THE UNITED STATES AT THE UNITED NATIONS: THE UNITED STATES POSITION REGARDING CERTAIN PROBLEMS OF UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE

I. UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING ELECTIONS TO CERTAIN ORGANS, COMMISIONS, AND COMMITTEES OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

10 Files: USGA/IA/DEL. MIN./1 (Chr)

Minutes of the First Meeting of the United States Delegation, on Board the Queen Elizabeth, January 2, 1946, 11 a.m.

SECRET

[Here follows list of names of persons (34) present.]

Mr. Stettinius called the meeting to order at 11:01 a.m. The Chairman stressed the importance of the Delegation's task of bringing the United Nations into operation and expressed the joint determination to do the job quickly and well. He recalled that at the close of the San Francisco Conference a Preparatory Commission had been established as an interim organization pending the coming into force of the Charter. Following a single meeting of the Preparatory Commission at San Francisco, it had adjourned leaving the task in the hands of a fourteen-member Executive Committee which met in London. The Executive Committee had completed its work on November 12, 1945. The Preparatory Commission met on November 23 and in a five-week session had approved most of the recommendations of the Executive Committee.

The Chairman pointed out that under the recommendations of the Executive Committee and the Preparatory Commission the first part of the first session of the General Assembly was to be a constituent meeting. It was proposed by the Preparatory Commission that there

---

1 Regarding the organization and composition of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, see pp. 1 ff.

2 For the Charter of the United Nations, signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945, see 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1021, or Department of State Treaty Series 993. For the agreement regarding Interim Arrangements, which set up the Preparatory Commission, signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945, see 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1411, or Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 461. For the reports of the Preparatory Commission and its Executive Committee, see Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations and Report by the Executive Committee to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations.
should be a second part of the first session for substantive problems. The Chairman expressed the hope that the second session would be able to open on April 25 at the new site of the Organization.

In answer to a question from Mr. Dulles as to what compelling force there was to restrict the first session to procedural matters, Mr. Hiss pointed to the resolution of the Executive Committee (PC/EX/113/Rev.1, p. 17), which resolution had been adopted by the Preparatory Commission, recommending that the first part should be primarily organizational but would also include consideration of such other world problems as might be raised by any member. The Chairman interposed that it had been emphasized in London that any member could bring up any subject before the Assembly and asserted that the Delegation must go to London expecting to have raised such questions as Iran, Syria, Lebanon, relief, and transportation. Mr. Dulles pointed out that under the rules of procedure any member could have any subject placed on the agenda six days before the General Assembly convenes. Mr. Hiss pointed out that the Preparatory Commission had added the refugee question to the list of questions to be discussed. In answer to a question from Mr. Bloom, Mr. Hiss stated that it was the evidence intention to discuss the whole problem of displaced persons under the heading of refugees. Mr. Bloom inquired whether it was not possible under the rules of procedure for the presiding officer to recognize any member on any subject. Mr. Hiss thought this was not the correct interpretation and that the rule referred to meant that any member could speak on any item on the agenda. He pointed out the rule under which an item could be added to the agenda by a majority vote of members present and voting.

Mr. Stettinius reported that he had received a wire from the Secretary of State early in the morning confirming Mr. Byrnes' intention of flying to London, where he would meet with the Delegation. Mr. Hiss expressed the hope that the meeting of the General Assembly would not be a long, drawn-out affair. The British were very hard-pressed for space and were likewise hoping that the meeting would not be a long one. The Chairman expressed his personal hope that the meeting could be concluded in three weeks.

[Here follows discussion regarding certain Delegation assignments and procedures.]

Mr. Stettinius regretted that Mr. Pasvolsky's illness prevented him from speaking and expressed the hope that the Delegation would hear from Mr. Pasvolsky a full review of the history of the United Nations Organization to the present date.

Mr. Stettinius then called on Mr. Hiss to give an explanation of the agenda of the General Assembly. Mr. Hiss explained the provisional agenda for the first part of the first session of the General Assembly
as set forth in the Executive Committee Report, pointing out such minor changes as had been made by the Preparatory Commission.  

Regarding the election of the President of the General Assembly, Mr. Hiss stated that the Department felt that the members would want a European President since the site of the Organization was to be in the United States. Accordingly, the United States had not taken a strong position on the matter. The United States favored as President Mr. Lie of Norway because he was personally a very fine man with a good command of both French and English, and Norway was a fighting United Nation which probably would not be elected a member of the Security Council. Mr. Hiss reported that there had recently been a strong feeling in London for Mr. Evatt as President. Latin American members had been reported to be particularly favorably inclined toward him. The view of the Department had been that Mr. Evatt would be a good candidate and that his candidacy should not be opposed. Senator Vandenberg stated that Dr. Evatt should be elected President because for the world he was the spokesman of the small powers, and Senator Vandenberg thought it was important that Mr. Evatt be elected as an indication that the small powers were receiving full recognition.

In answer to a question from Senator Connally regarding the membership of Australia on the Security Council, Mr. Hiss stated that the Department felt that Australia should not be on the Security Council but that Canada should be a member, especially because of its position on the Atomic Energy Commission, and that there should be only one member from the British Commonwealth on the Security Council.

Mr. Hiss explained that the Department still felt that it was only proper that the Organization should want a European since it was to be located in the United States and that, therefore, the Department should not take a strong stand for the candidacy of Mr. Evatt, lest it appear to rub in the non-European character of the Organization. Mr. Dulles questioned whether the choice should be made on the basis of European nationality or whether it might not be better to state simply that the President should be someone other than from one of the Americas. Mr. Stettinius reported to the Delegates that the United States had taken the position in London that it was expected that the President would be a European. Mr. Bloom questioned whether the

---

a The provisional agenda are printed in the Report by the Executive Committee, pp. 18 ff., and the Report of the Preparatory Commission, pp. 7 ff., respectively.

b For the Preparatory Commission background of this and other questions relating to states, discussed by Mr. Hiss, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. 1, pp. 1433–1509, passim; the basic document is a memorandum of the Secretary’s Staff Committee dated November 15, 1945 (SC/171/8), ibid., p. 1475.

c Trygve Lie, Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

d Herbert V. Evatt, Australian Secretary of State for External Affairs.
President was being elected simply for the first part of the first session of the Assembly or whether he was also to preside over the second session. Mr. Hiss said that it was the understanding of the United States that the President elected was to serve for both parts of the first session of the General Assembly. Mr. Stettinius stated the firm conviction that it was better to have a set of officers in both parts of the first session. Mrs. Roosevelt expressed agreement, and stated that she thought it better that the officers should serve for both parts.

Regarding the adoption of the provisional rules of procedure and the supplementary rules of procedure, Mr. Hiss pointed out that the rules were entirely provisional and that it was expected that permanent rules would be drawn up for the two parts of the first session. Mr. Hiss referred to a suggestion from Mr. Bloom that there should be a select committee of parliamentary experts to advise the Secretary General. This committee could undertake the task of working out an effective compromise between the parliamentary procedures of such states as the United Kingdom, France, and the United States.

Regarding the election of Vice President, Mr. Hiss stated that the United States regarded the important elective posts in the United Nations Organization to be the President of the Assembly, the Secretary General, the members of the Security Council, the Social and Economic Council, and the Trusteeship Council. The seven Vice Presidencies offered additional negotiating positions. The United States did not as yet have any slate to recommend on the Vice Presidents, and the matter could be worked out in London.

Mr. Bloom asked to return to the election of the Presiding Officer, and emphasized that he thought it was important that it should be made clear whether the President was to serve for one or two parts of the meeting because of the possibility of a precedent being established for future meetings. Mr. Stettinius remarked that the whole spirit of the negotiations in London had been that the President should serve for both parts of the session.

Regarding the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, Mr. Hiss stated that the Department’s position was that there should be elected to the six available seats one Western European member, one British Commonwealth member, two Latin American members, one from the Near East and Africa, and one from Eastern Europe. Mr. Hiss continued that the preliminary negotiations on the slate had already been taken up in London and the United States position on the composition of the slate had been explained to certain states. It had been made very plain in London, and Mr. Hiss wished to

*The provisional rules of procedure for the several United Nations organs drafted by the Executive Committee and the Preparatory Commission itself are found in the appropriate sections of the two reports.*
emphasize the point, that the United States has drawn up slates which the Department thought on balance would be reasonable, but that for the most part the slates were not to be taken as inviolable and immutable. Since the Charter emphasized equitable geographic distribution of council membership, the Department had thought the states in the various areas should be consulted concerning their wishes and it was the general intention of the United States to support only a state which was supported by its neighbors. For instance, Egypt would be supported for the Security Council in the event that it was supported by the Arab League. In the event that the Arab League supported another Near Eastern power, the Department would have to reconsider its position. The United States needed to keep freedom of choice to be sure in the future that some entirely objectionable state was not put forward as a candidate which we would be committed to support under the geographical formula.

The United States slate for the Security Council consisted of Brazil for a two-year term, Mexico for a one-year term, Canada for a two-year term, the Netherlands for a two-year term, Poland for a one-year term, and Egypt for a two-year term.

Regarding the possibility of the admission of new members to the United Nations, Mr. Hiss stated that he doubted that any recommendations would be made on this question. The United States had taken the position that it was preferable to take up this question during the second part of the Assembly and there seemed to be no disposition to disagree strongly with this view. The United Kingdom had not continued to press the candidacy of Sweden. In this connection, Mr. Stettinius stated the United States had indicated a preference to admit the five or six nations if any members were to be admitted during the first meeting. Mr. Hiss indicated that Portugal has put forward a desire to join the United Nations; there was also the possibility of Iceland.

Regarding the election of the Secretary General, Mr. Hiss stated that the United States position had been that he should not be a national of one of the Big Five powers in order to avoid the appearance of Big Five domination. The United States had also assumed that since the site was to be in the United States the members would want a European. The Department had informally indicated that Mr. Spaak of Belgium would be a good choice, but it was possible that he would not be available since he was of Cabinet rank, a possible Prime Minister in Belgium, and would, as Secretary General, have to step out of politics for five years. Mr. Hiss stated that the Department had made it known that the United States would be delighted if Mr. Pearson.

---

\(^8\) For documentation on this subject, see pp. 357 ff.

\(^9\) Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

\(^10\) Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Ambassador to the United States.
of Canada were elected as Secretary General, but it was expected that his candidacy would be hampered by the desire to have a non-American as Secretary General. Mr. Dulles inquired whether it was proper that the Secretary General should be chosen on a national basis since the Secretariat was to be of an international character. Mr. Hiss explained the Department’s position had been that other things being equal it would be advisable to have a man from outside the Americas. Mrs. Roosevelt inquired what considerations had led to the support of Mr. Spaak. Mr. Hiss replied that perhaps the main consideration had been that Mr. Spaak was well-known and highly-regarded throughout Europe. He had been a leader in the Belgian Government-in-Exile, he was politically strong at home, he had excellent qualities of leadership, and was a man of high integrity. His chief short-coming was that he did not speak English. Mr. Bloom questioned whether a five-year term was too long in case the Secretary General was unsatisfactory and therefore could only be removed with great difficulty. Mr. Hiss pointed out that the question had been debated at great length, that some states had wanted an indefinite tenure, and others had wanted a tenure of ten years. It had been felt that in order to secure the best man it would be necessary to offer the Secretary General a five-year term. Mr. Stettinius reported that he had conducted the negotiations on this question in London during three or four long and difficult weeks which had included many discussions in his own rooms. After delicate negotiations, the Russians and French had been brought to agree to a five-year term of office. This was subject to the condition that the Secretary General could be invited to resign if he proved completely unsatisfactory.

Regarding the election of members of the Economic and Social Council, Mr. Hiss pointed out that the eighteen members to be elected would have to be assigned terms of one, two, or three years in order to establish the annual elections for three-year terms in the future. The United States position assumed that the Big Five would be automatically members. However, in order that the situation should not arise in which three years after the first election all five members came up for reelection, allowing the election of only one other member at that time, it had been agreed that the five powers should be assigned varying terms of office in alphabetical order. Thus, the first three-year terms of the Big Five would go to China and France. The United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would be elected for two-year terms and the United States for a one-year term.

Regarding the rest of the slate, Mr. Hiss emphasized that it was very tentative, still subject to considerable negotiation. The United States position was that Denmark might be elected as a European member, Iraq from the Near East, and Greece from Eastern Europe,
all for three years. There should be four posts for Latin American states. The Department was still waiting to hear what candidates the Latin American states had agreed upon. At the last report, Peru, Chile, and Colombia were generally agreed to and the fourth post seemed likely to be offered to Cuba or Uruguay. The Latin American states were to hold a meeting on January 3, after which news might be available. The United States slate, based on a geographical distribution, had included Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay, and Peru. Now it appeared that Mexico would not be a candidate since it preferred to be a candidate for the Security Council. Mr. Hiss said that the whole question would have to be negotiated again in London. The United States slate proposed two-years terms for the Ukraine, Canada, and Belgium, and one-year terms for Australia, Czechoslovakia, and Turkey.

Mr. Hiss pointed out that the Delegation would be particularly interested in the General Assembly committee report which would be made upon the provisional budgetary, financial, and organizational needs for assessing and collecting contributions from members. Mr. Hiss pointed out that the Preparatory Commission had proposed in addition to the Executive Committee report the setting up of an advisory group of experts for the Administrative and Budgetary Committee of the General Assembly. Generally speaking, the budgetary arrangements were to be left as fluid as possible until the second session of the General Assembly to allow for full study. It has been recommended that a capital fund be established to carry the expenses of the first year’s operations. Contributions to this were to be made on the basis of the Food and Agriculture Organization contribution quota under which the United States could pay a maximum of twenty-five percent of the total contributions. Mr. Hiss pointed out that some states wished the United States to pay a larger proportion but some states wished the United States to pay a smaller portion in order to avoid the appearance of dominating the Organization.12 Mr. Sandifer pointed out that it should be clear that the Food and Agriculture Organization basis should apply only to the capital fund; that it was not to be a continuing arrangement. It was pointed out that if any money were left in the capital fund after the first year of operations, that money would probably be used for a building fund. Senator Connally expressed the opinion that unless the United States took a strong position, the United States would be cheated and would be saddled with the entire cost. Mrs. Roosevelt stated that she understood the United Kingdom was paying for the forthcoming meeting, the expenses to be offset in the final accounting. She inquired whether the same held for the expenses of the United States in connection with the

12 For documentation on this subject, see pp. 461 ff.
United Nations Organization. It was pointed out that the United Kingdom payment was to be offset against the general contributions, not against the United Kingdom contribution to the capital fund.

Mr. Hiss pointed out regarding the League of Nations dissolution, that the Preparatory Commission had made somewhat different recommendations from those of the Executive Committee. The non-political functions of the League, such as opium control, health and transport, were to be taken over by the United Nations on a provisional basis. All the buildings of the League of Nations were to be turned over to the United Nations and would probably be used for various groups and commissions. It was pointed out that there was also talk of having regional offices of the Economic and Social Council located at Geneva. The Chairman went on to state that the Russians felt very definitely that the United Nations should not move to Geneva as a temporary site and he thought it very important that there not be any mention of such a possibility. He thought that the Organization should move straight away to the United States to its new site as soon as the meeting adjourned. Mrs. Roosevelt agreed that this was highly desirable.

Regarding the organization of the Secretariat, the United States position was that the Secretary General should be allowed as much discretion as possible, that the General Assembly should merely lay down provisional guides and rules for the organization of the Secretariat, and definite rules should be adopted at the second session upon the recommendations of the Secretary General. Mr. Hiss stated that Mr. Bloom had previously made known to him his very strong feeling that the Secretary General should have complete freedom to choose the Under Secretary General and the Assistant Secretaries General, and Mr. Hiss stated that this was the clear intention of the recommendations. Although the General Assembly would have to approve the Secretariat officers, the Secretary General would have a free hand in choosing them. Mrs. Roosevelt stated that she thought that the Secretariat was an extremely important part of the Organization and it seemed to her that there was a point to be watched very carefully in its organization, more especially with regard to those nations with long and old governmental procedures. She thought it very important that there should be a combination of age groups which would utilize the experience of older men but which might also bring in younger men. She thought that there might be a tendency to unload older personnel from various Foreign Offices who were not wanted by their home governments and who could be sent off to the United Nations as a sort of pension. Mrs. Roosevelt said that she had been pleased to notice the Executive Committee recommendation that there should be a suitable range of ages, but thought it was a point which could be
easily overlooked, and should be kept in mind by those who are discussing organizational matters. Mr. Stettinius agreed that that was a very important point.

In discussing the report of the General Assembly Committee relating to trusteeship, Mr. Hiss pointed out that the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations would expire with that body. However, in answer to a question of Mr. Bloom Mr. Hiss emphasized that the limitations upon the authority of the mandates did not end until Trusteeship agreements had been concluded. Mr. Hiss pointed out that the mandatory powers had agreed in the Charter that mandated territories were appropriate for trusteeship. Mr. Hiss believed that probably the General Assembly would recommend that agreements to place the mandated territories under trusteeship be negotiated before the second part of the General Assembly convened. Mr. Bloom pointed out that some machinery was necessary to carry on certain functions of the Mandates Commission and that there would have to be action on this on the part of the General Assembly. Mr. Bloom emphasized his feeling that this must be done because if the Mandate Commission ended and there were no one to handle mandated territories a very bad situation would result.

Mr. Hiss reported, regarding the site of the headquarters, that the United States position was that the question of preferences and immunities and status to be accorded the permanent site was a question which should be dealt with in the second part of the first session, because negotiations on those questions would have to be carried out with the appropriate American federal, state, and local authorities. Mr. Hiss reported that the general feeling seemed to be that the Organization should be free from taxation on its land and should receive inviolability for its land and buildings. However, public services should be handled by contract and highway police, et cetera, supplied by the state. He reported that some members of Congress had recommended that there be established an international enclave for the permanent headquarters. Senator Connally interjected that the United States could not do this because it would be unconstitutional.

Mr. Stettinius stated that there would be distributed to the members of the Delegation a protest from Mayor Lapham. (Doc, USGA/Ia/4) He stated that he expected Australia and China to be active in reopening discussion on the motion that the headquarters must be in the Eastern United States. Mr. Bloom stated that he thought it was

---

13 For documentation on this subject, see pp. 544 ff.
12 For documentation on this subject, see pp. 60 ff.
14 Not printed. This is a reference to the extensive work done by many cities of the United States to persuade the United Nations to locate its permanent headquarters within their respective boundaries; Roger Lapham was Mayor of San Francisco.
unfair that one-half of the United States should be foreclosed from consideration and he felt that San Francisco should not be cut off. Mr. Stettinius said that he was sure that the question would be reopened, pointing out that when the vote was taken there were eleven members absent, and ten abstained from voting. Mr. Stettinius pointed out that it was important that a site should be chosen which would offer office and hotel facilities for several hundred people who would have to get right to work after the first session adjourned.

Regarding the nomination of judges for the Court of Justice, Mr. Hiss reported that the United States has not attempted a selection among the nominees since nominations do not close until January 10.

It was agreed that the Delegation should not schedule further formal meetings for the moment but should meet informally each morning at 11 a.m. with Mr. Hiss and Mr. Pasvolsky to discuss such questions as the Delegates might have.

IO Files: USGA/IA/Del. Min./2 (Chr)

Minutes of the Meeting of the United States Delegation on Board the Queen Elizabeth, January 3, 1946, 11:30 a.m.

SECRET

[Here follows list of names of persons (29) present.]

Senator Connally presided in the absence of Mr. Stettinius.

Mr. Pasvolsky explained the background of some of the decisions upon which the Charter is based; he outlined some of the more controversial questions in the discussions at the drafting stage and indicated the reasoning behind the decisions on those questions. He referred the meeting to the Chart in the front of Book I as a basis for his discussion.

Mr. Pasvolsky stated that the main structure of UNO was developed and agreed upon after reconciliation of differences in viewpoint. There was the basic question of whether an international organization should be responsible only for peace and security or should in addition deal with other problems including social and economic questions. The United States position had always been that the Organization should handle economic and social problems as well as security questions with a close inter-relationship among the parts of the Organization. This position was based upon the conviction that economic and social cooperation is an essential element of maintaining peace and
that, at the same time, peace and security are essential bases for developing economic and social cooperation.

At Dumbarton Oaks 36 there was a great deal of discussion over whether there should be one or two organizations. Whereas the United States and the British preferred a single entity, the Soviet Union wanted two organizations. The Soviet Union took the position that economic and social questions were so important that they should be dealt with separately; they felt that the League of Nations tried to cover too much ground which was one of the reasons for its failure especially as to peace and security. However, the Soviet Delegation ultimately became persuaded of the soundness of our position.

Another basic issue discussed in the early stages of the Charter drafting period was that of the role of the General Assembly as compared with the Security Council. The League of Nations Assembly and its Council (with a limited membership which increased from 9 to 15), exercised similar functions and had similar powers. Those responsible for the development of the United States position in the early stages of the Charter discussions, felt that the League arrangement resulted in “everybody’s business being nobody’s business”; the League Council, they felt, did cover too much ground. Hence, the Security Council should be limited strictly to security issues, whereas the General Assembly could deal with a range of other and related questions including political stability, and economic and social welfare which bear upon conditions of stability among nations. This conception proved to have a general appeal and since it provided a principal organ with functions limited to security, it assisted the Russians in accepting the United States concept of an organization that would include also other functions for which other organs would be responsible.

Another early question was whether or not the Economic and Social Council should have a restricted membership and autonomous powers outside of the General Assembly, in a manner analogous to the Security Council. It was decided that the Economic and Social Council should have less freedom and independence and should, in fact, operate under the authority of the General Assembly. There were several reasons: (a) Individual nations were ready to go less far in granting authority to an international organization in the economic and social field than in the security field. (b) The General Assembly with its full membership of the United Nations was the appropriate organ to serve as a coordinator in the expanding field of specialized agencies which

---

36 For documentation on the Dumbarton Oaks preliminaries to the establishment of an international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security, held at Washington, D.C., August 21–October 7, 1944, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. 1, pp. 713 ff.
themselves were expected to be composed of most or all of the members of the General Assembly.

Still another issue was that of the Court’s status. The British thought that in view of the United States attitude toward an International Court after World War I, the United States would accept a Court more readily if it were separated from the UNO. There was also a general desire to use the Statute of the old Court under which considerable experience had been gained. General agreement to make the Court a principal organ of the UNO was achieved by giving the Court more freedom for its own internal management than was the case with other organs, yet creating it through the Charter.

Fundamental to the nature of the Organization itself was the question of whether there should be an over-all world organization as the basic structure, or whether, as the British thought at that time, there should be a series of regional organizations capped by a loose world structure at the top. Mr. Churchill and his advisers in the early stages of the discussions preferred the latter alternative. The United States never agreed with that position and felt that while there clearly were functions for regional organizations they should be built within the framework of a world structure, the viewpoint which ultimately prevailed.

Perhaps the most widely known controversy has been that over the voting provisions, and the so-called “veto power”. Mr. Pasvolsky recalled that the Security Council possesses all the powers of the League Council and substantially more. He observed that the League of Nations itself operated on the rule of unanimity on substantive questions, with one or two exceptions. Early in the considerations of the Charter, its framers raised the question of whether the time had come for a step forward—away from the rule of unanimity and toward the majority rule principle. The majority system was clearly indicated for the General Assembly, its powers being limited to recommending. However, the Security Council while operating in a limited field was to have substantial power to act. Could for instance the United States be asked to use its troops against its own desires (though obviously not against itself)? In the light of that type of question, the United States was clearly as much interested in the veto power as was the Soviet Union. (Our controversy with the Soviet Union over the question of whether a country itself involved in a controversy should have the right to vote, was a separate question.)

Whereas, under the unanimity rule of the League all Council members had the veto power, it was agreed that in the Security Council

---

37 For documentation regarding the policy of the United States toward the International Court of Justice, see pp. 53 ff.
38 For documentation on this subject, see pp. 251 ff.
a decision could be made by seven of eleven members, which would bind the whole organization in certain cases, requiring, however, the concurrence of the five permanent members. The principal point of consideration was actually less the veto than the fact that decisions of the Council were binding upon the whole membership of the Organization.

Mr. Pasvolsky observed that in Mr. Evatt's criticisms of the veto power, Mr. Evatt was consciously playing the part of the gadfly in impressing upon world opinion and upon the Great Powers themselves the responsibility of the Great Powers in the use of the veto. Mr. Evatt fully recognizes that if the veto were abolished the powers of the Security Council necessarily would have to be curtailed.

Another of the basic issues which arose early in the discussions was that of whether there should be an international police force or whether member nations should provide contingents from their own forces. The military advisers at Dumbarton Oaks considered this question at great length, the U.S.S.R. being the principal proponent of the international force. However, the military advisers ultimately indicated that the practical difficulties were insuperable. In response to a question by Mr. Lewis Lorwin, of the Department of Commerce, Mr. Pasvolsky indicated that some of those difficulties included the probability that such a force would have to be supported from some kind of international tax base, international territory would have to be maintained to house, train, and deploy such forces and perhaps world establishments would have to be operated to manufacture arms and equipment. Senator Connally added that he had combatted the idea from the beginning and observed that frictions would have been created wherever such forces were stationed just as frictions had been created during the war by stationing of "foreign troops" in various lands.

Mrs. Roosevelt observed, and Mr. Pasvolsky agreed, that under the arrangements contemplated in the Charter it would be practical for the Security Council to use those forces closest to the seat of trouble. It was observed that this would, of course, be up to the Security Council which can ask some or all of the forces under its control to participate in a given action.

Mr. Pasvolsky also observed that a subsidiary question concerning armed forces was whether there should be commitments by the various nations for limited or unlimited contingents. The United States students of the problem felt certain the contingents would have to be limited and that there would be a substantial advantage in the Security Council's knowing exactly what forces it had available.19

19 For documentation regarding this subject, see pp. 712 ff.
Mrs. Roosevelt raised the question of the relationship of the proposed Rio Treaty, announced in today's news reports, to the Charter. Mr. Pasvolsky observed that the basic concept of the proposed Inter-American Treaty had its origins in the Resolution of Habana, 1940, and in the Act of Chapultepec. An attack by any state against any American nation will be considered an attack against all, and all parties have an obligation to take some action, and all are obligated to consult although they may or may not act.

The question was raised as to whether an attack, and a threat of attack, are to be considered as subject to the same type of action. Mr. Dulles observed that this question had required a month to settle in San Francisco and had given rise to the famous self-defense article of the Charter (Article 51) which provides that "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.", et cetera. This Article does not, however, permit any nation or group of nations to act in case of a threat or to intervene to prevent a threat of attack until authorized to do so by the Security Council.

Under the proposed Rio Treaty, American nations may act to repel an attack until the Security Council itself takes action, Mr. Pasvolsky explained. In the case of threats to the peace in the Western Hemisphere, the American nations must consult but enforcement action must be authorized by the Security Council. The character and extent of aid in the case of attack is within the discretion of each party. Two-thirds of the American nations must agree to measures to be taken for collective action and those who so vote are obligated to assist. All are obligated to consult in case of attack.

General Kenney raised the question whether under the proposed Rio Treaty, the United States could step in without Security Council consent if, for example, Paraguay were to attack Bolivia. Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out that the United States could do so and that the Security Council could then consider whether it approved the action. Even if all other members of the Security Council decided that they did not approve the United States could, of course, veto disapproval. How-

---

39 For text of the proposed Inter-American Treaty, later known as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed on September 2, 1947 at Rio de Janeiro, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1838, or 62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1651; the Resolution of Habana was Article XIV of the Final Act and Convention signed on July 30, 1940 at Habana at the completion of the Second Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, held July 21-30, 1940. For text of the Final Act and Convention, see Department of State Bulletin, August 24, 1940, pp. 127 ff.; the Act of Chapultepec was Resolution IX of the Final Act of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace and was signed on March 8, 1945 at Mexico City. For text of the Act, see TIAS No. 1545, or 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1947.
ever, such an action obviously would put the United States in a very awkward position.

Mr. Pasvolsky emphasized that the proposed Rio Treaty could not modify the rights of the Security Council to act under the Charter or the rights of individual or collective self-defense. He pointed out, however, that if the Security Council should state that it expected to handle a given problem a regional group such as the Inter-American system could not continue its activities independently.

It was also pointed out that the Security Council must be kept informed of steps contemplated by a regional group such as the Inter-American system.

Mrs. Roosevelt observed that presumably the Security Council would know of trouble and potential aggression brewing in any part of the world and would act to head off possible attack. In this connection, she pointed out that she felt that the prevention of the causes of war was a number-one responsibility of the Organization and said that she wondered whether it was generally recognized that the Economic and Social Council therefore has almost as heavy a responsibility in the security field as the Security Council itself. Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out that not only did such responsibility rest with the Economic and Social Council but also with its parent body, the General Assembly. He observed that there are a variety of causes of war—political as well as economic and social. The Economic and Social Council, the General Assembly, and the Secretary General, he said, all should keep the Security Council informed concerning threats to the peace. He pointed out that the power of the Secretary General in this connection is a great advance over the League of Nations in this respect. Mrs. Roosevelt added her observation that one of the great weaknesses of the League was that it could not tackle causes of war.

Senator Connally observed that in his opinion the proposed Rio Treaty should have a strong deterrent effect upon possible aggression by the American nations. He said clearly that the existence of the treaty arrangements could not prove hurtful and might very well be helpful. Mr. Pasvolsky agreed and observed that it imposed an implicit obligation on all countries in the Americas.

Mr. Pasvolsky also outlined briefly the basis of the Charter provisions concerning dependent areas. He pointed out that there are three different types of dependent areas: (a) mandates taken over from enemies of the Allied Powers in World War I; (b) territories to be detached from the enemies of the United Nations in World War II; (c) colonial areas which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship by the parent countries.

He said there had existed, and he felt there continued to exist, two extreme views on how to handle dependent areas in the United Nations framework. One view held that an international system was not feasi-
ble and that a colonial system under independent parent powers was the answer. The opposite extreme was the view that no single nation should take responsibility for any dependent area and that all dependent areas should be held internationally.

Between these extremes lay the idea behind the Charter—a system of international trusteeship for some territories.

In San Francisco it had been agreed that for each territory placed under trusteeship an agreement would have to be negotiated among the “states directly concerned”. The agreements would have to be submitted for approval to the United Nations and the terms thereafter could be modified only by the parties to the agreements. The General Assembly was to be responsible for approving agreements covering non-strategic territories and the Security Council for territories deemed to be strategic.

Chapter XI of the Charter setting forth the declaration of principles regarding non-self-governing territories was, he said, a gesture in the direction of colonial areas in general. While Chapter XI does not carry supervision by the United Nations over colonial areas, it is a self-imposed obligation on colonial powers to live up to the standards set in the declaration and to report upon colonial administration to the Organization.

Mrs. Roosevelt asked what action could be taken by the Organization if the report of a colonial power was not satisfactory. It was observed that the real sanction in such case was public opinion and that there could be discussion in the General Assembly and even a resolution of censure.

The question was raised as to which powers are the “states directly concerned”. Mr. Pasvolsky said that so far as the mandated territories were concerned the Treaty of Versailles was the basis for the United States position that the “states directly concerned” were the Allied and Associated Powers of World War I—the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan. The two latter states had, of course, eliminated themselves as enemy states of the United Nations in World War II. It is for the Allied and Associated Powers of World War I (without Italy and Japan) to decide what other states are “directly concerned”. If another state is the mandatory it is a “state directly concerned”. The addition of still others is a subject for negotiation. For territories detached from enemy states in World War II the question of which powers are “states directly concerned” must be settled by peace treaties to be drafted, under the procedure outlined in the recent Moscow communiqué. So far as colonies are concerned, Mr. Pasvolsky said that parent powers would simply prepare an agreement with the proposed trustee which might in any instance be the parent power itself.

Mr. Fortas observed that in certain instances there might be a
stronger sanction than public opinion for violations of Chapter XI. He said that perhaps Article 14 of the Charter could be invoked, thus permitting the General Assembly to recommend measures “for the peaceful adjustment of a situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, . . .”

------

501.EE/1-446

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Adlai E. Stevenson

SECRET

[LONDON,] January 4, 1946.

Ambassador Taquizadeh, Iranian Ambassador to the U.K. and Chairman of the Iranian Delegation of the General Assembly, called on me today to express his hope for U.S. support for election of Iran to a non-permanent seat on the first Security Council. He explained that he assumed that the Middle Eastern states, including the Arab League and Turkey and Iran, would be entitled to at least one representative on the Security Council. He was very humble and very modest and very friendly.

He pointed out that Iran had been the first state in this area to join in the war actively, was the “bridge of victory”, that it had put all of its resources at the disposal of the Allies, had suffered from lack of food to support the war effort and in many other respects, and that the service of Iran had been expressly recognized by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin at Teheran.

Ambassador Taquizadeh advised me that his government had reluctantly and “with a heavy heart” decided today not to put the Azerbaijan question on the agenda of the General Assembly due to the consultations that were going forward in Teheran with the U.S. and U.K. representatives. The view of his government had been that if nothing came of these discussions after approaching the Soviet Union they had no choice except to bring the matter to the General Assembly and had fully intended to request that it be added to the agenda, but at the last moment they had felt that it might only be disturbing it at a critical time in the life of the United Nations and had concluded not to request its addition to the agenda.

In the circumstances his government felt that it was imperative to be elected to the Security Council and that the opportunity to discuss their problem face to face with the great powers in the Security Council might be of some help; that their Ambassador in Washington

---

21 Mr. Stevenson, formerly acting United States Representative on the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, and newly designated as an Alternate Representative on the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, had remained in London during the interim between the meetings of the two bodies.

22 For documentation on this subject, see vol. VIII, pp. 289 ff.
had contacted certain people in the State Department and found them sympathetic but due to the Christmas holidays the conversations had not been comprehensive.

He also informed me that Turkey would actively support Iran for non-permanent membership on the Security Council.

I told the Ambassador that I hoped the Arab states, together with Turkey and Iran, would try to agree among themselves upon a candidate for the Security Council, that I understood that Egypt was actively seeking the post, but that so far as I was informed, no commitments had been made and that I felt reasonably confident that my government would consider Iran's candidacy most sympathetically if there was any common agreement on her selection among the Middle Eastern powers. He said he would initiate some talks with the Arab League states and left with an earnest expression of hope that we would find it convenient to give Iran's position every possible consideration.

---

501BB/1-446

**United States Delegation Working Paper**

**Assignment of Positions in the General Assembly**

Attached are a series of tables with suggested alternative distributions of positions in the General Assembly, and a table suggesting the composition of the Credentials Committee. These tables should be considered in conjunction with the notes which follow.

**General Principle of Distribution**

The President, 7 Vice-Presidents and 6 Chairmen of the main committees constitute the General Committee (total 14).

As a general principle, the distribution of seats should follow the distribution in the Executive Committee [of the Preparatory Commission], i.e., 5 major powers, 3 Latin American, 2 Dominion, 2 Eastern European, 1 Western European, 1 Middle Eastern. This principle is followed in all the attached tables.

**President**

The U.S. Candidate for President is Lie of Norway. The British candidate is Spaak of Belgium. Many Latin American states favor Evatt of Australia. The USSR may propose Poland. It is assumed that we will not agree to Poland, but may agree to one of the other candidates. In consequence the attached tables are made up on the basis of (1) Norway as President, (2) Belgium as President, and (3) Australia as President.

---

*Transmitted to Mr. Stettinius on January 4 (en route) by Mr. Abe Feller of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers.*
Vice-Presidents

In Tables 1, 2 and 3, the Vice-Presidents are the Big Five, plus Poland and Uruguay. Poland is selected in order to short-circuit a possible Soviet drive for a Polish President. Uruguay is selected because (a) it would be desirable to have a Latin American Vice-President, and (b) as a consolation for Uruguay’s failure to be elected to ECOSOC.

It would be helpful for future development of the United Nations if it were possible not to establish the precedent that all of the Big Five must be Vice-Presidents, although it is agreed that all five should be on the General Committee. If at all feasible, one of the Big Five should take a committee chairmanship. Table IV is an illustration of such a situation in which either China or the USA would hold the chairmanship of the Political and Security Committee. In such event there would be three small power Vice-Chairmen. In the illustration Iran (or Egypt) is listed as the third of these posts.

The Russians may raise strong objection to Iran as a member of the General Committee, and may likely suggest Syria. Since Syria is a very small and very recent state and since the French would not be too pleased with such a choice, it is unlikely that Syria would find general favor. We have therefore suggested Egypt as an alternative to Iran.

Committee Chairmanships

The choice of committee chairmanships must be based partly on political considerations and partly on considerations of personal competence. These are difficult criteria to reconcile. The explanation for individual choices appears in footnotes to the Tables.

Latin American States

The Latin American states are allocated 1 Vice-Presidency, 2 committee chairmen and 2 committee vice-chairmen. Before definitive choices are made, they should be checked with the leading Latin American delegations. The reasons for the suggestions here given are as follows: Uruguay for Vice-President and Venezuela for a committee vice-chairman as consolations for failure to be elected to ECOSOC; Colombia as chairman of the Trusteeship Committee because of Zuleta’s 24 competence; Mexico as chairman of the Legal Committee because of Padilla Nervo’s 25 competence. It is likely that small Latin American states will object to these choices, since some of them desire to establish a principle of rotation. We recommend that such a tendency should be resisted. The General Committee is important and we

---

24 Dr. Eduardo Zuleta Angel of Colombia, President of the Preparatory Commission.
25 Sr. Luis Padilla Nervo, Mexican diplomat and Mexican Representative at the San Francisco Conference.
should have important states and strong men on it. Colombia and Mexico will be exceptionally helpful because of the great ability and experience of the two men mentioned. In addition the U.S. can count on these men to give it strong and effective support, without any suspicion that they are acting as mere puppets. We have not discovered yet any outstanding men among the smaller Latin American states, and have found at least three delegates from such states who are unacceptable for any important posts. In order to leave some leeway for strong objections to a continuing important role for Colombia, we have suggested Venezuela as an alternative.

Rapporteurs

We have made no suggestions for choice of rapporteurs. It would be advisable to keep these positions open until after the committees have been organized in order to enable a choice to be made on the basis of competence of individuals, and also in order to give a greater leeway for distribution among states after the other posts have been filled.

[Annex 1]

Table I 26

(Norway as President)

President: Norway
Vice Presidents: China, France, UK, USA, USSR
Poland
Uruguay

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committee</th>
<th>Chairman</th>
<th>Vice-Chairman</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political and Security</td>
<td>New Zealand*</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Australia†</td>
<td>Egypt (or Iran)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Ukraine‡</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trusteeship</td>
<td>Colombia (or</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Venezuela)§</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative &amp; Budgetary</td>
<td>Iran (or Egypt)‖</td>
<td>Venezuela (or Colombia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>Mexico‡</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Because of Fraser's personal competence.
†As a consolation for not being elected President, and because the Australian delegation would very likely furnish a competent chairman.
‡Because of Manuilsky's personal competence. Some objection possible from British on ground that the Social Committee will handle the refugee question, but stronger political objections to an Eastern European chairman could be made with respect to almost any other committee.
§ See explanatory memorandum [p. 134].
‖A Middle Eastern state should be on general committee. Either Entezam of Iran or Badawi of Egypt should be able to handle the job, although neither would be ideal.
‡ See attached memorandum [p. 134].
### United Nations Organization

**Annex II**

**Table II**

(Belgium as President)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committee</th>
<th>Chairman</th>
<th>Vice-Chairman</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political and Security</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Egypt (or Iran)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trusteeship</td>
<td>Colombia (or</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Venezuela)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative &amp;</td>
<td>Iran (or Egypt)</td>
<td>Venezuela (or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budgetary</td>
<td></td>
<td>Colombia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(See footnotes on Table I.)

---

**Annex III**

**Table III**

(Australia as President)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committee</th>
<th>Chairman</th>
<th>Vice-Chairman</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political and Security</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Norway (or</td>
<td>Egypt (or Iran)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belgium)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Belgium (or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trusteeship</td>
<td>Colombia (or</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Venezuela)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative &amp;</td>
<td>Iran (or Egypt)</td>
<td>Venezuela (or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budgetary</td>
<td></td>
<td>Colombia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**As a consolation for not being elected President. See other footnotes on Table I. [Footnote in the original.]**
(Annex IV)

**Table IV**

(Illustration of a Big Power Holding a Committee Chairmanship)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President:</th>
<th>Australia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vice-Presidents:</td>
<td>France, UK, USSR, USA (or China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iran (or Egypt)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committee</th>
<th>Chairman</th>
<th>Vice-Chairman</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political and</td>
<td>China (or USA)</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Norway (or Belgium)</td>
<td>Egypt (or Iran)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trusteeship</td>
<td>Colombia (or Venezuela)</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative &amp;</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Venezuela (or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budgetary</td>
<td></td>
<td>Colombia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Annex V)

**Table V**

CREDENTIALED COMMITTEE

(9 members)

Brazil, Chairman
Byelo-Russia
Cuba
Ethiopia
France
Iraq
Netherlands
Philippines
Turkey

*Note:* Brazil, Cuba, Netherlands and Turkey have been given places because they are relatively important states. Byelo-Russia, Ethiopia, Iraq and the Philippines are designed to give representation to Africa, Arab League and Asia. France has been included in order to avoid the appearance that membership on this committee is merely a sop for not receiving anything else.
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Ross) to the Counselor of the Department (Cohen) 27

[WASHINGTON,] January 5, 1946.

The attached memorandum provides information on the slates supported by the U.S. Government for the Security Council, Economic and Social Council, International Court of Justice, Secretary General and the President of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Briefly these slates are as follows:

**SECURITY COUNCIL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Election</th>
<th>Second Election</th>
<th>Third Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil (2 yrs)</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada (2 yrs)</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands (2 yrs)</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland (1 yr)</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico (1 yr)</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Three Year Term</th>
<th>Two Year Term</th>
<th>One Year Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE**

U.S. Nominations

Green H. Hackworth — United States
Caracciolo Parra-Perez — Venezuela
Jules Basdevant — France
John Spiropoulos — Greece

SECRETARY GENERAL (one of the following)

Henri Spaak — Belgium  L. B. Pearson — Canada
J. H. Van Royen— Netherlands N. A. Robertson — Canada

PRESIDENT—GENERAL ASSEMBLY (one of following)

Trygve Lie — Norway
Henri Spaak— Belgium

---

27 Mr. Cohen, a Senior Adviser to the United States Delegation, was attached to the Secretary of State's party which was in Washington until January 7.
28 Not found attached.
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Principal Adviser to the United States Delegation (Hiss)

SECRET

[LONDON,] January 8, 1946.

Participants: Mr. Stettinius
Ambassador Eduardo Zuleta Angel, Colombia
Ambassador Luis Padilla Nervo, Mexico
Ambassador C. de Freitas-Valle, Brazil
Mr. Alger Hiss

The call of the three visitors was made on their initiative. They said that they realized Mr. Stettinius was not receiving callers regularly on detailed matters and that they had been selected as a committee to pay their respects to him on behalf of all the Latin American Delegations. They were, however, anxious to take up with him certain points prior to a meeting of the Latin American Delegations.

The point in which they were most interested was whether it would be possible for the Latin American countries to have two Vice-Presidents of the General Assembly and two chairmen of the Assembly committees. Mr. Stettinius said that frankly in his opinion it would not be feasible for representatives of the Latin American countries to be named two of the Vice-Presidents. Mr. Stettinius pointed out that it was generally assumed that five of the seven Vice-Presidents would be representatives of the five powers with permanent seats on the Security Council. This would leave only two Vice-Presidents for election at large and it did not seem reasonable for both of these to be filled by Latin Americans. The three visitors seemed to accept this comment in good part.

In the course of the discussion Mr. Stettinius mentioned that we had received word directly from the Australians that Dr. Evatt is not coming to London for the meeting of the General Assembly. He and his three visitors seemed to feel that this clearly ruled out any possibility of Dr. Evatt being considered for this post. Mr. Stettinius also mentioned that we had been informed indirectly that Mr. Spaak is not available for the position of the Secretary General. There was some discussion as to our preferences for the post of President of the General Assembly in view of the above developments. Mr. Stettinius indicated that since we had originally contemplated Mr. Spaak as a candidate for Secretary General and as we had also been favorably impressed by Dr. Evatt’s qualifications for President of the General Assembly that our attitude with reference to this latter position was now not quite the same as it had been during the period of the Preparatory Commission. Mr. Stettinius thought that either Mr. Lie of Nor-
way, whom we had initially suggested for this position, or Mr. Spaak would be an appropriate President. He said that he understood there was a good deal of favorable sentiment for Mr. Spaak and that perhaps he might become a unanimous choice. His three visitors indicated that they preferred Spaak to Lie for this position.

---

IO Files: USGA/Gen 30/Conv 12

Minutes by the United States Delegation of the Five-Power Informal Meeting, Held at London, Foreign Office, January 9, 1946, 3:30 p. m.20

SECRET

Present:

United Kingdom:
   Sir Alexander Cadogan 30
   Sir Charles Webster 31

China:
   Ambassador Wellington Koo 32
   Mr. Tsien Tai 33

U.S.S.R.:
   Ambassador Andrey Gromyko 34
   M. A. I. Lavrentyev 35
   Mr. Yunin 36

France:
   M. J. Paul-Boncour 37
   M. J. Fouques Duparc 38

United States:
   Mr. Adlai Stevenson
   Mr. Alger Hiss

Sir Alexander Cadogan opened the meeting by speaking favorably of the qualifications of Monsieur Spaak. He dwelt upon Spaak’s

---

20 Drafted by Alger Hiss, Principal Adviser on the United States Delegation.
21 Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, British Foreign Office, and a Principal Adviser to the United Kingdom Delegation.
22 Special Adviser to the Minister of State (Noel-Baker) and a Principal Adviser to the United Kingdom Delegation.
23 Chinese Ambassador to the United Kingdom; Head of the Chinese Delegation.
24 Chinese Ambassador to France; Representative on the Chinese Delegation.
25 Representative on the Delegation of the Soviet Union.
26 Representative on the Delegation of the Soviet Union.
27 Interpreter for the Delegation of the Soviet Union.
28 Former President of the French Council of Ministers; Representative on the French Delegation.
29 Minister Plenipotentiary, Director of the International Conferences Secretariat at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; a Principal Adviser to the French Delegation.
experience as presiding officer, mentioning in particular his serving in that capacity at the Brussels Conference. Ambassador Gromyko then said that in preliminary conversations held before he had returned to Moscow there had been two names mentioned, Spaak and Lie. He said the Soviet Delegation now has a definite view in favor of Lie.

Ambassador Koo said that he still felt that either of the two men mentioned would be acceptable, although perhaps on the basis of personal fitness Spaak might be preferable.

Mr. Stevenson said that his position was somewhat like that of Ambassador Koo. He said that he had been the first to mention Mr. Lie but that the disposition of the United States Delegation was to try to reach agreement on this matter with the other delegations. Other delegations including those of the American Republics in their conversations with him have expressed a marked preference for Spaak.

Monsieur Paul-Boncour remarked that Spaak is very experienced as presiding officer.

Ambassador Gromyko then said that he could not accept Spaak and that the Soviet Union has a very definite opinion in favor of Lie. He said he could not consider retreating from his position and that he felt confident that if the five were unanimously to agree upon Lie he could be easily elected.

The discussion then passed to the selection of members of the General Committee of the Assembly. There was general agreement that five of the Vice-Presidencies would be filled by representatives of the permanent members of the Security Council. Mr. Stevenson proposed that representatives of Poland and Venezuela might be elected to fill the other two Vice-Presidencies. He explained that the choice of the delegations from the other American Republics for this position was Venezuela.

Ambassador Gromyko expressed agreement in principle with this view and Ambassador Koo and Monsieur Paul-Boncour also agreed.

At Sir Alexander Cadogan's suggestion there was then specific agreement on Venezuela for one of the Vice-Presidencies. Sir Alexander then asked for similar agreement with respect to Poland. At this point Ambassador Gromyko said he would like to discuss this matter in connection with the Presidency of the Second Session of the General Assembly. He inquired whether the others would agree to Poland receiving that position.

Sir Alexander Cadogan replied that he had not thought about this matter but he found it difficult to commit himself a year in advance. He

---

*Refers presumably to the Nine-Power Conference held at Brussels, November 3–24, 1937 regarding Far Eastern Affairs. Mr. Spaak was Chairman of the Conference.*
inquired how this matter affected the question of Poland’s selection as a Vice-President now.

Ambassador Gromyko replied that if the selection of Poland as Vice-President now would prejudice her election at the next session he might wish to suggest Yugoslavia instead of Poland as a Vice-President now. Sir Charles Webster said that if Poland were now selected as Vice-President it would not prejudice Poland’s candidacy for President of the next session.

Mr. Stevenson expressed his agreement with this point of view.

Ambassador Gromyko then said that he thought the question he had just raised with respect to Poland also would affect the choice of the President of the present session. If Western Europe were to have a representative now, Eastern Europe might be granted a representative at the next session. Mr. Stevenson said that he thought such a proposal was worthy of consideration but he did not think it would be profitable to talk in terms of particular countries. Sir Alexander Cadogan said that it is not possible to say now who will be foreign minister of Poland at the time of the next session. Gromyko at this point agreed to the selection of Poland as a Vice-President at the current session and Paul-Boncour also agreed. Ambassador Koo said that he attached importance to the principle of geographic representation and that he thought there should be at least some rough general rotation of the Presidency, although he recognized that the individual selected was also a matter of importance. With this observation he expressed his agreement to the selection of Poland for Vice-President at the present time.

Sir Alexander Cadogan then brought up the subject of chairmen of committees, pointing out that they also will be members of the General Committee. Ambassador Gromyko said that before proceeding with this subject he wished to point out that the President of the Preparatory Commission had been an American (i.e., from the American Continent), and that the two parts of the first session of the General Assembly are really two sessions, both of which would be presided over by a Western European, whether Spaak or Lie is elected. He said that he wished to make himself clear and that he wished to know the opinion of the others present with respect to the selection of Poland for President of the Second Session. He suggested perhaps two countries might be mentioned in view of the suggestion that we could not be sure who would be foreign minister of Poland at the time of the next session. Cadogan said that he was willing to go so far as to say some geographic rotation would be desirable if a suitable candidate could be found. Mr. Stevenson expressed his agreement with this statement. Paul-Boncour said he thought Ambassador Koo’s suggestion was wise and met Ambassador Gromyko’s point of view.
The discussion then proceeded to the selection of committee chairman. Mr. Stevenson suggested a representative of Norway as Chairman of the first Committee if Norway is not elected President of the General Assembly, in which event perhaps a representative of one of the Dominions might be selected, perhaps New Zealand. Cadogan said he thought Mr. Fraser, Prime Minister of New Zealand, might be made Chairman of the Trusteeship Committee as he had presided over that Committee in San Francisco. Mr. Stevenson thought it might be desirable to have someone for that Committee who came from a country not interested in trusteeship, for example, a Latin American. Ambassador Gromyko said that he could not recommend Norway as Chairman of Committee 1 as he wants Mr. Lie to be President of the General Assembly. Mr. Stevenson then read the rest of the United States slate, namely, Australia for Committee 2, Czechoslovakia for Committee 3, Panama for Committee 4, Syria for Committee 5, and Uruguay for Committee 6. Sir Alexander Cadogan in turn read a British list which proposed Uruguay for Committee 1, the Ukraine for Committee 2, a Latin American State for Committee 3, New Zealand for Committee 4, Canada for Committee 5, and Egypt for Committee 6.

Ambassador Gromyko said that he had no objection to Fraser personally and that he felt Fraser had been a good Chairman at San Francisco, but that he thought it undesirable to have a representative of New Zealand be Chairman of this Committee. He proposed that the Ukraine be given the Chairmanship of the first Committee. He also expressed doubt as to the desirability of Panama being given the Trusteeship Committee Chairmanship. He expressed no objection to the United States proposals with respect to Committees 5 and 6.

Ambassador Koo remarked that the vast Asiatic Continent had been left out altogether. At this point it was suggested that the posts of Vice-Chairman be considered simultaneously and Mr. Stevenson read the United States list, i.e., Yugoslavia for Committee 1, Iran for Committee 2, Costa Rica for Committee 3, Denmark for Committee 4, New Zealand for Committee 5, and South Africa for Committee 6.

Sir Alexander Cadogan then read the British list as follows: Byelorussia for Committee 1, Chile for Committee 2, Denmark for Committee 3, South Africa for Committee 4, Turkey for Committee 5, and Cuba for Committee 6.

Cadogan suggested that agreement now be attempted on the Chairmanship of the first Committee and Paul-Boncour said that either the Ukraine or Uruguay would be satisfactory to him. Ambassador Koo suggested that Mr. Fraser of New Zealand would be an excellent choice. Mr. Stevenson said that he would be prepared to accept Uruguay, and that although he recognized that Mr. Manuilsky had been a
good Chairman during the Preparatory Commission he had some reservation in his mind as to whether a representative of one of the constituent Republics should be Chairman of this Committee. Ambassador Gromyko said that he would like to know Mr. Stevenson’s reason for this position. In reply Mr. Stevenson said he was thinking largely of the appearance of things. At this point Sir Alexander Cadogan said he would accept Mr. Manuilsky as Chairman of Committee 1. Mr. Stevenson continued that he thought it would be wise for the Chairman of this Committee not to have too close a connection with any of the great powers and Ambassador Gromyko then inquired as to what he would say to the proposal that one of the British Dominions or a Latin American State be given the Chairmanship of this Committee. Ambassador Koo said he did not think it important whether a Dominion or a constituent Republic was given the Chairmanship. He thought that either Fraser or Manuilsky would be a very able Chairman and he said that either would be acceptable to him. He added that from what he knew of the experience of McEachen of Uruguay as chairman of a committee of the Preparatory Commission he thought he would be very good, but that Mr. McEachen had not had as much experience as the other two. Mr. Stevenson said that his order of preference of the three men mentioned was Mr. Fraser, Mr. McEachen, and Mr. Manuilsky. Both Paul-Boncour and Ambassador Koo, in reply to specific inquiries from Sir Alexander Cadogan, said they would agree that Norway would be a good choice for this position if Mr. Lie were not elected President of the General Assembly.

The discussion then proceeded to the Chairmanship of Committee 2, and Ambassador Koo recommended India or Iran “for Asiatic reasons”. Monsieur Paul-Boncour said that Mudaliar had been very competent as a chairman, both at San Francisco and in the Preparatory Commission. Ambassador Gromyko replied that Mudaliar was a very able man but that he had some doubt as to perpetuating his chairmanship of an economic committee. He suggested the possibility of Denmark. Mr. Stevenson pointed out that another Western European state would upset the balance of the General Committee, remarking that dependent upon the outcome of the election of President of the General Assembly Mr. Lie might be Chairman of Committee 1.

The discussion then proceeded to the Chairmanship of Committee 3. Ambassador Gromyko suggested a Latin American. Ambassador Koo and Sir Alexander Cadogan said they would accept Czechoslovakia for this post. Ambassador Gromyko said he would agree to this if the

---

40 Dr. Roberto E. McEachen, Uruguayan Ambassador to the United Kingdom and Head of the Uruguayan Delegation.
41 Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar, Member of the Executive Council of the Governor-General of India; Head of the Government of India’s Delegation.
Ukraine were accepted for the first Committee. Mr. Paul-Boncour said he would agree to Czechoslovakia for Committee 3.

With respect to Committee 4 Monsieur Paul-Boncour agreed with the suggestion of New Zealand. Ambassador Koo suggested Colombia but Mr. Stevenson thought that the Latin American States would not agree in as much as Mr. Zuleta of Colombia had been President of the Preparatory Commission. Ambassador Gromyko said he thought Panama was not a good choice for Committee 4.

With respect to Committee 5 Monsieur Paul-Boncour accepted Canada. Ambassador Gromyko said he would agree to either Syria or one of the Dominions subject to the solution of the question of the Chairmanship of Committee 1. He said that he would like to think further about this matter. Ambassador Koo suggested Iran for Committee 5.

As to Committee 6 Ambassador Gromyko said he would agree to Uruguay subject to the decision with respect to the Chairmanship of Committee 1. He also suggested the possibility of Egypt for Committee 6.

The discussion then proceeded to the non-permanent members of the Security Council and Ambassador Gromyko remarked that as he had said before he left for Moscow he favored the following slate: Poland for two years; Brazil for two years; Canada for two years; Syria, Belgium and Norway each for one year.

Mr. Stevenson read the United States list of Canada, Brazil and the Netherlands each for two year terms; Mexico, Poland and Egypt each for one year terms.

Monsieur Fouques Duparc suggested Brazil, the Netherlands or Belgium, Poland, Egypt or Iran, Mexico and Canada.

Ambassador Koo suggested Brazil, Canada, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Iran and Mexico.

Sir Alexander Cadogan said that he did not have the British list with him.

There was agreement among all present upon Brazil and Canada. Sir Alexander Cadogan then inquired whether it was necessary to have two Latin American States in the Security Council and Mr. Stevenson replied in the affirmative. Cadogan then pointed out that Brazil and Mexico appeared on all the lists except the Soviet list. Ambassador Gromyko thought it would be fairer to have only Brazil on the Council as otherwise there would be four states from North America. He also argued that if both Brazil and Mexico were to be elected, the Council would be unbalanced after their terms had expired (implying that

42 That is, at the conclusion of the meeting of the Preparatory Commission late in December, 1945.
two smaller Latin American States would not be properly representative from a security point of view).

(At this point Sir Alexander Cadogan left the meeting and returned with the British list which was identical with the United States list.)

Ambassador Koo asked Sir Alexander Cadogan if the British included the Netherlands on their list instead of Belgium on the assumption that Monsieur Spaak of Belgium would be President of the General Assembly. Sir Alexander replied in the affirmative.

Ambassador Gromyko said that he thought the Netherlands should first make peace at home and then take care of the peace of other countries.43

The meeting then adjourned, agreeing to meet again at ten o’clock the next morning.

---

4 Files: USGA/In/12

United States Delegation Working Paper

SECRET

[LONDON,] January 10, 1946.

PRESENT SATE FOR GENERAL ASSEMBLY

PRESIDENT

M. Trygve Lie—Norway

VICE-PRESIDENTS

US    China
UK    France
USSR India
      Venezuela

COMMITTEE OFFICERSHIPS *

Committee 1—Political and Security Committee
Chairman: Ukraine
Vice-Chairman: Iran
Committee 2—Economic and Financial Committee
Chairman: Poland
Vice-Chairman: South Africa
Committee 3—Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee
Chairman: New Zealand
Vice-Chairman: Costa Rica

4 Possibly a reference to the situation in the Netherlands East Indies.
*It is expected that the rapporteurs will be decided upon after the personnel of the committees is known. [Footnote in the original.]
Committee 4—Trusteeship Committee
Chairman: Uruguay
Vice-Chairman: Denmark
Committee 5—Administrative and Budgetary Committee
Chairman: Syria
Vice-Chairman: Czechoslovakia
Committee 6—Legal Committee
Chairman: Panama
Vice-Chairman: Luxembourg

Minutes by the United States Delegation of the Five-Power Informal Meeting, Held at London, Foreign Office, January 10, 1946, 10 a. m.\(^4\)

SECRET

Present:

United Kingdom:
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sir Charles K. Webster

China:
Ambassador Wellington Koo
Mr. Tsien Tai

U.S.S.R.:
Ambassador Andrey Gromyko
M. A. I. Lavrentyev
Mr. Yunin

France:
M. J. Paul-Boncour
M. J. Fouques Duparc
An interpreter

United States:
Mr. Adlai Stevenson
Mr. Alger Hisse

Sir Alexander Cadogan opened the meeting by stating that during the course of the preceding evening he had occasion to talk to the representatives of other delegations and had found general agreement on the selection of M. Spaak for the Presidency of the Assembly. He said that the question of the Presidency could not be settled at the present meeting.

He then said that with respect to the Security Council his government still favored the Netherlands, although their position on that

\(^4\) Drafted by Mr. Hisse.
might to some extent be affected by the outcome of the election of the President of the General Assembly. Mr. Stevenson restated the position he had expressed at the preceding meeting with respect to M. Lie and Monsieur Spaak and added that as long as there is support for Monsieur Lie and no common agreement among the Big Five for Spaak the United States will vote for M. Lie but that the United States is not attempting to influence the votes of others. Sir Charles Webster remarked that Lie has withdrawn and when surprise was expressed at this statement he said that the morning issue of the *Times* so stated. Ambassador Gromyko said that the Soviet Union would vote against Spaak and would speak against Spaak. He said that all the discussion about candidates had made a very bad impression on the Soviet Delegation and shows that the five powers are not united. He said that the British press have sung Spaak's praises for weeks and that perhaps other delegations have made commitments. Cadogan objected that his delegation had made no promises. Mr. Paul-Boncour said that it would be regrettable if agreement could not be reached. He inquired why Ambassador Gromyko was opposed to Monsieur Spaak. In reply Ambassador Gromyko said he thought Spaak had been too closely identified with the League, that he was an able man but that there were other factors of more importance. He said that he saw some attempts by other delegations to discredit the efforts of the Soviet Delegation to reach a fair solution and he wondered why there had been no consultation with the Soviet Delegation before decisions had been reached. Sir Alexander said there had been no consultation at all before Gromyko arrived in London. Ambassador Gromyko then said that Spaak himself had the preceding day said it had been agreed he would be selected as President. Ambassador Gromyko said he wanted it to be reported to the foreign ministers of the other representatives present that the Soviet Delegation has received a bad impression because of the lack of cooperation. He referred to the "myth" of cooperation and said he thought this was a very bad beginning and that if there was to be no cooperation the Charter would be a paper document. He added that if the other delegations do not wish to cooperate his delegation would give the same answer. Ambassador Koo said that although he thought either Monsieur Lie or Monsieur Spaak would be a good choice he wished to point out that if Spaak were elected President of the Assembly, Belgium could not be on the Security Council and Norway would receive no recognition.

The discussion then turned to the choice of chairmen of committees and Cadogan said that the choice for the first Committee appeared to be the Ukraine. Mr. Stevenson said that the Ukraine had not been the choice of the United States Delegation but that if it proved to be the
choice of all the others he could agree although he had intended to suggest Czechoslovakia for this position and that he would also like to suggest Uruguay instead of Panama for the Chairmanship of the Trusteeship Committee, Committee 4. Ambassador Koo expressed his agreement with respect to Uruguay and so did Monsieur Paul-Boncour. Sir Charles Webster suggested Mr. Fraser as Chairman of Committee 3 and Czechoslovakia as Chairman of Committee 5.

Ambassador Gromyko said he stood for the selection of the Ukraine for Committee 1, Ambassador Koo said that he would agree to that and to Mr. Fraser as Chairman of Committee 3. Cadogan said he would agree to the Ukraine as Chairman of Committee 1. Mr. Stevenson then said that if Gromyko preferred the Ukraine to Czechoslovakia and would agree to the choice of Uruguay for the Trusteeship Committee he would agree to the Ukraine for Committee 1. Gromyko agreed to this proposal.

Mr. Stevenson then asked whether the others present preferred Bolivia or Uruguay as Chairman of Committee 4. Cadogan said that he preferred Uruguay and the others present agreed upon Uruguay as Chairman of Committee 4.

All present then agreed upon Mr. Fraser as Chairman of Committee 3.

Committees 2 and 5 were discussed jointly and Sir Alexander Cadogan suggested India as Chairman of either committee. Mr. Stevenson suggested Norway, Belgium or Denmark for Committee 2 depending upon other developments. Ambassador Koo supported India for either Committee 2 or Committee 5 suggesting that perhaps Committee 5 might be the preferable choice in order to avoid perpetuating Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar in the same post. Ambassador Gromyko said that he could agree to only one British Dominion for a Chairmanship. He did not know how two out of six would look. Cadogan said it would disturb the balance of the General Committee unless there were two Dominions on it. Gromyko then suggested that Poland be a chairman of one of the committees and that a British Dominion be made a Vice-President. Cadogan agreed and suggested that Poland be Chairman of Committee 5 and India receive a Vice-Presidency. Gromyko suggested Poland be Chairman of Committee 2. This was agreed upon tentatively, Gromyko saying that he wished to think over the suggestion that India receive a Vice-Presidency. As to Committees 5 and 6 Gromyko, Cadogan and Stevenson agreed upon Syria and Panama respectively. Koo accepted Panama for Committee 6 but suggested Iran for Committee 5. Paul-Boncour agreed provisionally to Syria and Panama.
On the subject of Vice-Chairmen of the Committees Mr. Stevenson suggested Iran for Committee 1, Denmark for Committee 2, Yugoslavia for Committee 3 and South Africa for Committee 5. Gromyko proposed Yugoslavia for Committee 4. Mr. Stevenson then suggested Denmark for Committee 4, South Africa for Committee 2, Costa Rica for Committee 3, and Czechoslovakia for Committee 5.

Sir Charles Webster then returned to the subject of chairmanships and raised the possibility of Turkey being made Chairman of Committee 5 but dropped the suggestion when Gromyko opposed it.

The discussion then continued with respect to Vice-Chairmanships. Gromyko again suggested Yugoslavia for Committee 4 and added Byelo Russia as an alternative. In the course of discussion on Gromyko’s suggestion Cadogan and Webster appeared to agree to both Byelo Russia and Yugoslavia being named rapporteurs of committees.

There seemed to be general agreement on Turkey as Vice-Chairman of Committee 6 but Gromyko wanted the question of the Vice-Chairmanship or Rapporteurship of Committee 4 settled first. He also suggested Chile as Vice-Chairman of Committee 6. Paul-Boncour suggested Luxembourg to which Gromyko agreed if Yugoslavia could be made a Vice-President. Ambassador Koo expressed a preference for Turkey as Vice-Chairman of Committee 6. Mr. Stevenson then suggested Turkey as Chairman of Committee 5 and Syria as Vice-Chairman of Committee 6 but this was opposed by Gromyko who suggested Yugoslavia as Rapporteur for Committee 5 and said he would agree to Luxembourg as Vice-Chairman of Committee 6. Ambassador Koo said that he could accept this proposal.

Gromyko then said that he wanted Yugoslavia and Byelo Russia as rapporteurs. Mr. Stevenson opposed this position.

As the meeting was adjourned Monsieur Paul-Boncour suggested that the election of the President of the General Assembly should be postponed until agreement could be reached among the representatives of the Big Five on that subject. Monsieur Paul-Boncour then suggested that the Big Five agree to the proposal earlier made by Ambassador Koo, that Lie be elected President of the General Assembly and Belgium be put on the Security Council.

Ambassador Gromyko then asked Sir Charles Webster whether Mr. Attlee’s address at the opening plenary session would be only a speech of welcome or a political speech defining the British attitude toward the organization. He said that if it would be the latter kind of speech he thought the other powers should also be given an opportunity to speak at the same meeting. Sir Charles Webster agreed to try to find out the nature of Mr. Attlee’s speech.
SECRET
US URGENT

LONDON, January 10, 1946—midnight.
[Received January 11—12:51 a.m.]

337. Personal for the President from the Secretary.

[Here follows discussion relating to the question of the establishment of international controls over atomic energy; for documentation on this subject, see post, pages 712 ff.]

I found that Adlai Stevenson, representing Stettinius, 6 weeks ago had determined that the only available candidate to preside over the first meeting was Foreign Minister Lie of Norway. He had asked the Norwegian Ambassador if Lie would be available and if he would accept. Subsequently he was advised by Norway that Lie would accept. Stevenson also told Gromyko that US representatives on the Preparatory Commission favored the election of Lie as president of the meeting.

Spaak of Belgium was then being considered for Secretary General. More recently it was determined that Spaak would not be urgent for that post and he was urged for President of the meeting. Stevenson advised me that a majority of the convention apparently favored Spaak. However, last night Gromyko told me that he had been asked by the US representatives 6 weeks ago to support Lie; that after consulting his govt he had been instructed to do so. In view of this and in view of the fact that US representative had first approached Norway on the subject, I determined it was our duty to vote for Lie regardless of the outcome of the voting.

Who presided over the meeting was not important but it was important that we should not break faith with two govt. I advised Gromyko that because of what had occurred we would vote for Lie but that we would not seek to influence the votes of other govt. The Soviet delegation nominated Lie. Four states friendly to the Soviets and Denmark seconded. We thought he would receive not more than 12 votes but he received 23 votes.44

The Soviets were very much opposed to Spaak. Had Lie received only a few votes, they doubtless would have been humiliated. Having received 23 votes they were agreeably surprised and I am sure they realized that most of those votes came from South American Govt who had learned today of our position and followed us even though we did not ask them to do so.

44 For proceedings and debate in the General Assembly on this subject, see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, First Part, Plenary Meetings, pp. 48 ff. Hereafter cited as GA (1/1), Plenary.
The matter was handled badly by the friends of Spaak who did not formally nominate him. The Soviets have a right to think that there was a caucus among the delegates when the man they nominated and whose nomination was seconded by 4 or 5 govs, received 23 votes and a man whose name was not mentioned on the floor received 28 votes. Observers will point out this was not done by chance because Spaak was the only person beside Lie to receive votes.

Our slate for the Security Council has been tentatively agreed upon by the Big Five with the exception of one place not yet decided where the contest is between Belgium and the Netherlands. The election of Spaak from Belgium makes me feel stronger for the Netherlands. But before deciding it tomorrow morning, I will consult the members of the delegation.

Byrnes

----

IO Files: USGA/Gen 30/Conv 14


SECRET

Present:

United Kingdom:
- Sir Alexander Cadogan
- Sir Charles Webster

China:
- Ambassador Wellington Koo
- Mr. Victor Chi-tsai Hoo

U.S.S.R.:
- Ambassador Andrey Gromyko
- M. A. I. Lavrentyev

France:
- M. J. Fouques Duparc
- Interpreter

United States:
- Mr. Adlai Stevenson
- Mr. Alger Hiss

Ambassador Gromyko at the outset of the meeting proposed that Yugoslavia be substituted for Czechoslovakia for the Chairmanship of Committee 5. This suggestion was agreed to by the others present. Ambassador Gromyko then proposed that a member of the Czech Delegation be selected as Rapporteur of Committee 4. Sir Charles Webster

47 Drafted by Mr. Hiss.
48 Alternate Representative on the Chinese Delegation.
and Mr. Stevenson both expressed disagreement to this proposal. M. Fouques Duparc suggested Czechoslovakia as Rapporteur of Committee 3. Ambassador Gromyko asked why there was objection to a Czech Delegate as Rapporteur of Committee 4 if it was appropriate to have a representative of Uruguay as Chairman of that Committee. At this point Sir Alexander Cadogan suggested a Norwegian Delegate as the Rapporteur of Committee 4 and Ambassador Gromyko suggested that Norway might be given the Vice-Chairmanship of Committee 2 or Committee 1 or be given the Rapporteurship of Committee 1. His suggestions were not agreed to and he then said that if some place were found for Byelo Russia he would agree to Czechoslovakia having the Rapporteurship of Committee 2 or Committee 3. The following tentative list was then suggested as a possible combination of the British and United States proposals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committee</th>
<th>Vice-Chairman</th>
<th>Rapporteur</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This list was not agreed to by Ambassador Gromyko.

The discussion then turned to the non-permanent members of the Security Council.

Ambassador Koo withdrew his objection to Poland. Ambassador Gromyko continued to object to Mexico on the ground that it would mean that four North American countries were represented in the Security Council at the same time.

The question was then raised by several of those present as to whether there would have to be two Latin American countries on the Council for an indefinite period of time. Mr. Stevenson, speaking on this point, said that he felt confident that certainly there would have to be two Latin American countries elected at this time and also at the next election the retiring Latin American country would have to be replaced by a Latin American country.

Sir Alexander Cadogan asked Ambassador Gromyko what country he would propose instead of Mexico and Gromyko replied that he had already suggested Belgium as a member of the Security Council but if the Presidential election had changed the situation he would like to consult his government on this point and he would propose a postponement of the election of Security Council members.

Sir Alexander Cadogan then suggested that agreement be reached on Egypt as one of the members of the Security Council. Ambassador Gromyko suggested Syria instead of Egypt. Ambassador Koo said

---

*Refers to the election of M. Spaak as President of the General Assembly.*
that Egypt was acceptable to him provided it was understood that there would not always have to be an Arab State on the Security Council, as contrasted with a state representative of the Middle East and Northern Africa. This qualification was agreed to by the others present and on that basis there was general agreement upon Egypt.

Cadogan then brought up the Netherlands and Mr. Stevenson expressed himself as in favor of the Netherlands. Fouques Duparc agreed to the Netherlands and said that he had dropped his support of Belgium in view of Spaak’s election as President of the Assembly. Gromyko said that he still favored Belgium but if there was a general feeling that there had been a change in the situation as a result of Spaak’s election he would have to ask for instructions and would want the elections delayed. He again suggested Norway instead of Mexico and then specifically asked that those present request their principal delegates to agree to a postponement of the Security Council elections. He said that he might receive his instructions by Monday but he refused to fix a specific date for the elections to be held. He asked that a reply to his request be given to him tonight or tomorrow morning. Both Cadogan and Koo said that if Gromyko could agree to a fixed date for the elections it would make a postponement of the elections easier from their point of view.

The discussion then proceeded to the slate for the Economic and Social Council. Mr. Stevenson read the United States list as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3 Year Term</th>
<th>2 Year Term</th>
<th>1 Year Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ambassador Gromyko read the following proposed Soviet slate: Australia, the Netherlands (on the assumption that they are not elected to the Security Council), Canada or South Africa, Iraq, Norway (if not elected to the Security Council) or Ethiopia, Cuba, Mexico (if not elected to the Security Council), or Peru, Denmark, Ukraine or Byelo Russia, Yugoslavia, Greece, Chile, Czechoslovakia, and the five major powers.

Sir Alexander Cadogan then read the British list which was the same as the United States list except he proposed that the positions of Canada and India be interchanged so that India would receive a two year term and Canada a one year term.

M. Fouques Duparc then said that the French list was the same as the United States list except that his delegation felt three seats would be sufficient for Latin America and so substituted Greece for Colombia. He explained that his delegation felt there should be representation for
the Mediterranean area, pointing out that it would be important to save a seat for Italy. He said that he thought it would be unfortunate to establish the principle of four Latin American States being entitled to continuing representation on this Council. Mr. Stevenson said he agreed that in due course the Mediterranean area will need further representation and that when Italy becomes a member of the United Nations the situation will have changed. He said he did not think, however, it would be possible at this time to decide at whose expense any change in representation should be made.

Ambassador Koo then read the following list: Peru, Chile, India, Norway, Canada, Turkey, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, the Ukraine, Australia, Belgium, Colombia, Cuba, and the five major powers. He subsequently agreed that the Netherlands should be a member of this Council but without specifying which country on his list he would drop in favor of the Netherlands.

After considerable discussion it was found that there was agreement by all present upon Australia, the Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Chile, Cuba and Canada. There was also general agreement, except for Soviet reservations, as to Peru, Belgium, Norway, and the Netherlands. (The Soviet reservation with respect to Peru was to the effect that if Mexico were not elected to the Security Council the Soviets would prefer Mexico to Peru; with respect to Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway its reservation was that it would not support any one of these countries for the Economic and Social Council if it were elected to the Security Council.) Four of those present favored India, Gromyko alone being opposed. Three of those present favored Colombia, the French and Gromyko being opposed. Four also favored Iraq, Koo saying that he would have to consult his delegation on this subject. The French and the Soviets supported Greece. China and the Soviets supported Yugoslavia, Gromyko’s support of Yugoslavia being stated in very strong terms. The Chinese favored Turkey in place of Iraq and suggested Iran if Turkey were not acceptable to the others. Gromyko suggested the possible inclusion of Ethiopia instead of a fourth Latin American State.

10 Files: USGA/Ia/12/Add.1

Memorandum by the Principal Adviser to the United States Delegation (Hiss) to the Secretary of State

[London,] January 12, 1946.

The attached slates have been circulated this morning by our political officers as our slates for the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council.

50 Typed notation at bottom of this memorandum reads: “Covering Memo to slates sent Byrnes Jan. 12, 9 a.m.”
United Nations Organization

[Annex]

Council States

Security Council

Two Years
Brazil
Canada
Netherlands

One Year
Poland
Egypt
Mexico

Economic and Social Council

Three Years
China
France
Chile
Peru
Belgium
Australia

Two Years
UK
USSR
Ukraine
India
Cuba
Norway

One Year
US
Czechoslovakia
Colombia
Canada
Netherlands
Iraq

501.BB/1-1246: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (Acheson)

London, January 12, 1946.

[Received January 12—10:48 p.m.]

430. Delun 56. GA today elected Brazil, Australia, Poland, Mexico, Egypt and Netherlands as nonpermanent members of SC, the first three for 2 year terms.

On first ballot taken at morning’s meeting 5 nonpermanent members of SC were elected as follows: Brazil (47 votes); Mexico (45 votes); Egypt (45 votes); Poland (39 votes) and The Netherlands (37 votes), 34 votes being required for the necessary two-thirds majority stipulated by the Charter.51

Previously Gromyko had proposed that election of nonpermanent members of SC be postponed to first of next week in order to permit further consideration and consultation. This motion, which was opposed on floor by US52 and UK and supported by New Zealand and Czechoslovakia, was defeated by vote of 34 to 9 with 8 abstentions. Only formal nominations were made by Manuilsky who proposed Brazil, New Zealand and Poland for 2 year terms, Egypt and Norway for 1 year terms and Mexico for either 1 or 2 year term. Both Fraser and Lie, however, stated that their governments were not candidates for SC seats.

Those states receiving votes in addition to 5 elected were Canada (33 votes); Australia (28 votes); Iran (6 votes); Czechoslovakia (6 votes); Norway (5 votes); Denmark (2 votes) and Belgium, Ethiopia,

51 See GA (I/1), Plenary, pp. 72 ff.
52 For Secretary Byrnes' statement to the General Assembly regarding the United States position, see ibid., pp. 73 ff.
Greece, Luxemburg, New Zealand, Turkey and Yugoslavia 1 vote each. This restricted choice in future balloting under Rule 74 to Canada and Australia and meeting concluded after second ballot which resulted in 27 votes for Australia and 23 votes for Canada.

At afternoon meeting, third ballot failed to result in two-thirds majority for either Canada or Australia but Canadian delegate suggested that election of Australia be made unanimous (Australia had received 28 votes to Canada's 23). Spaak, however, advocated strict adherence to rules of procedure and on fourth ballot Australia received 46 votes and Canada 3, 2 ballots being invalid.

Vote on 2 year term followed, GA supporting by vote of 35 to 5 (US voting negative, Spaak ruling that simple majority vote only required) where first ballot resulted in election of Brazil and Australia, vote on second ballot where choice lay between Poland and Netherlands was tied and Spaak then drew lots under Rule 74 resulting in selection of Poland for third 2 year term.

Following vote on SC membership Koo took floor to express hope that geographic distribution among first nonpermanent members of SC would not be regarded as precedent for future elections since Chinese Delegation felt that at some time in future there should be an Asiatic state as nonpermanent member.

Election of members of ECOSOC followed. First ballot resulted in election of 17 members, Belgium (41 votes); Canada (46 votes); Chile (49 votes); China (49 votes); Colombia (43 votes); Cuba (40 votes); Czechoslovakia (41 votes); France (43 votes); Greece (37 votes); India (42 votes); Lebanon (44 votes); Norway (49 votes); Peru (47 votes); Ukraine (41 votes); USSR (47 votes); UK (48 votes) and the US (47 votes). Voting on second and third ballots between New Zealand and Yugoslavia which had received 31 and 27 votes respectively remained indecisive. Meeting therefore adjourned until Monday.53 First meeting of SC is now tentatively scheduled for Monday afternoon.54

Byrnes

53 For the proceedings in the General Assembly on January 14 in which New Zealand withdrew its candidacy and Yugoslavia was elected as the eighteenth member of the Economic and Social Council, see GA (1/1). Plenary, pp. 93 ff. For a statement of appreciation addressed to the New Zealand Delegation by Senator Tom Connally, United States Representative, see ibid., p. 9. The first meeting of the Economic and Social Council was held on January 23 with former Ambassador John G. Winant being seated as the United States Representative on the Economic and Social Council. Regarding Mr. Winant's interim and permanent appointments effective respectively on January 12 and March 28, 1946 see Department of State Bulletin, January 20. 1946, p. 74 and April 7, 1946, p. 573.

54 The first meeting of the Security Council was held at Church House, Westminster, London on January 17, 1946, at which time the Representative of Australia, Mr. N. J. O. Makin, assumed the presidency of the Council. For the initial United States statement in the Security Council made at this inaugural meeting by the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius), see United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, First Year, First Series, No. 1, p. 7.
Memorandum by the Principal Adviser to the United States Delega-
tion (Hiss) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

[LONDON,] January 16, 1946.

Issues relating to selection of Secretary General on which United
States position has not yet been taken or if it has been taken, has not
been made definitely clear to other delegations.

1. Is the United States opposed to General Eisenhower's selection
as Secretary General? If so, the political advisers should impress this
upon the other delegations, especially the Latin American Delegations
as there is a real possibility of the present movement for General
Eisenhower getting out of hand.  

2. Does the United States feel that none of the British candidates
whose names have been mentioned would be suitable? If so, it is
presumed that the United States should continue vigorously to press
its former position that no national of the Big Five should be selected
for the post.

3. Does the United States definitely prefer Pearson or Robertson
to Lie? We have heretofore taken the position that with the site in the
United States we would assume that the organization would wish to
have a European as Secretary General if a qualified European were
available. This formula, if repeated under present conditions, would
tend to encourage Lie's candidacy and would make it difficult, if not
impossible, for us to oppose it directly or indirectly. No other Euro-

---

55 Forwarded to the Secretary of State on January 18.
56 General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, at this time Chief of Staff of the
United States Army. General Eisenhower's name had been suggested informally
by the British Government as early as November 1945; see footnote 48, Foreign
Relations, 1945, vol. I. Though the British interest in General Eisenhower
continued to the end of the Preparatory Commission period, the Department of
State did not encourage the idea; see telegram 13582, Copel 671, December 24,
1945, 9 p.m. from London, ibid., p. 1506, and footnote reference to Department's
telegram 11124, Preco 452, December 29, 1945, to London, ibid., p. 1507. Early in
January the London press gave considerable attention to the proposed Eisenhower
candidacy, and on January 11 in a United States Delegation Press Release (Num-
ber 6) Secretary Byrnes made the following statement: "Before leaving Wash-
ington, General Eisenhower advised me that he had been informed that his name
would be suggested, and in case it was, he wished me to state that he would not
be interested, that he intended to continue in the office of Chief of Staff." (IO
57 There had been mentioned at various times the names of Sir Winston
Churchill, wartime Prime Minister; Anthony Eden, formerly Foreign Minister;
and Gladwyn Jebb, British Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs and former Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission at this
time functioning in the capacity of Executive Secretary for the United Nations.
58 Norman A. Robertson, Canadian Under Secretary of State for External
Affairs.
pean not a national of one of the Big Five has so far received serious consideration or seems likely to.

4. What is the United States preference as between Pearson and Robertson?

10 Files: USGA/1a/13

United States Delegation Working Paper

TOP SECRET


U.S. LIST OF CANDIDATES FOR GENERAL ASSEMBLY COMMITTEES

| Committee 1:  | Chairman    | —  | Ukraine (Manuilsky) |
|              | Vice-Chairman | —  | Luxembourg (Bech)   |
|              | Rapporteur   | —  | Ecuador (Viteri Lafontane) |
| Committee 2:  | Chairman    | —  | Poland (Konderski)   |
|              | Vice-Chairman | —  | Philippines (Lopez)  |
|              | Rapporteur   | —  | Bolivia (Salamanca)  |
| Committee 3:  | Chairman    | —  | New Zealand (Fraser) |
|              | Vice-Chairman | —  | Costa Rica (Soto Harrison) |
|              | Rapporteur   | —  | Norway (Frieda Dalen) |
| Committee 4:  | Chairman    | —  | Uruguay (McEachen)   |
|              | Vice-Chairman | —  | Turkey               |
|              | Rapporteur   | —  | Czechoslovakia (Kerno) |
| Committee 5:  | Chairman    | —  | Syria (Faris al-Khouri) |
|              | Vice-Chairman | —  | Yugoslavia (Bebler)  |
|              | Rapporteur   | —  | Greece (Aghnides)    |
| Committee 6:  | Chairman    | —  | Panama (Jimenez)     |
|              | Vice-Chairman | —  | Denmark (Federspiel) |
|              | Rapporteur   | —  | Canada (Read)        |

— Mr. Joseph Bech, Luxembourg Minister for Foreign Affairs; Represen
tative on the Luxembourg Delegation.

Dr. Homero Viteri Lafontane, former Ecuadorian Minister for Foreign Affairs
and Representative on the Ecuadorian Delegation.

Mr. Waclaw Konderski, Alternate Delegate on the Polish Delegation.

Mr. Pedro Lopez, Acting Head of the Philippines Delegation.

Mr. Carlos Salamanca, Head of the Bolivian Delegation.

Mr. Fernando Soto Harrison, Costa Rican Delegate.

Mrs. Frieda Dalen, Alternate Delegate on the Norwegian Delegation.

Dr. Ivan Kerno, Alternate Delegate on the Czechoslovak Delegation.

Mr. Faris al-Khoury, Delegate on the Syrian Delegation.

Dr. Ales Bebler, Yugoslav Alternate Delegate.

Mr. Thanassis Aghnides, Greek Ambassador to the United Kingdom and Dele-
guate on the Greek Delegation.

Dr. Roberto Jimenez, former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs; Delegate on
the Panamanian Delegation.

Mr. Per Federspiel, Delegate on the Danish Delegation.

Mr. J. E. Read, Alternate Delegate on the Canadian Delegation.
Minutes by the United States Delegation of the Five-Power Informal Meeting, Held at London, Claridge’s Hotel, January 20, 1946

SECRET

Participants: James F. Byrnes
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.
Andrei Gromyko
Ernest Bevin
Wellington Koo
Victor Hoo
Paul-Boncour
Ambassador MASSIGLI
Fouques Duparc

Mr. Byrnes called the meeting to order and stated that he felt it was important that the five countries there represented discuss a number of topics inasmuch as they were all interested in them, specifically on the resolution of atomic energy, and the matter of the Secretary General. He said this was not a formal meeting, but an informal exchange of views.

Mr. Bevin immediately spoke up and said “I wish to make clear that while I am willing to have an informal exchange of views, I cannot be committed to anything in this room. My Government must always be free to act according to its conscience.” Later on in the afternoon he put it stronger, saying he disliked the five power conversations and hoped he would not have to have them often as it was bad to have secret conferences and would cause resentment in the United Nations. This is totally different from the view he expressed to me when I called on him in September, at which time he overruled Noel Baker and encouraged me to go ahead and have five power exchanges of views which he thought would be helpful.

All the others there stated that they thought it was most useful to have such a meeting and were glad Mr. Byrnes had invited them to come.

Mr. Byrnes then stated he had asked me to be with him inasmuch as I was the United States Representative on the Security Council and the matters we were going to discuss principally involved the Security Council, and also I would be the Chairman of the United States Delegation when he left. He further stated that as soon as the atomic resolution was approved it would be necessary for him to return to Washington, and that might occur any day.

Drafted by Mr. Stettinius.
British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the U.K. Delegation to the General Assembly.
M. René Massigli, French Ambassador to the United Kingdom; Delegate on the Delegation of France.
Mr. Byrnes stated that he wished to discuss the matter of the Secretary General. He said that he had not given this matter any thought until he had reached London, but after discussing the whole question with the members of his delegation, he and the delegation had come to the conclusion that of all the names which had been brought forth that Pearson, the Canadian Ambassador to Washington, was the best qualified, and he wished to put forth his name. Mr. Byrnes said Pearson was a young man about 50, was promising, would be able to grow in the job as more responsibilities were given to him, he spoke French well, he had an excellent standing among diplomats and that he had presided well at the recent FAO conference. Mr. Byrnes talked at some length and specifically stated that Pearson was our candidate and was the best qualified man we knew of. He made no reference to the fact that we had been searching for a European and had not been able to find one whom we felt measured up to Pearson.

Mr. Gromyko then stated that he felt that you could not divorce personality from geography, that they had a very high opinion of Pearson and thought well of him and were friendly toward him, but with the site in the United States and taking a Secretary General from Canada, they thought that would be criticized by the European people and the American people, and perhaps not be good for the organization. He said he had advanced the name of Simic:* to all the Governments’ representatives, and had had a favorable response from some but had received nothing from the others. He wished again to speak for Simic as a likely candidate. He laid great emphasis on the need of a representative from Eastern Europe in this post, particularly inasmuch as the site would be in the North American continent.

Mr. Byrnes then read from the Charter, regarding the qualifications, saying the Secretary General should be an international public servant and free from any influence of any state.

Mr. Gromyko immediately responded that that rule would apply to Simic as much as to Pearson. Mr. Gromyko ended his remarks by saying he would find great difficulty in accepting Pearson for this post even though they had a very friendly feeling toward him.

Mr. Koo spoke up saying that his Government was prepared to accept Pearson, that he was perfectly willing to consider other names if they were brought up, but Pearson was the best which had been brought forth.

Mr. Paul-Boncour stated that he had heard the names of two Ambassadors to Washington mentioned, the Yugoslavian and Canadian, but he wished to call attention to the fact that France also had an Ambassador in Washington and he was a very good man and his name

---

*Mr. Stanoje Simic, Yugoslav Ambassador to the United States; Delegate on the Yugoslav Delegation.
was Henri Bonnet, and he wished to bring his name forth for the post.

Mr. Bevin stated that his Government had decided not to bring forward any candidate for this post and had decided to sit back and study the field as it developed. He said they had considered bringing forth the names of some of their own countrymen who were extremely high in world affairs, but they had decided that would be a mistake and they would bring forth no Englishman for the post. He said that of the names mentioned, he was attracted to Pearson and he was sure his Government would support him.

At this point I spoke up and stated that it was very important that the five reach a conclusion on this matter—that the Secretary General was the next item on the agenda and that presumably we would have to decide in Executive Session on Tuesday, and inasmuch as it required unanimity, no Secretary General could be elected until we five could agree. There was a great discussion then as to whether it would be wise for us to continue consultation until we could agree, or to have a meeting of the Security Council, formal or informal, to take the other six non-permanent members into the discussion. After further discussion it was decided that it would be best to have an informal discussion of the eleven all together. I was designated to talk to Makin, the Australian Chairman, and immediately arrange for him to call an informal meeting of the eleven with only one representative or possibly two from each country tomorrow afternoon at 4:30 at any place which he selected. At that time there would be the same exchange of views which took place this afternoon, and out of that meeting, progress might be expected.63

---

**Memorandum for the Record**

[LONDON,] January 22, 1946.

Slate changes were frequently so rapid and dependent on so many different factors that any account can be only a brief condensation. There may nevertheless be some value, for future reference, in a cursory record.

Pursuant to conversations among delegations in the period leading up to the opening of the General Assembly on January 10, which were conducted by Mr. Adlai Stevenson with the assistance of the Political Advisers, the delegation had arrived at a slate of committee officerships embodied in USGA/1a/12, January 10, 1946 (which see). A balance among the chairmanships was a course sought by the five

---

63 This meeting was held on January 21, with inconclusive results (IO Files, U.S. document USSC 46/3/Report 5).
permanent members for the purpose of a proper political equilibrium in the General Committee on which the chairmen of the six committees sit with the already chosen GA president (Spaak, Belgium) and seven vice-presidents (the five permanent members, Venezuela, South Africa). The six agreed chairmen were thereupon elected on January 11 as follows:

**Committee 1—Political and Security**  
D. Z. Manuilsky (Ukrainian SSR)

**Committee 2—Economic and Financial**  
W. Konderski (Poland)

**Committee 3—Social, Humanitarian and Cultural**  
P. Fraser (New Zealand)

**Committee 4—Trusteeship**  
R. MacEachen (Uruguay)

**Committee 5—Administrative and Budgetary**  
Faris al Khouri (Syria)

**Committee 6—Legal**  
R. Jiménez (Panama)

In arriving at the decision of MacEachen as chairman for Committee 4 the United States had held out against the choice, by an American Republics caucus, of Bolivia for that position.

Although the immediate question was the election of chairmen only, we had at an early date a slate of vice-chairmen and rapporteurs also in mind as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chairman</th>
<th>Vice-Chairman</th>
<th>Rapporteur</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Manuilsky</td>
<td>Entezam</td>
<td>Viteri Lafronte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian SSR</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Konderski</td>
<td>Lopez</td>
<td>Salamanca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Fraser</td>
<td>Soto Harrison</td>
<td>Mrs. Frieda Dalen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 MacEachen</td>
<td>Bech</td>
<td>Kerno</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Faris al Khouri</td>
<td>Bebler</td>
<td>Aghnides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Jiménez</td>
<td>Federspiel</td>
<td>Verzijl*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The listing of Ecuador and Bolivia for rapporteurships was a recommendation of the American Republics group in consequence of negotiations among themselves growing out of distribution of other offices (including specifically the election as chairman of Committee 4 of MacEachen of Uruguay in preference to Salamanca of Bolivia). Shifts as between the particular committee officerships allocated earlier for certain delegations had also been incorporated in this slate by reason of personal competence of members of those delegations. Denmark, for example, preferred that it should have the vice-chair-

---

*J. H. W. Verzijl, Legal Adviser to the Netherlands Delegation.*
mansh ip of Committee 6 rather than of Committee 4 because Federspiel, a competent and experienced presiding officer with excellent knowledge of English, is a legal expert rather than an expert in trusteeship matters; and Denmark obtained the assent of Bech of Luxembourg to take the Committee 4 vice chairmanship so that Federspiel might have the Committee 6 vice chairmanship. Similarly Norway’s presence on the slate on Committee 3 was a consequence of the fact that the Norwegian delegation preferred that any rapporteurship given to it should be in Committee 3 where Mrs. Frieda Dalen, particularly competent for the work, would be attending.

When approached as to the vice-chairmanship of Committee 1, Iran stated an unwillingness to serve and requested not to be placed upon the slate at all (on the ground that her participation in the Executive Committee should now give preference to other delegations). We thereupon favored making use of Bech’s talents on Committee 1, to which he assented.

Committee 6 was the first to meet for the purpose of electing all its officers. Because of the weakness of the chairman and because of difficulty encountered before the meeting in obtaining assent for a Netherlands rapporteur, we were able to get agreement for John Read of Canada as rapporteur and he was duly elected, with Federspiel of Denmark named vice chairman as planned.

Salamanca told us on January 21 that he preferred that if Bolivia were to be given the rapporteurship of Committee 2, the choice fall to Eduardo del Portillo of his delegation. This was generally assented to.

The critical question became the problem of a vice-chairman for Committee 4. Russian assent and the assent of the other five permanent members was obtained for putting Turkey in the position. The Turkish delegation showed no enthusiasm for this assignment, and the British therefore undertook to talk further with the Turks. The British thereafter told us that the Turks would accept. After we asked the British on the morning of January 21 for confirmation of this assurance, they came to us just before lunch and stated that Turkey refused to accept. During luncheon the British tried out the idea of giving this vice chairmanship to China, Iran, or Canada, but did not obtain assent from the Soviet Union. The Committee elections came immediately after lunch. The British nominated Ethiopia for the position and we obtained for it a few supporting statements from the floor by other delegations. No other nomination was made and the Ethiopian representative on Committee 4 was duly placed in the vice chairmanship.

From time to time in the placing of names for nomination in the meetings of the respective committees we were embarrassed by the absence or tardy arrival of delegates who had agreed to place particular names in nomination. In such instances we had to make
immediate alternate arrangements with other delegates and managed
to be successful in each case.

The complete list of officers (see USGA/1a/15)\(^6\) elected for the
six committees follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committee</th>
<th>Chairman</th>
<th>Vice Chairman</th>
<th>Rapporteur</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Manuilsky</td>
<td>Bech</td>
<td>Viteri Lafronthe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukrainian SSR</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Konderski</td>
<td>Lopez</td>
<td>del Portillo(^6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Fraser</td>
<td>Soto Harrison</td>
<td>Mrs. Frieda Dalen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>MacEachen</td>
<td>Belata Ephrem</td>
<td>Kerno</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Tewelde Medhen(^6)</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Faris al Khouri</td>
<td>Bebler</td>
<td>Aghnides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Jiménez</td>
<td>Federspiel</td>
<td>John Read</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

\(^{10}\) Exles: USSC 46/3 (Report 6)

Minutes by the United States Delegation of the Five-Power Informal
Meeting, London, Claridge's Hotel, January 23, 1946, 11 a. m.\(^{23}\)

SECRET

Present: The Secretary Mr. Wellington Koo
          Mr. Stettinus M. Paul-Boncour
          Mr. Bohlen M. Fouques Duparc
          Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Vyshinsky
                                 Ambassador Gromyko

At Mr. Byrnes' request Mr. Stettinus outlined the result of the
informal meeting of the eleven members of the Security Council on
Monday in regard to the question of the Secretary General.\(^{23}\) He said
that the following six names had been suggested:

Pearson
Simic
Rzymowski
Bonnet
Lie
Van Kleffens

\(^{23}\) Not printed.
\(^{6}\) Mr. Eduardo Del Portillo, Delegate on the Bolivian Delegation.
\(^{6}\) Mr. Ephrem was Ethiopian Minister to the United Kingdom and Delegate on
the Ethiopian Delegation.
\(^{10}\) Drafted by Mr. Bohlen.
\(^{23}\) See footnote 63, p. 153.
He said that it was understood that if no new names were received before midnight, that these six would be regarded as candidates for the position.

