UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE UNITED NATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY: THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY; REGULATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS; EFFORTS TOWARD AGREEMENTS PLACING ARMED FORCES AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL; SOVIET RESOLUTIONS REGARDING THE PRESENCE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED NATIONS MEMBERS ON NON-ENEMY TERRITORY

Policy Planning Staff Files

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

[Extract]

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 1, 1945.

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

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ATOMIC ENERGY

We recognize that the application of recent scientific discoveries to the methods and practice of war has placed at the disposal of mankind means of destruction hitherto unknown, against which there can be no adequate military defense, and in the employment of which no single nation can in fact have a monopoly.

We are aware that the only complete protection for the civilized world from the destructive use of scientific knowledge lies in the prevention of war. No system of safeguards that can be devised will of itself provide an effective guarantee against production of atomic weapons by a nation bent on aggression. Nor can we ignore the possi-

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1 Regarding United States policy with respect to atomic energy in 1945, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. ii, pp. 1 ff. For extensive information on the formulation and execution of United States policy with respect to the international control of atomic energy, see Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., The New World, 1939–1945: A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, vol. i (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962). Chapters 15 and 16 are of special interest in connection with the present compilation. For documentation on aspects of United States policy with respect to atomic energy other than international control, see pp. 1197 ff. For documentation on United States national security policy, see pp. 1110 ff. For documentation on the attitude of the Soviet Union with respect to atomic energy, see vol. vi, pp. 691–817 passim.

2 Lot 64D563, files of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, 1947–1953.

3 For other extracts from this memorandum and a description of it as a whole, see p. 1134.
bility of the development of other weapons, or of new methods of warfare, which may constitute as great a threat to civilization as the military use of atomic energy.

We believe that the fruits of scientific research should be made available to all nations, and that freedom of investigation and free interchange of ideas are essential to the progress of knowledge. In pursuance of this policy, the basic scientific information essential to the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes has already been made available to the world. It is our intention that all further information of this character that may become available from time to time shall be similarly treated. We trust that other nations will adopt the same policy, thereby creating an atmosphere of reciprocal confidence in which political agreement and cooperation will flourish.

The military exploitation of atomic energy depends, in large part, upon the same methods and processes as would be required for industrial uses. We are not convinced that the spreading of the specialized information regarding the practical application of atomic energy, before it is possible to devise effective, reciprocal, and enforceable safeguards acceptable to all nations, would contribute to a constructive solution of the problems of the atomic bomb. On the contrary we think it might have the opposite effect. We are, however, prepared to share, on a reciprocal basis with others of the United Nations, detailed information concerning the practical industrial application of atomic energy just as soon as effective enforceable safeguards against its use for destructive purposes can be devised.

In order to attain the most effective means of entirely eliminating the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes and promoting its widest use for industrial and humanitarian purposes, we are of the opinion that at the earliest practicable date a Commission should be set up under the United Nations Organization to prepare recommendations for submission to the Organization. The Commission should be instructed to proceed with the utmost dispatch and should be authorized to submit recommendations from time to time dealing with separate phases of its work. In particular the Commission should make specific proposals: (a) For extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends; (b) for control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes; (c) for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction; and (d) for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions.

Our declaration of willingness to exchange immediately the basic scientific information and our plans for the setting up of a Commis-
sion under United Nations sponsorship have been sent by the Secretary of State to members of the United Nations Organization.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND SECURITY

The United Nations. Faced with the terrible realities of the application of science to destruction, we realize more urgently than before the overwhelming need to maintain the rule of law among nations and to banish the scourge of war from the earth. This can only be brought about by giving wholehearted support to the United Nations Organization, and by consolidating and extending its authority, thus creating conditions of mutual trust in which all peoples will be free to devote themselves to the arts of peace. It is our firm resolve to work without reservation to achieve those ends.

Using the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals as a basis, the San Francisco Conference agreed upon the Charter of the United Nations and upon the Statute of the International Court of Justice which is annexed to the Charter. The Charter was presented to the Senate of the United States on July 2, 1945; the Senate, by an overwhelming vote, gave advice and consent to ratification on July 28. The President on August 8 signed the formal document by which he ratified the Charter. On that date the instrument of ratification was deposited in the archives of the Department of State and thereby the United States Government became the first to complete action necessary to bring the Charter into force. The Charter was proclaimed in force by the Secretary of State on October 24, 1945, after ratifications had been deposited by the required number of states. It thus became a part of the law of nations.

The objectives of the Charter are to maintain international peace—by force, if necessary; to settle international disputes by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law; to remove the economic and social causes of international conflict and unrest; to promote world-wide progress and better standards of living; and to achieve universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all men and women—without distinction as to race, language, or religion.

At the San Francisco Conference the United Nations agreed to establish a Preparatory Commission, consisting of one representative from each signatory to the Charter, for the purpose of making provisional arrangements for the first sessions of the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council; for the establishment of the Secretariat; and for the convening of the International Court of Justice. The functions

* For documentation on the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, pp. 713 ff. For documentation on the San Francisco Conference, see ibid., 1945, vol. i, pp. 1 ff.
and powers of the Preparatory Commission, when it is not in session, are exercised by an Executive Committee of fourteen members. The United States is represented on the Executive Committee.

The Executive Committee met in London from August 16 to October 27, 1945 and drew up a report covering the above-mentioned points. The report is now being considered by the United Nations Preparatory Commission, on which fifty-one nations are represented, which convened in London on November 24, 1945.  

The Preparatory Commission will not deal with the political and economic problems awaiting action by the United Nations. It will complete the preparatory planning that is required to enable the United Nations to organize itself in order to deal promptly with these problems. The Commission will review the recommendations of the Executive Committee, adopt its own report and then call into session the first Assembly of the United Nations. It is scheduled to complete its work in from three to four weeks. The Executive Committee has recommended that the Commission convene the first Assembly in London between January 2 and January 7, 1946, in order that the United Nations Organization may begin functioning with the least possible delay.

We believe that the Charter constitutes a solid structure upon which the United Nations can build a better world. With all our might we intend to back our obligations and commitments under the Charter. Our action thus far is indicative of our policy of wholehearted cooperation and leadership to make effective the new International Organization. By proposing that the United Nations Organization appoint a commission to consider the subject of atomic energy, we demonstrate our confidence in that Organization as an effective instrumentality for world cooperation and world peace.

Transitional Security Arrangements. The United Nations Organization will be unable to bring force to bear to maintain peace until the conclusion and ratification of special agreements between the Security Council and members of the Organization for the provision of armed forces, assistance, and facilities. The Security Council will determine when sufficient of these agreements have come into effect to enable it to act in enforcement matters. The Charter provides that, pending the coming into force of these agreements, the parties to the Moscow Four-Nation Declaration of October 30, 1943, and France shall, in accordance with the provisions of that Declaration, consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Or-

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* For documentation on the Executive Committee and the Preparatory Commission, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. 1, pp. 1463 ff.
* For text, see ibid., 1943, vol. 1, pp. 755–756.
organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

It is the policy of this Government in accordance with the Charter, that action in relation to enemy states shall be taken or authorized by the governments having responsibility for such action, until those governments give the United Nations Organization responsibility in this respect and the Organization accepts that responsibility.

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IO Files: 7 USGA/GEN/18

Position Paper Prepared in the Division of International Security Affairs

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 28, 1945.

1. TRAFFIC IN ARMS

THE PROBLEM

In view of the reported intention on the part of the British Delegation to urge consideration of controls for the international traffic in arms at the first part of the First Session of the General Assembly, what position should the United States be prepared to take?

DISCUSSION

Article 11 of the Charter permits the General Assembly to "consider . . . the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments." This authority is believed to be broad enough to include such subjects as limitation, reduction of armaments, and establishment of a level for armaments, as well as controls for governing the international traffic in arms. The provisional agenda for the first part of the First Session is composed of organizational matters with provision made for introduction of substantive matters of urgent importance. Although the urgency of the arms traffic question is debatable in the light of the array of organizational details that must be disposed of at the first part, it is unquestionably a problem of immediate importance to the maintenance of international peace and security. The existence of huge stockpiles of arms in various parts of the world combined with the lack of an international agreement concerning their diversion or even a declaration of principles relating

7 "IO Files" is the short title for the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State.
8 The USGA series consists of twenty-nine position papers prepared in various divisions of the Office of Special Political Affairs on subjects with which the General Assembly was expected to concern itself.
to their use may well increase in number and complexity the political and military problems confronting the United Nations Organization when it completes its organizational work and can undertake the study of such problems. As the traffic in arms is a phase of the regulation of armaments of immediate interest to all members of the United Nations Organization, as exporters or importers of arms, it would be especially appropriate for the General Assembly to deal with this matter. The proposed committee structure of the General Assembly provides that the Political and Security Committee shall include within its province the regulation of armaments, and this Committee, when organized, could undoubtedly proceed to consider proposals for the regulation of the arms traffic. However, a directive from the General Assembly to this Committee, as possibly contemplated by the British, might serve the purpose of accelerating international action in this field.

THE UNITED STATES POSITION

The United States Delegation should lend sympathetic support to a proposal at an appropriate time during the first part for the study of the problems of peace and security arising out of the international traffic in arms so that general proposals might be submitted to the General Assembly for the regulation of this traffic.

In the event that it may be necessary to state the current views of the United States with respect to the supervision of arms manufacture and traffic, the Delegation should adopt, pending the formulation of definitive proposals by this Government, a tentative position along the lines of the attached draft.

[Annex]

[WASHINGTON, December 22, 1945.]

I. With respect to the supervision of arms manufacture and traffic.

A. The registering of manufacturers, importers, and exporters; the licensing of each shipment of arms and munitions in or out of a country; and the publishing of statistics comprise the minimum of what is involved in international agreement in this field. These matters are relatively non-controversial and, in view of existing American legislation, the position of this Government is already determined.

B. Recommendation V adopted at Mexico City states that “It is highly desirable that governments exercise a complete control over the production and distribution of armaments, thus eliminating the profit motive in the traffic in arms.” This expresses a rather widely

* For the full text of the resolution, see Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, Mexico City, February 21–March 8, 1945, Department of State Publication 2497 (Washington, 1946), p. 69.
held view. However it carried implications for relations between government and business which would be difficult for this Government to enact into legislation. Thought should be given, therefore, to the character of internal controls which might be both practicable and effective in the American case.

C. The circumstances in which exports of arms and munitions should be prohibited involve both national and international policy. We shall insist on remaining free in the future as in the past to impose prohibitions by virtue of our own unilateral action (e.g., the Joint Resolutions of January 31, 1922, November 4, 1939, and July 2, 1940); and, also we shall be under treaty obligations in old and new forms, to impose prohibitions in certain circumstances (e.g., the Cuban treaty, the peace treaties, the charter of the international organization). However, this issue arises most immediately in connection with the negotiation of international agreements other than one concerning supervision of arms manufacture and traffic. The only concern is that the machinery of control be sufficiently adaptable to be of use in the various circumstances in which it may be necessary to employ it and is more directly dependent on domestic legislation than it is on an international agreement for supervising arms manufacture and traffic.

10 Files: USGA/GEN/3

Position Paper Prepared in the Division of International Security Affairs

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, December 28, 1945.]

4. SPECIAL AGREEMENTS TO PROVIDE FORCES

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Is the United States willing to give real power of enforcement to the Security Council? If so, what is its attitude concerning the special agreements to provide forces?

DISCUSSION

The policy of the United States is to support full-heartedly the United Nations. To doubt that is to doubt the good faith of the United States. Therefore, as Mr. Truman further spelled out the policy, "We must fulfill the military obligations which we are undertaking as a member of the United Nations Organization." (Navy Day Speech, October 27, 1945). 10

The priority which should be assigned to the agreements has always

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been recognized since, even prior to Dumbarton Oaks, the United States position has been that the Security Council, "as soon as it comes into existence, should initiate the formulation of plans for, and the negotiation of, such an agreement . . ." (ISO 55 of August 17, 1944). 12 SWNCC agreed that "An important problem immediately facing the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee will be the preparation and negotiation of agreements" (SWNCC 219 of November 8, 1945). 12 However, because of the far-reaching importance of the special agreements set forth in Article 43, the present feeling is that actual "negotiations regarding special agreements cannot be initiated until substantial preparations have been carried out." (Preco 115 of September 27, 1945). 11

An examination of the documents relating to the negotiation of the special agreements, under consideration in the Department since 1942, discloses that the Army and Navy have generally worked on the technical aspects of the agreements. For instance, the United States' present position against an international force results, in part, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff statement that "To maintain such a denationalized, integrated force as a military entity on an effective footing, would involve serious technical difficulty [difficulties]." (Admiral Leahy 13 to the Secretary, ISO [to the Secretary of State] 18 of March 28, 1944). 11 It is understood, however, that the problem is now under further consideration in the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

PROPOSED U.S. POSITION

(Answering ad seriatim the questions raised in Mr. Notter's 14 memorandum of November 29, 1945). 11

1. When and how should the Security Council initiate the negotiation on the special agreements?

There must be an early consideration of the negotiation of the special agreements since their conclusion is prerequisite to the effective functioning of the Security Council. A satisfactory procedure would be for the Security Council, upon the advice of the Military Staff Committee,

1. to decide what should be the total pool of forces,

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11 Not printed.
12 Not printed. Regarding the role of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee in the formulation of United States policy with respect to United Nations forces, see footnote 73, p. 734.
13 Fleet Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the United States Army and Navy; the President's Representative on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
14 Harley A. Notter, Adviser, Office of Special Political Affairs.
2. to initiate the negotiations between itself and the Permanent Members,
3. to draw up the remaining special agreements including therein, in so far as possible, only those forces which the Member states had already indicated a willingness to contribute. Some small states may contribute no forces, but only facilities, a port or an airfield.

A satisfactory form for the agreements would be for each Member or group of Members to sign an identical general agreement with the Security Council, followed by an individual, separate Annex providing for the specific forces or facilities or both. The terms of each Annex would be dependent upon the overall strategic situation and upon the military capacity of the signatory Member or groups of Members.

2. Should the United States specify that the initiation of agreements should be among the Permanent Members of the Security Council first and then among all other states, or groups of other states?

Yes, the United States should support this procedure. While no special proviso to this effect need be included in the special agreements, there should be an informal understanding among the Permanent Members of the Security Council.

3. Should the agreements be negotiated directly between the Security Council and Members or groups of Members, or first among groups of Members and then between the Council and the groups of Members?

The United States takes no strong position in this connection. However, it does feel that the agreement should be signed with groups of Members only when those Members themselves suggest such a procedure. Furthermore, it should be remembered that, when a group of Members sign an agreement, an Amendment to the terms of that agreement with one Member may, constitutionally, require the assent of the other signatory Members.

4. Should the United States approve or disapprove inauguration of negotiation by a specified date, say July, 1946?

The United States should not support any specific target date, but should stress speed.

5. Should we insist upon negotiating full agreements covering all categories of forces and implements of war or should we favor making a series of agreements, the first, for example, to concern Air Forces?

The United States should support the initial negotiation of the full agreements, but with provisions therein for amendment.

6. Should we approve or disapprove preparations for the regulation of armaments concurrent with the foregoing negotiations?

Preparations for the regulation of armaments may be made concurrently with, but not dependent upon, the foregoing negotiations.
Although we strongly believe that armaments should be regulated, we do not believe that armaments can be effectively regulated until the special agreements, at least those between the Security Council and the Permanent Members, have been concluded and the security system is under way that is envisaged in the United Nations Charter.

10 Files: USGA/1a/ACCom/29

United States Delegation Position Paper

SECRET


THE VOTING PROCEDURE OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

The Moscow Resolution 18 is silent on the ways in which the proposed atomic energy commission shall reach its decisions or take any action. Its powers are of course only advisory but there must be some established method of arriving at the reports and recommendations which it is required to make.

The "Suggested Manner of Reaching Decisions in the Commission" (Document No. 13 in the book for the Moscow discussions) 19 provided that on procedural matters decision should be reached by a majority, but that on substantive recommendations no formal vote should be taken; if unanimous approval could not be obtained for them, full reports of the various views should be forwarded to the General Assembly. It is not revealed in the Moscow Resolution whether this was acceptable to the U.S.S.R.

The question is now raised whether the placing of the commission under the Security Council instead of the General Assembly calls for any reconsideration of the suggested method of handling this problem, or whether it is acceptable as it stands.

Having the commission report directly to the Security Council rather than to the General Assembly means that the permanent members of the Council are assured of a veto over any final action taken on the reports and recommendations of the commission. Hence, so far as these powers are concerned, it would not seem to matter very much

18 The resolution under reference is that on atomic energy contained in the Communiqué of the Moscow Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers, December, 1945; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. II, p. 822. For additional documentation on that conference, see ibid., pp. 560 ff. On January 6, 1946, Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, transmitted the resolution to the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations on behalf of the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France, China, and Canada. The sponsoring nations requested that it be placed upon the agenda of the General Assembly. (United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, First Part, Plenary Meetings, p. 257. Hereafter cited as GA(1/1), Plenary.)

19 Not printed.
how the commission arrived at its decisions. In fact it would seem advisable to keep the manner of action as informal as possible in order to allow wide freedom to the commission in exploring all aspects of the problem of atomic warfare.

The only new question that arises is concerned with the provision for making public the reports and recommendations of the commission. Paragraph II (a) of the Resolution provides that the commission "shall submit its reports and recommendations to the Security Council, and such reports and recommendations shall be made public unless the Security Council in the interests of peace and security, otherwise directs." This is a more generous provision than it appears at first sight since it means that the Security Council cannot prevent the reports and recommendations of the commission from being made public unless at least seven members including all five of the permanent members concur in such action. If any one of the five permanent members should not concur, then the Security Council cannot direct the commission to refrain from making its reports and recommendations public. In other words, so long as any single one of the five permanent members is willing to have the findings of the commission made public, the others cannot prevent it.

This is a very favorable provision from the standpoint of the work of the commission. It makes it possible for the commission to arrive at conclusions and make them public even though several great powers are in opposition. It removes the possibility that consideration of any one question can be blocked by a single great power. The Commission would be free to explore the pros and cons of all proposals and to make its findings public so long as it had the support of at least one permanent member of the Council. If the U.S.S.R. is prepared to accept this arrangement, the U.S. should also be willing to do so.

This means, of course, that the United States must be prepared to have the commission make public findings which are not in accord with the position of the United States on particular questions. For example, the commission might disagree with the position that the United States was entitled to an especially favorable position by reason of its present monopoly of the bomb. But the commission could do no more than make its findings public and it would not be likely to do so if the United States were antagonized thereby.

Some question might be raised as to whether the procedure for making public the reports and recommendations of the commission might lead to the unwanted disclosure of secret information entrusted to the commission. Under the arrangement suggested in Document no. 13, all different viewpoints on each question dealt with by the commission would be reported on, and if a single one of the five permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council should be interested in having such reports made public, there would be no way of stopping it, even though it involved the disclosure of information bearing on the security of a member state. If this danger were a real one, it might deter nations from making information available to the commission and thus obstruct its work.

As a matter of fact, if a state is willing to disclose information to the commission, it would probably not object to having it made public to non-member states. Generally speaking, all the states which could make use of such information in any important way would be represented on the commission and would thus come into possession of it through their representatives. So far as the United States is concerned, any information which it would be willing to make available to the U.S.S.R. and other members of the commission would hardly be of a kind that it would want to keep from non-member states. Hence the danger of unwanted disclosure is really very slight.

On the whole, the procedure for making public the reports and recommendations of the commission as contained in the Moscow Resolution seems both liberal and forward-looking and should receive the whole-hearted support of the United States.

IO Files: USGA/1a/AECOfm/50

United States Delegation Position Paper

SECRET

TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE COMMISSION

The general purpose is to give the Commission the greatest possible freedom in investigating all aspects of the problem and in making such recommendations as it deems advisable. There are no limits on the subject matter of its inquiries, save as the Security Council may direct in matters affecting security. Aside from this the Commission itself determines its own program and decides what is relevant to the questions arising from the discovery of atomic energy.

There is an implied obligation on the part of all the United Nations to provide such information and give such other assistance as may be necessary to enable the Commission to carry on its work. The success of its efforts will depend in large measure on the degree of cooperation of the various member states in supplying such assistance.

The listing of the four subjects on which the Commission is to make

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20 This paper concerns itself with the resolution on Atomic Energy (Section VII) contained in the Communiqué of the Moscow Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers, December, 1945; for full text of the Communiqué, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. 11, p. 815; for Section VII, see ibid., p. 822.
specific proposals does not exclude others, nor does it require the Commission to take these subjects up first or in the order mentioned. It is for the Commission to decide the best method of handling each problem.

The first specific objective—that of “extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends”—is broad enough to include the normal interchange of scientists and scientific knowledge in all fields. The term “basic” is not intended to cover the mechanical or technical knowledge concerning the manufacture of the bomb. While this subject is not directly excluded from the scope of the Commission’s work, it must be assumed that the United States is not prepared to reveal such knowledge until adequate safeguards have been erected against its misuse. The general purpose underlying this first provision is to bring about a resumption of normal intercourse among scholars to the fullest extent possible without endangering the security of any state.

The second specific objective—the “control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes”—is concerned with the ways whereby the fullest possible advantage can be taken of the peacetime uses of atomic energy without at the same time increasing the likelihood of its use for destructive purposes. The problem here arises out of the relative ease with which plants and materials for peacetime use of atomic energy can be converted into war uses. The Commission is asked to make proposals as to how such conversion can be subjected to effective control. The general purpose is to retain the widest potential employment of atomic energy in peace while removing the threat of atomic warfare.

The third objective—the “elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction”—approaches the problem of international control through the method of limiting or eliminating the weapons themselves. The major questions here raised are whether elimination or limitation of existing weapons and plants would remove the threat of atomic warfare, and whether some stockpiles and plants must be kept in existence in order to provide adequate means of sanction against a state violating the terms of international control.

The fourth objective is to find “effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions”. Such safeguards are made necessary by the exceptional risks which any nation would take in refraining from building up to its full capacity to conduct atomic warfare. Because of this risk, any international limitation agreement would have to include adequate means of reassuring the states complying with
the agreement that they would not be at the mercy of any violator of it. Such safeguards might take the form of an inspection system designed to give adequate warning in advance of any steps toward violation, as well as of sanctions of sufficient force to deter any potential violator. Because of the possibilities of surreptitious evasions, the success of any system of safeguards would seem to depend to a large extent on the creation of conditions under which all states would have a strong interest in making the system work.

The paragraph proposing that the Commission should proceed by “separate stages” does not mean that the four objectives previously specified are to be treated as separate stages and each one taken up and completed before the next one is considered. This provision takes account of the fact that the setting up of the essential conditions for a workable system of control cannot be accomplished in one stroke, but must be undertaken gradually, as confidence develops. It recognizes that successful international action with respect to any phase of the problem is not necessarily a prerequisite for undertaking affirmative action with respect to other phases.

The final provision takes note of the fact that the subject of atomic energy necessarily extends into fields already assigned to other organs of the United Nations. Where this is so, the Commission is directed not to infringe upon the responsibilities of such organs but to make recommendations which can be considered by them in the performance of their tasks. In line with paragraph II(a) dealing with the relations of the Commission with the organs of the United Nations, such recommendations would be transmitted through the Security Council.

IO Files: USGA/1a/AECom/31

United States Delegation Position Paper

SECRET

[LONDON, January 1946.]

THE QUESTION OF “SEPARATE STAGES”

There has been considerable confusion about the meaning of the provision in the Moscow Resolution stipulating that the work of the commission shall proceed by “separate stages.” This provision comes immediately after the list of four subjects on which the commission was directed to make specific proposals, and it has been assumed by many people, including Senator Vandenberg,21 that the four subjects were the separate stages, “the successful completion of each of which will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next

21 Arthur H. Vandenberg, United States Senator from Michigan; Representative to the General Assembly.
stage is undertaken”. The result of this would be that the important subject of safeguards would not be reached until the other three, dealing with exchange of information, control of atomic energy, and elimination of atomic weapons and other means of mass destruction, has been acted upon. It was thus foreseen with some uneasiness by Senator Vandenberg that an exchange of information might be proposed before full security had been achieved for the United States through the establishment of an effective inspection system.

As a matter of fact, the term “separate stages” was not intended to correspond to the four subjects on which the commission was specifically directed to make proposals. This is clear from the text of the Agreed Declaration, from which the provisions of the Moscow Resolution were taken verbatim. In the Agreed Declaration the provision about separate stages is followed by another sentence to the effect that “specifically it is considered that the commission might well devote its attention first to the wide exchange of scientists and of scientific information, and as a second stage to the development of full knowledge concerning natural resources of raw materials.” This second stage obviously does not correspond with the second of the four subjects mentioned above. Hence it can be assumed that there was no intention to direct the commission to deal with these four subjects separately, completing one before the next was undertaken. The commission is left quite free to consider each subject in relation to the others, and in whatever order it sees fit. Senator Vandenberg was so assured by the Department of State.

There is another more serious issue bearing on the order of the work or the commission. Many people take the position that no step toward international control of atomic weapons should be taken until a system of safeguards satisfactory to the United States has been accepted by the rest of the world. This view holds that not even the normal exchange of general scientific information should be considered until an effective inspection system has been assured in all countries having any capacity to produce bombs. It suggests that the only kind of an international control system which the commission can consider is one which springs full-blown into existence all at once and does not grow by gradual stages.

This position is not supported by any statement of the United States, and would in fact interfere seriously with the commission’s work. It is based on the erroneous assumption that our present ad-

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22 The reference is to the Agreed Declaration by President Truman, Prime Minister Attlee of the United Kingdom, and Prime Minister King of Canada, signed at Washington, November 15, 1945; for text, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1504, or 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1479.
vantage in possessing bombs will continue indefinitely and that the problem of international control is merely that of inducing other states to accept our terms. As a matter of fact, our advantage is only a temporary one. Other states might well prefer to wait until they had developed their own capacity to make bombs in order to be assured of entering into any scheme of international control on a basis of equality with the United States.

The problem of finding effective safeguards is essentially one of creating conditions under which all states will have a strong interest in making a system of international control work. It has been pointed out in the Agreed Declaration and elsewhere that no system of safeguards can be certain to work against a nation bent on defeating it. The process of setting up the necessary conditions will very likely have to be done in stages, and it was this fact which was foreseen in the "separate stages" provision of the Agreed Declaration and the Moscow Resolution. It would be most unfortunate if the impression were given that this position had now been abandoned, and that the commission could not consider any system of international control that called for gradual steps of development. If that body should be restricted to the consideration of schemes which would provide all nations with full safeguards right from the start, it might well have been given an impossible task.

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501.BC/1-1146

The Department of State to the Soviet Embassy

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 11, 1946.33

The Acting Secretary of State notes that the United Nations Preparatory Commission in London has endorsed the recommendation of the Executive Committee whereby Item 8 on the provisional agenda of the first meetings of the Security Council will be "the adoption of a directive to the Military Staff Committee to meet at a given place and date", and that the Preparatory Commission has also approved the language of the directive itself. Based upon the present plan to hold the inaugural meeting of the General Assembly on January 10, 1946, it may be assumed that the Security Council will be constituted about January 15, and shortly thereafter the Military Staff Committee item on the agenda should be reached. It may therefore be expected that the Military Staff Committee will be duly established and should be holding its first meeting sometime between January 15 and January 20.

33 Drafted in the Division of International Security Affairs on January 3, 1946.
Anticipating that one of the first tasks of the Military Staff Committee will be the determination of its functions and initial organization, this Government has prepared a paper entitled *The Functions and Organization of the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations*, which sets forth the United States views on this subject, and which is presented by this Government in the expectation that it should prove a useful basis for discussion in the early, organizational days of the Committee. This paper, a copy of which is enclosed, is now being circulated through military channels to the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council.

This Government has expressed its complete agreement with the proposal of the British Government to hold informal conversations in London, some days prior to the establishment of the Military Staff Committee, among the five initial representations to the Committee. With this in mind, it is planned to have the United States military and naval representatives arrive in London in ample time to participate in the suggested talks.

In regard to the form which the permanent representation of the five member nations on the Military Staff Committee should take, it is the view of this Government that this matter can be decided subsequently. In so far as the United States representation is concerned, the Chiefs of Staff propose to appoint representatives from each of the services who will hold rank equivalent to the grade of General or Lieutenant General. The United States Chiefs of Staff feel that they are unable to attend in person the first meeting or meetings of the Military Staff Committee, principally due to the recent changes among the Chiefs of Staff in this country.

A similar memorandum has been addressed to the French and Chinese Governments.

501.BB/1-1148: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 11, 1946—7 p.m.  
351. Undel. 1. In personal letter British Embassy has transmitted to us communication from ForOf, which reports that Soviet Government has declined British invitation to take part in preliminary con-

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24 This paper was later submitted to the Military Staff Committee; see footnote 46, p. 734.
25 The British proposal was contained in a memorandum delivered to the Department of State on December 13, 1945. The United States informed the United Kingdom of its agreement in a memorandum of December 29. (501.BC/12-1945)
versations among Five Power representatives to MSC prior to Committee’s establishment. ForOf telegram follows:

“Molotov has just written to inform us that under United Nations Charter, Article 47, the MSC is a body whose activity is controlled by the Security Council. The Government of the USSR accordingly is of the opinion that it would be premature to take up now practical questions concerning the Committee’s activity, prior to the establishment of the Security Council within whose province matters of this type fall. It is the Soviet Government’s view that discussion of subjects referred to in Sir Archibald Clark Kerr’s letter 28 should be inaugurated after the Security Council has been set up at prospective General Assembly session and after the Council has arrived at a decision on item 8 of its agenda regarding the date and place of the first meeting of the Committee, not to mention additional subjects, which may come up in the SC when this question is before it.

It is the view of the Soviet Government, therefore, that both for reasons of procedure and substance the correct method would be to await the consideration of the question of the MSC’s establishment in the Security Council before drawing up regulations of the Committee.”

2. In addition, British Embassy has addressed to us an aide-mémoire dated January 9 27 in which hope is expressed that we will request from the Soviet Government through our Ambassador, Moscow, the identity of the Soviet representatives to the MSC, and that we will inquire whether the Soviet Government will agree to have these representatives arrive in the UK by January 20. As a result we have cabled our Ambassador, Moscow, as follows: 28

“1. Memorandum has just been transmitted to Soviet Embassy here, 29 informing latter that US representatives to the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations will hold rank equivalent to General or Lieutenant General, that Chiefs of Staff will not attend in person the initial meetings, and that, based on present time-table, it appears likely that the Military Staff Committee might be established in period between January 15 and January 20. 2. Please inform ForOf that chief members of permanent US representation to Military Staff Committee will be General George C. Kenney, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgeway, and Admiral R. C. [K.] Turner, all of whom are now in London. Also, request names and ranks of Soviet representatives to Military Staff Committee, and, if possible, ascertain if these representatives can arrive in London about January 20, in order that Military Staff Committee, an organ of importance under Charter which we would like to see

28 Clark Kerr was British Ambassador in the Soviet Union. The letter under reference was presumably identical with or similar to the British aide-mémoire presented to the Department of State on December 13, 1945; the latter is described in the United States note to the Soviet Embassy, supra, and footnote 25 thereto.

27 Not printed.

25 Telegram 66, January 12, to Moscow.

29 Supra.
established as soon as possible after the Security Council has come into being, may be set up without delay.”

ACHESON

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 15, 1946.

SWNCC 219/4

Subject: U.S. Position on Traffic in Arms Phase of the Regulation of Armaments.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the paper on U.S. position on the traffic in arms phase of the regulation of armaments (Appendix.), approved by the Department of State for the guidance of the United States Delegation at the forthcoming meeting of the United Nations Organization, and submit the following comments and recommendations:

It is believed that the discussion in the Appendix does not emphasize that Article 11 of the Charter provides that the General Assembly may only “consider . . . the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both” whereas Article 26 charges the Security Council with the responsibility of “formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee . . ., plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.” From the military point of view, it is highly desirable that the United States should clearly maintain the position that while principles may be discussed and recommended by the General Assembly, the actual formulation of specific plans and proposals is the function of the Security Council acting with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

In paragraph C of the Annex to Appendix it is proposed that the

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50 In telegram 128 of January 13, repeated to London as telegram 23, the Embassy in Moscow reported that a letter had been addressed to Molotov in accordance with the instructions contained in the present telegram. The Embassy in Moscow further reported, in telegram 167 of January 18, repeated to London as telegram 31, that Molotov had stated that the Soviet Government would send representatives of the General Staff of the Red Army to a conference on the establishment of the Military Staff Committee as soon as the Security Council adopted a resolution concerning the MSC. (501.BC/1-1346, 1-1846)

52 Lot 52M46, the Files of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee which are located in the National Archives under the administration of the Department of State.

53 Document USGA/GEN/1, December 28, 1945, p. 716.
United States "shall insist on remaining free in the future as in the past to impose prohibitions . . ." on the export of arms and munitions. In addition, it is highly desirable from a military point of view that the United States maintain freedom as to our rights to export arms and munitions to those nations with which we may reach agreement in this respect. It is recommended that such a statement be included, as this point is of particular importance to the United States in view of our current plans to provide arms and munitions to other nations of the Western Hemisphere, the Philippine Commonwealth and to China. It should, however, be provided to the Delegation as supplementary guidance with the understanding that it is not to be advanced in connection with a discussion on private traffic in arms unless the developments of such discussion clearly require.

It is desirable further, that the basic paper be amended to indicate clearly that the position defined therein is applicable to the limited question of private traffic in arms.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
A. J. McFarland
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Secretary

SWNCC Files
Memorandum by the Acting State Member of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (Hickerson) to the Committee

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 18, 1946.
SWNCC 219/5/D

U.S. POSITION ON TRAFFIC IN ARMS PHASE OF THE REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS

A memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated January 14, 1946 (SM 4717), which was circulated with a note by the Secretaries of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC 219/4),55 relates to a position paper, Traffic in Arms (USGA/Gen/1),56 prepared in this office for the United States Delegation to the United Nations meeting at London. Below are the comments of this Office together with the reasons which make it unable to approve in full the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

1. This Office concurs in the desirability of emphasizing in this paper the responsibility of the Security Council under Article 26 of

54 Prepared in the Division of International Security Affairs of the Office of Special Political Affairs.
55 Supra.
56 Ante, p. 716.
the Charter in contradistinction to the General Assembly's functions under Article 11 relating to the regulation of armaments. Accordingly, it is proposed to amend the position paper by adding to the second paragraph of the section, "The United States Position", a sentence as follows:

"However, in consideration of these subjects by the General Assembly, it should be borne in mind that the Assembly's jurisdiction is limited to 'principles' whereas it is the responsibility of the Security Council, with the advice and assistance of the Military Staff Committee, to formulate plans in this field (See Article 26)." 

2. This Office cannot concur in the recommendation that a statement be included in the effect that this country "maintain freedom as to our rights to export arms and munitions to those nations with which we may reach agreement in this respect," as it is felt that the addition of such a statement would not be necessary to protect such rights in the General Assembly, but might serve as an impediment to the drafting of the desired proposals.

3. Considering that the manufacture of arms and munitions in some states, notably the Soviet Union and Mexico, is a government monopoly, this Office cannot concur in the suggestion that the arms traffic discussions be limited to the private traffic in arms. The tentative position proposed in this paper indicates the advantage of establishing in the various governments a definite responsibility for supervising arms manufacturing activities, and controlling arms exports and imports, and that an approach to the various problems of international regulation could be achieved through uniform domestic legislation enacted by the various states.  

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SECRET

A draft statement of the United States position with regard to the resolution proposing the establishment of an Atomic Energy Commission was circulated to the meeting.  

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37 The international traffic in arms was not considered by the General Assembly at its first session. Efforts to formulate a unified United States policy on the subject fell into abeyance thereafter. Regarding the status of policy at mid-year, see document PCA D-5, June 7, p. 840.

38 The draft has not been found in Department of State files. For the text of the statement delivered by Senator Connally at the 2nd Meeting of the First Committee of the General Assembly, January 21, see United Nations, Official
After some discussion it was decided that a drafting committee consisting of Messrs. Cohen, Pasvolsky and McRae should revise the statement to a form suitable for introduction to Committee I and submit it to Senator Connally for his approval. The purpose of the revision would be (1) to eliminate those parts of the draft statement which seemed directed to the American public rather than to an international body; and (2) to give emphasis to the U.S. conception as to how the proposed Commission would operate. Senator Connally also stated that in his opinion the statement should be compressed.

Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out that one of the principal questions that would be raised in the deliberations of Committee I would be as to how the Commission could establish effective safeguards against atomic disclosures without knowing more about the details of the matters involved. It was agreed that this question could not be answered in an entirely satisfactory manner. Mr. McRae pointed out that certain safeguards could be agreed upon based on hypothetical cases and Mr. Cohen added that on the basis of the testimony of scientists the Commission could make recommendations as to the adequacy of proposed safeguards. He pointed out further that under the Charter the Commission has no coercive power to compel disclosures from any nations or from any witnesses.

Admiral Turner raised the question of the meaning of the phrase “other major weapons adapted to mass destruction” and pointed out that this made the work of the Commission assume the proportions of a disarmament conference. Mr. Cohen stated that the reason this phrase was inserted in the proposed resolution was to enable the Commission to produce well balanced recommendations as atomic weapons were only one part of a larger problem. If the Commission made recommendations concerning the control of the atomic bomb alone, such recommendations would be lop-sided if in fact there were other important weapons on which similar controls should be placed.


The First Committee recommended, without opposition, that the proposed resolution be adopted. At its 17th Meeting, January 24, the General Assembly unanimously approved the resolution. For text, see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, First Part, Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly during the First Part of the First Session, p. 9. Hereafter cited as GA (1/1), Resolutions.

29 Benjamin V. Cohen, Counselor, Department of State; Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly.
30 Leo Pasvolsky, Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly.
31 William A. McRae, Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly.
32 Tom Connally, United States Senator from Texas; Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Representative to the General Assembly.
Mr. Pasvolsky suggested that it would be advisable to have a preliminary meeting of the nations sponsoring the atomic resolution prior to its discussion in Committee 1. Senator Connally stated that he would take this matter up with Mr. Byrnes.

[Here follows a brief discussion of another subject.]

Mr. Johnson pointed out that the Secretariat in drawing up the business for Committee 1 had put consideration of the atomic resolution as the first order of business. Senator Connally stated that Mr. Byrnes was anxious to have the work on the atomic resolution given priority.

501.BB/1-1246: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

SECRET
WASHINGTON, January 19, 1946—8 p. m.

631. Delun 49, paragraph 7. Undel 92. We suggest decision not to propose specific date for convening of representatives of members of MSC be reconsidered. With UK having failed in efforts for discussions pre-MSC meeting; with Soviet linking the despatch of their representatives to adoption of a decision re MSC by SC (Moscow's 31, January 18); with France and China unlikely to take initiative, there remains only US to make a proposal. Would it be unrealistic to propose sometime within next 10 days, say, January 25 or 28? Unless we are willing to propose a specific date we lose the value thereof in spurring action on other matters as well as render open to doubt our earlier assertions of desire to see MSC meet and organize without delay.\footnote{Joseph E. Johnson, Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs; Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly.}

\footnote{Not printed.}
\footnote{See footnote 30, p. 730.}
\footnote{At its 2nd Meeting in London, January 25, the Security Council adopted without objection the draft directive which the Preparatory Commission had recommended that the Council issue to the Military Staff Committee; for text, see United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, First Year, First Series, Supplement No. 1, Annex 1, Section 3, p. 2. The date for the convening of the MSC was not specified in the directive. At the suggestion of the United States, the date was set at February 1. The MSC actually first met on February 4 at which time the United States representatives presented a proposal "Views on the Functions and Organization of the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations." That document had been approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee as Appendix A of document SWNC 219/3 on December 12, 1945. The United States draft served as the basis for discussion in the drafting of MSC rules of procedure; the rules adopted by the MSC on February 14 and under which the MSC was directed to operate provisionally by the Security Council on February 16 drew heavily upon the United States proposal.

The files of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of
Department of State Atomic Energy Files

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET AND PERSONAL

LONDON, 20 January, 1946.

DEAR JAMES: The Prime Minister has asked me to let you know that he proposes making an announcement in the House of Commons next Tuesday, January 22nd, about the establishment in this country of an organisation for the production of fissile material required in connexion with the development of our programme for the use of atomic energy.  

The final text of the announcement is not yet available, but I will send a copy round to you as soon as possible. General Groves will also be notified in advance in Washington of the terms of Mr. Attlee's statement.

I would be grateful if you would treat this information as personal until Mr. Attlee speaks on Tuesday.

Yours sincerely,

ERNEST BEVIN

Department of State Atomic Energy Files
The Secretary of State to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin)

SECRET AND PERSONAL

LONDON, January 21, 1946.

DEAR ERNEST: Referring to your letter of the 20th advising me that the Prime Minister expects to make an announcement in the House of Commons tomorrow, January 22 about the establishment in this country of an organization for the production of fissile material required in your program for the use of atomic energy:

I do not want to seem presumptuous but I wish that the Prime Minister could see his way clear to delay his announcement until the Assembly has passed the Resolution as to atomic energy which is sponsored by our governments. The subject is not well understood

State, contain a set of the records of the Military Staff Committee which include records of the proceedings of the Committee and its subcommittees and the documentation produced thereby.

"Lot 57D688, the consolidated lot file on atomic energy 1942-1962 located in the Department of State, including the records of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State on Atomic Energy and the records of the office of the United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.

"For documentation on negotiations between the United States and the United Kingdom with respect to the continuation of cooperation in the development of atomic energy, see pp. 1197-1259, passim.

"Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves, Commanding General, Manhattan Engineer District, the United States atomic energy development program.
and I fear that this announcement on the day that the Resolution is reported to the Assembly will provoke discussion.

It is expected that the Resolution will be considered in Committee today and should be acted upon by the Assembly this week. [File copy not signed]

811.002/1-2446

Minutes of the Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, Washington, January 24, 1946

TOP SECRET

[Here follows discussion of various subjects.]

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Mr. Royall asked what was the exact function of the recently appointed Atomic Energy Commission. Mr. Acheson said that before Secretary Byrnes left he had been talking to him about what the American member on the United Nations Atomic Commission would say when and if that Commission is set up, and he is asked by his colleagues what he can tell them. Mr. Byrnes talked to the President about this problem and then appointed the Commission composed of Mr. Acheson, Mr. McCloy, Dr. Bush, Dr. Conant and General Groves. The Commission has had two meetings and its function as stated in the announcement is to study the question of safeguards and control of atomic energy so that the American member on the Commission may be told what to say. The Commission was appointed to advise the Secretary of State and not Congress. The Commission decided to get some of the men who have been working with General Groves to assemble the facts. The men selected are Dr. Oppenheimer,

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68 In a letter to Mr. Byrnes on January 23, Mr. Bevin stated that Mr. Attlee had agreed to defer his statement (Department of State Atomic Energy Files).

69 The Secretaries of the State, War, and Navy Departments or their representatives met on an almost weekly basis in 1946. Mr. Acheson usually represented the Department of State due to the frequent absence from Washington of Secretary Byrnes. Records of these meetings exist in the Central Files of the Department of State under enclosure number 811.002/1-2446.

70 Kenneth C. Royall, the Under Secretary of War.

71 The body under reference was the Secretary of State’s Committee on Atomic Energy. This Committee, of which the Under Secretary of State was chairman, had been appointed on January 7 and had met on January 14 and 21; draft minutes of these meetings exist in the Atomic Energy Lot File, Department of State. For a detailed account of the work of the Committee, and its Board of Consultants, see Hewlett and Anderson, Chapter 15.

72 Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State.

73 John J. McCloy, former Assistant Secretary of War (1941-1945).

74 Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development.

75 James B. Conant, Chairman of the National Defense Research Committee, 1941-1946; President of Harvard University.

76 J. Robert Oppenheimer, Director of the Los Alamos Laboratories of Manhattan Engineer District, 1943-1945.
Mr. Thomas of the Monsanto Chemical Co., Mr. Barnard of the Bell Telephone Co. of New Jersey—electronics expert—Mr. Winne of the General Electric Co. and Mr. David Lilienthal of T.V.A. They are to meet with General Groves and in two weeks’ time give the background which the Commission must have in order to advise the American representative on the United Nations Commission. There are many questions the answers to which the Commission should know, such as: (1) Raw materials. Are they scattered and in large quantities over the face of the earth, or are they concentrated in a few areas and in small quantities? (2) Technical trends. Will the bomb be produced in small and decentralized plants or must there be a large plant? (3) Cost factors. Is it the poor man’s weapon or the rich man’s weapon? Mr. Royall said that he had been urging the War Department to take steps in the direction of compiling this information which he felt should have been done long ago. He spoke of the existing confusion in Congress and at the White House, etc., and said he was glad such a Commission has been set up. Mr. Forrestal agreed. Mr. Acheson said that after yesterday’s meeting of the Commission he had talked with Senator McMahon and told him that he will go over with him whatever conclusions are reached. He said that Senator McMahon had agreed not to call the people working with this Commission to testify.

Mr. Petersen asked how the Commission could be coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff who are responsible for instructions to our military staff people on the United Nations. Mr. Acheson said that for the time being the Commission will rely on General Groves to tell it if it is going in the wrong direction. When Mr. McCloy returns they will talk to General Eisenhower, Admiral Nimitz, and General Groves. He reiterated that the purpose of the Commission is to keep our delegates advised of possible pitfalls to be avoided. Mr. Royall inquired whether the State Department had been asked for its views

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59 Charles A. Thomas, Vice President, Monsanto Chemical Company.
60 Chester I. Barnard, President, New Jersey Bell Telephone Company.
61 Harry A. Winne, Vice President, General Electric Company.
62 David E. Lilienthal, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Tennessee Valley Authority.
63 The Lilienthal group constituted the Committee’s Board of Consultants which met frequently in January, February, and March. The Department of State Atomic Energy Files contain handwritten notes on the meetings of the Board of Consultants taken by Carroll Wilson of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, the Board’s secretary.
64 James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy.
65 Admiral Nimitz, United States Senator from Connecticut; Chairman of the Senate Committee on Atomic Energy.
66 General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Chief of Staff, United States Army.
67 Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, Chief of Naval Operations.
on legislation pending before Congress. Mr. Acheson said that the Secretary had received a letter just prior to his departure and had said that he would talk to the interested Senators on his return. Mr. Royall said that he was somewhat in doubt as to the present White House views on the legislation.

811.2423/2-146

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee

TOP SECRET  [WASHINGTON,] January 23, 1946.

SM–4810

GUIDANCE AS TO THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF A UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON ATOMIC ENERGY

REPORT BY THE JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE IN COLLABORATION WITH THE JOINT STAFF PLANNERS AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE COMMANDING GENERAL, MANHATTAN DISTRICT

THE PROBLEM

1. To develop conclusions as to the military implications of the creation of a United Nations Commission on Atomic Energy.

2. To provide guidance to the representatives of the United States Chiefs of Staff on the Military Committee of the United Nations as to the military advice to be given the United States representative on the Commission on Atomic Energy.

3. J.C.S. 1567/25 was considered by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee and the Joint Staff Planners in connection with this study.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION

4. See Appendix “A” (page 131).

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*In regard to Congressional legislation on atomic energy in 1946, see Hewlett and Anderson, Chapter 14.

*Reproduced in SWNCC 253, January 24, 1946.

*The Joint Strategic Survey Committee, a wartime inter-service body established on November 7, 1942, made recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on global and theatre policy. The JSSC continued to concern itself with national policy and world strategy in 1946. It frequently drafted JCS positions on matters pending before the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee; its members sat on SWNCC’s Ad Hoc Committee on United Nations Security Functions. With respect to SWNCC and its Ad Hoc Committee, see footnote 73, p. 754. The Joint Staff Planners was similarly an inter-service group created in 1942 which continued to advise the JCS on strategic matters. Manhattan District was the wartime code name for the atomic bomb development program commanded by Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves; the designation continued to be employed after the nature of the project became public knowledge.

*Not printed.
REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS

RECOMMENDATIONS

5. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that:

a. Rapid resolution by the Congress of the United States as to the governmental machinery for handling matters connected with atomic energy and the security thereof is desirable in the interest of sound action in the international field.

b. The production of atomic energy for industrial and scientific use by any nation will place that nation within a short step of the immediate capability of production of the atom bomb. Information essential to such use of atomic energy must be therefore regarded as in the same category as the "know how" of the atomic bomb itself.

c. No realistic system of inspection and control is as yet apparent which will ensure against the production of atomic bombs for military use in a nation which possesses such capability. However, in view of the certain alternative that failure of international regulation and control will result in an atomic armament race, every effort must continue to be made to develop and establish such a system.

d. Atomic weapons can be most effectively used against highly developed nations having centralized industries. The United States is such a nation. Consequently it is to the interest of the United States to assume active leadership in establishing international means to control atomic weapons. So long as the United States is the sole nation actually having atomic bombs and is furthest advanced in the field of atomic energy, it holds a preeminent position for the exercise of such leadership. This preeminence will wane with the passage of time. Therefore, all possible action should be taken under United States leadership before other nations develop their own atomic weapons.

e. The United States is committed to the establishment of a Commission on Atomic Energy under the United Nations in accordance with and for the purposes defined in the declaration on atomic energy of 15 November 1945, issued by President Truman and Prime Ministers Attlee and King and in the communiqué of 27 December 1945 from Moscow following the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom.

f. The work of the Commission is of vital interest to the United States from the standpoint of its national security.

6. It is not possible to state categorically in specific and comprehensive terms the military implications of the creation of a United Nations Commission on Atomic Energy, and the consequent opening of this matter to consideration and action by that Commission. While it is not possible to furnish a firm and complete list of objectives to be sought by the U.S. representative, it is apparent that any revelation of atomic information now held alone by the United States accelerates the rate at which other nations reach equality in respect to atomic weapons. The degree of agreed safeguards must thus be the criterion of the amount of information disclosed.

7. Much reliance will have to be placed on step by step analysis of
problems as they arise in committee. The representatives of the United States Chiefs of Staff on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations should be given a position advisory to the United States Representative on the Commission. Furthermore, there should be available, both as an assistant to the United States Member on the Commission and as one of the United States Military Staff Committee organization, an individual cognizant of matters of atomic energy and with a broad military background.

8. As a statement of implicit limitations on the functions of the Committee, the Representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Military Staff Committee should be guided by the following principles:

   a. It is essential that any action contemplated in the Commission be not prejudicial to the security of the United States.
   b. Progress should not be hurried. Painstaking examination and thorough coordination of each step within the United States Government are required.
   c. A satisfactory solution from the United States' point of view of the problem of effective controls and safeguards must be arrived at before any disclosure or exchange of specialized technological information is agreed.
   d. Normal reciprocal peacetime interchange of basic scientific information and the restricted interchange of scientists and students is acceptable only under the limitations imposed in paragraph 17 of Appendix "A" and in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above.
   e. Exchange of information on raw materials should not be undertaken at the present.

9. A copy of this paper be transmitted to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee for consideration in formulating the State Department's instructions to the United States Delegation to the United Nations Organization.

10. This paper be transmitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to their representatives on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations for their interim information with the caution that it is a highly classified document and should be discussed only with United States personnel authorized to deal with matters concerning atomic energy.

Appendix "A"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION

1. On 15 August 1945, the President issued the following memorandum . . . to the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development:
"Appropriate departments of the Government and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are hereby directed to take such steps as are necessary to prevent the release of any information in regard to the development, design or production of the atomic bomb; or in regard to its employment in military or naval warfare, except with the specific approval of the President in each instance."

2. On 30 August 1945, the President modified his memorandum of 15 August 1945, . . . to permit:

"a. Identification of individuals and organizations now or formerly associated with the project together with disclosure of the general nature of their project activities, subject to rules already laid down by the War Department. These rules prohibit the release of any information of value to any foreign government which that government could not easily obtain without recourse to espionage.

"b. Release by the War Department of information of general interest which in the opinion of the Department will not jeopardize national security."

3. The question as to how matters related to atomic energy will be controlled within the United States has not yet been settled. There are several bills before Congress now under consideration by the Special Committee on Atomic Energy of the U.S. Senate. It appears probable that a commission on the Cabinet level will be established to oversee all matters related to atomic energy and that the legislation establishing this commission will impose definite security regulations and some measure of Congressional control upon the commission.

4. On 15 November 1945, the President of the United States and the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and Canada jointly issued a declaration on atomic energy which suggested the establishment of a Commission on Atomic Energy under the United Nations. The full text of this declaration is attached as Appendix "B" (page 144). 70

5. On 27 December 1945, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United Kingdom jointly issued a communiqué outlining the agreements reached by them at their meeting in Moscow. In Section VII of this communiqué, the Foreign Ministers agreed to recommend to the General Assembly of the United Nations at its first session, that a commission be established to consider problems arising from the discovery of atomic energy and related matters. The full text of Section VII of the communiqué is attached as Appendix "C" (page 148). 71

6. The above mentioned declaration and communiqué established

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70 For text, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1504, or 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1479.
71 For the full text of the Communiqué, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. II, p. 815; for Section VII, see ibid., p. 822.
as major missions of the proposed commission the preparation of recommendations for control of atomic energy to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes; for the elimination of atomic weapons and all other major weapons of mass destruction; and the provision of adequate safeguards against use of atomic weapons. Atomic weapons as presently known consist primarily of the atomic bomb. Radioactive by-products of the manufacture of atomic bombs also have a potential military use. “Other weapons of mass destruction” such as gas and biological warfare are not discussed herein since it is considered that their elimination is a somewhat separate problem.

7. The precise military characteristics and effects of atomic weapons have not as yet been fully developed, but the following general points may be assumed as factual:

a. The explosive effect of the present atomic bomb is roughly equal to that of 20,000 tons of TNT. As the development of the new weapon progresses, it is reasonable to expect that its effectiveness will increase.

b. The explosion of the bomb is accompanied by heat of solar proportions and the creation of radio-active material which, if the bomb explodes on or very near the surface of the ground or water, impregnates a limited area of that surface to such an extent that lethal effects may for sometime result to humans moving through the area affected.

c. The bomb is presently best transported by aircraft but could in anticipation of its future use be transported piecemeal to the target in secret, assembled on the spot, and exploded by remote control. In the future, it might be delivered by rockets and guided missiles, launched alone or from subsidiary airborne, surface or sub-surface carriers.

d. There are no defensive measures now envisaged which will guarantee protection of vital points from atomic weapon attack.

e. The elements presently utilizable for manufacture of the bomb are uranium and possibly thorium. All major powers have access in some degree to the necessary raw materials, but control of areas of rich deposits and assured communications thereto will assume increasing strategic importance.

f. Radio-active materials can be produced as a by-product to either production of atomic bombs or power in an atomic energy plant. Consideration has been given to the utilization of such radio-active materials to force the evacuation of vital points or to deny sizeable areas of terrain to any enemy armed force. Present indications are that such use would not be of extreme military importance because of difficulties attendant to their proper utilization and to the fact that they probably are no more effective than existing known gases under many conditions. Moreover, such utilization of radio-active materials probably would be considered to be in the same category as gas warfare and therefore barred by existing agreements.

8. The “secret” of the atomic bomb is not so much a scientific secret as it is one of scientific, industrial and engineering “know how” and
particularly "top notch" American management and the ability to produce in quantity the intricate instruments, equipment and machinery required.

9. The manufacture of fissionable elements for use in atomic explosives is a gigantic undertaking. Any great power, starting from scratch with presently available information and determined to produce atomic explosives, can be expected to do so within five to seven years, if it received assistance in the procurement and use of specialized equipment and machinery from nations best able to produce them, and within fifteen to twenty years without such outside assistance.

10. Atomic weapons increase the incentive to aggression by enhancing the advantage of surprise. They can most easily be used in such fashion by authoritarian or totalitarian nations. They would be most effective against highly developed nations where industries are centralized, the national mode of life would not easily accept the cost and disruption of decentralization, and where complete military preparedness is difficult to maintain. The United States falls in this latter category of nations, and, consequently, it is highly to its advantage to take the lead in establishing means to control atomic weapons. To this end, it is most desirable that the proposed commission on a Cabinet level, mentioned in paragraph 3 on page 131, be established at an early date so that international negotiations may be adequately directed.

11. Enemy states in possession of atomic weapons can deliver destructive force thousands of times more effective than previously possible. A nation attacked with such weapons must be highly courageous and disciplined to withstand the mass killings that would result, and still be able to continue to fight. Its most effective use would be against cities and industrial concentrations, and a relatively few bombs successfully delivered could kill millions of people and destroy a large percentage of the total critical industrial capacity. The implications of atomic warfare, so long as no effective international safeguards exist, emphasize the necessity for the United States to maintain:

a. Forward bases from which aircraft could intercept attacks against the United States and in counter-attacks could deliver bombs against possible enemies.

b. Balanced armed forces, including highly perfected air forces, in a state of readiness, capable of: holding these bases; maintaining sea and air communications to them; retaining control of the land, air and sea spaces around the United States; providing instantaneous defense against air attack or sea forays against the United States; delivering offensive action by a striking force to the limit feasible.

c. Additional forces capable of very rapid mobilization to provide full defensive organization against atomic weapon attack and to provide further augmentation to offensive or holding forces in the field.
d. Adequate plans for complete mobilization of the country, including the civilian population, in order to carry on production in the face of great destruction, to prevent sabotage and secret delivery of atomic weapons, and to avoid hysteria and panic.

12. Future peacetime uses of atomic energy are considered possible, but the threat of military use will overshadow them until a system of effective world-wide control of military use is established. Highly important in this connection is the fact that materials used in atomic-energy plants as presently envisaged could rapidly and comparatively easily be converted into bombs. Furthermore, atomic-energy plants could produce fissionable materials as a by-product of producing controlled energy. Any system of inspection for the purpose of controlling war-like use of atomic energy will be greatly complicated should industrial use be authorized and in practice. Therefore, international disclosure of technological information even for peaceful use should be withheld until effective inspections, controls and safeguards against military use are established.

13. Effective international control to guarantee that atomic weapons could not be used by an aggressor nation is virtually impossible under the present concept of a world divided into nations maintaining their full sovereignty. No system of inspection can be expected to be one hundred percent effective in such a world, and ninety-nine percent effectiveness is no guarantee. The best possible system of inspection is a necessary adjunct to any effort at control but effective sanctions, should inspection uncover violations, are equally vital. Since such sanctions probably cannot be applied by the United Nations, at present, because of the veto provision, immediate consultation and agreement of nations other than the offending state will be necessary. Obviously the United Nations system will then have broken down as such. The final solution, as yet apparently unattainable, is the creation of a world state in which all nations surrender sufficient of their sovereignty to assure the rule of law and the prevention, if not of war itself, of illicit means of waging war.

14. The prospective negotiation of atomic energy matters by representatives of the United States must be done with the nicest balance between the requirements for international cooperation on the one hand and an enlightened understanding of the demands of national interest and national security on the other. In this regard, the probable intent of Congress to hold close control over atomic energy matters must be kept in mind. The United States is in fact the sole power which holds the necessary scientific knowledge and has existing manufacturing plants which permit the production of atomic weapons. The United States thus holds a position of pre-eminence in the field and by virtue of this position and the part played in developing the
weapon has a great responsibility to the world to maintain enlightened leadership in formulating the international controls and safeguards required.

15. The declaration by President Truman and Prime Ministers Attlee and King, issued on 15 November 1945 (Appendix "B") states that they are of the opinion that a commission under the United Nations should be established to prepare recommendations on how to attain the most effective means for entirely eliminating the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes and promoting its widest use for industrial and humanitarian purposes. The commission should, according to the declaration, make specific recommendations:

"(a) For extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends.

(b) For control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to insure its use only for peaceful purposes.

(c) For the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.

(d) For effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions."

The declaration goes on to say that the work of the commission should proceed by separate stages, the successful completion of each one of which will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken. Work by separate stages is interpreted to mean that affirmative action along any fruitful lines is permissible so long as effective safeguards are in force before information contributing to the production of atomic weapons is revealed.

16. The communiqué from Moscow (Appendix "C") repeats almost verbatim the above missions for the commission and, in addition, clarifies its composition and competence and proposes to place it, for matters affecting international peace, under the Security Council of the United Nations. Neither in the declaration nor in the communiqué is it clearly stated in which order the separate stages shall be considered, except perhaps by implication.

17. The matter of the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends as a possible first step, has raised considerable controversy, particularly if it is envisaged to mean completely free exchange visits of scientists. As stated above, the "secret" of the atomic bomb is less a matter of restricting the dissemination of knowledge related to nuclear physics than it is in retaining information as to the application of this knowledge to the mass production of essential ingredients and their assembly in the bomb. Pure science is international in times of peace and complete control of atomic research is virtually impossible. The interchange of scientific information and advances in scien-
tific thought existed before World War II through the medium of technical journals and through conventions of scientists and their normal travel and study. Any restriction on such an interchange would meet great resistance and might slow down appreciably advance in peaceful fields. However, the interests of national and world security are jeopardized when scientists holding either the theoretical or the practical knowledge of production are given authority to exchange this knowledge with others who may, through lack of effective controls and safeguards, be free to apply the knowledge gained towards selfish individual or national aims not in consonance with the world effort to abolish all use of atomic weapons. In paragraphs 5 and 6 of Appendix "B" this problem is discussed and the answer there suggested appears sound, i.e., that detailed information concerning the practical application of atomic energy can be shared only so soon as effective, enforceable safeguards against its use for destructive purposes can be devised. Therefore, no interchange of information other than basic theory and no interchange of numbers of scientists holding detailed information regarding production and application of fissionable materials should be permitted until definite progress has been made in the field of safeguards and controls.

18. As for the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to insure its use only for peaceful purposes, this is inevitably only a phase of the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and the provision of adequate safeguards to protect complying states from the hazards of violation. As stated above, the materials used for the peaceful industrial applications of atomic energy are precisely those which are used in atomic weapons, and the problem of their production is more difficult than their final adaptation to form the bomb. Once produced, they can be relatively rapidly, easily, and secretly diverted from peaceful use and made into atomic weapons. Even the most extensive and effective inspectional machinery might find it impossible to detect on all occasions such a diversion, particularly if it were done bit by bit over an extended period of time. The surest guarantee against such action could only come from the basic conviction by all individuals and all nations concerned that atomic energy should not be used in weapons. This conviction must be recognized as impossible of attainment, certainly, at any rate, under the present world order.

19. Inspection can be relatively effective only if the inspecting teams are fully cognizant of the processes for manufacturing and applying atomic energy to warlike use. No great power is likely to trust the reports of inspectors of other nationalities. Furthermore, to admit inspectors of alien allegiance into U.S. industrial installations, let
alone into U.S. plants producing fissionable materials, would be to violate all present day concepts of patent rights and the rights to secret commercial processes. To apply the concept of completely free inspection in all other nations of the world would be equally revolutionary and equally unlikely to be accepted. Therefore, to establish an even partially effective inspection system will be an unprecedented and most difficult task. One variation of the inspectional scheme envisages dependence on national inspection forces, each inspecting within its own country and being inspected in turn by an international inspection force. This is comparable to the present international system of controlling narcotic drugs and has, in that field, been relatively successful. However, it is a well-known fact that quantities of narcotic drugs are still sold in all parts of the world to those willing to pay the price demanded. Therefore, in view of the potentialities of the atomic energy, it is believed that such a system of control would be entirely unacceptable.

20. The provision of rapid and effective counter-action, including war, against any nation using or taking steps to use atomic weapons might be easier to attain. Under this concept the violation of the atomic agreement by any nations would be considered by all others as a prima facie act of war and all possible effective action against the aggressor would be enforced. The application of such measures would, it is true, be an admission of failure and would most probably mean the plunging of the world into atomic warfare. Nevertheless, such a system seems vital. The danger of any one nation electing to use atomic weapons should be measurably lessened if it were realized that all others capable of using atomic weapons or any other means of force would effectively apply these means against the aggressor. This is an extension of the present basis for the enforcement of world peace as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, with one notable difference, i.e., no offending nation, whether it be one of the five permanent members of the Security Council or not, would be free from the threat of the use of force by all others. The whole concept of effective action against a great power intent on violating its agreement is a highly theoretical and controversial matter which can only be resolved, nationally and internationally, after much discussion and negotiation.

21. The United States already has available atomic weapons in some quantity, has used them, and is making more of them. Consequently, it would be logically difficult to forbid other powers from developing and making ready atomic weapons unless the United States ceases production and destroys all its bombs or unless all other nations agreed to make the United States the trustee of the weapons;
agreed further that no others should manufacture them and that if any attempted to do so, it would be proper that U.S. atomic bombs, in conjunction with the forces of the balance of the United Nations, should be used to destroy the unauthorized manufacturing plants. The United States should not destroy its bombs, and as to the second alternative, it seems unlikely that other major powers, as for instance the USSR, would agree. However, appointment of the United States as a trustee of the bomb might profitably be explored, since, if universally accepted, it would provide an interim means for enforcing the safe development of atomic energy.

22. Whether or not such an interim step be feasible or even desirable, the important situation to plan upon is the ultimate one where some or all nations are using atomic energy for peaceful purposes. This implies that they have then readily available the basic materials for conversion to atomic weapons. Under this hypothesis and by that time the necessity for agreement on effective action to be taken against a violator is apparent, and the United States should take the lead in establishing provision for such action. It is not to be envisaged that the United States would ever use the atomic bomb except against an aggressor state. Therefore, the national interest of the United States would coincide with that of other non-offender nations and the threat of the use of the atomic bomb would be a great deterrent to any aggressor which might be considering embarking on an atomic war. A pool of atomic weapons under the Security Council, with provisions prohibiting the existence of any other atomic weapons, has been proposed. Were it not for the veto power this procedure might be of value, but, with the failure of the Security Council to operate, no legal means of using this pool against a major aggressor appears available. Again, the location and trusteeship of the pool present difficulties. The Council has no inviolate territory of its own; agreement as to custodianship of all weapons by any one nation seems impracticable to achieve. Division of them among several, or many, nations will be simply furnishing those trustee nations with ready-made surprise weapons. The realistic working out of a scheme whereby such a pool could be established is therefore exceedingly difficult since the location of the pool, the means of using the pool, and its protection against capture by an unscrupulous power are matters hard to resolve.

23. A system of inspection should not be considered as a completely reliable solution to the problems raised by the development of atomic energy. Correlative with the establishment of such a system, the United States should support, realistically and vigorously, development of education throughout the world, to push towards the establishment of the regime of world law and order wherein lies the only hope for a
more permanent removal of the dangers inherent in atomic weapons.

24. The great complexity of the problems discussed above leads to
the conclusion that progress can be expected to be slow. The United
Nations in the first days of the existence of their organization will be
hard put to solve the problems involved. Close integration of action
proposed by the United States representatives on the Atomic Com-
mission with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State-War-
Navy Coordinating Committee, appropriate Congressional leaders,
and finally with the President, is essential.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer 72

[WASHINGTON, February 2, 1946.]

In these notes I shall write down some of the non-technical things
that have seemed to me relevant to the establishment of effective
international control of atomic energy, and make, in rather broad
terms, proposals on the basis of which a sound solution can in my
opinion be sought. I shall write these notes against the background of
our discussions in the past days, and with the thought in mind that
the technical basis of many of the judgments will be provided in a
separate report.

1. It is probable that the main desire of our Government is the
achievement of safety and protection against the threat of atomic
warfare. Even if it were possible to achieve this without considering
such positive features as the extension of knowledge and its application
to constructive purposes, it might be argued that such a course should
not be followed. It is my belief that quite apart from its desirability,
the provision for constructive development of the field of atomic energy
will turn out to be essential for the operation of any system of safe-
guards. You have seen in the last days evidence of the enthusiasm,
inventiveness, and intelligence that has gone into the development of
the field in this country, and that has manifested itself even in such
relatively peripheral matters as the exploration of raw material re-
sources. I believe that just these elements must be brought to bear on
the problem of control if there is to be any chance for a real solution.
In particular, it has become clear to us that not only politically, but
scientifically and technically as well, the field of atomic energy has

72 This document was a component part of a workbook of papers prepared by
members of the Board of Consultants. The Board first considered this workbook
on February 12 and subsequently prepared its preliminary report to the Acheson
Committee by means of combining several of the workbook papers, including the
present document, into an integrated argument.
witnessed very rapid change and very rapid progress. I believe that
this will be the case in the future, too, and that no organization and
no proposal can be effective which does not have a flexibility adequate
to these changes. I further believe that any proposed organization
must itself reflect the changing character of the problem and the con-
structive purposes which are a complement to control. It is clear that
quite apart from any organizational details, the objectives here out-
lined will require a genuine cooperation and not a mere acquiescence
on the part of the participating powers and agencies. As I understand
it, the primary function of the United Nations Atomic Energy Com-
misson must be to lay the basis for such cooperative approach to the
problem.

2. The position of the three powers, the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Canada, that have in the past collaborated in the de-
velopment of atomic energy, is a rather special one, and that of the United
States perhaps the most special of all. There are two parts to this: our
technical advantage put us in a position to exercise disproportionate
influence in shaping the proposals made, and our greater scientific and
technical mastery of the problem should give us greater insight into
the implications of a proposed solution and the character of the steps
necessary to achieve it.

It has from the first, seemed important to balance our technical
superiority insofar as possible by allowing the proposals to be formu-
lated as a result of multilateral discussion, rather than through accep-
tance of a plan elaborated unilaterally by us. It would seem to be
inevitable that differences of opinion similar to those which appeared
in the Panel, but far more profound, would be expressed in approach-
ing the organizational problems of control. Here again it would seem
to me neither desirable, nor in any long term practical, to avoid a dis-
cussion of these issues in an attempt at their constructive reconcilia-
tion. Just this possibility is in fact my ground for believing that the
negotiations we are now discussing may provide a prototype for more
difficult future problems.

I have a somewhat different view of the situation arising from our
sole possession of the technical and scientific insight necessary to sound
judgments. This problem is in part technical, since many of the facts
at our disposal, but not now generally known, are indeed relevant to
questions of feasibility, adequacy, and safety. It is also in part a
psychological problem in that insight depends not only on having facts
available, but on having a sense of assurance that the relevant facts
have not been withheld. I believe that it is premature to discuss the
precise extent to which basic scientific information should be made
available to the Atomic Energy Commission. It is clear, on the one
hand, that such information neither must, nor with propriety should, include detailed engineering specifications for plants and for weapons; on the other hand, our experience would indicate that the Smyth Report as it stands is probably far from sufficient. We shall be in a better position to judge this on our next meeting.

3. In order to evaluate the proposals that I should like to make, it may be well to consider extreme examples, which have been suggested from time to time, of proposals that I regard as unworkable. Almost everyone has, at some stage or another in his acquaintance with this problem, considered prohibiting further work on atomic energy, and devising a system of inspection adequate to insure that this prohibition is carried out. It is not only that this proposal would make impossible the application of existing knowledge to constructive ends; it would be so contrary to the human pattern of exploration and exploitation that no agreement entered into by heads of state could command the interest or the cooperation of the people of the world.

An apparently less radical solution would be the separation of the functions of development and of control according to which the only responsibility of an international authority would be the inspection of work carried out under a purely national or private initiative, and the possible prohibition of some of this work. The negative approach to the problem of control would leave the inspecting agency with inadequate insight, both into the technical state of the subject, and into its motivation and the organic characteristics of its growth. It would provide inspectors who are less informed and less enlightened than those whose evasions they were trying to prevent; it would provide inspectors with a motive pathetically inadequate to the immense and dreary task which such inspection would involve, and who would no doubt be in a poor position to apply to their work the technical ingenuity and inventiveness which alone can make it an undertaking of finite dimensions and some prospect of success. One sees these difficulties most clearly if the problem is considered as it may appear in the almost immediate future. On the one hand, I believe that no one would be willing to wait for the institution of a system of controls until such time as many nations had a flourishing atomic energy industry, and no doubt a flourishing atomic armaments program; on the other hand, it is probably true that at the present time there is pitifully little to inspect in any countries but the United States, the

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United Kingdom, and Canada. It is unclear what primary deposits would be exploited in the future, what plans would be made for the production of fissionable materials, and what laboratories and scientists will in the end be chosen to carry out this work. It is just this circumstance which would make the task of inspection so unenlightened and so vast as to be prohibitive. It is also clear that this approach to the problem would sacrifice almost wholly whatever advantages there are in the fact that atomic energy developments are nowhere else in the world as established and flourishing activity, representing a vested interest and a living organization.

4. Against this background of the difficulties of control as an isolated and negative function, I have thought it essential at least to consider combining the functions of development and of control in a single agency. It is fairly certain that there are now, and will increasingly be, activities having to do with atomic energy which are not vital to control and which, for human, or organizational, or political, reasons should not be included among the functions of the controlling authority; but there are certainly several such functions which, as matters now appear, should be so included among them: the development of raw materials, the exploration of atomic weapons, and the application, in its more dangerous forms, of atomic energy to power and technology.

a. I thus propose that the international authority have a monopoly on the study, development, and exploitation of uranium: That this could be an interesting activity some of our discussions of last week clearly showed, and apart from considerations of security a coordinated attack on a worldwide scale is the more appropriate way of exploiting the raw materials. An agency which was well informed about the location of deposits and the most highly developed means of working them, and their relation to each other, would be in a strong position to detect and discourage illegal enterprises of a more private nature. It would also be in a position to provide the basic accounting and material control for an ingredient which is at present, and probably will remain for a long time to come, uniquely necessary. Technical arguments suggest that the same machinery should be applied to the exploitation of thorium.

b. A second activity of the international authority, which is doubtless far less urgent, but for which provision must ultimately be made, is research and study of atomic explosives. You will remember from our discussion that this is a field in which we are by no means confident of the facts; it is, of course, possible that such atomic explosives may be useful to the peacetime economy of the world, but quite apart from this it is only by their exploration that any agency can have a reasonable chance of insuring that developments beyond its control are not of great danger to the world.

c. It would be an essential function of the international authority to develop atomic energy for industrial purposes and as a source of
power, and to carry out the technical advances necessary to make these developments practical, and to extend their range. In conducting this program, it is clear that economic, technological, and even sociological considerations will be as important as purely scientific ones, and it is further clear that the solution of the resulting conflicts will involve compromise and good will which only an agency with authority and adequate technical competence can bring to the problem.

d. As we pointed out, there are a number of potential applications of atomic energy which can be made relatively safe, either by denaturing procedures, or because plants are involved which destroy, rather than create, atomic explosives; or because the scale of the operations is small enough to be immaterial for atomic weapons. There may be strong arguments (and there probably are) for conducting these developments under a license system, with nations or with more private organizations, but the line between safe and dangerous activities should not remain fixed where we would draw it today, so that I should be reluctant to make a final apriori definition at this time.

e. It would seem to me desirable and, in fact, essential, that the international authority cooperate with scientists, engineers, industrialists, and others who are not members of their organization but who have an interest in, or a contribution to make toward, the work of the authority. This openness would contribute in an important way to making the authority subject to enlightened criticism and to making its findings available for more private exploitation wherever this could be done effectively and safely.

5. There are a number of questions which probably should be discussed in connection with the above proposals, although I do not feel qualified to discuss them. In particular, the organizational structure of the international authority, whether it be a commission or a corporation (or take another form), will have to be settled in the light of conflicting views as to the best methods of providing initiative, responsibility, and integrity. The machinery set up for providing a reasonable, forward-looking allocation of atomic power and atomic products, the machinery required for financing undertakings, many of which in the earlier times may not be economically profitable, and the contributions that might be expected in the form of labor, technical competence, and raw materials, all would need a fairly prompt discussion. Other questions on which there will be differences of opinion are the appropriate scale of development and the priorities that should attach to various phases of the work. In all of these matters one will have to draw both on the technical ingenuity of those familiar with the field of atomic energy, and on all useful precedents of effective organization.

6. There are a few questions which it seems to me not very profitable to discuss at present. One has to do with the complex of problems that would arise should there be abrogation of agreements by a nation or a group of nations, or activities in serious violation of these agree-
ments. Such discussions will inevitably bring one to the problem of sanctions, which seems to me essentially separable from the questions we have been asked to consider. Related to these questions is the provision of an adequate physical security for installations operated by the international authority but susceptible to diversion for military use, and the question of whether any useful purpose can be achieved by stockpiling atomic weapons to facilitate the application of sanctions. It is inevitable that all these questions will be asked; in my opinion their discussion cannot contribute in a constructive way to the solution of our primary problem.

501.BB/1-2546 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

CONFIDENTIAL URGENT WASHINGTON, February 14, 1946—6 p. m.

1526. Undel 212. 1. State-War-Navy Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Security Functions of the UN ¹³ has considered JCS paper (1567/28) on armed forces to be made available to SC and has recommended SWNCC approval subject to minor amendments, including a new text of a proposed standard agreement. SWNCC will consider this at an early date.¹⁴ It is understood US members MSC already have JCS 1567/28.

¹³ The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) was the principal interdepartmental body concerned with the coordination of foreign and military policies in 1946. For a description of the organization and functions of SWNCC, see footnote 3, p. 1112. SWNCC made provision for planning with respect to United Nations political-military matters in 1945 by establishing the Ad Hoc Committee to Effect Collaboration Between the State, War, and Navy Departments on Security Functions of the United Nations Organization (subsequently known as the Ad Hoc Committee on Security Functions of the United Nations). Such a body had been suggested by Joseph E. Johnson, Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs, in a memorandum to John D. Hickerson, the Department of State Member and Acting Chairman of SWNCC, on July 20, 1945. The Ad Hoc Committee, which became the principal formal machinery for formulating and recommending unified United States policy on UN security matters, first met on August 18, 1945, and subsequently concerned itself with matters before the United Nations Preparatory Commission and the Executive Committee at London. The Department of State was represented on the Ad Hoc Committee by personnel from the Office of Special Political Affairs; Alger Hiss, Director of SPA was the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee in 1946. The Military Establishment was represented by members of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; regarding the functions of that body, see footnote 68, p. 738.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff took into account recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee and its parent body in instructing their deputies, the United States Representatives on the Military Staff Committee, regarding UN forces and other matters. (SWNCC Files)

¹⁴ The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee approved the recommendation of the JCS paper on February 27 as SWNCC 219/8; with respect to that document, see USMS/12/Rev. 1 (the text of the principles later extracted from it) and Blaisdell's memorandum of April 1, pp. 759 and 769, respectively.
2. Subcommittee also considered relation between discussion of
armed forces in MSC and discussion of same subject in SC, with spe-
cific reference to Item 10 of SC agenda 75 (reported deferred in Delun
148).76 State Dept members presented political desirability of having
MSC consider question of armed forces in pursuance to directive from
SC. Service members pointed out that SC would need advice of MSC
in preparing such directive and that informal discussion on military
level may have already occurred.

3. Dept does not know what were intentions of SC in deferring Item
10 (Delun 148). Possibly SC intended to return to Item 10 after arrival
of remaining members of MSC and after organization of latter com-
mittee had been completed. If this is the case, it is of interest that the
Ad Hoc Subcommittee agreed that a satisfactory procedure would be
for the SC, in returning to Item 10 to request the MSC to prepare
recommendations as to the best means of arriving at the conclusion
of the special agreements referred to in Article 48 of the Charter. At
the same time, it was recognized that you and the US members of the
MSC might wish to work this out by consultation in the light of the
existing situation.77

BYRNE

SPA Files 78

Memorandum by Mr. Howard O. Johnson of the Division of Inter-
national Security Affairs to the Director of the Office of Special
Political Affairs (Hiss)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] February 25, 1946.

Subject: Consideration of the Regulation of Armaments by the
SWNCC Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Security Functions of the
United Nations

In December 1945 the Joint Strategic Survey Committee prepared
a paper for the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the regula-
tion of armaments,76 a paper designed to serve as guidance for the
U.S. members of the Military Staff Committee. JCS considered the
paper unsatisfactory and referred it back to JSSC for further study

75 Item 10 on the Security Council agenda read as follows: "Item 10. Discussion of the Best Means of Arriving at the Conclusion of the Special Agreements Referred to in Article 48 of the Charter."
76 Not printed.
77 At its 23rd Meeting, February 16, the Security Council decided that the Military Staff Committee need not meet again at London. For the text of the resolution adopted at the same meeting concerning the future work of the MSC, see Blaisdell's memorandum of April 1, p. 769.
in the light of additional factors suggested by JCS. JCS also forwarded the attached memorandum to SWNCC, suggesting that the SWNCC Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Security Functions of the United Nations undertake a preliminary study of the matter.

On December 28, 1945 SWNCC referred this memorandum to the Ad Hoc Subcommittee for necessary action. No action has been taken as yet in the Subcommittee. It has not been pushed by the State Department since it was considered desirable that the Department have its own position somewhat clarified before entering discussions with the service departments; it was understood informally that War Department staff officers also believed that some initial guidance from the State Department would be essential.

IS expects to complete next week a paper which might be used as a basis for discussion; it will not set forth a definitive position on the regulation of armaments. We believe that there would be substantial advantage in bringing together a State-War-Navy working group as early as practicable for further work on the subject.

It is recommended that you, as chairman of the Subcommittee now charged with action on the development of the U.S. position on the regulation of armaments, raise informally with the other members of the Subcommittee the desirability of setting up a working group to draft papers on the subject for consideration of the Subcommittee. It would be desirable to have at least two members from each Department on the working group. IS considers it essential that IS be represented on the working group, and suggests that it would be desirable to have EUR represented if possible.

[Annex]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, 21 December 1945.

SM-4531

Subject: U.S. Guidance as to Disarmament and the Regulation of Armaments.

It is the understanding of the United States Chiefs of Staff that the subject of the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament, may be raised for discussion in early meetings of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee of the

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80 Presumably an antecedent draft of SWNCC/MS UNO Doc. 28, June 5, prepared in the Division of International Security Affairs; for partial text of that document, see p. 533.

81 Circulated as SWNCC 240/D, December 28, 1945.
United Nations. The United States Chiefs of Staff will wish to furnish adequate guidance on this subject to their representatives on the Military Staff Committee and to insure that such guidance is carefully coordinated with the views expressed by the United States representative in the Security Council.

For the present, the United States Chiefs of Staff propose to instruct their representatives not to discuss the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament, in the Military Staff Committee until the Security Council calls upon the Committee for advice and assistance with respect thereto.

In order that U.S. views might be ready when needed, it would appear to be most desirable for a preliminary study of the problems involved in the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament, to be undertaken as early as practicable. It would appear that this a proper function for the State-War-Navy Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Military and Security Functions of the United Nations Organization, on which the armed forces are represented by the members of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
A. J. MCFARLAND
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Secretary

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Mr. Bernard M. Baruch 59 to the Secretary of State


My Dear Jim: I have just been able to get the atomic energy resolution 59 which I read over very carefully.

Section 5, paragraphs B, C, and D are the crux. Any proposal will have to be based upon a better observance of promises. In the present circumstances that would be worth very little judging by your notes to Russia.

There is no reason why Section A should not be undertaken, although this immediately raises the question of patents in connection with all scientific processes, particularly those of peace, which are being indus-

59 Civic leader and investment banker; chairman of the War Industries Board during World War I; government consultant during World War II. In late February, Byrnes had asked Mr. Baruch to be United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.

59 The resolution on atomic energy adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, London, January 24, 1946; for text, see GA (1/1), Resolutions, p. 9.
trialized and which help to raise the standard of living of everyone. In war one can seize those patents, but in peace they must be protected.

When it comes to the others, I do not see how we can proceed at present. If Russia will not permit entry of news men or others, can we believe they will permit any inspection? That would immediately stop the discussion regarding atomic energy.

Unless we get a better working UNO which is the only hope of the world, we will be unable to discuss the elimination of the atomic bomb from armaments because we will be the only ones who will have them.

I must confess that paragraph B is a puzzler to me. Indeed, I feel I should like to have you expatriate a little more on the terms of reference of the commission. I understand it had to be more or less indefinite but I would like to know more about what exactly lies in your mind.

Another thing, I can only work between the hours of 10 and 12 in the morning and from 2:30 to 4:30 in the afternoon. I cannot go to any night sessions.

I feel very strongly we ought to work everything through the UNO and try to uphold that, but I do not see any point in our discussing any of the questions this will bring up unless a better understanding—a two-way street—is had with other countries, particularly Russia and that all contracts and promises should be lived up to. There is no good making new ones unless we live up to the old ones.

I understand also that this will not stop me from expressing my views on any other questions. It will stop me from making any statement regarding atomic energy which will be the work of the commission. Anything I will have to say will have to be said to the commission. I then become a part of the machinery as long as I remain a member of it.

This is a very important matter and I do not want to say No, but I should like to have an alternate or assistant—a man like Eberstadt,§§ Hancock,§§ Searls§§ or Swope,§§ besides the scientific advisers.

In view of all this, if you still want me to serve I will accept.

Sincerely yours, [File copy not signed]

§§ Ferdinand Eberstadt, banker, served on the War Production Board during World War II.
§§ John M. Hancock, investment banker, served with the War Resources Board during World War II.
§§ Fred Searls, Jr., mining corporation executive, served with the Office of War Mobilization during World War II.
§§ Herbert Bayard Swope, former editor of the New York World and head of the New York State Racing Commission; served with the War Industries Board during World War I.
Memorandum by the United States Representatives on the Military Staff Committee

SECRET


1. The Security Council of the United Nations shall establish a pool of armed forces which shall be maintained by the respective contributing member nations at operational strength and in readiness for combat in order that units may be drawn upon promptly under conditions recognized by the Security Council as requiring the use of forces under the United Nations Charter.

2. The pool shall include land, sea and air force units so organized and distributed geographically as to enable the United Nations to bring military pressure to bear in any part of the world in so far as practicable. In particular, national air force contingents would be held immediately available to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures as stated in Article 45 of the United Nations Charter.

3. Armed forces contributed by member nations shall habitually be based within the respective borders or territorial waters of each contributing nation, or its possessions, or within areas occupied by them under international agreements except at such times as such forces are acting under the direction of the Security Council. (Submit to J.C.S.)

4. The permanent members of the Security Council shall provide the major portion of the security forces initially with the contributions of smaller nations being integrated into the pool of forces as they become available.

5. The permanent members of the Security Council shall agree to contribute forces of comparable over-all strength but which may differ widely as to the strength of separate components, land, sea or air. Other member nations will be given an opportunity to offer contributions in the form of armed forces and/or installations, services, transportation, rights of passage or items of common military supply. The Military Staff Committee will be prepared to confer with military repre-
sentatives of nations not permanently represented on the Security Council as to what appropriate contributions might include.

6. Forces, or any part thereof, contributed by member nations shall come under the control of the Security Council at the time and place designated by the Security Council.

7. United Nations forces, when operating under direction of the Security Council, shall serve under the over-all commander designated by the Security Council. The over-all commander shall act under the strategic direction of the Military Staff Committee. Except when required for use by the Security Council, armed forces listed as available to the United Nations shall remain under the exclusive command of the respective contributing nations.

8. The Security Council and any member or group of members of the United Nations shall have the right to reopen negotiations for an increase or decrease of the contribution of that member or group.

9. Each member nation shall be responsible for the supply and maintenance, including replacement personnel, of the forces it contributes to the United Nations forces. Each member nation shall also provide transportation for its forces acting under the Security Council to the extent of its capabilities.

10. In case of inability of any member nation to provide the required transportation to move its contingent of the United Nations forces operating under the Security Council, the transportation shall be obtained from other member nations as part of such other nations' agreed contribution to the support of the enforcement powers of the Security Council, or it shall be found and chartered by the Security Council.

11. In general, agreements between the Security Council and member nations shall include general guarantees providing for rights of passage and for the furnishing of services and facilities required by forces acting under the Security Council, within the limits of each nation's capacity, rather than including a detailed determination of them. Such services and facilities shall be provided at the request of the Security Council, and the expenses thereof shall be borne as the appropriate authorities may determine.

12. No member nation shall be urged to increase its military strength or create a particular component thereof for the purpose of providing a contingent to the United Nations forces.

13. The United Nations forces should be established with the least practicable delay.

14. Separate agreements shall be prepared for negotiation between the Security Council and each member nation. If practicable, these agreements shall be on a standard form.
The Secretary of State’s Committee on Atomic Energy to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, March 17, 1946.

Dear Mr. Secretary: Your committee was appointed on January 7, 1946, with the following terms of reference:

"Anticipating favorable action by the United Nations Organization on the proposal for the establishment of a commission to consider the problems arising as to the control of atomic energy and other weapons of possible mass destruction, the Secretary of State has appointed a Committee of five members to study the subject of controls and safeguards necessary to protect this Government so that the persons hereafter selected to represent the United States on the Commission can have the benefit of the study."

At our first meeting on January 14, the Committee concluded that the consideration of controls and safeguards would be inseparable from a plan of which they were a part and that the Commission would look to the American representative to put forward a plan. At that meeting we also agreed that it was first essential to have a report prepared analyzing and appraising all the relevant facts and formulating proposals. In order that the work should be useful, it was necessary to designate men of recognized attainments and varied background, who would be prepared to devote the major part of their time to the matter.

On January 23, 1946, we appointed as a Board of Consultants for this purpose:

Mr. David E. Lilienthal, Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, who acted as Chairman of the consulting Board,

Mr. Chester I. Barnard, President of the New Jersey Bell Telephone Company,

Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, of the California Institute of Technology and the University of California,

Dr. Charles Allen Thomas, Vice President and Technical Director, Monsanto Chemical Company, and

Mr. Harry A. Winne, Vice-President in Charge of Engineering Policy, General Electric Company.

The Board of Consultants has spent virtually its entire time, since the date of appointment, in an intensive study of the problems, and has now completed its report, which is transmitted herewith.\footnote{A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy, March 16, 1946, Department of State Publication 2498 (Washington, 1946). The report, formally released on March 28, is often referred to as “The Acheson-Lilienthal Report.”}

A preliminary draft of this report was first presented to your Committee ten days ago. Extensive discussion between the Committee and
the Board led to the development of further considerations embodied in a subsequent draft. Still further discussion resulted in the report now transmitted.\footnote{The Secretary of State's Committee on Atomic Energy and its Board of Consultants held joint meetings at Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, D.C., on March 7 and 8, and March 16 and 17. Handwritten notes of those sessions by Carroll Wilson, and Miss Anne Wilson's shorthand stenographic notes, exist in the Atomic Energy Lot File, Department of State. For an account of the meetings, see Hewlett and Anderson, pp. 540–553.}

We lay the report before you as the Board has submitted it to us "not as a final plan, but as a place to begin, a foundation on which to build." In our opinion it furnishes the most constructive analysis of the question of international control we have seen and a definitely hopeful approach to a solution of the entire problem. We recommend it for your consideration as representing the framework within which the best prospects for both security and development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes may be found.

In particular, we are impressed by the great advantages of an international agency with affirmative powers and functions coupled with powers of inspection and supervision in contrast to any agency with merely police-like powers attempting to cope with national agencies otherwise restrained only by a commitment to "outlaw" the use of atomic energy for war. In our judgment the latter type of organization offers little hope of achieving the security and safeguards we are seeking.

We are impressed also by the aspect of the plan which concentrates in the hands of the international agency only the activities which it is essential to control because they are dangerous to international security, leaving as much freedom as possible to national and private research and other activity.

We wish to stress two matters brought out in the Board's report—matters of importance in considering the report's proposals as they affect the security of the United States both during the period of any international discussion of them and during the period required to put the plan into full effect.

The first matter concerns the disclosure of information not now generally known. The report points out that the plan necessitates the disclosure of information but permits of the disclosure of such information by progressive stages. In our opinion various stages may upon further study be suggested. It is enough to point out now that there could be at least four general points in this progression. Certain information, generally described as that required for an understanding of the workability of proposals, would have to be made available at the time of the discussions of the proposals in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, of the report of the Commission in the Security
Council and General Assembly of the United Nations and in the national legislatures which would be called upon to act upon any recommendations of the United Nations. We have carefully considered the content of this information, and in our discussions with the Board have defined it within satisfactory limits. We estimate the degree of its importance and the effect of its disclosure to be as follows: If made known to a nation otherwise equipped by industrial development, scientific resources and possessing the necessary raw materials to develop atomic armament within five years, such disclosure might shorten that period by as much as a year. Whether any nation—we are excluding Great Britain and Canada—could achieve such an intensive program is a matter of serious doubt. If the program were spread over a considerably longer period, the disclosure referred to would not shorten the effort appreciably.

The next stage of disclosure might occur when the proposed international organization was actually established by the action of the various governments upon the report of the United Nations. At this time the organization would require most of the remaining scientific knowledge but would not require the so-called technical know-how or the knowledge of the construction of the bomb.

By the time the organization was ready to assume its functions in the field of industrial production it would, of course, require the technological information and know-how necessary to carry out its task. The information regarding the construction of the bomb would not be essential to the plan until the last stage when the organization was prepared to assume responsibility for research in the field of explosives as an adjunct to its regulatory and operational duties.

The second matter relates to the assumption or transfer of authority over physical things. Here also the plan permits of progress by stages beginning in the field of raw material production, progressing to that of industrial production, and going on to the control of explosives.

