FAR EASTERN QUESTIONS

CHINA: NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Editor's Note.—The agreement signed by Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill at Yalta on February 11, 1945, regarding entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan ¹ contained provisions relating to Outer Mongolia, Dairen, Port Arthur, the Chinese Eastern Railroad, and the South Manchurian Railroad. The agreement provided that these provisions would require the concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and that President Roosevelt would take measures to obtain that concurrence. In the agreement the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to conclude a pact of friendship and alliance with the National Government of the Republic of China. The Sino-Soviet negotiations leading to the conclusion of this “pact of friendship and alliance” were begun at Moscow on June 30, with Prime Minister T. V. Soong as the principal Chinese participant. They were interrupted by Stalin’s departure for the Berlin Conference, were then resumed following Stalin’s return to Moscow, and were concluded on August 14, 1945.²

The documentation on this subject printed in this compilation is limited to (a) papers describing the status of these Sino-Soviet negotiations immediately upon the eve of the Berlin Conference and (b) papers prepared specifically for the Berlin Conference or at the Conference itself, where the Moscow negotiations were discussed between the United States and Soviet Delegations. See volume II, pages 45-46, 476.³

¹ Executive Agreement Series No. 498; 59 Stat. (2) 1823. Text also in Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 984.
³ Concerning aspects of the Sino-Soviet negotiations not covered by the documents printed in this compilation, and for information on related Soviet-American negotiations, see United States Relations With China, pp. 116-120; Feis, The China Tangle, pp. 316-321, 342-350.
UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF JAPAN AND POLICY TOWARD LIBERATED AREAS IN THE FAR EAST IN RELATION TO UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

III. POLICY TOWARD CHINESE LIBERATED AREAS AND CHINA GENERALLY

With regard to policy in liberated areas of China, we stand for: (1) Full recognition of China’s sovereignty in those areas and their restoration to Chinese control as soon as circumstances will permit termination of military administration of civil affairs; (2) abstention from interference in internal political affairs during, as well as of course after, the period of military occupation and administration of civil affairs; and (3) in relation generally to areas restored to China, as in relation to China as a whole, adherence to the principles of the Nine Power Treaty committing the signatories to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial [and] administrative integrity of China, to provide the fullest opportunity to China to develop and maintain an effective and stable government, to safeguard the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in China, and to refrain from seeking special rights and privileges in China.

We advocate agreement among the principally interested powers (U. S. S. R., United Kingdom, and United States) to support the foregoing principles of conduct with regard to China.

Liberation of Chinese territory, including Manchuria, will inevitably accentuate the present political difficulties between the Chinese Government and the Communist regime in as much as the latter control extensive areas in North China contiguous to areas to be liberated. It is of the utmost importance that the principally interested powers agree to refrain in areas liberated by their military forces from activity which would foster discord and disunity in China. Conversely, those powers should agree upon measures to encourage national unity in China and the formation of a broadly representative Chinese Government cooperative with all its friendly neighbors.

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1 Annex 3 to the attachment to document No. 177.
2 For other extracts from this paper, see documents Nos. 589 and 607.
3 Signed at Washington, February 6, 1922 (Treaty Series No. 723; 44 Stat. (3) 2113).
Furthermore, those powers might agree upon non-competitive measures to assist China towards recovery from the ravages of war and toward economic reconstruction along lines to improve the livelihood of all the Chinese people.

It is of the utmost importance that the situation in China, now and as it may develop in the future, not be permitted to become a source of irritation and possible friction between the three principally interested powers. Efforts to bring about political and military unity in China have so far not met with success. It is believed that only through the coordinated efforts of the U. S. S. R., the United Kingdom, and the United States can conditions making for unity and stability be created.

[WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1945.

No. 575

740.00119 (Potsdam)/6-2446

*Briefing Book Paper* ¹

**TOP SECRET**

**SPECIAL MANCHURIAN PROBLEMS**

**A. FREE PORT, DAIREN**

In 1898 Russia obtained from China a 25-year lease of the Kwantung Leased Territory in South Manchuria ² in which is situated Dairen, a large modern ice-free port, and Port Arthur, a naval base. Dairen is connected with Siberia by rail through Manchuria. In 1905, following the Russo-Japanese war, the lease was transferred to Japan with the consent of China.³ The period of the lease was extended to 99 years by the terms of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915 ⁴ (one of the so-called “21 Demands”), the validity of which China has contested. The United States Government has never recognized the validity of that Treaty.

Should the USSR enter the war against Japan, it is probable that the USSR will desire that Dairen retain the status of a “free port”.

So long as there is upheld the principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations, there would be no reason for the United States to oppose any Russian proposal that Dairen remain a “free port”. At the same time, however, the United States should support China’s sovereignty over the Kwantung Leased Territory,

³ See *ibid.*, p. 522.
⁴ Text printed *ibid.*, vol. II, p. 1220.
including Dairen, as that territory has been regarded as forming a part of Manchuria, and the Cairo Declaration provides that Manchuria is to be returned to the Republic of China.

B. TRAFFIC ARRANGEMENTS ON MANCHURIAN RAILWAYS

In 1896 China granted Russia the right to construct a railway known as the Chinese Eastern across Northern Manchuria to shorten the route across Siberia to Vladivostok. This railway, with all its appurtenances, was to revert to China free of charge 80 years after being placed in operation and China possessed the right to purchase the railway after 36 years. In 1898 Russia obtained, under similar terms, rights under which a connecting line was built southward from Harbin to Dairen and Port Arthur in the Kwantung Leased Territory. The lines were opened to traffic in 1901 and 1903, respectively.

The railway zone usually consisted of a narrow ribbon of land varying from 50 to 300 feet on either side of the right of way, except in special areas, principally railway towns, where it was widened to include sizeable settlements.

In 1905, as a result of the Russo-Japanese war, the rights pertaining to the southern half of the connecting line were transferred to Japan with the consent of China. This Japanese-held southern section was known as the South Manchuria Railway. The period of Japan’s lease on this line was extended to 99 years by the terms of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915, the validity of which China has contested. The United States Government has never recognized the validity of that Treaty. In 1935 Soviet Russia sold the Chinese Eastern Railway (including the northern half of the connecting line to Dairen) to “Manchuko”. The USSR, which has no completely ice-free port in the Far East, has both economic and historical reasons for wanting free use of and access to Dairen after the war.

So long as it is the intention of the Soviet Government to effect these purposes through amicable negotiations with China, there would appear to be no reason why the Government of the United States should offer opposition, provided that any arrangements made will not operate to establish in favor of the interests of the Soviet Union any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial and economic development in the area concerned.

Since the original trunk lines were built, there have been constructed both by Chinese and Japanese interests a considerable mileage of connecting lines. It is less likely that the Soviet Government will

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7 See ibid., p. 119.
have an interest in any of these lines, her chief interest being in through
traffic on the line between Manchuli and Vladivostok and between a
point on that line (Harbin) and the ice-free port of Dairen.

Foreign traffic moving through Manchuria should have the unhamp-
pered right of duty-free transit by rail between Dairen and the inter-
national borders of Manchuria if Dairen is to be of maximum use as a
free port.

[WASHINGTON,] July 3, 1945.

No. 576

761.08/7-1045

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 12, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The following message to the President from Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek has been transmitted by Ambassador Hurley in a telegram
No. 1140 of July 10, 2 p. m.:

"I wish to thank you for your telegram of June the 15th, containing
an outline of a proposed agreement between the National Government
of China and the Soviet Government. I am especially grateful to you
for the keen interest you have taken in this connection. In accordance
with arrangements I have already sent to [sic] Dr. T. V. Soong to
Moscow to negotiate with the Soviet Government, and I shall keep
you constantly informed of the progress of these negotiations through
Ambassador Hurley. As this is a matter of grave concern not only be-
tween China and Russia but also to the interests of peace and security
of the world at large, I earnestly request you to continue to bestow
your great attention on it and enlighten me with your views from time
to time."

As we have been requested by the Map Room to limit telegraphic
communications to you to those of an urgent character this message
has not been repeated by telegraph but is being forwarded by pouch
so that it may be available to you for transmission to the President.

JOSEPH C. GREW

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1 Not printed herein. See Truman, Year of Decisions, pp. 268–269. Hurley
had delivered to Chiang on June 15 a message from Truman which included
the terms of the agreement regarding the entry of the Soviet Union into the war
against Japan which had been concluded at the Yalta Conference.
2 The communications center at the White House.
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President and the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[Moscow,] 12 July 1945.
PRIORITY

Personal and top secret for the President and the Secretary of State from Harriman.

Soong had another talk with Stalin tonight. He tells me that he has come to an understanding on all matters along the general lines previously reported except for some points as to the railroads and the ports. After long argument Stalin agreed that the guards should be Chinese and that there should be no rights to move Soviet troops in Manchuria. The forces going to Port Arthur would be moved by sea. The final point not agreed to regarding the railroads is control of the management. Stalin still insists on a majority of the directors which Soong has resisted. Soong has offered joint operation with equal participation in the board and the management.

As to the ports Stalin still insists that the military zone under Russian control should include Dairen as well as Port Arthur and that there should be a naval base within Dairen. Soong offers Port Arthur and the area south of Dairen as a military zone. Dairen however should be a free port under Chinese management with certain docks and storage yards leased on a commercial basis to the Soviets for their through shipments.

Soong suggested to Stalin that he return to Chungking to consult the Generalissimo over the points still at issue. Stalin however said that it was better to come to agreement before he met you at Berlin as he wished to decide with you date of his entry into the war. Another meeting has been arranged therefore for the night of the 12th. Soong intends to outline in detail the maximum concessions he is authorized to make along the above lines. If no agreement is reached he will return to Chungking to consult the Generalissimo and will give me to report to you the position of the negotiations—the matters on which agreement has been reached and the points remaining at issue.

Soong asks me to tell you that he feels that in order to meet Stalin's demands he has gone beyond the Yalta Agreement in agreeing to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia after the war and has fully met any reasonable interpretation of the Yalta Agreement in his proposals regarding the railroads and ports. On the other hand Stalin has offered him satisfactory conditions for the Treaty of

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1 i.e., July 11.
Friendship and the Civil Affairs Agreement during the military period in Manchuria, also assurances that he would withhold support from the insurgents in Sinkiang and the Chinese Communist Party.

No. 578

761.29/7-1345: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President and the Secretary of State*  

**TOP SECRET**

**PRIORITY**

Moscow, 13 July 1945.

(Personal and top secret for the President and Secretary of State from Harriman.)

Soong saw Stalin and Molotov again last night (Thursday) and outlined the maximum concessions he was authorized to make along the lines of my last message (numbers 120015 and 120755, July 11–12 ²)[.]

As to the management of the railroads he proposed equal number of directors with Chinese to be Chairman without administrative authority as a courtesy to China; the Manager of the Chinese Eastern to be Russian and the Assistant Manager Chinese; the Manager of the South Manchurian to be Chinese with a Russian as Assistant Manager. He proposed that the Port of Dairen should be a free port under Chinese management, but offered the Soviets docks and storage areas under commercial lease for their through traffic. He explained that for obvious reasons he could not agree to the Port of Dairen or the connecting railroad to be in a Soviet military zone or to be used as a Soviet naval base. Soong offered Port Arthur as a naval base for joint use but under Soviet control. There does not appear to [be?] any differences regarding Port Arthur but Stalin told Soong that his proposals regarding the Port of Dairen and the railroads were unsatisfactory. Stalin did not offer any further concessions in his demands for the control of the railroads and for the inclusion of Dairen in the military zone substantially under Soviet control. Soong then said that he felt he should return to Chungking to consult with Chiang, but would be prepared to come to Moscow again at any time Stalin wished. The meeting parted, according to Soong, in a friendly atmosphere and he expressed satisfaction with the frankness of discussion and confidence that he had gained of the friendly attitude of the Soviet Government toward the Chinese Government.

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¹ Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.
² See document No. 577.
Soong told me that he did not press Stalin further on any points as he was anxious to leave the subjects open in order to obtain your views. He is hopeful that you will be able to get Stalin to accept the Chinese position at the forthcoming conference or that you will be able to work out a compromise which the Generalissimo can accept. He did not, however, say this to Stalin, although from a political standpoint he feels that China has made a serious concession in agreeing to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia. He feels that the discussions here have made important progress in the establishment of friendly relations between his government and the Kremlin and is satisfied with the understandings reached on questions other than those still at issue.

He is leaving for Chungking tomorrow (Saturday) morning in the plane which you placed at his disposal and hopes that it may remain there to bring him back to Moscow as soon as possible. He asked me to present this request to you.

I am leaving for Berlin with General Deane and Admiral Maples this afternoon.

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No. 579

Truman Papers

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[MARCHING,] July 13, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Subject: U. S. Interpretation of the Yalta Agreement and Terms Which China Might Appropriately Accept in Regard to Outer Mongolia and Manchuria

The attached memorandum entitled "U. S. Interpretation of the Yalta Agreement and Terms Which China Might Appropriately Accept in Regard to Outer Mongolia and Manchuria", has been prepared in pursuance to the suggestion contained in Ambassador Harriman's 081800 and your request sent through Admiral Leahy (MRS-IN-19).3

There is in the Department no copy of the Yalta Agreement or of any records of conversations relating thereto. The attached memorandum has therefore been prepared on the basis of our recollection of its contents.

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1 The presence of the signed original of this memorandum in the Truman Papers suggests the probability that Byrnes passed it on to Truman.

2 i.e., the agreement regarding entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan signed by Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill at Yalta, February 11, 1945.

3 Documents Nos. 203 and 204, respectively.
You may wish to give special attention to the portions of the memorandum which have been marked in red.\footnote{The marked portions of the attachment are here printed in italics.}

\textbf{Joseph C. Grew}

\begin{center}
\textbf{TOP SECRET}
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\textbf{U. S. INTERPRETATION OF THE YALTA AGREEMENT AND TERMS WHICH CHINA MIGHT APPROPRIATELY ACCEPT IN REGARD TO OUTER MONGOLIA AND MANCHURIA}

\textit{Outer Mongolia.} With regard to the interpretation of this Government of the term \textit{“status quo”} as applied to Outer Mongolia the following facts are pertinent.

The Chinese Government claims all of Mongolia, including the area occupied by the Mongolian People’s Republic, as part of the Republic of China. The present Chinese Provisional Constitution for the Period of Political Tutelage (1931) states that the territory of the Republic consists of the several provinces and Mongolia and Tibet. Although China lost control over Outer Mongolia in 1911, the Chinese Government has never ceased to claim it as an integral part of the Republic, and in the treaties which it concluded with imperial Russia respecting Outer Mongolia and with Outer Mongolia itself China gained from both of them recognition of this claim. (See the note attached to the Sino-Russian Declaration, November 5, 1913;\footnote{Text in MacMurray, ed., \textit{Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1894–1919}, vol. ii, p. 1066.} Article II of the Tri-Partite Treaty of Kiakhta, June 7, 1915;\footnote{Text printed \textit{ibid.}, p. 1243.} and Article V of the Sino-Soviet Agreement on General Principles of May 31, 1924.)\footnote{Text in \textit{Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1919–1929} (Washington, 1929), p. 133.}

China, having gained recognition of its claim to sovereignty from the U. S. S. R., contends that it is the sole government legally competent to regulate the affairs of Outer Mongolia, and it has protested against any agreements made by the U. S. S. R., with or concerning Outer Mongolia. Thus when the Soviet-Mongolian Mutual Assistance Pact of March 12, 1936\footnote{Text in Stephen Heald and John W. Wheeler-Bennett, eds., \textit{Documents on International Affairs, 1936} (London, 1937), p. 472.} was signed, the Chinese Government protested to the Soviet Union that Outer Mongolia was an integral part of the Republic, and that no foreign state might conclude treaties or agreements with it. The Soviet Foreign Office in reply reaffirmed the Soviet Union’s recognition of Chinese sovereignty.

\footnote{\textit{No. 579}}
China also protested against the Declaration attached to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of April 13, 1941* which stated in part:

"... the U. S. S. R. pledges to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of Manchukuo, and Japan pledges to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the Mongolian People's Republic."

The following day the Chinese Foreign Minister** issued a statement in which he declared:

"The four Northeastern Provinces and Outer Mongolia are an integral part of the Republic and will always remain Chinese territory. The Chinese Government and people cannot recognize any engagements entered into between third parties which are derogatory to China's territorial and administrative integrity.***

The substance of this statement was communicated to the Soviet Foreign Office in the form of a protest to which the latter answered that the Soviet-Japanese Pact was solely to insure the security of the Soviet Union and had no bearing on Soviet relations with China.

The U. S. S. R. has not claimed the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic, and it has repeatedly informed the Chinese that it respects Chinese sovereignty therein. In statements by Soviet officials the view is held that the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic is autonomous, and able to enter into independent treaty relations. Izvestia, the semi-official Soviet newspaper, in its issue of March 6, 1925 quoted Chicherin, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, as declaring: "(the U. S. S. R.) recognizes Mongolia as [a] part of the whole Republic of China, enjoying, however, autonomy so far-reaching as to preclude Chinese interference with its internal affairs and to permit the establishment of independent relations by Mongolia". (Quoted by Louis Nemzer, "The Status of Outer Mongolia in International Law", American Journal of International Law, Vol. 33, 1939, p. 461.) Statements by other Soviet officials so far as they are available all emphasize the autonomy of the region.

The representative of the Mongolian People's Republic in Moscow*** does not bear one of the usual diplomatic titles but is called a "Delegate Plenipotentiary and Commercial Representative", indicating that the Mongolian People's Republic is not regarded as a fully independent state. When Vice President Wallace visited Ulan Bator

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** Quo T'ai-ch'i.
*** Telegram No. 135, from Embassy, Chungking, April 15, 1941 (761.9411/87). [Footnote in the original. The document cited is not printed.]
**** Zhamsurun Sambu.
in the summer of 1944 no Mongol visa or other Mongol, Chinese or Soviet document was necessary, although the visit was made with the advance knowledge of the U. S. S. R. and China. Notwithstanding the special consideration doubtless shown to the Vice President of the United States, this is nevertheless an indication of the anomalous status of the Mongolian People's Republic vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and China.

In connection with the conclusion of the Soviet-Mongolian Mutual Assistance Pact, the British Prime Minister\(^2\) was asked in Parliament whether Outer Mongolia (Mongolian People's Republic) was an independent state or a part of China. He declared that: "His Majesty's Government continue to regard Outer Mongolia as under Chinese sovereignty; and since the conclusion of the Protocol of the 12th of March, the Soviet Government have declared that in their view the Sino-Soviet Treaty of May 1924 in which Outer Mongolia was recognized as an integral part of the Chinese Republic, is not infringed by the Protocol and retains its force." (Parliamentary Debates—House of Commons Official Report, Vol. 312, p. 5, May 11, 1936.)

No statement has been issued by the United States Government in regard to Mongolia, or the Mongolian People's Republic. By the terms of the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922\(^3\) to which it is a signatory, the United States has agreed to respect the territorial and administrative integrity of China (Article I) and it has been at pains to refrain from any indication that it considered the outlying dependencies of China such as Mongolia in a different status from the remainder of China.

It would thus appear that while de jure China has sovereignty over Outer Mongolia, de facto sovereignty has not been exercised since 1911.

If the future status of Outer Mongolia is decided on the basis of the principle of sub-determination [self-determination?] of peoples, then there is little doubt that that territory would separate itself from China, and as an independent nation or otherwise, enter the Soviet orbit. Mongolians have been traditionally antipathetic to the Chinese and, so far as can be judged, have been willing adherents to Soviet ideologies and influence. In the light of realities of the situation it is believed that the Chinese Government would be well advised to give formal recognition to a situation which has long existed in fact and at the same time endeavor to capitalize upon the good-will of the Soviet [Union] thereby gained to obtain firm commitments from the Soviet Government which will confirm and strengthen the Chinese position in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria.

