PALESTINE

IN卷VOLVEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE ARAB-ZIONIST
CONTROVERSY CONCERNING THE FUTURE STATUS OF PALESTINE;
The QUESTION OF JEWISH IMMIGRATION INTO PALESTINE

867N.01/1-946: Airgram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) to the Secretary
of State

CONFIDENTIAL

JERUSALEM, January 9, 1946.
[Received January 21—4:35 p.m.]

A–5. Shertok ² informed me today Jewish Agency Executive has
decided that the Agency as such should give evidence before Joint
Inquiry Committee. He indicated majority in favor of participation
was small and there was very strong minority opposition. He himself
will carry most of burden of giving evidence, but Dr. Weizmann ²ª is
expected to give preliminary general statement.

Shertok said this decision was not being made public at this time
and requested Department not to publish it.

PINKERTON

867N.01/1-1746: Circular telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain American Diplomatic and
Consular Officers and Officers in Charge of Missions ³

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, January 17, 1946—11:25 a.m.

The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, after completing its
series of hearings in the United States, ⁴ will proceed on January 18th
to London, via the Queen Elizabeth, to conduct a series of hearings
there from January 25 to 31. Although the itinerary from that point
is tentative at this time, it is expected that the Committee will depart

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³ For previous documentation on these subjects, see Foreign Relations, 1945,
vol. VIII, pp. 678 ff.
² Moshe Shertok, Head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency for
Palestine.
²ª Chaim Weizmann, President of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for
Palestine.
³ Sent to 23 posts in Europe and the Near East.
⁴ For statement issued by the White House on January 7, 1946, when the
Committee began its hearings in Washington, see Public Papers of the Presidents
Office, 1962), p. 9. Information on the hearings held in Washington is contained
in Department of State Bulletin, January 20, 1946, p. 74.
for the continent approximately February 1st to visit Germany and various other countries for a period of about 1 month. While on the continent the Committee will have Berlin as its headquarters and most of the travel in other countries will be by small sub-committees. It is planned that the Committee will open hearings in Cairo on March 1. After a short stay there it will proceed to Palestine, where it plans to remain for a period of about 1 month.\footnote{For the actual itinerary of the Committee and its sub-committees, see Department of State, Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry: Report to the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, Lausanne, Switzerland, April 20, 1946 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 52.}

As announced by the Governments of the United States and Great Britain on November 13, 1945 the terms of reference of the Committee are as follows:

"1. To examine political, economic and social conditions in Palestine as they bear upon the problem of Jewish immigration and settlement therein and the well-being of the peoples now living therein.

"2. To examine the position of the Jews in those countries in Europe where they have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution, and the practical measures taken or contemplated to be taken in those countries to enable them to live free from discrimination and oppression, and to make estimates of those who wish or will be compelled by their conditions to migrate to Palestine or other countries outside Europe.

"3. To hear the views of competent witnesses and to consult representative Arabs and Jews on the problems of Palestine as such problems are affected by conditions subject to examination under paragraphs 1 and 2 above and by other relevant facts and circumstances, and to make recommendations to His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States for ad interim handling of these problems as well as for their permanent solution.

"4. To make such other recommendations to His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States as may be necessary to meet the immediate needs arising from conditions subject to examination under paragraph 2 above, by remedial action in the European countries in question or by the provision of facilities for emigration to and settlement in countries outside Europe."

The Committee consists of the following members: (American) Judge Joseph C. Hutcheson, Chairman; Frank Aydelotte; Frank W. Buxton; Bartley C. Crum; James G. McDonald; William Phillips; (British) Sir John E. Singleton, Chairman; Wilfred P. Crick; Richard H. S. Crossman; Sir Frederick Leggett; Major Reginald E. Manningham-Buller; Lord Morrison.

[Here follow several paragraphs on staffing.]

The War Department has dispatched to the various Theater Commanders communications requesting that Army facilities be made available to the Committee. You are likewise requested to render to the Committee every assistance in the discharge of its responsibilities.
Funds have been allotted to the Committee by the Department of State and current expenditures will be met by the Administrative Officer. Any expenses incurred on behalf of the Committee by you will be reimbursed by him in cash or by check.

ACHESON

867N.01/1-1746: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan)

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, January 17, 1946—8 p. m.

96. Members of Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry are proceeding to Europe immediately and desire to visit Soviet zones in Germany and Austria as well as Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary to study position of Jews in those areas. Purpose of Committee is to examine position of Jews in European countries where they have been victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution and practical measures taken or contemplated in those countries to enable Jews to live free from discrimination and oppression and to estimate number who desire or will be impelled by their condition to migrate to Palestine or other countries outside Europe.

Please communicate foregoing to Foreign Office and state that direct requests will be submitted to Control Commissions in Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary and to Soviet authorities in Soviet zones of Germany and Austria. Stress Dept’s earnest desire that necessary instructions be issued to Soviet representatives in these areas to grant permission for Committee representatives to make contemplated visits.

Committee representatives desire to visit Soviet zone in Germany during first half of February and other areas in last half of February.

Personnel of Missions to various areas follows:

[Here follow lists of Committee representatives and their proposed destinations in Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Roumania, and Hungary.]

Dept understands that similar instructions are being sent to British Embassy in Moscow. Please concert with your British colleague in approaching foreign office. *

ACHESON

* In telegram 216, January 24, from Moscow, Mr. Kennan reported that on the previous day he had addressed a letter on the matter to Vladimir Georgyevich Dekanozov, Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs in the Soviet Foreign Office, and that the British Embassy had also done so (867N.01/1-2446).
The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iraq (Schoenrich)

WASHINGTON, February 5, 1946—6 p. m.

US URGENT

52. Immediately following telegram contains text of a message received from Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry, now in London, for communication to Govts of Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon.

Officers in charge missions in foregoing countries should join their respective British colleagues in presenting this communication to the Govts to which they are accredited. British Foreign Office has already forwarded message to its representatives in foregoing countries with similar instructions. In presenting communication it should be made clear that you are forwarding a message from Committee only and that Committee’s consideration of views of Arab states does not constitute the consultations to which this Govt is committed in advance of any basic change of policy in Palestine.

Consular officers in charge at Jerusalem and Aden should similarly communicate the Committee’s message to Govts of Trans-Jordan and Yemen, where British Colonial Office is taking parallel action.

Sent to Baghdad, repeated to Cairo, Jidda, Jerusalem, Aden and Beirut (for repetition to Damascus). Also repeated to London for Judge Hutcheson.

Byrnes

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iraq (Schoenrich)

WASHINGTON, February 5, 1946.

US URGENT

53. “The Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry into the question of European Jewry and the Palestine problem was constituted by His Majesty’s Government and the Government of the United States with terms of reference requiring it among other things ‘to consult representative Arabs and Jews on the problems of Palestine’. The Committee has had the advantage of hearing members of the Arab delegations to the United Nations Assembly in London. The Committee proposes to sit in Cairo probably during the first week of March and is inviting the League of Arab States to submit written and oral evidence there. It will also invite representatives of the Arabs of Palestine to appear before it in Jerusalem. The Committee fears that the time at its disposal may not be sufficient to allow it to visit the
Arab capitals other than Cairo. The Committee wishes, however, to assure the Governments of Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Syria and Lebanon that if that Government in addition desires to acquaint the Committee more directly with their views on the question of Palestine the Committee will be happy to receive anyone whom they may designate to represent them before the Committee during its stay in Cairo. Should the Government[s] of Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Syria and Lebanon decide to be represented in this way they are requested to communicate their intention to the secretary of the Committee at the British Embassy in Cairo.

Sent to Baghdad, repeated Jidda, Beirut (repeat to Damascus), Cairo, Jerusalem and Aden.

BYRNE

867N.01/2-646

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman

Subject: British Government's Decision Regarding Jewish Immigration into Palestine.

I believe you will be interested to know that the British Government has authorized provisionally the resumption of Jewish immigration into Palestine at the rate of 1500 immigrants per month, pending the report of the Anglo-American Committee.

The British Government has twice submitted this proposal to the Arab States, on November 13, 1945 and January 5, 1946. Although no definite answers have been received from the Arab States, the British Government feels that some of the Arab Governments are well disposed toward the British proposal, but are deterred from replying favorably by their hesitancy to support openly a proposal which, whatever its merits, might subject them to the criticism of the Arab League.

The British Government needs such a quota to take care of those of the 900 illegal immigrants now under detention in Palestine who

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7 File copy not dated; memorandum drafted on February 6, 1946.
8 According to telegram 24 of January 4, 1946, from British Prime Minister Attlee to President Truman, and airgram A-23, February 13, from Jerusalem, the quota of Jewish immigration into Palestine had been fixed by the British White Paper of 1939 (British Cmd. 6019: Palestine, Statement of Policy, May 1939) at 75,000. This quota was exhausted as of December 14, 1945. The new monthly quota of 1500 for 3 months commenced as of the following day. From the total of 45000 certificates, deductions were to be made by the British Government for 1350 illegal immigrants and for 700 legal immigrants expected shortly. The Jewish Agency was granted 1,000 certificates for distribution. The Government retained the balance for illegals expected to arrive during the period ending March 14, 1946. (867N.01/1-546, 2-1346)
might be found admissible if a quota existed. Also, certain classes of immigrants from Europe for whom the British military authorities have already arranged transport are being held up en route for lack of a quota.

In establishing this provisional monthly quota of 1500, the British Government has indicated that it will give preference to European Jews having a special claim, such as those to whom commitments have been made, or relatives of Jews already established in Palestine.

The British Government is making known its decision informally to the Arab States in the belief that official communications might inspire formal catalogues of objections.

JAMES F. BYRNE

867N.01/2–1946: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

RESTRIC TED

Moscow, February 19, 1946—8 p.m.

PRIORITY

[Received February 19—2:57 p.m.]

489. ReDeptel 96, January 17. Reference Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. Have received answer dated February 18 from Dekanozov to my letter of January 23 re visit of members of Committee of Inquiry to Soviet zones of occupation in Germany and Austria as well as to Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary which reads as follows:

“The Soviet Govt is consistently and steadily following a policy which excludes all kinds of racial discrimination including that in relation to Jews. Pursuing this policy the Soviet authorities in the Soviet occupation zones in Germany and Austria are suppressing any attempted manifestation of racial discrimination in these zones.

As concerns the position of Jews in Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary, as is known, the armistice terms with these countries provide for the abolition of every kind of racial discrimination and the respective Allied Control Commissions are keeping a careful watch on the execution by Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary of this condition of the armistice.

In accordance with this the Soviet Govt does not see any necessity for a visit to the Soviet zones of occupation in Germany and Austria as well as Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary by the members of the above-mentioned committee, concerning the creation, purposes and functions of which the Soviet Govt, moreover, was not informed.”

Please repeat to Berlin, Vienna, Sofia, Bucharest, Budapest, Paris and London.

KENNAN

* See footnote 6, p. 578.
401. Anglo-American Committee arrived last night without Aydelotte who is expected from London shortly. Hearings begin Mena Hosie [House] Saturday morning with Azzam Pasha \(^9\) speaking for Arab League supported by representatives of member states. Hamdi el-Pachachi \(^10\) and Iraqi colleagues are expected to testify in personal capacity Monday. Committee leaving for Palestine Tuesday night.

League's statement given to Legation in advance asserts interest of all Arabs in Palestine, reviews formation of Arab League as manifestation of Arab unity which Palestine as Jewish state would frustrate. Opposition of League to Zionism is declared not based on racial prejudice but on its inconsistency with democratic principles, on its threat to security and tranquility of Jewish community in Arab states, and on failure of Zionism as solution of world Jewish problem. Opposition of Arab League to Jewish immigration and transfer of land is declared to be as determined and absolute as to Jewish state.

In conclusion League demands abolition of mandate and creation of Palestine as independent Arab state. It further declares that League by appearing before Committee, does not recognize right of Committee to decide Palestine issue or of US or Britain to handle problem exclusively.\(^11\)

Full text of statement by pouch. Copies to London and Arab capitals.

\(^9\) Abdul Rahman Azzam, Secretary-General of the Arab League.

\(^10\) Iraqi Prime Minister.

\(^11\) Despatch 1382, March 4, 1946, from Cairo (received in the Department on April 2), stated:

"The Chairmen were under the impression that Azzam Pasha would give testimony on behalf of the League and that representatives of the Arab states would appear on behalf of their governments. Azzam Pasha and the representatives of the member states designated by their governments to appear before the Committee had agreed, however, that Azzam Pasha should speak on behalf of the League and that the representatives of the member states would confirm the statement made by him. Thus when upon the invitation of the Chairman, Judge Hutcheson, representatives of the Arab states were called upon to speak, H.R.H. Prince Seif al-Islam Abdullah, as representative of Yemen, arose and read a brief statement in which he affirmed the League's position and stated that Yemen as an Arab state considered Palestine a part of the Arab countries, that it objected to Jewish immigration into Palestine, to the establishment of a Jewish state and the making of Palestine into a Jewish national home.

"This statement, by agreement among the Arab states, was later introduced into the testimony as the view of all the states." (867N.01/3-446)
Memorandum of Conversation by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Satterthwaite)

[WASHINGTON,] April 16, 1946.

Participants: Under Secretary
Mr. Robert [R.] Nathan 12
Mr. Gilbert 13
Mr. Satterthwaite, NE

Mr. Nathan and Mr. Gilbert called again on the Under Secretary at 12:30 today. Mr. Acheson opened the conversation by saying that their project had been given much thought and study. He and Mr. Clayton 14 had discussed it at length with Mr. Vinson 15 and the latter had reached the conclusion that the best method of handling it would be to have an amendment introduced providing the Eximbank with additional funds not only for the Jordan Valley Project but for other projects in the Middle Eastern area as well.

To introduce an amendment providing funds for this specific project alone, Mr. Acheson added, would be contrary to the accepted policy of leaving the actual administration of loans to the Bank’s directors. A single project of this type would, moreover, run into both domestic and international complications, whereas if the amount they proposed were doubled and the amendment were drafted in general terms to provide for expenditures on constructive projects in that area such as the proposed Jordan Valley Authority, these objections might be overcome in part at least.

Another factor to be considered, Mr. Acheson said, was that the site of the proposed project is at present under British Mandate and that no international authority has yet been created to carry it out. In these circumstances for Congress to appropriate funds for this project would be analogous to the British appropriating funds for some project in Puerto Rico without first consulting us.

12 Deputy Director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion in 1945.
13 Possibly Richard V. Gilbert, Economic Adviser to the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration until he resigned in February 1946.
14 In a conversation with Mr. Acheson on April 3, Mr. Nathan had sought Department support for Congressional authorization of an increase of $250,000,000 in the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank, to be earmarked for a Jordan Valley hydro-electrification project. Mr. Acheson pointed out the difficulty of undertaking a project in Palestine alone because American motives would be misconstrued and attributed to the pressure of Jewish groups. He stated that a sort of Tigris-Euphrates Valley Authority and a Nile Valley Authority as well as projects in Iran and Saudi Arabia should also be considered in a general plan. (867N.0463/4-346)
15 William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.
16 Fred M. Vinson, Secretary of the Treasury.
Mr. Nathan inquired whether the Department intended to sponsor the project. To this Mr. Acheson indicated that neither the Administration nor the Department are directly sponsoring it and that it would be unwise for them to do so, as he understands it to be the President's underlying philosophy that the Eximbank should carry on relatively small operations, but that major emphasis should be placed on the International Bank, the International Fund and the British loan.

Mr. Gilbert said that they had in fact considered taking up their proposal with the International Bank. As it is not yet operating, however, they felt that too great a delay would be involved.

Mr. Nathan expressed his strong feeling that the Jordan Valley Project could make a constructive contribution to the serious problem of Arab-Jewish relations. He suggested that it might even be welcomed by the British, since he felt that there was bound to be trouble after the Committee of Inquiry issued its report. He asked how soon the report would be finished. Mr. Acheson said he didn’t know but rather imagined that the Committee would be breaking all records for such committees if it succeeded in finishing its report before the deadline, in this case May 7. He also pointed out in this connection that the Department had rigidly followed the rule that it would not issue instructions or suggestions of any kind to the Committee, since it was appointed by the President, but would rather limit itself to facilitating the Committee's work.

In response to Mr. Nathan’s inquiry whether Mr. Acheson had discussed this matter as yet with the Secretary, Mr. Acheson replied that he had not done so and that it had been handled so far by Mr. Vinson, Mr. Clayton and himself. Mr. Nathan remarked that he thought it important that Mr. Byrnes should be informed. Mr. Acheson stated that in view of this he would be glad to talk it over with the Secretary this afternoon if possible and that he would telephone Mr. Nathan of the result.

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Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman

WASHINGTON, April 19, 1946.

Subject: Mr. Bevin’s 16 Request Regarding Report of Palestine Committee of Inquiry

1. I enclose a copy of Lord Halifax’s letter to me of yesterday’s date, 17 transmitting a message from Mr. Bevin in which he expresses

16 Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
17 The British Ambassador’s letter not printed.
the earnest hope that no action be taken by the United States Government on the report of the Palestine Committee of Inquiry without prior consultation with him.

Mr. Bevin is also particularly anxious that publication should not take place either in Britain or the United States before he has had an opportunity of consulting the United States Government.

If you concur, I shall inform Lord Halifax that we shall be glad to comply with Mr. Bevin's request.¹⁸

2. In a Top Secret telegram received this morning, Judge Hutcheson states that he is flying to Washington with the report, arriving Sunday, April 21. He hopes that you will be able to see him on Monday, April 22, in order to receive the report.

JAMES F. BYRNES

867N.01/4-2546: Circular telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers¹⁹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 25, 1946—10 p. m.

Report AngloAm Committee Inquiry re Palestine will be published May 1 according to present plans. Summary of main conclusions for your strict confidential info follows:

1. No hope in countries other than Palestine of substantial assistance in finding homes Jews wishing or forced leave Europe. But this is world responsibility and Palestine alone cannot meet Jewish emigration needs. AmBrit Govts in association other countries should endeavor find new homes all displaced and nonrepatriable persons both Jews, non-Jews. Since most will continue live Europe, AmBrit Govts should endeavor secure basic human rights freedoms as set forth UN Charter.

2. 100,000 certificates for Jewish victims Nazi Fascist persecution should be authorized immediately for admission Palestine. Certificates awarded as far possible 1946 and actual immigration accelerated as rapidly conditions permit.

3. Exclusive claims of Jews and Arabs to Palestine should be disposed of once for all on three principles: Jew shall not dominate Arab in Palestine and vice versa; Palestine shall be neither Jewish nor Arab state; form of govt ultimately established shall fully protect interests of Christian, Jewish, Moslem faiths under international guarantees. Ultimately Palestine to become state guarding interests of Moslems, Jews and Christians alike according fullest

¹⁸Marginal notation by President Truman: "Approved—but it [might] just give the British a chance to pull their usual stunt. H.S.T."
¹⁹At Jerusalem, London, Moscow, Paris, Cairo, Beirut, Baghdad, Jidda, Tangier, and Ankara.

219-490—69—38
measure selfgovt consistent three principles above. Palestine as Holy Land completely different from others hence narrow nationalism inappropriate. In view ancient [and] recent history Pal neither purely Arab nor Jewish land. Jewish National Home has right to continued existence protection development. Minority guarantees would not afford adequate protection for subordinated group. Struggle for numerical majority must be made purposeless by constitution.

4. Hostile feeling between Jews Arabs and determination of both achieve domination makes almost certain attempt establish Palestinian state or states now or some time to come would result in civil strife possibly threatening world peace. Palestine Govt should continue under mandate then UN trusteeship until hostility disappears.

5. Mandatory or trustee should declare Arab economic, educational, political advancement in Palestine equal importance with Jewish and prepare measures bridge present gap by raising Arab standards. Perhaps advisable encourage formation Arab community on lines Jewish community.

6. Pending trusteeship agreement Mandatory should facilitate Jewish immigration while ensuring rights and position of other sections population not prejudiced. In future Pal Govt should have right decide number immigrants admitted in any period having regard to well-being of all Pal people. View disapproved that any Jew anywhere can enter Pal as of right. Any immigrant Jew entering Pal contrary its laws is illegal immigrant.

7. Land transfers regulations should be amended on basis freedom sale, lease, use of land irrespective race, community, creed. Stipulations that only members one race, community, creed may be employed in connection conveyances, leases, agreements should be made nugatory and prohibited. Govt should closely supervise holy places and localities to protect from desecration offensive uses.

8. Not competent assess value plans presented for agricultural industrial development. Such projects if successful of great benefit but require peace and cooperation adjacent Arab states. Full consultation, cooperation required from start with Jewish Agency and Arab states affected.

9. Reformation of educational system both Jews Arabs and introduction compulsory education.

10. Should be made clear beyond doubt to both Jews Arabs that attempts by violence, threats, organization or use illegal armies to prevent execution of report if adopted will be resolutely suppressed. Jewish Agency should resume cooperation with Mandatory to suppress terrorism, illegal immigration, maintain law order.

Acheson
[In telegram 172, April 30, 1946, 6 p.m., the Department notified Baghdad that "American members of Committee were appointed by and responsible to President and such matters as release of report and determination of American Govt policy toward it have been handled by White House not Department. . . . Dept is not in position to state at this time to what extent report will be adopted as policy this Govt or what procedure will be followed in this connection. Committee was of course completely free to make its own decision and you should take every suitable opportunity to point this out and to stress that Committee received no instructions from either Government outside its terms of reference." (867N.01/4 2646)]

In a memorandum of April 24 to Under Secretary of State Acheson, the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) stated: "On a first reading of the Recommendations and Comments of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine, it is our opinion that the Committee has done a thorough and conscientious piece of work, it has not evaded any important issues, and it has produced a set of general recommendations which constitute a reasonable and intelligently-defined compromise solution. . . . In one aspect or another, the Report will doubtless be a bitter disappointment to both Arabs and Jews, but it will doubtless be generally regarded as an honest and impartial effort." (867N.01/4-2446)]

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)²⁰

TOP SECRET
[PARIS,] April 27, 1946.
Participants: Mr. Bevin, accompanied by Mr. Robert Dixon
The Secretary
Mr. Matthews

Mr. Bevin called at his request and took up a number of matters. He said that he felt he must return to London over the week-end for talks with the Dominion Prime Ministers and asked the Secretary if he would be willing to forego his Sunday meeting. The Secretary agreed.

[Here follows paragraph numbered 1, dealing with food.]

2. Palestine. Mr. Bevin spoke at some length on the subject of Palestine and urged delay in the publication of the report of the Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry. He said that while Britain

²⁰ Mr. Matthews was attending the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers which took place at Paris, April 25–May 16.
was prepared to go ahead and permit the immigration of 100,000 Jews, they could not all go to Palestine immediately. What worried him most, he said, was the fact that the Jews are acquiring large supplies of arms, most of them with money furnished by American Jews, and are in a very aggressive frame of mind. He said that most of the immigrants were carefully selected for their military qualities by the Jewish Agency and he urged that we join the British in forcing the Jewish Agency to cease its aggressive tactics. He said that the point has about been reached where he must consider the possibility of a complete British withdrawal from Palestine. At present he is forced to retain four Divisions there and this cannot go on indefinitely. He realizes that after British withdrawal there might be Russian penetration in the area and that it would weaken the whole situation in the Middle East, but he sees little hope of any improvement unless we accept a share of the responsibility. He said he hoped we could send some American troops there. He indicated he would send the Secretary a memorandum on the question with particular reference to several objectionable paragraphs in the Commission of Inquiry's report. During the course of his remarks, Mr. Bevin asserted that the Jews through their aggressive attitude were “poisoning relations between our two peoples”.

[Here follow paragraphs numbered 3, 4, and 5, dealing with Greece, the Italian Colonies and Egypt, and bases in the Pacific, respectively.]

H. Freeman Matthews

867N.01/4-3046: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris 21

WASHINGTON, April 30, 1946.

1970. From Acheson for Secretary Byrnes. The President has asked me to transmit urgently to you the following message which you may care to discuss with Mr. Bevin:

"Following is the text of a statement which I shall issue at 7:00 p.m. today, simultaneously with the release of the Anglo-American report on Palestine: 22"

21 Mr. Byrnes was attending the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers at Paris. On April 28, in telegram 2025, he advised Mr. Acheson of a communication from Mr. Bevin expressing the hope that the United States would not make a statement of policy on Palestine without consulting with the British Government. Mr. Byrnes noted he was willing to agree but requested Mr. Acheson to apprise President Truman. The President informed Mr. Acheson at their regular meeting on April 29 that he felt it necessary to issue a statement when the report was released on May 1. Subsequently the White House sent the President's proposed statement to Mr. Acheson for communication to Mr. Byrnes. It was done in this telegram (1970). Mr. Byrnes, in a telephone conversation with Mr. Acheson on April 30 stated he did not object to the President's making the statement and that he would mention it to Mr. Bevin. (740.00119 Council/4-2846.)

22 The report of the Committee, dated April 20, 1946, was released by the Department of State in 1946 as Publication No. 2536.
'I am very happy that the request which I made for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine has been unanimously endorsed by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The transference of these unfortunate people should now be accomplished with the greatest dispatch. The protection and safe-guarding of the Holy places in Palestine sacred to Moslem, Christian and Jew is adequately provided in the report. One of the significant features in the report is that it aims to insure complete protection to the Arab population of Palestine by guaranteeing their civil and religious rights, and by recommending measures for the constant improvement in their cultural, educational and economic position. I am also pleased that the Committee recommends in effect the abrogation of the White Paper of 1939 including existing restrictions on immigration and land acquisition to permit the further development of the Jewish National Home. It is also gratifying that the report envisages the carrying out of large scale economic development projects in Palestine which would facilitate further immigration and be of benefit to the entire population. In addition to these immediate objectives the report deals with many other questions of long range political policies and questions of international law which require careful study and which I will take under advisement. Harry S. Truman.'

Repeated to London. Adding following heading "Urgent repeat of telegram 1970 to Paris which follows should be conveyed at once to Mr. Harriman." 23

ACHESON

867N.01/5-146: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

US URGENT

LONDON, May 1, 1946.

[Received May 1—1:58 p.m.]

4650. At close of question hour in Commons this afternoon Prime Minister 24 made statement on Palestine report. Text obtained from Foreign Office reads as follows:

"His Majesty's Government desire to express their appreciation for the care and trouble which the Committee have devoted to the preparation of the report. They hope that it will prove to be a notable contribution to the solution of the problems of Palestine and of the Jews in Europe both of which they have so much at heart. His Majesty's Government received the report only last week. His Majesty's Government and the US Government jointly appointed

23 Telegram 1970 was repeated to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman) as 3618 the same day. In telegram 3634, April 30, Mr. Acheson requested Ambassador Harriman to transmit the text of the President's statement to the British Foreign Office (867N.01/4-3046).

24 Clement R. Attlee.
the Committee and the report is addressed to both Governments. His Majesty's Government are now studying it and will consult with the Government of the US as soon as possible.

"The report must be considered as a whole in all its implications. Its execution would entail very heavy immediate and long-term commitments. His Majesty's Government wish to be satisfied that they will not be called upon to implement a policy which would involve them single-handed in such commitments and in the course of joint examination they will wish to ascertain to what extent the Government of the US would be prepared to share the resulting additional military and financial responsibilities.

"The report recommends that 100,000 certificates for the admission of Jews to Palestine should be awarded immediately, so far as possible in 1946, and that actual immigration should be pushed forward as rapidly as conditions permit. The practical difficulties involved in the immediate reception and absorption of so large a number would obviously be very great.

"It is clear from the facts presented in the report regarding the illegal armies maintained in Palestine and their recent activities that it would not be possible for the Government of Palestine to admit so large a body of immigrants unless and until these formations have been disarmed and their arms surrendered. As the report points out private armies constitute a danger to the peace of the world and ought not to exist. Jews and Arabs in Palestine alike must surrender their arms. The Committee have drawn attention to the failure of the Jewish Agency to cooperate in dealing with this evil and have expressed the view that the Agency should at once resume active and responsible cooperation with the mandatory power. His Majesty's Government regard it as essential that the Agency should take a positive part in the suppression of these activities. They hope that both Jewish and Arab leaders will give patience and restraint. His Majesty's Government recognize that decisions must be taken as soon as possible but meanwhile the House will understand that I am unable to make any further statement."

[Here follows an account of further discussion in the House of Commons.]

Harriman

867N.01/5–246: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

JERUSALEM, May 2, 1946—10 a.m.

[Received 2:53 p.m.]

136. Committee report has been discussed at length by Jewish Agency Executive which has decided to issue no statement pending indication of action to be taken by British Government. Am advised general feeling of Executive was favorable to immediate concessions to refugees but was bitterly opposed to parts of report denying basic
Zionist political aims. One member Political Department said "Zionist political aims have been sacrificed to philanthropy."

Arabs were not surprised at contents of report but have nevertheless reacted violently. Higher Committee has called general Arab strike for May 3, has decided to increase its membership to 40 possibly with view to action and sporadic disturbances are expected. Reception being held today by Iraqi Consul General for birthday of King of Iraq was cancelled yesterday "because of situation in Palestine". Jamal Husseini 26 in public statement said Arabs everywhere would fight implementation of report particularly immigration of hundred thousand and indicated his belief report was made under American pressure. Police state there is distinct possibility of Mufti 27 coming to Damascus and if he should be able to do so immediate uprisings of Arab population is expected. 28

PINKERTON

867N.01/5-346

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Hilldring) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

[WASHINGTON,] May 3, 1946.

As anticipated, the British are stalling on the Anglo-American Committee’s recommendation for authorization of 100,000 immigration visas to Palestine. Mr. Attlee has announced that action upon this recommendation will be withheld pending (a) disarmament of the Jewish underground Army in Palestine and (b) guarantee of military and financial assistance by the U.S. This position is inconsistent with the Committee’s recommendation, which attached no such conditions, and, in fact, is reported to be the position which was considered by the Committee but was specifically rejected by it.

Our military and political interests in Germany and Austria require that we press for immediate implementation of the Committee’s recommendation. I believe that unless we exercise unremitting pressure to this end, these interests will not receive adequate representation by our Government and there will be no effective counteraction to British tactics of stalling and confusing the entire issue.

26 Jamal al-Husseini, leading member of the Arab Higher Committee.
27 The Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin el-Husseini.
28 In telegram 140, May 4, 1946, noon, from Jerusalem, Mr. Pinkerton reported that the Arab Higher Committee had sent a letter to Prime Minister Attlee rejecting the Committee report as an outcome of Anglo-American political expediency and denouncing it as a violation of previous commitments to the Arabs, of the Atlantic Charter, and of Allied principles. The letter announced that "pending the decision of the British Govt, the Arabs will proceed to organize their national forces, and to prepare means of defense in order to resume our national struggle." (867N.01/5-446)
The answer to Arab opposition in the Middle East and to Britain’s negative attitude may very well be demonstrations by Jewish displaced persons in Germany and Austria and scathing comments by Jewish leaders and organizations in this country. In order to further our interests in Germany and Austria, i.e., to resettle the Jewish displaced persons as expeditiously as possible, I think that all the Jewish pressure should be directed against the British rather than against both U.S. and British Governments jointly. This result, I believe, can be achieved only if this Government pursues an aggressive public policy of needling the British to implement the Committee’s recommendation for entry of 100,000 immediately and without reference to future action on any other aspects of the Report. Since the British have already put us on the defensive by Mr. Attlee’s public announcement, I believe that it is essential that we announce immediately our forthright position in favor of entry of the 100,000. Such an announcement should be accompanied by a generous gesture which will counteract the British inference that we are only ready to advise but not to assist materially.

I suggest, therefore, that you discuss with the President the following recommendations for immediate action:

a. A public statement by the President stressing the urgent necessity of immediate implementation of the Committee’s recommendation for issuance of 100,000 immigration visas.

b. A public offer by the U.S. Government to assume primary responsibility for movement of all of the 100,000 from Europe to Palestine. This offer should be accompanied by a statement of the President’s intention to designate an outstanding U.S. citizen (preferably by name) as his Personal Representative to coordinate the movement of these persons. Such an individual would be empowered to coordinate and mobilize the resources of the Army, War Shipping Administration, UNRRA, Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, and Jewish voluntary agencies, in order to effect the movement. It is believed that the net cost of such an operation to the U.S. Government would be not more, and perhaps even less, than the expense of maintaining Jewish displaced persons in camps in Germany and Austria for another year.

If you concur, I will prepare an appropriate memorandum to the President for your signature.

J. H. Hilldring

867N.01/5—346: Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

CAIRO, May 3, 1946—3 p. m.

[Received May 4—2: 35 a. m.]

770. Reaction here to Anglo-American Committee report bitterly critical. Individuals and Arab organizations have voiced their oppo-
sition while newspapers almost without exception attack report as disastrous and in complete variance with justice for Arab rights. Blame for recommendation generally assigned to America, an attitude encouraged by widely-printed remarks of President and other Americans welcoming recommendations.

Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of Arab League, called on me to present protests of Arab League against report and to voice belief that American position in Arab world would inevitably deteriorate if the recommendations became policy. He said that he was sorry to come on such a mission. Arabs had long held America and Americans in high regard but if this report were to become policy an entirely different attitude would prevail. When asked why he put blame for report on America, he replied that Britain had long been recognized as enemy of Arabs. America by report had shown that it was now an enemy.

Report in his opinion could only add fuel to the flames. Zionists had achieved in report all they could desire at this time. They would now be encouraged to renew their terrorist activities. Arabs on other hand had now nothing but despair. Those who had kept quiet in expectation of implementation of White Paper now had every reason to renew fight dropped in 1939. He declared report in its support of Zionism and repudiation of Arab claims could have been written in any Zionist office in America. When it was pointed out that the report repudiated Jewish state, he retorted only three things mattered: Immigration, land and future government. The report gave Zionists two things which could lead only to Jewish state: Immigration and right to purchase unlimited land while denial of right to control immigration and land transfer was repudiation of all of Arab rights.

He said that from moment report had appeared, he had been besieged by representatives of every Arab state. He had talked by telephone with most Arab capitals and could confidently say that Arabs were united in their complete opposition to the policy of report. He could not prophesy what steps League might take although he was under tremendous pressure to authorize drastic and serious action. He was considering calling extraordinary session of League to recommend best course of action. He asked that his representations be transmitted to my Government. Azzam called on British Ambassador the following day and made similar representations.

Only on one or two occasions during his call did Azzam Pasha depart from his usual moderate tone but there was no doubt of his sincerity nor the seriousness with which he regarded report as destructive of Arab rights and of American position in the Arab world. Similar views have been given to press.
Other interested parties have communicated their views to Legation. Protest signed by Arab Union, Moslem Brotherhood, Moslem Youths, Arab Palestine Society received yesterday. One observer stated that many Egyptians regarded report as particularly disastrous. Hitherto, American statements on Zionism had been explained away as having been made with an eye to elections. This report by allegedly impartial commission together with the President's remark welcoming recommendations especially those concerning further immigration and establishment of Jewish national home would now be regarded by Arabs as revealing true American attitude towards Palestine because of which America could count only on Arab hostility. This observer held that Russia and Zionists only would benefit from report.

[Here follows press and other comment.]

Paraphrase by pouch to London and Arab capitals.

TUCK

867N.01/5-446: Telegram

The Chargé in Iraq (Moose) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

Baghdad, May 4, 1946—noon.
[Received May 8—8:25 p.m.]

229. Foreign Ministry has sent Legation copy of Iraq Government's formal protest to British Embassy against findings of Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry. Iraqi Government points out that it "holds Great Britain solely responsible for the policy which is being applied in Palestine" and that U. S. is being informed as matter of courtesy. Highlights of protest, complete translation of which follows by air, are as follows:

1. Iraqi never recognized the validity of the Committee nor bound itself to accept its recommendations.

2. "Justice demands that fate of Palestine be decided by its legitimate inhabitants only."

3. Committee's claim that Palestine is only land offering substantial hope for Jewish immigration is strange indeed since Committee has not investigated capacity of U.S. or British possessions as haven for Jews.

4. Committee ignored Arab rights in Arab country.

5. "Committee's recommendation for entry of 100,000 Jews is flagrant aggression against Arab rights and challenge to humanitarian principles and international pledges which have been made to them. Immediate immigration of 100,000 Jews into Palestine and continued Zionist immigration thereafter is dangerous not only to the Arabs of Palestine but to all the Middle Eastern Countries and this danger will undoubtedly result in bloodshed and in disturbing the peace and security in this part of the world."

6. Removal of restrictions covering transfer of lands to Zionists will once again enable Jews to strip Arabs of their possessions and means of livelihood.
7. Committee was unduly influenced by "Zionist pressure in U. S.—unfortunate plight of Jews in Europe and through Zionist terrorism in Palestine."

8. "Adoption of any of the Committee's recommendations which fall short of the 1939 White Paper shall be regarded as an unjust act calculated to disturb international peace in the Middle East."

9. The British Government as mandatory power is alone responsible, legally and morally, for what will take place in and for Palestine in the other Arab countries.

10. The interference of USA in Palestine's affairs has no legal validity because if the U.S. were devoid of Zionist influence its relationship with Palestine would be like that of any other power of the United Nations.

MOOSE

867N.01/5-646: Telegram

The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Sands) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JIDDA, May 6, 1946—9 a.m.

URGENT

[Received 11:32 a.m.]

129. (1) Sheikh Iusuf Yassin Deputy FonMin returned yesterday afternoon from Riyadh and departed early this morning for Cairo where he will discuss Palestine inquiry report with Arab League officials (Legtel 127, May 5[29]). He told me on arrival only that the reaction of the King to the report was "very bad."

(2) I am informed that staff members of British Legation here in conversation with Saudis are successfully conveying impression that recommendation for entry of hundred thousand Jews into Palestine was one purely of American origin against which British members struggled unsuccessfully.

SANDS

867N.01/5-646

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman[30]

WASHINGTON, May 6, 1946.

Subject: Proposed Procedure Regarding the Palestine Report.

I am attaching for your approval the draft of a telegram which I believe you might wish to send to Mr. Attlee regarding the Palestine

[29] Not printed.

[30] Draft transmitted to Mr. Acheson by Mr. Henderson on May 3. The latter's transmitting memorandum noted that "The situation developing in the Near East with regard to the report makes it all the more desirable in our opinion that we should take some action as soon as possible looking toward consultation with Arabs and Jews". Mr. Henderson also added two marginal notations. One stated: "We are of course playing with dynamite"; the other stated: "You may prefer to discuss this orally with the President". In an appended memorandum of May 6 to Mr. Henderson, Mr. Acheson noted: "I took this over to the President who kept the memorandum and the telegram. He seemed to approve it but wants to talk it over with some of his people." President Truman gave his approval on May 8; for the telegram sent to London the same day, see infra.
report. This telegram is based on the assumption that the report constitutes a valid basis for determining this Government's policy toward Palestine and for initiating the consultations between Arabs and Jews to which both the American and British Governments are committed.

