ACQUISITION OF MATERIALS FOR USE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ATOMIC BOMB; EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY

[For documents relating to earlier discussions among high officials of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada with regard to the development and control of atomic energy, see the subsequent volumes of this series containing documents on the conferences of Heads of Governments held at Washington, Casablanca, and Quebec in the years 1941–1944. A detailed narrative account is given in Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., The New World, 1939/1946, which is volume I of A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (University Park, Pa., The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962), hereinafter cited as The New World, 1939/1946.

President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill had agreed at Hyde Park, New York, on September 18, 1944, that full collaboration between the United States and the British Government in developing TUBE ALLOYS, i.e., atomic energy, for military and commercial purposes should continue after the defeat of Japan unless and until terminated by joint agreement. During the remaining months of 1944 various discussions were held among United States officials, and occasionally with British officials as well, on such subjects as postwar arrangements, security, disclosure of information, international control, patents, and relations with other governments. Secretary of State Stettinius and Assistant Secretary James C. Dunn were informed of the atomic project in January 1945 (The New World, 1939/1946, pages 322-335).]
Minutes of a Meeting of the Combined Policy Committee

[Extracts]


Present:
Members: The Secretary of War, Chairman
Dr. Vannevar Bush
Sir Ronald I. Campbell
Mr. C. D. Howe
Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson

By Invitation: Sir James Chadwick
Major General L. R. Groves

Joint Secretaries: Mr. Harvey H. Bundy
Dr. William L. Webster

5. The French Situation.

The Chairman made the following statement:

"Sir John Anderson has informed us that there is grave danger that the French, through Mr. Joliot, or possibly through De Gaulle instigated by Joliot, may press for immediate participation in the T.A. Project. It is not known whether this request will include only industrial aspects or whether it will also be for military participation.

"Neither the United States nor Great Britain want any question about this project raised at this time with France and Sir John Anderson thinks some assurance to Joliot will have to be given in order to bring about a postponement of the issue and thereby protect against

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1 Office of International Scientific Affairs, Department of State.
2 This Committee was established under the terms of the Roosevelt–Churchill "Articles of Agreement governing collaboration between the authorities of the U.S.A. and the U.K. in the matter of Tube Alloys" (i.e., atomic energy research and development) signed at Quebec, August 19, 1943 (Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 2898; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (UST), vol. 5, p. 1114).
3 Henry L. Stimson.
4 Director, Office of Scientific Research and Development.
5 British Minister, Washington.
6 Canadian Minister of Munitions and Supply.
7 Head, British Staff Mission, Washington.
8 Chief Scientific Adviser to the British Government on Atomic Matters.
9 Commanding General, Manhattan Engineer District (code name for the atomic bomb development program).
10 Special Assistant to the Secretary of War.
11 Of the Office of Scientific Research and Development.
12 British Chancellor of the Exchequer.
13 Jean Frédéric Joliot, Director, French National Center of Scientific Research.
15 Tube Alloys.
political explosion by the French with or without collaboration with the Russians, with possible danger to security.

"I understand that it has now been suggested through Sir Ronald Campbell to Sir John Anderson that he make a statement along the following lines to Mr. Joliot:

'Since it is inadvisable to attempt detailed discussions as to arrangements with France in the field of nuclear sources of power until the termination of hostilities, the Government of the United Kingdom is prepared, in view of this postponement, to assure the French Government that upon the termination of hostilities it will discuss further with the French Government fair treatment of any claims of the French Government relating to commercial or industrial applications of nuclear sources of power.'

"I have stated to Sir Ronald Campbell that in view of the fact that all contacts with the French have been with the British, I am not prepared to recommend to the President that the United States make any commitment now to the French in regard to these matters.

"I understand the British authorities feel that the treatment of the French relation to this whole project is very much affected by certain inventions and patent rights which the French claim and on which the French have been filing claims in various places throughout the world. I should appreciate it if Sir Ronald Campbell would state more fully this phase of the question."

Sir Ronald Campbell then made the following observations:

"One of the factors which may have to be borne in mind in considering the French problem is the fact that the French Government hold certain patents or patent applications in the T.A. field to which they attach considerable importance.

"In 1942 the opinion of legal counsel was sought in London on the bearing of patent applications known as A and B on T.A. development. It seems probable that A and B would be held valid in England and, if valid, that they would be master patents controlling the working of many later patents.

"This conclusion does not necessarily hold for the United States, owing to the differences in the patent practice of the two countries.

"If the above estimate of the strength of the French applications A and B is correct and if importance is attached to the building up of a strong patent position in the T.A. field, it seems desirable that the British and U.S. Governments should acquire control over these two patents in all countries in which the Governments are interested in the development or control of the T.A. project.

"It might be advisable to begin now to offer to negotiate an agreement on patents, with the object of acquiring for the British, United States and Canadian Governments jointly the world rights, outside France and the French Empire, in patents arising from the French applications. The question of what would constitute an equitable patents agreement, or one which would satisfy the French, is not easy to answer. It might require the assignment to the French Government of exclusive rights for France and the French Empire in some,
or even all, Nuclear Pile inventions within the powers of disposal of
the three Governments and it might involve the disclosure of infor-
mation contained in such United Kingdom and United States patents.
This is a matter which would require very careful examination.

"Any commercial or industrial rights arising from the world rights
ceded to the three Governments under such a patents agreement would
be disposed of in accordance with the Quebec Agreement.

"The advantages of an agreement on patents would be firstly, and
chiefly, to convince the French Government that it could safely leave
the T.A. arrangement to follow its present course of development,
so avoiding a demand for immediate discussion and settlement of
policy between them and the Governments concerned or seeking satis-
faction elsewhere, and, secondly, to lead Joliot to desist from pressing
his patent applications all over the world as he is now doing, with
some danger to the security of the T.A. project.

"The Governments of Great Britain, the United States and Canada
have taken the view, as far as their own countries are concerned, that
T.A. is not a suitable project for commercial exploitation for private
profit and all patent applications taken out in the T.A. field in these
countries are allocated to the respective Governments.

"It might be desirable, in order to prevent private exploitation in
other countries of the world and to keep T.A. development under suit-
able supervision and control, to try to acquire all rights in the French
patent applications outside France and the French Empire."

Dr. Bush expressed serious doubts about the importance of these
French patents to the future of the project as a whole, partly because
ownership of patents would not prevent development under other
Governments, and partly because high cost would probably constitute
a more effective barrier to the development of T.A. for ordinary com-
mercial purposes. He pointed out that American active desire to
obtain control by the U.S. Government of patents, relating to this
project, had been based largely on the wish to avoid difficulties which
would arise inside the U.S.A. if a profusion of patents remained in
private hands. At a later stage, this motive was reinforced by the
thought the Government control of patents would facilitate agree-
ments between the U.S. and other Governments which might emerge.
Dr. Bush reported that the U.S. Government authorities concerned
were paying careful attention to patents held independently within
the U.S.A. but did not feel that action on these could usefully be
pressed beyond what was "reasonable."

With reference to this French situation, the Chairman, referring
to Article III of the Quebec Agreement, stated that high policy on
the disclosure of information to other Governments was a matter
for the determination of the signatories of that Agreement. An ex-
tended discussion took place during which it was accepted that the
present action of the Committee should be limited to security aspects.
This discussion necessitated a consideration of the Committee's com-
petence on matters in which are interwoven (as in the case of contacts with the French Government) political as well as technical and security issues. While it is not contemplated that the C.P.C.\textsuperscript{16} will take formal action outside its terms of reference or the special competence of its members, it is expected that important problems arising from the project and affecting C.P.C. countries will be discussed at Combined Policy Committee meetings, even though not requiring formal action by the Committee, in order that the members of this Committee may present such views as may be pertinent, and that the individual members of the Committee may be in a position to report to their respective Governments views expressed by the members.

The Committee agreed that negotiations with the French regarding patent rights would involve serious danger of disclosure of information diminishing the general security of and increasing the risk of sabotage to the existing co-operative project already committed to its charge.

It was finally decided to record as the sense of the meeting that the Committee noted the dangers reported by Sir John Anderson which might arise from the French pressing for consideration of their interest in the T.A. Project. The Committee was also unanimously of the opinion that the proposed statement which, as the Chairman had reported, might be made by Sir John Anderson to Professor Joliot, amended by the insertion of the words “with the Axis powers” after the two occurrences of the word “hostilities” would not be objectionable from the standpoint of security. The Committee, however, was unanimously of the opinion that any more extensive discussions of negotiations with the French as to their interest in the project would be undesirable from a security standpoint.

\textit{Harvey H. Bundy}  
\textit{William L. Webster}

\textit{Memorandum by the Commanding General, Manhattan Engineer District (Groves)}

\textit{[Washington,] 23 February, 1945.}

Major Vance,\textsuperscript{27} the officer who accompanied the Secretary of State on his visit to Rio de Janeiro, made the following report:

1. The discussions between Secretary Stettinius and President Vargas took place on 17 February 1945 in the presence of Senhora Elvira

\textsuperscript{26} Combined Policy Committee.
\textsuperscript{27} Maj. John E. Vance, on the Staff of General Groves.
Amaral Peixoto, the President's daughter, (who acted as interpreter) and Senhor Leao Velloso, the acting Brazilian Foreign Minister. A wide variety of subjects was discussed by the Secretary and President Vargas prior to the mention of thorium. When this particular subject was brought up the Secretary brought Major Vance into the meeting.

2. The Secretary based his approach on the following points as we had agreed with the British:

a. The approach should be limited to paving the way for future negotiations and to securing optional control of the situation.

b. It would be unwise at this time to make any definite agreement as to prices and quantities.

c. All that was desired was an understanding through conversations that Brazil would agree not to sell to others without our consent and to sell to us on a reasonable basis both as to price and quantity. Terms would be agreed upon later.

3. The Secretary emphasized the desirability and the advantages of close cooperation between the United States and Brazil after the war as well as at present. After some discussion of the particular needs of Brazil for materials which could be made available by the United States, the Secretary stated that the United States was interested in maintaining a supply of monazite, the carrier of thorium, for industrial purposes. He pointed out that during the past five years the United States had purchased the entire Brazilian export of monazite sands and that India might be expected to dominate the market completely in the future, owing to lower labor costs in that country and to the higher grade of the Indian product. In keeping, however, with our general policy of buying within the Hemisphere, we would like to enter into negotiations leading to a possible continuation of our purchases of the Brazilian exports of monazite and implied we wanted all of their exports. Neither price nor definite quantities were mentioned.

4. President Vargas replied that Brazil had already entered into several agreements to provide the United States with strategic materials of various types and that the Brazilian government stood ready to continue that policy. President Vargas suggested that negotiations could be carried out with Senhor Valentim F. Bouças (Senhor Bouças is the Director of the Brazilian Commission to Control the Washington Agreements.) on this subject and that the discussions could be initiated in Mexico City if we desired. President Vargas stipulated that any agreement would have to be approved by his government before taking effect.

5. The Secretary then summed up the conversation by saying that he understood it would be agreeable to the Brazilian government if
our representatives discussed with Senhor Bouças the possibility of arriving at an optional agreement to purchase the Brazilian monazite production. President Vargas concurred.

L. R. Groves
Major General, U.S.A.

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Minutes of a Meeting of the Combined Policy Committee

[Extracts]

[WASHINGTON], March 8, 1945.

Present:

Members: The Secretary of War, Chairman
Dr. James B. Conant
Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson
Dean C. J. Mackenzie, representing Mr. C. D. Howe

By Invitation: The Right Honorable The Earl of Halifax
Sir James Chadwick
Major General L. R. Groves

Joint Secretaries: Mr. Harvey H. Bundy
Dr. W. L. Webster
Mr. D. H. F. Rickett

[3.] (e) Action in Brazil.

The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Chairman of the Trust submitting a report by Major Vance who had been present with Secretary Stettinius during his discussion with President Vargas on February 17th.

As a result of this discussion which, as agreed with the United Kingdom Government, had been of an exploratory character only, President Vargas had said that he would be willing for further negotiations to take place between the United States and the Brazilian

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18 Chairman of the National Defense Research Committee.
19 Chairman of the Canadian National Research Council.
20 British Ambassador.
21 Denis H. F. Rickett, Personal Assistant to Sir John Anderson.
22 Supra.
23 Reference is to the Combined Development Trust, of which General Groves was Chairman. This agency was established by the Agreement and Declaration of Trust, signed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, June 13, 1944; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. II, p. 1026. The Combined Development Trust was to operate under the direction of the Combined Policy Committee; its main function was to secure control and insure development of uranium and thorium supplies located outside the jurisdiction of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Dominions, India, and Burma.
Governments with regard to the granting of an option to the United States Government to purchase Brazilian production of thorium.

The Committee:—

Took note of this report and agreed to discuss further the control of thorium supplies in the next item of their agenda. (See conclusion 4 (b) below.)


The Committee had before them the following papers:

Two memoranda, dated February 3rd and March 3rd[24] respectively giving the views of Sir John Anderson on supplies and requirements of raw materials for the project.

A memorandum by General Groves to the Secretary of War, dated March 7th,[25] commenting on Sir John Anderson’s views.

(a) Uranium.

Briefly summarized, Sir John Anderson’s views were:

--- (1) that the deposits in the Belgian Congo should be exploited as rapidly as possible and the material, both of high grade and low grade, removed to safe territory;

(2) a program of exploration should be instituted to decide what were the ultimate resources in the Belgian Congo;

(3) the Trust had recommended that supplies in North America should be conserved so far as possible. This raised the question whether Canadian production should be maintained at a high level;

(4) the information service initiated by the Trust should be maintained at a high level of efficiency;

(5) commercial action should be taken quietly wherever opportunity offered to obtain control of minor sources of supply but no attempt should be made to cover this by political agreement.

The memorandum by General Groves pointed out that while Sir John Anderson had estimated the annual needs of North America for uranium at 600 tons, the present United States estimate for the next five years, based on experience so far obtained and as calculated for the plants now in operation or being completed, was 2000 to 2400 tons of uranium oxide per annum.

With reference to (4) of Sir John Anderson’s views summarized above, it was explained that much fuller information was needed to discover the location of uranium deposits throughout the world, particularly those of low grade ore.

The Committee:—

Took note of Sir John Anderson’s views on requirements and supplies of uranium as summarized above which were in accordance with those of the U.S. authorities. Action by the Trust on these lines in the

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areas for which it was responsible was accordingly approved in principle by the Committee.

(b) Thorium.

The Committee considered what further action should be taken to follow up the preliminary approach which had been made to the Brazilian Government as reported in conclusion 3 (e) above.

It was noted that while in Sir John Anderson's view it seemed clear that really useful action to deny supplies of thorium to other countries was not possible, it was equally clear that if such action was to be attempted at all it should be taken quickly. Sir John Anderson had, however, assumed that the need of the cooperating Governments for large quantities of thorium in addition to or instead of the large quantities of uranium already secured had not been established.

On this point the Committee noted that the latest experimental data, while still incomplete, gave every promise that thorium would be of great use and that once the reaction had started it could be continued on a large scale without the use of further uranium.

The Committee were also reminded that while the extent of world supplies of thorium was unknown, the cost of purchasing the whole pre-war output of Brazil would be negligible in comparison with the general scale of expenditure on the project. Any objections to such action, therefore, must be based on considerations of security.

In a letter to the Chairman of the Committee from the Chairman of the Trust, dated March 8th, the Combined Policy Committee were asked to give guidance to the Trust as to the importance of acquiring or controlling supplies of thorium. The policy adopted in regard to Brazil would necessarily determine the line on which action should be taken to deal with supplies in India and the Netherlands East Indies, the other two large sources of supply. The letter proposed that an executive agreement on thorium between the Governments of the United States of America and Brazil should be negotiated in the near future which would provide for control of exports of thorium and for information to be furnished in regard to stock piles and exploration of deposits. The United Kingdom would probably not be a formal party to this agreement which might be based on the present relations existing between the United States and Brazil. In this event the equal participation of the United Kingdom and the United States in all rights and obligations under the agreement should be recorded formally presumably by an exchange of letters between the two Governments or in the Minutes of the Combined Policy Committee or the Combined Development Trust. In any case there would be full consultation between the Secretary of War and the Ambassador and their representatives at every stage in the negotiations. Careful consid-

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28 Not printed.
eration should be given to the diplomatic and commercial procedure to be followed.

There was general agreement that action on these lines in regard to Brazil was desirable. This raised the further question of the steps to be taken in respect to Travancore and the Netherlands East Indies.

After a full discussion the Committee:—

(a) Agreed that the Trust should be directed to draw up the principal provisions of a proposed agreement between the United States and Brazilian Governments under which the United States Government would acquire certain thorium-bearing sands from Brazil, while the Brazilian Government would agree not to sell any thorium-bearing sands to any other country without consulting with the United States Government. The equal interest of the United Kingdom Government in this agreement should be recorded in some appropriate manner.

(b) Agreed that the Trust should submit recommendations regarding the procedure to be followed in negotiating this agreement which would then be discussed between the Secretary of War and the British Ambassador and their representatives.

(c) Agreed that when a political agreement had been negotiated with the Brazilian Government as indicated in (a) and (b) above, it would be for the Combined Development Trust to arrange for the negotiation of suitable contracts for the purchase of thorium from the Brazilians.

(d) Agreed to recommend that the United Kingdom Government should take steps to secure that exports of thorium from Travancore should be controlled and to secure that the supply should be available to the two Governments. These steps should be so timed that control could be put into effect and supplies assured upon a satisfactory basis as soon as the negotiations with the Brazilian Government had been concluded.

(e) Agreed that the Combined Development Trust should review as rapidly as possible the information available on thorium deposits in the Netherlands East Indies and should report the general result of this inquiry to the members of the Combined Policy Committee. Should these deposits be found to be of substantial importance, arrangements should be made between the United States and the United Kingdom members of the Committee for negotiations to be opened with the Netherlands Government with a view to securing control of these deposits.

5. Relations With the French.

(a) Position of the French Government.

Lord Halifax informed the Committee that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had had a conversation with M. Joliot on February 23rd
in London. The Chancellor had been away from London for a few days after this meeting and Lord Halifax had not yet received a full report of it. From what he had heard, however, it appeared that it had passed off in general satisfactorily.\footnote{A record of the meeting between Anderson and Jollot, authorship not indicated, is in the Department of State files. According to this document, Jollot indicated that the Russians had been approached to ascertain whether they were interested in information on atomic energy; they said that they were, but, when they asked what had been done so far, were told that no information could be given. The memorandum concluded by saying that it was Anderson’s impression that Jollot would most likely not take drastic action in the near future, but that he had made it clear to the Chancellor that France would turn to the Soviet Union unless admitted to collaboration by the United States and Great Britain on atomic energy. (Files of S/AE, the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Matters)}

The Committee:—

Took note of this information.

\begin{flushright}

Harvey H. Bundy  
William L. Webster  
D. H. F. Rickett
\end{flushright}

[On March 15, 1945, Secretary of War Stimson spoke to President Roosevelt about the status of atomic research and development and the need to decide between (a) an attempt at Anglo-American control through secrecy and (b) an international effort based on free interchange of scientific information and free access to the laboratories of the world. Roosevelt agreed that the matter must be decided before the first bomb was used, but he died on April 12 without having taken further action (The New World, 1939/1946, page 340).]

On April 25 Stimson and Groves presented to President Truman two memoranda, one pointing out the important implications of the bomb for international relations, the other describing the genesis and current status of the atomic project. After further discussions Stimson saw the President again on May 2 and completed arrangements for the appointment of an advisory group, which came to be known as the “Interim Committee”, to recommend early steps with regard to postwar policies and relations with other governments. Stimson served as Chairman. Assistant Secretary of State William L. Clayton was one of the members, and James F. Byrnes soon joined the group as a special representative of the President (The New World, 1939/1946, pages 342–346).

During May and June 1945 the principal civil and military officials of the United States, and their scientific advisers, held various meetings to discuss atomic developments, particularly with regard to (a) possible use of the atomic bomb against Japan, (b) the question of informing the Soviet Union, (c) domestic legislation, and (d) pos-
sible measures of international control (The New World, 1939/1946, pages 347–371).]

SCI Files

Minutes of a Meeting of the Combined Policy Committee

[Extracts]

[WASHINGTON,] July 4, 1945.

Present:

Members: The Secretary of War, Chairman
Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson
The Hon. C. D. Howe
Dr. Vannevar Bush

By Invitation: The Right Hon. The Earl of Halifax
Sir James Chadwick
Major General L. R. Groves
Mr. George Harrison

Joint Secretaries: Mr. Harvey H. Bundy
Mr. Roger Makins

3. Use of Weapon Against Third Parties.

FIELD MARSHAL WILSON stated that the British Government concurred in the use of the T. A. weapon against Japan. He added that the Prime Minister might wish to discuss this matter with the President at the forthcoming meeting in Berlin.

The Committee:—Took note that the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States had agreed that T. A. weapons should be used by the United States against Japan, the agreement of the British Government having been communicated by Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson.


THE CHAIRMAN said there were two conclusions:

1. The scientific principle of the weapon would inevitably be known as soon as it is used, and other countries would understand that one of three or four processes had been employed.

28 Special Consultant to the Secretary of War.
29 British Minister in Washington.
30 Reference is to the Potsdam Conference, July 16–August 2, 1945; for specific references to documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. 1, Index, entries under Japan, p. 1072; ibid., vol. II, Index, entries under Atomic energy, p. 1094; and Japan, p. 1623. (This publication is hereinafter referred to as Conference of Berlin (Potsdam).)
2. The technical and mechanical difficulties encountered in the production of the weapon and the methods by which they have been overcome need not and should not be disclosed.

Lord Halifax said that the greater the amount of information which was disclosed to other countries, the less inducement there might be for them to agree to measures of international control, should we ever desire to suggest them.

The Chairman said he was thinking of an earlier period, viz., the forthcoming meeting with Stalin. His own opinion had been very much influenced by the probable use within a few weeks after the meeting. If nothing was said at this meeting about the T. A. weapon, its subsequent early use might have a serious effect on the relations of frankness between the three great Allies. He had therefore advised the President to watch the atmosphere at the meeting. If mutual frankness on other questions was found to be real and satisfactory, then the President might say that work was being done on the development of atomic fission for war purposes; that good progress had been made; and that an attempt to use a weapon would be made shortly, though it was not certain that it would succeed. If it did succeed, it would be necessary for a discussion to be held on the best method of handling the development in the interests of world peace and not for destruction. If Stalin pressed for immediate disclosure the President might say that he was not prepared to take the matter further at the present time. The Chairman added that the knowledge of the large deposits in Sweden did not cause him to modify his advice to the President.

Lord Halifax said that he would propose to inform Sir John Anderson of what Mr. Stimson had said.

The Chairman agreed.


Mr. Bundy said that the supplies of material from the Belgian Congo received by the Trust, as well as some captured material which had been turned over to the Trust, were on their way to the United States, but it was appropriate that the position in regard to the allocation of material should be on record.