The development of detailed proposals for such scheduling will require further study and much technical competence and staff. It will be guided, of course, by basic decisions of high policy. One of these decisions will be for what period of time the United States will continue the manufacture of bombs. The plan does not require that the United States shall discontinue such manufacture either upon the proposal of the plan or upon the inauguration of the international agency. At some stage in the development of the plan this is required. But neither the plan nor our transmittal of it should be construed as meaning that this should or should not be done at the outset or at any specific time. That decision, whenever made, will involve considerations of the highest policy affecting our security, and must be made by our
government under its constitutional processes and in the light of all the facts of the world situation.

Your Committee, Mr. Secretary, awaits your further instructions as to whether you believe it has performed the task you assigned to it and may now be discharged or whether you wish it to go further in this field under your guidance.

Respectfully submitted,

DEAN ACHESON  
Chairman  
VANNEVAR BUSH  
JAMES B. CONANT  
LESLIE R. GROVES  
Major General, USA  
JOHN J. MCCLOY

Memorandum Prepared in the Division of International Security Affairs 92

[WASHINGTON,] March 19, 1946.

Preliminary Views of the U.S. Security Council Group 93 (Political) on the Next Steps in the Preparation and Negotiation of the Agreements Referred to in Article 43

1. On February 16, 1946, the Security Council directed the Military Staff Committee substantially as follows: (a) to meet at the temporary headquarters simultaneously with the Security Council, and (b) as its first task, to examine from the military point of view the provisions in

92 The present document accompanied a memorandum of March 20 from Dean Rusk of the Division of International Security Affairs to Alger Hiss, Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs.

The Division of International Security Affairs (IS) of the Office of Special Political Affairs was the area within the Department of State directly concerned with the subject of United Nations security matters. Primary responsibility for the formulation of Department of State positions on this subject in the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and its Ad Hoc Committee on Security Functions of the United Nations, and for drafting instructions for the United States Delegation at the United Nations on the matter rested with IS.

93 The United States Security Council Group consisted of Department of State and military officials concerned with the question of placing armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council. Department of State representation included political officers from IS, SPA, and other areas. Military membership included the United States Representatives on the Military Staff Committee. The Security Council Group met in London and Washington prior to the establishment of the United States Permanent Delegation office at the United Nations in New York on March 19. It does not appear that the body as such met thereafter. However, the office of the United States Representative on the Security Council (the Permanent Delegation) maintained close contact with the United States Representatives on the Military Staff Committee and provided them with guidance on the political aspects of their work.
Article 43 of the Charter and submit the results of the study and any recommendations to the Security Council in due course. The Military Staff Committee now plans to meet in New York on March 25.

2. It is understood informally that the U.S. Representatives on the Military Staff Committee plan to propose to the Committee at its first meeting that, in order to proceed to comply with the above directive, the Military Staff Committee deal with problems arising in connection with the special agreements of Article 43 in the following four phases:

(a) Formulation of general principles applicable to the special agreements;
(b) Estimation of the total pool of forces which the Security Council might require;
(c) Contributions which the permanent members of the Security Council might make by way of armed forces, assistance and facilities; and
(d) Similar contributions which other Members of the United Nations might make.

3. It is also understood that the U.S. Representatives will, if the above phasing is acceptable to the Military Staff Committee, recommend that a sub-committee be appointed immediately to consider general principles. The U.S. member of this sub-committee would then introduce a paper setting forth broad principles which he will propose be adopted. This paper has already been prepared and consists of broad principles extracted from SWNCC 219/8.

4. At an informal meeting of the staff of the U.S. Representative on the Security Council, held on March 15, it was concluded that the next steps toward preparing and negotiating the agreements referred to in Article 43 should be:

(a) The U.S. Representatives on the Military Staff Committee should propose to the Committee that it proceed along the lines indicated in par. 2, above.
(b) If the Military Staff Committee agrees and appoints a sub-committee to consider general principles, the U.S. member of the subcommittee should introduce U.S. views to the general principles involved, basing such views on SWNCC 219/8.
(c) As soon as the Military Staff Committee has arrived at a formulation of general principles, these should be forwarded to the Security Council for approval, prior to the consideration by the Military Staff Committee of the application of these principles to the quota forces.
(d) If the above procedure is halted by disagreement in the Military Staff Committee, the U.S. Security Council Group (political and military) should meet at once to determine the next step.
(e) Close liaison between the political and military members of the U.S. Council Group will be required at all times.
Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 22, 1946.

VIEWS OF THE U.S. SECURITY COUNCIL GROUP (POLITICAL) ON THE PREPARATION AND NEGOTIATION OF THE SPECIAL AGREEMENTS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 43

The U.S. Security Council Group agreed that it would be desirable for the U.S. Representatives on the Military Staff Committee to introduce the following memorandum at the next meeting of the Military Staff Committee: 94

PROCEDURE FOR COMPLYING WITH SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE OF 16 FEBRUARY 1946 REGARDING THE PREPARATION OF MILITARY AGREEMENTS

Memorandum From the U.S. Delegation on the Military Staff Committee

1. At its meeting of 16 February 1946, the Security Council decided that the next meetings of the Military Staff Committee should be devoted to the study of Article 43 of the United Nations Charter.

2. As a method of accomplishing this task, the United States Delegation proposes the following procedure be carried out in the sequence given:

   a. Formulate recommendations to the Security Council as to the basic principles which should govern the organization of the United Nations forces. (A subcommittee should be appointed at once to study this question and submit its recommendations to the Military Staff Committee as a whole).

   b. Formulate recommendations to the Security Council as to the contribution of forces to be made by each of the five permanent members of the Security Council.

   c. Formulate recommendations to the Security Council as to the contribution of forces which should be made by each member nation which is not a permanent member of the Security Council.

It was also agreed that it would be desirable for the Military Staff Committee to forward its recommendations as to general principles (under a, above) to the Security Council for approval before using such principles as a basis for examining the contributions of forces to be made by Members of the United Nations.

94 The Military Staff Committee convened in New York on March 25, at which time the United States Representatives submitted as document MS/20 the proposal printed here. It was agreed to establish a subcommittee on basic principles. (IO Files)
Mr. Bernard M. Baruch to President Truman

WASHINGTON, March 26, 1946.

My Dear Mr. President: I was, of course, very much gratified that you should have expressed such great confidence in me as to appoint me the United States representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. I do not underestimate either the honor or the responsibility but, as I have become more familiar with the situation, there are certain elements of it which are causing me concern, and which I, therefore, want to discuss with you. As I understand my duties and authority, they consist presently solely of the obligation of representing United States policy on atomic energy, as communicated to me by you directly or through the Secretary of State, before the United Nations Organization. I see nowhere any duty or responsibility on me to participate in the formation of that policy.

This situation has been brought very forcibly to my attention by the press announcements of the report rendered by Mr. Acheson's Committee. I do not underestimate the effect of this publication in the United States or in the world at large, and while I have not had an opportunity to examine the report with care and cannot state my own definite views with respect to it, the letter from Secretary Byrnes to me transmitting the report states that it was unanimously recommended by a Committee headed by the Under Secretary of State. This brings the report pretty close to the category of the United States Government policy.

I have no doubt that the public feels that I am going to have an important relation to the determination of our atomic energy policy. There is no legal basis for this view and now that the Under Secretary of State's Committee Report has been published, the determination of policy will be greatly affected by the contents of this report. Even the superficial and incomplete examination of the subject that I have been able to make in the last few days convinces me that this report is likely to be the subject of considerable and rather violent differences of opinion. Its publication, which I understand to have been unauthorized, does not render the situation any less difficult.

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65 Presented in person at the White House, March 26; for an account of this Truman-Baruch meeting, see Hewlett and Anderson, pp. 557-558.
66 The appointment had been announced on March 18. In regard to the circumstances of the appointment, the selection and functions of Baruch's staff, and the establishment of liaison between Baruch's office and the Department of State, see Hewlett and Anderson, pp. 554-576.
67 Letter of March 21, not printed.
68 Accounts of the report had appeared in the press on March 25 although the document was not formally released by the Department of State until March 28.
These are the things that have been bothering me, and I wanted to talk them over with you before coming to a final conclusion myself as to whether, in the circumstances, I can be useful to you. I will need a little more time to reflect. As it presently stands, I think that embarrassment all around would be avoided if you would ask Chairman Connally of the Foreign Relations Committee to postpone any action on confirmation of my appointment until I have had a little more time to think things over.

Respectfully yours,

[File copy not signed]

601.BC Atomic/3-2946

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 29, 1946.

At the end of Mr. Makins' call upon me, the principal subjects of which have been described in other memoranda, he told me that he was reading with very great interest the report of the Consultants on the international control of atomic energy which was released last night. While he had not finished it he was finding it a most thoughtful paper. He believed that it was not very far from ideas which were developing in London. He mentioned specifically that part of the report which dealt with the control of raw materials. He did not express himself on the international control of primary producing plants or of the production of explosives. I stressed to Mr. Makins that the report was, of course, only a working paper and did not reflect established Government policy. He said that he understood this. He asked when I expected the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to meet and when I thought the United States Government policy would be crystallized. I told him that I could not offer an opinion on these subjects beyond saying that a great deal of work remained to be done. He said that Sir Alexander Cadogan had expressed a desire to come to Washington to discuss these matters with me. I replied that I should be delighted to see Cadogan and would be most happy to discuss with him the ideas expressed in the report. I could not, however, as of the present time be very helpful to him on the other matters he mentioned.

Dean Acheson

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90 Roger Makins, British Minister in the United States.
Memorandum by the Associate Chief of the Division of International
Security Affairs (Blaisdell)

[WASHINGTON,] April 1, 1946.

NOTES REGARDING STATUS OF SWNCC 219/8 "U.S. GUIDANCE AS TO
THE ARMED FORCES TO BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE SECURITY COUN-
CIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS" 2

1. Development of SWNCC 219/8; the paper originated with the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and was revised in collaboration with the State
Department. In its present form it has the approval of the State-War-
Navy Coordinating Committee which means the approval among
other things of the Secretary of State. It has also been discussed in-

2 SWNCC 219/8 was a basic interdepartmental statement of United States
policy with respect to Security Council armed forces. It was a revision of SWNCC
219/6/D, a document circulated within the State-War-Navy Coordinating Com-
mittee by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on February 1. SWNCC referred SWNCC
219/6/D to the Ad Hoc Committee to Effect Collaboration Between the State,
War, and Navy Departments on the Security Functions of the United Nations
Organization which considered it on February 8 and recommended changes which
were incorporated into SWNCC 219/7. SWNCC 219/8 represents the Ad Hoc
Committee's recommended text slightly revised and approved by the parent body
on February 27.

SWNCC 219/8 contained the following conclusions:

"That the agreements establishing the numbers and types of forces, their
degree of readiness and general location and the nature of the facilities and
assistance to be provided should preferably be concluded between the Security
Council and each individual member nation, although negotiations leading to
individual agreements may be facilitated by dealing simultaneously with groups
of nations in generally similar circumstances."

"That a standard form of agreement along the lines of the annexed draft
agreement may be used as found convenient by the Security Council as a basis
for negotiations with member nations." A draft standard form of agreement was
included; that draft was submitted to the Military Staff Committee as MS/38,
May 18.

The United States should provide one corps comprising two divisions, a
balanced task force of 5 wings, one carrier task group, amphibious and sea
transport lift for the above forces to the extent available, plus adequate surface
support.

"The contribution by any member and especially by smaller nations should
not exceed their military capability of maintenance and should be based on the
ability and willingness of each member nation to make available such force."

"No fixed limit should be set for the entire Security Force at this time. Therefore,
the size and composition of the entire force cannot now be determined."

Transportation and other assistance and facilities should be provided for.

"The permanent members of the Security Council should agree upon and
announce their respective quotas initially."

"No reduction should be made in their quotas merely to maintain the total
Security Force at a fixed over-all strength; any reductions in their quotas should
be based on developments in the world situation and the ability and willingness
of member nations to contribute."

"The Security Council should set the earliest practicable target date for the
availability of the pool of forces to be furnished. Subject to legislative processes,
it is now estimated that U.S. forces as far as military preparations are concerned
might be ready by 1 January 1947." (SWNCC Files)
formally by Mr. Acheson with the President, who has indicated his agreement. 3

2. Document 219/8 contains proposals which are political in character as well as military. For example, the proposal that the governments of the five permanent members of the Security Council provide the major portion of the security forces initially. The Security Council to which the Military Staff Committee reports is composed of representatives of six other members as well as of the five permanent members.

3. In view of paragraph 2 above, it has been felt that the Military Staff Committee should operate with respect to Article 43 under a Security Council directive setting out the principles to be followed in negotiating the agreements.

4. The Security Council adopted a directive at its last meeting in London on February 16, 1946. There follows an excerpt from the Journal of the Security Council for its meeting of this date. Sir Alexander Cadogan, the United Kingdom, proposed: "... that the Security Council should request the Military Staff Committee to meet at the temporary headquarters of United Nations simultaneously with the first meeting of the Security Council at the temporary headquarters in New York and that the Council should direct the Military Staff Committee as its first task to examine from the military point of view the provisions in article 43 of the Charter and submit the results of the study and any recommendations to the Council in due course." ..." This was agreed to without objection.

5. After discussion among the Security Council group of the United States Department of State, a suggested procedure was developed for complying with this directive (see Mr. Rusk's paper of March 22, 1946, particularly paragraph 2, a). The recommended principles, which it is felt the United States should advocate, have been extracted from SWNCC 219/8 and have been set out in a separate paper. 6

6. The Military Staff Committee has adopted the procedure suggested by the United States representative, the subcommittee has been set up, and it was agreed in the Military Staff Committee to have the subcommittee receive draft principles from each of the members repre-

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a Mr. Acheson described his discussion with President Truman on March 27 in a memorandum of the same day. The President approved transmitting SWNCC 219/8 to Stettinius and to the United States Representatives on the Military Staff Committee as a tentative basis of discussion. During the same conversation, President Truman suggested that the views of Senators Connally, Vandenberg, and Thomas (of Utah), be solicited. (501.BC/3-2646)

*Ante, p. 766.

6 Ante, p. 769.
sented. The principles extracted from SWNCC 219/8 are being presented to the subcommittee as the United States proposal.³


**SPA Files**

_Memorandum of Conversation, by the Associate Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs (Blaisdell)_

_[Washington,]_ April 1, 1946.

**NOTES OF A CONFERENCE BETWEEN STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS AND CERTAIN SENATORS, APRIL 1, 1946, 2:30 p.m., SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ROOM IN THE CAPITOL**

At the suggestion of the President and on the instructions of the Under Secretary, Messrs. Hiss and Blaisdell conferred today with Senators Connally, Thomas of Utah,⁷ Vandenberg and Austin⁸ regarding SWNCC 219/8 and the statement of principles to be advocated by the United States in the negotiating of agreements under Article 43 of the Charter. Senator George was invited but was unable to attend because of illness. There were also present Mr. R. V. Shirley, Clerk of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Mr. Francis Wilcox, Head International Relations Analyst in the Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service.

At the beginning of the conference, copies of SWNCC 219/8, “U.S. Guidance as to the Armed Forces to be Made Available to Security Council of the United Nations,” and the paper, “Principles to be Advocated by U.S. in Preparing Military Agreements between Security Council and Member Nations of U.N.” dated March 29, 1946,⁹ were distributed. Most of the discussion was focused on the latter paper; there was no attempt made to read through the former paper, the principal reference being to the suggested quota for the United States (pages 84 and 86).

The questions raised by the Senators and their comments relate principally to the following four matters: 1) the responsibility for meeting the expenses of operations engaged in by contingents under the authority of the Security Council; 2) the size of the proposed U.S. contingent; 3) regional use of earmarked forces; and 4) the atomic bomb.

³The United States Representatives presented the principles under reference to the Military Staff Committee as MS/28, April 1.
⁴Elbert D. Thomas, United States Senator from Utah.
⁵Warren R. Austin, United States Senator from Vermont; United States Representative-Designate at the Seat of the United Nations.
⁶Printed as USMS/12/Rev. 1, p. 759.
1. Cost.—Senator Vandenberg queried the suggested principles in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 for meeting the expenses of operations engaged in by earmarked United States forces. As a general principle, he thought that the cost of such operations, exclusive of pay of troops, should be borne by the organization. Senator Austin agreed. Mr. Hiss and Mr. Blaisdell agreed to have these paragraphs examined in the light of this suggestion.

2. Size of Proposed U.S. Contingent.—Senator Vandenberg thought that an aggregate of earmarked forces numbering in the neighborhood of a million from the five permanent members was too large, in as much as the forces cannot be used against them but only against other powers. Following a discussion of paragraph 2 (see below), Senator Vandenberg said that total contingents in this number from the five permanent members would probably be all right if the concept of regional use were taken care of adequately. He wondered how many men would be involved in the proposed U.S. contingent of one corps comprising two divisions and of a balanced task force of five air wings. Senator Vandenberg said he did not believe that the forces would ever be used, but that in any event they would only be used on the “little fellow.” He was apprehensive over the possible effect on American public opinion of a U.S. contingent of the size suggested. He wished to have it made as small as possible so as to avoid “soapbox” attacks. Instead of one corps comprising two divisions, he would prefer a single division, a proposal with which Senator Thomas agreed. Senator Vandenberg emphasized that a great progress had been made in getting the United Nations accepted by the American people; the objective now should be to get them to remain tied to the United Nations. Senator Thomas suggested listing the air and naval forces in that order followed by ground forces.

3. Use of Forces Regionally.—With reference to paragraph 2, both Senator Vandenberg and Senator Austin expressed a dislike of the paragraph in its present form, particularly the phrase “in any part of the world.” Senator Austin would like to exclude non-American forces from the Western Hemisphere in order to show that the Monroe Doctrine is unaffected. He would not want Soviet forces brought into Latin America. Senator Vandenberg said that paragraph 2 at present makes no specific reference to the purposes of the Charter. Several amendments to the present text of paragraph 2 were proposed to have it read as follows:

The pool shall include land, sea and air force units so organized and distributed geographically as to enable the United Nations to bring prompt and appropriate military pressure to bear in the particular part of the world where a threat to the peace may occur.
In addition, Senator Vandenberg would insert a sentence following
the present text of paragraph 3, to read as follows:

Armed forces, in the first instance, so far as practicable, shall be drawn
for use from the geographic or regional areas involved.

4. The Atomic Bomb.—Senator Vandenberg asked whether the
atom bomb was included in the weapons of the proposed U.S. Contingent. When Mr. Hiss answered in the negative, Senator Vandenberg
said that this question was sure to be raised on the floor of the Senate.
He urged that if no specific reference is to be made in the agreement,
the reasons why should be at hand. Mr. Hiss stated what he felt to be
the real reason, with which Senator Vandenberg concurred, namely,
that until the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission has made
proposals for international control, it would be premature to take any
definite position regarding the use of the bomb. Incidentally, Senator
Vandenberg stated he thought that sooner or later the United Nations
would acquire the bomb for its use.

Several amendments to the text of other paragraphs were suggested.
Senator Vandenberg felt that the text of paragraph 4 indicated that
other members, Canada, for example, does not have as emphatic an
obligation to provide forces as the five permanent members. He felt
that the statement of the principle in paragraph 4 should not leave the
impression that there were primary and secondary obligations, the
first attaching to the five permanent members and the second to the
other members.

The word “contribution” to describe the earmarked forces and fa-
cilities was questioned by Senator Vandenberg, Senator Austin and
Senator Thomas on the ground that it does not connote an obligation.
The word “participation” was suggested as a possible substitute.

There is attached a copy of those paragraphs to which amendments
were proposed, the original matter being stricken and the new matter
being underlined.\(^{10}\)

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

*The Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss) to the*
*Under Secretary of State (Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 11, 1946.

**Joint Chiefs Views Concerning Military Implications of**
**Atomic Energy Commission**

You will recall that on the 25th of January last a Joint Chiefs of
Staff paper (JCS 1567/26) entitled “Guidance as to the Military Im-
lications of the United Nations Commission on Atomic Energy” was

\(^{10}\) The attachment is not printed.
distributed to the members of the State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC 258). Mr. Blaisdell prepared under date of January 25 a brief commentary on the Joint Chiefs' paper which was sent forward to you together with a supplementary memorandum dated January 29 from Mr. Ross. Copies of the papers referred to are attached for convenient reference.

In Mr. Ross' memorandum the question was raised of the attitude the Department should take with regard to this paper when it came up for consideration in SWNCC the following afternoon. It was suggested that this paper might be referred to the SWNCC Committee on Security Arrangements for further consideration with a view to concerting the views of the three Departments.

If my understanding is correct you discussed this matter with Mr. Matthews and Mr. Ross and authorized Mr. Matthews, as the State Department Representative on SWNCC, to inform the Committee that you were keeping the Secretaries of War and Navy currently informed on the progress of work of your Committee on Atomic Energy and that it would seem, therefore, for the time being no further action on the Joint Chiefs' paper would be required. This was in effect the decision of the Committee.

An officer of the War Department General Staff and Joint Staff Planners has told Mr. Blaisdell informally that the Joint Chiefs are considering revision of the paper under reference and its resubmission to SWNCC. Also Mr. Baruch is scheduled next Monday to discuss with General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz the question of his relations with the two Services with regard to atomic energy matters. It is understood that the General and the Admiral have under consideration recommending that the United States Representatives on the Military Staff Committee serve as advisers to Mr. Baruch with regard to military implications of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission. This would be consistent with the Joint Chiefs' paper under reference which states one of its objectives as being "to provide guidance to the Representatives of the United States Chiefs of Staff on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations as to military advice to be given to the United States Representative on the Commission on Atomic Energy".

In view of this information it would seem essential for the Department to take the initiative to the end of assuring civilian clearance among the three Departments of any material to be sent to our Milli-

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11 Ante, p. 738.
12 Not printed.
13 Not printed; John C. Ross, Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs.
14 H. Freeman Matthews, Director of the Office of European Affairs.
tary Staff Committee Representatives and, in turn, used by them in advising Mr. Baruch.

It is recommended that this initiative be taken in two ways: first, Mr. Blaisdell should be authorized to discuss informally with officers of the Joint Chiefs with whom he is in more or less constant contact, any current revisions which may be contemplated of the Joint Chiefs' paper under reference; second, it is recommended that if the Joint Chiefs of Staff decide to resubmit a revised paper to SWNCC the Department's view should be to refer this paper to the SWNCC Committee on Security Arrangements.

The subject of this memorandum is closely related to the question of organising the Department's work in regard to atomic energy matters both generally and with particular reference to Mr. Baruch's plans. A separate memorandum on this subject is being sent forward to you. I think a very useful purpose would be served if we might discuss this entire subject with you on the basis of these memoranda at your early convenience.

SPA Files

Memorandum by Mr. George H. Haselton of the Division of International Security Affairs to the Associate Chief of the Division (Blaisdell)

[WASHINGTON,] April 12, 1946.

Subject: Comment on memoranda from the Chinese and United Kingdom Delegations. The Chinese Memorandum

1. The basic principles governing the organization of the United Nations forces proposed by the Chinese Delegation follow closely the line of reasoning laid down in the United States proposal, and although it does not enter into quite so much detail, no new points are raised therein which are not already covered in the United States paper. In short, it seems adequate and conservative, with little in it which might arouse controversy.

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15 Not printed.
16 The Subcommittee on Basic Principles of the Military Staff Committee first met on March 28 and adopted at that time a United States resolution which required each delegation to furnish the other delegations with a statement of principles which should govern the organization of United Nations forces not later than April 3. The principles submitted by the United States Representatives on April 1 are printed in document USMS/12/Rev. 1, p. 759. The United Kingdom, Chinese, and French statements, not printed, were submitted on April 2, and 8, respectively. In answer to a letter from the Principal Secretary of the Military Staff Committee of April 22 requesting the time when the Soviet statement could be expected, the Soviet Delegation indicated that study and examination of the question was continuing. (TO Files)
2. Several principles are proposed in the United Kingdom memorandum which do not appear in that of the United States Delegation. The statement is made in paragraph 2 "that if [the United Nations Force] will only be employed against any Nation or combination of Nations other than the five permanent Members." This thought is contained in SWNCC 219/8 but it does not appear in the United States statement of principles.

In paragraph 4 the memorandum states "the force will have behind it the whole weight of the available resources of the United Nations. Its size should be governed by this principle." Although this principle may have been assumed, or implied, in the United States paper, it nevertheless is not mentioned therein and it does raise some interesting conjectures. The implication is that although a nation may contribute only a small fraction of its military establishment to the United Nations Force, there will be behind this fraction the entire logistical organization and resources of that state. This principle, if accepted, would indeed affect the size of the total United Nations Force.

Although the United States paper states that the five permanent powers will initially provide the United Nations Force the British memorandum, in paragraph 5, makes a stronger case for this transitional condition. The first sentence of this paragraph reads "until such time as experience has been gained in the control and operation of an integrated international force, the greater the number of national contingents, the greater will be the practical difficulties, in its organization and operation". The result of this principle, if accepted, might be that the five powers would be the sole custodians and providers of the United Nations Force for a very considerable time, to the dissatisfaction perhaps, of some of the smaller nations. Here again, I think, the implications should be carefully considered.

In paragraph 7 the memorandum states that "there should be no delegation of sovereignty over bases, which would continue to be manned and operated by the nation to whom they belong unless such nation wished otherwise". This may be an obvious rule but the United States statement of principles makes no mention of the subject and it may be that it should be incorporated into our paper.

In its treatment of command, paragraph 10 of the British memorandum says that "the Security Council will appoint a Commander or Commanders, on the recommendations of the Military Staff Committee". The important point here is, I believe, that the nomination of a Commander will originate, according to the British version, with the Military Staff Committee, a subject again which the United States paper has not approached so specifically.
The Secretary of State to the United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Baruch)

WASHINGTON, April 19, 1946.

Dear B. M. B.: Summarizing for the record our discussion of April 18 in which Mr. Hancock and Mr. Searls participated, I have asked you to give me the benefit of your advice when, with the President, I attempt to determine the policy of the United States which is to guide you in your representation of the United States on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.

You have pointed out that under the statute you are not called upon to determine policy. The fact is that under the law the President determines the policy and transmits such policy through me to the United States representative on the Commission. However, as a practical matter, I know that the President will ask for my views in determining the policy and I, in turn, will ask for your views. That is why I had asked you to be good enough to fully explore the subject.

I have advised you that I am favorably impressed by the report which has come to be called the State Department report and which was prepared under the direction of Mr. Acheson. I have, however, advised you that I am not of the opinion that it is the last word on the subject and, on the contrary, that I shall give careful consideration to any views that may be presented by you after you consider the problem.

I have suggested that submission of your advice should be informal. I hope that you will give me the benefit of your advice from time to time as your study progresses. I suggest this because from time to time I may be called upon to discuss the matter with the President. I would want to give to him, or have you join me in giving to him, any views we thought might be helpful to him in his consideration of the subject.

There is to be no formal report. The decision as to policy is the President’s. You and I will advise him just as I advise him on many other matters. While it is the duty of the President to determine the policy, it is my thought that when determined it should not be made public by him but should be transmitted to you and you, as the representative of the United States, should announce at the meeting of the Commission what is the policy of this Government. However, this will be for the President to decide.

[37] John M. Hancock, Associate United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission.

[38] Fred Searls, Jr., Associate United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission.
Once the Commission is in operation, there must be close cooperation between you and the Secretary of State. Matters will arise which cannot be foreseen and you must be given discretion to exercise your own judgment as to all such matters, only avoiding positions that would be in conflict with the President's policy.

I do not believe that you will have any difficulty about these matters. You will be acting toward me just as I act toward the President. I know what his basic policies are. Knowing that, I do not hesitate to take positions as to matters which could not be anticipated. If they are matters of great importance I try to communicate with him. We have never had any difference in views that was not quickly reconciled. I am sure that will be your experience.

If you need any help from the State Department I am sure it will be granted without question. Should there ever be a question this letter is your authority to call upon the officials of the Department of State for assistance.

I expect to leave Washington Tuesday morning. Good luck to you!

Sincerely yours,

JAMES F. BYRNES

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John M. Hancock of the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission

[Extract]

[NEW YORK,] April 19, 1946.

... In going over the substance of the report he [Dr. Oppenheimer] added some points which I thought worth noting:

First, that Western Europe is very much concerned about atomic energy and atomic bombs.

Second, he recognizes the difficulty of developing tests without accepting other nations into the program. The committee thinks some plan has to be worked out which will not infringe sovereignty beyond an acceptable extent. Happily the problem is made easier by the fact that there are no vested interests outside of our own.

Third, he thinks it is important to get the knowledge in the intelligence field as to what Russia has, what she plans to do.

20 April 23.

21 This memorandum describes a discussion with Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer which occurred at Mr. Baruch's home on April 5; it has not been determined which members of the United States Delegation other than Mr. Hancock were present. (Department of State Atomic Energy Files)

Fourth, he thinks the proposed system is entirely incompatible with the present Russian system. He thinks the plan of procedure should be to make an honorable proposal and thus find out whether they have the will to cooperate.

Fifth, he seems to put great faith in the idea that the American people will act quickly if some foreign nation gets off the reservation. I wonder whether it will be a repetition of the German and Japanese naval and military rearmament program which lacked only official statement as to its existence. Everyone knew quite well what Germany and Japan were doing, but the rest of us did not prepare and I doubt that we would have gone to war had we had the information officially. I think it will take a lot of a strain on the moral fibre of America to make an attack with the atomic bombs because some foreign nation gets off the reservation. At any rate, that is the crux of the issue before us.

J[ohn] M. H[ancock]

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss)

[Washington,] April 23, 1946.

I called Senator Vandenberg yesterday morning and said that in view of the fact that I understood he was leaving for Paris I wanted to talk to him about the questions relating to provision of armed forces which we had taken up with the Senator and with Senators Connally, Thomas and Austin earlier this month. I said that we had not completed our discussions with the military authorities but that it looked as though they would find that the suggestion that the costs of operations being prorated among the members was too complicated to be worthwhile. I said also that they had felt that the proposed size of the U.S. land forces contingent could not be reduced below two divisions without raising serious questions as to command. The purpose was to have one corps which would include headquarters troops. The Senator wondered if we could list one combat division and one headquarters division or something of that sort. He said, humorously, that he was particularly interested in unit one. I said that the military had suggested calling it one corps without specifying its composition. He said he thought this would be preferable to specifying two divisions. He did not fully commit himself on this point but he gave the impression

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22 Senator Vandenberg was departing to join the United States Delegation at the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers; for documentation on that session, see vol. II.
23 For the record of that meeting, see p. 771.
that he did not feel very strongly that the maximum would have to be one division.

I then said that the most important question and one which warranted my calling him when he must be busy getting ready to leave for Paris dealt with the sentence he wanted included with respect to regionalism. I told him that the changes in language which Senator Austin had suggested were agreeable to everyone but that there was a feeling that for us to spell out the regionalism approach quite so specifically as he had suggested would get us into trouble with other regions. I added that our military authorities felt that they could assure the desires of the Senators in this respect, which the military fully share, could be made effective through our representation on the Military Staff Committee but that they feared that specification of the regionalism formula might enable other countries to exclude us from participation in other regions. The Senator indicated no adverse reaction to the points I made and then said that anything which was worked out which was satisfactory to Senator Austin would be satisfactory to him.²⁴

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum for the Files, by Mr. John M. Hancock of the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission

[WASHINGTON,] May 1, 1946.

This memorandum is aimed to touch upon the matters which I have discussed in Washington the last two days.²⁵

As to Mr. Acheson and my talk with him, I will first outline the matters which I had covered in my agenda before leaving New York.

The first item was the matter of determining policy. In general terms, Acheson would like us to develop our views in outline form as early a date as feasible and then to come to Washington with them and discuss them with all groups that might properly be asked in. At the moment he thinks of these groups as the State Department (and he is concerned about the immediate absence of Secretary Byrnes), certainly the War and Navy Departments, also the political leaders at some proper stage in the meetings, and certainly the President; and after that has been gone through, any statement of policy and attitude described by the President. In general terms, he would expect us to keep the work of drafting all the necessary papers, in-

²⁴ On June 24, Hiss discussed with Robert V. Shirley, clerk of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, clearance of Article 43 agreements with Senators Vandenberg and Connally in Paris. Mr. Shirley agreed with Mr. Hiss that under the circumstances only Senator Austin need be consulted. (Lot 55D9223)
²⁵ During this period, Mr. Hancock met with Under Secretary of State Acheson, Secretary of War Patterson, General Groves, and Senator McMahon.
cluding a tentative draft of what we would look upon as the final report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council.

He strongly advises our developing a charter, which would be a sound, fair-minded statement of policy and procedure. While he pretends that this would not be left to Russia and all other nations to accept or reject, still that is about the net result of his thinking so far.

He is very much concerned about the pressure from the public to get this policy determined soon. When I threw out the suggestion that it might take three months to get to that point, he thought there ought to be an organization meeting, at least, held at an early date. He is quite satisfied that all of the nations represented on the Council already have access to all of the published material and presumably it has been thoroughly studied by the delegates chosen. I saw in the press about the appointment of Gromyko and the report was in Washington that the Mexicans would appoint their delegate by the end of next week. Acheson agreed that if a statement were made regarding the organization meeting, there might be no public unrest for as short as sixty days or up to about 120 days.

For the time being he prefers that contacts between the State Department and ourselves be channeled from him to me and return.

As to the Committee of Scientists, he believes we can get along in our policy without much reliance on the scientific group. He told me of something I didn't previously know and that is the unexpurgated Acheson report had a great deal of validation of the report—that there were some 20 scientists of top standing who had agreed with the conclusions of the report.

I bored in every direction I could to find out whether there was any desire that we attach ourselves to the State Dept. He said he thought it would be a convenience to us from the point of view of staff and contact with people in Washington if we were there. He didn't push the matter at all. He has no men working on the problem except Herbert Marks and Fahy. Acheson agrees without reservation that they expect us to take the initiative. He admits that he is concerned—probably in large part because of his own lack of knowledge of what

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27 An “unexpurgated Acheson report” has not been found in the files of the Department of State, nor is there evidence that the final report of the Secretary of State's Committee on Atomic Energy was abridged prior to publication. While the Board of Consultants had sought the opinions of members of the scientific community, it does not appear that validation based on such opinions constituted an unpublished portion of the final report. For information on the development of the report, see Hewlett and Anderson, Chapter 15.

28 Herbert S. Marks, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State.

29 Charles Fahy of the Office of the Legal Adviser; appointed Legal Adviser June 19, 1946.
we are doing—about the possibility of our coming up with the outline of a plan in as short a time as say sixty days. He offered to get us an administrative assistant, and if we see Rothwell \(^{30}\) here, it will be arranged for.

He has no projects under way or in prospect which would call for the formation of any committees or the assignment of any duties involving atomic energy. I asked whether there were any open ends or further avenues to explore, because all through the Acheson report they kept touching upon more information being needed in certain fields, and he said he had not been impressed by it. Marks cut in to say that was merely a means of saying they didn’t pretend to know all about the specific subject, and that they knew of no specific fields of inquiry that would properly be undertaken at this time.

As to appointments here, Acheson called in his Administrative Assistant and the discussion rolled around a great deal without my getting any clear view of what they want. They would like us to work out some plan as to employment, oaths of office, and secret documents in order that we will be less likely attacked by Congress and will have fitted ourselves into the ordinary Government routine.

As to budgets, they don’t know of anything but a small amount of money which is available until the end of June and suggest that we see Rothwell quickly and work out any budgets for the periods after July 1, 1946.

I should emphasize throughout that Acheson was very gracious, very friendly and most helpful in his whole attitude. I find nothing to criticize in the whole day’s discussion...  

I had raised the question with General Groves as to whether, by any chance, the desired course of action could be carried out through a United Nations Statute. Incidentally, I raised the same question with McMahon. Neither had any views on the matter, but Acheson was clear that it had to be a Treaty. I told Acheson, it appears from the Wilson Foundation reports, that they were committed to the Treaty procedure. But my query was also, what if the Russians or someone else should take a reverse view and want to strengthen the United Nations—then what would be the answer? And he said there would be no power in the United Nations to pass legislation along these lines.

I asked him whether he had any thoughts regarding the kind of an organization to operate when the body was finally set up. He did not express any desire that it would be in the State Dept. or anywhere else.

I have been somewhat concerned about the apparent conflict between the authority of the United States Commission proposed under the

\(^{30}\) C. Easton Rothwell, Executive Secretary of the Central Secretariat.
McMahon bill \(^{21}\) and the proposed United Nations’ action. The McMahon bill, of course, provides for over-riding power of any international agreement. In developing that, I asked whether they had any thoughts about the men to represent this country should the McMahon bill be passed. He had no suggestions to offer. I think it would be helpful to us if we could have that man fairly well picked out in our minds and attached to our own staff here so that he could pick up the threads from here and save a great deal of time and effort in getting into the problem.

In reference to this matter of preparing a finished report for the first meeting, with the implied statement to the world that they could take it or leave it, I question the wisdom of that and purely on my own thinking feel that is not the best method of proceeding with the Russians and some of the other nations. I wondered whether the delegates of foreign countries wouldn’t want to be able to take credit for some of the principles of the final document, and I feared it would be too dogmatic an action on our part. He did not argue the merits of the case, and he thought all along that it would be taken for granted that we would give them a fair, sound plan and invite cooperation by our action. I am sure Acheson doesn’t reasonably expect general acceptance of any plan we might propose. With it, the main element of negotiation will be as to the time in which information will be given in the secret aspects of the utilization of atomic energy.

[Here follow further comments on Mr. Hancock’s discussion with Mr. Acheson, and on his conversations with Secretary of War Patterson, General Groves, and Senator McMahon. Matters treated include, in addition to international control, domestic legislation and negotiations with the United Kingdom with respect to continued cooperation in the development of atomic energy. A portion of this memorandum dealing with the last mentioned subject is printed on p. 1242.]

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SPA Files

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs (Rusk) \(^{32}\)

CONFIDENTIAL  

[WASHINGTON,] May 3, 1946.

Russian delay in submitting statement of general principles to subcommittee of Military Staff Committee.

At a meeting on Tuesday, April 30, the senior members of the U.S. Delegation of the Military Staff Committee discussed at great length

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\(^{21}\) With respect to Congressional legislation on atomic energy in 1946, see Hewlett and Anderson, Chapter 14.

\(^{32}\) This memorandum was directed to Messrs. Hiss, Raynor, and Blaisdell.
the problem raised by the failure of the Russian Military Delegation to submit a statement of general principles which the Russians considered applicable to the special agreements referred to in Article 43 of the Charter. Such a statement has been overdue since April 3; statements were received on time from the United States, Great Britain, France and China.

Our Military Delegation came to the conclusion that the United States should not undertake to heckle the Russians on this statement of general principles. They thought that the matter could best be handled through some official agency such as the Secretary-General or the current Principal Secretary of the Military Staff Committee. The present Principal Secretary is Chinese; inquiries as to when the Russian paper might be expected have thus far been unavailing.

Our Military Delegation agreed that General Ridgway (the U.S. member of the Military Staff Committee subcommittee on general principles) should find a suitable opportunity to inquire of General Vasiliev \(^{28}\) informally as to when the Russian statement of principles might be expected. It is already generally known in the Military Staff Committee that the Russian statement is being drawn up in Moscow in the light of the statements of the other four powers.

It was also agreed that General Ridgway should attempt to ascertain General Vasiliev’s views as to whether the Military Staff Committee subcommittee should proceed to discuss the four other statements of general principles already in hand, without prejudice to any comments or suggestions which the Russians might wish to make later. In this connection, it is recalled that the French reaction in early April was that the general principles should not be discussed until all five papers have been submitted.

In a conversation with me Captain Knoll \(^{24}\) stated that our Military Delegation do not yet attach sinister implications to the Russian delay in submitting a paper. Captain Knoll, who was a member of the U.S. military mission in Moscow for over two years, expressed a personal opinion that the situation would not be normal until the delay had extended at least three months.

Captain Knoll asked that no political representations be made by Mr. Stettinius or through other channels in an effort to expedite the Russian paper without the fullest prior coordination with the U.S. Delegation, Military Staff Committee. He felt that a very useful working basis is being established in New York between the American and Russian Military Delegations and that the greatest care should be

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\(^{28}\) Lt. Gen. Alexandre F. Vasiliev, Soviet Representative on the Military Staff Committee.

\(^{24}\) Capt. Denys W. Knoll, Secretary to the United States Delegation to the Military Staff Committee.
exercised to protect this relationship from unnecessary irritation. I have passed this point on to Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Johnson in New York.

I believe we should leave this matter in the hands of the U.S. Delegation, Military Staff Committee, at least for the time being; however, I believe the political staff should follow this matter very closely since there will come a time when further delay in submitting the Russian paper will have serious political aspects. Paragraph 3 of Article 48 of the Charter requires that the special agreements be negotiated as soon as possible. The statement of U.S. policy contained in SWNNC 219/8 also urges expeditious action. The draft paper on the regulation of armaments prepared in IS recommends a special instruction to the U.S. Representative on the Security Council along the same line. D[ean] R[usk]

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

The United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission (Baruch) to the Secretary of State


Dear Mr. Secretary: I have delayed answering your letter of April 19th until I might be in receipt of a letter from the Under Secretary in keeping with our extended telephone talk on the afternoon of April 22nd. At that time it was not clear whether Mr. Acheson was planning the creating of a large and varied staff within the State Department or whether he advised us to create such a staff in order to carry on our work. I thought it would be more fruitful of the results we have in common, if Mr. Hancock were to go over the entire matter with him, which he did on April 30th, in a thoroughly satisfactory interview.

I am quite in accord with you on the first two paragraphs of your letter of April 19th. It was because I thought “the report which has come to be called the State Department Report and which was prepared under the direction of Mr. Acheson” had opened up constructive and practical avenues of approach to the general subject, that I asked you to have the Board of Consultants continued in order that they might explore further those approaches and give us the benefit of the

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26 See footnote 2, p. 769.
27 The draft paper under reference has not been identified. SWNNC/MS UNO Doc. 28, prepared in the Division of International Security Affairs, discusses the Military Staff Committee but does not present the specific recommendation cited here; for partial text of SWNNC/MS UNO Doc. 28, June 5, see p. 883.
28 Ante, p. 777.
intensive study which they had already given to it. I knew of no other group which could pick up the problem so well, without a material loss of time.

It was with very great regret to me that the members found that they could not continue the Committee and its sub-committee.\footnote{With respect to the decisions by the Acheson Committee and its Board of Consultants to decline further service as formal bodies, see Hewlett and Anderson, pp. 559-560.}

Mr. Lilienthal expressed his view that a new group would require an additional eight weeks of intensive study to arrive at the same points of progress as the groups in question, and that I would have to spend an equal amount of time to post myself on the problem.

As you know, some of both groups have placed their services at my disposal and, of course, I am grateful to them. My plan is to use these men to the greatest possible extent.

The reply of the Committee of Experts brought out the fact that there were some very complex questions that must be studied, none of which is more than adverted to in the Report. It was just these problems which I thought best be met by the former groups. Now with the appointment of the Mexican delegate (completing the list) and the pressure for an early meeting, we must avoid any appearance of procrastination that might arouse suspicion on the part of the general public, and particularly of any of our associates in the United Nations. We shall endeavor to move rapidly but surely in view of the difficulties which they spoke of so graphically.

In our conversation over the telephone I was glad to clear up one point and that was—when asked my opinion you agreed that there should be a written statement by me, not for the purpose of publication but to have as a matter of record. As to what becomes of such a statement—that rests entirely with the State Department or the President.

Mr. Lilienthal, Dr. Bush and Mr. Acheson had all spoken of the necessity of a large “battery” of experts. You referred to the appointment of Mr. Fahy for legal work on this problem within the State Department. My understanding is that, as discussed at the Acheson-Hancock meeting, you are not planning to build any large group in the State Department at this time to help in developing the policy to be followed by me in my work with the Atomic Energy Commission. I plan to set up an adequate but small staff to develop the facts in order to better understand the problems.

Of course, I assume that when the Commission reports to the Council, my official work will be done and that the State Department will take over the further responsibility. I am not planning an organization with the thought of carrying my work beyond that point. I as-
sume, however, that the State Department will take appropriate steps to set up such an organization as it may wish for carrying on the work beyond this point, to cope with the problems which would involve work with the heads of Government and the Assembly as well as the treaty forming work and the early discussions of the Authority, should it be set up.

Sincerely yours,

[File copy not signed]

SPA Files

The Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

[WASHINGTON,] May 8, 1946.

Suggested Procedure for Initial Meetings of the Atomic Energy Commission

We know that the United Nations Secretariat has for some weeks been anxious to speed up the formation of the Atomic Energy Commission. Official letters asking the member governments to name representatives to the Commission were sent out weeks ago and a follow-up letter was sent more recently. Last Friday the Secretariat inquired of us whether May 20 would be a convenient date for the initial meeting of the Commission. We replied that it would not be convenient and that we would let them know soon what our views were on this subject. Today the Secretariat has again raised the subject, this time asking whether May 27 would be convenient and we have replied that we would give them our views tomorrow.

The Secretariat's desire for speed in this matter is understandable. More than three months have passed since the General Assembly on January 24 adopted a resolution establishing the Commission. In urging the Assembly to approve the resolution, Secretary Byrnes on January 24 stated: "I hope that the Commission will promptly set to work on its tasks." There has been great public interest in the prompt establishment of the Commission and our own press has in recent weeks been particularly insistent that no further time be lost in calling the Commission together.

Our own responsibility is especially acute. The Secretariat has told us that most of the other governments concerned had been agreeable to the May 20 date. Already we have had evidence that other countries are suggesting to the press that the delay thus far has been caused by the United States. This was an inaccurate charge up until last Friday. However it is clear that unless we agree to a prompt meeting of the Commission we will be accused of being responsible for current delays. This would be particularly undesirable in view of our pre-
dominant role in the atomic energy field and the fact that the whole idea of and the creation of the Commission was on our initiative.

For the foregoing reasons it is recommended that we should inform the Secretariat that we see no objection to an organizing meeting of the Commission being held on May 27 and succeeding days until the committee organization and work program have been agreed upon. It is further recommended that at the initial meeting Mr. Baruch should make a statement as to the interest of the United States in this whole field and the role which the United States has played to date. It is especially recommended that Mr. Baruch also present to the Commission for comment by the other members of the Commission the report on the International Control of Atomic Energy by the Secretary’s committee. It is suggested that Mr. Baruch say that he is presenting it simply as a basis for discussion and that the United States will welcome not only the comments of the other members of the Commission but similar proposals for discussion being submitted on their part.

If the foregoing recommendations are approved it is anticipated that after several days of determining the organization and procedure of the Commission the Commission would wish to adjourn until the other members had had an opportunity to consider the report of the Secretary’s committee and to prepare their comments or proposals of their own. The organization details which will have to be settled relate to the determination of the chairmanship (whether a single chairman for a specified period of time or a rotation of the chairmanship), staff arrangements, methods of procedure, place of meetings, schedule of work, et cetera. It is to be assumed that except for the initial meeting when Mr. Baruch made his statement and opportunity was afforded for other members to make opening statements, these organizational meetings would be private.

Our information is that there is a very excellent prospect that the War Department would be entirely agreeable to the submission of the report of the Secretary’s committee as a basis for discussion. This would be directly in line with the attitude which this Government has consistently taken toward the Commission and its functions. It has been our position that the object of the Commission is to permit a joint study of the whole subject without fixed positions being taken in advance. It would not be consistent with this approach for us to do more than submit proposals as a basis for discussion, to invite the submission of similar proposals by other members of the Commission and to welcome orderly discussion of such proposals by the Commission. To limit the initial meetings to purely organizing aspects with no prospect of early discussion of matters of substance would almost
certainly result in adverse public comment in view of the delay which has already occurred since the Commission was created and in view of the continuing public interest in the subject of atomic energy which will result from the Bikini tests.10 For the reasons indicated above it could be anticipated that most of the adverse comment would be directed primarily at this Government.

Department of States Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John M. Hancock of the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission


Mr. Baruch and I met with Mr. Acheson on May 9. We discussed the date of the forthcoming meeting. Mr. Baruch was very clear in his position that he had been embarrassed by the declination of the two committees to go forward with their work without change in set-up.11 He told of the public opinion that the Acheson report has become understood as the government policy and that it was certainly going to be the minimum in the point of view of other governments. Mr. Acheson was very firm in the view that the President was not committed to any policy, that while he had seen the Acheson report and thought well of it, there had been no pressure upon him to accept it. I told Mr. Acheson, and the Chief [Baruch] restated it, that we were sure he had been very careful in his statements to refer to the report in both aspects. First, that it was a basis for study and second, that it was not a statement of policy and that I felt we would have to decide the question as to how far we should go in mentioning specific reservations. It was my feeling at the time that unless we went rather far in listing our reservations we might be condemned by our silence into a position of accepting the report as a statement of policy. On the other hand, I didn’t want to go so far with a statement of our reservations as to appear to reject the report because I thought it was an exceptional document.

On this matter of ownership, Mr. Acheson used the word dominion in place of ownership and I would not be adverse to using the expression absolute dominion, more from the point of view of preventing abuses, in contrast with ownership and its problems.

We discussed the desirability of the meeting in Washington with the members of the two groups on May 17, 18 and 19.

John M. Hancock

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10 For documentation on the Bikini atoll atomic bomb tests, see pp. 1203-1248, passim.
11 The two committees under reference are the Secretary of State’s Committee on Atomic Energy and its Board of Consultants.
SECRET URGENT NEW YORK, May 16, 1946—3:45 p.m.
[Received May 16—2:55 p.m.]

188. Personal. The Soviet Delegation on the Military Staff Committee still has not introduced their paper on the general principles applicable to the proposed military agreements. Our military representatives have tried repeatedly to obtain further information as to the date when the Russian paper will be forthcoming, but have been unable to obtain either information or any commitment. The paper was promised by the Russians for April 3.

Our best estimate on the information available is that this matter is out of the hands of the representatives here and that the matter is being held up in Moscow, on the political level. Gromyko's comments and attitude when I broached the subject to him a few weeks ago do not encourage hope that any progress is to be made through that channel. The Military Staff Committee cannot proceed on this subject until the Russian paper has been submitted. Furthermore, this subject is basic to the greater part of the Military Staff Committee's substantive work.

I, therefore, recommend that the Department ask Bedell Smith in Moscow to request information from the Foreign Office regarding the present status of this matter and, if possible, to get them to speed action on it. Ambassador Smith might well state that the work of the Military Staff Committee is being held up due to failure of the Russians to submit their paper; that the other four powers have all submitted theirs; that all these papers are without prejudice and without any commitment by the governments involved; that the matter is being dealt with by a subcommittee of the Military Staff Committee; and that there will be no final commitment until the whole question is reviewed and settled by the Security Council itself.

STETTINIUS

Department of State Atomic Energy Files
The Board of Consultants to the United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission (Baruch)

[WASHINGTON], May 19, 1946.

DEAR MR. BARUCH: At the close of the meetings with you in the Blair Lee House yesterday, you asked us to summarize the main

42 Walter Bedell Smith, Ambassador in the Soviet Union.
43 The Acheson Committee, its Board of Consultants, and Mr. Baruch and his assistants, met at Blair-Lee House in Washington on May 17 and 18. The par-
features of a policy that would reflect the conclusions in our Report on
the International Control of Atomic Energy. We are glad to try to
make a summary that may be helpful to you, although you will appreci-
ate that in order to be understood and evaluated any statement of
this kind will have to be read in the context of the entire Report.

The first basic conclusion of the Report is that an international
agreement leaving the development of atomic energy in national hands,
subject to an obligation not to develop atomic energy for war purposes
and relying on an international inspection system to detect evasions,
will provide no security and indeed will be a source of insecurity.

The second basic conclusion is that avoidance of an atomic arma-
maments race can only be achieved by entrusting to an international
organization managerial control of all activities intrinsically danger-
ous to world security. If an international agency is given sole respon-
sibility for the dangerous activities, leaving the non-dangerous open to
nations and their citizens and if the international agency is given and
carries forward affirmative development responsibility, furthering
among other things the beneficial uses of atomic energy and enabling
itself to comprehend and therefore detect the misuse of atomic energy,
there is good prospect of security. In our Report the international
agency is called the Atomic Development Authority.

The fundamental features of a plan which would give effect to these
basic conclusions are as follows:

1. As to the raw materials—uranium and thorium. Once the Atomic
Development Authority has been set up, its first purpose will be to
bring under its complete control world supplies of uranium and tho-
rium. Wherever these materials are found in useful quantities, the
Authority must own them or control them under effective leasing ar-
rangements. One of its principal tasks would be to conduct contin-
uous surveys so that new deposits will be found, and so that the agency
will have the most complete knowledge of the world geology of these
materials. It will be a further function of the agency constantly to
explore new methods for recovering these materials from media in
which they are found in small quantities so that if, and when, it be-
comes practical to recover uranium and thorium from such sources,
means of control can also be devised for them.

In this way there will be no lawful rivalry among nations for these
vital raw materials, and one of the most serious causes of friction be-
tween nations will be avoided. As will appear from what follows, by
placing exclusively in the hands of the Authority the other dangerous
participants of the conference sought to reconcile the Acheson-Lillenthal Report
with the views of the Baruch group which had been studying the question of
International control since early April. Minutes of the Blair-Lee House sessions
exist in the Atomic Energy Lot File, Department of State; for an account of
the proceedings, see Hewlett and Anderson, pp. 562–567.
activities relating to atomic energy, rivalry between nations as to them, and the potential friction which it would cause will also be eliminated.

2) As to primary production plants. The Atomic Development Authority must exercise complete managerial control of the production of fissionable materials. This means that it must actually own and operate all plants producing fissionable materials in dangerous quantities and own and control the product of these plants.

3) As to atomic explosives. The Authority must be given exclusive authority to conduct research in the field of atomic explosives. When the plan is fully in operation there would be no stockpiles of atomic bombs anywhere in the world, either in national or in international hands. But research activities in the field of atomic explosives are essential in order that the Authority may keep in the forefront of knowledge in the field of atomic energy and fulfill the objective of preventing illicit manufacture of bombs. For only by preserving its position as the best informed agency will the Authority be able to tell where the line between the intrinsically dangerous and the non-dangerous should be drawn. If it turns out at some time in the future, as a result of new discoveries, that other materials or other processes lend themselves to dangerous atomic developments, it is important that the Authority should be the first to know. At that time measures would have to be taken to extend the boundaries of safeguards.

4) Strategic distribution of activities and materials. The activities entrusted exclusively to the Authority because they are intrinsically dangerous to security, as well as stockpiles of raw materials and fissionable materials, must be distributed geographically throughout the world in such a way as to establish a strategic balance.

5) Non-dangerous activities. Atomic research (except in explosives), the use of research reactors, the production of radioactive tracers by means of non-dangerous reactors, the use of such tracers, and the production of power in plants which use up, rather than produce, fissionable materials, are to be open to nations and their citizens under reasonable licensing arrangements from the Authority. Denatured materials necessary for these activities would be furnished, under lease or other suitable arrangement by the Atomic Development Authority.

The foregoing emphasizes the fact that the production of these denatured materials can only be accomplished through dangerous activities; that is to say the promising non-dangerous, beneficial applications of atomic energy become possible only if dangerous operations first occur.

It is important to be aware at all times of the necessity for taking advantage of the opportunity for promoting decentralized and diversi-
fled national and private developments and of avoiding unnecessary concentration of functions in the Authority. It would, therefore, be a primary function of the Authority to encourage developments by nations and private enterprise in the broad field of non-dangerous activities.

6) Definition of dangerous and non-dangerous activities. All activities relating to atomic energy from the mining of raw materials through the production of the active materials, and including research in atomic explosives, must be classed as dangerous to security. All other activities in the field are classed as non-dangerous, although for some of them (such as the production of power in plants which use up denatured fissionable materials) close questions as to security must be faced. This is merely a rough classification. Although a reasonable dividing line can be drawn between the dangerous and the non-dangerous, it is not hard and fast. Machinery must therefore be provided to assure constant examination and reexamination of the question, and to permit revision of the dividing line as changing conditions and new discoveries may require.

7) Inspection activities. By assigning intrinsically dangerous activities exclusively to the Atomic Development Authority, the problem of inspection is thereby reduced to manageable proportions. For if the Atomic Development Authority is the only agency which may lawfully conduct the dangerous activities in the field of raw materials, primary production plants, and research in explosives, then any visible operation by others will constitute a danger signal. This situation contrasts vividly with the conditions that would exist if nations agreed that each of them would conduct those dangerous operations, but would do so solely for proper purposes; for surreptitious abuse of such an agreement would be very difficult to discover by any system of detection that might be devised. It is far easier to discover an operation that should not be going on at all than to determine whether a lawful operation is being conducted in an unlawful manner.

The plan, therefore, does not contemplate any systematic or large-scale inspection procedures covering the whole of industry. Many of the inspection activities of the Authority should grow out of and be incidental to its other functions. The chief measure of inspection will be those associated with the tight control of raw materials, for this is one of the keystones of the plan. The continuing activities of prospecting, survey and research in relation to raw materials will be designed not only to serve the affirmative development functions of the agency but also to assure that no surreptitious operations are conducted in the raw material field by nations or their citizens. Inspection will also occur in connection with the licensing functions of the Authority. Finally, a means should be provided to enable the
international organization to make special "spot" investigations of any suspicious national or private activities.

8) Personnel. The personnel of the Atomic Development Authority will have to be recruited on a truly international basis, giving much weight to geographical and national distribution. Although the problem of recruitment of the high-quality personnel required for the top executive and technical positions will be difficult, it will certainly be far less difficult than the recruitment of the similarly high-quality personnel that would be necessary for any purely policing organization.

9) Negotiation stage. The first step in the creation of the system of control we envisage is the negotiation among the nations of the world of a Charter spelling out in comprehensive terms the functions, responsibilities, authority, and limitations of the Atomic Development Authority. Once a Charter for the agency has been written and adopted, the Authority and the system of control for which it will be responsible will require time to become fully organized and effective. The plan of control will therefore have to come into effect in successive stages. These should be specifically fixed in the Charter or means should be otherwise set forth in the Charter for transition from one stage to another.

10) Stages of operations. After it is created, one of the first major activities of the Authority must be directed to obtaining cognizance and control over the raw materials situation. There are probably other activities in which the Authority would have to begin its work almost as soon as it is set up. But except for control of raw materials, most of the operations of the Authority are, from the standpoint of the practical workability of the plan, subject to scheduling. Some of them, merely because of the time required to get them under way have to come at later stages. But the schedule for most of them—that is, outside the raw materials control—is properly a matter for negotiation and the manner in which we and other nations treat their scheduling may affect the acceptability of the plan but not its workability.

11) Disclosures. In the deliberations of the United Nations Commission on Atomic Energy, the United States must be prepared to make available the information essential to a reasonable understanding of the proposals which it advocates. If and when the Authority is actually created, the United States must then also be prepared to make available other information essential to that organization for the performance of its functions. And as the successive stages of international control are reached, the United States must further be prepared to yield, to the extent required by each stage, national control of activities in this field to the international agency.
12) Security achieved through the Atomic Development Authority. When fully in operation, we believe that the plan proposed can provide a great measure of security against surprise attack. Once the operations and facilities of the Atomic Development Authority have been established and are being managed by that agency within other nations as well as within our own, a balance will have been established among the nations of the world. Protection will lie in the fact that if any nation decides upon a program of aggression and seizes the plants or the stockpiles of raw and fissionable materials that are situated in its territory, other nations will have similar facilities and materials situated within their own borders so that the act of seizure need not place them at a disadvantage; protection will lie in the further fact that if a would-be aggressor seizes facilities, a year or more would be required after seizure before atomic weapons could be produced in quantities sufficient to have an important influence on the outcome of war. Thus all the nations of the world would receive well in advance of the possible time of attack by atomic weapons clear, simple, and unequivocal danger signals that would enable them to prepare all measures of protection that would be available—an opportunity which would be wholly lost to them in the event of surprise attack.

As the plan goes into operation and continues, it can, moreover, create deterrents to the initiation of schemes of aggression, and it can establish patterns of cooperation among nations, the extension of which may even contribute to the solution of the problem of war itself.

In this response to your request of yesterday for a summary, we fear that we may have sacrificed something of clarity and completeness to our desire to comply with your request as quickly as possible. If there is anything that you wish in the way of clarification or enlargement, or if there is any way at all in which you feel this Board can be helpful, in further discussion or otherwise, please be assured that we are anxious to cooperate with you in your enormously difficult task.

In this letter we have not attempted to touch again upon the many matters that were discussed during the Blair Lee House meetings. If as to them it would be useful to you to have a memorandum from us stating the views that we offered in the discussions, we shall of course be glad to prepare it.

Sincerely yours,

CHESTER I. BARNARD
J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER
CHARLES A. THOMAS
HARRY A. WINNE
DAVID E. LILIENTHAL,
Chairman
The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the United States Representatives on the Military Staff Committee

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 24, 1946.

GUIDANCE AS TO COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES TO BE PLACED AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

1. The following are the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on certain matters which may be subjects for discussion in the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations. In arriving at these views, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered USMS/25 . . . and USMS/19/1/Rev/1 . . . .

2. Armed Forces to be Placed at the Disposal of the Security Council of the United Nations. Agreements should be completed as soon as possible as to the size of the armed forces to be made available to the Security Council by each member nation and as to the broad principles for employment of these forces in accordance with J.C.S. 1567/32 and this memorandum.

3. Establishment of Permanently Available International Military Forces. Establishment of international armed forces on a permanent basis is contrary to present United States policy, except in the case of such security forces as may be required for the internal policing of areas under United Nations trusteeship.

4. Command and Staff Arrangements for Security Forces. The following general policies will govern for the present:

   a. Predetermined rules covering establishment of international command and staff arrangements for security forces are deemed inadvisable. However, it is recognized that the Representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Military Staff Committee should have available a statement of general principles for guidance in the event discussion of command and staff arrangements is precipitated by the representatives of other nations.

   b. Arrangements in each instance for the command and staff of combined security forces of the United Nations should not be made until

"This document, a report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee dated May 22, was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on May 24. The JCS forwarded the report to the United States Representatives on the Military Staff Committee on May 24 "as an expression of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . pending receipt of comments from the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee." The U.S. Representatives on the Military Staff Committee took note of the report at their 11th Meeting, June 3 (IO Files). The JCS also presented the report to SWNCC on May 24 for concurrence or comment; it was circulated as SWNCC 219/9, May 27. SWNCC approved it on June 20. (SWNCC Files)

"Neither printed.

"SWNCC 219/8; for a description, see footnote 2, p. 769."
immediately before such forces are to be placed at the disposal of the Security Council.

c. It is undesirable and impractical to establish any rigid criteria for the designation of a supreme commander. The Representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Military Staff Committee should seek clearly to establish the principle that their advisory responsibilities extend to the question of command designation but should leave the question of arriving at their choice for resolution when occasion arises.

d. In event discussion of the question of command is precipitated by representatives of other nations on the Military Staff Committee, the following may be presented as the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

1. There should be unified command under a supreme commander of a United Nations military force and attached civilian personnel for the execution of a particular mission assigned by the Security Council, under the provisions of Article 48 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The United States will not agree to choice of a supreme commander nor to the designation of commanders of air, naval or ground components, nor to the designation of commanders within regions, until immediately prior to the time such forces are to be placed at the disposal of the Security Council.

3. Other than those appointments reserved for the Security Council, the appointment of commanders of subordinate forces of mixed nationalities should be the responsibility of the supreme commander of a United Nations military force and such appointments should be made from officers made available to him for this purpose by the nations furnishing the armed contingents. The appointment of the senior commander and subordinate commanders in any national contingent should be the responsibility of the nation which furnishes that contingent.

4. Any agreement approved by the United States must include provisions to permit senior commanders to communicate directly with the military authorities of their own governments.

5. When armed contingents of two or more nations participate in an operation, the nations concerned should provide suitable officers, acceptable to the supreme commander, for service on the operational, administrative, and civil government staffs of the supreme commander.

6. It is essential that any supreme commander:

(a) Receive instructions for strategic direction of the armed forces under his command directly from the Military Staff Committee (paragraphs 1 and 3, Article 47).

(b) Have military operational command of all contingents assigned to his forces, to be exercised through the respective commanders of these contingents. Internal discipline and administration should remain as responsibilities of the commander of each national contingent.

(c) Administer within the theater of operations all matters pertaining to external and intercontingent logistical problems of the forces under his command.

(d) Have administrative and disciplinary control (except courts-martial jurisdiction) over all personnel accompanying the forces under his command, including observers appointed by the Military Staff Committee.
5. General. The Representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Military Staff Committee should refrain from expressing opinions to representatives of foreign governments and from entering into any commitments, express or implied, on major matters on which they have not received guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with whom this responsibility rests and who may freely be consulted.

Appendix

Discussion

1. On 24 August 1944, at Dumbarton Oaks, the representatives of the Soviet Union proposed the establishment of an international military force, particularly an international military air force corps, to be permanently available to the Security Council for the enforcement of world peace and security. They supported this proposal with the arguments that the Security Council should have "the most effective means to bring to bear against an aggressor either to force him to stop the aggression or to bind him until national forces can be thrown into action." They thought an international force best met this requirement and, further, that the very existence of such a force would create fear in potential aggressors, which would make them think twice before undertaking actual acts of aggression.

2. The United States and British delegates rejected the principle of permanent international forces. The Charter of the United Nations reflects this rejection in Article 43 of Chapter VII, which specifies that armed forces shall be made available to the Security Council "on its call." Although Article 45 of Chapter VII provides that national air force contingents shall be held immediately available for combined international enforcement action, the rejection of the principle of a permanent international air force corps is nevertheless implicit in this article. When the United States ratified the Charter, the United States objection to the principle of permanent international security forces became national policy. Further, the United States position has always been that specific operational plans would be developed within the United Nations only in the event of an existing or potential threat to the peace. Therefore, the Representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations should initiate no discussion of the formation of permanent international armed forces and under no circumstances should they indicate approval of such a proposal.

3. When considering problems relating to the command, control and employment of armed forces made available to the Security
Council of the United Nations, the following factors should be kept constantly in mind:

First, the existence of the veto power makes use of force by the Security Council highly improbable, and in any event force can be used only against the small nations.

Second, under the provisions of the United Nations Charter, "The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize... regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority" (paragraph 1, Article 53).

These two considerations make elaborate predetermined arrangements for international command and staff for the security forces, or combined maneuvers to train them, both unnecessary and impractical. If subsequent developments remove the veto power such matters should be re-examined in the light of the then existing situation.

4. Paragraph 4 of Article 47 of the Charter, which refers to appropriate regional agencies, taken in conjunction with Articles 52, 53, 54, 106, and 107, recognizes regional arrangements or agencies as appropriate international agencies for implementing decisions of the Security Council. An example of an appropriate regional arrangement is the Inter-American system. If the decisions of the Security Council requiring the use of force are in fact carried out by utilization of regional arrangements or agencies (paragraph 1, Article 53):

a. Our desire, as expressed by members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs (conference between State Department officials and Senators Connally, Thomas of Utah, Vandenberg and Austin, 1 April 46), to exclude non-American forces from the Western Hemisphere and keep the Monroe Doctrine unaffected by United States ratification of the Charter of the United Nations will be facilitated. However, since regional arrangements are subject to the final authority of the Security Council and since non-American forces can operate in the Western Hemisphere only on its authorization, our most practical means for excluding such forces lies in the actions of our members on the Military Staff Committee and on the Security Council.

b. It would be both possible and practicable for the United Nations security forces to take speedy action against adjudged aggressors; and

c. It would be unlikely that substantial United States ground forces would be called upon to operate as a part of United Nations security forces under foreign command, particularly in Europe or in Asia.

5. However, there are numerous bilateral alliances in existence, particularly alliances between Russia on the one hand and England, France, China, Yugoslavia and Poland on the other, which might be construed by parties thereto as "regional arrangements or agencies" appropriate for enforcement action under authority of the Security Council and (keeping the veto in mind) used to exclude American
armed forces from participating in action by the Security Council in Europe and Asia. It is for this reason that the United States desires the relevant sections of the Charter to apply to regional arrangements already in existence when the charter was drafted (the Inter-American System) or to other regional systems which might develop through natural evolution. In any event the United States does not believe that the Charter was intended to promote the artificial development of regional arrangements for security purposes. Considerations such as those outlined above serve to illustrate the undesirability from the United States point of view of concluding predetermined principles for the selection of commanders and the employment of United Nations security forces. Furthermore, the drawing up of principles for selection of commanders might cause theoretical debate in the Military Staff Committee on questions involving power politics. This should be avoided. The establishment of technical or temporary rules beyond the scope of the broad principles enunciated below is also undesirable. The functions of the Military Staff Committee in these matters are advisory, and the United States members should seek clearly to establish that their advisory responsibility extends to the question of command designation, leaving the question of the method of arriving at their choice for resolution when occasion arises.

6. With regard to USMS/19/1/Rev/1 (J.C.S. 1670/1), it is considered that the United States representatives should not introduce for discussion in the Military Staff Committee the subject of principles relating to command of United Nations armed forces. However, it is recognized that the Representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Military Staff Committee should have available a statement of general principles for guidance in the event discussion of command and staff arrangements is precipitated by the representatives of other nations. In such case, the United States representatives should express opinions which conform to the following:

a. There should be unity of command, under a supreme commander, of a United Nations military force and attached civilian personnel for the execution of a particular mission assigned by the Security Council, under the provisions of Article 48 of the Charter of the United Nations.

b. The United States will not agree to choice of a supreme commander nor to the designation of commanders of air, naval or ground components, nor to the designation of commanders within regions, until immediately prior to the time such forces are to be placed at the disposal of the Security Council. This is realistic in that the considerations of command, composition of forces and the method of application of forces must in each case be affected by both the political and the military situation which then prevail.

c. Other than those appointments reserved for the Security Council, the appointment of commanders of subordinate forces of mixed na-
tionalities should be the responsibility of the supreme commander of a United Nations military force and such appointments should be made from officers made available to him for this purpose by the nations furnishing the armed contingents. The appointment of the senior commander and subordinate commanders in any national contingent should be the responsibility of the nation which furnishes that contingent.

d. Any agreement approved by the United States must include provisions to permit senior commanders to communicate directly with the military authorities of their own governments.

e. When armed contingents of two or more nations participate in an operation, the nations concerned should provide suitable officers, acceptable to the supreme commander, for service on the operational, administrative, and civil government staffs of the supreme commander.

7. A supreme commander should have military operational command of all contingents assigned as a part of his force, exercising this command through the respective commanders of these contingents. Internal discipline and administration should remain as responsibilities of the commander of each national contingent. A supreme commander should administer within his theater all external and intercontingent logistical matters for the forces under his command.

8. It is not considered advisable to burden commanders with observers responsible only to the Military Staff Committee and reporting directly and only to the Military Staff Committee. Certainly the supreme commander must have administrative and disciplinary control (except courts-martial jurisdiction) over all personnel accompanying the armed forces under his command, including observers appointed by the Military Staff Committee. Further, copies of all reports should be furnished him to facilitate and expedite corrective action when appropriate. It must, of course, be borne in mind that no arrangement as to observers obviates the normal necessity for operational reports and other information that will be made available to the Military Staff Committee by the supreme commander.

9. By ratifying the Charter of the United Nations, the United States subscribed to the general principles and objectives therein, but the means of implementing them are yet to be agreed upon. The character and extent of United States participation in the implementation are matters which necessarily still remain subject to decision on the highest governmental level. In consequence the Representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Military Staff Committee should refrain from expressing opinions to representatives of foreign governments and from entering into any commitments, express or implied, on major matters on which they have not received guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with whom this responsibility rests and who may freely be consulted.
501.2C/5-1646: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1946—6 p. m.

80. The Department would prefer not to take at this time the action suggested in your 188 of May 16. General considerations make it desirable to handle a matter of this sort through existing United Nations machinery if possible rather than by unilateral action on our part in Moscow. Further, a slight additional delay would not be entirely unwelcome to us for the following reasons: We have not yet completed our discussions with Senate leaders on the general principles applicable to the special agreements and on the size of the proposed U.S. contingent. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are now preparing comments from a military point of view on certain points for our use in further conversations. Senators Connally and Vandenberg are both involved and have just returned from the Paris Conference.

The Department will try to complete its conversations with Senate leaders as soon as possible and will notify you when that has occurred. If by that time the Russian paper has not been received by the Subcommittee of the Military Staff Committee, action might then be taken within the Committee itself or by consultation among the Representatives of the permanent members of the Security Council either to attempt to hasten the submission of a Russian paper or to proceed with discussions without such a paper. It seems desirable to leave for later decision whether further steps by appropriate diplomatic action might thereafter be required.

If the Russian paper is submitted prior to the conclusion of our conversations with the Senators, our representatives should proceed, of course, with discussions in the Subcommittee of the Military Staff Committee subject to the possibility of some amendment of our views at later stages based on our further discussions with Senators.

The War and Navy Departments have concurred informally in this message and we suggest that copies be furnished to the U.S. Delegation, Military Staff Committee.

Byrnes

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John M. Hancock of the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission

[WASHINGTON,] May 30, 1946.

Those present were Messrs. Byrnes, Acheson, Baruch and Hancock.
I cannot attempt to outline in detail the entire compass of the talk

Messrs. Baruch and Hancock met with Messrs. Byrnes and Acheson in Washington on May 30 and 31 with a view to drafting a statement of United States
this morning. The discussion roved over many points which have been discussed by all of us, and I don't plan to cover those in this memorandum.

Mr. Byrnes stressed the importance of laying on the table a working document on the day before it was up for discussion in the general meeting or in a subcommittee. The difficulties of language make this very important as a matter of procedure. He stressed the danger of using the word "present" in connection with any documents we offer, because the word "present" implies that it has our validation. As to the several documents we proposed to give to the delegates, he and Acheson both thought it wiser to have them available without any formal presentation on our part.

This brought me to the clear conviction that we should not present the Acheson Report unless we were to be under the embarrassment of being accused of having validated such report. There is no objection to having the backbone of our approved policy embodied in Mr. Baruch's speech, but whatever is included should be supplied to the delegates also as a working paper. I believe that this backbone will have to be discussed in the Committee as a whole and that it will not lend itself with reference to the subcommittee.

The old query arose as to what we would say if the Russians were to query us about stopping making bombs. I pointed out that under my approach under which we outlaw the possession of bombs and dangerous projects in general, there would necessarily be some agreement covering both the further making of bombs and the disposal of all bombs then in being. I don't want to see us open the door as to the best plan of disposing of bombs. Any plan for entrusting them to the scattered bases or of turning them over to the Security Council will have to be discussed by the Security Council. This is going to be a very difficult determination, which will require our approval, and I don't want to see us use any words which would imply any approved plan as to the manner of disposal or transfer to anyone else. Of course, we could always convert that material back to use in power plants.

A long discussion was had as to the manner of handling the other weapons of mass destruction. Mr. Byrnes' statement, made upon his return from Moscow, indicates his thought at the time that it related only to weapons using atomic energy. He says, however, that in discussions in Moscow reference was made to biological warfare. Byrnes thinks it would be a serious mistake to attempt to cover these other weapons as a part of our present assignment.

Mr. Baruch was very strong in pointing out that the problem of
atomic energy is a problem of the hearts of men and that no plan so far proposed gives any guarantee or assurance. Every plan offers lots of hope, but in the end the best any plan gives, even if it works, is an advance warning. Men will differ as to the time of the warning, but, at best, this advance warning is too short a time to meet the needs of our people’s frame of mind in which they shrink from going to war except in reply to an overt act.

We had a long discussion about penalties. We will discuss it further tonight. I think Mr. Acheson will have no objection to penalties, but he still will feel that it will not be self-operative under any plan we can now conceive of, and as a matter of fact, any nation that has in mind to violate the plan as we propose it would already have in mind the making of alliances and the marshaling of the tools of war, and before a violation of this kind took place, the nation would be ready to go to war. As a result, the only sanction is war.

Mr. Baruch raised the question about a provision in the Constitution of all the nations, similar to the provision General MacArthur has inserted in the Japanese Constitution. He also referred to the principle back of the Nuremberg trials, that of individual responsibility for violations of international law. They were not commented upon at length this morning.

Mr. Acheson pointed out this morning that there always has to be some ultimate authority to enforce a Treaty and that the only such authority is going to war.

I proposed that big power plants using material which would be potentially dangerous should be authorized by the A.D.A. only subject to approval of the Security Council. I think this is necessary; otherwise there might well be plans for granting Russia the power to build a number of large plants which would be very near in point of time to the utilization of their construction for the manufacturing of bombs. This plan of requiring the Security Council to approve construction of such plants would make the veto in the Security Council a very powerful weapon. I do not believe that the power to disturb the military balance should be left in the A.D.A. without some further control. I assume the Security Council would naturally take the same view.

When we raised the question of our relationships to Canada and Britain, Mr. Byrnes thought that we should work with them in advance of our meeting. He was not concerned about charges of a compact block because he felt our joint effort put us all in a similar position.

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*General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Pacific; Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Japan.*
Byrnes spoke at length of the difficulties of language and the importance of starting out with one word and continuing to use it. He said that whenever a word was changed, there was always a query as to why it was changed. He felt that we should avail ourselves of the expert treaty draftsmen of the State Department. He has no thought that we should lay down the form of a Treaty at an early date. He thought the parts should be drafted as principles are established.

We had some discussion about the make-up of the Atomic Energy Authority. It would seem to me that if true internationalists of competence could be found, they would make the best body to handle the problem. We felt, however, that we would have to follow a pattern somewhat similar to the Security Council and that we would have to have national representation in the body. We doubted that in [any] body of trustees of international character would win the support of our people. The question in the end is, however, do we balance national interests in the make-up of the Board of Directors. In the discussions the name of Nils Bohr 40 arose as one ideal type.

In regard to the exchange of information and the survey plans with regard to raw material, Byrnes thought the suggestion would be worthless because the Russians would disagree. He does agree that it should be a part of the Treaty. He feels that our proposing it as a part of our national platform would invite an early breakdown without a clear and adequate basis for such a breakdown.

We had quite a long discussion about the dangers of the leakage of scientific data and the plans for limiting the fields for inspection. Nothing very definitive came out of the discussion beyond our own present thoughts in these respects. The question naturally was whether foreign inspectors might seek to do espionage work under the cover of a geological survey. There was willingness to trust the Atomic Energy Authority for a decision in such matters, and it was thought that this would be enough safeguard regarding the danger of snooping as a part of the inspection process.

Mr. Baruch was very strong as to the matter of penalty and told Mr. Acheson (as Byrnes was leaving for the Carter Glass funeral) that he had to be in the position of advocating something in which he believed.

This summarizes down to this: That we omit from our statement of policies (May 30th draft) the last item regarding the raw material survey; that we present the statement of policies of this Government as the working document; that we embody them in Mr. Baruch’s  

40 Niels Bohr, Danish theoretical physicist; pioneer in nuclear physics.
speech or not, as we wish; that we avoid endorsing any document as United States policy except the working paper we present.

Every impression I gained was that they are relying in the State Department upon a development of policy on the initiative of B.M.B. When B.M.B. asked Mr. Byrnes what his policies were, Byrnes replied, as nearly as I can recall, “Oh hell, I have none. What are your views?”

Acheson was willing to have the inspection in the field of raw materials be empowered to go beyond, in the event any diversion were discovered, to tracing down the destination of such diverted material.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State (Marks) to the Under Secretary (Acheson)

[WASHINGTON,] May 30, 1946.

The “Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy” outlined proposals for international action but expressly left numerous questions of procedure and substance for later consideration. This was done in part because of the limited time which the Board of Consultants had in preparing the Report and in part because the nature of the questions seemed to require different qualifications or different terms of reference from those of the Board.

If the proposals in the Report are to be advocated as a basis of discussion in the United Nations Commission these questions will have to be carefully investigated by the United States in order to equip our representative for the deliberations of the Commission.

General procedure—In many ways the procedural problems of the United Nations Commission on Atomic Energy will not differ from those of other international meetings, for example, the Bretton Woods or Dumbarton Oaks Conferences. The organization of the Commission and its sub-committees, the question of open and closed sessions, liaison between representatives of the several member nations—in dealing with these and many similar matters the practices followed in other international meetings should provide a guide.

In view of the extensive experience which Mr. Alger Hiss and his staff have had in such matters, I assume that they should work intensively on them and give Mr. Baruch and his associates all possible assistance. I understand from Mr. Hiss that some work has already been done along these lines and that he feels that much more should be done. Definite arrangements should be worked out between Mr. Hiss and Mr. Baruch’s staff for providing the most effective cooperation on a continuing basis.

Procedure in relation to disclosures—One of the most important
aspects of procedure, is peculiar to the subject itself. The Board's Report states that at an early stage in the Commission's deliberations, we must be prepared to make available enough presently classified information to enable the representatives of other nations to understand and appraise our proposals. In dealing with this issue there are two main questions: (1) At what stage in the deliberations and under what conditions should we make such disclosures and (2) what should be the scope of the disclosures to be made.

(1) There are doubtless a good many possible alternatives as to the time and circumstances of disclosure. Perhaps a reasonable proposition might be worked out under which we would not make any disclosures until other nations agreed to do something in return, either in the way of reciprocal exchange, or in some other form. But, I think it fair to say that none of us who worked on the Report have been able to think of an arrangement of this character which would be generally acceptable to other nations or at any rate acceptable if it involved their supplying us with anything that we would really be interested in getting. However, it may be that the Secretary of State and Mr. Baruch will have ideas on this subject and it would certainly be worth-while to give further consideration to the possibility if anyone in a position of responsibility feels that it may be feasible.

Another alternative would be to proceed in the following manner. Submit the Report as a basis for discussion. Be prepared to discuss the Report as it now stands and without any reference to classified information. Discussion on this basis might be pursued as long as necessary to make certain that the essential features of the Report are understood by other nations and that they are seriously interested in it. During this stage our representatives would have to state frankly that the scientific premises on which the Report is based would have to be accepted for the time being without discussion of underlying classified information. However, as our own internal meetings have shown, there is a great deal of unclassified information, technical and nontechnical which is not included in the Report but which can be used to illuminate the Report itself. An example of this is Doctor Rabi's introduction to the Doubleday-Doran edition of the Report. Because our scientists and public officials have given so much thought to the subject, they are perhaps in a better position to draw upon and organize this unclassified information in ways that could be of great assistance in promoting a clear preliminary understanding of the Report itself among the representatives of other nations.

This preliminary consideration of the Report might take several

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50 Dr. Isador I. Rabi, a Columbia University physicist; consultant to Manhattan Engineer District.
weeks or much longer. If skillfully conducted, it might evoke rather clear signs of understanding and interest on the part of other nations and when these occur we might then begin to take up the classified material which your Committee agreed the Commission would require "for an understanding of the proposals" and which you found it possible to define "within satisfactory limits".

A third alternative would be to make the information in question available at the outset as a sign of our own seriousness and good faith.

Whether one of these or some other alternative is to be adopted, the point that needs to be emphasized now is that a decision of major policy must be made in resolving this question of procedure.

(2) The scope of information to be made subject to disclosure will have to be carefully worked out in advance. When in the meetings between your Committee and the Board, this information was "defined ... within satisfactory limits", the definition was of necessity based upon consideration of very general categories of data. In preparation for the Commission meetings these categories will have to be examined in detail and decisions made as to the numerous specific items which may be used in discussion.

In short, a second "Smyth" report \(^{21}\) will be needed to guide our representatives or in some other way responsibility will have to be fixed and authority conferred to enable our representatives, in the language of the Report, to make available the "limited category of information which should be divulged in the early meetings of the United Nations Commission".

This advance preparation is of critical importance. For it is quite likely that the better we prepare, organize and present information, the less information we shall have to use. A limited amount of data presented effectively and at the right moment in the deliberations may well provide necessary understanding. On the other hand, if data is not readily available as required and if it is not presented in the most orderly and effective form, the resulting confusion may well involve more disclosures than would otherwise be necessary or may preclude satisfactory understandings.

*Other questions of procedure*—At least one other question of procedure which should be given consideration now concerns the order in which matters should be taken up. Assuming that the Report is adopted as a basis of discussion, and discussions proceed far enough to establish a serious interest and understanding of the proposals by other nations, it seems probable that the next step would be to commence work on drafting a charter or treaty. At this point, or before,

\(^{21}\) See footnote 72a, p. 751.
it is probable that other nations will raise questions as to the steps in the transition period.

When this occurs we may want to urge that the problem of the transition should be deferred until after substantial progress has been made in the drafting of a charter. If we are unsuccessful in this, we shall have to face at the outset of the drafting or even before, the extremely difficult problem of the transition steps. During the extensive discussion of the transition steps in the meetings between your Committee and the Board, you will recall that quite a number of the participants pointed out that the most intensive kind of study would have to be given to this problem in order to determine how it should be handled from the standpoint of negotiations. This then is one of the most important matters to be thought through as soon as possible and will require the assistance of the most highly qualified people.

Substantive questions—As the Board of Consultants stated, a succession of processes like that involved in preparing the Report itself will be necessary, each building on the preceding analysis, before even the major ramifications of the problem can be understood and the major questions partially answered. Numerous matters which are adverted to in the Report in the most general terms will have to be made the subject of analysis in order that our representative may be prepared to deal with them in the negotiations. Among the more important are the following:

(1) Raw Materials—The discussions in the Blair Lee House meetings sufficiently indicated how complicated the raw materials problem is. Even if the general recommendation in the Report with respect to raw materials is adopted it is clear that the precise pattern of control would have to vary, depending upon the facts in different types of situations. But, until the available geological, mining and economic facts concerning the occurrence, distribution and use of uranium and thorium have been closely examined it will not be possible to spell out the detailed measures of control. Intensive study undertaken now should go a long way toward simplifying this problem.

(2) Strategic Distribution of Dangerous Facilities and Stockpiles of Raw Materials and Fissionable Materials—This problem likewise requires immediate study with the help of geographers, economists, military personnel and people experienced in political affairs. With such help, the experts in the field of atomic energy should be able to give some indication of the pattern of distribution that would afford a sound strategic balance geographically. Many questions which would otherwise be extremely troublesome in the negotiations can be avoided through such advance preparation. For example, the point has been made that if a single primary production plant were located in each of the five major nations that might place any two of the nations at a
numerical disadvantage if the others took aggressive action in concert against them. But if, as seems probable, investigation of the scientific facts shows that any nation controlling one or two of these plants could wage just as effective atomic war as a nation which controlled three, then the problem of shifting political alignments becomes less troublesome.

(3) Financial Problems—The Blair Lee House discussions and the Report itself sufficiently indicated the difficult financial questions that would have to be solved. Since they are bound to arise in some form before the negotiations have proceeded very far, advance preparation in this field also seems necessary.

(4) Personnel Problems—This was another matter touched upon at the Blair Lee House and on which there appeared to be agreement that considerable advance study by experts in the field would be desirable.

(5) Management Problems—There are numerous questions concerning the organization of the Authority which need to be explored. Some of these are mentioned in the Report but none of them are discussed at length and there are many others that are not touched upon.

(6) The “Veto” and “Sanctions”—In relation to these matters it is evident that considerable confusion exists and that there are many serious questions which need to be thought through and answered. The scope of the problem was pretty well defined during the Blair Lee House meetings. There is a related matter which so far has not been discussed. This has to do with the definition of evasions. Some types of evasions would have to be regarded as so serious that they signify a complete breakdown in the plan. Others could be safely regarded as minor and subject to disposition under some form of administrative machinery provided in the plan itself. These definitions and the machinery would have to be spelled out in considerable detail in the charter. To do this will require very careful advance preparation.

(7) Scientific Problems—In the various discussions of the Report these problems have not received much attention. However, they are among the most important of all. The definition of the dividing line between safe and dangerous activities, the conditions under which research in atomic explosives should be undertaken by the Authority, the measures by which security can be “built” into the facilities of the Authority and into licensed facilities—these are all enormously complicated scientific and technical problems. In order that they may be sufficiently simplified so that the negotiations can make progress it will be necessary for us to put our qualified scientists and technicians to work on them as soon as possible.

Herbert S. Marks
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John M. Hancock of the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission.\textsuperscript{52}


Those present at the apartment of Mr. Byrnes in the Shoreham Hotel were Messrs. Byrnes, Acheson, Baruch and Hancock.

In a way, this will be a continuation of the morning’s discussion. After some conversation about general procedure, Mr. Acheson laid out the things he had wanted to talk with Mr. Byrnes about insofar as atomic energy was concerned. He thought there ought to be a means of coordinating the position of Government and that there should be a group set up in the State Department which would be able to gather for us the answers to any questions which might arise in the conduct of our discussions in New York. He even broached the point that it would be helpful if our body were here. He went on developing his idea, and I can see no disadvantage in an interdepartmental board, with appointees from each agency of Government who would get together the facts from the branches of Government concerned or would develop a statement of policy on the part of the departments concerned. The purpose of this would be to have a group in the State Department who would be in close contact with the President and get authoritative rulings on America’s position. Up to this point I can see advantages but no disadvantages.

Mr. Acheson went on to outline the idea that he might reconstitute, as a board, the Lilienthal Committee\textsuperscript{53} for the purpose of advising the State Department. As to this I demur, because I believe it could only complicate our problem. The scientists as a body do not agree, and I feel we have to make our determination with our staff as to what should be our policy. These problems are not often purely scientific problems. They blend very quickly into political problems. If we were able to keep the scientists onto the purely scientific aspects, I wouldn’t look for any trouble because there is fairly general agreement among the scientists as to the purely scientific aspects. The divergences come in when you start interpreting these scientific facts into a political policy. The scientists tend to be unbending and calculating in the field of science—which is natural—but they carry over their inelasticity into arguments in the field of international affairs, politics in the proper sense, and negotiation. They generally seek to have the whole story laid out before committing themselves to it and that

\textsuperscript{52} The meeting here described occurred on the evening of May 30.

\textsuperscript{53} Reference is to the Board of Consultants which advised the Secretary of State’s Committee on Atomic Energy.
doesn't lend itself to this plan of handling the problem. Mr. Baruch and Mr. Acheson are to talk that matter over further.

I told Mr. Acheson that I thought the military problems were entirely cleared now by the appointment of General Groves to act as the interpreter of military policy on behalf of the Chiefs of Staff and on behalf of the American delegation to the Military Security Committee [Military Staff Committee] of the United Nations Security Council. Mr. Acheson thought General Groves would be speaking without the support of the military authorities and, when I said that I had seen nothing in General Groves' conduct to lead me to support that belief, he was pleasant but firm in restating his position. Apparently, this is a relic of the fight of false issue about military versus civilian control, and also it may be a by-product of the feeling of the scientists toward General Groves. I understand that the most vehement of the group against General Groves is Dr. Urey, and I also understand, on good authority, that General Groves kept Dr. Urey, on four different occasions, from making the wrong practical interpretation of the scientific fact of which Dr. Urey was fully possessed.

I think the matter of drafting is quite cleared up now. There had been a view expressed earlier that we should start men drafting early. I expressed my view that there wasn't anything to draft at this stage of the operation, and yet it would be helpful to have assigned to us the men who were going to do the drafting and that they would be in a better position to do the drafting if they sat in on the decisions on policy matters which were later to be embodied in the form of a treaty draft. To me, it would be putting the cart before the horse to start drafting before policy decisions are made. We expressed our entire approval of having a man from the State Department to aid us in this work. When Mr. Byrnes emphasized the language difficulties and the suspicions that arise when a word is changed, it seemed clear to me

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54 In a letter of May 27, Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, Chief of Naval Operations, had informed Mr. Baruch that General Groves would represent the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to technical and security matters confronting the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission (Department of State Atomic Energy Files).

55 Dr. Harold C. Urey, Professor of Chemistry and member of the Staff of the Institute for Nuclear Studies, University of Chicago.

56 In a memorandum of June 2 to Hancock, Tolman stated the following:

"On page 3, it is stated that General Groves kept Dr. Urey, on four different occasions from making the wrong practical interpretation of scientific facts. This I think comes from me, and needs a little correction. What I said was that I could give four instances of where General Groves' scientific and engineering intuition was better than that of the scientists. Only one of these applies to Urey. This, however, was the very important one, that Urey thought that the diffusion process, for which he was the top scientist, ought to be abandoned, and Groves was the one who forced it through to its very successful conclusion, and thus really saved Urey's scientific reputation." (Department of State Atomic Energy Files)
that in any statement of policy which we draft and submit to the
Commission, it would be helpful to have such drafts reviewed by the
treaty drafters, as in that way we would be getting into our first
draft the same language as we would expect to use in the final draft.

Going back to this matter of organization, I can see advantages in
having a staff group in the State Department to dig up facts and to
act as a clearing point with the President for a statement of our
policies. I cannot see a situation in which the State Department would
attempt to present to the President for approval some different con-
tent of a statement of policy than one in entire keeping with our views.
If we have to go into battles before the President in case of a differ-
ence of point of view, then I think we want to carry our own banner
before the President rather than have differing recommendations sub-
mitted by people who may feel entirely free to alter our statements,
or might not knowingly do so.