It is likely that the British Government will approach us in the near future with a view to determining the attitude of the two Governments toward the Committee’s report. It is almost certain that the British Government will desire to consult the Arabs and Jews before deciding to take action on any of the Committee’s recommendations. In our opinion, it is desirable that the two Governments reach as soon as possible a decision regarding the report as a whole so that all parties may know to what extent the Governments intend to base their future policy upon the report.

The procedure which we propose is: first, an approach to the British Government along the lines of the attached draft message; second, consultations with Jews and Arabs, carried out concurrently but not jointly by the two Governments; third, consultation between the two Governments as to the policy which they will adopt toward the report as a whole; and fourth, a public announcement of that policy, which would include references to the placing of Palestine under United Nations trusteeship. If you desire, the Department of State will be glad to undertake the consultations with Jewish and Arab organizations in behalf of this Government, and will inform you promptly and fully of the replies received.

DEAN ACHESON

867N.01/5-646: Telegram

President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Attlee)\textsuperscript{31}

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1946—1 p.m.

I have been considering the next steps which should be taken with regard to Palestine and believe that the first thing to be done is to initiate the consultations with Jews and Arabs to which both our Governments are committed. I believe the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry offers a basis for such consultations and I contemplate the adoption of the following procedure, on which I should welcome your comments:

The report will be brought by this Government in the immediate future to the attention of the Jewish and Arab organizations specified

\textsuperscript{31}Sent to the Ambassador in London as Department’s telegram 3816, with the instruction: “Please deliver following message from the President to Prime Minister Attlee.”
below as well as the Governments of Arab States with which this Government maintains relations with the request that they transmit their views on it within a certain period, say two weeks. On receipt of their views this Government will consult the British Government and then proceed to determine its attitude toward the report as a whole and to issue a public statement as to the extent to which it is prepared to accept the report as the basis for its Palestine policy.

I imagine that the British Government will wish to take concurrent action and should be glad to know if this assumption is correct. In view of the urgency surrounding the question of the admission to Palestine of the 100,000 Jews whose entry is recommended by the Committee, I sincerely hope that it will be possible to initiate and complete the consultations with Arabs and Jews at the earliest possible moment.


867N.01/5-346

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

[WASHINGTON,] May 8, 1946.

Assistant Secretary Hilldring, in his memorandum of May 3, states that our military and political interests in Germany and Austria require that we press for immediate implementation of the Committee's recommendation, and that in order to further our interests in these countries the resettlement of Jewish displaced persons should proceed as expeditiously as possible. He advocates that this Government pursue an aggressive public policy of needling the British into issuing 100,000 immigration certificates for Palestine immediately and without reference to future action on any other aspects of the report.

This recommendation apparently fails to take into account any aspect of the complicated Palestine problem other than the European. Before any action along such lines is contemplated, the following points should be given the most serious consideration:

(1) The whole question of procedure has already been put up to
the President with the Department’s observation that, since the Committee’s ten recommendations form a carefully integrated whole, the various parts cannot be singled out for separate treatment. At the same time we urged that the report as a whole be adopted as this Government’s policy at the earliest possible moment.

(2) Until the United States Government is prepared to accept the report, which it has not yet done, its status is simply that of a recommendation. It would seem unwise for this Government to take active steps to give effect to it, either in its entirety or in part, before it is adopted as the official policy of this Government.

(3) Our policy toward, interests in, and relations with the various Arab countries in the Near East, chiefly Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, are of an importance which is certainly commensurate with our interest in the future of the occupied zones of Europe. The Arab reaction to the Committee’s recommendations has been swift and alarming. The Arabs have singled out the recommendation for putting 100,000 Jews into Palestine for criticism of the strongest kind, and they give every indication of the intention to resist. We have many political, economic and educational interests in these countries. Our educational interests, for example, have taken more than a century to build up, and they constituted a sheet anchor in the Middle East when we were militarily weak. These American schools and colleges require Arab good will for their continuance and effectiveness. Our Near Eastern trade and petroleum interests cannot be neglected, nor the desirability of our maintaining friendly relations with the countries located in the vital Near and Middle Eastern area.

(4) According to sources in close contact with the displaced Jews of Europe, the removal of 100,000 persons from the American zones in Germany and Austria would be a temporary solution at best, as they expect the influx of DP’s from the Soviet Russian zones to continue unabated and soon fill the vacuum.

(5) The fact that the Committee was bi-national and its report a joint Anglo-American undertaking would seem to preclude unilateral action of any sort on our part, certainly at this stage. If, without full consultation with the British, the President were to issue a statement similar to that recommended in the memorandum under reference, British resentment would follow as a virtual certainty, to the inevitable detriment of our long-range interests in Palestine and elsewhere. It may be recalled that the British Prime Minister reacted strongly to the President’s espousal of the 100,000 recommendation in view of the fact that no accompanying commitment was made to share responsibility for the results of carrying it out.
(6) Last but not least, this Government has committed itself on various occasions to take no action involving a change in the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. We have also made it known that the hearings before the Committee did not constitute this consultation. If all or part of the report were to be put into operation by us without such consultation, it would be regarded as a breach of faith which could not fail to have repercussions of a very serious nature.

GORDON P. MERRIAM

867N.01/5-946: Telegram

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

BEIRUT, May 9, 1946—4 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received 8:43 p. m.]

213. Regarding Department’s circular telegram April 25, 10 a. m. [p. m.], I have delayed reporting Syrian and Lebanese reaction to Palestine Commission Report to end that all essential factors might be covered. Some of these were slow in developing, and it was only yesterday that occasion could be made for effective discussion with Prime Minister Jabri in Damascus.

2. In general, reaction in press, public and official circles has been disillusionment, hardening into determination to resist implementation of Commission’s recommendations. This was clearly foreseen by Emir Faisal [32] who one week before publication of report said to me, “I am afraid we Arabs will have to resist, by force if necessary, though that I should greatly regret because of our countries’ otherwise truly friendly relations.”

3. Disillusionment is particularly bitter as regards American Government attitude as voiced in Mr. Truman’s statement of April 30th. [32a] Local Arabs argue substantially as follows:

That from mountain of documentation and testimony commission, like its predecessors, should produce only ineffectual mouse was not unexpected. That Britain should again let Arabs down was not surprising per se although surprisingly shortsighted in sight Soviet pressures in Middle East. But that United States, by voice of its President, should take so unreservedly pro-Zionist attitude was shocking to all those who had long counted on its erstwhile seeming ardor to implement principles of international justice in postwar world.


4. Elaboration of this theme stresses Roosevelt promises (id est in letter of April 12, 1945, to Syrian President 33) that American Government would take no decision regarding basic situation in Palestine without full prior consultation with Arabs, as well as our recent assurances that Commission's inquiry did not constitute such "consultations" and that by "Arabs" we specifically meant Arab Governments.

5. It is then argued that nothing could affect Palestine situation more basically than imposition of 100,000 Jewish refugees and abrogation of White Paper guarantees regarding land transfers and future immigration. Consequently, Mr. Truman's statement is read as clear promise to Zionists that such imposition and abrogation will be major elements of America's Palestine policy.

6. I have been so much impressed by intensity of resulting anti-American feeling in official circles and among informed public that I venture to suggest Department consider issuing official statement reiterating assurances mentioned above and/or directing me to reiterate them formally, preferably in writing, to Syrian and Lebanese Governments prior to scheduled Arab League Council meeting at Bludan 34 May 18.

[Here follows statement made by the Syrian Prime Minister on May 4, concluding with his question as to whether the United States wished the Arabs to take their case to the Security Council as one endangering international peace.]

8. As Jabri's concluding query may be indication of policy to be proposed to Arab League, Department may wish to give me indication of its reaction thereto. I replied that, while Palestine problem was of such international importance that final word might perhaps well be left with UNO, it would seem wiser for time being to consider Commission's findings as simple recommendation, however unpalatable to Arabs, with respect to which consultations on intergovernmental plane appear to be next logical step. 35

9. In Lebanon, Prime Minister Solh issued brief statement May 3 declaring Commission's recommendations unacceptable and undertaking to support Palestine Arab position and to cooperate with Arab

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34 In Syria.
35 In telegram 215, May 22, 1946, 7 p. m., the Secretary of State "in general" approved the position taken by Minister Wadsworth. He added, for the Minister's background information, that "high officials of UN Secretariat including Assistant Secretary-General for Security Council Affairs Sobolev have indicated their belief that it is unlikely that Palestine question will be lodged at this time before the Security Council, or for that matter, any other organ of UN. We share this view." (867N.01/6-946)
states in safeguarding Arab rights. Following day Council of Ministers decided to request early extraordinary convocation Arab League Council. Yesterday Parliament devoted 2 hours to members' protest and ministerial declarations. Highlights of latter were:
[Here follow these highlights and further Lebanese and Syrian reaction.]

14. It may be appropriate to end this review by drawing special attention to suggestion ventured in paragraph 6 above. President Dodge of American University and other leading Americans here support it.

Paraphrases to London, Moscow and Arab capitals.

WADSWORTH

740.00119 Council/5-946: Telegram

The Secretary of State to President Truman

TOP SECRET

URGENT

PARIS, May 9, 1946—5 p.m. [Received 9:35 p.m.]

59. Delsac 482. For the President from the Secretary. Bevin has given me a copy of a memorandum prepared by his Govt for his use in discussing with me the Anglo-American Committee's report on Palestine and the Jewish question of which the following is a summary:

1. A brief examination shows that the commitments involved in giving effect to the report would involve the expenditure of large sums of money and the employment of military forces to an extent beyond the capacity of His Majesty's Govt to meet alone. Before any decision is taken as to whether the report should be put into force or not the British Govt must know what assistance they can count on obtaining from the US Govt.

2. The military burden is the more important one. Before any decision could be taken to admit 100,000 additional immigrants as recommended in the report, the illegal Jewish armies must be suppressed and there must be a general disarmament throughout Palestine. Otherwise these armies would be swollen by recruits drawn from the new immigrants. The implementation of the report would cause serious repercussions throughout the Arab world involving additional military commitments which the British Govt could not undertake alone in present circumstances.

3. The British now have an equivalent of two and one-half divisions in Palestine. The British Govt considers that adoption of the Committee's report would make necessary reinforcements of the
order of two infantry divisions and one armoured brigade. There is no possibility of providing these reinforcements from British sources if they are to meet their inescapable commitments in other parts of the world. It would be necessary for American forces of the required strength to be immediately available before the policy recommended could be endorsed by the British Govt. and it would be essential to obtain a guarantee that American assistance would be sustained at full strength so long as the commitment in Palestine lasted. A token contingent would not be sufficient.

4. A conservative estimate is that the recommendations of the report would involve an expenditure of from 60,000,000 to 70,000,000 pounds in Palestine during the next couple of years if the new immigrants are to be housed and fitted into the economy of the country. Over a period of 10 years the expenditure involved would be from 115,000,000 to 125,000,000 pounds. The foregoing figures exclude the cost of development schemes such as the Jordan Valley project which is estimated to cost 76,000,000 pounds.

5. Zionists have suggested that expenditures of this nature be met from reparations allocation for the victims of Nazism but the total available from this source for both Jews and non-Jews is only about 7,500,000 pounds. Even allowing for a maximum effort by world Jewry, there will obviously be a much larger residue than the British Govt will be able to bear alone and it would be glad to know to what extent it can count on American financial assistance should it be decided to put these measures into operation.

6. The British are convinced that they would not be in a position to put the report into operation without substantial financial and military contributions from the US Govt.

7. Both the British and US Govts are committed to consultation with the Arabs and Jews before a new policy is adopted which fact would preclude the British Govt from giving immediate effect to the report.

8. Consideration should be given to the form of such consultations and whether the US would be associated with the British Govt in conducting them.

9. If the US Govt is unable to agree to assist in implementing the report the British Govt will have to consider what its future policy in Palestine is to be. Meanwhile some other state may refer the matter to the Security Council at any moment as a situation likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

10. The British Govt considers that the Committee on Refugees and
Displaced Persons of the Economic and Social Council should deal with the question of the disposal of the Jews for whom immigration to Palestine has not been suggested.\textsuperscript{36}

[BYRNES]

867N.01/5–1046 : Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman\textsuperscript{37}

TOP SECRET

[LONDON,] 9 May, 1946.

Thank you very much indeed for your message of yesterday about Palestine and for your kindness in consulting me. Your message arrived while I was in Cabinet—I brought it at once before my colleagues. We are all agreed that closest cooperation between our two Governments on this matter can only be to the benefit of all concerned. We are most grateful for your communication and for the suggestions which you make which we are now studying. I am sorry I cannot send you a final reply immediately but as I have explained to your Ambassador I want particularly to discuss it with the Foreign Secretary who as you probably know has had a preliminary talk with Mr. Byrnes. I hope he will be able to come from Paris during the weekend for consultation.

2. I realise the need for speed; but, in order to ensure that we make the best possible approach to the problem, I should be grateful if you could wait a few days until I am in a position to give you the considered views of my Cabinet colleagues. Meanwhile I hope you will give consideration to the suggestions put to Mr. Byrnes by the Foreign Secretary, especially that there should be some provision for the study

\textsuperscript{36} In telegram 2260 (Delsec 481), May 9, 1946, 6 p. m., from Paris, Secretary Byrnes informed President Truman as follows: “Mr. Bevin has discussed with me your message to Attlee as to Palestine. He says the problem of arranging for the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt is so acute he earnestly hopes you can delay sending your request to Jewish and Arab organizations. . . . I think it would be wise to delay request until 20th so we can have time to consider whether our course will commit us to military assistance. They urge they cannot act without assurances of our military and financial assistance. If after reading Bevin’s statement you are willing to make any commitment that would involve military assistance, I suggest asking Eisenhower’s opinion as to the number of troops that contribution might ultimately involve.” (740.00119 Council/5–946) For documentation on the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt, see pp. 69 ff. General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower was Chief of Staff, United States Army.

In telegram 2266, May 10, 1946, 8 p. m., Mr. Acheson notified Secretary Byrnes that the President concurred in the latter’s view that it would be wise to defer consultations until May 20 and authorized him to so inform Mr. Bevin (740.00119 Council/5–946).

\textsuperscript{37} Copy transmitted to Mr. Acheson by the British Ambassador (Halifax) on May 10.
by experts of our two Governments of the financial and military liabilities involved and that if possible this study should take place at the outset and before the proposed consultations with Jews and Arabs.

[Here follow paragraphs numbered 3 and 4 dealing with subjects other than Palestine.]

867N.01/5-1046

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] May 10, 1946.

Participants:  Mr. Mahmoud Hassan, Minister of Egypt
Mr. Ali Jawdat, Minister of Iraq
Dr. Charles Malik, Minister of Lebanon
Sheikh Asad Al-Faqqih, Minister of Saudi Arabia
Dr. Costi K. Zurayk, Chargé d'Affaires of Syria
Mr. Dean Acheson, Acting Secretary of State
Mr. Loy W. Henderson, Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs

At their request the diplomatic representatives of the five Arab countries in Washington were received by the Acting Secretary of State at 12:30 o'clock today.

The Egyptian Minister acted as spokesman for the group, which included the Minister of Iraq, the Minister of Lebanon, the Minister of Saudi Arabia and the Chargé d'Affaires of Syria.

The Egyptian Minister stated that the representatives of the five Arab states acting under instructions of their Governments had called in order to present to the American Government notes setting forth the views of the Arab countries with regard to the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine. The Minister continued substantially as follows:

It had been the understanding of himself and of the other Arab representatives in Washington—and this understanding had been conveyed to their respective Governments—that the American Government had taken the position that the Anglo-American Committee was an advisory body and that neither the British nor the American Governments necessarily be bound by its findings. Furthermore, he and the other representatives in Washington of the various Arab Governments had been assured that before any steps would be taken which would result in a change in the basic situation in Palestine,

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38 Identical notes of May 10 not printed; they enclosed an identical undated memorandum, the text of which is printed in the New York Times, May 17, 1946, p. 6, col. 2.
Arabs and Jews would be consulted. In the opinion of the Arab world, the introduction of 100,000 Jews into Palestine would bring about a basic change of the situation in that country. He was sure that this opinion must be shared by everyone acquainted with the situation in Palestine. He wished to point out that President Roosevelt on various occasions had assured the heads of Arab States that the Arabs would be consulted before any change would be made in the basic situation in Palestine. The President had also given assurances that he would take no action hostile to the Arabs. These assurances had made a deep impression upon the Arab world which had confidence in the word of the President and of the Government of the United States.

The report of the Anglo-American Committee had made a painful impression upon the Arab world. The Arabs were not satisfied with the suggestions contained in it and they hoped that the British and American Governments would consult with them before taking action based upon it. In view of the violent reaction which the report had caused in the Arab countries, he would like to suggest that the American Government at least before the 18th of May, the date of the next meeting of the Arab League, issue an announcement to the effect that it does not consider itself necessarily bound by the recommendations contained in the report of the Anglo-American Committee and that in any event it would live up to its assurances to consult with Arabs and Jews before adopting a policy calling for action which would alter the basic situation in Palestine.

The Acting Secretary thanked the Ministers for the notes which they were giving him and stated that he appreciated the frankness with which they had expressed the views of their Governments. He could assure them that the Government of the United States had every intention of living up to the assurances which it had given and of consulting Arabs and Jews before making a definite decision with regard to the report on the basic situation in Palestine.\textsuperscript{39} He added that the views of the Arab Governments set forth in the notes which had been handed to him would be given careful study.

\textsuperscript{39} In a memorandum of May 10 to President Truman, Mr. Acheson noted that the assurances in this sentence had been given by him to the Arab Chiefs of Mission pursuant to the President's authorization (867N.01/5-1046). On May 17 he sent identical replies to their notes of May 10, which stated in part: "I wish to take this opportunity to renew the assurances which I expressed to you during our conversation on May 10 ... when I stated that it was the intention of the Government of the United States to consult with Arabs and Jews before taking any definite decision relative to the Committee's report." The full text of his replies is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, May 26, 1946, p. 917.

Assurances similar to those in the notes of May 17 were telegraphed by Mr. Acheson to Abdul-Karim Mutahher, Yemenese Foreign Minister, on May 17 in response to his telegram of May 11; and by President Truman to the Amir of Trans-Jordan and the President of the Lebanon on May 22 in reply to their telegrams of May 11 and 14, respectively, and to the President of Syria on May 24, in response to his telegram of May 16 (867N.01/5-1246, /5-1146, /5-1446, /5-1646). The text of the President's telegram of May 17 to Prince Abdul Ilah, Regent of Iraq, is printed in Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, vol. II, p. 148.
TOP SECRET

[London, undated.]

Personal and Top Secret. I have now been able to consult the Foreign Secretary and the Cabinet on your message of 8th May concerning Palestine. We agree that the consultations with the Jews and Arabs to which both our Governments are committed should be initiated as quickly as possible. I hope however that in view of the delicate negotiations which we are at present conducting in Egypt, you will feel able to postpone any approach to the parties concerned until 20th May at the earliest.

We also think that the suggested period of two weeks is too short for the Arab Government and Jewish Organisations to prepare and submit their views on the Anglo-American Committee’s recommendations and that it would be preferable to allow them one month.

As I said in my previous telegram we think it important that there should also be some provision for the study by expert officials of our two Governments of the implications of the Committee’s Report, with particular reference to the military and financial liabilities which would be involved in its adoption. We would prefer these official discussions between experts to precede the consultations with Jews and Arabs, but if this suggestion does not meet with your approval they can be conducted either simultaneously with or after those consultations.

It also seems to us most desirable that as a final stage in the consultations which we are contemplating every effort should be made to convene a conference at which Arab and Jewish representatives would meet with representatives of our two Governments to consider the whole question on the basis of the Committee’s report and of the results of the preliminary consultations both between Arabs and Jews and between our own experts.

Our two Governments would then be in a position to make known their decisions on the issues dealt with by the Committee of Enquiry, having had the fullest opportunity of bringing their own views into harmony and of promoting the largest possible measures of agreement between the other interested parties.

Transmitted to President Truman by the British Embassy on May 13; copy received by the Department from the same source the following day.
SECRET

JERUSALEM, May 13, 1946—6 p. m.
[Received May 13—5:47 p. m.]

152. Chief Secretary 41 informs me ship carrying about 1600 illegal immigrants from Black Sea due to arrive Palestine within 2 weeks and as all available certificates from quota for April–May as well as 300 from May–June quota have been used for Spezia immigrants situation will become very embarrassing. Govt has received reports that other immigrants have left or are about to leave from Greece and that entire tempo illegal immigration is being stepped up. He has no suggestion as to possible Govt action with regard to illegals in view of exhaustion of quotas to which they might be charged—Chief Secretary says illegal immigrants are not type whose entry is contemplated by Committee report but are potential reinforcements of illegal armies. He doubts whether admission 100,000 would have any effect upon illegal immigration.

PINKERTON

867N.01/5–1646: Telegram

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1946—8 p. m.

US URGENT

I have given careful consideration to your two messages concerning Palestine and am pleased to note that you and your colleagues share our feeling regarding close collaboration between our two Govts. We are proceeding with arrangements for consultations with Arabs and Jews so that the communication to them may be made on May 20. I hope that this will be agreeable to you and that your Govt will take concurrent action. I am still most anxious to have these consultations completed as early as possible but in view of your feeling that two weeks would be too short I am agreeable to extending the period to one month. We are drawing up a covering memorandum to be handed to Arab and Jewish representatives at the time their views on Committee’s report are requested and we will furnish your Govt with an ad-

41 Of the Palestine Government.
42 Sent to London as Department’s telegram 4074, with the instruction: “President desires the following message to be transmitted to Prime Minister Attlee in reply to latter’s telegrams of May 9 and May 14 [13].” Telegram 4074 was repeated to Paris for Secretary Byrnes as No. 2383.
vance copy of this memorandum. We assume Brit Govt similarly will let us have an advance copy of any covering memorandum it may decide to use.

As regards question of studies to be made by experts of the two Govts, with respect to certain matters arising out of report, we are proceeding to organize an appropriate group from among officials of this Govt. However, as Brit Emb has already been informed by Dept of State, we do not believe it would be advisable to have these discussions between experts of the two Govts precede the requests for the views of Arabs and Jews. It is our belief that latter (i.e. the consultations) might serve to clarify issues involved and narrow field in which expert discussions would take place. At same time, however, we believe at least preliminary expert discussions can be initiated as soon as the views have been requested. In this connection it would be of the greatest usefulness if we might have as soon as possible some indication of subjects which your Govt thinks should form basis of these discussions, as well as any further detailed suggestions.

We have noted your proposal for an eventual conference which would include Jewish and Arab representatives. We believe that this is something which our two Govts should have in mind during the consultations with interested parties and that it is at least possible such a conference might be convened at a suitable time if results of consultations with Arabs and Jews indicate that a conference would be helpful. For the moment I do not feel able to give you a more definite reply on this point.

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867N.01/5-2046 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman* 43

**TOP SECRET**

**URGENT**

**LONDON, 19 [18] May 1946—6 p. m.**

[Received May 18—11 p. m.]

Personal and Top Secret. I am most grateful to you for your telegram of May 17th [16] and much appreciate your readiness to meet our views in regard to timing of the approach to the Arabs and Jews and also in regard to the time limit to be allowed for these consultations. We also have been considering the form which our consultations with Arabs and Jews should take.

On the Jewish side we propose to consult only the Jewish Agency, in view of the special position conferred on it by article 4 of the Mandate as the accredited representative of Jewry in matters relating to the Jewish National Home. On the Arab side we shall consult the Arab Higher Committee and the States of Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan and the Yemen.

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*Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by the White House on May 20.*
We are proposing that the following communication shall be handed by His Majesty's Representatives to the governments of the states above mentioned and by the High Commissioner to the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency on May 20th.

"In a statement made in Parliament on the 13th November, 1945, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs announced the intention of His Majesty's Government to consult all parties concerned before reaching a decision on any recommendations which might be made to them by the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry regarding the problems of European Jewry and Palestine. In pursuance of this undertaking, His Majesty's Government will be glad to be furnished with the views of . . . . on each of the 10 recommendations put forward by the Committee. They will further be grateful if these views may be communicated to them not later than the 20th June, 1946 ends."

I am in entire agreement with your suggestions regarding the discussions between our officials and will let you have shortly our idea as to the subjects which should form the basis of these discussions.

I am glad you think that the idea of a conference is one which is worth consideration and hope that procedure above described may eventually make it desirable.

867N.01/5-1946: Circular telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers 44

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 19, 1946—8 a.m.

US URGENT NIACT

On May 20 you should address communication to Govt to which you are accredited enclosing text of memo which is being transmitted in Dept's immediately following telegram as well as copy of report of Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry with appendices. Memo is that referred to in Dept's circular May 16 45 and is also being sent together with copy of report to interested groups in this country. British representatives in your area will probably receive instructions from their Govt also to ascertain views of Arabs and Jews and you should offer to associate yourself with them in approach. Cairo will approach Arab League and Govt of Yemen as well as Egyptian Govt and Jerusalem will approach Arab Higher Committee, Jewish Agency and Govt of Trans-Jordan. Dept plans make public in near

44 At Beirut, Cairo, Baghdad, Jidda, and Jerusalem. The circular telegram was also repeated to London with the following addition: "Memo mentioned is same as contained in Dept's 4136 of May 19, noon." For No. 4136, see infra.

45 Not printed.
future fact that views of Arabs and Jews have been requested and will release text of memo.

Beirut inform Damascus.
Repeated London for information only.

ACHESON

867X.01/5-1946: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman)

SECRET Washington, May 19, 1946—noon.

US URGENT

1346. For your info following is text of memorandum regarding Palestine which is mentioned in our no. 4074 of May 16, of which Brit Emb was handed copy for transmission to London:

"In inviting comments and suggestions on report of Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, Govt of US desires to make the following observations:

1. Report is advisory in character, consequently, its recommendations are not binding. However, US Govt is giving careful consideration to report in view of standing of members of Committee, of fact that report was unanimously approved by them and of fact that they were entirely free to arrive at any conclusions which to them seem fair and reasonable. US Govt will also give careful consideration to views of Govts and organizations which it is now consulting. Judging from preliminary reactions to report in various quarters, criticism is to be expected. In view of importance of this problem and sincere desire of US to arrive at a policy with regard to Palestine which will be both humane and just, this Govt greatly hopes that general character and trend of observations and suggestions may, so far as possible, be of a constructive nature.

2. By means of participation of American citizens in work of Committee, and through present consultation, Govt of US is seeking info and assistance looking to formulation of its policy on several difficult and complex problems. It readily recognizes that other Govts and organizations will have their own respective attitudes in regard to these questions which may or may not be similar to attitude which shall be adopted by US. US Govt is grateful for cooperation and help which have already been accorded to Committee of Inquiry and

46 For text of the Department's announcement on May 21 that "the Government of the United States, in conjunction with the British Government, has taken steps to initiate the consultations with Jewish and Arab leaders regarding Palestine to which both Governments have been committed", see Department of State Bulletin, June 2, 1946, p. 956. The text of the Department's letter of May 20 seeking the views of various American organizations with a particular interest in Palestine is printed ibid.

47 The memorandum here quoted was approved by President Truman on May 18, and sent as a circular telegram to Beirut, Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, and Jerusalem on May 19, 9 a.m.

48 See footnote 42, p. 607.
hopes that assistance and collaboration will continue to be forthcoming as these matters develop. US Govt, for its part, will be prepared at all times to reciprocate to best of its ability many courtesies which have been afforded to its citizens and representatives by interested Govts and groups.

3. The interest of US in questions considered in report is believed to be legitimate and is based upon following:

(a) Compassion for and a desire to assist victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution, both Jews and non-Jews.

(b) The fact that for a number of years American citizens have been contributing substantial assistance to upbuilding of Jewish National Home in Palestine, and that there is every reason to expect that their interest will continue.

(c) The deep interest which the American Government and its citizens have in maintaining and promoting mutually beneficial and harmonious relations between US and countries of NE in political field, in education and other cultural activities, in trade, and in economic development.

(d) The value placed by US upon contributions which NE countries have made and will doubtless continue to make to the cause of world peace and prosperity and to upbuilding and effectiveness of international organization created for these purposes.

4. This Govt will be glad to receive comments and suggestions regarding report as a whole or any part of it, and would be grateful if these could be received, at latest, 30 days from today."

Acheson

867N.01/5-2446 : Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman)
CONFIDENTIAL
WASHINGTON, May 24, 1946—4 p. m.

4262. We spoke to Brit Embassy May 21 re reports circulating in Near East as reported specifically by Legations Beirut and Jidda alleging that Brit representatives in area were informing Arabs that American members of Palestine Committee had exerted pressure on Brit members to obtain their agreement to certain recommendations more favorable to Jews than Arabs. We pointed out that regardless of fact that Committee’s deliberations were in camera with no record kept it would appear most regrettable if such activities on part of Brit Govt officials should occur at time when the two Govts were seeking earnestly to follow a common policy with regard to the Committee’s report.

Brit Embassy agreed forward matter London for investigation.
Sent London. Rptd Beirut, Jidda, Cairo, Jerusalem, Baghdad.

Byrnes
Personal and Top Secret. In your message of the 17th [16th] May, you asked me to give you some indication of the subjects which, in the opinion of this Government, should form the basis of discussion between our expert officials. The following list enumerates the various matters on which decisions would be required before the report could be implemented and I think that a full and frank exchange of views between our officials on all these matters would be of great value to both our Governments.\textsuperscript{51}

Recommendation No. 1.

(a) The further efforts to be made by the two Governments in association with other Governments to find new homes for displaced persons generally.

(b) The finding of new homes for Jewish displaced persons outside Palestine.

(c) The steps that might be taken to secure that practical effect is given in Europe to the provision of the United Nations Charter calling for the “Universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language and religion”.

Recommendation No. 2.

(a) The cost of

(1) Transporting;

(2) Temporarily accommodating and maintaining and,

(3) Permanently housing the 100,000 Jewish immigrants proposed for admission to Palestine.

(b) The provision of transport.

(c) The supply of materials for housing.

(d) The capital assets necessary to enable productive work to be found for the immigrants.

(e) The financing of this immigration.

(f) The rate at which 100,000 immigrants could be absorbed into the economy of Palestine without creating widespread unemployment.

(g) The method of selection of immigrants.

\textsuperscript{50} Sent to Secretary Byrnes by the British Minister (Balfour) on May 27, with the request that the Department forward the message to President Truman. This was done by Mr. Byrnes in a memorandum the following day.

\textsuperscript{51} In a memorandum of May 27, 1946, to Mr. Acheson, Mr. Henderson described the list of subjects as “very comprehensive and well thought out”. (867N.01/5-2746)
Recommendation No. 3.

(a) The measure of self government, in the near future, consistent with the three principles laid down by the committee in this recommendation.

(b) The possibility of devising a workable constitution in which, in accordance with the committee's suggestion, a numerical majority would not be decisive.

Recommendation No. 4.

(a) The nature of the administering authority to be defined in the trusteeship agreement for Palestine—a single state, two or more states, or direct administration by the United Nations.

(b) The states to be regarded as "directly concerned" for the purpose of article 79 of the Charter.

(c) The prospect of negotiating a trusteeship agreement for Palestine on the basis of the report with whatever group of states may be recognised to be "directly concerned".

Recommendation No. 5.

(a) The measures necessary to bridge the gap now existing between Jewish and Arab standards of living.

(b) The cost of these measures.

(c) The advisability of encouraging the formation by the Arabs of a communal organisation similar to that already established by the Jews.

Recommendation No. 6.

(a) The possibility of defining more precisely than is done by the committee in the comment upon this recommendation the principles which should be observed in regulating future immigration into Palestine.

(b) The prevention of illegal immigration.

(c) The form in which the Jewish Agency should be required to cooperate in such prevention.

Recommendation No. 7.

(a) If the Land Transfers Regulations of 1940 were rescinded, the nature of the legislation required to provide adequate protection for small owners and tenant cultivators.

(b) The measures necessary to ensure that too large a proportion of the land does not become unalienable through acquisition by one or other community.

(c) The prevention of illegal land seizures.

Recommendation No. 8.

(a) The methods to be adopted in the examination, discussion and execution of plans for large scale development in Palestine.
(b) The chances of obtaining the willing cooperation of adjacent Arab states in the execution of such projects.

(c) The possibility of combining Jewish finance with Government responsibility and control.

(d) The difficulties inherent in the legislation required to secure for the Government power to regulate the use of underground water and determine rights to surface water.

(e) The consequences of omitting from the trusteeship agreement any provision of the kind contained in article 18 of the Mandate.

**Recommendation No. 9.**

(a) The cost of introducing compulsory primary education in Palestine.

(b) The period within which primary education could be made universal.

(c) The cost of increasing facilities for secondary, technical and university education for the Arab population.

(d) The measures necessary to increase the control exercised by the government over the Jewish educational system.

**Recommendation No. 10**

(a) The preparations necessary for suppressing Arab or Jewish attempts to prevent by force the execution of the report.

(b) The suppression of terrorism and the liquidation of private armies.

(c) The form in which the Jewish Agency should be required to cooperate in such suppression and liquidation.

**General questions arising from the report.**

(a) The probable reaction of the two communities in Palestine to the adoption of the report.

(b) The repercussions in the Middle East generally of the adoption in Palestine of a policy based upon the report.

(c) The additional military commitments which would follow from a decision to adopt such a policy and the sources from which these commitments would be met.

(d) The incidence of the finance for the additional expenditure, capital and recurrent, required by the adoption of such a policy.

(e) The effect of such a policy on British and American interests in the Middle East.

(f) In view of the difficulties which may be foreseen in negotiating a trusteeship agreement for Palestine and of the fact that trusteeship system is not yet operating, the possibility of referring the problem of Palestine to the United Nations organisation in advance of the preparation of a trusteeship agreement.
(g) If the problem is referred to the United Nations by a third party, the attitude of the United Kingdom and United States Governments.

2. I suggest that the discussions might conveniently be initiated about a week before the date on which we expect to receive the replies of the Arabs and Jews to the reference made to them on May 20th. This would enable the ground to be surveyed in advance. I hope with you that the consultations now in progress may serve to clarify the questions under discussion.

867N.01/5-2746: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

JERUSALEM, May 27, 1946—6 p.m.
[Received 9:32 p.m.]

170. In reply to request for comments and suggestions on Anglo-American Committee report (reDeptl May 19, 9 a.m.52). Arab Higher Committee “reject it completely”. They say Arabs of Palestine are “sole people to decide on their fate and they reject any foreign intervention in their country”. They summarize their demands as (1) abolition of mandate, cessation of Jewish immigration and of land sales; (2) establishment of Arab democratic govt and (3) removal of foreign troops. Full text by air mail.

PINKERTON

867N.01/5-2846: Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JIDDA, May 28, 1946—6 p.m.
[Received May 28—12:15 p.m.]

165. 1. In audience today Amir Faisal handed me sealed personal letter from King Abdul Aziz to President Truman 53 for me to carry and deliver earliest possible.

2. Amir Faisal said

“You will understand that no action can possibly be taken by Saudi Govt on projects of cooperation such as TWA proposals or Treaty of Commerce and Friendship 54 so long as we are in doubt about the intentions of your Govt toward us. It would be useless to discuss specific lines of cooperation so long as the atmosphere is clouded by

52 See footnote 47, p. 610.
53 Copy not available.
54 For previous documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. viii, pp. 1082 ff.
grave distrust of the basic USA policy in the Middle East. I personally still hope that your Govt will not sacrifice the good will and the considerable investment of the American people in the Middle East in favor of Zionism. Surely the mutual best interests in this area of 140,000,000 Americans and of 45,000,000 Arabs will prevail against the special pleading of almost 5,000,000 Jewish lobbyists. It is precisely America’s total interest in the Middle East that would be sacrificed.

3. If I, one of the few Arabians who know and love America, am disillusioned, imagine the state of mind of my fellow countrymen who do not know the USA. Yet as matters now stand, I would not wish to return to the USA where the friendship for which I worked there, as you have worked here, appears to be held in contempt.

4. The last communication from your Govt, the alleged ‘consultation’, brought the worst injury to date. It petulantly asks for quick and constructive comment on a problem which is much more our concern than America’s, and it was followed by an announcement of an immigration policy for Palestine which renders the pretense at prior consultation a mockery. The Arab nations will shortly determine a Palestine policy for themselves.9

Sent Dept as 165; repeated Cairo as 73; Jerusalem 4; Beirut 3; Baghdad 5.

EDDY

867N.015/5-2946: Telegram
The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

BEIRUT, May 29, 1946—5 p.m.
[Received May 29—4:45 p.m.]

251. ReDeptel 215, May 22.55

1. In brief conversations with Lebanese President May 25 and Syrian Prime Minister May 27 regarding Palestine problem I gathered clearly that neither favored reference to UN Secretariat.

In general I gather that any recourse to UNO is disfavored by majority nationalist leaders on alleged ground that fair interpretation of charter principles ‘could not be expected in view obvious pro-Zionist sentiment in highest American and British official circles, as result shameless Zionist special pleading and political pressures and because experience at San Francisco and London showed tendency of many smaller countries’ representatives to vote in line with British and American lobbying directives (sic).

One very good Arab source sums up current Arab tactical objectives in arranging current meetings of chiefs of state and Arab League Council as follows:

It is hoped thereby to persuade British and American Governments that if they adopt policy designed to implement Anglo-American

55 Not printed; but see footnote 35, p. 600.
Committee’s recommendations they will incur deep-seated enmity of Arab world with subsequent serious damage to their position and interests therein.

Same source added that later Arab objective may become recognition of right of Arab states to be considered “states directly concerned” if Great Britain proceeds to drafting of trusteeship agreement to replace mandate under article 79 of United Nations Charter. A corollary would be insistence that question of 100,000 Jews in British and American military zones camps be referred to ECOSOC and divorced from basic political consideration of Palestine problem.

2. There follows translation of body of note dated May 27 from Syrian Foreign Ministry in reply to Legation’s memorandum of May 20 (reDepeçirtel May 16 46).

a. “The Syrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs presents its compliments [to the Legation of the United States and has the honor to refer] to the Legation’s memorandum dated May 20, 1946 regarding the desire of the United States Government to learn the viewpoint of the Syrian Govt concerning the recommendations of the Anglo-American Inquiry Commission, the Syrian Government prefers to postpone giving its detailed viewpoint on each one of the recommendations until the exchange of viewpoints, forming of a common plan and discussion of the Palestine question by the Arab Governments is accomplished.

b. “Nevertheless, the Syrian Government cannot but express now and in a general way its deep surprise at the issue of such recommendations which resulted from a superficial and hasty study. From such an inadequate study the commission could not foretell the consequences of these recommendations which are as a whole an injustice to the rights of the Arabs, a threat to their existence, and a menace to peace and order in this part of the world.

c. “The Syrian Government while expressing its disapproval of these recommendations, which contradict the right and aspirations of the Arab nation as a whole and Palestine in particular, fully trusts the United States Government will not rely on these recommendations in determining its Palestine policy.”

3. [Here follows report on press comment in Syria and Lebanon.] Paraphrases to Arab capitals.

WADSWORTH

867N.01/6–546: Telegram

President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Atlee) 57

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1946—10 a.m.