Lord Halifax observed that the effect of the decision, with which the Chancellor of the Exchequer entirely agreed, to allocate to the United States all the material which could be used in the American plants for the production of weapons against Japan, was that at the

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31 Generalissimo Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman, Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union.
32 For text of the Memorandum of Agreement, September 26, 1944, between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Belgium relating to this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. II, p. 1029.
end of the war the United States would have a stock of weapons and of material in and awaiting process, while the United Kingdom would have no raw material except what it could secure by release at that date from Trust purchases. This was a position which caused the Chancellor some concern in relation to Parliament and public opinion and he desired that his position in the matter should be clearly understood. He hoped that when the time came for allocation of material for purposes other than the production of material for the present war, all relevant factors would be taken into account.

After further discussion the Committee:

Determined that while the war lasts all uranium supplies received by the Combined Development Trust for the joint account of the United States and the United Kingdom should be allocated to the United States Government for the production of weapons for use against the common enemy. The Committee’s attention having been called to the fact that this policy will leave Great Britain without any reserve of supplies of this material for future use, the Committee noted this statement of the British members and agreed that insofar as the material received by the Trust exceeds the quantity required for the production of weapons against the common enemy in the present war it should be held by the Combined Development Trust to be disposed of or otherwise dealt with in accordance with paragraph 3(1) of the Agreement of 18th June 1944, and that in making future allocations all relevant factors should be reviewed.

Harvey H. Bundy
Roger Makins

S/AB Files

Memorandum by Mr. S. Maurice McAshan, Jr., and Colonel John Lansdale, on the Staff of the Commanding General, Manhattan Engineer District (Groves)


Report on Negotiations in Rio de Janeiro,
June 27-July 10, 1945

1. McAshan, Lee, Vance and Lansdale had lunch with Bouças at his office on 27 June 1945. We did not broach the subject of the pro-

See footnote 23, p. 7. Paragraph 3(1) of the Agreement read as follows:
"The Trust shall carry out its functions under the direction and guidance of the Combined Policy Committee, and as its agent, and all uranium and thorium and all uranium and thorium ores and supplies and other property acquired by the Trust shall be held by it in trust for the Two Governments jointly, and disposed of or otherwise dealt with in accordance with the direction of the Combined Policy Committee."

Frank Lee, member of the British Treasury delegation, Washington.
posed discussions because we had not had sufficient time to discuss the matter among ourselves. Boucas, however, asked us out of a clear sky whether we were here to discuss monazite sands. (At the next morning meeting he told us that the President had authorized him to conduct negotiations on this matter before he went to Mexico City.\textsuperscript{25}) We told him that monazite sands were the purpose of our visit but that we were not prepared to discuss details at that time. A meeting was arranged for the following morning. The five of us (McAshan, Lee, Volpe,\textsuperscript{26} Vance and Lansdale) spent the afternoon and evening preparing for the meeting with Bouças.

2. Because of Brazilian records of exports of monazite sands during the past few years and because we were using credit for private transactions, we decided not to attempt to start with a figure as low as 750 tons but rather 1500 tons. It was also agreed that it would be inadvisable to attempt a 99-year term for the agreement.

3. On 28 June at 9 A. M. we had a general discussion with Bouças. McAshan, Lee, Vance and Lansdale were present. We called attention to Lee's presence as a representative of the British Government, and explained that while the British were jointly interested with us in the negotiations, the agreement would be solely between the United States and Brazil.

4. We advised Mr. Bouças that thorium, of which monazite is a carrier, might have appreciably \textit{appreciable} military significance although we had no definite knowledge of its potentialities at this time. We gave him no further details and Bouças was uncurious about the matter. At one point Bouças said that if the matter were a military secret, he did not want to know about it because there were certain persons in Brazil who could not be trusted.

5. The discussion covered the points of interest to us and was kept on a commercial basis. Agreement in principle was reached as to the points to be covered. In discussion of the necessary secrecy involved, he asked if we could not include some provisions for military participation by Brazil in end uses since it would then be easier for him to handle the matter with the required secrecy. We told him we were not in a position to discuss this aspect of the matter.

6. Mr. Bouças suggested several points to be covered in the agreement:

\begin{itemize}
  \item [a.] That Brazil be bound not to increase taxes or official fees during the period of the agreement.
  \item [b.] That the United States might have to educate Brazilian inspectors if they were needed.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{25} To attend the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, February 21–March 8, 1945. For documentation on this Conference, see vol. ix, pp. 1 ff.

\textsuperscript{26} First Lt. Joseph Volpe, on the staff of General Groves.
a. That the ports of shipment be specified by Brazil in order to facilitate export control.

7. Bouças also wanted annual renegotiation of price and quantity with a ten per cent increase per year in quantity. He finally agreed, however, on the three-year term with renegotiation of price every three years and a floor on quantities. He also agreed on successive options and gave the impression that he would agree to an indefinite series of options. Bouças also requested that some provision be made indicating an intention of the United States to continue to buy monazite sands from Brazil on an equitable basis as to quantity after the Indian market was reopened. He expressed the opinion that the agreement should be executed by the Brazilian foreign minister and by Mr. Berle.\textsuperscript{37}

8. The balance of the morning and afternoon was spent in making a preliminary draft of the agreement. Mr. Lee contributed materially in the work of drafting.

9. In the late afternoon, McAslan and Lansdale called again on Bouças with the preliminary draft.\textsuperscript{38} Bouças went carefully over each provision. After due consideration, we called Bouças' attention to the indefinite term of the agreement as drafted and asked his advice as to the best way to handle the matter. He clearly had missed this point and stated that the agreement must have a definite limitation. He was of the opinion that five terms of three years each was all he could get Vargas to approve. At our insistence he agreed to try to obtain approval for ten terms. At the same time he insisted on a provision for the purchase of grades under six percent thorium; he gave as his reason the danger of a weak government refusing to enforce the export control if another foreign buyer offered a good price for lower grades. He cited the difficulty with Argentina on pyrethrum.

10. Bouças also insisted on including in the agreement clauses for provisional payments. Furthermore, he wanted six months' notice of the exercise of the option rather than the sixty days we had proposed, to enable producers to handle the labor problems involved in case of discontinuance of the agreement.

11. He asked also for a rewording of the non-discrimination clause to cover all amounts shipped under the agreement whether the shipments were to the United States or to another country by designation.

12. Bouças completely balked on paragraph 6 of the first draft which had to do with the limitation of use in Brazil. He insisted that the point was sufficiently covered in the reservation to Brazil of ma-

\textsuperscript{37} Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Ambassador in Brazil.
\textsuperscript{38} Not printed.
terial for normal use and that it was politically impossible to insert any provision indicating that Brazil must first ask the United States before using within Brazil their own product.

13. Bouças left about seven in the evening with a copy of the draft to see the President. He later called McAs an and requested us to meet him at the train just before his departure for São Paulo. He told us at that time that the President had approved the agreement in principle but that the President had insisted on a commitment during the initial three-year period for the purchase of 3000 tons per year. We agreed to consider this point and to redraft the memorandum to cover the other points under discussion and to meet with him on Wednesday* on his return to Rio. Bouças voluntarily returned to us the copy of the memorandum we had given him, for security reasons.

14. Vance, Volpe and Lansdale had called on Berle on Tuesday afternoon, 26 June and had advised him of the nature of our mission. On the morning of the 27th, McAs an and Lansdale called on him again. Friday morning, 29 June, McAs an and Lansdale reported to Mr. Berle the events to date and discussed the non-discrimination clause at length with him. On Friday morning the 6th of July, McAs an called on Berle and discussed the formalities of execution. Mr. Berle suggested that the execution should be by exchange of notes referred [referring?] to the initialled memorandum rather than by notes incorporating the text of the memorandum. Mr. Berle was thoroughly and constructively cooperative at all times. He gave us good advice on procedure which we followed as closely as changing circumstances permitted.

15. The intervening period until our next meeting with Bouças (delayed until Friday, 6th July) was spent in redrafting the arrangement. We determined to meet Bouças' request to include grades under six percent thorium in order to strengthen export control but with a limitation to twenty percent of the quantities purchased and at a substantial discount in price. Lee participated fully in the redrafting and concurred on all points. No material changes were made subsequent to Lee's departure on 4 July although the final draft was written the afternoon of 5 July.

16. The afternoon of 6 July McAs an, Vance and Lansdale met Bouças with the final draft. Bouças insisted on 3000 tons. We attempted to secure an increase in the number of options to fifteen, Bouças, however, would not budge. He warned us that failure to meet the President's request for 3000 tons or an insistence on an increase in the periods might result in the President requiring a

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*July 4.
complete reworking of the agreement and placing it in foreign office channels. He pointed out that the agreement would not be published and that nothing would be done to stimulate Brazilian production unless we wanted it, so that in point of fact, we would probably not find much in excess of 1300-1400 tons per year available for purchase. Bouças suggested that the memorandum be signed at that time in order to strengthen his hand in securing the final approval of the President. This was done.

16. Bouças took the original signed memorandum to the President. He telephoned McAshan at 8:30 P. M. on 8 July to say that the President had approved the agreement without further change but that he had not been able to get in touch with Velloso who had just arrived in Rio. At the same time Bouças expressed profuse thanks for the priority that we had secured for his son, George.

17. Saturday morning at 10 A. M., McAshan and Lansdale visited Mr. Berle who prepared the draft of a covering note to be exchanged in identical form between Velloso and Berle. Our signed memorandum in English was incorporated in the note by reference. A copy of this draft was handed to Bouças at 11 A. M. Bouças took this draft together with his copy of the memorandum of agreement and a résumé of the agreement and course of negotiation to Leon Velloso. The résumé which was in Portuguese was dictated by Bouças to his confidential secretary, Beatrice Brandão.

18. At 9:30 A. M. on 9 July, Berle's office reported he had an engagement with Velloso at 12 noon, at which time it was hoped that the signed notes would be exchanged. Bouças reported that he would be there and wanted Mr. Berle to insist on keeping the agreement out of the Brazilian Foreign Office document registry system which would take time and cause a loss in security.

19. Berle met Velloso at 12, noon, and found Velloso's "amour propre" wounded over the fact that President Vargas had not sent Velloso direct authorization to conclude the agreement. Velloso even kept Bouças waiting outside until 1:15 and then did not see him. Velloso also wanted to obtain the concurrence of Ministro Antonio Ferreira Braga (Foreign Office Chief of Economic Affairs) before exchanging notes.

20. Bouças went to work on the President's military aide to get Velloso direct instructions from Vargas and requested us not to take the matter up with Braga as suggested by Berle since he might not have been brought into the deal. Bouças reported about 5 P. M. that Velloso had a date with Vargas on Tuesday morning, 10 July, to secure authorization to conclude the exchange of notes. At noon, word was received that Velloso would not be able to see President Vargas before 4 P. M. at the earliest.
21. At 5 P.M. Velloso requested Mr. Berle to call at the Foreign Office at 6 P.M. presumably to exchange notes. At 5:25 P.M. Bouças advised that the Foreign Office required a Portuguese translation of the memorandum of agreement to be signed by McAskan and Bouças, the same persons who signed the English duplicate originals and further said that the Portuguese version would not be ready until Wednesday or Thursday since it was being made confidentially by Ministro Braga and an official translator in Itamariti.

22. At 6 P.M. Berle and Velloso exchanged notes in identical language, except that Berle’s was in English and Velloso’s was in Portuguese, both ratifying as an act of their respective governments the agreement of 6 July. Braga was the only other Brazilian present. Immediately thereafter, Berle handed Lansdale the original note from Velloso, the duplicate agreement of 6 July and a covering letter to the Secretary of State, Washington.

23. McAskan and Vance will handle the Portuguese translation 11 July or 12 July and Vance will bring a copy of it to Washington with a copy of Berle’s note in English.

Throughout our negotiations Bouças was fully cooperative and stated that as far as he was concerned, the agreement must be handled on a basis of mutual trust because of its confidential nature. While he gave the impression of being in sympathy with us and of trying to assist us in writing an agreement which would obtain ready approval from President Vargas, Bouças skillfully used the fact that the agreement was being handled “out of channels” as a means of trading hard and driving a good bargain for his government. We feel, however, in view of the present political situation, a great deal more time would certainly have been required and it is very questionable whether the 33-year period or the same type of export control clauses would ever have been obtained through regular Brazilian channels.

We feel that Bouças is entitled to full recognition by the U.S. Government for his constructive assistance in this matter.

S. M. McAskan, Jr.
John Lansdale

S/AE Files

The Ambassador in Brazil (Berle) to the Secretary of State


Sir: I have the honor to enclose herewith an original note dated at Rio de Janeiro on July 10, 1945,\(^\text{40}\) which is identical in tenor to a

\(^{40}\) Note from the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs, not printed.
note of the same date delivered to the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs and signed by me. The only difference between the notes is that that of the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs is written in Portuguese whereas the Embassy’s note is written in English.

To each note there is attached duplicate original of the agreement referred to in the note, being a memorandum of agreement between the United States of Brazil and the United States of America, dated July 6, 1945 and signed for the Government of Brazil by Valentim Bouças and for the Government of the United States by Mr. S. M. McAshan, Jr.

In view of the special request for security, this despatch and its enclosure is being entrusted to John Lansdale, Jr., Colonel, United States Army, General Staff, who will act as special courier for its transmission. Because of the security arrangements, this Embassy is not retaining a copy of the memorandum, though it has retained a copy of the note.

Respectfully yours,

A. A. BERLE, JR.

[Enclosure]

The American Ambassador (Berle) to the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Velloso)

RIO DE JANEIRO, July 10, 1945.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that my Government agrees to the provisions of your note of this date to which is attached a duplicate original of a memorandum of agreement between our two Governments, dated July 6, 1945, signed on behalf of the United States by S. M. McAshan, Jr., and on behalf of Brazil by Valentim Bouças. The other duplicate original is attached hereto and made a part hereof.

This note and that of Your Excellency of today’s date and in similar language constitute an agreement between our two Governments, and that they, having regard for their mutual security, will hold the existence of this agreement in the strictest confidence.

I avail myself [etc.]

ADOLF A. BERLE, JR.

[Subenclosure—Translation a]

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1. This agreement between the Governments of the United States of Brazil and the United States of America shall be effective from 16th

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a Translation supplied by the editors.
July 1945 and, following upon the initial period provided for in paragraph three, hereof, shall continue in effect for so long as the successive options provided for in paragraph five, hereof, shall be exercised and carried out by the Government of the United States.

2. The Government of Brazil agrees to establish and maintain, during the whole time this agreement is in effect, restrictions on the export from Brazil of all grades of monazite sands or other carriers or compounds of thorium or of thorian, limiting the export of such materials to consignees in the United States or to other consignees designated or approved by the Government of the United States. All exports shall be from deep-water ports specified by the Government of Brazil.

3. For an initial period of three years beginning 16th July 1945, the Government of the United States agrees to purchase, directly or through an agent, from the Government of Brazil or sellers in Brazil, not less than 3000 metric tons, dry weight, per year, if available, of monazite sands averaging not less than 6% thorium or the equivalent weight of thorium in other compounds; however, not more than 20% by weight of the shipments under this agreement each year shall contain less than 6% thorium, based on separate analysis for each shipment. It is intended that every effort shall be made to deliver the highest possible grade of monazite sands and that in no event will monazite sands of a grade of 6% thorium content or higher be mixed with lower grades. Purchases made by official and private buyers in the United States or by any others designated or approved by the Government of the United States shall be deducted from the total annual contractual obligations undertaken by the Government of the United States under this agreement, the Government of Brazil agreeing to keep a record of such purchases and to make such record available to the Government of the United States as requested.

4. The price to be paid by the Government of the United States for monazite sands during the initial three year period shall be U.S. $22 per metric ton for monazite sands containing between 4% and 4.99% thorium; U.S. $31 per metric ton for monazite sands containing between 5% and 5.99% thorium; U.S. $40 per metric ton for monazite sands containing between 6% and 6.99% thorium; for monazite sands containing 7% or more thorium the price shall be U.S. $6.66 per 1% of thorium content per metric ton, all dry weight.

5. The prices to be paid under this agreement represent delivery of the material f.o.b. carrier at Brazilian deep-water ports of export specified by the Government of Brazil. All export duties and all other taxes, if any, as well as warehouse charges and all other charges connected with placing the material on board carrier, including packaging in suitable containers, are to be for the account of the exporter.
and are included in the prices stipulated in this agreement. During the time this agreement is in effect the Government of Brazil will take steps to prevent the creation of new taxes, fees or other charges on the materials or the exportation thereof, or increases in taxes, fees or charges already in existence on the materials or the exportation thereof. It is further agreed that all contracts between the Government of the United States and the Government of Brazil or agencies thereof designated under the terms of this agreement shall follow the customary trade practices for a. provisional payments against ocean bills of lading in advance of final results of analysis and landed weights; and b. provisional payments against approved warehouse receipts for materials remaining unshipped thirty days after being made available for shipment at deep-water ports specified by the Government of Brazil, including the payment of storage charges after such thirty day period. The final payment of all invoices covering material purchased by the Government of the United States or its agents shall be based on landed net dry weights and independent analyses of the thorium content upon arrival at destination ports.

6. The Government of Brazil agrees that the Government of the United States shall have ten successive options to extend this agreement for periods of three years each, provided that notice of the exercise of such option be given to the Government of Brazil six months prior to the expiration of each such period of three years. During the time this agreement is in effect the Government of the United States shall have the right to purchase all or any part of the monazite sands or other carriers or compounds of thorium or of thorium produced in Brazil subject to the right of the Government of Brazil to reserve such reasonable quantities of these materials as may be required for normal industrial applications within Brazil. The prices to be paid during each such three year period shall be mutually agreed upon at the beginning of each such period on a fair and equitable basis; provided, however, that the quantities to be purchased in each such three year period shall be not less than the amount provided for in paragraph three hereof; and, provided further, that the prices per 1% of thorium content per metric ton so to be agreed upon shall be not less than those then being paid by the Government of the United States to any other seller in any other producing country.

7. In the event that the needs of the Government of the United States for monazite sands or other carriers or compounds of thorium become at any time such as to warrant a substantial increase in the production within Brazil of such materials, the Government of the United States agrees to furnish qualified geologists or other appropriate technical experts to collaborate with the appropriate authorities of the Government of Brazil in the survey, discovery and development of the production of these materials in Brazil. In order
to assist the Government of the United States in determining the availability of these materials in Brazil, the Government of Brazil agrees from the date of this agreement to make freely available to duly accredited representatives of the Government of the United States all information concerning the existence and working of deposits of monazite sands or other carriers or compounds of thorium.

8. In the event that after the initial period of three years provided for in paragraph three hereof, there is a continuing demand on the part of the Government of the United States for monazite sands or other carriers or compounds of thorium, the Government of the United States undertakes that in the meeting of that demand due regard will be given to the desirability of maintaining imports from Brazil of such materials on a basis which will be fair and non-discriminatory in relation to imports from other producing countries into the United States, taking into account all deliveries made under this agreement.

9. The Government of the United States agrees to make available from time to time, if requested by the Government of Brazil, technical experts to facilitate and to advise on all measures of inspection and control which may be necessary to accomplish the purposes of this agreement.

10. The Governments of the United States and Brazil reiterate their intention to use their best efforts to accomplish the purposes of this agreement and to that end shall adopt whatever measures may be desirable or necessary.

**Rio de Janeiro, 6th July 1945**

For the Government of the United States of Brazil

VALENTIM BOUÇAS  
C. Ext. C.C.A.W. 42

For the Government of the United States of America

S. M. McASHAN, JR.

[For documentation relating to discussions at the Conference of Berlin, July 16–August 2, 1945, concerning the projected use of the atomic bomb against Japan, see Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), volume II, index entries under Japan, page 1623. For text of a statement by President Truman announcing the use of the bomb at Hiroshima, August 6, 1945, see Foreign Relations, 1945, volume VI, section under Japan entitled “Surrender of Japan . . . .”, part I. For a narrative account of related events during July and August, see The New World, 1939/1946, pages 371–417.]

*Portuguese abbreviation for: Executive Secretary of the Commission for the Control of the Washington Agreements.*
Draft Memorandum of Instruction From the United States and United Kingdom Governments to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson) 42


Subject: Recommended Approach to Swedish Government

1. At the outset of the discussion with the Swedish representatives, the necessity for complete Top Secret security should be impressed upon them together with the fact that only the minimum number of people essential to the negotiations should be acquainted with the subject.

2. It is suggested that the initial approach be conducted along the following lines:

a. The U.K. and U.S. Governments have been conducting complex experiments and putting forth extensive efforts to determine the uses of uranium for military purposes. The experiments have indicated that it has definite military value but it is clear that full advantage of its potential uses can be realized only by nations with vast industrial capacity.

b. It is considered of the utmost importance to obtain control of the sources of uranium in view of their possible future significance to world peace.

c. The existence of uranium in Sweden in deposits of kölm, a hardened asphalt-like substance used for fuel, and in oil shale, is known to geologists. The uranium usually comprises less than one per cent of the material in which it is contained. It is believed that considerable and significant quantities of uranium can be recovered in fields which can be developed easily.

d. In view of the strategic importance of these deposits the Governments of U.K. and U.S. desire to ask the Government of Sweden to agree:

(1) To effective control of its uranium bearing materials for a long period of years.
(2) To prevent export of uranium bearing materials except with consent of the two Governments.
(3) To give the two Governments the privilege of first refusal on the uranium content of the Swedish supply of uranium bearing materials.

e. In consideration of such an undertaking by the Government of Sweden the Governments of the U.K. and U.S. would be willing to agree to purchase a reasonable quantity of uranium bearing materials having in mind the rate at which the deposits can be worked economically.

3. If the proposals under 2.d and 2.e above should materialize, the appropriate contractual arrangements between an agency of the two

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42 Concerning the authorship of this memorandum, see items No. 9 and No. 11 of memorandum by Major Traynor, August 8, infra.
Governments and some agency of the Swedish Government might provide not only for sale of material but also for collaboration in exploration and development.

4. The best information presently available indicates that there is no production currently, though the small Närke field is being worked by the Swedish Admiralty for oil as a war time measure. It is understood that the larger, Västergötland, field is not being worked except as a small source of fuel for the production of agricultural lime. It is believed that the Swedish Government has control of the mineral rights at both fields but the situation in this respect should be investigated carefully. It may be that the existence of oil in both fields, though in uneconomical amounts, and the present interest of the Swedish Admiralty in the Närke field, might be used to facilitate special control measures.

5. It should not be necessary, at any rate at this stage, to disclose the fact that a recent investigation was specially made by a British official geologist with the cooperation of a Swedish mineral exploration company. Ostensibly the British geologist was in Sweden to discuss recent progress in geo-physics in Sweden and to discuss geological matters generally with competent authorities there. In the course of his visit he collected samples and made a few field excursions as a result of the special interest he has had for some time in the world's uranium deposits. As a result of this special enquiry, the amount of uranium oxide in the Swedish deposits has been estimated to be at least 80,000 tons; but it would probably be advisable not to be at all precise even in answer to questions.

