat personnel express skepticism of possibility running Palestine with “four governments” (meaning governments of Arab State, Jewish State, Jerusalem Free Zone, and “Government for Economic Affairs”).

2. Jewish Agency officials seem very satisfied. At lunch today Myerson and others of Agency’s Political Department told officer of ConsGen it was very good report and that “corridors” were very in-
genious. Same officials said report had two serious drawbacks—the inclusion of Jerusalem in the Free Zone and failure to include western Galilee in Jewish State. In confidential aside the Zionist correspondent of large American newspaper remarked “to say Jews pleased with report is understatement, they are elated”. Myerson said she had western Galilee in mind when she told press yesterday that “in better division of the country” Jews would not say Jaffa must be in Jewish State.

3. Arab reaction, aside from fiery statements from Emil Ghouri as spokesman for the Higher Committee, has thus far been relatively moderate probably due to fact that leaders are outside the country.

Department please repeat London. Copies by pouch to Arab capitals.

MACATEE

501.BB Palestine/9-347: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, September 3, 1947—4 p. m.

4765. Following obtained informally September 2 from Iraqi FonMin Jamali who is departing for UN, GA via SS Queen Mary September 4:

1. UNSCOP report in Jamali’s view proves Arab wisdom in boycotting UNSCOP, both majority and minority reports are “ridiculous” and are not in accord with general recommendations. For example if Palestine cannot be considered as solution of Jewish problem, why admit great wave of DP Jews? If economic unity of Palestine is indispensable why not political unity, without which economic unity cannot exist?

2. Jamali said that if UN GA takes “wrong course” it will “mean end of UN for all Arab States”. He had “not slightest doubt about this”.

3. Jamali hoped that there would be no Palestine Arab uprising against Jews before UN GA dealt with Palestine. If UN GA accepted anything like UNSCOP recommendations there would, in his view, be bloody Arab uprising first against Jews as invaders and second against British troops if these interfered. Asked whether Mufti would give Arab uprising signal, Jamali replied “he might” but other people could give signal too.

4. Jamali had come to London partly with a view to discussing UNSCOP report with Bevin and other British officials. However, after talking to Beeley and others he was convinced that British Gov-
ernment has not yet taken its decision re report. He now believes British Government ideas may not be formulated until last minute. Sent Department 4765, repeated Baghdad 62.

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/9-1147 : Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Hawkins) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, September 11, 1947—6 p. m.

4931. From recent talks with Neumann (Embassy's 4921, September 11\(^1\)), Goldmann (Embassy's 4922, September 11\(^1\)), and Horowitz, all of whom have approached Embassy recently, it appears that primary concern of moment to JA leaders and experts is implementation of UNSCOP majority plan. All seem to take for granted UNGA approval of majority plan since it has been formulated by impartial group appointed by UNGA. They appear worried, however, by repeated statements to effect that British Government will not implement UNGA decision alone. JA is apparently now studying possibility of Jews taking care of implementation unaided. Horowitz spoke of 3 to 6 months being enough time for British to get out and for Jews by themselves to consolidate frontiers drawn in UNSCOP majority plan: Goldmann mentioned 6 to 12 months. Horowitz hoped that Jews would in this event be allowed to import arms and munitions during interim period. All seem confident that Jews can take care of Palestine.

(2) Persons named above all seem to regard Bevin as number one enemy of Zionism.

(3) Same sources agree that since British Government seems likely to stand aside in UNGA, or at least to accept UNGA decision, success or failure of UNSCOP majority plan will largely rest upon attitude US Government adopts towards it. They are confident that US Gov- ernment would support majority plan if a declaration to this effect were enough. However, they are worried by fact that in this instance US will very likely be called upon as UN member to accept at least its proportional share of responsibility for implementing plan. Of US willingness to accept responsibility they are less confident. For this reason, Embassy understands that JA contemplates between present and UNGA decision an intensive educational campaign in US in favor of majority plan.

\(^{1}\) Not printed.
Sent Department 4931; repeated Baghdad 57; Cairo 97; Beirut 29; Jidda 51.
Department please pass to Jerusalem 66.

HAWKINS

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**Editorial Note**

The provisional agenda of the Second Session of the General Assembly, issued as GA doc. A/329 on July 18, contained forty-three items. Three of these dealt with Palestine: the "Question of Palestine (item submitted by the United Kingdom)", the "Report of the Special Committee on Palestine" and the "Termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the recognition of its independence as one State (item submitted by Saudi Arabia and by Iraq)". (United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, General Committee*, hereafter cited as GA (II), *General Committee*, pages 32–34.) The letters to the Secretary-General by the representatives of Saudi Arabia and Iraq have been released as General Assembly documents A/317, July 7, and A/328, July 14, respectively.

In connection with the organization of the Second Session, Secretary-General Lie circulated his memorandum of September 12, 1947, which suggested that the General Committee recommend to the plenary meeting "the establishment of an *ad hoc* political committee on which each Member of the General Assembly would have the right to be represented, and that this committee should consider any items on the agenda concerning Palestine." (*ibid.*, page 38)

On September 17, after the Syrian delegate opposed creation of an *ad hoc* committee and the British and American delegates favored creation of such a committee, the General Committee agreed to recommend to the General Assembly the creation of an "*Ad Hoc* committee on the Palestinian Question", along the lines of the Secretary-General's recommendations (*ibid.*., pages 1, 2). The three items in the provisional agenda dealing with Palestine were among those approved by the General Committee the same day (*ibid.*, page 5), and on September 23, the General Assembly voted to create the Committee (GA (II), *Plenary*, page 275).

The *Ad Hoc* Committee convened on September 25. On that day, Chairman Evatt requested the Secretary-General to invite the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency for Palestine to be present during the Committee's deliberations (United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question*, hereafter cited as GA (II), *Ad Hoc Committee*, pages 1, 2).
Excerpts From the Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly, New York, September 15, 1947, 10 a.m.

TOP SECRET

Position on Palestine

The Secretary explained that Ambassador Johnson could not be present because of the meeting of the Security Council. Before proceeding with the Agenda, he brought to the Delegation’s attention a matter arising from discussion held by Mr. Henderson and General Hilldring with the Zionists. He reminded the Delegation that General Hilldring had been designated by the President as an alternate representative, replacing Dean Gildersleeve.

Secretary Marshall said he was being pressed for a decision before he spoke to the General Assembly on Wednesday on the subject of Palestine. The United States, he recalled, had been largely involved in the procedure which had been followed regarding the sending of a United Nations committee to Palestine. This committee had now returned a majority and a minority report. While Australia had abstained, he now understood the Australian representative on the committee would now be pushed aside and Dr. Evatt would step in and press vigorously for the majority report.

Adoption of the majority report, the Secretary said, would mean very violent Arab reaction. To be consistent with the integrity of its position, the United States should avoid actively arousing the Arabs and precipitating their rapprochement with the Soviet Union in the first week or ten days of the General Assembly. This would happen, he said, if the Delegation took a clear stand on Wednesday. On the other hand, if the Delegation did not take a clear stand, the Secretary said, he and the State Department would undoubtedly be severely attacked for “pussyfooting.” If the Delegation took a stand in accord with the evident popular desire, for support of the majority report, it thereby would create difficulties for itself in subsequent General Assembly maneuvering.

The Secretary added that Mr. Henderson was especially concerned by the long-term factor. If the Delegation committed itself definitely—and a two-thirds General Assembly majority would hardly be possible without such a United States commitment—then the United States would be obligated to take part in implementing action agreed upon by the General Assembly.

Arab reaction, the Secretary repeated, would be hostile to such implementation action. About twenty per cent of Zionist opinion would
also be hostile. No commission could undertake the job. Great Britain had made it clear that it would not carry through alone; it was therefore quite obvious that the United States would have to take part.

Mrs. Roosevelt 1 at this point asked whether it was really evident, as indicated in previous discussion, that the U.S.S.R. would be opposed to the majority report. Secretary Marshall replied that this was the assumption, since the case offered such a fine opportunity for the Soviets to carry out their ends regarding the Arabs, for the sake of expediency. Mrs. Roosevelt said that the Arabs were clearly more afraid of the U.S.S.R. than of us. Mr. Henderson said he was convinced that just as we, during the war, lined up with the U.S.S.R. although having nothing in common, so the Arabs for convenience would work with the U.S.S.R. against the No. 1 common enemy, ourselves.

General Hilldring said that the Russians had already made their position clear. Their first choice was a federal state. He believed they would espouse a federal state to the very end, as an advocate of Arab desires.

The Secretary then introduced the statement which had been framed by Mr. Lovett and Mr. Henderson for delivery by him on Wednesday. This expressed hope that the General Assembly would find a definite solution for the problem of Palestine; that if this problem were to be solved it must be approached with resolution and restraint; that in considering the work of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine it was worthy of note that although the committee had been unable to reach an [unanimous?] agreement on partition, it had reached unanimous agreement on eleven other points; and concluded with the hope that general agreement would be reached during this session, after the General Assembly has had an opportunity to study in full the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine report.

General Hilldring then said that it would certainly be a disappointment to American Jews and Jews everywhere, who hoped the United States would take a favorable position on Palestine at the beginning of the General Assembly in favor of the majority report. But, he felt, this was not a serious enough consideration to warrant a definite statement by the United States on Wednesday in favor of the majority report. The Delegation should talk to representatives of the Jews, explain that it was impossible for the United States to take a definite position, and ask them to contain themselves a little longer. This was not the time for such a definite position.

Mrs. Roosevelt asked what was to be supported by a definite position.

1 Anna Eleanor Roosevelt (Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt), Representative of the United States at the Second Session of the General Assembly.
General Hilldring replied that he meant a definite position at least in support of partition. The real nub of the matter, he said, was disagreement in the United States Government as to whether to accept the principle of partition. He thought the United States should go further and accept the majority report, while remaining willing to amend it as a result of debate in the Assembly.

Mrs. Roosevelt then asked whether another question was not involved in this matter, something which had nothing to do with the Jewish situation. She felt this was the question of the importance of supporting a report brought in by a United Nations committee, for the value of such support in promoting the success of the United Nations. She posed the question whether this was not quite a serious consideration for the Delegation, as important or more important, a consideration than whether such a stand would please American Jews. Such a position in support of the United Nations report would strengthen the United Nations in the minds of the American people.

The Secretary said he had been surprised at the quality of the report and at the extent of agreement on this extraordinary difficult matter. The report had proved much better than he had anticipated. He added that one consideration which must be borne in mind by the Delegation was that when the United States supported the report, it must follow through. It could not be regarded merely as an immediate political settlement, bringing relief to all parties in the United States. Recalling his mention of the ability of the Soviet Union to take advantage of Arab hostility to partition, he said this was merely part of the problem. We will have to be ready to put troops into Palestine, the Secretary said.

Mr. Henderson agreed that there was no doubt that the majority report, if accepted, would have to be implemented by force. The British Government, he felt, would either say it would not have anything to do with implementing the report or that it would do its share. He doubted very much that the British Government would even be willing to do its share. Mr. Bevin, Mr. Henderson said, had been evasive during a talk with Mr. Henderson, but had made it clear that Britain could not be prepared to raise hostility toward itself in the Arab world. The question therefore arose of whom the United States was to send to aid in implementing. Two fronts would arise: Jewish terrorists would continue to fight and assassinate, and Arab terrorists would do likewise. He did not know how far this would go, Mr. Henderson said.

The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine report, while intended to be impartial, was not based on any principle, he said. It

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2 For Mr. Henderson’s memorandum of September 9, see pp. 496, 498.
was full of sophistry. Mr. Henderson said he thought it proper for the United States to use force and to incur enmity when a principle was involved, but he failed to find any principle here, only expediency. Those who signed the majority report would not be concerned in carrying it out; it was therefore easy for them. Those who would carry it out would have to be the great powers. He did not think Great Britain, France, or the U.S.S.R. would be willing to help carry it out.

Assuming the United States was going to favor the majority report, Ambassador Austin said, then it was necessary to judge the timing of the statement of the United States position. The question was whether to take up a position now or to wait until the row got hot, resentment higher, and until the favor we would have to exert for the side we favored would have to be stronger. In line with the United States stated principle of backing the United Nations by defending political independence and integrity, Ambassador Austin did not see how it was possible to carve out of an area already too small for a state a still smaller state. He thought it was certain that such a state would have to defend itself with bayonets forever, until extinguished in blood. The Arabs, he said, would never be willing to have such a small state in their heart.

Ambassador Austin said he stood with the Secretary on the matter. On the assumption that the Delegation was going to support the majority report, it would be necessary to take the urgent next step, and to support it with all the required help, including troops. However, he feared his judgment might have been affected by his special study of the matter in 1936, accordingly, he made the following statement with reservations. His notion was that it would be a much sounder policy for the Delegation to take its position then, and to announce it Wednesday, not in a threatening manner but in dignified accents. Such action would buoy up the United Nations, he felt. The Delegation had taken a position in the Secretary's speech the previous day, a very strong position, and the Delegation would be slipping if it did not march consistently in accord with that speech. He therefore repeated that he felt Wednesday's statement should be as clear as possible; the United States then would stand before the world as courageous and wise, and by creating a determined effect early would prevent the situation from flaring up—since the Arabs would not get the idea that they would yet convince the Delegation.

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*For the address delivered by Secretary Marshall before the American Association for the United Nations at New York, see Department of State Bulletin, September 21, 1947, p. 539.*
Mr. Dulles said he did not feel confident enough about his views to want to volunteer them at the moment, although he would speak, if necessary, with great reservations. The Secretary said that in that case the meeting would proceed, and that a copy of the proposed statement from Washington would be given each of the delegates for consideration before the afternoon meeting. Mr. Dulles said he would like this procedure, and also he wanted to ask some questions of General Hilldring and Mr. Henderson.

THOMAS F. POWER, JR.  

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Statement by the Secretary of State  

[Extract]

The General Assembly is also faced with the problem of Palestine. The Government of the United States intends to do everything within its power at this session of the General Assembly to assist in finding a solution for this difficult problem which has stirred up such violent passions, and which is now resulting in the shedding of blood and in great mental and moral anguish. The solution will require of each of us courage and resolution. It will also require restraint.

The Special Committee on Palestine is to be highly commended for its contribution to the solution of this problem. Although the members of this Committee were not able to agree unanimously upon a number of important issues, including that of partition, they have been able to find the basis for agreement on eleven recommendations to this Assembly. Their achievement in reaching unanimity on so many points represents definite progress.

We realize that whatever the solution recommended by the General Assembly, it cannot be ideally satisfactory to either of the two great peoples primarily concerned. While the final decision of this Assembly must properly await the detailed consideration of the report, the Government of the United States gives great weight not only to the recommendations which have met with the unanimous approval of the Special Committee, but also to those which have been approved by the majority of that Committee.

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Made before the General Assembly on September 17; reprinted from GA (II), Plenary, vol. 1, pp. 19, 20.
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) 1

[WASHINGTON,] September 18, 1947.

Ambassador Wadsworth, who recently arrived from Baghdad in the United States, is now in New York as one of the political advisers to the American Representative at the UN. Following the Secretary's address before the General Assembly of the UN on September 17 Ambassador Wadsworth ascertained the reaction of the various Arab delegations to be substantially as follows:

The delegates from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia were unanimous in interpreting the Secretary's words as an all-out declaration of American support of the Majority Plan in the UNSCOP report, and consider it as being a forthright commitment that the United States would make every effort and wield its influence in favor of a Zionist solution for the Palestine problem.

Members of the Syrian and Lebanese Delegations consider Secretary Marshall's statement that the United States gives “great weight” to the Majority Plan in the UNSCOP report as meaning full U.S. support for that plan. These members also observed that the U.S. Government, with the exception of the White House, had been neutral until today but that even the State Department was now following a pro-Zionist policy. It was added that even though the Secretary did not commit the U.S. to final support of the Majority Plan, he could not later go back on his remarks favoring the Majority report.

Ambassador Wadsworth added that Prince Faisal, the Saudi Arabian Minister of Foreign Affairs, had two principal points: (1) No useful purpose would be served in discussing the terms of procedure in the UN with Ambassador Wadsworth, as Secretary Marshall had already made the American commitment; (2) There was no aspect on the Palestine question on which further Arab-American cooperation was possible. Prince Faisal observed that the decision indicated by the Secretary's remarks on Palestine was the most dangerous step which the United States had ever taken on the Near Eastern political scene, that it was dangerous not only for the United States and for the Arab States, but for world peace, and that “it just can't be made out as you wish”.

Faris el-Khoury, of the Syrian Delegation, was in hearty agreement with the Secretary's address, with the exception of the passage on Palestine. Faris el-Khoury was adamantly opposed to our Palestine

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1 Marginal notations indicate that the Secretary of State as well as the Under Secretary of State saw this memorandum.
policy, and said that the issue would hamper Arab-American cooperation on other problems.

Ambassador Wadsworth reports that Jamali, Iraqi Foreign Minister, and Malik, Lebanese Minister in the U.S., were more pessimistic than Faris el-Khoury. Malik said, "We are younger—to us Palestine is the issue." Jamali said that the U.S. has embarked on a policy leading to tragedy, that U.S. troops would probably be sent to Palestine, that Jewish aggression would continue, but that means would be found to oppose such aggression, "even by force of arms". Jamali added that both the Arabs and Great Britain could have agreed on Palestine if it had not been for Zionist pressure on the U.S. Government which had forced the U.S. to intervene. Jamali accordingly considered the U.S. as primarily responsible for present and future developments in Palestine.²

L[oy] W. H[Enderson]

²In a memorandum of September 19, summarizing his conversation of the previous night with Paul Gore-Booth of the United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations, G. Hayden Raynor, Adviser to the United States Delegation, stated: "Mr. Gore-Booth tried to draw me out as to the exact implication of the section of the Secretary's speech on Palestine. I did not discuss this point. I did, however, gain the impression that the British were not entirely pleased with this part of the speech." (IO files, US/A/405, September 21, 1947)

501.BB Palestine/9-2247

_The Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State_

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 22, 1947.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I went to New York on September 15 with General Hilldring at the request of Mr. Lovett to present our views as to what you might say in your speech of September 17 with regard to Palestine. I had just returned from Greece and was not really prepared to enter into a full discussion as to the attitude which we should assume with regard to the UNSCOP report. I am afraid, therefore, that I did not give the views of my office, which are also those of nearly every member of the Foreign Service or of the Department who has worked to any appreciable extent on Near Eastern problems, in the manner in which they should have been presented.

The attitude which we assume towards the Palestine problem during the proceedings of this Special Session may have far-reaching effects upon our relations with the peoples of the Near East and with Moslems everywhere. It may greatly influence the extent of success or of failure of some of our efforts to promote world stability and to prevent further Soviet penetration into important areas free as yet from Soviet domi-
nation. I consider, therefore, that it is my duty briefly to point out some of the considerations which cause the overwhelming majority of non-Jewish Americans who are intimately acquainted with the situation in the Near East to believe that it would not be in the national interests of the United States for it to advocate any kind of a plan at this time for the partitioning of Palestine or for the setting up of a Jewish State in Palestine.

**Certain Considerations Against Advocacy by the U.S. of the Majority Plan**

1. An advocacy on our part of any plan providing for the partitioning of Palestine or the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish state would be certain to undermine our relations with the Arab, and to a lesser extent with the Moslem, world at a time when the Western World needs the friendship and cooperation of the Arabs and other Moslems.

Without at least a degree of Arab cooperation we shall encounter numerous difficulties in connection with any support which we may give to the efforts of the British to find bases which will enable Great Britain to remain as a stabilizing power in the Eastern Mediterranean. We shall need the confidence and cooperation of the Arabs in the near future if we are to achieve any success in forestalling violent Arab nationalists uprisings against the French in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. The resources and geographical position of the Arab countries are of such a character that those countries are necessarily factors of importance in the international economic field. Arab friendship is essential if we are to have their cooperation in the carrying out of some of our vital economic programs. During the next few years we are planning to draw heavily on the resources of the area, not only for our use, but for the reconstruction of Europe. Furthermore, we are intending to make important use of the communications facilities in the area. Already, partly as a result of our policies regarding Palestine, the attitude of the Arab Governments towards American firms has changed sharply and their demands on the firms are becoming more and more truculent and extravagant. Loss of confidence in the sense of justness and in the impartiality of the United States has been accompanied during the last two years in the Arab world by a growing suspicion of our overall motives and by increasing doubts as to our national integrity. Although the Arabs have in general no use for Communism, they feel so emotional with regard to the problem of Palestine that if an attempt should actually be made to set up a Jewish State in Palestine in pursuance of decisions supported by us, they may consider the United States as their foremost enemy and enter into at
least temporary cooperation with the Soviet Union against us just as we cooperated with the Russians during the war years against common enemies.

If we press for a Jewish state, we shall undoubtedly weaken the position of the moderate Arabs who are friends of the western world and strengthen that of the fanatical extremists. Just last week, for instance, one of the moderate Arab leaders was slain in Palestine by followers of the fanatical Mufti.

2. *If we advocate a plan providing for partitioning and the setting up of a Jewish State, we shall certainly be expected to make major contributions in force, materials and money to the implementation of such a plan if it is adopted.*

We are under tremendous pressure at the present time to advocate such a plan. If we do, and if the plan is adopted, we shall be under still greater pressure to contribute to its implementation. We shall be lacking in courage and consistency, it will be argued, if after a plan supported by us has been adopted we do not do our part in carrying it out. Furthermore, we shall be expected to bear the main burden of implementation. We have shown more interest in the Palestine problem than any other great Power, except Great Britain, and Great Britain is beginning to weary of the Palestine burden. Furthermore, the execution of a partition plan such as that in the majority report will be a task lasting over a period of many years. Differences arising from attempts to carry out such a plan will arise to plague every session of the General Assembly. As one of the sponsors for the execution of the plan, we shall be the target for bitter attacks by both Arabs and Jews.

3. *Any plan for partitioning Palestine would be unworkable.*

Of all the previous committees which have ever studied the Palestine problem, only the Royal (Peel) Commission 1937 recommended partition as a solution.

The Partition (Woodhead) Commission set up in 1938 to carry out the Peel proposals was unable to devise a practicable plan for partition, so the Peel recommendations fell to the ground. The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, composed of six prominent Britshers and six well-known Americans, stated in their report of April 20, 1946:

“Partition has an appeal at first sight as giving a prospect of early independence and self-government to Jews and Arabs, but in our view no partition would have any chance unless it was basically acceptable to Jews and Arabs, and there is no sign of that today. We are accordingly unable to recommend partition as a solution.”

If complete partition would be unsuccessful unless acceptable to Jews and Arabs, how much chance of success in the face of fierce Arab
opposition has the UNSCOP majority plan which provides for an economic union of the two states—a union which cannot possibly succeed without Arab-Jewish friendship and cooperation? Irrigation ditches, railways, roads, telephone and telegraph lines, etc. must pass through both states. These facilities cannot function if the population of one state is hostile to that of the other. If political partition providing for the incorporation of 400,000 Arabs in a Jewish State is forced on the population of Palestine, this hostility will exist and will increase.

4. The UNSCOP Majority Plan is not only unworkable; if adopted, it would guarantee that the Palestine problem would be permanent and still more complicated in the future.

Some of the reasons for the unworkability of the Majority Plan are:

(a) It is not possible for the two states to have political individuality and economic unity if the population of one or both of these states objects to such a partnership and refuses to cooperate;

(b) In case economic unity is found to be unworkable, it would not be possible to have complete economic individuality since the terrain of the country and the nature of the communications are such that the two states are inextricably meshed economically;

(c) In spite of the arguments advanced to the contrary in the report, an Arab state of the type envisaged would not be viable even if subsidized by receiving half of the revenues derived from the customs and other services;

(d) The cost of policing, in view of both extreme Arab and Jewish irredentism, would be more than the combined national budget could bear.

5. The Majority Plan does not dispose once for all of the Palestine problem because:

(a) It provides for an economic union to be presided over by a Joint Economic Board, the members of which shall consist of three representatives of each of the two States and the foreign members appointed by the Economic and Social Council. An organ of the United Nations must, therefore, indefinitely act as an economic umpire between these two States. Will representatives of the Great Powers serve on this Board? If so, will an American serve? In case important Jewish interests are involved, is the American Government to be put under constant internal political pressure to order its representative to side with the Jewish State? Is the Soviet Union or a Soviet satellite to be represented by one of the three members? If so, what kind of a role would such a representative be likely to play?

(b) The Majority Plan provides that if either of the two states should fail to take the steps suggested in the plan, including the calling of a constituent assembly, the setting up of a provisional government, the making of a Declaration, etc., that fact will be communicated to the United Nations for such action by the General Assembly as may be deemed proper.
It is likely that the Arab State will not take the steps suggested and that, therefore, the whole Palestine problem will be back on the doorstep of the General Assembly at least within two years.

We are convinced that no plan can be found which will completely dispose of the Palestine problem so far as the United Nations is concerned at this session. I have stressed the fact that the majority plan does not rid us of this problem merely because there has been some thinking in the Department to the effect that if it is adopted, we can finally wash our hands of this disagreeable matter.

6. The proposals contained in the UNSCOP plan are not only not based on any principles of an international character, the maintenance of which would be in the interests of the United States, but they are in definite contravention to various principles laid down in the Charter as well as to principles on which American concepts of Government are based.

These proposals, for instance, ignore such principles as self-determination and majority rule. They recognize the principle of a theocratic racial state and even go so far in several instances as to discriminate on grounds of religion and race against persons outside of Palestine. We have hitherto always held that in our foreign relations American citizens, regardless of race or religion, are entitled to uniform treatment. The stress on whether persons are Jews or non-Jews is certain to strengthen feelings among both Jews and Gentiles in the United States and elsewhere that Jewish citizens are not the same as other citizens.

The United States is undoubtedly honor bound to take steps to make sure that the Jews in Palestine are not discriminated against and that they participate on at least an equal basis with other peoples in the Government of Palestine. We are under no obligations to the Jews to set up a Jewish State. The Balfour Declaration and the Mandate provided not for a Jewish State, but for a Jewish national home. Neither the United States nor the British Government has ever interpreted the term "Jewish national home" to be a Jewish national state.

7. Tactics which the United States should pursue in the handling of the Palestine problem before the present session of the General Assembly.

In our opinion, there is no ready solution of the Palestine problem to which both Jews and Arabs would acquiesce to such an extent as to render it workable. Any kind of an imposed solution opposed by the majority of either the Arabs or the Jews is bound to result in failure, involving much loss of property and bloodshed and loss of prestige to the supporters and executors of the plan, as well as to the whole United Nations. If a solution is found which is workable, it will,
we believe, be evolved only after long and protracted discussions during the course of which the moderate Jews and moderate Arabs would find common ground. If we at the beginning take either the Arab or the Jewish side of the controversy, it will be extremely difficult for either the moderate Arabs or the moderate Jews to get together.

Our Government has already stated that we give serious weight to the majority proposals. On an early occasion, we should repeat this statement, making it clear at the same time that our minds are by no means closed and that we shall also give due weight to the views of other nations and particularly of the interested parties.

During the debates regarding the merits of the various plans, we should not play too active a role. We should create the respect of all fair-minded persons by being, so far as possible, strictly impartial. We should concentrate our efforts primarily on working out agreements of all parties with regard to as many points as possible. It seems to us that there is a possibility that the moderates in both camps might be led to acquiesce in a sufficient number of points to enable the setting up of a trusteeship for a period of years which would be instructed to function in such a neutral manner as not to favor either partition or a single state. At the conclusion of this term of years, there could be a plebiscite on the question of partition, in the light of which the General Assembly could make its final decision on this fateful question. Any kind of a temporary arrangement should probably provide for immediate Jewish immigration of at least 100,000 persons.

It may be impossible even to work out a delayed solution such as that outlined above. If so, the Palestine problem will probably become even more of a world problem than at the present time.

It is realized that the tactics outlined above are not likely to appeal to those of us who prefer to approach all problems with energy and decisiveness. There are times, however, when energy and decisiveness are not appropriate.²

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Editorial Note

The Foreign Offices of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Egypt, in notes to American Diplomatic Missions in their respective countries, drew the attention of the United States Government to

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²In a transmitting memorandum of September 22 to the Secretary of State, Mr. Henderson stated: “I wish to assure you that in spite of the views expressed in this memorandum, the staff of my Office is endeavoring loyally to carry out the decision which you made last Monday [September 15], and unless informed otherwise by you, will continue to endeavor to execute that decision in a manner which will minimize as far as possible the damage to our relations and interests in the Near and Middle East.” (501.BB Palestine/9-2242)
various resolutions on Palestine approved by the Political Committee of the Arab League. The notes, not printed, were of similar import and form and were transmitted to the Department by the Missions at various dates between September 22 and October 1, 1947. A note of somewhat different character was received from the Saudi Arabian Foreign Office; see telegram 431, October 15, from Jidda, page 1184.

501.BB Palestine/9-2647

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Paul H. Alling, Adviser to the United States Delegation at the General Assembly

TOP SECRET

Participants: The Secretary; Amir Faisal of Saudi Arabia; Faris Bey el-Khoury of Syria; Noury As-Said Pasha of Iraq; Dr. Mohamed Hussein Heykal Pasha of Egypt; M. Camille Chamoun of Lebanon; Ambassador Johnson; Major General Hilldring, U.S.A. (ret.); Lieutenant General Ridgway, U.S.A.; Mr. Wadsworth; Mr. Alling; and Shaikh Ali A. Alireza of Saudi Arabia (Faisal's interpreter)

At a luncheon offered on September 23, 1947 by the Secretary at the quarters of Lieutenant General Ridgway, at which the foregoing were present, the general question of the UNSCOP report was discussed. Faris Bey el-Khoury of Syria was the chief speaker for the Arab Delegations. He opened the discussion by saying that the Arab group was greatly disappointed that the Secretary in his address of September 17, 1947 had come out in favor of the majority report of the UNSCOP. Mr. Khoury stated that he was a member of Parliament in his country and that he would, from his point of view, consider the UNSCOP report, because of its biased position against the Arabs, an unacceptable draft document and not worthy of consideration as a working paper. He elaborated on this thought by presenting the usual Arab point of view that none of the Arab states could accept the thesis of a Jewish sovereign state, that such a state was only the beginning of Zionist penetration in the Near East which sooner or later would end up in bloodshed and disaster. He stressed the point that the Zionists had progressed in Palestine only because of the tremendous sums of money poured into the country from abroad, particularly from the United States, and cited the failure of the colonies established and

1 The conversation covered by this memorandum took place in New York on September 23. Mr. Alling, however, prepared and dated the memorandum on September 26.

2 Matthew B. Ridgway, senior United States Army member of the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations.
financed in Palestine early in the present century by Lord Rothschild after the latter had withdrawn his support.

The Secretary replied that although he had not received as yet a full analysis of the UNSCOP report and therefore could not express any definitive views, he hoped that the Arab Delegations would bear in mind certain points:

1. He thought he had an understanding of the general Arab point of view on the Palestine question.
2. He had resisted strong pressure put upon him to make statements regarding the American position during the period the UNSCOP inquiries were in progress, since he felt any such statements might prejudice the findings of the Special Committee.
3. He asked the Arab Delegations to remember that the United States faced critical problems all over the world, among the most pressing of which was the question of "majority voting". That question came up at Rio de Janeiro; it was among the outstanding questions at the present meeting of the UNGA.
4. In view of the foregoing, and looking at the broad picture, the Secretary could not "throw the UNSCOP report out of the window" and revert to the situation existing last spring. Such a procedure would have weakened the UN and would not have served the cause of peace.
5. The alternative was to dignify the proceedings of the UN by paying tribute to the UNSCOP effort and by accepting the UNSCOP report as a working basis.

The Secretary went on to say that he had listened to Mr. Chamoun's address at the UNGA on September 20, 1947 in which the latter had referred to the position of the Secretary as favoring partition. He pointed out that during Mr. Chamoun's address a member of the United States Delegation had turned to him (the Secretary) and said: "But the Lebanese delegate misunderstands the situation; you have made no such commitment".

Ambassador Johnson supported the Secretary's view and emphasized the point that the Secretary had no choice but to pay tribute to the efforts of the UNSCOP and would have been obliged to do so whatever the nature of the report since it was most essential at this critical period to strengthen and reinforce the procedures and machinery of the UN with a view to furthering steps toward a real peace.

General Hilldring pointed out that the Secretary had not committed the United States to accept any particular solution of the Palestine question; that we wanted to hear all points of view before

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*This refers to the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security which met in Rio de Janeiro from August 15 to September 2, 1947; for documentation on the Conference, see vol. viii, pp. 1 ff.
*For statement by Mr. Chamoun, see GA (II), Plenary, vol. i, p. 164.
reaching any conclusions; and that the way was still open for all interested governments to express their viewpoints which we were anxious to hear. General Hilldring added that the minds of the United States Delegation were by no means closed.

The Amir Faisal made few remarks but those supported the views of the other Arab leaders. However, he followed with close attention, through his interpreter, the exchange of views.

After discussing the question with the Syrian delegate and the Lebanese representative, who added little to Faris Bey el-Khourii's views, the Secretary invited the comments of the Egyptian and Iraqi representatives.

Heykal Pasha, the Egyptian delegate, asked why should the UN perpetuate a failure which, he asserted, the Palestine mandate had been from the beginning. It had brought on several serious conflicts in Palestine which had been put down only by British arms. From an economic point of view the Zionist experiment had continued only because of the funds poured in from abroad. He pointed out that the Balfour declaration (which was in conflict with British promises to the Arabs) had at the maximum agreed to “a Jewish National Home in Palestine”. Now the Zionists asked for a Jewish state and that was only the beginning. Once having obtained a foothold, the Zionists would demand more and eventually try to gain complete control of the Arab lands. Faris Bey el-Khourii reinforced the thesis of failure by pointing out that although a thousand years ago the Crusaders had attempted to establish their dominance in the Holy Land, they had finally been ejected with disaster to themselves. He predicted a similar fate for Zionist efforts.

Noury As-Said, speaking for Iraq, said that in his view the political and humanitarian aspects of the matter had to be separated. If the political aspects of Zionist aspirations could be put aside, the Arab countries would be with the United States fully in efforts to solve the humanitarian side of the Jewish problem. (Although Noury As-Said does not express himself adequately in English, it was the general understanding of those present that he was attempting to convey the idea that if other countries would accept their fair share of the problem of displaced persons, particularly Jewish DP's, the Arab countries would cooperate completely.)

The luncheon was terminated by the Secretary expressing his appreciation for the courtesy of the Arab delegates in informing him of their views. He expected he would have occasion to seek their views again during the coming weeks. Faris Bey el-Khourii thanked the Secretary for his friendly reception of the Arab delegates.
After the luncheon the Amir Faisal spoke to Ambassador Johnson and me at Flushing. He stated that he wanted the Secretary to know that all of the Arab countries desired nothing more than to work with and cooperate with the United States in the Near East, but they could not do so if we supported the thesis of a Jewish state in Palestine. He added in strict confidence that he could not say publicly at the Secretary's luncheon one most important consideration, as follows: Speaking as a responsible Arab statesman he wanted the Secretary to know that NO Arab Government in the Near East would be able to restrain the outraged feelings of its people if a Jewish state were established in Palestine.

I had a brief talk with Faris Bey el-Khoury at Flushing after the luncheon and inquired about his impressions of the talk with the Secretary. He said he felt somewhat reassured but hoped that the American delegate in the Ad Hoc Committee in Palestine would make clear that the United States had not taken a firm position in favor of the majority report of the UNSCOP and that we were open to suggestions. Faris Bey el-Khoury thought such a clarification was important since several non-Arab and non-Moslem Delegations had received the impression that the United States was out to railroad through the majority recommendations at all costs to us and to the rest of the world.²

* This memorandum was cleared with General Hilldring.

501.BB Palestine/9–2447

Memorandum by Major General John H. Hilldring to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)

[NEW YORK,] September 24, 1947.

After the meeting of the United States Delegation this morning, another meeting regarding the United States position as to Palestine was held in the Secretary's office with the following attendance: The Secretary, Mrs. Roosevelt, Mr. Dean Rusk, Mr. Charles Bohlen,¹ Mr. Charles Fahy² and General Hilldring.

After a discussion in which everyone present participated, the Secretary decided that:

1. The United States Representative on the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine would, in general, conduct himself in accordance with the

¹ Counselor of the Department of State.
² Alternate Representative of the United States at the Second Session of the General Assembly.
following plan: a) No opening statement will be made by the United States Representative in the early phases of the discussion of the Palestine question; b) The United States Representative will support and encourage a general discussion of the Palestine question during the early days of the Ad Hoc Committee meetings, especially with respect to getting before the Committee the views of the United Kingdom, the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency; c) At the completion of this general discussion, the United States Representative will for the first time present the U.S. views. This view should take into account the historical commitments of the United States regarding Palestine, the majority report of UNSCOP and a consideration of the views expressed in the general debate before the Committee.

2. The presentation of the United States position mentioned in (c) above should begin at once. It should embrace support of the majority report of UNSCOP with such amendments as are now believed by the United States Government to be wise and essential to a workable plan. It was understood, and the Secretary stated, that this plan should have incorporated in it any useful suggestions that are brought to light in the general discussion before the Committee. However, there should be retained in the plan the provisions for partition and large-scale immigration. The exact time at which this position will be stated by the United States cannot now be determined. This is a question that must for the moment be kept open.

3. In the event that the United States proposal, described in (2) above, does not elicit the support of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly, or in the event that it is ascertained beforehand that such a plan will not receive the support of two-thirds of the members of the United Nations, the United States Government will consider at that time which of the following two lines of action should be taken: a) Force a vote in the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine to demonstrate the absence of support in the United Nations for the majority report of UNSCOP, or b) decide, in the absence of support of two-thirds of the members of the United Nations for the majority report of UNSCOP, to propose an alternate solution which, based on the information available at that time, will elicit the support of two-thirds of the members of the United Nations.

4. To prepare a tentative draft of the switch position described in (3) above to be submitted by the United States whether the decision is made under (3) a above or (3) b above.

It was the firm conviction of all those present that the utmost secrecy must attend the United States position and line of action which was this morning decided by the Secretary of State as described above.
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

SECRET

Participants: Secretary Marshall;
Lord Inverchapel, British Ambassador;
Mr. Creech Jones;
Mr. Hector McNeil

The three gentlemen arrived at noon for an early lunch. After a brief period of general conversation the Ambassador stated that Mr. Bevin had given Mr. Douglas on the previous Sunday morning an outline of the British position in regard to Palestine, anticipating that Mr. Douglas was flying to Washington and would go over the matter with me and with the President. On learning that Douglas was coming home by steamer Mr. Bevin directed that I be gotten in touch with immediately and that Creech Jones explain the matter to me personally; therefore their call by telephone late the previous evening.

Mr. Creech Jones then stated the British position that was to be announced the following morning. I will not go over this because it is now a matter of public information.

Mr. McNeil stated he hoped that there would not be a reaction in the United States along the line, similar to the case in Greece, that the British were “walking out” on us. I stated that from my brief understanding of their statement, I thought that would not be the case.

I stated that I personally was very sympathetic to the British dilemma and, without discussing the wisdom of the course they had followed in particular incidents, that I felt they had been the victims of an impossible situation and considerable unjust criticism. I further stated that in our approach to the matter we would deal with it on the highest level, meaning by implication which I did not explain, that we would treat the matter as an international affair and not permit local political pressures to determine our actions.

There was little else said at the interview other than a repetition of the British statement for my benefit in order that I might understand the various factors involved.

1 British Representative at the Second Session of the General Assembly.
2 In a statement before the Ad Hoc Committee on September 26, reported in telegram 883, September 26, 2:18 p.m., from New York, Mr. Creech Jones noted that there was no conflict between the general conclusions of UNSCOP and the broad objectives of British policy. He concluded that his Government was ready to assume responsibility for carrying out any plan securing Arab and Jewish agreement, but if the Assembly recommended a policy not acceptable to the Arabs and Jews, his Government would not feel able to give effect to it. In the latter case it would be necessary to provide an alternative implementing authority (501.BB Palestine/9-2647). For the official record of his statement, see GA (11), Ad Hoc Committee, p. 2.
Jamal Hussein, on behalf of the Arab Higher Committee, appeared before the *Ad Hoc Committee* on September 29. The summary of his statement, printed in *GA (II), Ad Hoc Committee*, pages 5–11, notes at one point: “Regarding the manner and form of independence for Palestine, it was the view of the Arab Higher Committee that that was a matter for the rightful owners of Palestine to decide. Once Palestine was found to be entitled to independence, the United Nations was not legally competent to decide or to impose the constitutional organization of Palestine, since such action would amount to interference with an internal matter of an independent nation.

“The future constitutional organization of Palestine should be based on the following principles: first, establishment on democratic lines of an Arab State comprising all Palestine; secondly, observance by the said Arab State of Palestine of human rights, fundamental freedoms and equality of all persons before the law; thirdly, protection by the Arab State of the legitimate rights and interests of all minorities; fourthly, guarantee to all of freedom of worship and access to the Holy Places.” (pages 10, 11)

Abba Hillel Silver, on behalf of the Jewish Agency, appeared before the Committee on October 2. The summary of his statement, printed *ibid.*, pages 12–19, set forth the approval of the Agency of the eleven unanimous recommendations of UNSCOP except for Recommendation VI on Jewish displaced persons, which the Agency did not disapprove. He also termed Recommendation XII unintelligible.

Rabbi Silver deemed the minority report unacceptable; nor did the majority report satisfy the Jewish people because of the limited area of the proposed Jewish state and the exclusion of Jerusalem from that state. Nevertheless, the Agency was willing to accept the majority report since it made possible the immediate reestablishment of the Jewish State. This acceptance was made subject to further discussion of constitutional and territorial provisions (pages 15–17).
TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 30, 1947.

UNITED STATES POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE

THE PROBLEM

The problem is to determine the position which the United States should take in the General Assembly with regard to the Palestine question.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The United States Delegation, in dealing with the Palestine question, should be guided by the following basic objectives:

   a) to assist in every way in the finding of a solution of the Palestine problem at this session of the General Assembly.

   b) to secure the maximum possible agreement between Arabs and Jews and among the Members of the United Nations.

   c) to implement the United States position on the Palestine question, as set forth below, by methods best calculated to safeguard the strategic, economic, and political interests of the United States in the Near East.

   d) to achieve a United Nations recommendation regarding the Palestine problem and, to this end, to implement the United States position in such a way that the final recommendation of the General Assembly can not be regarded as an “American plan”.

2. With regard to the respective roles of the General Assembly and the Mandatory Power, the U.S. Delegation should be guided by the following considerations:

   a) The General Assembly has been asked by the United Kingdom to make recommendations on the future government of Palestine. However, in accepting this task the General Assembly has not accepted responsibility for the Government of Palestine.

   b) The United Kingdom is at present the responsible administering authority for Palestine. This responsibility was incurred by agreement with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers of the First World War and is expressed in the terms of a mandate approved by the Council of the League of Nations. Both on legal and policy grounds the United Kingdom should continue to discharge this responsibility.

1 There were two earlier drafts of this position paper. One was provided to SPA for comment by NEA (memorandum of September 22 by Mr. McClintock to Mr. Rusk, 501.BB Palestine/9-2247) but a copy has not been found in Department of State files nor is its date known. A copy of the draft of September 24 is filed in a folder entitled “Palestine—Sept. through Oct. 1947” (records of the Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Lot 82-370, Box 5).
until arrangements have been made to supplant it or a settlement in Palestine has been effected.

