RESIGNATION OF AMBASSADOR PATRICK J. HURLEY; CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING CERTAIN CHARGES MADE BY THE AMBASSADOR

123 Hurley, Patrick J.

The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to President Truman

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1945.

My Dear Mr. President: I hereby resign as Ambassador to China. In tendering my resignation I wish you to know that I am in agreement with the foreign policy outlined by you in your recent Navy Day address.1

I am grateful to both you and the Secretary of State for the support you have given me and for your kind offer in requesting me to return to China as Ambassador.

In one capacity or another I have been on the perimeter of America's influence since the beginning of the war. During the war I have served in Java, Australia, New Zealand, and generally in the southwest Pacific, in Egypt, Palestine, The Lebanon, Syria, Trans-Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Russia, Afghanistan, India, Ceylon, Burma and China. Of all of the assignments China was the most intricate and the most difficult. It is a source of gratification to me that in all my missions I had the support of President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull, Secretary Stettinius, yourself, Mr. President, and Secretary Byrnes.

In the higher echelon of our policy-making officials American objectives were nearly always clearly defined. The astonishing feature of our foreign policy is the wide discrepancy between our announced policies and our conduct of international relations. For instance, we began the war with the principles of the Atlantic Charter 2 and democracy as our goal. Our associates in the war at that time gave eloquent lip service to the principles of democracy. We finished the war in the Far East furnishing lend-lease supplies and using all our reputation to undermine democracy and bolster imperialism and Communism. Inasmuch as I am in agreement with you and the Secretary of State on our foreign policy I think I owe it to you as well as to the country to point out the reasons for the failure of the American foreign policy in reaching the objectives for which we said we were

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1 Department of State Bulletin, October 28, 1945, p. 653.
2 Joint Declaration by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill on August 14, 1941, ibid., August 16, 1941, p. 123.

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fighting the war. I will confine my remarks in this letter to Asia, although I wish to assure you that I will be at your service in discussing frankly other phases of our international relations.

I was assigned to China at a time when statesmen were openly predicting the collapse of the National Government of the Republic of China and the disintegration of the Chinese Army. I was directed by President Roosevelt to prevent the collapse of the Government and to keep the Chinese Army in the war. From both a strategical and diplomatic viewpoint the foregoing constituted our chief objective. The next in importance was the directive to harmonize the relations between the Chinese and American military establishments and between the American Embassy in Chungking and the Chinese Government. It will readily appear that the former objective could not be accomplished without the accomplishment of the secondary objective as a condition precedent. Both of these objectives were accomplished. While these objectives had the support of the President and the Secretary of State it is no secret that the American policy in China did not have the support of all the career men in the State Department. The professional foreign service men sided with the Chinese Communist armed party and the imperialist bloc of nations whose policy it was to keep China divided against herself. Our professional diplomats continuously advised the Communists that my efforts in preventing the collapse of the National Government did not represent the policy of the United States. These same professionals openly advised the Communist armed party to decline unification of the Chinese Communist Army with the National Army unless the Chinese Communists were given control.

Despite these handicaps we did make progress toward unification of the armed forces of China. We did prevent civil war between the rival factions, at least until after I had left China. We did bring the leaders of the rival parties together for peaceful discussions. Throughout this period the chief opposition to the accomplishment of our mission came from the American career diplomats in the Embassy at Chungking and in the Chinese and Far Eastern Divisions of the State Department.

I requested the relief of the career men who were opposing the American policy in the Chinese Theater of war. These professional diplomats were returned to Washington and placed in the Chinese and Far Eastern Divisions of the State Department as my supervisors. Some of these same career men whom I relieved have been

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*General Hurley was appointed Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in China on August 18, 1944; for documentation on the Hurley Mission, see *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. vi, pp. 247 ff.*
assigned as advisors to the Supreme Commander in Asia. In such positions most of them have continued to side with the Communist armed party and at times with the imperialist bloc against American policy. This, Mr. President, is an outline of one of the reasons why American foreign policy announced by the highest authority is rendered ineffective by another section of diplomatic officials.

The weakness of American foreign policy has backed us into two world wars. We had no part in shaping the conditions that brought about these two wars. There is a third world war in the making. In diplomacy today we are permitting ourselves to be sucked into a power bloc on the side of colonial imperialism against Communist imperialism. I am opposed to both. I still favor democracy and free enterprise.

Our announced policy in the first world war was to make the world safe for democracy. That slogan was elaborated for the second world war by a definite statement of principles in the Atlantic Charter and the Iran Declaration. We won both wars but in both instances we failed to establish the principles for which we alleged we were fighting. America's foreign policy officials have always been divided against themselves. Consequently, we have always been a prey to the nations that give lip service to our ideals and principles in order to obtain our material support. The war that is now in the making is not even intended to defend or establish democratic ideals. Instead of putting our weight behind the Charter of the United Nations we have been definitely supporting the imperialistic bloc. At the same time a considerable section of our State Department is endeavoring to support Communism generally as well as specifically in China.

The Hydra-headed direction and confusion of our foreign policy in Washington during the late war is chargeable to the weakness of our Foreign Service. If our Foreign Service had been capable of understanding and sympathetic effectuation of our announced war aims it would not have failed so completely to couple our logistical strength with our foreign policy to obtain commitments to the principles for which we claimed to be fighting from the nations to which we gave the strength of our productivity and manpower.