6. As soon as the matter is opened by Mr. Johnson in this way he will then report what are the prospects of success in the negotiations so that suitable arrangements may be made for them to be carried on jointly in London or in Stockholm as may seem most satisfactory.

S/AE Files

Memorandum by Major Harry S. Traynor, on the Staff of the Commanding General, Manhattan Engineer District (Groves)

[WASHINGTON,] August 3, 1945.

REPORT ON TRIP TO ENGLAND: 8 JULY TO 1 AUGUST 1945

1. Initial Approach to Ambassador Winant.

Major Taney and Major Traynor arrived in London on 10 July 1945 and called on Ambassador Winant. The Ambassador was

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44 John G. Winant, Ambassador in the United Kingdom.
45 Maj. Clifford A. Taney, on the Staff of General Groves.
handed the letter from General Groves which he immediately read.

A general summary of the mission at hand was given verbally to the Ambassador with emphasis on the importance which Sweden and the Netherlands East Indies had recently assumed. The Ambassador was very interested in the latest development of the project and asked when success might be expected. To this question Major Traynor replied that he was not acquainted with exact dates but thought that important tests were not far distant.

The Ambassador explained that he was engaged for the next twenty-four hours and stated that as soon as several pressing matters at hand were taken care of he would see us again.

2. Memoranda by Dr. George Bain.

Dr. Bain arrived in London on 11 July and at the request of the undersigned prepared summarized non-technical memorandums on the occurrence and possibilities of the desired minerals in Sweden and the Netherlands East Indies. (See Exhibits A and B.)

3. Delivery of Letter for Mr. Johnson to Ambassador Winant.

After receiving cabled instructions from General Groves the envelope containing the letter to Mr. Johnson was delivered to the Ambassador on 11 July and the cable shown to him. At his request, a copy of the cable was prepared and handed to him.

In view of the importance which the occurrence of a test and possible consequent relaxation of security might have on impending negotiations, the Ambassador was informed by Major Traynor that tests might take place during the course of the negotiations, that news of this might conceivably get spread around, and that use might follow closely after tests. This information was conveyed to him in highest secrecy and understood by him as having that classification.

The Ambassador was also informed that brief non-technical one page summaries on both Sweden and the N.E.I. were being prepared for him. He indicated that he felt these were highly desirable. He asked if commercial interests would be involved in the Netherlands and Swedish arrangements to which the reply was made that this was possible, and if so they would probably have to be taken care of in a manner similar to the Belgian agreement by introducing The Trust as a two-government agent.

46 Not found in Department files.
47 Senior Geologist for the Murray Hill Area, the exploration arm of the Manhattan District Project.
48 Neither printed.
49 Herschel V. Johnson, United States Minister in Sweden.
50 See footnote 38, p. 14.
4. First Meeting with U.K. Representatives.

On 12 July, the first meeting (See Exhibit C— for Minutes of this meeting) with the British was held in the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s office and was attended by Sir John Anderson, Ambassador Winant, Sir Ronald Campbell, Mr. R. S. Sayers, Major Taney, Major Traynor and Mr. D.H.F. Rickett, Sir John’s confidential Secretary. A discussion as to how the approach should be made to the Netherlands Government was held and it was agreed that the best procedure would be for Sir John Anderson to see M. Van Kleffens, Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs, alone. It was mentioned by Sir Ronald Campbell that the Netherlands government was at present in a confused frame of mind, was somewhat wary of approaches made to them by the larger powers, would have to be handled carefully and that more would probably be accomplished if the initial contact was made in an informal talk by one person. Sir John Anderson seemed the logical one to do this because of his prior and personal acquaintance with M. Van Kleffens.

The approach put forth by Sir John Anderson was to point out that scientific developments had been such that uranium supplies of the world might become a source of danger if their exploitation was not controlled and recent research suggested that similar risks might be attached to thorium. The desire that the Netherlands Government would control all exports of monazite and thorium compounds extracted from it and not permit such exports without the consent of the contracting parties would then be expressed.

The possibility that commercial aspects might enter into the negotiations gave rise to the thought that the purchase of minimum quantities of monazite might have to be a consideration in order to obtain for the United States and the United Kingdom first refusal or option clause.

Mr. Winant emphasized the high order of security of the matter and that the arrangements should cover thorium deposits outside the mining company concessions. Sir John Anderson made an informal statement that he thought the top Netherlands Government representative could be trusted. It was the consensus of opinion of those present that the form of agreement with the Netherlands should be the sort of legal instrument as was made with the Belgians—that is a memorandum confirmed by an exchange of letters between the three Governments.

50 Not printed.
51 British Representative on the European Advisory Commission; formerly British Minister, Washington. For documentation pertaining to the work of the European Advisory Commission (EAC), see vol. III, pp. 1 ff.
52 Of the British Treasury.
5. *Sir John Anderson’s Approach to M. Van Kleffens.*

Immediately after the above described meeting with U.K. Representatives, Sir John Anderson met with M. Van Kleffens, Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs. (See Exhibit D for notes of this meeting). Sir John reported that he outlined to M. Van Kleffens in general terms the nature of the problem and the approach the U.K. and U.S. were disposed to make to it and that M. Van Kleffens said he had no doubt but that his Government would be entirely cooperative but that he would have to mention the matter to the Netherlands Prime Minister and Netherlands Minister for Overseas Territories.

M. Van Kleffens was said to have promised to take the matter up immediately with his Government upon his return to The Hague on 17 July and propose that someone be designated by the Netherlands Government to deal with the matter, both diplomatically and scientifically, and inform Sir John of what could be arranged.

Sir John stated that he then asked that the person selected come to London the next week but that M. Van Kleffens was doubtful if this could be accomplished but promised to expedite the matter. Sir John also stated that he indicated it would be welcome to himself and Ambassador Winant if M. Van Kleffens could attend the next meeting with such experts as his government might designate and that M. Van Kleffens received this suggestion favorably.

6. *Meeting with Mr. Herschel V. Johnson.*

Mr. Herschel V. Johnson, United States Minister to Sweden, came to London on 14 July 1945, at the request of Ambassador Winant. On Sunday, 15 July 1945, Major Taney and Major Traynor met with Mr. Johnson for the purpose of giving him the necessary background and informing him in more detail of the job to be done. Ambassador Winant had had a short talk with Mr. Johnson the evening of the previous day and had delivered to him the letter dated 6 July 1945 from General L. R. Groves.

A brief résumé and genesis of the project was given to Mr. Johnson touching on formation of the idea, the original fostering of the work by the Office of Scientific Research and Development, the approved report of 17 June 1942 by V. Bush and J. B. Conant with the consequent assumption of large phases of the work by a special group of the Corps of Engineers under General L. R. Groves; the existence of production plants and communities; the high manpower and material priorities and requirements of the work; the high order of security surrounding the project; the fact that the end products were produced.

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52 Not printed.
53 William Schermerhorn.
54 Johann H. A. Logemann.
from uranium, the approval from President Truman for continuation of the work, the experimental status of thorium, the existence and inter-relation of agreements between the U.K. and U.S. covering the project, the existence of the Trust, the existence of a Belgian agreement and impending Brazilian agreement, the fact that an approach was being made to the Netherlands Government; and the fact that some measure of success and the breaking down of complete security might come during the process of negotiations.

The extreme secrecy of the entire subject was emphasized and it is felt that the need and justification for this was completely understood and appreciated by Mr. Johnson.

Mr. Johnson asked if a neutral country had ever been approached previously and was told it had not. He stated that the Swedes were a very intelligent and democratic people; that their form of government might make it difficult for them to concede [accede?] to our wishes, that they realized their perilous political and geographical positions and had no illusions about their being able to withstand for long any major avalanche of force that might be directed against them. Nevertheless, he trusted implicitly their Prime Minister, the retiring (August 1, 1945) and incoming Foreign Minister[s] and especially the permanent Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Johnson thought the matter would have to be handled with these top men, and further before his return to Sweden he desired to talk with Sir John Anderson and the Ambassador.

7. Meeting with Ambassador Winant and Mr. Johnson, 17 July 1945.

Mr. Johnson, Major Taney and Major Traynor discussed with Ambassador Winant the method of approaching the Swedes, the advisability of having the initial negotiations take place in Stockholm, the necessity of transmitting all important messages between Stockholm and London by courier, the special delicacy of the Swedish position rising out of Sweden’s geographical and political positions and from the fact that the Swedish form of government restricts freedom to make security-cloaked governmental agreements especially where private interests were concerned and the fact that the situation might be further complicated by changes in the Swedish Cabinet on 1 August 1945 when a new Foreign Minister would take office.

Mr. Johnson stated he thought both the incoming and outgoing Foreign Ministers and the permanent Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs were favorably disposed towards the United Kingdom and the United States.

55 Per Albin Hansson.
57 Christian E. Günther and Östen Undén, respectively.
59 Stig Sahlin.
The possibility of using the assistance of the new British Minister to Sweden,⁶⁰ who had not yet assumed his post and whose experience had of late been in Argentina, was discussed but was considered impracticable and unwise. This, it was felt would merely extend information on the project to still another person who would not be in a position to play an essential role in the negotiations.

In conclusion, arrangements were made to meet with Sir John Anderson on Wednesday, 18 July to discuss with him, and decide upon Mr. Johnson’s approach to the Swedish government.

8. Meeting with Sir John Anderson

On Wednesday, 18 July 1945, Ambassador Winant and Mr. Johnson met with Sir John Anderson to discuss the procedure to be followed in opening negotiations with the Swedish government. (See Exhibit E—⁶⁰ for notes of this meeting). Others present were Major Taney, Major Traynor, Mr. Sayers and Mr. Rickett.

Mr. Johnson expressed the view that if negotiations were opened in London, time would be lost inasmuch as the Swedish representative approached would have to return to Stockholm for instructions. Both Mr. Johnson and Ambassador Winant suggested the right course was for Mr. Johnson to see the Swedish Foreign Minister and his permanent Under Secretary together for the initial contact and when the possibilities of an agreement had been explored to continue final negotiations in London. Sir John Anderson was agreeable to this procedure.

Sir John Anderson suggested that Mr. Johnson might open by saying that as the Swedish Government would be aware, there was a scientific possibility that uranium might become of importance for military purposes. The U.S. and British Governments were carrying out research on this possibility, the results of which made them anxious as a matter of prudence to ensure that the exploitation of the large deposits of uranium known to exist in Sweden were properly controlled. The two Governments were anxious that the Swedish Government should give an undertaking not to permit the export of uranium except with their agreement and to grant to the two governments the right of first refusal on all Swedish uranium supplies. In consideration of this undertaking the two Governments would be willing to enter into an agreement to purchase whatever might be considered a reasonable yearly quantity of uranium, having regard to the rate at which the deposits were capable of being economically worked.

Mr. Winant and Mr. Johnson expressed general agreement with the basis of negotiations suggested by Sir John and agreed that Mr.

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⁶⁰ Cecil B. Jerram.
⁶⁰ Not printed.
Winant should arrange for a memorandum to be drafted in consultation with Sir John's advisors setting out the approach on which Mr. Johnson would take up the matter in Stockholm.

Mr. Winant and Mr. Johnson said that they thought it would help to create a favorable atmosphere for the negotiations if the U.K. and U.S. Governments could expedite the implementation of the arrangements on post-war supplies which had been agreed upon in principle with the Swedish government. Sir John remarked, that as Mr. Winant knew one of the difficulties in the negotiations relative to the commodities which Sweden wished to purchase from the U.K. were that they were in very short supply, but that he would see what could be done to carry out Mr. Winant's suggestion.

9. Preparation of Swedish Memorandum for Mr. Johnson.

In accordance with instructions obtained at the above described meeting on 18 July, Messrs. Sayers and Rickett prepared a preliminary draft of approach for Mr. Johnson. This was revised by Major Taney, Major Traynor and Dr. Bain and shown to Ambassador Winant and Mr. Johnson on 19 July who suggested a minor change to make the semi-technical explanation of the uranium deposits clearer to the layman. This change was made, and the draft of 20 July 1945, (See Exhibit F) was shown to and approved by Colonel John Lansdale and Major John E. Vance and later by Ambassador Winant and Mr. Johnson. A copy of this approved 20 July Draft was delivered to Mr. Rickett for transmittal to Sir John Anderson.

10. Information from M. Van Kleffens.

Late Friday evening, 20 July 1945, M. Van Kleffens, who had returned to London, reported to Sir John Anderson that he had contacted his Prime Minister and Minister for Overseas Territories on the matter and that he expected to return to The Hague on Monday July 23 and expected to arrange the desired meeting in London with representatives of his government by the middle of the week of 22–28 July.

11. Approval of Swedish Memorandum by Sir John Anderson.

On 23 July, Sir John Anderson informed Colonel Lansdale of his approval of the 20 July Draft Memorandum prepared for Mr. Johnson with the exception that he desired to add a paragraph. This paragraph is No. 6. Its addition was approved by Ambassador Winant and Mr. Johnson.

12. Information on Netherlands Delegation.

Mr. Rickett informed Major Traynor on 25 July 1945 that Sir John Anderson had received word from M. Van Kleffens that the

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\(^{a}\) *Ante, p. 24*.
Netherlands delegation, consisting of M. Van Kleffens, M. Kramers and M. J. Van den Broeck, former Netherlands Minister of Finance, would be in London on Monday, 30 July for the purpose of opening negotiations. Mr. Rickett stated that the Dutch were somewhat surprised when told that United States representatives would also be present. Apparently they had not understood this to be the case from M. Van Kleffens' discussion with Sir John Anderson.


On 27 July 1945, a draft of a proposed "Memorandum of Agreement Between the Netherlands Government and Governments of U.S. and U.K." was handed to Ambassador Winant. The Ambassador thought the memorandum was satisfactory as a preliminary draft. He was told that it followed substantially the same lines as the Brazilian agreement. The Ambassador then asked if any change had been made from the Brazilian form to take into recognition the different form of the Netherlands Government. Colonel Lansdale told him that no such change had been incorporated in the proposed Netherlands agreement because such an agreement was considered an external matter to which the form of government subscribing to it made little difference. The Ambassador agreed that this approach was correct.

14. Colonel Lansdale's Meeting with Secretary of War and Mr. Bundy.

Colonel Lansdale met with the Secretary of War and Mr. Harvey Bundy at Prestwick, Scotland on 27 July 1945. The impending negotiations with the Netherlands and Swedish governments were made known to both gentlemen.

15. Second Meeting with Netherlands Representatives.

On 30 July 1945, a meeting was held in the Chancellor of the Exchequer's office with the Netherlands' representatives. Those present were Sir John Anderson; Ambassador Winant; M. Van Kleffens, Netherlands Foreign Minister; Dr. Kramers, a Dutch Physicist; Sir Thomas Barnes, Solicitor of the Treasury; Sir Ronald Campbell; Colonel John Lansdale; Major John Vance; Mr. Rickett and Mr. Sayers. (M. Van den Broeck, Netherlands former Minister of Finance was delayed by bad weather and could not attend this meeting).

Sir John Anderson reviewed his previous approach to M. Van Kleffens for Ambassador Winant, mentioning the Brazilian agreement, negotiations with the State of Travancore, and his previous suggestion to the Netherlands that they undertake to restrict exports of

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*Not printed.*
thorium ores in return for an agreement by the U.S. and U.K. to purchase specified quantities.

M. Van Kleffens stated that the Netherlands Government agreed in principle but commented that to date nothing had been said as to the form an agreement was to take. He mentioned possible difficulties since normally international agreements made by the Netherlands went before their Parliament. However, he believed that the impending agreement could be handled without publicity. He further stated that he was aware of the danger in allowing the material in question to fall into the hands of enemies.

Sir John again emphasized the need for security.

Colonel Lansdale asked if M. Van den Broeck would have figures on commercial aspects and M. Van Kleffens stated that he would since M. Van den Broeck was Chairman of the Board of the Billiton Company.

M. Van Kleffens stated that in considering restrictions on the material the Netherlands would want a certain amount for themselves for experimental purposes. To this statement, Sir John Anderson replied that the Belgian agreement had provided for the retention of material for such purposes and felt that there would be no difficulty in this respect in the impending agreement.

M. Van Kleffens mentioned that there were many deposits of minerals in the Celebes but that these were largely unexplored, and that there might be thorium containing material in other parts of the Netherlands East Indies. Mr. Sayers said thorium might occur anywhere that tin was found to which M. Van Kleffens stated there was no tin in the Celebes. (This agrees with Dr. Bain's information). Dr. Kramers mentioned the Republic of Colombia as a possible source of thorium.

Sir John Anderson suggested a meeting of technical representatives when M. Van den Broeck arrived. All agreed that more detailed facts were needed and that such a meeting should take place as soon as M. Van den Broeck arrived and that following the meeting a memorandum of agreement would be drafted.

M. Van Kleffens stated that he hoped to have the business concluded by the end of the week of 29 July–4 August 1945.

16. Meeting with Sir Thomas Barnes.

Immediately after the meeting with the Netherlands representatives, Colonel Lansdale and Major Vance met with Sir Thomas Barnes . . .

17. Colonel Lansdale's Discussion with Ambassador Winant.

During the afternoon of 30 July 1945, Ambassador Winant discussed with Colonel Lansdale several aspects of the new British gov-
ernment. He informed Colonel Lansdale that Mr. Attlee had not been aware of the D.S.M.\(^3\) project, prior to becoming Prime Minister and that he (Mr. Winant) and Mr. Churchill \(^4\) had prepared a memorandum for Mr. Attlee on the subject.

18. Third Meeting with Netherlands Representatives.

M. Van den Broeck arrived in London on 30 July 1945. In accordance with arrangements made on 30 July, a meeting was held on 31 July. Those present were: Sir Thomas Barnes, Sir Ronald Campbell, Mr. Rickett, Mr. Sayers, M. Van den Broeck, Dr. H. A. Kramers, Colonel Lansdale, Major Vance and Dr. Bain.

Sir Thomas Barnes reviewed the general agreement reached on 30 July that control of the materials would be provided for and that the agreement itself would have the appearances of a commercial document.

M. Van den Broeck requested disclosure of the Belgian agreement but it was clearly stated by Sir Thomas Barnes and Colonel Lansdale that the Belgian agreement contained a clause prohibiting its disclosure by the governments involved. M. Van den Broeck said he had no doubt it dealt with uranium since the Belgian Congo was rich in that material. He further stated that his government wished to be informed of the development of the project and the extent of its progress, emphasizing the Netherlands nearness to Germany. He added that the Netherlands government would wish to reserve the right to use thorium for defense purposes and not solely for industry.

Colonel Lansdale replied that our experiments on thorium were entirely preliminary and Sir Thomas Barnes added that any disclosure of the project was a matter of high policy. He asked the Netherlands government to trust the U.K. and the U.S. to keep the material out of the wrong hands, and that in any case the group present could make no disclosures of any sort.

M. Van den Broeck agreed to leave these points in abeyance but said that any agreement that might be reached would be subject to a further discussion on the matter of revealing progress on the project to the Netherlands government.

Sir Thomas Barnes said that in accepting this the U.K. and U.S. were not agreeing to a later disclosure but only recognizing that the Netherlands might again bring up the request. M. Van den Broeck countered by saying he could not guarantee that the Netherlands would enter into an agreement without a disclosure.

A semi-technical discussion followed. It became apparent that before the Japanese occupation monazite was not separated as such

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\(^3\) An earlier designation for the atomic bomb development program, i.e., the Manhattan District Project.

in the N.E.I. but rather that the tin ore, after being removed from the deposits, contained a small amount of monazite which was removed at the smelters in Holland. Or in other words, most of the monazite which occurs in the tin ore is left in the N.E.I. as waste material mixed with all of the original base rock and is probably not recoverable except at great expense. In the past there has been only a small demand for monazite so no effort has been made to produce the material.

The only purchaser before 1939 was Aver Gesellschaft with offices in Frankfurt and Berlin. M. Van den Broeck believed the use was for gas mantles and not for experimental purposes. He did not know the exact amounts of monazite sold but thought it was only a few hundred tons in comparison with some 20,000 tons of tin in 1939. He mentioned a price of $60 to $80 per ton in Holland for monazite containing 6 per cent to 8 per cent thorium, which was the only grade for which a market existed and stated there were no stocks of low grade monazite available. He did not know the extent of monazite reserves.

It was agreed that all grades of monazite should be controlled and generally agreed to limit export of all materials containing thorium in “recoverable amounts”, leaving the definition of the term “recoverable amounts” to discussion from time to time.

In further discussion of prices, M. Van den Broeck said that freight from the N.E.I. to the Netherlands was $14 to $16 per ton. A periodic adjustment of prices was suggested.

M. Van den Broeck stated that if increased production was wanted the price for monazite would be much higher and asked if increased production was desired. He was given a negative answer.

In the event of increased production M. Van den Broeck said it might be done either in the N.E.I. or the Netherlands. (It is quite probable that the only successful production on a large scale would have to be carried out in the N.E.I.—Vance.)

M. Van den Broeck said he would return to the Netherlands on 2 August and would get figures on present production prices, etc. from his technical people.

M. Van den Broeck again referred to the Netherlands requirements of thorium and to their request for project information. It was concluded that a draft of an agreement would be prepared for M. Van den Broeck by 4 P.M. of 31 July and that on 1 August it might be advisable (after a morning meeting to discuss the draft by those then present) to have a meeting of Sir John Anderson, Ambassador Winant and M. Van Kleffens to consider the agreement and at the same time discuss the disclosure request.

An effort was made to limit the amount of monazite reserved for the Netherlands to a specified figure such as 20–30 tons but M. Van
den Broek objected and wanted the amount left open for the Dutch to determine saying that they could not bind themselves to restrict the use of their own resources and stated it should not be necessary since they were already agreeing to keep the material out of the hands of the enemy.

19. Meeting with Ambassador Winant.

Colonel Lansdale reviewed the essence of the negotiations of the morning meeting with Ambassador Winant. At the suggestion that perhaps a follow-up should be made to Mr. Herschel Johnson on the Swedish matter the Ambassador advised against it and stated he thought Mr. Johnson was probably waiting for the new Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs to take office on 1 August before approaching the Swedish government.

20. Fourth Meeting with Netherlands Representatives.

On 1 August 1945 Sir Thomas Barnes, Mr. Rickett and Mr. Sayers representing the U.K.; Colonel Lansdale, Major Vance and Dr. Bain representing the U.S.; M. Van den Broek and Dr. Kramers representing the Netherlands met to consider a memorandum of agreement.67 . . .

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S/AF Files: Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman68

[LONDON,] August 8, 1945.

When we were at Potsdam the potentiality of the atomic bomb had not become actuality and the pressure of immediate problems was too heavy to give us the opportunity of discussing the implications of success.

The attack of [on] Hiroshima has now demonstrated to the world that a new factor pregnant with immense possibilities for good or evil has come into existence.