It became very clear that we should work this out closely with the
President and the Department of State. The purpose of this would be
primarily to keep the President informed so that he would not say
something in his press conferences which would be contrary to the
position we might be taking in the Commission.

We distributed copies of the Ten-Point Policy Statement, which
were read over by all concerned.

There were two points discussed at quite some length. The problem
of automatic sanctions was gone over again, and I don’t recall any-
thing significant which was new. Mr. Baruch was again firm in his
argument that we must get some automatic penalties, or that other-
wise we had to tell the world that this plan gave us a warning of
between three months and a year, which was zero in our form of Gov-
ernment. I think Mr. Acheson quite doubts the wisdom of the sugges-
tion. He argued quite objectively for his point of view and didn’t insist
upon it at all. Mr. Byrnes thinks the penalties would be some deterrent.
Mr. Byrnes is going to see the President about the whole statement of
policy.

The other point of argument was with regard to uranium ore in the
ground. Mr. Acheson wants the Authority to be given the responsi-
bility of preventing diversion and so do we. He does not think the
inspection can be as good as ownership, and he even wants to go so
far as to give the right to take ore in the ground for power plants. I
don’t see this argument at all. If we advance the argument favoring
the right of eminent domain, we will to some degree facilitate the
production of bomb material and certainly that isn’t our purpose.

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*The memorandum under reference is not printed; for a summary of its
substance, see Hewlett and Anderson, p. 567. A redraft dated June 4 is printed
on p. 827.*
the same time the amounts required for the so-called beneficial uses are almost negligible. I see no reason to give Government the power to seize the property of one citizen, with the object of converting it to purely commercial purposes. If we don't make bombs and don't create potentially dangerous power plants, there is more uranium readily and immediately available to meet the needs of the so-called beneficial uses.

Mr. Acheson's argument is that Russia will not consent to inspection, and my argument—equally as firmly asserted—is that inspection can't be any more difficult for the Russians to accept than to accept ownership by an international body in any country in which the State is supreme and the private property does not exist as such. It would seem to me that if we try to assert the right of ownership, we will have a more difficult time with Russia than if we ask merely for control or dominion. Mr. Acheson's reply was that unless we own we cannot stop diversion in Russia. I do not see where an ownership gives us any advantage against inspection. On the other hand, I think, the nations which do believe in private property would demur to a Treaty asserting the right of eminent domain. Mr. Acheson claimed he did not quite understand my statement about ownership. We didn't get very far in a discussion of it, but the last thought expressed by him was that he wanted the Authority given the responsibility to safeguard uranium supplies and to prevent diversions in any and every way which it was [saw] fit. And I did not demur to ownership in some cases, leases in other cases, licenses in some cases, or in other words to a plan of operation in which the Authority would be free to use its judgment as to the best means of carrying out its responsibility. One difficulty is the inherent difficulty I see in all administrative law procedures. Unless some guides are set down for the administrative law authority, almost inevitably the authorities are anxious to grab a lot of power.

When I brought out the problems of the financial set up, capital funds, working funds, etc., Mr. Acheson said no work had been done in that field, and when he volunteered to get a group for it, I told him that Eberstadt would be free today and that he had that assignment. I plan to write Mr. Acheson and ask him for any work which has been done on this problem in connection with other international groups. I emphasize my concern that with the ending of the war and the desire of Congress to cut expenditures, with the inability of many parts of the world to benefit from our plans and their probable lack of desire to contribute to the work, I fear the international Authority will break down and do such a poor grade of work, because of lack of funds, that the Authority will lose public favor and support and become defunct. I fear that the entire financial obligation in the end will rest upon us,
and I do not look upon this prospect as favorable to the general project.

We had a long discussion about the reference to weapons of mass destruction. Mr. Byrnes said that the only intent back of the final resolution was to handle the matter of atomic energy and atomic bombs. He said that there had been mention made of biological warfare and that the broad term was used so that it might include biological warfare. I pointed out Mr. Byrnes' statement made after Moscow, to the effect that the problem was the atomic bomb and other matters related to it which, of course, would seem to exclude biological warfare. It looks frankly as if the intent now is being made to exclude it so as to simplify our job and that the effort is being made to build up the argument that this reference was a bit of window dressing so far as gaining support for the entire program. I agree with Mr. Byrnes that our major effort should be in the field of atomic energy at this time. I also agree with Mr. Baruch that we cannot dismiss the problem from our presentation. (In talking with General Groves on Friday morning, May 31, he brought out a suggestion that when we list the crimes in connection with atomic energy, we also mention the use of biological warfare and provide a penalty for it without pushing for an exact definition of all the crimes which might be set up in this connection.) While there wasn't any outspoken approval of either the content or the manner of expressing the other points, there likewise was no demurring to them.

During the day Mr. Baruch had questioned the wording in my memorandum—"It will readily be seen at this time that this is not the endorsement of the creation of national Authorities". He thought we should cover both sides of the issue rather than leave it in the present form which is one sided. He didn't use this expression, but I think his thought is that we neither endorse nor condemn the idea of having national bodies. In the discussion on this point last night, it seemed that the international bodies might wish to refer certain problems to national Authorities. For example, an international body might give a national body a certain quota of material for research or power plant use inside any one country. The international body could keep out of local politics by having allocations made by the national body.

I raised the query again as to whether it wouldn't be a good plan to provide that large power plants should be permitted by the international body only, with the approval of the Security Council. The difficulty in this matter is that with the uncertainties of development in the field of denaturing, we might be setting up in the Atomic Development Authority a power which would permit the location of civilian power plants in one country. In the uncertainties regard-
ing denaturing, in particular of plutonium, a permission given to one nation to build a large number of power plants might disturb the military balance among the nations to an extreme degree. It would be a factor of safety to have the location and the existence of such plants approved by the Security Council where such projects would come under the view of the military security group. This, of course, contemplates an advancement in power plant development and the right in the Authority to change its position regarding these large power plants. The difficulty is that if the Authority once permits a certain large power plant to use material which seems safe at the start, it might later have to draw back the potentially dangerous material and allow operation only with material which was safe in accordance with the changed standard. Have it explicitly stated that changing standards might require change of material. This would create a definite friction between the Atomic Development Authority and the nation involved, particularly if the nation involved were trying to set up large power plants so as to have larger production of bomb material more readily available in the event of need. While no specific assent was given to this idea, there was no demurring on the part of Messrs. Acheson or Byrnes.

There seemed to be a good deal of confusion in regard to the matter of licensing. Admittedly, I have not been trying to write a statute which would grant to the Atomic Development Authority any specific powers in the granting of licenses or any right to include in the terms of the license any specific project. I deliberately avoided doing this because I thought that an attempt to develop the terms of such licenses at this time would only take our eyes off the main problem. I certainly have no objection to a more specific statement than the ones I have used with regards to this license, their granting or their terms.

On the morning of May 31, Mr. Baruch and I talked with General Groves in the Shoreham Gardens. We reviewed the delegation of authority to him; the talk with Messrs. Byrnes and Acheson of last evening; the need of posting the Chiefs of Staff regarding our policy before any decision was made by the President as to national policy. We also went over our statement of the ten-point policy program and mentioned the two additional points which we had been discussing. These two points are a consideration of the MacArthur plan to embody in the Constitution of Japan a prohibition against war, and the idea developed from the Nuremberg trials that the individual has responsibility for violating the laws. General Groves commented on the second point to the effect that if the President ordered him to do something contrary to the Treaty, Gen. Groves would be aware of the criminal liability in international law in the event we lost the
war. We didn’t press the point, but I would guess that any military man would be skeptical on this point.

Gen. Groves used one very pat expression which impressed me very much. It arose in a discussion of what are weapons of mass destruction. In the suggestion previously discussed regarding a prohibition regarding biological warfare, he said we must make it impossible for any major nation to start a war. He didn’t satisfy himself with the statement that in the event war comes, all the forbidden weapons will be used. His statement rather was that as these terrible weapons will be used if war once starts, the only course of the nations to follow is to prevent any nation from starting a war. This is nothing particularly new by way of concept, but, I think, it is a better way of expressing the idea than I have previously heard.

I gave Gen. Groves my Ten-Point Program, and he went over it carefully. He thought the penalties should be “immediate and certain” rather than “prompt and certain” as I had written it.

I forgot to mention that Mr. Byrnes justifies the exclusion of biological warfare from our work at this time on the ground that these weapons have never proved themselves in warfare as has the atomic bomb. Mr. Byrnes thought that if we can solve this one problem of the atomic bomb, we can then go on to solve the others. I pointed out to him that the kind of inspection which might be adequate for controlling abuses with atomic energy quite certainly would not be adequate for these other kinds of warfare.

General Groves thinks that it is too strong a statement to say that it can be regarded “as probable” that atomic energy will in the course of years provide an important supplement to other methods of power production. He would not demur if the words “as probable” were changed to “quite possible”.

[Here follows an account of further discussion with General Groves concerning personnel and the release of classified information.]

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John M. Hancock of the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission

[WASHINGTON,] June 1, 1946.

I didn’t take notes so this memorandum will likely omit some matters which were discussed last evening.

For a long period we discussed various aspects of the Paris negotiations, the difficulties encountered there, the attitudes of the different

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58 This memorandum, written on the morning of June 1, describes a meeting attended by Messrs. Byrnes, Baruch, and Hancock.
nations—particularly Russia—the difficulties encountered in dealing with them—all as a background for our conducting ourselves in the negotiations coming up with reference to atomic energy.

Mr. Byrnes handed me a memorandum which, he said, Dean Acheson had dictated in about a half hour. Mr. Byrnes asked me to look it over in comparison with our policy statement. There wasn’t a clean-cut, sharp presentation of the reason for the Acheson rewrite, except that Mr. Byrnes wanted it put in the usual form of a State Dept. paper, in order to make it more in keeping with the practice of informing the President about contemplated national positions to be taken during the course of the negotiations. The first line of the Acheson statement is significant to me in that the document purports to be a “basis of discussion”, whereas I had thought it would purport to be a statement of policy. When put forward in its present form, it gives me the impression that we are much softer in our attitude than if the same material were to be presented as a matter of national policy. I am told that this is the diplomatic procedure in matters of this kind. I told Mr. Byrnes it would be more in support of Mr. Baruch and would put him in a stronger position—a position less likely to be traded against if Mr. Baruch would always be able to say that the statement was a definition of our position. Apparently the words have a different meaning in diplomatic procedure than I am accustomed to.

The Acheson statement was rather supposed by Mr. Byrnes to be a restatement of my ten-point memorandum of “policies for discussion May 30, 1946”. (The eleventh point, the exchange of information about raw materials and the survey, was dropped from our memorandum following our evening session on May 30.) The Acheson memorandum, of which I have only one copy, attached to the original of this memorandum, wasn’t an attempt to restate my memorandum in keeping with the views of the State Dept. It really was nothing but a review of the Acheson plan. Also in a copy attached to the original I marked the items in my statement which were not included in the Acheson statement. When I pointed this out to Mr. Byrnes, he emphasized that the statement was written for form rather than content, though it was partly to inform the President.

In reporting to the President, Mr. Byrnes had told him of the meetings and he approved the idea of the penalties as laid down in our memorandum. Mr. Byrnes recommended that it be included and the President assented. Mr. Byrnes told him that there were other minor

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59 The Acheson memorandum is a slightly revised version of the memorandum by the Board of Consultants to Mr. Baruch, of May 19, which is printed on p. 766. 60 The memorandum under reference is not printed; for a summary of its substance, see Hewlett and Anderson, p. 567. A redraft dated June 4 is printed on p. 827.
points of difference which, he thought, could be worked out in the ordinary course.

I told Mr. Byrnes that the Acheson memorandum did not have the content of my memorandum, and that I thought the best thing for me to do was to revise my statement of policies so as to make it as brief as possible, thus avoiding argument on the part of people who query why any change of wording occurs in successive drafts or handling of the idea. I had quite a discussion about the form, and I proposed that I would be glad to work with Ben Cohen after I once revised my statement. The purpose of working with Cohen would be to see that the form was acceptable to the State Dept. I made it very clear that I wasn’t in accord with the content of the Acheson memorandum. It isn’t too clear to me that the Acheson memorandum avoids all argument. Mr. Byrnes wants my statement in the form of conclusions without argument, and this is understood to be the usual procedure. I have not looked over the Acheson memorandum critically so as to see that it has no argument, but my impression is that it departs from the standard which Mr. Byrnes is aiming at.

I told Mr. Byrnes of my attempt to find the legislative history back of the expression, “other weapons of mass destruction”, but that I had gotten only his statement of the evening before. I told him that Gen. Groves, yesterday morning, had offered the suggestion that in the statement of crimes in connection with atomic energy, we might also work in a reference to the use of biological warfare as a crime calling for a penalty, and we might bring in the reference in an indirect way through some such statement as this. Later on in this conference we may want to consider the advisability of providing a penalty for the use of biological warfare and to set up an appropriate penalty at a proper time in our proceedings. We would not be advocating that as a part of our national policy. I have no sharp view as to whether this could be better handled as a statement of U.S. policies or as a part of Mr. Baruch’s personal talk. Mr. Byrnes reviewed the legislative history back of the expression, and in exactly the same form as I reported upon for the evening of May 30th.

The other matter which Mr. Byrnes had in mind as the difference which, he thought, could be reconciled, related to the matter of ownership of uranium ore in the ground. I had told Mr. Byrnes on Thursday night of the views we had in this matter, but apparently I had not been clear, as Mr. Byrnes said last night that he didn’t see the issue entirely in the clear.

I told Mr. Byrnes that when I first read over the Acheson Report, I felt sure there would be a flareup over the word “own” and that

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*Benjamin V. Cohen, Counselor, Department of State.*
before I talked to any mining men and before I read over the report of the Carnegie Foundation, the report also known as the Kerr Report, I had grave concern over that approach to the problem. It will be recalled that in a previous memo in reporting this discussion, I had used the word “control” rather than “own.” Dean Acheson had replied with the word “dominion,” and I had replied in turn with the word “absolute dominion.” I don’t believe there is much difference in position, although Mr. Acheson may feel that ownership adds some safety to control measures.

When the issue was made clear to Mr. Byrnes, it was quite fully discussed. I stressed that I want the International Authority to be the only owner of ore from “birth to death” from the mine mouth on. I mentioned the characteristic of ownership which would be documented by the filing of a deed in the Court House. I mentioned that I wasn’t sure of any similar concept in other parts of the world, particularly where there were not adequate maps and surveys to serve as a basis of the deed. Mr. Byrnes thought there was some benefit of ownership, particularly if the property were posted, and some neighbor came in to operate what was known as international property. I agreed that there might be signs posted or fences put up around known deposits. There is no possible way of owning unknown deposits, and presently unknown deposits could be mined in remote parts of the world without any discovery except the kind of discovery which would be a part of the inspection function as much as a part of the owning function.

I then pointed out that the best way to control atomic energy would be to keep the uranium in the ground so there was no reason to buy a lot of stuff which would only remain in the ground if we, in the A.D.A., were not prepared to buy it. The exception to this would be if a nation decided to violate the Treaty and do it in a way to escape attention. There would be no commercial benefit to their taking such action, and it certainly would be very difficult to produce enough such material for a bomb without revealing the existence of the metallurgical plants required to convert the ore into bomb material. I stressed the point that we were entirely in accord with A.D.A. ownership, management, control, and dominion over the final material ready for bombs. In the middle of the life history of the ore above ground until final use in a bomb, we were stronger than the Acheson Report with regard to so-called safe materials in large power plants. We feel that these plants will likely require the same kind of control as for bomb material, whereas the Acheson Report, relying largely on the denaturing process and its effectiveness, was willing to allow such plants to operate under private control.

I reviewed the argument about the application of eminent domain, agreeing that it would be entirely right and acceptable to our stand-
ards and that of other capitalistic countries to use that right in producing material for national security or for war. As our purpose is to prevent war, I see nothing to be gained by setting up the right of eminent domain.

I pointed out that I can see every benefit in favor of our plan as against the Acheson plan insofar as Russia might be concerned. I would think Russia would be more likely to object to international ownership than an international inspection. I cannot conceive Russia agreeing to turn over to an international sovereignty her own State property. I think it is more likely she would consent to inspection, particularly if we can set up some machinery which will keep espionage activities outside of the inspection activities.

On the other hand, I point out that the Acheson plan will have many difficulties with the capitalistic States, particularly in connection with the mines producing uranium as by-products.

I refer to the need of purchasing the entire Rand mines and taking over a control of a large part of the international mining activities, thus destroying or seriously limiting private enterprise in the capitalistic countries. I believe that America, Canada, Britain, Belgium (probably), the Belgian Congo, the Union of South Africa would certainly object to the Acheson plan. This plan would seem to all men in the capitalistic economy as the first start to an international socialized State. Even if the Acheson plan of ownership were to gain the approval of Russia, in preference to my plan of inspection, I think the capitalistic nations would check off that aspect of the plan as being thoroughly distasteful.

I told Mr. Byrnes that I thought it would be very difficult to provide the funds with which to do the purchasing of all of the uranium mines; that I thought the burden would fall upon us to provide the capital and the operating deficits; that Congress would be adverse to large appropriations for the purpose; that other nations could only be induced with great difficulty to carry on their share of the appropriations, because many of them could not get any remote gain from the beneficial uses so far discussed. I feel the ultimate result would be that we would cut down the funds, that the Authority would have to live within its funds, and that the character of its operations would suffer with the result that they wouldn’t have even a good inspection, as a result of which the whole operation would be a failure.

We discussed at some length the difficulties of a truly international managing personnel, the problems of local labor, the difficulty of setting up such a large organization as would be necessary, and the benefits of undertaking a smaller program. Of course, I wouldn’t argue for my point of view, if I were not convinced that inspection
can be as efficient to control diversions as if ownership were added to this same inspection. We discussed at some length the means of detecting diversion from mines and the fairly complete devices for locating radio-active materials, whether in the ground or on the person of anyone trying to steal such material, even if this stealing were attempted at the direction of Government.

I feel that if an International Authority tries to operate mines in various parts of the world, it will raise all sorts of questions which can only interfere with the local economy in a way which could not take place if private capital in the country were operating the mine. I did not argue the relative merits of Government operation against private operation, although I see no reason for favoring Government operation, except when it is necessary for the safety of the people or of the nation.

I pointed out that if the Authority had lots of money and were obligated to own, that there would be all sorts of difficulties in determining values and that in many places in the world, there would be low grade mines sold to the International Authority with tremendous pressure for high valuations; and I thought the bickering over the ore content in the mines and the basis of valuation would tend to break down international harmony rather than add to it. On the other side of this picture, if the International Authority doesn’t have the money and if it is the only possible purchaser of a mine, there will be charges of favoritism on the part of the International Authority toward a nation or its nationals desiring to sell their mining deposits. The fact is that we want the International Authority to have dominion. We want to rely upon punitive laws, and we believe that if we take title at the ground, we accomplish everything that is accomplished by the other plan of ownership and we do it with a lot less personnel and a lot less financial risks. With reference to the by-product mines, every one of the same complications would exist.

I agree that there ought to be dominion over the tailings. I also agree that the license given to a by-product mine should be very strict and should be made effective by inspection. I would control the maintenance of the stockpile of tailings, any movements from it, any handling of it by license, and I would make the penalties very severe. I certainly see no reason why—if a clear case is made out that the tailings are not being controlled in terms of the license or if there is any substantial reason to suspect diversion—the Authority should not clamp down, even to the extent of closing the entire mine. I believe that the complicated metallurgical processes, which are required for converting the ore along with the plants required, make it almost as easy to detect diversions at this point as at the earlier point of taking out of the ground. I think a nation which wanted to avoid detection
would find it far easier to get the material in several big power plants, denature it, and prepare it for use in a bomb, than to start back with the raw ore and go through all of the processes through which the ore goes before it is ready for use in big power plants.

While I have probably missed some points of the argument insofar as this memorandum is concerned, I think I have devoted enough space to the argument last night. At the end I pointed out our policy of desiring to interfere as little as possible with the private, Governmental and State economy, with the only reason for stepping into that field being one of national safety. In other words, I feel that the International Authority should not dip any further into established local customs or rights than is absolutely necessary for national safety. I question the fairness of any plan which seizes one man’s property, even at fair compensation, in order to give it to another man for a commercial purpose. This argument has been reviewed before. If we plan to provide for ownership, we shall have to set up standards, court practice, etc., and frankly I fear that the Authority may become liable to large payments if valuations are made by national courts against the International Authority. Having seen what has happened in Washington from pressure groups, I don’t want to further the activities of such groups. In the background of all this argument, of course, is my belief that if war uses are prevented, there isn’t any possible use for the metal now in sight.

There were two other points, outside of our ten-point memorandum, which were discussed. One was the matter of personal responsibility as set up in the Nuremberg trials. Mr. Byrnes’ view is that there is now in being adequate international law to cover the matter of personal responsibility for acts of war. He sees no reason to make that as a special point of our program, though he sees no objection to a mention of it. The discussion as to modifying National Constitutions wasn’t pressed to any conclusion.

Mr. Byrnes placed great emphasis upon the desirability of a Treaty, and I placed great emphasis upon a good, effective Treaty. He emphasizes agreement more than I do, because he thinks that the making of agreements gets people into a right frame of mind which will insure the maintenance of the Treaty relationships.

We reviewed at some length the warning given and our concern over the over-selling of the denaturing plan, and we thought it would be helpful to argue for the penalty provisions even if we failed to get them, because the country would see that in our opinion the Treaty wasn’t as good as we would like. I mentioned the situation in which we would find ourselves before the Senate when the confirmation question arises, because at the same time we would not be able to press unre-ervedly for ratification. We would, in effect, be saying:—This is not
as good as we wanted. It is as good as we can get. The Treaty does afford some protection, but the protection ranges from say three months to a year after the plan is in operation and assuming that it works up to our hopes. There, first, is the problem of the interim period during which we rely upon the incapacity of the world to produce a bomb within say five years. We will then be back to reliance upon the Treaty, with such faith as we have in its being lived up to. In order to avoid emphasizing the dangers, we should point out our belief that at the time of any discovered evasion, we would still probably have a head start over other nations because of our body of scientists, our experience, our industrial capacity, etc.

This morning, June 1, Mr. Byrnes telephoned me and we went over our conversation of last evening with reference to the difficulties between my 10 points and the Acheson memorandum, Mr. Byrnes’ statement to the President about the minor points of difference, my pointing out that the contents were entirely different, and Mr. Byrnes picking out of our conversation our general approval of the Acheson Report. He asked me to give him a memorandum which would point out the differences, with his purpose to give the memorandum to the President so that the President would be informed and would not make any slip or possibly be misled through Mr. Byrnes’ emphasis upon the minor points of difference, which could be reconciled.

We had planned to see Dean Acheson at 12:30 on Saturday, June 1st, and I arranged that if we didn’t find the time, I would cancel that engagement.

Mr. Byrnes told us he does not approve of the Acheson plan for reestablishing the Scientific Committee under the State Department. This was referred to in our memorandum.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by Mr. John M. Hancock of the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON.] June 1, 1946.

With reference to our telephone conversation this morning concerning the points of difference between Mr. Acheson’s draft of May 31st and my memorandum of policies for discussion of May 30th, I think there’s one substantial point of difference in the matter of ownership of the uranium ore in the ground as contemplated

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62 The May 31 Acheson draft is a slightly revised version of the memorandum by the Board of Consultants to Mr. Baruch of May 19 which is printed on p. 700. The Hancock memorandum of May 30 is not printed; for a summary of its substance, see Hewlett and Anderson, p. 567. A redraft dated June 4 is printed infra.
by Mr. Acheson and what I have chosen to call dominion or control short of ownership. I think ownership by the Atomic Development Authority should be permissive in its own decisions, but that the Authority should not be required to own all uranium in the ground. The reasons for it were discussed last night, and I would be glad to summarize my views if that seems desirable. I do not believe Mr. Acheson has made an adequate treatment of the problem of ownership with reference to mines producing uranium as a by-product.

It is my belief that there should be as little interference, as may be, with the economic plans and customs in the present private, corporate and state relationships in the several countries involved. I want us to attempt only as little as is necessary for national security. Each of us in our drafts emphasizes different points, depending upon judgments as to their importance.

I have taken some time to point out the beneficial results and our willingness to make them available to the world. I have tried to lay a foundation for understanding by pointing out that any international control is going to involve some surrender of jurisdiction.

Mr. Acheson does not include in his memorandum the penalty provision which has been so much discussed. I understand it is agreed that this matter will be included in the statement of United States policy.

The essence of our suggestions regarding penalties is that this may be a way of getting around the veto. There isn't any use in blinking that fact. Otherwise, penalty for violation will not be immediate and certain. One can only speculate about the deterrent effect of our penalty provisions.

I think I rely a little more than Mr. Acheson upon the terms of licenses which could, if properly authorized, be well within the framework of administrative law. I see every reason to set up specific provisions as to licenses, rather than to refer the problem to this Atomic Development Authority for its decision.

I doubt that I have the same reliance upon the denaturing process which seems to be the background of the Acheson Report. I also believe that there is more uranium and thorium ore in the world than any probable demands to serve peaceful purposes. I question whether America has not oversold the possibilities of commercial power plants operating under private control. This whole problem is going to become a matter of judgment on a changing set of facts. As of today, I would want such plants operated under the Authority.

Should certain conditions be met, the best we get is an advance warning of from three months to a year—not a year or more as Mr. Acheson states—assuming a forcing nation had the will to create an
atomic bomb. That is not enough time to marshal public opinion for a declaration of war by this country.

I treat with the point that any National Authority should be under the direction of the International Authority.

As to the virtue of operation versus policing, I don’t go as far as Mr. Acheson. I agree with his principle. I differ in the extent of its application. Of course, I am not proposing a mere policing organization.

If it can be done smoothly without creating a break in the negotiations, I think we should try to find out early what each nation has in the way of information about its uranium and thorium deposits and, that likewise, if a survey can be arranged for we might determine additional unknown resources and test the willingness of the world to accede to “complete access—free ingress and egress” for the purpose of detecting violations of the Treaty. We agree that this is not a matter of present statement of policy. In either event, it will be an essential of the Treaty and the only question is whether it is wise to take it up earlier so as to know what the raw material situation is, as it may affect the negotiation of the Treaty.

Other differences would be found on critical examination with a little more time available, but I think this memorandum summarizes the high-light. Our differences are largely matters of choice of subjects, of manner of procedure, of taste in expression, and of emphasis except in the matters of ownership and penalties.

I understand that I am to redraft my 10-point program for submission to you at an early date.

As a matter entirely outside the two memoranda, I have mentioned the importance of the military aspects of any Treaty and the need of working closely with the military authorities to complete any plan involving national security as much as this plan does. For this reason I think clearance of the policy statements with the military is important. Shall we undertake this or will you?

As another matter outside the two memoranda, Mr. Baruch wishes the President’s approval for his writing to the Chiefs of Staff for their views upon their ability to get ready for war in the event we receive only ninety days advance notice—or even a year’s notice—of a substantial violation of the Treaty. The second point of such an inquiry would relate to the effect on military planning if the Treaty should set up a plan for retaliation or penalty in the event any foreign nation were to commit any of the serious offenses set up in the Treaty as equivalent to an act of war. If this is approved by the President, may I be so advised?

John M. Hancock
The proposals in this paper, put forth as a basis of discussion, grow out of three basic conclusions:

1. It is believed that an international agreement leaving the development of atomic energy in national hands, subject to an obligation not to develop atomic energy for war purposes and relying solely on an international inspection system to detect evasions, will not provide adequate security and indeed may be a source of insecurity.

2. It is believed

(a) That a treaty merely outlawing possession or use of the atomic bomb would not be an effective fulfillment of the directions under which the Commission is to proceed; therefore, that an international atomic development authority be set up, with adequate powers:

(b) That in addition to the greatest safeguards which can be established through a competent international authority in this field, there should be immediate and certain penalties for certain defined crimes which the Commission should set up as a part of its plan; and

(c) That penalties of as serious a nature as the nations may wish and as immediate and certain in their operation as possible, be set up for such acts as

(1) Use or possession of an atomic bomb, or possession or separation of atomic material suitable for use in an atomic bomb;
(2) The seizure of an international authority plant;
(3) Construction of a plant for building atomic bombs;
(4) The creation or operation of dangerous projects in a manner contrary to or in the absence of a license to be granted by the international control body. Other offenses with other procedures and penalties will doubtless be a part of a control plan.

(d) It will be obvious that this necessarily involves an agreement for the disposal of all bombs and atomic material suitable for use in an atomic bomb.

(e) That the plan might also include a statement as to the employment of biological warfare and provide appropriate penalties therefor.

3. It is further believed that the aim of preventing atomic warfare can only be achieved by entrusting to an international organization

(a) Managerial control of all atomic energy activities intrinsically dangerous to world security;

*This document is a revision of Mr. Hancock's statement of May 30, p. 811, in view of the discussions between Byrnes and Baruch and their assistants on May 30 and 31 (Department of State Atomic Energy Files).*
(b) Power to control, inspect, and license all other activities and stages.

If an international agency is given sole responsibility for the dangerous activities, leaving the non-dangerous open to nations and their citizens and if the international agency is given and carries forward affirmative development responsibility, furthering among other things the beneficial uses of atomic energy and enabling itself to comprehend and therefore detect the misuse of atomic energy, these afford the best prospect of security.

For purposes of discussion, the following measures are proposed as representing the fundamental features of a plan which would give effect to the conclusions just stated. In this paper the proposed international agency is referred to as the Atomic Development Authority.

1. General—The Atomic Development Authority should seek to set up a thorough plan of control through various forms of ownership, dominion, licenses, operation, inspection, research and management by competent personnel.

It is believed that the plan of control in all its aspects must be adequate not only in concept—a combination of responsibility for developments as well as control—but in type of organization and in choice of personnel to guarantee the most effective control required to provide for the security of the nation. After this is provided for, there should be as little interference as may be with the economic plans and the present private corporate and state relationships in the several countries involved.

2. Raw Materials—The Atomic Development Authority when set up should have as one of its earliest purposes to bring under its complete dominion world supplies of uranium and thorium. The precise pattern of control for various types of deposits of such materials will have to depend upon the geological, mining, refining, and economic facts involved in different situations.

The Authority should conduct continuous surveys so that it will have the most complete knowledge of the world geology of uranium and thorium. The agency should also constantly investigate new methods for recovering these materials where they occur in small quantities so that as their recovery from such sources becomes practical, means of control can be devised.

It seems to be the minimum content of any plan that the international authority shall be given authority to license all production and shall be the sole buyer of any material from which uranium or thorium can be produced, sales to any other buyer being forbidden.

(a) On account of the character of the problem involved in mines where source materials may exist as by-products of other mining opera-
tions, all such operations must be carried on under license of the international authority. Such licenses should include every reasonable protective device to insure that source material of no matter how low a grade shall be handled, protected and disposed of only in accordance with the directions of the international authority. A license should permit the international authority to stop mining operations involving source materials except in keeping with the terms of such a license. It is assumed that if proper safeguards are established for the maintenance, protection and care of tailings, such materials may be permitted to accumulate when properly safeguarded. If our world demand should not require the normal output of this by-product uranium or thorium it is not our thought that the power should be given without restriction to the international authority to stop the entire mining operation.

(b) On the other hand, mines producing uranium or thorium not as a by-product of other mining operations, but operating under license from the international authority might be closed not only for violations of their licenses but also because of a surplus of production. It is conceivable, until world supplies are surveyed, that there may be situations in which the Authority should have power to require operation if the owners should decide not to operate such a mine—or course under proper provision for “fair compensation”.

(c) When the Atomic Development Authority finds it advantageous to own a mine producing source materials, it may buy such a mine.

(d) In the case of every mine, there should be absolute dominion and control by the international authority over the products containing source materials.

Under this plan, when ore gets to the mine mouth, or in the case of a by-product operation, when the ore starts toward the metallurgical process for the production of uranium, it is contemplated it belong to the Atomic Development Authority and be subject to its sole control thereafter.

3. Primary Production Plants—The Atomic Development Authority should exercise complete managerial control of the production of fissionable materials. This means that it should control in all cases, and ordinarily should operate all plants producing fissionable materials in dangerous quantities and own and control the product of these plants.

4. Atomic Explosives—The Authority should be given exclusive authority to conduct research in the field of atomic explosives. Research activities in the field of atomic explosives are essential in order that the Authority may keep in the forefront of knowledge in the field of atomic energy and fulfill the objective of preventing illicit manufacture of bombs. Only by preserving its position as the best informed agency will the Authority be able to tell where the line between the intrinsically dangerous and the non-dangerous should be
drawn. If it turns out at some time in the future, as a result of new discoveries, that other materials or other processes lend themselves to dangerous atomic developments, it is important that the Authority should be the first to know. At that time measures would have to be taken to extend the boundaries of safeguards.

5. Strategic Distribution of Activities and Materials—The activities entrusted exclusively to the Authority because they are intrinsically dangerous to security should be distributed throughout the world, with the approval of the Security Council. Similarly, stockpiles of raw materials and fissionable materials should not be centralized.

6. Non-Dangerous Activities—Atomic research (except in explosives), the use of research reactors, the production of radioactive tracers by means of non-dangerous reactors, the use of such tracers, and to some extent the production of power should be open to nations and their citizens under reasonable licensing arrangements from the Authority. Denatured materials necessary for these activities should be furnished, under lease or other suitable arrangement by the Atomic Development Authority.

It should be an essential function of the Atomic Development Authority to promote to the fullest possible extent the peacetime benefits that can be obtained from the use of atomic energy. In the field of pure science, the radiations and radioactive isotopes, produced as a consequence of atomic fission, are already being used in this country, though the supply is not yet adequate, for fundamental researches in physics and biology. In the field of applied science, these same radiations and isotopes will become available for medical and industrial utilization. And in the field of engineering, it can be regarded as quite possible that atomic energy will in the course of years provide an important supplement to other methods of power production for the national economy of all countries.

It is necessary at all times to take advantage of the opportunity for promoting decentralized and diversified national and private developments and of avoiding unnecessary concentration of functions in the Authority. It should, therefore, be a primary function of the Authority to encourage developments by nations and private enterprise in the broad field of non-dangerous activities.

7. Definition of Dangerous and Non-Dangerous Activities—The Atomic Development Authority should have power to decide what activities relating to atomic energy are dangerous or non-dangerous and to change its decisions as conditions change. Although a reasonable dividing line can be drawn between the dangerous and the
non-dangerous, it is not hard and fast. Machinery should therefore be provided to assure constant examination and re-examination of the question, and to permit revision of the dividing line as changing conditions and new discoveries may require.

8. Management and Licensing—It is believed that at the proper stage in the progress contemplated in a control plan, any plant dealing with uranium or thorium after it once reaches the potential of dangerous use must be not only subject to the most rigorous and competent inspection on the part of international authority, but also that its actual operation shall be under the management, supervision, and control of the international authority. The international authority shall also have powers to license operation by others until such time as the international authority is prepared to take on the responsibilities involved in this character of operation, but with a clear understanding that the international authority will not permit any such operation if in its judgment, such operation will lessen the security of the nations.

9. Inspection Activities—By assigning intrinsically dangerous activities exclusively to management by the Atomic Development Authority, the difficulties of inspection are thereby reduced to manageable proportions. For if the Atomic Development Authority is the only agency which may lawfully conduct the dangerous activities in the field of raw materials, primary production plants, and research in explosives, then visible operation by others than the Authority will constitute a danger signal.

The plan does not contemplate any systematic or large-scale inspection procedures covering the whole of industry. The delegation of authority for making inspections will have to be carefully drawn so that the inspection may be adequate for the needs and responsibilities of the Authority and yet not go beyond this point. Many of the inspection activities of the Authority should grow out of and be incidental to its other functions. An important measure of inspection will be those associated with the tight control of raw materials, for this is one of the keystones of the plan. The continuing activities of prospecting, survey and research in relation to raw materials will be designed not only to serve the affirmative development functions of the agency but also to assure that no surreptitious operations are conducted in the raw materials field by nations or their citizens. Inspection will also occur in connection with the licensing functions of the Authority. Finally, a means should be provided to enable the international organization to make special “spot” investigations of any suspicious national or private activities.

10. Personnel—The personnel of the Atomic Development Author-
ity should be recruited on a basis of proven competence but also so far as possible on an international basis, giving much weight to geographical and national distribution. Although the problem of recruitment of the high-quality personnel required for the top executive and technical positions will be difficult, it will certainly be far less difficult than the recruitment of the similarly high-quality personnel that would be necessary for any purely policing organization.

11. Negotiation Stage—The final step in the creation of the system of control is the spelling out, in comprehensive terms of the functions, responsibilities, authority, and limitations of the Atomic Development Authority. Once a Charter for the agency has been written, and adopted, the Authority and the system of control for which it will be responsible will require time to become fully organized and effective. The plan of control will therefore have to come into effect in successive stages. These should be specifically fixed in the Charter or means should be otherwise set forth in the Charter for transitions from one stage to another, as contemplated in the resolution of the U.N. Assembly which created this Commission.

12. Disclosures—In the deliberations of the United Nations Commission on Atomic Energy, the United States must be prepared to make available the information essential to a reasonable understanding of the proposals which it advocates. Further disclosures must be dependent, in the interests of all, upon the effective ratification of this treaty. If and when the Authority is actually created, the United States must then also be prepared to make available other information essential to that organization for the performance of its functions. And as the successive stages of international control are reached, the United States must further be prepared to yield, to the extent required by each stage, national control of activities in this field to the international agency.

It should require a still longer time to produce enough atomic bombs to have an important influence on the outcome of war. Thus all the nations of the world should receive well in advance of the possible time of attack by atomic weapons clear, simple, and unequivocal danger signals that would enable them to prepare all measures of protection that would be available—an opportunity which would be wholly lost to them in the event of surprise attack. This warning in time should bring into operation the plan for the “immediate and certain penalties”. Our working together here should help build a broad confidence among the peoples of the world and the plan which emerges from our work should still further advance this confidence.

As the plan goes into operation and continues, it can, moreover, create deterrents to the initiation of schemes of aggression, and it can
establish patterns of cooperation among nations, the extension of which may even contribute to the solution of the problem of war itself.

14. **International Control**—There will be questions about the extent of control allowed to national bodies, should an international body be established and in this respect, it is believed that any control by an atomic energy authority set up by any state should be subordinate to direction and absolute dominion on the part of the international authority. It will readily be seen at this time that this is not an endorsement or disapproval of the creation of national authorities, or a definition of their jurisdiction. This problem will be before the Commission and it should deal with a clear separation of duties and responsibilities of such state authorities if such are included in any plan, with the purpose of preventing possible conflicts of jurisdiction.

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**Memorandum Prepared in the Division of International Security Affairs**

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 5, 1946.

SWNCC/MS UNO Doc. 28

**REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS**

**U.S. COMMITMENTS UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS AS GUIDANCE TO FORMULATION OF A PROGRAM**

**PROBLEM**

1. To set forth U.S. commitments under the Charter of the United Nations as guidance in formulating a United States program for the regulation of armaments.

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64 Lot 58D138, a consolidated lot file in the Department of State containing documentation on armaments, regulation of armaments, and disarmament, 1943-1960.

65 This paper was prepared in response to the request by the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in SWNCC 240/D, December 28, 1945; for text, see the attachment to Johnson's memorandum to Hiss, February 25, 1946, p. 755. The present paper was submitted to the Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments at its 2nd Meeting, June 5; with respect to the establishment and functions of PCA, see footnote 72, p. 840. The present paper was intended for eventual transmittal to the Ad Hoc Committee to Effect Collaboration between the State, War, and Navy Departments on Security Functions of the United Nations, where it was to serve as the basis for discussion in determining a United States position. PCA Chairman Hilldring appointed a Sub-committee on the Regulation of Armaments to consider the present paper. The Sub-committee's preliminary report, PCA D-5/3, not printed, was submitted to PCA at its 26th Meeting, December 6, 1946. The report consisted of a list in outline form, "Topics to Be Considered in Connection with the Formulation of Specific United States Proposals for the Regulation of Armaments." PCA took no decision on PCA D-5/5 in 1946, nor did the Ad Hoc Committee actually undertake the formalization of a United States position. (Department of State Disarmament Files)
2. To recommend procedures by which the United Nations can meet its responsibilities in respect to the regulation of armaments.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION
(See Enclosure "A")

CONCLUSIONS

3. The United States and other permanent members of the Security Council have an obligation under the Charter to participate in the Security Council in the formulation of plans for the regulation of armaments in such manner that peace is maintained with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources, to the end that the Purposes and Principles of the Charter are upheld, and to the end that armaments are not a deterrent to the stability and well-being of members.

4. Under the Charter, the permanent members of the Security Council have not only equality of status before international law in all respects possessed by states by virtue of being sovereign but also have equality of special responsibility with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security. A logical development of this principle would be for these members to have a practical equivalence in readily available armaments. (For definition of armaments, see page 3 of Enclosure "A".) This would discourage aggression by any one or any two of the five in combination and would thus enhance the chances of lasting peace.

5. In achieving this practical equivalence, emphasis should be placed on reducing the readily available armaments of the more powerfully armed of the permanent members, the United States and the Soviet Union, rather than on augmenting the forces of the others.

6. A United States policy of shipping arms to other permanent members of the Security Council should be judged in the light of the principle of equivalence and should be consistent with the Charter obligations to reduce the total burden of armaments as far as possible.

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66 Not printed. It contains the following sections: Charter provisions pertaining to the regulation of Armaments, positions taken at Dumbarton Oaks on regulation of armaments, definition of terms, military obligations of permanent members of the Security Council under the Charter, military obligations under the Charter of other members of the United Nations, other Charter obligations affecting regulation of armaments, weighing military and other obligations of United States under the Charter, the necessity for adjusting the readily available armaments of the permanent members in line with Charter obligations, U.S. armaments policy with respect to other permanent members of the United Nations, urgent problems of regulation, present status of problems, and procedure
7. While the medium and small powers have military obligations under Article 43 of the Charter, these will not be great. However, it is evident that in addition to any contingents or other contributions which such governments may make available to the Security Council, these governments will, as in the case of the great powers, require additional forces for self-defense and the maintenance of internal order.

8. The Security Council should provide appropriate machinery for handling matters relating to the regulation of armaments. This machinery, however, should be supplemented by conversations, bilateral or otherwise, between the United States and other permanent members.

RECOMMENDATIONS

9. That the conclusions in paragraphs 3 through 8 be approved.

10. That the following program for further development of this Government’s position be adopted:

A. The development through SWNCC of a statement of general principles in extension of paragraphs 4 and 5 of these conclusions.

B. The discussion of these general principles with the other permanent members as soon as possible after the completion of A.

C. The development concurrently with A of a paper in response to SWNCC 240/D containing the outline of a general plan for the regulation of armaments, including the traffic in arms. The general plan as outlined would embody the principles emerging from the study scheduled under A.

D. Upon the completion of A, B and C, or sooner if the question of the regulation of armaments is raised in the United Nations, the making of a recommendation that the Security Council establish a committee on the regulation of armaments to consider and report to the Council on all matters referred to it.

E. The introduction in the Committee on the Regulation of Armaments the positions outlined in A and C.

11. That the United States Representatives on the Security Council and Atomic Energy Commission be informed that the United States considers:

A. That the Commission for the Control of Atomic Energy should seek as a matter of highest priority a plan for the prevention of the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes.

B. That the consideration of major weapons adaptable to mass destruction other than atomic weapons should not be permitted to delay the formulation of the plan indicated in A above.

12. That the Department of State be requested to implement paragraph 11 above.
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, June 6, 1946.

Comments on "Statement of United States Policy" (John M. Hancock Draft June 4, 1946) 67

It is assumed that this Statement, if approved by the President, is designed to serve as the instructions to the United States Representative, and that Mr. Baruch's opening speech to the United Nations Commission would be based upon it. Study of the draft suggests the following comments:

A. The provisions of 2(b) and 2(c), pages 1 and 2, propose a system of penalties for violations of the control plan. As indicated by 2(c) the violations in question are of such a serious character that if committed by a major power they would result in complete collapse of the plan.

The treaty establishing the control plan would of course have to contain comprehensive provisions covering the grave crisis that would occur in the event the plan collapsed. But for reasons which have been described in discussions with Mr. Baruch and Mr. Hancock, it is believed that the proposed system of penalties does not represent a realistic or effective approach to the problem.

B. Paragraph 2(e), page 2, is concerned with the possibility of covering biological warfare in the plan and penalty system. As to the penalties, the same comment applies as in A above.

C. Paragraph number 2, pages 3 to 6, deals with Raw Materials control. This paragraph is in substantial conflict with the corresponding provisions of the memorandum of May 31, 1946 "Proposed Statement of United States Policy", which was discussed with the President (copy attached) 88 and with the Report on International Control of Atomic Energy which was the basis of the memorandum of May 31.

The effort made in the draft of June 4 to leave major production activities relating to uranium and thorium in private or national hands would nullify one of the keystones of the Report on International Control of Atomic Energy. It is believed that the memorandum

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67 The June 4 Hancock draft is printed on p. 827. On the basis of the comments contained in the present document, Messrs. Acheson and Marks completed revision of the June 4 Hancock statement on June 6. The document presented to and approved by President Truman on the following day (post, p. 846) was identical with the Acheson–Marks revision with two exceptions. In paragraph 2(b) of the final statement, the word "penalties" replaced the word "procedure" in the Acheson–Marks draft. Secondly, paragraph 7(a) of the final statement had not appeared in the draft. (Department of State Atomic Energy Files)

88 Not printed.
of May 31 indicates the maximum degree of flexibility that can safely be suggested in a general statement of position on Raw Materials. The draft of June 4 goes very much further and in so doing opens the door to an insistence by other nations on national or private operation of mines under inspection arrangements which the United States could never accept as adequate for security.

D. Paragraph number 4, page 6, "Atomic Explosives", is similar to the corresponding paragraph of the memorandum of May 31 except for the omission of the sentence, "When the plan is fully in operation there would be no stockpiles of atomic bombs anywhere in the world, either in national or international hands." Possibly the same thought was intended in paragraph 2(d), page 2, June 4 draft, and in that case the omission in question could be supplied by merely making paragraph 2(d) somewhat more explicit.

E. Paragraph number 5, page 6, "Strategic Distribution of Activities and Materials", is phrased somewhat differently from the corresponding provision of the May 31 memorandum. It is not clear whether the change was intended to alter the substance of the earlier paper. Specifically, the suggestion in this paragraph of the June 4 draft that intrinsically dangerous activities should be distributed throughout the world with the approval of the Security Council has serious implications which it is believed require further consideration before the United States position becomes fixed.

F. Paragraph 7, page 8, "Definition of Dangerous and Non-Dangerous Activities", proposes that the Atomic Development Authority should have power to decide what activities relating to atomic energy are dangerous or non-dangerous and to change its decisions as conditions change. Within limits, the Authority should have this power but the problem is so complicated that it is believed the initial United States position should be left more fluid (Compare Report on International Control of Atomic Energy, G.P.O. edition, page 46). Omission of the first sentence in this paragraph would be helpful on this point.

G. Paragraph 8, page 8, is headed "Management and Licensing". The purpose and effect of this provision is not clearly understood.

H. It is assumed that paragraph 12, page 10, "Disclosures", would not foreclose the plan of procedure outlined in pages 2–4 of Mr. Marks’ memorandum of May 30 (copy attached).69

I. It is not clear whether the first full paragraph on page 11 relates to protection against surprise attack during the transition period or is intended to cover both the transition and the period of full operation. The paragraph seems to require clarification.

69 Ante, p. 806.
CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] June 6, 1946.

I have no other purpose than to serve. My presence here is, first, to get from you my instructions as to major policy and, second, to decide with your help and JFB's, whether I am the best instrument of carrying out your policy.

Frankly, I believe that the only possible issue that can arise is as to how far this country wants to go in the declaration of policy. I have been immersed in this for almost two months now, with greater intenstness than in any other work that I have assumed. I am deeply convinced that any expression which falls short of bringing a sense of security and a sense of truth to the public would be a gigantic error.

In fact, I have convinced myself that this is the only course I can follow with justice to the job. It may not be the best from the standpoint of the country—on that I shall not presume to judge—but I know it is the best from the standpoint of my serviceability.

That policy is to set a goal for which we should strive. Necessarily it must be inclusive of a statement of regulations, controls, and above all, punishment or sanctions. In this last lies the essential difference between the Acheson-Lilienthal Report and my own position.

There is no difference between the Acheson Report and my own view, except this:

I want to go further than the text of that document, while the authors are content with its limitations. Those limitations I regard as dangerously restrictive. Quite apart from the fact that no punishment is provided or indicated for violators of the regulations, it is admitted that we would only have from 3 months to a year in the way of warning, and as time goes on and as the art and science of the bomb improve, that factor of safety will be diminished.

I give you this high light, relating to the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, because of my unrest at a disposition I have observed, to take that document as our basic policy and to have further policy grow out of committee meetings and negotiations.

If you will permit me to say so, I doubt that that is the proper method. It may be the best course to pursue in the ordinary processes of diplomacy but, as I see this question, it is one that strikes to the

70 Mr. Baruch prepared this memorandum for his meeting with the President and the Secretary of State on June 7. At that meeting, the President signed it as an indication of general approval. (Heiwlett and Anderson, p. 674)
very heart of public thinking and feeling and, therefore, you and this country should be the first to proclaim an intention of reaching not merely a basis of negotiations but a formula of a secure peace.

There are two courses open to us:

1. To . . .11 these people and express the hopes of finding a solution to the problem, as laid down by the terms of reference, in the statement of Messrs. Truman, Attlee and King, and at the Moscow Conference, and which has been laid down by Mr. Byrnes on many occasions. "Here is the Acheson Report which we give you as an approach to the subject and, as has been indicated by some, there will be developed in the discussions and negotiations an understanding and a meeting of minds that will bring results."

2. The other course is to state the necessity of the Atomic Development Authority, of an international organization, outlining it not in complete detail but so that it can be grasped with its control of raw materials up to the final use of atomic energy. And further bringing to the attention of the American people the short-comings so as not to have their hopes or that of the world raised, and showing the necessity of adding enforcement to the engagements entered into by the nations. At this time I must bring to your attention that denaturing, which has raised the hopes of the people, has been overplayed in the Acheson plan. At the same time I want to tell you that our secrets are not as secret as we think they are.

Let me make plain to you, Mr. President, that I think the Acheson Report is a very good document within very sharp limitations. I do not believe that it represents a plan on which you can stand, but it is an important plank in that platform. And incidentally, may I add, that I have a very high opinion of the Under Secretary personally.

In saying to you that I regard penalization as being the sine qua non of our policy, I am quite aware of the fact that it may bring us athwart of the veto power, for this particular purpose, since it might require war as an ultimate penalization. If so, then either the penalty must be dropped or the structure of the United Nations must be changed or this is a separate body functioning outside of the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

I cannot, at the moment, supply an outline of the mechanism whereby punishment is to come, but that might be developed in the course of negotiations, if there were true intent on the part of all the nations to eliminate the atomic bomb—eventually to eliminate war—

11 Word or words omitted in the source text.
and eventually to abolish the use of other instrumentalties of destruction with the eventual purpose of eliminating war.

Department of State Disarmament Files

Memorandum Prepared in the Central Secretariat of the Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments*72

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 7, 1946.

PCA D-5

ARMS CONTROL POLICY AND PROBLEMS

GENERAL POSITION

The Department does not have an explicit general policy on arms control. The President and the Secretary of State have publicly endorsed the principle of limiting world armament by international agreement; and this country is committed to the use of procedures for the regulation of armaments such as those found in Articles 11 and 47 of the United Nations Charter. The Department's representative has presented to SWNCC the view that plans for the regulation of arms traffic by the United Nations Organization fall within the jurisdiction of the Security Council, acting with the advice and assistance of the Military Staff Committee, and that its discussions should not be limited to private traffic in arms (see SWNCC 219 series).*73

PRESENT POLICY

Policy has been formulated on such points as:

72 The Secretary of State established the Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments by a directive dated May 20, 1946, and circulated as document PCA D-1, May 27. The directive designated Assistant Secretary for Occupied Areas John H. Hilldring Chairman of the Committee. The Chairman of PCA, also Department of State Representative on the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, was responsible for the coordination of Department of State policy with respect to all matters concerning arms and armaments. The membership of PCA included representatives of the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, the geographic offices, the Office of Special Political Affairs, and the Office of Controls. With the establishment of PCA, the Armaments Working Committee, the Arms Policy Committee, and the Working Committee on Arms Control were abolished. PCA first met on May 31. The Committee's minutes, numbered documents, and other papers are located in the consolidated disarmament lot file.

The present memorandum was considered by PCA at its 3rd Meeting, June 12. Various questions discussed in the document were referred to competent subcommittees for study.

For documentation on general United States policy on the question of military assistance to foreign governments, see pp. 1110–1196 passim.

For documentation on United States policy with respect to military assistance to specific areas of the world or individual nations, see regional and bilateral compilations elsewhere in the Foreign Relations series.

73 See documents SWNCC 210/4, January 15, and SWNCC 219/5D, January 18, pp. 730 and 731, respectively.
1. The disarmament and demilitarization of Germany (SC–106,74 SC–107,75 the Potsdam Communique);
2. The disarmament and demilitarization of Japan (SWNCC 70/10 76 and the publication, 22 Sept 45, of the U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy Document for Japan); 77
3. The limitation of military establishments for Italy and the principal satellite states to what is necessary to maintain order and protect borders (Secretary’s statement in Press Conference, 12 Feb 46; a document [SWNCC 244 series] 77a on the treaties of peace with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary is before SWNCC); 78
4. The prevention of shipments of military equipment and capital equipment for arms manufacture to Argentina, and the attempt to secure the cooperation of the United Kingdom and Sweden in this policy (Secret Summary of Developments for 16, 18 Jan 46,79 the Working Committee on Arms Control 80 and the Staff Committee have considered documents on this);
5. The refusal to sell military equipment of any kind to Spain (Secret Summary of Developments, 3 Jan 46,81 Public Statement, 29 Jan 46);
6. The reduction to a minimum of plans for military assistance to China (SWNCC 83/16, approved on 10 Jan 46); 81
7. The restriction of the use of United States surplus military-type equipment for arming other nations to those special cases where specific commitments exist (Secretary’s Staff Committee, 5 Feb 46); 84
8. The reduction to a minimum of the supply of arms and military equipment to the other American republics under the Arms Standardization Program, and the Department’s recommendation of a full review of the Arms Standardization Program particularly in view of its possible effect on international efforts to control arms traffic (Secretary’s Staff Committee, 12 Jan 46);
9. The rigid limitation of disclosures of classified military information to foreign governments and their nationals (Armaments Committee Document approved by the Coordinating Committee 17 Oct 45 and by SWNCC 206/9, 21 Jan 46); 81

74 “SC” is the designation of documents circulated in the Secretary of State’s Staff Committee; for information on that body, see footnote 15, p. 1118. SC–106 consists of the directive to the Commander-in-Chief of United States forces of occupation regarding the military government of Germany, April 26, 1945, the Acting Secretary of State’s memorandum of March 23, 1945, on which the above directive was based, and the Acting Secretary of State’s memorandum of April 26, 1945, transmitting the directive to the President for his approval; for texts, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. iii, pp. 489, 471, and 483, respectively.
75 Comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the April 26, 1945, directive cited in footnote 74 above; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. iii, p. 509.
76 September 10, 1945, not printed.
77a Brackets appear in the source text.
78 SWNCC 244, June 5, 1946, not printed.
79 None printed.
80 A predecessor of the Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments in the Department of State.
81 Not printed.
84 See the Summary of Action of the 18th Meeting of the Secretary of State’s Staff Committee, February 5, 1946, p. 1141.
10. The creation of the Atomic Energy Commission, as part of a program to seek world agreement on means for preventing the destructive use of atomic energy (Joint US-UK Declaration 15 Nov 45 and the terms of reference of the Atomic Energy Commission). 88

POLICY PROBLEMS

Policy problems relating to arms control which are now facing the Department can be divided into two groups: (a) those arising directly from the liquidation of the war; and (b) those emerging in the post-war world.

LIQUIDATION OF THE WAR

The first includes the disarmament and industrial demilitarization of former enemy states and the disposal of captured matériel and Allied surplus military equipment. The principal remaining problems in this area for which no clear policy has been developed are:

1. The size of military establishments to be allowed to Italy and the satellite powers;
2. Final questions on the de-industrialization of Germany, particularly the disposition of the Ruhr and Rhineland; and
3. The possibility that another Allied power might seek to dispose of surplus military equipment to some third state, especially in Latin America.

LIMITATION OF ARMS

The second group of policy problems includes: (a) the limitation and concerted reduction of military establishments throughout the world; and (b) the control of future international arms traffic. On the question of arms limitation, our existing policy is extremely general and leaves most of the specific problems to be decided. The Department should formulate its position on such questions as:

1. Whether we should take the lead in an effort to achieve international arms limitation;
2. The extent of multilateral disarmament which we should be prepared to propose, support or accept;
3. The relation of our announced general policy of favoring disarmament to existing programs for military assistance to certain other states (especially China, France and Turkey);
4. The relation of our national security program to the same overall policy objective (See SC-169b, Action of Joint Chiefs of Staff Statement of United States Military Policy); 87 and
5. The military use of atomic energy.

CONTROL OF ARMS TRAFFIC

At present there is no stated policy on the control of international arms traffic; but recommendations for an interim agreement on arms

88 Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1504, or 60 Stat. (pt. 2), 1479.
87 Post, p. 1123.
traffic are pending before the Working Committee on Arms Control, and the Department has referred our policy of military cooperation with the other American republics to SWNCC for thorough review. The whole problem of control of arms traffic is particularly acute for this country because the chief market for such trade is in Latin America. Specific problems to be dealt with in the near future are:

1. The interim agreement on arms traffic;
2. The relation of our military assistance program for Latin America to our general policy objectives;
3. The practicality of closing the Latin American market by other means than the program for the standardization of Latin American arms on American models.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by the United States Representatives on the Military Staff Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

USMS 334 CCAE

[NEW YORK,] 7 June 1946.

Subject: Visit to Office of Mr. Bernard Baruch.

1. At 1030 hours on 6 June

   General Kenney 58  
   Admiral Turner 60  
   Lt. General Ridgway 60  
   Rear Admiral Ballentine 61  
   Colonel Gilmer 62

called at the Office of the Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Control Commission 63 on the 64th floor of the Empire State Building.

2. The members of the Atomic Control Commission present were:

   Mr. Bernard Baruch, Chairman  
   Dr. Richard C. Tolman, Scientist  
   Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt, Adviser  
   Mr. Fred Searls, Jr., Adviser  
   Mr. John Parks Davis, Executive [Officer]

3. No representatives of the State Department were present.

58 Gen. George C. Kenney, United States Representative on the Military Staff Committee.
60 Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, United States Representative on the Military Staff Committee.
61 Rear Adm. J. J. Ballentine, Member of the United States Delegation to the Military Staff Committee.
62 Col. Dan Gilmer, Adviser, United States Delegation to the Military Staff Committee.
4. It was explained to Mr. Baruch that the US MSC Representatives had made the visit in order to become acquainted and to offer assistance.

5. Mr. Baruch indicated that he had taken the job but that a clear piece of paper had not been given him; that there were many reservations already indicated such as the Acheson Report, the personal thoughts of President Truman, those of Mr. King (Canada), and those of Mr. Attlee (Great Britain). He mentioned also that Mr. Stassen and a Mr. Woodward of Oxford University had propounded certain theories on this subject.

6. The matter of a treaty was discussed in considerable detail. Mention was made that such treaty would cause a profound change on our entire governmental structure, the power of Congress and also the government structure of all nations as well.

7. Mr. Baruch stated that he was struck by General Arnold's exposition on a series of bases around the world. Here he mentioned that our methods of offense and defense would be changed drastically now that we have to deal with the atomic bomb.

8. Mention was made by Mr. Searls of the possibility of establishing bases of strategic readiness with stock piles of four to six bombs at specific locations over the world; that base commanders could have sealed orders. It was pointed out (1) that with different nationalities under the security force it would be difficult to expect them to participate against their own countries, and (2) that the United States would not desire to have foreign powers near the United States with atomic bombs at their disposal to drop on us without notice.

9. Mr. Baruch said, "It will be too late, if something is not done by prior agreement outside the Security Council on such happenings. The need is so great that we must re-examine every possibility for an international authority. If it can't be done the whole argument (for an international Atomic Authority) is no good."

10. Mr. Baruch stated that he proposed to be very frank with the President on this matter; that he felt "dreadfully hobbled."

11. Mr. Baruch felt that the military should be warned on the great implications of the atomic matter and that he would like to get the J.C.S. answer "before the President approves the proposal."

12. The following statement was made by Mr. Eberstadt: "Can we do anything worth while or is what ever we do worthless." He felt that the elimination of bombs was not in itself important.

13. General Kenney pointed out the difficulties we were having in

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94 Harold E. Stassen, former Governor of Minnesota; Member, United States Delegation to the San Francisco Conference, 1945.
95 General of the Army Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces, 1942–March 1946.
the MSC; that the J.C.S. of no nation agree; that the policies must stem from the politicos before the military can operate.

14. Mr. Baruch stated that he did not want to offer anything that the Army or the Navy does not consider feasible; that the safety factor of from three months to one year, now estimated by the scientists under a strict method of inspection, would diminish rapidly.

15. Mr. Baruch stated that a warning by itself was not "worth a damn."

16. Mention was made that General Groves had "consented to the Acheson Report."

17. Mr. Baruch stated that if Atomic Control could not be made an international matter that it (a treaty) would not be worth "ten cents"; that if we did have international control that it would mean "an immediate and drastic transformation of our form of government."

18. Mr. Eberstadt offered three possibilities:

a. Effective world control of war (counter-part of our own Federal Government).

b. Warning approach implemented by prompt action.

c. Warning approach without prompt action.

19. There was considerable discussion of these three approaches. Some felt that if the bomb was eliminated war would be eliminated.

20. Admiral Turner stated as a personal opinion that he believed it would be impossible to obtain agreement at present on an over-all sovereign world government having an International Army constantly ready, and believed any such proposal would involve a very prolonged debate. He felt that about all that should now be proposed (and referred to world action on Chemical Warfare for an analogy) would be an agreement to:

a. Seek renunciation by all nations of the use of atomic energy in warfare, except in retaliation for the improper use of atomic bombs.

b. Agreement among all nations to accept international supervision of atomic energy, approximately along the lines of the Acheson Report.

c. Confine to the Big Five alone punitive action in case anyone violates agreement. Such punitive action would be taken after "consultation" among the Big Five.

d. It would be necessary also to agree that the veto power would be relinquished in deciding on such action.

21. It was made quite clear to the Baruch group that:

a. We in the MSC were discussing these matters among ourselves, but cannot give effective advice without going to the J.C.S. We, of course, cannot discuss this matter with representatives of the other nations until so instructed by the J.C.S. (Mr. Searls has gained the impression that nothing is being done.)
b. General Ridgway gave his personal opinion (and General Kenney and Admiral Turner concurred) that of course there should be a penalty clause—sanctions for violations of agreements.

c. General Ridgway made it clear that military men agree that a plan is needed, however improbable we think the success of it might be. That as far as we know to date no such plan exists.

d. General Ridgway made it clear to the Baruch group that “we withhold nothing” from them.

The meeting ended at 1220 hours.

DENYS W. KNOLL
Secretary

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501 BC Atomic/6-746

Memorandum by President Truman to the United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission (Baruch) 

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1946,

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BARUCH: Because you requested it I herewith attach a statement of the United States policy with reference to atomic energy. This statement is solely for your guidance in your deliberations as the Representative of the United States on the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations.

The statement is general in character because I want you to have authority to exercise your judgment as to the method by which the stated objectives can be accomplished.

If as negotiations progress you conclude that there should be changes in this statement of policy, I will expect you to advise me and to frankly give me your views.

I know that you will keep me advised as to the negotiations. However, I want you to know that I am relying upon you to exercise your own discretion in those negotiations, subject only to the general statement of policy attached, unless you should receive from me through the Secretary of State a further statement of policy.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

[Annex]

June 7, 1946.

STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES POLICY 

The proposals in this paper, put forth as a basis of discussion, grow out of three basic conclusions:

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*The President approved the enclosure in the presence of Mr. Baruch and Secretary Byrnes on June 7. He dictated the covering memorandum to formalize his approval. (Hewlett and Anderson, p. 574)

*In the source text, the President’s initials appear opposite most paragraphs.
1. It is believed that an international agreement leaving the development of atomic energy in national hands, subject to an obligation not to develop atomic energy for war purposes and relying solely on an international inspection system to detect evasions, will not provide adequate security and indeed may be a source of insecurity.

2. It is believed

(a) That a treaty merely outlawing possession or use of the atomic bomb would not be an effective fulfillment of the directions under which the Commission is to proceed; therefore, that an international atomic development authority be set up, with adequate powers;

(b) That in connection with the greatest safeguards which can be established through a competent international authority in this field, there should be a clear statement of the consequences of violations of the system of control, including definitions of the acts which would constitute such violations and the penalties and concerted action which would follow such violations;

(c) That one of the objectives of the plan should be that when the system of control is fully in operation there would be no stockpiles of bombs in existence;

(d) That the plan might also include a parallel statement as to a system of control for biological warfare.\textsuperscript{98}

3. It is further believed that the aim of preventing atomic warfare can only be achieved by entrusting to an international organization

(a) Managerial control of all atomic energy activities intrinsically dangerous to world security;

(b) Power to control, inspect, and license all other activities and stages.

If an international agency is given sole responsibility for the dangerous activities, leaving the non-dangerous open to nations and their citizens and if the international agency is given and carries forward affirmative development responsibility, furthering among other things the beneficial uses of atomic energy and enabling itself to comprehend and therefore detect the misuse of atomic energy, these afford the best prospect of security.

For purposes of discussion, the following measures are proposed as representing the fundamental features of a plan which would give effect to the conclusions just stated. In this paper the proposed international agency is referred to as the Atomic Development Authority.

1. General—The Atomic Development Authority should seek to set up a thorough plan of control through various forms of ownership, dominion, licenses, operation, inspection, research and management by competent personnel.

It is believed that the plan of control in all its aspects must be adequate not only in concept—a combination of responsibility for devel-

\textsuperscript{98} Opposite this sub-paragraph, the President placed a check mark rather than his initials.
opments as well as control—but in type of organization and in choice of personnel to guarantee the most effective control required to provide for the security of the nations.

2. Raw Materials—The Atomic Development Authority when set up should have as one of its earliest purposes to bring under its complete dominion world supplies of uranium and thorium. The precise pattern of control for various types of deposits of such materials will have to depend upon the geological, mining, refining, and economic facts involved in different situations.

The Authority should conduct continuous surveys so that it will have the most complete knowledge of the world geology of uranium and thorium. The agency should also constantly investigate new methods for recovering these materials where they occur in small quantities so that as their recovery from such sources becomes practical, means of control can be devised.

3. Primary Production Plants—The Atomic Development Authority should exercise complete managerial control of the production of fissionable materials. This means that it should control and operate all plants producing fissionable materials in dangerous quantities and own and control the product of these plants.

4. Atomic Explosives—The Authority should be given exclusive authority to conduct research in the field of atomic explosives. Research activities in the field of atomic explosives are essential in order that the Authority may keep in the forefront of knowledge in the field of atomic energy and fulfill the objective of preventing illicit manufacture of bombs. Only by preserving its position as the best informed agency will the Authority be able to tell where the line between the intrinsically dangerous and the non-dangerous should be drawn. If it turns out at some time in the future, as a result of new discoveries, that other materials or other processes lend themselves to dangerous atomic developments, it is important that the Authority should be the first to know. At that time measures would have to be taken to extend the boundaries of safeguards.

5. Strategic Distribution of Activities and Materials—The activities entrusted exclusively to the Authority because they are intrinsically dangerous to security should be distributed throughout the world. Similarly, stockpiles of raw materials and fissionable materials should not be centralized.

6. Non-Dangerous Activities—Atomic research (except in explosives), the use of research reactors, the production of radioactive tracers by means of non-dangerous reactors, the use of such tracers, and to some extent the production of power should be open to nations and their citizens under reasonable licensing arrangements from the Au-
authority. Denatured materials necessary for these activities should be furnished, under lease or other suitable arrangement by the Atomic Development Authority.

It should be an essential function of the Atomic Development Authority to promote to the fullest possible extent the peace-time benefits that can be obtained from the use of atomic energy.

It is necessary at all times to take advantage of the opportunity for promoting decentralized and diversified national and private developments and of avoiding unnecessary concentration of functions in the Authority. It should, therefore, be a primary function of the Authority to encourage developments by nations and private enterprise in the broad field of non-dangerous activities.

7. **Definition of Dangerous and Non-Dangerous Activities**—Although a reasonable dividing line can be drawn between the dangerous and the non-dangerous, it is not hard and fast. Machinery should, therefore, be provided to assure constant examination and re-examination of the question, and to permit revision of the dividing line as changing conditions and new discoveries may require.

7(a) Any plant dealing with uranium or thorium after it reaches the potential of dangerous use must be not only subject to the most rigorous and competent inspection by the international Authority, but its actual operation shall be under the management, supervision and control of the international Authority.

8. **Inspection Activities**—By assigning intrinsically dangerous activities exclusively to management by the Atomic Development Authority, the difficulties of inspection are thereby reduced to manageable proportions. For if the Atomic Development Authority is the only agency which may lawfully conduct the dangerous activities in the field of raw materials, primary production plants, and research in explosives, then visible operation by others than the Authority will constitute a danger signal.

The plan does not contemplate any systematic or large-scale inspection procedures covering the whole of industry. The delegation of authority for making inspections will have to be carefully drawn so that the inspection may be adequate for the needs and responsibilities of the Authority and yet not go beyond this point. Many of the inspection activities of the Authority should grow out of and be incidental to its other functions. An important measure of inspection will be those associated with the tight control of raw materials, for this is one of the keystones of the plan. The continuing activities of prospecting, survey and research in relation to raw materials will be designed not only to serve the affirmative development functions of the agency but also to assure that no surreptitious operations are con-
ducted in the raw materials field by nations or their citizens. Inspection will also occur in connection with the licensing functions of the Authority. Finally, a means should be provided to enable the international organization to make special “spot” investigations of any suspicious national or private activities.

9. Personnel—The personnel of the Atomic Development Authority should be recruited on a basis of proven competence but also so far as possible on an international basis, giving much weight to geographical and national distribution. Although the problem of recruitment of the high-quality personnel required for the top executive and technical positions will be difficult, it will certainly be far less difficult than the recruitment of the similarly high-quality personnel that would be necessary for any purely policing organization.

10. Negotiation Stage—The first step in the creation of the system of control is the spelling out in comprehensive terms of the functions, responsibilities, authority, and limitations of the Atomic Development Authority. Once a Charter for the agency has been written, and adopted, the Authority and the system of control for which it will be responsible will require time to become fully organized and effective. The plan of control will therefore have to come into effect in successive stages. These should be specifically fixed in the Charter or means should be otherwise set forth in the Charter for transitions from one stage to another, as contemplated in the resolution of the U.N. Assembly which created this Commission.

11. Disclosures—In the deliberations of the United Nations Commission on Atomic Energy, the United States must be prepared to make available the information essential to a reasonable understanding of the proposals which it advocates. Further disclosures must be dependent, in the interests of all, upon the effective ratification of this treaty. If and when the Authority is actually created, the United States must then also be prepared to make available other information essential to that organization for the performance of its functions. And as the successive stages of international control are reached, the United States must further be prepared to yield, to the extent required by each stage, national control of activities in this field to the international agency.

12. International Control—There will be questions about the extent of control allowed to national bodies, should an international body be established and in this respect, it is believed that any control by an atomic energy authority set up by any state should to the extent necessary for the effective operation of the international control system be

*At this point the President made the marginal comment: “most important.”*
subordinate to direction and absolute dominion on the part of the international authority. It will readily be seen at this time that this is not an endorsement or disapproval of the creation of national authorities, or a definition of their jurisdiction. This problem will be before the Commission and it should deal with a clear separation of duties and responsibilities of such state authorities if such are included in any plan, with the purpose of preventing possible conflicts of jurisdiction.¹

HARRY S. TRUMAN

811.2423/6–846

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 8, 1946.

Participants: British Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel;
Canadian Ambassador, Mr. Lester B. Pearson;
Secretary Byrnes

I asked the British and Canadian Ambassadors to call at my office this morning, so that I might present to them a statement of United States policy with reference to atomic energy.

Using the President's memorandum of June 7 ² as a basis, I explained the plan fully and in some detail.

I told the Ambassadors that Mr. Baruch would get in touch with Sir Alexander Cadogan and General MacNaughton (Canadian representative) ³ the early part of next week to discuss the plan, at which time their two representatives might wish to present their views and submit any plans which they might have as a basis for discussion.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

The Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy (Leahy) to the United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission (Baruch)

WASHINGTON, 11 June 1946.

DEAR MR. BARUCH: Thank you for the compliment contained in your request for advice in the problem faced by you in obtaining a

¹The President wrote the following above his signature: "Above general principles approved June 7, 1946."
²Supra.
treaty that will be effective in preventing the employment of atomic bombs in war.¹

I realize that the difficulties before you must appear almost insurmountable and I believe that from a military point of view and in the interest of the National Defense of the United States, the only practicable line of approach is to endeavor to obtain from the United Nations an agreement that the employment of atomic bombs in war is outlawed except when authorized by a majority vote of the Security Council in retaliation for an unlawful use of atomic bombs.

Acceptance by the United Nations of the use of atomic bombs in retaliation when authorized by a majority vote of the Security Council involves a repeal of the "veto" provision of the United Nations Charter on this one particular problem.

Difficulty in obtaining agreement on such a repeal is foreseen. It is my belief that the most aggressive nations that can now be foreseen would hesitate long before becoming outlaws under such a world statute as the charter of the United Nations by the use of atomic bombs in war with a practically certain retaliation in kind by a majority of the United Nations of the world.

The present advantage held by the English speaking world through possession of atomic bombs should be advantageous in negotiating with our former enemies treaties that are designed to preserve world peace.

It therefore appears apparent that the United States should not enter into a treaty that would limit our possibilities of producing atomic bombs until:

1. Treaties of peace with our former enemies are ratified by the Allied Nations.
2. Effective and workable methods of inspection and control of manufacture are developed, tested, and found effective.

The only promising means of creating in the minds of all men a desire to comply with such a treaty is through fear of punishment for its violation.

Automatic and certain punishment for violation of the treaty must be within the authority of a majority vote of the Security Council.

I do not know of any short cut to the elimination of war that appears

¹Mr. Baruch had solicited the views of Generals Eisenhower, Spaatz, MacArthur, and McNarney, and Admirals Leahy, Nimitz, and King in letters of May 24. He had requested suggestions on not only international control of atomic energy, but also as to how war itself could be outlawed. The Baruch letters and replies from those mentioned above with the exception of General MacArthur exist in the Department of State Atomic Energy Files. The United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission received additional military guidance in the form of a memorandum by General Groves dated January 2, 1946, "Our Army of the Future—As Influenced by Atomic Weapons," which General Groves transmitted to Mr. Hancock on June 10; for text, see p. 1197.
to be an intermittent acute disease with which the human animal has been afflicted since his appearance upon the earth.

Widespread education in the material advantages of peace, illustrations of the horrors of war, convincing assurances that net losses in war are shared by the victor and the vanquished and that there can be no profit to anybody in an international war spread to all people of all nations by every possible means of modern methods of communication, and with world approval through the United Nations, might incline even the "have not," peoples toward our desire to keep the peace between nations and induce those people that already have more than their just share to meticulously avoid interfering with the governments of other nations.

I realize fully that these brief observations of mine based on military considerations of the national defense of the United States, which is my principal interest, will be of very little assistance to you in the solution of your most difficult problem, but they are the best reply that I can make to your inquiries.

With expressions of high regard, I remain always

Most sincerely,

William D. Leahy

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Department of State Atomic Energy Files

*The Chief of Naval Operations (Nimitz) to the United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission* (Baruch)

CONFIDENTIAL

Washington, 11 June 1946.

**Dear Mr. Baruch**: I will attempt to give you briefly my views concerning the atomic bomb. The fundamental objective is to outlaw the bomb and prevent its use.

The only course which now appears to offer real prospect of reaching the objective is through a program which by stages will attain international control of the mining and reduction of uranium and thorium ores, the distribution of the metals, and the production and use of fissionable matter together with completely effective international inspection to assure compliance with the control agreement. This program, to be fully effective, should ultimately include a prohibition against the possession of atomic bombs by any individual nation.

The United States is now in a position of advantage with respect to the atomic bomb. We should exploit that advantage to assist in the early establishment of a satisfactory peace and should relinquish it no more rapidly than is justified by the proven development of agreed controls. It will be desirable for international agreements concerning the atomic bomb to follow the European peace treaties and definitely to precede the time when other countries could have atomic bombs.
No plan of peacetime control will surely prevent the use of atomic weapons in a prolonged war. However, a plan which prevents the possession of atomic bombs by individual nations will prevent their use in a surprise attack.

The problem of punishment for violations of a treaty concerning atomic warfare is difficult. I have grave misgivings about the effectiveness of any international agreement to take concerted action, and I urge that no program be adopted which places major reliance on one. I feel that despite the sincerity with which all parties might enter into any such agreement, the formation of blocs or coalitions, particularly around powerful nations, will impair or destroy the will and power to carry it out.

I do not believe that the people of this country are prepared now to enter into an agreement for automatic punishment of other nations for acts which do not directly concern the United States. In other words, the people of the United States will in fact insist on the power of their elected representatives to veto the deliberate entry of the United States into war. I do believe that after it became known that another nation was violating the treaty and preparing to use atomic weapons, the people of the United States could then be induced to take action.

The ideal way to outlaw the bomb would be to outlaw war itself. In my opinion, it will not be possible to outlaw war or to dispense with armaments in our time. It will probably be possible to outlaw atomic bombs long before we could succeed in outlawing war. The method may be to make the penalties attendant on its use greatly outweigh the potential advantages.

I can offer no formula for surely preventing wars. The likelihood of war can be reduced only by eliminating conditions which breed wars. The likelihood of defeat in war can be reduced by keeping our own country sufficiently strong to make the eventual penalties of attacking us severe, obvious, and certain.

Very sincerely yours,

C. W. Nimitz,
Fleet Admiral, U. S. Navy

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

The Chief of Staff of the United States Army (Eisenhower) to the United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission (Baruch)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 14 June 1946.

Dear Mr. Baruch: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed that their views on the complex questions raised in your letters of 24 May 1946 can best be dealt with individually. My personal views follow.
General. I completely agree with you that only through effective international control of atomic energy can we hope to prevent atomic war. Arriving at the methods for such control is, of course, the difficult task. The national security requires that those methods be tested and proven before the U.S. can enter any international agreement limiting the production or use of atomic bombs.

Approach to the Problem. The procedures outlined in the Acheson report appear to offer the most practicable initial steps towards international control, provided that in the step by step accomplishment of those procedures, the U.S. does not recede from its position of advantage faster than realistic and practical reciprocal concessions are made by other powerful nations. We must not further unbalance against us world power relationships.

Inspection, the First Step. An essential primary step is to establish, and prove in operation, a system of free and complete inspection. We must satisfy ourselves of complete good faith on the part of the other great powers; their past and current policies are not altogether reassuring. In this connection, as I understand present atomic energy production techniques, no system of inspection can be expected to guarantee completely against the construction of some atomic bombs.

Preventive Measures. For the present, I am sure you agree that there must be force behind any system for preventing aggression. There must exist for deterrent purposes, provisions for retaliation in the event other control and prevention devices should fail. Further, the sanctions employed against a willful aggressor by law-abiding nations can be no less effective in character than the weapons the aggressor nation is capable of using. To my mind, this means, for the present, that to prevent the use of atomic weapons there must exist the capability of employing atomic weapons against the recalcitrant.

Decisive Weapons in War. Biological, chemical, and other as yet unforeseen weapons may prove no less effective than the atomic bomb, and even less susceptible to control. Another major war may see the use of such destructive weapons, however horrible, including the atomic bomb. The problem of controlling, and finally preventing, the use of atomic bombs (and other decisive weapons) thus becomes the problem of preventing war itself.

The Dilemma. If we enter too hurriedly into an international agreement to abolish all atomic weapons, we may find ourselves in the position of having no restraining means in the world capable of effective action if a great power violates the agreement. Such a power might, in fact, deliberately avoid the use of atomic weapons and embark on aggression with other equally decisive weapons. If, on the other hand, we enter into agreements providing for the maintenance of atomic
weapons under international control, we face extraordinary difficulties. First, in providing adequate control and inspection systems and second, the possibility that the national leaders of a totalitarian state, possessing a supply of the weapons, might choose to strike first rather than to compromise. This dilemma, unless other approaches to a solution come to hand, must be solved before we should proceed to any treaty, abolishing atomic weapons.

_Fundamental National Interest._ The U.S. should be party to no control treaty which militates against our vital security interests. I have touched upon aspects of this scarcely debatable point. However, the fundamental interest and security of the American people is bound up with a solution to the problem you face. We can yield much, even certain points of our sovereignty, to reach this solution. Whether our people could be brought to see this necessity at present is a question. There will exist practical difficulties in keying up the American people to accept even the necessity for immediate preventive military action with conventional weapons in case an aggressor violates measures for inspection and control. Historically, in the face of threats of unmistakable import and seriousness, our practice has been to indulge in wishful thinking rather than to undertake decisive action.

To summarize:

_a._ The existence of the atomic bomb in our hands is a deterrent, in fact, to aggression in the world. We cannot at this time limit our capability to produce or use this weapon.

_b._ We must move, by steps, toward international control of atomic energy if we are to avoid an atomic war. The Acheson report is a practicable suggestion for an approach to such control. A first step is to _prove_ a system of inspection.

_c._ Atomic weapons are only a part of the problem. There will be other equally terrible weapons of mass destruction. The whole problem must be solved concurrently with the problem of controlling atomic energy. To control atomic weapons, in which field we are preeminent, without provision for equally adequate control of other weapons of mass destruction can seriously endanger our national security.

I will continue to consider this problem and will communicate to you any ideas which might assist your difficult decisions.

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

[At the First Meeting of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission at Hunter College, The Bronx, New York, June 14, Mr. Baruch presented the United States proposal for the international control of atomic energy. The U.S. plan provided for the creation of an international Atomic Development Authority to which all phases of atomic energy]
energy development and control were to be entrusted. For the text of
Mr. Baruch’s statement, see United Nations, Official Records of the
Atomic Energy Commission, First Year, Plenary Meetings (hereafter
cited as AEC (I), Plenary), pages 4–14 or Department of State Bul-
letin, June 23, 1946, pages 1057–1062. A complete set of the records of
the AEC and its committees and subcommittees is located in the files
of the Office of International Organization Affairs, Department of
State. For an account of negotiations in the AEC in 1946, see Hewlett
and Anderson, pages 576–619.]

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Af-
fairs (Thompson) to the Deputy Director of the Office of European
Affairs (Hickerson)

[WASHINGTON,] June 27, 1946.

Ambassador Smith’s view as reported in his telegram 2013, June 27
[26], that basic issue in the atomic control question is that of inspec-
tion is certainly correct. If his proposal that we state we are prepared
to discuss regulation and control of all weapons of war would in fact
recapture moral ascendancy for us and re-emphasize the basic issue
of inspection, then it might be worth trying. I feel obliged to point out,
however, that such a move might have the opposite effect and obscure
the issue.

So far as the Soviet Union is concerned, I fear that they would in-
terpret such a move as indicating that our basic motive in our atomic
control proposal is to break down the present “closed shop” system
upon which the Soviet Union operates. Also, by getting involved in a
discussion of this wider field of control, they may be able to detract
attention from the essential matter of atomic control. The Russians
are probably not concerned about our basic military establishment as
they will always tend to maintain a larger standing army than our own.

LLEWELLYN E. THOMPSON

*Telegram 2013 is printed in vol. vi, p. 766. Ambassador Smith feared that
Gromyko’s remarks at the 2nd Meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission,
June 19, had had the effect of seizing the initiative for the Soviet Union. The
Soviet Representative had proposed an international convention prohibiting
the production, possession, and use of atomic weapons. The Soviet proposal made no
 provision for international control of atomic energy, inspection, or penalties in the
event of violation. For the text of Gromyko’s statement, see AEC (I) Plen-
ary, pp. 23–30, or Department of State, Documents on Disarmament 1945–1959,
vol. i, pp. 17–24. The Ambassador suggested that the United States recapture lead-
ership by re-emphasizing the issue of inspection and stating the willingness of the
United States to discuss the regulation and control of all weapons.*
Memorandum by Mr. James E. Doyle, Assistant to the Counselor (Cohen), to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)  

[WASHINGTON,] June 27, 1946.

I think the most important thing by far is that the current negotiations on the UN Atomic Energy Commission should be held strictly to exploring the nature of the problem of the control of atomic energy. This means that the discussions should be directed to the functions of an international authority on atomic energy. It seems to me unwise even to branch out to the enforcement problem now, and clearly unwise to branch out from atomic energy to the entire field of disarmament.

SPA's views on the telegram (through Mr. Blaisdell) are that the USSR has not in fact seized the moral leadership, that inspection is probably not the "basic issue" presently, that the USSR has not grasped the initiative, that the United States may not desire to agree to "unhampered inspection of military establishments and means of production", and that the Embassy in Moscow may be unable to evaluate more than "the one vital factor" to which it refers.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission (Baruch)

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1946.

DEAR MR. BARUCH: In my memorandum to you of June 26 I replied to that portion of your letter of June 23 which concerned the dissemination of your opening statement before the Atomic Energy Commission and the reaction to it abroad. You may be sure that we are doing and shall continue to do everything we can to give your statement the widest circulation throughout the world.

I have delayed answering the other points in your letter until I could talk to the President about them. While I was awaiting that opportunity, a telegram on this subject arrived from Ambassador Smith in Moscow. I am attaching to this letter a copy of the telegram.

When I saw the President, we discussed your letter and Ambassador Smith's telegram. The President's desire, and he expressed it very

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7 The source text bears the following handwritten addition by Mr. Doyle: "This refers to Moscow's 2013 of June 27, 1946."
8 Not printed.
9 The discussion occurred on June 27.
clearly, is that the efforts of the Atomic Energy Commission not be diverted by the Soviet or by anyone from the task of devising practical and specific measures for the international control of atomic energy. He feels that for us to raise the question of general disarmament would be to distract attention from the task at hand and to confuse the public mind about the nature of our proposals.

As he told you in his letter, the President believes that you are off to a fine start. He does not share Ambassador Smith’s opinion that the Soviet has seized the initiative and feels, on the contrary, that through your efforts the United States has the initiative and shall keep it. The best way to maintain the initiative, the best way to achieve some tangible progress in the negotiations, and the best way to discover whether the others genuinely desire to get on with the work, he thinks, is to confine the discussions as closely as possible to the stubborn and real difficulties connected with the control of atomic energy.

I explained to the President your general plan of procedure for the immediate future, as I have understood it from my conversations with you and Mr. Eberstadt and Mr. Evatt. I told him that you did not contemplate further general discussions and that you and your staff were working with Mr. Fahy on an outline of the specific topics or subjects raised by your proposal. I explained your hope that as these topics are thrashed out in the Commission it will become possible to start drafting on specific points. The President considers this a very intelligent plan and feels that it promises the greatest chance for success.

I am sure that you will find Mr. Fahy and his associates very helpful. Whenever you feel that the Department can be of assistance in any way, I hope that you will let me know.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

10 President Truman had written Baruch on June 27 expressing support. That communication is quoted in Joseph I. Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula: The Struggle to Control Atomic Weapons 1945-1949 (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970), p. 316. In his memoirs, Baruch quotes a letter he addressed to President Truman on July 2 summarizing the differences between the United States and Soviet positions and recommending that the United States should remain firm on its position (Bernard M. Baruch, The Public Years, New York, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1969, p. 373). In a letter to Baruch dated July 10, the President agreed that “we should stand pat on our program.” (Baruch, p. 374; Lieberman, p. 327)


12 Mr. Fahy, the Department’s Legal Adviser, had been instructed to have a draft treaty for the control of atomic energy prepared in his office. Henry G. Ingraham, Special Assistant to Mr. Fahy, had been detailed to Mr. Baruch’s office. (Department of State Atomic Energy Files)
The United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission (Baruch) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

New York, July 9, 1946.

My dear Mr. Acheson: Referring to your letter of July 1st, as to the dissemination of the atomic energy statement, that can best be done by sending copies of the full text to the embassies. General Smith would have had a different idea if he had gotten the full text and not the garbled report prepared for their own purposes in Pravda. I presume that General Smith will, by this time, have received a copy of the full report.

You misunderstood my reference to disarmament. It wasn't that I wanted to raise the point but to say that a wide opening had been left if there was anybody considering that matter. Everyone discussing atomic energy or other weapons of mass destruction says that elimination and outlawing of war are the only answer. But, as the President and you say, that is not my task. My associates and myself have gone ahead with ours as expeditiously and unremittingly as possible.

I wish there was some way of saying to the Australian Government how helpful Evatt has been, especially in his understanding of the matter and of his driving it forward.

I understand there is to be a meeting of the National Committee for Civilian Control of Atomic Energy, at which the Secretary of the Lilienthal Board of Consultants, by the name of Carroll Wilson, is to speak and, also, Secretary Wallace. I hope they understand that the statement delivered by me to the Atomic Energy Commission is the proposal of our Government, the President and the Secretary of State and is not to be considered the Baruch proposal. Word might be sent to them in order that men representing the Government should not be taking a position contrary to the American position.

I know you are being kept posted as to what is going on.

Sincerely yours,

Bernard M. Baruch

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Mr. George F. Kennan to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

Washington, July 18, 1946.

Mr. Acheson: The demands of my new job with the War College have forced me to study a good deal of the basic material on the problem of the international control of atomic energy.

13Henry A. Wallace, Secretary of Commerce.
To clarify my own thoughts on the position of the USSR with relation to this subject, I have written them out in the form of a few questions and answers.

I thought you might find these of interest, and attach a copy.

I am off for a speaking tour in the far west, and will be back in the end of August.

George Kennan

[Enclosure]

The Soviet Position With Respect to International Control of Atomic Energy
(As of July, 1946)


Q. Has our monopoly of atomic weapons made the Russians more hostile towards us?

A. No. To the Soviet leaders all forces are considered hostile which they cannot control, quite regardless of the weapons these forces may possess. We were viewed as an inimical element before we developed atomic energy. We continue to be viewed as an inimical element today. Thus, atomic energy has changed nothing in the basic attitude and objectives of the Soviet Union with respect to us.

Q. Did our monopoly of atomic weapons have any effect on the behavior of the Russians and their attitude toward us?

A. Yes. It upset their previous estimate of the military-political potential of the Soviet Union in the immediate post-war period. It caused them to revise this estimate basically. It forced them to modify their internal economic and their foreign political plans. For these reasons, it has caused them intense vexation and irritation.

Q. Has it made them more suspicious of our actions?

A. Probably it has; but principally in the sense that it has given a welcome set of opportunities to those elements within the Soviet system who have reason to fear improved relations between Russia and the west and who lose no chance to cast suspicion deliberately on the actions of the United States. Presumably, these elements have not been slow to interpret as threats of atomic retaliation any instances of American firmness in the face of Soviet demands and in this way to fan the existing bitterness over our possession of atomic weapons. It must not be forgotten that the men in the Kremlin, who would themselves never hesitate to use atomic energy as a means of extortion if they themselves had the exclusive possession of it, would
be particularly loathe to believe that we could really withstand the temptation to do this.

2. Background of the present Soviet Proposals.

Q. What is the predominant motive of the proposals which Gromyko has advanced in the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission?
A. The predominant motive is a desire to turn the tables on us and to produce a situation in which the Soviet Union, rather than the United States, would be the sole power able to use atomic energy in war.

Q. How does this jibe with the Soviet proposal that existing stocks of atomic bombs be destroyed and that further production and storing of the weapons be prohibited?
A. This proposal is designed primarily to effect the earliest possible disarming of the United States with respect to atomic weapons. Once that disarming had been achieved, the Soviet Government would feel itself in a far stronger position to put forward its further desiderata in connection with the international control of atomic energy.

Q. But would not the Soviet Union then likewise be inhibited from developing atomic weapons?
A. Not at all. In making this proposal, the Russians are counting on the American conscience and on the merciless spot-light of free information and publicity in the United States, supplemented by the vigilance of the communist fifth-column, to guarantee the faithful fulfillments of such obligations on our part. At the same time, they are counting no less confidently on their own security controls to enable them to proceed undisturbed with the development of atomic weapons in secrecy within the Soviet Union. If their proposal were to be accepted, they could thus look forward with confidence to the day when the democratic powers, caught in their traditional respect for solemn international engagements and in the overriding power of public opinion, would be stripped of atomic weapons where as Russia, having been secretly developing them behind the scenes, would be their sole possessor.

