CHINESE ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE LOCAL PROBLEMS IN SINKIANG AND SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO ACQUIRE EXCLUSIVE TRADE CONCESSIONS IN THAT PROVINCE

893.00/1-246 : Telegram

The Chargé in China (Robertson) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, January 2, 1946—1 p.m.
[Received January 3—3:38 a.m.]

7. According to telegram dated December 30 from Ward,² Chiang Ching-kuo³ arrived Tihwa December 26 and departed for Moscow December 28. (Embassy’s 2232, December 28 to Dept, repeated Moscow.)⁴ Ward says negotiations are proceeding with rebels; that Liu⁵ is confident of settlement and feels it may be soon, although (sent to Dept as 7; repeated to Moscow as 2) some local Chinese have taken umbrage at two new rebel desiderata: (1) that troops brought in to put down rebellion be withdrawn after settlement and (2) that secret police be disbanded.

ROBERTSON

893.00/1-846 : Telegram

The Chargé in China (Robertson) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, January 8, 1946—8 a.m.
[Received 2:47 p.m.]

48. By series of six telegrams dated January 3 (two badly garbled and being serviced) Ward reported that General Chang Chih-chung⁶ left Tihwa January 3 after signing on evening of January 2 an 11-point agreement with Ining rebels. (Embassy’s 2232, December 28,⁷ repeated Moscow.) Points covered in agreement include freedom

¹ For previous correspondence regarding conditions in Sinkiang, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. vii, pp. 985 ff.
² Robert S. Ward, Consul at Tihwa.
³ Son of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President of the National Government of the Republic of China.
⁵ Liu Tse-Jung, Chinese Commissioner for Foreign Affairs in Sinkiang.
⁶ Personal representative of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in Sinkiang since September 1945; Chinese Minister of Political Training.
of religion, speech and publication; reorganization of rebel troops as Peace Preservation Corps; use of Turki language as well as Chinese in Govt documents, etc.; release of political prisoners; reorganization of schools with lower and middle schools [apparent omission]; assurance of cultural protection; tax relief; freedom of trade; exchange of prisoners taken in course of current hostilities; and reorganization of Govt. (Here follow garbled messages which will be reported when serviced.)

Ward states that, to give effect to agreement, Central Govt will accept resignation of Chairman and members of present Govt, after which Chang will concurrently be made Chairman and Chief of Northwest Defense Headquarters.

(Sent to Dept as 48, repeated Moscow as 9) Ward comments that, while agreement falls far short of meeting aspirations of Turki, and will almost certainly be opposed by Chinese as conceding too much, it affords China an opportunity to make a fresh start in Sinkiang and if energetically and steadfastly implemented, would ensure a continuance of Chinese sovereignty in the province.8

Chungking press reports Gen Chang has returned to this city.

Robertson

803.00/1-1246: Telegram

The Chargé in China (Robertson) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, January 12, 1946—4 p. m.
[Received January 12—3:40 p. m.]

89. Garbled messages from Ward referred to in Embtel 48, January 8, repeated Moscow as 9, have been serviced. He states that reorganization of Govt covered in agreement provides for appointed Chinese chairman, 2 appointed Turki vice chairmen, 1 ex-rebel and 1 non-rebel; appointed 25 man Provincial Committee with 15 Turki members; 4 bureaus, heads of 2 (Reconstruction and Education) to be Turkis; offices with Chinese chief to have Turki vice chief and vice versa; chuan yuan (heads of districts comprising several hsien) and hsien magistrates to be elected; question of election chairman and Provincial Council to await decision of National Constitutional Convention. Two unsettled points, presumably concerning Chinese troops and police, subject further negotiations.

Ward comments that agreement represents successful negotiated settlement of situation pregnant with gravest threat to peace, and

8 Marginal notation by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Rice): “Chinese News Service Jan. 8 says 13 articles and Annex I (of three supplementary articles) agreed to but Annex II (of five articles) not agreed to.”
says that credit for achievement must in first instance be given unreservedly to three men: Liu Tse-jung, Chang Chih-chung, and Soviet Consul General Evseef. Liu had subtlety and sense to comprehend situation; Chang had balance and lucidity to be accessible to the truth and integrity to secure confidence of natives; Evseef worked sincerely and faithfully to discharge his good offices, leaning over backward to help Chinese.

(Sent Dept as 89; repeated Moscow as 11) In telegram dated January 4, Ward remarks further that the Turkis tan [also?] deserve no little credit for their willingness to arrest march which would almost certainly have left them masters of Sinkiang and to accept instead negotiated peace. Developments have also vindicated very small group which held out against anti-Soviet hysteria long enough to keep road open for Chang. Of this group British Consul Turrail was stalwart member and his Govt’s willingness to leave him here even though his successor had arrived is thus more than justified.

Ward adds that there remains a note of warning: Chinese appear to have forgotten their extremity in September and strong pressure to whittle away already very slender concessions to Turkis will doubtless begin to make itself felt as soon as Chang reaches Chungking. But this course would invite disaster, Ward believes; for Chinese to fail to live up fully to letter and spirit of their settlement would bring upon them catastrophe which has just been so narrowly averted in Sinkiang.

ROBERTSON

893.00/1-1746: Telegram

The Chargé in China (Robertson) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, January 17, 1946—5 p. m.
[Received January 18—9:47 a. m.]