3. The United States Delegation should follow the lines laid down by the Secretary in his speech of September 17, 1947, namely: "While the final decision of this Assembly must properly await the detailed consideration of the report, the Government of the United States gives great weight not only to the recommendations which have met with the unanimous approval of the special committee but also to those which have been approved by the majority of that committee." To this end, the U.S. should give support to the majority plan in principle with a view to perfecting the plan in certain of its features. In extending this support, the United States should endeavor to secure certain modifications and clarifications of that plan, either initiating or supporting the following principal modifications (for a detailed position analysis of the majority plan see Annex A):

a) Clarification should be sought with regard to the problem of the viability of the two states. On page 53 of the UNSCOP report it is stated that "the creation of two viable States is considered essential to a partition scheme". Yet on page 48 of the report it is indicated that the Arab state will be forced to call for financial assistance "from international institutions in the way of loans for expansion of education, public health and other vital social services of a non-self-supporting nature." Moreover, the technical note on the viability of the proposed states prepared by the Secretariat (pp. 55–56) is not conclusive as regards the viability of the Arab State. In view of the central importance of the question of viability as stressed in the Committee's report, a special subcommittee of the Ad Hoc Committee should be established to consider this question.

b) The city of Jaffa (70,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews), placed within the Jewish State under the majority plan, should be assigned to the Arab State as an enclave. This would substantially reduce the number of Arabs in the Jewish State and eliminate a fertile source of Arab objections. In view of the provisions of the majority plan for freedom of transit and visit, the normal objections to an enclave are not believed valid in this case.

c) The eastern boundary of the Western Galilee area of the Arab State should be redrawn to include Safad (9,500 Arabs and 2,500 Jews) for the same reasons given in b above. An enclave would not be necessary in this case.

d) In order to include the Arab areas in the southern part of the Gasa sub-district within the Arab State, it is believed desirable for the point of intersection in this area to be moved southeast to a point on the frontier of the Gasa sub-district.

e) The southern portion of the Negeb, allocated to the Jewish State by the majority plan, should be included in the Arab State. This area, useful only for seasonal grazing purposes, is inhabited by an estimated 60,000 Arabs. There are no Jewish settlements.

2 Entitled "Detailed Position Analysis of Majority Plan", not printed.
4. A vote should be taken in the Ad Hoc Committee on the majority plan in principle. If the vote is such as to indicate that a two-thirds majority could not be achieved in the Assembly, the minority plan should be put to a vote. The United States will not vote for the minority report. In the event that either plan receives a vote sufficient to indicate that it would probably command a two-thirds majority of the Assembly, a subcommittee should be established to work out details.

5. If an impasse is reached and a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly cannot be attained for either the majority plan or the minority plan, the United States Delegation should:

a) State that in view of the difficulties experienced within the committee it has become obvious that the necessary two-thirds majority cannot be obtained, for either the majority or minority plan, but that it would seem highly undesirable to disregard the work of UNSCOP entirely.

b) Initiate or support the establishment of a special sub-committee for the purpose of attempting to formulate a plan combining the best features of both the majority and minority reports, or any other workable and just plan which stands a reasonable chance of adoption by two-thirds of the General Assembly.

c) Use the attached outline (Annex B *) as a basis for its work in the sub-committee in an endeavor to secure a workable solution.

6. If agreed recommendations do not result from the procedures outlined above, the Department, after consultation with the Delegation, will transmit further instructions to the Delegation.

[Here follow those sections under the heading “Discussion” dealing with the provisional agenda of the Second Session of the General Assembly as they related to Palestine, the roles of the General Assembly and of the Mandatory Power, and the report of UNSCOP.]

Basic Considerations

The position taken by the United States Delegation in the General Assembly on the Palestine question should take full account of the following principal factors:

1. The Near Eastern area is of high strategic significance in over-all American policy. Consequently the maintenance of good will toward the United States on the part of the Moslem world is one of the primary goals of American foreign policy.

2. The policy of the United States toward Palestine over the span of the years since the First World War shows a consistent interest in the establishment of a Jewish National Home. The United States has

*Entitled “Scheme of Partition with Union for Common Interests”, not printed.
frequently stated its support of large-scale Jewish immigration into Palestine and has indicated that it might look with favor upon some arrangement providing for a partition of Palestine, provided that such an arrangement gave promise of being workable.

3. The position taken by the United States with regard to the report of the Special Committee on Palestine must indicate the confidence of this Government in the United Nations and United States support of the procedures for which, in this case, it assumed a large initiative.

4. The plan for Palestine ultimately recommended by the General Assembly should be a United Nations solution and not a United States solution. It is essential that the basic position to be taken by the United States Delegation to the General Assembly with regard to the Palestine report and the specific tactics followed by the Delegation be such that the final recommendation of the General Assembly cannot be labeled "the American plan".

5. It is a matter of urgency that the General Assembly should agree at this session upon a definitive solution of the Palestine problem. The only immediate hope of restoring order in Palestine and thus promoting stability in the whole Near East lies in agreement by the United Nations upon a solution which the interested parties cannot expect by agitation and violence to alter.

6. It is essential that any plan for Palestine adopted by the General Assembly be able to command the maximum cooperation of all elements in Palestine.

7. It is probable that the Arab States will reject any solution that creates a Jewish State or province or permits further Jewish immigration into Palestine; it is possible that they will withdraw from the United Nations in case any such solution is adopted. It is difficult to predict whether any solution short of immediate independence would obtain even the reluctant acquiescence of the Arab States, prevent their withdrawal from the United Nations, and preclude armed strife in the Near East.

8. The position of the United Kingdom Government as set forth in its statement of September 26, 1947 is:

[Here follows the British position.]

9. The Soviet Union has thus far avoided taking a position, but the Embassy in Moscow and other observers are convinced that, in the final showdown, the Soviet Union will support the Arab States. The Soviet Union at the Special Session of the General Assembly favored the establishment of "one dual, democratic Arab-Jewish state" in Palestine or, if that proved unfeasible, partition of the country. In the Special Committee the Czech member favored the majority report while the Yugoslav member favored the minority report.
10. The United States position on Palestine should be established with due regard to the requirement of a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly for important questions. Concerted opposition of the Soviet bloc and the Arab League states and their Moslem supporters could defeat any proposal which did not command almost unanimous support of the other members of the United Nations.

501.BB Palestine/10-1647

The Arab Higher Committee to the Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) ¹

JERUSALEM, October 3, 1947.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: We have the honour to present the following for submission to your esteemed Government:—

1. The Arabs of Palestine have declared a general strike today ² in protest against the schemes and recommendations of the UNSCOP, and in support of their national demands.

2. The Arabs of Palestine refuse definitely to acquiesce in any solution entailing the partitioning of Palestine, or the dismemberment of any part thereof; and insist on the application of the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

3. The Arabs of Palestine unanimously demand the termination of the mandate over Palestine, the establishment of an Arab democratic state, and the withdrawal of British Troops and Government personnel.

We earnestly draw the attention of your Government to the serious situation that will arise in Palestine and the Middle East if the Arab just demands are not implemented.

Yours Respectfully,

EMIL GHORY
for Arab Higher Committee

¹ Transmitted to the Department in despatch 183, October 16, from Jerusalem; received November 4.

² According to telegram 403, September 27, from Jerusalem, the Executive of the Arab Higher Committee, on September 25, had summoned the Arab and Islamic world to stage a general strike, including a demonstration, on October 3 to tell the world that Moslem and Christian Arabs rejected the UNSCOP recommendations and would resist any attempt to carry them out (501.BB Palestine/9-2747). Telegram 419, October 4, from Jerusalem, reported the strike on October 3 was complete but quiet, with only minor incidents reported (501.BB Palestine/10-447).
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Samuel K. C. Kopper

SECRET


Participants: Emir Faisal, Chairman of the Saudi Arabian Delegation
General Nouri Pasha, Chairman of the Iraqi Delegation
Dr. Fadhil Jamali, Vice Chairman of the Iraqi Delegation
Shaikh Hafiz Wahba, of the Saudi Arabian Delegation
Ambassador Wadsworth, of the United States Delegation
Samuel K. C. Kopper, Adviser, United States Delegation

Shortly after the Palestine Ad Hoc Committee adjourned today, Dr. Jamali, accompanied by Nouri Pasha, approached Ambassador Wadsworth and myself. Dr. Jamili said they had a matter of extreme importance which, on behalf of all the Arab delegations, they had been charged to take up with the United States Delegation through Mr. Wadsworth.

Dr. Jamali launched at once, without preamble, into his subject. He said that the six Arab States had held an important meeting last night at which the question under discussion was: Should the Arab States approach the U.S.S.R. with a view to obtaining support of the Arab position on Palestine.

Dr. Jamali then made a special point of saying that he and Emir Faisal had opposed such an approach until the attitude of the United States with regard to the UNSCOP report had been made known. He recalled that he had already informed us that Soviet overtures had been made to Arab delegates. These had been renewed yesterday by a Polish delegate; no answer had been given. He stressed that basic long-term Arab interests lay rather with the United States and Great Britain than with Soviet Russia.

His view and that of Emir Faisal, Dr. Jamali continued, had prevailed. The meeting had decided, therefore, to endeavor to ascertain

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1 Telegram 916, from New York, reported on October 1: "The Soviet delegation had approached the Arab States with an explicit offer to support the Arabs on Palestine if the Arab States in turn would support Ukraine for the SC, Jamali (Iraq) told USGAAdel Oct. 1. The Arab States turned this down. He added that the Lebanese Delegation was approached Oct. 1 by a member of the Polish Delegation speaking for the Soviet bloc with a request that the Arab States shift their votes to the Ukraine in order to preserve: (1) the effectiveness of the UN, and (2) the logical geographic distribution on the SC." (501.BB Summaries/10-147)
the United States position on the UNSCOP report. If the United States could not now “guarantee the Arab position”, the Arab States would then feel compelled to respond to these Soviet overtures for the purpose of obtaining Soviet support (six votes), in return for which Arab support (six votes) would be given to the U.S.S.R. on matters of concern to it.

Ambassador Wadsworth said that this was a matter of high importance and would require attention at top levels. Accordingly, before he could take the matter up effectively it seemed essential to have a clear and definite indication of exactly what the Arab States meant by this démarche.

At this juncture, Emir Faisal and Shaikh Hafiz Wabha joined the discussion. Dr. Jamali recapitulated. The following are the essential points made and repeated by the Arabs in the ensuing discussion:

1. The Arab delegations have recently received overtures from representatives of the Soviet bloc to discuss the possibility of arranging an agreement for a mutual exchange of support on matters of vital interest to each group. The Arab States had not thus far made favorable response.

2. At the meeting of the Arab delegations last evening, there was considerable feeling that the approach to the Soviet Delegation should be made now. However, Jamali and Emir Faisal were able to prevail against such feeling by urging that the attitude of the United States be first determined.

3. While loathe in any way to link themselves with the U.S.S.R., Palestine is of such vital importance to them that the Arab States are willing to arrange a “voting deal” for Soviet support if it appears that the United States position will not be substantially in accord with that of the Arab world. Such a deal, both Faisal and Jamali insisted, would not, however, mean a permanent orientation.

4. The Arab States must themselves know whether the United States can give assurance that it will not support partition of Palestine and, consequently, the establishment of an independent Jewish state. To block the latter was the paramount Arab objective.

5. If no such assurance can be given, the Arab States will, in all probability, decide, regardless of other considerations, to approach the Soviet bloc to seek support for the Arab position on Palestine.

In the event of such a “voting deal”, Dr. Jamali and Emir Faisal made clear, in answer to Ambassador Wadsworth’s specific enquiry, that the Arab States would go so far even as to support the U.S.S.R. on the Greek question, the Interim Committee, Warmongering, Korea and any other subjects necessary to obtain a Soviet commitment to support the Arab position against the establishment of an independent Jewish state. Sole exception would be continuing Arab support for India’s election to the Security Council.
In reply, Mr. Wadsworth assured Emir Faisal and Dr. Jamali that he would report their communication to the United States Delegation. He added that the United States position on the UNSCOP report was now in process of formulation and that he was particularly glad to be able to inform them that, before the United States would state that position in the Ad Hoc Committee, its text would be communicated to them in strictest confidence. In its substance, it might not fully answer their question, but it would certainly merit their careful consideration. He felt that they would wish to give it such consideration before deciding "whether or not" they would respond to the Soviet overtures in question.

Both Emir Faisal and Dr. Jamali seemed considerably relieved that they could report in the sense of this reply to their colleagues of all the Arab delegations.

(This memorandum was prepared in draft and then gone over in detail by Ambassador Wadsworth, Harley Notter and myself.—S.K.C.K.2)

2 Mr. Notter and Samuel K. C. Kopper were advisers to the United States Delegation at the General Assembly.

501.BB/10-347

Memorandum by Mr. Gordon Knox to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)

TOP SECRET


Subject: Palestine Question—meeting in Secretary Marshall’s Office, October 3, 1947. Those present were: Ambassador Austin, Ambassador Johnson, Mrs. Roosevelt, General Hilldring, and [Mr.] Dean Rusk, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Fahy, and Ambassador Alling.2

Following a discussion of the present position of the US Delegation regarding Palestine, Secretary Marshall stated:

1. The US Delegation wants to know more about the opinions of members of the UN concerning Palestine, and would also like to have more time for Arab and Jewish representatives to get together in the hope that, however slim the chance might be, they might reach some form of agreement.

2. Therefore, Dr. Evatt, chairman of the Palestine Committee, should be told that the US Delegation is not prepared to speak on this matter at the present time. It hopes that if no other members of the

1 Adviser on Security Council and General Assembly affairs to the United States Mission at the United Nations.
2 Mr. Alling had been appointed Ambassador to Pakistan on September 25.
Committee wish to speak, the session might be adjourned until next Thursday.

3. The US position regarding the UNSCOP report is to support the majority plan in principle. The US Delegation is impressed by the fact that this plan was drawn up by a majority of a Committee of the UN composed of members of disinterested states.

4. The US Delegation, however, has certain modifications to propose to the majority report. These modifications are of a pro-Arab nature, concerning inter-alia boundary changes and adjustments of the plan for economic union.

At the meeting, the following comments were made and seemed to win general support.

1. In all probability the majority plan does not obtain a two-thirds majority at present. Failure of this plan to gain sufficient votes seems to be particularly probable in the event US declines to help enforce it.

2. Arab resentment against the US will be strong if the US supports either a Jewish Sovereign State, or large-scale immigration.

3. The US is committed historically to the encouragement of Jewish immigration to Palestine. The US, however, is not committed to support the creation of a Sovereign Jewish State.

4. In the event, that the majority plan be not accepted by a two-thirds vote, some form of UN Trusteeship for Palestine might be desirable. The length of time such a trusteeship should be maintained was discussed, but was not determined. Such a trusteeship, however, should allow for Jewish immigration. Whether such immigration should extend throughout all of Palestine, or limited sections, was not determined.

The degree of Arab opposition to the majority plan was discussed but no final conclusion was drawn. It seems to be the general consensus that if the majority plan were accepted by two-thirds of the General Assembly the US should be willing to play its appropriate part in any enforcement of this plan. However, it seemed to be generally agreed that it would be unwise to employ organized US military units for this purpose.

Finally, the US should not attempt to persuade members of the General Assembly to vote for the majority plan.

Secretary Marshall indicated that he was contemplating the issuing of a statement to the press requesting Congress to pass legislation which would allow for increased immigration of displaced persons to the US.
Editorial Note

Ambassador Alling discussed the matters covered in the memorandum of October 3, supra, with Charles Malik of the Lebanese Delegation the following day. According to a memorandum of conversation dated October 4, by Ambassador Alling, he stated that “the Arab intentions were no less than a form of blackmail. Dr. Malik reluctantly admitted that this was more or less the case, but that I must understand how vital the Palestine question was to them. I told him that after working on the problem for more than twenty years, I thought I understood their position fully, but that if I considered their present intentions a form of blackmail, how much more so must American officials less familiar with the problem consider it to be blackmail. I asked him what sort of an impression he thought the American people would have when they read in the newspapers that all of the Arab Delegations were voting against American proposals, no matter how right and just such proposals might be. Again, he stated that the American people must realize the importance which the Arabs attached to the Palestine question. I told him I thought it unlikely that the American public would look at the matter in that light. All they would observe was that the Arab countries were opposing our reasonable proposals. I asked him if he thought that such an attitude on the part of the Arab Delegations would further their interests in this country or advance Arab-American relations and the cause of world peace.

“Dr. Malik appeared impressed by the foregoing arguments, and said that he would discuss them at a meeting of the Arab delegates, which was to take place this evening.” (IO files: US/A/AC.14/35)

Mr. Henderson brought the matter of the October 3 memorandum “urgently” to Mr. Lovett’s attention on October 6. His transmitting memorandum stated in part: “If we choose, we can regard this approach on the part of the Arabs as a species of blackmail. We must, however, remember that the question of Palestine is to them the most important question in their international life and that they consider it their duty to use all means available in order to block the setting up of a Jewish state. They feel that if they reject the overtures of the Soviets, whom they suspect are also negotiating with the Zionists, the Soviets may come out against them. It will be recalled that the Russians last spring, following Gromyko’s speech in which he indicated that the Soviet Union might support partition in case the establishment of a
Federal State would prove impracticable, indicated to the Arabs that their trend towards the Zionists was based on their feeling that the Jews were socially further advanced than the Arabs. This statement was properly interpreted by the Arabs to mean that Arab refusal hitherto to deal with the Russians was the motive which prompted Gromyko's speech. The Arabs now undoubtedly feel that the Soviet Union will turn against them if they continue to refuse to bargain with it. If the Soviet Union should turn against them and if the United States should also be against them, their hope of preventing the establishment of a Jewish state would indeed be small.

Therefore, we cannot consider the Arab approach as a mere species of blackmail. What they are really trying to do is to persuade us to take an attitude which will enable them to reject Soviet overtures.”

(501.BB Palestine/10-347)

501.BB Summaries/10-747 : Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

SECRET

NEW YORK, October 7, 1947—3:17 a. m.

947.

The outline of an Arab States plan for the settlement of the Palestine question was given to USGADel by Malik (Lebanon) on Oct. 6, with the explanation that the Arabs were in the process of elaborating upon it.¹ Basic Arab concepts were listed as (1) Palestine should be a unitary and undivided state with Jerusalem as the capital; (2) the form of government should be republican, democratic and representative; (3) full cultural freedom should be guaranteed to all ethnic groups; (4) there should be safeguards for the religious freedom of Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

Interim arrangements in the outline were: 1) establishment of a provisional government in Palestine upon the termination of the mandate and declaration of its independence; 2) the provisional government would supervise elections for a constituent assembly; 3) upon completion of the constitution, the provisional government would supervise elections for the national assembly; 4) upon the convening

¹Telegram 918, October 1, from New York, reported that “The Arab States would be willing to meet on common ground to discuss and work out a solution with the Jews if unlimited immigration, partition and the idea of a Jewish state were eliminated, Malik told USGADel on Sept. 30.” (501.BB Summaries/10-147)
of the national assembly, the constituent assembly would replace the provisional government.

In reply to a question, Malik said that unsatisfactory experiences in attempts to come to an agreement with the Zionists made him think it would be useless to discuss this plan with the Zionists. However, he saw no objection to a neutral person referring the Arab views to the Zionists in an endeavor to narrow the points of difference and arrive at a tentative solution.

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AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/10–947

Memorandum by Major General John H. Hilldring to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [New York,] October 9, 1947.

I talked to Mr. Lovett a few minutes ago about the Palestine statement.\(^1\) Mr. Lovett informed me that the President approved the statement and in view of the shortness of time, did not ask for any change in the language. However, the President informed Mr. Lovett that he wanted the United States Delegation to understand clearly

a) That with respect to financial and economic aid to Palestine, it should be understood that the United States would contribute its part only under the auspices of the United Nations and that no direct United States contribution should be looked for; and

b) That we are not going to pick up the present United Kingdom responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in Palestine ourselves, but that any contribution we might make toward the preservation of law and order in Palestine would again be a contribution under our United Nations obligation and as a part of a United Nations police force or constabulary; and

\(^1\) The proposed statement to be made by Ambassador Johnson; for the substance of the statement actually made by the Ambassador on October 11, see the editorial note, p. 1180. The text was agreed on at the meeting of the U.S. Delegation during the morning of October 9 and was transmitted to the Department in telegram Delga 26 the same day (501 Delga telegrams—1947).

The earliest draft of the proposed statement found by the editors in Department of State files was sent to USUN in telegram 415, September 23, 2 p. m. (501.BB Palestine/9–2347). The telegram was drafted in NE and was signed by Acting Secretary Lovett. There ensued various telephonic and written exchanges, as well as personal conferences, between the Department and the Delegation, culminating in the version transmitted in Delga 26. According to telegram 461, October 9, 4 p. m., to New York, President Truman approved this version (501.BB Palestine/10–947).

Thereafter, according to telegram Gadel 25, October 9, to New York, the Department requested a minor deletion which was agreed to by the Delegation at its morning meeting on October 10 (501 Gadel telegrams—1947). The final version was telegraphed to the Department in Delga 28, October 10, 12:48 p. m. The Department transmitted the text by circular telegram, October 10 [717], 1 a.m., to London, Jerusalem, and the Arab capitals (501.BB Palestine/10–1047).
That likewise with respect to any commitment in the use of United States forces these again could only be made available as part of a United Nations force made necessary by any obligation we might have as a member of the United Nations.

Mr. Lovett made the suggestion that he believed the President would be happier if we made it crystal clear in our Palestine statement that our suggestion about a constabulary was intended to mean a contribution to a police force or constabulary organized by or administered by the United Nations to which the United States contributed only its proportionate share.³

I will, therefore, between now and 9:15 tomorrow morning, attempt to improve the language of the appropriate paragraph for the consideration of the delegation.

J[OHN] H. H[ILDDRING]

³Mr. Lovett conveyed to New York, in telegram 461, October 9, 4 p. m., the gist of the four last paragraphs to this point. The message also expressed his desire "to make it clear that second sentence of para. 9 [of the proposed statement] applies to a local police force and not to organized troop units. Term "constabulary" might be confused with highly militarized constabulary now employed by U.S. in Germany." (501.BB Palestine/10-947)

501.BB Palestine/10-947

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 9, 1947.

Subject: Palestinian perplexities

When I took your telegram to Mr. Lovett for signature this afternoon he said he had just been on the 'phone with General Hilldring who, he said, "sees eye to eye with us on the constabulary thing".

Mr. Lovett made certain emendations and deletions in the telegram as indicated in the attached copy. The telegram went out at 3:45 and the code room assures us it will be in New York by 4 o'clock.

Mr. Lovett shares our misgivings regarding the sentence in paragraph 9 on the voluntary constabulary. He said on the basis of his talk with General Hilldring that he thought this sentence came from the Secretary himself. However, Mr. Lovett did not cease to be anxious over this sentence and agreed with me that reference to a volunteer constabulary might be taken by the more wild-eyed elements both on the Jewish and Arab sides as an invitation to man and finance small

¹Telegram 461, which had been drafted by Mr. Rusk; see footnote 2, above.
armies under the guise of police forces in the new Arab and Jewish States.

Mr. Lovett asked if you would communicate with General Hilldring by telephone and express again our doubts on this equivocal sentence. Since you were engaged in a meeting and General Hilldring I found was in conference at the Hotel Roosevelt with Mr. David Niles,² I endeavored to give the gist of Mr. Lovett’s comment to Mr. Sandifer.³ Sandifer said that the Delegation was getting conflicting reports as to the true perspective with which the Department regarded the constabulary clause. On one side (Rusk, McClintock and Co.) the Delegation was being told the Department had grave doubts as to this sentence while on the other side (Hilldring) a completely different picture was developed. Mr. Sandifer said that General Hilldring had reported from his telephone conversation with Mr. Lovett that the President did not object to American participation in the constabulary force provided it were a United Nations force and part of the over-all United Nations program for Palestine.

Mr. Sandifer thought it would be useful if you talked directly to General Hilldring in an attempt to work out these differences in emphasis.

I told Mr. Sandifer irrespective of whatever confusion he might have in mind he should be very certain to believe me when I said that the telegram enroute to New York reporting the President’s comments on Delga 26 ⁴ had been annotated in Mr. Lovett’s own hand and represented the Acting Secretary’s own account of what was said at the White House this morning.

² David K. Niles, administrative assistant to President Truman.
³ Durward V. Sandifer, Principal Executive Officer of the United States Delegation at the General Assembly.
⁴ October 9, not printed; but see footnote 1, p. 1177.

SECRET

DAMASCUS, October 11, 1947—1 p. m.

325. Syrian army units from Homs, Hama, Aleppo as well as Damascus moving slowly orderly to Palestine frontier today. (Reference Legation’s telegram 323, October 10 ¹). Visit Damascus area camps this morning revealed loaded convoys and men awaiting march order.

Damascus press predicts early declaration independent Palestine [and] formation Arab Government under presidency Grand Mufti;

¹ Not printed.
claims this decision taken in addition those published League's formal
communiqué.
Sent Department as 325, repeated Beirut 14, Baghdad 38, London 17.
Department please pass Jerusalem.

MEMMINGER

Editorial Note

In a statement before the Ad Hoc Committee on October 11, Ambas-
dador Johnson announced that the United States supported the
basic principles of the unanimous recommendations and the majority
plan which provided for partition and immigration; for text, see De-

Mr. Alling had already given copies to the heads of the six Arab
Delegations on a strictly confidential basis. The statement had also
been released to the press, in confidence, on the afternoon of October 10
(memorandum by Mr. Wilkins of his conversation with Mr. Malik of
the Lebanese Delegation, 501.BB Palestine/10-1047).

In a memorandum of October 11, Mr. Knox notified Ambassador
Johnson of comments by the British Delegation that his statement
"was far from being fully satisfactory." The Delegation was "not too
pleased that the United States supported partition although they un-
derstood, they said, the American reasons fully. But in supporting a
plan which will not have the approval of both sides, the United States
should have gone further and indicated how such a plan was to be im-
plemented." The allusion to a constabulary, the British thought, "could
not have been thought out carefully by the United States." They indi-
cated that for their part they were not enthusiastic about partition
(IO files, US/A/AC.14/72).

S. K. Tsarapkin, in a statement before the Ad Hoc Committee on
October 13, announced that the Soviet Union supported the partition
of Palestine; for the summary record of his statement, see GA (II),
Ad Hoc Committee, page 69.

In a memorandum of conversation of October 13, Mr. Kopper stated:
"Dr. Jamali told me late this evening that the six Arab Delegations
had decided a short time before that henceforth they would vote on
issues before the Assembly solely on the merits of each case. He stated
that the Arab policy of abstaining had come to an end. 'Since the
United States is apparently no longer an ally and Russia does not seem
to desire to be so, we shall now vote on each matter in accordance with
our own interests.' I replied that the United States Delegation felt
that each Delegation should determine how it would vote according
to its own conscience and on the basis of the merits of each particular
case.” (US/A/616, also controlled under US/A/AC.14/75, IO files)

During the general debate in the Ad Hoc Committee, proposals were submitted by the representatives of El Salvador, Uruguay, Colombia, Guatemala, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States jointly, the United States individually, Canada, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Syria, Egypt and Lebanon. The texts of these proposals are contained in GA (II), Ad Hoc Committee, pages 227–241, passim.

The United States draft resolution of October 13 read:

“The Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian question
“Resolves to establish a sub-committee composed of the representatives of . . . . . for the following purposes:
“1. To draw up a detailed plan for the future government of Palestine in accordance with the basic principles of the unanimous recommendations and the majority plan of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine;
“2. To incorporate this plan in the form of recommendations;
“3. To transmit these recommendations to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian question not later than 27 October 1947.” (ibid., page 227)

Two days later, the Canadian representative submitted an amendment to the United States draft resolution, which read:

“After paragraph 2, add the following paragraphs, numbering them 3 and 4 respectively:
“1 To consider the exercise of administrative responsibility in Palestine during the transitional period, including the possibility of the application of Chapter XII of the Charter;
“2. To consider methods by which recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian question, under paragraph 1 of this resolution, would be put into effect.
“Paragraph 3 of the original draft resolution would thus become paragraph 5.” (ibid., pages 227, 228)

S67N.01/10-1547

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 15, 1947.

Participants: The British Ambassador
             Mr. Lovett
             Mr. Wailes

The British Ambassador called by appointment at 12 o’clock today and handed me the attached memorandum listing certain points

1 Edward T. Wailes, Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs.
2 Infra.
which Mr. Creech Jones proposed to include in a further statement on Palestine to be made by him in the near future. I asked the Ambassador if a copy of this document had been made available to our delegation in New York, and he replied that he was not sure, but that he would see that this was done.

The Ambassador then said that he had been instructed to make the following oral observations on the subject of Palestine:

1. His Government wondered whether we had given full consideration to the implementation of the proposed majority solution. He then described at some length the severe fighting, and difficulties the British had encountered in the Arab revolt of 1934 or 1935 and said this now led his Government to believe that a volunteer constabulary in Palestine would hardly be sufficient to handle any major Arab disturbances. I replied that this phase of the Palestine problem had been given the most careful consideration by this Department, other interested agencies and top officials of the Government. I inquired whether the Ambassador’s comments meant that the British delegation was not going to support the majority plan and the Ambassador replied rather evasively that he was not sufficiently versed in the voting technique at the United Nations to know whether a country directly involved in the problem, such as the United Kingdom was in the Palestine situation, would be expected to vote or not.

2. The Ambassador then inquired whether we had given consideration to the time element involved in the maintenance of peace through the volunteer constabulary. I replied that we likewise had given serious thought to this matter and mentioned that the majority report referred to a two-year transitional period. The Ambassador stated that the serious problem with respect to the Arabs might last for an indefinite period, and I said that we appreciated this fact. The Ambassador stressed the point that serious difficulties with the Arab world would naturally affect British and American interests in the area, the general defense situation, et cetera. I said that we realized the dangers inherent in any plan which was not entirely acceptable to both the Arabs and the Jews, as well as the dangers which would exist if we did nothing. I pointed out that his Government had played a prominent part in proposing a committee of inquiry and that the majority plan was the result thereof.

3. The Ambassador stated that his Government wondered whether we had considered the question of the viability of the Jewish state from the standpoint of defense and of the Arab state from the economic point of view. I replied that we had also given these matters careful consideration.

*The Arab revolt began in 1936.
4. The Ambassador said that he had been greatly surprised at the position taken by the Soviet Government with respect to the majority report. He frankly failed to see what they would gain by it. In fact assuming that their desire was to stir up trouble, it would seem that it would be better if they were to back up the Arabs as the Arabs had felt they were going to do. I said that we, too, were mystified as to the reasons for the Soviet position.

[Here follows the final paragraph dealing with a matter other than Palestine.]

L[OVERT]

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

PALESTINE

Mr. Creech Jones will make a further statement on Palestine at Lake Success shortly in which the following points, amongst others, will be made.

Paragraph 7 of the United States statement on Palestine seems to imply that His Majesty’s Government have the responsibility for the administration of Palestine until some alternative regime is set up in pursuance of an Assembly recommendation. His Majesty’s Government do not share this view. They do not think that even in the days of the League of Nations a mandatory power could have been compelled indefinitely to continue administering a mandate against its will, or that it could have been prevented from resigning the mandate upon giving adequate notice of its desire to be free. Since the dissolution of the League it has been very doubtful how far the mandates system retains any obligatory force and His Majesty’s Government do not think that they can be regarded as continuing to administer except on a voluntary basis. What they have said is that in certain circumstances they will not continue to administer it any longer.

As there seems to be some confusion on this last point and as it does not seem to be realised that His Majesty’s Government are determined in certain circumstances to withdraw their administration as well as their forces, Mr. Creech Jones will underline the points made in his earlier statement. There is only one hypothesis on which His Majesty’s Government will continue to administer Palestine, namely that the Jews and Arabs agree. In this case His Majesty’s Government will be ready to stay for a limited transitional period in order to help them

1 For the summary record of the statement made by Mr. Creech Jones before the Ad Hoc Committee on October 16, see GA (II), Ad Hoc Committee, pp. 96-98.
2 Ambassador Johnson’s statement of October 11; see editorial note, p. 1180.
put the agreement into effect. If the Assembly fail to agree on a recommendation, or if they recommend a solution which is not acceptable to both the Arabs and the Jews, His Majesty’s Government will not feel bound to continue to bear responsibility for administering Palestine until a settlement is implemented and they will proceed to plan the withdrawal both of the British administration and of the British forces.

If the Assembly recommend international enforcement of a settlement which is not agreed by the Arabs and the Jews, His Majesty’s Government will consider whether the settlement is sufficiently just and sufficiently easy to enforce to justify their participation in such international administration and such international forces as may be appointed to put it into effect. The extent of their administrative or military participation would naturally have to be decided in the light of circumstances and His Majesty’s Government would not in any case have the responsibility for the administration. The existence of a United Nations volunteer police force would not make any difference to their determination to give up responsibility for the administration.

It is thus most important from the point of view of His Majesty’s Government that the Assembly should not vote on the nature of a settlement for Palestine independently of measures to implement it.

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S67N.01/10-1547: Telegram

The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Bailey) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Urgent

Jidda, October 15, 1947—9 a.m.

431. ReDept 312, October 13. Interruption courier service due cholera Egypt precluded sending text following note: 2

"The excitement and agitation taking place all over the Arab world because of the recommendations made by International Investigation Committee Delegates by [of?] UN to inquire into the Palestine situation is well known to the US Government. These recommendations are, as is known to American Government, inconsistent with Arab rights and are demolishing them as well as being the death blow to hopes of SAG which had anticipated right and justice would be maintained.

His Majesty’s Government on several occasions frankly and clearly invited attention to the agitation and excitement expected to take place all over Arab world and Middle East if pure rights of Arabs in Palestine are injured and denied.

1 Not printed.
2 The note was dated September 27.
SAG relied too heavily on diplomats and their foresight, not realizing they would take a step which would be cause for bloodshed and insurrection in Palestine as [in] all neighboring Arab countries, a revelation which nobody but God could know its termination.

On this occasion SAG requests the responsible people in American Government to take into consideration what has been stated by His Majesty's Government several times and its advice that no support be given Zionists who will be a menace to Middle East and humanity based on crimes committed and which will be perpetrated. His Majesty's Government believes that the continuance of such a policy will be a strong factor in starting a third world war which will burn humanity and will doubtless annihilate all that lives.

Therefore and on basis of what has been previously communicated by SAG it sends this anxious protest to what will be decided against Arab interests in Palestine. It at same time requests US Government to review Palestine question in light of justice and right end that this question will receive reasonable and equitable judgment."

— Bailey

501.BB Palestine/10-1647

Memorandum by Mr. Durward V. Sandifer to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) ¹

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] October 16, 1947.

Mr. Rusk called on the telephone to pass on informally to me certain observations concerning developments or reported developments on the Palestine question.

1. There had been a report in the Department that some consideration had been given here to the possibility of a joint resolution with an Eastern European state. Mr. Rusk said that the sentiment in the Department would be strongly against such action. I told him that I knew of no suggestion or thought of such joint action with an Eastern European state.

2. Mr. Rusk stressed the necessity of maintaining a broad approach to the question of implementation and the nature and organization of the interim administration to be set up in Palestine. Some people in the Department had been disturbed at what appeared to them to be the tendency here to go into the details of the organization of the constabulary, of economic planning, of the administrative framework of the government, et cetera. The present thinking in the Department, at least at the lower levels, was that the General Assembly should limit itself to recommendations in broad terms to the mandatory power. Attention should be directed to the broadest aspects of political and geographical questions.

As to the nature of the interim administration, the questions of the administrative framework of government, of the organization of

¹ Addressed also to General Hilldring.
courts of law, of the organization of a constabulary, the United Kingdom as the present administering authority was the best source for detailed plans and recommendations. The Department is not in a position to turn out a blue-print of the constabulary. We cannot let the assumption arise that the question of Palestine has become solely a United Nations responsibility through the British having referred it to the General Assembly for recommendations.

I told Mr. Rusk that I was quite sure that it would be impossible for the Representative of the United States on the proposed Subcommittee of the Palestine Committee to maintain any such a narrow view of the role of the Assembly in making recommendations. What he suggested represented a responsibility for the British which they showed no indication of a willingness to shoulder. I said that I thought that if thinking in the Department was running along such lines, the Delegation should have a written directive as to the main lines of approach to be taken in working out the question of implementation. We had put the stamp of our endorsement on the proposition for partition, and we would be in a completely untenable position if we refused to come forward with help and assistance in working out the details of plans for the establishment of an interim authority and for the working out of plans for the forces necessary to enable such an authority to perform its responsibilities.

Mr. Rusk said that he merely wanted to pass on to us some of their thinking for the purpose principally of stressing the need of not accepting without reservation the British effort to transfer the whole responsibility for the Palestine question to the United Nations.

These remarks should not be taken as reflecting any position on the part of the Department. We may hear from the Department further in a few days concerning some of the questions mentioned.

I told Mr. Rusk that our understanding was that Mr. Evatt intended to bring our resolution on basic principles to a vote on Monday, and if that were approved, to proceed to a vote on the establishment of a subcommittee. The questions which he raised would have to be met in the subcommittee.

Records of USUN

Memorandum by Mr. M. Gordon Know to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)


This clipping is not important by itself but I think it may be important as the first of public expression of doubt concerning the

1 An article by the Washington correspondent of PM, a newspaper in New York City, dated October 19; see footnote 3, p. 1199.
sincerity of the American position regarding Palestine. This particular article can be ignored, but I suspect that the US Delegation will have to reply to accusations that we don’t really want partition.

In this connection, I notice what may be a difference of opinion or difference in emphasis which seems to exist between the US Delegation and the State Department. I wonder whether it would not be helpful to have Mr. Rusk come to New York, so that we can understand completely the Department’s viewpoint. In addition to the question of US Delegation tactics, this [that?] is, lobbying, mentioned above there are important specific questions which may need to be answered next week:

1. The US position regarding implementation.
2. The US position regarding the British responsibility for Palestine.
3. What specific suggestions the US might have regarding economic union between the proposed Jewish and Arab states.
4. Details concerning the future government of Palestine.
5. Specific boundary changes.
6. American attitude regarding the various resolutions which have been submitted to the UN Palestine Committee.

The Delegation’s attitude on many of these questions has been or is being formulated, but the Delegation is not receiving the detailed views of the Department on some of these questions and the reason is, I suspect, that the Department is so anxious that the US should not replace the British as the power most directly responsible for solving the Palestine question, that it does not wish the US to adopt clear cut attitudes regarding some of these questions as clear cut attitudes might lead to responsibility for implementation.

501.BB Palestine/10–1947: Telegram
The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, October 19, 1947—10 a.m.

455. While Arab and Jewish reactions to Johnson speech have been obvious, following details may be of interest:

1. Jewish Agency security chief in talk with officer of ConGen stated US introduction of resolution for acceptance majority report even more heartening to Jews than Johnson statement as this indication of US intention to back words with action.

2. Jewish press at moment follows same line though publicity is given to despatch of Palestine Post New York correspondent that “many observers feel real tests of American intention will be shown by amount of pressure on Britain to fall in with majority”.
3. Arab bitterness at Americans is apparent on all sides. Press throws out daily challenges to US rather than to UN. As indication of feeling it may be noted that not one Arab organization or newspaper has expressed any regret at bombing of ConGen.\(^1\) There has been no editorial mention of incident in Arab press, a pro-American Arab friend says incapable of believing as mind refuses register what words of statement say and this believed attitude of all Arab friends.

4. Reaction British varied. While police consider statement harmful British position here and increases urgency British withdrawal, high official of civil govt thinks American position sound because offers basis for solution. Considers some kind of solution imperative, preferring imperfections to no solution at all. Does not see “period of anarchy” mentioned in press inevitable if UN will appoint small international commission take over govt for interim period utilizing governmental machinery which British would leave behind and presumably employing such British administrators as might wish remain in such an organization. Confirms great fear now prevalent in Yishuv and considers Arab world profoundly shocked by realization no western power champions their clear-cut and unassailable cause.

MACATEE

\(^1\)Telegram 440, October 13, 1 p. m., from Jerusalem, reported that the U.S. Consulate General in that city was bombed at 12:15 p. m., October 13 (125.491/10–13/47).

501.BB/10–2947

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClinfolk to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)\(^1\)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 20, 1947.

Following a brief visit to the Delegation in New York City and conversations at Lake Success with various Delegates and newspapermen, the conviction grows on me that we must take a more decisive line with regard to Palestine.

I have in a previous memorandum\(^2\) outlined the reasons why I think that, irrespective of parliamentary dialectics, the British are bound and determined to pull out of Palestine. It is true that last Spring they

\(^2\)Addressed also to Mr. Henderson.

\(^3\)To Mr. Rusk, dated October 16; it set forth three alternative policies, in view of “the fixed British determination to wash its hands of Palestine”, namely a United Nations trusteeship; a “Frente-type of Government designed to fulfill the obligations of the temporary administering authority until such time as the Jewish and Arab States are established”, i.e., centering on a Governor with wide powers, appointed by and answerable to the General Assembly; and a “recommendation by the Assembly that the transitional arrangements of the Majority Plan be telescoped and that the Arab and Jewish States be constituted de jure immediately.” (501.BB/10–2947)
requested the General Assembly to advise them as to the future government of that country and that now they have changed the emphasis by saying that they are not willing to be responsible for the government of Palestine except in carrying out a solution acceptable both to the Arabs and to the Jews, which is the same thing as saying that if someone can square the circle or find the fifth dimension they are willing to stand by a little longer. I think in view of the fixed British intention to withdraw from Palestine, which has been reflected in a Cabinet decision which in turn reflects an overwhelming popular opinion in the UK, that for us to debate parliamentary points and suggest that a new resolution be placed before the Assembly which would change the emphasis from advising the British on the Government of Palestine to proposing outright a scheme of government for that country would involve us in tedious debate and arrive at no more advantageous result than to illustrate further the complexity of the Palestine problem.

Last Saturday in conversation with Dr. Evatt, he three times referred to the “American Plan” favoring the majority report of the Special Committee on Palestine. My demurrer that this was not an “American Plan” and that the joint Swedish-American resolution had been introduced merely as a convenience to the Committee and at his own suggestion in no way altered the Australian Foreign Minister’s view that the U.S. was the exponent of an “American Plan” for Palestine the essentials of which were partition into a Jewish and an Arab State.

Dr. Evatt suggested that the best line of approach would be to appoint a subcommittee to work out details of the majority report before testing the sentiment in full committee as to whether or not the majority report should be favored in principle. Dr. Evatt thought that this would avoid double debate.

I think that the procedure suggested by the Chairman is most unwise. Unless the principle of partition is accepted in first instance it will be fruitless to elaborate the details of a solution along the lines of the majority report. At the same time it was apparent to me at Lake Success that the Arabs are increasingly confident that even if the ad hoc committee on Palestine accepted the Majority Report as the basis of its recommendations they could muster sufficient voting strength to defeat a detailed plan for the partition of Palestine at the Plenary Session.

[Here follow two paragraphs setting forth Mr. McClintock’s observations concerning various delegations at the United Nations.]

As the facts of the situation exist (which is not the same as saying what the facts ought to be) these conclusions are evident:
1. There is an “American Plan” favoring the partition of Palestine.
2. The “American Plan” can possibly obtain a majority vote in the Palestine Committee but it will fail of receiving a two-thirds majority vote at the Plenary unless a more active line is taken by the U.S. Delegation.
3. If the Partition Plan fails of acceptance at this assembly we shall be involved in a most unpleasant mess.

[Here follows a paragraph of further observations by Mr. McClintock.]