Q. But the Russians have implicitly acknowledged the desirability of some scheme of control. Do they not fear that this would hamper them in secretly developing atomic energy?
A. No. They do not fear this. They feel that if they could once get the weapon formally abolished they could easily prevent the maturing of any international agreement which could seriously hamper the clandestine development of atomic weapons in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, they know that their internal controls are so elaborate that they would have good facilities for evading any ordinary international control system. They are well aware that the only really effec-
tive type of control would be that which we have proposed: namely the entrusting to an international atomic development authority of all phases of the development and use of atomic energy, starting with the raw material. Once they were able to get agreement to the abolition of atomic weapons as such, they could oppose the establishment of such an authority, as being illogical and unnecessary. Hence, their time-table, and particularly the emphasis on the early destruction of existing stocks.

Q. Is this not direct bad faith on the Soviet side?
A. To the communist mind, all words are relative. Once in possession of the bomb, Russia could confidently risk an outbreak of war between the Soviet Union and the western powers. In modern wars, all holds are fair; and once hostilities were in progress the sudden revelation that Russia had the bomb could be exploited propagandistically as a demonstration of the wisdom and foresight of Soviet leadership, which had once more outsmarted the capitalist world and foiled its most evil designs. It should be remembered that a state propaganda machine would find no difficulty in producing evidence to indicate that western nations, too, had been ratting on their obligations not to produce atomic weapons and that Russia had been saved only by the vigilance and decision of the Kremlin.

3. The Soviet Reaction to our Plan.

Q. What is the basic Soviet objection to our plan?
A. The basic objection is that our plan provides no loophole through which the Soviet Union could itself achieve monopolistic possession of the atomic weapon.

Q. Are there other objections as well?
A. Yes. Our plan implies a breaching of the security controls which exist in Russia and which are anchored in the selfish interests of the all-powerful secret police. It further implies a certain derogation of the absolute and unlimited power which the Soviet leaders now exercise over economic processes and property relationships within the Soviet Union. Finally, it implies the participation of foreign elements in scientific work conducted within the Soviet Union, thus introducing foreign influence into Soviet science and providing opportunities for the satisfaction of foreign scientific curiosity.

Q. Why are the Russians so averse to the limitation of the veto power in the case of atomic energy?
A. Partly because they see in it an attack on the veto power in the Security Council as well as on the principle of the veto in general. But also because they have every intention to proceed independently with the development of atomic weapons, regardless of any engagements they may have entered into, and do not want any international
agreement outstanding which could penalize them if there should be undesirable revelations. In this sense, it is precisely the penalties for the preliminary evasions of restrictions on atomic weapon production which worry them most and where they are most concerned for the preservation of the veto power.


Q. Is it then useless to hope that the Soviet Government can be brought to accept our plan, in its general outlines?

A. No—not if it can be proved to them that not only is there no possibility of their actually attaining monopolistic possession of the weapon, but that the further pursuit of it may even prove actually dangerous to the security of their state.

Q. By what arguments can this be proved to them?

A. There are no arguments by which this could be proved to them. It can be proved to them only by facts. They will not be amenable to any presentation of ideas on our part.

Q. By what set of facts could they then be influenced?

A. By the policies we ourselves adopt with relation to our own defense and our collective arrangements with other nations. If we follow a resolute policy of preparing for all eventualities: if, while carefully continuing to press for full international agreement, and holding the door open for such agreement, we quietly and vigorously proceed to develop the U.S. capacity to absorb atomic attack and to effect instant retaliation; if we adapt our armed forces to the demands of atomic warfare and effect intelligent dispersal and “compartmentation” of essential services within our own country; if we do not hesitate, in the absence of Soviet agreement, to enter into international agreements with other countries for the joint development of atomic energy as far as this is consistent with our own security; if in this way we make it evident to the Soviet Government that the idea of using atomic weapons against this country is a dangerous pipe dream that has little prospect of successful realization and might well lead to the atomic isolation rather than the atomic superiority of the Soviet Union—then there is a possibility that we might eventually maneuver Moscow into a grudging acceptance of the main points of our program.

Q. Could such a change of front on Russia’s part be a whole-hearted one which would mean clear sailing in the future for an eventual atomic energy development authority?

A. No. Unfortunately, the execution of Russia’s participation in any such a scheme would encounter deep-seated inhibitions in the nature of Soviet society and powerful elements within the Soviet Union would try at every turn to sabotage the efficacy of the authority, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned. Soviet acceptance of our proposals would mean only the beginning, not the end, of our difficulties;
and we would have to fight a long and practically constant battle to achieve a real and successful functioning of the authority within the Soviet Union itself. For this reason, we would have to maintain at all times some instruments of pressure, through which we could present the Soviet Government with some sort of ugly and undesirable alternatives, in the events that Soviet collaboration in the execution of the agreements should prove unsatisfactory.

501.BC Atomic/7-2446

Mr. John M. Hancock of the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission to the Secretary of State

NEW YORK, July 24, 1946.

My Dear Mr. Secretary: In keeping with my promise on the phone a few minutes ago, I am enclosing three documents: 14 one, the tentative outline of items for Committee No. 2 as presented at the meeting today; two, a copy of the record of Mr. Gromyko's speech; 15 three, the copy of the press release given by the Press Division.

There wasn't anything unexpected in the speech and there wasn't any new problem presented by it. This speech had been in the making for some time and I think Mr. Gromyko felt that he was being thwarted in his desire to make it. When the question arose today about his right to comment upon our #3 Memorandum, 16 I advocated that we depart from the strict terms of the Agenda because his desire was quite well inside of the first item on the Agenda, which was then in tentative form and is now undergoing a minor textual revision. 17

As to the tentative agenda, Mr. Gromyko's four points were that the agenda did not cover these points: First, the prohibition of production of atomic weapons. (My reply was that I had no objection to any sharpening of the words but that I was willing to have the idea embodied in more specific terms. It already is included in the

14 The enclosures are not printed here.
15 At the 3rd Meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission, June 25, a Working Committee (Committee 1) consisting of one representative of each member of the Commission, was appointed. The Working Committee agreed to establish Committee 2 at its 2nd Meeting, July 12; the new body was directed to concern itself with the basic issue of international control. Regarding the development of the Commission's committee system in June and July, and negotiations during that period, see Hewlett and Anderson, pp. 584-590.
16 For the text of the summary record of the 2nd Meeting of Committee 2, July 24, during which Gromyko delivered the address cited here, see United Nations, Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, First Year, Special Supplement, Report to the Security Council (1946), pp. 114-120 (hereafter cited as AEC, I, Special Suppl.)
17 In elaboration of its proposal of June 14, the United States Delegation submitted three memoranda to the Commission (July 2, July 5, and July 12); for texts, see AEC, I, Special Suppl., pp. 92-102, and 106-111, or Documents on Disarmament 1945-1959, vol. 1, pp. 25-42.
18 Mr. Hancock represented the United States on Committee 2.
first two (I and II) broad classifications.) Second, the destruction of bombs. (My comment was that that was included in I, in specific terms in the expression “elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons” and in IA in the word “storing.”) Third, punishment by nations. (I pointed out that that was covered by our V on the Agenda in which we referred to enforcement agencies, actions by national governments, etc.) Fourth, definitive action and more definitive terms used as to the exchange of scientific and technical information. (I reminded him that this had already been specifically assigned to the Scientific and Technical Committee.)

I don’t want to show an impatience over the delay on purely procedural matters, but it is very irksome. I haven’t wanted to argue about committee set-ups. I think the present attempt to split the problem into beneficial uses and dangerous uses by assignment to separate committees is unrealistic. The uses are safe up to the point that somebody decides to convert them into a dangerous use—as you so well know. The attempt to handle these problems as if they were separable will finally result in a merger, and finally the Working Committee will handle all policy matters. There seems to be a desire to handle policy matters as if they were unrelated to the scientific and legal aspects. People will have to learn that this is a problem in the whole, that one can view any problem from several aspects but one cannot insulate many bits of this problem until there is a general understanding of both the scientific and legal aspects and the reasons for the kind of control involved in our plan.

We are not going to fight for conducive votes on these matters. We have arranged to go along, develop points of agreement, ascertain points of disagreement without bringing the latter to a vote, and hope that in the orderly process of education, we will bring all to the same conclusion we have ourselves reached. I don’t like to use this expression educational process because it might give the impression that we think we are the only educated ones. After the session was over today, I talked to Mr. Gromyko, told him we would have an answer for his observations—all of which we appreciated—when we came to the problems in the order set forth in the tentative Agenda. His objections, you will note, are not keyed to the order of points for study, nor did they contain any matter of substance.

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38 Committee 3, the Scientific and Technical Committee, had been appointed at the 2nd Meeting of the Working Committee, July 12, to arrange the exchange of information and explore the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Committee 3 first met on July 19. Information submitted by the United States Delegation is contained in the following Department of State Publications: The International Control of Atomic Energy; Scientific Information Transmitted to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946–October 14, 1946 (Washington, n.d.) and December 15, 1946 (Washington, 1947).
There was a curious misunderstanding during the meeting. The Chairman\textsuperscript{19} had proposed that the Agenda be modified and brought up at our fourth meeting a week from today. I deferred moderately to a week's delay on the procedural matters and argued that we get into the substance without waiting for a week for agreement upon the precise wording of the Agenda. The French alone were a little hesitant about pushing too fast but the French Delegate\textsuperscript{20} had not been in touch with developments of the past three weeks. He made some reference of desiring to hear from his home government, but in a subsequent talk with his right-hand man, Lacoste,\textsuperscript{21} I think I cleared up that point with him.

Going back to my talk with Gromyko, he is willing to meet in Committee No. 2 every day and he plans to be actively interested in going ahead with the very long Agenda which might well occupy the Committee for some months.

I think this is all in accordance with your desires and while it is not a complete review of the day's events, it does cover the things at the top of my mind and those which would normally arise in the mind of anyone who might see the afternoon papers. We had a press conference this afternoon at 5:00 P. M., too late for the afternoon papers, and I think you will find a much saner atmosphere in the papers tomorrow.

Your Representative, Porter McKeever,\textsuperscript{22} was at the press conference and at the end of it, he was unreserved in his approval. I had emphasized that this was an explanation of Mr. Gromyko's previous document which we were glad to have, that in no respect were we surprised, that there was nothing in the nature of a crisis, and that we were going ahead with our long Agenda with the consent of all concerned. I took plenty of time to give the reporters a lot of background. I am not sure they will use it as intended but the conservative ones were very appreciative of the time I had given them. Of course, they wanted me to tell them what we were going to do next, and I had foreclosed that question in the early part of the conference by stating that I was willing to discuss history, but that at this time I was not prepared to state what we would do in the future. I did make it plain that when we took action they could expect to hear of it in normal course.\textsuperscript{23}

Very truly yours,

John M. Hancock

\textsuperscript{19} Capt. Alvaro Alberto da Motta e Silva, Brazilian Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission.
\textsuperscript{20} Alexandre Parodi, Permanent French Representative at the United Nations.
\textsuperscript{21} François Lacoste, Adviser, French Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission.
\textsuperscript{22} Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly.
\textsuperscript{23} The following handwritten addition by Mr. Hancock appears at the bottom of the source text: "No atomic bomb blew up here. We wanted to get their position defined a lot more and we will get it as the days go by—and in the process I hope we will get the educational process carried forward too."
Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Notes of an Informal Meeting of Members of the United States, French, Canadian, and Australian Delegations to the Atomic Energy Commission, New York, July 24, 1946, 3 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL

Present:

United States: John M. Hancock, Dr. R. C. Tolman, John P. Davis, Lincoln Gordon, Frank Lindsay and Gordon Arneson.

France: M. LaCoste.


Australia: Ralph Harry.

Mr. Hancock felt that Committee #2 should be allowed to wither away since it is essentially a duplicate of the Working Committee. Mr. LaCoste and General McNaughton were in full agreement with this point.

As to the Legal Committee and the Scientific and Technical Committee, Mr. Ignatieff felt that they were primarily advisory and could operate most effectively if the chairmanship were made relatively permanent. Mr. LaCoste felt, and General McNaughton agreed, that if rotation was to be continued, then it should be among all members and not merely between two such as Gromyko had proposed.

Mr. Hancock suggested that the question of terms of office could be left to the Committees themselves with some provisions for continuity. Dr. Tolman thought that the chairman should hold office "at the pleasure of the committee".

General McNaughton then stated that he favored allowing Gromyko to present his proposal for a convention at the next session.

Mr. Davis asked if Mr. Gromyko should be cross-examined on his proposal. General McNaughton felt that there was danger that the preparation of fixed questions would appear to be a gangup on the Russians. At this point Mr. Harry arrived and the plan to consolidate the Working Committee and Committee #2 was reviewed for him. Mr. Harry did not favor this consolidation and suggested instead that the Chairmen should be the same for the two Committees.

Mr. Gordon, in reference to questions that might be put to Gromyko, believed that a demonstration of the inadequacy of a convention should be stressed.

General McNaughton suggested that the question should be carefully phrased with the thought in mind that the record would be sent to Moscow and that it might influence the people who call the plays there. Suggested that the past experience of the U.S.S.R. with pacts of this sort should be brought out.
Mr. Harry expressed the fear that Gromyko will try to maneuver us into a position of refusing to sign a convention. Mr. Harry believed that ultimately there should be no bombs held by the Security Council or any other organization.

General McNaughton agreed.

Mr. Harry suggested that the Russians might ask for disclosure of the records of bombs produced and for the right to supervise disassembly.

Mr. Hancock expressed agreement, at the proper time.

General McNaughton suggested that we should indicate that it is not the U.S.S.R. we fear but rather some unknown government which may be developed at some time in the future.

Mr. LaCoste believes that the initiative now lay with the United States as a result of Gromyko’s reply to the United States’ proposals. He suggested that it was not [now?], up to the United States to state that a convention is essential, but that it is not sufficient in itself. He thought that Gromyko’s first speech was written before Mr. Baruch’s speech was delivered and that Gromyko’s plan must be fully answered at this time in order to force new instructions for Gromyko.

Mr. Ignatieff believed we should now concentrate on developing the questions or plans which had already been presented.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Notes on a Staff Conference of the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission, New York, August 1, 1946, a.m. 24

RESTRICTED

Present: Mr. Bernard M. Baruch

Mr. John M. Hancock

Mr. F. Eberstadt

Mr. John Parks Davis

Mr. Lincoln Gordon

This conference was preceded by a general discussion of the meeting of Committee No. 2 on July 31. 25 and the problems raised by the reference to the Scientific Committee of the question of the technical possibility of control of atomic energy and the most effective means of carrying out such control. There was some speculation as to the considerations which motivated Mr. Parodi in breaking into the discussion of the Soviet proposal with his suggestion for this reference to the Scientific Committee. Some concern was also expressed, particularly by Mr. Eberstadt, that the discussions in the Scientific Committee

24 Drafted by Lincoln Gordon.

25 For the summary record of the 4th Meeting of Committee 2, July 31, see AEC, I, Special Suppl., pp. 123–128.
might eventuate in a complaint that the United States was impeding progress by withholding technical information necessary to an understanding of proposed control measures.

The conference then proceeded to a review of the present status of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the desirable course of action in the immediate future.

Mr. Baruch stated emphatically that he felt that we have no real cause for disappointment at the progress to date. He felt that we had come along as quickly and as well as we should expect at this time.

Our goal remains a unanimous report adopting the principles of the American Plan. He said that no alternative to this goal is now under consideration and that no member of the Delegation should suggest in any manner that any thought was being given to alternatives.

Mr. Baruch said that we must endeavor to draw out the Russians on their ideas as fully as possible, and that we must avoid at all costs any humiliation of the Russians—even to the extent, if necessary, of some personal humiliation to ourselves. If any breach in the negotiations arises at a later date, it must not originate with us, and we must make it crystal clear that we have explored every possible avenue of agreement.

Mr. Baruch also said that in his judgment our plan was generous and just, and that we had the right as well as the power on our side. He saw no reason to believe at this time that the Russians would not be brought around, when they had had an opportunity for complete understanding of our proposals.

Mr. Hancock then outlined four lines along which he thought work should progress. They were as follows:

1. **Continuing Educational Work** to attain complete understanding of the American proposals among the other Delegations. This should include a much more detailed explanation than had as yet been given of the considerations which led the Lilienthal Board members to the conclusions in the Acheson-Lilienthal report. He suggested the possibility of talks by Dr. Oppenheimer, Mr. Charles Thomas and General Groves to joint sessions of the scientific and political delegates. Mr. Eberstadt suggested that we lay out a specific program for carrying out this educational work. This will, of course, have to be preceded by clarification of the effect of Section 10 of the McMahon Act.

2. **Informal Contacts with Other Delegations.** Mr. Hancock noted that members of our staff had been making increasingly useful contacts with staff members of the other Delegations. He felt that there was a need for systematic informal discussion at frequent intervals with the heads of other Delegations by the heads of our Delegation. Mr. Eberstadt suggested that a regular timetable be developed for this purpose, so that we are sure that no Delegation is overlooked.

3. **Treaty Drafting.** Work is already under way on the early stages
of drafting a treaty incorporating the American proposals, under
the supervision of Mr. Fahy. Mr. Hancock suggested that Professor
Manley Hudson might usefully be brought into this work. There was
no decision on this point.

4. Stages. The elaboration of the stages in which the American plan
would be implemented is a major substantive task for the Delegation
at this time. Mr. Hancock felt that it may be desirable to develop our
proposal on stages as part of the draft treaty. Mr. Eberstadt suggested
that a Working Committee including Dr. Oppenheimer (or Dr.
Bacher) and Messrs. Fahy, Volpe and Gordon devote a period of two
weeks of concentrated effort to this problem, developing a memoran-
dum for further consideration by the Delegation.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Notes on a Conference Between Members of the United States and
Canadian Delegations to the Atomic Energy Commission,
August 1, 1946

CONFIDENTIAL

Present: U.S. Canada
Mr. B. M. Baruch Gen. McNaughton
Mr. John M. Hancock Mr. G. Ignatieff
Mr. F. Eberstadt
Mr. John Parks Davis
Dr. R. C. Tolman
Mr. F. Lindsay

General McNaughton referred to the interrelation between current
negotiations at Paris Peace Conference and negotiations here. The
French have told him that they believe that the Russians may attempt
to shift the focus of world attention from the Paris Conference to
New York. They may try to condemn the United States for its failure
to implement its professed desire to eliminate the atom bomb because
of its refusal to sign the proposed Russian convention.

Ignatieff referred to the French move during yesterday's meeting
which resulted in diverting the questioning of Gromyko on his pro-
posals. He believed that Parodi was simply trying to be helpful
and to forestall any possibility of an immediate crack-up.

Mr. Baruch felt that possibly the various delegations did not even
now fully understand each other. For the present, discussion must
continue.

Mr. Hancock believed that the Russians would consider it to their
interests to continue negotiations and avoid an open break.

26 Drafted by Franklin T. Lindsay.
27 For the summary record of the 4th Meeting of Committee 2, July 31, see ABC,
Mr. Baruch stated there has been a tremendous change in public attitude toward Russia. We must do everything we can to reach an agreement; nevertheless, ultimately we must face the facts. If we have made every effort to reach an agreement, we can then face a break with a clear conscience. He further stated that the United States would not trade and that this problem was far too important to do any trading about.

Mr. Eberstadt agreed that our negotiations must be studied in light of concurrent negotiations at Paris and at the forthcoming General Assembly. He asked General McNaughton if he thought Russia had anything to gain by forcing a break at this time. General McNaughton replied that he believed that if Russia finds that she is going to lose the initiative at Paris with respect to her political domination of Europe, it may become advantageous to transfer the center of attention to New York.

Mr. Eberstadt believed there was an additional danger that the Scientific Committee might report that it was impossible to further consider the problem because of the refusal of the United States to make available the necessary scientific information.

General McNaughton suggested that the next meeting be opened by statement from one of the delegates requesting Gromyko to further elaborate his ideas on how effective control might be achieved through the Security Council. He added that Canada would assume the chair when the meetings would be resumed at Lake Success. He believed that it would be an opportune time to review the work that had been done and to re-focus the Commission’s attention on the basic problems to be solved. He asked whether or not the United States Delegation had any suggestions for such a statement.

Mr. Baruch said that the American Delegation would be glad to review the situation and to make suggestions to General McNaughton.

Mr. Baruch made a further statement that we must be fair and decent in our relations with the Russians, but that at the same time we must also be fair and decent to those people we represent.

Dr. Tolman arrived and reported that the Scientific meeting today had gone along more successfully than any previous meeting.

Mr. Hancock stated that he still had not a definitive answer to the question General McNaughton had raised at the previous meeting concerning the interpretation in the McMahon Bill on the provisions limiting publications of technical information.

Mr. Gordon stated he felt there was a danger that there might be a premature discussion of the Security Council during the next session of the Legal Committee and that this discussion might upset plans for discussion on the same subject in the next meeting of Subcommittee No. 2.

It was decided that the United States Delegation would discuss this
problem with Van Kleffens before the Legal Committee meeting
and attempt to work out a solution with him. Mr. Ignatieff said that
the Australians appear to be pushing for a showdown and that he was
quite concerned over this. Apparently Evatt had left instructions to
the Australian Delegation to force the issue on the veto as much as
possible.

General McNaughton said that he planned to leave for Ottawa on
August 8 and to return the 16th. He would then have a few days
before the first meeting at Lake Success during which he could work
out with United States and other delegations a plan of action to be
followed.

Mr. Hancock suggested that general report from the various Ameri-
can scientific societies outlining research projects which they had on
their books might be helpful to the general situation. General
McNaughton suggested that visits to a few laboratories or plants, or
to the Canadian Chalk River Plant might be desirable.

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Secret

Present

Rear Admiral Davis Mr. Hiss, Chairman
Captain Gladney General Crain
Commander Moore Mr. J. E. Johnson
Mr. Haselton

Major General Lemnitzer Absent: Mr. Hickerson
Major General Anderson
Colonel Cress
Colonel Griffin

Mr. Hiss opened the meeting by explaining that it had been called
to review the present status of the work of the Military Staff Com-
mittee. The specific purpose was to deal with the problem created with

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28 Dr. Belco Nicolaas van Kleffens, Foreign Minister of the Netherlands;
Representative on the Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission
and in the General Assembly; presumably, at the time the present document
was drafted, Chairman of the Legal Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy
Commission.

29 Rear Adm. Arthur C. Davis of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

30 Maj. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

31 Maj. Gen. Samuel E. Anderson of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
respect to work on the special military agreements provided for in Article 43 of the Charter by the fact that the Soviet Delegation to the Military Staff Committee has not yet submitted a statement of basic principles.

Mr. Hiss added that it has now been proposed by the U.S. Delegation to the Military Staff Committee that General Kenney, in his capacity as Chairman of the Military Staff Committee, address a letter to the Soviet military representative reminding them that they have promised the paper and asking them when it might be expected. Mr. Johnson then presented a brief history of the matter, stating that a Military Staff Committee subcommittee, charged with the formulation of recommendations as to basic principles, had agreed on March 28 that all delegations should hand in a statement of basic principles by April 3. This subcommittee has held only one meeting, on April 3. The statements of the other four delegations were submitted at that time, but the Soviets presented no paper. Being thus stymied in the subcommittee the other delegations agreed to establish a separate subcommittee to make recommendations regarding a standard form of agreement for the provision of armed forces. This body has met regularly; the Soviets, however, have not participated in its discussions although they have sat in the meetings.\textsuperscript{32}

The opinion was expressed by members of the \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee that the Russians were doubtless waiting for all the other delegations to show their hands and that the present situation therefore placed the Soviet representatives in an advantageous position. It was also the view of the Army and Navy members of the \textit{Ad Hoc} Committee that there might be further unfortunate publicity regarding this long delay which would, unless something were done about it, be directed not at the Soviets who deserve it, but at the Committee as a whole.

It was \textit{agreed} that General Kenney should send such a letter as was proposed, doing so in his capacity as Chairman. It was suggested that, following the anticipated unsatisfactory reply from the Soviet delegation, General Kenney might propose in the Military Staff Committee that, since no further substantive business could be transacted in the circumstances, the Military Staff Committee might adjourn pending receipt of the Soviet paper. Mr. Hiss pointed out at this point that the U.S. Delegation to the Military Staff Committee should be careful not to give an impression that it was withdrawing from the Committee, but should merely indicate that there is no further business re-

\textsuperscript{32} On August 27 the subcommittee, considering a standard form of agreement, submitted to the Military Staff Committee a draft based on the United States proposal, not printed, which had been used as a basis for discussion. The Military Staff Committee, however, took no action on the subcommittee report pending agreement on basic principles. (TO Files)
quiring the Committee to meet. He thought that if other delegations desire periodic meetings, the U.S. Delegation could agree, leaving junior officers to attend. The Ad Hoc Committee agreed that this might be the best procedure.

General Lemnitzer stated that General Kenney, before sending his letter, desired direct assurance that the State Department has no objection on political grounds to this action. It was agreed that Mr. Hiss should confer with Mr. Acheson the following day and then transmit the State Department's views directly to General Kenney informing General Lemnitzer as well.33

Admiral Davis asked whether the U.S. Delegation to the Military Staff Committee has instructions to reveal the U.S. position beyond submission of the statement of principles. In reply, it was stated that the U.S. views on a standard form of agreement have been presented to the appropriate subcommittee as authorized by instructions, but that no further material contained in SWNCC 219/8 has been given to other delegations on the Military Staff Committee.

Mr. Johnson raised the question whether there might be a way around the difficulties presented by the Soviet refusal to submit a paper on basic principles. Specifically, he suggested that, if the Soviet Delegation does not submit a statement of principles, the U.S. Delegation might inquire whether the Soviets have any suggestions as to other ways in which the Committee might proceed with its work. It was the sense of the Committee that such a procedure would not be desirable at the present time. It was also the sense of the Committee that the U.S. Delegation to the Military Staff Committee should pursue a less active and vigorous role and should not continue to press ahead in the absence of a Soviet paper on basic principles.

In reply to a question as to whether the State Department now feels that the matter might be taken up through diplomatic channels, a procedure that had been decided against when the question was raised in May by Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Hiss said that he had spoken to Mr. Hickerson on this matter and that the latter felt that any representations through diplomatic channels would be both ineffective and politically undesirable.

Colonel Griffin inquired as to the reason why the United States

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33 In a memorandum of August 15 Mr. Hiss indicated that he had discussed the subject with Mr. Acheson that morning. Mr. Acheson had felt that there were no objections from a political point of view to the General's proposed action. Mr. Hiss accordingly informed General Kenney of that by telephone and told General Lemnitzer of this action. (501BC/8-1546) General Kenney addressed a letter, dated August 14, of the nature contemplated at the present meeting, to General Vasilev, the Soviet Representative on the Military Staff Committee. General Vasilev replied by letter on August 23 that the Soviet Delegation was continuing to study Article 48 but was not yet in a position to present its views or renew discussion. (10 Files)
wished to expedite arriving at special military agreements, apart from the fact that the Charter mentions haste in concluding the agreements. Mr. Hiss replied that public-relation-wise it would benefit the United Nations if the Military Staff Committee actually could conclude the special military agreements. It was pointed out at this juncture that some publicity might be discreetly given to the press if it were desired to indicate the cause of the delay in going forward with the agreements. Mr. Hiss remarked, however, that the press in the United States was already familiar with the delay in the Military Staff Committee and the cause of it, adding that the Military Staff Committee’s report to the Security Council would, when published, indicate the lack of progress which the press, again, could not fail to see and analyze, since it already knew that the Military Staff Committee had a directive from the Security Council to proceed with this work.

Mr. Johnson indicated that at the San Francisco Conference a number of delegations indicated a suspicion that the U.S.S.R.’s support of Article 106 of the Charter was based on the possibility of using it to postpone indefinitely the conclusion of special military agreements.

General Lemnitzer inquired as to the result of the conference with certain Senators who had raised some objections to the United States statement of basic principles. Mr. Hiss informed him that at the last conference the Senators had agreed to withdraw their objections.

[Here follows brief discussion of other subjects.]

General Anderson pointed out that a British proposal had been received by the U.S. Delegation to the Military Staff Committee which provided for a member nation placing all of its military forces at the disposal of the Security Council. The opinion was expressed that agreement to such a plan would be very difficult to obtain in the United States. When the question was asked whether a working group should prepare a position on this subject, it was decided that the Ad Hoc Committee would wait until comment on the subject had been received from the U.S. Military Representative in New York. It was pointed out that General Kenney had indicated that a number of other Delegations apparently would favor such a proposal. It was further agreed that the Ad Hoc Committee would consider the matter further when the views of the U.S. Military Representative on this British suggestion had been received in Washington.

The Committee rose at 12:40.

Joseph E. Johnson
Executive Secretary
The Commanding General, Manhattan Engineer District (Groves), to Mr. John M. Hancock of the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1946.

Dear Mr. Hancock: I am inclosing two copies of the memorandum on stages which we have been working on and discussing over the past several weeks.

These are for your files.

Sincerely yours,

L. R. Groves
Major General, USA

Memorandum for Discussion With the United States Delegation

Subject: Stages of Transition to Full Control by the Atomic Development Authority

The proposals put forward by the United States for the establishment of the ADA envision a series of progressive stages so designed as to furnish safeguards against breach of faith by any nation or nations. This is particularly important in view of the reliance now placed by the United States on the atom bomb as a counter balance to the enormous military establishment maintained by Russia. In the event of a breakdown in international cooperation, security, not only for the United States, but for the world, will be impossible if the military strength of this country, and this means the atomic bomb, is seriously impaired. While it is essential that our timing be such as to avoid an impasse, yet it is vital that we come to grips at the outset with troublesome political problems which are inherent in the proposed step-by-step evolution of an internationally controlled agency.

The spelling out of a comprehensive plan in terms of the functions, the responsibilities and the authority of a control agency will entail lengthy discussions to bring about a reasonable understanding of the proposals advocated. Yet such discussions should not require any material change in the special position of the United States. The information essential to this understanding has already been disclosed. A large body of additional scientific information will probably be published in the near future with the approval of the Manhattan District. Accordingly, an outline of proposed stages may be limited to that which will follow after a treaty or charter has been ratified by the necessary nations.

Recognizing that the preparation of a timetable or scheduling of
steps is dependent on negotiation and the requirement of agreement, the initial importance of any consideration of stages lies in the formulation of a plan which provides a basis for agreement and at the same time affords the security desired. The rights and obligations of the signatory powers will have to be most carefully defined. The problem of the participation of countries not now represented, and therefore without voice in the Atomic Energy Commission, cannot be postponed indefinitely. These countries must accept the plan before the initial stages are put into effect.

In the following outline an attempt is made to spell out a suitable sequence of events or stages. It will be evident that certain of the proposed stages leave little room for compromise. Where the authority or powers of ADA must be firmly fixed, comment is made outlining the reasons for this position.

First Stage: Unrestricted Survey by ADA of World Resources of Raw Materials in the Ground.

a. Establishment of complete access to all sections of the world by ADA representatives with the requirement that all countries will cooperate in facilitating their travel and work.

Note: ADA engineers, geologists, and surveyors must be able to inspect thoroughly all known mines and occurrences which they think are of interest and to explore all sections of the world to locate undisclosed or unknown deposits. They must be able to acquire such samples and make such assays as they desire.

b. Establishment of means for carrying forward development work and for setting up research facilities to determine new or improved methods of extraction and concentration particularly in the field of low-grade ores.

Note: This will assist in determining a safe cut-off percent. The failure to achieve this stage in practice will mean that any cooperative effort will fail.

Second Stage: Interchange of Information on Deposits of Raw Materials.

a. Disclosure by all countries of complete information on deposits of raw materials within the jurisdiction of each country. This would include the furnishing of all desired information concerning geological occurrences, specimens, prospects, assays, ores and residues.

b. Review of such data and other published information by ADA geologists, mining engineers, and surveyors.

c. Development of additional information as required by ADA.

d. Establishment of facilities for sampling and assaying and for obtaining samples or specimens by ADA representatives.
e. Organization and maintenance of inspection of known and newly discovered sources.

   Note: This system should be progressively expanded as subsequent stages are undertaken.

f. Disclosure by all countries of current and past production figures of worked deposits.

Third Stage: Establishment and Maintenance of Control Over Deposits of Uranium and Thorium and Other Materials Vital to an Atomic Energy Program and Over Facilities Used for Their Extraction and Concentration.

a. Establishment of control over mines.

   Note: The form of control will depend on the type of occurrence and the amount of the estimated reserves. It will also be greatly influenced by whether the materials occur in conjunction with other products of value and in such case whether they are the primary or the by-product. The form of control might be mere inspection; licensing of production with ADA control or ownership of tailings; exclusive purchasing plus inspection; or outright ownership.

b. Establishment of control over facilities used for extraction and concentration of uranium and thorium.

   Note: Form of control may vary as in the control over mines. With full accomplishment of this stage some curtailment of U.S. operations in the atomic energy field will be inescapable.

Fourth Stage: Establishment and Maintenance of Control Over Any Facilities Devoted Exclusively to the Refining or Processing of Uranium or Thorium.

   [Note:] The form of control may vary as in the control over mines. The possibility of illicit operations by industries in allied fields will be greatly reduced by rigid controls over the ore itself. The obligations of participating countries must be clearly defined.

Fifth Stage: Establishment of Research Facilities Under ADA.

a. Furnishing by U.S. of scientific and technical information essential to peacetime uses.

b. Establishment of ADA research facilities to carry on development work in the field of "safe" activities.

c. Establishment under ADA control and supervision of small nuclear reactors and similar scientific research tools within the several States.

   Note: Such piles would be designed, constructed, and operated as determined by ADA.

   Note: Once this stage is initiated the U.S. will be under great pressure to furnish active materials in increasing quantities of
enriched active materials of varying concentrations. This stage will require broad discretion and authority on the part of the U.S. government authorities to deal with private interests and governmental agencies.

**Sixth Stage:** Disclosure by U.S. of Scientific and Technical Information Including Data Dealing With Design, Construction and Operation of Large Scale Production Plants.

a. Disclosure of all data essential to “safe” operations.

b. Disclosure of all data essential to “dangerous” operations up to but not including the atomic bomb itself.

**Seventh Stage:** International Ownership and Operation of Primary Production Plants.

a. Turning over to ADA by the U.S. of its primary production plants, (and by any other country having such plants).

b. Construction and operation of similar plants in such places as might be provided for under the convention or by later agreement.

Note: Scientific and technical advances will determine the technical and economic desirability of duplicating U.S. plants or the feasibility of adopting new methods.

**Eighth Stage:** Turning Over to ADA by U.S. and by All Other Countries of All Scientific and Technical Data in Their Possession Concerning Atomic Weapons.

**Ninth Stage:** Destruction or Turning Over by U.S. of All Stocks of Bombs. Turning Over by U.S. of All Stocks of Material for Peaceful Endeavors (and by Any Other Country Having Such Stocks). The ADA Assumes Exclusive Control Over All Dangerous Activities.

Assuming that the ADA will develop into an effective operating agency and that there would be full and effective cooperation by the important participating countries the following timetable would seem to be reasonable. It must never be forgotten that the degree of completion of each stage must govern the rate of progress rather than any calendar.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Possible Time of Starting Stage, Measured in Months from the Starting of the First Stage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>18 to 24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>24 to 30</td>
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<td>Fourth</td>
<td>30 to 38</td>
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<td>Fifth</td>
<td>32 to 44</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sixth</td>
<td>33 to 50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seventh</td>
<td>42 to 60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eighth</td>
<td>48 to 66</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ninth</td>
<td>50 to 72</td>
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</tbody>
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For the purpose of discussing this problem within the Commission itself when an appropriate occasion arises a paper should be prepared using this document as a basis. The paper, however, should be more general in its approach. The introductory remarks could well be expanded while the detailed schedule should be replaced with a discussion of the gradual evolution and development of the ADA as envisaged by the U.S.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Notes of an Informal Meeting Between Members of the United States and Canadian Delegations to the Atomic Energy Commission, New York, August 20, 1946, 3:30 p. m.\注34\note{This document was drafted by Mr. Arneson and dated August 21.}

REstricted

Present:  Mr. B. M. Baruch  
Mr. Hancock  
Mr. Eberstadt  
General McNaughton  
Mr. Ignatieff  
Mr. Jarvis  
Mr. Gordon  
Mr. Lindsay  
Mr. Arneson

MR. HANCOCK stated that he had been able to get no definite time schedule on the work of the Scientific and Technical Committee. It seemed likely that its preliminary report would be somewhat delayed.\注35\note{At its 4th Meeting, July 31, Committee 2 had requested Committee 3 (the Scientific and Technical Committee) to present a report on whether effective control of atomic energy was possible and to provide an indication of the methods by which effective control could be achieved. Committee 3 completed this report by the end of August, but final action was not taken until September 26 due to reluctance on the part of the Soviet Union to accept it. For text of the report, see AEC, I, Special Suppl., part IV.} He stated that we were prepared, now that we are perfectly clear on the interpretation of the McMahon bill, to bring such men as Lilienthal and Thomas to speak before the Scientific and Technical Committee, Committee No. 2, or both.

MR. BARUCH pointed out that he has been most anxious that the pace not be forced; that we do not drive Gromyko into a corner so that a reasonable attempt to understand could not be forthcoming. He stressed the conviction that a slower educative approach was necessary and that our present emphasis on the work of the Scientific and Technical Committee was a concrete manifestation of this conviction.
GENERAL McNAUGHTON agreed emphatically that we could not push for a break now simply because the matter has not as yet been fully explored.

Mr. Ignatieff reported on his recent conversations in Ottawa with the Undersecretary of State. Mr. Ignatieff said that the Undersecretary felt as we did that any further pursuing of the political aspects would simply bring about a deadlock or a complete breakdown of the negotiations. He felt, therefore, that we should concentrate for the present on the scientific and technical aspects of the problem. Mr. Ignatieff suggested that it would be wise strategy to allow the break if it must come between the Western World and the U.S.S.R. to occur somewhere else in the world, rather than in these particular negotiations. He urged that we must concentrate on securing the allegiance of world opinion to our plan and that every endeavor should be made to secure the support of all nations who must join in any international control which may be established if that control is to be effective.

In reply to a query from Mr. Gordon as to how the Scientific and Technical Committee report might be discussed in Committee No. 2, Mr. Ignatieff suggested that the report should be considered only an interim report and that Committee No. 2 should refer back to the S. & T. Committee requests for more detailed information.

Mr. Eberstadt [said] that he thought the S. & T. Committee report was an admirable document, one which had avoided quite successfully the ticklish political aspects of the problem. For example, while setting off danger points against points of control, the report does not say who shall exercise the control that seems necessary. He thought it was perfectly clear that even if the Soviets do eventually accept international control of atomic energy they would make every attempt to secure all the advantages they could possibly obtain by a program of delay. Yet, it must be remembered that our work is only a part of a much larger picture and that our tactics would have to be oriented to the progress of negotiations in other places, as, for example, the Paris Peace Conference. He felt that, whatever we do and however we may proceed in the negotiations, it was quite likely that we would finally come out with a 10 to 2 report. We must have patience but that patience must be tempered with the realization that we may not get a unanimous AEC report.

Mr. Eberstadt suggested three alternatives:

1. A preliminary progress report by the AEC to the Security Council—

The AEC might very well prepare a preliminary progress report as a means of summarizing negotiations to date. This might well be done at the end of General McNaughton’s chairmanship and should not
contain any recommendations or hard-and-fast conclusions, but merely bring the events of the preceding 90 days together in one document. Mr. Eberstadt thought this procedure would constitute a sort of minor warning to the world and to the United Nations that time was running out and that soon the AEC would have to come to close quarters with the real points of divergence.

2. A draft convention.

The draft convention might be presented toward the end of General McNaughton’s term after the preliminary report of the S. & T. Committee had been received. Preparation of the draft convention obviously would be difficult at this stage, inasmuch as many facets of the problem had not yet been fully explored, as, for example, the matter of “stages”. This alternative would be a much sharper challenge to the Soviets and would bring the disagreements to a head more sharply.

3. Continuation of the seminar technique.

Continuation of more detailed discussion of the elements of control and of the scientific and technical facts lying behind the American proposal would, if not supplemented by more specific action, bring about increased public impatience with the progress of negotiations.

Mr. Ignatieff felt that public opinion was already resigned to the concept of two worlds. The public was thinking that a break was inevitable and was resigning itself to it. He queried whether something could be done to change this public attitude.

Mr. Eberstadt replied that he thought a statement could be in the preliminary report of the AEC to the Security Council which would help to dissipate this pre-judgment which the public has been tending to make. He thought that after reviewing the record of proceedings for the past three months the report might state that the next stage of negotiations would be a reconciliation of points of view and a further analysis of the technical and scientific facts underlying the problem.

Mr. Baruch felt that General McNaughton might very well make an opening statement, as the new chairman, in which he would review the proceedings of the past two months, ending with a statement of the problem as indicated by the discussion thus far but without any specific recommendations. He went on to say that he planned to talk with Gromyko on Wednesday in order to ascertain, if possible, just what was going on in the Soviet mind. He supported the idea of a preliminary survey of negotiations to date with stress on the fact-

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August 21.
finding character of the next stage of negotiations and the attempt to secure a reconciliation of points of view.

General McNaughton expressed strong approval of the report of the S. & T. Committee, pointing out that it was in reality the first official report of the Atomic Energy Commission and its subcommittees. He thought that the report was essentially sound, that it did not weaken the American view, and that it had the real merit of being a new source document to which all could refer in future discussions. In other words, while it followed the lines of the Acheson report and the Baruch Plan, it did not suffer from their disabilities in that it was not an American report but an AEC report.

Mr. Eberstadt said it was more important that we have a sound report, even if that meant a split in voting, than simply to get a unanimous vote on a report which was too weak.

Mr. Baruch pointed out that the tide of public opinion is running very strongly against the Soviets. He remarked that even many of the so-called liberal groups had commented to him that they were no longer able to support many of the actions which the Russians have recently taken. Jokingly, he commented that he was being branded a communist, since he was trying to work with Gromyko in a patient and understanding fashion. He remarked cryptically that we must be prepared one day to say: "Good Morning Death!"

Mr. Ignatieff remarked that the chief preoccupation of all nations was for security and that the concept of two worlds offered precious little in the way of security. Therefore, we must make every attempt to join these two worlds.

Mr. Eberstadt asked what the alternatives would be if a real split occurred. He pointed out the difficulties of determining what nations would have to be excluded from our world, citing, as an example, Poland. He mentioned Section 51 of the United Nations Charter, commenting that we might, at some time in the future, have to remind the Soviets of the power inherent in that Section. He pointed out the danger that was inherent in any two world alternative. If this came to pass we would be accused by public opinion of having devised a plan which was obviously unacceptable to the Soviets with the full realization that they would reject it and then having revealed our real intentions by proposing an atomic alliance against them.

General McNaughton stated that he would press for the completion of the preliminary report of the S. & T. Committee with the idea of having it presented formally to the full Atomic Energy Commission. He promised to talk to Captain Alberto about some sort of resume of the past two months of negotiations.
Notes of a Meeting Between the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission and the United States Representatives on the Military Staff Committee, New York, August 22, 1946, 3 p. m.  

CONFIDENTIAL

Present: Mr. Baruch  Admiral Turner
Mr. Hancock  General Kenney
Mr. Eberstadt  Lt. Gen. Ridgway
Mr. Searls  Lt. Gen. Haislip
Dr. Tolman  Maj. Gen. Lemnitzer
Mr. Gordon  Maj. Gen. Groves
Dr. Fleming  Brig. Gen. Kibler
Mr. Johnson  Brig. Gen. Cabell
Mr. Lindsay  Colonel Gilmer
Mr. Howard  Colonel Harris
Mr. Arneson

In welcoming the United States Members of the Military Staff Committee to the meeting, Mr. Hancock stressed our desire to have any views they might wish to make at any time. He said that we were open to suggestions and observations of whatever sort they would care to make on any occasion. This meeting was called primarily to cast up a number of problems on which we thought the Military Staff Committee would be especially well qualified to make recommendations. Taking up the points raised by the memorandum distributed to the group the discussion that ensued was as follows:

A. Relations of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council on security matters

Mr. Hancock suggested that the Military Staff Committee might attempt to formulate a precise meaning of Paragraph 2(b) of the Resolution of the General Assembly of January 24, 1946, which states that any matters affecting security the Security Council shall issue directions to the Commission and that on security matters the Commission shall be accountable for its work to the Security Council.

B. Other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction

Pointing out that the terms of reference of the AEC included recommendations for the elimination from national armaments not only of atomic weapons but of all other major weapons adaptable to mass

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27 This document was drafted by Mr. Arneson and dated August 23.
destruction, Mr. Hancock asked for the views of the Military on this point.

General Ridgway felt strongly that we should not attempt to expand the scope of our work at this time to include other weapons. General Kenney strongly concurred in this view, as did General Groves. General Groves expressed the view that the problem would become hopelessly complicated if effort were made to expand the terms of reference at this time. He thought that we should keep the “other weapons” in mind and plan to recommend at a later stage that negotiations be started on them. Admiral Turner pointed out that if the terms of reference were expanded at this time we would be faced with a very difficult job of definition, that, in fact, the term “weapons of mass destruction” was as vague as the term aggression which the United Nations has carefully avoided trying to define.

Mr. Hancock expressed concern about the fact that there is no known means of effective control over biological warfare and that an attempt to include BW in our work might play into the hands of Gromyko, inasmuch as all we could propose for BW would be a mere convention. Mr. Searls said that the problem was further complicated by the fact that the Commission might very well end up with a split report.

C. Stages

Referring to the U.S. proposal which recommends that the establishment of an ADA should proceed by stages, Mr. Hancock enquired whether the Military had any concern about this phase of our proposal. No criticism was raised. He stated that we were anxious to get the views of the Military on this as quickly as possible, since we would probably have to be prepared to make some presentation to the Commission on this question within the next three or four weeks.

Mr. Baruch pointed out that both Senators Connally and Vandenburg had been most emphatic on the need to proceed by stages and that the stages idea was deeply embedded in the Acheson-Lilienthal report.

General Groves differentiated two different concepts on stages as follows:

1. the stages relating to the progressive inclusion of other weapons after the atomic bomb had been handled, and
2. a sort of stages-within-stages concept in which control over a given weapon would proceed step by step. He reported that Secretary Byrnes had assured and reassured him on several occasions that it was the Secretary's intention that the problem of atomic energy and the establishment of an international control body should proceed stage by stage.

Admiral Turner pointed out that there was some confusion between the idea of stages in the establishment of the ADA and the idea of
having the work of the AEC proceed by separate stages. The original tri-partite statement (Truman, Attlee, King) called for the establishment of an International Authority by separate stages. On the other hand the Resolution of the General Assembly stated that the work of the Commission should proceed by stages. When Senator Vandenburg saw the Resolution he insisted on a clarification. On his return from London Secretary Byrnes did clarify the meaning of this concept, insisting that the establishment of an International Authority should be by separate stages so devised as to assure a balance of security among the participating nations.

1. Destruction of the bombs.

Admiral Turner pointed out that we have made no definite commitment to destroy our stocks of atomic bombs. We have simply stated that we propose that existing stocks of bombs should be disposed of at a late stage in the establishment of the ADA "pursuant to the terms of the treaty". There seems to be a general feeling in the public mind that the United States has agreed to destroy the bombs once an ADA has been established and is in effective operation. Admiral Turner felt that this opinion might be dangerous and there might be some occasion to clarify this at a later date. He felt that before we give any definite commitment on this point we should seek a final opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. Hancock stated that our thinking had not completely jelled on the question whether there should be any atomic bombs anywhere in the world or not. He did indicate, however, that the problem would seem to be an easier one if there were no bombs anywhere in the world. That, of course, raised the question of how a violator would be dealt with if no bombs existed. Mr. Baruch considered this a question on which we wanted help from the Military people.

General Ridgway remarked that it was his understanding that our position was that bombs would be disposed of only after actual proof of good faith on the part of all nations had been demonstrated through every stage of the establishment of the ADA. This he thought was the only sound position that could be taken on the matter. Mr. Hancock pointed out this difficulty however: the decision as to when bombs should be disposed of could not be made in our discretion alone. It is probable that some formula would be written into the treaty which would leave that decision to the ADA itself. In any event the treaty would have to state very specifically just what conditions had to be met and who would decide that those conditions had been met.

General Kenney suggested that the Military Staff Committee should be the organ to check on whether specified conditions actually had been reached. This would have the merit of retaining the veto, in the sense that the Military Staff Committee reports to the Security
Council. Mr. Eberstadt thought that General Kenney's suggestion was a very good one, at least on certain types of conditions. General Groves pointed out that the stages will probably have to overlap in order to avoid undue delay. Even in providing for overlap he found that a minimum of five years was required. The overlap feature might complicate this matter of certification and make it more difficult for the Military Staff Committee to check. He suggested that the Military Staff Committee would probably have to take the testimony of the ADA as first evidence that a particular stage had been met. This was so because many technical considerations were involved which only the ADA would really be in a position to understand. Mr. Eberstadt pointed out that giving this kind of function to the Military Staff Committee would tie in very nicely with their general responsibility for recommendations on disarmament.

Mr. Hancock asked whether this question of Military Staff Committee participation in the stages picture could be raised formally with the military. In reply Admiral Turner said he thought that the question should be raised by us directly with the Government. He thought that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would need a specific request in writing in order to consider the question. Mr. Hancock replied that much discussion would be needed on this point and said he was not sure that it should be raised formally at the moment. He hoped that the Military Staff people would think about this question.

Mr. Baruch remarked that we had been depending on General Groves to keep the Chiefs of Staff fully informed of our operations and likewise to keep us informed of questions that the Joint Chiefs had on their minds.

2. Alternative plans.

General Groves felt that if we were unable to get a unanimous report through the Security Council the alternative would be nothing at all. Mr. Eberstadt felt very strongly that we should not even contemplate an alternative plan at this stage. He felt that there was grave danger inherent in any situation that might lead to our proposing an alternative plan simply because many would think that we had purposely put forward an original plan which was obviously unacceptable, and that what we were really trying to do was to come out with an atomic alliance against Russia.

Mr. Hancock said that it is not our job to consider alternative plans but that this question was one with which the Military Staff Committee should be very much concerned. General Groves remarked that the Military Staff Committee might inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Delegation has no alternative plan in mind.

Mr. Searls remarked that we were obliged to report a plan, even if that plan could not be unanimously agreed to. Mr. Eberstadt in-
sisted that this plan must be fully adequate and must be one which would necessarily provide that all nations must join in.

Mr. BARUCH stated that we would be interested in another plan only if it were stronger and better than the one we have already put forward.

GENERAL GROVES stressed the need of conducting the negotiations in such a fashion as to make it perfectly clear to the world that the plan we sponsor is a fair and reasonable plan which has been worked out openly and patiently. It must be clear that Russia had been given every possible chance to understand and to accept. He thought this sort of procedure was essential whether we felt that the Russians would accept it or not. Then in the event that the plan is rejected by the Russians we could be sure of the support of the world and especially the support of American scientists on any course of action we might then find necessary.

Mr. HANCOCK explained that he had carefully avoided using the word compromise in reply to Gromyko’s accusation that we were offering a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. This was a bit of tight rope-walking with the view in mind of not falling into Gromyko’s trap, while at the same time, avoiding any implication that we were willing to compromise. He stated categorically that we have no intention whatsoever of compromising the basic principles of our plan. In fact, our plan represents the minimum that is required to bring about an effective, workable system of control. He pointed out that there were, of course, certain aspects of the plan that had not yet been elaborated and that in these cases we would want to accommodate the views of other delegations as far as this was possible without compromising our basic requirements.

D. Strategic balance

Mr. EBERSTADT expressed the view that the ADA could not be given unlimited power to decide the location of plants and the general question of strategic balance. He thought that the ADA might be required to confer with the Military Staff Committee on this kind of question and, indeed, to secure approval from the Military Staff Committee on its proposals. GENERAL KENNEY thought that the ADA might be required to secure at least recommendations from the Military Staff Committee. GENERAL GROVES felt that the Military Staff Committee might be given the same power on the question of location of plants as on the question of stages. He did not feel that the Military Staff Committee should be empowered to pass on location of all ADA installations but primarily on the location of large plants. In response to a question from Admiral Turner, General Groves said he thought the
Military Staff Committee’s power should extend to the physical location of individual large plants.

Admiral Turner thought that the question of locating plants would not be very difficult, inasmuch as the Big Five are not only strong militarily, but are the chief industrial powers and that primary production plants would logically be placed in their respective territories. Mr. Eberstadt, however, pointed out that there would be considerable pressure from backward countries to have power plants located in their territory.

E. Destruction of Atomic Bombs

Mr. Hancock stated that this was one of the most difficult of problems on which to arrive at a sound decision and that he was anxious to have views of the Military men present.

General Kenney thought that the United States should retain a stockpile of bombs to be held in trust and available to the Military Staff Committee force on call from the Security Council. Mr. Eberstadt posed two alternatives: (1) a quota of bombs to be turned over to a common pool, or (2) to have no bombs in existence. He did not think that the proposal that the U.S. keep a stock of bombs as its contribution to the Military Staff Committee force would be an acceptable one to other nations. He felt that if bombs were to remain in existence they would have to be possessed physically by the United Nations force. He felt, furthermore, that not to have any bombs was more in accord with the overall objectives of the United Nations. General Lemnitzer remarked that while it might be much easier to get agreement on a treaty which provided there would be no bombs, he felt that the absence of bombs in the hands of an international body would put a premium on a nation’s getting atomic bombs and using them.

Mr. Eberstadt suggested that the stages concept might be a useful one to consider here. A formula might be devised looking toward a period when bombs would finally be destroyed, but that a series of stages leading up to this final objective might provide first, for a period of trusteeship by the U.S., later possession of bombs by the United Nations force and so on to final destruction. He pointed out that calculated risks must be taken all the way along in this problem. Risks cannot be avoided. We must simply try to make them as balanced as possible. Mr. Searls expressed full agreement with this idea. Mr. Gordon pointed out that one of the more serious aspects of this question was the fact that with bombs existing in the world, the warning period would be very short, while, if all bombs were destroyed and possession of them made illegal, nations would have a considerably longer period of warning.
ADMIRAL TURNER pointed out this difficulty: in an atomic age a premium will be put on speed of reprisal for any violation of the treaty. If atomic bombs remain in existence reprisal could be much quicker and more effective.

There was some discussion of a point raised by GENERAL CABELL that bomb components might well be distributed among several powers in such a way that no one nation could use them. These components could be called in by the Security Council for use, if this were necessary. Among the objections raised to this idea were the following:

1. Big Power veto.
2. Loss of instantaneous use of the weapon which would in turn negate the purpose of having bombs available at all. This objection would apply even if it were provided that the bombs could be called into use by a simple majority vote of the Security Council.

F. Other uses of atomic energy

GENERAL KENNEY asked if atomic energy were prohibited for use in bombs, could it be used to make other weapons more effective. Dr. TOLMAN replied that in the present state of the art, the use of atomic energy for ship propulsion seemed to offer some real possibilities. GENERAL KENNEY then asked whether such a possibility was prohibited. Mr. EBERSTADT’s view was that such use would be prohibited, inasmuch as the terms of reference speak of atomic weapons, rather than merely atomic bombs. He said this was not an easy question to answer but that it was his impression that this interpretation was correct. He cited the fact that Gromyko always refers to atomic weapons and not to atomic bombs.

ADMIRAL TURNER expressed the view that it would be absurd to encourage the utilization of atomic power for freighters, while prohibiting its use for warships. Dr. TOLMAN pointed out, however, that there was far less likelihood of, or need for, use of atomic power in freighters than in warships. Mr. HANCOCK pointed out that there would be real danger in allowing battleships to employ atomic power plants, inasmuch as these power plants could manufacture fissionable material.

On the question of the use of radio-active materials as a kind of weapon for war, Dr. TOLMAN felt that this possibility did not now seem feasible and could not be until a satisfactory method of dispersing the material by fine sprays had been worked out.

G. Commercial Problems

MR. HANCOCK raised the question about providing some sort of quota system on raw materials to prevent on the one hand, hoarding of fissionable materials by any one nation, and on the other hand, the
depletion of supply in another country. General Groves pointed out
that the value of uranium and thorium is so great in a national security
sense that there would be tremendous pressure to search out all possible
sources of supply. There would also be great pressure to increase tech-
nical mining efficiency so as to get at the low-grade deposits. He stated
that it was within the realm of possibility that one day a method
would be devised for recovering uranium from the ocean.

H. Inspection

There was some general discussion about the question of opening
industrial plants and military reservations to inspection by an Interna-
tional Authority. General Groves felt that it would not be difficult to
hide any of the Oak Ridge processes in some of our larger industrial
plants. Admiral Turner thought that we should be willing to open up
all of our industrial plants to inspection, provided reciprocal conces-
sions were received from other countries. He recognized that the chief
difficulty with this idea had to do with preservation of trade secrets in
industry.

I. The moral issue of using the bomb

Mr. Hancock mentioned that he was somewhat concerned that pres-
sure would be built up in this country condemning the use, and con-
tinued manufacture, of the atomic bomb. He queried whether we should
not take steps in the near future to ward off this sort of public opinion
development. General Groves felt that it would be quite unwise to
have this question debated but thought that it might be wise to do
whatever could be done privately to head off this kind of development.

In closing the meeting, Mr. Hancock said that we might have to be
ready with specific proposals on stages within a period of three or four
weeks. He hoped that the Military Staff Committee members would
give us the benefit of their views on this question as soon as possible. He
reiterated that the Military Staff Committee members should feel free
to talk with us at any time on any problem on which they might care
to express their views.

501. BC/8-2946: Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Johnson) to the Secretary of State

URGENT

NEW YORK, August 29, 1946—midnight.
[Received August 29—11:30 p. m.]

527. The following is an unofficial translation for the press of state-
ment by Ambassador Gromyko, before the Security Council, 29 August,
1946 proposing that UN members report on their troops stationed in certain foreign territories:

“In connection with the war the United Nations waged against their common foes—Hitler Germany and militaristic Japan—troops of certain powers, members of the United Nations, were situated on the territory of several countries, members of the United Nations, and certain countries which had not participated in the war, for the purpose of driving out the German and Japanese aggressors, or to prevent invasion by Axis troops. After these tasks had been completed and the war had ended and Germany and Japan were put under the control of Allied occupation forces, some Allied troops were withdrawn from the above-mentioned territories. However, according to the available information, Allied troops still continue to be situated on the territory of several member states of the United Nations and other states, not including the former enemy territories.

The presence of Allied troops for so long a time after the end of the war, a presence which is not called for by military necessity, must provoke natural uneasiness in the peoples of those countries in which foreign troops are still stationed. Further, world public opinion, which is interested in the establishment of peace as soon as possible and the maintenance of collective security, follows with open concern the situation which has been created in the above-mentioned countries.

The Security Council should therefore study the question of the maintenance of Allied troops at the present time on the territory of member states of the United Nations and other states, with the exception of former enemy territories. The Security Council, however, has not at its disposal information on where in the territory of member states of the United Nations and other states, excepting former enemy territories, troops of other member states of the United Nations are situated, and on the number of these troops. Taking into account the duties of the Security Council provided for in Chapter 7 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council should be informed on the question of where the armed forces of member nations of the United Nations are stationed in the above-mentioned territories and on the number of these troops. In connection with this, I submit, on instruction of the Soviet Government, the proposal that the Security Council should take the decision to require states members of the United Nations to submit to the Security Council within two weeks the following information:

1. In which places in the territories of member states of the United Nations or other states, with the exception of former enemy territories, and in what number are armed forces of other members of the United Nations stationed.
2. In what places in the above-mentioned territories are situated air and naval bases, and the strength of their garrisons, belonging to the armed forces of other member states of the United Nations.
3. The information mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 should be submitted as of August 1, 1946.”

JOHNSON

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, in Paris

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1946—6 p.m.

4508. Secdel 791. I discussed with Judge Patterson ⁵⁹ and Acting Secretary of Navy Kenney this morning Gromyko's statement to SC yesterday (unofficial translation being relayed to you separately) ⁶⁰ proposing that UN members report on their troops in foreign territories. We agreed as follows:

1. Purpose of Soviet proposal is obviously propaganda.

2. Best counter propaganda would be for our representative to state in SC when proposal comes up, possibly next Tuesday or Wednesday, that we see no objection in principle, that we have nothing to hide, but we feel basis should be broadened to include armed forces located in former enemy territories. We would then move that Soviet proposal be amended by striking out exception of former enemy territories.

3. If Soviet vetoed our amendment we would then feel free to veto their original proposal.

4. If Soviet accepted our amendment we would make all information called for available; reporting all combined U.S. forces in excess of 100.

5. With regard to bases referred to in section 2 of Soviet proposal we interpret meaning as calling for report from us only on eight 99-year lease bases plus Panama and Cuba.

We urge that you discuss foregoing with Bevin before making such a proposal in view of UK position in Greece and the Near East. If you approve proposed course of action we shall instruct Johnson in New York accordingly.

ACHESON

501.BC/8-3146 : Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT

NEW YORK, August 31, 1946—10 p.m.

[Received August 31—9:48 p.m.]

534. Cadogan has received instructions from the Foreign Office and comment from Mr. Bevin regarding Soviet proposal that the Security Council ask for full data regarding military forces stationed in foreign countries.

Following is substance of Foreign Office instructions to Cadogan.

⁵⁹ Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of War.
⁶⁰ Telegram 527 from New York, August 29, supra.
This telegram was repeated to Mr. Bevin in Paris and his comment will be outlined later.

British Foreign Office comments that the scope of the Soviet proposal is by no means clear. They suggest two alternatives.

(1) That a robust line be taken by the British representative as soon as the provisional agenda on which this item appears is under discussion. Cadogan should denounce the Soviet move as another typical and irresponsible maneuver designed to damage the prestige of the Security Council, and to declare that he will vote against placing it on the agenda provided his U.S. and French colleagues can be brought to agree.

(2) It is suggested that the British representative inquire at the Council meeting what provisions of the Charter are involved in the Russian proposal and on what grounds the Security Council could properly call for such information. Perhaps the Russians have chapter 7 of the Charter in mind. British Foreign Office points out that this line of approach would afford an opening to comment on the manner by which the Military Staff Committee has been hamstrung in its work through lack of instructions to the Soviet representative. The type of information called for by the Soviet demand should normally be asked for by the Council on the advice of the Military Staff Committee. The fact that this is not so in the present case coupled with the urgency of the Soviet demand suggests that the Council is being asked by Russia to presume some danger to the maintenance of international peace exists in the presence of troops in foreign countries. If that is the real intention of the Russians, their request should be reframed to make this point clear. Until this is done, the Soviet proposal is irrelevant and inconsistent with the procedure of the Charter.

The British Foreign Office itself prefers this second alternative. It feels that this method would serve to expose to public view the Russian attitude to the Military Staff Committee and would also offer an opportunity to force into the open the Russian attitude toward foreign troops in former enemy countries, expressly excluded in the Russian request. (See penetrating comment in leading editorial, New York Times, August 31.)

Mr. Bevin has sent a telegram to Cadogan commenting on the foregoing. He states that he prefers the first alternative providing Cadogan can bring his U.S. colleague to concur. Mr. Bevin says the British cannot take a stronger line than the U.S. and points out that the Russian proposal is aimed at the presence of U.S. troops in China as well as British troops in Greece and elsewhere. Cadogan is instructed by Mr. Bevin to make every effort to secure concurrence of both his American and French colleagues in this matter. In a passage of his telegram which was garbled and the meaning of which the British here consider to be uncertain, Mr. Bevin apparently instructed Cadogan under no circumstances to vote in favor of the Russian request being placed on the Council’s agenda.

I understand from telephone conversations with officers in the Department that we are considering meeting the Russian demand openly and giving full information as we have nothing to hide or apologize
for. There may well be advantages in following this line rather than either of the lines suggested by the British. I think it important, however, that our action in this matter be carefully concerted with the British and that we agree together and follow the same line. From the Russian point of view, we are both in the same position and our rejoinder would be greatly weakened in effect if we take divergent lines. Whatever line we take, we should consider a counterblast at Russia with well-documented details.

There was nothing in Cadogan’s message from the Foreign Office or the one from Mr. Bevin to indicate that Mr. Bevin had discussed this matter with the Secretary. He may have done so. In any event, I request that this telegram be immediately repeated to the Secretary in Paris for his consideration.

JOHNSON

501.BC/9-246

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

IMMEDIATE

PARIS, 2 September, 1946.

DEAR JAMES: Before we meet this afternoon I ought to let you know that I have been in touch with London about the suggestion which you made to me yesterday that we should counter the Gromyko resolution at New York by challenging the Russians on their troops in the ex-enemy countries. I am confirmed, after these consultations, in my original conclusion that your suggestion would lead to very grave difficulties for the British Commonwealth and I must tell you frankly that we are absolutely opposed to it. There are very fundamental reasons for this attitude which I will explain to you confidentially this afternoon.

For our part we shall feel obliged to instruct Cadogan to vote against the question being put on the agenda of the Security Council.

Yours sincerely,

ERNEST BEVIN

501.BC/9-246: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT

PARIS, September 2, 1946—11 p. m.

[Received 8:18 p. m.]

4396. For Acting Secretary for Johnson from the Secretary. Reference New York’s 534, August 31. Soviet proposal that the Council ask

*No record of the conversations under reference has been found in the Department of State files.
for full data regarding military forces is of course propaganda. My first reaction was to advise offering an amendment to make certain that it would apply to Russian troops in ex-enemy states. However, British believe it would be followed by request for number and location of naval vessels. They will oppose placing subject on the agenda. Therefore, I advise that we take same position showing that request would not require statement from Soviets as to their troops in ex-enemy states. Johnson should assert it is ridiculous so far as we are concerned because newspapers daily publish the number of our troops in foreign territories and that no American soldier is in any country which has not requested the presence of such soldiers except those in ex-enemy states.

[Byrnes]

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by the United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission (Baruch)


On reading the scientific reports, the only query I had—because of my ignorance of the subject—was whether we were releasing information that was not necessary to an understanding of the subject. Dr. Tolman, General Farrell 42 and General Groves have assured us that practically all of it is information that has been given out at different times in the Smyth and Acheson-Lilienthal reports and various scientific newspaper and magazine articles. It only has been correlated here—something that could be done and doubtless has been done by others.

I have always been puzzled about the amount of secrecy that was connected with the production of atomic energy. We do know that certain pumps have been ordered by the Russian government. We do know they try to buy certain raw materials. We do know they have received information and small samples through their spies in Canada and probably in other places.

The object of the scientific report was to show the necessity of controls at various points. I think it clearly does that. I hope that it will convince those who heretofore did not approve of the American proposals that the proposals were fair and just in the circumstances. The acceptance of this report will be evidence that controls and inspections are necessary. The public should be acquainted with the facts that there

is nothing new and the security of the United States has not been affected, as evidenced by the statement of those who best know (Dr. Tolman, Gen. Farrell and Gen. Groves). We should be careful not to put ourselves in the position of really having told anything that was not necessary. As a matter of fact, it now appears that they already had all that was necessary and it had only to be correlated—which, as stated above, they doubtless had already done.

This makes all the more puzzling to me the paragraph referring to the necessary giving of information to make the proposals more understandable in the Acheson–Lilienthal report. I appreciate that later on, if the A. D. A. is set up and it progresses, that more information of a secret nature will have to be made available, but only after a treaty is signed for controls, inspections and punishment.

We have to face very soon the fact that Brazil, Egypt and Mexico will be replaced. Therefore, some decisions must be heard before their exit and others come on the scene.

BERNARD M. BARUCH

USUN Files 43

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. M. Gordon Know, Adviser, Permanent United States Delegation to the United Nations

[NEW YORK.] September 4, 1946.

De Rose (France), in answer to a query, said his delegation had received no instructions on the Soviet request for military information. He added it was his personal and unofficial guess that France would support the U.K. and U.S. in this matter.

He said that the matter did not concern France directly, but that France was concerned by the Soviet attitude at the Peace Conference 44 during recent weeks and might be inclined to adopt an anti-Russian viewpoint to this Soviet inquiry if it should become a political rather than a purely technical matter. His delegation would not want to discuss the question now because it lacked instructions. However, if instructed to oppose its placement on the Agenda he could think of many reasons. Two reasons he advanced were: There was no complaint, hence the matter was outside the Charter; the question is properly the concern of the MSC which has been blocked for months by Russian recalcitrance.

43 Files of the United States Mission at the United Nations.
44 For documentation on the Paris Peace Conference of 1946, see volumes III and IV.
REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. M. Gordon Know, Adviser, Permanent United States Delegation to the United Nations

[new York,] September 5, 1946.

Dr. Hsu *6 told USdel on September 5 that his chief (Hsia)*6 had strong opinions on the Soviet request for military information, but would be influenced by the American viewpoint. He said China would not like a prominent part in any debate, because of the present situation in China.*7

The Chinese delegation’s opinion was that the matter should not be admitted to the Agenda because it is not covered by the Charter and to admit it would open a “floodgate” for other inappropriate inquiries. An alternative possibility of broadening the inquiry to include enemy states would be useful, but would not offset these objections, in the view of the Chinese.

Department of State Disarmament Files

Position Paper Prepared in the Office of Special Political Affairs*8

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 5, 1946.

PCA D-5/2

Tentative United States Position at the Forthcoming Meeting of the General Assembly With Regard to Regulation of Armaments

Statement of the Problem

If it is proposed that the subject of the regulation of armaments or disarmament be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly what position should the United States take?

Recommendations

1. While it is the traditional and present policy of the United States to support the regulation of armaments this Government does not believe an effective system for the regulation of armaments, except as regards atomic weapons and the international traffic in arms, can be established under present world conditions. Thus the United

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*6 Dr. Shunsh Hsu of the Chinese Delegation to the Security Council.
*7 For documentation on United States policy with respect to China, see volumes IX and x.
*8 This paper was a revision of an earlier draft in accordance with the suggestions of the Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments of September 3. It was transmitted to the United States Delegation at the United Nations as position paper SD/A/C.1/20, undated, titled “Regulation of Armaments.” (10 Files)
States is not prepared to take the initiative of placing the matter on the agenda of the General Assembly and would prefer that the question not be raised at this meeting of the Assembly. If the general subject of the regulation of armaments or that specific phase of regulation dealing with the international traffic in arms is formally proposed for inclusion on the agenda, the United States representative should not oppose and should vote in favor of placing the matter on the agenda.

2. Once the matter is placed on the agenda of the General Assembly, the United States should recommend its reference to the Political and Security Committee for study and for report at the next session of the General Assembly.

3. If the Political and Security Committee should have the subject of the regulation of armaments under discussion, the United States representative at an appropriate time should propose the examination of the problems of the international traffic in arms by a subcommittee established for that purpose.

4. Should the subject of arms regulation arise in informal discussions, representatives of the United States should express to other delegations the view of this Government that while progress is possible at this time toward the regulation of atomic weapons and the international traffic in arms, action with respect to the overall regulation of other armaments appears premature in view of the major unsettled problems of peace and security. Foremost in their relation to armaments are the problems of the peace settlements, the enforcement of disarmament of the enemy states and the provision of forces to the Security Council in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter. It should be emphasized that the United States considers that the manner of the solution of these problems will affect substantially the eventual military requirements of member states, particularly the states having permanent membership on the Security Council.

DISCUSSION


a. Article 11 (1) of the Charter of the United Nations states that “The General Assembly may consider the . . . principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both”.

b. The jurisdiction of the General Assembly on this subject should be considered in connection with Article 26 which makes the Security Council “responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system
for the regulation of armaments”. Although the right of the General Assembly to discuss the problems of armament regulation and make recommendations thereon cannot be questioned the responsibility for making plans in this field lies with the Security Council.

2. **United States position on regulation of armaments**

A definitive position on the regulation of armaments has not been formulated by this Government primarily because of the unsettled problems of peace and security referred to (3) below. However, careful study of the problem is being made and it is possible that the United States may initiate discussion of the subject in the Security Council or the Military Staff Committee sometime within the coming year. As the Security Council is responsible for formulating plans in this field it appears highly desirable that substantive proposals for armament regulation originate in the Security Council.

3. **Factors affecting timeliness of regulation proposals**

There is nothing to be found in the Charter or in the discussions leading up to its adoption to show that steps toward the regulation of armaments or disarmament should be taken prior to or independently of the solution of other problems affecting peace and security. Instead, the Charter provisions relating to the regulation of armaments reflect the current and widely accepted concept that armaments are a factor contributing to security and cannot be considered independently of other problems affecting international security. It can be argued that the adoption by the General Assembly at this time of a declaration of principles to govern armament regulation in the postwar period might accelerate action toward the settlement of other pending problems of peace and security. The pending problems are of such a nature, however, that until they are settled the armament requirements of the United States cannot be determined. Included among these problems are:

- a. The conclusion of the peace treaties,
- b. the enforcement of the disarmament upon the enemy states, and
- c. the conclusion of agreements for providing contingents to the Security Council pursuant to Article 43 of the Charter.

It can hardly be expected that an effective system for the regulation of armaments, exclusive of the urgent and special problems now being dealt with by the Atomic Energy Commission or of the international traffic in arms, the United States position on which is discussed elsewhere in this paper, can be established while these issues remain unsettled.

4. **Procedure for dealing with proposals, if submitted**

There has been no intimation that proposals for the regulation of armaments or disarmament will be submitted to the General Assem-
bly nor has the subject reached the agenda of the Assembly. It appears unlikely, therefore, that the General Assembly will consider this matter at the coming session. It is possible, however, that a member will submit a resolution on the subject or will request its inclusion on the agenda. In such event the United States should take no formal action which might be construed as opposing the consideration of the subject. The representative of this Government should support any formal action to include the regulation of armaments on the agenda.

If the General Assembly determines that the regulation of armaments should be considered at this time, the United States should recommend reference of the matter to the Political and Security Committee for study and for report to the General Assembly at its next session.

5. International Traffic in Arms

At the first session of the General Assembly in London, it was expected that the British would advance a proposal relating to the distinct phase of armament regulation which deals with the international traffic in arms. A tentative United States position was adopted with regard to the supervision of this traffic but the matter did not reach the agenda of the General Assembly at this meeting. Should a member propose the inclusion of the international traffic in arms on the agenda of the General Assembly the United States should give the proposal its full support. On the other hand if a proposal of this nature is not made and there is referred to the Political and Security Committee the question of the over-all regulation of armaments, the United States representative should at an appropriate time propose that consideration be given to the problem of the international traffic in arms. The United States should also propose the establishment of a subcommittee of the Political and Security Committee to examine this matter. A position along the line of that set forth in the addendum should be adopted. A more specific position on this subject will be made available if necessary.

Addendum

UNITED STATES POSITION REGARD TO THE SUPERVISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS

If the occasion arises the United States should be prepared to discuss the establishment of an international system of supervision over the traffic in arms (other than atomic weapons) in the forthcoming meeting of the General Assembly.

The position of this Government should be that a system of this nature can be instituted despite the unsettled character of arrangements for peace or the delay in establishing the security system pro-
vided for by the Charter. Generally speaking, it is felt that any system for the supervision of the international traffic in arms should contain the following elements:

1. Uniform domestic legislation to be enacted by states signatory to a convention for the supervision of this traffic. Such legislation should provide for:
   a. Supervision by each government of the manufacture of arms, ammunition and implements of war within its jurisdiction, and
   b. Licensing of exports and imports of arms, ammunition and implements of war.

2. A uniform definition of all articles to be considered as arms, ammunition and implements of war for the purposes of the system.

3. The systematic reporting to the United Nations of all manufacturing for export, and export of arms, ammunition, and implements of war.

4. The undertaking that exports of arms, ammunition and implements of war will be sanctioned by their governments only if such exports can be regarded as contributing to conditions of stability in recipient countries and to international peace and security. The interest of the Security Council in significant shipment of arms should be specifically recognized.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs (Johnson)⁴⁹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 9, 1946.

PLANS AND PROSPECTS RELATING TO THE WORK OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION AND THE RELATION OF THE COMMISSION'S ACTIVITIES TO OTHER ASPECTS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. John Hancock
Mr. Lincoln Gordon of Mr. Baruch's staff
Mr. Frank Lindsay
   Mr. Joseph E. Johnson—IS
   Mr. Marks—U
   Mr. Blaisdell—IS
   Mr. Hiss—SPA

I went to New York by previous agreement to have a discussion with Mr. Hancock and other members of Mr. Baruch's staff, on matters of common interest. During the discussion they indicated that:

(1) Mr. Baruch, and they themselves, have become increasingly conscious of the fact that their plans and activities have to be conceived

⁴⁹ The conversation here described occurred in New York on September 5.
in terms of the fact that U.S. participation in the work of the Atomic Energy Commission is very closely related to other aspects of U.S. foreign policy. They demonstrated a strong desire to make sure that what they are doing and will do is in line with over-all foreign policy considerations.

(2) They stated that the first report of the Scientific and Technical Committee had been completed and that it was expected the report would be adopted by the Committee at a meeting on Friday, September 6. They believed that there was a fair chance that the Soviet Representative, who had already indicated his personal agreement with the report, would receive instructions to accept it. (They realized that such instructions might not be forthcoming.)

(3) They desire to avoid raising political issues for as long as possible and believe it may be feasible to postpone any further discussion of political issues for a period of from a month to three months.

(4) They hope that the Scientific and Technical Committee can continue its work for as long as six weeks, exploring technical problems related to raw materials and production of atomic energy. They are not yet clear as to how much can be done in this field within the limitations imposed by considerations of security of information.

(5) There is also a possibility that the Soviets may again raise, at any time in the next three months, major political questions, possibly by forcing a vote on the original Soviet proposal.

With respect to (1) above, they asked me what bearing I thought the present acrimonious temper of discussions in the Security Council might have on the work of the Atomic Energy Commission. In reply I stated in effect that the temper of discussions and character of issues in the Security Council are not primary considerations. They result from general over-all relations to which the key is, in my opinion, the situation in Paris. I added that we in the Department who are concerned with Security Council affairs, constantly refer important policy decisions to the Secretary in Paris. This is done not so much because he is the Secretary of State but primarily because the peace conference and the Council of Foreign Ministers are at the present time the focal points in major international relations, particularly those with the Soviet Union. I endeavored to hint as strongly as I could that I felt Mr. Baruch would wish to consult the Secretary in Paris before making major policy decisions, for precisely the same reason. Mr. Hancock and his colleagues appeared to concur in my views and to agree that the policy decisions should be made in the light of over-all developments, particularly of the Secretary's policy in Paris.

With respect to (5) I was asked whether I thought it likely that Mr. Gromyko would force a decision soon on the Soviet proposal for the control of atomic energy. I replied that while I could speak with no assurance on this point I felt it unlikely that he would do so, saying that I could see no advantage from the Soviet point of view in forcing an early decision on this matter. Moreover, it seemed to me if the Soviets seek additional issues with which to point up their differences
with the West there are a number which they would choose before they choose that of the international control of atomic energy. Mr. Hancock and his colleagues appeared to agree that my estimate might be the correct one. Mr. Hancock added, however, that they are preparing material to be used when the political issues are raised again in the Atomic Energy Commission. Mr. Hancock nevertheless indicated clearly that Mr. Baruch's present desire is to avoid such issues. In this connection he inquired whether it might not be desirable for the Atomic Energy Commission to take a recess during the meeting of the General Assembly. I gave it as my personal opinion that this might be a good idea and suggested that it might be quite feasible to bring about such an adjournment. I pointed out that many of the Delegates on the Commission have several roles already and that the sessions of the Assembly would greatly add to their labors. I thought, therefore, that they might welcome, and possibly even initiate, a move for the adjournment of the Commission's work.

JOSEPH E. JOHNSON

501.BC/9-246: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1946—7 p.m.

185. 1. The following comments concern USSR proposal that Council obtain certain information regarding military forces and take into account Secretary's instructions on this subject (reference secret telegram 4396, September 2 from Paris).

2. We believe you should informally sound out those Council members likely to oppose USSR proposal to determine their positions and indicate to them we desire USSR proposal should be kept off agenda pointing out obvious propaganda nature of USSR proposal, inconclusive manner in which the Council's jurisdiction is invoked, and, if desirable, any further arguments mentioned hereafter. If it appears that there will be sufficient votes to preclude placing USSR proposal on the agenda in its present form, we feel that extended discussion in Council should be avoided. We hope in this manner to bring on early vote so Council can pass on to matters more in keeping with its responsibilities and dignity. It seems to us that under these circumstances short statement by you to this effect would suffice.

3. Should it appear doubtful from your informal conversations with other members that there is assurance of keeping this matter off agenda, and if you, therefore, will need to make extended arguments in Council, then you may in your discretion take initiative in Council in seeking to keep matter off agenda, provided others are unwilling.
to do so. You may argue that we do not stand on technicalities when complaints are brought to attention of Council and indeed encourage full discussion of problems that concern Council. However, in this instance, USSR statement in no way indicates any relation to international peace and security or to the work of the Council.

a. The statements of "unconcealed anxiety" of world public opinion or of "natural uneasiness" cannot conceivably establish basis for considering the matter as dispute or situation under Chapter VI. Furthermore, USSR statement does not refer to Chapter VI.

b. While USSR statement refers to Chapter VII, there is nothing in that statement that can be construed as being threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression.

c. We do not see what useful purpose, in relation to work of Council, desired information would serve. It is pertinent to inquire whether information is intended to relate to matters at present assigned by Council to MSC. How will it facilitate work of MSC if that is intention? 50

CLAYTON

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Notes of the Meeting of the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission, New York, September 10, 1946, 11 a. m.

CONFIDENTIAL

Present: Mr. Bernard M. Baruch
        Mr. John M. Hancock
        Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt
        Mr. Fred Sears
        Mr. Herbert B. Swope
        Mr. T. F. Farrell
        Dr. Richard C. Tolman
        Dr. D. F. Fleming
        Mr. Lincoln Gordon
        Mr. Franklin A. Lindsay
        Mr. Albin E. Johnson
        Mr. Henry G. Ingraham
        Mr. Joseph Chase
        Mr. R. Gordon Arneson

The staff had before it a draft of a letter to the President concerning the status of negotiations and possible alternatives of future

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50 The Security Council considered the question of placing the Soviet proposal on its agenda at its 71st Meeting, September 23, and 72nd Meeting, September 24; see SC, 1st yr., 2nd Series, pp. 423-442 and 443-460, respectively. At its 72nd Meeting, the Council decided not to admit the subject to the agenda by a vote of seven to two (Soviet Union and Poland) with two abstentions (France and Egypt).
action. The alternatives were: (1) to push ahead toward an open break, or (2) to proceed cautiously avoiding any votes and any aggressive action against the Russian intransigence.

Mr. Hancock: While the draft memorandum to the President is an excellent one, it should not leave the President in the dark as to the course we would propose to take unless instructed otherwise by him.

Mr. Baruch: We have a clear duty to report in writing to the President the present status of the negotiations. It is obvious that the AEC negotiations are now only a sideshow in the international picture. In fact, these negotiations seem to have become more and more a State Department affair, rather than our affair. The sideshow must be tied in with the main rings of the circus. It may be that our group should become advisory to the State Department, thereby tying it in with general diplomatic maneuvers. In any event, it is important that we inform the President now how things stand.

We are handicapped by the failure of the President to appoint members of the domestic Atomic Energy Commission. Until this Commission is appointed, the situation regarding the disclosure of information remains very foggy.

Mr. Hancock: Whether the members of the domestic Atomic Energy Commission are appointed soon or not, makes little difference to our operations. It cannot materially influence the course of our negotiations, nor can it simplify the problem of disclosure of information.

Mr. Baruch: Two alternatives that we could consider are these: (1) get work started in the Commission on the drafting of the treaty, or (2) prepare an interim report from the Commission to the Security Council. If we must adopt a temporizing procedure this might better be carried out by the bureaucrats.

Mr. Eberstadt: The draft statement should be amended to include this third alternative of preparing an interim report to the Security Council. (Mr. Eberstadt presented a draft paragraph which would accomplish this end).

Mr. Sears: The statement should contain a specific recommendation from us as to the course of procedure we think should be followed. The statement should remind the President that whatever course of action is taken serious consideration must be given to the military needs of the country in the event negotiations break down.

Mr. Hancock: In his statement of 27 August, Secretary Patterson clearly stated that the War Department must plan its operations on the contingency that no international agreement for the control of atomic energy may be reached.

Mr. Baruch: In strengthening our military potential against the day that negotiations may break down, efforts should be redoubled to accumulate stockpiles with raw materials and atomic bombs.
Mr. Hancock: We should follow our present course of avoiding any definite break and avoid the taking of any votes and inform the President that we are doing so unless we receive different instructions. At the same time we must consider the question of whether it may be necessary to begin using threats to force the issue. We might raise this question with the President in the interim.

Concerning the report of the Military Staff Committee about which Mr. Baruch inquired, it is being sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in part as a means of needling them into action. As far as military policy as it relates to our negotiations is concerned, our group should receive these instructions not from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but from the President.

Mr. Eberstadt: The value of using the Military Staff Committee in determining when the various stages to the treaty have been reached lies in the fact that the veto remains with the Big Five in the Security Council. There are four possibilities that might be considered in deciding when certain stages have been completed.

(1) The decision might be left with the United States alone. (It is most unlikely that any other nations would agree to this).
(2) Give the Military Staff Committee responsibility for determining when the stages have been completed.
(3) Leave this decision to the Security Council; and
(4) Use the present Atomic Energy Commission as the review board to determine when stages have been completed. (Mr. Hancock felt this was the best alternative, since it would obviate the veto).

Mr. Eberstadt: We should describe to the President very clearly the impasse we have now reached and state that unless we receive instructions to the contrary we will continue our present methods of avoiding a break. We should express regret that the members of the domestic Atomic Energy Commission have not yet been appointed. We should point out that even though we continue to attempt to avoid a break, the President should be aware of the necessity of laying plans concerning our national security in the event negotiations fail, and should appoint the members of the domestic Atomic Energy Commission as soon as possible.

Mr. Baruch: There is urgent need for a coordination of our work with that of the domestic Atomic Energy Commission, the State Department, and the military authorities.

Mr. Farrell: We should press for a vote on the report of the Scientific and Technical Committee and throw the discussion of the whole issue back into the political committees.

Mr. Hancock: We cannot afford to let the issue come to a head in the Atomic Energy Commission before the middle of November.

Mr. Eberstadt: We must bear in mind that we cannot control the
other delegates to the AEC. The British, French, and Canadian delegations had indicated pretty clearly that they do not want the issue forced. If the decisions were taken, however, to present an interim report to the Security Council, the other delegations would probably go along with us on this proposal.

Mr. Hancock: Our group is not directly concerned with the nation’s military policy. Responsibility on these matters rests with the President. We are charged with responsibility of carrying out an already established policy as regards negotiations leading to the establishment of an ADA and we must proceed in carrying out that objective unless and until our instructions are changed by the President. While we can remind the President of the military implications that flow from the progress of our negotiations, we should not presume to tell him how the military problem should be handled.

Mr. Farrell: An important point to make in connection with the need for the prompt appointment of the domestic commission is that until the commission is established no thorough program for the procurement of raw materials can be established.

Mr. Eberstadt: The advantage of the first alternative of pressing for a break lies in the fact that the public would be aroused to the dangers that confront us and the world, and it would result in widespread, popular support for military preparedness. Adoption of a policy of avoiding a break makes the necessity of prompt military preparations nonetheless imperative but the necessity appears less clear-cut.

Mr. Baruch: The statement to the President should point out the deleterious effect on the international situation of the disintegration of our economy at home.

Mr. Swore: It may be necessary to effect an open rupture with the U.S.S.R. on the return of Secretary Byrnes from the Paris Peace Conference. The memorandum to the President should underscore Gromyko’s specific refusal to accept our proposals either in whole or in part.

Mr. Baruch: In the absence of Secretary Byrnes there is no alternative but to report directly to the President on this situation. The President is entitled to know how things stand in order that he may decide whether any change of instructions is indicated. He is entitled to know all of the things we know about the negotiations and what our views are.

Mr. Swore: Mr. Baruch should see the President personally and talk to him at length on the basis of points prepared in advance. There is no use kidding ourselves about the main issue. Russia is the stumbling block.
Mr. Baruch: It is quite clear that the other delegations would not go along with us at this time if we attempted to force the issue with the Russians. We have lost the initiative to Russia, and other nations are beginning to waver more and more. The longer we hesitate and the more we retreat, the more other nations will shift away from us. We are losing ground every day and we are in danger of losing the support of some of the nine we have had with us. It was quite clear in the discussion with Mr. Ignatieff that Canada wants delay. The same appears to be true of other delegations, notably the British and French and probably the Chinese as well.

Mr. Eberstadt: If we attempt to set a deadline for a vote on our proposal versus the Russian, it is quite probable that the French, British, Canadian, and Chinese delegates would not support us.

Mr. Hancock: In the memorandum to the President we should point out that we are continuing to push forward on the policy established with the approval of the President immediately prior to the opening of the negotiations. We should remind him of the need for considering what steps this nation should take in the event our negotiations fail.

Mr. Baruch: We are all perfectly clear in our own minds that we must do everything we can to bring about the successful conclusion of our negotiations. Nevertheless, we are also clear in our own minds that we must tell the President now what the situation is.

Mr. Farrell: Whatever the outcome of these negotiations may be, our position will be strengthened if we refuse to retreat from our basic proposals. Even if we fail we must be able to say that we stood firm on our position.

Mr. Hancock: The initiative has passed to the Russians and they may take advantage of these in forcing a break. For our part we must not push for a breakdown unless we are instructed to do so by the President.

Concerning the report of the Military Staff Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it contains three recommendations which are quite controversial:

1. That the Navy should go ahead to develop atomic power for use in battleships. This proposal is absolutely contrary to established U.S. policy as transmitted to Mr. Baruch and cannot be countenanced if we are to have any effective system of international control of atomic energy.

2. That a set of bombs should remain in existence for punitive purposes after the ADA is established. Strong arguments can be made on either side of this question. It is obvious that the chances of getting a treaty are much better if it provides that there should be no bombs in existence.

3. That the Military Staff Committee should have responsibility
for deciding when the various stages have been reached and for passing upon the location of large atomic energy installations, including power plants. This raises the question of whether the Military Staff Committee would be infringing on the administrative operations of the ADA.

Mr. Swope: In view of the confusion that exists in the public mind as to the provisions to the Baruch Plan, it would seem desirable to put out a reaffirmation of the Baruch proposals.

It was generally agreed that the draft of the memorandum to the President should be rewritten in the light of the comments above and that when rewritten it should be sent to Mr. Swope for final editing.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

*Position Paper Prepared in the Division of International Security Affairs 51*

WASHINGTON, September 11, 1946.

**STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM**

If the question arises in the forthcoming General Assembly session as to whether the General Assembly should ask for a report on the work of the Atomic Energy Commission, what position should the United States take?

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. The United States should not take the initiative to request a report on the Atomic Energy Commission.

2. If another member of the General Assembly proposes that a report be requested on the Atomic Energy Commission, the United States Delegation might attempt to discourage the move informally but if there is substantial support for such a request he should not formally oppose it.

3. If a report is requested, the United States Delegation should take the position that it would be preferable that the Security Council be asked to request a report from the Atomic Energy Commission for the information of the General Assembly.

The United States Delegation should give the following reasons for the above positions:

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51 This paper was transmitted by the Chief of the Division (Johnson) to Lincoln Gordon at the Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission on September 11. Mr. Gordon replied in a letter of September 20 that it was entirely satisfactory to the Delegation. (Department of State Atomic Energy Files)
A report from the Atomic Energy Commission at this time would be preliminary and inconclusive and of little value to the General Assembly.

Since the General Assembly by its own Resolution of January 24, 1946, has obligated the Security Council to forward reports when appropriate, it is to be expected that the General Assembly will receive a report from the Security Council on the Atomic Energy Commission after the Commission has had more time to consider the problem. However, in line with the policy of this Government not to oppose discussion of questions it will not oppose any move to request a report if there is a substantial desire on the part of the members to request a report.

If a request for a report is initiated, it should be communicated preferably to the Security Council and not directly to the Atomic Energy Commission, in order that the Security Council, which is responsible for directing the security aspects of the Commission’s work in accordance with the General Assembly Resolution, could establish guidance in terms of security directions for the preparation of the report.

DISCUSSION

1. Can the General Assembly request a report on the Atomic Energy Commission?

Article 15 of the Charter states, “The General Assembly shall receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security Council; these reports shall include an account of the measures that the Security Council has decided upon or taken to maintain international peace and security”. Article 24, paragraph 3 states, “The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration”. It is clear from the above Charter provisions that the Security Council has an obligation to make reports and the General Assembly has a right to receive reports.

The General Assembly, however, by its own resolution of January 24, 1946 established the procedure for the transmission of atomic energy reports to the General Assembly. “The Commission shall submit the reports and recommendations to the Security Council, and such reports and recommendations shall be made public unless the Security Council, in the interest of peace and security otherwise directs. In the appropriate cases the Security Council shall transmit these reports to the General Assembly and the members of the United Nations . . .”.

