ALBANIA

EFFORTS TO REACH A SATISFACTORY BASIS FOR THE REESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ALBANIA; WITHDRAWAL OF THE INFORMAL UNITED STATES MISSION

711.75/1-2946: Telegram

The Representative in Albania (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TIRANA, January 29, 1946—5 p. m.

PRIORITY

[Received 9:16 p. m.]

68. Various messages beginning my telegram 263, Dec 28 have indicated growing unfriendliness of regime here toward US and possible fundamental changes going on in Govt itself. After careful sifting all available information following summarizes situation as of this date:

1. There has been and continues to be marked increase in Soviet prestige and activity in Albania. Soviet Legation has been established headed by [Minister] Chuvakin and staffed by First Secretary Pavlov-Razigraev, Second Secretary Ivan-Ivanov and Attaché Nicolai-Grishin. Minister and two Secretaries speak English and all have wives with them. Soviet Military Mission still remains staffed by three officers, colonel, major, captain, two of which have wives. In addition there are various clerks and custodial employees of Soviet nationality. That Legation and Mission now occupy five houses and one fairly large semi-apartment house where offices and some residence quarters are situated. These officers, especially military, are frequently seen in public places with Albanian officials and military officers and during recess at Assembly meetings there was cordial hobnobbing between them. In addition there are number Russians in city supposed to be technicians but with no known jobs that can be discovered. Rumour has it that there are now several hundred such people with several thousand more to come to replace Italian technicians who will be expelled from the country. While I discount these rumours as regards numbers, the Russians definitely increasing.

2. Next most noticeable development has been expulsion of Italian Mission under Turcato and during past few days the complete taking over of businesses and assets of all Italian firms while Italians are being told to leave their homes and be ready for expulsion. This development fits in with a directive which, as reported in my 252,

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1 For previous documentation on the question of the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Albanian regime, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. iv, pp. 1 ff.
2 Not printed.
December 21, General Shehu brought back from Moscow. General Shehu has since returned to Moscow reportedly to take care various Albanian officers and students proceeding there for indoctrination.

3. Definite movement under way not only to eliminate Catholic clergy Italian nationality but also to circumscribe all religious activities of Catholics such as schools and orphanage which have been closed. Also evidence steps taken to restrict all secular activities Orthodox Church and Bektashi and other Moslem sects.

4. Pending Soviet Legation seems to have reduced prestige of Yugoslav Legation and Military Mission which are no longer in limelight although they are probably collaborating behind the scenes.

5. Within the Govt itself extreme radical pro-Yugoslav-Soviet group is taking most active part in Assembly to mold new Constitution along Soviet line. This has provoked certain opposition among Moderate Radicals who are resisting but as they seem to be in minority they are likely to lose. This rift has brought about arrests members so-called opposition such as Kokoshi, Aslani, and Larry Post mentioned mytel 59, Jan 25. There are rumours also of fighting in north between Partisan troops and bands oppositionists.

6. In contrast with foregoing our own position has deteriorated with marked cooling of cordiality which hitherto existed, ignoring of requests for entry permit for Offic of PolAd and wife of caretaker Marinschak and for passes for short trips out of Tirana, failure to reply to note regarding Albanian interest in Germany war plans for which Jan 22 was deadline, ignoring inquiries concerning whereabouts and welfare American citizens and complete silence on treaty question although copies of all treaties were finally handed Hoxha Jan 16.

Foregoing climaxed afternoon Jan 28 when all alien employees on Govt payroll at Mission and servants employed by staff including Meno were told they had to leave Albania by Feb 15. This includes Rudolph Marinschak who has been employed by our Govt for many years and who rendered yeoman service in protecting our property during occupation years. This culminating incident is being made

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*Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. iv, p. 79.
*Not printed; it reported that Larry Post, alias Llazi-Papapostoli, an Albanian citizen who had been in the United States between 1936 and 1943 and subsequently returned to Albania, had been arrested by Albanian security police for alleged oppositionist plotting against the Albanian Government (765.75/1-2546).
*Carmel Offic, United States Deputy Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.
*Telegram 42, January 17, 1946, from Tirana, reported that Jacobs had handed to Prime Minister Enver Hoxha on January 16 a set of bilateral treaties and agreements between the United States and Albania together with a list of international agreements to which Albania had been a signatory (711.75/1-1746). For a list of the bilateral treaties and agreements between the United States and Albania, see Department of State Bulletin, November 17, 1946, p. 914.
subject of separate telegram for which this telegram should be read as background. 8

Repeated Caserta 32, Moscow 7.

JACOBS

711.75/2-146: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State
SECRET
Moscow, February 1, 1946—8 p. m.
[Received February 2—8:54 a. m.]

321. Pattern described by Jacobs in his 68, January 29 to Department is so familiar from Moscow standpoint that there can, in our opinion, be little doubt as to who is pulling strings in Albania. For this reason, I venture to suggest that if we intend at all to resist what appears to be a deliberate attempt to reduce effectiveness and prestige of our Mission in Albania, we act at once and with great energy and firmness disputing every detail of treatment which we find unacceptable and being prepared to back up our protests promptly and decisively with measures really disagreeable to Albanian regime.

Should other means of pressure fail, I do not think we should shrink even from prospect of withdrawing our Mission if it is not given possibility to operate effectively and if the treatment accorded it is markedly discourteous.

These recommendations may seem extreme but I can assure Department that there are no people anywhere more alive and sensitive to questions of “face” than precisely that type of Russian who is working behind the scenes in Albania. If we react quickly and with vigor, these persons may find themselves subject to criticism by their own superiors for having acted impulsively and gone too far. And if we then continue to make it evident that every move against us will be vigorously countered, we will probably get reasonably good treatment in the end. But if we start by acquiescing in petty annoyances, either because they seem too petty to discuss or because we wish to avoid unpleasantness, we may rest assured that the encroachments

8 In telegram 69, January 29, 1946, from Tirana, Jacobs expressed the view that the action taken against his staff by the Albanian authorities was in contravenation of the agreement contained in the exchange of notes of March 1945 for the establishment of the United States Mission in Albania. Jacobs proposed to take up the matter with Hoxha (124.75/1-2946). In telegram 16, January 31, to Tirana, the Department approved Jacobs’ proposal to take up the matter with Hoxha but reminded Jacobs of the established principle that foreign government officials and their staffs must be acceptable to the authorities of the country wherein they are stationed (124.75/1-2946). On the exchange of notes in March 1945 regarding the sending of the United States Mission to Albania, see telegrams 229, March 19, 1945, to Caserta; 1136, March 24, 1945, from Caserta; and 1161, March 25, 1945, from Caserta, Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. iv, pp. 15–18.
will be progressive and that final result can only be to render our mission entirely ineffectual.

Sent Dept 321, repeated Caserta 5 and Tirana unnumbered.

KENNAN

TIRANA, February 4, 1946—5 p.m.
[Received February 5—12:35 p.m.]

85. As our relations here continue to worsen and Soviet prestige increases, herewith with résumé developments to be followed in separate telegram by certain deductions and recommendations:

1. Since seeing Hoxha, Jan 31 regarding alien staff have heard nothing from him but names of all Italian employees have been posted at deportation camp for departure. As Marinschak's name has not appeared I assume Hoxha and authorities intend to say no more than he indicated. Marinshak's case is special but Italians must go (my telegram 73, Jan 31).10

2. Press and radio campaigns indirectly slapping US continues. (My telegram 71).21 During Sunday morning regular radio program an Albanian opportunity taken poke fun at Stettinius as head of UNO when commentator said that probable reason why Stettinius did not want Albania admitted was that he had heard that Albanians “eat men”. Same commentator made fun UNRRA saying it brought in “frogs” (meaning jeeps) to kill “dogs”. Sunday issue Bashkimi in more sober tone expressed regret to Albanian people that its American and British Allies were affording asylum in neo-Fascist Italy to such war criminals as Kadri-Cakrani and Xhelal Staravecka who executed massacres Tirana February 4, 1944. Persons mentioned are two of Albania's three worst war criminals (Devais [Khafer Deva?] third) whom Brig. Hodgson recommended last July should be turned over to Albanians.14

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10 See telegram 87, February 5, infra.
11 Not printed; it reported on Jacobs' conversation with Hoxha relative to the Albanian regime's order that all alien employees and members of staff of the United States Mission in Albania leave the country by February 15. Jacobs reported that the “trend of conversation with Hoxha indicated lack of cordiality which has hitherto characterized our conversations.” (124.75/1-3146)
12 Not printed.
14 Brig. D. E. P. Hodgson was Commander, British Military Mission in Albania. His recommendations were reported to the Department in telegram 3288, August 15, 1945, from Caserta (740.00116 BW/8-1545). For United States policy with regard to Albanians in Allied custody charged with war crimes by the Albanian regime, see telegram 31, July 7, 1945, to Tirana, Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. iv, p. 41.
3. Marked falling off in calls at Mission of friendly Albanians and according to word reaching us, some have been warned to stay away and others are afraid to come because of press and radio campaign against US, Great Britain and UNRRA. Also, while these three Missions have always been under certain surveillance it is now more strict than ever.

4. Restrictions imposed upon members of my staff as well as British and UNRRA personnel still continue. All permanent passes to drive on road to Durazzo canceled in December have never been renewed. On Saturday afternoon while walking in hills on outskirts Tirana, Robinson, British Press Attaché, was arrested by soldiers, taken to headquarters and warned not to go walking out of city again. If passes are issued for trips a partisan accompanies.

5. In discussing opening of Italian representative Turcato's pouches on his departure (mytel 58, January 24) Bashkimi has argued that Albanian authorities have right to open diplomatic pouches to determine whether papers inimical to Albania or contraband are contained therein.

Note should be taken of this because that rule may some day be applied to us.

6. Most of our informational literature and that of the British is not being displayed and we suspect some not allowed to circulate.

7. There is considerable military movement in and around Tirana especially northward where marching soldiers frequently seen. These may be mere maneuvers under tutelage Russian army officers now here. But it is possible that these troops are in northern Albania to intimidate opposition who exist largest numbers there.

8. Number Russians continue increase and one rumor places Russian army officers now here as high as 300. Mytel 68.

9. There is noticeable silence in press and radio on Albanian Greek problems and Bevin's speech.16

10. Deportation of Italians continues. It is believed they will be completely eliminated from country except for few persons with technical knowledge who will promptly be sent out when replaced by Albanians, Yugoslavs or Soviet technicians. Mytel 68, Jan 29.

Repeated Caserta 41, Moscow 8.

JACOBS

15 Not printed.
TOP SECRET

TIRANA, February 5, 1946—11 a. m.  
[Received 3:15 p. m.]

87. Remytel 85, Feb. 4. Following certain deductions and recommendations:

1. Since mid-December about time last Moscow Conference, Soviet influence here has been increasing by leaps and bounds until I believe it accurate to say that it is now paramount and that everything Albanian Govt is doing is directed by Communist pro-Soviet group with at least knowledge and consent of Soviet authorities and possibly under their direction. Knowing some of non-Communist members Govt as well as I do as result my 9 months’ connection with affairs this country, I believe they are impotent in face of this development and I doubt whether any Albanian official not fully behind Sovietization program is any longer free agent.

2. Believe our position here will become more difficult and our every activity circumscribed as much as possible. Doubt whether authorities will reply for some time on question treaties, certainly not until some similar step is taken Belgrade same subject. Also doubt whether they are any longer interested establishing relations with US and that they will refuse any request we may make for entry additional members staff here. As already reported they refused entry to British public relations officer on ground that matter can wait arrival British Minister. Also anticipate in view resumption telegraphic communications with Europe that I may be asked before long to close down my radio facilities here.

[Remainder of telegram is devoted to Mr. Jacobs’ recommendations that no additional officers be assigned to the Mission, that no further informational material be sent, and that the Army courier plane to Tirana seek to maintain a regular weekly schedule.]

Repeated Caserta 42; Moscow 9.