Mr. Vyshinsky said that it was the view of his Government that, since the site was to be in the United States, and the basic activity of the organization and many of its branches were to be in Western Europe, the Secretary General should come from a Slavic country of Eastern Europe.

The Secretary said that he had previously expressed his opinion that the person selected for the job would be under obligations to be an international figure and not a representative of any country, and he therefore felt that too much emphasis should not be placed upon the geographic factor. He said he thought that the personal qualifications of the individual, should be the guiding considerations, and that, after discussing with Mr. Stettinius the various names which had been brought forth, and examining the qualifications, the United States Delegation had come to the conclusion that, of those proposed, Mr. Pearson was the most suitable.

Mr. Koo said that China attached great importance to this post and thought that every effort should be made to find a most suitable candidate. He also felt that because of his experience and his objectivity, Mr. Pearson would be the best candidate.

M. Boncour said that he felt that geographic considerations, while important, should not be the deciding factor since the Secretary General was an international figure who was supposed to have severed his ties with his native country. He said he had mentioned Bonnet because most of the candidates had appeared to be ambassadors accredited to Washington. He said the French Delegation had no very great preference among the persons proposed, but they would have preferred to have seen a statesman rather than a diplomat, perhaps someone who had been foreign minister of his country. This would bring to the post a broader experience than that of a diplomat. He said, for example, that Eden’s name had been mentioned, but that since he was not nominated, it was presumed that he was not available for the post. Lie, the Foreign Minister of Norway, would bring this experience to the post, but the drawback in his case was that he did not know French, which was one of the working languages of the organization. He repeated that the French Delegation had no strong preferences among the list proposed but would be inclined to accept any on the list which the others agreed to.

Mr. Bevin stated that Great Britain had put forth no candidate but had they put forth one, it might well have been Mr. Jebb, but after consideration, this thought had been abandoned. The British Government, while putting forward no candidate, felt that Mr. Pearson was the best of those nominated.
Ambassador Gromyko said he had already expressed the view of his Government on this point, and that, while he agreed that geography should not be the controlling factor, it nevertheless should not be lost sight of; that both the factors of personal ability and experience as well as the country of origin should be considered. He said, for example, that although the Organization would be international no matter in what country it was located, there had been great debate in the Preparatory Commission concerning the site.76 He said he had known Mr. Pearson since 1943 and thought he was personally very well qualified for the job, but he felt that, with the site in the United States, to appoint a Canadian would cause legitimate complaint from several European countries on the ground that there was too much American influence. He said that since the specialized agency of the Organization would probably be in Western Europe and especially important meetings would take place there, plus the fact that English and French would undoubtedly remain as the working languages which meant that there would be more English and French in the Secretariat, it was only right that the Secretary General should be from an Eastern European country. It was for this reason that the Soviet Delegation proposed either Simic or Rzymowski, either of whom he felt would be personally well qualified.

The Secretary said he wished to point out that the United States had in no way sought the location of the Organization in the United States. He said he mentioned this fact because he felt that the decision of the United Nations, which, incidentally, had first been proposed at San Francisco by the Soviet Delegation there, to locate the Organization in the United States should not affect other decisions.

Mr. Vyshinski said he fully understood, but nevertheless the location of the Organization in itself did enter into the matter. He felt that the decision was correct, and he was glad that it had been done on Soviet initiative. He said, however, the Organization wherever located must have living and creative ties with all countries, and in view of the fact that its first function was the preservation of peace, it was very suitable that the Secretary General should come from one of the countries which had especially suffered during the war. While all of the United Nations had done their share, few of them had been reduced to a desert as had Yugoslavia and Poland. This fact, he felt, should be taken into consideration.

Then ensued a general discussion as to procedure, namely, whether to hold a formal meeting of the Security Council to vote on the matter, or to continue informal discussion among the members. It was finally agreed that there would be an informal meeting this afternoon among

76 For documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. 1, pp. 1435 ff.
the eleven members in order to discuss additional candidates and to hear from the non-permanent members. It was finally understood that if this informal meeting failed to produce agreement, the Council would then hold a formal meeting and vote, even if the absence of unanimity among the permanent members rendered the election of a Secretary General impossible. During this discussion Mr. Bevin spoke strongly against the practice of having private meetings, which, he said, led to suspicion and uncertainty.71

---

71 This meeting was held on January 23, with inconclusive results (IO Files, U.S. document USSC 46/3/Report 7).
also awaiting the views of the Department on the other Latin American candidates before going further in making selections.

2. An additional candidate from Eastern Europe, Winiarski of Poland has been favorably mentioned by the Department, and we are awaiting further data on candidates from this region. We have not felt it wise to support either (1) Verzijl (Netherlands) who is supported by the British, or (2) Davis (South Africa) who is particularly favored by the British. The first of these selections would mean three Western European Judges in addition to France as against one for Eastern Europe (excluding U.S.S.R.). The second selection (Davis) would mean four Judges from countries representing the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence.

3. To support two candidates giving representation to the Moslem legal system and the Near and Middle Eastern geographical area. Three candidates are considered in this connection: Zafrullah Khan (India), Badawi Pasha (Egypt) and Cemil Bilisel. Further advice from the Department is being awaited before proceeding with these decisions. If it is decided to support only one of these candidates, Spiropoulos of Greece might be selected for the vacancy thus created. He is a nominee of the United States National Group.

IO Files: USGA/7a/Del. Min./Exc/3 (Chr)
Minutes of the Meeting of the United States Delegation (Executive Session), Held at London, Claridge's Hotel, January 25, 1946, 9:30 a.m.

SECRET

[Here follow list of names of persons (21) present, and Delegation discussion of preceding items on the agenda.]

Court States

Mr. Hiss reported that he had circulated a memorandum on Court slates (USGA/7a/Le Com 9)\textsuperscript{a} and would be glad to receive any comments. He described the present picture as being one in which nine of the fifteen permanent seats on the Court were about settled with well qualified men who came from the proper judicial systems to achieve a balance. He further reported that Secretary Byrnes thought\textsuperscript{b} that, with the exception of the case of Mr. Hackworth, the United States should not tell other states for whom to vote although the United States was announcing its own slate. Of the six places left it was expected that three would go to Latin America. The staff was now awaiting to hear from Mr. Braden\textsuperscript{c} on the possibility of naming an Ar-

\textsuperscript{a} Supra.

\textsuperscript{b} Secretary Byrnes was en route from London to Washington on this same day.

\textsuperscript{c} Spruille Braden, Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs.
gentine judge. Senator Connally interjected that if the Delegation in London was to be controlled by Mr. Braden he was not for it. Mr. Stettinius urged that the Department slate be obtained and shown to the Delegation as quickly as possible. If there were objections they could be entered then. He asked what delayed the Department decision pointing out that the Security Council was going through its agenda rapidly. He thought that the Court would probably be before the Council on next Wednesday. He urged that the Department be wired for instructions before that time. Mr. Cohen agreed and urged that the Department be asked to send its best judgment by Monday at the latest.

Mr. Bloom asked whether the Department should not be informed regarding the Delegation’s attitude on Argentina. He predicted that the United States might get into a jam if Argentina were placed on the Court slate. In this he agreed with Senator Connally. Mr. Cohen pointed out that the case was peculiar because the particular Argentine candidate (Podesta Costa) was pro-democratic and pro-American. Mr. Hiss stated that the only question was whether Mr. Braden thought it was wise to vote for Argentina. He pointed out that the Argentine candidate is supported unanimously by Latin American states and he would receive support elsewhere. Mr. Bloom reiterated that the support for Argentina would cause a lot of trouble at home.

Mr. Dulles observed that if he had any responsibility in choosing individual judges and if he had to account at home for his choice then he would have to consider the matter quite carefully and at greater length. He stated he would prefer to have this matter handled on the basis of instructions from the President and the Department of State. Hr. Hackworth stated that he thought the matter was so important that no Delegate should follow instructions blindly because the Statute specifies that judges are to be elected on the basis of qualifications, not nationality. He thought Mr. Dulles should exercise his own judgment.

Mr. Stettinius pointed out that any Delegate could offer advice to him as head of the Delegation but he was not required to take such advice. He said that any Delegate could feel a responsibility but he himself had the responsibility of casting the vote. Mr. Walker said that he was unable to find information regarding the qualifications of the various judges although he had watched the matter carefully. He stated that he would adopt the position that he took the recommendation of the State Department. Mr. Dulles pointed out that both he and Mr. Walker were members of the Bar and that they might be

---

59 For documentation regarding United States-Argentine relations, see vol. xi, pp. 182 ff.
called to account by their Bar Associations when they returned home to explain their vote. Mr. Dulles reiterated that he preferred that the State Department and the President take the sole responsibility for selecting the judges. Otherwise he thought the Delegation must take more time. Mr. Bloom stated that at home people would look at the nationality of the judges chosen rather than at their individual qualifications. Senator Connally stated that the country knows that the United States has been kicking Argentina around and that therefore if an Argentine were elected as a judge it would be taken for granted that he was a member of the other crowd. He stated that in any case it would be hard to explain such a vote. It was agreed that a wire should be sent to the Department by Mr. Hiss asking that the slate for the Court be in the hands of the Delegation by Monday.

[Here follows discussion of other items.]

IO Files: USGA/Ia/Dep. Min./Exec/4 (Chr)

Minutes of the Meeting of the United States Delegation (Executive Session), Held at London, Claridge’s Hotel, January 26, 1946, 3:00 p.m.

SECRET

[Here follow list of names of persons (16) present, and preliminary remarks by Mr. Stettinius about the progress of the work of the General Assembly and its Committees.]

Mr. Stettinius reminded the group that Item 7 of the Security Council agenda concerned the Council’s recommendation to the General Assembly of a candidate for Secretary General. He said there had been a pause of two days and nights on this question, that it was necessary to get ahead but that as a result of the discussion in yesterday’s Delegation meeting he needed to know exactly what the position of the Delegation on this question was and what he should do.

Mr. Stettinius said that he had talked with the Secretary about this matter immediately before the latter left London and that it had been agreed that:

1. Mr. Pearson of Canada was the first choice of the United States and that the Delegation should hold out for him as long as there was hope of his nomination by the Security Council;

2. If and when it became clear that the nomination of Mr. Pearson was not possible, the second choice of the United States should be Mr. Lie of Norway; and

3. If and when it developed that Mr. Lie could not be nominated, the third choice of the United States should be Mr. Wellington Koo of China.

Secretary Byrnes left London to return to the United States on January 25.
Mr. Cohen agreed that this had been the understanding.

Mr. Stettinius said that the Secretary had told him that he (the Secretary) had talked with Senator Vandenberg concerning this matter and that the Senator had said he would not object to voting for Lie. Mr. Stettinius said, however, that recalling Senator Vanderberg's statement on this subject at yesterday morning's Delegation meeting, he thought that the whole matter needed clarification. Mr. Stettinius also recalled the statements of Mr. Dulles and Mr. Walker at yesterday's meeting.81

Referring to the Delegation discussion of the previous morning, Mr. Bohlen said he wished to suggest that in his opinion neither Mr. Lie nor his native country of Norway should be considered as falling within the Russian sphere of influence. Mr. Bohlen observed that the question was not necessarily one of geographical proximity. He said that the only overt pressure that Russia could influence would be through taking action against Norway and this was not to be thought of as a likely probability. He observed that the USSR was not in a position to exercise direct influence on the Norwegian Government itself and that the situation was therefore quite different than if, for example, the Foreign Minister of Poland were to be chosen as Secretary General. Mr. Bohlen said that it was his understanding that Mr. Lie resented any assumption that he was under Russian influence and that Mr. Lie had also stated that he had not been approached by the USSR Delegation on the subject of the Secretary Generalship. Mr. Bohlen also pointed out that the situation would be quite different in the case of a Yugoslav Secretary General but that Norway would not be under USSR influence as much as Czechoslovakia, for example, and indeed the latter was not in the USSR network.

81 A marked difference of opinion had been registered at the January 25 meeting of the Delegation. This was whether an agreement had been reached between the Delegation and Secretary Byrnes on the question of whom the United States would support for the Secretary Generalship, specifically whether the United States should back Mr. Lie of Norway if the candidacy of Mr. Pearson appeared lost. Senator Vandenberg and Mr. Dulles, in effect, voiced opposition to Mr. Lie, holding that "Mr. Lie, as a citizen of Norway located near the Soviet Union, could not be a free agent and would not dare to be a free agent. . . . Mr. Walker said that he did not think the United States Delegation should support Mr. Lie if Senator Vandenberg and Mr. Dulles were strongly opposed to him. . . . Mr. Stettinius observed that Mr. Lie had been the second choice of Secretary Byrnes and that at the last meeting of the Delegation Mr. Stettinius had been authorized to vote for Mr. Lie in case of an emergency. . . ." (Minutes of Meeting of the U.S. Delegation (Executive Session), London, January 25, 1946, document USGA/Ia/Del. Min./Exec/3 (Chr), IO Files) Concerning Mr. Stettinius' reference to the last meeting of the Delegation, no Delegation minutes have been found in the Department's files for the period when Secretary Byrnes was in London (January 8–25). An entry in the January 23 minutes of a meeting of the executive and political officers of the Delegation suggests that records may not have been kept, reading, "It was noted with regret that records of certain informal meetings held by members of the Delegation and the meetings of the Delegation itself were not being kept." (IO Files, document USGA/Ia/Exec Off/8)
Mrs. Roosevelt remarked that she and Mr. Townsend had arrived at the same conclusions yesterday. She said that in the course of a luncheon conversation with Mr. Lie yesterday she deduced that Mr. Lie was trying to indicate his independence although he did not directly refer to the subject. Mrs. Roosevelt said that Mr. Townsend had independently formed the same impression. Mrs. Roosevelt observed that obviously if Russia wanted to move against Norway any Norwegian, as Secretary General of the organization, would be in a difficult position. But she observed that the same would be true in the case of China. Mrs. Roosevelt added that with United States backing, Norway would be much less apt to fall into the Russian orbit than without such backing.

Mr. Townsend added that he had asked Mr. Lie directly how Mr. Lie thought the question of Secretary Generalship was going and that Mr. Lie had also indicated that he felt he should be considered as independent of USSR influence. Mr. Bohlen said that Mr. Lie had put the same thought in stronger language the night before.

Mr. Stettinius said he should tell the Delegation that the French Delegation has recently told the Chinese that they (the French) have reason to believe that USSR support will shift to Masaryk and that then the USSR Delegation, at the final stage, will give the impression that it reluctantly will accept Lie but only if someone else sponsors him. It was pointed out that whereas Mr. Masaryk had said earlier that he was not available for Secretary General he was now coming around to the position that he would be available and that he might even take an Assistant Secretary Generalship. Mr. Dulles said that a couple of weeks ago he had indicated he would accept the latter.

Senator Connally said he would prefer Lie to Masaryk and observed that any one selected will be charged with being under the influence of one of the great powers.

Mr. Stettinius called on Mr. Pasvolsky for his opinion, observing that Mr. Pasvolsky had given a great deal of thought to this subject over a long period. Mr. Pasvolsky said he thought the contest had narrowed itself to Mr. Lie and Mr. Pearson. ... Mr. Pasvolsky recalled that Mr. Gromyko had told him that he would prefer a Slav for the position and Mr. Pasvolsky said that unfortunately the question of the geographic area from which the Secretary General comes was bound to arise. He recalled also that Mr. Bevin had said that he attached no importance to geography but that Canada was, after all, halfway between the danger spots of Europe and the Far East. Mr. Pasvolsky observed that he himself would prefer Mr. Bruce of Aus-

---

* Mr. Jan Masaryk, Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs and Delegate on the Czechoslovak Delegation.
tralia to Mr. Koo of China. Mr. Stettinius said he thought Mr. Victor Hoo of China better than Bruce. It was generally felt, however, that the time was past for considering new names.

Mrs. Roosevelt declared she was in favor of sticking to the line that the United States Delegation had taken.

Mr. Pasvolsky said he felt that the only real question was that of who would propose Mr. Lie in case of a deadlock on Mr. Pearson. Mr. Pasvolsky said he felt that the United States should not propose Mr. Lie.

Senator Vandenberg said he was not impressed with what Mr. Lie himself had to say about his independence and Norway's position. The Senator remarked that the more Mr. Lie, as a candidate, had to say on this subject the less impressed he was. He thought it was inevitable that if Mr. Lie were elected the general impression would be that the USSR candidate for the General Assembly who had been defeated in that election actually was getting a better job. He said he would prefer Mr. Koo to Mr. Lie since he did not doubt but that China would turn to the United States in case of action against China by Russia. Mr. Bohlen pointed out that Mr. Lie as a longtime Socialist was not likely to be under Communist influence.

Senator Vandenberg asked why it should be assumed that Mr. Pearson could not be elected. Mr. Cohen said that the basic reason lay in the need for unanimity of the great powers on this subject under the voting rules of the Security Council where the nomination would be made. He said that rightly or wrongly the Russians might well take the counterpart of the views being expressed at this meeting—they might well take the position that any Anglo-Saxon would be influenced by the United States. Senator Vandenberg said he thought the Russians would be correct in that. Mr. Cohen continued that the search was for a compromise and doubted that it would be possible to find a country that would better satisfy both the USSR and the United States than Norway.

Mr. Pasvolsky said that both the United States Delegation and the USSR probably were wrong in ascribing too much importance to the job of Secretary General. He said the Russians ascribed too much political importance to the job and that the United States' viewpoint was wrong in ascribing too much political importance to the choice of a man for the job. He continued that it should be possible to find better candidates among the Big Five than Mr. Koo if the understanding were to be broken that no Big Five national should be a candidate. He said, however, that among the smaller powers only Mr. Pearson and Mr. Lie seem possible, and that the United States group should revise its views on the political importance of this action. He
said that from a geographical standpoint since the site was in the
United States it was logical to think that the Secretary General should
be from Europe. He continued that he was not impressed with Sena-
tor Vandenberg’s argument that any Secretary General would operate
with his country as a hostage. He said that the most serious influence
the Secretary General might have would be to affect the speed of the
Security Council action. He said, however, that under the rules of
procedure likely to be agreed to no individual could hold up a meeting
of the Council since any member could request that a meeting be held.
Mr. Pasvolsky said he attached more importance to the individual
qualities of the Secretary General, his talent for administration, for
example. He said that while Mr. Lie had a poor reputation as an ad-
ministrator that would not be too much of a handicap if the rest of
the Secretariat was good enough.

Senator Vandenberg said he thought that rather than overrating the
post of Secretary General, the group may have underrated it. He said
that he thought the trend of events in Committee 5 indicated that pro-
fessional European career diplomats expected to make a good thing
of employment in the Secretariat. Mr. Pasvolsky said that this im-
pressed him the more with the need to have an able American for
Assistant Secretary General in charge of administration and Senator
Vandenberg said he thought that might well be.

Senator Connally suggested that the United States Delegation
ought to inform Mr. Lie of its position concerning his candidacy, but
warned that it should be tactfully done lest too much United States
enthusiasm might discourage Russian support of Mr. Lie. Senator
Connally said he doubted if the United States could secure the elec-
tion of Mr. Pearson because of the United States having been selected
for this permanent site. He observed that he was therefore against
having the site in the United States because it will be repeatedly
brought up as an argument for not accepting United States candidates
for various positions. He continued that he thought Mr. Lie was the
only possibility on the horizon. . . .

Mrs. Roosevelt excused herself from the meeting saying that she
felt Mr. Lie was satisfactory.

Senator Connally continued that he was more concerned about
USSR influence with Mr. Koo than with Mr. Lie.

Mr. Walker asked Mr. Stettinius if the latter had the impression
as a result of yesterday’s Delegation meeting, that Mr. Walker was
against Mr. Lie. In this connection Mr. Walker said that his remarks
at yesterday’s meeting were directed rather to the need for unanimity
within the Delegation. It was observed that it would almost be a
case for the use of the veto by the United States if the USSR insisted
upon a Yugoslav for Secretary General and that Russia might feel
the same way about a Canadian candidate. Mr. Walker continued that he did not know Norwegian politics but by tradition no country was more independent. He could not therefore believe that Russia would dominate Mr. Lie. However, he did not want to return to the United States with two or three members of the Delegation against the Delegation’s choice for Secretary General and recalled that on the way over to London the need for unanimity in the Delegation had been stressed. He also stated that he had been unimpressed with Mr. Koo’s work as presiding officer today and felt there was a greater danger from Russian influence being exerted on a Chinese Secretary General than on a Norwegian in the same post.

Mr. Stevenson said he was certain that Russia would accept Mr. Lie. He said that this was certain to be the case although the Russians have consistently stressed the fact that the choice should be from Eastern Europe. He said that in the recent meeting with Mr. Vyshinsky and Mr. Gromyko they had contended for Eastern Europe. Mr. Stevenson said, however, he wondered what would happen if the United States shifted from Pearson to Lie and the latter did not prove acceptable.

Mr. Bohlen asked how firm Mr. Koo was as the third United States choice. Mr. Stettinius said that after today’s discussion concerning Mr. Koo he would take the responsibility for dropping him from the United States list. He said that the Secretary had merely agreed to the suggestion of Mr. Koo as third choice and did not feel strongly on the point. Mr. Stettinius said that it was therefore understood that Mr. Koo was dropped and the United States had no third candidate. He said it further was clear that the United States did not want a Secretary General from the Balkans or Eastern Europe nor from France. Senator Connally said that van Kleffens would suit him. Mr. Stettinius said he did not find van Kleffens acceptable and that the choice was therefore down to Mr. Lie and Mr. Pearson and he doubted if there was any chance to elect the latter. He said it was then a question of whether to take Mr. Lie with pleasure or hold out for Pearson and lose.

Mr. Stevenson said he agreed with the thoughts expressed earlier by Mr. Bohlen and Mrs. Roosevelt concerning Mr. Lie but said it ought to be understood that if Mr. Lie were elected it would look like a Russian victory. He said the Delegation should not delude itself that the United States would get credit for Mr. Lie’s election. He said in fact there was little to be salvaged and that the public impression would be that the USSR’s defeated candidate for the Presidency of the General Assembly won the Secretary Generalship instead.
Mr. Cohen said he saw no reason for putting a less favorable light on the situation than the facts warranted. He recalled that Mr. Lie had first been put up as a candidate for the Presidency of the General Assembly by the United States. Now our first choice for Secretary General would be Mr. Pearson but with the veto in prospect it was necessary to find a compromise candidate. He saw no reason why Mr. Lie was not a logical compromise and that the result would then be that we had neither won a victory nor suffered a defeat. Senator Connally added that it was well known that Russia's first choice was Mr. Simic. It was commented that this first choice had shifted to the Foreign Minister of Poland, Wincenty Rzymowski.

Mr. Cohen continued that in the United States Norway was thought of as having the American type of democracy and that in a crisis Norway might well turn to the United States.

Mr. Dulles said that while he did not know the facts he doubted if the United States had really fought for Pearson; he also did not know whether Russia would really veto Mr. Pearson. Mr. Stettinius said there had already been two informal votes at the 4:30 meetings in the rooms of Mr. Makin of Australia, in which all Delegations represented on the Security Council had spoken. There was, of course, no public knowledge of the veto. Mr. Stettinius continued that as a result of talking with the Secretary before the latter left they had hoped to get a clear vote in one of these meetings but that Australia had upset the plan by opening discussion of various candidates.

Mr. Pasvolsky said that six votes were all that could now be rounded up for Mr. Pearson. Mr. Stevenson said he thought it would be possible to get a 9 to 2 vote in favor of Mr. Pearson.

Mr. Walker asked why anyone thought it necessary to defeat the USSR in this instance and become a dominating force.

Mr. Dulles said he thought the United States' standing would be improved if the United States picked a candidate and fought for him. Mr. Stettinius said he did not know how the United States could have fought any harder, that everything had been done but to ask for a public vote; Mr. Pasvolsky added that the United States had even asked for that.

Mr. Dulles said he had known Mr. Lie for four or five years and had a high regard for him as a person. He felt there was no Russian influence exercised on Mr. Lie personally but Mr. Dulles observed that Mr. Lie had once told him that he had cast a vote because of the presence of Russian troops on Norway's border. Mr. Dulles said the United States did not use its influence in the same way but that in any event he agreed with Mr. Bohlen that Norway was not in the USSR zone
and probably would not be penetrated; however, Norway could be placed in an awkward position with sudden deterioration in her trade, finance, et cetera, whereas the USSR could not, for example, exert such serious influence on Canada or on the Netherlands. Mr. Dulles said he thought it was an extremely important factor that the Secretary General would control every appointment to the Secretariat for five years and further that he would be the only individual who could bring situations likely to disturb the peace to the attention of the Security Council. Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out that this provision of the Charter was only for convenience in bringing situations involving non-members to the attention of the Council and that too much importance should not be attached to it.

Senator Connally inquired who could oust the Secretary General under the Charter. Mr. Pasvolsky said there was no provision for this step. Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the Secretary General obviously would go if the majority wanted him to.

Mr. Stettinius said it was clear that Mr. Pearson was the first choice of the Delegation. He then asked whether if Mr. Pearson were vetoed by the Russians privately or publicly, the Delegation should stand by the instructions from the Secretary which Mr. Stettinius outlined earlier in the meeting, making Mr. Lie the second choice of the Delegation, or whether the Delegation should get in touch with the President and the Secretary for new instructions.

Mr. Dulles said he preferred van Kleffens to Lie as more nearly a free agent. Mr. Stettinius said he was against Mr. van Kleffens because of his temperament and the condition of his health.

Mr. Dulles and Mr. Stevenson thought van Kleffens also would be vetoed by Russia and Mr. Dulles said he thought Lie was the USSR candidate from the start. Mr. Stevenson said that in his talks with Mr. Gromyko concerning the Presidency of the Preparatory Commission, Mr. Gromyko made it clear that they looked cordially upon Mr. Lie but thought Poland should have the honor. In subsequent talks Mr. Gromyko had always put emphasis on Eastern Europe but Mr. Stevenson thought he would accept Mr. Lie... .

Mr. Stettinius asked if anyone had any further names to suggest.

Mr. Dulles again referred to van Kleffens and said that if the United States was to start by looking for someone acceptable to the USSR the United States might just as well go to the Russians in the first instance and accept their choice. He said he thought the United States should not assume that a veto will be exercised on this issue and doubted if the USSR would use it. Mr. Cohen said he did not like
to contemplate the prospect of the veto but after having suggested a candidate and having found he was not likely to be accepted he thought the best course was to settle upon a candidate who was agreeable to both the United States and the USSR. Mr. Stevenson suggested the name of Mr. Evatt of Australia. Mr. Bloom thought he would not be suitable.

Mr. Walker said he thought it might be necessary to stay with Mr. Pearson since there did not appear to be general agreement in the Delegation.

Mr. Dulles said he was prepared to go along with the position of having Mr. Pearson as the first choice and Mr. Lie as the second and would take no public position against it. He said he thought this was a question of individual judgment and not an issue of principle and that it was upon issues of principle that he wanted to be free to disagree.

Mr. Pasvolsky outlined the positions of the members of the Security Council as of Wednesday evening. He said the United States and Brazil were unequivocally for Pearson. China favored Pearson and had given a long statement of its reasons. Egypt had favored Pearson but felt that Lie was a very adequate second choice. France favored anyone on whom the other members of the Big Five could agree, had dropped Bonnet, and expressed a personal preference for van Kleffens. The Netherlands paid tribute to both Pearson and Lie on even grounds. Australia favored Lie as first choice and Pearson as second. Russia favored the Polish Foreign Minister, Wincenty Rzymbowski, as first choice and Simic of Yugoslavia as second. Poland agreed with Russia and also thought the selection was a political matter. Concerning the British position, Mr. Bevin had expressed a personal preference for Mr. Jebb, but would be happy, however, with Mr. Pearson. Mexico had dodged the issue and said the big powers should agree and the smaller powers would then make up their minds. Egypt had said the big powers should agree on two or three acceptable candidates.

Mr. Pasvolsky reiterated that if Lie is the ultimate choice his candidacy should come not from the United States but from some other nation and that if the inclination were toward Mr. Lie we should agree. However, at the next discussion with Security Council members we should begin by standing firm for Mr. Pearson.

Mr. Dulles thought it would be possible to get a 9 to 2 vote and Mr. Stevenson added that he felt the United States had not worked hard enough for it. Mr. Pasvolsky thought it would be possible to
get 7 votes for Pearson. Mr. Stevenson said that he thought much more could be done with Mexico and that Mr. Nervo had only been told that we were for Pearson without being definitely urged to take the same position.

Mr. Pasvolsky said the real position was that the Russians had vetoed Mr. Pearson and that the United States had vetoed both Rzymowski, Polish Foreign Minister, and Simic of Yugoslavia. He said he thought the British would stand with the United States in vetoing both Rzymowski and Simic.

Senator Vandenberg said that Mr. Stettinius had his instructions and that the only question Senator Vandenberg could see was how long to stand by Mr. Pearson. Mr. Stettinius replied that after yesterday's Delegation meeting he had not felt that the Delegation's position was clear.

Mr. Stettinius asked if any member of the Delegation objected to Mr. Lie if the United States was unable to push through the election of Mr. Pearson. Senator Vandenberg said he thought it was settled but Mr. Stettinius said he did not feel the position was completely clear.

Senator Vandenberg then said his position was the same as Mr. Dulles had expressed somewhat earlier when Mr. Dulles had said that he did not expect to take a public stand against Mr. Lie. Senator Vandenberg said, however, that he would go down with Pearson and when the fight was clearly lost he would go to Lie but that he agreed with Mr. Stevenson that the United States should give all possible effort to the fight for Pearson.

Mr. Pasvolsky suggested that the question should be brought to a vote and Mr. Dulles suggested that we should be sure it was a 9 to 2 vote. Mr. Pasvolsky said a vote might be possible at the next Big Five meetings but felt that the smaller nations should not be put on the spot by requesting them to vote. Mr. Stevenson said he thought that the support of France could be gained for Pearson but Mr. Stettinius said that Mr. Boncour was not likely to take a strong position in view of the current French political crisis.

Mr. Cohen said he thought it was one thing for the United States to vote for Mr. Pearson and another to bring great pressure on others to do the same. He thought the latter course might make agreement on the second choice more difficult and felt that an appeal but no high pressure would be the best course in favor of Pearson.
Mr. Stettinius asked Senator Vandenberg and Mr. Dulles if they would be satisfied if the United States was able to bring the question to a vote, tell friends of the United States how we expected to vote, and if defeated to vote then for Mr. Lie. Senator Vandenberg said he saw no alternative. Mr. Dulles said he thought that would be satisfactory and that while he would have made a tougher fight that fight was not made, and he felt the United States was not going to make an all-out fight for Mr. Pearson. Mr. Pasvolsky said he thought that had been done and Mr. Dulles said he did not see how it could have been done with Mexico still on the sidelines. Mr. Stevenson observed that Mexico had suggested to him earlier that they would like to have an Assistant Secretary Generalship and that he had said that was for future decision. Mr. Dulles asked if some trading could be done with the USSR who wanted an Assistant Secretary Generalship for political and security affairs as he understood it.

Mr. Townsend said he felt that if the United States could not succeed in getting Mr. Pearson elected the Delegation should then vote for Lie and suggested that the United States might talk in advance to Mr. Lie in terms of having a United States national appointed as an Assistant Secretary General. Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Pasvolsky agreed that the United States should have the Assistant Secretary Generalship for administration.

Mr. Stettinius then asked Senator Vandenberg if he was satisfied. Senator Vandenberg replied that “satisfied” was not the right word but that he could not think of the word he wanted. Mr. Stettinius then asked if he objected; Senator Vandenberg did not reply. He said there should be no suggestion of a subsequent partisan political position that would differ from that which had been outlined by Mr. Stettinius.

Mr. Stettinius then stated that he would stand by Pearson and vote for him, and when the break came would shift to Lie.

Mr. Bohlen then suggested that the greater the United States success in lining up votes for Mr. Pearson, the greater would be the appearance of USSR victory for Mr. Lie after Mr. Pearson had failed of nomination.

Mr. Stettinius said he understood the position of the Delegation and that this would be the last meeting on this subject. He would, however, report progress.

Mr. Dulles said that was satisfactory.

Mr. Stettinius said the next Delegation meeting would be at 9:30 Monday morning.
Minutes by the United States Delegation of the Five-Power Informal Meeting, Held at London, Claridge’s Hotel, January 28, 1946, 9 p. m.

SECRET

Participants: For France—Mr. Paul-Boncour
Mr. Fouques Duparc
Interpreter

For China—Mr. Wellington Koo
Mr. Victor Hoo

For USSR—Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Gromyko
Interpreter

For UK—Mr. Bevin
Sir Alexander Cadogan

For US—Mr. Stettinius
Dr. Pasvolsky
Mr. Stevenson
Mr. Cohen
Mr. Bohlen

The meeting was convened at the suggestion of Mr. Stettinius to discuss Secretary General and he opened the meeting with a reminder that six names were still in contemplation since the last meeting, namely, Simic, Rzymowski, Pearson, Lie, Van Kleffens and Bonnet. He suggested that each representative now express himself candidly.

Wellington Koo asked if other names could be offered.

Mr. Stettinius asked the Soviet representatives what their position was since consulting their government. Vyshinsky replied that they had consulted their government and would no longer insist on Simic or Rzymowski but could not accept Pearson.

At this moment the name of Eden was mentioned briefly but I am not sure whether it was suggested by Boncour or someone else. Stettinius said that discussion of Eden raised the question of whether the Secretary General should be a national of one of the great powers and asked for reactions to Lie of Norway.

Boncour was opposed to Lie on the ground that he did not speak

---

25 Drafted by Mr. Stevenson.
24 Refers apparently to the meeting held at Claridge’s Hotel, January 23, 11 a.m.; see p. 166.
French. Vyshinsky replied that he was ready to think over the proposal of Lie. Bevin stated that he would have to consult his government and there was some conversation about Lie's good English and the rapidity with which he had learned it. Koo stated that he had previously intimated that if we could not agree on Pearson, he would be willing to accept Lie. Vyshinsky added that he felt he also could accept Lie on his own responsibility. Boncour stated that he would also join in supporting Lie if Lie would accept.

Mr. Stettinius stated that Mr. Lie’s Government had intimated that if drafted for this post he would be able to accept in spite of his importance to Norway as Foreign Minister.

Bevin stated that he would not veto the selection of Lie but for the present he was tied by a Cabinet decision and would consult his government Tuesday morning.

Gromyko stated that they would also ask their government to accept Lie as a compromise.

Boncour stated that Bidault would not be here until Wednesday and that he would ask his government by telegraph or telephone.

Vyshinsky stated that on his own responsibility he was now prepared to vote for Lie.

There ensued a discussion as to whether or not the eleven members of the Security Council should be summoned in a formal or informal meeting and advised of the agreement among the five, and when. It was agreed that upon receipt of confirmation from Bevin and Boncour an informal meeting of the eleven members of the Security Council should be held on Tuesday evening, if possible, and the matter presented formally to the Security Council meeting on Wednesday.

It was also agreed that pending agreement by the French and British governments nothing whatever should be given to the press.

SP A Files: Lot 61–D 146, Box 4531

Memorandum by the Principal Adviser to the United States Delegation (Hiss) to Mr. Frank Walker, United States Alternate Representative

[London,] 31 January 1946.

Attached is a telegram just received containing instructions from the President as to candidates for the Court whom the Delegation should support.

Upon the recommendation of the Security Council, the General Assembly elected Mr. Lie Secretary-General of the United Nations at its first session on February 1; see GA (1/1), Plenary, pp. 303 and 304.

For content, see infra.
I think you should now feel perfectly free to inform other delegations of our entire slate along the lines we have previously discussed, i.e., that we are actively supporting only Mr. Hackworth and that as to the other candidates for whom we will vote, we are, of course, glad to notify other delegations of our plans but we are not actively campaigning for any of the other candidates on our list.

Moreover, in the light of prior instructions from the Department, we should in communicating our list to the other delegations say the following with respect to Podesta Costa:

We regard him as a jurist of highest eminence, and also as an outstanding advocate of the principles of law and democracy. We should make it plain that there are no political implications in our choice of Podesta Costa.

The delegation's policy has been to inform the press, after the election, of candidates whom we have supported. I think that the same statement with respect to Podesta Costa noted above should be included in any statement we make to the press or other interested parties.

---

FILE: USGA/Ia/Del. Min./11 (Exec) (Ch)

Minutes of the Meeting of the United States Delegation (Executive Session), Held at London, Claridge's Hotel, February 1, 1946, 9:30 a.m.

SECRET

[Here follows list of names of persons (21) present.]

Court Slates

At the request of Senator Connally, who was presiding, Mr. Hiss read a telegram from the Department from Secretary Byrnes to Mr. Stettnius reporting that the President had stated he would be glad to have the Delegation determine whom they should support for election to the International Court of Justice. However, as the Delegation asked for instructions, he instructed that the Delegates vote for the following: Zoricic, Azvedo, Hsu, Klaestad, Krylov, Badawi, Basdevant, Winiarski, McNair, Devisscher, Hackworth, Podesta Costa, Parra Perez, Read, Spiropoulos. In the event that a second ballot is required, the telegram continued, it would be impossible for the President to know who the remaining candidates were and therefore he authorized Mr. Stettnius to exercise his discretion after the Delegates had been consulted.

[Here follows continued discussion of the question of Court Slates, centering on a point raised by Mr. Dulles.]
Mr. Stevenson said that Mr. Zuleta (Colombia), who professed to be speaking for all the Latin American countries, had called on him the previous day and had shown considerable annoyance that the United States would not support four Latin Americans for the International Court of Justice bench. Mr. Zuleta had talked about going to the Russians in order to secure votes for the candidates. However, he and Mr. Stevenson had parted friends and Mr. Stevenson had found that some other Latin American states did not share Mr. Zuleta’s views. Mr. Hiss pointed out that the Permanent Court of International Justice had had three Latin American judges.

Mr. Hackworth reported that Mr. Krylov (USSR) and Mr. Beckett (UK) had asked him for the American Court slate. He inquired whether he was free to give it out now. Mr. Stevenson expressed the opinion that the list had to be made available. Mr. Hiss recalled that it had been agreed that the United States should campaign only for Mr. Hackworth and that the list should be made known. Senator Connally inquired whether there was any embarrassment because several states had suggested Judge Manley Hudson 97 rather than Mr. Hackworth. Mr. Hiss said that there was no embarrassment and that the position of the United States in favor of Mr. Hackworth had been explained. Mr. Hiss thought that the problems would arise on how many judges should be elected from the various geographical areas. He said he thought that members of the Delegation were free to say what the United States slate was, if they were asked. It should be made clear that a vote was to be cast for Podesta Costa because he was a noted jurist with a wide experience in law and was a firm supporter of democracy. Mr. Hackworth expressed the opinion that the nomination of Podesta Costa was going to raise trouble whatever explanation was made as to why the United States was voting for a man not from a democratic country. Mr. Bloom concurred, stating that he thought that the nomination was wrong. He thought that the American people would not believe anything except that the Government was doing the same old thing with Argentina. Mr. Hiss pointed out that the principle of election to the Court was on the basis of personal competency, not national representation. He stated that he thought that the information should be given out only to other Delegations that asked for it, but not to the press at the present moment. Mr. Hackworth expressed the opinion that the newspapermen would soon get hold of the story from the Delegations to which it was given. The fact that the United States was going to support Podesta Costa would then reach the newspapers ahead of the official American explanation.

---

97 Eminent legal scholar and publicist.
Senator Connally inquired whether the chief alibi was not that the Latin American states wanted Podesta Costa. Mr. Hiss stated that he thought the chief reason for the United States support was that Podesta Costa was thought an outstanding jurist by those who know him. Mr. Stevenson said he thought the Delegation should know that Podesta Costa had twice been offered the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs by the Perón Government and had twice refused. Mrs. Roosevelt inquired whether the Delegation was to take any cognizance of what was being said about Argentina and asked whether anything was to be done about the question at this session. Mr. Bloom said that he was opposed to the choice of an Argentinian and felt very strongly that the people at home would not like it. Senator Connally expressed the opinion that not one person in fifty would know who the judges were for they did not even know the names of their own county judges. Mr. McDermott noted that there were rumors on the AP ticker of a revolution in Argentina.

[Here follow further discussion of the Court question, and Delegation discussion of other items.]

IO File: USGA/In/De. Min./Exec/12 (Ch)

Minutes of the Meeting of the United States Delegation (Executive Session), Held at London, Claridge’s Hotel, February 5, 1946, 9:30 a.m.

SECRET

[Here follow list of names of persons (17) present, and Delegation discussion of previous items on the agenda.]

Court slate

Mr. Walker said that the United States slate of fifteen judges had been discussed with representatives of the United Kingdom and the USSR and that there was general agreement on twelve candidates on our slate. He said the USSR did not agree with our candidates from Venezuela, Greece, or Argentina but that they had not yet given us three substitute names. He thought the USSR might ultimately agree to Podesta Costa of Argentina, but they wanted very much to have a candidate from Mexico instead of Venezuela and might prefer to have four Latin American judges in order to get a Mexican member. He said that the United Kingdom wanted to replace Brazil with El Salvador and probably substitute Greece for South Africa although they would not insist on the latter change. He said the United Kingdom preferred a judge from India instead of Poland and wanted a Moslem.
Mr. Pasvolsky observed that the USSR had been making a strong political play for support of Mexico. He said that the representative from Mexico in the Security Council the previous night was one of the United States’ “worst enemies”. Mr. Dulles said that Mexico was “playing” less and less with the United States and more and more with the USSR. Senator Vandenberg said that Parra Perez of Venezuela was the best man on the United States list of candidates.\textsuperscript{48}

[Here follows discussion of other items on the agenda.]

\textbf{Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss) to the Acting Secretary of State (Acheson)}\textsuperscript{49}

\textbf{SECRET}

\textbf{WASHINGTON,} August 6, 1946.


\textbf{THE PROBLEM}

At the second part of the first session of the General Assembly which will be convened on September 23, 1946, it will be necessary to elect three states to non-permanent membership on the Security Coun-

\textsuperscript{48} For General Assembly proceedings regarding the election by the Assembly of the judges of the International Court on February 6, see GA(1/1), Plenary, pp. 340 ff.

\textsuperscript{49} In a covering memorandum of even date Mr. Hiss minuted to Mr. Acheson:

> "The attached memorandum on United States slates for election of members of the Security Council, Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council was prepared in meetings of the Membership Team and cleared through the Interceded Offices: SPA, EUR, FE, NEA, ARA, and ICT.

> "It is hoped that this memorandum can be discussed in the meeting in your office at 9:30 on Wednesday, August 7, so that it will be available for distribution in the Department and for transmission to Mr. Johnson [Herschel V. Johnson, Acting United States Representative at the United Nations] in New York.

> "It is felt that, in the circumstances, any slate prepared now may need to be modified in the light of later developments in actual negotiations just preceding the General Assembly. Accordingly, as a supplement to the attached memorandum, the Membership Team is preparing possible alternative choices." (501.BB/8-646) See memorandum of September 24, p. 197.

Departmental action on the slates question had begun on June 5, at which time the Department's United Nations Liaison Committee had agreed that the Committee's working team on membership questions should have its terms of reference broadened "to consider the entire problem of slates, to prepare background papers, and to formulate policy recommendations in this regard." (Extract from Minutes of Meeting of UNLC, June 5, 1946, File No. 501.BB/6-546) At least six drafts of this paper were prepared between the inception of the project and the final memorandum of August 6; these are scattered throughout several folders in RSC Lot File, 55-D324, Box 10100.

This memorandum was approved by Acting Secretary Acheson on August 15 (memorandum by Durward V. Sandifer, Chief of the Division of International Organization Affairs, to Miss Dorothy Fosdick of the division, August 20, File No. 501.BB/8-2046). It was then set up as a Departmental position paper for the use of the U.S. Delegation.
cil, and six states to the Economic and Social Council, to replace states whose membership will expire in January 1947. If it is possible to establish the Trusteeship Council, it may also be necessary to elect one or more states to membership thereon, in order to attain an equal division between states which administer trust territories and states which do not, in accordance with Article 86 of the Charter. (For present composition of these Councils, see Table, page 3.)

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended that the United States slate for non-permanent membership on the Security Council be Belgium, Colombia, and Syria.

2. It is recommended that the United States slate for election to the Economic and Social Council be the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland or the Byelorussian SSR, Uruguay, Turkey, and the United States.

3. If an election to the Trusteeship Council should be required, it is recommended that the United States slate be Egypt, Denmark and the Philippines, in the order named.

4. It is recommended that no commitments for United States support for election to these Councils be made to the representatives of any foreign countries prior to September 5, 1946 and that, whenever possible, commitments be avoided until the United States Delegation to the General Assembly reaches New York. It is further recommended that if such representatives should approach the Department seeking United States support, the Officers concerned should respond in accordance with the following formula:

   (a) In answer to all inquiries, it should be emphasized that no final decisions have been made, and that they will probably not be taken until the Delegation reaches New York.

   (b) If an approach is made by a representative of a country which the Department plans to support, a statement may be made to the effect that the United States is giving serious consideration to its candidacy.

   (c) If an approach is made by a country whose candidacy the United States would definitely oppose, its representative should be informed that there is no present prospect of support for it.

It is further recommended that, unless special circumstances suggest the desirability of a contrary course in a particular case, states which may be admitted to membership in the United Nations at the forthcoming meeting of the General Assembly not be considered for election to these Councils at this time.

**Note:** Reference is to the Table printed on p. 190.
## Table

### Present Membership on U.N. Councils and Recommended U.S. Slates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Present Membership</th>
<th>Proposed Slate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Council</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent Members:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Permanent Members:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Two-Year Term:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>One-Year Term:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic and Social Council:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Three-Year Term:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Two-Year Term:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>One-Year Term:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian S.S.R.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trusteeship Council:</strong></td>
<td>If elections are necessary:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Not yet organized)</td>
<td><strong>Three-Year Term:</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Discussion

1. **Security Council**

   Under Article 23 of the Charter, the General Assembly each year elects three non-permanent members to the Security Council for a term of two years, "due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance..."
of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution." A retiring member is not eligible for immediate re-election.

Subject to the condition that members be capable of making an important contribution to the maintenance of international peace, the Department, on the basis of the present membership of the United Nations, has considered it desirable to include among the six non-permanent members of the Security Council:

One member of the British Commonwealth  
One country from Eastern and Central Europe  
One country from Northern, Western and Southern Europe  
Two countries from the other American Republics  
One country from the Near East and Africa  
(SC-171/8, November 15, 1945).

It is to be noted that the above proposed categories provide for appropriate current representation of the Pacific-Far Eastern area in as much as China is a permanent member of the Security Council and Australia by virtue of its election last January to a two-year membership will be a member of the Council during the next year.

This distribution was attained in the elections held at London last January, when Egypt, Mexico, The Netherlands, Australia, Brazil and Poland were chosen as non-permanent members of the Security Council. The first three of these states will retire from the Security Council, in January 1947; Australia, Brazil and Poland will continue to serve for another year.

If the existing balance among the non-permanent members is to be retained, Egypt, Mexico and The Netherlands must be replaced by a Near Eastern or African State, a Latin American State and a Western European State.

Turkey, though originally favored by the Department for the Security Council at this election, has expressed a preference, for membership on the Economic and Social Council. At the same time Syria, which we had preferred for ECOSOC, is apparently the Arab League’s candidate for the Security Council. It seems desirable to support this exchange of candidacies between the two countries.

Colombia was similarly slated as a replacement for Mexico, and no change in this selection is recommended. Colombia is favored as a matter of preference, rather than pursuant to commitment, since the United States’ vote for Colombia at the Economic and Social Council election last January discharged any previous commitment.

Belgium is regarded as the logical successor to The Netherlands. Although Belgium will retain a seat on the Economic and Social

---

Council for two more years, it is nevertheless considered more desirable to support it at this time for election to the Security Council than Norway, Denmark, or Luxembourg, the other eligible Western European States which are now Members of the United Nations.

2. Economic and Social Council

Under Article 61 of the Charter, the General Assembly each year elects six members to this Council for a term of three years. A retiring member is eligible for immediate re-election.

The current membership of the Economic and Social Council is indicated in the Table on Page 3.

The existing geographic balance in the Council is as follows:

The Five Major Powers
Four Latin American Republics (Chile, Cuba, Peru, Colombia)
Four Eastern European States (Czechoslovakia, Greece, Ukrainian S.S.R., Yugoslavia)
Two members of the British Commonwealth (Canada, India)
Two Western European Countries (Belgium, Norway)
One Near Eastern or African State (Lebanon)

The present distribution of seats differs in some respects from that proposed in the Department before the elections held in London last January, and will probably be further modified as new states are admitted to the United Nations. It is suggested that, in the forthcoming election, the United States seek to change the existing distribution by the election of one additional member of the British Commonwealth and one additional Western European State, to replace two of the four Eastern European countries (not including the U.S.S.R.) now represented on the Council. The resulting geographic balance would be the same as that proposed by the United States representative last January, in conversations with the delegates of the other major Powers at London. (USGA/Gen 30/Conv 14, Jan. 11, 1946).‡

This distribution would be attained if the United States, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland or the Byelorussian S.S.R., Uruguay, and Turkey were chosen to replace the six members of the Council whose terms expire next January.

The United States should be re-elected without difficulty, in view of the common agreement on the desirability of representation for all five of the major Powers on the Economic and Social Council.

The Netherlands, because it is an important factor in world economy, is suggested as a replacement for Greece. The Netherlands will retire from the Security Council in January.

New Zealand is indicated to succeed Yugoslavia because it volun-

‡ Ante, p. 153.
tarily withdrew from a deadlocked election in the General Assembly at London, thereby permitting Yugoslavia to occupy the last unfilled seat on the Council.

The Byelorussians S.S.R. or Poland is listed for election as the result of a process of elimination. Czechoslovakia will remain on the Council for another year. Generally, except in the case of the major Powers, it is felt that immediate re-election is undesirable, as it would result in deferring membership unduly for many states. Consequently, neither Yugoslavia nor the Ukrainian S.S.R. is included on the slate, and only the two states listed remain for consideration. While Poland is far more important than the Byelorussian S.S.R. as an economic factor, it must be remembered that it retains a seat on the Security Council for another year. When the election occurs, consideration should be given to supporting the Eastern European State whose candidacy the Soviet Union is most actively pressing.

Uruguay, a state whose political, economic and social policies are on the whole favorable from the United States point of view, is the preferred choice to succeed Colombia on the Council. This recommendation, however, is made subject to the possibility that the United States might agree to support some other American Republic chosen as a result of consultation among the delegations of the other American Republics. Before the results of such consultation are fixed, it is recommended that the United States discreetly encourage support of Uruguay’s candidacy.

It seems desirable to respect Turkey’s preference for membership on the Economic and Social Council and, at the same time, the Arab League’s apparent choice of Syria for the Security Council.

3. Trusteeship Council

Article 86 of the Charter provides that the Trusteeship Council shall consist of the following Members of the United Nations:

(a) those Members administering trust territories;
(b) such of the five major Powers as are not administering trust territories; and
(c) as many other Members elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly as may be necessary to ensure that the total number of members of the Trusteeship Council is equally divided between those Members of the United Nations which administer trust territories and those which do not.

The Trusteeship Council can not be established until a sufficient number of states have become administering authorities as a result of the conclusion, by the states directly concerned, of trusteeship agreements for specified territories, and the approval of such agreements by the Security Council or the General Assembly. It is possible that the
General Assembly will approve a number of these agreements at its September session.  

If the U.K., France, and Belgium should become administering authorities, the Trusteeship Council could be brought into existence without an election, since China, the U.S.S.R., and the United States would automatically serve as the balancing powers.

If trusteeship agreements for Australia and New Zealand, as well as the U.K., France, and Belgium, should be approved by the Assembly in September, or if some other combination of states should become administering authorities, an election might be necessary. In this event, it is recommended that the United States support Egypt, Denmark and Uruguay, respectively, for the first, second and third elective posts.

Egypt is recommended because it is believed that an Arab State should be represented on the Trusteeship Council in view of the intense interest of the Arab states in the problem of trusteeship, unless Egypt should be elected to the Economic and Social Council.

Denmark is suggested because of the traditional interest of the Scandinavian countries in equal treatment in social, economic and commercial matters, one of the basic objectives of the trusteeship system, and the contribution which Scandinavian nationals might, on the basis of their role in the Permanent Mandates Commission, be expected to make in the Trusteeship Council.

The Philippines are recommended because it seems desirable, in view of their recent achievement of independence, for the United States to support them for some United Nations post and because the Philippine delegate shows a very strong individual interest in trusteeship questions and was very active on the subject at San Francisco and London.

4. Procedure Prior to Elections

It is recognized that these states constitute optimum proposals from the point of view of the United States. In all probability they will undergo some modification during the course of pre-election negotiations with other countries. This is especially likely in cases where groups such as the Latin American Republics or the Arab League select candidates with regard to which the United States has no special objection. In such cases, after discreet advocacy of its own candidates, the United States Delegation may be well advised to concur in the ultimate decision of the group. It is believed that the procedure and formula outlined in Recommendation No. 4, above, will serve to reduce to a minimum the possibility of misunderstanding, disappointment, and charges of bad faith.

*For documentation on this subject, see pp. 544 ff.*
State Department Briefing Paper

[WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1946.

BACKGROUND PAPER

WHETHER UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVES ON THE COMMISSIONS OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL SHOULD BE UNDER FORMAL INSTRUCTION

THE PROBLEM

The Council at its second session decided that commissions shall be made up of "one representative from each of . . . (12 to 18) . . . Members of the United Nations." The Council turned down the suggestions of several of the nuclear Commissions that members of the commissions should serve in their individual capacities rather than as government representatives and therefore should not be instructed. There is no statement to the effect that members of the commissions shall be instructed. The United States consistently has taken the position that better work can be done if members of the commissions are individual experts without instructions. The question is, therefore:

---

*May 25–June 21, 1946, at New York; the first or organizing session had been held at London from January 23 to February 18.

*At the London session the Economic and Social Council had established five commissions on a temporary basis pending final determination of the scope and composition of said commissions. These were described at the time as "nuclear" commissions and comprised the Commission on Human Rights (with a sub-commission on the status of women); the Economic and Employment Commission; the Temporary Social Commission; the Statistical Commission; and the Temporary Transport Commission; also established was the permanent Commission on Narcotic Drugs. At the second session in New York commencing May 25 the scope of the above-named temporary commissions was defined and their composition settled upon, thus establishing them on a permanent basis.

*In respect of the question of the composition of the commissions of the Economic and Social Council United States policy at the Preparatory Commission, the first part of the first session of the General Assembly at London, and the two sessions of the Council in January–February and May–June had been generally to favor a commission membership that would be appointed on the basis of technical ability and professional competence, that is a nonofficial membership, though not without any reference to the governments of the countries from which the individual experts would be elected (see IO Files, documents USGA/1a/SH Com/15, dated January 15, 1946, section 1.A.5, and US/E/4, dated May 5, 1946).

*In a working paper prepared for the use of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly at London this view was stated as follows:

"It is felt that the prestige of certain types of commissions will be enhanced if it is clear that they are to conduct their investigations impartially and without undue concern for the political views of particular Member states. Emphasis on the individual capacities of commission members should help to keep commissions to manageable size by reducing the necessity for widespread distribution among Member states. It should in many cases be easier to obtain the services of highly qualified experts and persons of outstanding prestige if they are appointed primarily on the basis of their personal qualifications." (IO Files, USGA/1a/SH Com/15, January 19, 1946).
Should the United States Government, in the light of the Council's decision, formally instruct representatives on the various commissions in spite of its earlier position.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that United States Members of the Commissions be provided with general instructions covering major issues. They should be given an opportunity to collaborate in the preparation of their instructions. In the Commission meetings the U.S. Members will of necessity speak for the Government of the United States, but they should be free to speak in the light of circumstances and their individual reactions, being guided, of course, generally by their instructions. They would, of course, rarely if ever announce that they were speaking as individuals. They should have the right, for tactical as well as other reasons, to seek special instructions.

DISCUSSION

The United States has based its attitude in the past mainly upon the arguments: 1) That the best men can be obtained for the job and they will do their best work only if they are free from all political interference and pressure and can think for themselves; 2) That the Commissions are necessarily small bodies which must nevertheless consider the interests of the entire world. Governmental representatives instructed to follow the interests of their own country cannot be expected to represent other countries; 3) The presence of the press at all meetings will limit instructed representatives to careful statements as a result of the fear of committing their governments.

On the other hand, it is clear that recommendations must so far as possible, be consistent with policies of governments if they are to be implemented. Members of the Commissions must be familiar with these policies and act on lines generally consistent with them if useful work is to be done.

Moreover, since many of the members will be specifically instructed and will speak with the full prestige of their governments, the United States Members will be at a great tactical disadvantage if they can argue only on the basis of their personal opinions.

Finally, it appears that the maximum of flexibility would be desirable. It is suggested that the recommendation outlined above gives this flexibility and, at the same time, answers the arguments on both sides so far as possible. It will, of course, be necessary for United States Members of the Commission to make it clear when they are speaking as individuals in order to prevent any misunderstanding from arising from the fact that they will be called "representatives".
Memorandum Prepared in the Division of International Organization Affairs

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 6, 1946.

Subject: Alternative Candidates for Council Posts.

I. Introduction

The basic memorandum prepared on the subject of slates for election to the three UN Councils lists in specific detail the states which will be supported by this government for election to all available posts. The United States Delegation to the General Assembly will engage in conversations with other Delegations in New York in an endeavor to secure general acceptance for its candidates. Very probably, however, it will be necessary to alter the proposed United States slates in order to produce a list of nominees which will be acceptable to the United States and will at the same time enjoy a reasonable prospect of election. The present memorandum is designed to provide general guidance as to the priority in which other states should be considered if our original choices for Council posts prove unacceptable.

It is important to note the criteria which must be observed in making selections for the various Councils. Article 23 of the Charter prescribes that, in the election of non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard should be paid “in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution”.

The Charter does not prescribe any particular set of qualifications for membership in the Economic and Social Council. It is clear, however, that the economic importance and the economic and social policies of the various states are among the important factors to be taken into consideration in selecting suitable candidates.

No special criteria are set forth in the Charter for election to the Trusteeship Council. The list of eligible states is, however, limited to those who will not already be members of the Council by virtue of their status as states administering trust territories or permanent members of the Security Council.

II. Alternative Choices in Specific Geographical Areas

(a) Latin America

The basic memorandum on the subject of slates contained a statement that the Latin American countries might select candidates of

*Prepared originally as a “draft”, this paper was approved later by other interested offices and set up on September 24 as a Departmental position paper (IO Files, document SD/A/C.1/37).
their own for the two Council positions open to them. In that event, the memorandum stated, the Delegation might be well advised to concur in the decisions of the Latin American countries, provided the United States has no special objection to the candidates selected.

If Colombia and Uruguay, our first preferences for the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council respectively, are not supported by the Latin American delegations, the United States would probably have no objections on political grounds to the selection of any other Latin American candidates except Argentina, Nicaragua, Honduras, or the Dominican Republic. These four countries would not be acceptable as candidates for either of the Councils. It is doubtful, however, that any Latin American republics except Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela will receive serious consideration as candidates for Council posts at the forthcoming Assembly session.

(6) Europe

(1) Security Council.

Belgium is our first choice among the European states to fill one of the three impending vacancies on the Security Council. The Department has been informed that a report that the Belgian Government is unwilling to be a candidate for this post is entirely without foundation. There seems at present to be no completely satisfactory alternative choice for Belgium, although Denmark and Norway are possibilities.

Denmark is not now a member of any Council. It is however, our choice for the second elective post on the Trusteeship Council and for membership on the Social and Statistical Commissions and on the Commission on the Status of Women.

Norway already enjoys considerable representation in United Nations bodies. It is serving a two-year term on ECOSOC; the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Registrar of the International Court of Justice are Norwegians; and Norway is supported by the United States for election to the Human Rights, Statistical, Transport and Communications, and Fiscal Commissions.

(2) Economic and Social Council.

Denmark would be the logical alternative to the Netherlands for election to ECOSOC. In case Sweden should be admitted to membership in the UN before the elections are held, it would be a highly satisfactory choice for this Council because of its economic importance and its leadership in the field of social affairs.

South Africa would be the logical alternative to New Zealand as the British Commonwealth choice for ECOSOC.

In view of the fact that all Eastern European countries which are members of the UN are now holding or will hold Council posts under our original proposals, it seems impracticable to suggest alternative choices from that area.
(c) Near and Middle East and Africa.

If it should appear that Syria and Turkey, our preferred candidates for the Security Council and Economic and Social Council, respectively, cannot be elected, the United States might possibly be disposed to support Greece or Iran for one of the Council posts.

Greece is now completing a one-year term on the Economic and Social Council and would therefore presumably not be considered for reelection to that Council. Because Greece has twice been involved in matters considered by the Security Council and, at the beginning of September, was still engaged in a controversy before that body, its election to the Security Council might be undesirable. It might possibly be considered, however, for election to the Trusteeship Council if our preferred candidates should withdraw.

As regards the Security Council, the same objection might apply to some extent in the case of Iran. If the situation in Iran should develop favorably, however, so that Iran indicates a sincere desire and intention to act independently, the United States might possibly support Iran for one of the Council posts in the event that a vacancy should develop in our slates.

It seems desirable not to consider Iraq or Lebanon for positions on any of the Councils at this time.

(d) Far East.

The Philippines is not at present a member of any United Nations Council and is in effect our alternate choice for the Trusteeship Council. It is supported by the United States for membership on the Human Rights Commission and the Fiscal Commission of the Economic and Social Council.

501 BC/3-2646

The Canadian Embassy to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL AND INFORMAL MEMORANDUM ON THE VIEWS OF CANADA ON ELECTIONS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL.

1. At present the six non-permanent members of the Security Council are:

   For two-year term: Australia
                        Brazil
                        Poland

   For one-year term: Egypt
                        Mexico
                        Netherlands.

* Transmitted to the Department by the Canadian Embassy under cover of a letter dated September 26, not printed.
2. The United Nations Assembly in October will elect successors to Egypt, Mexico and the Netherlands. These states are not eligible for immediate re-election.

3. The Latin-American Republics appear to have agreed on Colombia. The Arab states (Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi-Arabia, and Iraq) have agreed on Syria and have secured the concurrence of Turkey and Iran. It is widely expected that Belgium will be the candidate of the Western European states for the succession to the seat of the Netherlands though there may be strong opposition to a state being a member at the same time of both the Economic and Social Council and the Security Council.

4. According to the Charter (Article 23:1), the primary consideration to be taken into account by the Assembly in elections to the Security Council is “the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization”. The secondary consideration is “equitable geographical distribution”.

5. In fact, however, at the elections in London in January scant attention was paid to the principle of functionalism and the two governing principles were the sharing of honours and equitable geographical distribution. The first principle means that a state (other than one of the Big Five) should not be a member at the same time of both the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. The second principle means that various groups of states are each entitled not only to a seat on the Security Council but to agree among themselves on which of them should have the seat. Of the six non-permanent seats five, in the minds of the adherents of these principles, are divided as follows:

- Western Europe (1)
- The Soviet Zone of Europe (1)
- Latin America (2)
- Middle East (1)

The sixth seat was at London given to Australia and it is debatable whether this seat is considered as belonging to the British Commonwealth or to the area lying south of China and the Arab states and including the whole of Africa.

6. Regionalism, combined with the rotation of seats among the states members of the regional groups, is likely to produce a weak Security Council. It has already resulted in Syria being chosen as the Middle Eastern candidate. This has been done certainly with little regard being paid “to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purpose of the Organization”. Two years from now it may
result in the two Latin American members of the Security Council being countries with little military or economic force to contribute to the preservation of peace.

7. The present system also means that the non-permanent members of the Security Council are not in fact being elected by the Assembly but that the Assembly is merely ratifying the decisions of regional groups. Not all states are members of any recognized regional group and some states which might be useful members of the Security Council will, as a result, be disqualified from membership in the Council.

8. From Canada’s point of view the situation is especially serious. Since the United States is always on the Security Council, Canada can make no claim for membership on the basis of equitable geographical distribution. Canada belongs, moreover, to no organized regional group. If Latin America always has two seats on the Security Council, Western Europe one seat, Eastern Europe one seat, and the Arab bloc one seat—only one seat is left over for Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and India and for the other states which do not belong to one of the four regions. The argument will be made that that seat should go to a representative of the vast area lying south of China and of the Arab states and including the whole of Africa.

9. We would be serving neither our own immediate interests or the interests of the United Nations if we were to give support to the view that membership in one Council disqualified a state, other than one of the Big Five, from membership in the other Council. This would mean that Canada would be ineligible for membership in the Security Council until its term on the Economic and Social Council expires in January 1949 (i.e., Canada could not be elected until September 1948). By limiting the choice of candidates for the Councils it would weaken the Councils since they can do their most effective work only if they contain the states which have the greatest contribution to make to the solution of the problems with which they are dealing. Canada should therefore be prepared to oppose any movement which may develop in the Assembly to disqualify Belgium from membership on the Security Council because of its membership on the Economic and Social Council.

10. Should Canada stand for the Security Council this year, one of the main arguments for our standing (even if we expect to be defeated) would be that by so doing we would make clear our opposition to the acceptance of our [four?] undesirable conventions:

(1) The convention that the Assembly can properly disregard in elections to the Security Council the principle of functionalism set forth in Article 23 of the Charter;
(2) The convention that a state is ineligible for election to the Security Council if it is already a member of the Economic and Social Council;

(3) The convention that a number of regions of the world have a right to be represented on the Council by a state designated by them no matter what the qualifications of that state may be;

(4) The convention that only one member of the British Commonwealth, apart from the United Kingdom, should sit on the Security Council.

WASHINGTON, September 25, 1946.

501.BB/10-146

Memorandum Prepared in the Division of International Organization Affairs

SECRET

[WASHINGTON], October 1, 1946.

COMMENTS ON CANADIAN MEMORANDUM ON ELECTIONS TO UN COUNCILS

Our comments on this memorandum may be grouped in accordance with the four "conventions" with which it concludes.

1. "The convention that the Assembly can properly disregard in elections to the Security Council the principle of functionalism set forth in Article 23 of the Charter."

We agree that the Assembly should not disregard the functional principle, but we consider it equally harmful to disregard the geographic principle. As long as the five Great Powers are in a predominant position on the Security Council, there is no danger of a "weak" Council. We believe that, to be most effective, the Council should include representatives of the major geographic areas and of the British Commonwealth. We should remind the Canadians that it is not only the members of the Security Council, but all UN members, who contribute military and economic force to the preservation of peace. We should maintain, moreover, that a small state which speaks for the entire regional group to which it belongs on major issues wields an influence greater than that represented by its own military and economic strength.

2. "The convention that a State is ineligible for election to the Security Council if it is already a member of the Economic and Social Council."

We do not agree with this thesis as an invariable rule, and the Canadians should be reassured by our sponsorship of Belgium for the

19 Drafted by David H. Popper.

11 Supra.
Security Council at this time. At the same time, we would ordinarily prefer a wide distribution of Council posts among the members of the Organization. It is important that the smaller states, which are already dissatisfied because they play so small a part in UN operations, be granted as much voice as possible in UN activities, although frankly we would not now expect that every small state would some day achieve membership on the Security Council.

3. “The convention that a number of regions of the world have a right to be represented on the Council by a State designated by them no matter what the qualifications of that State may be.”

(a) We could not agree that a regional group has an inherent right to demand that other states necessarily respect its choice of candidates from among its own membership. But it is only realistic to acknowledge that regional choices, and logrolling among regional groups, are to be expected. Normally, we would proceed to select our own candidates from the areas concerned and attempt to persuade the appropriate regional groups to accept our choices. If, however, we failed in the attempt, we should be inclined to accept the candidate chosen by a regional group, provided we had no special objection to it as a candidate.

(b) We do not feel that Council members from a given regional area must necessarily, or should always, be members of an organized regional group. In this connection, it may be well to explain generally to the Canadians how the Department came to support Syria for the Security Council, stressing the fact that Turkey was our original candidate.

4. “The convention that only one member of the British Commonwealth, apart from the United Kingdom, should sit on the Security Council.”

(a) We should explain to the Canadians that our conception of the proper geographic allocation of seats among the non-permanent members of the Security Council, as determined in the Department prior to the General Assembly session at London, includes one member of the British Commonwealth, in addition to the United Kingdom. We might assure the Canadians that we do not intend to bracket the Dominions with “the vast area lying south of China and of the Arab states and including the whole of Africa.” In Africa, this “vast area” involves only two UN members, Liberia and Ethiopia, which we place in the NEA group; in the Far East, the only UN members concerned are the Philippines and India.

(b) It seems to us that the Security Council, which is a political body, should roughly reflect the existing division of political forces. On this basis, we do not see how the British Dominions can expect to
occupy more than one seat among them, particularly if only one seat is allocated to the Soviet satellites.

501.BB/10-146: Circular telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] October 1, 1946—2 p. m.

At early opportunity please convey informally following views to FoMin.

This Govt has expressed view in response to inquiry of Urug FoMin and suggestions of certain other Amer FonOffs that no commitments should be made by Amer Govts with regard to the support of specific AmReps for election to principal organs of United Nations until delegations meet in NYC for General Assembly. This Govt holds to this view and has made no commitments. However, in view postponement meeting and presence several delegations from other AmReps in this country it is recognized that some informal discussion of views regarding selection of AmReps for these posts is inevitable. Dept wishes inform FoMin informally of its view that following countries merit sympathetic consideration for two major posts: for Security Council, Colombia; for Economic and Social Council, Uruguay.

Above views are communicated for FoMin for his information. Dept not making any firm commitment at this time and considers desirable continue discussion this subject among delegations in NYC before final decision.

For Emb's info Dept does not wish encourage further discussion of candidacies through you at this time, but would of course be glad know any views FoMin may volunteer. This instruction prompted by evidence that some AmReps actively campaigning for support now.

Dept wishes its tentative views known before further commitments are made by other govts.

Mexico and Venezuela known to be soliciting support for ECOSOC. Dept prefers Uruguay because of high qualifications including East

32 The date for the convening of the General Assembly had been postponed from September 23 to October 23. This, a second postponement, was necessitated by the slow progress of the Paris Peace Conference. For United States Delegation Minutes of those meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers at the Paris Peace Conference dealing with the postponement question, see vol. III, pp. 313-321, 364-370, 383-390, and 398-404, passim.

33 Venezuela had made several overtures to the United States as early as January 22 and as recently as September 26 (IO Files, United States Delegation Briefing Book entitled “Elections of Members of Security Council, Economic and Social Council and Trusteeship Council [1946, New York].”
Coast location since Cuba, Colombia, Peru and Chile now on ECOSOC.  

ACHESON

IO Files: SD/ A/91

Memorandum of Conversation, by G. Hayden Raynor, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] October 2, 1946.

Participants: Mr. C. P. Hebert, Counselor of the Canadian Embassy
Mr. Wailes, of BC
Mr. Hayden Raynor, of EUR

[Here follows discussion of the Canadian Embassy memorandum sent to the Department on September 26. “The conversation centered on the four conventions contained at the end of Paragraph 10 of the Canadian memorandum. In our conversation we followed generally the points made in Mr. Popper’s memorandum of October 1...”]

After completing our discussion of the Canadian memorandum I referred to the inquiry he had made at our last meeting relative to the makeup of the ECOSOC. I stated that we were in full agreement that the economic importance of a state was an important factor in determining the membership of this Council. I quoted to him the pertinent paragraph in our working paper on alternate candidates for Council posts which sets forth this very clearly. I added, however, that we differ from their view on the matter of membership by the Big Five. (Mr. Hebert had suggested that the Canadians felt that only the Big Three should be continuous members.) I stated that we felt, not necessarily because of the importance of all of the Big Five from the economic point of view, but because of the concept of Big Five unanimity on which the United Nations had been built, that the Big

34 Replies to this circular are found in the Briefing Book named above. In general these expressed cooperative interest while at the same time pointing out that Venezuela, Argentina, and Mexico were actively interested in their own candidacies.

35 This refers to a meeting held on September 16 at which Mr. Hebert “... informed us that he was instructed to ascertain informally our reaction to the following proposal. He stated that they felt that in the economic world Canada and certain other states such as the Netherlands were equally as important as France and China and should be so recognized in the ECOSOC. His proposal is this: The Big Three (the US, UK and USSR) should always have seats on the ECOSOC. Half of the remaining fifteen seats should always be filled from a group of twelve important economic states such as Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, presumably France and China, Australia, Brazil, etc. Mr. Wailes and I promised to ascertain what the reaction of the Department might be to this suggestion and to talk to him informally about it later.” (IO Files: Document US/A/14).
Five should be continuously represented on all major organs of the United Nations.

During the discussion I inquired if Mr. Hebert had received any Canadian views on the makeup of the Trusteeship Council. He indicated that their first preference was for an European state, either Sweden or Denmark, and that if two seats were elected they felt the other seat should be held by a non-European state. He indicated that he had supposed that the South American countries would feel entitled to this seat and that in that event they had been prepared to favor Brazil. He indicated that Egypt would be an acceptable candidate to them for the second seat. As in his previous conversation he indicated a distinct lack of enthusiasm for the Philippines as a candidate and urged that consideration be given to India as a member of this Council but not this year.

Mr. Hebert seemed entirely satisfied with the informal views expressed to him. I think with the exception of Syria that we will find the Canadians and ourselves in quite close agreement in New York on the question of slates.

501.BD/10-946

Memorandum by David H. Popper of the Division of International Organization Affairs

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 9, 1946.

Selection of ECOSOC Commissions

1. Results of the Elections

On October 2 the Economic and Social Council selected the members of eight commissions which it had created to work in specific fields. The table appended to this memorandum lists the membership of the Commissions.

Thirty-nine of the 51 members of the United Nations have been given places on one or more Commissions. By common consent, each of the Big Five has a seat on each Commission. India is represented on six Commissions. The following states are represented on four Com-

---

16 At the third session of the Economic and Social Council which extended from September 11 to October 3 the Council determined the terms of reference and composition of the Population Commission and the Fiscal Commission. It then selected the States to designate representatives on all of the now permanent commissions (except the Narcotics Commission, to which the membership had been elected immediately at the London session), namely Economic and Employment, Human Rights, Social, Status of Women, Statistical, Transportation and Communications, Fiscal, and Population.

17 Table not appended.
missions: Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR, and Yugoslavia.

Eight Latin American States are unrepresented on the Commissions (Argentina, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay). In the Near Eastern-African area, Ethiopia, Liberia, and Saudi Arabia are without representation. Among the Western European states, Luxembourg did not receive a seat.

Total representation on all Commissions, by regional groups, is indicated in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Number of States</th>
<th>Number of seats on eight Commissions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Big Five</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smaller Eastern Europe</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Dominions</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smaller Western Europe</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near East-Africa</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>51</strong></td>
<td><strong>120</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Original Instructions to the Delegation

The basic instructions to the Delegation, as contained in the Position Paper of September 3,¹⁸ called for the inclusion of nine of the smaller Eastern European States on the six Commissions which had been previously created by the Council, as against fifteen such seats for Latin American countries. The lists as chosen gave fourteen seats to the smaller Eastern European countries and fifteen to the Latin American States, with five seats for the Eastern European bloc as against four for the Latin Americans on the Fiscal and Population Commissions, which were created at this session of ECOSOC.

3. Attempts To Reach a Compromise

Following several telephone conversations on the subject, Mr. Hendrick¹⁹ of OA returned to Washington on September 19 from a visit to New York with a description of negotiations which were being carried on with the Soviets, British and others with a view to reaching complete agreement so that the matter could be presented to the Council and voted upon without delay or acrimonious debate. On the basis of tentative commitments which the Soviets were making

¹⁸ Not printed.
¹⁹ James P. Hendrick of the Division of International Organization Affairs.
at that time, it was understood that the margin of disagreement with the Soviets was relatively small; that the Soviet representatives indicated we might have almost as many Latin American countries on the compromise slate as on the original; and that they felt we should lose some Western European seats. No specific information, however, was formally supplied to the Department on the proposed composition of the six Commissions. It was indicated that Mr. Stampar, Deleg- 

tate of Yugoslavia and Acting Chairman of the Council, thought that the tentative compromise slate gave too much representation to the Eastern satellites.

On receipt of this information, the Delegation was requested by telephone to state in writing the present position with regard to slates, giving the details as to the composition of each Commission. The response to this request came to us in telegram #595 from New York, September 21. This telegram indicated that the Soviets not only would not accept the compromise slate but also were making additional demands which would raise the smaller Eastern representation to 17 seats on the six Commissions (as compared with 9 on the original U.S. list and 13 on the compromise slate).

4. Department’s Views on Compromise

As a result of this information the Department’s Membership Team held a meeting on September 23 in which it decided that it would reluctantly accept the compromise slate as it had been handed to Mr. Stampar as the limit of its concessions to the Soviets. The Team felt that the representation afforded the Soviet bloc under this so-called “Stampar list” was more than generous to the Soviet bloc on a proportional basis, considering that it comprises only 6 of the 51 UN members. Certain additional changes were authorized, but these would not have increased the representation of the Eastern group. It was stated that, if an agreement upon this basis were unobtainable, the Department preferred that the Delegation revert to support of the original list of candidates prepared in the Department and included in the Position Paper of September 8, and left to the Delegation’s discretion the methods to be followed in order to produce a generally accepted slate as close to the original list as possible. (Telegram No. 205 to New York, September 24).

5. Department’s Opposition to Further Concessions

On September 25 Mr. Hyde telephoned to say that the outlook for any agreement on the slates was dark and to get our reaction on the

---

21 Dr. Andrija Stampar.
22 Not printed.
23 Louis Hyde, Adviser to the United States Representative on the Economic and Social Council.
possibility of making further concessions to the Russians in a final attempt to reach unanimous agreement on the slates. The changes suggested by Mr. Hyde would have raised the representation of the smaller Eastern European countries on the six Commissions to 15 seats as against 13 given to them under the Stampar list and 9 in our original slate. Mr. Hendrick and Mr. Popper told Mr. Hyde that this appeared to give the six UN members in the Soviet bloc a far higher representation than that accorded to any other group or region. They told Mr. Hyde that they seriously doubted the Department would agree to the Russian demands, but that they would inform him more definitely after consultation with the officers concerned. As a result, telegram No. 216, September 27,24 was sent to New York confirming the fact that there was no change in the basic instructions for the Commission slates but permitting a few alterations which would not have increased the representation of the Eastern group. It was specifically stated that the Department did not approve placing Poland on the Economic and Employment Commission.

6. Prospect of Agreement on Favorable Basis

On September 30 Mr. Hyde telephoned us to say that it appeared that an agreement might be reached on the basis of only 12 seats for the Eastern group. It was indicated that the Russians would not insist on placing Poland on the Economic Commission, and that they also agreed that Yugoslavia should receive only three seats on the six Commissions, including the Commission on Women instead of the Transportation Commission. This seemed encouraging, since it indicated we might reach unanimous agreement on a basis more favorable to us than the Stampar list.25

7. Consultation with Mr. Acheson

On October 1 and 2 Mr. Hyde spoke with the Department in four separate telephone conversations during which matters were moving very rapidly. At this stage Mr. Hyde told us that Mr. Winant had received authorization from Mr. Acheson to reach an agreement with

---

24 Not printed.
25 In a revision of this memorandum drafted on October 14 Mr. Popper wrote at the beginning of this paragraph: "On September 30 Mr. Hyde telephoned the Department from a public phone in the Delegates' lounge at Lake Success. Since he could be overheard by other people, he had to talk in guarded language, and his exact meaning was difficult to ascertain. We understood him to say that it appeared an agreement might be reached on the basis of only 12 seats for the Eastern group. . . ." At the end of the paragraph in the revised memorandum there appeared a parenthetical statement: "(Mr. Hyde has since informed us that what he was attempting to convey was that, if no agreement were reached with the Soviets and a vote were taken, we could elect a slate which contained only 12 seats for the Eastern Group on the six original commissions.)" (501.BD/10-1446)
the Russians on the basis of 14 seats for the smaller Eastern European countries on the six original Commissions, plus two seats for the Eastern satellites on each of the two new Commissions (Population and Fiscal). In his last conversations Mr. Hyde gave the impression that the matter was now being handled at Mr. Winant's level and was largely out of his (Mr. Hyde's) hands. 26

8. Changes in the Final Stage

During these conversations Mr. Hyde dictated to us the tentative slates as they stood on October 1, before the telephone conversation between Mr. Acheson and Mr. Winant. A comparison of these slates with those finally elected shows that, at the final stage, five seats were transferred from other states to the Eastern group, against one from an Eastern group state to a Latin American state. Norway and Poland were substituted on the Economic and Employment Commission for Egypt and the Netherlands, although the Department had strongly opposed both these changes. Greece had been displaced from the Transportation and Communications Commission by Yugoslavia, and was thus reduced to a single seat on the Commissions. Byelo-Russia had replaced Norway on the Human Rights Commission; the Ukraine had replaced India on the Population Commission and had also replaced Denmark on the Fiscal Commission. As a result of these changes it will be observed that the smaller Eastern European group was limited to one seat on the Commission for Women and the Statistical Commission, which are relatively unimportant from the standpoint of policy. On the contrary, the smaller Eastern European group has three seats on each of the following Commissions: Economic and Employment, Human Rights, Social, Transportation and Communications, and Fiscal, as well as two seats on the Population Commission. On all of these more important Commissions it has at least as many representatives as any other group and in some cases more.

26 In the revised memorandum of October 14 Mr. Popper wrote an additional paragraph in section 7, following this paragraph: "Mr. Winant had in fact telephoned Mr. Acheson and had informed the latter that the Department had suggested limiting the representation of the smaller Eastern European countries on the six original Commissions to 13 seats; that the British were prepared to settle on the basis of 15 seats for these countries; and that he (Mr. Winant) felt sure he could reach an agreement on the basis of 14 seats. Mr. Acheson authorized Mr. Winant to reach an agreement on this basis. In a second telephone conversation, after the event, Mr. Winant said that he had agreed to proportionate representation for the smaller Eastern states on the two new Commissions (Population and Fiscal). Mr. Acheson apparently assumed this to mean that the smaller Eastern group had received two seats on each of these Commissions." (501.BD/10-1448)
Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

Draft

[WASHINGTON,] October 10, 1946.

Remarks of Mr. Leroy Stinebower \(^27\) at Membership Team Meeting
October 10, 11:00 a.m.

Mr. Stinebower, who had returned from New York a few days previously, discussed with the Membership Team his recollection of the events which had taken place in the process of reaching an agreement with the other members of the ECOSOC preparatory to the election of the members of 8 Commissions by the Council.

Mr. Stinebower stressed the fact that final agreement was reached after Mr. Winant had talked directly with Mr. Acheson by telephone and had received approval for raising the Soviet representation on the 6 original Commissions from 13 to 14 states. Mr. Stinebower took the view that if there was any dissatisfaction with the final results, it should be attributed to a failure to keep Mr. Acheson adequately informed about the problem, as a result of which Mr. Acheson took a decision which was not in accord with the instructions sent to New York by the Membership Team.

Mr. Stinebower also emphasized Mr. Winant’s desire to reach unanimous agreement with the Soviets on the slates, as a desirable method of procedure and as a method of possibly gaining sympathetic consideration by the Soviets for our plan for an Economic Commission for Europe. The final agreement, Mr. Stinebower stated came after a long evening session during which Mr. Winant negotiated with the Soviets and the British. At that stage the Soviets were insisting on 15 Eastern European seats on the 6 original Commissions while our limit was 13 seats. Finally it was agreed to split the difference and give the Eastern European bloc 14 seats. Since the Soviet representation on all 8 Commissions thus rose to 19 seats it was considered necessary to raise the Latin American representation 1 seat to preserve parity. Mr. Stinebower understood that the concept of parity had been specifically accepted in these final negotiations. He made the point

---

\(^27\) Drafted by Mr. Popper of the Division of International Organization Affairs.

\(^28\) Leroy D. Stinebower, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp), also serving at New York as United States Deputy Representative on the Economic and Social Council.
that the negotiators linked together the seats allocated to the British Dominions and India and that this total too reached 19 seats.20

Mr. Stinebower further stated that no member of the Council appeared to be aggrieved at the result of the elections except Greece, which had only one seat as compared with two for Lebanon. He commented on the fact that there was no sizable dissatisfaction among the four Latin American members of the Council, who had demanded a total of 22 seats for the Latin American states. He also explained the loss of Liberia on the ground that the Big Three considered it was too backward to form [perform] its responsibilities on any Commission.

Mr. Stinebower explained the inclusion of Poland on the Economic and Employment Commission but noted that the Soviets had insisted on this concession as a prerequisite for unanimity. He indicated that Mr. Acheson had approved by telephone the addition of Poland on this Commission as the additional Soviet seat.

Mr. Stinebower further declared that it proved important [impossible] to leave any Commission seat vacant in order to save them for Sweden, which is not yet a member of the United Nations. Finally, he noted that reaching unanimity it was possible to keep countries off the Commissions when we did not wish them seated. In this connection he mentioned specifically how difficult it was to keep the Dominican Republic representative, Miss Bernardino, off the Commission on the Status of Women.

---

10 Files: US/A/M (Chr.)/7 (Part 2)

Minutes of the Second Part of the Seventh Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at New York, Pennsylvania Hotel, October 22, 1946, 11:30 a. m.

SECRET

[Here follow list of names of persons (20) present,20 and brief mention of the topics discussed by the Delegation in the earlier part of the meeting.]

20 In a revised memorandum drafted October 11 Mr. Popper wrote, following this paragraph: "When the Soviets continued to insist on giving still another seat to the Byelo-Russian SSR, we indicated that our absolute maximum allotment for the Eastern group was 19 seats for 8 Commissions. We said that if the Soviets wanted an additional seat for Byelo-Russia, they would have to reduce the representation of some other Eastern state. Eventually the Soviets acquiesced, but this necessitated a considerable reshuffling of seats involving both the Eastern group and other countries." (601.BD/10–1146)

20 For the composition of the U.S. Delegation to the General Assembly and its advisory staff, see pp. 37–42.
Election of Officers of GA Committees

Mr. Sandifer, in raising this problem, pointed out that while most of the officers who were elected at the first part of the session in London would be present at the current meetings, according to present information, the Chairmen of Committees 2, 3, and 4 as well as four of the Rapporteurs and two Vice Chairmen would not be present. He pointed out that the absence of the Chairman created a problem regarding the composition of the General Committee.31 He presented for approval the recommendations contained in Document US/A/26.32 These provided that the United States should support a proposal to elect as the three new chairmen the heads of the Delegations from those States which held the chairmanships in London, and that the United States should generally favor filling the vacancies for Vice Chairmen and Rapporteurs by election of members of the same delegations which held the positions in London.

It was brought out in the discussion that Foreign Minister Olszewski of Poland would probably be adequate as the new Chairman of Committee 2 although his knowledge of French was only fair and he did not speak English. In response to a similar question regarding Ambassador Blanco as Chairman of Committee 4, Ambassador Dawson stated that, although elderly and not in good health, Blanco was an experienced diplomat with excellent knowledge of French and fair knowledge of English, and that he would be adequate as Chairman.

Decision

The four recommendations in Document US/A/26 were approved.

31 This subject was discussed informally on October 19 between Mr. Andrew Cordier, Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Lie) and Mr. Durward V. Sandifer, Principal Adviser, United States Delegation Staff (Chief of the Division of International Organization Affairs in the Department) and two members of Mr. Sandifer’s staff. Mr. Cordier “indicated that Secretary-General Lie was in favor of allowing the vice-chairmen of these committees to serve as chairmen. . . . [Mr. Sandifer] expressed the view that it would be more satisfactory to elect a new chairman from the state holding the chairmanship in London, so that the same distribution of states on the General Committee would be continued and the principle would be recognized that chairmen were elected in part for their individual capacities. Mr. Cordier expressed sympathy with this view and urged that some work be done on it prior to the Thursday morning plenary session when such elections as were decided upon would take place.” (IO Files, document US/A/19) The United States Delegation staff had produced two working papers by October 21 which embodied in tabular form the principle of selection of new committee chairmen from the country holding the position at London. (IO Files, documents US/A/24 and US/A/25, neither printed)

32 Not printed. This U.S. Delegation position paper is found in the IO Files.
Election of New Members to the Security Council

Mr. Sandifer explained that it would be necessary to elect three States to non-permanent membership on the Security Council and presented the following list of candidates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Alternates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Any other American republic which the Latin American Delegation may agree upon except Argentina and the Dominican Republic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Denmark or Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Greece or Iran</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mr. Sandifer explained that these countries had been selected after careful consideration in the light of the requirements of Article 23, par. 1, in order to preserve the balance of membership in councils as originally worked out at the London meetings.

Mr. Dulles pointed out that, in view of the method of determining membership on the Atomic Energy Commission, this change in the composition of the Security Council would result in the replacement likewise of three members on the AEC which seemed unfortunate. He raised the possibility of not altering the Commission. Mr. Fahy stated that the question had been explored and it was felt that nothing could be done to prevent the replacement, adding that the new representatives of the AEC would have to be educated on atomic energy problems and they and their governments brought up to date on the development of views within the AEC.33

Decision

The Delegation approved the support of Colombia, Belgium, and Syria as non-permanent members of the Security Council (with the qualification mentioned below with respect to Greece).

Election of Members to ECOSOC

Mr. Sandifer explained that it would be necessary to elect six new members to the ECOSOC to replace those whose terms had expired and presented the following as recommended candidates:

- Uruguay
- The Netherlands
- Turkey
- Poland or Byelorussian S. S. R.
- New Zealand
- United States

Mr. Sandifer pointed out that although this slate would reduce the representation of the Eastern European countries from four to three,

---

33 For documentation on this subject, see pp. 712 ff.
the replacement of Yugoslavia by New Zealand had been made in view of the fact that when the elections were held in London, New Zealand withdrew in favor of Yugoslavia with the understanding that she would receive support at the next election. It was generally recognized in the Delegation, however, that this portion of the slate would be likely to create the greatest difficulties.

Senator Vandenberg raised serious question as to the exclusion of Greece. He pointed out that she was being removed from ECOSOC, that she was denied a seat on the Security Council, that she had no significant post in any of the commissions, and that she was forced again and again at the Paris Conference to accept adverse decisions. He expressed fear that with such a succession of disappointments at the hands of her allies, Greece would begin to question whether she had made the right choice of partners. The Senator felt that he could not overemphasize the problem in view of the fact that Greece was in such a key position from the point of view of the United States peace pattern.

General discussion followed of possible recommended candidates for whom Greece might be substituted. Mr. Sandifer pointed out that to give Greece a position on the ECOSOC would require replacement either of Turkey or The Netherlands, which would be difficult. Mr. Wadsworth suggested that to a certain degree the position and importance of Turkey is similar to that of Greece.

Senator Vandenberg suggested that it might be possible to substitute Greece for Syria on our Security Council slate but Mr. Wadsworth brought out the point that it seemed possible that a complaint involving Greece might come before the Security Council in the near future and that it might be better, therefore, if Greece were not a member.

Senator Vandenberg and Senator Connally both expressed the view, in which there was general concurrence, that the matter should be brought to the attention of the Secretary.

Decision

At the suggestion of Senator Austin, the Delegation approved the recommended slate subject to a further attempt to rearrange it to include Greece after consultation with the Secretary of State.

Election of Members to the Trusteeship Council

The Delegation then turned its attention to the recommended slate for the Trusteeship Council in case it should be organized at this session. Mr. Sandifer explained that our recommended preference was for Egypt, Denmark and Philippines for the elective positions to the Council in the order named.
With respect to Egypt, Mr. Dulles raised a question as to the political desirability of supporting an Arab State for membership in the light of the Palestine problem. Mrs. Roosevelt and Mrs. Douglas likewise queried whether it was necessary to pick Egypt if only one member was to be elected. The suggestion was therefore made that Egypt might be placed as second choice rather than first.

After some discussion, Mr. Dulles pointed out that the problem was at the present time a remote one in view of the uncertainty as to whether or not the Trusteeship Council would be organized and an elective member chosen at this session. He moved that the matter be deferred.

Decision

The Delegation agreed that a decision on candidates for elective members to the Trusteeship Council should be deferred for the present.

---

IO Files: US/A/55

Memorandum of Conversation, by G. Hayden Raynor of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

SECRET

[New York], October 24, 1946.

Subject: Matters in Connection with General Assembly

1. States. Mr. Gore-Booth this morning told me that we could now consider official the information he had previously given me that the British are supporting the candidacy of India for the Security

---

*Mr. Raynor's Departmental position was Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of European Affairs.

*The record of the discussions between members and staff of the United States Delegation and members and staff of other delegations on all matters relating to affairs of the General Assembly is found in the documentary series US/A/1 ff. in the IO Files.

*P. H. Gore-Booth, Assistant Principal Adviser to the British Delegation.

Mr. Gore-Booth had first mentioned this to Mr. Raynor on October 21 "unofficially" (IO Files, document US/A/42). Also on October 24, in a general conversation with Mr. Raynor, Mr. Michael Tandy of the British Delegation "... wondered what we would think of the substitution of India for Syria on the Security Council slate. I was non-committal". (IO Files, document US/A/66) Mr. Tandy in a conversation on the same date informed Mr. Robert McClintock of the United States Delegation "... in confidence that the British were considerably disturbed by the pretensions of India for a seat on the Security Council. He said the British were fearful that if they did not acquiesce to the Indian claim 'the Indian Delegation would throw itself in the arms of the Soviet bloc'. Mr. Tandy said that the British Delegation had assumed that if India were to be sponsored for membership in the Security Council it would automatically replace Belgium as a candidate." (IO Files, document US/A/49).

The Government of India broached its candidacy officially to the Department of State on October 23 when Sir Girja Bajpai, Indian Agent General, called on the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson). Mr. Henderson in his memorandum of conversation recorded that after Sir Girja had stated the position of the Government of India that "Sir Girja then said that he
Council instead of Belgium. He said that the British had explained this to Mr. Spaak. He added that they had made no commitments to the Indians for next year in case they were defeated this year on the basis that to support them next year would almost be to sabotage the then candidacy of Canada. He also told me that the British Delegation had expressed preference for Poland rather than White Russia for the ECOSOC. He also informed me that he understood Greece had been campaigning among the Latin American Delegations with some success.

He informed me that the British Delegation had discussed at some length whether or not it would be wise to approach the Soviets with the objective of attempting to reach an agreement on the Council slates. He said their decision had been not to attempt this as success would seem very unlikely and it did not seem to them that any very good purpose would be served by such an attempt. He said they felt that it should be unnecessary in view of the Assembly's Rules of Procedure which eliminate nominations from the floor and provide for secret balloting. He did say that he had been instructed to inform the Soviets what the British views are on this matter and to solicit as a matter of information whatever views they might have on it.

[Here follows discussion of other matters.]

IO Files: US/A/82

Memorandum of Conversation, by Charles W. Yost of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] October 30, 1946.

Subject: Slates for the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council

I described to Mr. Novikov our projected slates for the vacant memberships on these Councils, emphasizing that these slates are

did not know what our position was and whether we had already committed ourselves to some other country to replace Egypt. Mr. Henderson said that it was not our policy definitely to commit ourselves prior to the elections in New York but that the Department had drawn up a provisional slate on which Syria tentatively appeared as a replacement for Egypt. He stated that our slate was drawn up at a time when we were unaware of India's possible candidacy and at a time when it appeared desirable to include an Arab country because of developments in that area. Mr. Henderson added that aside from the question of regionalism, we felt strongly that small nations should receive appropriate recognition on the Council in order to avoid the implication that the Council was being packed with large powers. He went on to say that India certainly could not be included in the category of small nations and that indeed India was on the verge of emerging even from the category of middle powers. He said, however, that there was nothing to prevent reconsideration of our tentative slate, that he appreciated the cogency of India's claim for membership, and that he would be glad to submit the Government of India's arguments for inclusion to the proper committee of the Department for consideration. (501.BC/10-2346 and IO Files, document US/A/56)

38 Kirill V. Novikov, Secretary General of the Soviet Delegation.
wholly tentative at this stage. Mr. Novikov said that the Soviet Delegation is considering this question within the next day or two and that he will let me know the Soviet preference as soon as Mr. Molotov’s decision is known. (It would appear from this and other indications that within the next day or two the Soviet Delegation may be going over its position on all the principal issues before the Assembly with the view to making decisions on these subjects before Mr. Molotov becomes involved in the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers.)

---

Minutes of the Thirteenth Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at New York, Hotel Pennsylvania, November 1, 1946, 9:00 a. m.

TOP SECRET

[Here follow list of names of persons (32) present, and Delegation discussion of first item on the agenda.]

Elections to the Security Council

Senator Austin requested Mr. Popper to report on the recent developments regarding the slates for the Security Council. Mr. Popper reported that the conversations were still in an exploratory stage. It was possible that other preferences would be secured within the next few days, at which time it may be necessary to have more definite decisions. He expected that the question would arise in Committee I at the end of next week. The United States slate was not changed from its previous slate of Belgium, Colombia and Syria.

