GENERAL QUESTIONS

ESTABLISHMENT OF A COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
AND DISSOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN ADVISORY
COMMISSION

No. 227

740.00110 EW/8-1945 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

URGENT

SAN FRANCISCO, June 19, 1945.


The following memorandum may be helpful in the preparation of a reply to the President's memorandum of June 15 [9]:

"It seems clear that it would be desirable to avoid the convocation of a full-fledged peace conference to deal with the major political problems that have arisen as a result of the termination of the war in Europe. A formal peace conference would be slow and unwieldy and ratification of the resulting document might be long delayed. On the other hand, a formal 'peace conference' limited to a few states such as the Big Four, would probably encounter much opposition on the part of the States not invited to participate. It is therefore suggested that the problems concerned to [sic] be dealt with on an ad hoc basis by a council of Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, the U. S. S. R., China and France with the inclusion of other states whenever problems of particular interest to them were under consideration.

1. The proposal might be discussed informally with the British and we could inform the Russians that we intended to raise this question at the meeting of the three Chiefs of State. The Chinese and French would be informed as soon as British and Soviet agreement is obtained.

2. At the Big Three meeting, we would endeavor to obtain Soviet and British agreement as to the time and place of the meeting as well as to some of the items that would be placed on the agenda of the first meeting. It would probably not be advisable to hold a meeting in a capital of the participating powers. Brussels or Vienna might be suitable. The latter would probably be favored by the Russians as they would there be able to make their own security arrangements and

1 Document No. 150.
communication facilities. The meeting should be held as soon after the Big Three meeting as the necessary preparations can be completed.

3. Each of the Foreign Ministers should be accompanied by a high ranking deputy capable of carrying on the work of the Council in the absence of his chief.

4. Each Foreign Minister should also be accompanied by a small group of experts and advisers; but it should be agreed that the major portion of the work of preparation of the various agreements is to be undertaken by the respective Foreign Offices.

5. The procedure to be followed by the Council should be adapted to the particular problem under consideration. Whenever the Council was considering a question of particular interest to a state not represented, such state could be invited to send a representative to participate in the discussion of that question. This should not, however, preclude preliminary consideration by the Big Five of any question without the participation of other states. In some cases the Council might find it advisable to convene a formal conference of the states chiefly interested to deal with a particular problem such as, for example, the conclusion of a treaty of peace with Italy. In other cases such as the settlement of the Yugoslav and Italian frontier, the Big Five might reach agreement in consultation with Italian and Yugoslav representatives and embody the results in a treaty to be concluded between Italy and Yugoslavia only.

6. The European Advisory Commission could probably be liquidated as soon as the control machinery is in effective operation in Germany and Austria.

The various control commissions, being chiefly operating organizations, would not conflict with the Council of Foreign Ministers, but the latter could, of course, consider any question referred to it by their Governments.

7. In view of the position of the Soviet Government that Poland and Yugoslavia should be included in the Reparations Commission if France were to be included the inclusion of China may be essential in order to avoid a similar Soviet position with respect to the Council of Foreign Ministers. By including China the Council would consist of all the permanent members of the proposed security council and this would furnish a basis for excluding other countries from full membership. It might also be well to relate the creation of the Council to the liquidation of the EAC. It would, in any event, probably be desirable to avoid undue emphasis on the establishment of the council as an organization but rather to allow its functions to become clear as they evolve in practice. [7]

2 Of the United Nations.
3 In connection with the genesis of the Council of Foreign Ministers, see also Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 70–71; James F. Byrnes, All in One Lifetime (New York, 1958), pp. 288–289.
Subject: Proposal for the Establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers.

One of the most urgent problems in the field of foreign relations facing us today is the establishment of some procedure and machinery for the development of peace negotiations and territorial settlements without which the existing confusion, political uncertainty and economic stagnation will continue to the serious detriment of Europe and the world. The experience at Versailles following the last war does not encourage the belief that a full, formal peace conference is the best procedure. Such a conference would be slow and unwieldy, its sessions would be conducted in a heated atmosphere of rival claims and counter-claims and ratification of the resulting documents might be long delayed. On the other hand a formal peace conference limited to the three or four principal nations would encounter much opposition from the part of other members of the United Nations not invited to participate. It would also be subject to the oft-heard criticism that the big powers are running the world without consideration for the interests of smaller nations. The Department feels, therefore, that the best formula to meet the situation would be the establishment of a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France, and the United States. These are the countries which compose the permanent members of the Security Council of the world organization and by limiting its membership to these five the possible efforts which Russia or Great Britain might make to include in the membership countries closely identified with their respective foreign policies could be forestalled. It is our thought that this Council should meet as soon after the meeting of the three heads of government as preparations therefor can be completed. It would probably be advisable to hold the meeting elsewhere than in one of the capitals of the participating powers. Brussels or Vienna might be suitable. Each Foreign Minister should be accompanied by a high-ranking deputy who could carry on the work of the Council in the absence of his Chief. He should also be accompanied by a small group of experts and advisers, but it should be agreed that the major work of preparation would be undertaken by the respective foreign offices. The procedure of the Council should be

1 Annex 1 to the attachment to document No. 177.
adapted to the particular problem under consideration. Whenever the Council was considering a question of particular interest to a state not represented thereon, such a state should be invited to send representatives to participate in the discussion and study of that question. It is not intended, however, to fix hard and fast rules but rather to permit the Council to adapt its procedure to the particular problem under consideration.

There is attached a draft proposal which you may wish to present to Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill for consideration at the forthcoming meeting.

[Attachment]

TOP SECRET

DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

With the termination of hostilities in Europe the United Nations are faced with the urgent problem of peace negotiations and territorial settlements without which the existing confusion, political uncertainty and economic stagnation will continue to the serious detriment of Europe and the world. The experience of Versailles following the last war does not encourage the belief that a full, formal peace conference is the procedure best suited to obtain the best results or to arrive at a solution conducive to those conditions of permanent peace which the United Nations organization is dedicated to uphold. Such a formal peace conference would necessarily be slow and unwieldy, its sessions would be conducted in an atmosphere of rival claims and counter-claims and ratification of the resulting documents might be long delayed. On the other hand, a formal peace conference limited to the three or four principal nations would almost certainly encounter much opposition on the part of other members of the United Nations not invited to participate. They would feel that problems of direct concern to them were being decided in their absence. The United States, therefore, offers the following proposal as the formula best suited to meet the problems ahead:

(1) There shall be established a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France, and the United States.  
(2) The Council shall hold its first meeting at . . . . . . . on . . . . . . . . . . Each of the Foreign Ministers shall be accompanied by

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2 In another copy of this paper in the Department of State files (file No. 740.00119 Council/6-3045), the word “China” has been deleted, and the following manuscript addition to this paragraph has been made by Yost: “If & when the Council deals with Asiatic affairs China shall become a full member.”