124. By telegram dated January 14 Ward informs Embassy that Chiang Ching-kuo left Tihwa for Chungking Jan 13. (Sent to Dept, repeated Moscow as 16.) Ward says Chiang is understood to share conviction that first prerequisite for peace is clean sweep of present provincial regime.

For Chargé:
Smyth *

CHUNCKING, March 21, 1946—8 a.m.
[Received March 23—6:10 a.m.]

531. Appointed Commander of Northwest Field Headquarters and concurrently Chairman of Sinkiang Province has been Chang Chih-chung. Kuo Chi-chiao, Deputy Commander at Tihwa, who made speech predicting failure of peaceful settlement, will be transferred to Lanchow as Deputy Commander Northwest Field Headquarters and will be replaced at Tihwa by General Sung Hsi-lien. Masud Sabri, venerable and respected Turki leader, has been appointed commissioner of supervision of Sinkiang. These dispositions are all good. (This is substance of message dated 18 March for Ward at Tihwa. Sent Dept as 531, repeated Moscow 41, March 21, 8 a.m.)

Chang Chih-chung expected to arrive Tihwa about 25 March after stop-over at Lanchow. Rebel delegates should arrive Tihwa about 27 March for negotiations on important supplementary issues. Rebel army remains on Manass River and crisis cannot be regarded as safely past as long as this situation prevails.

Imminent replacement of Evseev, Soviet Consul General, is unfortunate. However, Ward remains confident that settlement satisfactory to all parties can and will be achieved. Only danger lies in possible failure of FonOffs to realize extreme delicacy of situation and need for patience and understanding in devolution of settlement.

Smyth

NANKING, May 29, 1946—8 a.m.
[Received 2:27 p.m.]

879. Through good offices Soviet Consul General and labors of Governor Chang Chih-chung, deadlock in Sinkiang negotiations which continued from last days April through 10 May broken 11 and 12 May by Chinese agreement establishment six regiments rebel troops to garrison Ining, Tacheng and Chenghwa (Embtel 843, May 22). This message complete[s] text Ward's 65 through 73 from Tihwa dated 14 and 15 May) rebels on their side dropped demand to have one regiment each Kashgar and Aqsu.

\[\text{Note printed.}\]
Chinese have agreed not to despatch troops other than those so stationed into areas garrisoned by ex-rebel regiments although border of Sinkiang is to be held by Chinese troops; Chinese have also agreed to consult ex-rebel views in proposed reorganization of Peace Preservation Corps in Kashgar and Aqsu. Rebels have today presented list of eight nominees for posts in Provincial Govt; only very slight differences 6-point Govt plan remain and it should be possible to complete new supplementary agreement and [give] effect thereto on establishment of the new Sinkiang Provincial Govt within 4 or 5 days.

However, it must be most sharply emphasized that even when these things shall have been brought about they will represent only the essential conditions precedent to a solution of the Sinkiang problem rather than amounting in themselves to such a solution.

It is automatic that no alien ruling minority can hope to maintain its rule by anything less than its complete dedication to the welfare of the native people. The Chinese have now procured another chance, albeit almost certainly their last one, to make good their governance of Sinkiang. If they fail again, Sinkiang will be irrevocably lost.

They can avoid such failure only by the most urgent and vigorous action to raise the living standards of the people, to increase production, to reopen trade, to provide for at least a bare minimum in public health, to build adequate system of good roads, to establish an educational system in the Turkish language, to set up native printing presses, and to wipe out the present fantastic corruption among the Chinese Govt officials.

The last of these objectives is far and away the most immediately pressing: Chang should receive complete support from the Central Govt in a crusade to clean up the Govt of Sinkiang; several leading officials of the last regime should be publicly exposed and their gross speculations should be spread over headlines in China. For Sinkiang at least, this is a political imperative of the first order of importance.

If the Chinese speedily achieved these objectives and there was still not peace, the Chinese case and cause would then be unassailable. On the other hand, if they do not act at once to attain them, peace is impossible and China will be fortunate if she loses only Sinkiang.

Sent Dept 879, May 29, 8 a.m. Dept please repeat to Moscow.
The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

Nanking, May 29, 1946—9 a.m.
[Received 12:15 p.m.]

880. Agreement has been completed but difficulty has been encountered in vexatious problem of procuring accurate translation into Turki, especially since rebel delegates remain very suspicious and insist on word-by-word examination of text. (Embtl 879, May 29, 8 a.m. This message is substance of Ward’s 76 through 79 from Tihwa dated 22 May.)

When translation has been completed, rebels will return Ining to procure formal acceptance of agreement by rebel regime. Central Govt acceptance is expected to be given at meeting of Executive Yuan, Nanking, 28 May.

Agreement does not provide specifically for withdrawal of rebel army from Manass River; Chinese believed that this withdrawal could best be effected incidentally, as a result of making rebel commander face [vice?] chief of Peace Preservation Corps under Chang Chih-chung, whereby the Manass River troops not being provided for under the agreement, Chang, as Commandant of Peace Preservation Corps, could order his vice-chief to effect their removal.

When this particular formula was first explained to me, I thought it very good, but now feel some anxiety, in light of very sharp and minute attention which Turkis are giving to translation of agreement, whether any arrangement which is not explicit, however clearly it may be implied, can be got to work smoothly. Nevertheless, it would be very unfortunate were agreement to be rejected by Central Govt.

Sent Dept 880, May 29, 9 a.m., Dept please repeat to Moscow.

Smyth

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 6, 1946—10 a.m.
[Received June 6—9:41 a.m.]