I am purposely omitting from this short paper a discussion of my negotiations with Britain and Russia for the recognition of the territorial integrity and independent sovereignty of China and the procurement from both of these nations of an agreement to support the

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4 General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Japan.
5 For text of latter, see Department of State Bulletin, December 4, 1943, p. 409.
6 Department of State Treaty Series No. 993, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031.
7 See telegram of April 14 from the Ambassador in China (Hurley) temporarily in Tehran, p. 329, and telegram No. 1212, April 17, 7 p. m., from the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan), p. 338.
aspirations of the Chinese people to establish for themselves a free, united, democratic government. These negotiations as you know were successful and so far as Russia is concerned was solemnized in a treaty and exchange of letters.⁸

A democracy must live on its intelligence and its integrity and its courage. The people of a democracy should be given all the facts to enable them to form correct opinions. The discrepancy between American foreign policy as announced in the Atlantic Charter and the Iran Declaration and in your recent Navy Day address and as carried into effect may be attributed in large measure to the secrecy which has shrouded the actions of the State Department. All too frequently information concerning the conduct of our foreign relations “leaks” out to the public in distorted, garbled, or partial form. The result is that the American people have too little basic information to judge the extent to which their State Department correctly interprets and administers the foreign policies of the nation.

During the war we had to maintain secrecy to prevent giving aid to the enemy. I grant that sometimes during the war we had to be expedient. Now we should endeavor to be right. I raise this issue because I am firmly convinced that at this particular juncture in our history an informed public opinion would do much to give intelligent direction and implementation to our international objectives.

With special reference to China and the other nations where I have served in the last four years, the blessings of factual publicity would be manifold. Now that the war is over I am willing that all my reports be made public, together with the reports made by those officials in the foreign service who have differed with the promulgated American policy.

Our true position in China is misunderstood abroad because of this confusion of policy within our own Government. This situation suggests the need for a complete reorganization of our policy-making machinery beginning at the lower official levels. No international policy can succeed without loyal and intelligent implementation. Because of the confusion in our own international policy, make no mistake, Mr. President, America has been excluded economically from every part of the world controlled by colonial imperialism and Communist imperialism. America’s economic strength has been used all over the world to defeat American policies and interests. This is chargeable to a weak American Foreign Service.

I wish to absolve from this general indictment some of our career men. Some of them are very admirable and well-equipped public

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⁸ For texts of treaty of friendship and alliance and related documents signed at Moscow, August 14, see Department of State, United States Relations With China (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 585; for documentation on this subject, see pp. 851 ff.
servants who have fought in the State Department and in other countries against overwhelming odds to advance American ideals and interests.

America’s economic and diplomatic policies should be coordinated. America’s strength should not be allied with any predatory ideology. America should support the amendment or revision of the San Francisco United Nations Charter to make it democratic. Our strength should be used to uphold the decisions of the United Nations rather than to support conflicting ideologies or war-making power blocs.

Respectfully,

PATRICK J. HURLEY

[On November 27 the White House announced that President Truman had accepted the resignation of Major General Patrick J. Hurley as Ambassador to China and had appointed General of the Army George C. Marshall as his special envoy to China with personal rank of Ambassador. For comments by the Secretary of State at his press conference on November 28 on criticism by former Ambassador Hurley, see Department of State Bulletin, December 2, 1945, pages 882–883.]

711.93/11-3045 : Telegram
The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, November 30, 1945.
[Received November 30—3:55 p.m.]

177. John Service* and I are identified with the resignation of Ambassador Hurley in meager and confusing reports which have been published here.

It is reported that Mr. Hurley charged that Chinese Communists had been advised by some Foreign Service Officers against reconciliation with the Chinese Central Government; that we “continue to interfere with the affairs of China” here in Tokyo.

It is reported also that an announcement has been made by the Department that in the “dispute with career diplomats” it is siding with Mr. Hurley and that an investigation will be made by Congress.

Some clarification would be greatly appreciated as these reports are incomprehensible.

We very much regret that we have become the objects of this publicity and we certainly have no desire to enter into any public

*Foreign Service Officer assigned to the Office of the Acting Political Adviser in Japan.
dispute. However, if these ridiculous contentions have actually been made by Mr. Hurley, it is our suggestion that the best means of dispensing them would be to produce the record which, regarding my reports, would start with my long telegram which I sent from Chungking at the end of May 1943 in which I described the difficulties in China and the immediate and additional assistance to the Generalissimo and his Government.

Atcheson

123 Hurley, Patrick J.

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] December 3, 1945.

General Hurley stated, “The last day I talked with you I said I would be glad if there was anything I could contribute to what you are doing to get General Marshall started—in other words, whether I could be of any help.

“But I want to tell you also that with reference to all the furore on the floor of the Senate and my being called by the two Committees of the House, that I did not ask for any hearing and I have not conferred with any of the people up there. Everyone has wanted me to talk about what I am going to do or say, but I am holding it close to myself and I want you to know that there won’t be one word that will be in opposition to you or the President. I am for both of you.

“Another thing, I have thought from some of the things asked me today that they would probably want me to talk about the recent correspondence on Indo-China, Hongkong, et cetera, and I don’t intend to do it.”

I told him I was satisfied he would not say or do anything that would embarrass the Government in its relation with other Governments.

General Hurley said, “After all, this is my country just like it is yours and we are together about it. I am not going to present any document except those that have already been published without your consent.”

I told him that I did not know what documents he had reference to.