JACOBS

TOP SECRET

TIRANA, February 8, 1946—10 a. m.  
[Received February 10—5:21 p. m.]

95. Concur heartily in recommendation contained Moscow’s 321, February 1 received here only Feb 6. If we acquiesce without vigorous protest against conduct Soviet authorities who within few weeks after recognizing a Balkan state cram their ideology down the throats
of the govt recognized and inaugurated through their puppets, a pro-
gram of fear and reprisal against all opposition including that ob-
vously incapable of overthrowing govt and thus nullify every
attribute of a truly democratic state, we may expect Soviet authorities
to follow exactly same pattern Rumania and Bulgaria and even Korea
once recognition is accorded. I feel certain that what has taken place
here within short period of 6 weeks transforming an atmosphere of
good will and democratic spirit at election time on Dec 2 to a regime of
suspicion and fear is being forced upon Albanian authorities by small
group Albanian Communists working hand in glove with Moscow
and that majority members Govt are not only not in sympathy but
helpless. While some action needs to be taken here, the first and most
effective place for approach is Moscow where we can with good grace
in view of Yalta commitments and past friendly collaboration with
Moscow with respect to Albanian policy, express surprise at sudden
transformation which has taken place here involving large influx
Soviet nationals and large supply arms and inquire what Soviet in-
tentions are. Time is of essence and this approach should be made
at once.

2. If, when approach is made, Moscow presents an air of surprise
and aggrieved innocence as it will, it might be suggested that as De-
partment’s information is so definite that something has gone wrong
in Albania, since Soviet Legation has opened, Soviet Minister here be
instructed to confer with me and British representative regarding
situation so that all three can exchange views and endeavor to see that
in accordance with Yalta and Potsdam commitments new government
here is pursuing truly democratic course.

3. With regard to possible action here which, as indicated above, is
secondary, there are two aspects: first, action with respect to final
recognition and second, action with respect to our Mission. Concern-
ing recognition we are awaiting reply from authorities concerning
treaty question with respect to which they have since January 16 had
copies of all treaties. As already indicated to Department I feel
certain we shall receive no reply here until Yugoslavia is ready to reply
and reply here and at Belgrade will be identical. Regardless, how-
ever, of what that reply may be, I am of opinion sudden developments
indicating so clearly Soviet direction and control raises question of
whether, even if authorities accept our position with respect to
treaties, we should proceed further without clarification of Soviet
intentions and additional assurances here that minorities shall have
right to express themselves freely and that our representatives will
be accorded courtesies due them.
4. With respect to our Mission, situation is delicate. Strictly speaking, it has no standing. It was sent here to study conditions and make a report which has been submitted. It has remained with Hoxha's consent on mutual understanding that it is a transition agency awaiting opening of diplomatic mission which has been delayed over treaty question. I am sure authorities, especially those unfriendly toward us, are fully aware of our vague status and this partially explains why our activities are circumscribed and discourtesy heaped upon us. This discourtesy is worse than I can take time to describe by telegram and is doubly damnable because inspired by Soviet agents. It follows too closely Soviet pattern and is too alien to proverbial Albanian hospitality for any other conclusion. With regard to Dept's attitude on servant question as stated last paragraph Deptel 16, Jan 30,\(^{17}\) authorities have been so nasty toward this Mission since mid-December it is not a question, as posed by Dept, of whether I am persona grata to them but rather question of whether US can permit its representative to be kicked around and still command respect due him and his position.

5. Think therefore we must envisage possibility closing Mission on our initiative or being asked by authorities to close, a regrettable development in either case. Consider latter probability unless representations made at Moscow move authorities call halt on activities their henchmen here. If we decide to close, there are two alternatives: First, close entirely leaving property in charge British; or second, withdraw all personnel except Fultz, Stevens and Nicholas who would be left as custodians and transmitting agents for messages to be exchanged between Department and authorities here. However none of persons mentioned wish to remain if situation after representations appears ominous.

6. Accordingly while raising question at Moscow urgently, Department can be considering representations that might be made here.

7. This may be last chance to befriend this honest industrious small people who have suffered grievously from 300 years Turkish misrule, years of Yugoslav and Italian intrigue, followed by Italian and German occupation and devastation and now face prospect exploitation under fear and terror by Soviet imperialistic swashbucklers.

8. In considering this message, following telegrams should be read: 59, January 25; 68 and 69, January 29; 73, January 31; 82 and 83,

\(^{17}\) Not printed, but see footnote 8, p. 3.
February 2; 85 and 86, February 4; 87 and 89, February 5, as well as Moscow's 321, February 1 to Department. 39
Repeated Caserta 48, Moscow 11, London 8.

Jacobs

711.75/2-846: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Representative in Albania (Jacobs)

TOP SECRET U.S. URGENT WASHINGTON, February 12, 1946—8 P. M.

23. Your 95, Feb. 8 and preceding telegrams. In light of recent developments which seriously affect situation and prestige of Mission and raise fundamental questions bearing on US policy toward present Albanian regime Dept believes that strongest representations to Albanian authorities are in order. You are accordingly instructed to communicate to Gen Hoxha following memorandum and to make clear to him that Dept attaches grave importance to matter:

Begin Memorandum. The Govt of the US has observed in recent weeks increasing evidence of an unfavorable attitude on the part of the Albanian authorities toward the US and the American Mission in Albania. This situation is in part reflected in recent attacks on the US by the official Albanian press and radio. More significantly, however, the Albanian authorities by their recent treatment of the American Mission have acted in a manner that is prejudicial and unfriendly to the Mission and that in practical effect hampers it seriously in the discharge of its functions.

In particular, the US Govt considers as unwarranted and discourteous the action of the Albanian authorities on January 28 in ordering certain employees of the American Mission in Tirana to leave Albania by February 15. The American Representative in Tirana, Mr. Joseph E. Jacobs, was given no prior notice of the intention of the Albanian authorities in this regard. These employees, it may be noted, were selected with care by Mr. Jacobs and have in no instance engaged in subversive activities. Their deportation will handicap and embarrass the Mission and, if carried out by February 15, will preclude proper arrangements for their welfare abroad or their replacement on Mr. Jacobs' staff within that time-limit. This proceeding is clearly

39 Of the messages cited in this paragraph, telegram 59, January 25, 1946, is not printed, but see footnote 5, p. 2; telegram 69, January 29, is not printed, but see footnote 8, p. 3; telegram 73, January 31, is not printed, but see footnote 10, p. 4. Telegram 82, February 2, not printed, reported on the campaign by Albanian authorities to confiscate Italian property and expel Italians from Albania (765.75/2-246); telegram 83, February 2, not printed, reported on the opening of a trial in Scutari involving prominent Roman Catholic clergymen and a trial in Tirana on war crimes charges of two former regents of Albania under the German occupation regime and a former Albanian Prime Minister under the Italian occupation regime (740.00116 EW/2-246); telegrams 86, February 4, and 89, February 5, not printed.
inconsistent with the spirit and letter of the understanding established by the exchange of memoranda in March–April 1945 between the Office of the US Political Adviser at Caserta and the Albanian authorities, whereby the American Representative in Albania was to be accorded such courtesies and facilities as might be necessary to the fulfillment of his mission.

This Govt has also taken note that the activities of the American Mission have been more and more circumscribed in recent weeks. Permanent passes which permitted members of the Mission staff to drive on the road to Durazzo were canceled in December and have never been renewed. Requests for permission to make short trips out of Tirana have been ignored. In addition, requests for the entry into Albania of Mr. Carmel Offie, a US Govt official, and of Mrs. Rudolph Marinschak, wife of the Mission's caretaker, have not been granted. It is clear from these incidents and the generally discourteous attitude currently manifested toward the Mission that there does not exist on the part of the Albanian authorities that sense of confidence toward the members of the Mission that was implicit in the arrangement under which the Mission was established.

The Albanian authorities will recall the friendly ties which have existed between the US and Albania since the establishment of Albanian independence. They will no doubt also recall the statements on December 10, 1942, and subsequent occasions wherein this Govt affirmed its support of the restoration of an independent Albania. During the war the US encouraged and supported the resistance of the Albanian people to the Axis invader. It has contributed heavily to UNRRA, an organization which for months has been giving important assistance to Albania. The informal American Mission which entered Albania on May 8, 1945, to survey conditions there in connection with the question of recognition of an Albanian Govt undertook that task objectively and with a sympathetic understanding of the problems of the Albanian people. On the basis of the favorable reports and recommendations submitted by that Mission, and after consultation with the other Allied Govts signatory to the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe, the US Govt in November 1945 made known its readiness to recognize the present Albanian regime provided the latter was prepared to give assurances that free elections would be held and to affirm the continuing validity of treaties and agreements in effect between the US and Albania on April 7, 1939.

19 Regarding this exchange of memoranda, see telegrams No. 229, March 19, 1945, to Caserta; No. 1136, March 24, 1945, from Caserta; and No. 1161, March 25, 1945, from Caserta, Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. iv, pp. 15–16.
20 Department of State Bulletin, December 12, 1942, p. 666.
21 For text of the Declaration on Liberated Europe, included as part V of the Report of the Crimea Conference, February 12, 1945, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 971.
22 The readiness of the United States to recognize the Albanian regime provided certain assurances were received was made known in a note delivered to Hoxha on November 12, 1945. See telegram 106, November 8, 1945, to Tirana, and telegram 191, November 12, 1945, from Tirana, Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. iv, pp. 67 and 69, respectively.
The requested assurances with regard to elections were given and the elections have already taken place. As for the question of the treaties, copies of the pertinent instruments have been furnished to the Albanian authorities and an early reply on the matter has been invited.

In order to remove any grounds for the misunderstanding which seems to exist in the minds of the Albanian authorities regarding the attitude of the US in respect of the admission of Albania to the United Nations, this Govt takes this occasion to state that it is fully aware of the desire on the part of Albania to obtain membership in the United Nations and has been favorably disposed toward the admission of Albania at such time as that organization is prepared to receive and act upon applications from non-member states. However, it must be pointed out that the position ultimately to be taken by the US in this connection can neither logically nor as a matter of principle be formulated without reference to the willingness of the Albanian Govt to fulfill its international obligations.\(^{23}\)

The Govt of the US finds it most difficult, in view of the friendly treatment accorded Mr. Jacobs and his staff in the past, to understand or excuse the disagreeable attitude which has now been adopted by the Albanian authorities. Indeed, in the circumstances, question inevitably arises as to the sincerity of professions made by the existing regime regarding its national and international objectives and whether the present authorities have any real desire to enter responsibly into normal relations with the US Govt. In this connection it remains the hope of this Govt that such conclusions need not be irrevocably drawn and that the Albanian authorities will restore the basis of mutual confidence by giving earnest consideration to the matters set forth above. It is the further hope of this Government that the Albanian authorities will communicate their confirmation of the continued validity of treaties and agreements between the US and Albania to the American Representative in Tirana at an early date. Meanwhile, the Govt of the US desires to leave no doubt in the minds of the Albanian authorities that, should discourteous treatment of the American Mission continue and present efforts to dissipate the unfriendly atmosphere which has recently developed fail, it would feel compelled, while preserving the most genuine sentiments of friendship for the Albanian people, to reexamine its position vis-à-vis the existing Albanian regime. \textit{End Memorandum.}

We do not believe it advisable in first instance to make representations in Moscow.

Sent to Tirana, repeated to Moscow, Caserta, Paris and London.\(^{24}\)

BYRNES

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\(^{23}\) For additional documentation on the policy of the United States with respect to the admission of Albania into the membership of the United Nations Organization, see vol. i.

\(^{24}\) Repeated as Nos. 276, 51, 708, and 1446, respectively.
711.75/2-1946: Telegram

The Representative in Albania (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

TIRANA, February 19, 1946—noon.

URGENT

[Received 5:26 p.m.]

115. Handed General Hoxha yesterday, my first opportunity, memorandum communicated Deptel 23, Feb 12, received Feb 15, and stressed point Dept attaches grave importance to matter.

