

THURSDAY, JULY 19, 1945

MEETING OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THURSDAY,
JULY 19, 1945, 10 A. M.¹

PRESENT

Fleet Admiral Leahy	Brigadier General Lincoln
General of the Army Marshall	Brigadier General Esposito
Fleet Admiral King	Captain McDill
General of the Army Arnold	Captain Stroop
General Somervell	Captain Oster
Lieutenant General Hull	Colonel Peck
Vice Admiral Cooke	Colonel Dean
Rear Admiral Flanigan	Colonel Donnelly
Major General Gross	Colonel Stone
Major General Deane	Colonel Riggs
Major General Norstad	Colonel Cary
Brigadier General Cabell	Lieutenant Colonel Woodward
Brigadier General Jamison	

Secretariat

Brigadier General McFarland Captain Moore

J. C. S. Files

Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes

[Extract]

TOP SECRET

8. INFORMATION FOR THE RUSSIANS CONCERNING THE JAPANESE WAR
(C. C. S. 884, 884/1 and 884/2²)

GENERAL HULL said that it was the desire of the British that information be given to the Russians on a combined basis. This had not been the policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Combined Intelligence Committee had prepared an intelligence report on the Japanese situation which had been presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff³ and the Joint Intelligence Committee had prepared a report which might be given to the Russians.⁴ He said that he did not believe that

¹ J. C. S. 198th Meeting.

² Documents Nos. 609, 611, and 614, respectively, printed in vol. I.

³ Not printed as a whole. See *ante*, p. 36, footnote 5.

⁴ Not printed. Cf. *post*, p. 352.

the British would agree to giving the Russians the Combined Intelligence Committee report, but he thought the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be willing to give the report of the Joint Intelligence Committee to the Russians.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he thought the British were more concerned in regard to intelligence that might be given the Russians on special projects than in regard to operational intelligence.

GENERAL DEANE said that he believed that the British had two motives in presenting their views: first, to share in the operational running of the war, and second, to exchange information with the Russians on a *quid pro quo* basis.

He said that he believed that we should give the Russians operational intelligence without reference to the British. He agreed to a certain extent in the exchange of intelligence with the Russians on a *quid pro quo* basis, but it had been the policy of the Military Mission to Moscow to go further than that and to provide the Russians with information they needed to win the war. He felt that Russian security was entirely adequate and that they would not disclose information furnished them. It was his view that the only relations that the British would have with the Russians in connection with the war in the Far East was in the exchange of intelligence, whereas our interest was operational and much greater than that of the British.

ADMIRAL KING said that he had noted that the British paper on the subject (C. C. S. 884/2) was written before yesterday's meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and he felt that their motive at that time was to take an equal part with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the operational strategy of the war against Japan. He thought there should be a delimitation between operational intelligence and general intelligence; that we should give the Russians directly such operational intelligence as we considered necessary and that general intelligence should be furnished the Russians on a common basis which would mean a continuation of the present arrangement.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to discuss this subject with the British Chiefs of Staff.

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SECOND MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS, THURSDAY,
JULY 19, 1945, 11 A. M.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Secretary Byrnes
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Harriman
Mr. Cohen
Mr. Page
Mr. Thompson¹

UNITED KINGDOM

Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sir William Strang
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr

SOVIET UNION

Foreign Commissar
Molotov
Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Gusev
Mr. Novikov

Truman Papers

Thompson Minutes

TOP SECRET

MR. EDEN in the Chair stated his understanding that the Agenda for today included—

- (1) German political questions, on which there was a revised draft;
- (2) Poland; and
- (3) German Economic Problems.

MR. EDEN stated that before consideration of the agenda, he understood that Mr. Byrnes had a point to make on the paper concerning the Council of Foreign Ministers.²

MR. MOLOTOV at this point asked whether he could add to the agenda.

RECONSIDERATION OF PAPER ON COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

MR. BYRNES stated that he wished to move reconsideration of the language of the paper on the Council of Foreign Ministers. He referred to the members charged with duties under section 3 and specifically to the language restricting membership to governments signatory to the terms of surrender. He pointed out that some governments were at war but were not signatory to the armistice terms and asked that the drafting committee on this subject be instructed to reconcile points of view on this phase of the matter.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether paragraph 3 was referred to and stated that it was not quite clear to him what question was involved.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that France, for example, was at war with Italy but was not signatory to the armistice terms³ and asked

¹ Thompson's presence is assumed from his authorship of the minutes.

² Document No. 712, *post*.

³ France signed neither the armistice with Italy concluded at Fairfield Camp, Sicily, September 3, 1943, nor the instrument of surrender signed at Malta, September 29, 1943. For texts, see *Treaties and Other International Acts* Series No. 1604; 61 Stat. (3) 2740, 2742.

whether she would be permitted to participate in discussions regarding Italy.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he believed that she would.

MR. BYRNES stated that under the present language of this paper he did not believe that a state in such a situation could participate.

MR. MOLOTOV asked whether the change would provide only for Italy.

MR. BYRNES replied that if Russia, for example, were at war with a country but was not a signatory to the armistice terms, Russia should not be excluded.

MR. MOLOTOV then asked specifically whether France should take part in the formulation of the peace treaty with Rumania.

MR. BYRNES stated his belief that if France were not at war with any country she would be present during any discussions but would not necessarily participate in the decisions.

MR. MOLOTOV then moved that Mr. Byrnes' motion be accepted.

MR. EDEN stated general agreement and asked Mr. Molotov what subjects he wished to add to the agenda.

GERMAN FLEET AND MERCHANT MARINE

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he had a draft on the German fleet and merchant marine which he wished his colleagues to study. He stated that the draft would be ready in 10-15 minutes.⁴

CONSIDERATION OF THE AGENDA

MR. EDEN then brought the meeting back to the agenda and stated that the drafting committee on German political questions had a revised draft ready for presentation. He asked Mr. [Sir William] Strang to present it.

MR. STRANG explained in some detail various changes made by the drafting committee in the text of this paper. (See Attachment 1⁵)

In paragraph 1 [2] (i) the word "demilitarization" was added after the word "disarmament" in order to bring this section in line with the declaration issued in Berlin on June 5.⁶ Subparagraph (a) immediately after subparagraph (i) was altered to accord with EAC recommendations.⁷ Subparagraph (b) was altered by the deletion of the word "seize" and the substitution of the phrase "held at the disposal of the Allies", since most seizures had already been made.

⁴ Document No. 1007, *post*.

⁵ Document No. 856, *post* (not attached, but clearly identified).

⁶ Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1520; 60 Stat. (2) 1649. Text also in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XII, p. 1051.

⁷ See the accompaniment to document No. 1038, *post*, section I, paragraph 1.

MR. MOLOTOV then thanked the drafting committee for its work, and was followed by MR. EDEN and MR. BYRNES.

MR. BYRNES moved that the text be approved and this was agreed to.

POLAND

MR. EDEN stated that the next item on the agenda was Poland. He added that the Prime Minister during the meeting on July 18 had promised to produce the text of a possible proposal.⁸

MR. EDEN stated gratitude to the Generalissimo for his understanding of British difficulties even though their purposes were the same.

The British Delegation had produced the text of a draft proposal and had attempted a Russian translation, which was only in manuscript form. This proposal⁹ was delivered to the delegates and there was an interim period for consideration of it during which MR. MOLOTOV distributed copies of the Russian proposal.¹⁰

After a brief period MR. EDEN again called the meeting to order.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that the Russian Delegation had no objection to the first paragraph of the proposal. There was, however, some question about paragraph 2. The title [*paragraph?*] began "The British and U. S. Governments express their willingness." This was not considered urgent enough and some expression of the need for immediacy was needed.

MR. EDEN stated that he wished to say that a telegram had come giving information on this subject. The British have done more than the Prime Minister was able to indicate during the July 18 session of the Heads of Governments.¹¹ The British Government had taken under control the whole machinery of the former Polish Government, which was being liquidated rapidly. A Treasury committee has assumed full control of all Polish finances. All Polish ministries have been closed and diplomatic privileges have been withdrawn. All properties except the Polish Embassy have been taken by the British Government and all work not connected with the liquidation of the former Polish Government has been stopped. All recruiting for Polish armed forces has been stopped and the War Office is now supervising the activities of the Polish General Staff. Polish ships are under charter to the United Kingdom, which desires to discuss this question with the Warsaw government. Much has been done and is being done.

⁸ See *ante*, p. 93.

⁹ Document No. 1121, *post*.

¹⁰ Presumably document No. 1120, *post*.

¹¹ See *ante*, pp. 91-93.

MR. MOLOTOV then pointed out that since there is no representative of Poland here, it is impossible for the Soviet Delegation to speak for them. The principal question is to prevent the London Government from transferring assets and properties to private persons.

MR. EDEN stated that he was able to give absolute assurances on this point.

MR. MOLOTOV then pointed out that the law governing these matters was recent and that many transfers might have taken place in the past.

MR. EDEN replied that British action had been taken from the moment that recognition was accorded to the Warsaw government. The British Government is now awaiting the arrival of a representative of the Polish Provisional Government in London in order that immediate discussions can begin.

MR. MOLOTOV again raised the question of immediacy.

MR. EDEN replied that discussions could not be begun with persons who are absent.