General Hurley replied, “You know that I told you there were leaks in the Department. Drew Pearson published a lot of stuff and Langer wrote a letter to the State Department which the Department asked me to answer. That is the document I am referring to.”

“However, I wanted you to know I did not ask for the hearing and have had no meetings with any of them and I am going to do my best

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10 No. 803, May 28, 1943, 4 p. m., Foreign Relations, 1943, China, p. 57.
11 Senator William L. Langer of North Dakota.
12 Not printed.
to have it a quiet and genteel proceeding when I go there. I wanted you to know that any information I have or any help I can give I will be delighted to offer.”

123 Atcheson, George, Jr.: Telegram
The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, December 6, 1945.
[Received December 8—7:13 p.m.]

191. Mr. Hurley’s continuous assaults together with the falsity and apparent vindictiveness of his statements seen at this distance to place us in a position where a statement of some kind in refutation appears increasingly unavoidable. I am most reluctant to make a statement which might prolong the matter or which might raise for public discussion any question of past or present policy. But continuous replies of “no comment” to press inquiries lend themselves to the implication that by avoiding comment we give credence to Mr. Hurley’s charges. My reputation in the service generally after 25 years is of importance to me. My reputation in China where I spent some 17 years is of importance to me. My reputation in my present position is of importance to me. Mr. Service feels the same way.

While we have continued today to reply “no comment” to press inquiries, I have been considering whether I should not, in the light of all the circumstances, make a statement along lines as follows:

“Mr. Hurley’s (radio SCAP (USPolAd) to WarCoS SecState December 45 19) statement that any officer of the Foreign Service in China sought the downfall of the Chinese Government is completely untrue. The China officers with whom I was associated in the Department from 1939 to 1942 and subsequently in the Embassy in Chungking worked unremittingly as did I to obtain greater aid for the Generalissimo and the Central Government.

This is on the record. My first substantive report to the Department after arrival in Chungking in May 1943 urged increased American aid to the Chinese National Government. No member of the staff was in opposition to this or to many subsequent similar recommendations, and I know of no officer who did not favor support of the Central Government.

Early this year, while I was awaiting promised replacement, after the normal tour of duty, Mr. Hurley returned to the United States and, under the Department’s instructions, I assumed charge of the Embassy and remained until after the middle of April, when my successor arrived. The Ambassador’s absence was not designed to stop the work of the Embassy. During that period I sent the Department a

123 See telegram No. 196, December 8, from the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson), p. 732.
telegram

in the light of the current situation, submitting for consideration some thoughts which we felt might assist in furthering Chinese unity in the war against Japan. The telegram specifically requested that its contents be discussed with Ambassador Hurley in Washington. I do not know Mr. Hurley’s purpose in implying that this was done behind his back.

Mr. Hurley’s statements, in regard to ‘Communism’ and to ‘European Imperialism’ are so empty as regards Foreign Service Officers as to merit no further comment.

After 17 years service in China I know that our officers have been good friends to China, faithful in carrying out their instructions, and devoted to the interests of the United States.

Mr. Service has similarly been considering a brief statement as follows:

“Mr. Hurley’s charges before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as reported in the press, that I ‘proposed that Chiang’s government be allowed to collapse’, and that I circulated my reports [to] the Communists are wholly untrue.”

I shall, of course, report to the Department if and when any statement is made.

ATCHESON

120.1/12-745

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Legal Adviser

Hackworth

WASHINGTON, December 7, 1945.

Because I wish to exercise the greatest care in matters affecting the security of this Government, I desire you to undertake for me a continuing inquiry into certain subjects.

I desire you to determine to the best of your ability whether there is any evidence within the Department, or available to the Department, that any of the officers named by General Hurley in his recent testimony, or any other employees of the State Department, ever communicated to the Communist faction in China any information concerning allied military plans for landings or operations in China. I also desire you to determine to the best of your ability whether any of the officers named by General Hurley, or any others, advised the Communists in China that Ambassador Hurley’s efforts to prevent the collapse of the National Government did not represent the policy of the United States, or openly or privately advised the Communist faction to decline unification of the Chinese Communist Army with

14 Telegram No. 324, February 28, 1 p.m., from the Chargé in China, p. 242.
15 Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; Investigation of Far Eastern Policy, December 6, 6, 7, and 10 (filed under 120.1/11-3045).
the Nationalist Army unless the Chinese Communists were given control.

In addition to these questions raised by the statements and testimony of Ambassador Hurley, I desire you to acquaint yourself with any information which may reach the Department from time to time concerning allegations against the personnel of the Department on the grounds of disloyalty to the Government of the United States. I am issuing instructions that information of this kind is to be brought to your attention. I desire you to consider this information, to make such independent inquiries as you may deem necessary, and to report to me as often as may be required with your recommendations for action on my part.

I am delegating to you full authority to investigate such matters on my behalf now and in the future and I am charging you with responsibility commensurate with this authority.

James F. Byrnes

711.98/12-745: Telegram

The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, December 7, 1945.

[Received December 8—7: 15 p.m.]

193. Newspaper clippings received here indicate that as result Hurley’s statements some persons are linking my name with communist activities. It would accordingly seem appropriate that I make the following statement to the Department for purpose of record and for the use of the Department if the Department should wish to use it.

1. I have always been strongly opposed to communism (this does not mean that I do not favor cordial relations and cooperation between the Big Four Powers).