Mr. Popper then read the following telegram of October 29 from Secretary Byrnes regarding the Greek candidacy:

"After thorough consideration of all factors involved I have concluded that it would be unwise under present conditions for us to support Greece for SC or ECOSOC. Although desirous of giving US support to Greek Government, I believe Greek membership on SC would not strengthen SC or our position therein and might prove embarrassing to Greece which has already been involved in two cases before SC and if elected would be in vulnerable position in cases involving other powers. Singling out Greece for re-election to ECOSOC would upset desirable geographic balance and would also violate principle of rotation of Council membership. Delegation may wish to consider Greek membership on any new bodies created by Assembly such as proposed Committee for Codification of International Law if size of that body permits or any new group that may be constituted to consider site matters.”

---

²⁹ M. M. Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister.
³⁰ Telegram 250 from the Department (501.8/B/10-2340).
³¹ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 525 ff.
Senator Vandenberg said that he had talked with the Secretary about this matter and it was agreeable to him to drop Greece from consideration for the Security Council. He stated that he simply wanted to say in extenuation that Mr. Herschel Johnson agreed with his point of view, but nevertheless the Senator would withdraw his previous suggestion that Greece should be considered.

Indian Candidacy

Mr. Popper reported that there was a strong tendency to support India for the Security Council developing among the United Kingdom and the Dominions and apparently also from Russia. The Indian Delegation had stated that it had twelve to fourteen votes for its candidacy for the Security Council.

Mr. Popper reported that the Delegation had been advised by the Department that if it was unprofitable to support Syria, India might be supported. However, it was not certain whether Belgium or Syria would have to give way to India if a change were necessary. He said that the Department was opposed to dropping Belgium because that would reduce the representation from Western Europe. He said that he thought that it would be better to drop Syria since both Syria and India were from the general middle-eastern region.

Mr. Wadsworth pointed out that it was true that India was tied to the Middle East in the organization of the Department of State and was geographically in somewhat the same area as Syria. However, he felt that the Middle East area itself was a very vital one and should have a representative on the Security Council. The only possible alternatives were Greece, Turkey and Iran. The same argument applied to all three possibilities, that they were under Russian pressure. The Turks did not want to have membership on the Security Council; therefore, the state must be an Arab state. Egypt was now on the Security Council and could not be reelected. Then the next best candidate was Syria. Moreover, Syria had the support of the other Arab states and also of many South Americans. Mr. El Khoury told Mr. Wadsworth that he had definite assurance of support from Gromyko. El Khoury had sent his men to talk with each of the Eastern European bloc and found that each had instructions to vote for Syria. Mr. Wadsworth thought that the tide was running to support Syria and India and drop Belgium.

---

42 The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations.

43 Reference may be made to telegram 252, October 29 from the Department (501 BC/10-2946) and memorandum of telephone conversation between Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs Hiss (in Washington) and Mr. John C. Ross of the Delegation Staff (in New York), October 31 (501 BC/10-2946), neither printed.

44 Mr. Faris al-Khoury, Head of the Syrian Delegation.

45 Andrei A. Gromyko, Representative on the Soviet Delegation.
Mr. Villard said that he agreed entirely with Mr. Wadsworth. He thought the Delegation should stick to Syria. He saw no valid reason for putting up India as a candidate. He noted that it was Russia that was interested in putting that country forward. He thought the reason for that was to eliminate a western state from the Security Council.

Mr. Dulles thought it would be a great mistake to switch from Belgium to India. The latter was a government groping toward independence and had a parlous domestic situation. It lacked a firm government that could speak with effectiveness. Moreover, it was much more apt to be in the Soviet bloc than was Belgium. He noted that at lunch with Mr. Novikov the latter had said that he wanted India on the Sub-Committee on Trusteeship Agreements. Mr. Bloom added that the Russians had suggested in this connection that India would be acceptable to the Arab states.

Mr. Wadsworth said that Mr. El Khoury had come to see him late the previous evening to say that he had talked with the Indians, who had assured him that India was not a candidate if it meant displacing Syria. India wished to replace Belgium or Colombia. Thus, Mr. Wadsworth said, all the countries in that part of the world agreed that Syria was the best choice.

Senator Connally stated that he was all for the Indians, but noted that the lack of experience of India as a nation and its large amount of trouble at home made it questionable for the Security Council. He thought a nation should learn to walk before it tried to run. He did not think that Belgium should be kept off the Security Council.

Mr. Sandifer pointed out that the Delegation had received a telegram from the Department stating that it still supported the slate and wished the Delegation to continue to support it as long as possible. The Department was definitely opposed to India.

Senator Austin inquired whether anyone wished to propose a change in the Security Council slate. Hearing no motion, he declared that the slate remain unchanged.

Memorandum of Conversation, by Adlai E. Stevenson, Alternate Representative on the United States Delegation to the General Assembly

SECRET

Yesterday Gromyko asked for a frank discussion of slates for ECOSOC and advanced Russia's emphatic wish for the reelection of Yugoslavia and the election of Byelorussia to succeed the Ukraine. I asked him what priorities he had in the event we could not support both and he refused to express himself but obliquely suggested that if we would support Poland and Byelorussia they might be satisfied.
He also indicated that if he could count on our support for two candidates for ECOSOC they would go along with our slate for the Security Council.

I told Gromyko that I would report the United States position to him at an early date.

He assured me again that his Delegation had not yet discussed the question of permanent headquarters and that he would communicate with me as soon as they had, which he suspected would be early next week.\footnote{For documentation on this subject, see pp. 60 ff.}

---

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Randolph Harrison of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] November 4, 1946.

Dr. van Roijen, of the Netherlands Delegation, telephoned me this morning to say that as the result of a Netherlands Delegation meeting this morning, and pursuant to instructions received from The Hague, it had been decided that the Netherlands definitely desired to be a candidate for a seat on ECOSOC rather than to try for a seat on the Trusteeship Council. Dr. van Roijen added, however, that the Netherlands Delegation did not wish to put forward their candidacy for a seat on ECOSOC unless they were sure of a reasonable chance of success. They particularly wish to know whether they could expect support from the various Latin American Delegations. He said that he would very much appreciate information from the American Delegation along those lines as soon as possible.

---

Memorandum of Conversation, by G. Hayden Raynor of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] November 4, 1946.

I inquired of Mr. Tandy during the course of a conversation today if the British are still supporting India for the Security Council. He replied that they are; that they have no alternative. He added, however, that they felt the election of India is quite unlikely and that they had told this to the Indians. He also confirmed the information that on their first vote the British will vote for India, rather than for Belgium.

He also confirmed information from other sources that Belgium is now completely ready to accept the responsibility of membership on the Security Council. This is the first admission to this effect from
the British of what we had already learned from the Belgians
themselves.

TO Files: US/A/118

Memorandum by Henry S. Villard of the United States Delegation
Staff of Advisers to the Principal Adviser (Sandifer) and Interested
Political Officers

SECRET

[NY, November 8, 1946.

Subject: Arab Slate for Councils Elections

1. Mr. Wadsworth and I have been informed, last evening and
today, that the Arab Delegations, having received appropriate instruc-
tions, have decided unanimously that their candidates are:

- Syria, for Security Council
- Lebanon, for ECOSOC
- Iraq, for Trusteeship Council

2. The Egyptian Ambassador to the United States, speaking as
"the Senior Arab Representative to the United States", made special
point of saying he would go all out to plead full election of this slate.
Adding that he "was sacrificing an interest of his own country" in
thus supporting Lebanon, he urged that that State was a far more
logical choice than the Netherlands for ECOSOC, Belgium being
already a member. The Netherlands, he felt would wait until next
year when Belgium went off, thus maintaining continuity of repre-
sentation of the Belgian-Netherlands economic union.

3. Mr. Wadsworth and I gather anew that there will be extensive
small-power support for this Arab slate, despite any preference we
may express to the contrary, unless such expression of preference
carry with it strongly expressed definitive opposition to a specifically-
named state on the Arab slate. Our understanding of the Department's
views is that no such opposition is to be expressed.

TO Files: US/A/124

Memorandum of Conversation, by G. Hayden Raynor of the United
States Delegation Staff of Advisers

SECRET

[NY, November 8, 1946.

Subject: Slates

During a conversation with Mr. Gore-Booth this afternoon at Lake
Success I told him that our proposals which had hitherto been de-
scribed as tentative were now firm. He indicated that the British were
in agreement with us with the exception of India rather than Belgium
initially for the Security Council. They will undoubtedly support

*Mahmoud Hassan.
India as long as there is a chance for her to be elected, and if and when
that should be foreclosed they will switch to Belgium.

I believe there is some doubt as to Uruguay in their mind, inasmuch
as Mr. Gore-Booth seemed a bit depressed when I suggested that we
were not too pleased over the efforts being made by Argentina in this
matter.

IO Files: US/A/135

Minutes of Informal Meeting of Certain Political Officers of the
United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

SECRET

[NYORK.] November 13, 1946.

Participants: Messrs. Sandifer
    Dawson
    Wadsworth
    Raynor
    Hall
    Allen
    Popper

An informal meeting was held on November 13, to discuss the pros-
lpects of election for our slate for the Economic and Social Council,
which we felt to be growing dimmer as a result of developments during
the last few days.  

—This refers to the growing success of the Lebanese candidacy for election to
the Economic and Social Council (see Villard memorandum of November 8, p. 222)
and the dimming prospects for the election of Uruguay to the Latin American va-
cancy on that organ. The Latin American candidacy had been subject to a growing
confusion arising out of the contending aspirations of three other candidates—
Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela, and the apparent inability to agree upon one
candidate. The confusion was further heightened by a vigorous campaign by
Argentina: and by the apparent withdrawal on October 31 of Uruguay (despite
Uruguayan disclaimers). In a caucus of Latin American delegations for a further
discussion of Economic and Social Council candidacies on November 13 Mexico
and Venezuela received six votes each, Argentina four votes and Uruguay none.
(See IO Files, documents US/A/94, 101, 103, 113 and 132)

The Uruguayan situation was a source of anxiety for the United States Delega-
tion. Ambassador Davison had minced Senator Austin on November 1 regarding
the problem: “Unfortunately, the Uruguayans have been lamentably inactive in
pushing Uruguay’s candidacy in spite of the strong encouragement we have given
them . . . I inquired of Blanco [Juan Carlos Blanco, Head of the Uruguayan
Delegation] why he or members of his delegation did not take a more active part
in furthering Uruguay’s candidacy, adding that, as he knew, we had gone to con-
siderable lengths in making known our sympathetic attitude. After some urging
on my part, he said that he would talk with some of the other Latin American
diplomats and particularly with those who are members of the Washington diplo-
matic corps and consequently his close personal friends.” (IO Files, document
US/A/90) In reporting a conversation with Señor Blanco that took place on
November 4 Ambassador Dawson informed Senator Austin: “In the course of our
conversation, Blanco intimated that the United States had not taken a sufficiently
strong stand in backing Uruguay’s candidacy. I took sharp issue with him and
asked him if he were not aware of our circular telegram [see circular telegram of
October 1 p. —]. He said that he knew of this but that he thought we could have
gone further, particularly here in New York, in inducing countries claiming prior
commitments to support Uruguay . . . I told him that he must realize that we
cannot impose a candidacy or exert pressure and that it was my opinion that we
had gone considerably further in the case of Uruguay than we could probably do
normally.” (IO Files, document US/A/103)
It was pointed out that there was a danger that the Netherlands and New Zealand might not be elected as the candidates of Yugoslavia and Lebanon for reelection were pushed, particularly since the Arab States might not support the Netherlands. It was also noted that no Latin American State might be elected if the American representatives did not reach an agreement on the Latin American candidate they should all support. The desirability of such an agreement from our point of view was stressed. Some disagreement was expressed with the conduct of the Uruguayans in the campaign, first because of their apathy and later because of their tendency to seek outside support by agreeing to vote for candidates not on our slate.

Those present agreed that it was of first importance that we secure all possible support for the Netherlands, New Zealand and Turkey. It was agreed specifically that the Uruguayans should be approached with this in view, in the light of their apparent commitment to the Lebanon. It was remarked that some other Latin American States might have made a similar commitment in seeking support for their candidacies. It was noted that the only way in which our favored candidates—including, of course, ourselves—could be supported under these circumstances would be for such Latin American States to drop the single Soviet satellite included on our slate and to vote for the Lebanon instead.

There was considerable discussion of our attitude toward the Lebanese candidacy. Mr. Wadsworth explained the view of the Arab States that one of their number should be represented on each United Nations Council and stressed the special importance of ECOSOC in linking the Arab States with the United Nations and assisting in the advancement of our Middle Eastern policies. He suggested that the Arab States might have a better claim on our support for one seat than the Latin Americans for their fourth seat on the Council, even though Syria was on our slate for the Security Council.

Mr. Sandifer and Ambassador Dawson remarked that it would be impossible even to intimate that we would not support a fourth Latin American State for election to ECOSOC. Mr. Sandifer also stated that while the Arab States should have proper representation in the organization as a whole, this did not mean that an Arab State must necessarily sit constantly on ECOSOC. It was noted that the Arab representation on the ECOSOC commissions was very satisfactory. Mr. Sandifer also stated that the basic decision on the slate had been made in the Department earlier, and that no changes in the slate could be considered here. Reference was also made to the undesirability of reelecting any member of ECOSOC other than the Big Five.

On this matter Mr. Wadsworth said that the Arab State representatives regarded the Lebanon as the best candidate to act in their com-
mon interest, but that if the reelection feature were the only undesirable element in the situation the Arab States would probably agree to substitute Egypt. As to our attitude with regard to the Lebanese candidacy, Mr. Wadsworth said that he was informing the Arabs that we were not supporting Lebanon but were not opposing its election. He was opposed to the exercise of any pressure in this connection.

501.BB/11-1646

Memorandum by John C. Ross, Senior Adviser to the United States Delegation, to the Political Officers  

SECRET  


The question of whether there should be any change in the Department’s slates for the elections coming up on Tuesday has been reconsidered in the Department and the decision reached that there should be no change in our present slates.  

It follows, therefore, that all of the political officers and others concerned should campaign actively among the other delegations in support of our slates with particular reference to Belgium for the Security Council.

IO Files: US/A/M (Chr.)/22  

Minutes of the Twenty-Second Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at New York, Hotel Pennsylvania, November 19, 1946, 9 a.m.  

SECRET  

[Here follow list of names of persons present (31), and discussion concerning the first item in a Delegation consideration of the agenda for plenary sessions of the General Assembly projected for that day.]

49 On November 19 the members and staff of the Delegation were informed in a Delegation memorandum dated November 18 that the Latin American delegations at a morning meeting on November 18 had definitely settled the question of a Latin American candidacy for ECOSOC with a unanimous decision to support Venezuela, after Mexico had withdrawn (IO Files, document US/A/149).  

50 For the names of the thirteen officers who were assigned to the United States Delegation as Political Officers, see footnote 65, p. 41.
Council Elections

Mr. Sandifer expected that the greater part of the session would be taken up with the elections to the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. He recalled that the United States slate for the Security Council was Belgium, Colombia, and Syria. It appeared from present evidence that the latter two would be elected on the first ballot. Other contenders included India, and there was just a possibility that it might be elected on a second ballot. In any case, the United States would continue to support Belgium unless some drastic change in the situation arose on the floor. Senator Austin inquired who might determine how the vote should be cast in that event. Mr. Sandifer replied that Senator Austin should make that decision with the advice of the Political Officers. Senator Austin stated that this matter was settled.

Mr. Sandifer recalled that the United States slate for the Economic and Social Council included the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Venezuela, and Turkey. He noted that Lebanon was a strong contender.

[Here follow brief discussion of two other items and a lengthy review of the troops question then pending before the First Committee.]

501.BB/11-1946: Telegram

Senator Austin to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, November 19, 1946—11 p. m. [Received 11:33 p. m.]

828. Elections held in General Assembly plenary session today to choose three members of Security Council and six members of ECOSOC \(^{51}\) produced following results:

Colombia, Syria, and Belgium were elected to Security Council on first ballot, gaining 51, 45, and 43 votes, respectively. The unsuccessful candidates were India (13 votes), Norway (4 votes), and Canada, Cuba, Greece, and Turkey with one vote a piece.

Only four of the six ECOSOC posts were filled in course of four ballots held after Security Council election. In the first ballot, with 36 of the 54 votes cast as the necessary majority, the US, Venezuela, and New Zealand were elected, with 51, 46, and 44 votes, respectively. Lebanon received 41 votes on the second ballot and was declared elected. In the third and fourth ballots, taken after a luncheon recess, no candidate received the requisite two-thirds majority of the 52 votes

\(^{51}\) For General Assembly proceedings on the balloting at the two meetings on November 19, see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, Second Part, Plenary Meetings, pp. 975 ff.; hereafter cited as GA(1/2), Plenary.
cast. General Assembly President Spaak thereupon postponed subsequent voting until the next plenary meeting, which a member of the Secretariat indicated would be held on December 6.

Voting for the remaining eligible candidates in the first four ballots is shown in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1st ballot</th>
<th>2nd ballot</th>
<th>3rd ballot</th>
<th>4th ballot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>(elected)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byelorussian SSR</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>(eliminated)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Poland attempted to withdraw in favor of Yugoslavia after the first ballot, but Spaak held that this was not possible under the General Assembly rules of procedure.

On the first ballot, the US voted for itself, Venezuela, New Zealand, The Netherlands, Turkey and Poland. On the second ballot, the US switched its support from Poland to the Byelorussian SSR, acting in accordance with Dept’s position paper SD/A 31, of August 6, 1946. After the second ballot, USDel, following consultation with advisers and political officers, decided to vote for the Byelorussian SSR and The Netherlands for the two posts remaining to be filled. Byelorussian SSR was supported on the ground that it was important to give one seat to the eastern group, two of whose members are currently retiring from ECOSOC. The Netherlands was supported rather than Turkey because, after the election of Lebanon, this seemed most nearly in accord with the basis upon which our original slate had been selected and because it seemed undesirable from the standpoint of geographical distribution to elect a second Middle Eastern state to the Council. (Before the elections, commitments had been made to support both The Netherlands and Turkey).\(^{52}\)

During the luncheon recess, this information was communicated to the Turkish Ambassador, who stated that he considered the US still bound by its commitment and any departure therefrom a violation of our pledge. As the General Assembly was just about to reconvene for its 4 p.m. session when this news was received, Senator Austin telephoned directly to the Secretary,\(^{53}\) and under his instructions voted on

---

\(^{52}\) During the luncheon recess and between the two plenary meetings this Delegation decision was communicated to the following by Mr. Raynor in separate conversations: Mr. Paul Gore-Booth of the British Delegation, Mr. Escott Reid of the Canadian Delegation, Minister Harry Andrews of the South African Delegation, Mr. Paul Hasluck of the Australian Delegation, and Minister Eriksson of the Swedish Delegation (501.BB/11-1946).

\(^{53}\) See footnote 67, p. 287.
the third and fourth ballots for Turkey rather than The Netherlands, and voted for the Byelorussian SSR for the second remaining vacancy.

During the luncheon recess Gromyko had asked Senator Austin for the support of US Del for Byelorussia and Yugoslavia. After the telephone conversation with the Secretary and before the third ballot, the Senator told Gromyko that we would vote for Byelorussia but that we would not be able to vote for Yugoslavia.

AUSTIN

---

IO Files: US/A/152

Memorandum of Conversation, by Randolph Harrison of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] November 20, 1946.

Participants: Mr. Fack of the Netherlands Delegation

Mr. van Roijen, of the Netherlands Delegation

Mr. Randolph Harrison

Both Mr. van Roijen and Mr. Fack, of the Netherlands Delegation, sought me out to express their deep concern and disappointment over the action of the United States in withdrawing its support from the Netherlands for a seat on the ECOSOC. Mr. Fack said that losing the vote of the United States was bad enough in itself, but since the act of the United States was generally known due to newspaper publicity, he felt that it would undoubtedly influence other nations to withdraw their support from the Netherlands. Mr. van Roijen and Mr. Fack both expressed the earnest hope that the decision of the United States on this subject was not final and that it would reinstate the Netherlands in its slate.

---

4 Mr. Raynor records the following in a memorandum of November 19: "Following Senator Austin's conversation with the Secretary, and in accordance with the Senator's express instructions, I told Dr. van Roijen [of the Netherlands Delegation] that because of a commitment to Turkey we had found it necessary on the next ballot [the third ballot] not to vote for the Netherlands. I explained to Dr. van Roijen that up to this point we had been informing other Delegations that we were voting for the Netherlands and that the time of receiving these instructions did not permit us to inform others of this change. I stated that on the next ballot, in my opinion, this would mean the loss of only one vote to them and should not in itself do any particular harm to their candidacy. I explained, of course, that this decision had nothing whatsoever to do with our relations and high regard for the Netherlands but had been dictated by other broad considerations which he could appreciate. He was most courteous but obviously the information came to him as a serious shock and disappointment." (501.BB/11-1946)
Memorandum of Telephone Conversations, by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss)

[WASHINGTON,] November 20, 1946.

As a result of the discussion in the morning meeting in Mr. Acheson’s office I called Mr. Ross and gave him the following information.

It had been the general consensus of the discussion this morning that the United States should support both Turkey and the Netherlands for the remaining two seats on the Economic and Social Council and should, therefore, drop its support for Byelo-Russia. There was unanimity in the recognition of the strategic importance of Turkey and it was felt essential that the United States should, therefore, continue its support for Turkey. Mr. Clayton pointed out the economic importance of the Netherlands, emphasizing especially that the Netherlands could be counted on as a supporter of our important trade policy. A comparison of economic importance between the Netherlands and Byelo-Russia demonstrated the desirability of the Netherlands, which had just ceased to be a member of the Security Council, being elected to the Economic and Social Council. It was recognized that if we cease to continue our support of Byelo-Russia a probable consequence will be that Byelo-Russia will not be elected and this in turn would mean an unbalance as between regions. (The eastern European region was overbalanced last year because of the unexpected election of Yugoslavia as well as the anticipated election of the Ukraine. Election of the Netherlands and Turkey would mean no eastern European state elected this year. The only eastern European states which would then be on the Council for the next year would be Czechoslovakia and the U.S.S.R.) It was suggested that in as much as the eastern European region had been overrepresented to the extent of one state last year it would redress the balance to have them underrepresented to the extent of one state this year. It was, however, further recognized that Senator Austin had made a commitment to Gromyko yesterday to support Byelo-Russia. It was not clear whether this commitment had been fully complied with by our votes of yesterday or whether it represented a continuing commitment. In any event we had earlier committed ourselves to support Turkey and the Netherlands.

---

55 For documentation on this subject, see pp. 1260 ff.
Mr. Acheson's decision, which he wished communicated to New York, was that while the consensus of the Department's views was that we should support Turkey and the Netherlands the effect of dropping our support for Byelo-Russia upon the Council of Foreign Ministers' negotiations should be considered. In view of the fact that Senator Austin will be consulting the Secretary further on this whole subject, it was suggested that a final decision should be left to the Secretary who would naturally be in the best position to take into account all the over-all factors.

Subsequently Mr. Ross called me back and said that he was at the moment with Senator Austin who had been considering the Economic and Social Council elections situation in the light of the Department’s views as I had earlier conveyed them to Mr. Ross. Mr. Ross said that the Senator considers his commitment to Gromyko of yesterday is a continuing one and not limited simply to the ballots taken yesterday. He said that the Senator feels it would damage his relations with the Soviet Delegation for the United States forthwith to cease its support of Byelo-Russia. Consequently the Senator would like to propose to the Secretary the following procedure: The Senator would inform the Turkish, Dutch and Soviet Delegations, and other delegations also, that we had intended on the fifth vote to vote for Turkey and Byelo-Russia as we had done on the third and fourth ballots. He would then say further that we plan to continue with that program on the fifth vote when it is taken but that if another ballot or ballots were required we will in such ballots vote for Turkey and the Netherlands. Mr. Ross said the Senator felt this would put all parties concerned on notice as to our intentions.

After talking to Mr. Acheson I called Senator Austin and said Mr. Acheson had asked me to convey the Department’s views on this as follows: The Senator knows the shading of his commitment to Gromyko. In view of his feeling that a procedure of the kind he has suggested is necessary under the terms of his commitment and to preserve his relations with the Soviet Delegation, we are prepared to go along and would not object to this proposal being recommended to the Secretary by Senator Austin. However, if it were not for Senator Austin’s commitment, we would prefer to have us in the next ballot vote for Turkey and the Netherlands. The Senator said that he would convey this message to the Secretary and would talk with the Secretary about the matter.

* The Secretary of State was in New York at this time attending the current session of the Council of Foreign Ministers; see vol. II, pp. 965 ff.
Memorandum of Conversation, by John C. Ross, Senior Adviser to the United States Delegation

SECRET


Following my telephone conversation with Mr. Hiss on the question of election to the Economic and Social Council slates I went over the points we had discussed with Senator Austin.

Senator Austin felt that to drop Byelorussia at this time would be embarrassing to him in view of the commitment which he had given to Ambassador Gromyko to support Byelorussia.

Gromyko had urged that the United States support Yugoslavia and Byelorussia. The Senator had indicated we could not support Yugoslavia but would support Byelorussia. Following his telephone conversation with the Secretary just before the four o'clock session of the Assembly yesterday when it was decided that the United States would support Turkey and Byelorussia, the Senator had gone to Mr. Gromyko and confirmed that we would not support Yugoslavia but would support Turkey and Byelorussia.

The Senator and I then tried to find a formula that would give him a fair release from his commitment to Gromyko and which would, at the same time, give some encouragement to the Dutch in line with the views developed in the Department this morning.\(^2\) It occurred to us that these objectives might be accomplished if we were to make it known to the Russians, the Turks, and the Dutch that on the next (fifth) ballot we would again vote for Turkey and Byelorussia but that if this ballot should again result in a stalemate we would then vote for Turkey and the Netherlands, dropping Byelorussia at this point. If instead of resulting in a stalemate one of these three countries should be elected on the fifth ballot, then we would determine in the light of the circumstances which of the remaining two countries we would vote for.

\(^2\) The following is recorded in a memorandum by Mr. Ward P. Allen, a Political Officer on the Delegation Staff, of a conversation with Ambassador Vlad Popovich, Representative on the Yugoslav Delegation, on November 26: "... Ambassador Popovich stated that he assumed that the United States was still opposed to Yugoslavia. He remarked that it would be unfair to oppose her and favor Turkey in view of the latter's well-known neutrality during the war... Reaffirming our support for Byelorussia, it was suggested to him that where the United States had to choose among Yugoslavia, Netherlands and Turkey for the remaining post, he could understand that we would naturally favor either of the other two, with whom our relations were excellent and with whom no trouble had arisen concerning airplanes or other matters." (10 Files, document US/A/160) See vol. vi, pp. 367 ff., regarding these references.

\(^3\) See memorandum of telephone conversations, supra.
We then discussed this briefly with Mr. Sandifer and I discussed this on the telephone with Mr. Hiss. He in turn discussed this proposal with Mr. Acheson and called back, speaking to Senator Austin and telling him that Mr. Acheson’s reaction was that if the Senator felt that this proposal was the wisest one in view of the tactical situation then the Department would certainly go along. However, Mr. Acheson felt, subject of course to the Senator’s views and the Senator’s discussion with the Secretary, that the conclusions reached earlier in the morning as stated in my memorandum of conversation with Mr. Hiss were probably sound.

Senator Austin then telephoned Secretary Byrnes. He read to the Secretary my memorandum of conversation with Mr. Hiss and then explained, as stated above, the nature of his commitment to Gromyko. He then indicated the possible way out and the reaction which Mr. Acheson had to this proposal.

The Secretary made it very clear that despite the conclusions and reasons developed in the Department earlier this morning, he was perfectly clear in his own mind that the decision he had made yesterday for us to support Turkey and Byelorussia was the right one. He made it clear that the considerations he had in mind outweigh those advanced with regard to dropping Byelorussia in order to restore the Netherlands.

With reference to what our position should be after the next ballot the Secretary felt that we should not make any statement indicating that we would then support Turkey and the Netherlands. He said this would be too inflexible and would involve a commitment which we might find it difficult to get out of. He said that we might let it be known that our commitments would stand only for the next ballot. He said that if conditions then change we wouldn’t consider ourselves bound. He felt that the Senator should hold himself free.

The Secretary felt that we should inform the Turks, the Dutch, the Russians and the Byelorussians where we stand. He did not seem to feel there was much point in taking the initiative in spreading our position among other delegations, although it was my impression that he felt if other delegations should ask us our position we should be free to state it. In closing the conversation the Secretary said his reaction right now was to stick by Byelorussia, which remark, in its context, seemed to imply quite clearly that the Secretary felt we should stick by Byelorussia, not only on the next ballot but any succeeding ballot.
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss)

[WASHINGTON,] November 20, 1946.

Mr. Ross called me back and said that Senator Austin had talked with the Secretary and had informed him of the Department's views as set forth in a separate memorandum of conversation of today on the same subject. Mr. Ross said that the Secretary had not been impressed by the Department's arguments. The Secretary had decided that the Senator should tell the other delegations concerned that on the next ballot we will vote for Turkey and for Byelo-Russia and that thereafter we will consider ourselves as not being necessarily obligated to any delegation, reserving freedom of action to determine our vote after seeing the results of that ballot. The Secretary had emphasized the desirability of our maintaining the utmost flexibility. However, Mr. Ross said that it was clear from the Secretary's conversation with Senator Austin that the Secretary's mind is set in the direction of our continuing to support Turkey and Byelo-Russia. Mr. Ross had the impression that it would take considerable in the way of new developments to cause the Secretary to change his view on this.

Mr. Ross said that the Secretary left it to the discretion of Senator Austin as to how many other delegations should be informed of our position. Apparently the Secretary was aware of the fact that it would not be possible to keep our position a secret but had felt it was not desirable to make a public statement of the matter. Mr. Ross said the Secretariat is hoping that further plenary sessions can be postponed until December 6 in order to permit uninterrupted committee work. If further balloting is postponed until then there is certainly every likelihood of considerable inquiry developing on the part of other delegations and of the press as to the U.S. position.

Senator Austin plans to inform Dr. Van Kleffens \(^5^9\) at dinner tonight of our position and is sending a note today to Gromyko. In view of the fact that we will continue on the next ballot to support Turkey, the Senator is informing the Turkish Delegation indirectly (I assume through Mr. Villard and Mr. Wadsworth).

\(^5^9\) Dr. E. N. van Kleffens, Deputy Head of the Netherlands Delegation to the General Assembly and Netherlands Representative on the Security Council.
SECRET


If the Netherlands is not elected to the Economic and Social Council, it may be desirable, by way of compensation, to support the Netherlands for the Trusteeship Council whenever that agency is set up. It will be recalled that the Netherlands Delegation at one stage indicated that it might be inclined to stand for the Trusteeship Council rather than the Economic and Social Council.

The successful conclusion of the negotiations with the Indonesians might provide a more favorable atmosphere for the Netherlands candidacy on the Trusteeship Council than would previously have been the case.\(^61\)

I would suggest that we consider substituting the Netherlands for Denmark on our Trusteeship Council Slate. The Danes do not appear to have shown any special interest in a position of this sort, and we have had at least one bad experience with an unenthusiastic candidate.\(^62\) I believe the Netherlands could make at least as good a contribution to the work of the Trusteeship Council as the Danes, and I think it very desirable from our point of view that the Netherlands should not be excluded completely from the United Nations Councils.

An alternative possibility would be to substitute the Netherlands for Egypt. This could be justified on the ground the Arab states were already represented on both the Security Council and ECOSOC, and on the ground that it is not politically expedient for us to support an Arab state for the Trusteeship Council in view of the Palestine situation.\(^63\) In this connection it should be noted that, a few days ago, the Arab states agreed that Iraq would be their candidate for this council. We have always considered Iraq unacceptable.

---

501.BD/11-2146

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson)


Mr. Reuchlin, Counselor of the Netherlands Embassy, came in to see me at his request today and made an eloquent plea for U.S. support

\(^60\) Addressed to Messrs. Sandifer, Ross, and Raynor.

\(^61\) For documentation on the situation in the Netherlands East Indies, see vol. viii, pp. 787 ff.

\(^62\) This refers to the earlier United States support of Uruguay for a position on the Economic and Social Council described in preceding pages.

\(^63\) For documentation on this subject, see vol. vii, pp. 576 ff.
for the Netherlands in the pending election of states to the Economic and Social Council. In addition to an excellent restatement of Netherlands general qualifications on economic grounds for the place, Mr. Reuchlin stated that there were important political reasons why the United States should support the Netherlands. He said that the U.S. Government is interested in seeing the Netherlands Parliament approve the recently initialled agreement with the Indonesian leaders and he fears that if we do not support the Netherlands for ECOSOC, it may cost the agreement votes in Parliament. I told Mr. Reuchlin that I felt that the Netherlands had an excellent case for membership on general grounds but that his complicated political arguments frankly left me a little cold.

I told Mr. Reuchlin that last night Senator Austin had informed Mr. Van Kleffens that the U.S. would vote for Turkey and Byelorussia on the next ballot and that thereafter we would consider ourselves completely free to vote in any way we considered wise. Mr. Reuchlin brightened perceptibly and said that he assumed that this meant that we would vote for the Netherlands. I replied that his assumption was incorrect; that the statement meant exactly what it said and that our vote would depend upon circumstances at the moment.

JOHN HICKERSON

IO Files: US/A/154

Memorandum by George Wadsworth, Minister to Syria and Lebanon and Adviser on the United States Delegation Staff

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] November 21, 1946.
Subject: Turkey’s Candidacy for Economic and Social Council

The Turkish Ambassador, after calling by special appointment this morning on Senator Austin regarding the subject noted above, called on me with a view to asking that I make careful memorandum of his views in the matter.

It was, he said, a matter to which he attached “much importance”; he had spoken “frankly and in all sincerity” with Senator Austin. He had marshalled his ideas clearly and presented them substantially as follows:

“Turkey appreciates highly American support for a seat on ECO SOC; but, in all frankness, there appears to be a contradiction between principle and practice in extending such support. In practice two

---

64 For documentation on this subject, see vol. viii, pp. 787 ff.
65 Addressed to Senator Austin, Mr. Ross, and the Political Officers.
66 Mr. Huseyin Ragip Baydur, Head of the Turkish Delegation.
wrongs have been done Turkey, one before the elections of last Tuesday and the other during the balloting.

“The result of the second wrong was that Turkey was not elected. It had received 30 votes on the first ballot, 33 on the second. Only 3 more were needed for the election. It was American action and only American action which prevented Turkey receiving on the third ballot well over the 36 votes needed for election.

“To explain these two wrongs:

“The first was when in the thinking of the American Delegation, the seat held by Greece was considered to be a European seat. The elections in London had given two seats to Near Eastern countries, Greece and Lebanon. Turkey posed its candidature for the Greek seat. This was told the Department of State several weeks ago. We thought at the time, as apparently did the Department, that Egypt would be the Arab candidate to replace Lebanon.

“What later happened seems to have been that the American Delegation decided not to support Lebanon for reelection and, consequently, to support Turkey for the Lebanese seat and the Netherlands for the Greek seat. But we were supporting an Arab state and the Arab states were supporting us. Obviously this could not be for the same seat. What the American Delegation did in fact do was to support us for a seat which did not exist. It was clear some time ago that an Arab state (Lebanon by choice of the Arab states) would hold that one seat. The American Delegation, in reality though not by intention, voted for two seats, Turkey and the Netherlands, for the Greek seat.

“What then should be American action in the face of the resulting situation? The essence of solution appears to lie in returning the Greek seat to its original setting. If this be done, the American and an ample number of other Delegations will support Turkey. This involves, of course, “dropping” the Netherlands; but, when a wrong is to be righted, the best approach is to return to first truths.

“Senator Austin has said that he will vote for Turkey on the next ballot; but he appears to feel that further than that he cannot commit himself. I feel that, if he adopts my premise, we shall be elected on that ballot; but I do not agree that, if there be need for further ballots, he should not support us all the way through.

“Elsewise, the American Delegation would simply be saving appearances: One vote for us, then a shift to Netherlands. If this were to become known, as these things do become known, the Netherlands election would be assured.

“Let us assume that Byelorussia is elected on the next ballot, with Turkey and Netherlands running a close second and third and Yugoslavia a poor fourth. Then, for the next balloting, Yugoslavia would have to drop out of the race; and it would be between Turkey and Netherlands. That is just the moment when support for Turkey would be most needed; when the issue as to Turkey’s succession to the Greek seat would have to be faced most squarely.

“Now for the second wrong. That was when, after the first two votes, members of the American Delegation spread the word—and I have it from several Latin-American colleagues—that it would vote for Netherlands and Byelorussia on the ground that Lebanon, a Near Eastern State having been elected, it felt it need no longer support Turkey.
"Fortunately, the wrong was partially righted by Mr. Villard's twelfth-hour intercession; but it came too late to do more than bring about the stalemate with which the Assembly was faced. We were saved, but not elected as would assuredly have been the case had the third vote not been prejudiced by the earlier circulated word of American renunciation of support for Turkey.

"What now should be done? The answer would seem to be the same as to the first question, i.e., support Turkey to the end and let it be known that that is to be done. Elsewise, an odd sort of conclusion would seem to be forced on us, i.e., that we would have a better chance of election were we to become a Soviet satellite.

"As a last comment, remember that the Russians asked you to support their satellite candidate. Did you ask that in return they support your candidate Turkey? We do not ask for the Russian vote, nor do we ask you to ask for it; but, were they to give it, it would prove that they can be amiable towards us, and that would be all to the good. We simply submit these thoughts for your consideration."

I assured the Ambassador that I had taken careful notes of his exposition and would prepare a memorandum thereof for Senator Austin and Mr. Henderson, as he had requested.

501.BB/11-2246

Memorandum by G. Hayden Raynor of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers to Senator Austin

SECRET

[NYORK.] November 22, 1946.

Subject: Economic and Social Council Elections

Our abandonment of the Netherlands is having a most unfortunate, although natural, reaction on them. Reports reaching us by the "grapevine" indicate that members of the Netherlands Delegation have been stating to other people that this illustrates that the United States can not be depended upon, that it is unfortunate that a friend who has proved himself a true friend should be thrown over because of pressures of a "nuisance type", and that they wonder if it is worth standing

6 No documentation is provided here on a sharp disagreement that arose at this time within the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers as to whether Mr. Henry S. Villard (Adviser, Political Officer, and within the Department the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs) was consulted in the Delegation's decision to drop Turkey from the United States slate on November 19 between the second and third ballots (memorandum by Mr. Popper, November 21, 501.BB/11-2146, and memorandum by Mr. Villard, November 25, 501.BB/11-2546). It is stated in Mr. Villard's memorandum that Senator Austin's decision to consult with the Secretary of State by telephone at that time was due to an intervention in the situation by Mr. Villard after he had had a talk with the Turkish Ambassador, a successful intercession in the event as the Secretary directed that Turkey's name be restored to the United States slate; see telegram S28, November 19, from New York, p. 226.
by a country if an unpredictable reaction of this type may be expected in return.

It is my opinion that our decision to vote for Byelorussia and Turkey on the next ballot is tantamount to the election on that ballot of Byelorussia, assuming that the Soviets are normally keen on the matter. If they do display normal keenness, they can be expected to concentrate the votes now distributed between Byelorussia and Yugoslavia in favor of Byelorussia and thus elect Byelorussia.

If this comes about the next ballot would then be between the Netherlands and Turkey. As I understand it, decision has already been made in favor of Turkey as between these two. If my analysis, therefore, is correct, as I see it we have already abandoned the Netherlands.

In view thereof I am raising in the Department the question as to whether it would be advisable to support the Netherlands for the Trusteeship Council. If this is done we must have a decision on a very firm basis because it would be even more than the goodwill of the Dutch can be expected to understand to repeat the ECOSOC experience on another Council election.

I think it is very important that we make a prompt decision as to what we will do on the second ballot. Until such decision is made I do not think it is wise for us to talk on this subject with other Delegations. In fact, I think that if we have indeed abandoned the Netherlands that it would be better to confine this act to ourselves alone and not damage the position of the Netherlands further by telling other Delegations of our action.

501.BB/11-2246: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Senator Austin

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 22, 1946—7 p.m.

293. For Gadel. Our reasons for preferring Netherlands to Byelorussia as candidate for ECOSOC are set out below for your consideration when subject is next discussed by Secretary and USDel:

(1) Among remaining candidates for three-year membership on ECOSOC, Netherlands is only state willing and able to collaborate wholeheartedly in creation and implementation of ITO, in our view, most important tasks to be undertaken by ECOSOC. (2) Netherlands has demonstrated unswerving fidelity to western democratic principles in all organs UN and Van Kleffens has made particularly notable contribution to work of SC. In view this record, failure of US to support Netherlands might have adverse reaction not only upon Netherlands but upon other small western European states as well.

ACHESON
Memorandum by G. Hayden Raynor of the United States Delegation
Staff of Advisers to Senator Austin

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] November 23, 1946.

Subject: ECOSOC Slate—The Netherlands

1. In addition to the reasons advanced in Department's 293 of November 22 for preferring Netherlands to Byelorussia with which I fully agree, I submit the local situation must also be taken into account. It is as follows:

   a. We have just as much of a commitment to the Netherlands as we have to Turkey or Byelorussia (I do not believe at this stage of balloting that we really have a commitment beyond the next ballot to anyone).

   b. The Netherlands "hat would not be in the ring" except for the fact that her name appeared on our slate.

   c. We have told other delegations from the beginning that the Netherlands was a candidate in whom we were especially interested.

   d. As late as during the luncheon recess on the day of the election we campaigned actively for the Netherlands.

   e. In addition to supporting our policy strongly over the past year in the Security Council and elsewhere, Netherlands has been one of our few supporters here in the General Assembly on such matters as Relief and Contributions to the Budget. It could have been counted on to go down the line with us on Spain (perhaps the only European state to do so).

2. I am not urging in view of decision already taken that we vote for the Netherlands rather than Turkey, but that if Byelorussia is not elected on the next ballot that on the following ballot we vote for the Netherlands rather than Byelorussia.

IO Files: US/A/158

Memorandum of Conversation, by Henry S. Villard of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] November 25, 1946.

Mr. Esin 68 approached me at Lake Success today in regard to our position on Turkey's candidacy for the Economic and Social Council. He expressed the strong hope that we would continue to support his country whether it took one or more ballots. I explained that we would

68 Seyfullah Esin, Adviser to the Turkish Delegation, Director-General of the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
certainly vote for Turkey on the next ballot but that our course of action after that, if further balloting were necessary, had not been finally decided.

Mr. Esin then said that he wished to urge the United States Delegation not to mention the position described above in conversation with members of other delegations. He said that the element of uncertainty as to our course of action following the fifth ballot would only cast doubt in the minds of those whose support Turkey was endeavoring to enlist in its candidacy. He referred particularly in this connection to the Latin American States, and said that the lack of a clear cut attitude on our part would only weaken Turkey’s case.

I assured Mr. Esin that the United States Delegation had in fact adopted a policy of not discussing its position on the two remaining Economic and Social Council seats pending final clarification of our intentions.

Mr. Esin also urged that when we had finally made up our minds on the slate, which he hoped would be to support Turkey all the way through, we would notify other delegations of our decision. He felt that this was especially important in the case of the Latin Americans, who would probably follow the United States’ lead and whose vote might well be the deciding factor in the situation.

Memorandum of Conversation, by Charles W. Yost of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

SECRET


Brigadier Williams⁶⁹ said that Mr. Spaak⁷⁰ and Mr. Lie⁷¹ are fearful that, unless some steps are taken informally to come to a general agreement on the Economic and Social Council slates, balloting will continue indefinitely without any substantial change in the situation resulting from the last ballot. They were hopeful that the United States, British and Soviet Delegations might come to some agreement which would result in the prompt election of one eastern European and one other state to the remaining seats on the Council. I told Brigadier Williams that as far as I knew no such informal arrangements as he mentioned had been made. I said that the United States position was very difficult, that our calculations had been upset by the unanticipated election of Lebanon and that we had made at least qualified commitments to both Turkey and the Netherlands. I

---

⁶⁹ Brigadier Williams was attached to the Office of the Secretary-General.
⁷⁰ Paul-Henri Spaak, President of the General Assembly.
⁷¹ Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations.
added, however, that it was my impression that our present intention is to vote for Byelorussia and Turkey on the next ballot, leaving to future developments our decision as to our subsequent course of action. Brigadier Williams said that he would continue his contacts with other Delegations and inform me of the results of these contacts. He said that he believed the Secretary-General might advise Mr. Spaak, if there were no final results from the next ballot, to postpone subsequent balloting until there had been a further opportunity for informal consultation among the Delegations.

He also said that he understood that there was some thought of proposing the Netherlands for a seat on the Trusteeship Council in order to console them for a possible defeat in the Economic and Social Council balloting. He, however, understood that the Netherlands did not desire a seat on the Trusteeship Council at this time, although they might wish to be a candidate for the Council in some future year.

501.BD/11-2746

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] November 27, 1946.

The Netherlands Ambassador called today to discuss US support for the election of the Netherlands to ECOSOC and to discuss informally the Netherlands-Indonesian Agreement. Dr. Loudon pointed out that he was in New York when it was learned that the US had abandoned its support for the Netherlands as a member of ECOSOC and that he had consequently instructed Mr. Daubanton and Mr. Reuchlin, his Ministers in Washington, to voice the protest of his country to the State Department. The Ambassador expressed official disappointment at our move and said that the Netherlands regarded itself as a more important nation economically than Turkey. I observed that the US fully appreciated the economic importance of the Netherlands and the support which the Netherlands was expected to give to our proposals for broadening the bases of world trade. I explained, however, that the election of Lebanon had confused our position since it left us with three candidates for two positions. I added that the matter was being handled personally by the Secretary and that it was my understanding that the Secretary was discussing our position with Senators Austin, Connally and Vandenberg this afternoon. I advised the Ambassador that if his Government wished to discuss the matter further it should be taken up in New York.

[Here follow personal remarks by Dr. Loudon about the Netherlands-Indonesian agreement.]
United States Delegation Position Paper

secret


U. S. SLATE FOR TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

1. The Problem

On October 22 the Delegation deferred action on the Trusteeship Council slate recommended by the Department of State pending developments in Committee 4. That slate consisted of Egypt, Denmark, and the Philippine Republic in the order named.

As the prospect now appears good for action on a sufficient number of trusteeship agreements \(^2\) to make it possible to establish the Council at this session of the Assembly, it is necessary to establish a slate which the Delegation will support in the election. The number of members to be elected will be either two or four depending upon the number of agreements approved.

2. Recommendations

(1) The following slate is proposed for consideration as a result of consultation among the Advisers principally concerned with this matter. The question is concurrently under consideration in the Department of State.

First seat—Iraq
Second seat—Netherlands, or Brazil, or Denmark
Third seat—Philippine Republic, or Brazil, or Denmark
Fourth seat—Brazil, or India, or a Soviet satellite

(2) If a full slate is not elected on the first two ballots the Delegation should be given authority to cast its vote in such a manner as to produce the closest possible approximation to our desired slate.

[3.] Discussion

(1) The substitution of Iraq for Egypt is based upon the decision of the Arab states to support Iraq as their candidate. The votes controlled by the Arab League may be important in securing the two-thirds majority in the Assembly necessary to approval of the trusteeship agreements.

(2) a. Support for the Netherlands has been suggested in the event that it is not elected to the Economic and Social Council and if it desires to be a candidate.

b. Brazil is an active contender for a seat on the ground of the contribution it could make to the Council as a Latin American state with experience in the administration of undeveloped tropical

\(^2\) For documentation on this subject, see post, pp. 544 ff.
 territory. It is believed that it could secure a number of votes in the Assembly for approval of the trusteeship agreements. Brazil will remain on the Security Council for another year.

c. Denmark is suggested because of the desirability of including a progressive country interested in equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters. The Danes have not been approached on this subject and have given us no indication that they would be interested in the post.

(3) The Philippine Republic, a newly independent state, has shown a consistent interest in trusteeship problems and desires a seat on the Council.

(4) In view of the heavy representation which the Western democracies will have on the Council, it might be desirable from the point of view of adequate balance to support India or a Soviet satellite. This might be particularly true if no Soviet satellite is elected to the Economic and Social Council this year.

501 BE/12–446

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

[WASHINGTON,] December 4, 1946.

Mr. Dulles \(^7\) called me from New York this morning and said that he had just learned from Senator Austin that consideration was being given to our supporting the Netherlands for the Trusteeship Council. He said that he understood the background of this proposal and appreciated the motives which lead to it; however, he said that he thought it would completely destroy the chances of getting the Trusteeship Council established at this session for the following reasons:

The Soviets, the Chinese, the Indians and others have been asserting that the proposed trusteeship agreements are merely devices by which the colonial powers will make the trust territories colonial dependencies. Consequently their tendency is to defeat approval of the trusteeship agreements unless the administering powers agree to far-reaching amendments. The proposed administering powers, in turn, are clearly not willing to go very far in accepting major changes. The strength of our position has been our insistence upon the desirability of some form of trusteeship supervision which can only be accomplished if agreements are approved and the Trusteeship Council established. We have pointed out that unless the agreements are approved there will be no international supervision. This, we say, should not be

\(^7\) John Foster Dulles, Alternate Representative on the United States Delegation and Representative of the United States on the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly (Trusteeship).
satisfactory to those claiming to be the chief advocates of the interests of dependent peoples.

Mr. Dulles says that if word gets around that we are going to support the Netherlands for membership on the Trusteeship Council this would assure the Council having a majority of the colonial powers and would let the Soviet-Chinese-Indian bloc oppose the approval of the agreements more effectively on the ground that no good could be expected from creation of such a Trusteeship Council in any event. Mr. Dulles said he felt so strongly about this point that he might have to drop out of representing us on trusteeship matters if we were to support the Netherlands for the Trusteeship Council. He said he had only just heard the point this morning and that he feels Senator Austin now thoroughly understands his views.

I explained to him that the Senator had been discussing this very point with the Secretary and that I did not know what, if any, decision the Secretary had reached. He said that he would himself get in touch with the Secretary.

I pointed out to Mr. Dulles that the proposed Netherlands action in granting autonomy to the East Indies had seemed to remove much of the stigma of their being a colonial power. Mr. Dulles disagreed and said that in the work of the Trusteeship Committee of the General Assembly the Netherlands have supported the colonial powers 100 percent, much more so that [than?] we ourselves have. Consequently they are in the Assembly completely identified with the colonial powers.

I said that I would call his views to the attention of others in the Department.

Mr. Dulles added that at the moment, unless some such development as our committing ourselves to support the Netherlands for the Trusteeship Council occurs, he is optimistic as to the prospects of establishing the Trusteeship Council at this session. Consequently he considers the issue a real and current one.

---

IO Files: US/A/M (Chr.)/32

Minutes of the Thirty-Second Meeting of the United States Delegation, Held at New York, Hotel Pennsylvania, December 5, 1946, 9:00 a.m.

SECRET

[Here follow list of names of persons present (28), and Delegation discussion of another subject.]

Trusteeship Council Slates

Mr. Sandifer recalled that in the previous discussion on the Trusteeship Council slates the decision had been postponed since it was not
certain that there would be a Trusteeship Council. Now, however, it appeared that a Council would be set up and our slate must be ready. He recalled that earlier the Department’s slate had been Egypt, Denmark and the Philippines. However, on later consideration, the following recommendation had been drawn up (US/A/169): *4

“2. Recommendations

(1) The following slate is proposed for consideration as a result of consultation among the Advisers principally concerned with this matter. The question is concurrently under consideration in the Department of State.

First seat—Iraq
Second seat—Netherlands, or Brazil, or Denmark
Third seat—Philippine Republic, or Brazil or Denmark
Fourth seat—Brazil, or India, or a Soviet satellite

(2) If a full slate is not elected on the first two ballots the Delegation should be given authority to cast its vote in such a manner as to produce the closest possible approximation to our desired slate.”

Mr. Dulles said that whether there were enough agreements negotiated to establish a Trusteeship Council depended largely upon what the Council was going to be like when it was set up. He said there would be a lot of log-rolling in order to get the agreements passed. It was very apparent that there was no desire to have a Trusteeship Council if it was to be dominated by the colonial powers. He pointed out that one-half of the Trusteeship Council was to consist of administering authorities and, since the Council operated by a majority vote, if another colonial power were added to the Council there would be a majority of colonial powers. He thought that if that kind of a Council were to be established there would be no Council for there would be no agreements concluded. Specifically, he thought, placing the Netherlands on the Council might prevent the creation of that body.

Mr. Dulles agreed that it was vital to have an Arab member on the Council in order to have the necessary agreements concluded, since the Arab bloc plus the Soviet bloc was an important factor. Iraq had handled itself very well in the Trusteeship Committee. Originally, he had opposed Iraq because of its attitude on Palestine but now he thought it was necessary to elect it to the Trusteeship Council.

Mr. Sandifer pointed out that Iraq was the choice of the Arab states.

Senator Austin noted that Brazil was very anxious to be elected. Mr. Dulles said that he would like to see Brazil on the Council. He noted that Mexico always voted with Russia in Committee IV. Ambassador Dawson noted that Brazil was the only country which had made a strong plea for membership. Mr. Gerg noted that Cuba was actively competing.

Mr. Dulles said that he favored the list in the position paper US/A/169 with the elimination of the Netherlands and also provided that there was a Latin American state which would bring to the United States position the votes it needed. Senator Austin commented that he thought that if Brazil were assured of our support it would work for the United States.

Mr. Sandifer pointed out that Brazil was on the Security Council and had another year to serve on that body. He thought that on the face of it, that raised the question as to whether it was desirable to give another Council seat to Brazil, or wanted to elect some other Latin American state. Mr. Dawson commented that Cuba and Peru were both possibilities, but they were both on the Economic and Social Council. He noted that Argentina was not pushing its candidacy.

Mr. Raynor said that he would be agreeable to eliminating the Netherlands, provided it was placed on the Economic and Social Council slate in the next ballot. He thought Mr. Dulles’ arguments were cogent for not supporting the Netherlands for the Trusteeship Council. He noted, in passing, that the reason the Netherlands had pushed its candidacy for the Economic and Social Council was because it had learned it was on the United States slate.

Senator Austin polled the Delegation on eliminating the Netherlands from the Trusteeship Council slate and this was unanimously approved.

Senator Vandenburg urged strongly that the Netherlands should be put on the Economic and Social Council slate, because he said the Netherlands was being thrown out the window in the Assembly’s selections. Senator Austin agreed, and said that the Delegation should think over whether it wished to substitute the Netherlands for Turkey or Byelorussia.

Mr. Dulles inquired when the information might be passed to Iraq that the United States would support it for the Trusteeship Council. Mr. Sandifer replied that he thought the Department could be consulted quickly during the morning. Mr. Dulles said that since he had given the Secretary a memorandum on the question, he thought that clearance could be quickly obtained. He requested that the matter of handling the tactics of informing the Iraq Delegation should be left to him and Mr. Wadsworth.

Senator Austin reported that Brazil came around to see him every day to inquire how he was progressing with the Brazilian Trusteeship Council candidacy.

Mr. Sandifer said he would like to have the Delegation’s reaction as to whether India or a Soviet satellite be supported for the fourth seat. Mr. Sandifer apologized for the use of the term “Soviet satellite” in Document US/A/169. Mr. Dulles thought the word “or” in the
phrase “India or a Soviet satellite” was superfluous. The choice for the third seat should also be decided between Denmark and the Philippines, Mr. Sandifer said.

Mr. Gerig pointed out that if the Strategic Area Agreements of the United States were approved, there would be four elected Members on the Trusteeship Council. In answer to Mr. Dulles’ question, he said that he thought the Assembly could elect members to fill those seats on a contingent basis.

Mr. Allison said that the Far East Office of the Department felt very strongly that the Philippines should be supported for a Trusteeship Council seat. If there were to be four elected members, the office would like the Philippines to have the third seat. The Department felt that the Philippine Republic should be included as a new country, recently free, and because the Far East was represented only by China. Also the Philippines badly wanted to be a member. Mr. Allison said that General Romulo frequently asked him about his candidacy.

Mrs. Roosevelt said that she would like to see Denmark rather than India on the Council. She thought the Philippines should be selected. Mr. Raynor said that he would like to see slate consisting of Denmark and the Philippines. Mrs. Roosevelt continued that the Danish Representative on Committee III was an extremely able person. She thought that the Danish background would be useful in the Trusteeship Council and that it would bring a healthy note to its discussions, whereas India would probably not do so.

Senator Austin polled the Delegation and secured unanimous approval for the Trusteeship Council slate as follows:

First seat: Iraq
Second seat: Brazil
Third seat: Philippine Republic
Fourth seat: Denmark

The meeting adjourned at 9:30 a.m.75

75 Ambassador Carlos P. Romulo, Head of the Philippines Delegation.

76 In telegram 928, December 5, 5:30 p.m., from New York, the tentative slate approved by the Delegation was named, a brief summary given of the Delegation’s discussion, and the Department’s “views on the subject” requested “at earliest convenience”. In the fourth paragraph of the telegram Senator Austin stated that “Although point was not specifically discussed, it is apparent that if a full slate has not been elected after the ballots, delegation should be given authority to cast its vote in such manner as to produce closest possible approximation to our desired slate.” (501.BE/12-548)

In telegram 308, December 6, 7 p.m., to New York; the Acting Secretary of State (Acheson) informed the Delegation that “Although preferring Philippines as candidate for one of first two seats, Department approves slate recommended in your para one on basis Delegation’s estimate of importance of proposed TrustCo [Trusteeship Council] slate to issue of obtaining wide GA support for approval of pending trusteeship agreements and consequent establishment TrustCo. . . Procedure outlined your para four is acceptable.” (501.BE/12-549)
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] December 6, 1946.

Senator Austin called me this morning and asked for my advice on the following three matters:

[Here follows discussion of the question of finding a site for the permanent headquarters of the United Nations.]

The second point on which he wished instructions was the question of our support of Turkey, the Netherlands or Byelo-Russia for a place on ECOSOC. He said that under the direction of Secretary Byrnes there had been transmitted to Turkey and Russia a statement of our intention to vote for Turkey and Byelo-Russia on the next ballot and then consider ourself free to take whatever course the situation convinces us we should take. He said there were three situations that might develop on which he would like our advice. However, as our conversation progressed, he mentioned only two.

The first is the question of what he should do in case of a deadlock on this ballot.

The second situation he foresaw was the election of one country, perhaps Byelo-Russia, leaving our decision to be made as to which of the other two we should vote for on succeeding ballots. I told him that he must ask Secretary Byrnes how this question should be handled. We understood that the number one country on which we should center all the way through was Turkey. It was not yet understood that Mr. Byrnes wished us to advise Turkey that we planned to do so. Senator Austin said he would have a talk with Mr. Byrnes about this point.

As between the Netherlands and Byelo-Russia, we understand that Mr. Byrnes wishes to support Byelo-Russia because of the wide considerations of policy. We understand, however, that he does not wish to make our position known to the Russians. Senator Austin said that he would try to see Secretary Byrnes and get his specific instructions on this point.

[Discussion followed on the third subject named by Senator Austin. We need not concern ourselves with it because it concerned an informal proposal by Mr. Lie for a Deputy Secretary-Generalship of the United Nations.]

DEAN ACHESON
Memorandum of Conversation, by G. Hayden Raynor of the United States Delegation, Staff of Advisers

TOP SECRET

NEW YORK, December 8, 1946.

Dr. van Royen told me in greatest confidence this noon that Belgium wished to resign its seat on the Economic and Social Council in order to enable the Netherlands to have a place on this Council. He asked me if I would check with our charter constitutional experts in an effort to ascertain whether or not in their opinion there was any way this could be accomplished without opening the whole matter up to new elections which might conceivably develop in neither Belgium nor the Netherlands being on the Council.

After checking with our experts I informed Dr. van Royen that as we saw it Rule 88 which called for a by-election was the only rule applicable and that therefore as much as we would like to see the solution worked out, we were unable to select the method which would avoid the risk mentioned above. He then told me that the latest thinking in the Belgian and Dutch Delegations on the subject was to put the matter up frankly to the Assembly asking for a vote on a hypothetical basis as to whether if Belgium resigned the Assembly would elect the Netherlands. This is not a final decision and is subject to further consideration between the Belgian and Netherlands Delegations.

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Associate Chief of the Division of Dependent Area Affairs (Green)

WASHINGTON, December 18, 1946.

Mr. Geric telephoned this morning to say that the Delegation was considering the slate for elections to the Trusteeship Council. Its present slate, approved by the Department, consisted of Iraq and Brazil. Ambassador Dawson and Mr. Hall had reported, however,

77 Dr. J. H. van Roijen, Representative on the Netherlands Delegation.

78 After two ballots on December 7 Byelorussia was elected to ECOSOC. This had the result of narrowing the field to the Netherlands and Turkey, and after two more ballots at the same meeting had failed to effect an election the President of the Assembly declared the voting postponed to a later time (GA (1/2), Plenary, pp. 998-1006, passim. When the balloting was resumed on December 12 there followed a complicated parliamentary situation, which may be traced ibid., pp. 1222-1231. This in turn resulted in the withdrawal of Belgium from its ECOSOC seat, then the election of Turkey and the Netherlands in that order.

79 Benjamin Gerig, Adviser on the United States Delegation Staff, and within the Department, Chief of the Division of Dependent Area Affairs.

80 Carlos Hall, Adviser on the United States Delegation Staff.
that Mexico was rapidly becoming a more important candidate than Brazil. The Mexicans were campaigning actively, and claim to have obtained sixteen of the Latin American votes and the six Arab votes. Senator Austin felt so deeply committed to Brazil that he could not switch his vote to Mexico if Brazil did not withdraw its candidacy. The question was being considered, therefore, as to whether the Delegation should now vote for Brazil on the first ballot but not campaign for the Brazilian candidacy. If the first ballot revealed that Mexico was in the lead the Delegation might then switch its vote to Mexico on the second ballot. Mr. Gerig asked that I consult ARA on this matter.

I subsequently telephoned Mr. Miner of SPA since he has been handling the slate question. Mr. Miner said that he had received similar information from Mr. Popper in New York but had been unable to consult ARA on this matter. Mr. Miner asked that I check with Mr. Gerig to make sure that Mr. Dulles would have no objection to the selection of Mexico since Mr. Hiss had previously understood that Mr. Dulles was not satisfied with the Mexican approach to trusteeship questions. I then telephoned Mr. Gerig who said that, while the Delegation had had some doubts about Mexico early in the Assembly, the Mexican representatives in Committee 4 had been very helpful throughout the discussions, whereas, the Brazilian representatives had contributed absolutely nothing. On the question of monopolies, only Mexico and Uruguay had supported the United States position. Mr. Gerig did not think, therefore, that Mr. Dulles would have any objection to the selection of Mexico. I gave this information to Mr. Miner who said that he would consult ARA as soon as possible and prepare a telegram on the Department's position.

I asked Mr. Gerig whether any consideration had been given to the contingent election of two additional seats to the Trusteeship Council in order to anticipate approval of the United States trusteeship agreement by the Security Council. Mr. Gerig said that nothing had been done on this point and that he felt it was too late to raise it in the Plenary Session.82

---

81 Robert G. Miner of the Office of the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs.

82 The Department replied in telegram 321, December 13, 7 p. m., that it had "no objections to Garel supporting Mexico instead of Brazil for TC, if Garel considers such action desirable, and provided previous commitment to Brazil discharged." (501.BB/12-1346)

With the adoption by the General Assembly of seven trusteeship agreements on December 13 (see pp. 544 ff.) the conditions requisite for the constitution of the Trusteeship Council were fulfilled, and the Assembly proceeded to entertain a resolution submitted by the Fourth Committee calling for the same (GA (I/2), Plenary, pp. 1286 ff.). Final action was deferred until December 14 when the General Assembly elected Iraq and Mexico to the two seats on the new Council available on an elective basis; see ibid., pp. 1320 ff.

This action by the General Assembly completed the establishment of the last of the principal organs of the United Nations and so of the Organization itself.

501. BC/3-2246: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

New York, undated.

[Received March 22, 1946—9:16 p.m.]

Unnumbered. For Hiss and Bancroft. Following is text submitted by Soviet to Chairman of Committee of Experts just prior to today's meeting.

Text Translation Original Russian

Amendments to the redraft of the provisional rules of procedure for the Security Council proposed by the Soviet representative.

---

Alger Hiss, Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs in the Department of State. For documentation relating to the organization and arrangements affected for the conduct of United States relations with the United Nations, see pp. 1 ff.

Harding F. Bancroft of the Division of International Security Affairs. At this time the United States Delegation to the United Nations (hereafter referred to as the Permanent Delegation) was being organized in New York and Mr. Bancroft was about to be detailed there as an adviser on matters relating to the Security Council with specific reference to the work of the Committee of Experts.

The Committee of Experts was established by the Security Council on January 17 to draft permanent rules of procedure for that body. It was composed of a representative of each of the eleven members of the Security Council, and at this time the chairman of the committee was the Chinese delegate, Mr. Yuen-li-Liang.

The Soviet proposal, submitted by the Soviet delegate on the committee, Mr. Orekhov, was presented against this background: The Security Council at the time was operating under a set of temporary rules drafted by the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations (for documentation on the Preparatory Commission see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. 1, pp. 1433 ff.), Rule 19 of which dealt with the Council's voting procedure in very general terms as follows: "Voting in the Security Council shall be in accordance with the relevant Articles of the Charter and of the Statute of the International Court of Justice." In its initial stint at London (January 17–February 8) the Committee of Experts on February 5 turned out a provisional re-draft of the provisional rules of procedure, but the rule on voting, now Rule 30, remained the same (for this set of rules, under which the Security Council operated until April 9, see United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, First Year, First Series, Supplement No. 2, pp. 1 ff., annex 1a; thereafter cited as SC, 1st yr., 1st series, Suppl. No. 2).

At the last meeting in London on February 8 delegates of the Committee were asked to be prepared, upon the re-convening of the Committee in New York in March, to submit any new rules of procedure, or revision of rules then in use, in which they might be interested. When the Committee did reassemble in New York on March 20 it was presented with a memorandum dated March 18 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations entitled "Statement on the Rules of Procedure of the Security Council". Among other things the Committee was invited by the Secretary-General to consider the importance of the distinction between

Footnote continued on following page.
[Here follows section on the Soviet proposal for Rule 19 of the provisional rules of February 5.]

"Rule 31. Should the Security Council consider a dispute, provided for by Article 33 of the Charter, a party to the dispute shall abstain from voting in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 27 of the Charter.

Should the Security Council consider a situation provided for by Article 34 or any other dispute which does not fall under Article 33, all the members of the Security Council are entitled to participate in voting.

The decision of whether the question under consideration by the Security Council is of procedural nature and also of whether the question under consideration is a dispute or situation and whether this dispute is of the nature referred to in Article 33 of the Charter shall be regarded as accepted if it is voted for by seven members of the Security Council including the concurring votes of all the permanent members of the Security Council."

[Here follows Soviet proposal for new Rules 32, 33, and 40.]

[STETTINIUS]

"dispute" and "situation" with reference to the voting procedure of the Security Council under Article 27, in the light of the experience of the Security Council during the sessions in London in January and February. It was at this point that the Soviet proposal was presented. It may be noted parenthetically that in the Department of State meanwhile a rather general approach was being taken to the whole question of rules of procedure.

The Soviet proposal was printed as Committee of Experts document S/Procedure/17, March 22, 1946 and the Secretary-General's memorandum as document S/Procedure/12, March 18, 1946; the Secretariat memorandum is printed in SC, 1st yr., 1st series, Suppl. No. 2, pp. 8 ff., annex 1b.

The Russians submitted four proposed rules of procedure, both amendments to existing (provisional) rules and wholly new rules. Only the rule relating to voting under Article 27 (proposed Rule 31) is considered here.

Article 33 states: "1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. 2. The Security Council shall, when it seems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means."

Article 27 reads: "1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote. 2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members. 3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting."

Article 34 reads: "The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."
12. For Ross and Blaisdell from Johnson. There is set forth below a memorandum of conversation between Mr. Lawford, U.K. Delegation and Mr. Joseph E. Johnson:

I called on Mr. Lawford at the Savoy Plaza on the evening of March 26 at his suggestion to discuss the work of the Committee of Experts.

He began by saying that Sir Alexander's instructions in general envisaged close cooperation with the United States Delegation, and in the course of the discussion, he made this even clearer by reading an instruction relative to the proposed Soviet amendments.

[Here follows discussion of the Russian proposals for Rules 19, 32, and 33, which are not being considered here.]

On the third Soviet proposal, Mr. Lawford said that they had requested instructions and legal opinion. He read to me extracts from the legal opinion, which he commented did not help a great deal. He indicated that he thought that Section II (2) of the Four Power statement at San Francisco put us in a rather difficult position on

---

90 John C. Ross, Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs.
91 Donald C. Blaisdell, Associate Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs.
92 Joseph E. Johnson, Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs, detailed to the Permanent United States Delegation to the United Nations as a general technical advisor, and at this time representing the United States on the Committee of Experts.
93 Nicholas V. Lawford, officer in the United Kingdom mission at the United Nations.
95 Proposed Rule 31.
96 For the Statement by the Delegations of the Four Sponsoring Governments on Voting Procedure in the Security Council, June 7, 1945, issued by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China at the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, and subscribed to by the Delegation of France, see Department of State Bulletin, June 10, 1945, p. 1047. For documentation concerning the San Francisco Conference, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. 1, pp. 1 ff.

The two parts of Section II of the Four Power Statement read:

1. In the opinion of the delegations of the sponsoring governments, the draft Charter itself contains an indication of the application of the voting procedures to the various functions of the Council.

2. In this case, it will be unlikely that there will arise in the future any matters of great importance on which a decision will have to be made as to whether a procedural vote would apply. Should, however, such a matter arise, the decision regarding the preliminary question as to whether or not such a matter is procedural must be taken by a vote of seven members of the Security Council, including the concurring votes of the permanent members.
this matter. He then read a three point attempt to define the dispute prepared in the Foreign Office which he said he would give me a copy of as soon as he could because on this point particularly they had been instructed to work very closely with the U.S. (No mention had been made of working with anybody else!) Copy attached.

I commented that one idea we had was that it might be possible to get agreement on lumping disputes and situations so that neither the party who brought a dispute or situation to the attention of the Council nor any member or members named as being involved, could vote. This would, of course, have to be adopted by general agreement, presumably by unanimity.

As to procedure for handling this matter, Mr. Lawford said that Cadogan had told him that he thought it important for the committee to discuss the question first and that any high level or Big Five negotiations should only be held after committee discussions. Indicating general agreement with this, I said that while I had not taken this up with Mr. Stettinius yet, I thought the best procedure might be to have a general discussion in the committee, of this issue, and that I was prepared to say that in my opinion such a rule as paragraph 3 of rule 31 would be a violation of the spirit of the Yalta formula.

Mr. Lawford and I both agreed that it was most important, in dealing with rules which either incorporated or expanded articles of the Charter, to make sure that no violation of the Charter occurred in dealing with them.

(Attachment)

United Kingdom suggestions for rules dealing with the definition of a dispute (prepared in Foreign Office and handed to J. E. Johnson by Mr. Lawford under instructions March 27; see memorandum of conversation between Mr. Lawford and Mr. Johnson on March 26.)

Begins:

(A) Definition of a "dispute".

In deciding under Chapter VI of the Charter whether a matter brought before the Security Council by a state is a dispute, or a situation, the Security Council shall hold that a dispute arises:

(1) If state or states bringing the matter before the Security Council, and the state or states whose conduct is impugned, agree that there is a dispute;

---

*For the "Yalta voting formula" agreed upon by the United States, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union at the Crimea Conference on February 7, 1945, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 682, or Department of State Bulletin, March 11, 1945, p. 394: references in this text are to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference Draft of the United Nations Charter. This formula was incorporated into the United Nations Charter as Article 27.*
(2) Whenever the state or states bringing the matter before the Council allege actions or intentions of another state are endangering, or are likely to endanger, the maintenance of international peace and security, and state or states which are subject to these allegations contest some or all of the facts or inferences to be drawn from the facts;

(3) Further, if a state bringing a matter before the Council alleges that another state is violating the rights of a third state and the latter supports the contention of the first state, then the third state shall also be deemed to be a party to the dispute.

(B) Submission of cases in writing.

Any state bringing a dispute or situation before the Security Council shall furnish a full written statement of the grounds of fact and law on which its case is based, for circulation to members of the Council before the discussion is opened. Ends. [Johnson.]

STETTINIUS

10 Files: US/S/CE/3

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss) 98

SECRET


COMMENTS ON THE "DISPUTE" AND "SITUATION" PROBLEM 99

Purposes of Article 27(3) of the Charter Are Clear

As Mr. Noyes demonstrates in his memorandum of March 23 1 (first two paragraphs of item 2), it is clear that the purpose of the abstention provision in Article 27(3) was to avoid having any Power a judge in its own case.

However, it does not follow from this that every determination of whether a particular case is a dispute turns upon this objective. There can be other distinct but valid reasons why a member nation may wish to insist that it is not a party to a dispute.

98 Presumably Mr. Hiss was in New York with the Permanent Delegation at the time he drafted this paper.

99 This subject insofar as it related to the voting problem had been under study at the Permanent Delegation from the time the Delegation was established at New York in mid-March, with specific reference to the issue between the Soviet Union and Iran to be considered by the Security Council when it re-convened at New York on March 25; see vol. viii, pp. 289 ff.

1 Not printed. Charles P. Noyes was assigned to the Permanent Delegation as a special assistant to the United States Representative (Stettinius); this position was later formalized to constitute an advisoryship on Security Council matters.
From the point of view of the abstention provision in Article 27(3) there would be good reasons for insisting that the determination of whether or not a dispute exists, and who the parties to that dispute may be, should be determined by procedural vote. Certainly no permanent member of the Council could argue with good grace that it should have the right to veto a determination that it should not vote in questions arising under Chapter VI. On the other hand, from the point of view of the substantive determination (for other purposes of the Charter) of whether a particular case is or is not a dispute, there is good ground for the argument that this should not be regarded as a matter of mere procedure. The apparent impasse which results from these considerations is of significance only insofar as it affects the determination of who may and may not vote on particular motions. The impasse was solved at London by the British and French representatives waive any right to vote without admitting that the matter was a dispute. This experience indicates a practical reaction to the problem which might be generalized.

Suggested Formula for Determining Abstention

On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it would appear that a solution would be found by concentrating on defining by rule those who should abstain in specified situations. The rules might recite the purpose of the abstention provision in Article 27(3) along the lines indicated above, and then provide that to give effect to these provisions the principle of abstention should apply in cases analogous to disputes, i.e. where charges are officially preferred by complaining State regardless of whether or not the case is technically a dispute for the purposes of the Charter. Obviously the abstention provision would apply in any case which is technically found to be a dispute. However, where no finding that a dispute technically exists has been made, the purposes of the abstention provision, Article 27(3), can best be effectuated by a determination of qualification to vote separate and apart from a determination of whether a particular case is a dispute. This separate determination would not involve a debatable interpretation of the Charter, that being generally agreed to be hypothesis if there is agreement as to the purposes of the abstention provision in Article 27(3). Consequently, this determination may appropriately be made by a procedural vote.

Chapter VI of the Charter is concerned with the pacific settlement of disputes and relates therefore to the conciliatory function of the Council as contrasted with the Council's "policeman" function under Chapter VII (action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression).
This is, in effect, exactly what occurred in London in the Syrian-Lebanese case by reason of the voluntary action of the British and French representatives. There, there was no technical finding that a dispute existed, and the British and French Governments might very well have resisted any such finding for general purposes of the Charter. At the same time they recognized that they should not participate in voting in the case; made no assertion that they had a right to veto any decision that they should not vote; and, therefore, in substance preferred to be guided on this point by majority sentiment of the Council.

Course To Be Followed If the Above Proves Unacceptable

It would seem that even if the above suggestion proves unacceptable in the Committee of Experts, it would still be valuable for us to have presented it in order to clarify the basic issue involved and to try to separate two distinct concepts that are involved. If it is not accepted, we will probably have to free [face?] frankly the fact that we have reached an impasse on the determination of voting qualification; but if the general purpose of the abstention provision, Article 27(3), receives general agreement, an impasse may prove to be not too important. It would then be plain that no permanent member which insisted upon vetoing a resolution whose sole purpose was stated to be the disqualification of that member from voting would be placed in a most untenable position vis-à-vis world opinion, and this would also apply to votes by that member cast on subsequent substantive resolutions under Chapter VI. This result would salvage all that can practically be salvaged in the event of impasse in any event and would prevent the opprobrium to which the Council would subject itself if the matter were left at the impasse stage with no procedure settled for an indefinite period.

In other words, if the suggestions proposed above are not accepted, our next course will simply be to agree to rules of procedure which do not specify the nature of the vote required in determining, for the sole purpose of settling voting qualifications, whether a dispute exists. Such rules would of course still leave open voluntary action of the kind taken by the British and French in the Syrian-Lebanese case, thus still making it possible to settle the issue of voting qualifications without determining whether a dispute exists—which would mean effectuating the purpose of Article 27(3) in situations as well as all technical disputes.

---

3 For documentation on this subject, see vol. VII, pp. 751 ff.
Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department (Cohen)\footnote{Handed by Mr. Cohen to Harding Bancroft of the Division of International Security Affairs on April 8; transmitted by Mr. Bancroft to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss) on April 9. The memorandum printed \textit{infra} was transferred in the same way. The two were described subsequently by Mr. Hiss as "paper 1" and "paper 2".}

[WASHINGTON, April 8, 1946.]

THE EFFECT OF ABSTENTION FROM VOTING

Article 27(3) provides:

"3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting."

It should be noted that the Charter provides that a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. It does not expressly provide that if a party to a dispute is a permanent member, its concurrence shall not be required. Yet it is clear that the intent of the Charter is that such concurrence may be dispensed with when a permanent member which is a party to a dispute abstains from voting as it is required to do under the Charter.

If a permanent member's concurrence is not necessary when it is required to abstain from voting, there would seem to be no sound reason why its concurrence should be required if it voluntarily abstains from voting.

There was it is true some informal committee discussion in San Francisco that looked the other way, but this discussion was never publicized nor were any authoritative decisions communicated to the Conference at the time the Charter was adopted.

There certainly is no compelling reason for requiring the concurrence of a permanent member if it voluntarily abstains from voting. Every legitimate interest of a permanent member is protected when it is given the right to register its nonconcurrence. If it fails to avail itself of the opportunity granted and deliberately abstains, it should be deemed to have waived its right of concurrence.

There may be many matters on which a permanent member may not wish to vote in the affirmative and still may not wish to exercise its veto. It is absurd to insist that a permanent member must veto a proposal if it cannot vote for it.

If a permanent member deliberately withdraws from participation
in any proceedings of the Council, it cannot be urged that it was intended to give it the right to stop all further proceedings until it chose to return. While the hope was expressed at San Francisco that no member would withdraw from the Organization, yet it was conceded that a member could withdraw if it wished. Yet it was never suggested that the withdrawal of a permanent member would put an end to the Security Council. But that is exactly what would happen if the abstention of a permanent member is considered the equivalent of a negative vote on every substantive question.

The requirement that seven members of the Council must vote affirmatively to make any substantive decision is a requirement that cannot be waived. It was placed in the Charter to prevent action by a rump Council. But the concurrence of the permanent members was a special right given to the permanent members in view of the special responsibilities they assumed. To retain that right, the permanent member must be present and register its nonconcurrence.

---

501. BC/4–846

Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department (Cohen)

[WASHINGTON, April 8, 1946.]

THE DETERMINATION OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE

Article 27(3) of the Charter provides that in decisions under Chapter VI a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

There is no express provision in the Charter determining whether a matter constitutes a dispute or requires a determination of that question before the issue arises as to the right of a party to vote on a particular issue.

In these circumstances if the right of a member of the Council is challenged, it would seem that the Chairman in determining initially the right of the challenged member to vote should determine (1) whether the matter before the Council is a dispute and (2) whether the member whose vote is challenged is a party to the dispute. The Chairman’s determination can of course be overruled by the Council by a procedural vote. All decisions of the Chairman are procedural and no decision of the Chairman should require a substantive vote to overrule.

To require a substantive vote to overrule the Chairman would obviously place excessive power in the hand of the Chairman.

* A notation by Mr. Hiss on the transmittal “chit” reads: “paper 1 doesn’t consider [question] of US Govt commitment to others of Big 5”, a possible reference to the June 7, 1945 Statement of the Four Sponsoring Powers.
To require a substantive vote to sustain the Chairman in a case of this kind would make it impossible to disqualify a member from voting in a dispute to which it is a party without its consent. Such a result was obviously never contemplated by the framers of the Charter.

The Charter is clear and explicit. It provides that a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting under Chapter 6. It does not say that a member may vote unless the Council affirmatively determines that it is a party to a dispute.

When, therefore, a member's right to vote is challenged, the Chairman must rule whether or not the member has a right to vote under the Charter. If the Chairman's determination is not satisfactory to the Council, it can be overruled by a procedural vote.6

---

501 BC/4-1246

Memorandum by the Associate Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs (Bancroft) to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss)

[WASHINGTON,] April 12, 1946.

Joe Johnson reported on the telephone this morning that the Committee of Experts, through the use of subcommittees, expects to complete its consideration of the Rules relating to the conduct of business this week. Meetings have been held regularly twice a day by the Committee and two meetings are scheduled for today.7

Accordingly, there is every likelihood that early next week the Committee will commence and perhaps complete its consideration of the Rules relating to the determination of a dispute vs. situation and relating to the determination of who must abstain from voting under Article 27, 3.

Although Joe Johnson has done all he can to retard the Committee's

---

6 Notation by Mr. Hiss on transmittal "chit": "paper 2 doesn't cover a 'situation'". A third paper drafted by Mr. Cohen and transmitted to Mr. Hiss via Mr. Bancroft is not attached to the two documents under consideration and has not been found in the Department's files.

7 The first phase of the work of the Committee of Experts in New York ended on April 5 when the Committee submitted to the Security Council a report recommending the adoption of 23 rules of procedure regarding meetings, agenda, representation, and credentials, and secretariat. Intended to replace or supplement rules 1-15 of the provisional rules of the Security Council drawn up by the Preparatory Commission and adopted by the Council during January-February, the report also proposed the adoption of a supplementary rule regarding communications from nongovernmental sources. The Security Council on April 9 adopted the new rules, with minor amendments; these were incorporated into United Nations document S/35 (see SC, 1st yr., 1st series, Suppl. No. 2, pp. 15 ff., annex 1c). Rule 30 of the February rules (voting) became Rule 27 in the April 9 rules.
excessive haste, he has not been able to control it. I suggested to him that in such circumstances he should make every effort to obtain agreement among the Committee members to the United States desiderata on the question of abstention from voting by parties to a dispute; and that we were hoping to clear a statement of such desiderata with Mr. Hiss and Mr. Cohen today. In the meantime, the memoranda prepared by Mr. Cohen and Mr. Hiss on the question could serve as a basis for his arguments.

The members of the Committee who are the proponents of excessive speed are the Soviet and French representatives. The basis of their position is that their experts on procedure will not be in New York long and they want to get the job completed before they go.

It might now be appropriate for Mr. Stettinius to have an informal conversation with Mr. Gromyko and M. Bonnet with a view to slowing down the processes of the Committee. He could very appropriately point out that the work of the Committee of Experts should be continuing in nature, and that to adopt Rules on such important subjects as are now before the Committee without adequate consideration would serve in the long run to retard rather than to expedite the work of the Security Council.

501.BC/4-1246 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

[Extracts]

SECRET URGENT New York, April 12, 1946—8:30 p.m.
[via Courier]

71. Daily Secret Summary . . .
Committee of Experts . . .

A comprehensive program for the work of the Committee of Experts as regards rules of procedure was outlined in a memorandum of April 3 drafted by the Associate Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs (Bancroft); by April 9 it had been approved within the Department and was ready for transmission to the Permanent Delegation (501.BC/4-946).


Henri Bonnet, French Representative on the Security Council.

No record of such an approach by Mr. Stettinius has been found in the Department’s files.

Attention is invited to the special procedure used in this compilation with regard to the printing of extracts in daily summary telegrams. As these telegrams are multi-subject, the usual Foreign Relations practice of describing omissions in a bracketed note is not followed. Instead, omissions are indicated by dots when such omissions involve subjects in the summary telegrams other than proposals under discussion by the Committee of Experts relative to Article 27.
The next document discussed was S/Procedure/51, a group of additional rules proposed for inclusion in the chapter on conduct of business. These were originally part of a list submitted by the U.S. representative and which were discussed by a three-man sub-committee appointed April 11. . . .

The U.S. representative, at the close of the meeting, explained that during the course of the meeting he had received new instructions from his government concerning Rule A (S/Procedure/51), which had already received general agreement in substance from the committee. Since his government had raised important questions of principle relating to it, he requested that the committee defer final approval of Rule A for several days; this was granted. . . .

Stettinius

501.BC/4–1346: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 13, 1946—11 a.m.

18. For Johnson from Hiss. Text of proposed Rules of Procedure discussed in telephone conversation April 12 between Johnson and Bancroft is as follows:

Rule B—"In announcing the results of a procedural vote, the President shall indicate the number of members voting in favor of the proposed action and shall state whether the proposed action has been taken.

In announcing the results of a substantive vote, the President shall indicate the number of members voting in favor of the proposed action, and the permanent members concurring; the number of members voting against and the permanent members voting against; and the number of members abstaining and the permanent members abstain-

---

14 This document contained nine draft rules, "A" through "T".
15 Joseph E. Johnson.
16 Regarding Rule A, see footnote §, p. 288.
17 Presumably this was the result of the telephone conversation between Mr. Bancroft in Washington and Mr. Johnson in New York described in Bancroft's memorandum, supra.
18 A Permanent Delegation memorandum dated May 6 identifies these rules as (new) "rules in lieu of S/Procedure/51/Rev. 1, Rule A" (IO Files, document SD/S/137). These were proposed by the Counselor of the Department, Mr. Cohen, who wrote in a memorandum of April 12, apparently the basis of this telegram, "I am in doubt whether it is wise to submit rules of procedure which may affect the trend of thinking on some of the most delicate voting questions until we had chance to discuss our views informally with members of the Council and their experts.
If we must go into these questions now, I should suggest that the following two rules should be submitted. . . ." (501.BC/4–1246)
ing. Unless a permanent member abstaining, affirmatively indicates that it does not concur, it shall not be deemed to have exercised its veto right, but shall be deemed to be willing to concur without voting on whatever action the Council may take by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the other permanent members."

Rule C—"In accordance with Article 27(3) a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting on non-procedural matters, and in announcing any vote on any such matter the President shall record any member which he deems to be a party to a dispute within the meaning of Article 27(3) as not voting. If any member of the Council appeals a ruling of the President either that a member shall abstain or shall not abstain from voting, the President’s ruling may be overruled by a procedural vote."

Further telegram follows." [Hiss.]

BYRNE

501.BC/4-1346: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 13, 1946—2 p.m.

19. For Johnson from Hiss. Reference our telegram April 13 20 sending text of two rules for use in informal conversations with the representatives on the Committee of Experts.

In general, after discussion with Mr. Cohen, we feel that you must make it clear to the Committee that its agreement on any rule of procedure must be regarded only as tentative and not binding on the United States. In other words, your acceptance as a representative on the Committee of an agreed rule of procedure is an ad referendum acceptance and is subject to approval here.

We still retain our view that controversial rules should not be discussed prematurely by the Committee of Experts and would therefore prefer the Committee to consider rules which are susceptible of prompt agreement and do not involve Charter interpretation.

We are not prepared to recommend Rule B set forth in the earlier telegram as the firm position of the United States Government. However, it can be used to promote discussion in the Committee of Experts or elsewhere and may be helpful in your efforts to persuade the other

19 Telegram 19, April 13, 2 p.m., infra.
20 Telegram 18, supra.
members to the view that a permanent member may abstain from voting on the Council without exercising a veto.

The question of the matters before the Council to be decided by a procedural vote or by a substantive vote is one that should be considered by the Committee of Experts in its entirety and not in its application to a single case. We would recommend that the Committee could usefully consider an inventory of matters which should be determined by the Council by substantive and by procedural votes. This would enable the Committee members to see the problem as a whole and to evaluate the extent to which Council action must be taken by one or the other types of vote.

We suggest that Rule C be used as a first step in discussion only if the Committee determines to proceed to the immediate consideration of Rule 81, proposed by the Soviet representative or another specific rule dealing with other problems set forth in Rule C. [Hiss.]

BYRNES

---

501BC/4–1546: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 15, 1946—8 p. m.

24. To Johnson from Hiss. We transmitted to you today by pouch Minutes of the Twenty-ninth Meeting of Committee of Five Deputies at San Francisco on May 29, 1945. We call your attention to discussion on pages three to six inclusive, where Sobolev opposed Pasvolsky's proposal that Conference answer list of questions on application of voting procedure on ground that Security Council itself after its organization should decide questions rather than Conference.

In our recommendation that Committee of Experts could usefully consider inventory of matters which should be determined by procedural or by substantive vote and in suggesting to Committee specific rules calling for procedural or substantive votes of Council, US is in effect carrying out procedure suggested in San Francisco by Soviet representative. [Hiss.]

BYRNES

---

21 Not printed.
22 A. A. Sobolev, member of the Soviet Delegation to the San Francisco Conference.
23 Leo Pasvolsky, Adviser, United States Delegation to the San Francisco Conference.
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

SECRET URGENT NEW YORK, April 15, 1946—9:30 p.m. [via Courier]

74. Daily Secret Summary . . .

Committee of Experts . . .

The bulk of the day’s discussion attached to the Soviet proposal to amend Rule 31 (Item 3; S/Procedure/17). At the outset, Professor Stein, the USSR representative, contended that the present rules on voting now in force are not precise enough, and that his amendment was intended to clarify the voting procedure using as the juridical basis the four-power declaration at San Francisco and the Charter itself. “The text is clear,” Professor Stein said. “It should be adopted or rejected as you like.”

Mr. Hasluck, the Australian representative, then questioned Stein as to what his amendment meant when it referred to, in paragraph two of his proposal, any other dispute which does not fall under Article 33 . . . Stein replied that the Charter enabled the Security Council to discuss many types of disputes although its principal responsibilities related to those under Article 33.

Chairman Liang, giving his interpretation of the legal status of “disputes”, concluded, after a detailed analysis of the Charter’s references to disputes, that it would not be in accordance with the spirit of the Charter to limit the application of the abstention clause of Article 27, Par. 3, to disputes brought up under Article 33.

Mr. Johnson, U.S. representative, agreed with the chairman’s remarks and added that he could not in any case accept a rule of procedure limiting the obligation to abstain from voting solely to the type of disputes referred to in Article 33. The Egyptian representative, Mr. Saba, associated himself with the chairman’s and Mr. Johnson’s remarks, as did the U.K., French, Brazilian and Polish representatives.

Prof. Stein then said that since it was agreed that there were two types of disputes it was necessary “from the logical viewpoint” to dis-

---

* Professor B. B. Stein had replaced Mr. Orekhov on March 28 as Soviet delegate in the meetings of the Committee of Experts.
* The Soviet proposal is found in New York’s unnumbered and undated telegram which was received in the Department on March 22; see p. 251. Paragraph two reads: “Should the Security Council consider a situation provided for by Article 34 or any other dispute which does not fall under Article 33, all the members of the Security Council are entitled to participate in voting.”
tistinguish between these two. The Council’s first duty is to distinguish between the two, and the second duty, after they have made a distinction is to decide whether the parties to the dispute should abstain from voting. He was not convinced that the voting process should be the same for both distinct types of disputes.

It was agreed that under Article 34, the Council first must decide to “investigate any dispute . . .” and second, must decide “whether the continuance of the dispute . . . is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.”

Liang agreed that there could be a distinction in disputes but added that they had different consequences. However, these had no bearing on the voting procedure, and Article 27(3) was effective in both cases. Johnson enlarged this point and stated that since a party to a dispute should not be a judge in its own case, a permanent member of the Council should not have the right to prevent determination of what particular class of dispute exists.

The committee discussed this problem further but adjourned at 1:00 p.m. until Tuesday, April 16, without coming to a decision. Since the Security Council meets at 11:00 a.m. Tuesday, April 16, the committee will probably meet at 3:00 p.m. Tuesday, for continued discussion on the Soviet veto proposal, and probably will take up immediately Paragraph 3 thereof.

In the course of Sunday, April 14, and Monday, April 15, U.S. representative Johnson informally and confidentially presented copies of the suggested U.S. revision of Article (A)—(S/Procedure/51)—relating to announcement of votes to his U.K., China, U.S.S.R. and French colleagues on the committee of experts, in the order given.

In each case Johnson made it clear that this was a suggestion on which the U.S. would like comments. He referred specifically to the two discussions in San Francisco on this point among representatives of the Big Five, and explained that this background was the reason for showing copies at this time only to representatives of the permanent members. Lawford and Chaumont made no comment on the substance. Liang thought China would accept the concept of abstention. Stein, while he made clear the need to talk to Gromyko, said that he personally was not in favor of forcing a state to vote if it wished to abstain. This is perhaps significant in light of the fact that Johnson told Stein in detail of Lavrentiev’s position at San Francisco.

Johnson also discussed with Lawford and Liang the proposed rule relating to parties to a dispute (Department’s urtel 18). Both Liang

---

26 That is, Mr. Johnson distributed texts of Rule B as set forth in telegram 18, to New York, April 13, p. 262.
27 Mr. Chaumont was the French delegate on the Committee of Experts.
28 See Rule C, telegram 18, April 13, p. 262.
and Lawford had doubts as to whether there was sound legal basis for this procedure. Johnson has not yet had time to discuss this matter with Chaumont and Stein.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

STETTINIUS

501 BC/4-1646: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

SECRET URGENT New York, April 16, 1946—10:15 p.m.

[ via Courier ]

81. Daily Secret Summary. . . .

Committee of Experts. . . .

Discussion on the Soviet proposal (S/Procedure/17) was then resumed and dealt with paragraph three of item three.29 Liang pointed out that this paragraph actually consisted of three parts:

1. Whether the question under consideration by the Council is one of procedure shall be approved by a vote of seven members of the Council including concurring votes of all the permanent members;

2. Whether the question under consideration is a dispute or a situation shall be approved by a vote of seven members of the Council including concurring votes of all the permanent members;

3. Whether the dispute is of the nature referred to in Article 33 of the Charter shall be approved by a vote of seven members of the Council including concurring votes of all the permanent members.

General agreement was reached on point one, since it stemmed directly from the San Francisco declaration by the Big Five.30 However, several members contended that it was not necessary to spell out such a rule since the San Francisco declaration existed to guide the Council.

The Polish representative pointed out that some questions were obviously procedural and others obviously substantive, therefore a rule stating exactly which questions were procedural should be drawn up. Johnson (U.S.) declared he would like to see each question labeled as to whether it was procedural or substantive and the rules of procedure drawn up accordingly. Lawford (U.K.) agreed with this, say-

---

29 Paragraph 3 reads: "The decision of whether the question under consideration by the Security Council is of procedural nature and also of whether the question under consideration is a dispute or situation and whether this dispute is of the nature referred to in Article 33 of the Charter shall be regarded as accepted if it is voted for by seven members of the Security Council including the concurring votes of all the permanent members of the Security Council."

30 i.e., the June 7, 1945, Statement by the Four Sponsoring Powers; see footnote 96, p. 253.
ing his government would like clear, comprehensive and automatic decisions as to whether voting should be on a procedural basis or not. Hasluck (Australia) said everyone recognized that there was a clear division on most questions as to whether they required substantive or procedural vote, but that the committee should try to reduce the middle ground of doubtful questions to an area as small as possible. These would have to be settled by ad hoc decisions.

The committee then proceeded to the second part of the problem. Hasluck questioned what the political effects of rules drafted on this problem would be, since a party to a dispute, if unscrupulous, could remove a future ban on its participation in voting by using the veto in the early stages of the question. Chairman Liang, speaking as the Chinese representative, reminded the committee that the Yalta formula was set up only with the Dumbarton Oaks documents as a basis. Thus, he cautioned, when the Yalta formula mentions "disputes" it also means "situations." He added that any widening of the veto power should be guarded against, since the sponsoring powers who made the San Francisco declaration pledged to the smaller nations only limited use of the veto. Adoption of the Soviet proposal's interpretation could hardly be considered consonant with such a pledge, he reasoned. Johnson subscribed to Liang's remarks and pointed out that two points were involved: 1) Decision as to whether a dispute or situation exists; and 2) Decision as to who, under Article 27(3) are parties to a dispute. 1) is clearly substantive, but he could not accept such a rule unless it also included a rule on 2).

STETTINIUS

501 BC/4-2446: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

SECRET URGENT New York, April 24, 1946—10 p.m.
[via Courier]


Committee of Experts . . .

The Security Council's Committee of Experts met at Hunter College at 10:30 a.m. Wednesday, April 24, and proceeded to discussion of Item 3 of S/Procedure/17, the Soviet proposal for the redraft of Rule 31.32

32 The Committee of Experts had put this question aside and considered other matters during the period April 17-23.
The Committee agreed at request of Soviet representative Stein to
discuss the third point in the third paragraph of this item, which says
that the "decision . . . whether the dispute is of the nature referred
to in Article 33 of the Charter shall be regarded as accepted if it is
voted for by seven members of the Security Council, including the
concurring votes of all the permanent members of the Security
Council."

Van Blokland (Netherlands) gave a prepared statement which dealt
primarily with the second point in the third paragraph of Item 3.
This concerns the vote on the decision as to whether the question under
consideration is a dispute or a situation. Van Blokland felt that the
rule should be concerned not only with the vote on this question but
also with the problem of determining whether the question is a
situation or dispute.

