IRAN

EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES TO SECURE REMOVAL OF THE
ARME-D FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION FROM IRAN; WITHDRAWAL
OF SOVIET FORCES AFTER SOVIET-IRANIAN AGREEMENT

591 BB/12-2745

Memorandum by Mr. Harry N. Howard of the Division of Inter-
national Organization Affairs, and Mr. W. Clyde Dunn of the
Division of Middle Eastern Affairs

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 27, 1945.
USGA/Gen/24

SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS

I. The Problem of Iran

If the Delegate of Iran should bring the problem of Soviet-Iranian
relations before the General Assembly of the United Nations, under
Articles 10 and 11, on the ground that the political independence and
territorial integrity of Iran were impaired, in violation of the Charter,
by Soviet-inspired developments in Azerbaijan province, what should
be the attitude of the Delegate of the United States?

II. Proposed Position of the United States

If this problem arises, the United States Delegate should point out
the seriousness of the allegations made by Iran and should state that
the problem should be dealt with at once. The Delegate should also
point out that the United States is particularly interested since it is
a signatory to the Declaration regarding Iran of December 1, 1943.

\footnote{For previous documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. viii, pp. 359 ff.}
\footnote{The Office of European Affairs recommended that this memorandum be held
for review in the light of possible developments at the meeting of Foreign Min-
isters, held at Moscow December 16-26, 1945, and that final conclusions should
await return of the U.S. delegation. For a summary of discussions concerning
Iran at Moscow, see telegram 4311, December 28, 1945, from Moscow, Foreign
Relations, 1945, vol. viii, p. 517.}
\footnote{Of the United Nations Charter, adopted at San Francisco on June 26, 1945,
Department of State Treaty Series 993, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1081.}
\footnote{Made at Tehran on December 1, 1943, by President Roosevelt, British Prime
Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's
Commissars (Premier) of the Soviet Union; for text, see Foreign Relations,
1943, vol. iv, p. 413.}
and that it has already endeavored to bring about a satisfactory solution of the problem by conferring with the other signatories to that Declaration. He should add that, since no solution satisfactory to Iran has been worked out, it is only fair to Iran that the matter be considered at the earliest possible moment by the General Assembly and the Security Council. Postponement of the consideration of allegations of this character by a member of the United Nations at the very time when the United Nations Organization is taking form would impair the confidence of member nations in the ability of the United Nations Organization to preserve a peace based upon principles embodied in the Charter of that Organization. Among the purposes and principles of the United Nations Organization it is particularly pertinent to note that all members of the United Nations "shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."

The Delegate should explain that the issue which appears to be joined is whether Soviet troops stationed in Northern Iran have aided and abetted a change in the form of government in the area of Azerbaijan over the protest and against the will of the government which is recognized by the Soviet Government and other members of the United Nations as the Government of Iran. If Soviet troops have engaged in such activity, with the approval of the Soviet Government, it would seem clear that the Soviet Government had violated the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It, therefore, may be the duty of the United Nations to determine the facts in the case. The United States Delegate should, in such instance, suggest a fact-finding commission to be appointed by the appropriate organ of the United Nations to ascertain the facts and to report its findings to the United Nations for appropriate action.

[Here follows Section III, "Essential Facts Concerning the Present Status of Soviet-Iranian Relations".]

891.00/1-146: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, January 1, 1946—8 p. m.

[Received January 3—2:32 a. m.]

1. Deptel 759, December 29, received December 31. I conveyed to Prime Minister * this morning and to Shah * this afternoon infor-


* Ibrahím Hakímí.

* Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlávi.
Information regarding Moscow conversations on Iran and in particular regarding proposal to form Anglo-American-Soviet Commission to [advise and assist Iran govt in reestablishing satisfactory relations with provinces.

Prime Minister seemed entirely receptive to proposal and promised to bring it at once before Council of Ministers and to inform me of decision as soon as possible.

Hakimi expressed indignation at repeated references by Stalin to “hostile” government of Iran and observed that apparently only government that is entirely subservient to Soviet demands would be regarded by them as “friendly”. Prime Minister then referred to his repeated but rebuffed offers to discuss with Soviets anywhere and any time matters of mutual interest to two countries and added that if it would be helpful to his country in present situation, he would gladly resign. (In) later conversation with British Ambassador* a few minutes after his return to Tehran he remarked rather gloomily that he “supposed there would have to be change of govt.”)

In audience with Shah he informed me of likelihood that Hakimi Govt would soon fall owing to withdrawal of support by a number of deputies in majority group (presumed to be under British influence) some of whom now accuse Hakimi of inability to deal with Russians and others of whom believe he has been too conciliatory.

Shah discussed with great frankness, as has been his wont in recent months, the distressing position in which his country now finds itself by reason of British interference in south and Soviet interference in north. He realizes fully that, while British interference doubtless has no such sinister motives as appear to inspire Soviet activities, the Soviets regard British activities with suspicion and may feel counter measures on their part justified.

With regard to proposed Anglo-American-Soviet Commission, Shah said he personally was inclined to view it with favor for particular reason that it would assure friendly and unbiased assistance of US. In view however of Molotov’s¹⁰ position that Soviet Govt could not deal with “hostile” Hakimi Govt, he said he wondered whether Soviet tactics would not be to insist in first instance on setting up of “friendly” govt (i.e. one that would meet all Soviet demands) whereafter Soviets would declare that they did not wish to participate in such commission that proposed to “interfere in internal affairs of Iran”.

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*The following bracketed portion was taken from the copy in the Tehran Embassy files because of garbling in the message as received in the Department.
*Sir Reader W. Bullard.
¹⁰Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.
In reply to Shah's misgivings, I stated that while, of course, there were risks of failure in any proposal of this kind, I was convinced that it was in Iran's vital interest for govt to espouse the proposal thereby demonstrating govt's willingness to resort to every reasonable remedy in order to relieve present strain in its relations with Soviets. Even if such measures fail, Iran would have given evidence of her good faith and have strengthened her case in world public opinion.

I added in conclusion that, as His Majesty was well aware, I have strongly urged since my return to Iran that govt here endeavor by every reasonable means to establish personal contacts with Soviet Govt through suitable emissaries if necessary and that in any case I earnestly hoped that if Hakimi is to resign due consideration will be given in selecting his successor to the great importance of his being competent to deal effectively with Soviets without, of course, sacrificing vital interests of the country.

Murray

891.00/1–246 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Tehran, January 2, 1946—4 p.m.
[Received January 3—11:36 a.m.]

10. Rossov in Tabriz confirms fall of Rezaieh and end of Iran Govt resistance in Azerbaijan. He states that Kurds aided Democrat forces not Iranian Army as local press had reported.

Sent Dept as 10, repeated Moscow 5.

Murray

891.00/1–246 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

SECRET

Washington, January 2, 1946—9 p.m.

4. The Iranian Ambassador ¹¹ has informed the Department that the Iranian Government, in considering whether to bring Iran's case before the General Assembly of the United Nations during the meeting this month in London, desired to have assurance in advance that the United States and Great Britain would support the Iranian position. In the absence of such assurance, the Iranian Government would hesitate to take a step which would further widen the breach between Iran and the Soviet Union without accomplishing any constructive results.

The Ambassador has been informed that while the American Government has in no way changed its policy as regards Iran, which is

¹¹ Robert Rossov, Jr., Vice Consul at Tabriz.

²² Hussein Ala.
based firmly on the Declaration regarding Iran and on the United Nations Charter, the American Government could not undertake to give advance assurances of the position it would take in any case of this kind to be brought before UNO. The United States has friendly relations with both the Soviet Union and with Iran, and for us to give advance commitments to either side would not be in harmony either with those friendly relations or with the spirit of the United Nations. The Ambassador was authorized, however, to assure his Government that the United States intends to carry out the commitments which it made when it signed the Charter of the United Nations, and that it intends fully to support the principles of the Charter in any matters which may be presented to the UNO.

As regards press reports which have recently appeared from London to the effect that the United States and Great Britain are discussing the Iranian question in an effort to prevent its being brought before the UNO, you may inform the Iranian Government that the United States is of the view that any member of UNO should be entirely free to present its case to that organization.

Byrnes

[WASHINGTON,] January 3, 1946.

Lord Halifax came in to see me today at his request, in the Secretary’s absence. He said that he had a cable from Mr. Bevin informing him that the Iranian Ambassador in London had stated that his Government wanted to have the Azerbaijan matter put down on the agenda of the United Nations meeting. January 4 is the last date on which items could be added to the Agenda. Lord Halifax said his Government wanted this Government to instruct Ambassador Murray to join with the British in urging the Iranian Government not to do this. The only reason that the British had for urging this joint action was that the possibility of the Soviets’ joining the proposed Tripartite Commission on Iran would be defeated by the proposed Iranian action.

I told the Ambassador that I felt that the Secretary would not feel that we could justify any such action on our part, but that I would

13 The substance of this memorandum was sent to Tehran in telegram 5, January 4, 1946, 1 p.m. The telegram was repeated to London, Moscow, and Ankara.
14 The British Ambassador.
15 Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
16 Seyid Hassan Taqizadeh.
17 Formal British views on this matter were set forth by the British Embassy in an aide-mémoire of January 7, 1946, not printed (761.91/1-746).
discuss the matter with the Secretary and call him back again this evening.

I called the Secretary at home and told him of the Ambassador’s proposal and that Mr. Henderson and I felt we should not join with the British in this matter. I also said that last night we had sent a cable to Murray denying press reports that the British and United States Governments were holding conversations looking toward recommendations to Iran not to take this matter up in the United Nations meeting. The Secretary replied that we could not possibly urge Iran not to bring the matter up if they wished to do so. In view of the lapse of over a week since the Secretary’s departure from Moscow and in the absence of any statement from Molotov that the matter was being reconsidered, the Secretary felt that we had no basis to believe that the Soviets would join the proposed Commission.

Subsequently I called Lord Halifax and told him that I had talked with the Secretary, who instructed me that we should not make the representation to Iran, and that to do so would be to take on a responsibility which we should not assume. He also felt that if the Soviets were going to join in the proposed Tripartite Commission they would have done it before this.

Lord Halifax said that he had thought that this would be our reaction and that he would inform London of our decision.

DEAN ACHESON

891.00/1-416: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

SECRET       TEHRAN, January 4, 1946—2 p. m.
US URGENT     [Received January 5—8:53 a.m.]

17. Embtel 13, January 3. British Ambassador Bullard under instructions from London succeeded in persuading PriMin to send urgent instructions to Ambassador Taqizadeh in London to withdraw from UNO agenda previous request for discussion of Iranian question. Iran Govt had instructed Taqizadeh previously to place on agenda questions of (1) withdrawal of foreign troops and (2) “interference in internal Iranian affairs”.

When I asked him if he thought chances for eventual formation of Three Power Commission suggested in Moscow talks were good (this being reason for urging Iranians to drop UNO proposal) he replied

18 Loy W. Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.
19 Not printed; Mr. Murray reported that the British Ambassador had discouraged the Iranians from presenting their case to the United Nations, that the British had not consulted with him before taking this line, and that he found it difficult to reconcile this point of view with the United Nations Charter (891.00/1-346).
gloomily that he feared not. He admitted that Iranians might be left by his Government’s action without hopes of either three power commission or investigation and settlement by General Assembly of UNO. Bullard said urgency of matter had prevented his consulting me in advance but that he assumed British FonOff was taking up matter with Dept. I informed him that I had no instructions from Dept and that I certainly had no intention of approaching Iran Govt along same lines as he had. I told him further that I consider his action ill-advised especially since he himself felt chances of creation of commission were slight and that his action had now left Iranians with no recourse in sight. Bullard countered by suggesting that Iranians might be able to raise question with Security Council at later date after that body is formed and functioning. Difficulty here, of course, is that by time Security Council is formed Iranian crisis may be settled in totally unsatisfactory manner.

I have been handicapped in this matter by total lack of instructions from Dept and I do not intend to mention matter to Iranians until I have some indication of Dept’s wishes. I can not, however, see any objection to Iranians raising issue in UNO meeting in London next week unless chances of setting up of Tripartite Commission are more favorable than I have been led to believe.

I would appreciate receiving from London urgent report of actions of Iranians and attitude of FonOff on whole question of placing Iranian problem on General Assembly agenda.

To Dept as 17 repeated Moscow 8 London 5.

Murray

891.00/1-446: Telegram

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)


The Iranian Ambassador came in to see me this morning in order to examine the text of the proposal which had been made with regard to the Tri-Partite Commission to deal with the Iranian problem.

He said that his government had asked him to make his comments with regard to the proposal.

During the course of our conversation he asked me whether the proposal was an American or a British proposal. I told him that it had originally been made by Mr. Bevin but that certain amendments had been made to it by both the Russians and ourselves and that these

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In telegram 25, January 6, 1946, 10 a.m., Mr. Murray stated: “I welcome and am in complete agreement with point of view set forth in Deptel 4 Jan 2 which was received here subsequent to transmission Embtel 17 Jan 4.” (891.00/1-646)
amendments had been approved by Mr. Bevin and incorporated into the draft which I showed him. The Ambassador asked what the final Russian attitude had been. I said that I had understood that they had decided at the last moment they did not wish to discuss it further at the time.

The Ambassador said that his government desired him to inquire, in case it should agree to the formation of such a commission and such a commission would be formed, whether the American representatives on it would give full support to Iranian sovereignty. I told the Ambassador that I did not believe it would be appropriate for the American Government to give any assurances other than those shown in the document. I pointed out that if he examined the document he would find the reply, particularly in view of the fact that the American Government had amply demonstrated during recent months that when it gave commitments such as those incorporated in the document, that it really lived up to them.

The Ambassador, after examining the documents, said that it seemed to him that there were in it several features rather dangerous for Iran, and that he would appreciate it if I would give him my personal opinion as to whether it would be to the advantage of Iran to agree to such a Commission. I told him that, in the opinion of the Secretary, it would be advantageous for Iran to agree to such a Commission since by agreeing to its formation, the Iranian Government would strengthen its position before the world and might also find a solution of the problems facing it. I added that we did not desire to bring pressure upon Iran to agree to such a Commission since we felt that any agreement of this kind should not be given under pressure.

The Ambassador said that he had received a message from the Iranian Ambassador in London to the effect that the latter had been instructed by his government not to present Iran's case to the United Nations Organization at the present time. He said that the Iranian Government's decision had been taken in view of the earnest plea made by the British Ambassador in Iran to the Iran Government not to present the matter to the United Nations until it had become clear that the Russians would not agree to participate in the Tri-Partite Commission. He asked if the American Government had changed its attitude and now desired Iran not to bring the matter before the United Nations Organization.

I told the Ambassador that I wished to make sure that he knew what our position had been and asked him to state his understanding of it to me. He replied that it was his understanding that the United States did not feel that it should endeavor to bring pressure in any
way upon Iran in the matter; Iran should decide for itself, in view of all the circumstances, whether it would be advantageous to it to bring the matter before the United Nations.

I told the Ambassador that he had stated what I understood to be the position of this Government and that I was sure that this Government continued to adhere to this position. I said that it was important he should give his government to understand that the Government of the United States was not encouraging Iran to present the case to UNO. The American Government would, of course, be glad if the matter could be settled outside of UNO and UNO would be spared facing a problem of this kind at its inception. Nevertheless, the United States Government was of the opinion that Iran should decide for itself what it should do.\footnote{In telegram 87, January 18, 1946, 8 p. m., to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinus), at London, Acting Secretary of State Acheson stated: “Iranian Ambassador in call today requested assurance that American delegation to UNO will adopt a friendly and sympathetic attitude toward Iranian case when it is presented to UNO. He was again informed that while we would regret presentation of matters of this kind until UNO is well established, we adhere to our position that members of UNO should be entirely free to bring their problems to that organization. He was assured that American Delegation will treat the question if presented in a fair and impartial manner but that we can give no assurance in advance of attitude we will adopt in any hypothetical case.” (501.BB/1-1846)}

801.00/1-846: Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, January 8, 1946.

[Received January 8—3: 22 p. m.]

73. Tass article from Tabriz published Soviet Press January 8 reports meeting in Tabriz between Pishevari\footnote{Jafar Pishevari (or Peshavari), “Prime Minister of the National Government of Azerbaijan” and Chairman of the Democratic Party in Azerbaijan.} and American Consul Rossov, at which latter is said to have stated that he was glad to make acquaintance of Premier in whose person he welcomed National Government of Iranian Azerbaijan. Article states further that upon being asked by Rossov about further plans of government Pishevari observed that these plans were set forth in program. He expressed wish that this program might be realized without bloodshed. Rossov advised that way be left open for negotiations with Tehran to which Pishevari replied that Tehran itself keeps way closed. Rossov inquired how Pishevari would proceed if Shah acknowledged autonomy. Pishevari replied that recognition alone was small matter, guarantee was required that autonomy would be preserved. Article states that
Rossow in conclusion “promised to render all support to National Government of Iranian Azerbaijan”.

Sent Department 73, repeated Tehran 3 and Frankfurt.

[KENNAN]

891.00/1-946: Telegram

The Vice Consul at Tabriz (Rossow) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Tabriz, January 9, 1946—noon.

[Received January 11—11:18 p.m.]

3. Aside from stopping of Iranian troops and the well evidenced supplying of arms to rebel democrats, the most flagrant Soviet subversive intervention Azerbaijan is through the “Society of Friends of Soviet Azerbaijan”. Organized recently upon the return of its leaders from visit to Baku as guests of Soviet Union, its ostensible aims are the fostering of nationalities between the two Azerbaijans. In recent days its drive for memberships assumed large and significant proportions.

Although the social and economic reforms are not entirely unpopular among the people here, they are assuredly opposed in the majority to Soviet domination, and only fear and intimidation lead them to endorse movements of this sort. However, the omnipresence of heavily armed Soviet troops, the general awareness of Soviet manipulation of recent revolt, and widespread fear of the ruthlessness of Soviet agents, have given rise to a deeply ingrained terrorism, such that a mere invitation to join such a society is tantamount to duress. The reality of this terror cannot be doubted since it pervades even the most casual contact with natives.

[Here follows discussion of specific cases of intimidation.]

Soviet sponsorship is openly indicated by fact that both the Soviet Consul General and the Soviet military commander have personally approached [several prominent Tabriz merchants to] urge them to join.

As to real aim of society, Muhammad Beriya, local Minister of Education, founder and behind the scenes leader of the society, in

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22 In telegram 18, January 9, 1946, 7 p.m., the Department informed Tehran that “Press here has reported Tass despatch Jan. 8 from Tabriz to effect that Rossow in interview with Peshviri promised ‘all kinds of aid’ to National Govt Azerbaijan. Dept. spokesman in press statement Jan. 8 denied these allegations. He states that while Rossow did talk to Peshviri he merely listened and gave no assurances of any kind.” (891.00/12-2945)

In a letter of January 9 to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson), the Iranian Ambassador, then in New York, stated that the Tass report had made a bad impression and caused great surprise (891.00/1-946).

23 Bracketed insertions in this telegram based on copy in Tabriz Consulate files.
response to direct inquiry denied that society aimed at annexation, but added the specific qualification “provided of course the Central Government meets our demands”.

Evidence as to methods and aims of the society would appear to be sufficient in both volume and reliability toward any official notice to be taken of these terrorist subversive tactics.

As reported mytel 14, December 29,26 the local PriMin’s pliability and concern for world opinion may make it possible to hamper designs for independence provided adequate conciliatory measures are taken by Central Government. This would, however, merely be a half way measure since Soviet terrorism is so deeply ingrained. Only an occupation by some trusted power or powers could entirely eliminate it, but even though Soviet denial could be expected, an expression of world concern as to such terrorism, perhaps by the United Nations, would go far in impeding it, and might give the people hope that some real effective measures would eventually be taken by the Security Council. Any statement for the attention of [the Azerbaijan public should be com]municated through me since only world news service published by the one authorized newspaper is Tass.

Unless some sort of energetic action is soon taken Azerbaijan must be written off.

Sent Department as 3; Tehran as 1.

Rossow

761.91/1-1046: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, January 10, 1946—5 p. m.

PRIORITY

[Received January 11—12: 52 p. m.]

44. Prime Minister told me yesterday that 2 days previously he had sent further instructions to Iran Ambassador London again authorizing me [him] to submit Iranian dispute for discussion by UNO Assembly. This reverses Hakimi’s earlier action in ordering Taqizadeh to withdraw request (Emtel 17, January 4) and I believe is in response to strenuous objection expressed by Cabinet to that earlier step, which was taken under strong British pressure without consultation with other Cabinet Ministers. (I have learned that Ambassador Bullard insisted on having telegram drafted in his presence and himself sent it over British military radio).

British Ambassador has been holding conversations with Minister Foreign Affairs regarding details of proposed tripartite commission but Hakimi said yesterday there is little chance Iran Govt will find

it possible declare its acceptance of proposal. Majlis sentiment seems
definitely hostile. Criticism has been directed especially at sugges-
tion regarding use of "minority" languages [which] govt objects to
because it claims there is no minority problem. Govt has also sugges-
ted there should be Iranian members on commission.

Mossadegh 26 made impassioned speech in Majlis yesterday bitterly
attacking commission idea and thanking Russians for having re-
jected it. He compared proposal to Anglo-Russian partition agree-
ment of 1907 27 and ill-famed Anglo-Persian treaty of 1919. 28 Asserted it ran counter to independence of Iran. Urged that Azerbaij
difficulties be settled by direct negotiations with dissatisfied elements
and if that failed by direct negotiation with Soviets. Said Russians
had right to object if Iran Govt sought aid of third powers as inter-
mediaries. Demanded resignation of Hakimi and formation of truly
"neutral" govt.

Prime Minister was greatly disturbed by Mossadegh speech, which
he regards as indirectly Soviet inspired and as confirmation of fear
that Russians would reject or sabotage commission even if Iran Govt
agreed to it. He expressed view only thing which would satisfy
Soviets would be grant of oil concession northern Iran and that any
Govt which refused such grant would be branded as hostile to USSR.

British attitude recently has strengthened my belief they are pre-
paring make tacit deal leaving Soviets free hand in north while they
consolidate British position in south (Embtel 1075, Dec 6 29). British
are urging Iranians to accept tripartite commission and refrain from
presenting their case to UNO, yet Bullard admits today he thinks
there is almost no chance Soviets will agree to formation of commis-
sion. These tactics may well be intended to prevent any action at all
and to make it possible for whole question to be shelved. British may
have decided there is nothing to be gained by engaging in acrimonious
public dispute with Russia in cause already lost and that they had
better concentrate on making sure of their own sphere of influence
in Persian Gulf.

I think it significant that Bullard, in his original note to Bevin
suggesting tripartite commission, mentioned Khuzistan as possibly
meriting special consideration and that final draft presented to Mos-
cow Conference speaks of Arabic as one of minority languages which
might be introduced in schools, etc. This may indicate that British

27 Reference is to the Convention between Great Britain and Russia concerning
their interests on the continent of Asia, signed at St. Petersburg on August 31,
1907, Foreign Relations, 1907, pt. 1, p. 550. Under the terms of the Convention,
Iran was divided into Russian and British spheres of influence with a neutral
zone in between.
29 Ibid., 1945, vol. VIII, p. 479.
envisage possibility of balancing an autonomous Azerbaijan under Russian domination with an autonomous Khuzistan under British domination. It will be recalled British formerly exercised informal protectorate over [Khuzistan] through late Sheikh Khazal of Mohammerah (now Khorramshahr). They are still active in defending interests Khazal’s family with Iran Govt.

I am especially struck by frantic urgency of British action in trying to persuade Iranians not to raise issue in UNO. It is at least surprising, in view of close Anglo-American collaboration on Iranian question at Moscow and before, that British Govt should have brought such strong pressure to bear on Iran Govt without even advance notice to Dept or this Embassy. Apart from fact this seems almost discourteous I cannot help but wonder whether British have not decided it could be embarrassing to them to have all facts of foreign intervention in Iran aired in UNO. However pure their motives may be, they may realize that to world public their dictatorial actions vis-à-vis Iran Govt and constant intervention in provincial affairs in south could be made to appear virtually as reprehensible as those of Soviet.

Sent to Dept as 44, repeated Moscow 13 and London 7.

Murray

891.00/1-1246: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, January 12, 1946—10 a. m.

[Received 7 p. m.]

53. Embassy requested on December 18 Soviet pass for travel Tabriz and return of Associated Press correspondent Joseph Goodwin during period December 24 to 31. Soviet Embassy stated January 9 present inappropriate time for travel Goodwin. I am informing Soviet Chargé he and other Soviet spokesmen have reiterated calm prevails Azerbaijan, and am requesting travel pass be issued forthwith.

No travel pass received thus far for Jernegan or Ferguson. 50 Embassy telegram 3, January 2. 51

Dept may desire make most active representations to Soviet Government through Moscow Embassy and parallel representations in Washington through Soviet Ambassador, against Soviet attitude towards travel Americans in Azerbaijan.

50 John D. Jernegan and C. Vaughan Ferguson, Jr., were Second Secretary and Third Secretary of Embassy, respectively, in Iran.

Goodwin being informed status of matter. Department may wish make statement to press that Department and Embassy officials (Minor, Jernegan and Ferguson) have been prevented from performing their duties in Iran in consequence obstructionist tactics Soviet officials.  

Murray

123 Rosswow, Robert, Jr. : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, January 14, 1946—3 p. m.  
[Received January 15—9:40 a. m.]

56. I regret I cannot agree with position taken in Deptel 25, January 1144 for following reasons:

1. Whole episode of Tass despatch smacks of Soviet “frame up” especially since Rosswow’s ... background is unquestionably known to Soviets. Should our Govt remove Rosswow at this juncture, it would lend credence to Tass despatch and give impression we do not believe his denial given in his telegram 2, January 10.65 Removal would completely discredit Rosswow in Iranian eyes and would make him of no further value in Iran. Soviets without doubt are opposed to any American consular officer in Tabriz who follows vigorous course and Rosswow’s sudden flood of telegrams and interviews has

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44 Harold B. Minor, Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs; for documentation on Soviet refusal to permit him to travel in Azerbaijan, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. viii, pp. 499–519, passim.

65 Telegram 290, January 28, 1946, from Moscow, not printed, quoted a letter of January 22 from the Soviet Foreign Office which stated that the necessary instructions had been given to issue travel passes to Messrs. Minor, Jernegan, and Ferguson. The letter concluded: “There is sometimes delay in issuance of passes to zone of deployment of Soviet troops in Iran because Soviet Embassy in Iran must preliminarily confer on such questions with Soviet command.” (761.91/1–2346)

44 Not printed; it stated that Mr. Rosswow’s “continued presence in Tabriz will add to the impression that the official contact which he made with the rebel group implied American sympathy and support.” The Department added that it believed it “wise to replace him at least temporarily”. (123 Rosswow, Robert)

45 In telegram 52, January 12, 10 a. m., Ambassador Murray transmitted to the Department the text of Mr. Rosswow’s telegram 2 which stated: “Peshavari states vehemently he did not interpret anything in my conversations with him as connoting US approval of or sympathy with his regime, that he fully understood my visit to have been on purely personal and informal basis, and that he never made any statement remotely approximating Tass report. . . .

“I can only conclude that Tass report is deliberate fabrication, probably of local inspiration, intended to cause me embarrassment.

“You may be assured that I have been and will be most cautious in my statements, and would under no circumstances attempt to express US policy in this region without specific instructions.” (123 Rosswow, Robert)
undoubtedly indicated to them fact that he intends to keep his Government fully informed of all events in Azerbaijan. We have permitted Soviets to effect removal of one American Consul (Kuniholm) from Tabriz \(^{38}\) and I feel strongly we should resist their intrigues at all costs in present instance.

2. I fail to see how any officer sent to Tabriz can function efficiently without contact with only authority in power. I feel Rossow’s contact with Pishavari has been valuable and has not in any way jeopardized our position in Iran. Only authority which could possibly object to his activities in this regard would be Iranian Govt and no such objection has materialized. My understanding is that sole reason for maintaining Tabriz Consulate is for reporting of political events and it seems difficult to see how this is to be done if our Consul can not interview the persons making the news. Certainly should Jernegan or Ferguson replace Rossow under these circumstances their hands would be tied as far as reporting is concerned.

They would not only be unable to approach any of rebel officials but all native informants would be afraid of report if got them \(\textit{sic}\) through fear of reprisals. Little or no information could be obtained from Soviets and they would be forced to rely almost entirely on bazaar rumors.

3. While I realize personalities can not always be taken into consideration in matters of this sort I feel recall of Rossow would be unfair and humiliating to officer who has been working hard to provide Embassy and Dept with prompt and accurate information.

4. Rossow has been cautioned to say or do nothing which would in any way indicate to rebels that their movement in any way has American sympathy or support. I am convinced he has done and will do nothing in variance these instructions. I would appreciate therefore Dept’s reconsidering matter as I can see no good and a great deal of harm accruing to our Government from change at Tabriz. I would appreciate urgent indication of Dept’s reaction to above.\(^{37}\)

MURRAY

\(^{37}\) For documentation on this subject, see \textit{Foreign Relations, 1943}, vol. iv, pp. 337–361, \textit{passim}.

\(^{38}\) In telegram 46, January 18, 8 p. m., the Department notified Mr. Murray that it deferred to his judgment and withdrew its suggestion that Mr. Rossow be replaced. It gave instruction that “Rossow should say or do nothing which might create an impression in Iran that he is endeavoring to bring about mediation between the rebels and the Iranian Govt or that he would be willing to play a mediatery role”. (123 Rossow, Robert)
The Head of the Iranian Delegation at the United Nations (Taqizadeh) to the Acting Secretary General of the United Nations (Jebb) 38


Owing to interference of the Soviet Union, through the medium of its officials and armed forces, in the internal affairs of Iran, a situation has arisen which may lead to international friction.

2. In accordance with Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Iranian Government has repeatedly tried to negotiate with the Government of the Soviet Union, but has met with no success.

3. Accordingly, the Iranian delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations, on behalf of the Iranian Government, has the honour to request you, in accordance with the terms of Article 35, paragraph 1 of the Charter, to bring the matter to the attention of the Security Council so that the Council may investigate the situation and recommend appropriate terms of settlement.

4. The Iranian delegation is prepared to assist the Security Council by furnishing a full statement of the facts which have given rise to the present situation, together with a copy of the relevant Treaty which binds the parties concerned.

S. H. Taqizadeh

891.00/1-1246: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

SECRET

Washington, January 19, 1946—6 p.m.

53. Urteil 53 Jan 12. Dept believes that issuance of press statement suggested by Rossow in his no. 6 Jan 17 39 would be inadvisable at present time.


39 Telegram from Tabriz not printed; it advised the Department of indications that the issue of Azerbaijani independence would be brought to a head very soon in order to present the world with a fait accompli before the Iranian complaint could be considered by the United Nations. Mr. Rossow recommended that he be authorized to issue a press statement locally, timed to anticipate and prevent drastic action in this direction. (891.00/1-1746) Ambassador Murray supported the recommendation and outlined the text of a proposed statement (telegram 94, January 21, 2 p.m., from Tehran, 891.00/1-2146).
The Secretary has informed Dept. 40 that he "feels it highly undesirable for obvious reasons for US Govt to issue" at this time a public statement setting forth the difficulties which members of the Embassy and American journalists are encountering in obtaining Soviet permission to travel in Northern Iran.

Sent to Tehran.
Repeated to Tabriz, London and Moscow.

ACHESON

891.00/1-2146 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, January 21, 1946—11 a.m.

[Received 11:48 p.m.]

92. During interview January 19 with PriMin I expressed to him (as I did some time ago to Shah) my personal view that Iran Government should try to make direct contact with Azerbaijan dissidents utilizing for this purpose some of outstanding Azerbijanis resident in Tehran, three of whom are Cabinet members. I pointed out that Azerbaijan "Prime Minister" Peshavari had repeatedly declared his willingness to negotiate with central government and that it might be well at least to test his sincerity. I stressed danger that failure of central government to make some sort of move toward settlement would give Tabriz leaders motive and pretext for declaring complete separation from Iran and requesting Soviet protection. I mentioned Rossov's report that silence of Tehran Government was discouraging Azerbaijan population and facilitating task of extremists who seemed to be working for final break. Hakimi was at first reluctant to attempt anything on grounds that Azerbaijan "government" is completely under Russian domination and so terrorized it could not come to any reasonable agreement. He asserted members of rebel government are scoundrels and pointed out Governor General Bayat had attempted conciliation in early December with complete lack of success.

40 Secretary Byrnes was in London participating in the sessions of the United Nations; reference here is to telegram 656, January 18, from London, not printed. In telegram 472, January 16, the Department had informed London that Ambassador Murray was anxious to issue a statement concerning the United States Government's inability to obtain permits from Soviet authorities authorizing American officers to travel in Northern Iran in performance of their official duties. The Department had also noted that Mr. Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, and Elbridge Durbrow, Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, had approved release of the statement, the text of which was included in the telegram for the Secretary's approval "as we don't know whether it might upset his plans." (501.BB/1-1946)
I agreed that his objections might be well taken but urged that public gesture would have good effect on local Azerbaijan population by demonstrating it was not being forgotten by central government. It would also show world that Iran Government was doing what it could to solve own problems. Some benefits were to be expected even if negotiations came to nothing. PriMin agreed with this view and said he would let it be known through press and radio that Government would be willing receive representatives from Tabriz. He felt and I concurred that conversations could best be conducted in freer atmosphere of Tehran.

Sent Department 92 Moscow 29, London 16.

MURRAY

501 BC/1-146

Memorandum by the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

[LONDON,] January 22, 1946.

USSC 46/6

Subject: Proposed United States Position in the Security Council With Respect to the Iranian, Soviet and Ukrainian Requests.42

I propose that we adopt the following position with respect to all three of these requests:

(1) That they should be treated identically.

(2) That at the next meeting of the Security Council (which will probably be on Thursday 44) I should either propose or support (depending on circumstances) the position that the Council should at that meeting decide to ask each of the three countries which have brought situations to the attention of the Security Council to appear at a stated date within the next week to present its case in elaboration of its letter to the President of the Security Council. An opportunity would of course be afforded the other states whose interests are directly affected to give their side of the cases. Separate days should be set for each of these hearings, perhaps successive days next week.

(3) That at the next meeting of the Security Council I should propose or support an invitation to the Greek Government to be represented at the meeting when the Soviet case is presented; this would be done by a procedural vote in accordance with Article 31 of the Char-

42 The Soviet complaint alleged that the continued presence of British troops in Greece was fraught with grave consequences for the maintenance of peace and security; the Ukrainian complaint dealt with the situation in Indonesia. For documentation on the two complaints, see ante pp. 104 ff., and volume VIII, respectively.

44 Actually, the Second Meeting of the Security Council took place on Friday, January 25.
ter which provides: "Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected." Except for Iran and the Ukraine which would be invited under (2) above, Greece appears to be the only country whose interests are specially affected in any of the three situations which is not on the Security Council and to which an invitation should therefore be extended; the U.S.S.R., the U.K. and the Netherlands are members of the Council.

(4) That the Council, after hearing the formal presentation of the case by each of the three appellants and any remarks that other states, including those whose interests are specially affected, may wish to make, should study the briefs and documents submitted. Any decisions of the Council with respect to investigation or other proposals for dealing with the issues will be made after the Security Council has made its study of the documents and their presentation.

This recommendation is concurred in by Mr. Dunn, Mr. Pasvolsky, Mr. Wadsworth, Mr. Hare and Mr. Bohnen.\[43\]

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501BC/1-146

Memorandum by the Political Adviser to the United States Delegation at the United Nations (Hare) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

TOP SECRET


USSC 46/34

In your conference on January 21 regarding the situation resulting from the raising of the question of Soviet-Iranian difficulties before the Security Council, the Department's memorandum entitled "Soviet-Iranian Relations" (USGA/Gen/24)\[44\] was taken as the basic document but you suggested that it might be useful to record certain additional matter which was mentioned during the conference, and also to have a collection made of the documents to which reference had been made. This memorandum and its attachments\[45\] have accordingly been prepared in compliance with your suggestions.

[Here follow accounts of the historical background of relations between Russia and Iran, the problem of Iranian oil, and the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops from Iran.]

\[43\] James Clement Dunn and Leo Pasvolsky were Senior Advisers to the United States delegation at the United Nations; George Wadsworth, Raymond A. Hare, and Charles E. Bohnen were Political Advisers to the delegation.

\[44\] Ante, p. 289.

\[45\] Attachments not printed.
In its weekly “Current Foreign Relations” the Department summarized the then existing situation in northwestern Iran as follows:

“At the end of one month of disturbances in Iranian Azerbaijan the situation is as follows: The insurgent ‘Democrats’ are in firm control of all important towns and roads of Azerbaijan. They have elected a Governmental Assembly of Azerbaijan which has appointed a Cabinet. The ‘Democrats’ have demanded autonomy for Azerbaijan in all matters except foreign relations and war. They have acted throughout under the direction of the Soviets, although the latter have been careful not to take a direct part in the movement. The Iranian Government has been unable to act effectively, either directly against the insurgents, or through appeals to the Soviet authorities in Iran and Moscow. Iranian officials in Azerbaijan have been rendered powerless and Soviet forces have blocked all attempts to send assistance from outside the area. While at first the ‘Democratic’ movement had little popular support, it is gaining strength through the evident inability of the Iranian Government to cope with it. The disaffection may spread to other parts of the population, including the tribes. The Iranian Government is unable to restore its authority so long as Soviet troops are in Iran. It may also be difficult to do so after their withdrawal. There is widespread feeling among the Iranians that their only hope is US assistance since they fear the British might compromise with the USSR on spheres of influence. The people of Azerbaijan have just cause for complaint against the central government, whose administration in Azerbaijan has been oppressive, corrupt and inefficient. If a solution is not soon found, Iran is likely to be dismembered with the northern provinces eventually becoming parts of the USSR.

“Although oil has not been mentioned during the current dispute, some observers believe the Iranian Government’s refusal to grant broad concessions in northern Iran to the USSR in 1944 is the cause of the present difficulty.”

“Appreciating the seriousness of the issues involved, especially in relation to the success of the UNO, we have recently formulated three principles which we have applied to Iran and to which we believe the three major powers should adhere: There is no longer any need for foreign troops in Iran and they should be withdrawn as rapidly as possible. Iran has the sovereign right to move its armed forces about its territory without hindrance. Iran is entirely free to grant or withhold commercial concessions on its own territory on any terms agreeable to it and without being submitted to external pressure.”

[Here follows discussion of the attachments to this memorandum.]

While various factors of course enter into the formation of our

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“A booklet prepared weekly by the Department of State in order to summarize major developments of diplomatic character for the information of the Foreign Service. During December 1945, its name was altered, temporarily, to the Weekly Review. The three paragraphs here quoted were taken from the Weekly Review of December 20, 1945, p. 7.

*For documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. v, pp. 452 ff.*
policy, it would seem that emphasis should be laid on (1) the importance of this as a test case in assuring a free hearing and just decision to a small state victim of large state aggression and, even more important, (2) the danger that this situation holds of serving as a focal point for Anglo-Russian disagreement with all the grave implications which might derive therefrom.

Memorandum by the Senior Adviser to the United States Delegation at the United Nations (Stevenson)

USSC 46/30

[LONDON,] January 24, 1946.

In talking with Secretary Byrnes just before he left today about the political issues, he expressed the following views:

When a state files a complaint alleging a “situation or dispute” we must assume that it is filed in good faith and that the complainant is entitled to a hearing and discussion of his complaint in the Security Council.

Applying this principle to the Iranian case, it should be our policy to support the right of Iran to present its case to the Security Council. If the presentation is “reasonable” we should actively support and speak for an investigation.]

This policy is, however, not intended to preclude a recommendation that bilateral negotiations between Russia and Iran be attempted first should the parties be disposed to proceed in that manner and should there be evidence of any reasonable likelihood of success. In short, if full attempts have not been made for the parties to get together and resolve the question, it would seem proper for them to do so before commencing an investigation. In the event of any such bilateral negotiations the Security Council should be kept closely informed of all the developments.

A. E. STEVENSON

The Head of the Delegation of the Soviet Union at the United Nations (Vyshinsky) to the President of the Security Council (Makin) 48

LONDON, 24 January 1946.

The delegation of the Soviet Union, acting on behalf of the Soviet Government, considers it necessary, in connexion with the appeal of the Iranian delegation addressed to the Security Council, to make the following statement:

1. The allegation made by the Iranian delegation of interference by the Soviet Union, through its officials and through its armed forces,
in the internal affairs of Iran is not in accordance with the facts and is devoid of any foundation. In this particular case, the Iranian delegation repeats the statement made by the Iranian Government to the Soviet Government in November 1945.49 This statement, however, was categorically refuted by the Soviet Embassy in Iran in its Note of 26 November.50 It should also be noted that in its reply of 1 December 1945,51 the Iranian Government not only failed to disprove the facts referred to in the Soviet Note of 26 November, but also expressed, as is stated in the above-mentioned Iranian Note, “its satisfaction that, as is confirmed by the Embassy’s reply, the interference of Soviet officials in the internal affairs of the northern districts of Iran is not in accordance with the facts”. Moreover, in the same note, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran “expresses its satisfaction at the fact that, as has been pointed out, the Soviet officials fully respect the Tri-Partite Agreement52 and the Declaration signed and published in Tehran by the leaders of the three great Powers,53 Allies of Iran.”

These facts are sufficiently convincing evidence of the inaccuracy and groundlessness of the statement of the Iranian delegation regarding the alleged interference on the part of the Soviet Union in the internal affairs of Iran.

2. Equally in contradiction to the facts is the statement of the Iranian delegation that the Iranian Government has made unsuccessful attempts to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Government on this question. This statement of the Iranian delegation is refuted by the above-mentioned facts, since the Iranian Government not only attempted to negotiate but entered into negotiations with the Soviet Government on this question, as is evident from the Iranian Note of 1 December, referred to above.

3. The Soviet delegation considers it necessary to point out that the Iranian Government is trying to use the presence of foreign troops in Iran in order to represent this fact as a violation of Iranian sovereignty and as a cause of the events which are taking place in Iranian

49 For summary of note of November 17, 1945, from the Iranian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Soviet Embassy in Iran, see telegram 959, November 19, 1945, from Tehran, Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. viii, p. 431. The text of the note is printed in SC 1st yr., 1st ser., supp. No. 1, p. 50.
50 For last paragraph of Soviet note, the key section in the Soviet reply, see telegram 1040, December 2, 1945, from Tehran, Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. viii, p. 470. The full text is printed in SC 1st yr., 1st ser., supp. No. 1, p. 55.
52 The Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and Iran, signed at Tehran on January 29, 1942; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, March 21, 1942, p. 249.
53 The Declaration regarding Iran, December 1, 1943, Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iv, p. 413.
Azerbaijan. As a matter of fact, the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Iran is quite legitimate inasmuch as this right was granted to the Soviet Government by the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 26 February 1921,44 and the Soviet-British-Iranian Treaty of 1942. The events in Iranian Azerbaijan have no connexion with the presence there of Soviet troops, as the indisputable and entirely objective facts bear witness. These events are of an exclusively Iranian and internal nature.

As is known, what is happening in northern Iran is connected with the aspirations of the population of northern Iran for national autonomy within the limits of the Iranian State, and with the achievement of the wishes of the local population, which is nothing unusual for a democratic State.

4. At the same time, the Soviet delegation cannot but draw attention to the fact that propaganda hostile to the Soviet Union has of late been growing stronger in Iran with the manifest toleration of the Iranian Government. This propaganda in no way differs from the fascist propaganda which was carried on against the Soviet Union at the time of Riza Shah.

The anti-democratic and pogrom activity, hostile to the Soviet Union, on the part of the reactionary forces in Iran which are supported by certain influential Iranian groups drawn from the ruling circles and the police authorities, creates for the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic and for Baku a danger of organized hostile actions, diversions and so forth.

The Soviet Government considers, however, that questions of this kind, which affect the relations between two neighbouring States, the USSR and Iran, can and should be settled by means of bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government. The Soviet Government did not and does not refuse to accept this method of settling such questions arising between Allied Governments.

5. In view of these facts, and taking into consideration that in this particular case the conditions envisaged by Articles 34 and 35 of the Charter of the United Nations are lacking, the Soviet delegation regards the appeal of the Iranian delegation to the Security Council as devoid of any foundation and is categorically opposed to the consideration of the above-mentioned appeal of the Iranian delegation by the Security Council.

A. VYSHINSKY

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[The Iranian and Soviet letters of January 19 and 24 were brought formally to the notice of the Security Council at its meeting on January 25. Two major issues were discussed at this meeting: The question of the inclusion of the Iranian matter on the agenda of the Council and the question of Iran's right as a member of the United Nations to be invited to the Council's table.

The Iranian question was placed on the agenda with no objection. At this point, Mr. Vyshinsky stated:

"There is one point I would like to clarify: that is the inclusion of the Iranian question in the Security Council's agenda. Does this mean consideration of the substance of the question or discussion as to whether it should come before the Council at all?

If this item is placed on the agenda so that we may discuss whether the question should be considered, then I have no objection to its inclusion on the agenda for the next meeting. . . . The Soviet delegation . . . has put forward reasons proving that the statement of the Iranian Government should not be considered by the Security Council.

It therefore seems to me that we should, in the first place, thoroughly discuss this matter, and, as the Chairman suggests, the Soviet delegation should in any case have the opportunity at the next meeting of putting forward its reasons why this question should not be considered by the Security Council."  (United Nations, SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 1, p. 16.)

The President of the Council replied: "... I should like to say that the inclusion of the item in this agenda does give an opportunity for the Council to have a discussion, and that the USSR could, at the initial stage of that discussion, make such proposal as it might think proper. The inclusion would not deny to the USSR representative the opportunity of being able to move in whatever direction he might wish."  (Ibid.)

In reply to a question by Mr. Bevin, the President of the Council stated further: "... It is for the Council itself to determine the procedure that it wishes to adopt in regard to this matter, that is, whether it wishes to proceed to a discussion or to take any other action it might wish."  (Ibid., p. 20)

Regarding the second issue, Mr. Stettinius stated: "... I wish to make very clear that the United States Government believes that any Member country of the United Nations which makes a complaint has a right to be heard at this table."  (Ibid., p. 18.) A motion by the Egyptian representative to this effect was adopted without a vote.

For the official record of the proceedings of the Security Council on January 25, see Ibid., pp. 15-20.]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (Minor)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] January 26, 1946.

Participants: The Ambassador of Iran
Mr. Acheson
Mr. Minor

Ambassador Ala called today, at his own request, on the Under Secretary. The Ambassador began the conversation by referring to Mr. Acheson’s statement at a press conference to the effect that he believed Russian forces would withdraw from Iran by March 2d. Mr. Acheson replied that the statement was not a formal pronouncement regarding Iran but was made merely in answer to a question. He said that in his view the only proper attitude which the Department of State can take in a matter of this kind is to assume that a friendly power such as Russia will live up to a solemn commitment.

The Ambassador appeared to be satisfied with Mr. Acheson’s clarification and then launched into a recital of the present status of the Iranian case against Russia. He reviewed the background of the dispute and stated that Russia had interfered widely in Iranian affairs during the occupation of northern Iran. He said that it was a violation of the tripartite pact for Russia to prevent Iranian forces from going into northern Iran to put down the disturbance. The Ambassador expressed concern that Russia seems to have in mind introducing troops into Iran or keeping troops there on the basis of the 1921 Iran-Soviet Treaty. The Ambassador said that while the Russians might have used this treaty as a pretext for entering Iran, in 1941, to put out the Germans, but that the Russians could not conceivably invoke the treaty at this time. The pertinent provision of this treaty states that Russia will have the right to introduce troops into Iran if Russia is threatened in Iran by a third power, and then only if Iran proves unable to remove the danger to Russian territory.

The Ambassador regretted that a great deal of confusion seems to have arisen with regard to the presentation of the Iranian case to UNO. He regretted that Prime Minister Hakimi had found it necessary to resign since this had introduced a confusing element. He did not know whether the new Prime Minister Qavam would withdraw the case from UNO but he expressed the strong hope that this would

55 The Hakimi Cabinet resigned on January 20.
not be done. The Ambassador ended the conversation by expressing the hope that the United States will support Iran in this critical time, but he did not ask for any particular commitment in this regard.

501 BB/1-2646: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

[Received January 28—2:25 a.m.]

1015. DelUN 101. Set forth below are the letters from the chief delegate of Iran to the President of the Security Council as received by the Secretariat on January 26, 1946

"Security Council

Letter From the Chief of the Delegation of Iran to the President of the Security Council

Sir, The Iranian Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations have taken note of the letter of 24 January 1946, addressed by the delegation of the Soviet Union to the Security Council and desire to bring to the attention of the Security Council the following facts:

(1) The continued interference of Soviet military and civil authorities in the internal affairs of Iran can be fully proved. The statement of the facts showing this interference and containing the necessary proofs will be submitted to the Security Council. The Iranian Government has in fact brought many instances of such interference to the notice of the Soviet Government in a number of notes which the Soviet Government have either completely ignored or failed to deal adequately with the complaint.

(2) While it is true that the Soviet Government in its note of 26 November 1945, contrary to the true facts, categorically denied the allegations of interference contained in the note of the Iranian Government of 17 November 1945, yet it remains the fact that in their note of 26 November 1945, the Soviet Government admitted that they had not been willing to allow the passage of Iranian reinforcements to suppress the revolt in Azerbaijan on the clearly unjustifiable grounds that, according to the Soviet Government the arrival of Iranian troops on part of their own territory would cause disturbance and blood and that in the event of the outbreak of disturbances the Soviet Government's word to maintain security in the areas stationed by her armed forces, be constrained to complement her armed forces. Later, however, in the Soviet Government note to the United States Government dated 29 November 1945, they tried to find a new excuse for their action alleging that it was 'a matter of aspirations with respect to the assurances of the democratic rights of Azerbaijanian population of northern Iran which is seeking national autonomy within the limits

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of the Iranian state', which point is now reiterated in paragraph 3 of the letter of the delegation of the Soviet Union to the Security Council.

(8) In the circumstances the Iranian Delegation maintain that the conditions envisaged by Article 25 of the Charter are present and that the Security Council should, in accordance with the terms of the Charter, investigate this dispute between the Iranian Government and the Soviet Government.

Yours sincerely,  

(signed) S. H. Taqizadeh  
Head of the Iranian Delegation["""]

[Here follows enclosure to the above-quoted letter: Note of December 1, 1945, from the Iranian Foreign Ministry to the Soviet Embassy in Iran, the text of which is quoted in telegram 1054, December 3, 1945, from Tehran, volume viii, page 473.]

STETTINIUS

891.00/1-2846 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, January 28, 1946—1 p. m.

PRIORITY [Received 10:32 p. m.]

127. I saw Qavam yesterday immediately after he had received his formal appointment as Prime Minister. He showed me telegram he had just sent to Iran Ambassador London instructing him not in any way to weaken his efforts to have Iranian case considered by UNO but at same time to approach Vishinsky and ascertain whether opportunity offered for direct settlement of Iran–Soviet problems. Taquizadeh was directed to associate Soheily 58 with himself in this approach.

Qavam added that he proposed to attempt negotiations with Russians both here and in Moscow and that he further planned to send special mission to negotiate with Azerbaijanians. He remarked he would "tame" Azerbaijanians by giving them Provincial Council. (I understand he does not mean by this that he would recognize present Tabriz Assembly.) In connection proposed negotiations with Soviets I repeated remarks made previously to Shah and Hakimi re possible desirability of utilizing outstanding personalities outside ordinary diplomatic machinery and again pointed to success of such methods when employed by President Roosevelt. Qavam said he believed present Iranian difficulties with Soviets all date from oil crisis of late 1944 precipitated when Prime Minister Saed refused Russian


58 Ali Soheily, member of the Iranian delegation at the United Nations and former Prime Minister.
demand for exploration rights in Northern Iran. He asked my opinion as to his proper course if he should be faced with another demand of this kind. I of course declined to give direct answer but recalled in general way President Roosevelt’s advice given Shah in 1943 to effect Iran should not let her oil resources be preempted by foreigners but should endeavor to develop them in such way as to uplift welfare Iranian people. I mentioned that when it appeared our Govt might acquire Saudi Arabian concession, Roosevelt had been insistent we should develop it for benefit of Arabs. I said also that I realized difficulty involved in case of Russians where any concession would have to be granted to Govt since private enterprise did not exist in USSR.

I took occasion to say if Iran Govt should decide to reopen oil concession question we would expect to be notified so American companies could again present their proposals.

Qavam said his original intention had been to defer formation of Cabinet until after he had determined whether Soviets would be willing negotiate with him on satisfactory basis. However, he had decided this might take too long and it would be unwise to leave country without Cabinet for indefinite period. Accordingly I assume he will proceed at once to choose his Ministers.

He said at one point that he would be grateful for any advice Department or Embassy could give him in connection with carrying out of his task.

Sent Department as 127; repeated London 25; Moscow 34.

MURRAY

501. BC/1-28/46 : Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

SECRET

LONDON, January 28, 1946—4 p.m.
[Received 6:25 p.m.]

1022. Personal for the Secretary. We had several interesting conversations on the Iranian, Greek and Indonesian situations prior to the Security Council meeting at 3:00 today which I am reporting fully for your information.

1. Wellington Koo *66 called upon me Sunday evening at 7:00 shortly after he had talked with the Soviets. He was very anxious to have the three complaints now before the Security Council handled in a manner which would not cause ruffled feelings. He stated that the Russians had advised him that they were willing to negotiate with the Iranians and that the Iranians were likewise willing to negotiate. He therefore

*66 V. K. Wellington Koo, Chinese Representative at the United Nations.
proposed that the Security Council merely state that they were delighted that the two Governments were willing to negotiate and then the chairman could follow with a statement that the Security Council would be kept informed of the progress. Ambassador Koo thought this would be a satisfactory way of handling the matter. He then added that the Soviet Union was firmly opposed to the Council’s passing any resolution of any kind on the Iranian situation.

I stated that I did not like the suggestion that we agree not to pass any kind of resolution because it was of paramount importance at this moment to keep world confidence and world respect for the Security Council and I could not make any commitment that I would not insist upon some formal action by the Security Council even though the two countries stated they were willing to negotiate. The only basis on which I thought it would be possible to drop the whole matter was if the Iranians asked that it be dropped and that they be given a chance to negotiate with the Soviet Union.

STETTINIUS

891.00/1-2446 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 28, 1946—7 p. m.

US URGENT

74. I have given careful consideration to the recommendations contained in your 116, Jan 24, and other telegrams concerning a public statement of the Am Govt’s interest in the Iranian situation. I am inclined to believe that it would not be appropriate for this Govt to make a public statement of the kind suggested relating to a matter which has been formally placed before UNO. Our ability to contribute to a proper settlement of the difficulty will be greatly strengthened if we refrain from taking any action which might imply that we have already formed a fixed opinion with regard to the merits of the case.

If the new Govt in Tehran agrees to enter into direct negotiation with Russians on the matter, its hand will be greatly strengthened by the fact that its case is pending before UNO. I insisted in London that Iran should have a full hearing. My statement in this regard has been carried in the press and should have become well known to all interested persons in Iran.

BYRNES

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*Not printed; it expressed the Ambassador's hope that the Department would reconsider its decision not to issue the proposed press statement on Azerbaijan and that "we should at least make it clear informally to Azerbaijan 'government' what American Government’s attitude would be toward any drastic move." (891.00/1-2446)*
SECRET

TEHRAN, January 29, 1946—8 a.m.
[Received 1: 01 p. m.]

130. Even though it may be superfluous I should like to draw attention to numerous flaws in Vishinsky’s letter of January 24 to President of Security Council of UNO.61

1. That Soviet note of November 26 to Iran Govt denied assertions made in Iran Govt’s note of November 17 can hardly be accepted as proof that Iranian complaints were unfounded.

2. Iran Govt’s note of December 1 did not accept Soviet statement that Russian authorities were not interfering in northern Iran. Note expressed pleasure because it appeared from Soviet communication that “said measures will not be repeated” and went on to state Iran Govt’s hope “that no such actions will ever again be taken by Soviet military authorities in the northern provinces.” Repeated Iranian complaints regarding “deplorable incidents” that had occurred as result of interference with Iranian officials in north. Renewed request that Soviets allow freedom of action to Iranian security forces.

3. Exchanges of notes between Iranian FonOff and Soviet Chargé in which Soviets simply contradicted all statements made by Iranians and refused all Iranian requests cannot be considered “negotiations” in any true sense of word. Fact is that Iranian PriMin and Min-FonAff were never able engage in discussions with any Soviet official of consequence since Russians had withdrawn Ambassador and never responded to repeated Iranian offers to go to Moscow for high-level conversations. It will be further recalled that at Moscow Conference Molotov himself stated Soviet Govt could not discuss anything with “hostile” Iran Govt then in power.

4. I have already pointed out (Mytel 1195, December 28 #) that Irano-Soviet Treaty of 1921 is not applicable to present circumstances. Unless Soviets can produce evidence that they are threatened by third power operating in Iran their reiterated assertion of rights under that treaty should be rejected out of hand.

5. Iranians have never asserted that mere presence of Russian troops in Iran was violation of Iranian sovereignty. They object solely to interference by those troops with activities of Iranian civil and military authorities.

6. Only Soviets and their stooges would be cynical enough to assert that presence Russian troops in Azerbaijan has no connection with recent events in that province. Apart from abundant other evidence

61 Ante, p. 309.
Soviet’s formal refusal permit Iranian reinforcements to go to Azerbaijan should be sufficient to prove rebellion relied on Soviet protection.

7. Iranian newspaper criticism of USSR is no more severe than that directed against Britain. Again only Soviets would be so cynical as to pretend surprise or fear at being criticized by press in weak country whose sovereignty they are openly infringing.

8. It is absurd to assert that Baku is threatened by “organized hostile actions” from Iran.

9. If Soviet Govt really wished to settle difficulty by legitimate bilateral negotiations it has had ample opportunity before now to initiate such negotiations.

To Dept as 130, repeated London 26, Moscow 35.

MURRAY

891.00/1–2946 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, January 29, 1946—9 a.m.
[Received 1:41 p.m.]

132. Embtel 81, Jan 17. As In as much Goodwin instructed by Associated Press remain Tehran further 10 days to fortnight and authorization has not been issued for his travel Tabriz and return, Embassy will appreciate being informed whether Dept may not desire to take up matter with Moscow authorities for purpose of having truth re conditions in Azerbaijan made available to American public.

Daniel of New York Times was refused permission to visit Azerbaijan some weeks ago and now Goodwin, in addition to which Minor, responsible Dept official, was similarly refused. Our continued acquiescence toward local Soviet practice of refusing Americans permission to visit Azerbaijan on legitimate business may well lend encouragement to further restrictive acts against Americans that area. In any event, Soviet Embassy statement that present time “inopportune” (Embtel 53, Jan 12) for travel Goodwin in Azerbaijan constitutes inadequate reason for refusal and I feel we would be justified in insisting on issuance travel pass or reason for nonissuance acceptable to US.

Embassy has in mind, in this connection, successful efforts of Dept to obtain entry of American correspondents into countries eastern Europe under Soviet influence.

MURRAY

**Not printed.**
London, January 29, 1946—2 p. m.

[Received 7:37 p. m.]

1064. Personal for the Secretary and the President.

1. Before the Security Council meeting this morning,^{64} Bevin informed me that he had talked with Vyshinsky several times in the last couple of days. He felt that Vyshinsky had shown considerable nervousness at the present situation and stated that he showed a new friendliness and readiness to reach agreements. They had discussed the Bulgarian and Rumanian situations and Bevin had concluded from Vyshinsky's remarks that he was ready to drop the Russian charges regarding Greece and Indonesia if the United Kingdom would make satisfactory concessions in the Balkan situation. Bevin said that he had told Vyshinsky flatly that he would not allow the Iranian situation to be dropped by the Security Council, leaving Britain to stand alone in the dock on the Greek and Indonesian matters.

2. We also learned from the Iranians before the Council meeting that they had received instructions from their Govt to pursue the case before the Council. The Iranian Ambassador indicated rather vaguely that he had also received authority, if an opportunity developed, to open discussions directly with Vyshinsky. He did not believe that his Govt would negotiate directly with the Russians in Tehran. He felt strongly that any bilateral negotiations which he conducted in London should be pursued under the aegis of the Security Council and in accordance with the Council's recommendation. He did not want the Council to turn the dispute back to the parties for negotiation and to drop the case in the meantime.

3. Also prior to the meeting we were given to understand that the Russians would strongly oppose consideration of the case by the Security Council, and would object on various procedural grounds to the procedures which the President had indicated he would follow at the meeting.

4. At the Council meeting the President proposed that we should hear the Iranian case and the Soviet's reply, at that point the meeting

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^{64} This meeting of the Security Council took place at 3 p. m. on January 28. Presumably, telegram 1064 was drafted the day before it was actually sent. For the official record of the proceedings of the Security Council on January 28, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 1, pp. 31-44.
should be thrown open for discussion of any resolution which any member desired to propose. The USSR did not object to this procedure but attempted to reserve its right to object to any consideration by the Council of the substance of the dispute. The Iranian Ambassador thereupon read a long statement of the Iranian case, which contained little that was new. He ended up with a request that the Security Council recommend that the USSR remove its troops from northern Iran by March 2nd, that in the meantime the USSR should permit Iranian security forces to move freely into northern Iran and that it should cease interference in Iranian internal affairs.

Vyshinsky in reply stated that he would not deal with the substance of the complaint but only with procedural matters which were raised. His main points were (a) negotiations had taken place and the results had been declared satisfactory by the Iranian Govt which for this reason had not pursued the matter further; (b) for this reason the Iranian conflict was not a matter which under the Charter could be considered by the Security Council; and (c) that the Russians had never refused to negotiate and that they are still ready to go on with bilateral negotiations between the parties. He analyzed articles 33, 34, 36, and 37 and contended that none of them applied in this case. He ended by urging that the Council leave this matter for the moment, so that it could be solved between the parties by bilateral negotiations.

5. The Council decided to adjourn at this point, over Vyshinsky's objection, after about a 3-hour meeting. At the end of the meeting the President announced that since this was a dispute and since the USSR was a party to it, the USSR would be required under the Charter to abstain from voting on any decisions under Chapter 6. Vyshinsky raised no objection to this.

6. After the meeting I was advised very privately that the Chinese had been requested by the Iranians to present at the next meeting a resolution suggesting bilateral negotiations between the parties and in addition that contact had already been made between the parties to this end. Am attempting to confirm this.

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Telegram 1061, January 29, 1946, from London, reported in part: "After Iranian representative had been invited, without opposition, to sit without vote with SC, Chairman emphasized that this was first time that SC was performing its functions under Chapter VI. Since rules of procedure for its operation under Chapter are yet to be developed, SC would have to proceed on ad hoc basis this time, but should bear in mind that its action would constitute precedent.

Ambassador Tagizadeh submitted a memorandum and other documents to the Security Council at this meeting; for texts, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser. supp. No. 1, pp. 25-73.
Memorandum by Mr. Charles P. Noyes, Special Assistant to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

USSC 46/33

[LONDON, undated.]

Calendar Notes on Iranian Matters

Tuesday, January 29

In the afternoon Mr. Stettinius asked Mr. Hare to call on Ambassador Taqizadeh, Head of the Iranian Delegation, to find out if possible what instructions he had received from his government in regard to placing the Iranian case before the Security Council. During the evening Mr. Hare reported back that he had had a conversation with Mr. Kazemi, second man on the Iranian Delegation, who told him that there had been no changes in the Iranian instructions. The Iranians were prepared to continue to pursue the case. The Iranians stated that they thought perhaps the best approach would be for the Council to recommend bilateral negotiations under the jurisdiction of the Council. He asked if the United States would make this proposal. He indicated that the Chinese had agreed to do so, but that it would be preferable if the United States would do it. (See Document: USGA/la/Gen.30/Conv.45) 67

Mr. Noyes reported this conversation immediately to Mr. Bohlen, and later in the evening to Dr. Pasvolsky. That evening a telegram was received from Teheran reporting that the new Prime Minister had told his Ambassador that he planned to open bilateral negotiations with the Russians both in Teheran and in Moscow, as well as having instructed Ambassador Taqizadeh (together with Mr. Kazemi) to make contact with Mr. Vyshinsky in London (see Telegram Red No. 1736 68).

At the last two conversations referred to, the main questions discussed were the position we should take in the light of the public position of the Iranian government that they were prepared to enter bilateral negotiations. It was considered likely that the Iranian delegate would receive new instructions, as reported from the press, either instructing him or authorizing him to enter into bilateral negotiations. We considered it possible if not probable that the Prime Minister of Iran had already been in direct contact with the Russians in Teheran or Moscow as the Chinese had reported to us privately. It was also possible that the Prime Minister might even proceed to Moscow himself. There was discussion therefore of the advisability of taking

67 Not printed.
68 No record of this message found in Department files.
a position which would still be tenable if Mr. Vyshinsky announced at the meeting that his government had already begun direct discussions.

**Wednesday morning, January 30**

Immediately after the full delegation meeting held on the 7th floor of 20 Grosvenor Square, Mr. Pasvolsky, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Noyes, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Notter, Mr. Hartley, and Mr. Hare assembled in Mr. Stettinius’ office to discuss the United States position at the afternoon Security Council meeting. Mr. Pasvolsky read a statement which Mr. Wellington Koo had told him he proposed to make at the meeting. The general consensus was that this was a very poor statement and should not be used. Mr. Pasvolsky read a statement which he had prepared, copy attached. This was considered an excellent statement for Mr. Stettinius to use. Several minor revisions were made in the statement and in the accompanying resolution. (copy of revised resolution also attached)

At 11:30 the meeting adjourned to Mr. Stettinius’ suite at Claridge’s [Hotel]. Mr. Stettinius had just had a meeting with Sir Alexander Cadogan (this conversation is written up in ERS’ Calendar Notes for that day). Bevin was reported to be willing, after a full discussion of the meeting in the Council, to allow bilateral negotiations to take place under the sponsorship of the Council. He would not insist on a vote, but felt a statement from the Chairman would suffice. Mr. Stettinius had agreed to support a full discussion and said we also were willing to agree to bilateral negotiations between the parties, as long as the Council was kept informed.

Mr. Pasvolsky’s resolution was discussed and approved. It was agreed that Mr. Hare would get in touch with the Iranian Ambassador immediately, to urge him to point out in reply to the Soviet statement at the last meeting that the Iranians had sought bilateral negotiations over the issue of the Soviets having prevented the Iranian service forces from proceeding into northern Iran, but that the Russians had refused to negotiate. He was to suggest then that it would be the wisest course for the Iranians then to state that he was prepared to undertake bilateral negotiations with the Russians as long as the case

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*Benjamin V. Cohen, Senior Adviser to the United States delegation at the United Nations.

*Joseph E. Johnson, Harley Notter, and Robert Hartley were Political Advisers to the United States delegation at the United Nations.

*Statement not printed.

*Not printed; the statement was not made at the meeting of the Security Council during the afternoon of January 30.

*Memorandum of conversation not printed; Sir Alexander Cadogan was Principal Adviser to the British delegation at the United Nations.
remained before the Security Council, and the Security Council requested the parties to keep it fully informed of the progress and of the results of their negotiations.

Mr. Pasvolsky thereupon went off to see Mr. Wellington Koo to obtain his support for our resolution.

Mr. Hare reported back at about 1:30 to Mr. Noyes, by telephone, to the effect that the Iranians, as we had suggested, would seek the floor immediately upon the opening of the meeting, would make the argument that the Russians had never negotiated in good faith, would state that Iran would be willing to enter into bilateral negotiations under the aegis of the Council, if certain safeguards were provided. He also reported that the Iranians had received no instructions.

At quarter to two, Mr. Pasvolsky and Mr. Bohlen came in. Mr. Pasvolsky reported that the Chinese had agreed to our resolution. We met again just before the Security Council meeting.

[Annex]

Resolution

The Security Council,

having examined the documents submitted to it by the representatives of Iran and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, relating to the dispute existing between the two countries;

having heard the oral statements made by these representatives;

having taken due cognizance of the declarations made by these representatives of their willingness to proceed with direct negotiations in an effort to find a mutually acceptable solution of their differences,

hereby expresses its hope that the differences between the two countries will thus be adjusted in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations; and

resolves:

1. That the appeal of the Iranian Government, communicated to the Security Council on January 19, 1946, remain on the continuing agenda of the Council until such time as the Council decides to remove it from its agenda; and

2. That the Governments of Iran and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics keep the Council currently and fully informed of the progress of their direct negotiations and of the results thereof.
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

US URGENT

[Received January 30—9:02 p.m.]