3 Blanks in the original. Manuscript revisions in Matthews' copy of the Briefing Book make this sentence read as follows: “The Council shall meet at . . . . . and its first meeting shall be held on . . . . . . . . . . . .”
a high-ranking deputy duly authorized and capable of carrying on
the work of the Council in the absence of his Foreign Minister. He
will likewise be accompanied by a small staff of technical advisers
suited to the problems concerned and to the organization of a joint
secretariat.

[(3)] As its immediate important task, the Council would be author-
ized to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Na-
tions, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary
and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on
the termination of the war in Europe. (At a later date, if the five
governments agree, the Council might 4 be utilized for the prepara-
tion of a peace treaty with Germany when it is mutually agreed that
a German government adequate to the purpose is functioning.) The
Council should not be limited, however, to consideration of the fore-
going problems. It may by common accord give its attention to such
other European problems of an emergency character as it may feel it
can properly take up.

(4) Whenever the Council is considering a question of direct in-
terest to a state not represented thereon, such state should be invited
to send representatives to participate in the discussion and study of
that question. It is not intended, however, to fix hard and fast rules
but rather to permit the Council to adapt its procedure to the par-
ticular problem under consideration. In some cases it might desire
to hold its own preliminary discussions prior to the participation of
other interested states. In other cases the Council might desire to
convolve a formal conference of the states chiefly interested in seeking
a solution of the particular problem. It is so authorized.

4 In Byrnes’ copy the word “shall” has been substituted in pencil for “might”.
In Matthews’ copy the parentheses surrounding this sentence and the word
“treaty” have been stricken, and the following substitute phrase has been written
in the margin: “settlement for Germany to be accepted [by] the government of
Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established.”

No. 229

Truman Papers

Memorandum by the Assistant to the President’s Naval Aide (Elsey) 1

TOP SECRET

THE PEACE CONFERENCE

On two occasions during Mr. Hopkins’ recent visit to Moscow,
Marshal Stalin emphasized the importance of planning at once for
the organization of the Peace Conference insofar as it relates to
Europe. Mr. Hopkins reported to the President that Stalin was
apparently thinking about a formal conference, for he referred to the
Versailles Conference at which he said the Allies were not properly
prepared and he stated that was a mistake which should not be
made again.

1 Submitted to Leahy July 1 and subsequently forwarded to Truman.

[No. 229]
Mr. Hopkins reported that Stalin will discuss arrangements for a Peace Conference at the meeting in Berlin.²

G. M. Eelsey

² Cf. document No. 147.

No. 230

Memorandum by the Joint Civil Affairs Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ¹

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

Termination of European Advisory Commission and Delegation of Authority to National Commanders in Chief Discussion

1. The European Advisory Commission was established for the purpose of making recommendations concerning European questions connected with the termination of hostilities. Hostilities have now terminated. In Germany the four national commanders have been designated as the representatives of their respective governments. Similar designations will shortly be made with respect to Austria.

2. During hostilities the European Advisory Commission was the one organization through which the four [sic] powers could regularly consult together on problems relating to Germany and Austria. That has ceased to be true of Germany and will shortly cease to be true of Austria. If the problems of military government in Germany and Austria are to be handled expeditiously it is essential that there should be no needless duplication of consultative agencies. The European Advisory Commission should, accordingly, cease forthwith to consider problems relating to the control of Germany and should deal with no problems concerning the control of Austria after the Allied administration is established there.

3. Experience in the European Advisory Commission has shown that a principal cause of delay in the solution of problems of pressing importance is the reluctance of the respective governments, and particularly of the Soviet Government, to delegate to their representa-

¹ This memorandum was forwarded to Leahy by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 26, together with other reports, under cover of a memorandum which stated explicitly: "These reports represent the views of the committees only and have not been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Leahy subsequently passed it to Truman.
tives on the Commission broad authority to decide current questions. It is most important that the respective national commanders be vested with broad authority to decide the day-to-day questions of policy with which they will be confronted.

RECOMMENDATIONS

4. a. It is recommended that agreement be sought that the jurisdiction of the European Advisory Commission with respect to problems concerning Germany shall terminate forthwith and, with respect to those concerning Austria, be terminated upon the establishment of the Allied administration in Austria.

b. It is recommended that the United States urge the broadest possible delegation of authority to the respective commanders in chief in Germany and Austria, and insist that on all matters, other than those involving the alteration or establishment of basic policy, such commanders must be empowered to act without advance reference of the questions to their governments.

No. 231

London Embassy Files—710 Tripartite Conference Berlin

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the British Foreign Secretary (Eden)

SECRET

LONDON, July 8, 1945.

DEAR MR. EDEN: In connection with the first item of the suggested list of topics for discussion at the forthcoming meeting of the Heads of Government transmitted in my letter of July 7, 1945,² I have been requested to communicate to you the proposal enclosed herewith ³ which the President plans to present to Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin at an early stage in their forthcoming conversations.

This document is being communicated in advance to the British and Soviet Governments in the belief that they may wish to be giving the matter some thought prior to the meeting.

Sincerely,  

JOHN G. WINANT

¹ Harriman conveyed the same information to Molotov in note No. 384 of July 8 (Moscow Embassy Files).
² See document No. 189, footnote 1.
³ Except for minor editorial variations, the text enclosed is identical with the attachment to document No. 228.
No. 232

Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Page)

[Moscow,] July 11, 1945.

MEMORANDUM [OF] CONVERSATION

Present: Mr. W. A. Harriman, American Ambassador
Mr. Edward Page, Jr., First Secretary of Embassy
Mr. V. M. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U. S. S. R.
Mr. Pavlov, Soviet Interpreter

Subject: Agenda for Forthcoming Berlin Meeting.

Mr. Molotov then referred to the first topic in Mr. Harriman's letter regarding procedure and machinery for peace negotiations. He said that it was evident that this question involved a general peace conference for Europe. According to the Ambassador's letter of July 8 it was proposed that China should take part in the Council of Foreign Ministers which would study this question. He seemed to question the advisability of Chinese participation. He stated that there were many subjects which are absolutely new to the Chinese since they had not participated in discussions on European matters and were not members of the European Advisory Council [Commission]. He inquired whether the Ambassador could give him any additional information on such Chinese participation. The Ambassador stated that he had no information save what was included in his letter of July 7. The subject was a new one to him. He did not know the reason for including China. However, he assumed that since the German attack had world wide implications and since the Far Eastern countries had interests in Europe just like the European countries had interests in the Far East (although not so comprehensive) it appeared reasonable to expect China to participate in the European peace talks. In addition, China was one of the permanent members of the Security Council which would certainly deal with European questions. It would therefore be advisable for the Chinese member to be kept closely informed of European questions.