\(^2\) Stanley Baldwin.
\(^3\) Signed at Washington, February 6, 1922 (Treaty Series No. 723; 44 Stat. (3)12113).
Such a disposition would not materially affect any substantial American interest.

Manchuria. The Yalta Agreement contains a general provision for the reversion to the Soviet Union of rights in Manchuria formerly possessed by Czarist Russia prior to the Russo-Japanese War. Under sub-headings to this main provision there are certain specific provisions dealing inter alia with the “internationalization” of Dairen and joint Sino-Soviet operation of Manchurian railroads. It is not clear to what extent the specific provisions are to be construed as explanatory to the main provision and to what extent they represent modifications of or limitations on the main provision.

The principal rights enjoyed by Russia in Manchuria prior to the Russo-Japanese War may be summarized as follows:

Leases of Port Arthur and Talienvan (Dairen) (Russo-Chinese Convention of March 27, 1898.\(^4\)) Lease for 25 years (expiring in 1923), subject to renewal by mutual consent, to the Russian Government of Port Arthur and Dairen. The lease “in no way to violate the sovereign rights of the Chinese Emperor to the leased territory”. Russia to have complete and exclusive enjoyment of the whole area, including the entire military command and supreme civil administration with no Chinese land forces permitted in the leased area. Port Arthur to be used solely by Chinese and Russian vessels. Dairen, with the exception of one of the river bays set apart for the use of Russian and Chinese fleets, to be open to foreign commerce with free entry granted to the merchant vessels of all countries. The Russian Government at its own expense to erect fortification buildings and lighthouses, to maintain garrisons and take steps for defense.

Railways. The Chinese Eastern Railway, constructed in 1897–1901, by the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, was nominally a Russo-Chinese institution but actually almost exclusively, if not entirely Russian, which Company was granted by the Chinese Government exclusive rights of operation. It was provided that 80 years from the date of completion the line would pass free of charge to the Chinese Government, and further that after 36 years from the date of completion the Chinese Government would have the right to buy it back.

The Chinese Eastern Railway extended from Manchuli Station in the west across Manchuria to Pogranichnaya on the Ussuri Railway, with a southern branch extending from Harbin to Dairen (Dalny) and Port Arthur. That portion of the southern branch from Changchun (Hsinking) southward was transferred to Japan by the Russo-Japa-

\(^4\) Text in MacMurray, ed., Treaties and Agreements, vol. 1, p. 119.
Chinese Treaty of Peace of 1905. The remainder of the Chinese Eastern Railway was transferred to "Manchukuo" in 1936.

The Russians assumed civil administration of the railway zone until 1920. Under the agreement of September 8, 1896, between the Chinese Government and the Russo-Chinese Bank, lands necessary to the construction, operation and protection of the railway were ceded to the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, and, according to the Russian (French) text, the company was given le droit absolu et exclusif de l'administration (the absolute and exclusive right of administration or management). The Chinese text of the treaty, however, does not contain this stipulation. On the basis of the French text, interpreting administration to mean administration in the full English sense rather than mere management, the Russians organized within the railway zone, (an irregular strip of land extending for some distance on either side of the railway and embracing Harbin and other cities which developed along the railway), their own civil administration, including courts of justice, police, schools, etc. The Government of the United States has considered that this procedure was an encroachment upon Chinese sovereignty and impaired the extraterritorial rights of American citizens.

The statutes of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company provide for a board of management (or board of directors), to consist of nine members elected by the shareholders. The chairman of the board was appointed by the Chinese Government. The vice chairman was chosen by the members of the board from among themselves. Shareholding was limited to Russian and Chinese subjects. It is understood that nearly all of the shares were purchased by the Russian Government. The Chinese were, at the most, allowed an amount of stock sufficient only to afford a right to participate in the election of the directorate. Prior to 1917 the board of directors sat in St. Petersburg. The actual operation of the railway was confided to a manager, who was assisted, and to an extent controlled with respect to important matters, by a council of administration consisting of the manager and his principal assistants. The manager was also civil governor of the railway zone and as such possessed the most extended powers.

The provisions of the proposed agreements in regard to the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur and in regard to railways, as described in Moscow's 081750Z, are clearly more advantageous to China than would

17 Text printed ibid., p. 84.
18 Not printed. Cf. document No. 578.
be terms calling for the complete restoration of the rights possessed by Russia in Manchuria prior to the Russo-Japanese war.

On the other hand, the provisions of the proposed agreements are less advantageous to China than would be terms based upon a normal construction, taken by themselves, of the somewhat ambiguous and vaguely worded terms of the specific sub-headings of the main provision calling for the recovery by the Soviet Union of its former rights in Manchuria. For example, the term "internationalization" of Dairen could not of itself warrant the interpretation placed upon it by the Soviet Government in the draft agreement, calling for Soviet predominance in administration, nor would the provisions in regard to the joint Sino-Soviet operation of the railways call for an implementation whereby Russia would have sole ownership and superiority of authority over the Chinese in the management of the railway.

There is an undoubted inconsistency between a Soviet commitment to respect Chinese sovereignty and proposals under which for even a limited period of years Russia would exercise virtual control over the main railways of Manchuria and enjoy predominant administrative rights in Dairen and exclusive administrative rights in Port Arthur. For reasons set forth below, it is believed that there are less disadvantages to be seen in the proposal in regard to Port Arthur than in the rest of the draft agreements which, if carried out in full, would represent a reversion to a situation which was one of the most pernicious foci of imperialism and which we had hoped might be eliminated once and for all, and is therefore disappointing from the point of view of American interests, policy and ideals. Accordingly, if it should be possible for this Government, either singly or in conjunction with Great Britain, to influence the Soviet Government toward a modification in favor of China (and of other countries) of the terms relating to Dairen and the railways, it is believed that we should make the effort. There would seem warrant for such an approach to the Soviet Government on the ground that it was not our understanding of the Yalta Agreement that "internationalization" of Dairen meant transfer of predominant administrative rights to the Soviet Union or that joint operation of the railways called for transfer of exclusive ownership to the Soviet Union and for vesting Russia with a predominant position in management. If through such an approach the Soviet Union could be influenced to make substantial modification in these proposals it would be very welcome from our point of view. At the same time the fact cannot be lost sight of that the National Government of China stands to gain much by Russian participation in the war against Japan and by Russian agreement not to support the Chinese Communists. For these benefits China must be prepared to make reasonable concessions and we should not support Chinese objections to such otherwise reasonable concessions
...are not inimical to American interests or in contradiction of American policy.

The United States has, of course, an important practical interest in trade and commerce in Manchuria which should be safeguarded. In respect to any arrangements which may be made between the Soviet and Chinese Governments regarding Manchuria we should obtain explicit commitments from both governments that the principle of non-discrimination in international intercourse will be respected in all areas and operations which may be the subject of agreement. We should expect that application of this principle would cover the right of equality of access by the United States to the port facilities of Dairen, the privilege of leasing and purchasing land there for business and residential purposes (a right which was generally denied in practice during the Japanese regime) and the right of free and full use of traffic facilities of the railways.

With regard to the proposed arrangement for Port Arthur, it is believed that the Chinese could afford and would be well advised to grant to the Russians privileges at least no less liberal than those granted to us by Great Britain in connection with the lease of certain naval and air bases in British territory in the Western Hemisphere. For example, in the master agreement comprised in an exchange of notes between the British Embassy and the Department of September 2, 1940, it is provided that:

"His Majesty's Government, in the leases to be agreed upon, will grant to the United States for the period of the leases all the rights, power, and authority within the bases leased, and within the limits of the territorial waters and air spaces adjacent to or in the vicinity of such bases, necessary to provide access to and defense of such bases, and appropriate provisions for their control."

In the Anglo-American Agreement of March 27, 1941 for the lease of air bases in Newfoundland, Bermuda, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Antigua, Trinidad and British Guiana Article IV specifically grants jurisdiction to United States courts over members of the United States forces, United States nationals, persons not British subjects, and British subjects charged with having committed, either within or without the leased areas, offenses of a military nature punishable under American law including but not restricted to treason, offenses relating to sabotage or espionage, and any other offenses relating to the security and protection of United States bases, establishments, equipment or other property or to operations of the Government of the United States in the territory. While the proposed arrangement for Port Arthur envisages that the port will be under "Soviet administration",

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19 Executive Agreement Series No. 181; 54 Stat. (2) 2405.
20 Executive Agreement Series No. 285; 55 Stat. (2) 1560.
there would not, in the light of all the circumstances, seem to be
ground for putting forth objection on our part if the Chinese grant the
Soviet Government exclusive jurisdiction within the port area of
Port Arthur, whereas the proposals relating to Dairen and the railways
as they now stand are open to legitimate objection on the part of the
United States and other of the United Nations.
JAPAN

PEACE FEELERS THROUGH THE SOVIET UNION

Editor's Note.—It has not been possible to establish the precise extent to which the United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference was aware of the contents of the papers of Japanese origin printed in this section and in volume II, pages 1248–1264 and 1291–1298. The contents of certain of these papers were known to United States officials in Washington, however, as early as July 13 (see Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York, 1951), page 74; cf. pages 75–76) and information on Japanese peace maneuvers was received by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson at Babelsberg on July 16 (see volume II, document No. 1236, footnote 4). It has also been determined that a series of messages of Japanese origin on this subject was received by the United States Delegation during the course of the Berlin Conference and that these messages were circulated at Babelsberg to some members of the President’s party. Furthermore, in a conference on January 24, 1956, between Truman and members of his staff and Department of State historians, Truman supplied the information that he was familiar with the contents of the first Japanese peace feeler (i. e., the proposal contained in document No. 582) before Stalin mentioned it to him at Babelsberg (see volume II, page 87) and that he was familiar with the contents of the second Japanese peace feeler (i. e., the approach reported in document No. 1234) before Stalin brought it to the attention of Truman and Attlee at the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the Berlin Conference on July 28 (see volume II, page 460).

The texts of the documents in this section are translations prepared for these volumes by the Division of Language Services, Department of State, from microfilm copies, now deposited in the Library of Congress, of portions of the archives of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They are all drawn from the reel of microfilm catalogued as follows by the Library of Congress: “S 1.7.0.0–55 Documents relating to negotiations between Japan, and the U. S. S. R. concerning the termination of the War including the Soviet declaration of war against Japan . . . . Reel S586.” For a published collection of Japanese documents on this subject in the original language, see Shisen shiroku (Tokyo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1952).
No. 580

751.947-2145: Telegram

The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato)

[Translation]

VERY SECRET

890. Re my telegram No. 884.¹

The foreign and domestic situation for the Empire is very serious, and even the termination of the war is now being considered privately. Therefore the conversations ² mentioned in my telegram No. 852 ¹ are not being limited solely to the objective of closer relations between Japan and the U. S. S. R., but we are also sounding out the extent to which we might employ the U. S. S. R. in connection with the termination of the war.

Our readiness to promise long-term mutual support for the maintenance of peace, as mentioned in our proposal, was also intended for the purpose of sounding out the Soviet attitude toward Japan with reference to the above. The Soviet Union should be interested in, and probably will greet with much satisfaction, an abandonment of our fishery rights as an amendment to the Treaty of Portsmouth.³

With reference to the other items, the manner of answering the arguments would be to meet fully the demands of the Soviets according to my telegram No. 885.⁴ Therefore, although we of course wish the completion of an agreement from the Malik-Hirota negotiations, on the other hand, sounding out the Soviets as to the manner in which they might be used to terminate the war is also desired. We would like to learn quickly the intentions of the Soviet Government regarding the above. As this point is a matter with which the Imperial Court is also greatly concerned, meet with Molotov immediately whether or not T. V. Soong is present in the U. S. S. R.⁵ With the circumstances of the earlier part of this telegram in mind, ascertain as best you can their intentions and please answer by telegram immediately.

¹ Not printed.
² i. e., the Hirota-Malik conversations concerning a new Soviet-Japanese agreement. See Robert J. C. Butow, Japan’s Decision To Surrender (Stanford, 1954), pp. 121-123, and Toshikazu Kase, Journey to the “Missouri” (New Haven, 1950), pp. 170-171, 187-188. Sato had received instructions to try to expedite a Soviet reply to the Japanese proposals for such an agreement and to explain Japan’s intentions in this connection.
⁴ Concerning Soong’s negotiations in Moscow, see ante, pp. 857, 862-864.
As you are skilled in matters such as this, I need not mention this, but in your meetings with the Soviets on this matter please bear in mind not to give them the impression that we wish to use the Soviet Union to terminate the war.

No. 581

761.947-2145: Telegram

The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato)

[Translation]

SECRET [Tokyo,] July 11, 1945—7 p. m.

URGENT

891. As it has been recognized as appropriate to make clear to Russia our general attitude concerning the termination of the international war despite the last paragraph in my telegram No. 890,¹ please explain our attitude as follows, together with the substance of the above telegram, and let me know of your progress with Molotov by telegram as soon as possible:

"We consider the maintenance of peace in Asia as one aspect of maintaining world peace. We have no intention of annexing or taking possession of the areas which we have been occupying as a result of the war; we hope to terminate the war with a view to establishing and maintaining lasting world peace."

Please confer with Mr. M. within a day or two.

¹ Document No. 580.

No. 582

761.947-2145: Telegram

The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato)

[Translation]

SECRET [Tokyo,] July 12, 1945—8:50 p. m.

URGENT

893. Re telegram No. 891 ¹ and others.

Not having seen the telegram ² regarding the meeting with Molotov, I feel as though I am sending troops out without sufficient reconnaissance. Much as I dislike doing so, I find that I must proceed at this time and would like to have you convey to the Soviet side before the Three-Power Conference begins the matter concerning the

¹ Document No. 581.
² Not printed.
Imperial wishes for the termination of the war. The substance of the following should be borne in mind as appropriate in your direct explanation to Molotov:

"His Majesty the Emperor is greatly concerned over the daily increasing calamities and sacrifices faced by the citizens of the various belligerent countries in this present war, and it is His Majesty’s heart’s desire to see the swift termination of the war. In the Greater East Asia War, however, as long as America and England insist on unconditional surrender, our country has no alternative but to see it through in an all-out effort for the sake of survival and the honor of the homeland. The resulting enormous bloodshed of the citizens of the belligerent powers would indeed be contrary to His Majesty’s desires, and so it is His Majesty’s earnest hope that peace may be restored as speedily as possible for the welfare of mankind.

The above Imperial wishes are rooted not only in His Majesty’s benevolence toward his subjects but in his sincere desire for the happiness of mankind, and he intends to dispatch Prince Fumimaro Konoye as special envoy to the Soviet Union, bearing his personal letter. You are directed, therefore, to convey this to Molotov, and promptly obtain from the Soviet Government admission into that country for the special envoy and his suite. (The list of members of the special envoy’s suite will be cabled later.) Furthermore, though it is not possible for the special envoy to reach Moscow before the Russian authorities leave there for the Three-Power Conference, arrangements must be made so that the special envoy may meet them as soon as they return to Moscow. It is desired, therefore, that the special envoy and his suite make the trip by plane. You will request the Soviet Government to send an airplane for them as far as Manchouli or Tsitsihar."

No. 583

761.947-2145: Telegram

The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato)

[Translation]

VERY SECRET [TOKYO,] July 12, 1945—2:20 a. m. [sic] URGENT

894. Re my telegram No. 893.¹

When you convey this matter to them, please make it understood that the subject should be treated as absolutely secret. I realize that I am being presumptuous in saying this; I mention it merely to be sure.

¹ Document No. 582.
The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo)

[Translation]

VERY SECRET

Moscow, July 12, 1945—11:25 p. m.

1382. 1. Your telegrams No. 890 and 891 were received on the 12th immediately after my reply No. 1381 was sent. I take it that the purpose of your telegram was to sound out the possibilities of utilizing the Soviet Union in connection with the termination of the war.

In the unreserved opinion of this envoy and on the basis of your telegram No. 885, I believe it no exaggeration to say that the possibility of getting the Soviet Union to join our side and go along with our reasoning is next to nothing. That would run directly counter to the foreign policy of this country as explained in my frequent telegrams to you. It goes without saying that the objectives cannot be successfully attained by sounding out the possibilities of using the Soviet Union to terminate the war on the above basis. This is clearly indicated in the progress of the conferences as reported in my telegram No. 1379.

Moreover, the manner of your explanation in your telegram No. 891—"We consider the maintenance of peace in Asia as one aspect of maintaining world peace"—is nothing but academic theory. For England and America are planning to take the right of maintaining peace in East Asia away from Japan, and the actual situation is now such that the mainland of Japan itself is in peril. Japan is no longer in a position to be responsible for the maintenance of peace in all of East Asia, no matter how you look at it.

2. Although the Empire and its commanders have said, "We have no intention of annexing or taking possession of the areas which we have been occupying," what kind of reaction can we expect when in fact we have already lost or are about to lose Burma, the Philippines, and even a portion of our mainland in the form of Okinawa?

As you already know, the thinking of the Soviet authorities is realistic. It is difficult to move them with abstractions, to say nothing about the futility of trying to get them to consent to persuasion with phrases beautiful but somewhat remote from the facts and empty in content. In fact, with reference to your proposal in telegram

1 Documents Nos. 580 and 581, respectively.
2 Not printed.
No. 853,\(^3\) Molotov does not show the least interest. And again, in his refusal he gave a very similar answer. If indeed our country is pressed by the necessity of terminating the war, we ourselves must first of all firmly resolve to terminate the war. Without this resolution, an attempt to sound out the intentions of the Soviet Union will result in no benefit. In these days, with the enemy air raids accelerated and intensified, is there any meaning in showing that our country has reserve strength for a war of resistance, or in sacrificing the lives of hundreds of thousands of conscripts and millions of other innocent residents of cities and metropolitan areas?

3. Concerning these important matters, we here do not have appropriate or accurate information relative to our present armament production and therefore are not in a position to judge matters correctly. To say nothing about the fact that it was only by chance hearsay that we learned of the Imperial Conference which began in early June,\(^4\) at which it was resolved to take positive steps. And, if worse comes to worst and the progress of the war following the conference turns extremely disadvantageous for our side, it would behoove the Government in this situation to carry out that important resolution. Under these circumstances, the Soviet Government might be moved, and the desire to have it mediate will not be an impossibility. However, in the above situation, the immediate result facing us would be that there will be no room for doubt that it will very closely approximate unconditional surrender.

I have expressed my extremely unreserved opinion in the foregoing and I beg your pardon for such frank statements at this time. I have also heard that at the Imperial Court His Majesty is greatly concerned. I find these dreadful and heartbreaking thoughts unbearable. However, in international relations there is no mercy, and facing reality is unavoidable. I have transmitted the foregoing to you in all frankness, just as I see it, for I firmly believe it to be my primary responsibility to put an end to any loose thinking which gets away from reality. I beg for your understanding.

\(^3\) Not printed.  
No. 585  

The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato)  

[Translation]  

SECRET  

[TOKYO,] July 13, 1945—7:30 p. m.  

URGENT  

898. Re my telegram No. 893.  

It was considered proper that I should receive Ambassador Malik and convey the intended dispatch of the special envoy, but as Malik was sick in bed, I sent Ando, Director of the Bureau of Political Affairs, to communicate to the Ambassador that His Majesty desired to dispatch Prince Konoye as special envoy, carrying with him the personal letter of His Majesty stating the Imperial wish to end the war; that you were to communicate the same to the Soviet Government; and that the Ambassador should concurrently accord facilities in this connection. Ambassador Malik promised to telegraph promptly about the matter to his Government.