The burden of his argument was that procedures should be set up
to narrow the doubtful area between the two questions and make it
easier for the Council to decide whether the matter was a situation
or a dispute. In effect, his criterion for determining whether a dispute
exists in a doubtful case is if a situation violates justice and interna-
tional law and somebody brings it to the Council’s attention. As an
example, he said if troops of one country lined the border of another
country this could be considered only a situation, but if the first
country conducted fifth column activities and charged that this was a
fact, then the situation thus became a dispute. He left himself open
on how the Council would decide on this point if the claim that a
dispute exists was challenged by some other state. He understood both
sides of the argument but leaned to the idea of considering it a
procedural matter.

At this point, Stein called the Committee’s attention to the fact that
they had agreed to discuss the third point of the paragraph and there-
fore requested the views of the members on this.

Liang (China), Lawford (U.K.) and Johnson (U.S.) all stated that
they thought the decision relating to this point should be by substan-
tive vote, but each insisted that the rule should contain provisions
setting forth the obligatory abstention from voting of Council mem-
bers who were parties to the dispute in question.

Hasluck (Australia), and de la Colina (Mexico), although agree-
ing tentatively on this point, did not express firm opinions on Stein’s
specific proposal. Hasluck brought up the question of the binding effect
of the four-power statement at San Francisco. Johnson and Chaumont
(France) stated categorically that it is binding on the five powers, Chaumont specifically including France on this point.  

Hashluck denied that it bound any but the five powers, while de la Colina declared that this was at least a moot point. Johnson agreed with de la Colina and pointed out that at San Francisco, committee 3 (1) had agreed not to vote on this point. Stein argued that the four-power statement was binding on all, basing his argument on the fact that he knew of no existing document which contradicts this interpretation.

Stein, at this point, indicated that he wished to summarize the debate, but Johnson, with Stein's permission, proceeded to summarize the arguments he had presented in the committee on the three parts of the third paragraph of the Soviet proposal for Rule 31.

1) With respect to determining whether a procedural or substantive decision is involved, Johnson stated that the final paragraph of the four-power statement at San Francisco made it clear that such a decision must be substantive. However, he could not accept a rule such as the Soviets proposed unless there had previously been spelled out the vote by which decisions under each rule, where a decision is required, were to be taken. Indeed, he was not sure that even then the Soviet rule would be desirable.

2) As to the decision whether a situation or dispute exists, that also is substantive. Here again, however, Johnson opposed any rule on this point unless coupled with a satisfactory rule taking care of the distinct and separate issue of determining who are to be considered parties to a dispute for the purposes of Article 27 (3).

3) The decision whether the dispute is of the kind referred to in Article 33 is also substantive. Johnson opposed, however, a rule to cover only this question under Chapter VI and did not wish to accept it unless coupled with as many rules as the committee would draft relating to other decisions under Chapter VI. Moreover, the question of abstention of parties would also have to be considered in connection with this rule.

Stein declared, after Johnson's summary, that the USSR attached great importance to these amendments since they felt that the absence of rules of procedure on these points would hamper the work of the Council. The lack, or absence, of precise rules, he added, may have consequences not only of juridical but also political importance, and may block the work of the Council and affect its prestige.

He noted that even those who admitted they are bound by the four-power statement do not want these rules. He pointed out, "without criticizing", that such binding includes the obligation to carry out the four-power statement with implementing rules. He came to the conclusion after the statements made by Liang, Hasluck, Johnson and

---

Lawford on the Soviet proposals, that the committee should present an objective report to the Council, not at once, but in the near future, on the discussion on Rule 31 of the Soviet proposal.

As the meeting closed, Johnson requested permission to speak first at the next meeting in connection with certain remarks Stein had made in his summary and particularly on Stein's proposal that a report should be made to the Council on the various views on the Soviet amendment. Hasluck also reserved the right to speak on these points at the next meeting. The committee meets again at 10:30 a.m. Thursday, April 25.

After the meeting, in a brief discussion with Chaumont, Johnson said that he opposed such a report as unnecessary and undesirable. Chaumont said that if his delegation agreed on this, he would support Johnson's opposition to such a report.  

501.BC/4-2646: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT New York, April 26, 1946—12:10 p.m. [Received 1:44 p.m.]

113. Attention Hiss. Request instructions regarding position on Rule A of S/Procedure/51, revision 1, in light of the following.  

As you will recall Johnson, acting under instructions, reserved the U.S. position on this rule and at his request Committee deferred further consideration of it. Subsequent to receipt of your Nos. 18 and 19 of April 13, Johnson handed copies of rule B set forth in former to representatives of U.K., France, China and U.S.S.R. explaining purpose of this rule and stating that he realized it, in effect, would constitute a reversal of decision reached by Big Five at San Francisco, June 11[?], 1945. He said that his Government had given further consideration to this question and believed that abstention of permanent members parties to a dispute was both desirable and consistent with provisions of Charter.

Johnson has now ascertained the views of his four colleagues as follows. The French are rather in favor of the proposed rule. The British see no objection to the proposed rule but believe it would be

4 At the meeting on April 25 Mr. Johnson made a prepared statement declaring his opposition to the Soviet request that a special report be made on the Committee's consideration of the Soviet rule for voting contained in the proposal for a new Rule 31. This statement was incompletely reported in telegram 110, April 25, from New York, not printed. (501.BC/4-2546)

5 See telegram 71, April 12, 8:30 p.m., from New York, p. 261.
difficult to reach agreement on it. The Chinese apparently share the British view. Stein, on the other hand, states that he has consulted his Government and that it is opposed to such a rule. While a permanent member cannot be forced to vote he said, against its wishes, the Charter clearly imposes a special obligation on permanent members and they should not be encouraged by such a rule to abstain. Moreover, there might be serious practical difficulties if so many abstain as to make an affirmative vote impossible.

It appears certain that discussion on rule A of S/Procedure/51 will take place early next week. Johnson has indicated to all four of his above-mentioned colleagues that he may submit the proposed amendment to this rule at that time, but has made no final decision on this point.

In view of the facts that this rule would, in effect, reverse a five-power agreement and that Soviet Government opposes it, Johnson desires instructions regarding its submission to Committee as a whole. If he is not to introduce it, what attitude should be taken toward present rule A? If it is introduced and Stein announces his opposition, what course should be followed?

It is our tentative view that rule A, as it stands, can be accepted without prejudicing possible later amendment along the lines suggested in proposed redraft.

STETTINIUS

591.3C/4-2646 : Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

SECRET   WASHINGTON, 26 April 1946—1 p. m.

37. For Johnson from Hiss. This relates to Rule A of S/Procedure/51/Rev. 1 (reurtel No. 113 of April 26).

Inasmuch as Rule A does make it mandatory on the President after a vote is taken to state whether the question voted on has been carried, we believe that it would be a mistake for the Committee of Experts to adopt Rule A as it now stands without having considered the question of the voluntary abstention of a permanent member.

It seems to us that this is one of the cases where it is preferable for the Council to have no rule of procedure than to have one on which unanimous agreement has not been reached. Furthermore, in view of the fact that our proposed Rule B has been shown only to the representatives of the permanent members and not to the representatives of the other members of the Council, it would be helpful to have the views of those governments. We see no reason why the Committee of Experts
should reach a decision on this question in great haste and would prefer to have it discussed at some length and over a period of time.

Stein’s opposition to the rule appears to be not against its practical operation but against the existence of the rule itself. His admission that a permanent member cannot be forced to vote against its wishes appears to us to indicate that he would not necessarily attack the validity of a resolution of the Council on a substantive matter which was adopted by the necessary majority except for a permanent member who voluntarily abstained. This seems further to indicate that there is no necessity for having a rule on this subject at the present time.

As far as his arguments against the rule are concerned, we are willing to admit that the permanent members have a special obligation to vote on questions coming before the Council but this does not mean that the Charter itself demands that they must vote on every issue where they are willing to accept a decision of the Council without affirmatively voting for it.

We are not particularly impressed with his second argument that there might be practical difficulties in obtaining the necessary majority if permanent members are permitted to abstain. The same reasoning would apply to the abstention of non-permanent members which under the Charter and according to past practices of the Council is clearly permissible.

Accordingly, you should urge the Committee not to adopt Rule A in its present form. [Hiss.]

Acheson

---

501.BC/5-246 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

SECRET URGENT WASHINGTON, May 3, 1946—2 p. m.

44. For Johnson from Hiss. We are transmitting today by pouch minutes of Twenty-fourth Meeting of Committee of Five Deputies on May 26, 1945.27 We call to your attention section on pages 1 and 2 entitled “Answers to Questions on Voting Procedure.” Note that Committee approved of answers contained in Annex D and “recommended that the revised draft would also be considered by the five delegations.”

Question 22 contained in Annex B reads as follows:

“In case a decision has to be made under Chapter VIII, Section A, or under the second sentence of Chapter VIII, Section C, paragraph 1,

27 Not printed.
will a permanent member of the Council be entitled to participate in a vote on the question whether the permanent member is itself a party to the dispute or not?"

The answer to question 22 as contained in Annex D reads as follows:

"This question seems to be based on a most unlikely hypothesis. But if a permanent member of the Council were involved in a dispute and argued in the Council that he was not involved in a dispute, the Council would presumably make its decision on this point by a vote of seven including the votes of the permanent members other than the permanent member who was alleged to be involved in the dispute."

Hartley 39 who drew up minutes of this meeting informs us that answers to these questions were never referred to Five Delegations or to Conference. At Twenty-ninth Meeting of Committee of Five Deputies on May 29, 1945, Deputies came to the conclusion that Security Council itself after its organization rather than Conference should answer the question. This decision which was proposed by Sobolev was brought to your attention in Amdel 24 of April 15, 1946.

This telegram for your information in your discussions in Committee of Experts and does not represent change of Department's position set forth in Amdel 19, dated April 13, 1946.39 [His.]

Acheson

501.BC/5-2946: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

New York, May 29, 1946—4:30 p.m.

251. There follows the substance of a memorandum of conversation regarding voting in the Security Council, which took place on May 28, 1946, between Cadogan, accompanied by Lawford and Gore-Booth,40


40 No further progress was made in the Committee of Experts at this time on the question of voting, the Committee reporting to the Security Council on May 13 that "It was the view of certain members of the Committee that this chapter [that is, the chapter entitled "Voting"] should contain detailed provisions covering both the mechanics of the vote and the majorities by which the various decisions of the Council should be taken. There was a full and free exchange of views on this subject in the Committee. It was agreed to postpone the further study of this question and to recommend the retention for the time being of rule 27 of the provisional rules of procedure (document S/35), which now becomes rule 37." Rule 37 read: "Voting in the Security Council shall be in accordance with the relevant Articles of the Charter and of the Statute of the International Court of Justice." (SC, 1st yr., 1st series, Suppl. No. 2, pp. 23 and 27)

For a summary of this phase of the voting problem, see document SD/A/C.1/7, p. 282.

40 Paul H. Gore-Booth, British Foreign Office expert on United Nations affairs.
and myself, accompanied by Noyes, H. V. Johnson 41 and J. E. Johnson.

"Following discussion of the Iranian question (which is recorded in a separate memorandum from Mr. Noyes), Sir Alexander raised the question of rules relating to voting in the Security Council. This had been one of his objectives in requesting a meeting. In the ensuing discussion the following points were brought out:


With respect to the Soviet proposal for a rule providing that the decision as to whether a question is substantive or procedural should be taken by a qualified vote, J. E. Johnson restated, at Cadogan's request, the position which he had taken in the Committee of Experts. This was that the Soviet proposal only covered the last paragraph of the statement by the four sponsoring governments at San Francisco, and that it should be read only in context of the previous paragraphs of that statement. J. E. Johnson suggested that an attempt might be made to define those decisions which are clearly procedural and those which are clearly substantive either by means of separate lists or by an indication in each relevant rule as to the manner which the decision is to be taken. Only after this is done, would such a rule as the Soviets have proposed be at all acceptable. Mr. Noyes emphasized this last point by stating that we do not consider that, if a question is raised as to the kind of vote to be taken, the decision must always be a substantive one. There was complete agreement on this point, Sir Alexander remarking that from paragraph 2 of the four power statement itself it is clear that certain decisions will unquestionably be procedural.

There seemed to be, however, considerable doubts as to whether such a solution, as proposed by Mr. J. E. Johnson would be sufficient. Sir Alexander doubted whether it would be possible to induce the Soviets to accept the idea of stating in each rule the nature of the vote to be taken, and it was pointed out that, even if this were done or a list of decisions agreed upon, there still might be too broad an area in which doubt might arise. It was remarked, for example, that however complete the list might be, there would still be room to question whether that part of the Iranian resolution of April 4, which requested reports from the Soviet Union and Iran, was procedural or substantive.

There was general agreement that this question requires further study.

2. Disputes, Situations and Parties to a Dispute.

41 Herschel V. Johnson, newly-appointed Deputy Representative of the United States on the Security Council. Mr. Johnson assumed his position on May 8, and upon the resignation of Mr. Stettinus in early June became Acting United States Representative at the United Nations and head of the Permanent Delegation.
It was pointed out to Sir Alexander that the US feels that a distinction should be made between, on the one hand, the determination as to whether the Council is dealing with a situation or dispute within the meaning of Chapter VI and, on the other, the determination as to who should be considered parties to a dispute within the meaning of Article 27(3). The proposal, which had been informally submitted earlier to the representatives on the Committee of Experts of the other permanent members, was again shown to Cadogan and the reason for proposing that the determination of parties to a dispute should be made by a ruling of the President was explained. Cadogan indicated that he felt the acceptance of such a rule would be a very happy solution, but he did not believe that the Soviets could be induced to accept it. He recognized that the history of the Yalta Formula gave grounds for endeavoring to interpret “parties to a dispute” as meaning “parties in interest”. He, nevertheless, felt that it would be hard to speak of “a party to a situation” and expressed serious doubt as to whether the Soviets would accept such a modification of the letter of the charter.

Cadogan then raised the question of the Foreign Office’s proposal for the definition of a dispute. It was agreed that the text proposed by the Foreign Office is not satisfactory, and that some attempt should be made to revise it. There seemed to be general agreement, however, that, while it would probably be impossible to formulate a definition of a dispute which would take care of all possible contingencies, a carefully drafted definition might be useful in working toward the desired end of preventing a permanent member from blocking its own exclusion from voting. In the course of this discussion, Gore-Booth, who was familiar with the Foreign Office background of this paper, remarked that he understood one of the purposes of the proposed definition to have been to wipe away the distinction between “situations” and “disputes” and to include all matters in the latter category.

The British representatives having stressed the Foreign Office’s interest in this approach, and requested US criticisms of the paper, they were informed that: (a) the draft did not adequately take care of frivolous claims; (b) it confused the definition of a dispute with that of a party to a dispute; and (c) paragraph (2) dealt only with disputes of the nature referred to in Article 33 of the charter.

It was agreed that Lawford and J. E. Johnson should get together with a view to drafting a new paper which the UK delegation might send to the Foreign Office for comment.

---

42 Refers to Rule C in telegram 18, to New York, April 13, p. 262.
It was agreed that the two approaches mentioned above—that suggested by the US and that advanced by the Foreign Office—are not mutually exclusive and that both avenues should be pursued.


In answer to an inquiry from Cadogan, the US representatives stated that their Government does not favor forcing the issue if agreement cannot be reached in the Committee of Experts. The US believes that this issue should be dealt with very cautiously and that the matter should be allowed to simmer. It was further stated by the US representatives that, in their personal opinions, no good would be served by pushing this issue very hard while the Iranian case is still before the Council. Cadogan and his advisers appeared to agree with both points, although they gave the impression that the Foreign Office may have been leaning toward forcing the issue in open meetings of the Security Council.

There was some discussion of the advisability of informal five-power conversations at the expert level. There was tentative agreement that such discussions should not in any case be held until after the matter had been given further study both by the two delegations in New York and by their respective governments.”

STETTINIUS

501.BC/5-2946: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1946—7 p. m.


The problem of defining a dispute in the rules raises the entire question of the voting procedure of the SC and our position set forth in Amdel 18 and 19 of April 13.

It is perhaps possible that a sufficiently comprehensive definition of a dispute incorporated into the Rules of Procedure might accomplish the desired result of preventing a permanent member from vetoing the Council’s decision that it must abstain from voting. However, we doubt if such a comprehensive definition would be acceptable to all the members of the SC at the present time.

We therefore believe that any advantage to be gained through our
favoring a rule such as that proposed by the British would be more than offset by the following considerations:

1. We agree with your position as set forth in your telegram 251 of May 29 distinguishing between a determination as to the existence of a dispute or situation and the separate and not necessarily related determination as to the parties to abstain from voting. The U.S. position on the type of vote that will be required on the latter determination is set forth in Amdel 18 and 19 of April 13. A rule of procedure such as that proposed by the U.K. which fails to differentiate between the meaning of dispute as used in Article 27 (3) and its meaning in other sections of the Charter would be inconsistent with this position and might complicate future discussion of the whole voting and abstention problem.

2. We believe that your suggestion to the British as set forth in telegram 251 of May 29 that parties involved in a situation as well as parties to a dispute must abstain from voting is sound both historically and analytically. The definition of a dispute in the rules would, we believe, make it difficult for us to assert this position.

3. We believe that the best way to distinguish between procedural and substantive questions is to indicate those decisions which are clearly procedural and those which are clearly substantive either by separate lists or by an indication in each relevant rule as to the manner in which the decision is to be taken. We believe the Soviets should be willing to accept this procedure in view of Professor Stein's statements to the Committee of Experts (S/Procedure/60, p. 6) and also since such a procedure is in accord with the Soviet proposal at San Francisco. (See Amdel 24, April 15). While the procedure of enumerating in the Rules the substantive and procedural decisions is not closely related to the idea of defining a dispute, we fear that the British approach might tend to shift the emphasis from our approach which we believe over a period of time has greater chances of success.

4. Finally, we see no real hope that it will be possible to work out a satisfactory definition of a dispute. Hartley informs us that numerous previous efforts have been made and were unsuccessful.

Although as you point out in your 251 of May 29 the UK and US approaches are not mutually exclusive, any attempt by the British to press for an agreed definition of dispute in the Committee of Experts will raise all the angles of the whole voting problem.

We therefore suggest that you try to persuade the British to postpone any discussion of this matter. It may be that developments during the summer may alter the British position. Likewise on the basis of further information which you may furnish us it might be desirable to reconsider our position upon Mr. Cohen's return from Europe.45 [Hiss.]

BYRNE

45 The Counselor of the Department (Cohen) was about to leave with the Secretary of State for the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers (June 13).
SECRET URGENT New York, June 12, 1946—8:35 p.m.
(via Courier)

Lawford (UK) indicated on June 11 to J. Johnson (US) that he would probably introduce the U.K. proposal relating to the definition of a dispute into the Committee of Experts in about a week. He hoped that it might be possible to obtain agreement in the Committee of Experts without getting into the whole question of voting in the Security Council.

Lawford hinted, however, that if further discussions make it appear that it would be impossible to obtain early agreement on the definition of disputes, he might tell his Government of the difficulties and ask permission to drop the matter for the time being.

Lawford read a Foreign Office report which made the following points:

1. That the U.S. would be well-advised to drop its proposal relating to abstention of parties to a dispute. For one thing this would create two new concepts unknown to the Charter, (a) a party to a situation, (b) an issue. Secondly, it was illogical to attempt to disqualify a State from voting on the ground that it is a party to a dispute before determination has been made that a dispute exists.

2. The Foreign Office would like to support the U.S. concept of extending the scope of procedural decisions by the adoption of a list of matters which would be deemed procedural, or by a similar device.

3. In answer to Lawford's earlier query as to whether the definition should not be extended to cover cases in which a state does not contest the facts or inferences but, nevertheless, is actually involved in a dispute with another State, the Foreign Office thought this would be a most unlikely situation. It was, however, willing to insert in Paragraph A (2), following the word "contest", the words "or do not admit".

4. In connection with point (3) the Foreign Office made it clear that its proposed definition was not meant to be all inclusive, but was merely designed to narrow the area of uncertainty as to what constitutes a dispute.

5. Commenting on Lawford's report that U.S. representatives had pointed out that Paragraph A (2) of the U.K. proposal appeared to limit the definition of disputes to those which endanger or are likely to endanger the international peace and security, London said that this
was intentional. The Foreign Office added that in its view the Security Council could not, under the Charter, deal with disputes of any other character.

6. The Foreign Office failed to comment on the U.S. suggestion that Paragraph A (3) of the proposal related to a definition of a party to a dispute rather than to that of a dispute. It did say however, in response to a specific query, that all three of the states referred to in this paragraph would in its opinion be parties to a dispute.

JOHNSON

501.BC/5-1446: Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, June 14, 1946—9 p. m. [Received 9:10 p. m.]

316. For Hiss. Following receipt of urtel No. 92, June 12, and of telephoned report of discussion on June 13 in Mr. Cohen’s office concerning that part of mytel 308, June 12, relating to definition of dispute, J. E. Johnson yesterday requested appointment with Lawford (U.K.). He read Lawford your 92 except for last two sentences and then added that, since receiving report of the conversation of June 11 (mytel 308), US Government had taken an even stronger position regarding the definition of a dispute. Johnson stated that, in view of the US Government there is nothing in the Charter which makes a rule defining a dispute necessary, or desirable. Moreover, his government had informed him that it is quite firmly opposed to the UK proposal for a definition of a dispute, because (1) it does not agree with the text, and (2) it wishes to avoid discussing this question unless there is complete discussion of entire voting question.

At Lawford’s request the US views were later given to him in an informal memorandum.

Lawford, who fully understands our position and is obviously unhappy about both the text of the proposal and the Foreign Office’s insistence of introducing it now, intends to tell F.O. at once of US views. He also read Johnson a draft of a letter to F.O. in which he raised some of the points mentioned in mytel 308 (for more complete report of June 11 talk, see memorandum of conversation given Bancroft 45). The letter also emphasized the inadvisability of introducing a proposal without advance US concurrence: Lawford wrote in this connection that, on the basis of previous experience, he felt that the proposal would have little chance of adoption by Committee of Experts in absence of UK-US agreement on it.

45 Not found in Department files.
Following a brief discussion, Lawford, feeling F.O. would not alter its position on his recommendation alone, wondered whether matter might not be referred to Paris for discussion between Jebb and Cohen. I believe this suggestion, which Lawford intends to pass on to Cadogan, merits serious consideration and would appreciate your views.\(^{45}\)

JOHNSON

740.00119 Council/6–1846: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 18, 1946—7 p.m.

2926. Secdel 289. For Benjamin Cohen. Joseph Johnson has had a series of conversations with Lawford of the UK delegation in New York and has pointed out in emphatic terms our reaction to the British proposal that the term “dispute” be defined in the Rules of Procedure of the SC.

Johnson has reported that (New York telegram 316, June 14) although Lawford is willing to recommend to the FonOff that the proposal be dropped, he does not feel that it will alter its position on his recommendation alone. Accordingly, Lawford has suggested that a conversation between you and Jebb might help to change the FonOff view. Cadogan has requested FonOff to ask Jebb to discuss question with you.

In the light of the foregoing, you may wish to bring the matter up with Jebb in the hope that the FonOff can be dissuaded from pursuing its present course.

Repeated to New York as Dept’s 96.

ACHESON

740.00119 Council/6–2046: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT PARIS, June 20, 1946—7:30 p.m.

[Received 10:08 p.m.]

3017. Delssec 603. For Hiss from Cohen. Had talk with Jebb at lunch today on rules regarding disputes. Told him our fears regarding their proposed definitions and our feeling that it might be better to delay action now.

\(^{47}\) H. M. G. Jebb, Counsellor, British Foreign Office, principally engaged in United Nations affairs at this time.

\(^{45}\) In telegram 324, June 17. 8:10 p.m., Minister Johnson stated: "Lawford informed member US delegation today . . . that Cadogan has requested Foreign Office to ask Jebb to take up question of definition of a dispute with Cohen in Paris." Mr. Johnson suggested also that Mr. Cohen be informed of the substance of the conversations in New York. (501.8/6–1746)
Also explained our position that charter does not require a finding by the Council that there is a dispute or a determination of the parties to a dispute, but that these questions may be raised in connection with the right to vote and then decided as a procedural matter. I had not yet received your Secdel 296 49 and he did not appear to be briefed on their position.

He listened sympathetically and, while not committing himself definitely to our position, did not seem disposed to advance contrary position, merely indicating that some of their people thought that their definitions might be helpful rather than harmful. He also indicated that there was a division among their people regarding our position on the effect of abstention though he was inclined to agree with our position.

CAFFERY

49 Telegram 2934, June 19, 11 a. m., to Paris, not printed; it transmitted the text of the British proposal for defining disputes.
50 This document, drafted as a briefing paper for the United States Delegation to the Second Part of the First Session of the General Assembly under date of October 2, 1946, sums up the Committee of Experts phase of the Security Council voting question. It is being printed here for purposes of convenience.
51 This collection of papers is identified in the IO Files as SD/S/247. It is a comprehensive survey of the subject, consisting of six units: (1) introduction, (2) positions taken at San Francisco, (3) positions taken in the Security Council, (4) positions taken before the Committee of Experts, (5) recent (to June 12) memoranda, telegrams, etc., in the Department concerning the United States position, (6) conclusion.
made in the development of techniques for interpreting that Article. In
general, it was agreed by all Representatives that procedural decisions
of the Security Council should be enumerated in the Rules of Pro-
cedure. It was further agreed that after as full an enumeration as
possible of procedural decisions, the question of whether other deci-
sions of the Security Council were procedural would require the
concerenee of the permanent members of the Council.

Undoubtedly, very little agreement was reached in the application
of these techniques. For example, no agreement was reached as to the
nature of the decision approving reports from the Security Council
to the General Assembly. Also while it was recognized that a per-
manent member of the Council a party to a dispute must abstain from
voting on decisions in connection with that dispute, no agreement was
reached as to whether or not the alleged party to the dispute must
abstain from voting on the preliminary questions as to whether the
matter was a dispute or a situation, whether the dispute endangered
the maintenance of international peace and security, and whether the
State was in fact a party to the dispute. As will be pointed out con-
siderable agreement on most of these problems was achieved among
the Representatives on the Committee of Experts other than the
Representatives of USSR.

The chief significance of the Committee of Experts discussions is
that they indicate the approaches towards consideration of the prob-
lem of voting which are most likely to secure support for the United
States position. A summary of the most important discussions in the
Committee of Experts follows:

I. Security Council Rule of Procedure on Voting

The Committee of Experts recommended in February 1946 and the
Security Council adopted the following Rule of Procedure on voting:

"Voting in the Security Council shall be in accordance with the
relevant Articles of the Charter and of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice." (Rule 40)

This Rule of Procedure, which is a recognition of the fact that the
problem of voting cannot be dealt with summarily, was adopted pro-
visionally by both the Committee of Experts and the Security Council
without any substantial discussion.

To quote the Report of the Security Council to the General
Assembly (page 47) : 52

52 This is an incorrect page citation which should read p. 87 (United Nations,
Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, Second Part, Supple-
ment No. 1, "Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly, . . . ").
Further, the quotation which follows is out of context; actually, it appeared in
the May 13 Committee of Experts Report to the Security Council; see foot-
note 39, p. 274.
“There was a full and free exchange of views on this subject in the Committee. It was the view of certain of its members that the Chapter on Voting should contain detailed provisions covering both the mechanics of the vote and the majorities by which the various decisions of the Council should be taken. But since the Committee was not able to draft additional rules of procedure on this subject, it was decided to defer further consideration of the problem to a later date.”

II. “Rule 31” Proposed by Representative of the U.S.S.R.

The greater part of the discussion of voting in the Security Council has centered around the consideration of the so-called “Rule 31” proposed by the Representative of the U.S.S.R. to the Committee of Experts. This proposal, which is contained in S/Procedure/17, is as follows:

Rule 31 proposed by Soviet Representative in S/Procedure/17

“Rule 31. Should the Security Council consider a dispute provided for by Article 33 of the Charter, a party to the dispute shall abstain from voting in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 27 of the Charter.

Should the Security Council consider a situation provided for by Article 34 or any other dispute which does not fall under Article 33, all the members of the Security Council are entitled to participate in voting.

The decision of whether a question under the consideration of the Security Council is of procedural nature and also of whether the question under consideration is a dispute or situation and whether this dispute is of the nature referred to in Article 33 of the Charter shall be regarded as accepted if it is voted for by seven members of the Security Council including the concurring votes of all the permanent members of the Security Council.”

The discussion of the problems raised by this Rule of Procedure which took place between April 15–25, 1946, was extremely extensive and in some instances went far beyond the specific provisions of the Rule. The positions taken by the respective delegates on the four main issues raised either directly or indirectly by the proposed Rule were as follows:

A. Decision of Security Council as to whether a matter is of a procedural nature.

a. The rule proposed by the U.S.S.R. provides that the decision of whether the question under consideration by the Security Council is of procedural nature shall be by a substantive vote. In view of paragraph 2 of Part II of the Four Power Declaration it would be difficult for the United States to take a contrary position without violating the Four Power Declaration. This is recognized by the United States Representative, S/Procedure/70, page 7. Only Australia and Netherlands suggested that the determination of this question should be by procedural vote. Australia, S/Procedure/71, page 2 and 73, page 3; Netherlands, S/Procedure/75, page 4.
b. In the Four Power Declaration it was contemplated that the area covered by such a rule should be restricted as much as possible through specifying in the Rules of Procedure the types of decisions of the Security Council requiring a procedural vote. The following Representatives have approved such a procedure:

U.S., S/Procedure/60, page 2; Australia, S/Procedure/60, page 2; Netherlands, S/Procedure/75, page 4; Poland, S/Procedure/60, page 3; France, S/Procedure/60, page 3; U.S.S.R., S/Procedure/60, page 4 and 70, page 8; U.K., S/Procedure/60, page 5; China, S/Procedure/70, page 5.

The further enumeration of procedural decisions through Rules of Procedure was deferred in the Committee of Experts until completion of urgently required rules on subjects which were less controversial.

B. Decision of Security Council as to whether a dispute under Chapter VI is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

a. The U.S.S.R. proposal provides that such a decision should be by a substantive vote. This is undoubtly in accordance with the discussions at San Francisco. This position was approved by the Representative of China, S/Procedure/61, Rev. 1, page 1 and 70, page 4; U.S., S/Procedure/70, page 4.

b. However, the U.S.S.R. proposed rule likewise provides that the parties to a dispute shall not abstain from voting unless the dispute falls under Article 33 (i.e., endangers the maintenance of international peace and security). All Representatives excepting the Representative of U.S.S.R. agreed that there is nothing in Article 27 (3) which justifies such distinction in connection with the duty to abstain from voting. The U.S.S.R. position on this question was opposed by the following Representatives:


C. Decision of the Security Council as to whether a matter before the Council is a dispute or situation.

a. In the discussions in the Committee of Experts it is frequently pointed out that the decision of the Council as to whether a dispute or situation exists has consequences in addition to those relating to the problem of abstention from voting. (S/Procedure/73, pages 4 and 5) for example, a State which is a Member of the United Nations may, under Article 32, participate in the discussion in the Security Council of a dispute but not of a situation. (Probably a State involved in a situation could be invited to participate in the discussion of the Security Council under the general powers of the Council or in certain circumstances under Article 35. See paper on Technical Aspects of Proposals for Liberalized Interpretation of Four Power Statement and Article 27, page 6). Likewise, under Article 33, the parties to a
dispute are required to seek a solution by means of their own choice. This requirement does not extend to the parties involved in a situation. The U.S.S.R. position is that the determination of whether a dispute or situation exists should be by a substantive vote. The Representatives of France and the United States have tentatively acquiesced in the U.S.S.R. position except on the question of abstention from voting (France, S/Procedure/60, page 7, 61, Rev. 1, page 6; U.S., S/Procedure/70, page 7). The Representatives of Netherlands and Australia suggested that such a decision might be by a procedural vote (Netherlands, S/Procedure/75, page 4; Australia, S/Procedure/60, page 6 and 73, page 6).

b. The United States, however, has taken a position that in the interpretation of Article 27 (3) no distinction should be made between disputes and situations—in other words that the term "dispute" should cover "situations". As is pointed out in the memorandum on the History of the Voting Problem (Chapter on Yalta Conference I, 4, d) and also in the memorandum on the Technical Aspects of Proposals for a Liberalized Interpretation of Article 27 (3) and the Four Power Statement (page 6) it appears that the omission of the word "situation" from Article 27 was inadvertent. The United States Representative therefore contended that parties involved in situations as well as parties to a dispute should be required to abstain from voting under Chapter VI of the Charter. The following Representatives have supported this position:

U.S., S/Procedure/60, page 8 and 70, page 7; Australia, S/Procedure/60, page 6, 71, page 2 and 73, page 5; China, S/Procedure/60, page 8 and 61, Rev. 1, page 4; Netherlands, S/Procedure/75, page 3; Mexico, S/Procedure/70, page 6.

D. Decision of the Security Council as to whether a State is a party to a dispute.

This problem is not raised directly by the proposed Rule 81. However, if Rule 81 were adopted, there would be practically no occasion for a vote on the question of the parties to a dispute since an alleged party to a dispute could exercise its veto power at an earlier stage of the proceedings. However, in the event of the adoption of any rule in accordance with the position taken by the United States Representative, this problem would arise.

In the discussions in the Committee of Experts the following Representatives have indicated that the decision of this question should be by procedural vote:

Australia, S/Procedure/73, page 5; Netherlands, S/Procedure/75, page 4.

The Representative of China has indicated that the decision of this

---

53 None of these is printed. They are found in the IO Files as documents SD/S/681, SD/S/685A, and SD/A/71A, respectively. They are included also with two other documents in a collection of position papers entitled "Unanimity Rule and Related Issues" which was prepared by the Department for the United States Delegation to the Second Part of the First Session of the General Assembly, scheduled to meet in New York in the fall of 1946.
question should be by a substantive vote with alleged parties to the dispute abstaining from voting. S/Procedure/61, Rev. 1, page 4.

The United States has taken no definite position on this matter in the Committee of Experts except as hereinafter set forth in connection with the so-called "Rule C".

[Here follows discussion of another aspect of the voting problem, unrelated to Article 27.]

IV. Proposed Rules B and C.

In Amdel 18 of April 13, 1946 the Department communicated to the United States Delegation two proposals for Rules of Procedure on the subject of voting. These proposals were as follows:

Rule B. "In announcing the results of a procedural vote, the President shall indicate the number of members voting in favor of the proposed action and shall state whether the proposed action has been taken.

"In announcing the results of a substantive vote, the President shall indicate the number of members voting in favor of the proposed action, and the permanent members concurring; the number of members voting against and the permanent members voting against; and the number of members abstaining and the permanent members abstaining. Unless a permanent member abstaining, affirmatively indicates that it does not concur, it shall not be deemed to have exercised its veto right, but shall be deemed to be willing to concur without voting on whatever action the Council may take by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the other permanent members."

In Amdel 19 of April 13 the United States Representative was authorized to discuss Rule B under the following circumstances:

"We are not prepared to recommend Rule B set forth in the earlier telegram as the firm position of the U.S. Government. However, it can be used to promote discussion in the Committee of Experts or elsewhere and may be helpful in your efforts to persuade the other members to the view that a permanent member may abstain from voting in the Council without exercising a veto."

Rule C. "In accordance with Article 27 (3) a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting on non-procedural matters, and in announcing any vote on any such matter the President shall record any member which he deems to be a party to a dispute within the meaning of Article 27 (3) as not voting. If any member of the Council appeals a ruling of the President either that a member shall abstain or shall not abstain from voting, the President's ruling may be overruled by a procedural vote."

In Amdel 19 the United States Representative was given the following instructions concerning the proposed Rule C:

"We suggest that Rule C be used as a first step in discussion only if the Committee determines to proceed to the immediate consideration
of Rule 31, proposed by the Soviet Representative or another specific rule dealing with other problems set forth in Rule C."

(Rule 31 is quoted on page 2 of this memorandum.)

The report of the United States Representative concerning these proposed rules is set forth as follows in Telegram 74 of April 15, 1946 from New York:

"In the course of Sunday, April 14, and Monday, April 15, U.S. Representative Johnson informally and confidentially presented copies of the suggested U.S. revision of Article (A)—(S/Procedure/51)—a relating to announcement of votes to his U.K., China, U.S.S.R. and French colleagues on the Committee of Experts, in the order given.

"In each case Johnson made it clear that this was a suggestion on which the U.S. would like comments. He referred specifically to the two discussions in San Francisco on this point among Representatives of the Big Five, and explained that this background was the reason for showing copies at this time only to Representatives of the permanent members. Lawford and Chaumont made no comment on the substance. Liang thought China would accept the concept of abstention. Stein, while he made clear the need to talk to Gromyko said that he personally was not in favor of forcing a State to vote if it wished to abstain. This is perhaps significant in light of the fact Johnson told Stein in detail of Lavrentiev's position at San Francisco.

"Johnson also discussed with Lawford and Liang the proposed rule relating to parties to a dispute (Department's Urteil 18).† Both Liang and Lawford had doubts as to whether there was sound legal basis for this procedure. Johnson has not yet had time to discuss this matter with Chaumont and Stein."

(Lavrentiev's view at San Francisco was substantially the same as that expressed informally by Stein).

There has been no further discussion of these proposed rules.

V. U.K. Proposal to Define a Dispute

The United Kingdom Representative on instruction showed United States Representative a draft which he proposed to bring before the Committee of Experts, of a suggested Rule of Procedure defining a dispute in such a manner that every matter brought before the Security Council and alleged to be a dispute would in fact be a dispute. The United States opposed the British proposal for a number of reasons, two of which are closely linked to the general problem of voting. First, the United States has taken the position that parties involved in a situation, as well as parties to a dispute, must abstain from voting. If the term "dispute" is defined in the Rules, it would be difficult to assert this position. Second, the United States has taken the position that differentiation should be made between the meaning of "dispute"

---

*aArticle A was a proposed Rule of Procedure requiring the President to announce the results of voting in the Security Council. [Footnote in original]
† Amend 18 of April 13, 1946—previously quoted. [Footnote in the original.]
as used in Article 27, paragraph 3 and as used in other sections of the Charter. Any Rule defining a dispute which failed to make such a differentiation would be inconsistent with the United States position, which recognizes that for the purpose of some articles the determination requires the concurrence of the permanent members of the existence of a dispute.

The Representative of the United Kingdom informed the United States Representative that while he had instructions to bring the matter before the Committee of Experts, he did not wish to do so unless the United States agreed. In view of the United States objections which were communicated informally to the United Kingdom Representative, the proposal was never carried beyond the stage of informal discussions between the two Representatives.

501.BC/8-1646

Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Special Political Affairs

PROPOSED PAPERS ON THE ISSUE OF THE "VETO" IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND RELATED QUESTIONS.  

SECRET  

[WASHINGTON,] August 16, 1946.

The issue of the "veto" in the Security Council has been placed on the agenda of the General Assembly, scheduled to meet September 23, by the Australian Delegation which requests consideration of the application of Article 27 of the Charter dealing with the method of voting in the Security Council. In addition, the Cuban Delegation has placed on the supplementary list (containing items which can be included in the agenda by vote of the Assembly) an item requesting that a general conference of United Nations members be called in accordance with Article 109 of the Charter (General Conference to consider amendments) "in order to modify Paragraph 3 of Article 27 of the Charter to eliminate the so-called veto privilege."  

54 A working paper drafted in the Office of Special Political Affairs for the Department's United Nations Liaison Committee.  

55 This proposed item was placed on the provisional agenda by the Secretary-General; for General Committee consideration of this subject see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, Second Part, General Committee, pp. 74 and 75.  

56 United Nations document A/75; this proposal was addressed to the Secretary-General on August 1. Subsequently (October 3) Cuba submitted another item calling for a general conference of Members of the United Nations under Article 109 of the Charter for the purpose of reviewing the present Charter (United Nations document A/102); this was in effect a reiteration of the original Cuban proposal and not designed to enlarge its scope. (Documents found in United Nations depository libraries.)  

The relevant section of Article 109 reads: "1. A General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the present Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council. Each Member of the United Nations shall have one vote in the conference."
There is every prospect of a full debate on the subject of the "veto" followed by possible action by the General Assembly. Public as well as official interest has of course been increased by the use of the veto in the Security Council and discussion in the Atomic Energy Commission.

The United States Representative to the Security Council and ranking officers of the Department of State have proposed a full study of the "veto", not only in its technical aspects, but more especially from the broader viewpoints of the philosophy of the "veto" and the theory and use of the principle in national governments and in international organizations other than the United Nations as well as in the United Nations itself.

Listed below are a series of papers suggested for preparation in various interested offices and divisions of the Department. Responsibility for the preparation of each paper is suggested after each title on the assumption that the named office or division will consult with other interested offices and divisions.\(^{57}\)

1. The United States position \(^{58}\)—SPA and its divisions in collaboration with the other interested offices and divisions.

---

\(^{57}\) Technical information regarding drafting procedures, deadlines, etc., omitted: omissions not indicated. Detailed studies were made on each subject; most were completed by the first week in September. In turn these were incorporated into a collection entitled "Background Book on Unanimity Rule and Related Issues" (10 Files).

\(^{58}\) See document SD/A/C.1/66B, October 22, 1946, p. 298, for the statement of the United States position which eventuated from this study; see also minutes of meeting with Senator Austin, September 11, p. 293. Senator Warren R. Austin had been appointed Senior Representative on the United States Delegation to the Second Part of the First Session of the General Assembly.

The work on preparing a position paper on the General Assembly items dealing with voting in the Security Council was initiated in the Division of International Security Affairs in the Office of Special Political Affairs. By August 31 a second draft was being circulated within the Office of Special Political Affairs and at this time Elwood N. Thompson, Special Assistant to the Director (Hiss) noted in a memorandum to Mr. Hiss and the Deputy Director (Ross) that: "... The basic question seems to me to be whether or not the attached paper is couched in a sufficiently broad framework to be satisfactory to Mr. Austin, Mr. Cohen and Mr. Fahy [Charles Fahy, Legal Adviser of the Department of State]. Material perhaps can be adapted to a broader framework which will make clear the reasons for the position taken. The paper as now organized seems to balance a large superstructure primarily on the consideration of an effective set of tactics to gain our objectives in the Committee of Experts. Perhaps the necessary broad framework can be established separately in the outline for possible use in preparing an address, which Mr. Ross planned to develop." (501.BC/8-3146)

In one of the earliest meetings in the Department on this question, shortly after the Australian item had been submitted, Mr. Ross had written: "... I find it difficult to escape the feeling that we perhaps have been indulging in a large amount of shadow-boxing with the technicalities of rules of procedure without having first formulated our broad policies with regard to the veto not only as this question arises in the Security Council but in many other ways." (Memorandum to Mr. Fahy and Mr. Cohen, July 22, 501.BC/7-2246).
2. Legislative and diplomatic history of provisions for voting in the Security Council up to the adoption of the Charter—IS.

3. Analysis of voting procedure in cases thus far considered by the Security Council—IS.

4. A compilation of official U.S. statements on the veto in relation to the control of atomic energy—IS, with Le.

5. Present status of discussions in the Committee of Experts on voting in the Security Council—IS.

6. The “veto” principle as expressed or implied in Article 79 of the Charter and in recent U.S. proposals for its relaxation in application—DA and EUR.

7. The “veto” principle in the Council of Foreign Ministers, and in the peacemaking machinery established after World Wars I and II—EUR.

8. The “veto” in Allied Control Commissions in Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Germany, Japan and Rumania—EUR and FE.

9. Public attitudes toward the “veto” in the United States—PL.

10. Voting procedure in the League of Nations and in major Pan American conferences—OA.

11. The “veto” or influence tantamount thereto in specialized international agencies—OA.

12. Aspects of U.S. foreign policy on which this Government insists on exercising its unilateral judgment (e.g. immigration, bases, Monroe Doctrine, Panama Canal, etc.)—OCL, with all geographic offices, Le, A-C, A-B.

Note: An appropriate query in connection with the following suggested papers would be: What recognition is given in national attitudes and practices or political theory in various parts of the world to the possibility of interposing decisive objections (legal or extra-legal) to proposed international action?

13. The “veto” or influence tantamount thereto in relation to international organization in the Western Hemisphere (this paper should also characterize, if possible, the general attitude of Latin Americans toward the existence of the “veto” in political processes)—OA (Regional Branch), with ARA.

14. Soviet attitudes and practices with respect to the “veto” in international affairs, particularly in international organization—EE.

15. Chinese attitudes and practices with respect to the “veto” in international affairs, particularly in international organization—FE.

16. French attitudes and practices with respect to the “veto” in international affairs, particularly in international organization—EUR.

17. The “veto” in the operation of the British Commonwealth of Nations (This paper should also treat of the general attitude toward the “veto” or its equivalent in the internal politics of the various British Commonwealths)—BC.

18. Voting arrangements in the Arab League—NEA.
19. The "veto" in American constitutional theory and practice (This would include an examination of the Federalist Papers, analysis of relations between branches of the Federal Government, and analysis of congressional parliamentary practice and theory)—Le, with OCL.

501.BB/8-3146: Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT NEW YORK, August 31, 1946—12:15 p. m. [Received August 31—11:30 a. m.]

533. Reference Department’s 167, August 23, 2 p. m.59 I have discussed frankly with Hasluck all queries raised in the Department’s telegram. He said that as he understands, what Evatt proposes to do at the Assembly will depend very largely on what he finds the “climate” of the Assembly to be. Evatt does not plan an all-out attack on the veto as such but his purpose is to effect a restriction of the veto more in line with what he believes to have been the general intention at San Francisco. Evatt is worried about developments since San Francisco which indicate that the Russians consider the veto a convenient piece of machinery to impose their will in all sorts of questions and to block any type of action that does not please them. I gather from Hasluck’s remarks, therefore, that Evatt does not favor total abolition of the so-called veto but would like to see its use confined to matters of real substance which would be of vital interest to the great power employing it. Hasluck showed some caution in reporting his statement as the views of Evatt because he has not got specific instructions. His conclusions may, therefore, be erroneous, as Evatt, if he finds extensive support in the Assembly for abolition of the so-called veto, may go further than he now intends. Evatt, however, has considerable political realism and, if my judgment of him is correct, he would not wish to go too far out on an issue which would lead him to a complete impasse. According to Hasluck, the Australians regard the Cuban proposal as unrealistic and I do not think that the Australian item has any relation to the Cuban proposal.

JOHNSON

59 Not printed; The Department requested Ambassador Johnson to “... obtain by informal casual inquiry of Hasluck” information regarding Foreign Minister Evatt’s purpose in requesting that the Australian item relating to Article 27 be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly. “To what extent does he desire modification of voting formula? Does he favor abolition of so-called veto on all or part of Chapter VII, or other parts of Charter in addition to those relating peaceful settlement? Does he intend open challenge of four-power declaration? “Any information you can obtain as to Australian views on Cuban proposal and its relation to Australia item would be appreciated.” (501.BB/8-2346)
Minutes of the Seventh Meeting on General Assembly Preparations
With Senator Austin, Department of State, September 11, 1946,
11 a.m.

TOP SECRET

Present: Senator Warren R. Austin  Hayden Raynor
Bernhard B. Bechhoefer  John C. Ross
William Dawson  William Sanders
Everett Drumright  Durward Sandifer
Charles Fahy  Isaac Stokes
Dorothy Fosdick  Elwood Thompson
Alger Hiss  George Wadsworth
Joseph E. Johnson  Charles Yost

GENERAL ASSEMBLY AGENDA ITEMS DEALING WITH VOTING IN
SECURITY COUNCIL

Mr. Ross stated that the purpose of this meeting was primarily to
consider the approach which would be used in consideration of the
problem of veto rather than the conclusions. The discussion in the
meeting should center around the draft of a proposed position paper
and Senator Austin's memorandum of September 9. Mr. Ross stated
that two factors must constantly be borne in mind:

1. That the discussions must be centered around the two specific
proposals before the General Assembly—the Australian proposal and the
Cuban proposal.

2. That since the veto problem will not be settled in this session of
the General Assembly, a broad approach must be made to the specific
agenda items and their relation to the future development of the
United Nations.

Senator Austin stressed that in public discussion of the veto ques-
tion the emphasis had been wrong; that the affirmative problems of
prevention of war and peaceful settlement of disputes should be
stressed rather than the negative functions of the veto; that the veto
merely was one aspect of the principles of voting which were in turn
only phases of the broader subject of the prevention of war and peace-
ful settlement of disputes.

Mr. Ross indicated that the general line of Senator Austin's ap-
proach was the same as the approach that had been taken in the
Department of State.

60 Neither printed; the principal points in Senator Austin's memorandum were
discussed at this meeting; for the position paper that finally eventuated, see
Legal Effect of Four Power Statement

Mr. Johnson suggested that consideration of Senator Austin’s memorandum and the draft position paper raised the important problem of the legal status of the Four Power Statement. Senator Austin thought that the statement was morally but not legally binding on the Members of the United Nations that subscribed to it. Mr. Fahy suggested that the Four Power Statement, while not legally binding on the U.S., should be departed from reluctantly and should be given great weight as a statement of U.S. policy.

Senator Austin suggested that other statements of other Members of United Nations,—for example, a British statement which he quoted—should likewise be given weight as interpretations of the Charter and particularly as interpretations of problems where the Four Power Statement itself was ambiguous.

Mr. Ross summarized his impression of the views of Mr. Benjamin Cohen on the Four Power Statement and the general subject of the development of the Security Council. He stated that Mr. Cohen regarded the Four Power Statement in the nature of “dicta” concerning interpretation of the Charter which can be modified as the development of the world situation requires. Mr. Cohen did not consider the Charter as a static instrument the interpretation of which cannot be changed with development in world affairs. He believed that the Security Council would from time to time be given powers far beyond the specific limits of the Charter. An instance of such development would be the authority given to the Security Council with reference to the Government of Trieste.

Mr. Ross added his own view that future development is as important as past precedents in the interpretation of the Charter.

(It was agreed that a further paper be prepared on the specific question of the legal effect of the Four Power Statement).61

Reconciliation of Position on Veto Taken by Mr. Baruch62 With the Position To Be Taken Before the General Assembly

Mr. Fahy pointed out a possible conflict between the suggested position of the IS position paper and of Senator Austin’s memorandum that the Charter should not be amended, and Mr. Baruch’s position advocating abolition of the veto in connection with enforcement action in the event of violations of the proposed treaty concerning atomic

---

61 The seven-page document that resulted was serialized in the IO Files as document SD/A/71A and incorporated in a book of position papers entitled “Unanimity Rule and Related Issues”.
62 Bernard M. Baruch, United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission; for documentation concerning atomic energy matters, see pp. 1197 ff.
energy. It was agreed that the U.S. position should be stated in such a manner that it would not be possible to claim that the U.S. opposition at this time to amendment of the Charter provisions on voting would prevent the carrying out of the recommendations of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Senator Austin stated that the position to be taken before the General Assembly should not interfere with the position taken by Mr. Baruch and should not limit future exceptions to the general voting position to the specific matter of atomic energy.

**Possibility of General Assembly Statement Interpreting the Veto**

Mr. Thompson suggested the possibility of a General Assembly statement similar to the Four Power Statement interpreting the veto. Senator Austin was impressed with the usefulness of such a statement in magnifying the roles of smaller States in United Nations. Mr. Johnson, although impressed by the importance and usefulness of such a statement, stressed the difficulties of securing agreement on it.

Senator Austin and others felt that the important thing was to get a broad and liberal expression of the Assembly’s view, even though some Members might not agree to the statement. Senator Austin suggested and it was agreed that as a first priority the Department of State should draft a proposed text of such an interpretative resolution.\(^{63}\)

**Importance of Voting Formula**

Senator Austin stressed the importance of the voting formula as set forth in Article 27 of the Charter, and that without this formula, there probably would have been no Charter. He felt that the veto was the smallest element in the voting principles and that stress must be given in all publicity concerning the positive achievements with respect to voting.

Mr. Sanders cited as a parallel the situation in the Inter-American organizations where despite the non-existence of a veto, it has been found desirable to work toward unanimity in order to insure the better functioning of the system. Mr. Wadsworth contrasted the useful purposes of the veto to its abuse. Mr. Ross pointed out that the shifting of emphasis from the negative side of the veto to the possible usefulness of unanimity among United Nations Members should not be permitted to obscure the fact that the greatest accomplishments of United Nations have taken place in one of the organs where there is no veto, the Economic and Social Council.

\(^{63}\) No paper as such seems to have eventuated.
Present Position on Elimination of the Veto

Senator Austin stated that in his opinion it would not be appropriate to eliminate the veto at this time in connection with problems arising under Chapter VII. On the other hand, it would be appropriate to take some steps towards eliminating the veto in connection with recommendations under Chapter VI. For the future after disarmament the number of situations where the right of veto is retained should become progressively less and less. It is to be anticipated that disputes among nations will in the future be dealt with more frequently through the methods of pacific settlement or through the use of the World Court. A tremendous step in this direction was the recent U.S. commitment to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

Draft Position Paper

The most important comments concerning the proposed position paper submitted by Mr. Johnson are set forth below. Mr. Johnson requested Senator Austin’s view on the problem of U.S. policy towards elimination of the veto in connection with recommendations of the Security Council pursuant to Article 37(2). He explained that there was a great deal to be said both for and against elimination of the veto in this situation.

It was agreed that all positions set forth in the paper should be specifically limited to the present time thus leaving the door open for possible future modification of positions.

Senator Austin suggested that the position paper stressed insufficiently the accomplishments of the Security Council to date and presented too pessimistic a picture of the present procedures in the Security Council.

---

64 Chapter VII deals with breaches of the peace, etc.
65 Chapter VI is concerned with pacific settlement of disputes.
66 Article 37 of the United Nations Charter reads: “1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council. 2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.”

Article 36 reads: “1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment. 2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties. 3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.”
It was agreed after discussion that a brief paper should be prepared to indicate whether or not under Article 25 a Member of the United Nations was under legal obligation to carry out recommendations under the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VI. There was considerable difference of opinion among those at the meeting as to proper interpretation of that Article.

501.8C/10-1646

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss) 68

[WASHINGTON, October 16, 1946.]

Subject: Consultation with other Members of the Security Council on the Veto Question.

It is proposed that as soon as the U.S. position paper on the veto question is fully approved in the Department, a communication be submitted to each of the other four permanent members of the Security Council, briefly setting forth in substance:

(1) That the U.S. regards the principle of unanimity as reflected in the Yalta voting formula as sound and valid;
(2) That accordingly, the U.S. does not at the present time favor any amendment to Article 27 of the Charter nor a modification of the Four-Power Statement issued at San Francisco;
(3) That the U.S. does, however, favor a liberalized interpretation of Article 27 and the Four-Power Statement along the lines of the three points set forth in the U.S. position paper.
(4) That the U.S. favors full discussion of the veto question in the General Assembly, including the Cuban proposal, but will oppose the calling of a general conference to amend or eliminate the so-called veto privilege.
(5) That the U.S. position with respect to voting on the Security Council does not alter the position taken on the problem of the application of the veto in the control of atomic energy.

This procedure will enable the Governments of the other four permanent members of the Security Council to consider the U.S. position in advance of discussion in the General Assembly or in Committee. It will also make it possible if deemed advisable by the permanent members, to have discussion at the expert level as to the methods of carrying forward, by Rules of Procedure or otherwise, the U.S. pro-

67 Article 25 of the United Nations Charter reads: "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter." There seems to be no paper on this subject as such.
68 Addressed to the Counselor (Cohen) and the Under Secretary of State (Acheson).
posal for a liberalized interpretation of Article 27 and the Four-Power Statement.\(^{69}\)

\(^{69}\) Marginal notation by Elwood N. Thompson, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss): “I have told Harding Bancroft [now Associate Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs] to go ahead & prepare the paper suggested. ENT.” For subsequent developments concerning this proposed communication to the four other permanent members of the Security Council, see pp. 317 ff.

\*This paper deals with the question of the veto as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, particularly in respect of voting in the Security Council. It does not touch directly on the problem of the application of the veto in the control of atomic energy. [Footnote in the original.]

\[The Cuban representative proposed an additional item to the General Assembly agenda calling for a general conference of the United Nations members to review the Charter. It is understood that this was in effect a reiteration of their original proposal and not designed to enlarge its scope. [Footnote in the original.]

10 Files: SD/4/C.1/69B

Department of State Position Paper

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON, October 22, 1946.]

UNITED STATES POSITION ON GENERAL ASSEMBLY AGENDA ITEMS DEALING WITH VOTING IN SECURITY COUNCIL

I. The Problem*

The Problem is to determine the United States position with respect to

(1) the following item placed on the agenda of the General Assembly by the Australian Government: “the application of Article 27 of the Charter (dealing with the methods of voting in the Security Council) in the proceedings of the Security Council during 1946, and including exercise and the purported exercise of the right of veto upon Security Council decisions conferred by Article 27 and the circumstances connected therewith;” and

(2) an item for the consideration of the General Assembly proposed by the Cuban Government, which has been placed on the Supplementary List by the Secretary-General, as follows: “A convocatory for a general conference of the Members of the United Nations Organization in accordance with Article 109 of the Charter in order to modify Paragraph 3 of Article 27 of the Charter to eliminate the so-called veto privilege.†

II. Possible Objectives of Proponents of Veto Discussion

Discussions in the General Assembly may be expected to be directed toward any or all of the four following objectives:
A. An attack on the interpretation of Article 27 contained in the Statement on Voting Procedure issued at San Francisco by the United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, and United States, and agreed to by France, with a view to one or more of the following: (1) the adoption of a resolution denying its validity and binding character, (2) requesting the International Court of Justice to interpret Article 27 of the Charter, (3) inducing the permanent members of the Security Council to modify or abandon the Statement.

B. Charter amendment to eliminate or curtail the veto right in certain limited respects, most probably in relation to (1) pacific settlement under Chapter VI and Article 52(3), and (2) election of the Secretary-General and admission of new members.

C. Charter amendment to eliminate the veto right in its entirety.

D. Convocation of a General Conference to initiate amendments for either total or partial elimination of the veto.

III. Recommended United States Position†

A. General Considerations.

The position of the United States Delegation in the Assembly debate on voting in the Security Council should be based on the determination of the United States to make the United Nations an effective international organization and to promote its growth toward greater effectiveness as an instrument of international cooperation. This is the position which President Truman and Secretary Byrnes have repeatedly proclaimed and which the latter again enunciated at Stuttgart in these words:

"We intend to support the United Nations organization with all the power and resources we possess."

In carrying out this objective, the United States must continue to recognize that the principle of unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council is inseparably linked with one of the basic forces which made possible the establishment of the United Nations,—the coordinated action of the great powers during the last war and in preparation of the organization of the United Nations.

It is believed that the requirement that important decisions of the Security Council shall have the concurrence of all of the permanent members tends to discourage the assumption by the major powers of intransigent positions and to encourage the achievement of unanimity through compromise, the alternative being no decision at all. While

†The United States should early in the debate make its whole position known. The various points set forth in this section being interrelated, the United States position would suffer serious distortion unless stated as an integral whole. [Footnote in the original.]

‡ For text of address delivered by Secretary Byrnes in Stuttgart, Germany, on September 6, 1946, see Department of State Bulletin, September 15, 1946, pp. 496 ff.
the requirement of unanimity tends to increase the difficulties of adopting a clear-cut decision by forcing the great powers to endeavor to find a solution acceptable to all of them, it probably produces better results than would a voting formula that permitted an important decision unacceptable to any one of them. In any event, it prevents any tendency for the Security Council on issues of major importance to the Great Powers to become progressively committed to a course of action inconsistent with the continued collaboration of one or more of those Powers in the Security Council.

Therefore, the United States should seek to direct the Assembly debate on the veto toward carefully considered and feasible objectives which will strengthen the United Nations as much as present circumstances permit. Four general factors serve as guide posts in determining the objectives which are feasible:

1. The highest possible degree of unanimity among the permanent members is not only a desirable objective, but is considered essential to the effective operation of the Security Council. Therefore, even if all the other great powers were ready and willing to consent to a voting formula in the Security Council which would permit substantive decisions where the great powers were not unanimous, it is not at all certain that the United States should favor such a formula, since it would be likely to retard the achievement of unanimity. In situations where the principle of unanimity should be maintained, the voting formula itself should be changed to permit decisions which are not arrived at unanimously only if extended experience shows that such change is necessary for the successful operation of the Council.

It is pointed out in the Four Power Statement (Part I, Paragraphs 6 and 7) that the voting formula in the Security Council is in itself a relaxation of the stricter conception of unanimity contained in the Covenant of the League of Nations.

§Certain decisions of the Council under Chapter VI, now requiring the concurrence of all the Permanent Members might well be adopted by an unqualified majority of any seven members without affecting the objectives set forth herein. See C, 2 infra. [Footnote in the original.]

a These paragraphs read: "6. In appraising the significance of the vote required to take such decisions or actions, it is useful to make comparison with the requirements of the League Covenant with reference to decisions of the League Council. Substantive decisions of the League of Nations Council could be taken only by the unanimous vote of all its members, whether permanent or not, with the exception of parties to a dispute under Article XV of the League Covenant. Under Article XI, under which most of the disputes brought before the League were dealt with and decisions to make investigations taken, the unanimity rule was invariably interpreted to include even the votes of the parties to a dispute.

"7. The Yalta voting formula substitutes for the rule of complete unanimity of the League Council a system of qualified majority voting in the Security Council. Under this system, non-permanent members of the Security Council individually would have no ‘veto’. As regards the permanent members, there is no question under the Yalta formula of investing them with a new right, namely, the right to veto, a right which the permanent members of the League Council always had. The formula proposed for the taking of action in the Security Council by a majority of seven would make the operation of the Council less subject to obstruction than was the case under the League of Nations rule of complete unanimity."
It can be argued that much of the current criticisms of the veto stem not so much from the legitimate use of the privilege but primarily from its abuse. This abuse has fostered confusion about the primary interests involved.

2. The unanimity rule was meant to be confined in the United Nations to the most vital decisions affecting war and peace. It is important to keep in correct perspective the significance and influence of the requirement of unanimity among the great powers. It does not apply to voting in the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council or the Trusteeship Council. It has not been incorporated into the rules or practices of the several Commissions which have been established, including the Atomic Energy Commission, nor into the constitution of any of the specialized agencies.

The approach, therefore, towards a solution of the problem raised by the requirement of unanimity is a gradual extension of the areas wherein the probability of obtaining unanimity, or effective action without it, is high enough to eliminate or diminish substantially the need for a unanimity rule. This extension will be based largely upon experience gained through the operations of the United Nations in fields where unanimity is required.

Article 27 of the Charter which establishes the voting procedure in the Security Council was the result of thorough and carefully planned study in the United States and of extended and difficult negotiation. This has also been the case only to a slightly lesser degree with regard to other Articles incorporating the unanimity rule, such as those relating to amendments, (Articles 108, 109 (2)). It would appear to be undesirable to alter the Charter in this respect before the advantages and disadvantages of the present provisions had been tested both from the point of view of the interest of the United States and from that of the effectiveness of the United Nations.

3. In accomplishing its objectives, the United States must constantly bear in mind the viewpoint of other nations and particularly of the Soviet Union towards the unanimity principle and avoid action which tends to drive them into grudging, half-hearted partnership or even out of the Organization. All the evidence at hand indicates that the Soviet Union is, if anything, even more devoted to the principle of unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council than it was when the Charter was signed. It is clear that the Soviet Union feels that it cannot be assured that the fundamental principle of unanimity will be observed and that it will not be subject to the direction of an opposing majority, in the absence of a voting formula permitting a veto by a permanent member. This being so, the Soviet Government can be expected to resist to the utmost any proposal for even partial elimination of the veto from the United Nations Charter, at least at the present time. The United States position, therefore, should be along lines which will insure the maximum accomplishment with the greatest cooperation from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

---

72 Article 108 deals with the amendatory process when the amendment is effected by the General Assembly; Article 109(2) when the alteration is made by a "General Conference" for which provision is made in the first section of the article; both procedures required the assent of all the permanent members of the Security Council.
4. The successful functioning of the United Nations requires that all members uphold the Charter in good faith and a spirit of conciliation, and be ever alert to live up to and to defend the purposes and principles of the organization, both within the organization and in all their other international relations. The special responsibilities of the great powers as permanent members of the Security Council impose on them a particularly heavy obligation in this regard. In view of its great responsibilities, the United States, while seeking to understand the views of other states and to obtain maximum cooperation from them, must use its full influence to ensure adherence by all members of the United Nations, and particularly by the other permanent members of the Security Council, to the principles and purposes of the organization and to the spirit of the Charter. No member of the United Nations can be permitted to ignore the fact that, as Secretary Byrnes said on February 28, 1946, "the mere legal veto by one of the permanent members of the Council does not in fact relieve any state, large or small, of its moral obligations to act in accordance with those purposes and principles." Nor does the failure of any organ of the United Nations to take a decision relieve any member of that obligation.

The United States position has been formulated with regard to these general considerations.

B. Preferred Position: Liberalized Interpretation of Article 27 and Four Power Statement.

In view of the general considerations outlined above, the United States Delegation to the General Assembly should take a position designed primarily to promote a liberal interpretation by the Security Council of Article 27 and the Four Power Statement. Concretely it should (1) demonstrate what can be accomplished in this direction and the technique by which this may be done, and (2) endeavor to persuade the Soviet Union and the other permanent members of the Security Council on the one hand, and the lesser powers on the other, to accept such a liberalized interpretation. It should of course be remembered that this objective cannot be achieved by a resolution of the Assembly alone but requires action by the Security Council as well.

This course of action has the great advantage from the point of view of negotiations with the Soviet Union of making previous agreements the point of departure and of expanding gradually therefrom the areas of agreement. It would be a mistake to assume that even with this approach it will be easy to secure the consent of the Soviet Union to a liberalized interpretation of the voting formula. Discussions which have already taken place, particularly in the Security Council Committee of Experts, have demonstrated that not only will the Soviet

---

73 This statement was made by the Secretary in the course of an address to the Overseas Press Club at New York, and broadcast over the radio network of the National Broadcasting System.
Government resist liberalization along the lines proposed, but that it actually desires Rules of Procedure which will interpret Article 27 so as to expand the field of decision requiring the concurrence of the permanent members. Also it will remain possible, as long as the Four Power Statement remains in effect, for a permanent member to attempt to invoke Part II, Paragraph 2, of that Declaration in connection with any decision not previously determined to be procedural and thus to attempt to assert a veto in patently unjustifiable cases.\)

In this connection, it should be noted that in the Four Power Statement the four governments expressed their belief that the permanent members would not “use their ‘veto’ power willfully to obstruct the operation of the Council.” If all permanent members had lived up to this principle, it seems likely that there would have been very little criticism of the voting formula. Criticism has been mainly directed at the abuse rather than the use by the permanent members of their privileged voting position.\)

In a general way it is possible through a liberalized interpretation of Article 27 and the Four Power Statement to eliminate most of the abuses of the voting formula that have handicapped the operations of the Security Council to date. While the United States is probably not legally bound by the Four Power Statement, almost as much can be accomplished in the direction of improving the operations of the Security Council through interpretation of both Article 27 and the Four Power Statement, as through interpretation of Article 27 without the Four Power Statement. In this connection it should be noted that the Four Power Statement was regarded at San Francisco as a liberalization of the original Yalta Formula even by Mr. Evatt who was its bitterest opponent.

It is believed that the advantages of this method of approach far outweigh any possible disadvantages. Further experience as a result of the operations of the Security Council, however, may open new avenues of approach. The proposed liberalized interpretation of Article 27(3) and the Four Power Statement should, if possible, include all the following points:

(1) Agreement that the abstention clause of Article 27(3) shall be interpreted to prevent a state from being a judge in its own cause in

\[Part II, Paragraph 2 reads as follows: “In this case, it will be unlikely that there will arise in the future any matters of great importance on which a decision will have to be made as to whether a procedural vote would apply. Should, however, such a matter arise, the decision regarding the preliminary question as to whether or not such a matter is procedural must be taken by a vote of seven members of the Security Council, including the concurring votes of the permanent members.” [Footnote in the original.]

\[For discussion of abuses of the voting formula, see paper entitled Use of Veto in the Security Council of the United Nations (Background Book), and The Unanimity Principle in Theory and Practice, pp. 8 to 14, and Annex A (Position Book). [Footnote in the original. These “books” are found in the IO Files.]\]
any decisions under Chapter VI and under Paragraph 3 of Article 52. This would require a party to a dispute or involved in a situation to abstain from voting on decisions in connection with the particular dispute or situation, not only in connection with recommendations and other substantive decisions, but also in voting on any preliminary questions which may be necessary to determine whether a dispute or situation exists and whether the particular state is a party in interest. This was the clear intent of the Charter. It is true that several Articles of Chapter VI distinguish between disputes and situations, while Article 27(3) refers only to a dispute. Nevertheless, there are sound historical and logical grounds for assimilating disputes to situations in so far as Article 27(3) is concerned. Moreover, the spirit of the Charter would be seriously violated if it remains possible for a permanent member to block its own exclusion from voting by insisting either that no dispute exists or that it is not a party, and by vetoing any attempt to decide the contrary.

(2) Agreement that the requirement of unanimity among the permanent members on a non-procedural decision will be satisfied if all of the permanent members actually voting on the decision, vote in the affirmative (i.e., that voluntary abstention from voting by a permanent member—as opposed to the abstention required of a party to a dispute under Article 27(3)—shall not be the equivalent of a negative vote). This will enable the Council to reach a decision in cases where one or more permanent members do not approve of a decision but nevertheless are not prepared to vote against it.

(3) Agreement on a clear and exhaustive definition of procedural matters for the purpose of increasing to a maximum the occasions when the question of whether a matter is procedural may be decided without a vote. (Under Paragraph 2 of Part II of the Four Power Statement such decision requires the concurrence of the permanent members). Such an interpretation will not only eliminate most of the debate over procedural questions which now occupies a great part of the Security Council’s time and energy but will reduce to a minimum the opportunities for a permanent member to veto a motion before the Council which it does not like merely by invoking Paragraph 2 of Part II of the Four Power Statement.

It will probably be desirable to secure most, if not all, of the above interpretations through Rules of Procedure. In some instances, however, it might be adequate and more feasible to accomplish the results through the establishment of precedents in the Security Council as a

---

*Paragraph 3 of Article 52 reads: “The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangement or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.”

**This may be an extremely difficult position to maintain technically. Although the English text of Article 27(3) provides for “the concurring votes of the permanent members”, the text of the Charter in Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish translated literally requires “the concurring votes of all the permanent members”. Furthermore, at San Francisco the United States Delegation expressly interpreted the English text in the same manner, i.e., as if the word “all” were included, and hence contrary to the present proposed position. See History of the Voting Problem p. 49. [Footnote in the original.]
first step rather than through the immediate adoption of Rules of Procedure.

A detailed exposition of the nature and limitations of this approach to the problem of voting in the Security Council, as well as a detailed statement of reasons for believing that the U.S.S.R. consent might be secured to the specific suggestions is contained in the paper on technical aspects of proposals for liberalized interpretation of the Four Power Statement and Article 27, (Doc. SD/S/668A).

C. Position on Possible Objectives of Proponents of Discussion.

1. Modification of Four Power Statement.

The United States, from the viewpoint of logic and without prejudicing its national interests, could not only agree to, but should welcome an interpretation of Article 27 which would restrict more than does the Four Power Statement both the areas to which the veto applies and the possibilities of its abuse. Such an interpretation might provide, for example, that decisions under Articles 33, 36 and 52 (3) of the Charter and decisions to investigate (but not subsequent determinations) under Article 34, should be taken by procedural vote, on the ground that such decisions deal only with procedures of pacific settlement and not with the substance of disputes and situations.

Under the present circumstances, however, the United States should not favor discarding the Four Power Statement. While the Statement does not bind this country legally, it does constitute a moral commitment towards other nations which should not be unilaterally renounced without the most careful consideration.†† Any statement in the General Assembly by the U.S. of a desire to secure modification would certainly arouse the resentment of the U.S.S.R. and doubtless lead the Soviet Government to question the sincerity of U.S. support of the principle of unanimity, thus increasing the difficulty of achieving that degree of liberalization possible within the framework of Article 27 and of the Statement. It would probably be unfavorably received by some other permanent members of the Security Council.

The United States should therefore publicly declare its intention to stand on the Four Power Statement and should discourage the introduction of any General Assembly resolution attacking it, as this would weaken our tactical position in securing any modification through direct negotiations with the other four powers. It should, if necessary, affirm that its actions in the Security Council will be based on the Statement as the United States interprets that document, regardless of any such resolution unless the statement is modified by agreement of the five powers.

††See paper on Legal Status of the Declaration of the Delegations of the Four Sponsoring Governments. Doc. SD/A71A. [Footnote in the original.]
There are a number of indications that the Australian Delegation will probably train its heaviest guns on the Four Power Statement, endeavoring to obtain acceptance as a minimum, of the following positions:

(a) That decisions as to whether a matter is procedural or substantive shall be taken by procedural vote;
(b) That a procedural vote shall govern decisions of the Security Council generally under Chapter VI.

Unless the United States, by strong and effective leadership, keeps the debate properly focussed, there is considerable likelihood that a good many Delegations will rally to the support of any resolution designed to challenge the Four Power Statement on these, and perhaps other, points. Three further points should be borne in mind in this connection. In the first place, the Statement does not contain as restrictive an interpretation of Article 27 as could be devised, or even as the Soviet Delegation desired at San Francisco when they undertook to limit the procedural vote to matters coming within Articles 28 to 32 inclusive and even to contend that discussion of a question should be subject to the veto.

In the second place, the U.S. is not in a position to argue that the Four Power Statement is an unreasonable interpretation of Article 27. While it is true that nearly all members of the U.S. Delegation at San Francisco, including Senators Connally and Vandenberg, expressed themselves in Delegation meetings as opposed to the application of the unanimity rule to pacific settlement, the only point of interpretation of Article 27 insisted on by that Delegation in meetings of the Big Five related to Paragraph 1 of Article 35. In accordance with the view expressed in the State Department release of March 24, the American Delegation insisted, in the words eventually incorporated in the Four Power Statement, that “no individual member of the Council can alone prevent consideration and discussion by the Council of a dispute or situation brought to its attention. . . .”

Thirdly, it must not be forgotten that this Government proposed the formula adopted at Yalta and that the Four Power Statement con-

---

75 Article 35 of the United Nations Charter states: “1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly. 2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter. 3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Article 11 and 12.”

forms to all prior public interpretations which the U.S. had made of Article 27.

2. Partial Elimination of Veto through Charter Amendment.

It is quite probable that suggestions will be made in the General Assembly for amendments to the Charter which would eliminate the requirement of the concurring votes of the permanent Members in connection with the following types of decisions by the Council:

(a) Election of the Secretary General.
(b) Admission of new members to the United Nations.
(c) Decisions relating to pacific settlement of disputes. (Chapter VI and Article 52 (3)).

In connection with any of such proposals, it must be stressed that no amendment could be adopted without the concurrence of all the permanent members of the Security Council which has been shown to be unlikely. In the absence of previous agreement by all these states, support of proposals for amendment would serve no useful purpose and would probably hamper the attainment of the principal objectives of the U.S. with respect to the United Nations.

The following analysis of such proposals is concerned solely with their relation to U.S. policy objectives and does not deal with their political feasibility. It is quite possible that some of the proposed Charter amendments considered below would not be ratified by the U.S.

As regards the election of the Secretary General, unquestionably the prestige of the office is increased if the incumbent has the support of all permanent members. This is one instance where observance of the unanimity principle is clearly helpful. It does not follow, however, that the voting formula should make unanimous action mandatory in this type of matter. The U.S. could readily forego its special voting privilege in this instance in the interest of building up the Security Council, if such a course should meet the tests set forth in the general considerations described in III A above.

The considerations with respect to admission of new members are somewhat similar. It is probably desirable that there should be unanimity among the permanent members on this matter. However, in this instance the requirement of unanimity in the voting formula has resulted in the exclusion from membership of certain applicants in total disregard of the standards for membership set forth in Article 4 of the Charter. Here too, there is no serious reason why the U.S. should not forego its special voting privilege especially since there was far less reason for the Charter to provide for the concurrence of the permanent members on this matter than in other cases.
The objectives of U. S. foreign policy would probably be served by removal of the requirement of unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council in questions of pacific settlement, possibly including even decisions recommending terms of settlement under Article 37 (2). One of the grounds on which the U. S. agreed to the requirement of unanimity of the permanent members in this instance was that it would have the effect of forcing the great powers to compromise and harmonize their views. The full measure of the anticipated results has not thus far been achieved.

Another reason was the belief that proposals relating to pacific settlement which did not have the support of all the permanent members would lack the weight necessary to be fully effective and might encourage failure to adhere to recommendations of the Security Council.

The U. S. also took the position which is embodied in the Four Power Statement that "decisions and actions by the Security Council" (under Chapter VI) may well have major political consequences and may even initiate a chain of events that might in the end require the Council under its responsibilities to invoke measures of "enforcement" under Chapter VII. The basis of this argument was that effective enforcement action would probably not be possible unless the permanent members of the Security Council had all been in agreement on the decisions taken by the Council prior to the time when enforcement action became necessary. The weakness of this argument is that it will probably be applicable to extremely few cases since the great majority of cases brought before the Council will be disposed of before any question of possible enforcement action arises. On the other hand, a voting formula that requires the concurrence of permanent members may prevent the Council from utilizing fully its machinery for effecting peaceful settlements in a large number of cases, and therefore it is important to strengthen the Council's powers in this field.

The elimination of the unanimity requirement from the operations of Articles 33, 34, 36, 38, and 52 (3) would not, it is believed, remove any protection from vital United States interests which the veto now affords. The only decisions which the Security Council can take under these articles relate to (1) calling upon states to settle their disputes by peaceful means of their own choice; (2) the finding of facts as the basis for possible Security Council recommendations; and (3) recommendations of procedures and methods of settling disputes. While

\[\text{\footnote{This reads: "If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate."}}\]
technical and legalistic changes in the voting procedure of the Council cannot be a really satisfactory substitute for effective reconciliation of conflicting interests, particularly of the permanent members, it should be to the real advantage of this Government, which has taken a position of leadership in the United Nations, if the Security Council were able to arrive with greater ease and dignity at decisions relating to investigation and recommendations of procedure of settlement.

The U. S. can suffer no real injury through elimination of the unanimity requirement from decisions under the articles listed above. Enforcement action under Chapter VII will still require the concurrence of the permanent members.

Article 37 (2) which provides that the Security Council may in certain circumstances “recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate” raises serious questions and it is not clear whether the U. S. would wish to agree to the abandonment of the unanimity requirement with respect to such recommendations. It is conceivable that a majority of the Security Council might recommend terms of settlement in cases in which the U. S. is not a party, which the U. S. did not regard as consonant with its fundamental interests. While there may be no legal obligation under Article 25 to accept and carry out “recommendations” of the Security Council in contrast to “decisions,” nevertheless the moral opprobrium in failing to carry out suggested terms of settlement is considerable.

On the other hand, as previously stated, the highest possible degree of unanimity among the permanent members is considered essential to the effective operation of the Security Council. This is extremely important in connection with the recommendations under Chapter VI, not only for the reasons previously set forth, but also because a recommendation in which only two or three of the Great Powers concurred, even though favored by the smaller states, would not have the force and effect of one supported by all five major powers.

In summary, then, it would appear that the advantages of changing the voting formula with respect to election of the Secretary General, election of members, and pacific settlement of disputes, probably somewhat outweigh the disadvantages. The decisive factors which make it undesirable for the U. S. to favor at this time an amendment of the Charter along these lines are: (1) that it would be impossible to accomplish the desired result in view of the fact that amendments to the Charter require the concurrence of all permanent members of the Security Council; (2) that it would minimize the chances for obtaining concurrence of the Soviet Union in liberalized interpretations of the Charter; and (3) that it might jeopardize the objectives which the principle of unanimity is designed to serve.
3. Elimination of Veto in its entirety through Charter Amendment.

In the event that such an amendment were to be proposed at the forthcoming General Assembly, the United States should oppose it, and should endeavor to concert its efforts to this end with those of the other four permanent members of the Security Council. There are several grounds on which the United States should oppose under present circumstances any proposal for the abandonment of the unanimity rule in its entirety:

(a) The most fundamental ground is the importance of great power unity, which is recognized to be vital to the maintenance of international peace and security. The U.S. had advocated the unanimity requirement and has defended it against attack on the ground that it is an essential basis for the attainment of unity among the Great Powers and thus has a practical value more than offsetting all difficulties attaching to it. Elimination of the unanimity rule might well increase rather than diminish basic disagreement among the Great Powers.

It is also clear that if a grave conflict between the Great Powers should occur, the United Nations itself could not by enforcement measures prevent major hostilities. Consequently, the membership and voting provisions of the Security Council do not directly bear on the issue of the effectiveness of enforcement measures against a great power.

The elimination of the unanimity rule with respect to enforcement action would not alter in any real sense the special status which the Great Powers now have with respect to military matters. As Mr. Stettinius stated before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

"The Charter does not confer any power upon the great nations which they do not already possess in fact. Without the Charter the power of these nations to make or break the peace would still exist."

At present the United Nations has no military forces at its disposal. Even when provision of forces is made in accordance with Article 43, these forces will not be able to carry out against one of the three Great Powers a Council decision to take enforcement action. Probably not even a decision against France or China could be enforced. While it is conceivable that the Council could enforce decisions against certain smaller states despite the refusal of one of the permanent members to agree to the decision, it is unlikely that the rest of the Council would be prepared to take the risk of carrying out enforcement action against such a state over the determined opposition of a permanent member which regarded its vital interest as adversely affected.

Even if, under such circumstances, enforcement action were not actively resisted, it might well be ineffective. It is logical to assume
that the Security Council, having decided to use force, would wish to make use of the forces of the Great Power nearest at hand. It is unlikely that a great power would place its forces at the disposal of the Council to carry out a decision it did not approve. Yet, it is quite possible, that under the assumption that the Security Council would wish to use the forces of the Great Power nearest at hand, the forces of this power would be the logical, if not the only ones, that the Security Council could effectively utilize.

Some day the armaments of the Great Powers may be reduced to a level which would make possible enforcement action against any one of them. Quite aside, however, from the factor of military potential, which is independent of the size of forces in being, is the fact that effective regulation of armaments cannot be attained except as a consequence of, or as an accompaniment to, mutual confidence among the Great Powers. This in turn depends upon their ability to attain agreement on major issues. Elimination of the veto on enforcement action would doubtless lessen the chances of Great Power agreement, rather than the contrary; hence, it would render effective regulation of armaments even more remote than at present.

The unanimity rule is designed to facilitate such agreements, and should also facilitate rather than impede the development of an effective system for the regulation of armaments.

(b) The U. S. Government is not in a position to consider at the present time a change in the Charter whereby the concurring vote of the U. S. would be unnecessary to a decision of the Security Council involving enforcement measures in which U. S. forces or economic instrumentalities would be required to participate. Apart from the arguments presented in (a) is the fact that the whole course of development of this Government’s position on voting and the debates on the ratification of the Charter show that the Senate regarded the veto as essential in these respects. Moreover, it is open to question whether the American people would in the last analysis support such a step at this stage of international relations.

(c) The U. S. would not now be prepared to accept an amendment of the Charter which would modify the unanimity rule with respect to strategic areas placed under trusteeship.

(d) It is improbable that the U. S. would care to forego the requirement for concurrence among the permanent members of the Security Council in the ratification of amendments to the Charter which might increase the obligations of membership.

(e) The U.S. would have to give the most careful consideration to the effect of the elimination of the unanimity rule on the Monroe Doctrine and on the relations between the Security Council and the Inter-American system, particularly in the light of the Act of Chapultepec and its implementation in the forthcoming Rio Conference.78

78 For the Act of Chapultepec and the Rio Conference, see footnote 20, p. 130.
4. Cuban Proposal for General Conference To Amend or Eliminate the Veto.

There is no reason why the U.S. Delegation should oppose placing the Cuban proposal on the agenda of the Assembly. The U.S. could appropriately suggest, however, that the item should be coupled with the Australian proposal so that the two may be considered at the same time. This is especially desirable since the Cuban proposal permits a consideration of only one phase of the problem, while the Australian proposal permits the discussion of all phases of the problem including the particular question raised by the Cuban proposal.

Technically also, it would be possible to amend the Charter either to limit or eliminate the veto under Article 108 without convening a conference. There seems to be no reason to believe that more could be accomplished through a conference pursuant to Article 109 than through the procedure for amendment provided by Article 108. The U.S. should therefore oppose the holding of such a conference for this reason, as well as for the reasons set forth above applicable to all proposals to amend Article 27 of the Charter.

Memorandum by Bernhard G. Bechoefer of the Division of International Security Affairs to the Chief of the Division (Johnson)

TOP SECRET

[NEW YORK,] October 23, 1946.

Subject: First Meeting of Delegation on October 22, 1946 concerning the Veto Problem

I am submitting this memorandum at the suggestion of Mr. Paul Taylor since neither the secret summary which I prepared immediately after the meeting and which was sent today nor the minutes which Mr. Taylor has prepared and cleared with me deal with certain phases of the meeting which are of particular interest to you. I shall follow this practice only in unusually important matters where greater detail is required than is ordinarily furnished through the minutes. The meeting took place on the afternoon of October 22 and lasted approximately an hour. Senator Austin stated that the U.S. position has been briefed more thoroughly in connection with the veto problem than with any other problem confronting the General Assembly because it was necessary to convince not only the General Assembly but

---

79 Paul B. Taylor of the Division of International Organization Affairs and an Assistant Executive Officer on the expert and advisory staff attached to the United States Delegation to the General Assembly.

80 Neither the telegraphic summary nor the minutes of the meeting are printed here. The minutes of the meetings of the United States Delegation are in the IO Files, the series carrying the symbol US/A/M(Chr); the identifying number for the meeting under reference here, the eighth held by the Delegation (October 22, 1946, 3 p.m.), is US/A/M(Chr)/8.
also to convince public opinion in order to rectify misunderstandings and to secure agreement on voting principles.

Senator Austin stated that there was nothing novel in the Security Council voting principles embodied in the Charter and that they were evolved after much study to meet actual conditions. He compared at some length the procedure leading to the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations with the procedure used to adopt the U.S. constitution.

Senator Austin stressed the necessity of (quoting the Vermont constitution) "recurrence to fundamental principles". He stated that the U.S. position aims to avoid the tangle of details. He then said that the U.S. position paper,\(^{61}\) which was distributed in the meeting, comes from the White House. It had been discussed and approved by the President, the Secretary of State, and the Under-Secretary and that the contents represented the recommendations of the Chief Executive.

Senator Austin stated that the discussion with the Secretary of State and the President concerned not only the substantive position but also procedures for presenting the substantive position. It was agreed that a general statement of the U.S. position should be presented to the delegates of the permanent members of the Security Council\(^ {62}\) before any discussion took place either in the general committee or in the General Assembly. Senator Austin would personally see the delegates in the hope that the permanent members would take positions similar to that recommended by the U.S.

Senator Austin further stated that the U.S. would advocate a discussion in the General Assembly immediately after the general debates and prior to the reference of this particular matter to a committee. The Senator would attempt to induce the U.S.S.R. to suggest a general discussion prior to the reference of the matter to a committee. The purpose of such discussion would be to limit the extent of consideration in the committee and to sift out the most important problems.

Senator Austin then proceeded to state briefly the substance of the position paper. He made two fundamental points: First, the U.S. adheres firmly to the principle of unanimity which requires that the more important decisions of the Security Council be approved by all Powers with responsibilities to carry out the decisions. The loss of speed through the requirement of unanimity is more than counterbalanced by the gain in certainty of the abolition of war. Second, the U.S. must assure the world that it is not standing against world opinion through opposing change. The U.S. is eager to go ahead at the proper time when real progress can be achieved through change and when change will advance the possibilities of peace. Specifically, from a long-range standpoint, the U.S. looks forward to interpreta-

---

\(^{61}\) Document SD/A/C.1/69B, supra.

\(^{62}\) See document US/A/C.1/20, November 4, p. 320.
tion of the Charter in such a manner that the veto at some future time may not apply to matters arising under Chapter VI of the Charter. The U.S. cannot however hold out any hope for any change in the Charter which would eliminate the veto under Chapter VII.

Senator Austin suggested that the position paper be studied carefully and that more detailed discussions should take place at a later time.

Senator Austin stated that one aspect of the U.S. position is negative. The U.S. believes that no case has been made out for amendment of the Charter at this time and therefore will oppose the Cuban proposal for a convocation of a general conference. The indictment against the Security Council voting formula is directed not to the formula but to abuses, malpractice—and therefore is insufficient to justify amendment of the Charter.

Affirmatively, the U.S. suggests rules, regulations, definitions, not changes.

Senator Connally suggested that possible future modifications of the Charter should not be restricted to Chapter VI but might also apply to matters such as the election of the Secretary-General. Minister Wadsworth further suggested that future modifications might also apply to admission of States to membership.

Senator Austin agreed but stated that the first task was to stop the Cuban movement which could not help but result in futility because of the right of permanent members to veto any amendments.

Mr. Dulles suggested that the U.S. should not take the Cuban proposal too seriously since the Cubans knew that it was futile. It was put forward because of the feeling of many nations, not only the smaller nations but also some of the greater powers, that the veto has been used arbitrarily. However, to the best of his knowledge no State has contended that the veto has been used arbitrarily by the U.S. Mr. Dulles therefore suggested that it was not necessary for the U.S. to come to the defense of the veto. If the purpose of the discussion is to air the grievances of the smaller States concerning the veto, why should we come to its rescue?

Senator Austin stated that the U.S. must take the leadership to revive the spirit of our people with regard to the United Nations, indicating that the campaign against the veto had shifted the viewpoint of the U.S. from fundamental conceptions of the United Nations. Mr. Dulles said that he conceded Senator Austin’s contention but stated that he objected to Senator Austin’s statement that there was no grounds for the Cuban indictment. Congressman Eaton asked if the U.S. was defending the veto and merely objecting to the U.S.S.R. use of the veto. Senator Austin reiterated that the attacks on the veto undermined the confidence of the American public in the United Nations and the U.S. position must be directed to end the defeatist
attitude in the U.S. Minister Wadsworth said that he was impressed by the necessity for defending the principles of unanimity but asked what safeguards could be given against continuing abuses. Senator Austin said that safeguards could be furnished through rules and regulations. Senator Austin informed Mr. Stevenson that there would be many chances for further discussion but that such discussions should not take place until all the delegation had had an opportunity to study the Charter.

[For the brief General Committee discussion as to whether the three items on the voting question should be recommended to the General Assembly for inclusion on its agenda, see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, Second Part, General Committee, pages 74 and 75. In deference to the Soviet Representative's (Vyshinsky) withdrawal of an initial opposition to the inclusion of the items on the agenda, the United States Representative (Austin), “actuated by the same conciliatory spirit as Mr. Vyshinsky”, did not press for a General Committee recommendation for discussion of the items by the General Assembly in plenary session before referral to the appropriate committee. The General Committee decided, then, that a “qualified committee” should be appointed to study the question and to report to the General Assembly. The final recommendation of the General Committee to the General Assembly was that the items should be adopted for inclusion in the final agenda and then be referred immediately to the First Committee (Report of the General Committee to the General Assembly, document A/163, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, Second Part, Plenary Meetings, pages 1475 ff., annex 30; this record is cited hereafter as GA (1/2), Plenary,].

IO Files: US/A/M (Chr) /11

Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting of the United States Delegation,
New York, Hotel Pennsylvania, October 28, 1946, 9 a.m.

SECRET

[Here follow list of names of persons (26) present, and discussion of other subjects.]

Position on the Veto

Senator Austin reported that he had decided to speak at the close of the general debate. He would take the position on the veto outlined

*With respect to the minutes of the meetings of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly the list of persons present is not printed because of excessive length; those who are mentioned in the minutes themselves as participating in the discussion are readily identifiable; note may be made of the general lists of persons on the expert and advisory staff printed pp. 37-42.
in the position paper. The net of this was that the United States objected to amending the Charter. Our understanding of the veto principles was that they were pre-eminently constructed and not negative. We favored keeping the door open to amendments if the case were suitable but, in the meantime, there should be announced a progressive, constructive policy regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes. The voting principles had not been intended to interfere with peaceful settlement of disputes. Senator Austin did not propose to put forward any resolutions or recommendations to be acted on by the General Assembly.

Senator Connally inquired whether the United States could not sponsor or agree to a resolution expressing the hope that the Security Council would use the veto sparingly, thus indicating the United States was not pleased with its prodigal use. Senator Austin said that he thought the United States could agree to such a motion but he thought that it should not be put forward in his speech but in later debates or in the Committee. Senator Connally agreed. He recalled that in defending the veto at San Francisco, he had defended the principle of unanimity among the Great Powers. It had been agreed then if two Powers were to try to coerce a third major Power, war might be precipitated and therefore unanimity was essential. However, it had not been the intention that the veto should be used all over the lot on two-bit questions.

Senator Austin said that it might be that Senator Connally might see fit to make some such proposal in Committee I.

In answer to Mr. Eaton’s question, Senator Austin said he was not going to imply that the veto had been abused. Mr. Eaton asked if that were not the case. Senator Austin said that he had not completely clarified the position but that he expected to urge that the use of the veto be restrained by rules of procedure.

Senator Vandenberg said he did not know what the speech should contain for it was Senator Austin’s and not his. He continued that the thing he missed was the lack of affirmative United States proposals on anything on the agenda. He said that he did not believe that there was any United States proposal in the thirty-two items on the agenda. He did not believe that moral leadership would be obtained in that way. He agreed that it was no time to amend the Charter but that the development of a definition of the veto should specifically assert that in our opinion the veto should be confined to Chapter VII. This would be a progressive step which could be taken without jeopardizing in any degree reasonable use of the veto.

Senator Connally observed that when abuse of the veto was charged, someone would ask in what cases it had been abused. Senator Vandenberg replied that one didn’t have to charge abuse of the veto but he
did not like, even by silence, to deny the great majority of small States who had charged an abuse of the veto. He did not like to be associated with the general denial. Senator Austin remarked that that was the reason for his speech. Senator Connally thought that was a very nebulous sort of approach. Senator Vanderberg replied that it ceased to be nebulous if it was established that the veto applied only to Chapter VII. Senator Connally recalled that the Delegation had started out and intended in San Francisco to have the veto apply only to Chapter VII. However, some provisions of the Charter had been drawn which did not sustain this position. Senator Austin said that he believed the use of the veto to obstruct peaceful settlement violated the Charter. Senator Connally stated that if Senator Austin emphasized that argument it would lay the groundwork for Committee 1 to come along with some recommendations.  

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

501.BB/11-248

The Counselor of the Department (Cohen) to Senator Austin

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, November 2, 1946.

My Dear Senator Austin: I enclose a revised copy of the memorandum entitled "U.S. Position on General Assembly Agenda Items Relating to Voting in the Security Council." You will recall that an earlier draft was discussed in the meeting in Washington on the evening of October 18. I also enclose a paper entitled "United States Proposals for Rules of Procedure of the Security Council", which contains three proposed rules together with brief comments thereon. These are revisions of three of the rules contained in the document "Technical Aspects of Proposals for Liberalized Interpretation of Four Power Statement and Article 27 (SD/S/668B)", a copy of

44 For Senator Austin's statement of the United States position on the General Assembly item dealing with voting in the Security Council, delivered in the course of his speech to the General Assembly on October 30 at the time of the opening speeches by the delegates, see GA (1/2), Plenary, pp. 904-908. Omitted from Senator Austin's speech were details of the United States program for liberalization of the voting procedures and practices of the Security Council as set forth in the position paper of October 22 and included in earlier drafts of the speech.

The General Assembly on October 31 after a brief discussion adopted the General Committee's recommendation that the items regarding Article 27 be referred to the First Committee (GA, (1/2), Plenary, pp. 931-933).

See documents US/A/C.1/20, November 4, p. 320.

50 See memorandum of October 16 by Mr. His, p. 297, for initial proposals on this paper.

51 See document US/A/C.1/18, November 4, p. 322.

52 Not printed; this was a lengthy working paper of some 25 pages which went through several revisions.
which was included among the background material for the position paper on the "veto." You will note that the other rules and alternatives in that document have been omitted.

It is our judgment that the best way to achieve success in obtaining agreement on these draft rules, which we believe will accomplish the ends set forth in the position paper and in your speech, is to discuss them at an early date with the representatives of the other four permanent members of the Security Council, and as soon as practicable thereafter to have them considered by the Committee of Experts of the Council.

The Department believes that the best way to approach the other four permanent members would be for you personally to hand copies of the two documents directly to each of the Chiefs of the Assembly Delegations from those countries, stating that you wish to take advantage of their presence for an exchange of views on this most important question. You will wish, I believe, to explain the two memoranda briefly, emphasizing our view that the establishment of satisfactory procedures for the Security Council is the responsibility of the Council itself. You will probably wish also to indicate that you will be glad to hold further consultations with them after they have had an opportunity to study the two documents, and perhaps to suggest conversations on the technical level as well. The four Chiefs of Delegations should be also informed of our desire to have the Committee of Experts of the Security Council consider these proposals at an early date, preferably within the next week or so. In this connection it should be noted that drafts of rules designed to achieve the same ends as Rules B and C of the second paper were handed informally last spring to the representatives on that Committee of the other permanent members, but were never discussed in the Committee or shown to its other members.