1166. For the President and the Secretary of State. At this afternoon’s meeting of the Security Council the Iranians expressed their willingness to undertake bilateral negotiations under the aegis of the Council, if the Council so recommended, retained the matter before it, and requested the parties to report progress. After 4 hours discussion we reached unanimous agreement on a resolution which took cognizance of the readiness of the parties to seek a solution by bilateral negotiations, requested the parties to report the results, and retained the right to the Council at any time to request information as to the progress of the negotiations. Vyshinsky agreed to a supplementary statement by Bevin that if the reports were unsatisfactory the Council

"For the official record of the proceedings of the Security Council on January 30, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 1, pp. 45-71.

"In conclusion, I should like to say that, now that this dispute has come before the Council and has found a place on its agenda, it cannot be dismissed and must not be dismissed. In no circumstances must it go out of the hands of the Council; it must be pursued.

"If, as the Soviet representative said at the conclusion of his statement, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is ready for direct negotiations for the settlement of this dispute, we will be prepared to take part in direct negotiations, if the Council recommends this procedure to be adopted. We have always tried in the past, and have always wished to enter into direct negotiations. But now this procedure should be adopted according to a recommendation of the Council, and in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Charter.

"The Council should take this matter under its jurisdiction; negotiations should proceed under its aegis. Progress should be reported to the Council from time to time, and results should be reported to it within a reasonable lapse of time. In this way, we are ready to get into direct negotiations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, but under no circumstances are we prepared to let the matter go out of the hands of the Council." (SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 1, p. 45)

"The resolution as introduced by Mr. Bevin and adopted unanimously by the Security Council read as follows:

"The Council,

"Having heard the statements by the representatives of the Soviet Union and Iran in the course of its meetings of 28 and 30 January, and

"Having taken cognizance of the documents presented by the Soviet and Iranian delegations and those referred to in the course of the oral debates;

"Considering that both parties have affirmed their readiness to seek a solution of the matter at issue by negotiation; and that such negotiations will be resumed in the near future,

"Requests the parties to inform the Council of any results achieved in such negotiations. The Council in the meanwhile retains the right at any time to request information on the progress of the negotiations." (Ibid., p. 70)
could consider the matter at any time." Before the resolution was accepted I stated that I would agree with the understanding that this matter remains of continuing concern to the Council until a settlement is reached in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter.\footnote{Mr. Bevin’s resolution, as originally drafted, included the following terminal sentence: “In the meantime, the matter remains on the agenda.” (SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 1, p. 64). Mr. Vyshinsky commented: “... I am decidedly against this question remaining on the agenda of the Security Council. It must be removed in view of the express agreement for a friendly settlement of this question. I am convinced that we shall achieve results. Should we fail to achieve any results, then any member of the Security Council can come into the Security Council and say: ‘Give us an account of what you have done to carry out the obligations which you have assumed at the meeting of 30 January 1946.’” (Ibid., p. 66.) After further discussion, Mr. Bevin asked: “... If we put a full stop at the word ‘negotiations’, and take out the words ‘the matter remains on the agenda’, does he [Mr. Vyshinsky] agree—this is the question—does he agree that if the progress of the negotiations is not satisfactory, the matter can be discussed by the Security Council?” Mr. Vyshinsky’s reply was: “... But, if, unexpectedly, owing to other circumstances or to the interference of some hot-heads, no results are achieved, then I can answer Mr. Bevin’s question thus: ‘Yes, in accordance with the terms of the Charter.’” (Ibid., p. 70.) Mr. Bevin then dropped the terminal sentence in his draft resolution.}

Bevin made a very blunt statement charging among other things that the Soviets’ admission that they had stopped the Iranian forces from moving into northern Iran indicated clearly a violation of the Tripartite Treaty of 1942.

I believe this is a satisfactory solution and one which will be not displeasing to the Iranians.

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Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)\footnote{Mr. Stettinius made three statements of substance during the discussion on January 30. He noted first: “... I do not believe that keeping the matter on the continuing agenda of the Council while negotiations are in progress, until a solution is found, is in any way incompatible with the Charter or the dignity of the Council, or any of its members. Moreover, it does not seem to me that the Council can divest itself of its responsibility in the situation which has been brought to its attention.” (SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 1, p. 58). Later, he reinforced his position with the statement: “... It must be understood that the item remains on our continuing agenda.” (Ibid., p. 63) Finally, just prior to the unanimous adoption of Mr. Bevin’s resolution, Mr. Stettinius noted: “Since I think I was the only one who insisted on the words ‘remaining on the agenda’, I wish to make my position clear at this time in relation to Mr. Bevin’s recent proposal. I am willing to accept Mr. Bevin’s proposal with the understanding that this matter remain a continuing concern of the Council until a settlement is reached in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter.” (Ibid., p. 71)}

[WASHINGTON,] February 1, 1946.

We have had some hesitation in drafting the attached telegram to Moscow\footnote{Addressed to the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary (Acheson); this memorandum was attached to telegram 132, January 29, from Tehran, p. 319.} since we are anxious not to do anything which will make...
still more complicated the negotiations which we assume will take place in the near future between Iran and the Soviet Union with regard to Azerbaijan.

Our reasons for recommending this action are briefly as follows:

1. Our failure to take any action might give the Soviet Government the impression that our numerous expressions of interest in the freedom of news are not based on any real intention on the part of this Government to endeavor to render it possible to back up American correspondents abroad.

2. Our failure to support the Embassy's request lowers the prestige of the Embassy in the eyes of Soviet officials in Iran and might render more difficult effectively to perform its functions of carrying out American policies in that area.

3. Unless Soviet officials can demonstrate that the presence of American correspondents in Northern Iran might be a threat to the security of that area, they have no ground to forbid our correspondents to enter that area. We should not continue for an indefinite period to acquiesce in the Soviet practice of barring American correspondents from non-Soviet territory.

4. The American public should not be prevented from obtaining the impressions of the American correspondents regarding developments in Iran.

LOY W. HENDERSON

501.BC/1-146

Memorandum of Conversation, by Raymond A. Hare, Political Adviser to the United States Delegation at the United Nations

SECRET


USSC 46/13 (Conv. 1)

During the Security Council meeting on Greece yesterday, I had a short conversation with Ambassador Taqizadeh regarding the decision taken by the Security Council in the Iran case and I mentioned to him certain of the more reassuring aspects of the result, stressing particularly the importance of the decision made in the Council's resolution in respect of reporting back to the Council on its demand, the effect of which was to make it possible to bring the matter back before the Council by a procedural vote.

The Ambassador replied that he was of course still very much disappointed that the Council's resolution had not made provision for maintaining the Iranian case on its agenda, this having been the stipulation on which he had indicated willingness to resort to direct negotiation. He added that he appreciated the importance of the provision made for reporting to the Council but the question which came to his mind was whether the necessary initiative would in fact be taken by
the Council should necessity arise. He had greatly appreciated the strong support which Britain, the United States and Australia had given Iran in the course of the debate and he hoped that he could count on their continued support. In view, however, of the difficulties in the relations between Britain and the Soviet Union, he thought it would be much better if the United States would raise the question of reporting in the event that the circumstances should so require and he asked if Iran could count on United States support in that regard. I replied that this was a question which I, of course, could not undertake to answer and that generally speaking it was difficult to give definite assurances upon the basis of hypothetical future developments. However, I suggested that the Ambassador would undoubtedly wish to bear in mind in this connection the past statements of American policy in respect of Iran and also the reservation made by Mr. Stettinius at the end of Wednesday's debate to the effect that the Iranian question should remain of "continuing concern" until a satisfactory solution is reached.

[Here follows comment by Ambassador Taqizadeh on the stand taken by various members of the Security Council during debate on the Iranian matter.]

Ambassador Taqizadeh said that, despite his disappointment in the Council's verdict, he wished to do everything possible to make the best of the existing situation and that he had accordingly approached Mr. Vyshinsky on Thursday and had suggested that they proceed at once to bilateral conversations as envisaged in the Council's resolution. Mr. Vyshinsky had replied that he would require instructions from Moscow in order to initiate such conversations and asked if Ambassador Taqizadeh had powers to enter discussions. The Ambassador replied that he was prepared to begin discussions immediately and emphasized to Mr. Vyshinsky the importance of "striking while the iron is hot". Mr. Vyshinsky said that he would seek instructions from his government immediately and hoped to have word back from Moscow within the course of the next day or so.

RAYMOND A. HARE

891.00/2-446: Telegram

The Vice Consul at Tabriz (Rossow) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TABRIZ, February 4, 1946—2 p.m.
[Received February 6—3:32 p.m.]

15. [Here follows report by Mr. Rossow that he "called on 'Prime Minister' Peshavari this morning with a view to effecting release of large shipment of American-owned sausage casings now spoiling in Tabriz warehouse for lack of permit to ship out of Azerbaijan." ]
I mentioned prevalent economic distress in province and inquired what steps were being taken in that regard. He replied that at request of merchants this government was preparing to negotiate commercial treaties with foreign governments. I said I believed only sovereign nationals [nations?] negotiated treaties. He replied he was aware of that but nation had to live and he had no alternative. I asked if he meant that he had changed his mind about remaining within Iranian nation. He answered no, but that nation had to have economic life. In reply to question he said he was not now actually in negotiation with any foreign government.

I said I had been informed that movie censorship board had been set up and that American films were being banned on political grounds. He replied this was not true but that films may have been cut on moral grounds. He added there may have been mistakes made but he would see they were not repeated.

I then asked conversationally what his impressions of recent Security Council hearings had been. Embarking on impassioned tirade he said that reference of this problem to UNO had been a great mistake because the affair was a purely internal matter between central government and Azerbaijan. He said no decision could be made on this matter without Azerbaijan’s consent, and that any decision unfavorable to Azerbaijan, no matter where made and whether or not backed up by force, would be resisted. He said his people would not give up national existence and would fight for it to the last man and with sticks and stones if necessary. He continued, he bitterly resented the fact that this matter was being discussed over his government’s head and without its consent and likened it to parents arranging marriage of a daughter.

I commented that my understanding was that case at issue was between Soviet Union and Iran and thus obviously an international matter, that UNO had been created for precisely such matters, that he had himself just said he did not consider province independent, and that therefore I could not quite follow his argument since provinces of a nation are not customarily consulted in international issues. He replied that Azerbaijan’s special status must be recognized and it must be consulted directly in this affair.

I asked if he considered the position at which he had now arrived was irrevocable with respect to finding any satisfactory arrangement with central govt. He said it was irrevocable in the sense that his govt would not retreat one step in its struggle for national existence but that it was revocable in that if central govt wished to come to him the door for establishment of pleasant relations was not closed. He went on to castigate central govt for lack of cooperation and lack of efforts to arrive at satisfactory agreement. I asked then if he had ini-
tiated any such action. He replied that he had sent statement of Azerbaijani demands long ago to Shah and Majlis but that it had not even been acknowledged.

I then expressed interest in his recent speech (mytel 11, Jan 28 \(^{81}\)) and particularly the reference therein to “foreign imperialist nations” aiding his enemies, and inquired what nations he was referring to. He replied he had no specific nations in mind but that any nation that opposed Azerbaijan’s national destiny fitted the description. He went on that he had said govts and not nations, that merely because a foreign govt adopted hostile policy did not mean he would consider nation an enemy.

I commented that knowing difficulties of moving large bodies of troops I had been rather surprised with March 2 so close not to have seen any apparent move on the part of Soviet troops toward evacuation. He said, “Why don’t you ask the Russians why they don’t leave.” I replied I was not asking but merely commenting. He then said he was aware of lack of signs of departure, but that since Russians had been strictly neutral in the local affair, since occupation arrangement had been made with central govt and not with Azerbaijan, and since he had more pressing internal problems at the moment he did not intend to request Soviet troops to evacuate. He said perhaps eventually his govt might ask them to leave but that would have to be considered later.

His comment regarding Kurdish situation which followed above and concluded interview will be reported by separate telegram.\(^{82}\)

Sent Dept as 15; Tehran as 21, London and Moscow as 9.

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891.00/1-1246: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, February 6, 1946—7 p. m.

US URGENT

232. Urteil 53, Jan. 12.\(^{83}\) In view of statements by Soviet Emb Tehran that calm prevails in Azerbaijan, please request appropriate Soviet authorities to instruct Soviet military and diplomatic representatives in Iran to issue passes for travel in northern Iran to Arthur [Joseph] Goodwin of AP (urteil 132, Jan. 29 \(^{82}\)) and such other ac-

\(^{81}\) Not printed.

\(^{82}\) No. 18, February 6, not printed.

\(^{83}\) This telegram came from Tehran.
credited American correspondents who may wish to visit Azerbaijan for purpose of reporting to newspapers in this country.  

Sent to Moscow, repeated to Tehran.  

BYRNE

761.91/2-846: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, February 8, 1946—2 p. m.  
[Received February 9—10:11 a. m.]

177. Qavam told me yesterday he doubts that Soviets intend to evacuate Iran by March 2. He said, however, that he hoped to arrange withdrawal as result of his projected conversations in Moscow  

where he thinks he can create more friendly atmosphere.

He has evidently decided definitely to go himself to Moscow but has not settled exact time of departure or selected man to accompany him. He remarked this would have to wait until after formation of his Cabinet which he expects to complete within week.

I mentioned that certain quarters seemed to feel it unwise for him to make trip personally, to which he replied that he also had heard this said and believed that such remarks were intended to discredit him and weaken his position. He was emphatic in defending his decision to go.

In reply to my question Qavan said he still intended to send mission to Azerbaijan and that he planned to dispatch it at same time he himself leaves for Russia.

Prime Minister spoke with strong indignation of Reuters' report of his asserted decision to make sweeping concessions to Azerbaijanians and Russians. (My telegram 172 February 8)  

When I saw him he had just held press conference at which he had flatly denied story. In discussing it with me, Qavam expressed conviction report originated with Seyid Zia ed-Din (his bitter enemy) and was designed first to discredit him with British and second by forcing him

84 According to Moscow's telegram 442, February 14, such a request was made in a letter to the Soviet Foreign Office (811.91291/2-1446). In telegram 246, February 26, 1946, 10 a. m., from Tehran, the Department was informed that the Soviet Consul had instructions to issue no permits to foreign correspondents to visit northern Iran since they would write "silly" stories on the situation there (811.91291/2-2846).

85 In telegram 154, February 4, 1 p. m., Ambassador Murray reported that Prime Minister Qavam had informed the Soviet Government of his plan to send a mission to Moscow and that the Soviet Government had replied that it would be delighted to receive the mission and hoped that the Prime Minister would head the mission (761.92/2-446).

86 Not printed.
to deny any intention of making concessions to alienate Russians before conversations with them could begin. He was especially indignant with Reuters for publishing story without making any effort to check with him first.

To Dept as 177, repeated Moscow 43, London 31.

MURRAY

891.00/2-1140: Telegram

The Vice Consul at Tabriz (Rassow) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Tabriz, February 11, 1946—noon. [Received February 13—12:13 a.m.]

20. Peshavari’s consistent policy up to January 26 was to display patience, caution and forbearance vigorously protesting willingness to negotiate with Tehran, while at same time encouraging intolerable economic situation.

On above date he began new tactic of inflammatory and extravagantly belligerent pronouncements in intensity and culminating in proclamation reported mytel 19, February 9, announcing creation of Army and commencement of conscription, and asking religious leaders somewhat inconsistently to declare Jahat or Moslem holy war. For past 2 days frenzied demonstrations have been staged in streets vainly attempting to foment support for Army and warlike spirit. The extreme vituperation and recklessness of Peshavari’s recent statements have caused serious apprehension locally.

The apparent motive behind earlier policy of restraint was to allow Democrats and Russians to propagandize a superficial justification and attitude of innocence blaming all the evils of situation on “despotic reactionary” Tehran. It was apparent, however, that this cautious policy could not be long maintained as forecast mytel 5, January 16.

The motive behind new policy of verbal violence would appear obviously to give Russians an excuse for remaining in occupation to prevent “bloodshed, disorder and terrors of holy war,” an idea already being voiced locally by known Russian sympathizers.

The schematic pattern appears skillful and clear, phase 1 providing propagandistic justification allowing Russians openly to render moral support and assistance to Democrat regime, and phase 2 providing excuse for practical support through continued military occupation.

It is believed that at this stage any negotiations between Tehran and Azerbaijan will not be successful unless very extreme concessions are made by former.

87 Not printed: it stated that the proclamation was made by Mr. Pishvani as “Chairman of the Democratic Party and Prime Minister of Azerbaijan” and was published in the newspaper Azerbaijan on February 7 (891.00/2-946).

88 Not printed.
Although as reported mytel 12, January 30" Security Council hearings caused momentary concern to Democrat leaders, withdrawal of issue from agenda, interpreted as Soviet victory, has encouraged them to prosecute with even greater vigor their increasingly belligerent policies.

Similar interpretation of withdrawal of issue was made by general public. Nevertheless, lack of execution of announced internal reforms and increasingly desperate economic conditions with unemployment widespread have produced cautious but almost unanimous opposition to every aspect of Democrat regime, earlier tentative support of internal program having been entirely withdrawn.

Only support of regime is from own active members estimated at not over five percent of population excluding those under duress. But disagreement over extremist terrorism, economic situation and Kurdish problem has even shaken internal organization of [Govt] and party directorate to the reported annoyance of Soviet mentors. Also fidayis have been deserting for lack of pay and restraint on looting.

Peshavari's fervent assertions that people support conscription and new national army are absolutely false. Opposition is almost unanimous and many of military age have gone into hiding, leaving draft quotas unfilled. Police have commenced summary impressment of any fit young males seen walking on streets.

If Soviets withdrew, the Army and entire Democrat regime would undoubtedly crumble instantly of own accord. But so long as Soviets remain and hope for help from outside is lacking, this opposition cannot be expected to have serious result, for though overt terrorist tactics have been played down since mid-January the general fear of Russians persists as strongly as ever.

Open contact between Soviet and local officials is limited to social and cultural affairs, but it is apparent to all observers that clandestine contact is continuous with local Soviet Consulate General and with all-powerful Soviet town commandants in interior.

There is no sign of Soviet military withdrawal. On contrary, they are reported letting 6-month contracts for local supplies and small groups of reinforcements are reliably reported continually arriving from Soviet frontier. Attention is also drawn to fact that in recent interviews (mytel 15, Feb 4) Peshavari virtually admitted remain in occupation. At same time his vehement insistence that on decision of Security Council depended future his regime, almost amounted to flagrant admission of Soviet intervention.

"Not printed.
"Civilian armed volunteers of the Pishavari regime.
Although independence of Azerbaijan has not been proclaimed in so many words, it is believed recent words and actions may be accepted as tantamount thereto. Further secessionist indications are that wearing of imperial insignia and display of Shah's portrait have recently been forbidden.

Sent Dept as 20; Tehran as 27; Moscow and London as 13.

[Rossow]

761.31/2–2246: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, February 22, 1946—4 p. m.

321. Top Secret for Kennan. In view of the Iranian-Soviet negotiations which are taking place in Moscow, \(^{21}\) we feel it is important that you should have a clear exposition of the position adopted by the US Representative on the Security Council and the considerations which led to the adoption of that position. The following summary is therefore for your information and such use as you may deem advisable in any conversations you have with the Iranian Prime Minister during his stay in Moscow. It is of course obvious in view of the position which the US Government has adopted before and during the presentation of this case to the Council, that we do not wish to give any impression that we are uninterested in the outcome of the negotiations or that we would view with favor any arrangement which might impair the independence and integrity of Iran. Conversely you will, of course, understand that under no circumstances should any impression be conveyed to him that the US is seeking to influence the course of the negotiations or to encourage the Iranian delegation to adopt an unreasonable attitude.

Begin Summary. The Iranian case as originally presented before the Council was in essence a charge of interference in internal Iranian affairs and of preventing the exercise of Iranian sovereignty on Iranian territory in violation of the tripartite pact of 1942. Had the case been pressed before the Council in the original form presented, the US Representative would have supported Council action. However, the resignation of Hakimi whose Government presented the original case and the appointment of Qavam on the eve of the hearings altered the basis of the Iranian case. Since Qavam had publicly announced on assuming office that he intended to seek bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Government and the Soviet Government was urging that the matter be so dealt with, the Council had no clear grounds for

\(^{21}\) The Iranian mission headed by Prime Minister Qavam left Tehran by Soviet plane for Moscow on February 18.
taking direct jurisdiction over the matter. The US Representative, however, considered it of great importance to make it plain that while accepting the willingness of both parties to negotiate, the question having been brought before the Council should remain its continuing concern pending settlement. The US Representative would have preferred that the question be left formally on the “continuing agenda” and so proposed. When this suggestion was not supported by other members of the Council, Mr. Stettinius withdrew his proposal but on the express understanding that the matter would remain the continuing concern of the Council until it was settled in conformity with the principles and purposes of the Charter. In view of the wording of the resolution, which it is assumed you have, and the statements of other members of the Council particularly the US and British, it is clear that ample opportunity is afforded to the Iranian Government to return the question to the Council either on its own initiative or through a third party in the event that the negotiations take a turn which the Iranian Government regards as threatening the integrity of Iran. This Government has publicly made clear its expectation that the results of the present negotiations agreed to by the Council will be in full conformity with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations. End Summary.

In view of our position in this matter, it is of course extremely desirable that we be kept currently informed of the course of negotiations in Moscow, and in your discretion you may express to Qavam the hope of this Government that he will keep you advised.

Byrnes

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761.91/3-246: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 2, 1946.
[Received March 2—11:34 a.m.]

610. Press March 2 carries despatch “Soviet Troops in Iran”. Full translation follows:

On February 25 at time of conversation with Iran Premier Qavam, he was informed of decision of Soviet Government that on March 2 withdrawal will begin of portion of Soviet’s troops from Iranian districts that are relatively more peaceful, that is, from districts of Meshed, Shahrud and Samnan located in eastern part of Iran. As regards Soviet troops in other districts of Iran they will remain in Iran pending examination of situation.

Sent Dept. as 610, repeated Tehran as 35, London as 109, and USPolAd and Frankfurt.

[Kennan]
SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 8, 1946—2 p. m.

165. For the Ambassador. The Iranian Ambassador told Department evening March 2 that he would appreciate it if we would register immediate protest to Soviet Government for its failure to withdraw troops from Iran on March 2 in accordance with treaty obligations. He said that he was acting without instructions but was sure, from his knowledge of basic policies of Iran, that the Shah and his Government would approve his suggestion and that he had already telegraphed the Shah and his Government on the subject.

We told him that we had as yet no report to the effect that the Shah or any responsible member of the Government had made it clear that Soviet decision to retain troops beyond March 2 had been taken without the approval or consent of the Iranian Government. Any representations which this Government might make, therefore, in the circumstances might be lacking in effectiveness, since they could be based only upon an assumption, not upon definite knowledge, that retention of Soviet forces was without the consent of the Iranian Government.

British Embassy has submitted to Department draft of a note of protest which British Government is proposing to present to the Soviet Government. This protest is based upon Soviet violation of the Tripartite Treaty to which Great Britain is a party. It seems to us that the only basis on which we could make a protest would be the violation by the Soviet Union of the territorial integrity of Iran. If Iranian Government has assented to retention of Soviet troops in Iranian territory it would be difficult for us to substantiate a charge of this nature, unless we were in possession of strong evidence of duress.

Byrnes

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92 This telegram was repeated to Moscow as No. 396 and to London as No. 1951.
93 In a conversation with the Secretary of State on March 4, the Iranian Ambassador made a further request for U.S. representations to the Soviet Union concerning the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran. The Secretary said that he was interested in knowing the attitude of the Iranian Government in this matter and he hoped the Ambassador would communicate with him when he received a message (761.91/8-446).
94 On March 2.
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

Moscow, March 4, 1946—8 p. m.
[Received March 4—4: 40 p. m.]

642. ReEmb’s 532, February 25 and 546, February 26. Having returned to my desk today after illness of nearly 2 weeks, I called this afternoon on Iranian PriMin Qavam. He appeared very depressed; said that he had been able to reach no understanding at all with Russians; that he was planning to leave for Tehran tomorrow, and that he was seeing Stalin for last time tonight.

Stalin, he observed incidentally and with some sadness, was very rough.

He inquired whether we were making a démarche to Soviet Government similar to that of British with respect to Soviet troops remaining in Iran after March 2. I told him this question had been raised in Washington by his Ambassador and explained why our Government was not in position to make such démarche following closely in this explanation the lines of Dept’s 366, March 3. He then informed me that he had himself entered protest with Soviet Government over failure to remove troops. I inquired the terms in which this protest had been made and he went out to another room to fetch a copy of the document. When he returned, he explained he had just learned that the note had actually not been delivered because the official designated to deliver it could not be received at Narkomindel until 6 o’clock this afternoon Moscow time. Nevertheless, he showed me a copy of the communication which he stated would be delivered. When entering Narkomindel at 6:15 this evening, I saw Iranian Counselor coming out so I assume note was actually delivered. Communication referred to Izvestiya report about troops remaining in Iran, (from which I gather that the Iranian Government had had no direct communication apprising them of Soviet decision) stated that this was flatly

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65 Neither printed.
66 In telegram 622, March 2, 1946, noon, Mr. Kennan reported information from a source he thought reliable that the “Russians have been putting tremendous pressure on Persian Prime Minister Qavam. They have advanced three initial demands, first that Persians recognize autonomy of area now in insurgent hands, second that they grant oil concessions requested by Russians in ’44 and third that they agree to continued presence of Soviet troops in northern Persia.” The third demand might be retracted if their demand for oil concessions were granted. (761.91/3-246)
67 See footnote 92, p. 336.
68 People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.
contradictory to terms of 1942 treaty, registered a categoric protest against this, and requested Soviet Government to withdraw troops at once. I told him I would inform my Government this step was being taken. He said he would inform Tehran telegraphically this evening along this same line.

He said that he had already raised with Russians in oral conversation this question of troops remaining and had asked on what ground they could justify this. They replied that Persian delegate at Paris Peace Conference in 1919 had raised question of cession to Persia of large portions of Russian territory and that Persian delegate had later and quite recently occupied a high position in Tehran Government. Russians could therefore not feel secure against Iranian plans of aggression and for this reason had to keep troops there.

He then inquired whether I thought they could count on our Government’s support if they failed to reach an agreement with Russians. I told him that I could only say that my Government took highly serious view of its obligations as a member of UNO and that if this question were returned to Security Council either by Iran or by third party, I was sure my Government would do everything in its power to see that questions were solved in conformity with principles and purposes of UNO Charter. I added that as far as retention of Soviet troops was concerned, I found it hard to conceive that Soviet reference to statements made at Versailles Peace Conference would be considered in UNO as constituting very weighty grounds for maintenance of Soviet troops in Iran in violation of treaty obligations.

In leaving, I expressed to PriMin the hope that perhaps in his final interview with Stalin there might still be some unexpected turn for the better and asked him to keep me informed if by any chance he did not carry out his plan of leaving in the morning.

British Chargé who called on Qavam this morning told me Qavam had given him following version of course of talks. He, Qavam, had requested Russian assistance in dealing with situation which had arisen in northern Iran. Russians had flatly declined to give such assistance. They had revived demand for oil concessions to which he had simply replied that he was unable to discuss this question in view of existing Iranian law forbidding such questions to be discussed with any country having troops on Iranian territory. They had also asked for recognition of autonomy of local regime in northern Iran and he had explained that he also had no authority to discuss this question. With this, discussions had come to an impasse and he saw no further reason for remaining here.

Although both my British colleague and I have heretofore been skeptical as to ability of Qavam to stand Russian pressure, I must
say that I now have impression that Qavam came here so closely restricted by his own Government in what he could do that it was impossible for him to reach any agreement with Russians except in open defiance of his own Government which he was unwilling to contemplate.


KENNAN

861.24591/3-546

The Iranian Ambassador (Ala) to the Secretary of State

No. 2936

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1946.

Sir: In the course of my conversation with Your Excellency, yesterday morning, I had the honour to request that the United States Government, which is a signatory of the Declaration of Teheran and of the United Nations Charter, be good enough to protest in Moscow against the breach of faith of the Soviet Government in failing to withdraw their forces from the whole of the North of Iran by the second of March 1946, the ultimate date fixed by the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance of January 29, 1942.

Your Excellency observed that before taking action, the State Department would need to be informed of the attitude of the Prime Minister of Iran, who is at present negotiating in Moscow, in the matter of the Soviet default.

As I had surmised, it is now officially confirmed by a cable received from our Prime Minister by my colleague in London and communicated to me this morning, that Mr. Ahmad Qavam, Premier of Iran, protested in writing against the failure of the Soviet Government to live up to its solemn pledge, and would welcome and appreciate American intervention at this critical juncture.

It would, therefore, appear that there is no longer any obstacle to prevent Your Excellency from issuing the necessary instructions to your Chargé d’Affaires in Moscow.

I would also like to draw your attention to the fact that in accordance with information received from well-informed quarters the Soviet Government are making the evacuation of Iran depend upon the acceptance by the Persian Government of certain very important demands whereas the withdrawal of foreign allied forces at the end of the war has always been considered unconditional.

May I venture to ask Your Excellency to use the great influence of the American Government to obtain the unconditional evacuation of Iran by the Soviet forces?

Please accept [etc.]

Hussein Ala

* See footnote 93, p. 336.
The Vice Consul at Tabriz (Rossow) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
US URGENT NIACT

TABRIZ, March 5, 1946—1 p. m.
[Received March 6—6: 25 a. m.]

40. Exceptionally heavy Soviet troop movements have been going on since yesterday as follows: On night March 3—450 Soviet trucks heavily laden with supplies, mainly ammunition, departed Tabriz toward Tehran. Last night 20 tanks with 100 trucks departed in same direction and had reached Bostanabad early this morning.

Two regiments of cavalry with two attached batteries of artillery, equipped for full field operations, departed Tabriz this morning toward Marand. It is not definitely known whether they will go on to Zhulfa or turn off toward Khoi, Rezaieh and Maku. However very heavy forage shipments made during past week by Soviets from Tabriz particularly to Rezaieh would seem to indicate latter direction of march. It is further reported from Mahabad that Kurds are preparing to assert claim to Turkish Kurdistan and plan to commence military operations to that end soon.

Another strong force of Soviet cavalry was observed 2 days ago marching southward through Gorgan with Iraq frontier as reported destination. In apparent conjunction with this movement 9 Soviet tanks left last night in direction of Maragheh.

There remain in Tabriz at least 2 regiments of cavalry and some artillery but no known armored elements. During past 3 nights several large truck convoys loaded with troops have been observed arriving from direction of Soviet frontier.

Sent Department 40, Tehran 55; Moscow 32; London 20; Ankara 7; Baghdad 5.

Rossow

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan)

SECRET
US URGENT NIACT

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1946—7 p. m.

388. Please deliver immediately the following note to Mr. Molotov:

"I have the honor to inform your Excellency that I have been instructed by my Government to deliver to the Government of the Soviet Union the following message:

The Government of the United States has been informed that the Government of the Soviet Union has decided to retain Soviet troops in Iran after March 2, 1946, that this decision was taken without the consent of the Iranian Government, and that Soviet troops continue to remain on Iranian territory in spite of the protests of the Iranian Government."
It will be recalled that in reply to a note addressed on November 24, 1945 by the Government of the United States to the Government of the Soviet Union suggesting the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Iran, the Soviet Government on November 29 stated that the period of the stationing of Soviet troops in Iran was governed by the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty of January 29, 1942. The Government of the United States understood from this statement that it was the intention of the Government of the Soviet Union that all Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Iran not later than March 2, 1946, six months after the date of the signing of the instrument of surrender with Japan on September 2, 1945. This understanding was based upon Article Five of the Tripartite Treaty referred to above which states:

"The forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Iranian territory not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or armistices, or on the conclusion of peace between them, whichever date is the earlier."

So far as the Government of the United States is aware, this commitment was not questioned at the recent meeting of the Security Council in London which agreed that the Soviet Union and Iran should seek a solution of their differences by direct negotiation.

The decision of the Soviet Government to retain Soviet troops in Iran beyond the period stipulated by the Tripartite Treaty has created a situation with regard to which the Government of the United States, as a member of the United Nations and as a party to the Declaration Regarding Iran dated December 1, 1943, can not remain indifferent. That Declaration announced to the world that the Governments of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom were 'at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran'. In the opinion of the Government of the United States, the maintenance of troops in Iranian territory by any one of the three signatories to that Declaration, without the consent and against the wishes of the Government of Iran, is contrary to the assurances contained in that Declaration. Furthermore it was generally accepted during the various discussions which took place at the meeting of the Security Council in London that the retention by a member of the United Nations of its troops in the territory of a country which is also a member of the United Nations, without the consent of the Government of that country, is not in accordance with the principles of the United Nations and that the withdrawal of such troops should not be made contingent upon other issues.

The Government of the United States, in the spirit of the friendly association which developed between the United States and the Soviet Union in the successful effort against the common enemy and as a fellow member of the United Nations, expresses the earnest hope that the Government of the Soviet Union will do its part, by withdrawing immediately all Soviet forces from the territory of Iran, to promote the international confidence which is necessary for peaceful progress among the peoples of all nations.

The Government of the United States trusts that the Government of the Soviet Union, no less than itself, appreciates the heavy responsibility resting upon the great powers under the Charter to observe their obligations and to respect the sovereign rights of other states.

The Government of the United States requests that it be promptly advised of the decision of the Government of the Soviet Union which it hopes will be in accord with the views herein expressed."^2

Sent to Moscow, repeated to London and Tehran.

BYRNE

861.24591/3-646: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

URGENT

MOSCOW, March 6, 1946—4 p.m.
[Received March 6—10:30 a.m.]

682. Text of note set forth in Dept's 385, March 5 concerning failure Soviet Govt to withdraw troops from Iran has been transmitted urgently to Molotov this morning.

Sent Dept as 682 repeated Tehran as 45 and London as 124.

KENNAN

861.24591/3-646: Telegram

The Vice Consul at Tabriz (Rossow) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

URGENT

TABRIZ, March 6, 1946—5 p.m.
[Received March 8—10:20 a.m.]

41. Soviet troop reinforcements continue arriving night and day by truck and rail from Soviet frontier, and are being constantly re-deployed from here. Also yesterday 46 new medium tanks arrived from Soviet Union by rail.

General Bagramian, Soviet Army Commander with spectacular combat record, has arrived and taken command of Soviet troops in Azerbaijan, superseding Lieut. General Glinsky who is only Corps Commander and has no extensive combat experience.

More tanks and truck loads of supplies and troops, mainly infantry and dismounted cavalry, have been departing Tehranward since yesterday (mytel 40, March 5) and Tabriz—Tehran road has been closed indefinitely to non-military traffic because of these movements. Truck loads of Azerbaijan Army troops are also reported departing in same direction in relatively large numbers.

Additional Soviet troops including strong force of motorized infantry have departed southward towards Mahabad and Iraq frontier.

^2 In telegrams 397 to Moscow, 173 to Tehran, and 2053 to London, respectively, the Department on March 6 authorized the conveying of the substance of the United States note to Prime Minister Qavam at Moscow, and to appropriate Iranian and British officials (861.24591/3-646).
Previously reliable confidential informant states he was told yesterday by high officer that the two cavalry regiments which left yesterday toward [Mahabad?] and were to be joined by third regiment already in the field and that they were proceeding to Bazorgan on Turco Iran frontier [garble] and Maku. This point governs main accessible frontier to Turkey. [Garble] said this cavalry was not from Tabriz occupation force but had been brought to Tabriz from Russia during past weeks and fitted out here.

Report from recent travellers indicate that Soviet troops already stationed in frontier region have been heavily reinforced in both troops and equipment. It is also reported that large numbers of Kurd Army troops are being moved northward by truck from Mahabad and Rezaieh region to points on Turk frontier.

All Soviet troops departing from here are equipped for combat and there seems noticeable lack in their supply trains of garrison types of equipment. All observations and reports indicate inescapably that Soviets are preparing for major military operations.

Postscript: During encoding a report has come in that another shipment of tanks had arrived from Soviet Union. General Bagramian is said to be specialist in tank warfare.

Sent Dept 41; Tehran 56; Moscow 33; London 21; Ankara 8; Baghdad 6.

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861.24591/3-646: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

Moscow, March 6, 1946—7 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received March 6—4:33 p.m.]

687. In accordance with Dept’s 397, March 6,3 I called on Qavam again this evening and conveyed to him substance of note to Molotov sent in pursuance to Dept’s 385, March 5. Since he does not understand English, I translated appropriate passages of note orally into French for him. He made no comments but nodded approvingly from time to time.

He confirmed to me that he expects to leave tomorrow morning and to stop over one night at Baku. Journey to Tehran, he explained, was too tiring to make in one day.

He showed me text of final communiqué which Russians had proposed to him. General sense was that they had discussed in amicable and agreeable atmosphere questions of interest to the two Governments and that talks would be continued in Tehran between Iranian Government and new Soviet Ambassador to Iran. He said that he

3 Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 342.
had declined to accept this text and had altered portion to read that
in connection with arrival of new Soviet Ambassador in Tehran, the
two Governments would continue their efforts to arrive at mutually
acceptable solutions of the various questions of interest to them. [I?] only had a glimpse of Russian text on that document so this is not
a verbatim version. What significance of this change is, I cannot
say. Qavam’s version appears, however, to leave much wider leeway
for Iran Government in further talks in Tehran.

He said dinner last night had been cordial with many toasts and
speeches. As Dept knows, this means in Russian circumstances—
exactly nothing. But fact that he stayed over and that dinner was
given at all is itself significant.

On occasion of both my visits to him, he showed interest in status
of Security Council at present moment, particularly as to whether
it was in permanent session and where. I told him it was my under-
standing that it was in permanent session although I was not sure
what would be considered its seat at this moment.

Sent Dept 687, repeated Tehran as 46.

KENNAN

361.2459/3-746 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Tabriz (Rossow) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRETTABRIZ, March 7, 1946—2 p. m.
US URGENT [Received March 8—6:06 a. m.]

42. Mytel 41, March 6. I cannot overstress the seriousness and magni-

Tude of current Soviet troop movements here. This is no ordinary

reshuffling of troops but a full scale combat deployment.

Last night another force consisting of 20 medium tanks, 20 armored
cars and 40 truck loads of infantry departed Tehranward, and another
force of 12 tanks and an undetermined quantity of motorized infantry
departed later south toward Mahabad. These movements were in ad-
dition to continued piecemeal movements in both directions and there
is reason to believe considerable numbers of troops are being moved
by devious routes avoiding points where they could be observed.

Streets are filled with armored force personnel far outnumbering
the cavalry which was the main arm here. More trucks and armored
vehicles are in evidence than horses.

New tanks are still continually arriving by rail. This morning I
observed the unloading of 12 new mediums. At same time, ammuni-
tion, both artillery and small arms, was being unloaded and installed
directly into the tanks. About 30 new trucks were also in UK loading
zone.
Soviets have reopened [garble] formerly abandoned ammunition dumps and are transporting large volume of stores there. Checkposts which had been used only during revolution period have been reestablished.

Soviets have refused without explanation to issue me a pass to go to Mahabad.

I expect communications to be cut at any moment.


ROSSOW

861.24591/3-646: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 7, 1946—6 p. m.

US URGENT NIACI

182. Re Moscow’s 687, Mar 6, repeated to Tehran as 46. You may inform Iranian Govt that Qavam, in conversation with Kennan in Moscow, showed interest in status of Security Council at present moment and was told that Security Council was in permanent session but that present seat of Security Council was uncertain. You may further inform Iranian Govt that Security Council in London adjourned until a time to be determined by the President of the Council. It was informally understood in London by the Security Council that its next meeting would be held in New York about March 21. However, the Council can be convened by its President at any time. The Council is accessible through de Freitas-Valle, President of the Security Council or Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations who are understood to be in London now.

You may also point out that Article 28 of the UN Charter provides as follows: “The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously.”

Sent to Tehran, repeated to Moscow.

BYRNE

861.24591/3-846: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom

(Gallman)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 8, 1946—2 p. m.

US URGENT NIACI

2108. Personal and top secret for Gallman only from the Secretary. Dept 2053, Mar 6.∗ You are instructed to inform Bevin in strictest

∗Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 342.

219-490-69—23
confidence that, if a satisfactory reply to the United States note of Mar 6 is not received and if the Soviet Govt continues to retain troops in Iran against the wishes of the Iranian Govt, this Govt feels that it will have no choice but to place the matter without delay before the UN Security Council. Our action would be based on our obligations as a member of the United Nations and as a signatory of the Declaration Regarding Iran. This Govt would appreciate being informed whether the United Kingdom, as the third signatory of the Declaration Regarding Iran, desires to join the US in placing the Iranian question before the Security Council.5

Sent to London. Repeated to Tehran, no. 422, Personal and Top Secret for Murray 6 from the Secretary, and to Moscow, no. 184, Personal and Top Secret for Kennan from the Secretary.

BYRNES

Editorial Note

At the request of an officer of the Historical Office, Department of State, a memorandum entitled “Events Relative to the Azerbaijan Issue—March 1946” was prepared on August 16, 1945, by Edwin M. Wright of the Foreign Service Institute, Department of State, who in 1946 was Special Assistant to Mr. Henderson. The memorandum stated in part:

“On the morning of March 6, 1946, a telegram came in from Rossow [No. 40, page 340] stating that unusually heavy troop movements of Soviet forces in Azerbaijan were taking place. Rossow had obtained

5#Telegram 3004, March 14, 6 p.m., from London, reported that the British Foreign Office was preparing a reply to the Department’s query which “intended to mention the possible desirability of Iran’s bringing its own case before Security Council so as to avoid raising question of right of British and ourselves to vote in event we took joint initiative and also to make reference to the different positions in which British and ourselves would approach matter in view of their being parties to Anglo-Russian-Iranian treaty, whereas we would presumably emphasize our special interest in fulfillment of Tehran Declaration.” (861.24591/3-1446)

6#In telegram 188, March 8, 5 p.m., the Department directed Ambassador Murray to inform the Shah of the substance of telegram 2108 to London. It then stated: “In your conversation with the Shah please stress the seriousness with which this Govt regards the assurances given by the late President Roosevelt when he signed the Declaration Regarding Iran.

“You may use your discretion regarding the extent to which you discuss this matter with Qavam and other appropriate Govt officials.” (861.24591/3-846)

In telegram 308, March 10, 5 p.m., Ambassador Murray replied: “I delivered Dept’s message to Shah this morning just before arrival of Qavam telling His Majesty that I hoped this information would strengthen his hand in dealing with Prime Minister if latter should prove to be so discouraged or depressed as to be in danger of weakening his attitude toward USSR. I emphasized strongly vital importance of continued firmness on part of Iran Govt in refusing to agree to presence Soviet troops in Iran. He likewise urged me to emphasize it to Prime Minister, which I shall do when I see Qavam late this afternoon.” (861.24591/3-1046)
the assistance of several merchants in various parts of Azerbaijan, through their Tabriz headquarters, to report any unusual Soviet activities. This telegram mentioned Bostanabad (found on no maps) and a series of other obscure places. Mr. Henderson asked me to prepare a large blown-up map of Azerbaijan which would indicate the movement of Soviet forces taking place. It was expected new information might confirm and add to this telegram by the 7th. But nothing came in the next morning. (Actually, Rossow had sent a second, more detailed telegram on the 6th, but it arrived the morning of the 8th.)

[No. 41, page 342.] About 4:30 p.m. on the 7th, Mr. Henderson stated that he thought Mr. Byrnes ought to see the map as it was and he called the Secretary’s office for an appointment. Mr. Minor and I were told to report at 6:00 p.m., because Mr. Henderson had an appointment which he could not change. So Mr. Minor and I took the map up at 6:00 p.m. to Mr. Byrnes’ office. Once the Secretary had familiarized himself with the map, we pointed out the size and direction of each thrust. Mr. Byrnes asked the significance of each arrow and noted that they aimed at the Turkish border, the Iraqi border, a third was headed due south (possibly indicating a thrust toward the oilfields), and a drive toward the capital at Tehran.

“Mr. Byrnes, having gone over the telegram and verified the place names with the map, remarked that it now seemed clear the USSR was adding military invasion to political subversion in Iran, and, beating one fist into the other hand, he dismissed us with the remark: ‘Now we’ll give it to them with both barrels.’ He told us to be ready to present it at a meeting the next morning, March 8th.

On the morning of March 8th, two more detailed telegrams came in [Nos. 41 and 42 from Tabriz, pages 342 and 344]. Mr. Minor and I added their information on the map showing that the USSR was moving fast toward their objectives. Mr. Henderson then took Mr. Minor and myself to a meeting in which Dean Acheson, Alger Hiss, Ben Cohen, Charles Bohlen, and possibly others, were present. It was near noon. We explained the map and the three attached telegrams.

There was considerable discussion of the telegram of March 5th [No. 385 to Moscow, page 340] and the fact that the USSR seemed to ignore it completely. All agreed that these Soviet moves were clear violations of every agreement mentioned in the telegram of March 5th. Only one conclusion could be drawn—the USSR seemed to be determined to face Iran and the rest of the world with a fait accompli. How strongly could the US react? We had no information from the U.K. as yet. Mr. Acheson stated that we ought to let the USSR know that we were aware of its moves, but ‘leave a graceful way out’ if it desired to avoid a showdown. With this in mind, Mr. Hiss had scribbled a draft statement and passed it to Mr. Henderson. Mr. Minor
and I left the meeting at this point, but later in the afternoon, a second telegram was sent to Moscow (NIACT #425 [infra]).” (File No. Pol 23-7-Iran)

861.24591/3-846: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 8, 1946—4 p.m.
US URGENT NIACT

425. For Kennan. Please deliver following message to the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs:7

“The Govt of the US has the honor to inform the Govt of the Soviet Union that it is receiving reports to the effect that there are considerable movements of Soviet combat forces and materials of war from the direction of the Soviet frontier towards Tabriz and outward from Tabriz in the direction of Tehran, Mahabad and various points in Northwestern Iran.

The Govt of the US desires to learn whether the Soviet Govt, instead of withdrawing Soviet troops from Iran as urged in the Embassy’s note of Mar 6, is bringing additional forces into Iran. In case Soviet forces in Iran are being increased, this Govt would welcome information at once regarding the purposes therefor.”

Sent to Moscow, repeated to London and Tehran, Ankara and Baghdad.8

BYRNES

Editorial Note

The transcript of President Truman’s press and radio conference of April 24, 1952, states that “in 1945 he had to send an ultimatum to the head of the Soviet Union to get out of Persia. The President said that they got out because we were in a position to meet a situation of that kind.” The announcement led to a series of questions and answers at the conference during which the President reiterated his statement.

Later the same day, a White House spokesman made an oral statement to the press which explained that “the President was using the term ultimatum in a non-technical layman sense. He said that the President was referring to United States leadership in the United Nations, particularly in the Security Council and through diplomatic channels, in the Spring of 1946, which was the major factor in bringing about Soviet withdrawal from Iran.”

No documentation on the sending of an ultimatum to the Soviet Union has been found in the Department files or in the files of the

7 Message delivered to the Foreign Office on March 9.
8 As telegrams 2117, 187, 201, and 103, respectively.
Department of Defense, nor have several of the highest officers of the Department in 1946 been able to affirm the sending of an ultimatum.

Expressions of President Truman's views on this matter are published in his *Memoirs*, volume II, pages 94-95 (1956) and in *Truman Speaks*, page 71 (1960).

861.24591/3-946: Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, March 8, 1946.

[Received March 8—11:46 a.m.]

717. Press March 8 reports Qavam was seen off Mar 7 by Molotov and others and upon departing expressed "complete confidence that in very near future all misunderstandings will be resolved." Sov-Iranian communiqué referred to his series of conversations with Stalin and Molotov and concluded "In negotiations held during these conversations and conducted in atmosphere of friendship questions were discussed of interest to both parties. Both Govts will exert all efforts so that with appointment of new Sov Amb to Iran favorable conditions will be created for further strengthening of friendly relations between both countries." *

Sent Dept 717; repeated Tehran 49 and Frankfurt.

KENNAN

861.24591/3-1146

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen)*

[WASHINGTON,] March 11, 1946.

Dr. Daftary 10 said that while the Iranian Ambassador was proceeding on the assumption that Prime Minister Qavam will remain entirely steadfast in prosecuting the Iranian case before the Security Council, he wished to know whether the United States would be willing to initiate an inquiry in the Council in case Qavam for any reason

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*In telegram 742, March 9, 9 p.m., from Moscow, the Chargé stated: "For your interest to note that Soviet authorities have not as yet seen fit to apprise their public in any way of nature and seriousness of situation which has currently arisen with respect to Iran. Laconic announcement published March 2 on retention of Soviet troops in certain areas of Iran 'pending clarification of situation' made no reference whatsoever to any international agreement in light of which this date was significant. Thus average Soviet citizen is utterly unaware of political crisis created by this action on part of his Government. Fact that British evacuated all their troops by March 2 was, of course, not reported. Nor have any of diplomatic exchanges on this subject been mentioned by Soviet press or radio." (861.24591/3-946)*

10 A. A. Daftary, Counselor of the Iranian Embassy.
felt unable to instruct his own representatives to do so. Dr. Daftary recalled that at the last meeting of the Council, a resolution was passed requesting USSR and Iran to report back to the Council the result of their further negotiations. The Iranian Ambassador is anxious that some one at the next meeting of the Council should call for this report. Since Iran is not a member of the Council, it might be difficult for Iran either to report or to call for a report, even assuming that Qavam remains anxious to press the case.

I assured Dr. Daftary that his request would be given due consideration in the Department.

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861.2459(3-1146) : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, March 11, 1946—4 p.m.

[Received 11:59 p.m.]

315. I left Shah’s Palace yesterday in time to greet Qavam on his arrival at airport 12:45 a.m. He was given enthusiastic welcome by huge crowd and went at once to Palace where he gave Shah brief report. At 5 p.m. he received me at his home. Following is substance of conversation which lasted 2½ hours and which he asked be kept entirely confidential:

1. Before questioning him about Moscow conversations I gave him copy of our note of March 6 to Soviet Government 21 which he had not previously seen and had its substance translated to him. I also thought it desirable and necessary to use discretion you had given me in your telegram 188, March 8 22 to inform him of intention of my Government, in case Soviet Government continues to retain troops in Iran contrary to wishes of Iran, to parallel action of Iranian Government by placing matter immediately before Security Council. (Shah had not told him of this). As I had previously done with Shah (my telegram 308, March 10 23) I hammered at point that it was of most extreme importance that there should be no sign of weakening or haziness with respect to Iran’s determination to act on her own behalf in this connection. I gave him no indication that US Government might act on own initiative if Iran failed to act.

Prime Minister then said that before reciting course of Moscow talks he wished to ask what America and Britain could or would do to assist Iran in case Soviet Government ignored our present protests and proceeded to do as it wished here. I replied it was impossible to give precise answer to such question at this moment; however, I believed he was aware of important pronouncements you had recently

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21 See Department’s telegram 385, March 5, 7 p.m., to Moscow, p. 340.
22 Not printed, but see footnote 6, p. 346.
made in your address before Overseas Press Club; 12 I had stressed to Shah yesterday the seriousness with which my Government regards assurances given by President Roosevelt when he signed Declaration Regarding Iran; and finally the step contemplated by my Government on behalf of Iran at next meeting of SC was of incalculable importance and advantage to Iran in present crisis.

2. Qavam said he had raised three points in Moscow: (a) He had tried obtain Soviet promise to withdraw troops before March 2; (b) He had asked for Soviet moral support in settling Azerbaijan difficulties; (c) He had requested appointment of new Russian Ambassador to Iran (which has been done).

With regard point a, Stalin at first advanced 1921 Irano-Soviet treaty as justification for retaining troops, which Qavam had countered by citing text and accompanying notes to show clearly treaty was inapplicable and by recalling that he himself had been in office at time treaty signed and knew from personal knowledge what was intended. Soviets had then raised “hostile attitude” of Iranian delegation at Paris Conference, to which Qavam replied that head of delegation had been Moshavar-ol-Mamalek (Ali Gholi Kahn Ansari 14) who had later negotiated and signed 1921 treaty to which Soviets so often pointed with pride. Russians ultimately fell back on bald and unexplained statement that their “interests” required retention of troops in Iran.

On point b Stalin had said Azerbaijan was internal question for Iran. Why should Iranian Government be so disturbed, since Azerbaijanis were asking only autonomy, not independence? In any case, USSR could do nothing because “Soviet honor was involved”. This statement was not explained.

Qavam answered that constitution did not allow autonomy. If Azerbaijan were autonomous other provinces would follow and central government would lose all control. Iran [apparent omission] Molotov suggested that Iranian Government recognize existing Azerbaijani regime minus Minister of War and Minister Foreign Affairs. Qavam indicated he was willing to compromise on Azerbaijan but could go only so far as provincial councils law allowed and could not possibly accept present arrangement.

3. Both Stalin and Molotov separately had raised question of oil concession to Russia. Molotov had insisted upon discrimination shown in making grant to Britain and refusing anything to USSR. Qavam had refused to discuss question because of Majlis law prohibiting oil negotiations with foreign countries. He had pointed out that present

12 On February 28; for text of address, see Department of State Bulletin, March 10, 1946, p. 355.
14 Persian Foreign Minister. The Peace Conference, meeting in 1919, refused to seat the Persian delegation.
Majlis would never repeal law and only hope of reopening question lay in election of new Majlis which was impossible so long as Russian troops remained in Iran. Molotov then asserted that Bayat, when Prime Minister, had offered to form Russo-Iranian company, 51% Russian and 49% Iranian, to develop north Iran oil. USSR had rejected this but was now willing to accept it. Molotov embodied this proposal in a written note to Qavam which also contained suggestion that Iranian Government should recognize existing Azerbaijan regime. When Qavam reiterated his inability to do anything contrary to constitution or law, Molotov withdrew offer to accept asserted Bayat proposal and said Soviet Government would insist on full oil concession.

I gathered this request for oil grant was only affirmative demand made by [Soviets?] during course of conversations.

4. In strictest confidence and without explaining context out of which remark arose, Qavam told me that at one point Stalin and Molotov had burst out with statement that, “We don’t care what US and Britain think and we are not afraid of them.” (He asked me not to report this to my Government and said he had not told Shah.)

I suspect this may have been elicited by some effort on Qavam’s part to advance American and British attitude as reason for his inability to comply with Soviet wishes.

5. In one talk Stalin had stressed necessity for social reforms in Iran saying that if England had made reforms in America she would not have lost us and if she did not make reforms in India she would lose India. Even in England itself reforms were essential. Qavam had replied he wished to make reforms but this would be possible only if Iran were left alone.

6. At end of talks Soviets had proposed text of joint communiqué including statement that “negotiations had been conducted in spirit of friendship and good understanding” and that they “would be continued in Tehran thru new Soviet Ambassador”. Fearing this phraseology was intended to indicate that negotiations had ended in agreement and so prevent further recourse to UNO Qavam crossed out words “good understanding”. Likewise to prevent possible assertion that negotiations were still in progress he had changed final sentence to read that two Governments would make every effort through new Ambassador to consolidate friendly relations.

7. I remarked that rumors had reached Tehran from Moscow to effect he (Qavam) might be confronted with temptations leading...
toward disloyalty. I myself did not believe these stories and hoped his actions would give them the lie. He threw up his arms in disgust and assured me he had told me the whole truth.

8. I asked whether Russians had tried to have him substitute continued conversations with Soviet Ambassador here for renewed discussions in Security Council to which he replied that they "would have liked" to have him do that.

9. Prime Minister said that throughout he had made every effort to avoid provoking Russians. Nevertheless it appeared some of conversations had taken on very strained note.

10. At end our conversation I asked Qavam what he intended to do next. He said he wanted to send full written account to Ala and asked me to forward it through our pouch. I agreed but pointed out situation was urgent and telegraphic action seemed indicated. He appeared to acquiesce but did not make clear statement as to instructions he would give Ala nor did he say definitely that he would ask further immediate consideration by SC. However, he did say that Iran had not and would not withdraw its petition to SC.

On whole I was relieved by his straightforward account of Moscow talks and felt he was telling truth though he may have suppressed some points. His failure to commit himself clearly regarding action in regard to UNO may be suspicious but may also easily be explained by fact he had just returned from tiring trip with no time to rest before he saw me, that until our interview he had not seen our note of March 6 nor heard of action we proposed to take in SC and needed time to grasp and reflect on significance of these points and finally that he should properly consult his Cabinet before committing himself on question of this nature.

I am seeking another appointment with Prime Minister in a day or two at which time I hope to elicit something more positive.

Because Qavam's attitude did not seem entirely clear as regards UNO action I arranged audience with Shah this morning. I told His Majesty that I had no grounds for suspecting Prime Minister of weakening but would like him (Shah) to make sure Qavam understood situation and vital importance of Iranian action. I am sure Shah is completely clear on this.

His Majesty expressed grave concern over rumors of possible Soviet Putsch in Tehran to seize capital and gain control of Government. He pointed out that if this should happen Soviets could dictate instructions to Ala, prevent Iranian appeal to UNO and so make parallel Irano-American action impossible. He suggested that in such a case US and Britain could nevertheless act on own initiative on basis their obligations and voice true Iranian sentiments.
Shah made point that Iranian case is now far more simple and clear cut than at time of London UNO discussion since continued presence of Soviet troops in Iran after March 2 is obvious breach of treaty and makes it unnecessary to demonstrate that Soviet authorities are interfering in any other fashion. I agreed and said that in view of this strengthening of Iranian case it would be utter folly for Iran to weaken at this stage.

In connection my interview with Qavam Shah asked if I had urged on him danger to himself as well as to his country of any flirtation with proposals from Soviets to install him in high office in which he would be used, squeezed dry and tossed aside. I said I had not mentioned this but would be prepared to do so at next opportunity.

Sent Department 315; repeated Moscow 89; London 54. Murray

861.24591/3-1446: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

TEHRAN, March 14, 1946—1 p.m. [Received 3:20 p.m.]

335. Qavam last night gave me his definite promise that within 2 or 3 days he would send instructions to Ala to present Iran's complaint to Security Council.

At FonOff reception this morning he said he had already ordered instructions to be drafted. Added he would tell Ala to adopt tone of moderation in his presentation in order avoid arousing unnecessary antagonism on part of Soviets.

PriMin outlined five slightly differing procedures he might follow:

1. Arrange to have SC inquire as to results of Iran-Soviet conversations on basis of understanding reached at London session. (This would have advantage from Qavam viewpoint of avoiding overt Iranian action before SC.)
2. Make direct appeal to SC and say nothing to USSR.
3. Appeal to SC and notify Soviet Embassy here that this was being done because Soviet troops continued in occupation of Iran.
4. Appeal to SC and notify Soviet Embassy that appeal would be withdrawn if Soviet troops were evacuated in 15 or 20 days.
5. Appeal to SC and notify Soviet Embassy that this was being done because Iranian constitution forbids presence foreign troops in country unless authorized by Majlis. Point out that Majlis authorization expired when Tripartite Treaty expired March 2 and that PriMin could not acquiesce in violation of constitution. He would tell Soviets this should not be considered unfriendly act since he would be merely fulfilling his legal obligation.

(Qavam told me today he intends to adopt procedure 5.)
He asked my opinion which I gave on personal basis to effect it would be best for Iran to take initiative in making appeal and that I saw no objection to procedure 5. I suggested that if procedure 4 were adopted he should make sure that case was not withdrawn from SC before Soviet troops had physically left country pointing out that Russians had already violated one promise this regard. He assented.

In course of conversation which I consider highly satisfactory I reemphasized utter importance of action by Iran to speak out for herself in defense of her rights so long as she is free to speak. Qavam agreed. I further stressed simplicity and strength of Iran's present case and advantage of having advocate of Ala's high caliber to present it. I also pointed out that in coming Council meeting Iran could act with advance assurance of US support which it had not had at London meeting.

Since we cannot be sure Iranian FonOff will give Ala adequate background information Dept may wish to give him substance of such parts of my two recent conversations with Qavam as it deems appropriate. Furthermore although I am satisfied with Qavam's assurances it is always possible that Russians will apply great pressure on him when they learn of his decision and try to persuade him to withdraw instructions. Accordingly I suggest Dept urge upon Ala importance of immediate action on his part to get matter before SC as soon as he receives his instructions. Once case is presented formally it will be easier for Qavam to resist pressure.

I opened our talk yesterday by giving PriMin copy of Dept's press release of March 12 on our inquiry of Soviets regarding increase of troops in Iran. He was unimpressed and took line that we should not ask Russians about such matter because they would be sure to lie but rather to tell them that we knew reinforcements were arriving.

He then asked what I would do in his place if Soviet troops should occupy Tehran on ground that lives of Russian nationals were in danger. I asked whether Russians had approached him on that score. He said no. I expressed surprise saying his own FonOff had mentioned a conversation with Soviet Embassy personnel this subject. (Shah also had told me Russians had asserted their officials were in danger here.) Qavam then summoned Homayunjah who was inclined to play down matter but on being pressed by PriMin finally produced full memo of conversation which Qavam read with obvious surprise. Memo gave details confirming Shah's statement that Soviet Embassy here had expressed fear for safety of its personnel. In light of PriMin's evident surprise I think his question to me must

Mohammad Ali Homayunjah, Under Secretary of State in the Iranian Foreign Office.
have been motivated by some remark made to him in Moscow rather
than by Soviet approach to FonOff here. (This strengthens my feeling
he has not yet told full story of Moscow talks.)

In reply to his question, I told PriMin I felt pretext that lives of
nationals in foreign country were endangered had become too obvious
a device since Hitler had used it so often. In any case, I considered
PriMin could not afford to allow any foreign government to assert
that with all Iranian army *gendarmerie* and police at his command,
he was unable to maintain order and protect foreigners in his capital.
Such admission on his part would be virtual abdication of sovereignty.

I asked again about Qavam's written protest filed in Moscow. He
at once produced copy which my interpreter read. It was forthright,
clear and emphatic, used the word "protest" and asked immediate
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran. He has sent me copy. I
pointed out this document would be important in SC discussion of
case.

To Dept as 335; repeated Moscow 100, London 59.

Murray

861.24591/3-1546: Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

**PRIORITY**

Moscow, March 15, 1946.

[Received March 15—10:29 a.m.]

815. Soviet press March 15 publishes Tass denial reading as follows:

There has been published in American press a statement of State
Department of USA that there is taking place in Iran a shifting of
Soviet Military units through Tehran and [toward?] western frontier
of Iran. Tass is authorized to state that this report absolutely does not
 correspond to reality.

Sent Department 815, repeated Tehran 62, Tabriz and Frankfurt.

[Kennan]

861.24591/3-1546: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State*

**TOP SECRET**

**US URGENT**

**N I A C T**

Tehran, March 15, 1946—1 p.m.

[Received 6:56 p.m.]

343. Confidential emissary from Qavam came to see British Ambas-
dador and myself this morning with following message:

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*Translated text transmitted to Department in telegram 337, March 15, 1946,*

9 p.m., from Tehran, not printed. The Prime Minister's note was dated
March 3. (861.24591/3-1546)
Soviet Chargé called on Prime Minister yesterday and said Soviet Government had heard he planned to make complaint to Security Council. Chargé said this would be regarded as unfriendly and hostile act and would have unfortunate results for Iran. He therefore advised Qavam not to take any such step.

Prime Minister replied that presence foreign troops Iran after expiration Tripartite Treaty was unconstitutional and that if he failed to act he would be called to account by his people and eventually by Majlis. Further cited fact that case remains before Security Council which can ask for report on basis London decision.

Apparently because of the stout resistance shown by Qavam during their long conversation Soviet Chargé finally shifted his position slightly and pressed Prime Minister at least to refrain from taking initiative himself and to await request from Security Council for report.

(Qavam asks that no reference ever be made to this conversation with Chargé, whether in Security Council or elsewhere.)

Through his emissary Qavam asked Sir Reader and me for our advice as to his course in light of Soviet threat. Further asked what support he could expect from US and British if he took risk of bringing complaint to Security Council. Our visitor explained that Prime Minister feels his responsibility keenly and would be glad of any loophole to escape Soviet wrath while at same time protecting interests of Iran. He is therefore tempted to follow Chargé’s advice and leave it to Security Council itself to raise question.

Sir Reader and I replied that we could not give official advice on matter of such gravity without consulting our Govts. Personally, however, we felt Iran’s case would be gravely prejudiced if she did not herself speak out soon since Soviets would undoubtedly exert even greater pressure on Iran Govt at time of Security Council meeting to force her to keep silent and would then argue that Iran’s silence indicated all was well.

In this connection our visitor (who is highly intelligent and holds high position though not member of Cabinet) suggested that Soviets would probably send new Ambassador here in very few days to hold out hopes to Qavam and persuade him to renew Moscow conversations here. Having accomplished this he would advise Qavam that any recourse to Security Council in midst of negotiations would be highly improper and unfriendly and would destroy all hope of Irano-Soviet reconciliation thus at one and same time tempting Prime Minister with hopes of salvation and bludgeoning him with threats of utter distaste [disaster?]. Visitor also suggested as a possible alternative line of Soviet action that, after persuading Qavam to delay appeal,
they would overthrow his Cabinet between now and March 25 and see to it that new Cabinet would be completely under their control thus eliminating all possibility of Iranian appeal to Security Council. I concur entirely in this reasoning and believe Sir Reader does too.

Although I remain convinced, as I have told Shah and Prime Minister repeatedly, that Iran's sole frail hope of salvation lies in quick appeal to Security Council, direct and ominous threat by Soviet Chargé makes immediate situation so grave that I hesitate to say anything further to Qavam without definite word from Dept as to its present position. I therefore request urgent instructions as to official reply I should give to his request for advice and his query regarding support he could expect from US if he defies Soviet warning. Sent Dept 343, repeated Moscow 104, London 61.

MURRAY

123 ROSSOW, ROBERT: TELEGRAM

THE VICE CONSUL AT TABRIZ (ROSSOW) TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SECRET

US URGENT

NIACT

TABRIZ, March 15, 1946—4 p.m.

[Received March 16—11:16 a.m.]

83. This morning at 10:00 I had my chauffeur drive me in consular car with American flag flying prominently over hood, down road to railroad station which is about 4 miles west of city. About 800 yards from station is road turning off toward freight unloading zone and on toward Maragheh. Soviet sentry was blocking that road. We made no attempt to turn off but continued to passenger part of station, the sentry making no gesture whatsoever to stop car. However, after we turned around and started back to town sentry came out into main road and stopped car. He kept us there about 10 minutes till a Soviet non-com arrived. He ordered me gruffly to get out of back seat and into front. When I failed to move he barked his command again. I told him I was American Consul. At that he leveled his carbine at me and with a jabbing gesture repeated his command. This time I obeyed. Then on command another soldier got in back seat and leveled their weapons, one had carbine and the other a submachine gun, at the backs of our heads and ordered us to drive down toward unloading zone to some headquarters. On arrival the soldiers got out and posted three submachinegunners around car. They disappeared but a lieutenant came out about 20 minutes later and gruffly questioned my driver (my Russian is very limited) as to what we were doing there. I told driver to repeat I was American Consul and was just taking morning drive. He then went away and about half an hour later a captain came out and gruffly told us to get back to town and not to try to come that way again.
I made immediate strong protest to Soviet Consul General who excused incident as merely result of excess zeal of ignorant soldiers. He said it was assuredly not directed against my person nor my official position. He said he would investigate and have soldiers reprimanded if found wrong. He said he hoped I would forget about incident. I impressed upon him the seriousness of matter and neither accepted nor rejected his remarks.


ROSSOW

891.77/3-1546: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, March 15, 1946—5 p.m.

PRIORITY

[Received 9:42 p.m.]

345. Embtels 114 [144] Jan 31; 180, Feb 9; 189, Feb 12. American press clippings for month of February sent Embassy by Dept have just come to my attention and I believe it highly advisable for Dept to correct in whatever manner may be most feasible impression which American press has gained that Soviets have turned back northern section of Iran's state railways. Railway has not been turned back and stories in American press that it has can only serve to give American public totally erroneous idea that Soviets have in some instances shown friendly and conciliatory policy toward Iranians and have given indications that they will eventually evacuate country. I feel it most important American public have no illusions about Soviet policy in Iran and trust Dept will lose no time in correcting stories about return of railway to Iranians which originated with announcement last month that actual turnover had begun.