MR. MOLOTOV then stated that he only wanted a statement stressing immediacy.

MR. EDEN expressed the belief that such statement could be made and MR. BYRNES agreed.

MR. BYRNES then mentioned the fact that an attempt had been made to transfer the Polish Embassy property in Washington but that this had been stopped and the Embassy had been vacated and was now at the disposal of the Warsaw Government.

MR. MOLOTOV then raised the matter of stocks, assets, and property and asked whether the sentence from the Russian proposal forbidding such transfers¹² could be used.

MR. EDEN replied that he would consider a phrase noting that steps had been taken.

MR. MOLOTOV then questioned practice in other countries, specifically mentioning Norway.

MR. EDEN then agreed that a drafting committee might be appointed in order to try to find words which would meet Mr. Molotov's wishes and asked whether there were any other points in the draft to which the Soviet Delegation took exception.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired concerning the debts of the London Polish Government and asked for an indication of the totals.

MR. BYRNES replied that he was unable to give a definite answer on this point and pointed out that the statement in paragraph 2 con-

¹² See document No. 1120, *post*, the last sentence of paragraph 1.

cerning discussions which would take place on these matters apparently met Mr. Molotov's point.

MR. EDEN noted that the draft paper only suggests that discussions embrace this question and does not ask the Polish Provisional Government to accept a liability in advance.

MR. BYRNES suggested that the matter be referred to a committee to reconcile differences in language, and MR. MOLOTOV agreed.

MR. EDEN felt that the meeting should hear more about remaining points first.

MR. MOLOTOV then stated that the last words in paragraph 3 regarding the assurance of a livelihood carried an implication which no country could guarantee.

MR. EDEN suggested the words "personal freedom and security."

MR. MOLOTOV suggested the inclusion of the words "without discrimination."

MR. MOLOTOV then asked whether the Crimea text¹³ could not be used in the last paragraph and suggested that this point and other differences be left to the drafting committee.

MR. BYRNES and MR. EDEN agreed.

MR. BYRNES appointed Mr. Harriman and Mr. Bohlen to serve on the drafting committee.

MR. EDEN appointed Ambassador Clark Kerr and Mr. Allen.

MR. MOLOTOV appointed Mr. Vyshinski and Mr. Golunski.

MR. EDEN asked whether it was possible that a draft would be ready for the meeting this afternoon.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he would prefer to have the question discussed on July 20 since the matter should not be hurried.

MR. BYRNES then suggested that an effort be made to get a draft today, but if this was not possible it be held over until tomorrow.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed.

GERMAN ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

MR. EDEN stated that the next item on the agenda was the consideration of German economic problems but that he understood that the drafting committee had no report ready since it had not been possible to meet yesterday. Therefore, neither this meeting nor the meeting of the Heads of States could consider this question today.

MR. EDEN then suggested consideration of an agenda for the meeting of the Heads of States.

MR. MOLOTOV asked that other matters be discussed first. These included the disposition of the German fleet and merchant marine,

¹³ See document No. 1417, *post*, section vi.

and Spain. A Russian proposal on Spain was distributed at this point. (See attachment 2 ¹⁴).

MR. EDEN inquired concerning the disposition of these two matters.

MR. BYRNES stated that he saw no reason why these two subjects should not be put on the agenda for discussion today by the Heads of States.

MR. EDEN stated that it was impossible for him to discuss the German fleet without consultation with naval authorities, who were not now present.

MR. BYRNES reiterated his belief that both questions should be discussed by the Heads of States. He also suggested that the President's paper on the implementation of the Yalta agreement ¹⁵ come up for consideration this afternoon.

MR. EDEN remarked that the President's paper dealt only with the Balkans and asked for permission to add two items on the British agenda. These are: one paper on Yugoslavia ¹⁶ and one on Rumania.¹⁷

MR. BYRNES agreed that these questions should be added and if not reached on the agenda today should go over until tomorrow.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he had no objection.

AGENDA FOR MEETING OF HEADS OF STATES

MR. EDEN then recapitulated the items agreed upon for discussion by the Heads of States on the afternoon of July 19. These were:

1. Agreed text on political control of Germany;
2. Poland;
3. The German fleet and merchant marine;
4. Spain;
5. Implementation of the Yalta Declaration;
6. Yugoslavia;
7. Rumania.

MR. MOLOTOV asked whether there were any drafts available on items 6 and 7.

MR. EDEN promised them by this afternoon.

MR. EDEN, after asking whether there was anything else to come before the meeting, then declared the meeting adjourned.

¹⁴ Document No. 1177, *post* (not attached but clearly identified).

¹⁵ Document No. 745, *post*.

¹⁶ Document No. 1202, *post*.

¹⁷ Document No. 837, *post*.

Truman Papers

*United States Delegation Memorandum*¹SUMMARY OF MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS THURSDAY MORNING,
JULY 19

I. AGENDA OF MEETING OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS

It was agreed that the following subjects should be recommended to the Heads of Governments for discussion this afternoon:

1. *Authority of the Control Council for Germany in Political Questions.*²

The redraft of the U. S. proposal³ on this subject drawn up by the subcommittee named yesterday was approved by the Foreign Ministers and is ready for discussion by the Heads of Governments.

2. *Polish Question.*

A British paper on this subject was referred to a subcommittee for drafting changes. If the subcommittee is able to report by four o'clock, this question will be ready for discussion by the Heads of Governments this afternoon; otherwise, it will be held over until tomorrow.⁴

3. *Disposition of German Fleet and Merchant Ships.*

A Russian paper on this subject has been presented for discussion.⁵

4. *Spain.*

A Russian paper proposing a policy to be adopted by the three Governments toward the Franco regime has been presented for discussion.⁶

5. *Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe and Satellite States.*

The paper on this subject presented by the President at the opening meeting of the Conference is recommended for discussion.⁷

6. *Yugoslavia.*

The British will raise the question of the implementation of the Yalta declaration on Yugoslavia and hope to have a paper ready on this subject.

¹ Authorship not indicated. Apparently this summary was before Truman during the Third Plenary Meeting.

² Manuscript notation in the margin by Truman: "agreed to".

³ For the documents referred to in this summary, see the footnotes to the Thompson minutes, *supra*.

⁴ Manuscript notation in the margin by Truman: "Tomorrow".

⁵ Manuscript notation in the margin by Truman: "For future disposition".

⁶ Manuscript notation at the end of the paragraph by Truman: "Postpone".

⁷ Manuscript notation at the end of the paragraph by Truman: "Postponed".

7. British and U. S. Oil Interests in Rumania.

The British will raise this question and hope to have a paper ready for presentation.

II. COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

The Foreign Ministers agreed that the document establishing a Council of Foreign Ministers, which was approved by the Heads of Governments yesterday, should be reconsidered and paragraph 3 thereof should be revised in such a way as to permit any member of the Council at war with a given state to participate in the peace settlement concerning that state, even if it was not a signatory of the armistice terms concluded with that state. It was understood that if a member of the Council was not at war with a given state, it might participate in the *discussions* of the peace settlement concerning that state but would not participate in the *decisions* connected with that peace settlement.

740.00119 Potsdam/7-1945

*Rapporteur's Report*¹

PLENARY MEETING, 19TH JULY 1945

REPORT BY MR. EDEN ON THE MEETING OF THE FOREIGN
SECRETARIES ON JULY 19TH

(1) The United States Secretary of State informed the meeting that the United States Government desired to propose an amendment to the redraft, adopted by the Foreign Secretaries meeting on July 18th, of paragraph 3 of the United States draft proposal for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers.² The meeting agreed to refer this point to a drafting committee.

(2) *Germany. Political questions.*

The Foreign Secretaries have given further consideration to the political section of the proposed agreement on the Political and Economic Principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period circulated by the United States Delegation. Preliminary consideration was given to this draft by the Heads of Governments at their meeting yesterday and the Foreign Secretaries were asked to submit a report on this draft at the present meeting.

¹ Eden acted as *Rapporteur* for this meeting.

² For the documents referred to in this report but not separately cited, see the footnotes to the Thompson minutes, *ante*, pp. 101-106.

The Foreign Secretaries now submit a revised draft (Flag A) ³ of the political section of the proposed agreement, which is already in the hands of Delegations.

In addition to clarifying the draftmanship of the text, the Foreign Secretaries have supplemented it in a few places with new material. They now recommend it for acceptance by the Heads of Governments.

When the economic section has been discussed and agreed upon, it will be for consideration whether the whole agreement should be made public.

(3) *Poland.*

The United Kingdom Delegation put forward a redraft of the draft "Statement of the Heads of the Three Governments on the Polish Question" put forward by Marshal Stalin at the Plenary Meeting on July 18th.

The meeting agreed to refer this redraft to a drafting committee.

AGENDA FOR THE PLENARY MEETING

The meeting agreed to submit the following points for discussion at the Plenary Meeting this afternoon:

(a) *Germany: political questions.*

(b) *Poland.*

This item to be on the agenda if the report of the drafting committee is ready in time.

(c) *The German Navy and Merchant Marine.*

A memorandum by the Russian Delegation has been circulated.

(d) *Spain.*

A memorandum by the Russian Delegation has been circulated.