We went over memorandum together and while Hoxha agrees Mission was entitled more consideration with respect permit matters and said servant matter badly handled, he tried shift blame to “subordinates” and expressed regret that discourtesy had resulted. His remarks seem to indicate he has no clear understanding courtesy and consideration which his Govt should extend Mission friendly Govt.

When we came to paragraph on UNO he burst forth in heated argument Albania’s right admission and paid little attention my efforts explain. He said Albanian people were very angry treatment accorded them by US and Great Britain and that fact explains why Albanians were no longer friendly toward Mission, overlooking fact that discourtesies began before UNO took action. Concerning press and radio attacks he said he did not pay attention such things, although with respect to American correspondents who criticized regime, he complained bitterly that US had not screened those sent here and ignored my remark that articles of which I complained appeared in official paper and over radio whereas our Govt does not control press, correspondents and radio. I then mentioned treaty matter but, as we had talked more than hour and was past lunch time, Hoxha said he would give entire memorandum consideration and advise me later.

I venture no prediction concerning results as I believe they will depend much upon wishes present Soviet advisers.

Parenthetically might add my three Italian house servants left for Italy Feb 16 after week’s extension was denied and gardener expects leave this week when papers are in order. Marinschak’s case not been settled because he was told when matter arose that his pass was valid until Feb 28, when he should report for further instructions.

Our 115, repeated Moscow 18, London 12, Paris 3, Caserta 58.

Jacobs

711.75/2-2846: Telegram

The Representative in Albania (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TIRANA, February 28, 1946—3 p.m.

PRIORITY

[Received March 1—8:40 a.m.]

135. Mytel 123, February 23.24a Having heard nothing from Hoxha,
inquired whether he intended send me memorandum or desired sehle [apparent garble] regarding Dept's memo. His secretary replied General wished to see me and fixed February 27, noon, as time. Accordingly, we discussed matter hour and half with following results:

(1) Treaties and agreements consumed more than hour interview: Hoxha constantly reiterating while some international treaties seemed acceptable, his Government could not agree in advance continued validity any treaties either bilateral or multilateral. Position his Government remained same as set forth his notes November 15 and 22, to effect that after US recognition accord [apparent omission] has arrived first task would be re-examine treaties with us, revise or abrogate them and submit those to be continued or new ones to Constituent Assembly for ratification. Said we should trust his Government but I replied it was not matter of trust as in view recent developments here most-favored-nation agreement and naturalization treaty were more important to us than ever. When I inquired whether assuming US would accept Albanian Government's assurances with respect to re-examination after recognition, his Government would be willing exchange notes assuring American officials and nationals most-favored-nation treatment pending examination treaties and agreements, he replied in negative.

2. This occasion there was little time discuss treatment Mission but Hoxha did try in unconvincing way explain expulsion our [servants among the?] first group Italians was not intended discourtesy. I replied I disagreed but as these Italians had now left (gardener and family February 27) all authorities could best demonstrate good faith in this respect by approving continued residence Marinschaks which Hoxha said he would look into again giving impression he might be permitted stay. When, however, I mentioned entry Marinschak's wife he shook his head and said he was afraid that would not be possible. As his case has been taken up not only with Hoxha but also with Resident Permit Bureau which is aware my approach Hoxha shall await some word from authorities before permitting Marinschak take further steps himself because if he appears at Bureau he might be arrested as were two servants Fultz and Hoffman. Also mentioned Hoxha that last Saturday three stenographers my office applied permit visit Scutari Sunday and although British majors who applied same time and were to take ladies with them were advised permits could not be issued, my Mission was not given courtesy reply of any kind. This seemed to irritate Hoxha who made note and said he would look into matter immediately. As Permit Bureau under direct supervision Koci-Xoxe, head Security Police and arch Communist operating with Russian Commissar in his office, there is more than suspicion Hoxha himself does not know what goes on there.

My comments on foregoing and situation created thereby are as follows:

1. Feel certain all authorities will not recognize continued validity

\[25\] For texts of Hoxha's notes, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. iv, pp. 71 and 73, respectively.
treaties and agreements in advance complete recognition and no changed diplomatic representatives.

2. While possibility treatment accorded Mission may improve slightly some respects (at least until next consideration Albania's application admission UNO) am certain that as long as Government and Yugoslav so-called military and civilian advisers are wandering over country and as long as any vestige opposition exists members Mission will continue be restricted Tirana and only occasionally permitted travel outside accompanied by Partisan guard. Equally certain Mission will not be permitted employ any one except Americans or Albanians and that not only would Mrs. Marinschak not be permitted to enter but doubt whether Marinschak himself will be permitted remain much longer. Moreover can be expected treatment accorded Mission in future will follow identically treatment accorded foreign missions Moscow with more unfortunate results here for staff because whereas Moscow is large city with opportunity for amusement and recreation, Tirana is still small town with few such facilities. Also through fear and intimidation, as in Moscow, contacts with local Albanians have practically ceased.

3. Is clear Albania has become nothing more than satellite state Soviet Union and Yugoslavia with probability only interest those two countries have in maintenance independent Albania is hope it may eventually be admitted UNO and thus add another vote Soviet bloc. If at next session UNO Albania not admitted, Albania may become unit Yugoslav federation. Notwithstanding foregoing statement, feel certain majority Albanians opposed Russian infiltration and domination and to federation.

4. According official pronouncements and provisions of proposed new constitution now under consideration, it is clear present regime and its Russian advisers determined set up in Albania state-controlled economic system along Soviet lines; which will deny US participation in trade and development country. Likewise new restrictions on dissemination foreign publications will prevent US from carrying on cultural and info activities or at least such activities will be greatly circumscribed. Also as part this Sovietization process, all foreigners (Hoxha has insinuated as much), including Americans (one already has had residence permit renewed to April 80 only) will eventually be expelled from country except such types persons as are now permitted remain Soviet Union. As corollary this step, Albanians, barring officials, are forbidden emigrate or travel except Soviet and its satellite states.

5. Also in Sovietization process, every form opposition will be exterminated ruthlessly with Soviet and Yugoslav assistance if necessary. Even school children are being urged and given prizes for spying on teachers and parents and more important indication trend is arrest Kokoshi-Asmani group which tried form second party election time November, December last year.

6. With regard Albanian regime itself are some members Government not at all in favor turn events but are helpless. Government in hands shrewd, determined and unscrupulous Communist group which granting sincerity in its beliefs is in bringing Russia here no better than previous regime which sold Albania either to Yugo or Italy.
In view foregoing following possible courses action submitted for Department's consideration in connection with such plans as it may have in contemplation:

(1) I should be instructed advise Hoxha attitude taken by his Government toward treaties and agreements not acceptable and that US Government cannot proceed with recognition and exchange diplomatic representatives until such time as Albanian authorities are willing to reconsider. Note or memo should then include one alternatives paragraph 2 below.

(2) Mission here should be withdrawn completely or I and part of staff recalled, leaving Fultz in charge reduced Mission. Suggestions as to staff and property will be submitted if second alternative decided upon.

(3) As Department has in past kept London and Moscow and sometimes Paris advised may wish confer with or advise Foreign Office those capitals its intentions. British Foreign Office now waiting Department's decision before instructing British Minister proceed and head French Military Mission here advises new French Minister scheduled arrive Tirana next week.

(5) [sic] Before taking any other action Department may wish make representations Moscow suggested mytel 95 February 8.

(6) In view fact Albania's history since last war to present time reveals one unscrupulous group after another has got control and sold out some foreign power, am beginning come round view Albanian people may not be qualified for independence. On other hand Albanians are sufficiently large and virile minority to preclude their inclusion in or division between Yugo and Greece without creating grave minority problem those countries and aggravating Balkan unrest. It begins look therefore that solution might be trusteeship under UNO but Russia and Yugo are now so strongly entrenched fear they cannot be got out except by force or on *quid pro quo* basis.

(7) In view these developments need seems greater than ever reconsider UNRRA Albania program suggested A5 February 16 and telegrams 119 February 20 and 121 February 21.26

Jacobs

875.00/3-2246: Telegram

Mr. Homer M. Byington, Jr., Acting United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

Caserta, March 22, 1946—7 p. m.

[Received March 22—5 p. m.]

350. Reference our 329 of March 18, noon.27 COS 28 requested me

26 None printed.

27 Not printed; it reported that the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, General Morgan, was waiting to see what action would be taken in the case of the American Mission in Albania before reaching a final decision entirely to withdraw the British Military Mission from Albania (875.00/3-1846).

to see him this a.m. together with my British colleague concerning withdrawal of BMM from Albania. General McLeod said that messages which he had received from Arnot had become increasingly alarming in re to personal safety of Mission and Brigadier Hodgson had also strongly recommended that BMM be removed without further delay.

General McLeod said that Broad recommended AFHQ action be correlated with US action in Albania and that he himself did not like to take prior action but he felt that this may be necessary.

I said that Jacobs had already explained to Dept that situation BMM was different from his own (see Juranat's) [Tirana's?] 85 of March 13, 3 p.m.) and I was sure that Dept would in no way wish safety of BMM to be jeopardized merely in order to obtain joint action vis-à-vis Albania. I said this, of course, was my personal opinion but that I would telegraph immediately requesting Dept's views in this matter.

General McLeod has telegraphed WarOff that BMM situation has become most uncomfortable and it is possible hostile demonstrations may occur against it. Arnot has also received a report confirming his fear that an attempt may be made to implicate BMM in the political trials now proceeding this report is that interrogation of accused "has revealed that the British General not only supported these traitors but organized their movements".

In conclusion General McLeod is urging that WarOff consult urgently with Foreign Office and authorize immediate withdrawal of BMM. He is including my views as expressed above, and adding that I am requesting urgent instructions.

Please advise me as soon as possible in order that I may communicate Dept's views to AFHQ. 31

Sent Dept, repeated Tirana via pouch as 38.

BYINGTON

30 Philip Broad, British Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.
31 Maj. E. Maxwell Arnot.
32 In telegram 97, March 23, 1946, to Caserta, repeated to Tirana as 49, Byington was authorized to confirm to General McLeod "that while we appreciate desire to coordinate removal of BMM from Albania with possible US action we do not wish Brit to jeopardize safety of BMM personnel by delaying order for withdrawal..." (875.00/3-2246) Telegram 200, April 1, from Tirana, reported that the British Military Mission would depart from Albania on April 3, leaving no British official in the country and no known British nationals (875.00/4-146).
CONFIDENTIAL

TIRANA, April 12, 1946—4 p. m.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

[Received 2:20 p. m.]

213. No information has appeared press or otherwise available concerning alleged new wave terror in northern Epirus and arrest persons mentioned Dept’s 60 April 9. If I approach authorities am certain they will deny as Hoxha did 2 months ago when I approached him subject persecution Greek minority.

As indicated various telegrams wave of terror has been sweeping Albania since Communist group threw off mask in Jan and inaugurated Sovietization process. People are spied on, thrown out of their homes (in Tirana to provide quarters for Russians), have their stocks sequestered, are sent to prison and concentration camps and discharged from Govt positions without respect race or creed. Some evidence also that population in northern [southern?] Albania beginning to look to Greece as salvation from communism. Not surprising, therefore, that seven persons mentioned may be under arrest not necessarily because they are Greeks or belong to Greek minority but because in some way they are under suspicion as non-conformists or even oppositionists.

In view Sen. Pepper’s resolution and present status our Mission I believe it inadvisable approach authorities in specific case this kind raised, by Greek Govt. Preferable course would seem to be when question recognizing is raised again we make more favorable treatment minority and nonconformist groups in another condition precedent to recognition or suggest Greece bring such recurring problems before UNO which may after all be best agency to solve various problems of international concern existing here.

JACOBS

875.00/4–2046: Telegram

The Representative in Albania (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TIRANA, April 20, 1946—3 p. m.

PRIORITY

[Received April 22—7:32 a. m.]