It may be urged that failure of the Assembly to accept the partition scheme by a two-thirds majority would leave the case open for solution by our “switch position” or by some form of compromise more or less along the lines laid down in the minority report of the special Palestine Committee. I think, however, that in view of certain Jewish pressure which may be exerted on many delegations if the partition scheme is not accepted, and in light of the fact that both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have come out in favor of the partition plan, there is no possibility whatever that such a compromise scheme would receive the necessary two-thirds vote of the Assembly.

In light of these conclusions it seems to me that we have only one course: firmly to support the majority plan for partition of Palestine and to see that it is passed at this Assembly.

This firm course should be modified and mollified not only by the territorial adjustments which we will propose as amendments to the majority plan but also by a constructive effort to help the Arabs. I was impressed, in talking with Ambassador George Wadsworth, by his remark that the Greater Syria scheme would be a successful antidote to the discomfort of the Arabs in a partitioned Palestine, if Abdullah of Trans-Jordan were not to benefit thereby and if in consequence Greater Syria were a Republic with its capital at Damascus. Such an enlarged Syria would, in the Ambassador’s opinion, be able to absorb the Arabs of Palestine and leave a Jewish State in the Holy Land whose lineaments on the map look less like a crazy quilt than does the map of the majority report. As a second suggestion Ambassador Wadsworth said that, if the Iraq irrigation project ever materialized, land could be offered to the Palestine Arabs infinitely richer and more attractive than the stony hills of Judea on which they now scrabble for existence.

I asked the Ambassador if he would formulate his views in a draft statement which might be used, if not in open debate, at least in private during high level conversations with Delegations in New York.

I think also, in the direction of modifying the rigor of the majority report so far as the Arabs are concerned, a close look should be taken

*For documentation on this subject, see pp. 738 ff.
at the workability of the proposed economic union of the Arab and Jewish States. Last week I requested Mr. Mattison to ask the economic side of the Department to give us a critique of this section of the majority plan. In New York I heard considerable talk to the effect that the Jews did not like the economic union idea and that the Arabs thought it unworkable. If neither side wants economic union there might be some possibility of improving this aspect of the report by developing economic plans which would be more effective in the long run in providing both new states with livelihood.

I cannot refrain, on concluding this unconscionably long memorandum, from repeating what to me seems to be the only practicable solution which can be reached at the present time.

The British have said in effect they will withdraw from Palestine as quickly as possible. I am told by a very experienced foreign correspondent who travelled with UNSCOP on its wanderings in the Holy Land and in Europe that the British can get between 60,000 and 70,000 troops out of Palestine within six months but that totally to evacuate their present forces and civil service personnel will require at least a year. If this is true it would seem to me that if the Assembly recommended that the Jewish and Arab States be constituted as of July 1, 1948 the British would perforce have to be the administering authority during this much shortened transitional period.

As a sop to the Arabs I would propose that there be no Jewish immigration into Palestine in the interim period. After all, the Jews have been waiting 2000 years to get back to Palestine and they certainly can wait eight months before resumption of immigration on a controlled but increased scale.

As for the security aspects of such a solution, I have the feeling that there will result an uneasy but nevertheless actual balance of power as between the Jewish and Arab States. Mr. Nat Barrows of the Chicago Daily News, whose judgment I value, tells me that the present Palestinian Constabulary consists of 25,000 excellent troops divided as to origin between the Arab and Jewish races. It seems to me that this body could be allocated on a racial basis to the two new States and could almost automatically form Jewish and Arab Constabularies under separate commands. This would relieve us of the potential embarrassment which our constabulary suggestion still involves. I am told that in the Jewish State the Jewish Settlement Police are an able outfit, that the Commandos of the Irgun and Stern Organizations are exceedingly tough and well trained and that, in sum, the Jewish military strength is considerable. Opposing this strength it would seem that the Arabs also can muster forces which would make up in

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*Gordon H. Mattison, Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.
fanaticism and courage what they might lack in training in modern warfare.

If the numbers of the present constabulary were reinforced by these elements of military strength in the two separate states and then, if from outside, pressure were brought on both states to keep the peace, the balance of power I visualize might well result. By outside pressure I contemplate not only remonstrance by the United Nations either by the Assembly, the Interim Committee, or the Security Council, but also immediate and affirmative action by the U.S. Government to prevent our own Jews from sending additional supplies of war to their brethren in the new Jewish State. Assurance to the Arab Governments that we would take such action on condition the Arabs for their part keep the peace would, it seems to me, have effect.

The foregoing suggestion is submitted in full realization of the fact that there is no solution for the Palestine problem which will please both the parties at issue or which will, at least in the immediate future, make it possible for the Holy Land to live up to its name.

501.BB Palestine/10-2147

Memorandum by Ambassador George Wadsworth to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)

TOP SECRET


Subject: Palestine: Important Arab Démarche Envisaging Possibility of Compromise Settlement.

1. Mr. Beeley, Palestine expert of the British delegation, phoned me this morning to ask that I make an appointment with him alone to enable him to discuss a matter of importance. We arranged to lunch together.

2. At lunch he began by saying that he had been charged by Nuri Pasha, head of the Iraqi delegation, with communicating through me to General Marshall the following important facts and suggestions relative to the possibility of Arab-American agreement on Palestine settlement:

Some ten days ago Nuri Pasha had approached Emir Faisal with his long-rumored proposal as to how the Arab States might contribute to the finding of "a plan of Palestine settlement-by-agreement".

Their discussion dealt in fundamental fashion with both substance and procedure. Both were important to Nuri's proposal. As to substance, it was based on what has been referred to as "cantonal settlement." As to procedure, its sine qua non was Arab-American agreement at highest level.
Nuri had persuaded Faisal that only King Ibn Saud: 1) Possessed sufficient influence in the Arab World to induce the Palestine Arabs, under the leadership of the Mufti, to modify their present position; and 2) Was in a position to conduct profitable negotiations in the matter with the United States Government.

Faisal was impressed by Nuri's arguments and submitted the proposal to his father. Ibn Saud concurred, on condition that it and his intervention have the full, unequivocal support of all the Arab delegations and their firm commitment to abide by any agreement he might conclude.

With this reply in hand, Faisal and Nuri met with the heads of the other Arab delegations. The only other person present was Dr. Jamali, Iraqi Foreign Minister, in his capacity as co-head of the Iraqi delegation. No other Arab delegates have been taken into their confidence.

The unanimous consensus of the meeting was that the King's conditions should be accepted and that Faisal and Nuri should lay the matter before General Marshall provided it could be ascertained in advance that he would wish to receive them. On this point Faisal recalled that, at the end of his last discussion with General Marshall on October 9,1 the Secretary had expressed a ready willingness to discuss at a later meeting any matters of importance to American-Saudi relations.

The present proposal was deemed to be such a matter. It was that, after preliminary discussion here with General Marshall, the American Government should charge its Minister at Jidda, Mr. Childs, with receiving King Ibn Saud's personal assurances in the matter and with discussing it in detail with him.

3. Beeley then explained that this Arab démarche appeared to be based on the premise, with which he agreed, that no compromise Palestine settlement-by-agreement was possible by direct negotiation between Palestine Arabs and Palestine Jews but that, if such settlement could be reached between the Arab and American governments, they in turn could bring the two peoples to accept it.

Partition, they argued, was only a suggested solution in extremis which the Arab peoples would in honor bound be forced to resist. There were other possible solutions. "Cantonization" was one of these. It was in line with the findings of the 1946 Anglo-American Commission of Enquiry and with the ensuing Morrison–Grady discussions. It might not be too late for the American and Arab governments to consider it in the light of present circumstances.

4. In conclusion, Beeley explained why Nuri had preferred to charge him with this communication, rather than to make it directly to me. The reason was that, should General Marshall feel that the American

1 Memorandum of conversation, October 9, not printed.
Government was so firmly committed to Partition as to preclude its discussing any other solution, it might be better were his dénoncement to be permitted to “die” as a subject of conversation between us (Beilby and myself) rather than that it should have been raised as a formal question between the Arab and American delegations.

If, on the other hand, General Marshall should wish the matter pursued, it would, of course, be entirely appropriate for me or Mr. Alling to approach Nuri and Faisal directly with a view to obtaining their direct confirmation and, he personally hoped, to arranging the suggested meeting.

Should the meeting be arranged, Beeley believed that Nuri and Faisal would wish to be accompanied respectively by Dr. Jamali and Saudi Minister Ali Reza (as interpreter).

5. Let me add the following personal comment touching on the background of this dénoncement:

Nuri has long been known to us who have worked in the Near East as an exponent of a “moderate” compromise solution. As long ago as 1937, to my personal knowledge, he had discussions in this sense with Dr. Magnes, the then Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem, and others.

Further, in Nuri’s last conversation with me in Baghdad (early last July before he left Iraq to accompany the Prince Regent on a visit to London) he gave me clearly to understand that at some appropriate moment he hoped to review his efforts for compromise solution.

Later, in August, reports were rife in the Arab capitals, that Nuri (who is the main pillar of strength of the Hashimite dynasty and of the British position in Iraq) had discussed his “plan” when in London and had obtained informal British approval.

Finally, since the opening of this General Assembly, we have had several indications that some such dénoncement as this might in due course be made to us.

Consequently, I venture to suggest that this present dénoncement is not one induced solely by recent developments in the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine but may well be the culmination of Nuri’s known long interest in the problem.

It is significant, too, that it is advanced jointly by highest Hashimite and Saudi representatives whose long-standing rivalries in the Arab World have been exacerbated of late months by Hashimite pretensions in the Greater Syria matter. Only vital common interest could so soon have brought them to this common dénoncement.

GEORGE WADSWORTH

Editorial Note

At its meeting on October 21, the Ad Hoc Committee adopted resolutions calling for appointment of three subcommittees, one the Sub-
committee on conciliation to find common ground by the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee on the future of Palestine; one to draw up a detailed plan based on the majority proposals of UNSCOP, as called for in the draft United States resolution and the Canadian amendment; and one to draw up a detailed plan for the recognition of Palestine as an independent unitary state as proposed by Saudi Arabia and Iraq (agenda item 3) and endorsed in a draft resolution proposed by Syria. The latter two subcommittees became designated as Subcommittee 1 and Subcommittee 2, respectively. For the official record of the meeting on October 21, see GA (II), Ad Hoc Committee, pages 126-137.

501.BB/10-2947
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) 1

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 22, 1947.

NEA has been asked to comment on the attached memorandum to you from Mr. McClintock of SPA. 2

In this memorandum the position is taken that the U.S. has but one course, which is to give full support to the partition plan for Palestine and see that it is passed at this Assembly. On the other hand, it is stated that the only practicable solution which can obtain a decision at this Assembly is to have the British administer Palestine until July 1, 1948, on which date the Jewish and Arab States would be constituted de jure, and that although trouble would ensue it might by various means be kept within bounds.

The first suggestion would have us not only support partition, which is what we are doing and presumably will continue to do, but also carry the banner for partition.

NEA is convinced that none of the palliative arrangements suggested in the detailed portion of the memorandum under consideration would have the least effect on the Arab attitude. If we carry the flag we shall inescapably be saddled with the major if not sole responsibility for administration and enforcement which, we gather, neither the Congress nor the American people are willing to undertake. NEA and, it is believed, important Departments of the Government are unwilling and unprepared to accept the losses to the U.S. position in the Middle East which would be bound to follow an aggressive partition policy.

1 Sent through Carlisle H. Humelsine, Director of the Executive Secretariat in the Office of the Secretary of State.
2 Dated October 20, p. 1188.
We are also convinced that the alternative suggestion is impracticable. The British will not carry on an interim administration of Palestine leading to partition. An unenforced partition would lead to outside intervention from the Arab States, the Soviet Union and, eventually, ourselves, in one form or another. A complete stoppage of immigration until next July would be impossible. An all-Jewish constabulary in a Jewish state containing nearly as many Arabs as Jews would be difficult to justify.

On the assumption that we are going to follow our present policy of supporting partition without waving the flag, we agree that partition will probably fail of a two-thirds vote. Our people in New York feel that time is working against partition as more and more of the delegates come to appreciate the difficulties. However, if partition fails, we do not see that the U.S. or any other country which has supported it would be inhibited from retreating to some compromise plan which would receive a two-thirds vote.

If worse came to worst and United Nations could not vote out any definitive solution, it would be in order to propose a temporary trusteeship with fairly substantial immigration, ending in a plebiscite in Palestine.8

L[ox] W. H[enderon]

501.BB Palestine/10-2247

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] October 22, 1947.

Participants: Mr. Shertok, Jewish Agency
Mr. Epstein, Jewish Agency
Mr. Henderson, NEA
Mr. Mattison, NE

Mr. Shertok opened the conversation by expressing gratitude for the United States position in supporting the majority report of UNSCOP.

8The McClintock and Henderson memoranda were sent to the Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armour) on October 24 by the Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat (Reams). Mr. Armour, in a memorandum of October 29 to Messrs. Humelsen and Reams stated: "I agree with the position taken in Mr. Henderson's memorandum that none of the palliative arrangements suggested in SPA's memorandum would have any effect on the Arab attitude.

"I feel that our policy should be to continue our present position which, as I understand it, is to support partition but not to attempt to influence the attitude of the other delegations; in other words, not to carry on a crusade or to assume active leadership for partition as Mr. McClintock's memorandum would clearly have us do.

"I see no reason to bother Mr. Lovett with this matter unless Mr. McClintock particularly desires to have his views brought to the Under Secretary's attention." (501.BB/10-2947)
He stated that he had come down to Washington to maintain his contacts with the Department of State. He wanted us to know that it had been decided that Mr. Epstein would return to Washington from New York. I assured him that we were always glad to see Mr. Epstein.

Mr. Shertok asked whether it would be possible to elaborate further on the United States proposal with regard to a U.N. Constabulary. I informed Mr. Shertok that this had been put forward by our delegation as a suggestion, not as a detailed plan, and that in our opinion this was a matter which could most properly be elaborated within the U.N. Sub-committee.

Mr. Shertok advanced as his tentative thinking, and not that of the Jewish Agency, that the U.N. force would probably be only a token force with the moral authority of the U.N. behind it, and that the actual police force be recruited and maintained by the separate states. He felt that the Jewish State would be able to handle this but might need equipment from outside sources.

Next Mr. Epstein mentioned that they were considerably disturbed by rumors that were prevalent that would-be immigrants to Palestine embarking from Rumanian ports were, in fact, communist agents. I informed Mr. Epstein that we too had heard such rumors, but were not inclined to place too great credence in them.

When Mr. Shertok admitted that endeavors were being made to introduce large numbers of Rumanian Jews and Jews fleeing from the Soviet Union into Palestine I expressed concern lest the emphasis on aiding these Jews to get to Palestine might interfere with plans for the relief of Jewish DP’s in Germany. I said that the Jewish Agency had been apparently so deeply interested in the fate of these Jewish refugees in Germany that I was surprised to see the efforts of the Agency directed towards Jews from Rumania, Bulgaria, Russia, etc. Mr. Shertok replied rather warmlyly that the Jews from the Black Sea area were also displaced persons fleeing from hunger, other hardships and from Soviet domination. I said that what Mr. Shertok said with regard to the Jews of the Black Sea areas might apply with equal force to most of the inhabitants of that area. We were sorry for all these peoples but we had a special responsibility for the DP’s in Germany and would regret it if Palestine would be filled up with Black Sea Jews before the DP’s in Germany were given an opportunity to go there. Mr. Shertok said that the Agency could not be unsympathetic to any unhappy Jews anxious and ready to go to Palestine.

Mr. Shertok then stated that he understood that Abdullah of Transjordan was renewing efforts to obtain United States recognition. The Jewish Agency saw no objection to such recognition, but hoped that if

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1 For information on the attitude of the United States toward recognition of Transjordan, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. vii, p. 738.
it were done that we would make clear that we did not expect Abdullah to use his troops against Palestine. I thanked Mr. Shertok for his expression of views and stated that they would be given full consideration.

Mr. Shertok then said that the last point which he wished to take up was the fact that there seemed to be considerable uncertainty among certain Latin American States as to which way they would vote on the UNSCOP report. The Arab Delegations seemed to be creating the impression that the United States had not really meant what it had said in supporting the majority report. Would it not be possible for the United States Delegation to correct this impression with certain South American countries, and state that we would consider it a friendly act to follow our lead and vote for the majority report?

I informed Mr. Shertok that we were extremely anxious that any solution of the Palestine problem be a United Nations solution, and that we not give the impression that it was an “American solution”. The advantages to all parties concerned were readily apparent. Any attempt by the American Delegation to “corral” votes for the majority plan by “arm-twisting” tactics would inevitably lead to the impression that that plan was an American plan. If any Latin American delegation had doubts about the American position it was free to approach our delegation. They would undoubtedly receive assurance of our sincerity in supporting the position outlined by Mr. Johnson.

L[OY] W. H[EYNDERSO[O]]

501BB Palestine/10-2347

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)¹

SECRET

New York, October 22, 1947.

AMBASSADOR JOHNSON: General Hilldring went over the Palestine occurrences of yesterday and stated that he felt that we had to make an early decision as to whether or not we would avoid any direct leadership in lining up votes or not. He explained that the first issue of a vote on principle as to whether or not there should be partition had been in effect tabled for the time being because of the stand of the Chairman, Dr. Evatt, and the resulting vote.²

¹ Copies of this paper were distributed on October 23 to advisers and executive officers in New York. A copy has also been found in II files, but there is no indication as to when it was received in the Department of State.

² Possibly a reference to the proposals by Dr. Evatt on October 21 to appoint various subcommittees and to the voting that took place the following day. For the official record of the meetings of October 21 and 22, see GA (II), Ad Hoc Committee, pp. 126-143.
I authorized him with regard to the next issue—that of amendments to the majority plan on partition and manner of implementation—to line up the vote to support the American proposals.3

G[ORGE] C. M[ARSHALL]

3 In a letter of October 25, Fraser Wilkins, Adviser to the United States Delegation, informed Mr. Mattison that he had spoken to General Hilldring about the Secretary's memorandum and had been authorized to communicate with Mr. Mattison about the matter. He described an article appearing in the newspaper PM on October 18 [19] to the effect that although the United States was supporting partition officially, it was privately informing other delegations it did not mean what it had said. He added that an article along somewhat similar lines had appeared in The New York Times of October 20.

Mr. Wilkins noted that “All of us” vigorously denied this contention. He concluded his letter with the observation that the articles had “nevertheless 'raised a ghost' and it has been observed by many persons attending the UN that we did not appear to be 'lobbying' for our Palestine position as we are believed to have done in the Greek case and other important issues before the UN.

“Many members of the U.S. Delegation believe that the position of the United States in world affairs automatically places upon it a major role in the UN, and that unless we actively support positions which we had taken in the UN, we, in that sense, evade our responsibility. It may be recalled that the Secretary has consistently stated that the United States desired strongly to support the UN.

“it is my belief that it was these general thoughts which the Secretary had in mind in sending his memorandum to Ambassador Johnson. I interpret the Secretary's recent memorandum to Ambassador Johnson regarding Palestine as being in accord with this basic policy and as authorizing a course which will give testimony of our sincerity. I do not interpret it as indicating that we should 'browbeat' the representatives of other countries at the UN into our point of view.

“Active support of our stated Palestine policy logically follows and is in line with the forthright backing which the United States desires to give to issues which it supports in the UN. If we follow any other course, we might be open to charges of insincerity and duplicity. On the other hand, if we and other nations of like opinion are defeated on such issues, we accept the judgment of the UN, and proceed to consider other means by which a particular question may be resolved.” (561.BB Palestine/19-2347)

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$99B.00/9-2347: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iraq

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, October 22, 1947—6 p.m.

399. In response Iraqi note quoted Embtel 414 Sept 23 1 following reply should be sent FonOff:

“Embassy of US presents its compliments to Ministry Foreign Affairs Iraq and has honor acknowledge receipt Ministry’s note Sept 22, in which attention US Govt is drawn to certain resolutions approved by Political Committee Arab League Sept 19 re problem of Palestine.

In reply Embassy is instructed state that Govt US cannot accept allegation of responsibility which Iraqi Govt places upon it “for any

1 Not printed; the note was dated September 22. For information on notes received from various Arab states on the Palestine question, see editorial note, p. 1158.
events which may develop should any decision be taken tending to prejudice right of Palestine become independent Arab State? The Iraqi Govt must be aware that whatever recommendation may be made by GAUN affecting Palestine will be collective responsibility that organization, reflecting world opinion, and not responsibility of any individual nation. Any other interpretation of UN action would, in opinion US Govt, be contrary to spirit of Charter. It would likewise be contrary to fact, as US Govt has sought to impose no unilateral solution Palestine problem but has advocated finding by UN of fair and just solution which would command support of world opinion.

Embassy is instructed further to state that Govt US considers as entirely unfounded implication that it has provided material or given moral support or encouragement to any organization or body providing assistance to organizations engaged in terrorist operations in Palestine. The attitude of this Govt is reflected in the statement made by President on June 5 in which he declared his opposition to any and all activities in support terrorism in Palestine. In that statement he urged ‘every citizen and resident of U.S., in interests of this country, of world peace, and of humanity, meticulously to refrain, while UN is considering problem of Palestine, from engaging in, or facilitating, any activities which tend further to inflame passions of inhabitants of Palestine, to undermine law and order in Palestine, or to promote violence in that country.’

In conclusion Embassy is instructed to state that it is the view of US Govt that responsibility for govt of Palestine continues to rest with Mandatory Power.

Embassy avails itself, etc.”

LOVEITT

2 Replies of virtually identical character were sent to the Governments of Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt in telegrams 234 to Damascus and 468 to Beirut, both dated October 22, 6 p. m., and 1506, October 31, 7 p. m., to Cairo (867N.01/9-2247, 9-2547, and 10-147). According to airgram 198, October 28, no reply was made to the note from Transjordan since the United States had not accorded recognition to that country (867N.01/9-2947).

501.BB Palestine/10-2347: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

US URGENT

New York, October 23, 1947—7:08 p. m.

1075. Following decisions taken at Delegation meeting this morning:

1. The question of Palestine:

a. The Delegation agreed that discussions with the British should be undertaken with a view to shortening the two-year transition period proposed by UNSCOP so that independent states would be set up by July 1, 1948, with the assistance of a UN commission as the agency of transfer.
b. The Delegation approved the details of the proposed territorial modifications of the Majority Plan of UNSCOP (Doc US/A/AC.14/114),1 with the following qualifications:

(1) With respect to the modification of the boundary of the western Galilee area to include Safed within the Arab state, it was agreed that an attempt should be made to give certain mountainous territory to the Jews in compensation, by moving the boundary line to the west near Lake Tiberias.

(2) With regard to the proposed changes in the Gaza area, it was agreed that the proposed alterations should not be pressed unless both Jews and Arabs agreed.

(3) The proposal for inclusion of the southern Negeb in the Arab state was accepted in principle.

[Here follows paragraph numbered 2 which deals with a matter other than Palestine.]

MARSHALL

1 Dated October 22, not printed.

867N.01/10-2447 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 24, 1947—6 p. m.

1479. Officer in charge observe strictest secrecy re following: It is hoped serious trouble will not develop Near East re Palestine. If violence does break out belief here it will be localized rather than cover all Arab countries. Even if disorders widespread, Dept expects women and children to leave first and that some personnel will be able remain posts.

Dept Navy and Air Force, however, drawing up plans evacuation all Americans Near East along following lines:

1. **Egypt.** Americans will either leave by plane or proceed Alexandria and Port Said for evacuation by Navy southern Italy.

2. **Palestine.** Americans will proceed directly to Haifa. If this impossible they will seek shelter nearest British Army camp for later transportation Haifa evacuation Navy southern Italy.

3. **Lebanon.** Americans outlying areas will proceed Beirut for evacuation Navy Italy.

4. **Syria. (a)** Americans Damascus should proceed overland Beirut evacuation Navy Italy. If overland route impossible, USAF will provide transportation. (b) Americans Aleppo to proceed overland Alexandretta en route southern Italy, or by air direct.

5. **Iraq (a)** Americans central and northern Iraq assemble Habbaniya for transport US-Brit Air Force Beirut or southern Italy. (b) If no air transport available, Americans Basra to proceed overland or by ship southern Iran or Bahrein en route Naples area.
6. Kuwait. Evacuation by commercial tanker to southern Iran or Bahrein. Rendezvous southern Italy.
7. Muscat and Oman Province. At first sign trouble Americans to be flown Dhahran.
8. Eastern Saudi Arabia. (a) At first sign trouble Al Kharj group to be flown Dhahran. (b) Abqaiq, Dhahran, Ras Tanura communities to be evacuated by air or commercial and Navy tankers to Bahrein en route Italy rendezvous.
9. Western Saudi Arabia. (a) At first sign trouble Americans Mahad Dahab to be brought Jidda. (b) Jidda colony to be flown commercial or Army planes Asmara eventual rendezvous southern Italy.

All Americans to be returned US as soon possible. If trouble Near East appears long duration FSO not entitled home leave would then be reassigned.

Detailed instructions re Govt and non-Govt personnel follow by airgram.

Make local preparations to fit this general pattern and inform Dept preparations made and comments this general plan.

Sent Cairo, repeated Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Jidda.

LOVETT

10 Files: US/A/AC.14/123

Memorandum Prepared in the United States Mission at the United Nations

TOP SECRET


DRAFT PROPOSED DETAILED POSITION REGARDING MAJORITY PLAN

RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Partition and independence

1. Palestine within its present borders, following a transitional period of two years from 4 September 1947, shall be constituted on July 1, 1948 into an independent Arab State, an independent Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem, the boundaries of which are respectively described in Parts II and III below.

2. Independence shall be granted to each State upon its request only after it has adopted a constitution complying with the provisions of section B, paragraph 4 below, has made to the United Nations a declaration containing certain guarantees, and has signed a treaty creating the Economic Union of Palestine and establishing a

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1 The portions underscored with double lines are in the nature of additions to an earlier draft; the portions set in canceled type are intended for deletion. The earlier draft may be Annex A, referred to in the Department's memorandum of September 30, p. 1166.
system of collaboration between the two States and the City of Jerusalem.

B. Transitional period and constitution

Steps Preparatory to Independence

1. During the transitional period, the present mandatory Power shall:

(a.) Carry on the administration of the territory of Palestine until July 1 1948, under the auspices of the United Nations and on such conditions and under such supervision as may be agreed upon between the United Kingdom and the United Nations, and if so desired, with the assistance of one or more Members of the United Nations;

(b.) Take such preparatory steps as may be necessary for the execution of the scheme recommended;

(c.) Carry out the following measures:

1. Admit Jewish immigrants at the present monthly rate 150,000 [sic] a uniform monthly rate, 30,000 of whom are to be admitted on humanitarian grounds. Should the transitional period continue for more than two years, Jewish immigration shall be allowed at the rate of 60,000 per year. The responsibility for the selection and care of Jewish immigrants and for the organizing of Jewish immigration during the transitional period shall be placed in the Jewish Agency.

2. The restrictions introduced by land regulations issued by the Palestinian Administration under the authority of the Palestine (Amendment) Order in Council of 25 May 1939 shall not apply to the transfer of land within the borders of the proposed Jewish State.

2. The law [sic] shall appoint a Commission, headed by a High Commissioner, to act as its agent for the purpose of facilitating the transition to independence.

2. 3. Prior to March 1, 1948 Constituent assemblies shall be elected by the populations of the areas which are to comprise the Arab and Jewish States, respectively. The electoral provisions shall be prescribed by the Power administering the territory, the mandatory power. Qualified voters for each State for this election shall be persons over twenty years of age who are: (a) Palestinian citizens residing in that State and (b) Arabs and Jews residing in the State,

*Apparently "150,000" should precede the word "immigrants".*
although not Palestinian citizens, who, before voting, having signed a notice of intention to become citizens of such State.

Arabs and Jews residing in the City of Jerusalem who have signed a notice of intention to become citizens, the Arabs of the Arab State and the Jews of the Jewish State, shall be entitled to vote in the Arab and Jewish States, respectively.

Women may vote and be elected to the constituent assemblies.

3. During the transitional period, 4. Prior to July 1, 1948, no Jew shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Arab State, and no Arab shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Jewish State, except by special leave of the Administration.

4. 5. The constituent assemblies shall draw up the constitutions of the States, which shall embody chapters 1 and 2 of the Declaration provided for in C. below, and include inter alia, provisions for:

(a) Establishing in each State a legislative body elected by universal suffrage and by secret ballot on the basis of proportional representation, and an executive body responsible to the legislature.

(b) Settling all international disputes in which the State may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

(c) Accepting the obligation of the State to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

(d) Guaranteeing to all persons equal and non-discriminatory rights in civil, political, economic and religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religious worship, language, speech and publication, education, assembly and association.

(e) Preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents and citizens of the other State in Palestine and the City of Jerusalem, subject to security considerations of national security; provided that each State shall control residence within its borders.

(f) Recognize the rights of the Governor of the City of Jerusalem to determine whether the provisions of the constitution of the States in relation to Holy Places, religious buildings and sites within the borders of the States and the religious rights appertaining thereto are being properly applied and respected, and to make decisions in cases of disputes which may arise with respect to such Holy Places, buildings and sites; also accord to him full co-operation and such
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of his functions in those States.

5. 6. The constituent assembly in each State shall appoint elect a provisional government empowered to make the Declaration and sign the Treaty of Economic Union the undertaking provided for in C, and D. below.

On making the Declaration and signing the Treaty of Economic Union by either State, and upon approval by the General Assembly of the United Nations of such instruments as being in compliance with these recommendations; its independence as a sovereign State shall be recognized.

If only one State fulfills the foregoing conditions, that fact shall forthwith be communicated to the United Nations for such action by its General Assembly as it may deem proper. Pending such action, the regime of Economic Union as recommended shall apply.

C. Declaration

A Declaration shall be made to the United Nations by the Provisional Government of each proposed State before the interim administration is brought to an end. It shall contain inter alia the following clauses:

General Provisions

The stipulations contained in the Declaration are recognized as fundamental laws of the State and no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.

Chapter 1
Holy Places, Religious Buildings and Sites

1. Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.

2. Free access to the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites and the free exercise of worship shall be secured in conformity with existing rights and subject to the requirements of public order and decorum.

3. Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Government that any particular Holy Place, religious building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Government shall call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repair. The Government may carry
it out itself at the expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.

4. No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the State.

5. The Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall have the right to determine whether the provisions of the Constitution of the State in relation to Holy Places, religious buildings and sites within the borders of the State and the religious rights appertaining thereto, are being properly applied and respected, and to make decisions in cases of disputes which may arise with respect to such Places, buildings, and sites. He shall receive full cooperation and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of his functions in the State.

Chapter 2

Religious and Minority Rights

1. Freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, shall be ensured to all.

2. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the ground of race, religion or language.

3. All persons within the jurisdiction of the State shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.

4. The family law and personal status of the various minorities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.

5. Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or eleemosynary bodies of any faith or to discriminate against any representative or member of them on the ground of his religion or nationality.

6. The State shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish minority, respectively, in its own language and its cultural traditions.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the State may impose, shall not be denied or impaired.

7. No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any citizen of the State of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in
religion, in the press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.*

6. 8. No expropriation of land owned by an Arab in the Jewish State (by a Jew in the Arab State) †‡ shall be allowed except for public purposes unless the land, suitable for agricultural purposes, has remained uncultivated and unused for not less than one year after written notice of utilization thereof has been given; and upon an order made by the Supreme Court of the respective State approving the expropriation on the grounds of absence of sufficient reasons for the non-utilization thereof. In all cases of expropriation full compensation as fixed by the Supreme Court, shall be paid previous to dispossess.

* The following stipulation shall be added to the Declaration concerning the Jewish State: “In the Jewish State adequate facilities shall be given to Arabic-speaking citizens for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, in the legislature, before the Courts and in the administration.” [Footnote in the source text.]

† In the Declaration of the Arab State the word “Arab” should be replaced by the word “Jewish”. [Footnote in the source text.]

‡ In the Declaration concerning the Arab State, the words “by an Arab in the Jewish State” should be replaced by the words: “by a Jew in the Arab State”. [Footnote in the source text.]

501.BB Palestine/10-3547: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1947—1 p. m.

US URGENT NIACT

4578. For the Ambassador. It is of greatest importance that you discuss immediately with Mr. Bevin certain aspects of the Palestine problem now before the UN. For background reference see: (1) unanimous recommendations I and II of UNSCOP providing for termination of Palestine Mandate and independence in Palestine; (2) majority recommendations A and B 1 (a) of UNSCOP providing for transitional period; (3) UK statement of Sept. 26; 1 (4) US statement of Oct. 11; 2 (5) UK statement of Oct. 16 3 (all in UN Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine).

It appears that some difference has developed between the US and the UK with regard to responsibility for the administration of Palestine during the process of transition to independence. We have been

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1 See footnote 2, p. 1164.
2 See editorial note, p. 1180.
3 See undated memorandum from the British Embassy, p. 1183.
assuming that, in asking the GA for recommendations concerning the future government of Palestine, the UK has been seeking recommendations on the basis of which it would make disposition of its mandate. The UK statements indicate a different approach. It will be appreciated if you will discuss this matter with Mr. Bevin along the following lines:

It is clear from Report of Special Committee on Palestine and from statements by US, UK and other members of UN that there is general agreement with regard to early termination of mandate and prompt establishment of independence in Palestine; and that UK intends to terminate mandate and to withdraw its forces and its administration within limited period except in case of agreement between Jews and Arabs or if the UK is able to accept a role in a UN administration.

In this connection, however, question arises as to whether mandate might not be terminated and independence achieved in Palestine in a shorter time than was contemplated in majority plan of UNSCOP. It may not be necessary to envisage an interim period of greater length than that which Government of the UK will require in any event to withdraw its forces and its administration from Palestine.

If the GA adopts recommendations based upon majority plan of UNSCOP; US considers that position of the UK might be substantially met by recommendation that British Government upon withdrawal turn over responsibility to the authorities of the Jewish and Arab states. This would permit passage of responsibility directly to the independent states proposed by the UNSCOP majority without the necessity of passing through any formal transitional period.

In order to facilitate transition to independence, it is suggested that GA’s recommendations to the Government of the UK with regard to the future government of Palestine might provide for the appointment of a UN Commission, headed by a UN High Commissioner, to act as agency of transfer. It is believed that duties of such UN Commission might include making final adjustments in boundaries recommended by UN, assisting in transfer of administration and of assets of government to authorities of Jewish and Arab states, and making final report to GA on termination of mandate and establishment of independence in Palestine. We should appreciate Mr. Bevin’s views on these points, and particularly with regard to the assistance which the UK Govt would be prepared to offer the UN Commission during the transitional period.

US considers it essential for UN recommendation to include the date on which British Mandate would be terminated. This question has already arisen in UN and it is almost impossible to determine upon preparatory steps leading to establishment of the two states in the ab-
sence of a period of known duration prior to their independence. We suggest July 1, 1948 and would be interested in learning British reaction. For your info, USSR Representative has already said that he would insist on a date being set for termination of mandate.

For your background and discrete use we consider that it would be extremely unfortunate for the British at this time to make an announcement regarding a specific date of withdrawal.

It is repeated that the foregoing is based on assumption that majority plan of UNSCOP would meet with approval of 2/3 of Members of GA. If majority plan does not meet with such approval, Govt. of US must, of necessity, reconsider its views with regard to question of Palestine.

Department and US Delegation plan to approach UK representatives in Washington and New York with views expressed above simultaneously with your approach to Mr. Bevin in London. If Mr. Bevin agrees with our general approach, it would be most helpful if he could indicate as much to the UK Delegation in New York.²

LOVETT

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² For information on the origins of telegram 4578, which was drafted by Mr. Rusk, see Mr. Wilkins’ letter of October 31, p. 1222.

IO Files: US/A/AC.14/125

Memorandum Prepared in the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET


QUESTION OF PALESTINE

Ambassador Johnson

General Hilldring

1. As was indicated at the last delegation meeting which discussed the question of Palestine, it is the view of the State Department, on consultation with General Hilldring and myself,⁴ that there should be a very brief interim period between the recommendation of the General Assembly regarding Palestine and the establishment of independence for the two proposed states in Palestine. The actual date which has been proposed is July 1, 1948. On that day, if the suggestion of the United States is accepted by a two-thirds of the General Assembly, both Arab and Jewish states will become independent.

⁴ Presumably Ambassador Johnson.
2. This means that the maintenance of internal law and order between now and that date will continue to devolve upon the British forces and administration now in control. With this thought in mind a telegram has been sent to Ambassador Douglas requesting him to discuss this matter with Mr. Bevin. I shall read the telegram (Annex 1).

3. If the British agree to continue to be responsible for Palestine during the next eight months there will be no need for further implementation of the partition plan. Moreover, it is technically impossible for the British to evacuate their troops and supplies from Palestine in a shorter period than the one contemplated. It is conceivable that the British government may reject the suggestion regarding the date for termination of the mandate and may institute a policy of “scuttle and run”. This may cause civil strife and chaos in Palestine and would present the United Nations with a very serious problem, one concerning which it might feel a moral obligation to take some action of a pacifying nature, although its legal powers to do more than make recommendations are by no means established. It is partly to avoid, if possible, any such action by the British government that the telegram just read was sent to London. However, the British who have been responsible for Palestine for so many years and who voluntarily accepted this responsibility, can hardly object to being requested by the United Nations to continue in control in that area for a few months longer.

4. The feeling in the sub-committee now dealing with the partition plan is such that a date for termination of the mandate will probably be set regardless of the opinions of the British government. The Russian representative has already indicated strong opinions on that subject. It is apparent that the setting of an early and specific date for independence is the best way to avoid saddling the United Nations with the responsibility for administering the area and for implementing its recommendations, and hence is the best way to make sure that neither American troops nor Russian troops, nor any form of volunteer constabulary be employed, although the latter device might be appropriately used in the internationalization of the city of Jerusalem.

5. The other major elements of the United States proposed comments on and changes to the partition plan drafted by UNSCOP are as follows:

Immigration during the transitional period. The UNSCOP report envisaged a transitional period of not more than two years and therefore suggested interim mass immigration into Palestine, that is the future Jewish state, of 150,000. This works out to about 6,200 per

\* Supra.
month. The present quota is 1500 per month. The United States is not suggesting any change in this UNSCOP recommendation. However, it is to be expected that the British will be very reluctant to maintain administrative control over Palestine while admitting all these immigrants. It is true that such a mass immigration would make the task of keeping internal peace and order much more difficult. The United States delegation has been advised of this difficulty unofficially by the British Delegation. If therefore, the British express a strong desire that the present restricted quota of 1500 per month be continued until the states become independent, next July, at which time, of course, both States will be in exclusive control of their immigration policies, the United States will acquiesce. This interim period will be one of great tension; it may be a small price to pay, to have a temporary continuation of the present immigration regulations, in order to keep the precarious peace between the Jew and Arab.

6. A United Nations Commission, headed by a High Commissioner, will be established to facilitate the transition to independence. This Commission will have the task of consulting with the British regarding such matters as the regulations to be made for holding of elections prior to independence, the calling of constituent assemblies in both Arab and Jewish States, the acceptance of economic union between the States and similar matters. The Commission will not be the interim government, but will act in an advisory capacity, as agent of the General Assembly, to the mandatory power and the Jews and Arabs.

7. Religious rights and minority rights shall become fundamental law in both States, according to the UNSCOP recommendations, and it is also proposed that there shall be no modifications of these religious and minority rights without the consent of the General Assembly.

8. The proposed economic union will include articles preserving non-discrimination regarding development and use of such facilities as ports, railroads, irrigation projects and land reclamation. There will also be a common currency. I am not sure that the Arab State, if created, would agree to such an economic union, but it is designed to be of financial and economic assistance to the Arab State in the first instance, and only secondarily of help to the Jewish State. It has been accepted in principle by the Jewish Agency, albeit with some reluctance.

9. Finally, UNSCOP proposes that if the two States are formed along the lines laid down in the UNSCOP report and outlined above, "sympathetic consideration" should be given to their application for membership in the United Nations. The United States does not object to this recommendation, but will point out that it cannot be construed as committing the United States a priority to supporting applications
for membership to be made at a future date. We do not want to run into the same difficulty as occurred regarding the admission of Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania.

King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud to President Truman

At this critical moment, during which relations between the United States and the Arabs are clouded with doubt and suspicion, it is my duty as a close friend whose country is united to the people of the United States by several strong mutual political and economic ties to implore you before this last opportunity is missed to revise as quickly as is possible this dangerous situation which has resulted from the support your Government has lent to Zionism against the interests of the Arab peoples which may lead to the partition of Palestine into two states.

1. The decision of the Government of the United States to support claims of the Zionist in Palestine is an unfriendly act directed against the Arabs and, at the same time, is inconsistent with the assurances given us by the late President Roosevelt. This decision is also inconsistent with interests of the United States in these Arab countries. It is most difficult to believe that the Government of the United States can persist in its unfriendly decision.

2. Without doubt, the results of this decision will lead to a deathblow to American interests in the Arab countries and will disillusion the Arab’s confidence in the friendship, justice and fairness of the United States.

3. The Arabs have definitely decided to oppose establishment of a Jewish state in any part of the Arab world. The dispute between the Arab and Jew will be violent and long-lasting and without doubt will lead to more shedding of blood. Even if it is supposed that the Jews will succeed in gaining support for the establishment of a small state by their oppressive and tyrannous means and their money, such a state must perish in a short time. The Arab will isolate such a state from the world and will lay siege to it until it dies by famine. Trade and possible prosperity of the state will be prevented; its end will be the same as that of those crusader states which were forced to relinquish coveted objects in Palestine.

4. Such a policy of the United States is in disagreement with its long-held reputation as a defender of friendly nations against fear-

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1 Transmitted to the Department by the Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Bailey) in telegram 456, October 30, 10 a.m., with the notation: “Sunday at Riyadh King Ibn Saud handed me unsigned message from him to His Excellency President Truman”. 

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fulness and aggression. This former policy of honor was seen in the support given Syria and Lebanon by the United States in expelling the tyrannous French; this same policy was followed in supporting Turkey and Greece against the aggression of their neighbors to the north.

The Arabs of Palestine had anticipated that this same policy of support in obtaining their right to decide their own destiny would be continued by the United States.

5. The policy followed by the United States at the present is in disagreement with its announced policy of considering matters of immigration as an internal affair of foreign states. As the Government of the United States does not permit foreign powers to dictate policy of immigration into any of the United States, why then should the Arab permit foreign states to dictate conditions of immigration into their states? Should this policy be implemented, there will be no limit to Jewish aggression, which will be continued until they become a majority in both Palestine and Transjordan.

6. As this decision is still in the hands of the United States, we hope deeply that the United States will reconsider its stand before the opportunity slips away and it becomes impossible to maintain peace and security in the Near East. The establishment of a Jewish state will be a menace to peace in the Near East. It will be cause for bloodshed and will create difficulties which will be prejudicial to the interests of the United States in the Arab countries. 12–12–1366.

October 26, 1947.2

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2 Telegram 456 concluded with: "In fairness to Arabs and by support of US policy to present both sides of question it seems only just this message ought to be released to press. "Copies by courier to Arab capitals and London."

501.BB Palestine/10–2747

The Economic Adviser to the Jewish Agency for Palestine (Gass) to the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam)

Washington, October 27, 1947.

Dear Mr. Merriam: As I indicated in our discussion of Palestinian economic questions on October 14th, the Jewish Agency for Palestine is now engaged in crystallizing its views on various aspects of the proposed Palestine Economic Union. It was my understanding that a corresponding process is now going on also in the United States Government.

You may recall your suggestion that—as soon as our views on the various economic and financial questions were clarified—you would welcome their submission to the State Department, in written form, so that they might be examined by United States Government experts
with a view to an interchange of views and the development of a common approach, in so far as possible.