(e) *The Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe.*

A memorandum of July 17th on this subject by the United States delegation has been circulated.

(f) *Yugoslavia.*

The British Delegation proposed discussion of the situation in Yugoslavia and the fulfilment of the Tito-Šubašić Agreement ⁴ and undertook to submit a paper on the subject.

(g) *Rumania.*

The British Delegation proposed discussion of the question of the removal as booty of Allied industrial equipment, especially in Rumania, and undertook to submit a paper on the subject.

³ Presumably document No. 856, *post*.

⁴ Text in *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 251-254.

FIRST MEETING OF THE ECONOMIC SUBCOMMITTEE, THURSDAY,
JULY 19, 1945, 11 A. M.¹

PRESENT²

UNITED STATES

Mr. Clayton
Mr. Murphy

UNITED KINGDOM

Mr. Turner

SOVIET UNION

Mr. Maisky

Frankfurt USPOLAD Files—500 Potsdam Conference

*Memorandum by the Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy)*³

POTSDAM, July 19, 1945.

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Subcommittee of Experts on Economics.

This committee agreed to proceed informally. The scope of its discussion was limited to a statement of principles and it is expected to report back items on which the members do not agree.

MR. MAISKY led off by inquiring what was meant by decentralization. MR. CLAYTON explained that this related to the breaking up of trust cartels and monopolies, while MR. TURNER stated that it meant the elimination of a tight central control of industry and commerce. The following definition of decentralization was agreed upon: "The German economy shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified by cartels, syndicates, trusts, and other monopolistic arrangements."

*Item No. 10.*⁴ MR. MAISKY said he had no quarrel with this principle.

Item No. 11 (a). MR. MAISKY inquired what is meant by relief of liberated areas.

Item No. 11 (b). MR. TURNER inquired whether we were talking about the Germany included in the 1937 frontiers. At this point MR. MAISKY made no comment.

With respect to the minimum subsistence standard in Germany, a formula was suggested under which it would be essential to maintain in Germany the average standards of living which would not exceed the average living standards in the European countries (European countries excluding the U. K. and U. S. S. R.).

¹ Time of meeting from the heading cited in footnote 1 to document No. 858, *post*.

² With respect to the usual representation on this subcommittee, see *post*, p. 942.

³ Printed from the ribbon copy, which is unsigned. Murphy's memorandum on the meeting of the Economic Subcommittee on July 20 (*post*, p. 141) is a continuation of this memorandum.

⁴ These items refer to the numbered paragraphs of document No. 852, *post*.

Item No. 11 (c). MR. TURNER pointed out that [*sic*] the desire to produce a balanced economy throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports. MR. MAISKY said we will consider this point.

Item No. 11 (d). No grant of credit shall be permitted except with the approval of the Control Council.

Item No. 12. The principles (and proposals)—this was added language by Pauley, here agreed.

New Item No. 12 (a). This was submitted for consideration.

Item No. 13. To the effect that Germany was to be treated as an economic unit. Agreed.

Item No. 13 (1). MR. TURNER submitted a re-draft.⁵

⁵ Not found.

STIMSON-CHERWELL CONVERSATION, THURSDAY,
JULY 19, 1945, NOON

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM
Mr. Stimson	Lord Cherwell
Mr. Bundy	

EDITOR'S NOTE.—No official record of the substance of this conversation has been found. Stimson's diary entry for July 19 contains the following summary: "At twelve o'clock Lord Cherwell called, and he and Bundy and I sat out under the trees and talked over S-1. He was very reasonable on the subject of notification to the Russians, feeling about as doubtful as we. He reported Churchill as being much pleased with our luncheon together last Monday [*Tuesday*]¹ and much cheered by the talk."

¹ See *ante*, p. 47.

STIMSON-ALEXANDER CONVERSATION, THURSDAY, JULY 19, 1945,
EARLY AFTERNOON

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM
Mr. Stimson	Field Marshal Alexander
Mr. McCloy	Field Marshal Wilson

EDITOR'S NOTE.—No official minutes of this conversation have been found, but Wilson reported upon it later in the day to the Combined

Chiefs of Staff (see *post*, page 115). Stimson's diary entry for July 19 contains the following summary:

"After lunch at two o'clock Field Marshal Alexander and Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson came in. The main subject of their call was the appointment of Colonel James H. Douglas to be the American member of the Italian Control Commission. There had been delay and some complications about it and Alexander reported that there had been news reports which had been embarrassing to the present incumbent, Admiral Stone. He thereupon proposed a solution by suggesting that Douglas come out on a visit of inspection preparatory to assuming the duties of the office, and invited him to stay with him. Then he would take office later in September. This was agreed to and the telegrams were drawn up and sent.¹ I talked over with Alexander his campaigns in Italy and complimented him on their success which seemed to please him. It is the first time I had met him personally, he having been absent when I visited both Africa and Italy. We talked over the episodes of Tito and de Gaulle in their incursions into Italy."

¹ See document No. 1113, *post*.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, THURSDAY, JULY 19, 1945, 2:30 P. M.¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

General of the Army Marshall
Fleet Admiral King
General of the Army Arnold
General Somervell
Lieutenant General Hull
Vice Admiral Cooke
Major General Norstad
Captain Oster
Captain McDill

UNITED KINGDOM

Field Marshal Brooke
Marshal of the Royal Air
Force Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Wilson
General Ismay
Major-General Laycock
Major-General Hollis

Secretariat

Brigadier General McFarland
Captain Moore

Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
Lieutenant-Colonel Haddon

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

TOP SECRET

1. APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES OF THE C. C. S. 195TH MEETING, 18 JULY 1945

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Approved the conclusions of the C. C. S. 195th Meeting subject to the following amendments:²

¹ C. C. S. 196th Meeting.

² These amendments have been made in the minutes of the 195th Meeting as printed *ante*, pp. 83-86.

(1) Change item 4 *a.* to read:

"Agreed in principle that that part of the present Southwest Pacific Area lying south of the boundary proposed in paragraph 2 of C. C. S. 852/1, should pass from United States to British command as soon as possible."

(2) Change item 5 *e.* to read as follows:

"In the event the U. S. S. R. enters the war against Japan, the strategy to be pursued should be discussed between the parties concerned."

b. Approved the detailed report of the meeting subject to later minor amendments.

2. PARTICIPATION OF TWO FRENCH COLONIAL INFANTRY DIVISIONS
IN FAR EASTERN OPERATIONS
(C. C. S. 895, 895/1, and 895/2 ³)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the reply to the Chief of the French Military Mission in the United States in the Enclosure to C. C. S. 895/2.

3. COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF MACHINERY AFTER THE WAR WITH
JAPAN
(C. C. S. 891 and 891/1 ⁴)

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had considered the memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 891/1. The British Chiefs of Staff were prepared to discuss the matter or to take note of the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff as the latter desired.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were not in a position to discuss at this date the post-war relationship between the respective military staffs.

ADMIRAL KING said that the second paragraph of C. C. S. 891/1 was meant to refer to the procedure envisaged in the changed conclusion under 5 *e.* of the minutes of the Combined Chiefs of Staff 195th Meeting.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note of C. C. S. 891 and 891/1.

4. INFORMATION FOR THE RUSSIANS CONCERNING THE JAPANESE WAR
(C. C. S. 884, 884/1, and 884/2 ⁵)

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff felt that it was desirable that the policy adopted in imparting information con-

³ Documents Nos. 1288, 1290, and 1291, *post*, respectively.

⁴ Document No. 550, printed in vol. 1, and document No. 1197, *post*, respectively.

⁵ Documents Nos. 609, 611, and 614, respectively, printed in vol. 1.

cerning the Japanese war to the Russians should be coordinated with the policy of the United States Chiefs of Staff.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had considered the matter raised in the memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff and had come to the following conclusion:—

a. The United States Chiefs of Staff desired to retain freedom of action regarding the passing of purely operational information and intelligence to the Russians.

b. On matters of information and intelligence which were not purely operational, the United States Chiefs of Staff would agree not to pass such information to the Russians without consulting the British Chiefs of Staff.

c. As regards information and intelligence from purely British sources, this would not be passed without permission of the British Chiefs of Staff.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that there was considerable technical information which had been developed by joint effort, and he asked whether this information would be handled the same as operational information.

ADMIRAL KING said that information on technical equipment was not included in purely operational information. Operational information or intelligence included information on such matters as weather and the composition and disposition of enemy forces. The technical information referred to by Sir Charles Portal would not, therefore, be handled under *a.* above.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it was the policy of the United States Chiefs of Staff to pass purely operational information and intelligence freely to the Russians and not to withhold it for bargaining purposes. If such information contributed to the efficiency of the Russian armies or aided in the prosecution of the war the United States Chiefs felt that it should be given to the Russians regardless of whether or not the Russians reciprocated.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that this policy would be agreeable to the British Chiefs of Staff as they felt that it would be better for the British and United States Chiefs of Staff to pursue the same policy in this matter since both countries have military missions in Moscow.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed:

a. Operational Information and Intelligence

That the U. S. and British Chiefs of Staff will pass to the Russians such operational information and intelligence regarding the theatres in which they are respectively responsible as either may wish and without bargaining.

b. Information and Intelligence Other than Operational

The United States and British Chiefs of Staff will consult together before passing to the Russians any information and intelligence other than operational. Neither party will pass to the Russians information or intelligence derived wholly or in part from the other party's sources without their consent.