1 Document No. 582.

No. 586  

The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo)  

[Translation]  

VERY URGENT  

Moscow, July 13, 1945—10:40 p. m.  

1385. Re my telegram No. 1383.  

I immediately requested an interview with Molotov but was told that he was simply not able to accommodate my request and I was asked whether I would convey my message to Lozovsky. Therefore, I met Lozovsky at 5 p. m. on the 13th and conveyed His Majesty's wishes contained in your telegram No. 893, translated into Russian, addressed to Molotov, and accompanied by my confidential note. I requested further that he immediately transmit this message to Molotov after reading it. The above note included the Imperial wish to dispatch Prince Konoye, mentioned in your telegram, and the request for agreement from the Soviet Government concerning the Prince's visit. Furthermore, in the event of approval, provisions for an airplane and other conveniences were also requested.

1 Not printed.  
2 Document No. 582.
Moreover, I mentioned that the special mission on this occasion was absolutely different in nature from those special missions previously proposed to Molotov, as this envoy was being sent in response to His Majesty’s personal wish and we would like to have the matter treated accordingly. I further expressed the desire of the Japanese Government to obtain an early answer on this matter, if only a consent in principle, and if at all possible before Molotov’s departure, so that the above-mentioned special envoy might be able to meet the Soviet authorities soon after their return from Berlin.

In answer to Lozovsky’s question as to which member of the Soviet Government the message was intended for, I said that since it conveyed the Imperial wishes of His Majesty no addressee was designated but that we wished to have it transmitted to Kalinin, Head of the Soviet Government, Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, and Molotov. Lozovsky thereupon stated that he could understand the Japanese Government’s hurry for an answer and would try to expedite an answer in accordance with our desires, but he also expressed doubts as to the possibility of an answer before departure time, for one government group was scheduled to depart that very evening. Accordingly, I replied that in the event that an answer was not possible prior to Molotov’s departure, we would like him to establish communications directly with Berlin by telephone or other means for their answer, as the special envoy and his suite will require preparations and arrangements. Lozovsky answered that he would naturally handle the matter as above requested and promised to turn my note over to Molotov without delay. I hasten to telegraph the foregoing.

No. 587

761.947-2145 : Telegram
The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo)

[Translation]

VERY SECRET

Moscow, July 13, 1945—10:40 p. m.

URGENT

1386. Re my telegram No. 1385.¹

Although it may be presumed that the Soviet side this time will agree to the dispatch of a special envoy, it is still difficult to say before receiving the actual reply. In the event that the Soviets agree

¹ Document No. 586.
but the duties of the special envoy are in accordance with your tele-
gram No. 890,² where the purpose was to sound out the limits to
which the Soviets may be utilized in terminating the war, or in the
event that his duties go no further than abstract explanations as
indicated in your telegram No. 891,³ they will simply not consider it.
It appears from your telegram No. 893 ⁴ that His Majesty is deeply
concerned about the restoration of peace. Even if we are oversawed
by the fact that the dispatch of a special envoy is the Imperial wish,
if the Japanese Government’s proposal brought by him is limited
to an enumeration of previous abstractions, lacking in concreteness,
you would not only be disappointing the authorities of this country
and causing a feeling of great dissatisfaction with the insincere atti-
dude of Japan but would also be provoking trouble for the Imperial
Household. I have great apprehensions on this point.

In my humble opinion, as long as the dispatch of an important
special mission from afar has been determined, I believe that its
purpose should be nothing other than a proposal for peace and ter-
mination of hostilities. The Soviets can understand the Imperial
wish for peace as reported by this envoy, but they may not find the
appointed task of the mission clear and may very well request a
supplementary statement. Consequently, although I have no doubt
that the special envoy will report the details in person on his arrival,
it may become necessary to give a preliminary explanation of the
gist of the special envoy’s mission in the event that the Soviets
request it. At any rate, I would appreciate your answer by telegram.
In fact, after ascertaining this point, I believe it is possible to carry
out the instructions contained in your telegram No. 893. Neverthe-
less, as Molotov’s departure time is so near, I have not had time to
telegraph information to you and I have handled the matter in the
manner indicated in the opening paragraph of my reply. However,
reflecting on the extremely serious nature of the outline of the pro-
posal which the special envoy would be bringing, I am also thinking
of sending a supplementary telegram of my humble opinion for your
information after carefully considering the matter.

² Document No. 580.
³ Document No. 581.
⁴ Document No. 582.

[No. 587]
The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo)

[Translation]

Very Secret

Moscow, July 15, 1945.

1392. Re my telegram No. 1386.1

Stalin and Molotov departed from here on the night of the 14th, apparently heading for Berlin. In my opinion this left at least more than half a day to spare before departure, but despite this the Soviets answered that there would be a delay in their reply to my request concerning the dispatch of the special envoy. In view of the fact that a definite answer was not given, it may be assumed that in a matter such as this, which can bring about grave results, the Soviets are avoiding a hasty reply and giving the matter full deliberation. Or it may be that they feel that we are not expecting an urgent reply, which I doubt.

Some reasons which may be thought of for the Soviets’ hesitation:

(1) Although they understand the Imperial wish concerning the termination of the war, they lack clarification with regard to the actual mission of the special envoy or with regard to whether or not concrete proposals for the termination of the war are to be presented.

(2) That Japan is proposing unconditional surrender or a peace approximating unconditional surrender would be surprising. But if Japan is thinking of a so-called negotiated peace, there would be apprehension that she is hoping for the good offices of the Soviets for mediation. In that case, it would be difficult for the Soviet Union to accept.

(3) To avoid disturbing the relations between the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union for the sake of Japan at a delicate time when harmony between the three countries is so strongly required.

(4) The need to ascertain the attitudes of England and America before giving Japan a definite reply concerning the matter of the special envoy, as Far Eastern problems are inevitably going to come up in the talks either inside or outside the meetings at the coming Big Three Conference. Or Stalin is ascertaining the intentions of the American and British leaders first, by informing them of Japan’s recent request, before replying. If this is so, the attitude of the Soviets will be difficult to determine.

1 Document No. 587.
The foregoing are some possible conjectures. Of these, No. 2, with regard to negotiated peace—to conclude a treaty terminating the war by peace negotiations, including the Greater East Asia War—is something which has been strongly rejected from the very beginning by America and Britain and particularly by the former. The Soviet Union was also hesitant regarding such a peace earlier in connection with the unconditional surrender of Germany and even urged Britain and the United States to open a second front, and with this cooperation knocked out Germany. Judging from these circumstances, a peace treaty by negotiation is something which cannot win the support of the Soviet Union. In the final analysis, if our country truly desires to terminate the war, we have no alternative but to accept unconditional surrender or something very close to it.

On the other hand, concerning the developments up to the time I read the Imperial wish, your successive telegrams had not clarified the situation. The intentions of the government and the military were not clear either regarding the termination of the war. Furthermore, in a situation where it is finally decided to settle the matter, it should be considered proper at an Imperial conference to pass a new resolution adequate to reverse the decision of the previous conference of June 8th. However, this has not been done, and in connection with notification of the Imperial wish to dispatch the special envoy immediately I feel that the scheduled special mission does not yet have the concrete conditions mentioned in point (1) above.

Even if the approval of the Soviet Union is obtained and the special envoy’s visit takes place, I cannot bear to think of the very grave results to which it may lead.

In this regard, after very carefully examining this telegram, my telegrams No. 1382 and No. 1386, should you finally decide to dispatch the special envoy, I earnestly request that the Cabinet Council resolve to have the envoy bring along a concrete proposal for the termination of the war.

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2 See Butow, Japan’s Decision To Surrender, pp. 99–101. Sato seems to have been unaware of the imperial conference of June 22 (see ibid., pp. 118–120).

2 Document No. 584.
ISSUANCE OF A PROCLAMATION CALLING FOR THE SURRENDER OF JAPAN

No. 589

740.00119 (Potsdam)/S-2445

Briefing Book Paper 1

[Extract 2]

TOP SECRET

UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF JAPAN AND POLICY TOWARD LIBERATED AREAS IN THE FAR EAST IN RELATION TO UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

I. PROPOSED STATEMENT OF UNITED NATIONS AIMS

It is proposed that the principal United Nations at war with Japan issue a joint statement or parallel statements presenting in general terms the salient features of our program for the treatment of defeated Japan, in expectation that the Japanese people will be more inclined to accept unconditional surrender if reassured in regard to their future, hard though that future may be, than they now are when facing the unknown. (A draft statement is now being prepared by the State and War Departments.)

Without abandoning our formula of "unconditional surrender", it is believed that the Japanese people could be informed in more precise terms than have been employed in the past of the treatment which they can expect to receive upon unconditional surrender and of our intention to permit them to retain their political institutions, in so far as they are not inimicable to peaceful international relations. Such a statement of aims would tend (1) to dissipate the present Japanese fear of the unknown, (2) to combat the Japanese domestic propaganda to the effect that unconditional surrender means the extinction of the Japanese state and the enslavement of the people, (3) to create a conflict in Japan between the die-hard militarists and those who wish to end the war before all of Japan is destroyed, (4) to eliminate the most serious single obstacle to Japanese unconditional surrender, namely, concern over the fate of the throne, and (5) to satisfy a growing body of opinion in United States which is demanding that we endeavor to hasten the end of the war in the Pacific by stating definitely our war aims.

[WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1945.

1 Annex 3 to the attachment to document No. 177.
2 For other extracts from this paper, see documents Nos. 574 and 607.
3 See enclosure 2 to document No. 592.
Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

ATTITUDE TOWARD THE EMPEROR

RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States Government has approved the establishment of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission to make recommendations to the participating governments:

"On the instruments to carry out the terms imposed upon Japan as a result of its unconditional surrender or total defeat; and

"On the terms and provisions to be imposed on Japan, including the measures necessary to ensure the complete disarmament and subsequent effective control of Japan." 1

As the attitude of military government toward the Emperor is a problem directly concerned with "the instruments to carry out the terms imposed upon Japan", it is suggested that if this question is raised, discussion on the matter be referred to the Far Eastern Advisory Commission.

The attitude to be taken by military government toward the Emperor has been formulated and approved by the Department of State and is submitted in general outline in the attached appendix.

[WASHINGTON,] July 3, 1945.

[Appendix]

TOP SECRET

[THE POSITION OF THE EMPEROR IN JAPAN]

I. APPREHENSION OF THE EMPEROR

The Department of State has recommended that immediately upon the unconditional surrender or total defeat of Japan, the constitutional powers of the Emperor should be suspended. It has further recommended that if it is politically practicable and physically possible the Emperor and his immediate family should be placed under protective custody in a detached palace outside of Tokyo. He should be kept in seclusion, but his personal advisers should be allowed to have access to him under reasonable conditions.

II. THE EMPEROR AND INSTRUMENT OF UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

The Department of State has also recommended, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have tentatively concurred,\(^2\) that:

1. The Emperor should proclaim that Japan has surrendered unconditionally to the United Nations at war with Japan and should command the armed forces and people of Japan to cease hostilities forthwith and to comply with all requirements imposed by the designated commander for Japan.

2. The Emperor should also command all civil and military officials to obey and enforce all orders and directives issued by the designated commander for Japan and direct them to remain at their posts and to perform their duties until specifically relieved by the designated commander.

3. The Emperor, as well as the highest available representative of the Japanese High Command, should sign and seal the instrument of unconditional surrender.

4. If the several requirements as to the acknowledgment of unconditional surrender by the Emperor are not fulfilled, the designated commander may receive the unconditional surrender of Japan by the highest military authorities of Japan or he may by proclamation take over supreme authority of Japan.

III. REMOVAL OF EMPEROR FROM JAPAN

The Department of State believes that the occupation forces should not threaten to remove the Emperor from Japan, but if for any reason they feel that his removal is advisable, the Department of State should be given an opportunity to express its opinion before such action is taken.

IV. IN THE ABSENCE OF THE EMPEROR

If the Emperor escapes from Japan or cannot be found, the occupation authorities should:

- (a) Notify the Japanese people that, so long as these conditions obtain, the occupation authorities will consider any action of the Emperor without validity.
- (b) Make no statement that the Emperor has abdicated unless the Emperor himself makes such an announcement or a regency is set up.
- (c) Take no initiative in choosing a successor to the throne.

V. INSTITUTION OF THE EMPEROR

Since the Japanese at present show an almost fanatical devotion to their sovereign, an attempt from the outside to abolish the institution of the Emperor, would, so long as the present attitude of the Japanese continues, probably be ineffective. The mere dethronement of the Emperor against the will of the Japanese people would not accomplish the abolition of the emperorship nor could it probably be

\(^2\) The Department of Defense has supplied the information that there is no evidence in the files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to indicate that the Joint Chiefs of Staff either approved or disapproved these recommendations.
effectively legislated out of existence so long as the Japanese believed
in it and were determined to maintain it. Under these circumstances
the indefinite occupation of Japan might be necessary if the United
Nations wished to prevent the revival of the institution of the
Emperor.

To assure that the treatment of the Emperor by the occupation
authorities does not prejudice the continuance of the institution of the
Emperor against the will of the Japanese people, the occupation
authorities should in all their treatment of and their contacts with the
Emperor refrain from any action which would imply recognition of or
support for the Japanese concept that the Japanese Emperor is
different from and superior to other temporal rulers, that he is of
divine origin and that he is indispensable. They should permit abso-
lute freedom of discussion, except where there may be incitement to
breaches of the peace, of political as well as other subjects.

VI. ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE EMPERORSHIP

There are indications that the Chinese may favor the abolition of
the institution of the Emperor and public opinion in the United States
increasingly seems to prefer this solution. On the other hand, it is
questionable whether the British would support such a policy. As for
the Soviet Union, their attitude on the matter is not known.

[WASHINGTON,] July 3, 1945.

No. 591

Department of the Army Files

Minutes ¹ of a Meeting of the Committee of Three ²

[Extract]

TOP SECRET

MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF THREE HELD TUESDAY,
JUNE 26, 1945, AT 9:30 AM

Present: Messrs. Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War
James V. Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy
Joseph C. Grew, Acting Secretary of State
Mr. John J. McCloy was present as Recorder.
Major M. F. Correa was present at the invitation of the
Committee.

The discussion continued on the subject of [a] warning to Japan
and the Secretary of War read a draft of memorandum he had pre-

¹ By John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War.
² i.e., the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the
Navy, or their representatives.

[No. 591]
pared for the President. A discussion of the effect of the proposed warning on world and domestic opinion followed. There was general agreement, however, that the tone of the proposed letter was about right and that though following the program suggested in the letter might not achieve the capitulation desired, it might do so, and it was thought that no harm would result from trying. It was pointed out that it might very well consolidate opinion for an out and out struggle if the Japanese did not respond and it might check in the U. S. a deterioration of will to complete the defeat of Japan, as it would make clear the necessity for fullest efforts if the Japanese did not accede.

It was left that a subcommittee of the State, War, and Navy Departments would attempt to draft the actual warning as well as any other papers that would be incidental to the delivery of such a warning.

Major Correa was designated by the Secretary of the Navy as the Navy representative, Mr. McCloy was appointed representative for the War Department, and Mr. Grew said that Mr. Doorman and Mr. Ballantine would act for the State Department.

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3 Not printed. For the text of the memorandum on this subject which Stimson sent to Truman on July 2, see document No. 592 and enclosure 1 to that document.

4 For the text of the draft warning which Stimson submitted to Truman following study by the subcommittee, see enclosure 2 to document No. 592.

No. 592

Department of the Army Files

The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 2, 1945.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am enclosing herewith a memorandum to you on the matter of the proposed warning to Japan, a subject which I have heretofore discussed with you. I have tried to state as succinctly as possible how the matter lies in my mind, and in the course of preparing the memorandum, I have consulted with the Secretary of the Navy and the Acting Secretary of State, each of whom has approved the tenor of the memorandum and has subscribed to the recommendations contained in it.

I have also had prepared a proposed form of proclamation which has been discussed with representatives of the State Department and the Navy Department, as well as with officers of the General Staff but which has not been placed in final form or in any sense approved as a

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1 This paper bears the following manuscript notation: "Handed to the President by Sec. War July 2/45".
final document by the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Navy or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It has been drafted merely to put on paper something which would give us some idea of how a warning of the character we have in mind might appear. You will note that it is written without specific relation to the employment of any new weapon. Of course it would have to be revamped to conform to the efficacy of such a weapon if the warning were to be delivered, as would almost certainly be the case, in conjunction with its use.2

As these papers were primarily prepared as a possible background for some of your discussions at the forthcoming conference, this added element was not included, but a suitable provision could be readily added at the appropriate time.

I shall continue to discuss this matter with the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Navy, as well as with the representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and will of course keep you currently informed of any further suggestions we may have.

Faithfully yours,

HENRY L STIMSON

[Enclosure 1]

The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PROPOSED PROGRAM FOR JAPAN

1. The plans of operation up to and including the first landing have been authorized and the preparations for the operation are now actually

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2 According to John J. McCloy, at a meeting with Truman at the White House in June 1945 (which McCloy attended as Assistant Secretary of War) the suggestion had been made that the Japanese should be warned, before an atomic bomb was dropped on Japan, that the United States had such a weapon. Summarizing the discussion some years later, McCloy stated that neither Secretary of War Stimson nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff had thought well of such a specific warning, one reason against it being the possibility that the work on the bomb might be unsuccessful. See John J. McCloy, The Challenge to American Foreign Policy (Cambridge, 1953), pp. 42-43.

Louis Morton, in "The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb", Foreign Affairs, vol. 35, pp. 341, 348, definitely identifies the meeting referred to as the one which took place on June 18. While the discussion of this subject was not recorded in the minutes of that meeting prepared by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see document No. 598), it may have constituted the "certain other matters" referred to in those minutes (see ibid., footnote 8). Cf. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, pp. 70-71.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND LATE DEVELOPMENTS

going on. This situation was accepted by all members of your conference on Monday, June 18th.  

2. There is reason to believe that the operation for the occupation of Japan following the landing may be a very long, costly and arduous struggle on our part. The terrain, much of which I have visited several times, has left the impression on my memory of being one which would be susceptible to a last ditch defense such as has been made on Iwo Jima and Okinawa and which of course is very much larger than either of those two areas. According to my recollection it will be much more unfavorable with regard to tank maneuvering than either the Philippines or Germany.  

3. If we once land on one of the main islands and begin a forceful occupation of Japan, we shall probably have cast the die of last ditch resistance. The Japanese are highly patriotic and certainly susceptible to calls for fanatical resistance to repel an invasion. Once started in actual invasion, we shall in my opinion have to go through with an even more bitter finish fight than in Germany. We shall incur the losses incident to such a war and we shall have to leave the Japanese islands even more thoroughly destroyed than was the case with Germany. This would be due both to the difference in the Japanese and German personal character and the differences in the size and character of the terrain through which the operations will take place.  

4. A question then comes: Is there any alternative to such a forceful occupation of Japan which will secure for us the equivalent of an unconditional surrender of her forces and a permanent destruction of her power again to strike an aggressive blow at the "peace of the Pacific"? I am inclined to think that there is enough such chance to make it well worthwhile our giving them a warning of what is to come and a definite opportunity to capitulate. As above suggested, it should be tried before the actual forceful occupation of the homeland islands is begun and furthermore the warning should be given in ample time to permit a national reaction to set in. 