MURRAY

861.24591/3-1546: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Vice Consul at Tabriz (Rossow)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 15, 1946—7 p.m.

US URGENT

10. You are commended for the energetic and thorough manner in which you have been keeping Dept informed regarding military and other developments in your area.

Reports have been received from London that on Mar 13 an official of the FonOff made a statement to the effect that reports from Washington regarding movement of Soviet troops in Northern Iran had been exaggerated. According to Brit info only two fresh columns of Soviet troops had been observed in Northern Iran.
Please inform Dept regarding extent to which you are keeping in touch with Brit Consul General in Tabriz and whether his estimates of movements of Soviet armed forces and military equipment differ materially from yours.  

Sent to Tabriz, repeated to Tehran as no. 213, to London as no. 2328 and to Moscow as no. 479.

BYRNE

861.24591/3-1546: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 15, 1946—8 p. m.

US MOST URGENT NIACT

214. British Embassy has just informed Dept that the British Ambassador in Tehran has telegraphed the FonOff that the Governor of the National Bank, on behalf of Qavam has informed you and him that the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires has threatened that the Soviet Govt would regard as an unfriendly act an appeal by Qavam to the Security Council, and that the Prime Minister in view of this threat wishes to have the advice of the British and US Govts and to know what support they could give him.

The telegram goes on to state that you and the British Ambassador agreed that while you personally thought the failure of Iran to appeal would prejudice her case you felt that you must consult your respective Govts before giving any advice.

The Embassy also informs us that Bevin has instructed the British Ambassador in Tehran to inform the Iranian Govt that in his opinion there is no course open to Iran but to appeal to the Security Council.

Please tell Qavam that there is nothing in the circumstances for Iran to do but immediately to file an appeal with the Security Council. You should remind him that we have already given him assurances of our full support to such an appeal.

BYRNE

20a Telegram 357, March 18, 10 a. m., from Tehran, reported: “British Embassy states it does not feel Rossov’s reports exaggerated and that British Consul’s reports from Trabz have reported same info. British here deny sending anything to London belittling Soviet troop movements in Azerbaijan and they state they fail to understand statement made by FonOff official.” (861.24591/3-1846)

Mr. Rossov stated in telegram 30, March 20, 1946, noon, that “I have maintained closest possible contact with Brit Consul throughout my assignment here. We have traded information without restraint... He has just confirmed my constant belief our reports and estimates are essentially same.” (861.24591/3-2046)

21a Abol Hassan Ebtehaj, Governor of the Central Bank of Iran (Banque Mellie).

21b In telegram 216, March 16, 11 a. m., the Department notified the Ambassador in Tehran: “The question raised in your 343 of Mar. 15, 1 p. m. [p. 356] has already been answered in our 214 of Mar 15, 8 p. m.

“We fully approve the position taken by you during the course of the conversation reported in the telegram referred to above.” (861.24591/3-1546)
The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, March 17, 1946—6 p.m.

[Received March 17—3:30 p.m.]

352. Having received early this morning urtel 216, March 16. I anticipated instructions sent urtel 214, March 15 (which was delayed in transmission) and called on Qavam at noon today. While I was with him your 214 was received and delivered to me and I conveyed your message to PriMin at 12:45 p.m.

At request of Brit Ambassador I again assured PriMin that Brit and American attitudes on this point were identical.

Qavam said he concurred in our views and would send telegraphic instructions to Ala tonight or tomorrow. (Brit Ambassador has since told me he has received same assurances.)

PriMin said arrival of new Soviet Ambassador is expected tomorrow, a prospect which evidently disturbs him a great deal because he foresees that Ambassador will try to deter him from recourse to Security Council and endeavor to involve him in renewed negotiations. In fact Qavam told me today that present Soviet Chargé had already assured him difficulties would be removed following arrival of Sadchikov and appeal to SC would be unnecessary (Qavam further repeated direct to me his account of Chargé's threat as reported mytel 343, March 15). This confirms me, and I think Qavam as well, in belief that Sadchikov's mission is to confuse issue and make it possible for Russia to prevent SC action by asserting bilateral negotiations are still in progress.

PriMin asked my advice as to manner in which he might deal with new Soviet Envoy, pointing out that refusal to talk with him would seriously worsen Irano-Soviet relations, whereas if he entered into any sort of conversations he would give Russians pretext they are seeking. I replied that there are many subjects which he could well discuss with Ambassador without compromising Iran's position regarding withdrawal of troops. He could make clear to Sadchikov that question of evacuation in accordance terms Tripartite Treaty is not subject for negotiation, that he (Qavam) is prohibited by constitution from negotiating in this connection and that only place question could be discussed is Security Council. Having thus stated his position there would be nothing to prevent him from carrying on conversations on other subjects of interest to the two Govts. I also emphasized that whatever unpleasantness might result from an immediate appeal to SC would be much less than was to be expected from a later appeal.

²² Not printed, but see footnote 21, p. 360.
made after Sadchikov had arrived and had attempted to open conversations. I therefore urged PriMin to get off instructions to Ala before new Ambassador presented himself. Qavam seemed to agree with my observations.

As sidelights on situation Qavam called to my attention new attacks in Soviet press on Iranian claims at time of Versailles Conference and fact that Soviet Chargé has excused himself from FonOff luncheon tomorrow in honor Sir Reader Bullard on obviously manufactured excuse that he has to meet his Ambassador (who cannot possibly arrive until well after luncheon will be over).

PriMin mentioned Herald Tribune editorial which he had seen quoted in our radio bulletin in which it was stated Iran was in great need of reform and that it was unthinkable for America to go to war over desert wastes of Iran. This seemed to disturb him. I pointed out that editorial began by condemning Russian attitude toward Iran. I went on to say that Herald Tribune is staunch Republican paper and could be expected to differ from views of Democratic Administration. I had just finished reading great quantity of American newspaper clippings on Irano-Soviet situation which I would be glad to send him and I had been struck by fact that virtually every paper in every part of US had strongly supported Iranian case and called for action by UNO.

By close of conversation Qavam repeated what he told me March 14: That he would instruct Ala to be moderate in presenting case in SC. He observed that Ala is great patriot, deeply concerned over possible fate of his country and family and that he is inclined to be excitable. PriMin therefore thought it well to warn him against being carried away and provoking Russians. I agreed this might be desirable and added that Iran's case is so clear that calm dignified presentation of facts should be sufficient to win it.

MURRAY

861.24501/3-1740 : Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State
SECRET
US URGENT
Moscow, March 17, 1946—9 p.m.
[Received March 17—5:37 p.m.]

843. Moment is opportune, I feel, for an attempt to recapitulate implications of present Soviet activities in Iran as seen from Moscow.

First of all I consider it almost a foregone conclusion that Soviets must make some effort in immediate future to bring into power in Iran a regime prepared to accede to major immediate Sov demands, particularly continued maintenance of Sov armed forces in Iran and granting of oil concessions. This effort will of course be made through
subservient Iranian elements without direct responsibility on Sov side. Sov forces in Iran will serve this scheme by sheer force of intimidation and if necessary by preventing any forceful interference with its execution.

Some such development seems probable because

(a) Sov Govt has no intention of withdrawing its troops from Iran. On the contrary, reinforcements, even though not on large scale, have been sent in.

(b) Sooner or later the Sov Govt must give some explanation to the world for continued presence there of their forces in violation of treaty engagements.

(c) Delay in giving answer to our inquiry indicates Sov Govt is reluctant to base its action solely on security requirements of USSR and is waiting for some sort of development which will make possible a better answer.

(d) Answer which would best commend itself to Sov mind would be that Iranian Govt had requested troops to remain.

(e) Coming UNO session and string which SC still has to Iranian question make some early solution imperative.

I find it hard to conceive that Sov Govt could be planning overt Sov aggression against Turkey at this juncture. There has been no special political buildup for this here nor as far as I can see any attempt to create a pretext for such action. This is not to say that smashing of Turk power, achievement of Sov bases on Straits 23 and establishment of “friendly” regime in Ankara may not be objectives of Sov policy to be pursued in due course and time. It is also not to say that Sov armed Kurds might not now begin to make trouble along Turkish border leading to disturbances which might later be cited as grounds for Sov interference. But there is not sufficient evidence here for concluding that present Sov military preparations in northern Iranian sector envisage an immediate Sov attack on Turkey.

With respect to Iraq, situation is not so clear. Here there is some evidence which points toward a Sov inspired and Sov armed Kurdish action to seize Mosul district with Sov forces in background prepared to back up insurgents in favorable circumstances and perhaps to come in after them, ostensibly at Kurd request. It must be emphasized that there has been big propaganda buildup here for difficulties with British and to extent such an attempt on Mosul district might cause difficulties with British, it may be considered a possibility from standpoint of psychological preparation here. But we here do not have impression that Sov Govt plans to push this to point of open break with London. Unless there has been some tremendous and fundamental decision taken here to forego all advantages of further cooperation with western world and to enter on path of complete defiance

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23 For documentation on this subject, see pp. 801 ff.
and armed isolation, a turn of events for which we have as yet no evidence, then I feel Russians will try in whatever action they may undertake in Middle East to keep just this side of the line which would mean a complete diplomatic break with British. They are doubtless prepared to face very serious diplomatic and political difficulties but to attain their objectives they will try to gauge their action, if our hypothesis is correct, in such a way as to stop just short of the decisive point. Naturally this involves a considerable risk that they may not estimate accurately the line of delimitation or that their action may automatically carry them farther than they originally planned to go. But I believe that these are risks which they have probably taken into calculation and which they have deemed to be warranted in view of immediate and ultimate objectives involved.

Thus it appears to me that whatever action may be undertaken in pursuance of present Sov preparations in that area, Russians must try to hold it down to point where it can be given a local character, i.e., where it should not place either Sov or British Govts in a position from which national prestige would not permit withdrawal. Any other line of procedure would, I must reiterate, imply a profound change of Sov policy on a world wide scale of which we here have no evidence. It is not like the Kremlin to blunder casually into situations, implications of which it has not thought through.

Sent Dept 843; repeated Tehran 67 and London 146.

KENNAN

861.24591/3-1846: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, March 18, 1946—5 p. m.
[Received 11:50 p. m.]

362. Capt. Gagarine 24 and Rossow have requested permission to attempt trip from Tabriz to Rezaieh presumably to check on disposition Soviet forces and activities of Kurds. I have instructed them not to attempt this or travel anywhere in Kurdistan. 25

Unless Dept considers it vitally important to have first-hand information on reported Soviet troop concentrations in Irano-Turkish frontier region I do not propose to send any American officer into

24 Alexis M. Gagarine, Assistant Military Attaché in Iran. In telegram 362, March 18, 4 p. m., the Ambassador in Tehran reported that “Gagarine arrived Tabriz March 17 having traveled by road from Tehran. Reports having seen personally Soviet column of 25 tanks moving direction of Tehran. Says Soviet garrison Qazvin increased and Soviet infantry unit at Zenjan. Observed armed Red troops in same trucks with armed Azerbaijan ‘Democrats.’” (861.24591/3-1846)

25 In telegram 223, March 19, 7 p. m., to Tehran the Department agreed fully with Murray’s view, that “travel of official personnel in Kurdistan is presently unwise.” (861.24591/3-1846)
that area at present. Territory is inhabited by armed Kurds who are apparently under little or no control and I think there would be grave danger of a serious incident which might even be engineered by Russians to divert attention from main issues involved in present crisis. It seems to me we should try to avoid anything which would confuse matters when Iran's case is brought before Security Council.

I should appreciate Dept's comment.
To Dept as 362, repeated to Moscow 110 and Ankara.

Murray

861.24591/3-1946 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

MOST IMMEDIATE

WASHINGTON, March 19, 1946.

222. Secretary General UNO issued following press release here today at 5:00 p. m.:

"The Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. Trygve Lie, received yesterday, at 7:00 p. m., the Iranian Ambassador to the United States, His Excellency Hussein Ala.

Ambassador Ala, under instruction from his Government, delivered to Secretary General Trygve Lie the following communications:

March 18, 1946.

'My dear Secretary General,
In accordance with telegraphic instructions received this morning from my Govt, I have today addressed, in your care, a letter to the Chairman of the Security Council, bringing to his attention a dispute between Iran and the U.S.S.R.

I take the liberty of enclosing a copy of that communication, which was sent to New York, and I should be extremely grateful if Your Excellency would have the appeal of Iran put on the agenda of the Security Council due to meet on March 25th.

Believe me, my dear Secretary General,
Yours sincerely,

s/ Hussein Ala'

March 18, 1946.

'Sir,
Pursuant to Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations, Iran brings to the attention of the Security Council a dispute between Iran and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. This dispute has arisen by reason of new developments since the adoption by the Security Council of the resolution of January 30, 1946, relating to the earlier dispute between Iran and the U.S.S.R. The U.S.S.R. is maintaining Soviet troops in Iranian territory after March 2, 1946, contrary to the express provisions of Article V of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance of January 29, 1942. Furthermore, the U.S.S.R. is continuing to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran through the medium of Soviet agents, officials and armed forces. These acts are in violation of the aforesaid treaty, and also in violation of the Declaration of Teheran and the Charter of
the United Nations. The immediate and just solution of this dispute by the Security Council is of the greatest importance to the preservation of the good relations with the U.S.S.R. which Iran wishes to maintain as an independent and sovereign state, and to the survival of the purposes and principles which the members of the United Nations have solemnly undertaken to respect.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient servant,

s/ Hussein Ala'

"Secretary General Trygve Lie has formally acknowledged receipt of the communication in a letter to the Iranian Ambassador, and has transmitted the communications to the representatives of the members of the Security Council thru their diplomatic missions in Washington.

The Iranian request is, therefore, on the provisional agenda to be submitted for approval of the Security Council at the first sitting in New York, now scheduled for Monday, March 25, 1946."

BYRNES

[In telegram 224, March 20, 1946, to Tehran (repeated to London and Moscow), the Department informed the Ambassador:

"In releasing to press copy of his letter to Secretary General UNO [see supra], Iranian Ambassador made following press statement here 5 pm March 19:

"This notice speaks for itself. I desire, however, on behalf of my Govt to emphasize that the bringing by one party before the Security Council of the United Nations of a dispute of this kind should not be interpreted as an act of unfriendliness by the other party.

"The Govt of Iran feels compelled to take this course because of its responsibilities to its people and because of the obligations imposed upon it by the Constitution of Iran. No Iranian Govt could take any other course. We have every hope that this dispute will be decided by the Security Council with such expedition and justice that it will leave no room for misunderstanding." (861.24591/3-2046)]

The Representative of the Soviet Union at the United Nations (Gromyko) to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Lie) 26

LONDON, 19 March 1946.

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics I ask you to take steps in order to postpone the date of the meeting of the Security Council from 25 March to 10 April. The question which was raised by the Iranian Government before the

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26 Reprinted from SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., supp. No. 2, p. 44.
Security Council is unexpected for the USSR Government, since the negotiations between the Iranian Government and the Government of the USSR are being conducted at the present time.

In view of the above, the Government of the USSR is not prepared now to take part in the discussion of the question raised by the Iranian Government in the Security Council. In order to secure the necessary preparation of the Government of the USSR to participate in the consideration of this question in the Security Council, naturally, some time is required. That is why the Government of the USSR suggests postponing the meeting of the Security Council until 10 April.

Andrei A. Gromyko

861.24591/3-2046: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 20, 1946—6 p. m.

MOST IMMEDIATE

226. 1. With reference to our telegram no. 188 of Mar 8 stating the intention of this Govt to parallel the action of Iran, Stettinius is today sending the following letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations:

"I have received your letter of Mar 19 informing me of the action of Iran in filing with you the two letters of Mar 18, copies of which you enclosed.

Under instructions from my Govt, I wish to inform you that when the Security Council reconvenes I shall move:

1. That consideration of the letter filed by Iran be placed at the head of the agenda of the Security Council.

2. That, in connection with the consideration of this letter, Iran and the USSR be requested to report upon the negotiations which may have taken place between them in accordance with the Resolution of the Council adopted February 1 [January 30], 1946."

2. After considerable study of procedural and other considerations we have come to the conclusion that this line of action is the most effective and appropriate which we can take at this moment in the carrying out of our obligations arising from the Declaration of [Regarding] Iran and the Charter of the United Nations. You may make this clear to the PriMin when delivering to him a copy of the letter.

Byrnes

\(^{27}\) Not printed, but see footnote 6, p. 346.

\(^{*}\) Not printed.
Extract of Telegram From the British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Washington, March 21, 1946

TOP SECRET

"I am sure Mr. Byrnes will agree that this question of an immediate invitation to Molotov is now inevitably caught up in the tangle over Persia created by Gromyko's letter of 19th March to the Secretary-General.

2. I do not object in principle to the idea of a preliminary meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Paris, indeed I think it would be a good thing provided always that the Peace Conference is held more or less on the date suggested. But I am convinced it would be a great mistake to send the invitation to Molotov at the present moment as it would play straight into Molotov's hands, since Gromyko's letter shows that the Russian game is to delay the hearing of the Persian dispute until they can fix matters in Persia in the way they want. The danger I see is that the Russians might seize on the invitation to justify transferring consideration of Persia to the Paris meeting. I am sure that we ought not to allow the Security Council to be sidetracked in this way. So I very earnestly hope Mr. Byrnes will not send the invitation until the Security Council has taken Persia.

3. In my view the Council should meet as planned and decide its agenda and timetable by procedural vote. We would certainly support putting the Persian complaint at the top of the agenda, as Mr. Stettinius has proposed in his letter of 20th March to Secretary-General, and we would press for it to be discussed immediately. We would then naturally ask why there has been no reply to our note to Soviet Government, we have fulfilled our obligation under the 1942 treaty and we are entitled to ask what Soviet troops are still doing in Persia.

4. The vital question is now whether or not the Soviet Government will withdraw their troops in accordance with their treaty obligation. There is no need for the Soviet Government to prepare a case on this simple issue and the Security Council would be failing in its duty if it agreed to an adjournment while Russian troops remained on Persian soil.

29 Transmitted to the Secretary of State by the British Ambassador on March 21 with the statement: "I enclose an urgent message which Mr. Bevin has asked me to convey to you."

30 On March 6, the Secretary of State proposed to Mr. Bevin the convening of a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to discuss the draft treaties of peace with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and Finland in advance of the Paris Peace Conference scheduled for May 1, 1946; see Mr. Byrnes' memorandum of conversation, March 6, vol. ii, p. 25.
5. As regards the question of negotiations between the Soviet and Persian Governments, our evidence is that it is untrue that negotiations are still in progress, and this is borne out by the terms of the complaint which Persian Government have filed.

6. If Soviet Government were to refuse to attend the proceedings on March 25th or walk out if the Persian question is put down for discussion before April 10th, personally I think the Council should go ahead as far as it can without a Russian representative. Such action by the Soviet Government would be a direct challenge to the authority of U.N.O. It seems to me therefore that we have got to face this situation squarely. Any weakening or inconsistency on this fundamental Persian issue would put U.N.O. on a slippery slope. I believe that the whole future of the United Nations is at stake.

7. Please give Mr. Byrnes very urgent message in the above sense.\(^5\)

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\(^5\) In reply Mr. Byrnes stated, in part: "Much disturbed by your recent note. I intend to insist on serious consideration of Iran question at forthcoming meeting of the Security Council. I will attend meeting on behalf of our Government. I regret you do not plan to come because issue is necessarily critical and may affect whole future of United Nations. I should not favor any meeting at Paris which would indicate in advance that final disposition of Iran question was to be delayed. I intend to insist on final disposition now." For full text of Mr. Byrnes' reply, see telegram 2740, March 21, 10 a.m., to London, vol. 11, p. 33. For further reply by Mr. Bevin on March 22, see ibid., p. 34.

Mr. Byrnes directed Ambassador Caffery to emphasize, similarly, to the French Foreign Minister the importance he attached to obtaining final disposition of the Iranian question and his hope that Mr. Bidault would attend the sessions of the United Nations (telegram 1319, March 21, 6 p.m., to Paris, filed under 861.24591/3-2146).
I had two and a half hour conversation with PriMin this morning which he asked be kept completely confidential. (I again assured him that leak on Soviet Chargé’s threat had not come from American source.) To induce him to talk I opened by telling Qavam of Gromyko’s letter to Lie requesting postponement of Security Council meeting and of President’s public statement that meeting would not be postponed. I also reminded him of Stettinus’ statement at London SC meeting that US Govt considered withdrawal of foreign troops from any country which requested it should not be subject to any conditions. I stressed importance of this position.

PriMin did not explicitly confirm Ebtehaj version of his talk with Sadchikov but from his remarks I am sure that account was substantially correct.

According to Qavam Sadchikov expressed himself as having been surprised and upset on learning at Baku of Iranian appeal to SC saying he had thought it had been understood that he was coming to Tehran to continue Moscow negotiations. PriMin replied by reminding Sadchikov of him [his] protest filed at Moscow against continued occupation of Iran and of changes he (Qavam) had insisted on making in proposed communiqué in order to show that negotiations were not to be continued Tehran. He thought he had made it clear that presence Soviet troops in Iran after March 2 tied his hands so far as negotiations were concerned. Sadchikov said Stalin felt it was regrettable that during Moscow talks Iran had made no single gesture favorable to USSR, especially with respect to oil. PriMin answered by saying he had not rejected any Soviet proposals, since law did not permit him consider proposals regarding oil. He further said that if Soviet Govt pressed him to do anything against law his only course would be to resign. New PriMin could hardly be more favorably disposed to USSR than he.

Qavam then asked me hypothetical question which confirms my belief in Ebtehaj story. He said (in effect): What would you do in my place if Soviet Ambassador should offer to effect withdrawal of Soviet troops in exchange for an understanding regarding exploitation of oil in northern Iran? I said I could only speak personally but felt he should be extremely careful about any sort of written agreement or exchange of letters exclusively involving Iran and USSR. He had already had experience in which Soviets had broken pledged word embodied in formal treaty and should have even less reason to depend on any less formal, bilateral, understanding. However, if he could induce Russians to commit themselves before SC to withdraw

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32 See telegram 343, March 15, 1 p.m., from Tehran, p. 356.
33 See, for example, the statement made by Mr. Stettinus at the Twenty-First Meeting of the Security Council on February 15, 1946, SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 1, p. 301.
by certain date he would have more binding assurance. I also suggested it would be well for him to leave way open for Soviets to save face if he could do so while safeguarding Iranian interests.

Essence of Qavam’s thinking as it developed in course of conversation was:

1. He fears that if SC censures USSR and asks withdrawal of troops Russians will vent their wrath on himself and on Iran, which could be harrassed in many ways by Soviet Govt, and that UNO could not provide adequate protection.

2. He considers that from viewpoint of practical politics understanding with USSR on northern Iranian oil is long overdue. He asserted that Soviet complaints that Iran had discriminated in favor of Britain by granting AIOC* concession were hard to meet in light of fact controlling interest in AIOC is held by British Govt. He believes any future Majlis will approve concession to Soviets and that such concession is inevitable.

3. He believes he can get around law prohibiting oil negotiations by arranging for a joint Irano-Soviet Company with the two Govts sharing control. He admits even such company would ultimately need Majlis’ approval for its operations but is confident this can be obtained. Meanwhile during period before new Majlis assembles, he asserts approval may be granted by Cabinet decree subject to later Majlis confirmation. (I would hesitate to pass on correctness of his legal position in this reasoning, which seems to me open to grave doubt. However he might be able to carry it off in circumstances.)

4. He is considering preparation of an agreement in very general terms which would provide in principle for joint Irano-Soviet oil exploitation as inducement for Soviets to withdraw troops. He would draft this very carefully to make troop withdrawal a condition precedent. He added this agreement might be expanded to include subjects other than oil.

PriMin was to lunch today with Shah and Hosein Pirnia (Motamen-Ol-Molk) an outstanding elder statesman and patriot. He was to see Sadchikov again at 5:00 this afternoon. Unless Shah dissuaded him I believe he planned to suggest to Sadchikov some sort of arrangement such as that indicated above, to be conditioned on Soviet pledge to SC that troops would be withdrawn by specified date not more than 6 weeks distant.

Sent Department as 383; repeated Moscow 191; London 72.

Murray

861.24591/3—2246: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

SECRET  WASHINGTON, March 22, 1946—7 p. m.

233. Soviet Amb in letter of Mar. 20 [19] to UNO requested postponement of Security Council meeting until April 10 on grounds that

* Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.
presentation of Iranian case was unexpected, since negotiations between Russia and Iran are now being conducted, and hence the Soviet Govt is not prepared to discuss the question before Security Council.\textsuperscript{35} Iranian Amb in note of Mar 21 \cite{1} to UNO requested that action not be delayed, stating that the continued presence of Russian forces in Iran beyond Mar 2 is not a proper subject for negotiation under the Charter or Iranian Constitution.\textsuperscript{36} He said that delays already encountered have intensified the critical situation in Iran and that further delays would cause harm to Iranian interests.

President Truman in statement to press Mar 21\textsuperscript{37} stated that this Govt will not agree to postponement of Mar 25 meeting and further that it will insist on immediate consideration of Iranian case.

Soviet Amb told press Mar 22 that Russia has a firm and definite position in this matter. The meeting he said should be postponed in interests of Iran itself since hasty action would only complicate the question as far as Iran is concerned.

Sent to Tehran, repeated to Moscow and London.

\textbf{BYRNE}\

\textit{891.24/3-1246: Telegram}\

\textbf{The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)}\

\textbf{SECRET}\

Washington, March 22, 1946—3 p. m.\textsuperscript{38} 236. Urgel 318, Mar. 12.\textsuperscript{39}  Present policy precludes sale of surplus arms, ammunition and instruments of war to Iran.\textsuperscript{40}  While Dept is prepared to consider amendment of policy to permit sales to Iran upon receipt from Iranian Govt of firm request specifying exact materials

\textsuperscript{35}  In telegram 915, March 22, 6 p. m., the Chargé in the Soviet Union stated: "I wish to invite Dept's attention to fact that Iran's appeal to Security Council, although several days old, has not as yet been referred to directly or indirectly in Soviet press. Neither, of course, has press referred to Soviet request for delay in SC session. Today's press reported that Soviet Ambassador has arrived in Iran but this brief message contains no hint concerning any further negotiations between the two Governments."

"On the whole the Soviet public continues to be largely unaware of existence of an international crisis resulting from Soviet action in Iran." (861.24591/3-2246)

\textsuperscript{36}  The Iranian letter of March 20 also stated that the negotiations between the Soviet Union and Iran called for at the London meeting of the United Nations "have failed"; for text of the letter, see SC 1st yr., 1st sr., supp. No. 2, p. 45.


\textsuperscript{38}  Not printed; it stated that Maj. Gen. Clarence S. Ridley, Chief of the United States Military Mission with the Iranian Army, had made formal inquiry of the Embassy concerning sale by the United States to Iran of military equipment essential for the maintenance of security involving its armed tribes (891.24/3-1246).

\textsuperscript{39}  For the Department's "present policy" on disposal of military-type surplus equipment to foreign governments, see Secretary's Staff Committee document SC/R-184, February 5, 1946, volume i, documentation on United States National Security Policy.
desired, no assurance can be given at this time that approval would be granted. Desired material might, of course, be available from private manufacturers.

BYRNES

[In telegrams 531 and 538, both dated March 23, 1946, the Department requested Moscow to send in full text “the most literal and careful translation” of the Soviet note of November 29, 1945, to the United States concerning the withdrawal of foreign troops from Iran. The request was made “for purposes of verification, particularly part containing implication that 1942 treaty is only controlling factor.” (861.24591/3—2346) For text of the Soviet note, see telegram 4015, November 30, 1945, from Moscow, Foreign Relations, 1945, volume VIII, page 468. The nature of the reply by Moscow is given in footnote 84, ibid., page 469.]

861.24591/3—2346: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, March 23, 1946—11 a.m.
[Received 4:51 p.m.]

384. Mytel 383, March 22. While Qavam was telling me yesterday of his thoughts regarding possible arrangement with USSR on oil he interposed statement that if any such arrangement were made he would see that Americans were given same rights for exploitation of oil in Baluchistan.

When I mentioned in passing that British had also sought oil concession in Baluchistan he expressed surprise and said that British have already received all oil rights they will ever get in Iran and that southern oil still unallocated will go to Americans.

This bears out his long record of favoring American enterprise in Iran. Among other instances Dept will recall he was Prime Minister in 1923 when Sinclair concession was negotiated.46

MURRAY

861.24591/3—2346: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
US URGENT

TEHRAN, March 23, 1946—2 p.m.
[Received March 24—8:56 a.m.]

387. As I hope you have gathered from mytel 383, March 22, I have not encouraged Qavam to make any concessions to Soviets in

46 For documentation on the granting of an oil concession in Iran to the Sinclair Exploration Company, see Foreign Relations, 1923, vol. II, pp. 711-736.
order to obtain withdrawal their troops. I have repeatedly reminded
him of our position that evacuation foreign troops from any country
should be unconditional. On other hand I have not tried to dis-
courage him from making proposal he has conceived as set forth
mytels 383, and 385 March 23 although I might possibly have done
so. In adopting this course I was influenced by following consider-
ations:

1. Lacking specific instructions from Dept it would have been grave
responsibility to attempt interference in vital negotiations of this kind.
I could not be sure that US Govt or UNO could save Iran from con-
sequences if I succeeded in persuading PriMin to give up plan which
he had himself devised and which appeared to stand some chance of
success.

2. I am impressed with fundamental importance of securing with-
drawal Soviet troops while at same time creating conditions under
which Iran and Soviet Union can live together amicably. From my
necessarily limited vantage point here I can see little utility in winning
a resounding victory over USSR in SC meeting if it either (a) fails to
result in evacuation of Iran or (b) leaves Russians smearing under
humiliating defeat and determined to revenge themselves on Iran.
Both Qavam and Ebtehaj have pointed out that Iran has long common
frontier with Russia and latter would have unlimited opportunities
to make trouble for Iran Govt in northern area even if troops left
Iran. Ebtehaj pointed out, possibly reflecting PriMin’s thoughts, that
Iran could not keep appealing time after time to SC for protection
against her powerful neighbor.

3. Realizing that UNO is still in formative stage, I have wished to
avoid encouraging any intransigence on part of Iranians which would
make its task unnecessarily difficult. I believe it is important to leave
way open for Soviets to withdraw gracefully from untenable position
they have gotten into.

4. Qavam feels, perhaps correctly, that some sort of oil concession
to Russia must and should be made eventually. If this is true it might
as well come now when it can help resolve extremely delicate interna-
tional situation.

5. While Soviet oil concession northern Iran presents obvious
danger of Soviet penetration in this country it does not, of course, repre-
sent any actual or potential loss to US in oil, since there is no pos-
sibility that we could get concession that area. Even if we could it
is my understanding its exploitation by us would be commercially im-

"Telegram No. 385 not printed; Ambassador Murray advised of a report from
Mr. Ebtehaj that the Prime Minister seemed to have come to decision on ques-
tions discussed mytel 383, March 22. He told Ebtehaj he would try to get Soviet
agreement whereby Iran and Russia would inform Security Council that Russian
troops would leave Iran not only by a fixed date but also according to detailed
time schedule. . . . As inducement for this he would offer Russians executive
agreement for joint oil explorations northern Iran.” (861.24591/3-2346)
practicable because of great transportation costs to Persian Gulf involved. As shown in mytels 383 and 385 PriMin is aware of dangers Russian entry into field would present and intends to draft agreement so as to minimize them as much as possible.

6. PriMin's plan is completely in Persian tradition, which accepts as matter of course that justice must be cajoled by special inducements to perform her duties. Considering that Qavam is old style Persian grandee brought up in that tradition it is unlikely that my personal representations against his proposal would have persuaded him to drop it. (This is not to say that powerful official arguments adduced by our Govt, if it is prepared to take such action, might not have effect.)

7. Finally with international relations so strained in all parts of world I would hesitate to reject any solution of Iranian problem which would be reasonably satisfactory and would permit our Govt and UNO to turn to the many other pressing problems confronting them.

In summary much as I regret possibility that Iran will be forced to pay bribe to secure what should be accorded her automatically as of right, I do not feel that proposed solution is too bad. Majority of Iranians themselves would probably accept it with good grace. Ebtehaj seems quite enthusiastic and remarked to me that if Qavam succeeds in his efforts it will bring ray of hope to all other small nations lying within Russian orbit. If plan goes through it should provide reasonable basis for improved Irano-Soviet relations despite fact that it leaves many openings for possible future difficulties. We cannot after all provide Iran with an insurance policy against all potential dangers.

Furthermore, I would consider that contemplated agreement would be at least partial victory for US Govt and UNO, since I am absolutely certain Russians would have forced their demands to limit if it had not been for firm stand taken by America in upholding UNO Charter. Iranians realize that if Russian troops leave Iran it will be solely due to our action and they are immensely grateful.

Sent Dept as 387, repeated Moscow 121; London 74.

MURRAY

891.60/3-2046 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 23, 1946—5 p. m.

MOST IMMEDIATE

239. We are not in a position, in view of uncertainty of course of events in Iran, to give you definite instructions in reply to urtelt 371
Mar 20. We leave to your discretion the reply you should make to Shah or Govt if you are approached for advice as to whether they should remain in Tehran or move to some other place. We have full confidence in your judgment and are sure you will not give any advice which will entail responsibility or obligation on the part of this Govt. While we believe it would be better for Shah and Govt to remain in Tehran even if it involves some danger or inconvenience, it is recognized that circumstances may develop which make this inadvisable.

If Shah leaves Tehran with his court for purpose of setting up Govt at some other place in Iran, you may find it advisable to designate a secretary of Embassy to accompany him. If however he leaves Tehran merely to take refuge elsewhere it seems to us that it would be preferable not to detail a secretary to accompany him. We leave this, however, to your discretion.

The question of the recognition by this Govt of a new Govt in Iran will of course depend on circumstances. In general we would not recognize a new Govt brought about by duress.

Sent to Tehran, repeated to Moscow and London.

Byrnes

861.24591/3-2446: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, March 24, 1946—1 p.m. [Received 1:25 p.m.]

392. Last night I learned from American correspondents of press conference given yesterday by Qavam in which latter was understood to say that it did not matter whether Security Council meeting was

**Not printed. It read in part as follows:**

"Although passage of time without any Soviet move to occupy Tehran may indicate that such move is less likely, I feel we should keep in mind that it is a possibility. If it should materialize there is further possibility that Shah and Cabinet might flee to some other part of the country...

"Since both Qavam and Shah recently have consulted me frequently on questions of policy I think it most probable that they would ask advice of our Government in connection with any plan to leave capital. I request therefore that Department consider question and inform me at earliest possible moment what I should say if I am approached on subject by either Shah or Prime Minister.

"In view of grave potential dangers involved in flight of Iranian Government, Department may wish to consider whether it could find means to fortify Government against Soviet pressure if Shah and Cabinet remain in capital regardless of Soviet occupation. In my opinion, if this could be done it would be preferable solution.

"I should further appreciate instructions regarding course to be followed if Government decides to leave capital. Would Department wish a representative of this office to accompany it? My own feeling is that we would have to maintain some contact with Shah and Prime Minister..." (891.00/3-246).
delayed week or two and that he had reprimanded Ala for opposing postponement. Correspondents received impression Prime Minister felt problem might be settled without SC action.

I saw Qavam this morning and expressed surprise and concern that he should have made public statements of this kind. I remarked that it seemed curious time for him to appear to belittle importance of SC in light of stand taken by US Government and fact that even Stalin had just emphasized importance he attached to it.

Qavam replied that correspondents must have misunderstood his remarks which were general in character and that he had not intended to convey impression they seemed to have received. (Since Mozaffar Firuz who is fast becoming Qavam’s evil genius acted as interpreter I can believe Prime Minister’s remarks may have been distorted in translation.) On my urging he summoned another press conference this morning to correct impression given yesterday. To ensure against distortion this time I left my own confidential interpreter Saleh to handle translation.

Qavam said he had not sent any new instructions to Ala regarding presentation of Iranian case to SC and that he did not intend to do so unless and until he reached some satisfactory agreement with Soviets here.

In reply to my question Prime Minister said he had not definitely presented to Soviet Ambassador proposal for joint oil exploitation as inducement for withdrawal Soviet troops. However, he still had this idea under active consideration and did not believe Russians would evacuate without this concession. He did not indicate when he planned to broach his suggestion to Sadchikov but it would seem time is too short for anything to be done on this regard before SC meets tomorrow.

He asked my counsel regarding proposed agreement. I said I could give him no advice. I agreed that it was important for Iran Government to build satisfactory basis of understanding with USSR but he must make his own decision as to advisability of offering oil rights to achieve this. Once again I reminded him that US did not consider it should be necessary for Iran to purchase withdrawal of foreign troops.

In telegram 388, March 24, 8 a.m., Ambassador Murray reported: “Department may be interested to know that Qavam has expressed to Ebehaj strong annoyance at Ala’s action in announcing that Iranian Government opposed delay in Security Council meeting. He said this statement was made without authorization and considers it was unnecessary since President Truman had already declared American position to this question... Essentially Qavam has been trying to soothe Russians whenever possible and he feels Ala has not grasped this clearly.” (861.24501/3-2446)

Assistant to Prime Minister Qavam and Director of Propaganda in the Iranian Government.

219-490-69—25
I saw Shah last night and learned that he favors Qavam's contemplated deal with Soviets as does Motamen-Ol-Molk. Shah also remarked that he did not think Soviets would agree to any multilateral scheme for development of northern Iranian oil.

To Department as 392 repeated Moscow 123, London 76.

Murray

861.24501/3-2446: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray) 45

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1946—5 p. m.
MOST IMMEDIATE

238. We fully approve position taken by you as outlined in your 383, 385, 387 and 391 [392]. It is important that no one should obtain false impression that our determination to carry out our obligations under the Charter and the Iran Declaration has been influenced in the slightest by a selfish interest on our part in Iranian petroleum. Please make it clear, therefore, in case Iranian officials again refer to possibility of petroleum concessions for us in Baluchistan (urtel 384) that any American interest in the Baluchistan fields which may exist has no relationship whatsoever with our efforts to prevail upon the Russians to remove their troops and we prefer that this interest be not discussed in connection with withdrawal of Soviet troops and related problems.


Byrnes

861.24501/3-2946: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

URGENT

MOSCOW, March 25, 1946.
[Received March 25—10:25 a. m.]


1. Tass announcement “regarding evacuation of Soviet troops from Iran” which reads as follows in translation:

“The withdrawal of Soviet troops in Iran from districts of Meshed, Shahrud and Semnan begun March 2, 1946, has already been finished. By agreement with the Iranian Govt the evacuation of the remaining Soviet troops begun March 24. The Soviet command in Iran esti-
mates that the complete evacuation of Soviet troops from Iran can be concluded in the course of 5-6 weeks if nothing unforeseen should take place.”

2. Tass despatch from Tehran “statement of Qavam Es Saltane”. Despatch is translated as follows:

“Iranian Premier Qavam Es Saltane today told correspondents in Tehran that differences between Iran and Russia can be solved before session of Security Council takes place. It is of no significance whether the session takes place March 25 or 14 days later. If the question of evacuation of Soviet troops from Iran and other problems are not settled sooner the Iranian question will be included on the agenda of Security Council. Answering question of a correspondent concerning the letter of the Iranian Ambassador in Washington Hussein Ala to the General Secretary of the UNO Trygve Lie the Iranian Premier emphasized categorically that this letter was written and sent by the Iranian Ambassador without the knowledge and sanction of the Iranian Govt. Qavam Es Saltane told correspondents that he had sent strict telegraphic instructions to Hussein Ala in which the necessity of avoiding the repetition of such arbitrary action in the future was pointed out. Qavam Es Saltane expressed confidence that the Iranian question would be settled satisfactorily. The most important question is the evacuation of Soviet troops from Iran. All the other problems depend upon the solution of this question. The question of Azerbaijan has comparatively little importance. It can be settled by means of negotiations as soon as agreement is reached concerning the evacuation of Russian troops from Iran. Qavam Es Saltane denied reports that after March 2 additional Soviet troops came to Iran.”

3. Tass despatch from Iran reporting that at press conference in Tehran Qavam Es Saltane in replying to question of foreign correspondents on circumstances which led to arrest of Seyid Zia 47 stated that decision to arrest him was adopted without any pressure from the side and was caused exclusively by the threat which Seyid Zia’s subversive activity represented to the international security of Iran.

Pravda March 25 also announces appointment of Gromyko permanent representative of Soviet Union on Security Council.


[KENNAN]

861.24591/3-2546 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, March 25, 1946—3 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received March 26—8:03 a. m.]

395. Following information given me today by Qavam:

1. Soviet Ambassador Sadchikov called on him last night 7 o’clock with three notes: First note said Soviet Govt would evacuate all Iran-

47 Seyid Zia ed-Din Tabatabai, prominent Iranian politician.
ian territory within 5 or 6 weeks “if nothing further happened”. (Sadchikov said he did not know what this latter phrase meant but guessed it might refer to Azerbaijan situation.) Second note proposed that Irano-Soviet company be formed to develop Iranian oil, 51% to be Russian and 49% Iranian. Third note offered to intercede to adjust Azerbaijan situation on basis that “Prime Minister of Azerbaijan” should be known as Governor General, Cabinet Ministers should be known as Directors of Offices, and local Majlis should be known as Provincial Council.

2. Sadchikov called again at 10 p. m. with telegram just received from Moscow saying Soviet Govt pleased to learn of arrest of Seyid Ala [Zia]-Ed-Din and announcing Soviet intention to withdraw troops at once from Karaj and Kazvin in accordance request of Iranian Prime Minister.

3. Qavam intends to reply to first note by expressing appreciation and requesting evacuation be completed in 4 weeks. He will also insist that Russian decision be communicated formally to Security Council. (He may already have taken this action.) In reply to second note he plans make counterproposal on oil development. In reply third note he will decline offer of Soviet intercession and negotiate direct with Azerbaijan “Government”.

4. He has not modified Ala’s instructions in connection Security Council discussion. I infer he will wait to see that Soviets carry out their assurances before doing anything in this respect.

Sent Dept as 395, repeated London 77, Moscow 124.

Murray

861.24591/3–2546 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

TEHRAN, March 25, 1946—5 p. m.
[Received March 26—10:45 a. m.]

397. At noon today I advised Qavam of Department’s position re Baluchistan oil as stated 238, March 24. I explained that while we duly appreciated his consideration of American interests it must be clearly understood that his assurances this regard were gratuitous on his part and must never under any circumstances be considered to have any relation to question of Soviet evacuation of Iran. I wanted there to be no misunderstanding on this point. Prime Minister agreed that I had correctly stated case and said his offer had been entirely on his own initiative.

I acted promptly in order to avert two dangers which I thought might possibly arise in this connection:
1. In all good faith Qavam might make bid for American public favor by announcing assurances he had given me. I feared he might not realize folly of such step.

2. If Russians learned of Qavam’s informal promises (as is likely to happen sooner or later) they might cite them as evidence that we were engaged in making same kind of deal with Iran on oil as they themselves were trying to force through. They could then plausibly charge us with adopting righteous attitude while at same time making profit out of Irano-Soviet dispute. I therefore wanted to make the record clear with no possibility of misinterpretation.

To Department as 397, repeated London 78, Moscow 125.

MURRAY

Statement by the Soviet Representative at the United Nations (Gromyko) 48

[Extracts]

“I would begin by making an official declaration on behalf of the Soviet Government. Negotiations between the Soviet Government and the Government of Iran have resulted in an agreement regarding the evacuation of Soviet troops still in that country. It is already known that the evacuation of these troops began some time ago, on the 2d of March. As regards the evacuation of the troops still remaining in certain zones of Iran, I would state that in accordance with an agreement concluded between the Soviet and the Iranian Governments the evacuation of these troops began on the 24th of March, that is, two days ago, and will probably end within five or six weeks unless unforeseen circumstances arise.

In conformity with the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 30 January in its session at London, the differences between the Governments of the Soviet Union and Iran were to be handled by negotiations between the two parties, bi-lateral negotiations.

48 Made before the Security Council in New York City on the morning of March 26; reprinted from Department of State Bulletin, April 7, 1946, p. 568. The statement, with substantial language changes, is printed in SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, p. 11.

For an account of the meetings of the Security Council on March 26 and of the discussions preceding the morning meeting, see telegram 6, March 26, from New York, p. 383.

In telegram 949, March 26, from Moscow, Stalin was quoted as saying in a press statement: "... As regards the question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran, it, as is known, has already been solved in a positive sense by agreement between the Soviet Government and the Government of Iran." (861.24591/3-2646)
In conformity with this decision, negotiations between the two Governments did take place. These negotiations brought about positive results—the positive results which I have already mentioned—results agreed to and agreements between the two parties.

Therefore the decision to place this subject on the agenda of the Security Council contradicts not only the facts of the situation, but the letter and the spirit of the resolution adopted by the Security Council on the 30th of January.

For these reasons I propose that the question raised by the Iranian Ambassador in the letter of the 18th of March should not be included in the agenda of the Security Council.”

Statement by the Secretary of State 49

I cannot agree with the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics nor support the amendment he offers to the agenda. The facts before the Council are that the Iranian Government, through its representative, brought to the attention of the Council a dispute between Iran and the USSR which it declared was likely to endanger international peace and security. The Iranian Government further stated that contrary to the provisions of the Treaty of 29 January 1942, the USSR was maintaining troops on Iranian territory after 2 March. In its letter to the Council, it further declared that the USSR was continuing to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran through the medium of USSR agents, officials and armed forces.

The Iranian Government, through its representative, referred to these facts as constituting new developments arising since the action of the Council on 30 January.

Today the representative of the USSR states that there has been an agreement. If that information is correct, then the USSR Government should have presented to the Council for its consideration a joint statement from the Iranian Government and the USSR Government stating that an agreement had been arrived at and asking that there be no further consideration of the question. But that is not the case. The Iranian Government has not withdrawn its letter.

Though we have tried to ascertain the facts, we have not ascertained from the Iranian Government that there has been an agreement.

Therefore, when a Member of the United Nations advises the Council that a situation exists which is likely to threaten the peace and security of the world, we cannot deny to that nation the opportunity to

49 Made before the Security Council on the morning of March 26; reprinted from SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, p. 18. The statement, with minor changes, is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, April 7, 1946, p. 570.
be heard, to say whether or not there has been an agreement, to say whether or not it wishes to withdraw its complaint.

If that is not correct, then all that a Government represented on the Council would have to do when a complaint was made against it would be to advise the Council that there had been an agreement, and on the strength of that statement, to ask that the complaining Government should be denied the opportunity to have a hearing.

All that is contemplated now is the adoption of an agenda which would give to the Iranian Government an opportunity to present facts which in the opinion of that Government constitute a threat to international peace. Surely the Council cannot deny to any Member of the United Nations the opportunity to present a request of that kind, filed in complete accord with the provisions of the Charter.

If there has been an agreement, certainly the Council would want to hear that fact stated by the representative of the Iranian Government. If there has been an agreement, we must assume that the representative of the Iranian Government will make a statement as to the agreement. We must put this matter on the agenda; we must give to the Iranian Government an opportunity to say whether or not there has been an agreement.

If there is not a complete understanding between the Iranian Government and the USSR Government, that fact will be disclosed when opportunity is given to both parties to the dispute to make a statement. When that is done, the Council can take the matter under consideration and determine whether it can take any action to bring about complete agreement. But certainly it cannot deny to a Member of the United Nations that states that a condition exists which is likely to threaten international peace and security, even the opportunity to present its case.

501.BC/3-2646: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (Acheson)

SECRET

URGENT

NEW YORK, March 26, 1946—9:45 p. m.

6. Tuesday's Council session opened with all the members fully aware of the existing tension revolving on Russia's insistence upon postponement of discussion of the Iranian question. By the time the delegates convened for the session at 11 a. m. there was a distinct possibility that Russia would withdraw from these Security Council meetings and possibly from UN as a whole.

**For the official record of the proceedings of the Security Council on Tuesday, March 26, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, pp. 10-43.**
There was indication of this at the luncheon given by Secretary-General Lie Monday noon for Security Council members. At the luncheon Mr. Stettinius had a conversation with Mr. Gromyko concerning the Iranian question. Gromyko advised Mr. Stettinius that at the Tuesday meeting of the Council he would make a statement which would make his position very clear.

Gromyko stated that while he was perfectly willing to have the ceremony opening the Council session he could not participate further if we pressed the Council to deal with the Iranian question before April 10.

When Gromyko asked Mr. Stettinius if the U.S. position was still firm, Mr. Stettinius replied that it was the American delegation’s opinion that the Iranian question should be dealt with promptly. Mr. Stettinius inquired if a short postponement would help him. Mr. Gromyko replied: “I don’t need any help.” He reiterated that in the event the Security Council decided to deal with the Iranian question before April 10, he would not participate in the discussion.

At this point, Mr. Stettinius suggested: “Perhaps it would be wise for some of us to have a discussion about this whole question after the meeting today or this evening.”

On Tuesday, by the end of the day’s sessions the situation was completely in the open but apparently was not as serious as feared. Gromyko stated that if any substantive matters on the Iranian question were discussed Russia “could not participate and could not attend” such discussions. However, this was interpreted by the U.S. and other delegations to mean that the Soviet delegation would not withdraw completely from Security Council or UN deliberations.

All of Tuesday’s Council discussion centered on procedural matters. After Russia’s motion to take the Iranian question off the agenda was defeated, by a vote of nine to two, Poland supporting Russia, Council members voted to accept the Iranian item in the Secretary-General’s proposed agenda.

With passage of this item, Mr. Gromyko immediately proposed postponement of discussion on the Iranian question and this precipitated lengthy and detailed argument which boiled down to three specific proposals:

1. Gromyko’s proposal that the whole question be postponed until April 10;
2. Egypt’s proposal that the Iranian representative be called in to explain how he felt about postponement, and then the Council would decide from the views presented there as to whether or not postponement was indicated; and
3. Australia’s suggestion that Iranian views and documentary material be presented in writing, as well as orally, for quasi-judicial

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*For amplification of Mr. Gromyko’s views, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, p. 37.*
Council deliberation, discussion and decision, on whether or not the Iranian question should be postponed.

Secretary Byrnes and Sir Alexander Cadogan of United Kingdom appeared to be bearing the brunt of the argument, urging, first, that postponement could not be countenanced if Iran was in a desperate situation, and second, that Iran—as a pledge to all other small nations—must at least be heard by the Council. Poland’s Dr. Lange backed Soviet arguments thoroughly, with some amplification, but urged that documentary evidence come from Teheran and not from the Iranian Ambassador alone. Mexico took issue with Gromyko’s proposals practically at every turn. Van Kleffens, of Holland, pointed out that the Council was obliged, under Article 31, to allow Iran to participate since it was quite obvious that Iran’s interests were “specially affected”.

With tempers fraying and little progress being made, delegates finally agreed on France’s proposal that a three-man subcommittee thrash out the three aforesaid proposals and come to agreement on what the Council should do about them and present their conclusions by 3 p.m. Wednesday. Dr. Quo, Council Chairman, then appointed the U.S., U.S.S.R. and France to this committee, to the apparent discomfort of all three. Adjournment, which had been sidetracked by Bonnet’s subcommittee proposal, came quickly after this.

Ambassador Ala, Iranian representative, hopes to be called to present his case, and is extremely anxious to tell his country’s story to the Council. He intends to put forth a lengthy exposition of his country’s situation, and will of necessity present many substantive items to the Council, as well as his views on whether or not discussion should be postponed. His main objective, it was said, is to keep the Iranian question definitely on the continuing agenda.

[Here follow discussions on matters other than the Iranian question.]

BYRNES

861.24591/3-2746: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET AS URGENT NIACl

TEHRAN, March 27, 1946—5 p.m. [Received 10:10 p.m.]

411. Mytel 395, March 25. During conversation which he requested be kept completely confidential PriMin told me late this morning that he had as yet made no final agreement with Soviets. Added that he had complained to Soviet Ambassador about statements made by Gromyko and Stalin to effect agreement had been reached. However

52 The most significant statements made by Secretary of State Byrnes are to be found in SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, pp. 30–36.
he showed me two draft notes which I understood he intended to give Sadchikov today in reply to notes latter delivered March 24.

I gathered he had already discussed their purport with Sadchikov. Substance was as follows:

1. First note expressed appreciation for Soviet decision to withdraw troops and asked that this be notified formally to Security Council omitting qualifying phrase “unless something unforeseen happens”. (Qavam said he had asked Soviet Ambassador to write him letter stating this phrase would be omitted. Latter had replied he was sure Soviet Govt would acquiesce as soon as other agreements were concluded.)

2. Second note consisted of counterproposal to Soviet suggestion for joint Irano-Russian company to exploit Iranian oil. (Qavam remarked that this was real crux of present crisis, that oil was what Russians really wanted.) Points covered were:

a. Participation should be equal for both countries instead of 51 percent Russian and 49 percent Iranian as Soviets had suggested.

b. Iran should be called upon to make no financial contribution. She would furnish land which would constitute her share of capital. Russians would provide technical personnel and equipment.

c. Duration should be 30 years instead of 50 years as proposed by Soviet Govt.

d. Russians had suggested exploitation should cover provinces of Azerbaijan, Gilan, Mazanderan, Gorgan and that part of Khorassan contiguous to Soviet frontier. (Virtually all of northern Iran.) Qavam suggested omitting areas of Azerbaijan contiguous to Turkey and Iraq arguing that otherwise international friction would be aroused which would be in interest of neither Iran nor USSR.

e. Any security forces needed for whatever purpose in connection with exploitation should be solely Iranian.

With respect to third Soviet note dealing with Azerbaijan Govt, Qavam apparently had not prepared reply. He said however he had talked to Sadchikov on this subject and had said he was willing to negotiate with Azerbaijanis within limits permitted by constitution. He had thought it would be well for Azerbaijanis to send delegation to open negotiations. Soviet Ambassador had replied that if Qavam could go no further than that he considered it useless to attempt negotiations.

PriMin remarked to me that he did not want Soviets to interfere in details of his dealings with Azerbaijanis, all he wanted from Soviet Govt this connection was its general moral support and that he had so advised Sadchikov. Apparently this Azerbaijan phase of his negotiations with latter is still hanging in air.
In reply to my insistent questioning and to my surprise and disquiet PriMin said that he intended to keep word of his proposed agreements with Russians strictly confidential. He read me telegram he had sent Ala last night or today informing latter of negotiations but instructing him not to reveal them to SC or anyone else. If Ala were asked whether Irano-Soviet agreement had been reached he was to reply that he would have to inquire of his Govt and Qavam would then give him instructions as to what further statements he could make. (PriMin said he himself drafted telegram and I think it possible he even encoded it himself. It was marked to be decoded only by Ala.)

Qavam asked my opinion regarding this procedure. I replied that without instructions from my Govt I could express no definite opinion. However he should consider very carefully consequences of attempt to keep agreement of this sort secret and should realize that he might run into serious trouble. He should be thinking of answer he would give Ala when latter requested directions on how to answer probable SC request for report on Irano-Soviet negotiations.

I think it probable Qavam’s secretiveness in this matter is result of Soviet pressure.

In course of talk I asked whether Qavam considered formal Soviet assurance to SC regarding troop withdrawal would be sufficient protection. He replied by asking my view. I suggested he might do well to instruct Ala to see that question remained one “of continuing interest” to Council even after present discussions should have terminated and until all Russian troops have been withdrawn. I believe he plans to follow this course.

Although Qavam did not make clear exact manner in which he intended to handle Iranian case in present SC debate I assume he will have Ala continue to press matter until he (Qavam) reaches what he considers satisfactory agreement with Russians in negotiations here after which Ala will be instructed to announce that Soviet assurances for troop withdrawal are satisfactory and Iran considers case closed provided assurances are fulfilled.

To Dept as 411; repeated Moscow 131, London 83.

Murray

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53 In telegram 414, March 28, 10 a. m., Ambassador Murray stated: “If you wish me to do so I think I could convince Qavam at this stage that his best course lies in being entirely open and aboveboard with Security Council revealing his oil negotiations together with any agreement which may result from them. I believe this could still be done in such way as to save face for Russians since both they and Qavam could say with some degree of truth that agreement had not been forced out of Prime Minister but had been freely and voluntarily negotiated.” (861.24591/3-2846).
The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

New York, March 27, 1946—10:55 p.m.

10. The United Nations Security Council continued to discuss Wednesday afternoon the advisability of immediate consideration of the Iranian question after the Soviet delegation walked out of the Chamber in protest over the failure of the Council to accept its demand to postpone all action on that issue until April 10.

Andrei Gromyko, Soviet delegate, who had argued in vain for hours for the delay, and his three advisers dramatically stalked out of the Chamber shortly after the Council had voted down the Soviet postponement proposal.

Before taking this action Gromyko made a brief statement, pointing out that he had made it clear that for reasons he had expressed that he could not as a representative of the Soviet Union participate further in the meeting. He then carefully packed his papers in a case and led the three advisers out of the hall.

The Soviet group left the Chamber at 5:20—more than 2 hours after the meeting opened. Up to that time delegates discussed without a break their views on the Soviet postponement motion. Arguments followed much the same line as the previous day.

Chairman Dr. Quo Tai-Chi opened the third New York Security Council session with a report that the three-nation sub-committee had been unable to reach agreement on the postponement question. He called for additional observations.

The sub-committee, comprising delegates of France, U.S.S.R. and the United States, was named late Tuesday when the Council was confronted with three separate proposals on the Iranian issue.

Again on Wednesday U.S. Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, and Gromyko had the leading roles in debate on the Iranian question. Byrnes steadfastly maintained that the Council should not act on the Soviet postponement motion until it had heard the views on the suggested delay from the Iranian representative.

The U.S. delegate pointed out that he had information from the American representative in Iran that no settlement had been reached in the Iranian-Soviet negotiations. He said that all confidence in the effectiveness of the Security Council would disappear if the Iranian representative were denied a chance to state his Government’s views on the postponement motion.

For the official record of the proceedings of the Security Council on Wednesday, March 27, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, pp. 44-70.
“UN will die in its infancy of inefficiency and ineffectiveness,” Byrnes added.\textsuperscript{56}

Considerable discussion followed before the actual vote on the Soviet postponement motion was taken. Only Russia and Poland voted for the delay.

After the vote the Polish, Egyptian and French Ambassadors were called on for remarks before Gromyko had a chance to announce he would leave the Chamber.

The Council then proceeded to vote on an Egyptian motion to invite the Iranian representative to express his views on postponement before that body decided whether to delay consideration of the substance of the Iranian complaint that the presence of Soviet troops and agents in Iran pose a threat to international peace and security.

Seven votes were required to carry the Egyptian motion and eight were obtained. Australia and Poland abstained and Russia was not represented at the time.

Ambassador Hussein Ala, Iranian Ambassador, whose letter of March 18 called the Security Council’s attention to what was termed a dispute between Iran and the Soviet Union, was then asked to sit at the delegates’ table.

Ala said that he knew of no agreement, secret or otherwise, on the matter now before the Council. He added that negotiations at Moscow between the Iranian Prime Minister and officials of the Soviet Government, including Stalin and Molotov, did not result in an agreement because of the Russian demands. He pointed out that Soviet troops were still in Iran, despite a treaty calling for their evacuation by March 2. He said he was prepared to proceed immediately with the case.

When Ala began to discuss the substance of the complaint, Secretary Byrnes suggested that he confine his remarks, as closely as possible, to the question of postponement.

Ala then said he had no instructions from his Government to agree to a postponement. He added that Soviet troops and agents in Iran interfered with internal affairs and that demands had been made on Iran’s sovereignty. He described the situation as explosive. He stated that a delay would be a threat to peace, and then asked for immediate action on the issue.\textsuperscript{56}

When the Polish delegate indicated he would like to ask certain questions of the Iranian representative, it was suggested that he wait until the next meeting for answers, in view of the lateness of the hour.

\textsuperscript{56} For full text of Mr. Byrnes’ remarks, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, p. 49.
\textsuperscript{56} For text of Ambassador Ala’s remarks, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, p. 62.
He was agreeable and Chairman Quo adjourned the meeting at 6:45 p.m.

The Security Council will meet in private session Thursday afternoon at 4:00 o’clock.57

[Byrnes]

861.24391/3-2746: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, March 28, 1946—3 p.m.

MOST IMMEDIATE NIAC

248. From Byrnes for Murray. With reference to your Niact 411 Mar 27, 5 p.m., please inform Qavam that we appreciate his keeping us closely informed regarding his negotiations with the Soviet Ambassador and will respect his request that this information be kept strictly confidential. However, the position of the American Representative on the Security Council will become very difficult unless the Council receives information promptly concerning certain aspects of the negotiations, particularly the fact that the Soviet Ambassador continues to qualify his assurances regarding troop withdrawal until agreements are reached regarding oil and Azerbaijan. We have maintained resolutely before the Council that the Iranian request to present its case should be granted on the ground that according to our information the claim of the USSR that an understanding has already been reached is not correct. If the present status of the bilateral negotiations were clearly reported to the Council, our contention that no agreement has been reached would be indisputably established. If no report of the status of the negotiations is made the impression will be created that Soviet-Iranian negotiations are progressing smoothly and that the United States is pressing the case of Iran for its own purposes.

It is no longer possible for Iran to continue both to plead its case in the Council and at the same time to carry on secret bilateral negotiations regarding which it is unwilling to inform the Council. Iran is entitled to have its case considered by the Council, but Qavam should authorize Ala immediately to inform the Council regarding the status of the negotiations. [Byrnes.]

Acheson

57 The purpose of the private session was to discuss the serious problem arising from the walkout of the Soviet delegation. In telegram 9, March 27, 10 p.m., the Secretary noted that “Under terms of the Charter the Security Council cannot take a substantive decision when any member of the Big Five Powers is absent from the meeting, unless the absentee has been declared a party to a dispute. The Soviet Union has not been officially declared a party to a dispute. This poses a serious problem as Gromyko has repeatedly declared in the last 2 days that he cannot participate in or attend as a representative of the Soviet Union any Security Council meeting prior to April 10 at which the Iranian issue is discussed.” (501.BC/3-2746)
Memorandum on Private Meeting of Members of Security Council, March 28, 1946, 4:10 p.m.\(^6\)

TOP SECRET

(Memorandum based on confidential minutes of the meeting which were seen by officers of the Delegation but were not available for circulation and were not to be copied.)

Present:

President—Mr. Quo Tai-Chi (China)
Mr. Hodgson (Australia)
Mr. Velloso (Brazil)
Mr. Hassan Pasha (Egypt)
Mr. Bonnet (France)
Mr. Najera (Mexico)
Mr. Van Kleffens (Netherlands)
Mr. Lange (Poland)
Mr. Cadogan (United Kingdom)
Mr. Byrnes (United States)
Mr. Stettinius (United States)

[Mr. Lie]

1. Dr. Quo stated that since he had been unable to assure Mr. Gromyko that the Iranian question would not be discussed, Gromyko had felt himself unable to attend the meeting, but that the Soviet representative had indicated his willingness to discuss the situation with the President, or one member or a group of members of the Council.

2. After a general discussion in which the desirability of sending a delegation to discuss the situation with Gromyko was considered, general agreement was reached that no delegation should be appointed since such a procedure was not thought fitting for the Security Council and might be embarrassing to Gromyko, but that individual representatives might consult with him.

3. Mr. Van Kleffens remarked that executive meetings should be held only when no other course was open, and then business should be confined to procedural matters with discussions of substance held to a minimum. Colonel Hodgson stated his government thought that in such meetings under no circumstances should matters of substance be discussed.

4. Mr. Cadogan said that since his government wished the Security Council to conduct an immediate investigation of the Iranian application, he considered the Council should resume its meetings to show that it was impossible for one member to veto discussion.

5. Mr. Byrnes then presented a preliminary draft of a proposal he intended to make, which he stressed was not being submitted for adoption, but merely as a basis of discussion. The draft was almost exactly similar to the statement the Secretary delivered at the Council on March 29 (see page 437 of Journal No. 22 of the Security Council), except that in the draft of March 28 Mr. Byrnes specified April 1 as the date replies should be received, and in his statement the next day the date was April 2. Mr. Byrnes then said in his opinion the seriousness of the dispute would be greatly diminished if the USSR could assure the Council that the withdrawal of troops was not predicated upon any Iranian concessions, and that the “unforeseen circumstances” did not refer to further agreements or concessions. Mr. Byrnes emphasized that the assurances he specified would not only be consistent with the Soviet–Iranian understanding as quoted by Gromyko, but would also agree with the statement Vyshinsky had made at the January 30 Council meeting that under the resolution then adopted, any member, at any time, could call for an immediate report from the parties.

6. Subject to detailed consideration, Mr. Hassan expressed general agreement with the Byrnes’ statement. Mr. Hodgson, however, thought that such proposals would be appropriate only after investigation, and that since no evidence on the merits had been called for, the Iranian representative at the next meeting should be asked to confine his statements to the issue of postponement. If there was no postponement, he continued, both the Iranian and Soviet representatives should be asked to submit a written statement setting out the full facts since in the absence of the Soviet representative Ala should not make an oral statement. Mr. Hodgson was willing to have a time limit set, since he only wished to secure the facts, and had no desire to delay the proceedings. Mr. Byrnes in reply said that the information sought in his proposal, plus the statement already before the Council, would be sufficient to enable the Council to form its conclusions, and would further obviate the embarrassing situation of obtaining a full Iranian, but no Soviet case. Mr. Cadogan thought that if Ala were to make an oral statement, public opinion might be distressed if he were denied the right to make further oral statements. Mr. Najera agreed with the substance of Mr. Byrnes’ proposals, which he considered a compromise between the Egyptian and Soviet motions in the Council, and suggested that Mr. Gromyko be informed of them before the next meeting. Mr. Bonnet, while in general agreeing with Mr. Byrnes, pointed out that the Council would be unable to vote on questions of substance.

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This concerned the date the Soviet Union and Iran were to report to the Security Council on the status of negotiations between them; see telegram 17, March 29, from New York, p. 396.
7. Dr. Lange considered that the request for information from the two governments involved a decision of substance, that such a decision could not be taken without the USSR’s concuring vote, and that while the Secretary General might request information his action could not be taken in the name of the Council. Replying, Mr. Cadogan thought the Council could advise the President to request the information, but in any event no decision of substance was involved, for at San Francisco there had been agreed that no one power could prevent investigation. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the parties to a dispute did not vote. Dr. Quo then reminded the group that the Committee of Experts was considering the procedure by which the existence of a dispute should be established, and Mr. Byrnes said he considered this a highly important question which would have to be discussed in an open meeting.

8. There was general agreement that Ala should attend the next meeting to answer Mr. Lange’s questions as well as any others. It was also agreed that Mr. Byrnes would revise his draft and express his views at the next meeting; that Mr. Gromyko should be informed of the meeting in the usual way, and that the next meeting would be held at 3 PM the following day.

9. Mr. Lie considered it would be necessary for him to talk with his legal experts concerning both Mr. Byrnes’ proposal and the general position arising from Mr. Gromyko’s withdrawal. He also suggested an informal meeting of the Council members to discuss the temporary headquarters of United Nations, and said in conclusion the Committee of Experts would present additional rules of procedure within a few days.

The meeting rose at 6:40 PM.

501 B.C/3-2946: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Kennan)

Top Secret

Urgent

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1946—noon.

575 . . .

For your info, following is outline of position which Secretary proposes to take in further discussions of Iran problem:

(1) We are not going to agree to Sov request for postponement.

(2) In view of ambiguity as to whether there is an understanding or not, and if there is an understanding why it is that Iran cannot accept it, we plan to ask both Sov and Iran Govs to let Council know status of any so-called understanding or any other agreement which has been reached or is in the course of discussion. It is planned to
request both Govs to make this info available for Council meeting on April 2. We have confidential info from Qavam as to general character of negotiations but he has insisted that neither we nor his Ambassador can use this info since he fears that its disclosure might further antagonize SovGov. We are therefore making requests to both Govs in an effort to bring details of proposed agreements into open in order that it may be clear why we are taking firm stand in Council.