The General Assembly, therefore, will receive reports on the Atomic Energy Commission in appropriate cases from the Security Council. However, there appears to be no restriction on the General Assembly assuming the initiative to request the Security Council for a report.
on the Atomic Energy Commission. The General Assembly has a right to receive reports from the Security Council. The General Assembly established the Atomic Energy Commission and could modify its terms of reference, although as a political actuality this would be extremely difficult without general concurrence and backing of the permanent members of the Security Council. Finally, there is no evidence that the Charter silence on the question as to whether the General Assembly can take the initiative and ask for a report establishes a prohibition on the General Assembly action.

There is also no specific provision which would bar the General Assembly from requesting the Atomic Energy Commission directly for a report. However, inasmuch as the Security Council is responsible for directing the Commission on certain aspects of its work in accordance with the General Assembly Resolution of January 24, 1946, which states, “In view of the Security Council’s primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security the Security Council shall issue directions to the Commission in matters affecting security”, and inasmuch as the reports from the Commission must be cleared by the Security Council, it would seem preferable that the request for a report should be communicated to the Security Council for transmittal to the Atomic Energy Commission. This would allow the Security Council to send security directions, if considered necessary, to the Commission in order to provide guidance for preparing the report. The substance of the report and its time of transmittal might be affected, however, by questions of international peace and security which the Security Council alone can decide.

Conclusion: The General Assembly, therefore, has a right to request a report on the Atomic Energy Commission, and it would appear preferable that the Security Council be asked to request a report from the Atomic Energy Commission for the information of the General Assembly.

2. Should the General Assembly request a report on the Atomic Energy Commission this year?

The Atomic Energy Commission has been organized less than four months. In that time concrete but general proposals have been placed before the Commission. These proposals have been discussed but not in conclusive detail. It would not appear fruitful to the General Assembly nor judicious at this time to open up the discussion of these general proposals in the General Assembly through the vehicle of a report from the Commission. There would be the danger that the special problem of atomic energy control would be closely associated with the political lines drawn in the Assembly on general international
problems. The development of such a situation at this preliminary stage might decrease the chances of resolving the problems before the Atomic Energy Commission.

The General Assembly itself has recognized the special nature of the atomic energy problem. That special nature is being examined at the present time in the Atomic Energy Commission by scientists as well as representatives on the Commission. Until the Commission has had more time to examine the problem and discuss the proposals in detail a report would be inconclusive.

Conclusion: It would be inadvisable to have a report from the Commission at this time because such a report would be preliminary and inconclusive and, therefore, of little value to the General Assembly. Also a discussion on the report at this time might intensify problems rather than assist in their solution in the Atomic Energy Commission.

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IO Files


SECRET

On 12 September 1946, General Kenney arranged a private visit with General Vasiliev with a view to encouraging some action on the part of the Soviet Representatives. General Vasiliev was advised that the U.S. Delegation was about to submit a proposal for the subcommittee on basic principles to reconvene and continue with its work. General Vasiliev was encouraged to do everything possible in order that the Soviet Delegation could take part in the work of the subcommittee when it was reconvened.

On 13 September 1946, to further confirm the comment General Kenney had made to General Vasiliev, the U.S. Delegation submitted a proposal outlining the directive which the Military Staff Committee had received. The resolution which the subcommittee had adopted was also reviewed with emphasis placed on the fact that four members had complied with the resolution but since all members had not complied, the second meeting of the subcommittee had been delayed indefinitely. The U.S. Delegation therefore proposed that the Military Staff Committee consider whether or not it was desirable for the sub-

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2 This document is an excerpt from document USMS/54/2, Enclosure “B,” a summary covering the period February 15–October 24, 1946, submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the United States Representatives on the Military Staff Committee on October 25. Paragraph letter designations and references by document symbol to unprinted Military Staff Committee documentation which appear in the source text have been omitted. (IO Files)
committee to resume its work at an early date with instructions to study all available oral and written statements which may be presented by any members and to submit recommendations to the Military Staff Committee as soon as possible.

On 18 September 1946, at the 18th meeting of the Military Staff Committee, the U.S. proposal to resume work of the subcommittee on basic principles was considered. The Soviet Delegation made a long statement, it pointed out the question of the armed forces to be made available to the Security Council was a new question in history and a rather complicated one. In the course of the statement, the Soviet Delegation submitted a proposal entitled “The Purpose of the United Nations Armed Forces”. In submitting the proposal, the Soviet Representatives pointed out that they were only submitting the first question, namely the question of the Purpose of the United Nations Armed Forces, for consideration. It was pointed out that it was quite obvious that other questions such as the basic principles governing the organization of the armed forces and the employment of the armed forces would have to be discussed. General Kenney proposed that the subcommittee should resume meetings at an early date. The Soviet Representatives proposed further that the subcommittee should keep to an order of sequence in their discussions. The first principle questions which the subcommittee should consider and discuss was the question

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53 The Soviet proposal was as follows:

1. All Armed Forces, made available to the Security Council by Member Nations, in accordance with Articles 42 and 43 of the Charter, are intended for the sole purpose of prevention or suppression of acts of aggression with the object of maintaining or restoring international peace and security.

2. The Armed Forces, made available to the Security Council by Member Nations, are placed at its disposal only for the period necessary to prevent or to suppress aggression.

3. The Armed Forces, made available to the Security Council by Member Nations of the United Nations, may be employed only by decision of the Security Council and only in such cases when measures, taken in accordance with Article 41, would be or have proved inadequate to prevent or suppress aggression and when the threat to world peace and security is such that it necessitates the employment of these Armed Forces.

4. These Armed Forces may not be employed for purposes inconsistent with the principles and the spirit of the United Nations Charter, with principles of equal rights and self-determination of nations, or for the purpose of suppressing national liberating movements or interfering in the internal affairs of a State.

5. After the Armed Forces, made available to the Security Council, have fulfilled their task of prevention or the suppression of aggression, they shall be withdrawn to their national territories in not more than . . . . days from the date of the termination of such activities, unless otherwise decided by the Security Council.

6. If for any reasons these Armed Forces remain in territories or territorial waters granted for the use of such Forces, under special agreements between the Security Council and other Member Nations, for the passage, stationing or action of these Forces against an aggressor, they shall be withdrawn to their national territories not later than 30 days after the termination of activities undertaken for the purpose of prevention or suppression of aggression, unless otherwise decided by the Security Council.” (TO Files)
of the Purpose of the United Nations Forces. After the subcommittee had completed work on the subject of “Purpose” it should submit its recommendations to the Military Staff Committee for its consideration and approval. The proposal of General Kenney with the modifications proposed by the Soviet Delegation were adopted by the Military Staff Committee.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by Mr. Franklin A. Lindsay to the United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission (Baruch)

CONFIDENTIAL

[New York,] September 14, 1946.

Subject: Notes on Conversations With Australian, Canadian and Netherlands Delegations.

Mr. Ralph Harry, Evatt's Deputy, returned to New York yesterday after two weeks in Washington. He, together with McNaughton and Ignatieff, made a round of the other delegations in order to determine the general attitude toward the future of negotiations. Harry stated that he found among delegations other than Russia and Poland a fairly widespread feeling that agreement would prove to be impossible. They believe that the main consideration has now become the determination of the proper issues and timing so that the break will be made on terms to our advantage rather than to the Russians’ advantage.

He indicated that there is general approval of the McNaughton plan of procedure for the next phase, and that a major break should be avoided until after the minor treaties have been completed at Paris. However, he felt strongly that there was no weakening in any of the delegations on the substance of the American Plan.

He stated that it was his own opinion that very shortly work should be initiated on an outline treaty which could be submitted by majority vote to the Security Council. This treaty should be in sufficient detail to permit the possibility of last-minute Russian acceptance in the Security Council.

Such an outline treaty might be submitted to the Security Council together with a request for approval. If approval was forthcoming (including the five permanent members), the Security Council might then refer the document back to the Commission to be used as the basis of preparing a final treaty for signature. If, on the other hand, we are not to get acceptance by the five permanent members, the outline treaty

United States Delegation staff member.

54 Regarding General McNaughton's proposal, see Mr. Baruch's memorandum to the President, September 17, part III, p. 326.
would be far more desirable from our standpoint as it would not be necessary to settle all the questions upon which disagreement between the “friendly” members might arise. If we were to attempt to settle such disagreements at this stage, we would give the Russians the opportunity to exploit our differences to their own advantage.

At luncheon today, Beelaerts van Blokland, of the Netherlands Delegation, said that apparently there is a general stop order out from Moscow on the signing of all pending United Nations documents. The Russian Member of the Headquarters Commission has refused to sign their report pending approval from Moscow. In the Security Council, Russian approval of the report to the General Assembly has been likewise held up. He thought that the delay in signing our scientific report was due to a general order and was not directed specifically against atomic energy negotiations. It was probably a result of Paris disagreements.

He indicated approval of the McNaughton proposal and stated further that a break should be avoided until after the Paris conference.

He and van Kleffens have been working on a draft treaty which he stated was a “dressed-up edition of the American Plan”. They had in mind that this might be submitted to the Commission to be used as a basis of discussion in preparation of recommendations to the Security Council. It seems to me that if we find that this document does not basically differ from the United States’ proposals, it would be extremely advantageous to have it used as a basis of discussion, rather than submitting an American draft. He also expressed an opinion that if useful work can be done, there should be no adjournment during the period in which the General Assembly will be meeting.

FRANKLIN A. LINDSAY

501.BC/9-1446

The State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee to the Secretary of State

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 14 September 1946.

SWN–4744


Reference: SWNCC 219/8. The following memorandum is forwarded to the Secretary of State at the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

“The United Kingdom representatives on a subcommittee of the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations have proposed inclu-
sion in the Standard Form of Agreement concerning the size and composition of the armed forces to be made available to the Security Council an article as follows:

'\[\text{Member Nation}\] guarantees to place, if requested by the Security Council, the whole of its national forces at the disposal of the Security Council so far as its other commitments and transport resources permit.' 56

"The British members on the subcommittee of the Military Staff Committee presently drafting a Standard Form of Agreement have already agreed to inclusion of Article II as set forth in the draft agreement in SWNCC 219/3. It is, therefore, concluded that the British intend their proposed article to be in addition to Article II instead of a replacement for it. It is noted, however, that in the memorandum proposing the new article to the subcommittee, the British representatives stated, 'An agreement of this nature would seem to eliminate the need for large predetermined forces under Article II,' and that a British representative stated in effect in a subcommittee meeting on 22 August that national contributions should be kept as small as possible and that, in order to do this, member nations should agree to reinforce these contributions by the method set forth in the proposed article. These statements indicate a trend of thought which, if adopted by all other member nations, might result in the Security Council having on call armed forces insufficient to cope with even foreseeable situations. The purpose of making contributions under Article 43 of the Charter which is 'in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security' may be vitiated by this trend. Aside from the proposed article itself, this trend of thought on the part of the British is objectionable from the military point of view.

"If member nations pledge quotas commensurate with their resources, the forces permanently available under the provisions of Article 43 of the Charter should be ample for any need that can develop, short of major war. The outbreak of war among the major powers will mean that the United Nations has failed to achieve its purpose and will terminate the organization as constituted under the present Charter.

"It is considered that the political importance of the matter is paramount. Its military implications are nebulous because of the indefiniteness of the phrase 'so far as its other commitments and transport resources permit' and because possible political and popular interpretations of the proposed article are unknown. The question

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56 At the 3rd Meeting of the Sub-Committee for the Consideration of a Standard Form of Agreement Between the Security Council and Member Nations of the United Nations Concerning the Provision of United Nations Forces, the British representative raised the possibility of including such an article. The United Kingdom mentioned the proposal at several subsequent meetings without eliciting support from the other delegations. At the 7th Meeting, August 23, the United Kingdom offered two alternative drafts which simply specified that member nations had an obligation to provide additional forces should those listed in the annexes to the initial agreements prove inadequate. Later in the meeting, the United Kingdom accepted the view of the United States that the purview of the Sub-Committee was limited to agreements with respect to agreements providing for specific forces. It did not abandon the principle upon which its proposal was based. Therefore, while the Sub-Committee took no action on the British proposal, the possibility of subsequent discussion of it by the Military Staff Committee existed. (10 Files)
is primarily whether additional forces, if required, will be made available to the Security Council by negotiation between the Security Council and member nations when or after an emergency arises, or whether the United States will agree beforehand that all forces not required for other commitments will be made available if needed. This and other political implications contained in the British proposal are outside the competence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but appear to be of major importance to the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, feel they should have advice from proper governmental authority as to the attitude of the United States Government toward the British proposal before preparing and forwarding to their representatives on the Military Staff Committee a statement of the position to be assumed toward it. It is possible that in the light of the advice received, military objections will become apparent which are not now perceived because of the obscure nature of the implications surrounding the British proposal.

"It is requested that this memorandum be forwarded to the Secretary of State with the request that he furnish the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a matter of priority, a statement of the United States Government's attitude toward the British proposal."

It is requested that the information desired by the Joint Chiefs of Staff be forwarded to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee for transmittal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

Ernest A. Gross
for J. H. Hilldring,
Chairman

501.BC Atomic/9-2046

Memorandum by The United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission (Baruch) to President Truman.57

SECRET

New York, September 17, 1946.

Subject: Request for Further Statement of Policy for U.S. Representative, United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, in the Light of Proceedings to Date

The first stage of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission, which began three months ago with my statement of the United States

57 Mr. Baruch came to Washington on September 18 to report to the President, but due to the fact that their conversation was devoted to the Wallace incident (see Mr. Hancock's memorandum, p. 232), Mr. Baruch did not deliver this paper at that time, instead transmitting it from New York on the following day. On September 26, the Department forwarded a copy to Secretary Byrnes in Paris. On September 25, Acting Secretary Clayton asked President Truman to defer a decision on Mr. Baruch's recommendations until the Acting Secretary had studied the memorandum and had had an opportunity to discuss it with the Chief Executive. (Department of State Atomic Energy Files)
plan for international control, is now coming to an end. A new phase is about to begin. The Commission's future course is so dominated by the general development of international policy that I feel it essential to report to you on the progress of our negotiations to date, to acquaint you with the issues, and to seek your instructions as to the alternative courses of action likely to face us in the near future.

I. ORGANIZATION AND APPROACH OF THE U.S. DELEGATION

The Staff of the United States Delegation has been organized so as to include experts in all of the various specialties required for our task. In my long experience, I have never been associated with a group of men of such outstanding calibre and unqualified devotion to the public interest. Many are serving entirely at their own expense. All are unstintingly sacrificing their personal interests and willingly undergoing inconvenience in order to further this work, so important to this nation and to the entire world.

In addition to the distinguished full-time scientific members of our staff, we have had the continuous assistance of a panel of outstanding scientists through whom we have kept closely in touch with the scientific profession at large. We have also maintained close contact with the Department of State, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the United States members of the United Nations Military Staff Committee, with Major General Leslie R. Groves, representing the Manhattan Project, and with members of the Lilienthal Board of Consultants who prepared, last March, the State Department "Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy".

In accordance with the basic United States policy, confirmed in your instructions to us, we have provided other members of the Commission with the underlying scientific information "essential to a reasonable understanding of the proposals" we have advocated. It has been possible for our Delegation to fulfill this commitment without disclosing any information not contained in previously published scientific or official literature or not properly cleared under security provisions.

No secret information has been released in the course of the discussions. Obviously, even the mere discussion of published information inevitably helps to clarify the picture to some extent for the scientists of other countries. Such clarification has been contemplated as a part of our national policy ever since the Agreed Declaration of Washington announced by you and Prime Ministers Attlee and MacKenzie King last November, and is, of course, a prerequisite to any attempt to negotiate a treaty of the kind sought by our government.

In this connection, you should be aware that there is considerable doubt as to the precise extent of real secrecy surrounding the science
and technology of atomic energy. Much information has necessarily been revealed through the publication of the Smyth Report, the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, and scientific literature authorized for release in accordance with our national policy. Information has also been given in publications not presented for official clearance. We know of efforts by other nations to acquire a few items of industrial equipment specially adapted for use in certain atomic energy manufacturing processes. We also know of attempts by other nations to acquire atomic raw materials. Certain secret information and small samples of secret materials have been obtained through espionage activities in Canada, which are now a matter of public record. Similar activities are probably going on in this country. While expert testimony suggests a period of at least five years before any other country will be in a position to produce atomic weapons, we are not ourselves able to assess accurately the length of this margin of time. It is conceivable that this margin may be cut, especially under the pressure of an atomic bomb race.

Throughout the deliberations to date, we have adhered rigorously to your original instructions, on which my initial statement of the U.S. position was based. We have encouraged the presentation of other proposals which would meet the mandate given the Commission by the General Assembly last January, and have indicated that we would welcome suggestions to strengthen the U.S. proposals. Yet only a single alternative proposal has been put forward—that of the Soviet Union—and, for the reasons stated below, their plan in no way meets the Commission’s instructions from the General Assembly.

We have steadfastly refrained from the use of pressure or threats of any variety. Nor have we suggested plans for dealing with the situation which might arise if unanimous agreement on effective international control proves impossible. We have regarded it as our single task to work toward complete agreement on a plan fully satisfying the Commission’s terms of reference as interpreted in your instructions to us.

II. Work of the Commission to Date

The work of the Commission to date may be briefly summarized in three phases as follows:

1. Presentation of Original Positions of the Several Delegates

This phase occupied the Commission in meetings from June 14 through July 15. Only two proposals were put forward. In my address of June 14, I stated in broad outline the United States proposals as approved by you. Our plan was subsequently elaborated in three supplemental memoranda.
As you know, the U. S. plan called for the establishment of an international Atomic Development Authority responsible for the supervision, inspection, and control of all activities in the field of atomic energy, starting with the raw materials as they come out of the ground and including ownership or management of the necessary refineries, plants for the production of nuclear fuels, and major installations producing atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

The Authority would be supported by a system of rapid and effective punishments for violations and by free access for geological surveyors and other necessary inspectors to prevent misuse and insure compliance. The Great Powers' veto in the Security Council would not be permitted as a device for nations to protect themselves or their friends from punishment for violations of a treaty controlling atomic energy which they had previously accepted. Thus we proposed to eliminate the veto in the atomic energy field, not on unforeseeable policy issues which might arise in the future, but on punishment for crimes specifically defined in advance by voluntary agreement.

After a system of international control has been brought into effective operation by appropriate stages, we proposed to cease bomb production and dispose of then existing bombs pursuant to a treaty, properly ratified according to our constitutional processes. We left open the question as to whether the treaty should provide for dismantling of the bombs or for their transfer to an international agency for possible use against aggressors.

The Soviet proposal, presented on June 19, called for an international convention merely outlawing the production and use of atomic weapons and requiring the destruction of all stocks of atomic weapons, whether in a finished or unfinished state, within three months after entry into force of the convention.

This agreement would be implemented only through national legislation and through international action by the Security Council under the present provisions of the U. N. Charter. Other features of the Soviet position are discussed in point 2 below.

The U.S. position was generally supported by nine other delegates, representing Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Mexico, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Their statements ranged from an unqualified endorsement by Egypt to a general indication of agreement by others. The Soviet position was supported only by Poland.

2. Consideration of the Soviet Views

The Soviet views were elaborated by Ambassador Gromyko in a series of closed meetings from July 24 to August 6. We then learned that the Soviet plan envisages no systematic measures of prevention,
control or inspection, other than through national legislation. Such
national legislation might prevent misuse of atomic energy by private
individuals within a country, but it would of course have no effect on
the national governments themselves.

As a practical matter, the Soviet proposal bears a strong resem-
blance to the many abortive and ineffectual agreements of the past
for disarmament or nonaggression. The only form of international
implementing action which the Soviet plan contemplates is punitive
measures to be taken by the Security Council under the present pro-
visions of the Charter. We do not see how such measures could be
either swift or certain, as is essential from the very nature of the
problem, or how they could be kept free from willful obstructionism
through the employment of the veto.

Although Mr. Gromyko repeatedly stated a willingness to discuss
details of “how the Security Council should carry out its functions
as regards sanctions against a possible violator”, he consistently failed
to indicate any fruitful line which such discussion of “details” might
take. Despite repeated efforts by the Mexican, Netherlands, French,
Australian, and other Delegates, as well as ourselves, to have the
Soviet representative make plain the workings of his proposal, he
refused to consider international preventive control measures (as
contrasted with punishment after an offense) and failed to recognize
any need for special international arrangements to aid the Security
Council in enforcing an atomic energy agreement. He stated, in effect,
that the atomic bomb was to be viewed exactly as any other weapon
and that it could be handled entirely within the existing framework
of the U.N. Charter.

In our judgment preventive measures are the very essence of con-
trol. Without them, we do not see how the Security Council could
even have knowledge of prospective violations. The very establish-
ment of the Commission and the terms of the Moscow Resolution
demand the creation of special safeguards aimed at anticipating and
preventing the use of atomic weapons. In the face of this, the Soviet
government is apparently proposing that a convention outlawing
atomic weapons be signed immediately and that the Commission pro-
ceed later to the discussion of controls, safeguards, and sanctions,
although every indication suggests that such later discussion would
be utterly fruitless.

These meetings had the effect of building up a clear record before
the entire Commission of the weakness of the Soviet position, which
completely violates the express mandate to work out effective controls
and safeguards. That mandate, as you know, was unanimously ap-
proved by the General Assembly last January on the basis of the
Moscow Declaration of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Thus the Soviet Government’s present position is sharply at variance with the position it endorsed only a few months ago.

In fact, as pointed out by Dr. Padilla Nervo 58 of Mexico, the Soviet proposal adds almost nothing to the commitments already undertaken in the United Nations Charter itself, since all members have already agreed to “settle their international disputes by peaceful means” and to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force”. (Article 2)

During these same discussions, the Soviet representative stated flatly that his Government could not accept the U.S. proposals as now presented, “either as a whole or in their separate parts.” He regarded our plan as incompatible with Soviet views on national sovereignty which would be violated, he asserted, by any form of international inspection. He also objected vigorously to any change in the application of the veto, although we have proposed to forbid the use of the veto only (1) to prevent escape from punishment for violation of crimes specifically defined in a treaty voluntarily agreed to by all participants, and (2) in the day-to-day administrative operations of the Atomic Development Authority. He assailed any suggestion for modifying the veto as “undermining” the United Nations, although in our opinion adoption of the U.S. proposals would greatly strengthen the United Nations. In his view, the importance of inspection, which, along with access, we regard as essential, was “greatly exaggerated” and “a superficial approach” to the problem.

Two of the chief fundamental issues separating the Soviet and Polish views from those held by other ten nations may be summarized as follows:

(1) The Soviet proposal relies for compliance solely on the good faith and mutual trust of nations, backed up by punitive action through the Security Council with the Great Power veto intact, and without any systematic means of warning the Security Council of prospective violations; whereas the U.S. plan calls for an effective international organization to prevent in advance, so far as possible, the misuse of atomic energy, and to provide adequate warning and swift and certain punishment, unimpeded by the veto, for violations if they do occur.

(2) The Soviet proposal calls for the immediate outlawry of the production and use of atomic weapons, and the destruction of existing stocks, prior to the erection of international safeguards to ensure

58 Dr. Luis Padilla Nervo, Mexican Representative at the General Assembly and on the Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission.
compliance and without any provision for swift and certain punishment of violators; whereas the U.S. proposal requires as a prerequisite to the elimination of atomic weapons that there be established effective preventive safeguards and machinery for punishment.

The U.S. plan includes the Soviet proposal in the sense of also embracing a convention outlawing atomic weapons. But the Soviet plan stops at that point, while we insist on simultaneous, effective, and enforceable safeguards to ensure that the production and use of atomic weapons is not merely illegal but is in fact prevented.

We see no possibility of reconciling these views. Agreement could be effected only through a drastic change in the Soviet position or through a sacrifice by us of the very principles which were unanimously endorsed by the United Nations last January and restated in your instructions to me. Abandonment of those principles would mean defrauding the peoples of the world.

3. Work of the Scientific and Technical Committee

By the end of July, it was generally recognized that no further progress could be made by discussions on the policy plane, without serious risk of breaking negotiations in advance of a general understanding of the scientific aspects of the problem. We also appreciated the particular importance of avoiding any open rupture at that time, when the Peace Conference in Paris was just getting under way.

In view of our instructions from the State Department, we therefore acquiesced in the motion of the French Delegate, to adjourn the discussion of policy for the time being, and to request the Scientific and Technical Committee to prepare a report on "the question of whether the effective control of atomic energy is possible, together with an indication of the methods by which the Scientific and Technical Committee considers that effective control can be achieved." The Scientific Committee has been working intensively over the last five weeks. Its report was completed on September 3rd, but still awaits formal action by the Soviet Delegate.

Early in the discussions of the scientists, it was found that a direct reply to the request before their Committee would inevitably involve policy considerations. The Committee, therefore, limited itself to a discussion of the basic underlying facts in the production and use of atomic energy, together with an indication of the possibilities of misuse at each stage through diversion of nuclear materials, through seizure of installations, or through clandestine activities. The members also reached the important conclusion that there is no basis in the available scientific facts for supposing that effective control is not technologically feasible.

The report is significant in providing a general international scien-
tific recognition, in contrast with ex parte American assertion, of the basic facts on which our proposals for control are based. While the report on its face avoids reference to any particular system of control, the facts there set forth point inescapably, in our opinion, toward the U.S. proposals, once the necessity for effective control is recognized.

The report received the unanimous concurrence of the members of the Scientific Committee, including Soviet members, in informal meetings. However, the Soviet Government has not yet authorized formal approval of the report. This step has been promised and then postponed, without stated reasons, on three successive occasions. In a conversation on September 11 with the Chairman of the Commission, Ambassador Gromyko indicated that he was in personal agreement with the report, but that he would like a little more time for the experts of the Soviet Union to study it. He indicated that their report would be ready very soon, perhaps in a few days. If other delegations thought it was important to proceed earlier, he had no objection, and in this case the Soviet Union would merely refrain from voting for the present. Mr. Gromyko indicated that he did not think that particular importance should be attached to the report of the Scientific Committee in the work of the Atomic Energy Commission.

If formal Soviet approval is not forthcoming in the near future, the Scientific Committee will presumably submit its report without Soviet (and probably without Polish) concurrence.

III. FURTHER WORK IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE

The late Chairman of the Commission, General McNaughton of Canada (who was succeeded by Dr. Hsia of China on September 15), has proposed that immediately on receipt of the Scientific Report, and working with it as a foundation, the policy committee proceed to a further development of the factual problems of control, delaying for the time being any crystallization of the political issues. This process would involve a review of each stage in the production and use of atomic energy, with a discussion of the types of technical control measures needed to prevent diversion or clandestine operations. This course would not require the disclosure of additional scientific or technical information.

This line of discussion appears useful, and will assist in further clarifying the problem and promoting general understanding of the complex technical considerations involved in devising workable measures of control. We cannot be certain that the Soviet representative will agree to pursuing any discussions along this line. In any

\[69\] Dr. C. L. Hsia, Alternate Chinese Representative on the Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission; Secretary, Chinese Delegation to the General Assembly, New York.
event, it can last only a month or two. Then the basic issues of policy will again be sharply before us.

IV. Conclusions

In the light of the discussions to date, and barring a drastic shift in the Soviet position, it seems clear that unanimity on the fundamental issues of policy facing the Atomic Energy Commission cannot be achieved in the now foreseeable future. In these circumstances, the best we can presently hope for on any vote in the Commission on such issues is a 10–2 majority for an international control plan along the lines we have advocated.

The question of exactly when and in what manner the issue shall reach decision in the Commission seems to us a matter of high policy, intimately related to the general course of our international relations and the entire worldwide diplomatic situation. The deliberations of the Commission are inevitably becoming dominated more by influences of the international political atmosphere, notably the peace negotiations in Paris, than by our specific problem of preventing the misuse of atomic energy.

Once the short-term work of the Commission is concluded, we can see only two possible courses of action. These are:

Alternative No. 1. We might recognize frankly the difficulty of reaching unanimous agreement on the fundamental issues, press the matter to a probable 10–2 vote in the Commission, and then render a divided report to the Security Council.

The majority report would consolidate the record of our position, which has thus far stood up against all assaults. Our proposals appear to have received the almost unanimous endorsement of all nations in the world outside the Soviet sphere. We would also take the appropriate opportunity for a public statement of the total inadequacy of the Soviet proposals.

Such a divided report would doubtless be the subject of bitter debate in the Security Council, and might further aggravate the frictions already present in that body. It might also force a premature decision on the treatment of the atomic energy problem in the world outside the Soviet sphere—a matter which lies outside our assignment and involves the most vital diplomatic and military considerations.

Moreover, it is by no means certain that we would have the support of all the friendly delegates in bringing the matter to a vote promptly. However, if actually forced to a vote, we believe that we would have the support of all except Poland and the Soviet Union.

If a showdown is inevitable, both its proper timing in relation to
the whole international picture and the manner in which the issues are presented to the world are clearly of crucial importance.

**Alternative No. 2.** A sharp cleavage in the near future could be avoided by recessing the Commission to permit the delegates to consult with their governments. Some delegates, notably the French, have already made this suggestion informally, on the ground that the questions remaining before the Commission, once the short-term phase of technical exploration is concluded, involve matters of high international policy.

At the same time, the Commission might render an interim report to the Security Council, summarizing the discussions up to that point, and pointing up the issues without seeking to resolve them or to create a break. Depending on the general course of international relations, following such recess the work of the Atomic Energy Commission could (1) be resumed after a reasonable interval, (2) be suspended until a brighter outlook in the broad international scene gave promise of a successful outcome, or (3) await advice from the Security Council or the General Assembly.

**V. Recommendations**

1. **Short-Term Policy**

Our oral instructions from the Acting Secretary of State make it clear that we should not take the initiative in precipitating a break in the negotiations. Assuming that the initiative remains with us, these instructions call for continued efforts at joint exploration of all aspects of the subject, with special emphasis on the technical problems of effective control and safeguards. In the absence of altered instructions, we shall continue along the course now indicated for the short-run future. I must emphasize, however, that this line of discussion can hardly last more than another 30 to 60 days.

It is of course always possible that the Soviet Union may initiate a break. In this event, we would be forced immediately to mount a vigorous counter-attack on the Soviet position, aimed at demonstrating the utter inadequacy of the Soviet plan and its repudiation of the Commission’s mandate which they themselves sponsored in the Moscow Declaration.

2. **Long-Term Policy**

Within the next 30 to 60 days, it will become necessary to choose one of the two alternatives outlined in Section D [IV] above. This decision on the longer-run action requires new instructions taking into account the relation of the negotiations on atomic energy to the overall pattern of our foreign policy.
A decision as to the course which we shall pursue is essential before the end of this year, because three present members, namely Egypt, Mexico, and the Netherlands, retire on January 1, 1947. These three nations are all supporters of the U.S. proposals. They will be replaced by three others selected by the General Assembly. The successors that have been discussed are Belgium, Colombia, and Syria. It is impossible to be certain of the position that they will take, and in any case a considerable period of time must elapse before they can express themselves formally on the proposals. Present indications do not point to the likelihood of obtaining the acquiescence of Poland or the Soviet Union to our proposals in the near future. The possibilities are rather that we may lose present support than that we can gain new support.

In these circumstances we feel that, unless overriding international considerations dictate a different course, it would be advisable to follow Alternative No. 1 and bring the U.S. proposals to a vote within a reasonable period. Such action would be a clear indication to the American people and to the world of the views of the several nations on the control of atomic energy. Action in this Commission is, of course, not final or binding on any nation. As you know, its recommendations go to the Security Council, where they can be acted upon by way of approval, modification, or rejection.

On the other hand, considerations of general foreign policy may suggest that we follow Alternative No. 2. We do not possess the necessary knowledge to appraise such factors. For this reason, we now seek instructions based on the international situation as a whole so that our efforts may become a positive, rather than a passive, factor in the overall foreign policy of the United States.

3. Necessary National Action

Regardless of the progress of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, I cannot emphasize too strongly the vital importance of readiness to take the necessary national measures in the event of failure to achieve an adequate plan for the international control of atomic energy. We cannot afford to base national security on the assumption of success in our negotiations. Pending establishment of the national Atomic Energy Commission on a fully operating basis, there must be assurance that there is no lack of decisiveness in any aspect of our atomic energy program. These considerations add further weight to the importance of a prompt appointment of very able men to that body.

I shall welcome the opportunity of further discussions with you on the matters covered in this report and on the future course of action which I should pursue.

Respectfully submitted,

BERNARD M. BARUCH
The United States Representatives on the Military Staff Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

17 September 1946.

**Basic Principles Governing the Organization of the United Nations Forces**

**The Problem**

1. To determine the advisability of resuming subcommittee discussion of the basic principles governing the organization of the United Nations Forces.

**Discussion**

2. The trend of developments within the Subcommittee on a Standard Form of Agreement has demonstrated that considerable progress is possible in the work of the Military Staff Committee even though one of the national Delegations does not participate in the discussion. Recent incidents within the Military Staff Committee clearly indicate that the Soviets not only have no intention of participating in substantive work of the Military Staff Committee but also that they are committed to a policy of obstructionism.

3. In view of the foregoing, it is evident that if there is not to be a complete breakdown in the function of the Military Staff Committee, some constructive action must be taken. It is proposed that the resumption of the work of the Subcommittee on Basic Principles Governing the Organization of United Nations Forces would serve as a means to further progress of the Military Staff Committee.

4. At its meeting in London on 16 February 1946, the Security Council directed the Military Staff Committee as its first task to examine, from the military point of view, the provisions in Article 43 of the Charter and to submit the results of the study and any recommendations to the Council. As a method of accomplishing this task, the Military Staff Committee, at its 5th Meeting on 27 March 1946, by resolution, established a subcommittee with terms of reference directing it to study Article 43 of the Charter and to formulate recommendations to the Military Staff Committee as to the basic principles which will govern the organization of the United Nations forces.

5. At its first meeting on 28 March 1946, this subcommittee adopted a resolution that: “Each national Delegation shall, not later than 3 April, furnish each of the other national Delegations, in writing, a

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"This memorandum, approved by the United States Representatives on the Military Staff Committee at their 26th Meeting, September 16, was forwarded to the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for information. (IO Files)"
statement of the principles which shall govern the organization of the United Nations forces, and that this subcommittee shall meet on 5 April to consider these several statements." Four members of the subcommittee complied with the aforementioned resolution. Since all members had not complied therewith, the second meeting of the subcommittee was postponed indefinitely. The fifth member has not been able to indicate to the subcommittee a definite foreseeable date on which a statement of the principles which shall govern the organization of the United Nations forces may be expected.

6. While subcommittee discussion on a five-Power basis is preferable, it is evident that it will be necessary to proceed, at least initially, on a four-Power basis as has the subcommittee discussion on the Standard Form of Agreement. Further delay in meeting this issue plays squarely into the hands of the Soviets and contributes to their policy of obstructionism.

7. Several advantages would accrue by pursuing the action outlined above. In the first place, it would lead to a showdown in the Military Staff Committee and possibly within the Security Council, and would contribute to a showdown in the General Assembly. It is possible that it would force the Soviets into acting in concert with the other four Powers. On the other hand, if it should force an open break, as long as the action is that of the Soviets, such a break might be preferable to the present condition of stalemate.

8. Assuming that the Soviets will enter into the discussion within the reasonably foreseeable future, initiating the discussion on a four-Power basis would have the effect of disclosing and solving many minor but troublesome points as in the case of the Standard Form of Agreement. Thus much preliminary work will have been accomplished by the time the Soviets see fit to participate.

9. Assuming that the Soviets will indefinitely delay their participation, four-Power discussion nevertheless will be of value, inasmuch as it will have produced prior agreement between the United Kingdom, China, France, and the United States on principles which are likely to be required in the event of a complete breakdown of the United Nations organization.

10. Furthermore, although the proceedings of the Military Staff Committee are restricted, should information reach other nations, through the Security Council or the General Assembly, as to the work in progress, it is considered that it would have the effect of pointing up the attitude of the Soviets and its deleterious result in implementing the Charter of the United Nations.

11. There are certain unfavorable factors to be considered. It may be objected that by four-Power discussion with Soviet observation
we disclose our position. However, the plane of the discussion and the general terms involved are such that no information of substantive value accrues to the Soviets. This is borne out by the proceedings of the Subcommittee on a Standard Form of Agreement. In addition, the United States, along with three other national Delegations, have submitted written statements (MS/28, MS/29, MS/30, MS/31/Rev. 1) on the basic principles.\(^6^1\)

12. Another objection might be that without Soviet participation no substantive action is possible. Here again experience with the Standard Form of Agreement indicates that considerable progress is possible. Furthermore, should an open rupture occur, considerable advantage in time required for organization will have accrued.

CONCLUSION

13. It is concluded that it would be advisable to resume subcommittee discussion in the Military Staff Committee of the basic principles governing the organization of the United Nations forces.

RECOMMENDATION

14. That the U.S. Representatives on the Military Staff Committee forward a proposal in substance as attached as the Enclosure to the four other Delegations of the Military Staff Committee, to be placed on the provisional agenda of the next meeting of the Military Staff Committee.\(^6^2\)

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by Mr. John M. Hancock of the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission

CONFIDENTIAL


Early yesterday morning Mr. Baruch called me about the Wallace letter which appeared in the morning papers—the letter of July 23.\(^6^3\) I went over it, Mr. Baruch and I talked about it, we talked to our Associates here, and saw Mr. Clayton\(^6^4\) at the State Department, out-
lined to him what we were going to say to the President, and were informed that the President was seeing Mr. Wallace at 3:30 and would likely issue a statement shortly after. Mr. Clayton was satisfied the statement would be to the liking of both ourselves and the State Department. Clayton went with us to the White House.

The President seemed very pleasant but grim when we got on to the Wallace issue. Mr. Baruch told the President of his respect for the office of President, his regard for Mr. Truman personally, his purpose in coming down to make the report, and the progress of negotiations but his belief that there wouldn’t be time, and that it would not be wise to go into the report itself then.

He referred to the new situation in which we found ourselves on account of the Wallace letter’s release to the Press. He told the President in a very firm but very friendly manner that so far as he could see there were three choices of courses open to us. First, a full retraction on the part of Mr. Wallace; second, an utter repudiation of Mr. Wallace’s statements; or third, that we resign, as our usefulness was ended. The President told us of his plan to see Wallace, asked us not to be in a hurry about resigning, and told us that he thought his action in the afternoon would be satisfactory to us. Mr. Baruch used some such words as these—that our position was in nowise an ultimatum, but that we still saw only those three courses open. We told the President these general observations: (1) That we had first seen the July 23 letter the same morning. We were told by the President that he showed the letter to Byrnes immediately before Byrnes’ leaving for Paris, that the letter was of such a character that it did not require any action by the State Department, this explanation apparently being made to remove any attack on Mr. Byrnes. (2) Mr. Wallace’s comment is not based factually on the U.S. Plan or on any action we have taken. (3) Mr. Wallace has made no attempt to establish the facts by inquiry of us. We assured the President that we could have disproved all of his assumptions and assertions in a 5-minute talk. (4) We pointed out that Wallace understands the Russian plan better than he does the U.S. Plan. (5) We argued that Mr. Wallace should be required to reveal his source of information, because it quite obviously came to him from somebody who was trying to preach Red doctrine. (6) We pointed out that Mr. Gromyko had told us well over a month ago that we were not aware of the differences in American public opinion, the principal implication of that statement being that it was the Russian plan to propagandize and undermine our position. The chain [blame?] was not directed to the person who informed Mr. Wallace of the stuff on which he bases his letter, but it would pay the government to find out who this person was.
We referred to the obvious lack of teamwork on the part of Mr. Wallace in irresponsible statements about fellow government officials. (7) We referred to one line in Mr. Wallace’s statement that under certain conditions he believed Russia would negotiate. My comment was that I could not assume that Mr. Wallace had any authority from Russia for making such a statement, but that if he didn’t have authority, he was a trouble-maker and a repeater of gossip. At any rate, such an opinion was an irresponsible opinion which could only divide American opinion and give comfort to people who are trying to tear down America’s objective. (8) We asked why Mr. Wallace assumed that Russia was not competent to speak for herself. We said that Mr. Gromyko had never told us of the “Pravda” argument, but that Wallace was speaking in a manner which Gromyko had not used. We said that Gromyko had been perfectly frank as far as we knew, that he had been tone-full, but definitely in opposition to our point of view.

It was interesting to find that the President was under a misunderstanding. He thought that Wallace’s letter was written before the American Plan was presented. We pointed out to him that this was not the fact and that not only was our plan initially presented on June 14 but that we had filed three supplementary memoranda before Wallace’s letter was written. The American position had been made public and widely spread, and there was no excuse for misunderstanding the exact American position so far as it was revealed.

I don’t recall whether we told the President about Wallace’s assumptions regarding raw material. We did talk to Will Clayton about it. We pointed out that it stemmed from the meeting with the Acheson Group arranged for us under State Department auspices, and that somebody there had leaked and had assumed what we were going to do.

Afterward I recalled that I had been a speaker at the session of the Atomic Scientists in Washington on July 15. Wallace spoke there in my presence but he was not present during my talk. Wallace did hear Auger’s foolish talk at that dinner, in which the bad negotiating was referred to by Auger, and in which he asked that we make the gesture of stopping the making of bombs.

I still don’t know how Wallace’s letter got to the Press. The President told us he had tried very hard to stop it on the day before. He asked Mr. Clayton to support his statement of these efforts. Clayton did assent. The statement then made was that the efforts were too late, that copies were already in the hands of “P.M.” and some other paper, and that it was therefore released.

65 Alternate French Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission.
The President seemed as much incensed as he is capable of being over the release of a private and confidential memorandum. During the day I heard that Drew Pearson,\(^9\) who was apparently the man who found the copy of the July 23 letter, gave out a statement saying that he had not gotten it from the Department of Commerce, and Mr. Truman expressed his gratification that the leak had not taken place in the Department of Commerce. I am not convinced of the accuracy of the statement. I do understand that after the President’s efforts were found unavailing in stopping the release, then the statement was given out. I am under the impression it was given by Charlie Ross, the White House Secretary, but I have not heard this stated officially.

I don’t know all the facts, of course, because we were flying home yesterday afternoon. If the Press is to be relied upon, the President had not settled either of our problems. He did give us authority to put out any statement we wished after we saw what he had done with Wallace in the afternoon. I feel that facing the Delegates in the Commission and our own public, we must issue a statement on the pattern of Al Smith’s “Let’s look at the Record” in which we would take Wallace’s factual statements, quote them, in as a subjective manner as we can, but for myself I will put on plenty of heat. There would be, I think, an additional gesture in telephoning Wallace as to whether he wants to retract any portion of his letter. I doubt that it would produce any results because Wallace has said today, according to the Press, that he will not speak on any public matters for one month.

My view at the moment is that the President misled us or changed his mind when he faced Wallace. This one month’s muzzle does not affect either of our purposes of getting a retraction of the facts or a repudiation by the President. I have read the statement in the “Tribune” this morning in which the President generally supports our program. To me that is not enough.

In order to handle Wallace personally, my present feeling is that our wise course is to write him as sharp a letter as we wish, characterizing his misinformation, his trouble-making attitude, his failure to cooperate, his ability to get the facts from us in a 5-minute talk, if he had so chosen—and further along the same line. Mr. Wallace could easily be made a martyr in the present position if we were to attack him publicly for the silly ideas and conclusions he draws. To give him ammunition for a reply in a month from now when the gag comes off wouldn’t do him much good either.

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\(^9\) Syndicated newspaper columnist.
CONFIDENTIAL


At 11:30 a.m. I talked with Mr. Clayton at the State Department. I am dictating this memorandum immediately thereafter.

The first point was that the President had not given out a statement but that he is contemplating a press conference tomorrow and will unquestionably give out a statement tomorrow regarding the Wallace statement.

I told Clayton that we were considering and were studying to carry out three courses of action.

First: We were preparing a cold analysis of what Wallace said and we were putting against it what the American plan is, as contained in the document, along with any analysis or comment that seemed appropriate. We plan to give this out to the press because we have an obligation to our people and to the delegates of the other nations.

Second: We plan to write a letter to Mr. Wallace, with copies to the President and the State Department, in which we will go into our views of Mr. Wallace's conclusions. This would be more the character of a personal letter, not intended for publication and not to be released by us at this time. I don't want this to be any understanding of a commitment not to release it at some future time if conditions warrant, and we will make it very clear to Mr. Wallace in the letter itself.

Third: Mr. Baruch is probably now talking with Mr. Wallace to the general effect that Mr. Baruch has been a friend for years; that Wallace's assumption of facts were very wrong; that they could have been verified in five minutes by telephone conversation; that Mr. Baruch is giving out a statement to the press regarding these facts; that he insisted in addition that Mr. Wallace retract his statement of facts.

I stress the fact that Mr. Baruch is offering the opportunity for Wallace to fly up here and get the facts as early as this afternoon or tomorrow morning.

Clayton was in thorough accord with all this. He expressed detailed approval of various aspects. He said that telephone conversation with Europe was very difficult and that apparently the President had not concluded to handle the conversation by teletype because of the telephone difficulties. Clayton had seen the President twice this morning already; was thoroughly dissatisfied with the present situation because it settled nothing. When I told Clayton that the muzzling for a month meant that the muzzling would come off at the end of the
month, Clayton said this is no time for a truce on matters like this; the matter has to be settled conclusively.

Clayton knows Byrnes is not satisfied but due to the bad telephone connections he does not know what the final position is going to be. He said he would welcome our letting him know what we do, and I told him we were out of touch with the news and would appreciate him letting us know what they do. I told Clayton we want to be on the same front with them and at least know what the other is doing. Clayton is in entire accord.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. R. Gordon Arneson

CONFIDENTIAL


At 12:50 PM Secretary Wallace returned Mr. Baruch's call. Messrs. Hancock, Swope, Farrell, Gordon, Johnson, Lindsay, and Arneson were present while Mr. Baruch talked to him.

Mr. Baruch told the Secretary that he was sorry to learn about his letter of July 23. If Mr. Wallace had spent just a few minutes with us before writing it, the various mis-statements of fact that the letter now contains could easily have been avoided. He said that their associations in the past had been such that he thought it was incumbent on each of them to discuss such matters in advance. He felt that both of them were anxious to do what was right, and their associations in the past had been on the basis of mutual understanding, and that he was sorry that the Secretary had not kept this necessity in mind in the instant case.

Mr. Baruch invited Mr. Wallace to come up to see him in order that they might go over the public documents in which the United States position has been amply spelled out. Whoever furnished Mr. Wallace with the information on which the letter was based had clearly transmitted gross errors of fact. He urged Mr. Wallace to come up as soon as possible in order that the rift that now existed between them might be prevented from becoming deeper. Mr. Baruch pointed out that he was as concerned as Wallace was about the increasing difficulty of seeing eye to eye with the Russians. The U.S. Delegation to the A.E.C. has exercised extreme care in working with the Russian Delegation and was doing everything in its power to understand and to take into account their point of view.

Mr. Baruch urged that Mr. Wallace consider seriously correcting

67 Staff member, United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission.
the errors of fact in the July 23 letter. To this Mr. Wallace apparently replied that since he had been muzzled by the President he was in no position to make any public statement whatever on this matter. In reply, Mr. Baruch stated that the decision of course was up to Mr. Wallace, that we wanted him to make such corrections, and that if he felt that he was unable to do it himself, we would undertake to say it for him—and in our own words.

Mr. Baruch reminded Mr. Wallace that the proposals put forth on June 14 were in fact the official U.S. policy which had been approved paragraph by paragraph by President Truman himself. Mr. Wallace’s attack, therefore, on the Baruch Plan was actually an attack on official U.S. policy.

Mr. Baruch urged again in the interests of the country and in the interest of relations between them, that Mr. Wallace come up promptly to discuss this matter in detail. Mr. Wallace had clearly been misinformed as to the facts concerning our proposals and it was time that he got the facts straight. We are faced with a delicate situation which requires prompt attention.

In response to Mr. Wallace’s suggestion that he would like to bring Dr. Condon to him, Mr. Baruch replied that Mr. Wallace could bring with him anyone he wished to. He urged, however, that it be done soon, otherwise their relations would be very seriously damaged. Mr. Baruch stated that the decision was up to Mr. Wallace whether he wanted to come up or not, but that he should understand that if he didn’t we would be compelled to bring this issue to the attention of the public.

After he had finished talking with Mr. Wallace, Mr. Baruch told us that Wallace would call him back in a short while.

R. G. ARNESON

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by Mr. Franklin A. Lindsay to the United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission (Baruch)


Subject: Conversation with de Rose of French Delegation

This morning Linc Gordon and I called on de Rose, Parodi’s assistant, to discuss the coming Scientific Meeting, and the course which the Commission might follow after that meeting. De Rose stated that he believed Parodi would be opposed to bringing the Scientific Report to a final vote tomorrow. He stated the Russians were proud people and

65 Dr. Edward U. Condon, Director of the National Bureau of Standards.
66 United States Delegation Staff Member.
67 François de Rose, Adviser, French Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission.
that if we forced a decision before they were ready to sign, they might later decide not to sign at the bottom of the list. He thought that there would be nothing gained by forcing a 10–2 approval tomorrow.  

He reiterated the position taken by Parodi at luncheon with us a month ago that after receiving the Scientific Report the Commission should recess in order that the Members might report to their Governments and receive further instructions.

Apparently, both he and Parodi had understood you and Mr. Eberstadt to have approved the suggestions (a) that there should be no discussion of political questions until after the Paris Conference and the General Assembly had adjourned, and (b) that the Commission should recess and seek further instructions from the various Governments. He was apparently not familiar with the Canadian proposal to begin examination in a sub-committee of Committee No. 2 of the specific measures of control which would be required at each stage in the technological processes outlined in the Scientific Report. He was not sure how Parodi would receive such a proposal. He was certain that Parodi wished to avoid political discussions until after the General Assembly, and thought that he might wish to delay this type of discussion also.

At the end of the discussion he reassured us of the French support of the principles of our plan. He stated that sooner or later a final decision would have to be taken, and that if the Russians refused to participate in international control, we would then have to examine the question as to whether or not we desired to set up an international control agency excluding the Russians.

FRANKLIN A. LINDSAY

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Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. R. Gordon Arneson

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK.] September 27, 1946.

Notes of Meeting with Mr. Wallace and his Aide, Mr. Hauser, 10 a. m., Friday, September 27, 1946

When he first arrived, Mr. Wallace spent about 15 minutes with Mr. Baruch while Mr. Hauser exchanged pleasantries with Mr. Hancock, Mr. Gordon, Mr. Lindsay, and Mr. Arneson.

71 The Scientific and Technical Committee adopted its report on the feasibility and nature of effective controls at its 2nd Meeting, September 26, subject to the following reservation by the Soviet representative: "The information at the disposal of the Committee was, as the report acknowledges, limited and incomplete. For this reason, the majority of the conclusions in the Committee's report are hypothetical and conditional. It is with this reservation that I vote for the adoption of the report."

72 Staff member, United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission.

73 President Truman had asked for and received Mr. Wallace's resignation as Secretary of Commerce on September 20.
At 10:15, Mr. Baruch and Mr. Wallace were joined by Mr. Hauser, and Messrs. Hancock, Eberstadt, and Swope. After some minutes of discussion, Messrs. Farrell, Gordon and Arneson were asked to join the meeting. The notes which follow are based on notes I took on the discussions that preceded intermittently during the remainder of the day.

Mr. Hauser considered that the Baruch Proposals were quite ambiguous on the question of stages. He felt that there was considerable room for interpretation as to whether those proposals had in mind retaining for the United States “unfettered discretion” in determining when specific stages had been reached and also as to what the content of stages should be. He agreed, however, that the previous discussion that the group had just finished had convinced him that we did not contemplate leaving “unfettered discretion” in the hands of the United States but that we did in fact intend to wrap the entire agreement in a “single package.”

Mr. Hauser stated that much of Mr. Wallace’s letter of July 23rd had been thought about, and in fact written, before June 14th and that references to the Baruch Proposals had been added somewhat as an afterthought.

He agreed that our position on the substance of stages was sound. The question remained, however, of the timing on stages and he referred to that part of the Baruch Proposals which states that securing dominion over raw materials should be one of the earliest duties of the ADA.

Mr. Eberstadt pointed out that the Soviets are the ones who have refused to accept an agreement in a single package. They have proposed a convention outlawing the production and use of atomic bombs to be followed at some indefinite future date by vague considerations of control. We have found it necessary to accept the Russian view that this problem can be solved piecemeal. [síoc] This is the real rub of our difficulties in negotiating with the Soviets. Mr. Hauser agreed with this analysis and went on to point out that atomic energy negotiations are merely a part of the much broader problem of overall relations with Russia. Mr. Gordon stated that Mr. Gromyko himself has never raised any question about the order of events involved in setting up the ADA. Mr. Eberstadt went on to say that Mr. Gromyko was in no position to argue about stages because we have not yet spelled those stages out. They have proposed a sort of stage scheme of their own in which they want the job tackled piecemeal. Meanwhile, it would be perfectly legitimate to build atomic energy plants and to do research on military weapons. The Russian Proposal outlawing the bomb has no teeth in it.

Mr. Hauser referred to items 2 and 13 of the Baruch Proposals
which deal with raw materials and disclosures. In his view these sections state that we proposed full disclosure of raw material sources before we would be willing to disclose any technical and scientific information concerning atomic energy. Mr. Hancock pointed out that we did propose that dominion over raw materials should be one of the “earliest” purposes of the Authority, not necessarily the first, and that this would be done not before the treaty was agreed to but after it was agreed to and the Authority had been established. As to disclosures of information, he stated that here also the question of timing would have to be settled by negotiation and specifically set forth in the treaty. There was certainly no “take it or leave it” concept in this. He said that during the discussions which Mr. Baruch and his associates had had with the Acheson–Lilienthal group at the Blair Lee House last May, the question had been discussed whether we should insist on getting information on raw materials during the negotiations stage as a means of testing the good-faith of other countries. This proposal, while discussed, had not been taken seriously by anyone. He felt that the views reflected in Mr. Wallace’s letter on this question of raw materials may have sprung from a leak concerning these discussions. Our present position, which is fully reflected in published documents, is that no nation is required to show its “trump cards” during the negotiations. Obviously, all nations must know about, and agree to, the contents to be set forth in the treaty, governing not only stages and disclosures but all other facets of the problem. Each nation is free to accept or reject the conditions that might be arrived at by negotiations. After the treaty is agreed to, there are no trump cards to be played. Mr. Wallace agreed.

Mr. Hauser asked why we did not clarify this matter of stages. He stated the position of the Federation of Atomic Scientists which proposed that the first step should be the wide dissemination of atomic energy information and that dominion over raw materials should be the second step. He thought that a clear statement of our position on stages would go a long way to rally additional support for our proposals. He felt that the ambiguity that exists concerning the timing of stages was the very center of our present deadlock with the Russians. Gromyko has proposed that all bombs should be destroyed; we have declined to accept his proposal. What point is there then in going on with an elaboration of stages unless they are revised to meet him half way. Mr. Baruch reminded Mr. Hauser that progress by stages matched with adequate safeguards by way of inspection and other means was specifically laid down in the terms of reference of the Atomic Energy Commission. Mr. Eberstadt said that we have been unjustly accused in Mr. Wallace’s letter of asking for trumps in
the negotiation stage and that the letter alleged that we had taken a one-sided position concerning stages, whereas, as a matter of actual fact, we have not yet spelled out our ideas on the substance or timing of stages. We have not yet gone beyond the basic declaration that the ADA should be set up by a series of stages which will be fair, equitable, and applicable to all nations who join in.

Mr. Swore felt that while Mr. Wallace was perfectly correct in sending his letter to the President, inasmuch as the President has asked him to do so, there was gross error in not having checked the facts with our group before the letter was sent. Mr. Hancock agreed with this pointing out that Mr. Wallace has a right to hold any opinions he wishes to but that he did have a responsibility for checking the facts on which such inferences and opinions were based.

After that portion of Mr. Baruch's letter to the President dealing with the question of the veto had been raised and discussed in some detail, Mr. Wallace stated: "I am in full accord with your explanation of the veto problem." He went on to say that he thought that the whole handling of the veto in this field should be spelled out in the treaty itself.

Mr. Wallace urged that we should seek some face-saving device which could be presented to the Russians to induce them to go along with our proposals. The Soviets must be convinced that we are not out to destroy them. He felt that their intransigence, as exemplified by their stand on the veto, stemmed from a deep distrust of other nations and the unhappy developments under the League of Nations Covenant. He felt that atomic energy negotiations were only a part of a much broader problem of working out mutual confidence and trust between the USSR and the western powers. He hoped that Mr. Baruch and his associates would find it desirable at a later date to meet with other government groups to work out a common policy of bringing about mutual trust and confidence.

Mr. Eberstadt inquired of Mr. Wallace what essential departure we could make from our plan in order to save face for the Russians. Mr. Wallace replied that we could agree to stop the manufacture of bombs and perhaps allow the Security Council to inspect to make sure that we had in fact stopped. Mr. Eberstadt then pointed out that we would be in a very bad position if negotiations broke down and we found it necessary in the interests of national security to resume manufacture. He said that Mr. Wallace's proposal would have some weight if we had any real assurance of completely getting agreement of international control of atomic energy. Mr. Wallace agreed that the time was not yet ripe to make any such face-saving move. He urged, however, that we should be prepared to make some such move at the appropriate time.
As Mr. Wallace was about to leave, he summed up his view of the discussion by stating: "It is obvious that I was not fully posted." After Mr. Wallace left, Mr. Hauser stated that he was going to suggest to the Secretary that he bring the matter up to date. He thought that Mr. Wallace would probably want to issue a statement.

Mr. Hauser went off to another room to prepare a draft statement of the sort he thought Mr. Wallace had in mind and Mr. Swope discussed the matter with him in some detail. When Mr. Swope returned to the meeting, he reported that Mr. Wallace planned to put out a pamphlet which would contain his Madison Square Garden speech and also his July 23rd letter to the President. It was proposed that the section of the letter dealing with atomic energy would be left intact but would be followed by an addendum which would contain our memorandum to the President plus a short statement to the effect that Mr. Wallace agreed with the corrections of fact which our letter contained. Mr. Swope stated that he thought it would be completely wrong to circulate a letter which contained so many errors even though the addendum device was used to attempt to correct those errors.

Mr. Eberstadt felt that we should have no part of Mr. Wallace's pamphlet; that we should publish our letter to the President plus a statement from Mr. Wallace in which he would admit his errors. Mr. Swope agreed that we should publish our own letter plus Wallace's retraction but that in addition we might have our letter printed in the addendum to the pamphlet. Mr. Baruch stated that whether Wallace published a pamphlet or not was entirely his own affair and that we should have nothing whatever to do with it. To this, both Mr. Hancock and Mr. Eberstadt expressed their full agreement.

After lunch, Mr. Hauser met again with Messrs. Hancock, Swope, Gordon, Johnson, and Arneson. We read to him a draft of the statement we wanted Mr. Wallace to agree to. (Attached, Tab A). Mr. Hauser expressed some doubts as to whether Mr. Wallace would agree to it, and that the text could be remedied so that he would—by adding a short 5 sentence summary of the points of correction on which Mr. Wallace had agreed.

After interminable discussion, which extended late into the afternoon, the text of Wallace's statement was agreed to by all. (Attached, Tab B). Mr. Hauser expressed his conviction that he would be able to sell this statement to Mr. Wallace and would undertake to do so immediately.
After Mr. Hauser had left to return to Washington, the staff continued its discussion of strategy. Mr. Hancock summed up his views by saying that if Mr. Wallace agrees with the text of the statement which had been arrived at with Mr. Hauser, we should then put out that statement along with Mr. Baruch’s letter to the President. If Mr. Wallace does not agree to the text as written, then we should not consider ourselves bound to any course of action but should feel free to proceed in any manner we see fit.74

R. G. Arneson

Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Notes of a Meeting Between Members of the United States, United Kingdom, and Canadian Delegations to the Atomic Energy Commission, New York, October 1, 1946, 3 p. m.75

CONFIDENTIAL

Present

Mr. B. M. Baruch  Dr. W. B. Mann
Sir Alexander Cadogan  Mr. V. Lawford
Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton  Mr. Lincoln Gordon
Mr. J. M. Hancock  Mr. F. A. Lindsay
Mr. F. Eberstadt  Mr. G. E. Cox
Sir George Thompson  Mr. R. G. Arneson
Dr. R. C. Tolman

In response to Sir Alexander’s question on how best to proceed at tomorrow’s meeting,76 Mr. Hancock said he thought it was of great importance that we proceed in such a manner as to achieve a full understanding of the Scientific and Technical Committee report. Tentatively, it would seem that two or three formal sessions might be devoted to talking out the report and its broad implications. Procedurewise, he felt the chief point to bear in mind was that we should avoid at all costs precipitating political debates in Committee No. 2 at the outset. Referring to General McNaughton’s suggestion for informal meetings, he thought that the idea was a good one. It did, however, present the difficulty that representatives other than those officially on Committee No. 2 might be appointed to attend these informal meetings. We should, if possible, make sure that the official

74 The attachments are not printed here. Mr. Wallace subsequently refused to endorse a statement acceptable to Mr. Baruch. Consequently, the latter released “Tab A,” “Tab B,” and a memorandum he had addressed to President Truman on September 24 which answered Mr. Wallace’s criticisms point by point; for texts, see the New York Times, October 3, 1946.
75 Drafted by Mr. R. Gordon Arneson of the United States Delegation Staff.
76 Sixth Meeting of Committee 2, October 2.
representatives of Committee No. 2 shared in the educative process involved in informal meetings.

In response to a question from Sir Alexander, General McNaughton elaborated his views on the desirability of proceeding on an informal basis. The Scientific and Technical Committee was the first committee to achieve any basic agreement on the facts of the problem before us. During his month's tenure as chairman, General McNaughton had studiously avoided any activity on the part of the political committees which would interfere with the work of the Scientific and Technical Committee. This approach has achieved the conspicuous result of a unanimous report of the Scientific and Technical Committee. This report is a unanimous statement of the basic facts of the problem which points out where controls might be applied if the will exists to apply them. To be sure, the report contains nothing that was not already well-known before the Committee began its work. The importance of the report lies in the fact that twelve nations have agreed on the facts which it contains. It has cleared the way for further action, if we have the will to proceed.

We must now be prepared to grapple with the political implications of these facts. General McNaughton made it a point of talking to most of the delegations to ascertain whether they would agree to adopting an informal procedure for Committee No. 2. This would involve nominating political representatives from each of the twelve countries who would sit informally to go over the political implications of the report. The work should proceed by developing the basic facts of the problem and their implications, rather than by taking votes. Experts should be invited to participate whenever desirable. This procedure would build up a climate of opinion among the twelve nations favorable to a solution along the lines of the U.S. proposals. This procedure would also aid in educating the rest of the world to the implications and imperatives of the problem of control. In the course of these informal meetings it would be desirable to secure additional volumes of scientific information from the U.S. Delegation.

General McNaughton stated that he was prepared to move the adoption of this procedure in Committee No. 2, if there was general support for this approach. He would propose that the discussions proceed from the least contentious to the more contentious aspects of the problem. For example, phase one might deal with measures to prevent diversion of materials. Under this the following aspects would be considered:—(a) mining; (b) extraction of ore; (c) production of metal; (d) production of nuclear fuels (primary reactors); (e) secondary reactors. Phase two would consider measures to prevent clandestine operations. Phase three would discuss measures to prevent
seizures. Phase one could be handled in such a way as to minimize any political discussion, for these measures of preventing diversion could be considered either in national or international terms. It was presumed that several weeks might be taken in completing the discussion of phase one.

**General McNaughton** said that when this program was first considered, he had hoped that he might take a major role in pushing it along. Recently, however, he has agreed to undertake the job of working out the Canadian Control Board for Atomic Energy and consequently, will have less time than he had hoped.

**Mr. Hancock** expressed full support for the idea of both formal and informal meetings of Committee No. 2. He reported that a number of other delegations seem to be vacillating as to what ought to be done—some of them being in favor of compromise. He was sorry to hear that General McNaughton would not be able to participate full time in the program he proposed. He wondered who else might be considered.

**Sir Alexander** likewise gave full support to the general procedure suggested by General McNaughton and suggested that this method of approach should be proposed at tomorrow's meeting.

**General McNaughton** said that he would be prepared to move at tomorrow's meeting that Committee No. 2 should take up the discussion of the report of the Scientific and Technical Committee in informal meetings—these meetings to be attended by political representatives of the delegations and open to whatever experts the Committee might wish to invite. Any reports that the informal committee might wish to draw up on the basis of its discussion should be submitted to Committee No. 2 in formal session. The informal discussions should proceed along the lines of the topical outline mentioned above.

**Mr. Baruch** stated that he thought it most desirable that we have a plan of action ready for tomorrow's meeting in order to forestall any alternative proposals which might prove unacceptable.

In discussing General McNaughton's proposal around the table, **Mr. Hancock** stated that he thought the approach was a good one. Admittedly, it would be a slow process but might achieve real results in terms of education. He reported that Dr. Hsia appeared to want a restatement of the U.S. position in terms of its minimum essentials with the view of working out some compromise solution with the Russian proposals. **General McNaughton** reported that Mr. Parodi seemed to be leaning toward some kind of compromise also. With these two exceptions, however, the majority of the delegates seem to favor an approach along the lines of his proposal. **Sir Alexander**
expressed strong support for the proposed plan, stating that the nature of the problem lent itself to working up from the bottom. He felt strongly that any attempt to reopen the issue of general principles would be doomed to failure. General McNaughton felt that through this process of education the delegates would find themselves ending up with a solution of the problem which would be virtually identical to the Baruch proposals. He stated his intention of raising in a meeting of Committee No. 2 the question of whether adequate steps were being taken to inform the world generally of the nature of this problem and the work of the Commission in moving toward a solution. Mr. Eberstadt pointed out that the proposed approach had the merit of being exploratory rather than consummative and avoided creating a crisis. Sir Alexander was particularly in favor of the idea of exploring what might be done, rather than taking of votes on whether anyone was willing to do what was indicated. This procedure would build up a logical structure starting from the Scientific and Technical Committee report which would be most useful to world opinion whether we attain final success or not. General McNaughton saw the additional merit in the plan in that while it provoked no crisis, it was sufficiently flexible so that once the international situation improved the more political questions could be drawn into the discussions.

General McNaughton raised the question about the reservations that some delegates might have about discussing raw materials in phase one. In the discussion that followed it was agreed that mining in the terms of preventing diversion should proceed along general lines and should avoid any implication that the control mechanism would necessarily have to be international. All the delegates should be invited to participate in this discussion and draw upon his knowledge of how control is achieved in his own country. In no event should discussions in phase one be pushed to a point where delegates would balk at carrying the discussion forward. Questions that involve serious political conditions whether on the subject of mining or production of nuclear fuels should be put aside until phase two and phase three. In fact, phase one would be a softening-up process which might lay the groundwork for more crucial consideration of political problems in a later phase. For example, the question of undisclosed mines—that is mines not yet discovered—should not be discussed in phase one but should be left to a later period. As regards information on raw materials, General McNaughton stated that he was authorized by his government to say that he was prepared to discuss all information concerning the raw materials situated in his country, if other countries would undertake to do likewise.
Dr. Tolman pointed out that as far as raw materials were concerned, we wanted to know not only about reserves of the twelve countries represented on the Commission, but reserves in all nations throughout the world. To this Sir George replied that precise knowledge concerning world reserves of uranium and thorium would not be important in the first phase of discussion.

General McNaughton felt that the Scientific and Technical Committee should remain in being and that out of informal discussions of Committee No. 2 might come specific requests to the Scientific and Technical Committee to prepare reports on different phases of the problem as they arose. He hoped that the members of the Scientific and Technical Committee would not be drawn in too closely into any political discussions that might go on in Committee No. 2. He thought that the scientists should be invited to attend these informal discussions and participate as individuals.

Mr. Hancock summarized his understanding of the proposal as follows: Committee No. 2 should resolve itself into an informal working committee for the purpose of considering the question of controls as raised by the report of the Scientific and Technical Committee. Its discussions should proceed along the lines of the tentative outline proposed by General McNaughton. The heads of the several delegations should be asked to send as their representatives to these informal meetings anyone they chose. Individual members of the Scientific and Technical Committee should be invited to participate in these discussions as individuals. Whatever conclusions might be arrived at in these informal discussions should be written up in reports for presentation to Committee No. 2 in formal session for whatever action it deemed desirable.

General McNaughton thought that such reports as might be developed in informal discussion ought to be presented to the formal committee via the Chairman of the informal group. Mr. Hancock said this raised the question of whether it might be possible to break through the established pattern of the monthly rotation of chairmanship. General McNaughton proposed that a way to do this would be to have a deputy chairman appointed to Committee No. 2 who would be specifically charged with responsibility of chairing informal meetings. This suggestion was generally agreed to. Dr. Tolman and Mr. Gordon suggested that an excellent choice for this post would be Dr. Vallarta.

There was general agreement that General McNaughton would take the initiative on tomorrow’s meeting to move the adoption of a proce-
dure along the lines he had discussed earlier. It was generally agreed also that Dr. Vallarta or Dr. Nervo would be our candidates for deputy chairman.

The meeting adjourned at 4:15 PM.

R. Gordon Arneson

SPA Files

Memorandum by the Associate Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs (Blaisdell)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 2, 1946.

SD/S/727

Proposal by the Soviet Delegation to the Military Staff Committee "The Purpose of United Nations Armed Forces To Be Placed at the Disposal of the Security Council by the Member Nations of the United Nations"

Views of the Department of State

1. This memorandum sets forth the views of the Department of State on the proposal advanced on September 18, 1946 to the Military Staff Committee by the Soviet Delegation entitled "The Purpose of United Nations Armed Forces To Be Placed at the Disposal of the Security Council by the Member Nations of the United Nations." An expression of opinion by the Acting Representative of the United States on the Security Council was requested by the representatives of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Military Staff Committee in a memorandum of September 18, 1946 from Dennis W. Knoll, Secretary, United States Delegation to the Military Staff Committee, to Mr. Herschel V. Johnson. Comment of the Department was requested in a memorandum of September 19, 1946 from J. W. Scott to Joseph E. Johnson. The views presented in the present memorandum are for the use and guidance of the Acting United States Representative on the Security Council in complying with the

77 At its 7th Meeting, October 8, Committee 2 accepted the Canadian proposal that it conduct informal meetings on subjects considered in the Committee 3 report; regarding the nature of the meetings which occurred between October 15 and the end of the month, see Hewlett and Anderson, p. 607.

78 Dr. Manuel Sandoval Vallarta, Mexican Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission.

79 For text, see footnote 53, p. 915.

80 Not printed.

81 Joseph W. Scott of the Division of International Security Affairs.
request of the representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the
Military Staff Committee.\textsuperscript{83}

2. The Department is of the opinion that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
representatives on the Military Staff Committee should take the posi-
tion that in the absence of a specific directive from the Security Coun-
cil, the Soviet proposal is not an appropriate matter for the Military
Staff Committee or its subcommittees to deal with.

3. The Department is further of the opinion that if the Soviet
representatives in the Military Staff Committee and its subcommit-
tees consider that the establishment of the principles embodied in the
Soviet proposal or of modifications of those principles is a prerequi-
site to the formulation of the principles of organization of the United
Nations forces or is a prerequisite to the adoption by the Military
Staff Committee of a draft standard form of agreement concerning
the provision of armed forces for submission to the Security Council,
the matter should be referred to the Security Council without delay.

4. The Department holds the views expressed in paragraphs 2 and 3
above because the Soviet proposal does not deal primarily with the
military aspects of the purpose or employment of the armed forces to
be made available to the Security Council or with the principles of
organization of those forces. In addition, the proposal, in effect, con-
stitutes interpretations of Charter provisions dealing with the au-
thority of the Council to employ such armed forces and thus raise
questions of a political nature. The Military Staff Committee is
charged, both under Article 47 of the Charter and under Section II (c)
of the Revised Draft Statute (MS/87),\textsuperscript{84} with responsibility for ad-
vising and assisting the Security Council on questions relating to the
“employment” of forces placed at its disposal. But it appears to be
clear from the provisions of Article 47 and of the Draft Statute that
unless otherwise directed by the Security Council the Military Staff
Committee should, so far as concerns matters relating to the employ-
ment of these forces, deal only with matters related to the military
aspects of that employment.

\textsuperscript{83} The Ad Hoc Committee on Military and Security Functions of the United
Nations Organization discussed the Soviet proposal at its 13th Meeting, Septem-
ber 26. It was agreed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State
should transmit parallel instructions to their representatives in New York based
on consensus achieved at that meeting. (SWGCC Files) The present document
was forwarded by Mr. Hiss to the Delegation in New York on October 3 as the
tentative position of the Department, and transmitted by the Acting United
States Representative at the United Nations to the U.S. Representatives on the
MSC on October 10. The JCS despatched instructions to the U.S. Representatives
on the MSC on October 8 which were substantially the same as those contained
in the present document. The JCS instructions were circulated among the U.S.
Representatives as USMS/50/12 and in the State-War-Navy Coordinating Com-
mitee in SWGCC 219/14. (IO Files)

\textsuperscript{84} Not printed.
5. The Department holds the further view that if the members of the Subcommittee on Principles of Organization, other than the Soviet member, fail to support the position taken by the United States representative in accordance with the position set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff representatives should obtain further instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff before adopting any substantially different position.

6. The adoption of the position set forth in paragraph 2, 3, and 5 above with respect to the Soviet proposal would necessitate similar action with respect to proposals concerning the purpose of United Nations armed forces or any other matters outside the terms of reference employed by the Security Council in directing the Military Staff Committee “as its first task to examine from the military point of view the provisions in Article 43 of the Charter” which may appear in papers submitted by other members of the Military Staff Committee.

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Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by Dr. Richard C. Tolman to Mr. John M. Hancock

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] October 4, 1946.

Subject: Immediate cessation of bomb manufacture

1. In accordance with your request I am transmitting herewith an analysis of certain points with reference to the question of immediate cessation of bomb manufacture.

2. The principal argument given for the immediate cessation of bomb manufacture by the United States is that such action would demonstrate the sincerity of our desire to outlaw the use of this weapon, and would thus contribute to a better atmosphere and to better prospects of success for the UNAEC negotiations.

3. Such an action would certainly be regarded by some persons and for some length of time as a demonstration of sincerity, but it is not clear that it would contribute either to the success of the negotiations or to the security of the world.

4. Doubts as to whether we had really ceased bomb manufacture would soon be spread. On the one hand this would impair confidence in our sincerity. On the other hand it would emphasize the need for inspection which we believe to be an essential part of international control.

5. Rumors would be circulated that we already had a sufficient stock pile of bombs so that the cessation of bomb manufacture was meaningless.

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*Members of the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission.*
6. Demands might soon be made for destruction of existing bombs, disposition of existing fissionable material, and discontinuance of the manufacture of further fissionable material. This last would in time have a bad effect on development for peaceful uses.

7. Resumption of bomb manufacture after a specified time, or on approaching breakdown of negotiations would have a serious adverse effect on international relations.

8. Many nations would lose the sense of security that they now derive from the U.S. possession of the bomb and would cease to support U.S. positions.

9. U.S. bargaining position for a system of international control would probably be weakened.

10. Timing of cessation of bomb manufacture and disposition of existing bombs are appropriate items for inclusion in treaty.

11. U.S. security would be adversely affected at a time when demobilization of armed forces has already been great.

RICHARD C. TOLMAN

740.00119 Council/10–846: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, in Paris

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 8, 1946—7 p.m.

5378. Secdel 1075. 1. In view of our repeatedly stated position that GA may discuss any topic within the scope of the Charter and because its scope of discussion is thus wider than that of SC, we believe we should not oppose addition to GA Agenda of Soviet proposal re presence of forces of states members of UN on territories of non-enemy countries (re Dept's 5321, October 5).

2. Under GA rules all proposed Agenda items are passed upon by GA. Consequently, our position does not have to be taken definitively until GA convenes. However, we recommend that in order to make our position clear as well as to minimize risk of having Soviet proposal debated in its present form, we should promptly inform SYG our intention to move for a revision of the Soviet proposal or, if necessary, to propose a new Agenda item to include the question of troops of UN

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Repeated to New York as telegram 231.

In a letter to the Secretary General, October 3, the Soviet Delegation requested that the question of the presence of troops of United Nations members on non-enemy territory be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly; for text, see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, Second Part, First Committee, p. 332. Telegram 5321, not printed, informed the Secretary of State of the Soviet request. (740.00119 Council/10–546)

On October 7, Mr. Hiss and Senator Austin discussed the matter by telephone. Mr. Hiss indicated that in view of United States advocacy of freedom of discussion in the General Assembly the Department intended to recommend to Secretary Byrnes that the United States not oppose the placing of the item on the agenda. Senator Austin concurred. (740.00119 Council/10–546)
members in territories of non-member states (Dept’s telegram 4508, August 30), and that at the same time, we should request SYG to communicate notice of this intention to UN members. Our position should be determined promptly.

3. It is Dept’s view as well as that of War and Navy (Dept’s 4508, August 30) we should be willing to make available such information regarding US troops.

4. In view your prior consideration this matter with Bevin when proposed for SC consideration, you may wish to discuss it again with him. (Ur 4396, September 2)

ACHESON

Department of State Position Paper

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 14, 1946.

SD/S/734

BRITISH PROPOSAL TO MAKE THE WHOLE OF A NATION’S FORCES AVAILABLE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have requested the views of the Department of State on the following article which was proposed by the United Kingdom representatives on a subcommittee of the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations for inclusion in the Standard Form of Agreement concerning the size and composition of the armed forces to be made available to the Security Council:

"[Member Nation] guarantees to place, if requested by the Security Council, the whole of its national forces at the disposal of the Security Council so far as its other commitments and transport resources permit."

The Department of State holds the view that the United States should oppose the inclusion of this article in the Standard Form of Agreement. The reasons for holding this view are as follows:

1. The article would not be in agreement with United States law.

Section 6 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (Public Law 264-79th Congress) reads as follows:

"The President is authorized to negotiate a special agreement or agreements with the Security Council which shall be subject to the approval of the Congress by appropriate Act or joint resolution, providing for the numbers and types of armed forces, their degree of

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This paper was prepared in response to SWN-4744, September 14, p. 917. On November 27, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised the Department of State through the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee that the United States Representatives on the Military Staff Committee had been furnished guidance substantially as recommended in the present paper. (SWNCC Files)
readiness and general location, and the nature of facilities and assistance, including rights of passage, to be made available to the Security Council on its call for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security in accordance with article 43 of said Charter. The President shall not be deemed to require the authorization of the Congress to make available to the Security Council on its call in order to take action under article 42 of said Charter and pursuant to such special agreement or agreements the armed forces, facilities, or assistance provided for therein: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed as an authorization to the President by the Congress to make available to the Security Council for such purpose armed forces, facilities, or assistance in addition to the forces, facilities, and assistance provided for in such special agreement or agreements."

The wording of this section makes it clear that the special agreement to be entered into by the United States will have to be approved by Congress and that Congress expects the agreement to mention a specific quantity of armed forces, any commitment beyond which would require further authorization by the legislative branch.

2. The article would be out of harmony with congressional opinion.

During conversations held on April 1, 1946 by representatives of the State Department with Senators Connally, Vandenberg, Austin and Thomas, it was the judgment of these Senators that the number of forces, and particularly of the ground forces, should be small; otherwise, the possibility of public disapproval was foreseen.

3. The article overvalues the effectiveness of the Charter from the security point of view.

As stated in SWNCC 219/9 (page 97, paragraph 3), the existence of the unanimity requirement makes it highly improbable that the Security Council will ever take action by armed forces. Action against any of the permanent members of the Security Council is practically impossible. The only conceivable action which the Security Council could take would be against small nations. It would, therefore, be unnecessary to place large forces at the disposal of the Security Council.

In making this proposal, the United Kingdom probably wished to strengthen the United Nations and to increase its prestige. The United Kingdom has not, however, proposed the abolition of the unanimity rule, which would appear to be a necessary condition to strengthening the United Nations in the way suggested in this article. However, if such is the intention, it would appear to be useless to attempt to strengthen the United Nations in such an indirect manner at this time. If, at some future date, it seems likely that the unanimity rule could be eliminated, the question of providing larger forces might then properly receive further consideration.

For these reasons, the Department of State is of the opinion that the United Kingdom proposal should be opposed by the United States.
The same view would apply to other proposals which provide for the placing of anything but limited and specific number of armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council.

The Department recognizes, however, that the Security Council in some conceivable situation might need more armed forces than were made available to it in the special agreements. With this thought in mind the present article 8 of the Draft Standard Form of Agreement was included. In order to meet the wishes of other Governments, the Department would not oppose the inclusion in this article of a clause by which the member states would undertake to consider a request for additional troops made by the Security Council as rapidly as is possible in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

It is, therefore, recommended that the Department should advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, if they concur in the above views, they may wish to instruct their representatives on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations as follows:

1. The U.K. proposals or any other proposals which would cause the member states to commit anything but a limited and specific number of armed forces to the Security Council should be opposed.

2. The reasons for this position should be explained informally to the other Delegations. An effort should be made to get the U.K. representatives on the Military Staff Committee to have this proposal withdrawn. If such an effort does not succeed, the Department should be informed through the U.S. representatives on the Security Council.

3. A clause might be included in the Draft Standard Form of Agreement making it obligatory for member states to consider a request made by the Security Council for additional troops as rapidly as is possible in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

A request should also be made to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to advise the Department if their representatives on the Military Staff Committee are instructed in the above sense.

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Memorandum by Mr. Franklin A. Lindsay* to the United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Baruch)

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] October 21, 1946.

On Saturday evening, October 19, Mr. Eberstadt, Dr. Herring,** and I dined with Mr. Sobolev, Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations. The meeting was arranged through Herring with the purpose of establishing a point of contact with the Russian

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* Staff member, United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission.
** Edward Pendleton Herring, Secretary, Atomic Energy Commission.
Government in addition to the official contact established through Gromyko.

Sobolev began the discussion by asking why we refused to stop bomb production. He stated that we would still have our plants, personnel, and technical skill, and could start again at any time as we had an absolute monopoly at the present time. He acknowledged that the use of the bomb was “possibly” decisive in the Japanese war. But he asked what purpose we could possibly have for more bombs at this time. He felt that in the present international situation that our continued production was an unstabilizing force in the world and made more difficult the conclusion of any international agreements or understandings. Sobolev stated that he based his statement that we were continuing bomb production on press reports.

Mr. Eberstadt stated that approximately six weeks ago he had come to the conclusion that the Soviet Government did not wish to reach an agreement for the international control of atomic energy. He had gone over all of Gromyko’s statements on the subject, as well as various articles which had been written expressing the Soviet viewpoint. He found in these objections to the American Plan no insurmountable obstacles, with the exception of our provision for international inspection and control. That seemed to be completely unacceptable to the Soviet Government.

Sobolev replied that the United States plan was in essence a plan for world government. The world, he stated, was not ready for world government. The Soviets, themselves, had attempted a similar proposal in 1927, but this proposal had been rejected by the world as attempting to go too far too fast.  

He asked whether or not we thought that the American Senate would approve a proposal for world government.

Mr. Eberstadt replied that he thought the Senate would probably not approve a proposal labeled “World Government”, but he did think a proposal such as ours, designed to accomplish specific objectives, could be passed by the Senate.

Sobolev stated that the question of world government had also been examined at Dumbarton Oaks and in San Francisco, and had been rejected on the grounds that the world was not ready for it.

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Litvinov had made a proposal for complete and immediate disarmament, offered at the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission for Disarmament, at Geneva, on November 30, 1927. For proceedings of this session, see League of Nations, Documents of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference Entrusted with the Preparation for the Conference for the Reduction and Limitations of Armaments, Series 1 (C667.M.225.1927.IX), p. 11.

For documentation concerning the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. 1, pp. 713 ff.

Mr. Eberstadt brought up the Kuh article which had appeared in "PM". He felt that perhaps this article expressed legitimate cause for concern on the part of the Soviets. Sobolev did not indicate that he was the source for this article, but showed great interest in whether or not we considered it to be a legitimate article.

We attempted to demonstrate to him that our proposals in no way would be directed unfairly against the economic development of Russia. Mr. Eberstadt stated that an initial division of plants might be agreed to in the treaty, and that additional plants might be constructed only upon approval of the Security Council with the veto intact. This would make it possible for the Russians to veto our further use of atomic power as well as our vetoing of their expansion. Thus, the American Proposals would apply equally to both nations.

Sobolev replied that the Soviet Union was not seeking equality, but, rather, freedom to pursue its own policies in complete freedom and without any interference or control from the outside. He made at this point rather an oblique reference to two previous attempts which had been made by foreign nations to deprive the Russian people of their freedom, both of which had failed.

Sobolev said that he had been trained as an engineer, and that he knew engineering projects of this type could not be allocated on purely political considerations, as a great many factors were required to provide adequate conditions for the construction of plants. If those conditions did not exist, it would not be possible to construct plants allocated by political means.

Sobolev further stated that the United States at this time had a tremendous advantage. We had all of the plants already and the skill to operate them, and all the subsidiary industrial potential to support such a complex project. It was inconceivable that any of this would be torn down.

Sobolev then returned to his argument for stopping bomb production. Mr. Eberstadt stated that we were perfectly willing to stop bomb production as a stage in the transition to ultimate international control. However, the final stage of international control must be provided for and agreed to before we would stop bomb production. He stated that although he did not know the official United States position on this, he would be prepared to argue the point with his Government for making cessation of bomb production the very first step in the transition stage. This would be done immediately upon signing of a satisfactory treaty. However, it would be futile to even consider such a program without adequate guaranties on the part of other nations. The American people would not support such a move and without such support the Government could not conceivably take such action.
He referred to the joint declaration of foreign ministers which envisaged an international control agency and controls sufficiently effective to protect complying states in the event of violations. He did not know what the Soviet interpretation of this declaration was, but the American interpretation was that it certainly required effective and international control. [I cannot recall any reply that was made by Sobolev to this statement.]

Herring at this point suggested a possible compromise in which the initial disposal of plants would be provided for in the treaty in return for acceptance by the Russians of international inspection of the plant or plants located in their territory. Any nation would be perfectly free to construct additional plants at its own expense and where it desired, provided that it submitted to inspection. I stated that I doubted that such a proposal would provide for the minimum of security which we believe to be essential. I suggested, however, that the problem of inequality in requirements for power plants, which would cause a corresponding inequality in military potential, might be circumvented at least in part by permitting nations which did not desire to construct plants up to the agreed international quota to hold stocks of fissionable material equivalent to the working stocks that would be required in such plants. In this way they would be able to preserve their proportionate military potential.

Mr. Eberstadt suggested an alternate plan in which an initial quota of plants would be distributed throughout the world, and that construction of future plants would be up to Security Council approval. He emphasized, however, that he was speaking as an individual and that he had no idea whether such a proposal would be acceptable to his Government. Sobolev made no comment on either of these statements.

Sobolev again returned to the aspect of international control and repeated that the U.S. proposals were too ambitious, and that it was completely impossible for the Russians to accept them. He suggested the only possible way would be by slow stages as the world became more ready for international world government. He suggested that stopping of bomb production would be a first step, but that further steps could not be agreed upon now or could even be foreseen. He thought that it might be that after a period of years a situation could possibly be reached which would be quite similar to the situation envisaged by the U.S. proposals, but reiterated that our ultimate conditions could not possibly be accepted at the present time. He did,

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65 Brackets appear in the original.
however, suggest that the compromise proposal suggested by Eberstadt and Herring might be the subject of discussion between Molotov and Byrnes while both are in New York. He stated that he thought Molotov would not take the initiative in such discussions, and that Byrnes would have to bring up the subject. Eberstadt asked who else he thought should be present at those discussions. Sobolev replied that at least at first no one besides those two should be present.

Mr. Eberstadt remarked that he thought it might have been a mistake to bring the United States and Soviet proposals into the Commission without having previously discussed them privately. Sobolev made no comment.

At one point in the conversations, Sobolev referred to the anti-Soviet attitude of the American press. He stated that the figure of ten million men in Russian concentration camps was ridiculous. He stated that the United States would not believe officially-published statistics of the Russian Government. He said that it was true the Russians were planning to build a Navy, but with the industrial potential of the country it should be perfectly obvious to us that the size of the Navy could not possibly approach the size of the American Navy in the foreseeable future.

He stated that the current 5-Year Plan had been interpreted in this country as a war plan. The reason for the emphasis on basic steel production was not for war purposes, but to rebuild the railways and bridges that had been destroyed during the war.

Eberstadt brought up the question of the Red Army. Sobolev replied the figures quoted in the American press for the size of the Russian Army were fantastic, that the size of the Russian Army could be obtained by anyone from official Russian statements. For example, they had announced that they had already demobilized 20 classes. He inferred that the size of the Red Army could be determined by such information. He summed up this part of the discussion by saying that the United States knew fully as much about Russia as Russia knew about the United States.

The discussion ended with a reiteration by Sobolev that he spoke only for himself and did not speak as a Soviet official.

 ремонт:

This is by far the frankest discussion with a Soviet official in which I have participated. Based on my previous work with the Russians, I believe it to be an accurate statement of official Soviet policy.

I believe the main conclusions which can be drawn from the talk are:

1. The Russians are most anxious to get us to stop bomb production, temporarily, at least. They probably think that if they can get us to
stop production now they can use pressure of public opinion to prevent resumption of production later.

2. Stopping bomb production will in no way induce the Russians to accept any form of international inspection and control, the real obstacle to agreement.

3. The statement that the Soviet Union does not desire equality, but requires unlimited freedom to pursue its own policies, strongly indicates that no general understanding based on mutual trust and cooperation is possible between the two systems of government.

4. The proposal for discussions between Molotov and Byrnes was probably prompted by the hope that the Russians might get some concession from us, rather than by a desire to try to reach a general agreement.

The Soviet government is confronted with two alternatives:

a. To conclude an agreement which will mean world government in a limited and specific field, a system which might result in serious changes in their internal social and political structure.

b. Accept no international dominion of any sort; accept for the time being the superiority of the United States in atomic weapons; try to neutralize this superiority by all possible methods; and wait for the “inevitable” crack-up of capitalism.

We can only achieve success by making the second alternative more undesirable to them than the first.

FRANKLIN A. LINDSAY

501.BB/10-2146

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss)

[WASHINGTON,] October 21, 1946.

Participants: Mr. D. D. Maclean, First Secretary of the British Embassy
Mr. Alger Hiss

Mr. Acheson informed me Friday evening\(^*\) that the Secretary had agreed with the recommendation made to him by the Department in Secdel 1075 of October 8\(^*\) that we should not oppose the addition of the above item to the General Assembly agenda but instead should move for a clarification of it to ensure the inclusion of Austria as a

\(^*\) October 18.
\(^*\) Ante, p. 932.
non-enemy state and also for its expansion to cover troops in ex-enemy states. Mr. Acheson agreed that the British Embassy should be notified promptly of our views and that the Delegation in New York should be instructed not to notify the Secretary General of our intentions until after giving the British advance notice. Mr. Acheson suggested that we might simply notify the British that we intended to send our notification to the Secretary General on Tuesday or Wednesday and were giving the British advance information because of their interest in the matter.

Accordingly I informed Mr. Maclean of the British Embassy last Saturday of our intentions and pointed out that we were giving consideration to making public our own troop dispositions in the course of the Assembly discussion, probably at an early date in the particular committee to which the matter would be referred.

Mr. Maclean thanked me for this information and said he would immediately communicate it to London. He added that he thought our plans would be viewed with concern in London although he recognized the differences between the limited jurisdiction of the Security Council and the general authority of the General Assembly to discuss all subjects.

This morning Mr. Maclean called to say that the Embassy had received a preliminary reply on this subject which stated that the Foreign Office is giving urgent consideration to the problem which they regard as a joint problem since the Russian’s initiative in their opinion is aimed at the United States and Britain. Mr. Bevin had expressed the hope that we would not make our communication to the Secretariat until we had heard further from him. Mr. Maclean assured us that their further views would be forthcoming shortly. He added that the Ambassador was being instructed to take the matter up directly with the Secretary.68

Mr. Maclean said that in view of what I had said on Saturday, namely, that we do not contemplate communicating our views to the Secretary General until Tuesday or Wednesday that he assumed we would be able to wait a short time further until Mr. Bevin’s further views had been received. I assured Mr. Maclean this was the situation.

68 The file copy of the present document is accompanied by the following handwritten chit, addressed by Mr. Byrnes to Mr. Hiss, which is date-stamped Office of Special Political Affairs October 21, 1946: “Bevin asks we do not talk to Lie about Soviet Resolution as to armed forces until he communicates with me. I have told Ambassador would delay action but urged that he advise me promptly.”
Paraphrase of a Telegram Received from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, of October 23rd 1946

"I have been considering the line to be taken in the General Assembly in answering the Soviet item on Allied troops abroad. To my mind the over-riding consideration is that in no circumstances can we admit the obligation to disclose all our troop strengths and dispositions abroad. It would be disastrous to reveal at the present time the exact strength and composition of our forces abroad, for the reasons I explained to Mr. Byrnes in Paris. Furthermore to agree under any circumstances that the General Assembly has a right to this information would establish a precedent consequences of which would require to be carefully thought out. Once the figures of service strengths overseas are given to the United Nations, there is nothing to stop a recurring request by the General Assembly or Security Council for the figures to be brought up to date. In other words every replacement or reequipment of land and air units overseas and every movement of naval units outside home waters might have to be notified. Powers with a high proportion of air and naval forces and scattered bases would have far more to lose by publicity of this sort than a land power depending mainly on an army inside its own frontiers, such as the Soviet Union.