Thoughtful people already realise that there must be a revaluation of policies and a readjustment of international relations. There is widespread anxiety as to whether the new power will be used to serve or to destroy civilisation. The economic effects of the discovery will


68 Copy transmitted to Secretary of State Byrnes by the British Chargé (Balfour) under cover of a note dated August 10.
probably not reveal themselves for some years: its influence on international relations is immediate.

I believe that our two nations are profoundly convinced that if civilisation is to endure and progress, war must be banished for ever.

I consider, therefore, that you and I, as Heads of the Governments which have control of this great force, should without delay make a joint declaration of our intentions to utilise the existence of this great power not for our own ends, but as trustees for humanity in the interests of all peoples in order to promote peace and justice in the world.

The problems of control and the effect of the existence of this power on the new world organisation will require careful consideration, but I believe that a declaration of intentions made now will have great value.69

Stockholm Legation Files

Memorandum by the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)

[STOCKHOLM,] August 10, 1945.

On July 27, on my return from London, I called to see Mr. Stig Sahlin, Secretary General of the Swedish Foreign Office, and acquainted him with the substance of the draft instructions which I had received jointly from the United States and United Kingdom Governments as set forth in a document dated July 20, 1945, a copy of which I brought with me. Mr. Sahlin said that he realised the great importance of the suggestions and requests of the two Governments, that he would immediately acquaint the Prime Minister, and that our desire for utmost secrecy would be fully preserved. He said that Mr. Undén, who would assume office as Foreign Minister on August 1, would be informed and that in addition to him and the Prime Minister it would be necessary to advise Mr. Gjores, the Minister of Supply. Mr. Sahlin said that he was leaving Stockholm on August 4 for a holiday of two or three weeks; that during his absence his position would be occupied by Mr. Vilhelm Assarsson, the Deputy Secretary General; and that I would probably agree that it would be advisable to inform Mr. Assarsson as it would be through Mr. Assarsson that the matter would have to be treated until his return. I agreed.

I saw Mr. Assarsson on the evening of July 28 and mentioned the matter to him briefly. We did not discuss it in detail as he had already been informed of the nature of the approach by Mr. Sahlin.

69 President Truman's reply, contained in his telegram No. 1, August 9, to Prime Minister Attlee reads as follows:
"Replying to your Number 1 of 8 August, I am in general agreement with your proposal contained therein.
"Please send me for consideration a draft of the joint 'declaration of intentions' which you consider suitable for issue at this time." (Copy obtained from Department of Defense files)
On August 2 I called to see Mr. Sahlin to inform him that I had an appointment with the new Foreign Minister, Mr. Undén, for the following day and to inquire if he could make any suggestions which might be helpful in bringing up our business with the Foreign Minister. Mr. Sahlin informed me that the Foreign Minister had been fully acquainted with which [what] I had told him at our previous meeting and that Mr. Undén had discussed the matter with the Prime Minister. Mr. Sahlin said with respect to the American and British desire for the Swedish Government to agree to effective control of its uranium bearing materials that there would be no difficulty on this point as under Swedish law effective and complete control can be attained through withholding of licenses for export. He expressed some misgivings that the Government would agree to committing itself to American and British control of the uranium supply for a long period of years and suggested also that Swedish scientists might find uses for the material for peaceful purposes.

On August 3 I called to see Mr. Undén and gave him orally in considerable detail the substance of the draft instructions of July 20. Mr. Undén did not make any commitment but said that there would be no difficulty on the point of control as the Swedish Government was prepared to put that into effect immediately. He said he would welcome the visit to Stockholm of the American experts who had been dealing with this question and that our proposals might be discussed by those experts and myself with Mr. Assarsson and Mr. Sahlin. He also suggested that the Swedish Government would probably add one or two other people to the talks. The only name he mentioned was that of Professor Siegbahn, the noted scientist who has specialised in experiments with uranium. On the same day I sent a telegram to Ambassador Winant suggesting that Col. Lansdale and Major Vance come to Stockholm at once.

Col. Lansdale and Major Vance arrived in Stockholm on August 5.

On August 7 the new British Minister, Mr. Jerram, accompanied by Mr. Labouchère, the Counsellor of the British Legation, called to advise me that he had been instructed by his Government to associate himself with me in the present undertaking. He also advised me that Mr. Sayers 21 from the Cabinet Office in London had arrived in Stockholm to assist him (Mr. Sayers had worked on the matter in London with Col. Lansdale and Major Vance).

On August 8 the British Minister and I called on the Foreign Minister, Mr. Undén, at noon and left with him a draft memorandum prepared by Col. Lansdale and Major Vance with the collaboration of Mr. Sayers, setting forth in detail the American and British objec-

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21 James Sayers, member of the British group of atomic scientists transferred to work on the United States Manhattan District Project.
We made clear to Mr. Undén that this draft was designed to furnish him and his associates with a definite statement in writing of our proposals, which they could examine and study and that it was not offered as a suggested form of the agreement which we hoped would be concluded with his Government. Mr. Undén then read the draft agreement carefully and commented that it went "a long way". He said that it would be given very careful study and that he would indicate to me as soon as possible when there might be a meeting of our experts with his own. From Mr. Undén's remarks it was clear that the Swedish Government will put the uranium supplies in this country under strict control but he did not suggest that it is ready to assume a definite obligation to the American and British Governments in this connection. I urged upon him the importance which we attach to having Sweden's agreement that none of this material will be exported without the prior consent of the American and British Governments; that the matter was of such vital importance that we could not feel satisfied by the institution of a system of control on the part of the Swedish Government which might at a later date, in the absence of any contrary obligation, be modified to permit of export. We danced warily around the subject of Russia but Mr. Undén and I had a perfect understanding on this matter. He suggested I was afraid that the Swedish Government might not be able later to resist pressure for granting at some time in the future export licenses for this material. I replied that I was not suggesting that, but that I was apprehensive lest the known existence of such material in Sweden might constitute a great temptation to exert extreme pressure development for important peacetime uses.

There appears little doubt that the political implications involved in agreeing to our requests are the considerations uppermost in the mind of Mr. Undén. In this respect he doubtless reflects the thinking of the Prime Minister and of others whom he has had to consult. Mr. Undén mentioned in passing that Swedish scientists might find uranium bearing material in this country could offer a large field for development for important peacetime uses.

It is difficult to assess at the present moment the strength of what may be Swedish opposition to committing themselves to the U.S. and Great Britain for a long period of years on this matter, or to assuming a concrete obligation to us with respect to institution of a monopoly on uranium bearing material. This point should become clearer at our next meeting after Mr. Undén and his collaborators have been able to examine our proposals in detail. I hope before this meeting with Mr. Undén takes place that Col. Lansdale and Major Vance and I, together with the British Minister and Mr. Sayers, may have an opportunity for an informal discussion with Mr. Assarsson. I have
suggested this and Mr. Assarsson has agreed. Professor Siegbahn would probably be present at the meeting.

Herschel V. Johnson

Department of Defense Files: Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman


Number 2. Personal. Thank you for your telegram number 1 of August 9th. Since its receipt I have read the admirable statement which you included in your broadcast of August 9th which in fact amounts to a declaration of intentions of the kind I had in mind. In these circumstances I think that any joint declaration should wait until the means of control and the implications in the field of international relations have been more fully considered between those concerned. In the meantime I propose myself to issue as soon as possible a statement in the following terms. I hope that all this will be in accordance with your views.

"Since I issued a statement on the day of the release of the first atomic bomb, nearly a week ago, the vast and terrible effects of this new invention have made themselves felt. The last of our enemies has offered surrender. The events of these tremendous days reinforce the words in that statement to the effect that we must pray that the discovery which led to the production of the atomic bomb will be made to conduces to peace among the nations, and that instead of wreaking measureless havoc upon the entire globe, it may become a perennial fountain of world prosperity. President Truman in his broadcast of August 9th has spoken of the preparation of plans for the future control of the bomb, and of a request to Congress to cooperate to the end that its production and use may be controlled and that its power may be made an overwhelming influence towards world peace. It is the intention of His Majesty's Government to put all their efforts into the promotion of the objects thus foreshadowed, and they will lend their full cooperation to the end." 74

S/AE Files

The Secretary of War (Stimson) to President Truman

Washington, September 11, 1945.

Dear Mr. President: In handing you today my memorandum about our relations with Russia in respect to the atomic bomb, I

72 See footnote 69, p. 37.
73 Reference is to President Truman's Report to the Nation on the Potsdam Conference; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, August 12, 1945, p. 208.
74 The text of this statement by Prime Minister Attlee as released is printed in The Times (London), August 13, 1945, p. 4, col. 6.
75 A manuscript note indicated that this letter and the accompanying memorandum, infra, were handed to and discussed with the President by Mr. Stimson on September 12.
am not unmindful of the fact that when in Potsdam I talked with you about the question whether we could be safe in sharing the atomic bomb with Russia while she was still a police state and before she put into effect provisions assuring personal rights of liberty to the individual citizen. 

I still recognize the difficulty and am still convinced of the importance of the ultimate importance of a change in Russian attitude toward individual liberty but I have come to the conclusion that it would not be possible to use our possession of the atomic bomb as a direct lever to produce the change. I have become convinced that any demand by us for an internal change in Russia as a condition of sharing in the atomic weapon would be so resented that it would make the objective we have in view less probable.

I believe that the change in attitude toward the individual in Russia will come slowly and gradually and I am satisfied that we should not delay our approach to Russia in the matter of the atomic bomb until that process has been completed. My reasons are set forth in the memorandum I am handing you today. Furthermore, I believe that this long process of change in Russia is more likely to be expedited by the closer relationship in the matter of the atomic bomb which I suggest and the trust and confidence that I believe would be inspired by the method of approach which I have outlined.

Faithfully yours, [Henry L. Stimson] 

S/AE Files

Memorandum by the Secretary of War (Stimson) to President Truman

[WASHINGTON,] 11 September, 1945.

Subject: Proposed Action for Control of Atomic Bombs

The advent of the atomic bomb has stimulated great military and probably even greater political interest throughout the civilized world. In a world atmosphere already extremely sensitive to power, the introduction of this weapon has profoundly affected political considerations in all sections of the globe.

In many quarters it has been interpreted as a substantial offset to the growth of Russian influence on the continent. We can be certain that the Soviet government has sensed this tendency and the temptation will be strong for the Soviet political and military leaders to acquire this weapon in the shortest possible time. Britain in effect already has the status of a partner with us in the development of

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76 See Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), vol. ii, p. 1155.
77 See footnote 75, p. 40.
this weapon. Accordingly, unless the Soviets are voluntarily invited into the partnership upon a basis of cooperation and trust, we are going to maintain the Anglo-Saxon bloc over against the Soviet in the possession of this weapon. Such a condition will almost certainly stimulate feverish activity on the part of the Soviet toward the development of this bomb in what will in effect be a secret armament race of a rather desperate character. There is evidence to indicate that such activity may have already commenced.

If we feel, as I assume we must, that civilization demands that some day we shall arrive at a satisfactory international arrangement respecting the control of this new force, the question then is how long we can afford to enjoy our momentary superiority in the hope of achieving our immediate peace council objectives.

Whether Russia gets control of the necessary secrets of production in a minimum of say four years or a maximum of twenty years is not nearly as important to the world and civilization as to make sure that when they do get it they are willing and cooperative partners among the peace loving nations of the world. It is true that if we approach them now, as I would propose, we may be gambling on their good faith and risk their getting into production of bombs a little sooner than they would otherwise.

To put the matter concisely, I consider the problem of our satisfactory relations with Russia as not merely connected with but as virtually dominated by the problem of the atomic bomb. Except for the problem of the control of that bomb, those relations, while vitally important, might not be immediately pressing. The establishment of relations of mutual confidence between her and us could afford to await the slow progress of time. But with the discovery of the bomb, they become immediately emergent. These relations may be perhaps irrevocably embittered by the way in which we approach the solution of the bomb with Russia. For if we fail to approach them now and merely continue to negotiate with them, having this weapon rather ostentatiously on our hip, their suspicions and their distrust of our purposes and motives will increase. It will inspire them to greater efforts in an all out effort to solve the problem. If the solution is achieved in that spirit, it is much less likely that we will ever get the kind of covenant we may desperately need in the future. This risk is, I believe, greater than the other, inasmuch as our objective must be to get the best kind of international bargain we can—one that has some chance of being kept and saving civilization not for five or for twenty years, but forever.

The chief lesson I have learned in a long life is that the only way you can make a man trustworthy is to trust him; and the surest way to make him untrustworthy is to distrust him and show your distrust.
If the atomic bomb were merely another though more devastating military weapon to be assimilated into our pattern of international relations, it would be one thing. We could then follow the old custom of secrecy and nationalistic military superiority relying on international caution to prescribe [proscribe?] the future use of the weapon as we did with gas. But I think the bomb instead constitutes merely a first step in a new control by man over the forces of nature too revolutionary and dangerous to fit into the old concepts. I think it really caps the climax of the race between man’s growing technical power for destructiveness and his psychological power of self-control and group control—his moral power. If so, our method of approach to the Russians is a question of the most vital importance in the evolution of human progress.

Since the crux of the problem is Russia, any contemplated action leading to the control of this weapon should be primarily directed to Russia. It is my judgment that the Soviet would be more apt to respond sincerely to a direct and forthright approach made by the United States on this subject than would be the case if the approach were made as a part of a general international scheme, or if the approach were made after a succession of express or implied threats or near threats in our peace negotiations.

My idea of an approach to the Soviets would be a direct proposal after discussion with the British that we would be prepared in effect to enter an arrangement with the Russians, the general purpose of which would be to control and limit the use of the atomic bomb as an instrument of war and so far as possible to direct and encourage the development of atomic power for peaceful and humanitarian purposes. Such an approach might more specifically lead to the proposal that we would stop work on the further improvement in, or manufacture of, the bomb as a military weapon, provided the Russians and the British would agree to do likewise. It might also provide that we would be willing to impound what bombs we now have in the United States provided the Russians and the British would agree with us that in no event will they or we use a bomb as an instrument of war unless all three Governments agree to that use. We might also consider including in the arrangement a covenant with the U. K. and the Soviets providing for the exchange of benefits of future developments whereby atomic energy may be applied on a mutually satisfactory basis for commercial or humanitarian purposes.

I would make such an approach just as soon as our immediate political considerations make it appropriate.

I emphasize perhaps beyond all other considerations the importance of taking this action with Russia as a proposal of the United States—backed by Great Britain—but peculiarly the proposal of the United
States. Action of any international group of nations, including many small nations who have not demonstrated their potential power or responsibility in this war would not, in my opinion, be taken seriously by the Soviets. The loose debates which would surround such proposal, if put before a conference of nations, would provoke but scant favor from the Soviet. As I say, I think this is the most important point in the program.

After the nations which have won this war have agreed to it, there will be ample time to introduce France and China into the covenants and to incorporate the agreement into the scheme of the United Nations. The use of this bomb has been accepted by the world as the result of the initiative and productive capacity of the United States, and I think this factor is a most potent lever toward having our proposals accepted by the Soviets, whereas I am most skeptical of obtaining any tangible results by way of any international debate. I urge this method as the most realistic means of accomplishing this vitally important step in the history of the world.

HENRY L. STimson

S/AB Files

The Acting Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)

WASHINGTON, September 19, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I have to inform you that according to the procedure agreed between our two Governments, the Government of the United States has negotiated and concluded with the Government of Brazil an Agreement,\footnote{Ante, p. 20.} in the form transmitted to Mr. J. Balfour by letter from the Secretary of State, dated August 27, 1945.\footnote{Letter not printed.}

I understand that a representative of the Government of the United Kingdom was present and the interest of the United Kingdom was disclosed to the Brazilian Government at these negotiations. I trust that the Government of the United Kingdom concurs in the terms of the Agreement as finally concluded.

I understand that the Government of the United Kingdom is prepared to assume the same obligations and to acquire the same rights as those it would have assumed and acquired if the Agreement had been made with the Government of Brazil by the Governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom jointly, and the Government of the United States is prepared to do all acts necessary to secure to the Government of the United Kingdom the rights which it would have acquired if the Agreement had been so made.
In this connection, I propose that the Combined Development Trust should act on behalf of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom in all matters relating to the fulfillment of this Agreement.

Sincerely yours,  

DEAN ACHESON

S/AE Files  
The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Commanding General,  
Manhattan Engineer District (Groves)

STOCKHOLM, September 22, 1945.

MY DEAR GENERAL GROVES: I received your Top Secret letter of July 6 in London on July 14 from Major Harry S. Traynor. I now enclose the original copy in English of a note to me from Mr. Östen Undén, Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, and signed by him. The contents of this note are self-explanatory. A copy was handed by the Foreign Minister to the British Minister and has, I understand, been transmitted by him to London.

Mr. Undén gave, on behalf of his Government, the oral assurance that until the legislation contemplated by the note has become effective, which will put control of uranium-bearing materials completely in the hands of the Government, that the Swedish Government will, through the machinery of existing law, control and prevent the exportation of any uranium-bearing materials. The Government will simply refuse to issue any licenses for export of this material. I understand that the legislation is to be introduced into Parliament early in October and within a month or six weeks thereafter should be in full effect. I requested Mr. Undén also to agree that if any request, formal or informal, by any foreign Power to obtain use of or control of uranium-bearing materials in Sweden should be presented to his Government, that the United States and Great Britain would be immediately informed. Mr. Undén said that he personally was willing to give such an assurance but that he would have to consult with the Prime Minister and certain other colleagues in the Government and get their approval. On September 13 he sent for me and stated that he was authorized to give a formal oral assurance that the United States and Great Britain would be informed immediately of any request by any foreign Power to obtain use of or control of uranium-bearing materials in Sweden, which request might be of a “serious” nature. He explained the expression “serious” by saying that if an ordinary commercial request should be made for supplies of this material, for instance as a coloring agent in the manufacturing
of pottery glazes, it would not be considered a "serious" request. In any event, whether the request should be "serious" or not, exportation would be prohibited by the proposed legislation, and in the meantime licenses for export for any purpose would be refused by the Government.

It is my considered opinion that the obligations undertaken by the Swedish Government in the solemn declaration which is embodied in this note fully achieve our essential purposes. The requests we made in the original draft for exploitation and exclusive export rights to this material were in my opinion impracticable from the Swedish point of view and unobtainable under present world conditions.

I would like to express to you the appreciation I feel for the very able and invaluable services of Colonel Lansdale and Major Vance in the negotiation of this agreement. Colonel Lansdale will fill in this report to you orally when he returns to Washington. He and Major Vance kept a daily record of our progress and that, I believe, is already in your hands.

I should add that no papers in connection with this matter are being kept in the files of this Legation. All those papers which Colonel Lansdale and I considered important are being returned to Washington and the others are being burnt. There is only one English copy of the agreement in the secret files of the Swedish Government, together with one copy of a Swedish translation.

I am likewise enclosing a Swedish translation furnished by the Foreign Office of the English note.

Sincerely yours,

Herschel V. Johnson

[Enclosure]

The Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Undén) to the American Minister (Johnson)

Stockholm, September 11, 1945.

Monseur le Ministre: The proposals that you, together with the British Minister, handed over to me on August 3rd, 1945, have been subject to a close study by those members of the Swedish Government whom they would most directly concern. After these deliberations, my colleagues and myself have come to the following conclusions.

We consider it excluded, were it but on constitutional grounds, that the Swedish Government, without the knowledge and assent of the Riksdag, or at any rate of the Utrikesnämnd, would enter into an agreement with the United States and United Kingdom Governments

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82 See memorandum by the Minister in Sweden, August 10, p. 37.
83 Foreign Affairs Committee of the Riksdag.
along the lines indicated in the proposals. Much the less can single members of the Swedish Government, nor legally nor de facto, restrain Sweden's liberty of action in such an important question, in the manner proposed.

Political considerations make it equally impossible for the Swedish Government to put an option relating to uranium materials, by means of a secret agreement, in the hands exclusively of two of the great Powers of the world.

My colleagues and myself highly appreciate, however, the noble motives inspiring the proposals of the two Governments. We are likewise fully aware that it is of an extraordinary importance that these minerals should be exploited under such a control as to prevent misuse. The Swedish Government will, therefore, choose a line of conduct which—even though it does not correspond with the proposals of the two Governments—nevertheless serves the same purpose.

Accordingly, the Swedish Government intend to propose to the Riksdag, at an early date, to adopt legal provisions to the effect, on the one hand, that uranium materials may not be mined or exploited without consent of the Government, and, on the other, that the export of these materials will be prohibited. By passing such a law, the Government and the Riksdag would announce to the world their firm intention to see to it that Swedish uranium resources are not exported to any other country, but are in their entirety reserved for use within Sweden and under the control of the Government. It is the hope of the Swedish Government that the United States and United Kingdom Governments will consider this announcement as a guarantee that the policy thus defined will be sustained, and that the two Governments will find that one of their substantial objects in making the request, will thereby be attained.

The Swedish Government also desire to assure the United States and United Kingdom Governments that should the Swedish Government desire, or find it necessary, for any reason, to change the policy set out in this note, the Swedish Government will give to the United States and United Kingdom Governments the first opportunity to discuss the results of such a change of policy and to arrive at mutually satisfactory arrangements.

Please accept [etc.]

Östen Undén
tween the Government of the United States and the Government of Brazil, the text of which was transmitted to Mr. J. Balfour by letter from the Secretary of State, dated 27th August, 1945.

The Government of the United Kingdom concurs in the terms of the Agreement as finally concluded.

I confirm that the Government of the United Kingdom is prepared to assume the same obligations, and to acquire the same rights as those it would have assumed and acquired if the Agreement had been made with the Government of Brazil by the Governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom jointly. The Government of the United Kingdom accordingly agrees to do all the acts which it would have been obliged to do if the Agreement had been so made.

The Government of the United Kingdom concurs in the proposal that the Combined Development Trust should act on behalf of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom in all matters relating to the fulfillment of the Agreement.

Sincerely yours,

HALIFAX

WASHINGTON, September 25, 1945.


The conclusion of this memorandum is that a policy of secrecy is both futile and dangerous and that the real issues involve the methods and conditions which should govern interchange of scientific knowledge and the international controls which should be sought to prevent a race toward mutual destruction.

The premises upon which this conclusion rests are as follows:

(1) Scientific opinion appears to be practically unanimous that the theoretical basic knowledge is widely known at present; that foreign research can come abreast of our present knowledge in a comparatively short time; that foreign industrial engineering and development in, for instance, the Soviet Union, can equal our present development in about five years; that there is little prospect of developing effective defensive measures against the bomb. In other words, what we know is not a secret which we can keep to ourselves; once known to others, there is no certain way that we can protect ourselves from its use against us.

(2) This scientific knowledge does not relate merely to another and more powerful weapon. It relates to a discovery more revolutionary in human society than the invention of the wheel, the use of metals, or the steam or internal combustion engine. Its de-
Development cannot be suppressed or confined to one country. Development on the destructive side, as on other sides, is in its infancy and sober scientists contemplate the possibility of explosives which, when combined with the rocket principle, will be capable of the mutual destruction of vast areas which employ it against one another. In other words, if the invention is developed and used destructively there will be no victor and there may be no civilization remaining. The advantage of being ahead in such a race is nothing compared with not having the race.