228. Fr Min Picot disappointed with his status here, plans return Paris in few weeks and states he may not return if Brit and US do not recognize regime. Am moved therefore to raise again status our

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22 See vol. vii, p. 132.
23 For text of the Pepper resolution of February 19, 1945, see telegram 76, May 8, 1946, to Tirana, p. 20.
Mission as no reply rec'd my tel 202 April 2.\textsuperscript{34} and as no danger seems imminent to warrant closing office under authority contained Deptl 48, March 23.\textsuperscript{35}

Having heard nothing further from Hoxha can only assume present regime still remains adamant on question validity treaties and agreements. Aside from that question does not seem desirable now to recognize regime with \textit{without} clear and specific assurances with respect regime's conception meaning usual rights immunities and facilities accorded diplomatic representatives under international custom, diplomatic courier service, unhindered use tel radio facilities, greater freedom to travel about, right continue our present plane and radio service until other facilities are available and with respect alien employees right to employ Albs without interference before and after employment and insistence upon continued employment Rudolph Marinschak and permission his wife to join him.

In addition there are other matters concerning which Dept may wish to require assurances before recognition. First, as present regime has now gone all out for one party system which ruthlessly crushes all opposition, strong guarantees are necessary if non-govt party groups are to enjoy freedom of speech and have equal access to press with Govt party. Second, in view present widespread distribution Sov lit and drastic restrictions on ours we should have equality and administrative formalities should not be applied to nullify that equality. Third, in view surveillance now maintained over members our Mission and persons who visit it, guarantees are necessary that our Mission and staff shall be permitted establish normal friendly relationships with Albs without such relationships being subjected to police supervision.

Finally as record discloses it was never intended when we collaborated with Britain and Soviet Union with respect Albania \textit{that} Soviet authorities would step in and practically take over country. I still feel as suggested once before that some representations without publicity should be made at Moscow. If there is any occupied country where in accordance Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe three Great Powers might collaborate on equal footing that country is Albania. However, with no excuse whatsoever Soviet has stepped in and through small group local Communists has manipulated machinery

\textsuperscript{34} Not printed; it requested instructions from the Department regarding future steps to be taken with respect to the Mission in Albania in view of the departure of the British Military Mission on April 3, 1946 (124.75/4-246).

\textsuperscript{35} Not printed; it authorized Jacobs to send to Italy such members of the Mission as he deemed advisable. The Department added that it wished Jacobs and such male personnel as necessary to remain in Tirana as long as it was possible to report on military developments in Albania without jeopardizing the safety of American personnel. (875.00/3-2246)
of government to give Soviet complete control to exclusion US and Britain or for that matter any other power. We should not continue without protest to allow Soviet make itself appear champion little Albania at UNO and other international gatherings and US and British unreasonable in our attitude when that attitude has resulted from underhand Soviet action.

As highly unlikely for time being, present regime will give assurances with respect all matters mentioned above. I should like to be instructed if Dept does not have other imminent instructions for me to proceed to Paris during conference FonMins\(^{35}\) to discuss problems with officers of Dept and from other Balkan countries who may be there. As our activities here are so curtailed there is little I can do anyway and Fultz can take charge in my absence. Next plane from Tirana scheduled April 26.\(^{37}\)

JACOBS

740.00119 Council/4-2646 : Telegram

The Representative in Albania (Jacobs) to the United States Delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris

SECRET

TIRANA, April 26, 1946—2 p.m.

URGENT

[Received April 26—12:16 p.m.]

9. For Dunn. You already have my telegram 8, April 23 (repeated to Dept as 234)\(^{38}\) commenting on Albanian Greek frontier problem.

After study this problem feel Greek claim not only unwarranted but approval that claim would make it impossible for Albania to exist economically as independent state to which US committed itself in Secretary Hull’s statement in December 1942.\(^{39}\)

Satisfactory solution might be given [give?] Dodecanese Islands to Greece who would drop claim for northern Epirus. This was one solution proposed after last world war but Italy seized Dodecanese so

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\(^{35}\) The Council of Foreign Ministers met in Paris, April 25–May 15, 1946, and June 15–July 12, 1946. For documentation on the meetings, see vol. 11, pp. 88 ff.

\(^{37}\) In telegram 2008, Delsec 440, April 27, 1946, from Paris, the Secretary stated it would be inadvisable for Jacobs to leave his post at that time (740.00119-Council/4-2746).

\(^{38}\) In telegram 234, April 23, 1946, from Tirana, repeated to Paris as No. 8, Jacobs urged that the Council of Foreign Ministers find some way to resolve the Albanian-Greek frontier problem and made the following appraisal of that problem: “... continual rattling this old claim by Greece seriously affects peace of Balkans and gives Albania excellent excuse to keep army fully mobilized and Soviet to pose as protector little Albania to and supply arms and military advisers. There is nothing that makes Albanians of all political and racial complexions ... see red more quickly than proposal to give southern Albania to Greece.” (740.00119 Council/4-2346)

\(^{39}\) For text of Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s statement of December 10, 1942, see Department of State Bulletin, December 12, 1942, p. 998.
that Greece lost both northern Epirus and those islands. This arrangement would be just to both parties and at same time make difficult for Soviet to press its claim for Dodecanese as by so doing she would prejudice Albania's claim to its present frontiers.

As corollary to foregoing, provision should be made for minorities on either side of border to those [choose?] whether they wish remain or be repatriated with further provision that repatriation arrangements be carried out under UNO auspices.

If we could take lead in being first to suggest foregoing solution, it would help restore some our lost prestige here because even our friends are aroused over Pepper resolution.40

Repeated to Department as 239.

_Jacobs_

711.75/4-1546: Telegram

_The Acting Secretary of State to the Representative in Albania (Jacobs)_

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1946—8 p. m.

US URGENT

76. Urtel 216 Apr 15 and despatch 190 Apr 15.42 Reply to Gen Hoxha's communication of April 12, 1946, requesting clarification of radio and press reports concerning Senate Foreign Committee resolution on Northern Epirus should be made in sense of following memorandum:

_Begin Memorandum:_ Govt of US refers to communication of April 12, 1946, in which Gen Hoxha asserts desire of Albanian regime to remove misunderstandings that might prejudice relations between US and Albania and requests clarification of reports by Radio London, Reuters, and American press regarding resolution presented in US Senate Foreign Relations Committee concerning "Northern Epirus" (Southern Albania). US Govt, motivated by equal desire to eliminate any misapprehensions which might stand in way of early resumption of normal relations between US and Albania, invites General Hoxha's attention to the following facts in this connection:

1. On February 19, 1945, Senator Pepper submitted following resolution which was referred to Senate Committee on Foreign Relations:

"Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that Northern Epirus (including Corfu) and the twelve islands of the Aegean Sea, known as the Dodecanese

40 For text of the Pepper resolution, see telegram 76, May 8, to Tirana, infra.

41 This telegram was repeated to United States delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers at Paris as 2188, Secdel 212, and to Caserta as 133.

42 Telegram 216, April 15, 1946, from Tirana, reported receipt of a note dated April 12 from Hoxha requesting clarification of reports regarding a resolution passed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee expressing sympathy for Greek claims to Northern Epirus (711.75/4-1546). The text of Hoxha's note was transmitted to the Department with despatch 190, April 15, from Tirana, neither printed (711.75/4-1546).
Islands, where a strong Greek population predominates, should be awarded by the peace conference to Greece and become incorporated in the territory of Greece."

2. Foregoing resolution was reported out of committee, without amendment, on March 27, 1946. Senate has to date taken no action on resolution.

3. It is prerogative of US Senate to express its views on any matter it so desires.

4. However, action taken by Senate in such an instance is not to be construed as indicating attitude of Executive Branch of US Govt as to merits, pro or con, of substance of proposals in question. End Memorandum.43

ACHESON

740.00119 Council/7-2746 : Telegram

The Deputy Director, Office of European Affairs (Hickerson), to the Director, Office of European Affairs (Matthews), in Paris

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 27, 1946—4 p. m.

US URGENT

3697. Secdel 529. For Matthews 44 from Hickerson. I have been unhappy for some time about situation of Jacobs’ Mission in Albania. We have repeatedly told Albanians we expect them to reaffirm their continued adherence to treaties and agreements enforced [in force?] between us in 1939 and our Mission has remained in Albania without satisfactory response to this request or any further action on our part since February. Jacobs and his staff have, as you know, received scant consideration from Albanians. Jacobs has complained on numerous occasions about his treatment.

You will recall that we have discussed this situation in EUR and in the past it was your feeling that it was advisable for us to maintain some representation in Albania for purpose of reporting, chiefly military information. Jacobs’ sources of information seem to be progressively drying up.

It seems to me that Jacobs’ remaining in Albania is both futile and undignified and I do not believe that the present small trickle of information which he is able to report to us justifies keeping him there.

The foregoing paragraphs are the summary of an airmail letter which had been prepared for my signature to consult you before making a recommendation to the Secretary about withdrawing Jacobs.

43 Telegram 275, May 15, 1946, from Tirana, reported that this memorandum had been sent to Hoxha on May 11 (711.75/5-1546).
44 Matthews was serving as a political adviser on the United States delegation to the Paris Peace Conference.
In the last 24 hours there have been two developments which caused me to telegraph rather than write you:

1. FE and Hilldring have just told me that they would like to propose Jacobs’ name to the President as U.S. Political Adviser in Korea with the personal rank of Minister. They need urgently a top-flight Officer with extensive Far Eastern experience and experience in dealing with the Russians and Jacobs is their first choice.

2. We received yesterday an airgram and personal letter from Jacobs asking for home leave this summer or early autumn.

I favor our telling Hilldring that EUR has no objection to his sending a telegram to Jacobs offering him Korea assignment. Do you agree?

We could withdraw the entire Mission if Jacobs leaves or withdraw only Jacobs leaving Fultz in charge if he is willing to stay; if Fultz is not willing to remain as we understand may be the case we could use Henderson who is going from Rome to Tirana. My own inclination would be to withdraw the whole Mission but I do not have strong views on this. What are your views?

[Hickerson]

711.75/8-1546: Telegram

The Representative in Albania (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL TIRANA, August 15, 1946—9 p. m. [Received August 16—11:45 p. m.]

428. In response request I call, saw Hoxha afternoon August 13, when he recited difficulties over treaties and tried to blame United States for not having made counterproposals. I protested, reminding him that at close last interview on subject he had said his Government’s position was same as stated his two notes last November and I had said my government expected something more closely approximating recognition Albania’s treaty obligations than expressed in those notes.

He then went on to say that after further study his Government was prepared to accept continued validity of 11 multilateral treaties,

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*John H. Hilldring, Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas.

*In telegram 3688, Delsec 750, July 28, 1946, from Paris, Matthews replied as follows: "I agree to Jacobs’ reassignment to Korea, reference your Secdel 529. I believe it better for time being to keep foot in the door with either Fultz or Henderson." (740.00119 Council/7-2846) Harry T. Fultz and George D. Henderson were members of the United States Informal Mission in Albania.

* For Jacobs’ report on his conversation with Hoxha on February 27, see telegram 135, February 28, from Tirana, p. 12.

* Multilateral treaties to which both the United States and Albania were parties are as follows: Convention for the Formation of an International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs, Regulations and Final Declarations, July 5, 1890; International Labor Organization: Convention and Protocol for Limiting the Manufacture and Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, July 13, 1931;
copies of which we submitted in January. Concerning four bilateral treaties he said his government was prepared immediately after recognition and arrival American Minister to take these treaties under consideration for purpose of making certain "corrections" to bring them into line with new kind of international relationship created by anti-Fascist war. He cited as example that under our extradition treaty political offenders could not be extradited, which might prevent handing over Albanian war criminals seeking refuge in United States. Concerning naturalization treaty said his Government did not object to past cases but for future some corrections would be necessary. Regarding passport fees agreement, said there was no objection.