It is not impossible that during the consultations others will make an attempt to explore more fully the question of eliminating the "veto" with respect to atomic energy. Should this occur, I believe the United States position should be that the question is irrelevant until such time as the Atomic Energy Commission makes specific proposals. We are presently concerned solely with the procedures of the Security Council within the framework of the Yalta formula.

I enclose a copy of a letter I am sending today to Mr. Herschel Johnson, suggesting that after consultation with you, he arrange with Sir Alexander Cadogan, the President of the Security Council, to have
the Committee of Experts meet for the purpose of considering these proposals.

Sincerely yours,  

Benjamin V. Cohen

501.BB/11-246

The Counselor of the Department (Cohen) to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)

Confidential

Washington, November 2, 1946.

Dear Herschel: I enclose a copy of a letter I am sending today to Senator Austin, together with copies of the enclosures referred to therein.

As you know, the proposed draft rules result from long and careful consideration of the problem of the “veto”. You will note that there has been considerable redrafting and that certain of the rules and alternatives discussed in the paper on “Technical Aspects of Proposals for Liberalized Interpretation of Four Power Statement and Article 27”, have been left out of this paper. This was done in the belief that the three rules which are submitted constitute the basis on which we should begin negotiations with the other permanent members of the Security Council and in the Committee of Experts. In this connection, I should say that while the Department feels very strongly that it is essential to obtain eventual agreement on the substance of these three rules, it does not regard the form and language as fixed and binding.

We regard the successful adoption by the Council of rules of this nature as the primary objective to be sought from the consideration of the “veto” question in the present session of the General Assembly. The Department is fully aware that the attainment of this objective will be difficult and may take considerable time. We regard certainty as much more important than speed. We do, however, want to have the Committee of Experts begin considerations of our proposals before the General Assembly has completed its discussion of the “veto”.

I believe that it should be possible to begin discussions within the Committee of Experts a week or ten days after these proposals have first been submitted to the other permanent members of the Security Council. Will you, therefore, keep in touch with Senator Austin with a view to your asking Sir Alexander Cadogan to call a meeting of the Committee of Experts as soon as it appears appropriate, and to
ask the Committee to examine these proposals thoroughly and with as much dispatch as is consistent with accuracy and thoroughness.

Sincerely yours,

BENJAMIN V. COHEN

IO Files: US/A/C.1/20

United States Delegation Working Paper

SECRET

[NYORK,] November 4, 1946.

U.S. Position on General Assembly Agenda Items Relating to Voting in the Security Council.89

(Draft of Memorandum Which It Is Proposed To Hand to the Delegations to the General Assembly of the Other Four Permanent Members of the Security Council)

The U.S. Government attributes importance to the discussion in the General Assembly of the agenda items proposed by the Governments of Australia and Cuba dealing with the voting procedure in the Security Council.

For this reason and because these items necessarily have a special significance for the five permanent members of the Security Council the U.S. Government desires to outline its position on this subject to each of the other permanent members prior to the discussion in the General Assembly.90

The U.S. position may be summarized as follows:

(1) The U.S. regards the principle of unanimity as of the highest importance for the success of the United Nations and the reflection of this principle in the Yalta voting formula (Article 27 of the Charter) as valid.

(2) Accordingly, the U.S. does not at the present time favor an amendment to Article 27 of the Charter.

(3) The United States is opposed to the calling of a general conference to amend the Charter in respect to the so-called "veto".

(4) The United States hopes that the five permanent members may find it desirable at some time in the future in full agreement among themselves and with other Members to support modifications of the unanimity requirement in its application to matters arising under Chapter VI.

(5) The United States recognizes that some of the difficulties encountered in the Security Council during the first year of its opera-

---

89 In a revision of this paper (document US/A/C.1/20 (Rev.a), November 5, not printed) this title was changed to read: "United States Position on Voting in the Security Council with Special Reference to the General Assembly Items on This Subject"; the parenthetical statement which follows was eliminated.

90 This paragraph was omitted in the November 5 revision.
tions were due to lack of certainty regarding the meaning of the voting formula adopted at the San Francisco Conference. Consequently, the United States favors the clarification of ambiguities in that voting formula and suggests that a more detailed interpretation of Article 27 of the Charter and of the Four Power statement might be agreed upon along lines set forth below.

(a) Agreement should be reached on a list of procedural matters, which should be as exhaustive as possible, for the purpose of increasing to a maximum the occasions when the question of whether a matter is procedural may be decided by a simple reference to such a list and without a vote. Such an interpretation will eliminate most of the debate over what is a procedural question which now occupies a great part of the Security Council's time and energy.

(b) In accordance with the clear intent of the Charter, the abstention clause of Article 27 (3) should be interpreted to ensure that a State be unable to serve as a judge in its own cause in any decisions under Chapter VI and under paragraph 3 of Article 52. This would require a State party to a dispute or involved in a situation to abstain from voting on non-procedural decisions in connection with the particular dispute or situation. It would eliminate the distinction between disputes and situations in connection with the Charter injunction of abstention from voting. It would also prevent a permanent member of the Council from rendering that injunction inoperative by casting its vote against a Council determination that a particular state was in fact a party to a dispute or involved in a situation.

(c) The permanent members of the Council should be permitted to abstain from voting on any decision without having such abstention regarded as a negative vote. Thus the requirement of unanimity among the permanent members on a non-procedural decision will be satisfied if all of the permanent members actually voting on the decision, vote in the affirmative. This will enable the Council to reach a decision in cases where one or more permanent members do not choose to exercise the right to vote.

(6) The United States is proposing the texts of three rules of procedure for the Security Council, copies of which, together with brief comments, are submitted herewith.91 Since the United States Government regards it as inappropriate for the General Assembly to consider or pass upon the texts of rules of procedure of the Security Council, it does not intend to introduce its proposed rules before the General Assembly. It does desire, however, to have them considered by the Committee of Experts of the Security Council at an early date.92

91 See document US/A/C.1/18, November 4, p. 322.
92 In the November 5 revised paper this section was changed to read: "The United States is proposing to the Security Council the texts of three draft rules of procedure which embody these concepts and which it hopes can form the basis for constructive action by the Council. Since the United States Government does not believe that the General Assembly should consider or pass upon the texts of rules of procedure for the Security Council, it does not intend to submit its proposed rules to the General Assembly. It does hope, however, that the Security Council will request its Committee of Experts to consider them at an early date."
(7) The U.S. position with respect to voting in the Security Council does not affect the position taken by the U.S. Representative on Atomic Energy Commission on the problem of the application of the “veto” in the international control of atomic energy. It has already been made clear that the United States proposals do not attack the general requirement for unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council.

The U.S. will welcome the opportunity for further consultation on this question with the Delegations to the General Assembly of the other states which are permanent members of the Security Council. 93

---

10 Files: US/A/C.1/18


United States Proposals for Rules of Procedure of the Security Council 95

A. Rule Listing Procedural Matters:

Decisions of the Security Council on the following matters, including all other matters falling within the general categories set forth below, shall be deemed procedural and the vote thereon shall be in accordance with Article 27 (2) of the Charter.

1. Decisions of the Security Council relating to its meetings and those of the General Assembly. This category shall include such decisions as those pertaining to (a) the time and place of regular and periodic meetings; (b) whether a meeting should be public or private; (c) what records of meetings should be kept, the classification thereof and the right of access thereto, etc; (d) convocation of a meeting of the General Assembly; (e) the time and place for a general conference for the purpose of revising the Charter pursuant to Article 109.

Comment:

Article 28 of the Charter providing that the Council “shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously” comes under the

---

93 This paragraph was eliminated in the November 5 revision.
94 This document is a development in detail of the general principles stated in Section 5 and its sub-sections of the Delegation’s Working Paper of November 4, “U.S. Position on General Assembly Agenda Items Relating to Voting in the Security Council” (document US/A/C.1/20), supra. Rules “A”, “B” and “C” enumerated above relate to the rules so designated that were communicated by the United States member of the Committee of Experts to certain members of the Committee in April. See further on this matter in footnote 11, p. 105.
95 In a revision of this paper (document US/A/C.1/18 (Rev.2)), November 5 (see minutes of informal meeting of members of Committee I Group, November 4, infra) this title was amended to read: “United States Proposals for Additional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council”.

heading "Procedure" in the Charter. The Four Power Statement of June 7, 1945, Part I, paragraph 2, states that a procedural vote will be used by the Security Council to "select the times and places of its regular and special meetings."

It was agreed in the Committee of Five Deputies of the Heads of Delegations at San Francisco that the convocation of a special session of the General Assembly was a procedural matter. (Meetings on May 18 and May 29, 1945). See Article 20 of Charter.96

The practice of the Council has been to decide on the time and place of meetings of the Security Council, and on the records of meetings without a formal vote or by a procedural vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council relating to the agenda of its meetings and to the determination of items of which it is seized. This category shall include such decisions as those pertaining to (a) the adoption of the agenda or the addition of an item to or deletion of an item from the agenda; (b) the inclusion of a matter among, or the elimination of a matter from, those of which the Security Council is seized; (c) the Secretary-General's notification to the General Assembly pursuant to Article 12.

Comment:

Part I, paragraph 3 of the Four Power Statement provides that the veto power cannot be used to prevent bringing a matter to the attention of the Security Council. It has been the practice of the Council to adopt the agenda without taking a formal vote; in cases where a vote was taken the decision has been made by a procedural vote.

Similarly all the members of the Council have expressed the view that removing an item from the agenda is a procedural decision. Under Rule 10, an item which is being considered remains on the agenda unless the Council votes to remove it.

The decision to include a matter among or eliminate a matter from those of which the Security Council is seized is part of the decision to consider or to terminate the consideration of a matter and accordingly is likewise procedural.

3. Decisions relating to credentials. This category shall include decisions relating to the credentials of a representative on the Security Council or of a representative of any other State invited to participate in its meetings.

96 In the November 5 revision of this paper this section was eliminated. A new section read: "Article 100 of the Charter provides that the decisions of the Security Council relating to the convocation of a General Conference to review the Charter shall be made by procedural vote. By the same token, the request of the Security Council to the Secretary-General for the calling of a special session of the General Assembly under Article 20, which comes under the heading 'Procedure', should also be by procedural vote."

310-101-72—22
Comment:
It has been the practice of the Council to approve the Secretary-General's report on credentials without a formal vote.

4. Decisions relating to the presidency of the Security Council. This category shall include such decisions as those pertaining to the manner of selecting the President, his term of office, the rights, duties, and responsibilities of his office.

Comment:
Article 30 of the Charter authorizing the Security Council to determine the method of selecting its President comes under the heading "Procedure" in the Charter. See also Four Power Statement, Part I, paragraph 2 which states that the Council will by a vote of any seven of its members "determine the method of selecting its President."

5. Decisions of the Security Council on questions of parliamentary procedure. This category shall include such decisions as those pertaining to (a) rulings by the President on points of order; (b) the precedence of principal motions and draft resolutions; (c) the order in which amendments to motions or draft resolutions are to be voted upon; (d) the motions listed in Rule 33 and similar parliamentary motions; (e) requests to members of the Secretariat or to other persons for information or for other assistance.

Comment:
All of these matters relate to parliamentary conduct of the discussions in the Security Council. Primary responsibility for decisions of this type rests on the President in his capacity as presiding officer of the Security Council. The authority which the Security Council reserves to itself in this area and does not delegate to the President is clearly procedural and has been so regarded in the past proceedings of the Security Council.

6. Decisions relating to invitations issued by the Security Council to States to participate in its discussions. This category shall include such decisions as those pertaining to (a) invitations to non-members of the Security Council to participate pursuant to Articles 31, 32, and 35 (2) of the Charter; (b) the conditions of such participations.

Comment:
This category is expressly covered by Part I, paragraph 2 of the Four Power Statement which states that the Security Council will by a vote of any seven of its members "invite a member of the Organization not represented on the Council to participate in its discussions when that member's interests are specially affected; and invite any state when it is a party to a dispute being considered by the Council to participate in the discussion relating to that dispute."

The practice of the Council has been to invite a non-member of the
Security Council to participate without the taking of a formal vote; when a formal vote was taken the decision was made by procedural vote.


Comment:

Rule 58 provides that except where the Security Council decides otherwise, an application shall be referred to a Committee and the Council has followed the method provided in this rule. It seems clear that a decision to use some other procedure than that which is specified in Rule 58 would be procedural.

8. Decisions concerning relationships with other organs of the United Nations. This category shall include such decisions as those relating to (a) the establishment of such relationships; (b) approval of annual and special reports to the General Assembly.

Comment:

It seems clear that questions relating to the methods of establishing and conducting relations among the various organs of the United Nations are procedural. This category would not include a decision to refer a matter from the Security Council to the General Assembly. Inasmuch as reports of the Security Council should record past proceedings of the Council rather than contain recommendations this approval by the Council should be by procedural vote.

9. Decisions on all matters relating to the election of Judges of the International Court of Justice excepting where a different voting procedure is provided in Article 10 (2) of the Statute of the Court.

Comment:

Article 10 (2) of the Court provides that the Security Council shall elect judges and appoint members of a joint conference by an absolute majority of votes “without any distinction between permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council.”

It would follow that decisions on matters purely incidental to the election of Judges such as the dates of special elections or questions of procedure in connection with the balloting should not require more than a procedural majority of the Council. Matters on which the Security Council would be required to vote are listed in Article 12 and Article 4, paragraph 3 of the Statute of the Court.

Such incidental decisions as were taken in the Council during the election of judges in February 1946 were made without formal vote.

10. Decisions relating to the conditions under which a State not a member of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of the International Court under Article 93 of the Charter, and the conditions under which the Court shall be opened to States not parties
to the Statute under Article 35 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

11. Decisions concerning the creation of subsidiary organs, and their relation to the Security Council. This category shall include such decisions as those pertaining to (a) the appointment of any committee or commission, or of the Secretary-General as Rapporteur for a specified question; (b) the approval of procedures of committees and commissions established by the Security Council.

Comment:

Article 29 of the Charter authorizing the establishment of subsidiary organs is one of the Articles coming under the heading "Procedure." The Committee of Five Deputies of Heads of Delegations at San Francisco tentatively agreed on May 27, 1945 that this matter was procedural.\(^{97}\)

The resolution establishing the Atomic Energy Commission specified that its Rules of Procedure should be approved by the Security Council by a procedural vote and the Security Council has established this precedent.


Comment:

This matter is specifically covered in paragraph 2 of Part I of the Four Power Declaration which states that the Security Council may by a vote of any seven of its members "adopt or alter its Rules of Procedure." The power to alter would include the power to suspend.\(^{98}\)

13. All other decisions of the Security Council not involving its taking direct measures in connection with settlement of disputes, adjustment of situations likely to lead to disputes, determination of threats to peace, removal of threats to the peace, and suppression of breaches of the peace.

Comment:

Part I, paragraph 1 of the Four Power Statement provides as follows: "The Yalta voting formula recognizes that the Security Council, in discharging its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security, will have two broad groups of functions. Under Chapter VIII, the Council will have to make decisions which involve its taking direct measures in connection with settlement of disputes, adjustment of situations likely to lead to disputes, determination of threats to peace, removal of threats to the peace, and suppression of breaches of the peace. It will also have to make decisions which do

\(^{97}\) The second sentence of this section was omitted in the November 5 revision.

\(^{98}\) Paragraph 12 was omitted in its entirety in the November 5 revision, and paragraph 13 became paragraph 12.
not involve the taking of such measures. The Yalta formula provides that the second of these two groups of decisions will be governed by a procedural vote—that is, the vote of any seven members. The first group of decisions will be governed by a qualified vote—that is, the vote of seven members, subject to the proviso that in decisions under Section A and a part of Section C of Chapter VIII parties to a dispute shall abstain from voting.”

B. Rule Relating to Abstention From Voting Under Article 27(3)

In accordance with Article 27 (3) a party to a dispute or a party involved in a situation shall abstain from voting on non-procedural matters under Chapter VI or paragraph 3 of Article 52 relating to such dispute or situation. If prior to or immediately following the vote on such decision, question is raised as to whether a member of the Security Council is required under the Charter to abstain from voting as a party to the dispute or involved in the situation the President shall rule whether that member is required to abstain from voting.

If after the president’s ruling a vote is requested, the question whether the member is required to abstain from voting shall be submitted to the Security Council under Article 27 (2). The ruling shall stand as the decision of the Security Council, unless by an affirmative vote of seven members the Council decides in a contrary sense.

In the event that question is raised as to whether more than one member is required under the Charter to abstain from voting the Security Council’s decision as to each such member shall be made separately.

Comment:

The injunction contained in Article 27 (3) of the Charter that a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting was designed to give effect to the principle that a member of the Council should not be a judge in its own cause. That principle, which is a fundamental of the Yalta voting formula and which, as was pointed out in the Four Power Statement, was an important distinguishing feature between the Yalta formula and the practice of the Council of the League of Nations, should be applied whether a particular case before the Security Council is labelled a dispute or a situation.

The distinction that is made in other articles of the Charter between a situation and a dispute was not intended to prevail in derogation of the Charter provision which enjoins the parties to a case before the Council to abstain from voting on non-procedural decisions relating to that case.

The Charter specifically enjoins a party to a dispute to abstain from voting. This can only mean that the vote of the party must not be
included in recording votes on non-procedural decisions. It means further that no individual member of the Council should be permitted to prevent the operation of the Charter injunction.

While this injunction is absolute, and while the Charter makes no provision for a determination by the Council as to whether a particular member is in fact a party, some method for determining whether a vote should be counted is essential.

In view of the fact that no individual member can be permitted to prevent the operation of the Charter injunction, this question should not be determined by a non-procedural vote. Moreover, the U.S. is convinced that this determination is in the truest sense procedural. It is a decision that clearly does not involve the taking of direct measures in connection with the settlement of the case but rather determines in what manner the vote of the Security Council shall be taken when the substantive decision comes to a vote.

C. Rule Providing that Voluntary Abstention From Voting Shall Not Be Considered the Equivalent of a Negative Vote

The failure of a permanent member of the Council to vote on any non-procedural decision of the Council shall not constitute a negative vote. Unless a permanent member affirmatively indicates that it does not concur it shall be deemed to be willing to concur in any such decision that the Security Council may make by the affirmative vote of seven members including the affirmative votes of the permanent members not abstaining.

Comment:

The question of whether the voluntary abstention of a permanent member of the Council should operate as a negative vote was discussed both at Dumbarton Oaks and at San Francisco. Although in those discussions the U.S. representative took a contrary view, it is now the position of the U.S. Government that a proper construction of the Charter does not prevent a permanent member of the Council from abstaining without having that abstention operate as a veto.\(^{60}\)

The practice of the Council has been to permit the elected members of the Council to abstain without depriving the necessary majority of seven of the right to decide. There appears to be no greater reason for giving a different effect to the abstention of a permanent member. If for political or other reasons a permanent member is not in a position to support affirmatively a proposition but is perfectly willing to

---

\(^{60}\) In the revised paper of November 5 this section was changed to read: “The United States Government believes that the Charter may properly be construed so as to permit a permanent member of the Council to abstain without having that abstention operate as a veto.”
defer to the wishes of the majority there is no reason why that member should be forced to exercise its veto.

It is the view of the U.S. that this liberal construction of the voting formula is of primary importance to the successful functioning of the Charter. Certainly no permanent member should be able to prevent the functioning of the Council merely because it is unwilling to vote on a proposition either in the affirmative or in the negative.

In construing a basic document like the Charter the right given to the permanent members in the voting formula should be construed as a right subject to waiver by its non-exercise, particularly when such a waiver cannot be regarded as prejudicial to the interests of the Organization or to the interests of any of its members.

10 Files: US/A/C.1/37

Minutes of Informal Meeting of Members Committee 1 Group ¹


Voting in Security Council

Present: Senator Warren R. Austin Mr. Sandifer
          Senator Connally Mr. Joseph Johnson
          Ambassador Herschel Johnson Mr. Noyes
          Mr. Dulles Mr. Foote
          Mr. Stevenson Mr. Sanders
          Mr. Cohen Mr. Stokes
          Mr. Fahy Mr. Wilcox
          Mr. Ross Mr. Bechhoefer

Copies of documents US/A/C.1/20 and US/A/C.1/18 were distributed to those present. Mr. Joseph Johnson read the former document which was a draft of a memorandum which it was proposed to submit to the delegations to the General Assembly of the other four permanent members of the Security Council indicating the position of the United States on the problem of voting in the Security Council. Mr. Johnson summarized the latter document which also was to be submitted to the other four permanent members of the Security Council and which contained the proposals for rules of procedure of the Security Council which the United States intended to present to the Security Council.

After considerable discussion it was agreed that the position memorandum should be revised in certain details. Likewise the comments on the proposals for the rules of procedure should be revised to de-

¹ Drafted by Mr. Bechhoefer.
lete all reference to secret documents of the San Francisco Conference. It was further agreed that both documents as revised should be submitted to the delegations of the other members of the Big Five—if possible today or tomorrow morning and in any event, prior to any discussion of the problem in Committee I. It was further agreed that they should likewise be submitted to the delegations of other members of the Security Council shortly after submission of the documents to the other Four.

It was decided that the documents should also be filed with the President of the Security Council but no decision was reached as to the time when such filing should take place.

No decision was reached on the following questions:

1. Whether the proposals on rules of procedure to be filed with the Security Council should be a restricted document.

2. Whether in the presentation to Committee I of the General Assembly the United States should confine itself to the general points made in Senator Austin’s speech or should list the matters where the United States believed additional interpretation of the voting formula was required.

3. The nature of the statement to be made by Senator Connally in the Committee.

4. Whether to submit the specific rules of procedure to the General Assembly.

5. The nature of any resolution which the United States should support in the General Assembly.

Mr. Stevenson and others emphasized that almost immediately after the presentation of the documents discussed in this meeting to the other members of the Security Council, their contents would become public. Therefore, it was suggested that it would be appropriate to submit the documents officially to the General Assembly for its information but not for action, even though the exact text of the proposed rules of procedure need not be deemed a firm position of the United States.

Mr. Cohen and Mr. Joseph Johnson emphasized that the objective of the discussions in the General Assembly was to obtain acceptance by the Security Council of satisfactory rules and practices, and not to secure a resolution that satisfied the General Assembly. Since it would be undesirable to press for the hasty adoption of rules by the Security Council which might be unsatisfactory, there was very little chance that the Security Council would act during the present session of the General Assembly. Accordingly they felt that the presentation in the General Assembly should be made in such a way as not to prejudice success in the Committee of Experts and in the Security Council.

Mr. Cohen stressed that the unofficial publication of United States
proposals would not be the equivalent of their being submitted to the General Assembly by the United States as an official document.

It was agreed that there was considerable danger that a great multitude of very specific proposals would be made to the General Assembly with the effect of confusing the main issues. The fact that other states might submit specific proposals to the General Assembly should not influence the United States to change its emphasis on the necessity of Security Council Action.

Mr. Dulles suggested that the United States revise its suggestion concerning voluntary abstention from voting to include the point made by Mr. Parodi in the General Assembly that the Security Council permanent members be permitted to vote negatively on non-procedural matters without their negative votes being considered as an exercise of the veto. Others present at the meeting suggested that such a proposal would contravene Article 27 of the Charter.

---

10 Files: US/A/C.1/38

Minutes of Informal Meeting of Members Committee 1 Group

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] November 6, 1946.

VOTING IN SECURITY COUNCIL

Present: Senator Connally Mr. Wilcox
Mr. Herschel Johnson Mr. Sanders
Mr. Fahy Mr. Stokes
Mr. Joseph Johnson Mr. Bechhoefer
Mr. Noyes

Mr. Joseph Johnson submitted to Senator Connally a revision (US/A/C.1/20, Rev. a), of the summary of the United States position on voting in the Security Council which was to be given to the heads of Assembly delegations of the other four permanent members of the Security Council. Mr. Johnson also submitted a revision (US/A/C.1/18, Rev. a) of the specific proposal for additional rules of procedure on this subject which would be made to the Security Council, and a draft memorandum on the proposed course of action to be followed by the United States.

The discussion in the meeting dealt chiefly with the first paper. Senator Connally commented with approval on the proposal for listing types of procedural decisions of the Security Council. He doubted,

---

2 Drafted by Mr. Bechhoefer.
3 Revisions indicated in footnotes appended to documents US/A/C.1/20 and US/A/C.1/18, November 4, pp. 320 and 322, respectively.
however, that after decisions were listed, the U.S.S.R. would be willing to accept the ruling of the chair that a particular decision was procedural without calling for a vote.

Mr. Joseph Johnson explained at some length the necessity for a rule of procedure which will make certain that no state should be a judge in its own case on decisions under Chapter VI of the Charter. Senator Connally indicated his approval of this proposal.

Senator Connally stated that the third proposal which would permit a permanent member of the Council to abstain from voting on a decision without having such abstention regarded as a negative vote was in his opinion contrary to the express terms of the Charter.

In defense of this proposal Mr. Stokes suggested that the term “concurring” vote be given a different meaning from the term “affirmative” vote:—in other words that a permanent member be permitted to concur in the decision of the other permanent members without casting an affirmative vote. Senator Connally did not believe that such construction of the Charter was possible.

Mr. Fahy suggested that the permanent members by agreement among themselves could waive their right of veto since the right was primarily for their benefit. Senator Connally stated that the Charter was not the property of the five permanent members but belonged to all the members and therefore that its provisions could not be waived by an agreement of five members.

Mr. Joseph Johnson stated that a rule to permit voluntary abstention from voting without such abstention being regarded as a negative vote was submitted informally last Spring to the representatives of the permanent members on the Committee of Experts but was never discussed in the Committee. All of the permanent members excepting the U.S.S.R. reacted favorably to such a rule but foresaw difficulties in interpreting the Charter to permit such a rule. The U.S.S.R. representative believed that abstentions by the permanent members were bound to take place, stating that “you can lead a horse to water but you can’t make him drink,” but was unwilling to accept a rule.

Senator Connally asked whether the proposed rule would be applicable to decisions under Chapter VII as well as under Chapter VI to which Mr. Joseph Johnson replied that abstention under the rule would be permitted on any non-procedural decisions. Mr. Herschel Johnson and Mr. Wilcox suggested that as a practical matter it might be desirable to limit the application of any such rule to decisions under Chapter VI. Mr. Noyes and Mr. Joseph Johnson felt that the principle was the same regardless of the decision, the latter holding that there was no danger in covering Chapter VII as well as VI in a rule for voluntary abstention. Mr. Fahy suggested that it might
be appropriate to provide that the rule apply to all decisions excepting those under Chapter VII. Mr. Herschel Johnson suggested that voluntary abstention should not be permitted in connection with the election of a Secretary General. After some discussion, it was suggested by Mr. Wilcox and Mr. Fahy, that a redraft of the rule for voluntary abstention of permanent members might be preferred which should apply to all decisions excepting those under Chapter VII. Senator Connally agreed that as a practical matter it would be desirable to loosen up the procedures in the Security Council except on decisions under Chapter VII. Senator Connally inquired as to the possibility of securing agreement in the Security Council on the proposals. Mr. Joseph Johnson felt that it might not be too difficult to secure a list of procedural decisions which would include substantial number of those suggested in the proposed rule and that likewise it might be possible to secure agreement on a rule for voluntary abstention by permanent members. He felt that the most justifiable of all the rules, that to insure the carrying out of the Charter provision for abstention by parties to a dispute, would have the hardest sledding with the U.S.S.R.

IO Files: US/A/C.1/56

Minutes of Meeting of Political Advisers and Executive Officers

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] November 9, 1946.

DEVELOPMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH UNITED STATES POSITION ON GENERAL ASSEMBLY AGENDA ITEMS DEALING WITH THE VETO

Mr. Johnson stated that the United States position was still not definitely determined in connection with this subject. Two papers had been circulated; one stating in summary the United States position (US/A/C.1/20 Rev.a) and the other listing proposals for additional rules of procedure (US/A/C.1/18 Rev.a). Mr. Johnson stated that that part of the position contained in points 1-5 (excluding the subparagraphs of 5) and 7 of the former paper was firm. However, it was uncertain whether the three proposals for interpretation of Article 27 would be submitted to the Assembly. It was also uncertain what disposition would be made of the texts of the three specific rules.

---

4 Presumably Joseph E. Johnson.
5 That is, internally, within the United States Delegation.
6 See footnote 3, p. 331.
7 The same as in the original paper, document US/A/C.1/20, November 4, p. 320.
8 See the sub-paragraphs of point 5, document US/A/C.1/20, November 4, p. 321.
9 That is, Rules "A", "B" and "C" of document US/A/C.1/18, November 4, p. 322.
Furthermore, as regards paragraph 6 of the first paper, the weight of sentiment in the delegation favored the view that the detailed discussion of voting in the Security Council should take place in the Council. This view was based first upon the necessity that the Security Council write its own rules of procedure; and secondly, upon the realization that very little would be gained through rushing into matters quickly. The United States tactics should be directed toward securing agreement leading to effective Security Council action. An Assembly resolution of such a character that the U.S.S.R. was forced to vote against it would scarcely be helpful in accomplishing this objective.

Whether the text of the specific rules would be given publicity even when they were submitted to the Security Council, has, Mr. Johnson stated, not yet been determined. If their submission was delayed until the matter was referred to the Committee of Experts it might be possible to keep the texts restricted.

Mr. Johnson stressed that the two papers referred to above represent the Department’s position. The general issues involved in all the specific proposals have at one time or another been discussed in the Committee of Experts, and drafts containing the substance of rules B and C were handed to the representatives of the other permanent members on the Committee of Experts last summer but were not placed before the Committee. Mr. Johnson stated that all the representatives of permanent members excepting the U.S.S.R. had been sympathetic with the objective of the second proposal and that all of the permanent members were sympathetic with the objective of the third excepting that the U.S.S.R. did not wish a rule. Mr. Johnson pointed out that in one of the decisions under the Spanish case which the U.S.S.R. claimed to be non-procedural, the U.S.S.R. itself had abstained from voting. Also in the Syria-Lebanon case, both the United Kingdom and France had abstained from voting.

Mr. Johnson reviewed Rule A briefly and indicated that a large part of that Rule might be non-controversial. This of course would not be the case with paragraph 12 which, however, was taken literally from paragraph 1 of Part I of the Four Power Statement. Mr. Johnson stated that one of the dangers in connection with Rule A which must be guarded against would be that the U.S.S.R. might, in con-

10 See footnote 92, p. 321.
11 That is, the rules enumerated in telegram 18, to New York, April 13, p. 262, except note: Rule B of document US/A/C.1/18 (under reference here) corresponds to Rule C in telegram 18 and likewise Rule C to Rule B.
nection with such a rule, attempt to write paragraph 2 of Part II of the Four Power Statement into the rules of procedure and thus in effect nullify for the future the provision that rules of procedure should be adopted by procedural vote.

Rule B, it was pointed out by Mr. Johnson, was the most important and vital United States proposal and likewise the one that would be most difficult to put across.

Bernhard Bechhoefer

Minutes of the Eighteenth Meeting of the United States Delegation, New York, Hotel Pennsylvania, November 12, 1946, 9 a.m.

SECRET

[Here follow list of names of persons (34) present, and discussion of other subjects.]

Veto Problem

Senator Connally said that the Secretary favored the delegation statement on the veto position.\textsuperscript{12} He pointed out that the United States was opposed to undermining the Charter and favored unanimity in relation to Chapter VII, but advocated that the Security Council should consider formulating more rules and procedures. The procedural matter should be designated but there should not be a list because that would cause endless debate over every item. He thought that this position was about as far as the United States could go now. It should be recommended that the Security Council get to work on its rules of procedure to say which should be procedural matters, and to prevent the veto from applying to Chapter VI.

Mr. Dulles noted that Senator Austin had said that we would present a program on the veto at a proper time. Senator Austin agreed and said that there would be a concrete formula drawn before the next meeting of the Delegation.

In answer to Mr. Fahy’s question, Senator Connally said that the Secretary thought that the question of whether an abstention was a veto should be left to the Security Council, otherwise there would be a great debate raised. The question had been examined but it was not proposed to put forward anything on this now.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

\textsuperscript{12} Presumably the position paper dated November 12, printed \textit{infra}. 
United States Delegation Position Paper

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] November 12, 1946.

UNITED STATES POSITION ON VOTING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ITEMS ON THIS SUBJECT

The United States position may be summarized as follows:

(1) The United States regards the principle of unanimity as of the highest importance for the success of the United Nations and the reflection of this principle in the Yalta voting formula (Article 27 of the Charter) as valid.

(2) The United States considers that hasty amendment of constitutional documents on the basis of inadequate experience is unwise and may be harmful.

(3) Accordingly, the United States is neither proposing nor supporting an amendment to Article 27 of the Charter.

(4) Likewise the United States is opposed to the calling of a general conference to amend the Charter in respect to the so-called “veto”.

(5) The United States hopes that the five permanent members may find it desirable at some time in the future in full agreement among themselves and with other members to support modification of the unanimity requirement in its application to matters arising under Chapter VI of the Charter relating to Peaceful Settlement of Disputes.

(6) The United States believes that the failure of the permanent members of the Security Council to agree upon important issues before the Council frustrates the carrying out of the principle of unanimity and leaves unsettled questions, the settlement of which is required in the interest of peace and security; and that the responsibilities imposed upon the permanent members of the Security Council under the Charter require them to make every effort to reach agreement on substantive questions before the Security Council.

(7) The United States considers that the failure of the permanent members of the Security Council to agree upon any substantive question before the Council must not and cannot be construed to relieve any state, large or small, of its obligations under the Charter and under the law of nations.

(8) The United States believes that many of the difficulties encountered in the Security Council during the first year of its operations have been due to lack of certainty and differences of opinion regarding the practical application of the voting formula adopted at
the San Francisco Conference. Consequently, the United States hopes that the voting formula may be clarified in the light of experience and practical need. In this connection the United States suggests that it would be helpful to implement Article 27 of the Charter and the Four-Power statement through the adoption by the Security Council of appropriate rules of procedure.

(9) Specifically the United States believes that the Security Council should give most careful attention to the development of practices and procedures that will carry out the assurances contained in the statement made by the Four Powers at San Francisco that under the Yalta formula decisions of the Security Council not involving the taking of “direct measures in connection with settlement of disputes, adjustment of situations likely to lead to disputes, determination of threats to peace, removal of threats to the peace and suppression of breaches of the peace,” will be governed by a procedural vote under Article 27(2). This should make it easier for the Council to arrive at satisfactory decisions relating to the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes.

(10) The United States believes that the consideration in the General Assembly of the question of voting in the Security Council should be directed toward focusing the issue on the general objectives set forth above, and that the discussion of specific proposals for clarification of the procedures and practices of the Security Council should as far as possible be avoided. It may be that at a later stage of the Assembly debates the United States may wish to support a Resolution containing the substance of paragraphs (6) through (9).

(11) The United States position with respect to voting in the Security Council does not affect the position taken by the U.S. Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission on the problem of the application of the “veto” in the international control of atomic energy. The United States has already made clear that its proposals do not affect the general requirement for unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council.

The present vote was 14 in favor, 9 against, 13 abstaining, with 13 votes not yet recorded.

Minutes of the Nineteenth Meeting of the United States Delegation,
New York, Hotel Pennsylvania, November 13, 1946, 9 a.m.

SECRET

[Here follows list of names of persons (33) present.]

Voting in the Security Council

Senator Connally pointed out that the debate on the veto was going to start on the following day, and he asked the Delegation’s opinion
on whether the U.S. should state its position early in the debate or let the situation develop. Also he wanted guidance on what line should be taken. He said that the position paper US/A./C.1/43 \(^{13}\) was on the whole satisfactory to him although there were some points that were not as clearly set forth as they might be.

Senator Austin said that he thought there was no confusion in the Delegation on its position. Senator Connally replied that he thought there was some confusion within the Delegation although he agreed with the position put forth in general. The thing which he did not agree with was the recommendation in paragraph 10 of the position paper that there should be a postponement in making known the U.S. position and he saw no reason for this delay and thought that a position could be taken now as well as later, especially since there was no violent change advocated.

Senator Connally continued that he would like to be able to say in his statement that the Four-Power statement at San Francisco was wrong when it stated that there must be a unanimous vote of the permanent Members to decide whether a question was substantive or procedural. He recalled that the statement had gone too far in order to get votes at that time and had been put forward at a moment of considerable pressure.

Mr. Dulles agreed that the Four-Power statement had been put forward very hastily at a time when the Delegation was engrossed in what it thought were larger problems. The theory put forward had been that of Mr. Pasvolsky and he thought that the Delegation had never given the matter much thought. Senator Connally reiterated that he thought the statement was wrong and that the Security Council should be asked to reconsider it. Mr. Dulles agreed that it was most important that the Four-Power statement should be corrected.

Senator Connally said that the Four-Power Statement made the veto apply to all questions. Anything could be vetoed when a substantive vote was applied to the decision as to whether or not a matter was procedural. Senator Austin commented that he thought if the matter were reconsidered that the Delegation should shoot high.

Mr. J. Johnson agreed. He pointed out that the Department's position was that no state should be a judge in its own case except in enforcement matters. He thought that the Charter should be consistent with the abstention clause in the Yalta formula regarding Chapter VI.

\(^{13}\) Supra.
He pointed out that the Charter in Article 27 says “shall” but this nicety of phraseology had been completely ignored by the Soviets who claimed that they could decide whether a matter was procedural or substantive. This, he said, was an intolerable situation.

Mr. Johnson thought that it was essentially a tactical matter how to handle the Soviets. The question was whether we were more or less likely to obtain agreement on procedural matters than last Spring when the attempt was made or at the time of the Four-Power statement.

Mr. Dulles said that as he recalled the Four-Power Statement it was an attempt to express the then present situation and it was not regarded as a perpetual definition. He had criticized the statement in that respect. The attitude of the Delegation at that time was that there should be as much dilution of the veto as possible in practice. Certainly, the statement had not been looked upon as being immutable. The U.S. Delegation had been forced into making it by the practical situation at the time.

Senator Connally pointed out that the Four-Power Statement had never been agreed to by the whole organization and was not binding upon it.

Senator Austin said that he thought that the United States position as outlined in the position paper US/A/C.1/43 was a fine position up to recommendation 10 which stated:

“The United States believes that the consideration of the General Assembly of the question of voting in the Security Council should be directed toward focusing the issue on the general objectives set forth above, and the discussion of the specific proposals for clarification of the procedures and practices of the Security Council should as far as possible be avoided. It may be that at a later stage of the Assembly debates, the United States may wish to support a resolution containing the substance of paragraphs (6) through (9).”

Senator Austin thought that the last sentence of paragraph 10 took away all the strength of the position to that point and he thought that this sentence should be deleted. Senator Connally agreed that the sentence should be taken out. Senator Austin described the sentence as a break and a clog upon the U.S. position. Senator Connally added that we should not make statements for the future but state the present position and then move on.

Mr. J. Johnson pointed out that the position paper was meant for
the Delegation's deliberations and referred to this session of the Assembly. He also was agreeable to striking out the sentence.

Senator Austin polled the Delegation and it was agreed that the second sentence of paragraph 10 should be stricken out of the paragraph.

Senator Connally said he thoroughly agreed with the action taken and with the position paper. He pointed out that he and Senator Vandenberg had to confer with Secretary Byrnes. Therefore he would like an expression of opinion from the Delegation whether the U.S. views on the veto should be expressed early in the debate or wait until the complainants had developed their positions. Senator Austin said he would like to see the position put forward early. Mr. Bloom remarked that it would be useful for educational purposes to put forward the position at an early date.

Mr. Wadsworth said that as a political officer he would like to support the statement of Senator Connally. All delegations were looking forward to hearing Senator Connally speak early in the debate and were looking to the United States to support a correction of the abuses of the veto. They were most anxious to know how the United States would approach the problem. He thought that the U.S. position should be made clear as early in the debate as possible.

Senator Connally thanked Mr. Wadsworth and, as he was leaving, he said that he would like to know who was giving out everything that transpired in the Delegation meeting. Mr. Bloom said that he would like to know too and it had to stop. Senator Connally observed that the release of the information was not helping the Delegation. Senator Connally and Senator Vandenberg then left.  

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

---

14 Consideration of the voting question by the First Committee began on November 14 and by November 18 resolutions or amendatory resolutions had been submitted by Argentina, Australia, Cuba, Peru, and the Philippines Republic; for the Committee's deliberations at this time, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, First Part, First Committee*, pp. 84–126, and pp. 323–328 (annexes 7, 7a, 7b, 7c, 7d, and 7f); the First Committee record is cited hereafter as GA(1/2), First Committee.

Senator Connally led off the meeting on the second day (November 15) with a statement of the United States position which was based on the memorandum of November 12 (document US/A/C.1/43) as modified by the Delegation's discussion on November 13. Senator Connally stressed to the Committee that "The General Assembly could best contribute by focusing any recommendations on general objectives rather than assuming to dictate technical details, which were the province of the Council's own rules of procedure." In concluding, Senator Connally lent the support of the United States Delegation in principle to the Australian resolution *(ibid.,* p. 323, annex 7), while disapproving of certain of its specifics *(ibid.,* pp. 92–94).
Minutes of Meeting of the Representatives of the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council

SECRET

PRESENT

U.S.                       U.K.
The Secretary            Mr. Bevin
Senator Connally        Sir Alexander Cadogan
Mr. Cohen              Mr. Jebb
Mr. Bohlen             Interpreter

U.S.S.R.
Mr. Molotov
Mr. Vyshinski
Mr. Pavlov

CHINA
Dr. Wellington Koo
(Two Advisers)

FRANCE
M. Parodi
Mr. Detourelle
Interpreter

[Here follows a table of contents.]

Mr. Bevin said he had asked for this meeting because his Government considers that the Security Council as set up at the San Francisco Conference was the central organization of the United Nations and that it was a body that to fulfill its functions must command the greatest respect among the nations of the world and be the body to which they would turn for protection and security on the most important questions. It must be capable of preserving peace in a serious crisis. The British Government had never felt that it should be used as a substitute for direct negotiations between states but only when states could not settle their differences.

As to the question of the veto, he had been a member of the Cabinet when the voting formula had been adopted after much discussion and had been regarded as a protection which would only be used when the vital interests of the Big Five were affected and only as a last resort. He said he wished to state first of all that the British Government had no intention of suggesting or supporting any amendment to the Charter on this subject but it was anxious that the permanent members of the Council should give a lead to the Assembly on this question and announce a code of conduct concerning the use of the veto, which would clear up the confusion regarding the use of the veto which has existed among other nations and public opinion during the past months.

15 United States minutes drafted by Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.
He said vital questions of disarmament and similar matters which are now being considered by the British Government would eventually go to the United Nations. His Government felt strongly that they could do nothing in these vital fields unless there was confidence and clarity concerning the manner in which the veto would be used. He said the British Government was considering formulation of basic policies and it was their desire to base these policies squarely on the United Nations, but before abandoning old methods of defense the British Government wished to be sure that the United Nations would be able to function as it had been expected at the time it was set up. It was for this purpose that he had circulated to the other permanent members of the Security Council a 7-point document which, as would be seen, was designed to clarify the problem of the use of the veto.

He said that he felt that much of the difficulty in this field had come from the lack of common agreement on the application of this principle. He said he must state that the confidence of his government in the United Nations after the experience of the past year was not so great as to permit it to go as far as it would like in basing its policies on the world organization. He said he thought that this was the most critical period since the end of the war, since everyone had recognized for the 15 or 16 months after the end of hostilities there would be great difficulties growing directly out of the war. Now future policies of long duration would be decided.

He repeated that Great Britain wished to base its policy on the United Nations but wished to be sure that the Organization would operate as intended. He said that the veto power made the preservation of peace in the first instance dependent on the five countries represented here and that if they could give the proper lead then in the next 15 or 20 years there was hope that a rule of law, as against a rule of war, would develop in the world.

He then said he would like to hear the views of his colleagues and called on Mr. Molotov.

(Copy of Bevin’s proposal attached. See Annex 1.)

Mr. Molotov replied that he had not asked for the floor but he was ready to state his views. He said they had studied Mr. Bevin’s document and they fully shared his desire to strengthen the authority of the Security Council and the United Nations organization. This had always been the view of the Soviet Delegation. The Soviet Government felt that recent efforts to popularize the discussion of the veto or its use was somewhat artificial. In so far as the Soviet Government was concerned it had only used the veto in essential cases and could not agree that anyone had abused the veto. Talk of abuse of the veto was a wrong method of work and participation in the activities of the
United Nations, which could only harm it. The purpose should be not
to weaken the foundations of the United Nations but to strengthen
them.

In regard to the veto, certain members of UN bear the responsibility
for the adoption of an attitude contrary to what was correct. He said
he did not believe that Australia and Cuba would have unleashed this
campaign against the veto and its use without having been encouraged
by certain other delegations. Account must be taken of the results of
this campaign, which had been conducive to a bad atmosphere in the
Security Council on the question of the veto. The proper course was to
give a rebuff to those delegations who for some reason or other do not
value the foundation of the Charter adopted by 51 nations over a
year ago.

The Soviet Delegation does not understand such a course of action
whereby simply because some members of the United Nations failed
to conduct themselves properly others should follow their example.
He said that the disposition to have no confidence in the Security
Council was in the opinion of the Soviet Delegation a one-sided atti-
dude and an unconvincing one. As to the Security Council, he said that
its work depended not on others but in the first instance upon our-
selves, and that it would be better not to base our attitude on the in-
correct attitude of others but to show confidence and support to the
Security Council and along with others to try to increase mutual col-
laboration and the settlement of questions that not only affect the
members of the Security Council but all members of the organization.
The best answer, therefore, to the question he felt was to agree to co-
operate more fully and he felt that this duty applied more directly to
the permanent members of the Security Council.

There had been various proposals for special agreements or new
regulations concerning the use of the veto in the Security Council.
The aim of these proposals was to create stricter rules, which he felt
were calculated to have an adverse effect on the work of the Security
Council and unnecessarily restrict its activities under formalities and
rules. This course, he said, instead of doing good would do harm. He
added that the Soviet Delegation was not against Mr. Bevin's pro-
sposal that the five permanent members should consult whenever pos-
sible. He felt that on certain questions it would be desirable to have a
preliminary understanding if such understanding would facilitate the
technical work of the Security Council and help the members to reach
understanding and to further cooperation between permanent and
non-permanent members. He said he felt everyone wished to act along
lines which would be in harmony with the principles of the United
Nations and consequently in the interests of the countries there
represented.
The Secretary stated that the United States had made its position clear at the General Assembly and in the Commission [Committee?] through the statements of Senator Connally. We consider hasty amendments based on inadequate experience to be unnecessary and harmful. That is not our conception of constitutional growth. For example, in a hundred years there had only been five amendments adopted to [after?] the U.S. Bill of Rights, which was an example of the slow development of a fundamental charter. Prior to the San Francisco Conference there had been a great deal of discussion concerning the wisdom of the veto. We recognized the necessity of this power but we had envisaged that it would be used primarily in cases involving enforcement of action and only in matters of the greatest importance. We recognized, for example, that if the United States were called upon to supply armed forces over its adverse vote, there would be great difficulties in putting any such course into effect because of the opposition from the United States Congress. Therefore, the United States had sympathized with those nations urging the inclusion of the veto in the Charter and had supported its inclusion.

On the other hand, we had always recognized the feelings of the smaller nations and their fear that the veto might be exercised in secondary questions. For this reason, they had joined in the San Francisco Declaration, which was in effect a pledge that the veto would not be abused.

The United States, he continued, is satisfied that many of the difficulties on this point had arisen from the practical application of the voting formula. He would not be frank if he did not say that the United States was disappointed at the too frequent use of the veto power. He said he had not been associated closely with the work of the General Assembly but from all his information the majority of small nations have serious objections against the use of the veto. He thought that they should devise some plan in order to reassure the small nations on this point. He said since we apparently had a common desire to avoid any question of amendment of the Charter at this time it would be well to find a solution which would prevent the question of amendment arising. He had therefore prepared in writing some suggestions to that end which he would now distribute.

(Copy of The Secretary's proposal attached. See Annex 2.)

Dr. Koo said that the Chinese Delegation had little to add to the statements already made. He would not take the time of the Committee to elaborate further the attitude of the Chinese Government which was sufficiently well known.

They had always attached great importance to the question of veto in the United Nations and had accepted the Yalta formula with cer-
tain diffidence because they had recognized the need of unanimity among the great powers in order to promote success of the organization. Having subscribed to the Charter, including Article 27, the Chinese Delegation wished to show its respect for the Charter in every way and feel that it should be given a test for several years before any consideration of an amendment. Therefore, the Chinese Delegation tried to make it clear, both in General Assembly and in Commission I that they did not wish any change in the Charter at this time.

This does not mean that the Chinese are not aware of or indifferent to the volume of criticisms, both in the General Assembly and outside, concerning the use of the veto. The Chinese Delegation has been deeply influenced by this criticism of the veto power and they are anxious to work out by agreement with the other permanent members some improvement on the use of the veto without commenting in any way on the manner in which any representative has used the veto. In this opinion, there has been too much discussion on procedure and too many votes on procedure.

The Chinese Delegate feels that in the light of the experience of the past year it should now be possible to agree on improvements in the work of the Security Council, which would in large measure meet the existing criticism without in any way revising the Charter. He pointed out that at San Francisco the four sponsoring powers and France had issued a Declaration concerning the use of the veto. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Declaration gave an example of questions which would be regarded as procedural. If at that time, without any experience in practice, it had been possible to give a list of such questions, now after ten months of existence it should be possible to extend that list.

In actual fact, the Security Council had already dealt with a number of procedural questions and had adopted some new rules. It would be wise to explore what further questions could be by mutual agreement regarded as procedural, thus in effect amplifying the San Francisco Declaration. The five permanent members might help the Security Council to amplify its rules of procedure. For example, at present there were 60 rules, but only one on voting, which merely said that voting in the Security Council would be in conformity with the Charter and Statute of the International Court. He felt that if they could clarify and elaborate the practical application of the voting formula it would not only meet criticism but would also fulfill the promise contained in the San Francisco Declaration that the permanent members would not use the veto in any way to obstruct or block the work of the Security Council. He said the Chinese Delegation welcomed Mr. Bevin’s initiative and in this spirit had some suggestions of their own to make.
(He circulated document containing these suggestions. See Annex 3.)

In explanation he said that many of these suggestions were along the lines of Mr. Bevin’s paper, but perhaps more concrete. He thought that if they could reach an agreement along these general lines it could either be embodied in a Declaration of the Five Powers or an addition to the San Francisco Declaration.

M. Parodi said he was the last to speak and would be brief. The French views on this subject were well known. They considered it would be neither wise, justifiable nor right to attempt to amend the Charter at the present time but they felt that certain improvements could be made in the function of the Security Council without touching the Charter. The French Delegation was in general agreement with the three texts which had been circulated. He would like to make a few observations.

He pointed out that points 3 and 4 of the Chinese draft were already in effect in the Security Council. As to Mr. Bevin’s suggestion, the French Delegation were in favor of the idea of consultation but he felt that to make that consultation effective there would have to be some agreement along the lines of points 4 and 5 of Mr. Bevin’s paper. As to the other points, he said he attached the greatest importance to point 7 and he had already made the views of the French Government known on this question of abstention. He recognized that there were legal difficulties and also that the adoption of this view on abstention would not be a final solution but would indicate a way to solution.

The Secretary then suggested that they should adjourn in order to study the documents which had been circulated. He said he thought every effort should be made to reach an agreement because once the question had been raised before the permanent members, failure to agree would have a bad effect on the General Assembly and those who opposed the veto would take it as an indication that the permanent members had no intention of changing their views.

Mr. Molotov said the Soviet Delegation had already expressed its views on the general question. He would like to add a few words with reference to what had been said here.

He knew that there have been many critical observations concerning the work of the Security Council and the use of the veto. He wished, however, to say that the Soviet Delegation did not regard criticism of the Security Council or of any organ of the United Nations as any-

---

105 Not printed. The views set forth in the document are incorporated substantially in a draft resolution dated October 10, 1947 which was submitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly by the Chinese delegate in the committee and printed in United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, First Committee, pp. 621 and 622.
thing to be afraid of. Criticism is necessary. Different views were held and if they were not stated there was no method of reaching agreed decisions. However, it is essential that criticism should be based only on the desire to strengthen the foundations of the United Nations and not to break them. If they could take that as a starting point and follow this aim, the criticism would be useful and even welcome. He said we should not fear criticism but he felt if they should proceed in their discussion to increase the regulation of the work of the Security Council they would be taking the wrong path and would create difficulties for the Security Council and the United Nations by heaping up formalities. There are enough rules already. In fact, no one here could even remember all existing rules. He said they should draw the necessary conclusions from the situation in order to help the practical work of the Security Council. To increase the regulations would bring about the opposite result.

The Soviet Delegation therefore takes as its aim, based on these considerations, the improvement of the work of the Security Council and not to add to its difficulties by more formalities and regulations.

He concluded that since he had no translation of the American or Chinese papers he would have no concrete observations to make on those. He said in general his attitude towards these suggestions would be as he had outlined here.

M. Parom said that Committee I was meeting this afternoon in order to consider a resolution to suspend discussion on this question until the Secretary General has drawn up a list of the various proposals which have been submitted, and that this would require several days.

Mr. Bevin said that they should not interfere with the work of the political committee or vice-versa. He did not wish in any way that this meeting of the five permanent members would be regarded as a substitute for anything in the United Nations. He said the difficulty as far as Great Britain was concerned was that the criticism had not been confined to the General Assembly but had in England unquestionably influenced the feeling of confidence in the Security Council. Some declaration as to the future work of the Security Council would be of great importance. It was not a question of regulation but of intent. He said everyone in England—the Government and the people—wished to build on the United Nations, but they could not ride two horses, and before shifting from one to the other they wished to make sure that the UN horse would run.

He repeated that the British Government wished to base its policy with [without?] qualification or reservation on the United Nations, but that any uncertainty as to its future functioning must be removed.

It was agreed that they would meet again tomorrow, November 19.
at eleven o'clock, if such a meeting did not conflict with the meeting of the Political Committee which Mr. Molotov wished to attend.\textsuperscript{10}

\textbf{Annex 1}

\textbf{(British Paper)}

\textbf{Note}

It must be recognised that the use of the "Veto" in the Security Council in recent months has called forth almost universal criticism from Members of the United Nations.

His Majesty’s Government themselves are amongst the first to admit the necessity for the maintenance of unanimity amongst the Great Powers. But the manner in which the "Veto" has often been used takes no account of unanimity, and its constant use in this way makes achievement of unanimity all the more difficult.

There can probably be no question of amending the Charter at this stage, but are there not some things that could be done to avoid in practice the situations that have given rise to so much criticism?

For instance,

(1) The Powers possessing the right of "Veto" might agree amongst themselves to consult each other, where possible, before a vote is taken, if their unanimity is required to enable the Council to function effectively.

(2) If there is not unanimity, it might be agreed that the minority of the permanent members, mindful of the fact that they are acting on behalf of all the United Nations, would only exercise the "Veto" where they consider the question of vital importance to the United Nations as a whole, and they would explain on what grounds they consider this condition to be present.

(3) The permanent members might agree that they will not exercise their "Veto" against a proposal simply because it does not go far enough to satisfy them.

(4) The permanent members might agree to advocate rules of conduct for the Security Council providing that questions are only brought before the Security Council after other means of settlement have been tried and must then be presented in proper form to the Council.

\textsuperscript{10} Although there was no meeting of the First Committee at that time the Five Ministers do not seem to have met again on this problem until November 23.
(5) The permanent members might agree to support the establishment of further rules of procedure for the conduct of the Security Council’s business, e.g., for the consideration of any question, the Council should appoint a rapporteur, or a Committee of some of its members, to make a further attempt at conciliation before resorting to the final discussion and voting.

(6) It might facilitate the work of the Security Council, and ensure that the Charter is properly applied, if a formula could be devised on which all could agree, for the definition of a “dispute”.

(7) It would be of great advantage if it were possible to provide, by some means, that a Permanent Member could abstain from voting without automatically vetoing the proposal. Similarly, that mere absence of a Permanent Member should not have the effect of a veto.

[Annex 2]

November 18, 1946.

Proposed Statement To Be Made by the Permanent Members of the Security Council.¹⁷

1. The permanent members of the Security Council recognize that the responsibilities imposed upon the permanent members of the Security Council under the Charter require them to make every effort to reach agreement on substantive questions before the Security Council.

2. The permanent members of the Security Council recognize that many of the difficulties encountered in the Security Council during the first year of its operation have been due to lack of certainty and differences of opinion regarding the practical application of the voting formula. They believe that these difficulties can in the main be worked out by the Security Council in the light of experience and practical need.

3. Specifically, that the permanent members of the Security Council undertake, with a view to removing or reducing these difficulties, to have the Security Council give attention to the development of practices which will ensure so far as is consistent with the Charter

   a. that matters which are truly procedural and matters which are truly non-procedural will be determined in advance of controversy by agreed rules of procedure;

   b. that no state shall act as judge in its own cause;

   c. that a permanent member shall be enabled to abstain from voting without exercising its veto power.

¹⁷ Submitted as an United States paper.
Minutes of Meeting of the Representatives of the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council.

SECRET


PRESENT

U.S.S.R.

M. Molotov (Chairman)
M. Vyshinsky
M. Pavlov

U.S.A.

Mr. Byrnes
Mr. Connally
Mr. Vandenberg
Mr. Cohen
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Bohlen

U.K.

Mr. Bevin
Mr. Cadogan
Mr. Jebb

CHINA

Mr. Wellington Koo
Mr. H. T. Liu
Mr. Chu Hsin Min
Dr. Quo Tai-Chi

FRANCE

M. Couve de Murville
M. Parodi
M. la Tourneille

Mr. Bevin: Will you take the chair, Mr. Molotov.

M. Molotov: Thank you. Are there any remarks on the procedure for the meeting?

Mr. Bevin: I wonder if there are any other views to be expressed since the papers have been circulated and if there is any possibility for agreement? There were the proposals of the United States, China, and the United Kingdom and the different questions evolved at Committee No. 1 at the Assembly. It seemed to me that the papers and the questions gave so much light that we might clear up the matter.

M. Molotov: I gave the general view of the Soviet Union the other day. Since reading the papers I should like to make additional remarks to clarify our view. The Soviet Delegation will submit certain proposals being typed now, and I will explain them. We hold that in the general discussion and in the proposals submitted to the General Assembly and to the Big Five that there were two outstanding questions: 1) revision of the Charter, 2) method of applying the procedure. As to a revision of the Charter, as far as I can judge from recent proposals submitted to the Five, no one insists on making such changes. It appears from these proposals that no one here thinks it would be timely or wise. There is no way we can avoid this matter as the question of revision of the Charter was raised in the Assembly, and as we think it should react in some manner. We think the Assembly should reject the proposal to revise the Charter as not timely.

18 United States minutes; no drafting information on document but probably drafted by Mr. Bohlen.
As to the second question, application of the Charter and the procedure agreed to by the Assembly, it is evident from reading the proposals of France, the United Kingdom, and China that the question centered around that. The Soviet Delegation believes that we should agree in regard to question two not to take the road of new agreements between ourselves intended to regulate our decisions. The matter has been the subject of many proposals which will not be helpful but harmful to the United Nations and the Security Council. We think that the relations between the United Nations and individual countries, particularly the Great Powers, should not be based upon technicalities and regulations. This is a serious question. As to the substance of the question, we can't agree that anyone applied the veto wrongly in the Security Council and think it undesirable to foment passion around this question. It would hurt not only the Soviet Union but all of us. This attitude is not calculated to induce us to seek agreement; therefore, it is essential that we adopt a decision saying that it is not correct to make more rigorous rules for the Security Council or the United Nations. We should make clear that any attempts to stiffen the rules are calculated to do harm and will not be useful. I can now read the draft proposals prepared by the Soviet Delegation:

"1. Bearing in mind that the Organization of the United Nations is still in the first period of its activity, the General Assembly considers it important that all States of the United Nations strive for the further strengthening of the Organization of the United Nations and the improvement in every respect of the work of its organizations in conformity with the lofty principles and aims of the Charter which has received commendation from all peace-loving peoples. The General Assembly considers incorrect attempts to revise the Charter in view of the short period which has elapsed since its unanimous adoption by the United Nations.

2. Attaching special importance to the unification of the efforts of nations both large and small in the development of firm relations between them and in the establishment of durable peace and security, the General Assembly calls on the United Nations for the broadening of international cooperation on the above-mentioned basis, avoiding superfluous regimentation and formality in the work of its organizations and furthering the development of practical achievements in political, economic, and cultural cooperation between nations. In accordance therewith, the General Assembly rejects the proposals aimed at the regimentation of the application of the rule of unanimity set forth in Article 27 of the Charter."

Mr. Bevin: It seems to me that the text you read, Mr. Chairman, applies rather to the General Assembly. But it seems to us that this is a matter for each Delegation. We said that we had no desire to change the Charter. All we tried to get is a code of conduct between ourselves to see if we can avoid these difficulties. We have no desire to
have a lot of rules and regulations, but we want to establish more confidence in the United Nations, as, quite frankly, we haven’t much confidence now. We couldn’t do anything like making a general resolution such as you have read. That is a matter for the General Assembly to express its views upon. It is a general matter. As for the British Government, we are working out our policy now, and we hoped that we could agree amongst ourselves so that I could say to the British people whether we could build security on the Security Council. After this first year that seems very doubtful. I thought we could settle it here as there are only five powers here who can use the veto. A general statement of the character of the one you read does not help understanding amongst the Big Five. We have tried, and we can’t do more than explain our position as to what we have been doing.

M. Molotov: I would like to make plain that if the draft I just gave is unacceptable on the ground that it is drawn up in the form of a decision of the General Assembly, that this can be put right. We can regard the draft not as a decision of the General Assembly but as a draft that will enable us to reach agreement on the questions being discussed now. The form is secondary; the substance is what matters. If Mr. Bevin says that his Government is engaged in drawing up its long-term policy, we are prepared to discuss this in businesslike language.

Mr. Bevin: It was not so much the form as the substance which does not deal with what my Government has felt to be the points at difference in the operation of the Security Council. It desires to know if the operations can be on a more understanding basis than in the past year.

Mr. Byrnes: I made at our last meeting a statement with regard to the position of the United States. The United States has announced that it does not approve efforts to amend the Charter but sympathizes with the point of view of small states that the Great Powers have exercised the veto in a manner never envisaged at San Francisco. It is evident that there was a serious misunderstanding among the Permanent Members. The United States believes that the veto should be sparingly exercised and only on the most important matters. The United States will join in a statement that the veto will be exercised only in times of great emergency to create assurance. This might lead to the cessation of attempts to amend the Charter. It would be a mistake to make a statement of the kind proposed which suggests that the General Assembly is trying to regiment the Permanent Members. It will be better to say nothing at all if we can’t make a better statement.

M. Parodi: The resolution which has been submitted would be important for the collaboration of the nations belonging to the United
Nations. I think it is somewhat general and vague in tone. We have made numerous efforts to achieve collaboration in the Security Council. I think also that a great atmosphere of unquietness has characterized the discussions in the General Assembly. We must do everything to quiet this spirit in the Assembly. If the Permanent Members of the Security Council submit such a statement as you propose, it would poison the spirit in the Assembly. The very important questions the Assembly has to decide would not be helped by such a resolution. It would be better to submit nothing than to say that. I understand the desire not to augment the rules, but the proposals presented to the Assembly are aimed not at augmenting the rules, not at making the procedures more rigid, but at making them more supple.

M. Koo: At the last meeting I gave the views of my Government on the veto. I won't repeat them today since we have also presented some concrete suggestions, but I would like to say a word or two on the Molotov statement and also the words of explanation he has given. None of us desires to revise the Charter. As to that part of the statement, it is in accord with the views of the Chinese Delegation. The problem has two aspects. I believe those two will have to be met. a) The effective working of the Security Council has been commented on in the General Assembly. The general view, which we share, is that the past workings of the Security Council have not been as effective or as smooth as we might have hoped. The Security Council should see itself how it can improve. Since the question was raised in the General Assembly, we should meet that criticism as far as we can. I agree with Mr. Molotov that we should not add to the rules in the Security Council. We have sixty articles already. Whereas the past has produced agreed procedures, I think they might be put in writing. If the procedures were enlarged, the criticism of the General Assembly might be met. What I have in mind is matters such as the inclusion of an item on the agenda, or the removing of an item from the agenda. If I am correct, that could be included in the list of procedures established by the Permanent Members at San Francisco. We should make use of our past experience to improve the workings of the Security Council for the future.

The second question is a situation in the General Assembly which we must meet in some way. This is really a matter between the five Permanent Members and the five members coming from the Assembly. So far as the emphasis in the Soviet proposal is on strengthening the United Nations and improving relations between great and small nations we all agree, but we wish the conclusion at the end were more concrete. I mean some definite procedures which we in the Security Council have reached in the past, or here. Only by this step can we meet the criticism from the General Assembly. If only a negative
statement is made, we will only get a long debate, and I can’t see what the outcome would be. Only if we make concrete suggestions, can we dispel the criticism, and we would thus contribute to the collaboration Mr. Molotov urges.

M. Molotov: Various remarks have been made with regard to our draft resolution, and, owing to the fact that differences of opinion came to light, the opinion was expressed that we could dispense with the statement. The Soviet Union thinks that some statement is necessary. It is desirable that certain conclusions be placed for our work in the future. It would be a good thing if after our discussion of the veto, the Charter, and other things, we could arrive at a unanimous opinion, at least on the part we can express an opinion on now. It can be stated that the Five think revision of the Charter untimely, as it has been in force only one year. To revise it now would be to discredit the work of the United Nations last year. I wonder if we can’t make a resolution saying that we deem it essential to maintain the prestige of the Charter agreed to by all peace-loving nations. It was said that our draft contained certain negative elements, and that such a resolution was undesirable. Although we are the authors, we won’t insist upon it. Let us modify it, or eliminate the negative elements but find a solution which will strengthen the Charter and establish more harmonious work in the Security Council and in the United Nations as a whole. When the reference was made to the Security Council in the initial period, the approach was one-sided. The Soviet Union cannot ignore the discussion of the Iranian question in the Security Council. The method used was not conducive to harmonious work. It is easy to say that this or that government has no confidence in the Security Council, but we must remember that confidence in the Security Council depends upon each of us, and we should all try for harmonious work and not be one-sided or use the Security Council against one of the members. Take the question of the veto. It wasn’t raised today, but discussion of this took a one-sided trend, and the atmosphere around it was one-sided, too. The impression was created in the outside world that certain of us are encouraging this view. In the long run the work of the Security Council depends not upon new decisions but upon each of us trying to improve the work. The method of majorization has acted several times to the disfavor of the minority, to the disfavor of the opinion of delegations which did not have a majority on any of the questions under discussion. I think the method of majorization in the Security Council and other conferences will not be useful. It would be better to establish business-like relations and understanding to allow us to improve the work. Upon each of us five much depends. We should say there was room for im-
provement in this respect. There is no need for new formal decisions upon the regimentation of the work, but we should secure the character of the work so as not to injure any one of the partners, but so that the interests of the minority are taken into account as well. The statement under discussion will be good if it contributes to the improvement of the work.

Mr. Byrnes: At the last meeting proposals were presented by the United Kingdom, China, and the United States, and France expressed approval in principle of the three resolutions. The Soviet Delegation was unable to agree and added its own resolution. The United States cannot agree with the Soviet resolution. One hour and forty-five minutes have gone by, and, as the matter must be settled elsewhere, I suggest we adjourn for fifteen minutes and then go on with consideration of the treaties. I would add that we will all have the opportunity to express our views in Committee No. 1. It is useless to go on here.

Mr. Bevin: I agree. We must reserve our position for the Assembly, and state our case there. There is nothing positive we can put forward elsewhere than in Committee No. 1. Certainly my Government understood the use of the veto was to be quite different after San Francisco. I hoped we could have agreed. If we had, I should have been very happy. If we can’t—

M. Molotov: Any objections?

M. Koo: I want to ask Mr. Molotov if he said he could not accept the other papers. I understood that his observations were of a general character.

M. Molotov: I take it we have been engaged today in the examination of these drafts as well as of our own.

Mr. Bevin: We are as well divided as the Security Council.

M. Molotov: We will adjourn until 6:00 p. m.

---

Editorial Note

Discussion of the voting question was resumed by the First Committee on December 1 at which time it was decided to appoint a sub-committee to reconcile the several resolutions which had been offered (the Soviet Union submitted one at this meeting, making a total of six). The Sub-Committee, composed of representatives of the delegations of Argentina, Australia, China, the Soviet Union, the United

---

19 That is, in the General Assembly.

20 This is a reference to the session of the Council of Foreign Ministers which was meeting in New York at approximately the same time as the General Assembly.
Kingdom, the United States, and Venezuela, in an unsuccessful attempt to reach a consensus extending through five meetings, finally on December 6 drafted a report to the Plenary Committee which recommended that the Committee vote on the resolutions of Cuba, Peru, Australia (the second of two revisions), the Soviet Union, and China (the latter submitting a resolution to the Sub-Committee on December 6). For the deliberations of the First Committee on December 1, see GA (I/2), First Committee, pages 210 ff.; the Soviet and Chinese resolutions are found *ibid.*, pages 328 and 330, annexes 7g and 7i, respectively; the two Australian revisions are found *ibid.*, pages 327 and 331, annexes 7e and 7j (the text finally voted on by the First Committee was that found in annex 7j); see *ibid.*, pages 329 and 330, annex 7h for the text of the Sub-Committee’s report.

In the final phase of the First Committee’s consideration of this issue, on December 8, the Committee, grappling with a tangled parliamentary situation, finally approved the second Australian revised text, while rejecting its second paragraph which was implicitly condemned of the past performance of the Security Council; the Australian Delegation had signified its willingness that the voting on the proposed resolution should be on a paragraph-by-paragraph basis. For the December 8 proceedings of the First Committee see *ibid.*, pages 284 ff.

At both meetings of the Plenary Committee, on December 1 and December 8, the United States Representative on the First Committee, Senator Connally, declared that the United States Delegation supported the resolution offered by Australia except for the second paragraph “which appeared to imply a condemnation of past events and reflect on members of the Security Council. . . . His delegation believed the Council’s difficulties were the growing pains of a new organization for which no one should be blamed” (*ibid.*, pages 218 and 219; quotation from December 8 statement).

The report of the First Committee to the General Assembly on this matter is found in GA (I/2), Plenary, pages 1538 ff., annex 7l. General Assembly debate of the report during two meetings on December 13 is found *ibid.*, pages 1231 ff. For Senator Austin’s statement to the General Assembly in support of the First Committee’s recommended draft resolution, see *ibid.*, pages 1244 ff. The draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly without change and as Resolution 40 (I) read:

“The General Assembly
Mindful of the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations, and having taken notice of the divergencies which have arisen in regard to the application and interpretation of Article 27 of the Charter:
Earnestly requests the permanent members of the Security Council
to make every effort, in consultation with one another and with fellow members of the Security Council, to ensure that the use of the special voting privilege of its permanent members does not impede the Security Council in reaching decisions promptly;

Recommends to the Security Council the early adoption of practices and procedures, consistent with the Charter, to assist in reducing the difficulties in the application of Article 27 and to ensure the prompt and effective exercise by the Security Council of its functions; and

Further recommends that, in developing such practices and procedures, the Security Council take into consideration the views expressed by Members of the United Nations during the second part of the first session of the General Assembly."

(United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, Second Part, Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly during the Second Part of the First Session, pages 64 and 65.)

---

III. POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES FAVORING EARLY ADMISSION OF STATES ELIGIBLE FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS

10 Files #: USGA/GEN/10

United States Delegation Position Paper

[WASHINGTON, December 1945.]

12. NEW MEMBERS

THE PROBLEM

The main practical question relative to the admission of new members concerns the time at which we shall support membership applications from States which in our opinion are peace-loving, and are able and willing to carry out the obligations of the United Nations Charter. Enemy and ex-enemy States are not now concerned, since final treaties of peace have not yet been concluded with them. Obviously, the United States welcomes the full collaboration of all qualified States in the United Nations Organization as soon as the working schedule of the Organization permits this to be arranged.

---

21 Short title for the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State.

22 This document was one of 29 position papers drafted in the Department's Office of Special Political Affairs for purposes of providing a briefing and position book on as many projected issues as possible for the use of the United States Delegation to the First Part of the First Session of the General Assembly; it is found in the 10 Files under the series USGA/GEN/. For documentation regarding the organization and arrangements effected for the conduct of United States relations with the United Nations, see pp. 1 ff.; within the Department of State the Office of Special Political Affairs (SPA) was principally responsible for the formulation and coordinating of policy relating to United Nations Organization matters.

For practical reasons, however, the United States has taken the general attitude that the admission of new members should be postponed until after the Assembly session devoted to the task of organization.\textsuperscript{24} The problem is whether this attitude should be relaxed so as to permit us to support the applications of any States and, if so, of which States.

\textbf{PROPOSED U.S. POSITION}

We should maintain our position that the consideration of applications for membership should be deferred until after the first part of the first session of the Assembly. Completion of this primary task in the January meeting would leave the way open for consideration, during the second part of the session or the first meeting thereafter, of applications forwarded by the Security Council with its recommendation.

\textbf{DISCUSSION}

The paramount factor in the decision—over and above any considerations pertaining to the admission of any particular State—is believed to be the estimated effect which consideration of membership questions at the January meetings would have upon the Assembly’s ability to complete the structure of the United Nations during those meetings. It is not unlikely that consideration, during the first part of the first session, of an application of a single State might unavoidably raise complex questions concerning possible applications of other States as well. To deal with these involved matters might take up much time which is urgently needed for completion of the essential mission of this part of the session: to establish the Organization on a working basis. A still more serious danger is that the deliberations and decisions of the Assembly on the essential structure of the Organization might be affected or determined by political maneuvering on membership questions. When the establishment of the United Nations Organization is complete, we should, so far as possible, give separate consideration to the application of each State, entirely on its own merits. Care must be taken to avoid a log-rolling process which might make difficult the rejection of applications of, for example, entities which lacked the qualities of statehood necessary to effective membership in the Organization.

A few foreign Governments have approached United States representatives with questions concerning the proper procedure and time for making application, or intimating an interest in membership. In

\textsuperscript{24} For documentation regarding United States policy in the organization of the several United Nations organs at the first meeting of the General Assembly at London in January and February 1946 and elections relating thereto, see pp. 117 ff., London section.
September 1945 the Government of Iceland informed the American Minister of its desire to be admitted to the UNO at the earliest possible date, and requested that this be brought to the attention of the Secretary of State in case such questions should be discussed at the forthcoming London conference of foreign ministers.25 In reply it was stated that while Iceland could count on our whole-hearted support for membership at the earliest possible moment, only the Council and Assembly could handle admissions and that a communication to the Secretary-General, when he was appointed, might elicit information as to the correct procedure for making application.

The Swedish Government has shown a very active desire for early admission to membership. It has been informed that, while consideration of applications would probably be deferred, for practical reasons, until the second part of the present session, the United States was most desirous of seeing Sweden become a member of the Organization at the first appropriate date and that it would support Sweden’s application as soon as applications were in order.

Various reports indicate a definite, though still undeclared, interest in membership on the part of Portugal. A suggestion from Lisbon to the effect that Members of the League of Nations—referring to Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland—might be admitted as a group, was not favored by the Department of State and it was said that in any case new members could not be admitted until the second part of the present session, or later. The Brazilian Government has already indicated to the United States its support for Portugal’s application.

Our position with reference to the question under discussion has thus been consistently developed both in the Preparatory Commission26 and in our diplomatic relations with individual States, and at present at least, no difficulty in maintaining it is anticipated.

501.BB/1–2646: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

URGENT

LONDON, January 26, 1946.

[Received January 28—7:56 a.m.]

1016. Delun 162. There is quoted below the text of the telegram from Colonel General Hoxa addressed to the President and Vice Presidents

---

25 That is, the session of the Council of Foreign Ministers that met at London in September 1945.
26 For documentation regarding the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations which met at London in November and December 1945, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. 1, pp. 1433 ff.
of the General Assembly requesting Albanian admission to UNO membership. This telegram was recently transmitted by the Yugoslav delegation to Mr. Jebb. It was agreed at the Security Council meeting Friday that the question of whether the Albanian application should be placed on the agenda would be discussed at the next meeting of the Security Council on January 28. As the British through Gore-Booth have approached us not only on the question of the Albanian application but on the matter of admission of new members generally, we should appreciate receiving from the Department any advice that it may have.

"Message from the President of the People's Republic of Albania to the President and Vice-Presidents of the General Assembly.

The following is the text of the telegram from Colonel General Enver Hoxa, President of the People's Republic of Albania, to the President and Vice-Presidents of the General Assembly.

To His Excellency the President and to the Vice Presidents of the General Assembly of the United Nations, London.

On the occasion of the opening of the first session of the General Assembly of the United Nations which marks an important stage in the history of mankind, I should like to inform Your Excellency that the Government of the People's Republic of Albania, being desirous of giving positive evidence of the importance they attach to the organisation for peace and cooperation among nations and of the joining the other democratic countries in the working out of the noble purposes and the exalted principles which constitute the bases of the organisation, had the honour to address a request to the President of the Preparatory Commission on the 20th December 1945 asking him to undertake the necessary steps with a view to the admission of Albania into the organisation of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and on the basis of the contribution of her people to the common cause of the United Nations. In renewing their application the Government of the People's Republic of Albania are convinced that the General Assembly, appreciating at their true value the immense sacrifices made by the Albanian people during the long and arduous struggle against the Axis Powers, will accede to their request. At the same time, I wish to declare on behalf of the Govern-

---

27 H. M. Gladwyn Jebb, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission, who was acting in a temporary capacity as United Nations Secretary-General pending the election of a permanent official.

28 At this meeting on January 25 when the Albanian application first came to the notice of the Security Council Mr. Statistimu made a brief statement which in effect set the direction of United States policy on this issue for the remainder of the London meetings: "May I suggest that we deal with the question of new membership as a whole later on, at one meeting rather than piecemeal? I am sure there are a number of delegations which have statements to make relative to new membership, and I think it would be much better to deal with the subject in toto" (United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, First Year, First Series, p. 21; hereafter cited as SC, 1st yr., 1st series).

29 Paul H. Gore-Booth, British Foreign Office official and head of the Secretariat of the United Kingdom Delegation to the General Assembly.
ment of the People’s Republic of Albania that our country is prepared to assume all the obligations arising from the Charter of the United Nations.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express to Your Excellency, in the name of the Albanian people, the name of the People’s Republic of Albania and my own, the warmest and most sincere good wishes that the work of the new organisation may be crowned with full success in achieving a more prosperous future for mankind.

President of the People’s Republic of Albania Colonel-General Enver Hoxa.”

STETTINIUS

501.BB/1–2646: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

U.S. URGENT WASHINGTON, February 1, 1946—1 p. m.
SECRET NIACI

1105. Undel 147. Department has no additional information on the general question of admission of new members nor has its policy in that regard changed (first paragraph Delun 162). It assumes that position taken by the U.S. Delegation at Security Council meeting of January 28 with regard to the Albanian application for membership was in line with this general policy but if there were specific factors relating to the Albanian request or if there are other developments relating to admission of new members to UNO, we should appreciate fuller information than given in Delun 171.30

30 Telegram 1061, January 29, from London. This was a daily summary telegram of the events of that date and read in pertinent part: “At Security Council meeting today first question raised was whether Albanian request for membership should be on agenda. U.S. motion that it should not be included being lost 4 to 4, with three abstentions and Chairman not voting. Extended discussion ensued as a result of which it was agreed without objection to including this item on agenda, on clear understanding that, as emphasized by Chair, decision as to when to consider Albanian request should be taken when item is reached on agenda.” (501.BB/1–2946) The record of this meeting is found in SC, 1st yr., 1st series, pp. 24 ff. In his statement on the motion for adjournment Mr. Stettinius said: “You will recall that I referred briefly to this question the last time we met. In view of the position taken by the Executive Committee [of the Preparatory Commission] and also by the Preparatory Commission, that new applications for membership would not be acted upon at the first part of the General Assembly session, I feel it would be best not to include this item at this session of the Council. The admission of new Members is a serious and important matter, requiring the most careful consideration of the Members of the United Nations. In the circumstances, it is apparent that the only reasonable and fair method of giving proper and adequate consideration to applications for new membership would be to defer all applications until some time prior to the next meeting of the General Assembly, when the Security Council would have had an opportunity to deal with the number of applications that have accrued at that time” (ibid., p. 25).
We desire to repeat to Tirana not only text set forth in Delun 162 but also such additional information as you may be able to provide. It would be helpful if you could give us an estimate as to when consideration of the Albanian request will be given in the Security Council. For your secret information Jacobs\textsuperscript{31} reports from Tirana that there is a marked increase in Soviet prestige and activity in Albania, coupled with a growing unfriendliness of the Hoxha regime toward the U.S.

BYRNE

501.BB/2-746: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

LONDON, February 7, 1946—4 p. m.
[Received February 8—9: 36 a.m.]

1514. Delun 247. [Here follows summary of the January 25 meeting of the Security Council, and part of the January 28 meeting, as these related to the membership question.]

After my motion was defeated (Delun 171)\textsuperscript{32} there followed extended discussion at end of which it was agreed to place item on agenda on clear understanding that question of time when subject should be considered will be determined by SC when this item is reached.

Albanian application has since remained last item on published agenda of each meeting of SC. Presumably question as to when to consider request will be decided after consideration of Greek problem and Indonesia question has been finished.

I believe it likely that Albanian application will not have to be considered again in London. If, however, it comes up either in normal course of events or in connection with consideration of question of moving to US, I propose to take same line as before and to attempt to postpone consideration until after Council is in session at temporary site.

It is significant that Poland and Soviet Union both supported early consideration of Albanian application and indicated that they would support application itself. While there has been no public Greek opposition to application, Glintaris of Greek delegation on January 29, in long conversation with Hare emphasized that incidents of this kind fitted perfectly into familiar pattern of Russian encroachment in Balkans which he doubted either British or US delegations fully appreciated. Moreover, Aghnides telephoned member of staff same day

\textsuperscript{31} Joseph E. Jacobs, head of the informal mission to Albania.

\textsuperscript{32} See footnote 30, p. 361.
suggesting that when Albanian question is raised I might wish to suggest that in view of Greece's proximity to Albania, SC would desire to hear from Greek delegate. He expressed view that it would be inappropriate for a state which has not yet entered into peace arrangements to be singled out as first new member. Unless otherwise instructed I shall not make such a suggestion as it might indicate a tendency to support Greek position in Greek Albanian issues.

Freitas Valle of Brazil who supported me in Council January 28 remarked in [apparent omission] today expressing to me belief that SC could finish in three or four meetings that he hoped it would do so before Albanian item came up.

I would welcome any comments or suggestions Dept cares to make.  

Stettinius

501.AA/3-1546

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of International Organization Affairs (Sandifer)

SECRET

UNITED STATES ATTITUDE TOWARD MEMBERSHIP QUESTIONS DURING COMING SECURITY COUNCIL MEETINGS

THE PROBLEM

The Security Council placed Albania's membership application on its agenda on January 28. On February 13, the Council voted, on the motion of the United States, to defer disposition of the matter "pending further study until the Security Council convenes at the temporary

---

50 In telegram 1403, Undel 198, February 11, 7 p. m., to London, the Delegation was informed that "Dept approves your course of action proposed in fifth paragraph of Delun 247 and desires that you continue effort to secure postponement of vote. Please inform us of probable time of vote. Department will cable further instructions prepared in the light of current developments in Albania." (501.BB/2-746).

The Department instructed further in telegram 1495, Undel 207, February 13, 8 p. m., to London, that "Dept assumes that question of Albanian application will probably be disposed of by vote to consider at later meeting of Security Council. If, however, your efforts toward this end should fail, Dept desires that you vote along general lines of your statement in paragraph 2 of Delun 247. . . . " (501.AA/2-1346).

The question was in fact voted upon the evening of February 13, when Mr. Stettinius offered a motion that "... this item be kept on our agenda, but that disposition be deferred, pending further study, until the Security Council convenes at the temporary headquarters." Mr. Stettinius added: "My Government desires to have more time to examine the problem." The motion was carried. (SC, 1st yr., 1st series, p. 268.)

51 No date appears on this document; internal evidence indicates that it was drafted in the early part of March, probably no later than March 15.

52 The Security Council was scheduled to reconvene in New York on March 25.
headquarters." The issue will, therefore, almost certainly be discussed at the coming meetings.

Its exact place on the agenda remains to be determined. In postponing consideration until its next meeting, the Security Council did not indicate what priority the matter should have on the agenda, several representatives indicating simply that the Council could call up this or any other item for discussion at such time as it wished.

As to action on the application itself, we have the choice of three main alternatives:

(a) To vote for a favorable recommendation from the Security Council to the General Assembly;
(b) To vote against such a recommendation;
(c) To propose or support further postponement.

However, our action on this matter is only a single item in what must be a broad program for the admission of new members. The Potsdam agreements reflect a purpose to admit the neutral States (except Spain) and, after the conclusion of peace treaties, Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Roumania and there is a general consensus that this program should be set in motion without unnecessary delay.

Thus a further branch of the problem is the decision whether choice of one of the alternatives set out above should be combined with some other action or statement designed to advance the program of bringing in all qualified States.

PROPOSED UNITED STATES POSITION

1) The following course should be carefully considered and, if the current political atmosphere is judged not unfavorable therefor, steps might be taken as follows:

(a) The neutral governments might be sounded out to ascertain their views and desires concerning the submission of membership applications;
(b) A few members of the Security Council might be sounded out to ascertain whether or not they plan any action in the present meeting on the subject of admission of new members, and to ascertain their views with regard to possible means of expediting admission of qualified neutral States as a group. Such action would be presented as a procedure for carrying out the provisions of Chapter X of the Potsdam Communiqué;
(c) If it were found that some of the neutral States were ready to submit applications at once, we might consult and if possible come to an agreement with other Security Council powers concerning means

---

of encouraging and expediting this, and of securing prompt and favorable action by the Security Council;

(d) To provide for neutral States who were not admitted or who did not apply, a resolution might be proposed, providing in substance:

"That the consideration of any applications for membership received from any neutral State be made an item of the continuing agenda of the Security Council, to the end that any ex-neutral State that so desires may, if found qualified, be admitted to membership by the General Assembly at its September meeting."

(e) We should, if this course were taken, presumably be prepared to vote for Albania’s admission if this should make possible favorable action on a reasonable number of other applications.

2) If conditions appear unfavorable for the successful execution of such a program as is outlined in (1), we should proceed as follows:

(a) If, as is anticipated, General Hoxha makes no satisfactory acknowledgement of the present effect of the treaties in force between the United States and Albania on April 7, 1939:

i. We should, if possible, favor postponement until August or September, of action by the Security Council on this and any other applications that might be received in the meantime. Our position might be explained as follows:

When the subject was discussed before, consideration was deferred pending further study. The primary question requiring such consideration was, and still is, what general procedure the members of the United Nations shall follow in providing for the admission of a number of States, at least some of which have been generally assumed—in the Potsdam agreement, for example—to qualify for membership. This question is not one merely of Security Council procedure—although that has not been put in final form as yet—but one of the general relations of States and one which in particular involves many uncertainties connected with post-war reconstruction. These uncertainties, concerning the internal and external relations of many States, will, it is hoped, decrease during the coming months.

We accordingly suggest that, in the circumstances, the best general procedure for taking the initial steps to bring about the membership of qualified states would be as follows:

(a) Consideration of all membership applications should be postponed until a meeting of the Security Council in August or early September, the exact date to be agreed upon later.

(b) That meeting would be a propitious occasion for considering not only Albania’s application but also any applications from the former neutral and enemy States whose admission was generally envisaged in the Potsdam Communiqué. In the case of ex-enemy States, admission would naturally depend on the prior conclusion of peace treaties.

(c) It should be strongly emphasized that such a program need not delay by a single day the final acquisition of membership by any State that was found qualified. The General Assembly which has the final decision on membership applications, does not meet again until September.
ii. In prior discussions with representatives of other Security Council Members, it should be indicated that our intentions are as stated above and that we should prefer to support a motion to postpone consideration to the alternative of simply voting against a motion to approve Albania's application. Actual voting tactics should be left to the decision of the American representative in the light of political conditions existing just prior to the vote. However, in view of the fact that the United States representative has proposed two previous resolutions to postpone, it would be preferable to arrange, if possible, that the motion be put by some other State.

iii. In case sufficient support for a postponing vote could not be secured, it would presumably be necessary to vote against the application on the merits or, perhaps, to abstain from the vote. A possible statement giving grounds for an adverse vote is given in Annex B.37

3) In the unlikely case that a satisfactory response should be received from General Hoxha, we should favor the application.

4) Whatever the attitude taken by the United States toward the application we should, in one of our statements, refer to Chapter X of the Potsdam Communiqué, of August 2, 1945 and point out that since the Security Council will be considering Albania's application at its meeting in August or September, it would presumably be ready at that time to consider also any applications from States whose admission is envisaged in the Communiqué. In the case of ex-enemy States, this would naturally depend on conclusion of the peace treaties by that time. This government regards the admission of any state to membership in the United Nations as a matter that must be decided through careful consideration of the actual merits of each particular case.

DISCUSSION

Our attitude in connection with the Albanian application should be consistent both with our general attitude and program toward the admission of new members and with the individual merits of the Albanian case. As to the former, it is clear that Albania cannot be a major concern of our broad policy. Our action should, therefore, not be such as to delay necessary steps toward the admission of a number of States whose membership would strengthen the United Nations. Unless a rather bold course such as is outlined under (1) above is practicable, it seems that the needs of our broad policy toward admission to membership would be served by incorporating into our proposal for postponement some indication that the Security Council should be ready in August or September to consider applications from neutral States.

It is believed that a reference to Chapter X of the Potsdam Communiqué, which registers the views of the Big Three in favor of the admission of the neutrals other than Spain and, following the conclusion of peace treaties with the enemy states of Italy, Bulgaria,

37 Not printed.
Roumania, Hungary and Finland, would serve our purpose of giving some public hint of our interest in securing the admission of at least some ex-neutral states. The reference to the Potsdam Communiqué would also indicate that we wish to limit the field at this time and that we would not be open to any possible suggestion that further Soviet Republics be admitted.

With regard to the three possible alternatives of action in Albania's application, set out in the statement of the "problem" above, it seems clear that unless the Hoxha regime modifies its present attitude in important respects, it will be impractical for the United States to cast a favorable vote on the application. The background of the case is briefly as follows:

This Government sent a political representative to Tirana in May 8, 1945, and negotiations looking toward recognition of the Hoxha government have supposedly gone on since then. The United States made an acknowledgment by the Hoxha regime of the continued validity of the treaties in force between Albania and the United States on April 7, 1939, a condition precedent to recognition. General Hoxha has made no such acknowledgment and has stated that the validity of no treaty could be accepted "in advance". While negotiations were thus supposedly continuing without leading to tangible results, the American mission was subjected to increasingly inconsiderate and unfriendly treatment in a number of respects. The American representative accordingly delivered to General Hoxha, under instructions, a strongly-worded memorandum expressing the dissatisfaction of the United States Government and indicating that it would not grant recognition to Albania unless the attitude of the Hoxha regime became satisfactory in respect of the basic questions at issue. It was intimated that Albania's admission to the United Nations would be opposed unless proper respect for treaties was shown by the Hoxha regime.

It is not understood that a satisfactory response has thus far been received.

In case a satisfactory reply were received, so that recognition could be granted to the Hoxha regime it would seem logical and desirable to vote in favor of the application. This eventuality, however, appears unlikely at present.

In case no such satisfactory reply is received, it would presumably be impossible for us to support the application. However, unless general circumstances favor a flat negative vote on the merits of the case, it would seem preferable to find some formula for postponing any vote on the merits. A negative vote would, of course, create resentment,

---

58 For documentation concerning this matter, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. iv, pp. 1 ff., and ibid., 1946, vol. vi, pp. 1 ff.
would probably provoke discussion in the Security Council on the special issues between ourselves and the Hoxha regime, and would in any case require explanations on our part that would receive much publicity. However, the general circumstances may possibly be such as to make it desirable for us to raise the issues publicly and to make a strong statement of our attitude on them.

The need for special care in choosing the ground on which we favor postponement is obvious. The application has already received some discussion in the Security Council on two different occasions and we and the British took the attitude then that more study of the subject was necessary before a decision could be given. We ourselves moved postponement of the vote until the present session; this attitude would naturally create the expectation that we would at this time be prepared to cast our vote on the merits of the case. Accordingly, it will be fairly obvious to all concerned—and particularly to the Russians, who are doubtless familiar with the issues between ourselves and Hoxha—that our attitude of favoring postponement contains the element of unwillingness to approve the application at the present time. We should attempt, by prior discussions with Security Council members, to get our attitude accepted without the necessity of airing our views on the precise issues between ourselves and Hoxha. However in case circumstances should make it necessary to do so, we should presumably be prepared to make a statement along the general lines of Annexes A and B.  

---

10 Files: SD/S/111

Department of State Position Paper  

secret  

[WASHINGTON,] March 22, 1946.  

U.S. POSITION TOWARD MEMBERSHIP APPLICATIONS DURING COMING SECURITY COUNCIL MEETINGS  

1. We should favor a motion to postpone, until a meeting in August, consideration of the Albanian application and any other application received before that time, since

---

58 These contingencies did not arise, and the annexes are not printed.

49 Internal evidence indicates that this paper had been cleared through the Department by March 22. On that date it reached the office of the Secretary of State and by March 25 it had been passed on to the office of Mr. Stettinius (whether in Washington or in New York is not clear) “with a mere notation from the Secretary that it was for him [Stettinius], . . . It was apparently transferred to Mr. Stettinius pursuant to the general intention that the Secretary should handle only the Iranian case.” (Memorandum by Mr. Sandifer, Chief of the Division of International Organization Affairs, to Alger Hiss, Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs, April 3, File No. 501.AA/4-346; this memorandum is printed in part infra).
(a) the admission of Albania or any other applicant State could not possibly take place until final approval of the application by the General Assembly at its meeting in September, and

(b) the Security Council should make provision for considering not only the one application now before it, but all applications that may be presented within a reasonable time.

To provide now for action upon such application at a meeting during August, the exact date to be fixed later on, would establish a general and reasonable procedure by which the Security Council could give the membership problem as a whole the careful consideration which it warrants, and by which all States that desire membership can prepare and present applications without any State necessarily suffering any delay in securing admission.

2. In prior discussions with representatives of other Security Council members, it should be indicated that our intentions are as stated above and that we would not be able to vote in favor of approval of the application. We should arrange, if possible, that a motion along the lines of (1) above should be made by some other member with assurance of our support.

3. In case such a motion should fail, we should maintain our position that action on the Albanian application should be postponed until a meeting in August. If necessary, in order to maintain this position, we should vote against any motion for approval of the application.

4. In the unlikely case that General Hoxha’s attitude should suddenly become such as to justify our support in principle and, further, that the motion to postpone should fail, we should favor the application.

501.AA/4-346

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of International Organization Affairs (Sandifer) to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss)

[WASHINGTON,] April 3, 1946.

I have received the following informal report from Mr. Taylor,41 dated April 2, concerning the Albanian membership question:

"1. As I told you on the phone, we have as yet had no indication of any impending move to place the Albanian problem on the agenda. However, such a move should probably from now on be expected at any time.

"2. I have just prepared a handy collection of documents on the Council proceedings on this matter and including as well a proposal as to our tactics and a proposed statement for possible use. After talking a previous draft over with Alger,\textsuperscript{43} Charles Noyes\textsuperscript{44} and Harding Bancroft\textsuperscript{45} I have drawn it up so as to suggest that we resist any move to place the item on the agenda of any meeting before July. A distinction has emerged from the Committee of Experts'\textsuperscript{46} discussion, between the "Calendar of Business" (a sort of docket of future business without any indication as to the time it will be taken up) and the "Agenda", which is the order of business of any particular meeting. The Albanian matter would, under the new procedure, be said to be at present on the Calendar of Business, but not on the agenda. Under this suggested plan, we should oppose placing the matter on the agenda on the grounds specified in the position paper that was cleared through the Department. I think we will discuss the matter tomorrow—Noyes and Johnson\textsuperscript{47} will, I hope, have time for it but the latter is extremely busy attending and preparing for the meetings of the Committee of Experts. I shall see that you are informed at the earliest possible moment.

"3. One suggestion has been that we make concrete proposals for so changing the rules of procedure as to make some special provision for the consideration of membership applications. There is, as you may know, a specific Russian proposal along these lines in the Committee of Experts.\textsuperscript{48} It seems to be the consensus here, so far as I have been able to observe, that no such rules are needed unless possibly for negotiation purposes in connection with the handling of this application. We have made something, in the Council discussions before, of the need for the establishment of general procedures for the handling of the matter. It may possible be that a suggestion to submit all such matters to a committee of the Council would be helpful. I am going to ask the opinions of Mr. Johnson and Mr. Noyes on that matter tomorrow if possible. I do not know yet whether present plans call for any general use of committees by the Council. A referral to committee might possibly offer one means of ascertaining in advance what the Members' attitudes toward particular applica-

\textsuperscript{43} These particular papers have not been identified in the Department's files.
\textsuperscript{44} Mr. Hiss.
\textsuperscript{45} Charles P. Noyes, Special Assistant to Mr. Stettinius, Adviser on Security Council matters.
\textsuperscript{46} Harding F. Bancroft, Associate Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs.
\textsuperscript{47} The Committee of Experts was a committee of the Security Council set up by the Council to frame permanent rules of procedure; it was made up of 11 members representative of the membership of the Security Council itself. For documentation regarding the work of the Committee of Experts with reference to the establishment of rules for voting in the Security Council, see pp. 251 ff.
\textsuperscript{48} Joseph E. Johnson, Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs, at this time detailed to New York and acting as United States delegate on the Committee of Experts.