(3) The moral and political nature of our people is such that the use of the atomic bomb for an unwarned attack on another nation is not a practical possibility. Therefore, the advantage of unannounced attack would be with others.

(4) At the present time the joint development of this discovery with the U.K. and Canada must appear to the Soviet Union to be unanswerable evidence of an Anglo-American combination against them. To their minds, there is much other evidence of this.

(5) It is impossible that a government as powerful and power-conscious as the Soviet Government could fail to react vigorously to this situation. It must and will exert every energy to restore the loss of power which this discovery has produced. It will do this, if we attempt to maintain the policy of exclusion, in an atmosphere of suspicion and hostility, thereby exacerbating every present difficulty between us. For us to declare ourselves trustee of the development for the benefit of the world will mean nothing more to the Russian mind than an outright policy of exclusion.

(6) Over-all disagreement with the Soviet Union seems to be increasing. Yet I cannot see why the basic interests of the two nations should conflict. Any long range understanding based on firmness and frankness and mutual recognition of the other’s basic interests seems to me impossible under a policy of Anglo-American exclusion of Russia from atomic development. If it is impossible, there will be no organized peace but only an armed truce.

(7) The question whether or not to attempt a program of mutual exchange of information and cooperation in this field with the Soviet Union cannot be avoided by proposals for control by the United Nations Organization. The United Nations cannot function in this field without agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. This agreement, if it is to be reached, should be attempted directly and not with the added complication of fifty or more other countries being involved at the start.

(8) Without the same informed and extensive public discussion that preceded the San Francisco Conference and an opportunity to hear fully the opinions of the scientists on which the scientific premises are based, the public and Congress will be unprepared to accept a policy involving substantial disclosures to the Soviet Union. But postponement of an approach to the USSR is also untenable. The resulting deterioration in Russian relations would not only adversely color our domestic discussions but would also make the Russian attitude less favorable for an ultimate program of collaboration. It

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58 Reference is to the United Nations Conference on International Organization, held in San Francisco, April 25–June 26, 1945; for documentation on this Conference, see vol. 1, pp. 1 ff.
is necessary that public opinion be given an opportunity to mature at the same time that action is taken to prevent Russian fear and suspicion from increasing and crystallizing.

Recommendations—

That an approach be made by the United States to the Soviet Union after discussion with the British, as required by our arrangements with the latter, having for its purpose the working out of a program of mutual exchange of scientific information and collaboration in the development of atomic power to proceed gradually and upon condition:

First, that the exchange should be mutual and that we become convinced that United States scientists are being fully informed of Soviet developments;

Second, that an agreement be reached on mutual renunciation of further development of the destructive features with adequate opportunity for inspection to give mutual confidence that this was being done;

Third, that initially and perhaps permanently, depending on developments, collaboration should go forward on the development of atomic power and not on the production of the military weapon; and

Fourth, that a plan be worked out to extend these principles to other countries in due course, probably through the mechanism of the United Nations.

This approach to the Russians would seek to reach an agreement on the terms under which full collaboration would later proceed. It need not involve at this time any disclosures going substantially beyond those which have already been made to the world.

Concurrently with the initiation of these discussions with the Soviet Union, the President might send a message to the Congress stating the reasons which lead him to urge an ultimate program of collaboration and which make necessary the immediate approach to the USSR, recommending that the Congress proceed with its own full consideration of the problem of atomic energy, indicating the type of domestic legislation favored by the President, and stating that the outcome of the negotiations with the Russians will be reported to the Congress as soon as they are completed and that requests for Congressional action will be made on any resulting agreements requiring it.

DEAN ACHESON

S/AB Files

Memorandum by Major John E. Vance, on the Staff of the Commanding General, Manhattan Engineer District (Groves)

25 September, 1945.

1. Col. Lansdale and the undersigned arrived in Stockholm on 5 August in response to a request by Mr. Herschel V. Johnson, the
United States Minister to Sweden. During the first meeting with Mr. Johnson he reported that he had made the initial approach to the Swedish Government based on the draft instructions dated 20 July 1945, which had been transmitted to Mr. Johnson in London. Prior to 5 August, Mr. Johnson had seen Mr. Stig Sahlin (Secretary General of the Swedish Foreign Office), Mr. Assarsson (Deputy Secretary General) and Mr. Undén, who became Foreign Minister on 1 August. Mr. Johnson reported that he had been told by Mr. Sahlin that there was no doubt that the Swedish Government would agree to control the Swedish materials but some doubt was expressed that the Swedish Government would agree to US and UK control of their uranium supply for a long period of years. Mr. Johnson also stated that Mr. Per Albin Hansson, the Prime Minister, had been informed of our requests by Mr. Undén.

2. After a discussion with Mr. Johnson and the British representatives (Mr. Jerram, the British Minister to Sweden, and Mr. Sayers) the draft of 7 August was prepared. On the morning of 7 August the Stockholm papers carried the story of the atomic bomb. Mr. Johnson was of the opinion that the publicity would not be harmful since it emphasized the great importance of the matter and the need for speedy conclusion of the agreement.

3. The draft of 7 August, approved by the two Ministers, was taken by Mr. Johnson to the Foreign Office on 8 August where he saw both Mr. Undén and Mr. Sahlin. At this meeting it was apparent that the Swedish Government was well aware of the necessity of controlling these materials but that they believed any action which would place the control of Swedish uranium-bearing materials in the hands of the US and UK would jeopardize the strict neutrality which has been maintained by the Swedish Government; in other words, they felt they would have to refuse any requests made by the US and UK since they firmly intended to refuse any requests made by Russia.

4. On 15 August a meeting was held with the following present: Mr. Assarsson, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Jerram, Mr. Labouchère (Counselor of the British Legation), Prof. Siegbahn (Physics Professor at Stockholm University), Col. Lansdale, Mr. Sayers and Maj. Vance. Mr. Assarsson, for the Swedish Government, said that the purpose of the meeting was to obtain information which could be presented to the Prime Minister so that he might better understand the purpose of the agreement. Col. Lansdale then presented the required background in a very general way. Mr. Assarsson pointed out that other large countries would probably seek Swedish supplies though no approach had yet been made. Mr. Johnson replied that this emphasized the need for control of Swedish resources by the US and UK because of their military value and expressed the opinion that it would be

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80 Not printed.
to the best interests of the Swedish Government to enter into an obligation with the US and UK so that future demands by other governments could be referred to them.

5. On 16 August, Mr. Jerram advised Mr. Johnson that a message had been received from the British Government which took exception to the draft of 7 August with respect to the provisions concerning a firm commitment to purchase materials and the stimulation of Swedish production. After discussing the two points with Washington and London, a new draft was prepared on 22 August in order to avoid a delay in the negotiations. The draft was concurred in by the two Ministers; one copy was forwarded to General Groves and one copy to Mr. Rickett.

6. On 28 August, Mr. Johnson met with Mr. Undén for a lengthy discussion of the proposed agreement. Mr. Undén made several objections to the proposals: (a) acceptance of the proposals in full would mean a virtual abandonment of the basic Swedish policy of neutrality; (b) The agreement would make Sweden's position more difficult politically if an approach was subsequently made by other powers; (c) there was a serious question of the legality of an agreement concluded by the Swedish Government without reference to the secret Joint Foreign Affairs Committee of the two Houses of the Swedish Riksdag.

Mr. Undén added that the Swedish Government would have no hesitation in participating in an international arrangement for the control of uranium materials.

In reply to Mr. Undén, Mr. Johnson pointed out: (a) that the position of the Swedish Government would be, in fact, much stronger in relation to other powers if committed to the US and UK on a contractual basis; (b) since the US and UK already possessed control of the majority of the world's resources, a continued Swedish policy of neutrality with respect to these materials might possibly be a dangerous temptation to outsiders; (c) while he recognized there would be some question of the validity of the agreement beyond the life of the present Swedish Government, that was a risk we would have to relation to other powers if committed to the US and UK on a control was a matter for future action and that such a possibility should not influence present negotiations.

As a result of the above discussion, Mr. Johnson believed it would be imprudent to press the Swedish Government for an immediate decision.

7. On 11 September, Mr. Johnson reported he had seen the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister stated that Sweden could not possibly conclude an agreement along the lines suggested for the following reasons: (a) essential security could not be maintained because of the

87 Not printed.
constitutional requirement that such an agreement be submitted to the Joint Foreign Affairs Committee of the Riksdag, consisting of 32 members, which also has the power to put the matter before the entire Riksdag; (b) it was impossible to word the agreement in such a way that it would not be regarded by Russia as a political act of an unfriendly nature on the part of Sweden and would result in a further deterioration of the relations between the two countries; (c) the US and UK could not make themselves responsible for the relations between Sweden and Russia.

In place of meeting our requests, the Prime Minister stated that Sweden was prepared to guarantee that none of the materials would be exported and that suitable legislation would be enacted in the very near future. He further pointed out that temporary control could be effected by existing laws which require all exports to be licensed by the government. The Prime Minister said that the Swedish reply would take the form of a unilateral declaration in a letter to Mr. Johnson and would not be made public in Sweden.

After a discussion with Mr. Johnson, it was decided to request the Swedish Government to include the following points in their reply: (a) that information be made available to the US and UK both now and in the future, on Swedish resources and the exploitation and production of uranium-containing materials; (b) that the two governments be informed immediately if the Swedish Government found it advisable in the future to collaborate with other powers in the exploitation of their resources that the US and UK be given first opportunity to make mutually satisfactory arrangements; (c) in the event that the Swedish Government rescinds their restrictions on the exports of these materials that the US and UK be given first refusal for the purchase of such materials.

9. On 11 September, Mr. Johnson, the British Minister and Col. Lansdale met with Mr. Undén and Mr. Assarsson to discuss the Swedish reply and to request the inclusion of the three points in the above paragraph. The Swedish representatives stated that they would give an oral assurance to furnish information and that they could not agree to giving us first refusal in the event that restrictions on exports were lifted in the future. With slight change, the provision with respect to future collaboration in the event of a change of policy was incorporated in the note. At our request, Mr. Undén and Mr. Assarsson agreed to advise us in the event that the Swedish Government was approached by any other power with respect to same or similar matters. For obvious reasons they objected to incorporating such a statement in the note.

JOHN E. VANCE

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68 See note from the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American Minister, September 11, p. 46.
Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of War (Patterson) to President Truman

[WASHINGTON,] September 26, 1945.

PROPOSED ACTION FOR CONTROL OF ATOMIC BOMBS

This memorandum is in response to your request for the views of those present at cabinet meeting on September 21st, concerning the action to be taken for future control of atomic bombs, particularly in reference to Russia.

I am in thorough agreement with the position taken by Secretary Stimson in his memorandum to you of September 11th. His memorandum recommends that, after discussion with Britain, we should approach Russia with a proposal to make an agreement limiting use of the atomic bomb as an instrument of war and encouraging development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Such an approach, more specifically, might lead to a proposal to stop work on the manufacture and further development of the atomic bomb as a military weapon, provided Russia and Britain should make the same engagement; and we might also state our readiness to impound the atomic bombs we have on hand, provided the three powers should agree that none would use the atomic bomb as an instrument of war unless all agreed to such use. We should also state our willingness to provide for exchange of benefits of future developments for use of atomic energy for industrial and humanitarian purposes.

As I see the matter, the great need is to do everything in our power to make sure that the atomic bomb is controlled in the way best calculated to insure world peace, not merely for the next ten or twenty years but for the long-range future.

The best qualified experts, meaning the scientists, industrialists and Army officers who have been most closely engaged in the production of the atomic bombs, have advised Secretary Stimson that they have no doubt that Russia could, without any aid or assistance from us, produce atomic bombs within a period of from four to twenty years. In other words, we can take it as fairly certain that our present control of atomic bombs to the exclusion of Russia will not extend beyond twenty years at the outside.

That fact, to my mind, is of the most fundamental importance, and it should serve as the guide to our international policy. It means, as I see it, that we should exert our best efforts to prevent an armament race in production of atomic bombs, even though we now have

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*Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson became Secretary of War on September 27, 1945.*
and probably would continue for some time to have the military advantage of a start in such a contest.

There is another fundamental consideration. Our best-qualified scientists who have worked on production of atomic bombs have also advised Secretary Stimson that the waging of war by use of atomic bombs, as they are likely to be developed further if an armament race is carried on, may well mean the end of civilization. If these men are right, and they may be, their conclusion makes it all the more compelling that an international arrangement for control of atomic bombs be arrived at.

Secretary Stimson’s recommendations, it may be noted, do not include the point that the secret ordnance procedures having to do with production of atomic bombs as weapons of war should be revealed to Russia or any other nation.

[For a report on the Soviet Union’s interest in and capacity for unilateral development of atomic energy, see despatch 2151, September 30, from Moscow, volume V, page 884.]

[On October 3, 1945, President Truman sent to the Congress a Special Message on Atomic Energy; for text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, April 12 to December 31, 1945 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1961), pages 362–366. For an account of discussions leading to this message, see The New World, 1939/1946, pages 408–427.]

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740.00119 EW/10–1045

Minutes of a Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy,
October 10, 1945, 10:30 a.m.

[Extracts]

Present: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of War, accompanied by Mr. George L. Harrison
The Secretary of the Navy, accompanied by Mr. J. E. Geilfuss

Mr. Matthews  

Mr. Byrnes said that he had had a long talk with Mr. Stimson just before leaving for London and had begged him not to recommend to

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# Footnote

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Freeman Matthews, Director of the Office of European Affairs.
the President discussion of international consultation in his message. Mr. Byrnes added that he felt himself in closest agreement with the views of General Groves and that we do not yet know enough about the whole question of atomic energy or the future world situation to discuss the international cooperation aspects. Mr. Harrison said that he agreed with Mr. Byrnes on the matter of timing of the discussion but sided with Secretary Stimson on the question of ultimate authority. Mr. Forrestal emphasized that the Navy wants to be heard at that stage and that he has definite views on the matter. Mr. Patterson said that the State Department wanted both the domestic and the international treatment of the bomb discussed in the President’s message which had been drafted by Judge Rosenman. Mr. Byrnes added that it was going to create difficulties for him and that he could foresee that at future meetings Molotov would refer to the President’s statement and ask to discuss the whole question of the control of the atomic bomb. Mr. Forrestal said that there was also great danger of increased pressure in support of international control from within this country. Mr. Byrnes said he agreed that the pressure would be both internal and from abroad and that he intended to talk further with the President. He felt that before any international discussion of the future of the bomb could take place we must first see whether we can work out a decent peace. Mr. Harrison pointed out that the British wished to discuss the matter of a common approach to the problem in the light of the President’s statement. Mr. Byrnes said he realized this and regretted public discussion of that aspect. Stettinius, he said, wanted to put in a reference to the atomic bomb in a speech he is making in London and he had told him to take out all reference to the bomb. Mr. Forrestal asked whether we were going to turn the bomb over to “a piece of paper”. Mr. Byrnes recalled that Churchill had been most determined that no one should be told about the bomb and had not even wished to talk about it with Attlee.

Mr. Byrnes said that he would be glad to meet with the committee on Saturday and that he would plead with the President not to push the question of consultation.

There was further discussion of the British desire to have Presidential approval to Halifax’s appointment to the committee and there was general agreement that this was not necessary. Mr. Patterson

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51 Samuel I. Rosenman, Special Counsel to President Truman. For text of President Truman’s Message to Congress, October 3, 1945, see Congressional Record, vol. 91, pt. 7, p. 9322.
52 Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.
53 Reference is to the Meeting of the Combined Policy Committee, October 13; for extracts from the minutes, see infra.
suggested it would be adequate to record in Saturday's meeting the Committee's "satisfaction" that Lord Halifax would join them.

Mr. Forrestal expressed his fears that the British might wish to utilize the committee to consider the whole question of the future of the bomb de novo and that he would be inclined to the view that it would be better to consider the Committee defunct. Mr. Byrnes suggested that the question was one to be given some thought and suggested that the three secretaries think over between now and Saturday the desirability of continuing the committee. This was generally agreed upon. Mr. Harrison pointed out that a whole chain of committees depended upon this principal one and that this factor should likewise be given thought....

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Minutes of a Meeting of the Combined Policy Committee

[Extracts]

[WASHINGTON,] October 13, 1945.

Present:

Members: The Secretary of War, Chairman
The Rt. Hon. Earl of Halifax
Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson
Dr. Vannevar Bush

By Invitation: The Canadian Ambassador, Mr. L. B. Pearson
(representing the Hon. C. D. Howe)
Sir James Chadwick
Mr. George Harrison
Mr. Benjamin Cohen ⁴⁴ (representing the Secretary of State)

Joint Secretaries: Major General L. R. Groves
Mr. Roger Makins

X. Research and development in the United Kingdom.

Lord Halifax said that he had been asked by the Prime Minister to inform the Committee that the British Government propose to set up a Research Establishment in the United Kingdom to deal with all aspects of atomic energy. This establishment will include a pile to provide material for research and development.

At the same time, some internal reorganization has taken place in the United Kingdom. The responsibility for the research establish-

⁴⁴ Counselor of the Department of State.
ment will rest with the Minister of Supply. The Prime Minister will continue to exercise general supervision over all aspects of policy on the use of atomic energy, and the Advisory Committee under Sir John Anderson, will report to him as at present.

The British Government is also considering what they should do in regard to large-scale plants for the production of fissile material, but have not yet come to any conclusions on this matter.

These steps will enable the British Government to play their part in any common plan for the development of atomic energy.

The Committee: Took note of this statement.

Mr. Harrison said that he assumed that the decision to set up a pile would result in a request by the British members for some modification of the present allocation of raw materials which had been approved by the Combined Policy Committee. He asked whether it was desired to discuss the point at its present meeting.

Sir James Chadwick said that it was premature to raise this question before His Majesty’s Government had decided their general policy in regard to production of material.

The Committee then adjourned.

L. R. Groves
Roger Makins

S/AB Files

The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman

[LONDON,] 16 October, 1945.

Dear Mr. President: Thank you for your letter of the 5th October in reply to mine of the 25th September which I wrote with a sense of the urgency of our facing up to the problems of the atomic bomb. I am now also being subjected to heavy Parliamentary pressure from both Parties to make a statement on the Government’s policy. I have to reply to a Question tomorrow.

It is my desire to exchange views with you before making a further statement but it will not be possible for me to postpone discussion for long.

It is our view here that the meeting of Foreign Ministers was overshadowed by the problem, and that the prospective conference

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65 John Wilmot.
66 See minutes of the meeting of the Combined Policy Committee, July 4, paragraph 6, p. 13.
67 Forwarded to the Secretary of State on October 24 for preparation of a suitable reply for the President’s signature.
68 The First Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers had been held at London, September 11—October 2; for documentation, see pp. 99 ff.
of the United Nations\(^2\) will be jeopardised unless we have some clearness on our own attitude to the problem.

I have been discussing the matter with Mackenzie King,\(^1\) who is here. He takes the same view as I do of the urgency of the problem. I should like to receive your views and I think it important that you and I and Mackenzie King should have a discussion as soon as possible. I need hardly say that I am prepared to come over as soon as convenient.

Yours sincerely,

C. R. Attlee

\(^{740.00119}\) EW/10–1645

Minutes of a Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy,

October 16, 1945, 10:30 a.m.

[Extracts]

Present: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of War, accompanied by Colonel Charles McCarthy\(^2\)
The Secretary of the Navy, accompanied by Major Correa\(^3\)
Mr. Matthews

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Atomic Energy

Mr. Patterson brought up the question of atomic energy. He said that the British have in mind the statement in the President’s message that he intends to follow up with consultations with Britain and Canada and later with others. He wanted to know what the channel would be—whether the talks would be through regular diplomatic channels or through some other procedure. Dr. Bush, he said, had informed him that Attlee was coming over and perhaps the President would discuss this with him. Mr. Patterson said that he had no preference. Mr. Byrnes remarked that he had one view on this matter, namely, the overemphasis placed on the views of the scientists. He said that he bowed to them in their ability to develop the bomb but on the question of giving information to others he thought the scientists were no better informed than he was on the construction of the bomb. Mr. Patterson said that the British and Canadians were under present Russian [Quebec\(^5\)] agreement in effect junior partners

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\(^1\) William Lyon Mackenzie King, Canadian Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs.
\(^2\) Secretary of the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC).
\(^3\) Lt. Col. Mathias F. Correa, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy.

\(^2\) The First Session of the United Nations General Assembly was to meet in London, January 10–February 14, 1946.
in the business and have a good stand in their request to be consulted. Mr. Forrestal pointed out that neither have as yet the means or capacity for producing the bomb. Mr. Patterson said that he believed the British had only one pilot plant on plutonium. Mr. Byrnes said that to him the question depends entirely on our ability to inspect plants in other countries. If we are not able to inspect such plants he thought we are all agreed that we should not give information with regard to our methods of manufacture. He said that in a meeting he had asked General Marshall whether his experience in dealing with the Russians justified him in relying on the United Nations Organization to inspect Russian plants and in telling the American people that he could rely on such inspection. Mr. Byrnes said that he was only going on the basis of past experience and he did not feel that this justified any such confidence. Mr. Patterson said that the President, he thought, had in mind only a gradual approach and that in no event would information on the industrial manufacture of the bomb be given to others. He said that we were, however, committed to talks with the British and Canadians to a certain extent. Mr. Byrnes remarked that Oppenheimer had impressed him considerably and he thought that General Groves knew more about the problem than any of the people from Dupont, Union Carbide or Eastman. He said that we can't get into Rumania and Bulgaria much less Russia and that it is childish to think that the Russians would let us see what they are doing. He added the query whether if Russia made an agreement today we would want to rely on it. He pointed in this connection to the fact that though they had a formal treaty of non-aggression with Japan the Russians, as far back as Yalta, were making definite plans for their attack upon Japan. He added that Stalin and Molotov would probably be insulted today if you implied that they had intended to keep their solemn treaty with Hitler. By implication of the same process of reasoning, it would not be wise for us to rely on their word today. Mr. Patterson inquired whether when Attlee arrives Mr. Byrnes will take up with him the matter of channel through which the talks will be conducted. He said that he was agreeable to having it done here through the State Department or through the Combined Policy Committee on Atomic Energy. Mr. Byrnes remarked that in his opinion the principal reason Russia wants Libya has to do with uranium. He pointed to the map how a Soviet base in Libya would facilitate their access right down to the Belgian Congo.

*General of the Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army.
*J. Robert Oppenheimer had been Director of the Manhattan District Project Laboratory at Santa Fe, New Mexico.
Mr. Patterson inquired whether the Russians are really serious with regard to Libya and Mr. Byrnes replied emphatically in the affirmative. He said it was the cause of all his troubles and mentioned Gromyko's approach on this question at Potsdam.

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Minutes of a Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy,
October 23, 1945, 10:30 a.m.