(3) Our position will not be one of antagonism to Sov Union but will be couched in terms to indicate that Council is desirous of helping to arrive at a constructive settlement which will strengthen Iran hand so that they will not have to accept agreement under pressure.

(4) We hope in this way to prevent possibility of Sov troops being used to bring pressure on IranGov to reach unequitable agreement. We plan not to back away from insistence that Sov troops must withdraw unconditionally.

ACHESON

861.24591/3-2946 : Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
Tehran, March 29, 1946—3 p.m.
US URGENT
[Received March 30—11:25 a.m.]

424. Following is substance of talk I had with Qavam today:
He has not yet reached agreement with Soviets and thinks final understanding will still take some time.

Yesterday he delivered to Secretary of Soviet Embassy three notes: First dealing with troop evacuation, second with oil and third with adjustment Azerbaijan situation. First two evidently followed lines indicated mytel 411, March 27. In connection troop withdrawal I gathered he did not insist on completion in 4 weeks. He said he had been unable obtain from Soviet Ambassador any clarification of phrase “unless something unforeseen happens”. With respect oil I understood he had modified his previous draft proposal to provide for 50-year duration of company as requested by Soviet Govt instead of 30 as he had intended. Otherwise these two notes presumably were as he showed them to me March 27.

Note on Azerbaijan stated Qavam’s willingness to allow use of Turkish language so long as Persian remained official language and to allow Provincial Council to appoint all subordinate officials in province. Governor General would be appointed by Tehran Govt subject to approval by Provincial Council. Three functions: War, finance and police (and, of course, foreign affairs) must be reserved absolutely to Central Govt.
PriMin did not make clear to me whether he was merely informing Russians of his position this regard or was requesting their intercession to bring about Azerbaijan settlement on this basis. He said, however, that he had told Soviet Secretary that unless his proposal on Azerbaijan was accepted he would regard any oil agreement as nullified (I pointed out that obviously he should also refuse oil agreement if troop evacuation was not carried out on schedule. He agreed and said he would make this clear to Soviets.)

We had lengthy discussion on question of whether he should inform Security Council of these negotiations. I cited points made by Ehtehaj (mytel 414, March 28) and added suggestion that revelation need not necessarily be embarrassing either to him or to Russians since it could be said that negotiations had been free and based on logic of situation. Although I did not directly urge him to take decision either way, at end of conversation and in reply my direct question, Qavam stated emphatically that he had decided to instruct Ala to give full information to SC whenever he requests such authority. I suggest you convey this to Ala.

PriMin stated he had already sent telegram to Ala touching lightly on steps where he had felt latter might have gone too fast but in effect fully endorsing Ambassador’s actions to date.

I asked whether Qavam intended to withdraw complaint from SC if his exchanges of notes with Soviets resulted in agreement. He replied that Ala had been and would be instructed to see that matter remained of continuing concern to SC until last Russian soldier had left Iran.

PriMin remarked that he had not told British of his oil negotiations and asked whether I thought he should do so. I said I could give no official advice. However, I thought he should remember that Britain was also signatory to tripartite treaty of 1942 and might well feel entitled to be informed. If he failed to tell British what he was doing he would risk their displeasure and would gain little since news of agreement would soon reach them in any case. He wanted British support in SC and wanted to be on good terms with all Iran’s neighbors. I felt he could present matter to them in such way that they would not object since he could point out importance of laying foundation for permanent good relations with USSR. He should, however, take care not to invite counter-demand by Britain for oil rights. Qavam said he agreed with my observations and would inform British on this point.

In conclusion Qavam declared that he did not take seriously Soviet walk-out from SC and believed they would eventually return to

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*Not printed.*
meeting. He expressed optimism that satisfactory settlement would be reached.

Sent Dept 424; repeatd London 86, Moscow 137.

MURRAY

501.BC/3-2946 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinus) to the Secretary of State

NEW YORK, March 29, 1946—9:15 p.m.

17. With the Soviet delegate absent for the second consecutive day, the United Nations Security Council at a public meeting Friday, adopted unanimously a U.S. proposal calling on Russia and Iran to report to the Council the existing status of negotiations between these two Governments.

As a result of this action, Secretary-General Trygve Lie was instructed by the Council Chairman Dr. Quo Tai-Chi to request the Soviet and Iranian Governments to forward this information in time for the next Council meeting on Wednesday morning, April 3, at 11 o’clock. At this time the Council will decide whether to consider immediately substance of the Iranian complaint that the presence of Soviet troops and agents in Iran poses a threat to international peace and security.

The proposal, introduced by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, was promptly endorsed by the nine other delegates present. Under its terms the Soviet Union and Iran are specifically asked to advise whether the reported withdrawal of Russian troops from Iran is conditional upon the conclusion of agreements between the two Governments on other subjects.

Byrnes’ original statement asked for the information to be forwarded in time for a meeting of the Security Council next Tuesday, April 2. Some delegates favored a longer period and Chairman Quo compromised by setting Wednesday morning, April 3, as the date for the next session.

The U.S. statement took note of the fact assurances have been given the Council by the Soviet representative that the Soviet Union has commenced to withdraw its troops from Iran; that it is the intention of the Soviet Government to proceed with the withdrawal of its troops as rapidly as possible; and that barring “unforeseen circumstances” the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the whole of Iran will be completed within 5 or 6 weeks.

The statement delivered by Byrnes continued:

“The Iranian representative has stated that the dispute with the

*March 29; for the official record of the proceedings of the Security Council on that date, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, pp. 70–82.*
Soviet Union arises from the continued presence of Soviet troops in Iran beyond the date stipulated for their withdrawal in the Tripartite Treaty of Jan. 29, 1942, and has requested the Council to recommend their prompt and unconditional withdrawal!"

It also recalled the Soviet representative’s announcement that the withdrawal was being made in accordance with an understanding with the Iranian Government has not been confirmed by the Iranian Government.

The statement also said that assurances given the Council by Gromyko had not been completely unqualified, but are subject to change in the event of “unforeseen circumstances”, and added that apparently negotiations on certain matters are still proceeding between the two governments about which the Council is not fully informed.

It pointed out that if the Council should see fit to recommend the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran, the withdrawal could not be completed in a substantially shorter period than the 5 or 6 weeks’ time limit specified by the Russian delegate.

“But the members of the Council must be solicitous to avoid any possibility of the presence of Soviet troops in Iran being used to influence or coerce the Government of Iran in negotiations with the Soviet Government. If the Council could obtain more adequate and exact information regarding the status of any negotiations between the Soviet and the Iranian Government, the Council might be able to satisfy itself that the assurances of the Soviet Government as to the prompt withdrawal of troops from Iran are in fact for all practical purposes unconditional. In that event there might be no need for the Council to go into the substantive issues, provided it reserved the right to both parties to have the case immediately taken up by the Council should there be any developments which threaten to retard the withdrawal of troops,” Byrnes’ statement said.62

62 For the full text of Mr. Byrnes’ statement, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, p. 74, or Department of State Bulletin, April 21, 1946, p. 620. Telegram 19, March 29, 10 p.m., (relayed to Tehran in Department’s 258), which furnished the text to the Department was signed by Mr. Byrnes and concluded as follows: “As I emphasized in conversation with Ambassador Aia today it is essential that the Iranian Government make clear to the Council the exact status of its conversations with the Soviet and the extent to which, if any, conditions are attached to the promised withdrawal of Soviet troops. I suggested to Aia that it might be appropriate for the PriMin to inform the Soviet Ambassador that in view of the demand by the Security Council for information it [he] could no longer refrain from making a statement regarding the pending negotiations dealing with the question of whether the withdrawal of troops was conditional upon agreements on other matters. The Premier might also express the hope to the Soviet Ambassador that the Soviet Government would inform the Council that no conditions were attached to the promised withdrawal of the troops and would make a similar statement to the PriMin so that there would be no discrepancy in the reports by the Soviet and Iranian Governments to the Council. If the Soviet Government could not do this, the PriMin might make clear he would have to inform the Council that the withdrawal of troops had been made conditional upon agreement on other subjects.

“Urgent action is necessary in view of date set for replies.” (861.24591/3–2946)
All delegates present not only endorsed Byrnes' statement, but also took occasion to thank the U. S. Secretary for presenting it.

Shortly after the meeting opened, Chairman Quo invited Hussein Ala, Iranian Ambassador, to join Council members in their discussion on procedural aspects of the Iranian issue. Ala proceeded to answer questions, three of which were asked by the Polish delegate just before the close of Wednesday's (March 26) open session.

Ala said that his Government's instructions were broad and clear and gave him discretion to act as he saw fit in behalf of Iran. He added that he had acted in accord with his instructions and had reported all he had done to his Government.

Ala said that he had no information, official or otherwise, that any Soviet troops have returned to Russia from Iran, although they may have moved within Iran. He declared that there could be no true negotiations between the two countries while Soviet troops remained in Iran and that the Iranian Prime Minister had instructed him to urge the Security Council to recommend that Russian armed forces be evacuated unconditionally.

The Iranian Ambassador pointed out that one of the reasons why the Prime Minister had asked him to act was that as head of the Iranian Government he wanted to be free of pressure from any outside Government. He also stated in reply to a question that the new Iranian Parliament could not be elected until foreign troops are withdrawn unconditionally from Iran, explaining that such a stipulation had been voted by the last Parliament before it went out of office.

In regard to Gromyko's assertion that only details of a Soviet-Iranian agreement remained unsettled, Ala said that at best such was a misunderstanding. No agreement has been concluded and the indefinite character of the Soviet assurances increases tension in Iran, Ala declared, in urging immediate Security Council consideration of the Iranian complaint.

[STETTIUS]

S/61.24501/3-3046: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, March 30, 1946—8 a.m.
US URGENT

[Received 8:10 p.m.]

426. For the Secretary. Last evening I delivered to Qavam message contained urtel 248, March 28. I urged upon him that our Govt and Security Council were trying to help him and that his best course was to be entirely open and honest and establish completely clean record for Iran.

Qavam agreed and assured me he would send instructions to Ala last night. However, he pointed out that it was vitally important
to avoid breach with Soviets and he feared Soviet Ambassador here might break off conversations if Ala took initiative in informing SC of current Irano-Soviet negotiations. He thought it would be far better if this information were elicited from Ala by questions from Council members. I concurred. PriMin therefore said that his instructions to Ala would authorize him to divulge negotiations only in response to questions which might be put to him.

He was also reluctant to have revealed all details as to terms of proposed agreements. I said that so long as agreements remained in present stage of negotiation I thought it would be unnecessary for Ala to do more than state subjects under discussion and explain that exact terms had not yet been settled because talks were still continuing and no final understanding had been reached. However as soon as agreements should be signed I felt Ala might as well inform SC of full details especially since they would certainly become known sooner or later. Again Qavam agreed and said he would instruct Ambassador accordingly.

[Here follows final paragraph of telegram, which concerns the Prime Minister's conversations with the British Chargé.]

MURRAY

861.24591/3-3046 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN, March 30, 1946—noon. [Received March 31—10 p.m.]

483. Except for Azerbaijan Soviet evacuation is reported well under way or about to get under way from northern areas previously occupied. Karaj has been completely evacuated and Qazvin is almost clear. Reports have been received of evacuation of Firuzkuh, Shahi and Babol. Transports have been observed in Pahlavi harbor and heavy troop movements in direction of Pahlavi from Qazvin.

Sent Dept 483, repeated Moscow 139, London 88.

MURRAY

861.24591/4-146 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, April 1, 1946—4 p.m. [Received April 1—3 p.m.]

485. Qavam told me this morning he has still not arrived at any agreement with Russians.

63 Telegram 104, March 30, from Tabriz, reported ostentatious Soviet troop movement indicating evacuation was starting that morning (861.24591/3-3046).
He has received and answered message from Ala conveying Trygve Lie's request for information on Irano-Soviet conversations. I understood his reply to Ala gave latter summary of talks substantially as I have previously reported them.

PriMin said that Soviet Ambassador had made oral reply to his notes on oil and Azerbaijan. On latter points Soviets agreed to conditions Qavam had laid down (mytel 411, March 27) and said they would use their moral influence to bring about settlement on that basis. Qavam indicated to me he is no longer worried on this score.

With respect oil, however, Sadchikov said Moscow made following counterproposals:

1. Since Iran proposed to furnish no capital other than value of land, USSR could not accept equal participation of two countries and must insist on 51% Russian holdings.
2. Western Azerbaijan must not be excluded.
3. Instead of requiring Majlis approval within 3 months of its reassembly, agreement must call for Majlis approval within 6 months after March 24 (date of commencement of Red Army evacuation of Iran).

Moscow accepted stipulation that security in connection oil exploitation should be furnished solely by Iranian forces.

On March 31 Qavam sent emissary to Sadchikov to say that he could not recede from his demand that Irano-Soviet participation must be on equal basis. (He would, however, consent to some sort of subsidiary arrangement whereby USSR would in fact receive 51% of profits.) Further he could not include western Azerbaijan except for small piece of territory contiguous to USSR and not contiguous to Turkey or Iraq. PriMin told me he had sent message that if Russians were not satisfied with these terms, "they could do whatever they pleased".

PriMin said he had received report this morning that Soviets had established new military post east of Qazvin which he feared might be intended as intimidation following his rejection of counterproposals on oil.

Qavam asked me what attitude I thought Security Council would take toward his negotiations. I replied that I thought he had done wisely to give Ala facts and that so long as he (Qavam) was negotiating freely, not under duress, I believed Security Council would recognize his right to make agreement with USSR.

He also asked my views as to possible British reaction, to which I made substantially same reply.

(In this connection I realize that in broad picture mere presence Soviet troops in Iran constitutes form of duress. However, it may also be argued with some force that course of Qavam's negotiations to
date in Moscow and Tehran demonstrates pressure on him is not overwhelming and that agreements which may be reached will have been result of give-and-take discussion by both sides.)

Qavam seemed worried by fact he is in position of revealing subjects of Russian communications to him which Soviets had marked "Secret". He feared this would antagonize them. I tried to reassure him by pointing out these matters must necessarily come out eventually.

Sent Dept, repeated Moscow 140, London 89.

MURRAY

861.24591/4–246: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

NIACT

TEHRAN, April 2, 1946—1 p. m. [Received April 3–6:45 a. m.]

439. For the Secretary. Most unfortunately I did not receive until late last night urtel 19, March 29 from New York relayed in Deptel 258, March 29. (For reasons for delay see mytel 440, April 2.)

I saw Qavam at 10 this morning and read him your statement in Security Council March 29 together with account of your remarks to Ala as to procedure Iran Govt should follow to induce Soviet Govt to disavow any conditions which might be attached to withdrawal Red Army troops from Iran. Prime Minister had received nothing from Ala this subject.

Qavam said he greatly regretted delay in receipt your message since he would have been glad to adopt course you suggested. He was at first reluctant to take any action now for two reasons:

1. Because he felt it too late to have any influence on Security Council proceedings and

2. Because he feared his request to Soviet Ambassador for concerted Irano-Soviet statement would be met by counterproposal that Soviet Govt would agree only if Iran Govt accepted Russian terms on oil deal.

I urged on him that it might not be too late and that in any case it would always be to his advantage to get Soviet acquiescence in unconditional withdrawal of troops regardless of Security Council proceedings. I reminded him that he himself had from first endeavored persuade Soviet Ambassador to eliminate qualifying phrase "unless something unforeseen happens." With respect possible Russian counterproposal I remarked Russian bargaining position might

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61 See footnote 62, p. 397.
62 Not printed; the reasons given for the delay were the methods of transmittal and coding by the Department (124.916/4–246).
be weaker than he assumed. Soviet Govt was in very embarrassing position before Security Council and might be glad to give assurances suggested in order to avoid discussion of substantive issues.

Prime Minister ultimately agreed with viewpoint I presented and said he would speak to Sadchikov tomorrow morning along lines you suggested to Ala.

Murray

861.24591/4-346 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

Tehran, April 3, 1946—6 p. m.
US URGENT

[Received April 3—12:54 p. m.]

456. For the Secretary. In press conference today Prince Firuz revealed Ala would inform Security Council that Soviet note of March 24 regarding withdrawal of Soviet troops did not contain any qualifications. This is correct according to information Qavam has recently given me and I do not want you to be misled by statement in first paragraph mytel 395 March 25 to effect that note said Iran would be evacuated “if nothing further happened”. This qualification was not contained in any note and was merely communicated orally to Qavam by Soviet Ambassador when latter called at 10 p. m. March 25, 3 hours after he delivered note.

Murray

501.BC/4-346 : Telegram

The United States Representative to the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

New York, April 3, 1946—9:20 p.m.

29. The Security Council met Wednesday morning, April 3, at 11:13 a.m. to consider replies from the Governments of the Soviet Union and Iran on the “existing status” of bilateral negotiations between those two countries. Ambassador Andrei Gromyko, Soviet delegate, was not present.

Council Chairman Dr. Quo Tai-chi invited Hussein Ala, Iranian Ambassador, to sit at the Council table. Dr. Quo read letters from Secretary-General Trygve Lie, advising that he (Lie) had requested the Soviet Union and Iranian representatives to have their Governments submit reports on the status of their negotiations. The Chair-

man also read a letter from the Prime Minister of Iran, stating that Ala has been and continues to be fully accredited and qualified to represent Iran before the Council.

The Soviet reply to the Council’s request for information said that negotiations had led to an understanding regarding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran and that other questions were not connected with the withdrawal. The Soviet report did not mention “unforeseen circumstances”, a proviso included by Gromyko in earlier statements to the Council.

The Iranian answer said that the negotiations had not achieved “positive results” and Soviet agents, officials and armed forces continue to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran. It pointed out that on March 24—the day before present session of the Council opened—the Soviet Ambassador to Iran informed the Iranian Prime Minister that the promise to evacuate Russian troops from Iran within a period of 5 or 6 weeks was on the condition that no unforeseen circumstances should occur. Three days later, in another conversation with the Iranian Prime Minister, the same Soviet representative said that there would be no further cause for anxiety and no unforeseen circumstances would take place if agreement could be reached on the questions of oil concessions and a form of autonomous government for the Province of Azerbaidjan, the Iranian report added.

After the replies had been read, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes said that he did not care to discuss them until he had an opportunity to study them. He then asked Ala whether in the light of the replies he had any suggestion to make as to what action should be taken by the Council.

Ala answered that Iran would be willing not to press further at this time for consideration of the matter, provided the Soviet representative would be willing to remove the condition of “unforeseen circumstances” relating to the withdrawal of troops and give the Council assurance that the troops would be evacuated unconditionally not later than May 6, and provided that these matters remain on the agenda of the Council for consideration at any time.

Chairman Quo adjourned the meeting at 11:45 a.m. until 11:00 a.m. Thursday, April 4, with the observation that replies had been

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67 The reply by Ambassador Gromyko was dated April 3. It also stated that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran had been renewed on March 24 and would be completed within one-and-a-half months. For text of the reply, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, p. 34.
68 By Ambassador Ala, dated April 2; for text, see ibid., p. 85.
69 For text of Ambassador Ala’s statements, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, p. 87.
received too late to enable the Secretariat to make copies for the delegates.

Wednesday afternoon Security Council delegates met informally at a closed session to discuss latest developments in the Iranian question.\textsuperscript{70}

The Security Council's committee of experts Wednesday afternoon, April 3, reached agreement on the redrafting of eighteen provisional rules of procedure.

\[\text{[STETTINIUS]}\]

\textit{The Vice Consul at Tabriz (Rossow) to the Secretary of State}

\textbf{SECRET}

\textit{Tabriz, April 4, 1946—9 a.m.}  
\[\text{[Received April 5—9:48 a.m.]}\]

118. There has been no major Soviet troop movement in or out of Tabriz since that reported mytel 105, March 31.\textsuperscript{71} Only rear echelon activities observed here.

Attention is directed to large volume of troops and material that passed through Tabriz during March. These are deployed somewhere in this province believed mainly in area south of Lake Urmia. If Soviets do begin to evacuate, we here in Tabriz will very well know it. Furthermore if Soviets intend to evacuate by May 6, which I do not believe, they will have to start very soon for it took 4 weeks to bring these troops and materials in and it will presumably take as long to move them out.

I strongly urge the following:

(1) That Department and Embassy remove all prohibitions against my travel in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. I do not believe there is undue danger involved in such travel and there is now an officer to leave in charge here in my absence.

(2) That I be authorized to insist upon being given a Soviet pass to go wherever I choose in my consular district. When Soviets refused to give me pass for Mahabad (mytel 42, March 7) Soviet Consul General's subsequent absurd explanation was that he did not know whether Mahabad was in his consular district. Since for other reasons I was not able to make trip at the time anyway, I was not in position to press matter.

(3) That my insistence on passes be accompanied by general attack on Soviet pass requirement. There is not now the slightest shred of

\textsuperscript{70} A memorandum on the Second Executive Meeting of the Security Council, held at 3 p.m., April 3, 1946, not printed; it was prepared by the United States Delegation at the United Nations on April 8 and was given control number US/8/5 (filed under 761.91/4-846).

\textsuperscript{71} Not printed; it reported movement out of Tabriz of a large column of Soviet trucks carrying troops and a few trucks moving artillery (861.24591/3-3146).
justification legal or otherwise for requiring passes for travel here and requirement is a flagrant interference in conduct of American Government affairs. Please instruct urgently.  


Rossow

861.24591/4-446: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET  

TEHRAN, April 4, 1944—3 p. m.  

US URGENT  

[Received 4:22 p. m.]

460. At 10:30 this morning Qavam informed us that he has reached virtual agreement with Soviet Ambassador on all points under discussion and that draft notes to be exchanged on withdrawal of troops, oil, and Azerbaijan are in process of preparation. (Communications on Azerbaijan will be merely unsigned memoranda since Prime Minister prefers keep this question on informal basis to avoid pretext for Soviet intervention.)

Qavam saw Sadchikov late last night and they prepared together text of communiqué to be issued as soon as Moscow approval obtained. Sadchikov promised to get approval by telephone, and Prime Minister thinks statement may be made public today. Substance of draft which we saw is:

1. Negotiations begun in Moscow have been continued Tehran and full agreement reached.

71a In telegram 114, April 5, Mr. Rossow reported a serious deterioration in the security situation in Tabriz during the past week as evidenced by the relaxation of party discipline and the arming of irresponsible elements who made no secret of their hatred of Americans and British (391.1115/4-546). The Department informed him in telegram 13, April 5, that “while we agree fully that you should be free to travel about your district and are entitled to receive Soviet pass without delay, it is our feeling that, due to delicate situation in Tabriz described in urtel 114 Mar 4 [April 5] you should not travel extensively and should not press Russians at this moment for travel permit” (861.24591/4-546). The following day Ambassador Murray directed Mr. Rossow to impress on Mr. Pishevari the extreme importance of safeguarding the lives and property of foreigners at all times (telegram 64, repeated to the Department as No. 476, 891.00/4-646).

On April 7, in telegram 116, Mr. Rossow reported the views of the “Deputy Prime Minister” of Azerbaijan that while his government did not consider itself sovereign and independent, it did not recognize the Central Government as representative of the will of the people and did not recognize any of its laws and treaties if they were in opposition to that will (391.1112/4-746).

72 The communiqué was signed by the Iranian Prime Minister and the Soviet Ambassador at 4 a.m., April 5. Written notes were exchanged the same day; texts of the exchanges dealing with the evacuation of Soviet troops and the oil accord were transmitted in telegram 485, April 9, p. 413.
2. Soviet troops will be entirely withdrawn from Iran in 5 or 6 weeks. No conditions are attached to this withdrawal.
3. An agreement for joint Irano-Soviet Oil Company will be submitted to Majlis within 7 months.
4. Azerbaijan is purely internal Iranian problem and will be settled by Iran Govt direct with inhabitants of province.  

Prime Minister said that on receipt of Moscow agreement to foregoing communiqué he would instruct Ala to inform Security Council that this was in fact position of affairs and that matter could be considered settled. We suggested it would be well to make clear that question would not be considered finally settled until all Soviet troops had in fact been withdrawn. Qavam assented and said he would incorporate such statement in his telegram to Ala.

Major terms of oil deal as agreed upon in principle are:

(1) Term of company to be 50 years.
(2) During first 25 years control to be 51% Soviet and 49% Iranian. During second 25 years control to be on basis of equality for both Govts.
(3) Territory to be covered by company’s operations is Gilan, Mazandaran, Gorgan, Northern Khorassan and that part of Azerbaijan east of line drawn southeast from junction of Irano-Soviet-Turkish frontiers along eastern side Lake Rezaieh to Miandoab (this excludes all territory directly contiguous to Turkish and Iraqi frontiers).
(4) All security forces in connection company operations to be Iranian.

Azerbaijan understanding remains as stated mythels 429 [4247], March 29 and 435, April 1.

Qavam seemed exceptionally cheerful and evidently considered solution arrived at as satisfactory, although he admitted he had had to give way on question of percentages of participation in oil company.

He said he had been much disturbed by Ala’s statements in SC yesterday, since Ambassador had gone beyond his instructions. One specific point he mentioned this connection was Ala assertion Soviets had said evacuation would be carried out without condition “if satisfactory agreements were reached on other points”. He said he had never even told Ala about this. We gathered his instructions to Ala had been to make only general statement that negotiations were being

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73 According to telegram 489, April 8, 10 a. m., from Tehran, the Iranian Prime Minister on April 7 informed an officer of the American Embassy that he contemplated inviting an Azerbaijani commission to enter negotiations with an Iranian commission. He also stated that the interpretation of the communiqué by press correspondents and others to mean that Iranian security forces would not be sent into Azerbaijan after Soviet withdrawal was incorrect and that gendarmes and army forces would be sent into the province in due course. (861.24591/4-846)
carried on, that conditions were not attached to troop withdrawal, and
that exact subjects and character of agreements could not be an-
nounced until they had been concluded.

It was after learning of Ala’s declaration that Qavam sent for Sad-
chikov last night and proposed issuance of communiqué. He said
Sadicchikov was highly annoyed by Ala remarks, since on previous day
he and Qavam had mutually agreed that both Iranian and Soviet rep-
resentatives would formally assure SC troop withdrawal was uncondi-
tional (Deptel 258, March 29 and mytel 439, April 2) and would
so make unnecessary any discussion of substantive questions. Soviet
Ambassador complained Qavam said one thing here and another
thing through his representative New York. However Prime Minis-
ter had told him that was water over dam and had persuaded him to
agree to communiqué in order remedy matters.

Sent Dept 460, repeated Moscow 147, London 95.

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501.BC/4-446: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
to the Secretary of State

NEW YORK, April 4, 1946—6:45 p. m.

35. The Security Council, at a 95-minute meeting on Thursday,
April 4, agreed on a solution to the Iranian question. The vote was
9-0 with Australia abstaining.

With the Soviet delegate still absent, the session was called to order
at 11:10 a. m. by the Chairman, Dr. Quo Tai-Chi. The agenda was
adopted without comment. Hussein Ala, Iranian Ambassador, was
invited to take a seat at the Council table.

U. S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes submitted a resolution, which deferred action on the Iranian issue until May 6, 1946, under
the following conditions:

1. That the Council note the statements of the Iranian representa-
tive that the appeal to the Council arises from the presence of Soviet
troops in Iran and their continued presence there beyond the date
stipulated for their withdrawal in the Tripartite Treaty of Janu-
ary 29, 1942.

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⁵⁴ See footnote 62, p. 397.
⁵⁵ For the official record of the proceedings of the Security Council on April 4,
see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, pp. 88-90.
⁵⁶ For text of the draft resolution offered by Mr. Byrnes, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser.,
No. 2, p. 88.
2. That the Council note the responses on April 3, 1946, of the Soviet and Iranian Governments, pursuant to the Secretary General’s request for information as to the status of negotiations between the two Governments, and as to whether the withdrawal of Soviet troops was conditioned upon agreement on other subjects.

3. That the Council, in particular, note and rely upon the assurances of the Soviet Government that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran has already commenced and that Russia expects that the complete evacuation of its troops from the whole of Iran will be accomplished within 5 or 6 weeks.

4. That the Council note that the proposals under negotiation between the Iranian and Soviet Governments are not connected with the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

5. That the Council is solicitous to avoid any possibility of the presence of Soviet troops in Iran being used to influence the course of negotiations between the two Governments.

6. That the Council recognizes that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the whole of Iran cannot be completed in a substantially shorter period of time than that within which the Soviet Government has declared it to be its intention to complete such withdrawal.

The resolution also provides that the Soviet and Iranian Governments shall report to the Council on May 6 whether or not the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the whole of Iran has been completed, and that the Council will then decide what, if any, further proceedings on the Iranian appeal are required.

The resolution left the way open for the Council to consider at any time, as the first item on its agenda, reports from any member of the Security Council on developments which may retard or threaten to retard the prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran.

In support of his proposal Byrnes said that it spoke for itself, but pointed out that it rested upon his earlier suggestion that the Soviet and Iranian Governments should be communicated with through their representatives. He added that he had stated then that if the Council were able to ascertain adequate and exact information as to the status of the negotiations, the Council might be able to satisfy itself that the assurances of the Soviet Government as to the prompt withdrawal of troops from Iran were in fact, for all practical purposes, unconditional.

Egypt, Brazil, the United Kingdom, Poland, Mexico and France, in the order named, voiced support for the proposal and praised the course followed by the U.S. Secretary, before Australia announced that it would refrain from voting on the resolution.

The Australian delegate took exception to the procedure followed by the Council and to what he termed an incomplete investigation of the facts in the Iranian question. He said that the case posed a chal-

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57 The Iranian response was dated April 2, 1946.
lenge to the Council and that, in his opinion, the Council did not face the challenge. In stating that he would refrain from voting, the Australian delegate said that he was reserving the right to call for an investigation of all facts on May 6.

The Netherlands delegate endorsed the resolution, paid tribute to Secretary Byrnes and disagreed with the Australian delegate, stating that he did not believe the Council shirked its duties under the charter.

Chairman Quo, speaking for China, also endorsed the resolution and paid tribute to Secretary Byrnes for his valuable contribution to the Council.

On a show of hands vote only Australia abstained from supporting the resolution.

Chairman Quo then called on the Iranian representative. Ala said that the fundamental problem was to have all foreign troops removed from Iran. He added that the people of Iran were willing to accept the Soviet pledge, as the Security Council had, that its troops would be withdrawn unconditionally by May 6. Once this is accomplished, Ala said that he believed the Iranian Government will be able to negotiate with the Soviet Union on other questions.

Ala praised the Council for its firmness and courage. He said that the Council action already had instilled a feeling of confidence among the smaller nations, and concluded that the results achieved have significance of permanent value and that Iran has received something from the Council which it could not have obtained alone.

Secretary Byrnes expressed appreciation for the adoption of his resolution and said that he was happy to hear the Iranian representative agree to the solution. He added that the withdrawal of troops from Iran without condition was the only sane method to follow. The U.S. Secretary concluded by expressing the opinion that the United Nations today was truly a center for harmonizing international differences.

[Here follow discussions of matters other than the Iranian question.]

[STETTINIUS]

[The Ambassador in the Soviet Union, Walter Bedell Smith, interviewed Generalissimo Stalin on April 4. The question of Iran was one of the matters discussed; for Ambassador Smith's report on the interview, see telegram 1053, April 5, 6 p. m., from Moscow, volume VI, page 732.]
501.4-848: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

PRIORITY

New York, April 8, 1946—6 p. m.
[Received 8:20 p. m.]

41. For Byrnes from Stettinius. Official text (Doc. S/30) of a letter dated April 6th from Ambassador Gromyko to the Security Council President has just been received. It follows:

Mr. President: On 26 March, when the Security Council proceeded to consider the Iranian Government's statement of 18 March regarding the delay in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran, I proposed, under instructions from the Soviet Government, that this question should not be considered by the Security Council.

I pointed out on that occasion that, under the understanding with the Iranian Government, full evacuation of the Soviet troops from Iran was started on 24 March and would be completed in 5 or 6 weeks and that in consequence the Security Council had no reason to consider the Iranian question.

The Security Council, however, did not agree with the Soviet Government and retained the Iranian question on the agenda. In the meantime the Soviet-Iranian negotiations continued and, as is known from the joint Soviet-Iranian communiqué published on 4 April, an understanding on all points was reached between the Soviet and the Iranian Governments.

This has fully confirmed the accuracy of the Soviet Government's statement of 26 March and the absence of any reason for bringing the Iranian question before the Security Council for consideration.

The Soviet Government, moreover, cannot ignore the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 4 April. Under this resolution the Security Council decided to continue the consideration of the Iranian question on 6 May despite the fact that on 3 April the Soviet Government stated that the question of the evacuation of Soviet troops had been settled by an understanding reached between the Soviet and the Iranian Governments. Such a resolution of the Security Council might have been well-founded if the position in Iran had threatened international peace and security, as provided in article 34 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Under the Charter, the Security Council may investigate any dispute or any situation which might endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. It is, however, quite obvious that in fact such a position did not and does not now exist in Iran, so that the Security Council had no reason to give further consideration to the Iranian question on 6 May.

Accordingly, the above-mentioned resolution of the Security Council of 4 April is incorrect and illegal, being in conflict with the Charter of the United Nations.
For the above-mentioned reasons the Soviet Government insists that the Iranian question should be removed from the agenda of the Security Council.

I have the honour, etc.,

Signed. Andrei A. Gromyko
Ambassador

His Excellency,
Dr. Quo Tai-Chi,
President of the Security Council.

STETTINIUS

501 BC/4-846: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 8, 1946—7 p.m.

URGENT

11. For Stettinius. You should not oppose the placing of Gromyko’s letter on agenda, or its being considered as the first item, if he so moves. If a motion to delete the Iranian question from the Council’s jurisdiction is made you should strongly oppose along the following lines:

There seems to be no occasion for the Council on the basis of the letter of the Soviet representative to rescind at this time the resolution that it adopted on April 4 deferring further proceedings on the Iranian case until May 6.

The United States is pleased to learn that the Soviet Government is satisfied (1) that an agreement has been reached between the Soviet and Iranian Governments on all questions and (2) that the Security Council will find no reason for further discussion of the Iranian question on May 6. The United States sincerely hopes that the difficulties between the two governments have been satisfactorily adjusted on the basis of freely negotiated agreements and that on May 6 upon being informed that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran has been completed the Council will be able to drop the case from its agenda.

Twice however the difficulties between the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government have been brought to the Council’s attention by the Government of Iran. On the first occasion the Iranian Government complained of activities of the Soviet troops on Iranian territory which it contended were not authorized or permitted by the Tripartite Treaty of January 29, 1942 and interfered with the sovereignty of Iran. On the second occasion the Iranian Government complained of the continued presence of the Soviet troops in Iran.
without its approval beyond the date stipulated for their withdrawal in that Treaty.

In the view of the United States the complaints of the Iranian Government were properly brought to the Council's attention under Article 34 of the Charter. It is the clear duty of the Council to consider the complaint of any sovereign state that foreign troops are being used in its territory to interfere with its sovereignty in a manner not authorized or permitted by treaty. It is the clear duty of the Council to consider the complaint of any sovereign state that foreign troops are continuing to remain on its territory without its consent beyond the date authorized by treaty. Such complaints present grave issues under Article 2, section 4 of the Charter, as to "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the Charter." When such complaints are presented to the Council, clearly it is not permissible for the Council to take the position that the continuation of the conditions complained about would not endanger international peace and security.

On the basis of the Soviet assurances that withdrawal of Soviet troops had commenced and that the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the whole of Iran would be completed within 5 or 6 weeks, the Iranian representative stated that his Government would be willing to have further proceedings deferred until May 6, provided that the Iranian appeal remained on the agenda. The Iranian representative did not state that Soviet troops had remained in Iran after March 2 with the approval of the Iranian Government. The Soviet assurances as to the prompt withdrawal of their troops from Iran and the willingness of the Iranian government to accept those assurances made it possible for the Council to proceed on the basis that the conditions which the Iranian Government had complained about would not be allowed to continue. Those assurances, however, did not establish that the conditions complained of did not exist. The Council must satisfy itself that the Soviet troops in Iran which gave rise to the conditions complained of have been withdrawn.

If nothing occurs to interrupt the withdrawal of Soviet troops and their withdrawal is completed by May 6, there will be no need for the Council to go into the substantive issues involved, and on May 6 the Iranian appeal may be dropped from the agenda. But nothing has been submitted to the Council which would justify the Council in reopening the case to take affirmative action to drop the Iranian appeal from the agenda on the request of the Soviet Government before the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran has in fact been completed.\footnote{The above statement was not made, being set aside in favor of the one proposed in Department's telegram 20, April 13, p. 420.}
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 8, 1946—7 p.m.

US URGENT MOST IMMEDIATE

281. We greatly regret that Emb has approached PriMin with regard to negotiations on behalf American oil companies.79 As stated in Deptl 298, Mar 24 we are anxious that impression should not be obtained that we have been influenced in our recent actions before Security Council by selfish interest in Iranian petroleum. In that telegram we stated that any interest which Americans might have in Baluchistian fields should not be discussed “in connection with withdrawal of Soviet troops and related problems”.

We do not wish any discussions with regard to possibility of Americans obtaining oil rights in Iran carried on by representatives this Govt or American oil companies at least until Soviet troops have evacuated Iran or until law prohibiting such negotiations is no longer effective. In no event should such discussions take place until Dept has stated that it has no objection and until arrangements have been made which would give interested American companies an equal opportunity.

Please make our position clear to representatives in Iran of interested American oil companies stressing they should make no approach on subject to the Iranian Govt until clearance has been given by Emb. We have informed interested oil companies in US in this sense.

In view of conversation reported in your telegram under reference you should again inform PriMin of our attitude in this regard.80

BYRNES

861.24591/4-946: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, April 9, 1946.

[Received April 9—10: 50 p.m.]

488. Following translated texts of notes dated April 4 exchanged

79 In telegram 481, April 8, 11 a.m., from Tehran, (received April 8, 11: 26 a.m.), the Ambassador had reported: “Jernegan [Second Secretary of Embassy] called on PriMin yesterday to ask whether he would now be willing to receive negotiators on behalf American oil companies. Qavam asked how soon they might be expected and was told it seemed unlikely any could reach Tehran in less than month. He thereupon said he would be perfectly willing to receive them. Asked whether this would embarrass him in his relations with Soviets, Qavam replied that so long as American interest was confined to Baluchistan he would anticipate no trouble in that respect.” (891.6363/4-846)

80 In telegram 500, April 10, 4 p.m., Tehran reported: “Jernegan saw Qavam this morning and explained that our prior inquiry regarding possibility of American oil negotiations had been purely for background information and that American Govt did not desire early opening of such negotiations. PriMin said he understood and recalled that we had already made clear our position this regard. He remarked that there was plenty of time.” (891.6363/4-1048)
between Prime Minister Qavam and Soviet Ambassador Sadchikov. Texts were published here April 8.

a. From Sadchikov to Qavam: “I hereby have the honor to inform Your Excellency that according to instructions received the Soviet Army Command in Iran has taken all preliminary steps for the complete evacuation of Iranian territory by all Soviet Army units within a period of one-and-one-half months as from March 24, 1946.”

b. From Qavam to Sadchikov: “I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that I have taken note of the purport of Your Excellency’s note stating that as a result of instructions received by the Soviet Army Command all preliminary steps for the complete evacuation of Iranian territory by all Soviet Army units within a period of one-and-one-half months starting from March 24, 1946, have been carried out.”

c. From Qavam to Sadchikov: “Following the conversations which have taken place between us I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Imperial Government of Iran agrees that the Iranian and Soviet Governments should establish a joint Irano-Soviet Company to explore and exploit oil producing territories in northern Iran under the following fundamental conditions:

1. During the first 25 years of the company’s operations 49% of the shares will be held by Iran and 51% of the shares will be held by the USSR, and during the second 25 years 50% of the shares will be held by Iran and 50% will be held by the USSR.

2. Profits accruing to the company will be divided in proportion to the shares of each party.

3. The boundaries of the lands originally allotted for exploration are those (shown) on the map which Your Excellency left with me during our conversation on March 24 with the exception of the part of western Azerbaijan situated on the western side of a line commencing at the point of intersection of the boundaries of Iran, Turkey and the USSR, crossing the eastern shore of Lake Rezaieh, and reaching the city of Miandoab, as additionally indicated on the said map on April 4, 1946. Meanwhile the Iranian Government undertakes not to grant a concession in the territory situated west of the said line to foreign companies or to Iranian companies with foreign participation or employing foreign capital.

4. On the Iranian side the capital will consist of the oil bearing lands mentioned in Article III which after technical operations shall contain oil wells the produce of which may be useful for the company and on the Soviet side the capital will consist of any kind of expenditures involved, instruments, equipment, and the salaries of the experts and laborers who may be needed for the extraction and refining of oil.

5. The period of operation of the company is 50 years.

6. After the expiration of the period of the company’s operation the Iranian Government shall have the right to purchase the shares belonging to the USSR and/or to prolong the period of operation of the company.

7. The protection of the lands subject to exploration, the oil wells and all installations of the company will be carried out exclusively by Iranian security forces.

The agreement to be concluded later for the establishment of the said joint Irano-Soviet oil company according to the text of this note will be presented for ratification by the new Iranian Majlis as soon
as it has been elected and has begun its legislative activity in any case not later than 7 months after March 24 of the current year."

d. From Sadchikov to Qavam: Note identical, mutatis mutandis, with note quoted immediately above.

Sent Department as 485, repeated Moscow 152, Tabriz 68, London 100, Cairo 199.

MURRAY

501.BC/4–946 : Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, April 9, 1946—7:30 p.m.

URGENT

[Received 7:36 p.m.]

49. For Byrnes and Acheson from Stettinius. Following is an unofficial text of a letter from the Iranian Ambassador reportedly submitted to the United States representative in April 9. Official text will be sent as soon as available, but had not been submitted to the International Secretariat by 6:30 p.m., April 9.

"Sir: Permit me to thank you for your note of April 8, 1946 forwarding for my Government a copy of Mr. Gromyko's letter of April 6 requesting that the question brought to the attention of the Security Council by Iran be removed from the agenda.

I am instructed to state that the position of the Iranian Government remains the same as stated to the Security Council in the meeting of April 4, 1946. It is the desire of my government that the matter referred by Iran to the Security Council remain on its agenda as provided by the resolution adopted on April 4, 1946.

Hussein Ala."

STETTINIUS

861.24591/4–1046 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, April 10, 1946—2 p.m.

US URGENT

[Received 2:17 p.m.]

498. Prime Minister said today that Ala's action on asking that Iranian question be retained on Security Council agenda was taken on basis earlier instructions. Qavam has sent no new instructions to Ala and at moment has no intention of doing so.

He would prefer to have matter remain on agenda but fears Soviets may soon demand that he join in their request for its withdrawal. (They have not yet approached him.) If they do, he proposes first to say that he can see no harm in letting question remain in present

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For the official text, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., supp. 2, p. 47.
status before Security Council, but if Russians insist he feels he will be obliged to inform Council at least that Iran would not object to its elimination from agenda. He suggested Iran Govt might include in such communication an expression of hope that it would not prove necessary again to request Council action.

In this connection Prime Minister asked whether, if subject should be removed from agenda at this time, Iran could not return to Security Council at any time should circumstances require. Jernegan replied that he believed this was correct, since Council is supposed to be in continuous session. Qavam seemed to be debating with himself as to how far he could trust Russians. At one point he asked whether we believed Soviets could fail to carry out evacuation in view of public commitments they have made.

Murray

861.24891/4-1046 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

TOP SECRET US URGENT MOST IMMEDIATE

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1946—7 p.m.

295. Reurtel 498 Apr 10. With reference to Qavam’s question whether Iran could return to Security Council at any time should subject be removed from agenda, please inform him immediately that while it is true that Council is intended to be in continuous session, actual experience in Iranian case up to present will demonstrate how difficult it may be in practice for Iran to obtain a prompt hearing. You should remind him Iran’s request to be heard at Council table 2 weeks ago was granted only after the most strenuous efforts on part of US and other members of Council.

You should add that if Iran should ask for the withdrawal of the case after it had insisted so strongly that it be kept on the agenda until May 6 impression might well be created that Iran had not been entirely frank with the Council. It might appear that Iran had been using Council merely to bargain for better terms rather than to obtain assistance in upholding principles. There is a danger that Iran consequently would run the risk of losing much of the world sympathy and support which it presently enjoys. Members of Council would be likely to receive without enthusiasm an Iranian request for restoring the case to the agenda and no assurance could be given that such a request would receive majority approval.

For your info I am leaving for France on Apr 22 82 and probably will not be back in Washington until after May 6.

Byrnes

82 To participate in the Second Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held at Paris from April 25 to May 16, 1946.
Tehran, April 11, 1946—10 p. m.

[Received April 12—5:19 a. m.]

510. At 7 tonight Jernegan saw Qavam and delivered carefully and fully substance of message contained your telegram 295, April 10.

Prime Minister who appeared dejected, said that he had seen Soviet Ambassador less than half an hour previously. Sadchikov had told him that Iranian insistence on continuance of case before Security Council was insult to USSR and would not be tolerated. After signature of agreements of April 4 there was no reason for keeping matter before SC. Iranian attitude indicated lack of confidence in Soviet word and would strain relations between two Governments.

Qavam had argued that present status of question before SC did no harm but eventually, under insistent pressure by Sadchikov, he had promised to telegraph Ala to withdraw case from Council.

Jernegan urged that he reverse that decision, pointing out danger that he would lose UNO support and find himself facing Soviets alone. In negotiations so far Iran had been able make reasonably satisfactory arrangements with USSR only because of SC support. Without that bulwark she would be entirely in hands of Russians. Jernegan added that Soviet action in bringing pressure to have case withdrawn was itself highly suspicious. It would seem better for Qavam to continue to pin his faith in SC despite Russian threats, especially in view of fact he had successfully defied previous threats when he first appealed to Council.

Prime Minister admitted force these arguments but insisted he could not refuse Soviet demand that he change Ala’s instructions. He remarked that when dealing with lion you must cajole it and feed it, not attempt to match your claws against his. He felt position was extremely difficult. If he antagonized Soviets now he might lose all he had gained. Among other things Russians might break off economic negotiations at present in progress and also make impossible his contemplated negotiations with Azerbaijan.

At end of hour of discussion he made following request: That Embassy should report circumstances to you, explaining dilemma in which he found himself, and ask if United States could not so arrange matters in SC that favorable attitude toward Iran could be maintained even if she acquiesced in withdrawal of case now. Being in full position [possession?] of facts, he hoped you would understand and be prepared again to come to Iran’s aid if necessary. Meanwhile, he would withhold despatch of new instructions to Ala until we had had reply from you, putting Sadchikov off with some excuse or other. When Jernegan suggested that US delegation to SC might continue
to be sympathetic but could not guarantee attitude of other members, Qavam said he thought US and Britain between them should be able manage it.

Jernegan expressed regret that Prime Minister found himself unable definitely to refuse Soviet demand and promised to convey his request to you immediately.

Request urgent reply.

[Murray]

501.BC/4-1246: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, April 12, 1946—1:10 p. m.  
[Received 2:08 p. m.]

69. To Secretary of State from Stettinius. Hussein Ala, Iranian Ambassador, called upon me at my apartment this morning at 11:15 at his request.

He commenced the interview by saying that he was not feeling at all well, that the strain of recent events was beginning to show on his nerves. He then stated that he thought it would be very helpful for him to have a frank exchange of views with me this morning relative to the Iranian situation, with particular emphasis upon the procedure to be followed at Monday's 63 meeting.

Ala stated that prior to Gromyko submitting his letter to Lie requesting the Iranian matter be taken off the agenda that he had exchanged messages with Qavam in which it was agreed that it was vitally important that the matter be continued on the agenda until May 6. After Gromyko's letter to Lie was received, Ala communicated with Qavam stating that based upon the understanding that he had had several days previous, he had submitted his letter to Lie stating that Iran was desirous that the matter be continued. Ala said that inasmuch as he did not receive disapproval of this action he has assumed it was in accordance with Qavam's desires.

Ala then referred to the fact that after the press releases from Tehran in which Qavam was quoted as having said that now that satisfactory arrangements have been made with the Soviet Union the whole question could be dropped by the Security Council, that he had communicated with Qavam, asking whether this was a correct interpretation of his statement. Qavam immediately replied saying that this was not accurate and that he was desirous of the matter remaining on the agenda. Ala then stated that he had heard through reliable

63 April 15.
sources in the last 48 hours that great pressure was being brought on Qavam to instruct him, Ala, to state before the Security Council that it would be satisfactory to Iran that the matter be dropped.

Ala said that last night he had sent a very strong message to Qavam stating that in the event of such instructions, if he took such a position, he would lose the sympathy of the nation's position, he would lose the sympathy of the nations who had rallied to Iran's support in the last 2 weeks, that it would show weakness and indecision, and that he would have great difficulty in ever getting the Iranian question before the Security Council again if it were taken off the agenda. Ala then added to me personally that if Qavam sent him instructions to take the Iranian matter off the agenda of the Security Council, he would not execute those instructions and would resign.

Ala then inquired as to what I felt the procedure would be on Monday afternoon and whether it was likely that he would be called to the table. I replied saying that I thought it was unlikely that he would be called to the table and it would be best from the Iranian standpoint that he not be. That I felt the normal procedure would be for the chairman to ask the Soviet representative if he desired to supplement his written statement with an oral statement; that after the Soviet statement was made undoubtedly several countries would immediately make statements defending the Byrnes resolution; and that I had every reason to believe that the Council would decline to alter that resolution and would insist on the Iranian matter remaining on the agenda until May 6. Ala stated that this would be an ideal solution from his standpoint.

[Here follows Mr. Ala's analysis of various matters and his statement concerning a remark attributed to Mr. Gromyko that he might not be present at the Security Council meeting if he, Ala, were called to the table and participated in the deliberations.]

STETTINIUS

861.24591/4-1146: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, April 12, 1946—7 p. m.
MOST IMMEDIATE NIACT

308. Please inform PriMin that I have given careful consideration to his views as reported in your 510 Apr 11 and fully appreciate his difficulties. You should point out to him, however, that any indication of willingness on his part to have the Iranian case dropped from the agenda of the Security Council would be likely to create an impression on world opinion and among members of the Council that Iran wished to have the Council act merely to help it in its negotiations and not because it believed as it stated, that the presence of
troops of another Govt threatened international peace. Furthermore, a feeling might be engendered that the members of the Security Council should not be expected to engage in protracted and at times acrimonious discussions for the purpose of endeavoring to uphold the integrity and independence of a country which is unwilling to maintain a firm stand on its own behalf.

The one request urged by Iran above all others was that this case remain on the agenda until foreign troops had withdrawn. The Council granted Iran's request. If Iran now says it wishes to have case removed from agenda before troops are withdrawn how can it hereafter expect any Govt give serious attention to its appeals.

The most friendly and sincere advice that I can give to the PriMin, in the interests of Iran and of developing a United Nations strong enough to maintain peace, is that he take the attitude that the question whether the Iranian case should be dropped or remain on the agenda is one entirely for the Security Council to decide. The Council and not Iran placed it on the agenda and did it by a unanimous vote. Iran should stand firm in respecting the decision already taken by the Council and be prepared to report to the Council on May 6 as requested.

BYRNES

501. BC/4–1246: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 13, 1946—4 p.m.

URGENT

20. For Stettinius. Reference Department’s telegram 11, April 8 and your 69 of April 12.

1. The Iranian Government may join the Soviet Government in asking that the Iranian question be dropped from the agenda. If such a proposal is made formally to the Security Council or even if it is merely announced officially in Iran prior to your having an appropriate opportunity to make the statement contained in Department telegram 11 you should instead take a position along the following general lines:

The United States is pleased that the Soviet Union and Iran consider that the issues between them are in course of being solved in a manner satisfactory to both parties. The difficulties between the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government have twice been brought to the Council’s attention. On the first occasion the Iranian Government complained of activities of the Soviet troops on Iranian territory which it contended were not authorized or permitted by the
Tripartite Treaty of January 29, 1942 and interfered with the sovereignty of Iran. On the second occasion the Iranian Government complained of the continued presence of Soviet troops in Iran without its approval beyond the date stipulated for their withdrawal in that Treaty.

In the view of the United States the complaints of the Iranian Government were properly brought to the Council’s attention under Article 34 of the Charter. It is the clear duty of the Council to receive the complaint of any sovereign state that foreign troops are being used in its territory in a manner not authorized or permitted by treaty. It is the clear duty of the Council to receive the complaint of any sovereign state that foreign troops are continuing to remain on its territory without its consent beyond the date authorized by treaty. Such complaints present grave issues under Article 2, section 4 of the Charter, as to “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the Charter.” When such complaints are presented to the Council, clearly it is not permissible for the Council to take the position that the continuation of the conditions complained about would not endanger international peace and security.

The Council had before it on April 4 when it adopted the resolution on the Iranian matter the assurances given to it by the Soviet Government that withdrawal of Soviet troops had commenced and would be completed by May 6 and that this withdrawal was not conditioned upon other matters being discussed by the two Governments. These assurances and the willingness of the Iranian Government to accept them were the basis upon which the Council acted. I emphasize the facts that these assurances were given to the Council itself and that the action of the Council on April 4 was to continue the matter to May 6 in the hope and belief that the withdrawal of Soviet troops by that date would have disposed of all phases of the matter before the Council. Thus the assurances given to the Council and the action taken by the Council are interdependent.

We are now asked to consider this matter again and prior to May 6. It is not represented to us that the situation in connection with the withdrawal of troops has in any manner changed since April 4. Neither the Soviet nor the Iranian Government suggests that the assurances will not be carried out nor that they will be carried out sooner than was anticipated on April 4. To consider the case at this time would raise many difficult and grave questions which my Government hopes and believes will be rendered moot by the withdrawal of troops in accordance with the assurances. We do not see that any advantage would be gained by going into such questions at this interim phase of the matter. For these reasons my Government does not believe that there are valid grounds for changing the procedure adopted by the Council on April 4 for the disposition of the Iranian case.

That procedure seems to us sound and proper and I, therefore, move that the proposal that the matter be dropped from the agenda be brought before the Council on May 6, so that all remaining phases of this matter can be dealt with at the same time. On that date we sincerely hope that upon being informed that the withdrawal of Soviet
troops from Iran has been completed, the Council will be able to drop
the matter from the agenda. It seems to us that that would be the
appropriate time to take action on the pending proposal.\textsuperscript{34}

2. If your efforts to postpone action on an Iranian proposal to drop
the case are not successful, you should vote against the proposal.

3. If you have occasion to use the statement set forth in telegram
11 of April 8, we suggest that in the second and third sentences of
paragraph 5 the words “consider” be changed to “receive” and that
the words “to interfere with its sovereignty” in the second sentence
be eliminated.

4. We suggest that you may wish to approach Gromyko informally
this week end to see if you cannot persuade him to allow his letter
of April 6 to be passed over without discussion by the Council. You
can point out to him that he has made his record and that if he allows
discussion of his letter to go over to May 6 there will then be nothing
to argue about. That would seem to be the proper time for the whole
matter to be disposed of satisfactorily to all concerned. This would
avoid additional controversy as we will oppose his proposal that the
matter be dropped now. If he should be agreeable to such a sugges-
tion, there would then, of course, be no need for you to make on Mon-
day either the statement contemplated in this telegram or the
statement contained in telegram 11.

\textbf{BYRNES}

\textit{861.24591/4–1846 : Telegram}

\textit{The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State}

\textbf{TOP SECRET}

\textbf{Tehran, April 13, 1946—10 a. m.}

[Received 8:30 p. m.]

515. Jernegan saw Qavam at 7 tonight and conveyed in full message
transmitted urtel 308, April 12.

Qavam was obviously still uncertain as to his best course and ex-
tremely reluctant to risk offending Soviets. He again pointed out
that if he failed comply their wishes they might turn against him on
Azerbaijan question, in which he must have their moral support to
achieve settlement. They could withdraw Soviet troops from Iran
as agreed but supply arms to Azerbaijanis and encourage them resist.
Tehran Govt would be forced send troops and precipitate fighting,
whereupon Russians could assert right to intervene to protect security
their frontiers.

He admitted however that Soviets might also break their agreements
even if he acquiesced in their demand to withdraw case from Security

\textsuperscript{34} Mr. Stettinius delivered this statement on April 15, substantially as set forth
here; see telegram 75, April 15, from New York, p. 424.
Council. Jernegan pointed out in such case Iran would be left completely defenseless and urged that in long run Iran would face fewer dangers if she relied on UNO and made it possible for that organization to become real force for security.

Ultimately with evident misgivings, after long discussion, Prime Minister agreed that he would not instruct Ala to request withdrawal of question from Security Council. However he did not want Ala to continue his aggressive tactics in opposing Soviet move. At Jernegan’s suggestion, based on final paragraph urtl under reference, he decided he would direct Ambassador that, if called upon by Security Council to make statement, he should say only that Iran left matter entirely in hands of Council for whatever decision it might choose to take.

MURRAY

501.BC/4-1546: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

PRIORITY New York, April 15, 1946—6:10 p.m. [Received 6:19 p.m.]

73. Letter from the Iranian Ambassador to the President of the Security Council, dated 15 April, 1946:

Iranian Embassy New York, 15th April, 1946.

Sir: On April 9, 1946, I had the honour to state, in accordance with the instructions of my Government, its position regarding the request of the Soviet representative on the Security Council that the Council remove from its agenda the matters relating to the continued presence of Soviet troops in Iran and the interferences in the internal affairs of Iran. In my letter, I informed the Council of the desire of my Government that these matters remain on its agenda as provided by the resolution adopted on 4 April, 1946.

Yesterday, April 14, my Government instructed me to make to the Security Council the following statement:

“As a result of the signature of the agreement between the Iranian Government and the Government of the Soviet Union, it has been agreed that the Red Army evacuate all Persian territory by the 6th May, 1946. The Iranian Government has no doubt that this agreement will be carried out, but at the same time has not the right to fix the course the Security Council should take.”

This morning I received a further telegram from my Government reading as follows:

“In view of the fact that the Soviet Ambassador has again today, 14 April, categorically reiterated that the unconditional evacuation of Iranian territory by the Red Army will be completed by the 6 May, 1946, it is necessary that you immediately
inform the Security Council that the Iranian Government has complete confidence in the word and pledge of the Soviet Government and for this reason withdraws its complaint from the Security Council.”

Stettinius

501.BC/4-1546: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

NEW YORK, April 15, 1946—10: 25 p. m.

75. The Security Council discussed for more than 3 hours Monday afternoon, April 15, the Russian demand that the Iranian question be removed from its agenda, and adjourned without taking a vote. The discussion will continue at a meeting called for 11: 00 a. m. Tuesday, April 16.

Chairman Dr. Quo opened the meeting at 3: 00 p. m. All delegates were present. The provisional agenda was adopted without comment.

The Chairman read a letter from the Iranian Ambassador, announcing that Iran wished to withdraw its complaint from the Security Council. Dr. Quo said the letter was given to him by the Iranian representative at 2: 00 p. m. Monday, April 15.

A telegram received by the Iranian representative from his Government was quoted in the letter as follows:

[Here follows last paragraph of telegram 73, April 15, from New York, printed supra.]

Ambassador Gromyko was the first speaker. He called attention to his letter of April 6 in which he “insisted” that the Iranian question be removed from the Security Council agenda. He said that the Security Council decision of April 4 (the vote to review the Iranian question on May 6) could be justified only if the situation in Iran constituted a threat to the peace and security of the world. He added that only a person without any “sense of reality” could argue that the situation did constitute a threat to peace. Gromyko argued that the April 4 Council decision was therefore contrary both to the spirit and the letter of the Charter. He also stated that the Security Council

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85 In a telephone conversation at 9: 15 a. m. and in person at approximately 10 a. m. on April 15, Ambassador Ala informed Mr. Stettinius of his Government’s binding instruction to withdraw the Iranian complaint. The same morning, Mr. Stettinius informed Sir Alexander Cadogan that he had notified the Secretary of State of this development by telephone and that Mr. Byrnes felt “they should play for time.” Shortly after, Mr. Stettinius gave Dr. Quo his opinion that “they should just wait and let nature take its course and see what happened.” The memoranda by the United States Representative summarizing his conversations with the Iranian, British, and Chinese delegates are filed under 501.BC/4-1546.

86 For the official record of the proceedings of the Security Council on April 15, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, pp. 122–141.
could not take a decision on situations or disputes of the kind referred to in the Charter without having heard both parties immediately concerned, and maintained that this condition had not been fulfilled because of the Soviet Union’s refusal to participate in the discussions prior to April 10.

Gromyko said that the arguments put forth in his letter of April 6 and his supplementary remarks proved that the demand for the removal of the Iranian question from the agenda was well founded. He added that such was clear even before the Iranian Government decided to withdraw the request it had made to the Security Council. He asked the Council to remove the Iranian question from its agenda.  

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., followed Gromyko. He said that the U.S. was naturally pleased to learn that the Soviet Union and Iran considered that the issues between them are in the course of being solved in a manner satisfactory to both parties. He pointed out, however, that it was not represented to the Council that the situation in Iran, in connection with the withdrawal of Soviet troops, has changed at all since the Council decision of April 4.

"Neither the Soviet, nor the Iranian Government suggests that the assurances will not be carried out, nor that they will be carried out sooner than was anticipated on April 4. To reconsider the case at this time would raise many difficult and grave questions, which my Government hopes and believes will be rendered moot by the withdrawal of troops, in accordance with the Soviet assurances. We do not see that any advantage would be gained by going into such questions at this interim phase of the matter. For these reasons, my Government does not believe that there are valid grounds for changing the procedure, adopted by the Council on April 4 for the disposition of the Iranian case, and will therefore not support the motion to delete the Iranian matter from the agenda at this time," Stettinius declared.

The U.S. representative concluded with the hope that on May 6, upon being informed that withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran has been completed, the Security Council will be able to drop the matter from the agenda.  

[Here follows further discussion of the Soviet motion by delegates of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Brazil, all voicing opposition to the motion.]

... Gromyko spoke for a second time for his motion to delete. He said that even Iran now said it was not necessary to continue the matter, and the remarks of the U.S. and United Kingdom delegates

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87 For text of remarks made by Ambassador Gromyko, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, p. 123.
88 For full text of remarks made by Mr. Stettinius, see ibid., p. 126, or Department of State Bulletin, April 28, 1946, p. 706.
only tended to confuse the issue. Gromyko said there was nothing left to consider since Iran had withdrawn its request.  

[Here follows further discussion in which the Soviet motion was supported by the delegates of France and Poland and opposed by those of Mexico and Egypt.]

Speaking for a third time Gromyko said that the U.S. proposal was contrary to the Charter as it denied a member nation the right to withdraw a request. He added that his doubts about whether the U.S. and U.K. were really anxious for a quick, peaceful solution of the Iranian case were confirmed by the position these countries had taken in today's debate. He accused the U.S. delegate of claiming "to know better than the Iranian Government what the Iranian Government should do in order to reach a solution of its difference with the Soviet Union."  

At this point Chairman Quo said it was getting late and asked if the members would object to adjournment until morning, explaining he still had the names of several speakers on the list.

Stettinius said he did not object to the adjournment, but he wanted to make it clear that the U.S. had made no proposal. He added that his remarks merely outlined the U.S. views on the Soviet request to delete the Iranian question from the agenda.

Sir Alexander Cadogan said that the Soviet delegate was entirely wrong about his expressed doubts over the U.K. position. He added that the British Government always had wanted a quick, peaceful solution of the question, which it believed had been found in the Council resolution of April 4. It was the Soviet representative who had brought the matter up at this time by asking the Council to rescind its own resolution. Had he not done so, Cadogan concluded, we should have heard, I hope, no more of the Iranian question."

Dr. Quo adjourned the meeting at 6:20 p.m.

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861.24591/4-1646: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, April 16, 1946—9 a. m.

URGENT

[Received 12:15 p.m.]

532. Embtels 515, April 13 and 518, April 15. Qavam last night gave Jerneian following account of developments resulting in instructions to Ala to request withdrawal Iranian appeal to Security Council:

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80 For text of these remarks made by Ambassador Gromyko, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, p. 133.
81 For text of these remarks by Mr. Gromyko, see ibid., pp. 139-141, passim.
82 Latter not printed.
Soviet Ambassador learned of new instructions sent Ala to leave matter for decision of Security Council and protested to Prime Minister this was illogical because Iran simultaneously professed confidence in Soviet evacuation yet did not follow Soviet action in asking Council to drop complaint. Qavam replied his action not illogical in view initial Soviet qualification that troops would be withdrawn if "nothing unforeseen occurred".

Sadchikov then stated that this qualification had been made before agreement had been reached between Iran and USSR and at time when it seemed possible elements hostile to Russia might be able to force out Qavam. Since that time agreements had been signed and Qavam's friendly Govt remained in power, therefore reservation no longer obtained. Under circumstances he insisted Prime Minister must direct Ala join in request to drop question from agenda.

Qavam drew up formula which was approved by Cabinet to effect that since Soviet Ambassador on April 14 had given assurances that evacuation would be completed unconditionally by May 6, Iran Govt wished to withdraw its appeal to Security Council. After consulting Moscow, Sadchikov informed Qavam at 9:30 yesterday morning that this was acceptable and instructions were despatched accordingly.

Qavam apologized to Jernegan for having failed to inform us of his action, saying it was due solely to rapidity of events and not to any intent to slight American Govt in any way. (From talks with British Chargé we learn British had been even more in ignorance of developments than we.)

Jernegan said he feared Prime Minister's decision would be regretted by American Govt but he hoped and was sure American Govt hoped that it would achieve results Prime Minister desired.

Qavam said that in addition to renewed assurances re evacuation, Sadchikov had again given assurances that Soviets would use their influence with Azerbaijanis to have latter keep their demands within limits Prime Minister felt he could grant, as stated Embtel 424, March 29. (Mozaffar Firuz told Jernegan last night that preliminary, indirect negotiations with Azerbaijan are under way and it is hoped get Azerbaijan delegation to Karaj soon.)

MURRAY

50.4.BC/4–1646 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

to the Secretary of State

New York, April 16, 1946—7:30 p.m.

80. The Soviet demand for removal of the Iranian question from the agenda again occupied the attention of the Security Council at a
2-hour meeting Tuesday morning, April 16.\textsuperscript{22} No decision was reached. The Council will meet again Wednesday afternoon, April 17, at 3:00 o'clock.

Chairman Quo opened the 33rd meeting at 11:11 a.m. All delegates were present. The provisional agenda was adopted without observation.

Dr. Quo announced that he had received letters from the French delegate\textsuperscript{39} and Secretary General Trygve Lie since the close of Monday's session. The French letter, proposing the adoption of a resolution on the Iranian case, follows:

"Having again considered at its meetings of the 15 and 16 April, the question which it had placed on its agenda on 26 March 1946 at the request of the Government of Iran and which formed the subject of its resolution of 4 April;

"Takes note of the letter dated 14 [15] April addressed to it by the representative of the Government of Iran in which the latter informs the Security Council of the withdrawal of its complaint;

"Notes that an agreement has been reached between the two Governments concerned;

"Requests the Secretary General to collect the necessary information in order to complete the Security Council's report to the Assembly, in accordance with article 24 of the Charter on the manner in which it dealt with the case placed on its agenda on 26 March last at the request, now withdrawn, of the Government of Iran."

Lie's lengthy letter commented on legal aspects of the Iranian case. Dr. Quo suggested after both letters had been read that Lie's communication be referred to the Committee of Experts for study and report to the Security Council. He pointed out that the Secretary General's letter was given to him but a short time before the meeting opened, and inasmuch as it contained a number of legal points the delegates would probably want to study them as well as the Committee of Experts.

Lie's letter said that it was arguable that, following withdrawal by the Iranian representative, the Iranian question would be automatically removed from the agenda unless the Security Council voted:

1. An investigation under article 34;
2. A member brought it up as a situation or dispute under article 35;
3. The Council proceeded under article 36, paragraph 1, which would appear to require a preliminary finding that a dispute existed under article 33, or that there was "a situation of like nature."

The Secretary General added:

"An argument which may be made against the view of automatic removal from the agenda is that once a matter is brought to the at-

\textsuperscript{22} For the official record of the proceedings of the Security Council on April 16, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, pp. 142-152.