1770. Essential difference between developments in Azerbaijan and those in Sinkiang (Nanking’s 879, May 29) is one of timing. USSR manipulation of Azerbaijan situation was precipitate and therefore Soviet tactics were necessarily heavy-handed and obvious. Overt nature of Soviet aggression in Azerbaijan aroused rest of world and
caused strong international opposition which proved embarrassing to USSR and obstructive to smooth realization of Soviet aims.

Soviet timing in Sinkiang has been most deliberate and cautious. USSR is taking its time with regard to Sinkiang, quietly assisting or perhaps only standing by and watching genuinely indigenous forces accomplish changes favorable to USSR. By not forcing pace of developments in Sinkiang, USSR may get what it seeks—effective control over province—without arousing international alarm and concerted resistance.

Agreement reached by Government and rebels as reported by Ward represents a considerable Soviet advance. This is certainly so if rebels are witting or unwitting tools of Soviet. It is still so even if rebels are in no respect—which hardly seems likely—subject to Soviet influence, because rebel gains mean weakening of Government authority which in turn means strengthening of Soviet position in Sinkiang.

We concur with Ward’s comment that only way in which Nanking will be able to maintain its authority in Sinkiang is to institute provincial administrative housecleaning and general reforms.

Our attitude in this respect is based on our general belief that most effective way to combat Soviet political expansionism is to cut the ground out from under Soviet case by ourselves supporting reform. Elimination of just causes for complaint, whether they be in Sinkiang, Azerbaijan or Greece, is to heighten domestic resistance to Soviet intrigue and to expose any Soviet expansionist movements as pure aggression.

Request Nanking give copy of this to General Marshall at once. Department relay this to Nanking as Moscow’s 79.

SMITH

893.00/6-1346: Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smyth) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, June 13, 1946—11 p. m.
[Received June 13—5 p. m.]

965. Following Ward’s 87 through 94, June 7, 1946.

Signing of agreement (which is properly known as supplement 2 to agreement of January 2, supplement 1, outlining the structure of the provincial govt, having been signed at same time as original agreement) by Gen. Chang Chih-chung for the Central Govt and three delegates for Inning regime, was completed last night at 7:30.

11 General of the Army George C. Marshall, Special Representative of President Truman in China.
Supplement II contains six articles: Article I: Rebel troops in Ining, Tacheng and Ashan administrative districts to be reorganized into 6 regiments, 3 cavalry and 3 infantry, totaling 11 to 12,000 men, 3 regiments of which are to be National Govt troops and 3 regiments provincial Peace Preservation Corps.

Article II: Muslim nominated by Ining to command all 6 regiments, being responsible to Sinkiang garrison commander for 3 national regiments and to Sinkiang peace preservation commander for 3 regiments PPC; same Muslim to be Vice-Commander of all Sinkiang PPC.

Article III: Six regiments to remain in three administrative districts of Ining, Tacheng and Ashan and to have sole responsibility for maintenance of peace in those districts. Central Govt frontier defense troops to undertake defense of national frontiers, following method and distribution of troops identical to that prevailing prior to revolt.

Article IV: Aqsu and Kashgar units of Peace Preservation Corps to be reorganized, using native recruits and in consultation with Muslim commander.

Article V: Supply, equipment and treatment of 6 regiments to be on par with top national army and PPC respectively.

Article VI: Reorganization of rebels troops into 6 regiments to be responsibility of Muslim commander; garrison points of these troops in 3 administrative districts to be reported to and approved by provincial authorities. This agreement will take effect upon Gmo's approval; personnel appointments in reorganized provincial gov't will be submitted to, and passed upon, by Executive Yuan meeting June 18.

It is in my opinion urgently important that the Central Govt should clearly understand the vital importance of giving Gen Chang Chih-chung the fullest and most unstinted support in these and in any other dispositions which he may recommend. [Ward.]

Sent Dept 965. Dept please repeat Moscow.

Smyth

761.00/6-1546: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 15, 1946—3 p. m.
[Received June 16—1: 52 a. m.]

1890. Development of Soviet policy in Asia appears to be shaping up on different pattern from Soviet policy in Europe. USSR medi-

Peace Preservation Corps.

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
ated in Sinkiang between Government and rebels, and conduct of Soviet officials there appears to have been designed to avoid giving open cause for criticism of USSR. Trend with regard to Iran seems to be in similar direction. And now with announcement of Soviet-Afghan agreement on frontier questions, which for years have caused Afghan anxiety, USSR appears to have taken another step in direction of "correct" relationship with its Asiatic neighbors. These disarming symptoms, in contrast to Soviet truculence in Europe, do not by any means indicate that USSR has abandoned predatory aims in Asia. They simply represent different tactical approach.

They suggest that Soviet policy, calculating that time and the forces of decay and regeneration in Asia are on Soviet side, are relying heavily on: (1) Ingratiation with Asiatic masses; (2) holding USSR up as contrast to "imperialist" USA and UK; (3) intrigue and covert political manipulation of native fifth column. These tactics are more dangerous than more obvious ones employed in Europe and will bear close attention and reporting. (Department please repeat to Paris as Moscow's 183, to Tehran as 112 and Nanking as 83).

SMITH

833.00/10-346: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, October 3, 1946—9 a.m.
[Received October 3—3:15 a.m.]