US URGENT

Thank you for sending the list of the subjects which your Govt

56 Not printed.
57 Sent to London as Department’s telegram 4482, with the instruction: “President requests you deliver following message to PriMin Attlee in reply to latter’s telegram regarding Palestine received through Brit Emb on May 27.”
would like to have discussed by the experts of the two Govts in connection with the Palestine report. Our feeling is that the matter is one which will require a rather extensive exchange of views and we have certain plans for the setting up of a special group to handle this and related questions arising out of the report. We are proceeding to organize this group as quickly as we can and in the meantime we have turned your list over to the various experts in the State and War Depts with the request that they give it their immediate attention.

We are hopeful that members of the group of experts will be able to proceed to London as soon as possible as suggested by Mr. Bevin. As we doubt however that our plans will be sufficiently advanced for our side to begin the discussions on the report as a whole at the time you suggest, namely one week prior to June 20, we are planning to send to London by that time one or more experts to discuss the urgent physical problems arising out of the transfer to Palestine of the 100,000 Jews mentioned in the report.

While it will take considerable time to find satisfactory answers to all the problems which you have listed, we feel it would be highly desirable that we begin immediately consideration of the question of the 100,000 Jews whose situation continues to cause great concern. I can assure you now that we shall take responsibility for transporting these persons as far as Palestine and shall lend necessary assistance in the matter of their temporary housing. We shall be glad to consider also providing certain longer term assistance for them. This last matter, however, should be reserved for the more general conversations.

We understand, of course, that until after June 20 it will not be possible for our two Govts to make any definite decisions with regard to any of the points contained in the report. We are anxious however in view of the urgency of the problem of the 100,000 Jews to initiate the discussions between the two Govts on the physical problems directly connected with their transfer as soon as possible.

867N.01/6-746

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)


In accordance with your request, there are given below our views regarding the proposal of Mr. Robert Nathan to amend the Export-

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28 In memorandum of May 18 from the British Embassy, not printed.
Import Bank Act for the purpose of financing Jewish settlement and general economic development in Palestine.  

1. The proposed amendment rests on certain assumptions, namely: that restrictions upon Jewish immigration into Palestine and land purchase will be removed; and that 100,000 Jewish displaced persons in Europe will be permitted to enter Palestine at once. These assumptions may turn out to be correct, or they may not. At all events, this question of finance, though important in itself, is only one of a considerable number of important questions relating to Palestine which should be considered and weighed together by the Cabinet Committee which is being organized. That Committee is, or soon will be, the proper body to determine, in consultation with the British, etc., the financial needs of Palestine and the extent to which and the manner in which the United States Government should assist. Enactment of this legislation at this time would jump the gun.

2. From the point of view of our relations with the Arab world, this legislation would have an extremely bad effect because of the recognition of the Jewish Agency as "an appropriate borrower" under the Act. The Jewish Agency, in theory, acts as the representative before the Government of Palestine of all Jews, Zionist and non-Zionist. It is so recognized under the Mandate, and, as Mr. Nathan points out, is authorized to develop the country's natural resources under supervision of the Government. In fact, however, it is a Zionist-dominated organization and is regarded by the Arabs as the principal agency by which the Zionists are moving to achieve economic and political domination of Palestine. The Arabs would, therefore, regard such a provision as clinching evidence that the United States Government will back Zionist political aspirations in Palestine by its overwhelming economic and financial power. Moreover, the Arabs would jump to the conclusion, however unwarranted, that since no Arab borrowing agency is mentioned, they would receive no benefit, or that their benefits would be controlled by this Jewish organization. It is precisely because of the extreme care with which proposals of this sort must be considered, that the Cabinet Committee is being formed.

3. The Export-Import Bank is perfectly capable of deciding what organization or organizations are acceptable as borrowers. Its judgment in such a matter should not, as a matter of principle, be restricted in any way.

In conclusion, we would suggest that, if possible, Mr. Nathan's proposal be turned over to the Cabinet Committee, when formed, for appropriate consideration. If an immediate decision is required, you might wish to inform Mr. Nathan orally that work on the report of

— See memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, April 16, p. 583.
the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry will have to reach a somewhat more advanced stage before the Department will be able to take a position on legislation of this type.

867N.01/6-746

The British Minister (Balfour) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1946.

Dear Loy: Gordon Merriam *60 recently drew Michael Tandy’s *61 attention informally to statements alleged to have been made to the Syrian Government and to Saudi Arabian citizens by British officials in Syria and Saudi Arabia, of which you had learned in reports from the United States Legations at Beirut and Jeddah.

These alleged statements, you will remember, were to the effect that the British members of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry had yielded to the pressure of their American colleagues (and specifically to an ultimatum that non-compliance would prejudice passage of the British loan) before acquiescing in proposals favourable to further Jewish immigration into Palestine. It was also learned that American Civil Aviation interests in the Near East believe themselves to have been placed at a commercial disadvantage with competitive British interests by these alleged statements.

His Majesty’s Minister at Beirut *62 gives a categorical denial to the charge that such statements have been made by British officials within his jurisdiction and further points out that, when the Pan-American Airways mission to Syria paid its second visit to Damascus on the 2nd May, the Anglo-American Committee’s report had only just been published. Moreover the mission had left Syria before the press campaign against the report had fully developed. Shone is, however, aware that suspicions of this kind are unfortunately entertained in local American circles. He cites a specific charge voiced by a member of the American community in Beirut that the British Press Office is responsible for whatever anti-American tone the Arabic press may on occasions display. The charge is quite unfounded and, as you probably know, His Majesty’s Legation at Beirut have been in communication with the United States Legation upon the point.

It would at the same time be idle to deny that Arab public opinion is inclined to lay a large measure of responsibility for the Committee’s recommendations upon its American members, in view of the known

*60 Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.
*61 Presumably A. H. Tandy, First Secretary of the British Embassy.
*62 Sir Terence A. Shone.
sympathy and influence commanded by Jewish interests in the United States. The Arab press is, however, little, if any, less bitter against His Majesty’s Government, among other counts, for having invited the cooperation of the United States in the solution of the Palestine question!

With regard to the charges in respect of Saudi Arabia, His Majesty’s Minister at Jeddah reports that there is an insistent conviction in Arab circles of American pressure, both inside and outside the Committee of Enquiry, which it is quite impossible to remove by argument. He further suggests the possibility that Saudi Arabians, voicing this assumption in conversation with members of the United States Legation, may have invented local British support for it, in the hope both of strengthening their story and of embarrassing British officials. He is in any event positive that no such statements have been made by any responsible member of his staff.

As you have no doubt been informed, the London Times recently reported that the British Cabinet had had an opportunity of learning from the British members of the Anglo-American Committee the factors which influenced the production of a unanimous report. Grafftey-Smith points out that to many Arabs a plain statement of this kind inevitably suggests, however unjustifiably, the thesis of American pressure. He concludes by saying that, if the accusation were true, it would argue a complete lack of moral courage and individual conscience in the British members of the Committee. Consequent damage to British prestige in the Arab world would so clearly outweigh any temporary commercial advantage that it is difficult to believe that British officials would circulate such allegations.

Mr. Bevin, who has learned of these charges with some concern, wishes the State Department to be assured that he fully shares their desire that no encouragement should be given either to Arabs or Jews in any efforts they may make to drive a wedge between the United States Government and His Majesty’s Government on the Palestine issue. He regrets that the United States Ministers in Beirut and Jeddah do not appear to have approached their British colleagues before reporting to Washington and asks me informally to recommend this procedure, should subsequent difficulties of this nature arise.

Please feel free to use this letter as you think fit. I wonder whether, for example, you think advantage should be taken of Colonel Eddy’s visit to Washington to ascertain more precise details, such as the names of the members of the British Legation staff alleged to have made the statements, as well as those of the Saudi Arabian nationals to whom

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63 Laurence B. Grafftey-Smith.
the alleged statements were made. If so, Tandy or I are entirely at your disposal for further discussion."

Yours sincerely,

J ohn Balfour

867N.01/6-746: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton)

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1946.

198. At Press Conference June 6 correspondent stated it is understood that US and Brit are committed to consult Arab and Jewish interests before determining any permanent long-range policy for Palestine and asked President why cannot US insist on immediate admission of 100,000 Jews as recommended by the Anglo-American Committee without regard to such long-term consultations. President replied that we had made such a recommendation to Great Britain but there were certain details and obstacles which would have to be overcome such as housing, road building and other things. President added that the Foreign Ministers were now working on it.

Correspondent asked President if what he said meant that Great Britain has agreed that 100,000 Jews should be allowed to enter Palestine. President said that it did not and that he had made a statement on what we would like to do in order to settle the matter. He added that we and Great Britain were trying to come to a conclusion on it.

Sent Jerusalem, repeated Cairo, Baghdad, Jidda, Beirut, Damascus and London.

Byrnes

Memorandum by the Acting State Department Member of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (Matthews) to the Secretary of the Committee (Moseley)

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1946.

The British Government has proposed, in connection with the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, that experts of the British and American Governments should meet as soon as possible to discuss certain implications arising out of the Committee's

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"4 In a memorandum of June 17, Richard H. Sanger of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs noted:

"In commenting on Mr. Balfour's letter to Mr. Henderson of June 7, Colonel Eddy told me that every British official who has recently talked to him in the Middle East has said officially that the British have been forced into their present stand on Palestine through the actions of the United States.

"Yusef Yassin also told Colonel Eddy that the British in Saudi Arabia have informed him that they would have taken a more pro-Arab stand in regard to Palestine if it had not been for United States pressure." (867N.01/6-746)
recommendations. A list of the topics on which the British Government desires the views of this Government is attached ⁶⁵ (Appendix A) and it will be observed that several of these questions are of particular interest to the War and Navy Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This is particularly true in the case of the points raised with respect to Committee recommendations numbers 4 and 10 as well as certain general questions raised by the British regarding the report as a whole (see page 3 of Appendix A). Copies of the Committee's report have already been furnished the Secretariat.

In order that representatives of this Government may be prepared to discuss fully the various issues with the British experts, it is requested that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War and Navy Departments be obtained with respect to the particular items referred to above as well as any other issues arising from the report.

As the possibility of this Government's sharing with the British Government in a future trusteeship for Palestine under the United Nations has been mentioned in various quarters and may be formally proposed by the British Government, it would also be appreciated if the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War and Navy Departments would indicate their views as to whether from a long range standpoint, having regard to this country's national interests, to our position in the United Nations, and to our interest in the security of the Middle East as of other areas it would be advantageous for this Government to undertake a joint trusteeship with Great Britain for Palestine.

It is further requested this inquiry be treated as a matter of high priority in view of the proposal of the British Government that discussions regarding this entire question begin not later than June 13.

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

867N.01/6-1146: Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Atlee) to President Truman⁶⁶

TOP SECRET 

LONDON, June 10, 1946.

Top Secret and Personal. Thank you for your telegram.⁶⁷ I am very glad to hear that you will be able to send a group of officials to discuss the problem with our officials here.

2. You will, of course, understand that His Majesty's Government will not feel able to determine their policy on any one of the Committee's recommendations until they have examined the results of the

⁶⁵ See undated telegram from the British Prime Minister to President Truman, p. 612.
⁶⁶ Copy transmitted to the Department by the British Embassy on June 11. The substance of the message had been furnished to the Department the previous day, however; see footnote 68, p. 624.
⁶⁷ Of June 5, p. 617.
official consultations on the Report as a whole. As regards the admission of 100,000 immigrants for example, it is necessary to consider not only the physical problems involved but also the political reactions and possible military consequences. These in turn may be found to depend to some extent on the conclusions reached in respect of the Committee's other recommendations.

3. In the circumstances we consider that it is preferable that the discussions should begin with the full groups on both sides and doubt whether any useful purpose would be served by the sending of an advance party.

867N.01/6-1046 : Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman) 68

SECRET
WASHINGTON, June 10, 1946—7 p. m.
US URGENT

4600. For Amb Harriman. On May 27 we received through Brit Emb a message from PriMin Attlee to President listing various problems raised as result of report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry which Attlee suggested should be the subject of discussions between the experts of two Govts. Attlee also suggested that these discussions might conveniently be initiated about June 13. In our telegram to you, 4482 of June 5, 69 President asked you to inform PriMin that we doubted that our plans would be sufficiently advanced to enable us to begin discussions on whole report by June 13 but that we were planning to send to London by that date one or more experts to discuss the urgent physical problems arising out of transfer of 100,000 Jews.

President is setting up a Cabinet Committee on Palestine and Related Problems 70 under chairmanship of SecState composed of Secretaries of State, War and Treasury. The members of this

68 The drafting of this telegram was completed on June 10, presumably before the Department knew of Mr. Attlee's message, supra. At 5:10 p. m., June 10, by which time Mr. Henderson had been apprised of the message, he sent a memorandum to the Secretary of State which said in part: "We feel that regardless of this message from Attlee, the experts whom we have assembled should go on to London as planned and endeavor to assist the Embassy in carrying on at least preliminary talks with the British officials. If they don't go we may be bogged down for several weeks and a delay of this kind would be unfortunate at this time." (867N.01/6-1046)

69 See footnote 57, p. 617.

70 This was done under Executive Order 9735, June 11; for text of order and statement made the same day by President Truman, see Department of State Bulletin, June 28, 1946, p. 1080. Mr. Henderson had sent to Mr. Acheson on May 23 a draft outline of the composition and functions of what was then described as an "Inter-Departmental Commission on Palestine" (867N.01/5-2346).
Committee are to appoint alternates who will organize a group to assist in early consideration of recommendations of Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry and of views which may be submitted as a result of the consultations thereon and in the determination of the steps to be taken by this Govt in regard to Palestine and related problems.

In view of the urgency of the problems of the displaced Jews in Europe it has been decided that without waiting for organization of this group to be completed conversations should begin at once in London with purpose of examining physical problems which would be involved in transfer to Palestine of 100,000 Jews. These discussions with Brit are to be of a purely exploratory nature as it is not possible for two Govts to reach any definite decisions in this matter until after June 20, the date by which the comments of Arabs and Jews with regard to the report as a whole should be received.

It would be appreciated if you would undertake these discussions with the assistance of a group of experts who are planning to depart by air from Washington for London on June 12. They will bring with them written instructions regarding their mission. No publicity is being given to purpose of this mission although departure of group will undoubtedly become known. Group will comprise Evan Wilson, Assistant Chief of NE, L. W. Cramer, Office of Assistant Secretary Hilldring, and probably three army officers who are being designated by War Dept. War Dept has advised ComGenUSFET and ComGenUSFA of Mission and has suggested their holding suitable officers available for participation in London discussions. If you agree this would be desirable please immediately inform the Commands direct.

It is intended that members of preliminary group will remain in London only so long as they are needed to assist Emb in carrying on discussions pending arrival in London of representatives of President's Cabinet Committee. We would like in particular for Wilson to return to Washington to assist in connection with general work of Cabinet Committee just as soon as you feel he can be spared.

Please immediately inform FonOff of foregoing and provide all appropriate assistance to preliminary group such as secretarial help, office space, etc. Dept cannot stress too highly importance of this mission and feel certain Emb will cooperate to fullest extent possible.

Byrnes

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72 In a memorandum of June 18, 1946, to Mr. Acheson, Mr. Henderson stated: “More generally speaking, we believe that the Department ought to yield place to the Cabinet Committee in regard to the Palestine question and not to take any action regarding it except at the Committee's direction or with its concurrence.” Mr. Acheson noted his agreement in a marginal notation. (867X.00/6-1846)
[In an address to the Labor Party Conference at Bournemouth on June 12, 1946, British Foreign Secretary Bevin stated that he would have to place another division of British troops in Palestine if 100,000 Jews were placed there tomorrow and that he was not prepared to do so. Moreover, he stated, the Chancellor of the Exchequer would be unable to carry the tremendous financial burden involved.]

867N.01/6-1446

President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Attlee)\textsuperscript{72}

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 14, 1946—4 p. m.

US URGENT

In reply to your telegram of June 10 concerning the Palestine talks, I of course agree that it will not be possible for our two Governments to reach any definitive decisions regarding any of the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee until after June 20. I also am appreciative of the considerations which will undoubtedly impel your Government to give the most careful consideration to determining its future action regarding all of the Committee's recommendations including that pertaining to the 100,000 Jews.

Nevertheless, I consider that our two Governments should without delay endeavor to make detailed plans for the transfer of the 100,000 Jews to Palestine. These plans would thus be ready for use when definite decisions are made. I feel moreover that considerable time would be saved, when the two Governments discuss all of the various matters relating to the report, if such plans had already been devised. It is for this reason that we are instructing our Ambassador in London, Mr. Harriman, to initiate preliminary conversations at once with representatives of your Government relative to these technical and physical problems. He will be assisted by a group of representatives of the State and War Departments who are proceeding to London this week.

We are organizing as rapidly as possible the group which is to go to London to discuss the report in more detail. Meanwhile, however, I hope that your Government will agree to begin now the exploratory conversations relative to the purely technical issues involved in the transfer to Palestine of the 100,000 Jewish displaced persons, whose situation requires such urgent attention.

\textsuperscript{72} Sent to London as Department's telegram 4722, with the instruction: "Following message is for delivery to Premier Attlee from President."
The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman

TOP SECRET

[LONDON,] 14 June, 1946.

Personal and Top Secret. I am glad to be able to tell you that a delegation of British officials has now been constituted for the purpose of discussing the Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry with the United States officials whom you are sending to London. The Delegation is composed of Representatives of the Foreign Office, Colonial Office, Treasury and the Services. Its Chairman is Sir Norman Brook, additional Secretary to the Cabinet.

This Delegation will make contact immediately with the advance party expected tomorrow from Washington, with a view to preparing the ground for their discussions with the Representatives of your Cabinet Committee. I should like, however, to draw your attention again to the decision of His Majesty’s Government, to which I referred in my telegram of June 10th, that we cannot determine our policy on any one of the Committee’s recommendations until we have examined the results of the official consultations on the Report as a whole. More particularly, we cannot contemplate accepting the proposal to admit large numbers of Jews to Palestine without very careful consideration of the effects which such a decision, when announced, would have in the light of the other proposals we were making at the same time. Tension is mounting in Palestine and we are satisfied that precipitate action on the immigration question alone would provoke widespread violence. I am sure you will appreciate that His Majesty’s Government cannot take this risk.

867X.01/6–1746: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

JERUSALEM, June 17, 1946—10 a. m.

[Received 12:07 p. m.]

198. Summary Jewish Agency’s reply to request for comments on Anglo-American Committee report is as follows:

1. Views regarding and reasons for Jewish state “remain valid and unaltered”.

73 Copy transmitted to Mr. Acheson by the British Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel, on June 15.
2. Urge immediate implementation recommendation for admission 100,000 Jewish victims of persecution and cancelation discriminatory land transfer laws. They hope Governments will cooperate in vast transport and resettlement involved.

3. Hesitation and delay in implementing above positive recommendations has given rise serious misgivings and such delay is considered indefensible with Jews still confined DP camps and their position generally in Europe deteriorating.

4. After implementation in good faith of recommendations that first 100,000 Jews be enabled reach Palestine immediately, Jewish Agency is prepared to discuss with Governments US and UK any matters arising out of Committee recommendations.

Full text by airmail.

PINKERTON

867M.01/6-1946: Telegram

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

BEIRUT, June 19, 1946—11 a.m.

[Received 8:20 p.m.]

292. Following are synopses of:

(1) Reply \(^{14}\) to our memorandum of May 20; and

(2) Comment on Palestine Committee’s 10 recommendations, (reLegtel 290, June 17 \(^{15}\)).

1. League is glad United States Government recognized recommendations as advisory only, considers Committee possessed neither legality nor permanency, believes some members lacked impartiality, nevertheless facilitated enquiry because of cherished friendly relations with peace-loving United States endangered by clamorous American Jewry seeking American support for Jewish state.

Interference by these American Jews in violation rights of Palestine Arabs and consequent investment Jewish-American funds for political objective merit censor [censure]\(^{16}\) rather than favor of United States Government. Resulting Palestine question was not created by Nazi persecutions but by earlier mistaken British policy based on Balfour Declaration.\(^{17}\) Palestine offers no solution to Jewish problem. Support of Zionism is persecution of Palestine Arabs. In confusion of two questions justice is lost.

Had United States attempted solve racial persecution on world-wide humanitarian basis, Arabs would have gladly lent support.

\(^{14}\) By the League of Arab States.

\(^{15}\) Not printed; it reported that Secretary-General Azzam had handed to Mr. Wadsworth on June 15 a note transmitting the League’s reply (890B.00/6-1746).

\(^{16}\) For text of letter concerning a Jewish national home in Palestine written by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Arthur James Balfour, to Lord Walter Rothschild on November 2, 1917, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iv, p. 752, footnote 14.
American material and moral aid have led Zionists to believe they can dictate their will in Palestine. To this end they have organized armed forces. While United States works for United Nations principles, clamorous American Zionists work to precipitate clash between Arab and American policies and interests.

If Zionist threat of force continues Arabs cannot stand supine. It is unlikely a clash could be localized. Mandatory power’s inability to disband Zionist army is already apparent. Surely United States does not support policy of might against right. Even worse, these developments and American support of Zionism is poisoning Arab thought and engendering hitherto unknown anti-Semitism. Had these energies and funds been directed elsewhere for solution of Jewish problem good fruit for all would have resulted.

We share sincerely American Government’s desire that firm good political, economic and cultural relations continue despite efforts of political Zionists and hope avoid necessity defend existence of Palestine Arabs.

We are sending British Government, now responsible for administration of Palestine, detailed comment on Committee’s biased recommendations. It should know that neither Zionist forces nor its own can free it from former pledges or basic policy of 1939 White Paper.

Finally, knowing Committee Enquiry does not constitute consultations promised by United States Government, we stress that this reply should likewise not be so construed. True consultation requires better opportunity for exchange of views and understanding. We recall Roosevelt letter of April 5, 1945 to Ibn Saud. 77

2. Partiality towards Zionist case has been shown by some members of Committee. Clearly too some came to carry out already formulated policy, such as recommendation that 100,000 immigrants be accepted this year, no more no less, same figure proposed by President Truman. In general, recommendations do not follow logically from fact finding.

Hurried enquiry precluded penetration to basic facts of Palestine situation. Due consideration was not given rights of rising Arab nationalism or of Arab League to speak for regional interests. Recommendations contravene interests of every Arab nation.

Committee was influenced by sentimental tides and failed give practical consideration to problems inherent in its recommendations. Those based on economic projects are impossible because contingent upon cooperation between Arabs and Zionists. Recommended immigration ignores legal and natural Arab rights. On fundamentals Committee’s apparent desire to impose particular policy by force cannot be reconciled with principles of democracy and United Nations.

First recommendation strangely reports hopelessness of finding homes for Jews except in Palestine when vast areas exist especially in

British Empire and United States. Transfer to Palestine can only mean sacrifice of Palestine on altar of Zionist political greed.

Second recommendation. Another strange contradiction is recognition that 100,000 would be heavy load on Palestine, that even without immigration population density of its settled area will rise in 14 years to 450 per square mile, and that Palestine is poor in resources and industrial possibilities.

Third recommendation. Principles here enunciated would impair government by majority and envisage unjust equalization of position, Arab rights being based on over thousand years settlement whereas Jews rely on weak historical association severed 2,000 years ago. This is contrary to practice and law of nations, discriminating against Palestine Arabs and depriving them of rights enjoyed in other Arab lands.

Fourth recommendation. To continue present government until hostility between Jew and Arab disappears would violate mandate itself. Jews seek majority and Jewish state; Arabs will never admit this Zionist dream, now encouraged by Committee's views on immigration.

Fifth recommendation. Palestine Arab living standard is not inferior to those in Egypt, Syria or Lebanon where no conflict exists with prosperous Jewish communities. Basis of conflict in Palestine is forced establishment of Jews of heterogeneous cultures; additional reason is mandatory budgeting of 5 per centums for education, health and social services against 30 per centums for security and officials.

Sixth recommendation. Continued immigration would ignore Arab rights; already percentage Arab population has been reduced to 69 from 87 in 1922. White Paper voiced decisive conviction that immigration had already injured position and rights of Arabs.

Seventh recommendation. Committee ignored fact that several earlier British attempts along lines now recommended resulted in complete failure; also that 1940 land transfer regulations were result studied British effort to afford Arabs just protection.

Eighth recommendation. Suggests projects requiring cooperation of neighboring Arab states, whereas no Arab state would further any project furthering Zionist expansion, a danger to themselves as well. No project for Palestine development can be considered unless guarantee be given that Arab character of Palestine will be maintained.

Ninth recommendation. Re education is reasonable, but so long as mandate and present policy continue sufficient funds cannot be envisaged. This is additional reason for Palestine independence.

Tenth recommendation. Whereas British treated Arabs with utmost severity when they rose to defend natural rights, Jewish aggression meets patience and tolerance and Jews are not disarmed. Arab Higher Committee was suppressed without due proofs, whereas
Jewish Agency is unmolested although refusing cooperation in restoration of order and companion of terrorists. To put Arab and Jews on same level in this regard falsifies situation.

(Paraphrases to Arab capitals).

WADSWORTH

867N.01/6–1946: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman) to President Truman

TOP SECRET

LONDON, June 19, 1946—8 p.m.

[Received June 19—2:49 p.m.]

6109. Personal and Top Secret for the President and the Acting Secretary. Repeated to AmEmbassy Paris Top Secret and Personal for the Secretary. The Prime Minister asked me to call late this afternoon to inform me that the British Government was much concerned over the terrorist developments in Palestine. He said that the military in Palestine had so far acted with great restraint although there had been certain British soldiers killed. They were now concerned, however, over reports of plots to kidnap and hold as hostages British officers and plans to expand the terrorist activities. He expected to have a fuller report from Palestine tomorrow morning and then the Cabinet will meet to decide what action should be taken. He told me he would advise me of the decisions taken. In the meantime he asked that I inform you in the strictest confidence of his concern.

The Prime Minister said he thought it would be helpful if Mr. Grady and his associates could come to London as soon as possible.

I hope to be able to give you fuller information tomorrow.

HARRIMAN

867N.01/7–246

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 21 June 1946.

With regard to the request of 7 June 1946 by the Acting State member, State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee (Appendix), fol-

**Footnotes:**

78. Henry F. Grady, alternate for the Secretary of State on the Cabinet Committee on Palestine and Related Problems; for statement by Mr. Byrnes, released June 11, on Mr. Grady's appointment, see Department of State Bulletin, June 23, 1946, p. 1060. Goldthwaite H. Dorr and Herbert E. Gaston served as alternates for the Secretaries of War and Treasury, respectively.

79. Circulated within the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee on June 21 as SWNC 311. The Committee agreed, on June 27, to transmit the JCS paper to the Department of State. In telegram 3142, June 26, 1946, from Paris (DelSec 324), the Secretary directed Mr. Acheson to “make certain that the President sees the JCS paper on Palestine”. Mr. Acheson responded in telegram 3129, June 27, 1946 (Secdel 300), that he had handed the paper to the President. (740.00119 Council/0–2646)
ollowing are comments by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on certain topics proposed by the British for joint consideration in connection with the recommendations of the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine. It will be noted that no definitive recommendations are offered on many of the difficult political aspects of this problem, on which the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not feel they should advise.

We urge that no U.S. armed forces be involved in carrying out the Committee's recommendations. We recommend that in implementing the report, the guiding principle be that no action should be taken which will cause repercussions in Palestine which are beyond the capabilities of British troops to control.

Should the question of using any U.S. forces arise, we would point out that, under present War and Navy Department commitments to the Congress, only very limited forces could be spared from tasks in which we are already engaged. Such contingents might in theory be of a size to contribute to pacifying the situation in Palestine, but we believe that the political shock attending the reappearance of U.S. armed forces in the Middle East would unnecessarily risk such serious disturbances throughout the area as to dwarf any local Palestine difficulties. Such a condition would, among other effects, invalidate entirely any current estimates of required strengths of the Army and Navy. Further, the Middle East could well fall into anarchy and become a breeding ground for world war.

It is believed that implementation of the report by force would prejudice British and U.S. interests in much of the Middle East and that British and U.S. influence would consequently be curtailed except as it might be maintained by military force. The USSR might replace the United States and Britain in influence and power through the Middle East.

As to the importance of a stable Middle East, friendly to the Western Powers, it is obvious that this area is the buffer between Russia and the British Mediterranean life line. If the peoples of the Middle East turn to Russia, this would have the same impact in many respects as would military conquest on this area by the Soviets. Under these conditions, even if Turkey maintains her internal and political integrity, it is highly questionable that she could continue her stand on the Dardanelles and maintain her position as other than a satellite Russian state. Also, for very serious consideration from a military

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* A limited number of copies of this report was circulated to the State, War and Navy Departments with SWN-4393 dated 7 June 1946. [Footnote in the original.]

** For documentation on the question of the Turkish Straits, see pp. 801 ff.
point of view is control of the oil of the Middle East. This is probably the one large undeveloped reserve in a world which may come to the limits of its oil resources within this generation without having developed any substitute. A great part of our military strength, as well as our standard of living, is based on oil.

As to U.S. participation in a Palestine trusteeship, we consider that military advice must rest on our supposition that such participation would lead to military involvement, on which subject our views are stated above.

In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that in implementing the report of the Anglo-American Committee, no action be taken which would:

a. Commit U.S. armed forces, or
b. Orient the peoples of the Middle East away from the Western Powers, as the U.S. has a vital security interest in that area.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A. J. McFarland
Colonel, U.S. Army
Secretary

867N.01/6-2146: Telegram

The Chargé in Lebanon (Kuniholm) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

BEIRUT, June 21, 1946—noon.
[Received 10:40 p.m.]

296. Lebanese Foreign Office yesterday gave me:

(1) Reply to our memorandum of May 20;
(2) Copy of Lebanese reply to British note of same date;
(3) Copy of the comment furnished British Government on recommendations of Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry;
(4) Copy of note inviting British Government to begin immediate negotiations with all Arab Governments for an accord to settle Palestine problem in conformity with objectives and principles of United Nations.

Lebanese action conformed closely to procedure forecast by Arab League Secretary General Azzam (reference Legation's telegram 290, June 17) and argument was in harmony with reply and comment of Arab League (reference Legation's telegram 292, June 19).

Lebanese position, expressed more emphatically to British than to U.S., was denial of right of United States to take any unilateral action on Palestine outside framework of United Nations, and insistence that

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81 For documentation on this subject, see pp. 18 ff.
82 Not printed, but see footnote 75, p. 628.
the only juridically interested parties were Arab states themselves and
Great Britain as mandatory power; these parties by negotiation should
reach agreement on Palestine to be submitted to General Assembly of
UN. Both competence and authority of Palestine Commission was
rejected.

[Here follows summary of the four Lebanese documents.]
Copies of all four notes were forwarded to Department this morn-
ing by air pouch and paraphrases to Arab capitals.

KUNTHOLD

867N.01/6-2146: Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

CAIRO, June 21, 1946—7 p. m.
[Received June 22—8:36 a. m.]

1108. Legation received this morning note dated yesterday from
Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs reply to Legation’s note No.
128 of June 1 transmitting portent of Dept’s circuit May 19 and reply-
ing that Egyptian Govt had studied Anglo-American Committee’s
report in conjunction with states of Arab League and transmitting
note containing its observations and recommendations together with
translation of memo addressed to US Govt by Secretary General
Arab League. Memo from Egyptian Govt contains five general
observations followed by specific comment on each of Committee’s
recommendations:

(1) After Committee was appointed partiality of portion of Com-
mittee towards Zionism was revealed, others were known Partisans of
Zionism before nomination.

(2) Committee or certain of its members were designated to ratify
a policy established in advance its recommendation of 100,000 Jews
coinciding with number recommended by Truman proves absence of
logical link between truths which Committee admitted and its
recommendations.

(3) Committee by its haste failed to get to bottom of essential ques-
tions. It did not give these questions sufficient attention: Arab Na-
tionalism and its right to life and development; Arab League and its
right to organize relations between members and to safeguard regional
interests.

(4) Recommendations not practical; based on sentiment not study
of economic, military and administrative problems emanating from
recommendations. Economic project based on unrealizable collabora-
tion. Immigration was recommended before effect on life of Arabs
and their legitimate rights was ascertained.

(5) Committee contradicted itself paticularly on principles as
when it pretended to hold to principles of democracy and of UN Char-
ter at same time it imposes its determined policy on people deserving
democratic life and right of decision on their own political fate.
[Here follow specific Egyptian comments on each of the Committee's recommendations, a statement that it was a manifest impossibility to reconcile the claims of Arabs and Jews, and a discussion of the Arab League's reply to the Committee report.]

TUCK

[The comments of the Iraqi Government on the Committee's recommendations were transmitted by Baghdad in telegrams 347, June 20, 1946, and 354, June 21; those of Abdullah, King of Trans-Jordan, were sent in Jerusalem's telegram 201, June 19. In general, they paralleled the comments made by other Arab sources. (867N.01/6-2046, /6-2146, /6-1946) In telegram 356, June 21, Baghdad reported an official statement by the Iraqi Government that the Arab states would regard acceptance of the recommendations as an unfriendly act, that the Arab League reserved full freedom of action to resist aggression and that full responsibility for the troubles which would take place in Palestine and other Arab lands would rest on those who upheld and carried out the Committee's report (867N.01/6-2146).]

867N.01/6-2546: Telegram

The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Clark) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

JIDDA, June 25, 1946—11 a. m.

[Received 8: 45 p. m.]

196. From Childs. Azzam Pasha informed me upon his return from Bludan to Cairo 22nd, members of Arab League had decided unanimously to open negotiations with British Government as mandatory power for Palestine re-determination its future status. Collective note in this sense was addressed by League to British Government.

83 J. Rives Childs, the Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia.

84 An extraordinary meeting of the Arab League Council convened at Bludan, Syria, from June 8 to 12, 1946. The question of Palestine was the chief matter discussed. Of the decisions made public, the following were the most significant: the formation of a Palestine Committee of the Arab League and of a supreme Arab Committee in Palestine; a call for the demobilization and disarmament of the Zionists in Palestine; and the formation of a special fund for Palestine to which all Arab Governments would contribute (despatch 448, June 19, 1946, from Damascus, filed under 800B.00/6-1946).

Secret decisions were also made at Bludan. The latter provided that if the American and British Governments accepted the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry and attempted to put them into execution, the Arab countries would defend themselves by not giving them any new concessions; by not supporting their special interests in any educational institution; by a moral boycott; by considering cancellation of any concession in the Arab world; and by complaining to the United Nations and to the Security Council of the United Nations. The secret decisions were transmitted from Beirut in despatch No. 188, October 16, 1947, by Lowell C. Pinkerton, who at that time was Minister to Lebanon. He noted that he "had no reason to doubt that the veil of secrecy has been removed from the Bludan Secret Decisions." (890B.00/10-1647)
on June 15 and Arab states, members of United Nations, had addressed individual notes on same subject.

Action was taken by those states as ones "directly concerned" under article 79 of UN Charter. If no agreement could be reached with British Government before September meeting of Assembly for joint Anglo-Arab submittal of agreed-upon project to that body the Arab states would at once submit proposals separately. Those states were prepared to accept British trusteeship for Palestine over period of 10 years if assurance obtainable of Palestine independence at end of period. Azzam expected and hoped reference of Palestine problem to United Nations to be welcomed by both American and British Governments as it would place problem where it belonged, not as exclusive concern of two powers but of all members of United Nations. Arab states fully prepared to accept their share burden helping solve humanitarian question displaced Jews but they see no reason why Palestine, an Arab country, should be called on to bear it in its entirety.

Above submitted in view its importance, notwithstanding it may have been received from other sources.

Sent Department as 196, repeated Beirut, Baghdad, Cairo, Jerusalem, Damascus, London. [Childs.]

CLARK

867N.01/6-2646 : Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman. 85

TOP SECRET LONDON, June 25, 1946—9:30 p. m.
URGENT [Received June 26—1:20 p. m.]

Personal and Top Secret. The American and British officials who are making a combined study of the implications of the Anglo-American Committee’s second recommendation, proposing the early immigration of 100,000 Jews into Palestine, are now within sight of the end of their work. I understand that it should be possible for the American experts to leave London for Washington before the end of this week.

I know you share my anxiety that discussion of the other nine recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee’s report should be put in hand at once. The Jews and Arabs have now replied to our request for their comments and we must expect increasing pressure for a decision on the report as a whole. The local situation in Palestine is difficult and is not made easier to handle by the uncertainty about the attitude of our two Governments to the report.

85 Copy transmitted to the Department by the White House on June 26.
I therefore suggest that the second phase of the conversations between officials should begin during the week ending 6th July. The British delegation will be ready at any time after the beginning of that week to welcome Mr. Grady and his colleagues.

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867N.01/6-2646: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Childs)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 26, 1946—7 p. m.

173. In your discretion you are authorized to speak to King or Foreign Minister, when you present your credentials, along following lines.

King’s letter was taken directly to President Truman by Colonel Eddy day he arrived in Washington. President has studied letter carefully and will reply soon.

We of course regret that Saudi Arabian Govt was disappointed in report of Joint Committee of Inquiry on Palestine. We sincerely hope that SAG will give full consideration and weight to all sections of report, which we feel was an honest effort to reach balanced and equitable conclusions.

Recommendation that 100,000 Jewish refugees be admitted to Palestine is a humanitarian proposal for relief of displaced persons and, in Committee’s view, would not be a step toward a Jewish state. The Committee believed that 100,000 could be settled in Palestine without prejudice to the rights of Arabs now living there. It is further believed that admission of this number, when taken into account with other recommendations contained in report, would not constitute a change in basic situation.

At all events, overall policy of this Govt with respect to these questions has not been determined as yet and they are being given most careful examination and thought by recently constituted Cabinet Committee, which has duty of making policy recommendations to President.

It may be useful to recall that in course of its short history, US has received (between 1820 and 1938) more than 38 million immigrants, large numbers of whom might be classed as refugees, and that during the recent World War this country has received 250,000 refugees.

ACHESON

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The communication cited in telegram 165, May 28, from Jidda, p. 615.
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

US URGENT

London, June 27, 1946—7 p. m.
[Received June 27—3:21 p. m.]

6342. For Merriam from Wilson. Final meeting this afternoon approved report prepared by Drafting Committee summarizing results of our conversations. 87

Preface of report states terms of reference of group and points out discussions were limited to physical and economic problems involved in recommendation 2 with no account taken of political and military repercussions or connection with other recommendations of Anglo-American Committee.

Body of report contains discussion of principal problems involved under headings of target, illegal immigration, method of selection, infiltration and measures whereby it might be checked, priority groups, issue of certificates by Jewish Agency under specific directive, transportation, reception in Palestine, rate of movement, cost of moving and absorbing the 100,000, provision of materials and supplies and general financial effect. Text of outline plan for operation is then given. Annexes give statistics regarding displaced Jews, rules governing issuance of certificates, and discussion of rate at which immigrants could be absorbed in Palestine. Latter annex comprises:

1. Statement of views of British Delegate;
2. Jewish Agency memorandum submitted by US and
3. report of Subcommittee comparing the two.