We have the following enormously favorable factors on our side—factors much weightier than those we had against Germany:  

Japan has no allies.  
Her navy is nearly destroyed and she is vulnerable to a surface and underwater blockade which can deprive her of sufficient food and supplies for her population.  
She is terribly vulnerable to our concentrated air attack upon her crowded cities, industrial and food resources.  
She has against her not only the Anglo-American forces but the rising forces of China and the ominous threat of Russia.  
We have inexhaustible and untouched industrial resources to bring to bear against her diminishing potential.  

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3 See document No. 598.
We have great moral superiority through being the victim of her first sneak attack.

The problem is to translate these advantages into prompt and economical achievement of our objectives. I believe Japan is susceptible to reason in such a crisis to a much greater extent than is indicated by our current press and other current comment. Japan is not a nation composed wholly of mad fanatics of an entirely different mentality from ours. On the contrary, she has within the past century shown herself to possess extremely intelligent people, capable in an unprecedentedly short time of adopting not only the complicated technique of Occidental civilization but to a substantial extent their culture and their political and social ideas. Her advance in all these respects during the short period of sixty or seventy years has been one of the most astounding feats of national progress in history—a leap from the isolated feudalism of centuries into the position of one of the six or seven great powers of the world. She has not only built up powerful armies and navies. She has maintained an honest and effective national finance and respected position in many of the sciences in which we pride ourselves. Prior to the forcible seizure of power over her government by the fanatical military group in 1931, she had for ten years lived a reasonably responsible and respectable international life.

My own opinion is in her favor on the two points involved in this question.

a. I think the Japanese nation has the mental intelligence and versatile capacity in such a crisis to recognize the folly of a fight to the finish and to accept the proffer of what will amount to an unconditional surrender; and

b. I think she has within her population enough liberal leaders (although now submerged by the terrorists) to be depended upon for her reconstruction as a responsible member of the family of nations. I think she is better in this last respect than Germany was. Her liberals yielded only at the point of the pistol and, so far as I am aware, their liberal attitude has not been personally subverted in the way which was so general in Germany.

On the other hand, I think that the attempt to exterminate her armies and her population by gunfire or other means will tend to produce a fusion of race solidarity and antipathy which had no analogy in the case of Germany. We have a national interest in creating, if possible, a condition wherein the Japanese nation may live as a peaceful and useful member of the future Pacific community.

5. It is therefore my conclusion that a carefully timed warning be given to Japan by the chief representatives of the United States, Great Britain, China and, if then a belligerent, Russia, calling upon
Japan to surrender and permit the occupation of her country in order
to insure its complete demilitarization for the sake of the future peace.

This warning should contain the following elements:

The varied and overwhelming character of the force we are about
to bring to bear on the islands.

The inevitability and completeness of the destruction which the
full application of this force will entail.

The determination of the allies to destroy permanently all authority
and influence of those who have deceived and misled the country into
embarking on world conquest.

The determination of the allies to limit Japanese sovereignty to her
main islands and to render them powerless to mount and support
another war.

The disavowal of any attempt to extirpate the Japanese as a race
or to destroy them as a nation.

A statement of our readiness, once her economy is purged of its
militaristic influences, to permit the Japanese to maintain such
industries, particularly of a light consumer character, as offer no
threat of aggression against their neighbors, but which can produce a
sustaining economy, and provide a reasonable standard of living.
The statement should indicate our willingness, for this purpose, to
give Japan trade access to external raw materials, but no longer any
control over, the sources of supply outside her main islands. It
should also indicate our willingness, in accordance with our now
established foreign trade policy, in due course to enter into mutually
advantageous trade relations with her.

The withdrawal from their country as soon as the above objectives
of the allies are accomplished, and as soon as there has been established
a peacefully inclined government, of a character representative of
the masses of the Japanese people. I personally think that if in
saying this we should add that we do not exclude a constitutional
monarchy under her present dynasty, it would substantially add to
the chances of acceptance.

6. Success of course will depend on the potency of the warning
which we give her. She has an extremely sensitive national pride and,
as we are now seeing every day, when actually locked with the enemy
will fight to the very death. For that reason the warning must be
tendered before the actual invasion has occurred and while the
impending destruction, though clear beyond peradventure, has not
yet reduced her to fanatical despair. If Russia is a part of the threat,
the Russian attack, if actual, must not have progressed too far. Our
own bombing should be confined to military objectives as far as
possible.
TOP SECRET

PROCLAMATION BY THE HEADS OF STATE


[Delete matters inside brackets if U. S. S. R. not in war]

(1) We, the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, [the Generalissimo of the Soviet Union] and the President of the Republic of China, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to surrender on the terms we state herein.

(2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west [have now been joined by the vast military might of the Soviet Union and] are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied nations to prosecute the war against Japan until her unconditional capitulation.

(3) The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example before Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power backed by our resolve means the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

(4) Is Japan so lacking in reason that it will continue blindly to follow the leadership of those ridiculous militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation? The time has come to decide whether to continue on to destruction or to follow the path of reason.

(5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. They may be accepted or not. There are no alternatives. We shall not tarry on our way.

(6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the country into embarking

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4 The text of this enclosure was sent to the Department of State by the War Department on July 2. On July 3 the Department of State transmitted to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War by telephone the following suggestion for revising the second sentence of paragraph 12 (file No. 740.00119 PW/7-245): "This may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty if completely satisfactory evidence convinces the peace-loving nations of the genuine determination of such a government to follow policies which will render impossible for all future time the development of aggressive militarism in Japan." Cf. post, p. 899.

5 Brackets throughout this document appear in the original.
on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

(7) Until such a new order is established Japanese lands must be occupied and the exercise of our authority shall continue until there is convincing proof that Japan’s war-making power is destroyed.

(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration ⁶ shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such adjacent minor islands as we determine.

(9) The Japanese military forces shall be completely disarmed and returned to their homes and peaceful and productive lives.

(10) The Japanese shall not be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice will be meted out to all war criminals including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. Democratic tendencies found among the Japanese peoples [sic] shall be supported and strengthened. Freedom of speech, of religion and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.

(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain only such industries as will not enable her to rearm herself for war but which can produce a sustaining economy. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventually Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.

(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as our objectives are accomplished and there has been established beyond doubt a peacefully inclined, responsible government of a character representative of the Japanese people. This may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty if it be shown to the complete satisfaction of the world that such a government will never again aspire to aggression.

(13) We call upon those in authority in Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all the Japanese armed forces under the authority of the Japanese Government and High Command, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action.

The Assistant Secretary of State (MacLeish) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1945.

Subject: Interpretation of Japanese Unconditional Surrender.

Mr. Acheson pointed out at the Staff Committee meeting on July 4 that there are two views about this matter in the Department.\(^1\) Since I hold one of these views rather strongly, and since it will be impossible to discuss the matter in full prior to your departure, I should like to submit several points for consideration.

(1) *What is it precisely we propose to do?* The proposed public statement\(^2\) is couched in terms of clarification or interpretation of our announced unconditional surrender policy. The assumption is that we continue to demand unconditional surrender but that we propose to state what unconditional surrender will mean. Is this assumption correct? In our June 13 “Analysis of Memorandum Presented by Mr. Hoover”,\(^3\) we used this sentence: “Every evidence, without exception, that we are able to obtain of the views of the Japanese with regard to the institution of the throne indicates that the nonmolestation of the person of the present emperor and the preservation of the institution of the throne comprise irreducible Japanese terms.” The memorandum proceeds to state that the Japanese would be ready to undergo most drastic privations “so long as these irreducible Japanese terms were met” and are prepared for prolonged resistance if we propose to abolish the imperial institution and to try the emperor. If these are the considerations which move us to support the proposed public statement, can we describe that statement as a clarification of [or] interpretation of unconditional surrender? Surrender on terms, even irreducible terms, is not unconditional surrender. I am not here raising the question whether we should accept the irreducible Japanese terms. I am raising the question whether, if we do, we should not state explicitly what it is we are doing. If we are modifying the announced policy of unconditional surrender to a new policy of surrender on irreducible Japanese terms, the American people have a right to know it.

(2) *Is the proposed public statement on surrender policy for Japan consistent with surrender policy for Germany?* The purpose of the proposed statement, as I understand it, is to announce that the Japanese may retain their characteristic political institution and that

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\(^1\) The minutes of this meeting of the Secretary’s Staff Committee do not describe the discussion referred to by MacLeish.

\(^2\) See document No. 594.

\(^3\) Not printed.
the person of the present incumbent of that institution will not be molested. IPCOG 1/4 of May 11, 1945, directs the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Forces of Occupation in Germany to enforce a policy by which the dominant and characteristic institution of German political life is to be stamped out and the person for whom, and in whom, that institution existed is to be arrested and imprisoned. Furthermore, the restoration of this characteristic German political institution is prohibited. And, finally, German life is to be reconstructed on a democratic basis. There are, of course, historical differences between the National Socialist Party in Germany and the imperial throne in Japan. There are also differences between the Führer and the emperor, though the Führer also demanded, and was accorded, a respect which approached reverence. In spite of these differences, however, the question presents itself whether the application of these rigorous measures to Germany and their non-application to Japan will not create an obvious inconsistency which will certainly be observed and which will undoubtedly be resented by a majority of the American people.

(3) Is the proposed policy sound in fact? This is a question as to which the opinions and advice of experts are entitled to the greatest possible respect. Nevertheless, certain disturbing questions present themselves even to a non-expert like myself whose knowledge of Japan is limited to a study of a few months duration. What has made Japan dangerous in the past and will make her dangerous in the future if we permit it, is, in large part, the Japanese cult of emperor worship which gives the ruling groups in Japan—the Gembatsu—the current coalition of militarists, industrialists, large land owners and office holders—their control over the Japanese people. As Mr. Acheson pointed out in the Staff Committee, the institution of the throne is an anachronistic, feudal institution, perfectly adapted to the manipulation and use of anachronistic, feudal-minded groups within the country. To leave that institution intact is to run the grave risk that it will be used in the future as it has been used in the past. The argument most frequently advanced for the preservation of the throne is the argument that only the emperor can surrender. This is a powerful argument for the immediate future. It must be balanced against the longer-range consideration that however useful the emperor may be to us now, he may be a source of the greatest danger a generation from now. The same consideration applied to the argument that lives will be saved now if the Japanese are allowed to keep their emperor. The lives already spent will have been sacrificed in vain, and lives will be

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4 This paper circulated the text (approved by Truman on May 11, 1945) of a "Directive to Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany". A slightly modified version of this text is printed in Department of State Bulletin, vol. xiii, p. 596.
lost again in the future in a new war, if the throne is employed in the future as it has been employed in the past by the Japanese Jingos and industrial expansionists.

Recommendation. For these various reasons, I urgently recommend that no public statement be issued until there has been a real opportunity to determine the policy of the Department of State on this matter. The question has not yet been debated to conclusion in the Secretary’s Staff Committee. Secondly, I should like to record my own earnest conviction that any such statement issued on this vitally important subject should be clear and precise and subject to no possibility of misinterpretation:—that if what we propose is to replace the policy of unconditional surrender with a policy of surrender on irreducible Japanese terms, we should say so, and say so in words which no one in the United States will misunderstand.

ARCHIBALD MACLEISH

No. 594

740.00119 Control (Japan)/7-945

United States Delegation Working Paper

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

DRAFT PROCLAMATION BY THE HEADS OF STATE

[Delete matters inside brackets if U. S. S. R. not in war]

This draft has been approved by the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Acting Secretary of State.

(1) We,—The President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, [the Generalissimo of the Soviet Union] and the President of the Republic of China, representing the hundreds of mil-

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1 It has not definitely been established that this is the draft given to Byrnes on July 6 (see document No. 595). It is, however, a revision of the draft which Stimson submitted to Truman on July 2 (enclosure 2 to document No. 592) and the text here printed was attached to Hackworth’s memorandum of July 9 (document No. 596).

A variant text, identical with this document except for paragraph 11, has been erroneously identified as a draft prepared in the Department of State in May 1945. See Grew, Turbulent Era, vol. ii, p. 1431; Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings Before the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 82d Congress, 1st Session (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951-1953), pt. 3, pp. 728-734. The Department of State draft statement of May 1945 (file No. 740.0011 EW/5-3145) is, however, quite different, and the draft proclamation printed here is clearly derived from the text which Stimson had submitted to Truman on July 2 (enclosure 2 to document No. 592), which in turn was based on the material which Stimson had placed before the Committee of Three on June 26 (see document No. 591).

2 Brackets throughout this document appear in the original.
lions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that the Japanese people shall be given an opportunity to end this war on the terms we state herein.

(2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west [have now been joined by the vast military might of the Soviet Union and] are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied nations to prosecute the war against Japan until her capitulation.

(3) The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power backed by our resolve will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

(4) Are the Japanese so lacking in reason that they will continue blindly to follow the leadership of those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation? The time has come for the Japanese people to decide whether to continue on to destruction or to follow the path of reason.

(5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.

(6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

(7) Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war making power is destroyed, Japanese territory shall be occupied to the extent necessary to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

3 The words printed in italics throughout this draft were underscored in the source copy, apparently to call attention to changes from an earlier draft (see enclosure 2 to document No. 592), and this emphasis was inadvertently carried over into later drafts and into the final text. Cf. documents Nos. 1244, 1249, and 1382, printed in vol. II.
(9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

(10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. Democratic tendencies among the Japanese people shall be supported and strengthened. Freedom of speech, of religion and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.

(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy but not those which would enable her to rearm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.4

(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established beyond doubt a peacefully inclined, responsible government of a character representative of the Japanese people. This may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty if the peace-loving nations can be convinced of the genuine determination of such a government to follow policies of peace which will render impossible the future development of aggressive militarism in Japan.

(13) We call upon the Japanese people and those in authority in Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all the Japanese armed forces and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

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4The following typed memorandum, of unidentified authorship, is stapled to the file copy of this document:

"It is suggested that there be added at the end of paragraph numbered (11):

"'Questions such as reparations will be taken up at the proper time.'"

[No. 594]
Minutes of the 138th Meeting of the Secretary’s Staff Committee

[Extract]

TOP SECRET

MINUTES SECRETARY’S STAFF COMMITTEE SATURDAY MORNING, JULY 7, 1945 AT 9:15 A.M., IN THE SECRETARY’S OFFICE

Present: The Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew (presiding)

Messrs. Acheson

Dunn

Hackworth

General Holmes

Messrs. MacLeish

Pasvolsky

Rockefeller

Thorp (for Mr. Clayton)

Beninghoff

Lewis

Yost

Absent: The Secretary

Mr. Clayton

The Committee met at 9:15 a.m.

URGENT BUSINESS

TERMS OF JAPANESE SURRENDER

Mr. MacLeish discussed a memorandum which he had submitted to the Secretary on July 6,2 setting forth his point of view regarding the proposed statement to clarify the meaning of unconditional surrender as it applies to Japan.

The Acting Secretary explained that the proposed joint statement was one which he had been charged by the President to work out with the Secretaries of War and the Navy. The statement (in the form of a proclamation by the United States, Great Britain, China and possibly the Soviet Union) had been completed on July 6 in time for the Secretary to take with him to Berlin. He said it had been approved by Secretaries Stimson and Forrestal, Admiral King, and probably General Marshall. The Acting Secretary then read to the Committee the draft statement.3

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1 By James H. Lewis, Foreign Affairs Specialist, Central Secretariat.
2 Document No. 593.
3 See document No. 594.
The Committee discussed the arguments for and against the issuance of such a statement, particularly those relating to the question whether this Government should be placed in a position of supporting the retention of the institution of the Emperor. The Acting Secretary reviewed his arguments in favor of such a statement, including his belief that it is absolutely impossible to abolish the institution; that it is the military element and not the Emperor which has been responsible for the war; and that what is most important is to eliminate the military machine and the big industrial families of Japan. He emphasized again that such a statement could in no way be interpreted to be a modification of the terms of unconditional surrender.

Mr. MacLeish referred again to his feeling that the institution of the Emperor was an implement which the military machine had found useful in controlling the Japanese people. Mr. Acheson said he could not understand why, if the Emperor had no importance in Japanese war-making capacity, the military element in Japan should be so insistent on retaining the Emperor. He said there must be some reason why the people now in control consider the institution to be vital to them.

Mr. Pastovsky raised the question how large an army would be needed to control the Japanese people if the throne were abolished. Mr. MacLeish pointed out that the political institutions of Germany had been abolished and we were proposing to control the situation there. Mr. Dunn asked whether it was necessary to go beyond a statement that the Japanese would be permitted to form a government which would be peaceful. Mr. Hackworth asked why the statement could not merely say (1) that we propose to get rid of the military control of Japan, and (2) we will give the Japanese people the opportunity to develop a government of their own choosing. The Acting Secretary asked Mr. Hackworth to write out this suggested formula and to present it at the next meeting of the Committee. He suggested also that Mr. Dunn might bear in mind the Committee’s discussion when he goes to the forthcoming Berlin meeting.

Mr. Acheson said he hoped there was nothing in the record of this Committee to indicate that the Committee had approved the proposed statement. The Acting Secretary said there was not, and that the Committee was not involved or responsible in any way for the statement which had been submitted to the Secretary on July 6.

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4 See document No. 596.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND LATE DEVELOPMENTS

No. 596

740.00119 Control (Japan) 7-945

Memorandum by the Legal Adviser (Hackworth)\textsuperscript{1}

\textbf{[WASHINGTON,] July 9, 1945.}

The present system of military control in Japan must be uprooted and not allowed again to assert itself.

The people of Japan shall be given an opportunity to control their destinies along peaceful lines.\textsuperscript{2}

\textsuperscript{1} Printed from an unsigned carbon copy. This memorandum constitutes a redraft of two sentences of document No. 594, to which this paper is attached.

\textsuperscript{2} The second paragraph has been revised by hand by Dunn to read: “When the people of Japan have convinced the peace loving nations that they are going to follow peaceful lives \textit{[lines?] they shall be given an opportunity to control their destinies along peaceful lines.’”

No. 597

740.00119 P. W. 7-1345

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET \textbf{WASHINGTON, July 13, 1945.}

\textbf{DEAR MR. SECRETARY:} I am enclosing the text of the statement \textsuperscript{1} which I made to the press on July 10 regarding Japanese peace feelers so that you may know just how the land lies. My purpose in doing this was twofold. First, to put a stop to the growing speculation in this country, as indicated in speeches, editorials, et cetera, as to whether the Japanese Government had or had not made a bona fide peace offer. This trend of public thinking seemed to me to be dangerous, as tending to weaken the war morale of the country and also to create in Japan the belief that the American people are getting ready for a compromise peace and all the Japanese have to do is to continue to fight. Secondly, I believe that my statement will have created in Japan a situation where anything that the President may say as to what unconditional surrender will mean and what it will not mean will have maximum effect. In other words, my statement will not have contributed to creating in the Japanese mind any belief as to what, if anything, they can hope for, and if the President, either individually or jointly with others, now conveys the impression that unconditional surrender may not be as bad a matter as they had first believed, the door may well be opened to an early surrender. This of course is guesswork but it seems to us to be sound guesswork. I may say that my statement was unanimously approved by the

\textsuperscript{1} Text in Department of State \textit{Bulletin}, vol. xiii, p. 84.
Secretary's Staff Committee, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Office of War Information.

I hope that early action may be taken on the proposed statement by the President which I gave you before your departure spelling out a little more definitely what unconditional surrender will mean.

With the very best of wishes to the President and yourself in the great job which you are about to undertake at Terminal, I am [etc.]

JOSEPH C. GREW

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2 See document No. 594.