[Extracts]

Present: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of War, accompanied by Colonel Charles W. McCarthy
The Secretary of the Navy, accompanied by Lieut. Colonel Correa
Mr. Matthews

ATOMIC ENERGY

Mr. Patterson brought up the question of the channel of negotiations with the British and Canadians. Mr. Byrnes said that the President had spoken to him of the forthcoming visit of Prime Minister Attlee but had expressed no views on the nature of the discussions. The President wants Mr. Byrnes and Admiral Leahy to be present and it is contemplated that the visit will take place about November 11 or 12. Mr. Byrnes wanted to delay the announcement until November 6 since there would be lots of speculation to the effect that Mr. Attlee was coming over to talk about Palestine. However, he has agreed to Lord Halifax’s proposal to announce the visit on November 1 and to say that it is for the purpose of discussing the atomic bomb.

Mr. Byrnes referred to a visit he had received from Dr. Oppenheimer who thought that Stalin should have been approached with regard to the atomic bomb a month ago and that there should be no

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6 Andrei Andreyevich Gromyko, Soviet Ambassador to the United States.
7 Presumably the reference to the Potsdam Conference is in error, but for an exchange of letters between the Acting Chairman of the Soviet Delegation to the San Francisco Conference and Secretary of State Stettinius, June 20 and 23, 1945, on this general subject, see vol. 1, pp. 1398 and 1428, respectively. For discussion of this exchange of letters at the 15th Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London, September 21, 11 a. m., see post, pp. 288, 287.
8 Fleet Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
delay in discussions. Oppenheimer did, on the contrary, think that legislation on the subject in this country should be delayed. Mr. Byrnes had replied that he thought the pending bill on the whole is a good one, but that possible amendments should be given careful consideration and there should be full study. On the international aspects Mr. Byrnes informed him that while he had great admiration for Dr. Oppenheimer's scientific attainments, he did not believe that he knew the facts or had the responsibility for the handling of international affairs. He pointed out that the American people had elected Mr. Truman President and that the responsibility is his and Mr. Byrnes'.

Mr. Patterson pointed out that the President's message to Congress called for sound consultation. The difficulty is that the scientists are restless under any control or restrictions. He thought that he had brought Dr. Oppenheimer back on the track and that the latter now favored the passage of adequate legislation. The scientists with experience in public affairs like Dr. Bush and Dr. Conant are all right. The same is true of the top scientists who have been working on the problem, but the smaller fry partly through earnest conviction and partly through the desire to sound off are restless. They are men who are less stable and in fact do not know what they want in the handling of atomic energy. On the international aspect, however, all the scientists were of one mind that the secret of construction can be kept only for a five to fifteen year period. The only problem is one of industrial capacity for production and he thought that Mr. Stimson's memorandum of September 11 contained the sound approach. He thought it provided for a broad and gradual development and is based upon good will on both sides and the exchange of information and right of visitation.

Mr. Byrnes agreed that the whole problem of cooperation is predicated on free inspection at all times. He cited the fact that we cannot recognize the Rumanian and Bulgarian regimes because we cannot get information on conditions there and our representatives have difficulty in getting around. If this is true in Rumania and Bulgaria, it is considerably more true in Soviet Russia and he had asked Dr. Oppenheimer whether full inspection under conditions such as he described could be had in the Soviet Union today. Dr. Oppenheimer, he said, finally admitted that this situation was pretty bad. Mr. Patterson said that he wants Mr. Byrnes to make sure that all the facts are understood and then it is up to the State Department to decide what to do about it.
Memorandum by Captain R. Gordon Arneson to the Secretary of War
(Patterson)

[WASHINGTON,] 17 April, 1946.

Subject: Negotiations with the British and Canadians, November 1–
November 16, 1945

There follows a chronological recital of the events of last November
relating to discussions with the British concerning collaboration in
the field of atomic energy. This recital of the facts is derived from
the day by day record which I kept during this period. Pertinent
documents are appended.

1 November

Secretary Patterson wrote Secretary Byrnes today strongly urging
that the State Department undertake a thorough examination of the
international phases of atomic energy in preparation for the arrival
of Prime Minister Attlee. He stressed particularly the problem of
the war-time Quebec Agreement and its relation to the post-war
situation. While stating that this was a State Department matter,
he offered the assistance of the War Department in pulling the facts
together. (Tab A)9

Following up the letter, Secretary Patterson had an hour’s confer-
ence this afternoon with Secretary Byrnes, during which he again
urged prompt and thorough preparation for Attlee’s visit. Secretary
Byrnes was non-committal.

2 November

Late this afternoon when he was discussing with Dr. Bush the forth-
coming conference with the British and the Canadians, Secretary
Patterson called in Lt. Arneson and asked him to prepare a study
of the current situation under the Quebec and Combined Development
Trust Agreements and a tentative set of U. S. proposals for discussion.
It was agreed that the proposals should follow the lines of Secretary
Stimson’s memorandum of September 11, and Secretary Patterson’s
of September 26 and should outline the several stages of negotiations,
viz.: revision of agreements with the British and the Canadians,
approach to Russia, and finally an approach to the UNO.10 It was
agreed further that Dr. Bush’s memorandum to the President of
September 25,11 which went into some detail, should be used as a

9 Letter from Secretary of War Patterson to Secretary of State Byrnes, November 1, not printed.
10 United Nations Organization.
11 For summaries of Dr. Bush’s views as expressed in this memorandum, see
The New World, 1939/1946, p. 421; also, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, vol. 1:
guide in the preparation of the study. Secretary Patterson remarked that while the study might never see the light of day, it should be ready in the event it was called for. Even though it might not be wanted by Secretary Byrnes it would, in any event, serve to jell Secretary Patterson’s thinking on the subject.

7 November 1945

The study prepared by Lt. Arneson was transmitted to Secretary Patterson this morning. The section suggesting a set of U. S. proposals that might be used as a basis for discussion with the British was purely tentative and was put forward merely as a point of departure for further consideration by the Secretary and his advisers.

10 November 1945

On the basis of the discussion they had had with Secretary Patterson the day before, General Groves, Dr. Bush, and Mr. Harrison met in General Groves’ office this morning to revise the U. S. proposals for discussion. Lt. Volpe and Lt. Arneson were present. The revision spelled out in greater detail our proposals for continuation of cooperation with the British and the Canadians and suggested only in general terms the nature of the approach which the three governments might agree the United States should make to Russia. The further step of setting up an organ of the UNO to control the field of atomic energy was stated as an ultimate objective, to be achieved, however, only after a considerable period and only after the effective cooperation of Russia had been proven in practice. As regards our relations with the U. K. and Canada, the recommendations made it clear that in exchange for the abrogation of Clause IV of the Quebec Agreement 12 in any new agreement that might be arrived at the U.K. should undertake to bring under the control of the CDT and subject to allocation by the CPC on an actual use basis all uranium and thorium ores situated anywhere within the British Commonwealth.

Tab B) 16

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12 Text of this section of the Quebec Agreement, August 19, 1943, is as follows: “Fourthly, that in view of the heavy burden of production falling upon the United States as the result of a wise division of war effort, the British Government recognize that any post-war advantages of an industrial or commercial character shall be dealt with as between the United States and Great Britain on terms to be specified by the President of the United States to the Prime Minister of Great Britain. The Prime Minister expressly disclaims any interest in these industrial and commercial aspects beyond what may be considered by the President of the United States to be fair and just and in harmony with the economic welfare of the world.” (TIAS No. 2993, or 5 UST 1115)

16 Not printed. These tentative United States proposals also called for prior consultation by the United States with the United Kingdom and Canada prior to use of atomic weapons as a means of warfare.
11 November 1945

Mr. Harrison and Lt. Arneson saw Secretary Patterson briefly this morning to give him a copy of the revised study, which Mr. Harrison pointed out represented the unanimous views of General Groves, Dr. Bush, and himself.

14 November 1945

Mr. Makins and Mr. Rickett met informally with General Groves, Mr. Harrison, and Lt. Arneson at 5:15 p.m. to exchange views concerning what should be done on the question of revising the Quebec Agreement during the Truman–Attlee–King conference.

Mr. Harrison reported that—as indicated in a memorandum of November 14 (Tab C), which Dr. Bush had written to President Truman recapitulating his understanding of the conclusions reached at the White House on the evening of the 13th, and a copy which was received by Secretary Patterson today—the principals desired that Secretary Patterson and Sir John Anderson and their advisers consider together what should be done with matters of collaboration covered by the Quebec Agreement.

There was general agreement that whatever was done with the Quebec Agreement and its specific provisions, it was clearly desirable to continue the Combined Policy Committee, perhaps with different membership, to act as the coordinating body for whatever degree of collaboration might be decided upon and to continue the CDT as the agent of the CPC for the acquisition of ores.

General Groves suggested that each of them should study the Quebec and Combined Development Trust Agreements in detail and to raise points which should be considered in working out revisions. It was agreed that this should be done in preparation for the meeting in the Secretary's office scheduled for 10:00 a.m. the next day.

25 November 1945

The following met with the Secretary of War in his office at 10:00 a.m. to discuss revision of existing agreements: Sir John Anderson, Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Malcolm MacDonald, General Groves, Mr. Harrison, Mr. Dennis Rickett, Mr. Roger Makins, and Lt. Arneson.

Sir John stated that the British were anxious to know what decision the United States was likely to make with regard to Clause IV of the Quebec Agreement, for the U.K. had hoped in the near future to build pilot plants and would want to know how the matter of commercial rights stood. The United Kingdom recognised that the deci-

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35 Not printed.
36 United Kingdom High Commissioner in Canada.
sion on Clause IV rested with the United States and would, of course, accept whatever decision was made. To this Secretary Patterson replied that as far as he was concerned he was prepared to recommend that a solution be found which would not place the U.K. at a disadvantage.

There was general agreement that the CPC should be continued to supervise such arrangements as were mutually agreed upon and that the CDT should also be continued to handle the acquisition of ores, but that it would probably be desirable to terminate the Quebec Agreement, in toto, and replace it by a new agreement which would properly reflect the post-war situation.

Sir John felt that consideration should be given to full interchange of personnel in any new agreement that might be signed. General Groves felt that the quid pro quo for this would have to be an undertaking whereby the U.K. would bring all uranium and thorium ores situated in the British Commonwealth under the control of the CDT for allocation in accordance with demonstrated demand. In agreeing with this point, Sir John pointed out that the U.K. would have to proceed with caution in some cases, as for example, South Africa.

It was agreed that Sir John’s advisers and Secretary Patterson’s advisers should prepare a Memorandum of Intention which would set forth the basic policies to be followed in writing a new agreement. It was agreed further that the CPC should be given the assignment of writing the new agreement in line with these basic policies. Another meeting was called for 9:00 a.m. the next day to consider the memorandum.

After the meeting in the Secretary’s office, General Groves, Mr. Harrison, Mr. Rickett, Mr. Makins, Lt. Volpe, and Lt. Arneson met in Mr. Harrison’s office to arrive at some preliminary understanding as to the form and content of the Memorandum of Intention. It was the view of General Groves and Mr. Harrison that there should be prepared for consideration on Friday (1) a short directive to the CPC for signature by the President and the Prime Ministers instructing the CPC to prepare for their consideration a new agreement envisaging the continuation of the CPC and the CDT, and (2) a longer memorandum, also for signature by the President and the Prime Ministers or at least by the Secretary of War and Sir John, setting forth the basic policies to be considered by the CPC in drawing up a new agreement. Mr. Rickett and Mr. Makins did not dissent from this view.

The Quebec Agreement was then examined point by point and amendments proposed. When this had been done, it was suggested that Mr. Makins and Mr. Rickett on the one hand and Lts. Volpe and Arneson on the other should prepare separate drafts of the Memoran-
dum of Intention for comparison and further discussion later in the
day, and that the British should also prepare a draft of the short
directive to the CPC.

Mr. Makins, Mr. Rickett, General Groves, Lt. Volpe, and Lt.
Arneson met again at 6:00 p. m. at which time the short directive
to the CPC which had been prepared by the British for signature by
the President and the Prime Ministers was agreed to. The directive
stated in substance that the signatories desired that cooperation in
the field of atomic energy among the three Governments should con-
tinue, that the CPC and the CDT should be continued in suitable
form, and that the CPC should recommend appropriate arrange-
ments to accomplish this. As to the longer paper, there appeared
some divergence in point of view. The British wanted the memo-
randum to be quite informal, more in the nature of a very general
statement of broad principle rather than a specific set of basic points
by which the CPC would be guided in its work. General Groves
wanted the memorandum to be quite specific on the basic issues of
policy and binding on the CPC when adopted by the Anderson-
Patterson sub-committee of the conference. No agreement was
reached on this question of procedure and it was decided to hold it
over for consideration the next day and to concentrate that evening
on the content of the memorandum.

Lts. Volpe and Arneson met with Mr. Makins and Mr. Rickett
at the British Embassy at 10:00 p. m. and came to agreement on the
basic points of policy to be laid down in the memorandum with the
exception of the point on interchange of information. The more
restrictive U.S. formula for interchange of information was written
into the draft (see Tab D, item 5)\(^7\) with the understanding that the
British would put forward an alternative formula for consideration
the next day.

15 November 1945

Throughout the discussions in Mr. Harrison’s office, and at the
6:00 and 10:00 o’clock meetings, the U.S. participants held the view
that any revision of the Quebec Agreement could be implemented
only by treaty, but not, in any event, by any secret Executive arrange-
ments. The British participants held that the question of the form

\(^7\)The text of this portion of the United States draft read as follows: “There
shall be full and effective interchange of information, ideas, and personnel in
the field of scientific research between the two countries. In the field of develop-
ment, design, construction, and operation of large-scale plants having to do
with atomic energy, interchange of information and ideas shall be regulated
by such ad hoc arrangements as may appear to be necessary or desirable. Such
ad hoc arrangements shall be subject to the approval of the Combined Policy
Committee established below.” Paragraph 6 charged the Committee with peri-
odic general review of the work in progress, allocation of materials, and settle-
ment of disputes that might arise.
any agreement on this matter should take was a political question which should not be decided at this time or at this level.

16 November 1945

The following met with the Secretary of War in his office at 9:00 a.m.: Sir John Anderson, Field Marshal Wilson, General Groves, General Ian Jacob, Mr. Harrison, Mr. C. D. Howe, Dean MacKenzie, Mr. Nevile Butler, Mr. Makins, Mr. Rickett, Lt. Volpe, and Lt. Arneson. Agreement was reached promptly on the joint directive to the CPC for signature by the President and the Prime Ministers. One change was agreed to which might prove most significant. This was the proposal made by Sir John that the words "full and" be inserted before the phrase "effective cooperation" in the first sentence. (Tab E) The American participants at first objected to this change, but finally reluctantly agreed with the understanding that the words "full and" made no material change in the meaning of the phrase.

After some discussion, it was agreed that the Memorandum of Intention should be addressed to the CPC and signed by Sir John Anderson for the U.K. and by General Groves for the U.S. and that it would serve only as a general guide and not as a set of basic policies binding on the Committee in the writing of a new agreement.

While Sir John, Mr. Makins, Mr. Rickett, General Groves, Mr. Harrison, and Lt. Volpe reassembled in Mr. Harrison's office to arrive at a final draft of the memorandum, Secretary Patterson accompanied by Lt. Arneson proceeded to the White House with copies of the joint directive which were signed by President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee at approximately 10:15 a.m.

The Memorandum of Intention was agreed upon by noon and was signed in eight copies by Sir John and General Groves before Sir John departed for Ottawa at 3:00 p.m. As signed, the memorandum contained a series of recommendations to be considered by the CPC in the preparation of a new document to replace the Quebec Agreement and all other understandings with the exception of the Combined Development Trust Agreement which was to be revised in conformity with the new arrangements. No mention was made of post-war commercial rights, but the memorandum recommended that all ores that may be acquired, by purchase or otherwise, by the CDT, including all that may be secured throughout the British Commonwealth, should be held jointly subject to allocation by the Combined Policy Committee to the three Governments "in such quantities as may be needed, in the common interest, for scientific research, military, and humanitarian purposes," provided that the unallocated portion

18 Lt. Gen. Ian Jacob, Military Assistant Secretary, British War Cabinet.
19 Nevile M. Butler, Assistant Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office.
20 For text of this document, dated November 16, see p. 75.
not so needed be held by the CDT for disposal at a later date "in the light of then existing conditions and on a fair and equitable basis." As regards interchange of information the memorandum recommended that there should be full and effective cooperation in the field of basic scientific research, while in the field of development, design, construction, and operation of plants, cooperation—recognized as desirable in principle—should be regulated by ad hoc arrangements through the CPC. (Tab F)²¹

Gordon Arneson

S/AE Files

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Bush) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] November 5, 1945.

Subject: Coming conference with Mr. Attlee.

Two points will come up: The Quebec Agreement, and the approach to Russia on the future of atomic energy.

For a thoroughly sound approach to this conference it seems to me essential that the President, as soon as he decides on the general policy and objectives, should constitute a small group to prepare for the conversations in very definite manner. This should not be the Interim Committee,²² as the President will probably wish new membership, specifically from the Senate. The Interim Committee should hence be dissolved. The new group should continue after the conference. I feel it is utterly essential, if this administration is to present a consistent and united point of view to the public, that there should be no statements on atomic energy from the administration until after they have been reviewed by this group. In particular I feel the Attlee conference should be promptly followed by a careful statement to the public, and that the group should prepare it for the President's approval. The Secretary of State should of course head the group.

Québec Agreement

The Quebec Agreement is an agreement between Roosevelt and Churchill having three parts:

The first has to do with interchange on atomic energy. This has automatically ceased to be operative, since it was based on the principle that we would give the British such information as would aid in winning the way, and no more. This was what was done, and they have not been given much of our manufacturing information.

²¹ For text of the Memorandum of Intention, November 16, see p. 75.
²² Concerning the establishment of the Interim Committee, see The New World, 1939/1946, p. 345.
The second part had to do with joint acquisition and allocation of materials. This occurs under the Combined Policy Committee, and the Combined Development Trust. The matter may be on a somewhat insecure foundation. Continued arrangements along these lines are certainly necessary.

The third part contains several political clauses. The one about commercial use may embarrass the British. The ones that require British approval on some of our actions might conceivably be considered to embarrass us.

It appears that this somewhat informal agreement should now be superseded by a permanent one, drawn in consultation with the Senate on this side. This should be written with the intention of making it public, and having it fit in appropriately with any more general agreements that may be made, through UNO or otherwise.

It seems to me, therefore, that the coming conference should result in an understanding that the whole affair will be renegotiated to put it in permanent form, and in an exploration of the form and content desired by each party, basing this on the assumption that the Quebec Agreement was intended for the war period only.

Personally I would supersede the agreement by a simple one with the British providing merely for sharing of materials, leaving political clauses and the dissemination of information to be worked out on a more general international basis.

The Approach to Russia

This is the great question before the conference. Russia should be approached before the whole subject comes up in the United Nations Organization.

The objectives are clear. We wish to proceed down the road of international collaboration and understanding, to avoid a secret arms race, and above all to avoid a future war, in which atomic bombs would devastate our cities as well as those of our enemy.

The difficulty is also very clear. It resides in the fact that Russia is naturally secretive and suspicious, and very intent on its own immediate interests. We must make agreements with Russia which Russia will keep.

The solution, if there is one, is to make the agreements in such manner that it will be in Russia's interest to keep them. This involves proceeding on a basis of "partial payments", and step by step, in such manner that Russia will be faced with the alternatives. Either she will genuinely conform, or her failure to do so will become fully known, and public opinion all over the world will become arrayed against her.
We want no future war. If we cannot avoid one, we at least wish to be in our full strength and to have the rest of the world with us. We also want to have atomic bombs and to be in a clear position to use them promptly, if there is any chance that our enemy has them. Hence our program toward international understanding should involve no premature “outlawing of the bomb”, which is a dangerous phrase. It should be realistic at every step.

With these points in mind I advocate an approach along the following lines. The Russians should be apprised at the outset that we propose to go the whole distance, but the steps should be taken in sequence, and the success of one should be essential to the initiation of the next. Needless to say we should ourselves conform genuinely at all times, and be tolerant of minor irritations or departures. We hope genuinely to open up Russia, and it will take time.

(1) **Step One** should be a simple one.

We should approach Russia with the suggestion that she join Britain and the United States in suggesting the establishment under the UNO as a creation of the Assembly of a scientific body charged with the full dissemination of fundamental information on science in all fields including that of atomic fission.

As a prerequisite it should be fully understood in advance that every country will (1) invite visits of foreign scientists freely to its laboratories where basic research is carried on, as may be arranged between the scientists themselves, and with no artificial impediments applying to foreigners that do not apply to its own nationals, (2) allow its own scientists to travel freely for such purposes, (3) further the exchange of students for the same purpose, (4) encourage its scientists, engaged in fundamental research, to publish freely, and further full publication and the complete dissemination of the results.

The primary objective of this step is to start Russia down the path of collaboration with us. It will require no policing. The scientists themselves will soon know whether Russia is really opening up her laboratories on fundamental work or not.

This step probably costs us nothing. Russia can readily find out most of what we do in fundamental science anyway, and the chances are certainly that we will publish freely in any case, no matter what Russia does. Moreover, while our free publication, in the absence of agreement, might help Russia’s progress on atomic energy some, it would be very likely to help our own progress more.

It will give us a chance to find out whether Russia really wants to proceed with us. There is little incentive for her to join us genuinely on this step unless she does.
(2) Step Two.

This step should include under the provisions above the practical aspects of atomic energy, centered about its application to industrial uses.

The quid pro quo should be the establishment of an internationally constituted inspection system, organized under the UNO, with technical men from various countries. No control is involved, but the Commission of Inspection should have the right, without impediment, to visit any laboratory or plant in any country where atomic fission is being carried out, to the extent necessary to determine the magnitude of the operations, the disposition of the product, etc.

In this matter we alone at the present time have extensive operations. We do not wish to open this whole affair up until we are assured that the inspection system is really going to work. Hence we should approach the matter gradually, and should state our intention to do so at the outset. There should hence be a deliberately restricted scope of the Inspection Commission's function at the outset, with the provision that further disclosures shall be in accordance with a definite schedule prepared in advance, stating dates and categories, each extension, however, being subject to certification by the Assembly of the UNO that the inspection system is operating satisfactorily. It would be hoped that the scope might ultimately become extended to the point where secret preparations for war would be sufficiently difficult to avoid a secret arms race, on atomic bombs or anything else.

The first definition might include merely the materials, that is the mining and processing of ores of uranium and thorium, and all international and internal movements of these.

This might soon be extended to include the extent and capacity of plants for concentration and separation of products capable of sustaining chain reactions.

All of this the Russians now know, or can readily determine. The next step should include work being done on commercial applications directly. Note that we would require a strong law on internal controls before taking this step. It assumes that secret commercial development, and private patents, would have little meaning in this field, but this is a small price to pay. I believe we should indicate at the outset that we plan to go at least this far, if Russia really collaborates.