Among principal points made in report are that final decision on maximum rate could not in any event be taken without regard to political considerations connected with conditions in Europe and Palestine beyond scope of present discussions, that rates taken as basis for calculations in report are 4,000 and 10,000 monthly (with exception of transportation estimates which include higher hypothetical rates), but

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87 The exploratory conversations on the physical problems involved in the transfer of 100,000 Jews to Palestine began at London on June 17. On June 21, Sir Norman Brook requested Ambassador Harriman to transmit the request of the British Government that a representative of the United States Chiefs of Staff be sent to London to hear the views of the British Chiefs of Staff on overall Middle East strategic questions as they related to Palestine (867N.-01/6-2246). In telegram 466, June 23, 1946, from Paris to London, the Secretary of State expressed the view "that any military discussions between the British and US on the specific subject of Palestine are most undesirable at this time and that nothing should be done now which might be construed as indicating a US interest in the possibility of US military involvement in Palestine." (867N.-01/6-2346). Mr. Byrnes was attending the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers which was held at Paris from June 15 to July 12, 1946.
that nothing in report is intended to preclude either Govt from pressing for higher or lower figure. On cost of absorption, point is made that little difference exists between estimates of Agency and British Delegates when former are made to conform with latter’s assumptions, that British Delegates do not consider cost of operation to be less than 100 million pounds from public or private sources, but that Agency has informed President Truman that even if requested assistance should not be forthcoming, they are prepared to bear entire cost as they estimate it. With regard to paper just submitted by British Delegates on general financial effect of admission of 100,000 and resultant expenditures in behalf of Arab population which British Govt would consider necessary, point is made that report of Anglo-American Committee is intended to be read as a whole and that start of movement of 100,000 should be accompanied by initiation of proposals of committee for improvement of Arab standards. Agreed defer this paper for later consideration.

Meeting discussed possible announcement to be made to press and matter will be considered further tomorrow.**

As authorized by Dept Cramer is departing tomorrow morning for USFET for one day conference prior to returning to Washington. Dougherty, Billingsley, Lewis and I are scheduled to leave tomorrow afternoon by American Airlines flight 21 for Washington. [Wilson] Harriman

867N.01/6-2946: Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman**

TOP SECRET [LONDON, undated.]

Top Secret and Personal. Prime Minister to President of the United States. In view of the continuance of terrorist activity in Palestine culminating in the recent kidnapping of six British officers, His Majesty’s Government have come to the conclusion that drastic action can no longer be postponed. The High Commissioner has accordingly been authorised to take such steps as he thinks necessary to break up illegal organisations, including the arrest of any individ-

**According to telegram 6371, June 28, 1946, from London, a statement was issued by the British Foreign Office on June 28 with the approval of Ambassador Harriman. It stated that “Certain technical problems arising from recommendation No. 2 of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry have been examined with a view of preparing the ground for further discussions with the group of US officials representing the President’s Cabinet Committee on Palestine and Related Problems which is expected to arrive in London shortly.” (867N.01/6-2846)

**Delivered to the White House on the night of June 28; copy transmitted to Mr. Acheson by Lord Inverchapel in a letter of June 29.
uals against whom there is clear evidence that they are responsible for the present campaign of violence. The authority does not extend to any comprehensive disarming of the whole civil population at this stage.

I understand that the High Commissioner intends to take action early on the morning of Saturday, June 29th. It is proposed to raid the Jewish Agency and to occupy it for a period necessary to search for incriminating documents. At the same time, members of the Agency considered implicated directly or indirectly in Hagana outrages will be arrested. Similar action will be taken in the case of headquarters of illegal organisations.

I regret that such action should have become necessary while we are engaged in discussing the report of the Anglo-American Committee; but we could not resist the conclusion that we could no longer, without abdication of our responsibility as the Mandatory Government, tolerate such open defiance and that, while discussions regarding the future of Palestine are proceeding, law and order must be maintained. We shall make it clear that our action is not merely made necessary by the recent outrages by the Jews but is also a first step towards restoring those conditions of order without which no progress can be made towards a solution of the long term problem. Our action will be directed, not only against the maintenance of existing private armies or similar illegal organisations, but also against their future creation by either community.

You will remember that the Anglo-American Committee called upon the Jewish Agency to resume active cooperation with the Mandatory Government in suppressing these illegalities. I need not add how much we should welcome any statement you may feel able to make indicating your support of our determination to bring to an end the violence and terrorism in the Holy Land.

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90 Telegram 211, June 29, 10 a.m., from Jerusalem, reported that at an early hour of the morning, British military forces temporarily occupied the premises of the Jewish Agency and various buildings in Tel Aviv and searched several widely separated Jewish colonies in what was described as an "exceptionally large operation". It also noted the High Commissioner's statement that the "sole aim of present operations is suppression of violence rather than reprisals and that action taken against Agency was based upon evidence of its part in organization, direction and cooperation with terrorist groups." (867N.01/6-2946)

91 In a telegram of June 29, 1946, to President Truman, Ambassador Harriman stated: "The Prime Minister has sent me this morning for my personal information, a copy of the telegram which he had sent you earlier informing you of the action the British Government has taken regarding the terrorist activity in Palestine. If you do not wish to reply direct, is there any aspect of this situation which you would wish me to discuss informally with Mr. Attlee?" (867N.01/6-2946).

Mr. Truman responded as follows: "There does not appear to be any aspect of the Palestine situation that you should discuss informally with Attlee at the present time." (Department's telegram 5149, July 2, to London, 867N.01/7-246)
SECRET

JIDDA, July 1, 1946—5 p. m.
[Received 8:20 p. m.]

207. Department's 173, June 26. Following presentation letter of credence Prince Faisal offered customary dinner to staff and leading members American community and I had opportunity to inform him that reply to King's letter might be expected soon, that overall Palestine policy not yet determined but being considered by Cabinet Committee.

In long discussion which followed, and which full report being made by despatch, Viceroy 92 expressed considerable gratification that no final decision reached and expressed most earnest hope that decision would be a just one which would not prejudice the greatly valued friendship of the US by Saudi Arabia. He added Palestine question was matter of life and death to Arabs who viewed Zionist aspirations Palestine as having ultimate end of swallowing up Arab world. His statements were temperate but firm. He reiterated that Saudi Arabia and Arab world were placing great store in sense of justice of US.

In this initial talk with mouthpiece of King, I am convinced that unless we proceed with utmost circumspection in considering all phases of possible repercussions of Palestine question, we may raise difficulties for ourselves in this most strategic area of vital national interest which will plague US constantly in years to come and render abortive purposes to which we have subscribed in Charter of UN.

Sent Dept as 207, repeated Cairo as 90, Beirut as 8, Baghdad as 8, Jerusalem as 8, Damascus as 3.

CHILDLS

President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Attlee) 93

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1946—8 p. m.

Personal and Top Secret. I share the feeling expressed in your message of 26 [25] June 1946 that the American Cabinet Committee on Palestine and the British delegation should initiate their discussions as soon as possible. The Committee has made arrangements to depart for London by air on July 13. It is now studying the problem and awaiting the return of the American experts who have been discussing in London the technical aspects of the early immigration of 100,000 Jews into Palestine.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

92 Prince Faisal was Viceroy of the Hejaz.
93 Sent to London as Department's telegram 5126.
President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Attlee) \(^{94}\)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 2, 1946—7 p. m.

US URGENT

Replying to your message of June 28,\(^{55}\) I join with you in regretting that drastic action is considered necessary by the mandatory government while discussions of the report of the Anglo-American Committee are in progress. I also join with you in a hope that law and order will be maintained by the inhabitants of Palestine while efforts are being made toward a solution of the long term policy.

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Press Release Issued by the White House, July 2, 1946

The President conferred today with the following American members of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine: Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, Dr. Nahum Goldmann, Mr. Louis Lipsky and Rabbi Abba H. Silver.

The representatives of the Jewish Agency gave the President their views of recent events in Palestine.

The President expressed his regret at these developments in Palestine. He informed the representatives of the Jewish Agency that the Government of the United States had not been consulted on these measures prior to their adoption by the British Government. He expressed the hope that the leaders of the Jewish community in Palestine would soon be released and that the situation would soon return to normal.

The President added further that it was his determination that these most recent events should mean no delay in pushing forward with a policy of transferring 100,000 Jewish immigrants to Palestine with all dispatch, in accordance with the statement he made upon the receipt of the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The President indicated that the Government of the United States was prepared to assume technical and financial responsibility for the transportation of these immigrants from Europe to Palestine.

He expressed his thanks for the workmanlike suggestions embodied in the letter which the American members of the Jewish Agency Executive sent him on June 14 with respect to the technical and finan-

\(^{94}\) Sent to London as Department's telegram 5150, with the instruction: "Kindly transmit following message from the President to PriMin."

\(^{55}\) See undated telegram, p. 639.
cial problems involved in the transfer and resettlement of the 100,000 immigrants.

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867N.01/7-448: Telegram

**The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman**

**TOP SECRET**

London, July 4, 1946—10:40 a.m.
[Received 1:55 p.m.]

Personal and Top Secret. I note from your telegram of 2nd [1st] July that the representatives of your Cabinet Committee plan to leave for London on 13th July to begin the second stage of the discussions on the Palestine report.

I am increasingly concerned about the timetable of these discussions in relation to our parliamentary situation here. I have promised that the House of Commons shall have an opportunity to debate the Palestine problem before Parliament rises for the summer recess on 2nd August. Parliamentary interest in this question is so keen that I could not deny facilities for this debate. But you will realize that in such a debate I shall be placed in an embarrassing position if no further progress has been made towards an agreement between our two Governments on at least the main recommendations of the report. It would certainly be very difficult to conduct such a debate in Parliament here while the discussions between officials of the two Governments were still proceeding in London.

I am also concerned about the effect in Palestine of delaying much longer a decision on the important issues dealt with in the report.

We have also to take into account the notification from the Arab states that, unless some arrangement satisfactory to them has been reached meanwhile, they will bring this matter forward at the meeting of the Assembly of the United Nations in September.

For all these reasons it has become a matter of the greatest urgency that the officials' discussion should begin at the earliest practical moment and be conducted with the utmost speed. I should have wished myself to set 20th July as a target date for the completion of their work. But if they do not begin until the 15th July I do not imagine that they can finish by the 20th. This moves me to ask yet again whether it would not be possible for them to leave Washington earlier. Every day gained is of value and I should still like to see these talks start as early as possible in the week beginning 8 July.

Thank you also for your further telegram of July 2 and for what you say therein. Best wishes.

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95 Copy transmitted to the Acting Secretary of State by the White House on July 4.

97 In telegram 3296, July 5, 2 p.m., the Secretary of State, at Paris, requested "that this matter should be hurried up as much as possible." (867N.01/7-546)
President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Attlee)\textsuperscript{88}

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1946—9 p. m.

Personal. I fully appreciate the problems brought out in your message of July 4, and in compliance with your wishes we are arranging that our committee and their staff of 12 depart by air from Washington on Wednesday evening July 10. If there are no delays en route they should be in London ready to start discussions on Friday next.

I would appreciate it very much if you could talk personally with Ambassador Grady and Mr. Dorr upon their arrival.

I join you in the hope we can reach an agreement on the main recommendations of the report by the target date you mention.

Harry Truman

\textsuperscript{88} Sent to London as Department's telegram 5213.

The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman\textsuperscript{99}

TOP SECRET

[LONDON,] 8 July, 1946.

Personal and Top Secret. Many thanks for your telegram of July 6th [5th] and for action you have taken to expedite the departure of your committee and their staff. We shall all here be ready for discussions to begin on Friday next.

I shall be delighted to see Ambassador Grady and Mr. Dorr upon their arrival and have asked Averell\textsuperscript{1} to let me know immediately they arrive.

\textsuperscript{99} Copy transmitted to Mr. Acheson by Lord Inverchapel on July 9.

\textsuperscript{1} Ambassador Harriman.

Memorandum on Matters Regarding Palestine To Be Considered Before the London Conference\textsuperscript{2}

1. Is U.S. willing to employ military forces? No

2. Is U.S. willing to act as Trustee or Co-Trustee in Palestine? No

3. Is U.S. willing to support Anglo-American Committee report as a whole, including "No Jewish, no Arab State"? Yes

\textsuperscript{2} Marginal notation: "Top page approved by President Truman in interview with Grady, July 9 '46'. The authorship of the memorandum is not indicated but it was prepared, presumably, in the Cabinet Committee on Palestine. Attached to it is an undated "Memorandum of Board of Alternates to Cabinet Committee as to certain matters to be discussed with the British in London", not printed.
4. Is President willing to ask Congress to admit say 50,000 non quota victims of Nazi persecution?  
5. Is President willing to ask the appropriate lending agencies (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Export-Import Bank) for substantial funds for development of Middle-Eastern countries, including Palestine?  
6. Is President willing as part of the immediate 100,000 program to support admission of Palestine to the International Bank and a loan of up to $200,000,000 for sound projects, or failing this a loan of $50,000,000–$100,000,000 by Export-Import Bank for such projects?  
7. Is President willing as part of 100,000 program* to ask Congress for grant-in-aid to Palestine of $25,000,000 up to $50,000,000 for aid in improving conditions of the people of Palestine on the assumption that the British government will make a like grant?  
8. Is President willing to end preferential displaced persons care for future infiltrates in Europe?  
9. Should any future announcements of our policy contain some emphasis on our interest in the Palestine situation as part of our larger interest in the peoples of the Middle East, their regained political equality and their economic development, and of our understanding at any rate of their points of view?  

President Truman to the King of Saudi Arabia  
(Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud) *  

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1946.  
YOUR MAJESTY: It was a great pleasure to me to receive Your Majesty’s letter of May 24, 1946 containing your preliminary views regarding the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine, which was brought to me by my good friend and former Minister to Your Majesty’s Government, Colonel William A. Eddy, the day he arrived in Washington, and I wish to assure Your Majesty that it will be a very real help to me to have the benefit of Your Majesty’s considered views on this most difficult question.  

*Note: Total cost of 100,000 program estimated at $450,000,000 (exclusive of costs of transportation which the U.S. will bear) of which Jewish sources estimate they can make $250,000,000 available. [Footnote in the original.]  
* Sent to the Legation in Jidda in instruction No. 1, July 13, 1946, for transmission to King Ibn Saud.  
* The communication cited in telegram 165, May 28, from Jidda, p. 615.
I am deeply gratified by the close and friendly relations which have always existed between our two Governments and between Americans and Saudi Arabs generally. Although the questions under discussion between us are not without difficulty, I sincerely trust that these relationships will remain cordial and strong in the future.

I was very pleased that Your Majesty recognized the humanitarian principles which have motivated this Government in its approach to the Palestine problem. American interest in this question is of long standing and has been accentuated by the dire and urgent needs of victims of Nazi persecution. I am very conscious of the deep significance which all Arabs attach to Palestine and I particularly welcomed the visit to Riyadh of a sub-committee of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The report of that Committee reflects the complexity of the situation in Palestine. Its unanimous recommendations made after careful and dispassionate study I feel sure you will agree call for careful consideration by all.

I am sincere in my belief that the admission to Palestine of 100,000 Jewish refugees this year would neither prejudice the rights and privileges of the Arabs now in Palestine, nor constitute a change in the basic situation. I am convinced that Palestine can absorb 100,000 additional residents through its existing economy without interfering with the present inhabitants.

I have appointed a Committee of three members of my Cabinet to ensure careful consideration of the report on our part and to advise me. To that end they will engage in discussions with the British Government. I am hopeful that the situation will be further clarified by consultations with the Arabs and the Jews and that we can remain in close touch with the interested parties on these questions.

With my sincere wishes for the continued health and happiness of Your Majesty and for the prosperity of your people, I have the honor to remain your very good friend.

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

867N.01/7-1946: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

LONDON, July 19, 1946—6 p.m.

[Received July 19—2:53 p.m.]

6851. Personal for Secretary from Grady. Since our arrival in London \(^6\) we have been in constant meetings with representatives of

\(\text{\footnotesize\(^6\) The Cabinet Committee on Palestine arrived in London at noon, July 12, and conferred with the British Prime Minister early the same afternoon (867N.-01/7-1546).}\)
the British Cabinet and have explored numerous possible solutions to the Palestine problem.

Our thinking is now along the lines of provincial autonomy under which plan Palestine would be divided into two partially self-governing Arab and Jewish provinces with an overall Central Govt. Jerusalem and the Hegeb [Negev?] would remain under the direct jurisdiction of the mandatory. (This plan seems to offer the only means now apparent of moving the 100,000 into Palestine in the near future. It is strongly backed by the British Govt.)

The British have indicated no desire for our military aid or participation in a trusteeship. Present financial plans are well within the program outlined by us to the Cabinet Committee.

The British plan to invite the Jews and Arabs to London for consultations on a suggested settlement as soon as it is accepted by the British and American Govts. They presently expect to implement the plan under the mandate pending submission of a trusteeship agreement but if the proposed solution is not accepted by the Jews and Arabs the British indicate an intent to bring the matter before the United Nations. In any event it is expected that a report will be made to UN.

The plan as presented by the British is almost a verbatim copy of the plan for provincial autonomy submitted anonymously to the Anglo-American Committee in January by Sir Douglas Harris of the Colonial Office. Some changes in the plan are now under discussion. Copies of the plan without maps are in Anglo-American Committee files in care of Porter or Hurowitz.

I hope to be able to cable you the substance of a proposed agreement and an indication of the boundaries in the next few days. [Grady]

HARRIMAN

807N.01/7-2046: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, July 20, 1946—5 p. m.
[Received 10:30 p. m.]

2235. Heretofore, USSR has contrived to remain on fence regarding Palestine problem. It permitted and covertly encouraged its mouthpieces abroad to criticize Zionism. But inside USSR line was to play no favorites, commiserate with both Jews and Arabs, and denounce Anglo-American perfidy.

First clear indication of USSR sliding over to Arab side of fence appeared in lecture given by Victor D. Lutski. Lectures of this type are of course not private expressions of individual scholars but officially approved statements of Soviet point of view.
Main points of Lutski lecture were: (1) Anglo-American interest in Palestine is dictated by oil and military considerations; (2) Zionism is tool of imperialists and does not serve interests of Jewish masses; (3) "Large majority of Palestine's population consider it as Arab country and look upon Jews already living in country as citizens of future Arab independent democratic Palestine with full and equal rights."

[Here follow observations concerning the audience and a summary of the lecture and of the questions and answers.]

SecState pass to London as Moscow's 318 for Mr. Grady. Pass to Beirut; Beirut pouch to Jerusalem, Damascus, Baghdad, and Cairo.

Smith

867N.01/7–2246: Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Hooper) to the Secretary of State

URGENT

JERUSALEM, July 22, 1946.

[Received July 22—1:26 p.m.]

242. Between 12:20 p.m. and 12:40 p.m. today large party armed Jews disguised as Arabs attacked and destroyed with heavy explosives large part of Palestine Government Secretariat located in Annex King David Hotel. While casualties both killed and wounded are believed to be large, no official statement yet issued. Officer Administering Government Sir John Shaw and Acting Chief Secretary Gutch, Attorney General Gibson, are known to have escaped injury. Hotel suffered severe damage. Americans in hotel and vicinity escaped injury. Total curfew on Jerusalem and all exits. Official communiqué will be issued later today.

[Hooper]

867N.01/7–1946: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 22, 1946—7 p.m.

US URGENT

5541. Personal from Secretary for Grady. Appreciate info contained Embtel 6851, July 19. Do not have copy Harris plan which in customs with other Anglo-American Committee documents. Clearance may occupy some time. Please telegraph summary Harris plan with changes thus far envisaged and airmail complete copy.

Are we to understand from urtel Brit do not contemplate transferring 100,000 displaced Jews from Europe to Palestine until agreement covering whole future of Palestine along lines Harris plan has
been approved by both Jews and Arabs or, in case Jews and Arabs do not agree, by UN? If such is Brit attitude we are concerned lest transfer these Jews will be almost indefinitely delayed. It has been our hope that some kind of agreement might be reached between Brit and ourselves which would make it possible for transfer Jews begin near future.

Would also like to raise following questions: 1) Who would control immigration and land transfers under Harris plan, the autonomous provincial Govts or over-all central Govts 2) Does Harris plan contemplate partition Palestine into two partially self-governing Arab and Jewish provinces under a trusteeship plus certain areas under central Govt without any provision for termination trusteeship in manner which would result eventually in an independent Jewish state and an independent Arab state. If so, what would be advantage this plan over one which would result immediate partition with full independence resultant Arab and Jewish states, leaving Arabs and Jews work out their differences directly thus avoiding difficulties and misunderstandings which are likely result from third-party supervision 3) Have Brit definitely refused agree to adopt plan along lines recommended in principle by Anglo-American Committee which might be acceptable to moderate elements both groups and which would permit immediate transfer of 100,000 4) What are specific Brit objections plan of Govt worked out here which would contemplate unitary Palestine based on Arab Jewish cooperation commencing on lowest local territorial levels extending upwards through larger territorial units into Govt itself.

BYRNES

867N.01/7-2246 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

US URGENT

LONDON, July 22, 1946—7 p. m.

[Received July 22—5:13 p. m.]

6913. From Grady. Brook has just left with Ambassador Harriman and me the following draft of a reply to Arab note of June 19:

"His Majesty's Government drew attention, in the notes which they communicated to the states members of the Arab League on 20th of May, to their previous undertaking that they would consult all parties concerned before they reached a decision on the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry regarding the problems of European Jewry and Palestine. In accordance with this undertaking they readily accept the proposal made by the Government of X, in concert with the other Arab Governments, to enter into negotiations on the subject of Palestine.
“His Majesty’s Government have the honour to invite the Government of X to send a delegation to London for this purpose. They will communicate to the Government of X as soon as possible the date which they will propose for the opening of negotiations. This date will, if possible, be so arranged as to enable the conversations to take place before the session of the United Nations General Assembly which, as at present planned, will begin on the 23rd of Sept, 1946. It is the intention of His Majesty’s Government that other interested parties shall be similarly consulted at the same time.”

Foreign Office proposes to send this by Wednesday noon, London time, and would welcome any comments Dept may wish to make prior to that time. Foreign Office feels necessity of not delaying reply further because presence of Dr. Weizmann here seems to have created impression in Arab countries that British Government is beginning negotiations with him on settlement of Palestine question.

I am assuming that Dept does not wish our participation in these negotiations. British Government is willing to have us participate but has feeling that such participation on our part might be out of line with their mandatory responsibilities and lead to demands from other non-mandatory countries to participate also in negotiations. I concur in this view. However, the question of our participation in the negotiations with the Arabs and Jews is not one that requires immediate decision. [Grady.]

HARRIMAN

867N.01/7–2246: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Harriman)
SECRET
WASHINGTON, July 23, 1946—7 p. m.
US URGENT
5572. For Grady. Urteil 6913 July 22. We have no objection to Brit draft reply to Arab note of June 19. We are glad Brit not binding themselves to stop immigration into Palestine pending end of negotiations as requested by Syrian note to Brit copy of which furnished Dept in Emb despatch 827 June 25.6

We consider US commitment consult Arabs and Jews was discharged by our invitation May 20 for their views. However, we remain open for consultation by any and all interested parties whenever they desire.

We do not believe we should participate forthcoming negotiations between Brit, Jews and Arabs.

BYRNES

6 Not printed.
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, July 23, 1946.

5581. For Grady. The President today made following statement on Palestine "I have learned with deep regret of the destruction by a bomb of the building in Palestine in which were located the Palestine Government and the Brit military headquarters, resulting in the killing of approximately 50 men and women, soldiers and civilians. Every responsible Jewish leader, I am sure, will join me in condemning the wanton slaying of human beings. At this time representatives of the US Govt are in London conferring with representatives of the Brit Govt as to steps to be taken to implement the report of the Palestine Committee which recommended, among other things, the immigration of 100,000 Jews into Palestine. Such acts of terrorism will not advance, but on the contrary might well retard, the efforts that are being made, and will continue to be made, to bring about a peaceful solution of this difficult [problem]."

Sent London, repeated Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, Jerusalem, Cairo, Jidda.

BYRNES

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

US URGENT

[Received July 24—8:32 a.m.]

6952. From Grady. Secret and Personal. We are today cabling you complete text of agreement on joint recommendations to both Govts on Palestine and I believe it merits most expeditious consideration and acceptance. The British are anxious to proceed with it without delay in view of developments in Palestine and of the impossibility of allowing situation to continue as it is. British Cabinet is considering transmitting to Arabs and Jews and then making them public proposals contained our agreement as soon as approved by our Govt. They would of course consult you formally on this before action and would contemplate simultaneous publication here and Washington.

Questions raised in your No. 5541 of July 22, 7 p.m. are answered in proposed agreement. (Joint committee unanimous in conviction plan agreed to is only realistic solution at this time particularly if any extensive Jewish immigration is to be realized.) It leaves ample
room for progress toward federation if Arabs and Jews find they can live together in harmony but in present state of tension provides for their segregation which British officials with long experience in Palestine Govt believes essential. Proposed provincial boundaries give Jews best land in Palestine, practically all citrus and industry, most of the coast line and Haifa port. Jewish legitimate demands including large measure of control of immigration and opportunity to develop national home, have been met with exception of Jerusalem and Negev. Christian interests must be taken into full account in Jerusalem and Bethlehem, and disposition of Negev is remaining undetermined until its potentialities can be ascertained. I am not convinced that plan has been made so attractive to the Arabs but British are willing to negotiate with them on basis our agreement and as reported in my telegram No. 6913 of July 22 they want to convene appropriate representatives in London at earliest possible date. [Grady]

HARRIMAN

[In telegram 6956, July 24, 1946, 2 p.m., the Embassy in London transmitted a message from Mr. Grady to Mr. Henderson stating in part: “We have considered every phase of problem and see no practical alternatives to our recommendations. Moreover I seriously doubt under all circumstances that British would be willing to renegotiate on basis some alternatives. They have been most reasonable and completely cooperative.” (867N.01/7-2446)]

867N.01/7-2446 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET 

London, July 24, 1946—7 p.m.

US URGENT

[Received July 25—9:07 p.m.]

6970. From Grady. Secret and Personal to Secretary. Following is complete text of agreement reached unanimously with British Committee:

“1. The British and United States Delegations have now examined as a whole the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry and have arrived at a common viewpoint on the broad principles of a policy for carrying out these recommendations. The following summary of these general principles is submitted for consideration by the two Governments.

7 The Department files contain a version of the agreement printed (but not released) by the British Government entitled “Palestine: Statement of Policy”, dated July 26, 1946. The British version differs from the one in this telegram primarily in minor matters of punctuation, capitalization, and the like. Footnotes will indicate how the versions differ in a substantive sense. The agreement is known as the Grady-Morrison Plan, the Morrison Plan, or the Provincial Autonomy Plan.
Displaced Persons and the Position of European Jews

2. There are two aspects to this problem—(I) re-settlement in Europe and (II) emigration to countries outside Europe.

The Anglo-American Committee recognized that the overwhelming majority of displaced persons, including a considerable number of Jews, will continue to live in Europe. One of our objectives should, therefore, be to create conditions favourable to the re-settlement of a substantial number of displaced persons in Europe.

3. The only areas in Europe in which our two Governments can directly control these conditions are the British and United States zones of Germany and Austria.

In these areas, they are prepared to assist native Jews to resettle once more in German and Austrian communities. All available means are being used to eradicate anti-Semitism. Concentration camp survivors receive special treatment as to rations, financial assistance, housing and employment. Moreover, both American and British authorities are pressing for an early decision on plans, at present under quadripartite examination, for the restitution of property confiscated by the Nazis. We recommend that all further practicable steps should be taken to make possible the resettlement of displaced persons in those zones.

4. Italy and the four ex-enemy satellite states will be required by the peace treaties to secure to all persons under their jurisdiction human rights and the fundamental freedoms, and it may be hoped that this will promote in these countries conditions favourable to the re-settlement of displaced persons.

5. Elsewhere in Europe our two Governments must rely on action through the United Nations to give practical effect to the provisions on human rights in the Charter. They should support the establishment of a commission for human rights and, also such measures of implementation as the United Nations may adopt to ensure the protection of these rights to the fullest extent practicable. Through their support of the efforts of the United Nations to re-establish political and economic stability in Europe, our Governments will continue to contribute to the restoration of those basic conditions which will make possible the reintegration in Europe of a substantial number of displaced persons, including Jews.

6. Though substantial numbers of displaced persons may be resettled in Europe, new homes must be found elsewhere for many of those, including Jews, whose ties with their former communities have been irreparably broken. As the Anglo-American Committee pointed out, Palestine alone cannot provide for the emigration needs of all Jewish victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution. The two Governments should, therefore, proceed at once with measures designed to
aid the re-settlement elsewhere of other Jews and displaced persons. These will include the following:

(a) Continuing support, through the United Nations, for the establishment of the international refugee organization which will be capable of dealing effectively with the problem of refugees and displaced persons as a whole.

(b) Strong support for the appeal to be made at the forthcoming General Assembly of the United Nations calling on all member governments to receive in territories under their control a proportion of the displaced persons in Europe, including Jews. In doing so, it should be emphasised that the United Kingdom Government has already accepted a commitment to promote the re-settlement of about 235,000 Polish troops and civilians and their dependents.

In addition, a large proportion of the refugees admitted during the period of Nazi persecution have remained in the United Kingdom. Of these, approximately 70,000 are Jews. With respect to the United States, 275,000 refugees have been permanently resettled there, including 180,000 Jews. On resumption of the normal flow of immigration to the United States some 53,000 quota and non-quota immigrants from those European countries from which the displaced persons are drawn will be able to enter as permanent residents every year. It may be assumed that in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1947, the large majority of these immigrants will be Jews and other displaced persons. The President of the United States is prepared to seek the approval of Congress for special legislation for the entry into the United States of 50,000 displaced persons, including Jews.

(c) Simultaneous, though separate, approaches to the governments of the British Dominions, who should be informed of the action taken and proposed, and should be invited to support the appeal to member governments of the United Nations and to receive a number of displaced persons in territories under their control. Both governments, in their approach, would emphasise the weight of the influence which could be exerted by the example of action by the Dominions, the United Kingdom and the United States, in inducing other United Nations to correspondingly liberal action. The United Kingdom Government would further stress the relations between the settlement of displaced persons and the problem of Jewish immigration into Palestine. The United States Government would indicate that the arrangements it could undertake for an emergency quota would be favourably influenced if assurances had been given that a number of displaced persons would be re-settled in the British Commonwealth.

(d) Continued active support to the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees and, through it, to the re-settlement of as many refugees and displaced persons as practicable. Active consideration is already being given to a promising proposal for the transfer of displaced persons to Brazil. The number to be re-settled there is estimated at 200,000 or more. Similar proposals relating to other South American countries are also being explored.

7. We recommend that simultaneously with the announcement of the new policy for Palestine, our two Governments should make a statement on the lines indicated in paragraphs 2–6 above. Arab
opposition to the admission of 100,000 Jews to Palestine will be much stronger if this movement begins before any indication has been given that steps are being taken to promote the re-settlement of Jews and other displaced persons in Europe and to secure that other countries receive a share of those for whose emigration provision must be made.

8. We accept the principles laid down in recommendation 3 of the report of the Anglo-American Committee, that Palestine as a whole can be neither a Jewish nor an Arab state, that neither of the two communities in Palestine should dominate the other, and that the form of government should be such as to safeguard the interests in the Holy Land of the three great monotheistic religions. We recommend that any form of government adopted should be based on these principles. We also endorse the ultimate objective, set forth in the report, of securing self-government for the inhabitants.

The various alternatives to proceeding with the implementation of the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee have been considered. It is our view that some alteration in the present governmental situation in Palestine has to be made and made speedily. To attempt to continue the present situation would involve the imposition of a policy by the exertion of military force and against the resistance of either or both of the two peoples of Palestine.

In the present situation in Palestine the imposition of a system of government by external authority could only be avoided either (a) by the termination of the mandate and withdrawal of British troops, which would lead to such internecine warfare by the Jews and Arabs as to make such a course unthinkable, or (b) by agreement among the Jews and Arabs themselves, of which there seems to be no present prospect.

Since some degree of compulsion will probably have to be employed it should be employed in setting in motion a system of government based on recommendation 3. The degree of such compulsion may be minimized and perhaps even acquiescence secured by wise and practical implementation of that recommendation.

The crux of the governmental problem in Palestine is to find a constitutional system which while observing the principles of recommendation 3 will best make possible progress towards self-government. The report puts forward no detailed suggestions for this purpose and our main task has therefore been to devise a method for its attainment.

We have considered an instrument of government on unitary binational lines based on parity between the two peoples in its legislative and executive functions, with provision for emergency action by the administering authority in the event of absence of willingness on
the part of the two peoples to participate in the functioning of such a plan, or in the event of a deadlock in such governmental machinery.

In view, however, of the expressed reaction of the two peoples to the report of the Anglo-American Committee, we believe that the following plan is more practicable and that effect could be given to it with less difficulty.

Plan for Provincial Autonomy

9. Territorial areas. The plan envisages the division of Palestine into four areas: an Arab province, a Jewish province, a district of Jerusalem and a district of the Negev. The Jewish province will include Eastern Galilee, most of the Plains of Esdraelon and Jezreel, the Beisan area, Haifa, the Plain of Sharon (excluding the town of Jaffa) and a portion of the southern coastal plain. The Jerusalem district will include Jerusalem, Bethlehem and their immediate environs. The Negev district will consist of the uninhabited triangle of waste land in the south of Palestine beyond the present limit of cultivation. The Arab province will include the remainder of Palestine.

The population of these areas will be approximately as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Arabs</th>
<th>Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab province</td>
<td>815,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish province</td>
<td>301,000</td>
<td>451,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem district</td>
<td>96,000</td>
<td>102,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negev district</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The provincial boundaries will be purely administrative boundaries, defining the area within which a local legislature is empowered to legislate on certain subjects and a local executive to administer its laws. They will in no sense for [be] frontiers and they will consequently have no significance as regards defence, customs or communications. In our view, however, it is of great importance to make it clear that, once settled, these boundaries will not be susceptible of change except by agreement between the two provinces. We recommend that a provision to this effect be embodied in any trusteeship agreement and in any instrument bringing the plan into operation.8

10. Division of powers. The provincial governments will have power of legislation and administration within their provincial areas with regard to municipal and village administration, agriculture, fisheries, forest, land registration, land sales, land settlement, land purchase and expropriation, education, public health and other social services, trade and industry, and local roads, irrigation, development

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8 The British version at this point includes the following sentence: "The details of the boundaries proposed are shown in the map reproduced in Appendix A." The map is printed in British Cmd. 7044, Palestine No. 1 (1947) : Proposals for the Future of Palestine, July, 1946—February, 1947, after p. 14.
and public works. They will also have power to limit the number and determine the qualifications of persons who may take up permanent residence in their territories, after the date of the introduction of the plan. The provincial governments will be required by the instrument of government which establishes the fundamental law to provide for the guarantee of civil rights and equality before the law for all residents. They shall not, in their legislation or administration, impose obstacles to free inter-territorial transit, trade or commerce.

For the purpose of carrying out these functions the provincial governments will have power to appropriate funds, to levy taxes, excluding customs and excises, to borrow within the province and, with the consent of the central government, to borrow abroad.

Control of foreign exchange and currency shall, for the time being, be a function of the central government. The central government shall also for the time being be responsible for the licensing of imports. It shall allocate licenses equitably between the two provinces after consultation with their representatives. Within two years of the introduction of the provincial autonomy plan (unless a later date is agreed to by the provinces and the central government) a broad allocation of the value of import licenses between the two provinces shall be made from time to time by the central government, in consultation with the provinces. Thereafter the provinces shall have the right to obtain for their residents licenses up to the amount of the allocation and to decide to what classes of goods such licenses shall be allocated.

At a date not later than 31 December, 1946, import licensing shall be on a non-discriminatory basis as between sources of supply.

If Palestine becomes a member of the United Nations or any specialized agencies thereof (including the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank, or the proposed International Trade Organization) the provincial governments must deal with all relevant matters within their jurisdiction in a manner consistent with the obligations of Palestine as a member of these bodies.

There will be reserved to the central government exclusive authority as to defence, foreign relations and customs and excise. In addition there will be reserved initially to the central government exclusive authority as to police, prisons, courts, railway facilities and Haifa harbour, posts and telegraphs, civil aviation, broadcasting and antiquities, though certain of these powers will be transferred in whole or in part to the provincial governments as soon as it becomes practicable. The central government will in addition have power to borrow money, to make financial grants to the provinces, to provide for inter-territorial and international irrigation and development projects, to facilitate inter-territorial and international trade and commerce and communications, and to provide for arterial highways. It will be empowered to examine and verify municipal and provincial accounts, to
prescribe suitable and uniform methods of accounting, to prescribe the uses of any funds granted by it to the provinces, and to examine proposed budgets of provincial expenditures, and to make recommendations with respect to them.

Immigration will be administered by the central government. So far as the provinces are concerned, the central government will authorise the immigration desired by the respective provincial governments, to the extent to which the economic absorptive capacity of the province will not thereby be exceeded. It shall not have power to authorise immigration into either province in excess of any limitations imposed by the provincial government.

All powers not expressly granted to the provincial governments will be reserved to the central government.

11. **Provincial governments.** An elected legislative chamber will be established in each province. During the first 5 years of the plan the presiding officers of those chambers will be appointed by the High Commissioner. Thereafter they will be elected by the chambers from among their members. Bills passed by the legislative chambers will become law only after they have received the assent of the High Commissioner, representing the administering authority, but assent will be denied only if such bills are inconsistent with the instrument of government.

A provincial legislature may provide that any residents of the Jerusalem district designated by it may be represented in the provincial legislature if they so desire.

An executive consisting of a chief minister and a council of ministers will be appointed in each province by the High Commissioner from among the members of legislative chamber after consultation with its leaders.

If a provincial government fails to perform a proper governmental function or exceeds its proper function the High Commissioner will have authority to exercise emergency powers within the province for the performance of that function or to prevent such excess.

12. **The Central government.** The executive and legislative functions of the central government will initially be exercised by a High Commissioner appointed by the administering authority. He will be assisted by a nominated executive council composed of the heads of the major executive departments. Certain of these departments will be headed, as soon as the High Commissioner deems practicable, by Palestinians.

A development planning board will be established by the High Commissioner comprising the heads of the appropriate central executive departments, and representatives of each of the provinces. This board will initiate plans for the general economic development of Palestine and will supervise the implementation of such plans. A tariff board
will also be established on similar lines to advise on customs and excise policy and on the rates of duty to be imposed.

13. The Jerusalem district. In the Jerusalem district there will be established a council with powers similar to those of a municipal council. The majority of its members will be elected, but there will be certain members designated by the High Commissioner.

As [The] central government, in respect of the Jerusalem district, will have the same powers to limit the number and determine the qualifications of persons who may take up permanent residence in that district as are conferred on the provincial governments in respect of their provinces.