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1 Harriman sent a summary of the portion of this memorandum here printed to Grew in telegram No. 2528 of July 11 (file No. 740.0011 EW/7-1145) and the gist of this message was included in telegram No. 19 of July 12 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 740.00119 Potsdam/7-1245).
2 For the paragraphs omitted here, see document No. 207.
3 Of July 7. See document No. 189, footnote 1.
4 See document No. 231, footnote 1.
The Ambassador inquired whether Mr. Molotov had made the inquiry concerning China because he did not fully understand all the considerations or because he was unfavorably disposed to Chinese participation.

Mr. Molotov said that he had made the inquiry because the inclusion of China in European talks had been unexpected. He said the question certainly needed further study and exchange of views. He stated that China should of course participate in the final peace conference.

No. 233

740.00119 EAC/7-1245

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

London, July 12, 1945.

Dear Mr. Secretary: On the occasion of the meeting of heads of Governments you may find it useful to have a brief summary of the work of the European Advisory Commission over the last eighteen months, and some account of its accumulated experience. I believe you would find it helpful to read over the attached Summary Report.

Over many months I have felt that sooner or later the time would come to consider whether the European Advisory Commission had any further function to perform, since its work has been confined in practice to German and Austrian questions. It has always seemed to me that the Commission could not continue to work side by side with the Control Council which is to be set up to run Germany and which will have the widest knowledge and complete responsibility for what is done in Germany. It would not be practicable to have a separate body sitting in London and negotiating agreements on policies which are conducted on a day-to-day basis by the Control Council. I have assumed that the heads of Governments will wish, as soon as the Control Council has begun operation, to make provision for closing out the work of the European Advisory Commission, although they might wish to use the experience of the members of the Commission in carrying out your plan for a Council of Foreign Ministers.

I cannot submit my Summary Report on the work of the European Advisory Commission without expressing my appreciation for having been given the responsibility of taking part in a body concerned with coordination of Allied policies in a critical field of common concern.

Sincerely, John G. Winant

[No. 233]
SECRET

[LONDON,] July 12, 1945.

THE WORK OF THE EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION
(JANUARY 1944–JULY 1945)

A SUMMARY REPORT

1. Origins.

One of the principal decisions of the Moscow Conference of October 1943 was to set up a European Advisory Commission to work on the principal political problems arising from the termination of the war in Europe.¹ At the time of the Teheran Conference the three heads of Governments appointed their representatives on the Commission, which held a first informal, organizing meeting on December 15, 1943, and its first formal meeting on January 14, 1944. In November 1944 the three Governments invited the French Provisional Government to join the Commission as a fourth member. Since its inception the E. A. C. has held 95 discussion meetings and 10 meetings for signature of agreements.

2. Range of Responsibility.

At the Moscow Conference the U. S. and Soviet Governments maintained that the E. A. C. should deal with problems arising from the surrender of the Axis countries in Europe. The U. K. Government urged that it should deal with any political problems arising out of the war in Europe, including problems of liberated countries. The terms of reference laid down for the E. A. C. were broad, but in practice the U. S. and Soviet views have prevailed, as the Commission has dealt almost exclusively with problems concerning Germany and Austria. The E. A. C. did substantial work on the terms of Bulgarian surrender, but did not deal with the surrender terms for Finland, Rumania and Hungary, which were negotiated in Moscow. The E. A. C. has not been authorized by Governments to consider problems of liberated areas.


Under its terms of reference the E. A. C. was designed to be a recommending body. In practice it has been a negotiating rather than an advisory organ. Its discussions have been conducted, and its decisions reached, on the basis of detailed instructions from the Governments. None of the agreements recommended by it has been rejected or amended by the member-Governments.

Because the Commission has been a negotiating body its pace has varied. Speed of work has depended upon all three, later four, Gov-

¹ See Department of State Bulletin, vol. ix, p. 308.
ernments being prepared to negotiate on a particular subject at a particular time, and on their being willing to make the adjustments and mutual concessions necessary to reach an agreed policy. The Commission has had periods of intensive work, and other periods when, either through indifference on the part of some one of the Governments or because of its reluctance to undertake commitments at a particular time, the Commission was unable to reach decisions. The E. A. C. has never failed to meet when any one Government had any matter to bring forward.

In general, the U. K. Government has made the most sustained effort to make the E. A. C. a center for arriving at agreement on major policy toward Germany. The support given by the U. S. Government has been uneven, partly because of the difficulties of formulating, within the Government, a unified policy towards Germany. Since joining the E. A. C. on November 27, 1944, the French Delegation has shown a desire to facilitate four-Power agreement and to avoid raising issues which might impede the work of the E. A. C. The Soviet Delegation has at times worked hard and cooperatively to reach agreement on a limited series of subjects, but it has never shown the range of initiative of other Delegations. Its ability to negotiate effectively has been restricted by rigid instructions and by an apparent absence of instructions over several extended periods.

Continuous contact of the four Representatives has enabled them to consider informally a range of problems considerably wider than that of the agreements which have actually been formalized, and to acquaint their Governments with the views of the other Governments on many aspects of the treatment of Germany. Messages exchanged with the State Department number approximately nine hundred and fifty. Mutual confidence, built up over many months of face-to-face dealing, has facilitated the removal of misunderstandings which might otherwise have led to serious difficulties in the work of the Allied coalition. The E. A. C. has perhaps been as useful in the misunderstandings which it has forestalled or removed as in the actual agreements which it has drafted.  

5. Organization of the European Advisory Commission.

The Commission consists of four Representatives, one appointed by each Government. Each Representative is assisted by Political, Military and other Advisers as directed by his Government. The U. S. Representative has had the assistance of a Political Adviser provided by the Department of State, and of Military, Naval and Air

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2 For extracts from paragraph 4, omitted here, see documents Nos. 405 and 415.

[No. 233]
Advisers appointed by their respective Services. Final responsibility for the work of the U. S. Delegation rests with the Representative.

The E. A. C. has made use of a Secretariat, consisting of a Secretary-General and a small staff of interpreters and clerks, with its headquarters in Lancaster House, which is also the meeting-place of the Commission. Expenses, which have been negligible in amount, have been shared equally between the three, later four, Governments.


In addition to advising the U. S. Representative on matters under negotiation, the U. S. Joint Advisers have conducted a large amount of work in preparation for negotiation. In the absence of agreed directives from Washington concerning post-surrender policy toward Germany, the U. S. Joint Advisers surveyed the field in which Allied agreement would be useful in the immediate post-surrender period and prepared 36 draft directives, designed to provide agreed policy guidance to the Allied Commanders-in-Chief in Germany, and 5 draft agreements. After consideration by the appropriate authorities in Washington 24 draft directives and the 5 draft agreements were transmitted, with slight revisions, to the U. S. Representative, for circulation and negotiation in the Commission. In carrying on their work the Joint Advisers have held 76 formal meetings, many of which were also attended by U. S. civilian experts in London and by officers of the U. S. Control Groups for Germany and Austria, as the Advisers dealt with subjects of concern to them. In this work the Joint Advisers made full use of policy documents and studies made available to them by their respective Departments and Services. To assist in their work the Joint Advisers organized a Planning Committee, consisting of junior members of their staffs, which has held approximately 150 meetings. Through their initiative in the preparation of directives, the Joint Advisers helped to keep to the fore both in London and in Washington the need for developing a consistent U. S. policy for Germany.