5. PLANNING DATE FOR THE END OF ORGANIZED RESISTANCE BY
JAPAN
(C. C. S. 880/8⁶)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed that for the purpose of planning production and the allocation of manpower, the planning date for the end of organized resistance by Japan be 15 November 1946; that this date be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war.

6. APPOINTMENT OF COLONEL DOUGLAS TO ALLIED COMMISSION
IN ITALY

FIELD MARSHAL WILSON reported that he had attended that afternoon a meeting between the U. S. Secretary of War,⁷ the U. S. Assistant Secretary of War,⁸ and Field Marshal Alexander at which the appointment of Colonel Douglas as Chief Commissioner to the Allied Commission in Italy had been discussed.⁹

It was proposed at that meeting that Colonel Douglas should visit Italy for a month or so to examine the situation on the spot. He could then take over the appointment from Admiral Stone in September, when all Italian territory, excluding Venezia Giulia, would have been handed back to the Italian Government and a change in the status of the Control Commission to more of a civilian basis would take place.

This proposal had been accepted by the United States and British representatives present at the meeting, and subject to approval by Colonel Douglas which was being requested from Washington,¹⁰ it was decided to adopt the above suggestions provided the Department of State and the Foreign Office agreed.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note of Field Marshal Wilson's statement.

⁶ Document No. 602, printed in vol. 1.

⁷ Henry L. Stimson.

⁸ John J. McCloy.

⁹ See *ante*, p. 112.

¹⁰ Douglas subsequently declined the appointment referred to. See document No. 1114, *post*, footnote 2, and document No. 1116, *post*, footnote 2.

THIRD PLENARY MEETING, THURSDAY, JULY 19, 1945, 5 P. M.¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
President Truman	Prime Minister	Generalissimo Stalin
Secretary Byrnes	Churchill	Foreign Commissar
Fleet Admiral Leahy	Foreign Secretary Eden	Molotov
Mr. Davies	Mr. Attlee	Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Harriman	Sir Alexander Cadogan	Admiral of the Fleet
Mr. Pauley	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Kuznetsov
Mr. Dunn	Major Birse	Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Matthews		Mr. Gusev
Mr. Cohen		Mr. Sobolev
Mr. Bohlen		Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Thompson ²		

Truman Papers

Thompson Minutes

TOP SECRET

BULGARIAN-GREEK FRONTIER INCIDENT

MR. CHURCHILL said he wished to refer to a point which Stalin had raised at the previous meeting concerning an incident on the Bulgarian-Greek frontier. He had made inquiries. The British Government had heard of no fighting. These people did not like each other very much and he did not doubt but that there had been some sniping. There was no Greek field division in northern Greece, however. The British knew this, as they had their own people there. There were seven thousand Greek guards on the Albanian and Yugoslav frontiers. They were there for purposes of internal order. On the other side of the frontier there were 30 thousand Albanian, 30 thousand Yugoslav and 24 thousand Bulgarian troops. He only mentioned this because this Conference of the Great Powers should make clear that there should be no marauding attacks and that frontier questions should be settled by the peace conference. It should be indicated that those who try to violate frontiers are likely to prejudice their own claims.

THE PRESIDENT said he had never heard of this and that he did not hear it mentioned at the previous meeting. He agreed that frontier matters should be settled at the peace conference.

STALIN said there had been some misunderstanding. He had not raised this matter at the previous meeting but in a personal talk with Mr. Churchill.³ This did not affect the fact that this Conference

¹ This is the time given on the cover sheet of the Thompson minutes. The Log (*ante*, p. 15) indicates that the meeting was called to order at 4:05 p. m.

² Thompson's presence is assumed from his authorship of the minutes.

³ See Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 635.

could consider the matter and he might wish to raise the matter at a later date.

CHURCHILL agreed that it was not raised at the meeting, although it had been brought up at this table. He agreed with Mr. Stalin that it could be raised at the Conference.

THE PRESIDENT then proposed that Mr. Eden submit his report of the meeting of Foreign Ministers.⁴

MR. EDEN said that the United States Secretary of State said this morning that he wished to submit an amendment to the redraft of paragraph 3 of the document on the Council of Foreign Ministers.⁵ This had been referred to a drafting committee.

GERMAN POLITICAL QUESTION

The second point examined at their meeting was the German political question. The Foreign Ministers had considered the economic and political principles that were to guide the Control Council of Germany. Preliminary consideration had been given to this matter by the Heads of Government at a previous meeting.⁶ The Foreign Ministers were now submitting a redraft of the political section of the document on this question.⁷ In addition to redrafting, they had added some new material. They suggested that when the economic part had been agreed upon, they would consider it and refer it to the meeting of the Heads of Government.

The political section of the document was approved as revised.

POLAND

MR. EDEN said that the British had submitted a new draft⁸ to replace the paper submitted by the Soviet Delegation⁹ on the Polish question at the previous meeting. The Foreign Ministers had had a useful discussion on this subject and had submitted it to a drafting committee. They hoped to present it tomorrow.

CHURCHILL observed that when the drafting committee had finished its work, they would discuss it.

THE PRESIDENT and STALIN agreed.

MR. EDEN said that apart from the two subjects already mentioned, the Foreign Ministers proposed the following subjects as the agenda for the present meeting:

1. German Merchant and Naval Fleet.
2. Spain.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 108.

⁵ See *ante*, pp. 101-102, 108. Cf. documents Nos. 712 and 713, *post*.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 89-91.

⁷ See document No. 856, *post*.

⁸ Document No. 1121, *post*.

⁹ Document No. 1120, *post*.

MR. EDEN pointed out that the Russians had submitted a memorandum on this subject.¹⁰

3. The Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe.

MR. EDEN stated that the United States Delegation had circulated a memorandum on this subject.¹¹

4. Yugoslavia.

The United Kingdom had submitted a paper on this.¹²

5. Rumania.

EDEN said that the British had prepared a memorandum on the removal of oil equipment as trophies.¹³

EDEN commented that as the meeting of Heads of Government had finished their previous session at an early hour, a long list had been prepared for the present meeting.

DISPOSITION OF GERMAN MERCHANT AND NAVAL FLEET

THE PRESIDENT said that with respect to the first question, the disposition of the German fleet, the first thing to consider was, what is reparation and what is war booty. The merchant fleet was to be classified as reparations, as he thought it should; the matter would eventually have to be referred to the Reparations Commission. He said he was interested in the merchant fleet because the United States wanted it to operate under the present control in the Japanese war zone.

STALIN said that war material taken by armies in the course of a war is booty. Armies that laid down their arms and surrendered, turned in their arms and these arms were booty. The same thing applied to the navy. It was stipulated in the military proposals put forward by the Three Powers¹⁴ that the navy be surrendered. It was, therefore, booty. It was possible, however, to discuss the question whether the merchant fleet was booty or reparations. Regarding the navy, there was no question about the matter. He recalled the case of Italy in which both naval and merchant fleets had been treated as booty and no question had been raised.

MR. CHURCHILL said he did not want to approach this matter from the juridical standpoint.

THE PRESIDENT said he held the same view.

CHURCHILL said he wanted to reach an agreement on this matter between the three powers as a part of their general agreement at the Conference. In saying this, he was speaking only of the German war fleet. He said that they had the whole of the German merchant

¹⁰ Document No. 1177, *post*.

¹¹ Document No. 745, *post*.

¹² Document No. 1202, *post*.

¹³ Document No. 837, *post*.

¹⁴ This presumably refers to the terms of article 2 of the Declaration of June 5, 1945 (Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1520; 60 Stat. (2) 1649).

fleet in their keeping at the present time. Should a general agreement be reached at this Conference and a friendly settlement of their problems be achieved, he would not be opposed to a division of the German fleet. He felt that the question of the Italian fleet could better be discussed in connection with the settlement with Italy. He went on to observe, however, that replacement of losses was relevant to this matter. The British had had immense naval losses in the war. Speaking from memory, they had lost about 10 capital ships and aircraft carriers, 20 cruisers and literally hundreds of destroyers, submarines and various kinds of small crafts. The question of U-Boats stood on a somewhat different footing. These U-Boats had a limited legal use. The Germans had used them in contravention of the international agreements on this subject.¹⁵ As many of them as possible should in his opinion be destroyed. The latest German U-Boats, however, might contain valuable information for the future and that should be reasonably shared by the three Powers. He did not look at the matter solely from a naval point of view. He was aware of the tremendous sacrifices which the Russians had made in the field. He suggested that there should be no final discussion today but he thought that the bulk of the U-Boats should be sunk and the remainder shared equally. With respect to the other naval vessels he thought that they should be divided equally, provided a general agreement was achieved at the Conference and that they parted amicably from this meeting. He had no objection to the Soviet proposal that the German naval fleet be divided. He did not feel that a nation as great and mighty as Russia should be denied this. It should have its flag welcomed. As it took so long to build new vessels, these vessels would be a means of developing a Russian navy and training personnel and would facilitate showing the Russian flag on the ocean.