2. While, as Department is aware, I at one time favored using the question of American aid as a means of pressing for a working military arrangement between the Central Government and Chinese Communists without the concurrence of General Chiang Kai-shek, my relations with Chinese Communists have been limited to the following:

(a) In December 1934, I was sent into Anhwei Province to investigate the decapitation by Chinese Communist soldiers under General Peng Teh-hui of two young American missionaries, Mister and Mrs. Stamm.16 I was stopped at Wuhu by further instructions and remained there for some time keeping track of the movements of the Communist forces and telegraphing warnings to American mis-

16 For reports of Mr. Atcheson’s assignment in connection with the murder of Mr. and Mrs. John C. Stamm, see Foreign Relations, 1934, vol. III, pp. 479 ff.
sionaries to move from their path. I acted as American coroner when
the Stamm’s bodies were recovered some 22 days after their murder
and, following submission of my reports, the Chinese Government
informed the Embassy that two of General Peng’s soldiers had been
apprehended and executed for the crime.

(b) I have met (and only casually) but one of the Chinese Com-
munist leaders, Chou En-lai, at a large reception where our con-
versation was confined to saying “How do you do” and “Goodby”
to each other. I have never discussed any political matters or talked
with or even seen Mao Tze-tung, Lin Tsu-han or others.

(c) During 1944 and perhaps early this year the Embassy at Chung-
king received from time to time letters from Communist or guerilla
commanders at interior places reporting the rescue of forced down
American flyers. Copies of these letters were sent to American Mili-
tary Headquarters and we made replies thanking the various com-
manders whoever they might be for their services in behalf of
American airmen.

3. Except as stated above and Soviet officials whom I have met
in the ordinary course of my work, I do not to my knowledge even
have acquaintance with any Communist, official or unofficial, Ameri-
can or foreign.

Atcheson

711.93/12–745: Telegram

The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary
of State

Tokyo, December 7, 1945.
[Received December 10—4:27 p. m.]

194. Some newspaper clarification has reached us of Mr. Hurley’s
charges that Foreign Service Officers in China were aligned with a
British, French and Dutch “imperialist bloc” which wished to see the
downfall of the Chinese Govt.

From conversations in Chungking with Mr. Hurley, it is my im-
pression that his ideas on this subject flowed from some oral instruc-
tions from the late President to keep an eye on European imperialistic
activities in southeast Asia, with especial reference to French Indo-
China and Siam and which were not intended to have reference to
China itself. I remember commenting to Mr. Hurley in Chungking
last autumn that it would be difficult to assume that Great Britain,
in the light of her hopes to restoration of her large commercial inter-
ests in China, would wish anything but a peaceful and stable China
and that the same consideration would logically apply to French
policy, as a disturbed China would not be conducive to revival of
French trade or to the benefit of Indo-China.
I am positive from my 2 years in Chungking that there was no “alignment” by any Foreign Service Officer with any European imperialistic activities as mentioned by General Hurley. I myself saw no evidence of any activities on the part of British, French or Dutch diplomatic representatives seeking any derogation of the authority of the Chinese National Government or of any desire that China should emerge from the war anything but a stable and unified nation.

A few days before my departure in April, General Carton De Wiart, Prime Minister Churchill’s personal representative whom I knew well, invited me to luncheon and during a discussion of the Generalissimo’s difficulties, was emphatic in stating his conviction in favor of continuing aid to Chiang and the Central Government. The attitude of the British Ambassador had been consistently in support of Chiang Kai-shek, and I think that it would be very difficult for an objective observer to believe that there existed anything in the nature of a plot against China by the three powers in question.

Atcheson

711.03/12-845 : Telegram

_The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State_

_TOKYO, December 8, 1945._

_[Received December 10—4:26 p. m.]

196. On the basis of further clarification of Mr. Hurley’s charges, I offer comment, for such use as the Dept may deem advisable, as follows:

1. The telegram I sent from Chungking to which Mr. Hurley objected was an official confidential telegram to the Dept and for discussion with Mr. Hurley. Its contents were known only to the Embassy in Chungking and the Dept and Ambassador Hurley in Washington. Its subject matter was not made known or discussed with any Chinese or foreigner or anyone in Chungking outside the Embassy. Unless Mr. Hurley himself earlier informed others in regard to it, any information concerning it was first made public by Mr. Hurley a few days ago. In the light of these circumstances it is difficult to see how Mr. Hurley could consider it in any way a “sabotage” of American policy.

The telegram contained what were merely suggestions for the unification of Chinese military forces to be considered by the Dept and Ambassador Hurley, or to be ignored. The telegram requested spe-

17 Telegram No. 324, February 28, 1 p. m., from the Chargé in China (Atcheson), p. 242.
cifically that its contents be discussed with Ambassador Hurley in Washington and they were so discussed. While it is of course to be regretted that this telegram has been misused, it was an honest tele-
gram which will stand the light of examination both from the point of view of its inception and its purpose. The situation between the Central Govt and the Communists was deteriorating and it was the clear duty of the Chargé d’Affaires (myself) to submit for consider-
tion any suggestions he could conceive which might possibly improve that situation. I am informed that when Mr. Hurley complained in the Dept in regard to the telegram he was informed by the then Under Secretary and the then Assistant Secretary in charge of Administra-
tion and by other officers of the Dept the telegram was considered entirely appropriate and proper; that it was the duty of officers in the field to report to the Dept conditions as they saw them and to make whatever suggestions and recommendations they felt to be de-
sirable; and that I would have been failing in my duty if I had not endeavored to find some solution for the worsening situation and to submit suggestions to that end.