The Commission should publish summaries from time to time showing the exact extent to which activity is being carried on everywhere. If it is blocked in getting data, or in assuring itself adequately that this is complete and reliable, it should place its situation before UNO and hence before the world.
(3) _Step Three._

This step can only be taken after the second has been worked, and its scope has been greatly extended.

There should then be proposed that all nations agree that they will hold materials capable of atomic fission, beyond a stated amount necessary for processing operations, only when it is in use in producing power for commercial purposes.

This would be subject to the inspection system, by then presumably mature and operative.

We would thereupon be called upon to distribute our stock of atomic bombs into power plants, and to make no more, except as the material could be thus further distributed. Admittedly we do not now know how to build such plants, but presumably we will by the time we are ready for this third step. There would need to be allowed a period of years to accomplish the full distribution, after the arrangement went into effect.

Fission materials thus distributed could of course be recalled and made into bombs. The point is that this would take time, and would be a fairly obvious procedure if it resulted in shutting down large power plants. If the distribution were known to be effective, therefore, the threat of surprise atomic bomb attack by one nation on another would be largely removed. This threat, hanging over the world, would be appalling. Certainly we do not wish to be in a position to make such an attack, if we are sure no one else is. We would make the move indicated in this third step only if we were convinced that the inspection system was actually effective. Certainly our statement at this time that we plan this third step would remove a great deal of fear from the world, and fear is a breeder of wars. Incidentally there would be a benefit to humanity by having power plants instead of stores of bombs.

Many years would be necessary to carry out all three steps above. The important point now is to make it clear to the world that this is the way in which we would like to proceed.

Certainly, if these steps were taken, not outlawing the bomb, but in the direction of removing its worst threat in a practical manner, it should be possible to proceed from there toward further effective understanding and controls, on other weapons, and finally on war itself. This is the path that can finally lead to a climate of opinion in which a United Nations Organization fully implemented to regulate international relations of all sorts, and prevent war, can be brought to pass.
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Bush) and the Commanding General, Manhattan Engineer District (Groves), to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, November 9, 1945.

Supplementing Memorandum of November 5.

This memorandum is prepared in answer to the question "what do we do with our bombs in the meantime", assuming that a plan similar to that of the previous memorandum is being carried out.

One possible answer is as follows, although this is advanced tentatively.

It is assumed that we will continue to manufacture for the present at least the explosive material for bombs. This will also be useful, after an interval of some years, for the generation of power for peaceful purposes.

We might announce when the discussions have proceeded to a propitious point, that we do not propose to assemble this into bombs. Rather we propose to store it in bar form, simply as a stock of material and hold it for later installation in industrial power units when matters have advanced to that point. Moreover, we could state that, when there is a workable international inspection system in operation, we propose to invite their inspection of this material to assure themselves that we are thus holding it in this form.

As a reason, we could state that we do this as a partial proof of our good will. We have no intention of attacking anyone suddenly. We realize that storage in the fashion proposed would prevent us from using the materials for bombs without warning. We wish voluntarily to take this step, because we wish to have no threats of sudden attack hanging over the world.

The cost of this step to us is merely that it would make the material unavailable for atomic bombs without a period of preparation.

The effect on the world if this step were taken soon might be salutary, even although it is only one step of many.

There is one other point that we should like to mention, as a result of our conference of yesterday. It is our understanding that the first conference will include only Mr. Attlee, Mr. King, Mr. Bevin, Mr. the President, and yourself. If the British should wish to bring others into later conferences, where atomic energy is to be discussed, we believe you should then bring in, not just ourselves, but the Secretary of War, and Mr. Harrison, as well.

L. R. Groves V. Bush

26 Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
[For text of the Agreed Declaration by President Truman, Prime
Minister Attlee, and Prime Minister Mackenzie King, signed at Wash-
ington, November 15, 1945, see Department of State Treaties and
Other International Acts Series No. 1504; or 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1479.]

S/AE Files

Memorandum by President Truman, the British Prime Minister
(Attlee), and the Canadian Prime Minister (King) 24

[WASHINGTON,] November 16, 1945.

1. We desire that there should be full and effective cooperation in
the field of atomic energy between the United States, the United
Kingdom and Canada.

2. We agree that the Combined Policy Committee and the Combined
Development Trust should be continued in a suitable form.

3. We request the Combined Policy Committee to consider and
recommend to us appropriate arrangements for this purpose.

HARRY S. TRUMAN
C. R. ATTLEE
MACKENZIE KING

S/AE Files

Memorandum by the Commanding General, Manhattan Engineer
District (Groves), and the Chairman, British Advisory Committee
on Atomic Energy (Anderson), to the Chairman of the Combined
Policy Committee (Patterson)

[WASHINGTON,] November 16, 1945.

We recommend that the following points be considered by the Com-
bined Policy Committee in the preparation of a new document to
replace the Quebec Agreement, which should be superseded in toto,
-together with all other understandings with the exception of the
Combined Development Trust Agreement which should be revised
in conformity with the new arrangements.

1. The three Governments, the United States, the United Kingdom,
and Canada, will not use atomic weapons against other parties without
prior consultation with each other;

2. The three Governments agree not to disclose any information or
-enter into negotiations concerning atomic energy with other govern-
ments or authorities or persons in other countries except in accordance

24 For background information on this memorandum, see the memorandum by
Captain Arneson, covering the period November 1-16, pp. 63, 68.
with agreed common policy or after due prior consultation with one another;

3. the three Governments will take measures so far as practicable to secure control and possession, by purchase or otherwise, of all deposits of uranium and thorium situated in areas comprising the United States, its territories or possessions, the United Kingdom, and Canada. They will also use every endeavor with respect to the remaining territories of the British Commonwealth, and other countries to acquire all available supplies of uranium and thorium. All supplies acquired under the provisions of this paragraph will be placed at the disposition of the Combined Development Trust.

4. The materials at the disposition of the trust shall be allocated to the three Governments in such quantities as may be needed, in the common interest, for scientific research, military, and humanitarian purposes. Such supplies as are not allocated for these purposes shall be held by the Combined Development Trust and their disposal shall be determined at a later date in the light of then existing conditions and on a fair and equitable basis.

5. There shall be full and effective cooperation in the field of basic scientific research among the three countries. In the field of development, design, construction, and operation of plants such cooperation, recognized as desirable in principle, shall be regulated by such ad hoc arrangements as may be approved from time to time by the Combined Policy Committee as mutually advantageous.

6. The Combined Policy Committee, already established and constituted so as to provide equal representation to the United States on the one hand and to the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada on the other, shall carry out the policies provided for, subject to the control of the respective governments. To this end, the Committee shall:

1. Review from time to time the general program of work being carried out in the three countries.
2. Allocate materials in accordance with the principles set forth in the fourth paragraph above.
3. Settle any questions which may arise concerning the interpretation and application of arrangements regulating cooperation between the three Governments.

The above is to be understood as being without prejudice to the consideration by the Combined Policy Committee of any matters not covered in this memorandum.

Sir John Anderson

Leslie R. Groves

Maj. Gen. U.S. Army
The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Ambassador is instructed to enquire the views of the Secretary of State on the procedure for bringing before the United Nations Organisation the proposal, made in the tripartite statement of November 15th on Atomic Energy, to set up a "Commission under the United Nations Organisation to prepare recommendations for submission to the Organisation."

2. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom understand that, in the view of the United States Government, action should originate with the General Assembly and that all the United Nations should have a part in the establishment of the Commission. With this His Majesty's Government are in agreement, but consider that a number of important matters remain to be settled.

3. In the first place, there is the question of the procedure for bringing the proposal for the Commission before the General Assembly. This could be done by:—

(i) a resolution of the Preparatory Commission placing the matter upon the provisional agenda for the General Assembly;
(ii) action by one or more of the United Nations proposing an additional item for the General Assembly's agenda at some time between the close of the Preparatory Commission and prescribed period before the General Assembly meets; or
(iii) raising the matter in the General Assembly after it has met and securing its addition to the agenda.

His Majesty's Government prefers alternative (ii) as the simplest and most natural procedure. They consider it desirable to discourage the Preparatory Commission from embarking on a detailed discussion of the proposed Commission in relation to the Atomic problem. But they recognise that it may in practice not prove possible to delay any further move until the Assembly meets.

4. His Majesty's Government feel it would be natural that the initiative in proposing this procedure should be taken jointly by the three Powers which issued the tripartite statement. It has, however, been suggested that the Soviet Government, in particular, ought, if possible, to be associated with the sponsorship of the tripartite proposals before the United Nations Organisation. Clearly it is most important to make every effort to secure the cooperation of the Soviet Government, and any procedure which achieved this would naturally commend itself to His Majesty's Government, and, they

25 See bracketed note, p. 75.
26 For documentation relating to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations, see vol. 1, pp. 1433 ff.
do not doubt, to the Government of the United States. But His Majesty's Government are very doubtful, on past experience, whether the Soviet Government would be likely to associate themselves with the sponsorship of a proposal in regard to which they had not been previously consulted.

5. In this connexion Lord Halifax is instructed to enquire:

(a) Whether the United States Government have had any reaction from the Soviet Government to the advance communication which they are understood to have made in Moscow in regard to the tripartite statement;

(b) Whether the Secretary of State would consider enquiring of the Soviet Government, through the United States Ambassador at Moscow, if the Soviet Government would co-operate in bringing the proposals made in the tripartite statement before the United Nations.

6. In regard to the constitution and composition of the Commission, His Majesty's Government assume that the Commission would be initially appointed by the General Assembly, but the question will remain as to the precise working of the Commission and the particular organ of the United Nations to which it should report. One possibility would be that the Commission should make its recommendations to the Assembly so long as it was dealing with the first two stages of its work, as defined in paragraph 8 of the tripartite statement, but that, at the stage when it came to deal with the control and supervision of Atomic Energy to prevent its misuse as a weapon of war, it should report to the Security Council in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter. As regards the composition of the Commission this would, no doubt, be influenced by the discussion in the Assembly, but His Majesty's Government would like to reach an understanding in advance with the United States Government.

7. His Majesty's Government would be grateful for the views of the United States Government as a matter of urgency on the foregoing points, and on any other matters that, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, may be held to affect the general question here discussed.

WASHINGTON, November 29, 1945.

811.2423/11-3045

The Canadian Ambassador (Pearson) to the Secretary of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Canadian Ambassador is instructed to transmit to the Secretary of State the views of the Canadian Government, and to enquire

27 For text of the United Nations Charter, see Department of State Treaty Series No. 988; or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031.
Mr. Byrnes’ views, on the procedure for bringing before the United Nations Organization the proposals made in the statement on atomic energy signed in Washington on November 15th to set up a “Commission under the United Nations Organization to prepare recommendations for submission to the Organization”.

With regard to the method whereby the proposal for the establishment of a special Commission should be brought before the United Nations Organization, the Canadian Government is in full agreement with the view that the matter should be considered by the General Assembly. The exact means whereby it is placed on the agenda of the General Assembly is relatively unimportant. It would perhaps be appropriate for the parties to the Washington discussions jointly to propose its inclusion in the agenda, preferably after the Preparatory Commission has closed its session and before the date for the opening of the General Assembly. If, however, the matter is raised in the Preparatory Commission joint action could be taken by the delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada to sponsor a resolution adding the question to the provisional agenda for the General Assembly.

It has been suggested that the Government of the U.S.S.R. might be approached with a view to securing their sponsorship for the tripartite proposals. This would seem unlikely to bring any fruitful results. Past experience indicates that the Soviet Government would be unlikely to associate themselves in sponsoring a statement about which they were not consulted and might also complicate the whole procedure by insisting at this stage that the subject was one which should properly be considered by the Security Council. It would, therefore, seem best that the three governments directly concerned should reach agreement between themselves on the course to be followed. They might then inform the Soviet Government, privately in advance, of the action which they propose to take without inviting comment from the Soviet Government. If this is done, it would be well to consider whether similar notification should be addressed to the Governments of France and China.

The desirable composition of the special Commission is difficult to determine. Perhaps the easiest course to pursue would be to suggest that it should be composed of representatives of the governments serving on the first Security Council. It is, however, essential that Canada as one of the sponsors for the establishment of the Commission should be assured of representation on it, whether or not Canada is elected to one of the non-permanent seats on the Security Council. The Commission is likely to continue in existence for a considerable period and it would not be desirable that its membership
should change automatically as a result of new elections to the Security Council. There might be included in it, initially at any rate, representatives of the five states with permanent membership, together with representatives of Canada, at least one Latin American country and at least one smaller European country. A wide degree of overlapping with the membership of the Security Council would be some assurance against conflicts over questions of jurisdiction within the United Nations Organization.

The terms of reference set forth in paragraph 7 of the Washington declaration cover matters falling within the scope of both the General Assembly and the Security Council. It might be that some of the proposals made by the Commission would require consideration by the Economic and Social Council and the collaboration of some of the specialized agencies to be brought into relationship with the United Nations, such as the Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. The most satisfactory course may prove to be the submission of reports by the Commission to either or both of the General Assembly and the Security Council. Matters falling directly within the competence of the Security Council under Articles 24 and 26 of the Charter could be the subject of recommendations from the Commission to the Security Council alone if necessary. Quite apart from the specific allocation of functions included in the Charter (whereby some of the recommendations of the Commission would properly be for consideration by the Assembly), it is most unlikely that agreement could be secured among the members of the United Nations for concentrating wholly in the Security Council responsibility for dealing with the problems raised by the development of atomic fission.

It will be necessary to decide in advance on a suitable designation for the proposed special Commission. Under the Washington declaration the functions of the Commission would not be limited to questions of the use or misuse of atomic energy. They would include the bringing forward of proposals for the elimination from national armaments "of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction" and also for the exchange between all nations of "basic scientific information for peaceful ends". While the Commission might be generally known by the short title of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, the designation given to it in the resolution to be placed before the General Assembly should clearly indicate its broader functions.

Mr. Pearson will be glad to hold himself in readiness to discuss these matters further with Mr. Byrnes at the Secretary's convenience.

[WASHINGTON,] November 30, 1945.
The Chairman of the Combined Development Trust (Groves) to the Chairman of the Combined Policy Committee (Patterson)

WASHINGTON, December 2, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Under the tripartite agreement, the United Kingdom and the United States were given, subject to certain limitations, a first refusal on all uranium mined in the Belgian Congo for a ten-year period following the completion of the contract for 3,440,000 pounds between the Combined Development Trust and African Metals Corporation of September 25, 1944. Deliveries under this contract have been proceeding satisfactorily and it is probable that they will be completed by March 1946.

To insure future supplies of uranium for the ten-year period, we have been negotiating for the past six months with the Belgians for the purchase of large quantities of uranium oxide to be mined at the Shinkolobwe Mine in the Belgian Congo. These negotiations have now been completed and two contracts were signed by the Combined Development Trust and African Metals Corporation on October 27, 1945.

The first contract involves the purchase by the Trust of all the uranium oxide content in high grade ore which can be produced from the mining operations down to the 150 meter level to a maximum of twenty million pounds of oxide and the Trust has been granted options with respect to the oxide contained in the lower grade ores down to that level. As in the earlier contract, African Metals retained the ownership of the radium and the precious metals contained in the ore and these will be returned to African Metals in the form of sludges after processing for the extraction of uranium. Initial deliveries of the ores will be made at Lobito or Matadi. Present information indicates that deliveries of the twenty million pounds will be completed by 1949.

The second contract is for the purchase of all the oxide which can be economically mined at Shinkolobwe within the ten-year period of the tripartite agreement and after the completion of the contract for twenty million pounds. The terms and conditions of this contract are the same as under the contract for twenty million pounds. Present estimates of the possible quantities involved in the second contract are about forty million pounds.

Because of the length of time involved, the Belgians insisted upon the protection of the purchase price by a gold clause. The British

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38 See footnote 32, p. 13.
39 Neither printed.
Government agreed to a gold clause with respect to the portion of the cost payable by them and in lieu of a gold clause on the American share, it has been agreed that a premium of fifteen per cent would be paid on the American share. This fifteen per cent increase will be discontinued if the American Government becomes authorized by legislation to agree to a gold clause. The price for uranium oxide under both contracts and subject to the adjustments noted above, will be $1.90 per pound for oxide contained in the high grade ores, and for the oxide contained in the lower grade ores the price varies from $1.85 per pound in the case of ores having a content of less than twenty-five per cent but not less than five per cent to fifty cents per pound in the case of ores having a content of less than one and one-half per cent.

Respectfully submitted,

L. R. Groves
Major General, U.S.A.

S/AB Files: Telegram

The British Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kerr) to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) ⁵⁰

[Moscow,] December 3, 1945.

1. Perhaps it might be useful if I were to try to describe present state of mind in Moscow as we see it here, towards the Atomic Bomb in general which may well govern the Russians’ approach to the question and misshape their judgment.

2. For this purpose I should probably reach back a longish way in order to draw in a little of the psychological background of the people upon whose minds the bomb exploded last August. For years they have been toiling after something like security for their country, their system and their own bodies. Nearly all of those who now govern Russia and mould opinion have led hunted lives since their early manhood when they were chased from pillar to post by the Tsarist police. Then came the immense and dangerous gamble of the Revolution followed by the perils and the ups and downs of intervention and civil war. Independence and even ostracism may have brought some passing relief to their country but not to the survival of their system or to their bodies whose safety remained as precarious as ever. Witness the prolonged and internecine struggle that came after

⁵⁰ Copy transmitted to the Department under cover of a note from the British Chargé (Balfour), dated December 6, which stated that this document was forwarded at the suggestion of Mr. Bevin, who felt it might be of interest to Mr. Byrnes in view of the forthcoming meeting in Moscow.
the death of Lenin and the years of the purges when their system was wobbling and no one of them knew today whether he would be alive tomorrow. Admission to the League of Nations which synchronised with the turning of the economic corner may have given some slight respite. But this was fugitive and it may be said that through all these years they trembled for the safety of their country and their system as they trembled for their own. Meanwhile, they worked feverishly and by means of a kind of terror till they dragooned an idle and slipshod people without regard for its suffering into building up a machine that might promise the kind of security they rightly felt they needed. The German invasion caught them still unready and swept them to what looked like the brink of defeat. Then came the turn of the tide and with it first the hope and then a growing belief that the immense benison of national security was at last within their reach. As the Red Army moved westwards belief became confidence and the final defeat of Germany made confidence conviction.

3. There was a great exaltation. Russia could be made safe at last. She could put her house in order and more than this from behind her matchless three hundred divisions she could stretch out her hand and take most of what she needed and perhaps more. It was an exquisite moment, all the more so because this resounding success under their guidance justified at last their faith in the permanence of their system.

4. I have reviewed all this in order to recall to you the uncommon, and at times almost unbearable, tension that has strained these people’s lives (it explains perhaps some of their abnormalities); and has hung over the whole history of the movement they have led, and in order also to suggest the measure of relief that must have come to them with the end of Nazism it would be hard to over-estimate.

5. Then plump came the Atomic Bomb. At a blow the balance which had now seemed set and steady was rudely shaken. Russia was balked by the west when everything seemed to be within her grasp. The three hundred divisions were shorn of much of their value. About all this the Kremlin was silent but such was the common talk of the people. But their disappointment was tempered by the belief inspired by such echoes of foreign press as were allowed to reach them that their Western comrades in arms would surely share the bomb with them. That some such expectation as this was shared by the Kremlin became evident in due course. But as time went on and no move came from the West, disappointment turned into irritation and, when the bomb seemed to them to become an instru-
ment of policy, into spleen. It was clear that the West did not trust them. This seemed to justify and it quickened all their old suspicions. It was a humiliation also and the thought of this stirred up memories of the past. We may assume that all these emotions were fully shared by the Kremlin. (Molotov’s speech of the 6th of November and the disturbing absence of any reply to the advance notice of Washington statement 31).

6. If my interpretation of the state of mind of the Russians is anything like right we may I think expect them to approach the proposal to discuss Atomic Energy in the first instance in the open forum of the General Assembly with all the prickliness of which they are capable.

7. We cannot indeed rule out the possibility of a refusal to discuss it at all. It seems to me therefore that if we are to secure the Russians’ cooperation we must go about things in a different way. I mean that before the Assembly gathers we and the Americans must have preliminary and private talks with Molotov who though unlikely in any circumstances to be willing to sponsor the Washington statements, might then be persuaded to treat the whole matter with goodwill and reason. It would not be enough to approach him through the diplomatic channel.

SCI Files

The Chairman of the Combined Development Trust (Groves) to the Chairman of the Combined Policy Committee (Patterson)

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1945.

My Dear Mr. Chairman: The following conclusions have just been drawn from the investigations by the Combined Development Trust of the world’s resources of uranium and thorium:

1. From present knowledge, it appears that the Trust group of nations controls 97% of the world’s uranium output from presently producing countries.

2. Of the large tonnage deposits which while of lower grade are capable of early commercial development, the British Empire controls 60%, i.e., those of the Union of South Africa. The other 40% is in Sweden.

3. Looking ahead ten years or more to large tonnage low grade deposits which might be developed if no consideration is given to costs, the Trust group of nations controls 35%, i.e., those of the United States of America and India. The remaining 65% is divided between Russia and the Argentine.

\(^{n}\) Reference is to the Tripartite Agreed Declaration of November 15; see bracketed note, p. 75.
4. According to our present knowledge, it would appear that the
only countries, outside of the Trust areas, having resources and in-
dustrial power which might challenge the dominant position of the
Trust group of nations in the near future are Russia and possibly
Sweden. Russian resources of raw materials are far inferior to those
of the Trust group of nations and in all probability these could not be
made available unless costs of production are completely disregarded.

Looking ten years or more ahead, the Argentine and Brazil might
possibly come into this class although this would mean a scale of in-
dustrial and technical development which does not now seem at all
probable.

5. Geological deductions would suggest that the discovery of de-
posits of uranium is not improbable in certain unexplored areas of
the world such as China, Manchuria and Portuguese West Africa.
However, even if such discoveries are made, having regard to indus-
trial and technical capacity, it is not believed that these countries are
likely to be able to challenge the position of the Trust group of nations
in the foreseeable future.

6. With regard to thorium, the Trust group of nations controls
about 65% of the world supply in India and Brazil.

7. The above opinions are based on the assumption that 100 tons
of uranium and thorium are a practicable minimum working stock
for an atomic energy project. We consider this a sound assumption
under present knowledge.

8. There is no possibility of acquiring one hundred per cent com-
mercial and political control of the world’s resources of uranium and
thorium.

9. We would like to emphasize that all above figures are rough ap-
proximations intended to show the general order of magnitude. They
represent the present picture integrating a number of factors which
are constantly changing. This picture will become more definite as
information becomes more fixed.

10. The above information is of the highest order of secrecy which
should be preserved not only from other countries but from citizens
of the United States (Trust group of nations) who might be tempted
to profit by the information.

A summary of work in progress, pending and recommended is
attached.\footnote{Not printed.}

Respectfully submitted,

L. R. Groves,
Major General, U.S.A.
Minutes of a Meeting of the Combined Policy Committee

[Extracts]

[WASHINGTON,] December 4, 1945.