2. "Similar objections apply to the idea of extending the proposal to cover enemy territories. It is quite possible that Monsieur Molotov would jump at this offer and provide figures whose accuracy, although it might well be highly dubious, we should have no means of checking. In exchange the whole world would know the precise strength of British and United States forces in Germany and Austria, as well as elsewhere, which it is certainly not in our common interest to divulge at the present time.

3. "For these reasons I cannot take any line in the Assembly which, even if the Russians turned the item down when extended to cover enemy territories, would admit the obligation to disclose our troop

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The source text bears the following marginal notation by Mr. Hiss: "Left (in single copy) with Mr. Hiss by Mr. Maclean 3: 45 p.m. 12/23 [1943]." The source text is accompanied by the following handwritten chit directed by Mr. Cohen to Mr. Acheson: "You will be interested in the enclosed note from Bevin. When you have finished reading it, please give it to Mr. Beams [R. Borden Beams, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State] to bring to the Secretary's attention immediately on his return from N. Y.

"My thought is that we might let the Russian proposal for the agenda go on as submitted and hold our amendment until the matter comes up in the Committee after the item has gone on the agenda."

Regarding discussion of the issue by Maclean and Cohen at the time of the delivery of the note, see Mr. Acheson's memorandum to Mr. Byrnes, October 26, p. 966.
dispositions abroad. Even the Military Staff Committee, if it were a united and effective body, would still not be entitled to have this information beyond what is required for Article 43, and it seems to me out of the question to concede the point at the present time.

4. "I quite agree that the difference in procedure between the Security Council and the General Assembly makes it impossible to keep the Soviet item off the Assembly agenda, as was done in the Security Council. Apart from this, however, I would propose to take much the same line as was taken then, namely that this is a Soviet propaganda move, that British troops abroad are not a menace to peace and security and that nobody seriously believes they are. I am of course assuming, as I think is bound to be the case, that the Soviet spokesman in the Assembly will take essentially the same line as Monsieur Gromyko took in the Security Council. I understand that Article 11 will be invoked in the Assembly and this Article, though more widely drawn, seems to give as much scope for such a Soviet line as Article 34 did in the Security Council. I should then observe that the Soviet item specifically excludes those countries who cannot speak for themselves and yet have to bear the burden of a quite excessive number of Soviet troops. I should also point out that if any Government feel aggrieved it is up to them to raise the question for themselves.

5. "I cannot be certain that a motion exonerating British and United States troops would get a clear two-thirds majority as there might be a number of abstentions. On the other hand, it is most unlikely that a Soviet motion on the lines of their Security Council argument would get a two-thirds majority. Our tactics should therefore be to get them to propose a motion which, provided the United States and United Kingdom delegates take a similar line, we should have no difficulty in defeating."

Mr. Bevin very much hopes that Mr. Byrnes will agree with the foregoing and with the course of action suggested. If he does not Mr. Bevin hopes Mr. Byrnes will make no move until he has had an opportunity of discussing the matter further with him on his arrival in New York.

[WASHINGTON,] October 23, 1946.

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501.BC Atomic/10-2446

Mr. Fred Searls, Jr., of the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission, to the Secretary of State

NEW YORK, October 24, 1946.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: You will have heard from Mr. Baruch, who has also reported to the President, the status of negotiations within
the Atomic Energy Commission and the high lights of efforts that have been made during your absence. No doubt, you have already formed some opinion as to the degree of success likely to attend further attempts at a unanimous agreement to a treaty, or recommendations to the Security Council.

It is assumed very generally indeed, not only by Mr. Wallace and the Communist-scientist group, but by almost everyone else who has spoken or written on "The Atomic Bomb," that failure to reach an agreement by the Atomic Energy Commission or some other creature of the United Nations, means acceleration of an atomic armament race, which most—but not all—of the writers and speakers believe will lead to war. Laurence of California,\(^1\) who is one of the realists, suggests that if the Russians do not soon agree, we should increase production of fissionable material, speed up the program for bases and B-36 planes, and in effect give notice that we are the future police force of the Security Council.

However, my efforts in trying to assist Mr. Baruch have been chiefly in the field of "raw materials" and the contacts I have had with the Russians, particularly with Alexandrov,\(^2\) and with the Manhattan District activities, convince me that there is perhaps another, less openly belligerent route that we can follow—indeed are following—which, if handled with great wisdom and not made subject to interference by radicals, can accomplish years of delay in competitive atomic weapon production, even if the Atomic Energy Commission fails of agreement.

This procedure of growing importance lies in the field of continuation and stimulation of preclusive and cooperative contracting in the field of raw materials, particularly, of course, of the ores of uranium and thorium but also of some other metals.

I know that, as a member of the Combined Policy Committee,\(^3\) you are familiar with the May 13th and previous agreements and, generally speaking, with the activities of the Combined Development Trust.\(^4\)

These activities have been of great importance but, if the Atomic Energy Commission fails, it appears to me that they may become of surpassing importance. It is, therefore, of the very greatest interest that they shall remain in the most competent hands.

The attitude, questions, desires, and general behavior of the Russians, of which I can give you details, support intelligence reports of declarations by Alexandrov at Bikini of the lack by them of workable high-grade deposits, and references to their consequent feverish activity in development of processes for treatment of their abundant very

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\(^1\) Presumably Ernest O. Lawrence of the University of California, inventor of the cyclotron and participant in Manhattan Engineer District.

\(^2\) Mr. S. P. Alexandrov, Adviser, Soviet Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission.

\(^3\) See footnote 14, p. 1205.

\(^4\) See footnote 15, p. 1205.
low-grade ore. It now seems to me that it may well be ten years before they can become possessed of an adequate supply, if we can prevent their obtaining it from other countries. Ten years may well mean everything in relations with the Russians since, surely, it is only a question of time before internal opinions will force a change in their government’s behavior to its own people and to foreign nations.

What I am afraid of is that this most delicate and important series of negotiations will fall into the wrong hands. So far, I think it has been very well done; but if the Atomic Energy Commission fails, it will need to be expanded wisely and promptly, particularly in the thorium field, and particularly in Asia and the East Indies. It is for this reason that I asked Donald Russell to send Bain of the Manhattan District with the delegation to the London Tin Conference.

It will be a tragedy if, just at the time this activity needs the greatest care and wise expansion, it becomes a bureaucratic prize, or subject to change of policy and public criticism or even knowledge because of ideological theories. This can easily happen, and probably will happen, if wrong appointments are made to the commission created by the McMahon Bill. As you doubtless know, the transfers agreed to by the Combined Policy Committee by the compromise agreement of May 13th have been held up until the new commission is appointed and acts. It is certain, even required, that the new commission will have “cognizance” (in the naval sense of the word) of all of the Combined Trust’s activities, even in dealing with foreign countries.

Nothing has been made quite so clear in the discussions of the Atomic Energy Commission as that no nation is willing to surrender actual ownership of deposits of these ores. With the possible exception of the United States, it is, I believe, indisputable now that all nations will vigorously resist any attempt to have an international agency actually take over ownership and operation of such deposits. One by one, the delegations of Canada, Brazil, Australia, France, United Kingdom, and China have expressed their relief at our willingness to depart in this respect from the original proposals of the Acheson-Lilienthal report. There is clearly distinguishable to anyone now engaged in the metal business, a new interest and growing determination on the part of all nations to regard as essential to sovereignty all metal deposits—not only metals with the very high atomic numbers—but all metals. As C. K. Leith says, there is little metal crossing the water these days, save by government action or, at least, with government approval.

The most stubborn advocate of international ownership of atomic energy ores has been Lilienthal. If surrounded and encouraged by other left-wingers ..., I think we can probably fold up the new-

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*Donald S. Russell, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration.

*Charles K. Leith, a United States trustee, Combined Development Trust.
born hope that little by little we can draw other nations in with the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, to form a group that will control atomic energy through possession of such an overwhelming proportion of the raw materials, that those nations left without the circle must pay the price of admission—real arrangements for permanent peace—or, failing that, realize that they will be hopelessly behind in an atomic energy race for many years to come.

I do not say that this is a permanent solution. There is too much uranium and thorium available for that. But it may well provide a delay of many years beyond the date, at which the Russians can make an atomic bomb or two. I am convinced they already know how to make them, and that they are bending every effort to get the material for many of them; but if the work initiated by the District and furthered by the Trust is let alone and wisely handled, it could provide the way to peace.

And it may be wise to include certain other metals in such a program. There are several others important in the peaceful application of atomic energy; and there are others still that will be needed, beyond the limits of stockpiles plus production, when the next war comes. In view of the growing importance of raw materials, it would be well if one member of the new commission were a man like Leith or some younger man, approved by Groves, who is experienced and informed on this subject.

It is not evident that Mr. Baruch has so far been successful in exercising influence in the choice of the members of the new commission and, while my fears may be founded on rumor, I think the importance warrants the anxiety. Could you yet get Baruch another hearing, or intervene yourself, or, if it is too late for that, could you get a Presidential edict, to which the appointees must accede before their appointment, which would be so worded as to leave this raw material program heading up to you and Patterson and Forrestal? If something is not done, I fear we may throw away one of our best approaches to the solution of an important segment of the world’s difficulties.

Respectfully,

Fred Searls, Jr.

501.BB/10-2646

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 26, 1946.

Subject: Russian Proposal with Respect to Troops in Non-Enemy States

There is attached hereto the memorandum from Mr. Bevin* which I mentioned to you on the telephone the evening of Wednesday,

*Ante, p. 962.
October 23, while you were still in New York. The British Embassy, in leaving it with us, emphasized that it was a personal message from Mr. Bevin for you.

Also on Wednesday, General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson of the British Joint Chiefs of Staff mission left a similar memorandum at General Eisenhower's office (the General was not available). General Norstad* immediately informed us of this and said that he was sure the General would wish to afford the British Joint Chiefs the courtesy of hearing General Wilson's arguments. General Norstad said that as our Joint Chiefs would be meeting on Friday, October 25, he would see that the British representations were made by then and a Joint Chiefs' decision reached this week. Meanwhile he knew that General Eisenhower would wish to recommend to the Department that no action be taken by us in New York until General Wilson's presentation of the British views had been obtained. In the light of my conversations with you, General Norstad was assured that we would take no action prior to your return next Monday.

On Friday, October 25, we learned that General Eisenhower had told General Wilson that he had never thought that military considerations were involved in the issue, and that after Mr. Churchill's inquiry in the House of Commons about total Soviet forces outside of Russia he thought the British had no case at all. We were told that the Joint Chiefs will make no further recommendation to the Department, which means they were not impressed by any military aspects of General Wilson's arguments.

Our Delegation in New York was also informed on the evening of Wednesday, October 23, that they should take no action on this matter until further communication to them following your return next week. They were also told that the British will not oppose the item going on the agenda and, of course, neither should our Delegation.

The British Embassy was also informed on Wednesday evening, October 23, that we would take no action in New York until your return next week.

The British Embassy has informed us that Mr. Bevin is sailing on the Aquitania on Saturday, October 26, and is due to arrive in New York the following Saturday, November 2. It is quite possible that as early as Wednesday or Thursday, October 30 and 31, the Soviet proposal will be taken up for discussion in Committee 1 (Political and Security) on which Senator Connally is our representative. The Delegation has, not unnaturally, been pressing us for our position on this subject. If it is raised for formal discussion in committee before you have a chance to confer with Mr. Bevin it may be embarrassing unless Senator Connally is authorized to take a definite position either of

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simple opposition to the Soviet motion or of proposing an amendment to include ex-enemy states. Having this in mind, Mr. Cohen observed to Mr. Maclean of the British Embassy, when Mr. Maclean brought in Mr. Bevin’s personal message to you on Wednesday, October 23, that while in response to Mr. Bevin’s request you might (as in fact you did a few hours later) be able to agree that we would take no affirmative action before the General Committee or in plenary sessions of the Assembly when the agenda was being adopted, other than to support the inclusion of the Russian item on the agenda, it might be necessary for us to propose our amendment to the Russian proposal if the subject came up in committee before Mr. Bevin’s arrival here. This warning has been communicated to Mr. Bevin by the British Embassy.

The British Embassy have informed us that in view of the considerations set forth in the preceding paragraph their delegation in New York will seek to postpone consideration of the Russian proposal in Committee I until after Mr. Bevin’s arrival. We have informally asked our delegation not to oppose such a British proposal. (In view of the British Embassy’s request that their representations be regarded as top secret, we have not informed our delegation on this point and have merely said that you were personally considering our position). On the basis of our latest information from New York, we think that other items now on Committee I’s agenda will keep the issue from arising until after Mr. Bevin’s arrival. If it should arise, a British proposal for postponement would almost certainly be accepted.

In view of the foregoing I should like to recommend that you promptly send the attached wire to Mr. Bevin on the Aquitania stating that as he knows you were glad in response to his request to drop our intention to take positive action in the General Committee or in plenary sessions of the Assembly and that you will be glad to confer with him about the matter upon his arrival, but that in the unlikely event the Russian proposal is raised in committee before he arrives, you feel it necessary to instruct our Delegation to propose an amendment of the proposal expanding it to cover ex-enemy states. The British Embassy has facilities for sending messages in code to Mr. Bevin on the Aquitania. I also recommend that a day or so later the Delegation be authorized to propose our broadening amendment if the proposal comes before Committee I before you communicate further with them, and that in talking to other Delegations who may inquire as to our views and in response to press inquiries, the Delegation should say that we consider the Russian proposal one-sided inasmuch as it does not cover troops in ex-enemy states.

You may be interested in the attached extract from a summary of
press comments on our action in the Security Council when we opposed the same Russian proposal.\footnote{The summary of press comments is not printed.}

[Annex]

Draft Message From Secretary Byrnes To Be Sent to Foreign Minister Bevin Aboard the Aquitania

I have carefully considered the message which you sent to me on October 23 about the Soviet item on allied troops abroad. In view of your problems on this subject I was glad, as a result of your request that we take no action until you and I have an opportunity of discussing the matter further, to give up our plan of promptly informing the Assembly that we favor amending the Soviet proposal to include troops in ex-enemy states. I will, of course, be very glad to discuss this whole matter with you on your arrival but the course of events in the General Assembly may force us to state our position before you and I can confer further. Consequently, I want you to realize that in the unlikely event that this issue is raised for discussion in the appropriate committee of the General Assembly before you and I have been able to discuss the matter, our representative will state that we consider the Soviet proposal one-sided, inasmuch as it excludes the ex-enemy states, and will propose an amendment covering the ex-enemy states if an actual proposal along the lines of the Soviet thesis is presented to the committee.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Lincoln Gordon\footnote{Delivered to the British Embassy on October 28 for transmittal to Mr. Bevin; see Mr. Hiss’ memorandum, October 30, p. 978.}

SECRET

[NY,] October 28, 1946.

An informal discussion was held from 11 to 12:15 AM at Senator Austin’s office in the Hotel Pennsylvania\footnote{Staff member, United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission. The source text is labelled “rough draft;” however, no subsequent draft has been found in the files of the Department of State.} at which the following were present: Senator Austin, Mr. Charles Fahy, Mr. Jack Ross, Mr. Wilder-Foote of the General Assembly Delegation; Mr. Baruch, Mr. Eberstadt, Mr. Lindsay and Mr. Gordon of the AEC Delegation.

Senator Austin stated that, contrary to his earlier intention, he had
now decided to participate in the general debate in the plenary sessions of the General Assembly. His speech will come toward the close of these sessions. In his speech, he will state that the United States proposes any amendment at this time of the Security Council voting provisions as set forth in the Charter. The United States will favor clarification and interpretation of the intent and desirable practice, particularly with respect to the peaceful settlement of disputes under Chapter 6, so that the unanimity principles will not hinder the peaceful settlement of disputes under this Chapter.

The subject of atomic energy will come up in the speech in the context of a discussion of specialized agencies of the United Nations. The speech will stress the constructive activities of such agencies and the flexibility and breadth of the constitutional arrangement in their organizations. It will point out that the voting principles in the charters of these specialized agencies normally called for decision by two-thirds or simple majorities. In this connection, his speech will cite the proposal for an Atomic Development Authority as an example of the flexibility which is possible under the existing Charter. The ADA is to be given the necessary power to insure that atomic energy is developed only for peaceful purposes and to give protection for complying states against violations and evasions. These purposes, the speech will say, are in accord with the General Assembly resolution of last January setting up the Atomic Energy Commission.

At Mr. Eberstadt's suggestion, and after some discussion, it was agreed that a sentence or two would be inserted into the speech saying that the United States position on the Security Council voting principles is entirely consistent with the United States atomic energy proposals as set forth by Mr. Baruch, in connection with which Mr. Baruch has repeatedly stated that there is no intention to modify the general requirements of Great Power unanimity in the Security Council substantive decisions.

It was agreed that Senator Austin's position and ours are perfectly in accord on the voting question.

There ensued a discussion of the possibility of a debate in the General Assembly on the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and its future course of action. Mr. Baruch summarized for Senator Austin the substance of our progress report to the President of September 17, pointing out that after completion of the present discussion of controls, we would be faced with a clear choice and form of stalling on the one hand and bringing the basic questions of principles to a vote on the

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14 The "general debate" included inaugural statements of broad policy objectives by the heads of national delegations. This phase occurred immediately after the General Assembly organized itself.
15 For documentation regarding United States policy with respect to the question of voting in the Security Council, see pp. 251 ff.
other hand. Mr. Baruch stated that he favored the latter course. He had been awaiting instructions from the President on this matter for six weeks, and felt it of the highest importance that the President make a decision promptly. He felt that the decision should favor a clear decision on principles unless broad considerations of international policy, of which Mr. Baruch is not aware, dictate the other course. Mr. Baruch stressed the importance of a decision before the change in membership of the Atomic Energy Commission early in January. He indicated that Senator Austin might be faced with the necessity of saying something on this subject, either in the General Assembly or at a later time in the Security Council.

Senator Austin pointed out that the subject was not now on the Assembly agenda. He agreed that, if it were raised (as suggested by the British), he could say nothing of substance unless or until further instructions from the President had been forthcoming. Mr. Baruch indicated his concern that the initiative on this subject might be taken by other nations, and in particular the fear that great pressure might be exerted to adopt the Soviet proposal for a mere convention, on the ground that this is something that could be done immediately.

Mr. Eberstadt reviewed in some detail the progress of the negotiations to date and the manner in which the policy questions are likely to arise after completion of the present phase of discussion on the practicality of controls.

Mr. Fahy raised the question as to whether, before pressing the policy questions to a vote, it might be desirable to discuss the Russian position privately with Mr. Molotov. Mr. Eberstadt indicated agreement with the desirability of so doing, if the President and Secretary Byrnes should be in accord. Senator Austin also felt that it was most desirable that any change in the AEC program be discussed privately with the Russians in advance, and stated that he was making it a point to have such discussions with Mr. Vyshinski on questions of General Assembly procedure.

501BB/10-546: Telegram
The Secretary of State to Senator Austin
SECRET URGENT [WASHINGTON,] October 29, 1946—7 p.m.
253. USdel 648, Oct. 5. Re Soviet item presence of forces of states members of UN on territories of non-enemy states Delegation should

36 Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Soviet Representative to the General Assembly.
37 The source text includes the following marginal notation by Mr. Hiss, the drafting officer: "Cleared in substance with War & Navy Depts."
38 Not printed.
feel free to propose expansion of item so as to include forces in ex-
enemy states, if an actual proposal along lines of Soviet thesis is pre-
presented in the appropriate committee prior to further communication
from me or the Department. 29

We understand item is not likely to come up this week in committee
and that in event it does the British Delegation will move for postpone-
ment of consideration until Bevin’s arrival in view of his personal
interest in the matter. We have assured British Embassy you would
not oppose such postponement. 30 We do not regard our amendment as
requiring placing of a new item on the agenda and therefore do not
feel that proposed agenda deadline will adversely affect our freedom
of action.

It occurs to me that you may wish to tell other delegations and the
press, if inquiry is made of you, that we do not oppose open discussion
in the Assembly of the Soviet proposal but that we consider it one-
sided in as much as it does not cover ex-enemy states.

It does not seem to me that it would be wise for us to make dis-
closure of locations and strength of U.S. troops in advance or
in absence of the adoption by the GA of a resolution requesting such
information from members. You should, however, feel free to point
out that we have nothing to hide with regard to our forces abroad
and that in no case are our forces in friendly countries remaining there
against the consent of such countries. Our forces entered these coun-
tries to prosecute the war against our enemies and where they are
still present they are remaining for legitimate purposes growing out
of the end of hostilities. For your information, any resolution the
Assembly may adopt should not call for information as to troops
except in excess of 100 in any particular country as we see no useful
purpose that would be served in including such minor contingents. It
is also important that you make clear that we regard Austria as not
being an ex-enemy country.

BYRNES

[At the 42nd Meeting of the General Assembly, October 29, during
the general debate phase, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov delivered
an address dealing with a wide range of issues confronting the United
Nations. His remarks included criticism of the U.S. proposal for the

29 The U.S. Delegation discussed the matter briefly at its 12th Meeting, 9 a.m.,
October 29, but took no decisions with respect to it. The minutes of the meeting
include the following: “Senator Vandenberg stated that abstractly the Soviet
proposal certainly dealt with the maintenance of peace and security. To oppose
it would be fantastic. Since consideration of it could not be escaped, it should
be arranged in the way the United States wanted it to be. He continued that
it would be just as fantastic not to broaden the proposal.” (IO Files)

30 In regard to the position of the present telegram in the flow of events,
including discussions with the British Embassy, see the bracketed note infra, and
Mr. Hiss’ memorandum of October 30, p. 878.
international control of atomic energy. He also read the Soviet resolution on troop reporting which had been presented to the Security Council on August 29, expressed regrets that the Council had refused to place the matter on its agenda, and contended that “It is essential for the General Assembly to state its weighty opinion on this subject.” Molotov concluded by introducing a Soviet proposal on the general reduction of armaments which read as follows:

“1. With a view to strengthening peace and international security in conformity with the aims and principles of the United Nations, the General Assembly recognizes the necessity of a general reduction of armaments.

“2. The implementing of the decision concerning the reduction of armaments should include, as its primary object, the prohibition to produce and use atomic energy for military purposes.

“3. The General Assembly recommends that the Security Council should ensure the effective implementing of the principles laid down in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

“4. The General Assembly appeals to the governments of all the states to give to the Security Council all the assistance necessary to enable it to discharge its responsibilities arising out of this task, the achievement of which lies within the scope of its mission to establish an enduring peace and maintain international security. This task is also in the interest of the peoples who would be released from the heavy economic burden caused by the excessive expenditure on armaments which do not correspond to peaceful post-war conditions.”

For the full text of Molotov’s speech, see GA (1/2), Plenary, pages 832–847.

501.BB/10–2946 : Telegram

Senator Austin to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

URGENT

New York, October 29, 1946—11 p.m.

[Received 11:15 p.m.]

736. Personal for the Secretary. Following is the text suggested by Senator Vandenberg and Mr. Dulles which I read to you over the telephone. An alternative text will follow by separate telegram.

21 Arthur H. Vandenberg, United States Senator from Michigan; Representative to the General Assembly.

22 John Foster Dulles, Alternate United States Representative to the General Assembly.

23 This text was suggested for incorporation into Senator Austin’s address in the general discussion phase of the work of the General Assembly; it was anticipated that Senator Austin would be called upon to present the views of the United States on October 30.

The source text bears the following marginal notation by Mr. Hiss: “The Secretary talked by telephone directly to Senator Austin.”
"I refer in beginning to the brilliant speech yesterday of our distinguished colleague from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In the candor which is permissible between friends, I express my deep regret that he found it necessary to deal in implications and inexcuses aimed at the good faith of the Foreign Policy of the Government of the United States. This has been a far too consistent pattern throughout the discussions in recent months in Paris. It is not conducive to the peace climate for which we join him in pleading. I hope we may all find it advisable to avoid recriminations here. I repeat what was said by an American representative in the final Plenary Session of the recent Paris Conference who found it necessary to say: 'The United States will leave its motives to the verdict of history; it will not plead as a defendant among allies to whom it has given every ounce of cooperation, in blood and sweat and tears, of which a great and unselfish nation is capable.' That closes the chapter so far as we are concerned.

But now I am happy to open a new and brighter chapter. I want to say to Mr. Molotov that the United States warmly welcomes his proposal for an immediate study of universal disarmament—much the same proposal which Mr. Litvinoff offered to the League of Nations many years ago which included adequate international inspection. What he has said is of grave importance because he says it. Just as our American testimony is of paramount value in respect to the control of atomic energy because we are at the moment in possession of an atomic monopoly, so Soviet testimony is of paramount value in respect to other disarmament because they now maintain by far the greatest armies in all the world and keep them in occupation of many critical points in central Europe. We mean what we say when we tell the world that we would outlaw atomic bombs forever, anywhere, any time, any place on earth, and when, in return, we ask only for effective guarantees against bad faith. We accept Mr. Molotov's eloquent and sturdy interest in world disarmament as being in the same pattern of complete earnestness and purpose. We assume that he, too, would wish assurance that disarmament shall be totally protected by international inspection in all aspects against bad faith.

I can assure the distinguished Soviet statesman that the Government of the United States—long since a world pioneer in cooperative disarmament—will join with him enthusiastically in the exploration of such a proposal to take the tools of war from the arsenals of men."

AUSTIN

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24 See the bracketed note, supra.
25 The reference is to Senator Vandenberg's address at the 46th Plenary Meeting of the Paris Peace Conference, October 14; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, October 27, 1946, pp. 744-746. For additional documentation on United States policy at the Paris Peace Conference, see vols. III and IV.
Mr. John C. Ross, Adviser, United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET URGENT

New York, October 30, 1946—7 a.m.

[Received 8:12 a.m.]

727. Personal for the Secretary from Ross. Following is the alternative text Senator Austin said he would send to you.\textsuperscript{26} Senator Austin, who has not yet seen this draft, will discuss it with you at 9 this morning.\textsuperscript{27}

At the outset of what I have to say to the General Assembly I must refer briefly to the address made yesterday by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Parts of Mr. Molotov's speech indicated distrust and misunderstanding of the motives of the United States and of other members of the United Nations. I do not believe that recriminations among nations allied in war and in peace promote that unity which Mr. Molotov so rightly points out is essential to the success of the United Nations.

I shall not participate in any exchange of recriminations.

The policy of the United States speaks for itself. It was summed up by President Truman in fifteen words last week: “The United States will support the United Nations with all the resources that we possess.”\textsuperscript{28}

That policy the Soviet Union must surely understand for Mr. Molotov said virtually the same thing yesterday when he declared, “the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stands unshakeably for the respect of the United Nations organization and deems essential that its charter be honestly and consistently observed.” May I say on behalf of the United States that we warmly welcome this renewed assurance.

\textsuperscript{26} See telegram 726 October 29, from New York, supra., footnote 23 thereto, and the bracketed note on p. 972.

The present text was substantially incorporated into the initial portion of Senator Austin's statement delivered at the 44th Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, October 30, 4 p.m. Mr. Austin's remarks also included the following:

“The Government of the United States understands Mr. Molotov’s statement to mean that the Soviet Union is fully prepared to report on its armed forces in enemy states as well as in other foreign territories. Therefore, the United States urges prompt fulfillment of this policy. The United States has nothing to hide with regard to our armed forces at home or abroad. The United States will promptly fulfill that policy. In no case are the United States forces in friendly countries except with the consent of those countries.

“It is our opinion that the proposed inquiry should include all mobilized armed forces, whether at home or abroad.”

For the full text of Austin's address, see GA (1/2), Plenary, pp. 893-908.

\textsuperscript{27} The source text includes the following marginal comment by Mr. Hiss: “Taken up with the Secretary and discussed personally with Senator Austin.”

\textsuperscript{28} For the text of President Truman's address before the 34th Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, October 23, see GA (1/2), Plenary, pp. 682-689, or Department of State Bulletin, November 3, 1946, pp. 808-812.
We welcome especially the confidence expressed by Mr. Molotov that unanimous agreement among all the nations both large and small can be achieved on such vital matters as the control of atomic energy and on steps to lighten the burden of armaments and military expenditures which still rest so heavily upon the peoples of the world. It is hardly necessary for me, the representative of the United States, to say that my country supports wholeheartedly the objectives of the resolution Mr. Molotov introduced for the reduction of armaments. The United States believes that Mr. Molotov’s proposal should be placed on our agenda and fully considered and discussed. The initiative of the Soviet Union in this matter is appropriate, because of its mighty armies; just as the initiative of the United States was appropriate in proposing measures to prevent the manufacture and use of atomic weapons.

I recall to you the initiative taken by the United States at Washington in November 1945 in the conversations among President Truman, Prime Minister Attlee and Prime Minister MacKenzie King—at Moscow in December 1945 in the conversations between Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Bevin—in the Assembly last January when the resolution creating the Atomic Energy Commission and establishing its terms of reference was unanimously adopted—and since then in the work of the Commission itself where the distinguished United States representative, Mr. Bernard M. Baruch, has presented proposals expressing the policy of the President of the United States.

Nor does the United States stop there. As President Truman emphasized again last week we attach the greatest importance to reaching agreements that will remove the deadly fear of other weapons of mass destruction in accordance with the same resolution passed by this Assembly.

And I might add that Mr. Baruch pointed out last night that we are ready to accept the Soviet proposal to outlaw the bomb and destroy our present stock—but only as a part of the whole.

So far as Mr. Molotov’s resolution concerns the regulation and reduction of other armaments, the whole world knows where the United States stands and has always stood. For 20 years before the war and in the 15 months since the fighting stopped the United States has consistently been in the forefront of those striving to reduce the burden of armaments upon the peoples of the world. Since the end of the war in Europe and the Pacific the United States has progressively and rapidly reduced its military establishment.

After the last war we made one mistake. We disarmed unilaterally. We shall not repeat that mistake.

The United States is prepared to cooperate fully with any other member of the United Nations which is sincere devoted to the goal of disarmament. We cannot reduce armaments by talking about the “regulation of armaments and possible disarmament” or the “heavy economic burden caused by excessive expenditures for armaments”.

We can not achieve it without positive acts which will establish the "peaceful postwar conditions" to which Mr. Molotov also referred.

Nor can a system for the regulation of armaments and possible disarmament as contemplated in articles 11, 26, and 47 of the Charter be effectively planned except in relation to progress in the negotiation of the armed forces agreements called for by article 43. At the beginning of April, four of the five members of the Military Staff Committee made specific proposals concerning the principles which should govern the negotiation of these agreements. In September the Soviet Union submitted for the first time a statement of its views on the problem.

I am happy to note that Mr. Molotov referred to the work of the Military Staff Committee. I hope it will now be possible for this Committee to make rapid progress. The conclusion of these agreements, providing the Security Council with peace forces adequate to prevent acts of aggression, is essential to carrying out the objectives of Mr. Molotov's resolution for the reduction of armaments.

Mr. Molotov also referred to article 43 in connection with the Soviet proposal concerning the presence of armed forces of the United Nations on foreign territories. He said, "In this connection it is natural that the Security Council should know the actual situation, namely where and what armed forces of the United Nations are situated at present outside the confines of their countries... for its part the Soviet Union is prepared to submit this information to the Security Council."

The Government of the United States understands Mr. Molotov's statement to mean that the Soviet Union is fully prepared to report on its armed forces in ex-enemy states as well as in other foreign territories.

The United States has nothing to hide with regard to US armed forces abroad. In no case are United States forces in friendly countries except with the consent of those countries.

The United States welcomes wholeheartedly the statement of Mr. Molotov that "as to the Soviet Union there is no hesitation and doubt among our people that peace among nations, and peaceful competition between them, which also means the possibility of increasing friendly cooperation and understanding among big and small states, be entirely in keeping with the interests of our country... it reflects the firm will to achieve universal peace and readiness to enter into peaceful competition in the social and economic sphere between states and social systems."

That is exactly the position of the Government and people of the United States. Peaceful competition and friendly cooperation are words every American understands because they are fundamental in our system and in our attitude toward other nations and other systems. We are very happy to receive such definite assurances that the government and the people of the Soviet Union feel the same way.

Warren R. Austin.
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (His)

[WASHINGTON,] October 30, 1946.


After the Secretary had signed telegram 253 of October 29 to New York on the above subject, Mr. Ross and Senator Austin both talked to me on the telephone from New York about the Molotov speech. In connection with Molotov’s references to the Soviet proposal relating to troop dispositions, Mr. Ross and the Senator felt it was essential that the Senator say today in the General Assembly (or tomorrow if he is not reached before then) that the United States will accept the Soviet proposal if it is expanded to cover troops in ex-enemy states. I told Mr. Ross and the Senator that the Secretary had earlier in the evening signed a telegram on this subject prior to any information about the Molotov speech. This telegram, I said, restricted its authorization to a statement along the lines suggested by Mr. Ross and the Senator in committee if the Soviet proposal were raised in committee before further communication from the Secretary. I said that I would take up with the Secretary the question of whether, in view of Mr. Molotov’s speech, the Secretary would extend the authorization along the lines desired by Mr. Ross and the Senator.

I subsequently called the Secretary at his apartment and in the course of passing on to him other views of the Senator about the Molotov speech I mentioned the foregoing point. The Secretary said that the Senator should feel free to use the information contained in the telegram in his speech in the General Assembly. I then promptly communicated this information to Mr. Ross and the Senator in New York.

I also called Mr. Maclean of the British Embassy at his house and asked him to inform the Ambassador promptly this morning of the fact that after the Secretary had seen the Ambassador last evening he had sent instructions to the Delegation along the lines he had discussed with the Ambassador and had mentioned in his personal message to Bevin of October 28 [26]. I added that subsequently, in view of statements on the subject in Mr. Molotov’s speech, the Secretary had authorized the Delegation to make a statement in the General Assembly today or tomorrow of our willingness to support the Soviet

29 Regarding Austin’s speech, see telegram 727, October 30, from New York, supra, and footnote 26 thereto.
30 See the bracketed note on p. 972.
31 For text, see the annex (p. 969) to Mr. Acheson’s memorandum to the Secretary of State, October 28, p. 966.
proposal if broadened to include troops in ex-enemy states. I asked Mr. Maclean to inform the Ambassador promptly this morning of these new developments and pointed out that they were in our opinion entirely consistent with the warning the Secretary had sent to Mr. Bevin in his personal message.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by Mr. Joseph Chase to Mr. John M. Hancock of the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission


Subject: Preliminary Comments on Molotov's Speech

1. Stalin, in his answers to Alexander Werth and Hugh Baillie, stated that, as regards the atom bomb:
   a. Its monopoly cannot endure;
   b. Its use will be prohibited;
   c. It should be under strong international control.

2. Taking as relevant, only points "b" and "c", it seems to me that Molotov, in carrying out this program, has reiterated Gromyko's arguments and added some new features, all of which point to a reaffirmation of the original Soviet position. By considering the atom bomb as merely another weapon, Molotov tied it to a general discussion of disarmament. Now, under the Charter, the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee are directed to study the problem and make recommendations concerning the regulation of armaments and possible disarmament (Articles 11, 26 and 47). This new "angle" merely reaffirms the Soviet position that existing organs of the United Nations are empowered and able to deal with atomic weapons and presumably all other phases of the problems of atomic energy. This is undoubtedly what Stalin means by strong international control and may even be an attempt to by-pass the Atomic Energy Commission eventually, and certainly rejects, by implication, an A.D.A. This latter statement is further borne out by Molotov's reference to the veto, especially in connection with his attack on the Baruch Plan.

3. This new approach is an attempt to divert the discussion of atomic weapons from the Atomic Energy Commission to other organs of the United Nations and also attempts to separate the discussion of peaceful and dangerous aspects of atomic energy.

32 United States Delegation Staff member.
33 Correspondent for the Manchester Guardian.
34 President of United Press.
35 Regarding the answers under reference, see vol. vi, pp. 784, 786, 788 (bracketed note), and 794.

310–101–72—63
4. I believe that in our reaction to the speech we should keep in mind that we are working for our plan, or a better one if such a plan is suggested or develops. We should not lose sight of our main objective, however strong the urge to react to the personal attack. Any reaction to this attack will make sensational reading, will cloud the real issues involved, and would play into Soviet hands. They just love “to fish in muddy waters”.

JOSEPH CHASE

USUN Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John C. Ross, Adviser, United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] November 1, 1946

DISCUSSION WITH SENATOR AUSTIN ON DISARMAMENT

Following Mr. Molotov’s speech on Tuesday \(^{36}\) raising the disarmament issue and Senator Austin’s speech on Wednesday \(^{37}\) accepting the Molotov proposals with regard to disarmament, I had a long discussion with Senator Austin this afternoon with regard to the next steps we should take to implement our acceptance of the Russian proposals. As a result of this discussion, which dealt primarily with the question of atomic energy disarmament, it was decided that I should go down to Washington for the weekend and discuss with Mr. Acheson, Mr. Cohen, and others the Senator’s views and get from the people in the Department their reactions and their own views.

It was understood at the outset and throughout our conversation that the Senator’s views were not to be taken as committing himself to any particular positions. He wanted, in effect, to think out loud.

We first discussed security measures to protect those who comply against those who violate. There must be some way whereby the Security Council would administer and be responsible for the administration of inspection and enforcement without the veto. It was necessary to eliminate the veto for the purpose of expediting action against violators.

It would seem to be better to have the Security Council responsible for the inspection than a special organ. Thinking in terms of trying to reach a compromise position with the Russians, we would be with them in taking inspection into the Security Council instead of some separate unit but we would be going against them by eliminating the veto.

\(^{36}\) Regarding Molotov’s address before the General Assembly, October 29, see bracketed note, p. 972.

\(^{37}\) With respect to Senator Austin’s address in the General Assembly on October 30, see footnote 26, p. 975.
We then discussed the Soviet idea of inspection by national inspection forces. Our plan, the Senator said, goes against them on this. He asked whether there is a middle ground wherein national operating agencies can be brought nearer to, but not into, an international organization.

Our problem of seeking a compromise was to maintain the autonomy of the United Nations, its jurisdiction, and at the same time to accommodate the nationalism which is still strong with regard to inspection.

The Senator then indicated that our military intelligence experts must have a great many precedents to guide them. This is not based on treaties, he said, but on practice. There has always been a certain amount of inspection by intelligence forces.

There are two extreme positions, the international represented by our proposal and the national represented by the Soviet proposal. We should get the two together, something in between. Our proposal is absolute, a very extreme position.

The Senator then went on to say some bookkeeping scheme so far as the rare products of the soil are concerned is possible. This means that the United Nations or the Atomic Development Authority can get control of uranium and thorium; we can’t do that, however, with bacteria and gasses.

I asked the Senator if he could give me a definite impression that I could convey to Mr. Acheson with regard to Baruch’s proposal to force a vote in the Atomic Energy Commission on the Baruch proposals in line with Mr. Baruch’s request for support when he called on the Senator some days previously. The Senator said that with the proviso that I make clear to Mr. Acheson his reaction was indefinite and immature [premature?], he would prefer to have the State Department say to Mr. Baruch, no, we are not going to force this issue now. The Senator then went on to comment that, “When you have the power you must stand back and get the perspective as to when you ought to use it. This relates to wisdom, not timidity.”

501 BC Atomic/11-146 : Telegram

Senator Austin to the Secretary of State

SECRET

New York, November 1, 1946—9:35 p.m.

[Received 10:01 p.m.]

745. Acheson from Hancock. At the end of the scientific and policy group, on the staff level, in atomic meetings yesterday, it was clear that Dr. Alexandroff, the Russian, was quite embarrassed by the

38 The meetings under reference were the final sessions of the informal talks regarding safeguards conducted by Committee 2 between October 15 and October 30.
almost unanimous views in opposition to him, and when the meeting broke up, he came to Dr. Vance, of the Chemistry Department of Yale, who was presented by us as more or less of an expert witness, and, after exchanging greetings, he said that it would be much easier to make progress if there were a clear policy on the part of the Russians.

George Ignatieff, the Russian-born Canadian now with the Canadian delegation, joined the circle and asked what Dr. Alexandroff had in mind. The Doctor referred to the Molotov speech and the Stalin speech. (He meant, of course, the Stalin press interview where he had said that Russia wanted a strong international control.) So, when that came clear in conversation, George asked him what Mr. Stalin meant. Alexandroff replied: "He meant exactly what he said." It was clear in the conversation, without trying to repeat words, that Alexandroff realized that his position, Molotov's position, and Gromyko's position, were contrary to what Stalin had said. Then he went on to say that Mr. Molotov was going to clear up the matter in a speech before the General Assembly—I assume at an early date. [Hancock.]

AUSTIN

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

The United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission (Baruch) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

NEW YORK, November 2, 1946.

MY DEAR MR. ACHESON: Yesterday, I tried to get you on the phone, and in turn, doubtless, you tried to reach me. What I wanted to discuss with you was the delay in answering the question contained in the letter of September 17, to the President and Secretary of State, asking for a decision as to the course that should be taken.

The Soviets have taken advantage of our indecision, have moved in, and now apparently have become the advocates of disarmament. As you may recall, I strongly advocated that we should do it first. I refer you to the letters addressed to you on June 23 and July 9, and your subsequent replies.

It is disheartening, to say the least, to see the moves that can and so apparently must be made, only to find that somebody else makes them, and we are fighting rear-guard actions. We cannot deal with this matter with dignity only. We are dealing with police court lawyers, to whom the truth is of no importance and the only goal is

[a] Not printed.
their particular selfish ends, without reference to the rest of the world.\textsuperscript{41}

Sincerely yours,

\textsc{Bernard M. Baruch}

\textsc{USUN Files}

\textit{Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John C. Ross, Adviser, United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly}

\textsc{TOP SECRET}

\textsc{New York, November 2, 1946.}

Comments by Dean Acheson on Disarmament with Particular Reference to Conversation with Mr. Baruch on October 28,\textsuperscript{42} to Mr. Molotov’s Speech on October 29, and to Senator Austin’s Speech on October 30

I spent three hours with Mr. Acheson Saturday morning\textsuperscript{43} during which time he developed his whole philosophy on the matter of atomic energy as it related to the general question of disarmament.

He said, first, that it was important to distinguish between international and national control. Second, he said that a clear distinction must be made between enforcement and inspection. On both of these points he said there had been a great deal of public misunderstanding; with particular reference to the enforcement question he said that Mr. Baruch and his people had been trapped in this cul-de-sac.

On the question of enforcement, Mr. Acheson said that there just is not any United States marshal or sheriff who automatically can enforce the law. He said that the situation was very much like that of the relations between the states of the United States. There is no United States Federal authority that can step in in disputes between the states.

It is asserted, he said, that there must be an automatic sanction against a violator. He asked what sanction is automatic, and answering his own question said there just is not any.

He said that the misunderstanding with regard to this matter of enforcement is based on misunderstanding of the true nature of big power relationships. This question must be considered in the light of the basic industrial and economic structures of the big powers.

\textsuperscript{41} Barnuch concluded a memorandum to Senator Austin, also dated November 2, as follows:

"I warned the State Department on June 23, that the Soviets would be likely to make this latest move, and I wanted to make it first.

There must be closer coordination of the work in the United Nations. The present disjointed method cannot bring results, even with all the ability and good will of our delegations." (USUN Files)

\textsuperscript{42} Regarding this conversation, see Ross’s memorandum to the Secretary of State, November 3, p. 988.

\textsuperscript{43} November 2.
Supposing armaments were reduced to the level of peace forces, you would have to get a treaty with a tremendous emotional driving force. Every nation would be obligated by the treaty to take action against an aggressor, that is, a violator of the treaty.

He then asked who is the possible aggressor? It wouldn’t be any of the small powers because that is not our problem. The possible aggressor in everybody’s mind in the United States is the Soviet Union. What kind of a situation would you have should the Soviet Union violate a treaty? The answer, he felt, was quite simple. Whether within the United Nations or among the signatories of a treaty there would be an almost immediate division into two blocs: Eastern Europe, India, probably China would come under Soviet domination; the United Kingdom, Canada, probably Latin America, and Western Europe would come under United States domination. There would be a rough balance of power and the treaty would, therefore, really be ineffective because you would have war. This is actually the situation which confronts us today without a treaty.

Summarizing what he had said, Mr. Acheson went on that the talk of enforcement is really paper talk. The main point, he said, is treaty or no treaty, will governments take action or will they not. If a treaty would help a little, let’s have a treaty by all means. But meanwhile let’s not kid the American people along. It is perfectly clear that the peace forces envisaged in the Charter would be no good against a major power.

He said that in a recent speech he had tried to touch on this problem subtly by saying that you don’t solve a difficult problem by turning attention to an insoluble one. He said that Mr. Baruch, by his emphasis on enforcement, had gotten us into an insoluble problem.

I then outlined to Mr. Acheson the very tentative views which Senator Austin had expressed the day before (see notes of this conversation on November 1), with particular reference to the possibility of finding some middle ground of accommodation with the Russians.

Mr. Acheson commented that he thought Mr. Austin was probably now in the same position that Mr. Byrnes was in a year ago when Mr. Byrnes was thinking along similar lines.

Stating his personal conviction, Mr. Acheson said he felt the Russians were using the United Nations as an instrument for their own purposes and that they do not subscribe to the fundamental spirit of the United Nations.

He said that this situation in the United Nations seemed to him to be comparable to the theory of the liability of government depending directly on its acceptance by the very large majority of the people. He

"Ante, p. 880."
said that any organization, any government, is based on the emotional, spiritual acceptance of it by 95% of the people. When you have 20% of the people who are not going along, the government just does not work. He said this is true in our own country with our strikes and labor difficulties. He said it has been true with the British in Ireland, and in Palestine [and] in India. He said that when 20% of the people are against the government its entire ethical foundation is lost.

Going on from this point Mr. Acheson said there were two possible approaches: first, we could support the United Nations and continue our efforts patiently to draw the Soviet Union towards an accommodation with us. Second, plan to lick the hell out of them in 10 or 15 years. It was clear that we were committed to the first and should do it and not diminish our efforts, but that as practical men we should realize that our efforts might not succeed and that we must therefore be prepared, should it be necessary, to adopt the latter course.

He said we obviously must set up an enforcement system but that we should not rely on it too heavily.

This brought him to an analysis of what was meant by inspection. Here again he said there was a great deal of confusion and misunderstanding. He made it clear that in the case of atomic energy, inspection as ordinarily conceived made no sense at all. There was absolutely no way by sending inspectors around looking at things to tell what was going on until the very last stages of the production of atomic energy for destructive purposes. At this point the discovery was too late because the final processes were extremely speedy. He said that inspection as ordinarily conceived was misleading in the same way that the lawyer’s doctrine of probing into the intent of the human mind was misleading. He said that any lawyer who had ever engaged in criminal practice realized how extremely difficult, if not impossible, it was to determine criminal intent. Lawyers had been trying for a long time to get away from this doctrine. It was necessary in the matter of atomic energy inspection to get into the field of administrative action. This meant getting all the best people concerned working together in this field toward the use of atomic energy for beneficial purposes.

Relating what he had just said to the question of international or national control, Mr. Acheson said that it was very, very important to realize that by the very nature of the atomic energy enterprise there was no half-way point. It was impossible to stop leaks or diversion of atomic energy for war purposes by inspection at one point or another. There were three great steps in the atomic energy field—mining, production of fissionable materials, and use of fissionable materials. International operation at all three steps was essential. Inspection or international operation at any one or two of the steps was simply worthless.
Digressing somewhat on the subject of the popular conception of inspection, Mr. Acheson said that as in the case of the prohibition, as in the alcohol factory, the whole situation is geared to trick the inspector. Under the circumstances of international control involving the participation of people of various nationalities in all three steps in the atomic energy process, foreign nationals would be in the atomic plants not as aliens but as operators; inspection would be an incidental function growing out of operation.

Mr. Acheson then discussed other weapons of mass destruction. The problem here was considerably more difficult because less tangible. On the other hand, there was some room for speculation whether the same principle we had been endeavoring to apply in the atomic energy field might not be applied in the other weapons field. If we could get into the other weapons field the best people, that is, scientists, whether Russian, British, French, or American, for the positive development of our knowledge towards beneficial purposes, the best people then would simply not be available for destructive development. In this way, for example, we might make great strides in developing the science of immunology and related sciences.

Digressing a moment, Mr. Acheson said that when people talked about stopping the production of fissionable materials they failed to realize that this was not quite as simple as the apparently similar concept of sinking navies. It would be impossible for us to stop the production of fissionable materials without losing the tremendous investment it was possible for us to make as a result of the war pressure and which we could hardly hope to regain. The vast potentialities of atomic energy for peaceful purposes would thus be lost.

Mr. Acheson then went on to say that Mr. Baruch had added the concept of sanction in the veto to our atomic energy presentation. He said that Mr. Swope was sick of it and would like to get away from these two points. The Baruch staff was trying to get out of this situation by some interpretation of Article 51 in the sense of there being not only a right but an obligation of self-defense. This is what Eberstadt probably thinks. Mr. Acheson thought that this was not a very important concept. Mr. Acheson then went on to mention a telegram which had been sent down the night before by John Hancock for him which referred to Stalin's statement about the Soviet willingness to accept international control and a conversation which had taken place with Alexandroff, the Russian scientist attached to the Atomic Energy Commission.45

Coming specifically to the question which Mr. Baruch had raised with Mr. Acheson and which he had previously raised with the Presi-

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45 Telegram 745 from New York, November 1, p. 981.
dent and Secretary Byrnes, namely, whether we should not press for a showdown vote in the Atomic Energy Commission with the Russians, Mr. Acheson said it seemed to him that there were two considerations involved; one, possible relationship of such a vote to the work of the Council of Foreign Ministers and, second, whether as a matter of policy it would be a good thing to have such a vote anyhow. On the Council of Foreign Ministers point, this, of course, was something which the Secretary himself would have to decide.

On the question of policy, Mr. Acheson said that we had to decide whether we had reached a point of irreconcilable difference or not with the U.S.S.R., or whether taking the recent report of the scientists attached to the Atomic Energy Commission as a basis, we could not proceed intelligently by a committee process to the examination of the consequences of control or lack of control, national or international, at each of the three atomic energy steps. Such a study, he said, might reasonably be completed in thirty or ninety days and would really give a scientific, rather than a political, basis for determining whether there is some possibility of reconciling our differences with the Russians.

Digressing again for a moment, he said that some people say you should be able to control atomic energy much as the traffic in opium is controlled, but the situation here was entirely different. In the opium case violators were individuals and could readily be punished. In the atomic energy case, or the disarmament case, violators are states and you could hardly expect states to police themselves.

Further on the question of pressing for a vote in the Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. Acheson doubted whether Mr. Baruch actually had the ten votes he thought he had. He doubted whether the other governments actually agreed with Mr. Baruch’s position. He said he had definite information that the British did not agree.

Mr. Cohen, who came into the room at about this time, said that even if some country did agree, they would perhaps not want to vote against the Russians on such an important issue.

Mr. Marks at about this point had also come into the room and our discussion continued with particular reference to the Molotov general disarmament proposals. The thought was developed more or less jointly among us that we should avoid any line of playing into the Russian hand to such an extent that general disarmament would swamp our atomic energy objectives. Mr. Marks made a very strong case against Soviet intransigent unwillingness to consider the necessity of international control with adequate safeguards. He argued strongly in support of the Baruch proposal to force a showdown vote.

Mr. Cohen and Mr. Acheson had a somewhat softer attitude and it
was more or less generally agreed that it was important to let Mr. Baruch take his vote but that the vote should not be taken in the sense of any drawing of a final issue but more in the sense of a definitive taking stock of progress to date.

It was agreed that Mr. Baruch should not be dissuaded, that Senator Austin and Mr. Baruch should both consult Mr. Byrnes, that while the sharpening of a final issue should be avoided, sharpening of the fundamental issue of Soviet intransigence against international control was necessary.

USUN Files

Memorandum by Mr. John C. Ross, Adviser, United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[NYORK,] November 3, 1946.

In the course of a long and cordial conversation on Monday, October 28, Mr. Baruch sought Senator Austin's support for the proposal Mr. Baruch had made to the President that he be authorized to bring the United States proposals to a vote in the Atomic Energy Commission before November 15. He expressed confidence that the United States would win this vote by 10–2.

Senator Austin was noncommittal in his reply since neither atomic energy nor disarmament were on the Assembly's Agenda and since there was no evidence at the time that anyone intended to propose these subjects for the Agenda.

On the following day, Tuesday, Mr. Molotov in his Assembly speech proposed that the question of disarmament, including the control of atomic energy, be put on the Assembly's Agenda. On Wednesday, Senator Austin in his Assembly speech welcomed this proposal.

Thus the two questions of Atomic Energy Control and General Disarmament, which had previously not been considered together, were brought together, and the Soviet proposal was approved for inclusion on the Agenda at a plenary session of the Assembly on Thursday afternoon, October 31.

This whole matter, probably the most important question by far to be considered at this Assembly session, thus became one of immediate concern to Senator Austin, in view of his present Assembly responsibilities and in view of the effect which any action taken by the Assembly will have on his responsibilities after the first of the year.

Transmitted to Mr. Benjamin V. Cohen, Adviser to the United States Delegation and Counselor of the Department of State, for the Secretary, on November 4.
as United States Representative to the United Nations. After a long discussion with him on Friday it was decided that I should go to Washington over the weekend to communicate his initial views and explore the thinking in the Department on this subject.

As a result of discussions in Washington on Saturday with Mr. Acheson and Mr. Cohen, in which Mr. Hiss, Mr. Marks and I participated, it was agreed to submit to you and Senator Austin for approval the course of action which is set forth in the first of the two attached papers. The second paper is a draft outline of the speech on disarmament which Senator Austin might make.\(^\text{47}\)

[Annex]

*Memorandum by Mr. John C. Ross to the Secretary of State*

**Conclusions and Proposals on Disarmament**

November 4, 1946.

1. The objective of Mr. Molotov’s disarmament proposals is probably to obfuscate the fundamental issues which have been developed in the Atomic Energy Commission in recent months. The purposes to be served probably are:

   (a) to lead thinking in this country and throughout the world away from the present emphasis on control of atomic energy and other weapons of mass destruction and the fundamental issue of whether we are going to have international control with adequate safeguards or national control without adequate safeguards;

   (b) to lead thinking into a maze of technicalities concerning the size and equipment of armies, navies, and air forces which come under the heading of “general disarmament”;

   (c) to capitalize on the widespread sentiment in this country and abroad for the drastic reduction of armies, navies and air forces (and cessation of production of fissionable materials)—a sentiment which does not take account of the consequences of such action, in terms of our own certain weakness vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, in the absence of a system of international control with adequate safeguards applicable in the first instance to atomic energy and other weapons of mass destruction.

2. Negatively, we should avoid a course which would follow the Soviet lead and which would commit us and the United Nations to involvement in the technicalities of “general disarmament” at the expense of loss of time and emphasis on our primary objective of inter-

\(^{47}\) The draft outline is not printed.
national control with adequate safeguards of atomic energy and other weapons of mass destruction. Affirmatively, we should promptly develop a course which would (a) counteract the adverse effects which the Soviet proposals (and the manner of their presentation) have already had and which would (b) regain the initiative and leadership for the United States in the interest of the United Nations. A very important part of our approach would be a well organized and effectively carried out program of public education to dispel widespread misunderstanding of the issues involved and to clarify and lead public thinking, not only in our own country but throughout the world, with regard to this whole subject. Our proposed course is set forth in the following points, the timing and presentation conditional, of course, upon the requirement of your work with the Council of Foreign Ministers.

3. Mr. Baruch should be authorized to seek the vote he feels is essential at this time in the Atomic Energy Commission. He and his staff would presumably wish to re-canvas the other members of the Atomic Energy Commission to make sure of getting the best possible majority. It was our thought that this purpose might best be served if we were to avoid the drawing of a final issue as might be the case, for example, if we were to force a vote at this time on the American proposals as such. It would be preferable we felt to seek in this vote at this time to sharpen the simple but fundamental issue of whether the Soviet Government is intransigently opposed to international control with adequate safeguards of atomic energy and other weapons of mass destruction. Based on this objective a resolution could be framed so as to avoid putting other governments under the formal necessity of voting for the United States or against the Soviet Union.

4. The proposed vote would set the stage for a major policy speech by Senator Austin in which he would develop the objectives set forth under point 2 above and chart our course for dealing with this subject in the Assembly.

591.BC Atomic/11-446

The United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission (Baruch) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW YORK, November 4, 1946.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On September 17 I addressed to you and the President a memorandum asking for a statement of policy to govern our action in the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.
At that time we were trying, and have since been pursuing the course of discussing the scientific and technical aspects of control, largely avoiding the political questions except as they arose by implication. At the middle of September it was clear to us that we could continue that course another month or two. There have been some unexpected delays, but we will certainly finish this phase of the work by the end of November at the latest. We now have two choices, as we pointed out:

a. To push into the political issues, or
b. To slow down the whole work of the Commission, going to the extreme of recess or adjournment.

At this moment we can reasonably expect a ten-to-two vote favoring our position on matters of policy. So far as our own problem is concerned, it is thoroughly feasible to move into the policy questions and attempt an agreed statement of policy to be completed by the year end—again on a ten-to-two basis. Again, purely from our own point of view, we will face a considerable delay and a good deal of uncertainty if we wait until after the first of the year. At that time three members of the Commission—Egypt, Mexico, and The Netherlands—all strong supporters of ours, will be replaced by presently unknown nations. These new delegations would require a long period of education, in all probability. It would be helpful to have even a ten-to-two vote on matters of principle arrived at during the present membership of the Commission. We couldn't look for any more than that as a result of the changes at the year end in the personnel of the Commission.

It is our thought to start immediately our staff work in concluding our views on the statements of policy and the matters to be covered by a ten-to-two interim report by the end of the year. We will need this month to complete the policy statement and to obtain clearances.

You probably have clearly in mind the original letter of September 17, but an additional copy is readily available in any event.

Incidentally, the Molotov move made here is a neat political maneuver which was implicit in the Russian attitude when I wrote to Dean Acheson on June 23. For the moment Molotov grabbed the initiative, but I think our people will see through the maneuver and that in the end he will not be the gainer. It may be that the maneuver is designed to back out of the commitment on controls and safeguards included in the Moscow Declaration and the January Assembly Resolution on atomic energy. We may attach undue importance to our part of the incident because early in our sessions we pointed out to Mr. Gromyko the ridiculous character of the Russian plan in that it was a proposal for unilateral disarmament and we told him we wondered whether
he was going to match the proposal with a proposal to demobilize nine-tenths of the Red Army. I think Senator Austin is handling the matter very well and of course we will keep in closest possible contact to insure that there is no unintentional "crossing of wires."

In view of the time and membership problem mentioned above, we will need a prompt decision. In the alternate, we will face a long delay—quite certainly six months—before the issue is joined on the political matters and even an interim report made to the Security Council or the Assembly.

Sincerely yours,

Bernard M. Baruch

501 BC Atomic/11-446

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs (Johnson) to the Legal Adviser (Fahy)

TOP SECRET [NEW YORK ?] November 4, 1946.

Subject: Soviet Position on Atomic Energy Commission

On Friday, November 1, 1946, when I was in Washington, Mr. Frank Lindsay of Mr. Baruch’s staff telephoned me to give me the following information:

 Ambassador Bedell Smith went to see Mr. Baruch and members of his staff (I gather, on Thursday) to have a general discussion. When Ambassador Smith left Mr. Lindsay accompanied him downstairs and held a brief conversation with him. Mr. Lindsay told me that he had raised with Ambassador Smith the question of the possibility of a direct approach to Stalin after a vote has been taken in the Atomic Energy Commission on the Baruch proposals. According to Lindsay, Ambassador Smith thought this would be a good idea and promised to take it up with the Secretary in the near future.

Mr. Lindsay made it clear to me that the idea would be for Mr. Baruch to go to Moscow for this purpose. Mr. Lindsay also indicated that the Baruch people here think of the vote taking place before the composition of the AEC is changed by the replacement of Mexico, The Netherlands and Egypt.

I gave no indication of what I thought of this proposal. I merely asked a question in order to be sure that the idea was to have the approach to Stalin made after a vote was taken. Lindsay did make this very clear. At Lindsay’s request, I agreed not to mention the matter
in Washington, but urged him to speak about this to Mr. Bohlen when he saw him, which Lindsay hoped to do shortly after Bohlen’s arrival in New York.

I should like to make to you the two following comments:

(1) I think it would be a great mistake to have the approach to Stalin made after a vote in the AEC. I think an approach to the Soviet Government, presumably by the Secretary speaking to Molotoff, should be made before any such vote. If a vote is taken before the approach to Stalin, the chances of a démarche being successful appear very small.

(2) If anyone is to go to Moscow, I think Baruch should not be the senior. The Secretary would be the logical person.

591.BB/11-446 : Telegram

Senator Austin to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NEW YORK, November 4, 1946—8 p. m. URGENT [Received 8:02 p. m.]

757. Chinese Ambassador Wellington Koo in conversation with me today said he had interpreted my remarks October 30 with regard to armed forces as indicating US assent to giving information on forces and bases in all countries outside national boundaries. I told Mr. Koo that my remarks extended to information concerning armed forces at home as well as abroad.

The Ambassador said he wished to be frank in stating that this might be very embarrassing to his government. Referring to relations of Chinese Government with Communists in China he said his Government would scarcely wish to reveal to the Communists the size and disposition of government forces, bases, and airfields in China.

I thanked Mr. Koo for bringing this aspect of the matter to my attention and assured him that my Government would wish to weigh it carefully in developing its position with regard to the armed forces item.

Foregoing has been communicated to Cohen for the Secretary with special reference to Deptel 253 of October 29.

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48 Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.
49 V. K. Wellington Koo, Chinese Delegate to the General Assembly.
50 In regard to Mr. Austin’s address to the General Assembly on October 30, see footnote 26, p. 975.
51 For documentation on United States policy with respect to the situation in China, see volumes x and x.
52 Ante, p. 971.
Record of a Special Meeting of the Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments, Department of State, November 4, 1946, 11 a.m.

SECRET
PCA M-23 (Supplement)

Present:

General Crain, A-H, Deputy Chairman
Messrs. Cummins, A-R, Executive Secretary
Solom, ESC, Secretary
Blaisdell, SPA
Dreier, IA
Exton, MD
Labouisse, EUR
Matlock (for McGhee, UE)
Ringwalt, FE
Timberlake, NEA

Consultants:

Messrs. Brown, Le
Hiss, SPA
Elliott, IS
Jamison, ESC
Lacy, SEA
Wainhouse, OA

UNITED STATES POSITION WITH RESPECT TO REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS

1. Action: After considerable discussion of the situation resulting from the position taken by Mr. Molotov on regulation of armaments in the General Assembly on October 29, 1946, the Committee agreed that:

a. It would not at this time draft a proposed resolution for presentation to the UN;

b. The Russian motives in asking for disarmament, whether genuine or propaganda, should not affect the establishment of the U.S. position;

c. The United States should agree with the Russian position with respect to the importance of controlling atomic energy but insist that the Security Council be guided in its actions by reports and recommendations from the Atomic Energy Commission;

d. The United States should agree with the Russian position concerning the regulation and reduction of armaments other than weapons of mass destruction with the understanding that any such...
regulation or reduction must be implemented by effective safeguards by way of international inspection and other means;

c. Solution of the problems with respect to the peace settlements and the forces to be provided under Article 43 of the United Nations Charter should not be brought forth as essential preconditions to an agreement upon regulation of armaments.

2. Discussion of above principles (The numbered paragraphs below correspond to the paragraphs above):

a. Position due to instructions from higher authority.  
   b. The opinion of the people of this country and world opinion will be based upon the contents of the Russian resolution and not upon the motives actuating it.
   c. This reiterates the present stand of the U.S., and of the United Nations as expressed in the resolution of the General Assembly of last January.
   d. & e. The position of the U.S. will be improved by positive support of general disarmament rather than by attempting to attach conditions; however, the U.S. must insist upon adequate safeguards to be provided by international inspection and other means to insure that the disarmament will be multilateral.

Should the Russians object to international inspection they would be obstructing disarmament; should they agree to this inspection their present position with respect to control of atomic energy would be exposed as capricious.

501BC Atomic/11-546

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission (Baruch)


Dear B. M.: Replying to your letter of the fourth, I have not had an opportunity to discuss the matter with the President.

I read your letter of September 17 and I think you should follow the course set forth in your recommendation a. There should be an expression of opinion by the present members of the Commission, who have participated in the study of this question for many months.

If you do not follow this course, you will have to grant those who become members of the Commission on January 1 an opportunity to familiarize themselves with all that has taken place since the Commission was organized. That means a long delay.

54 Presumably the Secretary of State.
55 In the source text, the handwritten addition of the word “not” has been made after the word “do.” However, the letter went out without this correction. (Department of State Atomic Energy Files)
I am submitting your letter, together with my recommendation, to the President and will advise you when I hear from him.\textsuperscript{56}

Sincerely yours,

JAMES F. BYRNES

811.002/1-2446

Minutes of the Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, Washington, November 6, 1946, 10 a. m.

[Here follows discussion of various subjects.]

DISARMAMENT

Mr. Acheson stated that following Mr. Molotov’s proposal before the General Assembly on disarmament the State Department has been considering how to avoid having the General Assembly discussions develop into useless arguments on details and comparisons between various types of armament such as air forces versus land troops and land troops versus naval vessels. He said that feeling in the Department of State is that we should endeavor to keep the discussion on important fundamentals. He went on to say that both as regards a regime for atomic energy control and a system for the reduction of other types of armament he feels that an international inspection system is of crucial importance. He said that he felt that the United States representative should handle this whole subject in such a way as to focus attention on the importance of an international inspection system. The Soviet Government had adamantly declined to agree to any international inspection system. Mr. Acheson said that he felt that we should endeavor to keep attention on this rather than be drawn into a useless discussion of details. Mr. Forrestal and Mr. Petersen\textsuperscript{57} expressed agreement.

SPA Files

The United States Representatives on the Military Staff Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff\textsuperscript{58}

SECRET

[NEW YORK.] 6 November 1946.

Subcommittee on basic principles has completed study of purpose and have submitted final report to Military Staff Committee indicating divergent views.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{56} Mr. Byrnes submitted the papers under reference to the President on November 5. The file copy bears Truman’s handwritten indication of approval. (501.0 BC Atomic/11-546)

\textsuperscript{57} Howard C. Petersen, Assistant Secretary of War.

\textsuperscript{58} The source text indicates that this communication was a despatch. A marginal notation reads as follows: “To Mr. Hiss from Col. Cress.”

\textsuperscript{59} In accordance with the decision taken at the 18th Meeting of the Military Staff Committee, September 18 (see the Summary of the Sequence of Events, p. 913), the Subcommittee on Basic Principles had resumed meetings on September 25. (TO Files)
Chinese, French, U.K. and U.S. representatives on Subcommittee accepted French proposed paragraph 1 as amended (U.S.M.S./50/16). U.S. reserved commitment as to whether final document of the MSC on basic principles should include article on purpose. Chinese, U.K., and U.S. representatives on Subcommittee rejected all of Soviet proposed paragraphs and paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of French proposal, but agreed that paragraphs 5 and 6 of both the French and Soviet proposals could be discussed later under other headings of basic principles. French favored retention of French paragraphs 3 and 4. Soviet adhered to its original proposal.

Security Council directed MSC to examine from the military point of view (not the military aspects) the provisions of Article 43 of the Charter. Since Article 43 mentions purpose and the French paragraph 1 as amended does not amend or alter the meaning of the Charter, the U.S. Representatives consider this one paragraph entirely suitable for inclusion in final basic principles report to Security Council. Unless instructions to the contrary are received, the U.S. Representatives will take that position at the next meeting of the MSC on 13 November.  

501.BB/10-2246

The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)

SECRET URGENT WASHINGTON, November 6, 1946—7 p. m.

272. For US Gadel. Ur tel 692, Oct. 22, 10 p. m. Department has prepared additional guidance on that part of position paper “Prob-

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60 Not printed.
61 The Military Staff Committee at its 22nd Meeting on November 13 agreed on the following definition of the purpose of United Nations armed forces and agreed to include it in its final statement of basic principles:

"1. Armed Forces, made available to the Security Council by Member Nations of the United Nations are intended for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security in cases:
   a. of existence of any threat to international peace,
   b. of any breach of international peace and security, when measures undertaken by the Security Council in accordance with Article 41 of the United Nations Charter would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate and when the threat to international peace and security is such that it necessitates the employment of these Armed Forces.

2. These Armed Forces may not be employed for purposes inconsistent with the purposes, principles, and the spirit of the United Nations Charter as defined in its Preamble and Chapter I."

The Subcommittee on Basic Principles did not complete its work as a whole in 1946. (IO Files)

62 Not printed. It requested additional guidance in view of strong criticism within the Delegation of the recommendation contained in SD/A/C.1/356, not printed, that in the event that a proposal were made to criticize the work of the Military Staff Committee, the Delegation should seek further guidance. Senator Vandenberg had expressed the view that the United States should support a resolution expressing the concern of the General Assembly with respect to the lack of progress. (501.BB/10-2246)
lems raised by the Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly” (SD/A/C.1/35a) which deals with the MSC and special agreements under Article 43. Text which follows supplants Section III, Subsection 1 (pages 3 and 4) of reference paper:

SD/A/C.1/44 Rev. 1
November 5, 1946

SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
(PART II, MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE)
GUIDANCE FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

I. Suggested Position

1. It is the Department’s feeling that an active role for the Delegation in the debate on Part II of the Security Council Report is not indicated except to oppose motions or resolutions, the intent or effect of which would be critical of the Military Staff Committee.

2. It is suggested that the Delegation should not attempt to direct the course of the debate towards criticism of the Soviet Government, if such criticism is not made by other Delegations.

3. It is suggested further that the Delegation should not attempt to divert criticism leveled at the Soviet Government for the lack of progress of the Military Staff Committee, if such criticism is made by other Delegations.

4. If questions of fact are asked by Delegations not represented on the Military Staff Committee, the Delegation should feel free to consult Delegations of the other members of the Military Staff Committee in order to concert efforts in supplying answers.

5. It is suggested that motions or resolutions dealing with Part II of the Report of the Security Council be forwarded to the Department in order that additional guidance may be furnished the Delegation.

II. Background

In connection with the Security Council Report to the General Assembly (Part II, Military Staff Committee), it was suggested that the Delegation seek guidance from the Department “if proposals expressing the Assembly’s concern, or calling upon the Security Council for further information or explanations, or urging it to direct the Military Staff Committee to take more vigorous steps in discharge of its responsibility are put forward” for the Assembly’s consideration (SD/A/C.1/35a, page 4). In secret telegram 692 of October 22 from the Delegation guidance was requested from the Department, in consultation with the War and Navy Departments, in advance of any

III. Discussion

The Department has been in consultation with the War and Navy Departments and presents the following views for the guidance of the Delegation.

It is a delicate matter to prepare guidance on this subject in as much as the United States is in possession of fuller and more accurate information regarding the work of the Military Staff Committee than is the General Assembly. In the absence of authorization by the Security Council to supply the General Assembly with information regarding the Military Staff Committee's activities since July 15, it is not believed that the United States Delegation should be the vehicle for the transmission of such information to the General Assembly. It is for the Security Council to decide whether and when to make this latter information available.

However, unofficial information regarding the work of the Military Staff Committee after July 15 is generally available through press reports. Although incomplete and not entirely accurate such reports lead to the conclusion that the Soviet Delegation was entirely to blame for the little progress achieved. Especially is this so if such reports are read in conjunction with Part II of the Security Council's Report.

Thus Members of the Assembly may raise questions regarding the activities of the Military Staff Committee not covered by the Report; about the reasons for the limited progress made; about the prospect of more rapid progress in the future. If Delegations were to attribute to all governments represented on the Military Staff Committee equal blame for the slow progress made, it is believed that this would be unjustified by the facts. In such case, the Delegation should feel free to point out in debate that delegations of four governments represented on the Committee submitted promptly their proposals of principles for the organization of forces to be made available to the Security Council while the fifth, that of the Soviet Government, did not make its proposals until a date after that covered by the Report and then in a form which has not facilitated progress.

Moreover, the Department shares the view of the representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Military Staff Committee that it is the Soviet Government and not its delegation which must bear responsibility for the Military Staff Committee's limited progress.

On the other hand, the Department desires that no action of the General Assembly should reflect adversely upon the Military Staff Committee. The Department is particularly anxious that the representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should not come in for criticism.
IV. Conclusions

In the light of these considerations, it is the Department’s view that while the Delegation should not oppose debate on Part II of the Security Council Report, it should not take a prominent part in the debate by (1) attempting to direct its course towards criticism of the Soviet Government or (2) diverting such criticism if the Soviet Government comes in for criticism at the hands of Delegations for the lack of progress of the Military Staff Committee. In general, it is felt that an active role in this debate is not indicated, except to oppose motions or resolutions, the intent or effect of which would be critical of the Military Staff Committee.

However, if questions of fact are asked, the Delegation should feel free to consult Delegations of the other members of the Military Staff Committee with a view to supplying answers.

Motions or resolutions dealing with Part II of the Report of the Security Council should be forwarded to the Department in order that additional guidance may be furnished the Delegation.63

ACHESON

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

The Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to the United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission (Baruch)

WASHINGTON, November 7, 1946.

MY DEAR MR. BARUCH: Even before receiving your letter of November 2, I had spoken with Mr. Byrnes regarding your concern in receiving an answer to the question contained in your letter of September 17 to the President and to him. Mr. Byrnes told me that he would go over the matter with you in New York and I now learn from him that by his letter to you of November 6 he has expressed his views. This morning the President told me that he was approving Mr. Byrnes’ recommendation.

In regard to your comments regarding the general disarmament procedures, we here in the Department have been and are in communication with Mr. Byrnes about the matter. I presume that, if he has not already done so, he will soon be in touch with you and Senator Austin regarding a strong position in this matter which will give full

63 At its 55th Meeting, December 11, the General Assembly unanimously adopted the following resolution: “The General Assembly, having received and discussed the report of the Security Council, resolves to pass to the next item of the agenda.” (United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, Second Part, Plenary Meetings, p. 1133). No debate on the substance of the report occurred in Plenary meetings or in the First Committee to which it had been referred.
support to the position which you have been taking in the Atomic Energy Commission.

With kindest regards.

Sincerely, 

DEAN ACHESON

501 BC Armaments/11-546

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 7, 1946.

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY BYRNES

Subject: Analysis of Molotov’s Resolution on Disarmament and Recommendations as to Method of Dealing With it.

On its face, the Molotov proposal appears to be a forward step in achieving United Nations objectives. Actually it will have an opposite effect. For the result of the proposal is to divert attention from the untenable position in which the Russians find themselves in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.

American policy should be aimed at making this vital fact explicitly clear and should seek to focus attention on the real elements of any disarmament program. Otherwise we are likely to be forced into the dangerous position of discussing in detail the technical problem of reduction and elimination of various types of armaments, while the Russians will avoid (as they have so far succeeded in doing in the Atomic Energy Commission) any genuine collaboration in the working out of the international safeguards which are the heart of any effective disarmament program.

It is believed that these conclusions as to the Molotov proposal and the dangers for us in joining in it, are borne out by the events that have occurred in the United Nations since last January.

Molotov now proposes that the General Assembly resolve: first, that a general reduction in armaments is necessary; second, that “a primary objective” in such a program should be “the banning of the manufacture and use of atomic energy for military purposes”; and third, that the Security Council should see to it that these two objectives, that is,

For the text of the resolution on disarmament proposed in Molotov’s address to the General Assembly, October 29, see p. 973.

A draft memorandum for the Secretary of State prepared by Mr. Hiss and dated November 5, not printed, had the same title as the present document and advanced substantially similar arguments. It included a draft resolution to be introduced in the General Assembly of the type described in the penultimate paragraph of the present memorandum. Although the Hiss draft is not a recognizable antecedent of the present document with respect to phraseology, the Office of the Under Secretary presumably considered its content in drafting the memorandum printed here. (501 BC Armaments/11-546)
general reduction of armaments and the banning of atomic weapons, are achieved.

The Molotov proposal has been made to appear as a new and far-reaching approach to the problem of disarmament. This is a quite erroneous impression. Nearly a year ago the General Assembly took action which, in its main features, represented a much more hopeful approach to the problem. In the popular stir created by the current Molotov proposal, many observers have lost sight of this significant circumstance.

The resolution of the General Assembly adopted on January 18, 1946 not only recorded the desire of that body to bring about the elimination of the most important weapons of war, but also provided specifically for practical machinery through which this immense task could be undertaken. That resolution set up a Commission directed, among other things, to “proceed with the utmost dispatch” and “make specific proposals... for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.”

The resolution clearly recognized that the heart of the disarmament measures must be the establishment of safeguards to cope with the hazards of secret violations of the terms of a treaty. To give effect to this view, the General Assembly further directed the Commission to make “specific proposals” “for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions.”

The Commission, thus established by the General Assembly on January 18, has been in session for the past five months. During these months the Russians have repeatedly professed approval of international measures to eliminate atomic weapons. But at every stage in the proceedings, they have stubbornly refused to consider or discuss any measures of genuine international control. It has become plain that what the Russians mean by international control is a mere paper agreement to ban atomic weapons. The only teeth they would countenance in such an agreement would be a provision that “the government signing the convention would, by national legislation, take steps to insure that the convention is applied and would in particular provide for the most severe punishment.” In short, each nation would have to take the word of every other nation that the treaty was being observed.

The only other “safeguard” advanced by the Russians is contained in the vague suggestion that “the Security Council would guarantee

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65 The reference is to General Assembly Resolution 1 (I), “Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy,” approved January 24, 1946; for text, see GA (1/1), Plenary, pp. 258-59, or Department of State, Documents on Disarmament 1945-1959, vol. I, pp. 6-7.
the enforcement of the convention as a part of its duties in connection with maintenance of international peace and security.” But despite the most persistent questioning by the representatives of other nations, the Russians have never been willing or able to explain what measures they believe the Security Council could possibly use to make this guarantee effective.

When in the course of the proceedings, the United States representatives have proposed real safeguards involving inspection and access to the various countries of the world by an international organization, the Russian representatives have responded that inspection is not reconcilable with the principle of sovereignty of states. This attitude, which is hardly consistent with the terms of the Resolution of January 18, 1946, is amplified in the following paraphrased translation from the Russian, issued to the press on July 31. The press release covered statements which the Russian representative was reported to have made in a committee meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission on that day:

“Mr. Gromyko said that the proposed inspection is not reconcilable with the principle of sovereignty of states. ‘No inspection as such can guarantee peace and security.’ And, he added, ‘This idea of inspection is greatly exaggerated in importance. It is a too superficial understanding of the problem of control.’ The Soviet Delegate repeated that inspection had assumed undue importance in the course of the discussions and said that the only real underlying method of control is ‘by the cooperation of the United Nations.’”

The statement just quoted is typical of the position which the Russians have taken throughout the deliberations of the Atomic Energy Commission. In the process of discussion it has become increasingly clear that they are evading the main issue. The repeated attempts by the representatives of other countries to draw the Russians out have highlighted this fact, and in consequence the position of the Russian representatives has become more and more awkward. It is this situation which probably accounts for the rather conflicting statements of Alexandrov, Gromyko, Molotov, and Stalin in recent weeks. They are certainly aware of the difficulties of their stand in the Commission and of the impracticability of maintaining that stand indefinitely, and they have been searching for a way out.

It is in this setting that the proposal of Molotov should be appraised. As already suggested, its effect would be to divert attention from the untenable position in which the Russians find themselves. If the Molotov resolution or something similar is adopted it will mean that discussions of disarmament will be carried on in broader terms and in a new forum and the proceedings of the Atomic Energy Commission will be minimized. Attention will be centered instead upon such
matters as "banning the manufacture of atomic weapons", reducing the size of navies, reducing the size of air forces, and reducing the size of armies, and the issues as to safeguards will be buried in a maze of generalities and technicalities.

This is the serious danger in any attempt to develop in company with the Russians a broad new approach to the problem of disarmament in the General Assembly. To guard against it our representatives in the General Assembly should emphasize the futility of any proposals for reduction in armaments unless there is some real possibility of agreement upon effective international safeguards; they should emphasize that effective international safeguards are impossible without some form of inspection, or international operations, or other measures which involve ready access by an international organization to the various nations of the world.

Our representatives should point out that the most important aspects of disarmament have already been acted upon by the General Assembly in its resolution of January 18, 1946; that the Atomic Energy Commission, the special organ of the Security Council set up to implement this action, is the agency through which the work ought to be continued with all possible vigor; that it can only serve to confuse the problem and give the world a false sense of hope for the General Assembly to adopt, as a dramatic new measure, a resolution which in fact would be less effective than the measure adopted a year ago.

In view of the paramount importance of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, the main purpose of the United Nations should be to make progress in disarmament in those fields. Obviously, if the ambitious program already voted can make no progress, it is foolish to believe that a still more ambitious program, such as that which Molotov professes to advocate, could have any hope of success.

An early decision should be reached as to what, if any, formal action on this subject the United States should advocate in the General Assembly. If we do not propose or join in an affirmative measure of some kind, it may appear that the Russians are taking the lead in pressing for disarmament, a widely popular move, and that we are opposing this policy. Effective exposition of our true position as suggested in this memorandum, should go a long way toward meeting this danger. And Mr. Baruch's proposal in his memorandum of September 17, which the President and you have approved, should serve to complement this line of action. In addition, however, it may well prove desirable for us to propose a specific measure in the General Assembly.

One possibility for such action would be a resolution by the General Assembly reaffirming that the resolution of January 18, 1946 is the most important step in approaching the problem of disarmament, expressing the conviction that the establishment of safeguards by way of
international inspection and other means is basic to any measures of disarmament, and recording its sense that the expeditious fulfillment by the Atomic Energy Commission of its terms of reference with respect to atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is of the highest importance. The foregoing is merely one suggestion.

There are doubtless a number of other possibilities for action which would serve the purpose as well or better, and the discussions which Senator Austin and Mr. Baruch are having should be very helpful in determining the best course to take. Through these discussions it should be possible for Senator Austin and Mr. Baruch to work out a program in which each would strengthen the other's position.

DEAN ACHESON

USUN Files

Memorandum by Mr. John C. Ross, Adviser, United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] November 7, 1946.

PRESENT STATUS—FORMULATION OF DISARMAMENT POLICY

1. The United States has indicated (Senator Austin's speech) that it welcomed the general disarmament proposals made by Mr. Molotov the day before. Our action in so doing has been publicly and privately acclaimed.

2. Considerable doubt has been expressed concerning the sincerity of the Soviet Union's motives in advancing its disarmament proposals. Until this doubt is clarified it is essential that the United States restore and maintain its position of leadership in this field.

3. Up to the point of Molotov's speech we were in a position of at least partial leadership based on the initiative we had taken and maintained with regard to atomic energy. Our proposal for the establishment of an Atomic Energy Commission, which was adopted by the General Assembly in London, covered two of the three areas of the disarmament field, namely, (a) atomic energy and (b) other weapons of mass destruction. We have made specific proposals concerning the control of atomic energy but we have made no specific proposals concerning the control of other weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, we have made no proposals at all in regard to the third phase of disarmament which concerns the reduction of armies, navies, air forces, et cetera. The Soviet Union has made proposals which cover this third phase as well as the other two. Although we have welcomed their proposals we must be honest with ourselves and admit that until we
take some positive, affirmative, constructive action the leadership rests with them.

4. There is general agreement among us that adequate safeguards are an essential component of any system of disarmament. Exactly what we mean when we use the term “adequate safeguards” is not, however, entirely clear and this subject will require further study and development.

5. There is also general agreement among us that the United States must not disarm unilaterally. Here again our meaning is not entirely clear and will require further study and development.

6. Beyond the area of agreement concerning adequate safeguards and unilateral disarmament there is a considerable difference of views as to what policy we should pursue generally with regard to this whole subject of disarmament and, more specifically, what action we should take in the current Assembly.

7. One view which, generally speaking, Senator Austin seems to have held consistently for a long time is that the disarmament field must be considered and dealt with as a whole. Atomic energy, other weapons of mass destruction, armies, navies, air forces—all of these and perhaps more are closely related aspects of a single problem which, in turn, is closely related to other problems such as the provision of armed forces under Article 43 of the Charter, and the Soviet agenda item concerning troops on foreign territories. This generalized approach was stated in effect by Molotov in his speech. It is an approach which has very widespread public support in this country. Molotov was presumably not unaware of this fact, which is evidenced by public and governmental reaction to Senator Austin’s speech. The principle of general disarmament has also received much support in the Congress. At the last session a considerable number of Bills on the subject were introduced, Senator Tydings’ proposal for a general disarmament conference to reduce armaments by January 1, 1950 down to the level of the peace forces required under the Charter being perhaps the most notable. With a Republican and economy-minded Congress the additional and very natural motives of Republican Party leadership in the Congress and economy through reduction of armaments (by far the largest item in our national Budget) must be added as strong factors to the already strong desire for general disarmament. Unless there is real responsiveness to all of these factors through adoption of a policy which is at once bold, imaginative and creative, positive, affirmative and constructive, there is a great danger that we shall be caught in a wave of irrational, unilateral disarmament without any quid pro quo from the Soviet Union or the rest of the world generally, a situation which would immeasurably weaken our capacity for self-
defense, our position in the United Nations, and in our whole foreign relations program. Even if this danger were not great, even if the risk were only a very small one, we cannot afford in this vital area of our national security to take lightly even the smallest risk.

On the other hand the broad, sweeping approach characterized by Senator Tydings' Resolution may fairly be described as an oversimplification of an exceedingly complex problem. Moreover, it would be more appropriate for the United States to take the initiative in the establishment of appropriate machinery within the framework of the United Nations rather than having our President, as suggested by Senator Tydings, convene an international conference. Furthermore, the job of disarmament is a very tough as well as complex one and an international conference is not the best machinery for this kind of job.

A broad generalized approach would be most responsive to Molotov's proposals. This might presumably be considered as a fact that would facilitate the negotiation and speedy conclusion of mutually satisfactory arrangements with the Soviet Union and other United Nations. However, while we want to be as responsive as possible to Soviet views the Molotov proposals are stated in very general terms and carry no assurances that would be considered essential by us. We cannot, therefore, risk jumping to the conclusion that virtually complete responsiveness to the Molotov proposals will produce satisfactory results and allow ourselves meanwhile to be sidetracked and lose the advantage we have gained and hitherto maintained, through our atomic energy proposals. I believe Senator Austin and everyone else would now agree, therefore, that whatever else we may decide to do, we must re-focus attention on the necessity of international control and development of atomic energy with adequate safeguards against diversion for non-beneficial purposes.

8. If I understand correctly, Mr. Herbert Marks feels strongly and Mr. Acheson tends to agree that the emphasis should be placed on atomic energy control to such an extent as virtually to exclude any action at this time with regard to other aspects of disarmament. If correctly represented this seems to be a somewhat extreme position. It would not be sufficiently responsive to the Russian proposals to offer real hope that progress could be made with them even in the atomic energy field. It would not be sufficiently responsive to public and Congressional opinion in the United States to avoid the danger of unilateral disarmament referred to above. It would not be sufficiently responsive to the general sentiment in the Assembly in favor of disarmament. Finally, it would in effect repudiate what was said in Senator Austin's speech about disarmament.

9. A less extreme alternative is embodied in a resolution drafted
by Alger Hiss and reviewed by Ben Cohen (copy attached). The essential parts of this resolution are contained in the first three paragraphs. The first paragraph reaffirms the desirability of general disarmament and "recommends that the Security Council give prompt consideration to the practical measures essential thereto" and recognizes that disarmament must be general and not unilateral. The second paragraph recognizes the necessity of "effective safeguards". The third paragraph re-focuses attention on the atomic energy problem and "recommends that the Atomic Energy Commission expedite its deliberations".

This draft resolution accomplishes the purpose of re-focusing attention on the work of the Atomic Energy Commission. Beyond that, however, it could hardly be considered as responsive to any of the various elements referred to above; on the contrary it is a very weak response. It is hardly to be expected that the Security Council which is already heavily burdened with work could at this time be expected to take on this additional very big and difficult job and discharge its responsibilities toward that job very effectively. Furthermore, the veto would be a serious deterrent to real progress. As in the case of atomic energy, specialized machinery consistent with the Charter and the responsibilities of the Security Council with regard to disarmament is necessary. (See Quincy Wright's letter.)

10. This leads to the suggestion that we propose in the Assembly a resolution which would (a) emphasize the necessity of expediting the work of the Atomic Energy Commission, in this connection underscoring the essentiality of international control with adequate safeguards, (b) emphasize the close inter-relationship of all phases of disarmament, including atomic energy, other weapons of mass destruction, armies, navies and air forces, and the provision of armed forces, the presence of troops abroad, et cetera, (c) emphasize the necessity of close correlation of all of these factors as parts of a comprehensive whole in the development of a rational program along parallel and integrated lines, and (d) propose, in order to achieve this correlation and establish the broad political principles and objectives which are necessary to achieve practical results at the technical level (tonnages, et cetera), the establishment of a Permanent Disarmament Commission related to the Security Council in much the same way as the

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66 The draft resolution under reference is not attached to the source text and has not been found in the files of the Department of State. See, however, the text of the resolution ultimately introduced by the United States, p. 1076.

67 Letter not identified.
present Atomic Energy Commission is related to the Council. The best organization of this Commission would be as indicated on the attached Chart No. 1, namely, a Commission composed of three or more panels to deal respectively with atomic energy, other weapons of mass destruction, armies, navies, et cetera, and possibly related questions such as armed forces under Article 43, et cetera. This Permanent Disarmament Commission might best consist only of the Members of the Security Council in view of the Council's particular responsibilities.

[Here follows a detailed description of the proposed Permanent Disarmament Commission and of parallel United States machinery to facilitate participation in its work.]

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501 BC Armaments/11-846

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 8, 1946.

I have had two conversations with Mr. Reams regarding our memorandum of November 7 to Secretary Byrnes entitled "Analysis of Molotov's Resolution on Disarmament and Recommendations as to Method of Dealing With It". The result of the two discussions is that Mr. Byrnes has read the memorandum carefully and agrees with it. He wishes to note one reservation for the time being. This runs to the next to the last paragraph on page 5 of the memorandum. Mr. Byrnes, as I understand it, is not questioning the propriety of such a resolution as that described in this paragraph should it be considered necessary at some stage to introduce a resolution. His point is that he thinks the time is not now opportune to introduce any resolution.

He, therefore, wishes us to proceed with whatever work we can do and are doing on the subject matter of the memorandum along the lines of the memorandum but until we put the matter up to him again not to propose a resolution.

DEAN ACHESON

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*The chart is not attached to the source text and has not been found in the files of the Department of State.*

*In regard to the proposal contained in this paragraph, see the USUN draft resolution of November 26, p. 1061.*

*This memorandum was directed to Messrs. Hilldring, Hiss, and Marks.*

*At a November 20th meeting of the Three Secretaries, Acheson, representing the Department of State, circulated his memorandum of November 7, informing the service Secretaries that Secretary Byrnes had approved it subject to the reservation with respect to the submitting of a resolution. (811.002/1-2446)*
CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] November 21, 1946.

Subject: Conversation with Dean Acheson, Friday, Nov. 8, 1946
(Messrs. Hancock and Lindsay)

With respect to proposed University of Chicago meeting, Mr. Acheson stated that he had asked Kennan not to attend the session. Acheson had seen the President that morning concerning our proposed course of action and the President was writing Mr. Baruch a letter confirming the Secretary of State’s recent note.73

We discussed the form in which the political questions should be put. Acheson fully agreed that there was no advantage in bringing up the easy questions first, but that we should begin with the basic fundamentals of international control. He took the position that this report should not be considered as final but rather as an interim report. We suggested that it might be in the form of a single report which could be accepted unanimously by the Commission and which would include:

(a) Areas of complete agreement,
(b) The principles which the United States and its friends supported, and
(c) The position held by Russia and Poland.

Such a report would have the advantage of highlighting the basic differences between us without forcing the Russians at this time to take a public stand against our proposals. This might make it easier for them to reverse their position at a later date.

In respect to the Molotov resolution on disarmament, rather than an attempt to revise the Molotov resolutions (an indirect attack) except when final action and vote is in order, Acheson agreed with Hancock that our initial approach should be a direct attack and should say in effect, “We have already been negotiating for nearly a year on disarmament in the field in which the Russians are weakest and in which we are the strongest. We have had no success whatsoever. Under such circumstances, it seems unthinkable that the Russians are sincere in their proposal for general disarmament in other fields in which they hold the advantage.” Acheson asked that he be kept informed of our progress and added that the Secretary of State sometimes neglected to keep him informed.