I am now in a position to send you the attached statement of our position on the monetary aspect of the Economic Union. We feel that this aspect is extremely important because it is so basic to the twin objectives of partition and economic Union; (a) the establishment of real economic sovereignty in each of the two States resulting from partition, with corresponding freedom of each to pursue its own economic development in accordance with its own judgment, and (b) the maintenance of Palestine as a single Economic Union for the free exchange of goods and services.

Naturally, at this stage, we have presented the monetary system which we believe required to meet these twin objectives only in tentative outline. The more final and detailed articulation of the monetary system, in so far as it is a matter requiring international approval, will be a task for the undertaking of Economic Union, to be worked out during the next months and submitted for the approval of the United Nations, if the procedure suggested by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine is followed.

The attached outline of a monetary system is a part of the submission on the question of the Economic Union which the Jewish Agency plans to make to the United Nations partition sub-committee in the next days. This memorandum, as amended, may then appear as an Annex to the Agency’s general discussion of the problems of Economic Union.

The economic officers of the Jewish Agency are prepared to discuss the questions dealt with by the attached memorandum at your convenience.²

Yours sincerely,

Oscar Gass

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¹ Not found attached.
² Mr. Merriam acknowledged this letter on November 17 with the statement that the memorandum referred to here had been transmitted to the Financial Division of the Department of State.

501.BB Palestine/10-2847

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 28, 1947.

New York has revised the detailed position paper on the UNSCOP majority report to “bring it in line” with our proposal that the transition period be shortened to July 1, 1948.

² See memorandum of October 24, p. 1202.
Actually you will see from Miss McCown’s memo attached that New York has gone much further than a mere revision to conform to a shorter transitional period.

Inasmuch as our recent experience indicates that New York, in requesting our comments seems to expect a rubber stamp, and ignores even the most strenuous objections, it would appear useless to send any detailed revisions. If you approve I will inform Mr. Wilkins what our reaction is in general to the revisions, but leave it to New York to make any detailed revision, if they should desire to give consideration to our objections.²

² Undated memorandum by D. Beatrice McCown of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, not printed. The memorandum began with: “The Palestine Committee of the US Delegation to the UN appears to have felt itself completely free to ignore the revisions suggested by, and approved in, the Department with respect to the Majority Plan. In fact, they are proposing changes which would be so far reaching in ultimate effect in Palestine that a major policy decision is involved.” The substance of Miss McCown’s analysis in the remainder of the memorandum was incorporated in Mr. Merriam’s letter of October 30 to Mr. Wilkins, p. 1217.

³ Mr. Henderson expressed his approval in a marginal notation.

501.BB Palestine/10–2847: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

US URGENT N I A C T

LONDON, October 28, 1947—8 p. m.

5758. Discussed with Bevin for more than an hour the proposals contained Deptel 4578, October 25.

I can summarize Bevin’s position as follows:

1. The British Government will support, within reason, any proposal or recommendation which has the concurrence of the Arabs and the Jews.

2. He will not make any commitment in regard to British assistance to implement any recommendation of the United Nations General Assembly until the British Government has had an opportunity to examine them carefully. He therefore refrained from commenting on any details suggested Department’s reference telegram.¹

3. However, in a general way, the suggestions contained in Deptel 4578 imply to him that the British lend assistance in carrying out a

¹ Telegram 1127, November 1, from New York, reported that in “Creech Jones’ opinion, Bevin refused to commit himself to Ambassador Douglas because the Cabinet would decide what UK action would be taken after a study of the recommendations. However, he personally felt that the UK would decide to carry out UN recommendations, although it would not be willing to accept any unilateral responsibility after the date of independence.” (501.BB Summaries/11–147)
program for Palestine which, in his judgment, will lead to disturbances, if not in fact, to violence and bloodshed, the latter of which he considers to be certain.

4. The British Government does not now contemplate announcing a date for the withdrawal of its forces and the termination of its mandate.

Bevin is deeply concerned about two former American ships—the Pan York and the Pan Crescent—now either at Constantza or putting into Constantza for the purpose, allegedly, of lifting some “18,000” illegal Jewish immigrants to Palestine. (See Embassy’s 5702, October 24.)  

DOUGLAS

2 Not printed.

867N.01/10-2947: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, October 29, 1947—4 p. m.

491. Following background for struggle which has commenced between Haganah and Irgun, in which firearms and grenades have for first time been used by Jews against Jews in Palestine.

October 20, representatives of right-wing parties met at Tel Aviv and there denounced Leftist tactics in controlling Jewish Agency and elected assembly. Party newspapers at once took up cudgels and [a]spate of recriminatory editorials ensued. Another meeting same groups took place on October 27, theme being “that Leftists were making preparations to seize power” in future Jewish state through institutions already dominated by them.

Almost simultaneous with first meeting reports of fighting between Haganah and Irgun in Tel Aviv district were received. While Haganah alleges only Irgun used firearms and grenades in October 23 incident at Benyamina, mounting frequency and violence of kidnappings, beatings and armed assaults are causing observers here to wonder whether they represent first stage of long awaited “showdown” between two groups.

Police opinion expressed mytel 436, October 11 to effect steps being taken unite Haganah, Irgun and Stern is hardly borne out by these developments. As recently as October 27, very high-ranking Palestine Government official remarked that prospect in event of partition would be “a little civil war between Irgun and Haganah”. Possibility exists,

1 Not printed.
however, that two groups would temporarily unite to face common enemy.

MACATEE

501.BB Palestine/10–2947: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

New York, October 29, 1947—4:40 p.m.

URGENT

1110. Following decisions taken at Delegation meeting this morning:
1. Territorial changes in UNSCOP majority plan suggested by Jewish Agency.

It was agreed that in Subcommittee 1 of the Ad Hoc Palestine Committee, Ambassador Johnson would attempt to secure agreement on the principle that the UNSCOP report should be examined with a view to reducing the size of the Arab minority and bringing into greater harmony the size of the two states relative to their populations. In accordance with this principle, it was decided to oppose the Zionist demand for all or part of Western Galilee, first, because it would remove from the Arab state virtually the only area suitable for future development and second, because it would weight the partition plan so heavily in favor of the Zionists that a two-thirds majority in the GA could not be obtained for the plan. The Delegation agreed that rectifications might be made in the eastern boundary of the coastal area of the Jewish state, on the basis that there would be no net gain of territory for that state. It was also agreed that the US should not support a Zionist demand for territory in southeastern Judea.

[Here follows discussion of matters other than Palestine.]

MARSHALL

867N.01/10–3047

The Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam) to Mr. Fraser Wilkins, at New York

TOP SECRET


My Dearest Fraser: With reference to your letter of October 25th, transmitting the revisions of Annex A made by the U.S. Delegation’s Palestine group, we feel in NEA that those revisions have been premised upon certain basic assumptions which may or may not prove to be valid and that these revisions in essence incorporate major policy decisions with respect to the future of Palestine, with some of which decisions the Department was not previously familiar.

2 Not printed.
The assumptions upon which the proposed revision of Annex A appear to be based seem to be the following:

(1) That the British will remain in Palestine until July 1, 1948.
(2) That, if they so remain, they will be willing to implement the plan being developed in Sub-committee 1 of the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine. (3) That leaders in both the proposed Arab and Jewish States will cooperate in the implementation of this partition plan so that by July 1, 1948, the governments of those States will be organized and in full operation. The validity of each one of these assumptions is highly questionable.

Two substantive changes proposed by the New York revision of Annex A would be so far-reaching in their effect upon the future of Palestine that they represent major policy decisions:

1. The New York revisions omit the majority report's requirement that neither the Jewish nor the Arab State shall attain independence until it has given to the U.N. and incorporated in its constitution certain fundamental guarantees for the Holy Places and the protection of minorities and until it has stated its adherence to the Economic Union for Palestine. Since independence is to come to Palestine automatically on July 1, 1948, it is entirely possible that one or both of the phoenix States born of partition will come into existence on that date without having fulfilled any of the conditions originally believed to be essential by the Majority of UNSCOP and previously approved on that basis by the Department.

2. The New York revisions omit the majority report's provisions that, in case only one of the proposed Palestinian States attains independence by establishing a provisional government and fulfilling the conditions required of it by the U.N., the problem shall be referred back to the U.N. Since the Economic Union, deemed by the UNSCOP majority to be absolutely essential to any partition plan, is dependent upon the existence of two Palestinian States, the existence of one State only in actual operation would render the entire plan for Economic Union void. The U.N. would have no further control over the situation since the hypothetical States would have become independent. Of course, this change in the UNSCOP majority plan appears to obviate the necessity for any decision upon implementation during a transitional period. In fact, it will probably mean that the issue will arise again in the U.N. as the result of the chaos which will ensue in Palestine after July 1, 1948.

One further comment of a minor nature: The New York revisions propose a Commission, selected by the General Assembly and headed by a High Commissioner, to act as the agent of the General Assembly in facilitating Palestine's transition to independence. This would result in a situation whereby there would be two authorities running Palestine in the brief period up to July 1, 1948. No indication is given as to the relationship which will exist between the present Mandatory Power and the General Assembly Commission.
In other words, confusion will be worse confounded even for the brief period in which Palestine will continue to have a single well-organized government.

As stated in the first paragraph these are the views of NEA, and not necessarily those of the whole Department. Perhaps there have been policy decisions upon which these revisions are based, of which we are not aware. If this is the case we would like to know the substance thereof, and would be glad to endeavor to obtain formal clarification of the Department’s views, if requested by the Delegation.

Sincerely yours,

GORDON P. MERRIAM.

Remarks by Ambassador Herschel V. Johnson at his Press Conference of October 31, 1947

Well, gentlemen, the statement I made on behalf of our delegation this morning is in the nature of a suggestion because of the nature of the sub-committee. It is not in any sense a final decision either by the United States or by the sub-committee and certainly not of the Ad Hoc Committee, which will have to make the final recommendation to the Assembly. It is merely a plan which we believe would offer a reasonable hope of success in implementing the partition recommendation of the majority of the Investigating Commission.

There are certain fundamental facts which are premises which we might remind ourselves of. It is perfectly clear from the report of the Special Committee on Palestine, that is the subject of all this discussion, and from statements that have been made by the representatives of various countries in the Ad Hoc Committee, in the open debate, that there is pretty general agreement all around with respect to an early termination of the mandate. It is also clear from statements made by a representative of Great Britain that the British Government regards the early termination of the mandate and withdrawal of its forces and administration as desirable. In fact, they have said they are going to get out.

Now, the majority report of the Special Committee on Palestine, as you will all remember, recommends a two-year transitional period before final independence of the two states becomes effective, and the date they gave for the beginning of that period is already past now—

2 Made during the ninth meeting of Subcommittee 1 of the Ad Hoc Committee. The United Nations has not published an official record of the 35 meetings of the Subcommittee. The United States Mission furnished the Department with the substance of these meetings, beginning with telegram 1078, October 24, and ending with No. 1250, November 22. These telegrams are filed under 501.BB Summaries and 501.A Summaries.
September, 1947—but they do recommend a two year transitional period.

We feel, however, and I have suggested it to this subcommittee, that it would be possible to shorten very materially the time between the effective date of the recommendations that the General Assembly may make and the real independence of the two states. Our delegation thinks that complete and early independence is not only feasible but for many reasons desirable. Furthermore, we believe that the date for independence can be fixed on a practical basis and geared in with the plans of the mandatory power for withdrawing its administration and the troops that are now there maintaining public order. It can be arranged so that the mandatory power can simultaneously with withdrawing its administration and troops turn over all governmental responsibility, including that for the maintenance of law and order, to the authorities for the new Jewish and Arab States.

This procedure would make it unnecessary for the General Assembly to provide in its recommendations for a transitional period under a trusteeship or any other arrangement, and it would make unnecessary the establishment of a special United Nations force for maintaining law and order during the interim period.

Of course, it is absolutely essential for a decision to be reached in the subcommittee on this point, because if the idea of having the mandatory turn over its sovereign powers and its administration responsibility of two independent states (is accepted by the subcommittee) the various provisions in the (UNSCOP) report which provide for transitional period machinery would have to be deleted or modified.

Now, we have also suggested that the General Assembly appoint a small and very competent commission with a High Commissioner at the head of it—we suggested that it might be composed of three top people—to go out to Palestine as soon as possible after the effective date of the Assembly’s action, to act in an advisory and guiding capacity with the leaders of the groups who will become independent states, or with the independent states, on this hypothetical date of July 1st (1948). Also, to work in collaboration with the British authorities still in Palestine and who, until the termination of the mandate, are still responsible for its government and for the maintenance of law and order. We believe that a small commission composed of men chosen for their personal qualifications, demonstrated by experience and public record, can give the most effective assistance to the leaders of the Arab and Jewish groups who are going to have to form governments in those states. It also can act as a sort of catalytic agent without the mandatory. We believe, too, that if this plan were adopted the British government, as a good member of the United Nations,
would help in every practical way possible. It would certainly be in
their interest to do so and to have a peaceful transition.

The date of July 1, 1948 was thrown out as a suggestion. That is the
earliest date suggested in any of the plans, I believe. One of the resolu-
tions put into the Ad Hoc Committee mentioned September, 1949. I
forget which country put that in, but our suggested date, in the absence
of any knowledge on our part of the precise date when the mandatory
will withdraw, would seem to fit in with the practical possibility when
we know that there are many thousands of British troops and a heavy
governmental machinery there that cannot be removed in a day.

We think, too, that this Commission which would go out there
should be sent out as the representative and agent of the General As-
semble. It naturally could not have any greater powers than the Gen-
eral Assembly itself has. Its powers would be that of recommendation.
However, the self-interest, as we see it, of all the parties concerned
would, it seems to us, have an impelling effect on the possibility of
usefulness of this commission. If a definite date for independence is
set, and both the Jewish and the Arab leaders and their peoples know
that on that date they are going to become responsible for order in
their own house, we think that it would be a very strong motivation
for their getting to work and for seeking wise and experienced and
unbiased advice, which is offered to them with the greatest possible
good will by the United Nations. We feel also that, knowing that the
mandatory is leaving, they will be wise enough to profit from the
counsel and suggestions of the heads of the mandatory states.

Now, in regard to the questions of public order, which is one of the
first questions raised by anybody in consideration of this plan, I would
like to make it perfectly clear that according to our thinking with
respect to our plan the two states themselves will be absolutely
sovereign on the effective date of their independence and they them-
selves will be responsible for the maintenance of their own public
order. Naturally, the most impelling motive they will have will be their
own self-interest. During this period the United Nations Commission
also would have the responsibility for formulating a recommendation
for the setting up of a United Nations trusteeship, or whatever other
plan might be finally adopted, for the government of the city of
Jerusalem and the contiguous territory within such limits as might be
finally recommended. We do not know yet what will be the precise
territorial limits of any of these three states, that is the Arab, the
Jewish, and the free territory of Jerusalem.

Now, I have no doubt that every one of you can think of possible
difficulties that may arise, as all the rest of us have thought of, and
if I can help in any way by giving you some idea of the way our
delegation has speculated on these difficulties and in what way they might be met—if I can, I will be glad to answer your questions.8

One other thing I had in mind to say. The question also arises of what body this United Nations group would be responsible to, and I think that the very terms of our proposal give the answer. It is responsible to the General Assembly. If another situation should arise, however, where there will be a real threat to international peace and security, the jurisdiction of that particular situation might well pass to the Security Council. We do not feel, however, that it is possible at this stage for our delegation, least of all, or for the committee or for the General Assembly, to anticipate by any kind of present action every possible difficulty that may arise. The most we can do is to lay down a plan which we hope is fair, and we want to be fair to everybody concerned, even if it does not give everybody everything they ask for. With a certain amount of good will and with some wise counsel on the part of competent people, the difficult transition period will be bridged and the two states become viable, both politically and economically, in a very short time. We feel strongly that the placing on the shoulders of the Jewish and Arab leaders in their states the full responsibility for their own future will be in some ways the best guarantee of its success. That may be too hopeful a statement, but as long as someone else is responsible, the people who are most concerned are not likely to progress as rapidly in their thinking and actions as when they must bear the entire responsibility themselves for those actions.

8 A transcript of the questions and answers which followed Ambassador Johnson’s remarks was issued by the United States Mission in press release 299, October 31 (10 files).

501.BB Palestine/10–2547

Mr. Fraser Wilkins to the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam)

TOP SECRET

NEW YORK, October 31, 1947.

DEAR GORDON: I have this morning received your letter of October 30, 1947 in reply to my letter of October 25, 1947 1 with regard to the revisions proposed by the United States Delegation to the United Nations in Annex A—Detailed Position Analysis of Majority Plan of UNSCOP.

I should like to recall, in order properly to present the practical problem which faced the Delegation, that early in the week of October 19 I had several telephone conversations with Gordon Mattison with

1 Not printed.
regard to the course of developments respecting Palestine and that, thereafter, Dean Rusk visited New York. Following Dean Rusk’s arrival we prepared a draft telegram to London which attempted to frame a workable approach to the question of Palestine as it was developing at the United Nations. Dean Rusk returned to Washington with this draft telegram on October 22.

In the meantime, in anticipation of Sub-committee meetings which were scheduled to commence on October 27, the United States Delegation was confronted with the problem of revising its papers in support of a position which was in the process of being adopted by the Department, based on policies approved by the Secretary in New York.

During the afternoon and late into the night of October 24 the working group labored on the revision of Annex A, as stated in the draft telegram. This telegram with minor changes was approved by the Department and sent to London about noon October 25. During the afternoon of October 25 the working group went over the majority plan of UNSCOP and its revisions of Annex A in detail, paragraph by paragraph, with Ambassador Johnson and General Hilldring. All of these revisions, with certain minor exceptions, were approved by Ambassador Johnson and General Hilldring.

Gordon will remember that we talked with him by telephone during the morning of October 25 and that he told me that, as the Delegation was in closer touch with the situation in New York, the Delegation might put forward the suggested changes in Annex A, as revised by the Delegation, in Sub-Committee 1; and that it would be sufficient if the Delegation forwarded a copy of revised Annex A for such comment as the Department might care to make. In accordance with this telephone conversation, we worked on our papers during the evening of October 25 and on October 26, dispatching five copies of revised Annex A to the Department by courier on the evening of October 26.

With regard to the revisions of Annex A I should like, on behalf of the Delegation, to make certain comments respecting the basic assumption and major policy decisions as set forth in your letter of October 30.

With regard to basic assumptions, it seems to us that similar assumptions, with appropriate changes for detail, are also basic to the majority plan of UNSCOP. For example,

1) that the British or some other administering authority will remain in Palestine until September 1, 1949.

2) that they or someone else will implement the plan (UNSCOP dodged this issue.)

3) that leaders in both the proposed Arab and Jewish states will cooperate in the implementation of this partition so that by September 1, 1949 the governments of those states will be organized and in full operation.
It is our belief that the validity of each one of these assumptions is as questionable as the validity of the assumptions on which the Department’s telegram #4378 of October 25 is based.

With regard to over-all policy respecting Palestine, the Delegation’s line of action was established and approved, following discussions with the Delegation, by the Secretary. The Department’s telegram #4878 of October 25 is an expression of one aspect of this policy. The Delegation’s revisions of Annex A flow from the general policy and the expression of it in the Department’s telegram #4578 of October 25.

As you have noted, the New York revisions omit the majority report’s requirement that neither the Jewish nor the Arab state shall attain independence until it has given to the UN and incorporated in its constitution certain fundamental guaranties for the Holy Places and the protection of minorities, and until it has stated its adherence to the economic union for Palestine. It was the Delegation’s view that inasmuch as the plan envisaged termination of the Mandate and independence in Palestine as early as July 1, 1948, thereby eliminating the formal transitional period and the necessity for an administering authority other than the present British administration acting behind a UN Commission, it would be unnecessary and undesirable to stipulate conditions precedent to independence. It was believed unnecessary because if the UN recommended that a declaration be made and an undertaking be signed, the moral effect of such a UN recommendation would require the authorities in the Jewish state and the Arab state to act in accordance with the UN recommendation, and in addition it would be difficult for either de facto state to make application for membership in the UN if it had not made the declaration and signed the undertaking. It was believed undesirable because the establishment of conditions precedent to independence might not be possible of fulfillment during the short time envisaged prior to independence which might have had the effect of raising a constitutional bar to actual independence on July 1, 1948.

As you have noted, the New York revisions omit the majority report’s provision that in case only one of the proposed Palestine states attains independence by establishing a provisional government and fulfilling the conditions required of it by the UN, the problem shall be referred back to the UN. It may be noted, however, that the Delegation retained the revised provisions in D regarding the undertaking with respect to Economic Union and Transit and that, in the broader sense, we strengthened this aspect of the partition plan by removing the 3rd paragraph of B.5 which, in the event only one state signed, referred the matter back to the UN. It is the Delegation’s belief that it is wiser to inform the Jewish and Arab authorities respectively in the areas of the Jewish and Arab states recommended by the GA that
they may be independent on July 1, 1948 than to make recommenda-
tions under which one of them may stall in order to keep the Palestine
question before the UN. It is also the belief of the Delegation that a
“sit-down strike” by the authorities, for example, in the Arab state,
should not prevent the independence of the Jewish state. It is realized
that Economic Union is deemed essential in the majority plan of
UNSCOP. Nevertheless, as a practical matter, many have doubts
regarding its essentiality. The Jewish Agency, for example, frequently
points out in discussions with regard to boundaries that the territorial
division recommended by the UN will probably be permanent whereas
the constitutional changes recommended by the UN may not neces-
sarily endure. The Delegation believes in the principles of Economic
Union and hopes that the UN recommendations in this respect will be
accepted by both the Jewish and the Arab states; but it believes at the
same time that the provisions for Economic Union should not be a
condition precedent to independence. Both the Jewish and Arab states
should be in a position voluntarily to adopt Economic Union. The
Jewish Agency has already stated that it would accept Economic
Union. The Arab High Commission has not, of course, discussed this
detail because of its general opposition to the UNSCOP Report, but
the Delegation believes that it should have the right of deciding
whether it desired to participate in the Economic Union or whether
it desired to make other arrangements for its economic well-being, for
example, with the neighboring Arab states.

With regard to a United Nations Commission, it was the Dele-
gation’s belief, as indicated in the Department’s telegram #4578 of
October 25, that the UN Commission, headed by a UN High Commiss-
ioner, would be appointed to act as the agency of transfer in order to
facilitate the transition to independence. The Delegation had no
thought of suggesting that two authorities would be in existence for the
administration of Palestine prior to July 1, 1948. The proposed UN
Commission, headed by a High Commissioner, would have no admin-
istrative or political authority, but would be charged simply to advise
Jews, Arabs and the mandatory power and to facilitate the independ-
ence of the Arab and Jewish states. The ultimate authority and respon-
sibility in Palestine rests with the UK until the Mandate is terminated,
whereupon it will be transferred instantaneously to the Jewish and
Arab states. It was the Delegation’s belief that the UN Commission
would represent the great moral authority of the UN in Palestine
behind which and through which the UK could actually transfer the
powers of government to the new states. It was our hope that London
would recognize this facade which, in our view, would have the effect of
removing the onus of actual partition to which the British have very
reasonably objected. The exact relationship between the UK and the
UN Commission was not specified because it was felt that this suggestion by the Delegation, while understood by the Delegation, might more appropriately be developed by other members of the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine.

It is my hope, Gordon, that these observations will give you some indication of the trend of our thought in New York, and will serve to indicate the manner in which we tried to overcome (1) the apparent reluctance of any member of the UN, including the UN [UK], to act as administering authority in Palestine, and (2) the possibility that the discussions in the UN with regard to military implementation would lead to some type of force in which it would be necessary for American units to participate.

With regard to the last paragraph of your letter of October 30, Gordon told me on October 25, as previously indicated in this letter, that the Delegation might put forward the suggestions in Annex A, revised, as the Delegation was in close touch with the situation in New York, on the understanding that any basic objections which the Department might have would be communicated to the Delegation. It was for these reasons that we undertook the revision of Annex A based on the Department’s telegram #4578 of October 25 and that I acted as transmitting agent for the Delegation in sending the revised text by the first courier on October 26 following conversation with Gordon Mattison on October 25. Originally we planned to send it by teletype but because of the technical difficulties, such as “crossing through” and “underlining” of words indicating deletion and addition of text we believed transmission of five copies by courier was preferable for accuracy, understanding and distribution in the Department. It is my duty to add, I believe, that the Delegation has requested the Department’s view with regard to these and all other important changes which the Delegation has proposed in the various papers connected with Palestine and that we have endeavored to bring all papers into line with policies laid down by the Secretary, the Department, and the Delegation.

Sincerely,

FRASER WILKINS

867N.01/10-3147

The Counselor of the British Embassy (Allen) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 31, 1947.

Ref: G.124/ 47

DEAR HENDERSON: You doubtless know that when Lord Inverchapel saw Mr. Marshall and Mr. Lovett this morning he discussed with them the question of illegal Jewish immigration into Palestine. One par-
ticular aspect of this question, which the Ambassador had no time to raise with Mr. Marshall but which he did later discuss with Mr. Lovett, was the problem of the control of Jews leaving the United States zone in Austria. Mr. Lovett told the Ambassador that if he would arrange to have the State Department furnished with full information on this question, he would see that it was looked into.

I accordingly enclose three copies of a memorandum setting out the facts on the basis of telegrams which the Ambassador has recently received from the Foreign Office instructing him to make representations on the subject to the United States Government. The Ambassador would be most grateful if you could have this matter investigated urgently by the Division or Divisions concerned. Needless to say, he very much hopes that the State Department will find it possible to arrange for early instructions to be sent to the United States authorities in Austria on the lines desired by the Foreign Office. You know the great importance which Mr. Bevin attaches to this whole question.

Yours sincerely, 

DENIS ALLEN

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2 Infra.

867N.01/10-3147

The British Embassy to the Department of State

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

It appears probable that as many as 17,000 Jewish illegal immigrants may reach Palestine waters from the Black Sea in the near future, thus threatening to fill the Cyprus camps to capacity. It is therefore most important that none of the 28,000 displaced Jews now in Italy should be allowed to embark for Palestine within the next few months. The success of the representations which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are making to the Italian Government on this subject will be considerably influenced by the extent to which the movement of Jews from Austria into Italy can be checked. The British representative at Vienna has been instructed to discuss this matter with his French and United States colleagues. His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris is also making representations to the French Government.

2. So far as the authorities in the French zone of Austria are concerned, the essential points are, that they should (a) prevent Jews from crossing the Italian frontier from their zone and take back those who do, and (b) tighten control of the frontier between the United States and French zones.
3. Recent indications point to a tightening up of French control of illegal Jewish movement through their zone. However, while the French authorities appear to be disposed to help, their ability to deal adequately with this movement will, to a considerable extent, depend upon the readiness of the authorities in the United States zone to cooperate, since the French authorities are reluctant to prevent egress from their zone or to take back Jews crossing into Italy so long as the United States authorities take no steps to control movement from their zone into the French zone.

4. The largest concentration of Jews in Austria is in the United States zone. It is understood that the policy of the United States zonal authorities has hitherto been neither to aid nor to hinder the movement of Jews and that they are unlikely to feel able to alter this policy without instructions from Washington.

5. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom accordingly request that the authorities in the United States zone may be moved to prevent Jews from crossing into the French zone and to take back those who do.

6. His Majesty's Government are also anxious that action should be taken to prevent the misuse by the American Joint Distribution Committee and similar organisations of ex-United States Army vehicles and equipment. The following is a typical instance of such misuse. At the end of May five hundred Jews arrived at the boundary between the United States and French zones led by an A.J.D.C. jeep containing a man in United States Army uniform who threatened the Austrian gendarme with a tommy-gun when the latter attempted to halt the convoy. It is suggested that if organisations such as the American Joint Distribution Committee were compelled to paint their ex-United States Army vehicles a different colour and to dye their ex-United States Army uniforms, this equipment could no longer be used to disguise the true nature of such convoys and thus prevent Jewish organisations from deriving indirect aid from a misuse of ex-United States Army equipment.

WASHINGTON, October 31, 1947.

S67N.01/10-1547: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Saudi Arabia

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, October 31, 1947—7 p. m.

339. In response SAG note quoted Legtel 431 Oct 15 express appreciation US Govt for views expressed and state they have been given careful consideration. Give assurance that US Govt has sought to
impose no unilateral solution Palestine problem but has advocated finding by UN of fair and just solution.

For your info SAG note, although apparently sent consequent meeting Pol Committee Arab League Sept 19, bears little or no resemblance to notes from other Arab Govts and is much more moderate.¹

Sent Jidda, repeated London, USUN.

LOVETT

¹ In reply on November 4 (telegram 467 from Jidda), Chargé Bailey stated: “Deputy Foreign Minister told me today SAG greatly disappointed Department’s reply in note quoted Legtel 431, October 15 saying “SAG cannot understand how US can say it has sought impose no unilateral solution Palestine problem and has advocated fair and just solution after favoring partition and openly opposing Arab cause; US must alter its stand re Palestine and withdraw its active support of Zionism if it hopes retain SAG unquestioned friendship now being strained; US constantly losing prestige Arab world; SAG is United States’ best friend and advises entire Arab world so when US loses prestige so does SA’. Last statement I heartily concur.” (867N.01/11-447)

501.BB Palestine/11-347: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT NEW YORK, November 3, 1947—1 p. m.

1133. For Henderson and McClintock from Rusk. On Friday I saw Lionel Gelber, Political Adviser to the Jewish Agency, whom I had known at Oxford. Our conversation was generally personal except that I took the occasion to express very strong views about the possibility of further incidents arising from attempts to run additional immigrants illegally into Palestine. I stated that the seriousness with which the US would view such further incidents could not be exaggerated and that it was of the utmost importance that the Jews give the UN an opportunity to settle this difficult question without the passion which further incidents would inevitably arouse. I asked him to speak to the heads of the Jewish Agency along these lines in the strongest possible terms.

On Sunday night Gelber came to see me with the following report: After the Secretary’s talk with Judge Proskauer,² the Jewish Agency had made contact with the Jewish Underground to ascertain the facts. After my talk with Gelber, Agency made fresh inquiries on Saturday and Sunday. Gelber said he was authorized to inform me that he had no information about prospective sailings either from Atlantic ports or from Black Sea ports for the next five or six weeks. He stated the Jewish Agency would do everything within its power to prevent further incidents but indicated that the Agency did not have complete

² Joseph M. Proskauer, President of the American Jewish Committee.
control of the Underground. He asked me if we could furnish him any
precise information we get as to perspective sailings in order that the
Agency might use its maximum influence to prevent incidents. I then
repeated what I had told him earlier and told him we expected the
Agency to exert itself to the utmost to see that the Underground is
restrained.²

Henderson may wish to call the above to the attention of the Secre-
tary. Further, if there is any intelligence on specific ship movements
which we wish Jewish Agency to block, I would be prepared to take
it up with Jewish Agency if Dept. desires. [Rusk]

AUSTIN

²According to telegram 1136, November 3, 4:27 p. m., from New York, Mr.
Shertok that day had assured General Hildring that there was no basis of truth
in the reports of vessels leaving American and Black Sea ports to carry illegal
immigrants to Palestine (867N.01/11-347).

867N.01/11-347: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, November 3, 1947—6 p. m.

497. Reference statement “UK might turn over responsibility to
authorities Jewish and Arab states” in infotel October 29, 5 a. m.¹

Although Johnson reported as stating October 31² if Arabs do not
form government their section might be continued as UN trusteeship,
desire emphasize this ConGen unaware any Arab who would accept
office in partitioned Palestine thus making himself target for assassina-
tion. Therefore if trusteeship is prospect for Arab area it should not
be envisaged as short-term arrangement and careful consideration
should be given to problem of policing such turbulent area.

Assumption of power by Jews may also be complicated in view dis-
sension and fighting in Jewish community at present over who will
govern. Right wing groups almost certain demand elections under UN
anspices as they claim present left wing labor control emanates from
unfairly conducted elections in past.

If partition is rejected by Assembly and Zionist hopes dashed, offi-
cials here believe terrorism will increase to extent unparalleled in past.

¹Not printed. It summarized telegram 4578, October 25, to London, p. 1207.
²In the question and answer period that followed his remarks of October 31
(see footnote 3, p. 1222), Ambassador Johnson stated: “Naturally the success
of this plan would depend in part on acceptance and cooperation of both states, but
if, for instance, the Arab State refuses to cooperate, that is no reason why the
Jewish State should not have its independence. Then if the mandatory were out,
the United Nations would certainly have the responsibility in the form of trustee-
ship for the other state until they could pull themselves together and fulfill the
requirements for independence.”
Foregoing uncertain elements not conducive British acceptance request they maintain order in trying period between now and July 1948. Weekend reaction news reports Johnson press conference October 31 summarized:

British officials and businessmen received news with anger or incredulity at what to them our lack understanding either of British or Palestine problem. High ranking police officer added Americans simply fanning flames pan-Islamism for which America may one day pay dearly.

When news of Johnson statements arrived late October 31 in government press room, British correspondents immediately denounced American position with considerable bitterness, telling American correspondents America desired build empire with British doing "dirty work". Jewish Agency security and intelligence chiefs elatedly informed officer attached ConGen Jewish state now practically set up.

Hebrew press declares Johnson and Balfour declarations will rank together for all time; announces Britain's maneuvers have failed her miserably and put her in situation where Americans are fixing date her departure for her.

Arab press practically ignores matter except brief reference Difaa saying in effect more American nonsense on subject but hopes American policy will change for better.

MACATEE

501.BB Summaries/11-447: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

SECRET

New York, November 4, 1947—2:59 a. m.

1141.

... Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, Subcommittee 1 (12th and 13th Meetings)

The USSR presented to the Subcommittee on Nov. 3 a 10-point proposal on implementation of the Palestine partition plan, recommending a one-year transitional period, during which the administration would be under the control of the SC. Detailed plans for setting up the independent Arab and Jewish states were also set forth in the Soviet plan. At its afternoon meeting the Subcommittee approved the majority of the Economic Union section of the UNSCOP Report.
At the outset, Tsarapkin (USSR) stated that the US proposals on the pre-independence period meant that the administration of Palestine would be ensured by UK and that British troops would remain until the Arab and Jewish states became independent. Under the US proposals all measures preparatory to independence would be carried out by the UK, while it was a fact that the UK’s mandatory system over Palestine had failed. In the USSR view “it is incorrect and does not correspond to the task of forming independent Arab and Jewish states to create such a situation in which all the preparatory measures in Palestine would be entrusted to the UK and put under its control, even if the UK would offer its services.”

Quoting statements by Creech Jones (UK) on the UK attitude on implementation of UN recommendations, Tsarapkin said these statements did not leave any place for doubt that the UK would not implement a decision which was not agreed to by both parties. As it was known that the Arabs had rejected partition, it appeared clear that referral of the preparatory measures for setting up the two states to the UK would lead to a situation in which both states would remain on paper.

As for the UN commission proposed by US, Tsarapkin observed that it was obvious that such a commission with such limited functions would be powerless and would only be a cover under the UN flag. He maintained that the UN could not agree to placing the problem into the hands of only one power. Acceptance of the US proposals, he said, would lead to the undermining of the Palestine problem, and the USSR could not agree with the US proposals on implementation, nor did it believe these proposals could serve as the basis for solution of the problem.

Tsarapkin then presented the following 10-point program on the structure of Palestine: (1) the British Mandate to be abrogated as from Jan. 1, 1948; (2) UK troops to be withdrawn from Palestine within the shortest time possible, but not more than four months after the abrogation of the Mandate; (3) between the termination of the Mandate and independence, a transitional period of as short a period as possible, with a maximum length of a year; (4) UN administration of Palestine during the transitional period “in the person of the SC” which should exercise the administration through a special commission composed of the representatives of SC members, the commission having its seat in Palestine; (5) on arrival in Palestine the commission should carry out measures for the establishment of Arab-Jewish frontiers in accordance with the GA decision; (6) after consultation with the democratic parties and social organizations of the two states, the special commission should elect in both states a provisional council.
of government, the activities of both councils to be carried out under the general direction of the commission; (7) both provisional councils should hold elections along democratic lines to the constituent assembly not later than six months after their formation, with the election regulations to be elaborated by the councils and approved by the special SC commission, (8) the constituent assembly of each state should work out a democratic constitution of its state and elect a government; (9) both provisional councils should proceed under the supervision of the special commission to establish administrative organs of government, central and local; and (10) both provisional councils should within the shortest possible time form an armed militia from the citizens of their states, sufficient in number to maintain internal order and to prevent frontier clashes. This militia, in its operative respect, should be under command of its national commanding personnel, but general military and political control over its activities should be exercised by the special commission, Tsarapkin explained.

Discussing the USSR proposals, Johnson declared that condemnation of the US plan as one which would sabotage the whole program was without substantial evidence. He observed that the USSR plan varied only in minor details from the US proposals. Pointing out that the problem of Arab rejection of any plan of partition would likewise arise in the USSR plan, Johnson said that the dilemma of this GA was to get a plan to which both parties would agree. He failed to see any advantage to be gained from prolonging the transitional period. He questioned whether it would be possible for UK troops to get out of Palestine in four months. Johnson further declared that an inexperienced commission in a troubled area like Palestine would have a most difficult task.¹

Johnson expressed the hope that the Arab state would have an enlightened view of its own self-interest. In case the Arab state did not accept the proposals, he declared that some other arrangement

¹Telegram 1152, November 5, from New York, reported that the United States Delegation discussed the Soviet proposals and that "While it was agreed that it would be highly undesirable to endow an organ of the SC with full governing powers in Palestine, it was recognized that the prospects for approval of a partition plan in the Assembly would be prejudiced if it proved impossible for the US and the USSR to reach agreement in the Ad Hoc Subcommittee. Ambassador Johnson was authorized to continue to press for adoption of the US plan, preserving a flexible attitude to permit future compromise if necessary." (501.BB/11-547) This wording was incorporated in the United States Delegation Decisions, November 5, under US/A/M/60, IO files.

In a memorandum of November 6 to Ambassador Johnson, Mr. Knox indicated that this wording did not present a clear picture of what had transpired at the meeting. He concluded that the following addition would clarify it: "It was emphasized, however, that the United States would not agree to any plan (short of action taken under Chapter VII of the Charter) which placed the administration of Palestine under the Security Council and thereby gave the Soviet Union a negative control over its development through use of, or threat to use, the veto power." (USUN files)
would have to be worked out, perhaps involving continuation of the UN Commission as a Trusteeship Authority. The period when the proposed SC commission would be in Palestine after the UK troops had left would be a difficult time. He appealed to the Subcommittee to set up the independent states as soon as possible.

\[ \text{AUSTIN} \]

\[ 10 \text{ Files: US/A/AC.14/SC.1/9} \]

\textit{Memorandum by Mr. M. Gordon Knox to the United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)}\(^1\)


The following is an analysis of the Russian proposals on Palestine.\(^2\)

At first sight, it would appear that a compromise could be found between the Russian proposals, and those suggested by the United States. The differences are seemingly not great. Furthermore, most states hope that the remarkable agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R. on the Palestine question can be continued. Also it is a foregone conclusion that at the present time, unless the Russian bloc agrees with the United States regarding support for a specific partition plan, there will be no partition at all, since there will be no two-thirds majority in the General Assembly.

Nevertheless, examination of the Russian proposals makes one wonder whether the Russians want partition or whether it is chaos they seek in Palestine. The Russian plan envisages the following things happening:

1. British troops would have no legal authority in Palestine after December 31, 1947. The troops, therefore, would have no basis for maintaining order; they would be welcomed or unwelcomed guests as the case may be. Their equivocal position during a period of civil strife might make them a target for abuse and attack which would tend to weaken law and order in Palestine, and damage British prestige in the Middle East.

2. British administration would cease to function on January 1, 1948, and twenty-five years of experience would be thrown to one side and replaced by a United Nations commission which would have no substantive experience on which to base its decisions and administrative acts. The outcome would be that persons representing eleven different nations which presumably would be at loggerheads, would be called upon to manage an area torn by civil strife.

Under paragraph four of the Russian proposals a loophole exists whereby the authority of this Special Commission, even if the Special

\(^1\) Addressed also to General Hilldring.
\(^2\) See telegram 1141, supra.
Commission could agree on certain administrative decisions, could be challenged and appeals could be made from the Special Commission's decisions to the Security Council which is its parent body. In the Security Council, there is the veto. For instance combining paragraphs four and five of the Russian proposals, the Special Commission would determine the boundary of the Jewish and Arab States. If the Arab state were displeased with the boundary decision and if the Russian member of the Special Commission had been in the minority when the particular frontier was voted on, the Arab state could refuse to abide by the decision of the Special Commission and challenge the Special Commission to seek support for its boundary line in the Security Council. The Arab state could hope that a Russian veto would cause the Security Council to repudiate the Special Commission's decision. There would be a ripe opportunity for the Arab state or the Arab League to offer political concessions to the Soviet Union in return for a Russian veto of a particular boundary decision, or any other decision which might be unfavorable to the Arab state.

Similarly, under paragraph six of the Russian proposals the Special Commission would elect a Provisional Council of Government for both the Jewish and the Arab states. Here again the very personnel of the Provisional Council would be dependent on Russian approval. The Provisional Council would not be elected by the inhabitants of the Jewish and Arab states, but by the Commission. Under paragraphs six, seven, eight and nine, of the Russian proposals a complicated procedure is established whereby the Provisional Council elected by the Special Commission and operating under the general direction of the Special Commission would hold elections to a Constituent Assembly in the Arab and Jewish states. Since the election rules in each state would be subject to the approval of the Special Commission, the effect would be that the Constituent Assembly might be largely the creation not of the electors, but of the Special Commission. Furthermore, the only frame of reference guiding the Special Commission in determining what kind of elections in [?] the Constituent Assembly should be held would be that said elections should be held on "democratic lines": Past experience in Germany, Austria and Korea shows how widely divergent are the views of the West and the Soviet Union regarding "democratic lines".

The next step under the Russian proposals would be to have the Constituent Assemblies draft "democratic constitutions" and elect governments for the Jewish and Arab states. It is not clear, however, what authority these governments would have. In any case at least under the transitional period, the provisional councils would establish local administrative organs of government under the supervision of
the Special Commission. However, these Provisional Councils would have no control over the armed militia and, therefore, would have no means of enforcing their decisions. According to paragraph ten of the Russian proposals, the Provisional Councils would form the armed militia in both of these states but in general the military and political control over the activities of the armed militia would be exercised by the Special Commission.

To summarize, the Russian proposals set up a very cumbersome and highly complicated rule of authority which would be difficult to make function even if the members of the Special Commission could agree among themselves; even if there were no inherent right of appeal from the Special Commission to the Security Council and even if it could be assumed that the inhabitants of Palestine were in substantial agreement with the principles of partition and desired by all means to make the partition plan work successfully and smoothly. None of these assumptions exists. Finally, this question can be asked: If this elaborate Russian plan of a Special Commission electing Provisional Councils which in turn hold elections to establish Constituent Assemblies which drafts constitutions and elects governments, fails to be carried out within the twelve months maximum period, does this mean that the Special Commission continues to exercise authority over Palestine after the end of the twelve months period? Also, how can the Special Commission enforce its regulations when it only has the right to give orders to both Jewish and Arab armed militia and no other means of making sure that said orders will be carried out? With the termination of British authority on January 1, 1948, and removal of physical presence of British troops not later than April 30, 1948, there will be no means for the Special Commission to proceed with its alleged duty of setting up two independent states against the wishes of the majority of inhabitants of Palestine, except by appealing to the Security Council for force. The Security Council at present has no force which can act, since Article 43 of the Charter has not been implemented. Action can be taken under Article 106 but the presence of troops of the Great Powers in Palestine would be extremely dangerous to the peace and security of that area, and perhaps lead to the division of Palestine into zones, and the repetition of the disastrous results which followed the dividing up of Germany, Austria and Korea.