\textsuperscript{49} This proposal was submitted to the Committee of Experts at the first meeting of the Committee in the United States on March 20, in connection with other Soviet proposals for rules relating to voting in the Security Council; see p. 251. It was printed first as part of Committee document S/Procedure/17, dated March 22, 1946 and later by itself in Committee document S/Procedure/82, dated May 6, 1946.
tions are and thus provide a way for reducing the chance of sharp
surprises and clashes in the open Council."

[Here follows further detailing of factual information, part of
which relates to the substance of footnote 40, page 368.]

501. AA/4-1046

Minutes of First Meeting of the Departmental Team on Admission of
New Members to the United Nations, Department of State, Washing-
ton, April 9, 1946

Participants: 49 OA: Mr. Sandifer
IS: Mr. Adams
EUR: Mr. Raynor
SEA: Mr. Landon

RL: Mr. Wilson
[NEA]: Mr. Satterthwaite
OA: Miss Fosdick
OA: Mr. Popper

The first meeting of the Departmental Team on the admission of
new members to the United Nations, organized pursuant to a decision
of the United Nations Liaison Committee, 50 was held at 2:00 P. M.,
April 9, in the Office of Mr. D. V. Sandifer.

Mr. Sandifer opened the meeting with a statement on the status of
the Albanian application and explained the proposal which had origi-
nated in New York, to postpone consideration of the application by
referring the entire question of new membership to the Committee of
Experts on the ground that it was necessary to determine methods of
procedure before moving to consider specific applications. It was the
sense of the meeting that, on the basis of the information hitherto at
hand, the original policy paper on Albania 51 provided a better method
of procedure. It was pointed out that the proposal for a delay by
reference to the procedural problem would put us in a vulnerable pos-
tion, since we might be voted down on it and would then have to veto
the Albanian application in the Council. The possibility was also

49 Respectively, J. Wesley Adams of the Division of International Security Af-
fairs (Office of Special Political Affairs); G. Hayden Raynor, Special Assistant
to the Director of the Office of European Affairs; Kenneth P. Landon, Assistant
Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Office of Far Eastern Affairs);
Mr. Wilson is not precisely identifiable but probably is Leonard S. Wilson of the
Division of American Republics Analysis Liaison (Office of American Republic
Affairs); Joseph C. Satterthwaite, Assistant Chief of the Division of Near
Eastern Affairs (Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs); Miss Dorothy
Fosdick, Assistant Chief of the Division of International Organization Affairs
(Office of Special Political Affairs); David H. Popper, also of the Division of
International Organization Affairs.

50 The United Nations Liaison Committee had itself just been organized in the
Department of State (see pp. 15 and 21), and had a membership which was rep-
resentative of each of the geographical offices and the Office of Special Political
Affairs. As "working teams" were set up by the Committee on special problems
each of the offices, as appropriate, was to name a member or members on the team.

51 Presumably the memorandum of March 22, p. 368.
raised that if, as the Russians desired, the consideration of Rules of Procedure was accelerated and completed within a few weeks, we should then be confronted with the necessity of a veto. Mr. Raynor remarked that we did not want to veto the Albanian application but rather to agree to the admission of Albania in return for Soviet concessions on applications favored by the United States. He stated that Mr. Bohlen had seemed confident that we could secure postponement of the Albanian case through the policy originally laid down, but that others, notably Mr. Noyes, had not been so optimistic. Mr. Raynor said that he would press for adherence to the original policy statement in New York and that he expected the British to follow the same line, perhaps even vetoing the admission of Albania on grounds of substance rather than procedure.

Mr. Satterthwaite, who was at the UNRRA Council meeting at Atlantic City, remarked that the Russians had probably used the case of Albania there to pave the way for its consideration in New York. He was of the opinion that we could expect the Soviets to insist on action before the Council.

Mr. Adams stated that at a meeting of the Liaison Committee last Friday (April 5) the view was expressed that we should take the initiative in preparing a resolution on the question of admissions, for introduction in the Council. He pointed out that this would be a logical outgrowth of our position at London and that it might be used to invite qualified states not now members to prepare their applications for submission in July or August. There was some discussion of the relative advantages and disadvantages of our taking the lead on this subject, particularly since we had been continually in the forefront of the discussions in London. The question was raised as to what advantage would be gained if we brought the matter up in case the Russians and the Yugoslavs did not do so. Miss Fosdick suggested the desirability of an amendment to any resolution proposed by other states, which under the Rules would be voted on first. A decision was taken to prepare a preliminary draft resolution for possible introduction, and to consider it at a Team meeting on April 10.

From a brief review of the states qualified to apply for membership, it appeared that Iceland was the only state in the area covered by EUR now ready to apply, and Sweden could easily be made ready. Mr. Raynor stated that EUR would try to arrange for an application by Italy before the other ex-enemy states—preferably along with the application of Austria, since it was not desired that Austria join before Italy. Mr. Landon noted that the Department wished Siam to apply as soon as possible. Italy, Austria and Siam, it was felt, might all be

Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. The United Nations Liaison Committee had been organized on Mr. Bohlen's initiative.
regarded in one sense as victims of aggression for which some special treatment might be appropriate. Mr. Satterthwaite said that at Atlantic City the French had urged us not to sponsor Siam for admission at this time but had indicated that their difficulties with that country would soon be straightened out.\footnote{For documentation on the interest of the United States in the Franco-Siamese dispute, see vol viii, pp. 378 ff.} Any application from Korea would be considered premature at this stage.

The procedure for acting upon applications was then considered. It was noted that there was no necessity that any application be sponsored by any member state. Mr. Raynor asked for clarification of the position as regards the eligibility of Switzerland, and Mr. Sandifer undertook to have OA prepare a specific statement on the difficulties raised by Swiss neutrality.

The discussion then turned to the possibility of opposing the placing of the Albanian question on the daily agenda. The view was expressed that this would be contrary to our broad policy of permitting discussion on all appropriate questions, and it was stated that we could not put through a positive resolution by means of such tactics. Mr. Raynor stated that passage of a Council resolution framed in general terms might encourage states which have been holding back their applications to forward them to the Secretary-General.

---

501.AA/4-1046

Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Departmental Team on Admission of New Members to the United Nations, Department of State, Washington, April 10, 1946

[Here follows list of names of persons present (8), the same as at the April 9 meeting.]

The second meeting of the team on the admission of new members to the United Nations was held in Mr. Sandifer’s office at noon on April 10.

Two documents were submitted at the meeting:

1. A memorandum on the qualifications for admission to membership in the United Nations and the procedure to be followed by an applicant state.\footnote{Document SD/S/113, April 10, 1946, not printed; it is located in the IO Files.} This document was prepared in OA in response to a request from Mr. Raynor, with the thought that it might be useful for guidance in the course of informal conversations with representatives of states desiring to apply for membership.

2. A draft resolution on the procedure to be adopted by the Security Council in connection with applications for membership.\footnote{This first draft has not been found in the Department’s files.} The form
of the resolution was discussed at some length and a number of changes were suggested. It was agreed that much of the material in the pre-amble would be more appropriate for inclusion in the statement by our delegate if and when the resolution was introduced in the Security Council.

It was decided that Mr. Sandifer would take with him to New York the text of a revised resolution. It was the consensus of the team that there might be great advantages for the United States in taking the initiative, barring the existence of unfavorable political factors, and it was suggested that we might either propose this resolution as a new item on the agenda or present it as a substitute proposal when the Albanian issue arose. Mr. Sandifer stated that he would consult with the members of the delegation concerned with the problem and would present this point of view.

501.AA/4-1246

Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Departmental Team on Admission of New Members to the United Nations, Department of State, Washington, April 12, 1946

[Here follows list of names of persons present (7), the same as at the April 9 meeting, page 371, with the exception of Mr. Sandifer.]

The third meeting of the Departmental Team on admission of new members was held in Mr. Raynor’s office on April 12, at 2:00 P. M. The meeting was called to discuss a proposed course of action on the question of admission to membership, which was an outgrowth of the draft resolution previously worked out by the Team and conversations held by Mr. Sandifer and Mr. Taylor in New York.

Mr. Raynor remarked that the proposed course of action appeared to be consistent with the attitude he had noted during his talks in New York. He suggested that, of the two Plans noted, our delegate should be instructed to propose Plan A first in his talks with the British, and to initiate discussion on Plan B only if Plan A does not meet with a favorable response. It was agreed that an instruction should be prepared on the proposed course of action for circulation and clearance in the Department, accompanied by a background memorandum on the subject.

A suggestion was made by Mr. Adams that provision be made for introducing Plan A as an amendment in case the Albanian application came up for approval over our opposition. It was agreed that this would be desirable.

56 See the instruction of April 17, infra.
There was some discussion of the question of consulting the Russians at some stage in the procedure. It was noted that, once the British had been approached, the delegation would have authority to approach representatives of other countries as it saw fit.

591.BC/4-1746

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1946.

Sir: A. In pursuit of the objectives set forth in the policy memorandum on the United States Position Toward Membership Applications During Coming Security Council Meetings you should immediately initiate discussions, first with the United Kingdom Delegation and then with other delegations at your discretion, to determine the extent of support for the following course of action:

1. The United States Delegate should at an early date, if possible prior to inclusion of the Albanian application on the Provisional Agenda of any meeting, introduce the following resolution in the Security Council:

RESOLUTION OF PROCEDURE TO BE ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN CONNECTION WITH APPLICATIONS FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

taking into account the fact that, under Article 4 of the Charter, membership in the United Nations is open to all peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the Charter, and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations; and

taking into account the fact that the General Assembly, which acts to admit applicant states to membership on the recommendation of the Security Council, will meet for the second part of its first session on September 3, 1946

RESOLVED that:

1. Applications for membership which have been or may be received by the Secretary-General shall be considered by the Security Council at a meeting or meetings to be held in August 1946 for this specific purpose.

2. Applications for membership which may be received by the Secretary-General not later than July 15, 1946 shall be referred to a committee composed of a representative of each of the members of the Security Council for examination and report to the Council not later than August 1, 1946.

2. If the Albanian application is included on the Provisional Agenda for a meeting before we introduce the foregoing resolution,
the United States Delegate should move to amend that item on the agenda so that in effect it will apply to applications for membership generally, including the Albanian application, and indicate our intention to introduce the foregoing resolution. If, over our opposition, an Agenda is adopted which includes the Albanian application, the United States Delegate should then introduce the resolution as an amendment to a proposal that is made in connection with the application or as a substitute proposal.

3. The United States Delegate should accompany the introduction of the resolution by a statement that it is desirable to work out satisfactory rules of procedure before considering applications from states desiring membership in the Organization. For this purpose, he should introduce in the Committee of Experts at the proper time, two rules along the following lines to replace Rule 34 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council (S/35, April 10, 1946).^7

Rule 34

The Secretary-General shall immediately bring the application for membership to the attention of all representatives on the Security Council in accordance with Rule 6. The President of the Security Council shall thereupon, unless otherwise directed by the Council, refer the application for examination to a committee of the Council composed of a representative of each of the Members of the Council. The committee shall at least thirty days in advance of each session of the General Assembly report to the Security Council on all applications received more than forty-five days prior to that session. When there is less than thirty days notice for any session of the General Assembly or when an application has been filed less than forty-five days prior to a session, the Security Council shall determine the time at which the committee shall report on applications before it.

Rule 35

The Security Council shall decide whether in its judgment the applicant is a peace-loving state, and is able and willing to carry out the

---

^7 The provisional rules of procedure in effect at this time had been approved by the Security Council on April 8 and printed in document S/35, dated April 10 (see United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, First Year, First Series, Supplement No. 2, pp. 15 ff., annex 1e; hereafter cited as SC, 1st yr., 1st series, Suppl. No. 2). Rule 34 read: "The application for membership in the United Nations shall be placed by the Secretary-General before the Security Council, which shall decide whether in its judgment the applicant is a peace-loving State and is able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter." Actually the Committee of Experts had not yet addressed itself seriously to the rules of procedure relating to admission of new members, and Rule 34 in the April 10 rules was unchanged from Rule 40 in the provisional rules adopted by the Security Council earlier on February 5 (ibid., pp. 3 ff., annex 1a) and the original rule drafted by the Preparatory Commission (Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, p. 27 [Rule 26]).
obligations contained in the Charter, and whether to recommend the applicant state for membership.

B. If the above course of action does not meet with a sufficiently favorable reaction, you should initiate discussions, with the United Kingdom Delegation and then with other delegations at your discretion, to determine the extent of support for the following alternative course of action:

1. The United States Delegate should oppose inclusion in the Agenda for any meeting of the Security Council of an item on the Albanian application, until such time as the rules of procedure governing the handling of membership applications shall have been approved by the Security Council.

2. The United States Delegate should introduce in the Committee of Experts at the proper time the two rules to replace Rule 34 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council as indicated in paragraph A3 above, so that the Albanian application would not be considered immediately by the Security Council.

3. If, over our opposition, an Agenda is adopted which includes the Albanian application, the United States Delegate should continue to oppose consideration of the merits of the application.

C. For your information, this instruction does not modify the position stated in the policy memorandum on the United States Position Toward Membership Applications During Coming Security Council Meetings 58 that you should vote against any motion for approval of the Albanian application if it is necessary to do so in order to postpone action on the Albanian application until a meeting of the Security Council in August.

Very truly yours,

JAMES F. BYRNES

[Enclosure]

MEMORANDUM TO ACCOMPANY INSTRUCTION ON UNITED STATES POSITION WITH REGARD TO CONSIDERATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF APPLICATIONS FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS

A. The Problem:

The Question of the admission of Albania to the United Nations was discussed in the Security Council in London in January, and on the proposal of the United States, further consideration was postponed until the Security Council should meet in New York. The subject may thus be placed on the Provisional Agenda of a meeting of the Security Council in the near future.

58 Dated March 22, p. 368.
The Department has not opposed the admission of Albania to the United Nations on the merits of the case and wishes if possible to avoid doing so. There has been no disposition to deny that the United Nations can function with maximum strength and efficiency only if all properly qualified states are participants in the Organization. At the same time, it is believed that there would be a great tactical advantage in considering the Albanian application together with other applications toward which this country would be more favorably disposed.

On January 28, Mr. Stettinius made the following statement of the United States’ position in the Security Council in London:

“The admission of new Members is a serious and important matter, requiring the most careful consideration of the Members of the United Nations. In the circumstances, it is apparent that the only reasonable and fair method of giving proper and adequate consideration to applications for new membership would be to defer all applications until some time prior to the next meeting of the General Assembly, when the Security Council would have had an opportunity to deal with the number of applications that have accrued at that time.”

Substantially this same position was reaffirmed in the policy memorandum on the United States Position Toward Membership Applications During Coming Security Council Meetings which was approved by the Secretary of State in early March. That memorandum stated:

“1. We should favor a motion to postpone until a meeting in August, consideration of the Albanian application and any other application received before that time, since

(a) the admission of Albanian or any other applicant state could not possibly take place until final approval of the application by the General Assembly at its meeting in September, and

(b) the Security Council should make provision for considering not only the one application now before it, but all applications that may be presented within a reasonable time.”

B. Purpose of Instruction:

The present instruction is intended to provide the basis for initiating discussions immediately with other delegations to the Security Council, beginning with the United Kingdom Delegation, to decide the course of action to be followed in dealing both with the Albanian application and with the related question of establishing a general procedure for handling applications for membership.

Two principal alternative courses of action are set forth, the second of which is recommended for exploration with other delegations only if adequate support is not forthcoming for the first.

C. Comment on Proposed Courses of Action:

The two courses of action set forth in the instruction are designed to secure the adoption of an agreed date this summer, such as August
first, for consideration by the Security Council of all membership applications. Both courses of action are directed to having the Albanian application referred to a committee where it could be held until mid-summer. Both are premised on our opposing the Albanian application if it comes up for consideration by the Security Council before that time.

The first course of action is preferred, however, for the following reasons:

1. The United States would be pressing for adoption of a positive proposal which it had itself suggested, to achieve the purposes which it favors, instead of laying itself open to the charge of merely blocking substantive action on Albania by such procedural devices as opposition to the adoption of an Agenda.

2. The ground of discussion would be shifted in the Security Council from the case of Albania to the general question of membership, thus serving to prevent what might be an acrimonious discussion with the Soviet Union on Albania’s qualifications.

3. The resolution proposed for introduction in the Security Council would serve as an indication to eligible applicants that they are invited to submit their applications in time for consideration before the specified date.

4. The resolution might be agreed upon as a special measure, even if the proposed rules of procedure providing for a regular procedure of submission of applications to a committee failed of acceptance in the Committee of Experts.

It is understood that if the Security Council adopts the proposed resolution that action would be in no way modified by approval of the suggested rules of procedure to replace Rule 34.

501.AA/4-2946

Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Departmental Team on Admisison of New Members to the United Nations, Department of State, Washington, April 29, 1946

SECRET

[Here follows list of names of persons present (8), the same as at the April 9 meeting, page 371.]

1. The Present Status:

Miss Fosdick opened the meeting with a description of the situation as it now exists in New York. She reported that there had been some feeling that the Secretary-General might put the Albanian question on the provisional agenda of the Security Council in the next few days. It was ascertained through Mr. Saba of Egypt, however, that President Asfii was disinclined to put the matter on the provisional

---

59 Mr. Saba was serving as Chairman of the Committee of Experts at this time.
60 Haraz Asfii of Egypt, at this time President of the Security Council.
agenda until the Committee of Experts had considered Rules of Procedure on the general subject of membership. Mr. Johnson, in New York, now believes that the Albanian question will not be placed on the agenda before the end of this week and possibly not until later.

With regard to our conversations with the British, Cadogan has evidently approved the method of procedure suggested in the Department's Instruction of April 17 and is communicating with London in this connection. Mr. Johnson is to discuss the matter today with the other members of the Security Council who supported our position on Albania at the London meetings.

2. Question of Supplementary Instruction for Delegation:

The question was then raised whether we should move immediately to present our resolution or wait until the Albanian question should arise. The decision on this point was that, if there was no additional information from New York today, we should prepare a telegraphic draft instruction tomorrow for clearance in the Department. The instruction would authorize the U.S. Representative to communicate our resolution to the Secretary-General for inclusion on the provisional agenda, provided the Representative feels that there is sufficient support to assure a favorable reception for it. The instruction further expresses the hope that the resolution can be introduced in the Security Council before our proposed Rules of Procedure on membership go to the Committee of Experts, although the Delegation would be authorized to introduce these Rules of Procedure at its discretion.\(^{61}\)

3. Draft Statement for Mr. Stettinius:

The Team then considered a draft statement which might be used by Mr. Stettinius in introducing our resolution on admission. The statement was approved in principle, after one change had been made, and members of the Team agreed to communicate to Mr. Popper any detailed changes they might later wish to suggest.\(^{62}\)

4. Survey of Situation by Countries:

A consideration of the timing factors involved in the problem of admission then ensued. Mr. Raynor expressed the opinion that the applications of Iceland and Sweden would be ready by August, but he was not so certain regarding those of Portugal, Switzerland, and Eire. Mr. Satterthwaite felt that the Afghans would probably be ready to apply whenever we informed them that the way was cleared to go.

\(^{61}\) See telegram 38, April 30, 7 p.m., to New York, infra.

\(^{62}\) The draft statement was forwarded to New York in telegram 48, May 6, 8 p.m. (501.6C/5-646), but is not printed as the United States Representative (Stettinius) followed it quite closely when he made his opening statement on the proposed resolution to the Security Council on May 17; see United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, First Year, First Series, No. 2, pp. 278-280; hereafter cited as SC, 1st yr., 1st series, No. 2.
ahead. There was, however, some slight possibility that Soviet pressure might restrain the Afghans. Mr. Landon stated that the French terms for a treaty of peace with Siam generally followed those of the British-Siamese Agreement, with the addition of the border settlement provisions. Mr. Raynor noted that talks with individual countries had been deferred pending the introduction of our resolution in the Council. He stated that we hoped to push the applications of Italy and Austria, perhaps even before the signing of an Italian peace treaty.

In reviewing the status of other eligible countries, Mr. Satterthwaite pointed out that it was premature to present applications for Yemen, Burma, or Nepal, while the case of Transjordan is so complex that some time will be necessary before the application stage can be reached. It was decided to have a paper prepared on Outer Mongolia for the Book being prepared for the Delegation. Mr. Raynor stated that the Department's attitude on this point was that we would accept the Mongolian application if it were pressed by another state.

The Team felt that the Department's policy on the admission of additional Soviet Republics is and will remain one of unalterable opposition.

501. BC/4-1746 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at
the United Nations (Stettinius)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 30, 1946—7 p.m.

38. USdel. Our instruction on admission to membership in UN of April 17, 1946 authorized you only to initiate discussions with other delegations to determine extent of support for resolution and rules of procedure set forth in instruction. In view of likelihood of early consideration of membership rules in Committee of Experts and possibility that move may suddenly be made to place Albanian application on Provisional Agenda of SC you are authorized to take action as follows:

If, in your view, there is sufficient support among members of SC to assure favorable reception of resolution set forth in instruction of April 17, 1946, you may immediately communicate resolution to Secretary-General for inclusion on Provisional Agenda of SC meeting. You may also at your discretion introduce in Committee of Experts rules of procedure on admission of members set forth in instruction of April 17, 1946. We still hope, however, that resolution can be introduced in SC before introduction of proposed rules of procedure in Committee of Experts.

ACHESON
SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 3, 1946—7 p. m.

45. USdel. We are encouraged by your reports as to support which has been found in your informal discussions to date for our proposed resolution on membership (reurtel 136 from New York, May 2, 1946). We gather that if either Mexico or Egypt indicate support necessary votes to carry resolution will be assured.

We are strongly of view that resolution should be placed on agenda of SC at earliest possible moment and by all means should be considered before specific question of Albania is placed on agenda.

Our short-term objective is to have SC's attention turned to subject of membership in general, rather than to have it discuss specifically admission of Albania. We feel our resolution represents best chance of accomplishing this. We feel resolution should be considered rather than relying on action on rules in Committee of Experts. At least three risks are involved in latter course; (a) our rule might not be adopted, (b) even if adopted it would permit committee to report Albanian case at any time, (c) also it would be possible for Albanian case to be brought up in SC at any time, and considered by SC without reference to committee as such reference under proposed rule is at discretion of SC.

Another reason for prompt consideration and adoption of our resolution is that we, from long-term point of view, favor wide membership in the organization as early as possible and therefore the early admission of certain states that are now eligible. The resolution is so phrased that in effect it is an invitation to non-members to file application for membership. We wish to discuss matter of applying for membership with neutrals and perhaps other countries at an early date, and thereafter to discuss prospects for their admission with members of SC, and we feel that the adoption of the resolution by SC may have constructive influence on position of countries eligible for membership.

For your own confidential information, we feel it would be most unfortunate for specific Albanian question to be brought to vote now.

---

63. This daily summary telegram contains a detailed report of conversations held in New York on May 2 by Mr. Johnson (501.BC/5-246).

64. The proposed United States rules on membership were in fact distributed to members of the Committee of Experts by Mr. Johnson on this same date, May 3 (as reported in daily secret summary telegram 140, May 3, File No. 501.BC/5-346).
as we would have to oppose it and we understand British would do likewise. We wish to avoid setting of this precedent. If matter is deferred until summer and then considered on broad bases we may find it possible to vote in favor of Albanian application. This would be case if situation with respect to Albania should change, which we must admit seems unlikely. In addition, however, we might in summer be disposed reluctantly to vote for admission of Albania if at same time group of other countries which we consider better qualified for membership are also admitted.

We realize that in suggesting this course of action a difficult situation would confront us if no application other than Albania's were forthcoming before August. We feel however that this risk is a slight one and must be taken.

As soon as necessary 7 votes seem assured, you should take steps immediately to have our resolution placed on agenda.

ACHESON

501.BC/5-746: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

SECRET U.S. URGENT New York, May 7, 1946—7 p. m.
[Received 7:53 p.m.]

149. For Acheson. As indicated by daily secret summary, there appears to be a fair possibility that Committee of Experts will reach agreement by Monday* on draft rules relating to admission of new members which will incorporate substance of US proposals.**

We believe strongly that this possibility might be jeopardized if we were to introduce our proposed resolution in SC now. (Reurtel 45, May 3, 7 p.m.) Moreover, we believe that if there is agreement on the rule it may be possible to reach agreement with Gromyko in advance on a resolution, if introduction of a resolution is still deemed desirable.

I accordingly request authorization to delay submission of proposed resolution until either an acceptable rule is agreed upon or agreement proves impossible. We should know the outcome by Monday at the latest.

STETTINIUS

* May 15.
* The daily secret summary was transmitted in telegram 151, May 7, 10:30 p.m., and was followed by a detailed account of the proceedings of the Committee of Experts in telegram 162, May 7, 11 p.m., neither printed.
SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1946—8 p. m.

55. Amdel, Reurtel 149, May 7. We feel the following considerations must be borne in mind in any delay in submission of proposed resolution on membership.

1. Secret summary (Urteil 152, May 7) 67 indicates considerable opposition to our rules of procedure. If rules are greatly altered in negotiation we are likely to be in unsatisfactory situation to introduce proposed resolution. Our hope has been that resolution might be agreed upon as special measure, if necessary by majority vote, even if our rules of procedure providing for regular procedure of submission of applications to committee failed of acceptance. 68

2. Even if substance of our rules is adopted our central objective will not be met of announcing positively by SC resolution that applications from non-members are welcome and that any received will be considered in August.

3. Also even if substance of rules is adopted they would not assure postponement of consideration of Albanian application by SC until August as would be assured by first paragraph of resolution. Rules would permit consideration of Albanian case by SC at any time and allow committee to report out Albanian case at any time. We prefer resolution to some more rigid permanent rule, as it would be undesirable to bind Council always to consider all applications only in month before GA meeting or bind it to refer all applications to a committee. On occasion we may want applications considered at another time of year and immediately by SC.

4. If agreement is reached on rules of procedure before resolution is introduced there is danger that many delegations may feel resolution is unnecessary. We will therefore have no assurances that stage is set for initiating our discussions with neutral states or that con-

67 Not printed; see footnote 66, p. 383.
68 Mr. Stettinius was in fact reporting at this very moment (telegram 157, from New York, May 8, 8 p. m.) that the sub-committee of the Committee of Experts had "decided to recommend to the Committee a draft rule on admission taking care, as far as possible, of the various views." The final results of a period of intensive committee and sub-committee work, May 8–13, were incorporated into Rule 56 (in its entirety) and Rule 57 (in part) of a set of provisional rules which the Committee of Experts recommended to the Security Council in document 5/57, May 13. This is printed in SC, 1st yr., 1st series, Suppl. No. 2, pp. 20 ff., annex 1d.
sideration of Albanian application will be postponed. Moreover our strategy for both these objectives will be vitiated.

5. If introduction of resolution is delayed SC may temporarily adjourn on disposition of Iranian question and resolution would thereby be further postponed. We would then have to delay our discussions with neutral states or initiate them without having support of SC resolution. We feel considerable time may be needed for these discussions and for talks with SC Members and time is beginning to run out.

6. We understand that Soviet Union has not been shown resolution. Since resolution supplements rules of procedure in important respects we feel Soviet Union might have grounds for considering that they were being misled as to our intentions if they agree to rules of procedure and are then faced with resolution. When given resolution they will in any case need some time for discussions with Moscow. We would prefer to have you show resolution immediately to Soviet Union so our full position is known to them.

In view of foregoing considerations we feel strongly that early action on resolution is important.\(^6\) We will leave to your discretion timing of its discussion with Soviet Union and of its submission to SC.

Reurtel 152, May 7. We prefer reference of applications to committee of deputies of senior representatives rather than to committee of whole in private session, since committee of deputies can be more informal in consideration of questions, and private sessions of council are likely to excite adverse public comment.

ACHESON

10 Files: US/5/56

Memorandum of Conversation, by Joseph E. Johnson\(^7\) of the United States Delegation to the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL


Just before the Security Council meeting this morning, Mr. Stettinius expressed to Ambassador Gromyko\(^8\) his hope that Gromyko

\(^6\) The Department had already sent a draft statement for use in introducing the resolution in the Security Council (telegram 48, May 6, 8 p.m., 501.BC/5-046). Mr. Stettinius reported favorably on the prospects for passage of the draft U.S. resolution in his daily secret summary on May 10, and stated that the document was about to be transmitted to the Secretary General (telegram 106, May 10, 3:25 p.m., from New York (501.BC/5-1046)).

\(^7\) Note may be made here of the arrival at the Delegation on May 7 of Mr. Herschel V. Johnson to take up his appointment as Deputy United States Representative on the Security Council.

\(^8\) A. A. Gromyko, Soviet Representative on the Security Council.
would be able to support the U.S. resolution on new Members. Mr. Gromyko replied that he did not understand this resolution and said that, to be specific, it seemed to him to be inconsistent with the rules proposed by the Committee of Experts (Document S/57).\textsuperscript{72} Mr. Stettinius replied that the resolution was not inconsistent but was drafted within the terms of the rules which are rather broad. Ambassador Gromyko said that, in any case, he intended to ask Mr. Stettinius some questions to clarify the matter, and Mr. Stettinius replied that he thought the questions would be answered in his introductory statement.

Gromyko did not give the impression that he was determined, at all costs, to oppose the resolution.

(N.B. This conversation took place after the one between Stein and J. E. Johnson, which is recorded in a separate memorandum.\textsuperscript{73})

[At the forty-second meeting of the Security Council on May 17 the Council adopted the additional rules of procedure recommended by the Committee of Experts in document S/57 including additions to Chapter X on the admission of new members (Rules 55, 56 and 57); Chapter X was carried by ten votes to one, the Australian Delegate dissenting (SC, 1st yr., 1st series, No. 2, pages 270 ff.). The new provisional rules were incorporated into Security Council document S/62, May 17 (SC, 1st yr., 1st series, Suppl. No. 2, pages 30 ff., annex 1e; Chapter X is found on page 38). Note should be made of subsequent changes in the Security Council's rules of procedure so that the rules on admission of new members were renumbered to become Rules 58, 59 and 60 (\textit{ibid.}, pages 41 and 42).

At the same meeting of the Security Council, after an exchange between the United States Representative (Stettinius) and the Soviet Representative (Gromyko), the resolution submitted by the United States was adopted unanimously, with a minor change suggested by

\textsuperscript{72} See footnote 68, p. 384.

\textsuperscript{73} Dated May 16. It read: "Just prior to the Council meeting today, Mr. Johnson asked Mr. Stein [Soviet delegate on the Committee of Experts] if Mr. Gromyko would be able to support the U.S. resolution on new Members. Stein shook his head, smiled and then said after a pause, 'What do you mean by 'support'?' To this Johnson replied that he hoped the Soviet at least would not vote against the U.S. resolution.

"Stein made no further comment on this subject." (IO Files, document US/S/55)
the Australian Representative (SC, 1st yr., 1st series, No. 2, pages 278 ff.).]

501.AA/5-2746

Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Departmental Team on Admission of New Members to the United Nations, Department of State, Washington, May 27, 1946

Participants: EUR: Mr. Raynor IS: Mr. Adams
ITP: Mr. Coppock \(^74\) OA: Miss Fosdick
SEA: Mr. Landon Mr. Taylor \(^75\)
NEA: Mr. Satterthwaite

The meeting was called to consider the revised draft instruction \(^76\) on membership which Mr. Raynor was to take with him to New York for consultation in the U.S. Delegation in connection with proposed conversations with the British delegation on membership questions.

Mr. Raynor explained that he had talked by telephone with Mr. Herschel Johnson about the proposed conversation with the British, that Mr. Johnson had agreed to our suggestions but wished to be fully sure of the Department's policy, and that the draft instruction would accordingly be presented to the Staff Committee the next morning, Tuesday, May 28.\(^77\)

The Committee made a few further drafting changes in the instruction preparatory to its submission to the Staff Committee.

A brief draft telegram \(^78\) to USdel, New York, authorizing con-

\(^74\) Joseph D. Coppock, Adviser, Office of International Trade Policy.

\(^75\) Paul B. Taylor of the Division of International Organization Affairs (Office of Special Political Affairs); Mr. Taylor had been on duty with the United States Delegation to the United Nations at New York.

\(^76\) See memorandum entitled "Further Steps in Relation to the Admission of New Members", May 28, infra.

\(^77\) The Secretary's Staff Committee was in effect the top policy-making group in the Department, being "responsible for advising and otherwise assisting the Secretary of State in determining current and long-range foreign policy..." No record has been found in the Department's files of a Secretary's Staff Committee meeting on May 28.

\(^78\) Telegram S1, May 28, 7 p.m., to New York, not printed. The conversations were to be based upon the general approach to the membership question described in telegram 55, May 8, to New York, paragraphs 4 and 5, in conjunction with the "full views" of the Department which were to be conveyed to the United States Delegation at New York by Mr. Raynor on May 29. (501.BC/5-246)
versations with the British on further phases of the membership question, was also submitted to the Committee, preparatory to its presentation to the Staff Committee for clearance.

IO Files: SD/S/175

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State 79

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 28, 1946.

Subject: Further Steps in Relation to the Admission of New Members.

Now that our Resolution on Membership has been adopted by the Security Council we are in a position to initiate discussions with various states eligible for membership and, after we ascertain the desires of such states, to review the situation in New York with representatives of the other permanent members on the Security Council.

Through telegraphic instructions and other papers forwarded to New York, as well as through conversations of Mr. Herschel Johnson in Washington, the Delegation has doubtless gained a full understanding of the Department’s objectives and a general understanding of the procedure envisaged. The membership book 80 also contains specific country study statements. For the sake of clarity, however, we will briefly review both aspects of the problems here.

Our long-term objective is membership for all qualified states. Our short-term aim is to obtain the admission this year of as many as possible of the states which are presently eligible. In our opinion, these states may be classified as follows:

(a) All the neutrals except Spain. As far as the neutrals are concerned, we think that the three powers which signed the Potsdam Declaration are fairly well committed, although we recognize that the question can still be raised as to whether certain of the neutrals are able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter. In certain cases, such as Switzerland, delays may ensue because of the difficulty to be expected in reconciling constitutional provisions or traditional policies with the obligations of the Charter.

(b) States which may be termed victims of aggression and states which were co-belligerents. We include Austria, Albania and Siam in the category of victims of aggression. We are prepared under any

79 Drafted by Messrs. Raynor and Taylor and taken to New York by Mr. Raynor.
80 This book was made up of two black binders entitled “Admission to Membership in the United Nations” and was divided into 3 parts: Policy, background information and pertinent documents, and information on specific countries.
circumstances to vote for the admission of Siam but probably would not be able to support its candidacy actively until Siam retrocedes certain areas which are in dispute with the French. We would be willing to vote rather reluctantly for the admission of Albania if we could arrange at the same time for the admission of neutrals which may apply, of Siam if it applies, of Austria and of Italy.

As to Italy, although it will be difficult under the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, we desire also to arrange for her admission. If that is not possible we would wish to defer action on Austria, since we feel that Italy—whose services as a co-belligerent should not be disregarded—should not be admitted later than Austria. We are by no means certain that we can arrange for the admission of Austria and Italy this year, but we wish to make the effort in any event.

We feel three things should now be done:

(a) We should ascertain definitely the wishes of the eligible states as to membership and in talking to them tell them what our position would be on their applications. In general, our position will be one of active support at the proper time for all of these states with the exception of Eire, in whose case we feel our support can only extend to voting in favor of an application, and of the possible reservation pertaining to Siam mentioned above.

(b) After definitely ascertaining the desires of the presently eligible states, and if there is no objection by the particular state concerned, we would then wish that the U.S. Representative ascertain informally the reactions of the other permanent members of the Security Council.

(c) We would then plan to discuss the question further with the eligible states, informing them fully of the content and the results of our discussions with the other permanent members of the Security Council. The eligible states would thus have adequate information upon which to decide whether or not to submit their applications, and in cases where it was justified we would encourage the candidate state to apply for membership.

Before starting the steps enumerated above and in view of the expressed wish of the British to discuss this problem with us it would be desirable for Mr. Stettinius or Mr. Herschel Johnson to review the whole matter informally with Sir Alexander Cadogan. We do, however, desire ourselves in any event to talk to Iceland, Sweden, Switzerland, and Afghanistan. The discussion with Sir Alexander should, we believe, take place at the earliest possible moment, since we desire to initiate our discussions with the other countries in the very near future.
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Landon)

[WASHINGTON,] May 28, 1946.

Participants: Mr. Luang Dithakar Bhakdi, Siamese Legation
Mr. Konthi Suphamonkhon
Mr. Abbot Low Moffat, SEA
Mr. Kenneth P. Landon, SEA
Mr. Stanton, American Minister to Siam

In the course of conversation Mr. Konthi said that one of the most important instructions that he had from his Government was to get Siam included among the United Nations. He reminded us that on a previous mission, shortly before the end of the war, he had had similar instructions but that he had been unsuccessful chiefly because Siam was occupied by the Japanese.

Mr. Konthi went on to say that he had a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary General of the United Nations inquiring as to the procedure of applying for membership in the United Nations. He asked us what the procedure was and if we would support Siam’s application for membership.

Mr. Konthi was informed that the method of applying for membership was quite simple in that all that was required was a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary General applying for membership and agreeing to abide by all of the rules and the charter that were binding on members of the United Nations. He was also informed that the United States stood ready to vote affirmatively on the Siamese application for membership, that Siam might expect some difficulty from France in this connection inasmuch as France still considered itself in a state of war with Siam and that, therefore, it might be wise to give some thought as to the best time to apply.

Mr. Konthi said that Siam has never been informed by France that France would oppose Siamese membership in the United Nations unless Siam first retroceded the disputed areas and that he did not believe that France would oppose Siam’s membership.

---

Mr. Konthi was a Siamese Foreign Office official.
Mr. Moffat was Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs.
Edwin F. Stanton.

In telegram 84, June 5, 7 p.m., to New York, the Department informed Mr. Johnson that “We assume Siamese letter on membership may raise questions re constituting membership committee and referring applications to it.
Under membership resolution Committee would in our view not meet until July 15. We suggest that Committee not be constituted until around that time and that chairmanship might rotate with council presidency.
“Would welcome your views re Chairmanship and method of constituting committee.” (501.AA/6-546).
501.BC/5-2946: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

NEW YORK, May 29, 1946—7 p. m.
[Received 7:25 p.m.]

257. From Herschel Johnson. Reference Department’s 81, May 28.65 I called with Hayden Raynor this afternoon on Sir Alexander Cadogan and gave him a brief summary of the Department’s views regarding admission of new members to the United Nations. I referred to the statement he had made yesterday to Mr. Stettinius that he felt it imperative for this situation to be canvassed between us at an early date and said that we had the same view.66 I told him that our long-term objective is membership for all qualified states and our short-term aim to obtain admission this year of as many as possible of those states now eligible. These states we had classified as follows: (A) All the neutrals except Spain; (B) The states which might be termed the victims of aggression and states which were co-belligerents. I then went over in detail the views on individual states contained in a memorandum from the Department which was brought by Raynor.

Cadogan was obviously in general agreement on the procedures we suggested and also as to our views on the specific countries. He seemed surprised at first that our support on Eire would not be all out as in the case of other neutrals but after I had repeated that we had every intention of voting in favor of an application by Eire, he replied that their position might be very close to ours. He gave no indication that Eire would have active British support. In the informal talks which we might have in certain capitals along lines suggested in the Department’s memorandum Cadogan thought it would be desirable for us to concert our action and he suggested that we might not be able to get through the entire catalog of states and that it would be useful to work out a schedule of priority. He said that the possibility of an application by Italy had not been mentioned to him by London but he reacted favorably to our suggestion and seemed to feel there might be a good chance of having an application from Italy accepted. On Portugal he expressed the opinion that the British would wish to take the lead in that country but stated very definitely that they would like our support. He will telegraph tonight a summary of

65 Not printed (501.BC/5–246); it informed the Delegation that Mr. Raynor was carrying to New York the “full views” of the Department on the membership question, a reference to the Departmental memorandum of May 28.

66 This information had been conveyed to the Department in telegram 250, May 29, 2:30 p.m., (501.BC/6–2946).
our views as to procedure and our views insofar as they are now clarified on individual countries.

Before going to see Cadogan I had gone over the Department's memorandum carefully with Raynor and the Department's views as expressed in the memorandum were followed closely. Sir Alexander Cadogan understood that these views were, although representing official opinion, put forward on this occasion on an informal basis.

Stettinius

501.AA/6-1146: Telegram

_The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)\(^7\) to the Secretary of State_

SECRET

NEW YORK, June 11, 1946—3 p.m.

[Received June 11—2:28 p.m.]

302. Reurtel No. 84, June 5.\(^8\) Following suggestions are submitted concerning the establishment and organization of the Membership Committee of the Security Council:

1. We believe that July 17 would be the most suitable date for the Membership Committee to convene since the presidency of the Security Council will change on that date. If agreeable, I suggest that we informally indicate this view to the Secretariat. If it were decided that the chairmanship of the Committee should rotate with the Council presidency, the chairman would be a representative of the Netherlands.

2. While we agree in principle that the Committee chairmanship might rotate with the Council presidency, we believe that since the Committee would be in session for a maximum of 6 weeks (unless a question arises during the meeting of the General Assembly), it would be unnecessary to provide for a change in the chairman on August 17. If you concur with this view, may we be authorized to discuss it informally with the other delegations, particularly the Netherlands and Poland?

3. The composition of the Committee is, of course, a matter for the individual members of the Council to decide for themselves, since the US resolution on membership provides that the Committee is to be “composed of a representative of each of the members of the Security Council”. In this connection a letter was received from the Secretary General on June 10 which stated in part as follows: “I have the honour to request that you communicate to me, before 1 July 1946,

\(^7\) For the resignation of Mr. Stettinius and the assumption of authority at the Delegation by Mr. Herschel V. Johnson, see bracketed note, p. 33.

\(^8\) See footnote 84, p. 380.
the name of your representative on the Committee to be constituted pursuant to the Security Council's resolution of 17 May 1946."

Because of the political importance which may attach to the deliberations of this Committee I feel that each delegation should appoint its deputy representative or a person occupying a relatively high position. Unless the Department objects, I shall indicate this view to the other delegations, and also inform the Secretary General that I shall be the United States representative. After the Committee commences its consideration of the applications, circumstances may require that I assign another member of the delegation to act in my stead. If this is necessary, I shall, nevertheless, continue to follow the work of the Committee very closely because of its importance.

4. With regard to the procedure to be followed by the Committee in examining applications for membership, it is believed that:

(a) Applications should be examined individually in the chronological order of their receipt. (This would mean that the application of Albania would be the first to be considered by the committee.)

(b) The Committee should examine each application in order to determine whether the applicant state has conformed with the provisions of Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Charter.

(c) The Committee should take into account any written or oral testimony relating to the qualifications of the state seeking membership which members of the United Nations desire to submit for consideration.

(d) The Committee should report its conclusions to the Council not later than August 1 in accordance with the US resolution. It would be preferable to have the report cover the Committee's findings on all of the applications; however, we see no reason for insisting that a single report, rather than individual reports on each of the applications, be submitted, provided the latter are submitted simultaneously.

The report should be as brief as possible but in such form as to prevent any superfluous discussion in the Council.

JOHNSON

501.BC/6-1946: Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET U.S. URGENT NEW YORK, June 19, 1946—7:30 p.m.
[Received June 19—6:43 p.m.]

337. I gave the substance of the following telegram to Mr. Hayden [Raynor] over the telephone today.

I had a further discussion this morning with Sir Alexander Cadogan on the subject of new members. He had received instructions
from the Foreign Office as well as comments on their attitude on each of the possible candidates.

The Foreign Office appears to be in general agreement with the procedures we had suggested to Cadogan previously (as reported in my No. 257 of May 29). The Foreign Office had the following comments in regard to possible candidates:

Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary were covered by the Potsdam declaration and could hardly be considered in the near future.

Italy: They favor Italy's membership, but would stick to the Potsdam provisions, and did not believe the question would arise this summer.

Austria: They would support Austria and hoped the Foreign Ministers Conference could agree on some form of peace settlement soon, so that Austria's application could be entertained. Their position was slightly different from ours in that they did not feel the necessity of bringing Italy in before or at the same time as Austria.

Siam: Britain has already agreed with India to support Siam for membership by the peace treaty of Jan. last and they favor Siam becoming a member. They feel, however, that unless the present difficulties are cleared up, the French are sure to veto a Siamese application.

Afghanistan: They will support.

Albania: They have not yet received assurances which would justify appointment of a Minister and will resist until this is done. However, they want to keep in step with the United States.

Eire: They will not take any initiative but will recognize Eire as having the same rights as any other respectable state. They would adopt a favorable attitude in any review and would support if it came to a vote.

Iceland: They will support.

Muscat: They felt it had little chance at this time.

Nepal: Subject to agreement by India, they would support.

Portugal: They will take initiative; will support in any general review and on a vote. They wish to take the initiative with the Portuguese Govt, but would be glad of our support.

Sweden: They will support.

Switzerland: They will support if Switzerland accepts all the obligations under the Charter, which they understand will require a referendum.

Tibet: An application is unlikely. In any case, the Chinese would veto, as they consider it part of China.

Transjordan: They would support as soon as the treaty between Great Britain and Transjordan is ratified. Sir Alexander feels there is a question with regard to the elimination of the mandate.
Yemen: An application is unlikely at present. In any case they feel consideration should be deferred.

Soviet Republics: They will resist any Russian demand that additional Soviet Republics be made members.

I pointed out that they had not mentioned Outer Mongolia and advised them of the fact that the Russians had stated that they would not be prepared to consider Afghanistan for membership separately from Albania and Mongolia. Sir Alexander expressed no opinion.

After discussion we agreed that we should make a list of the eligible states with whom we might want to consult with regard to their applications. The procedure for proceeding through diplomatic channels with these discussions should be agreed to either in Washington or London. After such consultations, we would then wish to consult informally with the other permanent members of the Security Council here in New York. We agreed to the following list: Afghanistan, Iceland, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland. We also considered the possibility of adding Transjordan to this list, but did not do so, pending further consideration of the problem of the treaty, of the mandate, and possible difficulties in regard to Palestine.\textsuperscript{66}

\textbf{JOHNSON}

---

\textbf{501.AA/6-1146: Telegram}

\textit{The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)}

\textbf{SECRET}

WASHINGTON, June 19, 1946—7 p. m.

98. Amde. Urtel 302, June 11, 3 p. m. 1. Re your paragraph one and your suggestion on chairmanship membership committee in your para two, we feel questions should be settled locally in accordance with views and convenience of all members and not as major issues. In addition to your suggestion and that of rotation with presidency, you may wish consider following:

\begin{enumerate}
  \item Beginning rotation at head of alphabet, with Australia, as Atomic Energy Commission has done;
  \item Electing one chairman for whole busy period of committee.
\end{enumerate}

\textsuperscript{66} For documentation on the status of Palestine in general and Trans-Jordan in particular, see vol. vnr, pp. 576 ff., and pp. 794 ff., respectively.

The United States Delegation was informed by Mr. Lawford of the United Kingdom Delegation in June that the Foreign Office intended to suggest a different procedure from that outlined in this discussion. It was the belief of Cadogan and Lawford that the Foreign Office might propose that shortness of time necessitated a speedier procedure and that a first approach should be made to the other permanent members in New York. This information was reported to the Department in telegram 346, June 21, 3:30 p. m., from New York (501.BC/6-2146).
We particularly suggest alternative (a) as application of rotation principle that avoids further concentration of work on delegation of Council president. If Council continues to create standing committees it may become impracticable to rotate chairmanship of all simultaneously.

Shortness of committee’s main period of work seems to make (b) worth consideration also.

2. Your course stated in para 3 is approved.

Acheson

501.AA/6-2446: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)

U.S. URGENT WASHINGTON, June 24, 1946—7 p. m. CONFIDENTIAL

108. Amdel. We think there are many advantages to concentrating the talks on membership with the British between you and Cadogan in New York rather than talking to the Embassy here or talking in London. Will you be good enough to see Cadogan again and attempt to obtain his concurrence without consulting London again in view of shortness of time to our making informal approaches immediately to Sweden and Iceland. You should tell Cadogan that we, of course, have no objection to the British making their own approaches. Will you also tell Cadogan that as the British do not desire to take the initiative we are considering making an immediate informal approach in Dublin. Also tell him that we hope the British will make approaches to Portugal and Switzerland. You may tell Cadogan we do not plan to approach either of these countries at the preliminary stage. We think it would be better for them to do so in the case of Portugal and our information on Switzerland is that it is quite unlikely that the Swiss will apply this summer. We hope the British will talk to them however. We agree with the British position on Switzerland.

Also please tell Cadogan that we think the talks in New York with the other permanent members should not be deferred until the results of the informal approaches are known and we would be receptive to a Foreign Office suggestion if made for the New York talks to commence almost at once.

In that connection we are reviewing our position on Italy, Austria, and the satellites and may wish to discuss these further with Cadogan.

On other countries discussed in your last meeting with Cadogan we have the following comments for you to transmit to Cadogan:
Siam: Our position on Siam, which you are authorized to impart in your discretion in whole or in part to Cadogan, is fully covered in our 105 of June 22.\footnote{See vol. viii, p. 1026. The U.S. attitude was to favor Siam’s application for membership in the United Nations in accordance with the general position of this government toward membership applications, contingent upon Siamese action with respect to settling the question of the disputed areas involving French Indo-China; for documentation on this subject, see \textit{ibid.}, pp. 978 ff.}

Afghanistan: Agree on support. From our point of view feel approach unnecessary as we understand application will be made. No objection to a British approach.

Albania: We are reviewing our position and will advise you further.

Eire: Will vote in favor and as indicated above will probably make an informal approach now.

Muscat, Nepal, Tibet: Please express to Cadogan the hope that applications will not be made at this time.

Transjordan: We think on balance an application now would be premature. There are many complicating factors from our point of view and we would prefer that the matter not come up.

Yemen: Would think better if doesn’t come up. If did come up could probably support.

Soviet Republics: In agreement.

Outer Mongolia: Don’t wish to encourage or discourage. If should be pressed might be able to support.

We hope Cadogan will agree that it is all right for us to initiate informal approaches immediately without awaiting further London clearance in the cases of Sweden, Iceland, and Eire. On our part we hope they will do the same without coming back to us on Portugal and Switzerland. We would appreciate a telephonic report following your discussion with Cadogan.

ACHESON

501.AA/6–2646: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)

SECRET U.S. URGENT WASHINGTON, June 26, 1946—1 p. m.

109. Amdel. Department has reviewed its position on Italy and Austria and continues to feel an effort should be made to obtain their admission to the United Nations this summer. Admission would give peoples of both countries great psychological lift and we feel strongly this is important. We continue to feel also that Austria should not be admitted prior to Italy and that if we should be blocked on Italy that Austria should be dropped.
We recognize that Potsdam gives the Soviets, should they desire to employ it, the strongest kind of an argument that an exception to Potsdam should not be made in the case of Italy. We believe if we propose Italy that we can almost certainly expect a Soviet counter demand for the satellites. We feel if such a counter demand is made and strongly pressed we must be prepared to accept it. This would mean a revision of Potsdam. Its justification is that at Potsdam no one expected it would take such a long time to develop and negotiate peace treaties.

Please review this urgently with Cadogan and request him to ask the Foreign Office to reconsider its position on Italy, Austria, and the satellites. For your own information, if the F.O. does not change its position we will be prepared to drop this matter this summer.

Also please tell Cadogan that while we are not happy over Albania and also lack certain reasonable assurances required to regularize our relations, we continue to feel that if necessary to accomplish our broad program we would reluctantly vote for Albania. We are also somewhat apprehensive over the possibility that it may be necessary to vote for Albania in order to get any state in. If necessary we would be prepared to do this after making a statement as to our unfortunate experience and indicating we are voting in favor in the interest of unanimity in the U.N. Please ask Cadogan to request F.O. to reconsider on Albania.

Pursuant your telephone conversation yesterday we are deferring approach in Dublin until you talk further with Cadogan.

Please impress on Cadogan urgency of these several questions as all should be resolved prior to your talks with other permanent members and these talks should take place almost at once.

ACHESON

501.AA/6-2846: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1946—7 p. m.

115. In view of the imminence of your talks with the representatives of the Soviet Union, China, and France on membership, we are outlining below certain suggestions for your guidance and on which we would welcome your comments or other suggestions.

1. The major objective is to find out if vetoes must be expected on specific applications. In this connection, the Soviet Union is probably the key. Hence, we suggest talking first with Gromyko.
2. The result of that talk will indicate the line to take with others and our comments are made with special reference to your talk with Gromyko.

3. We feel it is very important that the impression of a concerted U.S.–U.K. approach be avoided. It would follow that you and Cadogan should not call together for the talks. We believe preferable for you to persuade Cadogan that it would be wise for you to handle the first round of talks by yourself seeing each representative separately but as nearly simultaneously as possible.

4. You should lay on the table Sweden, Iceland, Afghanistan, Switzerland, Portugal, Eire, Italy, and Austria as states in our opinion eligible and well qualified for admission at this time. You would have to admit that we do not know whether or not all of these states will apply but indicate we are confident at least some of them will.

5. We think the conversation initially should be pitched on a discussion as to the qualifications of the states as to eligibility and should descend to a bargaining level only as last resort.

6. We think it would be wise as to above neutrals to refer to Potsdam and assume blandly that they are well qualified to assume obligations of Charter and become members.

7. Incidentally in mentioning name of Sweden you should, in view of assurance given Eriksson,³¹ make very clear we are not speaking in any way on behalf of Sweden.

8. On Italy you should stress cobelligerency and assistance rendered United Nations in war and you could refer to recent liberal revision of Armistice terms.³²

9. On Austria the strongest argument would be that she was a victim of aggression. Reference should of course be made to the Moscow Declaration on Austria.³³ You should attempt to avoid a detailed legalistic discussion as to whether Austria under military occupancy has sufficient control over its foreign relations to carry out obligations of membership. You should stress that if occupying powers agree on membership this could be worked out.

10. During discussion our position on Siam should be outlined. This obviously will present difficulties in French talk. A separate telegram contains our suggestions.³⁴

11. When Gromyko mentions Albania we feel you should reply at first that while we would like to vote for Albania it is difficult for us to reconcile her failure to give us requested assurances on treaties with willingness to carry out obligations of Charter. If we received the as-

---
³¹ Herman Eriksson, Swedish Minister to the United States.
³² For documentation regarding this subject, see vol. v, pp. 825 ff.
³³ For text see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i, p. 761.
³⁴ Telegram 114, June 28, not printed.
surances we would have no difficulty. We feel that by taking this line there is a bare possibility it may result in Soviets persuading Albanians to give requested assurances. If possible, therefore, in first conversation you should avoid conceding on Albania. A separate telegram gives information on types of treaties involved which should be mentioned to Gromyko with the explanation that they are of a type beneficial rather than detrimental to Albania in its foreign relations.

12. Likewise, we think it desirable to defer conceding on Mongolia until after Gromyko is thoroughly “smoked out” and you can evaluate the situation. In Chinese talk you should make a special point of ascertaining their reaction on Mongolia and on Siam.

13. We leave entirely to your discretion when you should indicate we are willing to go along on satellites if raised by Gromyko.

14. If Gromyko or others inquire with whom we are talking, you should reply first with the permanent members and later with other members of Council in order to avoid possible suspicion of Big Five deal. If he asks why, it would probably be appropriate to explain that we have indications that some states which would like to apply are holding back because of fear of a veto but this should be left up to your discretion to be determined on spot in light of tone of conversation.

15. Material in your membership book will provide you with argumentation on the countries we consider presently qualified.

16. In answering questions on other countries, you should follow information in our 108 of June 24.

17. If you desire Raynor to assist in conversations Dept. will make him available.

18. You will note these comments assume agreement with British on Italy, Austria and satellites and if such agreement not reached would of course be changed accordingly.

ACHESON

501.AA/7-146

Memorandum of Conversation, by G. Hayden Raynor, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] July 1, 1946.

Participants: The Swedish Minister
             Mr. Hugh Cumming, NOE
             Mr. Hayden Raynor, EUR

The Swedish Minister called this afternoon at his request to discuss the question of a possible Swedish application for membership in the United Nations.
The Minister handed to us the attached excerpts from instructions he had received by mail from Stockholm. He requested answers from us on the three questions listed in the first attachment hereto.

We informed the Minister that the answer to question No. 1 was Yes categorically.

We also informed him that our answer to question No. 2 was Yes. He then developed a thought behind question 2 further following the suggestion in the other excerpt of his instructions and inquired what our position would be if a situation developed in which a motion was made to postpone consideration of all membership applications. We informed the Minister that while we could not tell in advance what position we would take under such a contingency, we hoped that such a situation would not arise.

In answer to question No. 3 we told the Minister that in our view an application received after July 15 could be considered. We added that such an application would, of course, receive our support.

During the course of the conversation we indicated that our objective was to see as many eligible states as desired admitted to the United Nations this year. Also we told the Minister that we were strongly in favor of Sweden’s candidacy and would support it actively. We urged the Minister to recommend to his Government that should they desire to apply the application be filed with the Secretary General of the United Nations prior to July 15.

The Minister read to us a telegram he had received from the Swedish Minister in Paris indicating that the Swedes had made similar inquiry of the French Government. The French had replied favorably on questions 1 and 2 and reserved their opinion on question 3. Although the Minister did not admit it, it seems clear that the Swedes have directed the same inquiry to all of the permanent members on the Council.

Before leaving the Swedish Minister smiling broadly and in a light vein, but with evident underlying sincerity, stated that he understood application No. 1 had been received from Albania, application No. 2 from Siam, application No. 3 from the Mongolian People’s Republic and that it was suggested that application No. 4 should be from Sweden.

[Annex 1]

QUESTIONS, ORALLY AND INFORMALLY MADE BY THE SWEDISH MINISTER, ON JULY 1

Question No. 1: Is the Government of the United States prepared, through its delegates in the Security Council and in the General As-
sembly of 1946, to vote for the approval of a Swedish application for membership in the United Nations?

Question No. 2: Is the Government of the United States, in case of an affirmative answer to question No. 1, willing to support a Swedish application for membership, without making its attitude dependent upon a positive decision with regard to applications for membership from other nations?

Question No. 3: Could a Swedish application for membership be taken up for consideration and be expected to receive the support of the Government of the United States, even if submitted after July 15?

[Annex 2]

When making a decision regarding application for membership in the United Nations, the Swedish Government, for its guidance, would like to know what attitude the permanent members of the Security Council could be expected to take if Sweden should make such an application. In this respect it must be taken into special consideration that one or more of the members having veto right, although being prepared to vote for Sweden’s admission, might combine this question with the admission of one or more other nations. It might thus happen that a member combines the approval of a Swedish application with the admission of another country whose application has caused difference of opinion. Thereby, the result might be, for instance, that all applications are postponed for the time being, although none of the members, as to matter, is opposed to Sweden’s membership.

501.AA/6-2846: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)

SECRET U.S. URGENT WASHINGTON, July 1, 1946—6 p.m.

120. Amdel. Pursuant last night’s telephone conversation we suggest you tell Cadogan we feel we must go ahead with informal talks and that you then see Gromyko. We suggest that the discussion with Gromyko be confined to a sounding out process on the countries listed in paragraph four of our 115, June 28 and Siam. We feel in this initial conversation no commitments as to our position on any of the countries should be made. Following talk with Gromyko we can jointly decide upon next step.

Acheson
The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Harriman)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1946—7 p. m. 5121. Herschel Johnson has been having conversations in New York with Cadogan on question of membership in United Nations. Urgency is great because of July 15 date in Resolution on Membership passed by Security Council. Cadogan referred certain questions raised by Johnson including position of Brit with respect to Italy, Austria, ex-satellites, and Albania, and question whether inquiry should be made as to intention of Irish, to London some days ago and has not had definitive instructions thereon. Please stress urgency of this matter at a high level in Fonoof and urge they send Cadogan instructions on these matters promptly.95

Acheson

501/7-146

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) to the Secretary of State96

[Paris.] July 1, 1946.

Dear James: I have recently been considering the question of the admission of new members to the United Nations Organisation which has been the subject of some discussion between the representatives of our two governments on the Security Council.

I feel very strongly that we should if possible adopt a common policy towards this question and I am in any case opposed to it forming the subject of discussion between the representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council since I believe this would be likely to lead to some rather confused political bargaining.

I suggest that our governments should agree to tell the governments of Sweden, Portugal, Iceland and Eire that we should be prepared to support their candidature at the next Assembly if they put it forward. We have ourselves been approached by the government of Afghanistan and Trans-Jordan on this subject and are already committed to sup-

95 In telegram 6472, July 3, 7 p. m., the Ambassador informed the Department that he had seen Under Secretary Sargent in the British Foreign Office that day about the membership question and that Mr. Sargent had said that the matter had been urgently referred to Mr. Bevin in Paris (501.AA/7-346). Mr. Bevin, Secretary of State Byrnes, and the other Foreign Ministers of the Big Five were attending a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

96 Apparently written before Mr. Bevin was informed of the approach directed to him by this Government through the Foreign Office; see footnote 95, above.
port them if they apply for membership. We should be very glad if you felt you could do the same.

I do not think that Switzerland is worth approaching at present in view of her special position in regard to neutrality and I feel that Nepal, the Yemen, Tibet and Muscat need not be considered for the time being. I think we can also leave over Siam for the present as her candidature does not come up until the 15th July and there may by then have been some new developments in her frontier dispute with France. I suggest finally that our attitude towards Albania should be decided at the last moment before her candidature comes up.

As regards Italy, Austria and other ex-enemy states, I have myself very grave doubts about encouraging their candidatures this year since I feel that any attempt to go outside the Potsdam Agreement would only expose us to reproaches from the U.S.S.R., which would in any case veto such application.

I should very much like to speak to you about all this sometime tomorrow and will get into touch with you with a view to arranging a suitable time. As you know, time is short, as applications have to be in by July 15th.97

Yours sincerely,

ERNEST BEVIN

591.AA/7-346 : Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET U.S. URGENT NEW YORK, July 3, 1946—6:15 p. m. [Received 7:06 p. m.]

393. Reference Dept’s 120, July 1, 6 p. m., 115, June 28, 7 p. m., other related messages and telephone conversation this afternoon with Hayden Raynor.

I checked this morning again with Cadogan to inquire if he had received any new instructions regarding membership. He replied in the negative. I then asked him if he had serious objection to my having an informal discussion on the matter with Gromyko. I said I would not bring him or his govt into the discussion nor would I indicate to Gromyko that I had instructions. Cadogan said he had no objection whatever and would appreciate it if his name and the British position were not brought into the discussion.

I had a private talk with Gromyko this morning, no interpreters or assistants of his being present. He was friendly and apparently frank. I told him that the time when applications for membership in the

97 See telegram 3271, Delsec 660, July 3, 3 p. m., from Paris, p. 407.
United Nations would have to be considered by the Membership Committee was drawing very close and that I would be greatly interested to hear any personal views of his which he might be willing to express. I told him that I felt personally and I knew that my govt felt that Sweden, Iceland, Afghanistan, Switzerland, Portugal, Eire, Italy and Austria were in fact eligible and qualified for admission at this time; that we had no idea whether any or all of these states will apply in time but felt certain there would be a few applications at least and recalled to him that there has already been a press report of action taken by the Swedish Parliament to authorize the govt to apply for admission. He volunteered the comment that Portugal is not in the same position as Franco Spain. With regard to the former European neutrals and Iceland, Gromyko’s attitude, if I correctly interpreted it, was open-minded and not unfriendly. He said that his govt would not be able to indicate its final opinion on any countries prior to the time when the applications are actually up for consideration; and that in his view, all applications should be considered on their individual merits. He said he felt it was important for some countries to be admitted at this session and referred to Albania. I told him what our position on Albania is and suggested that his own govt or its representatives might be able to give Albania some good advice as to giving necessary assurances on her treaty obligations. Gromyko smiled at this and made a remark about Albania being a sovereign nation. I told him I readily admitted that, but that some great powers frequently advised their smaller friends upon action that might be usefully followed.

In discussing Italy and Austria I agreed without reservation that if these countries are admitted at this time, it would not be in accordance with the Potsdam decisions and that to take such action we would all have to agree on a revision of Potsdam. Gromyko then asked our attitude toward the Balkan states which, he said, were likewise covered by Potsdam. I concurred and said that I had not yet had precise instructions regarding these countries. He then said that whether the parties to the Potsdam Agreement agree to a revision of that agreement or not that in the Russian view admission of Austria and Italy is on all fours with that of Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. I admitted to him that under the Potsdam Agreement they were under similar handicaps for action. I expressed the hope, which I said was purely a personal one, that Austria, Italy and the Balkan countries might all be admitted to the United Nations as soon as possible. Gromyko apparently had no information about Afghanistan. He showed some interest, however, and gave no indication that the Russian attitude would be unfavorable. Our attitude in
regard to Siam seemed to interest him. He gave no indication of hostility to admission of Siam.

The only country he specifically inquired about was Outer Mongolia. I told him that I had received no information or instructions regarding Outer Mongolia, but said that I felt sure when the application is up we will give it objective consideration. I expressed the personal opinion to him, however, that the admission of Outer Mongolia was not a matter of urgent necessity or desirability and that as it was an entirely new country without established international relations, its application could hardly be considered in the same breath with the application, for instance, of an old established democracy like Sweden, which is ready to make immediate and positive contributions to the work of the United Nations. Gromyko did not dissent from this, and impressed me as being in agreement in his own mind.

When I left Gromyko said he would report the conversation to his government and thanked me for coming. He said he thought the informal discussion had been useful.

JOHNSON

501.AA/7-346 : Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Iceland (Dreyfus)
CONFIDENTIAL
WASHINGTON, July 3, 1946—4 p. m.
134. Please inform FonMin substantially as follows:

"Article 4 of UN Charter. With respect thereto, Security Council recently adopted following resolution on applications for UN membership:

1. Applications for membership which have been or may be received by the Secretary General shall be considered by the Security Council at a meeting or meetings to be held in Aug 1946 for this specific purpose.

2. Applications for membership which have been or may be received by the Secretary General before July 15, 1946, shall be referred to a committee composed of a representative of each of the members of the Security Council for examination and report to the Council not later than Aug 1, 1946."

As long-range goal US Govt interested in universality of membership in UN. Its immediate interest is that as many eligible states as possible become members UN during present year. As FonMin will recall, US Govt has repeatedly indicated to Ice Govt its friendly interest in Ice membership UN and has given assurances that Ice could count on wholehearted support of US Govt in earliest Ice application for UN membership.

According to rules of Security Council an application for member-
ship should be made directly to UN Secretary General and should be accompanied by a declaration of the readiness of state concerned to accept the obligations contained in Charter of UN. The recommendations of UN Security Council on applications for membership will then be submitted to UN General Assembly which, according provisions Chapter IV, Article 20 of UN Charter, meets in regular annual sessions. The session for current year will open on Sept 3, 1946; therefore, an application by Ice for membership in UN should, if possible, be submitted to UN Secretary General before July 15, 1946 and at latest by Aug 1, 1946, if consideration of such application to be given this year.

Accordingly, although US Govt realizes time remaining after elections is short and that Althing not in session, it hopes Ice application will be made by July 15, or at latest by Aug 1.

US Govt would be appreciative if it could be informed whether Ice intends apply for UN membership during current year.

In case FonMin inquires you may inform him that US Govt intends attempt informally to ascertain reaction other Council members to Ice application and will be glad to report results such inquiries to Ice Govt.

ACHESON

740.00119 Council/7-346: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, July 3, 1946—3 p. m.
[Received July 3—10:37 a. m.]

3271. Delsc 660. Mr. Bevin has just told me the British Govt expects, through their representatives in the respective capitals, to inform the Govts of Sweden, Portugal, Iceland, and Eire that the British will support their candidacy for membership in the United Nations. The British do not expect to take any action whatever with regard to the membership of any other nations to the organization at this time but will await later events or the meeting of the Assembly before taking any attitude with regard to the other nations. He said applications must be made before the 15th of July and he considered this notification of support to the four above-mentioned nations as an encouragement to their presenting their candidacy. He hoped that the United States would take a similar action.

I told Mr. Bevin that I would pass this on to you and suggest that if you saw no reason to the contrary you might take similar action.

Mr. Bevin said the British Govt were not taking this matter up with any other members of the Security Council at this time but were
confining their action to notifying the govs concerned as he did not see much point in starting a discussion among the members of the Council of this subject at the present time. I personally agree with him on this point.²

CAFFERY

501.AA/6-2946 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Ireland (Gray)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1946—8 p. m.

113. Bevin told SEC Paris July 3 that Brit Govt expects to inform Ireland that Brit will support its candidacy for UN membership.

Since Brit are approaching Irish, and in view of De Valera's⁹ probable negative attitude (urtsls 70, June 26[27] and 72 June 29),¹ we have decided not (repeat not) to make any approach to Irish at this time. Please inform us of Irish reaction to British approach.²

ACHESON

740.00119 Council/7-546 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, July 5, 1946—noon.

[Received July 5—10:14 a. m.]

3290. Delsel 664. For the Acting Secretary from the Secretary. Mr. Bevin has suggested that no effort be made to have Italian or Austrian applications for membership in United Nations put forward at this time as Italian peace treaty not concluded nor is treaty for establishment of Austrian independence concluded. I agree to this suggestion and have told Bevin I would inform you accordingly. [Byrnes.]

CAFFERY

740.00119 Council/7-546 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

SECRET U.S. URGENT

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1946—5 p. m.

3276. Secdel 412. Herschel Johnson has been having informal conversations with Cadogan New York on UN membership (reference

² Telephoned to New York on July 3 and then repeated to New York in telegram 128, July 3, 8 p. m., with the instruction that "We feel in view this information and your talk with Gromyko nothing will be gained by further talks in New York at this time." (501.BC/7-346)

¹ Eamon De Valera, Prime Minister of Eire.

¹ Neither printed.

² Repeated to New York as telegram 129.
Delsoc 660). You will recall some time ago approving program our supporting all neutrals except Spain, Siam, Italy and Austria and reluctantly to vote for Albania if good part of above program could be accomplished. British appeared to differ on Italy, Austria and Albania but Cadogan has been without definite instructions.

Our original program amended since your departure in following respects:

A. If Italy and Austria proposed and Soviets countered with satellites we would have to accept satellites.

B. Siam qualified to extent that she concurrently submit whole territorial dispute with France to UN agreeing in advance to accept obligations of pacific settlement including agreement in advance to carry out decision of UN but in any event would vote for if British do.

C. If we are pressed we could vote for Outer Mongolia which has submitted an application.

D. If necessary in order to obtain admission of only one or two eminently eligible states such as Sweden or Iceland we would very reluctantly vote for Albania.

We had intended authorize Johnson discuss question informally other permanent members in effort to ascertain if vetoes must be expected on specific applications in view of indication that states like Portugal would like to apply but are holding back because of fear of veto. Johnson authorized to talk with Gromyko and did so personal basis. Results inconclusive but Gromyko apparently agreed with principle that applications be considered on individual merits. Also he indicated no hostility towards neutrals nor did he give any indication neutral applications would be tied with other applications. Gromyko did give clear indication that if Italy and Austria were proposed Soviets would press for satellites. He also clearly indicated official Soviet position on any country would be withheld until matter before council. Under circumstances we feel nothing to be gained by further informal talks in New York.

We are paralleling British action Sweden, Portugal and Iceland but feel unwise to do so with Eire on which our position has been to vote favorably but not to take initiative.

Acheson

501.AA/7-546: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Portugal
(Baruch)

SECRET U.S. URGENT Washington, July 5, 1946—3 p.m.

644. You should inform FonMin as soon as possible of situation on UN membership as described below and report reactions to Dept.
UN Security Council passed resolution on May 23 stating that applications for membership received before July 15 would be considered by Council in August. See membership provisions in Chapter Two of Charter. Applications should be addressed to Secretary General and should contain a statement that the State is willing to assume the obligations of the Charter.

In interest of broadening membership in UN we hope that qualified states who desire membership will be admitted this year and that several of the neutrals will be applying at this time.

US Rep on Security Council has had informal and personal exchange of views with USSR Rep Gromyko. Latter said that definitive views of his Govt on application of any particular state would not be made known before time for action on the application in Security Council. However when Portugal was mentioned by US Rep he showed no hostility whatever.

We realize possible Portuguese hesitancy to apply unless they are sure that there will be no rebuff but above is all we can tell them together with assurance that their application would be warmly supported by US Govt on grounds of traditional friendship and important Portuguese contribution to Allied war effort.

We understand that your Brit colleague is giving Port Govt assurances of support of his Govt.

ACHESON

501.AA/7-1146: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative in Albania (Jacobs)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 11, 1946—8 p.m.

125. For your information this reviews recent developments our thinking problem Albanian application membership UN.

We continue to feel we should reluctantly vote favorably if by so doing we could accomplish objective of membership for group of states we consider eminently eligible. If necessary even to obtain membership for one or two eminently qualified states to vote favorably most reluctantly after making statement on our difficulties and stating voting favorably in the interest of unanimity in the UN. British have not yet definitely instructed Cadogan but have indicated they may have to resist until they receive assurances requested result cruiser incident.

We have not finally determined what our position should be in the event no eminently qualified states such as Sweden or Iceland apply. Very reluctant, however, to establish precedent of vetoing applica-
tions and it may be necessary to vote favorably to obtain admission of Afghanistan. Our position subject review in light Cadogan’s final instructions.

In informal personal discussion with Gromyko on membership Herschel Johnson explained to him would like to vote for Albania but difficult to do so in view of lack of requested assurances. Suggested to Gromyko that if we had assurances our difficulty would be removed. This was done with the thought in mind that it might possibly prompt the Soviets to discuss the question with Albania. Gromyko attempted ascertain if assurances prerequisite to favorable vote our part on which Johnson noncommittal.

Acheson

501.AA/7-1146: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

SECRET U.S. URGENT WASHINGTON, July 11, 1946—4 p. m.

3373. Secdel 455. In view of application of Trans-Jordan for membership in UN received July 5, we have to establish our attitude without delay and I am sending memorandum to President requesting his views. 9 I should appreciate knowing your thoughts in advance of beginning of SC Committee discussion on membership on July 15.

As you are aware, we have had correspondence with Senator Myers regarding Trans-Jordan and he has introduced resolution containing request that executive take no action in any way recognizing Trans-Jordan as separate or independent state and that US representative on UN be instructed to seek postponement of international determination of status of Trans-Jordan area until future status of Palestine as a whole will be determined.

We also have received a long detailed legal argument from Rabbis Wise and Silver 4 objecting to independence of Trans-Jordan.

Dept was informed in Brit Embassy Aide-Mémoire of June 26 that Trans-Jordan Govt intended to apply for admission to UN in near future; that it had taken this decision on its own initiative; that its application would have support of Brit Govt; and that in view of FO for reasons given in considerable detail Trans-Jordan fully satisfied requirements for membership in UN.

Brit Embassy has also furnished Dept with paraphrase of instructions to Cadogan on subject. He was told to convey gist of foregoing

---

9 For the Acting Secretary’s memorandum of July 15 to President Truman, see p. 414.

4 Leaders in the Zionist movement in the United States.
to US colleague in order to persuade him to support Trans-Jordan in SC using following arguments:

“We note that US Govt apparently think they will have to vote for Outer Mongolia in last resort. Transjordan, whose territory and record is open to all world is surely a more respectable candidate than Outer Mongolia, which is a quite unknown factor, and with whom western states have not hitherto been allowed to have any dealings. We think it would be deplorable if Outer Mongolia were admitted and Transjordan were not, and that this would incidentally encourage Soviet Govt to put up a Constituent Republic next year as their price for agreeing to Transjordan.”

Our tentative view is that, although legal position is not clear-cut in view of lack of precedents and differences in interpretation of treaties and other international obligations and can be argued ad infinitum, following considerations are important:

1. Non-applicability to Trans-Jordan of portions of Palestine mandate relating to Jewish National Home since 1922, plus existence of independent Arab Govt in Trans-Jordan since 1923, have resulted in evolution of Trans-Jordan distinct and separate from that of Palestine proper.

2. Assembly of UN, including US, welcomed Brit intention to declare Trans-Jordan independent. Subsequently League of Nations at final session last spring in effect recognized Trans-Jordan independence as accomplished.

3. We could if we desired abstain from voting on question of Trans-Jordan admittance on ground that lapse of time is required to establish its qualifications for UN membership. Our abstention in this case would, if otherwise desirable, be consistent with our long-range objective looking toward clear right of permanent member of Council to abstain from voting on substantive decisions without this constituting veto.6 You and Mr. Cohen7 are of course familiar with this issue. Brit and Arab States however might well question our refusal to vote for Trans-Jordan in view of our previous agreement to admit two constituent Soviet republics, India and Philippines and our present plan to vote in certain circumstances for admission of Outer Mongolia. (See Deptel 3270 Secdel 412 July 5 pg 2-c.)

4. Our failure to vote for Trans-Jordan admittance would almost certainly give rise to serious repercussions against us in Arab world and would tend to weaken position of Great Brit and ourselves in Middle East. We feel that in view of international situation we should vote in favor of admission even though such action will arouse storm

---

6 For documentation on this matter, see pp. 251 ff.
7 Benjamin V. Cohen, Counselor of the Department; Mr. Cohen was with the Secretary at Paris.
of protest among certain powerful Zionist groups in US and elsewhere and will result in criticism from various members of Congress who are supporting more extreme Zionists. Do you concur?

Supplemental telegram on other phases of membership question will follow.

Acheson

501.AA/7–1246: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET    US URGENT  NEW YORK, July 12, 1946—8:15 p.m.
[Received July 12—7:54 p.m.]

418. Dr. Quo, Chinese delegate, called to see me this morning on three matters.

1. He has received a telegram from the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding the application for membership in the United Nations of Outer Mongolia. The Chinese seem to be disturbed about this because of information they have obtained that a secret agreement exists between Outer Mongolia and Soviet Russia which the Chinese believe would authorize the maintenance of Russian troops in Outer Mongolia. Quo says that his Foreign Minister is of the opinion that China cannot support the application of Outer Mongolia until they know more about the terms of this secret agreement. This agreement they believe may be in violation of the Chinese-Russian treaty which recognized the status of Outer Mongolia as an independent nation and pledged both China and Russia to support its application for membership in the United Nations. The Chinese Foreign Minister has suggested to Dr. Quo that their information regarding this secret agreement between Outer Mongolia and Russia should be allowed to leak out to the press without its source becoming known. Dr. Quo has not yet, however, acted on this suggestion. Although he spoke with discretion he made it clear that he would welcome expression of opinion and even suggestions for [from?] our government. The Chinese Foreign Minister informed him that the US Government had expressed its willingness to support the application of Outer Mongolia and had even suggested to China that the latter should actively sponsor the application. I asked Dr. Quo where such a US suggestion had been made to the Chinese Government and he said he thought it was at Nanking. It is apparent that the Chinese Foreign Minister is troubled by this situation and what he believes to be our active sponsoring of the Outer

See footnote 12, p. 417.
Mongolia application. It would be appreciated by Dr. Quo and might be useful if the Department can give me a statement of its views and inform me whether the Chinese Foreign Minister’s information as sent to Dr. Quo is correct. If the secret treaty between Russia and Outer Mongolia exists in fact it would seem to me that it has an important bearing on the Outer Mongolian application for membership in the United Nations and its possible qualifications under the Charter. I would appreciate any information and views the Department may have in this matter.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

JOHNSON

501.AA/7-1546

The Acting Secretary of State to President Truman*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 15, 1946.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: You will recall that on July 11 we sent a telegram to the Secretary in Paris in which we informed him that in our opinion the United States should vote in favor of the admission of Trans-Jordan into the United Nations and asked for his concurrence. In that telegram we stated that it would be necessary for us to establish without delay our attitude in the matter and that we were sending a memorandum to you requesting your views.

I am attaching hereto a memorandum which discusses in some detail various factors involved in the problem and sets forth the considerations which cause the Department to feel that it would be in our national interests to support the application of Trans-Jordan for membership in the United Nations.

I would appreciate it if you would let me know whether you approve the course of action which the Department suggests. The matter may come up for discussion before the Security Council Committee on Membership within the next few days.

Faithfully yours,

DEAN ACHESON

[Enclosure]

Memorandum for the President

Subject: Position of United States with Respect to Admission of Trans-Jordan to United Nations.

The Kingdom of Trans-Jordan which was recognized by the British Government as an independent country on March 22 of this year, has

*Notation: “Approved Harry Truman”. 
applied for membership in the United Nations and the question has arisen as to whether or not the delegate of the United States to the Security Council should be instructed to vote for its admission. The decision which the United States Government takes with regard to this matter is certain to have considerable repercussions, both of a domestic and an international character.

Most of the Zionists and the supporters in the United States of extreme Zionism are opposed to the recognition of Trans-Jordan as an independent country and, therefore, to the admission of Trans-Jordan into the United Nations. On the other hand, Great Britain and the Arab world are extremely anxious that the application of Trans-Jordan for admittance shall not be rejected.

[Here follows discussion in some detail of the mandate for Palestine awarded to Great Britain by the Council of the League of Nations on July 24, 1922.]

It seems to the Department that in the absence of precedents, and in view of the possibility of various interpretations being placed upon the language used in the Mandate, in the American-British Convention, and in other pertinent documents, the Zionists can produce plausible arguments in favor of their position. The Department is of the opinion, however, that the position of the British from the legal point of view is the more sound. The Department also feels that in making its decision, the Government of the United States should consider the factual and international political aspects of the problem, not solely those of a legalistic nature.

Among these considerations are the following:

1) Trans-Jordan has been a separate and autonomous part of the Palestine Mandate since 1922, and those provisions of the Mandate which related to the Jewish national home have never been applied to territory East of the Jordan. The development of Trans-Jordan as an Arab state under a separate Arab government has resulted in the evolution of that territory in a direction quite different from that taken by Palestine proper. Even the most extreme Zionists have in

---

98 For the terms of the mandate see Foreign Relations, 1924, vol. ii, pp. 213-220. For a discussion of the special character of the Palestine mandate, see Marjorie M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, vol. i, pp. 650 and 651.
99 The mandate of Great Britain with respect to Palestine came into force on September 20, 1923. On December 3, 1924 the United States concluded with Great Britain a convention (signed at London) defining the rights of United States nationals in Palestine; see Foreign Relations, 1924, vol. ii, pp. 212 ff., or 44 Stat. (pt. 3) 2184, or Department of State Treaty Series No. 728. For a discussion of the treaties or conventions concluded by the United States with the mandatory states defining rights of its nationals in the several mandated territories, see Whiteman, Digest of International Law, vol. i, pp. 618 ff.
10 This separate status was established in Article 25 of the mandate agreement between the Council of the League and Great Britain; for text of this article, see Foreign Relations, 1924, vol. ii, p. 219. For a discussion of Trans-Jordan's special status, see Whiteman, Digest of International Law, vol. i, pp. 630 and 631.
the past apparently recognized the special and semi-independent position of Trans-Jordan within the Palestine Mandate, and they have not taken exception to Article 25 of the Mandate which sanctioned the exclusion of Trans-Jordan from the provisions relating to the Jewish national home. Furthermore, the population of Trans-Jordan is almost wholly Arab, and, so far as is known, contains no Jewish residents.

2) Great Britain has gone so far in setting up a recognize the independent Kingdom of Trans-Jordan that it is not now possible for it to change its policy in this respect. Great Britain, therefore, apparently has no choice other than to support the application of Trans-Jordan for admission into the United Nations. If the United States should oppose the admission of Trans-Jordan, a rift would take place between Great Britain and the United States in the Middle East with a resultant weakening of the position of the Western Powers and a decline of Western influence in that area. Such a development would be extremely unfortunate in the present world situation.

3) The government of the United States may find it expedient to vote reluctantly for the admission into the United Nations of Albania and Outer Mongolia, countries which have no greater degree of independence than Trans-Jordan. The Philippines and India are already members of the United Nations. It would be difficult to explain to the Arab world why the United States in such circumstances should oppose the admission of Trans-Jordan, which is a member in good standing of the Arab League. In this connection, it might be pointed out that the British Embassy has furnished the Department with a paraphrase of instructions issued to Sir Alexander Cadogan on this subject. This paraphrase reads in part as follows:

[Here follows text quoted in fifth paragraph of telegram 3373, July 11, 4 p.m., to Paris, page 411.]

In view of the above considerations and of the over-riding political necessity of maintaining the peace and stability of the Middle East, it is recommended that the delegate of the United States be instructed to vote for the admission of Trans-Jordan to the United Nations.

501.AA/7–1945: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 16, 1945—7 p.m.

140. Amdel. Re first para urtel 418, July 12, 8:15 p.m. 1. Our attitude toward membership application Mongolian People’s Republic remains as indicated to you in Deptel 108, June 24, 1946, namely that
we wish neither to encourage nor to discourage the application, but
that if pressed we might vote favorably. Nor do we wish advise China
concerning attitude it shall assume in matter. Dept has not suggested
nor instructed Emb Nanking to suggest to Chinese that they actively
sponsor MPR application.

2. Regarding reported secret agreement, we note that Treaty of
Friendship and Mutual Assistance between USSR and Outer Mon-
golia, signed Feb 27, 1946 seems to authorize presence of Soviet troops
in Outer Mongolia. Text of treaty published in Dept Bulletin, June 2,
1946, page 968. You may wish to inquire from Dr. Quo whether this
is Agreement referred to.

3. Published text Sino-Soviet Treaty Agreement of Aug 14, 1945,\(^\text{12}\)
to which Dr. Quo apparently refers, contains no provision pledging
parties to support an application for membership by Outer Mongolia.

4. Dr. Tan Shao-hwa, Min Chinese Emb, July 13, stated Chinese
Govt not disposed raise objection to MPR admission but does not feel
present moment is opportune for China to work for MPR's admission.

BYRNES

501.AA/7-1846: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of
State

SECRET

Moscow, July 18, 1946—10 a. m.
[Received July 18—6:26 a. m.]

2203. Concern of Chinese Foreign Office over possible secret agree-
ment between USSR and Mongolian Peoples Republic providing for
maintenance of Soviet troops in MPR. (Department's 1282, July 14).\(^\text{13}\)

Department is, of course, aware of USSR-MPR treaty of Febru-
ary 27, 1946, providing for mutual assistance (Department State
Bulletin June 2, page 968). We do not know of any secret annexes or
other treaties specifically providing for maintenance of Soviet troops
in MPR.

We feel Chinese anxiety over alleged secret agreement is unrealis-

\(^{12}\) Treaty of friendship and alliance between the Republic of China and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed at Moscow, August 14, 1945, together
with related agreements of the same date; Department of State, United States
Relations With China (Department of State Publication 3573, Far Eastern
Series 30; Washington, released August, 1949), pp. 585 ff., or United Nations

\(^{13}\) This was a repeat of the first paragraph of telegram 418, July 12, 8:15 p. m.,
from New York; see p. 413.
through operation of Soviet secret police and party apparatus. Soviet-MPR treaties, secret or open, are therefore matter of form. Soviet penetration and control of MPR is assumed to be so effective that MPR army may be regarded as under direction of Red Army General Staff and to all intents and purposes a part of Soviet military machine. Thus, unless MPR is confronted by major threat, there is no need for Red Army in MPR. If MPR is "threatened" USSR has right by known treaty of February 27 to send Red Army into MPR.

Soviet military relationship to MPR scarcely differs from that with Poland or Yugoslavia, both of whom are members of UNO. If we resist MPR entry into UNO simply because of its military relationship with USSR it would not be surprising if USSR raised question of British military relationship with Iraq and India or ours with Philippine Republic.

Department repeat to Nanking as Moscow's 89.

SMITH

501.A.A/7-1946: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)

SECRET US URGENT Washington, July 19, 1946—4 p.m.

143. Amdel. If, as appears to us, amendment membership Resolution necessary in order to postpone for approximately three weeks deadline for automatic referral applications to Membership Committee (now July 15) and for Committee report thereon to Council (now August 1), you may request inclusion matter on provisional agenda July 24 meeting or arrange that some other delegation do so.

Form chosen should be simplest and least controversial possible.

We suggest you consider making amendment conform with rules of procedure and have it provide Membership Committee with report to SC 35 days prior to opening Assembly on applications received up to that time. This will avoid confusion on part applicants between resolution and rules which has existed heretofore and will give additional period grace for receipt applications as contrasted possible alternative report set dates such as Aug 19 on applications received by Aug 5. This also keeps matter open without necessity further action should Assembly be further postponed.14

BYRNES

14The opening date of the General Assembly had been moved from September 3 to September 23.
WASHINGTON, July 20, 1946—11 a.m.

145. Amdel. 1. Dept believes it desirable to press Soviet Govt for its interpretation of Potsdam commitment to support admission qualified neutral states to UN. You should, accordingly, seek earliest occasion to speak to Gromyko along following lines:

(a) Various neutral States have inquired re our attitude toward their admission, and we believe at least some have made similar inquiries of other Security Council Members including Soviet Union and United Kingdom.

(b) In Chapter X of Potsdam Agreement (see Membership Book, Part III, Item 5 \textsuperscript{15}) three Powers pledged themselves to support applications for membership from those states that remained neutral during war and fulfill qualifications of Article 4 of Charter. Express exception was made in case of Spain. Potsdam Agreement has direct application to present situation in which one neutral has already applied and others have made inquiries allowing reasonable assumption that their submission of applications depends on attitude of Potsdam signatories. We think Potsdam powers obligated in fairness neutrals to interpret Potsdam clearly and remove doubts in minds neutrals.

(c) This Govt believes that only reasonable interpretation Potsdam agreement is that three powers should vote favorably on applications of Sweden, Afghanistan, Iceland, Portugal, and Eire, and application of Switzerland when Swiss in position to accept obligations of Charter and that powers should make this known to neutrals on inquiry.

Above States (1) were neutral during the war and (2) fulfill qualifications set forth in Article 4 of Charter.

(d) We assume that Soviet Union and UK will likewise, pursuant to Potsdam Agreement, support applications from any or all of above States. This Govt desires to know if this assumption correct as far as Soviet Union is concerned. If Gromyko can give no definite answer this Govt would appreciate his making telegraphic inquiry of Moscow.

(e) If Gromyko should raise question of States other than those listed in sub-para (c) above, whether or not they have applied, you might say that you have no views beyond those expressed in your interview July 3. Assume you will seek if possible to confine discussion to obligations accepted by Three Powers at Potsdam.

\textsuperscript{15} This book is found in the master files of the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO Files).
2. You should in your discretion speak also to Cadogan as rep of Potsdam signatory.

3. For your background information, at Under Secretary's meeting Friday morning, course described above was approved in preference to approach discussed with you yesterday.

BYRNE

501.AA/7-2946

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Cumming)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, July 20, 1946.

Mr. Aminoff, the Counselor of the Swedish Legation, telephoned me this morning. He said that day before yesterday the Soviet Minister in Stockholm had delivered to the Acting Swedish Foreign Minister a memorandum setting forth the Soviet reply to Sweden's inquiry as to the attitude of the Soviet Union towards a Swedish application for admission to the United Nations.

The Soviet memorandum in translation reads as follows:

"The Soviet Government takes a positive attitude towards Swedish admittance to UNO. At the same time the Soviet Government considers it necessary to point out that its representatives can not during consideration of the matter in the UNO refrain from taking into account the attitude of other countries concerning admittance to UNO, also of countries who have already expressed such desires."

Mr. Aminoff said that since the Soviet reply was obviously somewhat cryptic, the Acting Swedish Foreign Minister had asked the Soviet Minister for clarification. The Soviet Minister had replied that he could add nothing to the text of the memorandum which he had just delivered.

Mr. Aminoff said that he would appreciate our transmitting foregoing information in confidence to Mr. Herschel V. Johnson.

501.AA/7-2946: Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

US URGENT

NEW YORK, July 29, 1946—7:45 p. m.
[Received July 29—7:27 p. m.]

458. I had this morning a talk with Gromyko as suggested in the Department's telegram No. 145, July 20, 11 a.m.

I told Gromyko that several neutral states had made inquiries of
us regarding our attitude toward their admission to the United Nations and that we had reason to believe that some at least of them had made similar inquiries of other Security Council members. I referred to Chapter 10 of the Potsdam Agreement and the pledge of the Three Powers to support applications of the neutrals with the exception of Spain who could fulfill the qualifications of Article 4. I said that he must be aware that Sweden and Portugal and possibly other neutral states had hesitated to forward their applications for fear that one of the permanent members of the Council would vote against them. I referred to our talk of July 3 and remarked that I felt certain he understood exactly what my views were on each of the neutral states.

Gromyko said that he still had no instructions as to the attitude which would be taken on applications from these states. I asked him if he would not try to get an indication of Moscow’s attitude and said that I thought the neutral countries who were considering applying ought to get some sort of clearance, particularly as there seemed to be no reason to believe that any of them could not qualify under the terms of the Charter. Gromyko registered no objection but said that several states had already made their applications and mentioned particularly Outer Mongolia and Albania. He asked me in what order I thought the applications would be considered in the Membership Committee. I replied that it seemed logical to me for the applications to be considered in chronological order and that the facts found by the Committee on all the applications should be embodied in a single report. I reminded him that at our previous talk, he said all applications should be considered on their individual merits and that I did not see why it was necessary to connect consideration on the application of one state with that of another. Gromyko replied that they were connected in fact. I asked him if he meant “political” and he said yes. I did not disagree with his statement as both of us understood each other perfectly and it seemed unnecessary to get into argumentative discussion. He attempted to argue the case of Albania as a matter of right. I told him I had given him our views on Albania at our earlier meeting, that I hoped Albania would take the necessary steps to qualify, that I personally hoped that all the recognized states of the world could qualify under the Charter and be admitted as soon as possible. I reminded him that the Greeks have indicated objections to Albania and their intention to bring those objections before the Council. He then commented that the Greeks not only disliked Albania but also Bulgaria and the Soviet Union and other countries.

In regard to Outer Mongolia, I said that we know very little about that country and nothing as to whether it is qualified to assume the
obligations imposed by the Charter. I said that conditions in Outer Mongolia were unknown not only to us but to the world, to which he replied that the United States and Great Britain could get all the information they wanted about that country. He did not say how. He said that the Soviet Government had statistical evidence to prove that Outer Mongolia in fact had a very good moral claim to membership, that they had participated actively and in considerable numbers in actual combat against the Japanese.

The only country on which he tried to draw me out was Trans-Jordan. I told him our policy in regard to Trans-Jordan had not yet been formulated and that as he well knew it had important political implications in this country.

It is obvious that Gromyko understands our point of view and knows that we understand his. He did not commit himself specifically on any country but he made it sufficiently clear that Russian support of Albania and Outer Mongolia may go to the point of insisting on their admission as a condition for admitting western European states whose intrinsic claims to membership not even he would question. He was very good humored throughout the interview and promised to let me know of anything he got from Moscow. As a parting shot when I was leaving, he said that consideration of Outer Mongolia and Albania would in fact have a connection with consideration of applications of other states. I said: "You mean a political connection?" He laughed and said yes.

JOHNSON

740.00119 Council/8-346: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, August 3, 1946—10 p. m.

3844. Secdel 588. Membership Committee SC organized last week begin substantive discussion Monday.66 (Reur 3805, August 3—Delscc 770) 37 Procedure favored generally Committee but Russia not agreed

66 The Committee on the Admission of New Members of the Security Council was convened on July 31 and held its last meeting on August 20. Summaries of the sessions of the Committee, found in the Daily Summary telegrams of the United States Delegation, Series 501.BC, Department of State Central Files, are not printed. The report of the Committee to the Security Council is found in United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, First Year, Second Series, Supplement No. 4, pp. 53-148, annex 7; hereafter cited as SC, 1st yr., 2nd series, Suppl. No. 4.

37 Not printed. The Department had been requested to “telegraph the latest developments concerning application for United Nations membership, summarizing the present status and giving an estimate of the probable chances of each state.” If we should not accept Albania’s application, have you any information to indicate how this might affect the chances of other applicants?" (740.00119 Council/8-346).
discuss private session each application chronological order received
Albania, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Transjordan, but not vote finally on
any application until all reviewed preliminary stage. We believe above
procedure will be followed.

In addition above countries UN announced receipt Irish applica-
tion yesterday. Portugal tells us they filed yesterday and Iceland in-
forms filing today. Siam also expected file.

Sweden has not yet acted. They have been attempting but
unable obtain outright advance assurance from Soviets. Do not
know what they will do. In conversation with Johnson, Gromyko
has not committed himself but implied fairly clearly they tie
applications together. We think almost certain necessary vote
affirmatively Albania, and probably Mongolia to obtain ad-
mission Iceland, Portugal, Eire and Sweden if latter applies. We
are prepared finally if necessary to do this but British thus far show
no indication do likewise. Above is key situation. May be difficulty
with French on Siam. China dislikes Mongolian application but will
probably follow us. Dutch and others appear unenthusiastic on
Albania and Mongolia.