It is of no personal importance to me that the specific suggestions were not adopted. Officers everywhere are constantly making recom-
recommendations; it is a common experience that some recommendations are adopted and some are not.

As regards any subsequent “sabotage” I may respectfully point out that I was not on duty in the Dept until July; that during my 6 weeks there my work was principally Jap, Korean and Siamese affairs; that the only connection with China policy matters which I recall was some assistance I was asked to give in drafting instructions to the Moscow Embassy in connection with the recent Sino-Soviet Treaty agreements. Mr. Service’s period in the Dept was limited to routine administra-
tive matters. In Tokyo we have of course no slightest connection with American policy toward China or what transpires in China.

2. General Hurley began his assignment in Chungking with a strong prejudice against the Dept and the Foreign Service and especially officers who had served with his predecessor. Even before his appoint-
ment was definite, I assured him that if he should become Ambassador, he would find that he had a competent professional staff of officers thoroughly devoted to the service and to their jobs, that they were making a life work of the service, that most of them had served under a number of chiefs, that they would be loyal to him as their new chief. I urged him to show confidence in them. I called the staff together and told them of these comments and all were in complete agreement that they would do their best for him. It was however, a fixed idea with him that there were officers in the Foreign Service and American military officers who were in opposition to him. For a long time he
did not show us his telegrams to the President in regard to his negotiations with the Chinese Communists and did not in fact even report to the Dept in the matter but sent all his messages by channels other than the Embassy to the White House. When we finally persuaded him that an Ambassador had an obligation to report also to the Secretary of State, he called upon several officers to assist in putting into shape a series of telegrams to the Dept in regard to his activities.18

In his first drafts of these telegrams he inserted unwarranted and unbecoming references to his predecessor and also references to the “opposition” of Foreign Service and military officers. I pointed out to him that as we in the Embassy had not known the details of his activities, no officers there could very well be in opposition to them; and that now that we knew what was in progress, no officer in the Embassy was in opposition to his activities or objectives but on the contrary all were staunchly in favor thereof. In connection with one telegram concerning which he requested suggestions for revision I put such statement in a memorandum 19 which is doubtless on file.

3. I may say categorically that during the time I was in Chungking there was not one officer at the Embassy who opposed in any way or was not in complete favor of the Ambassador’s efforts to bring the Central Govt and the Communists together, both for the sake of the unity and stability of China and for the sake of the urgent problem of diverting Central Govt and Communist forces from blockading each other to active fighting against the progressing Jap forces. The personnel and efficiency records of the officers he has attacked well all, I think, be found to contain statements as to their proven loyalty, integrity, subordination and devotion to duty under trying and sometimes dangerous wartime conditions. I regard his attacks upon those officers as well as upon me as completely unfounded, as based in the minimum on long standing prejudice, and as incomprehensible for any reasonable purpose especially in the light of our arduous efforts, against overwhelming odds, to assist him, to work for and with him and to please him.

Atcheson

18 See pp. 192 ff., beginning with telegram No. 141, January 31, 6 p. m.
19 Memorandum of January 31 by the Counselor of Embassy in China to the Ambassador in China, p. 190.
Mr. John S. Service, of the Office of the Political Adviser in Japan, to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, December 8, 1945.
[Received December 18.]

Sir: I have the honor to submit the following statement which may be useful to the Department in connection with unfounded charges recently made against me by former Ambassador Hurley.

From July to November 1942, the Embassy sent me on an extended trip through Northwest China, unvisited by Foreign Service Officers since the outbreak of the China War and a zone of political tension because of nearness to the developing Communist areas. As a result, while on temporary detail in the Department in January, 1943, I was asked to write a memorandum on the general subject of Kuomintang-Communist relations. Officers of the Department were not at that time prepared fully to accept my view that those relations would become the core of the China problem as the war progressed and would eventually raise a question of American involvement. They did, however, agree in the need for direct and comprehensive information concerning the Chinese Communists in order to evaluate the probable trend and balance of political forces in China.

After my return to the Embassy in May 1943, the Embassy encouraged me to have informal contact with the officially recognized Communist representatives in Chungking for the purpose of obtaining information without which the Embassy's reporting of the political situation would have been incomplete.

In August 1943 I was detailed to duty with the staff of General Stilwell. Because of my experience and acquaintance with the Communists, and because it was thought impolitic at that time for American Army officers to have such contacts, I was instructed to act as the sole liaison between Army Headquarters and the Communist representatives in Chungking who, because the Central Government refused to permit Americans to visit North China, were the only source of intelligence from that area.

As political intelligence officer for General Stilwell, I also made reports to him on phases of the unstable political situation in China which might affect the conduct of the war and his operations. In connection with this work I was sent on several trips to places of actual or potential unrest and necessarily had direct or indirect contact with groups or persons possibly considered by the Kuo-mintang to be dissident.

The Embassy was kept fully informed of all my activities, which were entirely the gathering and reporting of information, and received copies of all reports prepared by me which were political in nature.

20 July 7, 1937.
21 For memorandum of January 23, 1943, by the Third Secretary of Embassy in China, temporarily in the United States, see Foreign Relations, 1943, China, p. 193.
This was at the express wish of General Stilwell who instructed me to cooperate fully with the Embassy and to act as a liaison between it and his Headquarters.