He then handed a letter on Albania, contents of which wishes me study, communicate to my Government and talk with him again if necessary to avoid misunderstanding. Letter reiterates substance what Hoxha said, mentioning eleven multilateral and four bilateral treaties, but contained no reference to nature desired corrections and does not mention passport fees agreement, money order convention and, what is far more important, most-favored-nation treatment, exchange of notes beginning 1922 and completed 1925 which Hoxha did not mention orally.50

As Albanian Regime accepts only multilateral treaties and agreements, believe this development merely for effect in connection with Albania’s United Nations membership application now under consideration in New York. Deptel 140, August 12, which I shall comment on separately shortly.51

Albania’s position with reference our bilateral treaties and agreements therefore remains same except we now know from Hoxha’s oral remarks something nature of revisions which Albanian authorities are seeking. Hardly know what to suggest as I question wisdom ac-

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49 For list of the bilateral treaties and agreements between the United States and Albania, see Department of State Bulletin, November 17, 1946, p. 914.

50 For text of Hoxha’s letter of August 13, see telegram 493, August 18, from Tirana, infra.

51 Telegram 140, August 12, 1946, to Tirana, summarized consideration by the Membership Committee of the United Nations General Assembly of Albania’s application for membership in the United Nations Organization (800.00 Summaries/8-1246). Jacobs’ comment on the Department’s telegram was contained in telegram 485, August 19, from Tirana (711.75/8-1946). For documentation on United States policy towards Albanian application for U.N. membership, see vol. 3.
cepting promises with respect to action to be taken after accorded recognition and exchange diplomatic representatives.

One course action would be stand firm and reply where we take note of Albania’s acceptance multilateral treaties, we must have assurances already requested with respect other treaties and agreements. Another course reply in foregoing sense but add either we are prepared to study list revision which Albanian authorities may wish to submit for purpose of determining whether some agreement cannot be reached press recognition or that I am authorized to discuss proposed revision with Foreign Office with same purpose in mind.

In addition treaty question something must be said regarding treatment to be accorded this Mission in interim and to our future Legation and diplomatic representatives. Imperative both because of ignorance present regime of puppets concerning international courtesies and sadistic tendency to be deliberately nasty. If this point not cleared up satisfactorily will be most difficult if not impossible for Department to keep staff here. First we should insist on general commitment our Mission and future Legation and staff be accorded usual privileges and courtesies extended as matter international practice all over world, not in one section thereof. Second we must mention certain matters growing out of above and insist they be attended to immediately:

1. Prompt action upon requests for entry and exit permits for American staff (in three recent cases 5 weeks were required)
2. Definite approval for engineer Marinischak remain here on Mission premises long as we want him and entry permit be granted at once for his wife to join him (this loyal employee is indispensable and attitude authorities toward his wife inexcusable: we cannot back down)
3. Right to employ local help without interference before or after employment. Our continued permission operate radio station and send in weekly planes.

If firm on these points even to extent threatening to close, believe we shall force them capitulate as doubt they now want us leave, and if they do, we may as well close anyway.

Copy of note and translation follow by mail.

Jacobs

711.75/2-1846: Telegram

The Representative in Albania (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State

Tirana, August 18, 1946.

[Received August 19—9:55 a.m.]

433. Following is translation with articles omitted for brevity of

The text of this telegram was sent to Paris by the Department as telegram 4690, Secdel 851, September 9 (740.00119 Council/3-946).
Hoxha’s letter dated August 13 text of which Department has requested.

“Always having in mind desire to reinforce and strengthen relationships between United States and Peoples Republic of Albania, in response to desires and aspiration of Albanian people and in keeping with new international spirit growing out of common war against German and Italian Fascists who attacked and enslaved our country, as they did to so many other countries of world and destroyed freedom, independence and sovereignty of country, Peoples Republic of Albania has taken under consideration and studied treaties which existed between United States and Albania before April 7, 1939.

Many of treaties signed during period before April 7, 1939 especially in case of Albania were signed by anti-popular governments created and brought into power through force backed by foreign bayonets and against will of Albanian people. Such treaties are directly or indirectly detrimental to interests and sovereignty of our country. The spirit and application of many of these treaties, reflecting entirely non-existent interests and aspirations of our people, dealt with them as colonial or semi-colonial people.

We cannot say that treaties between United States and Albania were created in spirit mentioned about [above?], but with respect to some of them especially treaties of a bilateral character between our two countries which were negotiated during period following last world war, some corrections are necessary.

This is due to new international relationships created by anti-Fascist war which, in interest of our two countries as well as in collective interest of all countries require new relationships based upon sincerity among progressive democratic states of world in order to harmonize principles for which our people fought heroically and continuously for years against those who caused great bloodshed and destroyed such relationships.

Government of the Republic of Albania having always in mind friendship based on mutual respect for international and national rights as link between our two countries, as well as similar relationships with all other democratic and progressive countries, most sincerely and patiently accepts validity of treaties of international character which existed between our two countries as listed below:
(here Department should insert titles of eleven multilateral treaties copies of which Department submitted to Albanian authorities through this Mission in January).

With respect to other treaties bilateral character as listed below: treaties of arbitration, conciliation, naturalization and extradition the Albanian Government is ready to take them under consideration immediately with American Minister who will come to Tirana after our government is recognized. After necessary corrections have been made by two parties these treaties will enter into force at once.

The Government of Peoples Republic of Albania expresses once more its readiness to continue most friendly relations with United States of America and with all progressive nations of world. This is tradition of the Albanian people who have shed their blood without hesitation to gain their undeniable rights, to assure merited place and
necessary respect in international field as well as to gain sincere support of Allied anti-Fascist nations, especially that of American people. Our people fought heroically throughout 6-year period without taking into consideration either loss of men or materials.

Hoping that diplomatic relations between our two countries may be reestablished as soon as possible as factor in reinforcing more than ever the friendship existing between the American and Albanian peoples please accept my highest esteem, Prime Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Peoples Republic of Albania General Colonel Enver Hoxha”.

JACOBS

740.00119 Council/9-946: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1946—7 p. m.

4689. Secdel 850. For ur further info re Tirana’s 466 Sep 6 (rptd Paris 54 for Secdel).^55 Min without Portfolio Tuk Jakova recently visited Dept own initiative discuss treaties. Conversations unofficial character since Jakova without authority speak behalf Albanian Govt and Hickerson made clear he was not speaking officially for Dept.

Jakova indicated personal belief Albanian Govt might now be prepared recognize in principle validity treaties and agreements between US and Albania. He agreed Hickerson’s suggestion it would be useful draft some language re status treaties which might, with approval Sec and Gen Hoxha, serve as basis official discussions between Albanian authorities and Amrep Tirana. Statement drafted substantially as follows:

Begin Albanian Govt accepts in principle all treaties and agreements between Albania and US in force Apr 7, 1939, date Italian invasion Albania.

Albanian Govt reserves right propose changes or termination aforesaid treaties and agreements on basis mutual interest. In this regard, any discussion treaties and agreements which are subject such proposals would begin after recognition Albanian Govt by US Govt and establishment diplomatic relations between US and Albania.

Pending possible changes or termination particular treaties and agreements accordance with their terms, both Albanian Govt and US Govt will carry out provisions existing instruments. End.

^55 Telegram 466, September 6, 1946, from Tirana, suggested that it might be helpful if someone on the United States delegation at the Paris Peace Conference discussed with Hoxha or one of the Albanian Foreign Ministry representatives then at Paris the Albanian note of August 13 on treaties. Jacobs added that “since multilateral treaties have been accepted, remaining questions of bilateral treaties and agreements and status this mission might be resolved or modus vivendi reached which would improve situation”. (711.75/9-946) Telegram 4312, Dessec 518, September 10, from Matthews in Paris, stated that the question of Albania’s position on treaties should be handled by the Department and not in Paris (740.00119 Council/9-1046).
Jakova stated he would communicate Hoxha and thereafter inform Dept PriMin’s reaction. It was made clear to Jakova that Dept would understand above as differing only in language and not in effect from our originally requested assurance. Hickerson again emphasized unofficial character this interchange, stated that Dept would wish consult Jacobs before taking definite position, and pointed out necessity, in event US and Albanian authorities wish seek agreement along lines foregoing draft, for Gen Hoxha take matter up officially with Amrep Tirana. Thus far, Dept has recd no further word from Jakova re matter.

Dept does not propose reply Hoxha’s unsatisfactory letter Aug 13 (Tirana’s 433 Aug 18, being rptd Paris) just now in view possibility that Hoxha in light of foregoing may wish withdraw it and substitute letter giving assurances we desire. Should treaty question be resolved to US satisfaction, we believe inadvisable to specify formally new and additional conditions recognition (Tirana’s 428, Aug 15 rptd Paris Sep 7) but would be inclined as alternative to notify Albanian authorities at time acceptance satisfactory treaty assurance that with establishment diplomatic relations US expects Legation staff will be accorded privileges and courtesies consistent international practice.

Sent Paris, rptd Tirana.44

CLAYTON

740.00119 Council/9-2046 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State 55

SECRET

PARIS, September 20, 1946—5 p. m.  
[Received September 20—7:30 p. m.]

4725. DelSec 968. From the Secretary for Clayton. I wish that no steps be taken toward recognition of the regime in Albania at this time. Regardless of what Albania may do to accept the validity of our treaties, any recognition extended at this time would be widely misinterpreted.

[BYRNES]

775.00/10-1046 : Telegram

The Representative in Albania (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State

SECRET  
TIRANA, October 10, 1946—5 p. m.  
[Received October 11—2:25 p. m.]

517. October 8 Hoxha in talk before National Front conference out-

44 As No. 159.
5 As the text of this telegram was transmitted in telegram 167, September 24, 1946, to Tirana, not printed.
linded Albania's foreign policy. Accused Great Britain using Saranda incident which he described as regrettable pretext for not resuming diplomatic relations. With respect US, he stated what Department already knows to effect Albania has agreed recognize multilateral treaties and is prepared consider in friendly spirit bilateral treaties after recognition accorded, adding Albania was awaiting reply on this question from American Government.

October 9 paid farewell call on Hoxha accompanied by Henderson and spent 2 hours going over our problems. In substance he repeated what is said above with respect treaties stressing fact he was expecting reply from US.

Also discussed with him outstanding matters as employment alien interpreter and case Marinschak's wife concerning both of which he finally agreed that something would be done.

During course conversation, he advanced his usual lengthy specious arguments about everything especially alleged mistreatment Albania by US at Paris and New York.

Most of our time taken up trying to get across to him other factors which he seems to wish to ignore.

Henderson will submit mail report with details and I shall take up matter upon arrival in Washington.\footnote{On the morning of May 13, 1946, two British cruisers passing through the channel between the Island of Corfu and Albania were fired upon by shore batteries located near Saranda in Albania.}

\begin{flushright}
JACOBS
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\textit{The Acting Representative in Albania (Henderson) to the Secretary of State}

\textbf{SECRET}

TIRANA, October 16, 1946.

[Received October 29.]

A-79. Reference Mission's telegram 517, October 10. Pursuant final paragraph telegram cited, submit following summary of 2-hour talk between Hoxha, Jacobs and myself October 9:

Jacobs stated I would assume charge of Mission in his absence and I was career officer. He then expressed thanks for courtesies and cooperation extended by Hoxha and Foreign Office during his stay in Albania, adding that, although some difficulties had arisen between Mission and Alb government, nearly all had been resolved (with exception of two he would mention later), and he therefore hoped to devote his undivided attention in Washington to major outstanding problem between U.S. and Albania, viz. bilateral treaties. However,

\textbf{\footnote{Jacobs departed from Tirana on October 10, 1946, and Henderson assumed charge of the Mission.}}
he hoped that two pending problems of Mission caretaker’s wife and imprisoned Mission translator could be solved prior to his arrival in Washington because, although issues were very minor from official international standpoint, they loomed large from his personal viewpoint which included smooth functioning of Mission. He then outlined background of efforts to bring Marinschak’s wife from Italy to join husband here, and renewed earnest plea that her entry be approved; and pointed out serious handicap being sustained by Mission through lack of translator who has been arrested several weeks ago and not heard from since.