1577. [For Penfield from Bayne.] 15

1. Fortnight ago Soviet Consul General in Sinkiang began conversations with Chinese Provincial Governor requesting on a "basis of realities" concessions to Soviets of all mineral and petroleum rights in the province. Provincial Governor referred the matter to Executive Yuan. Soong asked Wong Wen-hao 18 to advise the Generalissimo that such discussions should be conducted at the Central Government level.

2. Soong believed, Wong advised me, that a stronger front could be made against the Soviets' demand in Sinkiang if brought out into government to government basis. This opinion based on experience

15 This notation appears on copy in Marshall Mission files. James K. Penfield was Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, and E. A. Bayne was an American official loaned as special assistant on reparations matters to the President of the Chinese Executive Yuan (Soong).
18 Vice President of the Chinese Executive Yuan and President of the Chinese War Production Board.
between local and national discussions on Manchurian affairs last winter.

3. Wong believes Generalissimo wavering toward appeasement so long as sovereignty is not affected and may allow the negotiations to continue on a provincial basis, probably eventuating in major concessions. [Bayne.]

STUART

893.63/10–546: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Stuart)

WASHINGTON, October 5, 1946—1 p.m.

835. Development reported Urteil 1577 Oct. 3 is matter of grave concern to Dept. In giving consideration to problem Dept interested in knowing (1) whether Soviet proposal is for exclusive blanket concession for all of province, exclusive concession for certain areas of province or nonexclusive blanket concession; (2) would there be any advantage in making approach to both Soviets and Chinese somewhat along lines of our notes of last spring regarding Manchuria; 17 (3) have you secure communications with Ward to enable exchange of information. Please avoid giving Chinese impression that we might make representations to the Soviets regarding this matter.

Sent to Nanking. Repeated to Paris and Moscow.

ACHESON

661.9331/10–1246: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, October 12, 1946—4 p.m.
[Received October 13—12:08 p.m.]

1649. Upon receipt Deptel 835, October 5, 1 p.m., Embassy sent for Bayne who stated he had no further information but would pursue matter as opportunity offered. As regards question numbered 1, he stated categorically that the proposal was for exclusive concession for entire province.

In course of discussion with Beal, 18 Thurston and Butterworth 19 regarding problems of world trade charter, Dr. Kan Nai-kuang, Vice Minister Foreign Affairs, cited Soviet initiative re Sinkiang as illustrative of problem as to how and on what terms a country with a

17 For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 1099 ff.
18 John R. Beal, American adviser to the Chinese Government on foreign press and political relations.
19 W. Walton Butterworth, Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China.
noncontrolled economy would deal with country with totalitarian organized economy. Later Butterworth pursued this matter with Dr. Kan who confirmed that initial approach had been made by Soviet Consul General to Provincial Chinese Governor. He indicated that Central Govt had at first proposed that Soviet emissaries come to Nanking to negotiate but had later acceded to recommendations of Chinese Provincial Govt and had decided to send accredited Chinese negotiators to Sinkiang to conduct these negotiations. Dr. Kan asserted that Soviets had made neither detailed proposal nor demand of an exclusive nature. He regarded proposal as a bona fide approach to increase trade between two contiguous areas and stated that Chinese authorities in Nanking, no less than Provincial Govt in Tihwa, desired such increased trade.

Incidentally, when passing a copy of Bayne’s telegram 20 to General Marshall on October 3, when negotiations with the Generalissimo were at a very tense stage, Embassy queried: “Why should this come at this particular moment? Is it chance or is it now leaked to remind us of the large issue?”

Needless to say, we shall continue to pursue this matter and attempt to sift out and confirm the facts.

Situation regarding Ward was described in Embassy’s 1627, October 10.21 In the circumstances Embassy does not believe it can be assumed that codes now at Tihwa are still secure and, therefore, it is seeking other means of communicating with Ward when he returns.

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761.93/10-1446: Telegram

The Consul General at Shanghai (Davis) to the Secretary of State

SHANGHAI, October 14, 1946—noon.

[Received October 14—2 a.m.]

1993. For Butterworth and Ambassador from Bayne.

1. Re Manchuria. Chien,22 NSC [NRC?] Chief just returned from Manchuria, states no Soviet proposals made recently. However, Chinese expect proposals eventually.

2. Re Sinkiang. Wong Wen-nao, interviewed yesterday advised that Soviets are interested in exclusive rights and a degree of monetary control not yet made clear. There appears to be no direct connection between these negotiations and recently rumored Soviet pressure in Manchuria. Latter culminated in protest note to China.

20 See telegram No. 1557, October 3, 9 a.m., from the Ambassador in China, p. 1209.

21 Not printed.

22 Chien Chang-chao, Chairman of the National Resources Commission of the Chinese Executive Yuan.

389-246—72——77
station [stating] that Soviets as part owners of railway did not approve Nationalist troops using railway in war offensives. Chinese rejected note flatly. Russian troops or technicians then waiting in Manchuria to begin joint operations of railway were withdrawn. No further word on this subject has been heard, and Chinese are fearful of next Soviet step.  

3. Generalissimo has authorized two officials not yet named by Soong to join with Sinkiang Governor in economic negotiations with Soviet Consul General locally. These three will conduct talks to point of preliminary agreement when entire matter will be referred to Nanking for possible signature by top level.

4. Wong suggested that United States might wish to avoid taking open stand or position until matter is returned to Nanking from preliminary negotiations in Sinkiang. He states that while his position and mine as informant should be protected in this matter, Embassy might inquire at Foreign Office using rumor as basis and be informed of Sinkiang situation officially.”