\textsuperscript{39} Henri Bonnet.
tention of the Council, it is no longer a matter solely between the original parties, but one in which the Council collectively has an interest, as representing the whole of the United Nations. This may well be true; but it would appear that the only way in which, under the Charter, the Council can exercise that interest is under article 34, or under article 36, paragraph 1. Since the Council has not chosen to invoke Article 34, in the only way in which it can be invoked, i.e.: through voting an investigation, and has not chosen to invoke article 36, paragraph 1, by deciding that a dispute exists under article 33, or that there is a situation of like nature, it may well be that there is no way in which it can remain seized of the matter.”

The suggestion of the Soviet delegate that the Committee of Experts be given a time limit of 2 days in which to report their findings on the Secretary General’s letter was agreeable to Chairman Quo and other delegates. The Chairman announced that the suggestion that the Committee of Experts report to the Council by Thursday was adopted.

Mr. Stettinius was the first delegate called on at a continuation of the discussion on the Soviet demand to remove the Iranian questions from the agenda.

The U.S. delegate stated he was sorry the Soviet delegate had seen fit Monday, April 15, to question the U.S. motives in the Iranian case. He thought all delegates should avoid indulging in accusations against the motives of any of the United Nations. He pointed out that the only motive of the U.S. was fulfilling the objectives of the UN Charter.

Mr. Stettinius recalled the Soviet position that the entire Security Council action, including the April 4 resolution to defer the issue until May 6, was illegal and not in conformity with the Charter. Mr. Stettinius stated he did not believe that the subsequent Iranian request for withdrawal of the complaint should divert the Council’s attention from this “unjustifiable” Soviet charge. He thought it was within the power of the Council to continue the Iranian question on the agenda, even though Iran had withdrawn its complaint.

The U.S. delegate did not think circumstances justified a reversal of Council’s resolution of April 4. He was of the opinion that it would be unwise for the Council to drop the Iranian matter from its agenda, even though the parties concerned had requested such action. He pointed out that the principal factor in the case was the presence of

**For full text of the Secretary-General’s letter of April 16, see 80, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, p. 143, or Department of State Bulletin, April 28, 1946, p. 707.**

In telegram 81, April 16, 1946, 10:15 p.m., Mr. Stettinius stated: “The United States delegation feels that the communication submitted to the Security Council on April 16, 1946, was drafted with other than purely legal considerations in mind. It is considered extremely dubious practice for the Secretary General to put in an unsolicited interpretation concerning a matter which should be decided by the Council alone. This is particularly true in view of the fact that eight members of the Council had already put forth contrary opinions to those expressed by Mr. Lie.” (501.BC/4-1646)
Soviet troops in Iran after the expiration of the Tripartite Treaty and against the protests of the Iranian Government.

"The Council cannot ignore the fact that the sudden reversal by the Iranian Government of the position which it has steadfastly maintained until yesterday occurred while Soviet troops were still physically in Iran," the U.S. representative declared.

Retention of the matter on the agenda did not infringe on the sovereignty rights or independence of Iran, nor interfere with the agreements already reached between the two parties. On the contrary, it afforded them the opportunity of demonstrating to the Council and to the world that the confidence reposed by the Council in the assurances received in this matter was fully justified, Mr. Stettinius said. He concluded by pointing out that the April 4 resolution would make it possible on May 6 or before if the withdrawal is completed before that date, for the Council to dispose of the Iranian case in conformity with its responsibilities under the Charter.

Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet delegate, said that it was impossible to desire a quick and calm and peaceful settlement of the difference between the Soviet Union and Iran, and at the same time to insist on keeping this question on the agenda. He added that this was the case because it was known to all delegates that the Soviet and Iranian Governments had reached an understanding on all questions at issue between them.

Gromyko described the position taken by the U.S. delegate as “quite illogical”. He acknowledged that he called “things by their names” in the previous day’s discussion and said that he did not expect Mr. Stettinius to agree with him.

Gromyko said that the U.S. argued earlier that the Iranian question should not be deleted from the agenda because Iran did not agree to it. He said that argument was put forth repeatedly by Mr. Byrnes. Now, he asserted the Iranian question did not exist and the only logical conclusion was that it be removed from the agenda.

"However, I observe that the delegate of the U.S. sacrifices logic in order to prolong and inflate the so-called Iranian question," Gromyko concluded.

The Netherlands delegate believed the issue was the question, “who is master of the Council’s agenda: the Council or States who are parties to a dispute or situation”. He thought it could only be the Council who determined what was and what was not on the agenda. He pointed out that the Council alone admitted a question to its agenda. He thought that it was incontrovertible that the Council alone should decide whether the application of the party to strike a matter off the agenda should be granted. This, he said, was borne out and reinforced by the Charter which clearly gives several organs
of UN duties and powers independent of the will of the parties to a dispute.

The Netherlands delegate said that he was afraid that if the Charter were interpreted to give the parties sole power to judge, the door would be wide open for abuses. He added that it would be an incentive to bring diplomatic pressure to bear in order that the question placed before the Council be withdrawn from the agenda by the parties who requested it to be placed there.

Speaking for a second time, the U.S. delegate pointed out that the U.S. resolution of April 4 set forth many other reasons than those mentioned by the Soviet delegate.

Chairman Quo advanced China’s views on the question, stating that the Council had an obligation to interest itself in questions coming within the scope of the Charter. He said that the Council had the right to determine the time and manner in which to examine a problem placed before it and that he would stand by the April 4 resolution.

Chairman Quo proposed to put the Soviet demand to delete the Iranian question from the agenda to a vote. The Polish and French delegates suggested that a vote on that question would be out of order, as report from the Committee of Experts on the Secretary General’s letter should come first. The French delegate also said that he would ask for a vote on his resolution, which was submitted by letter at the opening of the meeting, before the Soviet motion when the Committee of Experts had reported.

The Chairman was agreeable to delaying the vote until the Committee of Experts reported. After the question had been discussed by several delegates there was no objection to that procedure.

[Here follow last two paragraphs dealing with matters other than the Iranian question.]

[STETTINIUS]

501. BC/4-1646: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 16, 1946—7 p. m. URGENT

28. Reference your number 78, April 16, setting forth the memorandum of the Secretary General.95

1. We suggest that both in the Committee of Experts and in the Security Council our position with respect to this memorandum should be along the following lines:

The Iranian complaint was properly brought under Article 35, paragraph 1 of the Charter. The Council on April 4 for reasons

95 Telegram 78 not printed; regarding the memorandum, see telegram 80, supra.
recited in its resolution of that date deferred the Iranian matter until May 6. There is no provision in the Charter which provides for the withdrawal of complaints or in any way provides for the termination of the Council’s connection with any matter brought before it.

The various articles referred to by the Secretary General deal with the authority of the Council to take action after consideration of cases brought before it. There has been no consideration of the merits of the Iranian case. We and other members of the Council hope that there will be no occasion for consideration of the merits of this matter. The question of what if any action the Council could or should take is not before the Council at this time. By its resolution of April 4 the Council deferred these and all other questions relating to the Iranian case until May 6. The language of the resolution in this respect was that “the Council defer further proceedings on the Iranian appeal until May 6”.

The Council will on that date determine what disposition it will make of the case. Certainly the Council could on that date, if conditions seem to it to warrant it, decide under Article 34 to consider the Iranian matter on its merits. The question now raised by the Soviet and Iranian communications to the Council will automatically come before the Council on May 6.

2. We agree with what we understand is your view that our representation on the Committee of Experts for the consideration of the Secretary General’s paper should continue unchanged. We think that our representative on the Committee of Experts in addition to presenting our views on the Secretary General’s memorandum should make it clear that he does not feel that the Committee of Experts can do more than interchange views on this matter which relates to important substantive interpretations of the Charter which must be made by the Security Council itself.

Byrnes

501.BC/4-1846: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 18, 1946—10 a. m.

29. The following comments are an amplification of yesterday’s telegram on the Secretary General’s memorandum and also take into account Mr. Bonnet’s proposed resolution to which you may have to speak.

With particular reference to the Secretary General’s memorandum we think you should emphasize that all that the Council did with respect to the Iranian matter by its resolution of April 4 was to defer further proceedings and any possible action by the Council until May 6. In effect the Secretary General now suggests that it might

* Joseph E. Johnson.
* No. 28, April 16, supra. Telegram 29 was drafted on April 17.
be illegal for the Council not to take action until May 6. The Secretary General suggests the Council must now take action to drop the matter from the agenda. It has been the Council’s hope that this very action will seem appropriate on May 6. It appears it is a curious legal doctrine that the Council must now take action when it after careful consideration has decided by an overwhelming majority to defer any action until May 6.

The issues now under discussion in the Council relate in our opinion solely to the Council’s own methods of procedure. It seems to us manifest that the Council must have wide latitude in the determination of its procedure with respect to any particular case before it. There is nothing in the Charter which requires a different approach. On the contrary Article 30 expressly provides that the Security Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure. This authority obviously extends to adoption of particular methods of procedure not specifically covered by existing formal rules.

The whole practice of the Council in the past has demonstrated general agreement on the part of all members that prior to determining whether to consider a matter on the merits the Council should and indeed must engage in a preliminary discussion of any such matter. This is all that the Council has so far undertaken with respect to the Iranian case and in carrying out that discussion the Council on April 4 by its resolution of that date for its own reasons recited in the resolution determined to defer further proceedings, which would include further discussion, until May 6. Subsequently the Soviet representative has insisted on renewing the discussions before that date. This is of course within his rights but it is for the Council itself to determine what it considers the most effective and orderly method of procedure in this as in other cases.

It follows from the above considerations that the Council can and in this particular case has discussed a matter without having determined whether or not to take it under active consideration on the merits under Article 34. Under any other view of the Council’s authority it would be in no position to determine whether to proceed with consideration on the merits and it could not for reasons of its own convenience and orderly procedure select a particular time for its exploratory discussions. The filing of the complaint gives rise to the necessity for preliminary discussion but when the Council has once fixed a date for such discussion the mere withdrawal of the complaint does not deprive the Council of authority to go forward with such discussion. This continues to be a matter for the Council itself to determine.

Mr. Bonnet’s proposed resolution also deals with procedural aspects of the matter. It apparently proposes to change the procedural decision reached by the Council on April 4 by leaving the whole question
of collection of information as to the results of the Iranian matter having been brought before the Council to the Secretary General for report by the Council to the Assembly. It seems to us that the procedure already decided upon by the Council whereby it can on May 6 itself consider further developments in the Iranian matter is preferable. We therefore see no need nor valid basis for a change in the Council’s determination of April 4.

BYRNES

891.00/4-2646: Telegram

The Chargé in Iran (Ward) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, [April 23, 1946.]
[Received April 26—1:10 p.m.]

578. Following is complete text of communiqué issued by Iran Government yesterday: 98

“Since formation of present government, Council of Ministers has given much of its attention to the ‘Azerbaijan events’. After making studies and considering the intentions of our dear and esteemed co-citizens, the Council of Ministers has decided that, as far as the limits of our constitutional laws permit, the ideals of the said province should be realized and has decided to welcome our dear compatriots to brotherhood and unity. Therefore the decision of the Council of Ministers as regards this matter is hereby communicated for the information of the public.

“The powers which under the law of Rabi-ol-Sani of lunar year 1325 (law of 1907 authorizing election of Provincial Councils) Articles 29, 90, 91, 92, and 93 of the supplement approved for the Provincial Councils are hereby specified and confirmed in Azerbaijan as follows:

“(1) The directors of the services of agriculture, commerce and industry, local transportation, education, health, policy, courts and offices of public prosecutors, and finance supervisors will be elected by the Provincial Councils and, in accordance with state regulations, their official commissions will be issued by the central government in Tehran.

“(2) The governor of the province will be appointed by the central government after having ascertained the views of the Provincial Council. Army and gendarmerie commanders will be appointed by the central government.

“(3) The official language of the province is Persian as in all other parts of the country. All official administrative and judicial acts will be in Persian and in Azerbaijani (Turki). The first five grades of the elementary schools will be taught in Azerbaijani.

98 In telegram 582, April 24, 10 a.m., from Tehran it was stated that the communiqué ‘appears designed to show good faith of Govt and considerable length it is willing to go in allowing measure of local autonomy. Announcement comes at time when Tabriz radio and press are rattling saber vigorously and denouncing Qavam govt as no better than its predecessors, and conciliatory policy proclaimed in communiqué should help strengthen Govt case before world opinion.” (891.00/4-2446)
“(4) When allocating tax revenues and budget credits for the country, the government will take into consideration the requirements of Azerbaijan for prosperity, for reconstruction, for educational and hygienic reforms and other works.

“(5) The activities of democratic organizations and labor unions in Azerbaijan are free as in other parts of the country.

“(6) No action will be taken against members of ‘Democrat’ party for participation in ‘Democrat’ movement in the past.

“(7) It has been agreed that the number of deputies from Azerbaijan in the National Majlis will be increased in proportion to the actual population of the province. At the inauguration of the fifteenth Majlis, a proposal to this effect will be introduced and, after approval, the appropriate additional number of Deputies will be elected.”

WARD

501.BC/4–2346: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

NEW YORK, April 23, 1946—10:02 P. M.

99. The Security Council at its 36th meeting Tuesday, April 23, decided to continue the Iranian question on its agenda until May 6, 1946. The Soviet delegate declared that the Soviet Government considered the decision contrary to the Charter and that it could not participate in any future Security Council discussion on the Iranian issue.

The meeting opened at 3:05 P. M. with all delegates at their places and Mr. Afsi, the Egyptian delegate presiding. After the provisional agenda was adopted the Chairman called attention to the report from the Council’s Committee of Experts on the Secretary General’s letter commenting on legal aspects of the Iranian case. This report offered the majority opinion that the Security Council alone should decide of which matters it is “seized”.

The Soviet delegate, speaking on the Committee of Experts report, said that the fact the experts were not able to reach a unanimous agreement led to the conclusion they followed the instructions of the heads of their delegations. He pointed out that the Secretary General’s memorandum concluded that the Council cannot deny a sovereign...

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99 For the official record of the proceedings of the Security Council on April 23, see SC, 1st yr., 2nd ser., No. 2, pp. 201–214.

At no time was a United States Statement made in the Committee of Experts or in the Security Council that followed at all closely the substance of telegrams 28, April 16, 20, and 29, April 18, to New York, pp. 431 and 432, respectively. The Committee of Experts considered the Secretary-General’s memorandum at five meetings on April 16, 17, and 18. A summary record of its deliberations is found among the records of the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, in documents S/Procedure/60, 62–64, and 66. For text of the Committee report, dated April 18, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., supp. No. 2, p. 47.
country the right to withdraw an appeal. The Soviet delegate recited the reasons he had given at earlier meetings why the Iranian question should be stricken from the agenda and concluded:

"Irrespective of the fact that the Charter gives no proper ground for the retention of this question on the agenda, some members of the Council are still trying, in vain, to have it remain on the agenda. These attempts are doomed to failure, Mr. President, and they will only discredit those who make them for they are attempting to sacrifice the Charter in order to give an opportunity for further discussion of this so-called Iranian question. Any attempt to make use of the Iranian question for this purpose is doomed to failure and is likely to have the most regrettable consequences."

Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the U.S. had consistently maintained that there was no reason for the question being brought before the Council at this time. He saw no reason why the Iranian question should not have been allowed to remain on the agenda until May 6 as the Council voted on April 4. The U.S. delegate said that he was unable to agree with the conclusions reached by the Secretary General in his memorandum on legal aspects of the case. He emphasized that the U.S. strongly supported the opinion offered by the majority of the Committee of Experts.

"We believe that the argument in the Secretary General's memorandum discloses a concept of the functions of the Security Council which is rather limited and which, if accepted, would have serious consequences for the future of this body. In ratifying the Charter, the United Nations placed upon the Security Council itself very great responsibilities. The Charter also gives us the powers commensurate with these responsibilities. Mr. President, I repeat that I am unable to concur in the proposal that the Iranian question should at this time be dropped from the list of matters of which the Council is seized," Mr. Stettinius asserted.

The U.S. delegate added that he could not support a French proposal calling for the Council to take note of reports and agreements on the Iranian question and instructing the Secretary General to compile a report for submission to the General Assembly in September. He thought that the French proposal dealt with procedural aspects of the question and would, if adopted, reverse the Council's April 4 resolution.

The Australian representative reviewed briefly the questions before the Council. He listed them as the Soviet request for removal of the Iranian question from the agenda and the French proposal to instruct the Secretary General to compile a report on the Iranian question for

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1 For the French resolution, see telegram 80, April 16, from New York, p. 427. For the text of Mr. Stettinius' remarks, see SC, 1st yr., 1st series, No. 2, p. 203, or Department of State Bulletin, May 5, 1946, p. 752.
the General Assembly. He said that Australia shared the majority view of the Committee of Experts.

Mr. Hodgson again cited the lack of facts in the case and recalled that he had reserved the right to call for the facts. He mentioned the Iranian-Soviet oil agreement made while Soviet troops were in Iran and the failure of the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Iran in the time specified by the Tripartite Treaty of 1942. He wondered whether this alleged breach of the 1942 treaty constituted a threat to peace and said that he thought the Council still was competent to call for a complete investigation. He said that Australia would not vote for either the Soviet resolution to strike the question from the agenda or the French proposal.

The French delegate made a strong appeal for his resolution which he had offered at a previous meeting. He thought the Council could vote for it without diverging from the Charter and disagreed with the U.S. stand that it dealt exclusively with procedure.

[Here follow views of the delegates on the various resolutions.]

At this point all delegates, with the exception of the Chairman, had expressed their views and the Chairman called for a vote. The Council agreed that the French resolution could be considered an amendment to the Soviet request to strike the Iranian question from the agenda, and the Soviet delegate associated himself with the French proposal. Poland, France and the Soviet Union voted for the French resolution by a show of hands.

The Soviet delegate inquired about the Soviet proposal. The Chairman advised him that there were 3 votes in favor of it and 8 in opposition. Gromyko then declared that in view of the agreement between the Soviet Union and Iran on all questions and the withdrawal by Iran of the appeal the Soviet Government considered the decision contrary to the Charter. He added that the Soviet Government could not take part in future discussions in the Security Council on the Iranian question.

[Here follows discussion of matters other than the Iranian question.]

[STETTINIUS]

891.00/4-2546: Telegram

The Chargé in Iran (Ward) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, April 25, 1946—noon.
[Received 8:31 p.m.]

590. Following is outline of current political situation Iran as it appears to Embassy:

(1) Soviet evacuation of Khorassan and Caspian provinces seems
to be nearing completion and Rossow's latest reports from Tabriz indicate Soviet forces may at last be leaving Azerbaijan as well. However, there are persistent reports from all northern provinces of growing numbers Caucasian and other Soviet citizens in civilian clothes, many obviously soldiers. This together with intense Soviet activity with Azerbaijan army as shown recent Tabriz reports clearly points to Russian intention of maintaining influence that area despite military withdrawal.

(2) Although they have agreed to persuade Azerbaijanis to accept Qavam's terms, it is quite possible Soviets may be in process of double-crossing Prime Minister by encouraging Tabriz government to hold out for full autonomy and providing it with arms and requisite military technicians to permit successful defiance of Tehran. Blustering style of public utterances Tabriz (Tabriz tel 131 April 22 gives one example) may be merely bravado or designed strengthen Azerbaijani bargaining position in projected negotiations with Iran Government but may equally be indication of intention to reject any diminution of present de facto independence. Rossow doubts Tabriz will make substantial concessions.

(3) Qavam is evidently attempting to appease Russians wherever possible but at same time endeavoring to stop short of position in which his Government would become outright puppet. He wants to convince Moscow his Government is "friendly" without making such concession that he could never hope to reestablish full Iranian freedom of action. In pursuing this policy he has: (a) made oil deal (b) offered quite liberal terms to Azerbaijan (c) vacillated in his position with reference to Security Council and ultimately yielded to Soviet pressure in asking that case be dropped (d) Arrested Seyid Zia-ed-Din, General Arfa. and certain lesser lights hostile to Russians; suppressed most outspoken anti-Soviet newspapers and released from suspension all Left publications; transferred or dismissed many army officers and Government officials considered anti-Soviet. (e) Removed ban on Tudeh meetings; appointed or permitted appointment of many Tudeh members, or sympathizers to posts in Government; definitely recognized Tudeh labor organization (although labor unions have no legal status in Iran) and even appointed its leader, Rusta, as member of new Higher Labor Council. (f) Consistently been conciliatory in his public statements regarding Azerbaijan question and issued positive orders to security forces to refrain from at-

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2 Not printed.
3 Hassan Arfa, who had been relieved of his position as Iranian Chief of Staff in February 1946.
4 The Masses (Communist) Party in Iran.
tacking or provoking Democrats and not to enter Azerbaijan until given specific permission by himself.

On other side of picture Qavam successfully rejected most extreme Russian demands on Azerbaijan and oil, did appeal to Security Council and follow through up to certain point in face of strong Soviet pressure, and has backed up Schwarzkopf in carrying out program of gendarmerie reinforcement in Caspian provinces as Russians evacuated. (Schwarzkopf says Tudeh are greatly disturbed by this latter move and believes they had planned coup in Mazanderan.) Prime Minister has ordered all members of all parties in Caspian area to turn in arms by May 12 and has ordered gendarmerie to maintain order regardless of who may attempt disturb security. He has not appointed Tudeh members to any of highest Government posts and is evidently attempting restrain them from drastic action. There are definite indications he has no intention of cutting loose from old-line landlord ruling class even though he is trying modify its economic and social attitude.

Embassy is still of opinion Qavam is acting as sincere patriot and has not sold out to Russians in any way.

(4) Prime Minister's internal policy is closely tied to foreign policy and consists primarily in attempting to remove grounds for foreign assertions that Iran is so backward she cannot manage own affairs or be trusted to maintain “democratic” (i.e. non-Fascist) government. To accomplish this he has: (a) Announced or caused to be announced programs of reforms in army and municipal policy. (This has additional effect of tending to placate Tudeh which attacks these organizations as instruments of reaction.) (b) Encouraged and assisted Schwarzkopf in making changes in gendarmerie looking toward greater efficiency. (He has not done anything to permit Tudeh infiltration into gendarmerie.) (c) Established new industrial and mining bank. (d) Created Supreme Economic Council and called for working out of 5-year economic plan. (Emtbel 462, April 4).7 (e) Created Higher Labor Council composed of representatives of Government, Tudeh labor organization, business, university professors and Mayor of Tehran. Objectives this body as laid down by Qavam are to work out plans for adjustment employer-worker rela-

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6 Col. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Chief of the American Military Mission with the Iranian gendarmerie; raised to rank of Brigadier General in July 1946.
7 In telegram 695, May 15, 1946, 3 p. m., Tehran reported that Iranian army and gendarmerie forces were being pushed gradually to the north through Gilan in the east and Kurdistan in the west but that these forces had not penetrated into Azerbaijan nor had they entered Astara, the frontier town on the Caspian Sea (891.00/5-1546).
7 Not printed.
tions, draft new labor law, plan reforms in landlord-tenant relationships on farms, recommend projects to combat unemployment, and study means for effecting economies in government administrations. 

(f) Caused Ministry Agriculture to announce plans for agricultural improvements including new schools, irrigation projects, etc.

Whether or not these various projects will bear fruit remains to be seen, but Qavam is at least launching them with promptness (for Iran) and is in general conducting himself with more decision and determination than any other Prime Minister in recent years.

(5) Russians are undoubtedly better pleased with Qavam than with his predecessors in office, but Embassy doubts they will rest content indefinitely with his variety of "friendly" government.

Already Tudeh party, which can be relied upon to follow Soviet line, has begun to snipe at Prime Minister as showing reactionary tendencies, although party has not yet broken with him. It is conducting vigorous campaign to strengthen its position (has already reestablished itself in Tehran) and is displaying increasingly aggressive attitude toward national and international matters, party is pushing Bahrain issue* insistently and seizes every opportunity to attack United States and Britain as imperialist powers. Recent violent press attacks on Schwarzkopf, full texts of which being sent airmail, suggest that Soviet-inspired drive to destroy American influence here is being launched.

Coming Majlis elections will be of crucial importance. There is much apprehension among moderates and conservatives here lest Tudeh gain such strong representation as to enable it to hamstring any cabinet which declines follow its dictates.

Danger is that Qavam, in pursuing his modified appeasement policy, will be forced to acquiesce in constant strengthening of Russian-backed groups to point at which he will be left only with choice of knuckling under entirely or being overthrown in favor of true puppet government. Collateral danger is that he will be physically unable to stand up under terrific burden he is carrying in his attempt single-handed to resolve critical diplomatic crisis and put life into moribund Iran Government machine. Some believe they already detect signs of weariness and feel Prime Minister beginning to yield ground for that reason. In any case Qavam is walking tight rope and will need all his strength and political cleverness to keep his balance.

Sent Department 590, repeated Moscow 176 and Paris for Amdel.

WARD

* See footnote 39, p. 45.
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Political Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Council of Foreign Ministers

TOP SECRET

Participants: Secretary Byrnes
Mr. Benjamin V. Cohen
Mr. Charles E. Bohlen
Mr. Molotov
Mr. Vyshinski
Mr. Pavlov

[Paris,] April 28, 1946.

The following is a summary of the conversation by subjects which took place before and after the dinner given by the Secretary for Mr. Molotov:

[Here follows section dealing with Bulgaria, printed in volume VI, page 100.]

Iranian Case

Before dinner, Mr. Molotov complained to the Secretary of the attitude of the United States in the Iranian case. He charged that the actions and attitude of the United States in the Security Council had not been those of a friend. He particularly mentioned U.S. refusal to postpone consideration of the case until April 10, as requested by the Soviet representative, and our insistence in keeping the matter on the agenda even after full agreement had been reached. The Soviet Government felt that it was the victim of an “anti-Soviet campaign” which had artificially exaggerated the Iranian situation and that the Security Council was being used as an instrument for the furtherance of this campaign.

After dinner, the Secretary outlined in great detail, with the help of Mr. Cohen, the actual course of events in the Security Council. The Secretary pointed out that the United States had attempted to be as conciliatory as possible and, by providing the resolution of April 4, had in effect postponed any discussion of the merits of the case until May 6, when we had hoped there would be nothing to discuss and the entire case dropped. He said that Gromyko’s subsequent motion to expunge the case from the agenda would merely serve to reopen the matter when it had in effect been really closed.

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*Counselor to the United States delegation at the Council of Foreign Ministers.*
During the course of the discussion, both Molotov and Vyshinsky admitted that no agreement had been reached until April 5, and in general did not appear to be very much convinced with their own arguments.

The Secretary recalled the efforts he had made at Moscow with Generalissimo Stalin and with Mr. Molotov to deal with the Iranian question precisely in order to prevent its coming before the United Nations when he had then told them the United States would be forced to take a position in opposition to the Soviet Government.

Mr. Cohen made the point that, whereas before a public event such as the retention of Soviet troops, beyond the treaty date, in Iran had occurred, it was possible to attempt privately to arrange matters in dispute, but that once a public event such as in this case had occurred, the issue had to be met in the light of public opinion, and it was impossible then to settle such things on the basis of any deal.

In reply to the Secretary's reference to the words "unforeseen circumstances" in the original Soviet assurances to the Iranian Government regarding withdrawal, Mr. Molotov stated that this phrase was to safeguard against the establishment of a new Iranian Government hostile to the Soviet Government. Once this was no longer regarded as a danger, the Soviet Government withdrew the qualifying clause. (It is interesting to note that by this statement Mr. Molotov went far toward admitting that the Soviet troops were retained in Iran in order to influence internal political developments in that country.)

The observations of Molotov and Vyshinsky again reveal the Soviet thesis that the relations between the great powers were more important than the strict observation [observed?] of the Charter and that their actions and policies in effect were outside the jurisdiction of the Security Council. Although Molotov and Vyshinsky did not withdraw their complaints of "unfriendly action" on the part of the United States, they did not press the arguments with any great vigor and the subject was dropped.

[Here follow remaining two sections dealing with Germany and Austria, printed in volume II, page 146.]

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123 Dooher, Gerald F. P.: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Vice Consul at Tabriz (Dooher)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, April 29, 1946—7 p. m.

14. Reurtel 137, Apr 27.11 We feel that it would be undesirable for you or Rosso to make a visit in present circumstances to Mahabad

11 Not printed.
as guests of Qazi Mohammad’s since Qazi still is a leader of an independent movement against Central Iranian Govt. Furthermore such visit might be interpreted throughout all Middle East especially in Iraq and Turkey as manifestation of American sympathy for Kurdish aspirations for establishment of independent Kurdish state. Sent to Tabriz, repeated to Tehran.

Acheson

861.24501/5-146: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ward)

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 1, 1946—6 p.m.

US URGENT MOST IMMEDIATE

383. Please ascertain Iranian Govt’s plans for compliance by May 6 with request embodied in Security Council resolution of Apr 4 “to report to the Council whether the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the whole of Iran has been completed.” If plans are negative or uncertain, you should make clear to Qavam that US Govt considers that compliance by members of the United Nations with requests of Council is of paramount importance in strengthening effectiveness of that organization. Reply urgently.

Sent to Tehran, repeated to N.Y.

Acheson

501. BC/5-246: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 2, 1946—8 p.m.

US URGENT

42. For Stettinius. With respect to the date upon which SC will resume consideration of the Iranian case in accordance with the resolution April 4 we feel that if it were likely that the reports from the Iranian and Soviet Governments would be received prior to May 6 the proceedings should be resumed on that date, preferably in afternoon.

We feel, however, that it is unlikely that the reports will be so received and since the Soviet and Iranian Governments have until

12 Chief Kurdish leader in Iran.
13 In telegram 648, May 6, the Chargé in Tehran recommended that ban on travel of Tehran Embassy and Tabriz Consulate personnel to Kurdistan be lifted on assumption that all Soviet troops would be withdrawn by May 7. The Department, in telegram 398, May 7, agreed that ban on travel in Kurdistan be removed as of that date. (124.91/5-648)
14 This telegram was repeated as No. 2075 to Paris for the Secretary of State.
midnight of May 6 to make their reports on the status of the Soviet troop withdrawal, May 7 would be the most practicable date for the Council to resume proceedings.

We believe that a meeting held on May 6 prior to the receipt of the reports might have an undesirable effect. The attention of the world press and opinion might needlessly be focused on the absence of these replies when they might actually be received up to midnight on that date. Should you determine, however, that the sentiment of the other members of Council strongly favors a meeting on May 6 regardless of the midnight deadline you should not oppose it.

We do not believe that the Council should meet on a date later than May 7 in view of clear terminology of the April 4 resolution and of the unfavorable world opinion which might be aroused by such a postponement.

ACHEDSON

501.BC/5-246 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 2, 1946—8 p. m.
US URGENT

43. For Stettinius. Following suggestions are submitted for your guidance at the time of resumption of Council proceedings on Iranian case.

1. If Soviet and Iranian Governments report complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran, our position should be that no further proceedings on the subject are required and that the matter should be dropped from the agenda. In this event you may feel it desirable to make a statement along the following lines: The Security Council’s resolution of April 4, 1946 requested the Soviet and Iranian Governments to report by May 6 whether the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the whole of Iran had been completed and provided that the Council would then consider what, if any, further proceedings would be required. In view of the reports made by the Iranian and Soviet Governments stating that withdrawal of the Soviet troops has been completed, it is the position of my Government that no further proceedings are required and that the Council be no longer seized of the case.

2. If the Iranian Government reports complete withdrawal of Soviet troops but the Soviet Government fails to report, our position should be the same as 1 above. In this event you should make a state-
ment along the lines suggested in paragraph 1 above but prefaced by an expression of regret at the failure of the Soviet Government to respond to the request of the Security Council for information.

3. If the Iranian Government or both Governments fail to report you should propose for support SC action calling upon the Secretary General to request an immediate report from the non-complying party or parties and stating that the Security Council should continue to be seized of the matter.

4. If Iranian Government reports that Soviet troops have not been completely withdrawn, you should propose or support an adjournment of the SC for 1 or 2 days in order that members may have an opportunity to study the issues involved in the light of the report. Under such circumstances our position will depend on the factual situation relating to the withdrawal and whether extenuating circumstances exist or have been alleged in the Iranian report and further guidance will be sent to you.

5. We have requested Tehran Embassy to keep us informed on a day-to-day basis of the factual developments there. We will transmit the information to you.

Sent to New York; repeated to Tehran and Moscow, and Paris for the Secretary.

ACHESON

501. BC/5-346: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

URGENT

New York, May 3, 1946—1:45 p.m.

[Received May 3—1:01 p.m.]

138. Sir Alexander Cadogan advised me this morning that he had talked to Mr. Lie last evening regarding the date of the meeting on Iran. Lie reported he had talked to the President of the Council about this matter and thought that the best thing to do would be not to set a date for the meeting now. If parties reported by midnight on May 6, he would get in touch with the President immediately and they could call a meeting on short notice. Sir Alexander had apparently told Lie he thought this was satisfactory. I told Sir Alexander I did not agree with this and would talk to Dr. Afifi Pasha about it and let him know the result.

I then arranged to see Dr. Afifi Pasha. I told him what Sir Alex-

36 Telegram 386, May 2, 1946, 6 p.m., not printed.
under had reported to me and advised him that I felt that this was an undignified procedure for the Council; I thought the Council ought to set now the date of its meeting for the afternoon of Tuesday, May 7; it seemed to me the Council should assume that the Russians and Iranians would act in accordance with the request of the Council in its resolution of April 4; if the Russian troops had evacuated Iran by midnight Monday there was no reason why the parties could not report that by Tuesday at 3 o'clock. In any case I thought the Council should meet as was contemplated in the resolution of April 4. If no reports had arrived by that time, the Council would have to make up its mind what to do about the situation.

Dr. Afifi agreed wholeheartedly with this suggestion. He said that he had discussed this question with Mr. Lie and had made this same suggestion to him. Lie had advised he would discuss the matter with the other members of the Council and let him know.

Dr. Afifi said he would call Lie immediately and advise him that a meeting should be called immediately for Tuesday at 3 p.m.

We discussed what was likely to happen at the meeting. I advised him that if from our own sources it appeared that the Russians had completed the evacuation and if the Iranians reported that fact, we would not insist upon a report from the Russians but would be agreeable to taking the matter off the agenda. I also advised him we thought the Council should not take the matter off its agenda without a report from at least the Iranians. In that case we felt the Council would have to ask the Secretary General to communicate with the parties. Dr. Afifi agreed that this would be the right approach to the problem.

He indicated that he felt it was likely that the Russian troops would have withdrawn. His private information was to the effect that they were leaving groups of "armed civilians" behind. He doubted whether the Iranians would raise this question, however. He thought they would be under severe pressure to report that the evacuation was completed and that they would probably do so. If they found later that there continued to be Russian interference they might possibly raise the matter again.

In regard to the question whether Gromyko would attend the meeting on Tuesday, Dr. Afifi thought that he probably would if he knew in advance that both parties would make satisfactory reports and that the Council would take action to drop the matter from its agenda. Otherwise, he did not believe he would be present.

[Here follows discussion of matters other than the Iranian question.]
SECRET US URGENT

TEHRAN, May 4, 1946—7 p.m.

MOSI IMMEDIATE

[Received May 4—5:50 p.m.]

638. Deptel 388, May 1. Qavam informed me this evening that he is despatching a commissioner to Azerbaijan “within a day or two” to ascertain in his behalf whether evacuation of Soviet troops is accomplished fact. He will inform Ala of this “probably tomorrow” and will instruct Ala to so inform Security Council and also inform Council that Iranian report to Council on Soviet evacuation will be made subsequent to receipt of report from above-mentioned commissioner.

Qavam states that according to latest information received from Soviet and Iranian sources all Soviet troops will be evacuated from Iran, including Azerbaijan, not later than May 6.

Acting Chief of Staff today informed Military Attaché that according to available but questionable information all Soviet troops have already been evacuated from whole of Iran (Deptel 388 [388?] 16, May 2 which was only received today).

Sent Dept 638, repeated Moscow 183.

WARD

891.00/5-446: Telegram

The Chargé in Iran (Ward) to the Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT

TEHRAN, May 4, 1946—8 p.m.

[Received 8:15 p.m.]

639. Qavam told me this evening his negotiations with Azerbaijanis are deadlocked. Principal point of disagreement is disposition of Azerbaijan Army. Prime Minister is insisting it must be completely disbanded and that any armed forces stationed that province in future shall be composed of regular conscripts with officers appointed by Tehran. Pishevari has refused accept this. Other disputed points are:

(1) Prime Minister demands that National Majlis Azerbaijan be dissolved and completely new elections be held for Provincial Council. Pishevari wants present Majlis preserved intact and simply converted bodily into Provincial Council.

(2) Qavam wants Azerbaijan finances controlled by commissioner appointed by Tehran, with locally appointed “comptroller” under

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16 Not printed; but see telegram 43, May 2, p. 444, paragraph 5.
him to represent provincial interests. Pishevari insists Chief Finance Officer must be locally named with Tehran appointee as subordinate comptroller.

Contrary to unofficial reports, Qavam says there has been no discussion as to who shall be appointed Governor General.

Prime Minister saw Pishevari and Soviet Ambassador Sadchikov this morning, Sadchikov being present as mediator. According to Qavam, Pishevari persisted in intransigent attitude to such point that he (Qavam) lost his temper and used “undiplomatic language”. At this point Sadchikov intervened and suggested discussions be postponed. Prime Minister hopes to see Pishevari tomorrow in effort to reach agreement. If this fails he expects Pishevari to return to Tabriz day after tomorrow but does not anticipate that this will mean complete break as he thinks either Pishevari or some other Azerbaijan representative will return later to resume conversations.

Qavam says he has told Pishevari plainly that he could not and would not make concessions beyond those publicly announced (EmbTel 578, April 23). He said constitution forbade it and he further lacked authority from his Cabinet. Dept will recall he told me same thing May 1.

Sent Dept 639; repeated Moscow 184; and Paris for Delam.

Ward

861.2459/5-546: Telegram

The Chargé in Iran (Ward) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Tehran, May 5, 1946—4 p. m.

[Received 6:45 p. m.]

640. Deptel 386, May 2. After consulting both British and Iranian authorities and other sources, Embassy feels it may safely be said that to date all of Northern Iran except possibly for Azerbaijan has been completely evacuted. British Military Attaché has just returned from trip along Caspian Littoral all the way from Astara to Bandar Shah and reports complete evacuation except for scattered units engaged in miscellaneous duties connected with physical details of evacuation. Reliable gendarme officer has returned from trip through all of Mazanderan and reports evacuation completed.

Information on number of Soviet troops left behind in civilian clothes is contradictory but in any case there do not appear to be many. This does not apply to Azerbaijan, accurate information on developments there not being available in Tehran. Gagarine who left for Tabriz by car May 3 should by now have arrived and he and Dooher should be able to provide reports on progress evacuation in Azerbaijan.

17 Not printed.
Our estimate is that evacuation of uniformed troops will be complete by specified date but that number of troops in civilian clothes will be left in Azerbaijan.\textsuperscript{18}

Sent Dept 640; repeated Moscow on 85.

\textbf{WARD}

\textbf{S91.00/5-646: Telegram}

\textit{The Chargé in Iran (Ward) to the Secretary of State}

\textbf{SECRET}

\textbf{TEHRAN, May 6, 1946—10 a.m.}

\textbf{US URGENT}

\textbf{[Received 5:48 p.m.]}

641. We learned last night that on May 3 Shah sent his aide General Rizi, to British Ambassador Le Rougetel\textsuperscript{19} to express fear lest PriMin Qavam rush into agreement with Azerbaijanis which would leave Azerbaijan Army in being and prevent reestablishment of regular Iranian Army in province. Shah thought Qavam would feel obliged conclude agreement before May 6 and might make excessive concessions to achieve this. He hoped British would use influence to prevent it.

Le Rougetel reported this to Bevin at Paris and yesterday received instructions in following sense:

1. British Govt saw no reason why Qavam need conclude agreement by May 6. If he were being pushed to do so by Russians it might mean they wanted Iranian Govt recognition of continued existence Azerbaijan Army, nominally as part of Iranian Army, in order that they might claim tanks and other arms turned over to Azerbaijanis were in reality supplied to Iranian Govt and so not proper subject of any complaint.

2. Qavam should not hasten agreement merely to induce Russians to evacuate Iran. British Govt had no intention of passing over in silence any further failure of Russians to carry out their agreements this regard. PriMin should remember Iran question still on Security Council agenda.

\textsuperscript{18} In telegram 147, May 6, 4 p. m., Mr. Dooher reported complete evacuation of uniformed Soviet troops and matériel from the Tabriz area except for a small detachment of semi-military railway personnel awaiting the arrival of a Central Government Commission in order to turn over railway materials. He was unable to verify personally the Soviet evacuation of the rest of Azerbaijan because of the refusal of the local government to grant travel permission. However, he cited reliable reports from various parts of the province indicating Soviet withdrawal except for frontier towns, which might easily be evacuated before the deadline (S61.2450/1/5-646). In telegram 148, May 7, noon, Mr. Dooher stated: "Analyzing results of personal observation Tabriz and reliable reports from several large towns in province I am convinced that evacuation of Soviet uniformed troops and such material not turned over to Democrats was completed by last night deadline." He noted that this opinion was held also by British and other foreign consular officials. He pointed out, however, that Soviet penetration by means of Caucasian immigrants was being pushed. (S61.2450/1/5-746)

\textsuperscript{19} Sir John H. Le Rougetel, who was designated British Ambassador to Iran on April 18, 1946.
3. However British Govt felt that Iranian Govt and Azerbaijan Govt should be able reach amicable agreement and felt Iranian Govt should avoid use of force against Azerbaijan.

Le Rougetel was authorized communicate foregoing views to Shah and Qavam. Bevin expressed opinion it would be useful if American Embassy supported this action.

British Ambassador was to see Shah and/or Qavam last night. I have not heard result.

In absence of instructions I do not propose make any formal démarche this regard, although I feel British position is well taken. As reported mytel 639, May 4, Qavam has given me to understand he will stand firm and does not intend to be rushed into making concessions beyond his publicly announced position. However experience has shown he sometimes weakens in situations of this kind when strong pressure is brought to bear and I think it might be useful if Dept were to instruct me to inform him of US Govt’s views. 29

In this connection I assume Dept agrees that continuance of well-armed Azerbaijan Army under control of local govt Tabriz would effectually perpetuate present de facto independence of province and make any agreement reached by Qavam purely face-saving device.

Sent Dept 641; repeated Moscow 186 and Paris for Delam.

WARD

501.6/5-646: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

US URGENT

NEW YORK, May 6, 1946—noon.
[Received 11:15 p.m.]

147. For Acheson, Henderson and Hiss. 21 The following letter from the Iranian Ambassador 22 was received by Trygve Lie at 9 p.m., Daylight Time, May 6th. This text was received by telephone:

“Sir: On the 4 April, 1946, the Security Council resolved ‘that the Council defer further proceedings on the Iranian appeal until 6 May 1946, at which time the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government were requested to report to the Council whether the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the whole of Iran has been completed and

29 In telegram 400, May 7, 8 p.m., the Department informed the Chargé: “We leave to Amb’s discretion views which should be expressed to Qavam regarding negotiations between Govt and Azerbaijanis. For our part we do not believe this Govt should accept responsibility for advising Qavam as to methods he should use in reasserting Iranian authority in Azerbaijan.” (891.00/5-746)
22 Alger Hiss, Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs.
23 Ambassador Ala called on Mr. Stettinius at about 11:30 a.m., May 6, prior to the sending of his letter; for the nature of their conversation, see telegram 2147, May 7, to Paris, infra.
at which time the Council shall consider what, if any, further proceedings on the Iranian appeal are required. . . .

The Iranian appeal set forth in the letter of 18 March 1946 related to two matters which it was stated were likely to endanger international peace and security. The first of these referred to the maintenance of Soviet troops on Iranian territory after 2 March 1946; and the second (which was first presented to the Council at its meetings in London) referred to Soviet interference in the internal affairs of Iran.

With respect to the withdrawal of troops, the Soviet Union has officially informed the Security Council that the evacuation would be completed during a period of one-and-one-half months from 24 March 1946.

For the reasons hereinafter stated, it is impossible for me to make a complete report at this time. On the basis of the information received by me from my government up to 5 o'clock this afternoon, I am able, however, to present to the Council the following report.

Soviet troops have now been completely evacuated from the provinces of Khorassan, Gorgan, Mazanderan and Gilan. This information is based upon investigation made by responsible officials of the Government of Iran.

So far as the Province of Azerbaijan is concerned, the Government has been informed through other sources that the evacuation of Soviet troops from that Province has been going forward and it is said will have been completed before 7 May 1946. These reports have not been verified by direct observation of officials of the Iranian Government. The reason for this is that, as previously pointed out to the Council, the Iranian Government has been unable, because of the interference complained of, to exercise effective authority within Azerbaijan since 7 November 1945, and from that time to the present has had no opportunity to ascertain through its own officials what are the conditions prevailing throughout that Province.

While it is hoped that arrangements can be made which will remove the unfortunate results of the interference complained of, it is impossible to forecast at this time with certainty what the subsequent developments will be. As soon as the Iranian Government is able to ascertain through its official representative the true state of affairs in the Province of Azerbaijan, the facts will be reported promptly to the Council.

I have the honor to be, Sir, your obedient servant,

Hussein Ala
Iranian Ambassador.

His Excellency
Dr. Hafez Afifi Pasha
President of the Security Council.”

STETTINIUS

861.24591/5-746 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 7, 1946—2 p. m.

2147. For Secretary Byrnes. Iranian Ambassador informed Stettinius on May 6 that he intended deliver written report to Security
Council later in day. Although without information from Tehran since May 3, Ala intended to report that Soviet troops had been withdrawn from all northern provinces except Azerbaijan and were, according to latest reports, in process of evacuating that province but that this could not be confirmed since Tehran Government had no representatives in Azerbaijan. He also planned to refer to Russian interference in Iranian affairs and to continuing negotiations between Premier Qavam and the Azerbaijani regarding home rule. Ala asked Stettinius whether Council would remove the question from agenda since Iran probably would not be able confirm withdrawal by May 8. Stettinius indicated there might be grounds for postponing consideration for few days until conclusive report could be received and queried necessity of report on May 6 since deadline was midnight. Ala promised to consider this aspect of situation but evening May 6 he delivered to Lie letter along lines indicated in conversation with Stettinius.

Ala had also suggested to Stettinius that it would be desirable for Security Council to retain question on agenda, even after official confirmation of Soviet evacuation had been received. Stettinius pointed out that such a course was not envisaged by Security Council's resolution of April 4 and would certainly meet with violent objections from USSR. Ala continued to urge this action, and Stettinius, although indicating objection to proposal, said he would consider matter further.²⁸

ACHESON

861.24591/3-746 : Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

SECRET
WASHINGTON, May 7, 1946—4 p. m.

49. We suggest that at the meeting of the Council tomorrow afternoon you make a statement along the following lines.

The Security Council, in its resolution of April 4, requested the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government to report to the Council on May 6 whether the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the whole of Iran had been completed.

The Soviet Government has not complied with the request of the Council.

The Iranian Government, on its part, has complied with the request in a preliminary manner—and apparently as fully as conditions per-

²⁸ In telegram 151, May 7, 10:30 p. m., Mr. Stettinius reported he had informed Sir Alexander Cadogan the same day “that the U.S. position was that under the circumstances there was no basis for remaining seized of the matter, if Iran reported complete Soviet evacuation.” (501BC/5-746)
mit. In its report the Iranian Government states that it is not possible at this time for its representative to make a complete report because it has had no opportunity to ascertain through its own officials the conditions prevailing in the Province of Azerbaijan.

In view of the statement of the Iranian Government that it will report promptly to the Council the true state of affairs in Azerbaijan as soon as it is able to ascertain the facts through its official representatives, I wish to submit for the consideration of the Council the following resolution:

"Resolved that in view of the statement made by the Iranian Government in its preliminary report of May 6, submitted in compliance with the Resolution of April 4, 1946, that it was not able as of May 6 to state whether the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the whole of Iran had been completed, the Council defer further proceedings on the Iranian matter in order that the Government of Iran may have time in which to ascertain through its official representatives whether all Soviet troops have been withdrawn from the whole of Iran; that the Iranian Government be requested to submit a complete report on the subject to the Security Council as soon as it has information which will enable it so to do and that in case it is unable to obtain such information by May 20, it report on that day such information as is available to it; and that immediately following the receipt of a further report on this subject from the Iranian Government, the Council shall consider what if any further proceedings on the Iranian appeal are required."  

Acheson

891.00/5-846: Telegram

The Chargé in Iran (Ward) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, May 8, 1946—6 a. m.

US URGENT

[Received May 9—8:17 a. m.]

659. From Allen. During my initial call on Prime Minister this morning Qavam said that communication which Ala had addressed to Security Council in past few days was in accord with instructions he had sent Ala. In response to my specific question he stated his instructions to Ala had included statement that Iran was unable inform Council fully regarding evacuation Azerbaijan because of activities of Soviet Union in that province.

As regards present negotiations with Pishevari, he said that they had achieved no results. At his last meeting with Azerbaijan delegation, he had again informed Pishevari that he could not modify in any way the 7-point program which he had announced some time ago, as basis for agreement with Azerbaijan. Yesterday when he had called in Soviet Ambassador to impress upon him desirability of

George V. Allen, the appointed Ambassador to Iran, did not assume charge of the Embassy until May 11.
public statement by Soviet Govt that all Soviet troops had withdrawn from Iran, he had informed Soviet Ambassador that he could not alter his position with Azerbaijan delegation, would have to resign his position if no further progress could be made. Soviet Ambassador told Qavam he hoped he would not resign since if he were followed by another Prime Minister who had a conciliatory policy, no advantage would be gained by resignation of Qavam who had pioneered this policy and was carrying it out so diligently. If new Prime Minister should carry out policy of coercion, bloodshed would result, and Iran would become scene of "international warfare". Qavam said that although Soviet Ambassador had said "international warfare" and not "civil war", he (Qavam) did not take remark very seriously.

The Prime Minister then told me in the utmost confidence that his difficulties were not so much with Pishevari as with the Shah. He said that he felt confident he could make arrangements with Pishevari and that they had actually come fairly close to an agreement, on the basis of the appointment by Tehran (1) of a governor general in Tabriz, and (2) of an officer from the Iranian Army to take command of the Azerbaijan forces, the latter to be selected by the Tehran Government from among five officers of the Iranian Army to be dominated [nominated?] by Pishevari. There still remained some difference over the question of finances, Pishevari insisting upon appointing the Director General of Finances of Azerbaijan, but Qavam thought this point could be arranged. Qavam said that the Shah objected to the proposed arrangement, and insisted upon sending three brigades of the Iranian Army (5,000 or 6,000 men) into Azerbaijan immediately, one to be station at Tabriz, one at Rezaieh, and one at Ardabil. Qavam was convinced that this action would result in fiasco, since dissatisfied elements in army and elements friendly towards Azerbaijan regime would probably go over to other side. In view of size of Azerbaijan forces (alleged to be 30,000), Qavam was afraid central forces would be defeated. He was convinced that best method of handling situation was to win Azerbaijan back under Tehran control by pacific penetration. The Shah, on other hand, insists upon forceful occupation of the area.

Qavam said that his primary difficulty with the Shah resulted from the Shah's insistence upon exercising, in practice, his nominal position as Commander-in-Chief of Army. Qavam hoped very much that I would give the Shah good advice on the occasion of my forthcoming visit to him.

In response to my specific inquiry as to whether negotiations between Tehran and Tabriz, now being on, could be considered an
internal Iranian matter, Qavam stated that this was not the case. He said that while the Russians gave the open appearance of aiding the two parties in getting together, he knew that Russians would aid Azerbaijan if matter developed into armed conflict.

In reply to another question regarding the numbers of armed civilian Russians left behind in the northern provinces, Qavam said that it was impossible for him to determine their number, but that he felt confident there were many such persons in Azerbaijan but not in the other four provinces. He said that they were well armed and were “officers, not enlisted men”.

In response to a further question, he said that as far as he was aware the military supplies and arms Russians still retained at time of their departure were taken away with them. He added, laughing, that they did not need to leave any behind, since they had armed the Azerbaijanis well already.

The two commissioners sent to Azerbaijan to determine whether Russian troops had withdrawn had visited only Tabriz and Julfa up to present time. Russian troops had in fact evacuated those points.

Qavam asked whether a public statement by Soviet Ambassador, or by Soviet Govt in Moscow, that all Russian troops had withdrawn from Iran would be satisfactory. I said that I did not think that would be sufficient, and that Iran Govt should make a further report to the Security Council as soon as it was in position to state on first hand knowledge that all Soviet troops had withdrawn. I pointed out that public statements to the press are neither a sufficient nor appropriate means of conveying information to the Security Council of the United Nations. Qavam nodded acquiescence.

The Prime Minister said that Soviet Ambassador had requested permission for 40 Soviet trucks to remain in northern Iran, to be used in fighting locusts. Soviet personnel to man these trucks would remain on Soviet side of the border (apparently until needed for locust control work). Qavam had refused the Soviet request, stating that any residue either of Soviet troops or material in northern Iran would give rise to claims that Soviets had not fully evacuated the country.

In response to my inquiry, he said that he was satisfied with Colonel Schwarzkopf and his mission, and that he liked Colonel Schwarzkopf personally. He also thought that General Ridley and the members of his mission were doing the best they could but that the Shah had not permitted them to accomplish anything with the Army.

During the conversation Qavam emphasized that he spoke in strictest confidence, both as regards his relations with Shah and his statement that Iran was still suffering from British as well as Soviet
pressure. As regards the latter, he may have been referring to his belief that British are trying actively to oust him in favor of a Prime Minister who would follow less conciliatory course with Russia. [Allen.]

WARD

501.BC/5-846: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

NEW YORK, May 8, 1946—9:30 p.m.

158. Security Council. The Security Council at its 40th meeting Wednesday, May 8, 25 unanimously adopted a U.S.-sponsored resolution deferring further proceedings on the Iranian question in order that the Government of Iran may have time in which to ascertain whether all Soviet troops have been withdrawn from the whole of Iran. The Soviet Union was not represented at this session.

Mr. Stettinius was accompanied by Herschel Johnson, his recently appointed deputy, 26 who arrived in New York yesterday.

Following adoption of the provisional agenda, Chairman Hafez Affi Pasha called on Mr. Stettinius. The latter pointed out that the Security Council in its resolution of April 4 requested the USSR and Iran to report to the Council on May 6 whether the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the whole of Iran had been completed. He said that the Soviet Government had not complied with the request and Iran has replied only in a preliminary manner, but apparently as fully as conditions have permitted.

Mr. Stettinius called attention to the Iranian statement that it would report to the Council on the true state of affairs in Azerbaijan as soon as it was able to ascertain the facts through its own official representatives before introducing the following resolution: 27

"Resolved: That in view of the statement made by the Iranian Government in its preliminary report of May 6, submitted in compliance with the resolution of April 4, 1946, that it was not able as of May 6 to state whether the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the whole of Iran had been completed, the Council defer further proceedings on the Iranian matter in order that the government of Iran may have time in which to ascertain through its official representatives whether all Soviet troops have been withdrawn from the whole of Iran; that the Iranian government be requested to submit a complete report on the subject to the Security Council immediately upon the receipt of the information which will enable it so to do; and that in

26 Herschel V. Johnson was appointed to this position on April 23, 1946.
27 For Mr. Stettinius’ statement and text of the resolution, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, p. 247, or Department of State Bulletin, May 19, 1946, p. 833.
case it is unable to obtain such information by May 20, it report on
that day such information as is available to it at that time; and that
immediately following the receipt from the Iranian Government of
the report requested, the Council shall consider what if any further
proceedings are required.”

[Here follow comments by various delegates on the resolution, and
discussion of matters other than the Iranian question.]

[Stettinius]

861.24591/5-946: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ward)

SECRET US URGENT MOST IMMEDIATE

WASHINGTON, May 9, 1946—6 p. m.

408. Conversation with Ala before Security Council meeting
May 828 revealed Amb’s feeling that Council resolution should recog-
nize existence of two Iranian complaints; should treat at this time
only one complaint dealing with presence of Soviet troops in Iran;
and should anticipate future Council action upon other complaint
charging interference by Soviet agents, officials and armed forces.
Henderson pointed out that whole context of Council proceedings on
Iranian matter seemed to treat Iranian appeal as single complaint and
reminded Ala that Iranian letter of April 1529 referred to the with-
drawal of “its complaint” from Security Council. Ala admitted use
of word in singular in Iranian withdrawal note was most unfortunate.
Henderson said he doubted that US, particularly in absence of clear
statement by Iran to Security Council on subject, would be able to
maintain position that Iran had withdrawn only that portion of its
complaint regarding presence of Soviet forces and had not withdrawn
portion regarding Soviet interference in internal affairs.

Before Council meeting, this matter was considered further in dis-
cussion with Cadogan, Van Kleffens, and Afifi Pasha. UK and
Netherlands representatives were sympathetic with Ala’s contention
and felt that interference issue should be kept alive. It appeared that
both representatives had been approached by Ala in this connection.
Van Kleffens suggested introductory statement limiting concern of
resolution to matter of withdrawal Soviet forces. It was finally
agreed that such limitation might cause Council controversy, which
was considered undesirable at this time.

Sent to Tehran, repeated to London, Moscow and Paris.

Acheson

28 As recorded in telegram 156, May 8, 5 p. m., from New York, not printed.
29 Quoted in telegram 73, April 15, from New York, p. 423.
219–490—69—30
SECRET

Tehran, May 11, 1946—4 p.m.
[Received 4:32 p.m.]

678. Following presentation of credentials this morning I had considerable conversation with Shah and Qavam, latter being present throughout in his capacity as Foreign Minister. His presence was unfortunate as far as obtaining significant information was concerned, since it was evident that Shah and Qavam were hesitant to speak entirely frankly in each other's presence.

As concerned Iranian case before Security Council, I said Iran had great sympathy in the United States in its efforts to maintain its independence, but added that some difficulty was caused Secretary of State by fact that there did not appear to be complete understanding at all times between the Iranian Government and its representative in New York. As illustration, I cited fact that Ambassador Ala stated to Council on April 3 that no negotiations were going on between the Iranian and Soviet Governments concerning either the presence of Soviet troops in Iran or Soviet oil concession, since negotiations on neither of these subjects would be legal. Following day agreements were announced in Tehran on both subjects, making it evident that negotiations had in fact been going on. I stressed importance of assistance Security Council could give nation like Iran but also importance of that nation presenting its case to Council in most positive and exact manner. Both Shah and Qavam expressed understanding of difficulties created. Shah then asked what Council could do in actual fact to assist Iran. He evidently had in mind that the Council had no security forces at its disposal. I said that in spite this fact, Council could accomplish great deal through public opinion, as evidenced by fact that Iran was today free of regular Soviet forces.

As regards elections, Shah said they would be held "soon". He and Qavam agreed, however, that 2 or 3 months would probably be required between issuance of decree calling for elections and actual holding thereof. No mention was made of foreign supervision. Qavam indicated he had in mind his promise to submit Soviet petroleum agreement to Majlis by October 24.

I said, principally for Qavam's benefit, that program of reform which he had announced shortly after assumption of office had made a favorable impression in the United States, and I hoped he would have opportunity to institute it soon. Shah interposed that country must be united and independent before other measures could be undertaken.
Qavam said that Pishevari and Azerbaijan delegation were still here, but offered no comment on progress of negotiations.

In general, Shah’s policy is more likely to produce bloodshed than Qavam’s but latter’s conciliatory attitude towards Azerbaijan may result in continued existence of the Azerbaijan Army. Qavam thinks that Tehran Government can gain control over this army gradually by penetration. Shah favors more direct and stronger methods. It is possible that if Qavam continues to find Azerbaijan delegation intransigent, he may move in the direction of Shah’s position. If he does so, and if fighting results, with indirect or direct support of Azerbaijan by USSR, I consider it likely Iranian Government will present to Security Council new complaint against USSR.

ALLEN

501 BC/5-846: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 13, 1946—3 p. m.

58. For Stettinius. Urteil 156, May 8.\(^{20}\) We have given careful consideration to question raised by Mr. Ala whether a finding by Security Council that all Soviet troops have been withdrawn from whole of Iran would justify Council action in dropping that portion of Iranian complaint relating to interference by Soviet agents, officials, and armed forces in the internal affairs of Iran, as well as that portion relating to continued presence of Soviet forces in Iran.

Mr. Ala has taken position that Iranian Govt, in its letter of Apr 15,\(^ {21}\) did not intend to inform Security Council that its complaint with re[gard] to such interference was being withdrawn. According to Mr. Ala, it intended to limit its request for withdrawal to that portion of its letter of Mar 18 relating to continued presence of Soviet troops in Iran.\(^ {22}\)

We have thus far been under impression that Iran, in its note to Security Council of Apr 15, had in using the words “withdraws its complaint” meant to withdraw both aspects of its complaint. We would not be in position to support contention that Iran had not intended to withdraw every aspect of its complaint against Soviet Union in its letter of April 15 unless Iran itself should on its own behalf make a clear statement to Security Council to that effect.

\(^{20}\) Not printed, but see telegram 408, May 2, to Tehran, p. 457.

\(^{21}\) Quoted in telegram 73, April 15, from New York, p. 423.

\(^{22}\) For texts of Mr. Ala’s letters of March 18, see telegram 222, March 19, to Tehran, p. 365.
If Iranian Govt does make such a statement, we should accept it at face value on the ground that Iran alone is able to give a true interpretation of its note. If Iran should insist that Soviet agents and officials are continuing to interfere in internal affairs of Iran and that its complaint in this regard has not been withdrawn, we should take position that this allegation represents continuation of complaint of Mar. 18.

We would have no objection, of course, if Iran should desire to raise the interference issue as an entirely new case, which action would not in our opinion be precluded by any action of Security Council in disposing of matter of presence of Soviet armed forces in Iran.

In either event, if the matter of interference comes up on Council's agenda, we should advocate that procedure in Council follow past practice under which Iranian Govt would first be asked to appear before Council and make statement in support of complaint of interference, and that Soviet Govt be given an opportunity to reply.

This position should be taken in Council itself and may, in your discretion, be imparted to other representatives on Security Council who may approach you on subject.

Sent to New York, repeated to Tehran, Moscow and Paris, and London.

Acheson

891.00/5-1346: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, May 13, 1946—3 p. m. [Received 4:10 p. m.]

680. Qavam informed me this morning that Pishevari on Azerbaijan delegation who returned to Tabriz today, left in an angry mood. Qavam feels that their annoyance is due primarily to failure to achieve positive results and is not directed against him personally since Azerbaijan representatives seem convinced that he wishes to follow conciliatory policy and avoid fratricidal bloodshed.

Following rupture of negotiations, Soviet Ambassador told Qavam that while he regarded matter as internal one, he was afraid Qavam's continued failure to reach agreement with Azerbaijan would result in "iron and blood". Qavam feels Soviet Ambassador is putting pressure on him rather than on Azerbaijanis.

Qavam, as appears to be his custom, asked my advice. I said that it would seem to me his duty and responsibility to make a clear and frank public statement now regarding the negotiations. He hesitated
to agree, saying that such statement would annoy Azerbaijanis and might lead to agitation in other Northern Provinces and even in Tehran itself. He said Azerbaijan Government might react to his public statement by declaring that it would have no further dealings with him. I said that while decision was his alone, there were occasions on which responsible official must take measures he considered proper and just in spite of difficulties and that Qavam might well consider this such occasion.

Qavam asked several times what assistance Security Council could give Iran if fighting should result. I said I wanted to speak to him in all frankness and sincerity. I would not advise Iran to approach Security Council again unless two conditions existed: (1) his Government must be confident it could establish clear case of foreign interference in Iranian affairs and be willing to place all evidence unreservedly before Council, and (2) his Government must be prepared to pursue the matter firmly, regardless of any pressure which might later be exerted by any government on him to change his course. I said Security Council had been able to render Iran certain aid in the past in spite of difficulties made for Council by wavering policy of Iranian Govt particularly as regards conflicting statements made by Ala in New York and Firuz in Tehran.

I referred to press reports that Soviet Ambassador had been present at meeting between Qavam and Pishevari, pointing out that this close association of Soviet Ambassador in discussions with Qavam’s acquiescence might make it difficult for Iran subsequently to establish case before the Security Council of Soviet interference in internal Iranian matters. Soviet representative in New York could state that his Govt had been invited to participate. Qavam said he appreciated point and repeated that Soviet Ambassador’s presence had been fortuitous and had, at any rate, been in accord with Soviet assurances of assistance in Azerbaijan negotiations.

It is evident that Qavam desires more specific assurances than he has received of positive aid which the Council can give to Iran. He thought mere commission of inquiry would be of little assistance. I told him that I did not believe he appreciated sufficiently aid which World Organization could give him if he gave it full opportunity.

In addition to points of difference with Azerbaijan already known, i.e., control of Azerbaijan Army and finances, and appointment of Governor General, Qavam revealed further point of disagreement which may be highly important. While Qavam agrees to plan for division of public domain among peasants, Azerbaijan delegation demands that Tehran Govt immediately redeem all ceded domains for distribution among peasants. Ceded domains are those previously granted by Crown and may have been sold subsequently many times.
Qavam said latter would cost hundreds of millions of dollars to purchase. As regards future, Qavam said that he would issue statement regarding negotiations and leave next move to Azerbaijan.

Sent Dept 680, repeated Moscow 192, and Paris.

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891.60/5-1446: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

PRIORITY

TEHRAN, May 14, 1946.

[Received May 14—9:53 a.m.]

686. Following announcement issued here last night by Prime Minister Qavam:

"On this occasion when the public is watching the course of the negotiations between the Government and the representatives of Azerbaijan, I deem it necessary to bring the result of the conversations of the past 15 days to the attention of the public to the end that the facts may be made clear.

The representatives of the inhabitants of Azerbaijan who came to Tehran are aware that I exerted every effort to settle the questions at issue in a spirit of goodwill and conciliation. After the publication of my communiqué of April 21, 1946, containing the seven points of the Government communication, many circles raised objections and considered that in my attitude I had exceeded the limits of the existing laws.

Although I have had confidence in the goodwill of the representatives of the Azerbaijan representatives, as a result of the negotiations of the past 15 days I am sorry that some of their demands surpassed my legal powers and the Government's seven points. Perforce the negotiations were suspended until such time as a way for the solution of the problem can be found, and the representatives of Azerbaijan left for Tabriz.

The questions in which the Government's legal powers and the seven points were at variance with the demands of the representatives of the Azerbaijan inhabitants were as follows:

1. According to article 2 of the Government's communiqué the right of appointment of the Governor General of Azerbaijan rested with the Government in consultation with the Provincial Council but the representatives of the Azerbaijan inhabitants insisted that the appointment of the Governor General should be made by the Government on the proposal of the Provincial Council.

2. According to article 2 of the communiqué of April 21, 1946, the Government was to appoint the military and gendarmerie commanders but the representatives of Azerbaijan believed that the appointment of such commanders should be made on the proposal of the Provincial Council subject to the approval of the Government."
3. The division of public domains and ceded lands among the peasants which has taken place in Azerbaijan, as a result of the recent developments, should be confirmed by the Majlis and is beyond the legal powers of the Government.

The above and several other points were discussed but since the final decision should be reached by the Majlis, the representatives of the Azerbaijan inhabitants returned to Tabriz to report (to their colleagues) and receive instructions in the matter.

Since I am willing to settle the questions at issue with perfect goodwill and conciliation it is obvious that I am prepared to continue the negotiations with a view to the adoption of a plan which shall not be at variance with the laws of the land. Since according to law and the accord reached with the Soviet Government concerning the northern oil, the Fifteenth Majlis should meet within 7 months from the date of signature of the accord, general elections should take place as soon as possible. I expect that the Azerbaijan representatives will provide the necessary facilities to the end that the Government may announce the general elections in conformity with law and the inhabitants may freely elect their deputies and send them to the capital.

I hope that with the goodwill and patriotism which I have found in the representatives of the Azerbaijan inhabitants, the necessary means can be found to allay public anxiety and the present difficulties will be eliminated with due consideration of the Government’s legal duties.”


ALLEN

861.24591/5-1546: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, May 15, 1946—3 p. m.

[Received 3:55 p. m.]

698. Qavam informed me this morning that he had sent telegram to Pishevari last night informing him that colonel in the Iranian Air Force and two inspectors from Qavam’s office would leave for Azerbaijan Friday to ascertain whether Soviet troops had left Iranian soil. Qavam said it would obviously be impossible for them to make definitive report by May 20, even if they were allowed to conduct investigation at all. I urged him to send factual report of exact status of matter to Ala by May 20. Qavam agreed to do so.