I think that the United States should make it clear that it can not and will not support the Russian plan: that there can be no compromise between the Russian and American plans, but that if the Russian proposals were to be used as a basis for discussion they must be completely rewritten. I can see the advantage of having the partition plan
as generally agreed upon, labelled the Russian plan rather than the American plan. But in that case I suggest that the Russian proposals be stripped of the following weaknesses:

1. The link to the Security Council
2. The elimination of British control prior to independence
3. The creation of a United Nations control body (the Special Commission) which has no means of carrying out its orders and which, therefore, has responsibility without having authority.

IO Files: US/4/AC.14/8C.1/S

_Statement by the United States Representative in Sub-Committee 1 of the “Ad Hoc” Committee on the Palestinian Question._


Mr. Chairman: I should like at this time to make a brief statement regarding implementation and the transitional period.

It is clear from the report of the Special Committee on Palestine and from statements of various Representatives in the Ad Hoc Committee that there is general agreement with respect to early termination of the Mandate. It is also clear from statements made by the United Kingdom Delegation that its Government regards the early termination of the Mandate and withdrawal of its forces and administration as desirable.

The UNSCOP Report recommends a two-year transitional period starting September 1947. There have been suggestions, however, that it might be possible to shorten the time between the recommendation of the General Assembly and the Independence of the two States. The U.S. Delegation feels that early independence is not only feasible but desirable. Furthermore, we believe that the date for independence can be so fixed that the Mandatory Power may, upon withdrawing, turn over all governmental responsibility, including responsibility for the maintenance of law and order, to the authorities of the Arab and the Jewish States. This would obviate the necessity for a separate transitional period under a trusteeship or other arrangement, and for the establishment of a special United Nations force for the maintenance of law and order.

If this idea of simultaneous termination of the Mandate and independence of the two states is adopted by the Subcommittee, certain changes in the UNSCOP Report, such as the deletion of all reference to a “transitional period”, will have to be made. I would suggest, therefore, Mr. Chairman, that the Subcommittee discuss and come to a conclusion on this suggestion, and that, if it is favorably considered, we immediately begin work on the necessary detailed changes in the
plan contained in the UNSCOP Report. My Delegation is prepared to present specific proposals for your consideration.

My Delegation does not presume to set a definitive date for the attainment of independence in Palestine but would suggest that July 1, 1948 may be a suitable date for working purposes.

In the view of my Delegation, the steps leading to independence should take place with the advice and assistance of the General Assembly. For this purpose we believe that the General Assembly should establish a United Nations Commission, headed by a High Commissioner, to advise and assist in the transfer of the powers of government from the Mandatory Power to the two independent states and to the proposed trust territory of this City of Jerusalem and in the establishment of the new units of government on a stable basis.

501.BB Palestine/10-2547

The Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam) to Mr. Fraser Wilkins

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 5, 1947.

PERSONAL

Dear Fraser: Many thanks for your letters of October 31 and November 1. I don't envy you people in your job of keeping away from the horns of the UNSCOP bull. Your problem is well stated in the middle paragraph of page 4 of your October 31 letter.

In so far as I can visualize it, what has happened is that on examination the gendarmerie horse proved to be an intractable beast, so that the Delegation sought to transfer the burden to the British goat. The British have yet to be heard from on this. My guess is that it was a good try on our part but that, despite Creech Jones, they won't fall for it. To Bevin it must seem that we've got ourselves into a position from which we are trying to squirm, and I think that quite possibly he is enjoying the spectacle, having been in the same position himself for lo! these many years. But, no matter how we dress up what we have in mind for the British in a stand-by role, they know that they would have to implement partition. I don't see how we can count heavily upon the moral authority of UN, since, if UN votes the UNSCOP plan in the face of opposition and resistance by one of the peoples directly concerned, and by some of its own members, UN's moral authority could be scored at zero, for it will have violated its own charter. There has been plenty of notice of this, official and otherwise by this time.

1 Letter of November 1 not printed.

2 This is the paragraph beginning with "It is my hope, Gordon"; see p. 1226.
It seems to me that, in this murky business, we should at least hang on to any principle that is discernible in it. The one principle that has been advanced thus far to justify our support of the UNSCOP report is that it is a majority report of a UN committee, which we have to support for that reason. However, so far as I can see we have now abandoned even that one principle by taking the position that Economic Union, regarded by UNSCOP as essential to the majority plan, is not essential. We might with equal reason take the position that partition is not essential to the plan, or immigration. Any one of these is or would be a major policy decision marking a departure from our basic September [October?] 11 decision. Jettisoning of Economic Union is not an amendment or modification of the majority plan “in order more accurately to give effect to the principles on which that plan is based,” nor is it in line with our position “that the powers of the Joint Economic Board be strengthened”.

A sit-down strike by the Arab portion of Palestine would not hold up Economic Union, because, according to UNSCOP, that is to apply even if one of the states does not adopt it. On the other hand, the failure of one outfit to agree to the Declaration and to Economic Union would be such a serious matter for the future of Palestine that UNSCOP was well advised to provide that the situation should be reviewed by the General Assembly in such an event.

It is hard to see why so much has been sacrificed for the purpose of plunging Palestine into chaos not later than July 1, 1948.

Since writing the foregoing on November 3 the Russian plan has been stated. On first reading, the bugs seem to be as follows: (1) It won’t work, as it depends on cooperation; (2) It would result in a dog-fight over what are “democratic parties and social organizations,” just as in Korea and throughout the Russian orbit; (3) the Russians would have veto power on the Security Council. A short trusteeship under the Trusteeship Council would reduce or obviate objections (2) and (3) but objection (1) would remain, as it does for all plans to implement the UNSCOP report thus far advanced.

Our main difficulty here is that when New York puts a draft position up to us, we don’t know how much steam the suggested position has behind it. We are uncertain how high up that position has been cleared at your end, or what new policy line lies behind it. A further difficulty is that while we are collecting a few preliminary thoughts on the subject, we are informed by the radio or the press that USUN has already spoken up in meeting. It may be, of course, that clearance between New York and Washington is done on a high level that we don’t know about in NE.

Now it is the morning of the 5th and we have Pearson’s statement. It seems good to me, but I think he has given up too easily on the
Trusteeship Council. If Ben Cohen's formula on "states directly concerned" could be utilized so that the Mandatory Power would be the one and only state directly concerned, the difficulty might be overcome. The difficulties attached to the SC formula seem considerable. While SC might have some justification for considering Arab resistance a threat to the peace, the Arabs could with equal reason contend that enforcement by SC of partition against Arab wishes would be aggression by the SC itself.

Sincerely,

GORDON P. MERRIAM

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867N.01/11-547: Telegram

The Chargé in Iraq (Dorsz) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

BAGHDAD, November 5, 1947—noon.

561. Azzam Pasha yesterday afternoon (Embtel 558, November 4) showed Busk (Embtel 551, November 3) cable from Feisal at Lake Success stating Salvador, Chile and third South American state had deserted Arabs under US pressure.¹

Azzam Pasha commented to Busk "Arabs can appreciate internal political considerations which determine US pro-Zionist policy, but can't they at least leave the small states alone to form their own opinions".

Busk reports Azzam depressed by message. Azzam contends US action is forcing Arabs to warfare which he is anxious to prevent.²

DORSZ

¹Not printed.

²Douglas L. Busk, British Chargé in Iraq.

³Telegram 353, November 5, from Damascus, reported President Kuwati's belief, expressed to the British Chargé in Syria, that China and Cuba, which had opposed partition, had been forced to change their attitude by American pressure (867N.01/11-547).

⁴Mr. Henderson, in telegram 547, November 6, to New York, drew Ambassador Johnson's attention to telegrams 561 from Baghdad and 353 from Damascus. He then stated: "In view of bitterness which is arising in Arab countries on this subject, I would appreciate your advice as to what reply can be made especially as to how far we can go in authorizing our representatives to make denial." (867N.01/11-547)
SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 6, 1947—6 p.m.

546. For Hilldring from Henderson and McGuire. Dept favors working group's revision (urteil 1146, Nov 4) and feels strongly that this is only wording USDel should vote favorably upon. If rest of Subcommittee 1 accepts Guatemalan revision, USDel should reserve its position and introduce working group's wording in full committee. Reference last para urtel 4 Delegation should not attempt to influence wording any alternative proposal.

If necessary to defend position, USDel might state:

1. US Govt considers it an integral part of the UNSCOP proposals that measures should be taken to provide in so far as possible that both the Jewish and Arab States have the means for financial stability and a reasonable opportunity for economic progress. This conception was the basis for UNSCOP's recommendation that there should be an economic union.

2. UNSCOP did not provide a detailed definition of economic union. The Jewish Agency has presented certain proposals regarding currency and customs which define economic union in a very limited way. In fact, the Agency proposals appear to be designed to establish economic separation. While in order to avoid delay in the submission of the whole report of the subcommittee, USDel has tentatively approved the Jewish Agency's currency proposals, it intends to devote further study to them, and reserves the right to suggest changes at a later time if it becomes clear that the Agency's proposals will endanger the financial stability of either state. In the meantime, USDel is not prepared to approve any change whatever in the specific UNSCOP proposal for an equal division of customs revenues, until such time as it becomes clear from experience that some other division is compatible with accomplishment of the objective of financial stability for both states.

1 Paul F. McGuire, Associate Chief of the Division of Financial Affairs.
2 Not printed; the revision read as follows: "After these obligations have been met in full, the surplus revenue from the customs and other common services shall be divided in the following manner: not less than 5 per cent and not more than 10 per cent to the City of Jerusalem, and the residue in equal proportion to the Jewish and the Arab States. At the end of the first year, and every two years thereafter, the division shall be reviewable by the Joint Economic Board, which shall make such modifications as may be deemed necessary." (501 BB Palestine/11-47)
3 Telegram 1146 reported this revision was "proposed by Guatemala in consultation with and to meet Jewish Agency's views" and read the same as the revision above through the distribution of revenues to the City of Jerusalem. Thereafter it read: "and the residue shall be allocated to each state by the Joint Economic Board in a proportion to be decided each year. The Board shall take into account that no state shall receive a share higher than approximately four million pounds in excess of its net contribution to these revenues, but the amount granted may be adjusted by the board according to the price level in relation to the prices prevailing at the time of the establishment of the union."
4 This paragraph gave the text of a compromise wording which was acceptable to the Jewish Agency.
Above position drafted in light of Dept’s understanding that USDel has already tentatively approved certain Jewish Agency currency proposals in modified form, and may not consider it feasible to retract this approval. However, Dept would prefer that US position on currency proposals also be formally reserved. If possible without serious embarrassment, Dept suggests that USDel take position that there is insufficient information available to permit any detailed elaboration of UNSCOP’s recommended objective of “a common currency”, and that such elaboration should be left to be worked out during the course of negotiations for the treaty of Economic Union.

Dept’s economic experts believe there is serious doubt that Arab State can be financially stable if it has to depend solely upon its own tax resources for governmental revenues and upon foreign exchange earnings from exports originating in the Arab State for all import requirements of that State. It would appear reasonable and compatible with UNCSOP concepts to provide for pooling of taxes and foreign exchange receipts and central import licensing for an initial period after political separation. An exception for gift capital remittances could be provided. If USDel feels it is incumbent upon US Govt to recommend a detailed plan for economic union at this time, State and Treasury will undertake to prepare such a plan in time for presentation to full Ad Hoc Committee. However, State and Treasury would be seriously handicapped by lack of info concerning economic effects of partition. It is in fact probable that the answer as to what form of economic union will be compatible with financial stability of both states can be derived only from experience, and that initially there should be a minimum of change from economic arrangements now in effect. I.e. the Joint Economic Board might take over the economic functions and procedures of the present Government of Palestine, but with instructions to work out procedures for a gradual transition to greater economic independence for the two states over a reasonable period of time. Dept would appreciate USDel’s comments on this approach. [Henderson and McGuire]

MARSHALL

501 BB Summaries/11-747: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

SECRET

NEW YORK, November 7, 1947—3:15 a.m. 1164.

At a meeting of the working group (US-USSR-Guatemala-Canada) on implementation of the Palestine Subcommittee on Par-
tion, USGADel on Nov. 6 presented a proposal designed to meet in part suggestions that the SC should be assigned a definite role in the implementation of the GA’s Palestine recommendations. Johnson suggested that the GA elect a UN commission composed of a high commissioner and two other members. This commission, subject to the GA recommendations on Palestine, would supervise and assist in the transfer of the powers of government to the two independent states and to the proposed trust territory of the city of Jerusalem, and would advise and assist the new governments in the establishment of stable bases of government and administration.

The US further suggested that the commission should report to and be subject to any instructions issued by the SC on matters affecting international peace and security and might report as necessary to the TC on other matters. For this purpose, the TC would be authorized to give advice to the commission within the framework of the GA recommendations. The UN commission would make its final report to the third GA session. As soon as feasible, on a date to be agreed by the SC and the mandatory power following a recommendation of the UN commission, but in any event, not later than July 1, 1948, the mandate for Palestine would be terminated and the independence of the two states would be achieved.

In the resulting discussion, it was made clear that the essential points of difference between the US and the USSR positions related to (1) the date on which the mandate would be terminated, and (2) the question of who would implement the GA recommendations. On the first point, the Soviet proposal called for the termination of the mandate on Jan. 1, 1948, followed by a transitional period, whereas the US proposal called for the termination of the mandate on July 1, 1948, simultaneously with the attainment of independence in Palestine.

On the second point, the Soviet position was that the SC should itself undertake the administration of Palestine during the period preceding independence, whereas the US position was that the steps preparatory to independence should be undertaken by the UK with the advice and assistance of a UN commission selected by the GA. These points of difference were not resolved. Tsarapkin (USSR) stated that the US suggestion gave no real responsibility to the SC. The mandatory power should lose all authority on Jan. 1, 1948, and only the SC had enough authority to take the necessary steps to carry out the GA recommendations. Therefore, the USSR felt that the Soviet proposals must be accepted.

AUSTIN
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Fraser Wilkins

CONFIDENTIAL


Participants: Sir Alexander Cadogan, United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. Lester B. Pearson, United Kingdom [Canadian] Delegation
Ambassador Herschel Johnson, United States Delegation
General John Hilldring, United States Delegation
Mr. Wilkins, United States Delegation

Ambassador Johnson and General Hilldring called on Sir Alexander Cadogan this morning at Mr. Pearson’s suite at The Biltmore. Mr. Pearson was also present. This meeting had been arranged at Ambassador Johnson’s request for the purpose of discussing with Sir Alexander Cadogan recent developments at the United Nations respecting the Palestine question and for the purpose of ascertaining, if possible, to what extent the British authorities in Palestine would be willing to cooperate in Palestine during the period prior to independence.

Mr. Pearson commenced the conversation by outlining the present situation in Subcommittee 1 of the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine. Mr. Pearson pointed out that this Subcommittee had been charged with the task of drawing up a plan for the partition of Palestine based on the majority plan of UNSCOP. Mr. Pearson explained that the vital part of this plan—its implementation—had been under discussion during the past few days in a working group of Subcommittee 1 consisting of the representatives of the United States, Soviet Russia, Guatemala and Canada. It was explained that the representatives of these four states had met as each of them had advanced suggestions regarding implementation.

Mr. Pearson observed that the United States plan provided for implementation during the period preceding the suggested date of July 1, 1948 by the United Kingdom with the advice and assistance of a United Nations Commission appointed by the General Assembly; that the Russian plan provided for the termination of the mandate on January 1, 1948, implementation by the Security Council and a United Nations Commission appointed by the Security Council reflecting the same membership as the Security Council and independence for the Jewish and Arab States on January 1, 1949; that the Guatemalan plan provided for a United Nations administration of Palestine, following the General Assembly’s recommendations, with forces supplied by such states as Mexico, Sweden and Czechoslovakia; and that the Canadian
plan was very similar to the United States plan except that, for legal reasons, the United Nations Commission appointed by the General Assembly, as envisaged by the United States, would be replaced by a United Nations Commission appointed by the Security Council.

Mr. Pearson explained that the United States had yesterday endeavored to compromise with the Russians by suggesting that the General Assembly's recommendations might stipulate that the United Nations Commission appointed by the General Assembly would have general supervision of the transfer of powers from the mandatory to the two new states, would be instructed to advise and assist not only the mandatory but the two new states and would be instructed to report to the Security Council on matters affecting international peace and security and might report to the Trusteeship Council on other matters. Mr. Pearson related that the Russians had found this compromise unacceptable.

Mr. Johnson then explained that he had informed the working group that he and Mr. Pearson would discuss the general question with the United Kingdom Delegation and would endeavor to ascertain to what extent the British authorities in Palestine would be willing to cooperate in Palestine during the period prior to independence. Mr. Johnson expressed the view that the United Kingdom would be mandatory for Palestine until the termination of the mandate and that it was inconceivable to him that the United Kingdom would deny all responsibility for the administration of Palestine and the maintenance of law and order during the period of British withdrawal prior to the termination of the mandate.

Sir Alexander Cadogan replied that he had been following developments with regard to Palestine in the United Nations closely and that yesterday he had sent a telegram to London raising similar questions and accordingly could not answer Mr. Johnson's question until he had had a reply. Sir Alexander continued that it seemed obvious to him that the British authorities in Palestine, as representatives of a good member of the United Nations, would continue to administer Palestine and maintain normal internal law and order while withdrawing. Sir Alexander said that London was presently working on plans of withdrawal, and that, although he was not aware of the time schedule or the manner in which it would be accomplished, he could say difficulties arising in Palestine as a result of United Nations recommendations would not be allowed to retard or reverse the British plan of withdrawal. In other words, as Sir Alexander envisaged the British plans, the British forces would gradually withdraw from the more stable areas, hand over the administration to the new authorities, and would leave what were believed to be the more unstable areas to the last. If
during this process trouble broke out in an area which the British forces had already evacuated, Sir Alexander did not believe that the British forces would return to it and again assume the responsibilities of administration and the maintenance of law and order in that area.

Mr. Johnson said that he appreciated the British position, and, of course, assumed that if a situation arose in a part of Palestine which appeared to affect international peace and security, that development would be a matter for consideration and action by the Security Council, but that as long as the United Kingdom had the responsibility for the mandate territory, it also had the responsibility for the maintenance of internal law and order within it.

Sir Alexander indicated that in general he concurred with Mr. Johnson's views and that he personally felt that the United Kingdom would cooperate in the transfer of administration and in the maintenance of internal law and order, but that more serious difficulties arising as a result of partition would not be the responsibility of the United Kingdom.

Mr. Johnson suggested that if the United Kingdom were in a position to issue a statement indicating in general terms the extent to which the United Kingdom was prepared to cooperate with the United Nations or its agents, such as the United Nations Commission, it would have a clarifying, salutary effect upon the present state of discussions in the Working Group on implementation, and in Subcommittee 1, and in the Ad Hoc Committee. Mr. Johnson was of the belief that a statement by the United Kingdom, such as that which he had indicated, would tend to remove the doubts which the Russians and the Guatemalans entertained as to the honest intention of the British to withdraw and would assist the United Nations in reaching a solution on the Palestine question.

Sir Alexander Cadogan remarked that there could be no doubt whatever about British intentions to withdraw and that there would be a "dwindling suspicion" in the minds of the Russians and the Guatemalans when the British forces actually began to depart. Sir Alexander further remarked that he hoped London's reply to the telegram which he had sent to London yesterday incorporated views along the lines of those which had been exchanged today would be favorable, and that it would be possible for the United Kingdom to issue a statement clarifying its views with regard to normal implementation.¹

FRASER WILKINS

¹ According to a second memorandum of November 7 by Mr. Wilkins, Sir Alexander Cadogan, during this discussion, informed Ambassador Johnson and General Hilldring that "the United Kingdom would abstain from voting on United Nations recommendations with regard to the future government of Palestine." (IO files: US/Δ/AC.14/159)
501.BB Palestine/10–3047: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin)¹

SECRET  WASHINGTON, November 7, 1947—7 p. m.

US URGENT

Reference is made to the aide-mémoire of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs dated October 30, 1947 ² with regard to the activities of the SS Pan Crescent and Pan York, which according to the aide-mémoire are vessels registered under the flag of Panama now present at Constanza. The Foreign Secretary has likewise invited attention to the possibility that the Colonel Frederick C. Johnson, now lying at Norfolk, Virginia, may be destined for the same traffic.

The Department of State has undertaken immediate investigation of the status of these vessels. This investigation however is not complete and the following comments provide merely an interim answer reflecting the concern which the Government of the United States shares with the Government of the United Kingdom over the activities of vessels engaged in the clandestine emigrant traffic to Palestine. Meanwhile armed cutters of the United States Coast Guard have the Colonel Frederick C. Johnson under twenty-four hour surveillance at Norfolk and all possible steps are being taken to prevent the sailing of this vessel.

For the most confidential information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs it can be revealed that Officers of the Department of State have discussed this problem as a matter of urgency with authorized representatives of the Jewish Agency in New York City. With specific reference to the SS Pan Crescent, Pan York, and SS Colonel Frederick C. Johnson an authorized representative of the Jewish Agency has informed the Department of State that the Jewish Agency has no information about prospective sailings either from Atlantic ports or ports in the Black Sea during the next five or six weeks. The representative of the Jewish Agency added that the Agency would do everything within its power to prevent further incidents but indicated that the Agency did not have complete control of the Jewish Underground. The Agency requested any precise information available as to prospective sailings in order that it might use its maximum influence to prevent incidents. The Department’s representative stated

¹ Sent to London as Department telegram 4772, with the instruction: “Please call on Mr. Bevin and leave with him the following memorandum in response to his aide-mémoire of October 30 (your 5787 October 30).” Telegram 5787 is not printed.
² Not printed.
that it expected the Jewish Agency to exert itself to the utmost to see that the Underground is restrained.3

Furthermore the Secretary of State has in person called in Jewish leaders and informed them with the greatest possible emphasis that unless immediate and effective steps were taken to stop this clandestine activity he would have no other recourse but to treat the matter publicly.

MARSHALL

867N.01/11-947 : Telegram

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, November 10, 1947—6 p.m.

249. In response Dept’s inquiry re allegations at Damascus and Baghdad of US pressure on Latin American states to support partition Palestine, Amb Johnson has informed Dept 1 as follows:

“I have discussed matter of soliciting support for the American position at the GA with delegation officials concerned. I am assured that no USDel officials have attempted to put pressure on states mentioned in telegram Damascus 355 of November 5,2 and Baghdad 561, November 5, in effort to persuade them to support partition of Palestine.

However, American representatives have not hesitated to explain and defend to representatives of foreign powers at UN the official American position advocating partition of Palestine and establishment of an independent Arab and Jewish state. Hence, answer to the question raised in the last paragraph of telegram Damascus 355, November 5, is in the negative. For your information and for use by Damascus and Baghdad Embassies as they see fit: Latin American states while not under pressure of US Government regarding Palestine are subject to considerable persuasion by national chapters of highly organized and well financed Jewish Agency. These states, while yielding to JA pressure, may be inclined sometimes to claim that the pressure comes from the US Government rather than the JA.”

Sent Damascus 249, repeated Baghdad 420, Beirut 502, Jidda 348, Cairo 1538, Jerusalem 463 and London 4790.

MARSHALL

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3 Telegram 1240, November 19, 11:05 p.m., from New York informed the Department: “A report in the NY Post to the effect that the Pan York and Pan Crescent were ready to sail from the Black Sea last week ‘but the Jewish Commission ordered the passengers disembarked pending further alterations to the ships’ probably meant that representations which the JA had made were being heeded, Gelber (JA) told USGADel. Gelber said he did not know what was meant by ‘further alterations to the ships’ but he thought it might be the reason given to the people by their leaders who did not wish to give the real reasons, i.e., the fact that illegal immigration should be cut down.” (501.BB Summaries/11-1947)

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2 In telegram 1181, November 9, 6:08 p.m., from New York.

2 See footnote 3 to telegram 561, p. 1240.
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] November 10, 1947.

Subject: Suspension of Exports of Arms and Ammunition to Arab States and Palestine

Discussion:

From time to time requests are received from Arab governments of the Near East for the purchase and export of arms and ammunition or other military material of a type requiring export licensing. Moreover, it is expected that the Jewish Agency or other Jewish organizations will make similar requests in the near future.

While these acquisitions are requested on the ground that they are required to improve and strengthen the internal security forces of these countries, I am of the opinion that, in view of the tense situation in Palestine and on its frontiers, we should not permit the export of any material of this nature to Palestine or neighboring states so long as the tension continues. Otherwise, the Arabs might use arms of U.S. origin against Jews, or Jews might use them against Arabs. In either case, we would be subject to bitter recrimination.

Recommendation:

I, therefore, recommend that effective immediately we suspend authorization for the export from the United States of arms, ammunition and other war material intended for use in Palestine or in neighboring countries, until the situation in that area has become somewhat more clarified. This suspension should also apply to export licenses already issued but not yet utilized.¹

Concurrences:

U — Mr. Lovett
A—A — Mr. Armour
MD — Mr. Cummins
NE — Mr. Merriam ²

LOY W. HENDERSON

¹ Marginal notation by the Secretary of State: “OK”.
² Concurrences indicated by U, A—A and MD; cleared also by the Office of the Legal Adviser.

501.BB Palestine/11–1147: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

New York, November 11, 1947—12:30 a.m.

1198. Delegation this morning¹ took following decisions re partition plan for Palestine:

¹ November 10.
A. Implementation.

The critical situation in the working group on implementation was explained to the Delegation. The differences between the US and USSR proposals especially in regard to relationship between the commission and the SC were explained. It was noted that the Department preferred the omission from the US plan of the proposal for having the commission which supervises the implementation of the partition plan report to the Trusteeship Council. It was also explained that we would be willing to approve the Canadian proposal that the mandate be formally terminated on January 1, provided that the British were willing to exercise the functions of policing and internal administration until independent states existed in the area. It was noted that the British had not yet informed us whether they would be willing to assume this responsibility. With regard to the further question whether the Soviets would agree to the Canadian compromise proposal, and whether the US would assume some of the onus for failure to secure a partition plan by refusing to agree to the Canadian compromise, the American representatives in the working group were given discretion to make the necessary decisions, subject to instructions which may be received from the Department during the course of the day.

B. City of Jerusalem.

It was explained that there was considerable sentiment in the working group for a proposal that the international regime for the city of Jerusalem be limited to the ancient walled city of Jerusalem, with the new Jewish city being made a part of the Jewish state while the Arab city was incorporated in the Arab state. The international authority would exercise supervision over other holy places throughout Palestine. It was agreed that the American representatives in the working group should go along with the majority on this question, provided that adequate safeguards for the holy places were retained.²

²Messrs. Wilkins and Merriam had already discussed this matter by telephone. The Department’s point of view was then sent to New York in telegram 556, November 10, 6 p.m., prefaced with “for Hilldring from Henderson”, as follows: “We feel that such a division is impractical and undesirable for following reasons:

1. It would be a further departure from the provisions of the Majority Report.
2. It would severely limit the territorial area under the authority of the Governor of Jerusalem and thus weaken his authority and prestige as guardian of the Holy Places throughout Palestine.
3. The majority of Christian establishments in Palestine are concentrated in Jerusalem but outside the Old City. Therefore the majority of Christian establishments would fall within the area of either the Jewish or Arab states. Considerable Christian opposition to such a move could be expected.
4. Difficulty of division of area by populations is illustrated by location of

Footnote continued on following page.
C. Territorial question.

It was pointed out that representatives of the Jewish Agency had stated that they could not give up their claim to the Negeb unless they received compensation elsewhere. Several delegations felt very strongly that the Arab claims to some of the Negeb were justified in view of the character of its population and the desirability of giving the Arabs a land bridge between Egypt and the other Arab states. It was suggested that the prospects be explored for a division of the Negeb, perhaps with some slight compensation to the Zionists in Galilee. If the matter arises in the working group today the American representatives will take a strong stand along the lines of the previous position adopted by the Delegation and will reserve the US position unless the solution recommended falls within the limits of the Dept’s instructions.

D. Economic union.

It was agreed that the American representatives should adhere strictly to the Dept’s position of opposing the Jewish Agency’s reservations with regard to a common currency for Palestine and a ceiling on contributions to the Arab state. The provision for a periodic review of the terms of the economic union were considered adequate to protect the interests of the Jewish state.

E. Freedom of religion.

It was agreed that, in the drafting of UN documents regarding the future of Palestine, the USDel would insist on the inclusion of the phrase “freedom of religion” rather than “freedom of religious worship,” the version preferred by the Soviets.

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Hebrew University which is far removed from predominantly Jewish area, and separated by a predominantly Arab area.

“5) Jerusalem has grown through a period of many years as a unitary city. The division of its administrative and municipal services, water supply, etc., would make them extremely difficult and costly to manage and operate.

“6) Under the proposed division almost the whole modern commercial area as well as all important government buildings would go to the Jewish state. The Arab state would be forced to build up an entirely new city in an area mostly unsuitable for such construction.” (867N.01/11-1047)

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501.BB Palestine/11-1147 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

New York, November 11, 1947—12:20 a. m.

PRIORITY

1197. Subcommittee I’s working group on implementation this afternoon 1 unanimously agreed on following:

1 November 10.
"1. The mandate for Palestine shall terminate on 1 May 1948, and the armed forces of the mandatory power shall be withdrawn from Palestine by that date.

2. Independent Arab and Jewish states shall come into existence in Palestine on 1 July 1948, or at such earlier date subsequent to 1 May 1948 as the UN Commission, referred to below, recommends and the SC approves as desirable and practicable.

3. There shall be a commission appointed by the GA of 3–5 members representing small powers.

4. The functions of the commission shall be to implement the measures recommended by the GA as follows: (The provisions to be included here, after approval by the working group, will be drafted having in mind the recommendations of UNSCOP report, points 5–10 of the Soviet Delegation’s proposals of 8 November and any other suggestions made by members of the working group.)

5. The commission shall assist the mandatory in the performance of its functions up to the termination of the mandate.

6. The commission shall be responsible for the administration of Palestine in the period, if any, between the termination of the mandate and the establishment of the two independent states.

7. The commission shall act under the authority and guidance of the SC. The commission shall be guided in its activities by the recommendations of the GA and by such special instructions within the purview of the recommendations of the GA as the SC may consider necessary to issue. The commission shall render periodic monthly progress reports, or more frequently if desirable, to the SC. (Further clarification of the last two sentences of this paragraph may be made by the working group.)

Norm: During the period between the adoption by the GA of the resolution on Palestine and the termination of the mandate, the mandatory power shall be requested by the GA to continue to be responsible for the maintenance of law and order and the conduct of essential public services in Palestine.”

Following are comments by USDel on paragraphs as indicated:

2. Provision for possible earlier independence inserted at instance USDel which expressed desire accomplish independence same date as termination of mandate.

3. It was generally agreed that powers selected for this commission should be states which support partition in the UN.

4. Soviet Delegation proposals of November 3 are contained in US/A/AC.14/144 and my telegram 1135 of November 3. USDel plans to propose those modifications of UNSCOP majority plan as are contained in Department’s Annex A revised by USDel—US/A/AC.14/123 of October 24, 1947 plus such other changes as required to bring UNSCOP majority plan into conformity with Subcommittee I’s working group agreement on implementation.

*Neither printed, but for Soviet proposals, see telegram 1141, November 4, from New York, p. 1221.
7. USDel’s acceptance of first sentence in principle was conditional on Russian acceptance of second and third sentences in principle. USDel made this clear in Subcommittee I’s working group and in Subcommittee I itself and stressed that special commission would have full authority to carry out GA recommendations without prior approval by SC, that SC could give instructions within the purview of the GA recommendations to commission, but commission would be free to act in absence of instructions; and that approval of reports of commission by SC would not be necessary.

Austin

501.BB Summaries/11-1147: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

SECRET

New York, November 11, 1947—3:48 a.m.

1201.

While the Arab Palestine plan developed in the Subcommittee was based on the establishment of a unitary state, the door was left “wide open” for cantonization,1 Beeley (UK) has informed USGAdel. The Arabs, he explained, did not contemplate suggesting cantonization, but had been tentatively decided that Siam would suggest in the Palestine Committee that the plan be amended to include cantonization. The plan as originally drafted contained provisions predicated on UK assistance continuing to be available for implementation. However, Beeley had informed the Arabs that these provisions would be unacceptable to the UK since it was obvious the JA could not agree to the plan.

Developments in the Palestine Subcommittee had prompted him to believe that the only basis for a solution was a unitary state with Arab and Jewish cantons having wide autonomous local powers. Jewish immigration should be permitted into the Jewish cantons for a period such as five years, after which the unitary state would become fully sovereign in immigration, in Beeley’s opinion.

The hope that the US was under no misapprehension as to the seriousness of the UK Government’s intentions to withdraw its troops was

1 According to telegram 1157, November 6, 12:57 a.m., from New York, Mr. Chamoun of Lebanon, on November 5, had informed a member of the American Delegation, that the “Arab States would not themselves propose cantonization in Palestine, but would not oppose it if it were proposed by some other nations.” (501.BB Summaries/11-647)
reiterated by Beeley. He said Bevin, in a reply to UKDel's request for an opinion on the Soviet and US proposal of implementation of the partition plan, had commented that if the US were really concerned about keeping the SC out of the Palestine question why didn't it abandon its support of partition.

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/11-1147: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, November 11, 1947—4 p. m.

518. 1. High government official confirms existence JA plan on highest level set up Jewish state within UNSCOP boundaries at first opportunity regardless UN decision. January 1 is date frequently mentioned. In such event British would probably not interfere, regarding this as training period leading to full statehood. Jews already operate many of own public services, excluding postal, railways, civil aviation and customs, which Palestine Government would not relinquish in advance withdrawal. Same applies control Haifa port. In circumstances so-called state would be handicapped to extent which informant thinks not at all realized by JA. Informant confirms existence rumors that JA has some kind of deal with Abdullah, possibly to take over portion of Palestine outside Jewish state.

2. Considers suggested partition Jerusalem visualizing Jewish state approaching walls of great Mosque more inflammatory, dangerous than partition of Palestine itself. Thinks interests of Christendom in holy places would be endangered to point where churches would have to enter dispute.

3. Recent meeting occurred at Nablus, following return of mayor of Nablus from talks with Mufti, at which clashing Husseini and Nashashibi factions reconciled for resistance purposes. This regarded as increasing effectiveness Palestine Arab resistance to partition.

4. Growing cleavage noted between right and left wings of Jewish community in struggle for power with Haganah now interfering less with rightist Irgun than formerly. Interesting to note leftist Jewish press including Davar spokesman for JA displayed prominently felicitations to USSR October revolution anniversary. This criticized by right-wing political elements, one industrialist saying such congratulations never appeared in [regarding] US July 4th.

5. Although both Arabs and Jews comment locally that USSR Palestine policy motivated by desire pave way for infiltration trained
Communist agitators from eastern Europe, source mentioned paragraph 1 unimpressed by this idea since Cominform Belgrade already has working relations with Palestine Communist Party (Jewish) and Arab League National Liberation.

MACATEE

501.BB Palestine/11-747 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 12, 1947—6 p. m.

558. With reference to Negeb question, Dept concurs with decision mentioned in para. C of USUN 1198 Nov. 11. It considers any substantial modification of US position would be most undesirable for following reasons:

1. Decision to include Negeb in Arab State was approved by Department and later by full Delegation under chairmanship of Secretary.

2. For Delegation’s information following factors were taken into consideration in arriving at Department’s position:

a. If partition is to be successful it should be as equitable and just as possible. Among factors taken into consideration in this regard were the preponderance of population in a given area and the end use to which area could be put. Using these criteria, it was found that the Negeb was overwhelmingly Arab and has historically been so. (United Kingdom figures furnished to Subcommittee No. 1 show considerable increase in Arab population of Negeb over figures used by UNSCOP. Furthermore there has been great increase in habitations and settled population. Tribes inhabiting region can no longer be considered as purely nomadic and non-settled population.) It is a barren, arid, and topographically inhospitable area suitable only for marginal cultivation and seasonal grazing, an occupation habitually engaged in by the present inhabitants—semi-nomadic Arabs. Many proponents of Palestinian development admit that there is extremely slight chance of any large-scale development in the area.

b. One of the major objections by the Arab States to partition as envisaged in the majority report has been the fact that the proposed Jewish State would divide the historic land bridge existing between traditionally Arab areas now constituted into Arab States. By giving the Negeb, with point of intersection at Beersheba, to the Arab State this connection would be maintained, and Beersheba developed as an effective trade and communications center between the Arab and Jewish States. The forcing of a Jewish wedge in an Arab area inhabited by traditionally turbulent and fanatical Moslems would immeasurably increase difficulties in connection with implementation.

c. Frequent reference has been made to the desirability of the Jewish State having an “outlet to the Red Sea and the Port of Aqaba.” It
should be pointed out that Aqaba is not in Palestine. The possibility of developing any part of Palestine bordering on the Red Sea as a port is open to serious doubt, and development of satisfactory communications with such a port extremely difficult.

In view of considerations set forth above Department does not feel that the approved position should be abandoned or substantially modified.

MARSHALL

867N.01/11-1247: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

LONDON, November 12, 1947—7 p.m.

6005. Linton of JA advised Embassy November 10 that on behalf of JA he had recently protested strongly to Colonial Office re use Arab Legion in Palestine pointing out to CoLOff that this was provocative step inviting trouble with Jewish farmers who know that 4,000-man Arab Legion is only well-trained and disciplined Arab body in area.

2. Linton said he was more concerned than ever (Embassy's 5489 October 10) re manner in which British Government would withdraw. He had gathered at CoLOff that its officials are disinclined to leave anarchy behind them but on other hand there had been some loose talk in this regard by Palestine Government officials. Linton thought HMG still hopes that Arabs and Jews may reach agreement and that in consequence HMG can stay in Palestine. If so, Linton said "HMG is very wrong".

3. Linton did not believe that boycott or other economic measures taken against Jewish state by Arab state with support other Arab governments would be effective because "JA has right to ask Jewish communities all over world to finance settlement of million new Jews in Palestine" and with gift dollars from these communities Jewish state at worst could for years be largely independent of its surroundings. However, Jews will make every effort to develop close economic relations with Arabs.

GALLMAN

1 Not printed; it reported Mr. Linton's deep concern over the possibility that "British troops will withdraw first from Arab area toward Palestine ports thus giving Arabs opportunity consolidate their positions in vacated area with result Haganah will have to fight its way back into this area. Manner of withdrawal will be of great significance to Jews according Linton who has heard rumors effect that British are planning withdrawal to favor Arabs." (867N.01/10-1047)
Memorandum by Ambassador George Wadsworth to the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Mattison)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 13, 1947.

1. Following our telephone conversation of this morning, I had "strictly personal and confidential" converse with Dr. Jamali. I began by telling him frankly that you had given me to understand:

a) That "at working level" the officers of NE wished as of now to outline a procedure which might properly be followed in the event that Partition (or any other proposed plan of settlement) failed to obtain a two-thirds majority;

b) That you believed it would be of high practical advantage were such outline to be "cleared" with General Marshall prior to his departure for London, especially in view of the fact that he would in all probability have left Washington before the Palestine question came to a vote in GAUN; and

c) That, to this end, you believed it would be especially helpful were NE to know, in general, Arab views on the subject and, in particular, to what degree the Arab plan of settlement (as evolved in the Second Sub-Committee) might open the way to the so-called "cantonization" compromise of which I had already informed you.

2. I then explained that I was leaving within the hour for Washington and said that I believed the moment was one when we should talk with the same full frankness which had marked our relations in Baghdad. I said that I had personally gathered the impression in conversations at working level that, in the event of "no vote," the American Government would be able to approach the resulting situation strictly on its merits and without prior commitment.

3. Dr. Jamali replied that the Arab delegations, too, had been envisaging the possibility of such a development, especially in the light of information received from London that Bevin continued adamant in his stand on "implementation." The resulting Arab views, he said, might be recapitulated as follows:

a) With failure of GAUN to adopt any resolution dealing substantively with the items on its current agenda, it "would have no further authority in the matter;" and

b) To the end that a formula be found for reopening the matter in the current session or at another special session, it would seem desirable that exploratory Anglo-American conversations be held immediately following a "no vote" in GAUN.

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1 To participate in the Fifth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers which was held from November 25 to December 15, 1947.
4. Were such conversations to be so held, Dr. Jamali said, the Arabs would wish them to be premised on mutual recognition of the following two considerations logically emerging from the prior proceedings:

a) There shall be no Jewish State anywhere in the Arab World, but every proper safeguard shall be given the already existing Jewish Home in Palestine; and

b) There shall be no further Jewish immigration into Palestine except as incident to international settlement of the D.F. question based on all members of UN doing their share.

[Here follow paragraphs numbered 5 through 7 dealing with three draft resolutions to be proposed to the Ad Hoc Committee by Subcommittee 2. The resolutions dealt with the referral of certain legal questions to the International Court of Justice, the questions of Jewish refugees and displaced persons, and the constitution and future government of Palestine: for texts as proposed by Sub-committee 2, see GA (II), Ad Hoc Committee, pages 299–308.]

8. It is in Resolution No. III, he concluded, that you will find both the safeguards which the Arabs conceive to be properly extendable to the Jews in Palestine (as individuals, as dominant majority groups in certain parts of the country and as a cultural and religious minority in the country as a whole) and the provision which might conceivably open the way to “cantonization”. In this connection he asks you to study carefully numbered paragraphs 6–iv through 6–xii. No. 6–x reads as follows:

The constitution shall authorize the Legislature to invest local authorities with wide discretion in matters connected with education, health and other social services.

9. Finally, in answer to two questions which I put to him, Dr. Jamali confirmed that the Arabs are quite willing: a) that administrative (sub-district) frontiers be so redrawn as to establish a number of “areas in which they (the Jews) are in a majority”; and b) that the President of the proposed Supreme Court (see numbered paragraph 6–xi of Resolution No. III) be selected by the International Court of Justice.

GEORGE WADSWORTH

501.A Summaries/11–1447: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
[Excerpts]

NEW YORK, November 14, 1947—1:30 a.m.

1213.
"Ad Hoc" Committee on the Palestinian Question, Subcommittee 1 (10[20]th meeting)

After the two working groups on boundaries and implementation had met in closed session on Nov. 12, the full Subcommittee, at an evening meeting, completed its recommendations on all but two points of the boundary question...

Chairman Pruszynski (Poland) then submitted the working group's recommendation that Jaffa be made an Arab enclave, with the Arabs having the right to free transit through the Jewish state. He did not favor a corridor through the Jewish state to Jaffa. Johnson did not believe that a special road should be constructed for Arab use from Jaffa through Jewish state, as the two peoples must learn to live together in common amity... The Subcommittee approved the working group's recommendation for inclusion of Jaffa in the Arab state with free communication between this city and the Arab state...

Passing to the question of Galilee, Pruszynski said the working group had been unable to formulate any definite proposal, but he recommended that a compromise on the JA proposals be worked out... Shertok (JA) said that there was the possibility that an exchange might be effected of some of the land in the northern part of the Negeb which UNSCOP had placed in the Jewish state.

Johnson declared that the US could not approve assignment of any area in western Galilee to the Jewish state, since the population in this area was so predominantly Arab. In addition, this was virtually the only area which offered the Arabs any room for future expansion and development. The US, he said, would favor a slight adjustment in eastern Galilee for the benefit of the Jewish state and if possible this line might be drawn to include Safad in the Arab state. Shertok objected that Safad was one of the four Jewish holy places. Johnson replied that it was only a working suggestion... Johnson said he believed that if western Galilee were given to the Jews it would seriously jeopardize the two-thirds vote for the partition scheme...