Sent Nanking as Shanghai serial 1136, October 14, noon; repeated Department 1993. [Bayne.]

DAVIS

661.9381/10-2046: Telegram

_The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State_

_NANKING, October 20, 1946—9 a.m._

[Received October 20—7:30 a.m.]

1704. Embassy has found it possible to confirm from responsible Foreign Office official information supplied in Embtel 1649, October 12, 4 p.m. It has also been given to understand that Soviet proposals included joint operation of a tin mine and a wolfram mine, but the suggestion was not made that all such mines should be so exploited. As Dept is aware, Russia has for past dozen years been a large importer of molybdenum from US and for many purposes wolfram can be blended by steelmakers with other ferrous alloys in substitution for molybdenum. Furthermore, it is indispensable to the machine-tool industry.

Foreign Minister has had interview with Soviet Ambassador in the matter of withdrawal of Soviet railways officials from Mukden area and expressed hope that no officials would be withdrawn except those who were ill or who were being replaced in view of desirability of China and Russia working out satisfactorily their joint problems.

STUART

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28 See also pp. 362 ff., passim.
24 WANG SHIH-CHIEH.
26 Appolon Alexandrovitch Petrov.
Nanking Embassy Files, Lot F79—610 Sino-Soviet (Sinkiang) : Telegram

The Consul General at Shanghai (Davis) to the Ambassador in China (Stuart)

SHANGHAI, October 23, 1946.

1175. For Butterworth from Bayne. Following report made personally to Wong Wen-hao by Executive Yuan representative who returned from Sinkiang last week. (Sent Embassy as Shanghai 1175, Oct. 23, 1 pm, rpt Washington for Penfield 2066, remytel 1136, Oct. 14 to Washington as 1993.)

1. Soviet economic requests are for joint exploitation rights in petroleum, tungsten, gold and other raw materials not specifically named.

2. While Soviet Consul General states that actual number of Soviet citizens registered is only 2000, Executive Yuan representative believes approximately 25% of non-Chinese population have accepted Soviet citizenship. Among those believed to be Soviet citizens by Chinese authorities in Sinkiang are several members of Provincial Council including the Vice Chairman who are non-Chinese.

3. Reported as local rumor is fact that provincial council members who are non-Chinese have returned allegedly from political training schools in Moscow and that as Soviet citizens these members may propose dismemberment of Sinkiang Province into four republics which would each have borders adjoining Soviet territory. [Bayne.]

DAVIS

893.63/11-146: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, November 1, 1946—9 a.m.
[Received November 1—8:40 a.m.]

1787. Chinese Govt is obviously using delaying tactics in matter of Sinkiang negotiations and so far as Embassy can ascertain it has not yet appointed officials to proceed to Tihwa. In the meantime it has notified Soviet Consul General at Tihwa that Chinese Govt agrees in principle to the joint exploitation of tin and wolfram mines on the understanding that the management is to remain in Chinese hands. (See Embtels 1649, October 12, 4 p.m., and 1704, October 2[20], 9 a.m.)

As regard trade he has also been informed that Chinese Govt is awaiting reply to communication made to Soviet Ambassador about a year ago in the matter of channelizing Soviet trade in Sinkiang through a single agency set up for the purpose.

STUART
The Consul General at Shanghai (Davis) to the Secretary of State

SHANGHAI, November 19, 1946—noon.

[Received 11 p.m.]

2271. Further report received from Bayne on Sinkiang situation, reference my telegram 1175, October 23; repeated to Department as 2066.

Governor Chang this province expected arrive shortly in Nanking for new instructions on dealing with Soviet Consul General at Tihwa. Since he had already offered Soviets joint operation of tin, petroleum and tungsten deposits on basis of blanket instructions received from Chiang Kai-shek when he took post, Governor’s instructions as previously reported to you have been both rejected and preempted by him in that he has already offered concessions to Soviets that do involve political sovereignty. Chang is also protesting as loss of face withdrawal of trade proposal made by Chinese to Soviets last year. Above is substance of Executive Yuan memorandum received from Foreign Office. Present uprising currently reported in press is not considered by Government as being directly connected with economic discussions. Present indications are that limiting instructions as reported will be adhered to by Nanking.

Sent Department as 2271; repeated Nanking as 1281.

Davis

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai (Davis)

WASHINGTON, November 22, 1946—7 p.m.

2131. Your recent message re Sinkiang (2271, Nov 19) not clear Dept, particularly phrase “rejected and preempted by him in that he has already offered concessions to Soviets that do involve political sovereignty”. Who has offered concessions and do you know what they are?

Acheson

The Consul General at Shanghai (Davis) to the Secretary of State

SHANGHAI, November 27, 1946—1 p.m.

[Received November 27—6 a.m.]

2338. Phrase quoted Department’s telegram 2131, November 22 should have read “do not involve political sovereignty”. Sinkiang
Governor offered to Soviets joint participation in exploitation of tungsten, tin and petroleum deposits. No other concessions offered except possibly parallel arrangement on gold. Further report will be made as soon as additional information received.

Davies

761.98/11—3046: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, November 30, 1946—2 p.m.
[Received December 1—3:40 a.m.]