Although the draft U. S. directives have not been negotiated in the E. A. C., principally because the Soviet Delegation, despite repeated promises and assurances, has never been instructed by its Government to proceed with their negotiation, they have met a number of important needs. Their circulation in the Commission has served to inform the other Allied Governments of U. S. policies toward Germany and has had a strong influence on the policies of those Governments. The draft directives also provided the U. S. Control Group for Germany with its first systematic guidance for preparatory planning and were incorporated, in large measure, in the General Directive for Germany, which, on instructions from Washington, was circulated to the E. A. C. for information, in May 1945.
[Editor’s Note.—A second enclosure, giving a statistical report on the work of the Commission, a list of documents signed, and a partial list of papers circulated, is not printed.]

No. 234

The Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) to the Secretary of State

[Extract 2]

SECRET

POTSDAM, July 14, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, called this afternoon and discussed for two hours in a preliminary way a number of matters on the agenda of the Conference. 3


Sir Alexander expressed general agreement with our proposal for setting up a Council of Foreign Ministers to handle the peace settlement. He felt that this should not be first on the agenda and that it would be desirable to begin with German questions. He suggested that the Council would probably require a definite location for its Deputies and Staff, but that the Foreign Ministers might well meet in various capitals; presumably he considers London the best location for the Deputies and Secretariat.

To my suggestion that the European Advisory Commission should terminate its work shortly, in view of the establishment of the Control Council for Germany, Sir Alexander hinted that the EAC might be utilized for dealing with other than German problems, by broadening its terms of reference and perhaps making some changes of personnel.

I explained to Sir Alexander that we had felt at first that the best arrangement for dealing with European problems would be to have a council of four, including France; however, in view of the difficulties regarding French membership on the Reparation Commission we had come to feel it would be better to follow the model of the Security Council [of the United Nations], with its five members, since, more-

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1 Printed from a carbon copy on which there is an unverified typed signature.
2 For other extracts from this memorandum, see documents Nos. 140, 218, 258, 319, 351, 379, 404, 470, 519, 635, 645, 678, and 708.
3 Cadogan was accompanied by J. E. Coulson, Acting Head of the Economic Relations Department of the Foreign Office, and William Hayter, Secretary General of the British Delegation to the Berlin Conference. The following United States officials were present: Dunn; Assistant Secretary of State William L. Clayton; Harriman; Joseph E. Davies (for the last part of the meeting only); and Philip E. Mosely, Political Adviser to the United States Representative on the European Advisory Commission.

[No. 234]
over, the same five powers would later have to deal with Asiatic problems. Sir Alexander agreed that in view of the composition of the Security Council it was reasonable to include China in the Council of Foreign Ministers.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN
UNITED NATIONS

ADMISSION OF ITALY AND SPAIN

No. 235

749.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

ITALIAN PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

We wish British concurrence with the principle that the United States and Great Britain should take the lead in bringing Italy back into international life without awaiting a definitive solution of Italy’s status. As one example we favor Italy’s being permitted to join the United Maritime Authority now, whereas the British have indicated the view that she should not be allowed to do so until she has signed a peace treaty. Italy should also be brought back into the International Labor Organization, whose Governing Body at its recent meeting in Montreal recommended favorable consideration of Italy’s application by the general assembly next fall.

The question of Italy’s relation to the World Security Organization should be clarified. At San Francisco the American view that Italy should be invited to attend the Conference was not pressed in order to avoid injecting any further complications into the discussions. In reply to our inquiry regarding British views on the subject, we were informed that the British in principle were sympathetic but that (a) the Soviets would probably insist on bringing in Rumania and Bulgaria if Italy entered while (b) British would demand that Portugal—who is a neutral and not a cobelligerent state—be brought in if Italy were. We believe that Italy should enter this world organization at the earliest possible date. It is therefore recommended that the United States request British concurrence in our intention, if and when Italy declares war on Japan, to support officially and publicly Italy’s admission to the world security organization.

Steps of this kind need not prejudice Allied claims in the final settlement, and at the same time they would do much to raise Italian morale and strengthen the more moderate elements in Italy.

[WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1945.
No. 236

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Grew)

SECRET

Memorandum of Conversation

[WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1945.

Subject: Declaration of War against Japan
Participants: Italian Ambassador, Signor Alberto Tarchiani;
              Under Secretary, Mr. Grew

The Italian Ambassador called on me this morning and took up with me the following matters:

2. The Ambassador then read to me a secret paper concerning a declaration of war by Italy against Japan. He spoke of his talk with Mr. Phillips on this subject and said he knew that our Government favors such a step and that his own Government at a recent secret meeting had also expressed itself in favor of such a declaration of war. The Ambassador is aware that while such a declaration would be of especial interest to the United States nevertheless Sir Alexander Cadogan had stated that the British Government would interpose no objection to Italy's declaring war against Japan. The Ambassador assumed that the Soviet Government might have to be consulted but hoped that no objection would be raised by the Soviet Union. He said he thought the matter was very urgent and that his Government would be especially glad to have the proposed step approved prior to the meeting of the Big Three. I said I did not know whether this could be done, and that it might have to be discussed at that meeting but that in any case I would explore the matter at once and would let the Ambassador know as soon as we are in a position to give him further information on the subject.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

SECRET

The Italian Ambassador has received instructions to ask for an audience with the President of the United States and to communicate to Mr. Truman, in a preliminary and confidential way, that the newly constituted Italian Government, in its recent secret meeting, has expressed itself in favor of the declaration of war against Japan.

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1 For the paragraph omitted here, see document No. 468.
2 See the attachments, infra.
Such an initiative on the part of Italy intends to be, first of all, a gesture of solidarity towards the United States, a solidarity which would be concretely and actively evidenced through the effective participation of the fleet, aviation and a Corps of volunteers.

The initiative also corresponds to the political directives of democratic Italy to align herself against aggression and militarism, and to her desire to join the cause of the United Nations even when specific interests of Italy be not directly at stake.

The Ambassador has been directed by his Minister of Foreign Affairs\(^3\) to ask the Department of State to kindly see the possibility of giving some precise indications as far as the moment deemed most convenient and timely for the official announcement of the Italian declaration of war on Japan is concerned.

The Department of State will certainly appreciate that the Italian Government must be in a position to justify, at the proper time, its decision in front of public opinion, and to explain it, with clear and plausible reasons, as well as with motives of national interest.

The Ambassador has also been instructed to convey the deep feelings of gratitude of the Italian Government for the oral statements of encouragement and assurance made by the Department of State through Special Assistant Ambassador Phillips.

WASHINGTON, July 6th, 1945.