F[RANKLIN] A. L[INDSAY]

72 Staff member, United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission.
73 Dated November 5, p. 965.
CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK.] November 12, 1946.

Subject: Notes on Conversation Held on Friday, November 8, between George F. Kennan of State Department, and Messrs. Hancock and Lindsay.

Mr. Hancock opened the discussion by referring to the University of Chicago meeting in December to discuss alternate atomic energy proposals. Kennan stated that he thought he would not be able to attend the meeting.

We outlined briefly our current status and our plan for bringing the political issues to the fore again before the end of the year. He agreed in general with this proposal, but felt that it should not be regarded in any way as a final step but rather as an interim step in long and drawn-out negotiations. He thought when the question of atomic energy came before the Politburo, the question was undoubtedly asked, “What will the Americans do if we don’t sign up?” At the present time the Soviets probably answered that question by assuming that we will do nothing. Under such circumstances they would undoubtedly reason that it was not necessary for them to take any action now. Kennan believes that we should begin a series of moves designed to convince the Russians of our serious intent and of the consequences if they chose to continue their present course. Such a series of steps might, for example, include Military Staff conversations between ourselves, the British and the Canadians or the construction of a new bombproof General Staff headquarters in a remote region. He firmly believes we must keep a constant and firm pressure on the Russians. We must show no sign of weakening whatever in the position which we have taken. Despite his realistic and rather pessimistic attitude, he feels that ultimately it may be possible to reach a satisfactory agreement with the Russians.

He believed that there was a slight possibility that Stalin and the Politburo really did not understand our proposals in the spirit in which they have been put forward. He considers that a direct appeal, therefore, to Stalin would be very desirable. This appeal should be made quietly and without publicity and should be made by Ambassador Smith and one or more qualified men from the United States. He also thinks that either he or Chip Bohlen should go along to interpret because of the personal confidence that Stalin has developed through long association with them.

FRANKLIN A. LINDSAY
SECRET URGENT  NEW YORK, November 18, 1946—10:15 p.m.
[Received November 19, 12:58 a.m.]

822. The following position on Soviet troop proposal, approved by Secretary, will be presented to Delegation tomorrow morning for approval: Recommendations

A. Substantive

(1) We should immediately take steps to broaden the inquiry so as to include all mobilized troops at home and abroad, including those in ex-enemy territories.

(2) We should indicate from the beginning complete readiness to comply with an appropriate request to furnish such information.

(3) Neither Austria nor Korea is to be regarded as an ex-enemy country.

(4) Only troops in excess of 100 in any particular country should be reported.

(5) If troops in home territories are to be included, only total figures should be required, without giving locations and breakdown.

(6) Should circumstances make it appropriate to do so, we should reaffirm the importance which we attach to adequate safeguards in the field of armament regulation.

B. Proposed tactics

The Soviet representative will presumably open the debate on the item relating to the disposition of troops of United Nations in other than ex-enemy countries.

The following tactical moves are recommended:

(1) The United States should endeavor to speak soon, if possible immediately, after the Soviet representative.

(2) The initial statement of the U.S. representative should be a brief and forceful one making it clear that we have a clear conscience and nothing to hide, and embodying the points made in A, 1-4, above.

(3) The U.S. should endeavor to avoid raising the issue as to whether broadening the resolution is within the Committee's competence. If the question is raised by others, we should insist that such an amendment as we propose is entirely appropriate.

(4) Before any statement is made in open committee, the U.K. Delegation should be consulted and, if possible, their concurrence with the U.S. position obtained.

Austin
Minutes of the Twenty-second Meeting of the United States Delegation, New York, Hotel Pennsylvania, November 19, 1946, 9 a.m.

SECRET

[Here follow list of names of persons present (31) and discussion of other questions.]

THE REPORT ON LOCATION OF TROOPS QUESTION

Mr. Sanders 75 noted that Committee I was going to postpone further discussion on the veto for a few days and turn to the question of the location of troops in ex-enemy territories. This item had been placed on the agenda by the Soviet Union. However, no Russian resolution had yet been submitted, although doubtless there would be one. He noted that the Russian intention was to have troops withdrawn throughout the whole world. Particularly in the long run this applied to the United Kingdom. He noted that Mr. Molotov in his opening speech had said, that the purpose of the Russian motion was to allow the Security Council to proceed under Article 43 of the Charter on forces. However, in the Security Council when this question had been discussed, the Russians had refused to agree that there was any connection between the two items. They had then claimed that the presence of troops in other countries was a source of uneasiness.

Mr. Sandifer 76 then read the recommendations from position paper US/A/C.1/54 (Rev. b) 77 as follows:

a. Substantive

1. We should immediately take steps to broaden the inquiry so as to include all mobilized troops at home and abroad, including those in ex-enemy territories.

Senator Connally pointed out that Secretary Byrnes had suggested the word “mobilized” in order that there might be included the large mobilized reserves. The Secretary’s thought was that a report should be made on all troops wherever they might be. Senator Austin noted that this might refer to the United States troops since we were quite likely to have a large reserve and a small active force.

Senator Vandenberg inquired about the meaning of the word “mobilized”. Did it mean prepared and ready to shoot? He thought it

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75 William Sanders, Associate Chief of the Division of International Organization Affairs; Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly.
76 Durward V. Sandifer, Chief of the Division of International Organization Affairs; Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly.
77 The recommendations under reference are printed in telegram 822, November 18, from New York, supra.
connoted readiness for war. Senator Connally said that this was the case.

Mr. Dulles said he wanted to question the desirability of including a report on troops at home. He thought the reason for the Soviet proposal was clearly that it was a propaganda effort to show that the United States had troops in China and the United Kingdom had them in Greece. Now the United States was coming back to say that it would not tell about its troops in China unless the Russians told about their troops in Russia. He thought that most people felt that the home forces were properly a matter of secret military information, just as we thought was the case with the atomic bomb. He thought that the proposal as put forward, was too wide to be on sound ground, and that we were over-playing our hand. He pointed out that the United States was not willing to disclose information regarding the atomic bomb which was our principal weapon. We would put forward our information regarding our subsidiary weapon while asking the U.S.S.R. to disclose information regarding its primary weapon.

Senator Austin pointed out that this was in line with United States views on disarmament. He said his own choice was to put the whole matter together and to consider this item as a matter of military intelligence with inspection accompanied by a disarmament proposal on a well arranged and organized plan. Disarmament obviously could not be accomplished in a day. The question is how to handle the report on troops—whether it could be taken up now or in connection with the general disarmament.

Senator Connally said that some of the advisers were insisting on combining the whole proposition into one. He did not agree, for he thought it lost the entire character of the proposal. He thought the Russians would not want the proposal if it was changed in this way. He did not expect that we would get far with disarmament at this session of the General Assembly. He said he was for disarmament but with a good many "ifs" and "whens". He did not want disarmament when someone else had a bead on us. Senator Austin said that this was exactly right, that Senator Connally had never spoken truer words. He said that the United States had no idea of reducing its military posture until security was acquired through the United Nations Peace Force.

Mr. Cohen reported that the Secretary's suggestion on mobilized troops came as a result of a talk with Mr. Bevin. Mr. Bevin's view was that if there were any resolution it should cover all mobilized forces. Mr. Cohen thought that feeling arose from the fact that the Soviet Union had large troops close to other territories and that this was relevant to the maintenance of security. He supposed that "mobi-
lized" meant troops in a position to be ordered out of the country for combat. At Senator Vandenberg's request, Colonel Bonesteel replied that mobilized troops meant troops under military discipline and control as opposed to inactive or reserve status. Senator Connally noted that when press reports spoke of mobilization [it] meant a call to the colors putting soldiers on active duty. Senator Austin noted that the United States system gave a less specific meaning to the word mobilized. Senator Vandenberg thought that the word had a belligerent atmosphere. Mr. Cohen said that he was sure that the phrase was used in a lay sense and he thought that the advisors might consider whether there was a more appropriate phrase.

Senator Connally reported that the Secretary had told him that he wanted the resolution to cover all troops everywhere. This was on the theory that the information was necessary when there was talk on disarmament. He did not think that the military and naval people wanted the clause regarding inspection to check on the information submitted. He thought that some of our military units were not strong enough to stand inspection.

Mr. Cohen said that he did not know whether the word "mobilized" was necessary. Mr. Ross suggested that the term "on active service" or "on active duty" might better be used.

Mrs. Roosevelt said that she believed with Mr. Dulles that we were making a mistake to expect the Russians to say what forces they had within their borders. We had a perfect right to ask what troops there were outside. She thought that to ask what troops there were at home, unless the request was implemented with an inspection provision, was not going to produce information of much value. It was asking a good deal of others. She said she was not sure this government would be perfectly glad to let the world know about our military situation. Senator Connally remarked that the world knows how many troops we have.

Mr. Dulles said that everyone wanted to keep the United States strong militarily as long as it was under the guns of a threatening power. He thought that the Soviet plan was a subtle one to disarm the United States unilaterally. If the American people were led to believe that the United States was militaristic, then we will disarm. He thought that the Soviet proposal regarding the presence of troops abroad and their attitude on the Japanese mandated islands question were being used to the same propaganda end. He thought that the United States had to play a propaganda game as skillfully as the Russians. We would be over-playing our hand, from a propaganda

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*For documentation on United States policy with respect to the Japanese mandated islands question, see pp. 544 ff.*
viewpoint, to demand the number of troops at home in return for giving the figures on those abroad for this would be considered an unreasonable condition.

Mr. Cohen said that it was not suggested that the information should not be disclosed unless the proposal were broadened. He noted that the United States position paper did not say that the United States would not join in disclosing all troops. He thought there should be no distinction between disclosing the troops abroad whether or not the Russians went along with disclosing the troops at home. There was no suggestion that in pressing for a broadened resolution, that the United States was unwilling to disclose its troops abroad.

[There follows further discussion of the subject. The formal Record of Decisions of this meeting indicates that the Delegation agreed to the substance of the recommendations contained in US/A/C.1/54 (Rev.2). The Record concludes as follows: "It was agreed to give Senator Connally discretion in handling this matter in Committee I, particularly with reference to the degree to which the U.S. should press to have the resolution cover the reporting on troops at home." (IO Files)]

Matthews Files 79

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)

TOP SECRET

Moscow, November 19, 1946.

Dear Doc: While I was in New York Mr. Baruch gave me a memorandum of a conversation on October 19th between Mr. Franklin A. Lindsay and other members of the Atomic Energy Commission and Mr. Sobolev of the Soviet Union.30 I assume you have a copy of this memorandum which is extremely interesting.31

It has been gone over carefully by the political officers of this Embassy, who believe that the conclusions reached by Mr. Lindsay as a result of this meeting are eminently sound. In fact, from close study of public pronouncements by Soviet officials, the position assumed by Soviet representatives at various international conferences, the authoritative statements of Communist Party ideologues and the line

79 Lot 5, files of Messrs. H. Freeman Matthews and John D. Hickerson who were in 1946 Director and Deputy Director, respectively, of the Office of European Affairs.

30 The memorandum is printed p. 955. For a memorandum by Mr. John Paton Davies, First Secretary of the Embassy in Moscow, on the memorandum of the conversation with Mr. Sobolev, see vol. vi, p. 806.

31 Mr. Matthews wrote "I have not." in the margin opposite this sentence.
followed by the Soviet press, our people had reached the same general conclusions which I quote below.

"The Soviet attitude toward American production of atomic bombs and the more general issue of adequate control and inspection is based upon and directly derives from the Soviet world outlook. This outlook is inspired by and inextricably bound up with the Leninist-Stalinist interpretation of historical materialism—a predetermined and dogmatic explanation of all human phenomena. The political philosophy of the men who rule Russia, despite its confusing tactical flexibility, is as intolerant and dogmatic as that which motivated the zealots of Islam or the Inquisition in Spain.

"By the terms of the Soviet outlook, the world is an arena of struggle between the forces of 'progress' led by the Soviet Union and the forces of reaction led by the United States and the British Commonwealth. According to Leninist-Stalinist dogma, there can be no compromise between the two camps. One or the other must be destroyed. Because the USSR is advancing along the 'scientific' path of historical materialism, the Soviet system is the one predestined to survive. But it is not likely to survive without a struggle. The decaying forces of capitalism are likely, by the same 'scientific' rule, to attempt to crush the Soviet Union.

"Because the western world is regarded as organically hostile, because there can be no compromise with the western world excepting for temporary tactical maneuvers, and because there is every likelihood of a war between the imperialist west and the Soviet system, Sobolev was speaking a Stalinist truth when he stated that the USSR was seeking to pursue its own policies in complete freedom and without control from the outside. For the same reason it may be assumed that Sobolev accurately reflected Kremlin thinking when he stated that the world was not ready for world government. The Stalinist doctrine preaches that the Soviet state must grow in strength and authority so long as 'capitalist encirclement' continues and that it cannot wither away until 'capitalist encirclement' has been eliminated. It is clear from the pronouncements of Soviet ideologues that 'capitalist encirclement' will not even diminish until the relative strength of the United States and the British Commonwealth has been drastically reduced below that of the Soviet empire.

"With the foregoing in mind, it is evident that the USSR will not voluntarily cooperate in any effective international scheme for inspection and control of atomic energy. If under pressure it consented as a matter of tactics to pro forma inspection and control, it would still employ every ruse and stratagem to prevent such inspection and control from fulfilling the purposes for which they were designed.

"As basic Soviet strategy is to weaken its 'enemies', it is wholly logical that the USSR should exert every effort to bring about the cessation of atomic bomb production in the United States. If the USSR succeeds in this, it will certainly attempt to prevent the resumption of American bomb production. It would, of course, be utterly naive to assume that the cessation of bomb production in the United States would induce the USSR either to abandon its own gigantic atomic research project or to participate sincerely in an effective pro-
gram for atomic control and inspection. The Kremlin creed is one of implacable hostility, not collaboration; unremitting preparation for war with the democratic west, not conciliation; the existence of two worlds now and the establishment of one world only when it will assuredly be a Soviet world.

"Mr. Lindsay's final conclusion, that the proposal for discussion between Molotov and Byrnes was probably prompted by the hope that the USSR might obtain concessions from the United States, would seem to be accurate, for reasons stated above.

"Having said the foregoing, the question arises—what should our future policy with regard to the control of atomic energy be? It is felt that nothing is to be lost and a good deal to be gained by continued pressure for genuine control and inspection. At the same time, production of atomic bombs should, of course, be continued. It might be well to broaden the proposals for control and inspection to include reduction, control and inspection of all armaments (as was suggested in the Embassy's telegram 2013, June 26 82).

"From a security point of view, the United States probably has little to lose in the unlikely event that the USSR accepts such a proposal. The USSR presumably already has extensive information regarding American military strength, while the United States has comparatively slight information regarding the Soviet military position. 83

"It is essential, however, in undertaking such a program that the United States attempt to regain from the USSR the moral initiative and leadership in the whole question of armaments reduction, control and inspection. If this is done and non-Soviet world opinion is mobilized behind the United States, we should be able to put the Russians on the spot sufficiently, if not to force adequate control and inspection measures, at least to place our own good faith indelibly on record and expose Soviet 'peaceful intentions' for what they are worth and thereby awaken the non-Soviet world to the peril which now threatens it."

My own opinion is that the ultimate and logical developments of our proposals for the control of atomic energy and the results which would seem to provide the greatest obtainable security for the western world and for ourselves, is the extension of our confidence 84 to those nations which are willing in good faith to accept and cooperate with the control measures which we have proposed. This would eventually include most of the nations of the non-Soviet world who are, of course, vitally interested in the security as well as in the economic benefits which might be expected to result if the combined scientific and productive capacities of a group of democratic nations were directed toward the development of atomic power.

82 See Mr. Thompson's memorandum to Mr. Hickerson, June 27, and footnote 5, p. 857.
83 Mr. Matthews placed a vertical line and a question mark in the margin opposite this paragraph.
84 Mr. Matthews underlined the word "confidence," placed a question mark opposite it in the margin, and wrote "What does this mean?"
Such a result would inevitably be interpreted by the Soviet Union as a direct threat, and might produce a violent reaction instead of their cooperation for which we have been hoping. However, I can see very little chance of any other really satisfactory solution, and if we now discard our last trump card we have nothing left to play.

I suggest that you furnish a copy of the above evaluation to Mr. Baruch for the information of the appropriate personnel of his Commission. I am sure he will find it interesting.

Sincerely,

Bedell

501.BB/11-1946

The Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

[WASHINGTON,] November 19, 1946.

Subject: Position of our Delegation on Soviet Proposal for Information About Location of Troops

Three main points have been under active consideration for the past few days and will probably arise again in the debate in Committee. Our initial position is, of course, settled by telegram 822 of November 18 from New York which you saw this morning.

1. Our proposal to broaden the inquiry to include troops at home.

It has been recognized in New York that many of the smaller countries are likely to resist this extension for the reason that without such an extension the proposal would not apply to them at all in as much as they have no troops abroad. The only suggestions any of us in the Department have made to New York on this topic have been that the possible adverse reaction from a number of the smaller countries to this broadening of the proposal made it appear unwise for the United States to submit an actual resolution at the outset of the debate. (There were other reasons which we also advanced as to why we should not initiate a resolution at this time.) The Delegation and the Secretary are agreed that we should not propose a resolution at this time.

I learned today that Mr. Dulles and others of the Delegates actually opposed including troops at home. Mr. Dulles in particular thought that if adopted it would simply lead the Soviets to say that numbers of troops were of less importance than some types of weapons and that they would thereupon ask that the inquiry be broadened to include a report on stocks of atomic bombs, etc. This must be the opposition the Secretary mentioned to you. It is, as you know, now settled that we
will continue to assert our support for this extension. Whether we will formally propose it will depend on reactions of other delegations.

2. Inspection and relationship to disarmament proposal.

The British apparently continue to hope to have the whole proposal dropped. In line with this they have advocated the requirement of inspection to enable verification of any figures submitted. They have also indicated a desire to combine consideration of the troop proposal with consideration of the disarmament proposal.

Our Military Staff Committee representatives in New York have also favored inspection as they fear that otherwise our figures, which would be accurate, would appear to the public as unduly large in comparison with the Soviet figures which would probably be markedly understated.

We have suggested to New York that it might be confusing and inconsistent with our major objectives in the disarmament field to combine these two topics. We have also said that the troop proposal would be a poor issue on which to fight out the question of inspection. Most of the smaller countries (on the assumption that we would still be supporting the inclusion of troops at home) would be apt to favor minimal inspection. Our people in New York, apart from the Military Staff Committee representatives, agree with us on both points. They are keeping in close touch with Ben Cohen on this.

3. Unilateral disclosure of our troop dispositions.

We have suggested to New York that in view of the British desire not to disclose the locations of their troops it would be unfair for us to make unilateral disclosure before any Assembly request for such disclosure. This would force the British to do the same against their will. We have suggested that any consideration for unilateral disclosure should therefore be checked with the Secretary through Ben Cohen who would know the effect of this on our commitments to the British.

Our Military Staff Committee representatives in New York have also opposed unilateral disclosure as they think it would weaken our bargaining position in trying to get the Soviets to disclose their troops in territories where the Soviets have not wanted to make such a disclosure.

Ben Cohen thinks that for public relations reasons we may have to state figures of our troops in particular countries, such as China, in the course of debate. He thinks also that we may have to release all our figures at the last moment if the resolution is being smothered to demonstrate that we have nothing to hide and have not tried to kill the resolution in order to cover up. He will keep in close touch with the British and clear the matter with them before making unilateral disclosure.
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 19, 1946.

DEVELOPMENTS WITH RESPECT TO SOVIET DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

I told Mr. Ross today, following up conversations I have had with you recently on this subject, that in view of the Secretary’s approval of your memorandum of November 7, copies of which are in Mr. Baruch’s and Senator Austin’s hands, it appeared that our Delegation in New York now have available material on which to prepare Senator Connally’s statements in Committee 1.

I made clear to Mr. Ross that the Secretary’s approval of your memorandum was subject to the proviso that the Secretary did not think it profitable to consider at this time the terms of any possible resolution.

Mr. Ross said that Senator Austin plans in the near future to talk to the Secretary about your memorandum. Mr. Ross says that he is confident that the Senator is in full agreement on the major points of the importance of safeguards, the primary significance of control of atomic energy, and the impossibility of unilateral disarmament. Mr. Ross is also confident that the Senator is aware of the dangers of getting into a consideration of the technical details of regulation of armaments. However, it is likely that the Senator may have somewhat different views as to how to accomplish the general objectives of your memorandum and wishes to discuss the question of tactics directly with the Secretary.

The foregoing is simply for your information and, so far as I can see, calls for no action on your part at this time.

Notes of a Luncheon Meeting Between Members of the United States and Soviet Delegations to the Atomic Energy Commission, New York, November 20, 1946

RESTRICTED

Present: Prof. Alexandrov Mr. Hancock
Dr. Mescheryakov Mr. Burton
Mr. Vavilov Mr. Lindsay
Mr. Kondratiev Dr. Fine
Mr. Chase

In a general discussion at the start of the luncheon, Mr. Hancock observed that the problem of atomic energy is unique in his experience
in that it seems to have no limits. Prof. Alexandrov stated that this was quite understandable since the problem concerns every aspect of humanity.

However, we must, in our work, put the problem within certain limits based on what we know. Otherwise, we can't arrive at any solution. Dr. Mescheryakov remarked that in the field of research, distant limits or no limits at all are desirable and, for that reason, confessed to a certain pessimism. Prof. Alexandrov replied that we are now talking of controls, and that he felt optimistic about the possibilities of setting certain limits and also of getting agreement within this area. The problem is almost one of what to exclude rather than what to include.

Mr. Hancock stated that he too was of an optimistic nature and felt that an agreement not only must, but could be reached. Prof. Alexandrov added that we must confine ourselves to the area of what is known, or certain. No one can foresee the full possibilities of atomic energy now, just as no one could foresee the possibilities of electricity when that form of energy was discovered. He felt that it would be better to centralize all development in this field for the present. The French suggestion of decentralizing this work throughout the universities is quite premature. That is for the future. We should so work that only those activities that are fully understood become decentralized or "democratized." We cannot foresee all such developments, and for this reason, we must not tie ourselves too firmly to any particular line. Dr. Mescheryakov added that students the world over are a wild lot and they should not be permitted to fool around with atomic energy. They might start making bombs.

Prof. Alexandrov prefaced his answer to this question by remarking that he was a scientist, engineer and pedagog and not a political man. However, it seemed to him that we should look for progress in the field of atomic energy to our superiors. Mr. Molotov had suggested (a) general reduction in armaments and (b) in this connection, the banning of atomic energy for military purposes. Mr. Stalin had also stated that a strong international control is necessary in the field of atomic energy. If Mr. Molotov could meet with a corresponding individual from the United States to agree on the general principles or policy of control, the Atomic Energy Commission could move forward very rapidly. At present, the members of the Atomic Energy Commission are working in the general background of this problem. They are handicapped by the fact that there is no agreement in principle on the part of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. It is surprising that we have been able to progress as far as we are now in view of this lack of agreement.

Mr. Hancock stated that he agreed that agreement in principle or in
policy must be achieved but feared that tying the problem of control of atomic energy to the general problem of disarmament might submerge this important problem in the overall debate and discussion.

Prof. Alexandrov replied that he did not think that this was possible, that he has felt all along that it was unfortunate that the problem of atomic energy has always been so isolated from the other problems affecting the entire world. If our Ministers of State, or other individuals empowered to deal with such problems could be persuaded to take up the problem of atomic energy while they are discussing problems of, let us say, Trieste, Germany, the Far East and general disarmament, an agreement in principle might be reached in the field of atomic energy which would fit this problem into the general pattern of world problems and would permit the Atomic Energy Commission to proceed rapidly in the working out of the details. Prof. Alexandrov asked Mr. Hancock's permission to bring up this subject with his superiors with the view of persuading them to take up this problem with corresponding U.S. officials.

Mr. Hancock gave Prof. Alexandrov blanket authority to report everything that was being said during the luncheon and added that he had no objection to such a proposed line of action. He stated that such added problems are not within his competence but that he understood that the U.S. was preparing to deal with this problem at the level suggested by Prof. Alexandrov. Mr. Hancock further added that the Moscow Declaration and the General Assembly Resolution had given a clear mandate to the Atomic Energy Commission on how to proceed with this problem. Prof. Alexandrov agreed but added that in the light of the Moscow Declaration and the G.A. Resolution the U.S. had proposed the plan known as the Baruch Plan and the Soviets had proposed a plan put forth by Mr. Gromyko. These plans are not in agreement, and Prof. Alexandrov felt that we have gone about as far as we can under these directives. He felt that a further agreement on policy was necessary before any appreciable progress could be made in the Atomic Energy Commission. When such an agreement is reached, and after the G.A., he felt that more frequent meetings of the Atomic Energy Commission would be possible in order to expedite our work. He again asked Mr. Hancock for permission to report the result of this conversation to his superiors with a view of having appropriate action taken. He also asked Mr. Hancock what his opinion was on this course of action.

Mr. Hancock repeated that this was outside his competence but that he understood that the United States was awaiting a further clarification of the Soviet position prior to taking any action. Mr. Hancock said that it was felt that the Soviet position was unclear, that recent statements by Mr. Stalin and Mr. Molotov were not entirely consistent
with statements made earlier in the proceedings of the Atomic Energy Commission. The United States felt hesitant about pressing the U.S.S.R. representatives for a clarification, feeling that Mr. Molotov would give this clarification in the general debate on disarmament before the General Assembly.

Prof. Alexandrov asked whether he could look upon this present meeting as a gesture of friendship on the part of the United States representative and as an indication of a genuine desire on the part of the U.S. to come to an agreement as soon as possible. He further asked whether the United States would like to receive advance notice of Mr. Molotov’s clarification of what was meant by a strong international control mentioned by Mr. Stalin. He added that every nation is entitled to its own guess as to what was meant by a strong international control, and that it seemed to him, speaking as an individual, that this statement meant, a strong control that was international, and shared in by all nations, beginning with raw materials and going through the entire process of atomic energy development. Discussions to date had indicated that a technical or scientific control was feasible, except for some blank areas in the final stages in atomic energy development. He hoped that physicists and scientists could eventually solve these technical problems. A policing method of control also seemed to be indicated. He repeated that the agreement on a higher level on general policy or principle in this problem was necessary. This agreement should cover the fields of (a) general disarmament, (b) the banning of atomic weapons in connection with general disarmament, and (c) some form of control. He added that with an incorrect solution on overall problems, agreement on atomic energy would be of little value. He added that if international inspection were established he hoped he might be the inspector in the United States and Mr. Hancock in the U.S.S.R. Mr. Hancock laughingly agreed.

Mr. Hancock assured Prof. Alexandrov that the present luncheon was more than a gesture of friendship and that the United States was sincerely and genuinely interested in solving the problems as soon as possible. He favored many more such meetings. Mr. Hancock added that he feared we might slow down the tempo of our work after the first of the year because of the necessity of educating three new members in the complexities of our problem.

Prof. Alexandrov thanked Mr. Hancock for this gesture of friendship and added that he himself had thought of approaching the United States representatives in a similar way, but had refrained because of a general atmosphere of suspicion and a possible misunderstanding of his motives. Such meetings would expedite our work as no agreements are ever possible without such frequent contacts.

Prof. Alexandrov agreed readily when it was suggested to him that
it might be a good idea to make a breakdown of the various problems in the general field of atomic energy control so that areas of agreement and disagreement would be clearly delineated. Such a breakdown would greatly aid our superiors in their considerations of the entire problem.

After the luncheon, Prof. Alexandrov, enroute to the elevators, asked Mr. Chase whether he would be at the meeting on Thursday. Upon receiving an affirmative answer, he stated that he might be able to give some advance information of the Soviet clarification of their present position at that time. He added that he would probably be a member of the U.S.S.R. Delegation for some time and looked forward to working for an agreement. After the luncheon Prof. Alexandrov stated that he expected Prof. Skobeltzyn to return to the United States.

JOSEPH CHASE

USUN Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John C. Ross, Adviser, United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET


Subject: Disarmament; Atomic Energy Commission

Participants: Senator Austin
Mr. Bernard Baruch
Mr. John Hancock
Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt
Mr. John Ross

Mr. Baruch, at his request, came in to see the Senator at 11:30. The discussion continued until one o'clock.

While we were waiting for Mr. Hancock and Mr. Eberstadt to arrive Mr. Baruch made a few preliminary remarks. He made a reference to the importance of punishment and said that in developing the other cardinal principles of our atomic and disarmament policy, we should not neglect this factor. He also said that he and his associates had in mind, among other things, to discuss evidences of a conciliatory attitude on the part of the Russians which they felt they had seen. Mr. Baruch said that he was always wary of Greeks bearing presents but at the same time he also always thought that it was sometimes a good thing to have a look at the presents.

85 November 21.
86 Professor D. V. Skobeltzyn, Adviser, Soviet Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission.
When Mr. Hancock and Mr. Eberstadt arrived, Mr. Eberstadt stated the purpose of their call, roughly along the following lines. In their work in the Atomic Energy Commission during the past two or three weeks they had seen evidence of a softening in the Russian position. It was becoming clearly more apparent to the Russians that they were in a situation, from which they had no good way out, of a very substantial majority of the Commission being for the United States proposals and against them. He said that they had had a test vote a week or ten days ago which they had anticipated would come out nine in favor of the United States with France abstaining and the Soviet Union and Poland voting in the negative. What actually happened was that there were ten votes for the United States, France voting with us, and two abstentions, namely, the Soviet Union and Poland.

Mr. Eberstadt went on to say that at the second and third Russian levels there had been evidence of a more conciliatory, softening attitude. Based on these sources he thought the Russians might be trying to find a way out of their present dilemma with regard to the atomic energy work in two ways; first, by using the Molotov general disarmament proposals as a means of confusing the atomic energy issues, second, by suggesting that with regard to the latter issues the time had perhaps come for a discussion between Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Molotov. It was the view of Mr. Baruch and his associates, Mr. Eberstadt said, that we should not allow ourselves to be misled in either of these directions. On the former point it was very important that we do not allow the general disarmament proposals to confuse the atomic energy matter. On the second point Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Molotov had discussed this matter fully in Moscow last December and again at the Assembly in London; they had agreed upon the fundamental principles. At this time it was felt further discussion would merely serve to take the focus off the Commission’s work as such.

Senator Austin turned his attention to the first of these points, namely, the question of disarmament. He said that we have been giving a good deal of thought to this question, having in mind the importance of not detracting from or delaying the atomic energy work, that he and I yesterday afternoon had read over a long paper which was set up in the form of a draft resolution which was probably much too long as a resolution, but that regardless of its form it was, in effect, a statement of all of the objectives and problems involved in the disarmament question, particular attention being paid to the constitutional basis under the United Nations Charter for the various specific proposals made. The Senator then asked me to read this paper which I did.

*The paper under reference is a preliminary draft of a resolution prepared in Senator Austin’s office; for the text of the 4th Draft, November 26, see p. 1061.*
After I had read it, Mr. Eberstadt was kind enough to say that he thought it was a magnificent paper, and that with regard to the atomic energy program he thought that it filled the bill and hit the nail on the head completely.

Mr. Baruch and Mr. Hancock appeared to agree with this general estimate.

Senator Austin queried whether the other gentlemen did not think that the paper was much too long. Mr. Eberstadt said he thought that while some of the matters relating to procedures, et cetera, might be taken out, he nevertheless felt that for a matter of this great importance there was much value in having a very full statement of all of these important points, having in mind that we would be establishing here, in effect, in such a resolution a worldwide basis for full public understanding of the principal points and issues involved. Mr. Baruch and Mr. Hancock appeared to agree.

We then discussed the preamble material in this paper, Senator Austin raising the question whether all of this preambular material might not be boiled down to the fundamental issue of the whole objective of the United Nations. Mr. Baruch seemed to react favorably to this idea. Mr. Eberstadt seemed to feel that while some boiling down could be accomplished, he nevertheless felt that there were some points in the preambular material which should be retained. I suggested that it was of great importance that the two fundamental principles contained in the paragraphs relating to multilateral, rather than unilateral, disarmament and to effective safeguards should be covered in the preamble and strongly affirmed. These were such fundamental principles, from our point of view, that it was perhaps not realistic to assume that any substantial progress could be made in the disarmament field unless these two principles were accepted. This did not, of course, mean that we would be putting forward any preconceived or half-baked ideas about, for example, the particular forms that safeguards might take in the different phases of disarmament. These were all open questions and part of the work of the proposed disarmament commission itself. Mr. Eberstadt and the others appeared to agree with this viewpoint.

There was then general agreement that in addition to eliminating the procedural material, the draft resolution could be further boiled down by omitting some of the itemizing of particular things that would be done and by attempting to cut down on some of the repetitious material. We then discussed some of the relatively minor points which Mr. Eberstadt raised as follows.

1. He had some doubt whether Canada should be included by name and by right as a permanent member. This was, of course, vital in the atomic energy case because of Canada’s particular relationship
to this problem. We indicated that we saw no real reason why Canada should be included in this way.

2. Is a treaty necessary in order to establish and make the commission operative or can we operate on the basis of a General Assembly resolution? I pointed out that we were not here attempting to set up an operating agency which probably would require a treaty, but a policy-making and planning agency which, I thought, was clearly within the powers of the General Assembly and would not require any treaty implementation.

3. On the general question of reporting by the proposed commission, Mr. Eberstadt said he would like to study this more carefully. He had one thought and that is whether we had adequately covered the point of the commission being able to report on its own authority.

4. With regard to the paragraph on relationships between the Permanent Disarmament Commission and the Atomic Energy Commission, where we state that the former should not infringe upon or impede "unduly" the work of the latter, Mr. Eberstadt felt that the word unduly was unfortunate and could be twisted by the Russians. We readily agreed that this word was not at all necessary.

5. He hoped that it would be possible to get in something about nipping aggression in the bud. (This, in a way, is the same idea as Senator Austin expressed yesterday about "removing the means for conducting aggressive warfare").

There was then some further general discussion about presentation with particular reference to Mr. Baruch's experience in the Atomic Energy Commission and the procedure they had followed of making, first, a fundamental statement of principles which they then followed up by fuller statements setting forth in greater detail some of the aspects of the principles originally stated. It was indicated that copies of these various papers would be sent to us.

With reference to the paragraph under the statement of functions which concerns the proposed commission as a clearing house and coordinating center, Mr. Hancock, while indicating his understanding of an agreement with the objective sought, thought that the wording could be improved in order to avoid some of the unfortunate wording used so much, during the war, in Washington.

Mr. Baruch then said that he would like to make a few off-the-cuff comments. He said that the first statement by Senator Austin will attract much more attention than any second, third, or fourth statements he might make. He said that the first statement, therefore, he felt, should be based fully on "high grounds". For this reason he would incidentally leave out anything more than the bare minimum relating to procedures and put this kind of material into supplemental papers.
Reverting to the theme of high grounds, Mr. Baruch said he hoped that Senator Austin would find it possible to develop the theme of elimination of war as an objective. He said he fully realized that this was considered to be an unrealistic sort of thing, but that he nevertheless thought the human yearning for the reestablishment of this objective in terms which were associated with some reasonable hope of accomplishment was tremendous and should be met. He said when he had discussed with the State Department the original presentation of his material in the Atomic Energy Commission he had been advised that the best thing to do would be merely to lay the Acheson-Lilienthal Report on the table. He said he had told Secretary Byrnes that he had to do more than this. He said that if he were going to do a job he had to get into it the basic convictions that he had held strongly for a long time.

He then went on to say that his second major point was a plea that in his statement Senator Austin should discuss the question of punishment. He said there must be no interference with the daily operations. He said that also there should be no interference with the punishment. He said that they must not veto the daily operations and they must not veto punishment.

Mr. Baruch said that he knew his views with regard to the veto were not exactly popular. He made it clear that he was for the veto given present circumstances, but he thought (and Mr. Eberstadt subsequently developed this point a little more fully) that when the United Nations reached the point of going beyond the Charter and making a solemn agreement in a field as important as atomic energy or disarmament, they must be willing to go beyond the Charter as well with regard to the veto.

Discussion of this point developed that in effect Mr. Baruch was suggesting the addition of a fourth cardinal point, namely, enforcement to the three cardinal points which we already had, that is, no unilateral disarmament, effective safeguards, and get on with the work of the Atomic Energy Commission.

In response to Senator Austin’s question whether it would be necessary in dealing with the enforcement question to get into the veto, Mr. Baruch and Mr. Eberstadt both said that there was no possibility of ducking the question, that it would be asked and it would be said that there is no possibility of enforcement because of the veto or if there were going to be any enforcement what would you do about the veto.

Mr. Baruch, apologizing to the Senator for being so vehement and explaining that he was only because of his deep conviction and sincerity, said that he hoped from the bottom of his heart that in the initial statement on this disarmament proposal nothing would be re-
served that the Senator has in the back of his head. He said he thought we must speak out very plainly on these fundamental questions.

By agreement I gave a copy of the paper which I had read to Mr. Hancock, explaining to him that it was very much of a first draft working paper which Senator Austin and I had been over only yesterday evening, that no one else had copies of it.

The discussion then concluded on a very friendly and cordial and cooperative note, it being understood that each group would keep in the very closest touch with the other.

After Mr. Baruch and his associates had left Senator Austin telephoned Secretary Byrnes and made an appointment to see him at 2:30 Friday. It was agreed that meanwhile I should try to boil down this present paper to somewhat more manageable proportions taking into account as much as possible of the discussions we had just had as a basis for discussion with the Secretary.

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501.BB/11-2146 : Telegram

Senator Austin to the Secretary of State

PRIORITY

NEW YORK, November 21, 1946—12:30 a. m.

[Received 12:47 a. m.]

831. Text of resolution on armed forces proposed in Committee I November 20 by Molotov follows:

"General Assembly recommends to Security Council to take a decision to effect that states-members of UN should submit following information to Secretary General and Security Council within a month:

1. At what points in territory of UN members or other states with exception of former enemy territories and in what number are armed forces of other UN members.

2. At what points in former enemy states and in what number are armed forces of Allied powers and other UN members.

3. At what points in above mentioned territories are air and naval bases and what is size of their garrisons belonging to armed forces of other UN states members.

4. Information to be provided under paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 should refer to the situation as it existed November 1, 1946."58

AUSTIN

58 The First Committee took up the question of United Nations members reporting on their troops stationed on non-enemy territories at its 24th Meeting, November 20; for the record of that meeting, see GA (1/2), First Committee, pp. 127-130. Molotov reiterated the Soviet position and submitted the resolution contained in the present telegram. Senator Connelly responded that United States troops were stationed on foreign territory with the consent of the governments concerned. He emphasized that the United States was willing to report on all troops as it had nothing to hide, but stated that the Soviet proposal just offered would have to be studied before he could comment upon it.
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss)

[WASHINGTON,] November 21, 1946.

Subject: Soviet Proposal for Reports on Disposition of Troops

Participants: Senator Warren Austin (USDel-New York)
Mr. John C. Ross (USDel-New York)
Mr. Alger Hiss

Mr. Ross called me this afternoon on the above subject and said that Parodi had supported Molotov’s position that the subject of troops at home should be taken up under the subject of disarmament. Molotov had then stated, in answer to Cadogan’s question of yesterday, that the Soviets believe this information would be helpful in connection with the preparation by the Security Council of agreements for the supply of forces under Article 43. He also referred, although more indirectly than in the past, to the political aspects of the presence of troops in other countries.

Bevin had then spoken and had said that the British would be prepared to give information of this kind in connection with the negotiation of agreements under Article 43. However, he thought that the whole question of reporting on troops should be considered in connection with disarmament and he made a formal motion to this effect.

This morning the Turkish Ambassador had called on Senator Austin and had expressed great anxiety about our suggestion that members of the United Nations should report on the number of their troops at home as well as those abroad. The Turkish Ambassador said it would be most embarrassing for his country at this time to report on this subject.

Mr. Ross said that Senator Austin wished to propose to the Secretary that in order to avoid confusing the troop question with the more important question of disarmament we should tomorrow express our willingness to support the Soviet-French proposal. In order to meet the British position as far as possible, Senator Austin would propose

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59 The first two paragraphs of this memorandum relate to the 25th Meeting of the First Committee, November 21; for the record of that meeting, see GA (I/2), First Committee, pp. 131-137.
60 At the 24th Meeting of the First Committee, November 20, the United Kingdom Representative, Sir Alexander Cadogan, had asked Molotov to explain the exact purpose of the Soviet proposal.
61 Huseyin Ragip Baydur, the Turkish Ambassador in the United States; Head of the Turkish Delegation to the General Assembly.
62 “Soviet-French proposal” refers to the fact that the French Delegation had expressed support for the Soviet resolution at the 25th Meeting of the First Committee.
an amendment to the Soviet motion which would recite that information on troops at home would of course be furnished by member states in connection with any disarmament program which might in the future be adopted by the United Nations. The Senator felt that in view of the fact that we would be differing from the British it would not be practicable for us to propose our own resolution along the lines of the Soviet-French proposal but differing in detail. He felt that this would confuse the parliamentary situation and he had been told that our proposal would get lost in the shuffle. Instead, therefore, he was going to suggest to the Secretary, unless we saw objection, that we support the Soviet proposals (the text of which is set out in New York’s telegraph 831 of November 21) with simply the amendment referred to above about information being given on troops at home in connection with any subsequent disarmament program.

Mr. Blaisdell discussed this suggested course of action with Colonel Giffen and Colonel Bonesteel and found that the Army would find it very burdensome to report as to what points in various countries our troops were located or the numbers at those points. Our present reporting system does not cover these matters and it would be necessary to ask for special reports in all cases. Colonel Bonesteel and Colonel Giffen felt that this effort was not warranted by the importance of the proposed resolution. They confirmed our feeling that reporting on specific locations would be particularly disagreeable to the British. They felt, however, that there was no real strategic disadvantage to the British or ourselves in this respect but they recognized that the British might disagree with their view on this. They did feel that the political question which we, of course, have been particularly concerned with was of major importance, namely, having it appear that the Soviets had succeeded in driving a wedge between us and the British. On the subject of our bases they said that they would prefer not to report on the size of our garrisons at particular bases and questioned whether the resolution was of sufficient importance to warrant such reports by us. They did not, however, feel that this was as important to them as the question of specific location of our forces in other countries.

After going over all the foregoing with Mr. Acheson I called Senator Austin and told him that Mr. Acheson thought it would be highly desirable for us to make every effort to get the British to agree to go along in support of a resolution asking for reports on troops both in friendly countries and in ex-enemy countries. However, he felt that it was more important to avoid confusing the troop reporting problem with the vital question of disarmament. He felt that if we pointed out
to the British the great importance of emphasizing in the disarmament discussion the necessity for adequate international inspection they might agree with our position. In any event he thought avoiding confusion in the disarmament field was more important than avoiding a split with the British on the troop question.

I then pointed out the views of the Army as set forth above with respect to the difficulty of reporting on exact locations of our troops and pointed out that this would probably be particularly objectionable to the British. With British support it might be feasible for us to propose desirable amendments to the Soviet proposal. I said that if we could not get an amendment making express provision that reports need not be made on troops below 100 in any country, our representative should get an expression of the committee’s agreement that whatever resolution was adopted was not meant to cover such small units. I pointed out that we had military attachés with their staffs in practically every country in the world and that if we reported on all these units propaganda could be made that we had troops in a very large number of countries.

Senator Austin appeared to appreciate the importance of each of the points which I made.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by Mr. John M. Hancock of the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission


I want to marshal all the arguments relating to the suggestion that we stop making bombs.

This argument takes these obvious forms with all sorts of permutations of them.

1. Truman should have offered to stop making bombs at the time of the Moscow Declaration.
2. The United States should now offer to stop making bombs.
3. When the advocates of #2 realize the futility of that argument, then they propose that the United States should stop making fissionable materials.
4. Beyond this, the first step in the appeasement process is to dispose of the present fissionable material.
5. The next step in the appeasement process is to offer the world the right to inspect to be sure that we are keeping our word.
6. The United States should turn over its atomic energy plants to an international trusteeship.

The various forms in which this argument appears make it very difficult to grab hold of the whole concept.
There seem to be two general ideas rolling around in the back of the minds of those who approach our difficulties by urging any one of the six suggestions above. One argument takes the form of urging that it would create a better attitude on the part of the other nations, particularly Russia, and that this better attitude would be of some tangible benefit in the negotiations. The difficulty I find is that at best the idea is only a gesture, which would be utterly ineffective unless it went the whole way, and if it should go the whole way it would be very dangerous because it would be the first step in the start of a general policy of appeasement, and the making of the first step would only lead to further demands.

The second argument in the minds of the advocates seems to be that it would be desirable to equalize the bargaining position of the nations. I don’t see any benefit in equalizing the bargaining positions if we expect thereby to get an effective treaty. The equalizing of the bargaining positions would be a fair guarantee there would be no effective treaty. If we start out with the theme that we are going to equalize the bargaining position, the first question is whether we mean to equalize it in (a) the atomic energy field, or (b) in the general disarmament field. If we talk of equalizing it in the atomic energy field, I don’t see any limit to which the demand would go. Certainly we couldn’t equalize it unless we gave up all the information, destroyed all our plants, killed the scientists, destroyed the know-how of production and the plants in which such know-how could be applied. It obviously would do no good for us to destroy all these things and leave the rest of the world free to go as far as it could in arriving at our present position.

As to the proposition that we stop making bombs, the advocates of that idea forget that we would have to stop making fissionable material, or the promise to stop making bombs would have no meaning. The production of fissionable material would put us in a position to make a bomb in a very short time. This fact shows the unsubstantial nature of the gesture to stop making bombs. If we go the whole way of stopping the production of fissionable material, we would interfere seriously with the research work and with the entire peaceful industrial program.

No one would assert that any one of these forms would not be a friendly gesture. The only answer is that the making of the gesture would be utterly ineffective.

So far as I am aware, no nation has asked us to do this, and quite surely no delegate has made the suggestion, but Dr. Auger did make the suggestion last July.

Some small nations have expressed opposition to the idea and have
urged us not to accept the suggestion. It seems logical that some small nations would feel safer with a bomb in our possession in the present condition of troublesome world affairs.

The suggestion has been made that we stop making the bombs for a specified time, disregarding for the moment the lack of clarity as to what we should stop making, and whether the request was limited to bomb manufacture alone or not. It would seem clear that any such offer would have to be conditioned in either of two ways: (a) for a specified time, or (b) under certain conditions. As to the first suggestion regarding the time limit, it seems obvious that at the expiration of the time there would be a heavy responsibility on this country if it were to decide to resume manufacture. It would be quite a terrifying notice to the rest of the world that an arms race really was starting and that war was imminent. The resumption of manufacturing would add to the terrors of the world in a very marked degree. Our stopping of the making of bombs would be regarded as an act in aiding the peace. Quite obviously, the resumption of manufacturing would be regarded as a threat to the peace.

As to the alternate suggestion it would be difficult to outline the conditions under which we would no longer be bound to stop production at this time, but if they were outlined, quite obviously we would face the alternative of having the decision as to compliance with the conditions rest with ourselves alone or with some other body. If we left it to our sole discretion, we would have the problem to meet that we met in the Wallace argument regarding the matter of stages. No one in that case, however, proposed that this matter should be handled at our sole discretion, but, still, we were accused of having that view. As to the bodies to decide whether conditions were met, I don’t want now to advocate any such decision except as a part of a treaty.

The argument seems to me to boil down to about this—that the advocates of these various ideas want us to do now what we are proposing to do under our plan in the treaty by well-defined stages, with some organization set up in the treaty to decide that the stages have been obtained. I don’t know at this time what that body should be, and, yet, I am sure that if we pursue the arguments for appeasement, we will be in that position very promptly.

Underlying this whole argument is a lot of confusion of mind about the duty and responsibility of this Government. It seems to me clear that this Government has a responsibility to its own people to protect them as a nation. Under our plan we are proposing that we surrender this responsibility in the field of atomic energy provided that no other nation is in a position to achieve what we are giving up.

People seem to forget that the atomic bomb is only one weapon in-
volved in the disarmament program. If other nations could get us to give up the bomb unconditionally or by the mere exchange of promises, my guess is that disarmament in the broad pattern would be doomed.

Take the specific case of Russia and her views of the atomic bomb and the treaty to deal with it. It seems clear to me that if Russia will not agree to inspection in that field where she gives up no weapon, she certainly will not agree to an effective disarmament in other fields where she will have to give up weapons. What she is after now is unilateral disarmament in the field where she has nothing to surrender. All we ask is that she surrender the chance to make bombs at some future date without our knowing that she has started to make bombs. Until the time arrives when Russia is able to make bombs, she gives up not even the opportunity to use them. Our own theme is that we will not lessen the security of any nation by any plan to which we will agree in connection with the atomic bomb.

One great difficulty with the suggestions is that they overlap each other, and whatever might be done in this matter would not create a uniform frame of mind on the part of those considering our action or attempting to interpret it. Any move by us should be calculated to have one certain logical effect, but that seems impossible in this particular case.

The Russian position regarding the surrender of sovereignty in the field of atomic energy seems to show a strange concern for their sovereignty with very little regard either for our sovereignty or for the sovereignty of the rest of the world, and still less regard for our national security.

On the one hand Russia has rejected the United States Proposals because it is an undue interference with national sovereignty. On the other hand the Russian proposal, made by Gromyko during the opening sessions of the Atomic Energy Commission, provided a very material infringement on United States sovereignty. In addition, the proposed Russian treaty would force an infringement on the national sovereignty of all nations who might not ratify the treaty, provided only 51% of the nations did ratify it.

It is very strange that some people think that Mr. Molotov has really scored a victory in referring to disarmament before the General Assembly at this time when the fact is that it was discussed at San Francisco almost two years ago that the Russians are the only ones up to now who have delayed action in this field insofar as the Military Staff Committee is concerned. There isn't anything new in their suggestions. The real fact is that the discussions started so long ago that people have forgotten about these discussions of almost two years ago.
U.S. Position With Respect To Furnishing Information Of Allied Troops In Countries Not Ex-Enemy

1. Reference is made to your memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 19 November,* concerning the position of the United States with respect to a Soviet proposal for information of Allied troops in territories not ex-enemy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff perceive no objection from the military point of view to the position approved by the Secretary of State as indicated in Annex (E) of the enclosure to your memorandum.94

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff understand that the U.S. Delegation will not in the discussion of troop information raise the question of safeguards in the field of armament regulation as indicated in paragraph A 6 of Annex (E) of your enclosure unless the subject of troop information is considered together with the question of armament regulation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in this plan not to raise this issue except under the circumstances indicated above. In the event, however, that the subject is considered jointly with the question of armament regulation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur with the position indicated in paragraph A 6 of Annex (E), and with the amendment suggested by you that there be added the phrase “with appropriate measures of international verification.”

3. In general, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the U.S. position regarding the importance of safeguards, including appropriate measures for international inspection (verification), would be more appropriate for consideration with the important issues of international control of atomic energy and armament regulation.

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*This memorandum was prepared by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; it was approved by the JCS on November 22 and circulated in the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee for information on December 4. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee report submitting the present document to the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that a Department of State representative, Hiss, had been consulted in its preparation and perceived no objection to the guidance it provided.

*Transmitted Enclosure "B". [Footnote in the original.] Enclosure "B" is not printed. In that document the Military Representatives summarized the situation created by the Soviet proposal, indicated that they had consulted with the United States Delegation on the matter, and requested guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Annex E of Enclosure "B", telegram 822, November 18, from New York, is printed on p. 1012.
rather than with the lesser subject problem of providing information regarding the location of troops.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John R. Burton, Jr. 95

[New York,] November 22, 1946.

Subject: Talk On French Disarmament Proposal at Luncheon Given by Mr. deRose of the French Delegation, Attended by Mr. Lindsay and Mr. Burton.

Had lunch with Mr. deRose of the French Delegation on Thursday, November 21. The general subject of the proposed French disarmament agreement was discussed. It seems certain that the French intend to submit some kind of a disarmament proposal in the near future. They are not certain in their mind yet, however, exactly what form this will take, and it might be that the copy we have is more in the nature of a trial balloon. The conversation developed the fact that the drafting was hurried and had not yet received the entire approval of either the local delegation or the French Foreign Office.

The only feature which was discussed at this particular luncheon with Mr. deRose was the inclusion of the concept of atomic energy control within the framework of any general disarmament proposal, and particular reference was made to any features involving an atomic truce while negotiations proceeded. The French point of view which, incidentally, is not shared by the entire French Delegation, is that some form of atomic truce would have a beneficial effect on negotiations. The length of time of the truce was stated to be six months. That had been chosen since the French were led to believe that it took six months to manufacture an atomic bomb from fissionable material. There was no thought that the United States should cease the manufacture of fissionable material which, of course, had peacetime applications but only cease the manufacture of atomic bombs. It was called to Mr. deRose's attention that the subject of general disarmament which would be discussed during this six months was so vast that it was doubtful whether agreement could be reached within that time on even a majority of the problems involved. He was asked what the reaction would be at the end of the six months period when we announced recommencing of atomic bomb manufacture. He admitted that this would have a disastrous and depressing effect on world opinion and might cause more harm in the long run than if the atomic truce had never been mentioned in the first place. He again stressed at this point

95 Staff member, United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission.
that the atomic truce was not favored by all the members of the delegation but evidently there is some substantial pressure behind this idea from undisclosed members. In closing, he was asked his opinion of the French reaction to a statement by this Government that it had ceased the manufacture of atomic weapons. He stated, “The average Frenchman in the street will simply say, ‘Oh, the United States has so many of the bombs anyway that they do not need to make any more’.” It was pointed out to him that based on this very frank statement, he could see what an empty gesture any such move on our part would be, and its failure to have any real beneficial effect on international negotiations at this time.

JOHN R. BURTON, JR.

IO Files

Minutes of the Twenty-fifth Meeting of the United States Delegation,
New York, Hotel Pennsylvania, November 22, 1946, 9 a.m.

SECRET

[Here follow a list of persons (29) present, consideration of another subject, and discussion of the Soviet resolution on reporting by United Nations members of their troops on non-enemy territory.]

Mr. Cohen said that the Secretary’s view was that it was advisable to support a merger of the two questions, making it clear that we did not want to delay disclosures of the number of our troops. That is, the United States should support consideration of the two items together but it should also vote for fairly prompt disclosure of the information requested in a matter of thirty or sixty days or some such time.

Mr. Dulles inquired whether when the Delegation voted on the Bevin resolution, that meant that we would disclose or would not disclose the number of our troops abroad. Senator Connally said that it was simply a question of discussing disarmament in the course of the debate and that some resolutions would certainly be brought in but that there were none before the Committee yet.

Mr. Dulles said that he thought it was all right to support the Bevin resolution if it was made clear that we will make the disclosures of the location of our troops whether the Bevin resolution passed or not. He said that the Soviets were of the opinion that our troops were scattered around the world engaged in some nefarious activities.

90 The merger under reference was proposed by British Foreign Secretary Bevin at the 25th Meeting of the First Committee on November 21; in regard to that meeting, see the memorandum of telephone conversation by Hiss, and footnote 88, p. 1061.
This was another kind of Soviet trap. The United Kingdom wanted to be evasive about giving this information. If we went along with them it would make us parties to the evasion. The alternative was to go along with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against the United Kingdom. If we went along with the Bevin resolution it should be made clear that we would none the less report on the presence of our troops abroad.

Mr. Cohen said that he thought that he had made it clear that the Secretary's position was that we should support considering the two items simultaneously, that is, the resolution on reporting and the discussion of disarmament. It should be made clear that we did not want to delay the prompt disclosure of the troops abroad. Mr. Dulles observed that the reporting might be delayed unless the date for giving the information were set. Mr. Cohen pointed [out] that if the Bevin resolution were passed it amounted to considering the two agenda items, the report on the number of troops and disarmament, as one item. Mr. Fahy pointed out that the discussions might be held together but that the problems could be separated when it came to voting.

Mr. Yost observed that it was likely that Manuilsky, the Chairman, would push for a vote on the Soviet resolution and he thought it likely that there might be a wrangle over this question.

Mr. Sandifer said that he thought it was important that the point which Mr. Cohen had made should be perfectly clear; our support of the Bevin motion was with the understanding that it did not affect our position regarding the prompt disclosure of our troops abroad. Mr. Dulles agreed that this was a good idea.

Senator Austin said that he wished to poll the Delegation as to whether [as to whether] it supported the Bevin resolution for merger of the two questions, at the same time serving notice we were ready to disclose troops in the home territory and everywhere else.

Senator Connally said the matter should not be made contingent, for that would give our hand away. Senator Austin said that he did not intend to make the matter contingent and he restated the Delegation position to be that this Delegation favored the merger of the resolution relating to information regarding troops and that relating to disarmament to be accompanied by a statement of our willingness to reveal the number of our troops abroad. This position was unanimously approved by the Delegation.

[Here follow additional discussion of the troops question and discussion of other subjects.]

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97 Charles W. Yost, Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly.
98 Dmitri Z. Manuilsky, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukraine; Chairman of the Ukrainian Delegation to the General Assembly.
SECRETARY BYRNE'S VIEWS ON ARMED FORCES MATTER

In the course of a discussion on a number of matters, the Secretary handed Senator Austin the attached, "Possible Redraft of Resolution on Armed Forces".\(^{06}\) He expressed the thought that we should not go along with the British on anything that looked like a stall. He said that in a phone talk he had with Ben Cohen during the Delegation Meeting this morning\(^ {1}\) he had expressed this thought and thought we ought to put up something which would make it clear that we were fully prepared to provide this information in 30 or 60 days.

The Secretary said he thought we could get the Bevin idea in in a paragraph in this resolution.

(The Secretary apparently had in mind the first paragraph of the attached redraft.)

The Secretary said that all the British were doing was to try to expose what they considered to be nothing but a Soviet propaganda effort.

Senator Austin mentioned the position of the Turks and Chinese who were reluctant to report on their troops at home. The Secretary said that could be taken care of by eliminating the phrase "at what points" in the Molotov draft. He said that is what gives them concern. It is the pin-pointing which would be involved as a result of this language.

Secretary Byrnes then went on to say that there was another point which affects us with reference apparently to paragraph 3 of the draft resolution circulated at the United States Delegation Meeting this morning. The Secretary said that the language "at what points in their own territories including territories outside their metropolitan areas for whose administration they may be responsible". He said that this was very confusing because this might cause us to report on our troops in Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and other places. He said this would give us the appearance of having thousands and thousands of troops all over the world. He said he thought this difficulty could very well be taken care of by paragraphs 2 and 3 of the attached redraft.

Upon returning to the Pennsylvania Hotel I discussed this redraft

\(^{06}\) Not printed, but see resolution contained in telegram 843, November 23, infra.

\(^{1}\) The minutes of the 25th Meeting of the Delegation, November 22, 9 a. m., are printed supra.
somewhat further with Senator Austin. It was agreed that it would be submitted to the Delegation for discussion at the meeting Saturday morning. Before having it reproduced for distribution, however, we would have to straighten out the reference to the regulation of armaments in the first paragraph. The Senator felt that this language, particularly the verb “to implement” was too rigid and that the whole reference to disarmament would have to be made more flexible and somewhat more vague.

501.BC/11-2346: Telegram

Senator Austin to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

New York, November 25, 1946—1 p.m.

URGENT
[Received 1:30 p.m.]

843. Re troop question, delegation decided November 23 on following course:

1. Confirmed decision to support Bevin motion to merge items 4 and 5 and consider them simultaneously; on understanding that this would not involve making issuance of information on troops subject to delays involved in question of disarmament;

2. Will immediately request views of Secretary of State as to whether Senator Connally should in Committee I Monday make statement that U.S. will by December 1 issue information as of latest practicable date covering:

(a) Total number of US uniformed personnel on active service wherever stationed (including personnel of armed forces and military organizations);
(b) Number of such personnel in active service within US territory;
(c) Number of such personnel on territory of each other country in which such personnel are presently maintained;

3. That over week-end experts be authorized to discuss with experts of other delegations possibility of securing resolution along lines of following US revised draft:

“The General Assembly, in order that the United Nations may have available information relating to armed forces necessary to assist the Security Council in giving effect to article 43 of the Charter, and relating to the general reduction of armaments,

a. Recommends that each member of the United Nations should submit the following information to the Secretary-General and to the Security Council:

November 23.

With respect to the decision under reference, see extract from the Minutes of the 25th Meeting of the United States Delegation, November 22, p. 1039.

November 25.
1. The total number of its uniformed personnel on active service wherever stationed, including personnel of the armed forces and in military type organizations;
2. The number of such personnel in active service within its own territories;
3. The number of such personnel on the territory of each other country in which such personnel are presently maintained;

b. Recommends that the requested information be descriptive of the situation existing on November 1, 1946 and that such information be supplied to the Secretary-General within thirty days after the adoption of this resolution; and

c. Instructs the SYG after the expiration of thirty days after the adoption of this resolution to publish promptly all information received and to furnish copies to the Security Council and to all members of the United Nations.  

USdel agreed informally yesterday to drop limitation contained in draft previously cleared with War and Navy Dept's, that troops only in excess of 100 in each particular country need be reported.

Austin

USUN Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John C. Ross, Adviser, United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] November 23, 1946.
Subject: Troops Matter

Participants: Secretary Byrnes
Senator Austin
Senator Connally
Mr. Ben Cohen
Mr. Charles Fahy
Mr. John Ross
Mr. Robert Shirley

Senator Austin outlined to the Secretary the Delegation discussion at its meeting this morning on the question of reporting on troops. In particular, Senator Austin raised the question whether the United States should, through Senator Connally, make a statement on Monday of our intention, as of a given date before the Assembly closes, to publish information on our troops at home and abroad along the

5 This draft resolution had been presented to the Delegation as position paper US/A/C.1/69, November 22.
6 Regarding the Delegation's decisions on the subject, see telegram 843, November 23, supra.
7 November 25.
lines of the draft resolution discussed in the Delegation this morning and regardless of whether any resolution is passed or whether any other government released similar information.

After considerable discussion of the various reasons for and against this proposal, the Secretary clearly indicated his strong opposition to such a unilateral declaration on our part and it was agreed, therefore, that no such declaration would be made.

The Secretary's principal reason was that if we were unilaterally to publish information of the character indicated, this would merely provide a target for other people to shoot at without our information being considered in the light of similar information provided by other governments. Rather than being improved our public relations would thereby be very considerably impaired. On the other hand, the Secretary felt that our public relations position would be very strong if our information were published as he felt it should be, together with similar information from the other countries.

There was then considerable discussion of the position which the United States should now take. It was agreed that for the present our political officers would not discuss with representatives of other delegations any specific resolution, but that they would discuss with them the fundamental points in our position, and that Senator Connally would make a statement in Committee 1 on Monday which would state these points with such explanation and amplification as may seem desirable.

These points were enumerated and agreed to as follows:

1. The United States agrees with the views expressed by Mr. Molotov, Mr. Bevin and others that the question of information concerning troops is related to and should be considered in connection with the Article 43 armed force agreements.

2. The United States agrees that information concerning troops is related to and should be considered with the question of a general reduction of armaments. The United States therefore supports Mr. Bevin's suggestion that these two matters should be considered together, provided, however, that, as the Secretary stated, we would support Mr. Bevin's suggestion if it envisaged that meanwhile the information called for would be provided within thirty days after passage of an appropriate resolution by the Assembly, and as further stated by the Secretary, if this were not the case then we could not support the British suggestion.

3. The United States believes that each Member of the United Nations should submit the following information to the Secretary General and to the Security Council:

(a) The total number of its uniformed personnel on active service
wherever stationed, including personnel of the armed forces and in military type organizations;
(b) The number of such personnel in active service within its own territories;
(c) The number of such personnel on the territory of each other country where they are stationed.

4. The United States believes that this information should be descriptive of the situation existing on November 1, 1946, and that it be supplied to the Secretary General within thirty days after the adoption of an appropriate resolution by the Assembly.

5. The United States believes that the Secretary General should publish promptly all information received and should furnish copies of such information to the Security Council and to all Members of the United Nations.

The Secretary stated that if the resolution contemplated failed of passage the United States had a free hand to furnish the information independently and to consider when and if it would do so regardless of the course of the resolution in the Assembly. This would not be said in Senator Connally’s statement.

On the question of supporting the British motion to combine consideration of this matter with the disarmament matter, the Secretary very clearly stated if the purpose of the British motion were merely to assure in all good faith that at the proper time the two matters would be considered together then he was for it. If, however, the British proposal meant that there would be any delay in action by the Assembly on the troops matter considered separately, then he would oppose it. In other words, the Secretary felt very strongly that whatever action is taken in Committee 1 and by the Assembly should include a provision calling for the information in question within thirty days after approval of a resolution. The Secretary said he had, in effect, told Mr. Bevin from the very beginning when they first discussed the matter in Paris and he would tell him the same thing over and over again as much as might be necessary and seemed to indicate that he would definitely speak with Bevin about it this afternoon.

SPA Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Elwood N. Thompson of the Office of Special Political Affairs

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 22, 1946—5 p.m.

After the conversation with Mr. Joseph Johnson and Mr. William Sanders in New York, reported in my memorandum of conversation
of 11:30 A.M., same date, I arranged for Mr. Acheson to receive an advance copy of telegram 843 of November 23 regarding the troop question. This telegram reports the Delegation position as of November 23 and contains also a revised US draft on the subject of troops.

I suggested that the position of US Del stated in telegram 843, and as outlined by Messrs. J. Johnson and Sanders in my earlier conversation with them, linked the troop reporting proposal rather closely to disarmament whereas I had understood the Department's position was to keep these issues separate. I also pointed out the omission of the previously held U.S. view that reports on troops need not cover countries where less than 100 foreign troops are stationed.

Mr. Acheson telephoned the Secretary in New York to discuss these and related issues raised by telegram 843. Mr. Acheson learned that the Secretary had talked directly with Senator Austin, Senator Connally, and other members of the Delegation, and there would be no unilateral disclosure of US troops stationed in other countries as recommended by the Delegation in the telegram of November 23.

The Secretary told Mr. Acheson that Senator Connally might indicate to the Committee on Monday that the US does favor prompt disclosure of troops and believes that the US or any other country could report within thirty days after a GA resolution on the subject was adopted. The Secretary also indicated that Senator Connally might use the substance of the three points stated in the draft US resolution contained in Telegram 843 of November 23 when stating the US position on Monday.

Mr. Acheson had told the Secretary of his concern that the Delegation was omitting that part of our former position which would preclude the necessity of reporting on troops where less than 100 were stationed. Mr. Acheson pointed out that this might even include posts where there were military attachés and that would mean reporting on troops in nearly every country in the world. Mr. Acheson said the Secretary shared his concern and that the Secretary said he would indicate to Senator Connally that the US should not drop this part of its position.

Mr. Acheson also expressed to the Secretary his concern that the Delegation in its draft resolution was linking the subject of disarmament too closely with the question of reporting on troops. The Secretary had said that there was discussion of a new resolution containing two parts, one concerned with reporting on troops and the other concerned with disarmament, inspection, etc. The Secretary had felt that part 2 would take care of the US desire that the subject of reporting on troops should not be confused with disarmament proposals.

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* Not printed.
* November 25.
Mr. Acheson suggested that we should in addition telephone the New York Delegation emphasizing our concern that the question of reporting on troops was being too closely linked to disarmament and also that the Secretary and Mr. Acheson had agreed that we should continue to maintain our point that there was no necessity to report on troops where less than 100 were concerned. With respect to the latter, Mr. Acheson said that he thought such a provision should actually appear in any resolution adopted or, at a minimum, the US should make clear in its public statements in Committee I that this was an accepted interpretation of any resolution that may be adopted.

Mr. Acheson also hoped that the Department would receive additional texts of proposed resolutions on the troop and disarmament questions as soon as they were formulated in New York, and suggested further that we obtain from the Delegation their understanding of the agreements reached in their conversation today with the Secretary.

Mr. Hiss subsequently talked with Mr. Ross in New York concerning the above points and again on Sunday to Mr. Acheson. These conversations are reported in separate memoranda.10

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501.BB/11-2446

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss)

[WASHINGTON,] November 24, 1946.

Subject: Question of Disclosure of Disposition of Troops

After learning from Mr. E. N. Thompson that Mr. Acheson talked to the Secretary in the afternoon, November 23, on the above subject, I called Mr. Ross in New York and told him of Mr. Acheson’s talk with the Secretary.11 I said that I understood that the Secretary would be getting in touch with Senator Connally about this subject and would urge the Senator to be sure that any resolution that was adopted did not require us to report on our naval attachés, military attachés and other smaller missions of less than 100. I said that Mr. Acheson would prefer to have an express statement to this effect in the resolution but I understood that he was more interested in substance than in the form by which our objective would be accomplished. Mr. Ross said he felt confident that the result would be accomplished. He pointed out that neither the British nor the Soviets would presumably want to have to report on their naval and military attaché

10 See memorandum of conversation by Mr. Hiss, November 24, infra.
11 For an account of the Byrnes-Acheson conversation under reference, see Mr. Thompson’s memorandum of November 23, supra.
missions. He added that if, however, despite a statement of our understanding of the resolution, a majority of the delegations were to ask for a report on naval and military missions, we would not be able to accomplish our objective. (I talked Sunday morning, November 24, with Colonel Bonesteel who said that G-2 had no objections in principle to reporting on our attachés in small missions; they merely felt that such a report was silly and not really in keeping with the objectives of the proposed resolution.)

I also said that Mr. Acheson was particularly anxious to avoid any confusion over the issue of safeguards and inspection with respect to disarmament. He had understood from the Secretary that the Delegation would be drafting a resolution on the troop question which would have some references to disarmament. The Secretary felt confident on the basis of his discussions with the Delegation that the references to disarmament would fully protect our position with respect to safeguards. Mr. Acheson would like to see a copy of the resolution before it is introduced. Mr. Ross told me that it seemed very unlikely that the Delegation would introduce a resolution in the near future and that no drafting of a resolution would at present be undertaken.

In connection with Mr. Acheson's desire to avoid confusion as to the disarmament question, I said it was my understanding that the Secretary in talking to the Delegation had said that we should take the position that information as to troops should in any event be made available within thirty days after the adoption of a resolution calling for such information by the General Assembly. In other words we should make it plain that any reference to the connection between the troop question and disarmament is not to result in delaying the publication. Mr. Ross said that the Delegation understood this clearly.

I said I understood that the Secretary had quite emphatically stated that there should be no unilateral disclosure by us of our troop dispositions. Mr. Ross said that this was clearly understood by the Delegation.

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On Sunday afternoon, November 24, Mr. Ross called me and read a copy of a draft resolution which had just been received from the British Delegation and which the British would introduce on Monday, November 25, if opportunity afforded. (See New York's telegram 849, November 24, which sets forth this resolution.) Mr. Ross said that

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12 War Department General Staff, Intelligence.
13 Not printed. For a description of the British draft resolution, see US/ A/C.1/72 (Rev. a), the text actually submitted in the First Committee, and footnote 17 thereto, p. 1050.
the Delegation would consider the British draft resolution at its meeting on Monday, November 25 at 9:00 a.m.\textsuperscript{14}

I then called Mr. Acheson and read the text of the British draft resolution to him. On the basis of his comments I subsequently told Mr. Ross that Mr. Acheson thought the Delegation should make a strenuous attempt to persuade the British not to confuse disarmament and the troop question. He thought we should point out to the British that this would tend to confuse the whole question of disarmament and particularly the question of safeguards. He thought that the phrase in the second paragraph of the British draft resolution “as a first step in a study of this question”, i.e., regulation of armaments, was objectionable as tending to give impetus to a drive for consideration of technical details of a disarmament program rather than clearing up at the outset the vital question of safeguards. Mr. Acheson also felt that the final clause of the British draft resolution, namely, that the troop information “should be immediately subjected, on the spot, to an effective United Nations system of verification”, was most unfortunate. Mr. Acheson said that this latter provision seemed to him really inconsistent with the Secretary’s decision that we should oppose any delay in making the figures as to troop dispositions promptly available after adoption of the resolution. He thought that the British argument that the verification provision would permit prompt publication of figures was disingenuous as obviously there would be prolonged discussion in the committee of the verification provision. Its effect would really be to delay and sidetrack the troop census proposal. In addition, Mr. Acheson thought that it was impractical and most unwise as tending to jeopardize the much more important question of safeguards for disarmament. He thought that if we could not persuade the British to eliminate this provision we should tell them that we would support its elimination on the foregoing grounds.

Mr. Acheson agreed that in view of the fact that the British themselves were now suggesting specification of the particular points where troops are located we could not oppose such a provision. He thought we might still interpret such provision as calling for a listing of the points where troops are located but with simply an over-all figure as to our troops within any particular country. He also felt that we could not as a practical matter argue against specification of air and naval bases and their garrisons.

\textsuperscript{14}For a summary of the decisions taken by the Delegation at its meeting on the morning of November 25, see telegram 881, November 25, from New York, infra.
Senator Austin to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, November 25, 1946—11:20 a.m.

URGENT
[Received 11:39 a.m.]

851. Re armed forces USdel decided this morning: 15 1. To make early statement along lines determined on November 23 (now embodied in US/A/C.1/69, Rev. A), 16 except that we would not give out information on our armed forces unilaterally;

2. To seek to secure agreement among the several draft resolutions in a subcommittee (of Committee I);

3. If situation permits, to present provisions for reporting forces at home and paragraphs b and c of US/A/C.1/69, Rev. A, as amendments rather than as separate resolution;

4. To oppose provisions for verification of reports and to authorize political officers to inform British to this effect.

AUSTIN

IO Files: US/A/C.1/72 (Rev. a)

United States Delegation Document

NEW YORK, November 25, 1946.

UNITED KINGDOM RESOLUTION ON ARMED FORCES 17

The Committee considers that items 4 and 5 on the Agenda are concerned with two aspects of the same question, the reduction and regulation of armaments.

As a first step in a study of this question, and to assist in the imple-

15 28th Meeting of the United States Delegation, 9 a. m.

16 United States Delegation position paper US/A/C.1/69, November 22, a draft resolution approved by the Delegation on November 23, is printed in telegram 843, November 23, from New York, p. 1042. US/A/C.1/69 (rev.a) differed from the original draft only in matters of minor wording and in its sub-paragraph A.3 which read as follows: "The number of such personnel on the territory of each other country in which they are stationed." (IO Files)

17 The present document is identical with the draft submitted by the United Kingdom Delegation at the 27th Meeting of the First Committee, November 25, 11 a. m.; for the Record of that Meeting, see GA (1/2), First Committee, pp. 143-151. The tentative draft of the present document transmitted by the British Delegation to the United States Delegation on November 24, not printed, differed from the present document in the following respects: It made no reference to Article 43; it made no provision for reporting on "military type formations;" and it did not specify that the system of verification would be one established by the Security Council prior to January 1, 1947. In the Minutes of the United States Delegation Meeting of 9 a. m., November 25, Sanders is reported as saying that the present document had been drafted "as a result of conversations with the British over the week-end." (IO Files)

At the 27th Meeting, Senator Connally expressed agreement with the British proposal to broaden the request for information to include all uniformed personnel in active service with military type organizations at home and abroad. He
mentation of Article 43, the Committee propose that the Assembly recommend that all members of the United Nations furnish the following information to the Secretary-General for communication to the Security Council and to other members of the United Nations and for publication.

1. At what points in the territory of members of the United Nations, or other States, with the exception of former enemy territories, and in what number, are armed forces of other members of the United Nations, including military type formations?

2. At what points in the former enemy States and in what number, are armed forces of the Allied Powers and other members of the United Nations, including military type formations?

3. At what points in the above-mentioned territories are air and naval bases, and what is the size of their garrisons, belonging to the armed forces of States of members of the United Nations?

4. What is the total number of their uniformed personnel on the active list, wherever stationed, at home as well as abroad, including military type formations?

This information, which should be furnished not later than January 1st 1947, should relate to the situation on that date, and should be immediately subjected to an effective United Nations system of verification on the spot by a Committee to be established by the Security Council before that date.

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. G. Hayden Raynor, Adviser, United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET

NEW YORK, November 25, 1946.

This morning before the opening of Committee 1 Mr. Escott Reid handed to me a revised copy of the Canadian proposal on disarmament. He inquired firstly if I had any comments on the earlier draft of this proposal which he had given to me a week ago. I told him that it was under study in my Delegation and in the State Department but to date I had received no comments on it. He then stated that the

also stated that in the long run there must be verification of the reports on troops to make disarmament effective. The record of Senator Connally's remarks includes the following: "His delegation emphatically rejected any implication in this discussion that the information was needed to quiet uneasiness over the presence of United States forces abroad. In this connexion he expressed appreciation for the statements made by the representatives of (China), Panama, Brazil, and Ecuador, which had absolved the United States from any inference that their troops were in those States for any improper purposes."

For text of the Canadian proposal introduced in the First Committee at its 30th Meeting, November 28, see GA (1/2), First Committee, p. 385. This proposal was a revision of the Soviet draft. The United States Delegation had transmitted a very similar version of the Canadian proposal to the Department of State in telegram 844, November 28, not printed (SOL.BB/11–2946).
Canadian Delegation was under pressure from Ottawa to submit this proposal at once but before doing so they want to know if that action would embarrass us in any way or if there was any reason we would prefer they not take this action.

After talking to Mr. John Ross on the telephone, I informed Mr. Reid later in the day that while we did not wish to make any request of the Canadians to defer this action we would appreciate their considering in this connection the points which I would make to him. I then explained that at very high levels in our Government a comprehensive plan on disarmament was being developed for presentation to this Assembly and that we expected our proposal would be a very important one. I explained that while I could not yet disclose its contents as it was not completed I could say that while parts of the Canadian proposal were along the same line as ours there were several points in the Canadian proposal which were at considerable variance from what our plan would probably propose. I said that we had expected all along, and still desired, to consult with the Canadians on our plan and that we hoped that we would be prepared for such consultation toward the latter part of this week.

Mr. Reid agreed to bring the points which I had made to the attention of Mr. St. Laurent. He later told me that he had done so and Mr. St. Laurent was referring the matter back to Ottawa and that there certainly would not be any action on their part for another twenty-four hours. Mr. Reid added, however, that he did hope the consultation would be a consultation and that we would not wait until our plan was so definitely frozen that there would be no opportunity for it to be revised and that the consultation would not be a consultation but the giving of information to them.

Mr. Reid, at the reception tonight, told me that he had been talking to the Australians on this matter as they also have a resolution which they plan to submit immediately. He asked if I would say something to the Australians along the same line as I had said to him as he then thought they might be able to work out an agreement between themselves so that each would postpone submitting its proposal.11

10 Louis S. St. Laurent, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs; Head of the Canadian Delegation to the General Assembly.

11 In a memorandum also dated November 25, Raynor stated the following:

"Following Mr. Escott Reid's request, referred to in a separate memorandum of this date, I spoke to Mr. Paul Hasluck at the reception this evening on the matter of disarmament. I repeated to him almost exactly what I had said to Mr. Reid relative to the development of our comprehensive proposal which we feel to be very important. I also said that we wished and planned to consult with the Australians on this matter. As a result of this conversation, Mr. Hasluck said he would telegraph Canberra in an effort to get permission to defer the submission of the Australian proposals until consultation with us could take place. Apparently, Mr. Hasluck, as have the Canadians, has been under pressure from home to submit their proposals to the Assembly promptly." (USUN Files)

For text of the Australian proposal introduced at the 30th Meeting of the First Committee, November 28, also a revision of the Soviet draft, see GA (1/2), First Committee, p. 337.
Memorandum of Conversation, by Senator Austin

TOP SECRET


I called on Secretary Byrnes by appointment at ten o’clock this morning and told him my purpose was to discuss, if he chose to do so, the draft relating to regulation of armaments and disarmament which we left with him last Thursday.22 He replied that he had not been able to study that, that he had been so tied up by his duties in reference to the treaties that he had been obliged to postpone the consideration of it. Thereupon, I told him that I felt time was of importance in this matter and that we are getting pressures from many sides to make our position clear. He said that he had not noticed pressures from other delegations, and I referred to papers that had been circulated showing that the Australians intended to make a proposition unless we did and wanted to know whether we were going to make one, and that the French likewise had indicated a similar position.

He then turned to the subject of troops and stated, in effect, that he had already told Mr. Bevin that the Delegation yesterday voted to oppose that part of the British proposal relating to troop disclosures which called for verification and that Mr. Bevin was coming to see him and might be there before I left, and that he intended to state our firm position on that matter in opposition to verification.

By way of bringing up to date the situation respecting regulation of armaments and disarmament I handed him the worksheet which I had made dealing with the possible speech to be made by me on this subject,23 and I said that I was particularly anxious to call his attention to the last three pages containing a reference to his statement publicly; then I read those three pages and asked him if I had correctly set forth the position he took and he said no, that he had never said he would have a proposal to make, that he did not make that statement at the Foreign Press Association Meeting, but that the substance of his remarks were a reply to Mr. Molotov’s speech made that night,24 that we would have a further statement which, “I intend making”. He remarked that this is a government matter. “First,” he said, “we will get to the atomic thing and have a showdown on that.”

This is not a complete statement but is my recollection of features of his statement which is to the effect that during the past six months

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22 Reference is to a draft, presumably the 3rd draft dated November 21 (Thursday), of a disarmament proposal prepared in Senator Austin’s office; for text of the 4th draft, November 26, see p. 1061.
23 Not found in Department of State files.
24 Both Byrnes and Molotov addressed the Foreign Press Association in New York on the evening of November 11.
he had been so engaged that he could not consider this subject. "Whether we are ready now to sponsor a proposal," he said, "has not been decided. When the plenary session is held on December 6 I am going to discuss the atomic resolution, the troop business and our position on disarmament. This is a matter of highest policy and must be studied by the President and the Joint Chiefs. I will turn it over to the President to be submitted to the Joint Chiefs and give you a prompt answer."

Then I said that this, in effect, answered some questions that I had not yet asked but intended to ask, namely, to what extent I should go in getting views, and that I had in mind asking him whether it was wise to get the views of Mr. Acheson and the War and Navy Departments, say on tomorrow when they meet. He replied no, that this is not in the scope of their meeting, that they meet on other subjects and not on a high policy like this, that this could only be handled by the President and the Joint Chiefs. Then I said I had wanted to ask him about taking the matter up with Senators Connally and Vandenberg and perhaps other members of our Delegation but that I had not yet turned over to them any copy of this draft and what he said warned me, put me on notice. He said, "You are right. This ought not to go to them now." I said, "Perhaps I have stubbed my toe in one respect. I have turned it over to Mr. Baruch." He said, "Well, if you want to avoid the press getting access to this you couldn't have done worse than turn it over to Mr. Baruch. He has with him Mr. Swope who has access to the papers and there is danger of its going out through him." He said, "I will get in touch with Mr. Baruch promptly and caution him that this draft must be kept secret until after he hears from me further."

"Now," he said, "I will take the draft you handed to me the other day and get copies made. I will send them to the President with a view to having him submit it to the Joint Chiefs." I said, "We have done a little work on that draft since then and I think it would be wiser to let me give you the latest draft for that use," and he said, "Do that; get it ready and send it right up here." 23

So the matter stands like this. At the next plenary session he will make an address covering this subject as well as the other two. The question whether a definite proposal shall be made by us has not yet been decided but will be decided promptly and we will be informed. In the meantime the draft is to be kept secret except as above stated.

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23 The following notation by Austin appears on the bottom of the last page of the source text: "Nov. 29—Sec. phoned he had sent to the Pres. two copies (one for Gen'l Eisenhower). Pres. expressed objection to hurrying."
Minutes of the Twenty-ninth Meeting of the United States Delegation, New York, Hotel Pennsylvania, November 26, 1946, 9 a. m.

SECRET

[Here follows a list of persons (28) present.]

Resolution on Armed Forces

Mr. Sanders, at the request of Senator Connally, introduced the subject of the Resolution on Armed Forces. He reported that the United Kingdom on November 25 had submitted its resolution on the subject (US/A/C.1/72 (Rev. a)). The question now before the Delegation he said was whether the United States should go along with the verification provision, which was set forth in the British resolution as follows:

“This information which should be furnished not later than January 1, 1947, should relate to the situation on that date, and should be immediately subjected to an effective United Nations system of verification on the spot by a Committee to be established by the Security Council before that date.”

Mr. Sanders continued that other than this paragraph the British resolution was acceptable to the United States.

Senator Connally pointed out the principle [principal] difference was that the United Kingdom provided for inspection in its resolution. He reported that on the previous day in Committee 1 he did not make a stand on the question, for the Secretary had said that he did not want to support the verification procedure. At the same time, Senator Connally said that he was hesitant, following the speech of Noel-Baker, to come out strongly against the British. He said he did not want to throw a wet blanket at that point. Therefore, the Delegation was now still in a position to talk about the verification procedure from either point of view.

Upon being asked by Senator Connally, Mr. Cohen replied that he had not had an opportunity to discuss the question with the Secretary since the previous day.

Mr. Sanders said that it might be possible to have both the Russian and United Kingdom proposals referred to a subcommittee. Senator Connally said he was not sure that such a move would be successful. Mr. Sanders pointed out that the essential question was what the Delegation wished to do on the inspection provisions.

28 Ante, p. 1050.
27 Philip Noel-Baker, British Representative at the General Assembly.
25 Regarding Senator Connally’s remarks at the 27th Meeting of the First Committee, November 25, see footnote 17, p. 1050.
Senator Connally recalled that at its previous meeting the Delegation had taken a position against the inspection provision because of the Secretary's views. Senator Connally said that he was going to oppose the verification proposal although his own feeling was that the verification was necessary in the long run at least. He recalled that it had been asked in the proposals on atomic energy. However, he realized the difficulties in establishing a verification procedure on short notice.

Mrs. Roosevelt said that if the inspection were established by the Atomic Energy Commission then a similar or the same procedure could be used for inspecting for all kinds of armaments. However, she thought that the last sentence of the British proposal was very difficult when it said that the information should be verified on the spot by a Committee established by the Security Council. She said that she thought the proposal would have some sense if it were to say that when a system of inspection was established for general disarmament then there should be verification of the reports.

Mr. McClintock reported that Cadogan had told him on a previous day that the United Kingdom was willing to publish where their troops were located first and then have a check made later. He added that this was told him in a private conversation. Senator Connally observed that of course the information could not be verified until it was published. He said that he agreed with Mrs. Roosevelt that any comprehensive arms plan must have an inspection system. Mrs. Roosevelt added that she thought it would be top-heavy if there were separate inspection systems for each type of armaments.

Mr. Sandifer reported that following the meeting of November 25, Mr. Ross had called the Department. It was Mr. Acheson's view that it was politically impractical, and would be considered as a delaying move, to support the verification procedure. Mr. Acheson was most anxious that the reporting provisions should be put through soon.

Mr. Dulles said that he did not see why we should vote against the verification procedure. It was a fundamental principle that the United States has voted for previously. He did not want to delay the reporting but asked why we should not request the various nations whether they would be willing to permit verification on the basis of reciprocity. If they were willing to do so, then the Security Council should be asked to set up machinery.

The reference is to the 28th Meeting of the Delegation, November 25; in regard to the decisions taken at that meeting, see telegram 851, November 25, from New York, p. 1050.

Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, widow of the late President Roosevelt; United States Representative at the General Assembly.

Robert M. McClintock, Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly.
Mr. Cohen said that he agreed that we should not oppose verification as a principle, but he thought we should be slow to allow verification to be brought into this resolution in the vague and all inclusive way in which it was proposed. He thought it was likely to endanger the effective safeguards which might be established later. If it were proposed that outside inspectors would be able to pry everywhere before there was an effective system of disarmament established, the effect would be to discredit all verification procedures. He thought it would be impossible in advance to define an effective verification method. He believed it was right to make clear that effective safeguards were the essence of disarmament. It should be pointed out that the United States did not think that the form of verification proposed for this purpose had been sufficiently worked out to warrant United States support for it.

[Here follows additional discussion of the troops question and of other subjects.]

Mr. Dawson observed that he would not like to have to go to the Latin American states and tell them that the United States was going to vote against inspection. He said he had the distinct impression that the speech of Noel-Baker had greatly impressed the Latin American delegates on the previous day. He thought that if the matter came to a vote and the United States had to inform the Latin American states that we were going to vote against the verification procedure, we would be in a most difficult position.

Mr. Sandifer reported that he understood that Mr. Acheson was also concerned lest hasty action of this kind might work to the detriment of the atomic energy inspection proposals.

Mr. Stevenson said that he wanted to concur in the opinion which Mr. Sandifer had just reported. He said it seemed to him that it was quite possible that the inspection proposal would be interpreted as a disingenuous manner of sabotaging the entire reporting procedure. Mrs. Douglas said that she agreed strongly. She believed that one of the reasons that the United Kingdom made the proposal was to delay and she thought that if we went along with this we would be falling into the trap.

Mr. Dawson explained that he did not mean that the British verification scheme should be supported, but he thought it would be embarrassing if it were necessary to oppose it flatly.

Mr. Dulles said that he had not heard anyone present advocate supporting the British proposal for verification, there being general agreement that it was playing right into the Russian hands. He said that the only question he was going to raise was whether we were going to reject the principle of verification, even admitting that it could
not be put into effect now. He maintained that the Soviet proposal had been intended to show a militaristic picture of the world. He pointed out that under this each country could draw its own military picture and there was no way of checking the reality. This followed the general Soviet propaganda line which painted the picture of the Soviet Union which it desired and which it was not possible to check. Pictures of other military establishments might also not always be accurate. It was his opinion that verification as proposed under the U.K. statement should not be approved but he thought it was entirely different to vote against the principle.

Mrs. Roosevelt inquired whether it could be argued that the principle of verification must apply to the whole disarmament question. Perhaps some temporary method of verification could be applied to this situation that would not be as satisfactory as might be devised when the whole picture developed. She thought that it might be pointed out by Senator Connally that the United States was not going to vote for this specific proposal but wanted it clearly understood that it agreed that eventually there must be verification procedures and methods set up to enable us to see the whole picture of disarmament. At present, we did not want to delay the information which should be given. Future arrangements for verification will change with altered circumstances.

Senator Vandenberg said that the last paragraph was out of harmony with the rest of the British proposal. The first paragraphs of the British proposal were a set of preliminary premises on which to base later study. To move from the general statement to the very specific one in the last paragraph, which in itself was not remotely adequate to defend the principle of inspection, would result in defeating that principle by its very inadequacy. He felt there should be a change in approach to indicate that this preliminary information was a specific instance and to establish any system for immediate verification was incompatible with what had been set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

Senator Connally said that on the previous day in Committee I the delegation had not been committed as to how we would vote. He reported that he had gone on to say that any disarmament proposal must have a verification procedure as an essential. He had recalled that that had been insisted on in the Atomic Energy Commission proposals. He noted that the British were greatly irritated at the Russians over this question, Mr. Molotov had as well as said that the purpose of the Russian resolution was to get foreign armies out of the overseas territories where they were stationed. Since the British felt that this was essentially a political question, it was no doubt part of their motive to introduce a paragraph which the Russians did not want.
Senator Connally continued that he was not anxious to leave the British open to the assaults of their enemies by announcing right after Noel-Baker's statement that the United States would vote against the United Kingdom proposal. He pointed out that it would be possible to vote on the resolution piece-meal and to avoid voting on the last paragraph or try to substitute a paragraph for it.

Senator Vandenberg pointed out that the United Kingdom paper described the information procedure "as a first step in the study of this question". He thought that was the point of view which should be maintained. It should not be attempted to make of this motion more than an exchange of information. To go further would need many other provisions which were not included in the United Kingdom resolution.

Senator Connally pointed out that part of the point of the United Kingdom proposal would be met if there were included in the resolution a report on the number of troops at home.

Mr. Dulles pointed out that the original Russian resolution did not make a connection with disarmament, it did not speak of any first step towards disarmament, it merely asked for the disclosure of information on the location of troops abroad. The connection would be established only if the United Kingdom resolution were passed.

Mr. Sandifer said that he thought that Senator Vandenberg had put his finger on the heart of the question. He inquired whether it was realistic to expect acceptance of an indefinite, ill-defined system. He was sure that other nations would not accept such a proposal.

Mr. Dulles pointed out that the delegation was unanimous in opposing the last paragraph of the British resolution. What he wanted to know was what was going to be said regarding the principle of verification.

Senator Connally left the meeting at this point to talk with the Secretary. Senator Vandenberg took the chair.

Senator Vandenberg remarked that he thought that this question should be referred to the Secretary who had the power to act on this matter.

Mr. Wadsworth reported that the British Political Officer for the Near East had on the previous day given him to understand that the British were bringing pressure to bear on the Arabs to vote for the resolution as it stood. With respect to the last paragraph of the British resolution, the British official had said that they wanted to go along with the United States realizing the difficulty the U.S. faced. He suggested that a great deal could be accomplished if only the United States would make some suggestion regarding the common ground. Mr. Wadsworth continued that he thought Mr. Dulles and Mrs. Roosevelt had found that common ground, that was to make the
resolution more general to approve the principle of verification and
to assign the means and time for making such verification to the
Security Council.