In Committee next week we intend stall and reserve position on
Albania and Mongolia at least until we know Sweden’s decision and
probably through initial series of discussions which may smoke out
Soviets somewhat. We will frankly tell what concerns us about Albania
and indicate need of better information Mongolia.

At proper moment will probably be necessary attempt strike bargain
Soviet possibly other prominent members anticipating objective
affirmative vote all states listed with our agreeing vote for Albania
and Mongolia if they vote for the three and four Western European
 neutrals.

Sent Paris; repeated New York for Herschel Johnson.\(^\text{18}\)

ACHESON

501.AA/8-646: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting United States
Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, August 6, 1946—8 p. m.

155. USdel. We are prepared to approve admission of following
group of states: Sweden, Iceland, Eire, Portugal, Afghanistan, Siam,
Transjordan, Albania, and Outer Mongolia. You may in your discre-
tion approach Soviet and any other delegations with proposal to admit

\(^{18}\) Repeated to New York as telegram 151.
whole group. We suggest proposal might preferably be made after more definite info on Sweden’s intentions is received and after preliminary review of all applications is at least substantially completed but before vote on any controversial application. General considerations stated in Deptel 153, Aug 5, 7 p. m., also in our view remain valid.

In making proposal, U.S. seeks apply Charter in broad, fair and tolerant spirit to achieve quickly objective of admitting broadly representative group of States. You should of course make clear that if Soviet and other Permanent Council Members cannot agree on full list this Government reserves its attitude on each of above States. However, for your info and appropriate use, if French oppose Siam we would still hope agreement could be reached on rest of list, and we will support Siam regardless of French position.

Acheson

501AA/S-1446: Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT New York, August 14, 1946—3 p. m.

[Received August 14—2:36 p.m.]

491. I had a conversation with Sir Alexander Cadogan in my office this morning, at which Lawford (UK) and Raynor and Popper (USdel) were present.

Sir Alexander said that he regarded Albania and the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) as clearly unsuited for membership at this time. He told me that his instructions were to oppose the admission of these two states. He felt that if the Russians in retaliation vetoes other candidates, it should be left to them to explain the reason for their actions in the Security Council. Cadogan said that he was not prepared to approve any attempt to make a deal with the Russians. He thought that if any horse-trading was to be done, Gromyko should start it. He had no objection to our talking with the Russians, however, and asked to be informed of the results.

I told Sir Alexander that, in previous conversations with Gromyko, the latter had agreed that political considerations were in fact involved in this matter. I argued that we were desirous that the four European neutrals—Sweden, Iceland, Portugal, and Ireland—should be admitted to the United Nations at this time, and that we would be willing to agree to the admission of Albania and the MPR in order to facilitate the admission of the neutrals. I said that if the neutrals were not admitted now, it might be more difficult to bring them in

19 Not printed.
later, especially since the Soviets might couple their admission with a demand for admission of the Baltic Soviet republics or other unacceptable conditions.

Cadogan reiterated that his present instructions did not permit him to agree to the admission of Albania and the MPR. He thought that the odds were 100 to 1 that the Soviets would not agree to our proposal. Replying to my argument that we might have to pay a higher price in the future, he said he felt he could not yield to that kind of blackmail.

It was his personal opinion that possibly the British might agree to postpone consideration of the Albanian application for one year, but that it would probably be many years before conditions in Outer Mongolia were sufficiently advanced and sufficiently clear to the outside world to permit the admission of the MPR. He said that it was obvious that the Soviets were prepared to link together the applications of Mongolia and Trans-Jordan, and appeared to feel certain that the Soviets had now closed the door to their approval of Trans-Jordan.

We then discussed the procedures to be followed by the Committee. The British feel that it will be impossible to reach decisions on the attitude of the Committee as a whole on the various applications. They would favor a report in which each applicant was considered separately, and in which the various opinions held with regard to each were set forth.

As Sir Alexander prepared to leave, I pressed him as to what his attitude would be if the Russians agreed to admit all the applicants on the basis I had suggested. He replied that in that case he would leave it to London to make the decision and that he could not honestly say that he liked the position we were taking. However, it is my impression that in the last analysis he would reluctantly agree to a settlement on the basis which I proposed to him.

JOHNSON

Memorandum of Telephone Conversations, by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss)

[WASHINGTON,] August 14, 1946.

Mr. Raynor called late yesterday afternoon to say that the Membership Committee had yesterday completed its first preliminary survey of applicant states. This now brought up the question of whether we should, as we had been planning, proceed to explain to the Russians our position that we would not be able to vote favorably for Albania and Outer Mongolia unless we were satisfied that states such as
Portugal, Ireland, Iceland and Sweden, which we consider more representative of states eligible for application than are Albania and Outer Mongolia, can also be assured of admittance. Mr. Raynor said that Mr. Herschel Johnson had made an appointment with Sir Alexander Cadogan at the latter's request for 10:30 this morning. Mr. Johnson was most anxious that he have the views of Mr. Hickerson, Mr. Henderson and myself by that time.

After talking to Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Henderson this morning I called Mr. Raynor back and said that we still felt the conversations with the Russians would be desirable; Mr. Henderson, in fact, thought they had already taken place. Consequently we felt that Mr. Johnson and Mr. Raynor should try to persuade Sir Alexander of the wisdom of this course and unless Cadogan disagreed we should go ahead. I said that Mr. Hickerson seemed to feel that if Cadogan did disagree we might reconsider the matter in the light of Cadogan's views.

Mr. Raynor thanked me for this information and said that he would let me know in any event the outcome of the talk with Cadogan.

We then discussed briefly the situation as it may develop, whether we do or do not have private discussions on the matter with the Russians. The Russians have said that they will vote for Afghanistan, that they have an open mind as to Iceland and to Sweden, and that they cannot support but reserve the right to consider again Trans-Jordan, Portugal, Ireland and Siam. We agreed that if the Russians should veto Trans-Jordan and/or Siam but not oppose the others we would probably cast our vote in favor of all applicants. However, if we knew that the Russians were going to veto any one or more of the four European neutrals, we would probably take the position that we could not vote in favor of Albania or Outer Mongolia in as much as we considered that an equally representative state or equally representative states would not be able to obtain admission at this time. Mr. Raynor pointed out, as he had last night, that in order to be able to act intelligently we really needed to know what the Russians would do about these four European states in as much as we would have to vote on Albania and Outer Mongolia before the Russians would have to vote on the four European states. This is the chief reason why Mr. Raynor and Mr. Johnson feel that it is desirable that we promptly explain our position informally to the Russians.

Later Mr. Raynor called to say that he and Mr. Johnson had completed their talk with Sir Alexander. He said that Sir Alexander

---

*20* John D. Hickerson, Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs.

*21* Loy W. Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

*22* See telegram 491, August 14, 3 p.m., from New York, *supra*.
does not believe our proposal has much chance of success and expressed his opposition to it, saying that he did not believe in bargaining over principles. However, he also said that he thought the Russians should come to him if they wanted to bargain.

Mr. Raynor commented that he understood in conversation with Mr. Lawford that Sir Alexander’s instructions would permit him to go along with us. However, Sir Alexander took the position in his talk with Mr. Johnson and Mr. Raynor that his instructions did not permit him to do so. Sir Alexander said that he had no objection to the United States going ahead with its talks with the Russians provided it was made clear that the British had not agreed to our proposal.

Mr. Raynor said he understood from the foregoing that Sir Alexander wished to vote against both Albania and Outer Mongolia and therefore would not be willing to agree at this stage to support the applications of these countries provided the Russians agreed to support the four European neutrals. However, Sir Alexander said that if the United States should succeed in reaching agreement with the Russians he would report the situation to his government, probably without recommendations.

Mr. Raynor believes that if we succeed in reaching an agreement with the Russians that the British will in fact come along and will not take action that would jeopardize the agreement. He said that Mr. Johnson had concluded his conversation by saying that he planned to go ahead and talk to the Russians anyway.

I spoke to Mr. Hickerson and told him of the foregoing and he agreed that Mr. Johnson should go forward with his proposed talks with the Russians. I notified Mr. Raynor to this effect.  

501.AA/8–1546: Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET U.S. URGENT NEW YORK, August 15, 1946—6 p.m.
[Received 6:29 p.m.]

300. I have just had a talk with Gromyko along the lines of the Department’s 155, August 6, 8 p.m.

He said that his instructions were definite in regard to Portugal, Ireland, Transjordan and Siam, that not only would Russia take a negative attitude toward these four countries in the Membership Committee but he would vote against them in the Security Council. He

---

23 Detailed summaries of the completion of the Committee’s consideration of the membership applications, and the debate attending the drafting and approval of the report to the Security Council by the Committee, are found in telegrams 485, August 14, 503, August 14 and 506, August 20, none printed (501.BC/8–1446, 501.AA/8–1446, and 501.AA/8–2046.)
said that there is no other reason than the fact that these countries do not have diplomatic relations with Russia, and that in the case of Ireland and Portugal it is clear from their attitudes in the past that they do not desire relations with Russia. The Russian stand on these countries, he said, is one of principle and that he knows of no reason to believe that this attitude may be changed. Sweden and Iceland he mentioned favorably as having diplomatic relations with Russia and as being otherwise eligible from the Russian point of view.

He then spoke warmly about the candidacy of Outer Mongolia, emphasizing particularly the fact that Outer Mongolia had contributed to the limit of her ability in the promotion of the war against Japan. His remarks conveyed the suggestion that the attitude of other countries toward Outer Mongolia might have a bearing on the Russian attitude toward Sweden, Iceland and Afghanistan whose applications on their own merits Russia would be disposed to favor. He did not mention Albania in this connection, although he referred warmly to that country’s claim to membership.

I thanked him for his statement and said I regretted his expressed attitude that opinions of other countries about Outer Mongolia should in any way affect decisions on other applications. He countered that remark by saying that Russia felt the merits of Outer Mongolia, despite the primitive state of development of that country, were as fully entitled to consideration as those of countries who had not made any direct contribution to the defeat of Germany and Japan.

Gromyko’s remarks gave no reason to doubt that the Russian decision against Ireland, Portugal, Transjordan and Siam is a fixed one. He may have wished, however, to give this impression at the present time in the hope that might influence our attitude. It is not possible from what he said to hazard a guess as to whether Russia will veto all or some of the other applicants if Outer Mongolia is not admitted.

I am communicating the substance of this talk orally to Cadogan and Velloso and I may have talks also with Hsia and Parodi if it seems later advisable.24

JOHNSON

501.AA/8-2146: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 21, 1946—8 p. m.

164. Amdel. With regard to Gromyko’s objection to Siam’s application for membership based on fact Siam and USSR do not have dip-

24 Pedro L. Velloso and Alexandre Parodi were Representatives on the Security Council for Brazil and France, respectively, and C. L. Hsia was an Alternate Representative for China.
diplomatic relations we are reliably informed that in 1941 the two governments were negotiating on establishment of such relations and that these conversations were interrupted by war. Following end of war Siam renewed negotiations and at present has asked Soviet govt to grant agrément for Siamese Minister to Moscow. A Siamese newspaper dated July 17 writes that diplomatic relations between USSR and Siam are in process of being established; that Siamese govt has selected its diplomatic representative but that agrément has not yet been given by Soviet govt.

We are informed that Siamese Chargé d'Affaires in Washington has visited Soviet Embassy and informed it of his govt's attempt to establish diplomatic relations with Soviet Union. Siamese Chargé d'Affaires states that Soviet Embassy was unaware of these developments and would inform Gromyko. It seems possible, therefore, that Russia may withdraw its opposition to Siam's application. In this event, France might feel its opposition can no longer be maintained.

ACHESON

501.AA/8-2246: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson).

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 22, 1946—3 p.m.

165. USdel. 1. In event your informal conversations on membership question do not result in securing adequate support for admission representative group of states, you should make initial statement in SC along following lines.\(^2^5\) We will send subsequently resolution \(^2^6\) in support of which this statement should be made.

From the inception of plans for the creation of the United Nations it has been clearly recognized that the organization should move toward universality of membership. In the world conflict which ended only a year ago, the several United Nations had a most vivid realiza-

\(^2^5\) The statement as delivered to the Security Council by Mr. Johnson at the morning session on August 28 followed this text closely; see SC, 1st yr., 2nd series, pp. 41 ff.

\(^2^6\) Telegram 168, August 23, 4 p.m. The draft resolution read: "The Security Council having received applications for membership submitted to the Organization by Albania, the Mongolian People's Republic, Afghanistan, Transjordan, Ireland, Portugal, Iceland, Siam and Sweden:

"Having pursuant to its rules of procedure and to its resolution of May 17, 1946 as amended, referred the above-mentioned applications to its Membership Committee for examination and report, and

"Having received and considered the Membership Committee's report, which indicates that individual consideration has been given to each application

"Recommends to the General Assembly that it admit to membership the following applicants: [Here follows list of the above nine applicants]." (501.AA/8-2346). The resolution proposed to the Security Council by the United States on August 28 (morning session) was the same as the above except for the omission of Siam and changes in nomenclature; see SC, 1st yr., 2nd series, pp. 42 and 43.
tion of the interdependence of all peoples and all parts of the world. That great coordinated effort, in which the forces of the various United Nations met the enemy throughout the world, was a lesson to all that took part in it. Now, with the memories of the fighting and the sacrifices already growing dimmer, it is necessary not to forget the fundamental lesson that the interdependence of the world demands its unity in efforts to ensure peace, that the talents and energies of all peoples must be united in an organized effort to this end. If they are not, those left out inevitably become a source of danger or at best an unused resource. If the United Nations is to be successful, no major state can be left out of it any longer than is absolutely necessary.

The conference at San Francisco created the Charter. In the first part of the first session of the Assembly, and the meetings of the other United Nations organs held in London at the time, the structure of the organization was substantially completed. We believe that one of the important constructive acts of the coming assembly meetings should be the logical next step—the expansion of membership to include all presently eligible applicants. The organization cannot afford to function any longer than is absolutely necessary without the cooperation of every qualified state. It should in its very first year seek as great universality as is possible. The General Assembly will not meet again this year after the coming session. It may not meet again for a full 12 months after that session. Unless favorable action is now taken by the Council on applications before it the organization must carry on for some time with a less representative membership than is necessary.

My Government proposes that the Council take broad and far-sighted action to extend the membership of the United Nations now, so far as is consistent with the provisions of Article 4 of the Charter. It accordingly proposes that the Council now recommend to the General Assembly the admission of all the present applicants. We do not disguise the fact that we have misgivings about some of the applicants, especially Albania and Outer Mongolia. Our doubts and questions with regard to these applicants were fully and clearly stated during the proceedings of the Membership Committee.

If there were among the present applicants an entity that was not a State in the international sense, or one that lacked the governmental powers or material means of carrying out the obligations of the Charter, we would not make this proposal. In order to accelerate the achievement of universality of membership we are prepared, on the basis we have suggested, to resolve the questions we have had as to the complete readiness of some applicants to assume the obligations of the Charter. Accordingly, the essence of our proposal is that the Council now, in a spirit of fair-mindedness toward all present applicants and
in the best interests of the organization recommend that the Assembly admit them all to membership.

2. In event foregoing proposal fails of acceptance you should find opportunity prior to actual voting on individual cases to make statement along following lines:

I must express the deep regret and grave concern of my Government over the rejection of what is, in our view, the fair and wise way to apply the Charter provisions as to membership. My Government is, however, determined to minimize the adverse results of such rejection to the fullest extent possible. It does not propose to agree to what is in its judgement an arbitrary use of power to bring about the rejection of clearly qualified applicants and the admission of doubtful applicants. That in my opinion would be contrary to the best interests of the United Nations.

The Membership Committee of the Security Council is established pursuant to the Rules of Procedure to provide a means for the examination of applications and report thereon to the Council. It was clearly contemplated that problems seen by the Members in connection with any application should be brought forward in the Committee, so that an opportunity would exist for clarifying the issues and, if possible, removing doubts in advance of the formal proceedings in the Council.

The record of the proceedings of the Membership Committee leaves no room for doubt that the problems connected with the applications of Albania and Outer Mongolia were raised by my Government and others at the proper place and time—that is, during consideration of the applications by the Committee. The difficulties raised pertained directly to the qualifications of the two applicants as measured by the Charter. Since then, little has been brought forward by either of the two applicants or by the Permanent Member that so strongly sponsored their applications, to remove the grounds for our misgivings.

When the applications of Eire and Portugal were considered, no substantial questions concerning their qualifications under the Charter were raised by any Member. The Delegate of the Soviet Union merely stated that the Soviet Union could not support their admission. This attitude has been maintained although it has not been attended by any explanation, in terms of the Charter, of why the two States concerned are thought not to be qualified.

The United States firmly believes that in the admission of new members there should be no compromise with principles. The decision upon any application should be made according to the objective standards of Article 4 of the Charter. These requirements are that the

---

27 The statement made to the Security Council by Mr. Johnson on the afternoon of August 28 was identical with this draft; see SC, 1st yr., 2nd series, pp. 54 and 55.
applicant be a State in the international sense, that it be peace-loving and that it be, in the judgement of the organization, able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter. Whether or not a State qualifies for admission to membership depends upon its possession of those qualifications. It does not depend upon other considerations. It does not depend for example upon the existence of diplomatic relations with any particular Member. It is true that one of the most reliable evidences of statehood is the acceptance of the entity as a State by other States generally, its reception into the international community of States. But this is far from saying that the Charter justifies a Member in making its vote on an application depend on its own direct relations with the applicant's Government.

It would be a manifest injustice and contrary to the best interests of the United Nations if Portugal and Eire, whose qualifications for membership have not been seriously challenged, should be rejected while two applicants concerning which such material doubts have been raised by a number of Members, should be recommended for admission. The result would be to make the membership of the United Nations unrepresentative of the qualified states of the world. The world will not understand why, in its first consideration of new members, the organization had chosen to admit the doubtful and reject the qualified. Such a precedent would be most unfortunate.

My Government must therefore propose that, in the circumstances, the Council not recommend at this time the admission of Albania and Outer Mongolia. We should dislike to cast an adverse vote. However, if other members insist upon bringing these two applications to a vote, we shall have to vote adversely on both applications.

I therefore move that the Council not take action at this time on the applications of Albania and Outer Mongolia. 28

Acheson

501.AA/8-2346: Telegram
The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Johnson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT New York, August 23, 1946—7 p.m.
[Received 7:20 p.m.]

515. Reference my telephone conversations this afternoon with Alger Hiss and Hayden Raynor.
At the meeting today on initiative of Secretary General Lie, Parodi,

28 Repeated to the Secretary of State at Paris as telegram 4286, Secdel 726.
Hsia, Gromyko, Cadogan, Lange,\(^{29}\) Sobolev\(^{30}\) and I were present. Informal discussion of membership problem was initiated by Secretary General Lie, who made earnest plea for admission of all 9 candidates. He also implored the members having the right of veto not to exercise this right in the case of applications for membership in the UN. He told the group that he thought use of the veto for this purpose would be damaging to the prestige of the UN and would further lower the esteem of the Security Council in the eyes of the world. Public opinion, he thought, already inclined to the view that the veto had been too frequently employed. He said that he knew that the representatives of the US, Mexico and Brazil favored the admission of all the applicants, and that he believed certain other members of the Council would also. He was also aware of strong objections which had been raised by other states represented on the Council.

I then spoke myself, confirming Lie’s statement that the US favored admission of all the applicants, and gave at length our reasons for this view. I told my colleagues that my Government desired me to make our position in this matter clear at the next meeting of the Council, when the report of the Committee on Membership would be considered and that a statement of our views had been prepared which I would then place on the record. I told them that I had copies of this statement with me and would distribute them to all the members present. I expressed the hope that all of them would be able to give the US their support in the Council on this important question. I concluded by saying that I must necessarily reserve the position that my Government would take on applications of individual states in the event that all members of the Council did not give their support to our proposal for admission of all 9 applicants.

Parodi then asked me if I would have to reserve my position in the event that France should be unable to cast an affirmative vote for Siam. He indicated that he wished to vote affirmatively for Siam, but that, pending the outcome of the talks now taking place in Washington between representatives of France and Siam, he would have to oppose the Siamese application under present instructions. I asked him if it would not be possible for him to abstain from voting if it became necessary to vote before the Washington talks had reached a favorable conclusion. He said that he was sorry, but that under his present instructions he would have to oppose the Siamese application.

The general opinion of the group was that the effect of abstention by a member of the Council is not determined. If one of the powers

\(^{29}\) Oscar Lange, Polish Representative on the Security Council.

\(^{30}\) A. A. Sobolev, United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Security Council Affairs.
possessing the veto should abstain, the controversial question might therefore arise as to whether it was not a veto by implication.31

Cadogan said he was sorry he could not say now what his attitude toward our proposal would be, that he could not give it his support under present instructions, but that he would telegraph London immediately.

Gromyko said that he would state his views on our proposal at the next meeting of the Council.

Cadogan informed me privately afterwards that he regretted that he could not give my proposal his full support, but that his present instructions made it impossible. He also indicated that he did not personally agree. I know that Cadogan feels strongly on the subject of Albania and Outer Mongolia, and believes that those countries should not be admitted at the present time. His views probably reflect those of the British Foreign Office. He said that he would not make any recommendation on our proposals and that if Gromyko should speak at the Council first, indicating that he accepted our proposition, the British then might be able to support it, but that he would not speak before Gromyko. I gathered from this remark that Cadogan feels that if all other members of the Council, including the Russians, accept our proposal, the British Foreign Office may allow him to go along.

Lie informed me privately that Gromyko told him yesterday that he would vote against Portugal and Ireland. Since the meeting this afternoon, I have spoken individually with all the other members of the Council who were not present, and have sent them copies for their confidential information of the statement of our position that I shall make at the next meeting of the Council. The Brazilian, Mexican and Egyptian delegates have assured me of their full support. Van Kleffens32 has not yet committed himself, but talked favorably and said that the thing which troubled him most was the Albanian disregard for treaty obligations. I told him that that point troubled us also, but that for the sake of the broader interest involved in securing admission of all 9 applicants, we would be willing to pass over our very real objections to Albania. I made clear to each of those who were not present at the meeting in Lie’s quarters that, if our proposals were not supported by all members of the Council, the US would be compelled to reserve its position on individual states.

JOHNSON

31 For documentation on this problem as part of the larger question of voting procedures of the Security Council under Article 27 of the Charter, see pp. 251 ff.
SECRET URGENT

New York, August 26, 1946—1:30 p.m.  
[Received 1:48 p.m.]

517. Reference my 515, August 23, 6:50 p.m. Cadogan came to see me this morning to discuss the membership problem. Although he did not say so specifically, I gathered he has received instructions from the Foreign Office. He said he did not wish to use the veto on our over-all proposition for admission of the 9 applicants but that after I had spoken he would have to make a statement himself expressing the British doubts about Albania and Mongolia. I told him that in the event the French are unable to support Siam, we will consider the possibility of then proposing the admission of 8 members but that final decisions on this point had not been reached. He thought the idea a good one and said that he would have no difficulty in supporting it as a second proposition upon failure of the first. I told him that if we fail on both and voting goes by individual countries that we would have to vote against Albania and Mongolia. His instructions are the same.

Hasluck's 33 attitude is uncertain. I talked with him Saturday and he said that he had telegraphed the text of our proposed statement to Evatt 34 with a request for instructions. The Australian attitude is difficult to understand. His reservations on the report of the Membership Committee do not make sense and seem to me contrary to clear stipulations of the Charter. The general Australian attitude seems to be that the voting should be by separate states but I have pressed Hasluck our view that it is desirable to avoid discussion of the merits of each individual case in the Council if we can do so.

I would appreciate the Department's views as soon as possible regarding the proposal that we suggest voting on 8 states if the French have to oppose Siam. I will try to see Parodi before the meeting of the Council on Wednesday. If he still has rigid instructions to oppose Siam and would therefore have to vote against our proposal for admitting all 9 applicants, we might consider whether our initial proposal should not be for 8 applicants, provided Parodi will previously request a postponement of Siam.

JOHNSON

33 Paul Hasluck, Australian Representative on the Security Council.
34 Herbert V. Evatt, Australian Minister for External Affairs.
The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT NEW YORK, August 26, 1946—6:15 p.m.
[Received August 26—5:30 p.m.]

520. Reference my 517, August 26, 2:30 p.m. Lie told me today that both Gromyko and Sobolev had been much impressed by the extent and character of our proposals regarding membership as outlined orally and in our draft statement at the meeting reported in my 515, August 23.

Lie indicated his belief that Sobolev who is now in Paris will endeavor to persuade the Soviet Foreign Minister not to oppose our proposal for admission of all 9 members. Gromyko has told Lie that he has definite instructions to veto the applications of Portugal, Ireland and Trans-Jordan. Lie now believes that both Gromyko and Sobolev will use their influence for whatever it may be worth to secure modification of the instructions. Lie stated that he has talked personally with each member of the Security Council and urged that our proposal be accepted.

JOHNSON

The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, August 26, 1946—6 p.m.

171. Amdel. The following for your guidance in event Greece or Yugoslavia asks to participate in SC discussion Albanian membership application:

As a general rule US favors full participation in SC deliberations of all states whose interests are specially affected by question under discussion. In matter of SC consideration membership applications, however, US believes that in general this question is not one in which interests of any one or several members are specially affected; rather it is of interest to all members that applicants meet qualifications set forth Article 4 of Charter. It is for SC and GA to judge each applicant on basis information available.

In present case all Members UN not members of SC were given opportunity on basis Australian resolution adopted by Membership
Committee Aug 1 \textsuperscript{35} to present to that Committee factual information on applicants. Furthermore, we assume any further written communications could be brought to attention SC.

Final decision as to membership rests with GA, thus providing forum for full oral presentation views by all members.

We believe Greek request to participate SC discussion more valid than Yugoslav because of Greek assertion it is still in state of war with Albania but do not wish to support participation of either. US, however, does not feel this question of sufficient importance to take a position in matter. Accordingly, you should go along with general sentiment of Council.\textsuperscript{36}

ACHESON

---

740.00119 Council/8–2246: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

SECRET U.S. URGENT WASHINGTON, August 26, 1946—6 p.m.

4381. Secdel 751. I asked Bonnet \textsuperscript{37} today if his Govt could not be persuaded abstain from voting on our intended proposal for the admission of all 9 applicants to UN rather than veto it because one of the applicants was Siam. ReDeptel 4353.\textsuperscript{38} He replied he was almost certain it could not. Because time is so short, I then suggested that the Fr Rep to S.C. propose an amendment to our proposal excluding Siam and reducing number of applicants to 8. He would then propose that consideration of Siamese application should be postponed for 30 days, at which time France as result conversations now going on in Wash with Siamese for settlement outstanding problems and termination technical state of war, hoped to be in position no longer oppose Siamese application. Bonnet is cabling suggestion Paris with request Parodi be instructed prior Council meeting Wed morning.

Sent Paris as 4381 rptd London as 6262 and New York as 170.

ACHESON

\textsuperscript{35} See SC, 1st yr., 2nd series, Suppl. No. 4, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{36} Repeated to the Secretary of State at Paris as telegram 4382.
\textsuperscript{37} Henri Bonnet, French Ambassador to the United States.
\textsuperscript{38} August 24 (Secdel 740), not printed. This telegram to the Secretary of State, addressed to the attention of the Counselor of the Department (Cohen) and the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews) who were at Paris with the Secretary, described briefly talks with the French Representative on the Security Council (Parodi) at New York, and instructed: “Since French veto would complicate already difficult negotiations would appreciate if one of you could raise same point with Baudet, Chief Far Eastern Section [French] FonOff. Since French seem sympathetic our proposal for broad UN membership some possibility of new instructions on Siamese application may exist.” (740.00119 Council/8–2246)
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of
Southeast Asian Affairs (Moffat)

[WASHINGTON,] August 27, 1946.

Mr. Bhakdi \(^{39}\) called by appointment at his request and informed us that the Siamese delegation had decided to submit a letter to Mr. Lie on Wednesday morning requesting postponement of consideration of the Siamese membership application. I inquired the reason for their proposal and what they proposed to say, pointing out that it seemed difficult to avoid either placing themselves in an embarrassing and perhaps ridiculous position (as such action might be construed as an admission that they were not peace-loving) or else as an attack upon the French (which would make their negotiations with the French very difficult if not impossible). Mr. Bhakdi stated it was proposed to state merely that there were conversations in progress between the French and the Siamese in an effort to settle their differences and they were requesting postponement of consideration of their application pending such settlement. He stated further that he thought such move would be of assistance to us because they knew we were anxious to minimize vetoes and to them because this course of action had been decided prior to the delegation leaving Bangkok. He explained that Siam was determined to avoid a French veto because the reaction in Siam to a veto would be so serious that border incidents and anti-French feeling would inevitably increase. The French would use such incidents to attack the good faith of the Siamese Government and by pointing to such incidents injure the Siamese position.

I explained that Prince Svasti had mentioned at lunch time that Bhakdi would be in to inquire our views regarding such a Siamese move and two or three of us personally had been giving thought to various moves which might be made; that these were purely personal thoughts and not Department views. I explained confidentially the proposed American resolution in which our interest favoring universality was so great that I thought we would be willing to have Siam temporarily excluded from the resolution if by such action individual voting on other countries could be avoided. I explained that there seemed to us to be three procedures by which this could be accomplished: that it was possible the French might move to postpone consideration of Siam, we might make such a motion, or the Siamese might request such postponement. I reiterated that this proposal had nothing to do with Siam \textit{qua} Siam. I then pointed out that if our resolution was in any event defeated and there were individual votes taken on each country, doubtless there would be numerous vetoes.

\(^{39}\) Chargé d'Affaires, Siamese Legation.
It seemed to us in that event that possibly our good offices, if both the Siamese and French approved, might be used to urge a postponement of consideration of the Siamese application in order not to jeopardize the negotiations. He stated that if that situation should arise the Siamese for their part would appreciate such exercise of good offices by the United States.

I inquired whether in any motions for postponement the Siamese would prefer a fixed date not later than the termination of the General Assembly meeting or an indefinite date which, if the conversations were not concluded before the end of the General Assembly meeting, would result in a postponement of action on their application for a year. Mr. Bhakdi stated that the Siamese would prefer an indefinite postponement and then explained that the French appeared to consider that their potential veto or support of the Siamese membership application was a trump card in their negotiations. This, he said, was not so. Siamese membership in UN is not so important to Siam as to warrant their giving way to the French as the price of such admission.

I inquired at least twice of Mr. Bhakdi whether the Siamese decision to withdraw its complaint had definitely been decided upon and he replied in the affirmative. I stated that we would consider further the various possibilities which we had discussed and that I would telephone him that evening any views which the Department might have on the various possibilities which I had outlined. I suggested that Mr. Konthi, Mr. Raynor in New York before he presented the Siamese letter to ascertain any very late developments.

After conferring with Mr. Hiss and Mr. Wallner, I telephoned Mr. Bhakdi in the evening that it was the view of the Department that the decision as to whether Siam would request a postponement of consideration of its membership application was one which the Siamese, after consideration of the advantages and disadvantages to themselves, must make solely from their own point of view. I said the Department would appreciate knowing definitely what action the Siamese decided upon so that it might decide what action if any it wished to take. I also said that the Department thought that if the Siamese decided to request postponement the French should be so informed and that if the Siamese did not wish to tell them directly we would be willing, if authorized by them, to have Mr. Raynor inform M. Parodi.

40 Mr. Konthi Suphamongkhon was in charge of the special Siamese delegation that was negotiating with the French regarding the border disputes.
41 Woodruff Wallner, Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs.
Later that evening in the course of conversation Mr. Bhakdi informed me that the Siamese delegation had decided to present the note to Mr. Lie requesting postponement of the membership application. The note would be along the lines he had indicated in the afternoon. Mr. Bhakdi also stated that the Siamese would be glad to have Mr. Raynor inform M. Parodi of their decision.


501.AA/3-2746: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1946—6 p. m.

172. USdel. You may after proposing resolution favoring admission 9 applicants accept amendment to postpone Siamese application as indicated in Deptel 170, Aug 26. In that case you should make statement along following lines:

The US believes Siam is qualified for membership in the UN now. We recognize however the special character of Siam’s case in that (a) question of its continued possession of territories gained through Japanese aggression is material to its qualifications for membership, and (b) this question is now subject of special negotiations at Washington between the two Governments concerned. We believe these negotiations should and can succeed in the immediate future. While we reluctantly therefore will accept postponement of action on the Siamese application at this time, we look forward to action being taken upon it by the SC in time for consideration of the application by the GA at the forthcoming session.

ACHESON

[For the basic United States position at the Security Council meetings on August 28 regarding the report of the Committee on the Admission of New Members, see telegram 165, August 22, 3 p. m., to New York, page 429. A United States declaration in favor of universality of membership was accompanied by a warning from the Acting United States Representative (Johnson) that the United

42 Telegram 4381, Secdel 751, August 26, 6 p. m., to Paris, p. 437.
43 This statement was not made by Mr. Johnson. Mr. Konthi Suphamongkhun, special Siamese representative in Washington, sent a letter on August 28 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations requesting that “consideration of Siam’s application by the Security Council be adjourned until a settlement of the dispute in question [with France] has been effected.” This letter was read to the Council by the President of the Council on August 28 just prior to the submission of the United States proposal by Mr. Johnson. For text of the Siamese letter and the Council President’s remarks, see SC, 1st yr., 2nd series, p. 41.
States Government reserved its position should its proposal not be accepted (SC, 1st yr., 2nd series, p. 52). See ibid., pages 52 and 53, regarding the withdrawal of the United States proposal. For the proceedings of the Security Council on this question on August 28, see ibid., pages 40 ff.

In the voting upon individual applications that followed on August 29 the applications of Afghanistan, Iceland, and Sweden were favorably acted upon by the Security Council. Concerning the remaining applications, the United States voted in favor of Eire, Portugal, and Trans-Jordan and against Albania and the Mongolian People’s Republic. For the proceedings of the Security Council on August 29, see ibid., pages 51 ff.

The Security Council’s recommendation for the admission of Afghanistan, Iceland, and Sweden was subsequently transmitted to the General Assembly in a special report (United Nations document S/177).

---

IO Files: SD/A/C.1/26

Department of State Position Paper

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 4, 1946.

POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES CONCERNING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

THE PROBLEM

Of the nine applications for membership thus far presented to the Organization, three have been acted upon favorably by the Security Council and transmitted with its recommendation to the Assembly for final action. These three applicant States are Afghanistan, Iceland and Sweden. One applicant (Siam) requested postponement of consideration of its application, two applications (Albania and the People’s Republic of Outer Mongolia) did not receive seven affirmative votes in the Council, and three applications (Eire, Portugal and Transjordan) were vetoed by the Soviet Union.

The General Assembly, which has the final decision on the admission of new members will in any case have its first occasion not only to act on applications but also to develop general policies and express its

---

*Prepared for the use of the United States Delegation to the Second Part of the First Session of the General Assembly; for documentation regarding the composition and organization of the Delegation, and arrangements effected in preparation for the General Assembly session, see pp. 40 ff. There had been a second postponement of the date for the meeting of the General Assembly, from September 23 to October 23.*
views on the subject of membership as a whole. General dissatisfaction over the results of the action of the Security Council on membership applications may be reflected in proposals in the Assembly.

Under present procedure, each membership application is referred by the Secretary-General to the Security Council for consideration. The Council, if it approves the application, makes a favorable recommendation to the General Assembly, which decides finally whether or not to admit the applicant to membership. The Australian Government may propose a change of procedure whereby membership applications will be submitted first to the Assembly, referred by it to the Council for a recommendation, and acted upon finally by the Assembly upon receipt of the Council's recommendation. It is not clear whether or not this proposal is designed to provide a means of eliminating the possibility of a veto of membership applications in the Security Council.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. We should support and vote favorably on the applications of Afghanistan, Iceland and Sweden.

2. We favor thorough study and debate, looking toward the adoption of suitable resolutions by the General Assembly on the membership problem as a whole, including the criteria for admission, and the policies and procedures of the Organization with respect to membership.

3. We see no particular value in Assembly consideration at this time of the applications rejected by the Security Council—those of Albania, the Mongolian People's Republic, Transjordan, Eire and Portugal. We should express this point of view but should also state that we do not oppose such consideration.

4. In case the Assembly should vote to consider any of the above mentioned applications, any U.S. statements on those applications would be made in the light of the circumstances then existing and of our previous proposals in the Council.

5. Any proposals involving questions concerning constitutional aspects of the Soviet veto of certain applications on grounds not found in the Charter should be considered primarily in connection with the other proposals on the general problem of the veto. However, our objections to the wisdom of these Soviet vetoes may be expressed wherever pertinent during consideration of membership questions.

6. We should favor full discussion of, but should not support, an Australian proposal, if presented, for adoption of a fixed procedure

---

46 See documentation concerning the question of the voting procedure of the Security Council under Article 27 of the Charter, pp. 251 ff.
whereby all membership applications should be considered first by the Assembly, referred by it to the Security Council for a recommendation, and acted upon finally by the Assembly after receipt of the recommendation.\footnote{The substance of this paper was adopted to constitute virtually the whole of a position paper drafted by the United States Delegation to the General Assembly and entitled "Admission of New Members to the United Nations", October 28, not printed (IO Files, document US/A/C.1/8). For certain changes made, to bring the document up to date, and to reflect the thinking of the Delegation as expressed in a Delegation meeting on October 29, see minutes of the October 29 meeting, infra.}

**DISCUSSION**

1. **Position Taken by U.S. Toward Membership Problem Thus Far.**

   (a) **General**

   Article 4 of the Charter provides:

   "1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.

   "2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council."

   This Government has strongly espoused the principle that the United Nations must, in order to be fully effective, attain as broad and representative a membership as possible in the shortest possible time. It has taken a series of steps to further this end.

   It proposed a resolution, which was adopted by the Security Council on May 17, 1946 providing in substance that all applications received up to July 15 (a date subsequently postponed three weeks) be considered together by a Committee of the Security Council and that the Council itself act upon all these applications in time to make recommendations thereon to the General Assembly at this session. In appropriate cases, the Department informed non-member governments of its willingness to support applications for membership submitted by them.

   In the proceedings of the Membership Committee of the Security Council it expressed its support for Afghanistan, Ireland, Portugal, Iceland, Siam and Sweden. It reserved its position with respect to Transjordan and, while declaring that it had an open mind toward the applications of Albania and the Mongolian People’s Republic, expressed doubts concerning the qualifications of those two applicants for membership.

   In the meeting of the Security Council on August 27[28], the U.S. Representative made a strong declaration in favor of universality of
membership and proposed a resolution providing for a favorable recommendation upon all applicants but Siam, which had requested that consideration of its application be postponed. In proposing this resolution, the American representative stated that while this Government continued to have misgivings concerning the qualifications of Albania and Outer Mongolia it was prepared, in the interest of helping the Organization to make as rapid strides as possible toward universality of membership, and applying the terms of the Charter in a broad and fairminded way, to resolve its questions with regard to some applicants in case the other members of the Council would join in the proposed action. It was made clear that in case our proposals should not be accepted the position of the U.S. toward each application was reserved. The resolution was opposed by the Soviet Union and Australia, and in the voting upon individual applications which ensued, only the applications of Afghanistan, Iceland, and Sweden were unopposed. Albania received five votes and the Mongolian People's Republic six, these applications being thus rejected by lack of the necessary seven votes. The Soviet Union vetoed the applications of Transjordan, Eire, and Portugal on the expressed ground that it had no diplomatic relations with these applicants. This ground is, of course, not found in Article 4 of the Charter and is hence objectionable as a matter of policy if not contrary to the Charter.

Poland joined the Soviet Union in voting against Transjordan and Portugal. Australia abstained from all votes on individual applications.

As a result of these votes, the Security Council made the following recommendation to the General Assembly:

The Security Council, having received and considered the report submitted by the Committee on the Admission of New Members regarding applications for membership in the United Nations presented by Albania, Mongolian People's Republic, Afghanistan, Transjordan, Ireland, Portugal, Iceland, Siam and Sweden.

Having considered in the course of its debate each one of the above mentioned applications, and having taken due notice of the statements of opinion of the members of the Security Council in regard to those applications, recommends to the General Assembly that it admit to membership in the United Nations the following applicants:

Afghanistan
Iceland
Sweden

A special report on the admission of new members is being made to the Assembly by the Security Council. The first part of this report
contains the recommendations; the second summarizes the Council's proceedings on the subject.

(b) U.S. Position Toward Individual Applications Recommended by the Security Council.

Afghanistan

In response to an inquiry by the Afghan Government the Department stated in May that in its opinion Afghanistan fulfilled the qualifications for membership and that this Government intended to lend its wholehearted support to Afghanistan's application. Similar inquiries of the British, French, Indian, Chinese and Soviet governments elicited favorable responses except that the Soviet Union stated that Afghanistan's application could be considered only in connection with those of Albania and Outer Mongolia. The Afghan Government applied by telegram dated July 2, 1946, declaring that it was prepared to accept the obligations contained in the Charter.

It is our view that Afghanistan is fully qualified for membership. Its status as a state is unchallenged, it conducts its own foreign affairs, maintains normal diplomatic relations with about a dozen states, and has succeeded in maintaining its independence. It observed a scrupulous neutrality during the war. It is believed that membership in the United Nations would serve to minimize the possibility of difficulty with Afghanistan's neighbors and of threats to Afghanistan's independence.

During the proceedings of the Security Council's Membership Committee and of the Security Council itself no objection to Afghanistan's admission was expressed by any Government. The U.S. stated its support for Afghanistan's application.

Iceland

Iceland's contribution to the success of the United Nations in the struggle for the North Atlantic sea lanes gave it from the start a close relationship to the United Nations. This relationship was recognized in the invitations extended to Iceland, as a nation associated with the United Nations, to participate in such conferences as those pertaining to the Food and Agricultural Organization, UNRRA, and Bretton Woods. Upon the inquiry of the Icelandic Government in September 1945 this Government stated that it would warmly support Iceland's admission. In July 1946 this Government informed the Icelandic Government that any application for membership should be submitted very shortly in order to secure membership this year, and inquired concerning Iceland's intentions in this respect. The Icelandic Government convoked the Parliament which on July 29 adopted a resolution authorizing an application for membership. This application was filed with the Secretary-General on August 2.
In the consideration of the resolution by the Parliament, the question of major interest concerned the scope and nature of the obligations under Article 48 of the Charter, to grant bases or other assistance to the forces of the United Nations. Considerable opposition was expressed to the grant of bases. Although Iceland's application was made without reservations or conditions, intimations were given to several governments, including that of the United States, of opposition to the grant of the use of Icelandic territory for military purposes.

This Government has consistently taken the position that Iceland, as an independent and peace-loving state, is fully qualified for membership and that it is able to make a useful contribution to the United Nations.

The United States supported Iceland's application strongly in the Security Council.

Questions.

Little doubt could exist concerning Sweden's qualifications for admission to membership. In July, the United States and British Governments indicated their willingness to support Sweden's application. The Swedish Government then inquired concerning the attitudes of the other permanent members of the Council and received indications of support although the Soviet Union indicated that its attitude toward Sweden would depend upon the attitudes of other Governments toward Soviet candidates for admission. The Swedish Government made application on August 9. No question was raised in the Membership Committee or in the Council concerning its qualifications.

This Government is convinced that as a member of the United Nations Sweden will be able to make an outstanding contribution.

2. Support for Declaration of Policies by Assembly on Membership Questions.

This Government is of opinion that since the General Assembly has the final decision on the admission of new members, it should play as influential a role as possible in determining the criteria for admission and the general policies of the Organization toward the matter. Consideration of the subject at the first part of the first session, at London, was discouraged in order to concentrate on the task of setting up the Organization. The Assembly has, accordingly, not yet dealt with membership questions. It is believed that we should encourage and support any reasonable moves to have the General Assembly give study to the subject of membership and, to the fullest possible extent, elaborate its views and policies with respect to the criteria for admission, to the basic policies of the Organization toward new members, and to the procedures of the Organization for giving effect to these policies.
Such moves may be given impetus by general dissatisfaction with the action of the Security Council on the nine membership applications received thus far. In particular, the action of the Soviet delegate in vetoing the applications of Eire, Portugal and Transjordan in the Security Council on the non-Charter ground that it had no diplomatic relations with those countries was sharply criticized by the Representatives of Australia and other Governments and it is not unlikely that an issue will be made of this matter in the Assembly. The Australian delegate stated in the Council on August 29 that

"our Delegation feels sure that if it should be necessary for this Council to report to the General Assembly that Membership in the United Nations has been denied to an applicant State for some reason which lies entirely outside the Charter of the United Nations, then that is a matter to which the General Assembly must give the very closest and the most careful consideration."

No concrete proposals designed to remedy the effect of the proceedings in the Security Council have yet been made. However, it would not be surprising if the Assembly were asked to consider and declare its views on the rejected applications with a view toward adoption of a resolution requesting reconsideration of certain applications by the Council. Again, it might be proposed that the Assembly state its views as to the criteria which under the Charter should be applied in the consideration of membership applications. In general, it seems likely that the tendency of the Assembly will be to support the basic objectives for which this Government has contended in the Security Council, namely, the admission of all qualified States and the exclusion of entities that clearly are not qualified. However, since further progress toward our objective of securing the admission of all qualified States depends upon the attitude of the powers on the Council, we have no specific proposals to make in the Assembly. We wish to leave the initiative in the Assembly to other Governments, but to lend general support to a vigorous exercise by the Assembly of its functions in relating to the membership question. We should naturally favor such elaboration of the criteria for membership as may make more difficult the admission of applicants that lack the qualities of statehood.

3. Assembly Consideration of Applications Rejected by the Security Council.

It might be proposed that the Assembly consider the applications rejected by the Security Council—those of Albania, Mongolian People’s Republic, Transjordan, Eire and Portugal—with a view toward an Assembly request that the Security Council reconsider its action in any of these cases. In principle, there would appear to be no objection to this, assuming that such consideration would be agreeable to
the applicant States. The status of the applications and the desires of the applicants since the action of the Security Council are not clear. However, it would seem doubtful whether any such request from the Assembly would be heeded by the Council unless any current Soviet candidates were mentioned favorably in the request. Thus if, for example, the Assembly should after considering the applications adopt a resolution stating that Eire, Portugal, and Transjordan appeared to have the qualifications for membership but that Albania and the Mongolian People’s Republic were doubtful and requesting Council action in accordance with these views, the Soviet Union could hardly be expected to agree. It would be preferable for the Assembly not to embark on any such action unless there were reasonable prospect of securing a vote in the Security Council in accordance with its objective.


The decision as to the position which this Government might make with regard to individual applications in the event that the Assembly should vote to consider them, would need to be postponed until all the circumstances became clearer.

In the Security Council, the U.S. proposed the admission of all applicants in order to secure approval of the maximum number of qualified members. In so doing, it stated clearly that it had certain doubts about the qualifications of Albania and the Mongolian People’s Republic and that, in case the broad proposal were rejected, it reserved its position with regard to individual applications. When the proposal was rejected by the Soviet Union, the U.S. representative voted in favor of Eire, Portugal and Transjordan and voted against Albania and the Mongolian People’s Republic.

Proposals looking toward universality of membership may be presented and strongly supported in the Assembly. If they are, this Government can refer to its Council proposal and state its support for the general principle. However, there would appear to be no reason why any doubts expressed by the United States in the Council concerning the qualifications of any applicant should not be repeated if still deemed valid at the time.

The Membership Book contains detailed background and policy data on each of the States that applied.17

5. Soviet Veto of Membership Applications.

Remarks of the Australian and Netherlands representatives in the Council concerning the Soviet veto of membership applications suggest that proposals relating specifically to this use of the veto might

17 This section constitutes Part II of the Membership Book, found in the IO Files.
be made. Thus, the Netherlands representative mentioned the possibility of a request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the subject. However, two proposed resolutions concerning the veto are already on the provisional agenda and their consideration should involve study of the veto problem as a whole by Committee I. It is believed that any proposals raising constitutional questions concerning the veto could be considered most usefully as part of this broader study. This does not mean that we should not express, in connection with discussions of the membership question, our general opposition to the Soviet veto. However, it would not be desirable, in present membership discussions, to take a definite position on the legal aspects of these vetoes.


The Australian Government has on various occasions expressed its adherence to a novel interpretation of Article 4 of the Charter. According to this interpretation, membership applications should appropriately be submitted first to the General Assembly for a decision as to whether or not they should be “entertained”, thereupon referred to the Security Council for its recommendation and then returned to the Assembly for final action. The Australian Government made a reservation in the Membership Committee of the Security Council and in the Security Council itself that the fact that an application for membership had or had not been considered by the Committee (and presumably by the Council) should not exclude such application from consideration by the General Assembly. It abstained from all votes on the individual applications in the Council. It has given other indications that it will present these views, possibly in the form of a concrete proposal, to the coming Assembly. It is not yet clear where, if at all, the Australian proposal will be presented. It has not been placed on the agenda. Since it relates to procedure, it may possibly be offered to the subcommittee of Committee VI appointed to consider revisions of the Assembly’s provisional rules of procedure. In any case it seems likely to be discussed generally in connection with membership questions.

Since the proposal has not been submitted in concrete form, the following discussion is necessarily general and tentative in character. It has not been made clear how this procedure is thought to strengthen the role of the Assembly in the membership question. The procedure might, however, conceivably be proposed as a method of circumventing the veto on membership applications. Such use would depend on the theory that the Council’s “recommendation” might be either favorable or adverse and that the Assembly could accept or reject either type of “recommendation”. Thus, the Assembly might consider appli-
cations in the first instance, expressly request recommendations (either favorable or adverse) from the Security Council on each application, and finally accept or reject such recommendations if and when received, voting to admit such applicants as it might consider qualified.

However, the records of the preparatory work which led to the adoption of Article 4 of the Charter indicate clearly that it was the design of the framers of the provision that the Assembly should not be able to admit an applicant State to membership without favorable action by the Security Council. Moreover, when the Australian representative in the Security Council presented the Australian plan as an argument for postponement of adoption of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure on membership, the Chinese, Mexican, United Kingdom and Soviet representatives clearly stated their understanding that the Assembly can admit an applicant to membership only if favorable action on the application by the Council also takes place. In addition it should be noted that the Security Council could, simply by refusing to make a negative recommendation on an application of which it did not approve, remove every possibility of final Assembly action on the application. It does not appear, therefore, that the adoption of the procedure outlined by Australia would provide a means of eliminating the veto of membership applications.

The proposal may, however, be designed not to remove the veto from the membership question but simply to vest more control over the matter in the Assembly by providing that the Assembly take both the initial and the final steps in handling an application. This might be thought to afford some insurance against “horse trades” in the Security Council the results of which the Assembly could only accept or reject. It may be thought, further, that such a procedure would facilitate consideration of applications on their merits. While, however, there is nothing to restrain the Assembly from considering membership applications at any stage, a fixed procedure requiring double consideration of each application by the Assembly would be cumbersome and time-consuming, and there would be no assurance that it would bring substantial improvement.

The Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Assembly and of the Council, adopted by the respective bodies, both clearly reflect the intention that the Assembly will ordinarily act to admit an applicant only after a recommendation has been received from the Security Council. When the Council’s draft rules of procedure drawn up by the Committee of Experts were considered by the Council, the Australian representative proposed postponement of their adoption on the ground that applications should be considered first by the Assembly.
His proposal was rejected 10–1, after various representatives had stated their preference for the draft rules.48

It would appear that adequate grounds for U.S. support for the Australian proposal have not been shown.

Minutes of the Twelfth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, New York, Hotel Pennsylvania, October 29, 1946, 9 a.m.

SECRET

[Here follows list of names of persons (25) present, and discussion of other subjects.]

Admission of New Members to the United Nations

Mr. Sanders 49 reminded the Delegation that the first two recommendations in the position paper on the Admission of New Members to the United Nations (US/A/C.1/8)60 had been approved on October 22. It was desirable to have the Delegation’s approval of the remaining recommendations in order that position could be clear when the matter came up for discussion early in the meeting. Mr. Sanders then read the remaining recommendations on recommendations as follows: (US/A/C.1/8, pp. 1–2).

"3. We see no particular value in Assembly consideration at this time of the applications rejected by the Security Council—those of Albania, the Mongolian People’s Republic, Transjordan, Eire and Portugal. We should express this point of view but should also state that we do not oppose such consideration. (None of these countries could in any case be admitted without prior approval by the Security Council)."

"4. In case the Assembly should vote to consider any of the applications mentioned in (3) above, any U.S. statements on those applications would be made in the light of the circumstances then existing and of our previous proposals in the Council.

"5. Any proposals involving questions concerning constitutional aspects of the Soviet veto of certain applications on grounds not found in the Charter should be considered primarily in connection with the other proposals on the general problem of the veto. However, our objections to the wisdom of these Soviet vetoes may be expressed wherever pertinent during consideration of membership questions.

"6. We should favor full discussion of, but should not support, an

48 See bracketed note, p. 386.
49 William Sanders, Associate Chief of the Division of International Organization Affairs, and at this time serving as an officer-advicer on the staff of the United States Delegation as a specialist in First Committee affairs.
50 See footnote 46, p. 343.
Australian proposal, if presented, for adoption of a fixed procedure whereby all membership applications should be considered first by the Assembly, referred by it to the Security Council for a recommendation, and acted upon finally by the Assembly after receipt of the recommendations.”

Senator Connally said that offhand he could not approve the last sentence of paragraph 5. He did not think it wise that if the Security Council voted properly that the General Assembly should raise objection unless something more vital were involved than appeared to be the case.

Mr. Sanders pointed out that the Soviet objection to the candidates whom they had vetoed had been that the U.S.S.R. had no diplomatic relations with those states. The United Kingdom had taken the position that this was an improper use of the veto under the Charter. It was possible that the United Kingdom would raise the question.

Senator Vandenberg wished that the sentence might be revised to point out that there was no objection to the Security Council’s action as such, but to the Soviet use of the veto. Mr. Dulles pointed out that the fact was that Article 4 of the Charter stated that membership in the United Nations was “open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations of the Charter, and in the judgment of the Organization, were able and willing to carry out these obligations”. It was mandatory to admit to the United Nations those states that met these tests. Extraneous grounds should not be introduced as a test for membership. Thus the question was whether the veto had been correctly used in the face of Article 4.

Mr. Sandifer said that it would be possible to word the sentence in question more explicitly. Senator Austin suggested that this be done.

Mr. Dulles inquired why the United States had voted against Outer Mongolia. Mr. Taylor replied that adverse vote had been cast since one government which we thought was more qualified than Outer Mongolia had been opposed by the Soviet Union, and because so little is known about that country. Chiefly, he said it was because so little was known about Outer Mongolia which only had diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Since there was no case made for it, it could not be certain Outer Mongolia could carry out its obligations.

Mr. Foote a1 pointed out that the United States said it would be willing to waive its doubts in the interests of the principle of universality provided objection was not raised to other candidates. However, once the Soviet veto had been exercised, the United States had not felt it could vote for Outer Mongolia.

a1 Wilder Foote, Director of Information, United States Delegation to the United Nations.
Senator Connally inquired whether he was correct in believing that the Russians gave as their only reason the lack of diplomatic relations. He was assured that this was the case.

Senator Austin polled the Delegation on accepting the proposition that whenever pertinent our objection to the wisdom of the Soviet vetoes on the basis the applicant states had no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union should be expressed. The Delegation unanimously approved this amendment to recommendation 5, (US/A/C.1/8, p. 2).

In discussing paragraph 6 (US/A/C.1/8, p. 2) of the recommendations on the Australian proposal on membership, Senator Connally observed that Australia could not maintain this position because it was clearly against the Charter. Mr. Sandifer remarked that the Australians had a novel interpretation of the Charter, that both the initiative and the final action in regard to membership was in the hands of the General Assembly. Senator Vandenberg remarked that the Australians wanted to amend the Charter. Senator Connally agreed that it was clear that the Charter required the Security Council to act first. Mr. Raynor remarked that Australia had no support for this view, but had a blind spot on the Assembly’s authority.

Senator Austin stated that certainly the United States Delegation would adhere to the letter and spirit of Article 4 of the Charter. Senator Connally said that he would prefer that recommendation 6 should state that “We do not object to” rather than “We should favor” full discussions. There was no objection to this change, and with it the recommendation was approved.

[Here follows discussion of another subject.]

---

**Editorial Note**

The General Assembly on October 31 referred the question of new members to the First Committee. That committee’s recommendations were transmitted to the General Assembly in three reports, one on November 9 (United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, Second Part, First Committee*, page 318, annex 6; hereafter cited as GA(I/2), *First Committee*) and the other two on November 19 (United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, Second Part, Plenary Meetings*, pages 1493 and 1494, annex 39 and pages 1494 and 1495, annex 40, respectively; hereafter cited as GA(I/2), *Plenary*).

The first report, on the admission of Afghanistan, Iceland, and Sweden, recommended favorable action and the draft resolution accompanying the report was adopted by the General Assembly with
one change on November 9; the representatives of the three countries were seated on November 19. The second report recommended to the General Assembly a draft resolution which asked the Security Council to reconsider those applications that the Council had examined but on which it had made no recommendations; the General Assembly adopted this resolution unanimously on November 19. In its third report the First Committee recommended a draft resolution in which the General Assembly would request the Security Council "to appoint a Committee to confer with a Committee on procedure of the General Assembly, with a view to preparing rules governing the admission of new Members which will be acceptable both to the General Assembly and to the Security Council"; this was adopted by the General Assembly on November 19 by 32 votes to 9 with one abstention, the United States voting negatively.

Throughout the deliberations of both the First Committee and the General Assembly the United States Delegation followed closely the policies established in the position papers of October 4 and October 28, supplemented by a Departmental telegraphic instruction of November 7 (telegram 275, November 7, 6 p.m., to New York, (501.BB/11-446)) which set forth this Government's judgment that a proposal by Australia was incorrect in claiming for the General Assembly primary and final responsibility in the admissions process. In the same telegraphic instruction the Department also restated its objection to vetoes of membership applications "on grounds not found in [the] Charter", a principle invoked by Senator Connally subsequently in the First Committee on November 11 when certain states attempted to fix the attitude and conduct of an applicant state during the Second World War as a criterion of acceptability for membership (GA I/2), First Committee, pages 321–323).

501.AA/11-1446

Memorandum by the Former United States Representative to Albania (Jacobs) to the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson)

[WASHINGTON,] November 14, 1946.

For the following reasons it is believed that the United States should oppose the admission of Albania to UN when consideration of that question comes up again before the Security Council upon recommendation made by the General Assembly on November 11, 1946:

1. The U.S. opposed the admission of Albania during the Security Council's consideration of Albania's application in August, for the reason that the present regime in control of the country has failed to
meet its international obligations by steadfastly refusing to recognize the treaties in existence between the U.S. and Albania when Italy invaded Albania on April 8, 1939. The U.S. was prepared, however, as proposed at the meeting of the Security Council on August 28, 1946 to agree to Albania’s admission under the “rule of universality”.

2. Since the occasions referred to above, Albania has renewed its refusal to recognize the aforementioned treaties in Prime Minister Hoxha’s note of August 13, 1946 to the U.S. Mission at Tirana (although it did accept multilateral treaties) and, as a result of this renewed refusal and for other reasons, the Department has now withdrawn its Mission from Albania.52

3. The withdrawal of the Mission referred to above constitutes a “rupture” of relations of sufficient gravity to warrant not only adherence to the Department’s previous policy of opposing Albania’s admission but also the withdrawal of our offer to agree to admission under the rule of universality.

4. The Secretary has indicated his unwillingness to recognize the regime in Albania at the present time even if it should agree to the continued validity of the treaties (Delsec’s telegram to Department no. 968, September 20, 1946).53 If we should now agree to Albania’s admission to UN and the regime suddenly agrees to the treaties, it would be most difficult for the U.S. to refuse to recognize the regime and exchange diplomatic representatives.

5. In addition to the foregoing reasons the conduct of the present regime in inaugurating a campaign of calumny against the Mission and false charges against Mr. Harry T. Fultz of the Mission, which involves the barbarous treatment of several Albanians, is ample evidence of the ruthless and unscrupulous character of the regime to indicate its unworthiness of membership in UN.

6. Finally, now that our Mission has been withdrawn, we can use as additional arguments against Albania’s admission the facts that the regime (a) is carrying on a regime of terror against all opposition and is thus wholly unworthy of designation as “democratic”, (b) has mobilized its manpower on a war footing at a time when UN is striving for peace and security, and (c) has compromised the independent status of Albania by permitting the country to become honeycombed with Yugoslav and Soviet advisers.

J. E. Jacobs

[The Security Council took up the General Assembly resolution regarding re-examination of applications for membership on Novem-

52 For documentation on this subject, see vol. vi, pp. 1 ff.
53 Vol. vi, p. 27.
ber 29 (SC, 1st yr., 2nd series, pages 507-522). Subsequently, informal consultations on the part of the President of the Security Council (Johnson) with Council members established that there was general agreement to defer for the time being Security Council reconsideration of the applications (ibid., pages 523-525).]

501.AA/12-546: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, December 5, 1946—7 p. m.

305. USdel. 1. As you know the Department is prepared to support prompt consideration by the SC of the Siamese application for membership 54 so that Siam’s admission can be accomplished by necessary SC and GA action during the present GA session. We think it would be particularly unfortunate in connection with reconsideration of rejected applications, however, for SC to make an adverse decision on Siam’s application at this time. The position you take in the Council with respect to the timing of a decision by the Council on Siam’s application should be guided accordingly.

2. Favorable action by SC on Siamese application appears now to depend largely on Soviet attitude. Should Soviet representative indicate either that he will support or not oppose Siamese application, you should endeavor to bring application to a vote following discussion in SC and without reference to Membership Committee. On other hand, in event it is learned that Soviet representative will oppose Siamese application or in event that Soviet position is undecided or unknown to you, application should probably be referred to Membership Committee in order to postpone immediate SC action.

3. Confidential telegram No. 1334 from Bangkok dated Dec 3 55 indicates Soviets have tentatively agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Siam subject certain conditions which officers in SEA here believe Siam will fulfill. Lack of diplomatic relations was, as you know, reason given by Soviet representative in Membership Committee last summer for opposition to Siamese application. In view of above and in order to minimize possibility that mistake in timing might prejudice favorable action by SC on Siamese application suggest you discuss matter with Prince Wan of Siamese delegation who is in

54 The Siamese application had been forwarded to the Secretary-General by Prince Wan Wathayakon, Siamese special representative, in a letter of November 29 (SC, 1st yr., 2nd series, Suppl. No. 10, p. 169, annex 15), following the settlement of the dispute between France and Siam.

55 Not printed.
New York and who should have latest information re Soviet attitude. Acheson

501.AA/12-646: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, December 6, 1946—7 p. m.

309. USdel. In connection with telegram No. 305 dated December 5, Department believes that the position you take with respect to the timing of a decision by the Council on the Siamese application should be guided by wishes of Siamese delegation and your opinion as to the most opportune moment for favorable action.

Prince Wan informed Kenneth Landon of SEA 56 on December 2nd that he was prepared to ask the Council to defer consideration of the Siamese application should this be necessary to avoid a Russian veto at the present time. He stated further that he was prepared to do this because of his confidence that the Russians would, in due course, withdraw any opposition they may now have to Siamese application.

We do not wish to do anything which would embarrass or prejudice Siamese opportunity to become a member of U.N. Accordingly, unless Prince Wan wishes, US should not press for immediate SC consideration if it is anticipated that admission will be blocked by a veto.

If we receive further information re Russian recognition of Siam, we will inform you immediately by telephone.

Acheson

501.AA/12-846

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Landon)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] December 8, 1946.

Participants: Prince Wan Waithayakon, Head of Siamese Mission;
His Excellency, Pridi Banomyong, Former Prime Minister;
Mr. Kenneth P. Landon, SEA.

In the course of a conversation at the Siamese Legation the question of Siam’s application for membership in the United Nations arose. I made it clear to Prince Wan that Mr. Herschel Johnson was expecting to hear from Prince Wan in regard to the method of procedure

56 The Assistant Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs.
at Tuesday's meeting of the Security Council. I said that Mr. Johnson would like to be informed whether Siam wanted the American delegation to support strongly Siam's application even though there might be a possibility of a Russian veto or whether Prince Wan would prefer to defer consideration of the question if Russia seemed inclined to veto the application. Prince Wan assured me that he would call upon Mr. Johnson on Monday after a further conversation with Mr. Gromyko and would discuss the best method of procedure.

501.AA/12-1146

Memorandum of Conversations, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Landon)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON,] December 11, 1946.

In the course of a conversation with His Excellency Pridi Banomyong, in reply to a question, I outlined briefly the situation in regard to Siam's application for membership in the United Nations. I made it clear to His Excellency that as matters stood the American delegate would press for immediate consideration only if so urged by Prince Wan in New York; that the question of Siam's application was coming up on Thursday at 3:00 p.m.; and that as far as I knew Prince Wan had not made his position clear to Mr. Herschel Johnson. His Excellency expressed great concern that Siam become a member of the United Nations; he asked whether there was still time to urge Mr. Johnson to support Siam's application strongly and expressed the hope that as he himself was not in an official position to express such an opinion to Mr. Johnson that the Department would urge Mr. Johnson to give such strong support. I said that I appreciated his expression of opinion.

[December 11, 1946, 4:00 p.m.: In telephone conversation with Mr. Charles Yost in New York, I learned that Mr. Yost and Prince Wan had been in consultation on the subject of Siam's application; that Prince Wan hoped that Mr. Johnson would make a strong speech in support of Siam's membership and would press for immediate consideration of the question; that this would then require an expression

57 Siam's application appeared as the second item on the provisional agenda for the meeting of the Security Council on December 10 (Tuesday).

58 At the December 10 meeting, upon the request of the representative of the Soviet Union (Gromyko), the Security Council agreed to place the Siamese application on the list of matters of which the Security Council was seized rather than upon the agenda itself (SC, 1st yr., 2nd series, pp. 525-527).

59 December 12.

60 Foreign Service Officer; at this time Adviser and Political Officer on the staff of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly.
of opinion from Mr. Gromyko; and that at that point if Prince Wan felt that Gromyko was taking a strong position which would inevitably lead to a veto that he himself would then take steps to ask for deferment of the question.][61

---

501.AA/12-1146

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Landon)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] December 12, 1946.

Prince Wan telephoned from New York and informed me that he had just had a conversation with Mr. Gromyko who had in simple language stated his position to the effect that until Siam issued a communiqué along the lines of an exchange of letters which have already taken place at Stockholm indicating that Siam repudiates the anti-communist attitude of previous governments that he is instructed to move for a deferment of consideration of Siam’s application and failing that, as a last resort, to veto.

Prince Wan stated that his Government had no objection to the issuance of such a communiqué but that the Minister of Foreign Affairs felt reluctant to use such a strong phrase in regard to the attitude of previous Siamese governments toward communism, and that a compromise formula was being sought.

I asked whether Prince Wan felt that the matter could be resolved in time for Siam’s admission to the United Nations this year. He replied that he had pointed out to Mr. Gromyko that there would not be time for an exchange of telegrams with Bangkok and that he would give him a letter of assurance that such a communiqué would be issued. He explained that he felt justified and empowered to make such a written statement in view of the fact that he had discussed the matter for several hours last night with His Excellency, the Elder Statesman, Pridi Banomyong and that His Excellency had thoroughly concurred in such a letter. Prince Wan added that, as I knew, the present Government was composed of followers of the Elder Statesman and there was no question of their supporting his judgment.

I urged Prince Wan immediately to see Mr. Johnson and tell him what he had told me. Prince Wan said that he would do so as soon as he hung up his receiver.

[In a telephone conversation with Charles Noyes [62 in New York he stated that Prince Wan had had an extensive conversation with

---

[61 Brackets appear in the original.

[62 Special Assistant to the Acting United States Representative (Johnson).]
Herschel Johnson and himself and had asked Mr. Johnson to agree to postpone consideration of Siam’s application for membership until the next meeting if Mr. Gromyko so desired on the grounds that he needed two more days to complete the arrangements that he had in mind. He then repeated the substance of the foregoing conversation and said again that he believed that he would be able to get the communiqué issued within two days. He added, however, that he was going to see Mr. Gromyko immediately and try to persuade him to be satisfied temporarily with a letter assuring him that such a communiqué would be issued and to withdraw his objections to Siam’s application for membership.

Mr. Noyes said that their procedure would be for Mr. Johnson to make a statement favoring Siam’s application and that if Mr. Gromyko asked for a postponement then Mr. Johnson would reluctantly agree to postponement stating that he would be willing to do so only until the next meeting or until an earlier moment than the next regular meeting if Mr. Gromyko were willing at an earlier time to discuss the matter. Mr. Noyes added that in view of the fact that Prince Wan had asked that the U.S. delegate agree to postponement, if Mr. Gromyko desired it, that there seemed to be no other course to pursue.64

501.BB/12-1346: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)

URGENT

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1946—6 p. m.

319. USdel. Dept most anxious that Siam be admitted to membership in UN at this session GA. Please make every effort expedite procedure to this end.65

ACHESON

63 The Security Council met at 3:30 p.m., December 12, with the Siamese application on the provisional agenda. When the agenda was adopted with no objection, the representative of China (Quo) made a motion that the Security Council adopt a resolution recommending favorable consideration by the General Assembly of Siam’s application for membership, and the resolution was adopted unanimously (SC, 1st yr., 2nd series, pp. 561-563).

64 Brackets appear in the original.

65 The resolution admitting Siam to membership in the United Nations was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly at the last plenary meeting of the Session on December 15 (GA (1/2), Plenary, pp. 1458 and 1459).
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Ross) to the Director of the Office (Hiss)


Jack Thompson \(^{66}\) talked to you this morning about the proportion of the United States contribution to the United Nations and I understand you plan to take this up with Mr. Acheson \(^{67}\) at 10:30 this morning. The papers on this subject are attached but the principal points may be summarized as follows: \(^{68}\)

\(^{66}\) Elwood N. Thompson, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs.

\(^{67}\) Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State (Acting Secretary at this time).

\(^{68}\) Papers not attached. At the London session the General Assembly had appointed a standing expert Committee on Contributions of ten members and directed it to establish for the consideration of the General Assembly at the second part of the first session a contributions scale for apportionment of the expenses of the Organization amongst the Member States. This was on the recommendation of the Preparatory Commission which had met at London during November and December 1945 (see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. 1, pp. 1433 ff.).

The General Assembly in setting up the Committee on Contributions instructed it to base the recommended quotas on the formula set forth by the Preparatory Commission in its Report (United Nations, Report of the Preparatory Commission, December 23, 1945, p. 108):

"The expenses of the United Nations should be apportioned broadly according to capacity to pay. It is, however, difficult to measure such capacity merely by statistical means, and impossible to arrive at any definite formula. Comparative estimates of national income would appear \textit{prima facie} to be the fairest guide. Other factors which should be taken into account in order to prevent anomalous assessments include the following:

(a) comparative income per head of population, e.g. in the case of populous states with low average income per head;

(b) temporary dislocation of national economies arising out of the second world war;

(c) the ability of Members to secure foreign currency.

Two opposite tendencies should also be guarded against: some Members may desire unduly to minimize their contributions, whereas others may desire to increase them unduly for reasons of prestige. If a ceiling is imposed on contributions the ceiling should not be such as seriously to obscure the relation between a nation's contributions and its capacity to pay. The Committee should be given discretion to consider all data relevant to capacity to pay and all other pertinent factors in arriving at its recommendations."

The Committee membership was made up of ten experts from as many states; they were not, however, representatives of the governments of those states. Mr. Paul H. Appleby was the member from the United States. For General Assembly action concerning the Committee see United Nations, \textit{Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, First Part, Plenary Meetings} [hereafter cited as \textit{GA}(1/1), \textit{Plenary}], pp. 621 ff., annex 18, especially pp. 627, 640, 641, and 443.
1. The Committee on Contributions was opposed to establishment of any ceiling.\footnote{United States policy had favored the establishment not only of a “ceiling” (maximum contribution) but also a “floor” (minimum contribution). This policy was formulated in the Department during September and October 1945 for the guidance of the United States Representative on the Executive Committee of the Preparatory Commission (Stettinius), and was communicated to Mr. Stettinius in telegram 5786, Prec2 149, October 4, 1945, to London, which telegram read in pertinent part: “We agree that countries should contribute on the basis of a rough approximation of their capacity to pay as indicated by their net national income, per capita income figures for the latest available pre-war year, and other pertinent factors such as the effect of the devastation of war on capacity to pay during the next few years. The capacity to pay principle should be modified by imposing both a ceiling and a floor to contributions. The minimum contribution might be fixed at $5,000 since without such a provision the smallest countries would contribute only very trivial amounts. It is thought that the membership of UNO should be worth at least $5,000 for any country. As to the ceiling, we are not prepared to make any definite estimates before consultation with Congressional leaders. It should be noted, however, that if no ceiling provision were adopted, the United States’ share might be approximately 45 percent of the total. Although such an assessment would be equitable according to capacity to pay, it would be undesirable for any one country to have such a dominant position in the financing of UNO. . . .” (500.CC(PC)/10-445)\footnote{When the Executive Committee failed to make “a positive recommendation in favor of imposing either a ceiling or a floor on contributions”, the Department cabled its disapproval to the Acting United States Representative on the Preparatory Commission (Stevenson) in telegram 10176, Prec2 305, November 21, 1945, to London. Mr. Stevenson was informed that “We continue to consider it essential that the formula of capacity to pay be modified by applying both a ceiling and a floor, and we favor the recognition of this principle by Prec2 [the Preparatory Commission].” (500.CC(PC)/11-2145 and FW 500.CC(PC)/11-2145)\footnote{The Committee on Contributions began its meetings in June. In May a paper had been prepared in the Department entitled “Scale of Contributions for Apportionment of United Nations Expenses”, to be transmitted informally to Mr. Appleby. This memorandum is missing in the Department’s files, but it may be presumed that it embodied the principle of a floor and a ceiling for contributions in light of previous and subsequent developments. (Memoranda, the Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Ross) to the Associate Chief of the Division of International Organization Affairs (Stokes), May 17, and Mr. Marion W. Boggs of the Division of International Organization Affairs to the Chief of the Division (Sandifer), June 3, both File No. 501.A/B/6-346). The Committee’s work on this question was substantially done by this date (August 29), although its Report was not formally completed until September.}\footnote{The October 4, 1945, message is available in the following files: 500.CC(PC)/10-445 and FW 500.CC(PC)/10-445}}

2. The Committee recommendation based on capacity to pay would call for a contribution of 49% for the United States, 11% for the United Kingdom, 9% for the U.S.S.R., 4% for France, and 2% for China.

3. However, the Committee gave three other scales calling for contributions of 25, 30 and 55% by the United States.

4. I understand Mr. Appleby’s position is that the United States should be prepared to pay 30 or 55% plus 5% for war damages.

5. The OA recommendation calls for a payment of 30 or 55% including war damages.

I personally feel very strongly that our initial position should be that we would be willing to make a contribution of 25% and that we might recede to 25% plus 5% for war damages but no further, and I
think this is the position Mr. Acheson should take in his discussion with Mr. Appleby today.  

On the matter of clearances I think we should discuss this matter with Don Russell and with or through him the Appropriation Committee Chairmen if they are in town. Subsequently the matter should, of course, be discussed with the Congressional members of the Delegation which should be given discretion to recede beyond what I suggest above as may be determined by the circumstances.

I think you understand the theory of "war damages". This means that for a period of a few years the United States would pay a slightly higher proportion while some of the other countries recovering from the war would pay a somewhat lower percentage.
official of the United States Government, however, I feel at liberty to offer you some comments on the Report and the Committee’s proceedings which may be helpful to the United States at the meeting of the General Assembly.

The first point I want to make perfectly clear is that the scale prepared is not the scale of contributions recommended for adoption by the Assembly. It is an index of relative capacities to pay and is submitted merely as a basis for negotiation in the Assembly.

I consider that the Committee fell short of completing its assignment when it decided not to prepare a scale that it would recommend for adoption. I personally felt very strongly that contributions should be determined by experts and taken out of politics as far as possible. As it is, the scale must now finally be determined by political argument in the Assembly.

The great obstacle in the way of a definite recommendation was the question of the United States contribution. While I agree that the statistical and economic data lead to the conclusion that the capacity to pay of the United States is over 49 per cent for the next three years, I decidedly do not agree, for reasons I shall elaborate upon later, that the United States contribution should be that high. I urged this position strongly in the Committee and was supported by Mr. Jacklin from South Africa, but we had no success whatever in persuading the Committee to deviate from the principle of capacity to pay. Consequently, the compromise solution arrived at was the only way to achieve agreement in the Committee.

The Report of the Committee is unambiguous on the point that the scale is not a recommendation for adoption. I quote the concluding paragraphs in full:

"21. Conclusion
The Committee has confined its work to making estimates of relative capacity to pay, recognizing that factors other than capacity to pay including ceiling provisions, which raise political issues, may be discussed by the General Assembly if it so desires.

"By taking into account the combined effects of its estimates on account of war dislocation, war improvement, availability of foreign exchange and per capita incomes, the Committee made adjustments to the scale derived from the original national income figures, and thereby arrived at the scale of relative capacities to pay that it now submits to the General Assembly. While differences in capacity to pay are very large in some instances, the Committee has exercised restraint in respect both of war allowances and degree of progressiveness. It feels confidence in its results and considers that the scale provides an

---

33 Mr. Appleby was Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget.
34 Mr. Seymour Jacklin was the member from South Africa on the Committee on Contributions.
appropriate estimate of capacity to pay for the years 1946, 1947 and 1948. Before the end of that period it can be hoped that the distortions in national economies produced by the war will have greatly diminished and that revised estimates can then be worked out on a firmer statistical basis. Meanwhile the Committee hopes that the exploratory work it has done in working out the present scale will prepare the way for improvement in the future.

V. Scale

"22. The Committee on Contributions submits that the following scale be accepted by the General Assembly as reflecting relative capacities to contribute to the administrative expenses of the United Nations:" (italics supplied)

I believe a large part of the trouble lies in the instructions of the Committee. Possibly the most literal interpretation of those instructions restricts the Committee to the question of capacity to pay. The only peg on which you can hang other considerations is the sentence "The Committee should be given discretion to consider all data relative to capacity to pay and all other pertinent factors in arriving at its recommendations." We argued that all other pertinent factors included factors other than capacity to pay. The majority of the Committee believed that the factors referred to were economic and nonpolitical factors of the same nature as capacity to pay.

There is, therefore, a possibility that the Assembly may have to revise its principles of assessment and make it clear that other factors are to be considered if it is to arrive at a scale of contributions that is acceptable to the United States.

When we started the negotiations, we thought that the idea of a ceiling would be acceptable to the Committee. We felt they would want no one nation to be predominant in the organization. We found that not to be the case. With the exception of Mr. Jacklin and Mr. Brigden, everyone seemed to think that the more the United States paid the better. I was particularly surprised to find this point of view held by the United Kingdom member. I should have thought that questions of prestige might enter in. I do not know whether the Committee is an adequate index of the temper of the Assembly, but I suspect that we shall find more resistance to the idea of a ceiling than we have been assuming.

The Preparatory Commission report states that "If a ceiling is imposed on contributions, the ceiling should not be such as seriously to obscure the relation between a nation's contributions and its capacity to pay." I believe that a figure that would be acceptable to the United States and desirable for the United Nations would deviate seriously from its capacity to pay, especially for the administrative budget of

---

25 Mr. J. P. Brigden, member from Australia on the Committee on Contributions.
the United Nations. I believe that other factors should have an important weight in determining contributions. Some of these considerations are:

1. A contributions scale should take into account the principle of sovereign equality as well as capacity to pay. Since every nation has one vote, the capacity to pay figure should be adjusted in the direction of equal contributions. Although the Committee refused to accept this idea I am sure it was unconsciously applied to the assessments for Latin America. Had South America consisted of one country instead of 20, I am sure its total contribution would have been lower. If the budget was small enough I would favor a system of equal contributions for each country. As it is, I believe there should be a compromise between the principle of capacity to pay and the principle of sovereign equality. Needless to say, the Committee would not accept this position.

2. It is undesirable for any one country to bear too large a share of the budget. This is true from the point of view both of the country in question and of all other countries. If the United States pays a large proportion of the budget, other countries would be likely to tolerate administrative extravagances on the grounds that the United States is paying most of the bill. I think we have seen evidences of this already.

3. The contributions of the veto powers should not differ too widely. There is no need for me to labor this point as I know you are fully aware of it. Mr. Jacklin and I tried out on the Committee the idea that the Big Five contributions should be settled by special consideration, but we met with a most hostile reception.

After giving a great deal of thought to this matter, I am convinced that from the point of view of the United Nations, the contributions of the United States should not in any event exceed 35 percent and should probably be less. If the Assembly is persuaded to accept this position, it will have to reverse its previous decision about the relation of a ceiling to capacity to pay.

The Committee was as reluctant to accept the idea of a floor to contributions as it was a ceiling. At one stage, we had thought of a floor of .05 percent. This would result in inequities as between the countries to which the floor applied, and the countries just above the floor. As it is, no country in the scale has an allocation of less than .02 percent. This means $5,000 on a $25 million budget. If the United States contribution were lower than 50 percent the minimum would probably be raised. It would be at least sufficient to pay the fares of five delegates to the Assembly meetings.

[Here follow comments in some detail by Mr. Appleby on the scale decided on by the Committee with a table showing indexes of relative capacity to pay for each Member of the United Nations based on national income reported for 1938-1940 and estimated national income for 1946.]
Following is a summary of the principal issues anticipated for Committee 5 arranged in order of relative importance. References to tab numbers correspond to the position papers in the Committee 5 Handbook.

1. (Tab 4) Report of the Committee on Contributions on a Scale for the Apportionment of Expenses. The Committee on Contributions, appointed by the Assembly, will submit an index of relative capacity to contribute to the support of the Organization for the first three years. This index lists the U. S. capacity at 49.94 per cent, the UK at 10.5 per cent, the USSR (together with Byelorussian SSR and the Ukrainian SSR) at 7 per cent, France at 5.5 per cent, and China at 2.75 per cent. On the basis of a $25,000,000 budget, the annual U. S. contribution would amount to $12,485,000. The report refers to the Assembly the question of a ceiling on contributions and does not propose a floor.

**U. S. Position**

It is suggested that the U. S. Delegation should:

1. Propose that the Assembly accept the Committee Report as a general technical basis to aid in determining contributions for the first three years (the U. S. would thus not have to attack the technical quality of the report);

2. Propose adoption by the Assembly of the principle of a ceiling, in order to prevent undue dominance of the Organization by one Member, and in recognition of the principle of sovereign equality as set forth in the Charter;

3. Propose that the basic ceiling be fixed at 25 per cent, but indicate a willingness to discuss a higher U. S. contribution for the first three years as a means of compensating for the “exemption” to be allowed certain countries on account of war damages;

4. Seek to secure adoption of a temporary three-year U. S. quota of not more than 30 per cent (i.e., a 25 per cent ceiling, plus 5 per cent, to compensate for war damages exemptions), but be prepared, if

---

"This has reference to volume 1 of two "books" of position papers and background memoranda relating to the Fifth Committee which had been prepared in the Department, and which are found in the IO Files. This Delegation position paper (in pertinent part) was an abbreviated version of a position paper prepared in the Department on the subject of the Report of the Committee on Contributions (IO Files, document SD/A/C.5/1). The Departmental paper is missing from the book in the IO Files, but a revised copy dated October 23 is found in the Department's central indexed files (501.AB/10-2646)."
necessary to facilitate agreement, to accept a temporary three-year quota as high as 33 1/3 per cent (i.e., a 25 per cent ceiling plus 8 1/3 per cent compensation for war damages);

(5) Refrain from pressing its previously held position for a floor and vote against a floor if one is proposed.  
[Here follow statements on other items on the agenda of the Fifth Committee.]

---

IO Files: US/A/M (Chr.)/13

Minutes of the Thirteenth Meeting of the United States Delegation,  
New York, Hotel Pennsylvania, November 1, 1946, 9:00 a. m.

TOP SECRET

[Here follows list of names of persons (32) present.]

United States Attitude Toward Contribution Ceiling

Senator Vandenberg stated that he wished to put before the Delegation the issue of the United States attitude on a contribution ceiling since Committee V met that morning. It had been proposed that Committee V immediately divide into two sub-committees, and he wished to be able to make the United States position clear to the whole

77 The United States Delegation to the General Assembly (see pp. 37-42 for information about the composition of the Delegation) discussed the contributions question at meetings on October 21 and October 28; this paper was used by the Delegation in its October 21 discussion. At this meeting a lengthy review of the problem was presented by Mr. William Hall, Adviser on the staff of the Delegation and expert on Fifth Committee (administrative and budgetary) matters. In a statement that followed Senator Vandenberg expressed apprehension that the United States "would pay so much that sovereign equality would become meaningless..." Later in the discussion Mr. Ross said he wished to clarify the thinking of the Department, where the emphasis was not so much on the principle of sovereign equality, "a frank and sincere [approach]", as on other factors. "More stress was put on (a) what Congressional reaction would be toward the proposed rate of the contribution in general, and (b) a concern lest Congress and the Executive Department be misled into thinking that, since the U.S. contributed almost half the expenses, it could exercise more influence in the UN than was actually the case..." In the end the Delegation decided to defer its decision on the United States position until there had been more opportunity to study the Report of the Committee on Contributions. (IO Files, Minutes of the 5th Meeting of the U.S. Delegation, October 21, document US/A/M(Chr.)/5)

At the October 28 meeting the paper under discussion apparently was the Department's own position paper on the Committee's Report (SD/A/C.5/1) referred to in footnote 76, p. 467, and the Delegation quickly approved it. (IO Files, Minutes of the 11th Meeting of the U.S. Delegation, October 28, document US/A/M(Chr.)/11).

On October 31 the Delegation received a telegram from the Department (telegram 259, October 31, 8 p. m., File No. 501.AB/10-2046) which directed that the first recommendation of the Department's position paper (and so of this Delegation working paper) be revised to read that "U.S. Delegation point out the admitted statistical inadequacies of the Report and the failure of the Committee to consider fully differences in cost of living and price indexes, but agree to use the Report as a general guide to differences in capacity to pay among Members in the sense that the United States has greatest capacity to pay even though it is not as great as indicated in the Report."
Committee before that time. He recalled that the Department’s position was that there should be a ceiling of 25 per cent of the contribution of any member. However, the United States, because of the post war emergency, would be willing to increase its contribution for 1947. Senator Vandenberg said that he thought that it would be almost impossible to get any ceiling imposed, knowing that even the Canadians opposed a ceiling. Therefore, he thought that the only possible position was a bold and immediate statement of the United States position to the entire Committee. He stated that he had prepared a statement on that subject and had submitted it to Mr. Bloom and Mrs. Roosevelt, whose opinion he particularly valued. He thought the question was whether the United States should meet the question head-on. He pointed out that the report of the Committee on Contributions recommended a 50 per cent United States contribution.

Senator Connally inquired regarding the prospects for getting by with the United States position. Senator Vandenberg replied that he did not know what the prospects were, but he felt sure that a proposition for the United States to pay 50 per cent of the budget could not get by Congress. Mr. Eaton stated that he was sure that such a proposition could not be passed, especially if there were a Republican House.

Mr. Sandifer pointed out that the matter had been carefully considered by the Department and that the view of Mr. Eaton had been taken into account. He thought that the other Delegations should be informed as to how far the United States was willing to go, and he thought it desirable that a public statement should be made. Mr. Ross also agreed to the desirability of making a bold and immediate statement. However, he proposed that the door should be left open in view of the economic dislocation of the world. While the 25 per cent ceiling should be a standard rule, it should be clear that the United States would be willing to go as far as a one-third contribution to the budget.

Mrs. Roosevelt said that she hoped Senator Vandenberg would stress that any group making such a large contribution to the budget as 50 per cent would be open to pressure by its constituency to exercise pressure on the Organization. It should be made clear that the United States interest was not only a monetary one but a concern that the Organization must be free.

Senator Vandenberg agreed that this was his primary point. He also said he would take occasion to point out that it was an old dictum that taxation without representation was unjust. He said he would note that for his British colleague.

Senator Connally said that he thought Mrs. Roosevelt’s point was a very good one, for if the United States contributed 50 per cent, there would be stimulated a spirit of suspicion. Mr. Dulles added that it would also stimulate a tendency toward extravagance.
Mr. Eaton said that the question had to be faced in view of the attitude of the House of Representatives. He said that the House of Representatives would never pass a bill providing that the United States pay 50 per cent of the expenses of the United Nations. He pointed out that it was difficult to get more money for UNRRA and emphasized that money bills had to originate in and be approved by the House.

Senator Vandenberg reminded the Delegation that every other representative at the Committee table would also be under an obligation to defend his position before his parliament.

Mr. Sandifer cautioned that it was important that the statement be firm and clear, but it would be dangerous to make it appear to be an ultimatum.

Senator Vandenberg said that he would agree to put in for an emergency ceiling of one-third of the budget to be paid by the United States and would emphasize that this should apply to the purely administrative budget. Insofar as the affiliated agencies were concerned, the United States would accept what was demanded by their needs. He would also say that in regard to the specialized agencies, wherever the United States had a special responsibility it would pay what was necessary.

Senator Austin polled the Delegation on whether Senator Vandenberg was authorized to state a firm position based on the Delegation's previous decision accepting a ceiling of 25 per cent on contributions, with an emergency ceiling of 33⅓ per cent in respect to the administrative budget for United Nations. This was approved unanimously.

[Here follows discussion of other items.]

78 See footnote 79, below.
79 At the first meeting of the Fifth Committee at 11 o'clock the same morning Senator Vandenberg made a statement setting forth the principal points of the United States position. He stressed the danger to the principle of "universal and equal authority" inherent in the allocation of "almost fifty percent" of the total assessments to one member; and criticized the Report of the Contributions Committee as "technically inadequate". "Mr. Vandenberg emphasized that he was not speaking of the operational budget [a reference to the budgets of specialized programs such as that of the International Refugee Organization], in which the United States clearly accepted larger responsibility, but of the administrative budget [the "house-keeping" budget of the Organization itself], regarding which his Government proposed that a ceiling of twenty-five per cent should be set on the assessments to any one Member. Although extraordinary conditions, such as the temporary incapacity of many nations to pay, resulting from war damages, might call for a temporary divergence from the twenty-five percent standard, such a divergence should be an emergency measure only. Under present conditions, the United States Government was prepared to urge its Congress to meet a temporary assessment of thirty-three and one-third percent." (United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, Second Part, Fifth Committee, p. 72; hereafter cited as GA(1/2), Fifth Committee)

At a meeting of the executive and political officers of the Delegation on November 7 "It was urged that everything possible be done to persuade other States to accept the U.S. position that there should be a ceiling on contributions. The anticipated serious difficulty with Congress on this question should be pointed out." (10 Files, document US/A/M/S)
Senator Austin to the Secretary of State

New York, November 8, 1946—10:25 p.m.

782. Daily Plain Summary. Committee V (22nd Meeting)

[In a statement to the Committee on the contributions question Senator Vandenberg "re-emphasized the U.S. position on the necessity for a ceiling on contributions to UN administrative budgets. ..." ]

Asserting that the U.S. did not seek to avoid any appropriate responsibility he assured the Committee that no matter what party was in the majority in Washington, full U.S. support was behind the UN. The issue, he added, was not what the U.S. could afford to pay, but "what is right and wise and just as between partners in this common enterprise."

The U.S. continued to be unable to agree that "relative capacity to pay" could justify a basic American assessment of 50%. The experts, he declared, had estimated 1946 national incomes in lieu of complete statistics, and "since it admittedly is a temporary figure representing temporary exigencies, it should not be consulted for more than one year."

The temporary U.S. acceptance of an unequal share of the administrative budgets, and application of a completely different standard to operational budgets "quite clearly demonstrates our complete desire and willingness to take our full share of the load," the U.S. delegate declared: The U.S. protest involves relatively small sums, but "a relatively large principle," he added.81

Vandenberg urged that the UN avoid the "mundane" relationship between contributions and control already recognized in some other international institutions, referring to the International Bank. He held further that decisions on the 1947 allocations should be con-

81 In the Delegation press release the sentence following at this point reads: "It [the U.S. protest] involves only what may become the permanent basic criterion for supporting the general administrative budget."

Senator Vandenberg went on to say (press release text): "We have suggested, therefore, the desirability of a ceiling at this one point. We do not believe it is desirable for this basic budget to indicate anything like a 50% reliance upon any ONE member of the United Nations. Although this view has been quite uniformly dismissed in the general debate, it persists in our thinking. ..."

"In the course of the recent general debate, one of our able colleagues reserved a doubt as to just how serious I may have been in my recent argument that the indispensable 'sovereign equality' among us may soon be jeopardized if any one member Nation is permitted to dominate the contributions [presumably a reference to his statement to the Committee on November 1; see footnote 79, p. 470]. I can assure him we are very serious—because, as a practical matter, any such preponderant contributor must take a somewhat relevantly preponderant interest in the creation of obligations and in the expenditure of funds. It will be his only protection. I am afraid that this sequence is inevitable. ... Certainly the government of the United States has no remote wish to see any such situation created. ..."
fined to one, single year and that the standing Contributions Committee and Advisory Committee on Budgetary Problems be instructed to reexamine the whole question of assessments without restriction and to report its recommendations to the 1947 GA.

Since the U.S. has offered to accept special obligations in respect to operational budgets, and also to accept extra, temporary obligations in respect of the basic administrative budget, Vandenberg contended it was only fair that all these obligations be considered together in fixing the 1947 allocations. Proposed budgets should be submitted at the earliest possible date to permit deliberative consideration, and decisions respecting allocations should be made at the same time, he said.82

The Uruguayan delegate remarked that there had been no concerted drive for unanimity since the Uruguayan and Belgian Delegations had "categorically" supported the U.S. principle that no nation should be responsible for a 50% contribution.

[Here follows review of other Fifth Committee items.]

AUSTIN

---

501.BB Summaries/11-846 : Telegram

Senator Austin to the Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT NEW YORK, November 8, 1946—9:40 p.m.

[via Courier]

781. GA Secret Summary. SYG Views on Contribution Scale. The SYG told Vandenberg after his [Vandenberg's] speech on No-

82 The Vandenberg proposals appear in the Committee records as follows:

"First, when the Committee decided upon the 1947 allocation, the decision should be confined to a single year.

"Secondly, the Committee should instruct the standing Committee on Contributions or the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to re-examine the whole study of assessments without restriction and report its recommendations to the second session of the 1947 General Assembly.

"Thirdly, since the United States had offered to accept special obligations in respect to operational budgets, and also to accept extra temporary obligations in respect of the basic administrative budget, it was only fair that all those obligations be reviewed together at one time in fixing all the allocations for 1947. The Committee could [should] not weigh those obligations separately. The answer to one problem would necessarily affect its attitude toward other problems.

"Fourthly, all proposed budgets should be submitted as early as possible to permit ample time for deliberative consideration. If certain of the budgets could not be presented, the most definite estimates available should be placed before the Committee. Any decisions respecting allocation should be postponed until all decisions could be made at the same time." (GA, (1/2), Fifth Committee, pp. 83 and 94) These suggestions were submitted as a formal proposal by the United States (United Nations document A/C.5/61, GA (1/2), Fifth Committee, pp. 322 and 323, annex 60)

83 Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations.
vember 8 that he had decided to intervene in the debate on the contributions scale in support of the U. S. The Secretariat would be in an intolerable situation if any one country contributed half of the budget, Lie said.

**U. K. Views on Contributions**

Pitblado (U. K.) told USdel that he found the contributions scale generally satisfactory except that the Russians and Latin-American States were under-assessed and the British Commonwealth countries and the U. S. slightly over-assessed. Considering that new members would contribute slightly more than two per cent and that other States might be expected to bear a one-tenth increase in their contributions, he thought it would be possible to bring the U. S. figure down to forty-two per cent, subject to possible Soviet objection. He believed that any scale adopted might apply only for one year.

While Pitblado was not prepared to fix a figure for the U. S., he hoped that the time would not be very far off when one-fourth to one-third would represent a reasonable percentage based on the U. S. share of the world income. He said the U. K. would oppose a vote on the contributions question, believing the U. S. would be voted down. The U. K. view was that it would be an unfortunate precedent to establish a scale over the negative vote of any major country.

The U. K. representative stated that the British reaction to proposed UN scales, particularly if applied for only one year, would be conditioned by agreements reached with the U. S. on other items involving dollar exchange, such as the IRO and the U. K. share of the cost of German occupation. He added that it would be helpful to the U. K. if the IRO and UN contribution scales could be considered at the same time and inquired whether the U. S. would consider an increase in its proposed forty-three per cent contribution to the IRO.

**Soviet Views on Contributions**

After Vandenberg's speech in Committee V on November 8, Geraschenko (U.S.S.R.) stated to USdel that “speaking as an individual” he was impressed by the U. S. position and would be prepared to support in his Delegation a reduction of the U. S. contribution to forty per cent or slightly less, assuming some method of spreading the reduction could be devised to keep the Soviet contribution below 7.5 per cent. Chernyshev (U.S.S.R.), at the same discussion, said

---

84 See telegram 782, November 8, supra.
85 D. Pitblado, Adviser to the United Kingdom Member on the Fifth Committee (Younger).
86 Vladimir S. Geraschenko, Alternate Member for the Soviet Union on the Fifth Committee.
87 P. M. Chernyshev, Alternate Member for the Soviet Union on the Fifth Committee.
he personally did not agree that the U. S. scale should be below forty-five per cent, citing the U. S. standard of living as compared to that of other countries.