BASIC MILITARY OBJECTIVES, STRATEGY, AND POLICIES IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

No. 598

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (McFarland)

TOP SECRET

MINUTES OF MEETING HELD AT THE WHITE HOUSE ON MONDAY, 18 JUNE 1945 AT 1530

Present[:]
The President
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy
General of the Army G. C. Marshall
Fleet Admiral E. J. King
Lieut. General I. C. Eaker (Representing General of the Army H. H. Arnold)
The Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson
The Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Forrestal
The Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. McCloy

Secretary

Brig. General A. J. McFarland

1. DETAILS OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST JAPAN

The President stated that he had called the meeting for the purpose of informing himself with respect to the details of the campaign against Japan set out in Admiral Leahy’s memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of 14 June. He asked General Marshall if he would express his opinion.

General Marshall pointed out that the present situation with respect to operations against Japan was practically identical with

1 i.e., 3:30 p.m.

[No. 598]
the situation which had existed in connection with the operations proposed against Normandy. He then read, as an expression of his views, the following digest of a memorandum prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for presentation to the President (J. C. S. 1388): 5

Our air and sea power has already greatly reduced movement of Jap shipping south of Korea and should in the next few months cut it to a trickle if not choke it off entirely. Hence, there is no need for seizing further positions in order to block Japanese communications south of Korea.

General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz are in agreement with the Chiefs of Staff in selecting 1 November as the target date to go into Kyushu because by that time:

a. If we press preparations we can be ready.

b. Our estimates are that our air action will have smashed practically every industrial target worth hitting in Japan as well as destroying huge areas in the Jap cities.

c. The Japanese Navy, if any still exists, will be completely powerless.

d. Our sea action and air power will have cut Jap reinforcement capabilities from the mainland to negligible proportions.

Important considerations bearing on the 1 November date rather than a later one are the weather and cutting to a minimum Jap time for preparation of defenses. If we delay much after the beginning of November the weather situation in the succeeding months may be such that the invasion of Japan, and hence the end of the war, will be delayed for up to 6 months.

An outstanding military point about attacking Korea is the difficult terrain and beach conditions which appear to make the only acceptable assault areas Fusan [Pusan] in the southeast corner and Keijo [Seoul], well up the western side. To get to Fusan, which is a strongly fortified area, we must move large and vulnerable assault forces past heavily fortified Japanese areas. The operation appears more difficult and costly than assault on Kyushu. Keijo appears an equally difficult and costly operation. After we have undertaken either one of them we still will not be as far forward as going into Kyushu.

The Kyushu operation is essential to a strategy of strangulation and appears to be the least costly worthwhile operation following Okinawa. The basic point is that a lodgement in Kyushu is essential, both to tightening our strangle hold of blockade and bombardment on Japan, and to forcing capitulation by invasion of the Tokyo Plain.

We are bringing to bear against the Japanese every weapon and all the force we can employ and there is no reduction in our maximum possible application of bombardment and blockade, while at the same time we are pressing invasion preparations. It seems that if the Japanese are ever willing to capitulate short of complete military defeat in the field they will do it when faced by the completely hope- less prospect occasioned by (1) destruction already wrought by air bombardment and sea blockade, coupled with (2) a landing on Japan

5 Memorandum not printed. Apparently it was never presented to the President.
indicating the firmness of our resolution, and also perhaps coupled with (3) the entry or threat of entry of Russia into the war.

With reference to clean-up of the Asiatic mainland, our objective should be to get the Russians to deal with the Japs in Manchuria (and Korea if necessary) and to vitalize the Chinese to a point where, with assistance of American air power and some supplies, they can mop out their own country.

Casualties. Our experience in the Pacific War is so diverse as to casualties that it is considered wrong to give any estimate in numbers. Using various combinations of Pacific experience, the War Department staff reaches the conclusion that the cost of securing a worthwhile position in Korea would almost certainly be greater than the cost of the Kyushu operation. Points on the optimistic side of the Kyushu operation are that: General MacArthur has not yet accepted responsibility for going ashore where there would be disproportionate casualties. The nature of the objective area gives room for maneuver, both on the land and by sea. As to any discussion of specific operations, the following data are pertinent:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign</th>
<th>U. S. Casualties</th>
<th>Jap Casualties</th>
<th>Ratio U. S. to Jap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Killed, wounded, missing</td>
<td>Killed and Prisoners (Not including wounded)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leyte</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>78,000</td>
<td>1:4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luzon</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>156,000</td>
<td>1:5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iwo Jima</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>1:1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>34,000 (Ground)</td>
<td>81,000</td>
<td>1:2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7,700 (Navy)</td>
<td>(not a complete count)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normandy</td>
<td>1st 30 days</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The record of General MacArthur's operations from 1 March 1944 through 1 May 1945 shows 13,742 U. S. killed compared to 310,165 Japanese killed, or a ratio of 22 to 1.

There is reason to believe that the first 30 days in Kyushu should not exceed the price we have paid for Luzon. It is a grim fact that there is not an easy, bloodless way to victory in war and it is the thankless task of the leaders to maintain their firm outward front which holds the resolution of their subordinates. Any irresolution in the leaders may result in costly weakening and indecision in the subordinates. . . .

An important point about Russian participation in the war is that the impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them into capitulation at that time or shortly thereafter if we land in Japan.

In considering the matter of command and control in the Pacific war which the British wish to raise at the next conference, we must bear in mind the point that anything smacking of combined command in the Pacific might increase the difficulties with Russia and perhaps with China. Furthermore the obvious inefficiencies of combined command may directly result in increased cost in resources and American lives.

\[\text{See ante, p. 174, and post, p. 921.}\]
GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had asked General MacArthur's opinion on the proposed operation and had received from him the following telegram, which General Marshall then read:

"I believe the operation presents less hazards of excessive loss than any other that has been suggested and that its decisive effect will eventually save lives by eliminating wasteful operations of non-decisive character. I regard the operation as the most economical one in effort and lives that is possible. In this respect it must be remembered that the several preceding months will involve practically no losses in ground troops and that sooner or later a decisive ground attack must be made. The hazard and loss will be greatly lessened if an attack is launched from Siberia sufficiently ahead of our target date to commit the enemy to major combat. I most earnestly recommend no change in OLYMPIC. Additional subsidiary attacks will simply build up our final total casualties."

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it was his personal view that the operation against Kyushu was the only course to pursue. He felt that air power alone was not sufficient to put the Japanese out of the war. It was unable alone to put the Germans out. General Eaker and General Eisenhower both agreed to this. Against the Japanese, scattered through mountainous country, the problem would be much more difficult than it had been in Germany. He felt that this plan offered the only way the Japanese could be forced into a feeling of utter helplessness. The operation would be difficult but not more so than the assault in Normandy. He was convinced that every individual moving to the Pacific should be indoctrinated with a firm determination to see it through.

ADMIRAL KING agreed with General Marshall's views and said that the more he studied the matter, the more he was impressed with the strategic location of Kyushu, which he considered the key to the success of any siege operations. He pointed out that within three months the effects of air power based on Okinawa will begin to be felt strongly in Japan. It seemed to him that Kyushu followed logically after Okinawa. It was a natural setup. It was his opinion that we should do Kyushu now, after which there would be time to judge the effect of possible operations by the Russians and the Chinese. The weather constituted quite a factor. So far as preparation was concerned, we must aim now for Tokyo Plain; otherwise we will never be able to accomplish it. If preparations do not go forward now, they cannot be arranged for later. Once started, however, they can always be stopped if desired.⁵

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed that Kyushu was a necessity and pointed out that it constituted a landing in the Japanese homeland.

Kyushu having been arranged for, the decision as to further action could be made later.

The President inquired if a later decision would not depend on what the Russians agree to do. It was agreed that this would have considerable influence.

The President then asked Admiral Leahy for his views of the situation.

Admiral Leahy recalled that the President had been interested in knowing what the price in casualties for Kyushu would be and whether or not that price could be paid. He pointed out that the troops on Okinawa had lost 35 percent in casualties. If this percentage were applied to the number of troops to be employed in Kyushu, he thought from the similarity of the fighting to be expected that this would give a good estimate of the casualties to be expected. He was interested therefore in finding out how many troops are to be used in Kyushu.

Admiral King called attention to what he considered an important difference in Okinawa and Kyushu. There had been only one way to go on Okinawa. This meant a straight frontal attack against a highly fortified position. On Kyushu, however, landings would be made on three fronts simultaneously and there would be much more room for maneuver. It was his opinion that a realistic casualty figure for Kyushu would lie somewhere between the number experienced by General MacArthur in the operations on Luzon and the Okinawa casualties.

General Marshall pointed out that the total assault troops for the Kyushu campaign were shown in the memorandum prepared for the President as 766,700. He said, in answer to the President’s question as to what opposition could be expected on Kyushu, that it was estimated at eight Japanese divisions or about 350,000 troops. He said that divisions were still being raised in Japan and that reinforcement from other areas was possible but it was becoming increasingly difficult and painful.

The President asked about the possibility of reinforcements for Kyushu moving south from the other Japanese islands.

General Marshall said that it was expected that all communications with Kyushu would be destroyed.

Admiral King described in some detail the land communications between the other Japanese islands and Kyushu and stated that as a result of operations already planned, the Japanese would have to depend on sea shipping for any reinforcement.

Admiral Leahy stressed the fact that Kyushu was an island. It was crossed by a mountain range, which would be difficult for either the Japanese or the Americans to cross. The Kyushu opera-
tion, in effect, contemplated the taking of another island from which to bring increased air power against Japan.

The President expressed the view that it was practically creating another Okinawa closer to Japan, to which the Chiefs of Staff agreed.

The President then asked General Eaker for his opinion of the operation as an air man.

General Eaker said that he agreed completely with the statements made by General Marshall in his digest of the memorandum prepared for the President. He had just received a cable in which General Arnold also expressed complete agreement. He stated that any blockade of Honshu was dependent upon airdromes on Kyushu; that the air plan contemplated employment of 40 groups of heavy bombers against Japan and that these could not be deployed without the use of airfields on Kyushu. He said that those who advocated the use against Japan of air power alone overlooked the very impressive fact that air casualties are always much heavier when the air faces the enemy alone and that these casualties never fail to drop as soon as the ground forces come in. Present air casualties are averaging 2 percent per mission, about 30 percent per month. He wished to point out and to emphasize that delay favored only the enemy and he urged that there be no delay.

The President said that as he understood it the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after weighing all the possibilities of the situation and considering all possible alternative plans were still of the unanimous opinion that the Kyushu operation was the best solution under the circumstances.

The Chiefs of Staff agreed that this was so.

The President then asked the Secretary of War for his opinion.

Mr. Stimson agreed with the Chiefs of Staff that there was no other choice. He felt that he was personally responsible to the President more for political than for military considerations. It was his opinion that there was a large submerged class in Japan who do not favor the present war and whose full opinion and influence had never yet been felt. He felt sure that this submerged class would fight and fight tenaciously if attacked on their own ground. He was concerned that something should be done to arouse them and to develop any possible influence they might have before it became necessary to come to grips with them.

The President stated that this possibility was being worked on all the time. He asked if the invasion of Japan by white men would not have the effect of more closely uniting the Japanese.

Mr. Stimson thought there was every prospect of this. He agreed with the plan proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as being the best

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6 Not printed.
thing to do, but he still hoped for some fruitful accomplishment through other means.

The President then asked for the views of the Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. Forrestal pointed out that even if we wished to besiege Japan for a year or a year and a half, the capture of Kyushu would still be essential. Therefore, the sound decision is to proceed with the operation against Kyushu. There will still be time thereafter to consider the main decision in the light of subsequent events.

Mr. McCloy said he felt that the time was propitious now to study closely all possible means of bringing out the influence of the submerged group in Japan which had been referred to by Mr. Stimson.

The President stated that one of his objectives in connection with the coming conference would be to get from Russia all the assistance in the war that was possible. To this end he wanted to know all the decisions that he would have to make in advance in order to occupy the strongest possible position in the discussions.

Admiral Leahy said that he could not agree with those who said to him that unless we obtain the unconditional surrender of the Japanese that we will have lost the war. He feared no menace from Japan in the foreseeable future, even if we were unsuccessful in forcing unconditional surrender. What he did fear was that our insistence on unconditional surrender would result only in making the Japanese desperate and thereby increase our casualty lists. He did not think that this was at all necessary.

The President stated that it was with that thought in mind that he had left the door open for Congress to take appropriate action with reference to unconditional surrender. However, he did not feel that he could take any action at this time to change public opinion on the matter.

The President said he considered the Kyushu plan all right from the military standpoint and, so far as he was concerned, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could go ahead with it; that we can do this operation and then decide as to the final action later.

The President reiterated that his main reason for this conference with the Chiefs of Staff was his desire to know definitely how far we could afford to go in the Japanese campaign. He had hoped that there was a possibility of preventing an Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other. He was clear on the situation now and was quite sure that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should proceed with the Kyushu operation.

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With reference to operations in China, General Marshall expressed the opinion that we should not seek an over-all commander in China. The present situation in which the Generalissimo was supporting General Wedemeyer, acting as his Chief of Staff, was entirely satisfactory. The suggestion of the appointment of an over-all commander might cause some difficulty.

Admiral King said he wished to emphasize the point that, regardless of the desirability of the Russians entering the war, they were not indispensable and he did not think we should go so far as to beg them to come in. While the cost of defeating Japan would be greater, there was no question in his mind but that we could handle it alone. He thought that the realization of this fact should greatly strengthen the President's hand in the forthcoming conference.

The President and the Chiefs of Staff then discussed certain other matters.  

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8 This paragraph may refer to discussion of a suggestion that the Japanese should be warned, before an atomic bomb was dropped on Japan, that the United States had such a weapon. See document No. 392, footnote 2.

No. 599

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff ¹

TOP SECRET  [WASHINGTON,] 29 June 1945.
C. C. S. 880/4

DEVELOPMENT OF OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC

1. In conformity with the over-all objective to bring about the unconditional surrender of Japan at the earliest possible date, the United States Chiefs of Staff have adopted the following concept of operations for the main effort in the Pacific:

   a. From bases in Okinawa, Iwo Jima, Marianas, and the Philippines to intensify the blockade and air bombardment of Japan in order to create a situation favorable to:

   b. An assault on Kyushu for the purpose of further reducing Japanese capabilities by containing and destroying major enemy forces and further intensifying the blockade and air bombardment in order to establish a tactical condition favorable to:

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¹ Noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 193d Meeting, July 16. See vol. ii, p. 38. Cf. appendix A to document No. 1381, printed in vol. ii.
c. The decisive invasion of the industrial heart of Japan through the Tokyo Plain.

2. We have curtailed our projected expansion in the Ryukyus by deferring indefinitely the seizure of Miyako Jima and Kikai Jima. Using the resources originally provided for Miyako and Kikai, we have accelerated the development of Okinawa. By doing this, a greater weight of effort will more promptly be brought to bear against Japan and the risk of becoming involved in operations which might delay the seizure of southern Kyushu is avoided.

3. In furtherance of the accomplishment of the over-all objectives, we have directed:

a. The invasion of Kyushu, target date 1 November 1945.
b. The continuation of operations for securing and maintaining control of sea communications to and in the Western Pacific as are required for the accomplishment of the over-all objective.
c. The defeat of the remaining Japanese in the Philippines by such operations as can be executed without prejudice to the over-all objective.
d. The seizure of Balikpapan, target date 1 July 1945.
e. The continuance of strategic air operations to support the accomplishment of the over-all objective.

4. Planning and preparation for the campaign in Japan subsequent to the invasion of Kyushu is continuing on the basis of meeting a target date of 1 March 1946 for the invasion of the Tokyo Plain. This planning is premised on the belief that defeat of the enemy's armed forces in the Japanese homeland is a prerequisite to unconditional surrender, and that such a defeat will establish the optimum prospect of capitulation by Japanese forces outside the main Japanese islands. We recognize the possibility also that our success in the main islands may not obviate the necessity of defeating Japanese forces elsewhere; decision as to steps to be taken in this eventuality must await further developments.

5. We are keeping under continuing review the possibility of capitalizing at small cost, without delaying the supreme operations, upon Japanese military deterioration and withdrawals in the China Theater.

6. We have directed the preparation of plans for the following:

a. Keeping open a sea route to Russian Pacific ports.
b. Operations to effect an entry into Japan proper for occupational purposes in order to take immediate advantage of favorable circumstances such as a sudden enemy collapse or surrender.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND LATE DEVELOPMENTS

No. 600

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

C. C. S. 877/1

[WASHINGTON,] 30 June 1945.

BASIC OBJECTIVES, STRATEGY, AND POLICIES

References: CCS 877 ¹
CCS 824/5 ²
CCS 746/10 & 746/24 ³

1. The British Chiefs of Staff would like to propose three amendments to the memorandum put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff (C. C. S. 877).

2. First, at the end of paragraph 4 a. they would like to change the words “British Isles” to read “British Commonwealth.” As at present phrased, the wording would not safeguard Imperial requirements, e.g., for India and Australia.

3. Second, for the reasons already given in paragraph 5, C. C. S. 824/4, the British Chiefs of Staff would still prefer to delete the words “or delay” in the last line of paragraph 5.

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¹ The United States Chiefs of Staff had made the following recommendation in C. C. S. 877, dated June 14 (J. C. S. Files):

“The agreed summary of broad principles regarding the prosecution of the war, set forth in C. C. S. 776/3 [see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 827], was based upon the agreed concept that Germany was the principal enemy. The unconditional surrender of Germany, and the vital importance of rapidly reorienting strength so that the maximum possible effort may now be brought to bear against Japan, make it desirable that this summary of broad principles be revised in consonance with the changed situation. Acceptance now of these principles will establish appropriate emphasis on the war against Japan, while taking cognizance of the changed situation in the European Theater. Accordingly, the United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the following statements of basic objectives, strategy, and policies.”

For paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of the draft statements referred to, see the left-hand column of the enclosure to document No. 1263, printed in vol. II. Paragraph 4 read as follows:

“4. The following basic undertakings are considered fundamental to the prosecution of the war:—

“a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.

“b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas with first priority given to those forces in combat areas.

“c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication.”

² Not printed.
³ Neither printed.

⁴ The reasons referred to are stated as follows in C. C. S. 824/4, a memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff dated May 3, 1945: “They [the British Chiefs of Staff] would also like to omit the words ‘or delays’... as these words could be interpreted very widely and this might lead to subsequent misunderstandings.”
4. Third, the British Chiefs of Staff point out that since discussions regarding the formula for priorities began, the cargo shipping review has been completed and formal approval to it should be given shortly. This review will cover all present foreseen requirements, but it remains to safeguard approved military operations against additional civil requirements not now covered in the cargo shipping review. For this reason, therefore, the British Chiefs of Staff would like to suggest that a paragraph should be added to the memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff as follows:

"7. The above formulae relate to cargo shipping, only in so far as additional requirements arise. Schedules of proposed military and civil allocations for the period 1 July 1945 to 30 June 1946 have been agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C. C. S. 746/24). The combined shipping authorities have given assurances (C. C. S. 746/10) that no civil allocations additional to the above, which might prejudice approved operational requirements, will be accepted without prior consultation with the appropriate Chiefs of Staff."

5. Subject to the above remarks the British Chiefs of Staff are in full agreement with the memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff (C. C. S. 877), and would not propose to submit any separate formula on priorities. If the United States Chiefs of Staff feel able to accept the amendments proposed above, the British Chiefs of Staff suggest that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should adopt the formula in C. C. S. 877, as amended by this paper, at once and incorporate it in the final report of the Terminal Conference.