SECRET

The Cabinet of the Italian Government has held, in the last days, a meeting in which took part all the Ministers leaders of the six parties forming the present Government. The Cabinet examined the Note of the Department of State of June 16th\(^4\) stating that the Government of the United States would welcome an Italian declaration of war on Japan, thus extending to the conflict with the common enemy in the Far East that solidarity with the United Nations which the

\(^3\) Alcide De Gasperi.

\(^4\) The text of the note referred to is as follows (file No. 740.0011 PW/6-1645):

"The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Italy and has the honor to refer to recent conversations between the Ambassador and officials of the Department on the desire of the Italian Government to declare war on Japan.

"It is requested that the Italian Government be informed that the Government of the United States would welcome an Italian declaration of war on Japan, thus extending to the conflict with the common enemy in the Far East that solidarity with the United Nations which the Italian Government and people have recently demonstrated in the struggle against the common enemy in Europe.

"In making this communication to the Italian Government, the Government of the United States wishes to make clear that such a declaration of war would involve no commitment on the part of the Allied Governments to provide resources or shipping for the prosecution by Italy of hostilities against Japan."
Italian Government and People have recently demonstrated in the struggle against the common enemy in Europe.

It appears that two Ministers have represented their fear that, recalling the Armistice Terms, some major or smaller Power could interfere with the Italian initiative. The said Ministers were therefore deeming it indispensable that some assurances in the matter were given to the Italian Government at least on the American side.

As far as the substance of the question is concerned, several Ministers have shared the opinion that Italy should give an effective contribution to the war within her possibilities (Navy, Air Forces, Corps of volunteers).

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1945.

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* Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604; 61 Stat. (3) 2740.

No. 237

The Acting Secretary of State to the Italian Ambassador (Tarchiani)

SECRET [WASHINGTON], July 7, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: With reference to our conversation of yesterday,* in which you told me of the decision of the Italian Government to declare war against Japan, I need not assure you that this news will be greeted with approval by the American people.

The time of the announcement of the declaration is of course a matter for decision by the Italian Government. The British, French, and Soviet Governments, which have already been informed of American approval of the Italian intention to declare war against Japan, have interposed no objection thereto, and the American Government naturally hopes that the announcement will be made at an early date.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH C. GREW

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1 See document No. 236.

No. 238

The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

ROME, July 9, 1945—4 p. m.

1898. I saw Prunas last evening and took occasion to inquire about his govt's intention to declare war on Japan. He said that after

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1 A summary of this message was included in telegram No. 12 of July 10 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7-1045).
Tarchiani has reported US approval of Ital declaration of war against Japan, Council of Ministers had met. Most of the ministers, including the Socialists, were in favor of immediate and active Ital participation. Only the Communists were cool to this proposal and insisted that any Ital participation in the war in the Far East should be symbolic rather than actual. Since there was some difference of opinion among the ministers with regard to the timing and degree of Ital participation, it was decided to instruct Tarchiani to ask the US Govt when the declaration should take place (Depts 1128, July 7, 7 p. m.\(^2\)) Prunas added that reports from the Ital Emb at Moscow indicated that the Soviets did not regard favorably an Italian declaration of war against Japan at this time.

I repeated Dept’s statement to Tarchiani, namely that the question of timing was, of course, one for the Italys to decide, but that as far as my govt was concerned the sooner the declaration came the better we would be pleased. Prunas said that he had no idea what date the Council of Ministers would set for the announcement of the declaration of war.

Kirk

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No. 239

719.527-945

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State

[Extracts]

[WASHINGTON,] July 9, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: The Spanish Ambassador, Sr. Don Juan Francisco de Cárdenas;
Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew.

The Spanish Ambassador, Mr. de Cárdenas, called on me this afternoon and took up the following matters. . . .

. . . . . . . . . . .

2. The Ambassador then referred to the action taken with regard to Spain at the San Francisco Conference by which there had been placed on the record the understanding that membership in the world organization would not be open to states whose regimes were established with the help of military forces belonging to the states which have waged war against the United Nations as long as these

[No. 239]
regimes are in power. The Ambassador asked if I was aware of some proposed action by Chile and Uruguay by which they would openly assert the application to Spain of this provision and whether Mr. Armour had recently made some statement on this subject in Madrid. I said I had no information regarding any such action by either Chile and Uruguay or by Armour. In this connection the Ambassador said that he was not speaking under instructions and only as from friend to friend.

\[\text{J[oseph] C. G[rew]}\]

\textsuperscript{1} The reference is to the following declaration by the Mexican Delegation at the Third Meeting of Commission I of the United Nations Conference on International Organization on June 19:

"It is the understanding of the Delegation of Mexico that paragraph 2 of Chapter III [of the Charter of the United Nations] cannot be applied to the states whose regimes have been established with the help of military forces belonging to the countries which have waged war against the United Nations, as long as those regimes are in power."

In presenting this declaration, which was adopted by Commission I, which exercised jurisdiction over questions of membership, the Mexican Delegate referred specifically to the Franco regime in Spain. In the course of the discussion of this declaration, Assistant Secretary of State James Clement Dunn made the following statement for the United States:

"The United States Delegation is in complete accord with the statement of interpretation made by the Delegation of Mexico and desires to associate itself with that declaration."


No. 240

740.00119 Potsdam/7-1145: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 11, 1945.

16. Recommendation that we request British concurrence in our intention, if and when Italy declares war against Japan, to support officially and publicly Italy's admission in due course to world security organization is now before the President in papers prepared for Big Three meeting (See Italy: Topics on Which Discussion is Desired; III, Participation in World Organizations\textsuperscript{1}). Inasmuch as it now appears that Italy may declare war before Big Three meeting, and since effective value of American action both in US and abroad may depend to great extent upon prompt announcement thereof following Italian declaration, it is believed that we should proceed immediately with recommendation.

\textsuperscript{1} Document No. 235.
If you agree, and President approves, instructions will be sent Winant to inform British Government and inquire if it is prepared to support American position.

[GREW]

No. 241

Truman Papers: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State


MR-IN-35. Reference your MR-OUT-99 (State Department No. 16, 11 July). I concur with your recommendation and approve your suggested approach to the British Government.

1 Document No. 240.

No. 242

740.0011 FW/7-1445: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 14, 1945—noon.

U. S. URGENT

5773. Ital Ambassador has informed Dept Italy has declared war against Japan and that declaration will be made public July 15. Dept therefore proposes to announce on July 17 this Govt’s intention to support officially Italy’s admission in due course to world security organization.

Inform Foreign Office urgently of Dept’s intention and express hope that British Govt will support American position.

GREW

No. 243

740.0011 P. W./7-1545: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, July 15, 1945—noon.

US URGENT

7144. Foreign Office given substance of Department’s 5773, July 14 this morning.

WINANT

1 Document No. 242.

[No. 243]
No. 244

740.0011 P. W./7-1545: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State ¹

SECRET  

London, July 15, 1945—6 p. m.