[Here follows summary of other developments of interest to the Delegation that occurred on November 8.]

AUSTIN

501.BB Summaries/11-1446: Telegram

Senator Austin to the Secretary of State

[via Courier] New York, November 14, 1946—12:30 a.m.

802. The following is the continuation of daily plain summary—November 13.

Committee V (23rd meeting). 88

The United Kingdom came out in Committee V on November 13 with strong support for the United Nations contribution scale recommended by the Contributions Committee as Younger 89 (UK) pointed out that a downward revision of the United States quota meant an upward revision of quotas of other countries much less capable of meeting heavy financial demands.

In a careful analysis of the present contribution scale, Younger admitted that the present United States quota of 49.89 percent was too high, but added that it was only a temporary quota due to exceptional post-war circumstances. The recovery of national economies, he asserted, would bring about a natural revision of present inequalities.

Younger declared that no one could be surprised at the high United States quota because the factors used by the Contributions Committee in determining “capacity to pay” were (1) national income which was highest in the United States, (2) per capita income which was highest in the United States, (3) dislocation of national economy from the war which had been least serious in the United States, and (4) the status of foreign exchange which affected the United States not at all. In fact, Younger added, the further one investigated the excellent work of the Contributions Committee in an attempt to justify the United States contention that its quota was too high, “the stickier the going becomes”. Younger further backed his case by asserting that

---

88 Within the general area of its discussion of the Report of the Committee on Contributions the Fifth Committee on this date had under specific consideration the proposals formally advanced by Senator Vandenberg at the end of his statement to the Committee on November 8 (see footnote 82, p. 472). For the summary record of the Committee's discussion at this time (November 13), see GA(1/2), Fifth Committee, pp. 102 ff.

89 Maj. Kenneth Younger, M.P., United Kingdom representative on the Fifth Committee.
much of the estimated 23 millions for United Nations expenses in 1947, of which 19 millions were for personal and common services, constituted "an invisible import" for the United States.

With respect to the political implications of the high United States quota and its effect on sovereign equality, Younger declared that the United Kingdom could [not?] agree with Vandenberg, since in a contributions scale having numerous inequalities, there was no point at which national sovereignties were clearly infringed. He added that in his opinion the doctrine that the amount of representation was related to total contribution was novel in international practice.

[Here follows summary of views of other representatives of the Committee, and discussion of other Committee items. It may be noted that at this meeting the Committee took steps to establish a subcommittee to study the report of the Committee on Contributions, the proposals of the United States Delegation and any new information which other delegations might wish to submit. (GA(1/2), Fifth Committee, pages 105 and 106 80)]

AUSTIN

501.BB Summaries/11-1446: Telegram

Senator Austin to the Secretary of State

SECRET

New York, November 14, 1946—5:05 p. m.

[Via Courier]

806. GA Secret Summary

[Here follows discussion of several items.]

Chinese Attitude on Contributions Scale

The opinion that Committee V might accept a 39 per cent contribution from the U. S. was expressed to USdel on November 14 by Hsia (China). This would have to be done in subcommittee by specific increases in contributions of several of the larger and middle powers. China would be prepared to increase its contribution at least 2 per cent in order to partially meet the U. S. position, he said.

USdel gained the impression that China might propose in the subcommittee an increase in its own quota and suggest that other Members make similar concessions to bring the U. S. figure down. Hsia felt it

80 Formal constitution of the sub-committee was deferred, however, until the Fifth Committee's meeting on November 15, at which time it was agreed that the sub-committee would be made up of the representatives of Canada, China, Egypt, France, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Uruguay (GA(1/2), Fifth Committee, pp. 110 and 111). The formal terms of reference of the sub-committee were conveyed to it in a letter from the Chairman of the Fifth Committee which is printed in pertinent part ibid., p. 318.
would be advisable for the U. S. to refrain from further pressing its case on the contributions scale.

[Here follows comment on another subject.]

AUSTIN

501.AB/11-1546

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss)\(^1\)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 15, 1946.

The Department this morning received from the Assembly Delegation a brief cable which reads:

"Present strong indication that committee will vote US contribution 49.89 percent. Please advise delegation course of action this event." \(^2\)

The total budget for this year is about $20,000,000 and the proposed budget for 1947 is $23,700,000. Information from New York indicates that the 1947 budget may be increased considerably. The contribution scale decided by this Assembly will apply to these two budgets and to the $25,000,000 working capital fund.

You will recall from your discussions with Mr. Appleby, who is Chairman of the UN Committee on Contributions, that his committee, whose members were appointed as experts rather than as representatives of governments, developed an index of relative capacity to contribute. This index listed the US capacity at 49.89 percent, the UK at 10.5, the USSR (together with Byelo-Russia and the Ukraine) at 7, France at 5.5, and China at 2.75.

You will also recall that Assistant Secretary Russell felt that it would be a mistake to accept these figures literally, since income figures, on which to base capacity to pay, were not necessarily comparable nor accurate for all countries reported upon. Moreover, the Department took the position that the US should propose adoption by the Assembly of the principle of a ceiling, in order to prevent

---

\(^1\) Addressed to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) and the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Clayton).

\(^2\) Telegram 804, November 14, 1:28 p. m., from New York (501.BB/11-1446). The Delegation at a morning meeting on November 14 had devoted virtually the entire session to the contributions problem. Senator Vandenberg leading off by stating "that he wished to have the problem of the UN budget considered because of developments on the previous day which he felt were most serious for the whole United Nations. He reported that the UK and Canadians had taken the leadership in the move to assess the United States for fifty per cent of the UN budget, regardless of any other consideration. They have declined to accept the ceiling idea." (See telegram 802, November 14, from New York, p. 474.) After lengthy discussion it was decided to ask the Department for guidance. (IO Files, Minutes of the 20th Meeting of the U.S. Delegation, November 14, 9 a. m., document US/A/M(Chr.)/20)
undue dominance of the organization by one member and in recognition of the principle of sovereign equality as set forth in the Charter. Our position was that a ceiling should be fixed at 25 percent but that we would be willing to discuss a higher percentage—not to exceed 33⅓ percent—for the first three years as a means of compensating certain countries because of “war damage”.

The Delegation has found little or no support in the Assembly for the principle of a ceiling. And, as the cable from the Delegation indicates, it is now apparent that there is no possibility of obtaining an agreement on a ceiling at or close to our previously adopted top limit of 33⅓ percent. However, there is some reason to believe we may be able to work out an arrangement with the British, whose position is likely to be of crucial importance, and ultimately with other delegations for a one-year contribution scale in which our share would be approximately 40 percent.

Recommendations

1. That you talk over this problem with Senator Vandenberg while he is in Washington this weekend.

2. That you recommend to Senator Vandenberg that he, with Senator Austin if that seems appropriate, discuss the problem with the Secretary and suggest that the Secretary may wish to speak directly to Mr. Bevin in view of our indications that the British attitude has substantially stiffened in the last few days. For your information we understand that Senator Vandenberg is having dinner with Mr. Bevin Sunday night.⁹³

3. That in talking with Senator Vandenberg you suggest the following position, which he may also wish to discuss with Senator Austin and the Secretary:

   a. Any scale adopted this year should be considered temporary only, with a definite understanding that the question be reconsidered at the next Assembly. This is not without precedent since the present scale applicable to provisional advances was adopted temporarily. (The FAO formula was adopted in London as a stop-gap. Under it our share has been approximately 25 percent.)

   b. A Sub-Committee of Committee 5 should be appointed to work out this temporary scale since the views of most delegations have been publicly expressed on the floor of Committee 5, and negotiation in such a large body is difficult.

   c. That our Delegation try to work out a scale under which the US would contribute just under 40 percent. The opinion that Committee 5 might accept a 39 percent contribution from the US has been expressed to the US Delegation by Mr. C. L. Hsia of China, and the Delegation

---

⁹³ No record has been found in the Department’s files of any of the conversations proposed here.
has reported in this connection that China would be prepared to increase its contribution at least 2 percent in order to partially meet the US position, Mr. Hsia has stated.

d. If a proposed assessment of just under 40 percent should come to a vote in the Sub-Committee, in Committee 5, or in the Assembly, the US Delegation should say that it cannot vote in favor of this percentage but must abstain because it feels the rate of assessment is too high, and unwise even on a one-year basis.

e. If a scale requiring the US to contribute more than 40 percent should come to a vote in the Sub-Committee, in Committee 5, or in the Assembly, the Delegation should vote "No", since the scale is so far from a plan which this government considers wise from the standpoint of the interests of the United Nations. The Delegation should not in this event indicate that the United States will not accept the verdict of the Assembly. A negative vote is simply the only effective way of registering our objection to what we consider a very unwise step.

f. In all the above steps the Delegation should feel free to use its own judgment within the broad lines indicated and to use any lines of procedure which it believes wise and calculated to obtain the desired objectives.

Note: Assistant Secretary Russell is out of the city and we were not able to reach him by telephone. In a conversation with Mr. Panuch, who was in Washington today, the latter agreed generally with the steps outlined immediately above and was particularly favorable to the idea of a Sub-Committee in which an attempt could be made in a more intimate atmosphere than prevails in a full committee to obtain a satisfactory solution. He did not feel that the amount of money involved was such that we should raise a major issue on that ground alone. He said he would be in New York tomorrow and would be glad to do anything we wished.

10 F I l e s : U S / A / C 5 / 4 1

Memorandum of Conversation, by G. Hayden Raynor

S E C R E T


This afternoon I expressed strongly to Mr. Gore-Booth our concern over the fact that the British had spoken in Committee 5 in favor of the United States contribution of 49.88 per cent. I also expressed regret that they had not consulted with us prior to making

94 Joseph A. Panuch, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary for Administration (Russell).
95 Mr. Raynor, an Adviser on the staff of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, was Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of European Affairs, Department of State.
96 P. H. Gore-Booth, Assistant Principal Adviser to the United Kingdom Delegation to the General Assembly.
97 See telegram 802, November 14, from New York, p. 474.
the statement, Mr. Gore-Booth expressed surprise that there had not been consultation and regret on his part that there had not been.

I then spoke of the concern felt by our Delegation, especially the Congressional members, with respect to this whole question. I stated that we viewed the matter as a very serious one and that we felt that a contribution of this size would have a most unfortunate effect in our Congress and in the country.

Mr. Gore-Booth stated that the British were under instructions to make a statement they had made on the economic aspect of the question and he felt they were right on that aspect. He added, however, that he knew there was considerable personal feeling in their Delegation that a single country should not be called upon for such a heavy contribution. He added that although they had been instructed to make the statement they made that this was not necessarily their last word on the subject. Entirely of his own volition he made the suggestion that it might be a good thing for Messrs. Noel-Baker \( ^{98} \) and Younger to discuss this matter with Senators Austin and Vandenberg.\(^ {99} \)

501.AB/11-1646

Memorandum by John C. Ross, Senior Adviser to the United States Delegation, to the Political Advisers\(^ {1} \) on the Delegation Staff

CONFIDENTIAL

[NY], November 16, 1946.

I have a report this morning from Washington on conversations in which Mr. Hiss participated with Senator Vandenberg, Mr. Acheson, Mr. Clayton, and members of the Congress.

As the result of these conversations the United States position is absolutely clear that there must be a ceiling on contributions.

An energetic campaign on the part of all of our political officers and others concerned in support of this position is essential.

Stated in briefest terms the United States position is that our contribution for this year should be clearly on a provisional basis; the primary objective is to secure acceptance of the ceiling principle. The United States contribution should in no case be larger than 40% and the political officers in their conversations with members of the foreign delegations on this subject should seek actively to persuade other delegations to agree to some percentage under 40%, possibly between 33 and 39%.

\( ^{98} \) Philip Noel-Baker, Representative on the United Kingdom Delegation.

\( ^{99} \) No record has been found of such discussions.

\(^ {1} \) For the names of the 15 men who comprised the team of Political Advisers on the United States Delegation advisory staff, and to whom this memorandum was addressed, see footnote 65, p. 41.
I should greatly appreciate it if you would get this campaign under way actively.

---

501.BB Summaries/11-1646: Telegram

**Senator Austin to the Secretary of State**

[via Courier]  
**NEW YORK, November 16, 1946—9:25 p.m.**

817. Committee V (26th Meeting). Firm support for the U.S. position on the Scale of Contributions was voiced by SYG Lie at a meeting of Committee V on November 16. Recommending a floor as well as a ceiling, the SYG suggested an increase in some of the smaller quotas and urged all countries to be prepared to invest a considerable sum in the UN, which was designed to secure world peace and security.²  

[Here follows discussion of other Fifth Committee items.]

**AUSTIN**

---

501.BB/11-1446: Telegram

**The Acting Secretary of State to Senator Austin**

**WASHINGTON, November 18, 1946—6 p.m.**

287. USdel. For GAdel. Reurtel 804, November 14.³ 1. Department regards principle of a ceiling for contributions as of paramount im-

² The summary record of the meeting says simply that "In reply to observations that had been made by certain representatives during previous discussions of the budget, the Secretary-General presented a detailed statement explaining the various sections of the preliminary budget estimates for the years 1946 and 1947..." (GA (1/2), Fifth Committee, p. 117). The Secretary-General's statement was printed as annex 4 of the proceedings of the Committee (ibid., pp. 291 ff.). His remarks about the contributions question came near the end of his statement: "Finally, I want to say something about contributions. This is, of course, a matter which the Member nations must decide. But there are two questions of principle which involve the Organization as a whole, and which I feel it is the duty of the Secretary General to discuss.

"It is my opinion that there should be both an upward limit and a downward limit to the amount which any State should pay.

"I feel that every Member State can properly be expected to make substantial contribution to the expenses.

"The present figure for some countries should be increased. . . .

"In regard to the second question, namely, the proportion of our expenses to be paid by any Member State, I agree in principle with what has been said by the United States representative in this Committee.

"Current conditions may make it necessary for one State to bear a very high percentage of the budget. But I feel that it would be undesirable from every point of view to allow this condition to continue over a period of many years.

"The international character of the United Nations would be threatened if one State were made to feel that it was primarily responsible for maintaining the Organization in a financial way.

"Even at the cost of sacrifice we must guard against anything which will threaten the independence and freedom of action and the true international nature of our Organization. I am glad that the United States has discussed the question on this plane." (Ibid., pp. 297, 298)

³ See memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss), November 15, p. 476.
importance to the wellbeing of the United Nations. We hope that the Delegation will mobilize all its resources in endeavoring privately to convince other delegations of soundness of our position in this respect. In this connection we suggest special efforts be made to persuade the British Delegation which we believe will play a crucial role in this matter.

2. We still feel that any proportion above twenty-five percent should be recognized as only temporary and should include recognition of principle of a ceiling. We believe that any proportion higher than 33\(\frac{1}{3}\)% percent should be for only one year with specific provision being made for reconsideration of the whole problem at the next regular session of the Assembly.

3. We consider it is of utmost importance that Delegation make every effort to keep our temporary share below 40 percent and we note developments since date of your telegram indicate this may be possible.

4. Should Committee 5 vote a U.S. contribution of more than 40 percent we believe the Delegation should definitely vote in the negative as the only way in which this government can register its objection to what it considers a very unwise step from the standpoint of the United Nations themselves.


date: November 19, 1946

[via Courier] New York, November 19, 1946—10:20 p.m.

827. [Here follows brief discussion of several items relating to the current General Assembly.]

Subcommittee on Contributions (1st Meeting) 4

Senator Vandenberg declared that the U.S. position on contributions was designed to save the UN, not to save money, as he warned the Subcommittee on Contributions on November 19 of the adverse effect on U.S. public opinion of the 49.89 per cent quota. He called for consideration of more than the major “capacity to pay” factor in order to reach an equitable solution which would take into account the principle of sovereign equality.

The U.S. was prepared to accept a 37\(\frac{1}{2}\)% per cent quota for the purposes of the Subcommittee discussions, although it was not rigidly committed to this figure, Vandenberg said.

4 The records of the subcommittee are not printed except for the subcommittee's report to the Fifth Committee (GA (1/2), Fifth Committee, pp. 318 ff., annex 6).
Vandenberg urged the Subcommittee to accept the statistics of the Contributions Committee Report and to proceed immediately to a decision on the major policy questions. The problem before the Subcommittee, he pointed out, was political rather than one of relative statistics. The U.S., Vandenberg asserted, had no intention of raising the question of the validity of the statistics involved, and considered the Committee's report as good a job as could be accomplished under difficult circumstances.

Expressing the hope that the U.S. would continue to have a good opinion of the UN, Vandenberg asserted that it was not only morally dangerous to the UN but damaging in terms of U.S. public opinion for any one nation to pay almost fifty per cent of the costs.

Urging the Subcommittee to transfer its discussions from percentages to dollars, Vandenberg pointed out that there was a difference of only two million dollars in actual cash between the proposed 49.89 per cent and the tentative U.S. figure of $71/2 per cent. He called upon the small nations to absorb this difference in order to defend the principle of sovereign equality and to prevent prejudicing public reaction in the U.S. The $71/2 per cent figure was acceptable to the U.S., he added, even though it was the present view that the normal contribution of any one nation should not exceed $31/3 per cent.

The U.S., Vandenberg said, would not involve itself in the ensuing discussions, but would leave the decisions in the hands of the other members on the Subcommittee. He wished to make it clear that there was no threat, no pressure by the U.S., and therefore he would withdraw from Subcommittee deliberations. A U.S. representative would remain to provide information and answer questions. Vandenberg assured the Subcommittee that he was prepared to return at any time and discuss the problem with the Subcommittee if it so requested.

Vandenberg said that he was exploring with the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury the possibility of making special arrangements under which dollar exchange could be made available to those countries whose contributions to the UN were made difficult by lack of U.S. currency.

Martinez-Cabanas (Mexico) who had been elected Chairman, supported Vandenberg's statement and said the Subcommittee would avoid the study of statistics and would restrict itself to actions necessary to achieve agreement on questions of policy. The main decision facing the Subcommittee, he pointed out, related to the political question of a possible floor and ceiling on contributions. The Advisory Committee of Experts, he asserted, would have to settle the questions raised by the entry of new members and the claims of several countries
that the "capacity to pay" index unfairly represented their present capabilities.

Younger (U. K.) replied to Vandenberg in a conciliatory statement in which he noted U. K. agreement on the question of statistics and expressed appreciation for Vandenberg's clear statement on the difficulties presented by adverse U. S. public opinion. He was particularly interested, he asserted, in Vandenberg's remarks on the "special arrangements for dollar exchange." Such arrangements would solve most of the serious problems which confronted several contributors to the UN, Younger declared. He expressed some doubt, however, of the possibility of achieving any satisfactory solution.

Dzung (China) supported the U. S. views and asserted that the task facing the Subcommittee related to questions of policy and practical politics rather than to mere statistics. He urged consideration of other factors than "capacity to pay" and exploration of all other available criteria in order to reach an equitable solution.

[Here follow other items of the summary.]

AUSTIN

501.AB/11–1946: Telegram

Senator Austin to the Secretary of State

SECRET U.S. URGENT NEW YORK, November 19, 1946—6 p. m. [Received 6:03 p. m.]

825. For Clayton from Vandenberg. One of the very real problems of many nations in connection with annual assessments is their lack of foreign exchange when they must pay in dollars. It would make a great difference in the attitudes of many delegations if a way could be found to pay in local currencies. Would it be possible to work out anything of this nature in connection with the stabilization fund or otherwise? [Vandenberg.]

AUSTIN

6K. W. Dzung, Chinese Adviser-Member on the Fifth Committee.
6The following was sent to Senator Vandenberg in telegram (Secdel) 1175, November 20, 4 p. m.: "For Vandenberg from Clayton. International Monetary Fund when in operation will undoubtedly be of great assistance to countries short of dollars but fund will not be in active operation until sometime next year. Meantime, many of such countries are being assisted generally through Export-Import Bank loans and will shortly derive assistance from loans by International Bank. Permanent assistance can only come from relaxation of trade barriers opening up markets for exports from countries short of dollars and other foreign exchange." (740.00019 Council/11–2046) For reasons not readily apparent this telegram was sent to Senator Vandenberg as a member of the United States Delegation, Council of Foreign Ministers.
SECRET US URGENT NEW YORK, November 21, 1946—10:30 p.m.
[via Courier]

836. GA Secret Summary.

[Here follows discussion of several matters taking up the attention of the General Assembly and the United States Delegation.]

Committee V, Subcommittee on Contributions (2nd Meeting)

At a continuation of the general debate on November 21, Turkey \(^7\) requested the Subcommittee to review the Turkish quota in view of the recent devaluation of Turkish currency and its consequent adverse effect on Turkish ability to secure foreign exchange.

St. Laurent \(^8\) (Canada) opened the discussion, stating that Canada had no quarrel with the criteria which the Committee on Contributions had used in defining “capacity to pay.” With respect to Vandenbarg’s statement at the opening meeting, St. Laurent reasserted the Canadian view that relative per capita contribution was fundamental. If other criteria than “capacity to pay” were considered, Canada would have to put its case as strongly as possible to prevent less fortunate nations from having to pay a higher per capita rate than the U.S.

Geraschenko urged the Subcommittee to consider the substance of Vandenbarg’s arguments, and on the basis of its discussions to see whether or not something had to be done to meet U.S. demands.

The Soviet delegate recommended that the quotas of new members and the requests of member nations, except the U.S., for the lowering of quotas be referred to the Contributions Committee. Geraschenko (U.S.S.R.) declared that the Subcommittee could come to no solution of its problems if it confined itself to discussing the establishment of a ceiling. Vandenbarg, he said, had suggested a 25 per cent ceiling for the U.S., but it might as well have been 33 1/3 per cent, or 40 per cent, and any discussion of an arbitrary ceiling would be academic. Geraschenko rejected the Canadian per capita principle, the consideration of contributions as a form of international taxation, and asserted that national revenue as well as the national budgets should be used in establishing capacity to pay.

The Polish delegate \(^9\) asserted that he appreciated that the U.S. position had been engendered by high principles and not through a desire to save money, but that Poland would have to oppose any attempt to establish ceilings at this time. He felt it was premature.

---

\(^7\) Mr. Sukru Esmer was the Turkish Member on the Fifth Committee; the Alternate Member was Mr. A. Birgen.

\(^8\) The Right Honorable Louis S. Saint-Laurent, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs and Head of the Canadian Delegation to the General Assembly (not one of the regular Canadian members of the Committee).

\(^9\) The Polish Member was Mr. Juliusz Katz-Suchy; the Alternate Member was Mr. Aleksander Bramson.
even to try to settle when ceilings might go into effect. When peacetime economics had been restored, he continued, quotas would have to be revised and due consideration given to “capacity to pay” and per capita contributions. The Polish delegate then urged lowering Poland’s quota.

Pitblado (U. K.) asserted that to establish ceilings at this time would be an arbitrary action taken in a period of changing conditions. He agreed that the decision on the quotas of new members and appeals for lowering of quotas, except that of the U. S., should be referred to the Contributions Committee.

The U. S. request, he asserted, differed from other questions facing the Subcommittee in that it was essentially political. Although under ideal conditions no one would like to see so large a proportion of the UN costs assigned to one nation, the U. K. position remained substantially as it had been stated in Committee V.

Pitblado said he had no very constructive proposals to suggest, but he reminded the Subcommittee that in February the GA had stated that if a ceiling were imposed it should not be one that seriously obscured the relationship between contributions and capacity to pay.

With respect to the U. S. assertion that all nations in the UN had certain influence and responsibilities and that these should not necessarily be related to “capacity to pay,” Pitblado reminded the Subcommittee that no nation could escape consideration of the public opinion factor. Referring to the matter of foreign exchange, Pitblado reminded the Subcommittee that the U. K. was well aware of the difficulties of procuring it in terms of added effort at production and reduction of goods for home consumption.

China\textsuperscript{10} opposed consideration of support of the UN as a form of international taxation rather than as national contributions. China recognized the justice of the U. S. request for a reduction in its quota because the request stemmed from an unselfish desire to give strong support to the UN. The Chinese delegate then suggested that the principle of sovereign equality might be applied to the smaller administrative budget and “capacity to pay” to the larger operational budgets.

The French delegate\textsuperscript{11} asserted that he did not believe that the Subcommittee had the technical ability or the time to fix a new scale of contributions. Although no one could disagree with the justness and fairness of Vandenbergh’s statement of principles, the French delegate questioned whether the U. S. meant those principles to be practically applied in relation to the 1947 budget. He pointed out that

\textsuperscript{10} Dr. C. L. Hsia was the Chinese Member on the Fifth Committee; Mr. J. C. Pao was the Alternate Member.

\textsuperscript{11} The French Member was M. Jacques Rueff; the Alternate Member was M. Andre Ganem.
in his belief, Vandenberg, even in his statements in Committee V, had not pressed for immediate adjustment, and that it was his understanding that what the U. S. wanted at this time was a recognition that the present U. S. contribution should not be a precedent.

Two suggestions were put forward by the French delegate (1) that the Subcommittee defer any discussion of the foreign exchange element until it received advice on the results of Vandenberg’s discussions with the U. S. Secretary of the Treasury, and (2) that the Subcommittee seriously consider Rueff’s (France) proposal in Committee V that the Secretariat Fiscal Committee be requested for a redefinition of “capacity to pay.”

Speaking as Chairman and the representative of Mexico, Martinez-Cabanas recalled that only the matter of administrative budgets was before the Subcommittee. He also pointed out that the SYG’s remarks on establishing a floor on contributions, as well as a ceiling, would have to be discussed. He expressed some doubt that contributions could be too closely related to per capita income in view of the fact that quotas were essentially based on national income.

[Here follow other items of the summary.]

AUSTIN

501.AB/11-2240: Telegram

Senator Austin to the Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT NEW YORK, November 22, 1946—4:30 p.m.
[Received 5:49 p.m.]

840. For Hiss from Sandifer. Senator Vandenberg has addressed to me the following memorandum concerning the reply to his telegram to Clayton concerning possible assistance to countries in need of dollar exchange for payment of UN contributions (No. 825). Dept’s telegram to Vandenberg was sent to CFM (Secdel 1175, Nov. 20, 4 p.m.).

“You have seen the Acheson message in response to my inquiry to Mr. Clayton regarding the use of the International Monetary Fund in connection with the settlement of UN assessments by countries which are short of dollar exchange. The message says: ‘International Monetary Fund when in operation will undoubtedly be of great assistance to countries short of dollars, but Fund will not be in active operation until some time next year.’

This matter is of such vital importance to most of the member nations—and has such intimate bearing upon the allocation of assessments—that I wish it could be possible for us to get more definitely and specifically encouraging message from Washington on the subject. I cannot overemphasize the effect this will have on the whole subject.

See footnote 6, p. 483.
of both administrative and operations allocations. The Acheson message intimates generically that the international monetary fund ‘when in operation’ will be of assistance when it gets into ‘operation sometime next year’. Most of these assessments will be payable ‘sometime next year’. Therefore, the time element would not be a barrier to the usefulness of assurances for the future if the assurances could take a somewhat more definite form. Even if we were able to expand the settlement of these UN accounts into sterling as well as dollars, it would be a great and welcome relief. I should think there ought to be some way that the international monetary fund could promise top priority to the problem of facilitating the settlement of UN internal accounts and to seek to create some specific machinery for this purpose because the successful financing of UN is at the base of all international cooperation.

The question I submit to you is this. Is it impossible for the State Department at Washington to give us a more concrete or at least a more encouraging reply to my original question? The report which I have to make on this subject on the UN Contributions Committee will have a far-reaching impact upon the whole UN fiscal problem which involves such vital considerations for the US.”

Would appreciate your taking any feasible steps to have this question re-examined in the light of the additional considerations set forth by Senator Vandenberg. It is important, if at all possible, to enable him to give to the Contributions Committee the more concrete and encouraging statement which he stresses. [Sandifer.]

AUSTIN

740.00119 Council/11-2646: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to Senator Vandenberg of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1946—1 p. m.

Secdel 1194. As you know, International Monetary Fund operates on basis of fixed quotas to each country for the purchase of dollars with their local currency. Under Articles of Agreement, Fund cannot start operating, however, until exchange rates have been fixed for countries having about two-thirds of such quotas. When this has been done, the countries for which exchange rates have been fixed can then purchase dollars up to the limit of their quota paying for same in their local currency. Such purchases are approved only for current transactions which however would include payments of UN assessments.

Since there is now a disparity of from one hundred to eight hundred percent between official and actual market rates of exchange in many countries, particularly in Europe, you will appreciate, I am sure, the great difficulty which the Fund faces in fixing a proper rate. Up to now no rates have been fixed. The Fund expects to begin operations

*Drafted by the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Clayton).*
sometime this winter. At such time, the amount of dollar exchange that the members of the Fund exclusive of the United States and the United Kingdom could purchase from the Fund in the first year of operation is over three-quarters of a billion dollars provided the necessary conditions of purchase are met.

If there is any further information desired please let me know.

ACHESON

TO Files: US/A/M (Chr.)/30

Minutes of the Thirtieth Meeting of the United States Delegation,
New York, Hotel Pennsylvania, November 27, 1946, 9:00 a.m.

SECRET

[Here follow list of names of persons (30) present and discussion of previous items on the agenda.]

Payment of United Nations Assessments in Local Currencies

Senator Vandenberg said that one of the fundamental questions in connection with United Nations assessments was whether they might be paid in local currencies. He read to the Delegation a statement which he intended to make before Committee V as follows:

Pursuant to my promise to your Committee, I have made a thorough examination of the possibilities that United Nations assessments may hereafter be paid in local currencies. I regret that my report cannot be more immediately encouraging. But there is substantial hope of some relief along these lines next year through the International Monetary Fund.

This Fund operates on the basis of fixed quotas to each country for the purchase of dollars with their local currency. The Fund cannot operate, however, until exchange rates have been fixed for countries having about two-thirds of such quotas. Up to now no such rates have been fixed, the difficulty being that there is a disparity of from one hundred per cent to eight hundred per cent between official and actual market rates of exchange in many countries.

But it is expected that the Fund will begin operations sometime this Winter. At such time, the amount of dollar exchange that Members of the Fund, exclusive of the United States and the United Kingdom, could purchase from the Fund in the first year of operation is over three-quarters of a billion dollars provided the necessary conditions of purchase are met.

This is the most important part of my report. Approved transactions through the Fund will include payments of United Nations assessments.

I have found no way, except through the Fund, that assistance can
be made available in connection with the problem submitted to my study.\(^{16}\)

The meeting adjourned at 9:45 a.m.

---

10 Files: US/A/C.5/49

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William Hall of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers\(^{17}\)

CONFIDENTIAL


Mr. Martinez\(^{18}\) of Mexico asked Mr. David Pitblado of the U.K., Mr. Orlov\(^{19}\) of the U.S.S.R., and myself to meet with him this afternoon.

At this session he proposed that the United States contribution be set at 40 percent; that the United Kingdom, Soviet Union, France, and China be asked to pay a contribution equivalent to the Committee of Contributions' recommendations plus 20 percent; and that countries other than the Big Five be asked to pay the Committee on Contributions' recommendation plus 5 percent with the exception of Canada, India, Czechoslovakia, and Poland which would be exempt from the 5 percent additional amount.

I said that we would prefer to consider the contributions question from the standpoint of the present provisional scale and, departing from that, show increases and decreases; that further our present instructions were that the United States contribution should not be more than 37½ percent, and I felt sure personally that there would be no possibility of obtaining approval of a contribution of 40 percent. Pitblado and Orlov objected strenuously to the use of the provisional scale as a basis for contributions and also objected very strongly to Martinez's proposal that a heavier assessment should apply to the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union than to the smaller countries. They cited the argument which we have been using, namely, that all countries had equal rights in the organization. The small countries had the same voting rights with the exception of the veto and that, in addition, countries other than the Big Five received many specific benefits from the United Nations organization.

Martinez then said he would prepare a scale which was based on a 10 percent reduction in the United States contribution which would

---

\(^{16}\) Senator Vandenberg's statement to the Sub-committee was printed in the Sub-committee's report to the Fifth Committee; see GA (1/2), Fifth Committee, p. 319.

\(^{17}\) Addressed by Mr. Hall to Senator Vandenberg.

\(^{18}\) Dr. Martinez-Cabanas was chairman of the Sub-committee.

\(^{19}\) Mr. N. V. Orlov, Soviet Adviser-Member on the Fifth Committee.
be based on a 39.89 percent contribution by the United States and which would provide for contributions by other countries in accordance with the index proposed by the Contributions Committee plus approximately 7\(\frac{1}{2}\) percent with the exception of China which had agreed to pay an additional amount because of its under-assessment, and Argentina and Brazil who had also agreed to pay additional amounts because of their under-assessments. He also agreed to put into his calculations Sweden at 2 percent and Afghanistan and Iceland at .04 and to provide for a floor on contributions at .04.

Pitblado then raised the question as to how the 2.08 percent of the new members might be provided in the scale which would apply to the 1946 budget. He said that, in line with the United States argument that the allowance of war dislocation should be revised downward each year, it seemed reasonable to him to ask the United States to carry this additional amount for the financial year 1946 in which the war dislocation was the greatest. He said he thought the United Kingdom Government would be willing to include in the Sub-committee report a statement to the effect that the scale should be revised each year for the next few years to take into account economic recoveries of the war-damaged countries; that the Sub-committee had noted the view of the United States representative that 33\(\frac{1}{3}\) percent constituted a reasonable ceiling for any one country; further that, while the Committee was not prepared as yet to set a definitive figure for such a ceiling, it recognized that under normal conditions some such figure as that proposed by the United States would not be unreasonable as the highest normal rate of contribution of any one nation. The Committee might also note that it would be anticipated that each year for the next several years the contributions of those countries which are today paying a proportionately large scale of contributions, namely, the United States, Canada, Argentina, Brazil, and Sweden, and others would expect some reduction in their contributions to take account of economic recoveries.

I said that I did not know what the attitude of the United States Delegation would be on this proposal; that I appreciated the difficulties which the Committee would face in apportioning the Swedish contribution over the 1946 contributions; and that, while I could appreciate the mechanical advantages of the United States acceptance of the additional contribution, I would want to consult my Delegation as [to] the political difficulties which might be encountered within the United States.

I said further that, insofar as the proposed 39 percent contribution for the United States to the 1947 budget and the Working Capital Fund was concerned, I could make no commitment and would put them on notice that our present instructions would not permit us to
agree to any such figures, and that I would make an effort to obtain further particular instructions on this point.20

20 In telegram 873, November 28, 8:40 p. m., from New York, Senator Austin informed the Department that "The French Delegation would make every effort to work with the Subcommittee on Contributions in arriving at a solution which would be fair to the U.S." This information was conveyed by M. Georges Pelissel, French Adviser-Member on the Fifth Committee. M. Pelissel said that "His Delegation was much impressed by Vandenberg's statesmanlike handling of the difficult problem." (501.BB Summaries/11-2846)
leaving the provisional scale in effect for 1946 and the Working Capital Fund.

As usual, this was violently opposed by everyone present at the meeting. It was agreed that Mr. Martinez would prepare for presentation a scale based on a United States contribution of 37.5 per cent, a United States contribution of 42 per cent, and a United States contribution of 39 per cent. We then proceeded to develop the attached scale which is based on the Committee scale reduced mathematically to a United States contribution of 39 per cent, which spreads certain other downward adjustments and the difference between 39 and 39.89 per cent for the United States.

It was agreed that the members of the Committee, other than the United States, would discuss the scale with the several representatives on Committee 5 to obtain their reactions.

During the discussion of the scale it became apparent that the Soviets were unwilling to accept their fair share of the increase. I pressed Mr. Orlov until the increase for the Soviet Union and the two Republics equaled .5, which was Mr. Geraschenko’s earlier commitment to me on the total Soviet increase. At that point Mr. Orlov refused to discuss the matter further and we left the Soviet figure at 6.43 per cent.

I am sure that the United Kingdom and other Delegations will insist on a reappraisal of the Soviet contribution in the Subcommittee. This is particularly true because of the sizeable increases assumed by several of the countries and the very small difference (.33) between the French and the Soviet Union contributions.

Mr. Ganem of the French Delegation was very helpful in agreeing to assume additional burdens. It seems to me that the French (at 6.12) have assumed more than a fair share of their cost of the Organization.

The United Kingdom contribution might, it seems to me, be increased to 12 per cent, but I doubt if they would be willing to agree to any such increase unless the Soviet contribution is also raised.

[Annex]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Committee on Contributions Scale</th>
<th>Provisional Scale</th>
<th>Draft Subcommittee Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1.50%</td>
<td>2.983%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>2.875</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.329</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.256</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>2.983</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byelorussian SSR</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.738</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Committee on Contributions Scale</td>
<td>Provisional Scale</td>
<td>Draft Subcommittee Scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>3.10%</td>
<td>4.362%</td>
<td>3.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.994</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>6.400</td>
<td>5.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.610</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.610</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1.447</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.640</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>1.497</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.256</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>5.602</td>
<td>6.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.394</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>4.391</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.610</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.384</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>1.615</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.428</td>
<td>1.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.994</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.640</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.610</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.256</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.231</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.295</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.989</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>1.497</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian SSR</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>1.231</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>6.892</td>
<td>6.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>10.50</td>
<td>14.768</td>
<td>11.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>49.89</td>
<td>24.614</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.502</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.502</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.738</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100.00  100.00  100.00
New York, November 30, 1946.

My Dear Mr. Secretary: Our various United Nation budget problems will shortly come to a climax. I want you to know the situation at first hand because I think the fiscal situation can be a far greater threat to the United Nations (and particularly to the attitudes of the American people) than even the veto \(^{22}\) issue.

As you know, an Advisory Committee \(^{22}\) (including our Mr. Appleby) reported that the United States has 50% of the United Nations “capacity to pay” annual assessments. I have been fighting this percentage in my Committee for five weeks. I fear that any such assessment against us would shock the American people into a literal revolt. We now have some hope of driving this percentage down to 39% or 40% for administrative expenditures, (on a temporary basis for one year). Even this will be difficult to “sell” to Congress and the American people. But this is only half the story.

Unfortunately, each UN “specialized agency” is virtually autonomous in making its budgets and its allocations. Undoubtedly, they will be largely influenced by the basic percentage of assessment which we accept for the central budget. This in turn produces hazardous consequences. The trouble is that all members of the United Nations are not members of the specialized agencies. For instance, only one-half of them belong to UNESCO. Therefore, a 40% base will become substantially higher when applied to the UNESCO budget. This is relatively true in connection with the budgets of all “specialized agencies” (which are being created entirely too rapidly and too ambitiously).

\(^{21}\) For documentation on this subject, see pp. 251 ff.

\(^{22}\) Senator Vandenberg’s intended reference here was to the Committee on Contributions, not to be confused with the General Assembly’s other standing committee on administrative and fiscal matters, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.
Consider the refugee prospectus. The State Department is talking about an American assessment for IRO between 43% and 50%. But! It is also proposed to launch IRO when seventy-five percent of its budget has been subscribed. Meanwhile, our dollar contribution would remain the same. This means it could actually represent an assessment against us of 66⅔ percent. I think this would excite the same sort of Congressional resistance as nearly defeated our 72% assessment in UNRRA.

I have been struggling to get one unified budget not only for the Central Office but also for all "Specialized Agencies." 23 I seriously fear the Congressional reaction when eight or ten separate and different budgets are submitted to Congress one by one. It will be impossible to accomplish anything along this line at this General Assembly except to order a study for future consideration. 24

This leaves us confronting uncoordinated budgets for 1947 and dangerously high percentages of American contribution. I, therefore, think it is highly important that all of our American representatives in "Specialized Agencies" should be emphatically instructed by the State Department to hold all 1947 budgets to an absolute minimum and likewise to hold our net contribution in the neighborhood of 40%. 25

With warm personal regards and best wishes,

Cordially and faithfully,

A. H. VANDENBERG

23 See points (3) and (4) of Senator Vandenberg's proposals to the Fifth Committee on November 8, footnote 82, p. 472.
24 See Fifth Committee discussions on November 18 in GA(1/2), Fifth Committee, pp. 125-128. These discussions in turn led on November 21 to the adoption of a draft resolution by the Committee which requested the Secretary General to explore ways for developing "a system of close budgetary and financial relationships between the United Nations and the specialized agencies...." (ibid., pp. 140-143). A resolution to this effect was adopted by the General Assembly on December 14 (United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, Second Part, Plenary Meetings, p. 1376; hereafter cited as GA(1/2), Plenary).
25 In a memorandum of December 1 from New York to the Acting Secretary (Acheson), Mr. Byrnes wrote: "I think we ought to adopt Vandenberg's suggestion and instruct our representatives along the lines proposed by him." (501.AB/11-3046). The Secretary informed Senator Vandenberg of his decision on the same date (memorandum from the Secretary of State to Senator Vandenberg, December 1, File No. 501.AB/11-3046).
SECRET US URGENT NEW YORK, December 6, 1946—10:25 p.m. [via Courier]

938. GA Secret Summary.
[Here follow the first two items of the summary.]

Subcommittee on Contributions of Committee V (3rd Meeting)

Developments at the Subcommittee meeting on December 6 indicated to the USdel representative that the U.S. could probably obtain approval of a 39.89 per cent contribution for 1946 but would have difficulty ensuring that this figure would apply for only one year.

Chairman Martinez (Mexico) stated that there were three issues before the Subcommittee requiring an answer from USdel. He listed them as, a 39 per cent contribution for the U.S. for 1947; assumption of the contributions of the three new members which would bring the 1946 contribution to 41.59 per cent; and acceptance of the 1947 scale for 1948.

The Contributions Committee's recommendations for the new members were presented as, Sweden 2.20 per cent; Afghanistan—.03 per cent; Iceland—.02 per cent. It was agreed that separate scales were required for 1946 and 1947. It was also agreed that the GA's basic resolution requiring adjustment of the Working Capital Fund to fit the 1946 contribution scale would have to altered to provide for the adjustments to be made to the 1947 scale.

Ganem (France) supported in principle a limitation on contributions and inquired whether the U.S. might be willing to accept for 1946 the 2.69 per cent contributed by new members in 1947. Orlov (USSR) supported the French proposal and stated that the adopted scale should apply for 1946, 1947, and 1948 since no substantial change in world economic conditions could be expected in the next few years. He urged the Subcommittee to consider whether a 39 per cent U.S. contribution represented too great a deviation from the principle of capacity to pay.

Pitblado (U.K.) supported the French request that the U.S. absorb the differential between the 1946 and 1947 scales. He recommended that the 1947 scale should also apply to the Working Capital Fund. He recognized the validity of the U.S. arguments for a ceiling, but thought the difficulty came in fixing the limitation on the normal amount, referring to the mystic 40 per cent.
Geraschenko (U.S.S.R.) urged the U.S. to absorb the 2.59 per cent contributions of new members as a gesture of good will. He argued for a three-year scale and agreed to a 39 per cent contribution for the U.S. for 1947.

Chairman Martinez's suggested scales for 1946 and 1947 were supported in general by France and the U.K. These scales called for a 39.89 per cent contribution from the U.S. for 1946 and a 39 per cent 1947 contribution for the budget and Working Capital Fund. The U.K. was set at 11.98 for 1946 and 11.65 per cent for 1947. The U.S.S.R. would pay 6.62 for 1946 and 6.43 per cent for 1947.

AUSTIN

---

10 Files: US/A/C.5/57

United States Delegation Position Paper

SECRET

United States Contribution to the Administrative Budget of the United Nations

Recommendations:

1. The Delegation of the United States is prepared to recommend to Congress that we accept as our contribution to the 1946 and 47 Budget and the Working Capital Fund a figure not to exceed 39.89 percent of the total, with the following distinct reservation:

   a. That under no circumstances do we consent that under normal conditions any one nation should pay more than a maximum of 33-1/3 percent in an organization of "sovereign equals."

   b. That the difference between 33-1/3 percent and 39 percent is voluntarily assumed by us for 1947 and for the Working Capital Fund because we recognize that normal post-war economic relationships have not yet been restored and we are willing to accept this added, temporary assessment to assist the United Nations in meeting the emergency.

2. The Delegation of the United States is unwilling to have any contributions figure set for 1948 or thereafter. It believes that since the scale reflects abnormal economic conditions, the scale should be annually reviewed to reflect whatever economic changes occur from year to year. It would also anticipate that other factors than so-called "relative capacity to pay" will be given hereafter the consideration they deserve as a matter of sound public policy in an international organization of "sovereign equals."
3. The Delegation of the United States will request that this statement be made a part of the record of the General Assembly.  

---

501.BB Summaries/12-946: Telegram

Senator Austin to the Secretary of State

SECRET  US URGENT  NEW YORK, December 9, 1946—10 p.m.
[via Courier]

948. GA Secret Summary.

Committee V, Subcommittee on Contributions (4th Meeting).

Senator Vandenberg on December 9 stated the "final" U.S. position on scales of contribution pointing out that an amount not exceeding 38.89 [39.89?] per cent of the UN budget and Working Capital Fund was the limit that could be recommended for Congressional approval.

There were two reservations which he wished to make clear, Vandenberg said. (1) Under no circumstances could the U.S. consent to any one nation paying more than a maximum of 33 1/3 per cent under normal conditions, and (2) the U.S. was voluntarily assuming the larger percentage for the 1947 budget and Working Capital Fund as a temporary assessment to assist the UN in an emergency post-war period of economic allocations.

The U.S. was unwilling, he added, to have any scale of contributions established for 1948 or thereafter because any scale should reflect economic changes which occur from year to year and should annually be reviewed. Vandenberg asserted that the U.S. anticipated that factors other than "capacity to pay" would hereafter be given serious consideration as a matter of sound public policy in an international organization of "sovereign equals."

Discussion closed without agreement being reached on the U.S. position or on a counter proposal that the U.S. assume 40.27 per cent

---

26 This 3-paragraph statement was introduced into the Sub-Committee record by Senator Vandenberg on December 9 (see telegram 948, December 9, from New York, infra). It was incorporated in its entirety into the Sub-Committee's report to the Fifth Committee (GA(1/2), Fifth Committee, pp. 318 ff., note p. 320) and into the Fifth Committee's Report to the General Assembly (see footnote 27, p. 499 for this citation). The United States statement was preceded in the Fifth Committee's Report by the following: "After discussion in the Sub-Committee the delegation of the United States agreed, notwithstanding their previous statements, to accept as an emergency contribution of 39.89 per cent, with the reservation that the following statement would be included in the records of the General Assembly: . . . ."
for 1946 and 39 per cent for 1947. Further alternative proposals, it appeared were being worked out by the Chairman.  

[Here follows discussion of other items.]

AUSTIN

V. ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

10 Files: USGA/In/Exec Off/2

Minutes of Meeting of Executive Officers of the United States Delegation, London, January 16, 1946, 9 a.m.

SECRET

CHECK LIST OF POINTS RAISED AND ACTION TAKEN

[Here follows brief commentary on first point under discussion.]

2. It was pointed out that the Journal  summary of the WFTU  discussion in the General Committee was unsatisfactory. The basic

---

27 At the 5th meeting of the Sub-Committee on December 11 the Sub-Committee reached agreement on an unanimous basis on a scale of contributions for 1946 and 1947 in which the United States was allotted 39.29 percent for each year; this meeting is reported in a detailed secret summary sent to the Department in telegram 955, December 11, 11:15 p.m., from New York (561 BB Summaries/12-1148).

The Sub-Committee’s report (GA(1/2), Fifth Committee, pp. 318 ff) was discussed in the Fifth Committee on December 12 (ibid., pp. 254 and 255), at which time Senator Vandenberg paid special tribute to Dr. Martinez-Cabanas for securing unanimous agreement in the Sub-Committee, and on December 13 (ibid., pp. 272 ff), when the Committee adopted the Sub-Committee’s report by 83 votes, with no opposition, the remaining members abstaining.

For the Report of the Fifth Committee to the General Assembly concerning the scale of contributions of the United Nations budgets for 1946 and 1947 and the Working Capital Fund, see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, Second Part, Supplement No. 4, pp. 58 and 59. For the resolution adopted by the General Assembly, December 14, embodying a scale of contributions for 1946 and 1947 which allocated to the United States a contribution of 39.29 percent (Resolution 69 (1)), see ibid., p. 60. For an “Explanatory Note” regarding the resolutions adopted in connection with the 1946 and 1947 budgets, see ibid., p. 62.

28 Short title for the master files of the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State.

29 United Nations, Journal of the General Assembly, First Session. As the Journal was subsequently discontinued, all citations are rather to the permanent official records which were then adopted and which incorporated retroactively the earlier verbatim record of the Journal in the case of the General Assembly itself and a summary record of the Journal for the Committees of the General Assembly, in this case of the General Committee. The meeting of the General Committee in this instance was that of January 15, 10:30 a.m. The reader should refer to United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, First Part, General Committee, p. 2. (Hereafter cited as GA(1/1), General Committee.)

30 The historical background of the World Federation of Trade Unions is described in an enclosure to the communication cited in footnote 35, p. 500.
issue had been whether the WFTU should be invited to speak before the General Assembly. Kuznetsov (U.S.S.R.) spoke on behalf of the WFTU as well as in the role of a Soviet Delegate taking the position that the desires of WFTU were clearly set forth in their letters to Mr. Jebb. The Secretariat had been of the opinion that no action should be taken until the WFTU clarified its demands. A long discussion took place on inviting the WFTU to appear before the General Committee. The debate was primarily a struggle between the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. Mr. Spaak was indecisive. Mr. McNeil of the United Kingdom carried the discussion with vigor and aggressiveness, and more than covered the points which the United States Delegation felt should have been made. The General Committee finally took the position, with the Russians agreeing, that a General Committee subcommittee should meet with a WFTU delegation and make a recommendation concerning the relationship of that body to the General Assembly but not the relationship of the WFTU to ECOSOC. The General Committee would then examine the report of the subcommittee and the Committee itself could invite the WFTU to appear before it but such action could not be taken by an individual Delegate.

[Here follow further brief comment on this question and discussion of other items pending before the United States Delegation at this time.]

The Principal Adviser on the United States Delegation (Hiss) to the Secretary of State


THE PROBLEM

The question of the relations of the World Federation of Trade Unions to UNO was discussed at a meeting of the Subcommittee of

---

Vassili V. Kuznetsov, Soviet delegate on the General Committee.

Mr. H. M. Gladwyn Jebb who was serving in a temporary capacity as Executive Secretary of the United Nations pending the election of the Secretary-General; the "letters" referred to here consisted of a communication dated December 13, 1945, with enclosure, from the Secretary-General of the WFTU, Mr. Louis Saillant, to the President of the Preparatory Commission which sat in London in late 1945, preceding the General Assembly; see GA (1/1), General Committee, pp. 33 ff., annex 2. As the letter arrived too late for consideration by the Preparatory Commission, and the objectives of the Federation stated therein were not deemed by Mr. Jebb to be sufficiently clear for consideration by the General Assembly, a certain confusion existed at this time as to the nature of the WFTU request.

For a second letter written sent by the WFTU see footnote 37, p. 503.

Paul-Henri Spaak, President of the General Assembly.

Hector McNeil, British Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Alternate Delegate on the British Delegation to the General Assembly.
the General Committee on January 16 from 9 p.m. to 12:30 a.m. 36 The WFTU representatives were Messrs. Citrine, Saillant, Jouhaux and Kuznetsov.

Three principal problems were discussed:

1. Collaboration with the Assembly
2. Collaboration with the ECOSOC
3. The right to vote in the ECOSOC

1. Collaboration with the Assembly
The representatives of the WFTU were asked two questions:

(i) Would they desire a permanent seat in the Assembly?
(ii) Would they claim the right to speak whenever they wanted in the Assembly?

The answer to the first question was a definite “yes”. The representatives said that they had not discussed the second question but that they recognized that there would have to be some restriction upon their action in this connection.

2. Collaboration with the ECOSOC
There was no disagreement that relations with the ECOSOC were provided for under Article 71 of the Charter. The WFTU however wanted the General Committee to recommend to the General Assembly that it recommend to the ECOSOC that arrangements be made to provide for regular and permanent consultation with the WFTU. The Labor representatives apparently had in mind having a seat in every meeting of the ECOSOC. Most of the time of the meeting was devoted to the issue of whether the General Assembly should make recommendations to the ECOSOC on this matter. No decision was reached.

3. The Right To Vote in the ECOSOC
The Labor representatives indicated that they would take up at some future time the question of a right to vote in the ECOSOC. They recognized that this would require an amendment to the Charter.

36 In a covering memorandum dated January 18 (apparently drafted on January 17) Mr. Hiss told the Secretary of State that it was expected that on January 18 the General Committee would hear the report of the “Subcommittee of 4 which was appointed to ascertain the request of the WFTU. There is attached a memorandum stating what occurred when the Subcommittee met with the WFTU representatives last night and setting forth recommendations as to the position which we feel the United States should take on this question.” The Secretary was urged to attend this meeting in person “... in view of the importance of the WFTU issues. ...” (501.BB/1-1846)

No meeting of the General Committee was held on January 18, however, and the Sub-committee’s views were not received by the Committee until January 21. Presumably the Sub-committee was awaiting the clarification of the WFTU’s objectives desired by the Secretariat, which was conveyed by the WFTU in its letter of January 17; see footnote 37, p. 508.
The question was also raised whether the Subcommittee was going to recommend that the WFTU representatives be given a hearing by the General Committee. They were told that this was a question for the General Committee to decide and not for the Subcommittee to decide.

**Recommended U. S. Position**

It is recommended that the U. S. should take the general position that the WFTU is not a unique case to be considered only on its own merits but that any privileges extended to it would also have to be accorded to other large international non-governmental organizations.

In the specific issues raised it is recommended that:

1. **Collaboration with the Assembly**
   
The United States should take a definite position that the WFTU is not entitled to a seat in the Assembly nor to the privilege of speaking in the Assembly.
   
   This point was raised by some of the British representatives with Mr. Bevin this morning and he stated emphatically that no such right or privilege should be given the WFTU.

2. **Collaboration with ECOSOC**
   
The United States should take the position that this is a matter to be taken up by ECOSOC in connection with Article 71 of the Charter and that no action by either the General Assembly or the General Committee would be appropriate until a recommendation on the matter has been made by ECOSOC.

3. **The Right To Vote in the ECOSOC**
   
   If our recommended position under point 2 is sustained this question will not arise. If it does arise, the United States should definitely oppose any action which would lead to the granting of the right to vote.

4. **Further Hearing of the WFTU by the General Committee**
   
The United States should take the position that the Subcommittee has now heard the wishes of the WFTU and that there is no need for the General Committee to hear any further statement from them. If any question arises requiring clarification, the Subcommittee might meet again with the representatives of the WFTU in order to save the time of the full Committee.
United Nations Organization

IO Files: USGA/In/Gen Com/3

United States Delegation Position Paper

SECRET

[LONDON,] January 21, 1946.

WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS ISSUE

In the General Committee, when the subcommittee which has conferred with representatives of the WFTU reports, there will apparently be three issues:

1. Whether the WFTU will have the right to sit regularly in the Assembly, and to speak at its request under special arrangements;
2. Whether the WFTU will have the special right to participate in the meetings of ECOSOC, its commissions and committees, and eventually the right to vote; and
3. The action to be taken by the General Committee on these points.

The General Committee should dispose of these questions in the following manner and for the following reasons:

1. Collaboration with and the right to vote in ECOSOC.

Provision is made in Article 71 of the Charter for consultation of non-governmental agencies with ECOSOC. Neither the General Assembly nor the General Committee should take any action on the question of relations of non-governmental organizations with ECOSOC. This is a matter for ECOSOC itself.

Recommendation: The President should be advised by the General Committee to reply in writing to the WFTU in this sense and he should inform the General Assembly of this advice.

The second WFTU letter, dated January 17, and signed by Sir Walter Citrine, President of the Federation, as well as the Secretary-General, Mr. Saillant, had been received by the Sub-Committee during its deliberations, and stated in pertinent part: "We feel it should be possible for representatives of the World Federation of Trade Unions to be invited to sit in the Assembly in an advisory and consultative capacity, and also to be brought into regular consultation, under the provisions of Article 71 of the Charter, with the Economic and Social Council. We would also hope that, at a later date, the World Federation of Trade Unions would be accorded full participation in the work of the Economic and Social Council, with the right to vote." (For complete text, see GA(I/1), General Committee, pp. 28-40, annex 2a)

By January 21 the General Committee also had received requests from three more non-governmental organizations for association with the organs of the United Nations along the general lines of the request from the WFTU: the International Cooperative Alliance, the International Federation of Women, and the American Federation of Labor (see ibid., pp. 40 ff., annexes 2b, 2c, and 2d). From the outset of the meeting of the General Committee on January 21, when he "submitted that the World Federation of Trade Unions was an organization of a totally different character from the other three....", the chairman of the Ukrainian Delegation to the General Assembly (Manulsky), was associated with the initiative in all attempts undertaken to establish a special status for the WFTU on this basis, first in the General Committee, then in the First Committee, and finally on the floor of the General Assembly.
2. Collaboration with the Assembly.

The United States should take a definite position against the proposals of the WFTU on this issue and should vote against it in the General Committee for the following reasons:

a. UNO is an association of governments. The Charter of the United Nations does not make any provision for relations between the Assembly and private organizations or individuals. Furthermore, there is no such provision in the rules of procedure.

b. The Charter provides under Article 71 for a special type of relations between the ECOSOC and private non-governmental organizations. By implication the Charter does not contemplate any similar relations directly with the General Assembly.

c. If any particular private international organization is given a special relationship with the General Assembly, the General Assembly would undoubtedly find it necessary to deal similarly with a large number of applications from other similar organizations.

Recommendation: The General Committee should advise the President to reply in writing to the WFTU in this sense and he should inform the General Assembly of this advice.


a. The U.S. representative should make it completely clear in his statements that they are not based on any antagonism toward the WFTU but are based on general constitutional considerations and that the position of the United States would be the same regardless of what private non-governmental organization made a similar request.

4. Procedural question of a recommendation to the General Assembly.

a. There is an additional argument why the General Committee should not recommend to the Assembly that the WFTU request should be granted, i.e., the procedural ground that the General Committee has no authority to make recommendations on substantive issues. The most that the General Committee is empowered to do is to refer such matters to the Assembly with a factual report and without recommendations.

5. Possible request for right to speak before General Assembly.

a. Some member of the General Committee may make an alternative suggestion that the Committee recommend to the Assembly that the WFTU be invited to speak before the Assembly at this meeting. We should oppose such a proposal on the following grounds:

1. The General Committee does not have the right to recommend action on the request of a private individual or organization.
2. It is not authorized by the Rules of the Assembly.
3. It would set a bad precedent.
It is recommended that the U.S. maintain this opposition so as to preserve its right to oppose the proposal in the Assembly.

6. Further Hearing of the WFTU by the General Committee.

The United States should take the position that the subcommittee has now heard the wishes of the WFTU and that there is no need for the General Committee to hear any further statement from them. If any question arises requiring clarification, the subcommittee might meet again with the representatives of the WFTU in order to save the time of the full Committee.\[38\]

\[38\] For the statements by Senator Connally, United States delegate on the General Committee, to the Committee on January 21 and January 24, in support of the United States position outlined in this memorandum, see GA (I/1), General Committee, pp. 9 and 12. The essence of his argument was that “the admission of any organization to permanent participation of the kind suggested infringed the provisions of the Charter, which were based on the principle of national representation by Governments”. (Ibid., p. 12).

The question of the representation of non-governmental bodies on the organs of the United Nations continued under the jurisdiction of the General Committee until February 2, at which time the General Assembly received it in the form of a report from the General Committee (see GA (I/1), General Committee, pp. 2-15, passim; pp. 33 ff., annex 2 and appendages; and United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, First Part, Plenary Meetings, pp. 578 ff., annex 5 [the latter hereafter cited as GA (I/1), Plenary]). The General Assembly on February 2 voted immediately to put the WFTU request on its agenda, and passed the problem on to its First Committee (Ibid., pp. 326 ff.). On February 14 the General Assembly received a report from the First Committee on the subject with a proposed resolution (United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, First Part, First Committee, pp. 667 ff. [hereafter cited as GA (I/1), First Committee]), and adopted the proposed resolution on February 14 (United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, First Part, Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly during the First Part of the First Session, p. 10; in the subsequent serialization of the resolutions of the General Assembly this was named Resolution 4 (1)). The complicated maneuvering that occurred both in the General Committee and the First Committee during this period may be traced in the official records of those Committees; General Committee references have been noted above; for the First Committee see GA (I/1), First Committee, pp. 15-35, passim; for the report by the General Assembly on February 14, see GA (I/1), Plenary, pp. 501 ff. This problem was canvassed exhaustively by the United States Delegation in meetings from January 25 to February 8; minutes are found in the IO Files, series USGA/In/Del. Min. (Chr.).

Throughout this period the United States, represented by Senator Connally in both the Committees and in the General Assembly, adopted a position based on the principles enunciated in numbered paragraph (2) (“Collaboration with the Assembly”) of this memorandum, and as a result the final resolution contained no provision for consultative relationships between non-governmental organizations and the General Assembly. Also by the end of the General Committee phase there was a complete acceptance of the United States view that there could be no question of granting an organization representation with the right to vote in any of the organs of the United Nations as this would constitute an amendment of the Charter. This principle was explicitly stated in the Report of the General Committee to the General Assembly and in the Report of the First Committee to the General Assembly.

Regarding the points set forth in numbered paragraph (1) (“Collaboration with the right to vote in ECOSOC”) of this memorandum, the United States subsequently modified its position, accepting a proposal that the WFTU request should be transmitted by the General Assembly to ECOSOC with a recommendation that suitable arrangements be established as soon as possible; at the same time the United States insisted that the same status be accorded to certain other non-governmental organizations. The resolution adopted by the General Assembly, incorporating these provisions relating to ECOSOC, was based on a draft originally put forward in the First Committee by the United States.
Editorial Note

On June 21, 1946 at the end of its Second Session the Economic and Social Council, in pursuance of the General Assembly's resolution of February 14, agreed upon principles and procedures for the admission of non-governmental organizations to a relationship with ECOSOC, established three categories of eligible organizations, defined their privileges, and set up a standing committee to constitute a channel for establishing effective consultation between the organizations and the Council. The World Federation of Trade Unions, the International Co-operative Alliance and the American Federation of Labor were placed in the first category, designated as "category (a)"; this was defined as including "organizations which have a basic interest in most of the activities of the Council and are closely linked with the economic or social life of the areas which they represent". The June 21 decisions of ECOSOC were based on the report of a special committee that had been appointed by ECOSOC on February 18 to implement the General Assembly's resolution of February 14. In turn the report leaned heavily on a memorandum of May 17, 1946 submitted by the United States Representative on the Economic and Social Council (Winant) and a working paper forwarded to the Council by the United Nations Secretariat. Before the Council took final action on the report the Soviet Union offered amendments that would have given the WFTU the right to participate without vote in the meetings of the Council and those of its commissions and committees. In the discussion that followed, concluding with the defeat of the Soviet proposals, the United States Representative (Winant) stated the position of the United States Government that no non-governmental organization should be given rights not accorded to a Member State of the United Nations not on the Council. For the June 21 proceedings of the Council see United Nations, Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, First Year, Second Session, pages 108 ff. (hereafter cited as ESC (II) [ECOSOC records are denoted by session rather than by year]). For the report of the special committee on which the Council's decisions of June 21 were based, see ibid., page 318 ff., annex 8a; for Part IV of this report, printed in this compilation, see annex I to United States Delegation Working Paper of November 21, 1946, p. 516. Mr. Winant's statement of June 21 is found in ESC (II), page 309. For the United States memorandum of May 17 and the United Nations Secretariat working paper alluded to above, see IO files, black binder entitled "Annotated Provisional Agenda", dated May 25, 1946, a briefing book prepared for the United States Representative (Winant) on the impending second session of ECOSOC, item II-5.
Minutes of the Twelfth Meeting of the United States Delegation,
New York, Hotel Pennsylvania, October 29, 1946, 9 a.m.

SECRET

[Here follows list of names of persons (25) present.]

REPORT ON GENERAL COMMITTEE MEETING

Invitation to Specialized Agencies

Senator Austin reported that at the meeting of the General Committee on October 27 [28], the Secretary-General had asked that there be extended an invitation such as he had given on the opening day to the heads of the specialized agencies including the ILO, FAO, PICOA [PICAO], International Monetary Fund, Bank, WHO, UNRRA and The League. The Committee approved extending the

---

28 For documentation regarding the composition and structure of the United States Delegation to the second part of the first session to the General Assembly which began at New York on October 22, see pp. 37–42.
29 In February 1946 at London the Economic and Social Council at its first session had passed a resolution providing for a Committee on Negotiations with Specialized Agencies and directing the committee to draw up draft agreement for the establishment of relationships between the United Nations and the specialized agencies. These agencies at that time were the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization (PICAO), the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. By June the Committee had negotiated agreements with the ILO, UNESCO and the FAO which were approved by the Economic and Social Council at the end of its second session on June 21, 1946. The third session of the Council, which began on October 3, 1946, saw the approval of the draft of a subsequently negotiated agreement with PICAO. In turn these approved drafts were referred by the Council to the impending session of the General Assembly for the Assembly’s approval. A brief survey of these developments and of the provisions of the draft agreements may be found in United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, Second Part, Supplement No. 2, Report by the Economic and Social Council to the General Assembly, 23 January to 3 October 1946, pp. 42–48.

From the outset the United States was very actively interested in the negotiation of these agreements and at an appropriate time the Department of State had forwarded to Mr. John G. Winant, United States Representative to the Economic and Social Council, drafts of the proposal agreements (IO Files, documents SD/SA/4, May 20, 1946 and SD/NSA/1, May 22, 1946, not printed). In a position paper of October 10, 1946, entitled “Consideration and Approval of Agreements Concluded with the Specialized Agencies” (IO Files, document SD/A/C.2/10, not printed), the Department had informed the United States Delegation to the impending session of the General Assembly that “The agreements already negotiated are, in general, satisfactory. They contain certain provisions which have been questioned from certain points of view ... but they fulfill the requirements of the Charter and leave scope for future implementation and improvement. Meanwhile, pressing substantive problems confront the United Nations and the agencies and it is of great importance that these organizations begin at once the day-to-day collaboration which is contemplated for these bodies. Hence, it is deemed advisable to get the agreements into operation speedily ...” (Relevant documentation for United States participation in this

Footnote continued on following page.
invitations to these men as guests for the whole session. They were also given the right to address the General Assembly and the committees. Senator Connally remarked that those persons would then have more privileges than members of the General Assembly. Senator Austin replied that the agencies had no rights. He pointed out that the draft agreements between the United Nations and the four specialized agencies were not yet accepted and that the Secretary-General's procedure was simply anticipating the approval of these agreements. If the Delegation disapproved of such an arrangement, the proper step, of course, would be to vote against it. Both Senators Connally and Vandenberg expressed the opinion that the agreements should not accord the representatives of specialized agencies the right to address the General Assembly.

Senator Austin continued that at the General Committee meeting he had favored the Secretariat proposal, admitting the representatives of the above-named organizations as guests. Mr. Sandifer, who had accompanied him, had approved this course. Senator Austin said that when he voted he thought he knew what the invitation meant. However, Mr. Parodi (France) moved that if one particular individual were absent when a matter concerning his agency arose, he should have the right to appoint a deputy to speak in the General Assembly. Then, Senator Austin said, he stated that he had understood that the individuals had been invited as guests only. Chairman Spaak replied that this was not the case, but that the invitation meant they could speak and attend all meetings for purposes of consultation.

Mrs. Roosevelt said that her understanding of the word "consultation" was that the heads of agencies should be consulted if the Assembly or a delegation wished to consult them, but it was up to the Assembly to take the initiative. Mr. Dulles recalled the London debates on the meaning of the word "consultation" and the Soviet view that determination of the need for consultation could be made by either party.

Senator Austin described the manoeuvre of the General Committee as a forward pass. The agencies were now out ahead of the agreements which were not yet approved. He pointed out if the Delegation did


For the text of the memorandum submitted by the Secretary-General to the General Committee on October 28, see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, Second Part, General Committee, p. 105, annex 19; hereafter cited as GA (Y/2), General Committee. For the discussion in the General Committee meeting on that date, see ibid., pp. 76 and 77.
not approve this arrangement, it could be changed in the contracts still to be signed.

Mr. Sandifer wished that Senator Austin's report should be clearly understood. When the United States agreed to the plan it had no information that the term "guest" was to be construed to mean that the representatives should have the right to speak. However, when the interpretation of the term "guests" was made, it had not been desirable to raise an objection.

Mr. Sandifer continued that the most important point of the agreements was an agreement for reciprocal representation. The specialized agencies were to be represented in United Nations meetings and vice versa. Even in the face of yesterday's move, he considered that the representatives could make statements only by invitation of the General Assembly. He said he was concerned that there should be a sound mutual basis of cooperation in view of the importance of some of the specialized agencies. Collaboration between those agencies and the United Nations was most important. However, the former had a tendency to hold back, which was explicable in part because of differences within the governments of the respective members. He cited as an example the fact that the Bank was slow about making an agreement with the United Nations. This was in part attributable to the fact that matters in connection with the Bank were handled by the Treasury rather than the State Department. A similar split in other governments explained a good deal of the reluctance of specialized agencies to conclude agreements with the United Nations.

Mr. Sandifer continued that a more important aspect of the question arose in respect to the possible parallel demands by non-governmental organizations. Manuilsky and Vishinsky had both served notice that they intended to press for a status for the WFTU similar to that granted the specialized agencies. Mr. Sandifer further remarked that it would have been much more preferable from the United States' view for the guest status to have been extended only to those four agencies which had concluded draft agreements with the Economic and Social Council, in order that there should be some advantage accruing to those who made agreements.

[Here follow brief remarks by Senator Austin, Senator Connally, and Mrs. Douglas.]

Mrs. Roosevelt believed that the emphasis should always be placed on the fact that it was an invitation extended which enabled the agencies to appear before the General Assembly. The Assembly, of

---

44 D. Z. Manuilsky, Head of the Delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and Chairman of the General Assembly's First Committee; A. A. Vishinsky, Representative of the Soviet Union to the General Assembly.
course, had the right to ask an explanation on any point. She pointed out that these agreements had been made in the Economic and Social Council and were now being submitted to the General Assembly for its approval. She could not imagine that the Economic and Social Council could have said that the agencies should appear and have a right to speak, because that could only be decided by the General Assembly, which wished to extend an invitation rather than grant a right.

Senator Austin agreed with Mrs. Roosevelt and pointed out that that concept had been stretched when the motion had been approved that there could be substitute speakers.

Senator Austin then read into the record the following paragraph from the draft agreement with the ILO: "Representatives of the International Labour Organization shall be invited to attend in a consultative capacity meetings of the General Assembly and shall be afforded full opportunity for presenting to the Assembly the views of the International Labour Organization on questions within the scope of its activities."

He noted that the agreement with the FAO and PICAO was of a somewhat different nature and read the following paragraph from the FAO agreement: "Representatives of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations shall be invited to attend meetings of the General Assembly for purposes of consultation on matters within the scope of its activities."

Mr. Bloom inquired what and when consultation would take place in the General Assembly. He stated that he thought it should be in committee and not in plenary sessions. Senator Austin said that it was his understanding that any delegate could call on the ILO representative and ask him questions. Mr. Stevenson said that he thought it had been construed that the representatives of the agencies could ask to be heard. Senator Austin replied that the record was not clear, that it was his understanding that the representatives should come as guests.

Mr. Dulles pointed out that when the Delegation talked about "consultation," it did not mean the same thing as other delegations. He cited Article 71 of the Charter and recalled the long struggle which had ensued over it. The U.S.S.R. interpreted this article to mean that the international organizations had the right rather than the privilege to be heard and even to vote, which was a very different meaning from the meaning ascribed to that article by the United States.

Senator Vandenberg said that it should be remembered that the fundamental and original concept of the United Nations was that it
was a world organization. It was commencing to mushroom entirely too fast, in Senator Vandenberg's opinion, and he thought the mushrooming was not healthy. He urged that the basic concept should be maintained, that governments and no one else sit and speak in the Assembly, except at the invitation and on the sufferance of the Assembly. If this road, which had been followed from the beginning, were left, the Assembly would wander into the wilderness.

[Here follows further discussion of this and other subjects.]

10 Files: US/A/C.2/11

United States Delegation Working Paper

CONFIDENTIAL


MEMORANDUM

REPRESENTATION OF SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AT MEETINGS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND OF ITS MAIN COMMITTEES

In view of the fact that this subject has been raised in the General Committee (October 28, 1946), and may come up in the Assembly or in one or more of the committees, the following background information may be found useful. Each of the draft agreements on the agenda for General Assembly approval contains an article on reciprocal representation. The status of representatives of the specialized agencies in respect of plenary meetings of the General Assembly is dealt with in one paragraph, and their status at meetings of the Main Committees of the General Assembly is dealt with in another paragraph.

Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly

Three of the agreements (FAO, UNESCO, and PICAO) contain essentially similar provisions to the effect that representatives of the agencies shall be invited to attend meetings of the General Assembly “for purposes of consultation” on matters within the scope of their activities (see attachment giving the texts of paragraph 3, Article II or III, in each of the four draft agreements). The corresponding provision in the draft agreement with the ILO provides that representatives of that organization shall be invited to attend meetings of the General Assembly “in a consultative capacity” and, unlike the other three agreements, goes on to state that they “shall be afforded full opportunity for presenting to the General Assembly the views of the ILO on questions within the scope of its activities”.
These provisions in the agreements with FAO, UNESCO, and PICAIO do not appear to confer upon these agencies a right to take the initiative in presenting general statements about the work of their organizations at plenary meetings of the General Assembly. The corresponding provision in the agreement with the ILO, however, might be interpreted as granting such a right. On the other hand, a case can be made that the wording of paragraph 3, Article II, of the ILO draft agreement should be taken to mean that the ILO shall be afforded full opportunity for presenting its views to the General Assembly only when questions within the scope of ILO's activities are under discussion in the General Assembly.

Meetings of Main General Assembly Committees

The paragraphs in the four agreements dealing with the question of representation of the specialized agencies at meetings of the Main Committees are essentially similar. (See attachment giving the texts of paragraph 4, Article II or III, in each of the four draft agreements.) They provide that representatives of the agencies shall be invited to attend meetings when matters within the scope of their activities are under discussion and “to participate, without vote, in such discussions”. The wording of the paragraph in the agreement with the ILO is slightly more favorable to that Organization than the corresponding wording in the other three agreements; that is, it provides the ILO with a somewhat better basis for claiming that it “has an interest” in matters under discussion.

Comments

It will be seen from the foregoing and from the texts reproduced in the attachment to this memorandum, that neither the word “guests” nor the word “observers” adequately describes the status of representatives of the specialized agencies, under their draft agreements with the UN, in respect of plenary meetings of the General Assembly or meetings of the Main Committees of the Assembly.

Pending the coming into force of the agreements between the specialized agencies and the UN, the General Assembly and its Main Committees need not accord to representatives of the four specialized agencies the treatment provided for in the draft agreements but may make ad hoc arrangements to hear them on matters within the competence of the agencies.

Although it might be argued that some differentiation should be made between the privileges accorded to representatives of specialized agencies with which agreements have been concluded and those representing agencies with which negotiations are still in progress or contemplated, it is believed that any such differentiation in treatment at
meetings of the General Assembly or of its Main Committees probably
would serve no useful purpose.  

WILLIAM A. FOWLER

[Attachment]

Relevant Texts of Four Agreements

ILO—Article II—Reciprocal Representation

"3. Representatives of the International Labour Organization shall
be invited to attend in a consultative capacity meetings of the General
Assembly and shall be afforded full opportunity for presenting to
the General Assembly the views of the International Labour Organiza-
tion on questions within the scope of its activities.

"4. Representatives of the International Labour Organization shall
be invited to attend meetings of the Main Committees of the General
Assembly in which the International Labour Organization has an
interest and to participate, without vote, in the deliberations thereof."

UNESCO—Article III—Reciprocal Representation

"3. Representatives of the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization shall be invited to attend meetings of the
General Assembly of the United Nations for the purposes of consult-
tation on educational, scientific and cultural matters.

"4. Representatives of the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization shall be invited to attend meetings of the
Main Committees of the General Assembly when educational, sci-
entific or cultural matters are under discussion, and to participate, with-
out vote, in such discussions."

FAO—Article II—Reciprocal Representation

"3. Representatives of the Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations shall be invited to attend meetings of the General
Assembly for purposes of consultation on matters within the scope of
its activities.

—There seems to have been no further discussion of this subject by the United
States Delegation. The report of the General Assembly's Joint Committee 2 and
3 recommending approval of the draft agreements is found in United Nations,
Meetings, pp. 1576 ff., annex 85; hereafter cited as GA (1/2), Plenary. The General
Assembly on December 14 in Resolution 50 (1) approved the draft agreements
with the proviso "that, in the case of the agreement with the International Civil
Aviation Organization [ICAO, successor to the PICA0], that Organization com-
plies with any decision of the General Assembly regarding Franco Spain."
GA (1/2), Plenary, pp. 1381 and 1382 and United Nations, Official Records of
the General Assembly, First Session, Second Part, Resolutions Adopted by the
General Assembly during the Second Part of Its First Session, p. 78; hereafter
cited as GA (1/2), Resolutions. For documentation regarding the Spanish ques-
tion at the United Nations, see vol. v, pp. 1023 ff.
4. Representatives of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations shall be invited to attend meetings of the Main Committees of the General Assembly when matters within the scope of its activities are under discussion and to participate, without vote, in such discussions.

PICO-A—Article III—Reciprocal Representation

3. Representatives of the International Civil Aviation Organization shall be invited to attend meetings of the General Assembly of the United Nations for the purposes of consultation on civil aviation matters.

4. Representatives of the International Civil Aviation Organization shall be invited to attend meetings of the Main Committees of the General Assembly when civil aviation matters are under discussion and to participate, without vote, in such discussions.

United States Delegation Working Paper

SECRET

NEW YORK,] November 21, 1946.

REQUEST OF THE WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS FOR CHANGE IN ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONSULTATION WITH THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

PROBLEM

Mr. Leon Jouhaux, Vice President of the WFTU in a letter of November 12, 1946 to Mr. Spaak 4 asks that the General Assembly recommend revision of the arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations (agreed upon in the Economic and Social Council on June 21, 1946) so as to give the WFTU

1. The right to submit to the Council questions for insertion in the provisional agenda in accordance with the procedure now applicable to specialized agencies. (This procedure is that the Council, subject to such preliminary consultation as may be necessary, includes on its agenda the agenda of its commissions items proposed by the General Conference or Executive Board of the specialized agencies.)

2. The right to present written and verbal statements to the Council on all matters of concern to the Federation.

Mr. Jouhaux, acting as delegate for France in a Joint Meeting of Committee 2 and 3 on November 20, asked that the above recommenda-

tion be adopted, and was strongly supported by the Soviet Delegate. The U.S. Delegate, Mr. Stevenson, favored a New Zealand proposal that the Assembly simply draw the attention of the Economic and Social Council to the remarks made in the meeting: “and to the letter of 12 November signed by the vice president of the WFTU.” This suggestion did not satisfy the Soviet Union. Further discussion was postponed.

The problem is whether we wish to support a recommendation to the Economic and Social Council that the WFTU be granted the additional rights proposed by Mr. Jouhau.

RECOMMENDATION

We should strongly oppose any recommendation by the General Assembly to the Economic and Social Council which suggests changes in the arrangements agreed upon for consultation with the WFTU. We should base this opposition on the following grounds:

a. The present arrangements, embodied in the Council’s Resolution of June 21, 1946 confirmed by its Resolution of October 1, 1946, give the WFTU ample opportunities for consultation with the Economic and Social Council. (See Annex I.) In particular with reference to the new demands of the WFTU, the WFTU now has three possibilities of recommending items for inclusion in the provisional agenda of ECOSOC:

   (1) By having one or more members of the United Nations submit the item.

   (2) By transmitting a recommendation to the President of the Council or to the Secretary-General (which they may place on the agenda at their discretion).

   (3) By addressing a request to the Committee on Non-governmental Organizations of the Council.

Under existing arrangements the WFTU also has the right to transmit to the Council any memoranda, recommendations or draft resolutions bearing on matters before the Council within the special competence of WFTU and such recommendations will be distributed to the members of the Council in full.

b. The present arrangements have been in force for such a brief

---

46 The French request was made on November 18 at the beginning of the Joint Committee's consideration of the draft report of the Economic and Social Council to the General Assembly; for the discussion on November 18 and subsequent discussions on November 22, 23, 26, and 27, see GA (1/2), Joint Second and Third Committee, pp. 1 ff.
47 See ibid., p. 96, annex 3a.
48 This refers to Council action extending category (a) status to the International Chamber of Commerce, thus adding a fourth non-governmental organization to the three already established in that category by the Council on June 21, see ESC (III), pp. 112 ff. This move was sponsored by the United States.
period that there is now no basis in experience for questioning their adequacy.

c. The Economic and Social Council is empowered by Article 71 to make the arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations, and it is inappropriate for the General Assembly to give the Economic and Social Council instructions on the nature of these arrangements. The Economic and Social Council should be left free to operate under the arrangements which have been agreed upon and which the President of the WFTU, in a meeting on October 2, 1946 with the Council’s NGO Committee, indicated were satisfactory. (See Annex II.)

[Annex I]

ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONSULTATION OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS WITH THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL. 48

(Report of the Committee on Arrangements for Consultation with Non-Governmental Organizations of June 21, 1946)

1. It is recognized that the nature of the consultations will vary with the character of the organization. Accordingly, it is recommended that in drawing up its recognized list of organizations the Council should so far as possible define the field of interest of each and should distinguish between:

(a) Organizations which have a basic interest in most of the activities of the Council, and are closely linked with the economic or social life of the areas which they represent;

(b) Organizations which have a special competence but are concerned specifically with only a few of the fields of activity covered by the Council;

(c) Organizations which are primarily concerned with the development of public opinion and with the dissemination of information.

2. Organizations in category (a) may designate authorized representatives to sit as observers at all of the public meetings of the Council. Representatives of these organizations which will include

---

48 On June 21 ECOSOC established a standing committee known as the Committee on Arrangements for Consultations with Non-Governmental Organizations and it was given the official short title of “Council NGO Committee”; see ESC (II), p. 320. The composition of this committee was made up of the President of the Economic and Social Council and four members; these were to be assisted by the United Nations Assistant Secretaries-General for Economic and Social Affairs. The Committee was to perform functions related to listing non-governmental organizations eligible for relationship with the Council and generally to perform in a liaison capacity.

49 This constitutes Part IV of the report on which the Economic and Social Council based its decisions of June 21; see ESC (II), p. 321.
organizations of labour, of management and business, of farmers and consumers, will be entitled to circulate to the various members of the Council written statements and suggestions within their competence. Such communications will be addressed to the Secretariat, which will transmit them to the members of the Council.

3. To insure effective consultation on matters in which organizations have special competence or knowledge, it is recommended that those included in category (a) may be invited by the Council to consult with a standing committee appointed for that purpose, if the Council so desires or the organization requests such consultation. The Chairman of the Standing Committee should be the President of the Council. The representatives of the organizations should be able to participate fully in any consultations of this kind so that the Committee may report to the Council on the basis of a full exchange of views. Upon recommendation of the Standing Committee, the Council as a whole may receive representatives of organizations in category (a) for the purpose of hearing their views.

4. Organizations in categories (b) and (c) may designate authorized representatives to sit as observers at public meetings of the Council. They may submit written statements and suggestions on matters within their competence, and the Secretariat will prepare and distribute a list of all such communications briefly indicating the substance of each. On the request of any member of the Council, a communication will be reproduced in full and distributed. Any lengthy communications will be distributed only if sufficient copies are furnished by the organization concerned.

5. To insure effective consultation on matters in which organizations have special competence or knowledge, it is recommended that those included in categories (b) and (c) may be invited by the Council to consult with a committee appointed for that purpose, if the Council so desires or the organization specifically requests such consultation. Their representatives should be able to participate fully in any consultations of this kind so that the Committee may report to the Council on the basis of a full exchange of views.

[Annex II]

PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED BY THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS COMMITTEE TO IMPLEMENT THE RESOLUTION OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL OF JUNE 21, 1946

The Council NGO Committee pointed out:

1. that the WFTU should receive in advance of every Session of the Council copies of its Provisional Agenda and of documents bearing upon the various points of the Agenda.
2. that under the existing Rules of Procedure of the Council, the WFTU had three possibilities of recommending items for inclusion in the Provisional Agenda as follows:

(a) by approaching a Member of the United Nations
(b) by transmitting a recommendation to the President of the Council or to the Secretary-General
(c) by addressing a request to the Council NGO Committee

3. that in line with Part IV, Paragraph 2 of the above-cited Resolution the WFTU as one of the organizations in category (a) would have the right to transmit to the Council any memoranda, recommendations, or draft resolutions bearing on matters before the Council within the special competence of the WFTU and that such communications would be distributed to the Members of the Council in full.

4. that the WFTU could, according to Part IV, Paragraph 3, request the Council NGO Committee to meet with representatives of the WFTU for the purpose of discussing views put forward by the WFTU.

5. that the Council NGO Committee would give most serious consideration to requests by the WFTU to be heard by the Council as a whole, if it is so desired on specific matters of importance within its special competence or knowledge.

6. that the WFTU under the provisions of Part IV, Paragraph 2, would automatically have the right to submit written communications to the Council protesting any decision by the Council NGO Committee, including a decision not to recommend to the Council that it should hear the WFTU on a particular matter.

7. that the Council NGO Committee would make a practice of keeping the Council fully informed about its consultations with the WFTU.

8. that according to Part V, Paragraph 1, the WFTU would normally have an opportunity to consult directly with the various Commissions of the Council.

---

10 Files: US/A/C.2 and 3/3

United States Delegation Working Paper

SECRET


At Saturday's meeting of Joint Committee 2 and 3, the first part of a USSR resolution concerning the relationship of the WFTU to

---

50 See Annex I, p. 516.
51 November 23.
the Economic and Social Council (see (A/C.2 and 3/10, of Nov. 21) was adopted by a vote of 32 to 15.

The second part of the USSR resolution, in which the GA would have recommended that the ECOSOC give to the WFTU the right to make oral as well as written statements "on all matters of interest to the Federation," was rejected by a vote of about 24 to 14. Included among those voting with the USSR in favor of this part of the resolution were Argentina, Chile and Colombia. Venezuela, among others, abstained.53

In the resolution adopted by the Joint Committee the GA recommends that ECOSOC give to the WFTU the unrestricted right, now enjoyed by specialized agencies and Member states not members of ECOSOC, to place items on the Council's agenda.54

The UK, Canada, New Zealand and the US vigorously opposed this resolution on some or all of the following grounds: (1) that it would go beyond the provisions of the Charter (Art. 71); (2) that the arrangements worked out by the Council should be entirely satisfactory to the WFTU and the other three non-governmental organizations presently included in Category A (American Federation of Labor, International Chamber of Commerce, and International Cooperative Alliance); (3) that these arrangements should be given a reasonable trial before the GA raises any question as to their adequacy; and (4) that it was questionable whether it was appropriate under the terms of the Charter (Art. 71) for the GA to attempt to deal with the details of the arrangements to be worked out by the Council for its consultative arrangements with non-governmental organizations. (For additional background information on this subject see Secret document US/A/C.2 and 3/2 of Nov. 21).55

Although a roll-call vote was not taken, the many speeches made

52 The operative section of the proposed Soviet resolution read:

"The General Assembly recommends that the Economic and Social Council grant to the World Federation of Trade Unions:
1. The right to submit for consideration by the Economic and Social Council, questions intended for inclusion in the provisional agenda in accordance with procedure applied at the present time to specialized agencies;
2. The right to submit to the Council written and oral communications on all matters of interest to the Federation." See GA(1/2), Joint Second and Third Committee, pp. 96 and 97, annex 3b, which is United Nations document A/C.2 and 3/10, November 21.

53 The United States vote was recorded against both parts of the proposed Soviet resolution. For the proceedings of the Joint Committee on November 23, see GA (1/2), Joint Second and Third Committee, pp. 15 ff.

54 The resolution as enacted (that is, the first section of the original Soviet proposal) was incorporated by the Joint Committee into a draft report which was being submitted by the Joint Committee to the General Assembly, relating to the Report of the Economic and Social Council to the General Assembly submitted earlier by the Council to the General Assembly; see ibid., pp. 97 ff., annex 3e, with particular reference to the second section on p. 93.

55 The United States Delegation working paper, printed supra.
prior to the vote, as they will be summarized in the Journal, will afford useful guides to attitudes and votes. In general, it was apparent that quite a few Delegations were reluctant to vote against both parts of the USSR resolution. Belgium (Lebeau) had taken the lead in suggesting the desirability of a “compromise” in which the first part would be accepted and the second part rejected.

USDel should make every effort, with the aid of like-minded Delegations, to defeat the USSR resolution, adopted by Joint Committee 2 and 3, when it comes before a Plenary meeting of the GA at some future date. It is vitally important that we rally the necessary support to do this. If we fail in the GA, we might not be able to stave off adoption of the USSR resolution by ECOSOC. Adoption of such a resolution by ECOSOC would seriously weaken the effectiveness of the Council; its agenda might be bogged down with all sorts of items from the WFTU and from other Category A organizations if, in accordance with the general principle of equality of treatment we favor, the same right were extended to other non-governmental organizations in the same category.

Immediately after the Joint Committee had adopted the first part of the USSR resolution, Mr. Stevenson called to the Committee’s attention the fact that there were other non-governmental organizations in Category A and asked whether it would be in order to propose an addition to the resolution just adopted, to the effect that if ECOSOC should grant the unrestricted right to WFTU to place items on the Council’s agenda, the same right should be given to all other Category A organizations.

The Chairman ruled that this would not be in order, but that the US Delegation would be free to submit a separate resolution for consideration at a later meeting.

After the meeting, a separate resolution (see attached) was drafted and submitted to the Secretariat to be circulated. It will come up for discussion at the next meeting of Joint Committee 2 and 3, probably on Tuesday.56

56 See GA (1/2), Joint Second and Third Committee, p. 97, annex 3 c. The draft resolution read: “The General Assembly,
Having considered the report of the Economic and Social Council (document A/125) concerning arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations:
1. Takes note of the action of the Council to place certain non-governmental organizations in category A; and
2. Expresses agreement with the general principle that all non-governmental organizations in category A should receive equal treatment in respect of consultative arrangements with the Council.”
This draft was approved by the U.S. Delegation at a meeting on November 25, and at the same time it was agreed that the United States should make every effort to defeat the Soviet resolution (included in the Joint Committee’s report) when it came before the General Assembly (IO Files, document US/A/M/20).
This resolution would simply place the GA’s stamp of approval on the ECOSOC principle of treating equally all non-governmental organizations within Category A. This resolution, and the attendant circumstances, will be discussed by Mr. Stevenson at the Delegation meeting Monday morning.

The present intention is to press for favorable action on this resolution in Joint Committee 2 and 3 on Tuesday. In presenting it, Mr. Stevenson would make it very clear that we remain unalterably opposed to the USSR resolution adopted at Saturday’s meeting and that we intend to work toward its defeat in the Plenary meeting of the GA, for reasons already stated. He would argue in favor of adoption of our resolution endorsing ECOSOC’s “equality of treatment” principle, mainly on the ground that we cannot let pass unchallenged the attack made on that principle by the USSR and a few other Delegations.

(Although not adaptable for use in an open meeting, there is the further consideration that adoption of our “equality of treatment” resolution would provide a hedge against the possibility that we may not be able to defeat the USSR resolution in the Plenary meeting of the GA.)

All political officers can begin immediately to attempt to build up support for defeating the USSR resolution in the Plenary meeting of the GA. After the Delegation meeting Monday morning they will have a clear idea of how best to deal with the proposed US “equality of treatment” resolution.75

10 Files: US/A/C.2 and 3/8

Memorandum by Adlai E. Stevenson, Alternate Representative on the United States Delegation, to All Political Officers on the Delegation Staff

SECRET


At the San Francisco Conference, the World Federation of Trade Unions made an aggressive effort to be admitted to the Assembly and Commissions. But the Steering Committee concluded that no private organization should have any special position in the Conference.

At the General Assembly in London last winter, the Soviet Delegation introduced a resolution supporting a letter from Louis Saillant, Secretary-General of the Federation, requesting special recognition

75 For the U.S. statement made by Mr. Adlai Stevenson in offering the U.S. resolution at the meeting of the Joint Committee on November 26, see GA (1/2), Joint Second and Third Committee, p. 23; debate on the resolution is found ibid., pp. 23–50. The resolution was adopted by the Joint Committee on the same date by 19 votes to 13, and 11 abstentions and 11 members absent, and incorporated into the draft report of the Joint Committee on the ECOSOC Report.
of the Federation in the Assembly and also rights of participation in the work of the Economic and Social Council.

The matter was debated there interminably in the General Committee, Committee I and the General Assembly. You are familiar with the results: resolutions recommending that the Economic and Social Council establish consultative arrangements with WFTU and with the AFoF and the International Cooperative Alliance.

In short, the best we could do at London was to insure equal treatment for the AFoF and the International Cooperative Alliance. Our policy there was first to resist the WFTU proposal and, failing that, to get equal treatment for two other large international non-governmental organizations.

Last June, after careful consideration, ECOSOC worked out a system of categories and placed these three organizations in Category A for consultative relationship with the Council because of their general interest in all of the work of the Council. Later, in October, the International Chamber of Commerce was added to Category A.

Despite the opportunity to do so, the WFTU has thus far made no proposals or suggestions relating to the work of the Council, and the WFTU negotiators expressed satisfaction with the consultative relationship established by the Council at its last session.

However, Leon Jouhaux, one of the French Delegates and a Vice-President of WFTU, wrote a letter to President Spaak on November 12 complaining that these arrangements were insufficient and requesting

1. The right to submit to the Council questions for insertion in the provisional agenda, in accordance with the procedure now applicable to specialized agencies;
2. The right to present written and verbal statements to the Council on all matters of concern to the Federation.

The USSR presented these two requests to Committee I in the form of a resolution and after prolonged debate the Committee approved the first of these requests 22 to 15 and rejected the second 24 to 14. The U.S., the U.K., Canada and a few others vigorously opposed the adoption of this resolution.

After further debate, we succeeded in getting a resolution adopted which reaffirms the general principle that all non-governmental organizations in Category A should receive equal treatment in respect of consultative arrangements with the Council. This “equality of treatment” resolution was introduced (1) to meet the challenge to the principle of equal treatment and (2) as a hedge against the possibility that our efforts to defeat the USSR resolution in the plenary meeting of the GA may be unsuccessful.

Mr. Stevenson's intended reference here is to the Joint Committee of the Second and Third Committees.
Our Delegation should vigorously oppose, in plenary session, the Soviet resolution granting the WFTU the same rights as a specialized agency with regard to inscribing items on the provisional agenda of the Council on the following grounds:

1. The arrangements worked out by the Council should be entirely satisfactory and afford WFTU and the other three non-governmental organizations included in Category A ample access to the agenda.

2. These arrangements have not even been tested by usage and it is altogether premature, therefore, to assume their inadequacy.

3. These arrangements should be given a reasonable trial before the GA considers any recommendations for change.

4. The GA should not interfere in the details of the Council’s work with regard to consultative arrangements with non-governmental organizations.

5. Such a right, which would have to be extended to other organizations in Category A, would seriously jeopardize the Council’s control over its own agenda; in this connection, it should be borne in mind that the placing of items on the provisional agenda is tantamount to placing them on the approved agenda.

It is apparent that the Soviets and possibly others are determined, if possible, to exalt the prestige of the WFTU at the expense of the ILO, to serve political purposes. That this incessant pressure for special recognition for WFTU is not motivated by a desire to improve the efficiency of the conduct of its business with the Council is best evidenced by the fact that it has made no use of the consultative arrangements already established.

As we attach first importance to defeat of this resolution in the General Assembly and because many Delegates do not take it seriously, or are influenced by their domestic labor movements, it would be very helpful to contact as many as possible before this matter arises in the Assembly to make clear the degree of our interest and the reasons for our opposition to the USSR resolution.59

---

59 General Assembly debate on the draft United States and Soviet resolutions incorporated in the Joint Committee’s report took place on December 15, the Soviet resolution being adopted by 25 votes to 22 votes with 6 abstentions and the United State resolution by 34 votes to 11 with 8 abstentions; for General Assembly proceedings on this see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, Second Part, Plenary Meetings, pp. 1393 ff. (hereafter cited as GA (1/2), Plenary). Texts are found in United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, Second Part, Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly during the Second Part of Its First Session, pp. 77 and 78; the two were designated two parts of the same resolution, Resolution 49 (I), entitled “Activities of the Economic and Social Council”.

The Soviet Union at this time re-introduced on the floor of the General Assembly the section of its original resolution that had been rejected by the Joint Committee (paragraph 2); see GA (1/2), Joint Second and Third Committee, pp. 96 and 97, annex 3b and GA (1/2), Plenary, p. 1591, annex 92a). This Soviet amendment was rejected by the General Assembly.

For a statement made to the General Assembly by the Alternate Representative on the United States Delegation (Douglas) against both the draft Soviet resolution and the Soviet amendment, see GA (1/2), Plenary, pp. 1399 ff.