Powers not delegated to the district council will be exercised in the Jerusalem district by the central government.

14. The Negev district. The Negev district will be held under direct administration by the central government pending a survey of its development possibilities. Within 5 years and upon the completion of this survey, the administering authority shall submit to the appropriate organ of the United Nations recommendations, arrived at after consultation with the Arab and Jewish provinces, concerning the disposition of the area.

15. Considerations in the adoption of the provincial plan. The following are the main advantages of the plan for provincial autonomy:

The plan offers to the Jews an opportunity to exercise a wide measure of control over immigration into one part of Palestine and to forward in the Jewish province the development of the Jewish national home. At the same time it offers to the majority of the Arabs of Palestine their own political institutions in an Arab province and freedom from the fear of further Jewish immigration into that province without their consent. It makes it possible to give practical [effect] to the principles of government enunciated in recommendation 3 of the Anglo-American Committee; and it offers a prospect of development towards self-government of which there is less hope in a unitary Palestine. It provides a means of segregating Jew and Arab to an extent which should substantially reduce the risk of a continuation of widespread violence and disorder in Palestine. In the long term, the plan leaves the way open for constitutional development either towards partition or towards federal unity. The association of representatives of the two provinces in the administration of central subjects may lead ultimately to a fully developed federal constitution. On the contrary, if the centrifugal forces prove too strong, the way is open towards partition. The provincial plan does not prejudge this issue either way. The administering authority will be prepared to hand over the government to the people of the country as soon as the two communities express a common desire to that end and present an agreed scheme which will ensure its stable administration.
In arriving at the provincial autonomy plan as preferable on grounds of practicability to the unitary bi-national plan, we are not unmindful of the fact that there are inherent in it certain difficulties:

(1) The plan calls for immediate decision on the highly controversial matter of the boundaries of the respective provinces. It is one on which feelings on both sides are apt to run high.

(2) The Jewish and Arab populations are so interlaced in the area out of which a Jewish province would have to be created that a very serious minority problem would arise in that province which would not be involved in the proposed Arab province. The argument may be made by the Arabs that if it is proper to submit such a large segment of the Arab population to a majority rule by the Jews in the Jewish province those same considerations would support their own contention that a Palestinian state be set up in which there would be a majority of the Arabs and a minority of the Jews. Under the proposed system, however, there would be effective protection for the Arab minority in the Jewish province.

(3) The proposed boundaries are such that the land and other economic resources in the Jewish area are superior to those in the Arab area. The Jewish area would be well able to support the requisite governmental services of the provincial government. The Arab area would not now be able to support even the present level of services, much less the improved services which the recommendations of the Anglo-American report urge as necessary to raise the Arab standard of living. This difficulty is met by the general power given to the central government to make grants to provinces and by the specific provisions in a later paragraph for meeting the anticipated deficiencies in the budget of the Arab province during the earlier years of the autonomy plan.

After considering the foregoing difficulties, we feel that the provincial autonomy plan is the preferable one for meeting recommendation 3.9

HOLY PLACES

16. It will be the duty of the central government to safeguard the Moslem, Jewish and Christian holy places. An inter-denominational council will be set up to advise the central government on all matters relating to the Christian holy places.

LAND POLICY

17. In putting the provincial autonomy plan into effect the administering authority will rescind the land transfer regulations of 1940. The prohibition or frustration of provisions in leases stipu-

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9 At this point in the British version appears a Section 15A which reads: "Further Details of Provincial Autonomy Plan.—The United States Delegation have submitted a preliminary draft for the heads of an instrument of government to give effect to this Plan. This draft, which is reproduced in Appendix B, gives some further details of the constitution proposed. The draft has not been examined by the two Delegations jointly; but it is a valuable contribution which will serve as a basis for further work on the preparation of the draft constitution."
lating that only members of one race, community or creed may be employed on or in connection with the land leased will be a matter for action by the provincial authorities.

**IMMIGRATION**

18. Under the provincial autonomy plan immigration will be administered by the central government separately for the Arab province, the Jewish province, and the Jerusalem and Negev districts. In effect immigration into the provinces will be regulated by the provincial governments, subject only to the power of the central government which may impose limitations upon immigration in accordance with the economic absorptive capacity of either province. These provisions will probably mean the complete exclusion of Jewish immigrants from the Arab province, but will result, under ordinary circumstances, in immigration into the Jewish province on whatever scale is desired by its government. The grounds on which the central government could curtail the immigration quotas proposed by the provinces will be defined in the instrument of government and in any trusteeship agreement or other instrument approved by the United Nations. The provincial authorities will, therefore, be able to appeal to the United Nations against any decision in respect of immigration which they consider to be in contravention of the terms of such instruments.

On the assumption that our proposals for provincial autonomy are adopted as the policy of our two Governments, we recommend the acceptance of recommendations 2 and 6 of the Anglo-American Committee.

19. We have considered the memorandum embodying the results of the preliminary discussions held in London from 17th to 27th June on recommendation 2 of the Anglo-American report, and we endorse the outline plan for the movement of 100,000 Jews to Palestine. We recommend that this plan be initiated immediately it is decided to put the constitutional proposals into effect.

We recommend that every effort should be made to complete the operation within 12 months of the date on which the emigration begins. We recommend that the necessary immigration certificates should be issued as rapidly as possible. As regards the rate of movement, shipment will proceed at the maximum rate consistent with the clearance of the transit camps in Palestine.

For the purpose of checking illegal immigration any Jews entering Palestine illegally after the plan has been initiated will be counted against the 100,000.

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18 At this point in the British version appears the following: “A summary of this Plan, revised to take account of our conclusions on the questions of policy then left outstanding and to incorporate certain later information, is contained in Appendix C.”
THE ARAB PROGRAMME

20. We accept recommendations 5 and 9 of the Anglo-American Committee that the economic and educational standards of the Arabs should be raised, subject to the proviso that the pace at which such development can be undertaken will have to be limited by practical considerations, such as the provision of trained personnel and the capacity of the economy of the area to absorb a large spending programme. A tentative plan has been worked out by Palestine Government which can form the basis of the programme.

(a) Health and social services. We endorse the proposals for a health service for the Arabs of a standard similar to that established for the Jews. We also contemplate the establishment of social services ancillary to education and health, e.g. institutions for the care of mothers, children and the old, school feeding, playgrounds, unemployment assistance, the teaching of handicrafts, youth and cultural organizations.

(b) Education. The immediate provision of compulsory education for the Arabs is not practicable, but universal primary education could be achieved in 10 years, except as regards girls in the smaller villages. Immediate steps should be taken to improve primary, secondary and university education in the Arab community.

(c) Economic measures. Improved facilities for education and for health and other social services will not alone bridge the gap between the standards of living of the two communities; a wide economic advancement must accompany them.

The greatest part of the Arab rural community, which constitutes 66% of the whole Arab population, consists of a peasantry living at about bare subsistence level. There are few village industries and Arab industry in general provides very little employment. Measures to improve Arab economic conditions must be directed primarily to the agricultural population, but should also include measures to promote the development of light industries. The principal measures envisaged are the following:

(I) Agrarian reorganization to rationalize and consolidate land holdings.
(II) Improvement in the use of land: promotion of regional development: prevention of erosion: agricultural research.
(III) Promotion of light industries and development of local crafts and industries.
(IV) Provision of cheap credit.
(V) Expansion of labour organizations.
(VI) Promotion of the cooperative movement.

(d) Living conditions. We also recommend the following measures for improving living conditions in the Arab community:

(I) Improvements in housing and promotion of housing schemes.
(II) Survey and town planning with a view to improvement schemes.
(III) Improvement of water supplies.
21. The cost of the foregoing proposals is discussed in later paragraphs.

**Development Projects**

22. We believe that the need for economic development in Palestine should be recognized as merely a part of the broader situation with respect to economic development in the countries of the Middle East. In any statement which is made to the interested parties or to the public, it should be emphasized that our Governments have assisted and welcomed the advent of the states of the Middle East into full political equality. They have observed with interest the examination by those states of their possibilities for economic development, which appear to be great. If it is the desire of any of those states to resort to international agencies for aid by loan or otherwise in exploring and effectuating such projects, as for example in the reclaiming or improvement of great areas by water control and irrigation, they will receive sympathetic support.

Certainly most substantial Palestinian development should be linked with developments in Transjordan and probably in Syria and Lebanon.

We recommend that a survey of the water resources of Palestine and, with the consent of the Government of Transjordan, of water resources common to the two areas should be undertaken as soon as possible by consulting engineers of international repute. They should further be invited, if adequate data for the purpose is available, to draw up an outline project indicating the best use of the water available. This project should be considered, and action on it taken, by the central government in consultation with the development board to which, for this purpose, the Government of Transjordan, and of any other neighboring state affected, would be invited to send representatives.

23. Long term development schemes which are wholly within one province will be financed by borrowing internally or abroad by the provincial government or an appropriate organization in the province. In the event that the borrowing is from abroad it is possible that the loans will have to be guaranteed by the central government. Long-term development schemes which involve both provinces or perhaps neighboring countries will require participation by the central government but it will be desirable for the provincial governments to take as much responsibility as is practicable in day-to-day administration and particularly in finance. The financial support of such projects should ultimately be made the responsibility of the provinces in proportion to the benefits which they derive. Schemes financed by loans
should be self-liquidating and, as such, they can be secured on revenues from the projects, reinforced when necessary by a general charge on provincial revenues.

**Finance**

24. We have considered various estimates of the cost of carrying out the measures set out above. We have also considered the effect on the Palestine budget of introducing the proposed scheme of provincial autonomy. We have based our conclusions on two assumptions; first, that the cost of living index will not rise in Palestine, and, secondly, that there will be no increased expenditure on law and order coupled with loss of revenue due to disorders and non-cooperation.

On the first of the points, it is clear that the programmes envisaged will constitute an inflationary influence, but against this a large part of expenditures will be for imported goods financed with external money. In addition substantial borrowing of savings within Palestine may be assumed and increasing supplies of imported goods at lower prices should become available. Should our assumption be incorrect, it is not possible to estimate the effect on the Palestine budget but cost of living subsidies involving expenditure of up to 4,000,000 pounds might be necessary. Equally, disorders and non-cooperation might add significantly to expenditures and reduce revenues.

25. The Jewish programme. According to our studies the total costs of the immigration of the 100,000 Jews can be put at approximately 70,000,000 pounds, made up as follows:

- Transitional assistance, 6,000,000 pounds.
- Housing, 14,000,000 pounds.
- Capital investment to provide employment, 50,000,000 pounds.

Since it is essential to complete the programme as soon as possible, we assume that the whole 70,000,000 pounds will be spent within 2 years. The maximum expectation from reparations available for Palestine is 5,000,000 pounds; from contributions by world Jewry 20,000,000 pounds; and from loans to be raised in Palestine (whether in Palestine pounds or in sterling) 35,000,000 pounds. This would give a total of 60,000,000 for the Jewish programme, leaving a deficit of 10,000,000 pounds, which can be met by self-liquidating loans.

26. The Jewish Agency has publicly accepted responsibility for costs connected with the immigration of 100,000 Jews to Palestine. This financial responsibility should be confirmed, but there would be no need to ask the Agency to agree to any of our specific estimates. In due course the responsibility in question will be transferred to the government of the Jewish province.

Our studies indicate that 10 million pounds of required capital cannot be provided from Jewish sources within the next 2 years. As,
however, this deficiency is for purposes suitable for self-liquidating loans, it can be met by loans under the 250 million dollars credit provided for in paragraph 29.

27. Financial effects of provincial autonomy. A rough distribution of existing expenditures and revenues on the basis of the division of responsibility among the central government, the two provinces, and the Jerusalem district indicates that:

(a) The central government will continue to incur more than half of the present expenditures of the Palestine Government. It will have an estimated surplus in the order of perhaps 1,000,000 pounds.
(b) Revenues of the Jewish province will be substantially in excess of expenditures, giving rise to a surplus of 1,400,000 pounds.
(c) Expenditures of the Arab province will be substantially in excess of revenues, giving rise to a deficit of 2,100,000 pounds.

Since expenditures in the programme for the benefit of the Arabs would be concentrated entirely in the Arab province, the deficit of 2,100,000 pounds in that province will be increased by an amount which might run to 1,000,000 pounds annually as an average in the first 5 years.

From this total recurrent deficit of roundly 3,000,000 pounds there may be deducted possibly as much as 1,000,000 pounds representing excess revenues of the central government subject to grants to the province. There will remain currently a net deficit in the neighbourhood of 2,000,000 pounds. The United Kingdom Delegation proposes to recommend to His Majesty’s Government to ask Parliament to assume of [the] ultimate responsibility for recurring deficits up [to] the time when increased revenues permit it to be met out of Arab provincial or central government funds.

28. Cost of the Arab program. We have attempted to estimate the cost of a practicable program, using as a guide the estimate of costs made in a survey by the Palestine Government. That survey was made on the basis of a program spread over the whole of Palestine. The concentration of the program in the Arab area would in any case make it necessary to revise these estimates. We have allowed for this, and also for such limitations as the provision of trained personnel and the capacity of the Arab economy to absorb a large spending program. Allowing for such considerations we think that a spending program of up to 15 million pounds to 20 million pounds over 10 years should be regarded as fully adequate to implement the recommendations for improved education, health, and economic services of the Anglo-American Committee. In addition, 10 million pounds should be provided for credit facilities. There are, however, so many unknown factors in the carrying out of such a program that it would be most unwise to commit ourselves to any public statement as to the amount
of the programs to be undertaken. Of the Arab program 10 million pounds for credit facilities could be secured from local bank credits. Of the remainder of the program, only a small portion would be suitable for the self-liquidating loans dealt with under paragraph 29. Provision of an additional 12,500,000 pounds at this time will, it is believed, care for expenditure sufficient to ensure that the program will be effectively carried forward to the period when means of additional financing may be found. The United States Delegation has therefore agreed, as a part of its contribution to the general program, to propose to the President of the United States that he recommend legislation granting 50,000,000 pounds to the Government of Palestine for the purpose of financing development schemes not suitable for self-liquidating loans and for assisting in the meeting of extraordinary expenses during the difficulties of the transitional period.

29. Capital for development. A large portion of the capital needed for the self-sustaining projects mentioned in paragraph 22 must come from outside sources. It is possible that Palestine could obtain a loan from the International Bank if she should become a member. The United States Delegation proposes, in the event that finance from other sources such as the International Bank is not available, to recommend that the President seek legislation authorizing the making of loans through an appropriate agency for the development of the Middle East region, including Palestine, up to 250 million pounds.

30. Public order.—It is clear that the difficulties of introducing the policy which we have outlined will be greatly enhanced so long as there are in existence armed organizations, Arab and Jewish, determined in the last resort to oppose by force any solution which is not to their liking. We agree that private armies constitute a danger to the peace of the world and ought not to exist, and that attempts to prevent by violence the execution of the policy once it has been put into effect should be resolutely suppressed. We agree that to this end it is necessary that armed organisations which are not prepared to submit themselves to the full control of the central government should be dissolved and that the illegal holding of arms and explosives should be vigorously combatted.

31. Future procedure. We recognise that, in view of the existing situation in Palestine, any policy for that country will probably have to be introduced without the willing consent of either community. On the other hand, there is a degree of sustained and determined resistance of either Jews or Arabs beyond which no policy could be

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11 The British version reads "dollars", as does the last word in paragraph numbered 29.
12 At this point in the British version the word "adequate" appears.
13 The British version contains a Section 29A which reads: "Details of the financial implications of our proposals are contained in Appendix D."
enforced. An effort to obtain at least a measure of acquiescence from the Arabs and Jews would therefore be an essential preliminary to the introduction of the above proposals. We therefore recommend that, if these proposals are adopted by our two Governments, they should be presented to Arab and Jewish representatives as a basis for negotiations at a conference to be convened by the United Kingdom Government.

32. In accordance with recommendation 4 of the Anglo-American Committee, we propose that the new policy should be embodied in a trusteeship agreement for Palestine. The conference with Arab and Jewish representatives should therefore be convened in time for its results to be available before the opening of the second part of the first session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. If the results of the conference were such as to suggest that the new policy would meet with a sufficient degree of acceptance in Palestine, the Government of the United Kingdom would proceed to put the plan into effect and would inform the General Assembly that practical considerations required this to be done under the existing mandate, but that they would press on as quickly as possible with a trusteeship agreement and would hope to lay a draft before the General Assembly at its next (1947) session. It would then be possible simultaneously to inaugurate the policy in Palestine and to undertake the consultations provided for in article 79 of the United Nations Charter.

33. We are not able at this stage to make recommendations regarding the course to be adopted if the conference with Arab and Jewish representatives led to the conclusion that the introduction of the policy proposed would be so violently resisted by one or both of the two peoples in Palestine that it could not be enforced. In that situation further consultation between our two Governments would be necessary.”

[Grady]

HARRIMAN

867N.01/7–2546: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

LONDON, July 25, 1946—10 a. m.

[Received 10:49 a. m.]

6975. From Grady. I have just received the following letter from Dr. Goldmann of the Jewish Agency which he insisted should be sent in to me at the meeting I was attending.

“Referring to my telephone conversation with you this morning, I feel it to be my duty to let you know the following, which Dr. Weizmann and I had intended to tell you had you been able to see us. We
understand from the various press reports of your negotiations with the British, that, whatever agreement the two Governments may reach will be submitted to both Jews and Arabs for discussion and consultation. It may be, therefore, that any agreement reached with regard to the admission of the 100,000 refugees to Palestine may also be included in such consultations, and this, in view of the complicated nature of the Palestine problem, may mean at best a delay of many months. As you know, the Jewish Agency has always held that the question of the 100,000 fates [certificates?] to be decided, as recommended by the Enquiry Committee, immediately, and without awaiting the decision on major policy which will require some time for its solution. From the very first days after the publication of the Enquiry Committee’s report, President Truman has taken up the same position, and has given expression to his views in various public statements. When the four American members of the Jewish Agency Executive had the privilege of being received by the President on July 2, he was good enough to tell us, in unmistakably clear terms, that he adhered to this view, and that the 100,000 certificates should be granted without waiting for the decision on major policy. In a conversation I had with Mr. Dean Acheson a few days before I left the States, he also agreed to this view. If for one reason or another this position should now be changed, and the agreement reached with the British regarding the admission of the 100,000 should become subject to future consultations—which means that it may be made dependent on Arab consent—I want you to know that a situation will arise which will make it impossible for the Agency to participate in any such negotiations. Jewish public opinion in the United States, and the Zionist movement all over the world, would have to regard such a step as a reversal of the policy of the United States Government. As to the main proposal concerning major policy—as published today in considerable detail in responsible British papers—I would also like you to know that if the reports accurately reflect the character of this proposal, it appears to me wholly unacceptable from our point of view. I felt that you should know this, especially what I have said with regard to the 100,000 certificates, at this—maybe decisive—stage of your negotiations with the British.\

It might interest the Department to know that while we are negotiating the Palestine matter there are here in London not only Dr. Weizmann but Goldmann, Kaplan, Berstein and Gass. I have made formal acknowledgement of this letter. I did not deem it proper for me to see the leaders of either Jews or Arabs while negotiations are going on. Since this letter is at least semi-official from the Jewish Agency and contains manifest misstatements the Department might wish me to follow up my acknowledgement with a letter. Should they wish this, please cable outline of reply they would want me to make.\[Grady.\]

Harriman

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\[14\] I.e., the Department.

\[25\] No reply by the Department has been found.
PALESTINE

867N.01/7-2646 : Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman

TOP SECRET LONDON, July 25, 1946—6:20 p.m.
URGENT [Received 8:43 p.m.]

Personal and Top Secret. The conversations between American and British officials on Palestine and related problems are now almost concluded and agreement has been reached on all matters of substance. I understand that their recommendations have been telegraphed to you. I am sure you will agree that the inhuman crime committed in Jerusalem on 22nd July calls for the strongest action against terrorism but having regard to the sufferings of innocent Jewish victims of Nazism this should not deter us from introducing a policy designed to bring peace to Palestine with the least possible delay. I hope, therefore, that you will be able to give urgent attention to the agreed recommendations of the two delegations and to let us have your views in the next few days. I have had some useful talks with Ambassador Grady and his colleagues, and I should like you to know that the British officials have paid a warm tribute to their energy and cooperative spirit in the discussions here.

867N.01/7-2646 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET LONDON, July 26, 1946.
URGENT [Received July 26—8:11 a.m.]

7080. For the Secretary from Grady. Constitutional proposals are the plan for provincial autonomy. It is not intended that start of movement of 100,000 shall be delayed until these provisions are actually put into effect but as is stated in second sentence of section 19 “we recommend that this plan (that is, outline plan for movement of 100,000 Jews to Palestine) be initiated immediately it is decided to put the constitutional proposals into effect.” Paragraph 19 should be read with careful consideration of paragraphs 31, 32 and 33. Since receipt your telegram No. 5633 of July 25, 7 p.m., I have again con-

16 Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by the White House on July 26.
17 Mr. Bevin notified Ambassador Harriman that the British Cabinet approved the recommendations of the Cabinet Committee on July 25 (867N.01/7-2546).
18 Not printed; it stated that because of garbles in Section 19 of telegram 6970, July 24, when first received in the Department, “we still not sure when movement 100,000 to begin. We sincerely hope this movement to start immediately after two Govts have reached over-all agreement. It would place this Govt in almost impossible position if it would agree arrangement whereby transfer would not begin until after full agreement had been reached with Arabs and Jews or, in absence such agreement, until action had been taken by United Nations.” (867N.01/7-2446)
sulted Brook and there is not the slightest doubt that the British Government will give the green light on the 100,000 at the earliest possible moment. They do not expect formal approval of the plan from either side but are counting on “a measure of acquiescence from Arabs and Jews” and feel that it has been understood by both our Governments from the beginning that consultation and a measure of acquiescence from both is an essential preliminary to their expressing determination to go ahead with the whole plan including the 100,000. As soon as they have decided to go ahead with the plan they will at once implement the movement of the 100,000. [Grady.]

HARRIMAN

867X.01/7-2646

Record of Teletype Conference Between Washington and London

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 26, 1946—1:28 p.m.

[Here follows record of the incoming conversation from London, primarily an amplification of telegram 7030, printed supra. The portion here printed is “outgoing” to London.]

What did you do to secure British consent to starting 100,000 immigration immediately instead of starting when plan agreed to?

My view is that plan is all right as basis for negotiation but it commits us to many things and in view of President’s repeated statements as to 100,000 immigration we could not agree unless immigration plan started. We would not expect large numbers first few months but unless there is assurance of starting immediately we could not agree and wish you would so advise British officials.

We can appreciate British position. Nevertheless after the stand that the President has taken we do not see how we can enter into any arrangement which would prevent us from continuing to take the position that the 100,000 should move without awaiting for agreement on part of Arabs and Jews. That agreement might be delayed for months or years, and we would have to be silent.

If British have made such commitments to Arabs and Jews it does not seem to me that we are committed to a similar policy. Any arrangement that might be made between us and the British should leave us free to insist on the transfer of the 100,000 beginning at once. We feel that we should be able to announce that we have not abandoned the position taken by the President in this regard.

I understand British position but I feel that President cannot well recede from his position. All parts of program should proceed simultaneously but President’s position has been that 100,000 immigration

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19 The participants in Washington were Secretary Byrnes and Mr. Henderson; those in London were Ambassador Harriman, Mr. Grady, and Mr. Pinkerton (on detail from Jerusalem to serve on Mr. Grady’s staff).
was to start immediately and he has so stated publicly time and again. Trouble with British plan is immigration never starts unless they get acquiescence of Jews and Arabs.20

[In remainder of outgoing part of conversation, Mr. Byrnes requested that Messrs. Grady, Gaston, and Dorr meet him in Paris on July 29 and stated he would advise Mr. Bevin that there had not been sufficient time to consider the plan and make a recommendation to President Truman.]

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867N.01/7-2946: Telegram

The Secretary of State to President Truman

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

PARIS, July 29, 1946—5 p. m.

[Received July 29—3:47 p. m.]

3701. For the President from Secretary Byrnes.21 Suggested statement of policy on Palestine for President Truman to be issued immediately after Prime Minister Attlee’s statement for the British Government on Wednesday afternoon. Attlee’s statement as wired has been so changed that he is speaking for the British Government only.22

1. The time has come when we should cease talking about a solution of the Palestine question but determine upon a solution and carry it out with fairness to both Arabs and Jews.

2. The basis for the solution should be found within the framework of the recent unanimous report of the joint Anglo-American inquiry. The British Government has stated that it is anxious to find a permanent solution within the framework of that report which will make possible the immigration of 100,000 Jews to Palestine as rapidly as possible.

3. The British Government has suggested as a basis for negotiation that such a solution would be facilitated by the creation of an Arab province in those parts of Palestine where there are at present few Jews and of a Jewish province in the area where the bulk of Jewish settlement now is. The suggestion contemplates a large degree of autonomy for these provinces. The exact boundaries of the provinces would be determined after consultation with the Jews and Arabs. Under this proposal it is anticipated that subject only to

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20 In telegram 7062, July 27, 1946, noon, Ambassador Harriman stated: “Reteleype conversation with Secretary Byrnes last night, I am convinced President can rely on the good faith of British Government to move with the greatest speed in the consultations. . . . British can see the solution of the problem of Jewish immigration only through their provincial plan. . . . I know British are as anxious for speed as we are.” (867N.01/7-2746)

21 Mr. Byrnes was attending the Paris Peace Conference which met from July 29 to October 15, 1946.

22 Prime Minister Attlee’s proposed statement had been transmitted from London in telegram 7083, July 27, noon (not printed).
limited reserved authority in the Central Government Jewish wishes
would determine the immigration policy of the Jewish province. A
Jerusalem district and a Negeb district will be under the Central
Government.

4. Adoption of this policy will impose a heavy financial burden on
the Palestine Government. Particularly in carrying out the recom-
recommendation made by the Anglo-American Committee for raising the
Arab standard of living. I have advised the British Government
that, if an immediate and satisfactory solution along the lines of this
policy could be found, I would urge that the American Government
provide substantial financial assistance to make possible its execution.
These grants-in-aid will not exceed $50,000,000. Until the revenues
make it unnecessary, the British Government would meet any deficit
in the annual budget of the Palestine Govt. This obligation is not
limited.

I have also advised the British Government that I would rec-
ommend to the Congress the granting of loans to Palestine and other
states in the Near East for sound development projects if for any rea-
on such projects cannot adequately be financed through the Interna-
tional Bank. That, I consider, to be a part of our general policy of
furthering the economic development of the whole Near East. A
$250,000,000 self-liquidating loan program is contemplated for the
Near East.

5. As a part of a general plan to aid in the resettlement of European
displaced people in which the nations of the world are being asked to
participate, I will also seek the approval of Congress for special legis-
lation for the entry into the United States of 50,000 displaced persons,
including Jews.

6. I want to say an additional word about the immigration into
Palestine of 100,000 persecuted Jews from the centers in Germany,
Austria and Italy which was one of the recommendations of the Anglo-
American Committee of Inquiry. The US has been urging the
promptest possible beginning of this immigration. It has joined in
active preparations for the movement. There are two things which
must be remembered. First, we are not the mandatory for Palestine
and cannot make a unilateral decision on the matter. Second, every
effort should be made to create conditions such that these people will
not open a new chapter in their tragic lot by immigrating into a vio-
 lent and strife-torn Palestine.

The situation as it has developed is such that this immigration
can in the judgment of both the United States and Great Britain be
peacefully and speedily effected as an immediate part of a general
plan such as has now been formulated. That general plan cannot and
should not in fairness be finally decided upon by the mandatory with-
out promised discussions with both Jews and Arabs. These discus-
sions have awaited the conference of the United States and United Kingdom delegations which have now been completed. They will be held in London in August and with the cooperation that should be received from all they should be speedily concluded. I ask the prompt and generous cooperation of both Arabs and Jews in discussing and effecting the new proposals.

I am given the personal assurance of Mr. Attlee that these consultations will be expedited to the utmost. I am convinced from what Mr. Attlee tells me that the consultation can be completed and the decision of His Majesty's Government can be reached not later than September 15, and that the immigration will proceed as rapidly as the immigrants can be absorbed. (Plans have been made which will make it possible to initiate the movement and reception of immigrants into Palestine as soon as the decision on policy has been taken.)

I believe that the plan proposed is the best solution of this difficult problem that can now be secured.22a

[Byrnes]

867N.01/7-3046

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

WASHINGTON,] July 30, 1946.

I called on the British Ambassador at the Embassy at my request and informed him that I was making this suggestion to reduce to the minimum the possibility of press speculation. I told the Ambassador that the President had been giving the most careful consideration to the recommendations of the alternates on the Cabinet Committee on Palestine. Since he had received those recommendations yesterday he had had a long meeting of the Cabinet and had consulted members of both houses of Congress. With the greatest reluctance and regret the President had concluded that he could not make the statement supporting the recommendations which had been prepared for him in Paris since he could not carry with him the support necessary to fulfill the proposals 23 which he was called upon to make. I said that under the proposals the important part to be played by the United States, in addition to its moral support, was that the President was to recommend to the Congress legislation admitting an additional 50,000 displaced persons, granting aid to Palestine of $50,000,000 and loans for the Middle Eastern area development projects up to $250,000,000 in the event that for any reason loans were not available through the

22a According to a letter of March 24, 1948, from Mr. Grady to Mr. Henderson, Secretary Byrnes and Mr. Grady had jointly drafted the message printed here as telegram 3701, intending it as a "proposed press release for the President". (867N.01/3-2448) The letter was sent to Mr. Henderson while Mr. Grady was serving as Ambassador to India.

23 Presumably those in telegram 3701, supra.
International Bank. In view of the extreme intensity of feeling in
centers of Jewish population in this country neither political party
would support this program at the present time and the President’s
statement, therefore, would be wholly personal and most misleading.

I said that the President was recalling Mr. Grady and his associates
for consultation and that until this had taken place I would not be
able to suggest to the Ambassador what the next step in the program
might be. I asked the Ambassador to communicate urgently with
Mr. Attlee who was to speak in the House of Commons the next day.
I told him that we were also sending word to Mr. Byrnes in Paris 24
and the American Embassy in London. 25

The Ambassador expressed regret as well as the thought that this
development would cause an embarrassing situation for the Prime
Minister. He said that he understood fully the considerations which
had moved the President to this conclusion since he was thoroughly
informed of the discussion of this matter in the American press. I
discussed briefly what Mr. Attlee might say and agreed that the less
said the better. I told the Ambassador that we were preparing a very
short statement for the President 26 which would be as non-committal
as possible and that I would read it to him after it had been prepared.
On my return to the Department I dictated this statement to the Am-
bassador so that he might send it to Mr. Attlee.

Dean Acheson

740.00119 Council/7-3146: Telegram

The Secretary of State to President Truman

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

Paris, July 31, 1946—5 p. m.
[Received July 31—3:53 p. m.]

3743. Delsec 761. For the President from the Secretary. Reurtel
Secdel 546. 27 The British are disappointed and do not like our action

24 In telegram 3732 (Secdel 546), July 30, 5 p. m.
25 In telegram 5728, July 30, 5 p. m., to London, repeated to Paris as No. 3734
(Secdel 548).
26 The statement, released by the White House on July 31, read:
"The President has been considering certain recommendations of the Alternates
of the Cabinet Committee with regard to Palestine and has decided in view of
the complexity of the matter to request Ambassador Grady and his associates
to return to Washington to discuss the whole matter with him in detail.
"The President hopes that further discussions will result in decisions which
will alleviate the situation of the persecuted Jews in Europe and at the same
time contribute to the ultimate solution of the longer term problem of Palestine."
The text of this message was transmitted to Ambassador Harriman in telegram
5727, July 30, 1946, 5 p. m., with an instruction to inform the British Government
that the President intended to issue the statement at 2 p. m. on July 31, 1946.
The telegram was repeated to Secretary Byrnes in Paris as No. 3733 (Secdel 547).
27 See footnote 24, above.
but the purpose of my message 3712 was to let you know that if you declined to agree to the proposals it would not embarrass me. Yesterday I advised Wise and Goldmann that my opinion was, in the absence of agreement the British will not agree to the immigration of 100,000 or any part of it, and that they could not look to you to bring about such immigration because there was no way you could force Britain to act. I think it would be wise for the present not to make public any further demand about the 100,000 in order to avoid newspaper conflict with Attlee.

Grady’s committee returning immediately.

[Byrnes]

867N.01/7-3146: Telegram

The Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Harriman) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

US URGENT [Received July 31—3:48 p.m.]

3744. Delsec 762. Re Secdel 547 and 548. Personal and Secret from Harriman for the Acting Secretary. I delivered to Mr. Attlee personally this morning in Paris letter explaining President’s position regarding proposed Palestine plan and public statement he intends to issue today.

Attlee gave immediate thought to what Mr. Morrison should say in the House today when he presents the British Govt’s position. As to the American position I gather that he will simply state that the President is unable to approve the proposal as a joint Anglo-American plan but that he hoped to hear further from the President on the whole problem. He was confused, however, as to what the British Govt’s position regarding the plan should now be. He said that the British Govt’s confidence in the success of the plan had been based on the US giving it moral as well as financial support. He has doubts whether the British Govt could force it alone. He emphasized his fear of increased chaos in Palestine. He showed keen disappointment that this plan could not have the support of the US as it was the only one yet devised which in the opinion of the British Govt would make it possible to bring into Palestine promptly the hundred thousand Jews.

38 Dated July 30, not printed. It stated: “I hope you will consider proposal entirely independent of any view I may have expressed because I do not know views people at home.” (740.00119 Council/7-3046)
39 See footnotes 26 and 25, p. 674.
40 Herbert S. Morrison, Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons.
I explained to him the public reaction to the plan in the US with which the President was confronted. He expressed the hope that the President would give sympathetic consideration to the serious difficulties which confronted the British Govt in Palestine and in the Middle East from Arabs as well as Jews. Sent Dept as 3744; repeated London as 571.

CAFFERY

867N.01/8-246: Telegram

_The Chargé in Egypt (Lyon) to the Secretary of State_

CONFIDENTIAL

CAIRO, August 2, 1946—2 p. m.

[Received 8:25 p.m.]

1308. Azzam Pasha has expressed to Ireland † unalterable opposition of League and Arab states to federal solution and partition for Palestine. He categorically denied statement in press attributed to League spokesman London that League did not oppose federalism.

Azzam Pasha characterized federal scheme as form of partition, as impractical and as foreshadowing Jewish state. Immigration into Jewish provinces as proposed could lead only to over-population there and further Zionist insistence on territorial aggrandisement. Both federal scheme and partition would destroy prospects of independent Palestine within Arab League. Arabs would oppose either scheme by every means possible. Suggested grant to Arabs for development purposes was labeled as Jewish American attempt to buy _Arab acquiescence in American schemes for Palestine_ which Arabs would reject even if sum offered were thousand times figure mentioned in press. He was unusually bitter, possibly due to strain of Ramadan fasting, toward American policy and declared any proposals now supported by America would be regarded by Arabs as designed to placate American Jewish opinion.

Arab states, with possible exception Iraq, accepting British invitation to London conference on Palestine. They consider invitation is answer to Arab note to Britain drafted at Bludan. According to Azzam Pasha, Arabs maintain 1939 view and will reply that they cannot sit down in conference if Jews are present. Kamel Bey, Under Secretary for Aff informed me however Egypt’s note of acceptance contained no conditions. Local representatives Arab states met Thursday to consider procedure and delegates to London conference.

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† Philip W. Ireland, Attaché at the American Embassy in Egypt.

‖ Telegram 7246, August 8, 5 p. m., from London, reported advice from a Foreign Office spokesman that the British would have to conduct two conferences simultaneously because of the refusal of the Arabs to sit at the same table with the Jews (867N.01/8-346).
Iraq has requested special session League to consider Palestine but no meeting planned before regular session Beirut October, although Arab FonMins probably convene here early September. Repeated London 70; copies to Arab capitals.

LYON

867N.01/8-746: Telegram

President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Atlee) 33

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 7, 1946—5 p. m.

Personal for Prime Minister Attlee from President Truman. I regret that I was not able promptly to give you a definite reply to your telegram of July 25 asking for my views with regard to the recommendations of the American and British groups concerning Palestine. Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Harriman have, I believe, discussed the matter with you and have explained that I do not feel myself able in present circumstances to accept the plan proposed as a joint Anglo-American plan.

The whole matter is being carefully reviewed in Washington and I hope in the not too distant future to give you a more definite reply as to our position.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

867N.01/8-946: Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Atlee) to President Truman 34

TOP SECRET

[LONDON,] 9 August, 1946.

Personal and Top Secret. Thank you for your message 35 which was passed to me by your Embassy yesterday morning.

2. I feel bound to express my great disappointment that you have not yet been able to accept the plan worked out with so much goodwill by the American and British experts as the best solution to this very difficult question. Meanwhile it has been necessary for us to make arrangements for the proposed conference with Jews and Arabs at the end of this month and I think that it may be useful to you to know what our present intentions are.

3. We have given very careful consideration to the plan of the American and British experts. We are convinced that this plan is in all the circumstances the best that can be devised and the most likely to lead to a settlement in Palestine. We believe further that

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33 Sent to London as Department’s telegram 5877. The message was repeated to the Secretary of State in telegram 3955 (Secdel 631), August 8, 6 p. m., to Paris.
34 Copy transmitted to Mr. Acheson by the British Ambassador on August 9.
35 Of August 7, supra.
it may be possible as part of this plan to introduce a substantial number of refugees from Europe into Palestine in the near future without disturbing the peace of the whole Middle East and imposing on us a military commitment which we are quite unable to discharge. We doubt whether there is any alternative plan which would offer the same prospect.

4. It is accordingly our intention, as was stated by the Government in the recent Parliamentary debate, to present the plan of the experts as the basis for negotiation at the conference. Given the support of your Government, we should be able to put the plan forward without modification. If however you continue to feel that you cannot accept the proposals as a joint Anglo-American plan and we have therefore to carry it into effect with our own resources alone, we shall present it to the Conference in a modified form. As we said in the debate to which I have referred, these modifications will relate particularly to the tempo and extent of Jewish immigration and Arab development.

5. I need hardly add that we shall give careful consideration to any suggestions you may have to make but I thought it only right that you should know our present intentions.

6. You will, I am sure, realise that we have to deal with the actual situation with all its difficulties and dangers. The lives of British, Jews and Arabs are imperilled and I more than hope that you may see your way clear to assist us in a final and permanent solution.

867N.01/8-946: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

US URGENT

[Received August 9—3:51 p.m.]