US URGENT

7146. We were called to FonOff this afternoon by Harvey who was considerably disturbed about Department’s proposed announcement July 17 re Italy and World Security Organization. (Re Department’s 5773, July 14 ² and Embassy’s 7144, July 15 ³). British Embassy Washington is being instructed to approach Department and request announcement be postponed until the question of future status of Italy can be discussed at Big Three meeting.

Harvey felt question of admittance of Italy to World Security Organization was tied up with peace treaty and said that British delegation to Berlin conference was thoroughly briefed on this subject and had hoped to discuss it there after which a three power declaration regarding future of Italy could be made. FonOff, according to Harvey, had tried to keep in step with Department on all matters affecting Italy but it felt in this case such short notice had been given that it would be impossible. Harvey pointed out that Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary both in Berlin and with best will in world FonOff unable to make decision on this matter in time available. Question is being referred to Mr Eden with request he discuss matter with Mr Byrnes and in meantime Harvey strongly urged that announcement be postponed.

₁ The gist of this message was included in telegram No. 35 of July 16 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 800.00 Summaries/7-1645). See also vol. II, document No. 723.
² Document No. 242.
³ Document No. 243.

No. 245

865.01/7-1545: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State ¹

PLAIN  


1987. The following is a translation of article entitled “the substance of Parri–Kostilev meeting: USSR godfather to Italy for its admission to the United Nations” which appeared in Il Secolo July 13 a Rome newspaper.

¹ Text repeated in extenso in telegram No. 37 of July 17 from Grew to Byrnes (file No. 865.01/7-1745).
"If our information is correct and we have good reason to so believe, during the recent meeting between the President of the Council of Ministers Ferruccio Parri and the Soviet Ambassador Kostilev the latter declared in the name of his Government that for the imminent Big Three Potsdam meeting Russia was to first take the initiative and will support unconditionally the admission of Italy among the United Nations. The Soviet Ambassador added that as in January 1944 when Russia was the first to resume regular diplomatic relations with the Italian democracy with the exchange of Ambassadors so now Russia takes the initiative for the admission of Italy among the United Nations.

We can also add from authoritative sources that Russia will do everything possible to assist in the immediate resumption of economic relations between Italy and Poland; the latter in normal times furnished Italy with coal from Polish Silesia lumber, wood pulp and cellulose which were shipped from Gdynia. It is also anticipated that the Moscow Government will facilitate the resumption of trade with Italy particularly by supplying coal from the Donetz basin the nearest to Italy, the quality of which is equal to the best English and American coal."

Repeat to Treasury for Tasca.

Kirk

POSSIBLE TRUSTEESHIP FOR ITALIAN COLONIAL TERRITORIES
AND KOREA

No. 246

740.00119 (Potsdam)/8-246

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

ITALY: TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS

LIBYA

a. The Government of the United States does not propose a program for the disposition of Libya. Nevertheless this Government would concur and would support any one of the following solutions, listed in order of preference, if proposed by another Government:

1. Return of the whole of Libya to Italian sovereignty, subject to such general measures of demilitarization as are devised for Italy;
2. Partition of Libya into its historic parts, Tripolitania to be retained under Italian sovereignty, Cyrenaica to be established as an autonomous Senussi Amirate under Egyptian or British trusteeship;
3. Partition of Libya, Tripolitania to be placed under International Trusteeship exercised by Italy, Cyrenaica to be established as an autonomous Senussi Amirate under Egyptian or British Trusteeship.

[No. 246]
b. Basic data.

Libya has an area of 680,000 square miles, but only about 2.5 percent of the area is cultivable. It is a poor agricultural and pastoral country with practically no natural resources.

Libya was taken from Turkey in 1911–1912, but during the first World War the Italians were driven back into the coastal towns by the Turks and Arabs. The pacification of the country began in 1922 and was practically completed in 1932 after a series of bitter campaigns against the Senussi of Cyrenaica. In 1939 the four coastal provinces Tripoli, Misurata, Bengasi, and Derna were declared to be integral parts of Italy.

In 1939 the total population was 878,650 of whom 101,986 were Italians. These were distributed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>56,214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misurata</td>
<td>9,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengasi</td>
<td>26,419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derna</td>
<td>9,441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahara territory</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>101,986</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The provinces Tripoli and Misurata correspond roughly to the historic Tripolitania and maintained about two-thirds (65,927) of the Italian population. Although most of the Italian population was concentrated in the coastal towns, about 30,000 persons had been established as agricultural colonists, chiefly through the colonization project begun in 1937. A great number of Italian colonists appear to have abandoned their holdings in Cyrenaica with the advance of the British armies, but in Tripolitania large numbers apparently have remained. Some of the Italian settlers have been repatriated to Italy, increasing the burdens of the Italian Government.

Libya is strategically important for control of the central Mediterranean because of its ports and air fields.

On January 8, 1942, Mr. Eden stated: “His Majesty’s Government are determined that at the end of the war the Senussi in Cyrenaica will in no circumstances again fall under Italian domination.”

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1945.

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1 See Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons Official Report, 5th Series, vol. 377, col. 78. Concerning later statements by Eden with respect to the Italian colonies, see vol. ii, p. 239.
No. 247

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

ITALY: TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS

ITALIAN SOMALILAND (SOMALI)

a. Italian Somaliland, together with French and British Somaliland, should be placed under International Trusteeship. A feasible alternative would be to place Italian and British Somalilands under International Trusteeship while leaving French Somaliland under French control, but with arrangements for a genuinely free port at Jibuti.

b. The Italian colony of Somaliland had an area in 1931 of 194,000 square miles, a total population of 1,021,572 persons most of whom were Somalis. There were at that time 1,663 Europeans, all but 37 being Italians.

The Italian colony was begun in the 1880s and in 1936, after the conquest of Ethiopia, was incorporated as a “government” of Italian East Africa. The area is unsuited for European colonization, but it has a certain strategic significance because of its location on the Indian Ocean near the entrance to the Red Sea.

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1945.

No. 248

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

ITALY: TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS

ERITREA

a. The Government of the United States favors the creation of an international Trusteeship over the area embraced within the former Italian colony of Eritrea.

b. Basic data

The Italian colony of Eritrea began with the purchase of Assab in 1869 and reached its approximate modern boundaries during the 1880s. In the periods 1893–1896 and 1935–1936 the colony served as the basis for attacks against Ethiopia.

In 1931 it had an area of 46,000 square miles and a total population of 600,000 of whom 4,600 were Europeans. In 1936 after the Italian conquest of Ethiopia, Eritrea was incorporated as a “government” of Italian East Africa. A considerable number of Italians went to
East Africa after this conquest, but most of the settlers in Ethiopia were driven out during the war. In 1943 it was reported that there was a total of 48,718 Italians in Eritrea.