By early in 1944, the rapid expansion of American military participation in China, including preparations for air operations extending into and over North China, caused the Kuomintang—Communist impasse to become an important American military problem: in addition to the need for united activation of all Chinese forces against the Japanese, direct access to the Communist-controlled areas of North China was essential for military intelligence, weather information, air crew rescue and so forth. It was natural, in view of my duties on General Stilwell’s staff, that I was assigned an active part in the negotiations to obtain permission from both factions for American observers to visit Yenan. My connection with the matter was made obvious to the Central Government by my presence with Vice President Wallace and General Ferris when consent was finally obtained from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

The War Department having offered the State Department participation in the observer group, Ambassador Gauss recommended acceptance, for the political intelligence to be obtained, and suggested that I be named. Thus my trip to Yenan, although nominally in a military capacity as a member of General Stilwell’s staff, was actually at the specific request of the State Department.

The Observer Group was explicitly instructed that it was to confine its activities to the gathering of information and such work as air rescue and was not to make any offers or to enter into discussion of military aid or supplies. These instructions were rigidly complied with. They were made known to the Communist leaders in the bluntest and clearest terms in our initial interviews and were a definitely understood condition in all my subsequent relations with them. I so reported in writing at the time.

I remained in Yenan from July to October, 1944. Copies of all reports prepared by me during that time, including memoranda of all non-social interviews with Communist leaders, were furnished the Department through the Embassy.

When General Stilwell was relieved of command of the China-Burma-India Theater in October, 1944, he ordered my return to the United States and my detail to the Army was considered ended. However, while I was on leave in the United States, his successor, General Wedemeyer, requested the State Department to reassign me to the Headquarters of the China Theater for similar duties.

I have been given to understand that the State Department was reluctant to release me because of a current shortage of officers but that, at the same time, it considered it important to maintain political observation at Yenan—which could only be accomplished, practically speaking, by an officer attached to the Army. The Department

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23 For documentation on the mission of Vice President Henry A. Wallace, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. vi, pp. 216 ff.
24 Brig. Gen. Benjamin Ferris, Deputy Chief of Staff to General Stilwell.
25 For documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. vi, pp. 335-718, passim.
therefore made my return for duty with General Wedemeyer conditional on my availability for observation at Yenan. General Wedemeyer agreed, stating that I would spend most of my time at Yenan. My return to China in January, 1945, was accordingly on that basis.

It was realized before I returned to China that my longstanding contacts with Communists and other opposition groups, my frequent movements about China, my connection with the negotiations for the Observer Group and my having visited the Communist areas, together with my close relationship to General Stilwell, had aroused the suspicion and hostility of certain persons and groups of the Kuomintang. Stories were freely circulated by them to Americans that I was a Communist.

During my absence from China, General Hurley had become Ambassador and it had already become apparent that he was unfortunately willing to give credence to these unjustified attacks (from which other officers of the Embassy and General Stilwell’s staff also suffered); that he identified private difference of opinion with “opposition” and “disloyalty”; and that he refused to accept factual reports if contrary to what he apparently wished to believe. In discussing this situation with the then Chief of Foreign Service Personnel before my departure from Washington, I stated that I was nonetheless willing to return to China because General Wedemeyer had requested my services and because I considered it a war job of importance.

On my arrival in Chungking, Ambassador Hurley warned me that if I “ever interfered with him” he would “break me”. It was never made clear to me just what he considered “interference”.

In February, 1945, after Ambassador Hurley had returned to the United States following a break-down of the Kuomintang-Communist negotiations, there were signs in Chungking of a dangerous drift in the political situation in which both main parties were stiffening their positions and making war-like preparations. The matter was of such gravity that I asked to join the political reporting officers of the Embassy in a telegram to the Department to which Mr. Hurley has apparently objected.

Shortly thereafter it became known that the Communists were about to hold their first Party Congress in many years. In view of the tense political situation in China, it was expected to be of great importance as defining the Communist position and laying down the Party’s future policy. Because political observation was obviously desirable and because I had been assigned to Headquarters for that purpose, I was instructed by the Chief of Staff, then in command, to proceed to Yenan. I did so about March 4, 1945. On this, as on my first trip to Yenan, I was instructed that I was in an observer capacity only. The Communist leaders were informed of this and understood clearly that I had no policy authority whatsoever.

As the Department is aware, I was ordered back to the United States about April 1, 1945, at the instigation of Ambassador Hurley, and since that time have not been concerned with China affairs of a policy nature.

As for the charges made directly by Mr. Hurley or appearing in what seem to be inspired articles (such as those by a former—non-

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27 Nathaniel P. Davis.
Foreign Service—member of the Chungking Embassy staff), I make the following brief comment.

I am not a Communist. This can be verified by anyone who knows me well.

I did not "sabotage" American policy in China. On the contrary, in answer to unavoidable questions by Communists I explained the impossibility of American intervention in favor of a political party forcefully opposing a recognized government.

I did not tell the Communists that Mr. Hurley's statements did not represent American policy. On the contrary I never left doubt that they were the policy.

I did not send any messages of any kind to the Communists; nor did I show my reports or other official reports to Communists or any other Chinese; nor did I give the Communists, orally or otherwise, any classified American military information. Officers who were members of the Observer Group can confirm that we took all possible precautions to safeguard our reports.