Johnson proposed that some adjustment be made in the northern part of the Negeb, including the town of Beersheba, which would be in favor of the Arab state...

"Ad Hoc" Committee on Palestinian Question, Subcommittee 1 (21st meeting)

The UK announced in the Subcommittee on Nov. 13 that British troops would not be available as "the instrument for the enforcement of settlement in Palestine against either Arabs or Jews."
Cadogan (UK) made this announcement at the opening of the afternoon meeting. He said that in line with the UK statement of Sept. 28, plans were being made for an early withdrawal of British forces and administration from Palestine. Efforts were being made to reduce the time required for the military withdrawal to a minimum and the evacuation should be completed by Aug. 1, 1948. As long as British troops remain in any part of Palestine, he stated, they must maintain law and order in the areas which they occupy, but they will not be available as "the instrument for the enforcement of settlement in Palestine against either Arabs or Jews."

The impracticability of withdrawing the last of the UK troops from Palestine before summer did not imply that a UK civil administration would be maintained for that length of time, Cadogan pointed out. "We reserve the right to lay down the mandate and to bring our civil administration to an end at any time after it has become evident that no settlement acceptable to both Jews and Arabs has been reached by the Assembly." In the event of an interval between the termination of the mandate and the withdrawal of the last British troops, the UK would not maintain a civil administration and would confine itself to preserving order in the areas controlled by its remaining forces, he added.

Concluding, Cadogan told the Subcommittee that "if a UN commission were at work in Palestine taking preparatory steps for a settlement which would require enforcement it must not expect British authorities either to exercise administrative responsibility or to maintain law and order except in the limited areas of which they would necessarily remain in occupation during the process of withdrawal."

At the conclusion of Cadogan's statement, Garcia Granados (Guatemala) asked a series of questions. To the general question as to whether the UK would accept the recommendations of the GA on Palestine if those recommendations did not require it to play an active role of enforcement, Cadogan replied that if the GA, by a two-thirds majority, approved any solution, the UK would not take any action contrary to it. Asked whether the UK would accept the date of termination of the mandate that the GA recommends, Cadogan replied it was difficult to give a very affirmative answer without knowing more specifically the date. He referred to his earlier statement that "we reserve the right to lay down the mandate and bring our civil administration to an end at any time."

To the questions whether the UK would agree not to obstruct the general task of the GA commission to implement partition, the establishment of provisional councils of government, the recruitment and organization of the militias for the two states, the work of the demar-
cation of boundaries committee, and the GA recommendations on immigration and land regulations for the future Jewish state, Cadogan replied in the affirmative. However, his answer was conditioned by the reservation that the UK would have to retain a certain degree of control in order to insure the safety of its troops and assure their orderly withdrawal.

Asked as to whether the mandatory power would, when requested, surrender the different branches of the administration in a gradual and progressive way to the UN commission, the provisional councils of government and the economic board, Cadogan answered that when the time comes, the UK might not be in the position to actually hand over all these functions. He said there would be no obstruction to the UN commission, the provisional councils, or economic board in their assuming those functions in the territory evacuated by the British, as and when it is evacuated. Cadogan could not give an absolutely affirmative answer to the question of whether the UK would obstruct the commission in obtaining whatever data it wanted, but he did not believe there would be any obstruction.

Pearson (Canada) declared that the working group on implementation would have to take this UK statement into consideration and make some modifications to its report. He hoped to produce a report soon which would be approved by the Subcommittee. Johnson questioned whether sufficient warning would be given and some form or [of?] agreement reached between the provisional councils of government and the UK in areas where the British civil administration had withdrawn prior to the withdrawal of UK troops. Cadogan replied that he could not answer this question without further instructions. However, he commented that UK authorities would not obstruct civil authorities assuming their functions in areas evacuated by the British. He did not contemplate that the provisional councils would come into being in areas where there was still military occupation. Garcia Granados asked whether there would be any area on the UN commission’s arrival where there were no troops and what exactly was meant by “military occupation.” Cadogan could not answer these questions, but promised to obtain the views of his Government.

“Ad Hoc” Committee on Palestinian Question, Subcommittee 1 (22nd meeting)

At a night meeting on Nov. 13, the Subcommittee modified the UNSCOP line in eastern Galilee, adding some additional territory to the Jewish state, but rejected JA claims to western and upper Galilee. Pruszynski (Poland) suggested a new line to the east of the one pre-
viously presented by the working group, and the US proposed a line
even farther east. The JA agreed to accept the line proposed by Pruszyński in the southern part of this area and that proposed by the US
in the northern part, which would add the villages of El Maikija,
Meirum, El Sammi‘i, Farradiya and Kafir I‘Nan with a population of
2,100 Arabs to the Jewish state. The Subcommittee agreed to this line,
completing the boundary discussions, except for the Negeb region.

AUSTIN

591BB Palestine/11-1447: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the
United Nations (Austin)

TOP SECRET
WASHINGTON, November 14, 1947—11 a. m.
U.S. URGENT
561. For Austin and Johnson and Rusk. For your urgent attention
following is text of statement handed me this morning by Sir John
Balfour:

"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have been con-
sidering the recent proposals of the working group on implementation
set up by the first subcommittee of the Palestine Committee of the
General Assembly.

They wish to make it absolutely clear that they will not allow the
British administration or British troops in Palestine to be used either
directly as the instrument of the United Nations for imposing a
settlement not acceptable to both Jews and Arabs and therefore likely
to provoke serious opposition in Palestine or in neighboring countries,
or indirectly for the purpose of maintaining law and order while a
United Nations Commission imposes such a settlement. They consider
that it would be playing the Soviet Union's game to allow British
troops to be embroiled in repressive action in Palestine against either
Jews or Arabs. However much H.M.G. might say that they were
acting as agents of the United Nations, the hostility aroused would be
directed only against them.

The use of British troops more or less in the role of mercenaries for
the ostensible purpose of shooting at either side in the name of law and
order, but in fact for the purpose of enforcing a settlement by force
on one side or the other, is therefore not acceptable to H.M.G. Nor
are they prepared to put their soldiers either under the command of
a United Nations commission or of a foreign power. Their troops must
remain under their own control and command."

1 According to a memorandum of conversation of November 17, by Mr. Knox,
Mr. Beeley of the United Kingdom Delegation had informed him that day that
"There would be cooperation between the United Kingdom and the Commission
to an extent . . . . The cooperation would be such that the Arabs would be

Footnote continued on following page.
H.M.G. are most anxious to remove all uncertainty about their basic position in this respect. It is that if a United Nations commission in Palestine were taking preparatory steps for an enforced settlement the British administration and British troops would not continue to exercise administrative responsibility or to maintain law and order, except for their own protection in the process of withdrawal."

Balfour said he had been instructed to deliver foregoing message to me more or less at the same time that Sir Alexander Cadogan delivered his statement at UN yesterday afternoon. It had however been impossible for me to receive him until this morning.

Marshall

unable to charge that the United Kingdom was helping to carry-out partition. The United Kingdom during that period would not attempt to sabotage the work of the Commission or to make its task more difficult. The United Kingdom simply would take care to avoid any responsibility for any such partition policy. Therefore, the United Kingdom would consult with the Commission and give administrative notice of the progress of evacuation and inform the Commission in advance of areas it intended to evacuate. The United Kingdom would also attempt to allow for a smooth transition of administrative control over essential governmental services for the sake of the population, but would not hold itself responsible for such transitional arrangements." (IO files: US/A/AC.14/177)

867N.01/11–1447: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Moscow, November 14, 1947—4 p. m.

3215. Despite lack info GA developments except from Soviet press and fragmentary radio news, we feel obliged register our conviction Soviet policy and tactics toward Palestine question are deliberately calculated to ensure unsettlement, rather than settlement, and to create maximum difficulties for British and Americans in Near East. While proposal for neutral, small-power interim commission appears highly desirable from our point of view, we consider it essential that body should be able operate freely under general directives, with its actions subject only to disapproval by Security Council unanimity (as in case ACC Austria) and not to unanimous approval. In latter case, USSR could be depended upon to obstruct and frustrate efforts to secure orderly and peaceful transition. While Soviet acceptance Palestine partition has seemed second-choice possibility since last May (Embgram A–843 August 25 1), surprisingly forthright support in current GA seems to us to reflect Kremlin decision that:

(1) Both Europe and Asiatic colonial areas are at present more critical and considerably "softer" for Soviet exploitation than

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2 Not printed.
“harder” Arab East, unshaken either politically or economically by war and enemy occupation, shielded by firm US stand in Greece, Turkey and Iran, bolstered by strong US and British interests and commitments and controlled by feudal anti-Communist ruling class, susceptible to limited political “deals” but unlikely to open doors to Soviet penetration.

(2) In view weakness indigenous Communist movements, Jews and other minority groups provide Kremlin’s only immediately useful tool to “soften up” area for eventual straight Communist cultivation.

(3) Support of UNSCOP majority recommendation would place Soviet Delegation in optimum position to secure “appropriate” implementing measures and ensure adoption partition plan. This solution, though second-choice, would serve Soviet interest in softening up area by:

(a) Securing withdrawal of British and ensuring against their replacement by other great-power influence;

(b) Launching unsettling and disruptive Jewish-Arab conflict which could be kept going indefinitely by covert Soviet aid and incitement to both sides through local Communist parties who will be heavily reinforced by Communist indoctrinated emigrants from Eastern Europe; thus threatening and damaging major US and British interests in an area where USSR has nothing to lose.

(4) Soviet offense in Arab eyes would be minimized by prior endorsement partition by UNSCOP majority and USA and by Soviet record in support Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt (already being propagandized, see Embtel 3205, November 13¹). Moreover, given shortness of man’s memory and flexibility of Soviet tactics, Kremlin could quickly recapture Arab good will by sudden reversal position if and when its interests should so dictate.

Dept pass Jerusalem 5, asking Jerusalem repeat Arab capitals. Passed to London.

SMITH

¹ Not printed.

501.BB Palestine/11-1847

Memorandum Prepared for the Secretary of State ¹

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 18, 1947.

Subject: Forthcoming procedures and policy on Palestine

¹ Sent by Messrs. Rusk and Henderson; drafted by Mr. McClintock.
PALESTINE

I.

In the ad hoc Committee

It is apparent that in the next few days votes will be taken in the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine on

1. The report of Subcommittee 1 which has worked out details of the UNSCOP Majority Report favoring partition of Palestine, and
2. The report of Subcommittee 2 which has worked out details of the Minority UNSCOP report favoring a unitary state in Palestine.

It is recommended that the US Delegation vote for the report of Subcommittee 1 and against the report of Subcommittee 2.

In Plenary Session

The report of Subcommittee 1 will undoubtedly receive a majority of votes in the ad hoc committee and be submitted to a Plenary Session of the Assembly. In this case the US Delegation will vote for the partition plan. It is possible also that the report of Subcommittee 2 may receive a bare majority in the ad hoc committee and be submitted likewise to vote in Plenary Session.

It is recommended that the US vote against the report of Subcommittee 2, but that its representative state in so doing that if neither partition nor the unitary state proposals receive the necessary two-thirds majority vote of the Assembly the US will join with other Members of the United Nations in seeking to find some other solution for the problem of Palestine.

In this latter event the US should advocate the following procedures:

1. A new ad hoc committee on the Palestine problem, to which each Member of the United Nations would have the right to appoint one representative, should meet not later than January 15, 1948 and submit a compromise plan to a Special Session of the General Assembly, which should meet not later than April 1, 1948, the committee bearing in mind the need that its proposed recommendation should be able to receive a two-thirds majority vote.

2. The General Assembly at its present session should call on the Mandatory Power to continue to discharge its responsibility under the Mandate for the maintenance of the Government of Palestine and the preservation of peace and order in that country until the Special Session has had opportunity to make a recommendation to the Members on a solution of the Palestine problem.

3. The General Assembly should reaffirm its resolution of May 15, 1947 which stated “The General Assembly calls upon all governments and peoples and particularly on the inhabitants of Palestine, to refrain, pending action by the General Assembly on the report of the Special Committee on Palestine, from the threat or use of force or any other action which might create an atmosphere prejudicial to an early settlement of the question of Palestine.”
II.

It is possible that in view of the support given the partition plan by the US and the USSR this plan will receive the necessary two-thirds majority vote in this Session of the General Assembly. In such a case there will probably be instantaneous outbreaks of violence in Palestine, accentuating in severity as the British forces withdraw and as the proposed UN Commission seeks to set up Jewish and Arab States.

This outbreak of hostilities as between Jews and Arabs or as between Arabs and any authority seeking to implement the recommendation of the Assembly will constitute such a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security as to place the question of Palestine before the Security Council. At that time it seems certain that a demand will be made that the Security Council undertake to implement the recommendation of the General Assembly for partition. The US, having been a protagonist of partition, would seem morally bound to acquiesce in such a demand that measures adequate to the situation be used for implementation.

The Soviet Union, also a protagonist of partition, would be likely to come forward with a suggestion that its troops be used in any UN effort to enforce implementation.

If the issue is thus raised before the Security Council, and the UK continues its present policy of washing its hands of the Palestine problem, and if the Arab States, as they threaten to do, resort to the use of armed force, two questions will urgently arise before this Government:

1. Whether US forces should be used in the contingency outlined above, or
2. The US should seek to discourage the use of force for implementation in order to avoid

   (a) irreparable damage to the relations of the US and the Arab countries, and
   (b) affording an opportunity to the USSR to infiltrate militarily as well as politically into the Middle East.

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501.BB Palestine/11-1847: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW YORK, November 18, 1947—4:40 p. m.
URGENT

1230. For the Under Secretary from Johnson and Hilldring. The work of the Sub-committee on the majority plan will probably be completed today. A solution on implementation satisfactory to the
USDel has been accepted unanimously by Sub-committee 1. This seems to assure US-Soviet accord as to the Palestine situation.

With two exceptions, Sub-committee has agreed with changes in the majority plan by the USDel.

First of these exceptions is the US position as to Negev. Situation regarding boundaries in general is:

(1) Population: (a) Reduction of approximately 80,000 Arabs in the Jewish state, leaving approximately 427,000 Arabs, including both Bedouins and settled people. This is a decrease of approximately 16 percent of Arabs in the Jewish state. This leaves approximately 950,000 people within geographic boundaries of the Jewish state. (b) This results in about 825,000 people in the geographic boundaries of the Arab state.

(2) Territory: (a) The agreed adjustments assign 542,000 dunums to the Jewish state but remove 166,000 dunums, leaving a net addition of 376,000 dunums to the Jewish state, of which 225,000 are desert along the Dead Sea. This is approximately 2.4 percent addition to the Jewish state. (b) The Jewish Agency proposes to concede an additional 500,000 dunums to the north and around the town of Beersheba including the city.

Only the United States Delegation has asked for assignment of territory in the Negev to the Arab state. At yesterday’s meeting, the Jewish Agency agreed at the insistence of the United States to the transfer of a further 2,000,000 dunums in the Negev to the Arab state, and has agreed to concede to the Arab state a strip of territory one kilometer in width across the central section of the southern Negev in order that Arab tribes in this area may pass from Egypt through Palestine to Transjordan on Arab territory. As a result of the above changes, the Jewish state will have about 14 million dunums and the Arab state approximately 12 million, instead of 16 to 10 million as in UNSCOP.

(3) Relationships: The population relationships will be approximately 9 to 8 and the area 7 to 6, or roughly proportionate.

Concessions referred to in (2)(b) do not meet the Department’s position as described in Deptel 558, November 12. USDel has accordingly reserved its position in Sub-committee 1 in order that that Committee may proceed with its work and send its report to the Ad Hoc Committee. Both of us feel strongly that it would be a mistake to carry this issue of the Negev farther. If the US introduces the question in this Ad Hoc Committee, it will be vigorously opposed by the Jewish Agency and probably by all the friends of partition in the 57-nation committee. It is certain in any case that only the Arab state will actively support the US position. In the event of the defeat [of the] majority report in the Ad Hoc Committee or in the GA, the blame for it will unquestionably be placed upon the US for raising this major doubt as to the justice of the partition plan. So many of the US recommendations have been accepted by the Sub-committee, and so large a
portion of the inequities in the UNSCOP report have been removed that both of us feel very strongly that US should accept the boundary recommendations which are being transmitted to the Ad Hoc Committee by Sub-committee 1.

There remain certain changes in the Sub-committee report on economic union that the Department desires made. They deal with financial structure, with the actual amount that any state shall pay to the other in any year, and provisions regarding commercial and financial treaties. There is no support in the Sub-committee for the US proposals. We stand alone in advocating these changes. We therefore have permitted the Sub-committee to submit the views of the other eight members with a reservation that we may wish to reintroduce our proposals in the Ad Hoc Committee. On two of these points, financial structure and commercial treaties, the decision is exceedingly close.

As to a ceiling on payments under economic union, we much prefer our formula to that of the Sub-committee and will try to effect its adoption. However, in view of Evatt’s intention to get a vote in the Ad Hoc Committee by Thursday night and Aranha’s announcement that he will finish with Palestine in the GA by Saturday night, we request authority to deal with this point in the Committee and in the GA in accordance with the judgment of the USDel based on developments and debate in each forum. As to the other two issues, namely, financial structure and commercial treaties, we recommend that they be dropped. [Johnson and Hilldring]

AUSTIN

867N.01/11-1947: Telegram
The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, November 18, 1947—5 p.m.

529. Officer this Consulate General visiting Amman November 16 reports following:

1. Under Secretary Transjordan Foreign Office unaware, until queried, of UP interview in which Abdullah said Transjordan would remain neutral Palestine dispute and that if “New York Jews and Iraqi Arabs and all other Jews and Arabs outside Palestine” would remain quiet Palestine matter would be solved peacefully through UN. King was interviewed at his winter quarters at Shumen without knowledge Transjordan Government. After reading article Under Secretary very upset particularly references to Iraq. Stated categorically Transjordan Government policy was that of Arab League and Transjordan could not remain neutral. Added his brother, the Prime Minister, drafted many resolutions at Beirut session Arab League and Transjordan was completely committed act jointly with other Arab states. Under Secre-
tary deplored bitterly King’s unbridled press statements, saying first Greater Syria scheme now this render Prime Minister’s position with other Arab states precarious. Expected severe reactions to interview. Possible interview may precipitate showdown on hitherto latent disagreement between King and government. Prime Minister’s position strong as no replacement available at moment and unlikely King’s final position on Palestine yet fully determined by British.

2. Rumored in Amman Prime Minister leaving end November for London ostensibly to discuss revision Anglo-Transjordan treaty 1946 but more likely Transjordan position re Palestine. However departure doubtful unless present crisis in relations with King overcome.

3. Reference mytel 518, November 11, Under Secretary denied agreement by King with Jewish Agency to occupy Arab Palestine after partition. However Transjordan Government not always aware of commitments made by King, as tacitly admitted by Under Secretary.

4. Brigadier Glubb, British subject, now Chief of Staff Transjordan Army, reticent on Arab League role re Palestine, saying “events” had taken control and he unaware what would happen. Asked if he would march into Palestine if so ordered by Abdullah, he replied Abdullah not only one who would have say in matter. Distinct impression gained that some plan in making but that no definite decision reached.¹

¹ According to despatch 885, November 21, from Damascus, on November 20, Nicholas Hajji Vasselou, the Greek Chargé accredited to Syria, Transjordan, Lebanon and Iraq, advised the American Chargé in Syria (Memminger) of his conversation the previous week with King Abdullah. According to the Greek Chargé, while the King “deplored the partition of Palestine, he was intelligent enough to realize that the power of the United States and Russia would be sufficient to achieve it. He, therefore, considered it his duty to face the facts and to move accordingly for the benefit of his family and his country. Abdullah, as usual, was not specific but did state that his army would move into and occupy Palestinian [etc] land to the west and to the north. He added that 6,000 of his desert legionnaires were already in Palestine and that the others would encounter no difficulty in joining them at the appointed time.

“Mr. Vasselou said it is obviously Abdullah’s intention to keep as much as possible of those parts of Palestine allocated to the Arabs under the UNSCOP Partition Plan.

“Mr. Vasselou concluded that while Abdullah admitted that he might have a certain amount of difficulty with Glubb Pasha he nevertheless believed that the Desert Legion would be loyal to the King and that he could rely on a sufficient number of Legion officers to achieve his aim.” (887N.01/11-2147)

MACATEE

501.BB Palestine/11-1947 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 19, 1947—1 p. m.

567. For Johnson & Hilldring from Lovett. Position set forth in Deptel 558 Nov 12 reflects our considered opinion that facts regarding Negeb warrant its inclusion in Arab State. Accordingly you should
not yield to demand of JA. We realize that our position on the Negeb may not be accepted by the Ad Hoc Committee. In such case you should vote for the majority report as modified by Subcommittee 1, including provisions on the Negeb accepted by the majority of the Ad Hoc Committee, making it clear that in so doing we defer to the will of the majority.

Comments on financial aspects of economic union follow in separate telegram.¹

LOVITT

¹ Comments on the financial aspects of economic union were drafted by Mr. McGuire on November 19 in the form of a telegram to New York for Mr. Lovett’s signature. The draft was cleared by NEA but was not cabled to New York for reasons not indicated in Department of State files. The draft telegram is now filed with No. 567.

501 Gadel Telegrams—1947

Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rusk), at New York

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 19, 1947—3:17 p.m.

URGENT

Gadel 30. Special for Rusk from McClintock. On receiving the attached telegram ¹ reaffirming our position on the Negeb, Ambassador Johnson through Mr. Rusk by telephone desired to report his very firm conviction that if we stuck by this position through the Subcommittee and carried it before the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine the result might be that many states would abstain in the vote favoring partition and that this vote might fail to receive a majority.

Ambassador Johnson therefore requested authorization from the Department to maintain our position on the Negeb only during the debate in the Subcommittee, and then, if we were beaten in the vote in the Subcommittee, gracefully to announce our readiness to be guided by the will of the majority. In effect, therefore, Ambassador Johnson proposed that our telegram read, in place of “Ad Hoc Committee”, “Subcommittee”.

Mr. Henderson of NEA agreed with Ambassador Johnson’s recommendation and having learned from Miss Schukraft ² that it would be impossible to see you [Mr. Lovett?] on this matter, I informed Mr. Rusk [you?] that the Department gave Ambassador Johnson the authority he desired.

R. M. McClintock

¹ Not found attached; presumably No. 567 to New York, supra.
² Gladys E. Schukraft, in the Office of the Under Secretary of State.
Memorandum for the File by Mr. Robert M. McClintock

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 19, 1947.

Mr. Rusk telephoned at 4 p.m. to say that Ambassador Johnson was poised to enter the 3 p.m. meeting of the Subcommittee on the Majority Report and prepared to carry out to the letter the Department’s instruction on the Negeb as set forth in our telegram this morning [afternoon] with the subsequent modification that the USDel need not maintain its position on the Negeb after the point where it was defeated in the Subcommittee. Ambassador Johnson was further prepared, if there was a fighting chance at all to carry our position on the Negeb, to take it up in the ad hoc Committee.

At this point President Truman, who had seen Dr. Wizeman today, telephoned General Hilldring. The President asked General Hilldring how things were going and Hilldring said he was not too happy. Hilldring told the President of the instruction received this morning [afternoon] from the Department on the Negeb and apparently repeated that he was not pleased with these instructions. President Truman then said that nothing should be done to “upset the apple-cart.”

Mr. Rusk said it was obvious that there had not been enough discussion on either side during this brief telephone conversation for the President to have a clear idea as to the substance of the matter at issue.

Mr. Rusk added that Mr. Bohlen had the story from General Hilldring and that I could find out from him what Hilldring had reported.

Mr. Rusk said that there were two points which should be emphasized to Mr. Lovett following a consultation with Mr. Bohlen:

1. That Ambassador Johnson in no sense had intended to change his instructions or had asked to have them changed.

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1 Chaim Weizmann, former President of the Executive of the Jewish Agency.
2 Mr. Bohlen later told me that General Hilldring told the President that neither he nor Mr. Johnson were at all pleased with this morning’s telegram. [Footnote in the source text.]
3 Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor of the Department. A memorandum of November 19 by Mr. Bohlen to Mr. Lovett notes that General Hilldring called Mr. Bohlen “urgently” at about 4 p.m. on November 19, informing him of a personal telephone call he had just received from President Truman. “The President said he personally agreed with Weizmann’s views and although he apparently did not issue any direct instruction, he made it plain that he wished the Delegation to go along with the majority report on the Negeb case ... General Hilldring said that in the circumstances in view of the contradictions between the President’s wish ... and the definite instructions from the Department to the opposite effect, he ... and Ambassador Johnson felt that they would not take a U.S. position this afternoon in the Subcommittee but would through the Chairman make it plain that the U.S. position would be made clear either later today or early tomorrow morning.” (867N.01/11-1947)
2. All that the US Del plans to do today in the Subcommittee is to keep silent and to permit the Subcommittee report to go to the ad hoc committee as a unanimous report but noting US reservations with regard to the Negeb and to the financial arrangements under the economic union.

This will at least leave the door ajar for the US Del to revert to these issues in the ad hoc committee.

In conclusion Mr. Rusk thought Mr. Lovett should be informed that the Subcommittee has been dealing with the JA exclusively; that the US has been the only Delegation with sufficient courage or conviction to dissent from the JA and that the other Members of the Subcommittee have by and large remained silent.⁵

⁵According to a memorandum for the files of November 19 by Mr McClintonck, Mr. Lovett telephoned Mr. McClintonck at 6:45 p.m. "to say he had talked with the President regarding General Hilldring's conversation with the White House earlier today. The President had not at all intended to change the Department's instructions, he had merely been concerned that the U.S. should not stand out as a useless minority... Mr. Lovett had communicated this to Ambassador Johnson, General Hilldring and Mr. Rusk in New York." (501.BB Palestine/11-1947)

501.BB Palestine/11-1947: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 19, 1947—7 p.m.

4906. Relative Brit statements before UNGA re Palestine, please inquire FonOff informally for clarification following points:

1. Brit reserve right to lay down mandate and end their civil administration whenever evident no settlement acceptable Jews and Arabs has been reached by GA. However, if UNSCOP majority plan fails this GA time may be lacking for approval any other solution this session. In this event, presumably GA will provide for continuing work on Palestine by some subsidiary body which might result in adoption by special GA session early 1948 settlement acceptable to Jews and Arabs. Question: Do British statements mean that Brit will withdraw in absence of agreed Jewish-Arab settlement at present GA session or will they withhold withdrawal until GA has reached conclusion re settlement at special session? We appreciate this may be regarded as hypothetical question. However present GA session may end within few days.

2. If partition fails of adoption by two-thirds GA vote, does Brit information indicate that Zionists will move forthwith to establish
Jewish state, possibly by force? In such eventuality, what attitude will Brit take toward such a move? 1

Sent London as 4906; rptd USUN as 568; rptd to Jerusalem as 482.

1 According to telegram 6138, November 21, 2 p. m., from London, Ambassador Douglas discussed the contents of telegram 4906 with Sir Orme Sargent on November 19. Regarding paragraph 1, the Ambassador reported that “in the absence of agreed Jewish-Arab settlement at present session GA, they see no reason to modify their present plans to complete the evacuation by August 1, 1948. He indicates that if present session GA fails to reach agreement, probably UNSCOP will continue its work with a view to submitting further recommendations to GA at later date.” The Ambassador also reported that the Foreign Office had no reliable information regarding the query in paragraph 2. (501.BB Palestine/11–2147)

Editorial Note

The reports of Subcommittee 1 and of Subcommittee 2 were submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee on November 19 and November 11, respectively; for their texts, see GA (II), Ad Hoc Committee, pages 242 and 270. The reports were discussed at consecutive meetings of the Committee from November 19 to November 25, when its Chairman declared its work completed; for the official record of these discussions, see ibid., pages 144–223. Subcommittee 1 awarded the Negeb to the Jewish state (ibid., page 260).

Chairman Evatt announced on November 19 that the Subcommittee on conciliation had done “everything possible . . . but there seemed little prospect of success.” (ibid., page 146)

501.A Summaries/11–2147: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

New York, November 21, 1947—3:30 a. m.

1243.

In the afternoon, 1 Cadogan declared that the UK had not deviated, “and cannot deviate,” from the position announced by Creech Jones, “and my task today is simply to apply the general principles contained” in that statement “to the specific proposals which are now before you.” He restated these principles[ : ] refusal to play a major part in implementation of a scheme not acceptable to both Arabs and

1 Of November 20, before the Ad Hoc Committee.
Jews; but without wishing to impede implementation of a recommendation approved by the GA.

The UK has assumed, he said, "that the Assembly, in drawing up its proposals, would take full account of the risk of strife in Palestine and of the need to provide means of filling the gap in the process of enforcement" left by the UK's decision "that its troops could not be used as the instrument of the UN for this purpose." Feeling bound to make clear the extent to which the role assigned the UK by the Subcommittee was compatible with the UK's declared intentions, he said the transitional period, as defined by the Subcommittee, "may begin in a few days' time." The Subcommittee's proposal that the commission be entrusted with authority in the transitional period was sure to create confusion and disorder because it would mean establishment of "an authority which would operate concurrently with the existing mandatory administration." He was therefore instructed to leave "no doubt that, so long as my government continues to hold the mandate for Palestine, they must insist upon their undivided control of that country."

"I should at once make it no less clear," he went on, "that my government have every right to relinquish the mandate at a very early date. In determining this date, they will certainly give proper consideration to such arrangements as may have been made by the UN for the establishment of a provisional regime to succeed the mandate." He added, however, that "there is no reasonable basis for the suggestion that my government must await the approval of the SC before exercising their right to lay down the mandate. Regarding the Subcommittee's recommendation of "a progressive transfer" from the UK to the provisional councils and the joint economic board of responsibility for governmental functions, Cadogan declared that "the transfer of authority by the Palestine Government directly to councils of government or any other local representatives under a scheme of partition would in practice amount to the implementation of this scheme" by the UK, "which, failing Arab-Jewish agreement, they are not prepared to undertake." "If a scheme of partition were approved and a UN Commission set up as proposed in the Subcommittee's report," Cadogan stressed, "it would be to this commission that the Palestine Government would, when the time came, hand over its authority. The commission could then transfer authority to appropriate bodies."

Within the zones in which British troops would remain pending final withdrawal, the paramount concern of British authorities would be to expedite withdrawal; therefore, they would have to maintain order, prevent sabotage, etc. "They will in no circumstance allow their forces to be used for the attainment of any other purpose." Cadogan repeated
that it was the UK’s objective to withdraw the last British forces “as speedily as possible.”

If the object of the Subcommittee’s provision about SC approval was to see that there was no delay in British departure, Cadogan assured the Committee that this was the identical purpose of the UK. It intended to move “as quickly as is practicable”; and it feared that “if other parties must participate in determining the date of our departure, there may be unnecessary delays.” He assured the Committee “we shall endeavor to keep the UN commission informed beforehand of our intentions regarding the stages of our withdrawal.”

Summarizing the UK’s intentions, Cadogan said the UK “will in due course announce a date upon which the British civil administration will be considered at an end. After that date, apart from those British authorities who will be exercising strictly limited functions in certain areas, there will be no regularly constituted authority unless the UN can fill the gap. It is for the Committee to recommend in what way this gap can be effectively filled. If the problem is solved there should be no great difficulty in making arrangements consequent upon the subsequent stages of our military retirement from the country.”

Regarding Subcommittee 2’s report, Cadogan said that UK policy would preclude it equally from playing the part assigned to it in the plan for a “unitary Palestine.” Subcommittee 2 had not decided to establish a commission, he noted. If the GA decided on such a commission to carry out the unitary plan, the UK attitude would be the same as toward the commission contemplated by Subcommittee 1. Without such a commission, the UK would inevitably be drawn into major participation in implementing a plan which would not command general consent in Palestine. Therefore, if the GA were to adopt the unitary plan, the UK would carry out withdrawal without assuming any responsibility for establishment of a new regime. In this case, also, a gap would be left between withdrawal and the recommendations as they now stood.

Pruszynski said the UK statement had not made the Committee’s task any easier. Since this declaration might have changed the situation, he suggested adjournment to give delegates a chance to consult their governments. Pearson asked (1) whether the date of ending of civil administration mentioned by Cadogan would be the same as the date of the termination of the mandate; and (2) whether the UK intended that the date of the termination of the mandate would be prior to the date of progressive troop withdrawal. Cadogan replied in the affirmative to the first question; in regard to the second, he said it might be assumed that the mandate would be terminated early during the troop withdrawal, or possibly even before withdrawal began. Evatt
inquired about "when the time comes," asking whether that meant when the mandate had been terminated and civil administration concurrently established. Cadogan said the time mentioned could not be before termination of the mandate, and he supposed it would be after completion of withdrawal. The UK, he added, would retain full authority so long as it was the mandatory. There would be no British civil authority after the mandate had been terminated, but the UK would retain military authority in the areas where it was still withdrawing.2

AUSTIN

2 For the official record of this meeting GA (II), Ad Hoc Committee, see pp. 153-156.

501.BB Summaries/11-2147: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]
SECRET
NEW YORK, November 21, 1947—4:41 a.m.
1244.

(33rd Meeting)

In a three-hour meeting, the Subcommittee on Nov. 20 discussed the implications of the latest UK statement on Palestine. Apparently, there was a general feeling that the changes required by the UK stand would probably not alter the partition report significantly and that these revisions would be acceptable. Both the US and USSR, however, as well as others indicated they would need to consult their governments before proceeding with the amendments. Poland and others expressed concern at lack of "final" UK statements on some problems.

The main changes which would be required were summarized by Pearson (Canada) and incorporated in suggested amendments circulated by him at the close of the meeting. They included: deletion of the provision for SC approval of the arrangements for mandate termination and transfer of authority; several changes of language to indicate that the UK's authority would be transferred to the UN commission and not directly to the provisional councils; ("the administration of Palestine, after the termination of the mandate and as the Armed Forces of the mandatory withdraw, shall be progressively turned over to the Commission") to indicate that the UK would maintain all authority intact until termination of the mandate; and other
wording changes to indicate that the UK alone would be responsible for military authority in areas from which its forces had not yet withdrawn, even after termination of the mandate.²

AUSTIN

² Subcommittee I submitted an additional report to the Ad Hoc Committee on November 21 to take account of Mr. Cadogan's statement of November 20; for text, see GA (II), Ad Hoc Committee, p. 265.

867 N. 01/10-1047: Telegram
President Truman to King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud ¹

YOUR MAJESTY[.] I have received your communication of Oct 26, 1947 and desire to assure Your Majesty that I have given it most careful consideration. I regret to learn of your belief that the relations between the Arabs and the United States are clouded, in view of the close ties between them which have become closer with time in view of our mutual political and economic interests.

As Your Majesty knows, the Palestine problem is now before the General Assembly of the United Nations, and it is the view of the United States Government, as stated by its representative to the appropriate organ of the United Nations on Oct 11, 1947 ² that the United Nations "must do everything within its power to evolve a practical solution consistent with the principles laid down in the United Nations Charter."

At the present time the members of the United Nations, all of whom are represented in the General Assembly including Saudi Arabia, which has as its representative your honored and distinguished son,³ are making their respective contributions to a solution of this difficult and complex question. As in any representative body of this kind, friendly and honest differences of opinions, whether held by large or small nations, should contribute to the ultimate achievement of a just and workable solution.

The approach of the Government of Saudi Arabia and of the Government of the United States to this particular matter is obviously different for several reasons; nevertheless I am firmly convinced that both Governments earnestly desire solution of international difficulties.

¹ Transmitted to Jidda in telegram 363, November 21, 5 p. m., with the notation: "Convey to King following reply Pres. Truman message Legtel 456 Oct 30." Regarding telegram 456 from Jidda, see footnote 1, p. 1212. The concluding paragraph of telegram 363 read: "Sent Jidda, repeated London, and repeated Cairo for repetition Jerusalem and Arab capitals."
² See editorial note, p. 1180.
³ Amir Faisal.
based upon reason, peace, and justice. The United States considers that
the United Nations has an indispensable part to play in the solution of
difficult problems such as the Palestine problem, and for its part, is
fully disposed to accept the decisions of the United Nations in this as
in other matters which come within its jurisdiction.

One of the important factors influencing the decision of the United
States Government to support the majority plan of the United Nations
Special Committee on Palestine was the fact that it represented the
majority views of a committee specially appointed by the United
Nations to consider the question. The United States decision was not
based on any desire to be unfriendly to the Arabs, and should not be
construed as an unfriendly act, any more than the decision taken in
this respect by other members of the United Nations. In the General
Assembly the vote of the United States counts for no more than the
vote of any other country, large or small.

In line with its support of the United Nations our delegation has
made it clear that the United States wishes to abide by the decision of
the United Nations and is confident that in conformity with the United
Nations Charter all members of the United Nations will take a similar
attitude.

I sincerely trust that the foregoing will serve to confirm to Your
Majesty once more the friendly feelings which the Government and
people of the United States have for the Government and people of
Saudi Arabia, and their strong hope that the present amicable and
useful relations will emerge from the present period, which is recogn-
ized as one of some strain and perplexity, stronger than before.

Statement by the Acting United States Representative at the United
Nations (Johnson) ¹

Mr. Johnson (United States of America) expressed agreement with
the statement made by the Chairman of Sub-Committee 1 that the
plan presented by the Sub-Committee was legal under the Charter.
There was nothing in the Charter which prevented an immediate
transition from a Class A mandate to independence. Under the pro-
posals of Sub-Committee 1, the work of the United Nations would be
of short duration, with the exception of its supervision of Jerusalem.
The role of the United Nations would be to assist in the actual transfer
of authority from the Mandatory Power to the independent States.
In practice, the United Nations Commission, while retaining the re-

¹ Made before the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question during the
afternoon of November 22; reprinted from GA (II), Ad Hoc Committee, p. 168.
responsibility, would have to transfer the practical duties of administration immediately to the provisional councils of government. It was not contemplated that there would be a gap during which there would be no effective governmental authority.

A most difficult situation had been created by the declaration of the Mandatory Power that it could not take part in the implementation of a plan which did not have the approval of the two peoples of Palestine, a condition impossible of fulfilment. He could not agree with the statement of the representative of New Zealand that the Mandatory Power was being given the sole responsibility for implementation. The members of Sub-Committee 1, with very desultory assistance from the United Kingdom delegation, had endeavoured to avoid that situation. They had been assured that the Mandatory Power would not prevent the carrying out of the implementation programme.

The Mandatory Power had requested the United Nations to make recommendations for the future government of Palestine and had unilaterally declared that it was relinquishing its responsibility. Hence any legal objections to the action of the General Assembly must be formal in character. The United States delegation would support the proposals of Sub-Committee 1 which, in its view, met the request of the Mandatory Power.

In formulating proposals for the implementation of the majority plan contained in the report of the Special Committee, members of Sub-Committee 1 had reached unanimity on every point. It was the earnest hope of the United States delegation that a large majority of the Members of the United Nations would approve the plan of the Sub-Committee and co-operate in its implementation. The plan was sufficiently flexible to afford adjustment to any situation which might confront the commission or the joint economic board in Palestine. It offered protection for the Holy Places and religious interests of the three great religions.

The United Nations was the proper forum for the solution of the Palestine problem. Those Governments which supported partition, realizing its imperfections but nevertheless believing in its justice and workability, would contribute to the solution of one of the most difficult political problems in the world. In the view of the United States delegation, no Member of the United Nations would attempt to defy the decision of the United Nations. In that sense, the greatest test of its integrity was being offered to the United Nations.

The proposal of the Jewish Agency met the objections which the United States delegation had voiced to Sub-Committee 1 regarding the uneven division of territory, and the United States reservations on the question were accordingly withdrawn. Mr. Johnson would submit
a formal amendment to the proposals of the Sub-Committee embodying the territorial changes suggested by the Jewish Agency.

In conclusion, he urged support of the partition plan which, despite its unavoidable imperfections, offered the most practicable and just solution.

Statement by the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)¹

Mr. Johnson (United States of America) asked leave to bring up a number of technical points the following day; for the time being he would make a few general observations.

The representative of Canada had referred to Mr. Johnson's comments on the attitude of the United Kingdom. While the members of the United Kingdom delegation, in their personal capacity, had co-operated with great courtesy in the work of the Committee, the United Kingdom’s policy had not always helped matters. The United Kingdom had not given its full co-operation and that had rendered the Committee’s task more difficult and had not closed any of the gaps, whether real or imaginary.

Like the representative of the Dominican Republic, Mr. Johnson wondered how a delegation, by abstaining, could promote a solution of the Palestinian question. As the representative of Canada had said, if the peoples of Palestine and the Members of the United Nations co-operated, the suggested means of implementation would suffice, and the difficulties which would not fail to ensue would be reduced to a minimum.

The determining factors in the success of the partition plan were loyal acceptance of the General Assembly's decision and co-operation both on the part of the peoples concerned and of the Mandatory Power during the period of the withdrawal of its troops. Mr. Johnson believed with the Canadian representative that the United Kingdom, as a loyal Member of the United Nations, would co-operate with the United Nations commission. Under the plan, as conceived, the Mandatory Power would not be burdened with the technical responsibility for implementation.

The plan of Sub-Committee 2 did not propose any means for implementation. The question therefore arose: What would happen if the United Kingdom withdrew its troops without any decision having been reached?

¹ Made before the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question during the evening of November 22; reprinted from GA (II), Ad Hoc Committee, p. 180. The text of Ambassador Johnson's statement was transmitted by New York in telegram Delga 51, November 25, 1:35 a.m.
While the plan of Sub-Committee 1 was far from perfect, it offered the best practical solution. Mr. Johnson recalled that reference had been made to the permanent members of the Security Council. His Government had authorized him to support the plan of Sub-Committee 1, in which the Security Council was called upon to play a part. The Council would be responsible for all matters relating to security set forth in the plan. It could send instructions to the commission which, in turn, could submit requests to it. If a situation covered by Chapters VI or VII of the Charter developed, it would be brought before the Council. In that case, the United States Government would fulfil its duty in accordance with the Charter by taking part in the implementation of the Council's decision.

The matter could wait no longer. The hour of decision had struck. If there were hesitation, the situation would be worse in a year's time. If action were decided upon, the United Nations would be equal to the task.

867N.01/11-2447

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 24, 1947.

Attached hereto is a copy of a personal telegram\(^1\) which I have just received from Hamdi Al Pachachi, who was Prime Minister of Iraq during the last year that I was United States Minister to that country.\(^2\) I trust that you will read this telegram in full, since, in my opinion, it represents fairly the feelings of the Arab world with regard to the United States and Palestine.

I feel it again to be my duty to point out that it seems to me and all the members of my Office acquainted with the Middle East that the policy which we are following in New York at the present time is contrary to the interests of the United States and will eventually involve us in international difficulties of so grave a character that the reaction throughout the world, as well as in this country, will be very strong.

We are committed to the idea that the security of the Middle East is vital to the United States. We also agree that unless the British continue to remain a force in the Middle East, the security of the Middle East will be gravely endangered. It is impossible for the British to remain a force in the Middle East unless they retain the friendship of the Arab world. By our Palestine policy, we are not only forfeiting

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\(^1\) Telegram of November 22 not printed.

\(^2\) In 1945.
the friendship of the Arab world, but we are incurring long-term Arab hostility towards us. What is important is that the Arabs are losing confidence in the integrity of the United States and the sincerity of our many pronouncements that our foreign policies are based on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In Mr. Johnson's speech of Saturday, the British were castigated before the whole world for not agreeing to suggestions of the Subcommittee which, if followed, would certainly have ruined British relations with the Arab world and would probably have resulted in the British being forced to withdraw from the whole Middle East. It is extremely unfortunate that we should be criticizing the British for following the only kind of policy which, it seems to me, they can follow if they are to remain in the Middle East. I am afraid that the reactions in London to criticisms of this kind will not help us in our efforts to prevail upon Mr. Bevin not to withdraw the remaining British troops from Greece.