2009. Ward arrived November 25 en route Washington. He summarizes Sinkiang situation as follows:

1. Sino-Soviet Economic Negotiations. In September Chang Chih-chung submitted tentative proposals covering Sino-Soviet economic cooperation in Sinkiang to Central Government. After considerable delay, Central Government in October appointed three-man committee to undertake negotiations generally along lines proposed, Chang himself to head delegation with Liu Tse-jung as representative Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Kao Shu-kang as representative Ministry of Economics. Kao arrived Tihwa from Nanking with revised instructions November 1; on November 4, under Central Government instructions which Kao brought, following proposals were handed to Soviet Consul General:

1st. Trade to be reopened over Sinkiang border; actual trading to be controlled on Chinese side by (a) Government organized trading body, or (b) by govt recognized monopoly formed by merchants engaged in the trade;

2d. Sinkiang’s oil, tin and tungsten to be exploited by Sino-Soviet company, shares of which company are to be held equally by China and Russia, China retaining administrative primacy, while Soviets would hold precedence in control of technical operations of company;

3d. Soviet Russia to assist China in reconstruction of Sinkiang through supply of industrial equipment, etc., actual terms, amounts of equipment, to be settled subsequent to conclusion of present agreement.

According to Liu Tse-jung, although no reply had as yet been received by the Consul General from Moscow anent these proposals, no unsurmountable difficulties to negotiation of agreement along these lines are expected. In explanation of apparent generosity of terms offered, Liu referred to blanket contract between Sheng Shih-tsai and Soviets promising latter all subsoil rights in Sinkiang; Chinese have no copy of this contract but believe Soviets may have and might require performance on it, a move which Chinese would resist.

28 Former Governor of Sinkiang.
2. Relations [with?] rebels. The liquidation of the rebel regime in three western districts of Ining, Tacheng, and Chenghwa was proceeding very unevenly and in some respects unsatisfactorily. Akhmed Jan, most energetic and influential of Turki rebel leaders, had accepted his role as Vice Chairman and had moved to Tihwa where he was cooperating fully with Government (he is now in Nanking with Turki Delegation to National Assembly); Provincial Government was assisting rebel areas in financial rehabilitation, having agreed to retire for Sinkiang currency the very large rebel note issue which Ining had printed to finance its revolt. The economic situation of rebel areas presented great difficulties since, contrary to widely accepted theory that Soviet-Ining border had been opened by Russians during revolt, it is now known beyond dispute that Soviets kept border tightly sealed throughout revolt, permitting no exchange of commodities; goods famine in Ining which occurred during revolt more grave than that in Tihwa; whereas Tihwa had hoped to receive cheap supplies of shoes, etc., from Ining, it is now required to make shipments to Ining, where prices of many commodities are even higher than in Tihwa. These facts do not preclude probability that some arms were brought across border during revolt presumably with tacit consent Soviet border authorities but possibly without their knowledge, since many Kazaks in Kazak state still possess illegal arms.

Political institutions of rebel area have been assimilated to those of rest of province; Turki head of Ining district, for instance, having been duly appointed chief district official by Provincial Government; election of Turki district magistrates in ex-rebel areas was proceeding apace by middle of November.

Military clauses of Ining agreement have proved major stumbling block. Although number of regiments permitted to ex-rebel areas was closely prescribed and ex-rebel troops were expected to wear uniforms of Chinese army, no Chinese military inspection of those troops has yet been possible and it is not known whether required reduction in their numbers has in fact occurred. Ex-rebels also continue to use their "national" flag; on visit of General Chang later in August to Ining, there were more rebel flags in evidence than Chinese; some Chinese also felt that Chang was not received with full honors and courtesies due chairman of Sinkiang. These and other circumstances led British Consul, who was in Ining shortly thereafter, to believe that Ining regime is no more than puppet of Soviets. In this connection it should be noted, however, that his relations with remnant anti-Soviet White Russian community in Sinkiang have been very close and his view may therefore not be entirely objective.

On other hand, there remains ample evidence throughout province of strong anti-Chinese feeling which would presumably [have] facili-
tated dissemination of pro-Soviet propaganda. In late summer, for instance, some 1500 Chinese who had fled from Tacheng into Soviet Russia during revolt were returned by Soviets to Tacheng for transfer by Chinese Government to Tihwa and interior. In Tacheng, last group of these repatriates to leave that city were attacked by populace, some of them being killed. Turkis claim that only 17 of these Chinese ex-officials lost their lives and that massacre was in retaliation for brutality and corruption with which they had earlier governed Tacheng. Chinese in Provincial Government claim, however, that 37 Chinese lost their lives; among non-official Chinese in Tihwa, number is alleged to have been 70, and it is asserted positively in latter circles that Chinese wives of murdered men, while being escorted under Turki guard to Manass River (which remains frontier between ex-rebel areas and those under full Chinese control) were repeatedly raped.

"Electoral" committee subsequently appointed by Provincial Govt to investigate this massacre and comprising Turki chairman and Chinese assistants, was met at Omin, southwest of Taumen [Tacheng?], by band of armed Turkis and murdered so that facts of massacre are still undetermined, although it certainly occurred.

Ex-rebel leaders now cooperating with Chinese deprecate these acts as those of group of young extremists who have not forgotten ease with which Turkis overwhelmed Chinese forces sent against them and are correspondingly unwilling to accept the re-establishment of Chinese sovereignty in the areas which they freed from their enemy by fighting. For same reason, Turki leaders explain, it is proving very difficult to persuade younger Turki army officers to abandon either their uniforms or the Turki flag, a green banner bearing red crescent and star and Turki quotation from Koran.

Evidence of sincerity of these Turki leaders is fact that they are fully represented on 18-man Sinkiang delegation despatched to National Assembly which is now in Nanking, where they are working for realization of full Turki autonomy under Chinese sovereignty.