I pointed out that Security Council might again defer Iranian case until say June 1. Qavam said that would be “all right”.

It seems to me very unlikely that Security Council will receive any definitive report from Iranian Govt on Soviet troops for some time, due to difficulties which Iranian officials will experience from Azerbaijan govt in making thorough investigation.
While it is difficult for me to suggest what period of time Security Council should allow for Iranian Govt to obtain information regarding Soviet troops, there is some advantage in having definite date set on which the Council will consider the matter again. If no date is set, Iranian Govt is under no specific pressure to obtain information or report.

During my official call on the Soviet Ambassador this morning I asked him outright whether Soviet troops had left Iran. His answer was as follows: "The last Soviet military unit left Iran on May 5 and there are no more Soviet troops in Iran. The Soviet Govt fulfilled entirely its agreement with the Iranian Govt on this subject." The latter sentence is not correct since Soviet units were still in Iran as late as May 9 or 10 but I now believe all uniformed troops have left.

Sent Dept 698; repeated Moscow 196 and Paris.

Allen

891.00/5-1546: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

US URGENT

TEHRAN, May 15, 1946—3 p. m. [Received 3:12 p. m.]

699. Qavam expressed the opinion to me today that the Tehran Govt must grant several concessions to Azerbaijan. He specified the questions of Commander-in-Chief of Azerbaijan Army and Governor General. He thought Tehran must concede these points to Pishevari to prevent Azerbaijan from declaring independence from Iran and repudiation of the dynasty. Qavam thought that other provinces and even Tehran might take similar action with regard to the dynasty.

Qavam said that the Shah had interfered in the recent negotiations by refusing to concur in any concessions to Azerbaijan beyond the seven-point program announced in advance. As regards Pishevari's statement on the radio last night that failure to reach agreement in the negotiations had been due to influence exercised by irresponsible authorities, Qavam said Pishevari meant the Shah. Qavam declared he had not told Pishevari of the Shah's interference in the negotiations and that Pishevari had reached his conclusion by deduction. I am inclined to doubt the latter statement. Qavam has clearly made every endeavor to remain in the good graces of Azerbaijan and Leftist elements. Even if he did not accuse Shah in so many words he certainly let Pishevari understand that he, Qavam, could reach a settlement except for the Shah's opposition.
Qavam asked me to impress the Shah with the necessity for making these concessions to Azerbaijan if he wanted to save the unity of Iran and the crown. Regardless of whether Qavam’s views in this matter are sound, it does not seem to me a question which I should attempt to give advice, certainly in the absence of a request by the Shah for his [my?] opinion. I would welcome Department’s views.33

Qavam said without elaboration, that a refusal to make further concessions to Azerbaijan might well result in war between Iran and the Soviet Union. I am inclined to believe that both in this statement and his remarks regarding the dynasty, Qavam is building up arguments in favor of making concessions to Azerbaijan.

Sent Dept 699, repeated Moscow 197 and Paris.

ALLEN

861.2459/5-1046: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1946—7 p. m.

US URGENT MOST IMMEDIATE

435. While our attitude in Iranian matter must be governed by nature of Iranian reply our present thinking follows these lines:

We favor dropping Iranian case from agenda if (1) Iran fails to report on May 20 as requested or (2) Iran reports it is unable to ascertain facts concerning Soviet troop withdrawal but fails to make clear-cut statement that this is due to Soviet interference in Iranian internal affairs.

We favor retention of Iranian case on agenda if (1) Iran reports its inability to ascertain facts is due to continued Soviet interference or (2) Iran requests Security Council remain seized of the complaint because of continuation of Soviet interference. In these two eventualities we favor following past procedures under which Iran would be permitted to state its case and Soviet Govt be allowed to reply.

Dept has indicated to Stettinius our view that S.C. should meet on May 22 to consider Iranian reply.

Sent to Tehran, repeated to Amdel, New York.

ACHESON

33 In telegram 440, May 17, 7 p. m., to Tehran, the Department stated: “We agree with your view that this is not kind of question in which you should give unsolicited advice. We are confident that you will be able, in case your advice is sought directly by Qavam or Shah, to give a reply which will be consonant with the assurances contained in the Declaration on Iran and which at the same time will avoid giving impression of a partisan attitude on part of this Govt in purely internal Iranian affairs.” (891.00/5-1546).
The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, May 17, 1946—4 p.m.
[Received May 17—2:40 p.m.]

709. Deptel 435, May 16. In all likelihood Iran will report to Council on May 20 that it is unable to ascertain facts regarding Soviet withdrawal but Iran will not make clear cut statement that inability is due to Soviet interference.

Action by Council to drop case from agenda will come as disappointment to many people in Iran, notably Shah and his group. However, further continuation of case on agenda is beginning to lose its efficacy in Iran and mere continuation may place Council in somewhat ridiculous plight. Fact that Soviet troops are generally believed to have withdrawn would make further continuation appear based on technicality without great substance.

It would be preferable from our point of view for US delegate not to make motion to drop case from agenda since we have been principal exponent of retaining case and our sudden change would be inevitably misconstrued.

If case is dropped, I strongly urge that US delegate point out that action is without prejudice to Iran’s right to bring matter to Council’s attention again if Iran should subsequently obtain information that all Soviet troops have not withdrawn or that foreign interference in internal Iranian affairs exists.34

Allen

501.BC/3-2046 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, May 20, 1946—3:15 p.m.
[Received May 20—3:12 p.m.]

201. Ambassador Ala and Judge O’Brien35 called on me today at Ambassador Ala’s request. Mr. H. Johnson and Mr. Noyes were with me.

34 In telegram 712, May 18, noon, the Ambassador in Iran reported that the Soviet Ambassador regarded the dispatch of Iranian representatives to Azerbaijan to report on Soviet troop withdrawals as an affront to the Soviet Union (561.24591/5-1846).

35 John Lord O’Brien of the firm of Covington, Burling, Rublee and Shorb. The services of this law firm had been engaged by the Iranian Government to assist in preparing its case before the Security Council.
Ambassador Ala said he had received no new information since Friday but expected a wire from Qavam today. Qavam had given him long and detailed explanations of his discussions with Pishevari and the reasons for Qavam’s refusal to accept Pishevari’s demands for autonomy beyond the Govt’s seven points. Ambassador Ala said that Qavam was clearly in a very difficult position. In the last of the conversations with Pishevari, the Russian Ambassador had been present and had unexpectedly sided with Pishevari in spite of previous agreement with Qavam on the Government’s seven points. Later the Russian Ambassador had talked of blood and iron and had appeared to threaten Qavam with serious consequences if he did not accept Pishevari’s demands.

Ambassador Ala indicated Qavam felt that the Russians were “riding” him and were right there at his doorstep in strength. He appreciated what the Security Council had done and hoped it could help Iran in her troubles. He apparently did not feel that he could take the initiative in the Security Council at this time.

Ambassador Ala then went on to say that he hoped that the Council could do something to help the situation. Latest newspaper reports indicated a situation bordering on civil war. Judge O’Brien indicated that he was very surprised at the report that the Iranian Government had attacked Azerbaijan since from the tone of Qavam’s cables it had not appeared that he was thinking of using force. He suggested that possibly the Iranian Army had gotten out of hand. Ambassador Ala interrupted to say that these reports came only from the Tabriz radio up to this time. He asked whether we had any information on the civil war and I said we did not. Both Ambassador Ala and Judge O’Brien made it clear that they felt the Russians were continuing to interfere in the present situation and that Russia was pulling all the strings in Azerbaijan at the present time. Her army might have gotten out of Iran officially but there was ample evidence that they had left behind soldiers in the Azerbaijan army or armed civilians and that they had equipped and trained the Azerbaijan Army with an eye to the present troubles. They thought that with the start of the fighting in Iran a new phase had been reached; that the Council could not ignore the present situation.

I asked Ambassador Ala whether he would report today. Ala said he would; that if he received no further telegram from Iran, he would have to report simply that he understood a Government commission had reached Tabriz but that no report covering Soviet withdrawals
had yet been received from them. I asked whether he would be able to make any references to continued Soviet interference. Ambassador Ala said he continued to feel that Iran had withdrawn only part of its complaint and that the complaint of interference still stood. I said I understood that and that Ala had indicated that to the press; I wondered, however, if this was the position of the Iranian Government. Judge O’Brian indicated that they had not received instructions on this point from Qavam and seemed to feel that it was rather doubtful whether Qavam could under the circumstances agree to take this position.

Ambassador Ala suggested that the Council might send a commission on investigation. I did not comment directly on this but in a discussion Judge O’Brian said that they were in position to present facts to such a committee. We indicated this was a new element since we had assumed that when the Iranians withdrew the complaint this meant that they would not present any further facts to the Council supporting their earlier claims. Judge O’Brian did not reply directly but said they had some evidence and depositions here in New York.

I then said that while we did not like the situation, it appears to us that after Iran’s action in withdrawing her complaint, it would be most helpful if she would take some affirmative step to help us deal with this difficult situation. I suggested that Ambassador Ala might come to the table at the forthcoming meeting on Wednesday and make some statements along the lines he had made in our discussion, which would make it possible for other members of the Council to take action without carrying the full responsibility on their own shoulders. Ambassador Ala said he would consider this very carefully.

STETTINIUS

[In telegram 720, May 20, 4 p.m., from Tehran, Ambassador Allen reported that the Iranian Prime Minister had “expressed hope to me last night that American delegation would state specifically at

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36 Mr. Ala, in a letter of May 20 to the President of the Security Council, stated that there was not sufficient first-hand information available to his Government as to the true state of affairs throughout Azerbaijan to make the complete report requested by the Security Council. Information available to him indicated that the Iranian Government was still prevented from exercising effective authority in Azerbaijan and that Soviet interference in Iranian internal affairs had not ceased. He asserted that the course of events since his report of May 6 demonstrated that the threat to the integrity of his country and to international peace had grown more serious. He noted further that if the reports of armed conflict in Azerbaijan were true, the danger to international peace and security was serious and imminent. For text of Ala’s letter, which was sent also to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., supp. No. 2, p. 52, or Department of State Bulletin, June 2, 1946, p. 941.
time Iranian case is dropped from Security Council agenda that Iran
was free to bring to the Council’s attention any further information
it might obtain regarding either Soviet troops which might have been
left behind in Iran or regarding interference in Iranian affairs by
Soviet nationals.” (861.24591/5-2046) In telegram 210, May 21, 1946,
11:10 a.m., Mr. Stettinus advised that he had informed the Nether-
lands Representative to the United Nations the same morning “that
while we were still studying the situation and had no fixed position
at the moment, our minds were running along the line of asking Ala
to explain why his Government has not been able to supply the infor-
mation the Council requested, and when he felt they could supply the
information. By this means we might continue the item on the agenda
until the Iran Government is in a position to make a firm statement.”
(501.BC/5-2146).]

861.24591/5-2146 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, MAY 21, 1946—5 P. M.

US URGENT

[RECEIVED MAY 22—5:56 P. M.]

726. PriMin today telegraphed Ala stating he had sent Inspection
Committee from Tehran to investigate evacuation of all of Azerbai-
jan and that during one week vital areas such as Tabriz and suburbs,
Marand, Julfa, Khoi, Salmas, Maku, Rezaieh and Miandoab were
carefully inspected. Inspectors’ reports state no sign has been found
of Soviet troops, armaments and transportation equipment. Te-
telegram concludes that according to investigations in all places through
local notables Soviet troops did evacuate Azerbaijan May 6th.37

It is clear from this that Qavam intends to report to Security Coun-
cil without reservation that Soviet troops have left Iran. It is also
clear from my talks with him that he knows that as result of this
action present Iranian case will be dropped from agenda.

So far as possible new case is concerned, PriMin seems to have in
mind possibility that if he gets substantial evidence of continued
Russian interference in Iran he will approach Soviet Govt with it
first and express hope that he will not find it necessary to make re-
newed appeal to Security Council.

Sent Dept 726, repeated Moscow 201.

ALLEN

37 A telegram from the Iranian Prime Minister along these lines was quoted
in a letter of May 21 from Ambassador Ala to the President of the Security Coun-
cil; for text of letter, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., supp. No. 5, p. 53, or Department of
SECRET

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

URGENT

New York, May 21, 1946—7 p.m.
[Received May 21—7 p.m.]

217. I called on M. Parodi \(^{33}\) at 4 o'clock this afternoon by appointment. Mr. J. E. Johnson \(^{36}\) accompanied me.

I told Parodi that the United States is considering very seriously bringing the Iranian question in its present status to the attention of the Security Council under article 35 of the Charter. If my Government definitely decides to do this I will make a statement to that effect at the Council meeting tomorrow, May 22, with the request that it be placed on the agenda for a meeting on Monday, May 27. I emphasized that this would constitute a separate agenda item and would not be dependent upon the information which the Iranian Government may present to the Council tomorrow. I explained that in the opinion of my Government the situation in Azerbaijan continues to constitute a matter of the kind with which the Council is legitimately concerned, and that this would remain true even though the Iranian Government should report that Soviet troops were completely withdrawn.

I further explained that the United States contemplates proposing the establishment of a Commission of Investigation to proceed to ascertain the facts with respect to the continuance of Soviet interference and to the reported civil war. I added that we are aware that a resolution proposing such a commission would require a substantive vote and that the question of a possible veto therefore arose.

I requested Parodi's comments which were elaborated in the subsequent discussion in the course of which we told him of the UP story to the effect that the Iranian Government had officially announced that their Commission of Inquiry reported that all Soviet troops had been withdrawn by May 6, and of the AP report that Prince Firouz had stated that Ala, in referring in his recent letter to continued Soviet interference, was expressing his personal views and not those of the Iranian Government. We also attempted without success to obtain Parodi's views with respect to the question of whether Soviet absence at the time of the vote would constitute a veto. We further endeavored, also without success, to persuade him that whether or not the matter constitutes a dispute within the meaning of chapter 6, the Soviet Union is a party to a dispute within the meaning of article 27 (3), since it is directly interested in the subject. On this second

\(^{33}\) Alexandre Parodi, the French Representative at the United Nations, who had assumed the Presidency of the Security Council on May 17.

\(^{36}\) Joseph E. Johnson, Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs.
point, Parodi first inquired whether this interpretation was generally accepted, and when informed that it is not, commented that he did not see how one could maintain that a dispute exists when the interested states do not make such a claim.

Parodi inquired on what basis the Iranian question could be considered within the Council’s competence if both parties maintain they are satisfied. He was informed that we have reports indicating that Soviet civilians remain in Azerbaijan and that Soviet troops are in the Azerbaijanian Army. Reference was also made to the role of the Soviet Ambassador in the negotiations between Pishevari and Qavam.

Alluding to the question of the freedom of action of the Iranian Government, Parodi expressed doubt whether a government which is actually engaged in fighting a civil war can be regarded as not having freedom of action.

At the end of the conversation, Parodi inquired whether the United States would not be satisfied to bring the situation to the attention of the Council as a new matter, without proposing at once the sending of a Commission of Investigation. We made no direct reply.

Throughout the conversation, which was hampered by language difficulties, Parodi manifested a spirit of caution, both as French delegate and as Chairman of the Council. He promised, however, to reflect on the matter, adding that the suggestion advanced by the United States took him somewhat by surprise as he had thought that the withdrawal of Soviet troops by May 6 constituted at least a “little” victory for the Council.

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501. BC/5-2146: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

SECRET URGENT
Washington, May 21, 1946—8 p. m.

67. For Stettinius. We suggest that at tomorrow’s meeting of the Security Council you make a statement along the following lines with respect to the Iranian matter:

In view of the record of Soviet-Iranian difficulties and differences and in view of the conflicting reports relating to the current situation in northern Iran, particularly in Azerbaijan, my Government would consider it most unfortunate for the Security Council at this time to drop the Iranian matter from its agenda. It will be recalled that in the Council’s resolution of April 4 the Council called upon the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government to report by May 6 whether the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the whole of Iran had been completed. The Soviet Government has made no report and no statement on this subject. Until today the Iranian Government was unable
to report factually as to Azerbaijan. It has today made a report
which on its face is incomplete and deals with only a portion of the
province of Azerbaijan. Moreover we must bear in mind that the
presence of Soviet troops on Iranian territory has been only one of
the subjects which has been a matter of dispute between the Soviet
and the Iranian Governments. For these reasons my Government
earnestly recommends that the Security Council should not at this
time drop the Iranian matter from its agenda.

I wish to add that my Government, which, as is well known, has
followed developments in the Iranian matter with the greatest con-
cern, has recently been giving careful consideration to requesting upon
its own initiative an investigation by the Council of the situation in
northern Iran in order to assist the Council to determine whether the
continuation of the situation in northern Iran was likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security. I do not at this
time propose that the Council take further action with respect to the
Iranian matter but I do wish to emphasize the feeling of my Gov-
ernment that it is most desirable that the Council continue to remain
seized of the Iranian matter and indicate thereby its continuing con-
cern in the developments with respect to northern Iran.

BYRNES

501.BC/5-2146 : Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)
to the Secretary of State
SECRET
URGENT

NEW YORK, May 21, 1946—10:00 p. m.

212. Security Council. Following the telephone conversation with
the Department at noon Tuesday, May 21, on the Iranian question,
various members of USdel conferred with some of the delegations
in regard to the tentative U.S. proposal to draw the Council’s atten-
tion to the situation in Iran and to send an investigating commission
to Iran to ascertain the facts.

The position of some of the other delegations, as reported in sep-
parate telegrams Tuesday afternoon,⁴⁰ is that France, Netherlands and
Egypt indicated opposition to the proposal; while the Australian,
British and Chinese delegates, lacking any definite instructions from
their Governments, indicated that they personally favored the
proposal.

M. Parodi (France) commented that he did not see how one could
maintain that a dispute exists when the interested States do not
make such a claim. Dr. Afifi (Egypt) was very firm in his view that

⁴⁰ None printed.
for the Council to attempt to send out a commission of investigation would be a serious mistake and was doubtful whether this could be done over the Soviets’ objection. He also felt it to be out of the question that such a commission would be allowed into Azerbaijan to make their investigation.

Dr. Van Kleffens (Netherlands) appeared favorably impressed with the U.S. proposal for bringing a new case, but was doubtful if it could be considered a dispute under article 27 (3), thus preventing a Soviet veto. He also was firm in his view that it would be a mistake to send an investigating commission since he felt the commission would never be allowed to enter Azerbaijan, a situation which would make the Council look impotent.

Before completing a check of the remaining delegations, USdel was informed by telephone of a possible change in instructions, which set forth that more time be taken to consider the problem and to discuss the matter more fully with other delegations.

Upon receipt of new instructions from the Department 41 Tuesday evening, USdel planned to contact some of the delegates previously reached in order to advise them of the change in plans.

[Here follows discussion of matters other than the Iranian question.]

STETTINIUS

501.BC/5-2246 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State*

NEW YORK, May 22, 1946—8:30 p.m.

223. Security Council. With the Soviet delegate absent, the Security Council at its 43rd meeting May 22,42 discussed for 90 minutes latest developments in the Iranian question and adjourned without reaching a decision. Ambassador Hussein Ala of Iran sat at the Council table, and answered questions of the delegates.

Various proposals were made, but only a Netherlands’ motion that the Council adjourn until an early date with the understanding that a meeting could be called at the request of any member was adopted. The Council remained seized with the Iranian question.

The Polish delegate, and to a lesser extent the French representative, favored removal of the Iranian question from the agenda, but the majority of the members were not satisfied that the latest report from the Iranian Prime Minister constituted a clear-cut declaration that Soviet troops had been withdrawn from the whole of Iran by May 6.

41 Presumably telegram 67, supra.
42 For the official record of the proceedings of the Security Council on May 22, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, pp. 287–305.

219-490—69——31
Mexico was represented by a new delegate, Padilla Nervo, when President Alexandre Parodi (France) called the session to order at 11:06 a.m. The provisional agenda and the Mexican delegate's credentials were adopted without observations.

The President said that a telegram had been received from the Government of Iran which was at first understood to be concerned with the Iranian question. He was referring to a message which was later found to refer to the world food situation. He called attention to the May 20 letter of Ambassador Ala which stated that while precise information on the situation in Iran had not been received, he (Ala) concluded that conditions set by the Security Council had not been fulfilled. Chairman Parodi then asked Assistant Secretary General Sobolev to read a May 21 telegram from the Iranian Government, which pointed out that the Prime Minister of Iran had sent a commission to Azerbaijan to investigate carefully regions such as Tabriz and its suburbs, Marand, Julfa, Khoi, Salmas, Maju, Rizaiyeh and Mianduab. The Prime Minister's message added that telegraphic reports are to the effect that no trace whatever of Soviet troops, equipment or means of transport were found, and that according to trustworthy people, who were questioned in the above-mentioned places, Soviet troops evacuated Iran on May 6th.

The British delegate wondered what proportion of the territory formerly occupied by Soviet troops was represented in the places named in the latest report and whether the report satisfied the Government of Teheran that the evacuation of Soviet troops was complete. He said he should like to know what steps the Commission took to satisfy itself and to verify that equipment and means of transport had been removed and whether reports that Soviet soldiers had been left behind in Azerbaijan in civilian clothes had been investigated.

Dr. Lange (Poland) regretted the way the whole Iranian matter had been treated by the Council, calling attention to the April 15 letter in which Iran withdrew its complaint from the Council. He thought the Iranian question had been used to create trouble and make Iran a perpetual and permanent football of big power politics. He said the latest statement of the Prime Minister of Iran closed the case effectively and was of the opinion that the question as to whether the Iranian Government was able to send its agents to Azerbaijan should be treated as an internal affair attributable to conflicts between the Province and the Central Government.

At the suggestion of Dr. Van Kleffens (Netherlands), Ambassador Ala was at this point invited to sit at the Council table. In response to questions, Ala said that in his opinion the first Iranian complaint that Soviet representatives were interfering in the internal affairs of Iran brought at the London meetings was still on the Council agenda. He stated that the Iranian complaint of March 18 concerned the
failure of the Soviet Government to withdraw its troops on the date stipulated in the Tripartite Treaty, but that it also maintained the first complaint of interference had not ceased. He thought that the April 15 letter from the Government of Iran, which came after the Soviet Government had assured the Iranian Government that all Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Iran by May 6, and which asked that the complaint be withdrawn, dealt only with the evacuation issue. He felt that the Iranian complaint on interference had not been withdrawn.

Before calling on Mr. Stettinius, President Parodi said that he thought as President of the Council he should express regret that the first communication received in New York from the Iranian Government came without the specific orders from the Iranian Government and was shortly afterwards contradicted by the Iranian Prime Minister.

Mr. Stettinius suggested that the Council again defer action on the Iranian matter, explaining that the U.S. did not believe that the Council had sufficient basis for taking definite action. He called attention to conflicting reports on the current troubled situation in Iran and the record of the Soviet-Iranian difficulties and differences and said the U.S. would consider it most unfortunate for the Council at that time to drop the Iranian question from the list of matters of which it was seized.

The U.S. representative stated that the Soviet Government had made no report to the Council and no statement on the subject of evacuation of its troops from Iran and the Iranian Government had been unable until May 21, to report any official findings as to Azerbaijan. He described the latest Iranian report as incomplete and inconclusive, adding that it dealt with only the western portion of the Province of Azerbaijan. The presence of Soviet troops in Iranian territory has been only one of the subjects which has been a matter of controversy between the Soviet and Iranian Governments, he said.

Mr. Stettinius declared that the U.S. Government had followed developments in the Iranian question with the greatest concern and recently had considered requesting upon its own initiative an investigation by the Council of the situation in Northern Iran in order to assist the Council to determine whether the continuance of the situation there was likely to endanger international peace and security. He said he was not suggesting an investigation at that time, but emphasized that his Government thought it most desirable that the Council continue to remain seized of the Iranian matter, indicating thereby its continuing concern in this potentially dangerous and as yet unclarified situation.45

45 For the text of Mr. Stettinius’ remarks, see SC, 1st yr., 1st ser., No. 2, p. 287.
Sir Alexander Cadogan (U.K.) endorsed the U.S. suggestion, stating that the latest word from the Iranian Government was an interim report which was inconclusive. He wondered whether the Commission sent to Azerbaijan enjoyed liberty of movement and action, pointing out that its information appeared to be largely second-hand.44

Ala asserted that he believed it was long after May 6 that Soviet troops had actually been withdrawn from Azerbaijan, if they actually have been entirely evacuated. He described the latest telegraphic report from his Prime Minister as inconclusive, pointing out it did not clearly state that all troops from the whole of Azerbaijan had been withdrawn.

At this point Ala reminded President Parodi that he was bound by the time limit which had been fixed by the Council for May 20 to put in a report on that date giving what information on the evacuation of Soviet troops from Iran was at his disposal. He said he had truthfully represented the situation in his letter of May 20, but the next day he received a communication from his Government and he had submitted that also.

In answer to a series of questions from the Polish representative, Ala said that the Iranian Government was not in authority in Azerbaijan; that the lack of authority there stemmed from Soviet interference; that he knew of no interference from any other large power; and that the Iranian Government was faced with a hostile army in Azerbaijan which was created under the Soviet supervision and which will not let the regular Army of Iran into Azerbaijan. Asked by Dr. Lange how the investigating Commission got into Azerbaijan and whether the Commission made its inspection through a telescope from an airplane, Ala replied that the Commission was a temporary unit and that it presumably went into Azerbaijan with the permission of Tabriz. Ala added that the Commission traveled in a Soviet plane.

The Iranian Ambassador disclosed that the Soviet Ambassador to Iran was present during recent discussions between Prime Minister Qavam and Pishevari and that the Soviet representative urged Qavam to accept the unacceptable demands of the "insurgent" Azerbaijan group. He added this amounted to interference in Iranian internal affairs.45

44 "Telegram 169, May 23, noon, from Tabriz, reported that the verification by the Iranian Government "consisted of conducted tours of five or six towns in Pishevari's car. Pishevari told correspondents today that although commission 'have freedom to visit any part of Azerbaijan, they are of course not allowed to see any Azerbaijani military installations.'" (S91.00-5-2346)

45 In telegram 219, May 22, 6: 45 p. m., Mr. Stettinus gave his opinion "that Ala had made up his mind before the meeting that this was his last chance to speak and that he could serve his country best by speaking out openly today. . . . In my opinion Ala has intentionally taken his political life in his hands in speaking out so courageously and openly today." (501.BC/5-2246)
Mr. Stettinius said that he believed more than ever after hearing Ala the Council would make a mistake if it dropped the matter and repeated his suggestion that action be deferred.

President Parodi offered a compromise proposal, providing that the Council continue the Iranian question on its agenda for a week or 10 days and, if at that time no information had been received contradicting the May 21 telegram of the Iranian Prime Minister, the matter would be dropped.

Parodi’s proposal was not acceptable to the British delegate who said that he believed a definite and conclusive statement from the Iranian Government that the evacuation had been completed was necessary before the Council could remove the issue from its agenda. Stettinius associated himself with Cadogan’s statement.

A discussion on various adjournment suggestions followed. Dr. Lange proposed that adjournment be voted with the stipulation that the Council direct a query to the Iranian Government asking it to state definitely with a yes or no answer whether the evacuation of Soviet troops from Iran had been completed. The Dutch and British delegates thought the Iranian Government was experiencing enough difficulties and such a telegram might prove embarrassing.

The Van Kleeffens motion to adjourn until an early date was carried by nine votes with Dr. Lange abstaining. Following the adjournment vote, the President put the Lange proposal to dispatch a query to the Iranian Government to a vote and it was defeated when only Parodi and Lange favored sending such a telegram.

[Stettinius]

501. BC/5–2246: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1946—8 p. m.

US URGENT

451. SC member has expressed to Stettinius his concern that Ala’s forthright statements to Council today (Summary of proceedings being sent you separate tel 46) may result in his being recalled or repudiated by Qavam. Ala’s statements were made in reply to specific questions from Council members and, in view recent reports from Tehran, appear to have gone beyond his definite instructions. Member feels strongly Ala has rendered outstanding service to Council and that it would be most unfortunate for UN if he were to be recalled or repudiated. He expressed hope Dept might request you to use your influence so that Qavam will not recall or repudiate Ala.

46 No. 453, May 22, not printed; it furnished the text of telegram 223, printed supra.
We feel that recall or repudiation of Ala at this time would impair
ability of Council to give aid to Iran and hope Qavam will refrain
from taking precipitous action against Ala under Soviet pressure.
Ala has told us that, while he may have gone beyond specific instruc-
tions in certain instances, he feels he has properly interpreted Qavam’s
factual cables and has taken action which Qavam would instruct if
Iran were not under Soviet pressure. In any event he has felt it his
duty as representative of Iran to speak out truthfully in the interests
his country regardless consequences to himself. It should be stated
Ala has followed this course of action on own decision and has not been
influenced by Dept to go beyond his instructions.

Sent Tehran repeated Moscow as Dept’s 953, and New York as
Dept’s 70.

Byrnes

861.24591/5-2346: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 23, 1946—8 p. m.

US URGENT    MOST IMMEDIATE

459. Since US position in SC Wed differed from tentative position
outlined my 435, May 16, you will be interested in factors causing
change of policy.

On Mon, May 20, earlier position was changed to forthright stand
calling for new case involving situation of Soviet interference and
for establishment commission of inquiry to be sent to Iran. This
stand was based upon following developments: (1) Reports of civil
war in Iran; (2) Iranian letter to SC dated May 20, which gave no
indication of when ever complete report would be forthcoming; (3)
Brit instructions that Cadogan propose as procedural matter com-
mission of inquiry to investigate presence Soviet forces in Iran. Tak-
ing into account world opinion re SC, past initiative of US in Iranian
case, prima facie evidence of Soviet interference, and time element
affecting instructions of other SC reps, Dept was willing for US rep
to offer strong affirmative resolution, despite recognition of probable
Soviet veto preventing adoption resolution.

On Tues, May 21, certain developments occurred which led to modi-
fication of above stand in favor of action subsequently taken by US
rep outlined my 453, May 22.47 Those developments were: (1) Tehran
reports (a) that no civil war existed, (b) that Qavam was advising
Ala of Soviet troop withdrawal, (c) that Commission of Inquiry
would not be welcomed by Iran, (d) that Ala’s letter of May 20 had

47 Not printed; but see footnote 46, p. 477.
been repudiated; (2) attitude of SC members (a) some anxious to drop Iranian case, (b) others merely willing retain case on agenda, (c) only Brit rep definitely agreeable to strong US proposal, (d) Dutch and Egyptian reps fearing commission would be vetoed or denied entry Azerbaijan with consequent loss of dignity to SC, and (e) time element operating against new instructions to SC reps generally which would insure support US proposal.

Purpose of US proposal adopted by SC setting no fixed date for further consideration Iranian matter was to permit our freedom of action, in light of developments, along either of two future courses: (1) to agree to drop Iranian case should some other SC member so propose and should majority SC sentiment favor such action; (2) to permit us or some other SC member to move for affirmative Council action in matter of Soviet interference.

Dept following current developments closely and would appreciate your info on following subjects: (1) presence of and interference by Soviet troops in Azerbaijan, especially in areas not covered in Iranian letter May 21; (2) specific instances of interference of Soviet agents, officials, or soldiers in civilian clothes in Iran, especially in Azerbaijan; (3) degree of Soviet pressure behind recent statements of Qavam and Firouz; (4) possible future reaction of Iranian Govt to SC commission of inquiry. In addition to treatment above subjects your estimate of general situation and your recommendation of specific future US position SC would be appreciated.

Sent to Tehran, repeated to N.Y., London, and Moscow.

BYRNES

501.BC/5-2446: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

SECRET New York, May 24, 1946—1:30 p.m.

URGENT [Received May 24—12:53 p.m.]

226. Ambassador Gromyko informed me last evening that the Tass radio broadcast from Moscow yesterday to the effect that the Soviets had evacuated all their troops from Iran by May 9 was "official." He made this statement with considerable emphasis.

In a discussion of the Iranian situation with a member of the USdel last evening, Sir Alexander Cadogan indicated that he thought it was

48 Telegram 1631, May 24, from Moscow, advised of a despatch from Tbilisi printed in the Soviet press on May 24 reporting an announcement by the Trans-Caucasian Military District that the evacuation of Soviet troops from Iran had been completed on May 9. The despatch stated that the date of evacuation corresponded with the evacuation plan announced by the Military District at the end of March. (861.2451/5-2246)
likely that Ala would be repudiated very shortly. He expected the Russians to put heavy pressure on Qavam to state they were satisfied that the Soviets had completely withdrawn, and to repudiate Ala’s contention that Iran had never intended to withdraw its complaint regarding Soviet interference in Iranian internal affairs. Sir Alexander said he had reported his views to the Foreign Office. He thought that if Qavam submitted to Soviet pressure, there was really nothing for the Council to do but to drop the matter from its agenda. He thought that if it were necessary to do this, it was important that at the same time some members of the Council should make it clear to the world that they considered that the Iranian Government had been put under heavy pressure by the Soviets; that the separatist movement in Azerbaijan was a direct consequence of Soviet interference in the past in a violation of the 1942 treaty and of the Charter. He also felt that if Qavam gave the USSR a clean bill of health, this would be an inopportune moment for any other member of the Council to bring a new complaint against the USSR; that it would be wise to wait for further developments which might provide a basis for Council action. 

STETTINIUS

501. BC/5-2546: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Tehran, May 25, 1946—noon.

US URGENT

[Received 4:38 p.m.]

750. Qavam received me immediately following receipt Department’s 451 May 22. In response my opening question regarding his reaction to Security Council’s decision retain Iranian case on agenda he said attitude American delegation pleased him but attitude and remarks of his own delegate had caused him most serious embarrassment and difficulty. He then launched into strong criticism of Ala before I had opportunity to explain purpose my visit.

It seemed evident he felt he had no alternative but to recall Ala in view of impossible position in which Ala’s letter to Security Council of May 20 had placed Qavam. He read me the telegram he had just sent Ala, instructing him categorically to withdraw from Security Council any statements Ala had made beyond his instructions. Qavam said Soviet Ambassador had called on him at 11 p.m. May 21, accusing Qavam of double dealing and hypocrisy. Qavam said Ala’s statements before Security Council on May 22 to effect that Soviet Ambassador had insisted upon Qavam’s accepting unacceptable Azerbaijani demands and that Qavam’s instructions to Ala regarding withdrawal of Soviet troops were inconclusive, had laid Qavam open
to proper complaint by Soviet Ambassador of duplicity, since Qavam had assured Sadchikoff he was satisfied all Soviet troops had left and would report definitively to Council to this effect. Moreover Qavam said that in all fairness he must say that the Soviet Ambassador had never pressed him to accept unacceptable Azerbaijan demands.

I told Qavam that while I could appreciate difficult position in which he found himself, I could say that from close association with Ala over long period, I had never known Ala to refuse to carry out instructions he received from Tehran, however objectionable they might be from his point of view. I referred specifically to Ala’s request that Council drop Iranian case, under instructions in which, Qavam knew, Ala did not concur. I felt confident Ala would carry out loyally any instructions he received and suggested that Qavam might wish to instruct Ala very precisely. Qavam said he had done so three times already, the latest being a few hours previous to our conversation. He had no confidence however that Ala would obey his last instructions any better than previous ones.

He said Soviet Ambassador had complained bitterly against Ala on three occasions, once in the presence of the Shah, and had pointed out that if a Soviet diplomat went beyond his instructions for one minute, he would be recalled immediately.

I then pointed out that Ala’s recall at this time might well do serious harm to Security Council and consequently to Iranian interests. Recall now would be construed as repudiation not only of Ala’s unauthorized statements but everything he had said. Qavam then suggested he might allow Ala to remain as Ambassador in Washington but send separate delegate to United Nations. I said such action at present would be open to same objections as Ala’s recall. I suggested that Qavam might wish to instruct Ala to return to Washington, but without withdrawing his credentials as Representative to United Nations. I agreed to suggest to Department that American delegation in Security Council attempt to arrange matters so that Ala would not be called personally to Council table again in near future. Qavam asked how Iran could express views to Council under such arrangement. I said Ala could communicate with Secretary General in writing whenever Qavam instructed him to do so.

Qavam said my suggestions seemed reasonable. At close of discussion, he agreed not to take any action regarding Ala’s recall at present, and I agreed to make recommendations to Department in foregoing sense.

Meanwhile Tabriz Government continues violent demand for recall and punishment of Ala, and local Tudeh Press is following similar line.
I urge Department to impress on Ala urgent necessity for him to confine his remarks to letter of his instructions.  

Allen

891.00/3-2546: Telegram  

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

SECRET  

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1946—5 p. m.  

US URGENT MOST IMMEDIATE

464. Ala informed Dept officials in confidence May 24 of receipt on May 23 of instruction from Qavam to withdraw from SC letter of May 20. This letter had asserted dispute between Iran and USSR "cannot be said, in reality, to have been resolved in manner consistent with purposes and principles of Charter of UN, and that recent events demonstrated that threat to integrity of Iran and to international peace has grown more serious." Amb has replied to Qavam in following sense: throughout Iranian case, he has had single purpose of strengthening Qavam's hand in holding out for seven points in negotiations with Pishevari and in effecting settlement consistent with Const of Iran; on May 20 and at all times, he had told SC only truth as furnished by latest cables received from Qavam at the time; that SC members knew what Ala had said was true and had so informed press; and that, therefore, it would be unconvincing to retract anything that he has said to SC. Reply continued at length to underscore seriousness of situation re Azerbaijan and suggested that Qavam alone seemed unaware of true state of affairs in North. In sending this reply, Ala had in mind Qavam's recent cables to effect that interference is obviously continuing; that Iran, while not overlooking immediate pressure of Russians, needed UN assistance; and that Pishevari's charge against Qavam of double-dealing had admittedly posed a choice for Qavam to make between UN and USSR.

In our view, Qavam would materially weaken ability of UN to assist Iran if he should insist upon withdrawal of letter. Furthermore, disavowal by Iran Government of Ala for his efforts on behalf of Iran would be likely to strengthen belief already prevalent in some circles that it is useless to endeavor to preserve Iranian independence and integrity so long as members of Iranian Government show a greater desire to propitiate the very forces which they admit privately are interfering in Iranian internal affairs than to give UN the facts which it should have in order to take effective action in the matter.

Byrnes

*The letter was not withdrawn.*
SECRET

NEW YORK, May 25, 1946—2:45 p. m. [Received 3:20 p. m.]

233. Dr. Quo (China) and Sir Alexander Cadogan (UK) called upon me this morning. Cadogan opened the conversation by stating that Van Kleffens yesterday discussed with him various alternative methods for dealing with the Iranian matter. He added that he and Quo had been in conference this morning and had reached certain tentative conclusions which they wished to discuss with me. Since Quo was indisposed, Cadogan did practically all the talking.

Cadogan said he thought that Ala would very probably receive instructions today to notify the Council within the next 48 hours that his Government desires the entire Iranian matter to be dropped by the Council. Cadogan and Quo thought that in the event we do not hear from Ala by, say, Tuesday mid-day, some member of the Council should ask for a meeting not later than Wednesday at which it would be requested that Ala come to the table. They believe Ala should then be asked whether his Government still desires that the second half of the original London complaint relating to internal interference in Iran be continued on the agenda. If Ala responds affirmatively and states that the Iranian Government wishes the question of internal interference to be kept on the agenda, the Council should then reach a decision to remain seized of the question.

However, if Ala on instructions states that his Government does not desire that this aspect of the problem continue on the agenda, Cadogan and Quo agree with Van Kleffens that the Council should then take some collective action. This should preferably be in the form of a resolution indicating that, while the Council is not fully satisfied with conditions in Iran, no useful purpose can be served by continuing the question on the agenda longer.

Cadogan and Quo left me at 11:45 a. m. to draft a resolution in the above sense. Cadogan will give me a copy and I shall transmit it immediately to the Department. 50

Before leaving, Cadogan volunteered that, in any event, he did not feel his proposed course of action would interfere in the event that the United States at any time would wish to enter a new complaint within the Council, as suggested by us a few days ago.

STETTINIUS

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50 Transmitted in telegram 234, May 25, 1946, 4:30 p. m., not printed.
SECRET

TEHRAN, May 25, 1946—5 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received May 26—4:30 p. m.]

752. Background furnished in Department’s 459, May 23, regarding US attitude on Iranian case in Security Council is most helpful. Qavam had expected report he made to Security Council to result in case being dropped from agenda, and line we took in meeting of May 22 caused some surprise but apparently no harm done.

I suggested some caution in future regarding press reports of civil disturbances. We will make every effort to keep Department promptly informed of any significant developments in this field.

As regards specific questions at end of telegram under reference:

1. I think it entirely safe to say there are no Soviet troops in Soviet uniforms in Iran with possible insignificant stray exceptions. On the other hand, there is too much evidence of presence of Soviet citizens in Azerbaijan, many with military training, to leave any doubt on this score. I have tried hard to obtain some estimate regarding numbers but few persons are willing to make any guess. Vice Consul Dooher, arrived today from Tabriz, estimates 2500 persons in city of Tabriz who could properly claim Soviet citizenship but he says this is mere guess and that many of them are of Turkish race and might also have claim to Iranian citizenship. He has heard one estimate of 150 genuine Russians from European Russia, but thinks this number too small if Soviet consular staff and officials are included. Tabriz is by far largest single center of Soviet activity. As regards interference, majority Soviet subjects are in Azerbaijan Army uniforms and are in charge Azerbaijan detachments at key points. Captain Gagarine says blond officer in Azerbaijan uniform who stopped him on route Tabriz could neither read nor speak anything except Russian. It would be unwarranted to assume from this incident that number of persons this type in Azerbaijan is necessarily large.

2. Specific instances of Soviet interference other than type indicated above are hard to establish, particularly in view difficulty to define what constitutes interference. Pishevari visits Soviet Consulate Tabriz frequently, especially in times of crisis, and Soviet Consul sees him often. It is evident that Pishevari leans on him heavily for advice, but I doubt very much that Soviet agents have found it necessary to use threats or even pressure. Pishevari group seeks Soviet assistance, often more than it obtains. As regards Soviet activities in Tehran, Security Council case seems to have had salutary effect on Soviet attitude, at least for the moment. Soviet Ambassador is bewildered by Qavam’s unpredictability and especially by Ala’s statements, and he suspects, despite Qavam’s denial, that Qavam may be instructing Ala to take line he has.

3. While Firuz is playing Soviet game he is doing so for own ulterior motives of retaining power and ultimate revenge on Shah. As regards Qavam, while strong and improper Soviet pressure was exerted on him while Soviet troops were still here, I could not honestly
say that at present he receives or acts on Soviet advice more often than on my own. Qavam thinks he is playing clever game with Leftists and Soviets, to obtain firm control of government and elect a Majlis he can dominate. Qavam probably expects to turn against Leftist at what he considers proper time, perhaps 6 months hence.

4. At present moment Iranian Government and large part Iranian public would not welcome Security Council inquiry commission. However, Qavam appreciates strength which Security Council gives him and might possibly welcome inquiry or at least threat of inquiry later if negotiations with Azerbaijan go badly.

As regards general situation, Iranian Minister Posts and Telegraph Ghaffari reflected to me yesterday attitude voiced frequently by important Iranian officials, including Qavam, that British actions and interference in Iranian affairs today are as extensive and objectionable as Soviet. My request for factual evidence of present British activity usually produces merely references to past history, but recent press story (see Moscow 623 [1623], May 235) that Ghaffari has confirmed British failure to evacuate Bushire, indicates attitude of large part Iranian officials and public.

It is not difficult to envisage that if next Iranian Cabinet is only slightly more to Left than present one, it might complain to Security Council against Britain. If suitable opportunity or provocation should arise even Qavam who knows that British do not like him might appeal against alleged British activity. Such an appeal would be carried through with more consistency than one against Soviets because of less fear of reprisals and equal if not more public support.

Actions of British in withdrawing troops by March 2 and overwhelming difference between British and Soviet attitudes towards Iranian case in Security Council seem, remarkably enough, not to have made any great impression on Iranians. In my view, Iranian appeal against British interference at present would be unwarranted, since British Ambassador appears to be carrying out loyally his instructions to keep hands off.

It is important to keep Iranian attitude towards British in mind to interpret Iranian Government’s attitude towards question of Soviet interference before Security Council. I would suggest caution on our part to avoid getting too far out on a limb on question of Soviet interference without more positive evidence to support Ala’s general accusations. Our sponsorship of complaints which are difficult to substantiate convincingly may rise to plague us in future cases before Security Council.

I am inclined to think on balance that it would be preferable for Security Council to terminate existing case on agenda. Iranian Government should not be encouraged to bring new case in future unless

* Not printed.
it has clear evidence which it is willing to place before Council and to stick to its guns. It may become appropriate for a member of Security Council to raise new case on his own initiative, but I do not think we should attempt to fight any case based on continuing Soviet interference unless we have more demonstrable proof than at present.

Open Soviet interference during last fall and winter has already achieved its purpose in the establishment of a functioning Azerbaijan govt and subsequent reports of concrete Soviet intervention are becoming increasingly scarce. It is entirely possible that Russians feel their work is so well done they can afford to leave rest to Azerbaijanis themselves except for the offer of advice from time to time. This latter is form of intervention almost impossible to prove.

Most likely case for Council intervention in connection Azerbaijan dispute would result from open Soviet assistance to Tabriz in case of civil war.

Allen

761.91/5-2646: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, May 26, 1946—11 a. m.

[Received 4:36 p. m.]

753. Shah indicated to me last night his increasing dissatisfaction with what he termed passive policy Qavam and his conviction that Govt must take forceful measures to prevent country from becoming puppet of USSR. He made every effort to obtain from me assurances of more direct American support to counteract Soviet penetration.

I repeated to him advice I had given him and other Iranian officials that only effective support US could give Iran was through United Nations.

Shah said this was not immediate enough for Iran’s needs and expressed desire for American and British activity in Iranian affairs to offset Soviet activity. I said such policy was contrary to American character and urged him not to invite any foreign interference since whole effort of UN [US] was to prevent foreign interference in Iran.

Allen

891.00/5-2746

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (Minor)

[WASHINGTON,] May 27, 1946.

The Iranian Ambassador called today at his own request. He referred to a telegram he sent last week to Prime Minister Qavam urging
that the Prime Minister take a strong line vis-à-vis the Russians and the Azerbaijansis, and that he keep the Iranian case before the Security Council. The Ambassador then gave a summary of a reply he received yesterday from the Prime Minister. This telegram reiterated the Prime Minister's previous messages to the effect he is resolved to follow a policy of conciliation with the Russians. The Prime Minister declared in strong terms that the Ambassador's action before the Security Council had caused him the greatest embarrassment. As a result of this the Prime Minister stated that henceforth Mr. Ala was to confine his activities to acting as Iranian Ambassador to the United States. The Ambassador was to take no action before the Security Council. The Prime Minister stated that if matters are to be taken up with the Security Council, the Iranian Government will "find some other means of doing it."

The Ambassador stated he was not surprised at this action by Qavam. He had expected this and had even anticipated that he might be dismissed as Ambassador. He said that he had taken this risk with his eyes open and had decided that he must speak out clearly in protection of the interests of his country. Ambassador Ala again urged that the Department take a strong line in the Security Council in protection of Iranian interests.

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501.BC/5-2746: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinus)*

to the Secretary of State

**SECRET**

**US URGENT**

New York, May 27, 1946—6 p. m.  
[Received 9:29 p. m.]

237. At Sir Alexander Cadogan's request, I attended an informal meeting this afternoon in his sitting room. Dr. Quo, Dr. Van Kleffens, Mr. Herschel Johnson, Mr. Noyes and Mr. Lawford 52 were present. Sir Alexander said that Dr. Van Kleffens had suggested certain changes in the draft resolution which I sent you in No. 234 of May 25. 53 He subsequently circulated a revised draft which I am wiring separately in No. 238. 54

I said that I had sent a copy of the first draft of this resolution to Washington but was not yet in a position to tell them what my Government's views would be. I said I had received some preliminary

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52 Valentine G. Lawford, attached to the British delegation at the United Nations.
53 Not printed, but see telegram 233, May 25, from New York, and footnote 50, p. 483.
54 Not printed.
reactions. Our view was that it would be wiser not to take any immediate steps to hold a Council meeting. I thought we should wait until Ambassador Ala submitted a report to the Council and then hold a meeting 2 or 3 days later. I also stated that our preliminary thinking was to the effect that if the Iranian Government, as expected, stated that they were satisfied that the Soviet troops had withdrawn and wanted the Council to drop the whole matter from its agenda, we would favor dropping the matter from the Council's agenda. We had almost made up our minds that in such an event it would be inopportune to request the Council to investigate the situation in Azerbaijan along the lines of the proposal I had discussed with them last week. I indicated that we would not want to take the initiative in requesting the Council to drop the matter from its agenda; we were wondering whether it would not be best to let the French and Polish delegations make such a proposal.

There seemed to be considerable agreement with these points. It was pointed out that this coming Thursday was a holiday and probably the Council would not want to meet between Wednesday and Monday. If by Monday Ala had not reported, Sir Alexander thought we might want to take some action to have a meeting. I agreed and said I thought we also would want to do so. Sir Alexander also indicated he would be glad to have the French and Polish delegation make the original proposal to drop the matter but thought it might be necessary for one of the "right thinking delegations" to make the specific suggestion. I said I could not comment on the resolution as a whole but I understood that my Government had not decided whether it wanted to drop the matter with a stern rebuke to the Soviet Union, a moderate statement of dissatisfaction, or with no comment whatever.

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65 These views were transmitted by telephone on May 27 to Mr. Noyes in New York by Mr. Hiss. Mr. Hiss' memorandum of conversation on that date stated in part:

"As a result of the morning meeting in Mr. Acheson's office I informed Mr. Noyes by telephone that the subject of telegrams 233 and 234 of May 25 had not yet been taken up definitively with the Secretary although the Secretary had apparently indicated very briefly to Mr. Acheson that his initial reaction was that the case would have to be dropped if Ala were, as anticipated, to inform the Council that Soviet troops have withdrawn from all of Azerbaijan and that the Iranian Government wishes to withdraw all aspects of its complaint from the agenda.

"I said that we were all in complete agreement that there seemed to be no reason for hurrying a decision and that we could not quite understand why Cadogan and Quo seemed to feel that some action was immediately necessary. We felt that until the anticipated report from Ala eventuates no action is called for and that even after such a report by Ala no action would be called for for three days or so. Consequently we certainly disagreed with the suggestion made by Cadogan and Quo, as reported in telegram 233, that a meeting should be asked for by Wednesday. In this connection I said that we also thought it would be inadvisable as suggested by Cadogan and Quo to have Ala present at the next meeting of the Council in as much as this would only compromise Ala." (S61.24501/5-2746).
Van Kleffens raised the question whether or not this resolution could be passed by procedural vote. It was apparently the general view that a decision to drop the matter from the agenda should be taken by a procedural vote, but there appeared to be some doubt as to whether the Council could state its collective opinion on the matters in the resolution by procedural vote. It was suggested that if these matters were put in whereas clauses, with the resolution merely stating that the matter was dropped from the agenda, this might avoid the difficulty.

[Here follows further discussion of the draft resolution.]

STETTINIUS

891.00/5–2846: Telegram

_The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State_

SECRET

TEHRAN, May 28, 1946—10 a.m.

US URGENT

[Received 3:57 p.m.]

762. Deptel 464, May 25. Ward saw Qavam last night and conveyed Dept’s views that withdrawal of Ala’s letter of May 20 to SC would be unfortunate.

He did not indicate that Ala had approached Dept but rather explained our interest on basis of Qavam’s remarks to Ambassador as reported Embtel May 25.56

PriMin said Ala had disregarded instructions to withdraw letter and apparently had no intention of withdrawing it. It appeared from his remarks that Qavam does not plan to pursue matter further, although he is apprehensive Soviet Ambassador may continue to press for withdrawal.

He asserted he was very anxious not to weaken Iran’s position before UN and wished to maintain good will and sympathy of American Government and people toward Iran.

Qavam said Ala had been ordered return Washington. If Iran should need representative to appear again before SC, new one would be designated.

ALLEN

501. BC/5–2846: Telegram

_The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State_

SECRET

NEW YORK, May 28, 1946—11:20 p.m.

URGENT


56 Telegram 750, p. 480.

219–490–69—32
that a Council meeting should be deferred for a few days in the expectation of a report from the Iranian Government. If this report states that Soviet troops have been evacuated, but does not state that they withdraw charges of Soviet interference, then the Council should remain seized only of the latter charge. If Iran desires to withdraw both complaints, the Foreign Office feels that the complaint on interference should be retained on the agenda until the Council was fully convinced there was no interference.

Cadogan explained that this would be done by changing his draft resolution—dropping the second paragraph and adding to the end of the fourth paragraph a sentence to the effect that the Council should remain seized of the Iranian matter until it was satisfied that there was no longer any interference by the U.S.S.R. in the internal affairs of Iran.

Mr. Stettinius explained to Cadogan that he probably could not support Cadogan’s original draft resolution since the U.S. felt it would be unwise for the Council to state formally that it was dissatisfied with its own decision, thus putting the Council in an undignified position. Cadogan said he would inform the Foreign Office of this immediately and, in addition, of the fact that the U.S. favored a simple resolution merely referring to the Iranian report and stating that the Council therefore dropped the matter.

It was agreed that if no report were received from Iran by June 4, there should be another discussion of the question of whether a Council meeting should be called to consider what should be done.

[Here follows an account of further discussions by members of the American delegation with members of the Australian, Mexican, and French delegations on the Iranian situation and on other matters.]

_STETTINIUS_

891.00/5-3146: Telegram

_The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State_

SECRET

TEHRAN, May 31, 1946—3 p.m.
[Received May 31—1:35 p.m.]

777. It seems evident that Qavam is attempting to conciliate Tudeh Party in anticipation forthcoming elections and is making every effort to elect Majlis which he can control. Since Tudeh is only large, well organized and functioning political machine in Iran he wishes to use it for his own purposes if he can.

Thus in Embassy’s opinion Qavam’s action in removing Ala from position of Iranian representative before Security Council was not solely or even primarily result of Soviet pressure but was basically
internal political move designed to placate Left elements in Azerbaijan and elsewhere. (Personal pique against Ala may also have had some influence in decision.)

Qavam is continuing to play risky political game. He appears to believe that once he has elected Majlis under his own control he can reverse trend to Left and steer Government more towards center.

He is undoubtedly aware of danger that situation might get beyond his control (many Rightists believe this has already happened) but is willing to risk it, apparently feeling that course to Left at moment is only means of settling Azerbaijan question peacefully and winning elections. His recent decree calling for distribution of state lands to peasants is important maneuver in this direction.

Additional dangers are that even if Qavam should succeed in electing Deputies he desires, he may not be able to control them. Moreover, political machine will be built up which will fall into subversive hands whenever Qavam leaves office.

On other hand, Qavam’s friendly attitude towards Tudeh has one potential advantage in that it might tend to remove Tudeh feeling that Party must depend on Soviet support to prevent being suppressed. Any encouragement that could be given Tudeh to become genuine Iranian Party without looking abroad for support would of course be helpful.

ALLEN

891.00/6-146

Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] June 1, 1946.

The Iranian Ambassador called at his request to see the Secretary. He told the Secretary he appreciated very much an opportunity at this busy time to see him to tell him about the troubles in Iran.

The Ambassador said that since he had last talked with the Secretary on April 4 they had gone through many vicissitudes in the Iranian case. He had reported the true facts to the Security Council. On May 6 he reported that in the provinces of Iran where they had representatives evacuation had taken place, but in Azerbaijan where the Iranian Government had no representatives it is difficult to give an opinion as to what is happening. Later, he said, he reported that his Government had sent a Commission of inquiry and at the same time he drew attention to the fact that it is hard for Iran to exercise any authority in this province in view of outside interference. He said the situation in Azerbaijan is deteriorating very fast, where there is a puppet government supported by the Russians. It is being made
into practically an independent state. The Army is equipped and supplied by Russia. Qavam is under extreme pressure to do what the Russians want, even to the point of having to dismiss certain members of his cabinet. He said Qavam has not contradicted what he has reported to the Security Council but he has asked him not to make any further reports to the Council.

The Ambassador said US assistance is very necessary in the Security Council to prevent the Iranian case being dropped from the agenda. He said if the situation in Iran is allowed to continue he fears for the security not only of Iran but of Turkey, Iraq and other nearby countries. The Ambassador made a strong appeal for the US to come to the aid of Iran.

The Secretary asked what the Shah is doing about Qavam.

He said the Shah sees him and advises him, but Qavam does things without consulting the Shah. Qavam even dismissed and arrested the Chief of Staff who was serving his country. Qavam took this action which he knew was contrary to the Shah's wishes.

The Secretary inquired if there is any explanation of Qavam’s action; is he under such influence by the Russians that he must meet all their demands?

The Ambassador said he had not given up hope that Qavam is really trying to do what he thinks best and that he will be loyal to his people. He said he had urged Qavam to resist the demands of the Russians, and then if their country is overrun by the Soviets, the United Nations will take action and justice will rule. He said Iran cannot send troops to Azerbaijan because they would clash with the people there who are under Soviet influence and there would be bloodshed and the Russians would then have an excuse to come back into Iran.

The Secretary inquired what would be the difference in having the Soviet troops return in the open and take over the country and having them take it over in the manner the Ambassador had described. If it is done in the open the Security Council could investigate the reasons, but to investigate removal of an individual from the Iranian cabinet would be difficult.

The Ambassador said certainly it would be better to have them do it in the open. He pointed out that Qavam does not say that he is satisfied with the situation in Azerbaijan; he simply says nothing about it because he cannot truthfully report that he is satisfied.

The Secretary said the problem was a hard one to get at, if Qavam is allowing outside pressure to force him to make changes in the cabinet and say nothing about matters that should be reported, and acting

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Presumably General Arfa; see telegram 590, April 25, from Tehran, p. 437.
contrary to the wishes of the Shah. He said if Qavam would stand up for what is the best interest of the Iranian people it would be easier to handle.

The Ambassador said the Shah may have to make a decision, but if he dismissed Qavam he fears that Qavam would rally a large following and bring on civil war, which would cause the Russians to come back with their troops.

The Secretary said he would look into the matter with the people in the Department directly concerned.

The Secretary praised the Ambassador for his courage in this difficult situation.

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861.24591/6-446: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 4, 1946—8 p.m.

482. Brit, Netherlands and Chinese reps SC yesterday agreed to suggestion of US Deputy rep that there was no necessity for SC meeting this week on Iranian matter, unless some further word was forthcoming from Iranian Govt. Cadogan has recent instructions to press for retention of Iranian matter on agenda, regardless of whether Iranian Govt asks that matter be dropped. Purpose of Brit position is to indicate to Iranians that SC stands behind them and to the world that Council disapproves of Sov tactics. Van Kleffens position remains not to drop matter without statement that Council is dissatisfied with situation. Quo has new instructions to support dropping matter from agenda if Iranians want whole matter dropped and if Council is not prepared to consider some affirmative action. If matter is dropped, he hopes Council can indicate to world that it is not satisfied with present situation and that matter remains of continuing concern to Council.

Johnson stated that US is carefully considering whole matter, and that our position as stated at last meeting SC still stands, but should be considered tentative and subject to possible change.

BYRNES

[No further word was forthcoming from the Iranian Government. The Security Council did not hold a meeting that week on the Iranian question (nor indeed for the remainder of 1946) and remained seized of the matter, as had been determined at its meeting on May 22 (see telegram 223, May 22, from New York, page 473).]
In memorandum No. SD/S/786 of December 10, 1946, Mr. S. K. C. Kopper of the Division of International Security Affairs drew the following conclusions from the deliberations of the Security Council on the Iranian question:

"1. The Security Council did not undertake a substantive examination of the second Iranian complaint. Consideration which the Council gave to the case was limited to procedural phases.

2. The Security Council established the precedent of conducting its business in the absence of one of its permanent members. The test of whether the Security Council could take substantive action in the absence of a permanent member was not made.

3. The Security Council determined that withdrawal of the complaint by a Member of the United Nations does not obligate the Council to cease to be seized of the complaint.

4. The Secretary-General established the precedent of submitting opinions to the Council on matters of which it is seized.

5. The Security Council is faced with the problem of what credence should be given to the statements of a representative of a Government who was duly accredited by that Government but who in reality seemed to be partially repudiated." (IO files)]

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891.00/6-546: Telegram

The Vice Consul at Tabriz (Rossow) to the Secretary of State

[Extracts]

SECRET

US URGENT

[Received June 7—6:37 a.m.]

TABRIZ, June 5, 1946—noon.

183. Following is summary of political situation this district:

There has been no lessening of Soviet penetration of Azerbaijan gov't and Democratic Party. At present this penetration consists chiefly of tutelage and instruction on high level policy, and control of political security thru strategic placement of personnel who are plainly of Soviet origin. Latter personnel are continually observed on streets in Azerbaijan uniforms or in civilian clothes and can be identified not only by their constant use of Russian language but frequently by features, for numbers of them are obvious north Russian types, although Soviet Caucasians are in the majority. All observers also agree that Soviet railroad personnel, who wear uniforms of military type, have been at least tripled for no known reason. Popular belief is that they are Soviet political agents.

All reports, supported by analysis of recent public pronouncements, indicate that Soviet Union has instructed Azerbaijan Govt to come
to terms with Tehran. Both Azerbaijan Govt and Soviet Union appear to have adopted a definitely defensive policy now with respect to Azerbaijan problem. Timing of this shift of policy together with reports of explanations from within party and Azerbaijan Govt, and press attacks against US, show plainly that it resulted from strong American stand at Security Council coupled with strong attitude of world press. Everyone here gives US full credit for this weakening of Azerbaijan Soviet policy, and bitterness of party and government hierarchy against US has accordingly increased. This has produced a series of violent editorial attacks against US, coupled with protestations of Azerbaijan govt's innocence and altruism, and continually reiterated insistence that Azerbaijan problem is internal affair. Propaganda crudely follows straight line.

Sent Dept 183; Tehran 179; Moscow 120; London 56.

Rossow

SECRET

TEHRAN, June 6, 1946.

DEAR LOY: . . .

In addition to seeing a good deal of the Shah and Qavam, I have had to receive innumerable delegations of Iranians, almost all of whom insist that the United States must play a more positive role in internal Iranian affairs. I have repeated almost ad nauseam that the United States is exerting every effort to prevent internal interference in Iranian affairs and that we cannot adopt the very tactics to which we object so strenuously, and insist that the United Nations is Iran's best safeguard. However, Iranians are so accustomed to outside interference they resemble a man who has been in prison a long time and is afraid to walk out into the sunlight. The only way they can think of to counteract one interference is to invite another. My statements often send Iranians away with the feeling that the United States is not really interested in Iran and cannot be depended upon to give them much actual assistance, with the result that some of them

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58 Information of a similar character had been given to Ambassador Allen by the Iranian Prime Minister on June 1 (telegram 791, June 1, 4 p.m., from Tehran, not printed).
turn to the Soviet Union for support rather than attempt to stand on
their own legs. I believe, however, that in the long run our policy will
begin to make an impression and am confident we should continue
to follow it.

GEORGE

891.00/6-1046: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, June 10, 1946—2 p. m.
PrioritY [Received June 10—1:45 p. m.]

821. In long conference with Qavam this morning I explained to
him in all frankness what, I felt confident, American reaction would
be to certain of his policies and recent communiqués. As regards
latter I found three points which are particularly objectionable from
American points of view: (1) Tendency to castigate any opposition
to Qavam as reactionary, Fascist and traitorous; (2) tendency to give
Qavam himself personal credit for all policies and accomplishments
of his Government; and (3) warm expressions of friendship for
USSR without any reference to any other nation. As regards first
two objections I said they would remind the American public of
communiqués issued by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Per-
sonal build-up of Qavam himself would remind Americans of similar
build-ups for Franco, Hitler and Stalin and would seem to point
towards a personal dictatorship. As regards third objection I said
United States naturally welcomed friendly relations between states
and that if relations between Iran and Soviet Union were on genuinely
solid foundation, we could only rejoice. However I reminded him
that American public is thoroughly aware that United States made
strenuous efforts during past 12 months to obtain early withdrawal
of all foreign troops from Iran, and that when we were unable to
obtain agreement from other powers, we withdrew our troops anyway
at considerable sacrifice in effort and shipping taken from other areas.
I said American public was also well aware that we had supported
Iran’s right to be heard before Security Council, even to extent of
adversely affecting our relations with our great Soviet ally. American

59 In telegram 817, June 8, 4 p. m., Ambassador Allen had expressed his concern
at the seemingly steady trend of the Qavam Government toward outright ap-
pearance of the Soviet Union and Leftist Iranian elements and his apparent
effort to consolidate his position by crushing internal opposition from Rightist
elements. After spelling out the matters which concerned him (along the lines
of telegram 821), the Ambassador had concluded: “... It is time we recalled
to Qavam that he should bear in mind reaction to his policies in US as well as in
Russia and that remedy for former repressive and pro-British policy of the
Right does not lie in repressive, and pro-Soviet policy of the Govt now.”
(891.00/6-846)
public could not help wondering why these efforts on our part in Iran's behalf remained without any evidence of appreciation in Qavam's communiqués. To put it quite bluntly I said certain people in US would begin to wonder whether we had made a mistake in our policy towards Iran. Perhaps if we had retained our troops here illegally until we had got such concessions as we desired out of Iran and if we had organized and supported a revolt against the Central Govt behind our lines perhaps Iranian Govt communiqués would now be fawning over the United States.

As regards Qavam's policies, I cited his suppression of opposition newspapers and arrest of political opponents without specific charge or public hearing. I expressed strong doubt that he would permit any newspapers to publish articles against the Soviet Union similar to those published every day against the United States and Americans.

Qavam said that his communiqués were for Iran and not the United States. He also believed they had been poorly translated to me. He said primary purpose of his latest communiqué was to quieten rumors that his policy of division of public domain would extend to private property. I said that it was not this feature of communiqué to which I was raising objection.

In parting Qavam expressed much appreciation for my bringing these views to his attention so frankly. I believe interview will have salutary effect, at least in letting Qavam know that American reaction must be reckoned with, and that he will be more mindful of this factor in future. 80

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[A 15-point agreement between the Iranian Government and the local authorities in Azerbaijan was signed at Tabriz on June 13 by Mozzafar Firuz and Jafar Pischvari. The text as printed in the Tehran and Tabriz press was sent to the Department from Tehran in despatch 53 and from Tabriz in telegram 193, both dated June 16. The despatch noted that the phrasing of the agreement made it appear that the seven articles of April 22 (see telegram 578, April 23, from Tehran, page 434) had been accepted in full and that the agreement was merely an interpretation of the articles. It noted also that while the agreement was being publicized as a full and final settlement, a number of the most important provisions called for further agreement as soon as possible. (891.00/6-1646)

Under the terms of the agreement, the Iranian Government recognized the existing National Assembly of Azerbaijan as the Provincial Council; was to select the Governor General of Azerbaijan from a

80 In telegram 507, June 11, 7 p. m., to Tehran, the Department approved Ambassador Allen's statements made to the Iranian Prime Minister as set forth in telegram 821 and commended him for his initiative (891.00/6-1046).]
group of names presented by the Provincial Council; would incorporate Azerbaijani regular and volunteer forces into the Iranian Army and gendarmerie, respectively, their status to be determined by the Iranian Government and the Provincial Council; and agreed that 75% of Government receipts in Azerbaijan were to be appropriated for local expenditures, the remainder going to Tehran. The agreement also was made applicable to the Kurds, Assyrians, and Armenians residing in Azerbaijan.

According to despatch 280, July 24, 1946, from Tabriz, the National Government of Azerbaijan was formally dissolved by a resolution adopted by the third and last general session of the Azerbaijan National Majlis on June 25 (891.032/7-2446).]

891.00/6-1546: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TEHRAN, June 15, 1946—11 a.m.

US URGENT

844. Dept's 512 [511], June 12, which reached here June 14.

Some of views expressed in British memo" are along lines British Ambassador has been recommending to his Government and some were thought up in London.