Eritrea in itself did not attract colonists, and the lowlands are not suitable for European settlers. Ethiopia has certain vague historic claims to the region which, together with French Somaliland, blocks her from access to the sea. Outright cession to Ethiopia, however, might jeopardize the Italian population and appear as a violation of the Atlantic Charter.¹

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1945.

¹ Executive Agreement Series No. 236; 55 Stat. (2) 1603.

No. 249

740.0011 PW/7-645

The Italian Ambassador (Tarchiani) to President Truman ¹

[Extract ²]

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TRUMAN PRESIDENT OF THE U. S. A.
ON THE POSITION, WISHES AND HOPES OF ITALY

4. a) Italy has willingly abandoned the Fascist dream of the recent colonial empire in East Africa, where, however, she has spent more than 36 billion lire at the pre-war value to establish and develop modern civilized systems.

b) Libya—as Algeria for France—is part of the national territory with the same administration of the Italian metropolitan provinces.

c) Eritrea and Somaliland are the two oldest Italian colonies—established in the second half of the Nineteenth Century—in which Italian capital and work have created, with long meritorious efforts, means and methods of civilization to the great advantage of the natives, whose feelings are wholeheartedly in favor of the continuance of Italian administration. Italy trusts that in giving all the cooperation and the guarantees which may be requested, her well-established rights will be recognized under such a form that may not injure her modest African patrimony and her national dignity at this moment of distress.

In examining the Italian colonial questions from a general point of view, the following considerations ought to be kept in mind.

¹ Handed to Grew on July 6 for transmittal to Truman. See document No. 468.
² For the other paragraphs of this memorandum, see the subattachment to document No. 468.
Italy, whose population reaches nearly 46 million inhabitants (representing about one third of the entire population of continental United States) has a metropolitan territory, for a considerable extent mountainous and barren, of nearly 120,000 square miles (that is, less than 1/25th of the continental area of the United States). The yearly increase in population is about 400,000. Italy is a poor country, lacking all essential raw materials. Her population is very thrifty. These factors have induced tens of thousands of Italian pioneers to settle in Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, Eritrea and Somaliland, where, in spite of the desert region and difficult local conditions, they have already carried out an extensive land rehabilitation through the constant effort of their hard work.

It is because of the above-mentioned factors that these colonies are considered by the Italian people as an essential part of their national territory.

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1945.

No. 250

Truman Papers

Memorandum by the Assistant to the President's Naval Aide (Elsey)

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

KOREA

The Declaration issued at Cairo in November [on December 1,] 1943 by Roosevelt, Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek said, in part:

"The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. . . . The aforesaid Three Great Powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent." 2

There was no reference to Korea in Map Room messages or documents until the Yalta Conference. On 8 February 1945, during a discussion on the Far East when Churchill was not present, 3 President Roosevelt explained to Marshal Stalin his intentions with regard to Korea.

The President said he had in mind for Korea a trusteeship composed of a Soviet, an American and a Chinese representative. He felt the trusteeship might last from 20 to 30 years. Marshal Stalin said the shorter the trusteeship period the better, and he expressed approval

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1 Submitted to Leahy July 1 and subsequently forwarded to Truman.
3 See Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 770.
when the President said foreign troops would not be stationed in Korea.

President Roosevelt said he did not feel it was necessary to invite the British to participate in the Korean trusteeship, except that they would probably resent their exclusion. Stalin replied that British resentment would be strong, and his opinion was that the British should be invited.

Korea was not discussed again at Yalta, nor was the subject pursued in Map Room messages.

When Mr. Hopkins arrived in Moscow, he found Stalin’s views had not changed and he reported to President Truman on 29 May that Stalin agreed to a trusteeship for Korea under China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States.¹

On the basis of this report, the President informed Chiang on 15 June that the U. S. S. R., Great Britain and the United States agree to a Four-Power Trusteeship for Korea.²

G. M. Elsey

² See Truman, Year of Decisions, p. 269.

No. 251

Briefing Book Paper ¹

[Extract ²]

TOP SECRET

UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF JAPAN AND POLICY TOWARD LIBERATED AREAS IN THE FAR EAST IN RELATION TO UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

II. SOVIET SUPPORT OF THE CAIRO DECLARATION

A. Minimum objective: To obtain (1) the adherence of the Soviet Government to the Cairo Declaration, . . .

The adherence of the Soviet Government would give the support of that Government to the important provisions in the Declaration . . . that Korea in due course shall be free and independent.

¹ Annex 3 to the attachment to document No. 177.
² For the full text of this section of the briefing paper, see document No. 607. For other extracts from this paper, see documents Nos. 574 and 589.
The agreement would prevent unilateral action by any of the three states to establish a “friendly” government in any of the territories under consideration.

B. Maximum objective: To obtain an agreement among the three powers that, with China’s anticipated cooperation, they will jointly support whatever measures appear best adapted to develop in Korea a strong, democratic, independent nation.³

[WASHINGTON,] June 29, 1945.

³ In another version of this paper (undated) in the Department of State files (file No. 740.00119 Council/6-3045), the following language is used with respect to Korea:

“It is also proposed that [the] three powers enter into an agreement that they will consult in advance among themselves and with China on all matters relating to the implementation of the territorial dispositions provided under that Declaration. Such an agreement would be especially important in reaching a successful solution of the post-war problems of Korea. The interest of the three powers and China in Korea, the probable inability of the Koreans themselves to establish a satisfactory government immediately following liberation, and the commitment as to Korea in the Cairo Declaration make it evident that it would be to the interest of each of the States concerned that they consult among themselves as to the measures which may need to be taken, such as the possible creation of an interim administration in Korea, to assist the Korean people in the early establishment of a free and independent state.”

No. 252

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2446

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

INTERIM ADMINISTRATION FOR KOREA AND POSSIBLE SOVIET ATTITUDES

NEED FOR JOINT ACTION

Joint action in connection with an interim international supervisory administration for Korea is both important and necessary for the following reasons:

(1) China and the Soviet Union are contiguous to Korea and have had a traditional interest in Korean affairs;
(2) The United States, the United Kingdom and China have stated in the Cairo Declaration that they “are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent”;
(3) It is recommended by the Department of State that there should be Allied representation in the military government in Korea; and
(4) If Korea were to be designated as a trust area to be placed under the trusteeship of a single power, the selection of any power as trustee would be extremely difficult and might cause serious international consequences.

[No. 252]
RECOMMENDATIONS

It is the opinion of the Department of State that, in view of the international character of the problems of Korea and of the probable inability of the Koreans to govern themselves immediately following liberation:

(1) Some form of interim international supervisory administration or trusteeship should be established for Korea either under the authority of the proposed international organization or independently of it.

(2) The United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China should be included in any such administration.

[WASHINGTON,] July 4, 1945.