I did not advocate the collapse or overthrow of the Central Government. On the contrary, my reports will show that I consistently took the view that the Central Government could (and should) strengthen itself by liberalization which would promote unification of the country on a democratic basis, and that American influence should be exerted to that end.

I have had conversation with Mr. Hurley only three times. On two of those I was not asked and had no opportunity to express opinions. I am at a loss to understand his basis for the charges he has made against me. It seems obvious that he has not made a careful reading of my reports and that he is not familiar with the background of my duties and assignments in China which is outlined above.

Everything that I wrote in China was given to the Embassy at Chungking and presumably is a matter of record there or in the Department.

I have received commendations from both General Stilwell and General Wedemeyer. I believe that my efficiency record in the Department of State is favorable.

I have always considered myself a loyal officer of the American Government and the Department of State, and that I have exerted my efforts in the furtherance of American interests.

Respectfully yours,

John S. Service

Approved for transmission:

George Atcheson, Jr.
The Secretary of State to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan (MacArthur)

WASHINGTON, December 9, 1945—2 p. m.

194. For Atcheson, Acting Political Adviser, from Far Eastern Office. In statement before Senate Foreign Relations Committee on December 7 Secretary stated _inter alia:_

"The officer in charge of an American mission in a foreign country bears the responsibility for full and accurate reporting of the factors and events which are necessary to the intelligent formulation and execution of United States foreign policy. . . . It is difficult to understand how Mr. Atcheson failed in any way to observe the letter or the spirit of these rules and traditions. His telegram of February 28 was a full and free report of the current situation in China as he saw it. His recommendation was an honest effort to assist the Department of State in the formulation of its future policy in China. There is nothing to indicate that he sought to circumvent his superior in making this report and recommendation. On the contrary the telegram expressly suggested that this was a matter upon which the views of Ambassador Hurley should be sought by the Department in Washington. . . . It is not my purpose to dwell at greater length upon the two documents [Atcheson's telegram and Service's report]. In my opinion, based upon the information which has thus far been presented to me, there is nothing in them to support the charge that either Mr. Atcheson or Mr. Service was guilty of the slightest disloyalty to his superior officers."

Full text of statement being airmailed. So far as we can ascertain the incident may now be considered closed.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS IN JAPAN (MACARTHUR)

WASHINGTON, December 12, 1945.


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28 Department of State Bulletin, December 9, 1945, p. 930.
29 Omissions indicated in the original telegram.
30 Telegram No. 324, February 28, 1 p. m., p. 242.
31 Brackets appear in the original. For report No. 43, October 12, 1944, by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Service), enclosing memorandum of conversation of October 10, one of the documents upon which the Ambassador based his charges, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. vi, p. 636.
Foreign Relations Committee appears in State Department Radio Bulletin of December 7. You are free of course to make public in reply to those charges any statement you desire.

BYRNES

[Green H. Hackworth, Legal Adviser, submitted a memorandum on March 1, 1946, to the Secretary of State (120.1/12-745), of which the following are extracts:

MR. SECRETARY: In your memorandum of December 7, 1945, you requested that I determine to the best of my ability whether there is any evidence—

(1) that any of the officers named by General Hurley in his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, or any other employees of the Department, ever communicated to the Communist faction in China any information concerning Allied military plans for landings or operations in China;

(2) that any of the officers named by General Hurley, or any others, advised the Communists in China that Ambassador Hurley's efforts to prevent the collapse of the National Government did not represent the policy of the United States; or

(3) that they openly or privately advised the Communist faction to decline unification of the Chinese Communist Army with the Nationalist Army unless the Chinese Communists were given control.

At the Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on December 5, 6, 7 ad 10, 1945, the following Foreign Service officers were named by General Hurley:

1. George Atcheson,
2. John Service,
3. John Carter Vincent,
4. John Davies,
5. Fulton Freeman,
6. Arthur Ringwald, and

We already had in our files communications from Messrs. Atcheson and Service regarding General Hurley's charges.

Following the receipt of your memorandum of December 7, I contacted Messrs. Ringwald and Freeman who were in the Department. I also sent communications to Messrs. Davies and Emmerson in Moscow and Tokyo, respectively, informing them of the charges and giving them an opportunity to submit such statements as they might desire to make concerning the complaint. We now have statements

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32 Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union.
33 Of the Office of the U. S Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander, Allied Forces, Japan.
from each of these officers; also numerous reports submitted from time
to time by them and by the Embassy in Chungking, regarding the
general situation in China.

Each of the above-listed officers categorically denies the charges
made by General Hurley. The statements of the respective Foreign
Service officers are attached as Exhibits 1-7.\footnote{None printed.}
In an effort to be fair
to these men who did not have a "day in court" during the Hearings,
the statements should be made a part of their records in the Depart-
ment.

Comment on the respective cases follows.