No. 601

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 10 July 1945.
C. C. S. 877/2

BASIC OBJECTIVES, STRATEGY, AND POLICIES

1. With reference to the amendment proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff to paragraph 4 a., "Basic Undertakings and Policies for the Prosecution of the War," of C. C. S. 877, the United States Chiefs of Staff had not proposed to change the wording of this paragraph, even though it does not fit the present situation. Now that the point has been raised, however, it is considered that the paragraph should recognize that, at this stage in the war, there is no longer any particular connection between "security" and "war-making capacity" in so

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1 See document No. 600.
2 See document No. 600, footnote 1.
far as the completion of the war against Japan is concerned. They agree to the inclusion of the term “British Commonwealth” in the statement in so far as “security” is concerned, even though the entire Commonwealth is not at war with Japan.

2. It is the view of the United States Chiefs of Staff that with the end of the war with Germany, justification does not exist for expanding the basic undertaking concerning “war-making capacity” which has been agreed during the period of a two-front war. Rather, now that our entire productive capacity is no longer being devoted to an all-out war, the wording should clearly restrict to this war the commitment in the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

3. Since the British Chiefs of Staff do not wish to continue the original wording, the United States Chiefs of Staff consider that paragraph 4 a. of the statement proposed in C. C. S. 877 should be deleted, the following substituted therefor, and paragraphs 4 b. and c. re-lettered accordingly:—

“4. a. Maintain the security of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth.

b. Maintain the war-making capacity of the U. S. and the British Isles in so far as it is connected with the prosecution of this war.”

4. As to the proposal to delete the words “or delay” from the sentence, “No other operations will be undertaken which hazard the success of, or delay, these main operations.”, such deletion would make it meaningless in so far as establishing a priority for operations is concerned. The United States Chiefs of Staff see reasons for inclusion of the phrase and see no reason even for considering its deletion unless the British Chiefs of Staff intend to propose an operation which might delay the main operations.

5. As to the proposal that a paragraph be added relating to cargo shipping, the intent of the memorandum proposed by C. C. S. 877 was to establish broad principles for the prosecution of the war. The United States Chiefs of Staff believe that interpretation of these principles to apply to specific cases should be considered as separate matters. The statements of broad policy contained in C. C. S. 877 will serve as guides to resolve problems in allocation of forces and resources. However, after meeting requirements for the supreme operations against Japan, there may remain matters of logistical and operational priorities which will require resolution by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and will have to be considered on their merits as they arise. It is therefore suggested that priorities for cargo shipping be excluded from the statement of basic policies and remain under consideration in the C. C. S. 746 series.
PLANNING DATE FOR THE END OF ORGANIZED RESISTANCE BY JAPAN

J. C. S. Files

No. 602

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 1

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] 7 July 1945.
C. C. S. 880/8

PLANNING DATE FOR THE END OF ORGANIZED RESISTANCE BY JAPAN
(For the Purpose of Planning Production and the Allocation of Manpower)

With reference to item (9), "Planning date for the end of the war against Japan," of the proposed agenda for United States–British military staff conferences (C. C. S. 880), the United States Chiefs of Staff recommend agreement to the following:—

a. That for the purpose of planning production and the allocation of manpower, the planning date for the end of organized resistance by Japan be 15 November 1946; that this date be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war.

b. The United States Chiefs of Staff desire to avoid use of the term "end of the war" in the sense proposed in the agenda, in view of the fact that certain United States laws, which should remain in effect during the period of occupation of Japan, will automatically lapse at stated periods after "the end of the war."

1 Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 196th Meeting, July 19. See vol. II, p. 115.
2 Document No. 154.

CONTROL AND COMMAND IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

No. 603

Truman Papers

Memorandum by the Assistant to the President’s Naval Aide (Elsey) 1

TOP SECRET [Undated.]

INDO-CHINA

Indo-China first became a subject in Presidential messages in November 1944. General Wedemeyer, Commanding General of U. S. Forces in China, on 15 November reported 2 that British, Dutch and French interests were making an intensive effort to ensure recovery of their prewar political and economic positions in the Far East. One example of this effort was the establishment of a French

1 Submitted to Leahy July 1 and subsequently forwarded to Truman.
2 Report not printed.

[No. 603]
military mission in India which was preparing to infiltrate into Indo-China. For his guidance, Wedemeyer asked for U. S. policy regarding Indo-China which, by decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, is in the Chinese Theater.

President Roosevelt instructed Ambassador Hurley the next day to inform Wedemeyer that “United States policy with regard to French Indo-China cannot be formulated until after consultation with Allies at a forthcoming Combined Staff conference.”

The President also asked Hurley to keep him posted on British, French and Dutch activities in southeastern Asia. Hurley had no information on Indo-China to pass to the President at the time, but on 26 November he sent a short diatribe against the policies of our three Allies which, he said, were directed to the “repossession of their colonial empires and the reestablishment therein of imperial governments.” On New Year’s Day 1945, Hurley sent the President a long and unfavorable analysis of British, Dutch and French policies with respect to China but he still had no information regarding Indo-China.

Nor did the Joint Chiefs of Staff know what our Allies proposed to do there. On 21 November, [1944,] by direction of the President, they had informed the Commanding Generals of U. S. Forces in India, Burma and China that: “This Government has made no final decisions on the future of Indo-China, and it expects to be consulted in advance with regard to any arrangements applicable to the future of southeast Asia.” The Joint Chiefs were not consulted by the British or the French, however, and when President Roosevelt arrived at Yalta he had no official information on their intentions with respect to Indo-China except that de Gaulle had spoken in a general way about sending French troops there.

On 8 February, while explaining his views on trusteeships, President Roosevelt told Stalin he had in mind a trusteeship for Indo-China. He said the British did not approve and wanted to give it back to the French because they feared that the implications of a trusteeship might affect Burma. He added that the French had done nothing to improve the natives since obtaining the colony. When President

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4 See ibid., and Don Lobbeck, Patrick J. Hurley (Chicago, 1956), p. 322.
6 Full text not printed.
7 This paragraph does not take account of Anglo-American consultations affecting Indochina, in which both the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were involved, which had been proceeding for almost a year. The President had been informed of the status of these consultations by the Department of State in December 1944, more than a month before the Yalta Conference, and Indochina continued to receive the attention of the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the early months of 1945.
Roosevelt said that de Gaulle had asked for ships to transport French forces to Indo-China, Stalin asked where de Gaulle would get the troops. The President replied that de Gaulle had said he would find the troops when the President found the ships; so far there were no ships. In March, Wedemeyer and Hurley were both in Washington. President Roosevelt told Wedemeyer that he must watch carefully to prevent British and French political activities in the area and that he should give only such support to the British and French as would be required in direct operations against the Japanese.

On 24 March, President Roosevelt and Hurley had a long discussion on Indo-China. Hurley reported this conversation to President Truman on 28 May as follows:

"In my last conference with President Roosevelt, I informed him fully on the Indo-China situation. I told him that the French, British and Dutch were cooperating to prevent the establishment of a United Nations trusteeship for Indo-China. The imperialist leaders believe that such a trusteeship would be a bad precedent for the other imperialistic areas in southeast Asia. I told the President also that the British would attempt, with the use of our Lend-Lease supplies and if possible our manpower, to occupy Indo-China and reestablish their former imperial control. I suggested to the President that for my own guidance and in order to clarify Wedemeyer’s position I thought we should have a written directive on Indo-China. The President said that in the coming San Francisco Conference there would be set up a United Nations Trusteeship that would make effective the right of colonial people to choose the form of government under which they will live as soon as in the opinion of the United Nations they are qualified for independence."

While Wedemeyer and Hurley were in Washington, Churchill wired that he understood there had been occasional difficulties between Wedemeyer and Lord [Louis] Mountbatten, British Commander of the Southeast Asia Theater, about activities in Indo-China, and he proposed that he and President Roosevelt direct the Combined Chiefs of Staff to make arrangements for “full and frank exchange of intentions, plans and intelligence between Wedemeyer and Mountbatten as regards all matters of mutual concern.”

The President replied on 22 March that he understood both commanders were independently conducting air operations and intelligence missions in Indo-China. This was wasteful and apt to
produce dangerous confusion, and President Roosevelt suggested a solution:

"It seems to me the best solution at present is for you and me to agree that all Anglo-American-Chinese military operations in Indo-China, regardless of their nature, be coordinated by General Wedemeyer as Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo. If you agree to this proposal, I suggest that you direct Mountbatten to coordinate his activities in Indo-China with Wedemeyer."

Churchill did not reply to the President’s suggestion until 11 April, after Wedemeyer had stopped at Mountbatten’s headquarters on his return to China from Washington. The two theater commanders had discussed operations in Indo-China. Wedemeyer was guided by President Roosevelt’s verbal directive to support only British and French operations directed against the Japanese, and he left Mountbatten’s headquarters believing he had reached an agreement whereby the British Commander would not carry out operations in Indo-China until they had been approved by him.

Mountbatten had another understanding of the agreement, however, and the British conception of it was voiced by Churchill to President Roosevelt on 11 April. It was apparent that political motives inspired British operations in Indo-China, as the Prime Minister wrote:

"Now that the Japanese have taken over Indo-China and that substantial resistance is being offered by French patriots, it is essential not only that we should support the French by all the means in our power, but also that we should associate them with our operations into their country. It would look very bad in history if we failed to support isolated French forces in their resistance to the Japanese to the best of our ability, or, if we excluded the French from participation in our councils as regards Indo-China."

It was also apparent that the British did not consider the Wedemeyer-Mountbatten agreement as calling for anything more than an interchange of information, for Churchill quoted his proposed directive to Mountbatten as follows:

"You may conduct from whatsoever base appears most suitable the minimum pre-occupational activities in Indo-China which local emergency and the advance of your forces require. It is essential, however, that you should keep General Wedemeyer . . . continually informed of your operations. . . ."

President Truman answered Churchill’s message on 14 April. He did not make an issue with Churchill, but he carefully stated the

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12 Chiang Kai-shek.
13 Ellipses and brackets throughout this document appear in the original.
14 Full text not printed.
American understanding of the Wedemeyer–Mountbatten agreement, as follows:

"General Wedemeyer reports that his conference with Admiral Mountbatten resulted in an agreement that the latter would notify Wedemeyer when he desired to conduct an operation in Indo-China and that the operation would not be conducted until approval was given by the Generalissimo. Wedemeyer’s understanding is that the procedure will be for Mountbatten to notify General Carton De Wiart, who would inform Wedemeyer in his capacity as chief of staff to the Generalissimo. If the proposed operation from SEAC could not be integrated with China Theater plans, then Mountbatten agreed he would not undertake it."

Following different policies and without an understanding on operations in Indo-China, Wedemeyer and Mountbatten came into open disagreement in May. Mountbatten informed Wedemeyer he intended to fly 26 sorties into Indo-China in support of French guerrilla groups.

Wedemeyer asked for more information because, he said, the French Government had placed all French guerrilla groups in Indo-China under the Generalissimo (Wedemeyer is Chiang’s Chief of Staff) and not under Mountbatten. He asked the specific question, “What arrangements have been made to insure that the equipment furnished guerrilla units is employed against the Japanese?”

Mountbatten did not answer this question, and after a quick exchange of messages in which he gave Wedemeyer neither the numbers nor the locations of the guerrilla units which he intended to supply, Mountbatten abruptly ordered his planes to carry out the sorties without waiting for the consent or approval of Wedemeyer or Chiang Kai-shek. Wedemeyer on 25 May protested vigorously:

“It had never occurred to me that you would presume that you have authority to operate in an area contiguous to your own without cognizance and full authority of the Commander of that area. . . . Your decision to conduct these operations without the Generalissimo’s approval is a direct violation of the intent of our respective directives.”

Wedemeyer informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the circumstances, as he saw them, of his misunderstanding with Mountbatten. He reported his conclusions:

“I have not sufficient information available to coordinate or evaluate the operations Mountbatten is now undertaking and I cannot carry out the explicit instructions of the President. . . . If lend-lease materials are being made available by United States to British in

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15 Full text of message not printed.
16 Not printed.
support of French Indo-China operations, I believe that these materials should be turned over . . . [to the China Theater] so that our country at least gets credit for such support and further so that I can carry out my directive in screening the nature of operations in the area. 17

Ambassador Hurley summarized his own view of the conflict in British and American policies which underlay the Wedemeyer-Mountbatten dispute in a long message to President Truman on 28 [29] May: 17

"I had been definitely directed verbally by President Roosevelt in regard to his policy in Indo-China," he wrote, "but we in this theater have never received a written directive on the political policy of the United States in Indo-China.

"It is in this situation we find ourselves when Lord Louis Mountbatten, the Supreme British Commander in Southeast Asia, informed Wedemeyer by cable that he is flying British sorties into Indo-China, which is not in his theater, without the consent of the Theater Commander, the Generalissimo, and without the consent or cooperation of General Wedemeyer. This military phase of the situation is being submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Wedemeyer. Lord Louis is using American lend-lease supplies and other American resources to invade Indo-China to defeat what we believe to be the American policy and to reestablish French imperialism.

"Attention is called to the fact that Lord Louis very recently requested, General Sultan, United States India-Burma Commander, for a large increase in lend-lease supplies that will enable him to defeat the Roosevelt policy in Indo-China and reestablish imperialism in that area. If you, sir, are opposed to Lord Louis[?] political objectives in Indo-China, I suggest that our Government stop giving him lend-lease supplies and deny him the use of American Air Forces and other American resources.

"The move of the imperialistic powers to use American resources to enable them to move with force into Indo-China is not for the purpose of participating in the main battle against Japan. Such a move would have two political objectives: (1) The reestablishment of imperialism in Indo-China and (2) The placing of British forces in a position where they could occupy Hong Kong and prevent the return of Hong Kong to China.

"It would clarify the situation in Asia for all of us if we could be given: (1) A definite Indo-China policy, and (2) A definite policy on Hong Kong or if we could be directed to follow the Roosevelt policy in both areas."

On 31 May, in a personal message to General Marshall, 18 Wedemeyer endorsed Hurley's interpretation of British intentions in the Far East. He reported that his information pointed to an increase of British political and economic operations in Indo-China for the purpose of recovering British pre-war prestige and economic preference in Southeast Asia; and that it was probable the British would

17 For another extract from this message, see ante, p. 917. For further extracts, see Military Situation in the Far East, pt. 4, p. 2890-2892; Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, pp. 409-411, 413-414.
18 Not printed.
propose, at the next Big Three meeting, extending the boundaries of Mountbatten's command to include all former British, French and Dutch colonial possessions.

There have been no Presidential messages on Indo-China within the past month. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken no action on inter-theater disputes in Asia, pending a meeting of the Combined Chiefs; Churchill has maintained a careful silence; and President Truman has told Hurley that this question will probably be discussed at the forthcoming Berlin Conference.\(^9\)

\(^9\) See document No. 149.

G. M. Elsey

\[\text{No. 604}\]

**Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff**

**TOP SECRET**

**[WASHINGTON,] 9 July 1945.**  
C. C. S. 890

**CONTROL AND COMMAND IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN**

1. We have been instructed to present the attached memorandum on command and control in the war against Japan which the British Chiefs of Staff have prepared for discussion at the next conference.

2. The views of the Australian and New Zealand Governments on the proposals formulated have been requested but have not yet been received.\(^1\)

\[\text{[Enclosure]}\]

**TOP SECRET**

**CONTROL AND COMMAND IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN**

**MEMORANDUM BY THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF**

1. In considering the proposals made by the United States Chiefs of Staff on the transfer of command in the Southwest Pacific Area,\(^2\) we have reviewed the whole question of command and control in the war against Japan under the following headings:—

I. Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) and Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA)

- (a) Boundaries of command
- (b) Chain of command
- (c) Date of transfer

II. Higher Strategic Control of the War against Japan

\(^1\) Concerning the Australian views on the enclosed memorandum and on document No. 615, see John Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, vol. vi (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), p. 268. The New Zealand views were not received prior to the conclusion of the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff held in connection with the Berlin Conference. See ibid., p. 269.

\(^2\) Not printed.

[No. 604]
I. SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

2. We agree with the United States Chiefs of Staff that there should shortly be some alteration in the responsibility for SWPA. In our view, the transfer of this responsibility will involve alterations in the boundaries of the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia's (SACSEA) command. We make the following proposals:

*Boundaries of Command*

3. SACSEA’s boundaries should be extended as follows:

Beginning at the junction of the Sino-Burmese frontier and the Sino-Indo-China frontier, along the frontier between Indo-China and China to the coast; thence down the coast of Indo-China to a point 15 degrees N; thence through the Balabac Strait along the 1939 boundary line between the Philippines and Borneo to latitude 05 degrees N; thence eastward to 05 degrees N, 128 degrees E; thence southward to 02 degrees S, 123 degrees E; thence southward to 08 degrees S, 125 degrees E; thence southwestward to 18 degrees S, 110 degrees E.

The main difference from the proposal so far made to us by the United States Chiefs of Staff is the inclusion of Indo-China, as well as Siam, in SEAC. This we consider important so that there may be unity of control of the major operations in this area when they develop and of previous subversive and paramilitary operations.

This line of demarcation would add Borneo, Java, and the Celebes to SEAC.

4. Boundaries of Australian command should now be defined as follows:

05 degrees N, 128 degrees E; thence to 05 degrees N, 130 degrees E; thence south to the Equator; thence to the International Date Line.

The main difference between this line of demarcation and that proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff is that all Australian mandated territories are now included in the area. This is naturally the desire of the Australian Government, with which we are in sympathy. It would, of course, be possible for United States forces to make use of the facilities in Manus and Guadalcanal.

*Chain of Command*

5. We propose that the chain of command and responsibility should then be as follows:

a. SEAC—no change.

b. Australian command—in this area there should be an Australian commander under the Australian Chiefs of Staff. The British Chiefs

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3 Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten was Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia.
of Staff should be the link between the Australian and Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Date of Transfer

6. In our view SACSEA may not be ready to assume his additional responsibilities until after the recapture of Singapore. We, therefore, propose that, subject to further examination with the United States Chiefs of Staff, the transfer of command should take place shortly after that time. This need not preclude the gradual turnover in the meantime of bases, ports, or airfields by agreement between the Australians and General MacArthur.

II. HIGHER STRATEGIC CONTROL IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

7. The present arrangements for the higher strategic control in the war against Japan are:—

a. SEAC (C. C. S. 319/5):
Under the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the British Chiefs of Staff acting as their agents.
b. Pacific and Southwest Pacific Areas:
In these areas the Combined Chiefs of Staff exercise jurisdiction over grand strategic policy and over the allocation of forces and war materials but the United States Chiefs of Staff are responsible for all matters appertaining to operational strategy.

8. We feel that the time has now come when we should take upon ourselves a greater share of the burden of strategic decisions which will be required before Japan is defeated. Although our contribution in the Pacific must always remain small in comparison with that of the United States, it is natural that our interest and concern should grow as more of our forces begin to be deployed in the Pacific area. Moreover, when the Straits of Malacca have been opened, there will no longer be the same natural geographical division between SEAC and the Pacific. All operations in the war against the Japanese would then form one strategic concept.

9. We therefore propose for consideration that the control of the different theatres in the war against Japan should now be organised as follows:—

a. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise general jurisdiction over strategic policy and the proper coordination of the Allied efforts in all theatres engaged against the Japanese.
b. The United States Chiefs of Staff acting as agents of the Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operations in the Pacific Ocean area and China.
c. The British Chiefs of Staff acting as agents of the Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operations in SEAC and SWPA.

* Not printed.
d. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise jurisdiction over allocation of forces and war materials as between all theatres engaged against the Japanese.