In this objective the delegation is representative of a large body of Turki opinion. However, there are many influential Turkis whose understanding of geographic and other limitations of eastern Turkestan is so limited that they believe they are working for an entirely independent Turki state in Sinkiang; there are also not lacking, particularly among ex-fighters in Ining, young men who are convinced Communists and ardently seek amalgamation of East Turkestan with the Soviet Union. Typical, if somewhat covert, expression of this point of view was made by Turki officer assigned by vice chairman as my escort on projected trip to Ining (which I was unable to make
because of Paxton's 27 arrival and necessity that plane return to Nanking next morning; this young Turki, sympathizing with me for having been ill, said: "It is the stale sickly air of Tihwa, which blows from inner China, which made you sick; in Ining we are made well by the fresh, new, clean air that blows across the border from the west."

3. Soviet relations with Sinkiang. Although it is very doubtful whether Soviets took any overt steps to precipitate 1944 revolt which resulted in present situation, they almost certainly realized that their complete withdrawal in 1942 followed by hermetic sealing of long Soviet-Sinkiang border would inevitably result in circumstances then prevailing in serious goods shortages and other economic dislocation; they also doubtless calculated on widespread resurgence of corruption which would characterize re-institution of typical Chinese regime; they realized that these factors could not but result in widespread unrest among Turki population, and some Soviets doubtless even counted on the inevitable revolution. They had only to sit back and wait. Their prestige among Turkis has been greatly enhanced by what has appeared, at least, to be scrupulous integrity with which they discharged their good offices to bring together revolting Turkis and Chinese to attempt settlement of revolt which they so clearly foresaw; they have even profited, in Turki eyes, by their refusal to open the border between Russia and rebel areas during revolt, thus allaying fears felt among some Turkis of Communist penetration.

Having acted throughout with such consummate finesse (and, from Soviet point of view, in such scrupulously good faith), the Russians are now in very favorable position vis-à-vis Sinkiang. Continuing confusion among governing Chinese other than Chang and Liu themselves, deepening economic difficulties, failure of Chinese to eradicate corruption, lack of adequate schools and hospitals, etc., etc., contrasted to Soviet regime in Western Turkestan, taken together with Soviet prestige gained through their recent actions in Sinkiang, place Soviet Govt in position where it could, if it so wished, take over actual control of ex-rebel areas through pro-Soviet younger group in Ining, whereafter that group could be manipulated to effect the extension of actual (as against avowed) Soviet control over all Sinkiang.

Whether or not Soviet Russia determines upon such a course may depend upon three factors: (1) Course of present negotiations for resumption of Sinkiang-Soviet trade; (2) direction followed by events in China; (3) world developments. If (1) trade negotiations fail; (2) Chiang Kai-shek is victorious over Chinese Communists and develops an anti-Soviet policy in China proper and (3) if world

27 John Hall Paxton, who succeeded Mr. Ward as Consul at Tihwa.
situation continues to develop in direction of world-wide division between pro-Soviet periphery plus Soviet proper and opposing coalition, the Soviet Union may well decide to exploit its present favorable position in Sinkiang to the limit, which might amount at maximum to the absorption of Sinkiang. If, however, trade negotiations were successful, coalition govt in inner China proved possible, and world-wide drift toward two worlds was checked, then it is unlikely that Soviet Union would take more than a benevolent interest in the development of an autonomous Turkic regime friendly to Soviet Russia but under recognized Chinese sovereignty.

4. Central Govt and Sinkiang. In this extremely delicate situation, where Chinese sovereignty hangs by a thread, Chang Chih-chung should be given fullest, most complete support by Central Govt in Nanking. He calculates provincial budget for calendar year 1947 at 50 billion Sinkiang dollars; of this he needs 30 billion for ordinary expenses of Govt and 20 billion for reconstruction. He may be able to raise 22 billion in taxes; full amount of remaining 28 billion (i.e., 8 billion to complete sum necessary for administration of Govt and the 20 billion for reconstruction) must be allotted him by Central Govt. The urgency of this need cannot be overemphasized. Turks have already lost faith in the whole Chinese Central Government save only in Chang Chih-chung, if they lose faith in him, or are forced to recognize that he is powerless to help them, the last hope of retaining Chinese sovereignty in Sinkiang will be lost; one more count will be chalked up against the Soviet Union, though in fact it will only have been the beneficiary of a situation which need not arise if the Central Government can be brought to act now to aid the establishment of a socially conscious government that will seek the welfare of the Turki peoples.

STUART

893.00/12-246: Telegram

The Consul General at Shanghai (Davis) to the Secretary of State

SHANGHAI, December 2, 1946—5 p.m.
[Received December 3—4 a.m.]

2378. Bayne reported on Sinkiang developments after return from Nanking last week. Apparently discussions between (reference my telegram 2338, November 27) Soviet Consul General and Chinese Governor are suspended pending reply from Moscow on Chinese request for answer to latter’s proposal last year for trade monopoly. Pending any new Soviet suggestion or reply, Governor Chang requested delay return to Nanking.
New subject. Foreign Office recently received suggestion from Soviet Embassy that Russian troops be stationed near Antung on Korean border north of Yalu River to protect hydro-electric power plant. Chinese reply was to effect that Nationalist troops were already giving this protection and that Soviet action proposed was therefore unnecessary.

Sent Department, repeated Nanking as 1351.

Davies

893.00/12–946: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 9, 1946—6 a.m.