Hoxha thanked Jacobs for his kind words, on occasion of terminating his mission, regarding himself and Foreign Office, reciprocated compliments, ignored two pending problems, and began to discuss treaty question. He emphasized great concession made by recognizing multilateral treaties, and stated he was waiting for U.S. to extend recognition so that bilateral treaties could be discussed after diplomatic relations had been reestablished and U.S. Minister arrived.

At this point Jacobs called attention to fact that we were awaiting word from Alb government as to outcome of talks recently sustained between Tuk Jakova and officials of State Department, to which Hoxha replied that Jakova’s visit to Department was purely courtesy call during course of which major outstanding problem of treaties had naturally been discussed, but inconclusively since Jakova had no authorization to speak officially or make any decisions.

Jacobs stated reasonableness of U.S. expectations that Albania would recognize validity of bilateral treaties prior to recognition, since he and U.S. Government had shown willingness to recognize Albania nearly a year ago. He mentioned that he had fully expected diplomatic relations to be resumed late in 1945, and was amazed that treaty question had hit unexpected snag at turn of year about same time that attitude of Albanian government had apparently undergone an unfavorable change toward U.S.

Hoxha then skipped treaty question, stated any change in government’s attitude toward U.S. had been imaginary and provoked by unfriendly elements, since Albanian government felt from beginning and continued to feel nothing but friendliness toward U.S., to which Albania was bound by numerous important ties. But, he continued, the U.S. had certainly shown unfriendliness toward Albania by supporting Greek claims to Albanian territory at the Paris Conference, a circumstance which was incomprehensible to the new Albania in view of quantities of blood Albanian partisans had shed fighting for same cause as U.S.

At this point I begged to disagree with Hoxha by stating that U.S. had at no time supported Greek claims to Northern Epirus, to which
he countered by saying that according to his sources the developments of the Paris Conference showed conclusively that U.S. had openly supported Greek claims. I replied that we did not know his sources but that I could assure him that I had followed developments at Paris Conference particularly with regard to Albania, with closest scrutiny, and reiterated statement that U.S. had not supported Greek claims. He then said that I must be misinformed because it was a matter of record that U.S. had voted for Greece and against Albania at Paris. I asked him to explain what he meant by this statement; he replied that U.S. had voted in favor of placing Greek claims on agenda of Conference, which was naturally tantamount to voting against Albania.

Next 45 minutes consumed an apparently futile attempt to convince Hoxha that in voting to place Greek claims on agenda we were simply fulfilling our repeatedly announced policy to maintain independence of Albania and to give consideration to any claims for border rectification only at eventual Peace Conference, and voting to place this border question on Conference agenda in no way implied U.S. support for claim. Department may be interested in Hoxha’s reaction to two analogies I drew to illustrate point: 1) I said that in U.S., for instance, concept of justice implied right of anyone to bring charges against anyone else and duty of courts to hear charges regardless of justness of charges; if charges were unfounded, court would quickly discover fact and throw them out without further ado; e.g. if Hoxha wanted to accuse me of being a thief, he would have the right to take the matter to court, where his accusation would be considered regardless of whether I actually was a thief or not. Hoxha’s comment was that the analogy did not apply because I was obviously not a thief, anyway. 2) Trying a closer attack I said: “General, what would your reaction be if Albania sought to have placed on the agenda of the Peace Conference a claim for some region, such as, for the sake of argument, the Kossovo region; and if the U.S. delegation voted against giving Albania the right to air its claim at the Conference? Would you not feel that you should at least have the right to have your claim discussed and studied?” Hoxha’s sole comment on this was “That is not an analogous case because we are not claiming the Kossovo region from our ally Yugoslavia.” Unwilling to give up quite so easily, I stated that as far as allies went Greece had fought just as valiantly with the Allies and against the Axis as Yugoslavia, Albania or any other country, to which he replied that that was very true, and that every true Albanian had cooperated with Greece in its noble fight against the Axis, but that the present Greek government had forgotten this fact and was now denouncing Albania as an Axis satellite and attempting to rob it of half of its already reduced territory.
At this point, Jacobs made sound observation that to think that U.S.
supported Greek claims to Southern Albania would be a contradiction
in terms since U.S. had consistently maintained that Albania should
remain independent, and if southern half of Albania were to go to
Greece Albania could not remain independent.

Jacobs then said that, speaking personally and frankly, he felt
that mistakes had been made by both Albania and United States
during past year and a half. Albania, preoccupied with urgent
problems of establishing stable, secure government, had perhaps over-
looked international aspects of its efforts to achieve this; and U.S.,
preoccupied during same period with numerous international con-
ferences of major import to world peace, had perhaps overlooked
importance of small, though strategic, Albania.

In any case, he said, he hoped that treaty question would soon be
ironed out so that diplomatic relations could be reestablished. He
then reverted to question of Marinschak’s wife and Mission translator,
asking that as personal favor to him Hoxha solve these two problems.

Re translator Hoxha said he was unaware of details of case, but that
his arrest certainly had no connection with fact he was translator for
U.S. Mission; he understood handicap to Mission of lack of translator
and promised to see that competent replacement be made available as
soon as possible. Re Mrs. Marinschak, he said that difficulty lay in
her not being U.S. citizen but instead a national of some satellite Axis
state, that she would have to be investigated, and that Marinschak
should not feel too badly over separation from his wife since many
Albanians in U.S. had not seen their families in Albania for many
years. In any case, he said, he would look into both matters and see
if they could be arranged shortly.

Interview, whose tone was friendly throughout, ended on optimistic
note.

HENDRSON

711.75/10-1946: Telegram

The Acting Representative in Albania (Henderson) to the Secretary
of State

SECRET

TIRANA, October 19, 1946—8 p.m.

US URGENT

[Received October 20—6:48 p.m.]

526. Dept will have noted from my press telegram 525, October 19 [8]
Hoxha in public speech 116 [October 16? ] stated he did not under-
stand what kind of work this mission does here and implied since its
work is done it has no reason to remain. In formal talk two days ago

[8] Not printed; it transmitted the approximate text of Hoxha’s speech of
October 16, 1946, at the opening of the Albanian Youth Congress as printed in
the newspaper Bujkimi on October 17 (711.75/10-1946).
with Acting [Secretary?] General of Foreign Ministry elicited admission he had not known of Hoxha’s idea on subject before they were publicly expressed: only interpretation he vouchsafed was possibly Hoxha was preparing ground for request to send similar mission to US. Although this explanation not to be discounted there is wealth evidence pointing to fact regime is trying force issue of US recognition and emotional language Hoxha on this subject in Youth Congress, speech was simply latest strongest manifestation of resentment over snubbing by UNRRA, UN and Paris Conferences, aggravated by continued delay in progress on obtaining US recognition. Reference Jacobs’ telegram 517, October 10; my telegram 521, October 14, A–79, October 16 and my press telegram 524, October 18. Two most likely major factors are increasing domestic pressure (even in GCP and government councils) over nonrecognition; and regime’s natural resentment over international treatment cited especially dual grievance at Paris Conference veto of reparations from Italy and Anglo-American vote to hear Greek claim to southern Albania.

Sequence events leading up to Youth Congress speech:

(1) Oct 7 at opening Democratic Front Conference Hoxha mouthed usual Communist line for Balkans then launched into nub of address which was declaration on foreign policy devoting 10 minutes on discussion treaty issue with US; his reasoning so warped that when Jacobs paid him farewell visit following day we tried largely in vain to set him straight on real issues involved.

(2) Oct 9 during this visit Jacobs (A–79) did mention he had completed his main task year ago when he recommended recognition but prefaced remarks by stating I would be in charge Mission during his absence and would act as local liaison for Dept and himself in efforts iron out differences over bilateral treaties in relation recognition. After visit Jacobs reproached himself to me over failure bring up vital question exit visas Albanians and asked me write firm note after his departure to Foreign Minister on subject emphasizing latter’s failure answer two previous notes on question and urge need for favorable action.

(3) Oct 12 pursuant Jacobs’ request (underscored by fact Vice Consul Hoffman on eve his departure previous week sent word number turned away by him to call at Mission to obtain passports) I made last-minute attempt break deadlock on exit visas before midnight Oct 13 (my telegram 521 cited) by sending sincere and friendly, but forthright, letter Hoxha pointing out hardship to US citizens exposed loss of citizenship if prevented longer leaving Albania; enclosing Dept’s press release No. 66, Sept 20; explaining grounds for same;

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59 Not printed.
60 Not printed; it transmitted an excerpt from Hoxha’s October 7 speech at the opening of the Albanian Democratic Front convention (711.75/10–1946).
61 On September 20, the Department of State issued to the press a statement regarding the action by the Albanian authorities in declining to issue to American citizens, who were also considered to be citizens of Albania, permits to leave Albania for the purpose of returning to the United States. For text of statement, see Department of State Bulletin, September 29, 1946, p. 551.
drawing relationship between Albanian Government's attitude this matter and reluctance US establish diplomatic relations with Albania prior acceptance by same of "treaties which constituted an outward expression of the close ties both governments recognize as having existed for many years between Albania and US"; suggesting reasonableness of his instructing appropriate authorities facilitate issuance exit permits to these citizens; thereby offsetting unfavorable impression created by negative attitude mentioned reassuring US of "your sincere intention to arrive at a mutually acceptable basis for resumption diplomatic relations and righting unintentional wrong that will otherwise be done to those citizens".

(Jacobs Naples has full text letter sent out on special plane take out his effects. Have wired him forward Dept soonest).

(4) October 16—Hoxha postponed for 2 days inauguration Youth Congress to allow him to prepare speech dealing in part with status this Mission (mytel 525 cited). If, as suspected, he also consulted Russians and Yugoslavia, it would lend support to thesis that present move may be another thrust to test how far we will go in support of our position, namely, that we played major role in liberation of this, and so many other countries, that we have definite interest in all that occurs here, and have legitimate right to have representation here in support of these interests. Russians and Yugoslavs would prefer that we have no representation here, or at most representation of purely formal kind while their representatives, advisors, and technicians run wild over country as they are doing. Still another factor behind Hoxha's blunt query as to what kind of work this Mission has been performing may have been his knowledge that Mission has recently been issuing passports to Albanian Americans possibly leading him to believe that US only indifferently interested in changing status of Mission and willing to continue its anomalous position indefinitely so long as it could go ahead performing certain diplomatic and consular functions without undue hindrance. As Department knows, until recently Mission was not authorized to extend recognition or protection to US citizens, and it is even not attempting to do so in precarious circumstance.

Present situation therefore seems to call for clarification status Mission pending recognition (telegram 428, August 15, Jacobs therefore advised this step). Since no action taken yet answer Hoxha's note August 13 (despatch (?) 7[307] August 16) suggest Department instruct me reply that note possibly in following sense: offer of recognition November 19, 1946 [1945] came about through effort Mission and Jacobs who made one trip Washington for consultation, Hoxha has been assisted in study treaties through being provided with true copies treaties and through such verbal interpretation is [as?] he permitted to facilitate his understanding; Mission continues facilitate clarification and exchange views between Hoxha and Dept and keeps latter informed events having bearing question recognition which through no fault US has not been consummated; after supplying Hoxha with true copies treaties early this year neither Mission nor Dept responsible for

*Despatch 307, August 16, 1946, from Tirana, not printed. Hoxha's letter was also transmitted to the Department in telegram 433, August 18, from Tirana, p. 24.*
delay while Hoxha and associates studied treaties to determine what if any provisions might be detrimental interests Albania, Hoxha's letter August 13 neither fulfills adequately conditions recognition set forth in November 1945 US note nor suggestions practicable alternative, since there appears be required further exchange views and information pertinent to entire problem recognition and essential a final adjustment question, Mission prepared provide necessary liaison and other assistance Hoxha and Department in working out acceptable procedures which there is every hope will lead to full recognition and to exchange of representatives on more formal basis.

It might also be pointed out that until this summer Albanian Govt refused even discuss treaty question and has now resorted to one-sided public presentation its case instead discussing it with Jacobs or myself. If Dept agrees it would seem desirable give publicity such communication both here and in Washington after delivery.