Suggestion that US and UK make joint approach" is not advisable in my view. Our effectiveness here is already weaker than it should be, due in considerable part to conviction in minds many Iranians that clever British, realizing Britain's own vulnerable position, are using well-meaning but somewhat naive Americans to support Britain's imperialistic aims. No amount of denials seems to have any effect in shaking this conviction. We can accomplish more for ourselves and for Britain as well by acting separately in Iran. British Ambassador is fully appreciative of this situation. He told me today how impossible it would have been for him to have stated to the press the few obvious truths reported in my 833, June 13. His motives

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61 Not printed.
62 No. 29/646, June 11, not printed.
63 To the Iranian Prime Minister to take a firmer line with the Tudeh Party and the Soviet Union and that he be made to understand the danger of his present course.
64 Not printed; it reported remarks made by Ambassador Allen to a group of Iranian journalists, all of whom were anti-Tudeh. The Ambassador concluded his remarks by stating:

"The responsibility of the press to keep the public accurately informed is particularly great at a time like the present, just prior to elections. It is important that all papers be free to publish various views so that the voters may have an opportunity to study the issues involved.

"It is in my view regrettable and even unethical for any journalist to take advantage of the liberties of the freedom of the press in a democratic country to attempt to bring into power any government which would stifle that freedom." (891.00-6-1346).
would have been impugned immediately by almost every Iranian from the Shah down. US is still given enough credit for acting on principle without selfish aims to enable us to do things British could not think of doing. We would lose this credit immediately if we began joint approaches to Iranian Govt.

British suggestions that Qavam be asked to take firmer line against Tudeh and against Russians and that Iranian Govt be encouraged to look to UN for help is of course excellent. This is exactly what British Ambassador and I are both doing every day, in every way we can think of. Specific instructions from our Governments might strengthen our hands but I have been acting on assumption I had such instructions, of standing nature. British Ambassador has already made suggestion to Qavam regarding supervisors for elections but PriMin reacted strongly against any such idea. Subsequently a report came to me through Colonel Stetson \(^{65}\) that Qavam would actually welcome UN commission but that for political reasons he must appear to oppose. Stetson is inclined to believe from channel of report that PriMin intended for it to come to me but both British Ambassador and I are rather dubious. Qavam loves power too much to want any outside supervision. If he should come to feel internal situation had got beyond his control and outside help might assist him to stay in power, he might risk UN commission but he has given no indication as yet that he doubts his ability to keep reins. If we suggested commission, I fear we would give Russians first class propaganda weapon without accomplishing anything positive.

As regards British suggestion regarding more propaganda activity on our side, this Embassy is doing all it can along this line with ridiculously small means at our command (see Embtel 812 \(^{66}\)). We are also encouraging native liberal groups.

British Ambassador is making great effort to work in closest harmony and contact with this Embassy but he naturally does not tell me everything he tells London. I suspect British suggestion of joint approach resulted from telegram he undoubtedly sent to London recently, reporting his suspicion that Qavam, at Moscow’s instigation, is attempting to drive wedge between US and UK in Iran. Le Rougetel reverted to this theme again today. His rather strained reasoning on the point is that Qavam has taken initiative in suggesting that Britain and Russia each state their aims in Iran. This in Le Rougetel’s mind could only lead to new tripartite Iranian, UK–USSR treaty. USSR is confident US would object to such a treaty on grounds that it would constitute division of Iran into spheres of influence. Le Rougetel suspects Russia intends to denounce whole

\(^{65}\) Col. John B. Stetson, Jr., Field Commissioner in Iran for the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner.

\(^{66}\) Dated June 7, not printed.
idea, blame Britain for suggesting it, and stand firmly with us in opposition. British Ambassador believes joint US-UK approach to Qavam now would tend to counter Russian game. I concur that overall British and American policies in Iran have similar aim but I do not believe joint approach is most effective means of achieving it.

ALLEN

891.00/6-1746: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, June 17, 1946—11 a.m.

US URGENT

[Received 11:39 a.m.]

850. Analysis of June 13 agreement between Tehran and Tabriz governments does not deserve the high praise which Qavam, through his Director of Propaganda, Firouz, has bestowed on it. Their characterization of agreement as victory for Qavam is justified only to extent that Iran may now become united country without civil war. However, instead of Azerbaijan returning to Iran the province seems likely to take over country, especially since so-called Democratic Party of Azerbaijan will remain in full control there; Democrats in Azerbaijan and Tudeh Party in remainder of Iran are working hand in glove. These two groups are both typical Communist parties everywhere in sense that both are highly disciplined, totalitarian and pro-Soviet. Azerbaijan party is strongest of the two since it has its own army which Tabriz agreement leaves intact at least for time being and perhaps indefinitely.67

Value of agreement depends on manner in which it is carried out.68 Qavam undoubtedly thinks that by policy of conciliation and even friendship for Azerbaijan leaders he can gradually bring them under his control.

More and more observers are beginning to suspect that Qavam has gone so far over to the pro-Soviet camp he cannot retract. Some are convinced he does not wish to retract since he feels that during next few years which is only period of time man of his age is concerned with

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67 In telegram 197, June 19, from Tabriz, Mr. Rossow analyzed the agreement as follows: “The only gain by Central Govt in making agreement was purely formal acknowledgment of its authority. It is in no sense in control of province. In actual fact nothing has been changed. The same men (Democrats) are still in power here, control of Azerbaijan Army remains here, and there is no indication of any reduction in the number of Soviet personnel in Azerbaijan uniform and civilian clothes.” (891.00/6-1946)

68 Telegram 856, June 18, noon, from Tehran, reported the initial implementation of the agreement with the selection of Salamollah Javid (or David), former Azerbaijani Minister of Interior, as Governor General of Azerbaijan. The Governor General was described as strongly pro-Soviet and an ardent party member. (891.00/6-1846)
Soviet Union will be dominating force in this area and friendship with USSR is his best means of remaining in power. Qavam’s actions during next few weeks should show his true intentions more clearly.

Allen

801.00/6-1746 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, JUNE 17, 1946—noon.

US URGENT

[Received June 17—11:05 a.m.]

852. One of most significant provisions of agreement signed at Tabriz June 13 is article 7, which provides for incorporation of considerable part of Azerbaijan volunteer forces into Iranian gendarmerie. Additional remark to this article provides that since gendarmerie has acted during recent years in manner to arouse hostile public opinion, it is agreed that wishes of people, particularly in Azerbaijan, be brought to knowledge of chief of government in order that decision may be taken changing the name of that organization.

Shah told me last night that he understood plans were afoot to remove Colonel Schwarzkopf. Whether the plans are concurred in by Qavam or are merely Tudeh schemes is not yet certain. Qavam had told both me and Schwarzkopf several times he is pleased with latter’s work; Embassy received note from Foreign Office today approving the 12 additional men for gendarmerie mission who have been under discussion for some time. However, Qavam is taking one step after another to appease Tudeh and might give in to their pressure against mission. Since we have objected strenuously to Tudeh allegations that US imposed mission on Iran, it will be difficult for us to insist on retention of mission if Government requests cancellation. Discussions regarding renewal of mission agreement are due any time after July 2, or 3 months prior to termination present agreement. I am convinced mission could be strongest force for law and order in Iran, if allowed to function at all properly and might be means of preventing Communists from seizing power. However, chances of its being allowed to function properly are not good.

Qavam might possibly propose compromise by which mission would continue on understanding that Schwarzkopf himself be recalled, since he personally has been especially singled out for Tudeh attack. While Schwarzkopf has assured me he is willing at any time to give up position if US interests require, I doubt we should accept such a compromise arrangement if offered. Schwarzkopf has done outstanding job here and we should avoid any action which would indicate our acquiescence in unjustified attacks against him. Moreover, any mission which remained under such compromise would stand little chance of being allowed to function properly.
Possible alternative arrangement might be for mission to remain intact under Schwarzkopf but only as a training mission without executive authority. In all probability, however, this would so weaken gendarmerie, especially if as now proposed it must absorb Azerbaijan Fidayis, that its strength would be vitiated. It is not unlikely that such weakening of mission’s authority would only whet appetite of pro-Soviet elements for further curtailment.

Discontinuance of mission would be serious step along road towards complete Soviet domination of Iran and I hope some means can be found to avoid this step.

Department’s instruction or thoughts in the matter would be welcome.

ALLEN

801.00/6–1546: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

TOP SECRET  MOST IMMEDIATE

WASHINGTON, June 20, 1946—6 p. m.

US URGENT

333. My 511, June 12.\(^6\) In reply to Brit memo June 11.\(^6\) Dept will give Balfour informally paraphrase of appropriate portions your 844, June 15, and of following views offered for your guidance.

(1) Joint Anglo-US representations to Qavam are considered inadvisable, since they may give rise to impression that US and UK are forming bloc in Middle East opposed to Soviet Union. Recognizing common interests of US and UK in maintenance of peace in Middle East, however, it would be helpful for you to keep in close touch with Brit Amb with regard to various representations which each may individually make to Qavam. In your conversations with Qavam, you should continue to impress upon him that, if his foreign policy persists in preference for a single great power and apparent disregard for those powers which are truly interested in future welfare of Iran, there is dangerous possibility that Iran will be deprived of its status as an independent nation, either by being absorbed into Soviet orbit of satellite states or by being divided into foreign-dominated spheres of influence. Persistence in such a policy would strengthen those groups who already take view that it is useless to endeavor to support independence of a people who are unwilling to take firm stand on their own behalf. While voluntary abandonment of Iranian sovereignty in favor of foreign domination may appear to be an easy way out of Iran’s present difficulty, it is not an effective long-range solution. Furthermore, Iran could probably never, through its own efforts, extricate itself from this domination.

\(^6\) Not printed.
(2) We agree that Iranian Govt should be encouraged to look not only to Soviet Union but also to other countries, and increasingly to UN, for assistance in solving its social and economic problems. So long as US is convinced that Iran is endeavoring to maintain its political and economic integrity as an independent country, attitude of US will continue to be sympathetic towards Iranian requests for assistance and support. With regard to UN observers in forthcoming Iranian elections, we feel it inadvisable to make such suggestion to Qavam. Soviet resistance, both in and out of SC, would probably in itself defeat such scheme. Further, SC generally does not appear favorable at this time, and conditions presently prevailing in Iran would militate against observers achieving objective of enforced fair elections.

(3) We feel that no opportunity should be lost to impress upon Qavam advantage to Iran of internal reform. Obviously, such reform should be carried out by patriotic Iranians working for good of Iran and not by persons who may use reform program as instrument to bring Iran under foreign domination.

(4) In connection with (3) above, Qavam might well encourage formation of truly Iranian political parties which would provide alternative to Tudeh Party and would carry Iran along road to democratic political advancement.

ACHESON

891.105A/6—1746 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1946—5 p. m.

552. Your 852, Jun 17. We share your views re usefulness gendarmerie mission and advisability its continuation. Our views on specific questions raised follow: (1) We do not favor withdrawal of Schwarzkopf or full mission solely because of Sov opposition or pressure. (2) We would have no alternative but to withdraw mission on suggestion of Iranian Govt. (3) We should give serious consideration to withdrawal of mission on our own volition if Iranians fail to support it or if they create working conditions so unfavorable that mission is no longer a constructive force in Iran or a positive element in American-Iranian relations. Before agreeing to renewal contract by Sep 2, Dept would like to have from you and Schwarzkopf statements that you are satisfied Iranian attitude and operational conditions warrant renewal. (4) We do not favor possible compromises involving either withdrawal of Schwarzkopf while retaining rest of mission or reduction of mission to mere advisory group. Either suggestion by Qavam would probably be based on Sov pressure and would be but an opening wedge to further fatal curtailment of mission. Also
such compromises would indicate an unfavorable or at least half-hearted attitude on part of Iranians which would make success of mission more than questionable.

Entire question of continuance this and Ridley missions in Iran in Dept’s opinion revolves around degree to which Qavam will orient his foreign relations in coming months exclusively toward Sov Union. We feel it would be advisable to delay decision on renewal Schwarzkopf contract, as was done last year, until late summer in order better to judge trend of events in Iran. Your views on this and other points solicited.  

ACHESON

121.5491/6–1146 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

SECRET US URGENT MOST IMMEDIATE

WASHINGTON, June 27, 1946—3 p. m.

559. Would appreciate your confirmation of report in AP Tehran despatch Jun 22 that Emb had protested to Iranian Govt incident reported Tabriz 198, Jun 21, 71 (repeated Tehran as 190.) Dept greatly disturbed over incident, which appears to represent endeavor by Azerbaijan to apply arbitrary totalitarian methods used by Sov forces when stationed in Iran, and feels that strong protest to Iranian Govt is called for. Iranian Govt should be requested to investigate incident, indicate what action if any is contemplated against persons involved, and what steps will be taken to prevent recurrence. These views were expressed by Dept official in conversation with Iranian Amb who promised to bring them to attention of ForMin.

Sent to Tehran, repeated to Tabriz, Moscow and London.

ACHESON

70 The agreement concerning the gendarmerie mission was renewed for a period of 2 years in an exchange of notes on July 25 and August 8, 1946; for texts, see United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 31, p. 424.

71 Not printed: Mr. Rossow reported that the previous day the Military Attaché, the Military Attaché for Air, the Assistant Military Attaché, and a fourth member of their party were arrested and held under armed guard at the Tabriz airport for 7 hours on the pretext that they had landed without authority. The Military Attaché had been assured previously by the Iranian Foreign Office that clearance had been arranged. Despite Mr. Rossow’s “most vigorous representations”, the officers were not permitted to leave the airport until at 5 p. m. the Acting Governor General of Azerbaijan consented to bring the officers to Tabriz where they were held under armed guard at the telegraph office. Finally they were released on condition that they would depart the following day if landing permission were not granted. Mr. Rossow summed up the manner of the local officials as “hostile, disrespectful and insulting to the prestige of the United States”. The Chief of Political Police informed the Consulate on the morning of June 21 that landing permission had been granted and expressed his hope that “we would not harbor rancor” since the matter was an error of the Central Government. (121.5491/6–1146)
The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN, July 1, 1946—11 a.m.
[Received July 2—6:14 a.m.]

919. Prime Minister Qavam has finally issued formal announcement expected for some time concerning formation new political party under his leadership, to be known as “Democratic Party of Iran”. Choice of name evidently resulted from desire to steal thunder of “Democrats of Azerbaijan” and also doubtless to unify country and possibly in hopes of taking Democrats of Azerbaijan under his wing. Prime Minister’s party will begin active operations within 2 weeks and expects to be organized throughout Iran in time for elections. Backbone of party will doubtless be Government officials in Tehran and provincial authorities appointed by Qavam.

Also announced yesterday was formation of “Liberal Front” based on agreement signed by leaders of Iran and Tudeh parties. Outstanding signer for Iran party is Allahyar Saleh, former member staff this Embassy and brother of Ali Pasha Saleh, Embassy’s Iranian adviser and chief interpreter. While details are lacking it seems likely that Iran and Tudeh parties will collaborate in forthcoming elections, nominating candidates in different constituencies and supporting each other’s candidates throughout country. It is possible this action may substantiate reports of split in Tudeh party between radical Iranian Nationalists and outright Moscow puppets. Latter have dominated party up to present.

Platforms of two leading groups in forthcoming elections, i.e. Democrats of Iran and Tudeh Iran Party coalition, seem practically identical. They both boil down to independence and reform. Qavam’s speech launching his new party was as full of vituperation against reactionaries and enemies of reform as anything Tudeh has said. Character of two parties will depend entirely upon individual leaders who adhere to each. In actuality Qavam’s group will probably be more conservative in spite of fiery Leftist pronouncements it will make.\(^2\)

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\(^2\) In telegram 981, July 14, 3 p.m., Ambassador Allen reported two divergent opinions regarding the Prime Minister’s new party that were prevalent in Tehran. The first opinion had it that the Prime Minister was outsmarting the Soviet-sponsored Tudeh by stealing their thunder and that he endorsed conservative nationalism, although he appeared superficially to be pro-Soviet. The opposing view was that creation of the new party represented the second phase of the Soviet Union’s political penetration of Iran, the first phase being the establishment of the hard-core Tudeh which operated as a terrorist tool. The second phase centered on a new party with a harmless face which would attract the support of many elements including conservatives. Eventually, according to the theory, the Tudeh would attach itself to the new party and obtain full control, as it had done successfully in Azerbaijan. (891.00/7-1446) In telegram 620, July 19, 7 p.m., the Department advised Tehran of information from the Iranian Ambassador that the Prime Minister viewed the new party as an indigenous group serving Iranian national interests and as not subservient to any foreign interests (891.00/7-1946).

219-490—69—33
Elections will probably not be held until September and might be deferred even longer.
Repeated Moscow as 238.

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121.5491/7-246: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Iran* (Allen) *to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

Tehran, July 2, 1946—4 p.m.
[Received July 3—1:17 p.m.]

942. Deptel 559, June 27. Embassy has forwarded by pouch full report on incident involving detention in Tabriz of Military Attaché personnel. 73

Embassy's protest was in form of letter to Chief of Protocol, reciting events which occurred and ending with following paragraph:

"I trust, dear Mr. Samii, that you will be able to take such action as will cause you to be able to assure the Embassy that further instance of this kind will not occur."

In addition I have spoken to Samii about incident emphasizing diplomatic status of Americans involved and stressing necessity for Iran Govt to [be] respectful international practice this regard. I suggested issuance of written or stamped clearance for aircraft as means of avoiding difficulties but repeated insistence that persons with diplomatic status, and identified as such, should never be held in detention under any circumstances.

Last night Samii told officer of Embassy that Iran Embassy in Washington had forwarded Dept's complaint to Foreign Office. He attempted to minimize incident but after several attempts to explain it away he finally admitted that thus far Central Govt simply has no control over province of Azerbaijan.

Sent Dept 94, repeated Tabriz 111.

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891.77/7-346: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran* (Allen)

SECRET

Washington, July 3, 1946—7 p.m.

575. In course conversation today 75 Iran Amb stated Qavam has telegraphed him, in reply to Ala's inquiry, to effect that railways in

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73 Despatch 65, June 29, not printed.
74 Dated June 29.
75 The conversation between the Iranian Ambassador and Messrs. Henderson and Minor took place on July 2 (memorandum of July 2 by Mr. Minor not printed).
north are still under control of Russians but that Russian commission will soon arrive in Iran to effect turnover. Qavam said also that Russians are still in temporary control Pahlevi airport.

\[\text{Acheson}\]

\[\text{711.00/7-1546}\]

\[\text{Policy and Information Statement on Iran Prepared in the Department of State}\]

\[\text{[Extract]}\]

\[\text{SECRET}\]

\[\text{[Washington,] July 15, 1946.}\]

\[\text{I. Current US Policy Toward Iran}\]

\[\text{A. General Political. Our policy toward Iran is one of assistance in its efforts to strengthen the nation’s sovereignty and to raise living standards by democratic processes. This policy is embodied in both the Declaration Regarding Iran of December 1, 1943 and the Charter of the United Nations. In the Declaration, President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin, and Prime Minister Churchill agreed that their Governments would continue economic assistance to Iran and gave assurances of respect for the maintenance of Iranian independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. In the Charter, Iran and the United States, together with the other United Nations, subscribed to the principle of sovereign equality of states and the purpose of advancing human welfare.}\]

\[\text{The objectives of our policy toward Iran are: (1) To encourage friendly relations of Iran with all states, and thus prevent the loss of Iranian independence either by being divided into Soviet and British spheres of influence or by being absorbed into the Soviet orbit of satellite states; (2) to create a condition of internal security, and thus prevent a situation which might invite foreign intervention; (3) to produce a healthy internal economy so as to preserve a system of free enterprise and to nourish multilateral international trade, thereby preventing the growth of economic discontent and, in consequence, the possibility of a controlled, totalitarian economy; (4) to encourage democratic institutions and processes, and thus prevent the growth of a dictatorial regime which might either oppose or limit friendly intercourse with other nations.}\]

\[\text{Implementation of our policy toward Iran is sought by the following means:}\]

\[\text{(1) Diplomatic. Through Embassy channels, we have reiterated, and shall continue to stress our friendly concern for Iran’s well-being. This concern is expressed unilaterally, in the desire to avoid any appearance of a bloc more opposed to the Soviet Union than interested in Iran. Every opportunity is taken to make clear to the Iranian}\]
Government the danger to Iran of its present tendency to orient itself exclusively toward the Soviet Union. It may become necessary to remind the Iranian Government that the Declaration Regarding Iran was based upon the implicit desire of Iran itself to enjoy sovereign equality with other nations and that voluntary surrender of sovereignty by Iran to the Soviet Union relieves us of the obligations expressed in the Declaration. Through United Nations channels, we have supported, and will continue to support, Iran’s position as an independent state. Should a situation arise in Iran which might lead to international friction, we would not hesitate to support an investigation by the Security Council.

(2) Military. Our military policy does not at this time contemplate the use of force to achieve our objectives in Iran. During the war, this Government sent non-combat troops to Iran to assist in aid-to-Russia operations and sent, at the request of the Iranian Government, two advisory military missions—one to advise the Army in quartermaster matters, another to assist in the organization, training, and administration of the Gendarmerie. When the wartime purpose of Allied forces in Iran was achieved, US troops were withdrawn from Iran and US properties there almost entirely disposed of before January 1, 1946. The UK and the USSR were asked by this Government to do likewise. Since the purpose of the two US military missions—namely, to assure an adequate internal security force—has not been achieved and since the Iranian Government desires their continuance, the Ridley–Schwarzkopf Missions remain in Iran. Effort is being made to obtain legislation granting the President authority to maintain military missions of this nature beyond the period of national emergency. So long as Congressional legislation permits their detail, and provided the Iranian Government desires and supports these missions, they will be made available. To enhance the success of the missions, we are assisting the Iranian Government in obtaining essential, non-combat supplies for the Iranian Army and the Gendarmerie.

(3) Economic. Our economic policy does not at present contemplate loans to Iran for political purposes. We are, however, prepared to extend advisory economic assistance to Iran upon request. Effort is being made to amend present legislation, which now permits the sending of official US civilian missions to certain countries, so that such missions can be sent, when appropriate, to any country, including Iran. Our policy is to channel economic assistance, in so far as possible, through the United Nations, the International Bank, and related international organizations on a cooperative, non-exclusive basis.

*For documentation on the disposition of American military installations and other surplus property in Iran, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. vii, pp. 566 ff.*
It is our policy to discourage the present tendency of the Iranian Government to grant exclusive economic concessions to the Soviet Union and to make clear the political consequences of such an orientation.

(4) Information. By a planned program of information and cultural relations with Iran, we propose to bolster the desire of the Iranian people for independence and to influence their development along democratic lines. This program involves the demonstration, by all available media, of US institutions and opinions, against a background of factual reporting of world news not furnished by any other source. Should other means of implementing our Iranian policy become impaired, this means should be intensified proportionately. Since the validity and effectiveness of our policy depends upon the conviction and support of the American people, we insist upon the unfettered flow of news between Iran and the United States. The Department is considering an information program for the US public concerning Iran and the Middle East, with the view to emphasizing the importance of the area in US foreign relations.

711.9/7-3146 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, July 31, 1946—4 p. m.  [Received 9:09 p. m.]

1049. Shah reverted at length yesterday to his favorite theme that only hope for Iran to withstand continued Soviet propaganda among Iranian masses is economic development to raise standard of living. He emphasized especially development of water power and he hopes American firms will become interested from investment and management point of view. He said principal necessity is large American loan, which he realizes we will not extend if Iran seems likely to become Soviet puppet state but he is convinced loan is Iran’s only hope.

I repeated necessity for specific plan of development and for detailed projects before loan could be considered. He said comprehensive 7-year plan is practically ready.

I expressed personal view that most likely means for Iran actually to obtain American credits seemed to me through individual projects sponsored by American companies such as airway project by TWA, electric power project by Westinghouse, communications project by International Telephone and Telegraph, etc.

We have every reason, in view of Declaration Regarding Iran and for other reasons, to consider sympathetically Iranian requests for economic assistance and Shah’s views concerning raising standard of living are excellent.
Any guidance Department may give me on this subject will be welcome.\textsuperscript{77}

\textbf{TEHRAN, August 6, 1946—noon. [Received 3:07 p.m.]}\n
1080. Recent reshuffle of Iranian Government,\textsuperscript{78} while apparently sudden, has been in Qavam’s mind for 2 months or more. Following agreement with Pishevari in June, Qavam said he might take one or two Tudeh members and an Azerbaijani into Cabinet. When he decided to move, however, he did so very swiftly, taking his Cabinet, Shah and country completely by surprise. While no representative of Tabriz government has yet been added, it is still possible that Pishevari, or one of his associates, will be given portfolio soon.

I feel confident change of Ministers resulted from Qavam’s belief he can handle Tudeh Party better inside Government than out and from his effort to absorb Tudeh organization into his political party. However, Secretary Rosso, who was in Azerbaijan during development of puppet regime there, points out many similarities between sequence of events there and here, and thinks Qavam has already lost control of situation.

First stage in Azerbaijan was formation of Tudeh. Second was formation Democrats of Azerbaijan, which appeared to oppose Tudeh at start and consequently attracted considerable number fairly respectable followers on this basis. Third stage (which is one we are just entering in Tehran) was union of Tudeh and Democrats of Azerbaijani forces. Result was complete domination of Government by better organized, financed and supported Soviet agents.

Rosso feels situation in remainder of Iran has now gone so far full Soviet domination of whole country is inevitable and Qavam could not retrieve situation, even if he exerted his utmost.

Many similarities between developments in Azerbaijan and those taking place in Tehran are evident. However, there are also differ-

\textsuperscript{77} In telegram 760, September 12, 1946, the Department advised the Ambassador in Iran that the Export-Import Bank could not consider more than a small loan to Iran because all but a small part of its resources had been committed to meet relief and rehabilitation needs of war-devastated countries, but stated that “the new International Bank is institution designed to handle long-term loans for major development projects such as Shah’s 7-year plan.” (891.51/9-3246)

\textsuperscript{78} In telegram 1062, August 2, 10 a.m., the Ambassador in Iran had reported a reshuffling of the Qavam Cabinet to admit three Tudeh leaders as Ministers of Health, of Education, and of Commerce and Industry. A fourth Cabinet post—the Ministry of Justice—had been given to an individual who had recently agreed to collaborate with the Tudeh Party and was generally recognized as virtually a party member. (891.002/8-246)
ences which furnish basis for belief situation here is not irretrievably lost. Outstanding consideration is Qavam’s continued support of Schwarzkopf Mission which is anathema to Tudeh Party. Moreover, there are no Russian speaking agents from Caucasus in high position here. Azerbaijan group established themselves in power behind Soviet bayonets but no such entrenchment of Tudeh has been possible here.

I regard situation as gloomy but by no means desperate.

Allen

891.00/8-1346: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, August 13, 1946—5 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received August 13—3:58 p. m.]

1116. Following my conference with Qavam today regarding Helmand River matter he asked me to stay for very serious talk concerning political situation. He said he expected delegation from Azerbaijan headed by Governor General Djaavid to arrive in Tehran in few days. He said he was determined to find out immediately, whether Tabriz government wanted Azerbaijan to be part of Iran or not. He said he would be very firm, and that if negotiations broke down he might have to use force to bring Azerbaijan back into Iranian nation, much as he hesitated to shed Iranian blood. He said his principal worry was that in case of resort to force he feared USSR would supply Azerbaijan with guns, tanks, airplanes, money and men in civilian clothes who would pose as volunteers. He asked what I thought UN would be able to do to help Iran.

I said that as he was of course aware USSR had veto in Security Council over substantive action by that body. Moreover, UN had no security forces or armaments available. Nevertheless I believed that in case of flagrant support by USSR of separatist movement in Iran and in case Iran placed matter strongly and unreservedly before Security Council, I could not believe that those nations which were determined to make UN a forceful organization capable of defending small nations from aggression, would sit by idly and admit that organization was incapable of any assistance in case of this kind. I referred to speeches by President Truman and Secretary Byrnes calling on members of UN to believe in UN and to base their policies on it as only hope for better organized world in future. I said I thought some means would be found to aid nations which did so.

*In telegram 1104, August 10, 1946, 5 p. m., from Tehran, the Ambassador had reported that negotiations between the Iranian Government and the Azerbaijani authorities regarding the status of Azerbaijani regular and volunteer forces had broken down and that relations between the two governments had seriously deteriorated (891.00/8-1046).
I suggested to Qavam that if negotiations with Azerbaijan broke off, he should make it abundantly clear to world that rupture came because Tabriz Government was not willing for Azerbaijan to become part of Iran again. This would make it clear that he was fighting for Iran's integrity. He could cite plenty of evidence that Azerbaijan group have failed even to abide by more than generous agreement Qavam gave them in June.

Qavam was in most determined mood I have found him since my arrival here. He said he knew that Azerbaijan group and probably Soviet press would denounce him as Fascist and reactionary, but he was prepared for all that. He said reason he had been so overly conciliatory to Azerbaijan and Tudeh up to present was his lack of confidence in Iranian Army but he had that confidence now. If USSR would remain neutral he did not fear results.

If Qavam appeals to Security Council again, I believe he will do so wholeheartedly and unreservedly. I hope Council will be able to show its ability to function in what may be real test.\(^{83}\)

Sent Department 1116; repeated Paris, London and Moscow.

**Allen**

891.00/8-2546: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State*

**TOP SECRET**

**TEHRAN, August 25, 1946—noon.**

[Received 3:46 p.m.]

1153. Principal points of my conversation yesterday with Qavam were:

1. He was especially interested and impressed by Department's approval of views I had previously expressed to him regarding ability of UN to assist Iran in case of Soviet interference (Embgt 1116, August 13 and Department's 692, August 16\(^{81}\)). I pointed out again that while USSR has veto in Council and UN has no security forces, nevertheless nations which were determined to make UN successful and potent international organization would find means to make it function in defending member states against aggression. I added again that Iran must be prepared to place its case unreservedly and wholeheartedly before SC if Iran expected latter to be able to help. Qavam said security measures his Govt was already taking to prevent

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\(^{83}\)In telegram 1117, August 13, 6 p.m., Ambassador Allen reported a conversation with Prime Minister Qavam during which he expressed the hope that the latter might visit the United States in September since it was especially appropriate for the Prime Minister of the first member of the United Nations to present a substantive case to the Security Council to head his country's delegation to the General Assembly (891.002/8-1346). In telegram 692, August 16, 6 p.m., the Department expressed its concurrence with the Ambassador's views regarding Iran's relations with the UN and Qavam's attendance at the General Assembly (891.00/8-1346).

\(^{81}\)No. 692 not printed, but see footnote 80, above.
infiltration of Soviet civilians into Iran and to defend capital against Soviet-inspired Tudeh uprising were already straining Iranian budget and that possible need for assistance would be financial.

(2) I told Prime Minister in all friendliness but frankly that I was disturbed by reports I had received that he was not following course, in his discussions with Azerbaijan delegation, which would maintain Iran's integrity. I said I would welcome his correction if my information was wrong but that according to my reports he was inclined to accept Azerbaijan demands that Azerbaijan Army and Fedaiyeh forces remain as they are, under Soviet control and infiltrated with Soviet secret police. I said no surer or quicker road to loss of Iran's independence could be taken. Qavam admitted that Azerbaijan demands were exorbitant but denied he had made any concessions. He said he was merely listening to them at present, to draw them out.

(3) Qavam admitted he had been disappointed in his experiment of taking Tudeh members into the Cabinet. He had hoped they would prove to be patriotic Iranians when they saw from the inside how USSR was treating Iran every day but they had continued to follow the Soviet line. Qavam said Tudeh Party was clearly directed by Soviet Embassy. He strongly implied that he was searching for good basis for throwing Tudeh members out of Cabinet.

(4) Conversations with Azerbaijanis will continue for several days. So far only military matters have been discussed but today equally difficult financial questions will be on agenda. Bank Melli Director Ebtehaj telephoned this morning just before conference with Azerbaijanis to find out Prime Minister's mood and to repeat his own determination to remain absolutely firm against Azerbaijan demands.

(5) My general impression is that Qavam is very reluctant to resort to other than conciliatory means with Azerbaijan but that in the end he will use force.

Allen

891.00/9-1546: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 29, 1946—7 p. m.

725. Urteil 1153. Reiteration on Aug 25 your views expressed to Qavam Aug 13 (Urteil 1116) concerning possible UN assistance vis-à-vis Sov Union suggests that our concurrence Aug 16 (Deptel 692 vi) may have been interpreted more broadly than was intended. In concurrence with your views re Iran's relation with UN we had in mind wholehearted Iranian submission substantive case to SC in event clear Sov violation Iranian sovereignty. While Dept appreciates and endorses your efforts to stiffen Qavam's attitude it is hoped that he has

vi Not printed; but see footnote 80, p. 512.
not gained any mistaken impression as to either UN capabilities or US intentions from your statement that “nations which were determined to make UN successful and potent international organization would find means to make it function in defending member states against aggression.”

We are confident that you understand fully present limitationsUN security action. For your private information, any subsequent measures by US beyond those possibilities would depend upon decision at highest level in light of prevailing circumstances.

We concur fully in objectives which doubtless prompted your remarks in point and our comments in no way modify our general position and support of attitude outlined in your previous conversations. Repeated to Moscow as no. 1570 and London as no. 6344.

Acheson

891.6365/3—646: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, September 6, 1946—3 p. m.
[Received September 6—1:50 p. m.]

1192. During conversation with Prime Minister yesterday subject turned to oil, which Qavam considers chief Soviet aim in Iran. If USSR can obtain its desires both as regards oil and Azerbaijan it will do so but if forced to choose between the two he feels confident Soviets will drop Azerbaijan.

In response to my request for information regarding basis for his discussion of oil with Soviet authorities in face of law which apparently forbids such discussion, he said he could not discuss “concession” but there was no difficulty about discussion joint development arrangement.

I remarked that American Government felt that as long as law remained on books, we should respect it and not embarrass Iranian officials by attempting to discuss subject. I added that as long as Iranian case remained on agenda of UN, we did not wish to have our motives in supporting Iran impugned. Qavam said he appreciated our reasoning and our attitude, adding cryptically that Soviet angle should be cleared up in another couple of months. As regards the law, he said he could discuss joint development arrangements with any one at any time. He then said, significantly and pointedly, that if he had in hand at the moment an American proposal based on a model development contract, his hands would be strengthened materially in dealing with Soviets since he could show Soviets what a just and proper proposal was like.

While I had not intended to get on subject of oil when I requested interview and I received no indication during conversation that Qavam
had planned his remarks, yet the rapidity with which he seized opportunity to make his point and earnestness with which he spoke shows he has had in mind talking with us about oil.

Qavam's remarks could well be taken as an invitation to us to make a petroleum proposal and as such they deserve considerably more attention than the similar suggestion recently made to me by Shah, since Qavam has power to carry out his ideas.

[Here follow Ambassador Allen's thoughts regarding possible formation of a joint company to develop Iranian-Baluchistan oil.]

ALLEN

711.91/9-2946

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Hilldring) to the Secretary of State--War--Navy Coordinating Committee (Reid)

SECRET

WASHINGTON,] September 26, 1946.

There is attached a series of questions concerning United States strategic interests in Iran which the Department of State requests you to transmit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their consideration. In view of the strong political interest of the Department of State in Iran, particularly in the present serious situation of internal strife, it is requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider this as matter of high priority.

H. W. MOSELEY, for J. H. Hilldring

[Annex]

PROPOSED QUESTIONS TO JCS

1. To what extent does the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider Iran to be an area of vital strategic interest to the United States for defensive or counter-offensive purposes, or as a source of supply?

2. In what way does the JCS consider the United States strategic interest in Iran to be related to United States strategic interest in the Near and Middle Eastern area as a whole?

3. In what manner does the JCS consider that United States strategic interest would be affected by:

(a) A division of Iran into a Soviet sphere of influence in the north and a British sphere of influence in the south?

(b) Permanent Soviet control of the Iranian province of Azerbaijan?

(c) The creation of a Soviet-dominated autonomous Kurdish state which might include contiguous portions of northwestern Iran and northern Iraq?

(d) Soviet domination of the whole of Iran?

**See footnote 25, p. 34. For further documentation on the question of Iranian oil, see pp. 30-50, passim.**

**Special Assistant to General Hilldring.**
4. Given the existing inadequacy of Iranian security forces and the political desirability of strengthening the authority of the central government, does the JCS consider that a program of assistance by the U. S. to the Iranian military establishment would contribute to the defense of United States strategic interest in the Near and Middle Eastern area?

740.00119 Council/9–2746: Telegram

740.00119

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 27, 1946—7 p. m.

US URGENT

5142. Secdel 1005. On instruction, Ala called today to communicate contents lengthy message from his Govt summarizing recent developments Southern Iran, particularly possibility Brit complicity. Iranians have what they believe to be conclusive evidence of incitement southern tribes by several Brit consular officers. Recall of principal person in allegations, Consul General Trott of Ahwaz, has been requested. Bevin has promised Iranian Amb to London to investigate fully and to take appropriate action in circumstances. Brit Amb Tehran denies involvement any Brit consular officer. Qavam has now instructed Iranian Amb London to bring complete evidence to attention Brit Govt and takes position that if satisfaction cannot be obtained by this means, Iranian Govt has no recourse but to bring matter before “International authority”.

65 Secretary of State Byrnes was attending the Paris Peace Conference, which met from July 29 to October 15, 1946.

66 In telegram 1219, September 12, from Tehran, Ambassador Allen had reported a conversation with Prince Firuz, who asserted he had irreputable proof that the British had engineered the recent plot by the Qashqai and Bakhtiari tribes to seize control of southern Iran, and declared that Iranian Government was considering appeal to the Security Council. Charges were made against the British Consul General at Ahwaz, Mr. A. C. Trott, and the question of his recall was raised. (741.91/9–1246) In telegram 1231, September 14, the Ambassador observed that he was “more and more convinced that entire question of plot was built up, out of smallest, if any, basis, for political purposes.” (891.00/9–1446)

According to telegram 5506, September 30, from London, Mr. Bevin, after studying the full British Foreign Office report on the Trott case, was satisfied that there was nothing to the Iranian charges (702.4191/9–3046). Telegram 7438, October 10, from London, reported that instructions had been sent to Ambassador Le Rougetel in Tehran to suggest to the Iranian Prime Minister that he withdraw the request for Mr. Trott’s removal, in which case the British would publish a statement containing a section intended for the tribes, as Mr. Qavam desired; or if Mr. Qavam refused to withdraw the request, the British would issue a shorter statement denying any connection with subversive activities in Iran. (891.00/10–1046).

Telegram 8806, October 16, from London, reported that the Iranian Government had withdrawn its request for Mr. Trott’s recall and that the Foreign Office planned to issue “as a reply to parliamentary question what amounts to statement desired by Qavam.” (702.4191/10–1646) For text of Mr. Bevin’s remarks addressed to the House of Commons on the matter, see Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 427, col. 902.
Qavam has impression US Govt may have had some foreknowledge of recent events and was not displeased by them. Ala was assured that US had no forewarning and that recent events can, in our opinion, only be detrimental to Iran. He was told further that declared US policy of continued economic assistance to Iran has not been altered.

In reply to Ala’s request for guidance concerning advisability his Govt bringing UN case against Brit, Amb was informed that this is naturally an important matter for decision only by Iran Govt. However, he might wish to consider precedent established in Iranian complaint against Soviet Union made at SC meeting in London, in which SC took position that matter should first be referred to parties in dispute for direct negotiations. We would hope, therefore, that Iran would not hesitate to enter into full and frank discussions with Brit in hopes of amicable settlement without bringing case before UN. Amb might also wish to consider whether precipitate action against Brit at this time might not play into hands of Russians and work to eventual detriment of Iranian sovereignty.


CLAYTON

891.00/9-2846; Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, September 28, 1946—3 p. m.
[Received September 29—12:27 a. m.]

1289. There are some additional indications that British are envisioning possible severance of Azerbaijan from Iran as an alternative to continuance of present situation, which they fear will result in incorporation of larger part of country into Soviet sphere. Idea seems to be that it would be preferable to cut off rotten part of apple rather than let it infect remainder. British Ambassador referred in conversation yesterday to what he feels is prime necessity for establishment of definite frontier between USSR and Iran. He feels that continued effort of Tehran Government to regard Azerbaijan as part of Iran is contrary to realities and results in mushy condition in which there is no clear-cut frontier and Soviets can continue to infiltrate into Tehran and exert pressure southward. Apparently his idea is that if Tehran Government would definitely break with Tabriz Government and establish strong military forces along Iran-Azerbaijan border, Tehran might then be better able to resist Soviet-inspired demands in rest of the country, such as inclusion of Tudeh in Cabinet and other conciliatory measures Tehran Government has been continually making in effort to keep Azerbaijan as part of nation.

67 As Nos. 6882, 810, and 1729, respectively.
British official policy undoubtedly continues to support a united Iran, including Azerbaijan, if this can be realized, and British Ambassador's inclination to look with certain complacency on loss of Azerbaijan may not reflect London thinking. However, overriding British consideration is to keep their oil concession, and all Britishers view Iran through that perspective.

I am inclined to believe that severance of Azerbaijan would not in fact relieve Soviet pressure on rest of country and might well place USSR merely in stronger position to realize other aims. Nor am I ready to admit that Azerbaijan has been irreparably lost, even though its recovery seems remote at the moment. Moreover, while I realize that present national boundaries of Iran, which result from historical accident or ancient conquests, are not sacred and that Azerbaijan may be closer in language and feelings to Turks in Turkey and USSR than to Iran, it seems to me we have no alternative but to continue to support integrity of Iran in accordance with Declaration Regarding Iran and United Nations Charter.

Sent Department 1289 repeated London 154 and Moscow 274.

Allen

891.00/9-3046: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

US URGENT

Tehran, September 30, 1946—1 p. m. [Received October 1—7 a. m.]

1293. In long conference with Prime Minister yesterday, held at his request, Qavam told me he realized that policy of conciliation towards Azerbaijan had not yielded favorable results and had merely encouraged other sections of country to make impossible demands. Qavam said he was contemplating sharp change of policy, based on strong insistence upon Iranian sovereignty throughout country. He fully realized he would be immediately castigated as turncoat and Fascist reactionary and would face serious internal difficulties. City of Tehran would even be in danger from almost certain Tudeh Party disturbances.

Qavam said new policy would in no way lessen his determination to institute far-reaching economic reforms which Iran needed so urgently. But to reestablish Iran as a nation and create conditions which would have some permanence, Iran needed immediate assistance along two major lines, military supplies and substantial financial credits. Iran could only look to United States for these. Before he undertakes new policy he would welcome assurance that United States would render assistance. He asked me to report conversation promptly and expressed hope for an early favorable reply.

I said I would naturally report his request immediately.
During conversation I expressed confidence that United States had in no way altered policy stated in Declaration Regarding Iran which contained assurances of American respect for Iranian sovereignty and our desire to assist Iran economically. I read to him Department's 810, September 27, 7 p. m. (sent to Paris as Secdel 1005) which fortunately had just reached me. I pointed out, however, that subsequent to signature of Declaration in 1943, both United States and Iran had become parties to a broader and more important instrument, the United Nations Charter. United States bases its foreign policy squarely on that Charter and encouraged other member states to do likewise. Nations like Iran which felt threatened with foreign interference for [and?] aggression should place reliance in UN for assistance. We should face the fact realistically that America could probably be moved to aid Iran seriously only to the extent its aid was regarded by American public as being given to support UN. Iran was making direct request of United States for combat military equipment and for credits which I understand Iranians felt should total 250 million dollars. I expressed opinion that sooner we came down to earth and viewed situation realistically the more progress we would make. My Government had told me 10 million dollars was most Iran could expect in credit from Export-Import Bank. As for combat equipment we had refused to sell any even to Latin America or China. I said I hoped in [my?] views were unduly negative since I would like nothing better than to be able to give him fullest encouragement. I knew Soviets had already offered him combat equipment to fight southern tribes. I hoped he would not yield to obvious temptation to accept this help which would have political strings attached. I could not encourage him to expect more direct American help than I honestly felt he was likely to get, but if my Government would give a more favorable response, no one would be more pleased than I.

Qavam said he realized foregoing was realistic appraisal of probable American reaction. At present moment he had little basis for new approach to UN but he might have better basis later. Present case against Britain would have to rest on intrigues between Consul General Trott and Bakhtiari, but latter tribe was not actually causing trouble. There was no adequate evidence of British instigation of other tribes which were causing difficulties. Case against Russia would be likewise rather hard to prove now, in view of Soviet troop withdrawals. He knew Soviets were involved in Azerbaijan but he would probably have to capture some Soviet Caucasians as exhibits before he could make much of a case. At same time he was basing his policy on UN and as evidence of this fact had decided to head Iranian delegation to General Assembly meeting himself. He knew, however,

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88 See footnote 87, p. 517.
that United States was dominant member of UN and he felt that only through assurance of our support could he prevent Iran from falling under domination of either foreign powers or subversive elements.

As indicated above, I would welcome instructions which would justify more favorable response to Qavam and also to Shah, who has been pressing me along same line for some weeks.


Allen

740.00119 Council/10-146: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, October 1, 1946—7 p.m.

5214. Secdel 1027. We are somewhat disturbed here by recent trend events in Iran. Situation, we feel, holds elements threat to international peace and security through possible involvement UK and USSR in protracted Iranian civil war. Even if such possibility should not materialize, outcome present situation cannot fail to be detrimental to Iranian sovereignty, UN principles and US policy objectives. Result might well be either division Iran into sphere of influence or domination Iran by single foreign power.

We feel that best possible hope preserving Iranian independence would be to strengthen Qavam’s hand by positive show US interest in Iran through full implementation our declared policy of economic assistance. For example, Iran has requested Exim Bank loan for development purposes, including irrigation projects, modernization transportation, water works and electricity for Tehran. Am[ericans] firm is about to make overall economic survey as part comprehensive program for economic and social development, to be carried out by Am[ericans] companies. While Qavam has pleaded for US economic assistance on many occasions, Allen has so far been unable give effective assurances due to our hitherto narrow concept of economic aspects our Iranian policy.

It seems to us not unnatural that in absence material assistance from disinterested friendly power Qavam should yield to selfish foreign pressures. We should welcome any views you may wish to give for our guidance.

Acheson

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*In note No. 1394, September 9, 1946, from the Iranian Ambassador to the Acting Secretary of State, not printed. The four projects enumerated in the note involved a total expenditure of 2,800 million rials, the equivalent of about $85 million, and called for a loan of about $45 to $50 million.* (891.51/9-946)
The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, October 3, 1946—3 p. m.
[Received October 3—12:37 p. m.]

4962. Delselc 1025. For the Acting Secretary from the Secretary. I feel we should extend economic help to the Iranian Government through sales of non-combat surplus property if any is available and through an Eximport Bank credit. In the light of my limited knowledge of the present situation in Iran I should not believe it wise to supply combat material (as suggested by Qavam in Tehran’s telegram No. 1293 to Department 30). Any contrary decision should be given most careful prior consideration.

Repeated Tehran 19.31

BYRNES

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, October 5, 1946—6 p. m.
[Received October 5—4:11 p. m.]

1324. Qavam told me today that his plans to attend UN General Assembly had had to be changed yesterday in view of formal and pressing demand he had just received from Soviet Ambassador for immediate holding of elections. Consequently, he would not be able to leave Iran for the present.

He said that 2 weeks ago Soviet Ambassador had asked him about elections and he had replied that elections were impossible as long as Azerbaijan question was not settled. He requested that Soviet authorities assist him in effecting agreement with Azerbaijan. Soviet Ambassador telegraphed this to Moscow and received reply stating that Qavam’s answer was not acceptable and insisting upon fulfillment of Qavam’s undertaking to submit oil agreement to Majlis. Qavam said that as result of Soviet insistence he had no alternative but to hold elections. He expects royal decree setting date for elections to be issued in few days and elections to be held one month thereafter. Meanwhile, he hopes to come to some kind of agreement with Azerbaijan which he says will return Khamseh province to Tehran but which will leave question of Azerbaijan Army for further negotiation.

30 Dated September 30, p. 518.
31 In telegram 1322, October 5, the Ambassador in Tehran reported that the substance of Mr. Byrnes’ telegram had been conveyed to the Iranian Minister (S91.00/10-546).
In reply to my question, Qavam said detailed oil agreement was yet to be drawn up for presentation to Majlis since only agreement in principle had so far been reached. Detailed agreement would have to be worked out between now and date Majlis assembles, which cannot possibly take place before November.

Elections will be rather a farce if held under present circumstances, with serious armed warfare going on in south and with Azerbaijan completely independent and defiant of Qavam. However, any elections held in Iran would probably be rather pro forma affair under best circumstances and Qavam’s principal aim to go through motions satisfactory to USSR. Moscow will apparently be satisfied with any group which will ratify oil agreement. Iranian constitution contains significant provision that Deputies from Tehran and vicinity can form a quorum to convene Majlis under some circumstances.

Qavam denied rumor that he has considered making executive agreement with USSR to enable Soviet petroleum exploration to begin immediately, in exchange for Soviet agreement not to press for early elections. Qavam doubted Soviets would agree since they have sent Sichov to Tehran and have required Sadchikov to defer his leave for month in order to press for elections.

Sent Department 1324, repeated London 162 and Moscow 280.

ALLEN

891.00/10-446: Telegram  
The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State  
SECRET US URGENT  
TEHRAN, October 6, 1946—noon.  
[Received 2:55 p.m.]

1325. Shah said last night he had just signed decree calling for immediate “preparations” for elections. He does not know exact date elections will be held but presumes they will take place in “about a month”. He hesitated to sign decree in view of disturbed state of country but decided he could not assume responsibility for further delay.

Shah is afraid Parliament to be elected will be divided between outright Soviet spokesmen and Deputies loyal to Qavam. He thinks latter group will also be susceptible to heavy Soviet pressure and that consequently new Parliament will “end Iranian independence” unless strong action is taken beforehand. He is toying with idea of asking Qavam to resign to enable formation of interim government to conduct elections. Announced basis for Shah’s action would be that Qavam, who is leader of political party, should not conduct elections...

--S. I. Sychev, Chief of the Middle Eastern Division of the Soviet Foreign Office.
in which his party is a contestant. Real basis for Shah's concern is his fear that new Parliament, elected under control of Qavam and Muzzafar Fuiruz, would be hostile to him and to western democracies.

In response to Shah's request for advice I said decision was one no foreigner had right to suggest and he must decide with his own counselors. He said counselor in whom he had greatest confidence and trust was Hussein Ala, who was unfortunately in Washington. He would welcome Ala's views . . . .

I am unable to guess Shah's probable action but suspect he may end by doing nothing, which may be best in circumstances. I have frequently cautioned him during conversations regarding Qavam that he should consider carefully the alternative. If he should force out present Cabinet and substitute for it reactionary regime regarded by Iranians as British stooges results would be shortlived. I am confident British themselves would not welcome such a regime. On other hand, there is real danger that new Parliament elected under present government may be Soviet-dominated. On balance I am inclined to let matters take their course. I would welcome Department's observations on situation since US attitude as expressed to Shah, whether of positive or negative nature, may have important bearing on his actions.

Sent Department 1325; repeated London 163.

ALLEN

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891.00/10-846

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

[WASHINGTON,] October 8, 1946.

Ambassador Ala, when he calls on you this afternoon, will probably bring to your attention what he considers to be the very critical situation in Iran and request American assistance at this time. The Ambassador will probably also request that this Government reopen the Iranian case before the Security Council.

Ambassador Ala yesterday informed us of the very serious view taken by him, and shared by the Iranian Ambassador in London, concerning conditions in Iran. The Ambassador feels that Iran has arrived at a crossroad where it must choose between exclusive orientation toward Russia and a more balanced policy within the spirit of the Charter of UN. He believes that the Russians are now exerting the strongest kind of pressure on Qavam to cause elections to be held, even while Azerbaijan is still outside the authority of the central Government and while the tribes in the South are rebelling against strong Russian infiltration throughout Iran. The Ambassador believes that if elections are now held the Russians will consolidate
their position in Northern Iran and eventually gain control of the entire country.

Ambassador Allen shares Mr. Ala’s concern. We feel that the situation is critical and that we should do everything within our power to prevent Iran from slipping into the Soviet orbit. I need not elaborate on the consequences for this country of Iran’s falling under Soviet domination. In addition to our political interests in preserving the sovereignty of all small states and in holding the line against Russia in this area, we have discussed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff the matter of US strategic interest in Iran. The JCS is strongly of the opinion that our strategic interest would be greatly harmed by division of Iran into spheres of influence or by Iran’s falling completely under Soviet domination. They hold the view that the oil fields in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iraq are absolutely vital to the security of this country.

We do not believe that the present Iranian case before the Security Council should be reopened at this time, since it may be contended that Qavam is following a sovereign and voluntary course of action. However, we do feel that some action on the part of this Government is required if Iran’s sovereignty is to be protected and the country prevented from taking immediate action leading to loss of the country’s sovereignty. We feel Qavam is following a pro-Soviet course of action, not because he desires to do so or because he believes it is in the interest of his country. We feel that Qavam is making concession after concession to the Russians of a nature which will eventually undermine the sovereignty of Iran and that one reason for his course of action is our inability to take concrete steps to assist Iran economically or politically. We have had too many occasions to meet Iran’s requests for assistance in a half-hearted or negative fashion. Unless we can consistently show Qavam by action that he can count on the support of this country, in and out of the United Nations, Iran will, in our opinion, inevitably give way to Russian pressure, with all that such yielding entails for the interest of this country. Specifically, it seems to us that Qavam should be urged to hold fast in the protection of Iran’s sovereignty. He should be encouraged to hope for American assistance in implementing his announced program of reform. He should be encouraged to hope for an American loan for internal development. He should be encouraged to hope for the supply by this country to Iran of combat supplies necessary to maintain internal security. Furthermore, he should be specifically informed at once that the holding of elections before the central Government has resumed its authority over Azerbaijan would represent a step extremely dangerous to the continued independence and sovereignty of Iran.
It is hoped that in your conversation with Ambassador Ala you will be able to give him, for transmission to Qavam, an indication of this country’s real interest in Iran and our resolve to implement fully the declared US policy toward that country. A show of our interest in Iran would be emphasized by sending an official of the State Department to Iran at this time to discuss the whole Iranian problem with Ambassador Allen and to carry a formal message from the President or the Secretary to the Iranian Prime Minister. A good occasion is afforded by the departure of a special plane being sent by the President to Baghdad on October 19 for a period of a week.

LOY W. HENDERSON

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern and Indian Affairs (Minor)

[WASHINGTON,], October 8, 1946.

Participants: Mr. Hussein Ala, Iranian Ambassador
Mr. Acheson
Mr. Minor, MEI

The Iranian Ambassador called today at his request. He said that he wished to emphasize to the Department the seriousness of the situation in Iran. He said that the Province of Azerbaijan is now entirely under the control of the Democrats, who are under Russian influence, so that the central Government has virtually lost control of this important state. In addition to this grave difficulty, the southern part of Iran is now torn by civil strife. Whatever the degree of British complicity in the southern rebellion, the Ambassador gave his opinion that the movement is a normal and natural reaction of the tribes against Russian infiltration into Southern Iran and domination over the central government. It all, in his opinion, goes back to the original “sin” of Russian aggression in northern Iran. Ambassador Ala declared that Iran now stands at a cross road, and the next moves may well determine Iran’s destiny. He stated frankly that, while he has up to this point been sure that Qavam is following a patriotic course designed to protect Iran’s independence, he is not now so sure of this. His general impression is still that Qavam has followed his present course because of necessity, since the Russians are on top of Iran and since little hope of assistance from any other power is evident. Iran, the Ambassador said, continues to pin its hope on the United States. He sincerely believes that Qavam has followed this course by default and that he will alter his course if encouragement is given by the United States.
The situation in Iran is made critical by the fact that Qavam has now agreed to hold elections. The Ambassador said he was at a loss to understand how Qavam could agree to hold elections for the Majlis at a time when Azerbaijan and part of the South are [not?] under the control of the central Government. The elections will certainly have the effect of returning to the Majlis a solid bloc of Soviet-dominated deputies from Azerbaijan and possibly from other northern areas. The result of this Soviet bloc will be to give the Russians virtual control of the central Government and all that that entails. If this course of action is carried through, Iran will have lost a major degree of sovereignty.

With this background in mind, Ambassador Ala suggested that the United States should now help Iran in the following three ways:

1. The Iranian case should be reopened before the Security Council by the United States. The Ambassador said that conditions in Iran are much worse than in May when the case was postponed temporarily. With Russian aggression still effective in the North and rebellion in the South, a full inquiry should now be made and a commission sent to Iran to investigate.

2. The United States should express to Iranian officials, through its Ambassador at Tehran, the serious view this Government takes of the trend of events and recommend that the impending elections in Iran should be postponed.

3. In addition to bringing American views to the attention of Soviet officials through our Ambassador, it would be very helpful if this Government could send an official of the State Department to Iran with a more personal message from this Government, to express the American Government’s viewpoint more fully and carefully than could be done by telegraph.

Mr. Acheson assured the Ambassador of the very close interest this Government has in the course of events in Iran. As to the possibility of reopening the Iranian case before the Security Council, Mr. Acheson did not wish to express an off-hand opinion without full consultation on the subject. However, he told the Ambassador frankly that it would be very difficult for this Government to reopen the Iranian case when there is no indication that the Iranian Government has altered the stand it took before the Security Council in the spring when it requested that the Iranian case be dropped from the agenda. We are not at all sure of what the Iranian reaction to such a move might be, and we do not know that Qavam would approve of reopening the case or sending a commission of inquiry. This is a question which should be carefully considered before any action is taken. Concerning the second of the Ambassador’s points, Mr. Acheson said that this Government has on many occasions expressed a great interest in the Iranian affairs and only recently instructed Ambassador Allen to

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93 The reference is presumably to telegram 844, October 8, to Tehran, infra, which was drafted the previous day.
express to Qavam the dangers which appear to be inherent in the proposed aviation agreement with Russia. We will continue to take a close interest in Iran and make every effort to implement our declared policy of economic assistance to that country. As to the specific point of recommending to Qavam that elections not be held, Mr. Acheson said he had some misgivings about such definite interferences in Iranian internal affairs. He thought that the appropriate course of action would be to give Qavam assurances of American interest and support so that he might feel strengthened to take whatever action he might feel suitable in the circumstances to protect Iran's sovereignty. Replying to the third of the Ambassador's points, Mr. Acheson said that the possibility of sending an official of the State Department to Iran on a special mission will be discussed with officials of the Department. In closing Mr. Acheson said he wished the Ambassador to take away the impression that the United States Government is sincerely interested in Iran and desires to be of assistance at this critical time.

891.796/10-846: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 8, 1946—7 p. m.

US URGENT

844. Ur 1298, Sept 30 and 1294, Sept 30. We are deeply concerned your reports Iranian Govt giving favorable consideration to Russian request that an aviation company with 50 percent Russian participation be organized for servicing Northern Iran.

We feel that in granting such request Iranian Govt would greatly facilitate realization of what appears to be Soviet plans absorb Northern Iran into Soviet sphere. Such a company would be certain to pass under full Soviet control and with Soviet support would be able without difficulty to eliminate all competitors and obtain monopoly on what promises to become most important means communication and transport in Northern Iran. Manner in which Russians exploit monopoly this kind is illustrated by way in which they decided on political basis who could travel by air between Tehran and Tabriz on Soviet controlled airlines during recent Azerbaijan crisis.

We are endeavoring live up to our assurances to support independence and territorial integrity Iran but responsibility for maintaining such independence and integrity rests primarily on Govt Iran. If Iranian Govt has not ability or courage to resist demands from abroad
for concessions, granting of which is likely to result in impairment
Iranian sovereignty or integrity, our difficulties in living up to our
assurances are enhanced.

Furthermore granting of such concession may eventually prejudice
operation US trunk lines through Iran and establishment direct air
communications other than those controlled by Russians between Iran
and Afghanistan.

You may discuss this matter in your discretion with appropriate
Iranian officials.


ACHESON

891.00/10-846: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, October 11, 1946—7 p.m.
MOST IMMEDIATE

858. Urtel 1336 Oct 8.\footnote{In telegram 1331, October 7, 1946, Ambassador Allen had quoted Qavam as saying that there had been no recent developments regarding proposal made to him some time before by the Soviet Union for establishment of a joint Iran-Soviet company to be given monopoly of commercial aviation in northern Iran, that Iranian Government had made a counterproposal two months ago offering the Soviet Union 25 percent ownership, but that nothing had been heard of it since. Mr. Allen indicated that this was entirely contrary to reports from highly responsible sources that Qavam was on the point of agreeing to original Soviet proposal. The Ambassador also commented that the recent excitement about the proposed aviation agreement may have resulted from discussions between junior Soviet and Iranian officials without the Prime Minister's knowledge. (891.706/10-746)} We agree that it would be difficult for us
to take any further action in Iranian case before SC in absence Ira-
nian initiative. Amb Ala so informed by me in conversation Oct 8.
In view our belief, however, that critical situation in Iran due at
least in part to Soviet pressure and continued Soviet interference in
Iranian affairs, we feel for time being at least Iranian case should
be retained on SC agenda. If during conversation between you and
Qavam question should arise you may say you feel your govt would
support an Iranian appeal to SC against continued foreign inter-
ference provided Iran would accompany such appeal with appro-
priate evidence such foreign interference.

We doubt that an Iranian request to GA for permission observe
elections would contribute materially alleviation situation in Iran.
In our opinion Iranian govt requesting such commission would im-
mediately become persona non grata with Soviet govt which would
refuse longer to cooperate with it and would probably make it im-
possible for such commission to carry out its functions. It seems to

\footnote{Not printed; Ambassador Allen reported that several Iranian political leaders had urged that a United Nations Commission be sent to Iran to supervise or observe the elections and to investigate the whole question of foreign interference in Iran (891.00/10-846).}
us any Iranian govt willing resist Soviet pressure would be in stronger position if it would insist no elections be held until law and order restored throughout the country or at least that no elections be held in areas over which Iranian govt not able exercise control.

If, however, Qavam should ask whether this govt would support Iranian request to GA for permission observe elections you may, after giving him our views re matter, state that if Iranian govt feels elections must be held in spite its lack of control over whole country and if it desires UN supervision such elections we would support such request. This request, however, should be dissociated from SC consideration of case before it and based merely on Iran's desire obtain benefit UN’s advice on electoral practices which such commission would be able to supply as result its observations. This distinction between SC consideration of interference and GA concern with elections is important, because GA cannot take any action under Art 12 on matter of which SC is seized. As indicated above we think SC should continue to be seized of present Iranian case.

In our opinion holding elections in Iran in present circumstances may well result in complete loss of Iranian independence and eventuality which may have serious consequences throughout whole Middle East. We hope therefore Qavam will reconsider his decision or at least consider possibility postponing elections in Azerbaijan and Fars (as US postponed elections in South during Civil War) until such time as govt regains full control there while continuing plans for elections other provinces.

Sent Tehran, repeated Secdel Paris 5485, London 7150, Moscow 1813.

ACHESON

711.01/10-1246

Memorandum by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to Major General John H. Hilldring 97

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 12 October 1946.

SWN-4818

Reference is made to the State Department memorandum dated 26 September 1946 which transmitted a series of questions prepared by the Department of State concerning United States strategic interest in Iran.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered these questions and have advised the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee as follows:

"It is apparent that the questions propounded by the Department of State are based on an assumption that a war with Soviet Russia is a

97 This memorandum was directed to General Hilldring in his capacity as Department of State member of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.
possibility. On that assumption the following replies based on military considerations are an expression of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a consideration apart from such assumption, it must be realized that the interests of the United States and its military capabilities would be adversely affected by loss of Middle East oil occurring through possible Soviet domination of Iran by means other than war.

"1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that as a source of supply (oil) Iran is an area of major strategic interest to the United States. From the standpoint of defensive purposes the area offers opportunities to conduct delaying operations and/or operations to protect United States-controlled oil resources in Saudi Arabia. In order to continue any military capability for preventing a Soviet attack overrunning the whole Middle East including the Suez-Cairo Area, in the first rush, it is essential that there be maintained the maximum cushion of distance and difficult terrain features in the path of possible Soviet advances launched from the Caucasus-Caspian area. Otherwise the entire Middle East might be overrun before sufficient defensive forces could be interposed. As to counteroffensive operations, the proximity of important Soviet industries, makes the importance of holding the Eastern Mediterranean-Middle Eastern area obvious. This is one of the few favorable areas for counteroffensive action. Quite aside from military counteroffensive action in the area, the oil resources of Iran and the Near and Middle East are very important and may be vital to decisive counteroffensive action from any area.

"2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that United States strategic interest in Iran is closely related to United States strategic interest in the Near and Middle East area as a whole as follows:

"Our best estimates indicate that the USSR does not now derive sufficient oil from sources within her borders to support a major war. The objective of the fourth Soviet five-year plan is 35,000,000 metric tons production annually. Again, our best estimates indicate this tonnage is only sufficient to meet the total Russian peacetime needs upon the expiration of this fourth five-year plan. The USSR and Iran have formed a joint Russian-Iranian oil company to develop oil resources in northern Iran, an area geologists consider an improbable source of large oil production, a fact which must be well known to the Russians. Hence, her motives in forming this Russian-Iranian oil company are subject to suspicion. Loss of the Iraq and Saudi Arabia sources to the United States and her allies would mean that in case of war they would fight an oil-starved war. Conversely, denial of these sources to the USSR would force her to fight an oil-starved war. However, due to Russia’s geographic position, great land mass, and superior manpower potential, any lack of oil limiting air action by the United States and her allies or hampering their transportation ability or their war production would be of great advantage to the USSR. It is therefore to the strategic interest of the United States to keep Soviet influence and Soviet armed forces removed as far as possible from oil resources in Iran, Iraq, and the Near and Middle East."
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that:

a. A division of Iran into a Soviet sphere of influence in the north and a British sphere of influence in the south would enhance the ability of the Soviets to achieve their ‘security’ ends in this area by political means while having the effect of serving notice to other countries that the western democracies admit their inability to protect their strategic interests in this area. Further, it would give the Soviets opportunity to perfect transportation facilities in northern Iran, to organize northern Iran for defense, and to prepare northern Iran as a possible base for operations against British and/or American oil resources in southern Iran and Saudi Arabia. It would allow the Soviets to move their forces half way to these sources of oil without serious opposition. It would, for all practicable purposes, nullify any ability the British may have at present to protect the oil fields in Iraq and, finally, it would be another step in the encirclement of Turkey.

b. Permanent Soviet control of the Iranian province of Azerbaijan would, from the strategic point of view, be the least objectionable of the four situations propounded in question three. It nevertheless would be a permanent penetration into Iran and thus permit movement of Soviet forces close to the oil fields of Iraq.

c. The creation of a Soviet-dominated autonomous Kurdish state which might include contiguous portions of northwestern Iran and northern Iraq would adversely affect United States strategic interests by introducing into the area a state owing its existence to the USSR, and therefore strongly influenced by the Soviets and hence probably a willing instrument of the USSR for the creation of discord, dissent, and revolt in the Near and Middle East. Such a state would very probably include the sources of British oil in the Kirkuk area. In this case the revenue now derived by Iraq from Britain for the use of these oil resources would revert to the newly created Kurdish state. Such a situation would probably cause the dissolution of the present government of Iraq and a subsequent chaotic condition from which might arise a new government oriented toward the USSR instead of toward the western democracies. Since Iraq stretches to the head of the Persian Gulf and the Abadan oil refineries are practically on the border of Iraq, our strategic resources in the area would be endangered.

d. Soviet domination of the whole of Iran would entail all of the objections raised in a, b and c above but with the possible adverse effects on United States strategic interests in the Near and Middle East greatly intensified.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that token assistance by the United States to the Iranian military establishment would probably contribute to the defense of United States strategic interest in the Near and Middle East by creating a feeling of good will toward the United States in the central government of Iran and would tend to stabilize and strengthen that government. They are informed that
the immediate security objective of United States policy toward Iran is to prevent civil disturbances which might invite intervention by powerful neighbors and which might endanger United States economic interests in the Persian Gulf area. They feel that, in support of this objective, the United States should accede to Iranian requests for non-aggression items of military material, in reasonable amounts, to enable the Iranian Government to maintain internal security, in view of the fact that Iran cannot supply its own military needs as they have no established sources for security supplies. They consider such non-aggression items of military material as small arms and light artillery, ammunition, small tanks, transportation and communication equipment, quartermaster supplies, and perhaps short range aircraft and naval patrol craft, to be appropriate for release to Iran in reasonable quantities upon the request of Iran, so long as the United States is satisfied that Iran demonstrates a desire to maintain its independence in the community of nations. Technical advice given unostentatiously and on request would also be appropriate and contributory to the defense of United States strategic interests in Iran and the Near and Middle East area. United States military missions now in Iran should remain there, but any additional military mission to Iran would be inadvisable at this time.