I wonder if the President realizes that the plan which we are supporting for Palestine leaves no force other than local law enforcement organizations for preserving order in Palestine. It is quite clear that there will be wide-scale violence in that country, both from the Jewish and Arab sides with which the local authorities will not be able to cope. It is my understanding that Mr. Johnson, on Saturday, indicated before the Subcommittee that if the situation in Palestine should develop into a menace to peace, the matter would naturally come before the Security Council and that the United States, along with the other four Great Powers, would be prepared to share responsibility for removing this menace. Our plan envisages apparently the despatch of American, Soviet and perhaps other troops to Palestine in order to preserve law and order. It seems to me that we ought to think twice before we support any plan which would result in American troops going to Palestine. The fact that Soviet troops under our plan would be introduced into the heart of the Middle East is even more serious. I know that you have so many problems facing you that you cannot keep informed regarding the details of all of them, and I am sending you this memorandum in order to make sure that you realize the direction in which we are headed.3

LOY W. HENDERSON

3 Mr. Armour noted, in a marginal notation on November 24: "I entirely agree with the above memorandum". In an undated marginal notation, Mr. Lovett stated: "I read this [memorandum] to the President at the 12:30 meeting today. I explained that the Dept thought the situation was serious and that he should know of the probable attempts to get us committed militarily. We are continuing to refuse."

The memorandum, except for the first paragraph and the last sentence, was transmitted to Messrs. Johnson, Hilldring and Rusk at Mr. Henderson's request and with Mr. Lovett's approval in telegram Gadel 31, November 24, to New York.
Editorial Note

Secretary of the Army Royall, on November 24, sent an undated report dealing with the problem of Palestine to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, with a request that it be circulated among the members of the Council and placed on its agenda.

The report defined the problem as the need “To assess the implications of current United Nations discussion of the problem of Palestine on the security interests of the United States.”

The section marked “Discussion” stated that if the plan for partitioning Palestine should be defeated in the General Assembly, “the United Nations would be left with the problem unsolved and the necessity for contriving some alternate solution. . . . There is thus posed the question of possible United Nations trusteeship with all its attendant subquestions of the state or states to be named trustees and what forces could be authorized and organized for the essential maintenance of law and order. The “Discussion” section concluded with the statement that “Any decision by the General Assembly, or its failure to reach a decision, will hold implications affecting the security interests of the United States and thus calling for study and recommendation by the National Security Council. These implications and the pressing time element are of such importance as to urge immediate attention by the Council.” (501.BB Palestine 11-2447)

At a meeting of the Consultants of the Council, on December 12, 1947, it was agreed that the Department of State should prepare the initial draft of a National Security Council report on the position of the United States on the Palestine problem.

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501.BB/11-2447

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET  

[WASHINGTON,] November 24, 1947.

Subject: President Truman’s Instructions on Palestine Position

Participants: The Acting Secretary, Mr. Lovett  
Ambassador Herschel Johnson  
General Hilldring

Mr. Lovett telephoned Ambassador Johnson and General Hilldring at 2:20 p.m. today. Messrs. Thompson and McClintock of SPA were present in the Acting Secretary’s office.

1 Drafted by Mr. McClintock.
2 Elwood N. Thompson, Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs.
Mr. Lovett said that he had gone to the White House before lunch to ascertain the President’s decision on the specific question raised this morning by the Delegation on whether or not the United States should participate in a Commission to implement partition in Palestine.

The President had said that he would be most reluctant to see the United States on such a Commission. It would only be in the event that the USSR were very likely to be placed on such a Commission that the President would agree to the United States accepting a similar post.

The second point made by the President, said Mr. Lovett, was on the question of the implementation. The President had reiterated his original position: that the United States would participate in enforcing a plan for Palestine only as a Member of the United Nations and jointly with other Members. It would not be a protagonist. If American forces were used they would merely be part of an overall United Nations force.

Mr. Lovett said that the President did not wish the United States Delegation to use threats or improper pressure of any kind on other Delegations to vote for the majority report favoring partition of Palestine. We were willing to vote for that report ourselves because it was a majority report but we were in no sense of the word to coerce other Delegations to follow our lead.

The President felt that the U.S. Delegation should scrupulously live up to any commitments which had been made to the Arab Delegations. Mr. Lovett asked if the Arab Delegations knew that the United States had fought to see their view on the Negeb accepted by the subcommittee. He thought that also within the President’s orders to adhere to our commitments to the Arabs lay the general requirement that the United States was not to be an advocate and was not to use improper pressure on other Delegations.

The Acting Secretary said that the President had told him of his keen awareness of the extraordinary difficulty of the tasks faced by Mr. Johnson and General Hilldring and of his great appreciation for the job they had done in these very trying circumstances.

The conversation concluded with the remark of Mr. Lovett that the President had said he did not wish General Marshall to be embarrassed in London should Mr. Bevin “blow his top” because of any implied suggestion by our Delegation that the British had been non-cooperative on the Palestine issue. Mr. Lovett thought that this theme could conveniently be soft-pedaled.

L[OVETT]

Editorial Note

On the evening of November 24 the Ad Hoc Committee rejected by a 29 to 12 vote, with 14 abstentions, the third draft resolution of Sub-
committee 2 containing the unitary plan for Palestine; see GA(II), Ad Hoc Committee, page 206. The text of the resolution is printed *ibid.*, page 302.

501.BB Palestine/11-2547

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Thompson) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 25, 1947.

Pursuant to your request this morning SPA desires to submit the following background information with regard to the United States position on implementing any United Nations plan for the partition of Palestine:

The original basic instruction to the Delegation, as approved by the Secretary of State, required that the Delegation, in dealing with the Palestine question, be guided, among other basic objectives, with the requirement

"to implement the United States position on the Palestine question, as set forth below, by methods best calculated to safeguard the strategic, economic, and political interests of the United States in the Near East.

"to achieve a United Nations recommendation regarding the Palestine problem and, to this end, to implement the United States position in such a way that the final recommendation of the General Assembly cannot be regarded as an 'American plan'."

When the President approved the Delegation's proposed statement on Palestine with regard to the question of implementation the President, as set forth in the Department's Top Secret telegram No. 461 of October 9, 1947 to the Delegation in New York

"emphasized that the Delegation must make no commitment for the use of United States troops in Palestine except as a part of United Nations action. Similarly any United States economic assistance would have to be our share in a general United Nations program. We do not wish in any sense to replace the British in Palestine nor to accept unilateral responsibility."

When the United States statement of position on Palestine was made by Ambassador Herschel Johnson before the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine on October 11, 1947, Ambassador Johnson said that

"The United States Government was willing to participate in any United Nations plan designed to assist the parties involved to establish a workable political settlement in Palestine. He had in mind assistance through the United Nations in meeting economic and financial

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2 Copy not found in Department of State files.

4 Not printed; but see footnotes 1 and 2, pp. 1177, 1178.
problems and also the problem of internal law and order during the transition period. The latter problem might require the establishment of a special constabulary or police force recruited on a volunteer basis by the United Nations. He would not refer to the possibility of violation by any member of the United Nations of its obligation to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force, since he assumed that the Charter would be observed.\footnote{This quotation is from the summary record of Ambassador Johnson’s statement; see GA (11), Ad Hoc Committee, pp. 62, 64.}

Pursuant to these basic instructions the Delegation has continuously made it clear that in the first place it felt strongly that the United Kingdom could not divest itself of its responsibility at least materially to assist the United Nations in the carrying out of whatever plan for Palestine was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Likewise consistent with these basic instructions the United States Delegation has throughout the Palestine debate during the past two months insisted that United States participation in implementation would only be as a part of a broad United Nations endeavor directed to this end.

It was pursuant to these broad basic instructions that Ambassador Johnson, on the evening of November 22, made the following statement:

“Furthermore, references have been made to the attitude of the permanent members of the Security Council. My Government has authorized the Delegation of the United States at the General Assembly to support the Report of Subcommittee 1. That report brings the Security Council into the picture. It makes the Security Council responsible certainly for the security elements involved in this implementation program. The Security Council may send instructions to the Commission. The Security Council may receive a request from the Commission for appropriate instructions. Certainly if the situation would fall under the proper clauses of the Charter, Chapter VI or VII, the Security Council will be seized of the question and my Government will perform its duty under the Charter along with other members of the United Nations in carrying out the decision of the Security Council in such a case.

“This is the situation, it seems to me, where we should grasp the nettle and go ahead. This is not something to be afraid of. If we drop it and let it go it will be worse next year than it is now. The time now is for decision and work out the inequities later on. The United Nations machinery is quite sufficient for that purpose if we can just make up our minds to move now.”

No comment would seem to be necessary on the foregoing portion of Ambassador Johnson’s speech other than to point out that, when he said “my Government will perform its duty under the Charter along with other Members of the United Nations in carrying out the decision of the Security Council in such a case”, this statement by no means
implied that the United States would necessarily send troops to Palestine. The United States Representative went no further than to reaffirm under his basic instructions the readiness of the United States to assume the responsibility which it shares equally with the other ten members of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

501.BB Palestine/11-2547: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

US URGENT

New York, November 25, 1947—4:33 p.m.

1257. Palestine [Ad Hoc] Committee on November 25 approved 25–13 with 17 abstentions and two members absent Subcommittee 1 report on partition with a revised Danish amendment.1 Six Arab states, Afghanistan, Cuba, India, Iran, Siam, Pakistan and Turkey voted against it. Paraguay and the Philippines were absent and Argentina, Belgium, China, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, UK and Yugoslavia abstained.2

[Here follow the text of the revised Danish amendment and information that it was approved 19 to 14, with the United States voting in favor and the Soviet Union abstaining.]

Austin

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1 According to telegram 1260, November 25, 11:55 p.m., from New York, this amendment was designed to strengthen the constitutional validity of the plan (501.A Summaries/11-2547). The Danish amendment and its revision are printed in GA (II), Ad Hoc Committee, p. 266.
2 For the official record of the afternoon meeting of the Committee on November 25, see ibid., pp. 220-223.

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867N.01/11-2547: Telegram

The Secretary of State1 to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

London, November 25, 1947—8 p.m.

Martel 6. Eyes only for Lovett from Marshall. Last night Douglas and I had dinner with Bevin. Alexander2 and their two wives and Sir Edmund Hall-Patch3 were present. After dinner Bevin discussed a number of questions with us.

1 The Secretary of State was participating in the Fifth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which met at London from November 25 to December 15.
2 Presumably Albert V. Alexander, British Minister of Defence.
3 Deputy Under-Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office.
The first was Palestine. He took exception to Herschel Johnson’s statement of the day before implying criticism of the British attitude regarding their troops in Palestine, informed us that he had directed his delegate to abstain in the voting. He summarized the British position rather elaborately stating that the unanimous political reaction in Great Britain was against the Jewish influence in Palestine and that it stemmed directly from the execution of the two British sergeants which would never be forgotten; that the anti-Jewish feeling in England now was greater than it had been in a hundred years. He stated further that, mentioning Pakistan, the British Government could not possibly be committed to a position which might involve military action against the Arabs.

He referred to the Jewish influence from the United States making impossible his efforts to successfully solve the difficulty prior to its reference to the United Nations. He referred to Balfour’s declaration for Jewish home rather than Jewish state, stated that he had had thorough legal advice that the declaration did not commit British Government to development of Jewish state, characterized the declaration as an unfortunate error and outlined the good faith in which he insisted Great Britain had conducted its mandate obligations. He stated that British information indicated that Jewish groups moving from the Balkan states to Palestine illegally contained many indoctrinated Communists which presented a serious threat to Middle East stability.

Douglas questioned whether or not information regarding Communist infiltration was reasonably authenticated and Bevin replied that they were so informed.

I made no answer to his various statements other than to say that I had sympathy for the British in their difficulties in Palestine and under the pressures of the American Jew; that I felt the issue must be settled without further delays or it would result in a much more serious situation in the Middle East; that I hoped the United Nations would find an agreed settlement and that the British position would not render such a conclusion impossible.

Bevin had previously asked me if I had read the papers resulting from the British-American discussions of the Middle East and what action had we taken. He was informed that I had read them and that they had been forwarded to the National Security Council and that favorable action had been recommended by the Council to the British. In the previous discussion I referred to Bevin’s view that this pending Middle East agreement was of great importance, and that therefore the

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4 For documentation on this subject, see pp. 485 ff.
prompt settlement of the Palestine matter was of equal importance preliminary thereto.⁵

[Here follows discussion of subjects other than Palestine.]

MARSHALL

⁵Referring to this paragraph in telegram Telmar 6, November 26, 1 p.m., to London, the Acting Secretary of State informed Secretary Marshall as follows:

"For sake of accuracy National Security Council recommendation was made to President not to British. Note use of word 'agreement'. We have taken great pains to make it abundantly clear to all concerned that no agreement is involved. Conversations represented merely exchange of views. Documents emanating from conversations were proposed statements of respective policies subject to confirmation. It was understood that these statements even after approval could not be considered as agreements; that no obligations were taken; and the policies outlined were subject to change to meet new conditions." (867N.01/11-2347)

Editorial Note

At the afternoon meeting of the General Assembly on November 28, the French Representative proposed that the Assembly postpone its decision until the following day to permit a last-minute effort to arrive at a solution acceptable to both the Arabs and the Jews. The French proposal was adopted by a vote of 25 to 15. For the official record of the discussion of the proposal, see GA (II) Plenary, pages 1401-1410, passim.

867N.01/11-2347: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET            LONDON, November 28, 1947.
US URGENT

Martel 12. To Lovett from Marshall. Bevin handed to me the following summary of the British plan of withdrawal from Palestine.

"Military withdrawal—a series of clear-cut backward moves northwards from the Egyptian frontier phased as follows: Phase one: Gaza civil district by 29 February. Phase two: Jerusalem, Lydda and part of Samaria by 31 May. Phase three: Remainder of Samaria and Galilee by 30 June. Phase four: The remaining enclave round Haifa by 31 July.

The evacuation of stores through Haifa and by land to Egypt will start on December 1. It is estimated that, even under the most favourable conditions, we shall lose nearly 150,000 tons of useful stores.

Withdrawal of civil administration—the civil administration and the mandate will be maintained over the whole of Palestine until May 15, 1948, except that in certain circumstances the civil administration, or some parts of it, may be obliged to withdraw at an earlier date from the Gaza civil district.

If the United Nations vote in favour of partition, the arrival of a United Nations commission for the purpose of carrying out this de-
cision in Palestine is bound to have a disturbing effect on the Arab population. If the commission arrived before we were ready to hand over to it, this would make it impossible to carry out our plan. We could not maintain the mandate and civil administration for a longer period than 15 days after the arrival of the commission in Palestine. The British representative in New York is accordingly being instructed, in the event of the Assembly voting for partition, to discuss with the United Nations commission a mutually convenient date for the commission's arrival, which, to fit in with the British plans, must be not before May 1. It would be most helpful if the United States representative could be instructed to use his influence to ensure that the commission were ready to come to an arrangement with us on these lines.\[1\]

MARSHALL

\[1\] The Department repeated this message to New York in telegram 578, November 28. The following day, in telegram 581, to New York, Mr. Lovett authorized Ambassador Johnson "to inform UK Representative that Department agrees to proposal set forth in Bevin's memorandum quoted in Martel 12." (501.BB Palestine/11-2947) According to telegram 1272, December 1, from New York, this information was transmitted to Sir Alexander Cadogan the same day (501.BB Palestine/12-147).

501.BB Palestine/11-2847: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Chile

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 28, 1947—2 p. m.

569. Saudi Arabian Delegation UN claims as result pressure United States Govt, Chile has decided change its vote against partition Palestine to vote for partition.

Saudi Arabian Delegation previously informed United States firmly supported majority report and in conversation with other delegations had made United States position clear, but we were not exerting "pressure" on other delegations change their votes.

In order Saudi Delegation may be appropriately informed would appreciate any comment you might care make with regard Saudi allegation regarding Chile.\[1\]

Lovett

\[1\] The Embassy in Santiago informed the Department in airgram A-541 on December 2 that "President Gonzalez Videla, personally, and certain members of the Govt sympathetic to Jewish cause. Chilean representative on Palestine Committee therefore instructed to vote in favor of partition Palestine. However, important Arab groups residing in Chile exerted sufficient pressure on political parties to cause Radical, Liberal, and Agrarian Labor Parties to issue resolutions urging Chilean Govt to either change its position on Palestine question or abstain from voting. The result was that, although in the Committee Chilean representative talked and voted in favor of partition, in the final voting Chile abstained. According to UndSecy FonAff, Egypt asked for Chile's support, but it was never granted; consequently, even if the United States had exerted pressure, the final result was unfavorable to the United States, since Chile, instead of voting in favor, abstained." (501.BB Palestine/12-247)
The Chargé in Syria (Memminger) to the Secretary of State

DAMASCUS, November 29, 1947—1 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL

390. President sent for me this morning to ask that eleventh-hour appeal be made for Arab rights (reLegtel 389, November 29). In hour’s conversation Quwatly stressed (1) injustice in resting Arabs otherwise promising future on votes of small remote states whose UN delegates were subjected to bribes and threats; (2) danger to US in opening Near Eastern door to Russia; (3) virtual certainty that partition would be followed by years of disruptive violence and bloodshed with possibilities of fighting among Arabs themselves; (4) Balfour promise to Jews of national home in Palestine, which they now had, in no way justified Jewish state advocated by US; (5) while US had but one GA vote American influence was so great that Zionists would have no chance without US support.

MEMMINGER

Not printed; it gave the text of a message from President Kuwatly to President Truman in which the United States Government was requested to take a stand on the side of the Arabs (501.BB Palestine/11-2947). On December 2, the Imam Yahya, King of the Yemen, cabled a plea to President Truman for renunciation of partition (867N.01/12-247). No evidence has been found in Department of State files that a reply was made to telegrams 389 or 390 from Damascus.

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

NEW YORK, November 29, 1947—6:10 p.m.

1271. The GA adopted at 5:35 p.m., November 29 the Ad Hoc Committee report on partition of Palestine 33–13 with ten abstentions and Siam absent.1 Opposing partition were: Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey and Yemen; abstaining were: Argentina, Chile, China, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Honduras, Mexico, UK and Yugoslavia. On the nomination of Chairman Aranha (Brazil), the following members were elected without objection to the UN Palestine Commission: Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama and Philippines.

AUSTIN

The Chargé in Syria (Memminger) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

391. Re my unnumbered telegram immediately preceding. 1 Just talked with Prime Minister who expressed profound regrets; said that speed with which mob struck caught Government entirely unawares; that mob organized secretly by foreign agents; that he had explained to crowds which subsequently gathered at presidency that violence could only harm Arab cause, and had arranged for gendarme protection of Legation and homes of all American personnel.

I made it clear to Prime Minister that US Government would take serious view of wanton destruction of American property and insult to American flag.

Entrance to Legation forced through rear first floor windows. No damage premises other than broken glass and shattered shutters. However, three Legation automotive vehicles completely burned.

Fire brigade which arrived in time to have saved cars was driven off by mob.

French Minister has just telephoned to say that tail end of mob stoned his Legation and tore down French flag, mob now seems to have dispersed.

British Legation untouched.

Repeat this and preceding to War.

MEMMINGER

1 Not printed; it reported that "Well organized Syrian mob of about 2,000 in which Moslem brothers predominated stoned and broke into Legation this morning after setting fire to Legation station wagon. Thirty Syrian policemen on specially arranged duty watched with bemused indifference as surging crowd reached roof and tore down American flag. In view my protests gendarmes sent to scene and order temporarily restored ... Russian-Syrian Cultural Society office entered and looted." (890D.00/11-3047). This undated message was received at 12:56 p. m., November 30. The expression "Moslem brothers" refers to members of the Moslem Brotherhood.

Telegram 667, undated, from Baghdad, received December 4, 1:12 p. m., reported that the office of United States Information Service in Baghdad was stormed by a mob on December 4. The Embassy made formal protest to the Iraqi Foreign Office the same day, denouncing the illegal and forcible entry and the subsequent destruction of United States Government property (124.90G1/12-447). In telegram 458, December 5, to Baghdad, the Department approved the action taken in the protest (124.90G1/12-547).

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria

RESTRICTED

263. Your statements to Prime Minister approved. Re your 391, November 30, 1 p. m. Please inform him that US Govt expects the
Govt of Syria like that of any country with which it maintains diplomatic relations to extend full protection to American Legation, American property, and American citizens in territory under its control. Displeasure which Syrian Govt and people may feel towards any policy or action of American Govt in United Nations or otherwise is no ground for violence of this character.

You may point out that failure of Syrian police officials to protect Legation and to prevent hauling down of American flag adds to seriousness of incident and is certain to be cause for regret to many friends of Syria in US.

In view of expressions of regret on part of Prime Minister it is assumed that Syrian Govt will take prompt measures to make clear before whole world its disapproval of such acts, to proffer the appropriate apologies, to compensate for property destroyed, and to give adequate protection in future.¹

Sent Damascus; repeated to Cairo, Baghdad, Jidda, Beirut, Jerusalem and War.

LOVETT

¹ Later the same day, in telegram 393, from Damascus, Chargé Memminger reported he had “just received President’s apologies and strongest assurance that no further anti-Americanism will occur.” (890D.00/11-3047)

501.A Summaries/12-147: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

NEW YORK, December 1, 1947—11 p. m.

1274.

At the outset,¹ Aranha asked for reports on measures taken since the previous day to promote agreement. Chamoun (Lebanon) speaking on behalf of all the Arab Delegations, said the Arabs were ready, “as ever”, to listen, study, and discuss “any proposals for conciliation, which were likely to offer a reasonable and just solution.” They would oppose, however, any solutions the implementation of which would involve force or threat of force. The Arab Delegations had evolved the following general principles which they felt ought to serve as basis for a compromise: 1) a federal independent state by Aug. 1; 2) to consist of a federal government with Arab and Jewish cantons; 3) boundaries of cantons to include fewest possible Arab and Jewish

¹ Of the meeting of the General Assembly on November 29.
minorities; 4) the population of Palestine to elect by direct universal suffrage a constituent assembly to draft constitution of the future federal state—the assembly being composed of all elements of population in proportion to the number of citizens; 5) the assembly, in defining powers of government organs and relations with cantons, to be guided by model of US and its relations with its states; 6) the constitution to provide for protection of holy places, freedom of access, religion, etc.

US finds Arab proposal not conciliatory.

The time for conciliation would come once decision had been taken and both parties faced the hard facts, and not before, Thors (Iceland) said. Johnson thought the conditions outlined by the Arabs did not fulfill the description of the conciliatory proposals envisaged by France. No conciliatory offer was now before the GA, since Lebanon’s statement had merely resurrected the minority UNSCOP recommendations, he added.

Adl (Iran) said the “Arab world’s” desire for conciliation could be seen in the Lebanese statement, and asked for “a reasonable delay”—an adjournment of a few weeks during which time the Ad Hoc Committee might reconsider the question. Aranha asked for this proposal in writing. El Khouri (Syria) also urged exploration of possible conciliatory possibilities. He quoted Faisal’s (Saudi Arabia) answer to Evatt (Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee), expressing readiness to meet with Secretary Marshall, and said no reply had then been received from Evatt.

While awaiting translation of Iran’s proposal, to make a ruling possible, Aranha called on the last speaker, Gromyko (USSR). He declared that the Lebanese and Syrian proposals introduced nothing new; that the unitary plan they propounded had already been rejected after careful study; and that partition should be voted upon immediately.

Iran proposes renewed Committee study.

The Iranian resolution, as presented in writing, called for adjournment until Jan. 15; invited renewed Ad Hoc Committee study, taking into account the Lebanese declaration; and asked the SYG to submit the Committee’s report to the GA by Jan. 31. Aranha ruled it was a new resolution, which could not be considered a motion to adjourn debate, and which could not be voted on until previous resolutions had been balloted upon. Chamoun, stating that the Ad Hoc Committee had done nothing about the unanimous recommendations in the UNSCOP report, thought these should be voted on first. Aranha ruled these were embodied in the reports of both Subcommittees, and required no special vote.

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AUSTIN
WASHINGTON, December 2, 1947—6 p.m.

451. Dept is deeply concerned lest anger of Iraqis arising from Palestine decision in UN might express itself in attacks upon Jews in Baghdad or elsewhere. Aside from humanitarian considerations it would be extremely unfortunate from point of view of security of Middle East, of interests of US, and of Iraq itself if Iraqi Govt should fail to grant full protection to local Jewish communities in case of outbursts of violence against them. You should therefore on all appropriate occasions endeavor to impress upon Iraqi authorities how important it is that they do not permit popular indignation to vent itself in violence against Jews. Dept leaves to your discretion manner and timing of such approaches as you may make.

This message is being repeated to our Missions in other Arab countries, which should follow parallel course with respect to govts to which they are accredited, and to Jerusalem for info.

Sent Baghdad as Dept's 451 rptd Beirut as Dept's 535 Cairo as Dept's 1609 Damascus as Dept's 270 Jidda as Dept's 376 and Jerusalem as Dept's 499.¹

LOVETT

¹Telegram 451 was repeated also as telegram 761, December 5, 7 p.m., to Tehran (501.BB Palestine/12-147).

CAIRO, December 3, 1947—noon.

1287. For Loy Henderson. I was received in audience by King Farouk yesterday to present Rear Admiral Ellery Stone (Rtd). On arrival Palace was informed that King wished to have private word with me before meeting Stone.

King said he wished to inform me frankly that, following the UNO decision, Egypt, in full accord with the other Arab countries, intended to resist partition in Palestine by force of arms. Egypt would make no military move until after British forces had left Palestine as he had no wish for further difficulties with Britain. He had two of his best divisions now at El Arish on Palestine frontier and, while they would remain inactive for the present, they had been sent there to guard the frontier and to restrain infiltration of Russian Jewish saboteurs into Egypt. Only five days ago he said a number of such saboteurs have
been apprehended on Egyptian territory and, from documents seized, there could not be the slightest doubt as to their intentions. Farouk added that it was possible that there might be some guerrilla fighting between Jews and Palestine Arabs but he reaffirmed that his forces would take no action until the British left Palestine.

The King said that it was possible that in the first phases of the Jewish-Arab conflict the Arabs might meet with initial reverses as there were Jewish elements which had participated in the World War and had had extensive commando experience. He expressed the belief, however, that in the long run the Arabs would soundly defeat the Jews and drive them out of Palestine. He said that he had as yet no clear idea of what steps UNO might take when British forces left Palestine, but if an international force were sent there to keep order it was possible that an American military contingent might form part of such a force. Thus, the King said there might exist the tragic spectacle of Arabs fighting Americans.

The King then said that there was a complete understanding between Egypt and the other Arab countries on measures to be taken in view of the situation and that following a lengthy interview he had had the day before with Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League, instructions had gone out other Arab capitals with a view of coordinating plans, both military and economic, in preparation for the conflict. King Ibn Saud, Farouk said, had pledged him his word that he would “follow Egypt” and Farouk expressed the belief that despite the great financial advantages which Ibn Saud derived from American ventures in Saudi Arabia, “the old man would rather destroy the oil wells than break his word”. (This last statement by Farouk I consider to be exaggeration for the sake of emphasis.) The King then referred to the Jewish population in Egypt. He would do all in his power, he said, to protect them as his people had never had any real differences with Jews in Egypt who were “good people”. If however there were to occur acts of sabotage or political assassination by Jewish elements from the outside, public opinion could react so violently that, despite military and police protection, Egyptians might take matter into their own hands.

I intervened to say that it was my earnest hope that every possible measure of protection would continue to be given to Jewish and other minorities in Egypt as well as the foreign colonies for I felt that acts of open aggression against Jews or others would be most severely judged and could only react unfavorably on Egypt’s position in the world. The King admitted that this was the case but that the “Stern Gang” methods of the Jews were only too well-known and that if per-
petrated on Egyptian soil might exasperate his people to acts beyond control.

Weighing the King’s remarks at their face value inclines me to the following conclusion: (1) That there is no doubt but that Egypt has definitely decided to play a full share in militarily opposing the Jews in Palestine; (2) that the King possibly through the agency of Azzam Pasha and the Arab League intends, if possible, to play a leading part in coordinating, organizing Arab resistance.

TUCK

501.BB Palestine/12–347 : Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

TOP SECRET
WASHINGTON, December 3, 1947—1 p. m.

586. For Johnson from Lovett. Although press reports suggest that SYG contemplates UN Palestine Commission assuming its functions in near future we much prefer to adhere to UK’s timetable set forth in Deptel 578 November 28\(^1\) which you were authorized to support in Deptel 581 November 29.\(^2\)

We feel initiative in this respect rests with UK but we have no objection to you, after consultation with Cadogan, making known to SYG or representatives of States on Palestine Commission our view that advantages of Britain maintaining the Mandate to May 15 far outweigh possible advantages of Commission actually undertaking its duties in Palestine before May 1.

This should not preclude the Commission actively undertaking its work of organization and initiating detailed conversations with the Mandatory Power with a view to taking over after UK withdrawal. Such conversations might profitably be carried out by the Commission in London, and should include talks also with representatives of the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee.

You should make it very clear to Cadogan that in agreeing with British timetable we confidently assume UK will furnish utmost facilities by way of advice and continuing cooperation to the Commission from the moment of its creation.

(Repeated to London for the Secretary as 5067, Secdel 1531.)

LOVETT

\(^1\) Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1290.
The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1947—6 p. m.

505. Re urtel 546 Nov 26. It is assumed that Britain as mandatory power will continue to be responsible maintenance order Palestine until termination Mandate and will afford non-discriminatory protection to all persons there including Americans.

If, however, Brit are unwilling or unable to afford appropriate protection, it would appear that only alternative would be to suggest refugees proceed directly to Haifa. However advice of this character is difficult for Dept to give at this distance and it is believed that decisions may be made by you based on first-hand knowledge actual situation in Palestine.

(Re last para 546) If evacuation becomes necessary by US naval vessel Navy will pay cost passage to southern Italy.

Loveitt

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1 Not printed; it advised that “Spokesman Palestine Government states temporary shelter such as envisaged in ‘nearest British Army camp’ cannot be afforded unneutral Americans numbering about 4,000 who must share such general protection as may be afforded by presence British troops in country.” (S67N.01/11-2647)

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The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, December 5, 1947.

Martel 34. Bevin left with me the brief quoted below which had been prepared for him to use during his conversation with me on December 2.

“Mr. Marshall has already been informed of the outline of our plans for withdrawal from Palestine and of the difficulty which we expect if the United Nations Commission were to arrive in Palestine more than say a fortnight before we were ready to hand over authority to them. This date, according to our plan, will be about May 15.

There has already been some Arab effervescence. Nevertheless, we have received assurances from various Arab spokesmen that they will not try to make trouble while we are still in Palestine. We are now sending to the Arab Governments a message that we expect them to honour these assurances, and suggesting that this will involve not only that they should refrain from armed intervention themselves, but that
they should stop individuals from other states crossing into Palestine
to provoke disorder, or inciting disturbances from outside.¹

Our object during this period will be to maintain the status quo in
all respects. This will apply particularly to immigration. If we modify
our policy on this subject, this will be an added incentive to the Arabs
to take the law into their own hands. We earnestly hope, therefore,
that the United States authorities will feel able to continue and in-
tensify the measures which they have recently begun to take to
restrain those involved in organizing this traffic. It will also be most
helpful if the United States authorities could recommend forbearance
and moderation to such Jewish representatives with whom they are
in contact in the same way as His Majesty's Government have made
similar recommendations to Arab representatives.”

MARSHALL

¹Telegram 6309, December 3, 7 p. m., from London, reported: “Foreign Office
showed Embassy today copy of circular telegram despatched December 2 to
British missions to which this telegram is repeated instructing British repre-
sentatives to urge moderation upon these Arab Governments and to point out
that British forces so long as in Palestine will have to suppress disorders from
whatever source in areas under British control. It would not be enough for Arab
Governments to refrain from official action while British Government is en-
deavoring to maintain status quo Palestine. Arab Governments should prevent
their nationals from crossing into Palestine to disturb peace.” Telegram 6309
was repeated to Cairo, Baghdad, Jidda, Beirut, and Damascus (867N.01/12–847).

867N.01/10–8147

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State has received the British Embassy's memo-
randum of October 31, 1947 concerning the clandestine movement of
Jews from Austria into Italy and the reported misuse of former United
States Army vehicles and equipment by the American Joint Distribu-
tion Committee and similar organizations.

Since receipt of the memorandum the Secretary of State has advised
the British Ambassador by letter dated November 10, 1947 ² of the
efforts of this government, including warnings to Jewish leaders, to
stop this clandestine activity. In the meantime also, the General As-
sembly of the United Nations has taken positive action on the question
of Palestine which, it is hoped, will bring an end to these movements.
In the light of this development the Department will keep under advise-
ment the question of any additional special border control measures
which should be taken in the United States Zone of Austria.

The Department is advised that the incident involving the misuse
of former Army vehicles and equipment reported to have taken place

²Not printed.
at the boundary between United States and French Zones of Austria was immediately brought to the attention of responsible representatives of the American Joint Distribution Committee who happened to be in Vienna at the time. These officials stated that the vehicles in question were not operated by the organization, and took steps immediately to identify to responsible authorities in Austria and Italy all vehicles and personnel currently employed in the relief activities of the organization.

WASHINGTON, December 6, 1947.

501.BB Palestine/12-647: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at London

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 6, 1947—1 p.m.

Telmar 42. For Secretary from Lovett. Reference Deptel 586 of Dec 3 to USUN New York repeated London as 5067 of Dec 3.

Shortly prior your departure for London Dept adopted policy,1 with Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments concurrence, of suspending authorization export from US arms, ammunition, other war material intended for use Palestine or neighboring countries until situation in that area had clarified. Suspension also held apply export licenses already issued but not utilized and include disposals from US-controlled stocks abroad.2

In view recent disorder Palestine and threats from Arab states, Dept anticipates representatives Jewish Agency who are also representatives of Zionist Organization of America will shortly request US Govt to permit export to Palestine from US of military supplies.

Dept proposes if and when approached by representatives Jewish Agency, to reply:

1) In period preceding termination mandate, requests for military supplies should be made to British authorities in Palestine.

2) In period following termination mandate, requests for military supplies should be made to UN Commission. Commission procedure thereafter is as yet unknown.

1 On November 14, as indicated in PCA summary of action, No. S–69.

2 For the statement released by the Department of State on December 5 concerning the discontinuation of the licensing of shipments of arms and ammunition to Middle East areas, see Department of State Bulletin, December 14, 1947, p. 1197. Under the new policy, the Department revoked its approval of the sale of sufficient arms and ammunition to train 100 Syrian pilots for one year (memorandum of December 1 by the Chief of the Munitions Division (Cummins) to Col. R. M. Barton of the Department of the Army). The approval had been given in a note of May 17, 1947, from the Secretary of State to the Syrian Minister. The memorandum and the note are both filed under 890D.24/4–2947.
3) US Govt believes UN Commission might wish at early date initiate conversations with British in London re military supplies which British may be able to make available.

Suggest you may wish inform Bevin character reply which Dept proposes make to JA representatives if latter approach Dept. *

LOVETT

*According to telegram Martel 69, December 10, from London, the substance of Telmar 42 was conveyed to Michael Wright, Superintending Under-Secretary in the British Foreign Office, on December 10 for delivery to Mr. Bevin. Mr. Wright's initial reaction was to "warmly welcome" this step by the Department (501.BB Palestine/12-1047).

740.00119 Council/12-647: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

7/London, December 6, 1947—3:30 p.m.

US URGENT

Martel 40. For Lovett from the Secretary. At a meeting with Bevin Thursday morning, at which Douglas and Dixon, Bevin's secretary, were present, the following matters were discussed:

1. Middle East
2. Austrian Treaty
3. Tactics toward Germany
4. Palestine

I shall comment on each separately, as follows:

1. Middle East.
   Memorandum being mailed. 1

   [Here follow comments on Numbers 2 and 3; for texts, see volume II, pages 750 and 751.]

4. Palestine

   Bevin handed me an informal note 2 on the plans and intentions of H.M.G. regarding the transfer of power in Palestine. He added that it should not be supposed that the withdrawal of the British administration and forces was an easy matter.

   Various arrangements had to be made and they had to make provision for British assets in the country. He laid particular stress on the importance of stopping any further illegal immigration. It was bound to lead to bloodshed, since the Arabs would undoubtedly be incited to massacre the Jews, and the situation might then require the use of force. The US Government might then find themselves required to provide forces and the Soviet Government might press to provide a force. Would the US Government like this? I admitted that the

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1 Copy not found in Department of State files.
2 Presumably the note quoted in Martel 34, December 5, p. 1298.
greatest fear of the US military authorities in regard to the question was the presence of a Russian force in Palestine. Bevin, continuing, said that if on the other hand Jewish immigration ceased until they were ready to hand over the administration to the United Nations commission in May, it would be possible to proceed in an orderly way. They should then hope to be able to introduce into Palestine the illegal immigrants now in Cyprus, numbering nearly 30,000, and they might also be able to provide a port on the Palestine coast for the introduction of legal immigrants after the taking over by the U.N. commission. They should also be able, in the period between now and May, to stop the infiltration of Jews across the frontiers. Bevin considered that it was not safe to leave this situation to the UN commission, but an understanding regarding the problems of the transfer of power was required between the US Government and H.M.G.

I said that I could not believe that the Jews would any longer proceed with illegal immigration, since it must be a dead loss to them and would be of no pressure value.

Bevin questioned this. He had no confidence in the Jewish Agency, to whom illegal immigration would still seem to have a pressure value; their object would be to cause incidents and keep their cause alive. He urged that the US Government should restrain the Jewish Agency from these courses and if possible arrange for some public announcement, condeming illegal immigration and urging the Jews to remain patient. Such a step would incidentally steady the Arabs.

I said I would send a message to Washington in the general sense advocated by Bevin. I remarked that the Zionists would be unwilling to make any statement regarding illegal immigration which would imply any responsibility for it on their part.\(^3\)

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\(^3\)A marginal notation indicates a copy of Martel 40 was sent to President Truman on December 8.

501.BB Palestine/12-947

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)\(^1\)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 8, 1947.

Participants: 
Mr. Moshe Shertok—Jewish Agency  
Mr. Eliahu Epstein—Jewish Agency  
Mr. Henderson—NEA  
Mr. Merriam—NE  
Mr. Mattison—NE  
Mr. Wilkins—NE

\(^1\) Drafted by Mr. Wilkins.
Moshe Shertok called on me this afternoon for the purpose of discussing current developments with regard to Palestine. Mr. Shertok's remarks were centered around three main points:

1) *Immigration.* Mr. Shertok observed that when immigration was under consideration at the UN, the Jewish Agency formed the definite opinion that the UN had provided for the evacuation by the British before February 1, 1948 of a port and hinterland in Palestine to receive immigrants and that the UN Commission, which was expected to leave for Palestine in December 1947 would have general control of immigration. Mr. Shertok said that, according to the Jewish Agency's present information, the UN Commission had not as yet officially been appointed and that it appeared that there would be some delay in its departure for Palestine. Mr. Shertok concluded that unless a seaport were available in the near future and unless the UN Commission arrived in Palestine at an early date, it would probably be difficult for the Jewish Agency to restrain illegal immigration into Palestine.

2) *Security Council.* Mr. Shertok requested the Department to consider the issuance of an instruction authorizing the United States Mission to the United Nations to make a statement at the next meeting of the Security Council in support of the UN recommendation on Palestine with particular reference to recent activities by sections of the Arab population and statements by some of the Arab States in opposition to the UN decision to partition Palestine. Mr. Shertok was of the opinion that an American statement of this character would reinforce the decision of the UN and would have the effect of indicating that the United States was still behind the UN recommendation.

3) *Military Supplies and Advisers.* Mr. Shertok stated that he desired tentatively to express his thoughts with regard to this question and observed that it would be essential for the Jewish authorities to be prepared militarily to take over gradually from the British authorities as the latter withdrew their armed forces. Mr. Shertok said that they turned to the US for assistance in the first instance but that if it should not prove possible to obtain such assistance in the United States the Jewish authorities would perforce be obliged to turn elsewhere. Military supplies were considered by Mr. Shertok to include reasonable quantities of all types of small arms plus heavier equipment including planes, machine guns, mortars, anti-aircraft and tanks. Military advisers were necessary, according to Mr. Shertok, in order that the Jewish authorities might best utilize the forces, equipment and territory at their command. Mr. Shertok added that it was necessary to discuss and act on these matters now in order that the Jewish state would be able to take care of itself on the actual date of British withdrawal; it being understood, of course, that use would not be made of such military supplies prior to the British withdrawal.
I asked Mr. Shertok whether the questions of immigration and military supplies had been discussed with the United Kingdom Delegation and with the UN Secretariat in New York and whether Mr. Nahum Goldmann had as yet had an opportunity, as planned, to discuss these matters with the British authorities in London. Mr. Shertok replied that the Jewish Agency proposed to go into these matters further with the UN Commission as soon as its members had been appointed and that Mr. Goldmann was proceeding to London tomorrow and would raise these and other questions there.

I pointed out the unfortunate consequences which might follow if further illegal immigration into Palestine were to take place at this time and was assured by Mr. Shertok that the Jewish Agency would take all steps in its power to prevent such illegal immigration; but that the provision of a seaport and an increase in the present rate of legal immigration would be essential to accomplish this purpose.

I also explained that the recently announced policy of the US Government prohibiting the export or disposal abroad of military supplies to Palestine and neighboring Arab countries was not a new policy having been established by the Secretary prior to his departure for London in November. I stated that it had been given publicity in the press recently because of other press statements to the effect that some $36,000,000 worth of military supplies had been transferred to the Arab States since the war. I pointed out that this latter statement was not correct and that, as a matter of fact, less than $8,000 consisting of light arms for internal security or police forces had been transferred to the Arab States. I said that the Arab States had received other supplies since the conclusion of the war but that they were of a non-military character similar to the surplus supplies received by many other countries in this period.

I told Mr. Shertok that I would bring all of his remarks including his request with regard to an American statement in the Security Council to the attention of Mr. Lovett and Mr. Armour.

Mr. Shertok expressed a desire to pay his respects to Mr. Lovett and Mr. Armour prior to his proposed departure for Palestine on December 16 or 17. I told Mr. Shertok that I would inquire whether the Acting Secretary and the Assistant Secretary would have an opportunity to see him during the next few days and, if so, that I would communicate with him accordingly.

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2 For a breakdown of these figures, see the Department’s statement of December 5, cited in footnote 2, p. 1300.

3 Mr. Henderson transmitted this document to Messrs. Lovett and Armour in a memorandum of December 9. He made the following recommendations: “1. Immigration: No further action by the Department at this time.

   “2. Security Council: No recommendation is made as I do not know what the policy of the U.S. Government is on this subject.

   “3. Military Supplies and Advisors: No recommendation is made pending further clarification of Mr. Shertok’s tentative views.” (501.BB Palestine/12-947)
Governor General Mohammad Ali Jinnah of Pakistan to President Truman

At this hour when the Muslim world has received a terrible shock owing to the most unfortunate decision of the United Nations Organization to enforce partition of Palestine, I would like to address to you, Mr. President, this personal appeal.

2. The decision is ultra vires of the United Nations charter and basically wrong and invalid in law.

3. Morally it is untenable. Politically, historically, geographically and practically it would be impossible to enforce partition against the united resistance of the Arabs who have the full sympathy and support of over three hundred million Mussalmans and many non-Muslim countries and not only those who voted against UNO decision.