Please instruct urgently.

HENDERSON

711.75/10-2946 : Telegram
The Acting Representative in Albania (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TIRANA, October 29, 1946—3 p.m.
[Received October 29—2:50 p.m.]

538. Although communiqué transmitted press telegram 536 October 28 (sent Caserta 218) may be subject ambiguous interpretation actual text rebuts Dept's press release by denying that any official requests have been made to appropriate authorities by persons claiming US citizenship and possessing documents to prove it. Moreover, communiqué openly states such preliminary requests by interested persons would if made, assist such persons to regulate their status once diplomatic relations resumed.

Basic statement communiqué denies facts. At least 30 US citizens this category have applied for exit permits from Korcha police chief and/or Ministry of Interior Tirana. At Korcha they have been refused exit permits but their US passports have been retained by police chief with promise to return them if and when exit permits accorded. Each such person is in possession valid recently-issued Albanian document of identification giving "American" as nationality.

Those who have applied Ministry Interior have simply been refused exit permit with vague explanation or none at all.

These facts alone (which we re-pointed out to Hoxha in my letter October 12 remytel 526, October 19 and in two previous notes cited in the letter) give lie to communiqué.

*Not printed; it transmitted the text of an Albanian communiqué on the United States protests against the efforts by Albanian authorities to prevent the return to the United States of Albanians who had acquired American nationality (711.75/10-2846).
Do not wish approach Govt this subject without Dept’s specific instructions which, however, I will welcome.

Although communiqué probably responds in part US accusation Albania discriminating against American citizens over exit permits (heard here in BBC broadcast linking this with US “slave labor” note to Yugoslavia) it is believed basic motivating factor was Dept’s press release September 20 sent Hoxha as enclosure my letter cited. If so, Hoxha apparently wishes ignore letter and arguments therein while indirectly replying to it through communiqué. Regime thus makes one more move in maneuver force recognition issue.

In this connection notwithstanding, Hoxha’s Youth Congress speech insinuating Mission should depart since it has no reason for being here; Mission continues function as it has in past and cordial notes continue to be exchanged with Foreign Office which has not ceased to take official cognizance Mission’s presence.

Awaiting Dept’s instructions re this telegram and my 526 cited.
Sent Department 538, repeated Caserta 220.

HENDERSON

711.75/10-1946: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Representative in Albania (Henderson) 65

SECRET
WASHINGTON, November 2, 1946—2 p.m.
US URGENT

199. After careful consideration all aspects situation (urtels 526 Oct 19 and previous), Dept has decided on immediate withdrawal US Mission from Albania. You are therefore instructed address informal letter PriMin Hoxha as follows:

“Since arriving in Tirana on May 8, 1945 to survey conditions in Albania in connection with the question of US recognition of the existing Albanian regime, the informal US Mission has sought to bring about mutual understanding and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Govts of the US and Albania. Despite US endeavors in this regard, and in the absence of a satisfactory response from the Albanian Govt to the offer of recognition which was tendered by the US Govt in Nov 1945, the Mission has been unable to achieve the purposes for which it was originally sent to Albania.

In the circumstances, although my Government retains its sentiment of warm friendship for the Albanian people, it does not feel that there

65 Reference presumably is to the United States note delivered to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry on October 18 protesting the use by Yugoslav authorities of American citizens for slave labor. For text of note, see Department of State Bulletin, October 27, 1946, p. 761.
66 This telegram was repeated to Caserta as 235, to London as 7517, and to Moscow as 1928.
is any further reason for the Mission to remain in Albania. The US Mission is accordingly being withdrawn."

You should proceed at once with preparations to close Mission. Administrative instructions will follow in separate tel.66

Dept will announce press withdrawal Mission upon receipt your urgent tel reporting delivery above letter.

ACHESON

711.75/11-746: Telegram

The Acting Representative in Albania (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TIRANA, November 7, 1946—5 p.m.

US URGENT

[Received November 8—6: 10 a. m.]

551. Following text Hoxha letter received 10 a. m. today in reply to mine November 5:

"I have the honor to advise you that I have received your letter of November 5, 1946 in which you state: 'There is not any further reason for the Mission to remain in Albania. The US Mission is accordingly being withdrawn'.

More than 18 months ago the US Government asked Albanian Government for permission to send an official American Mission to Albania, headed by Mr. Jacobs who would report to American Government on conditions in Albania with respect to question of recognition of Albanian Government by US Government. This American Mission was well received by us and it was given all possible opportunities and facilities to accomplish its purpose. For 18 successive months your Mission moved about (se promenade) freely to the four corners of Albania, in villages and cities without at any time finding any hindrance to its work which was to be solely informative in connection with recognition of our government. In spite of the fact that the nature of the American Mission was specifically limited as outlined above and that its work was, in effect, completed as of the date of delivery of American note of November 12, 1945,68 wherein were stated the conditions for recognition of our Government, the American Mission had not only continued to remain in Tirana but our government, with the greatest generosity and kindness, has permitted the entry and transfer of many employees and various friends of Mission which repeatedly requested clearances for them. Our Government with greatest generosity, has given the American Mission numerous opportunities even better to observe conditions in Albania and important developments in Albania, as for example, the elections of November '4569 and many others.

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66 Further instructions for the withdrawal of the Mission were contained in telegram 203, November 7, 1946, to Tirana (124.75/11-546).
67 For text of the letter delivered by Henderson to Hoxha on November 5, 1946, see telegram 189, November 2, to Tirana, supra.
68 See footnote 22, p. 10.
69 For report on the Albanian elections of November 1945, see telegram 224, December 11, 1945, from Tirana, Foreign Relations, vol. iv, p. 77.
Chief Commissioner Jacobs has expressed to me many times his enthusiasm for the constructive work being carried out in our country, for the heroic ways of Albanian people, for our stable democracy and for the fine sentiments of peace and generosity of Albanian people and their government. Chief of American Mission himself has told me many times that his reports to American Government with respect to recognition of our government have been very favorable and even that for him it was astonishing American Government had placed conditions on recognition our government. Mr. Jacobs characterized this condition to me after his first return from Washington as a ‘last minute question’ that he knew nothing about and which had been added by some technician of State Department.

The last minute condition which was added by some technicians of State Department and which Mr. Jacobs told me about was nothing but acceptance by us of some treaties which existed between US and some previous governments of Albania. The condition put to us for recognition was not a simply technical matter the way Mr. Jacobs tried to represent it, for the results demonstrate that it was purely a question of principle and the American Government raised it and used it as an obstacle of the first rate to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between our two countries. With regret we have also noticed that during all this time the question of treaties has been employed as an argument by American Government to oppose all our legitimate demands in international field earned with blood and sacrifices. But just as for American Government treaty question is matter of principle and this principle is defended insistently by American Government in the same way, this question is for matter of principle that we too have every right to defend in the interest of our people.

On part of our government it has always been endeavored to find solution to this question which impeded establishment diplomatic relations between our two peoples which are united by close friendship in past and in recent common war. Albanian people have nourished and have a great sympathy for friendly American people and regret much to see that pretexts and questions are being created to impede the best development of this friendship. Throughout period of negotiations on question treaties American Mission at Tirana not only did not show any warm interest in adjustment of differences but also its long and unjustified stay was used to create even greater difficulties in way of attainment satisfactory results. Fact is American State Department has time and again issued alarming and false communique in relation to treatment received by American Mission from Albanian authorities.

Convincing proof that Albanian Government has always been ready solve question treaties and recognition our government in the most amicable manner and without threat to interests of two countries, is our note of August 13 this year through which we agreed recognize all treaties of internal [multilateral?] character which existed between US and Albania and as to other two or three bilateral treaties they would be taken under examination immediately upon arrival American Ambassador Tirana. This was great concession that we were making for sake of friendship which ties us to American people because circumstances under which history of our people has developed, cir-
cumstances and people who have signed these prewar treaties on behalf of Albania and conditions and spirit created by anti-Fascist war have also brought with them indispensable examination of all prewar agreements which existed between our country and other states. Albanian people who have fought for and won their liberty, independence and sovereignty had a full right to correct that which in their bitter past had been done in open contradiction with their vital interests. Great democratic American people will be the first to approve our just point of view.

But unfortunately, American State Department and its Mission at Tirana has not even deigned to give an answer to our note which contained a sound basis for resolving the matter and for establishment of friendly relations between our two countries. Under these circumstances and in view of complete silence which met our favorable and friendly propositions expressed in our note August 13, 1946, we do not wish to believe that American State Department does not take with due seriousness question of diplomatic relations with Albania and the continuation and reinforcement of friendship between our two peoples.

Albanian people and their government have confidence in the American people and will conserve friendship which they bear them and are always seeking friendly spirit to reinforce on just and sound bases this friendship which many persons in American State Department and the American Mission at Tirana have undervalued. With distinguished salutations signed Enver Hoxha.”

HENDERSON

[On November 8, 1946, the Department of State released to the press a statement respecting the withdrawal from Albania of the American Mission; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, November 17, 1946, page 913.]

124.756/11-1746 : Telegram

The Acting Representative to Albania (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 70

SECRET US URGENT CASERTA, November 17, 1946—6 p. m.
NIAC T [Received November 17—7:27 p. m.]

811. From Henderson. ReDeptel 251, November 16. 71 In retrospect a number of Hoxha’s veiled allusions to Mission and certain members of it in speeches during month of October now take on addi-

70 Henderson and members of the American Mission departed from Albania and arrived in Italy on November 16, 1946.
71 Not printed; it requested information and comment on the trumped-up charges against Fultz and the United States made in the course of a trial in Tirana of Albanians accused of sabotage (124.756/11-946). Fultz and other employees of the American Mission in Albania were alleged to have instigated and subsidized sabotage activities at a drainage project on Lake Malliç, near Korgë.
tional significance: (a) In Front speech of October 7, Hoxha took pains to outline specific duties for which Mission sent to Albania; (b) In Youth speech October 16, he pursued this tack to point of asking bluntly what Mission was doing in Tirana since its legitimate function had been completed months before; (c) In his reply to letter announcing Mission’s withdrawal, he made several references to unfriendliness of certain members of Mission and drew distinction between great American people on one hand and on the other the State Department and certain members of the State Department Mission in Albania. These moves by Hoxha are unexplainable on the basis of actual facts and the normal and legitimate activities of the Mission. Secretary General of the Foreign Office himself admitted to me that he was at a loss to explain meaning behind Hoxha’s statements in Youth Congress speech. Therefore it can only be assumed that Hoxha, by taking above steps, had begun build-up for saboteurs’ trial which he had already planned for purpose of providing dramatic answers to his questions and innuendos. Department will recall that my 531 reported that secret preparations for trial, including torture of five Albanians, had already begun as early as October 28.

Ultimate objectives of trial may be summarized as follows: (a) To discredit US-UK role in UNRRA by fantastic charges re Maliq Lake alleged sabotage; (b) to justify Albanians departure US mission; (c) to discredit Fultz and his many friends in Albania (including high placed Albanian Government officials); (d) to “explain” Albanian Government’s failure to complete highly-touted project for drainage Maliq swamp by November 28.

It would seem that US decision withdraw mission caught Hoxha with his stage half set, that he therefore kept news of mission’s withdrawal secret as long as possible, began trial 2 days after he learned of US decision and then revealed one-sided version of mission’s departure, only after trial had attempted smear Fultz and Mission. Following facts bear out this conclusion: (a) News of mission’s withdrawal was kept secret in Albania for 4 days, i.e., until Department’s press release November 8 announced withdrawal, but first passing reference to mission’s departure appeared in Bashkimi only on November 10 and full text of Hoxha’s reply to my letter was not published until several days later (text of my November 5 letter was, of course, never published).

In connection with emphasis in trial on large sums of gold Fultz alleged to have passed on to saboteurs through UNRRA’s Woodward as well as directly to one of trial defendants, Department should bear in mind that Albanians know mission ceased selling gold to Albanian

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2a Not printed.
State Bank in August. ... The following are facts re Fultz' "acquaintance with persons being tried."