Mr. Fahy suggested that the difficulty might be resolved by the
adoption of an amendment along the following lines "the information
with respect to the numbers and location of armed forces shall be
subject to such method of verification or inspection as may be adopted
in connection with reduction of armaments or otherwise."

Mr. Stevenson observed that he thought that linking the question
in this way was going to get us into a long discussion. He said it
seemed to him that Senator Connally should say repeatedly that the
United States insists on the principle of verification. However, this
was a one-shot job to get the figures on the location of troops and
close the matter there. He was sure that if verification were insisted
upon there would be no action taken. He pointed out that this was
not a continuing matter of verification or reporting on a month-to-
month basis. Such reports would be provided under general
disarmament machinery.

Senator Vandenberg observed this was essentially a questionnaire.
He continued that it was fantastic to think that the verification could
be handled by the procedure set up under the last paragraph of the
British draft. However, he thought that the discussion could be most
profitably resumed on the following day.  

501.BB/11-2646

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs
(Hiss) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

[WASHINGTON,] November 26, 1946.

Mr. Ross informed me today by telephone that this morning the
Secretary spoke both to Senator Connally and to Mr. Bevin to the
effect that he is strongly opposed to any resolution on the disposition
of troops containing an inspection provision. This apparently settles
our position on this point clearly. (It will be recalled that Senator

21 The record of decisions of this meeting indicates that the following decisions
were taken:

1. Resolution on Armed Forces
The decision of the Secretary of State was reported that the United States
should not agree to the British proposal for verification in connection with the
furnishing of information on armed forces. The Delegation decision of the pre-
vious day, November 26, on this question was then reaffirmed.
It was agreed that the Delegation should move at the appropriate time for
the substitution of paragraph B of the draft US resolution (US/A/C.1/69 Rev. a)
for the final paragraph of the British resolution, with a change of the date No-
ember 1 to December 15."

For text of US/A/C.1/72 (Rev. a), see p. 1050.
Connally in his statement of yesterday on this subject did not make clear our opposition to such provision being in the resolution relating to troops. His emphasis, instead, was upon the importance we attach to safeguards, including inspection, in regard to disarmament.) Mr. Ross said that both the Chinese and French Delegations are also opposed to inspection in connection with reporting on troop dispositions.

Molotov today stated in Committee I that the U.S.S.R. is prepared to report on troops at home only in connection with the consideration of disarmament. He said that if such troops are to be reported upon then their armament, mentioning in particular jet-propelled planes and atomic bombs, should also be reported. He also indicated that the Soviets will be prepared to discuss the question of inspection in connection with disarmament. At that time, he said, they will have specific proposals to make with respect to inspection.  

USUN Files

Draft Resolution on Disarmament Prepared by the Staff of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

TOP SECRET

4th Draft


THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY:

With a view to strengthening peace and international security in conformity with the aims and principles of the United Nations* (Preamble, Chapter I of the Charter);  

32 The reference is to Molotov's statement at the 28th Meeting of the 1st Committee, November 26, 11 a.m.; for the record of that meeting, see GA (1/2), First Committee, pp. 151-158. In the course of the meeting, Senator Connally offered an amendment to the United Kingdom resolution (p. 1050) which eliminated the provision for the verification of information. Molotov then submitted an additional Soviet proposal which was subsequently resubmitted in connection with disarmament; it read as follows: "The General Assembly deems it necessary that all States Members of the United Nations should submit information regarding armed forces and armaments in their own territory, this information to be submitted when the Security Council will consider the proposals for general reduction of armaments."

33 The first draft of this resolution, November 17, and subsequent drafts, are similar in configuration to the present paper, emphasizing the advisability of creating a United Nations Permanent Disarmament Commission. The third draft, November 21, was transmitted for comment to Ferdinand Eberstadt of the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission on November 25. Eberstadt's reply of November 29 suggested certain changes in the language of the portions of the resolution directly related to the international control of atomic energy. It did not comment on the advisability of actually presenting the resolution to the General Assembly. (USUN Files)

The source text of the present document bears a marginal notation indicating that the original copy of the 4th draft was transmitted to Secretary Byrnes on November 26 to be forwarded by him to the President and thence to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment.

*This language is quoted from the text of the Soviet Resolution. [Footnote in the source text.]
With a view to determining the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and recognizing its responsibility for making recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or both (Article 11, paragraph 1);

In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, and recognizing the responsibility of the Security Council for formulating with the advice and assistance of the Military Staff Committee plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments (Article 26);

Recognizing the necessity of a general reduction of armaments,† thereby progressively removing the means of conducting aggressive warfare;

Recognizing that the provision of peace forces by the special agreements called for by Article 43 of the Charter should be considered in close relationship to the question of the general reduction and regulation of armaments, and that the ultimate objective of disarmament should be the reduction of armaments to the level of these peace forces together with the forces necessary to maintain domestic order and tranquility under law;

Recognizing that the provision of information concerning the armed forces of Members of the United Nations, whether at home or abroad, should be considered in close relationship to the question of the general reduction and regulation of armaments and disarmament, as well as to the provision of peace forces under Article 43;

Recognizing that progress toward the general reduction and regulation of armaments and disarmament depends upon the accomplishment as a first step of the purposes and objectives of the Resolution adopted unanimously by the General Assembly at the first part of its first session at London, January 24, 1946, which established a Commission, known as the Atomic Energy Commission, “to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and other related matters”, and which set forth the terms of reference of the Commission;

calls upon the Atomic Energy Commission to proceed with the utmost dispatch to complete its task of formulating, in the spirit of unanimity contemplated in the Charter, specific proposals for the international control of the production of fissionable materials and of the production and use of atomic energy, including effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means at all stages of production and use to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions, to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes, and to pro-

†This language is quoted from the text of the Soviet Resolution. [Footnote in the source text.]
hibit the production and employment of weapons based on the use of atomic energy for the purpose of mass destruction;††

AFFIRMS the fundamental principle that the general reduction and regulation of armaments and disarmament must be progressive, international and multilateral in character and not unilateral on the part of any Member of the United Nations;

AFFIRMS the fundamental principle that effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violation and evasion are essential to the general reduction and regulation of armaments and disarmament;

RESOLVES, under the authority conferred by Article 22 of the Charter, to establish as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly a Permanent Disarmament Commission, the composition and organization of the Commission, its functions and responsibilities, its relationship to other organs and agencies of the United Nations and its procedures to be as set forth in the following paragraphs:

1. Composition and Organization. The Commission shall be composed of one Representative of each of those States represented on the Security Council, and of four additional Members of the United Nations.§ The four additional Members shall be elected for a term of two years. Each member on the Commission may have such assistance as he may desire. The Commission shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously and each member of the Commission shall for this purpose be represented at all times at the seat of the organization. The Commission may establish subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

2. Functions and Responsibilities. The functions and responsibilities of the Commission, being directed toward the general reduction and regulation of armaments and disarmament, shall be as follows:

(a) To provide a coordinating center for the activities of all United

††The last phrase is quoted from the title of the Soviet draft convention introduced in the Atomic Energy Commission on . . . . . 1946. [Footnote in the source text.]

§ N.B. This would be a Commission of fifteen members. The additional four members are added for the twofold purpose of diluting somewhat the relative weight of the five permanent members who would thus have one-third of the voting strength but would of course be permanent members of the Commission, and of giving broader representation to other Assembly Members in view of the Assembly’s responsibilities in disarmament matters. By providing a more broadly representative Commission of fifteen members the political handicap of a possible Soviet veto in the Security Council of recommendations made to the Council by the Commission would be watered down, at least in the early stages of the Commission’s work. The interests of the United States would be protected by our own veto power in the Security Council, should the occasion to use it arise. The non-permanent Members of the Security Council would rotate on the Commission as a result of the system of election to the Council. A similar electoral system is provided in the case of the additional four members of the Commission. [Footnote in the source text.]
Nations organs and agencies concerned with the general reduction and regulation of armaments, disarmament and related matters.

(b) To consider all matters relating to the general reduction and regulation of armaments and disarmament; to prepare studies and reports and to formulate recommendations to the General Assembly or to the Security Council, or to both with regard to such matters; and to make an annual report jointly to the General Assembly and to the Security Council on its progress.

(c) To advise the General Assembly with regard to the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments (Article 11, paragraph 1) and related matters and in carrying out this responsibility to make such special reports and recommendations to the Assembly as it deems appropriate or as the Assembly may request.

(d) To formulate for submission to and consideration by the Security Council plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments (Article 25) and in carrying out this responsibility to make such special reports and recommendations to the Security Council as it deems appropriate or as the Council may request.

(e) To provide such advice and assistance as may be requested by the Council of Foreign Ministers with regard to the relationship between plans for the demilitarization and permanent disarmament of ex-enemy countries, in particular Germany and Japan, and plans for the general reduction and regulation of armaments and disarmament.

(f) To maintain, following the establishment of a comprehensive system for the general reduction and regulation of armaments and disarmament, constant surveillance over the effectiveness of the system, with particular reference to the effectiveness of safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions, to report annually to the General Assembly and to the Security Council jointly on the progress of the system and to submit special reports as it deems appropriate or as may be requested by the General Assembly or by the Security Council, and to make recommendations as it deems appropriate in the light of changing circumstances to the General Assembly, or to the Security Council, or to both with regard to any matter within its field of responsibility.

(g) To bring immediately to the attention of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Members any situation it considers to be a violation or an evasion of the terms of the system to be established for the general reduction and regulation of armaments and disarmament, together with its recommendations in regard to such situation.
3. Relationships with other organs and agencies of the United Nations. In addition to its relationships with the General Assembly and the Security Council as set forth above, the relationships of the Commission with other organs and agencies of the United Nations shall be as outlined in the following paragraphs.

(a) Military Staff Committee. The Military Staff Committee, consistent with its responsibilities as set forth in Article 47, paragraph 1, and other Articles of the Charter, may, upon the request of the Commission, advise and assist the Commission in any or all aspects of its work.

(b) Atomic Energy Commission. In carrying out its responsibilities the Permanent Disarmament Commission, having in mind the primary and urgent importance of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission, shall avoid any action which might infringe upon the responsibilities of the Atomic Energy Commission or impede or delay the prompt accomplishment of its task of formulating specific proposals for the international control with effective safeguards of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only and for prohibiting the production and employment of weapons based on the use of atomic energy for the purpose of mass destruction. The two Commissions shall work in close cooperation and whatever reports and recommendations the Atomic Energy Commission may submit to the Security Council under the Resolution of January 24, 1946 shall be made available to the Permanent Disarmament Commission.

(c) Economic and Social Council. The Economic and Social Council shall, under Article 66 of the Charter and upon the request of the Commission, prepare studies and reports and advise and assist the Commission with regard to expenditures for armaments and the costs of armaments in terms of the world’s human and economic resources and the relationship between the general reduction and regulation of armaments and disarmament and the attainment of the objectives set forth in Article 55 and elsewhere in the Charter.

(d) Secretariat. The Secretary General shall serve as Secretary General of the Commission with the right to participate fully in the discussions and deliberations of the Commission but without the right to vote. The Secretary General shall provide all necessary staff and facilities to carry on effectively the work of the Commission and shall defray all necessary expenses of the Commission from the Budget of the Organization.

4. Procedures. The Commission shall adopt its own rules of procedure, being guided as a matter of convenience and to the fullest extent practicable by the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly; provided that decisions of the Commission on procedural matters shall
be by simple majority vote and that decisions on all other matters shall be by two-thirds majority vote.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY:

CALLS UPON the Government of all the Members of the United Nations to give to the Permanent Disarmament Commission all the assistance necessary to enable it to discharge its responsibilities arising out of this task, the achievement of which lies within the scope of the mission of the United Nations to establish an enduring peace and maintain international security. This task is also in the interest of the peoples who would be released from the heavy economic burden caused by excessive expenditures on armaments which do not correspond to peaceful post-war conditions.||

IO Files: US/A/C.1/80

Memorandum of Conversation, by Charles W. Yost of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] November 27, 1946.

Subject: French Attitude on the Troop Case

Participants: Mr. Lawford, of the United Kingdom Delegation

Mr. Dejean, of the French Delegation

Mr. Charles W. Yost

Separate conversations were held with Mr. Lawford, of the United Kingdom Delegation, and Mr. Dejean, of the French Delegation, on this subject.

Mr. Lawford said that Sir Alexander Cadogan had had a long session with Mr. Parodi, of the French Delegation, last night at which Sir Alexander had taken him to task for the uncooperative French attitude on the troop case. It appeared that Mr. Parodi was adamant in refusing to support the principle of reporting on forces at home and that he was even considering presenting a resolution urging the early withdrawal of armed forces now on the territories of other United Nations. Sir Alexander had been able to persuade Mr. Parodi to drop this latter project. The British feel that the French Delegation has had recent instructions from Paris obliging them to support the Russians on this whole question.

A little later I discussed this same matter with Mr. Dejean. Mr. Dejean insisted that the question of forces at home is properly a part of the problem of reduction of armaments and should not be con-

|This paragraph is very close to a direct quote from the last paragraph of Molotov's disarmament proposal. [Footnote in the source text.]

Mr. Maurice Dejean, Alternate French Representative to the General Assembly.
sidered in connection with armed forces abroad which is after all, whatever may be said, basically a political issue. He said that there might be, of course, some cases in which the Security Council should have information about forces on home territories in connection with action it might wish to take concerning forces on foreign territories. He said that, for example, if the Security Council should be considering the question of the withdrawal of British troops from Greece, it might wish to ask the Yugoslav Government for information with regard to Yugoslav troops in Yugoslavia. In order to provide for cases of this kind the French Delegation believed that it would be proper to amend the resolution on armed forces now before Committee I to authorize the Security Council to take action of the sort he had just described. He handed me the text quoted below of a paragraph on this subject but indicated that the French Delegation did not itself propose to introduce this paragraph as an amendment at this time.

"If the Security Council decides that, in addition to the information prescribed in the three preceding paragraphs, information should be obtained concerning troops stationed on their own national territory, it will request the presentation of this information by the Governments concerned under the same conditions as in the case of the information indicated in the preceding paragraphs."

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501.BB Summaries/11-2746: Telegram

Senator Austin to the Acting Secretary of State

NEW YORK, November 27, 1946—8:10 p.m.

[via Courier]

Daily Plain Summary

865. Committee I (29th Meeting) 35

With eight roll-call votes in a five-and-a-half hour meeting November 27, the Committee adopted the U.K. amendments to the U.S.S.R. troop proposal, providing for a report to the SC by all UN members of troops and military type organizations on foreign territories and uniformed personnel at home. The U.S. amendment was adopted 25–19, calling for the report of January 1 of the situation as of December 15, and eliminating the need for verification. 36

35 For the Record of this Meeting, see GA (1/2), First Committee, pp. 158–177.
36 The original Soviet proposal is printed in telegram 531, November 21, from New York, p. 1030. The resolution as amended by the United Kingdom is printed in US/A/61/72 (Rev. a), November 25, p. 1050. For text submitted in the Report of the First Committee on the Presence of Armed Forces of Members of the United Nations on Non-enemy Territories, see GA (1/2), Plenary, pp. 1504–1505 (Annex 49). That text consisted of the resolution adopted here, differing slightly as to wording and couched in the form of a General Assembly draft resolution. With respect to the action of the General Assembly on the resolution, see telegram 962, December 13, from New York, p. 1099.
The Committee decided 24–18 not to consider a U.S.S.R. amendment to the U.K. text which would have required a report at the same time on armaments on home territories.\textsuperscript{37} By the same vote, the Committee refused to consider this as a separate U.S.S.R. amendment. A Soviet amendment which would have delayed the report on home troops until SC consideration of disarmament was rejected 31–10. An amendment introduced by Fawzi (Egypt) calling for a GA recommendation of withdrawal of troops where they are stationed on foreign territory without conformity to the letter and spirit of the Charter\textsuperscript{38} was warmly supported by Molotov. When Noel-Baker (U.K.) and Senator Connally asked for more time to consider the amendment, the Committee decided 29–13 to defer consideration. Chairman Mannilsky (Ukraine) announced the Egyptian amendment would be considered at 10:30 a.m. November 28, as well as the U.K.-U.S.S.R. resolution as a whole and the Argentine resolution.\textsuperscript{39}

[Here follow a more detailed description of the meeting and accounts of the November 27 proceedings of other United Nations bodies.]

501.BB/11–2846 : Telegram

\textit{Senator Austin to the Acting Secretary of State}

\textbf{NEW YORK, November 28, 1946—6 p.m.}

[Received 6:37 p.m.]

871. Following is text of Soviet proposal referred to by Molotov at end his speech Committee 1 today: \textsuperscript{40}

"To supplement the proposal of the USSR delegation regarding the general reduction of armaments of October 29, 1946 \textsuperscript{41} by the following paragraph:

To ensure the adoption of measures for the reduction of armaments and prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes there shall be established within the framework of the Security Council, who bear the main responsibility for international peace and security, international control operating on the basis of a special provision which should provide for the establishment of special organs of inspection for which purpose there shall be formed:

\textsuperscript{37} For text, see footnote 33, p. 1061.
\textsuperscript{38} For text, see GA (1/2), First Committee, p. 160. Hiss stated the following in a memorandum to Mr. Acheson, November 27. In regard to a telephone conversation with Ross concerning the Egyptian amendment: "Mr. Ross and I were in complete agreement that for obvious reasons the Delegation will oppose the amendment in its present form. It obviously makes no sense in its present form as the Charter simply does not cover the question and any such action by the Assembly would only lead to complete confusion and recrimination." (501.BB/11–2746)
\textsuperscript{39} For text of the Argentine resolution, see GA (1/2), First Committee, p. 333 (Annex 88).
\textsuperscript{40} 30th Meeting.
\textsuperscript{41} For text of the Soviet proposal of October 29, see the bracketed note, p. 972.
(a) A commission for the control of the execution of the decision regarding the reduction of armaments.

(b) A commission for the control of the execution of the decision regarding the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes.

AUSTIN

SPA Files

Memorandum by Mr. John C. Ross, Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly, to Senator Austin.\(^4\)

SECRET


The situation on disarmament in Committee 1 when it adjourned at about two o’clock is as follows: \(^4\)

Molotov was not present; Vyshinsky represented the Soviet Union. Senator Connally had made the speech we prepared last night and discussed with him before he left for Lake Success.

Following Senator Connally’s speech Shawcross, the British Attorney General,\(^4\) asked Vyshinsky four questions which he said he would like to have answered tomorrow. These questions were:

1. The United Kingdom Government assumes that the Soviet Union has no intention by its proposals to replace or sidetrack the Atomic Energy Commission. He asked Mr. Vyshinsky to reaffirm the Soviet Government’s support of the Commission.

2. He asked Vyshinsky whether the Soviet Government advocates the prompt establishment of an effective system of control. He apparently did not relate this question to atomic energy or any other particular phase of disarmament.

3. Assuming that atomic energy would be controlled by a separate agency, he asked Vyshinsky whether the Soviet Government advocates that the Security Council under the unanimity rule (veto) should control all other weapons.

4. After stating that the Canadian and Australian Governments had put forward proposals which were somewhat more detailed than the Soviet proposals, he asked Vyshinsky whether the Soviet Govern-

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\(^4\) The source text accompanied the following handwritten covering note:

“11/29. Dear Alger [Hiss]: Copies of attached were supposed to go down to you and Dean [Acheson] tonight but I’m not sure and am sending this as precaution. Will you see that Dean sees if he didn’t get his copy. Austin talked to Sec. at length tonight—not much on attached—but Austin is sending original to Sec. 1st thing in morning. This is very rough dictation in course of busy afternoon. Yours, Jack [Ross].”

A copy was also sent to Mr. Cohen.

\(^4\) For the record of the 31st Meeting of the 1st Committee, November 29, see GA (1/2), First Committee, pp. 185–199.

\(^4\) Sir Hartley Shawcross, British Representative at the General Assembly.
ment sees any difference in principle among these three proposals. If no difference in principle is seen, would the Soviet Government agree to setting up tomorrow a drafting subcommittee which could boil down the three proposals into one which might then be unanimously accepted by Committee 1?

5. Vyshinsky spoke somewhat later on to the effect that (a) the Soviet Union is in favor of complete disarmament involving all weapons in every country; (b) Mr. Molotov has made abundantly clear the Soviet position in favor of controls; (c) disarmament must come first before security; (d) the Australian and Canadian paragraphs relating to atomic energy were not as good as the original Russian paragraph on this subject. (The Australian-Canadian paragraphs are close to our own views; the Russian paragraph is, of course, based on their position in the Atomic Energy Commission.)

6. Vyshinsky indicated that a revision of the Soviet resolution incorporating the new paragraph proposed by Molotov yesterday, and bringing back into the picture the Molotov proposal of several days ago linking the reporting on troops at home to reporting on armaments, was being circulated and would be distributed later today. Vyshinsky raised no objection to the British proposal of a subcommittee.

7. Subsequently Shawcross probed into the Soviet position on the veto saying that Vyshinsky had not answered his question on this subject and that it looked as though the Soviet Union was trying to interpose the Security Council between the Atomic Energy Commission and any system of international control. He expressed the hope that the prospect of disarmament would not be broken down by any misuse of the unanimity rule.

8. Vyshinsky, replying to Shawcross, said that everyone knew where the Soviet Union stood on the unanimity rule and that it would be a bad omen if the abolition of the veto should be considered a condition precedent to accomplishment in the disarmament field.

9. Meanwhile some of the British advisers had sounded out our people indicating that the Canadian resolution might be acceptable to them and asking whether we can support it.

10. Since then I understand that the Canadians and Australians have gotten together and agreed on a consolidated text which we should have available later this evening.46

The situation we will be in at 10:30 tomorrow morning is as follows:

1. The only real difference between the Australian and Canadian

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46 In a letter to the Secretary-General, November 29, the Canadian Delegation submitted a revision of the Soviet draft which combined the earlier Canadian and Australian proposals; for text of the letter, see GA(1/2), First Committee, p. 340.
proposals, on the one hand, and the Soviet proposals on the other, is with regard to atomic energy. It is clear to me, however, that the Russians could readily accept, aside from details, the Australian-Canadian formulation in this regard without weakening to any substantial degree what, I am sure, is their simple objective of getting atomic energy, general disarmament, reporting on troops, the Article 43 agreements, and related matters all jumbled together into the Security Council at the earliest possible moment.

2. I doubt whether Vyshinsky is likely to raise any strong objection tomorrow to the appointment of a subcommittee.

3. If we raise no objection to those proposals tomorrow our failure to do so may be considered equivalent to agreement in principle to their content.

4. The principal question we have to decide before tomorrow morning, therefore, is whether we do have any objections to those proposals. If so, Senator Connally would presumably state them in Committee tomorrow morning.\textsuperscript{46}

5. Having stated any objections we may have, the next question we must consider is whether we will have any alternative to propose, if not tomorrow then at an early date.

It is my strong personal view that these resolutions contain a number of objectionable features as set forth below:

1. First of all, the second paragraph of the Soviet proposal which reads, “The implementing of the decision concerning the reduction of armaments should include as a primary objective the prohibition to produce and use atomic energy for military purposes” is objectionable on two counts: (a) it links too closely together the general reduction of armaments and atomic energy and thereby weakens the focus we want to maintain on the latter; (b) it is based upon the Soviet position in the Atomic Energy Commission which emphasizes the prohibition of atomic weapons rather than the necessity of international control with effective safeguards which is the United States position. The Canadian-Australian formulation with regard to the work of the Atomic Energy Commission which “urges the expeditious fulfillment by the Atomic Energy Commission of its task” under its terms of reference, would be more acceptable to us.

2. All three resolutions in one form or another would have the General Assembly recommend that the Security Council take action in this matter. The Soviet paragraph incorporating this recommendation is the most objectionable, not only because it is incomplete but because

\textsuperscript{46} Although the 32nd Meeting of the First Committee, November 30, was devoted to the question of the regulation of armaments, neither the United States nor Soviet representative was called upon to speak. The 33rd Meeting, December 1, concerned itself with another subject.
it would have the effect of referring to the Security Council for implementation both atomic energy and the general reduction of armaments. It seems clear that Vyshinsky evaded this issue under questioning by Shawcross today. The Canadian-Australian formula is an improvement over the Soviet formula because, having in a separate paragraph emphasized the work of the Atomic Energy Commission, the recommendation to the Security Council would be limited to the general reduction of armaments. Beyond this, however, there are a number of objections to the reference of even the general reduction of armaments to the Security Council at this time as set forth below:

(a). The most serious objection is that despite all the efforts we have been making to keep the related questions of atomic energy and general disarmament in separate channels the reference by the Assembly of the general disarmament question to the Security Council at this time would throw the two subjects immediately together since we are making every effort in the Atomic Energy Commission to get a vote in the Commission referring our specific proposals to the Security Council before the end of the year. That is, the reference from the Atomic Energy Commission of specific proposals on atomic energy would arrive in the Security Council almost simultaneously with the recommendation from the Assembly that the Security Council take up the general reduction of armaments. Once brought together in this way in the Security Council, it would be extremely difficult to keep them separated so that we could keep the emphasis on the atomic energy proposals. In the course of a telephone conversation just now with Mr. Eberstadt, who called me on another matter, I asked his reaction to this point and he agreed with my analysis.

(b). As a result of Molotov's initiative in the Assembly on October 29, the world has been led to expect some progress in the general disarmament field. Because of the veto power the Soviet Union would be in a position to block any progress in this field except on their own terms from the outset and at every step of the way.

(c). On the other hand, it is possible to respond to the strong pressures which have built up to do something about general disarmament without interfering in any way with the progress of our atomic energy program if we can deflect the general disarmament question away from the Security Council and into another channel.

(d). The Canadian-Australian proposal speaks of the advice and assistance of the Military Staff Committee. However competent in their highly specialized field, the members of the Military Staff Committee may be, we are here dealing with matters of the highest political importance; the professional and technical details of tonnages and the like, while important, are of a distinctly subordinate character. While the MSC should certainly assist in any program, they cannot fairly be expected to do the job that needs doing. Another suggestion has been a subcommittee of the Security Council comparable presumably to the so-called Committee of Experts which has worked on the veto. Again because of the highly political character of the subject it is not believed that any such subcommittee would be effective.

(e). In view of the emphasis which has been placed on disarmament
as the principal issue at this Assembly, failure of the Security Council to accomplish any tangible result whatever in this field for the reasons stated above will further seriously damage the status and reputation of the Security Council which was established as one of the vital organs of the United Nations.

3. The three resolutions also have in common the idea of establishing some kind of control commission. In the case of the Canadian-Australian proposals such a control commission would be based upon a general disarmament treaty or convention. The principal objection to this proposal is that it greatly over-simplifies one of the key points in our policy which is the necessity of effective safeguards by way of inspection in application to any phase of disarmament. This oversimplification is bound to confuse the already badly confused thinking on this subject and fails to take into account that the nature of safeguards and of the instrumentality to apply them requires very careful and patient study and could probably vary considerably from one phase of disarmament to another. It is believed that Dean Acheson would feel particularly strongly about this point.

If the foregoing objections are valid, the next question is whether in stating these objections we will be in a position to offer any alternative approach. The only alternative which seems at all feasible would be the proposal of appropriate machinery which would, on the one hand, deflect the general disarmament question away from the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Security Council but which would, on the other hand, provide a realistic opportunity for some accomplishment in the general disarmament field in response to the demand for such accomplishment.

501.BB/11-2946

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)


Subject: Resolutions on Disarmament

Mr. Ross has told me of his telephone conversation today with you in which the above subject was discussed briefly. In as much as you may be called upon to give opinions on this subject in the course of the next day or so, I am attaching hereto copies of the documents now before the Assembly. They are (1) the Canadian amendment to the Soviet proposal, (2) the Australian amendment to the Soviet proposal, and (3) the Soviet proposal itself. The latter is at the moment in three parts: Molotov's original resolution of October 29, the addition he proposed on November 28, and the proposal with respect to
troops and armaments at home which the Soviets proposed but did not press during the debate on the troop proposals. They have now said that they will incorporate this in their disarmament resolution. A consolidated Soviet text is not yet available.

I gather from Jack Ross that the feeling in New York is that it will not be feasible simply to oppose any Assembly resolution on the subject of disarmament. Secondly, they are all now much concerned about the confusion which would be created were the disarmament matter to be referred to the Security Council along the lines of any of the pending resolutions. They are apparently of the opinion that as a result of these resolutions it would now be too late for us to propose that the matter be referred to the Security Council but only to be considered after the Security Council had disposed of the subject of atomic energy on the basis of the Atomic Energy Commission report. The alternative they are thinking of is apparently the creation of a new disarmament commission similar to the Atomic Energy Commission which would in due course report to the Security Council. They feel that this would meet the pressure for action with respect to disarmament (which they apparently consider practically irresistible) but would prevent the whole matter being thrown into the Security Council with resulting jeopardy to our position on atomic energy and on safeguards generally. Obviously any such new commission could not possibly report to the Security Council before the Atomic Energy Commission’s crisis has come and gone (or at least been disposed of in some manner).

I have suggested to Mr. Ross that they might want to give consideration to the possibility of referring the subject of disarmament, with safeguards as first priority, to the Atomic Energy Commission itself. This might accomplish the objectives they are seeking in New York without the confusion likely to arise from having two commissions working in very closely related fields at the same time.

501.BB/11-2946

Senator Austin to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, November 29, 1946—12:40 a. m

[Received 1:45 a. m.]

877. In informal talks with US and UK delegates Thursday, Fawzi (Egypt) tentatively agreed, without commitment on any side, on revision of his resolution along following lines:

4 With respect to the earlier Egyptian proposal, see telegram 865, November 27, from New York (p. 1067) and footnote 38, p. 1068.
"The General Assembly considers that according to the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations and to the principle of sovereign equality, no state member can station its armed forces on the territory of another member except under the terms of a treaty freely negotiated with the latter member or otherwise with that member's free consent in accordance with the principles of the Charter.

The General Assembly recommends that, except as provided above, the states members having such armed forces stationed on the territory of other members withdraw them without delay."

Shawcross informed member US Delegation that draft cleared with London.

AUSTIN

501.BB/11-3046

Senator Austin to the Acting Secretary of State

NEW YORK, November 30, 1946—12:03 p.m.

[Received 12:25 p.m.]

891. Mytel 886, November 29. Full text Soviet proposal concerning general reduction of armaments (A/C.1/87) follows:

1. With a view to strengthening peace and international security in conformity with the aims and principles of the United Nations, the GA recognizes the necessity of a general reduction of armaments.

2. The implementing of the decision concerning the reduction of armaments should include as primary object the prohibition to produce and use atomic energy for military purposes.

3. To ensure the adoption of measures for the reduction of armaments and prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes, there shall be established within the framework of the SC, which has the primary responsibility for international peace and security, international control operating on the basis of a special provision which should provide for the establishment of special organs of inspection for which purpose there shall be formed:

(a) A commission for the control of the execution of the decision regarding the reduction of armaments;

(b) A commission for the control of the execution of the decision regarding the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes.

4. The GA deems it necessary that all states members of the United Nations Organization should submit information regarding armed forces and armaments in their own territory, this information to be...

43 Not printed.
submitted when the Security Council will consider the proposals for
general reduction of armaments.

5. The GA recommends that the SC should ensure the effective
implementing of the principles laid down in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and
4 above.

6. The GA appeals to the governments of all the states to give to the
SC all the assistance necessary to enable it to discharge its responsi-
bilities arising out of this task, the achievement of which lies within
the scope of its mission to establish an enduring peace and maintain
international security. This task is also in the interest of the peoples
who would be released from the heavy economic burden caused by the
excessive expenditure on armaments which do not correspond to
peaceful post-war conditions”.

AUSTIN

501.BB/12-146: Telegram

Senator Austin to the Acting Secretary of State

US URGENT   New York, December 1, 1946—6:30 p. m.
[Received 8:28 p. m.]

895. Following proposed resolution on disarmament received from
Secretary and submitted to Committee I, November 30: 49

“1. With a view to strengthening international peace and security
in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,
the General Assembly recognizes the necessity of an early general
regulation and reduction of armaments. Accordingly, the General
Assembly recommends that the Security Council give prompt con-
sideration to working out the practical measures, according to their
priority, which are essential to provide for the general regulation
and reduction of armaments pursuant to international treaties and
agreements and to assure that such regulation and reduction will be
generally observed by all participants and not unilaterally by only
some of the participants.

“2. The General Assembly recognizes that essential to the general
regulation and reduction of armaments is the early establishment of
international control of atomic energy and other modern technological

49 For the record of the 34th Meeting of the 1st Committee, December 2, during
which Senator Connally formally introduced the United States proposal, see
GA (1/2), First Committee, pp. 220–225. Following Senator Connally’s statement,
Vyshinsky requested time to study the proposal. At the same meeting, Parodi,
the French representative, expressed the belief that no fundamental differences
existed between the U.S. and Soviet positions on disarmament. The French Dele-
gation subsequently submitted a proposal in the form of a revision of the Soviet
draft; for text, see GA (1/2), ibid., pp. 344–45.
discoveries to ensure their use only for peaceful purposes. Accordingly, in order to ensure that the general regulation and reduction of armaments are directed towards the major weapons of modern warfare and not merely towards the minor weapons the General Assembly recommends that the Security Council give first consideration to the report which the Atomic Energy Commission will make to the Security Council before December 31, 1946, and facilitate the progress of the work of that commission.

"3. The General Assembly further recognizes that essential to the general regulation and reduction of armaments is the provision of practical and effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions. Accordingly, the General Assembly recommends to the Security Council that it give prompt consideration to the working out of proposals to provide such practical and effective safeguards in connection with the control of atomic energy and other limitation or regulation of armaments.

"4. The General Assembly calls upon the governments of all states to render every possible assistance to the Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission in order to promote the establishment of international peace and collective security, with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources."

AUSTIN

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Sir Hartley Shawcross of the United Kingdom Delegation to the General Assembly to Senator Connally of the United States Delegation

[NY], 2 December, 1946.

The Political Committee is now faced with four separate proposals on disarmament. It seems to me most desirable that we should all try to evolve some concrete and constructive plan on which we can secure at least substantial agreement, and it may be useful, therefore, if I indicate in a little more detail than I was able to do in the Committee how we see the position.

It appears to us that any disarmament proposals ought to be based on the following four general principles:

(1) The atomic side of regulation and disarmament must continue to be handled by the Atomic Energy Commission. The Assembly must do nothing to interfere with or discourage their work.

(2) No partial system of disarmament must be agreed to in the sense that we must not get into a position where, for instance, the
manufacture of atomic bombs is prohibited, but the manufacture of other weapons of mass destruction, e.g., rockets, is not. If we agree to the abolition of the atom bomb before we get agreement on other weapons subsequent agreement as to these might be vetoed. Therefore, the Atomic Energy Commission should complete its present work and put forward a plan for control. When this has been generally accepted, its actual coming into force should be suspended until a similar plan (which would not present anything like the same difficulties) has been agreed for other weapons.

(3) Any system of disarmament must provide for an immediate and effective system of control and inspection. Disclosure of information about armaments must not precede agreement on the system of control and inspection.

(4) The operation of the control and inspection agency and the extension of its work to newly invented weapons must not be subject to the veto.

In the light of these principles, I am not altogether happy about your present draft resolution. If it goes any further than the Assembly has already gone in these matters, it may be thought that it throws added emphasis both on priority of regulation for the atomic bomb, and on the position of the Security Council. Paragraph 2 appears to give precedence to the question of the prohibition of atomic weapons by requiring the Security Council to give first consideration to the report which will be made by the Atomic Energy Commission. Paragraph 3 recommends the Security Council to give prompt consideration to the working out of a control system in regard to atomic energy. Might this not possibly prejudice the proposal which may eventually come forward from the Atomic Energy Commission for the establishment of an Atomic Development Authority? It might be said hereafter that the Assembly had, in Paragraph 3, adopted the view that the control system in connection with atomic energy and other forms of armaments was to be established within the framework of the Security Council, which is, of course, what the Soviet propose.

On the other hand, I do not think there is anything in the Canadian and Australian proposals which involved any interference with the work of the Atomic Energy Commission. Paragraph 3 of the Canadian Resolution, on the contrary, urges that the Commission should proceed expeditiously with its task. Paragraph 5 recommends the establishment (under a treaty to be formulated by the Security Council in accordance with Article 26) of a permanent International Commission of Control, with power to make inspections, etc. This is not necessarily intended to take the place of the suggested Atomic Development Authority: indeed, that authority might itself be the proposed Commission. Alternatively, since the problems of atomic control may differ

Supra.
from those concerning other weapons, it might be better to have two permanent International bodies, the one dealing with atomic matters, the second with other weapons of mass destruction. The vital thing, as I see it, is that these bodies should operate quite independently of the veto; should be able to establish whatever system of control and inspection which appeared appropriate from time to time, and should be able to bring newly invented mass destruction weapons under control without danger of a veto.

A further point in the Canadian plan is that the prohibition of atomic weapons is linked with that of other weapons of mass destruction.

It seems to me that it may be possible (and it is certainly desirable that we should attempt it) to find some solution which we can all support, and which includes the best points in the American, Canadian and Australian proposals. I particularly like the direction to the Security Council that they should draw up a draft convention in the light of the Atomic Energy Commission’s eventual report, for this does require action.

The Soviet Resolution in its present form includes a provision for the disclosure of full information about all armaments “this information to be submitted when the Security Council will consider the proposals for general reduction of armaments.” This means, of course, that the information is to be submitted before the Security Council has decided to do anything but talk. We shall feel it necessary to oppose the disclosure of information until a control organization has been established.

As you said you are going to discuss with your Delegation the way in which your proposals should be presented to the Committee, I felt it might be helpful if I explained our present attitude.

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IO Files: US/A/C.1/86

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charles W. Yost, Adviser, United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET


In response to a question as to how he felt the Assembly session is going in general, Mr. Gromyko replied that it is too early to say. He declared that the most important subject before the General Assembly is the reduction of armaments and that it is not yet clear whether effective action will be taken on this matter. He said that this is a question which concerns primarily the United States and the Soviet Union and that the responsibility rests with these two countries to take effective steps. He said that he considered it most important that
these two countries attempt to harmonize their attitudes toward this question. I replied that I was certain that we would be very happy to hear any suggestions which the Soviet Delegation might have for harmonizing our policies on this matter. Mr. Gromyko replied that he too would be happy to hear any suggestions which the United States Delegation might have with this end in view. He emphasized that he did not believe there is any sharp difference between the United States and the Soviet position as now stated. He indicated that the Soviet Delegation is very carefully studying our proposal.

Mr. Gromyko inquired whether the United States saw any objection to tying in the machinery for the reduction and control of armaments closely with the Security Council. I replied that it would seem logical that any general plan for the reduction and control of armaments should be drawn up by the Security Council, the Military Staff Committee or some other body under the immediate control of the Council and that adoption of the final plan should be subject to the unanimity principle. I added, however, that we are concerned that whatever executive control or inspection body may be established by the plan shall be able to carry out inspections whenever and wherever it feels necessary without being subject to a veto of any kind. I pointed out that while we attach great importance to this matter, there is some question as to the extent to which it need be spelled out in the resolution to be adopted by the Assembly at this time.

501.BB/12-446

Senator Austin to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, December 4, 1946—12:36 a.m.

[Received 1:11 a.m.]

913. Reference my telegram 877, November 29 and phone conversations today with Dreier concerning Department’s view that 1st paragraph of tentative Egyptian resolution on troops in foreign territories should if submitted be revised to read as follows:

“The General Assembly considers that, according to the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations and to the principle of sovereign equality, no state member can station its armed forces on the territory of another member, except under the terms of a treaty or other agreement freely negotiated with the latter member, or with that member’s free consent given in some other form in accordance with the principles of the Charter”.

Sanhoury 51 informed Villard 52 today that instead of submitting resolution Egyptians will in connection with consideration of troops

51 Abdel Razak A. El-Sanhoury, Egyptian Representative to the General Assembly.
52 Henry S. Villard, Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly.
census question or disarmament in plenary session make statement along lines of above draft. However, reference to "terms of a treaty or other agreement" would be omitted.

Sanhoury asked if United States would make supporting statement but indicated he would rather have United States not speak than to make statement mentioning treaties or agreements as in text.

Since we understand Department attaches importance to reference to terms of treaty or agreement in this general context we informed Egyptians that we would prefer not to speak on subject, since our statement would need to include reference to treaties and agreements. For Department's information additional consideration was that such statements if made might evoke series of supporting statements in plenary which Soviet group might exploit and use to push through resolution on subject.

Egyptians indicated that our silence would be satisfactory to them and that they will make unilateral statement.

United Kingdom delegation will, however, support Egyptian statement, making specific reference to treaty or agreement and are cabling London for clearance of text tonight.53

Both Sanhoury and Fauzi [Fawzi] expressed their regret that their original proposal had led to complications and made clear that their decision to abandon the resolution resulted largely from a desire to avoid possible difficulties for United States in accepting the text of their proposed resolution.

AUSTIN

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by Mr. John M. Hancock to the United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission (Baruch)


I am seriously concerned about a letter from Sir Hartley Shawcross to Senator Connally under date of December 2. This letter contains his suggestion that we go ahead with the atomic energy problem, get it into treaty form, and then put it on ice until other weapons have been covered by a similar plan.

There would be an obvious advantage if this result could be attained, but I am convinced that his suggestion is not one which should be countenanced by our government. It would be an attempt to introduce a new element in the negotiations and it would go to our good faith [sic] in making our original proposals with reference to atomic energy. In fact, we did propose unilateral disarmament in the field

53 The statements contemplated here were delivered by Egyptian and United Kingdom representatives at the 53rd Meeting of the General Assembly, December 10; for texts, see GA (1/2), Plenary, pp. 1077 and 1084.
of atomic energy, and we did it without implying any such thought as Sir Hartley Shawcross now advances. We were the only nation to have the bomb and we offered to give it up on conditions which were briefly stated in your June 14 speech as follows:

“When an adequate system for control of atomic energy, including the renunciation of the bomb as a weapon, has been agreed upon and put into effective operation and condign punishments set up for violations of the rules of control which are to be stigmatized as international crimes, we propose that—

“1. Manufacture of atomic bombs shall stop;
“2. Existing bombs shall be disposed of pursuant to the terms of the treaty; and
“3. The Authority shall be in possession of full information as to the know-how for the production of atomic energy.”

The only out we would have would lie in the following words:

“But before a country is ready to relinquish any winning weapons it must have more than words to reassure it. It must have a guarantee of safety, not only against the offenders in the atomic area but against the illegal users of other weapons—bacteriological, biological, gas—perhaps—why not?—against war itself.”

I think this second paragraph as contained was intended to introduce the idea of the outlawry of war itself. I don’t regard it as a withdrawal of the other specific provisions with regard to atomic bombs. Certainly there has never been any thought that we would not go through with the disarmament in the field of atomic energy unless we had a total disarmament. The reference to the “other weapons—bacteriological, biological, gas” seems to me to be used primarily as an introduction to the idea of abolishing war itself.

I believe that if an open attempt is made to put the atomic energy plan on ice awaiting general disarmament, we are going to be accused of bad faith. The whole basis of our approach has been that if we could get perhaps disarmament in the atomic field in which we alone have possession of the weapon, we might have a good atmosphere in which to go on toward the effective outlawing of other weapons.

While one might be inclined to sit on the side lines and take no position should the British press this plan of theirs, I don’t see how we here can be in such a position. If the British, for their own reasons, prefer not to ratify the treaty, that’s another matter.

I don’t believe we should give any countenance to a joint move in this direction, and if the matter gets to public discussion I believe we are going to be forced to take a position in opposition. The danger lies in the possibility that the British will make this plan public without knowing of our position in advance.
If you agree with me, I think the matter should be discussed with Secretary Byrnes, Senator Austin, and possibly Senator Connally.

JOHN M. HANCOCK

501 BC Atomic/12-446

Memorandum by Mr. Henry G. Ingraham to the Legal Adviser (Fahy)

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW YORK, December 4, 1946.

For your information, Messrs. Baruch and Hancock today had lunch with Gromyko and Alexandrov upon Gromyko’s invitation. Mr. Baruch showed Gromyko a copy of the proposed findings and recommendations which Mr. Baruch is to present formally at tomorrow’s meeting at 6:00 P.M. of the full Commission. Gromyko read them and commented that the United States and the U.S.S.R. are now not far apart. He did not say how he would vote, and Mr. Baruch does not plan to propose and does not favor any vote tomorrow. But Gromyko’s comment, combined with the affable atmosphere and Molotov’s statement this morning with respect to the veto, appear to have made Mr. Baruch very optimistic. Mr. Hancock also seems optimistic, though more cautiously so. Both of them talked with Secretary Byrnes on the telephone following the luncheon.

Another new development, as you probably know, is that Shawcross made a statement in the Political Committee indicating that the control of atomic weapons should not precede, but should go into effect concurrently with, the control of other weapons (rockets, etc.) adapted to mass destruction. He made this point to Mr. Baruch also.

Mr. Baruch replied to the effect that he was interested but that a question of good faith was involved and that he (Mr. Baruch) was not in a position to decide the United States’ stand on the point. Mr. Baruch has reported this conversation to Secretary Byrnes.

HENRY G. INGRAHAM

54 Special Assistant to the Legal Adviser detailed to the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission.

55 At the 6th Meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission, November 18, the first plenary session since July 18, the AEC had approved a motion by Mr. Baruch that the Commission submit a report to the Security Council by the end of the year. All members of the Commission voted in favor of the motion with the exceptions of the Soviet Union and Poland who abstained. The document under reference here was a resolution containing points to be included by the Commission in its report which Mr. Baruch presented at the 7th Meeting of the AEC, December 5. The resolution contained a summary of the United States proposal for the international control of atomic energy. The Commission adjourned to permit studying of the proposal without setting the date for its next meeting. The United States resolution is printed as AEC(1), Supplement 3, Annex 4.

56 The statement under reference was delivered at the 38th Meeting of the First Committee of the General Assembly, December 4.
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Robert McClintock, Adviser, United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET


I had a long conversation on the evening of December 4 with the Turkish Ambassador, Mr. Baydur. The Ambassador is an expert on the Soviet Union, having served a total of nine years on two separate tours of duty as Turkish Ambassador in Moscow.

Commenting on Molotov’s more conciliatory proposal on disarmament and control of armaments presented that morning to Committee 1,57 the Ambassador said that he could not possibly conceive of the Russians admitting any effective system of inspection no matter what Molotov had said in this regard. He thought that it was utterly contrary to the Russian nature, to say nothing of the inclinations of the Soviet regime, to admit foreign or international observers to check on the Soviet military position.

At the same time Ambassador Baydur said that he thought the Government in the Kremlin was seriously concerned by the internal situation in the U.S.S.R. He thought that the varied reports of dissatisfaction throughout the Soviet Union over high prices and the scarcity of consumers’ goods had undoubtedly a large basis of fact. He said in his opinion the Soviet people were utterly weary from the long strain that had been imposed upon them through successive five-year plans and the final crucial test of the war itself. Their primary desire as a people was peace and the Soviet Government, despite its bellicose statements, was now forced to recognize this desire.

The Ambassador said that the Soviet Government, following the termination of hostilities, had followed a policy of attempting to grab as much as possible in terms of power and territory, and that it had only been checked in this course by the final decision of the United States Government to stand firm against further encroachment. The firm American policy was now bearing fruit in this new conciliatory line now adopted by the Soviet Foreign Minister.

The Ambassador concluded by saying that the Russian high political command had learned a great deal from Hitler and would not repeat his mistake of pressing the rest of the world too far. He recalled in this connection the Fable of Aesop about the division of spoils between the lion, the fox, and the ass, the ass having been killed in the process. The Ambassador thought that the Russians would profit by the example of Hitler.

57 Regarding the Soviet proposal under reference, see memorandum by the United States Naval Representative on the Military Staff Committee, December 5, and footnote 58, p. 1085.
Memorandum by the United States Naval Representative on the Military Staff Committee (Turner) to the Army and Air Force Representatives

[New York,] 5 December 1946.

USMS 388.3

Subject: Comment by U.S. Naval Representative on Soviet Amendments to U.S. Proposal concerning the General Registration and Reduction of Armaments, in General Assembly Committee I, 4 December 1946.\(^2\)

1. The United States proposal (A/C.1/90 of 30 November 1946) together with the Soviet amendments proposed on 4 December 1946 are quoted (deletions are dashed out, and additions underlined):

   1. With a view to strengthening international peace and security in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, the General Assembly recognizes the necessity of an early general regulation and reduction of armaments. Accordingly, the General Assembly recommends that the Security Council give prompt consideration to working out the practical measures, according to their priority, which are essential to provide for the general regulation and reduction of armaments pursuant to international treaties and agreements and to assure that such regulation and reduction will be generally observed by all participants and not unilaterally by only some of the participants. (Note: Molotov stated that paragraph 1 must be amended so that regulation of armaments would be by resolution of the Security Council.)

2. The General Assembly recognizes that essential to the general regulation and reduction of armaments is the early establishment of international control of atomic energy and other modern technological discoveries to ensure their use only for peaceful purposes. Accordingly, in order to ensure that the general regulation and reduction of armaments are directed towards the major weapons of

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\(^2\) Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov proposed the amendments printed here at the 38th Meeting of the First Committee, December 4. He stated that the Soviet Union was prepared to accept the United States proposal as a basis for discussion “in the interest of unanimity.” Earlier in the meeting he had contended that while the Soviet Union insisted on preserving the principle of unanimity in Security Council decisions, the veto would have “no relevance to the work” of inspection and control instruments. The Committee agreed to establish Subcommittee 3, a twenty-member body, to consider the various disarmament proposals before the Committee. Subcommittee 3 first met on December 5. Subsequently, a drafting group consisting of representatives of Canada, Egypt, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States prepared a text which was adopted by the Subcommittee at its 6th Meeting, December 12. The report of the Subcommittee contains the text of the recommended resolution, the membership of the Subcommittee, its terms of reference, and a summary of its work; for text of the report, see GA (1/2), First Committee, pp. 346-48. Subcommittee 3 documentation exists on microfilm in the IO Files.
modern warfare and not merely towards the minor weapons the
General Assembly recommends that the Security Council give first
consideration to the report which the Atomic Energy Commission
will make to the Security Council before 31 December 1946, and
facilitate the progress of the work of that Commission.

2. As an essential step toward the urgent objective of eliminating
from national armaments atomic weapons and all other major weap-
on adaptable to mass destruction, the General Assembly urges the
expeditious fulfillment by the Atomic Energy Commission of its terms
of reference as set forth in section 5 of the General Assembly resolution
of Jan. 17, 1946. Accordingly, in order to insure that the general regu-
lation and reduction of armaments are directed toward the major
weapons of modern warfare and not merely toward the minor weapons,
the General Assembly recommends that the Security Council expedite
consideration of the report which the Atomic Energy Commission will
make to the Security Council before 31 December 1946, and facilitate
the progress of the work of that commission and also that the Security
Council expedite consideration of a draft convention for the prohibi-
tion of atomic weapons.

3. The General Assembly further recognizes that essential to the
general regulation and reduction of armaments is the provision of
practical and effective safeguards by way of inspection and other
means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and
evations. Accordingly the General Assembly recommends to the Secu-
ritiy Council that it give prompt consideration to the working out of
proposals to provide such practical and effective safeguards in con-
nection with the control of atomic energy and other limitation or
regulation of armaments. To insure the adoption of measures for the
reduction of armaments and prohibition of the use of atomic energy for
military purposes there shall be established within the framework of
the Security Council, who bear the main responsibility for interna-
tional peace and security, international control operating on the basis
of a special provision which should provide for the establishment of
special organs of inspection for which purpose there shall be formed:

(A) A commission for the control of execution of the decision re-
               garding the reduction of armaments.

(B) A commission for the control of the execution of the decision re-
               garding the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military
purposes.

4. The General Assembly calls upon the governments of all states
to render every possible assistance to the Security Council and the
Atomic Energy Commission in order to promote the establishment of
international peace and collective security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources.

2. An analysis of the Soviet proposal indicates that, in the Soviet view, an international convention or treaty is required only for the prohibition of atomic weapons but that reduction of armaments must be handled by a resolution of the Security Council. This is shown by the following excerpt from the Soviet proposed paragraph 2:

"that the Security Council expedite consideration of a draft convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons."

In Mr. Molotov's Statement, the Soviet views on agreements relative to the reduction of armaments are clearly expressed:

"If we take the view that the reduction of armaments is to be carried out by means of international agreements, this will give rise to a good many pretexts for all sorts of delays. For this reason, the Soviet Delegation is of the opinion that the decision on the reduction of armaments should be taken by means of a resolution of the Security Council. . . . The wording of the first paragraph (of the U.S. proposal) must be amended accordingly."

3. The Soviet proposals reject the idea of an international treaty for setting up the rules for operation, control, and inspection by an Atomic Development Authority, and punishment of violators without veto in the Security Council, in favor of having the Security Council formulate the rules.

4. With respect to the possible veto in the A.D.A., Mr. Molotov stated:

"But when decisions regarding the composition of the control comissions are taken and the control commissions begin their task, they will, of course, work in accordance with those rules drawn up for them by the Security Council."

It should be noted that Mr. Molotov has also made it clear that in the formulation of the rules by the Security Council, the veto right must be unimpaired.

It appears from the foregoing that such rules regarding operation, control, and inspection by the A.D.A. as are approved by the Security Council, with the unanimous agreement of the five permanent members, may not be disregarded by the A.D.A. However, it is also clear from Mr. Molotov's statement that these rules will cover only the day-to-day operations of the A.D.A. and will not give the Security Council the right to punish a violator of the atomic treaty except in the case of unanimity of the five major Powers. This right will remain in the Security Council, with no derogation of the veto. Hence, the Soviet position is directly contrary to the United States position that the veto cannot be used to protect a wrongdoer in the field of atomic
energy; and does not constitute any advance in this respect from the
Atomic Energy Proposals made by the Soviet on June 19th.

5. The Soviet proposal reiterates their previous proposal for an
A.D.A. with the same powers of “control” as given in paragraph (3)
of the Soviet proposal of 19 June 1946 regarding the Atomic Energy
Control Committee of the Security Council (AEC official records,
No. 2, Second Meeting, 19 June 1946, p. 29). By omission, the current
Soviet proposal rejects the power of the A.D.A. to recommend a draft
convention as in paragraph (1) of their proposal of 19 June.

6. To summarize, the Soviet position with regard to Atomic Energy
remains exactly the same as it was. The only part of their current
proposals which may be considered an advance toward the United
States position is a clear statement that there will be no right of veto
in the A.D.A., but that the A.D.A. will function under rules prescribed
by the Security Council; and their statement that the Soviet will
accept some degree of control and inspection by an international
authority.

R. K. TURNER

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by Mr. Franklin A. Lindsay to Mr. John M. Hancock
of the United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission

[NEW YORK,] December 6, 1946.

Subject: Recommendations for Modifications of Disarmament Resolu-
tion Now Being Considered in a Sub-Committee on [of] the
General Assembly 89

1. Paragraph 1 has been tentatively agreed upon by all members
of the Sub-Committee. It contains the following sentence: “The plan
formulated by the Security Council shall be submitted to States Mem-
bers of the United Nations for ratification in accordance with their
constitutional processes.” This statement should be expanded to in-
clude the states which are not members of the United Nations.

2. Paragraph 2 has not been finally accepted by the Sub-Committee.
The U.K. has proposed an amendment to the following sentence: “The
General Assembly recommends that the Security Council expedite
consideration of the report which the Atomic Energy Commission
will make to the Security Council before 31 December 1946,” which
eliminates the last part “before 31 December 1946.”

In respect to the Soviet addition to the original American text,

89 Regarding the subcommittee under reference, see footnote 58, p. 1085. For text of
the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on December 14, see p. 1090.
which provides that the Security Council should expedite consideration of a draft convention also, it is recommended that if possible this Russian amendment not be accepted. If this is not tactically possible the statement should be amended as follows: “The General Assembly further recommends that in the light of such proposals which the Atomic Energy Commission may make within its terms of reference, the Security Council expedite consideration of a draft convention or conventions for the prohibition of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction and for the establishment of a system of international control and regulations.”

3. The Russians have proposed that the United States’ Paragraph 3 be amended to include their statement establishing the two control Commissions. It is strongly recommended that the General Assembly resolution contain no proposals for the establishment of any specific agencies of control. It is the function of the Atomic Energy Commission in accordance with its original terms of reference to make recommendations to the Security Council for the establishment of the proper Commission or Commissions for the execution of the system of control which the Atomic Energy Commission will devise.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by the United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission (Baruch) to the Secretary of State

[New York,] December 8, 1946.

The Atomic Energy Commission has been given a definite task—in no mistakeable language—by the Assembly, on the suggestion of the Foreign Secretaries and, originally, of the Chiefs of State.

The American representative on this Commission has made proposals aimed at carrying out the duties of the Commission, regarding atomic energy, which may well serve also to set a pattern for control of any other instrument of mass destruction, or indeed for all instruments of war.

In the United Nations General Assembly’s Political and Security Committee, discussions are taking place concerning atomic energy. The Atomic Energy Commission is about to bring forward a report on its own work which, necessarily is related to practically all of the points now being discussed in the Political and Security Committee. The adoption, by the Political and Security Committee, of specific resolutions relating to atomic energy, other than one asking the Atomic Energy Commission to expedite its report, may prejudice or even render impossible an unbiased report by the Commission, since certain
of its members are bound to be affected by their superiors now functioning in the General Assembly.

No one knows exactly what some of the words in these proposed General Assembly resolutions mean. Why pass them? Why not wait until the Atomic Energy Commission has made its report. Passing oblique resolutions may result in confusion and delay.

These declarations of principle should be referred to the Atomic Commission, which is charged with responsibility for an authoritative plan to be placed before the Security Council, while the General Assembly has only the right of recommendations. The Atomic Energy Commission should not be impeded by new and limiting instructions.

The American delegates are hampered more than others. We have not even had the benefit of a full exchange of views between those who are dealing with disarmament and those charged with atomic matters. There should be a close and constant liaison between them.

As you may recall, I suggested at the time Stettinius was our representative, that he, Winant, and I ought to discuss the subject of our duties. This you did not believe wise at the time. In addition, I was instructed to keep out of disarmament discussions, even though it was apparent such discussions would be closely connected with atomic energy and other weapons of mass destruction. The President, you and Senator Connally were especially emphatic that I try to avoid the subject of disarmament in my atomic energy actions.

I have not seen anything, so far, on disarmament, other than pious resolutions. On the other hand, the Atomic Commission is in the midst of preparing a definitive formula of action. But the program is bound to be deteriorated by pressures from outside sources.

Therefore, I ask that instructions be issued to our representatives on the Political and Security Committee, that all matters relating to atomic energy be referred to the Commission organized to deal with the subject. Also, that it be pointed out that if atomic energy is successfully dealt with in the Commission—and I believe it may be—other categories of armaments can be similarly treated.

What I ask for is support in the effort the President and you requested me to direct, instead of permitting it to be submerged in a sea of words which, unless canalized, will result only in harm, through obscurity and delay.

Delay is dangerous. Action is essential. I know that course has your warm approval. The way to get action is to concentrate the efforts in the one place where final responsibility exists. It is to that end that I address this letter to you.

B. M. Baruch
SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 9, 1946.

Subject: Military Guidance on the Regulation of Armaments.

In connection with the discussions now taking place in the General Assembly of the United Nations on disarmament and the regulation of armaments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would suggest that, from the military point of view, the positions taken by the United States Representatives should be based on the following:

a. Proposals for disarmament or the regulation of armaments should not be agreed to unless they are applicable to and accepted by all member nations.

b. There must be effective safeguards by way of international inspection and other means to protect all nations against the hazards of violation and evasion. The implementation of these safeguards must not be subject to veto or obstruction.

c. All matters pertaining to international control of atomic energy, including inspection, should continue to be dealt with by the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, which was established specifically for that purpose and in which the United States position has been adequately defined by Mr. Baruch.

d. Until final action has been taken on the United States proposals submitted to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, it is premature and futile to go beyond the discussion stages concerning other aspects of the problem of disarmament or the regulation of armaments.

e. No commitments concerning disarmament or regulation of armaments, other than those pertaining to atomic weapons referred to in subparagraphs c and d above, requiring action on the part of the

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*This memorandum was prepared in response to a request by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, November 26, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepare as a matter of priority, guidance from the military point of view on reduction and regulation of armaments in the light of the discussion of this subject in the United Nations General Assembly. It was circulated in the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee as SWNCC 240/1 on December 9 and transmitted to the United States Representatives on the Military Staff Committee on the same day. At the request of J. H. Hilldring, Chairman of SWNCC, the Department of State forwarded copies of this document to Secretary Byrnes and Senator Austin on December 13. (501.BC Armaments/12-1346; SWNCC Files; IO Files)*
United States, should be made until a reappraisal can be made of the world situation existing upon:

(a) Conclusion of the peace treaties and enforcement of those terms of the treaties having predominant military implications, and
(b) Conclusion of agreements for providing contingents of armed forces to the Security Council pursuant to Article 43 of the Charter of the United Nations.

It is requested that this information be transmitted to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
A. J. McFarland
Colonel, U.S. Army,
Secretary

501.BC Atomic/12-946

The United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission (Baruch) to the Secretary of State

NEW YORK, December 9, 1946.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Supplementing my memorandum to you of December 8th, on the same general subject, I take the liberty of calling to your attention some disturbing elements in the present drafts of Paragraphs 1. and 2. of the “proposal concerning the general regulation and reduction of armaments”, as passed by Subcommittee 3 of the first Committee of the United Nations General Assembly.

The Russians have contended, before the Atomic Energy Commission, that the first step in control of atomic energy should be “a convention”, as they always call it, outlawing the production and use of atomic weapons and providing, within a short time after the convention has been executed, for the destruction of existing atomic weapons. They have contended that this should be the initial step and should be taken separate and apart from definite commitments in other respects. They also have urged the formation of two committees, one of which should occupy itself with scientific matters and the other with controls.

We have not opposed the inclusion of an international agreement along the lines of the proposed Russian “convention” in a treaty providing a full and effective system of control. We have, however, declined to accept any such convention, apart from safeguards in the way of an international authority, fortified with powers of control and inspection to supervise and enforce the system of control and the terms of the convention.
Paragraph I of the proposals referred to above recommends that "the Security Council give prompt consideration to formulating the practical measures, according to their priority, which are essential, etc."

The last clause of paragraph 2 reads as follows "... The General Assembly recommends that the Security Council ... expedite consideration of a draft convention or conventions for the prohibition of atomic weapons, ... and the creation of an international system of control and inspection." It will be noted that the last clause of paragraph 2 refers to two things:

(a) a convention or conventions for the prohibition of atomic bombs, and  
(b) the creation of an international system of control and inspection.

Our fears in connection with this language, taken in connection with the instructions in paragraph 1 about priority, are that the Russians will continue to insist that the first priority belongs to a convention for prohibition of production and use of atomic bombs and their destruction promptly thereafter.

As you know, I am not authorized to concur in such a program, either by the President or by you, and you will, I am sure, agree with me that Congress would not in any event accept it. The language of the proposed resolutions, however, might give the Russians who, as you know, are very close readers and construers of language, a basis for insisting that the General Assembly had approved this order of procedure.

Paragraph 3. of the disarmament proposals of the Subcommittee of the first Committee in the General Assembly is now in draft. The Russian proposal there calls for two commissions under the Security Council, the function of one of which is to carry out the "decision on atomic energy".

I appreciate the difficulties involved in changing the present language in paragraph 2. If the pertinent part of this paragraph could be changed to read as follows:

"That the Security Council expedite consideration of an international system of control and inspection including a convention or conventions for the prohibition of atomic weapons, etc."

that would bring clarity. If this is not possible, it seems to me that the American representative should at every stage where this resolution is acted upon in the subcommittee, before the committee, and before the Assembly itself, emphasize the fact that in voting for the resolution, the United States construes its meaning, not as recommending a separate convention, but as calling for a system of international con-
trol, including safeguards by way of inspection and other measures of which system such a covenant would be an integral part.

I also feel that the final draft of paragraph 3., now under discussion, should eliminate all specific reference to the form of organization to be adopted for carrying out the control of atomic energy. Such measures should await receipt by the Security Council of the report of the Atomic Energy Commission which, I hope, will be completed and delivered to the Security Council very soon.

Sincerely yours,

BERNARD M. BARUCH

10 Flies

Memorandum by the United States Representatives to the Military Staff Committee

RESTRICTED

New York, 9 December 1946.

USMS/50/28

UNITED KINGDOM'S PROPOSAL REGARDING USE OF UNITED NATIONS ARMED FORCES AGAINST PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1. The United Kingdom Representative on the Subcommittee on Basic Principles informally circulated to the U.S. Representatives a draft of their proposal on the subject of Strength under item 3 of the Program of Work.\(^\text{1}\) This proposal is as follows:

"Item 3: Strength.

Principle affecting the total strength of Armed Forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council.

(i) The United Nations Armed Force can only be employed with the unanimous support of the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council and will therefore only be used against any nation or combination of nations other than the Five Permanent Members.

(ii) The United Nations Armed Force must be of sufficient strength to command the respect of all nations and to meet any commitments likely to exist under paragraph 1 above, but not so large as to prejudice swift and effective action when called upon by the Security Council.

(iii) The United Nations Armed Forces shall be kept to the minimum strength consonant with the principles stated in paragraphs (i) and (ii) above."

2. The U.S. Representatives informed the United Kingdom Representative on the Subcommittee that the U.S. Delegation on the Military Staff Committee could not accept paragraph 1 of the United Kingdom proposal under any circumstances for the following reasons:

\(^{1}\) The program of work under reference is that adopted by the Subcommittee at its 9th Meeting, October 29, contained in the record of that meeting, MS/UNF/10, not printed.
(a) It added to the provisions of the Charter and, in a sense, was considered as an amendment to the Charter.

(b) It was believed an unwise policy to make such a statement in the Basic Principles because of the probable unfavorable repercussions among the smaller nations and the general public. (Vide "Veto" debate.)

(c) The statement that the United Nations Armed Forces could never be used against any of the five major powers was directly contrary to the United States Atomic Energy proposal for decision without veto on punishment of treaty violators, and was contrary to similar views made by both the United States and United Kingdom Delegations to the General Assembly on the subject of the Regulation and Reduction of Armaments.

3. The U.S. Representatives also informed the United Kingdom Representative on the Subcommittee that the use of the word "minimum" in paragraph 3 was not believed to be as good usage as the word "limited." The word "limited" had been included in the instructions to the U.S. Representatives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and is believed to leave a wider freedom for future decision.

4. The United Kingdom Representative subsequently submitted informally a new proposal on the subject of Strength, as follows:

"The strength of the United Nations Armed Force should be governed by the following principles:

(i) Enforcement action under Chapter 7 of the Charter requires unanimity on the part of the Five permanent members. The moral weight and potential power behind such a unanimous decision will therefore be very great, and will directly influence the size of the force required.

(ii) The United Nations Armed Force must be of sufficient strength to command the respect of all nations and to meet any probable commitments but not so large as to prejudice swift and effective action when called upon by the Security Council.

(iii) The United Nations Armed Force shall be limited initially to the strength consonant with the principles stated under paragraph (i) and (ii) above."

5. The U.S. Representatives informed the United Kingdom Representative that paragraph 1 of the new United Kingdom draft proposal was still unacceptable to the U.S. Representatives because it seemed unnecessary, and, to some extent, was objectionable for the same reasons previously stated.

6. Mr. Herschel Johnson has been informed of the position of the

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62 For documentation on the veto question, see pp. 251 ff.

63 The United Kingdom submitted a draft to the 15th Meeting of the Subcommittee, December 17, identical with that printed here except that paragraph 1 read as follows: "The moral weight and potential power behind any decision taken in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter will be very great, and will directly influence the size of the force required." The Subcommittee continued to discuss the subject of strength at its three subsequent meetings in 1946, but failed to complete its consideration of the matter. (IO Files)
U.S. Representatives on the United Kingdom proposal and personally concur.


Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by Mr. Joseph Chase

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW YORK, December 9, 1946.

REMARKS ON VARIOUS PROPOSALS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE REGULATION AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS WHICH TOUCH ON THE WORK OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

BRIEF:

Three main points are made in this memorandum. The first is that, upon close inspection and reading, it is impossible to state the extent, if any, of recent U.S.S.R. concessions on inspection, veto and controls. The second is that it is impossible to know what Mr. Molotov meant when talking about *conventions, international control and inspection, and irrelevance of the veto, until we get down to concrete cases and smoke him out. The third is that the position of various countries on the use of the veto in the application of sanctions may not be in conformity with the United States’ plan for the control of atomic energy.

In his speech before Committee 1 of the General Assembly on December 4, 1946, Foreign Minister Molotov made a number of points whose meanings are either not yet clear or are not in conformity with the United States’ plan for controlling atomic energy.

1. The first point concerns the creation of two control commissions; one, “for the control of the execution of decision regarding the reduction of armaments”; the second, “for the control of the execution of the decision regarding the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes”. The Security Council will establish these commissions which would be international and would have at their disposal “means of inspection for verifying the situation in all countries”.

It has not yet been made clear just what was meant by control, inspection and verification of the situation. The U.S.S.R. presses for passing these resolutions, leaving clarification to be worked out later. As a minimum it may mean a body with international representation which would audit the figures on troops and weapons supplied to it by national governments.

What form inspection is to take is not yet clear. In reality, no concession was made on this point by Mr. Molotov. He merely voiced acceptance of a principle that had previously been agreed to in the

* Staff member, United States Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission.
* In Russian, a convention is synonymous with a treaty but usually means a multilateral treaty. [Footnote in the original.]
terms of reference of the Atomic Energy Commission, etc. In this connection, it will be recalled that Professor Alexandrov has refused to participate in the discussions of the last two informal meetings of Committee 2 because aerial photography and ground surveys were being discussed as a means of detecting clandestine atomic energy activities. Aerial photography was taboo because it was military reconnaissance, and both were “political” questions.

2. It is significant that the original proposal for a commission for the control of the execution of the decision regarding the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes did not mention the necessary parallel control of this energy for peaceful purposes. This separation may be corrected by paragraph 2 of the American plan for the regulation and reduction of armaments (accepted by the U.S.S.R.) which calls on the Atomic Energy Commission to expedite its report and on the Security Council to expedite its consideration of that report. The control commission may be the one recommended by the Atomic Energy Commission. There was a positive development in this connection when Mr. Molotov accepted an amendment on 6 December to ensure that atomic energy and other scientific discoveries and technological developments would be utilized for the benefit of mankind.

3. The original U.S.S.R. amendment also urged the original Gromyko convention and called on the Security Council to expedite consideration of a draft convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons. The meeting on 6 December added to this convention, or in separate conventions, the prohibition of other weapons for mass destruction and the creation of an international system of control and inspection. These conventions may be the treaty we are working for; but we must make sure that they will be based on the recommendations of the Atomic Energy Commission and therefore include the control of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. This point has not been clarified as yet.

4. The U.S.S.R. has continued to maintain that the veto will not operate in these commissions, which shall be established within the framework of the Security Council. The United States’ proposals submitted to the Atomic Energy Commission on 5 December placed the agency within the United Nations. They have refused, to date, to include these statements in the terms of reference of these commissions as unnecessary. A careful reading of their proposals indicates that, at most, the U.S.S.R. will waive the veto right in the day-to-day operation of the control commissions. The Security Council will still “bear the main responsibility for international peace and security”, and anything bearing on punishments and sanctions will still be subject to the veto. It will be recalled that after Molotov spoke on 4 December accepting Senator Connally’s plan with Soviet amendments,
Wilggress, Canada, agreed that the veto would not apply during the work of the control commissions, but that when it came to the application of sanctions arising out of inspection reports the use of the veto would be in "strict accord with the realities of the situation". He further added that since such application of sanctions would amount to a state of war, the veto was unimportant. Parodi had previously made a similar analysis, and the Australians have also expressed approval of this analysis. The United Kingdom has not been clear on this point either. China has indicated that it was willing to forego the veto on atomic energy matters, but it is not clear whether this includes the use of force in the application of sanctions. It is not known whether this is the official position of these countries or whether there is a lack of coordination between the political representatives and the atomic energy representatives of these countries. It may be advisable to get clarification on this point at the highest level.

5. There are some factors making for optimism in assessing the chances for agreement to the United States' plan for the control of atomic energy.

(a) Poor economic situation in the U.S.S.R. Reports indicate that the economic situation is not improving as anticipated in the Soviet Union. Stalin has indicated interest in a huge loan and Vyshinsky recalled at Madison Square Garden on 2 December 66 that Stalin had said in 1927 that Communist Russia and the capitalist states could get along economically. The U.S.S.R. needs help in reconstruction and will compromise to the extent necessary.

(b) In the atomic energy field, there may be a shortage of raw materials and certainly of equipment and trained personnel. The diversion of these latter is all the more difficult because of the economic situation in the U.S.S.R. Compromises may be made by the U.S.S.R. to gain the benefits of atomic energy.

(c) The U.S.S.R. seems to have decided that the possibilities for gains by being "tough" have been exhausted and has adopted a more conciliatory attitude.

All the above, with the possible exception of (b) are temporary phenomena and it seems desirable to proceed as rapidly as possible toward our goal. It is particularly desirable to get clarification on what is meant by inspection, control, convention, veto power in the control commissions and also whether the United States' plan submitted via the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council will form the basis for the control commission mentioned by Mr. Molotov.

A further possibility, and one to be guarded against, may be the result of Soviet difficulty in making headway in developing atomic energy. They may agree to the initial stages for the sake of gaining information and then attempt to pull out of international agreements.

Joseph Chase

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65 L. D. Wilggress, Alternate Canadian Representative to the General Assembly.
66 Reference is to Vyshinsky's address before a rally sponsored by the National Council of Soviet-American Friendship.
URGENT

New York, December 13, 1946—1 a.m.

[Received 1:21 a.m.]

962. Following is text of resolution approved by subcommittee of Committee I to replace resolution on reports on troops: 67

"The GA

Desirous of implementing, as soon as possible, the resolution of the ... Dec 1946 on the principles governing the regulation and reduction of armaments,

Calls upon the SC to determine, as soon as possible, the information which the states members should be called upon to furnish, in order to give effect to this resolution."

AUSTIN

SPA Files

United Nations General Assembly Resolution Adopted on December 14, 1946 68

A/267

Principles Governing the General Regulation and Reduction of Armaments

1. In pursuance of Article 11 of the Charter and with a view to strengthening international peace and security in conformity with the Purpose and Principles of the United Nations,

67 The General Assembly had discussed the report of the First Committee on the question of the presence of United Nations forces in non-enemy territories at its 52nd Plenary Meeting, December 8, and at its 53rd and 54th Meetings, December 10. In regard to the report which contained the resolution originally adopted, see telegram 865, November 27, from New York, p. 1067.

At its 54th Meeting, the General Assembly referred the First Committee's report to Subcommittee 3 of the First Committee. The Subcommittee, unable to arrive at a text acceptable to both the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, concluded that the resolution it had drafted on the regulation of armaments had dealt adequately with the question of United Nations troops on non-enemy territories and therefore recommended that the resolution providing for reporting on troops originally approved by the First Committee be replaced by the text contained in the present telegram. The Soviet representative opposed the decision. For the text of the report of Subcommittee 3 on troop information reporting, see GA (1/2), First Committee, p. 234. The First Committee adopted the substitute resolution at its 44th Meeting, December 13. For the report of the First Committee to the General Assembly, see GA (1/2), Plenary, pp. 1506-1507. The General Assembly approved the present text at its 63rd Plenary Meeting, December 14.

68 The First Committee unanimously adopted this text at its 44th Meeting, December 13, having made a few minor drafting changes in the text recommended by Subcommittee 3; with respect to the latter's work, see footnote 58, p. ... For the text of the report of the 1st Committee transmitting this text to the General Assembly, see GA (1/2), Plenary, pp. 1557-1559. The General Assembly discussed the resolution at its 62nd Meeting, December 13, and its 63rd Meeting, December 14. The consensus of the delegations was highly favorable to the resolution and optimistic as to its significance for the future of the regulation of armaments. Addressing the 63rd Meeting, Secretary Byrnes described the resolution as "a splendid contribution to the cause of peace." At the same meeting, the General Assembly approved the resolution by acclamation.
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
recognizes the necessity of an early general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.

2. Accordingly,

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
recommends that the Security Council give prompt consideration to formulating the practical measures, according to their priority, which are essential to provide for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces and to assure that such regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces will be generally observed by all participants and not unilaterally by only some of the participants. The plans formulated by the Security Council shall be submitted by the Secretary General to the Members of the United Nations for consideration at a special session of the General Assembly. The treaties or conventions approved by the General Assembly shall be submitted to the signatory States for ratification in accordance with Article 26 of the Charter.

3. As an essential step towards the urgent objective of prohibiting and eliminating from national armaments atomic and all other major weapons adaptable now and in the future to mass destruction, and the early establishment of international control of atomic energy and other modern scientific discoveries and technical developments to ensure their use only for peaceful purposes,

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
urges the expeditious fulfilment by the Atomic Energy Commission of its terms of reference as set forth in Section 5 of the General Assembly Resolution of 24 January 1946.

4. In order to ensure that the general prohibition, regulation and reduction of armaments are directed towards the major weapons of modern warfare and not merely towards the minor weapons,

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
recommends that the Security Council expedite consideration of the reports which the Atomic Energy Commission will make to the Security Council and that it facilitate the work of that Commission, and also that the Security Council expedite consideration of a draft convention or conventions for the creation of an international system of control and inspection, these conventions to include the prohibition of atomic and all other major weapons adaptable now and in the future to mass destruction and the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes.

5. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

FURTHER recognizes that essential to the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces is the provision of practical
and effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions.

Accordingly,

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

RECOMMENDS to the Security Council that it give prompt consideration to the working out of proposals to provide such practical and effective safeguards in connection with the control of atomic energy and the general regulation and reduction of armaments.

6. To ensure the adoption of measures for the early general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, for the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes and the elimination from national armaments of atomic and all other major weapons adaptable now or in the future to mass destruction, and for the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes,

THERE SHALL BE ESTABLISHED,

within the framework of the Security Council, which bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, an international system, as mentioned in paragraph 4, operating through special organs, which organs shall derive their powers and status from the convention or conventions under which they are established.

7. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

regarding the problem of security as closely connected with that of disarmament,

RECOMMENDS the Security Council to accelerate as much as possible the placing at its disposal of the armed forces mentioned in Article 43 of the Charter;

IT RECOMMENDS the Members to undertake the progressive and balanced withdrawal, taking account of the needs of occupation, of their armed forces stationed in ex-enemy territories, and the withdrawal without delay of armed forces stationed in the territories of Members without their consent freely and publicly expressed in treaties or agreements consistent with the Charter and not contradicting international agreements;

IT FURTHER RECOMMENDS a corresponding reduction of national armed forces, and a general progressive and balanced reduction of national armed forces.

8. Nothing herein contained shall alter or limit the resolution of the General Assembly passed on 24 January 1946, creating the Atomic Energy Commission.
9. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

calls upon all Members of the United Nations to render every possible assistance to the Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission in order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and collective security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human economic resources.

Memorandum of Conversation, by G. Hayden Raynor of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET

[NY,] December 14, 1946.

Participants: Mr. Paul Gore-Booth, of the United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. Percy Wells, of the United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. Hayden Raynor

During the course of the Secretary's speech this evening Mr. Gore-Booth expressed to me rather strong concern on the part of the United Kingdom Delegation over the fact that the United Kingdom Delegation had not been informed in advance of the substance of this speech. He was referring, of course, to the portions thereof in which we gave certain information with respect to our troops stationed in foreign territories. (In this connection it should be recalled that Mr. Bevin voted against switching the order of the agenda so that this question would be taken up tonight.) It seemed apparent from the way Mr. Gore-Booth spoke that the British were considerably nettled and felt that the disclosure by us of certain information with respect to troops abroad placed them in a difficult position. He did in the conversation indicate appreciation of the desirability, or almost necessity, of our taking this step but stressed that if they had had some advance information, although Mr. Bevin could not have included like information in his statement, he would have been able to prepare more comprehensive remarks than were possible on the spur of the moment.

Saturday, while talking generally to Mr. Percy Wells, I found occasion to ascertain discreetly from him as to whether Mr. Bevin had in fact been seriously discommoded the previous night. He disclaimed, I felt sincerely, that Mr. Bevin had been upset or resentful about the matter. From the manner in which he spoke, I believe that in the heat

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68 Certain files of the Office of European Affairs.
69 The reference is to Mr. Byrnes' statement at the 62nd Meeting of the General Assembly, December 13, in which he described where and in what number United States troops were stationed in foreign territory; for the text of his address, see GA (1/2), Plenary, pp. 1289-1296.
of the moment Mr. Gore-Booth had perhaps over-stated to me the feeling of the British Delegation on this matter.

In this connection it should be recalled that on Saturday morning Mr. Gromyko expressed a willingness to accept the troop resolution as amended by the United States Delegation to include information on troops at home, but omitting the British provision on verification, and also omitting the Soviet amendment on the disclosure of information on armaments. I took occasion to point out to Mr. Gore-Booth that we could have accepted this offer made by Mr. Gromyko as it met all the points for which we had been fighting. I suggested to him that if we had had any desire to make it difficult for them which, I of course knew he appreciated we did not, we could have accepted Mr. Gromyko’s proposal rather than voting against it and voting in favor of the innocuous proposal on this matter presented by Committee 1. Mr. Gore-Booth appreciated this situation, and I feel certain that any possible lingering resentment or concern brought about the night before was dissipated as a result of this course of action by the United States Delegation.

Matthews Files

Memorandum by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 27, 1946.

I have read General Smith’s letter giving an analysis of a memorandum of conversation between Mr. Lindsay and Mr. Sobolev in New York. While in New York I had seen the memorandum of conversation in question (a copy of which at my suggestion was sent to the Secretary and is in his files).

I am basically in entire agreement with the Embassy’s analysis of the Soviet attitude. My only comment is that while it is certain that the Russians would try to exploit any international scheme for control to weaken the non-Soviet world without weakening the Soviet world, I feel it does not necessarily follow that we should permit them so to use any international authority. It seems to me that that is a question for proper and intelligent handling of the problem on our part. Indeed with proper implementation the international control of atomic energy might force the beginning of a change in the Soviet structure.

71 The reference is to the proceedings of the 63rd Meeting of the General Assembly, December 14.

72 For Ambassador Smith’s letter, dated November 19, see p. 1016. For memorandum of conversation, dated October 21, see p. 935.
The Kremlin will obviously do everything in its power to prevent this, but the basic contradiction between a police state and an international authority does not automatically mean that the international authority would lose out. I gather that it was some such possibility that General Smith had in mind in the paragraph on page 3 that you marked which at first glance appears to be inconsistent with the considerations set forth earlier.

As to the paragraph on page 4 which you question, I think General Smith feels that we should proceed with the international control of atomic energy in cooperation with any nation that accepts it in good faith and not hold up international control because of the failure of the Soviets to join in such control. I am not entirely sure that I agree with that thesis since the net effect might be to water down our advantage as the possessors of the atomic bomb without any appreciable gain if the Soviets stay out. I am more inclined to the view that if a completely adequate arrangement cannot be made with the Soviet Union it would be better to drop any scheme for international control, which would only be partial if Russia were out, and leave our hands free to develop atomic energy on a national scale.\(^7\)

500.A/12–2846: Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

US URGENT

NEW YORK, December 28, 1946—3 : 30 p.m.

[Received 3:42 p.m.]

998. Following letter from Gromyko to SYG \(^7\) regarding implementation of GA resolution on reduction of armaments, dated December 27, was received by the delegation at 3 p.m. December 28 over the UN news line with notation that it was for press release at 6 p.m. December 28:

"I have the honour to request you to include in the agenda of the next meeting of the SC on 31 December an item on the consideration of the following proposal which I make on behalf of my government.

'Considering that the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces is the most important measure for the strengthening of international peace and security and that the implementation of the GA's decision on this question is one of the most urgent and most important tasks facing the SC, the Council resolves:

\(^7\) Mr. Acheson, to whom Mr. Matthews transmitted the file copy on February 1, 1947, made the following marginal notation beside the final sentence: "In cooperation with UK and Canada."

\(^7\) Secretary General of the United Nations (Trygve H. Lie).
REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS

1. To proceed with the working out of practical measures on the implementation of the GA's decision of 14 December 1946, on the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces and on the establishment of international control assuring the reduction of armaments and armed forces.

2. To establish a commission of the representatives of countries members of the SC which has to be charged to prepare and submit to the SC within a period of from one to two months but not later than three months its proposals in accordance with paragraph 1 of this decision.

Please accept, Mr. Secretary-General, the assurance of my very high esteem to you.

JOHNSON

500.A/12-2846: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1946—7 p. m.

U.S. URGENT

327. Urtei 998, Dec. 28. 1. You should at appropriate point during consideration of placing on agenda of Dec. 31 meeting Soviet proposal re armaments make statement along following lines:

a. US does not oppose placing this proposal on agenda.

b. This Govt feels, however, that the agenda item should preferably be, not consideration of Soviet proposal, but consideration of GA resolution of Dec. 14 on "principles governing the general regulation and reduction of armaments". This seems more desirable approach as it places discussion in proper perspective. In this connection other delegations will doubtless also have views as to best way in which SC should deal with its responsibilities under GA Resolution. It would be most in conformity with SC's responsibilities to consider all such proposals on equal basis rather than give priority to any one.

c. US also has proposal on this subject which it desires to have considered by SC, copies of which are being distributed for consideration of SC members.

d. However SC may resolve this procedural question which we do not wish to press, consideration of topic should be postponed until first meeting in 1947, and it should be clearly understood that our proposal and any other proposals relating to implementation of GA resolution which may be introduced will be considered concurrently and on equal basis with Soviet proposal. Postponement would have added advantage that SC would begin what will surely be very important and quite extended discussions of whole problem of regulation of armaments with membership which will be continuing consideration of problem in 1947.
2. Following is text of US draft resolution which should be distributed in accordance with paragraph 1 (c) above:

"The Security Council resolves that: (1) Pursuant to the General Assembly Resolution of December 14 concerning the ‘Principles governing the general regulation and reduction of armaments’, it gives first priority to the establishment of international control over atomic energy and, accordingly, it will consider and act upon the forthcoming report of the Atomic Energy Commission as soon as received; (2) It will thereafter consider what further practical measures it should take and in what order of priority for the implementation of the said General Assembly Resolution."

3. It is not believed you will need to speak in support of US Resolution at meeting on Dec. 31. Further instructions with respect thereto will be communicated subsequently. In the meantime you will wish to bear in mind that my speech of Dec. 13 has already clearly established order of priorities which US believes should govern consideration of GA Resolution of Dec. 14. Moreover, with respect to Gromyko’s proposal, it is our view that no additional commission should be established in general field of arms regulation at present time.

4. Please communicate above to Baruch immediately.

BYRNES

500.A/12–8146 : Telegram
The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT NEW YORK, December 31, 1946—4:30 p.m. [Received 4:52 p.m.]

1002. Paragraph 2 of Dept’s 327, December 30. In connection with the American proposal which delegation presented to the SC today, 16

16 The Atomic Energy Commission had debated the subject of its report at its 8th Meeting, December 17, and 9th Meeting, December 20. At the latter session, it voted to establish a Working Committee (the Commission itself in executive session) to prepare the Commission’s report on the basis of the United States proposal on findings and recommendations (see footnote 55, p. 1083), the General Assembly Resolution on the Regulation of Armaments of December 14, and the report of AEC Committee 2 on safeguards and control, adopted by that Committee on December 18. The Soviet Union and Poland opposed this procedure. The Working Committee agreed at its 5th Meeting to submit a report to the AEC which presented all texts of disputed passages. At the 10th plenary meeting of the Commission, December 30, the majority position on the report of the Working Committee was accepted as the Commission’s report to the Security Council by a vote of ten members with the Soviet Union and Poland abstaining. The First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, December 31, 1946, is printed as AEC (1), Special Supplement.

17 The speech under reference was that delivered by Mr. Byrnes at the 62nd Meeting of the General Assembly.

17 The reference is to the 88th Meeting of the Security Council.
British delegate Cadogan passed a note at the Council table to Herschel Johnson which expressed regret that the first paragraph of the American proposal called for consideration and action on the AEC report "as soon as received" (by SC).

The note stated:

"I rather regret the last phrase of your paragraph 1. I had hoped a pause might ensue before bringing the Atomic Commission report before the Council. We don't want to rush head-on into a veto, and are we clear enough yet as to the position that might be produced by an 'abstention'? I should have liked time for reflexion."

At the close of today's Council meeting, the delegation was informed by De Rose (France) and Hasluck (Australia) that the Council should not consider the AEC report for 3 weeks in order to give the Russians an opportunity to reflect on the AEC subcommittee's vote yesterday, which found all members in favor of the report except Russia and Poland who abstained. Both De Rose and Hasluck felt that it would be better tactically not to force consideration and quick action on the AEC report but instead to give an opportunity for the implications of the vote to have an effect in Moscow.

Johnson

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Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 31 December 1946.

In accordance with your directive, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined a resolution on disarmament proposed by Senator Austin and forwarded to you by letter from the Secretary of State.

The proposed resolution has been overtaken by events since on 30 November 1946 the United States submitted a materially different resolution on the subject and on 14 December 1946 the General Assembly, prior to adjournment of the 1946 session, formally approved a general resolution on disarmament. In view of the fact, however, that disarmament and the regulation of armaments seem now to be destined for further and more specific consideration in the Security Council of the United Nations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are submitting their

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78 Paul Hasluck, Australian Representative on the Security Council; Acting Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission.
79 The reference is to the 10th Plenary Meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission at which its report to the Security Council was adopted.
90 This memorandum was forwarded by the President to the Secretary of State on January 4, 1947.
80 For the draft resolution under reference, see p. 1061.
views on the proposals contained in Senator Austin's resolution for consideration in connection with future developments in this field.

Except for certain broad statements made in the fourth and fifth paragraphs of the preamble on the subjects of aggressive warfare and United Nations security forces, respectively, comment on which is made below, the Joint Chiefs of Staff perceive no objection to the provisions of the proposed resolution from the strictly military point of view.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not regard, nor do they believe the world regards, the current military establishment of the United States as a menace either to world peace or to international security. They believe that armaments are a consequence and not a cause. The need for them, today as throughout history, arises from the existence of conflicting international aims and ideologies, and will pass only with the passing of such fundamental reasons for conflict between nations. Consequently the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not consider that commitments toward the regulation of armaments or disarmament should be made prior to or independently of the solution of other problems affecting world peace generally and, specifically, the security of the United States. They believe that United States armaments are a vital factor contributing to our own as well as to international peace and security and should not be considered independently of other problems affecting that security. Prior to the settlement of such problems the military requirements of the United States cannot be determined. Foremost among these problems, from the military point of view, are the establishment of a system of effective international control of atomic energy along the lines of that proposed by the United States in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission; the conclusion of the peace treaties and enforcement of those terms therein having predominant military implications; and the conclusion of agreements for providing contingents of armed forces for the Security Council of the United Nations.

In connection with the inference in paragraph four of the preamble of the proposed resolution that a general reduction of armaments will remove the means of conducting aggressive warfare the Joint Chiefs of Staff would point out the position of the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in this regard. The military strength of the United States rests in limited, but highly developed, ground, air and naval forces employing weapons and equipment of great technical complexity, whereas that of the Soviets rests principally on the large size of its ground armies which are not so dependent on technical armaments for possible aggressive operations, particularly on the Eurasian continent. Therefore, any attempt at disarmament or the regulation of armaments on the superficially attractive and seemingly logical basis
of eliminating or regulating “offensive” (“aggressive”) weapons (atomic bombs, strategic aircraft and naval combat vessels) would only serve to limit our own ability to defend the United States or retaliate against aggression without being correspondingly effective in depriving the Soviets of their large ground armies which could, in the absence of effective opposition, be used offensively to overrun Europe and Asia if the Soviets chose to do so.

It would appear unnecessary and unwise for the United States to state, as indicated in the fifth paragraph of the preamble of the proposed resolution, that the “ultimate objective of disarmament should be the reduction of armaments to a level of . . . (United Nations security forces) . . . together with the forces necessary to maintain domestic order and tranquillity.” Such a statement implies that the United Nations, under the present Charter, will possess the full capability of utilizing the forces called for by Article 43 of the Charter to maintain world peace and security. Such a statement is unrealistic since the veto provisions in the Security Council make it impossible for the security forces to be used against any one of the powers possessing the veto, or against a satellite or ally of one of those powers if the latter wished to prevent such action. Such a statement would be misleading to the American people and would encourage them to underestimate the military strength required to insure their own security.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff firmly believe that until the problems mentioned in the fourth paragraph of this memorandum are resolved it is premature to go beyond the discussion stage of disarmament and regulation of armaments. In this connection they would invite attention to their views on this general subject as transmitted to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on 6 December 1946 for forwarding to the Secretaries of State, War and Navy as follows:

[Here follows text of SWNCC 240/1, printed on p. 1091.]

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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