RELATIONSHIP OF THE SOVIET UNION TO THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

No. 605

740.00119 (Potsdam)/6-2445

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

FORM OF SOVIET MILITARY PARTICIPATION

(1) OPERATIONAL ZONES

(a) Japanese Islands

This Government has adopted the policy that, for purposes of prosecuting the war and for military government, the Central Pacific Area and Japan come under the jurisdiction of the United States. Moreover, the military operations against the islands of Japan must be largely amphibious in character, requiring special equipment and familiarity with a special technique. The United States forces have developed this equipment and technique to a much higher degree than have the forces of any of the other nations at war with Japan. For these reasons, the Japanese islands should be primarily, but not exclusively, the American zone of operations. For political reasons it seems advisable that units from those countries actively at war with Japan, including Asiatic countries, participate in the combat operations, provided such participation is not prejudicial to the effectiveness of military operations.

(b) Manchuria, Mongolia and North China

It would appear that operations against the Japanese on the Asiatic mainland, exclusive of Korea, will be primarily land operations with air support—a type of warfare with which the Soviet forces are thoroughly familiar and for which they are well equipped. Moreover, geographical and logistic reasons would indicate that operations against the Japanese armies in the areas mentioned will be carried out principally by Russian forces, unless the Chinese are able to bring their forces into the areas. This part of the Asiatic mainland should therefore be considered as primarily a Russian zone of operations, although for political reasons it appears advisable that contingents from other Allied nations at war with Japan participate in the combat operations.¹

¹With reference to this paragraph and paragraph (c) on p. 925, cf. the section on “international implications” of a paper of July 5, 1945, entitled “The Chinese Communist Movement”, prepared in the War Department and circulated to the White House and the Department of State, among other recipients. Text in Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings Before the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 82d Congress, 1st Session, pt. 7A, pp. 2308–2310.
(c) Korea

Military operations in Korea may combine landings from the sea and overland invasion from Siberia. For this, and for political reasons, it would appear desirable that Korea be considered a combined zone of operations, probably under a single Allied command.

(2) MIXED CONTINGENTS UNDER ALLIED COMMAND, ESPECIALLY IN JAPAN

(a) Japanese Islands

Politically it appears advisable to demonstrate to the Japanese people (1) that their aggression has brought down on them the armed and active opposition of the greater part of the world; (2) that the solidarity of the United Nations is a fact; and (3) that the Pacific war is not a racial war. For these reasons it seems desirable that units from those United Nations actively at war with Japan, including Asiatic countries, participate in the combat operations against Japan, provided such participation is not prejudicial to the effectiveness of military operations, and further participate in the occupation of Japan following unconditional surrender or total defeat. Such participation may be by token forces or effective combat units, but should not be so large as [not?] to operate under the command of the American theater commander.

Soviet approval of this general plan and agreement to participate therein are desirable.

(b) Manchuria, Mongolia and North China

While the areas listed will undoubtedly fall within the Soviet zone of operations, to remove any possible source of suspicion and distrust it would seem advisable that the Soviet commander of the theater of operations invite the participation in combat operations of American and other Allied contingents, on much the same basis as the suggested Soviet participation in the American zone of operations.

(c) Korea

Various countries, especially China, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States, have an interest in Korea, either because of common frontiers or because of Korea’s strategic position, which vitally influences the peace and security of the Far East. No one of these countries would wish to see any one nation acquire a predominant position in Korea. Moreover, three of the countries, the United States, Great Britain and China, are committed to the principal [principle] that “in due course Korea shall become free and independent” 2 and therefore cannot consent to conditions which would prejudice Korea’s development toward freedom and independence.

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2 See document No. 606.
Furthermore, the Koreans themselves, having been once conquered
and enslaved, are extremely suspicious of the intentions of other
nations and probably would be hostile to the forces of any single
country operating within Korea. For these reasons it is considered
politically inadvisable for any one of the interested countries alone to
invade Korea for the purpose of driving out the Japanese. If it is
militarily feasible, therefore, it is believed advisable that the invading
forces be composed of units from the various interested countries,
under a single over-all Allied command.

No. 606

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

SOVIET SUPPORT OF THE CAIRO DECLARATION

I. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CAIRO DECLARATION

The Cairo Declaration (see Appendix for the text) was issued on
December 1, 1943, by President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek and Prime Minister Churchill. Marshal Stalin was not a
party to it. The Declaration contains the following territorial com-
mitments:

Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores shall be restored to China,
Korea in due course shall become free and independent,
Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she
has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in
1914 (the Japanese Mandated Islands and the Spratly Islands), and
"Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has
taken by violence and greed".

II. IMPORTANCE OF SOVIET SUPPORT OF THE DECLARATION

A Soviet engagement to adhere to the Cairo Declaration would
strengthen United States policy in the Far East and should tend to
closer cooperation between the Soviet Union and the three Great
Allies which issued the Declaration.

III. CONSEQUENCES OF SOVIET SUPPORT

1. Manchuria: A Soviet engagement to support the commitment that Manchuria shall be restored to China would be important in that it would bar the Soviet Union from making any territorial demands in Manchuria. It would not of itself, however, prevent Soviet attempts, as in Eastern Europe, to set up a “friendly” government in Manchuria.

2. Formosa and the Pescadores: It is assumed that the Soviet Government has no direct interest in Formosa and the Pescadores and that it would not oppose the restoration of these territories to China.

3. Korea: The Soviet Government should not object to the commitment that Korea in due course shall become free and independent. The Soviets, however, may attempt to set up a “friendly” government.

4. The Japanese Mandated Islands and the Spratly Islands: The Soviet Government should be willing to have these islands stripped from Japan. The Declaration makes no provision as to their disposition.

5. Other Territories Taken by Violence and Greed: It is to be assumed that the Soviet Government will be willing to support this commitment, and that it will interpret it as an obligation that Southern Sakhalin should be restored to the Soviet Union.

From this analysis, it appears that the chief advantage which the United States would gain from an undertaking by the Soviet Government to adhere to the Cairo Declaration would be a virtual pledge that the Soviets would attempt no territorial acquisitions in Manchuria. Soviet support of the Declaration, however, would not of itself stand in the way of Soviet efforts to set up “friendly” governments in Manchuria and Korea.

IV. CONCLUSION

A commitment by the Soviet Government to adhere to the Cairo Declaration would need to be supplemented by a detailed understanding as to the course of action to be taken in the Far East and the Pacific by the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States. Such an understanding would appear necessary to guard against possible Soviet attempts to set up “friendly” governments in Manchuria, possibly China as a whole, and Korea.

[No. 606]
TOP SECRET

UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF JAPAN AND POLICY TOWARD LIBERATED AREAS IN THE FAR EAST IN RELATION TO UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

II. SOVIET SUPPORT OF THE CAIRO DECLARATION

A. Minimum objective: To obtain (1) the adherence of the Soviet Government to the Cairo Declaration, and (2) an agreement among the three powers represented at the coming Conference that they will consult in advance among themselves and China on all matters relating to the implementation of the territorial dispositions provided for under that Declaration.

The adherence of the Soviet Government would give the support of that Government to the important provisions in the Declaration that Manchuria and Formosa shall be restored to China and that Korea in due course shall be free and independent.

1 Annex 3 to the attachment to document No. 177.
2 For other extracts from this paper, see documents Nos. 574 and 589.
3 In another version of this paper (undated) in the Department of State files (file No. 740.00119 Council/6-3045), the following language has been substituted for this entire section:

"II. SOVIET ADHERENCE TO THE CAIRO DECLARATION AND CONSULTATION THEREUNER

"It is proposed that the Soviet Government be invited to announce at an appropriate time its adherence to the Cairo Declaration. Such a Soviet engagement would strengthen the commitments made by the three Allies which issued the Declaration and should tend to develop closer cooperation between these Allies and the Soviet Union in settling some of the outstanding territorial problems resulting from the coming victory over Japan. It would especially give the support of the Soviet Government to the important provisions in the Declaration that Manchuria and Formosa shall be restored to the Republic of China and that Korea in due course shall be free and independent.

"It is also proposed that [the] three powers enter into an agreement that they will consult in advance among themselves and with China on all matters relating to the implementation of the territorial dispositions provided under that Declaration. Such an agreement would be especially important in reaching a successful solution of the post-war problems of Korea. The interest of the three powers and China in Korea, the probable inability of the Koreans themselves to establish a satisfactory government immediately following liberation, and the commitment as to Korea in the Cairo Declaration make it evident that it would be to the interest of each of the states concerned that they consult among themselves as to the measures which may need to be taken, such as the possible creation of an interim administration in Korea, to assist the Korean people in the early establishment of a free and independent state."
The agreement would prevent unilateral action by any of the three states to establish a “friendly” government in any of the territories under consideration.

B. Maximum objective: To obtain an agreement among the three powers that, with China’s anticipated cooperation, they will jointly support whatever measures appear best adapted to develop in Korea a strong, democratic, independent nation.

[WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1945.

No. 608

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (McFarland)

[Extracts]

[Editor’s Note.—The statements recorded below were made in the context of a full discussion of plans for the invasion of Kyushu and of the casualties anticipated in such an invasion. For a much more complete record of the discussion, in that context, see document No. 598.]

TOP SECRET

MINUTES OF MEETING HELD AT THE WHITE HOUSE ON MONDAY, 18 JUNE 1945 AT 1530

Present[:] The President
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy
General of the Army G. C. Marshall
Fleet Admiral E. J. King
Lieut. General I. C. Eaker (Representing
General of the Army H. H. Arnold)
The Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson
The Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Forrestal
The Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. McCloy

Secretary
Brig. General A. J. McFarland

1. DETAILS OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST JAPAN

... He [General Marshall] then read, as an expression of his views, the following digest of a memorandum prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for presentation to the President (J. C. S. 1388):2

1 i.e., 3:30 p.m.
2 Not printed. The memorandum referred to was apparently never presented to the President.

[No. 608]
We are bringing to bear against the Japanese every weapon and all the force we can employ and there is no reduction in our maximum possible application of bombardment and blockade, while at the same time we are pressing invasion preparations. It seems that if the Japanese are ever willing to capitulate short of complete military defeat in the field they will do it when faced by the completely hopeless prospect occasioned by (1) destruction already wrought by air bombardment and sea blockade, coupled with (2) a landing on Japan indicating the firmness of our resolution, and also perhaps coupled with (3) the entry or threat of entry of Russia into the war.

With reference to clean-up of the Asiatic mainland, our objective should be to get the Russians to deal with the Japs in Manchuria (and Korea if necessary) and to vitalize the Chinese to a point where, with assistance of American air power and some supplies, they can mop out their own country.

An important point about Russian participation in the war is that the impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them into capitulation at that time or shortly thereafter if we land in Japan.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had asked General MacArthur’s opinion on the proposed operation and had received from him the following telegram, which General Marshall then read:

“I believe the operation presents less hazards of excessive loss than any other that has been suggested. . . . The hazard and loss will be greatly lessened if an attack is launched from Siberia sufficiently ahead of our target date to commit the enemy to major combat.”

ADMIRAL KING agreed with General Marshall’s views.

GENERAL EAKER said that he agreed completely with the statements made by General Marshall in his digest of the memorandum prepared for the President. He had just received a cable in which General Arnold also expressed complete agreement.

THE PRESIDENT stated that one of his objectives in connection with the coming conference would be to get from Russia all the assistance in the war that was possible. To this end he wanted to know all the decisions that he would have to make in advance in order to occupy the strongest possible position in the discussions.

ADMIRAL KING said he wished to emphasize the point that, regardless of the desirability of the Russians entering the war, they were not indispensable and he did not think we should go so far as to beg

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3 Not printed.
them to come in. While the cost of defeating Japan would be greater there was no question in his mind but that we could handle it alone. He thought that the realization of this fact should greatly strengthen the President's hand in the forthcoming conference.

No. 609

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] 22 June 1945.
C. C. S. 884

INFORMATION FOR THE RUSSIANS CONCERNING THE JAPANESE WAR

1. The Head of the British Military Mission in Moscow, General Gammell, has asked the British Chiefs of Staff to inform him, in the event of Russia declaring war on Japan, what information he should pass to the Russians on Japanese dispositions and estimated intentions, and on British dispositions and operational plans.

2. The British Chiefs of Staff feel that it is desirable for the policy adopted by them in imparting information to the Russians on these subjects to be coordinated with the policy of the United States Chiefs of Staff.

3. The British Chiefs of Staff suggest that General Gammell and General Deane should be empowered to hand over information on Japanese dispositions and intentions, and also on Allied dispositions only if it is asked for, and then only on a basis of reciprocity. The British Chiefs of Staff as agents of the Combined Chiefs of Staff would provide General Gammell with the necessary information on Southeast Asia Command, and they assume that the United States Chiefs of Staff would provide General Deane with information about the Pacific, Southwest Pacific, and China Theatres. Coordination between General Gammell and General Deane would however be necessary in order to ensure that information is passed on American forces in a theatre under the operational control of the British Chiefs of Staff, and vice versa.

4. So far as Allied intentions in all theatres are concerned, the British Chiefs of Staff consider that information should be passed to the Russians only on the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on each occasion.

5. We should be glad to have the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff on this matter.

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1 Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 196th Meeting, July 19. See vol. ii, pp. 113-115.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND LATE DEVELOPMENTS

No. 610

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff

[Extract 1]

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 30 June 1945.
C. C. S. 877/1

BASIC OBJECTIVES, STRATEGY, AND POLICIES

5. Subject to the above remarks 2 the British Chiefs of Staff are in full agreement with the memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff (C. C. S. 877), 3 . . . .

1 For the full text of this memorandum, see document No. 600.
2 None of the remarks referred to concerned paragraph 6a of C. C. S. 877, quoted in footnote 3, infra.
3 Concerning the text of this memorandum, see document No. 600, ante, footnote 1, and document No. 1263, printed in vol. ii. The passage here pertinent reads as follows:

"6. The following additional tasks will be undertaken in order to assist in the execution of the over-all strategic concept:—

6a. Encourage Russian entry into the war against Japan. Provide such aid to her war-making capacity as may be necessary and practicable in connection therewith."

No. 611

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff 1

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 8 July 1945.
C. C. S. 884/1

INFORMATION FOR THE RUSSIANS CONCERNING THE JAPANESE WAR

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff have considered the proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 884 2 concerning the information which should be given to the Russians on intelligence, dispositions, and plans in the war against Japan.

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff consider this matter is not an appropriate one for combined agreement. However, they will not, without prior agreement of the appropriate British authorities, pass to the Russians any information on dispositions or operational plans of Allied forces in areas of British strategic responsibility or any information that has been obtained from a British source.

1 Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 196th Meeting, July 19. See vol. ii, pp. 113-115.
2 Document No. 609.
No. 612

701.95/7-1245: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President and the Secretary of State

[Extract 1]

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

[Moscow,] 12 July 1945.

Personal and top secret for the President and the Secretary of State from Harriman.

Soong suggested to Stalin that he return to Chungking to consult the Generalissimo over the points still at issue. 2 Stalin however said that it was better to come to agreement before he met you at Berlin as he wished to decide with you date of his entry into the war. . . .

1 For the full text of this message, see document No. 577.
2 In the Sino-Soviet negotiations being conducted at Moscow. See document No. 577.

No. 613

740.00119 Control (Japan)/7-1545

Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dooman) 1

TOP SECRET

JAPAN: OCCUPATION AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT

I. The United States has adopted the policy that for the purposes of prosecuting the war and for military government, Japan comes under the jurisdiction of the United States. Prime Minister Churchill is understood to have given tacit consent to this policy by certain statements made by him at the Second Quebec Conference in September 1944. 2

II. The State, War and Navy Departments have provisionally agreed upon the following position with regard to the occupation and military government of Japan in the post-defeat period. It is now before the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval or comment before

1 The file copy is unsigned, but bears a manuscript notation indicating that it was drafted by Dooman.
2 The records of the Second Quebec Conference are scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume in this series.

[No. 613]
being presented to the Secretaries of State, War and Navy for final action:

1. This Government is committed to the principle of united action for the prosecution of the war in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of Japan.

2. The United Kingdom, China and (if she enters the war) the Soviet Union, have a responsibility to participate with the United States in the occupation and military government of Japan and the obligation to assume a share in the burden thereof.

3. While the establishment of policies for the control of Japan is a matter to be entered into by the major Allies in harmony with other United Nations, the United States should insist on control over the implementation of these policies.

4. The major share of the responsibility for military government and the preponderance of forces used in occupation should be American, and the designated Commander of all occupational forces (the Military Governor), and the principal subordinate Commanders should be American.

5. The military government of Japan should be organized on the principle of centralized administration, avoiding the division of the country into national zones of independent responsibility administered separately.

III. If the foregoing should be adopted as the final United States position, it would call for a cordial acceptance of any Soviet expression of intention to despatch an armed contingent to collaborate in the assault on, and occupation of Japan. On the other hand, if and if [sic] there should be initiated a state of war between the Soviet Union and Japan, [and if] there were offered no such collaboration, the United States position would require the giving of a reminder to the Soviet Government of its commitment, under the Moscow Declaration of October 30, 1943, to the principle of united action for the prosecution of the war against Japan.

IV. The United States position would call for insistence upon

(a) a unified, and not zonal, military government of Japan; and
(b) the controlling voice of the United States in the determination of policies of military government; [ ]

With regard to (a) above, the unified character of Japan from administrative, economic, social and ethnic points of view, along with the fact that the United States will have assumed the major share of the burden in accomplishing Japan’s defeat and will therefore have acquired warrantable grounds for claiming a controlling voice in the post-defeat treatment of Japan, makes desirable a unified military government.

3 Text in Department of State Bulletin, vol. ix, p. 308.
Allied participation in military government of Japan would be effected by contingents of our Allies serving in the occupation forces directly under the designated Allied Commander, who will be an American, and representation on a council, advisory to the Commander, made up of ranking officers of the respective contingents.

V. In view of the undertakings given the Soviet Government with regard to Southern Sakhalien [Sakhalin] and the Kurile Islands, an exception to the principle of unified administration might well be entertained in respect of these areas if any proposal to that effect were made by the Soviet Government. The areas mentioned are sparsely populated and relatively unimportant, and their administration as a separate unit would not materially affect the administration of Japan proper.

**BERLIN CONFERENCE, July 15, 1945.**

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4 i. e., the agreement regarding entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan, signed at Yalta, February 11, 1945. For text, see Executive Agreement Series No. 498; 59 Stat. (2) 1823; Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 984.

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**No. 614**

**Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff**

**TOP SECRET**

C. C. S. 884/2

**[BABELSBERG,] 15 July 1945.**

**INFORMATION FOR THE RUSSIANS CONCERNING THE JAPANESE WAR**

1. The British Chiefs of Staff have considered the reply by the United States Chiefs of Staff (C. C. S. 884/1) to their memorandum (C. C. S. 884) concerning the information which should be given to the Russians if they enter the war against Japan.

2. The British Chiefs of Staff cannot agree that this is an inappropriate matter for combined agreement.

3. Hitherto throughout the war against Germany, it has been customary, although not obligatory, for the United States and British Chiefs of Staff to consult together as to the measure and means of our dealings with the Russians. The British Chiefs of Staff consider that on the whole this policy has been wise and profitable, and they see no reason, now that Germany has been defeated and Russia is not yet at war with Japan, to depart from it. They are not aware that it has aroused resentment on the part of the Russians, who nevertheless must have been aware of our joint collaboration.

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1 Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 196th Meeting, July 19. See vol. II, pp. 113–115.

2 Document No. 611.

3 Document No. 609.
4. If the British and American staffs now take an independent and quite possibly divergent line as regards passing information to the Russians, it seems possible that the Russians will be tempted to play one of us off against the other.

5. For the above reasons the British Chiefs of Staff would be grateful for an opportunity of discussing this matter further with the United States Chiefs of Staff at Terminal.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

No. 615

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff¹

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] 6 July 1945.