[Appendix]

TOP SECRET

[MEMORANDUM]

I. ADVANTAGES OF AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION

The establishment of an interim international supervisory administration or trusteeship for Korea, to function after the termination of military government and until such time as the Koreans are able to govern themselves, would make possible the preparation of the Korean people for the responsibilities and privileges which will come with independence. Qualified Koreans could be used in the employ of the administration and could progressively turn over the functions of government to the Koreans themselves. Furthermore, the establishment of such an administration would make possible the early transfer of the functions of military government to the administration and hence shorten the period of military government. Finally, it would allow those powers most vitally interested in the future of Korea to share in the temporary supervision over Korean affairs and it would lessen the international friction that might develop if this supervision were left to a single power.

II. RELATIONSHIP WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

The draft charter of the United Nations provides that the trusteeship system is applicable to "territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of this war" such as Korea, and that a single state or the United Nations' organization itself should be designated to exercise the administration of a trust territory. Consequently, if
joint action is to be taken in connection with an interim government for Korea, decision must be reached as to whether Korea is to be designated as a trust area and placed under the administration of the United Nations' organization itself or whether a special interim supervisory administration is established for Korea.

III. POSITION OF SOVIET UNION

If an interim administration for Korea is established independently of the projected international organization, the United States, the United Kingdom, China and the Soviet Union would naturally wish to take an active part in such an administration. The position of the Soviet Union in the Far East is such that it would seem advisable to have Soviet representation on an interim supervisory administration regardless of whether or not the Soviet Union enters the war against Japan.

The attitude of the Soviet Union toward an interim administration for Korea is not known, but it is possible that it will make strong demands that it have a leading part in the control of Korean affairs. If such demands required the establishment of an administrative authority in which powers other than the Soviet Union had only a nominal voice, it might be advisable to designate Korea as a trust area and to place it under the authority of the United Nations' organization itself.

IV. STATUS OF STUDIES ON KOREA

The studies on problems of post-war Korea undertaken by the Department of State and the British and Chinese Foreign Offices have not yet progressed far enough to enable the Department to make recommendations on either the exact structure of any interim international supervisory authority for Korea, or the time when Korea should be granted independence. However, it is the view of the Department that an agreement should be reached at an early date among the principal interested powers on the question of whether an interim international supervisory authority is to be established for Korea and if so what powers are to be represented thereon in order to avoid the possibility of an extended period of occupation and to prevent an unnecessary postponement of Korean independence.

[WASHINGTON,] July 4, 1945.

[No. 252]
POST-WAR GOVERNMENT OF KOREA

TYPES OF POST-WAR GOVERNMENT

It is envisaged that the post-war government of Korea will be divided into three stages, and [an] Allied Military Government, an interim international supervisory administration and a free and independent Korea.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Allied Military Government

The Department of State has recommended that with the completion of military operations in Korea there should be, so far as practicable, Allied representation in the army of occupation and in military government in Korea.

2. Interim International Supervisory Administration

The Department has recommended that an interim international supervisory administration for Korea be established to succeed Allied Military Government in Korea and to function until such time as the Koreans are able to govern themselves.

3. A Free and Independent Korea

The United States, the United Kingdom and China have stated in the Cairo Declaration that they “are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent”. This pledge implies that Korea shall be completely free and independent following the termination of the functions of any interim international supervisory authority for Korea.

[WASHINGTON,] July 4, 1945.

No. 254

Truman Papers

Note by the President’s Chief of Staff (Leahy)\(^1\)

[Kundated.]

KOREA

Recommend a four power agreement that upon the defeat of Japan Korea be placed under a trusteeship composed of China, Great Britain, the Soviet Republic [sic], and the United States for

\(^1\) Printed from the ribbon copy, which is unsigned.
so long a time as is necessary for it to demonstrate, and until it shall have demonstrated, its capacity to govern itself as a free and independent sovereign state.

OFFICERS OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS

No. 255

740.00119 (Potsdam)/5-2448

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Possible discussion at meeting between the President, Churchill and Stalin of the selection of officers of the Preparatory Commission

I. BACKGROUND

In the brief initial meeting of the Preparatory Commission at San Francisco it was agreed that the choice of officers of the Preparatory Commission and of its Executive Committee would be left open for subsequent determination.

The evening before the initial meeting of the Preparatory Commission our representative for that particular meeting, Dr. Pasvolsky, met with Mr. Jebb, the British representative, and Ambassador Gromyko, the Soviet representative. Dr. Pasvolsky and Mr. Jebb expressed the opinion that the question of filling the post of Chairman of the Executive Committee and the post of Executive Secretary of the Commission should be settled at the forthcoming meeting of the President, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin. Ambassador Gromyko appeared to agree with this opinion. In view of the fact that it is hoped that the Executive Committee can have its first meeting in London during the first week of August, it is desirable to have these two questions settled promptly and your forthcoming meeting with Churchill and Stalin seems to offer the best opportunity for a prompt settlement of the matter.

From statements made by Ambassador Gromyko at San Francisco, it would appear that the Soviet Government attaches considerable importance to the choice of Chairman of the Executive Committee. It appears likely that the Soviet position in this matter will be first to ask that its representative on the Executive Committee be the Chairman of the Committee and as a second choice to propose that,

following the procedure adopted with respect to the presidency of the San Francisco Conference, the position of Chairman be held in rotation by the representatives of the Big Five (China, France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States).

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

I believe that our own position in this matter should be as follows:

1. The Executive Secretary of the Commission should clearly be a British national in as much as effective discharge of the Secretariat’s functions will require ability to call upon the resources of the British Government and of various private British institutions.

2. I believe that we should oppose so far as possible the principle of rotation among the Big Five of the office of Chairman of the Executive Committee. We should be prepared to support the British Government if it desires to press for having the British representative as Chairman.

3. Our next choice, which may be unpalatable to the British, should be to let the Soviets have the Chairmanship, in order to avoid the principle of rotation. In this connection it should be noted that the Commission, acting through the Executive Committee, will almost certainly have to create a number of subcommittees or similar organs to specialize on various aspects of the Commission’s duties. The chairmanships of these subcommittees might perhaps be allocated among the members of the Big Five in such a way as to make more palatable the selection of the British or the Soviet representative as the Chairman of the Executive Committee without rotation.

4. If, as appears likely, the British do not make much of an effort to obtain the chairmanship and oppose the Soviet representative being chairman, they are likely to propose instead that this position be held in rotation by representatives of the Big Five. We should oppose this because of the aspect of great power domination which would be inevitable. Such a solution would be especially undesirable from the point of view of precedent as it will affect the choice of the President of the Security Council of the Organization. It would be preferable from our point of view for rotation to be among all fourteen members of the Executive Committee.

The question of the selection of the President of the Preparatory Commission as a whole will probably not arise at your meeting. It was agreed at San Francisco that this question could be left until the first business session of the full Commission, which will not occur for several months. My present feeling is that it might be wise to select a representative of one of the smaller powers for this position. You may wish to bear this possibility in mind in the discussions which are likely to arise with respect to the chairmanship of the Executive Committee.

[WASHINGTON,] July 4, 1945.