With respect to the German merchant fleet CHURCHILL said he felt that while the Japanese war continued, all captured ships should play their role to the full and contribute to the ending of that war. The limit of the conduct of the Japanese war was shipping. They had sufficient men, planes and naval ships but merchant ships were needed for the movement of men and materials. There was also the difficulty in feeding the British Isles and liberated Europe. Every ton was needed in this critical period. They had all placed all of their shipping in the shipping pool.¹⁶ He would be sorry if this German fleet was not used to conclude the war with Japan.

¹⁵ The only international agreement governing the conduct of submarines in wartime to which Germany was a party and which was in effect at the outbreak of World War II was the Treaty on Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament, signed at London, April 22, 1930 (Treaty Series No. 830; 46 Stat. (2) 2858).

¹⁶ Allied shipping was "pooled" and controlled through the operations of the United Maritime Authority and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Boards.

He pointed out that the Finns had had a merchant fleet of some 400 thousand tons which had passed into the hands of their Russian ally. Two Rumanian ships, from available troop ships, had also fallen into Russian hands. If the German fleet was to be divided by three, the Rumanian and Finnish fleet should also be divided.

STALIN interrupted to state that the Russians had not taken a single merchant ship from Finland and had taken only one ship from the Rumanians which was used for carrying wounded troops.

CHURCHILL replied that he was speaking of the basis of the question. He went on to say that there were others besides the three at this meeting. The Norwegians had suffered terrible losses. Their oil tanker fleet had been very valuable and it had been made use of freely. Other Powers not at the meeting had suffered heavy losses. Perhaps the German fleet should be divided into four and the fourth part might be used for the other Powers not represented at this meeting. He only threw out these suggestions which he thought should be considered.

THE PRESIDENT said he would be agreeable to a three-way division of the German merchant and naval fleets but he should like it to be done after the Japanese war. We needed these ships not only for the conduct of the war but also to haul food and supplies for rehabilitation of Europe, to our great ally, Russia, Greece, and others.

THE PRESIDENT said that we will need every bomb and every ton of food.

STALIN said what about the navy?

THE PRESIDENT said he was ready to dispose of them now. He added that when the Japanese war was over, the United States would have merchant and naval ships for sale but he did not want to upset our war against Japan now.

STALIN inquired, "Are not the Russians to wage war against Japan?"

THE PRESIDENT replied that when Russia was ready to fight Japan, she would be taken in the shipping pool the same as the others. He added that we wanted them in the pool.

STALIN said he was interested in the question of Principle.

CHURCHILL suggested that the vessels could be earmarked, if they had any ears when the Japanese war was over; if any were damaged they could be made good from our general resources. He said he must avow himself as a supporter of the request of Marshal Stalin that the Russians receive a share of these war and merchant vessels. The only alternative was the sinking of the naval vessels. This would be a harsh procedure, when one of our trusty allies has a desire for them.

THE PRESIDENT observed that they were not apart on this question.

STALIN inquired what sort of ships were meant. Was it merchant ships?

CHURCHILL replied that he referred to merchant ships.

STALIN said that of course it was not possible to depict the Russians as having the intention to interfere with the war against Japan and the matter could not be put in a way to imply that they were to receive a gift from the Allies. They were not after a gift.

CHURCHILL interrupted to state that he did not mention that.

THE PRESIDENT said that he had not either.

STALIN continued that he should like for the matter to be cleared up as to whether Russia was to have the right to claim one third of the German merchant and naval fleet and that what they would receive they would receive by their right; if his colleagues thought otherwise, they should say so.

THE PRESIDENT said he did not think otherwise.

STALIN said that if the principle were recognized, the Russians would be satisfied. With regard to the use to which the merchant fleet would be put, including the one third to be handed over to Russia, of course they would raise no obstacles to the use of their third in the war against Japan.

THE PRESIDENT said he had no objection to this proposal.

STALIN said then he agreed that this matter be settled at the end of the Conference as suggested by Mr. Churchill. There was one thing he should like to see accomplished, however. His people were not allowed to see the German fleet. The Russians had set up a Commission to deal with this question but they were not allowed to see the fleet nor were they even given a list of the vessels. Was it not possible to list them and to allow this Commission to inspect the ships and to find out what ones were there?

CHURCHILL replied that it was quite possible but the British would want reciprocal facilities to be given them to see German installations in the Baltic. He believed that the Russians had obtained 45 German U-Boats in Danzig. They could arrange an exchange.

STALIN observed that these submarines were out of use but said that they could agree to Mr. Churchill's request that the exchange of facilities be mutual.

CHURCHILL said that all they were asking for was fair play and equality.

THE PRESIDENT said that so far as the United States zone was concerned, the Russians were at liberty to see anything they wanted, only we would expect that this would be reciprocal.

CHURCHILL said he had made a distinction between U-Boats and other ships. He knew that Marshal Stalin would appreciate the

sensitiveness of an island power which grows only two-thirds or less of its own food. They had suffered much from the U-Boats and the submarine was not consequently a popular form of naval vessel in Great Britain. He strongly suggested that the bulk of them be sunk. Great Britain had very nearly perished from them twice. Those who live with a large population on a small island do not welcome any nations of the world extending their construction of submarines. His consent was conditioned on further discussion of how many are divided and how many are sunk, but he agreed that they be divided equally. In this war, German submarines had damaged them severely and had eaten up a large part of their war making capacity.

STALIN stated he was also in favor of sinking a large proportion of the U-Boats.

THE PRESIDENT then said he thought that was sufficient discussion on this subject.

THE SPANISH QUESTION

MR. EDEN said that the next question on the agenda was that of Spain.

STALIN said the Soviet proposals ¹⁷ had already been submitted and he had nothing to add.

CHURCHILL said that his Government had a strong distaste for General Franco and the government of his country. He had been misrepresented as having been friendly to this gentleman. All he had said was that there was more to Spanish policy than drawing rude cartoons of Franco. The taking out of jail prisoners who had been in jail for years and shooting them for what had happened long before indicated that Spain was not a democracy in accordance with British ideas on that subject. Therefore, when Franco had written him a letter proposing that he and Churchill organize the western states against that terrible country, Russia, he had, with the approval of the British Cabinet, sent him a chilly reply. Mr. Molotov would remember that he had sent him a copy of this reply and a reply [*copy?*] had also been sent to the President.¹⁸ British feeling was against the Franco regime.

STALIN stated that they had received the copy of the British reply.

¹⁷ Document No. 1177, *post*.

¹⁸ For a summary of the correspondence referred to, see *Stalin's Correspondence With Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman, 1941-45* (New York, 1958), vol. I, p. 395, note 80. This work is a reissue (including the original title pages and with the original pagination but bound in one volume) of the two volumes of *Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U. S. S. R. and the Presidents of the U. S. A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1944-1945* (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957; Ministry of Foreign Affairs publication). For a citation to the Russian-language edition of this work, see *ante*, p. xxix.

CHURCHILL said that he saw some difficulty in Stalin's proposal, particularly in the first paragraph concerning the breaking off of all relations with Franco Spain. It seemed to him that taking such a step in regard to a nation having a character like that of Spain, which was proud and touchy, might rally around Franco those elements now deserting him and making his position more precarious. The breaking of relations was not a satisfactory process. It would be a pleasure to do so but after that they would have no contact. Ambassadors were needed most of all in times of difficulty. If they took such action as this it would be a shock.

The result might strengthen Franco's position. He has an army although it was not very good. If this action resulted in strengthening him, it would be necessary to consider whether to take a rebuff or to intervene with force. He was against the use of force. He was against interfering with countries which had a different regime unless we are molested by them. In the countries which we control, we have, of course, set up democratic governments. Insofar as the liberated areas are concerned, we cannot allow a Fascist regime to be set up. With respect to the countries which have not taken part in this war, however, there should be no exchange of cannon fire. His Majesty's Government would have to give prolonged consideration to Stalin's proposals to break relations with Spain. He was prepared to take every measure by all proper diplomatic means to speed the departing guest.

The breaking of relations with a state because of its internal conduct of affairs was a dangerous principle. He added that he would greatly deplore anything which would lead Spain to civil war. Spain had suffered terribly from its civil war in which two million people had been killed. The British would be sorry to intervene as a government in an active manner in the Spanish affair at this juncture. Forces there were working for a change for the better.

He pointed out that the World Organization which had just been agreed upon at San Francisco had a provision against interference in domestic affairs.¹⁹ While they were preparing to ratify the charter drawn up at San Francisco, it would be inconsistent to resort to action which would be prohibited under it.

THE PRESIDENT said that he had no love for Franco. He had no desire to have any part in starting another civil war in Spain. There had been enough wars in Europe. He would be happy to recognize another government in Spain but he thought that Spain itself must settle that question.

¹⁹ i. e., article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter of the United Nations, signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945 (Treaty Series No. 993; 59 Stat. (2) 1031).