[Received 3:34 p.m.]

4348. We have read Ward’s summary of Sinkiang situation and despatches from British Consul at Tihwa on same subject, including one covering his visit to Iining (copies are being forwarded by pouch).

In reading Ward’s report we are struck anew by similarity between Sinkiang and Iranian Azerbaijan situations (Embassy 1850 [1890], June 15). In both Central Government was oppressive and corrupt in dealing with subject racial groups. There consequently existed ample causes for spontaneous revolt and genuine demands for autonomy. Altho Soviet army occupied Azerbaijan and not Sinkiang and tempo of developments in former has been more rapid, Soviet policy towards both appears to us to be substantially same. It is a policy of political rather than military subjugation.

In Azerbaijan genuine native discontent was surreptitiously encouraged by Soviet agents of same or related race to rebels; local elements subservient to USSR were organized to capture and retain, under concealed Soviet direction, control of insurrection; local autonomy was demanded, but it was to be an autonomy within framework of Iranian state; rebels retained control, however, over their armed forces and their tax collections. Policy in short was to maintain “correct” relations with Central Government while using Azerbaijan as one of instruments to disrupt and ultimately capture Central Government. Parenthetically it may be said such a policy seems admirably suited to situations such as exist in Iran, China, Iraq, Afghanistan, and before long India. Principal risk to such policy is that Central Government, incapable of instituting genuine sweep-

28 Walter Graham.
29 Despatch No. 603, December 10, not printed.
ing reforms, takes next most effective step—as Qavam 30 now appears to be doing—challenging rebels in a manner designed to force USSR to show its hand. Ward’s and Graham’s reports reveal that many of same symptoms of Soviet policy which appeared in Azerbaijan were present in Sinkiang. Now this may be purely coincidental. But we doubt it.

We doubt it because for compelling, ideological, nationalistic and strategic reasons USSR is incapable of maintaining a benevolent neutrality towards events in Sinkiang (Embassy’s 96, January 10 31). It must seek ultimate control over that province, first as an “autonomous” province in Chinese Republic, later perhaps as an “autonomous” state like Mongolian People’s Republic and possibly much later as an integral part of USSR like Tannu Tuva. Therefore, USSR must through its own agents and obedient local elements direct course of rebel movement towards realization of Soviet objectives. As Kremlin’s Sinkiang policy appears to be geared to slow penetration and consolidation, it is better able than in Azerbaijan to conceal its activities.

Perhaps one of surest indicators of Soviet control would be identification among Turki leaders of Soviet trained personnel. They are not likely to be in conspicuous posts, excepting interior affairs, secret police and propaganda. Attitude of Turki delegation in Nanking negotiations may also give clues of Soviet direction. Finally, we venture to suggest that Department may consider it desirable, if it has not already done so, to furnish Nanking and Tihwa with several of Tabriz’s very able despatches of past winter and spring analyzing Azerbaijani object lesson.

Dept repeat to Nanking.

SMITH

893.00/12–1846 : Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

NANKING, December 18, 1946—10 a.m.
[Received December 18—9:20 a.m.]

2128. Reference Department’s unnumbered, December 9, 11 p.m., 32 and Moscow’s 4348, December 9, 6 a.m.

The Sinkiang delegation to the National Assembly is composed of 18 members of whom only 3 Chinese, which includes those selected by the Chinese Governor-General Chang Chih-chung. The delega-

30 Ahmad Qavam, Iranian Prime Minister.
32 This telegram repeated No. 4348, December 9, 6 a.m., supra.
tion was quiet for the first few days after its arrival and finally Ahkmed Jan, Vice-Governor of the province and one of the two principal leaders of the Turki revolt and head of the East Turkistan Republic, spoke for the delegation and demanded full internal autonomy for the province and joint Turki-Chinese control of foreign affairs and national defense.

According to reports, [this] provoked an uproar in the Assembly but it is interesting to note that there was only casual press reference made on the following day and none since. It is not anticipated that there will be any further reference to it. Ward, when he was here, and some of the Turki delegates subsequently have stated that this position is supported by Chang Chih-chung himself on the grounds that matters have gone so far now that the only hope left for China to retain any kind of control or influence in Sinkiang is this proposal. The Turki delegates are frankly pessimistic over the prospects of Chinese agreement. On the basis of the known Chinese minority record, the Embassy is inclined to agree with this estimate. The Turkis, to substantiate their pessimism, point out that with the exception of one letter from the Chinese Government agreeing to consider an extension of cultural autonomy and assistance to Turki schools, the Government has so far failed even to acknowledge any Turki communications on the Sinkiang situation. The delegation claims further that their efforts to have some provision for safeguarding minorities written into the constitution have proved futile and that Government delegates, in fact, in general refuse to discuss the Sinkiang question directly with the Turki delegates but rather say that they will discuss the question among themselves and will inform the Turkis of their decision.

The minorities problem has been additionally complicated by the failure of an attempt to coordinate Mongol, Turki and Tibetan activities. Apparently the Tibetans have been agreeable to any proposal made by anyone since it seems they are not entirely sure of where they are or why they are here. Dissension, however, has arisen between the Mongols and the Turkis since each one feels that his own particular problems should be settled first. It is hardly necessary to state that the Chinese are desperate [in] exploiting this sort of division. In short, there is little or nothing so far in the visit of the Sinkiang delegates to Nanking to suggest that the drift of Sinkiang away from China is being checked.

Department please repeat to Moscow.

STUART