Conclusions:

\begin{enumerate}
\item As to the first of the questions stated at the outset of this
memorandum, I find no evidence that any of the Foreign Service
officers referred to by General Hurley or other employees of the De-
partment ever communicated to the Communist faction in China any
information concerning Allied military plans for landings or opera-
tions in China.
\end{enumerate}

In his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, General
Hurley stated that when the program was prepared for President
Roosevelt to go to Yalta there was drafted a paper, dated January
29, 1945, on American policy in Asia, one paragraph of which pro-
vided that "if the military, in landing on the coast of China, found
the Communists instead of the National Army, they would have the
right to arm all forces in such a condition that would assist the
American landing force." He stated that "With that I was in agree-
ment" and added: \footnote{Omissions indicated in the original memorandum.}

\begin{quote}
... But imagine my consternation when I saw a general move-
ment of Communist troops from a territory just described by Senator
Austin,\footnote{Senator from Vermont.} all moving toward a certain port in China. Then I read
that some Naval officer had been arrested here, and the Communists
not only knew the naval port but they knew the most secret plan of
the United States, and I picked that up, not from our career men, but
from the Communist armed party in China...
\end{quote}

The document referred to is apparently a memorandum of that
date,\footnote{Ante, p. 37.} prepared by Mr. Vincent as head of the Division of Chinese
Affairs, under instructions from the Acting Secretary of State "for
use in replying to inquiries from the Secretaries of War and Navy".
It was stated in the memorandum:

"We would like to see the rearmament, to such extent as may be
practicable, of all Chinese forces willing to fight the Japanese, but
the present unsatisfactory relations between the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communists makes it impolitic to undertake measures for the rearmament of the Chinese Communists even though it is generally conceded that they could effectively use quantities of small arms ammunition and demolition materials. However, if operations are undertaken along the China coast it is suggested that our military authorities should be prepared to arm any Chinese forces which they believe can be effectively employed against the Japanese, and that they should at an opportune time so advise the Chinese military authorities."

There is also in the files a copy of a document labeled "Item 7", undated and unsigned, headed "A paper communicated by the State Department to the Secretaries of War and Navy and by them to the Joint Chiefs of Staff about January 30, 1945", which contains the identical paragraph just quoted. It will thus be seen that persons other than officers of the Department had access to this information.

The memorandum does not state precisely what General Hurley said, rather it states that it would be "impolitic to undertake measures for the rearmament of the Chinese Communists even though it is generally conceded that they could effectively use quantities of small arms ammunition and demolition materials". It is added, however, and this is probably what General Hurley had in mind, that "if operations are undertaken along the China coast it is suggested that our military authorities should be prepared to arm any Chinese forces which they believe can be effectively employed against the Japanese, and that they should at an opportune time so advise the Chinese military authorities".

Neither Mr. Bohlen, who was at Yalta, nor Mr. Vincent has any knowledge that the matter was discussed at Yalta; they agree that if it was discussed it was probably on a military level.

Each of the Foreign Service officers mentioned by General Hurley has denied that he communicated to the Communists information regarding landing plans, or that he knew what such plans were.

The plans, if there were any, presumably were known to the military authorities. They naturally would have been more directly concerned and hence more likely to be informed.

Moreover, the possibility of Allied landings on the coast of China was the subject of widespread speculation. See for example the first numbered paragraph of Mr. Ringwalt's statement of January 2, 1946, quoted above.40

40 See footnote 52, p. 87.
49 Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State.
40 Not printed.
As early as August 1944 the Communist General, Chen Yi, informed Mr. Service of plans to retake former Communist bases in southeastern China, using for this purpose arms of defeated Kuomintang forces. (Despatch 3021 [3020], Sept. 29, 1944, from Chungking;\textsuperscript{41} file 740.0011 P. W./9-2944.) General Chu Teh, Commander of the Chinese Communist 18th Group Army, also discussed “American plans to land on the South China Coast” with Mr. Service on September 22, 1944. (Despatch 3093, October 25, 1944,\textsuperscript{42} file 893.00/10-2544.)

I do not find any reason for supposing that military plans were disclosed to the Communists by the Foreign Service officers in question.

(2) On the second of the questions stated on the first page above, namely, whether any of the officers named by General Hurley, or any others, advised the Communists in China that Ambassador Hurley’s efforts to prevent the collapse of the National Government did not represent the policy of the United States, I find no supporting evidence.

It is said to have been well known among the Communists, and even to Chiang Kai-shek himself, that the American military authorities were sympathetic to aiding other factions in China, as well as the Nationalists. This knowledge was extant even before General Hurley was made Ambassador. For example, in a telegram dated October 24, 1944\textsuperscript{43} Ambassador Gauss in reporting on the forthcoming detail of Mr. Service to the War Department in Washington, explained that the Embassy had reason to believe that “some of our Army officers and perhaps Stilwell favor direct aid to Chinese Communist forces and that object in having Service proceed to Washington has to do with some such proposal”.

While the Foreign Service officers referred to by General Hurley advocated that the base of the Chinese Government should be broadened to include representative elements in China, none advocated, as charged by General Hurley, the collapse of the National Government. They deny that they ever advised the Communists that Ambassador Hurley’s efforts to prevent the collapse of the National Government did not represent the policy of the United States.

(3) The third charge is that the Communists were advised to decline unification with the Nationalist Army unless the Chinese Communists were given control.

\textsuperscript{41} Not printed, but see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. vi, p. 527, footnote 44.
\textsuperscript{42} Not printed, but see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. vi, p. 588, footnote 90.
\textsuperscript{43} Telegram No. 1722, October 24, 1944, 8 a. m., from the Ambassador in China; Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. vi, p. 657.
The officers in question deny that they ever made any such suggestion or that they ever entertained any such view. They felt that unification of the Chinese forces was desirable but none ever suggested, so far as is disclosed by the record, that the Communists should be given control.

A considerable mass of material relating to various phases of the Chinese political, economic and military situation has been examined. I have used only such parts of it as seemed to be pertinent to the particular charges here in question. I have found nothing that leads me to feel that the charges were warranted.]