STALIN observed that this meant that everything would be unchanged in Spain. In his opinion, the regime of Franco was gaining strength. It was feeding semi-fascist regimes in other countries. Reference had been made to internal affairs. This was not an internal affair. The Spanish regime had been imposed on the Spanish people by Hitler and Mussolini whose regimes they were in the process of destroying. He believed that his colleagues had no love for Franco but this should be proved in deeds. He was not proposing military intervention nor that civil war be let loose, but he wished the Spanish people to know that the three Governments had taken a stand on the side of the democratic forces among the Spanish people and that the Spanish people should have ground to believe that they were against Franco. There was a diplomatic means of showing that they were against Franco and that they were for the democratic Spanish people. He said that suppose they assumed that the means of breaking relations was too severe. Was there not a more flexible means of letting the Spanish people know that the three Governments are in sympathy with the Spanish people and not with Franco. It was dangerous to let the Spanish regime remain as it was now. Public opinion in Europe and in America was not in sympathy with Franco and if the three Governments were to pass by in silence this cancer in Europe, it might be considered that they sanctioned Franco. That would be a grave charge.

CHURCHILL observed that the Soviet Union had no relations with Spain now.

STALIN replied that he had the right to raise and settle this question. Why should they be silent. People presumed that the Big Three could settle such a question and he was one of them just as Mr. Churchill was. Must they keep silent about what was going on in Spain, as well as to refrain from action against Spain which was giving shelter to Fascists? They could not shut their eyes to the grave danger of Franco Spain.

CHURCHILL said that individuals were not enjoined by governments from expressing opinions. Also the press, to which Marshal Stalin had referred, spoke very freely on this matter in the Soviet Union as did the British and sometimes the American press. His Majesty's Government had spoken very frequently to Franco and to his Ambassador.²⁰ They did not like, however, to break relations.

CHURCHILL referred also to the valuable trade relations which Britain maintained with Spain. Spain sent them many useful products and received British manufactured goods in return. This was an old and well established trade. Unless he were convinced that it would bring about the desired result, he did not want this trade stopped.

²⁰ The Duke of Alba.

He fully understood the feeling of Marshal Stalin. Franco had had the audacity to send a Spanish Blue Division to Russia. Russia was in a different position, having been molested. Insofar as the British were concerned in this war, they ^{27a} had refrained from taking action against the British at a time when such intervention could have been disastrous.

CHURCHILL continued that during the TORCH operation merely opening fire on the ships and Air Corps concentrated in the area of Gibraltar would have done them great harm.

STALIN interrupted to say that the Spaniards were afraid. They would have been doomed if they had dared to take such action.

CHURCHILL continued that they had not been specifically injured by the Spaniards. No one doubted that Marshal Stalin had no love for the Franco regime and he had no doubt that the majority of the English people shared this view. Churchill said he only intended to emphasize that the Russians had been injured in a way in which others had not.

STALIN said he thought that Great Britain had also suffered from Spain, which had provided bases on its shores for German submarines. He considered that all Allied Powers had suffered in this way. He did not wish, however, to look at the question from this point of view. What was important was the danger to Europe. This should be remembered. Some steps should be taken even if the breaking of diplomatic relations was too severe. They should say that they thought that the aspirations of the Spanish people were just. They had only to say this and nothing would be left of Franco. He considered that the Foreign Ministers should consider whether a milder statement could not be agreed upon.

THE PRESIDENT stated that he agreed.

CHURCHILL said he was opposed. The matter must be settled at the meeting of the Heads of Government.

STALIN pointed out that it would be settled by them. The Foreign Ministers would only give it preliminary study.

CHURCHILL said he did not think this was advisable. It was a question of principle. To interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries was very dangerous. He might not like some things in the United States, but he did not consider it wise to attempt to intervene.

STALIN said that this was not a question of a domestic affair. The regime of Franco was of external origin.

CHURCHILL rejoined to state that anyone could say this about any country.

STALIN replied that no other country in Europe had such a regime.

CHURCHILL observed that Portugal might be accused of being under a dictatorship.

^{20a} i. e., Spain.

STALIN replied that it was not the dictatorship that mattered. The regime in Portugal resulted from internal developments, whereas the regime of Franco resulted from intervention by Hitler and Mussolini. Franco's behavior was provocative. He gave shelter to Nazis.

CHURCHILL said he was not prepared that any government in which he participated should interfere in the internal affairs of other states. This has always been their policy. Moreover, to push things might make matters worse. He would be very glad, although he knew this idea would not be received with enthusiasm, if the regime were overthrown and replaced by a constitutional monarchy with free democratic principles, elections, etc. If, however, he or any British Government pushed this proposal, all would turn against it in Spain. No country likes to be told how it is to be run. There was intervention on both sides in the Spanish civil war. The Soviet Union intervened on one side and then Hitler and Mussolini came in on the other. But that was already long ago. Action taken at this meeting was more likely to rivet Franco in his place. The British Government did not give the slightest support to Franco Spain other than trade, which they have always carried on.

THE PRESIDENT stated that he would be happy to have the matter sent to the Foreign Ministers to see if agreement could not be reached.

STALIN said he also fully appreciated the British difficulties, but felt that this matter could be facilitated by action here. He proposed that they prepare an appraisal of the regime of Franco, including observations made by Mr. Churchill on the trend of developments in Spain. This would be one of the items in the declaration to be made on Europe. He assumed that they would have some sort of declaration on the results of their work. This statement on Spain should be included in them. It would not be binding on the British Government. It would be a short statement on the situation in Spain which would make clear to public opinion that their sympathies were with the Spanish people. This was a most mild form—milder than the Yalta Declaration on Yugoslavia²¹ and Greece.²² He suggested that they let the Foreign Ministers consider what form this declaration could take.

CHURCHILL replied that he had not agreed to any declaration on Spain and he gathered that the President had also not agreed.

STALIN said it was not a question of a declaration on Spain alone, but on all countries.

CHURCHILL said that the line he had taken was that in all countries

²¹ See document No. 1417, *post*, section vii.

²² There was no Yalta declaration on Greece, except insofar as that country was included within the terms of the Declaration on Liberated Europe. See document No. 1417, *post*, section v.

involved in this war that they should not interfere in their domestic affairs. This was a question of principle. There were many things in regard to Yugoslavia and Rumania which he did not like. They were involved in the war which gave us greater freedom there. He repeated that there was great danger in the intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries. If there were to be a declaration of the principles on which democratic governments were founded—he personally had always liked the statement in the American Constitution—and a statement on what governments had not fulfilled these principles, he could consider it, but he pointed out that many governments in Europe now do not fulfil these principles. He did not know what the Spanish people thought. There were many shades of opinion in Spain. Most of them would doubtless like to get rid of Franco without interference from outsiders.

THE PRESIDENT said there appeared to be no chance for agreement at the moment. He suggested that they pass on to something else upon which they could reach a decision and that they come back to the Spanish question at a later session.

STALIN suggested that it be referred to the Foreign Ministers to consider.

CHURCHILL said that this was the point on which they were not in agreement. He did not suggest an adverse decision but merely that they leave it for the moment.

THE PRESIDENT said that they could return to it at any time.

STALIN said that he agreed.

DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

THE PRESIDENT said that the document on this matter had been submitted at the first session.²³

STALIN suggested that discussion of this question be put off as the Soviet Delegation had another document on this question which they wished to submit.²⁴

This was agreed to.

YUGOSLAVIA

EDEN pointed out that the British Delegation had submitted a document on this question.²⁵

STALIN said that he thought they could not discuss this question without having the Yugoslavs present—at any rate they would be unable to achieve any results without them.

EDEN pointed out that they had agreed upon a declaration at Yalta²⁶ although no Yugoslavs were present.

²³ Document No. 745, *post*.

²⁴ Documents Nos. 804 and 1064, *post*.

²⁵ Document No. 1202, *post*.

²⁶ See document No. 1417, *post*, section VII.

STALIN replied that Yugoslavia was an Allied country and that it was not possible to settle this matter without the Yugoslavs. When they had met at Yalta there had been two Yugoslav governments which could not reach agreement. Now there was one legitimate government and he proposed that the representatives of that government be called in.

CHURCHILL inquired if he meant Tito or Šubašić.

STALIN said they could call in anyone.

CHURCHILL said, however, that the Yugoslavs were in extreme disagreement.

STALIN said this was the first time he had heard of it. He proposed that they verify this and let the Yugoslavs tell them all about it.

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether the Prime Minister's information was serious enough to warrant sending for the Yugoslav representatives.

CHURCHILL replied that it was a very serious matter and pointed out that at Yalta they had reached an agreement on this subject which had not been carried out; there had been no elections; the assembly (AVNOJ) has not been re-organized; juridical procedure has not been restored; Tito has imposed a strict party organization with police control and with the press almost as strictly controlled as in fascist countries. Yugoslavia has not in any way borne out the hope we had entertained at Yalta. We gave arms and support to Tito. We could not give much as we were heavily engaged but we gave all we could. He was very disappointed at the way things had turned out at the present time. The British proposal was a very modest one to restate what had been set at Yalta.

STALIN said that Mr. Churchill had passed to a discussion of the substance of the question but he had not answered whether he considered it worthwhile discussing the matter. If the President desired, he could make a statement on the substance of the question.

THE PRESIDENT asked him to do so.

STALIN said that the information given by Mr. Churchill in regard to the infringement of the Crimean decisions was unknown to us and does not agree with our information. Perhaps he is right; perhaps not, but he, Stalin, thought it would be useful to give the Yugoslavs a chance to reply to this accusation.