4. In the long run it will and must fail. The very people for whose benefit this decision is taken—the Jews, who have already suffered terribly from Nazi persecution—will I greatly fear, suffer most if this unjust course is pursued. Moreover the decision presents a great danger to world peace.

5. May I therefore, at this eleventh hour, appeal to you and through you to the great and powerful American nation, which has always stood for justice, to uphold the rights of the Arab race. The Government and the people of America can yet save this dangerous situation by giving a correct lead and thus avoid the gravest consequences and repercussions.

6. May I, Mr. President, with your permission, release this telegram to the press.

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Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 10, 1947.

Ambassador O'Neal at Manila has asked ¹ that you be informed of a conversation which he had on November 30, 1947 with President Roxas concerning the Philippine vote in the United Nations on the Palestine partition question.

As you will recall, the Philippine Delegate to the United Nations, Ambassador Romulo, in an address before the General Assembly

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¹ In telegram 1550, December 4, 7 p. m., not printed.
of the United Nations on November 26, 1947 indicated that the Philippines would vote against Palestine partition. When the vote was taken, however, on November 29, the Philippines voted in favor of partition.

In his telegram, Ambassador O’Neal reports that President Roxas stated that he had instructed the Philippine Delegation to change its position and vote in favor of partition because of his fear, based on a report from Ambassador Elizalde and a telegram from some ten United States Senators, that a vote against partition would have an adverse effect on United States-Philippine relations.

A statement of the substance of Ambassador O’Neal’s telegram ² and of the Department’s reply ³ thereto is attached.

ROBERT A. LOVETT

[Annex]

Ambassador O’Neal’s telegram is to the following effect:

President Roxas stated that he was greatly disturbed over the position in which he had been placed with regard to the Palestine question. He had received a report from Ambassador Elizalde that a “United States representative” had intimated that failure to support the United States position on the Palestine question might have an adverse effect upon Philippine-American relations. President Roxas had also received a “high-pressure telegram” signed by some ten United States Senators.

When queried by President Roxas, Ambassador Romulo had replied that he had been in close touch with the United States representatives at the United Nations, that these representatives had never intimated a desire that he support the United States position, that his instructions were to use his own judgment and that to reverse his position at that time would be extremely embarrassing and would be certain to renew the charge that the Philippines was a mere puppet of the United States.

President Roxas said that the Palestine question was important to him because of the considerable Mohammedan population in the Philippines. He added that he had never been approached by the American Embassy at Manila with regard to the subject. Nevertheless, fearing a Senate hostile group, he was wiring Ambassador Romulo to reverse his position and asked Ambassador O’Neal to write to the President explaining the situation.

Ambassador O’Neal added that he was sure President Roxas feels that he has been placed in an unfair and damaging position and that he desires to cooperate in full with the United States on all major questions.

In reply to this telegram, the Department has requested Ambassador O’Neal to inform President Roxas that this Government had supported Palestine partition as the best answer to the problem on the basis of a majority recommendation by the United Nations Special

² Infra.
³ Telegram 1273, December 9, 7 p. m., not printed.
Committee on Palestine; that the Department considered that United Nations Members had a right to their own convictions on the subject and had a right to vote in accordance with those convictions; that the way in which a Member voted was not so important as the maintenance of the freedom to vote in accordance with belief; and that it was important that the solution reached should have the genuine support of a majority of the Assembly of the United Nations. The United States Delegation at the United Nations had accordingly publicly stated that this Government favored the proposed partition of Palestine but had not sought to bring pressure in the matter on any Government and does not regard failure by any Government to support the plan as an indication of unfriendliness to the United States. These views had been expressed to the representatives of the various Governments at the United Nations. The Department was not able to understand the report from Ambassador Elizalde concerning the attitude of a “United States representative” referred to by President Roxas and desired additional information and an indication of the identity of the person involved.

The Department has also requested Ambassador O’Neal to inform President Roxas of this Government’s surprise that he should have entertained any doubt with regard to the effect which a vote on the Palestine question would have on United States–Philippine relations. He was also requested to indicate this Government’s appreciation of the Philippine Government’s known desire to cooperate with the United States on major problems.

The Department added for Ambassador O’Neal’s confidential information that Ambassador Elizalde’s attitude might reflect in part his own estimate of the possible effect which an adverse Philippine vote on partition might have on the extension of additional financial assistance to the Philippines by the United States Congress.4

4 Department of State files indicate additional charges by Arab sources that the United States exerted pressure on various countries to support partition. They also contain an explanation by the Greek Ambassador that Greece had voted against partition “as part of a deal which the Greek representatives had made with the representatives of the Moslem states. In return for Greek support on the Palestine issue the Moslem states agreed to give full support to Greece in the future on Greek questions arising before any UN organ.” (memorandum of conversation by John D. Jernegan, Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, December 3, 501.3B Palestine/12–347)

125.4916/12-1047: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, December 10, 1947—5 p.m.

589. Since predominantly Arab area in which Jerusalem situated now hostile to USA, we have following operational difficulties:
1. American personnel virtually confined in security zones maintained by British because elsewhere non-Arab cars stoned, fired upon.

2. Meeting courier at Lydda, 30 miles distant through Arab territory requires police escort, is hazardous and may become impracticable any time.

3. For same reason Americans wishing leave country with alternatives of Lydda or Haifa as egress points may be cut off any time. Railway travel has been eliminated for some time as too dangerous. Problem meeting new personnel, some of whom due shortly, also arises.

4. Messengers, chauffeurs, domestic servants, all Arabs, also Arab office employees showing signs tension and continued service problematical.

5. British as long as here may be counted upon for utmost helpfulness. When British withdraw problem how to operate becomes virtually unanswerable, raising question as to continuation food supplies, fuel, public utilities as post, telegraph, electricity. Food already becoming difficult.

Depcirirctels advising insistence for protection upon governments to which accredited naturally not applicable Jerusalem after British departure. Therefore will appreciate Department’s keeping us fully advised on following as guide for future planning and basis decisions regarding evacuation wives, families and possibly women employees:

a. Idea envisaged by UN there will be Arab State believed unrealistic because Arabs will refuse form one. Since assumed there will be early establishment US diplomatic mission in Jewish state does Department envisage a Consulate General continuing in Jerusalem and if so what will its principal functions be?

b. If so assume Consulate General will deal with UN Palestine Commission on problems relating to American interests in Arab area. However present indications are that UN Commission will be treated as enemy by Arabs. Chief Palestine Criminal Investigation Department told NY Times correspondent off record that police could not possibly protect UN Commission if it located anywhere except Tel Aviv. Such location would invest Commission with partisan character thereby preventing discharge of duties envisaged by UNGA. High Government official refuses visualize Commission in Tel Aviv thinks possible house in strongly guarded Mt. Scopus building Jerusalem from which Commissioners could not emerge however. These prophecies throw grim light on future of Jerusalem Trusteeship Council.

c. Can Department or US Delegation indicate who will do job of present experienced police force of 20,000 reinforced by British military of 60,000? As they now find security problem difficult seems logical think rapidly assembled substitute would find more so. Therefore suggest Department explore possibility providing Consulate General with own independent guard, assuming our present security zone will
be liquidated with British departure. Also discuss with Navy means for ensuring direct radio communication with their units in Mediterranean. High British officials think disruption communications in post-mandate period very likely.

d. Reference decision Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments. (Depintel December 2, 1 a. m.\(^1\)) JA officials already indicated informally will make formal request for arms and technicians in keeping with US responsibility for partition decision. In any case decision Policy Committee scarcely likely affect plentitude of arms already in Palestine and pouring in daily.

Realize hypothetical nature much of above, but extreme gravity future problems appears justification, even at risk seeming alarmist. Will appreciate Department’s guidance on matters discussed.

MACATEE

\(^1\) Not printed.

501/12-1147

Memorandum by President Truman to the Acting Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, December 11, 1947.

I read with a lot of interest your memorandum of the tenth in regard to the Philippine situation.

It seems to me that if our Delegation to the United Nations is to be interfered with by members of the United States Senate and by pressure groups in this country we will be helping the United Nations down the road to failure.

The conversation between the President of the Philippines and our Ambassador is most interesting.

I have a report from Haiti, in which it is stated that our Consul in Haiti approached the President of that country and suggested to him that for his own good he should order the vote of his country changed, claiming that he had instructions from me to make such a statement to the President of Haiti. As you very well know, I refused to make statements to any country on the subject of its vote in the United Nations.

It is perfectly apparent that pressure groups will succeed in putting the United Nations out of business if this sort of thing is continued and I am very anxious that it be stopped.

H[ARRY] S. T[UMAN]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)\(^1\)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 11, 1947.

Participants: Dr. Fadhil Jamali, Iraqi Foreign Minister  
Mr. Chorbach, Iraqi Chargé d’Affaires  
Mr. Henderson, NEA  
Mr. Colquitt, NE

Dr. Jamali called on Mr. Henderson on December 4 to pay his respects and to discuss with him the Palestine problem as it appeared following the UN decision in favor of partition. There were now two principal fears in his mind, Dr. Jamali said, namely, the possibility of armed conflict between Arabs and Americans, and the possibility of Soviet troops gaining a foothold in Palestine from which it might prove impossible to dislodge them. In the latter connection he referred to press reports of a statement by an un-named American military authority expressing fear of such military penetration of the Mediterranean by the Soviets through the opportunity presented by Palestine. Dr. Jamali felt that the seriousness of the situation made it essential that thought be given by those truly interested in preserving Arab-American amity—such as Mr. Henderson and himself—to some constructive solution of the problem before matters progressed so far that it would be too late to prevent a catastrophe.

Dr. Jamali commented that the Arab delegations felt badly disillusioned by the UN’s handling of the Palestine case, which they considered a gross injustice. Not only have the American delegation used pressure on other delegations, but even Dr. Evatt, the Australian chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee had been strongly opposed to the Arabs and had been observed canvassing for partition votes. Dr. Jamali said he could not understand why the last-minute Arab proposal for delay in the hope of achieving conciliation had been rejected.

The situation had now deteriorated so badly, Dr. Jamali reiterated that some means must be found out of the impasse. It was his personal belief that the problem should eventually be brought before the Security Council as a situation constituting a threat to peace, that the SC should pass the dispute on to the Assembly for conciliation, and that the Arabs should then propose cantonization as the basis for the future of Palestine.

In answer to Dr. Jamali’s inquiry as to whether he thought a solution might eventually be achieved by this course, Mr. Henderson replied

\(^1\) Drafted by Mr. Colquitt.
that he did not think it could be. Mr. Henderson stated that it would be misleading to hold out any such hope: the US had determined its policy of supporting partition after long and careful consideration, with full realization of the seriousness of the decision, and that the decision was final and would undoubtedly be adhered to. Mr. Henderson thought that the Arabs were mistaken if they thought that through bloodshed they could gain a reconsideration of the problem in UN. The use of violence would probably be regarded as coercion and would be resisted by the US. The only solution that he could think of, Mr. Henderson said, was for the Arabs to accept the UN Partition Plan; otherwise, he could see no way of breaking the impasse.

Dr. Jamali replied that the UN Partition Plan would never be accepted by the Arabs and that they would die in defense of their rights rather than accede to it. The world had not believed the Arabs when they had said they would give their lives to prevent the establishment of a Zionist state in Palestine, but now it would see the Arabs meant what they said.

Concluding, Dr. Jamali said that although the situation was very gloomy and that he feared a possible Arab-American clash, he felt that every effort must be given to thinking out a means of solving the problem while there was still time. Iraq wanted America's friendship, he said, and needed its help in implementing its plans for national development. Some means must be found to preserve that amity through removal of the friction caused by the Palestine problem.

Mr. Henderson assured Dr. Jamali that the US was equally anxious to preserve Arab-American friendship. As for the Palestine issue, however, he could see no other solution than the acceptance by the Arabs of the UN solution.

L[oy] W. H[enderson]

867N.01/12-1247

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armour)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] December 12, 1947.

Participants: Mr. Armour
Mr. Shertok, Jewish Agency
Mr. Epstein, Jewish Agency
Mr. Mattison, NE

Mr. Shertok opened the discussion with a review of the current situation in the Middle East as it affected Palestine, including the disturbances against Jews in Aden and Aleppo. He again urged, as in
his meeting with Mr. Henderson on December 8, that the United States Representative on the Security Council make a statement which would serve as a warning to the Arab States not to interfere in the Palestine matter. I replied that the matter would be considered by the officials concerned in the Department.

I took the occasion to emphasize our continued concern over the possibility of the departure of the Pan Crescent and the Pan York from Constanza. Mr. Shertok replied in the same vein as he had yesterday in his talk with Mr. Johnson in New York (New York tel. 1301, December 11), i.e., explaining the Agency's position and that while the Agency was against the departure of those ships that they might not be able to stop them. I again emphasized our earnest desire that the ships not be allowed to depart.

1 Not printed; it reported Ambassador Johnson's statement to Mr. Shertok that "we felt very strongly that it would be unwise for these ships to sail and for any illegal immigration to reach Palestine under present circumstances." (501.BB Palestine/12–1147)

Later the same day, Mr. Shertok sent a letter to Mr. Armour in which he noted that he "had intended to refer during our interview to the question of supplementary military equipment for the present Jewish defense organization or the future militia in Palestine, and I hope an early opportunity may be afforded for us to discuss the matter." Mr. Armour's reply of December 22 noted that Mr. Shertok's tentative views had already been given to Mr. Henderson and that Mr. Goldmann planned to raise the question with British authorities. He suggested, accordingly, "that a further discussion of this matter might be postponed for the time being." (867.N.01/12–1247)

CFM Files: Lot M–88; Box 104: Anglo-US-French Conversations

British Memorandum of Conversation

TOP SECRET

ANGLO-AMERICAN CONVERSATIONS

[London, 17 December, 1947.]

Mr. Marshall paid a farewell call on the Secretary of State at the Foreign Office at 6 p.m. on December 17th. The situation resulting from the breakdown of the recent meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers and other subjects concerning Anglo-American relations were discussed in a conversation lasting 1½ hours.

Arab Reactions to the General Assembly's Decision on Palestine.

The Secretary of State explained that Arab reactions had been even worse than we had expected. We were getting in reports from all over the Middle East, which were disturbing. He wished to tell Mr. Marshall in confidence that he was proposing to get along various Arab repre-

1 This memorandum was prepared by Frank Roberts, Personal Secretary to Mr. Bevin, and copies were given to Ambassador Douglas; see footnote 30, vol. II, p. 822.
sentatives to London one by one in order to steady them. The situation might blow up throughout the Middle East with serious reactions on the Americans as well as ourselves. He was himself convinced that the Soviet Union had supported partition in order to cause a general mix up, from which they would profit when the Jews and Arabs began to fight. He thought that if and when the Russians intervened, it would not be in Palestine itself but in Iraq. He was anxious about the position of 100,000 Jews in Bagdad and of others in other places in the Middle East. They would not be the victims of war but would risk having their throats cut.

Mr. Marshall said he had not had many reports yet. He had heard the situation was serious but had not thought it was as bad as the Secretary of State had said. The American representative[s] in the Middle East countries were of course disturbed and he would keep a careful watch.

The Secretary of State said that Mr. Marshall ought to know that some Arabs, including Nuri Pasha, whom he had recently seen in London, alleged that after Mr. Marshall had left America pressure had been put on many members of the United Nations, especially the Latin America countries, to vote for partition.

Mr. Marshall said that the position was very difficult. The Arabs also had been bringing pressure to bear everywhere. He had tried to stop this, although the Latin American countries had asked the Americans for a lead, he had refused to give it. He had taken a similar line over elections to the Security Council. He felt it was better in the long run not to intervene. He had given his people instructions accordingly over Palestine, and he had the greatest confidence in General Hilldring, who was handling this and who, he was absolutely sure, would handle it with very clean hands.

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**Editorial Note**

In the files of the Department of State, under 501.BB Palestine/12-1747, is a carbon copy of a report dated December 17, 1947, whose purpose it was “To assess and appraise the position of the U.S. with respect to Palestine, taking into consideration the security interests of the U.S. in the Mediterranean and Near East areas and in the light of the decision of the General Assembly of the United Nations regarding the partition of Palestine.” The paper gives no indication of authorship, but it seems to be the initial draft called for in the editorial note, page 1288, and a forerunner of Policy Planning Staff Report 19 of January 19, 1948. It is anticipated that the latter report will be printed in a forthcoming volume of *Foreign Relations*. 
The report of December 17, 1947, made two alternative recommendations, as follows: "25. The United States should immediately announce that we have become convinced that the partition of Palestine is impossible of implementation and that the Palestine problem should therefore be referred back to a special session of the General Assembly to meet in a neutral country such as Switzerland. At this session we should propose that a 'middle-of-the-road' solution be attempted for which we would endeavor to obtain support from the Arab and Jewish communities of Palestine. If this proved impossible, we should propose a UN trusteeship for Palestine, pending agreement by the Arab and Jewish communities.

"Meanwhile, we should take the lead in asking the British to remain in Palestine, with the right to request whatever assistance they might require from other members of the UN. In these circumstances the UN should be asked to defray the costs of continued occupation by the British.

"OR

"26. The US should take the position that, in view of the manifest impossibility of implementing the partition of Palestine, no steps should be taken to that end. We should oppose sending UN troops to Palestine to enforce partition. We should maintain and enforce our embargo on arms to Palestine and neighboring countries."

867N.01/12-1747: Telegram
The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, December 17, 1947—5 p. m.

615. Myerson, JA political chief, called December 15, complained about Palestine Government.¹ Said she saw sinister design in actions government adding while Jews can take care of themselves against Arabs, British and Arabs together too much. Cited several examples of "government discrimination" against Jews, including prohibition against Jewish settlement police using armored cars.

After adding Jews may be forced to war with both government and Arabs she wondered what outsiders would think if Jews remained quiet under "provocation". I remarked restraining on part of Jews will not be considered weakness but sign of strength that so much had

¹ Telegram 586, December 9, 1 p. m., from Jerusalem, reported that Mrs. Myerson, accompanied by Mr. Ben-Gurion, informed Mr. Macatee on December 8 that the Jewish Agency thought the Government of Palestine was unnecessarily lenient in controlling the Arabs. She expressed distress at news of an Arab ambush of a convoy on the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv road at which the Mukhtar of Yagur, a close friend, and a high-ranking Haganah officer had been killed. (867N.01/12-947).
been attributed to Jews because of terrorism that exhibition of restraint could not fail bring favorable reaction. Myerson wants UN committee here quickly, failing that a UN observer “who could keep eye on government”. Asked that her remarks be reported US Government.

This frame of mind typical of JA these days as their many difficulties increase. Having at first welcomed British handing over Tel Aviv area to Jewish police, now sees sinister design here also, commenting since British and Arabs remaining in Jaffa Jews will be compelled to fight them both.

Similar views expressed in Palestine Post editorial yesterday commenting upon which high government official said government felt if Jews took over own defence same would have to apply Arabs. Jews were not willing accept this therefore government feels their argument not valid.

MACATEER

501.BB Palestine/12-1747 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, December 17, 1947—6 p.m.

6523. Reciprocating information re US policy arms shipments Middle East (Telmar 42) and expanding initial Foreign Office reaction reported Martel 60, December 10, Michael Wright handed Embassy officer December 15 following top secret memorandum:

Text begins, “HMG has treaty obligations to supply certain Middle East states with war materials. They have regularly supplied such material in accordance with these obligations over number years. Delivery such items ordered under these arrangements some time ago has not yet taken place. It is not intended to hold up delivery such items, which form part previous orders.

“Any new orders from Palestine or Arab countries will be scrutinized with great care before decision is taken on them. Decisive factor will be whether war material in question is intended for use in Palestine or is likely to be used there.

“If hostilities broke out in Middle East, whole question of supply and delivery of arms to Middle East countries would be reconsidered.

1 December 6, p. 1300.
2 Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 1301.
3 Telegram 985, December 30, noon, from Ankara, reported that on December 29, the Turkish Foreign Minister informed Ambassador Wilson that “representatives Arab states recently requested Turkish Government supply arms. Turks refused pointing out this would be violation Turkey’s obligations as member UN; also Turkey receiving arms from US and if Turkey furnished arms to Arabs to combat UN decision supported by US this would place Turkey in impossible situation.” (890B.113/12-3047)
“British forces intend to abandon no weapons or warlike stores in Palestine in course of their evacuation.

“While Palestine Government continues to exercise its authority, it will continue as at present to take steps to prevent import of arms.

“From moment Palestine Government relinquishes authority it will be for UN Commission to decide on policy with regard to import of arms.” Text ends.

Wright remarked more he thought about it, more he thought Department would be well advised to avoid “superfluous” point three. Basic problem in Palestine as proven by recent disorders is that there are already too many arms hidden away by both sides. HMG does not favor more arms imports.

DOUGLAS

125.4916/12–1047 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1947—2 p.m.

545. Contel 489 [589], Dec. 10. In reply your lettered paragraphs:

a) Dept envisages continued functioning Jerusalem office pending clear picture course future developments in Palestine may take.

b) On basis UN Palestine recommendation Dept considers Consulate General should deal with Palestine Administration until mandate is terminated; with the provisional councils of govt, the UN administration for Jerusalem and the British military authorities in their respective areas thereafter until Oct 1, 1948; and with the councils of govt of the two areas and the UN administration for Jerusalem after Oct 1, 1948.

Consulate General should cooperate with UN Commission as agency of transfer keeping it informed of important developments in relations between Consulate General and post-mandate authorities. If subsequent developments should prevent formation or restrict activities of Councils of Government envisaged in UN plan, additional instructions will be sent you by the Dept.

c) UN recommendation made no provision for security forces other than militia for maintenance internal law and order. Provision of guard for Consulate General being discussed in Dept. To facilitate telegraph estimate no. and desired date arrival.

Dept assumes present and planned radio equipment (Deptel 526, Dec 12 and Contel 599, Dec 13) adequate to assure maintenance communications. Navy Wash being informed and requested arrange contact with Jerusalem.

1 Neither printed.
Dept concerned possible food shortage Jerusalem. If present or future needs cannot be supplied in Palestine or from nearby countries, telegraph estimate needs from US and whether you desire establish commissary.

d) No change contemplated in present US policy prohibiting export military supplies to Palestine and Arab States.

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*Editorial Note*

Mr. Eliezer Kaplan, Treasurer of the Jewish Agency, sent a letter to Mr. Henderson on December 22 in which he cited conversations he had had the previous week with officers of the State and Treasury Departments and of the Export-Import Bank. He enclosed two memoranda setting forth various financial proposals of the Jewish Agency (867N. 01/12-2247)

Mr. Merriam analyzed these proposals in a memorandum of December 31 to Mr. Henderson, as follows: “In scope and purpose, the program calls for raising 1 1/4 billion dollars for a four-year project calling for resettling 400,000 European and Asiatic Jews in the Jewish State, and for developing the country in a way to raise the Arab standard of living gradually to that of the Jews. The JA hopes to raise 3/4 billion dollars from private sources and appeals to the U.S. Government to supply the balance of 1/2 billion dollars. Of the latter sum, the JA seeks an Eximbank loan of $75,000,000, leaving it to be implied that the remaining $425 billion [million] is to be supplied by a grant from the U.S. Government.

“From the table of ‘Funds Required for the Accomplishment of the Four-Year Plan’ on page 3 of the memorandum, it is clear that expenses directly connected with the immigration program account for $1,070,000,000 of the total expenditure of $1,251,500,000 envisaged, thus leaving only $180 million for general development purposes, including raising the Arab standard of living.”

Mr. Merriam concluded: “it is difficult to see how serious consideration can be given to a financial request of this kind before political conditions in and around Palestine are placed on a sound basis and before the immigration and financial policies of the Jewish State are established. It is inconceivable that the Congress or the Eximbank would provide funds for the purpose of setting up an economic and immigration regime on a shaky, indigent basis which would result only in further appeals for money and other forms of assistance, probably including arms and armed force, to carry forward an unsound investment.” (867N.51/12-3147)
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs (Fales)

SECRET

Participants: Mr. Lovett
Sir John Balfour
NEA: Mr. Henderson
BC: Mr. Fales

Sir John stated that he had called in order to enlist "supporting action" to Britain's efforts to stop illegal immigration into Palestine. He referred to conversations on this subject between the Secretary and Mr. Bevin in London. He suggested this Government either continue its efforts of persuasion with the Jewish agencies or issue a statement condemning illegal immigration into Palestine.

Mr. Lovett recalled the actions taken over the past several months to delay the sailing of the ship Colonel Frederick C. Johnson and indicated that further efforts would be made if the British would authorize us to release information which would justify further action. Mr. Lovett referred to past efforts of persuasion which had been taken and indicated the difficulty of going beyond the President's statement of last June. The General Assembly Resolution (Nov. 29, 1947) providing for immigration after February 1 under the mandatory power was referred to and it was agreed that this Government could make no statement contrary to that resolution for which we had voted.

Discussion ensued of the possibility of Britain entering into an agreement with the Jewish Agency which would provide for regular immigration of refugees in Cyprus and possibly, if insisted on by the Zionists, of the Ewodus group now in Germany, during the period of the mandate in return for a commitment that there would be no attempt to force other immigration; such an agreement to also provide that a seaport for immigration would not be established in Palestine until Britain had laid down the mandate.

Sir John felt that such an agreement held possibilities which should be examined and said that he would transmit the suggestion to his Government.

867N.01/12-2347: Telegram
The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, December 23, 1947—5 p. m.

636. Stabler visited Amman and Shuneh December 21 and 22. In one hour interview with King Abdullah, King stated Arab Legion,

1 Wells Stabler, the Vice-Consul at Jerusalem.
now occupying strategic positions Palestine, may well be obliged occupy Palestine following departure British administration and troops if requested by Palestine Arabs to prevent chaos, anarchy and because internal security Transjordan requires such action. Asked through whom request Palestine Arabs might be transmitted in absence formal leadership King said mayors and municipal heads would be popular voice. That such request will be made or can be arranged most likely. King stressed propinquity Transjordan to Palestine and said disorders Palestine would affect Transjordan more than any other state. Consequently he must decide course action in light best interests his people.

Abdullah regretted haste of Jews and stated if they had shown more restraint some compromise benefitting both Arabs, Jews might have been achieved. Said federal form administration might be desirable in Palestine. Possibly such solution foreseen by King following occupation Palestine by his troops. Said after necessary period military government he would listen to all voices regarding administration and form government Palestine although determined there should be no Jewish state. King regards himself entirely alone in efforts maintain peace Near East with British withdrawing, United States withholding recognition, and Russia his “enemy”.

King who looked unwell was cordial as usual and seemed most disposed express his views. Interview was interpreted by Under secretary Foreign Office who at times seemed pained King’s views which not accord Arab League plans.

MACATEE

867N.01/12–347 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 26, 1947—5 p. m.

1695. For Tuck. Re statements made by King Farouk as reported urtell 1387 Dec 3. Unless you see some reason for not so doing please seek immediate audience with King and inform him you have been instructed by the President to discuss with him informally and orally problem of Palestine partition. During your discussion you should adopt following line:

1. US Govt decided after anxious and sober consideration to support partition in the UNGA despite realization of how strongly opposed Arab States were to establishment of Jewish state in Palestine. Its support of partition was not motivated by any unfriendliness towards Arabs or lack of appreciation of their concern in matter. US Govt took position because:

(a) After reviewing statements and expressions of policy by responsible American officials, resolutions of Congress, and Party platforms
of last thirty years it came to conclusion that unless there was some unanticipated factor in situation the trend of public opinion and policy based thereon practically forced it to support partition.

(b) Majority Report of UNSCOP recommending partition did represent new factor but one supporting Jewish state.

(c) Public opinion in US stirred by mistreatment of Jews in Europe and by intense desire of surviving Jews to go to Palestine strongly supported establishment of Jewish state.

(d) Troubled situation in Palestine accompanied by British decision to withdraw made it evident that solution of this difficult problem could not be postponed.

2. US Govt concerned re Palestine problem and sincerely desired fair solution. It therefore welcomed presentation to UN and earnestly and sincerely worked for impartial UNGA Committee with broad terms of reference to examine problem. At no time did Amer Govt directly or indirectly endeavor to influence recommendations of UNSCOP. It desired UNSCOP to approach matter in impartial way and work out solution of Palestine problem which would have overwhelming support of world opinion as one which was fair and workable.

3. US Govt in deciding to support Majority Report of UNCSOP at UNGA took position that it should not use its power and influence in prevailing upon other countries against their will to support Majority Report. US delegation was instructed that it should explain US reasons for supporting Majority Report but should not exert pressure on other delegations. So far as US Govt has determined no undue pressure was brought upon other countries by US Governmental officials responsible to Executive. Statements have been made that pressure was brought by Amer private citizens and by Americans holding official positions over whom Exec Branch of Govt had no control. It is impossible to determine definitely whether such pressure if it was applied changed any appreciable number of votes. In any event it is considered that the vote of the UNGA reflected the belief that partition was best of the solutions of the Palestine problem which were advanced.

4. It is understood that one of the reasons for Arab resentment at the UNGA decision is concern lest the Zionists intend eventually to use their state as a base for territorial expansion in the Middle East at the expense of the Arabs. It is the conviction of the United States Government, based on conversations with responsible Zionist leaders, that they have no expansionist designs and that they are most anxious to live with the Arabs in the future on cordial terms and to establish with them relations of a mutually advantageous character. If at a later time persons or groups should obtain control of the Jewish State who
have aggressive designs against their neighbors, the United States would be prepared firmly to oppose such aggressiveness in the United Nations and before world opinion.

5. The United States Government, prompted by the friendliest feelings for the Arab Governments and for the Arab peoples, expresses the most sincere hope that in their disappointment and resentment at the decision of UNGA, the Governments of the Arab countries will not attempt by armed force, or will not encourage the use of armed force, to prevent the carrying out of that decision. It is my own hope that Egypt, possessed of a sense of responsibility derived from long experience in world affairs, not only will set an example in restraint, but will use its great influence with its sister states to prevail upon them not to resort to actions of a character which may bring discredit to the Arab people, undermine the present order of the whole Middle East, and eventually lead to a world conflict in which the peoples of the Middle East may be the most tragic sufferers.

6. It seems hardly necessary to point out that there are in the world today powerful aggressive forces which create hatreds, promote violence, and result in chaos. It would be tragic if the forces striving for an orderly, peaceful and prosperous world should at this juncture allow themselves to be disrupted over the question of Palestine.

7. There is a mutual need for friendly political and economic cooperation between the United States and the countries of the Middle East. If there is to be a real sense of security as well as a developing prosperity in that area, the countries of the Middle East and those non-Middle Eastern powers who sincerely desire the principles of the Charter of the United Nations to be applied to that area in the interest both of the Middle Eastern people and of world security must work with cordiality and mutual trust. If the problem of Palestine, which has long been a source of suspicion and uneasiness could once and for all be eliminated, the United States Government can see no obstacles to the attainment of the cooperation so vital to all of us. It is the conviction of the United States Government that acquiescence on the part of the Arab States in the UNGA decision on Palestine, difficult though such acquiescence may be, would remove Palestine as a disturbing influence in international affairs.\footnote{Telegram 1695 was initiated by President Truman.}

Lovett

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**Editorial Note**

Mr. McClintock drafted a suggested press statement on the Pan-Crescent and the Pan York for use by Mr. Lovett at his press confer-
ence on December 30 and forwarded the draft to him with a memorandum of December 30. The draft consisted of four paragraphs. Mr. Lovett deleted the last paragraph and "took the rest," which stated: "The United States Government has learned that two vessels of Panamanian registry, the Pan Crescent and the Pan York, have picked up approximately 12,000 Jewish refugees from Rumanian and Bulgarian Black Sea ports destined for Palestine.

"This immigration is uncertified in that the passengers aboard the Pan Crescent and the Pan York have no valid visas for Palestine.

"The Department of State deprecates clandestine emigration to Palestine, particularly since the resolution which was adopted by the Second Session of the General Assembly on November 29, 1947, provided for substantial legal immigration to Palestine at an early date."

(867N.01/12-3047)

Mr. Lovett did not use these paragraphs at his press conference later the same day.

867N.01/12-3147: Airgram
The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to the Secretary of State
SECRET

JERUSALEM, December 31, 1947.
[Received January 14, 1948—8:55 a. m.]

A-274. Following is an attempt to summarize the developments of the four weeks since the UN vote on partition and to give the views of this Consulate General relative to partition and its effects on Palestine:

I. General.

In the present period, terror is prevalent and normal life (i.e., normal for Palestine) is disappearing. It is, however, compared with what may be expected in future, a period of relative quiet and restraint. This phase may continue until the withdrawal of the British is more imminent and until the Arabs have made more definite plans to give effect to their determination to prevent partition. Present outbursts are, it is felt, comparatively unimportant and disorganized and are merely the inevitable concomitants of a situation that is tense and waiting. They are prompted by hatred of the Jews mixed with feelings of intense patriotism, and may be expected to increase.

The present situation is also one of extreme uncertainty. The UN has not announced who is going to police Palestine when the British withdraw and what forces are to be used to implement partition. We feel that if the UN expects to be able to partition Palestine without forces to help maintain order and to enforce partition, its thinking is
most unrealistic and its efforts will be vain. Meanwhile, until some statement is made as to what will be done, the situation here will remain uncertain and watchful. No plans can be made to meet an unknown situation.

It is tragic that many of the present casualties comprise innocent and harmless people, going about their daily business. They are picked off while riding in buses, walking along the streets, and stray shots even find them while asleep in their beds. A Jewish woman, mother of five children, was shot in Jerusalem while hanging out clothes on the roof. The ambulance rushing her to the hospital was machine-gunned, and finally the mourners following her to the funeral were attacked and one of them stabbed to death.

II. Jewish Situation.

At the present time the Jews are maintaining comparative quiet. The Stern Gang is limiting itself to occasional attacks on British personnel. The Haganah is concerning itself with protection of Jewish lives and property and with "punitive" reprisals for Arab outrages. In some instances it is felt that the IZL has forced the hand of the Haganah in this respect since the IZL reportedly started these punitive attacks.

The Jewish Agency thus far has not called on the Haganah for any organized defense. However, recent attacks, particularly one in which Mrs. Myerson was involved, may give the JA an excuse for setting up an active defense against the Arabs. The Jewish Agency bitterly denounces the British forces whom it accuses, perhaps with some justification, of partiality to the Arabs. The Jewish Agency has claimed that it is completely impotent to deal with the activities of the terrorists. Pointing to British failures to deal with such persons, they justify the failure of the much smaller Jewish forces to deal with the same people.

There are indications that certain segments of Jewish opinion doubt the economic and military soundness of the proposed Jewish state. Their doubts are reflected in the demands recently made on the UN and the US for help to protect and bolster the nascent state. Mrs. Myerson's recent visit to the Consul General and her demands that something be done about the inability of the British to protect Jewish interests reflect this concern. The present Jewish difficulties in connection with food costs which are mounting daily, and in connection with road transport for food, are also part of this problem. The Jews produce about 35% of their own food. The rest must come from the Arabs and from abroad. Arab boycotts of Jewish markets, already started in connection with shipments from Egypt, would place Jewish food supplies in a precarious situation.
III. Arab Situation.

There is a tendency among outside countries to overrate the importance of the present unrest and violence in Palestine. As stated above, most outbreaks of trouble since the partition decision have been sporadic and unorganized. Such disturbances are to be expected in a country where there is so much tension and uncertainty as there are here. But responsible Arab headquarters are undoubtedly watching the situation and waiting for a favorable time to make a serious step. This time may come later in the spring when the proposed actions of the British become much more apparent than they are now. The Arabs will also have to wait until they are better organized and prepared than they are now.

The signs of serious preparation on the part of the Arabs for resistance are many. The women of the country are preparing bandages and material for the welfare of the troops. Young men are being constantly recruited and sent to neighboring states to be trained for military service. Some bands are already organized in the country and are working in a coordinated way. This is evidenced by the recent outbreak of attacks on freight trains and by the carefully selected targets of such attacks. Tons of food and rations have been stolen at such times—and it is most probable that these materials are being taken to safe storage for later use. There is an active market here for all kinds of arms and ammunition. Frequent thefts are made of guns and equipment from the British military. And there are constant reports on the desertion of Arab constables from the Police Force. These latter take their arms with them, and the rate of deserters has presently reached the average daily figure of fifteen. This points to the impracticability of the announced UN intention to rely on the use of local militia to maintain order.

Cooperation among Palestinians and members of the countries of the Arab League is close and seems to be more coordinated than before. Constant information shows that the Palestine Arabs are relying for considerable assistance, especially in arms, food and training of young men, on the surrounding Arab countries. Those delegates to UNGA who before the partition vote spoke with apparent contemptuousness of Arab bluff and will to resist would find it difficult, in this atmosphere, to continue in that belief. Yet observers here note with some wonderment, based on news which has so far reached this post, that the UN still proceeds toward the task of partitioning Palestine with no apparent realization of the extent of Arab determination to resist.

It is felt that the arrival of the UN Commission will probably stimulate Arab activity. It is also felt that the Arab attitude toward the
UN Commission will be indistinguishable from their attitude toward the Jews. UN Commission members and their staff are generally believed to be in real danger of assassination as soon as they arrive in Jerusalem.

As has been indicated, there is a general feeling here that the Arabs will fight. It is not believed that they will even pretend to negotiate with the UN Commission. Their rumored decision not to form an Arab state from the part allotted to the Arabs by the UNSCOP plan tends to bolster this belief. And certain quarters here have indicated that the Arabs believe the world situation will prevent any active UN interference in the war that they intend to wage on the Jews. They point to the fact that there is trouble between East and West. They also point to the fact that the United States is not interested in having Russian troops sent to the Middle East. The same is true of Soviet satellite troops. The Arabs feel that if UN sends troops here to maintain law and order and to implement the partition, either Russian or Soviet satellite troops—or both—will be sent to the Middle East. And the Arabs hope that such a dilemma will be effective in causing the US to oppose UN military interference in Palestine.

IV. British Situation.

Since the British have announced their intention of giving up the mandate, their chief desire seems to be to prevent any organized warfare before their departure. As a result, the strong-arm measures that were formerly characteristic of their occupation no longer obtain. Frequent outbreaks of violence are not stemmed by the police or by the army. When the British interfere in local troubles, they seem to do so only if the violence is of such a nature as would seem to be capable of spreading. The British attitude seems to be one that is governed by a desire not to precipitate general trouble by interfering too much in local situations.

There is probably some reason for the Jewish complaint that the British are favoring the Arabs. There is little doubt that the Palestine Police personnel, especially the middle and lower ranks, are inclined to favor the Arabs and to remain outside of the Arab-Jewish melee. Instances are frequently quoted in the Jewish press of the partisan attitude of the British forces. Requests from Jews for authorization to organize their own protection against the Arabs are refused. Police arrests and searches among Jewish personnel and settlements are the order of the day. The Jewish Agency is incensed at this attitude and is clamoring for the arrival of the UN Commission so that it can keep an eye on the Palestine Government. The Arabs are constantly erecting barricades on the highways and even in the cities. The police say that they cannot cope with all activity of this kind. Even police cars
and personnel are stopped. When the Arabs lay hands on a Jew, he is lucky if he escapes with his life.

One problem that is bothering the British authorities at the present time is the question of a free port for the Jews. The *Ad Hoc* Committee for Palestine gave orders to the mandatory government to evacuate a port for the use of the Jews by February 1, 1948. Presumably Tel Aviv will be the port chosen. The Palestine Government fears that such a port will be used by the Jews for the import of arms and war materials which it believes will inflame the Arabs far more than will Jewish immigration. The government is believed to have notified the UN of its concern over this matter, but the situation is not yet clarified so far as we can ascertain.¹

V. Position of the American Consulate General.

The first concern of the Consulate General is the continuance of its work here. So long as the British are here, there is little doubt that this mission will live and work in comparative security. The security zone system maintained in Jerusalem by the British makes working conditions possible for us and enables us to maintain contact with officials of the Government. But movement outside Jerusalem is particularly hazardous, and it is out of the question for members of this Consulate to move in and about those parts of Jerusalem which are not in protected zones. Furthermore, the comparative security enjoyed at present by the Consulate will last only so long as the British are here. After their departure, security will become a matter of conjecture. The question of importing enough American troops to protect our interests and to ensure the continuance of our work is a problematical one. Such a move would involve problems such as the question of other powers bringing in units of their own troops, but we have been assured by the present Government that it would not object to the arrival of American troops for the purpose of guarding the Consulate General. The British say they would have to consider similar measures for their own Consulate General which would be established upon their withdrawal.

The Arabs blame the United States for the success of the partition plan. They claim that the US delegation to UN brought pressure to bear on other countries to vote in favor of partition. As a result, the Arabs generally (with the exception of certain broad-minded indi-

¹ According to telegram 665, December 31, 9 a.m., from Jerusalem, the Jewish Agency sent to the Consulate General at Jerusalem a 13-point memorandum, dated December 29, 1947, for transmission to the United States Government. The memorandum stated that the Mandatory was acting in a way that would obstruct or delay implementation of measures recommended by the General Assembly. It also reviewed attacks by Arabs after November 29 and charged that the British were not exercising effectively their responsibility for the maintenance of order (567N.01/12-3147). The text of the memorandum was transmitted to the Department by Jerusalem in despatch 239, December 31.
viduals who remain cordial) do not look upon US personnel with any favor. Small incidents point up this unfriendliness. In one instance the arrival of American personnel on the scene in the nick of time prevented the burning of cars belonging to officers of this Consulate. Some reports indicate the belief among Arabs that the attitude of our UN delegation toward partition is due solely to the advice and guidance of this Consulate General. And the bombing of the Consulate immediately after the announcement of the US stand on partition is another indication of how the Arabs feel toward local US representatives. This feeling will be intensified by any official statement or act of the United States favoring the Jewish State.

In case of intensified trouble here, the question of communications becomes very serious. At the present time we are taking emergency measures to ensure a reserve of gasoline and food in case they are cut off. Such inadequate measures as are possible, with the limited supply of firearms available, have been taken to protect the Consulate against physical attack, at least for a short while. A radio transmitter has been set up so that communications will not be entirely cut off. But beyond this, little can be done. Even under present conditions trips to Lydda Airfield are out of the question, and our pouch has to be sent to a smaller field nearer to Jerusalem where only C-45’s can land. And the trip to this field, only ten minutes away by car, is not without hazard. In the case of serious trouble, road communications will undoubtedly be blocked, unless the Consulate General is provided with sufficient troops to escort messengers and travelers to the seaports. All exits from Palestine for personnel in Jerusalem will of necessity be through hostile country.

The question of protection of American citizens and property is problematical. Beyond giving a general warning to Americans to leave the country, there is little that can be done. The question is complicated by the fact that a large number of the American citizens here are Jewish. Any Arab uprising will not distinguish between American and other Jews. Since we are here to protect all Americans to the utmost of our ability, the community of Americans that is not Jewish will have to share the facilities afforded with the Jews—and will therefore have to share the hazards of the Jews in the country. In this connection, it is interesting to note that Americans of Palestinian Arab origin are making arrangements to leave the country as far as possible. A similar Jewish trend may be prevented by their inability to reach this Consulate in safety.

VI. Conclusions.

Generally speaking, we believe on the basis of present information that the UN Commission will be attempting a well nigh impossible task. The problems of security and safety for this Consulate may
become insoluble, and the question of what government we will be accredited to will become academic. There will be no Arab State, and if the UN Commission escapes assassination and is able to form an organization in Jerusalem, it may easily find itself in the position of having to function in prison-like conditions where the Arabs might succeed, through constant interference with communications, in preventing the public, including this Consulate General, from having access to it.

Macatee