7361. Reference Embassy's 7358 of August 9. Beeley, one of the officials in Eastern Dept of Foreign Office, immediately responsible for Palestine affairs told us this afternoon about the latest efforts being made by the British Govt to put an effective stop to illegal immigration into Palestine. The British Government, Beeley said, has very recently made representations to a number of European governments with a view to securing their cooperation in preventing the departure from ports under their control of ships carrying illegal immigrants to Palestine. Beeley stated that the countries to which representations have been made include Rumania, France, Italy and Belgium. No replies have yet been received by the Foreign Office from any of these countries he added. Beeley said he did not think any representations on this subject had been made to the Russians in Moscow but he explained that on more than one occasion the British have protested,
both to the Rumanian Government and to the Russian authorities on
the Control Commission in Bucharest, against the sailing from
Rumania of ships with illegal immigrants for Palestine.

A few days ago, Beeley continued, the British asked both the
Rumanian authorities and the Russian member of the Control Council
in Bucharest to prevent the sailing of a vessel now waiting in
Constanza harbor to take aboard immigrants for Palestine.37

Stories are printed under banner headlines in this evening's London
papers describing the new British move to arrest the flow of illegal
immigrants to Palestine.

Sent Dept as 7361; to Jerusalem as 55, to Paris for Seckel as 599.

Gallman

867N.01/8-1246: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United
Kingdom (Harriman)

Top secret

Washington, August 12, 1946—5 p. m.

US Urgent

5073. Section I. Premature leaks from London re contents rec-
ommendations incorporated in Morrison Plan gave groups in this
country opposed to plan opportunity mobilize so much public sen-
timent against it that Cabinet Committee and President felt they could
not agree accept recommendations at least until they had studied and
discussed them in detail. Alternates of Cabinet Committee, Ameri-
can members of Anglo-American Committee, the Cabinet Committee,
other members of Cabinet and various interested persons and groups
have participated in the discussions. During discussions, it has be-
come clear that it would be unwise for President to give his formal
support to Plan in its present form. President feels that in view
opposition to Plan, he would not be able to prevail on Congress to
agree to financial contributions for its implementation nor to rally
sufficient public support to warrant undertaking by this Govt to give
plan in its present form moral backing.

Section II. We have now been informed in confidence by Dr. Gold-
mann,38 acting behalf of Jewish Agency that on Aug 5, 1946, Ex-
ecutive of that Agency adopted following resolution:

"1) The Executive of the Jewish Agency regards the Brit pro-
posals based on the Report of the Committee of Six and as announced

37 On August 12, 1946, the British Government released a statement that im-
igrants arriving illegally in Palestine would no longer be allowed to land there
but would be removed to Cyprus or elsewhere pending a decision on their future.
The statement was transmitted to Mr. Acheson by Lord Inverchapel on the day
of its release (867N.01/8-1246).

38 In a conversation with the Acting Secretary of State on August 7; memoran-
dum of conversation not printed.
by Mr. Morrison in the House of Commons as unacceptable as a basis
of discussion.

"2) The Executive is prepared to discuss a proposal for the es-
   tablishment of a viable Jewish State in an adequate area of Palest-
   ine.

"3) As immediate steps for the implementation of Paragraph 2 the
   Executive puts forward the following demands:—

   "a) the immediate grant of 100,000 certificates and the imme-
      diate beginning of the transportation of the 100,000 to Palest-
      ine;
   "b) the grant of immediate full autonomy (in appointing its
      administration and in the economic field) to that area of Pal-
      estine to be designated to become a Jewish State;
   "c) the grant of the right of control of immigration to the ad-
      ministration of that area in Palestine designated to be a Jewish
      State."

Section III. In discussing this resolution, Dr. Goldmann has orally
stated substantially as follows:

A. Executive and most of American Jewry object to Plan primarily
because it calls for indefinite continuance Brit control of Jewish area,
provides for boundaries which are unacceptable, does not give suffi-
cient degree self-govt for area allotted to Jews, and does not provide
for immediate control by Jews of immigration into Jewish area.

B. Executive would be willing accept plan which:

1. would provide for immediate partitioning of Palestine into
three areas: Jewish, Arab and the holy places; the Jewish area
roughly to include territory assigned to Jews by Peel Report,9
plus the Negeb; Arab area to include remainder except holy places.
(Executive would be willing, however, to negotiate with regard to
Galilee);

2. would provide for termination Mandate so far as Jewish area
concerned and for setting up of independent Jewish State within
set period of not more than two or three years;

3. would permit Jews to set up their own administration and
to enjoy considerable home rule in economic matters pending es-
stablishment independent Jewish state;

4. would permit Jews, immediately upon adoption of Plan,
have full control immigration into their area.

C. He could guarantee support for such a plan on part of Agency
and of majority Jews and friends of Zionism in US.

D. If such a plan were carried out, Executive would be willing con-
sider Brit Govt as ally of Jewish State and would support granting to
Great Britain of such military establishments in Jewish State as Great
Britain might require.

E. In his opinion, Jewish State would be willing to participate in
confederation of Near Eastern states, including Arab states, for pur-
pose cooperation and under such conditions as should remove fear of
Arabs that Jewish state might serve as spearhead for introducing
external influences into Near East.

F. In his opinion, more moderate Arabs could be induced not to
oppose such a plan. If it should be decided add Arab area to Trans-

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Jordan, support of King Abdullah might be obtained since Trans-Jordan might, with addition of some 800,000 Arabs, become viable state.

G. In his opinion, Jewish State could be set up and recognized as independent by Great Britain without detailed review by United Nations in same manner as Trans-Jordan has been set up; 46 naturally when Jewish State would apply for admission to UN it would be subject to scrutiny given all applicants for admission that organization.

H. Immediately upon reaching decision adopt plan immigration 100,000 Jews should commence.

I. Dr. Weizmann was authorized by Executive discuss plan with Brit Govt and Executive hoped without loss of time two Govts might be willing accept it as basis for coming negotiations Brit with Arabs and Jews and that American Govt would give any solution based on it financial support comparable in extent to that suggested in Morrison plan. It hoped in particular American Govt would find it possible give financial assistance facilitate voluntary migration Arabs from Jewish to Arab area. Jews were prepared give every consideration Arab population and would not bring pressure directly or indirectly upon Arabs to leave Jewish territory.

Section IV. Examination Goldmann plan indicates although Executive states in first paragraph resolution that it rejects Morrison plan as basis for discussion, counter-proposals of Executive as elaborated upon by Goldmann might be regarded as certain alterations and extensions in various provisions Morrison plan rather than outlines of an entirely new plan. Counterproposals, for instance, contemplate short definite rather than indefinite transition period, and extension of authority of local govt during such period. According to Goldmann Jews wish their area during period nominate its own ministers subject approval Mandatory; they desire this area should have authority deal with such matters as imports and exports and borrowing money even though they realize creditors would have to be persons or organizations willing rely upon credit of transitory govt. They also insist area have right fully control its own immigration. Boundaries which they apparently have in mind furthermore are much more liberal to Jews than those defined in Morrison proposals. They admit Negeb might be of problematic value but insist it is of great psychological importance in that it added many square miles Jewish area.

Section V. Brit Govt undoubtedly in better position than we to assess kind of reception which such plan would receive from Arabs. In our view this recent development offers hope that Jewish Agency will realistically join in search for practicable solution. As first step we suggest possibility that Brit Govt might let it be known that coming consultations will not be rigidly bound to consideration one plan and the possibility of early creation of viable state of Jewish portion not precluded. If Brit Govt, following consultations with Arabs and

46 For documentation on this subject, see pp. 794 ff.
Jews, reaches decision which this Govt feels can obtain general public approval this country even though not satisfactory to extremists, this Govt will give it moral support and endeavor back it up with appropriate financial assistance.

Section VI. You are authorized discuss matter with Attlee, Bevin or Acting Minister Foreign Affairs. Please impress upon them importance of extreme secrecy.

Sent London 5973 rptd Paris 4037 (Secdel 657) for Secretary Byrnes and Ambassador Harriman.\textsuperscript{41}

ACHESON

867N.01/S-1246 : Telegram

\textit{President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Attlee)}\textsuperscript{42}

\textbf{TOP SECRET} \hspace{1cm} \textbf{WASHINGTON, August 12, 1946—6 p. m.}

\textbf{US URGENT}

I appreciate your courtesy in furnishing me information contained urtel Aug. 9.

After further study of recommendations of American and Brit groups and after detailed discussion in which members my cabinet and other advisers participated, I have reluctantly come to conclusion that I can not give formal support to plan in its present form as a joint Anglo-American plan.

The opposition in this country to the plan has become so intense that it is now clear it would be impossible to rally in favor of it sufficient public opinion enable this Govt to give it effective support.

In view critical situation Palestine and of desperate plight of homeless Jews in Europe I believe search for a solution to this difficult problem should continue. I have therefore instructed our Embassy London discuss with you or with appropriate members of Brit Govt certain suggestions which have been made to us and which, I understand, are also being made to you.\textsuperscript{43}

Should it be possible to broaden coming conference sufficiently to consider these suggestions, it is my earnest hope conference may make possible decision by your Govt upon a course for which we can obtain necessary support in this country and in the Congress so we can give effective financial help and moral support.

\textsuperscript{41} In telegram 4005 (Delsec 818), from Paris, August 13, 7 p. m., Ambassador Harriman stated: “I gave to Mr. Bevin the substance of your Secdel 657. Although Mr. Bevin indicated he was familiar with the proposals outlined by Dr. Goldmann as they appeared to be the same as those made to the British Government by Dr. Welzmann, he said that he would study the matter and discuss it later.” (740.00119 Council/8-1346).

\textsuperscript{42} Sent to London as Department’s telegram 5974, with the instruction: “Please transmit following message from President to Attlee.” The Department repeated the telegram to Paris for Secretary Byrnes and Ambassador Harriman “for presentation to Attlee if he is in Paris.”

\textsuperscript{43} See telegram 5973, supra.
TOP SECRET

LONDON, 15 August 1946.

Personal and Top Secret. Thank you for your personal message of August 13th [12th]. I have now received from the Foreign Secretary in Paris a copy of the message sent by the State Department to Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Harriman. We are discussing these proposals and it will probably take a few days before we can give our views on them.

867N.01/8-1546: Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

CAIRO, August 15, 1946—2 p.m.
[Received 3:46 p.m.]

1383. Conference Arab Foreign Ministers Alexandria which ends tonight after official dinner by Egyptian Foreign Minister has run true to expectations. Official communiqué after three sessions stressed complete unity adoption of decision supporting Palestine Arab aspirations, acceptance invitation London conference where Arab position will be governed by Bludan decisions and coordination of Arab policy to [at?] UN in accordance with interest of Arab states lasting peace and humane collaboration between nations. Election chairman Arab delegation to London apparently postponed.

Informal talks with various Ministers indicate that while they completely reject partition in any form and reflect resentment of American participation in Palestine problem they also face future with misgivings and without apparent program other than submission of Palestine to UN should London conference break down as they anticipate it will. Arab Higher Committee members called before Ministers said to be dissatisfied with policies adopted by conference on which Azzam Pasha and Lutfi el-Sayed, who presided, had restraining influence. Committee reported contemplating direct appeal to populace each Arab country. Local Arab press criticism of Arab League as “do nothing” organization has increased. Jamali and Faisal while deploring violence agree that something drastic must be done to save Palestine.

Repeated to London. Copies to Arab capitals.

PATTERSON

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44 Copy transmitted to Mr. Acheson by the British Minister in Washington (Balfour) on August 15.
45 Ahmed Lutfi el-Sayed, Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
46 Fadhill Jamali, Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs.
TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 15, 1946—3 p. m.

US URGENT

4112. For Harriman. I have discussed with President information contained in your 4084 and 4089 47 which proved most helpful. We have been greatly distressed here at continuing leaks regarding Palestine and have made every effort to maintain most absolute secrecy at this stage. In circumstances we are inclined to believe leaks must have come from Brit sources and from Goldmann himself. Brit must realize of course that sentiment in Congress and among public at large has been aroused to such an extent that most extreme caution must be exercised if we are to obtain Congressional approval to those aspects of plan calling for financial assistance and for admission of additional refugees into this country.

With regard to third paragraph your 4089 48 President has approved and contemplates issuing Friday afternoon a statement which we believe will contain reassurance on question of migration to places other than Palestine and which at same time constitutes most President feels he could say in a positive manner regarding present situation in view of considerations which I mentioned above. Statement of which you should give Brit advance copy reads: 49

"Although the President has been exchanging views with Mr. Attlee on the subject, this Government has not presented any plan of its own for the solution of the problem of Palestine. It is the sincere hope of the President, however, that as a result of the proposed conversations between the British Government and Jewish and Arab representatives a fair solution of the problem of Palestine can be found and immediate steps can be taken to alleviate the situation of the displaced Jews in Europe. It is clear that no settlement of the Palestine problem can be achieved which will be fully satisfactory to all of the parties concerned and that if this problem is to be solved in a manner which will bring peace and prosperity to Palestine, it must be approached in a spirit of conciliation."

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47 Telegrams dated August 15 from Paris; neither printed.
48 This paragraph stated: "Bevin further said that the Cabinet was considering laying the original plan before the Jews and Arabs in the pending conferences with the statement that they were prepared to receive from both sides counter-proposals. He is fearful that the Arabs will not acquiesce in any plan unless other nations will take some of the Jews from Europe and therefore unless the first proposal of the original plan is approved by the American Government; namely, dealing with the problem of the resettlement of the displaced persons, including Jews on a worldwide basis. "He pointed out that no mention had been made in our message of this point and specifically asked me to find out whether the President was prepared to join by recommending to Congress the admission of additional immigration to the United States. He asked that I obtain an urgent reply on this." (S67N.01/8-1546)
49 This statement was released by the White House on August 16.
It is also evident that the solution of the Palestine question will not in itself solve the broader problem of the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons in Europe. The President has been giving this problem his special attention and hopes that arrangements can be entered into which will make it possible for various countries, including the United States, to admit many of these persons as permanent residents. The President on his part is contemplating seeking the approval of Congress for special legislation authorizing the entry into the United States of a fixed number of these persons, including Jews."

Sent Paris for Harriman; repeated London.

ACHESON

867N.01/8-1546: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, August 15, 1946—10 p.m.

US URGENT

[Received August 15—7:08 p.m.]

7552. Personal for the Acting Secretary. At Attlee's request I called on him this afternoon. Hall, Colonial Secretary, was with him. Hall has seen Weizmann, Goldmann and Wise. They discussed with him their plan and attempted to make as a condition of the Jewish Agency's acceptance the British invitation to the consultations that their plan be made the basis of the discussions. Hall explained to them that the British Government could not accept this condition. The British Government would propose the original plan but were fully ready to consider the Jewish Agency proposals and proposals from the Arabs as well. Goldmann and Wise have returned to Paris to consult the other members of the Jewish Agency Executive and will inform the British Government promptly whether they will agree to accept the invitation to the consultations. Hall believes they will accept. Hall told me that the Jewish Agency had evidently been under the misapprehension that the British Government had intended to put forward its plan in a rigid manner for acceptance without deviation; whereas, the British Government was in fact entirely flexible and were prepared to give full consideration to both Jewish and Arab proposals. Hall told me on further development that the Agency's conception of the boundary of the Negeb area runs further north than that of the British. This may prove to be a difficulty in that it encompasses Arab communities of considerable population. Hall wished that this be kept in the strictest confidence as he thought it was unwise to have premature public discussions of this point prior to the consultations.
Mr. Attlee was desirous that the President should know of these developments for his information. He showed equal concern as Bevin had regarding the resettlement plan for the Jews in Europe including Jews on a world-wide basis and expressed the earnest hope that the President would support it. He emphasized the importance that this would have on the Arab reaction at the consultations.

Repeated to Paris, for the Secretary as 629.

HARRIMAN

867N.01/8-1746

The Secretary of State to Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, at Paris

PARIS, August 17, 1946.

DEAR DR. WISE: I have been so busy with the work of the Peace Conference that I have not had an opportunity to answer your note

50 as to seeing Dr. Goldmann about the Palestine matter.

Much as I regret not complying with any request of yours, I feel

that I should not hold conferences on this subject.

For the past year President Truman has had personal charge of

the Palestine problem. Communications between the British Govern- ment and the United States Government have been carried on by the

President and Mr. Attlee—not by Mr. Bevin and me.51

When the Peace Conference convened July 29, Mr. Attlee came to

Paris. Just at that time the press carried stories about the meeting of

the representatives of our Cabinet Committee and the British Com- mittee. The President requested me to see Mr. Attlee and also to talk with the representatives of our Cabinet Committee. I

communicated to the President their views and on the same day advised

him of the views expressed by you and Dr. Goldmann on the occasion

of your visit with me that morning.

Since that time I have not talked with the President or with any

official of the British Government as to the Palestine matter.

As long as the President is handling the matter I feel that I should

not confer with the interested parties unless requested to do so by the

President. Any interference by me without his request and without

knowing what his views are might be harmful instead of helpful.

Tell Dr. Goldmann that I regret I cannot see him upon this matter

but I am sure the President will be glad to give consideration to any

views Dr. Goldmann submits to him.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES F. BYRNE
The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 19 August, 1946.

Personal and Top Secret. I am now in a position to give a fuller reply to your message of the 13th [12th] August.

2. It is, of course, a great disappointment to us that you should feel yourself unable to give support to the plan recommended by the Anglo-American Expert Delegations. The discussion of the summary of this plan which we recently presented to Parliament will form the first item on the agenda at the coming conference. We earnestly hope that, as a result of the conference, some solution will emerge which, even if not fully accepted by either Arabs or Jews, may be possible of implementation without too greatly endangering the peace of Palestine or of the Middle East as a whole. But you will appreciate that any such solution must, as matters stand, be one which we can put into effect with our resources alone.

3. As regards the plan of partition submitted by the Jewish Agency, it is, as I have said, our intention to place the outlines of the provincial autonomy plan before the conference. On various matters, and in particular as regards the boundaries of the provinces and degree of self-Government to be conceded to them, we designedly refrain from committing ourselves in any way when presenting the plan to Parliament. While we are adopting the plan as the initial basis for discussion, we do not propose to take up an immovable position in regard either to the plan itself or to its constituent features in advance of the conference.

4. It is actually open to the Jews or to the Arabs, if they accept our invitation to attend the conference, to propose alterations in the outline plan as announced, to make recommendations as to its details or to submit counterproposals. All such proposals and recommendations will be given due consideration.

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Harriman), at Paris

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1946—3 p. m.

US URGE NT NIC ACT

4233. For Ambassador Harriman. Goldmann informed us by telephone this morning from Paris substantially as follows:

1. He had had number of useful constructive talks with Bevin and other members Brit Govt but had reached impasse apparently because attitude of Hall.

Copy transmitted to Mr. Acheson by the British Ambassador on August 19.

For a slightly different version of this message, see Francis Williams, A Prime Minister Remembers, p. 119.
2. In view attitude extreme Zionists in America, particularly Silver group,\footnote{Executive Agency could not agree as to attend conference called consider proposals other than those looking towards establishment Jewish state following partition.}

3. Chief Arab Dept Jewish Agency had had conversations with responsible Arab leaders Cairo who confidentially and informally stated they also agreeable discuss definite partition.

4. Agency had proposed that preliminary to opening formal conferences there should be arranged secret informal conversations between Brit and Jews and Brit and Arabs with idea these preliminary conversations might find mutually agreeable bases for formal conferences. Bevin seemed rather sympathetic suggestion; Hall opposed preliminary conversations and insisted that only formal conference be held primarily to consider Morrison proposals although prepared consider such other proposals as might be advanced. Goldmann says Arabs also favorable preliminary conversations since fanatical extremists Arab countries would render it difficult for them to begin openly to make compromises.

5. In view critical situation it was extremely important that we informally approach Brit and in some manner indicate we consider preliminary conversations might be useful and that we have concern lest failure arrange such conversations might render holding conference impossible.

We have made no undertakings to Goldmann but have informed him we shall give matter consideration. We hesitate instruct that approach be made Brit Govt since we are not acquainted with atmosphere present informal talks nor with all factors involved. It would appear to us from Goldmann’s statements that conference would have better chance of success if preliminary informal conversations could be held which would give Jews and Arabs chance to talk freely and privately. We leave to your discretion whether it might serve useful purpose for you to discuss this matter informally with Bevin or other appropriate Brit officials. Goldmann says final decision may be taken in Cabinet meeting tomorrow.

Repeated to London.

\footnote{The group supporting Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, President of the Zionist Organization of America.}

Acheson

740.00119 Council/S-2146 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Harriman) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

PARIS, August 21, 1946—noon.

[Received August 21—10:38 a.m.]

4141. Delsce 835. Personal for the Acting Secretary from Harriman. I called on Bevin yesterday evening to learn the recent developments in the Palestine situation.
He said that the President's statement on resettlement of displaced persons would be of real help in dealing with the Arabs at the consultations.

His immediate difficulty is with the Jewish Agency. As reported in the press he has seen several times in Paris representatives of the Jewish Agency, including Dr. Goldmann and Rabbi Wise. They have demanded that their proposal be accepted by the British Government as the basis for discussions at the proposed consultations. Bevin replied that the British Government intended to submit its proposal but would be glad to consider any amendments or any plan proposed by either the Jews or the Arabs, that if the Jewish Agency accepted the invitation to the consultations the British Govt would work earnestly and patiently to find an acceptable solution. Bevin considers that in his conversations with the Agency Representatives he has met and gone beyond our suggestions contained in Secdel 657 and that the British Govt cannot go any further prior to the consultations. He must give consideration to the reaction of the Arab States, all of whom have already accepted invitation to consultations.

On Sunday he had word from the Jews that they declined to participate except on their terms.

He feels that the Jewish Agency is overplaying its hand and still hopes that they will be more reasonable but in any event that there is no course open to the British Government but to stand on its present position.

In reply to my question, Bevin told me he had confidence that the British Military now have control of the terrorists in Palestine.

Repeated to London as 628.

[HARRIMAN]

740.00119 Council/8-2146 : Telegram
The Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Harriman) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
US URGENT
[Received August 21—2:49 p.m.]

4160. Delsc 837. Personal for the Acting Secretary from Harriman. My message Delsc 835 describing my discussion with Bevin yesterday crossed your 4233 to Paris.55

My comments given below on your message are based on yesterday's and other previous conversations with Bevin, Attlee and Hall:

Point 1. Bevin looks upon the Palestine question as his own primary responsibility since it is a major Governmental foreign policy

54 This was a repeat of Department's telegram 5973, August 12, to London, p. 679.
55 Supra.
56 Dated August 20, p. 687.
and not a colonial policy. He naturally consults Hall, but I cannot believe that Bevin would be influenced by Hall against his better judgment.

Point 2. In different conversation Bevin, Attlee and Hall have all specifically emphasized that they are not insisting that the Conference should consider the British proposal as a basis for discussion. As previously reported they have stated that the British proposal will be submitted to the Conference and that they are entirely open to any amendments or new plans. As I understand it they are not opposed to the consideration of any proposals for partition and for establishment within a certain time of a Jewish state.

On the other hand, Bevin has made it plain to me that the Jewish Agency must appreciate that he cannot condone or negotiate with extreme Zionists whom he believes have been responsible for the development of terrorist psychology.

Point 3. No comment.

Points 4 and 5. Bevin has not mentioned to me the idea of preliminary conversations. I assume he did not consider the idea as practicable. I see no objections to my asking him about it informally as a matter of information and will do so at the first opportunity.57 I hope, however, that the Jewish Agency will not be informed of this.

I am glad to learn that the Department has made no undertakings to Goldmann and I sincerely hope that the Department will find it possible to inform Goldmann that it cannot involve itself in the Jewish Agency’s negotiations with the British Government regarding conditions precedent to the conference beyond the steps taken last week.

Repeated London as 631.

HARRIMAN

867N.01/S-2946: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Goldman)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1946—6 p. m.

6364. We have discussed informally with Brit Embassy desire of American Council for Judaism (anti-Zionist) as stated in letter addressed to me by its President, Lessing J. Rosenwald, that Jewish representation in proposed London talks should not be confined to Agency. We learned Embassy had received information from FonOff similar to that contained fourth paragraph your 7875 Aug 29 58 indi-

57 In telegram 4194, August 23, 4 p. m., from Paris (Delsic 846), Mr. Harriman reported that Mr. Bevin had informed the Jewish representatives that the British Government was unwilling to approach the Arab states regarding preliminary conversations. Mr. Bevin felt that since the Arabs had agreed to accept the British invitation to the Conference, he was unwilling to risk a refusal on their part to attend if further suggestions were made prior to the Conference. (740.00119 Council/8-2346)

58 Not printed.
cating Brit Govt is at least contemplating inviting other Jewish groups although apparently final decision this respect not yet reached. With Embassy’s approval we informed Rosenwald orally of this.

Dept’s decision that this Govt should not participate in forthcoming conversations was communicated to you in our 5572 July 23. We have received inquiries from press regarding possibility that Govt might send observers but after consideration of matter in light of present circumstances we are stating decision has been reached to have no observers present, although Dept will of course follow developments closely.

Sent London, repeated Paris for Harriman.

ACHESON

867N.01/9-546: Circular telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers

WASHINGTON, September 5, 1946.

At press conference Sept 5 President was asked whether he would like to say what he had told Brit on Palestine problem some time ago. President replied that all had been made public. When correspondent pointed out President’s reply to Attlee had never been made public President said substance had been made public, adding that what he was trying to do was get 100,000 Jews into Palestine and he was still interested in it.

Correspondent remarked that it had never been officially stated that our Govt had turned down Grady-Morrison plan and he inquired whether we rejected it, to which President said it was still under consideration. Asked whether he would go along with $300,000,000 loan in Grady-Morrison plan, President replied that was still under consideration and he would rather not make any statement until whole program had been decided. Correspondent inquired whether we were going send any observers to Anglo-Arab-Jewish conference London, to which President replied in negative stating we were not interested in it. Asked if what he had said about Palestine meant discussions were still under way between American and Brit Govts President replied in affirmative stating discussions were still going on London.

CLAYTON

*At London, Paris, Moscow, Beirut, Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus, Jidda, and Jerusalem.

*For full transcript of President Truman’s press conference of September 5, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1946, p. 423.
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Wilson)\textsuperscript{a1}

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] September 5, 1946.

Participants: Mr. Eliahu Epstein, Jewish Agency
Mr. Henderson—NEA
Mr. Merriam—NE
Mr. Wilson—NE

Subject: Refusal of Jewish Agency to Participate in London Conference.

Mr. Epstein called at the request of Dr. Goldmann, of the Agency Executive, to inform the Department that the Executive had reluctantly decided that it could not accept the invitation of the British Government to the proposed conference on Palestine under the conditions proposed. The decision had been unanimous and had included Dr. Weizmann and Dr. Goldmann. In order not to embarrass the British Government the Agency was not making the decision public, and Mr. Epstein requested that this information be kept confidential. He said that the decision had only been reached after the most serious consideration, but that the terms imposed by the British for the Agency’s attendance were not acceptable. The most serious obstacle in this connection was the insistence of the British on putting forward the Morrison–Grady plan as the basis for discussion.

In the light of the well-known position of the Zionist movement with regard to a Jewish state, it was impossible for the leaders of that movement to participate in a conference on any other basis than that of a Jewish state in at least a part of Palestine. The Zionist movement, Mr. Epstein said, was a democratic movement and its leaders had to follow the desires of the rank and file. Constitutionally they could not enter into negotiations on any other basis than that of a Jewish state without the consent of the movement through a Zionist congress. In fact, the decision of the Executive to accept partition as a basis for entering into the negotiations represented a very marked modification from the official Zionist position as enunciated in the Biltmore program.\textsuperscript{a2} For the sake of entering into negotiations with the British which would give some hope of a settlement in Palestine, the Executive had been willing to proceed on the basis of partition, but

\textsuperscript{a1} A copy of this memorandum was transmitted to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Clayton) by Mr. Henderson on the same date. In his covering memorandum Mr. Henderson noted that the decision of the Jewish Agency not to participate in the forthcoming talks in London regarding Palestine “is a most serious development, as it is not likely that a satisfactory settlement can result from a conference between the British and the Arabs only.” (867N.01/9-546)

\textsuperscript{a2} Program adopted by the Extraordinary Conference of American Zionists at the Biltmore Hotel, New York City, on May 11, 1942, calling for the establishment of the whole of Palestine as a Jewish Commonwealth.
it was entirely unwilling to enter into negotiations with regard to the Morrison-Grady scheme. Their objections to this latter scheme were chiefly in connection with its failure to give the Jews sufficient assurances regarding immigration and autonomy in economic matters.

In other words, Mr. Epstein continued, the Agency was unwilling to be placed in a position where it might have to compromise between the Morrison-Grady proposals on the one hand and its own partition plan on the other. This would inevitably result if the Morrison-Grady plan were to be considered first.

Mr. Wilson inquired whether it would be correct to say that the Agency Executive had now accepted partition as the solution for Palestine which it favored. Mr. Epstein replied in the affirmative, pointing out that the decision to do so had been taken with only one member of the Executive voting against, and with three members abstaining. (This apparently referred to the meeting of the Agency Executive in Paris last month when the Morrison-Grady scheme was rejected but the decision was taken to negotiate with the British regarding partition under certain conditions.)

Mr. Epstein said that the situation was extremely serious, both from the standpoint of reaching a settlement in Palestine and from the standpoint of the future course that the Zionist movement would take. He very much feared that as a result of these developments the extremists would take over in Palestine as well as in the American Zionist organization. He could not foresee what course events would take and he had no specific request to make of the Department. Dr. Goldmann and Dr. Weizmann were conferring with regard to possible future action and it might be that he would have some word soon as to what might develop. Meanwhile Dr. Goldmann was maintaining a very tenuous contact with the British Government and it was to be hoped that this contact would not be broken.

Mr. Henderson thanked Mr. Epstein for this full account of the present position and said that he would inform Acting Secretary Clayton.

867N.01/3-1246

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

[WASHINGTON,] September 12, 1946.

Rabbi Wise and certain other Zionists are urging that you should issue at once a statement in favor of partition in Palestine. It is apparently the idea of certain relatively moderate elements among the Zionists that if the American Government does this, the Jewish Agency may be able to persuade the British Government to accept partition as the basis for the present London talks on Palestine, thereby enabling the Agency to participate in the talks with a view
to working out an eventual settlement of the problem. These elements also hope that a statement of this kind will strengthen them against the more extreme and anti-Administration Zionists who insist on all of Palestine being converted into an independent Jewish state.

Upon consideration of this matter we do not feel that it would be advisable for you to issue such a statement at this time, for the following reasons:

1. We do not believe that any statement at all should be issued by this Government during the course of the present conversations. The situation in London is very delicate and without full knowledge of all the complicated elements in the situation we might do more harm than good by intervening at this time. This is evidently the view of such observers on the spot as Secretary Byrnes and Ambassador Harriman. In this connection you may wish to bear in mind the recommendation of Secretary Byrnes at the time the decision was taken not to take part in the British announcement of the Morrison-Grady proposals, to the effect that you might wish to avoid making any further public statements with regard to Palestine, and specifically with regard to the 100,000 Jews, for the time being. Ambassador Harriman also, in a recent telegram, expressed the view after talking to Prime Minister Attlee, Foreign Secretary Bevin and other British officials, that in the circumstances we should not involve ourselves in the matter beyond the steps which we have already taken.

2. If we yield to the pressure of highly organized Zionist groups just now and make statements calculated to give support to their policies of the moment, we shall merely be encouraging them to make fresh demands and to apply pressure in the future whenever they conceive it to be in their interest for this Government to make further statements on their behalf. In any event, we do not believe that, without sacrificing the public interests, we shall be able to go far and fast enough in rendering them support to keep them satisfied very long. It seems to us that it would be wiser to make it clear to them now in the most friendly manner that the Government itself must determine when it is in the interests of the United States to make statements with regard to Palestine and that in the present instance, the Government is of the opinion that it is in the best interests of the United States and for that matter of the Zionists themselves for it to remain silent.

3. Any statement by this Government approving partition would mean that we had gone contrary to the recommendations both of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry and of the experts who drew up the Morrison-Grady scheme. This would undoubtedly give rise to the impression that we are adopting a policy on an important matter in order to satisfy a particular Zionist group.
4. The attitude of the Arab world toward the United States has become progressively hostile in the last few months. Our Joint Chiefs of Staff, who feel that the United States has a vital security interest in the Middle East, have urged that we take no action with regard to Palestine which might orient the peoples of the entire area away from the Western Powers. The Arabs have always been fundamentally opposed to the partition of Palestine and their adverse reaction to a statement by us favoring that solution would be intensified by the knowledge that we have taken such a position only after it had been adhered to by certain Zionist leaders.

It may be, however, that after considering the matter you may find that for other reasons it would be preferable for you to make another statement on the subject. We have accordingly prepared the attached draft, which in our opinion represents the most that should be said at this time.

W. L. CLAYTON

[Annex]

DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

As I pointed out last week, the American Government is not being represented at the present conversations in London relative to the future of Palestine. We are, however, deeply interested in the outcome of these conversations and hope that they will point the way to a settlement which may bring peace and prosperity to the people of Palestine. We also hope that before the conversations are concluded, representatives of the Jews, as well as of the Palestinian Arabs, may find it possible to participate.

In this regard, I am sure that the work of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, under the chairmanship of Judge Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., and of the British and American group in which the alternates of the Cabinet Committee on Palestine and Related Problems participated under the chairmanship of Ambassador Henry F. Grady, will prove of real assistance to those who are now endeavoring to work out an equitable solution to the problem. I have already made it clear that this Government has not put forward any concrete proposals in connection with the present conversations, nor is it committed to any single plan with regard to the future of Palestine. The United States would, however, be prepared to give its support to any concrete proposals calling for the eventual establishment of an independent state or of independent states in Palestine, provided such proposals would be in keeping with the basic principles of the Mandate for Palestine and would have a sufficient degree of acceptance among those most directly concerned to give good grounds for the hope that they could be successfully put into effect.
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, September 17, 1946—3 p. m.  
[Received September 17—11:51 a.m.]

8214. Following report of yesterday's private meeting Palestine conference has been communicated Embassy verbally by Secretary British delegation.

B Evin and Hall attended. Former delivered Govt's commentary drafted over week-end on Arab statements (Emb 8153, Sept 13 64). He said Govt's plan was carefully considered and took into account international aspects. Any solution must take into account absence common ground between Arabs and Jews. Answer seemed to lie in separation of two communities. Bevin wished make clear to Arabs that further immigration cannot be dismissed from problem because plight Jews and displaced persons in general makes immigration essential. Bevin gave following as five essential elements to any solution:

1. There are 600,000 Jews in Palestine who will insist on their political rights not only as individuals but as community.
2. There can be no settlement which does not admit further Jewish immigration.
3. Palestine cannot remain indefinitely under tutelage but must progress towards independence.
4. Therefore some institutions must be set up which will enable both peoples in Palestine to govern themselves more and more.
5. Tension in Palestine for last 10 years must be ended.

General discussion followed Bevin's commentary. British inquired regarding Arab counter-proposals and asked whether they would take into account five points above.

Arabs said they would like to consider Bevin's commentary and that they would comment upon it in day or two. When Arabs are ready next meeting will be arranged possibly Thursday.

Secretary British delegation said it was uncertain whether Arabs would merely comment next meeting or would comment and then present Arab counter-proposals. British are not inclined to rush matters.

GALLMAN

63 The Conference on Palestine had opened on September 10 at Lancaster House, London, with a speech by Prime Minister Attlee to the Arab delegations, replied to by the Syrian delegate as spokesman for the Arabs the following day. At a private session Foreign Minister Bevin had emphasized the common interests of the United Kingdom and the Arabs to preserve the peace in the Middle East, had spelled out certain conditions to this end, and had proposed to table the Morrison plan as basis for discussions. (867N.01/9-1046, /9-1146)
64 Not printed; it reported on two lengthy sessions on September 12 during which each of the Arab delegates had made long statements expressing dislike of the Morrison plan (867N.01/9-1846).
SECRET

LONDON, September 20, 1946—7 p. m.
[Received September 21—1:42 a.m.]

8333. Armstrong, Secretary British Delegation Palestine Conference, gave Embassy today in strict confidence following résumé of recent Jewish Agency approaches to British Government regarding participation Conference.

On September 14 Dr. Goldmann saw Bevin and Hall together. He stated that Jewish Agency was now prepared to attend Conference to state its views. Regarding Jewish Agency representation, he was told that no members of the Executive now detained or liable to detention would be received at conference. Goldmann said that Jews would not insist on this point but they would like invitations extended to a number of American Jews outside Jewish Agency. To this last British replied that a number of difficulties would be involved but no decision was taken. At Goldmann’s suggestion an agreed communiqué was drafted stating that on September 17 Jewish Agency would begin to participate to state its views.

On September 16 Goldmann requested that the communiqué should be held up in order for him to consult with his Jewish Agency colleagues overseas. On September 19, according British source, Goldmann and Locker saw Bevin and Hall and asked British to permit members of the Executive now detained to form part of Jewish Agency delegation. Shertok was mentioned particularly. Bevin and Hall said that they considered this request contrary to position which they understood was agreed September 14 and that British could not receive this category of delegate. Bevin said there would be no objection to Jewish Agency asking American Jews other than members of Jewish Agency to attend Conference as observers.

Locker is flying Palestine today to put British position, including British intransigence re delegates, before Action Committee which will meet Sunday.

Goldmann called at Embassy today and gave much the same account of his negotiations except that, according to him no agreement was reached on September 14 re Jewish Agency representation. He understood that British were prepared to consider a specific list of suggested Jewish Agency delegates. It was surprise to him to learn September 19 that British would make no exception. He said that personally he was doubtful that Action Committee would approve participation without at least one or two such figures as Shertok. In eleventh hour

*Berl Locker, member of the Executive of the Jewish Agency.
effort to remove British on this point he said that he was sending today to Hall a tentative list of 35 Jewish Agency delegates including Shertok and Ben-Gurion, with thought that while British might delete certain names the principle of a representative Jewish Agency delegation would be assured. Goldmann recalled that in 1939 British had released Arabs to attend conference and said that present British intrusigence re detained members Executive made him wonder whether British desired solution. If Action Committee refuses to attend Goldmann said that he would return to United States at once.

At Conference today consideration was given to Arabs counter-proposals (Embassy's 8381 to Department repeated Jerusalem 67, September 19) which were handed British late yesterday. Substance counter-proposals is still secret.

Sent Department 8333; repeated Jerusalem 68.

GALLMAN

867N.01/9-2346 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, September 23, 1946—5 p. m.
[Received September 25—2:27 a.m.]

8349. Embassy's 8333, September 20. Following substance six Arab counter-proposals handed British September 19 as made available to Embassy by Armstrong, Secretary British delegation Palestine Conference.

1. Mandate should be terminated and independent Palestine declared as "unitary state".
2. Democratic government should be established in accordance with constitution to be laid down by elected constituent assembly.
3. Provisions should be made guaranteeing Jews all essential rights and safeguards normally enjoyed by minorities.
4. Jewish immigration should stop immediately and future immigration should be left entirely to future government of Palestine.
5. Friendly relations between Palestine as independent state and Great Britain should be established by treaty of alliance.
6. Guarantees should be given in a suitable instrument for sanctity of holy places, including free access without distinction religion or language.