C. C. S. 889

British Contribution to the Final Phase of the War Against Japan

References: CCS 452 Series
            CCS 619 Series
            CCS 691 Series

1. We have been instructed to present the attached memorandum on the British contribution to the final phase of the war against Japan, which the British Chiefs of Staff have prepared for discussion at the next conference.

2. The views of the Australian and New Zealand Governments on the proposals formulated have been requested but have not yet been received.²

[Enclosure]

TOP SECRET

British Contribution to the Final Phase of the War Against Japan

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

1. It has been agreed that the over-all objective for the war against Japan is to force the unconditional surrender of the Japanese by:
   
   a. Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese naval and air strength.

¹ Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 194th Meeting, July 17. See vol. i, pp. 48-51.
² For the substance of the Australian views, see Ehrman, Grand Strategy, vol. vi, p. 268. The New Zealand views were not received prior to the conclusion of the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff held in connection with the Berlin Conference. See ibid., p. 269.
b. Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan.

2. It is agreed that the invasion of Japan is the supreme operation of the war. The prospect of the recapture of Singapore in November 1945, together with the opening of the Malacca Straits, enables us to offer, in addition to the British Pacific Fleet and the very long range (VLR) bomber force, a British, Dominion, and Indian land force to take part in this invasion. Owing to limitations of shipping, however, such a project will only absorb a part of the forces at present deployed in Southeast Asia Command. We have therefore planned that British forces should continue operations in the Outer Zone as far as limitations of other resources allow.

3. We propose, therefore, that British participation in the final phase of the war against Japan should take the following form:—

a. The British Pacific Fleet as at present planned.

b. A VLR bomber force of 10 squadrons increasing to 20 squadrons at a later date when more airfields become available.

c. A British Commonwealth force to participate in CORONET under American command, of three to five divisions, all to be carried in British shipping and provided with the necessary assault lift. This force would be supported by the East Indies Fleet, augmented by the British Pacific Fleet as necessary, and by a tactical air component of some 15 squadrons. The exact size, composition, and role of this force can only be determined by consultation between British and United States staffs in the light of United States operational plans, the target date of CORONET, and its relation to the date of the capture of Singapore. Our preliminary investigations show that it might take one of the following forms:

(i) A force of one or possibly two divisions in the assault together with two or three divisions in the build-up, administratively largely self-supporting.

(ii) A force of three divisions in the assault and immediate follow-up and one or possibly two divisions in the build-up, relying, to a considerable degree, on American administrative assistance.

(iii) A force of up to five divisions in the build-up administratively largely self-supporting. We should naturally prefer a course which allowed us to take part in the assault.

d. Operations in the Outer Zone to maintain pressure against the Japanese across the Burma–Siam frontier. In addition, plans for operations against Siam, for the establishment of bridgeheads in Java or Sumatra, and for the recapture of Hong Kong will be studied. A decision will be made at a later date as to whether, and if so when, any of these operations will be undertaken.

4. We therefore propose that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should approve the British contribution to the final phase of the war against Japan, as set out in this memorandum.
FRENCH AND NETHERLAND PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

No. 616

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

[Extracts]

WASHINGTON,] June 25, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: United States–French Relations
Participants: The French Ambassador, Mr. Henri Bonnet; Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew.

The Ambassador then said that while he had no instruction from his Government he wished in his capacity as Ambassador responsible for the good relations between our two countries to express to me his concern at the present unfortunate trend of these relations. He said that it was the earnest desire of General de Gaulle and, as I well knew, of himself to bring France and the United States steadily closer together and he felt that the present trend is unfortunately in the other direction. This arises from a number of issues in which France has been given little satisfaction and public opinion in his country, knowing of these issues, is at present developing in a way not conducive to the improvement of our relations.

The third point is the fact that although an understanding was reached in the talks which Mr. Bidault, when he was in Washington, had had with President Truman and myself 2 that a French Army Corps should be permitted to proceed to the Far East to participate in the war against Japan, nothing further had been heard about the matter.

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1 For other extracts from this memorandum, see documents Nos. 99, 357, and 637.
2 With respect to the scope of the Truman–Bidault conversations of May 1945, see Department of State Bulletin, vol. xii, p. 927.
No. 617

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 10 July 1945.

C. C. S. 842/1

FRENCH AND DUTCH PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff have considered the proposals put forward by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 842 and agree in principle that the Combined Chiefs of Staff might now state a general over-all policy with regard to French and Dutch participation in the war against Japan. They consider that such a policy should be stated as follows:

a. While it is at present impossible for French or Netherlands armed forces to play a major part in Far Eastern operations, the desire of the French/Dutch to join with us in the war against Japan and the possible provision of such assistance in the struggle in the Pacific which may be synchronized with operations already planned or under way will be taken into account by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. No French or Netherlands forces will be accepted for operations unless it has been previously agreed that complete control of such forces will be vested in the commander in chief concerned and their actual employment will be determined by him solely on military grounds. The actual use of any force must depend solely on military considerations.

b. In implementing this policy the Combined Chiefs of Staff undertake to give the French/Netherlands representatives timely information of their intentions in respect of any operations that will directly affect French/Netherlands territories or armed forces in the Far East.

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff consider that the draft letter in the Enclosure to C. C. S. 842 should be amended accordingly.

3. It is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

a. Accept the policy stated in paragraph 1 above.

b. Dispatch the attached memorandum (Enclosure) to the French/Netherlands representatives.

[Enclosure]

TOP SECRET

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM TO THE FRENCH AND NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVES TO THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have given consideration to the question of French/Netherlands participation in the war against Japan and wish to inform you of their views which are as follows:—

[Here follow paragraphs 1a and 1b of the covering memorandum.]

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1 Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 195th Meeting, July 18. See vol. II, p. 83.
2 Of April 25. Not printed.
Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 13, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Participation of Dutch Troops in Eventual Invasion of Netherlands East Indies

Participants: Netherlands Ambassador, Dr. A. Loudon;
 Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew

The Netherlands Ambassador called on me today and said that he desired to talk to me on his own initiative and without instructions regarding the very difficult situation in which his country is placed owing to the fact that no steps have been taken to enable Dutch troops to be transported to Australia, where they could train for the eventual occupation of the Netherlands East Indies. He said that even Dutch ships which were now used in the allied pool were not being made available for this purpose. The Netherlands Government had a great deal at stake in this matter and if the eventual invasion, occupation and mopping up of the Netherlands East Indies should be undertaken by American and Australian forces with no Dutch forces present the loss of face which Holland would undergo in the opinion of the natives would never be overcome.

I once again explained to the Ambassador the difficulties which must be faced in this situation arising from the fact that all our efforts, forces and shipping must be directed to the primary purpose of defeating Japan. If we are able to obtain Japanese unconditional surrender this would no doubt apply also to Japanese forces in the Netherlands East Indies. The occupation might then take place without combat. The Ambassador said that even in such a case unless Dutch troops participated in the occupation, there would be the same loss of face. He also doubted whether the Japanese forces in the Netherlands East Indies would surrender on an order from Tokyo. Many of them, especially in New Guinea, had settled down to the cultivation of their farms and had apparently no desire to return to Japan. The Ambassador spoke about this matter with great emphasis and emotion and indicated his profound regret, even indignation, that nothing was being done to arrange the transport of Dutch troops to Australia in order to train for the eventual occupation.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]
USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

No. 619

S/AB Files

Minutes of a Meeting of the Combined Policy Committee

[Excerpts]

TOP SECRET

MINUTES OF COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE MEETING HELD AT THE PENTAGON ON JULY 4TH, 1945—9:30 A.M.

Present:

Members: The Secretary of War, Chairman
Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson
The Hon. C. D. Howe
Dr. Vannevar Bush

By Invitation: The Right Hon. The Earl of Halifax
Sir James Chadwick
Major General L. R. Groves
Mr. George Harrison

Joint Secretaries: Mr. Harvey H. Bundy
Mr. Roger Makins

3. USE OF WEAPON AGAINST THIRD PARTIES

Field Marshal Wilson stated that the British Government concurred in the use of the T. A. weapon against Japan. He added that the Prime Minister might wish to discuss this matter with the President at the forthcoming meeting in Berlin.

The Committee: Took note that the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States had agreed that T. A. weapons should be used by the United States against Japan, the agreement of the

1 This Committee was established under the terms of the Roosevelt-Churchill "Articles of Agreement governing collaboration between the authorities of the U.S.A. and the U.K. in the matter of TUBE ALLOYS" (i.e., atomic energy research and development) signed at Quebec, August 19, 1943 (Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 2993; United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, vol. 5, pt. 1, p. 1114).

2 Henry L. Stimson.

3 British concurrence was required under the following paragraph of the Quebec agreement (see footnote 1, ante):

"Secondly, that we will not use it [an atomic weapon] against third parties without each other's consent." Concerning British concurrence, see Ehrman, Grand Strategy, vol. vi, pp. 275-276, 296-298.

British Government having been communicated by Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson.

4. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ON THE USE OF THE WEAPON

The Chairman said he was thinking of an earlier period, viz., the forthcoming meeting with Stalin. His own opinion had been very much influenced by the probable use within a few weeks after the meeting. If nothing was said at this meeting about the T. A. weapon, its subsequent early use might have a serious effect on the relations of frankness between the three great Allies. He had therefore advised the President to watch the atmosphere at the meeting. If mutual frankness on other questions was found to be real and satisfactory, then the President might say that work was being done on the development of atomic fission for war purposes; that good progress had been made; and that an attempt to use a weapon would be made shortly, though it was not certain that it would succeed. If it did succeed, it would be necessary for a discussion to be held on the best method of handling the development in the interests of world peace and not for destruction. If Stalin pressed for immediate disclosure the President might say that he was not prepared to take the matter further at the present time.

Harvey H Bundy
Roger Makins
Joint Secretaries

RELEASE OF TANKERS FOR THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN THROUGH ALTERED DISTRIBUTION OF EUROPEAN OIL SUPPLIES

No. 620

740.00119 EW/6-2445: Telegram

The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Secretary of State ¹

TOP SECRET

Moscow, June 24, 1945—4 p. m.

2250. Top sec from Pauley for the Secretary.

I am informed that the US has in effect waived any claim to reparation (other than compensation for damages to Amer property) from both Rumania and Hungary and that similar action is contemplated on the part of the Allied powers in the case of Austria. However,

¹ Sent to the Acting Secretary of State over the signature of Harriman.
surplus of certain commodities available for export from Rumania, Hungary and Austria such as oils and agricultural products are presently being supplied Amer occupation forces in Germany from the US. If these supplies could be made available to such forces by reverse Lend-Lease from the Soviet Union which has just announced it is expecting to receive some of these commodities from Hungary and Rumania as reparations it would both greatly assist in waging war against Japan and increase the net amount of reparations which we may be able to secure from Germany. I shall appreciate anything you may be able to do along these lines and I shall be glad to assist here in our dealings with the Soviet Union in any way which you may suggest.²

² The Department was informed by the United States Delegation at Babelsberg on July 21 (telegram Victory 181, file No. 740.00119 BW/7-2145) that, in view of a United States proposal made to the Berlin Conference (see vol. ii, document No. 1320), no further action on Pauley’s telegram No. 2250 was necessary, and that the reverse lend-lease issue had been dropped.

No. 621

800.6383/6-2945: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State ad interim

[Extracts]

SECRET

Moscow, June 29, 1945—1 p. m.

2320. Urtel 1120, May 22; Emtel 1974, June 8.¹

Soviet output of crude oil without natural gas is estimated to have fallen from 31.1 million metric tons in 1940 to approximately 21.5 million in 1945. Chief factors in drop were sharp fall off in Baku output due to almost complete lack of new drilling there during war, German devastation of Maikop Field and large part of Grozny Field, and drop in output of largest non-Caucasus Field in Bashkiria.

Because of fall off in domestic production as compared with prewar level, it is concluded that USSR will not be in a position to export petroleum in immediate postwar period except in limited quantities, for specific purposes, and at some sacrifice to internal economic programs. In addition USSR will probably endeavor to maintain control of petroleum production in Soviet occupied areas of eastern Europe.

HARRIMAN

¹ Neither printed.

[No. 621]
No. 622

740.00119 EW/5-3045 : Telegram

The Washington Liaison Representative for the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations (Wolf) to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley). 1

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 30, 1945—2 p. m.

1473. For Pauley from Wolf.

Ralph Davies PAW advises from best information available his Program Division indicated 1946 surplus petroleum supplies in eastern European areas under Russian occupation will be approximately 60,000 BD over local requirements. Romania accounts [for] 47,000 BD this figure. At same time he advises imports from Anglo-American sources to meet requirements western and Mediterranean Europe will average approximately 292,000 BD last half [19]45 and 226,000 BD [19]46. Any utilization apparent surplus eastern Europe not only eases critical petroleum supply condition world wide but effects material transportation saving if movement to western and Mediterranean Europe overland or from Constanța by tanker initiated promptly. Sending under separate cover Davies letter and supporting tables. 2

1 Sent over the signature of Grew.

2 Not printed. Cf. document No. 626, post, and annex I to document No. 1321, printed in vol. II.

No. 623

740.00119 EW/5-3045 : Telegram

The Political Adviser in Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State ad interim

SECRET

HOECHST, June 30, 1945—noon.

80. Re Moscow’s tel. No. 1 from Pauley dated June 24, 3 p. m., which was reptd. to Dept., 1 following information furnished my staff informally by Col. Vissering, Deputy Chief, current operations, G–4, SHAEF.

Present indications are that strictly military needs in the American zone (Germany) will by December 1, 1945, be approximately 200,000 tons of gasoline and related products (not including high octane aviation gasoline) per month. Under static conditions with 400,000 troops in our zone, need will drop to about 50,000 tons per month. With rehabilitation of German refinery on Danube, Austrian crude could be used as 70 octane is sufficient where combat conditions do

1 As telegram No. 2250 of June 24, 4 p. m. See document No. 620.
not prevail. These estimates are for our mil. needs only and do not include German minimum civil requirements. Accordingly SHAEOF is anxious to obtain any oil supplies available Austria, Hungary, or Rumania.

Sent Dept., reptd to Moscow as 8, for Harriman from [for] Pauley.

MURPHY

No. 624

840.63537-645

The Secretary of State to the Petroleum Administrator for War (Ickes)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. ICKES: Various reports have come to my attention regarding the interest of your administration in the matter of obtaining petroleum supplies from Eastern Europe to assist the deficiencies of Western European countries. I am therefore taking this opportunity to inform you regarding recent developments of the oil situation in Eastern Europe.

I am enclosing for your information three documents which I believe will be of interest to you in this regard:

1. The Department’s airgram to Moscow, dated June 29, 1945.1
2. Policy document under the subject “Use of American Property by Satellite Countries for Reparation”.2
3. Agreement captioned “Concerning the Reciprocal Delivery of Goods between Roumania and the USSR”.3

It will be noted from the above-mentioned airgram that the American Ambassador in Moscow is fully apprised of the important aspects of the oil situation in Eastern Europe and of the inseparable relation between the rapid rehabilitation of the petroleum industry and maintenance of maximum production in these countries and the global production required to meet the enormously expanded military and essential civilian needs.

The reparations document sets forth the policy of the United States Government and provides for the protection of American property in its relation to reparation payments in satellite countries. This document is being forwarded to the American diplomatic representatives in the various countries of Eastern Europe with instructions that it be used as a guide in all matters relating to this subject.

The USSR–Rumanian agreement in effect provides that virtually Rumania’s entire petroleum exports be delivered to the Soviet Union, that extensive new petroleum concessions be placed under Soviet

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1 Document No. 323.
2 Enclosure to document No. 324.
3 Not printed.
control, and that a Soviet controlled petroleum monopoly be established. The information in this document may be used in studies or reports classified as confidential, secret, or top secret provided that reference is not made to the use of the text of this agreement and the material is not directly quoted.

The Department has prepared, *inter alia*, appropriate recommendations for the President in his forthcoming conversations with the heads of other governments under the caption of "American and Russian Economic Relationship in Countries of Eastern Europe" \(^4\) and dealing with such matters as removals of American properties, entry and freedom of movement of United States nationals in countries of Eastern Europe, and economic interests of the United States in these countries.

I suggest that specific phases of the over-all petroleum situation in Eastern Europe in which you may be interested be discussed on an informal basis between members of our respective staffs at some future date mutually agreed upon. I believe this to be appropriate expedient [sic] pending the outcome of the conference among certain chiefs of states and the subsequent development of full information by the American diplomatic representatives in the countries concerned.

I am addressing similar letters to the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Administrator, Foreign Economic Administration.\(^5\)

Sincerely yours,

__For the Secretary of State:__

**WILLIAM L. CLAYTON**

*Assistant Secretary*

\(^4\) Document No. 322.

\(^5\) Henry L. Stimson, James Forrestal, and Lec T. Crowley, respectively.

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**No. 625**

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**Telegram**

The Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Deputy Petroleum Administrator for War (Davies) \(^1\)

SECRET

URGENT

Moscow, July 10, 1945—11 p.m.

2503. From Pauley to Davies, Petroleum Admin for War; copy to Wolf, White House.

Reference your letter June 29 \(^2\) subject western and Mediterranean Europe oil requirements from Anglo-American sources. Please rush info tanker requirements for this supply and approximate tanker saving in case Austrian, Hungarian and Rumanian sources could be used fully according to figures submitted.

\(^1\) Sent to the Acting Secretary of State over the signature of Harriman.

\(^2\) Not printed. For a telegraphic summary, see document No. 622.
SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. PAULEY: I have just been talking with Colonel Fogelson about the tightness of our United Nations oil program for the next year or eighteen months and have mentioned, in particular, the disappointment we feel over not having made available for United Nations use the production and refining capacities of Rumania, Austria and Hungary.

I cannot understand why the oil resources of these countries should be monopolized by the Russians, particularly in the light of the fact that American and British companies have an actual ownership of substantial proportions in the oil and the plants in these countries and the further fact that the U. S. A. is continuing to export a large volume of petroleum products to Russia.

The figures in the memorandum attached 1 will give you some idea of the volumes involved. The figures themselves do not look so large in relation to the supply and demand volumes world-wide, but we are operating practically without margin today and every barrel counts. Further, the location of this petroleum is such as to make for important transportation savings, as well, if it were made available in the program. Beyond this, there is the very pertinent point of the equities involved; the American public would have difficulty in understanding why American oil should be withheld by Russia from United Nations use while, at the same time, this country goes on exporting to Russia.

I do not know to what extent this situation is properly related to reparations, but I hope you will see some opportunity to advance our interests by one means or another.

With best personal regards [etc.]

R. K. DAVIES

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1 No such memorandum is attached to the original of Davies’ letter. Cf. annex 1 to document No. 1321, printed in vol. II.

[No. 626]
No. 627

The Washington Liaison Representative for the Delegation to the Allied Commission on Reparations (Wolf) to the Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley)  

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 14, 1945—11 a.m.

1610. For Pauley from Wolf.

Reurtel 2503 [July] 10th 2 Davies PAW requests you be advised as follows: "Regarding eastern European oil supplies for western Europe it is emphasized that prime consideration is urgent need for oil supplies as such rather than as means of saving transportation. However resultant tanker savings would be corollary advantage. Estimated that to extent supplies delivered by rail or barge to western Europe from Austria, Hungary, or Roumania saving would be eleven class B tankers of twelve thousand deadweight tons for fifteen thousand barrels daily of supplies. For supplies at Constanța for Mediterranean estimated net savings of seven class B tankers for fifteen thousand barrels daily. For different rates savings approximately proportional."

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1 Sent over the signature of Grew.
2 Document No. 625.