CHURCHILL pointed out that he had not made an accusation, but a complaint.

STALIN said I can agree to a discussion of the subject, but it is not possible to try the Yugoslav state without hearing its representatives.

CHURCHILL then stated that he had had time to think the matter over and that perhaps it would be useful to hear both sides—Tito and the other side separately. Perhaps they would be able to settle their

difficulties. He inquired if Stalin thought they would be willing to come.

STALIN said he did not know but they could inquire of the Yugoslavs.

THE PRESIDENT said that he was here as a representative of the United States to discuss world affairs. He did not wish to sit here as a court to settle matters which will eventually be settled by the United Nations Organization. If we do that, we shall become involved in trying to settle every political difficulty and will have to listen to a succession of representatives, de Gaulle, Franco, and others. He did not wish to waste time listening to complaints but wished to deal with the problems which the three Heads of Government had come here to settle. If they could not do that their time was wasted.

STALIN said that this was a correct observation.

CHURCHILL said he wished to observe with great respect that the United States was very interested in the carrying out of the Yalta agreement. Great allowances had to be made for Tito, in view of the recent end of the war and the great disturbances in that country. The British memorandum merely expressed the wish that there be carried out the decisions which were made at the Crimean Conference. The President's predecessor²⁷ had attached importance to this matter and, if I recall correctly, much of the drafting of this declaration had been done by the Americans.

THE PRESIDENT said he desired to see the Yalta declaration carried out. "Insofar as the United States is concerned, I intend to carry it out to the letter."

STALIN said that according to their information the Yalta agreement was being carried out.

THE PRESIDENT observed that complaints had also been received by his government. He thought that they could be passed on without the Yugoslavs.

CHURCHILL said that as the British paper had not met with support, he was prepared to withdraw it.

THE PRESIDENT suggested that it be postponed for a session or two.

CHURCHILL said that he wished to thank Stalin for his patience. If they could not settle their affairs here, where could they settle them?

STALIN replied that they could be settled here but that they should hear those who were concerned.

CHURCHILL said he was agreed but the President was opposed.

STALIN said that the matter must then be dropped for the time being.

²⁷ Franklin D. Roosevelt.

BRITISH AND AMERICAN OIL EQUIPMENT IN RUMANIA

CHURCHILL said that the British had submitted a paper on this subject²⁸ which they thought the Foreign Ministers could discuss and perhaps reach agreement. They would, in any event, benefit from the discussion between the Foreign Ministers. He observed that it was a rather detailed question.

STALIN said he thought this was a trifling matter which could be settled through diplomatic channels without raising it at this conference. Since it had been brought up, however, he wished to rectify one misstatement. No British property had been taken by the Soviet Union in Rumania. The property of some of these oil companies had been obtained in Germany. The Germans had captured it and had used it against the Allies. We removed some quantity of this type because the Germans destroyed our oil industry. He had no objection to the question being referred to the Foreign Ministers, but it would be better to handle it through the usual diplomatic channels in order not to trouble the conference.

CHURCHILL stated that this was not a trifling matter. It was true that the Germans had stolen their pipe, which they had obtained from Germany, but they had paid for it. The British view was that if this pipe which was taken by the Soviet Union was considered as reparations, Rumania should reimburse the British for it. He inquired whether it would be agreeable if the Soviet and British representatives here got together to settle the matter.

THE PRESIDENT observed that the United States was also interested. There was a similar situation with regard to the Standard Oil Company and the Shell Company. Why would it not be possible to let the Foreign Ministers discuss the matter.

This was agreed to.

Meeting adjourned.²⁹

²⁸ Document No. 837, *post*.

²⁹ At 4:55 p. m. See Log, *ante*, p.15.

Truman Papers

Cohen Notes

CHURCHILL: One point Marshal Stalin raised [was] that there was some trouble on the Greek-Albanian frontier. I made inquiries. We have heard of no fighting but people don't like one another very much and there is no [some?] sniping. There is no field division in northern Greece at all. There are many more troops on the borders in Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria than there are in Greece (citing certain figures). We should make it clear to small states we will not tolerate

marauding parties across frontiers and the frontiers will be settled by the Peace Conference.

TRUMAN: These are matters to be settled by the Peace Conference—not by direct action.

STALIN: I did not raise the question at this meeting but privately, and I will explain my views on other [*another?*] occasion.

EDEN: At the beginning of our meeting Secretary Byrnes said that he wanted to propose revision of [the document on] the Council for [*of*] Foreign Ministers and this was referred to the drafting committee.

The second point examined was the political principles for Germany. We submit a revised draft.

CHURCHILL: We agree to revised draft.

STALIN: I agree.

TRUMAN: It is accepted.

EDEN: The Polish question is next. We hope to have a draft ready for meeting tomorrow afternoon.

CHURCHILL: We are agreed that the Polish question shall be discussed as soon as drafting committee settles its work.

EDEN: Following additional items for the agenda today: (1) German Navy and merchant marine; (2) Spain (3) Yalta declaration on liberated Europe; (4) Yugoslavia; (5) Rumania (removal of industrial material as booty).

TRUMAN: First question is disposition of German fleet and marine[.] [There] must be decision as to what is war booty and war reparations, and if war booty then how we are to share the booty. I am interested in German fleet because I want that to continue under present control until the Japanese war is over.

STALIN: Any weapons taken in the course of the war by army represents booty. Armies surrender to those to whom they surrender. The same applies to the navy. The navy had to be surrendered. Therefore it is booty. It may be possible to discuss whether merchant fleet is booty. In case of Italy both battle and merchant fleet were placed in the category of booty.

CHURCHILL: I do not want to approach this matter from a juridical standpoint.

TRUMAN: I do not either.

CHURCHILL: I hope we may solve these problems by agreement. We have the whole of these vessels in our hands. We are not opposed in principle to the division of the German fleet. I am not speaking of the Italian fleet. Of course in these matters the replacement of losses is relevant. We have had tremendous losses. The questions of U-boats stand on a different footing. They have a limited legitimate use. The way they were used by Germany was prohibited by treaty. These vessels should be sunk. The latest U-boats contained valuable

information on future construction. That knowledge should be shared. But the bulk of U-boats should be sunk and the remainder divided equally. The surface ships should be divided equally. We are not opposed in principle to Russia's demand for one-third of the German fleet. Her flag should be welcomed on the seas by her allies. As to merchant ships, until the war with Japan comes to an end, these should be fully utilized. The prosecution of the war is limited by shipping. The transport of men and the feeding of civilians is limited by shipping.

There is another point. The Finnish fleet has passed into the hands of our Russian Allies. The Rumanian fleet, containing two very valuable troop ships, has fallen into their hands. It would seem that the three fleets should be shared.

STALIN: We have not taken a single ship from Finland and only one troop ship from Rumania, which is being used to carry the wounded.

CHURCHILL: There is also a question of others. The Norwegians have suffered terribly. The oil fleet was a great part of the nation's strength. It is a question whether the merchant fleet should be divided into four parts and the fourth part given to those not represented here. I should deprecate a hasty treatment of this subject.

TRUMAN: The subject [is] most interesting from our point of view. I should be very happy to make a division of the merchant fleet, but we must use these ships for the war and relief for liberated areas and the carrying of goods to our Russian Ally.

STALIN: What about Navy?

TRUMAN: I am ready to dispose of it at any time. Further, when the Japanese war is over, the United States will have merchant ships and navy ships for sale. But until the war is over, I don't want to disturb the situation.

STALIN: Are the Russians not interested in the Japanese war?

TRUMAN: Of course, and I desire to see Russia in the shipping pool with us.

CHURCHILL: But we all have our difficulties. Ships could be earmarked before being put into the pool. The advance of the Russians along the Baltic makes untenable the German harbors. I want to support the Marshal's request that Russia should in principle receive her share of war and merchant vessels. The only alternative is sinking and this seems wrong as long as one of our Allies desires the war vessels.

TRUMAN: We are not apart.

STALIN: What ships will be earmarked?

CHURCHILL: The merchant ships.

STALIN: Of course it is not possible to treat Russia as having the intention of interfering with the war against the Japanese. Nor can it be considered that this is a gift from the Allies. The matter should be cleared up. Have the Russians a right to receive a third of these ships? They want only their right. If my colleagues think otherwise, let them say so and I will obey. I want only clarity. The Russians are satisfied if their right to a third is recognized. If one-third is allocated to Russia, we will raise no objection to their use against Japan. So I suggest that the matter be settled at the end of the Conference as suggested by Churchill. One thing I should like. Our people are not allowed to see the fleet and are not given a list of them. Would it not be possible to lift this ban so that a Russian Naval Commission can inspect these ships?

CHURCHILL: You seized a number of U-boats in the Baltic. We could make an arrangement for an interchange of inspections[.]

STALIN: All the U-boats are damaged but we can arrange for you to see them.

CHURCHILL: All we want is reciprocity.

STALIN: Your people can see them.

TRUMAN: So far as the United States is concerned we are willing to exchange inspections, but we want it reciprocal.

CHURCHILL: I made a distinction between U-boats and surface fleets. The Marshal will appreciate the sensitiveness of an island power producing only two-thirds or less of its food about U-boats. I would argue that the bulk be sunk, the balance divided. My consent is conditioned on discussion of U-boats' disposition. I must ask pardon because of our special position.