1. (Known) Abdyl Sharra, chief engineer of project, graduate of technical school. Met twice since Fultz' return Albania, once early summer 1945, conversation less than 5 minutes each occasion, no other communication of any kind.

2. (Unknown) Vasil Mano, engineer Sharra's staff, purportedly one of three chief conspirators with Sharra and Mano's wife, name unknown to Fultz up to first day of trial.

3. (Unknown) Zyrika Mano, wife of Vasil, name unknown to Fultz up to first day trial.

4. (Known) Kujtim Begiri, engineer graduate of technical school, met twice since return, brief call May 1945 and once autumn 1945 at bridge ceremony, no other communication of any kind.

5. (Known) Pandele Zografi, technician known as student at technical school, not met since Fultz return Albania. Plays minor role in trial.

6. (Unknown) Other witnesses and minor defendants in trial unknown to Fultz, including two Italians and Aleks Vasilii, Albanian.

Fultz' casual meeting with Sharra and Begiri took place months before Maliq project was started and had no connection therewith; Fultz did not know Sharra was director of project until fact brought out in trial.

Albanian Government over year ago began discouraging Albanian citizens from associating with Mission and since the beginning of year this policy has been enforced to point of terrorization. For this reason, all former students of technical school have avoided meeting Fultz or communicating with him in any way.

On basis of its experience in Albania during past year, Mission can reliably state that following methods of torture are used by Hoxha regime for purpose of obtaining false confessions: Gashing leg, filling with salt, victims are known to have actually exhibited such wounds; electric current through decayed teeth or through bone in rear of ear; prolonged immersion in cold water up to neck; beating; splinters under fingernails; going through all preparations for execution even to firing blanks.

With regard to present trial, (1) above methods so well known that prisoners out of sheer terror may have made false confessions in hope of being spared or promise of being spared; (2) photograph of defendant Sharra during trial shows drawn emaciated features as evidence of torture and pressure.

Another aspect of case that should be noted is that Kujtim Begiri on witness stand denied receiving any gold from Fultz or anyone else or of having received any instructions to delay work on project. Begiri's denial was not only heard in court room but also over public
address system transmitting verbatim trial proceedings public in street outside court room. Official government organ Bashkimi, on other hand, published alleged confession that he had received 250 gold naps [bars] at one time, 200 at another.  

[**HENDERSON**]

124.75/11-1846: Telegram  

*The Acting Representative to Albania (Henderson) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET  US URGENT  CASERTA, November 18, 1946—6 p. m.  

[Received November 19—12:45 a. m.]

813. From Henderson. Reference Department’s telegram 251, November 16. Systematic account principal incidents in connection withdrawal Mission follows:  

(1) November 5. On Department’s instructions deliver letter immediately to Hoxha if necessary to his residence I managed bring French text of letter to Hoxha’s attention at his residence at about 1 p. m. despite his refusal to receive me (my telegram 549, November 5).  

(2) November 6. Received an Albanian text Hoxha’s reply which was simultaneously translated from Albanian to French to English with help French Legation translator and telegraphed urgently to Department.  

(3) November 7 Bashkimi dramatically prepares public for opening of saboteur trial November 8.  

(4) November 8 Trial of alleged saboteurs began for purpose discrediting Mission and preparing for Albanian consumption false justification Mission’s departure.  

Department press release announces instructions for Mission’s withdrawal.  

(5) November 9 simultaneous notes 10 a. m. to Foreign Office requesting exit visa entire staff, clearance for Navy ships to enter Albanian waters and use of cargo lighter for transferring freight from dock to cruiser outside port.  

2 p. m. Receive *note verbale* in which Foreign Office informs American Mission that its Mr. Fultz considered undesirable by Albanian authorities and Mission requested take measures his departure Albania briefest delay possible.  

2:30 p. m. Send *note verbale* stating Fultz will depart November 14 as already indicated in Mission’s prior note requesting exit visas for entire staff.

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73 Not printed.  
74 For the text of Hoxha’s reply, see telegram 551, November 7, from Tirana, p. 36.

Send second note verbale explaining sole reasons for original request and requesting reconsideration in light thereof.

P. M. Oral refusal exit permit for Marinschak; oral insistence that I will not depart without him.

(7) November 11 second note verbale in a. m. refusing reconsider ships clearance. Another Foreign Office note verbale transmitting passports with exit visas for all.

(8) November 12 at noon see Konomi (Foreign Office Secretary General) who agrees orally to grant my request for lighter and tug to transport personnel and effects from dock to destroyers at 3-mile limit. Express to him my fears re alien personnel; he replies they have nothing to fear providing they support Albania's "new democracy" but that if they have opposed or criticized government they will of course be imprisoned.

P.M. Send note verbale confirming oral request which I am assured will be approved in writing immediately. My staff waits until midnight to transmit approval to Navy through Caserta but reply not forthcoming.

Radio operator reports intensified Albanian jamming has reached point where contact with Caserta impossible, spends until 1 a. m. trying transmit message informing Caserta that no reply yet received from Foreign Office.

(9) November 13 in a. m. finally receive note verbale approving lighter request, etc., and stating Albanian pilot will show ships where to anchor 10 kms off shore.

Noon UNRRA Chief Floud finally constrained adopt firm stand re false charges against UNRRA officer Woodward and delivers ultimatum to Hoxha (my telegram 572, November 13, point 3).\(^7\)

P. M. Protest to Konomi by phone that Albanian station within five mile radius our transmitter jamming our radio channels so thoroughly we cannot relay to Navy Albania's instructions re ships; Konomi pretends not understand but then promises look into it. Jamming stops soon afterward.

\(^7\)Telegram 572 was an omnibus message reporting on the week's events in Albania. Point 3 of the telegram reported on the efforts of Peter Floud, Chief of the UNRRA Mission in Albania, to have the Albanian Government withdraw its demand for the expulsion from Albania of UNRRA employee Frank Woodward and to obtain an official Albanian Government statement exonerating UNRRA of any complicity in alleged sabotage at Lake Malliq. (124.75/11-1346) The crisis between the Albanian Government and UNRRA at the end of 1946 over the allegations made against UNRRA employees during the trial in November 1946 of alleged Albanian saboteurs is described in George Woodbridge, *UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), vol. II, pp. 175-177.
4 p. m. French Minister 26 finally gets word from Paris to assume custody United States premises; none of Department's instructions on this point could be complied with prior to this date and hour.

6 p. m. Epstein (UNRRA port officer at Durazzo) phones me Albanian authorities there have no word re our ships. Only person I can raise at Palace is Prifti Secretary General of Prime Ministry who knows nothing about matter but promises contact Konomi when I point out dangers inherent in situation where Foreign Office gives me assurances re ships (which I pass on to ships) but fails advise port officials Durazzo. Three minutes later Konomi phones me to state he will look into matter. Five minutes after this Konomi calls again to state instructions have now been given at Durazzo and asks what time I will leave Tirana because Chief of Protocol will represent Foreign Office and escort me to Durazzo. When I call Konomi back 10 minutes later to point out we have no passes to get by road blocks en route Durazzo he assures me Albanian Government will see that absolutely no difficulties or obstacles are put in my path in departing from Tirana via Durazzo.

(10) November 14 staff works through previous night in effort comply Department's administrative instructions, etc.; am in Durazzo when ships arrive off limit Albanian territorial waters, no pilot in evidence to assist ships find proper anchorage in narrow mine-swept channel so they anchor nearly 10 miles off Durazzo. UNRRA owned but Albanian operated tug approaches ships after they are anchored but no one aboard speaks English; tug therefore returns to port. Long-boat from USS Nola enters port to contact Epstein re cargo loading details then returns to destroyer.

Am in Tirana burn codes and confidential records; prepare inventory transfer documents for French to sign also receipts and accounts for cash as well as credits for gas, oil, etc., sold to French. Write notes to Foreign Office re French assumption custody our premises, re list of United States citizens and passport data left with French in case exit visas should be authorized for such persons, etc.; notes to other Legations informing departure Mission and French custody of premises; letters to post office re future mail and to newspapers re delivery unused subscriptions to French Legation.

P. M. Three minute flag lowering ceremony attended by French Minister, painful farewells native staff.

Drive to Durazzo in convoy of three Jeeps and Hudson carrying United States and Albanian flags. No stops at any of road blocks en route (as Konomi had predicted). Flat tire on Hudson 3 miles from Durazzo; half hour delay. One hour delay in Durazzo for passport

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and visa inspection attended by usual inquiries into family history each person.

While Security Police checking passports Protocol Chief Zoto (whose office had issued note requesting expulsion of Fultz and who had confirmed “official” condemnation of Fultz same day of note by pointedly refusing recognize me at formal Soviet Legation reception) to our amazement included Fultz personally in ceremonious greetings of Foreign Office on occasion Mission’s departure.

Another hour delay to drive Jeeps onto lighter on precarious beams in lieu of ramp. Epstein having informed me on arrival Durazzo that Albanians insisted all cargo and personnel go out on single trip of lighter and two tugs we were obliged to begin trip to Noa at 7 p. m. in storm which had sprung up after our arrival Durazzo. All personnel with few bags removed from Hudson on dock obliged to board one tug with assurance second tug towing lighter with all cargo and effects would follow first tug out to Noa. (Just before boarding tug at dock Zoto again extended to Fultz as well as myself ceremonial farewell and good wishes of Foreign Office, immediately after which I handed him letter to Hoxha re Fultz; see Caserta’s 810, November 16.)

Fifteen minutes out of port I inquired from tug captain why other tug with lighter not following; was informed to my amazement that tug and lighter would not come out until seas calmer. Too late to turn back and perhaps leave women on shore; I had to go on out anyway at least to request destroyers remain till morrow.

Two hour tug ride to ships 10 miles out completed in heavy seas which had even Albanian crew concerned over danger capsizing. Most of men, all women, violently sick (my wife in seventh month pregnancy).

Heavy seas where ships anchored rendered impossible making tug fast to Noa. I relayed Captain Whitehurst’s orders through megaphone to tug captain via Albanian sailor in Italian which he translated into Albanian. Ten foot waves frightened tug captain to point where he wanted return without transferring passengers. However we managed secure single hawser from ship to bow capstan of tug, each time Albanians tried to throw it off destroyer winch tightened up to foil such attempts. Then with tug bouncing like cork on destroyer’s beam we transferred staff to Noa. Each person stood on one foot deck of tug (secured by Marinschak and myself against being washed overboard), donned life jacket with safety rope attached and held by men on destroyer, waited for precise second when tug deck about level with destroyer deck and not more than 3 feet of water between hulls at

77 Not printed.
which point we threw person toward waiting hands of destroyer crew who grabbed outstretched arms and pulled person to safety. Each detail directed by Whitehurst without whose specific orders I refused allow anyone be lifted from tug. Unknown to me one woman was passed over to destroyer by anxious to depart Albanians toward stern of tug without benefit of life jacket, rope or Naval officers calm instructions; all staff rescued safely however.

(11) November 15. Ships waited 'till noon following day in fairly heavy seas with one mine sighted 200 yards off beam one ship and with anchors dragging in late forenoon. No signs of any craft from shore. In view peril of ships in such conditions no prospects improved weather in p. m. and need for ships return Naples soonest I reluctantly told Whitehurst at 12:20 he could weigh anchors since nothing on shore was worth risking men and ships any longer. We accordingly departed at once leaving everything, including hand luggage, at Durazzo and without any means advising Epstein our decision. Sent wire from Noa to Caserta asking UNRRA and French Embassy Rome contact their Missions Tirana to explain situation and arrange for things to be shipped out soonest by plane and UNRRA boats.

(12) November 16 arrived Naples 1400 hours.

Ironic sidelight: Epstein informed me at Durazzo that Albanian Government would charge nearly $1,000 for "loan" of UNRRA owned tug and lighter.

[HENDERSON]