At Conference meeting September 20 (Embassy's 8333, September 20) Arabs agreed British suggestion that committee of Conference, including one representative each delegation, Sir Norman Brook for

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*Not printed.
*For text of the formal constitutional proposals submitted by the delegations of the Arab States to the Palestine Conference on September 30, 1946, see British Cmd. 7044, Palestine No. 1 (1947), p. 9.
British and Secretary General Arab League, should meet to examine informally practical application Arab counter-proposals which are stated in broad terms. British made clear that at this stage there is no question of accepting Arab counter-proposals as basis for discussion.

First committee meeting held September 21 and second today. In British opinion such meetings may occupy remainder this week. Armstrong states there is nothing new re Jewish Agency participation (Embassy’s 8333, September 20).

Gallman

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Villard) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Clayton)

[WASHINGTON,] September 27, 1946.

1) When departing for San Francisco last week, Mr. Henderson instructed his office to endeavor to arrange that Mr. Wadsworth, our Minister to Syria and Lebanon who is now in the Department for consultation, call on the President and on you.

Mr. Wadsworth’s call on the President was arranged for yesterday. Unfortunately, you were unable to receive him before that time. We had thought that you might wish to comment on his proposed remarks to the President.

A copy of his “Outline of Remarks” is, therefore, now attached for your information; and it is supplemented by his memorandum of his conversation with Mr. Truman.68

2) The conversation dealt primarily and in interesting fashion with several aspects of the Palestine problem, the major theme being that, as an international problem, it could appropriately be dealt with on the international plane at the forthcoming United Nations General Assembly.

Mr. Wadsworth gathered the impression that, if the matter were to be so considered, the President would wish: (a) That the pressing problem of the European Jewish refugees be kept in the forefront of our thinking; and (b) That, in any solution of the Palestine problem itself, it be recognized that, while there could be no Jewish State, Jews in Palestine could be guaranteed protection under some local autonomy arrangement under the control of a power which would be responsible as well for defense, foreign affairs and finance.

[The remainder of this memorandum deals with the request by the Syrian Government for assistance by the United States Government in engaging census experts.]

68 Neither found in Department files.
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

US URGENT

London, October 2, 1946.
[Received October 2—12: 46 p.m.]

8572. Following is text communique issued this afternoon by Secretariat Palestine Conference:

"A full meeting of the Palestine Conference was held at Lancaster House this morning. The Conference received a report from the Joint Committee which has been studying the proposals put forward by the Arab delegations. The British delegation indicated that his Majesty's Government would wish to have further time in which to give full consideration to these proposals and suggested that at this stage the Conference should be adjourned for an interval.

His Majesty's Government would have wished and the Arab delegations shared this view that the interval should be short in view of the great urgency of reaching a settlement of the Palestine problem. It was recognized, however, that the timetable already arranged for other international meetings would prevent the early resumption of the discussions. Many of the delegates will have to leave London for New York in about two weeks time in order to represent their governments at the General Assembly of the United Nations. Thereafter, the British Foreign Secretary will be occupied for a time with important meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers. In these circumstances, it was agreed that the earliest practicable date on which the Conference could be resumed was 16th December 1946. It was accordingly agreed that the Conference should stand adjourned until that date." [3]

Gallman

857N.01/10-346: Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to the British Embassy

London, 2 October, 1946.

The British and Arab delegations participating in the London Conference on Palestine met on 2nd October after an interval during which the Arab proposals had been examined in a joint committee. This committee was appointed to elucidate the meaning and implications of the Arab proposals. This they succeeded in doing and the revised draft was accordingly presented to the full Conference as the Arab plan.

2. As the British delegation were not in a position to state the views of His Majesty's Government on the Arab plan they asked for an

*Copy transmitted to Mr. Acheson by the British Ambassador on October 3 on instructions from the British Foreign Office to communicate the message to the Acting Secretary of State.
adjournment. The Arab delegations agreed to this and to the terms of a communiqué which has been issued to the press (text in my immediately following telegram.79)

3. Among the reasons stated by the British delegation for their need to consider the problem further before declaring their attitude to the Arab proposals were the facts that they had not yet heard the Jewish point of view and the prospect now offered that the Jewish Agency might send a delegation to London. In deference to Arab wishes, however, this consideration was not included in the communiqué.

4. Together with the Colonial Secretary, I received Dr. Weizmann with some of his colleagues including two from Palestine on 1st October. It was again explained to them that His Majesty’s Government could not agree to release the detained Zionist leaders as the price of Jewish participation in the Conference. We were prepared, however, to examine with them the possibility of a truce in Palestine as a result of which the Jewish Agency would cooperate with the Administration in the restoration and maintenance of law and order, thus enabling the detainees to be released. It was agreed that the Jewish representatives would meet the Colonial Secretary again to discuss this matter and that when the position had been clarified in this respect they would resume contact with me on the broader issue.

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867N.01/10-346: Telegram

President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Attlee)71

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, October 3, 1946—1 p.m.

US URGENT NIAC

I deeply regret that it has been found necessary to postpone further meetings of the Palestine Conference in London until Dec 16 and I sincerely hope that it will be found possible in the interim to begin moving on a large scale the 100,000 displaced Jews in Europe who are awaiting admission to Palestine.

In view of the deep sympathy of the American people for these unfortunate victims of Nazi persecution in Europe and of the hopes in this country that a fair and workable solution of the Palestine problem be reached as soon as possible I find it necessary to make a further statement at once on the subject. Attached hereto is a copy of the statement which I am planning to issue tomorrow Oct 4:

“I have learned with deep regret that the meetings of the Palestine Conference in London have been adjourned and are not to be resumed

79 Telegram not printed; for text of communiqué, see supra.
71 Sent to London as Department’s telegram 6959, with the instruction: “Please deliver at earliest possible moment following message from the President to the Prime Minister.” The telegram was repeated to the Secretary of State in Paris as No. 6257 (Secdel 1037).
until Dec 16, 1946. In the light of this situation it is appropriate to examine the record of the Administration’s efforts in this field, efforts which have been supported in and out of Congress by members of both political parties, and to state my views on the situation as it now exists.

It will be recalled that when Mr. Earl Harrison 72 reported on Sep 29, 1945 concerning the condition of displaced persons in Europe, I immediately urged that steps be taken to relieve the situation of these persons to the extent at least of admitting 100,000 Jews into Palestine. In response to this suggestion the British Government invited the Government of the United States to cooperate in setting up a joint Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, an invitation which this Government was happy to accept in the hope that its participation would help to alleviate the situation of the displaced Jews in Europe and would assist in finding a solution for the difficult and complex problem of Palestine itself. The urgency with which this Government regarded the matter is reflected in the fact that a 120-day limit was set for the completion of the Committee’s task.

The unanimous report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry was made on April 20, 1946, and I was gratified to note that among the recommendations contained in the Report was an endorsement of my previous suggestion that 100,000 Jews be admitted into Palestine. The Administration immediately concerned itself with devising ways and means for transporting the 100,000 and caring for them upon their arrival. With this in mind, experts were sent to London in June 1946 to work out provisionally the actual travel arrangements. The British Government cooperated with this group, but made it clear that in its view the report must be considered as a whole and that the issue of the 100,000 could not be considered separately.

On June 11 I announced the establishment of a Cabinet Committee on Palestine and Related Problems, composed of the Secretaries of State, War and Treasury, to assist me in considering the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The Alternates of this Cabinet Committee, headed by Ambassador Henry F. Grady, departed for London on July 10, 1946 to discuss with British Government representatives how the Report might best be implemented. The Alternates submitted on July 24, 1946 a report, commonly referred to as the Morrison plan, advocating a scheme of provincial autonomy which might lead ultimately to a bi-national state or to partition. However, opposition to this plan developed among members of the major political parties in the United States—both in the Congress and throughout the country. In accordance with the principle which I have consistently tried to follow, of having a maximum degree of unity within the country and between the parties on major elements of American foreign policy, I could not give my support to this plan.

I have, nevertheless, maintained my deep interest in the matter and

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72 Earl G. Harrison, United States Representative on the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. His report on displaced persons, with special attention to the problems and needs of Jewish refugees among the displaced persons in Germany and Austria, is printed in Department of State Bulletin, September 30, 1945, p. 456.
have repeatedly made known and have urged that steps be taken at the earliest possible moment to admit 100,000 Jewish refugees to Palestine.

In the meantime, this Government was informed of the efforts of the British Government to bring to London representatives of the Arabs and Jews, with a view to finding a solution to this distressing problem. I expressed the hope that as a result of these conversations a fair solution of the Palestine problem could be found. While all the parties invited had not found themselves able to attend, I had hoped that there was still a possibility that representatives of the Jewish Agency might take part. If so, the prospect for an agreed and constructive settlement would have been enhanced.

The British Government presented to the Conference the so-called Morrison plan for provincial autonomy and stated that the Conference was open to other proposals. Meanwhile, the Jewish Agency proposed a solution of the Palestine problem by means of the creation of a viable Jewish state in control of its own immigration and economic policies in an adequate area of Palestine instead of in the whole of Palestine. It proposed furthermore the immediate issuance of certificates for 100,000 Jewish immigrants. This proposal received widespread attention in the United States, both in the press and in public forums. From the discussion which has ensued it is my belief that a solution along these lines would command the support of public opinion in the United States. I cannot believe that the gap between the proposals which have been put forward is too great to be bridged by men of reason and goodwill. To such a solution our Government could give its support.

In the light of the situation which has now developed I wish to state my views as succinctly as possible:

1. In view of the fact that winter will come on before the Conference can be resumed I believe and urge that substantial immigration into Palestine cannot await a solution to the Palestine problem and that it should begin at once. Preparations for this movement have already been made by this Government and it is ready to lend its immediate assistance.

2. I state again, as I have on previous occasions, that the immigration laws of other countries, including the United States, should be liberalized with a view to the admission of displaced persons. I am prepared to make such a recommendation to the Congress and to continue as energetically as possible collaboration with other countries on the whole problem of displaced persons.

3. Furthermore, should a workable solution for Palestine be devised, I would be willing to recommend to the Congress a plan for economic assistance for the development of that country.

In the light of the terrible ordeal which the Jewish people of Europe endured during the recent war and the crisis now existing, I cannot believe that a program of immediate action along the lines suggested above could not be worked out with the cooperation of all people concerned. The Administration will continue to do everything it can to this end."
867N.01/10-446: Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman

CONFIDENTIAL

LONDON, [undated.]

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received from Mr. Gallman a copy of your proposed statement on Palestine. The Foreign Secretary is in Paris and I should like to have time to consult him. You are, I am sure, aware that we are in consultation with members of the Jewish Agency at the present time. I would, therefore, earnestly request you to postpone making your statement at least for the time necessary for me to communicate with Mr. Bevin.

Yours sincerely, 

C. R. ATTLEE

867N.01/10-446: Telegram

President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Attlee)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, October 4, 1946—10 a.m.

MY DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I am very sorry indeed that I cannot comply with the request you made of me in your message yesterday to postpone making the statement on Palestine. For reasons which have been fully explained to the Ambassador here and by Mr. Byrnes to Mr. Bevin, it is imperative that I make my position clear today.

867N.01/10-1046: Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 4 October, 1946—10:35 p.m.

URGENT

[Received 11:17 p.m.]

Personal and Top Secret.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: When just on midnight last night I received the text of your proposed statement on Palestine, I asked you at least to postpone its issue for a few hours in order that I might communicate with Mr. Bevin in Paris. He has been handling the difficult negotiations with Jews and Arabs to arrive at a solution of this very complicated problem.

73 Received from London as Embassy's telegram 8605, October 4, 1946, 1 a.m., with the following introductory paragraph by the Chargé: "For the Acting Secretary. I have just seen Prime Minister and given him President's message (your 6959, October 3). Prime Minister prepared following reply, which he asks to be delivered to the President as promptly as possible." The Prime Minister's message was delivered to the White House at 9:35 p.m.

74 Sent to London as Department's telegram 6988, with the instruction: "Please deliver the following message to the Prime Minister urgently from the President." Supra.

75 The President's statement was released by the White House on October 4.

76 Copy transmitted to the Department by the White House.
I have received with great regret your letter refusing even a few hours grace to the Prime Minister of the country which has the actual responsibility for the government of Palestine in order that he might acquaint you with the actual situation and the probable results of your action. These may well include the frustration of the patient efforts to achieve a settlement and the loss of still more lives in Palestine.

I am astonished that you did not wait to acquaint yourself with the reasons for the suspension of the conference with the Arabs. You do not seem to have been informed that so far from negotiations having been broken off, conversations with leading Zionists with a view to their entering the conference were proceeding with good prospects of success.

I shall await with interest to learn what were the imperative reasons which compelled this precipitancy.

Yours sincerely,

C. R. ATTLEE

867N.01/10-546: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, October 5, 1946—4 p.m.
[Received October 5—1:02 p.m.]

8653. Embassy’s 8596, October 3. Goldmann today confirmed Foreign Office version Jewish Agency discussions with British Government and stated that at yesterday’s meeting with Colonial Secretary, Jewish Agency proposed temporary agreement between now and resumption Conference embracing following three points:

1. Immigration into Palestine to be resumed immediately on basis total 15,000 for next 3 months including approximately 4,000 now Cyprus.
2. Immediate release Jewish Agency detainees.
3. General searches for arms cease.

Jewish Agency representatives also suggested immediate removal of Barker, whose life is in constant danger.

In return for above, Jewish Agency offered full and active cooperation in preserving security along lines to be worked out by British and Jewish experts. Jewish Agency stated that with legal immigration resumed, illegal immigration would practically disappear. Jewish Agency representatives stressed fact that without renewed immigration, they could not guarantee general Jewish cooperation in preservation of the peace.

78 Not printed.
79 Lt.-Gen. Sir Evelyn Barker, British General Officer Commanding in Palestine.
Colonial Secretary Hall suggested that subcommittee could be formed to consider above proposals. At meeting next Tuesday afternoon, Jewish Agency representatives will endeavor to formulate with British terms of reference of this subcommittee.

Goldmann said that if British had not adjourned Palestine Conference until December, Jewish Agency representatives were planning to suggest such an adjournment themselves because Conference was getting nowhere.

Goldmann asked Department be informed that while in Paris he had no conversations with Soviet representatives regarding Palestine.

Sent Department 8653, repeated Jerusalem 76.

Gallman

867N.01/10-446: Telegram

President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Attlee)\textsuperscript{60}

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 10, 1946—4 p. m.
US URGENT

If my statement of October 4, 1946, was embarrassing to you, I very much regret it. My feeling was that the announcement of the adjournment until December 16 of the discussions with the Arabs had brought such depression to the Jewish displaced persons in Europe and to millions of American citizens concerned with the fate of these unfortunate people that I could not even for a single day postpone making clear the continued interest of this Government in their welfare.

It is now well over a year since I first brought to your attention the recommendations of Mr. Earl Harrison in regard to the European displaced Jews. Since that time, this Government has steadfastly adhered to the view that nothing would contribute more to the alleviation of the plight of the Jewish victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution than the immediate transfer of a substantial number of them from Europe to Palestine. It was in line with this attitude that, following the unanimous recommendation made by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry that the entry into Palestine of at least 100,000 displaced Jews be authorized at the earliest possible moment, I made it clear that the American Government would finance the transportation of these immigrants from Europe to Palestine. In the succeeding months, this matter was the subject of frequent communications between our Governments, but no decision was reached.

\textsuperscript{60} Sent to London as Department’s telegram 7109, with the instruction: “President desires you to arrange for immediate delivery to Prime Minister Attlee of following reply to latter’s personal and Topsec message of Oct. 4 re Palestine.” The message was repeated to the Secretary of State in Paris as telegram 5438 (Secdel 1092).
During the course of the recent discussions which your Government was conducting with the representatives of the Arab States, this Government had followed a policy of refraining from public statements with respect to Palestine which might complicate the negotiations. We did so in spite of recurring requests from many quarters that we make known unequivocally our attitude toward the matters under discussion in London. When, however, it was learned that the conference with the Arabs had been postponed until the month of December without a decision as to concrete steps which might be taken either to alleviate the situation of the Jewish survivors in Europe or to resolve the pressing problems of Palestine itself, I considered that it was incumbent on me to express regret at this outcome and again to call attention to the urgency of this matter.

The failure to reach an agreement which would permit their entry to Palestine has had a most distressing effect upon the morale of the European displaced Jews, who have seen nearly a year and a half pass since their liberation without any decision as to their future. Their feeling of depression and frustration was, of course, intensified by the approach of their annual Day of Atonement, when they are accustomed to give contemplation to the lot of the Jewish people. I am sure that you will agree that it would be most unfair to these unfortunate persons to let them enter upon still another winter without any definite word as to what disposition is to be made of them and specifically as to whether they are to be allowed to proceed to Palestine, where so many of them wish ardently to go. I felt that this Government owed it to these people to leave them in no doubt, at this particular season with all its traditional associations, as to its continuing interest in their future and its desire that all possible steps should be taken to alleviate their plight.

We realize that Great Britain is responsible for the administration of Palestine under the terms of the Mandate which your Government received after the end of the first World War. We believe, however, that one of the primary purposes of the Mandate was to foster the development of the Jewish National Home, a development which has commanded international sympathy and in which the Government of the United States has traditionally maintained a deep and abiding interest. In our view the development of the Jewish National Home has no meaning in the absence of Jewish immigration and settlement on the land as contemplated in the Mandate. We therefore feel that the implementation of the Mandate, as well as the humanitarian considerations mentioned above, call for immediate and substantial immigration into Palestine.

In stating these views we, of course, are fully appreciative of the many difficult problems which Great Britain faces in connection with the discharge of its responsibilities under the Mandate. It was a
matter of considerable regret to us to observe that the recent conversations in London did not apparently result in a situation in which some, at least, of these difficulties might have been lessened. We felt, however, that the matter of the transfer of the displaced Jews was so urgent that it could not await the outcome of negotiations which promised to be of a protracted character.

This Government, as has already been made clear, stands ready to do all in its power to initiate immediate measures for the transfer of the 100,000 Jewish displaced persons to Palestine. Believe me, Mr. Prime Minister, I appreciate the difficulty of the situation of your Government in the matter of opening Palestine to increased Jewish immigration. I am concerned, however, that further postponement of decisions which would permit displaced European Jews to begin entering Palestine in substantial numbers is sure to render still more difficult the solution of a problem in which my Government as well as your Government has so deep an interest.

867N.01/10-1546

The King of Saudi Arabia (Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud) to President Truman. 81

YOUR EXCELLENCY: In my desire to safeguard and strengthen in every way possible the friendship which binds our two countries together and which existed between the late President Roosevelt and which was renewed with Your Excellency, I reiterate my feelings on every occasion when this friendship between the United States on the one hand, and my country and the other Arab countries on the other hand, is endangered, so that all obstacles in the way of that friendship may be removed.

On previous occasions I wrote to the late President Roosevelt and to Your Excellency, and explained the situation in Palestine: How the natural rights of the Arabs therein go back thousands of years and how the Jews are only aggressors, seeking to perpetrate a monstrous injustice, at the beginning, speaking in the name of humanitarianism, but later openly proclaiming their aggressiveness by force and violence as is not unknown to Your Excellency and the American people. Moreover, the designs of the Jews are not limited to Palestine only, but include the neighboring Arab countries within their scope, not even excluding our holy cities.

I was therefore astonished at the latest announcement issued in your name in support of the Jews in Palestine and its demand that

81 Transmitted to the Acting Secretary of State by the Saudi Arabian Minister in his note of October 15, 1946, requesting that the message be communicated to President Truman.
floodgates of immigration be opened in such a way as to alter the basic situation in Palestine in contradiction to previous promises. My astonishment was even greater because the statement ascribed to Your Excellency contradicts the Declaration which the American Legation in Jeddah requested our Foreign Office to publish in the Government’s official paper Omm Al-Qura in the name of the White House, on August 16, 1946, in which it was stated that the Government of the United States had not made any proposals for the solution of the Palestine problem, and in which you expressed your hope that it would be solved through the conversations between the British Government and the Foreign Ministers of the Arab States, on the one hand, and between the British Government and the third party on the other, and in which you expressed the readiness of the United States to assist the displaced persons among whom are Jews. Hence, my great astonishment when I read your Excellency’s statement and my incredulity that it could have come from you, because it contradicts previous promises made by the Government of the United States and statements made from the White House.

I am confident that the American people who spent their blood and their money freely to resist aggression, could not possibly support Zionist aggression against a friendly Arab country which has committed no crime except to believe firmly in those principles of justice and equality, for which the United Nations, including the United States, fought, and for which both your predecessor and you exerted great efforts.

My desire to preserve the friendship of the Arabs and the East towards the United States of America has obliged me to expound to Your Excellency the injustice which would be visited upon the Arabs by any assistance to Zionist aggression.

I am certain that Your Excellency and the American people cannot support right, justice, and equity and fight for them in the rest of the world while denying them to the Arabs in their country, Palestine, which they have inherited from their ancestors from Ancient Times.

With Greetings, 

ABDUL AZIZ

867N.01/10–1846: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, October 18, 1946—10 p. m. [Received October 18—7:46 p. m.]

8961. Embss 8747 October 10.92 Jewish Agency and British subcommittee met Thursday and this afternoon. According Foreign Office full meeting was held attended by Weizmann and Creech

92 Not printed.
Jones at which latter announced that British could make no concession re increased rate Jewish immigration during adjournment Palestine Conference because immigration was under discussion at Conference and this question of major policy sub judice could not be prejudged.

JA representatives replied that failing any [gesture?] from British re immigration it would not be worth while for JA representatives to make any promises re checking disorders. Jews in Palestine would not obey any JA representatives instructions even if given.

Present series of JA–British talks is now terminated without any undertaking either side.

JA representatives stated that Kaplan would fly to Palestine to report to Inner Zionist Council which meets next Wednesday. JA would consider what further action Jews can take in present circumstances against disorders.

Creech Jones stated that sympathetic consideration would be given to release of detained JA leaders in Latrun and that position [refugees?] detained Cyprus would also be considered sympathetically. According Beeley, Foreign Office, latter reference refers to using balance 1500 quota beginning November 15 for Cyprus Jews after 800 to 900 illegal Jews now Palestine are accommodated. Similar use might be made of quota beginning December 15 in spite of recommendations of Palestine Government officials that relatives of Jews already in Palestine who have been long waiting for quota numbers should be given priority over “illegals”.

A brief communiqué saying only that talks have been concluded and that their results (not stated) will be communicated to Inner Zionist Council will be issued within a few hours.

Repeated Jerusalem.

GALLMAN

501BB Palestine/10–2146

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 21, 1946.

DEAR DEAN: In accordance with our various conversations on the subject, we have been preparing a number of suggestions as to the course of action which this Government might follow regarding Palestine in the light of the President’s statement of October 4. The mat-

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As for Arthur Creech Jones, whose appointment as successor to Mr. Hall as British Secretary of State for the Colonies was announced on October 5, 1946.

Eliyzer Kaplan, Treasurer of the Executive of the Jewish Agency.

Marginal notation by Mr. Acheson: “Hold”.
ter, as you know, is of particular importance at this time because of the necessity for instructing our Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations. 86

At the moment our Delegation has no instructions on Palestine, a situation which should be remedied because the question may arise in some manner during the sessions. Congressman Bloom, who is one of our Delegates, has discussed with the President the advisability of our raising the question in the Assembly and the Congressman will probably make some proposal to Senator Austin. 87

We have prepared three alternative position papers for our Delegation which are attached as Exhibits A, B and C. 88 The portion of each paper marked "Recommendations" gives the essence of each proposal.

The first paper directs the American Delegation not to raise the Palestine problem but, if the problem is raised by another delegation, to state our policy: entry of the 100,000 now, liberal immigration and unrestricted land sales, and support of a workable solution as suggested in the President's statement.

Our lack of a detailed program for a solution and our present unwillingness to assume military and administrative responsibility in Palestine make it necessary for us seriously to consider the advisability of refraining from raising the problem in the General Assembly. Such a course, however, might be criticized as being contrary to this Government's expressed interest in the settlement of the problem.

The second paper directs the Delegation to introduce a strong resolution calling for entry of the 100,000, early partition of the country with a resulting independent Jewish state along the general lines of the Jewish Agency plan, and a high degree of provincial autonomy under trusteeship in the interim. This course of action would be a demonstration of our determination to press vigorously for a settlement along the lines of the present Zionist program.

86 The Department had concerns itself with the possible reference of the Palestine question to the United Nations at least as far back as December 1945. On the 13th of that month, William I. Cargo of the Division of Dependent Area Affairs had prepared three memoranda setting forth the following proposed positions: "The position of the United States should be that it neither seeks, nor seeks to prevent, discussion of Palestine by the Assembly"; "The United States should not propose that the Palestine problem be specifically placed within the terms of reference of a temporary trusteeship body"; and "No plan for settlement of the Palestine problem should be offered by the United States in the forthcoming General Assembly" (USGA/Gen/21, 21b, 21c, 501.BB Palestine/12-1345). A 12-page draft paper on possible courses of action by the United States in the General Assembly on the Palestine problem was prepared on September 26, 1946, by working group consisting of officers of NEA, SPA and CCP and George Wadsworth, then detailed to the Department as NEA liaison officer to the American delegation (501.BB Palestine/6-2746).

87 Warrren R. Austin, Chairman of the United States delegation to the General Assembly.

88 None printed.
On the other hand, if our Delegation introduces a resolution of this type, there is serious doubt as to whether we would be successful in obtaining its passage by the General Assembly, in the face of almost certain opposition of the British and of the Arab and Moslem states, and of the possible opposition of the Soviet bloc. Moreover, vigorous advocacy of this extreme program will cause a serious deterioration in our over-all relations with the British and with the Arab and Moslem World. Accomplishment of the objectives of the program, which could only be achieved in collaboration with the British, would have these repercussions in the Near East:

Our cultural position, built up with painstaking effort over the past 100 years, as well as our commercial and economic interests, including oil concessions and aviation and telecommunications rights, would be seriously threatened. Already the almost childlike confidence which these people have hitherto displayed toward the United States is giving way to suspicion and dislike, a development which may lead the Arab and Moslem World to look elsewhere than toward the West for support. The growing hostility toward us among the Arabs may result in acts of violence against American property and persons. It will be recalled that already Arab terrorists have bombed our Legation in Lebanon and attempted the bombing of the American University of Beirut. The Arab States might well withdraw from the United Nations and sever diplomatic relations with us.

The third position paper directs the Delegation to introduce a resolution calling not for partition specifically, but for a solution which would seek to bridge the gap between the British plan for provincial autonomy and the Jewish Agency’s proposal of partition. We believe that the President had such a solution in mind when he issued his statement of October 4. This resolution would also provide for the immediate entry of the 100,000. While this is a modification in the plan put forward by the Zionists, it might still appeal to them as something which possibly could be achieved. Implementation of this more moderate plan might be administratively practicable; it points toward the early independence desired by both Jews and Arabs; and in taking the emphasis off partition, it becomes more acceptable to Great Britain and somewhat less objectionable to the Arabs. In our opinion, however, an attempt to implement the plan outlined in this resolution will have effects almost as adverse upon our standing and interests in the Arab and Moslem World as those resulting from the execution of the plan set forth in Exhibit B.

We believe that if either of the alternatives proposed in Exhibits B or C is decided upon we should first outline the substance of the two
resolutions to the British Ambassador and tell him in a friendly way that in view of the failure of the various interested parties to come to an agreement and of the extreme urgency of the matter, our Government is considering the advisability of taking the problem without delay to the United Nations.

After giving the British Government an opportunity to comment on these proposed courses of action, we should then discuss the matter with representative Zionist leaders such as Rabbis Wise and Silver and Dr. Goldmann. We could advise them of the nature of the resolutions and stress our desire to assist in working out some kind of a solution which would be in line with the views expressed by the President. They should be given a clear understanding that though this Government is prepared to do all that it properly can to persuade the British and Arabs to agree to a settlement, it believes that it would not be in the interest of any of the parties concerned, including the Zionists themselves, for us unilaterally to exert political or economic pressure in order to attain our objectives, such as for instance to refuse to implement the British loan. We should state that we are willing, however, to demonstrate our conviction of the justice of our position by placing it before the highest international authority, the United Nations.

The Zionist leaders may feel that it would be preferable for us not to introduce either resolution at the General Assembly. On the other hand, they may decide that the presentation of the more moderate resolution would yield the best results in the circumstances.

If such a conversation with the Zionists is held, it should be made plain to them that we must, of course, take into consideration all the factors of the international situation of the moment in making decisions as to what action we might be able to take with regard to Palestine and associated problems, and that they should not construe anything said to them now as in any way binding upon the policies and actions of this Government in the future.

In view of the urgency of this matter I would appreciate learning your reaction to the foregoing as soon as possible. In case it is decided that it would be unwise at this time to resort to any means other than persuasion in order to prevail upon the British to cooperate with us in finding a solution acceptable to this Government, we feel that in the not distant future we should tell the Zionists frankly the extent to which this Government is prepared to go. Otherwise the President, the Secretary and the Department will continue to be charged with lack of sincerity or "doublecrossing".

L[ox] W. H[enderson]
President Truman to the King of Saudi Arabia (Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud)\textsuperscript{90}

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1946.

\textbf{Your Majesty:} I have just received the letter with regard to Palestine which Your Majesty was good enough to transmit to me through the Saudi Arabian Legation under date of October 15, 1946, and have given careful consideration to the views expressed therein.

I am particularly appreciative of the frank manner in which you expressed yourself in your letter. Your frankness is entirely in keeping with the friendly relations which have long existed between our two countries, and with the personal friendship between Your Majesty and my distinguished predecessor; a friendship which I hope to retain and strengthen. It is precisely the cordial relations between our countries and Your Majesty's own friendly attitude which encourages me to invite your attention to some of the considerations which have prompted my Government to follow the course it has been pursuing with respect to the matter of Palestine and of the displaced Jews in Europe.

I feel certain that Your Majesty will readily agree that the tragic situation of the surviving victims of Nazi persecution in Europe presents a problem of such magnitude and poignancy that it cannot be ignored by people of good will or humanitarian instincts. This problem is worldwide. It seems to me that all of us have a common responsibility for working out a solution which would permit those unfortunates who must leave Europe to find new homes where they may dwell in peace and security.

Among the survivors in the displaced persons centers in Europe are numbers of Jews, whose plight is particularly tragic in as much as they represent the pitiful remnants of millions who were deliberately selected by the Nazi leaders for annihilation. Many of these persons look to Palestine as a haven where they hope among people of their

\textsuperscript{90} Sent to the Legation in Jidda as Department's telegram 266, with the instruction: "Please transmit urgently through appropriate channels following message from President to King in reply to King's message of Oct 15 on Palestine and confirm immediately by telegram receipt of message and hour of delivery. Message will be made public here in near future since King's letter was made public by Saudi Arabian Govt."

In telegram 322, October 28, 1946, from Jidda, the Minister reported that the President's message had been delivered to the King by the Legation's interpreter, Mohammed Effendi, presumably on the evening of October 26. According to the interpreter, the King was extremely vexed, observing that the President had expressed an obviously hostile point of view and that his communication was not based on logical grounds. The King stated further that the United States had nothing to do with the Palestine question, a matter which should be settled by the British, who had enticed American involvement in order to prejudice Saudi Arabian friendship with the United States. He concluded that if the United States desired to preserve its relations with the Arabs, it should give up its interest in the Palestine question (867N.01/10–2846).
own faith to find refuge, to begin to lead peaceful and useful lives, and to assist in the further development of the Jewish National Home.

The Government and people of the United States have given support to the concept of a Jewish National Home in Palestine ever since the termination of the first World War, which resulted in the freeing of a large area of the Near East, including Palestine, and the establishment of a number of independent states which are now members of the United Nations. The United States, which contributed its blood and resources to the winning of that war, could not divest itself of a certain responsibility for the manner in which the freed territories were disposed of, or for the fate of the peoples liberated at that time. It took the position, to which it still adheres, that these peoples should be prepared for self-government and also that a national home for the Jewish people should be established in Palestine. I am happy to note that most of the liberated peoples are now citizens of independent countries. The Jewish National Home, however, has not as yet been fully developed.

It is only natural, therefore, that my Government should favor at this time the entry into Palestine of considerable numbers of displaced Jews in Europe, not only that they may find shelter there, but also that they may contribute their talents and energies to the upbuilding of the Jewish National Home.

It was entirely in keeping with the traditional policies of this Government that over a year ago I began to correspond with the Prime Minister of Great Britain in an effort to expedite the solving of the urgent problem of the Jewish survivors in the displaced persons camps by the transfer of a substantial number of them to Palestine. It was my belief, to which I still adhere, and which is widely shared by the people of this country, that nothing would contribute more effectively to the alleviation of the plight of these Jewish survivors than the authorization of the immediate entry of at least 100,000 of them to Palestine. No decision with respect to this proposal has been reached, but my Government is still hopeful that it may be possible to proceed along the lines which I outlined to the Prime Minister.

At the same time there should, of course, be a concerted effort to open the gates of other lands, including the United States, to those unfortunate persons, who are now entering upon their second winter of homelessness subsequent to the termination of hostilities. I, for my part, have made it known that I am prepared to ask the Congress of the United States, whose cooperation must be enlisted under our Constitution, for special legislation admitting to this country additional numbers of these persons, over and above the immigration quotas fixed by our laws. My Government, moreover, has been actively exploring, in conjunction with other governments, the possibilities of settlement in different countries outside Europe for those
displaced persons who are obliged to emigrate from that continent. In this connection it has been most heartening to us to note the statements of various Arab leaders as to the willingness of their countries to share in this humanitarian project by taking a certain number of these persons into their own lands.

I sincerely believe that it will prove possible to arrive at a satisfactory settlement of the refugee problem along the lines which I have mentioned above.

With regard to the possibility envisaged by Your Majesty that force and violence may be used by Jews in aggressive schemes against the neighboring Arab countries, I can assure you that this Government stands opposed to aggression of any kind or to the employment of terrorism for political purposes. I may add, moreover, that I am convinced that responsible Jewish leaders do not contemplate a policy of aggression against the Arab countries adjacent to Palestine.

I cannot agree with Your Majesty that my statement of Oct 4.⁹⁸a is in any way inconsistent with the position taken in the statement issued on my behalf on Aug 16.⁹⁸. In the latter statement the hope was expressed that as a result of the proposed conversations between the British Government and the Jewish and Arab representatives a fair solution of the problem of Palestine could be found and immediate steps could be taken to alleviate the situation of the displaced Jews in Europe. Unfortunately, these hopes have not been realized. The conversations between the British Government and the Arab representatives have, I understand, been adjourned until December without a solution having been found for the problem of Palestine or without any steps having been taken to alleviate the situation of the displaced Jews in Europe.

In this situation it seemed incumbent upon me to state as frankly as possible the urgency of the matter and my views both as to the direction in which a solution based on reason and good will might be reached and the immediate steps which should be taken. This I did in my statement of October 4.

I am at a loss to understand why Your Majesty seems to feel that this statement was in contradiction to previous promises or statements made by this Government. It may be well to recall here that in the past this Government, in outlining its attitude on Palestine, has given assurances that it would not take any action which might prove hostile to the Arab people, and also that in its view there should be no decision with respect to the basic situation in Palestine without prior consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

I do not consider that my urging of the admittance of a considerable number of displaced Jews into Palestine or my statements with

⁹⁸a See footnote 78, p. 704.
⁹⁸ See telegram 4112, August 15, to Paris, p. 694.
regard to the solution of the problem of Palestine in any sense represent an action hostile to the Arab people. My feelings with regard to the Arabs when I made these statements were, and are at the present time, of the most friendly character. I deplore any kind of conflict between Arabs and Jews, and am convinced that if both peoples approach the problems before them in a spirit of conciliation and moderation these problems can be solved to the lasting benefit of all concerned.

I furthermore do not feel that my statements in any way represent a failure on the part of this Government to live up to its assurance that in its view there should be no decision with respect to the basic situation in Palestine without consultation with both Arabs and Jews. During the current year there have been a number of consultations with both Arabs and Jews.

Mindful of the great interest which your country, as well as my own, has in the settlement of the various matters which I have set forth above, I take this opportunity to express my earnest hope that Your Majesty, who occupies a position of such eminence in the Arab world, will use the great influence which you possess to assist in the finding in the immediate future of a just and lasting solution. I am anxious to do all that I can to aid in the matter and I can assure Your Majesty that the Government and people of the United States are continuing to be solicitous of the interests and welfare of the Arabs upon whose historic friendship they place great value.

I also take this occasion to convey to Your Majesty my warm personal greetings and my best wishes for the continued health and welfare of Your Majesty and your people.

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

The King of Saudi Arabia (Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud) to President Truman 91

[Translation]

Your Excellency:

I have received with deep appreciation, your message of October 25, 1946 which you sent to me through the American Legation.

I value Your Excellency’s friendship and that of the American people to me personally, to my country and to the rest of the Arab countries. In appreciation of the humanitarian spirit which you have shown, I have not objected to any humanitarian assistance which Your Excellency or the United States may give to the displaced Jews,

91 Transmitted to the Secretary of State by the Saudi Arabian Chargé in his note of November 2, 1946, asking that the message be communicated to President Truman.
provided that such assistance is not designed to condemn a people living peacefully in their land. But the Zionist Jews have used this humanitarian appeal as an excuse for attaining their own ends of aggression against Palestine:—these aims being to conquer Palestine and by achieving a majority to make it Jewish, to establish a Jewish state in it, to expel its original inhabitants, to use Palestine as a base for aggression against the neighboring Arab states, and to fulfill (other aspects of) their aggressive programs.

The humanitarian and democratic principles on which the foundations of life in the United States have been built are incompatible with enforcement on a peaceful people, living securely in their country, of foreign elements to conquer and expel the native people from their country. In the attainment of their objectives these foreign elements have confused world public opinion by appealing to the principles of humanity and mercy while at the same time resorting to force.

When the first World War was declared not more than 50,000 Jews lived in Palestine. The Arabs took up the fight on the side of Great Britain, its ally the United States and the other Allies. With the Allies, they fought in support of Arab rights and in support of the principles enunciated by President Wilson—particularly the right of self-determination. Nevertheless Great Britain adopted the Balfour Declaration and in its might embarked upon a policy of admitting Jews into Palestine, in spite of the desires of its preponderantly Arab population and in contradiction to all democratic and human principles. The Arabs protested and rebelled, but they were ever faced with a greater force than they could muster until they were obliged to acquiesce against their wishes.

When this last World War commenced the forces of the enemy were combined and directed against Great Britain. Great Britain stood alone and demonstrated a power and steadfastness which have won for her the admiration of the whole world. Her faith and courage did truly save the world from a grave danger. In those dark days the enemies of Great Britain promised the Arabs to do away with Zionism. Sensing the gravity of England's position at that time, I stood firm by her. I advised all the Arabs to remain quiet and assured them that Britain and her Allies would never betray those principles of humanity and democracy which they entered the war to uphold. The Arabs heeded my counsel and gave whatever assistance to Great Britain and her Allies they could, until victory was attained.