"The military implications in the existing international situation concerning Iran are closely related to the military implications of the current Turkish situation, on which the Joint Chiefs of Staff furnished their views to the Secretaries of War and the Navy on 24 August 1946."

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

A. D. Reed
Secretary

The Iranian Ambassador (Ala) to the Acting Secretary of State

No. 1574

The Iranian Ambassador presents his compliments to the Acting Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him that he has been instructed by his Government to have recourse to the State Department's support and good offices in securing a credit of ten million dollars for a period of thirty years bearing interest at the rate of three percent.

This credit will be earmarked for the purchase of arms and equipment in the United States and abroad through the Foreign Liquidation Commission in America, as approximately detailed in the accompanying list, which are urgently required to render the Iranian Army more mobile and put it in a better position to fulfil its duty

*Note: Copy forwarded to State Department in letter to Acting Secretary of State from Secretaries of War and the Navy dated 31 August 1946. [Footnote in the original; for memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, dated August 23, 1946, see p. 857.]

*Not printed.
in the maintenance of law and order within Iran's borders and in defending the integrity and independence of the Country without any thought of aggression.

In view of the American Government's desire, as expressed in the Declaration of Teheran of December 1st, 1945 [1943], to maintain the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran, the Ambassador feels sure that the State Department will do its utmost to assist him in obtaining as expeditiously as possible the credit requested by his Government.

Further particulars and detailed lists of the arms and equipment will be furnished as required.

WASHINGTON, October 15, 1946.

891.00/10-1546 : Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State
[Extracts]

SECRET

TEHRAN, October 15, 1946—3 p.m.  
[Received 3:31 p.m.]

1371. Shah said last night that Qavam had called on him earlier in the day to repeat assurances of loyalty and of confidence that elections could be arranged to avoid a Soviet-dominated Majlis. Shah told me that aside from question whether Qavam's assurance and confidence were genuine, he greatly doubted Qavam's ability to carry out such plans, in view of Qavam's loss of freedom of action.

Shah said he was uncertain regarding maintenance of security. I said he should approach question from point of view that constitutional methods were being followed and that military action was not necessarily involved. At same time he should, of course, be prepared for whatever security contingency might arise.

I am unable to predict what course the Shah will follow. The city is full of rumors of an impending change of government and it is always possible that Qavam may be the first to act.

Repeated London 169, Moscow 298.

Allen

891.00/10-1946
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 18, 1946.

There is attached hereto a memorandum prepared in this Office reviewing the background of events in Iran and suggesting certain
action which, if taken, might strengthen the hands of this Government in its efforts to preserve the independence of Iran and to prevent that country from succumbing to Soviet pressure and thus passing completely into the Soviet orbit of satellite states.

You will note that these suggestions include (1) the extension of credits to Iran for the purpose of financing specific approved development projects which have for their general purpose the raising of Iranian standards of living and (2) the sale to Iran of a limited amount of nonaggression military equipment to enable the Iranian authorities to maintain internal order.

We feel that unless we show by concrete acts that we are seriously interested in carrying out our various assurances to Iran, the Iranian Government and people will eventually become so discouraged that they will no longer be able to resist Soviet pressure. If the suggestions contained in the attached memorandum are approved at the highest levels of the Department, it will be much easier for the various Offices to solve the problems which arise daily with regard to Iran.

It will be observed that the memorandum is devoted primarily to long-term policies. We are faced at the present time, however, with an extremely critical situation in Iran which may require quick action on our part. Recent telegrams from Tehran are causing us deep concern. It has become clear to our Ambassador and to us that Qavam is now virtually a prisoner of his own policy of retreating before Soviet pressure and that Iran is daily losing what remains of its independence. The Shah apparently is alarmed at the situation and is considering utilizing the authority vested in him by the Iranian Constitution to dismiss Qavam and appoint a new Prime Minister . . .

We have been hoping that at a given point Qavam would show the required degree of firmness, but have reluctantly come to the point of view that Qavam has become so enmeshed in Soviet intrigue that he is no longer in a position to act as defender of the independence of Iran.

It is quite possible that within the next few days the Shah will remove Qavam and appoint a new Prime Minister. If such an event should take place, in our opinion we should at once give to the new government all appropriate moral support and at the same time make it clear that we are now prepared to extend to Iran the economic assistance which we have been promising for the last three years.

There is at the present time in Washington an Iranian military mission, headed by a Brigadier General, which is endeavoring to purchase on credit $10,000,000 worth of nonaggression military equipment. Thus far, we have been noncommittal with regard to this request. We can not delay giving a reply much longer. In case the Shah should appoint a new Prime Minister, it seems to us that we should indicate our willingness to sell at least a certain amount of
this type of equipment to Iran at once. It is our understanding that the Export-Import Bank has no authority to advance credits for the purchase of arms. Our suggestion, therefore, is that we sell such surplus noncombat military equipment as is obtainable to Iran on credit and a reasonable amount of nonaggression, combat equipment for cash. A separate memorandum on this subject is being prepared.

LOY W. HENDERSON

[Annex]

Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 18, 1946.

IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAN

[Here follows background material.]

In brief, the Iranian question transcends the mere bilateral relations between Iran and the United States. Politically, it involves our policy of supporting the independence of small countries in the spirit of the United Nations. Strategically, it involves the defense of our military interests in the entire Near and Middle Eastern area, having particular relevance to the position we have taken with regard to Turkey. Both the political and strategic aspects of this problem are an integral part of the broader question of United States relations with the Soviet Union.

These political and strategic interests require that we should give positive encouragement and assistance to Iran in an endeavor to save it from falling completely under Soviet domination and to rescue it if possible from its present state of partial subservience to the Soviet Union. In implementation of our declared policy toward Iran and of our moral commitments under the United Nations Charter, it is recommended that the following steps be taken by this Government:

1. Ambassador Allen be authorized to express to the Shah and the Prime Minister on appropriate occasions the genuine interest of the United States in the independence of Iran and assure them that this Government is prepared, so long as the Government of Iran sincerely desires independence and is willing to stand up for its sovereignty against external pressure, to support the independence of Iran not only by words but by appropriate acts.

2. This Government be prepared to extend an Eximbank loan to Iran to enable the carrying out of specific approved development projects, the execution of which will tend to raise Iranian standards of living.

3. This Government furnish, in reasonable quantities, arms and ammunition requested by the Iranian Military Mission presently in

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1 Marginal notation by the Secretary of State: “OK J.F.B.”
2 Marginal notations indicate the Secretary of State's approval of these steps.
this country, for the purpose of maintaining internal security. This
view is supported by recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
as follows: "The United States should accede to Iranian requests for
non-aggression items of military material, in reasonable amounts, to
enable the Iranian Government to maintain internal security, in view
of the fact that Iran cannot supply its own military needs as they
have no established sources for security supplies. They (JCS) con-
sider such non-aggression items of military material as small arms
and light artillery, ammunition, small tanks, transportation and com-
munication equipment, quartermaster supplies, and perhaps short
range aircraft and naval patrol craft, to be appropriate for release to
Iran in reasonable quantities upon the request of Iran, so long as
the United States is satisfied that Iran demonstrates a desire to main-
tain its independence in the community of nations. Technical advice
given unostentatiously and on request would also be appropriate and
contributory to the defense of United States strategic interests in
Iran and the Near and Middle East area."

4. United States military missions in Iran be supported and
strengthened, and legislation permitting their detail beyond the
period of national emergency should be supported before Congress.
5. Information and cultural relations between Iran and the United
States should be intensified by a well-executed program.

These recommendations are based on the assumption that Iran still
possesses a degree of independence and that the Iranian Government
is working for the true national interests of the country. Should
the course of events cause us to believe that the assumption no longer
holds, the recommended acts would of course not be taken but held
in abeyance.

891.002/10-1946: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, October 19, 1946—noon.

US URGENT [Received October 20—10:33 a.m.]

1390. [Here follows an account of the changes in the Qavam
cabinet.2]

... new Cabinet is primarily straight Qavam Party government, in
contrast to previous coalition government. Its formation has resulted
from combination of circumstances, but primarily from realization by
Qavam that collaboration with Tudeh was not possible. My represen-
tations to Qavam on October 11th regarding loss of independence of

2 In telegram 1384, October 18, 11 a.m., Ambassador Allen reported discussions
between the Shah and Prime Minister Qavam on the formation of a new
government. He noted that the situation had been brought to a head as a result
of the Prime Minister's decision three days before to replace the Governor of
Tehran, a Tudeh sympathizer, with a member of his Democrats of Iran Party
and that the three Tudeh members of the Cabinet objected strongly and absented
themselves from the Cabinet meeting of October 18. The Ambassador concluded
that the Prime Minister was taking advantage of the situation to try to eliminate
them from the Cabinet. (891.00/10-1846)
his Government, and British Ambassador’s insistent advice and warning against collaboration with Tudeh in forthcoming elections have helped bring about decision. Tudeh Cabinet members angered Qavam by truculent attitude they took against settlement of Fars revolt and by inordinate demands they made for control of forthcoming Majlis. Soviet Ambassador overplayed his hand and used threatening tone in recent conversations with Qavam. These and other considerations have convinced Qavam that his efforts to maintain coalition government could not continue and that he must make a clear-cut break with Tudeh. He will try to avoid open break with Moscow, and Muzzafar Firuz is slated to go to Moscow as Ambassador.

I do not believe Tudeh Party will accept Qavam’s decision quietly. While it may take several days or even weeks before their full reaction is felt, I have no doubt they will attempt to organize demonstrations and serious disturbances may result. All Qavam’s powers of manipulation will be needed to prevent Azerbaijan from breaking into armed hostilities. Soviet reaction against him will probably be violent, inpite of his efforts to conciliate USSR.

New Cabinet is very considerable improvement over former one. It is fortunate that change came about on Qavam’s own initiative since serious difficulties which would have risen if Shah had had to force change on Qavam have been avoided.

Repeated London 173 and Moscow 295.

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Allen

S91.002/10-2046: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, October 20, 1946—noon.
[Received 2:01 p.m.]

1391. Embs 1390. Shah gave me last night his version of events which brought about changes in Cabinet which differs somewhat from that previously reported. Shah said that following his conversations with me on Oct 14 (Embs 1365) he determined to force Qavam out and had decided to take action today (Oct. 20). Rumors that Shah planned to arrest Qavam became current and on Oct 16

*In telegram 1354, October 12, noon, Ambassador Allen reported that he had brought to the attention of the Iranian Prime Minister the facts that immediately after a recent Cabinet meeting discussing the aviation agreement with the Soviet Union, a member of the Cabinet had informed the Soviet Embassy of the exact position taken by each member and that within 24 hours a Soviet official had demanded of a Cabinet member why he had opposed Soviet interests. Mr. Allen pointed out to the Prime Minister that “when such conditions existed, it was obvious that present Government of Iran had no freedom or independence and that we might as well recognize the fact and cease pretending.” (701-0091/10-1246)

* Dated October 15, 10 a.m., not printed.

219-490—69—35
Qavam called on Minister War to find what true situation was. Minister of War told Qavam he was not aware of Shah's plans but knew that Shah was disgusted with continual pro-Soviet orientation of Govt and that Army was entirely loyal to Shah and would do whatever he ordered.

Qavam asked for audience with Shah next morning (Oct 17) and declared his willingness to follow any instructions. Shah says Qavam was "trembling with fright". Shah said his first requirement was that both Firuzes and three Tudeh members must be dismissed from Cabinet and Qavam's party must fight Tudeh with all its strength during coming election. Nothing further must be heard of coalition with Tudeh or collaboration agreement [regarding? ]election. Qavam promptly agreed to everything except dismissal of Muzzafar Firuz, pleading to keep him on at least for short while. Shah says he became furious, banged tables, and told Qavam that mention of Firuz again would end any cooperation between himself and Qavam forever. Shah said he wanted Firuz either in prison or out of country immediately. Qavam suggested sending him to Moscow and Shah agreed provided it was done immediately. Before Qavam left palace he and Shah drew up new Cabinet list.

They agreed to keep matter entirely secret for 24 hours to avoid Tudeh demonstrations but Qavam promptly told Firuz, who told Soviet Ambassador. Latter demanded to see Qavam immediately and did so that night (Oct 17). Sadchikov used abusive language and succeeded in weakening Qavam's nerve. Next morning Qavam called again on Shah in much agitation and expressed fear that Soviet troops might enter country if change of Cabinet went through. Shah says he expressed disbelief that USSR would invade Iran but that even so he was determined to go through with change and immediately call on UN for help in case of attack. They then agreed to announce new Cabinet without further delay.

Principal difference between foregoing account and my telegram yesterday (number 1390) is that Shah does not consider Qavam deserves any credit for initiative in changing Cabinet, although he admits that Qavam has become angry against Tudeh and is glad to be rid of them.

Shah told me he spent three sleepless nights trying to decide whether it was best to give Qavam another chance. He finally concluded that since Qavam had brought Tudeh into Govt Qavam should assume responsibility for ousting them. In response to his question I said I thought he had acted wisely and that manner in which change had
come about was most fortunate. Dept’s 880, October 18 has [omission] Dept’s assumptions are entirely correct and telegram appreciated. Repeated London 174 and Moscow 296.

Allen

891.51/10-2246 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

MOSL IMMEDIATE

TEHRAN, October 22, 1946—5 p. m.

[Received October 23—10:17 a. m.]

1400. Ebtehaj called again today to press for reply to enquiry regarding credits, reported in Embtel 1262, September 21, 2 p. m. 7

It would be most helpful at this juncture, when Iranian Govt has made gesture of independence from foreign domination by eliminating members of Cabinet who were under foreign control, if I could be authorized to offer some encouragement on subject of credits. I believe present is psychological moment for US to show that its assurances of economic assistance, given over signature of late President Roosevelt, are genuine. Frequent inquiries I received on this subject from Shah, Prime Minister and Ebtehaj are becoming embarrassing.

Ebtehaj said today that Iranian Govt contemplates utilizing first its own available resources in carrying out economic development plans for country, and that these resources may be sufficient to provide half the funds needed for overall project. He thought it might be up to 2 years before foreign credits will actually be needed. However, the Iranian Govt is unwilling to embark on the considerable plan contemplated until it submits detailed project to Eximbank and World Bank and obtains assurances that the remaining credits necessary will be forthcoming. Ebtehaj has in mind that perhaps $250,000,000 will be needed in foreign credits. He hopes that something like 100,000,000 will come from Eximbank and 150,000,000 from International Bank. He realizes that amount suggested from Eximbank is larger than that bank is accustomed to lend but he feels that Iran should be considered in special category in view of political position of Iran and promises of economic assistance. Current negotiations between Iranian Govt and British officials and AIOC are expected to increase materially dollar availabilities to Iranian Govt with which to repay credits. This subject will be covered in following telegram. 8

6 Not printed.
7 Not printed; it conveyed an urgent plea from Mr. Ebtehaj for a more encouraging attitude by the United States Government toward economic assistance in Iran (891.51/9-2146).
8 Telegram 1404, October 24, 1946, not printed.
One important means US Govt could help immediately would be to
make possible overall economic survey and engineering studies, which
Ambassador Allen reports will cost $225,000 plus expenses. This survey
is necessary before Iranian Govt can properly document and support
its applications for credits to Eximbank and World Bank.9

[In telegram 1456, November 11, 1946, 11 a.m., the Ambassador in
Tehran reported that on November 9 the Iranian Council of Ministers
had approved financial settlement with the British which provided
that sterling accretions between March 2 and October 31, 1946, would
be 60% convertible into gold and subsequent accretions would be 100%-
convertible to gold until July 1947, when sterling would become con-
vertible under Anglo-American financial agreement. The telegram
also noted that the British had sold £5,000,000 worth of gold to the
Banque de la Libération in final settlement of the Anglo-Iranian financial agreement which expired on March 2, 1946. (891.51/11-1146)]

891.00/10-2846: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 30, 1946—8 p.m.

US URGENT

909. After studying urtel 1415 Oct 28 10 and your previous telegrams
and reports on same subject we still are inclined to view expressed our
858 Oct 11 that any Iranian Govt willing resist Soviet pressure would
be in stronger position if it would insist no elections be held until law
and order restored throughout country.

We can understand your feeling re continuation of Govt by Cabi-
net decree but are wondering if such Govt would be less representative
of desires of Iranian people than one formed by Majlis composed
of Deputies selected in part by Soviet puppet govt. of Azerbaijan
and in part by Qavam in conjunction with Tudeh party leaders and
other Iranian politicians. You will recall that in urtel 1358 Oct 14 11
you referred to reported hope of Qavam that settlement would be

9 The Iranian Ambassador, on October 24, notified the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development that his Government had decided to make
application for a long-term credit of $250,000,000. A copy of the letter was sent
to the Department by the Bank on October 30. (800.515 BWA/10-3046)

10 Not printed; in it Ambassador Allen stated: "I am being pressed by various
factions to aid in efforts to have elections postponed but have refrained from
taking any position in matter. While convening of Majlis involves risk of
concessions being granted, on demands of USSR, which may be detrimental to
Iranian independence, I am inclined to think it is a risk we cannot avoid. In
principle Embassy should not assume responsibility for continuation of Govern-
ment by Cabinet decree . . ." (891.00/10-2846)

11 Not printed.
reached on basis 60 percent members Majlis from his party and 40 percent from other parties. It seems to us if coming elections merely represent method by which Qavam in connivance with Azerbaijani, Tudeh and others is to select members of Majlis, Shah may have some justification in what appears to be his fear that Qavam with hand-picked Majlis will be so strong he can pursue whatever policy he desires.

Have recent actions or attitude of Qavam caused you revise your feelings with regard to him indicated in urtels 1359 Oct 14 22 and 1371 Oct 15? Has confidence of Shah in Qavam been restored to any extent since Cabinet reshuffle? We had obtained impression reshuffle was made only because of pressure on part of Shah with backing of army rather than because of any change of heart by Qavam. In urtel 1358 you stated preparations for elections were going forward on assumption that both Azerbaijan and Fars matters will be settled. Fars matter has been settled but according MA Tehran tel Oct 21 Azerbaijanis have broken off negotiations with central govt and returned Tabriz. Do you not consider likely that holding of elections in Azerbaijan in such circumstances would be regarded as decision on Qavam’s part to abandon efforts to reassert Iranian authority in that province and to permit it to remain indefinitely under Soviet control?

Dept would appreciate your further views on subject.

BYRNES

801.00/11-246: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, November 2, 1946—11 a.m.

US URGENT

[Received 1:27 p.m.]

1430. Deptel 909 October 30. Dept’s uncertainty concerning my attitude towards Qavam is fully understandable since on October 15 . . . I felt Qavam had to go, whereas 5 days later (Embassy’s 1391, October 20) I felt Shah had acted wisely in permitting him to form new govt. Answer lies in unexpected action by Tudeh in refusing to attend Cabinet meeting on October 16 which offered Qavam another chance. It is difficult to predict now how much longer he will wait, but wisdom of Shah’s letting him form another govt has already been justified in increasing attacks on him in Tudeh and Moscow press without any blame being levied so far against Shah, who has reserved his power for future use.

17 Not printed.
I have felt ever since my arrival here and continue to feel that Qavam has many characteristics which fit him well for position of Prime Minister of Iran at this time. He is indisputably able politician and while his conduct of foreign affairs has often been weak-kneed in face of Soviet threats, we must keep in mind his appeals to US for help have been answered by advice to depend on United Nations for security. Our advice has been best we could give, but Qavam’s problems are immediate and cannot await debates in New York on question of veto. I have been distressed and no little annoy at Qavam’s failure to appreciate strength of world opinion in support of Iranian independence but he is old school politician who wants somebody else to test out how many army divisions world opinion is worth.

I admit certain sympathy for Qavam and my conclusion 2 weeks ago that he had to go was reached with considerable reluctance. ... his apparently indestructible attachment for Mozafar Firuz, whose action in trying to blackmail Cabinet officers into agreeing to Soviet aviation proposal (Embkel 1354 13) was last straw. Qavam’s failure to throw out Tudeh even after he was convinced they were Soviet puppets was also annoying, but I was aware that action along this line involved risk of serious internal disturbances which Qavam might well hesitate to run. But Firuz is thoroughly distrusted by every class of Iranian and his dismissal would have been popular move at any time.

Qavam dismissed Firuz from Cabinet only under Shah’s strong insistence and Firuz retains considerable influence over Qavam. Minister of War told me today that Qavam had agreed with Soviets that Firuz could remain in Iran until after elections. Ahmedi said Soviets were not pleased about Firuz appointment to Moscow since he is much more useful to them here than in USSR. At the moment Firuz is able to do less mischief than when he was in Cabinet as Minister of Propaganda but if Qavam continues to allow him to wield great influence behind scenes, Shah may find it necessary (and possibly in not distant future) to dismiss Qavam. Even so, it is best that Qavam has assumed responsibility for recent change in Cabinet.

As for elections, I appreciate Dept’s reasons for favoring postponement and these considerations may well prevail here. However, Tudeh and Qavam’s Democrats of Iran are becoming increasingly bitter in denouncing each other and Qavam’s followers are becoming more outspokenly anti-Russian in spite of Qavam’s efforts to tone them down. Firuz is capable of making deal with certain Tudeh deputies,

13 Dated October 12, not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 537.
either with Qavam's tacit consent or behind Qavam’s back, but general elections will be contest between Tudeh and rest of country with Qavam counting votes.

Election will be farce. Press is now carrying stories that voting is expected to take place between November 10 and 15 but not a candidate has yet been nominated and nobody has openly announced his candidacy. If elections are postponed there is no reason to believe they will be any better as our idea of elections go. Cabinet in power will win, and question seems to be whether we should advise Shah to remove Qavam not whether we should advise postponement of elections.

Qavam told British Ambassador 2 days ago he planned to send inspectors to Azerbaijan to observe elections and if inspectors reported elections were not fair he would not let Azerbaijan Deputies be seated. British Ambassador feels this will not accomplish purpose since once Azerbaijan deputies are elected, Qavam will not be able to withstand pressure to admit them. Le Rougetel has requested London’s authorization to tell Shah elections should be held only in parts of Iran controlled by Tehran Govt. He admits his proposal, if accepted by Iranian Govt, would probably result in separation of Azerbaijan from Iran, but he is much afraid to let Azerbaijan stooges have voice in affairs of all of Iran, including southern oil fields, and would much prefer to see Azerbaijan severed from nation. I agree that Qavam would probably not be able to keep Azerbaijan Deputies out of chamber, once elected, but am not prepared as yet to admit integrity of Iran can not be preserved. British Ambassador’s suggestion smacks me slightly of 1907, although Le Rougetel would deny such an implication. Decision as to best course is difficult, but I still believe our best policy is not to assume responsibility ourselves for opposing elections. Shah and others who favor postponement but who do not have nerve enough to say so openly, would like nothing better than to be able to say United States has advised against them, in order to turn Soviet blasts against US. Soviets would say US was trying to block Soviet oil concession. We may have to oppose Qavam again soon, but I suggest we keep hands off the elections question, at least for the moment. I do not mean to say we should urge them, and if the Persians defer them, well and good. If Dept has instructions, from its wider vantage point, I would be glad to have them.

Sent Dept 1430 repeated London 177 and Moscow 301.

Allen

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14 Reference is to the Convention between Great Britain and Russia; see footnote 27, p. 300.
The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, November 2, 1946—11 a.m.

[Received 3:07 p.m.]

1431. Minister of War called on me yesterday to say he had received word from Ambassador Ala that favorable consideration was being given in Washington to granting of credit of 10 million dollars to Iran for purchase of military supplies.15 He was not clear whether loan would be for purchase of surplus supplies in US as well as abroad, but he hoped credit might be available for purchase of new equipment from factories as well as surplus. Ala reported that my recommendation in matter might be important.

I said I had heard nothing of such a loan other than efforts by General Schwarzkopf to work out 2 million dollars supply purchase for Gendarmerie and General Ridley’s efforts to obtain spare parts for trucks. Ahmed said Iranian Army Purchasing Mission in Washington was active in matter. I have discussed question with Generals Grow16 and Schwarzkopf and we are agreed that US military missions to Iran cannot succeed unless some means is found to replenish army and gendarmerie noncombat supplies which are practically exhausted. Iranians have formed great expectations of US Army mission under Grow and are already talking about request that it be doubled in size and giving it more responsibility. Russians are waiting on doorstep to furnish all sorts of supplies, combat material included, and recently made generous offer to Qavam during southern troubles. Qavam wisely refused because he knew strings would be attached and Soviet advisers to Iran army would follow shortly thereafter. Soviet Army Officers on Persian Gulf and Indian border is not pleasant to contemplate, but as Grow points out, Iranians may turn to USSR in desperation if their army runs out of trucks, shoes, uniforms and blankets.

I realize need of Iran for such credit can be argued from standpoint foreign exchange holdings and metallic reserves of Bank Melli, on which Treasury probably possesses very able reports from Glendinning,17 but in my opinion political factor overshadows economic. Also question arises whether Iran is good enough political risk to

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15 See memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, October 29, p. 255.
17 C. Dillon Glendinning, Treasury Representative in the Middle East.
warrant credit, but same question is involved in our maintaining military mission here at all. We have to take some risk and we increase odds in our favor by giving Iran support. Embassy recommends as sympathetic consideration as feasible to Iranian request.

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891.00/11-846: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, November 8, 1946—5 p. m.
[Received November 8—1:20 p. m.]

1450. I took Doohoer to see Qavam today to give PriMin firsthand information concerning present situation in Azerbaijan. Doohoer emphasized that Kurdish leaders particularly Ammar Khan and chiefs of Western Kurds but also including Qazi Mohammad, are strongly opposed to Communism, having been disillusioned by Soviet failures to furnish them promised assistance, and are ready to join Central Govt in attack on Azerbaijan provided they are assured that Tehran Govt will coordinate its military activity with them and will promise that afterwards it will not follow again the repressive tribal policy of Reza Shah. Qavam showed great interest in Doohoer’s remarks and asked numerous questions about Tabriz govt and leaders. Qavam said he was determined to occupy Zenjan within 10 days, by force if necessary.

I assured Qavam that US had not wavered in its policy of supporting integrity of Iran, in spite of suggestions which had come to me that severance of Azerbaijan from Iran might be preferable to allowing Communist poison permeate Iran. I pointed out, however, that US would hardly be able to continue indefinitely to support Iranian integrity unless Tehran Govt gave evidence of being at least as interested in this subject as we are. Consequently, I welcomed his statement that he would use resources at his command to extend his authority to Zenjan. I said I thought Zenjan was not enough but that it would at least be a start. Qavam said he intended to progress “little by little”.

An American missionary who returned to Tehran yesterday from Tabriz says that Tabriz forces are digging trenches in front of Zenjan and give every appearance of intending to put up strong resistance.

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15 Reza Shah Pahlavi, Shahanshah of Iran until his abdication in 1941.
891.51/11-1346: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 14, 1946—7 p. m.

US URGENT MOST IMMEDIATE

949. We hope within next few days give you helpful info concerning fuller implementation US policy toward Iran, particularly economic. In meantime (urts 1471, Nov 13) we can inform you for your discreet use we have tentatively agreed furnish upon request reasonable amounts non-aggression military material to Iran for purpose maintaining internal security. We are endeavoring arrange sale combat and non-combat items through FLC on credit, with understanding that value combat material be limited 10 million dollars.

ACHESON

711.91/11-2246: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 22, 1946—7 p. m.

976. We have given careful consideration urts urging US implement more fully its declared policy assistance Iran. In view great importance we attach Iranian problem, not only in terms Iran-US relations but also in terms UN principles supporting independence small countries and US strategic interests Middle Eastern area as a whole, we feel measures listed below should be taken in implementing our announced policies re Iran.

1. You may express to appropriate Iranian officials on appropriate occasions genuine interest US in independence Iran and assure them this Govt is prepared, so long as Govt Iran sincerely desires independence and demonstrates willingness stand up for its sovereignty against external pressure, support independence Iran not only by words but also by appropriate acts.

2. We are prepared to consider sympathetically pending Iranian request sale reasonable quantities nonaggression military material to assist Iran in maintaining internal order. Conversations at present taking place between Iranian military mission and appropriate US officials. For your info, possibilities of credit for arms purchase are now being explored.26

3. We hope to be able maintain US military missions Iran if desired by Iranian Govt and will continue to support before Congress legislation permitting their detail beyond period national emergency. Rec-

26Not printed.

26 In a letter of November 26 to Brig. Gen. Mohammed Mazhari, Chief of the Iranian Military Purchasing Mission in the United States, Maj. Gen. Donald H. Connolly, as Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, stated that the United States was prepared to extend credit to the Iranian Government to purchase certain arms and equipment at prices substantially lower than original cost (891-24/11-3046).
ommendations these missions would be appreciated re present requests Iranian Military Purchasing Mission.

4. We are hoping be able intensify our informational and cultural program Iran. In this connection, revision surplus property obligations would make funds available purposes increased cultural exchange.

In connection with this program Dept is earnestly endeavoring obtain Exim Bank approval in principle to loan for Iran. Since we have not yet been able obtain Bank's approval you should make no commitment or statement to Iranian Govt other than to indicate Dept is giving question sympathetic consideration.

In bringing these measures attention Iran authorities, you should make clear US assistance Iran is based on assumption Govt Iran is working in true interests people Iran and to this end will endeavor steadfastly preserve Iranian sovereignty and independence.

Acheson

891.00/11-2446 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, November 24, 1946—2 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received 2:08 p.m.]

1517. PriMin Qavam informed me today that he had definitely determined to send security forces into Azerbaijan 21 and that if the authorities there resist (and he expects they will), he will appeal to Security Council for assistance. In response to my inquiry he said perhaps 2 or 3 weeks would be required to despatch the forces and bring matters to head. He contemplates making immediate appeal to SC whenever fighting starts.

I pointed out that SC concerns itself with matters threatening international peace. He said he was aware of this and that if fighting broke out in Northern Iran he would inform Council that situation existed which might endanger world peace. I asked specifically whether he had in mind any appeal or statement to General Assembly, possibly informing that body of action he was taking to reassert Iranian sovereignty over Azerbaijan. He replied in negative, stating that his appeal would be to Security Council where, he said, Iranian case was fortunately still on agenda.

21 In telegram 1514, November 22, 1 p. m., the Ambassador had reported the issuance of a proclamation by the Prime Minister stating that elections would be held in various districts when security forces of the Iranian Government were present in those districts. The proclamation was obviously issued with Azerbaijan primarily in mind but did not specifically mention that province. Previously the Prime Minister had intended to send civilian inspectors to observe the elections in Azerbaijan, hoping thereby to establish a basis for refusing to admit Soviet-controlled Deputies to the Majlis. (891.00/11-2246)
I reminded him that last April he had informed SC that all differences between Iran and Soviet Union had been settled and that there was no longer any case for SC to consider. I said Soviet representative on Council would be certain to cite this statement of Iranian Govt and that consequently Iranians would need new evidence of interference or threat to peace as answer to Soviet argument. He said his appeal, if made, would present new evidence.

In order to obtain this he was thinking of sending 1,000 soldiers to Azerbaijan, 500 to be concerned with elections and 500 to patrol Soviet border to seize Soviet agents or supplies coming south.

As regards type of assistance SC would render, Qavam realized troops could probably not be sent to aid Iran but he felt Iran must bring to Council’s attention situation which threatened peace and leave it to Council to determine what assistance it would render. He hoped members of Council would at least show their approval of Iranian Govt’s efforts to maintain its sovereignty.

At end of conversation I said I wanted to inform my Govt specifically regarding situation. He said “I will send troops to Azerbaijan, there will inevitably be fighting, consequently the probabilities are very strong that Iran will appeal to Security Council for aid soon.”

Since we have been urging Iran and other UN members to base their policy on UN, I hope Department will again feel in position to support Iran’s case strongly if presented. While every effort must be made to assure that case presented is strong one and that Iranian Govt goes through with it wholeheartedly, Qavam appreciates difficulties he placed US in last time and I do not think he will repeat his previous performance. He said he would like to coordinate his plans with US in closest detail when he prepares appeal.

Allen

801.00/11-2746 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 27, 1946.

[Received November 27—10:29 a. m.]

1528. Local newspaper Etelaat asked me following question today: “What is your opinion regarding the recent decision of the Government of Iran to send security forces to various parts of Iran, including Azerbaijan, in connection with the forthcoming elections?”

I answered as follows: “It is the well-known policy of the American Government to favor the maintenance of Iranian sovereignty and territorial integrity. This principle was stated in the Declaration Regarding Iran signed at Tehran December 1, 1943 and is embodied in the principles of the United Nations Charter. The announced
intention of the Iranian Government to send its security forces into all parts of Iran, including any areas of Iran where such forces are not at present in control, for the maintenance of order in connection with the elections, seems to me an entirely normal and proper decision.[22]

Allen

891.00/11-2846: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, November 29, 1946—4 p. m.

[Received December 2—1: 51 p. m.]

1536. Prime Minister asked me to come to see him urgently this morning. He said the Soviet Ambassador had demanded to see him last night and had informed him, on instructions from Moscow, that the sending of Iran troops into Azerbaijan was considered by the Soviet Govt as undesirable because it would create difficulties “within Azerbaijan and on the Soviet-Iran frontier”.23

Qavam considers these Soviet representations to be in the nature of a threat and consequently interference in Iranian affairs. He says he is determined to carry out his announced intention of sending forces into Azerbaijan, mentioning the figure 10,000 as being necessary to do the job, but he is afraid, in view of the Soviet Govt’s attitude, that USSR will send Soviet troops to support the Azerbaijan Govt.

Prime Minister asked me to obtain American Govt’s reaction most immediately to his idea of notifying Security Council of Soviet Ambassador’s representations to him. Qavam’s idea is that Iran would make such notification under Iran’s obligation to inform Security Council of any situation which might threaten international peace. He would not make any specific request of Council, leaving any action which Council might desire to make, up to the Council.

Qavam said he would avoid making any reply to Soviet Ambassador until he heard from US, but emphasized his anxiety to receive our reply within 24 hours if possible.

As regards action members of Council might take in respect to above Iranian notification, it seems to me that various members of

[22] In telegram 1000, December 4, 7 p. m., the Department expressed its approval of Ambassador Allen’s reply to the question asked by Etelaat (891.00/11-2746).

[23] Telegram 1534, November 28 noon, from Tehran, reported that on the day after the Iranian Government had announced its intention to send security forces to all parts of Iran in connection with the elections, the Soviet Ambassador made urgent calls on the Iranian Prime Minister and the Shah, inquiring whether an attack on Azerbaijan was intended. Both replied that the despatch of forces was a normal and routine one in connection with the elections and that no attack on anybody was involved. Tehran also noted that the Soviet Ambassador gave no indication of his Government’s intentions but that his visits had heightened Iranian apprehension of Soviet intervention. (891.00/11-2846)
Council might express appreciation for Iran's action in keeping Council informed of developments, in accordance with provisions of Charter; and might say that it is both Iran's privilege and obligation to do so in situation of this kind. As regards Iran Govt's decision to send security forces into all parts of Iran, in connection with elections, it would also be most helpful if members of Security Council would add that Iran Govt's actions are considered entirely normal and proper.

I hope Dept will authorize me to inform Prime Minister that American Govt considers Iran fully justified, if it so desires, in notifying Security Council in above sense. It would also be most helpful at this juncture if I could inform Qavam that American representative on Council will reply somewhat along lines I have suggested. I realize that we usually avoid giving any indication in advance of actions we plan to take in Security Council, but in present instance Qavam will be greatly discouraged, in face of strong Soviet pressure, unless he can have some indication that we will give him moral support publicly.

I should add that British Ambassador discussed with Qavam several days ago question of possible advance notification by Qavam to Security Council of Qavam's intention to send troops into Azerbaijan. When le Rougetel reported this conversation to Bevin, latter expressed view that advance notification would serve little or no useful purpose. Present case, however, is quite different since notification would be based on representations made by Soviet Ambassador yesterday. It seems to me that it would be difficult for us to advise Qavam that we do not think he should inform Council of Soviet actions.

If Dept's definite reply will be delayed, I would appreciate at least tentative acknowledgment and views most immediately.

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881.00/12-146: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, December 1, 1946—5 p. m.

MOST IMMEDIATE

[Received December 2—4:02 a. m.]

1540. 1. British Ambassador has just shown me telegram from Bevin stating that he had discussed matter with you in New York and that you were inclined to believe Iran Govt was justified in informing Secretary General of Soviet Ambassador's representations regarding sending troops to Azerbaijan. Bevin seems reluctant to

24 Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin were attending the Third Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which met in New York City from November 4 to December 11, 1946.
have matter come before Council. He suggests that Qavam might ask Soviet Ambassador for Soviet views in writing, which could be answered by Iranians and both notes made public by Iran Govt here. Difficulty with this suggestion seems to me to be: (1) Soviet Govt would undoubtedly suspect that written statement was desired for publication and would refuse to give it, and (2) Iranian Govt would be much discouraged by our coolness towards its desire to bring matter to Council.

Bevin requested more specific information regarding representations made to Qavam by Soviet Ambassador. According to Qavam, they consisted simply of oral statement, under instructions from Moscow, that sending of Iran troops into Azerbaijan would create difficulties “in Azerbaijan and on Soviet-Iran frontier”. I fully realize that Soviets would probably try to depict these representations as mere statement of fact, given to Iran in nature of friendly advice. Bevin is understandably reluctant, just as we are, to encourage Iranians to present new case unless it is a strong one. However, oral “advice” from Soviet Union, which country like US or Britain could follow or ignore as we chose, becomes an imperative matter for Iran which Qavam cannot ignore. He must either accept it, thereby acknowledging that Soviets can prevent him from sending troops into Iranian province, or he can refuse it, in which case he needs world support.

At time this telegram is sent Embassy has received no reply to our 1536 November 29.

Allen

891.00/11-2946 : Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen) 25
SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, December 2, 1946—10 p.m.
MOST IMMEDIATE NIAC T

993. (1) After examining urtel 1536 Nov 29 (which arrived 2 p.m. Dec 2) and urtels 1539 26 and 1540 Dec 1, and after studying Brit Amb’s telegrams on subject which have been shown us by Brit Emb, we are unable to understand precisely what advice or assurances Qavam desires. We observe in his conversation with Brit Amb of Dec 1 a shift in his position and a general weakening of his attitude vis-à-vis Soviet Union. Matter so urgent, however, we feel we should give you our views without awaiting clarification.

25 This telegram was cleared with the Secretary of State, in New York, by telephone.
26 No. 1539, December 1, 4 p.m., not printed.
(2) It seems to us that Iranian Central Govt is justified in taking appropriate measures, including the dispatch of troops, in order to restore its authority in Azerbaijan. We do not see how valid elections can be held in Azerbaijan so long as that province is not under control of Central Govt.

(3) If Qavam should refrain from taking appropriate measures to restore authority of Central Govt in Azerbaijan merely because of pressure brought to bear upon him by Soviet Amb, he will be adding to difficulties which we have been encountering in carrying out our policy of supporting integrity and independence of Iran. If on other hand following dispatch by Qavam of troops into Azerbaijan he should have reason to believe that Soviet Govt is interfering in Iranian affairs by giving support to Azerbaijan movement and he should bring this matter to attention of Security Council, American Govt will be prepared to pursue matter energetically. You can assure Qavam that this Govt will give its unqualified support to Iran or to any other power the integrity and independence of which may be threatened by external forces, provided that power shows courage and determination to maintain its own independence and freedom of action and provided it is willing to make its position clear to world.

(4) You may further inform Qavam that we feel that he would be justified at this point in informing SC of situation with regard to Azerbaijan. If he decides to do so he might care to incorporate in his communication some of following points: (a) Iranian Central Govt, despite protracted negotiations, has not as yet been able by peaceful means to reassert its authority over the province of Azerbaijan; (b) he has therefore decided to send Iranian forces into Azerbaijan to supervise elections and to reestablish order and restore authority of Iranian Govt; (c) he has taken this decision notwithstanding a message delivered to him by Soviet Amb on behalf of Soviet Govt to effect that if Central Govt forces are sent to Azerbaijan there will be disturbances in that province and along the Soviet border; (d) his present communication to SC is in nature of further report on developments in Iranian question pending before SC and he hopes that in view of situation in Azerbaijan SC will continue to be seized of Iranian question.

(5) Such communication would not of course be considered as invitation for SC to act at this juncture. It would however place SC upon notice re possibility that Iranian case might again become active in immediate future.

Acheson
The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, December 3, 1946—5 p. m.

[Received December 3—10:32 a. m.]

1548. Deptel 298, December 2, 10 p. m., reached the Embassy about 10 this morning and I called on Prime Minister at noon. He was highly appreciative of the views expressed and considered them outstandingly forthright and helpful. He asked to be permitted to take notes. My translator helped him make notes but my representations were oral.

At end of conversation Qavam said he intended immediately to instruct his representative to the United Nations to notify Secretary General, for information of Security Council, situation regarding Azerbaijan. He gave every indication of intention to follow closely points suggested by Department. While his communication will probably be worded in as conciliatory manner as regards Soviet Union as is feasible in circumstances, he said he was anxious to notify Council fully regarding situation.

I pointed out at beginning of conversation that Dept was not entirely clear regarding precise questions on which he wished advice and assurances, in view of some difference between reports of British Ambassador and my own.

Qavam said some difference was natural since he had talked with each of us for 2 hours and there would not only be some inevitable variation in his words and in translations but also in our drafting. He said what he wanted to know in essence was reaction of American Govt to present situation in Iran and our advice regarding course we felt Iranian Govt should best pursue to maintain its independence. He said Dept’s reply covered questions he had in mind perfectly.

During discussion Qavam said he had not intended to press us for views regarding his decision to send forces into Azerbaijan, because he had decided he must do so anyway, but he welcomed our concurrence.

It is clearly Qavam’s present intention to follow up matter in Security Council along lines suggested in paragraph 3 of Department’s telegram under reference, if Soviet support of Azerbaijan makes this course appropriate. I did not wish to inquire closely regarding military operations but would guess that Government intends to move within week or 10 days.
May I express my own appreciation for clarity and forthrightness of telegram under reference. While delay in transmission my 1536 was regrettable and I hope reason therefor can be clarified to determine future reliability of SSU channel, Dept's promptness in replying prevented embarrassment here.

Allen

891.00/12-346: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, December 3, 1946—6 p. m.
[Received December 3—1:11 p. m.]

1549. During talk with Qavam today he said election preliminaries would begin on December 7 as scheduled in Azerbaijan. He expects preliminaries to take some time, and while procedure may be completed in some areas sooner than others, he does not expect actual balloting to begin anywhere for at least 40 days, and elections will not be completed for perhaps 3 months. His manner in referring to elections shows he was not greatly concerned about them and I suspect his principal interest is in going through sufficient motion to keep down Soviet pressure on the subject.

Question of ratification by Majlis of Soviet oil concession came into conversation briefly. I said I had no instructions on this subject, although I believed that my Govt would not wish to oppose in principle the granting of a concession to USSR. Qavam said drafting of detailed Soviet oil proposal was "something for the future" and that he would like to discuss details with me when time came for drafting.

I said only American interest in question of which I was aware was our general interest in preservation of Iranian sovereignty. I hoped final agreement would adequately protect Iranian economic as well as political interests and would contain provision regarding sale of oil at world market price in free foreign exchange.

Allen

891.00/12-646: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, December 6, 1946—7 p. m.

MOST IMMEDIATE NIACT

1012. For your confidential info Iranian Amb states following communication sent to SYG, UN, N.Y. Dec. 5:

"Sir: In connection with the dispute arising out of the interferences

\[^{27}\text{Dated November 29, p. 549.}\]
in the internal affairs of Iran previously complained of, I have the
honour to submit for the attention of the Security Council a report
respecting the present state of affairs in the Province of Azerbaijan.
No request for action is made at the present time, though it will be
apparent that the decision of the Security Council to continue seized
of this question should remain unchanged. The purpose of the report
is to keep the Security Council informed of the further consequences
of the interferences previously complained of. I am, Sir, your
obedient servant, Hussein Ala, Iranian Ambassador and Representa-
tive of Iran before the Security Council."

Attachment. "His Excellency, The Honorable Herschel V. John-
son, President of the Security Council, Lake Success, New York. Sir:
My Government has instructed me to submit this report in connection
with the complaints previously made to the Security Council against
interferences in the internal affairs of Iran. It will be recalled that
a result of these interferences is that the Central Government has been
denied the exercise of effective control in the Province of Azerbaijan.
Unfortunately, in spite of every effort to remove by conciliatory means
the consequences of these interferences, the Central Government has
not yet been able to re-establish its authority in that Province.
Elections to provide for the selection of the Majlis, our National
Legislature, have been called to take place throughout Iran beginning
December 7th. In order to assure that the election procedures are
duly followed, it has been arranged that military forces shall be sta-
tioned in all the provinces of Iran. Those in control of affairs in
Azerbaijan have objected to the entry of such Government forces into
that Province. The Soviet Ambassador at Teheran, acting under in-
structions from his Government, has given friendly admonition that
the movement of Government forces into this part of Iran may result
in disturbances within that Province and on the Persian borders ad-
jaent to Russia, and advised that the Government’s plans be
abandoned.
It is, of course, the duty of my Government to exercise its sovereign
responsibilities, and to assure that the elections are carried out im-
partially in Azerbaijan as well as in the rest of Iran; and my Gov-
ernment for that purpose must station its troops in Azerbaijan no
less than in other parts of the Country. It is hoped that this will not
be used as a pretext for hostile demonstrations, but my Government
will not fail to take the action necessary to maintain law and order
throughout Iran, even though disturbances may be threatened.
The decision of the Security Council to remain seized of the ques-
tions raised by the complaints of Iran has demonstrated its concern
regarding the consequences of the interferences that have occurred in
the past. My Government has, therefore, felt it to be its duty to
furnish the information contained in this report in order that the
Council may be in a position better to interpret the course of events
in the Northwestern portion of my Country. I am, Sir, your obedient
servant, Hussein Ala, Iranian Ambassador and Representative of
Iran before the Security Council."

Sent Tehran rptd London, 8064, Moscow 2093.

Acheson
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] December 7, 1946.

The Iranian Ambassador telephoned from New York today at noon to tell me the contents of two important telegrams he had received from Prime Minister Qavam in Tehran.

The first telegram reported a second interview with the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran. The Soviet Ambassador referred to the “friendly advice” which he had given, on instructions from his Government, to Mr. Qavam a few days ago, namely that “difficulties” would ensue from the despatch of Iranian Central Government forces into the province of Azerbaijan abutting on the Soviet frontier. He recalled that Mr. Qavam promised to take the matter up with the Iranian Council of Ministers and stated that he had awaited the decision of the Council. The Soviet Ambassador reiterated that the action contemplated by the Iranian Central Government would lead to “disturbances” to which “the Soviet Government cannot be indifferent”. He stated that if there were any shortcomings in the agreement reached by the Iranian Central Government and the Azerbaijan authorities, Qavam should remedy them by “friendly conversations” with Azerbaijan officials. Otherwise, he stated, there would be “clashes of arms” involved in “partisan warfare” which would extend to the Soviet frontier. The Soviet Ambassador continued that defeated forces in Azerbaijan might be expected to cross the border into the Soviet Union and that there would be “trouble”.

Mr. Qavam replied that delay in communicating to the Soviet Ambassador the decision of the Iranian Council of Ministers was occasioned by the fact that a Friday holiday intervened and that certain Cabinet Ministers had been in Zenjan in connection with the Central Government’s reoccupation of that city. Mr. Qavam could now state, however, that the decision had been taken with regard to the despatch of troops to the whole of Iran in connection with the forthcoming elections. This attitude, he stated, cannot be changed and no exception can be made for the province of Azerbaijan. Mr. Qavam stated that he attached importance to the friendly advice of the Soviet Ambassador but that he was responsible to Iran and the Iranian laws, and that no pressure or possibility of disturbances should deter him in his duty to send forces into all provinces of Iran. Mr. Qavam stated that it was not intended to attack any province of Iran but merely to assure security during the course of elections. The Soviet Ambassador suggested that Mr. Qavam send a commission of “liberal-minded men” and of the press to observe elections in Azerbaijan. He recalled
that the Soviet Union had acted as mediator in the initial negotiations between the Central Government and Azerbaijan and stated that the Soviet Union “cannot remain indifferent to dangers on its frontiers”.

Mr. Qavam replied that such a commission would give no assurance of orderly elections, that Azerbaijan is Iranian territory, and that there is no danger to such a powerful state as the Soviet Union. He reminded the Soviet Ambassador that Soviet frontiers are not confined to Azerbaijan and enquired whether internal affairs in other states bordering the Soviet Union might likewise be considered dangerous to the Soviet Union. Mr. Qavam stated that the Soviet Government should be able to protect itself and should leave Iran free in this internal matter.

The Soviet Ambassador concluded by saying that he had fulfilled his mission undertaken on instruction from his Government. He stated that if Mr. Qavam does not accept Soviet advice and persists in his course toward Azerbaijan, the Soviet Government "will have to revise its attitude toward you personally".

Mr. Qavam concluded his statements by saying that if he were subject to threat, should abandon his efforts on behalf of Iran and step aside, anyone chosen to succeed him as Prime Minister would take the same action that Qavam is taking now. Mr. Qavam stated that his decision was not a personal one but reflected the public opinion of Iran.

Having reported the above conversation Mr. Qavam requested Ambassador Ala to send the contemplated report to the United Nations and let him know the results as soon as possible.

The second telegram was received at 10 p. m. Friday, December 6. Mr. Qavam referred to the statement which Mr. Acheson had made to him recently concerning Iranian relations with the United States and the United Nations. Mr. Qavam stated that he had sent instructions to Mr. Ala before receipt of Mr. Ala's telegram embodying that statement. Mr. Qavam said he was "steadfast" before the Soviet Ambassador and that Iranian forces would soon move into Azerbaijan to maintain security there during elections. He reported that Azerbaijan was considering hostile measures and had mined the roads at the provincial border. Mr. Qavam stated that the Tabriz radio had been violent in its attacks upon him and the Central Government, that the Tudeh press had apparently taken the lead of the Soviet Government, and that the Soviet Ambassador had threatened him personally. In spite of all this, Mr. Qavam emphasized that he will not change his position. He recalled that the subject of Iran is still

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23 See telegrams 993, December 2, to Tehran, and 1548, December 3, from Tehran, pp. 551 and 553, respectively.
on the agenda of the Security Council and that Council action is the only hope Iran has of preventing Soviet interference. He recalled that Iran had assisted the Allies during the war and now wished to be helped in its efforts to implement reforms already announced, certainly not to be threatened by great powers and at least to be left alone. He stated that other powers should not, by assistance to traitors, encourage the dismemberment of Iran but should leave Iran to set its own house in order. Mr. Qavam stated that he is relying upon Security Council attention to the present Iranian situation and hoped for positive results.

The Iranian Ambassador said he intended to see Mr. Herschel Johnson, United States President of the Security Council, Saturday afternoon and to attempt to see Mr. Bevin if he were still in New York. Mr. Ala said that on the strength of his latest telegrams from Tehran, he wondered whether a second note for the attention of the Security Council was now in order. Mr. Henderson observed that Mr. Qavam appeared to be steadfast in his present course of reliance upon the United Nations and that Mr. Ala might wish to take action only on specific instruction from his Prime Minister. Mr. Ala stated that he would immediately ask Mr. Qavam what further action was now desired.

L[oy] W. H.[enderson]

501.BC/12-746

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)

CONFIDENTIAL


SD/S/795

Participants: Ambassador Hussein Ala of Iran
          Mr. Gholam Abbas Aram, First Secretary of Iranian Embassy
          Mr. Herschel V. Johnson

Ambassador Ala: I believe Mr. Johnson has seen my letter which was addressed to him and it has been circulated as I understand. That letter was purposely restrained in tone and I asked for no immediate action from the Security Council because the Iranian Prime Minister was anxious to give the Soviet Government an opportunity to refrain from interfering and for saving face and not creating difficulties for the Iranian Government. He is acting with great tact in Teheran, but unfortunately I must give Mr. Johnson some more inside information to show that if the letter is restrained and no action is asked, it doesn't mean that we are not feeling very strongly about the situation, that we are extremely anxious. In fact, several cables have been re-
ceived since I sent in that letter to the President to indicate that the Prime Minister is getting almost desperate in this present situation because the Ambassador—the Soviet Ambassador—has called on him again, and now in this second interview has intimated that not only is he giving friendly advice not to send those forces into Azerbaijan but he says also that the Soviet Government cannot disregard—cannot remain indifferent to the situation which will be created once these forces get into Azerbaijan.

[Here follows a further account by Ambassador Ala of the conversation between the Iranian Prime Minister and the Soviet Ambassador in Iran, along the lines of Mr. Henderson's memorandum printed supra.]

**Mr. Johnson**: Thank you very much, Ambassador.

**Ambassador Ala**: It is a very great emergency in our country and I may come at any moment to write another letter to ask that action is taken.

**Mr. Johnson**: Until that is done, I am going to simply take note of the information which you have communicated to me and it will not be necessary, I think, unless there is some further development between now and Tuesday for me to make reference to this communication before the Council, because the Council is still seized of the Iranian question.

**Ambassador Ala**: That's right.

**Mr. Johnson**: And all of the members of the Council will have received this letter and unless it is commented by someone else and unless there is some new development, I do not intend to bring it up.29 I think that perhaps that would be the best.

[Here follows further discussion of Iranian-Soviet problems.]

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891.00/12-1146: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State*

**SECRET**

**TEHRAN, December 11, 1946—6 p. m.**

[Received December 11—11:39 a. m.]

1580. Soviet Ambassador made further urgent and strong representations to Qavam last night regarding Azerbaijan question. Qavam sent for me this morning to read telegram he had just drafted to Ambassador Ala on subject. Qavam told Ala that report was for his confidential information for the present and that he should await further instructions before taking any action (i.e. before reporting it to Security Council).

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29 Mr. Ala's communication was not referred to at ensuing sessions of the Security Council.
Soviet Ambassador demanded to know why Qavam had reported his "friendly advice" to Security Council. Qavam replied in effect that it was because of threatening tone Ambassador had used in giving that advice. Soviet Ambassador grew very angry, became rude, and declared that Soviet Government would not remain passive in face of this disturbance near Soviet frontier.30 Conversation lasted hour and half, and Soviet Ambassador left in very bad temper.

Qavam assured me he was not disturbed by these Soviet threats but he was somewhat uneasy lest Iran might not be supported strongly in Security Council. I expressed confidence that he would find support in Council in direct proportion to firmness with which he maintained Iranian sovereignty.

Repeated London 185, Moscow 310.

Allen

801.00/12-1246: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, December 12, 1946.

[Received December 12—10:10 a.m.]

1582. Azerbaijan situation is not entirely clear but it seems very probable the war is over. There has been very little fighting, in fact Gasflancu Pass was left undefended for some inexplicable reason, only one bridge in the pass being blown. Tehran troops occupied Mianeh at 3 p.m. yesterday without meeting resistance. Djavid telegraphed Qavam requesting termination of hostilities and saying he would go to Mianeh to arrange for peaceful occupation of Azerbaijan by govt troops. Qavam, in consultation with Shah, replied that his officers would discuss matter with Djavid in Tabriz. Meanwhile Chief of Staff ordered army to proceed to Tabriz in all haste.

There was division in Tabriz govt, Djavid and Shabostari who have been much less extreme than Pishevari and Daneshyan, favoring surrender while latter wanted to fight.31 Djavid presented question to Azerbaijan Council and gained majority. Extremists have fled from Tabriz, probably to Russia.

Soviet Ambassador called on Shah last night at 6:00. I have not yet received report of meeting but Shah assured me few minutes before Ambassador's arrival that he had no intention of allowing Ambassador to frighten him or to let anything deter him from bringing Azerbaijan fully back under Iranian sovereignty now.

30 Telegram 1567, December 8, 3 p.m., from Tehran, had advised of reports that clashes had taken place between Iranian and Azerbaijani forces but that no serious fighting had occurred (801.00/12-846).

31 In telegram 1579, December 11, 1946, 3 p.m., Ambassador Allen advised of a telephone call from the Iranian Minister of War that he had received a telegram of surrender from Pishevari and Djavid at 2 p.m. (801.00/12-1146).
Soviets are said to have let Azerbaijanis know that USSR could furnish them little more than moral support, which was not enough in face of determined move by Central Govt forces. Qavam’s notification to Security Council seems to have been well-timed.

Tehran Govt and populace are rather in a daze, incredulous that war could be over so easily and hesitant to celebrate too early lest there be a hitch somewhere.

Repeated London 186 and Moscow 311.

Allen

891.66/12-1246: Telegram

The Consul at Tabriz (Sutton) to the Secretary of State

Tabriz, December 12, 1946.

[Received December 16—1:14 p.m.]

263. Just a year and a day after it was founded the Democrat regime of Azerbaijan crumbled in a few hours yesterday. It had shown increasing weakness during past month and as tension rose morale declined. It was evident that people had no wish to fight and that leaders could count on little or no support. Today it is as if we live in a different city. The pall is lifted. I have never seen so many smiling faces since I came to Azerbaijan. They are relieved and happy.

Early yesterday afternoon martial law was declared and 8 o’clock curfew imposed but immediately afterward submission to Tehran was announced and all directives were thereafter disregarded. About midnight shooting could be heard in barracks area and continued until morning. By daybreak Democrats were in full flight. Although warned against disorder I felt it was important for me to be seen and to do what I could to convince people that security would be maintained. I do not share my British colleague’s view that at this critical moment we should keep out of sight. I therefore drove through streets and called on remaining civil and religious leaders. At sight of my car with American flag people cheered and applauded and shouted long live America. These were same people who stared sullenly at me few days ago as if they wondered why I was here.

Many civilians are armed and engaged in hunting out former Democrats but there is little general disorder. Intermittent firing continues but has no particular objective. I went to Governor’s palace and found it virtually empty except for Shabostari, President of Provincial Council, who is loyally trying to maintain semblance of control. He was always considered most respectable of Democrats and seems still activated by purely patriotic motives. I told him I wanted to do what I could to assist during the period of uncertainty and to prevent violence. He was most grateful and said he had been up all night and would stay at his post until central government troops
arrived. As I left I saw first armed uniformed soldiers I had seen but discovered that they were Assyrians who were afraid of being killed and wanted me to take them to some place of safety. I told them I would do my best to prevent disorder but that they should stay where they were.

I then went to Democrat headquarters and found it deserted except for a few heavily armed soldiers who did not know what or who they were guarding. They said Beriya, head of the Labor Union, was inside but when I entered I found only a stray member of the committee who knew little of anything. Pishevari’s office which, until the day before, was the center of authority was littered with bread and eggs and empty cups and cigarette butts, the traces of the last few hours of indecision. No one knows where Pishevari is. I was told that Beriya’s car had been attacked and that he had been taken to Soviet hospital so I went to see if I could find him. Hospital doors were barred and there was angry crowd outside which had demolished the car of the man who had been most popular of all Democrats. Doctors told me Beriya had been there but escaped by back door. I continued to drive about town through milling crowds who cheered when they saw my flag. Shots were fired near us but I saw only one blood covered spot on main street which looked as though someone had been killed there. I finally found Djavid who said there was only handful of security forces left and that he hoped Iranian troops would arrive today or tomorrow. This was discouraging news I had heard for I have misgivings about what may happen after nightfall if forces do not arrive. I have done what I can and will continue to move about town to encourage feeling of security as much as I can. The rest depends upon time and Tehran.

Sent Tehran as 445.

SUTTON

891.00/12-1746: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, December 17, 1946—2 p.m.
[Received 2:14 p.m.]

1507. Principal reason for sudden collapse of Azerbaijan movement, in Shah’s opinion, was (1) surprising weakness of Tabriz military organization, (2) high morale and determination of Tehran forces, and (3) most important, conviction by all concerned (Soviets, Iranians and Azerbaijani) that United States was solidly supporting Iranian sovereignty.

32 In telegram 264, December 14, the Consul at Tabriz reported that a small force of the Iranian Army had occupied Tabriz in the early evening of December 13 (891.00/12-1446).
In view of Soviet Ambassador’s strenuous efforts to prevent sending of Tehran forces to Azerbaijan and his frequent declarations to Shah and Qavam that USSR would not remain indifferent if those forces proceeded, people are asking why Soviets failed to give Azerbaijan any significant material assistance. Practically every Iranian, including notably the Shah, thinks answer lies primarily in fact that Soviets were finally convinced that US was not bluffing and would support any United Nations member threatened by aggression.

Embassy has received numerous visits from Iranian Cabinet officers and officials, including Minister of War, Minister of Finance, Governor of National Bank, President of last Majlis, et cetera, to express appreciation to America for “giving back Azerbaijan to Iran.”

At an informal social gathering last night Shah made a fulsome and even embarrassing tribute to our help. Azerbaijan was referred to by others present as the “Stalingrad of the western democracies” and the “turn of the tides against Soviet aggression throughout the world”. I emphasized that Iranians themselves had regained Azerbaijan and that any credit for enabling Iran to accomplish this free from outside interference, was due to existence of a world organization which could mobilize opinion against such interference.

Repeated Moscow 314.

ALLEN

123 Allen, George V.: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 20, 1946—7 p. m.

1052. Personal from Sec to Amb. I should like to express to you my gratification at the recent favorable turn of events in Iran and my personal appreciation for the admirable manner in which you have handled an extremely important and delicate situation. You have fulfilled all the expectations I came to have on the basis of your fine work in New York last spring. I like to think of the achievement of Iranian unity not in terms of victory or defeat for any outside nation, but rather as proof of the strength and effectiveness of the United Nations in helping those countries which truly desire independence. I hope that you will continue to impress upon Iranian leaders the great importance of carrying out a program of economic and social reform and of raising the standard of living of the Iranian people, thereby enabling Iran to make a contribution to the community of nations.

Sincere good wishes to you and your family for Christmas and the New Year.

BYRNES
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Allen)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1946—7 p. m.

1054. Now that Iran Govt has been able reassert authority over Azerbaijan we hope Qavam will adopt conciliatory attitude toward people that province and refrain from repressive or retaliatory measures against Russians, Azerbaijanis and Kurds. We believe that granting of general amnesty and limiting of punishment to judicial process against few guilty leaders would have good effect on world opinion and tend to counter Soviet statements that Iran is reactionary.

We feel that Qavam has splendid opportunity at this point to show statesmanlike qualities, mold Iran into homogeneous nation and put into effect reforms which he has stated are basis of his program and in general lead Iran toward a fuller life for the people and an improved place among the United Nations. It would be regrettable if through inaction or lack of publicity Soviet view that political trend in Iran is retrograde should gain currency in world. To prevent this we feel Qavam should lose no time in announcing and giving full publicity to a clear-cut program of social, constitutional and tribal reform which will leave no doubt that Iran is looking forward and not backward. In this connection we believe Qavam should refrain to extent possible from suppressing opposition parties and press but rather should encourage democratic processes and establishment of responsible press through positive leadership and by issuing official clarifying statements where misstatements have been made or truth distorted.

You may in your discretion make these views known to Qavam.

Byrnes

The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TEHRAN, December 23, 1946—1 p. m.

[Received December 23—12:35 p. m.]

1619. While view expressed by French officials has also been suggested by various persons here, I do not believe it correct. Soviet

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23 Telegram 6202, December 20, 5 p. m., from Paris (repeated to Tehran and Moscow), reported that French officials had expressed the view that the Soviet Union had come to an understanding with the Iranian Prime Minister under which it abandoned the Tabriz regime and secured a firm promise from Qavam that the Majlis would ratify the Soviet oil concession at an early date (891.6363/12-2046).
Govt made strenuous efforts, through its Ambassador here and through
Iranian Ambassador in Moscow, to prevent Iranian Govt from send-
ing its troops to Azerbaijan. Both Shah and Qavam considered
these efforts genuine and expected that USSR would assist Azer-
baijanis much more effectively than they did. For this reason origi-
nal military plan of Iranian Govt extended only to occupation of
Mianeh. If this could be achieved Iranians planned to wait and see
what happened. Sudden collapse of Tabriz movement was obviously
as great surprise to Qavam as it was to Shah and everyone else.
Why Soviets failed to give more assistance to their puppets in
Tabriz is difficult to judge here. From evidence we can see whole
question was badly handled by Soviet officials from beginning. Such
help as Soviets gave Azerbaijan regime during past year was rather
niggard and accompanied by close bargaining. Soviets made Azer-
baijanis pay high prices in wheat and other commodities for such
supplies as were accorded. While considerable amounts of automatic
rifles, ammunition, and light equipment were furnished, no heavy
armament was included. Soviet Consul General in Tabriz, instead
of guiding regime unobtrusively, demonstrated his control in brazen
and swaggering manner, thus depriving Pishavari of the considerable
local support he gained among Azerbaijanis during early days of
regime. As result, when Iranian forces entered province local people
themselves overthrew regime. Of the large number of persons sent
into Azerbaijan from Caucasus, only two, Pishavari and Daneshyan,
appear to have had much ability.

Soviet Ambassador here or his principals in Moscow misjudged
Qavam’s psychology and overplayed their hand by threatening him
personally. Qavam had been wavering on question of notification to
SC but Soviet threat angered him. When he received word that US
concurred in his right to notify Council he decided to do so on the
spot, without even consulting his Cabinet.

It is suggested that Soviet failure to send combat units to support
Azerbaijan may have resulted from fact that Azerbaijan regime col-
lapsed too fast, from internal considerations in USSR, from broader
questions of foreign policy connected with Europe, from fear of SC
and world opinion censure, or combination of all of them. General
impression here is that SC saved Iran from invasion.

Department requested repeat to Moscow if appropriate. Moscow’s
views regarding foregoing would be useful to us.

Sent Paris repeated Dept as 1619.

Allen
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, December 27, 1946—8 p. m.
[Received December 27—4:06 p. m.]

4476. Paris telegram 6202, December 20. While we would not exclude possibility that Azerbaijan rebel collapse was due to USSR having abandoned Tabriz for oil deal with Qavam Government, we are more inclined to accept obvious interpretation that Shah and Qavam called Tabriz bluff and that USSR, caught unprepared in Azerbaijan, decided not to show its hand by interfering openly on behalf of its puppet (Department’s 2177, December 24). British Minister Counselor here also believes that Tabriz collapse was not result of a Moscow-Tehran deal.

Essential factor causing Tabriz collapse was that when Tehran had mustered its quailing courage, and calling upon United Nations, had suddenly challenged Tabriz to showdown, USSR decided to let its Azerbaijan stooges fall rather than overtly support them—and thereby show its hand. Had, however, Tabriz made any show of determined stand, USSR might well have come to its aid with at least a major propaganda campaign.

To us, most surprising element in situation was weakness camouflaged Soviet military and political machine in Azerbaijan. Granting that regime had alienated masses, it still seems strange that USSR had not organized in province forces composed, if necessary, largely of Soviet Azerbaijani adequate to resist timid tentative Iranian advance. Poor organization and overconfidence may account for this Soviet failure.

If USSR lacked inside Azerbaijan reliable instrument to defend its interests there, only alternative by which it could retain control would be to march Soviet Army back into that Iranian province. Had issue been solely between USSR and Iran, Soviet Army might now be in Zenjan. But because of Qavam’s appeal issue threatened to become concern of UN with USA actively interested in it. It was these considerations which presumably gave Kremlin pause. Iran is no stronger than UN and UN, in last analysis, is no stronger than USA. [The Soviet Union?] for a complex of external and internal reasons is not willing on ground which is not well prepared to face at present a showdown with USA.

Collapse of Azerbaijan house of cards was a major victory for UN—and for a firm policy toward USSR.

34 See footnote 33, p. 564.
35 This telegram transmitted text of Tehran’s telegram 1619, supra, to Moscow (891.00/12–2546).
It must not be thought, however, that Kremlin will resign itself to this humiliating reverse. It will continue to maneuver not only for oil concessions but also for political (and strategic) ascendancy in Iran.

Department, please repeat Tehran as Moscow's 151 and Paris, as Moscow's 459.

[Smith]