STALIN: I am also in favor of sinking a large proportion.

TRUMAN: That seems enough discussion. Let us proceed. The next subject is Spain.

STALIN: Our proposals have been submitted.¹

CHURCHILL: His Majesty's Government and past government have strong distaste for General Franco and the government of Spain. All I said for Franco was that there was more in Spanish politics than drawing cartoons of Franco. But I view with disgust the killing of people for what they did five or six years ago. When Franco asked me to line up against the menace of Soviet Russia, I sent him a most chilling reply and I sent correspondence to Marshal Stalin and the President. We all detest the Spanish regime.

The difficulty with the Marshal's proposal is with the breaking off of relations with Spain. It may cause them to rally to his support. Breaking off relations breaks your influence. Ambassadors are needed

¹ For the documents referred to in these notes, see the footnotes to the Thompson minutes, *supra*.

particularly in time of difficulty. The course suggested would strengthen Franco's position, and he has an army. Should we take a rebuff or use force? I am against that. I am against interfering in the internal affairs of a country which has not molested us. I would greatly regret embroiling ourselves in their internal affairs. At the present time Franco's powers are undermined. We should speed the parting guest. But breaking off relations because of its internal conduct is a dangerous principle in this war. Nor would I like to see a renewal of the Spanish Civil War.

The San Francisco Charter has a provision against interfering in internal affairs.

TRUMAN: I have no love for Franco. I have no desire to get into a Spanish Civil War. We would be most happy to recognize another government. But Spain must settle it.

STALIN: That means everything remains unchanged in Spain.

TRUMAN: No. Franco is weakening.

STALIN: Franco is gaining strength. He is encouraging Fascism elsewhere. I believe you have no love for Franco, but you must prove it by acts. I do not propose a civil war, but I wish the Spanish people to know that we are on the side of the democratic forces of the Spanish people and against the regime of Franco. There are diplomatic means of showing this to the Spanish people.

Let us assume breaking relations too severe. There must be more flexible means. We should not pass by this cancer. Otherwise we sanction it. It is presumed that the Big Three can settle such questions. Are we entitled to keep silent? We cannot shut our eyes to the dangers that the Franco regime holds out for all Europe.

CHURCHILL: We cannot favor breaking relations. We have valuable trade relations and could not interfere unless we were certain of success. I appreciate how the Marshal feels as they sent the Blue Brigade against him. But they refrained from using arms when we went into Africa when they could have done us great harm.

STALIN: I suggest that the foreign secretaries try to find some means of making it clear that we are not in favor.

TRUMAN: I agree.

CHURCHILL: I should deprecate this. The question should be decided by the Big Three.

TRUMAN: I urge the Prime Minister to let the foreign secretaries discuss the question.

CHURCHILL: It is a matter of principle against interfering with internal affairs.

STALIN: It is not a matter of internal affairs. No such regime exists in any country of Europe.

CHURCHILL: Portugal might be considered a dictatorship.

STALIN: Portugal's government arose from internal forces; Spain from foreign forces. I do not place on the same level Spain and Portugal.

CHURCHILL: Franco is moving to his finale. He came to power many years ago. The Russian government as well as the fascist government[s] took part in the civil war.

STALIN: The foreign secretaries should prepare an appraisal of the regime of Franco, including the sentiments express[ed] by Mr. Churchill. This will not bind the government of Great Britain. I suggest [a] most mild form of influence—less than we applied to Greece and Poland.

CHURCHILL: I am not agreed in principle to making any Allied declaration and I did not understand that the President was.

STALIN: Statement need not be in reference to Spain alone but to all Europe.

CHURCHILL: Our action in other countries is because of their involvement in the war. Of course if you wish to make a declaration of general principles regarding governments which have not achieved those principles, that is different. That declaration is in the American Constitution. We can't improve upon it. I don't know what the Spanish people think but I feel that they do want to be rid of Franco.

TRUMAN: There seems to be no chance of agreement. Let us pass on and come back to this question later.

STALIN: But let us refer this matter to the foreign secretaries. Perhaps they can find a formula.

CHURCHILL: That is the very question we are debating. I suggest we leave the question without decision for the moment.

TRUMAN: Let us consider the declaration on Liberated Governments. I recommend discussion of paper submitted by me at first meeting.

STALIN: I suggest we defer this as we have written another document to submit on this.

TRUMAN: The next question is Yugoslavia.

STALIN: We can not consider this question until we hear the Yugoslavs. Yugoslavia is an Ally.

CHURCHILL: The two sides (Tito and Šubašić) are in disagreement.

STALIN: I have no such information. Let us verify this. Let us summon them.

CHURCHILL: The Tito-Šubašić agreement² has not been carried out. Tito has imposed a partisan organization. Yugoslavia has not realized the hopes we entertained at Yalta. We supported Tito,

² See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 251-254.

and are grieved and disappointed at the way things have turned out. Our proposal is very modest.

STALIN: Mr. Churchill has passed to the discussion of this question in substance without answering the President's question whether the question is worth discussing. The information which Mr. Churchill has given is not known to us. Perhaps Mr. Churchill is right but his information may not be correct. It would be just to hear the Yugoslavs on Mr. Churchill's accusations.

CHURCHILL: I made complaints, not accusations.

STALIN: It is not a matter of words. I cannot agree to substitute complaints for accusations.

CHURCHILL: I must think over this. But it might be well to have Tito and Šubašić come here. Do you think they would be willing to come?

TRUMAN: I am here to discuss world affairs with Soviet and Great Britain government[s]. I am not here to sit as a court. That is the work of San Francisco. I want to discuss matters on which the three heads of government can come to agreement. I did not come to hear Tito, de Gaulle, and Franco.

STALIN: That is the correct observation.

CHURCHILL: I thought that this was a matter in which the United States was very interested, particularly in view of their Yalta papers.

TRUMAN: That is true. I want to see the Yalta agreement carried out.

STALIN: According to our information, Tito is carrying out the Crimea decisions.

CHURCHILL: Our paper is a repetition of what we have already said.

TRUMAN: Let us drop it.

CHURCHILL: It is very important.

TRUMAN: We are dropping it only for the day as we did with Franco.

CHURCHILL: I had hoped that we could discuss these matters frankly.

STALIN: But we must hear the Yugoslavs first.

TRUMAN: We turn to the British paper on Rumanian oil property taken as booty.

CHURCHILL: I suggest that this be discussed by the foreign secretaries.

STALIN: I think that these matters can be settled by the usual diplomatic channels. But since the question has been raised, I should like to correct an inaccuracy. No British property was taken in Rumania. There were tubes purchased by the British before the war. The Germans captured them and used them. We took these tubes because Germany devastated our wells in the Caucasus. The Conference should not be troubled by this trifling matter.

CHURCHILL: This is not a trifling matter. Our people paid for these tubes. We have made no progress through diplomatic channels. Perhaps the British and Russian foreign secretaries could settle it.

EDEN: The United States is interested too.

TRUMAN: Why not let the three foreign secretaries see what they can do?

STALIN: No objection.

Adjourned.

**TRIPARTITE DINNER MEETING, THURSDAY,
JULY 19, 1945, 8:30 P. M.¹**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION
President Truman	Prime Minister Churchill	Generalissimo Stalin
Secretary Byrnes	Mr. Attlee	Foreign Commissar
Fleet Admiral Leahy	Sir Alexander Cadogan	Molotov
Mr. Harriman	Lord Cherwell	Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Pauley	Major Birse	Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Davies		Mr. Sobolev
Mr. Bohlen		Mr. Pavlov

EDITOR'S NOTE.—No official record of the substance of the conversation at this meeting has been found.²

¹ Truman as host. The meeting was held at Truman's quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg. Information as to time and participants from the Log (*ante*, pp. 15-16).

² Fragments of the conversation, as recalled by Sergeant Eugene List (who played the piano for Truman and his guests), are reported in *The New Yorker*, December 29, 1945, p. 15.

MOSELY-VYSHINSKY CONVERSATION, THURSDAY, JULY 19, 1945

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Mr. Mosely

SOVIET UNION

Mr. Vyshinsky

740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-2045 : Telegram

The Political Adviser to the Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Mosely) to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

[Extract ¹]

SECRET

BABELSBERG, July 20, 1945.

VICTORY 115. From Mosely at Babelsberg to London for Winant and State Department at Washington for Grew.

Vyshinsky informed Mosely today ² Soviet Government has approved agreement on additional requirements ³ except new title and new first paragraph; he expects latter will be cleared shortly.⁴

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¹ For the full text of this message, see document No. 1036, *post*.

² i. e., July 19.

³ See vol. I, pp. 604-606.

⁴ Cf. the following passage in a personal letter from Mosely, dated at Babelsberg July 24, to E. Allan Lightner, Jr., Secretary of the United States Delegation to the European Advisory Commission (file No. 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-2445): "With regard to the Agreement on Additional Requirements, I found from Vyshinsky last Thursday that the new title and preamble had to be referred to the Marshal [*Generalissimo Stalin*] before Saksin could be instructed to sign. Vyshinsky was inclined to revert to the title of 'General Order' but I gave him a vigorous sales talk in favor of our preferred title."