And now in the name of humanity it is proposed to force on the Arab majority of Palestine a people alien to them, to make these new people the majority, thereby rendering the existing majority a minority. Your Excellency will agree with me in the belief that no people on earth would willingly admit into their country a foreign group desiring to become a majority and to establish its rule over that
country. And the United States itself will not permit the admission into the United States of that number of Jews which it has proposed for entry into Palestine, as such a measure would be contrary to its laws established for its protection and the safeguarding of its interests.

In your message, Your Excellency mentioned that the United States stands opposed to all forms of aggression or intimidation for the attainment of political objectives, if such measures have been applied by the Jews. You also expressed your conviction that responsible Jewish leaders do not contemplate the pursuit of an antagonistic policy toward the neighboring Arab states. In this connection I would call Your Excellency's attention to the fact that it was the British Government which made the Balfour Declaration, and transported the Jewish immigrants into Palestine under the protection of its bayonets. It was the British Government which gave and still gives shelter to their leaders and accords them its benevolent kindness and care. In spite of all this the British forces in Palestine are being seared by Zionist fire day and night, and the Jewish leaders have been unable to prevent these terrorist attacks. If, therefore, the British Government (the benefactor of the Jews) with all the means at its disposal is unable to prevent the terrorism of the Jews, how can the Arabs feel safe with or trust the Jews either now or in the future!

I believe that after reviewing all the facts Your Excellency will agree with me that the Arabs of Palestine, who form today the majority in their country, can never feel secure after the admission of the Jews into their midst nor can they feel assured about the future of the neighboring states.

Your Excellency also mentioned that you were unable to understand my feeling that your last declaration was inconsistent with previous promises and declarations made by the Government of the United States. Your Excellency also mentioned the assurances which I had received that the United States would not undertake any action modifying the basic situation in Palestine without consulting the two parties. I am confident that Your Excellency does neither intend to break a promise which you have made, nor desire to embark on an act of aggression against the Arabs. For these reasons I take the liberty to express to Your Excellency quite frankly that by an act which renders the Arab majority of Palestine a minority, the basic situation would be changed. This is the fundamental basis of the whole problem. For the principles of democracy dictate that when a majority exists in a country, the government of that country shall be by the majority, and not the minority. And should the Arabs forego the right conferred upon them by their numerical superiority, they would inevitably have to forego their privilege of their own form of government. What change can be considered more fundamental! And would the American people acquiesce in the admission into the United
States of foreign elements in sufficient numbers to bring about a new majority? Would such an act be considered consonant with the principles of humanity and democracy?

I am confident that Your Excellency does not intend to antagonize the Arabs, but desires their good and welfare. I also believe that the American people will not agree to acts which are contrary to democratic and human principles. Relying on your desire for frankness and candor in our relations, I am prepared to do my best to remove all sources of misunderstanding by explaining the facts not only for the sake of truth and justice, but also to strengthen the bonds of friendship between Your Excellency, the American people, and myself.

I trust that Your Excellency will rest assured that my desire to defend the Arabs and their interests is no less than my desire to defend the reputation of the United States, throughout the Moslem and Arab worlds, and the entire world as well. Therefore, you will find me extremely eager to persist in my efforts to convince Your Excellency and the American people of the democratic and human principles involved, which the United Nations, Your Excellency, and the American people all seek to implement. For this reason, I trust that Your Excellency will review the present situation in an effort to find a just solution of the problem—a solution which will ensure life for those displaced persons without threatening a peaceful people living securely in their country.

Kindly accept our salutations.

ABDUL-AZIZ

867N.01/11-246: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Dubrow) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, November 2, 1946—1 p.m.
[Received November 2—7:50 a.m.]

4050. In our 2235, July 20, commenting on lecture given in Moscow regarding Palestine, we observed that USSR appears to be sliding over to Arab side of fence. This lecture which was not for export but was designed for guidance of those Soviet citizens interested in Palestine problem, received publication in Soviet press in much watered-down form. Fact that Pravda has now published openly pro-Arab and anti-Zionist article, reported in our 4047, November 2,22 represents further movement of Soviet policy toward undisguised support of Arab cause.

Pravda article went beyond Palestine problem in its championing of Arab cause, it sought to play on all Arab resentment against American policy toward Palestine. It is significant that in this connection Indian Muslims were mentioned. Article also revealed expected Soviet nervousness over possibility of Arab-Turkish bloc.

22 Not printed.
By way of conclusion we would reiterate at this time observations contained in final paragraph of our 3033 [3003] August 2.\textsuperscript{93} Repeat London as 411.

\textbf{Durbrow}

\textit{867N.001/11-540: Telegram}

\textit{The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State}

\textbf{London, November 5, 1946.}

[Received November 5—3; 20 p. m.]

9294. Colonial Secretary in statement to House of Commons today said that British Govt has decided to release Jewish leaders detained in Palestine and that following communiqué would be issued in Jerusalem today:

“In view of condemnation of terrorism embodied in resolutions announced at meeting October 29 of Inner Zionist Council which is accepted as an earnest of intention of Jewish Agency and representative of Jewish institutions in Palestine to disassociate themselves entirely from campaign of violence and to do their utmost to root out this evil, British Govt have concurred in the release by Palestine Govt of detained Jewish leaders.”

Colonial Secretary said that he was sure House would share his hope that this action would lead to an improvement in the security situation in Palestine or help to restore conditions in which progress can be made towards the general settlement which is so urgently necessary.

Colonial Secretary then said that release has also been approved of Palestinian Arabs who have been undergoing detention and that following announcement was being made this afternoon by the Palestine High Commissioner:

“British Govt have now fully considered representations made to them by Arab delegates to Palestine Conference on subject of Palestinian Arabs detained in the Seychelles. In light of these representations and as a gesture of goodwill at this time when important decisions on future of Palestine are in the balance, they have decided

\textsuperscript{93} Not printed; this paragraph stated: “We have reported indications that USSR favors an Arab state in Palestine and opposes Zionist demands. In these circumstances, would appear that Kremlin might be in better position to pursue its policies if we should make a decision on Palestine which would further antagonize Arabs against US. Arab resentment against US and UK will not be localized. It will mean Muslim resentment against US and UK, from North Africa through Levant, Arabia, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan to India and possibly on to Indonesia. If such a situation is created, USSR would probably seize upon and exploit it to the full in an endeavor to achieve a major political victory, alongside which Soviet gains in Azerbaijan would appear puny. Such a development might largely nullify our support of Turkish integrity because it would mean political outflanking of that country.” (867N.01/8-246)
to release these detainees and to permit their return to Palestine along with two other Arabs formerly detained in the Seychelles but already released on health grounds. In addition an amnesty is being granted by the Palestine Govt to certain other Arabs."

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GALLMAN

867N.01/11-646

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William J. Porter of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] November 6, 1946.

Participants: Dr. Goldmann of the Executive of the Jewish Agency
Mr. Henderson, NEA
Mr. Porter, NE

Dr. Goldmann called on Mr. Henderson at 4:45 p.m. He told Mr. Henderson that his reason for coming was to inquire about the meaning of the Secretary's announcement, as published in the press, to the effect that the Secretary was taking over the handling of the Palestine matter and would discuss it with Mr. Bevin in New York when an opportunity offered. Mr. Henderson replied that he did not think there was any particular significance to be attached to the statement although people had tried to read various things into it. He said when the Secretary was in Paris efforts were made to prevent discussions from going on at two different levels, that is, between the President and Mr. Attlee on the one hand, Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin on the other. Mr. Henderson thought that the feeling was that such a procedure would only lead to confusion. While the Secretary was in Paris therefore the matter had been handled by the President. Now that the Secretary had returned, and Mr. Bevin had come to New York, Mr. Henderson believed that the President and the Secretary had decided to take advantage of the opportunity of personal contact provided by Mr. Bevin's visit.

Dr. Goldmann added that he was very glad that the Secretary was taking the matter over; that the Secretary had worked with Mr. Bevin on a good many subjects and they had generally managed to reach an agreement; that this was a heaven-sent opportunity to get something done before the World Zionist Congress convened at Basle on December 9. Dr. Goldmann said that as the matter now stands the Congress would convene in a "vacuum" unless Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin could come to some arrangement. Dr. Goldmann added that all the essential people were in New York, the Arab Delegations, important members of the Jewish Agency, and top-ranking British and American officials. He said that if the World Congress convened with matters standing as they are now, it would give the extremists, led by Dr. Silver, a great opportunity to embarrass Dr. Wise and other moderates by demanding what they had gained by their policy of
moderation and their Partition proposal. He said that the extremists could do a great deal of damage in certain circumstances.

Dr. Goldmann said that if an agreement could be reached informally in New York they could keep matters in line in Basle very easily even though a formal settlement might have to await the reconvening of the conference in London later in December.

[Here follow three paragraphs giving Dr. Goldmann’s account of factionalism in the Zionist movement and an intended organization of the main branches of the Jewish Agency outside of Palestine.]

Dr. Goldmann thanked Mr. Henderson for the time he had given him and said that he was going to New York immediately with a view to seeing his colleagues and talk over with them the possibilities which he envisaged as resulting from Mr. Bevin’s visit to this country and Mr. Byrnes’ taking over the handling of the Palestine problem.

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 22, 1946.

Lord Inverchapel called at his request. He said that he had been spending some time in New York, chiefly talking with Mr. Bevin about Palestine. He had urged Mr. Bevin to see some of the Jews interested in this subject. Mr. Bevin had had two interviews with Rabbi Silver. Lord Inverchapel was hoping that he would see Ben-Gurion. Mr. Bevin has already also had talks with Goldmann in London. The first interview with Rabbi Silver was not very successful. The second one resulted in much freer conversation between the two men. Lord Inverchapel was present at both interviews. Without attempting to differentiate between the interviews, Lord Inverchapel gave me the following summary of the conversations:

Mr. Bevin led off by stating that he was most anxious to work out a permanent settlement in Palestine. He said that if his effort in this direction should fail, he would give up the Mandate. In doing so, he would first ask the United States Government to take over the Mandate. If that Government was not willing to do so, he would inform the United Nations that the British Government was giving it up and was placing the entire matter before the United Nations for its action.

Rabbi Silver was much agitated at this statement, which Lord Inverchapel said both he and Rabbi Silver were convinced was entirely sincere and was not a bargaining statement. Rabbi Silver stated that this would be a disaster; that the British could not give up the Mandate; and that to do so would produce chaos. Mr. Bevin insisted upon this point and said that he had discussed it with both Mr. Attlee and Mr. Churchill, who agreed.

David Ben-Gurion, Zionist leader.
Winston S. Churchill, former British Prime Minister and Leader of the opposition Conservative Party.
Rabbi Silver then came out for a partition. He stated that he personally did not believe in partition, but that he was willing to sink his personal views in favor of it on the ground that it gave up “territory for status.”

Mr. Bevin replied that in his view there was nothing in the Mandate which permitted the Mandatory to agree to partition, and that therefore such a proposal must be laid before the United Nations, the successor of the League of Nations for its approval. If this were done, he expected that there would be strong opposition and that the necessary vote of approval could not be obtained. Mr. Bevin said that he was not opposed to partition in principle except for the legal reasons given above.

Rabbi Silver said that in his opinion the opposition could not be effective if both the United States and the United Kingdom agreed to the proposal. Rabbi Silver strongly urged that prior to the meeting in Basle Mr. Bevin should “give him the word,” which meant that Mr. Bevin would agree to the principle of partition. Rabbi Silver stated that if this could be done before the convention in Basle, he would obtain the support of the Zionist Organization for such a settlement. Rabbi Silver repeated the assertions previously made by Mr. Goldmann that representatives of the Jewish Agency had received from Sidki Pasha and Azzam Pasha intimations that, if the United States and the United Kingdom agreed upon partition as a settlement, the Arab opposition would not be over-serious. Mr. Bevin said that he had heard these statements made before, but nothing which had come to the attention of the Foreign Office justified the belief that the Arabs mentioned held this view.

So far as my notes go, this appears to be the end of Lord Inverchapel’s summary of the interviews between Mr. Bevin and Rabbi Silver.

Lord Inverchapel went on to say that Mr. Bevin is moving rapidly toward acceptance of partition as the solution. His difficulty is that he believes that he cannot espouse it unless he knows with definiteness the attitude of the United States. He wants to know how far, if at all, the United States will support his proposing and putting through such a solution. Lord Inverchapel said that on one or more occasions during the interview Rabbi Silver had stated that the United States Government was committed to the solution of partition. Under cross examination he somewhat changed his statement and said that the United States Government would support partition. Lord Inverchapel asked me whether he would be justified in encouraging Mr. Bevin to believe that the United States Government would support partition.

I asked why Mr. Bevin did not talk this out with Secretary Byrnes and get a statement of our position which would not be in the vague field of encouragement but would have the authority of the President and the Secretary. He said that Mr. Bevin intended to do this on

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96 Ismail Sidki Pasha, Egyptian Prime Minister.
Tuesday or more probably Wednesday of next week, at which time he would have word from London of the Cabinet position on the paper which had been referred to the Cabinet. In the meantime Lord Inverchapel asked for my judgment as to the attitude of this Government.

I told him that so far as I was able to help him my statements would be rooted in the President’s public statement of October 4. I pointed out that in that statement, referring to the Morrison–Grady proposals, the President had said:

“However, opposition to this plan developed among members of the major political parties in the United States—both in the Congress and throughout the country. In accordance with the principle which I have consistently tried to follow, of having a maximum degree of unity within the country and between the parties on major elements of American foreign policy, I could not give my support to this plan.”

The Statement then went on, referring to the Jewish Agency proposal for partition, as follows:

“Meanwhile, the Jewish Agency proposed a solution of the Palestine problem by means of the creation of a viable Jewish state in control of its own immigration and economic policies in an adequate area of Palestine instead of in the whole of Palestine. It proposed furthermore the immediate issuance of certificates for 100,000 Jewish immigrants. This proposal received widespread attention in the United States, both in the press and in public forums. From the discussion which has ensued it is my belief that a solution along these lines would command the support of public opinion in the United States. I cannot believe that the gap between the proposals which have been put forward is too great to be bridged by men of reason and goodwill. To such a solution our Government could give its support.”

Finally the President, in his conclusions, stated:

“Furthermore, should a workable solution for Palestine be devised, I would be willing to recommend to the Congress a plan for economic assistance for the development of that country.”

I said that it seemed to me both from the words of the statement and from my recollection of the discussion at the time it was issued that the President was stating, not that he put forward the solution of partition, but that it would command the support of public opinion in the United States; that he did not believe the gap between that proposal and the Morrison proposal was too great to be bridged; and that to such a solution (that is, one which was worked out to bridge this gap) the Government of the United States both could give its support and the President himself would be willing to recommend to the Congress the necessary action.

Lord Inverchapel then asked me what the judgment of the Department was as to the degree of opposition of the Arabs to a plan of par-
tition. I told him that I did not have enough knowledge myself to make my opinion of any value, but that I would talk to the officers of our Near Eastern office and would give Lord Inverchapel a summary of our views sometime tomorrow.87

He then said that he had done some computing on a proposal to approve partition. Cadogan88 had stated that if everyone voted, it would take 19 votes to defeat such approval. He did not believe that there would be more than 12 such votes, including the U.S.S.R., the satellites, the Arab states, France and India among the number. Since, however, there would undoubtedly be abstentions, it could not be stated that the vote in the Assembly would be in favor of approval. I did not gather from any of Lord Inverchapel’s remarks that Mr. Bevin was contemplating action at the present session of the Assembly. In fact, he told me that everyone wished to postpone the resumption of the London talks on Palestine until sometime in January—the Arab states because they had nothing to gain by resumption, the Jews because they wished to complete the Basle Conference which began [begins] on December 9 before the talks resumed, and the British because they were so burdened with international meetings that they wished further time to prepare.

DEAN ACHESON

867N.01/12-246

The Secretary of State to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin)99

TOP SECRET

[NEW YORK,] December 2, 1946.

Dear Ernest: Referring to your letter of November 29 as to the Palestine matter,1 I note your statement that His Majesty’s Govern-

87 The following day, Mr. Acheson notified Lord Inverchapel of the Department’s best estimate of the situation as follows: All Arab countries would oppose partition, but with varying degrees of sincerity and intensity; we did not anticipate military action although some terrorist acts might endanger British and American representatives; anti-Jewish riots might take place in Baghdad and possibly in Cairo and Alexandria; demonstrations before the Legations would take place; the Arabs might threaten to leave the United Nations but would probably not do so. Mr. Acheson noted further: “An important factor will be the degree of determination with which such a solution is put forward and carried through and the degree of solidarity of front between the British and ourselves. If British representatives in that area undertake to place the responsibility for partition upon the United States or if United States businessmen or governmental representatives take a secretly critical attitude toward the British, this will be the crack into which the opposition will insert its wedge and will give encouragement to violence, demonstrations, and delays.” Lord Inverchapel stated that the views expressed by Mr. Acheson accorded entirely with his own. (867N.01/11-2346)

88 Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Representative at the United Nations.

89 Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin were attending the sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which met at New York City from November 4 to December 12, 1946.

1 Not found in Department files.
ment will study most carefully all suggestions submitted at the Conference.

The Jewish leaders, with whom I have recently conferred, regardless of views formerly held by them, now regard the partition proposal as the most practical long-term solution. My opinion is that before agreeing to attend the Conference in January, they would want to be assured specifically that the partition proposal favored by them would be fully considered by [His Majesty’s Government.]

I wish that you would let me know whether the British Government is prepared to give serious consideration to alternative proposals offered by the conference.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES F. BYRNES

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) to the Secretary of State

NEW YORK, 2 December, 1946.

DEAR JAMES: Thank you for your letter of December 2nd about the Palestine Conference.

I am very pleased to have the opportunity of assuring you that all proposals made by the Arab, Jewish and British Delegations at the Conference will be given equal status on the Conference Agenda. His Majesty’s Government do not regard themselves as committed in advance to their own proposals. Nor, of course, are they prepared to commit themselves in advance to any other proposals.

His Majesty’s Government will be ready to consider every possibility of reaching an agreed settlement, and will study most carefully all suggestions submitted to the Conference.2

Yours sincerely,

ERNEST BEVIN

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Basel (Sholes)

WASHINGTON, December 6, 1946—1 p. m.

68. For Lehrs3 from Henderson. Re Deptel 63 Nov 22.4 During scheduled sessions World Zionist Congress Dec 9 through 23 and in

2On December 7, the Department released a statement by Secretary Byrnes announcing that he had had several conferences in New York with Mr. Bevin about the Palestine situation. Mr. Byrnes stated that “In September His Majesty’s Government invited the United States to send an observer to the conference. At that time we could not see our way clear to accept the invitation. Mr. Bevin has orally renewed the invitation of his Government and in view of the assurances contained in his letter [of December 2], the United States Government feels that the leaders of the Jews and Arabs should attend the conference. If they do, the United States will accept the invitation to have an observer at that conference.” For full text of Secretary Byrnes’ statement, see Department of State Bulletin, December 15, 1946, p. 1105.
3John A. Lehrs, Vice Consul at Basel.
4Not printed.
resolutions adopted, Dept expects present differences policy re solution Palestine problem between coalition group headed by Weizmann, Wise and Goldmann and anti-Administration group headed by Silver and Ben-Gurion may be resolved. Coalition group consisting principally representatives and adherents Jewish Agency has advocated creation viable state in control own immigration and economic policies in adequate area Palestine instead whole of Palestine. Anti-Administration group which has recently included many members Zionist Organization of America has criticized Administration for not insisting on creation Jewish state in whole of Palestine, at least until it is apparent concessions will result in acceptable agreement. ZOA representation at Congress will include Silver and Sack.

Zionist groups have refused up to now participate conference London to which Brit invited Jewish and Arab representatives but discussions took place between Brit and Arabs in Sept and Oct. Discussions, which were inconclusive, were postponed until Dec 16 with almost certain prospects now further postponement until Jan due present preoccupation Arab leaders with UN matters and possibility World Zionist Congress decision re participation in discussions when renewed. Meanwhile Jewish leaders both groups have been attempting obtain promise from Bevin that Brit will consider Agency partition plan as basis for discussions Jan. They state if such promise given they may be able to persuade Congress authorize participation in discussions.

Refer President’s statement Oct 4 and letter Oct 25 to Ibn Saud, Radio Bulletins No. 238 and 258, respectively, for summary recent official American statements.

Pre-Congress estimates indicate delegates total 375 of whom 70 are anti-Administration, 300 are coalition and 5 independent, although some coalition may vote against Administration on policy and principally on organizational matters.

Congress will probably discuss following publicly: (1) Whether accept, reject or advocate change in existing regime in Palestine to federation, partition or provincial autonomy. (2) Whether attend London talks and what policy. (3) Whether Palestine problem should be presented to UN. (4) Vote of confidence in present Administration. (5) Economic questions such as financing legal and illegal immigration to Palestine, financing overall Jewish Agency program including absorption 100,000 immigrants and Jordan Valley authority project. (6) Attitude towards Arabs. (7) Extension non-Zionist representation in Jewish Agency Executive.

*According to telegram 9985, December 7, 1946, from London, British Foreign Office statement published on December 7 announced postponement of the Palestine Conference to an unspecified date in January. The postponement was said to have been made on Mr. Bevin's direct instructions. (807N.01/12-746).
Congress will probably discuss following privately: (1) Attitude toward terrorism. (2) Expansion program for illegal immigration and settlement illegal immigrants in forbidden zones.

Confirming telephone conversation with Sholes and Lehns latter is authorized attend public sessions as deemed desirable by him as informal observer. His telegraphic reports through Consulate should be marked for attention NEA to expedite handling and within 2 weeks following close session Lehns should submit comprehensive report despatch form accompanied by appropriate documents.

Sent Basel, reptd Bern. [Henderson.]

ACHESON

867N.01/12-1346

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND AMIR FAISAL, FOREIGN MINISTER OF SAUDI ARABIA, DECEMBER 13, 1946

There were present at the interview with the President the Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson; His Royal Highness Amir Faisal, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia; Sheikh Asad Al-Faqih, Minister of Saudi Arabia; and Sheikh Ali Alireza.

After exchange of courtesies between the President and Amir Faisal, the latter said that there were one or two matters which he had been directed by His Majesty King Ibn Saud to bring to the attention of the President. He stated that it was well known in Saudi Arabia and throughout the Arab world that the President's feelings toward his country and the other Arab countries were of deep friendship, a desire to assist them with their problems, and that the President was actuated by principles of justice and fairness. He wished to appeal to these feelings of the President in a situation which was causing His Majesty deep concern.

He stated that the desire of the Zionists to bring large numbers of Jews to Palestine in order to take away from the Arabs lands upon which they had lived for many centuries could not be defended as being in accordance with fairness or justice. The President stated that it was not his purpose in any sense to advocate taking from any person or people what belonged to them or to deal in any way unfairly or unjustly. He was concerned in urging a settlement of the situation in Palestine which would be just to all concerned and would make for peace in the Near East. The President added that in his correspondence with King Ibn Saud he had endeavored to make this position clear. The Amir would understand that the President had not yet had

*Transmitted to President Truman by Mr. Acheson in a memorandum of December 13.
an opportunity to reply to the last communication from the King on account of the great pressure of critical domestic and international matters which had pressed upon him.

The Amir continued that the proposals of the Zionists did not make for peace in the Near East. He said that he wished to bring two matters to the attention of the President.

First. A great deal of false and misleading propaganda had been put forth by the Zionists, which had misled many people in the United States. The President stated that he was not moved or influenced by propaganda. He thought that the plight of hundreds of thousands of displaced persons in Europe, the great majority of which were being cared for by the United States, must appeal to all men of good will. They could not continue indefinitely in their present situation. All must join in the effort to alleviate their situation. The President was taking steps with the Congress to receive a considerable number of these people in the United States. Plans were being made for others to go to South America. The President had spoken with General Smuts,\(^7\) who was willing to cooperate by receiving others in South Africa. Some of these people, the President added, desired to go to and he thought could well be received in Palestine.

The Amir said that many of the people coming to Palestine were bad people, as was shown by the acts of terrorism which were occurring in Palestine. The President replied to this that no one was more opposed to acts of terrorism, violence, and lawlessness than he. But he could not believe that the pitiful remains of the Jews were such people as had been described by the Amir. There were in all groups of people some who were bad. He was not speaking for these, but for the oppressed who had suffered so cruelly before and during the war and who were now seeking homes.

The Amir said that this brought him to his second point, which was that the central difficulty in the Palestine matter was the desire of the Zionists to establish a Jewish state in either a whole or a part of Palestine. The Arabs were prepared to live peacefully with and cooperate with Jews who were in the Near East. They were not prepared to accept the establishment of political Jewish communities or states. In particular any proposal of continuing immigration until the present Arab majority in Palestine was turned into a minority they believed to be unjust and to be disturbing to the peace.

The Amir continued that the Arabs had made a proposal to the effect that Palestine as a whole should now be given its independence and that the country so constituted should decide its own wishes as to immigration; that, until it was so established and could make that decision, immigration should cease.

\(^7\) Field Marshal Jan Christian Smuts, Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.
The President expressed his pleasure at the Amir’s statement that Jews and Arabs could live peacefully together. He stated that the very purpose of the meeting in London was to consider various proposals which had been or might be put forward to this end. He did not wish to go into them at this time. At the London meeting the proposals of the British Government, the proposals of the Arab states, and the proposals of the Jewish Agency could be considered. He believed, and had said many times, that the matter could be solved by men who had good will and desire to solve it. He stressed again the plight of the displaced persons and the necessity of all peoples’ receding from rigid positions in order to aid in finding a solution.

The Amir, in taking his departure, urged the President to give this matter his deepest consideration, because the Amir regarded it as a matter of the most profound consequence to the Arab peoples.

807N.01/12–1646: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State

Cairo, December 16, 1946—6 p.m.
[Received 10:13 p.m.]

1963. Mytel 1001, December 5. Secretary General of Arab League has now handed me note dated December 7 incorporating Arab League’s declaration on Palestine based on decision League Council December 2 and requesting me to transmit it to Secretary of State. Text of declaration follows.

"The Council of the League of Arab States now in session has discussed American intervention in Palestine affairs in recent months and the disturbing effects of the various declarations and statements made by the President of the U.S. as well as the efforts the President is exerting with the British Govt in this direction, and has decided to draw the attention of the Govt of the US of America to the great anxiety these declarations and efforts are causing throughout the Arab States and the Moslem world and their adverse effects on the excellent relations which the govt of member states of the Arab League are desirous of maintaining between them and the US Govt.

The Council has also discussed the efforts now being exerted in the regions under American occupation in Europe in an endeavour to encourage and facilitate Zionist immigration into Palestine and requests the US Govt to take measures necessary to ensure that an end is put to such acts, which are capable of no other interpretation

*Not printed; it reported information from the Iraqi Foreign Minister that the Arab League’s decision to protest against President Truman’s interference in Palestine arose from a desire to relieve American pressure on the British (890B.00/12-546). In airgram A-540, December 3, 1946, the Ambassador advised that the League had recommended that its member states instruct the heads of their delegations at the United Nations to inform President Truman and members of his Cabinet that the Arab states were disturbed and distressed at the President’s continuous interference in the affairs of Palestine (890B.00/12-346).
than taking sides with one of the parties to the dispute between the Arabs and the Jews, a dispute which is still under examination and study in the hope of reaching an honorable and just settlement, leading to the elimination of the causes of the present extremely difficult situation, thus paving the way to a reign of calm and tranquility and consolidating the foundations of peace, so dear to the hearts of all nations, led by the US with all the high principles which it champions."

If Dept perceives no objection I intend informally to acknowledge note and inform Secretary General that it has been forwarded. Please instruct. Full text of note by pouch.

TUCK

867N.01/12-2746

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)⁹

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON.] December 27, 1946.

Subject: United States Policy Regarding Palestine

The Palestine question and the related question of the future of the Jewish DP’s form an open sore, the infection from which tends to spread rather than to become localized. Moreover, the almost world-wide feeling of insecurity felt by Jews, results in something like a cosmic Jewish urge with respect to Palestine. But the development of our Palestine policy up to this time in regard to these questions and pressures, however well-intentioned, has not contributed anything concrete to their solution, and seems unlikely to do so in its present form. Not only is our Palestine policy of no real assistance to the Jews (whatever it may afford them in the way of moral encouragement), it keeps us constantly on the edge of embroilment with the British and the Arabs. Therefore, it is desirable to reconsider our policy in order to see whether it cannot be improved.

The main defects appear to be these:

1. We advocate and press for the admission of 100,000 Jewish DP’s into Palestine. By so doing we have pleased the Jews. But they now probably realize that it is unlikely that we are going either to force these Jews upon Palestine by direct action, or to exert decisive pressure upon the British to do so. Since the British remain adamant against all Jewish immigration save for a trickle (1,500 a month), in the absence of an overall solution for Palestine, most Jews have now

⁹Transmitted by Mr. Henderson to Mr. Acheson with an undated memorandum which stated: “I feel that you should read the attached memo from Mr. Merriam, Chief of the Near Eastern Division. Of course we have practically been forced by political pressure and sentiment in the U.S. in direction of a viable Jewish state. I must confess that when I view our policy in light of principles avowed by us I become uneasy.” The files do not disclose the reaction of Mr. Acheson.
completely rationalized illegal Jewish immigration into Palestine, which they assert is as legal, or as justified, as the Boston Tea Party. This is a situation from which no good can be expected.

Moreover, the 100,000 figure has lost meaning. Originally, at the time of the Harrison report, this was the approximate number of Jews in DP camps in the American and British zones in Europe for whom the Jewish Agency requested certificates in June 1945. The number is now probably over 250,000, which is certainly too many for Palestine over a short period of time, even neglecting political considerations. An examination of the DP and political situations as a whole might indicate more or less than 100,000 but there is no longer, in the absence of a re-assessment, any persuasive reason to rest on a particular figure.

2. Our position on a political settlement for Palestine is qualified and to some extent indefinite. While it has given some satisfaction to the more moderate "viable state" Zionists, it does not go as far as they would like. It is definitely out of line with the Biltmore program which envisages a Jewish state in all of Palestine, and even more out of line with the Revisionist program which includes Transjordan. Therefore, our policy is only moderately satisfactory to the Zionists.

3. Our policy, while not meeting the demands of the Zionists, is disliked and feared by the Arabs; it already handicaps and may eventually jeopardize our political and other interests in the Arab world.

It seems true to say that our policy has gradually taken form, though it is still somewhat indefinite, as the result of the pressures that have been applied to us from various directions. We go as far as we can to please the Zionists and other Jews without making the Arabs and the British too angry.

The main point which it is desired to make in this memorandum is that our policy, as it stands, is one of expediency, not one of principle. Time after time we have been maneuvered into acceptance of more or less specific propositions: 100,000 immigrants; a compromise between the Goldmann and British Government schemes, and we have then had the task—not always easy—of finding principles to justify them.

In the formulation of any policy which is really worth while, the procedure must be the exact opposite. We ought to proceed from principle to the specific, not vice versa. Operating a policy of expediency is an uncomfortable and dangerous business which we ought to get out of with all speed possible.

What should our Palestine policy, based on principle, be? First let the main premises be stated. These seem to be:

1. Palestine is an A Mandate. As such, it was to be prepared for independence. Were it not for the complication of the Jewish National Home, it would be independent today, as all the other A mandates have become. Arabs and Jews live there and must, sooner or later, come to some sort of a political agreement based on a minimum of mutual confidence and give-and-take, if they are to govern Palestine.
(2) The Jewish National Home was and is a new concept, undefined. The British statesmen who worked out the Balfour Declaration thought that the Jewish National Home would probably develop into a Jewish state, but they underestimated or misjudged the Arab reaction (Balfour did not realize that Arabs lived in Palestine).

(3) The Jews could run Palestine if it were full of Jews; the Arabs if it were full of Arabs.

(4) The Jewish DP problem, as well as the almost universal Jewish feeling of insecurity, presses powerfully and perhaps irresistibly upon Palestine in both the human and political sense.

(5) The reception accorded by Arabs, Jews, or both, to the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, to the Grady Mission plan—indeed, to all schemes and plans proposed by third parties—strongly indicates that no third-party plan has any chance of success, unless imposed and maintained by force.

The foregoing, taken together with the considerations mentioned earlier, plus certain general considerations which are in all of our minds, appears to lead to a set of principles which could appropriately constitute our Palestine policy.

The following is an attempt to state them:

(1) The mandate (or trusteeship) for Palestine should be replaced as soon as possible by independence. The form which Palestinian independence takes should be decided by free agreement between interested Arabs and Jews within and without Palestine, and must conform to United Nations principles. Questions relating to representation of Arabs and Jews for the purpose of the negotiations should be decided by the General Assembly of the United Nations after considering the recommendation of the Trusteeship Council, which will be formulated after hearings. The area of the Holy Places should be placed under a trusteeship administered by the British Government. Immigration and land ownership policies will be determined by the political entity or entities created as the result of the Arab-Jewish negotiations, subject to guarantees agreed upon between Arabs and Jews and approved by the General Assembly of UN on the recommendation of the Trusteeship Council.

(2) The United States will support any political arrangement for Palestine agreed to as the result of the negotiations between Arabs and Jews and approved by the United Nations.

(3) Until the security system of the United Nations is able to provide, directly or indirectly, for the general security of the Near Eastern area, and possibly by virtue and under the authority of that system when in operation, Great Britain should have control, under trusteeship, of an adequate area or adequate areas and facilities in Palestine for the purpose of providing regional security, such areas and facilities to be demarcated and specified by the Security Council on the recommendation of the Military Staff Committee (?).

(4) Pending agreement between Arabs and Jews on the future of Palestine, the existing mandate should be replaced by a trusteeship under the United Nations, administered by Great Britain. Detailed immigration and land settlement policy should be determined by the General Assembly of the United Nations after considering the recommendations of the Trusteeship Council, which will consider the
views and claims of those interested, including the recommendations of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees and the International Refugee Organization.

The foregoing is merely in the nature of a suggestion. The important thing is for us to adopt a policy of principle and general procedure which will be approved as fair and reasonable by the general public in this and other countries, and to break away from a policy of attempting to thread a way between the specific projects and plans of the contending pressure groups. A policy of principle and procedure would also be a move in the direction of getting world responsibility and handling for the world problems, which the Palestine and Jewish problems are.

The reasoning in this memorandum is capable of development at various points and can be expanded, if you think it of sufficient interest, along such lines as you may desire. Also, if you think it worthwhile, an estimate can be made as to the probable reactions of the Arabs and Jews to the suggested modification of our policy, and, more fundamental, an assessment can be made of what there would be in it for both Arabs and Jews.

GORDON P. MERRIAM

Memorandum by Mr. Fraser Wilkins of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] December 27, 1946.

According to Lehrs, Basel, the World Zionist Congress passed the following resolutions, summarized below:

1. Rejecting Morrison-Grady proposals even as basis for discussion.
2. Denouncing existing British regime in Palestine as contrary to civilized concepts of law and order.
3. Condemning present British immigration policy and pledging support of Zionist movement to all Jews seeking salvation in Palestine.
4. Expressing solidarity with Jews detained in Cyprus.
5. Expressing admiration of the firm stand of Jews in Palestine in opposing White Paper policy and confidence in their continued fortitude and discipline.
6. Demandim Palestine be established as Jewish commonwealth and open to Jewish immigration.
7. Rejecting White Paper policy as a violation of Jewish historic rights acknowledged in Balfour Declaration and Mandate.

Addressed to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) and to Messrs. Merriam and Wilson.
(8) Affirming necessity and moral compulsion of Jews in Palestine resisting present British policy there and promising them support of Zionist movement in struggle for right to immigration, settlement and self-defense.

(9) Instructing Executive persevere in exploring possibility of Jewish-Arab understanding.

(10) Disapproving terrorism as means of political warfare.

(11) Declining United Nations Trusteeship as possible successor to present mandate and declaring Jewish statehood as only acceptable regime should mandate terminate.

(12) Expressing appreciation to American President, Congress and people for advocacy of admission to Palestine of Jewish refugees and support of Zionist cause.

(13) Resolving that in existing circumstances Zionist movement cannot participate in London conference but that if change should take place in situation Council shall consider and decide re participation.

(14) Expressing gratitude to World Christian Committee and others for promoting sympathy of non-Jewish world to Zionist movement.

(15) Repudiating activities of Hebrew Committee for National Liberation, American League for Free Palestine, Palestine Emergency Committee and similar unauthorized bodies.

(16) Protesting deportation Jews from Palestine to tropical Africa.

(17) Claiming share German reparations.

867N.01/12-3046: Telegram

The Consul General at Basel (Sholes) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

BASEL, December 30, 1946—7 p. m.

[Received 10: 25 p. m.]

105. For Henderson from Lehrs. Supplanting Contel 104 29th.11 Final results of Zionist Congress can be summarized as follows, according to strictly confidential information obtained from Epstein and others:

Opposition led by Silver which defeated Weizmann's policy in Congress proved incapable to propose constructive alternative acceptable to majority of General Council. In endeavor to overcome deadlock Weizmann's supporters, including Ben-Gurion, Brodetsky,12 Gold-
mann and Shertok succeeded having General Council elect an Executive in which 13 of 19 members support partition plan and favor attending London Conference. Further they had General Council appoint a special political committee of 16 members with power to decide when and if necessary change in “existing circumstances” has occurred enabling Executive attend London Conference under provisions of Congress resolution reported in Contel 101 24th.13 Proportion of members in committee accepting partition and London Conference said to be similar to that in Executive. To achieve all this against Silver’s stubborn opposition they compromised with him by dropping demand for Weizmann’s inspection [reelection?]. Committee tentatively scheduled meet Paris in about fortnight. Meantime Brodetsky will endeavor see Bevin about January 3 to suggest a British gesture satisfying committee that change in “existing circumstances” has occurred thereby enabling it authorize Executive attend London Conference. Epstein says release of immigrants detained Cyprus would suffice. He also said members of Executive assigned Palestine determined to shrink from no measures to suppress terrorism.

Members of Executive, Brodetsky and Goldmann, assigned London and Shertok to Washington, latter expecting arrive there accompanied by Epstein about January 15 and confer with Department. Silver flying today from Amsterdam to New York.

Sent Department, repeated to London. [Lehrs.]

SHOLES

[In despatch 517, January 16, 1947, the Consul General at Basel reported on the 22nd World Zionist Congress which opened on December 9, 1946, adjourned on December 24, leaving its unfinished business to the General Zionist Council, and concluded on December 29 with the election by the Council of a new Executive of the Zionist Organization. Dr. Weizmann stood for reelection as President of the Executive on a platform of participation in the London Conference to discuss partition of Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state within it. He was defeated by the group led by Rabbi Silver who demanded a Jewish state in the whole of Palestine. Dr. Weizmann’s supporters succeeded in electing a new Executive in which the majority favored his partition proposals. The position of President of the Executive, however, remained unfilled. (867N.01/1-1647)]

13 Not printed; the resolution was the same as No. 13 in Mr. Wilkins’s memorandum of December 27, supra.