Present:

Members: The Secretary of State (in the Chair)
The Secretary of War
The Rt. Hon. Earl of Halifax
Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson
Dr. Vannevar Bush

By Invitation: The Canadian Ambassador, Mr. L. B. Pearson
(representing the Hon. C. D. Howe)
Mr. George L. Harrison
Mr. George Bateman

Joint Secretaries: Major General L. R. Groves
Mr. Roger Makins

V. Cooperation Between the Three Governments.

The Committee had before them two documents:

(a) Memorandum by President and Prime Ministers of Great Britain and Canada.$^{36}$

(b) Memorandum addressed to the Chairman of the Committee and signed by General Groves and Sir John Anderson.$^{35}$

(a) Procedure: Judge Patterson explained that during the visit of Mr. Attlee and Sir John Anderson there had been insufficient time to prepare a formal document to take the place of the Quebec Agreement. The present document was intended to constitute heads of an agreement for discussion and consideration, and had been worked out between General Groves and Sir John Anderson. It was in the nature of a preliminary working paper. Lord Halifax understood the memorandum to constitute general guidance to the Combined Policy Committee as to the way in which paragraph 3 of the memorandum signed by the President and the Prime Ministers should be implemented.

Judge Patterson said that it was important to note that this document would take the place of the Quebec Agreement, the provisions of which would be completely superseded, including paragraph 4 concerning the use of atomic energy for commercial and industrial purposes.

$^{34}$ At this meeting, the nomination of Mr. Bateman as Canadian Joint Secretary was approved.

$^{35}$ Dated November 16, p. 75.
GENERAL GROVES said that the memorandum was not exhaustive and there were one or two other questions which might have to be included in the final document.

On the proposal of LORD HALIFAX a Sub-Committee was then appointed consisting of General Groves, Mr. Makins and Mr. Pearson or Mr. Bateman, (designation to be made later by Mr. Pearson) to draw up a document for submission to the main Committee.

Discussion followed as regards the nature of the agreement to be drawn up, and it was suggested that it should be an executive agreement in the form of a memorandum for signature.

The Committee:— instructed the Sub-Committee to prepare a memorandum accordingly in the form of an executive agreement.

VI. Combined Development Trust.

GENERAL GROVES, Chairman of the Trust then made a report to the Committee on the following matters:

(a) He asked the Committee to take note of a trend towards the nationalisation of uranium throughout the world.

(b) World Survey Report: A letter addressed to the Chairman of the Committee by the Chairman of the Trust was read drawing attention to the conclusions of a recent survey of the world resources of uranium and thorium undertaken by the Combined Development Trust. (Copy of this letter is attached as Tab J.J.)

Attention was drawn to paragraph 3 of this letter regarding the low grade deposits in the Soviet Union and the Argentine. It was pointed out that it would require a revolution in extraction technique to develop these deposits.

In reply to a question, GENERAL GROVES said that the policy of the Trust was to extract and bring under the control of the Trust high-grade deposits at the earliest possible moment. For example, it was hoped that the Belgian Congo deposits would be worked out at the end of ten years. In reply to a further question, GENERAL GROVES said that there was no evidence of any high-grade deposits in the Soviet Union.

The Committee:— took note of the letter from the Chairman of the Trust and of the points made in the discussion.

(c) Contracts with African metals:

The Committee:— took note of a letter addressed to the Chairman of the Committee by the Chairman of the Trust reporting the conclusion of two further contracts for the supply of uranium between the Trust and African Metals Corporation.

GENERAL GROVES explained that the African Metals had insisted on the protection of the purchase price by a gold clause. Under the

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28 Supra.
27 Dated December 2, p. 81.
existing law of the United States this could not be agreed to by the United States negotiators. It had, therefore, been provided that, as far as the United Kingdom share of the cost of the uranium was concerned, a gold clause would apply, and a premium of 15% would be paid on the American share. It had been stated in an exchange of letters between the senior United Kingdom and United States members of the Trust \(^{35}\) that, although under this arrangement the amounts ultimately paid by the United States Government and the United Kingdom Government could differ, the Governments were in fact undertaking equal obligations under the contracts with African Metals and that the spirit of Article 3(1) and Article 6 of the Trust Agreement was therefore met.

The Committee:— Took note and formally approved this understanding.

\(d\) Travancore: General Groves reported that negotiations by the United Kingdom authorities with the State of Travancore concerning deposits of monazite sands in the States were continuing. Meanwhile, the mining of these sands had been stopped and full control had been secured over the export of monazite and its derivatives.

\(e\) Portugal: General Groves reported that the Trust was continuing its operations in Portugal, with the object of securing complete control of the uranium deposits in that country. These deposits were of sufficient size to permit a country which secured control of them to engage in extensive experimental work.

\(f\) Brazil: General Groves referred to the agreement which had been made in July 1945 between the United States and Brazilian Governments and the subsequent arrangements between the United States and the United Kingdom Governments for the control of monazite sand and its derivatives in Brazil. The time had now come to make some purchases of material from Brazil under this agreement and the matter was being pursued with the advice and assistance of the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. William Clayton.

The Committee:— Took note of this statement.

\(g\) Purchase of stock piles in the United States and United Kingdom: General Groves reported that there were certain stocks of thorium, mostly in the United States, which it was desirable should come under control of the Trust. It had been decided that each Government would take steps to secure this control in its own territory, and the Manhattan District was taking the necessary action in the United States of America.

VII. Policy in regard to the control of raw materials.

General Groves said that the policy of the Trust was to try and secure exclusive control of all deposits and supplies of raw materials

\(^{35}\) Not printed.
wherever they might be situated. He pointed out that there had been a considerable change in the membership of the Combined Policy Committee and asked that this policy be again stated by the Committee. JUDGE PATTERSON said he saw no alternative to re-affirming this policy, at least until some arrangement of a wider character could be reached and adequate assurance from other powers could be obtained. LORD HALIFAX, DR. BUSH and MR. BYRNES agreed.

The Committee:— Approved the policy of the Combined Development Trust as stated by its Chairman.

VIII. Combined Intelligence Section.

The Committee:— Took note of a letter to the Chairman from General Groves setting out the functions of the Combined Intelligence Section.

IX. Tripartite Declaration.

MR. PEARSON enquired whether the procedure for the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission under the United Nations Organisation would be discussed in the Committee.

MR. BYRNES said that there had already been an exchange of views between the Department of State and the British and Canadian Embassies on this subject, and he contemplated that for the time being the matter should continue to be handled through diplomatic channels.

X. Documents of the Committee.

MR. MAKINS said that the minutes and memoranda of the Combined Policy Committee were treated as Top Secret documents. There were two master copies of the proceedings and documents of the Committee; one for the United States Joint Secretary and the other for the United Kingdom Joint Secretary. These were kept in the War Department.

Mr. Byrnes directed that these documents should continue to be kept in the War Department.

The Committee then adjourned.

L. R. GROVES
Major General, U.S.A.
Rogers MAKINS

811.2423/11-2945

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)
AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Secretary of State has the honor to acknowledge the aide-mémoire dated November 29, 1945 from the British Ambassador con-

59 Not printed.
cerning the procedure for bringing before the United Nations Orga-
nization the proposal, made in the Agreed Declaration of November
15 on atomic energy, to set up a “Commission under the United Na-
tions Organization to prepare recommendations for submission to
the Organization.”

2. The Government of the United States is pleased to note that the
views of the British Government with respect to the establishment
of the proposed Commission accord in general with those of the United
States. This Government believes, however, that it would be unwise
to attempt to establish in definite form its position on the organiza-
tion of the Commission prior to discussion of the subject with the
Soviet Government.

3. This Government is in full accord with the view that it is desira-
able to discourage the Preparatory Commission from embarking on a
detailed discussion of the proposed Commission. The United States
Delegate to the Preparatory Commission has been so informed and
has been instructed to take this matter up with his British and
Canadian colleagues.

4. This Government has received only a simple acknowledgement
from the Soviet Government in reply to the Secretary of State’s
message communicating the text of the Agreed Declaration. A copy
of this acknowledgement is enclosed.\textsuperscript{40}

5. The Government of the United States believes that it would be
highly desirable to have the Soviet Government associate itself with,
or at least concur in, any proposal which may be made to the Gen-
eral Assembly. In reply to Lord Halifax’s query as to whether this
Government would consider approaching the Soviet Government with
a view to obtaining the cooperation of the latter in submitting to the
United Nations the proposal for a Commission, the Secretary of State
is pleased to state that this Government plans to discuss this question
promptly with the Soviet Government. It will be prepared to cover
in this discussion both the method of proposing the Commission and
the nature of the Commission’s authority.

6. The Government of the United States believes that consideration
should also be given to possible discussions with the Governments of
France and China. As the British Government is aware, the Secretary
of State transmitted the text of the Agreed Declaration to the Foreign
Ministers of France and China. No reply has yet been received from
the French Government, but one has been received from the Chinese
Government, a copy of which is enclosed.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{40} Not printed.

\textsuperscript{41} The Chinese reply in the form of a note, dated November 21, from the Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs, Wang Shih Chieh, expressed sympathy with the aims
contained in the Agreed Declaration of November 15.
7. The Government of the United States is grateful for the views of the British Government with respect to the establishment of the proposed Commission under the United Nations Organization, and desires to discuss this matter further with the Government of the United Kingdom in the very near future.

WASHINGTON, December 5, 1945.

811.2422/11-3045

The Secretary of State to the Canadian Ambassador (Pearson)

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Secretary of State has the honor to acknowledge receipt of the Canadian Ambassador’s Aide-Mémoire 42 concerning the procedure for bringing before the United Nations Organization the proposal, made in the Agreed Declaration of November 15 on atomic energy, to set up a “Commission under the United Nations Organization to prepare recommendations for submission to the Organization”.

2. The views of the Government of the United States with respect to the proposed Commission are in general accord with those expressed by the Canadian Government. In particular, this Government believes that Canada should be given representation on the proposed Commission. This Government believes, however, that it would be unwise to attempt to establish in definite form its position on the organization of the Commission prior to discussion of the subject with the Soviet Government.

3. It is the opinion of this Government that it would be desirable to discourage the Preparatory Commission from undertaking a detailed discussion of the proposed Commission. The United States Delegate to the Preparatory Commission has been so informed and has been instructed to take up the matter with his Canadian and British colleagues.

4. The Secretary of State finds it impossible to concur in the view expressed by the Canadian Government with respect to approaching the Soviet Government. This Government considers that it is essential, both for the successful establishment of the proposed Commission and for its effective functioning, that its composition and terms of reference be acceptable to the Soviet Government. For this reason, the Government of the United States plans to take up promptly with the Soviet Government the question of the establishment of the proposed Commission with a view to obtaining its cooperation in submitting a proposal to the United Nations Organization or at least its concurrence in such a proposal.

42 Dated November 30, p. 78.
5. As the Canadian Ambassador is aware, the Secretary of State transmitted directly to the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, France, and China, the text of the Agreed Declaration prior to its publication. The replies of the Soviet and Chinese Governments are enclosed for the information of the Canadian Government. No reply has yet been received from the French Government.

6. The United States Government believes that further consideration should be given to possible discussions with the Governments of France and China prior to the meeting of the General Assembly.

7. The Government of the United States is grateful for the views of the Canadian Government with respect to the establishment of the proposed Commission under the United Nations Organization, and desires to discuss this matter further with the Canadian Government in the very near future.

WASHINGTON, December 5, 1945.

Lot 55D 540 Box 266

Memorandum by an Informal Interdepartmental Committee

[WASHINGTON, December 10, 1945.]

Draft Proposals on Atomic Energy for Submission to Soviet Government

It is the earnest desire of the United States to collaborate with other nations for the purpose of developing with the greatest practicable speed international measures to prevent the use for destructive purposes of atomic energy and other means of mass destruction, and to promote the use of atomic energy and other scientific advances for the benefit of mankind.

The President of the United States announced on October 3, 1945, that, in furtherance of this purpose, it was the intention of this Government to hold conversations with the other Governments associated with it in the development and use of atomic energy, and subsequently with other governments. The first step having been taken, it is now desired, as the next step, to hold exploratory conversations with the

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"Not printed.
"See footnote 41, p. 90.
"For an account of the interdepartmental working group which drafted these proposals and of the policy committee which considered them and recommended them to the Secretary of State, see The New World, 1939/1946, pp. 471-472. The policy committee met in the office of Benjamin V. Cohen, Counselor of the Department of State, and its other members were Adm. William H. P. Blandy, Drs. Bush and Pasvolsky, and Messrs. Harrison and Bohlen.

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Soviet Government in regard to this matter which is of such vital importance to the peace and well-being of the peoples of the world.

As the Soviet Government is aware, the Governments of Great Britain, Canada and the United States believe that a commission should be established under the United Nations Organization to study the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and other related matters and to make recommendations for submission to the Organization. It is the hope of this Government that the Soviet Government will join in the sponsorship of a proposal to this effect at the first meeting of the United Nations in January, 1946. A draft embodying the present views of the Government of the United States as to the method of establishing the commission is submitted herewith.\footnote{For a later version of this document, see p. 665.} It is the desire of this Government to have a full exchange of views on this draft and to learn whether the Soviet Government will join in a proposal along these lines.

It is the belief of this Government that the substantive problem presents very difficult questions; in consequence agreed international action is likely to be exceedingly complex and must be based upon careful and earnest study.

The problem appears to this Government to consist of a number of separate although related segments. These segments include (1) the ever-widening exchange of scientists and scientific information; and scientific techniques and materials, (2) the development and exchange of knowledge concerning natural resources, (3) the exchange of technological and engineering information, (4) safeguards against and controls of methods of mass destruction. It is the belief of this Government that successful international action with respect to any phase of the problem is not necessarily a prerequisite for undertaking affirmative action with respect to other phases. Affirmative action should be taken whenever it is likely to be fruitful.

This Government believes that mutually advantageous international action might well be undertaken promptly with respect to the first segment listed above—the exchange of scientists and scientific data. This Government attaches great importance to the development of effective collaboration in all fields of science.

The other segments present very troublesome questions which require for their solution the devising of effective, reciprocal and enforceable safeguards acceptable to all nations. The United States Government does not purport to have the solution to these questions, but it is eager
and willing to work with the Soviet Union and other nations toward the establishment, as rapidly as possible, of mutually acceptable arrangements for full collaboration in these areas. To this end the United States Government will be glad to consider such proposals as the Soviet Government may wish to make in respect to any phase of these problems and to discuss them with the Soviet Government both in the United Nations Commission and separately.

[Annex]

PROPOSED RECOMMENDATION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT BY THE UNITED NATIONS OF A COMMISSION TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE DISCOVERY OF ATOMIC ENERGY AND OTHER RELATED MATTERS

I. Establishment of the Commission

The Commission should be established by the General Assembly which is the only body, under the terms of the Charter, possessing the authority to examine the entire problem of atomic energy.

II. Reports of the Commission

The reports of the Commission should be made to the General Assembly for transmission to the members of the United Nations, the Security Council, and the Economic and Social Council. The General Assembly should also request action of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council on those aspects of the reports which require action, and which fall within the respective jurisdiction of those bodies.

III. Composition of the Commission

The Commission should be composed of one representative each of those nations represented on the Security Council, and Canada when that nation is not a member of the Security Council. Each representative on the Commission should have such assistants as he may desire.

IV. Rules of Procedure

The Commission should establish its own rules of procedure. It should choose its own officers, and have whatever staff may be deemed necessary.

V. Terms of Reference of the Commission

The Commission should proceed with the utmost dispatch and inquire into all phases of the problems, including the following matters, and make such recommendations from time to time with respect to them as it finds feasible: (1) wide exchange of scientists and basic scientific information for peaceful ends, (2) further measures to
facilitate and promote the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and the controls necessary to limit its use to such purposes, (3) the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all other weapons capable of mass destruction, and (4) effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means for those nations complying with the recommendations of the Commission.

The Commission should not infringe upon the responsibility of any organ of the United Nations, but should present recommendations for the consideration of those organs in the performance of their tasks under the terms of the United Nations Charter.

[Sub annex]

Draft of U.S. Proposals on Exchange of Scientists and Scientific Data

A. Exchange of Scientists, Scientific Information

1. The exchange of scientific information, scientists and students between all nations for peaceful purposes should be encouraged and extended to the end that each nation may fully benefit by the scientific progress made by others.

2. In furtherance of this objective the following steps should be taken:

a. A Declaration of Principles regarding Scientific Freedom should be adopted, to which all nations should subscribe and which should be based on the following policies:

1. Each nation should agree to invite visits of foreign scientists freely to its laboratories where basic scientific research is carried on, as may be arranged by the participating governments or by the scientists themselves, and with no artificial barriers applicable to foreigners that do not apply to its own nationals; to encourage and assist its own scientists to travel freely for such purposes; and to further the exchange of students for the same purposes.

2. Each nation should agree to encourage its scientists to publish freely and to give the widest dissemination to the results of their work.

b. In implementation of the Declaration of Principles outlined above, there should be within the framework of the United Nations an International scientific agency charged with the responsibility of fostering full cooperation among nations in the exchange of scientists and scientific information. In carrying out this responsibility the scientific agency should encourage the dissemination of fundamental scientific information in all fields including the field of atomic fission, further the exchange of scientists and students and make arrangements for the calling of International Science Congresses.
B. Exchange of Isotopes

An international exchange of certain radio active isotopes which are useful for scientific and medical research should be initiated. This exchange might well be carried on through the medium of the central agency for the international exchange of scientific information outlined in the preceding proposal. It should be coordinated with the measures outlined in (A) in such a way as to make such exchange of isotopes of maximum usefulness.

The Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 11 December 1945.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have just seen for the first time the paper 44c which is proposed as a basis for your forthcoming conversations with the U. S. S. R. concerning the proposal for the creation of an Atomic Energy Commission within the United Nations Organization.

I feel most strongly that the proposed basis of discussion goes too far. I believe that there should be no discussion of proposals as to the specific kinds and types of information in this field to be made available by this country to other Nations until a procedure for the exchange of such information has been worked out that will guarantee genuine reciprocity in such exchanges.

Specifically I recommend that the basis of discussion in the forthcoming conversations be confined to that indicated in the enclosed revision of the proposed paper.44d This revision, you will note, deals

44c Memorandum of December 10, p. 92.
44d Enclosure not printed; Secretary Forrestal’s alternative draft included the following changes:

The final sentence of the second paragraph (p. 92) was revised to read: “... conversations with the Soviet Government with respect to methods of promoting international cooperation in this field.”

The third paragraph was revised to read: “As the Soviet Government is aware, the governments of Great Britain, Canada and the United States believe that a commission should be established under the United Nations to study the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and other related matters, and to make recommendations for submission to the Organization. It is expected that a proposal to this effect will be presented at the first meeting of the United Nations in January, 1946. There is attached to this connection as Annex I a draft incorporating the present views of the United States with respect to the establishment of the proposed commission. This Government proposes this draft as a basis for discussion and is desirous of ascertaining whether the Soviet Government will associate itself with a proposal along these lines.”

The remaining paragraphs were to be omitted.

The annex to the proposed paper was to be the same as that proposed by the informal interdepartmental committee (ante, p. 94), except that item (2) of section V was changed to read “the necessary measures to facilitate...” and item (4) to read “effective safeguards for those nations complying with the recommendations of the Commission.”
wholly with the establishment of the proposed Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations Organization in connection with the plan announced by President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee in their recent declaration.

Sincerely yours,

James Forrestal

Lot 55D 668, Box 2380

Memorandum by the Secretary of War (Patterson) to the Secretary of State


For your information I am sending you a copy of a memorandum from General Groves on certain questions in which I know your mission to Moscow is interested.

I approve of paragraphs 1a and b. No comment by me is necessary on paragraph 1c or paragraph 2 which merely reflect General Groves' views.

Robert P. Patterson

[Enclosure]


Memorandum for the Secretary of War:

1. In accordance with your instructions I give below my views on the steps which should be taken with respect to our domestic situation insofar as it affects the Moscow negotiations. If these meet with your approval, the United States representatives for the scheduled atomic energy discussions in Moscow should be informed.

a. Scientific information which can safely be made public should be released as soon as practicable. The possible amount of this information is so great that it cannot all be released at once but the process of release will extend over the next year or so. It includes information on medical research and other scientific matters not related to bomb production. A large amount of other information is vital to the national security and must not be released. Still other material is doubtful and will have to be carefully screened. I am momentarily expecting recommendations from my committee of scientists which has been reviewing this question.

b. Arrangements should be made as soon as practicable for the distribution of certain isotopes of value for peacetime research in medicine and other sciences. Possible isotopes among others might be radio-sodium, radio-phosphorus, long life radio-carbon, radio-iron and radio-calcium. This step would not endanger the national security by appreciably hastening bomb production in any other country. While such isotopes can be made in minute quantities in cyclotrons they can be made in real quantity as by-products of our operations. No isotopes of real value in further research for
bomb production should be released. There will be a considerable
time lag involved in making the arrangements for proper distribu-
tion to qualified scientists in this country which must be done before
any distribution can be made to foreign governments or nationals.

c. The visits of foreign scientists to this country would have to be
carefully supervised to prevent them from gaining appreciable in-
formation applicable to wartime uses of atomic energy. Furthermore, I know of no way of ensuring that American scientists
traveling in Russia will not disclose vital information.

2. I hope that the negotiators will not go beyond the first step out-
lined in the Joint Declaration of November 15, 1945. Specifically I
hope they will not at this time discuss the raw material situation as
covered in Paragraph 8 of the Declaration.

L. R. Groves
Major General, USA

[For documentation concerning atomic energy prior to and during
the Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers which took place in
Moscow, December 16–26, 1945, see pages 560 ff.]

500.CC (PC)/12–2845: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United
Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1945—9 p. m.

11149. Reference Copre 680.45 Please request British Government
to take necessary steps to have formation of an Atomic Energy Com-
mission placed on the agenda of GA by January 4 as a proposal
sponsored by the United Kingdom, Russia, the United States and
Canada, and also by China and France if their concurrence in this
procedure is obtained by the British Government. Inform Steven-
son 46 of this action.

For your information an invitation has been extended by us in
accordance with the Moscow Agreement 47 to the other permanent
members of the Security Council, France and China, together with
Canada to join in assuming the initiative in sponsoring the proposed
resolution at the first session of the General Assembly.

Acheson

45 Reference is to telegram 13830, December 28, 1945, from London, which
inquired concerning the possibility of including atomic energy on the General
Assembly agenda (500.CC (PC)/12–2845). Copre was the designation for
telegrams from the United States delegation to the United Nations Preparatory
Commission, meeting in London.

46 Adlai E. Stevenson, Acting United States Representative, United Nations
Preparatory Commission.

47 See Section VII of the Communiqué on the Moscow Conference of the Three
Foreign Ministers, December 27, 1945, transmitted to the Department in telegram
4284, December 27, 3 a. m., from Moscow, pp. 815, 822.